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VIETNAM REPORT

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ACTIVITIES OF ARMED RECONNAISSANCE UNIT REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Jul 82 p 3

Article by H.T., Dac Lac Province: "The Reconnaissance Unit of K Beo"

Although the forces of Fulro have been dealt a heavy defeat, their schemes are becoming increasingly clever. Taking advantage of the superstitious beliefs of the compatriots of the ethnic minorities, they have used the spirits to control, pressure, entice and persuade gullible persons to serve as bases supporting and resupplying them with grain and food.

Annihilating bandits and protecting the life of the people have become a movement of the people's public security force. K Beo urgently suggested to the leaders of his unit that he be allowed to directly participate in the fight. As the leader of an armed reconnaissance unit, K Beo is always clearly aware of his position and responsibility and is determined, along with the other members of his unit, to wipe out Fulro.

K Beo said to the other members of his unit: "We must know how to rely upon the masses, to mobilize all the people to participate in the struggle to annihilate the bandits, respect the customs of our compatriots and fully comply with the nationalities policy."

He visited each family to propagate the policy of the party and state concerning those persons who have chosen the wrong path, have fallen by the wayside and want to return to their villages. He encouraged those families who have relatives in Fulro to appeal to their sons and husbands to return to the people. As a result of wholeheartedly serving the people, K Beo is trusted, respected and helped by the people.

His anti-Fulro unit discovered a Fulro communications line extending from Lam Dong into the area of Nam Nung Mountain. After receiving instructions, K Beo and three members of his team left for the area. After a day of difficult travel, they arrived at the site where they were going to set up an ambush and rapidly implemented their combat plan. On the first day and the second day, they saw nothing. They patiently waited in ambush. By the 20th day,
they had still not seen any member of Fulro. Some members of the team wanted to return but K Beo persuaded them to stay. By the 29th day, the branches they were using for camouflage had withered but, at 1500 hours, as the sun was starting to set, a group of four members of Fulro appeared. K Beo and the other members of his team were ready to fight. After observing their surroundings, the members of Fulro cut banana stalks and used them as rafts to help them swim to the other side of the river. Just as the banana rafts touched the river bank gunshots rang out. Taken by surprise and unable to offer any resistance, the four members of Fulro were killed on the spot (two of whom were "captains"); our soldiers collected their four weapons and all of their military gear and documents.

The next time, they discovered two members of Fulro digging for tubers in the forest. They immediately began following them. After following the enemy for more than 3 hours, they arrived at a Fulro hideout. The first gunshots felled the guard and the three remaining members of Fulro resisted violently but ultimately fled. Not wanting to allow any of them to escape, K Beo ordered his team to pursue the enemy. Accurate gunfire by K Beo and the other members of his unit brought down the three remaining members of Fulro. The battle ended quickly, with four members of Fulro having been killed and three weapons having been captured. Having been informed by the people that a Fulro group was going to infiltrate K. Village and steal grain, K Beo had the area reconnoitered and surrounded. Waiting until they were in the middle of the encirclement, K Beo commanded his unit to open fire, killing three of them (one of whom was a "second lieutenant"), capturing one "first lieutenant" and capturing two weapons and all of their military gear and documents.

7809
GS0: 4209/441
HO CHI MINH CITY MILITARY FORCES BUILD DISCIPLINE

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Jul 82 p 2

Article by Lieutenant General Tran Hai Phung: "The Armed Forces of Ho Chi Minh City Take the Initiative in Teaching, Managing and Forging Discipline"

Text Recently, in the face of the tasks of building and defending the fatherland and conducting local military activities in a complex area, the party committee and command of Ho Chi Minh City have been giving special attention to teaching and managing troops so that they comply with the laws of the state and the discipline of the army.

In the process of carrying out the major campaign "develop upon the fine nature and increase the fighting strength" of the armed forces under the slogan "the entire army acts in accordance with orders," the people's armed forces of Ho Chi Minh City have recorded new advances in their outlook and thinking as well as in the organization of implementation and the improvement of their sense of organization and discipline. This is clearly evident in the performance of the tasks of maintaining combat readiness, building up forces, training, engaging in productive labor, strengthening the staff organization, improving the management of military personnel, managing the equipment, technology, property and finances of the army, strengthening and developing the unity between the army and the people, carrying out the international task and so forth.

