USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 4, April 1982

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USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 4, April 1982

Translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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CSO: 1803/11
U.S. SUPPORTERS, OPPONENTS OF DETENTE DESCRIBED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 16 Mar 82) pp 3-16

[Article by Yu. A. Zamoshkin: "Ideology in the United States: For and Against Detente"]

[Text] Certain types of ideology and ideological relations—and, after all, these obviously reflect the structural characteristics of a society and the objective processes taking place in the social organism—have demonstrated comparative independence in their development and have influenced political practices. The zigzags in U.S. foreign policy in recent decades are more understandable in retrospect, when we analyze the internal ideological situations accompanying them and the ideological baggage carried by the different political groups responsible for these zigzags. A more thorough examination of the ideological motives and arguments of the political groups for and against detente in the United States, and of the effect of changes in the U.S. ideological climate on the activities of these groups provides a better understanding of the past and future of the movement for detente in the United States and of the obstacles it has encountered.

During the cold war era, U.S. foreign policy was based on a peculiar combination of two major ideological currents: The first was the ideology of belligerent anti-communism and the second was the ideology of global hegemony, which the Americans themselves labeled "imperial."

One of the strongest pillars on which the "imperial" ideology rested was the Americans' traditional belief in the special mission of their country in the world and in world history. The idea of this worldwide historic "messianism," which goes all the way back to the first settlers, acquired special features during the revolution of 1776, when the Americans began to believe that their country was destined to serve all peoples as their moral mentor and leader in the struggle against the despotic feudal regimes then commanding other parts of the world. The idea of the mission in its original interpretation (objectively, it had a general democratic content, although it sometimes took the form of arrogance and of contempt for other peoples and their thousands of years of history) conquered the minds and hearts of millions of Americans and retained its power in subsequent periods of American history.

In the 19th century, however, another interpretation of the "messianic" idea became popular in the United States. It reflected the country's ambitions to set other
countries on the right path and guide them in their development according to the capitalist model. When American capitalism entered the stage of imperialism, the United States' strong expansionist ambitions were incorporated into the "messianic" ideology. This gave rise to the ideology of global hegemony, which entered into close interaction with U.S. foreign policy practices and gave them a definite "nationalistic" purpose in the 1950's and 1960's.

The reasons for the popularity of the "imperial" ideology in the United States are more understandable if we consider the following fact. The heralds of this ideology made extensive and constant use of the general patterns of thinking and set of concepts that were characteristic of the original interpretation of the "messianic" ideology, the general democratic one that had been most completely assimilated by the American mass mind. They declared that the hegemonic aims were a means of attaining general democratic ideals.

This is not an uncommon situation in the history of ideology. New ideological currents which objectively refute earlier ones and deny widely popular ideological traditions nevertheless strive to identify themselves with these traditions and lean on them for support. Actual denial takes on the external appearance of continuity and synthesis. Furthermore, the traditional beliefs incorporated in an alien ideological structure begin to perform a completely different, previously alien function. They turn into their opposite but still appeal to millions of people who abide by tradition. This is precisely how the "imperial" ideology in the United States has created, and is still creating, the illusion of its "continuity" in relation to the traditions of the general democratic ideology.

In addition to this, the "imperial" ideology gratified the national pride of Americans. It is important to realize that the formation of the American national consciousness was an extremely complex historical process: After all, this nationality took shape within a relatively short period of time as a result of the continuous influx of new generations of immigrants of various nationalities and ethnic groups. The sense of American nationality was born as part of a process which was often quite painful for the individual: This sense conflicted with the individual's attachment to the country he had left. The process had to overcome the stubborn opposition of many emotional and mental factors. It is not surprising that displays of American national pride have often been so obviously overplayed and exaggerated that people have wondered how strong this feeling actually is. Could this indicate a deep-seated and suppressed national inferiority complex? The process by which national awareness and national pride took shape in the United States was marked by considerable internal tension. The more obvious this tension became, the more ostentatiously the national pride of the Americans was declaimed.

The difficulties involved in the formation of the national consciousness in the United States are part of the reason for the tremendous role played in this process by the search for artificial, "external" psychological-ideological stimuli. One of these stimuli was and is the idea of the "external threat" that supposedly requires the rapid reinforcement and all-out mobilization of national spirit.

In the 1950's, when the natural wave of "national spirit" resulting from participation in the just fight against German Fascism and Japanese militarism began to ebb, the idea of the "communist threat," with the USSR as its chief symbol, served as a
powerful artificial means of stimulating national spirit. But when the feelings that are supposed to testify to the elevation of national spirit are artificially stimulated by means of intimidating talk about a foreign threat, the process is generally accompanied by feelings of insecurity, anxiety and fear. This is what happened in the United States in the 1950's. Furthermore, American national spirit during the cold war era was marked by a contradictory combination of the sense of pride that is natural for any nation and an artificially intensified sense of national arrogance, national vanity and contempt for other nations.

This brief description of the particular elements of the mass consciousness that nurtured the dominant "imperial" ideology of the cold war era would not be complete without some mention of the fact that this ideology also fit in with the desire for immediate advantages. For many Americans, these advantages were quite tangible: After all, U.S. economic influence had spread to many parts of the world and had become much stronger in the 1950's and 1960's (according to statistics, by the beginning of the 1970's the Americans, who represent 6 percent of the world population, were consuming around 35-40 of the world's energy and raw material resources).

In the late 1960's and early 1970's, tendencies which clearly undermined the cold war ideology became increasingly evident in international relations and within the United States. Movements taking direct action against neocolonialism and against corrupt regimes and military dictatorships took shape in many Asian, African and Latin American countries. Since these regimes were supported by the United States, the movements against them began to display anti-American tendencies. To protect these regimes, the United States resorted to the use of armed force as well as economic and political pressure. This was the reason for the war in Vietnam, a war which disgraced the United States morally and did not even lead to a military victory. This war gave birth to a mass protest movement in the United States, the most highly developed forms of which had anti-imperialist and anti-imperial aims.

The failure of the U.S. armed forces in Vietnam, the increase in anti-American feelings in many countries as a result of this war, the disapproval of the United States' NATO allies and the mobilization of anti-imperialist and anti-imperial movements within the country motivated the ruling elite to take several steps. American troops made an inglorious retreat from Vietnam. Quite sizeable cuts were made in the U.S. military budget. The end of the military draft was announced. Important steps were taken in the direction of international detente and the normalization of relations with the USSR and the countries of the socialist community.

The Americans' mounting fear of the danger of conventional war, not to mention nuclear war (fear which was psychologically reinforced by the military defeat in Vietnam), motivated the U.S. administration to enter into talks with the USSR on the reduction of the danger of war and the limitation of strategic nuclear arms.

The other alternative—the escalation of the arms race and militaristic activity—seemed too difficult to the U.S. ruling elite under the conditions of that time. It was made impossible by the antimilitaristic movements and feelings in the United States and in many other countries. Military budget increases were also impeded by the movement of the most underprivileged strata for the considerable improvement of their economic conditions. In the late 1960's and early 1970's their demands were supported to some degree by middle strata, which not only favored more government
assistance for the needy, but also wanted a higher income and a broader system of social security and social services for themselves.

What role did the ideological factor play in the motives and actions of the particular segments of the U.S. ruling elite that took several important steps in the direction of detente? What were their ideological arguments and to what degree did they use them to substantiate and justify these steps?

An analysis of the motives and arguments that were most characteristic of detente's supporters in the U.S. ruling elite indicates that their actions in the spirit of detente were usually based on purely practical considerations. The narrow pragmatic approach to foreign policy was quite apparent here.

In its traditional American variety, this approach does not place emphasis on any general ideological concepts or moral categories. On the contrary, the emphasis is on the specific advantages of a particular action and on the specific framework created by external circumstances for this action. The pragmatic approach in politics can be a sign of voluntarism and subjectivism but it can also be combined with some degree of realism because it presupposes the consideration of real circumstances and the pros and cons of any particular political action. In the late 1960's and early 1970's this foreign policy pragmatism became the principal vehicle of political realism in the United States. Its supporters favored adaptation to the changing circumstances of international life, advocated greater caution in the use of pure force in relations with other countries* and advised the more extensive use of diplomatic methods.

It was precisely this pragmatism that included the idea that earlier global "imperial" aims had to be limited to some extent: As it was virtually impossible to realize these aims, it was deemed more desirable to single out just a few objects of U.S. national interest that seemed the most important and the most promising from the standpoint of practical advantages. It was precisely this pragmatism that counseled consideration for the interests of other countries whenever this should appear absolutely necessary. It was precisely pragmatic considerations that were usually employed to prove and justify the need for peaceful agreements and mutually beneficial compromises with the USSR. The pragmatism in this sphere, which actually reflected political realism, was the objective opposite of the traditional political "ideologism" of the cold war era—that is, the kind of foreign policy approach whose supporters insisted on the unconditional and stubborn adherence to the basic premises of the ideology of belligerent anticomunism and anti-Sovietism (in accordance with these premises, the USSR could be viewed only as the personification of "world evil" and the object of "total confrontation").

The success of this realistic pragmatism in opposition to the "ideologism" of the advocates of cold war is most clearly reflected in the agreements with the USSR on measures to reduce the danger of accidental nuclear conflict, the adoption of the

* As we know, the Nixon-Kissinger administration, and the Ford-Kissinger one later on, did not balk at selective and ostentatious shows of military strength. Some examples were the bombing of Cambodia, the "Mayaguez" incident and so forth. Apparently, these shows were supposed to serve as psychological "compensation" for measures to relax international tension.
"Fundamentals of Interrelations" between the United States and USSR, the participation of the United States in the Helsinki declaration, the signing of the two SALT agreements and, finally, the series of agreements with the Soviet Union on broader commercial relations and cooperation in the sphere of science and culture.

However, the very fact that pragmatism became the preferred method of substantiating foreign policy actions exhibiting the spirit of detente testified to the inability or reluctance of those who took these actions to openly attack the ideological traditions on which the practice of cold war and global aggressive expansionism was based. When the initiators and organizers of actions promoting detente engaged in discussions of basic ideological matters, they did not criticize the essence and foundation of the "messianic-hegemonistic" ideology or the ideology of anticommunism, but only some of the excessive and obviously "utopian" forms of hegemonistic aims, some of the most archaic variations on the idea of "American exclusivity" and some of the most dogmatic, absolutist and extremist ideological precepts of bitter and frenzied anticommunism. Foreign policy actions promoting detente were most often viewed as measures on the "non-ideological" level, which did not affect the ideological goals of foreign policy, but only its means, and were therefore only of practical, purely instrumental significance.

It is indicative that Kissinger repeatedly advocated the separation, isolation or, so to speak, "distancing" of foreign policy practices from the ideological relations distinguishing domestic conditions in the United States. He was evidently motivated by a reluctance to continue aggravating the already aggravated relationship with influential cold war ideologists. There might also have been the fear that foreign policy reforms expressing the spirit of detente might exacerbate the ideological and political struggle, give too much strength to mass protest movements and give rise to other ideological developments that would destabilize the political power structure in the United States.

Nevertheless, a retrospective analysis proves that the political pragmatism that was used to substantiate steps in the direction of detente was and could still be a significant form of foreign policy realism under the specific conditions of the United States. The same analysis would also indicate, however, that foreign policy pragmatism was often a compromise between the wish for detente and "imperial" or anticommunist aims. In statements by many American politicians, for example, detente was justified as a temporary tactical measure to guarantee the period of respite needed after the "Vietnam scandal" for the reinforcement of the home front, the realignment of forces and the accumulation of strength for a subsequent sweeping offensive for the sake of the same old hegemonistic, expansionist and anti-communist goals.

According to the same logic, the limitation of strategic weapons was justified as something that would save money because it would reduce the production of missiles that already existed and were rapidly becoming obsolete, and as a prerequisite for the concentration of this monetary savings in the development of more promising weapons (cruise missiles, new multi-warhead missiles, new electronic missile detection or missile-guiding devices, etc.). According to this logic, the expansion of economic relations and scientific and cultural exchanges with the USSR and the countries of the socialist community was often interpreted as a means of bringing about the gradual internal "erosion" of socialism, a way to "dull vigilance" and
a medium for the ideological infiltration of socialist countries. The normalization of relations with the USSR in general was portrayed as a means of compelling our country to reduce or even cease its active assistance of national liberation, anti-imperialist and socialist movements in other countries.

These motives, expectations and goals naturally gave rise to a deep-seated internal contradiction in the foreign policy line that was connected largely with detente. Within the framework of this line, some actions undermined the results of other actions. This is the reason for this line's vacillation between the old and the new, between political realism and the traditional dogmatic "ideologism."

A retrospective analysis testifies that the foreign policy reforms enacted by detente's supporters in the U.S. political establishment were a response to narrow pragmatic considerations and to some ideological concepts. The concepts of "convergence" and the "end of ideology" played a perceptible role here. These concepts were backed up by an extremely characteristic line of reasoning in U.S. ideological theories of the 1960's. It was based on the glorification of some aspects of the technological revolution, which was viewed as a self-perpetuating and global process. There was the assumption that this process would bring about a steady and considerable decline in the significance of property relations and class differences, especially the differences between the bourgeoisie and proletariat, as well as the significance of political institutions and movements connected with class relations and the class struggle. There was the belief that the introduction of the new technology, backed up by modern science, into the social structure would assign the greatest significance to new relations—group relations which would be created by this technology and would differ fundamentally from class relations, new forms of economic management and new forms of authority, which would supposedly all be governed only by "technological imperatives."

In their discussions of these tendencies, ideologists predicted the gradual rapprochement, or "convergence," of the socioeconomic and political systems that now exist and are opposed to one another, especially the capitalist and socialist systems. The idea of "convergence" was closely related to the idea of the "end of ideology" because it was assumed that various ideologies were playing the leading role in the perpetuation of differences and conflicts between systems. The supporters of this view expressed the certainty that the development of contemporary science and technology would bring about the "end of ideology, which, in accordance with traditional American lines of reasoning, was regarded as the personification of utopian dreams, subjective emotions and passions, as a sphere dominated by only "private," "special" and limited group interests.*

The concepts of "convergence" and the "end of ideology" played an extremely contradictory role in U.S. foreign policy. We cannot forget that these concepts were

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* The term "ideology" has traditionally had negative connotations in the United States and is usually used in reference to forms of ideology that are rejected, criticized and regarded as hostile. The dominant forms of ideology in the United States are generally referred to in such "positive" terms as "morals," "ideals," "values," etc. Furthermore, there is the assumption that the "morals," "ideals" and "values" that are most firmly established in the United States are of universal and permanent significance, that they are consistent with the "truth" and that they can "promote the progress of all mankind."
well received by some anticommunists, who viewed them as further grounds for their hopes, anticipations and plans with regard to the internal "erosion" of socialist ideology and the socialist order. It is true that there was a distinction between anticomunist "modernists" and traditionalists, and it must not be underestimated. It is not surprising that by 1968 (after the events in Czechoslovakia), some of the most stubborn anticommunists were already criticizing the theory of "convergence" as a dangerous and harmful concept that was dulling the vigilance of anticommunists and making them less militant. It is not surprising that the most active opponents of detente were always in favor of the "reideologization" of foreign policy. This "reideologization" has now materialized in Reagan's policy with regard to the Soviet Union. But in the America of the late 1960's the concepts of "convergence" and the "end of ideology" prepared some members of the U.S. political elite (G. Kennan is a typical example) ideologically for the move toward detente and made this move easier for them. This historical fact should not be underestimated.

The supporters of "convergence" alleged that the Soviet society and Soviet foreign policy were gradually turning away from "communist ideologism," "totalitarianism" and "global revolutionary aims" toward "modernization," "partial liberalization" and more cautious foreign policy "pragmatism." In spite of their tendentiousness, these ideas were regarded by detente's supporters in the U.S. political elite as some kind of ideological alternative or ideological counterbalance to the insistence on cold war and "total confrontation" with the USSR. The concepts of "convergence" and the "end of ideology" apparently also appealed to some members of the U.S. political elite because they simplified the pragmatic explanation of steps in the direction of detente. These concepts made it possible to redirect foreign policy practices into the channel of detente without any radical changes in the bases of the prevailing anticomunist ideology.

At the same time, the concept of the "end of ideology" demanded that foreign policy be based on science and the careful analysis of new objective circumstances and, for this reason, it helped to some degree in the establishment of political realism and in the relative liberation of foreign policy practices from the prevailing ideological precepts in the United States, which were cold war precepts at that time.

A description of the connection between the concepts of "convergence" and the "end of ideology" and the foreign policy moves in the direction of detente at the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's must also underscore the other side of this connection. These concepts represented the hopes and general "optimistic" feelings of the American liberals of that time because they presumed that Soviet society and Soviet foreign policy could be transformed in ways desired by the liberals. Since the idea of detente was connected with these concepts, it naturally included some illusions and futile hopes. After all, the Soviet Union had no intention of changing its internal development and its foreign policy to fit the precepts of the concepts of "convergence" and the "end of ideology." The illusions and impossible dreams engendered by these concepts meant that their supporters would be unavoidably disillusioned. And since these dreams and illusions were closely associated with detente, disillusionment with them was naturally tantamount to disillusionment with the policy of detente. Many American liberals who supported detente at the end of the 1960's began to display this kind of disillusionment in the middle and second half of the 1970's.
In addition to this, the connection between the policy of detente and the concepts of "convergence" often motivated those who proclaimed this connection to work toward peaceful agreements and mutually beneficial cooperation with the USSR and the countries of the socialist community, but also to intensify political action and propaganda aimed at pushing the USSR and these countries in the direction of "liberalization," weakening the influence of socialist ideology, etc. Although some American liberals believed that this was not contrary to the process of detente and would even accelerate this, this activity actually increased tension between the USSR and the United States and intensified antiasocialist, anti-Soviet and, consequently, antidetente feelings within the United States.

Therefore, although the concepts of "convergence" and "deideologization" in the forms they took in the United States at the end of the 1960's served as one of the pillars of detente, this pillar was quite unsteady. The very connection between these concepts and the policy of detente threatened conflicts and dangers. Nevertheless, this connection can be assessed objectively, with a view to the peculiarities of the specific historical situation within the United States. After all, there were virtually no ideological concepts here which could have served as a more effective counterbalance to the ideology of belligerent anticommunism and anti-Sovietism and which would have been acceptable to the political groups responsible for foreign policymaking and to the general public.

A sober assessment of the actual (not the "ideal") possibilities for the evolution of U.S. foreign policy in the direction of detente must obviously underscore the practical value of recognizing some of the general parameters, problems and interests promoting the rapprochement of countries representing fundamental different historical traditions and socioeconomic, political and ideological systems. Of course, this recognition must be backed up by a strictly objective analysis of reality. Then it will not engender dangerous and harmful illusions and impossible dreams, like the ones that were expressed in the concepts of "convergence" and "end of ideology" in the second half of the 1960's.

There are, for example, certain common peculiarities, problems and practical interests, arising from near-equal levels of scientific and technical development. The development of science and technology is naturally influenced by the differences between socioeconomic, political and ideological structures, but there are also several common parameters and problems, and they create the need for peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation and the possibility of this kind of cooperation. The analysis of man's interaction with nature, ecology, urbanization, demographic changes, mass communications and so forth can reveal not only fundamental differences, but also similarities in the development of countries belonging to different systems. There are elements which objectively bring countries like the USSR and the United States closer together in the forms and tendencies of mass consumption, in the sphere of daily life and in the elementary standards of communal living and morality. Of course, they coexist with elements which divide these countries (they are connected with the peculiarities of structures, political systems, ideological views, cultural traditions, historical experience, geographic locations, etc.).

Many of the parameters, problems and interests which objectively bring the USSR and the United States closer together become more apparent when the analyst distinguishes more clearly between the two levels of their relations: on the one
hand, relations reflecting differences in historical forms of social development, sociopolitical systems, and systems of ideology; and on the other, intergovernmental relations. These two levels cannot be confused, much less equated, in matters of practical policy. Many problems of considerable, but purely practical or, so to speak, technical significance exist and demand immediate resolution on the level of intergovernmental relations. They have no direct connection to the fundamental differences between the prevailing ideologies in these countries.

Finally, there is another particularly urgent problem—the need to reduce the risk of nuclear war. This is vitally necessary and of equal importance to the United States and the USSR, to the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries. It is also vitally necessary to the future of mankind. A realistic recognition of the imperatives of this matter was and is the most important political and humanitarian—that is, ideological and moral—basis of the movement for detente. When Henry Kissinger was still supporting detente and was justifying peaceful agreements aimed at reducing the danger of nuclear war, he maintained that these agreements were consistent with the "universal moral imperative" under the conditions of the intensive growth of nuclear weapons. His emergence from the pragmatic framework into the sphere of universal moral categories was quite significant. But this important, ideologically significant statement was not amplified or implemented sufficiently in the United States in the second half of the 1970's. Although the Carter Administration signed the SALT II agreement, it refused to ratify it. And then the Reagan Administration began a new round in the arms race. It rejected the Soviet proposal that a first nuclear strike be condemned as a crime against mankind.

In the USSR, on the other hand, the recognition of the catastrophic effects of nuclear war on the countries capable of fighting this kind of war and on the rest of mankind represents the most important ideological and moral basis of the foreign policy line aimed at detente. These ideological, moral, and practical-political considerations are now the inspiration for the peace movement in Europe and even in the United States. The success of the movement for detente will depend largely on the degree and depth to which these considerations enter the mass political consciousness and the prevailing ideology and moral standards in the United States. Success will depend on the strength and clarity with which American politicians and the general public realize that ideological hostility toward socialism as a social order cannot and should not obscure the urgent need to prevent nuclear catastrophe, curb the nuclear arms race, and, consequently, move toward detente.

A sober assessment of specific conditions in the United States must not, however, disregard the fact that the general prospects for detente in this country have depended and still depend on the ideological views of the supporters of detente and its opponents, on the strength of the ideology of global hegemonism and anti-Sovietism. This is why it is important to look more closely into the situation in the United States in the second half of the 1970's, a situation which restored the strength of this ideology and its influence in foreign policymaking. At the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's many customary opinions and beliefs, which had taken firm hold in the minds of millions of Americans and had long affected their views on the external world, themselves and their country, were suddenly shattered in the most dramatic ways. The reasons were significant objective changes in the world and in the United States.
In the first place, national liberation movements became much more active in many of the countries that were objects of neocolonial dependence. These movements are usually anti-American in essence and, in their search for new avenues of national development, they generally turn to socialist ideals and to the experience and direct assistance of the USSR and the countries of the socialist community. Under the new historical conditions engendered by the success of these national liberation movements, the hegemonistic ambitions of the United States turned out to be absolutely impracticable. And since the realization of these ambitions had become a major criterion of national self-esteem, this had a negative effect on the level of this self-esteem. Besides this, the level of national self-esteem in the United States was connected with habitual lines of reasoning that stemmed from the primitive bipolar view of world politics, a view engendered by the cold war. According to this view, world politics could be reduced to the global confrontation between the United States and the USSR, governed by the rules of a game with no score (an American success automatically signified a Soviet failure, and an American failure was a Soviet success). This is why the changes described above naturally shattered the common belief that the United States was "on the offensive" in relation to the USSR, and consequently, the belief about the United States' "leading position" in the world. This, in turn, naturally had a negative effect on the level of national self-esteem.

In the second place, during this period the military strength of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries became much more apparent. It also became apparent that the armed forces of the developing countries resisting American diktat were already capable of opposing American armed forces successfully and even defeating them (the victory of the national liberation struggle in Vietnam is one example). Changes in the balance of military power dealt a perceptible blow to all of the customary beliefs that were of great importance to the American national consciousness.

It was at this time that the force of the blow struck at customary beliefs about the military invulnerability of the nation was fully sensed. This belief had existed for 200 years in the United States and represented a unique and major feature of the American national consciousness. A crushing blow was also dealt to the belief that the United States was superior to the USSR in the military respect—a belief which was an extremely important element of the picture of the world and the United States' place in this world, which was drawn during the cold war years by the ideology of hegemonism and anticommunism. Finally, a strong blow was leveled at the customary belief that military force could be used in relations with developing countries. The intensity and pain of this blow to the national consciousness can be imagined if we consider the strength of the earlier American certainty that military force could be used with impunity in relations with these countries.

A third series of blows struck at customary beliefs in the economic sphere, where the effects of crucial processes, characteristic of American capitalism and the world capitalist system in general, began to be felt. These blows shattered the "economic optimism" of the 1950's and 1960's. By the end of the 1960's the gap between the intensively rising expectations, needs and ambitions of fairly broad segments of the U.S. population and their actual economic status was already evident. This widening gap led to the rapid growth of mass dissatisfaction with
the state of affairs in the U.S. economy, dissatisfaction which was intensified noticeably by the start of the "lean" years of economic recession, the rapid rise of inflation and unemployment and the mounting difficulties with regard to raw material supplies, especially oil. The collapse of this "economic optimism" was naturally an extremely painful process: After all, it had been an important element of national consciousness and national pride.

The crisis of the illusions, beliefs and expectations connected with strong traditions of democracy and individualism was equally painful for the sense of national pride in the United States. In the bourgeois and petty bourgeois forms of consciousness that prevailed here, the idea of democracy had acquired an individualistic interpretation, and the individualistic outlook was expressed in the liberal democratic form. The development of state-monopoly capitalism in the United States was accompanied by the intensive establishment of authoritarian bureaucratic structures. This gave rise to severe mass dissatisfaction which turned the democratic-individualistic consciousness against these structures. The most apparent dissatisfaction was aroused by the authoritarian bureaucratic structures developing in government. This dissatisfaction could not be expressed widely in U.S. ideology and politics, however, as long as the government was able to convey the impression of effectiveness in the sphere of economics and foreign policy.

After the defeat in Vietnam and other foreign policy failures and after the U.S. economy began to evince more distinct symptoms of crisis, dissatisfaction with the government and the government bureaucracy took on mass dimensions and became much more intense. The Watergate scandal and Nixon's resignation were a few of the many signs of this dissatisfaction. The extremely painful process of the disintegration of mass expectations and beliefs connected with the traditions of liberal individualism in the United States became a major element of the general crisis of national consciousness as well as one of its stimuli.

Just as any other profound spiritual crisis, this crisis presented two fundamentally different possibilities for future development in the sphere of ideology, psychology and politics. The first was bold and consistent self-criticism, intense reflection and profound political realism based on a sober analysis of objective alternatives, new tendencies and the possibilities of the current era. The move toward detente was an important step in this direction. One of the essential conditions for consistent advancement in this direction was the discerning reassessment of ideological baggage.

For the sake of accuracy, it must be said that some steps were taken in this direction in the United States. Many of the most influential supporters of detente within the political elite, however, turned out to be unprepared to solve this important problem. Part of the reason was their limited pragmatic outlook and their ideological illusions about detente. The reassessment of ideological baggage was inhibited considerably by the general crisis of the two main currents of American ideology that sympathized to some degree with detente—leftist radicalism and liberalism. The crisis of liberalism was particularly important. It shattered the excessively optimistic and utopian beliefs about the future that stemmed from the glorification of technological progress and the technocratic-bureaucratic form of government.
Since most of the influential supporters of detente were liberals, the crisis of liberalism and the disillusionment of the masses with liberalism affected them directly.

As a result of the crisis of leftist radicalism and liberalism and of the absence of a new, truly alternative but politically influential and popular ideology in the United States, conditions were established for stronger conservatism and rightwing radicalism. It is obvious that conservatism and rightwing radicalism were able to make use of this opportunity. An important role in this process was played by their connection with the second avenue of ideological development and national psychology in the United States, which differed fundamentally from the first, and with the second type of ideological and psychological reaction to the collapse of customary beliefs and ideas.

This reaction could be called "neurotic." Its basic features were the following.

The defeat in Vietnam and subsequent foreign policy failures, ending with the events in Iran and the seizure of American diplomats as hostages, were interpreted by the neurotically inclined nationalist consciousness as a harsh insult to the "honor of the nation" and to national dignity. This gave birth to something like a "national inferiority complex," which included extremely painful and conflicting feelings of irritation and confusion, shame and fear, impotence and rage. These feelings were mainly directed outward, just as they usually are in a neurotic who has lost the ability of sober self-criticism. They were largely directed against the developing countries. The American nationalist consciousness had habitually behaved arrogantly toward these countries, most of which were small and ranked far below the United States in terms of levels of industrial development. Seized by nationalist arrogance, the Americans could not accept the idea that these countries might be the reason for the failures and defeats of an industrial and military giant like the United States. The neurotic nationalist consciousness in the United States wanted to find a reason for these failures and defeats that would be, so to speak, commensurate with its own vanity and arrogance.

The customary ideological views of the cold war, with which the conservatives were arming themselves quite vigorously in the middle of the 1970's, offered the nationalist consciousness the choice of the USSR as the source and symbol of "evil," as a scapegoat for all of the problems in American domestic and foreign policy and in the economy. Besides this, the neurotic and even paranoid nationalist consciousness generally wants to overdramatize its troubles. This gives rise to the idea that the reason for all misfortunes is some kind of "global conspiracy of evil forces." It is this tendency that has been apparent in the United States in recent years.

In the history of ideology there have been many cases in which conservative, rightwing extremist groups have been able to redirect feelings of national humiliation and shame into the channel of chauvinism, great-power imperial policy and militarism. This was done in Russia at the beginning of the century, after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese war. With good reason, V. I. Lenin then directed attention to this dangerous tendency. In an article entitled "The National Pride of the Great Russian People," he pointed out the importance of separating feelings of national pride from the nationalist-imperial ideology and mentality and, after
giving these feelings a fundamentally different class and ideological basis, rechanneling them into the struggle for the radical and positive renewal of the country and the expansion of its contribution to the progress of all mankind.*

This objective is now an extremely important one for the United States. The present alignment of forces in politics and ideology, however, has made its attainment impossible. By skillfully manipulating the feeling of hurt national pride, the opponents of detente have been able to persuade many Americans to accept the traditional views of the ideology of Messianism, hegemonism, anti-Sovietism and militarism as a psychological defense mechanism, as compensation for this feeling and as a means of national self-assertion.

The Carter Administration placed emphasis on the moral self-assertion of the United States, choosing as its main medium the ideological propaganda campaign about "human rights." This administration took advantage of the reluctance of the majority of Americans to enter into a new war, a reluctance left over from the defeat in Vietnam, and their revived interest in traditional liberal-democratic and individualistic ideals. Besides this, it also took into account the Americans' dissatisfaction with the amoral practices and lack of principles in domestic and foreign policy. The idea of "national self-assertion" by means of economic, political and military pressure on other countries was not clearly expressed in the words and actions of the Carter Administration until his last year in office.

The Reagan Administration has placed more emphasis on U.S. self-assertion through the use of military force and threats of military force and of power plays in power policy and international economic relations. The conservatives have also been gambling more on the "military inferiority complex" that has become a characteristic feature of the neurotic and paranoid nationalist consciousness in the United States. The conservatives have intensified this complex and have put the neurotic consciousness in a state of war hysteria by their efforts to carry out their plans for the further militarization of the country, to start a new round of the arms race and to regain military supremacy in the world. The principal vehicle for this has been the propaganda campaign of American intimidation with the "Soviet military threat." Apparently, another possibility was also considered: What if the fear of the military threat should reach the critical point and motivate the Americans to demand talks with the Soviet Union instead of a larger military budget? What if this fear should actually complicate the use of nuclear blackmail by the United States? This is why the Reagan Administration is striving to convince the Americans that the proper level of military strength would allow the United States to win a "nuclear war."

The ideology of U.S. military reinforcement and reliance on military strength has turned out to be related not only to the goals of "total confrontation" with the USSR, but also the goals of consolidating U.S. political and, what is most important, economic positions in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe.

The Reagan Administration, which is partly continuing the strategy of the previous administration but is also, and to a greater degree, adhering to the typical logic of 20th century American conservatism, is actively speculating on the neuroticism

of liberal democratic individualists, who are deeply disillusioned, rebellious, stubborn in their adherence to tradition, miserable and frightened by the rapid development of authoritarian bureaucratic structures, especially in the U.S. Government. The conservatives are actively using these morbid feelings against their ideological opponents within the nation—the liberals, who have gained the reputation of defenders of government regulation and bureaucracy—and against their main opponents—the world revolutionary liberation movement, inspired by Marxist-Leninist socialist doctrine. It is not surprising that the conservatives portray the USSR, the ideological and political center of this movement, as a symbol of anti-individualistic and antiliberal tendencies.

By speculating on petty bourgeois individualistic and liberal illusions, the American conservatives are helping to strengthen the monopolies, which are objectively making millions of Americans the objects of authoritarian bureaucratic control.

In the foreign policy sphere, the conservatives have concentrated their main attack against detente. They are making energetic use of the inability of the neurotic mass mind to soberly analyze multidimensional and deep-seated tendencies in contemporary history and its inclination to think in simple terms, backed up by purely external associations. The conservatives are taking advantage of the fact that the period of detente was associated in this type of mass consciousness with a period of foreign policy failures and the overall decline of U.S. influence in the world. It was associated with the period of relatively small military expenditures, cuts in armed forces and changes in the balance of military power that were not in the U.S. favor. This period was also associated with mounting crisis in the economy and increased difficulties in economic and trade relations with many other countries. This was also a period of scandals in domestic politics and the loss of faith in the federal government. Finally, it was a time when the moral crisis intensified, the crime rate rose, etc.

In short, detente was associated with a period of national development which is psychologically perceived as a "downhill roll" and which evokes feelings of pessimism, depression, national failure and humiliation. The pain of these feelings can be fully assessed from the simple reminder that the preceding period was, on the contrary, connected with artificially stimulated feelings of optimism, self-confidence and national arrogance. It is understandable that the growth of morbid feelings in a confused and near-neurotic consciousness in a country like the United States would certainly give rise to the desire to change society's direction to the direct opposite of the direction taken in the mid-1970's. In a confused and neurotic mind, this direction appears simultaneously to be movement "upward" and backward, because this kind of consciousness combines nostalgia with illusions about the future.

But the most dangerous thing is this: Since detente is associated with the general deterioration of the state of affairs, radical improvement will be associated with the renunciation of detente. The opponents of detente in the United States are making a colossal effort to reinforce these false associations so that detente can be blamed unjustifiably for the many difficulties and crises encountered by the United States.
The danger of this effort must not be underestimated. Obviously, the U.S. mass consciousness will be more receptive to the idea of detente if detente's association with the significant change of the world balance of power that was not in the U.S. favor can be broken. In Europe, especially in France and the FRG, where the evolution of the ideological and psychological climate has been somewhat different, there are none of the dangerous neurotic associations that are characteristic of the United States. For this reason, detente put down deeper and stronger roots here.

Although the foreign activity of the confirmed opponents of detente in the United States and the danger of the neurotic reaction of the mass mind to irreversible changes in world history must be underscored, we must not forget that there are supporters of detente here and tendencies toward political realism in public opinion. These tendencies might disappear from the visible surface current of public opinion and become an underwater current. There are objective factors, however, that make detente historically necessary. Peaceful forces in the world and in the United States are becoming more active. And this will have a positive effect on the ideological and psychological climate in the United States, although this will again give rise to an urgent need for the conscious and purposeful elaboration of the ideological basis of detente, ideological arguments in its defense and means of firmly establishing the idea of detente in the mass consciousness.

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DOMESTIC POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL

Moscow SSA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA,IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 16 Mar 82) pp 17-29

[Article by N. V. Osipova and S. M. Rogov: "The United States and the Middle East Muddle: Domestic Political Factors"]

[Text] The approach taken by U.S. ruling circles to the Middle East is determined primarily by the military-strategic and economic significance of this region in Washington's global plans. The region's proximity to the Soviet Union's borders, its location at the point where three continents and two oceans meet, and its colossal energy resources are the main factors determining the American Administration's approach. But Washington's Middle East policy is also affected by domestic political processes in the United States.

Within this context, one factor of great significance is the activity of the traditionally powerful Zionist lobby and the less influential pro-Arab lobbyists, who are directly engaged in urging American political institutions to move in the proper directions. The forms and methods of direct lobbying pressure on the administration and the Congress are of interest to researchers of U.S. Middle East policy. There has not been enough research, however, into the balance of views on U.S. Middle East policy within the American ruling class as a whole, in the two bourgeois parties, in the mass media, in the religious community and, finally, in the general public. This is the subject of this article.

Alignment of Forces

Since the end of World War II, when the Middle East first acquired an important place in U.S. foreign political expansion, two groups displaying particular interest in this region have been distinguishable in the American grand bourgeoisie. The first group consists of the oil monopolists who want to control Middle East oil resources, and the second group consists of the grand bourgeoisie of Jewish origins, connected with the Zionist elite of the Jewish community in Palestine, and later in the State of Israel. There are two views in Washington on the most effective way of strengthening U.S. influence in the Middle East. The prevailing view in the Pentagon and the State Department since the end of the 1940's has been that the United States can gain access to military bases and oil resources in the Middle East primarily through stronger ties with conservative Arab regimes. Another view has prevailed in the White House and, in particular, in the Congress: American policy in this region should rely on Zionist circles for support.
Some time later, the first approach came to be called "pro-Arab," and the second was called "pro-Israel," and these are still the most commonly used definitions. They are correct, with one stipulation: Washington is mainly concerned with protecting the interests of American imperialism in the Middle East, and this is the essence of U.S. strategy in this region, and the "pro-Israel" and "pro-Arab" approaches reflect differences of opinion with regard to tactics, and not Washington's strategy. Furthermore, it would be wrong to exaggerate the differences between supporters of the two approaches, although debates on questions of Middle East policy sometimes grow quite heated.

The advocates of the "pro-Arab" approach include such figures as former Secretary of the Treasury and Governor of Texas J. Conally, Under Secretary of State G. Ball, U.S. Representative to the United Nations A. Young, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs H. Saunders, head of the Middle East section of the U.S. National Security Council W. Kuanst and others. They also include some figures of Jewish origin: S. Tillman, a former assistant of Senators J. Fulbright and G. McGovern, and R. Newman, the former head of Ronald Reagan's "transition team" in the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger is the only member of the present administration who falls into this category.

The supporters of this approach are generally most in favor of the development of American relations with the Arab oil-producing states, especially Saudi Arabia. This, in their opinion, will not only guarantee the United States "access" to Middle Eastern oil, but will also strengthen American strategic positions in the region. According to these people, Washington's lopsided reliance on Tel Aviv creates unnecessary complications in the attainment of this objective. They are not saying that Israel should not be given any support, but they are demanding that the Israeli Government stop committing adventuristic actions which impede American diplomacy in the Arab world. They argue that the United States should demand that Israel curtail its territorial ambitions in exchange for U.S. economic and military aid. Some of the advocates of this approach favor the recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination and to a state of their own on the West Bank of the River Jordan and the Gaza Strip. This approach has been reflected in the reports of a number of American "brain trusts," including the Brookings Institution in 1975, the Atlantic Council in 1979 and the Institute of War, Revolution and Peace in 1980.

The supporters of the "pro-Israel approach" are more numerous. They include Senators H. Jackson, D. Moynihan and J. Biden, U.S. Representative to the United Nations J. Kirkpatrick, President Reagan's former National Security Adviser R. Allen and some individuals who are closely connected with Zionist circles, such as Assistant Secretary of Defense R. Perle, Director E. Rostow of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Deputy Representative to the United Nations K. Girshman, Adviser to the Secretary of State H. Zickerman, National Security Council Adviser R. Perlmutt and others.

The members of this group believe that a "strong Israel" will reinforce, and not weaken, U.S. influence in the Middle East. They stress the fact that this is the only developed capitalist state with a stable bourgeois political order in the entire region. For them, Tel Aviv represents a means of exerting pressure on
progressive forces in the Arab world and on conservative oil-producing states. Arguing that Israel cannot be replaced by any other state in the region (as, in their opinion, the Iranian experience proved), the advocates of this approach resolutely oppose all proposals that might "weaken" Israel, especially the idea of an independent Palestinian state.

Pro-Israeli feelings are widespread in Jewish bourgeois-nationalist circles and in the upper strata of American society in general. According to a 1980 Gallup poll, for example, 79 percent of all businessmen and professionals had a positive opinion of Israel, and only 17 percent had a negative one. According to a 1978 poll, 54 percent of the people of this category "sympathized" with Israel in the Middle East conflict, and only 12 percent were on the side of the Arabs. The number of supporters of the "pro-Israeli" approach is several times as great as the number of supporters of the "pro-Arab" approach to U.S. policy in the Middle East.

The support of Israel is not unconditional, however. This is attested to by the information in Table 1, which indicates the attitudes of American businessmen and professionals in 1978 toward shipments of weapons to the Middle East and methods of settling the Arab-Israeli conflict (in percentages):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For arms shipments to Israel</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against arms shipments to Israel</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For arms shipments to Arabs</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against arms shipments to Arabs</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Israel's retention of all occupied lands</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Israel's retention of some occupied lands</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Israel's surrender of all occupied lands</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the creation of an independent Palestinian state</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the preservation of the status quo</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*THE GALLUP POLL INDEX, May 1978, p 31.*

It is evident that there are evidences of opinion within the U.S. ruling class with regard to specific aspects of Middle East policy. Only a minority favors the preservation of the status quo in the Middle East—that is, the retention of all occupied territories by Israel—but the idea of a Palestinian state was rejected by the majority. The greatest approval was expressed for the partial withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the River Jordan and the creation of some kind of confederation between these territories and Jordan.

It was in the spirit of this "Jordanian alternative" that the current President expressed his views on the Middle East during the 1980 campaign. Apparently, this approach could win the greatest support in Washington. As far as the "pro-Arab" is concerned, the results of polls testify that most of the American bourgeoisie is unlikely to subscribe to these views within the near future. There
is considerable dissatisfaction in these circles with arms shipments to the Arab states, and this creates favorable conditions for certain actions by the Zionist lobby, such as the lengthy delay of the Capitol's approval of the sale of AWACS planes to the Saudis.

Since 1944 the two bourgeois American parties have included pro-Zionist statements in their campaign platforms. An analysis of the Republican and Democratic party platforms proves that the "pro-Israeli" approach enjoys the support of both parties, but the opposition party generally goes slightly further in its expressions of "sympathy for Israel" than the party in power. The Republican approach to Israel stresses military strategic aspects, but the Democrats are more likely to underscore the "democratic nature" of the Zionist regime and the "common moral values" of the United States and Israel.

An analysis of public opinion polls indicates that there are no serious differences in the views of members of the two leading parties on Israel and the Arabs. For example, "sympathy" for Israel is expressed by 45 percent of the Republicans and 42 percent of the Democrats, and the Arab states are supported by 13 percent of the Republicans and 11 percent of the Democrats. The number of Republicans favoring the creation of a "Palestinian fatherland" (46 percent) is slightly higher than the number of Democrats (39 percent), but an independent Palestinian state is supported by 35 percent of the Democrats, as compared to 29 percent of the Republicans, and a Palestinian-Jordanian federation is supported by 22 percent of the Democrats and 27 percent of the Republicans. The most important distinctions are found in attitudes toward arms shipments. In this regard, Republicans outnumber Democrats considerably both in their support of arms shipments to Israel (37 percent and 28 percent respectively) and shipments to the Arabs (24 percent and 13 percent). It is not surprising that the "package deal" (the sale of planes in a single "package" to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia) was carried through the Senate by the Carter Administration in 1978 with the aid of Republican senators, while most of the Democrats voted against it. In 1981 the Reagan Administration gained congressional approval of a new shipment of arms to Saudi Arabia. Most of the Republican senators expressed approval of this transaction, while most of the objections were made by Democrats.

The Role of the Jewish Community

The success of the pro-Israeli lobby is often explained as a result of the support given to the Zionists by the powerful "Jewish vote." This was a widespread belief in the United States even in the time of Harry Truman, who told American ambassadors to Middle Eastern countries: "I have to answer to hundreds of thousands of supporters of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arab voters."2 It is true that the number of citizens of Jewish origin is far in excess of the number of persons of Arab origin: According to the latest statistics, there are around 5.9 million Jews and 2.5 million Arabs in the United States. But the idea that all Jewish voters unanimously cast their votes according to the instructions of the Zionist lobbyists is a myth and has nothing in common with the truth.

In the first place, the "Jewish voting bloc," which took shape in the 1930's, was born and has existed with the support of the reformist wing of the Democratic Party. This is attested to by the data in Table 2, which reflect the results of
the votes cast by Jewish citizens in presidential elections from 1932 to 1976. At the end of the 1970's, 59 percent of the American Jews called themselves Democrats, and only 10 percent called themselves Republicans.3

Table 2

Percentage of Jewish Voters Supporting the Democratic Party in Presidential Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the second place, the "Jewish voting bloc" displayed a tendency toward erosion during the last decade, and in the 1980 election it ceased to exist. No candidate received a majority of the Jewish vote. For the first time in the last 50 years, less than half of the American Jews voted for Democrats, but the ones who abandoned J. Carter did not go over to Reagan's side. As the figures in Table 3 show, the split in the "Jewish vote" was caused by all of the Jewish voters who took the side of independent liberal candidate J. Anderson.

Table 3

Jewish Support for Presidential Candidates in 1980 Elections, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>June 1980 Poll</th>
<th>November 1980 Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J. Carter</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Reagan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Anderson</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This uncommonly high percentage of support for J. Anderson was a result of the spread of liberal attitudes among Americans of Jewish origin. A poll taken after the election on 4 November 1980 indicated that 44 percent of the Jews call themselves liberals, but only 25 percent call themselves conservatives.4

In the third place, since there is usually no serious differences in candidates' views on Israel, the overwhelming majority of Jewish citizens make their voting decisions independently. In 1980 Israel's DAVAR newspaper reported that Zionist lobbyists from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee estimate that they influence no more than 500,000 Jewish voters, and the "Zionist nucleus" consists of only 50,000 people.
In the fourth place, the pro-Israel feelings of American Jews do not mean unconditional support for Tel Aviv's policies. According to a poll, 49 percent of the American Jews believe that the Palestinians must have their own state, with 36 percent disagreeing, and 59 percent believe in the possible coexistence of Israel and a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the River Jordan, with only 25 percent disagreeing. Half of the American Jews believe that aid to Israel should be cut off if it attacks a neighboring state.

These feelings were reflected in a number of statements by prominent representatives of the American Jewish community in support of the "Peace Today" movement in Israel, calling upon the Israeli Government to recognize "the right of the Palestinians to national existence." In June 1980, for example, more than 90 prominent representatives of the Jewish intelligentsia and business community signed an appeal of this kind, addressed to the Israeli Government.5

In December 1980 the constituent conference of an organization called the New Jewish Program of Action was held in Washington and was attended by more than 700 delegates from various American cities. The participants were a heterogeneous group—from communists to "leftist" Zionists—but most of them were members of organizations fighting for civil rights and against the arms race. The heads of the organization hoped to create a coalition of leftist forces in the Jewish community with a platform of struggle against the domestic and foreign policy of the Reagan Administration. They are also trying to unite all of the opponents of the Begin Government's annexation plans. The organization opposes the creation of Jewish settlements on occupied Arab lands and is in favor of Palestinian self-determination.