Generally speaking, the armed forces, especially the various command echelons and the military agencies from the precinct, district and regimental level to the city's command have made much progress in managing and teaching compliance with the Code of Discipline, which they have done in a more thorough manner. Cadres and soldiers have begun to endeavor to perform their work in accordance with duties, regulations and orders. Procrastination, the practice of doing as one sees fit and the habit of having light regard for principles and regulations now only occur in isolated cases.

The centralized units and the precinct and district military units have maintained combat readiness procedures well, especially during the "highpoint" campaigns. All orders issued by superiors have been rapidly carried out in exact accordance
with tasks and requirements by the various echelons. The combat readiness plans of the key precincts and districts have been closely inspected. All regiments have a high degree of mobility. When necessary, even the centralized self-defense militia forces can be present in a short amount of time at their combat readiness positions with all their weapons and equipment.

In the task of patrolling, guarding and protecting potential targets and providing security for major political activities and the crowded entertainment activities of the people, the armed forces of the city have not allowed any major mistakes to occur. Many self-defense soldiers have bravely apprehended robbers and protected the property of the state and the people. The units that have the task of providing security for international and domestic delegations, participating in cargo transportation at airports and seaports, escorting overland cargo shipments and so forth have fulfilled their task and been commended by the economic agencies of the state.

The rear service units, such as the quartermaster, petroleum, motor pool, production and other units, have maintained material bases well and begun to practice economy. Negative phenomena, such as misappropriation, waste and driving vehicles in an unsafe manner, have rapidly been narrowed in scope.

From the movement "act in accordance with orders, live in accordance with the law" have emerged many examples very deserving of admiration. When their ship, ship 183, was involved in an accident and although they had been injured, the three soldiers Tran Nhat Linh, Nguyen Van Ham and Bui Quang Khai still wholeheartedly helped their compatriots; they picked up an ounce of gold and turned it over to public security troops to be returned to its owner. Corporal Duong Cong Thuan refused bribes from persons engaged in illegal activities three times. Corporal Dang Van Tham and soldier Nguyen Van Hong refused bribes from peddlers who wanted to sneak into the Binh Trieu Railroad Station, etc.

The advances mentioned above have made an important contribution to the maintenance of security and order within a newly liberated city of approximately 1.4 million inhabitants; at the same time, the city's armed forces have actively supported the city's public security forces and the people in the struggle to overcome the negative phenomena in the various fields of social activity, thereby firmly protecting the achievements of socialism.

However, compared to the requirements involved in heightening the sense of organization and discipline and establishing regular force procedures, the armed forces of Ho Chi Minh City must still make a very large effort. Not satisfied with the achievements that have been recorded, the party committee and command of our city see the need to accelerate efforts in the following areas:

1. Improving the education and management of troops.

In keeping with the program of the Political General Department to improve political education, the various units are endeavoring to improve their methods of teaching
and learning in order to avoid teaching general, dry lessons in the style of merely taking notes by always attaching importance to relating the lessons that are learned to the actual situation in society and the unit and presenting specific points that have an impact upon each unit and each person. We must also create for units forums to debate and determine the key aspects of problems and set forth practical corrective measures. Lessons must also give attention to better coordinating the effort to teach revolutionary consciousness with combating the psychological war and the war of sabotage of the enemy.

Educational activities must attach importance to presenting examples of discipline, examples that are highly persuasive, in order to inspire everyone to eagerly act in accordance with good examples. The militant nature of education must also be thoroughly heightened. In this way, the measures employed to manage troops will not only be complied with in a full and self-conscious manner, but troops will also contribute many practical ideas concerning them as well. This is a way to graphically coordinate the effort to raise the level of enlightenment and teach knowledge in order to forge the sense of organization and discipline of a revolutionary, regular force and modern army with the application of effective management measures and the heightening of the responsibility of each echelon in teaching and managing discipline. Troops must be managed in a comprehensive and thorough manner at all times and places, in the performance of every task. In particular, as regards Ho Chi Minh City, an important communications center, the management of troops when they are away from their barracks, when they are on the streets must be given greater concern by each echelon. The city must fulfill its responsibility to the cadres and soldiers of the entire army who pass through the city on assignments or stop in the city on leave.