Dissatisfaction with the Begin Government is also growing more pronounced in the bourgeois upper echelon of the Jewish community. Influential circles have rallied round the North American branch of the World Jewish Congress and have publicly expressed their fears that the adventuristic actions of the Israeli Government could foment a crisis in Washington's relations with Tel Aviv and could have a boomerang effect on the Jewish community in the United States. At the Seventh General Assembly of the World Jewish Congress in January 1981, a report prepared by representatives of the elite of the Jewish communities in the United States and other capitalist countries was presented. It voiced serious complaints against the Begin Government. In essence, it demanded that Tel Aviv stop creating "unnecessary difficulties" for the American grand bourgeoisie of Jewish origins in its relations with other groups in the U.S. ruling class. The report implied that financial and political aid to Israel would be reduced if the ruling circles of this state did not act on the "recommendations" of the congress.

Even the conference of presidents of major American Jewish organizations, which once blindly supported the Israeli Government, have begun to express dissatisfaction with M. Begin's actions. "The present Israeli cabinet is outside the bounds of the consensus in the American Jewish community, and possibly even in Israel," Chairman T. Mann of the conference said in November 1979. The present chairman of the conference, G. Squadron, flew to Israel to meet with M. Begin in June 1981, when the Israelis were bombing Lebanese cities and Palestinian camps, and asked him to agree to the plan proposed by American diplomat P. Habib, President Reagan's personal representative, for a Palestinian-Israeli ceasefire.6
Position of the Arab Community

Americans of Arab origins are probably even more divided than the Jews. The National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) is inclined in general to support the U.S. official line, although it has expressed disapproval of the Camp David agreements. The American Lebanese League has taken a sharply anti-Palestinian stand, has requested the Washington Administration to openly support rightwing Christian groups in Lebanon and has allied itself totally with the Zionist lobby. the Palestine Congress of North America, which was established in 1979, has become an arena of struggle between radical groups and those who support a line of capitulation.

Negative Arab stereotypes were given new momentum by the surge of anti-Moslem feelings in the United States at the time of the seizure of the American Embassy in Iran. Scandals involving illegal pay-offs with "Arab money" (the Lance affair, the Billy Carter affair and the "Abscam" scandal) have not made American politicians any more enthusiastic to establish ties with Arab lobbyists.

According to NAAA Executive Director E. Saad, "the creation of an Arab-American bloc is of decisive importance." After the 1980 election in the United States, however, he had to admit that, during the campaign, "not one candidate acknowledged the existence of an Arab group of voters" but "each candidate assured Jewish Americans that he would support Israel if elected." It is indicative that the Democratic Party National Committee decided to create a campaigning section to work with persons of Arab origins for the first time during this campaign. These duties were relegated to former NAAA President R. Shadiaq, although the press reported a few days later that he was a paid agent of the Lebanese Government. As a result, he was immediately expelled from the national committee and the section for work with Arab voters was eliminated.

The degree of political influence of the Jewish and Arab communities can be judged to some degree by the composition of the present Congress. After the 1980 election there were 6 Jewish senators (3 Republicans and 3 Democrats) and 2 Arab ones (1 Republican and 1 democrat) and the House of Representatives had 27 Jewish congressmen (6 Republicans and 21 Democrats) and 4 Arabs (all Democrats). Most of the Jewish politicians maintain close ties with Zionist circles and actively support the pro-Israeli line, but the Arab politicians (with the exception of former Senator J. Abourezk) rarely belong to Arab-American organizations or take any action to defend the pro-Arab approach.

The Position of Religious Organizations

The position of religious circles has played an important role in the development of the American approach to the Middle East. The search for the "Promised Land" figured prominently in the life of the puritans who came to North America in the 17th century, and they viewed themselves as "the children of Israel on the road to Zion." Protestant fundamentalism has promoted the spread of Zionist feelings because the "rebirth of Israel" is regarded by many fundamentalists as the fulfillment of biblical prophecies and an event directly connected with the "Second Coming." On the other hand, many American Protestant churches established missionary centers in Palestine as early as the 19th century and have maintained
contacts with the Palestinian Arabs up to the present time (there are more Christians among the Palestinians than in any other Arab country but Lebanon). Quakers, Methodists and members of several other Protestant churches have received small government grants to carry out programs of charitable aid to the Palestinian population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and have encountered opposition from Israeli occupation authorities.

In general, religious circles adhere to the "pro-Israel" approach. Support for Israel is expressed by 38 percent of the Protestants and 32 percent of the Catholics, while support for the Arabs is expressed by 10 percent and 13 percent respectively. Nevertheless, 33 percent of the Protestants and 36 percent of the Catholics are in favor of an independent Palestinian state, and only 21 percent of all Christians favor the preservation of the status quo in occupied territories.

American churches were almost totally on Israel's side at the time of the 1967 war. This was largely a result of the activity of the National Conference of Jews and Christians, which was established to combat anti-Semitism but has actually been used extensively for the spread of Zionist propaganda in the religious community. By 1970, however, the Quakers had already published a report entitled "The Search for Peace in the Middle East," which refuted many of the myths of pro-Israeli propaganda and raised the question of Palestinian rights. The Arab-Israeli conflict became the subject of lively debates in religious circles.

In 1973 the influential United Church of Christ spoke out in favor of the recognition of the rights of "Palestinian Arabs," and in 1977 the Reformist Church in America recognized "the right of the Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs to a national existence." In 1979 the creation of an independent Palestinian state was supported by large religious organizations—the Episcopalian Church, the United Methodist Church, the Church of the Brethren and the American Baptist Church. The United Presbyterian Church has taken a similar stand.

In November 1978 the Catholic Conference of the United States issued an important statement confirming the "rights of the Palestinian Arabs," including the right to "participate in negotiations to determine their future" and the right "to their own homeland." In November 1980 the liberal Protestant National Council of Churches (NCC) followed the example of the Catholics and issued a detailed statement on the Middle East. It demands the recognition of the right of "national self-determination for the Palestinian Arabs," including the creation of an independent state. The statement stresses that the Palestine Liberation Organization "represents the only organized voice of the Palestinian people and appears to be the only organ capable of negotiating a settlement on behalf of the Palestinian people." By doing this, the NCC took an important step toward the acknowledgment of the just conditions for the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East, for which it was immediately accused of "anti-Semitism" by the Zionists.

The position taken by churches on the issue of Jerusalem is also of interest. The America Catholics share the views of the Vatican, which has refused to recognize Israel's annexation of Jerusalem, including the rights of this state to "Christian holy places." The NCC statement stresses that existing international treaties "regulating the rights and claims of the three monotheistic religions to holy places must remain unchanged." Further on, the statement says: "Unilateral
actions by any group with regard to Jerusalem will only lead to more antagonism and endanger peace in the city and, possibly, in the region.\textsuperscript{11} We should remember that the Democratic Party platform in 1976 and the Republican platform in 1980 recognized "all of Jerusalem" as the capital of the State of Israel. But the Carter Administration was in no hurry to recognize this demand officially, and now Ronald Reagan is not in any hurry to do this either. Apparently, this is primarily a result of the position taken by the leading Christian churches in the United States.

The departure of the Catholics and liberal Protestant churches from the purely "pro-Israeli" approach led to the reorientation of the Zionist lobby towards several conservative Protestant groups that have traditionally held negative views of the Jews but are now energetically supporting Israel's aggressive policy.\textsuperscript{12} The Zionist lobby's union with the ultrarightist organizations of the Moral Majority, Christian Voice and Religious Roundtable, was nurtured by frenzied anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. In December 1980 Israeli Prime Minister Begin blessed this alliance by personally awarding the leader of the Moral Majority, J. Falwell, the Jabotsinski Medal.

This aroused displeasure in liberal Jewish circles in the United States, who view the appeals of conservative Protestants for the "Christianization of America" as a threat to American Jews and whose views on U.S. domestic policy conflict dramatically with the views of rightwing fundamentalist like J. Falwell. In the beginning of 1981, A. Schidler, the head of the liberal Union of American Hebrew Congregations, wrote: "The Moral Majority and other religious-political organizations belonging to the same coalition represent a threat to American democracy, to American Jews and, consequently, to Israel."\textsuperscript{13} It is indicative that People for the American Way, a liberal organization established by the opponents of the Moral Majority, has received the full support of President W. Howard of the National Council of Churches and President E. Bronfman of the World Jewish Congress.

The Position of the Mass Media

It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of the mass media in the formation of American public opinion, including views on Middle East policy. The press, radio and television have played an extremely important role in the spread of pro-Israeli views in the United States.

Only a few (just over 3 percent) of the 1,748 daily newspapers in the United States are owned by bourgeois Jews. But the actual influence of Zionist circles in the mass media cannot be measured by these figures. The fact is that the tone of reports on foreign policy issues is set by such newspapers as the NEW YORK TIMES, and WASHINGTON POST, which are owned by the Sulzberger and Graham-Meyer families, both of which are prominent in the bourgeois nationalist elite of the Jewish community.

With some reservations, the NEW YORK TIMES could be called the only nationwide paper in the United States because it is read by members of the America elite throughout the nation. Many local newspapers make use of the NEW YORK TIMES foreign political news services because they do not have their own correspondents abroad. Each day hundreds of local papers reprint articles by NEW YORK TIMES
correspondents. As far as the WASHINGTON POST is concerned, it is difficult to buy outside the American capital, but in Washington it almost has a monopoly on news, particularly since August 1981, when the second daily, the WASHINGTON STAR, folded. Furthermore, the owners of the WASHINGTON POST also owned a radio station and one of the television channels in the District of Columbia. It is obvious that they have a great deal of influence in the formation of the opinions of the American political elite.14

The leading positions in television are held by bourgeois Jews. These are the three main networks in the United States—the National Broadcasting Corporation, American Broadcasting System and Columbia Broadcasting System. It is television that "standardizes" public opinion on the national scale.

In conclusion, we cannot ignore the role of the Jewish bourgeoisie in leading American magazines, whether they are the conservative U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, the more liberal TIME and NEWS WEEK, the intellectual NEW REPUBLIC, NATION and COMMENTARY or the pornographic PLAYBOY.

The media listed above do not always support the "pro-Israel" approach a hundred percent. This not only indicates a pretense at "objectivity" but also reflects real differences of opinion within the American bourgeoisie with regard to the question of support for the Israeli Government. Zionist lobbyists had good reason for their recent announcement that the WASHINGTON POST is waging "an all-out war against the State of Israel."15 They also accused newspaper owner K. Graham, editorial manager M. Greenfield and foreign political editor J. Hoagland of preferring to serve Saudi Arabia as its mouthpieces.16 Of course, there was no basis for these accusations, but they testify to the extremely complex relations between the WASHINGTON POST and the Zionist lobby.

The Zionists' own news media are comparatively few in number and do not include any newspapers or magazines designed for the mass reading public, but consist only of specialized publications, such as the AMERICAN ZIONIST (45,000 copies) and MIDSTREAM (10,000) magazines and the NEAR EAST REPORT (30,000) bulletin. The latter is distributed to officials in the administration, members of Congress, editors and publishers, and Republican and Democratic party officials.

Several Zionist centers are engaged in the coordination of propaganda activities. The leader among them is the information and public relations commission of the American Zionist Federation (formerly known as the American Zionist Council). The documents of the commission report on such fields of work with the mass media as the "cultivation of editors" and the "stimulation and publication of suitable articles," including the spread of "positive information in the articles and commentaries of newspaper syndicates," "the reprinting and dissemination of favorable comments," "radio and television talks and interviews and the cultivation of leading figures in this sphere," "the preparation of programs about Israel" and "the disclosure and resistance of activity in the United States by Arabs and other hostile groups."17

The effect of specific Zionist propaganda actions can also be quite perceptible. For example, according to Gallup data support for Israel rose from 38 percent to 44 percent and support for the Arabs dropped from 11 to 10 percent in just 1 month
in 1978. The main reason was "Holocaust," a television mini-series about Hitler's genocide. Zionist propaganda stimulated pro-Israeli feeling by taking advantage of sympathy for the Jewish victims of Nazism. Among those who saw the film, support for Israel rose from 39 to 50 percent and, furthermore, it rose to 48 percent among those who saw only one episode and to 58 percent among those who saw all three.18

Ohio State University Professor R. Trice conducted a computer analysis of the editorials in the 11 most prestigious American newspapers with a daily circulation of 6 million copies and concluded that their main feature was their essentially undiscerning approval of U.S. policy; assessments of Israeli policy were not as unanimous, but were positive in general; the targets of the sharpest criticism were the Palestinians and the Soviet Union. According to his calculations, a pro-Israeli approach was most displayed not by East Coast newspapers, but by the CHICAGO TRIBUNE, DALLAS MORNING NEWS and LOUISVILLE COURIER JOURNAL, with the NEW YORK TIMES and WASHINGTON POST ranking below these. Only 2 of the 11 newspapers—the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR and ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH—criticized Israel. For attacks on the Arabs, the ATLANTA CONSTITUTION ranked the highest, followed by the NEW YORK TIMES. Only one newspaper, the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, adhered in general to the "pro-Arab" approach.19

What the Polls Reflect

The pro-Israeli feelings of the general American public were already apparent at the time of the first Arab-Israeli war, when 37 percent of all respondents expressed sympathy for Israel and only 14 percent expressed it for the Arabs.20 These feelings reached their highest point in June 1967, when 55 percent of the respondents declared support for Israel and only 4 percent supported the Arabs. After the October War of 1973, the correlation was 54 percent to 6 percent. Subsequent polls, however, revealed a tendency toward a gradual decline in support for Israel. The tendency became particularly pronounced after the Begin Government took power in Israel. By 1980 support for Israel had fallen to 42 percent (Gallup) or 37 percent (Ropper), and support for the Arabs rose to 15 percent (Gallup) or 10 percent (Ropper).21

There are several reasons for the still comparatively high level of support for Israel. They include sympathy for the Jews as the victims of fascist genocide, religious beliefs about Palestine as the "land of the Jews," Zionist propaganda and even anti-Semitism ("let the Jews live in Tel Aviv, not in New York"). Of course, the idea that Israel is defending U.S. interests in the Middle East is also quite important. A poll conducted in October 1981 indicated that 64 percent of the Americans regard Israel as a "reliable ally of the United States," 59 percent feel this way about Egypt, but only 33 percent say this about Saudi Arabia.22

After noting the relatively high level of support for Israel, we must stress that this support is not unconditional. According to an NBC NEWS poll in 1977, only 4 percent of the Americans were willing to send U.S. troops "to defend Israel," 24 percent were willing to furnish any type of weapon, but not send troops," 17 percent wanted "limited military shipments" and 39 percent were against any kind of aid whatsoever. In general, however, the majority of Americans are against the
shipment of weapons to Israel or to the Arabs, want Israeli troops to withdraw from occupied territories and are against the preservation of the status quo on the West Bank and in Gaza. A 1976 poll conducted by the Yankelovich firm at the request of the American Jewish Committee already indicated that only 31 percent supported Israel's refusal to negotiate with the PLO and the same number (31 percent) condemned Tel Aviv's position. In 1978, 46 percent of the people polled by CBS condemned M. Begin's policy and only 34 percent approved of it. Whereas in 1978 only 36 percent of the Americans favored the exertion of pressure on Israel, with 52 percent objecting to this, by July 1981 the number of people who felt that Washington should exert stronger pressure on Tel Aviv to achieve peace in the Middle East had already risen to 57 percent, with only 33 percent disagreeing.23

More people in the United States now believe that Washington should support Tel Aviv less if it wishes to retain access to Arab oil. In 1974 this position was supported by 20 percent, with 68 percent disagreeing (according to Harris data), but in 1981 the figure had risen to 39 percent, with only 43 percent disagreeing (according to NBC data). Furthermore, the majority of Americans object to U.S. military intervention in the Middle East. For example, 61 percent, as against 28 percent, oppose military action in the event of a new Arab-Israeli war. According to the WASHINGTON POST, "the majority of respondents are against the use of force to suppress a (possible) revolution in Saudi Arabia," as Reagan has promised to do.24

The level of support for Israel invariably declines whenever the American Administration disagrees openly with the Israeli Government. In 1956, for example, when President Eisenhower publicly censured the invasion of Sinai by Israeli troops, 40 percent of all respondents (as against 29 percent) said that Israel's use of force was unjustified. American-Israeli conflicts have not reached this level of intensity in recent years, but in February 1970, during the squabbles over the "Rogers plan," the level of support for Israel dropped to 44 percent; in spring 1975, when the "reassessment" of American-Israeli relations, announced by G. Ford and H. Kissinger, was going, it fell to 37 percent; and in the beginning of 1978, at the time of the conflict between J. Carter and M. Begin over the "package deal," it reached its lowest point to date—33 percent. Support for the Arabs rose at this time, reaching 14 percent in the beginning of 1978.25 Consequently, the White House is quite able to influence the American approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to manipulate public opinion.

The Reagan Administration came to power when serious changes began to take place in American views on the Middle East. Many of the traditional leaders of the pro-Israel coalition in the Congress lost the election or retired, including J. Javits, F. Church and R. Stone. The same thing happened to some of Israel's moderate supporters—G. McGovern, A. Stevenson and A. Ribicoff. They were replaced by conservative Republicans whose views on the Arab-Israeli conflict have not been clearly defined. Several important Senate committees were headed by opponents of 100-percent support for Israel—C. Percy, M. Hatfield, J. Helms and B. Goldwater. It is true that the pro-Israeli coalition did not disintegrate, but its loss of influence is attested to by the fact that, in October 1981, Zionist lobbyists were able to secure the votes of only 48 senators for the resolution protesting the planned sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Just a few years ago, however,
75-80 members of the Senate were part of the pro-Israel coalition. The Zionist lobby suffered its October defeat at a time when 58 percent of the Americans were against the deal with the Saudis and only 26 percent were for it.26

The escalation of Israeli aggression, the bandit raid on the nuclear reactor in Iraq and the blanket bombing of Lebanon have seriously undermined Israel's popularity in the United States. "Begin's aggressive actions in Baghdad and Beirut have made Americans angry," the WALL STREET JOURNAL reported.27 For example, 50 percent of all respondents, as against 31 percent, condemned the Israeli air raid on Beirut.28 The CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR reported with pleasure that "many influential members of the Jewish community outside the Congress are distressed by the bombing of Beirut. President Reagan does not, at least for the time being, have to deal with the kind of pressure encountered by past presidents when they tried to restrain Israel or to influence it in some other way."29 According to a Gallup poll, 61 percent of the Americans were against the resumption of shipments of F-16 planes to Israel.30 Citing the data of a poll conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly & White, TIME magazine reported: The opinion of Israel and its Prime Minister Begin has grown worse. The overwhelming majority of respondents believe that the United States must limit its support of Israel when it does not approve of Israel's policy."31

Judging by all indications, however, a change of approach toward the Arab-Israeli conflict does not enter into White House plans. The ruling clique in Israel has been assigned a key role in the American plans to create an anti-Soviet "strategic consensus" in the Middle East. Washington does not intend to stop supporting Israel's aggressive line, and the reason for this is certainly not U.S. public affection for Israel, but, we repeat, American imperialism's military strategic plans in the Middle East.

Furthermore, the Reagan Administration intends to continue its earlier attempts to diversify the United States' clientele in the Middle East and to establish stronger ties with the pro-American Arab regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which should, according to Washington's plans, serve as its "support basis" in the region—but along with Israel, and not instead of it. This approach is gaining increasing support in U.S. ruling circles.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more about these lobbies, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 8, 1978, pp 57-69; No 1, 1979, pp 70-78; No 10, 1980, pp 43-55. For a discussion of the new steps to strengthen the U.S.-Israeli military and political alliance and of the memorandum on mutual understanding in the area of strategic cooperation, signed on 13 November 1981, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 1, 1982, pp 34-45—Editor's note.


5. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 15 June 1980.


8. THE TIMES, 6 November 1980.


10. Ibid., p 7.

11. Ibid.


13. Ibid., p 11.


27. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 6 August 1981.

29. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 26 July 1981.


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CSO: 1803/11
U.S. POLITICAL, MILITARY GOALS IN HORN OF AFRICA EXAMINED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 16 Mar 82) pp 30-39

[Article by N. N. Tarasov: "The Horn of Africa in Washington's Strategic Plans"]

[Text] The role assigned to the Horn of Africa in the global imperialist strategy of the United States is primarily due to its location near the shipping lanes between the Indian Ocean and Europe and on the approaches to the world's main oil-producing region (the Persian Gulf, the Near and Middle East and the East Mediterranean), which is known to have been declared a sphere of U.S. "vital interests." Washington has also claimed the right to interfere in the affairs of the African people. "Now that Africa is becoming more important to us for economic, political and strategic reasons," the President's message of 21 January 1980 to the U.S. Congress says, "we will also be giving friendly countries, whether in the Horn of Africa or in other parts of this continent, help in safeguarding their security when their borders require protection."

The policy of American ruling circles in the Horn of Africa was affected, and is still being affected, by imperialism's negative reaction to the victory of the antifeudal, anti-imperialist Ethiopian revolution in 1974, a fact to which Washington still cannot reconcile itself. Besides this, the United States tried to "link" the course of events in this region with some aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly the strategic arms limitation talks. For example, Z. Brzezinski, the national security adviser in the Carter Administration, included Ethiopia (along with the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean states) in the so-called "crescent of crisis" (or "crescent of instability") in accordance with a theory which blamed objective processes in the world on the "subversive activity of the USSR" and which was used to substantiate the expansion of American military presence in the region and the reinforcement of pro-imperialist regimes. This theory was one of the factors that intensified the military element in American policy, and Soviet researchers have correctly viewed it as a return to the theory of former U.S. Secretary of State Dulles. He maintained that changes in Africa (just as in Asia and in Latin America) create a kind of vacuum which, under the conditions of socialist-capitalist confrontation, must be filled by American influence without delay. Furthermore, the United States made energetic use of differences and disagreements between Afro-Arab states and aggravated or even instigated conflicts between them.
As the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress noted: "Imperialist circles think in terms of domination and coercion when they think about other states and peoples. As soon as the monopolies need someone else's oil, uranium or nonferrous metals, the Middle East, Africa and the Indian Ocean are declared a sphere of U.S. 'vital interests.' The U.S. military machine is vigorously pushing its way into this region and it plans to stay for a long time."5

Some History

Chairman Mengistu Haile-Mariam of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Ethiopia (PMAC) described the intrigues of the United States and other capitalist states in the Horn of Africa as an imperialist "conspiracy against the Ethiopian revolution and unity."6

During the first years of its existence, the young Ethiopian Republic had to repulse two acts of aggression at once. Although these acts were committed by neighboring states, they were encouraged and promoted by American and NATO imperialist circles.

In 1977 the Sudan requested military aid from the United States, pleading increasing tension in the Horn of Africa, and simultaneously began to strengthen its ties with conservative Arab regimes. The same year, at an exceptionally difficult time for the Ethiopian revolution, when internal counterrevolutionary forces were gaining strength, the Sudanese Government resorted to direct armed aggression against Ethiopia. This action was preceded by the concentration of regular Sudanese military formations, the transfer of diversionary terrorist groups to the Ethiopian border and the unconcealed support of the Eritrean separatists. The Ethiopian province of Eritrea is located in the north of the country and occupies an area of 125,000 square kilometers. There is no ethnic basis for the name "Eritrean" and it applies to any permanent inhabitant of this province. On 2 December 1950 the Fifth Session of the UN General Assembly approved the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia.

In 1962 the Ethiopian imperial government liquidated the federation and turned Eritrea into one of the Ethiopian provinces. This canceled even the limited rights the Eritrean population had enjoyed up to this time. The movement for Eritrean autonomy and for secession from Ethiopia was born at that time. Ruling circles in the Ethiopian monarchy hoped to settle the conflict by military means.

The new Ethiopian leadership has responded to the Eritrean issue by adhering to the principle of regional autonomy, which was proclaimed in the program of the Ethiopian national democratic revolution (1976). But the Eritrean question has acquired an "international nature" directly as a result of the support of the Eritrean separatists by certain Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt, and of intervention by the West. The lengthy history of the American presence in Eritrea is significant in this connection: In accordance with an agreement concluded in 1953 by Washington and the imperial regime on "mutual defense," the Americans were authorized to lease a military base near Asmara, for the construction of which the United States allocated the emperor 65 million dollars. American personnel are permanently based here.

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The Soviet Union repeatedly underscored its support of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia, and this is reflected in the Soviet-Ethiopian Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation of 20 November 1978.

Eritrea is now controlled by the central Ethiopian Government, although motley gangs of separatists, torn apart by internal struggle, are still active in some of its regions. Within just 1 year (from October 1980 to October 1981), more than 5,000 former members of separatist groups in Eritrea went over to the side of the PMAC.7

As a result of energetic international activity by the PMAC, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and positive neutrality, relations between the two neighboring states were normalized. The two sides signed a joint communiqué in Sierra Leone at the end of 1977, stressing their desire to "settle disputes and disagreements by peaceful means in the spirit of the OAU Charter." As it turned out, this action was quite timely because there was already an urgent need to protect the revolution against aggressive actions by another neighbor--Somalia.

On 23 July 1977, Somalia (SDR) started a war against Ethiopia, violating one of the basic principles of the OAU Charter regarding "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state." During the course of the armed conflict the SDR hoged to satisfy its illegal claims to some parts of Ethiopia, especially Ogaden--part of the province of Harargue (Somalia also claimed part of the territory of Kenya and Djibouti). Somali ruling circles, seized by a fit of chauvinist nationalism, viewed the revolution in Ethiopia and the preoccupation of the PMAC with domestic reforms as a suitable time for their conquest of Ogaden.9

Although the imperialist states verbally advocated the political settlement of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict and stressed their "neutrality," they actually tried to make use of the conflict to undermine the Ethiopian revolution and to strengthen their own influence in the Horn of Africa. The American secret services were particularly active in Ethiopia just before the conflict, when Somalia was making preparations for war, and not without the knowledge of the United States, to the tune of the slogan "now or never!" A PMAC statement of 5 March 1977 made direct reference to CIA involvement in the crimes of "fascist elements" in Ethiopia, including the assassinations of many of the new regime's activists and the assassination attempt on PMAC Chairman Mengistu Haile-Mariam. The Ethiopian Government took resolute steps. In particular, it announced the closure of several American establishments in the country, including a propagandistic U.S. information center, an American military aid mission, U.S. military attache headquarters in Addis Ababa and the consulate in Asmara (Eritrea), and it canceled the American-Ethiopian agreement of 1953 on "mutual defense" and on the use of defense installations in Ethiopia by the Americans.

Somalia was also given covert assistance by other NATO countries, using third states (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman and Egypt), under the supervision and with the participation of the United States. Henry Kissinger's admission that Saudi Arabia had become involved in the war in the Horn of Africa "partly at our insistence" virtually nullified the American Administration's statement about "nonintervention in disputes" in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, even the American press expressed the opinion that "Carter contributed much to the start of the hostilities in the Horn of Africa by openly supporting the Somalis."10
The State Department's obviously provocative remarks about the United States' willingness to give military aid to Somalia, the special conference of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and the FRC in Washington in February 1978 for the coordination of efforts in support of Somali aggression and the dispatch of U.S. emissaries to Mogadishu are just some of the American Administration's "neutral" moves at the height of the hostilities in the Horn of Africa.

The Somali military intervention against Ethiopia went on for around 10 months. In March 1978, however, the Somali troops were defeated and driven out of Ethiopia on the strength of the emergency defense measures taken by the Ethiopian Government. At the time of the Somali invasion of Ethiopia, the USSR, Cuba, the GDR and other socialist countries did not deviate from their policy of giving the Ethiopian revolutionary government maximum international assistance, supported the victim of aggression and, at the request of the PMAC (and in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter), helped it in the reinforcement of its defense potential.

The SDR did not give up its claims to Ethiopian territory after the failure of the "Ogaden venture" and has continued to work toward the same goals in different ways by stipulating various conditions, particularly a plebiscite and referendum in Ogaden (it has a population of 1 million) on the question of its "self-determination" and the withdrawal of "all foreign troops" from the Horn of Africa.

The Ethiopian Government has categorically rejected the Somali demands as attempts to interfere in Ethiopia's internal affairs and has demanded compensation from the SDR for combat-related damages.

Tension still exists in the relations between the countries involved in this conflict and there has been no political settlement in the Horn of Africa: The present situation is neither open warfare nor a stable peace. The events of recent years have confirmed that the instigation of an armed conflict in the Horn of Africa is an important part of U.S. imperialist strategy. American imperialism has eagerly fanned the flames of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict whenever this has been in its tactical or strategic interests, but this has not stopped it from applying the appropriate pressure on the countries in the Horn of Africa in order to temporarily "extinguish" the Somali-Ethiopian conflict in the belief that this might undermine Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation.

It is quite apparent that the United States is taking advantage of the chauvinistic nationalism of pro-Western regimes in the region in its own interest. The use of nationalism for anticommunist, anti-Soviet purposes is an American imperialist tactic dating back to the cold war. Although nationalism is a dangerous ideology for the United States, as it can sometimes work against imperialism, Washington is now energetically making use of the chauvinistic nationalism of ruling groups in Somalia, Sudan and some other countries in its diplomatic activity and is taking a strictly differentiated approach to the countries in the Horn of Africa.

Aid in Exchange for...'Pragmatic Policy'

American policy in the Horn of Africa is further corroboration of the conclusion drawn at the 26th CPSU Congress: "The stronger independence of the liberated countries does not suit the imperialists. By thousands of ways and means they are
trying to attach these countries to themselves so that they can make freer use of
their natural resources and employ their territory in their own strategic plans.
They are making extensive use of the old "divide and conquer" method of the colo-
nizers."

For example, the SDR holds a place of honor among the countries of the Horn of
Africa in the orbit of U.S. benevolence. Although it certainly does not have a
productive economy, it pursues a "pragmatic" (that is, pro-Western) policy, and
when Washington sends economic aid to Somalia (just as to the Sudan and Egypt),
it tries to direct it into the private sector, to strengthen the particular
segment of the population that might become the support base of a pro-American
regime, prepared to make bargains with imperialism.

This is also the purpose of the IBRD recommendations regarding the "stabilization"
of the Somali economy, which actually means the end of the socioeconomic successes
attained along the road to socialism and a return to the resolution of economic
problems within the framework of private capitalist enterprise. In the broader
sense, the present objective consists in using Somalia to "convince" the African
countries that socialism "has no future." As a new way of winning the allegiance
of the wealthy classes in Somalia, just as in many other developing countries, the
Reagan Administration is making extensive use of a myth, invented by its political
strategists, about "international terrorism," which is supposedly instigated by
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and is portraying itself as the
 guardian of "law" and "order."

Now that the overwhelming majority of OAU countries, supported by the socialist
community and all progressive forces in the world, are continuing the broad-scale
offensive against the last stronghold of colonialism and racism in the south of the
continent, American imperialism and its NATO allies are trying to strike "deflecting
blows" by establishing their own support points in Africa, one of which is Somalia,
which is now playing (along with the Sudan) the role of imperialism's Trojan horse
in the Horn of Africa.

In line with the strategic plans to build up its own military potential in the Red
Sea and Indian Ocean, the United States signed an agreement with Somalia on the use
of a naval base and airfield for the storage of American weapons in Berbera and
the port of Mogadishu, which are regarded by the Pentagon as exceptionally convenient
and economically advantageous ports for American ships in peacetime and as impor-
tant bridgeheads for the "rapid deployment force" or other U.S. troop contingents
in "crisis situations" in the Indian Ocean or Red Sea.

The 23 March 1981 issue of London's MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL magazine reported
that the United States will supply Somalia with 40 million dollars' worth of mili-
tary equipment and 5 million dollars in economic aid in exchange for authorization
to use the port in Berbera and the airfield in Mogadishu. The agreement with
Somalia on these bases is "part of the American strategic program in Southwest
Asia, and the situation is now favorable for the shipment of military equipment to
this country," the NEW YORK TIMES remarked on 6 January last year.

When former U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger made a "private" tour of some African
and Middle Eastern countries in the beginning of 1981, he proposed that the zone
of U.S. "vital interests" in the Indian Ocean and its natural elements—the Red Sea
and Persian Gulf—be encircled by American military bases. In his words, the United States should establish a "visible presence in this region" and take "a strategic stand allowing for an effective role in African crises." 16

The fact that Somali President Siad Barre was invited to Washington during the first "hundred days" of the Reagan Administration and then visited the United States again in August 1981 testifies unequivocally that the White House has not lost interest in the Horn of Africa. When Washington courts Somalia's "friendship," it is certainly also considering the interest expressed in American aid by Somali ruling circles. The Barre regime needs this aid to satisfy its arrogant militaristic ambitions outside its own country and to suppress the growing opposition to the regime. Somalia is under martial law, instituted in October 1980 in connection with the mass public demonstrations against the ruling regime's anti-national domestic and foreign policy. In October 1981 the creation of a Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia was announced in Beirut. It "will struggle for the elimination of the Barre regime and the restoration of democracy."

The "special relationship" with Washington has naturally caused other states in the region to distrust Somalia and to suspect that Somali territory will become a bridgehead from which the United States can threaten progressive states in Africa and Southwest Asia with military intervention.

Although the Pentagon and the U.S. Secret Service are relying primarily on expansionist powers (Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Egypt) to undermine the basis of the Ethiopian revolution, they have not given up their attempts at diversionary action against the new regime in Ethiopia from within. When Mengistu Hailie-Mariam spoke at the 26th CPSU Congress, he discussed the Ethiopian situation, stressing that "Ethiopia is now among the developing countries which are of particular interest to imperialist and reactionary forces." 18

By arming Ethiopia's neighbors (Somalia, Sudan, Egypt and Kenya) and instigating conflicts in the Horn of Africa, American imperialism is involving Ethiopia and other countries in the region in an exhausting arms race which their economies cannot endure. According to estimates, the growth of military spending in many African states, including those in the continent's northeast, is much higher on a percentage basis than the growth of natural income. 19

Ethiopia is understandably taking retaliatory action of a defensive nature. In particular, in August 1981 it signed a treaty on friendship with Libya and the PDNY (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). This will not only strengthen the defense of the three states, but is also intended to consolidate progressive trends in the economic and cultural development of these countries (in response to this treaty, which is consistent with the principles of the movement for nonalignment, Somalia broke off diplomatic relations with Libya).

The United States and other imperialist states have recently made more persistent attempts to strengthen their influence in Ethiopia by giving it various kinds of assistance. Due to the pronounced anti-American feelings in Ethiopia, resulting from U.S. imperialism's extortionate policy during the years of the imperial regime, the United States' NATO allies are now playing the main role in this area.

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At the Rome session of the NATO Council on 4-5 May 1981, the foreign ministers of several NATO countries spoke openly for the first time about the coordination of their actions in Asia and Africa, including the Horn of Africa. The West now regards economic leverage as the chief way of influencing Ethiopia's future development, hoping to use it to regain the influence it has lost in this country.

In addition to this, imperialism has also resorted to economic sabotage in order to hold up the African countries' independent advancement, to discredit socialism to some degree in the eyes of the African public and to keep imperialism's dominant position in Africa unassailable. One item of interest in this connection is the plan to direct the so-called "peace canal" in Egypt, which is supposed to carry water from the Nile (the Nile basin encompasses all or part of the territory of Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt) to the Sinai Peninsula to irrigate the Sinai desert. The construction plans were drawn up under the supervision of Pentagon specialists and are of long-range strategic significance. The American and Israeli press frankly reported that the Nile waters are being diverted primarily to irrigate the Negev desert and provide Israeli cities and rural communities with drinking water. In particular, the waters of the Nile are expected to turn the Negev desert into a huge "produce garden for the American and Western European dinner table." Furthermore, the "contractors"--the United States, Israel and Egypt, whose firms have already begun work on the project--are ignoring the interests of other people who live in the basin of this great African river, although a change in the Nile's present characteristics will certainly have a negative effect on these interests (90 percent of the Nile's water comes from the Ethiopian plateau).

The Ethiopian Government was one of the first in Africa to object to this predatory plan.

As far as Djibouti, the third country in the Horn of Africa, is concerned, this state has recently been given more attention by imperialist circles and their agents--the reactionary Arab regimes. The port of Djibouti, which was under French colonial rule until 1977 and is still the location of a French military base, is of great importance to the NATO countries as a means of controlling the Bab al Mandab Strait, which connects the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean, and of exerting pressure on the Horn of Africa in general. France and Djibouti have signed the appropriate documents to perpetuate the French military presence in Djibouti and an agreement on economic and technical cooperation.

The possible use of French bases in Djibouti by the United States began to be negotiated in 1980. Eventually, the port will be as deep as the Suez Canal, making Djibouti accessible to all types of vessels, including aircraft carriers. In view of the port's convenient geographical location, at the point where Asia meets Africa, plans call for the transformation of Djibouti into a major center for NATO naval squadrons.

By entangling the Horn of Africa in a net of military bases and involving the countries in this region in an arms race, Washington is resorting to force, threats of force or subversive actions to keep the African states, even if in modified forms, in the position of targets of imperialist exploitation, to isolate them from the socialist community and, if possible, to stabilize pro-imperialist regimes in northeast Africa.
Camp David and the Horn of Africa

When the United States concluded the Camp David agreements in 1978, it not only hoped to break up the united Arab front, but also viewed Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement "as the first step toward the creation of an axis of 'moderate' pro-Western states in the Middle East and adjacent areas to compensate for the loss of Iran."23 In addition to this, the United States was trying to turn Egypt into a convenient supply center for its troops in the event of hostilities in the Red Sea basin and Persian Gulf, and into a new police force for the suppression of the national liberation struggle of Afro-Asian and Arab peoples.

It is indicative that the progressive Arab public could see even then that the plans for the capitulation in the Middle East were closely connected with the conspiracy against revolutionary Ethiopia. Article 4 of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation Between Ethiopia, Libya and the PDRY says: "The parties to the treaty will oppose the manoeuvres and intrigues of the signatories of the Camp David agreement."24 "Ruling circles in Egypt," representatives of the Communist Parties of Jordan and Israel stressed, "are not concealing their desire to display even more vigor than the Israeli rulers in the struggle against revolutionary changes in Africa and in the south of the Arab peninsula—in democratic Yemen."25

In addition to continuing their subversive activity to disturb the situation in Ethiopia and other progressive countries, American ruling circles are trying to unite reactionary forces and regimes in the region by supplying them with modern weapons and urging them to form a regional military alliance under the U.S. aegis. For example, more military equipment is being shipped to the Sudan, which is regarded by Washington as a "key" African country. American military aid to the Sudan in 1982 was expected to total 100 million dollars, which would be more than 3 times as great as the 1981 figure. After Sadat's death, however, the Reagan Administration decided to double the amount. In October 1981, according to a NEWS WEEK report, the United States sent six C-130 military transport planes to Khartoum; two American planes equipped with the AWACS system were already patrolling Sudan's borders (they are maintained and serviced by more than 200 American ground personnel). Besides this, the Pentagon informed Congress of its intention to sell Sudan 20 M-60 tanks with ammunition, spare parts and auxiliary equipment valued at a total of 36 million dollars.26

In all, as London's AFRICAN BUSINESS journal reported, the United States will send weapons valued at 400 million dollars to the Horn of Africa in fiscal year 1982.27 Washington's military expansion, according to this journal, is being carried out under the cover of "agreements" on the possible use of ports and airfields in Somalia, Kenya and Oman. According to Pentagon plans, these countries, along with Egypt and Sudan, are supposed to constitute a united system of permanent U.S. military presence in the vast region of Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, with its center located on the American military base on Diego Garcia.

The idea of creating an exclusive bloc of U.S. allies in the Red Sea region (Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Saudi Arabia) began to be implemented persistently and vigorously when the Reagan Administration took office. The idea was first brought up at the time of Henry Kissinger's abovementioned trip to the Horn of Africa and during talks by top-level representatives of the Egyptian and Somali armed forces:
They discussed the creation of a united command for the armed forces of these two countries. The further development of the military relations between these two states were discussed in August 1981 by the Somali deputy defense minister and the Egyptian leaders. H. Moubarek, who was then the vice president of Egypt, took part in the discussion. Egyptian Minister of Defense and War Production Abu Ghazala announced, after a visit to the United States in August 1981, that Cairo would assume full "military responsibility" for affairs in the region and the defense of African states "friendly" to Egypt, especially Somalia and Sudan. In 1981, Egypt conducted talks on "military cooperation" with Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia in addition to Somalia and Sudan. In this way, with the approval of the White House, Cairo donned the clothing of the "military defend r" of the African countries against the mythical "Soviet military threat." The United States hoped to take advantage of this situation to push the countries of the Horn of Africa into the channel of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism.

There is also another reason for Cairo's "African responsibility." As the WASHINGTON POST reported on 20 August 1981, "the upcoming buildup of Egyptian military strength with new shipments of American weapons is intended for a fight against Libya on the Western border and for the spread of Egyptian influence in the Red Sea region."

Recent events, including the massive "Bright Star" military exercises conducted in November-December 1981 on the orders of the U.S. President within the territory of Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Oman (American ground and airborne units from the United States and naval subunits from the Indian Ocean were transferred to this zone to participate in the exercises), have proved that Washington is not relying completely on a militaristic coalition of its allies in any particular part of the world, but prefers to supplement and reinforce it with the direct form of U.S. military presence that has become the most common form of American military "aid" under the Reagan Administration, including the presence in the Horn of Africa. The "Bright Star" maneuvers were intended to demonstrate the Reagan Administration's determination to "defend U.S. vital interests" in northeast Africa, the Middle East and southwest Asia.

Besides this, as Chairman Mengistu Haile-Mariam of the Ethiopian PMAC remarked in a message sent to the leaders of the PDNY in Libya, "by building up its military presence in the Mediterranean and Red Seas, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, the United States is trying to destabilize progressive countries and revolutionary movements." 28

All of the diverse events in the Horn of Africa essentially constitute a single group of interrelated problems. On the one hand, they reflect the irreconcilable conflict between imperialism and the world revolutionary process, which has taken the objective form of the fierce battle being waged by revolutionary democratic forces in the region against neocolonialism and its agents, the feudal-tribal and bourgeois circles that are frightened by the wave of revolutionary actions by the masses in the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, the increasing social polarization in the countries of northeast Africa is being utilized by external Arab reactionary forces with their own interests in the region and with misgivings about the revolutionary effect of the Ethiopian revolution on their countries. The efforts of reactionary regimes in the Arab east to undermine the revolutionary
movement in northeast Africa have been supported by American imperialism and its NATO allies so that imperialist hegemonic interests can be satisfied at the expense and to the detriment of the interests of the African countries and peoples. For this reason, everything that the United States does in northeast Africa and adjacent regions with the aid of the Camp David agreement and outside its framework is aimed, in accordance with the aggressive U.S. global strategy, at strengthening imperialism's military presence in the Horn of Africa, which is directly adjacent to the Middle East, and at militarizing northeast Africa.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Horn of Africa is the northeastern projection of the African continent where socialist Ethiopia, the Somali Democratic Republic and the Republic of Djibouti are located.


7. ADDIS ZEMEN (in Amharic), 15 November 1981.

8. Some Soviet researchers who examine intergovernmental relations within the "Somali triangle" (see, for example, P. I. Manchka, "Aktual'nye problemy sovremennoy Afriki" [The Urgent Problems of Present-Day Africa], Moscow, 1979, pp 119-120) make reference to the arbitrary division of the continent by the imperialist powers. This certainly applies to many African countries, but it is less true of Ethiopia, whose modern borders, including the Ogaden region, were delineated prior to the imperialist partitioning of Africa and, what is more, long before the birth of the Somali state.

9. This was pointed out, in particular, by J. Spencer, a former adviser of the Ethiopian emperor (J. Spencer, "Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa and U.S. Policy," Cambridge, Mass., 1977, p 4).


11. At the end of October 1981 TIME magazine reported: "The tension in this region could easily grow into a confrontation between the superpowers if Somalia...should be tempted, by virtue of its ties with the United States, from which it acquires its weapons, to support the rebels in Ethiopian Ogaden more actively" (TIME, 26 October 1981, p 22).


14. THE SUNDAY TIMES (Johannesburg), 7 June 1981.

15. In terms of per capita income (130 American dollars a year), Somalia is one of the lowest-ranking African countries and falls into the group of countries categorized by the United Nations as the poorest in the world.


17. In October 1981 the Senate of the U.S. Congress approved a bill on foreign aid for fiscal year 1982, envisaging appropriations totaling 5.8 billion dollars, including 78.5 million for Somalia (20 million in credit for the purchase of American weapons; 350,000 for the training of Somali soldiers; 16.2 million for development needs; 20 million in the economic support fund and 21.9 million in food assistance in accordance with "Act 480").

18. PRAVDA, 26 February 1981.

19. Somalia, for example, has an annual military budget of 95 million dollars; its armed forces, including reserves, number 91,050 individuals. Sudan's military expenditures are 442.6 million dollars a year and it has an army of 102,000. The respective figures for Egypt are 2.17 billion dollars and 882,000 (NEW AFRICAN, August 1981).

20. The Republic of Djibouti covers an area of 21,783 square kilometers and has a population of 260,000—Afars, Issas and Europeans. Islam is the state religion.

21. For example, according to reports in the press, Saudi Arabia is trying to pressure France and other NATO countries to recognize "special Arab interests" in this region. Since the time when Djibouti was proclaimed independent, Saudi Arabia has given this republic more than 80 million dollars in the form of economic aid (AFRICAN BUSINESS, July 1981).


27. AFRICAN BUSINESS, October 1981.


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DECLINE IN REAGAN'S POPULARITY LAID TO ECONOMIC POLICIES

Moscow SSA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 15 Mar 82) pp 51-54

[Article by N. P. Popov: "'Steady Decline in Popularity'"

[Text] This is what NBC correspondents had to say about President Reagan's tour of the Midwestern states, where he was greeted by mass protest demonstrations. And this is a good description of the reaction of many Americans to the results of the administration's actions.

"A year after Ronald Reagan took office," TIME magazine remarked, "the nation he governs is in a dismal mood. Americans are disturbed by the situation in the country, worried about inflation and troubled by the recession." According to public opinion polls, 63 percent of the Americans "see a real possibility of war somewhere in the world in the next 5 years." Many believe that "the President is doing exactly the opposite" of "achieving nuclear disarmament by means of negotiation."

The Americans have more than enough reasons for dissatisfaction and anxiety. The recession turned out to be more severe than the administration had predicted, unemployment reached a record level since the time of the "Great Depression" of the 1930's, leaving more than 10 million people out of work in February, and the deficit in the new budget proposed by the administration will exceed 100 billion dollars, in place of the promised reduction to 43 billion.

The practice of "Reaganomics" has injured the laboring public, especially low-income strata, the black population, the elderly and people living on welfare. The poor have expressed their growing discontent with the administration's policy by joining protest marches. It is obvious, however, that the administration is also losing the support of even the particular strata on whose solidarity it originally relied.

We should recall that Reagan's views on the need for cuts in excessive government spending, "wasteful" social programs and "big government" were shared by many in the second half of the 1970's, as a result of which rightwing conservative forces were able to instill the masses with beliefs close to those of the Republican Party right wing. At the basis of these attitudes lay the general deterioration of economic conditions in the 1970's, which affected even the strata that are
widely and sometimes quite arbitrarily called the "middle class" by American authors. These are small businessmen, white-collar workers and the upper stratum of the working class, all of whom were disturbed by rising taxes.

The Republican Administration is backed up primarily by big business, which has been granted new and significant privileges. Nevertheless, it also needs a mass base, the support of sufficient large segments of the population for the successful completion of its programs and for a Republican victory in the coming congressional elections in fall 1982 and presidential elections in 1984.

The present administration was relying on the "middle class" to provide it with this kind of base. It was relying on it even more than previous Republican administrations—for example, the Nixon Administration with its appeals to the "silent majority." Ethnic minorities, low-income strata and the poor, who would have suffered the most from the new economic program, were frankly written off in the plans of Republican Party strategists.

The unbridled rise in prices in the last 10 years has been a heavy burden for most of the population. However, whereas the working class was suffering primarily from unemployment, the main problem of the middle strata was inflation, and it was the proposed reduction of inflation that was supposed to show them that "Reaganomics" could be successful.

Many observers noted last summer that Ronald Reagan was able to quickly and successfully push virtually all of his programs through Congress and stifle the weak opposition of Democrats precisely because the administration had created sufficient mass support for these programs, primarily in the middle strata. The Americans were convinced of the need for cuts in social programs as the main cause of inflation and of the importance of increased military spending to safeguard national security. Even some of those who expected their own economic situation to be affected negatively by the cuts in social expenditures supported the administration's program as something "necessary for the country."

The Americans lived on hope. In general, the majority approved of Reagan's program (from 58 to 68 percent, according to various polls) and, what is more, 53 percent approved of his activity in the economic sphere and 53 percent also approved of his steps to reduce inflation. It is true that many continued to advocate the preservation of certain social programs.

The turning point came at the end of fall.

Millions of families felt the real consequences of cuts in social programs and millions of other families realized what they would have to face when projected further cuts were made. This dispelled the illusion that the cuts would only "trim the excess fat" from excessive programs and would not affect the "truly needy." In place of the government social programs won by the laboring public after more than 20 years of struggle, the President offered the Americans something rather vague: "To disclose need where it exists and to organize programs of assistance on a voluntary basis."
The increasing skepticism of the "middle class" became an important trend in mass attitudes. Although the rate of inflation has dropped slightly as a result of recession, increased unemployment and high interest rates, this is not giving people faith in the future at a time of general economic stagnation. Unemployment, which has reached a record postwar level, is affecting members of the middle strata more and more: Although the annual unemployment figure exceeded 9 million, more that 25 million Americans were out of work at some time.

As a result of this, unemployment, which was once ranked in public opinion polls as a relatively "secondary" problem, has now been placed on the same level as inflation. For example, according to the data of a November NBC poll, "the most important economic problem facing the government in the next 3 years" was listed as "high inflation" by 34 percent, as "the high rate of unemployment" by 32 percent and as "high interest rates" by 30 percent.

The middle strata have also been affected directly by cuts in various social programs. For example, cuts in "student loans" have deprived many middle-income families of the chance to send their children to universities and colleges. The expenses of Americans have risen as a result of cuts in medical programs for the elderly, particularly the funds for their maintenance and treatment in rest homes, etc.

All of this led to a considerable decline in the assessment of the Republican Administration's performance at the end of Reagan's first year in office. For example, 62 percent of the Americans did not expect inflation to drop the next year, and 63 percent had a negative opinion about the administration's activity in this sphere; 59 percent did not expect a drop in unemployment and the same percentage did not expect any significant drop in interest rates. The majority (52 percent as against 38 percent) did not expect a return to high rates of economic growth. According to TIME magazine, representatives of the Yankelovich firm asked voters if they were living better than they had been a year ago. No, replied 59 percent.

On the whole, the President's performance in the economic sphere was given a positive evaluation by 39 percent and a negative one by 59 percent after he had been in the White House for a year. The lowest of the specific assessments was given for the President's "concern about the poor, elderly and sick"--28:70. In the words of TIME magazine, 60 percent agreed with the opinion that Reagan "represents business interests, and not the average American."

Overall indicators of the President's popularity, despite their uncommonly high level during his first year in the White House, fell below the indicators for other recent presidents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation of Presidential Performance, %</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reagan, December 1981</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter, December 1977</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon, December 1969</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson, December 1965</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Under the conditions of the declining popularity of the administration's domestic policy program, its tough foreign policy line and its creation and exacerbation of international crises not only serve it as justification for the arms race and for additional allocations to the military-industrial complex, but are also being used to divert public attention from mounting domestic problems. In recent years the concerted influence of ruling forces on public opinion resulted in increased support for higher arms expenditures, but the militaristic rhetoric has gradually had the opposite effect.

Today the Americans are seriously worried, according to polls, about the danger of a thermonuclear war (63 percent are afraid that it will start in the next 5 years); 67 percent believe that the main objective should be "arms agreements with the Soviet Union." Only 25 percent said that "priority should be given to the expansion of U.S. nuclear potential as a means of deterrence"; 42 percent are disturbed by Reagan's insistence on arms buildup instead of arms control. There are significant differences between public opinion and official policy regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. For example, 55 percent believe that "the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe without any kind of agreement with the Soviet Union will increase the danger of nuclear war." Only 31 percent feel that this will "reduce the danger" of war. In contrast to the prevailing attitude of a year ago, 46 percent say that they would "cut military spending if necessary in order to balance the budget" (and 38 percent still object to cuts in military appropriations).

On the whole, the President's performance in the foreign policy sphere is given a negative evaluation by 50 percent and a positive one by 47 percent; furthermore, only 25 percent "agree completely" with the administration's policy line.

The future of the administration and its programs will depend just as much on the assessment of its policy by the business community, especially big business, as on the attitudes of voters. Judging by the openly pro-monopoly aims of administration policy, we can assume that it will be constantly supported by big business. Even the situation here, however, is somewhat ambiguous. The monopolies want more than just an administration with rightwing conservative intentions; they need these intentions to take the form of an effective economic program. During the first stage of the administration's activity, the business community graciously accepted tax deductions and other privileges for business and fully approved of administration policies and rhetoric, but in the second half of last year, when the administration had to demonstrate some success in economic recovery, the reaction of businessmen began to change.

The authors of the administration's economic program proceeded from the assumption that the privileges granted to companies would give them a chance to increase capital investments, which would, in turn, stimulate the economy and create more budget revenues and jobs. By the beginning of September 1981, however, big business suspected that the government would be unable to reduce the budget deficit and had doubts about the reliability and balance of the economic program in general. The steady decline instead of the rise promised by the administration cooled the attitudes of industrialists. In November, NEW YORK TIMES correspondent A. Louis wrote about the mounting skeptical feelings about "Reaganomics." "Now
everyone can see that large tax cuts combined with a rapid increase in military spending cannot lead to a balanced budget and prosperity, but, on the contrary, create a significant budget deficit, limited credit, recession and unemployment."

The capital investment growth anticipated by the administration did not take place. It had to make a choice between trying to reduce the budget deficit by cutting military spending, which would be inconsistent with Reagan's "tough" foreign policy, or make further cuts in civilian programs. The administration is now trying to do the latter, despite its declining popularity and mounting opposition in various segments of the population. It is true that there is a third alternative—the cancellation of the tax cuts. This, however, could lead to an even greater loss of prestige—to "Carterization," to use the now fashionable definition of an indecisive president with an unreliable policy. Many economists are urging Reagan to choose the third alternative, including Chairman P. Volcker of the Federal Reserve System.

The events of the first year of the Republican Administration, and of recent months in particular, indicate that there is growing mass opposition in the nation to the administration's reactionary policy. Socioeconomic programs are even losing the support of the people to whom "Reaganomics" was supposed to appeal the most—the members of the middle strata and the business community.

The future of the administration will depend largely on the state of the economy this summer. The congressional elections in November will fully reveal voter attitudes and will set the tone for politics in the next 2 years, up to the time of the next presidential election.

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U.S. TRADE SANCTIONS AGAINST USSR, POLAND ATTACKED

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 30 Apr 82 pp 1-4

["Digest" of V. A. Yulin article "Trade and 'Cold War' Relapses" in Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 pp 55-61]

[Text] At the end of December 1981 the U.S. administration applied new discriminatory moves against the Soviet Union and Poland in a bid to use economic relations for interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries and for pressuring them politically. However, the short period of time which has passed since then has confirmed another setback for America's long bankrupt policy "from the positions of strength." What is the essence of the new "economic sanctions" into which the United States wants to draw its West European allies contrary to their desire and interests?

In shaping the U.S. position on trade with the USSR and other socialist countries, Washington has always considered that the Soviet Union is more interested in this trade than America. That is why the U.S. ruling quarters believe that the Soviet Union should make political concessions to Washington for its "condescension" to trade with Moscow. Washington's readiness to stop trade with the USSR for one political aim or other becomes particularly apparent when the forces which want to intensify confrontation with the Soviet Union and which think in the categories of the "big stick" policy begin to win the upper hand in the U.S. ruling circles.

However, Washington cannot but take into account America's big constant deficit of foreign trade and the necessity to step up exports. That was one of the reasons why in April 1981 Washington abrogated Carter's ban on the sale of farm produce and superphosphoric acid to the USSR and prolonged the Soviet-U.S. grain agreement till September 30, 1982. Of course, this did not mean that Washington rejected the "weapon of embargo" in trade. It only scrapped the more discredited ban which hit, above all, the interests and international prestige of the United States.

Washington's strategy with respect to East-West trade failed to bring the results desired at the meeting of the "big seven" in Ottawa in July 1981. Attempts to openly pressurize America's partners, Washington's feigned "concern" over West Germany's decision to participate in the construction of a gas pipeline to run from the Western Siberia to the western border of the USSR and its "warnings" about West Germany's "dependence" on Soviet gas deliveries were of no avail either.
However, even after the Ottawa meeting the U.S. administration did not introduce major changes into its policy with respect to trade with the socialist countries. Speaking at the Senate subcommittee on international trade in July 1981, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig said that among the main elements of the administration's policy in this field were control over trade in strategic goods and the guidance of the foreign policy of the West.

Washington thought that the aggravation of the international situation, brought about by America's adventuristic policy in connection with the events in Poland, would make its allies rally behind their "senior partner" and this, in Washington's design, would give the United States a chance to increase pressure on the states which did not want to give in to U.S. diktat. That was why, distorting the state of affairs in Poland and the character of the steps its legitimate government took to prevent bloodshed and chaos in the country, the U.S. administration passed a decision meaning, to all intents and purposes, a rupture of economic relations with Poland. Reagan did not conceal that he wanted to hinder Poland's emergence from the economic crisis in every way and impede the provision of the Polish people with food.

As for the "sanctions" against the Soviet Union, Washington motivated them by the USSR's "responsibility" for the imposition of martial law in Poland. The U.S. administration suspended Aeroflot flights to the United States, postponed the talks on a new grain agreement, interrupted the talks on a new Soviet-U.S. shipping agreement, and the issue of export licenses to sell some types of equipment and technology, ordinary subjects of international trade, to the Soviet Union, and so on and so forth.

In this way, disregarding international law and its commercial and other commitments to other nations, the United States showed the world once again that it was unreliable as a trade partner.

The Reagan administration would like to enforce on the Western countries the U.S. standard of "sanctions" as a method of tying its partners to the U.S. strategy of anti-detente and support for Washington's hegemonistic course. Washington believes that the economic "sanctions" against the socialist countries should also serve as the gauge by which to determine the degree of the loyalty of America's allies to the idea of "Atlantic solidarity" in the face of the "Soviet threat."

On the whole, however, it is clear that America's policy of diktat misfires, although Washington's allies proceed, of course, from common class interests with the United States. It should be remembered that in the 1970's thanks to detente Western Europe considerably benefited by greater business cooperation with the socialist world. The USSR's trade with this group of countries totalled 4,700 million roubles in 1970 and 31,500 million roubles in 1980. A new dimension of the USSR's trade and economic relations with these nations is their long-term and large-scale character. Since the Helsinki conference on security and cooperation in Europe the Soviet Union has concluded over 30 long-term agreements and programs for trade and economic cooperation with Western Europe. Thus, the latest agreement with France covers the period up to 1990 and the similar agreement with West Germany expires in the year of 2003.
This course of developments meets the vital interest of Western Europe particularly now that the recession is in full swing in the West, a prolonged structural crisis has been raging in major sectors, industrial capacities are operated considerably below capacity, and unemployment keeps growing.

If today, by conducting its myopic policy, Washington excludes U.S. industrial potential from East-West trade, if, for example, in 1980, Soviet-U.S. trade made 40 percent of the USSR's commerce with Finland and France, and 25 percent of its trade with West Germany, responsibility for this goes to the U.S. ruling quarters which subject the USSR to trade and credit discrimination, as a result of which U.S. companies lose more and more Soviet contracts which go to their West European and Japanese competitors. According to experts, in 1974-1980 for this reason alone the U.S. companies lost over 4,000 million dollars in possible Soviet contracts for equipment. History convincingly shows that any attempts to discriminate against the Soviet Union, particularly to subject it to economic blockade or boycott, have never brought a success to their initiators and those who stand behind them. There is no doubt that today's "sanctions" will also fail.

CSO: 1803/11
U.S. CONTINUES LONGSTANDING EFFORT TO BRING SPAIN INTO NATO

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 16 Mar 82) pp 70-75

[Article by N. M. Sorokina: "Washington, Madrid and NATO"]

[Text] On 2 December 1981 the Spanish Government requested the NATO Council to accept Spain as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. At the Council session in Brussels on 10-12 December, foreign ministers of the NATO countries discussed this request and wrote a protocol on the matter, which was then submitted to all bloc members for ratification. In accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Spain's membership in NATO will become an established fact when the ratified document is filed with the U.S. Government. But this is only the first stage. It will be followed by talks about Spain's position and role in NATO and about its contribution to the bloc's system of military preparations. Whereas the first stage is expected to conclude by spring 1982, the second will apparently take longer due to conflicts between NATO members and Spain and between Washington and Madrid.

At the official protocol signing ceremony in Brussels, NATO Secretary General J. Luns stressed that the North Atlantic Alliance was accepting a new member at a time when the "situation in the international arena is becoming particularly complex."

But the complexity and tension of today's international situation are largely a result of the attempts of the United States and aggressive circles in other NATO countries to change the existing approximate balance of forces in Europe in their own favor so that they can be militarily superior to the Warsaw Pact states. Five years ago, at the Council session in December 1976, the NATO countries resolved to reject a Soviet proposal regarding the non-enlargement of existing military alliances. Now the West has taken a further step in its bloc policy: NATO has been enlarged through the acceptance of a new member--Spain.

The United States, which has always viewed Spain within the context of its own military strategic preparations, was instrumental in the accomplishment of this step. With a view to Spain's extremely convenient geostrategic location, its human resources and its close, traditional ties with the countries of North Africa and the Arab east, the United States has been particularly interested in this country in the postwar years. American policy has displayed two basic and
Interrelated lines in relations with Spain: the development of bilateral military cooperation and the involvement of the country in NATO activities. The attainment of these goals has been associated in the United States with, firstly, the consolidation of America's own influence in Europe and in the North Atlantic Alliance and, secondly, the reinforcement of the NATO bloc, particularly its southern flank.

Washington has been quite successful in its efforts to attain the first of these goals. In 1953 the United States signed its first agreement with Spain on military cooperation, in accordance with which it was authorized to use military bases on Spanish territory and to maintain a large U.S. military contingent on these bases in exchange for economic and military aid.

In 1963, Washington won the "right" to deploy nuclear weapons on Spanish territory by making some concessions to Madrid. American bombers carrying atomic bombs were flying over Spain before 1967, and the American nuclear submarines which were based in Rota remained there until 1979. Later, in 1968 and 1970, American-Spanish agreements were extended and revised. Some provisions were changed: For example, those pertaining to the status of the military bases, which were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Spanish Government, the status of American servicemen (making them more subject to Spanish law) and the nature of American aid, most of which was transferred to the military sphere in the 1970's.

The development of bilateral relations with Spain gave Washington tangible benefits: a chance to control the west Mediterranean, the permission to base its Sixth Fleet and aviation there, and access to the Atlantic and important shipping lanes. Spain became a training ground for American and NATO air force maneuvers and plans were made to use its territory as a bridgehead for the transfer of American troops to "hot spots" in other regions and as a NATO reserve and nuclear depot. By paving the way to the Spanish economy for American monopolies, the United States simultaneously obtained large profits, economic advantages and an opportunity to influence Spanish domestic and foreign policy to such a degree that there was talk of Spain's "Americanization" in the 1960's. Developing bilateral cooperation with Spain for its own selfish purposes, the United States turned it into a dependent ally.

The United States showed an interest in attaining the other goal—the inclusion of Spain in NATO—as soon as the North Atlantic Alliance was formed. In 1948, when the creation of NATO was being negotiated, American military delegations visited Spain. The question of Spain's membership in NATO was already being discussed during these visits and during talks with Western European allies. In the 1950's the United States made various plans for Spain's indirect inclusion in the system of Western alliances. Washington planned, for example, to create a so-called Mediterranean bloc, which would be made up of France and Italy in addition to Spain, as well as some countries in North Africa. This bloc was supposed to become something like a branch of NATO and allow the United States to make use of Spain's special relationship with the Arab countries.

These plans were opposed, however, by the Western European powers. Under pressure from the democratic public in these countries, their governments closed the "front doors" of the bloc to the Franco regime. Besides this, people in the Western European capitals were worried that a pro-American Spain might be utilized
by the United States to strengthen its own position in the bloc and serve its own interests in the Mediterranean.

In subsequent decades the United States tried to include Franco's Spain in the system of Atlantic ties by bringing the dictatorship out of international isolation, creating a favorable political climate and the practical foundations for the development of cooperation between Madrid and the Western European NATO countries and actually "attaching" Spain to the bloc's military preparations through the organization of joint naval maneuvers and exercises by NATO and Spanish armed forces and the training of Spanish servicemen in accordance with NATO standards. Special articles in bilateral U.S.-Spanish agreements also helped in the attainment of this goal. For example, the 1953 agreement on "mutual assistance in defense matters" contained secret provisions stipulating that military bases on Spanish territory will be used by NATO forces as well as U.S. troops in the event of war. In 1970, close cooperation "in measures to safeguard the security of the Atlantic and Mediterranean regions" was already stipulated in the published text of the new agreement signed by the two countries. Spain's inclusion in the system of relations encompassing the entire Mediterranean basin and in the NATO advance warning and air control system served as strong material reinforcement of this provision.

The next step leading to closer contacts with NATO was the treaty "on friendship and cooperation" signed by the United States and Spain in 1976. An American-Spanish council, with a special commission for coordination with NATO, was established in accordance with this treaty. Washington's Center for Defense Information acknowledged at that time that "if NATO does not open the front door to Spain, the United States will pull its ally in through the back door" with the aid of the military articles of this treaty.

The U.S. efforts to involve Spain in NATO activities became particularly active after Franco's death, and not only in connection with worries about the future of U.S. military bases in this country.* Certain processes in the mid-1970's weakened American influence within the so-called Mediterranean belt--from Portugal and Italy to Greece and Turkey. The destabilization of the situation in this subregion aroused anxiety in Western ruling circles because it was undermining NATO's southern flank. The bases in Spain and, what was most important, the stronger pro-Atlantic tendencies in Madrid's foreign policy seemed particularly important in this connection.

Washington began to exert stronger pressure on Madrid after the start of the Reagan Administration. Part of the reason was the partial loss of American influence in the Middle East in connection with the events in Iran and Afghanistan and the destabilization of the situation in the Near East after Sadat's death. Besides this, the 1976 treaty would be expiring on 21 September 1981, and Washington was interested in signing a new treaty with Spain after it had entered NATO, as this would give the United States a greater advantage.

* In accordance with the 1976 treaty, Spain authorized the United States to use air force bases in Torrejon de Ardoz (near Madrid), outside of Zaragoza and in Moron de la Frontera, a naval base in Rota (Andalucia), 7 radar stations and 20 other military facilities scattered throughout Spain.
A particularly massive political and diplomatic operation, aimed at Spain's inclusion in NATO, was launched after the unsuccessful attempt at a coup d'état in Madrid (February 1981). These events were used by the United States and its allies as a pretext for immediately taking Spain "under the protection" of the alliance. The negotiation of the bilateral Spanish-American treaty was postponed for 8 months—the presumed duration of the formalities that would turn Spain into the 16th member of the North Atlantic bloc. Spain was also subjected to stronger pressure by governments of other NATO countries: As leverage, they linked certain matters of particular interest to Madrid, such as membership in the EEC and the Gibraltar question, with its request to join NATO. The Spanish press remarked at that time that Madrid had not experienced pressure as obvious and direct as this for a long time.

In August 1981 the Spanish Government turned the question of NATO membership over to the state council, the highest consultative body. This was the first step. The further discussion of the question in parliament did not take much time because the ruling party, the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), had the necessary majority in the upper and the lower house of parliament. Nevertheless, the speed with which the Sotelo Government announced Spain's willingness to join NATO and began to make official preparations is striking.

It appears that the main reason for this haste was the belief of Spanish ruling circles that joining the bloc without delay would resolve other political issues—membership in the European Economic Community, the attainment of the promised advantages in talks with Great Britain about the status of Gibraltar and the conclusion of a more advantageous bilateral treaty with the United States.

There were also domestic political reasons for the haste with which the government made this decision. The growing dissatisfaction in the country with the American presence in Spain and with the policies of the ruling party are seriously undermining its influence. With the 1983 election coming up, the UCD wants to consolidate this influence and remain in power. The ruling clique believes that this can be accomplished through a stronger pro-NATO and pro-American orientation.

In addition to this, the present Spanish Government hopes to obtain certain military and political guarantees from the bloc. The American-Spanish agreements did not give Spain the kind of precise guarantees it wanted. Each time the treaty on bases was renegotiated, the American side refused to give Spain these guarantees but employed Madrid's interest in them as leverage for the inclusion of this country in the North Atlantic military bloc as soon as possible. This is the point at which the interests of ruling classes in both countries coincide.

There is also another aspect of the matter, however, which is ostensibly supposed to bring the governments of both countries to the same goal but actually carries the potential for conflicts. The Spanish Government hopes to heighen the degree of Spain's participation in the decisionmaking process within the military and political NATO bloc and the protection of national interests. The United States, on the other hand, is primarily interested in the pro-American orientation of the new member. It is therefore not surprising that even the first round of the talks for the renegotiation of the 1976 treaty revealed serious American-Spanish differences of opinion about the level of allied relations and the nature of allied
obligations, particularly with regard to the possibility of the American use of bases in Spain in military preparations against third countries, the deployment of nuclear weapons and foreign troops in Spanish territory, compensation for the use of these bases, etc.

By postponing the talks on the Washington-Madrid bilateral agreement until Spain has officially become a NATO member, the two sides hope to find an answer to these questions after the form and conditions of Spain's participation in the alliance have been defined. The American hopes are built on the following: The present procedure for the use of military bases in Spain, as defined in the 1976 treaty on friendship and cooperation, gives the Spanish Government the final say on the time and method of their use. If the military bases should be put under NATO command, these matters will be decided by the bloc leadership, meaning the Americans.

As far as the deployment of nuclear weapons and foreign troops is concerned, the Spanish Government has insisted that the country's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance must not be accompanied by the deployment of new foreign troop contingents, in addition to those already stationed on American bases in Spain, within its territory. The Spanish Government is equally reluctant to send its troops out of Spain. According to Spanish observers, Madrid's refusal to deploy NATO combat units within its territory is particularly significant because it might presuppose the nuclear-free status of the country.

We can foresee that all of these questions will, firstly, heighten differences of opinion between bloc members and Spain at the talks following the conclusion of the formal acceptance procedure and, secondly, probably be resolved in the interests of the alliance, and not of a single country, which is attested to by NATO's military and political history. It is also attested to by an unequivocal statement by Director E. Rostow of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which attracted the attention of the Spanish press. He stressed that any NATO country must be willing to deploy nuclear weapons within its territory. As Spain's PAIS newspaper reported on 1 October 1981, Rostow was referring in this case to the Spanish Government's statement that Spain would not allow the placement of nuclear weapons on its territory again even if it did join NATO.

There are also several other matters in which the interests of the NATO members and Spain clearly do not coincide. They include such regional issues as the fate of the Canary Islands and the cities of Ceuta and Melilla--Spanish colonies on the north coast of Africa. Spain wants the Canary Islands to remain outside the NATO sphere of action, under exclusively Spanish military control. On the other hand, Madrid wants the NATO sphere of action to include Ceuta and Melilla, which Morocco is claiming, to ensure their "protection" by NATO.

NATO's stand on these matters is the direct opposite. The bloc leadership is trying to expand its sphere of action and gain access to the Canary Islands, the strategic significance of which is highly appreciated. At the same time, it does not want to commit itself to support for Spain in its dispute with Morocco over Ceuta and Melilla.
When the American press discusses bilateral relations and the question of Spain's membership in NATO, it ignores these complexities and conflicts. Spain's inclusion in the North Atlantic Alliance is portrayed as a long-awaited "diplomatic victory" of the Reagan Administration. Nothing is said about the negative effects this political event will have on Spain and on the international situation in general.

We can foresee, however, that Spain's membership in NATO will have a serious effect on its domestic and foreign policy. For the Spanish economy, this move will mean a much larger military budget in connection with direct expenditures on participation in the bloc and the cost of re-equipping and modernizing the Spanish Army, domination by foreign monopolies and the liquidation of some branches of national industry. This is why the question of Spain's integration with NATO has already aroused widespread political resistance in the country. The leading opposition forces are the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). They firmly intend to continue the struggle against the country's entry into the aggressive bloc even after Madrid has signed the North Atlantic Treaty. The further intensification of political differences in the country will heighten domestic political instability and benefit those who want to restore the military dictatorship.

In the foreign policy sphere, integration with NATO will limit Spain's ability to pursue an independent foreign policy line and will turn it, as the October 1980 issue of West Germany's BLATTER FUR DEUTSCHE UND INTERNATIONALE POLITIK magazine remarked, into "an extra on the stage of European and international politics."

The international consequences of Spain's membership in the alliance will also be extremely dangerous. This move will disrupt the existing military and political balance in Europe and thereby undermine the prospects for stronger European security by strengthening one of the military blocs. This move is obviously contrary to the spirit of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and will make the reduction of international tension and the consolidation of peace even more difficult.

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GROWTH, STRUCTURE OF U.S. MISSILE INDUSTRY REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4 Apr 82 (signed to press 16 Mar 82) pp 77-87

[Article by G. A. Gornostayev: "The U.S. Missile Industry"]

[Text] Washington's "new" military-political strategy,1 aimed at military superiority over the USSR and the buildup of nuclear and conventional weapons, will have a significant effect on the development of the U.S. defense industry, particularly the missile sector. At the end of the 1970's the United States began to develop a new generation of nuclear missiles and to modernize and expand the research and production base of military missile-building. For example, the development of the

* The U.S. missile industry develops and produces combat missiles. This is why the subbranch for the development and production of space equipment is not discussed in the survey. It should be noted, however, that although this subbranch does not manufacture combat missiles, its products are also used for military purposes: missile-carriers, satellites for military space communications, reconnaissance and early warning systems, reusable spacecraft, like the "Columbia" in the space shuttle program, etc. In this connection, the launching of the "Columbia" spacecraft in 1981 is a good example. Even the American press did not conceal the military aspects of this undertaking.

We should recall that the space shuttle is a reusable space transport system, intended to put payloads (various types of satellites and other space vehicles) in orbit and return them to earth (for a detailed description of the technical characteristics of the space shuttle, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 3, 1979, pp 89-95). Our press has thoroughly covered the purpose of this program and the results of test flights, underscoring the Pentagon's plan to move the arms race into space when the program is fully underway. The present administration's military program presupposes a much more important role for space systems in the area of military communications and reconnaissance and as carriers of space-launched weapons. The space shuttle system, the test flights of which began in April 1981, has also been assigned a prominent role. This program will promote the growth of the space equipment output. Whereas the growth rate was 10 percent in 1975-1980, it was 17 percent just in 1980-1981—Editor's note.

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MX missile system alone will require 34 billion dollars between 1982 and 1987. As a result, American experts anticipate, the production growth rate in this branch in the next few years will be one of the highest (9-13 percent) in all U.S. industry.

Under these conditions, an analysis of tendencies and changes in the American missile industry seems quite interesting. This survey examines the dynamics and structure of production in this branch of American industry, its scientific-production base and the influence of technological progress on the effectiveness of this production.

Production Dynamics and Structure

In the postwar period production volume has increased in the American missile industry\(^2\) at around the same rate as in the aerospace industry\(^3\) and the U.S. defense industry in general\(^4\) (see Table 1). The output of missiles (the branch specialty, accounting for 90 percent of the total production volume) has increased more quickly than the military output of the aerospace and defense industries. Between 1958 and 1980, for example, the average annual growth rate (6.1 percent) exceeded the military production growth rate in the aerospace industry (2.9 percent) and the defense industry in general (4.1 percent) by 2.1 and 1.5 times respectively. This tendency was particularly pronounced at the turn of the decade: The average annual growth rate of the missile output for 1978-1981 (20.1 percent) was 2.6 times as high as the growth rate of the military output of the aerospace industry (7.7 percent) and twice as high as the rate in the defense industry in general (9.8 percent). The tendency became more pronounced because the United States began to develop and produce new missile systems in these years.

Between 1958 and 1980 the proportion accounted for by the missile industry's specialty product\(^5\) in the output of military equipment and weapons increased approximately 1.5-fold (from 9.3 to 14.1 percent) and its share of the output of aerospace and military aviation equipment increased 1.9-fold (from 13.2 to 25.7 percent). It should be noted, however, that the proportion accounted for by all of the missile industry's product shipments in the total production volume of the aerospace and defense industries during this period did not change significantly (see Table 2). This was primarily due to the fact that the specialization coefficient\(^6\) in the missile industry rose only in the late 1950's and early 1960's and later stayed at approximately the same level, while the proportional amount of military products in the total output of the aerospace and defense industries continued to decrease.

Almost all of the products of the missile industry--more than 90 percent of the branch output--are purchased by the U.S. Department of Defense. This is why the development of the missile industry depends mainly on short- and long-range programs of armed service organization, and they depend on the military and foreign policy of American ruling circles. As a result, cyclical changes in the U.S. economy have almost no effect on the development of missile engineering. Whereas industrial production as a whole decreased by 38 percent between May 1975 and July 1979, production volume in the missile industry decreased by 21 percent in 1975-1977 and later began to grow in connection with the preparations for the next round of missile rearming. Under the influence of the cyclical crisis, industrial production
in the United States decreased by 8.2 percent between August 1979 and July 1980, but the products of the missile industry continued to grow.

Table 1

Cost of Products Shipped, Millions of Dollars, Current Prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branches</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>Average Annual Growth Rate, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missile industry**</td>
<td>2,130</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>5,260</td>
<td>6,875</td>
<td>9,200</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerospace industry***</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>4,610</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense industry****</td>
<td>15,430</td>
<td>25,700</td>
<td>37,450</td>
<td>56,875</td>
<td>61,800</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,300</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>23,300</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<td></td>
<td>22,300</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>68,950</td>
<td>97,570</td>
<td>107,300</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17,400</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>33,070</td>
<td>42,480</td>
<td>46,400</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Forecast.

** The numerator shows the cost of products shipped by the missile industry, and the denominator shows the cost of shipments of its specialty—that is, only missiles.

*** The numerator indicates the cost of aerospace industry products shipped, and the denominator shows the cost of rocket and military aviation equipment.


Table 2

Missile Industry's Share of Products of Aerospace and Defense Industries, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missile industry's share of total aerospace production volume</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion accounted for by missile industry's specialty products in military production volume of aerospace industry</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile industry’s share of defense industry production volume</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion accounted for by missile industry's specialty products in military output of defense industry</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Forecast.

Production growth in the missile industry in the late 1950's and early 1960's was the result of the intensive creation of U.S. nuclear missile potential. For example, duplicate programs were used in the production of long- and medium-range ballistic missiles and, in 1958, work was being done simultaneously on six strategic offensive weapon programs. The production of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) took on the greatest dimensions in 1963-1964, when 900-1,000 such missiles were produced each year in line with four programs (Atlas, Titan, Minuteman and Polaris). Besides this, in 1963 the United States produced four types of operational-technical missiles (Pershing I, Honest John, Little John and Sergeant) and nine types of tactical missiles. The dramatic growth of the output of the missile industry in the late 1970's and early 1980's was connected with the beginning of a new cycle of missile rearming and the increase in appropriations for the development of the MX mobile ICBM, the Trident 2 SLBM and land- and air-based cruise missiles and the series production of the Trident 1 SLBM and the Harpoon and Stinger missiles.

For example, the Reagan Administration's strategic program, which was made public in October 1981, plans for the annual commission of one nuclear submarine with 24 Trident 1 missiles on board during the 1981-1987 period and the installation of Trident 2 missiles on the submarines at the end of the 1980's. In the second half of the 1980's, 3,000 cruise missiles are also to be installed on improved models of the B-52 and B-1 strategic bombers. 7

It should be noted here that the technical tactical characteristics of missiles do not always correspond to specifications. In September 1981, for example, tests of an air-launched strategic cruise missile reveal an unreliable navigation system and the missile's inability to maintain the altitude that would minimize the probability of its detection by an ABM system.

In many cases the development and production of missiles take longer than planned. For example, the Trident 1 SLBM was originally supposed to be ready for combat in October 1978, but technical difficulties encountered in the development of the power unit and electronic equipment kept the first "Lafayette" nuclear submarine with Trident 1 missiles from joining the fleet until the end of 1979.

Structural changes have taken place in the missile industry (see Table 3). For example, until the middle of the 1960's the output of strategic missiles grew more quickly. As a result, it accounted for a larger proportion of the total production volume. In subsequent years, however, this proportion began to decrease. Whereas the United States produced around 4,750 ICBM's and SLBM's in 1957-1967, it produced around 1,600 in 1968-1977. The reduction of the proportional amount of strategic missiles produced in the missile industry was partially the result of the longer operational life of strategic missiles combined with a relatively constant number of ICBM's and SLBM's. At the end of the 1980's, in connection with the mass production of cruise missiles and Trident 1 SLBM's and the increased research and development expenditures on the Trident 2 SLBM's and the MX ICBM's, this proportion will obviously increase, but not by much.

At first the United States designed liquid-propellant missiles, but the development of these missiles as tactical and strategic weapons, with few exceptions, was not extensive. The new solid-propellant missiles, which were more simple to use
and had a higher degree of combat readiness, almost crowded liquid-propellant missiles completely out of the arsenal of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. The proportional quantity of solid-propellant missiles rose from 60 percent of the missile output in 1960 to 85 percent at the end of the 1970's. In the 1980's the United States expected to produce mainly solid-propellant and turbofan missiles.

In the first half of the 1960's the number of series-produced missiles was constant, but it then dropped from 21 to 14 between 1965 and 1979. Whereas the United States produced four types of ICBM's and SLBM's in 1960 and two types in the first half of the 1970's, it was producing only one at the beginning of 1981. The numbers of the types of operational-tactical and antiaircraft missiles produced decreased respectively from four and five in 1965 to one and four in 1979. At the same time, the number of types of air-to-surface missiles produced rose from two in 1965 to four in 1980. Three types of air-to-air missiles were being produced in the United States in the second half of the 1970's, just as in the 1960's.

Despite the reduced number of types of missiles being produced, the variety of missiles in the U.S. arsenal increased from 25 types in the first half of the 1960's to 32 types in 1979. This was mainly due to a broader variety of tactical missiles, since the number of types of ICBM's and SLBM's had decreased from seven in 1970 to five in 1979. This broader variety has not only created inconveniences in missile maintenance but has also increased military expenditures. This is why attempts have been made in recent years to reduce the variety of weapons. For example, former Deputy Secretary of Defense W. Perry announced: "The United States would prefer to produce a smaller number of systems which are generally more precise in the technical respect and designed for multiple use."8

Although the proportion accounted for by missiles in the total output of the aerospace and defense industries is insignificant, as Table 2 indicates, these weapons account for a significant share of military research and development expenditures. Between 1967 and 1978, for example, these weapons accounted for 23-35 percent of the Defense Department's total research and development appropriations, or 45-55 percent of the appropriations for aviation, missile and space equipment research and development. Expenditures on research and development in the second half of the 1970's represented around 37 percent of the shipment volume of the missile industry, but only 20 percent in the aerospace industry. Workers account for only 35 percent of the persons employed in the missile industry, but the proportion in the aerospace and defense industries is 1.5 and 1.8 times as great.

The higher expenditures on missile development stem primarily from its higher scientific requirements and from the attempt to conduct advanced research on a broad front so that the United States can be superior to other countries in this field. The government provides missile engineering firms with the results of projects conducted in its research centers and with proving grounds, equipment and plans and assigns them priority in supplies of scarce materials and equipment. In 1976, for example, these firms were allowed to lease 16 government enterprises, and at the end of 1977 the highest priority was assigned to firms manufacturing cruise missiles in supplies of government-controlled materials and equipment.
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* Pre-series models.
The United States, which buys virtually no missiles abroad, represents a net exporter of these products in the foreign market. In the 1970's for example, American imports of aviation and missile equipment were equivalent to only 2 percent of its production volume in the nation. At the same time, the proportion accounted for by missiles in exported military equipment and weapons at the end of the 1970's was only about half as high as the proportion in the total volume of military shipments. The explanation is that the United States has exported mainly tactical missiles, which represent around half of the total output of the missile industry. Strategic missiles, on the other hand, like the Polaris A-3 missile, were sold only to Great Britain for its four nuclear submarines (16 missiles each).

The development of antitank, antiaircraft and antisubmarine missiles in the Western European countries forced Washington to agree to cooperate with them on a new generation of tactical missiles at the end of the 1970's. In particular, several memorandums on the "division of labor" in the development of promising tactical missiles for the NATO bloc were signed. They stipulate that the United States will develop one type of missile, and the Western European countries (mainly the FRG and France, and also Great Britain) will work together on another type. The new system will be produced in the United States and in its partner countries. In 1979, for example, an agreement was signed on the organization of the Western European production (on an American license) of the Sidewinder air-to-air class of missiles. The United States, in turn, decided to produce the Franco-West German Roland antiaircraft guided missile. The countries also agreed that the AMRAAM air-to-air missile developed in the United States would be series-produced in Western Europe as well as in the United States. A consortium made up of several Western European companies is expected to begin perfecting an ASRAAM missile, which will then be series-produced in the United States and in Western Europe. Plans are now being made for the development of a shoulder-launched light weight antitank missile by the United States for the NATO countries and the concentration of Western European efforts on antitank missiles than can be installed on troop carriers and helicopters. According to the estimates of American specialists, cooperation in the development of the new generation of tactical missiles will save the United States around 200 million dollars.9

It should be noted, however, that the United States is virtually uninvolved in the joint production of missiles and aerospace equipment in general with its allies. This is apparently connected with its desire to avoid dependence on other states in this field, since they now have an adequate scientific-production base and are capable of the independent production of all classes of this costly weapon.

The Scientific-Production Base

American industry does not have judicially defined branch divisions, and industrial enterprises are only grouped in separate branches in American statistics. The enterprises of companies specializing in the manufacture of missiles, warheads and missile equipment and engines constitute the scientific-production base of the missile industry. In the second half of the 1970's there were 41 private enterprises of this type with more than 100 employees. Besides this, 16 government enterprises were used for the same purpose. Most of them were built in the 1960's and have never been enlarged to any considerable extent. The original cost of the
fixed capital of private enterprises rose from 780 million dollars in 1963 to around a billion at the beginning of the 1970's (1972 prices are used here and further on), and it then began to drop (see Table 4). It was not until the beginning of the 1980's that it began to rise again, for well-known reasons.

Table 4

| Original Cost of Fixed Capital in Missile Industry, Millions of Dollars, 1972 Prices |
|---------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 770   | 780   | 860   | 1,110 | 1,015 | 930   | 860   | 855   | 670   | 800   |

* Author's estimate.


The reduction of the cost of fixed capital in the branch in the 1970's stems from the fact that the United States had established its scientific and production base by the middle of the 1960's and had moved on to its renovation in the 1970's. This is why the growth rate of the active elements of fixed capital (machines, equipment, etc.) exceeded the growth rates of passive elements (buildings, installations, etc.) and the total volume. This had a particularly strong effect on the peculiarities of the technological structure of capital investments (the correlation between active and passive elements). For example, proportional investments in machines and equipment rose from 70 percent of total investments in the first half of the 1950's to 83 percent in the second half of the 1970's (around 80 percent in the aerospace industry). As a result, the proportion accounted for by active elements of fixed capital rose from 60 percent in the middle of the 1960's to 70 percent in the second half of the 1970's (from 56.5 percent to 62 percent in the aerospace industry).

This tendency contributed to a significant savings in live and embodied labor per unit of product increment and the institution of resource conservation practices. Besides this, since the service life of active elements of fixed capital is much shorter than that of passive elements, the improvement of the technological structure lowers the turnover rate of fixed capital in general.

The government policy of accelerated depreciation has also lowered the age of fixed capital in the missile industry. At the end of the 1970's the average depreciation term of its active elements was already around 5 years. But this term was only a fraction of the actual service life of the equipment. For example, according to the latest census, taken in 1977, only around 6 percent of the metal-cutting tools, 14 percent of the forging and pressing equipment and 17 percent of the welding equipment in the aerospace industry were less than 5 years old. In all, 45 percent of the metal-cutting tools and 56 percent of the welding equipment were less than 20 years old. This means that the branch has sizable quantities of old machine tools and equipment that are rarely used but could still be employed for the considerable augmentation of the missile output. At present the potential
of the missile industry is being used only partially, to satisfy the current
demands of the armed forces and to renew stocks of existing types of missiles.
Most of the enterprises in the branch operate in one shift. This testifies to
the presence of production growth reserves.

American missiles are developed and produced by private industrial companies on
Department of Defense contracts. For example, most missiles are designed and
assembled by such firms as Boeing, General Dynamics, Hughes Aircraft, Vought, Martin
Marietta and Sperry Rand. The overwhelming majority of missile equipment and
warheads are developed and produced by the Bendix, General Electric, Honeywell,
Northrup, Philco-Ford and Raytheon companies. Missile propellant production has
been monopolized by the Aerojet General (an affiliate of General Tire and Rubber),
Hercules, Thiokol and Rockwell International firms. In 1979, for example, they
supplied the engines for 12 of the 14 types of missiles being produced at that
time.

All of these companies produce a variety of military products, which gives them
leeway for maneuvering in response to changes in demand on the part of military
agencies and also gives them access to military orders in the capacity of sub-
contractors. When a firm is unable to obtain the general contract for a new mis-
sile system, it takes every opportunity to gain the main subcontracts.

The increasing complexity and rising cost of missiles have led to the wider
practice of cooperative production, specialization in parts and components, in
which a system is assembled at the head enterprise from parts and components
supplied by hundreds of subcontractors. The leading place in this technological
chain is occupied by the general contractor. This is usually a large company
that has sewn up the contracts for this type of weapon. In ICBM production, for
example, strong ties have been established between the Boeing firm, which as-
sembles these missiles, and the Thiokol, Aerojet General, Hercules and Rockwell
International concerns, which furnish missile stages, equipment and control
systems. The general contractor for the Polaris and Poseidon SLBM's was Lockheed
Aircraft, which assembles them; missile stages were furnished by the Aerojet
General, Hercules and Thiokol firms; and the subcontractors for control systems
were General Electric and Hughes Aircraft. Lockheed Aircraft is also assembling
the Trident I SLBM's, and the first and second stages have been jointly developed
and produced by Hercules and Thiokol.

In tactical missile production there are long standing ties between the Hughes
Aircraft, Raytheon, General Dynamics and Rockwell International concerns, which
produce the missiles and its components, and the Thiokol, Aerojet General and
Hercules companies, which are the engine subcontractors.

In addition to technological specialization, there is also specialization in the
development and production of specific classes of missiles. For example, Lockheed
Aircraft specializes in SLBM production and Boeing specializes in ICBM's, air-to-
surface strategic missiles and air-launched strategic cruise missiles. Hughes
Aircraft produces mainly tactical missiles of the air-to-air and air-to-surface
class. General Dynamics is the largest producer of surface-to-air missiles and
the general contractor for submarine- and surface-launched cruise missiles.
The development and production of missiles and their components have been concentrated in special branches of military-industrial concerns, most of which are completely separate from civilian production. For example, General Tire and Rubber has concentrated the development and production of missile engines at enterprises of its affiliate Aerojet General. AVCO has concentrated the development and production of missile equipment in its Missiles and Space Division, and the Pomona Division performs the same function for General Dynamics. In the Hercules Company, the manufacture of solid propellant and the assembly of engines are the functions of Chemical Propulsion. The development and production of missile equipment in the Lockheed Aircraft concern are the functions of Lockheed Missiles and Space and Lockheed Propulsion. The Ford Motor Company has concentrated the manufacture of military products, including missiles, in its affiliate Philco-Ford. Rocketdyne produces solid-propellant engines for Rockwell International. Thiokol also has a branch, Aerospace Division, which develops and produces most of its solid-propellant engines. Hughes Aircraft and Martin Marietta also have branches for the development and production of missiles and space equipment.

Companies generally conduct research, development and experimental production of missiles, warheads, other equipment and engines at their own enterprises, and most of their series production is concentrated in plants leased from the government. For example, Boeing, the general contractor for all of the Minuteman ICBM's and the strategic air-to-surface SRAM missile, conducted the development and experimental production of these weapons at its own plant in Seattle, Washington, and their series production in a government plant in Ogden, Utah. Two of the three plants where missiles and components are manufactured by General Dynamics are also leased from the government (Pomona, California, and Fort Worth, Texas). At its own plant in Pomona, the firm is engaged mainly in the development and experimental production of these missiles. Half of the plants and scientific-production centers where engines are developed and produced by Aerojet General and Hercules belong to the government, and it is in these plants, just as in other cases, that they are series-produced.

The Economic Effectiveness of the Branch

Technological progress has done much to heighten the effectiveness of missile production. It has had a significant effect on missile engineering equipment and technology. More automatic equipment, new materials and new processing methods are being used. It must be said, however, that small-series production and the prevalence of assembly operations prevent the widespread use of machine tools with programmed control. Advances in the production of these machine tools, however, could lead to their more extensive use. If necessary, they can be combined in computer-controlled sets. The use of standard, multi-purpose machine tools with programmed control, not to mention complete sets of machine tools, could lead to the installation of automatic flowlines for the small-series production of missile parts and components.

The assembly process is still being mechanized and automated, but total automation does not appear possible as yet due to the small scales of production and the frequent changes in types of missiles. This is why automation now mainly takes the form of the use of automatic machines for individual operations.
In addition to conventional mechanical processing, electromachining, electrochemical and ultrasonic processing, chemical milling, electrolytic polishing and electronic beam and laser beam processing are also employed in the missile industry. Other new widespread practices are the use of powerful hydraulic presses for the forging of large panels, high- and low-temperature sheet forging, high-temperature and high-pressure molding and the rotary extrusion of missile hulls.

Technological progress has had a significant effect on the most important indicator of production efficiency—labor productivity. It is rising more quickly in the missile industry than the production growth rate. The output per worker increased from 19,200 dollars in 1963 to 25,700 in 1978 (see Table 5). This led to the reduction of the total number of persons employed in the branch from 134,000 to 90,000 during the same period (see Table 6).

Table 5

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<td>2,780</td>
<td>2,690</td>
<td>2,090</td>
<td>2,320</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital-labor ratio, thousands of dollars</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital-output**</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In 1972 prices. The numerator shows the cost of products shipped and the denominator shows the conditional net product.
** Calculated according to conditional net product.
Calculated according to sources cited in Tables 1-4.

Between 1958 and 1978 labor productivity in the missile industry rose 1.3-fold, although the indicator fluctuated considerably in certain years. This occurred because, even in periods of perceptible production decline, the level of which depends mainly on government contracts, the number of employees did not decrease at the same rate because the production capacities of the branch were generally maintained on a high level of readiness. In the second half of the 1970's, for example, when there were significant cuts in missile production, the United States did not make equivalent cuts in the number of employees because it was preparing
for a new rearming cycle in this field. This led to a slight drop in labor productivity in 1977. Later, however, in 1978-1980, an increase of 24,000 in the number of employees, or an increase of 25 percent, caused labor productivity to plunge dramatically because there was no significant increase in production volume.

Table 6

Employment Dynamics in Missile Industry

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of persons employed, thousands</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakdown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In missile, warhead and equipment development and production, thousands</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In engine development and production, thousands</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated according to sources cited in Tables 1-4.

The augmentation of labor productivity has generally been secured by a higher capital-labor ratio.\textsuperscript{10} Between 1958 and 1977 it rose at an average rate of 0.9 percent a year, and labor productivity rose at a rate approximately 1.4 times as high. This testifies that the growth of production capacities stayed ahead of the growth of fixed capital value. Employment cuts accompanied by the more intense underloading of production capacities in 1967-1977, however, led to a higher rise in the capital-labor ratio than in labor productivity.

Technological progress reduced the material-intensiveness of production\textsuperscript{11} by around 15 percent in 1958-1980. This was the result of significant changes in the structure of material expenditures—a relative reduction in funds spent on materials and a rise in expenditures on parts and components. This tendency was then influenced strongly by such factors as the larger proportion of science-intensive products with low material requirements in the total manufacturing output, the higher expenditures on advanced research, more extensive specialization and the stepped up growth of synthetic material consumption.

Technological progress has also had a significant effect on capital-output.\textsuperscript{12} It has been marked by various tendencies, taking shape under the influence of many factors. The quicker replacement of fixed capital, the saturation of the production system with new equipment and technology, causing productivity to rise at a rate exceeding fixed capital growth, the quicker construction and completion of enterprises and the growing proportion of active elements of fixed capital are all lowering the capital-output ratio. The more intense underloading of production capacities and the mastery of new products, on the other hand, raise this indicator. The long-range tendency in the overall capital output of the missile industry was marked by a decline from 0.351 in 1958 to 0.320 in 1977. At the same time, it had a tendency to rise during the intervals between rearming cycles in connection with the considerable underloading of production capacities. For
example, underloading in 1967-1977 led to an annual rise of 0.5 percent on the average in the capital-output ratio.

Labor productivity, material-intensiveness and capital-output in the missile industry have risen and fallen in the postwar period, but the use of technological achievements has generally promoted the improvement of these indicators and the institution of resource conservation practices in the branch.

The Reagan Administration's attempts to escalate the arms race could have a tremendous effect on the future development of the branch. Plans for the creation of new strategic and tactical missile systems will obviously increase the output of the missile industry. Furthermore, this will be the result of higher labor productivity and of increased employment in the branch. The development of new missile systems will also require larger capital investments in the modernization and expansion of the research and production base. By 1981, for example, capital investments in the aerospace industry as a whole already totaled around 3 billion dollars (in current prices), or double the 1978 figure. Although the new cycle of missile development could lead to livelier business activity in industries closely related to missile engineering (radioelectronics, aviation, etc.), over the long range this factor and others will impede the growth of civilian branches, escalate inflation and exacerbate conflicts in the development of the American economy.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more detail, see the article by V. V. Shurkin in issue No 11 for 1981--Editor's note.


3. The aerospace industry in the United States consists of the aviation and missile space industries. In turn, the latter consists of the missile industry and the previously mentioned subbranch for the development and production of space equipment.

4. It includes the aerospace industry, conventional arms manufacture and the subbranches of ship building, instrument building and radioelectronics that produce primarily military equipment.

5. The terms "missile industry" and "missile engineering" will always be used in reference to combat missiles.
6. The proportion accounted for by the specialty product in total branch output.


10. The value of all fixed productive capital per worker--Editor's note.

11. The ratio of material expenditures to the gross output. Material expenditures are calculated as the difference between the cost of products shipped and the conditional net product--Editor's note.

12. The ratio of fixed productive capital to the gross output--Editor's note.


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CSO: 1803/11
GLOOMY U.S. ECONOMIC FORECASTS SURVEYED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 16 Mar 82) pp 88-98

[Article by A. A. Poduzov: "The U.S. Economy in the 1980's (American Forecasts)"

[Text] The 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's were a time of sharp exacerbation of economic and socioeconomic problems in the United States. During this period the most severe economic crises of the entire postwar period raged throughout 1974 and 1975, accompanied by a decline of 9.3 percent in industrial production and of almost 14 percent in capital investments in fixed productive assets. The effectiveness of production, the relatively rapid growth of which had secured the primarily intensive nature of economic development throughout the first postwar decades, rose so slowly in the 1970's that the nation returned to the primarily extensive type of economic growth, and the growth rate was at least one-third below the rates of the 1950's and 1960's. The 4-fold increase in world oil prices just in 1973 and 1974 (they increased more than 12-fold in the decade) was the cause of massive and prolonged disparities in the national economy, the correction of which will require the radical technical retooling of the national production system. Inflation acquired unprecedented dimensions: Whereas the rate of increase in the consumer price index was 23 percent in the 1950's and 32 percent in the 1960's, it was 112 percent between 1970 and 1980. The proportion accounted for by unemployed individuals in the labor force, which averaged 4.7 percent in the 1960's, was almost 1.5 times as high in the 1970's, rising to 6.4 percent.

What about U.S. economic development in the 1980's? The many forecasts recently published in the American press testify to the interest of Americans in the prospects for their nation's economic development in the foreseeable future. These forecasts have been drawn up by leading research centers in the United States, by government organizations and by individual prominent economists. The overwhelming majority of forecasts were drawn up with the aid of large-scale mathematical models, which have been used for practical as well as scientific purposes in recent years.

The rapid growth of the demand for the mathematic modeling of economic processes in the private business sector and the U.S. Government is attested to by the following figures. Between 1968 and 1978 the income of one of the leading corporations specializing in economic forecasting, Data Resources, rose by an
average of more than 30 percent a year. Its total service volume in 1977 alone was estimated at 2 million dollars. It now fills the orders of two-thirds of the hundred largest companies in the processing industry, 32 of the 50 largest banks, 9 of the 25 largest insurance companies and around 25 different federal agencies. Much of the income of the Data Resources, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates and Chase Econometrics Research centers comes from private companies. The White House spends up to 250,000 a year on forecasts and congressional committees spend up to 500,000. In addition to this, federal agencies spend millions of dollars on the development and use of their own models. For example, the Department of Agriculture alone has 65 small-scale specialized models and spends around 2 million dollars a year on modeling and forecasting.

The presently available forecasts of U.S. economic development in the 1980's are quite divergent. The differences between the forecasts of federal agencies and the forecasts of research centers and leading American economists differ considerably. Apparently, the stimulating effect of Ronald Reagan's economic program is unjustifiably exaggerated in official estimates, as a result of which the growth rates of production volumes and productive resources are obviously too high.

American predictions for several branches of the economy are presented below.¹

Economic Growth and the Use of Productive Resources

In their forecasts of the dynamics of the real (in 1972 prices) gross national product (GNP) of the United States in the 1980's, most American economists agree that this indicator will rise at an average annual rate of around 3 percent. This is indicated, in particular, in the forecasts drawn up by the largest research centers for the first half of the 1980's and the forecast drawn up by Conference Board experts for the entire decade (see Table 1). The estimate of the latter organization (3.1 percent) is higher than the average annual GNP growth rate for 1973–1980 (2.5 percent), but lower than the rate of increase in 1947–1973 (3.7 percent). The Reagan Administration's predicted figure of 3.9 percent for the period between 1981 and 1986 is most probably a serious overstatement. Furthermore, it is completely obvious that neither this estimate nor the others, drawn up by the abovementioned centers, reflected the expectation of a new production decline in 1981—that is, shortly after the end of the recession of 1980.² All of this signifies the considerably deceleration of GNP growth in the 1970's and indicates that growth in the 1980's will probably be slower than in the 1950's and 1960's.³

According to forecasts, the science-intensive branches of the processing industry (radioelectronics, the aerospace industry, instrument building, the manufacture of automation equipment, etc.), where production volume will grow at least twice as quickly as the GNP, will continue to constitute the most rapidly developing sector of the American economy. These branches contribute to GNP growth indirectly as well as directly: Many of the products of these branches (computers, industrial robots, microprocessors, etc.) enter the traditional branches of the processing industry and the service sphere, thereby promoting the heightened efficiency of all national production. The science-intensive branches are also expected to display the highest rates of rise in labor productivity and employment figures.

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We cannot exclude the possibility, however, that the tendency toward a drop in the impact of capital investments, apparent in these branches in recent years, might continue into the near future.

| Forecasts of Average Annual Rates of Increase in Real GNP (in 1972 prices, %) |
|------------------|----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Chase Econometrics | 3.0            | 1.3     | 3.6     | 3.9     | 3.1     | --      | --      |
| Data Resources    | 3.0            | 2.7     | 2.4     | 3.2     | 3.8     | --      | --      |
| Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates | 2.8            | 2.2     | 2.1     | 3.4     | 3.4     | --      | --      |
| Institute of Economics (Claremont, California) | 3.2            | 0.3     | 3.2     | 5.4     | 4.0     | --      | --      |
| Reagan Administration | 3.9*           | 1.1     | 4.2     | 5.0     | 4.5     | 4.2     | 4.2     |
| Conference Board  | 3.1**          | --      | --      | --      | --      | --      | --      |

* For the period between 1981 and 1986.
** For the period between 1980 and 1990.

Production volume in the service sphere will increase at a rate slightly exceeding the rate of GNP growth. Labor productivity, however, will apparently not be the main cause of growth in this sector until the second half of the 1980's.

As far as the anticipated production growth rate in traditional branches of the processing industry, construction and the extractive industry (with the exception of fuel and energy resources) are concerned, they will, according to the estimates of BUSINESS WEEK, not exceed 2 percent a year. This is half as high as the growth rate of the same production volume in the 1960's and approximately two-thirds as high as the predicted GNP growth rate for the 1980's. As American economists have pointed out, one of the main problems in these branches is the need to restore the rise of labor productivity, which fell by an average of 2 percent a year between 1973 and 1980. This is apparently the reason that projected capital investments in these branches will focus primarily on the radical retooling of production. Domestic energy resource production will increase much more slowly than the GNP in the 1980's: U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT predicts an average annual growth rate of 1.8 percent. It is here that the highest increase in profits and capital investments is anticipated, and the prices of energy resources can therefore be expected to continue rising much more quickly than the overall price index. Whereas as oil company profits accounted for 25 percent of the profits of all non-financial corporations in 1970, the figure predicted by Data Resources for the 1980's is 33 percent. Furthermore, whereas capital investments in power engineering accounted for 21.4 percent of all capital investments in the nation in 1975, the Bankers Trust company predicts a figure of 30-35 percent in 1990.

The long-range trends of labor productivity dynamics are indicated by the following statistics. Labor productivity per man-hour in the private sector of the U.S. economy rose fairly quickly between 1948 and 1965--3.2 percent a year on the average. This rise slowed down considerably in later years: 2.3 percent
in 1965-1973, and 0.6 percent in 1974-1979. All of the forecasts agree that labor productivity will rise more quickly in the 1980's: U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT cites a figure of around 2 percent, CHALLENGE magazine indicates a range of 2 to 2.5 percent and ACROSS THE BOARD magazine estimates a rate of 1.5-2 percent. In their forecasts, therefore, American experts are excluding the possibility that growth rates in the foreseeable future will be as high as the rates of the 1950's and the first half of the 1960's. The most they are hoping for is a rate matching that of the second half of the 1960's.

All of these forecasts are based on the assumption that inflation will slow down within the near future, technological progress will speed up, the rise of the capital-labor ratio will be restored and the overall level of business activity will rise, partially as a result of the Reagan Administration's tax and budget measures. Although American economists agree that labor productivity will be the main stimulus of economic growth in the 1980's, they are far from unanimous in their views on the composition and role of the factors that are now inhibiting the augmentation of productivity. Although the role of some factors in the inhibition of productivity growth in the 1970's (the deterioration of the sex and age structure of the labor force, the economic crisis of 1974-1975 and the slower growth of research and development expenditures) is not doubted by the majority of economists, one of the leading experts in this field, E. Denison, admitted in 1979, in a book about the deceleration of U.S. economic growth in the 1970's: "The fact that I do not know why the state of affairs with regard to productivity deteriorated so suddenly after 1973 is not surprising, as the influence of all the factors I was able to mention is excluded from the investigation." The reason for this statement was that all of the factors measured by Denison could account for only less than half of the decline in productivity growth.

In recent years, more and more American economists have decided that one of the main factors inhibiting the rise of labor productivity in the 1970's was the quicker rise of energy prices. This factor will continue to restrain productivity in the 1980's. This factor has a dual effect. In the first place, it leads to the underloading of a considerable proportion of production capacities, especially in traditional branches of industry (from 20 to 30 percent in 1980) due to the excessively high cost of their operation. These means of labor must be replaced with less energy-intensive ones. The larger capital expenditures that this kind of replacement would require, however, will only restore the original dimensions of production capacities, and this means that the impact of these expenditures will be negligible.

In the second place, the proportion accounted for by profits in sales of the products of power engineering branches is almost twice as high as in the U.S. economy as a whole. This stimulates investment activity in power engineering to such a degree that the need for capital investments far exceeds the ability of energy corporations to finance them on their own. As a result, other, non-energy branches are being crowded out of the loan market. This is having a particularly painful effect on traditional branches of industry, the science-intensive branches of the economy and agriculture. According to the calculations of American economists, the proportion of the GNP accounted for by investments in non-energy branches (that is, the investments on which labor productivity in the national
economy depends) decreased from 9 percent at the end of the 1960's to 7 percent in 1980. Since the production accumulation norm in the economy as a whole stayed approximately the same for all of these years, underinvestments in non-energy branches totaled around 50 billion dollars in 1980 alone. The redistribution of capital investments in favor of power engineering will apparently continue until the conditions for the application of capital in this sphere at least approximate conditions in other branches.

These trends will probably continue in the foreseeable future. The 1980 annual report of the U.S. Department of Energy says: "By limiting the growth of capital investments in the private business sector, the higher world oil prices could be the reason for a much smaller quantity of fixed productive capital in the distant future, and this, in turn, could systematically slow down economic growth."

American economists also associate the slower rise of labor productivity and the quicker rise of energy prices with the marked tendency of recent years toward the absolute decline of the standard of living of the U.S. laboring public. According to available estimates, one of the chief elements of this standard—the average real (in 1967 dollars) weekly wage of production workers in the private non-agricultural sector—decreased from 109 dollars in 1973 to 95 dollars in 1980, or 13 percent. Furthermore, now that energy prices are rising so quickly, the population has had to seek additional funds to insulate homes, convert home heating systems from liquid fuel to natural gas, acquire smaller automobiles, etc. According to prominent American economist P. Davidson, "all of this reconstruction is having a more ruinous effect on the public standard of living than on national economic growth."

Structural Changes

According to American experts, U.S. economic development in the 1980's will be accompanied by massive structural changes.

The output of science-intensive branches of the processing industry increased almost 3 times as quickly as the GNP in 1973-1980, and this tendency will apparently continue into the foreseeable future. This means that the proportion accounted for by this sector in the national economy will continue to grow quite quickly. Another sector whose proportional significance will increase over the long range, although much more slowly than in the case of science-intensive branches, is the service sphere, especially such branches as finance, insurance, communications and trade. As for the group of traditional and, in general, power-intensive branches, namely the mining industry (with the exception of fuel and energy extraction), construction and the branches of the processing industry that are not science-intensive, the proportional significance of this sector will decrease. Although the absolute production decline of 2 percent a year on the average in 1973-1980 should be replaced by absolute growth, the estimated rates of this growth are nonetheless only two-thirds as high as the GNP growth rate.

As a direct result of sizable differences in long-range growth rates of individual sectors, structural changes will, in turn, affect the nature of short-range, cyclical fluctuations. In view of the fact that the proportional significance of the traditional branches of physical production will continue to decline—and these
are precisely the branches that are most vulnerable to cyclical fluctuation—the possibility that the range of fluctuation might be reduced in the future cannot be excluded. Noting the relative reduction of the role of these branches in the national economy, BUSINESS WEEK remarked: "Just recently the state of the American economy could be reliably judged according to the state of affairs in the automotive industry and housing construction. Now this cannot be done."

When American economists analyze the increasingly uneven development of branches of the U.S. economy, they express the opinion that this process is particularly harmful under present conditions. In the past the rapid growth of new, technically advanced branches was generally accompanied by the displacement of obsolete forms of production and the reduction of overhead costs in several other branches. the development of the national economy during various stages has been promoted to a considerable degree by the quicker growth of transportation, the chemical industry, plastics production, electrical engineering, electronics, etc. On the other hand, the rapid growth of capital investments in power engineering, a phenomenon of recent years which is expected to continue in the future, has not promoted the heightened effectiveness of production in other branches (essentially, the nation is producing approximately the same quantity of energy as before, but with the aid of colossal additional expenditures of other productive resources). At best, production costs in these branches will not rise as quickly as they would have risen if less capital were to be invested in power engineering.

The continuous rise of energy prices, which has a negative effect on economic development in general, puts traditional branches of the processing industry—the automotive and steel industries and many others—in a particularly difficult position. The growth of production costs, the decline of labor productivity and the resulting reduction of the competitive potential of products and the drop in the demand for these products are all creating a situation in which the rapid and radical reconstruction of the production system is of primary importance to these branches. The main area of this reconstruction should consist in the quicker modernization of existing production capacities. In recent years hundreds of obsolete enterprises in these branches were closed. In the steel industry, for example, 11 percent of all production capacities were liquidated during the 1977-1980 period alone. According to some estimates, the production capacity of the branch could be totally restored by 1985 primarily through the construction of mini-plants using the continuous casting process. In the rubber industry, 23 automobile tire plants were closed after 1973. They will be replaced by more efficient enterprises manufacturing the new type of radial tire.4

When American firms retool production, they try to retain and strengthen their position in the branches where they have the strongest competitive potential. Diversified companies, which have been successful in several branches at once when sales markets have expanded, cannot survive the kind of competition that flares up when the demand for products stops rising. These companies are now more likely to put up their less profitable branches for sale. In this way, they narrow their sphere of activity and concentrate this activity in the most profitable fields. Some American economists have predicted that the 1980's could be the time when the results of the past two decades of diversification are largely nullified.
Regional economic and socioeconomic problems in the United States are expected to grow more acute in the 1980's. Experts feel that the southern and western states, where most of the science-intensive and power engineering branches of the national economy are concentrated, will continue to develop much more quickly than the rest of the country. During the 1970's more than 3 million people moved from the northeastern and midwestern states to states in the South and West. According to Department of Commerce forecasts, around 3.3 million more people will move in the same direction in 1990. Whereas employment in the southern and western states increased 25 percent in the processing industry, 55 percent in construction and tripled in the service sphere during the 1970's, the number of jobs in the processing industry in the Northeast and Midwest decreased, the number in construction rose by only 2.7 percent and it doubled in the service sphere. During the same year the growth rates of real income and capital investments in the South and West were 2 and 2.5 times as high, respectively, as in all other regions combined. The big cities and industrial centers in the Northeast (Detroit, Chicago, Buffalo, New York and others) are experiencing severe financial difficulties and are incapable of solving the unemployment problem (in Detroit 16 percent of the labor force was unemployed in 1980), but cities in the South and West are concentrating on correcting the shortage of housing and academic institutions and other shortages that are creating bottlenecks in their more rapid economic development. American experts feel that the economic and political conflicts between the relatively quickly and slowly developing national regions will become much more pronounced in the 1980's.

Inflation

American economists have correctly noted that inflation was one of the main causes of the deceleration of U.S. economic development in the 1970's and that it will continue to inhibit it in the 1980's.

By lowering profit margins and bringing about the rapid rise of interest rates, inflation severely undermines the financial position of corporations and limits their access to external sources of capital investment financing. It slows down technological progress because it shifts priorities in corporate planning to projects involving minimum risk and a quick return, and these projects generally do not envisage the massive and total reconstruction of the production system on a new technological and technical basis. Finally, rising prices stimulate changes in the distribution of national income between consumption and accumulation in favor of consumption, thereby limiting the possibilities for the expanded reproduction of fixed capital on the national scale. All of this means that inflationary processes were most probably one of the main reasons for the decline in growth rates of national production efficiency and economic growth in the United States in the 1970's.

Most of the American forecasts published in 1981 regarding the rate of inflation in the 1980's (Table 2) indicate the anticipated dynamics of the GNP deflator—an indicator of the average change in the prices of all goods and services included in the GNP. The two last forecasts apply only to the prices of consumer goods and services. Some of the estimates were derived with the aid of econometric models and others were calculated by averaging the results of expert appraisals.
### Table 2

**Forecasted Rates of Price Increase,!* %**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chase Econometrics</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
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<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Data Resources</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Economics (Claremont, California)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan Administration GNP Deflator</td>
<td>6.9**</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of the Future (California) Consumer price index</td>
<td>6.7**</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of the Future (California) Consumer price index</td>
<td>9.0***</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The first four forecasts are of the GNP deflator.
** For the period between 1981 and 1986.
*** For the period between 1980 and 1990.

The broad range of the indicators in the table testifies to the indefinite nature of American economists’ predictions about the future rate of inflation. The above-mentioned research centers—Chase Econometrics, Data Resources and Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Associates—predict a 9-percent increase in prices in the first half of the 1980's and thereby suggest the possibility of the further escalation of inflation because the actual rate of annual increase in the GNP deflator between 1974 and 1980 was 7.9 percent. The Claremont Economics Institute and the U.S. Government, on the other hand, anticipate a much slower rise, predicting that the rate will fall to around 5 percent by the middle of the 1980's.

These two groups of forecasts essentially present complete different answers to the question of how much Reagan's economic program might influence prices. The reason for this is that the first three forecasts are based to a considerable extent on previous price dynamics, and the neo-Keynesian econometric model used in their derivation reflects the deciding role of demand factors in economic development, representing the basis of the economic policy of all Democratic administrations. The estimate of the Claremont institute was also derived with the aid of an econometric model, but this model assumes that the deciding role is played by supply factors—that is, it assumes the belief of the Reagan Administration.

The last of the forecasts presented in the table was compiled by the Institute of the Future as a summarization of the views of leading American experts. This forecast, like the first three, predicts the acceleration of the inflationary process, but on an even greater scale. The reason is that the average annual rate of around 9 percent, derived with the aid of econometric models, is the average for only 4 years, while the estimate of the Institute of the Future covers the entire decade.
Fuel and energy prices rose more quickly than the prices of all other products in the American market in the 1970's. The price of oil increased 12-fold between 1973 and 1980, which corresponds to an average annual growth rate of 36 percent. The prices of energy resources in general rose 2.2 times as quickly as the overall price index, 3 times as quickly as in the service sphere and 5.3 times as quickly as in agriculture.

According to renowned American economist D. Jorgensen, the reason for the negative effect of this process on national economic growth was the following: When the purpose of production is profit, any productive resource whose price rises at a more rapid rate tends to be replaced gradually by other, less costly resources. Manpower was this kind of resource in the United States until the beginning of the 1970's. Its replacement by fixed productive capital and energy resources led to the constant rise of capital-labor and power-labor ratios. This, in turn, contributed to the prolonged rise in labor productivity and economic growth. The unprecedented energy price hike of the 1970's changed this situation radically. When Jorgensen analyzed 35 branches of the U.S. national economy, he discovered that the economy responded to this price hike with a relative decrease in the demand for energy resources, the use of less fixed productive capital and a rise in the demand for manpower. As a result, production processes in the United States became more labor-intensive in the second half of the 1970's and labor productivity declined.

In forecasts of long-range tendencies in energy resource prices, American economists are unanimous in their opinion that these prices will continue to rise more quickly than the overall price index in the 1980's. It is probable, however, that they will rise much more slowly than in the 1970's. The U.S. Department of Energy believes that the world prices of crude oil will rise 10 percent a year on the average in the 1980's. The Institute of the Future has predicted a higher rate—15 percent.

American quantitative estimates of the degree to which economic growth will be slowed down by rising energy prices cover a broad range and are therefore unreliable. According to these calculations, the possible deceleration of GNP growth ranges from 0.1 percentage points (E. Denison) to 1 percentage point (R. Rachet and J. Tate). Jorgensen's estimate for the 1980's is 0.75 percentage points. This means that in 1985, for example, the absolute size of the GNP will be at least 4 percent, or a minimum of 100 billion dollars, smaller than it would be if energy prices were relatively stable.

The damage inflation will inflict on economic growth in the 1980's has not been estimated in quantitative terms as yet.

Technological Progress

The leading role played by technological progress in the growth of the American economy right up to the beginning of the 1970's is attested to by the results of a special study conducted by the U.S. National Science Foundation. According to its estimates, technological innovations were responsible for 45 percent of the average annual rate of GNP growth during the 1929-1969 period. A comparison of
science-intensive branches to other branches in the U.S. national economy indicated that labor productivity in the first group of branches rose twice as quickly on the average, production volume grew 3 times as quickly and prices rose at only one-sixth the rate of the second group. In the 1970's the significance of technological progress as a factor in U.S. economic growth decreased sharply. The calculations of prominent American economist J. Kendrick indicate that research and development were responsible for only 25 percent of the rate of GNP growth in the 1973-1978 period, which is only about half of the figure for 1929-1969. In the near future the rate of technological progress in the United States will probably rise. American experts have concluded that the most important changes of the 1980's will take place in three fields—electronics, robot engineering and biotechnology.

If the present tendency toward a relative drop in the prices of semiconductor equipment continues (in the last 10 years the cost of producing information storage cells has been reduced by 98 percent), the output of computers for personal use should more than quadruple, reaching 1.3 million in 1985. The level of automation in office managerial functions will rise considerably. During the next 5 years, for example, 75 percent of the 3.6 million companies with less than 500 employees are expected to automate the labor of office personnel to some degree with computers. The latest achievements in microprocessor programming and design will afford extensive opportunities for the comprehensive automation of the development, design and production of new commodities in the processing industry. According to the estimates of BUSINESS WEEK magazine, the sales volume of design automation equipment will rise at a rate of around 40 percent a year between 1981 and 1985 and will reach 3 billion dollars in 1985. An even higher rate is anticipated in subsequent years as a result of the rapid spread of production automation systems that are organically related to the system of design automation.

Robots have been assigned the key role in future production automation systems in the United States. The progress of recent years in the design of industrial robots has established the prerequisites for a rapid rise in the demand for them within the near future. It is obvious, however, that the largest corporations will continue to be the main consumers of this costly equipment for a long time. The following estimates indicate the scales of the anticipated demand for robots. General Motors, which now has 300 robots, plans to increase the total number to 2,300 by 1983 and 14,000 by 1990. General Electric plans to replace 37,000 workers with robots in the 1980's. The total number of robots produced in the nation could rise, according to BUSINESS WEEK, from 2,000 in 1980 to 100,000 in 1990. The total expenditures of firms on the acquisition of robots, according to U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, will rise from 100 million dollars to 1 billion during the same period.

Biotechnology is expected to play a much more important economic role after 1985. Experts believe that it will have a particularly significant effect on such branches as the pharmaceutical industry, agriculture and the chemical and food industry. The sales volume of medicinal compounds derived with the aid of biotechnology (insulin, Interferon, compounds for the accurate diagnosis of cancer, etc.) could rise to 500 million dollars by 1985. Sales of feed additives and biostimulants for agricultural livestock will probably reach the same level. Alcohol made from biomass and antifreeze made from ethylene will appear in the
American market within the next few years. According to forecasts, the total value of products developed with the aid of biotechnology will double (in current prices) between 1980 and 1985, which will correspond to a real increase (inflation-adjusted) of around 30 percent. In the second half of the 1980's, on the other hand, the actual output should more than triple.

After examining the prospects for technological progress in the United States in general, American experts have concluded that it will be accelerated in the 1980's. Consequently, they believe that labor productivity will rise more quickly in the second half of the decade than in the first.

Population and Labor Resources

According to the forecasts of the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor, the population, which numbered 220.6 million in the middle of 1979, will be 233 million in 1985 and 243 million in 1990. In other words, by 1990 the population is expected to increase by just under 10 percent. The average annual rates of population growth forecasted for the 1980's are approximately the same as the rates of the second half of the 1970's (Table 3). American demographers associate the slight acceleration of population growth in the first half of the 1980's with the recent rise in the birth rate. The number of births, which was 3.6 million in 1980, is expected to rise to 4.1 million by the middle of the 1980's.

Table 3

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-age population</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian labor force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 16 to 24</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 25 to 54</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 and over</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast to overall population growth, the growth of the working-age population (that is, people aged 16 and over) will slow down perceptibly in the 1980's. This is connected with the sharp decline in the birth rate, beginning and around 1960 and following the boom of the 1950's. The sharp fluctuations in the birth rate in the 1950's and 1960's are also the reason for the anticipated major changes in the age structure of the American working-age population in the 1980's. The highest growth rates will be characteristic of the 25-44 age group. In 1990 this group will be 25 percent larger than it was in 1979, numbering 77.6 million, and it will represent 32 percent of the total population, in contrast to 27 percent in 1979.
The labor force growth rates predicted for the coming decade are much lower than the rates of the 1970's. Nevertheless, the labor force will continue to grow more than 1.5 times as quickly as the working-age population. As a result, the proportion accounted for by manpower in the working-age population will rise from 63.7 percent in 1979 to 67.9 percent in 1990. This increase will be due, as the table indicates, to the relatively higher growth rate of women laborers (whereas the average annual growth rate of the female labor force was 2.4 times as high as the growth rate of the male labor force in 1975-1979, the first indicator will be 2.7 times as high as the second in 1985-1990) and to the high growth rate of manpower aged 25 to 54—this is the most important part of the labor force because these people have the highest level of professional skills and physical and mental capacities.

The high growth rate of manpower aged 25 to 54 and the simultaneous drop in the number of workers aged 16 to 24 mean that labor resources will be of better quality. At the same time, the anticipated growth of the female labor force at a rate exceeding that of the male labor force by more than 2.5 times will lower the quality of labor resources because experts believe that the quality of female labor is inferior to the quality of male labor. According to J. Kendrick's estimates, these two factors will just about compensate for one another in the 1980's. In other words, their combined effect on the quality of manpower will be approximately equivalent to zero. Positive changes in the educational and occupational skills of the labor force will remain the deciding factor in the enhancement of the quality of labor resources in the present decade. Kendrick's calculations indicate that the economic impact of the enhancement of manpower quality in the 1980's will be comparable to the impact of its extensive increase. For the sake of comparison, we could note that the share of GNP growth accounted for by the extensive increase in labor resources has been almost twice as great as the share accounted for by qualitative improvement in the last decade and a half.

In conclusion, we must stress the following. In the 1980's, national production in the United States will develop under the influence of a large group of economic, demographic and sociopolitical factors promoting both the acceleration and the deceleration of its growth.

American estimates of the balance of these factors are quite vague. The general conclusion of American forecasts is that the factors accelerating economic growth will prevail. This leads to another conclusion: U.S. economic growth rates in the 1980's will be slightly higher than they were in the 1970's. It should be borne in mind, however, that this does not mean a long-term acceleration of economic growth. On the one hand, even if this acceleration should take place, it will be temporary. American experts have repeatedly expressed the opinion that growth rates will decline again in the 1990's, approximately to the level of the 1970's. On the other hand, American calculations testify that the GNP growth rates of 1948-1966 were 1.3 times as high as the anticipated rate of the 1980's.

It is interesting that these data have brought many American economists to the conclusion that GNP growth will slow down considerably, and not speed up, over the long range. The reasons for this are rooted in the deep-seated contradictions of American society.
FOOTNOTES


2. For more detail, see the report by Yu. I. Bobrakov and Yu. G. Kondrat'yev in issue No 2 for 1982--Editor's note.

3. According to many American economists, the dynamics of the GNP indicator in comparable prices of the base year essentially can only indicate the quantitative increase in the mass of goods of services produced in the nation. To a considerable extent, this indicator does not take the expansion of the product assortment and the improvement of product quality into account. As a result, GNP growth rates understate actual rates of economic growth, as the increase in total manufacturing volume and the total value of goods produced.


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BOOK REVIEWS

CIA-Mafia Ties

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 16 Mar 82) pp 122-123


[Text] The author refutes the statements of many bourgeois scholars who regard organized crime in the United States as a "product of historical coincidence" (p 101). Actually, the author writes, the process by which various gangs united in large syndicates in the United States repeated the development of the American legal business enterprise and its "processes of monopolization" (p 105). Organized crime has the same aims as the monopolies—power and maximum financial gain.

The author reveals the reasons for the FBI's failure to take action against organized crime syndicates, a failure which seems odd on the surface. In his opinion, these reasons can be found, firstly, in the close ties between organized crime and ruling circles in the nation in general and, secondly, in what has been the FBI's main function from the very beginning: struggle against the Communist Party, leftist organizations, the black civil rights movement, the peace movement and student and other democratic movements.

I. A. Geyevskiy logically demonstrates the futility of the attempts of many American authors to prove the coincidental nature of the events leading up to the Watergate scandal by "reducing this political phenomenon to a chronicle of criminal actions and chopping off its deep roots" (p 182).

Watergate reflects the moral degradation of the ruling class and the increase in crime within its ranks. The persons involved in the scandal were mixed up in punishable crimes, were connected with organized crime and had a business relationship with its leaders. This scandal reaffirmed the fact that big business, big politics and big crime "are not separated from one another by impenetrable barriers but are more like communicating arteries" (p 227).

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U.S. Legal Profession

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 16 Mar 82) p 123


[Text] The author of this book demonstrates how the distinctive features of the American legal system give the legal profession an opportunity to create the semblance of relative judicial and political independence and make use of this opportunity in current political events, party politics and competition between bourgeois political groups.

The attorney plays a variety of roles: He can be the lawyer in a civil suit, the prosecutor in a criminal case, a legal counsel on technical legal matters, a political adviser in the government, a researcher and an investigator. Attorneys are in charge of prison management and immigration affairs. Finally, the centralization and hierarchical structure that are characteristic of the Western European procacy do not exist in the United States: Local attorneys are not under the jurisdiction of state attorney generals, and they, in turn, are not under the control of federal authorities (pp 8-9).

The author discusses the complex role of the U.S. legal profession as an institution of the bourgeois government. The profession's connections with current political events and with reversals in party politics have created a situation in which attorneys circumvent the law in the immediate interest of the ruling political group, as was the case at the time of the Watergate trial, which revealed the manipulative practices of the Justice Department and FBI, cases of illegal surveillance and wire-tapping, illegal searches, the obstruction of justice, graft and "dirty tricks" on political rivals.

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U.S. Macroeconomic, Budget Policies

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 16 Mar 82) p 123


[Text] The results of this study reveal all of the contradictions in the complex process by which the management of U.S. government programs is organized and provide some insight into several aspects of this process that are of interest to Soviet specialists. However, as the author correctly points out, this certainly does not mean that any part of this procedure should be adopted automatically, but simply that this knowledge can broaden the Soviet specialists' general outlook and thereby aid them in the management of the national economy.
The United States does not have the kind of government economic programming system that exists in other developed capitalist states. A bill on this kind of programming was introduced in the Congress after the crisis of 1974-1975 but was rejected. Nevertheless, the objective needs of the American economy are resulting in more sweeping, long-range programs in various fields of economic development.

The authors' discerning analysis of the Carter Administration's futile attempts to institute something "new" in the programming field is of indisputable interest. For example, the so-called system of "zero-based budgeting" was widely publicized by Carter. It essentially presupposed some kind of periodic (usually annual) reassessment of ongoing undertakings and programs in comparison to new ones, with a view to estimated future expenditures and anticipated results.

Other interesting chapters of the book analyze the compilation of military programs in the United States, which are naturally placed at the service of the military-industrial complex. The chapters in which regional programs are described are based on a great deal of factual material.

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U.S. Political Categories

Moscow SSShA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 16 Mar 82) p 124


[Text] The authors of this work use a broad range of sources as the basis for their discussion and detailed analysis of the basic currents of political ideology (and their corresponding modes of political thinking) that took shape in the 1960's and 1970's within the traditional currents of American political thought—liberalism and conservatism, as well as rightwing and leftwing radicalism.

Pointing out the limited and onesided nature of existing systems of classification, which are based on the traditional "liberal-conservative" division, the authors propose a more differentiated approach to the classification of modes of political thinking, which introduces a number of important clarifications and more subtle distinctions between internal subdivisions into the present view of the "spectrum" of these categories, particularly by means of the disclosure of various tendencies, which are sometimes contradictory, within the liberal and conservative currents, within rightwing and leftwing radical groups and at their "meeting-points."

The general principles of the analysis of mass political awareness are set forth in the chapter entitled "The Dialectics of American Societal Development and the Problem of Studying Political Awareness in the United States," and are categorized in accordance with the types of present-day American political awareness examined in the book: liberal-technocratic, liberal-reformist, libertarian, traditionalist, neoconservative, radical-libertarian, radical-statist, rightwing populist, radical-democratic, radical-rebellious, radical-romantic and radical-socialist. All of
these categories are described in detail in the next four chapters (II-V). The chapter entitled "Sociopsychological Mechanisms in the Formation of the Political Consciousness in the United States" examines the sociopsychological aspects of the different categories and their dynamics within the context of the present psycho-ideological situation in the United States.

Obviously, the proposed categories of American political thinking do not take in all of its numerous nuances and individual peculiarities. The authors are well aware of this. They stipulate that the categories discussed in the book are largely the product of abstractions, something like "ideal categories" which, in relation to real political awareness, serve as an instrument for the recognition and modeling of the most characteristic features and tendencies in its development. This approach, which consistently employs the Marxist method of moving from the abstract to the concrete, gives the authors a chance to describe present-day political awareness in the United States, with all of its complexities and contradictions and, at the same time, its internal orderliness and completeness.

The book is of more than purely theoretical interest. The proposed spectrum of political categories is representative enough to provide the political expert with something like a key to the consciousness of each specific politician, ideologist, etc. In view of the fact that there is some similarity between patterns of political thinking in the United States and in other capitalist countries, the proposed spectrum of categories can also be used (with the appropriate adjustments) in the analysis of political thinking in any capitalist country.

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CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS (DECEMBER 1981-FEBRUARY 1982)

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 16 Mar 82) pp 125-127

[Text] December 1981

1 -- The decree of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers "On the Result of the Visit of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, to the Federal Republic of Germany" notes that "the proposals set forth by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev represent a program of nuclear arms reduction in Europe. This is consistent with the desires of all people and the demands of the broad masses opposing the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union hopes that the West, especially the United States of America, will give the new Soviet initiative attentive and objective consideration."

1, 4, 8, 11, 15, 17 -- Plenary meetings of the Soviet and U.S. delegations at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear arms limitation in Europe were held in Geneva.

10 -- "The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs insists that the American side fulfill its obligation and take measures for the immediate surrender of the war criminal Linnas, whose American citizenship has been revoked, to the Soviet authorities," said a note to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

11 -- The permanent mission of the USSR to the United Nations sent the secretary general of this organization a letter pointing out the slanderous nature of the official Washington statements about alleged cases in which "Soviet-produced" chemical and toxic weapons were used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. The letter was distributed as an official document of the UN General Assembly.

12 -- Former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR T. Watson addressed the annual conference of the Arms Control Association, a public organization, and underscored the indissoluble connection between the talks on nuclear arms limitation in Europe and the strategic arms limitation talks, pointing out the impermissibility of any delays in the strategic arms limitation process.

16 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev received A. Hammer, prominent representative of the American business community and chairman of the board of Occidental
Petroleum, at his request. During their talk, L. I. Brezhnev noted that relations between the USSR and United States not only affect the interests of the Soviet and American people, but are increasingly likely to decide the fate of world peace. He also spoke in favor of the development of bilateral Soviet-American relations in various spheres on the basis of equality, mutual respect and mutual advantage. Hammer expressed complete agreement with these views.

21 -- When L. I. Brezhnev was interviewed by the American NBC Television Company, he stressed: "We are in favor of active dialogue with the United States, including summit meetings."

28 -- The White House published a statement by Ronald Reagan, in which he announced the institution of sanctions against the Soviet Union in connection with the events in Poland. In particular, Aeroflot flights to the United States were suspended; the talks on a new Soviet-American shipping agreement were postponed; conditions for the issuance of licenses for the sale of some types of equipment and technology, which are ordinary trade items in the world market, to the USSR were made more stringent; certain bilateral agreements will not be extended, including those pertaining to scientific exchange, ocean exploration, energy supplies, etc.; the negotiation of a new long-term agreement on grain deliveries was postponed.

29 -- USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo A. A. Gromyko received U.S. Ambassador to the USSR A. Hartman at his request. When the U.S. ambassador brought up the subject of the situation in Poland, he was told that the U.S. Government must stop interfering in the internal affairs of the Polish People's Republic.

January 1982

1 -- An article by Academician G. Arbatov, director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, "Crisis-Bound," about the policy of the Reagan Administration, was published in PRAVDA.

9 -- The U.S. attorney general authorized American border authorities to use any means, including the use of force, to keep 14-year Vladimir Polovchak from leaving the United States, although the Court of Appeals in the State of Illinois upheld the decision regarding his return to his parents. In connection with this, on 20 January the U.S. Embassy in Moscow received a memo from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which it insisted that "the unimpeded return of Vladimir Polovchak to his parents in the Soviet Union be made possible without delay."

12, 15, 19, 22, 28 -- Plenary meetings of the Soviet and U.S. delegations at the talks on nuclear arms limitation in Europe took place in Geneva.

14 -- A TASS statement was published in connection with the continued attempts of the United States and its NATO allies to intervene flagrantly in the internal affairs of Poland. The statement stressed that "by artificially dramatizing the situation in Poland and by escalating tension, Washington obviously hopes to poison the overall political climate even more and contaminate the atmosphere of East-West dialogue."
15 -- Soviet and American scientists met in Washington to discuss the problems of international security and arms limitation. The delegation from the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by Academician N. N. Inozemtsev, and a delegation from the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, headed by Professor W. Panofsky, continued the discussion of topics raised at their last meeting in Moscow in June 1981.

18 -- The White House decided to speed up the program of chemical "rearming." Pentagon plans call for larger appropriations for the production of chemical and biological weapons and the appropriate ammunition of around 810 million dollars in fiscal year 1983 and 1.4 billion in 1984.

24 -- In accordance with an earlier agreement, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig met for talks in Geneva. The ministers had two meetings, during the course of which they discussed a broad range of topics: the overall state of Soviet-American relations, the state of affairs at the talks on nuclear arms limitation in Europe, the problem of strategic arms limitation and the situation in the Middle East, in southern Africa, in Asia and in some other parts of the world. When the Polish events were discussed briefly, the Soviet side resolutely declared that the United States must stop all interference in the internal affairs of Poland, which it has been practicing in various forms for a long time.

February

2, 4, 9, 11, 17, 19, 23, 25 -- Plenary meetings of the Soviet and U.S. delegations at the talks on nuclear arms limitation in Europe were held in Geneva.

3 -- During a conversation with representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev set forth new initiatives aimed at sparing Europe forever from medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. He said that if the West should not be ready for this, the USSR would be willing to negotiate an extremely large reduction—of hundreds of units—of medium-range nuclear weapons on both sides.

4 -- Addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the U.S. Congress, Secretary of State Haig announced that the administration intends to continue "linking" the resumption of SALT with other questions.

5 -- A White House report was published in Washington, stating that the U.S. delegation at the talks in Geneva had submitted a draft treaty to the USSR, repeating the American proposal of the so-called "zero variant." The U.S. Administration simultaneously expressed its negative feelings about L. I. Brezhnev's proposal that the present quantity of medium-range nuclear weapons be reduced by two-thirds or even more on both sides by 1990.

8 -- Former American Ambassador to the USSR M. Toone announced that the unfavorable development of American-Soviet relations was primarily due to Washington's attempts to "link" talks with the USSR on arms control and other matters with totally unrelated questions.
9 -- A draft military budget for fiscal year 1983, envisaging unprecedented peacetime military appropriations of 263 billion dollars, was submitted to the U.S. Congress.

17 -- When Chairman N. A. Tikhonov of the USSR Council of Ministers was answering the questions of ASAHI newspaper (Japan), he said that "we do not want Soviet-American relations to become the object of a nearsighted political game, undertaken in the throes of an obsession with power diplomacy. We want smooth and stable relations with the United States."

19 -- A TASS statement on the announced multibillion-dollar U.S. program of "chemical rearming" was published. It said that "Washington has refused to continue the earlier talks with the Soviet Union on this matter because it is afraid that the prospect of an agreement might impede the realization of the apparently long-cherished plan for the "chemical rearming" of the United States." "The unbridled accumulation of weapons," the statement stresses, "including chemical weapons, pays no dividends to its initiators and does not strengthen anyone's security."

25 -- PRAVDA printed L. I. Brezhnev's reply to a letter from an Australian organization working toward international cooperation and disarmament, in which he reaffirmed the USSR's willingness to negotiate a large group of problems and give all of the other side's disarmament proposals unbiased consideration.

28 -- The second regional conference of the American-Soviet friendship council began in Washington. It is being attended by activists from council branches in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Buffalo and Washington.

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