2. Developing upon the examples set by cadres.

The most effective measure that we have been and are employing is to routinely hold training classes for the cadres on the various echelons, especially elementary and advanced training classes for subward and village military cadres and non-commissioned officers, and encouraging cadres to study on their own in conjunction with gradually strengthening staff organizations.

However, this only provides cadres with necessary knowledge and information concerning their duties. Of greater importance at this time is the need to imbue cadres with a high degree of will and level of responsibility as well as a pure, exemplary style regarding the maintenance of discipline. To meet these requirements, in addition to political activities, cadre conferences, conferences of military personnel to criticize cadres and so forth, we also feel that it is necessary to continuously struggle to build internal solidarity and to deal with cadres who intentionally violate the Code of Discipline very harshly, regardless of their echelon; frequently, it is necessary to punish cadres more severely than the lower echelons and soldiers. We absolutely cannot ignore irresponsibility on the part of cadres or crude actions or speech by cadres toward soldiers.

The more cadres set a good example of discipline, love soldiers with a spirit of fraternity and equality and truly concern themselves with soldiers, the more the conditions exist for maintaining strict discipline within the unit.
3. Supporting the material and spiritual lives of troops better.

In past years, a number of soldiers went back to their homes or did not like their units. There were many reasons for this situation but the most important one was that the material and spiritual lives of troops were not organized well.

However, in 1982, because the cadres on the various echelons have paid rather close, thorough attention to soldiers, to everything from sleeping mats to chairs at meeting halls, lights for use at night, equipment for club activities, libraries and so forth, soldiers feel that their living conditions are guaranteed and can study and forge themselves in combat and work with peace of mind.

Because funds are limited, very many obstacles would be faced if we only relied upon allocations. The various units have established brotherhoods with localities and enterprises to help one another while organizing production in coordination with protecting production and improving living conditions. As a result, meals have always been maintained at the proper level and frugality is being practiced in order to purchase additional items for the cultural activities of the unit.

If canteens are organized well and if essential goods are periodically sold to cadres and soldiers at prices lower than the prices on the market so that the life of the unit is more comfortable and relaxing, soldiers will spend less time outside their camps and disciplinary infractions on the streets and at public places will rapidly decline.

It can be said that in any unit in which the command cadre and responsible staffs possess a high spirit of responsibility, possess the spirit of initiative and activism, closely coordinate education, management and training and know how to organize their units and conduct inspections to insure that troops are well fed, that they are able to sleep well, that they have lighting at night, that they receive news and information on the contemporary situation, that the physical culture and sports movement is accelerated and that literature, art and relaxation are wholesome, the spirit of the unit is one of intensity and enthusiasm and negative phenomena are held to the lowest possible level. These are also very important factors in intensifying the effort to maintain and comply with our army's Code of Discipline well at this time.

7809
CSO: 4209/433
COVER-UP SUSPECTED IN GRAIN THEFT CASE

Hanoi LAO DONG in Vietnamese 15 Jul 82 p 5

Article by T.C.: "Was It Normal?"

The incident occurred long ago but it is still a matter of current interest. On 5 November 1978, Nguyen Van Tien, the pilot of ship number 619 of the Bach Dang River Transport Enterprise in Haiphong, was transporting 102,160 kilograms of wheat from Hon Gai to the port of Viet Tri. Accompanying him were First Mate Nguyen Khac Thien, two mechanics and one seaman. On 9 November, their ship arrived in the river basin in Hong Ha Village (Dan Phuong District, Hanoi), where they stopped to rest for the night. At approximately 2200 hours, a number of grain merchants on the river brought their boats along side the ship. Tien and his accomplices broke the lead seals and sold to these merchants four boatloads of wheat, approximately 8 tons, at a price of 10,000 dong (each person received 2,000 dong). On 15 November, the ship entered the Viet Tri port; when the cargo was delivered to the Viet Tri Mill, it was found to be nearly 23 tons of wheat short.

The grain merchants were arrested. Tien and his accomplices were prosecuted under the law. While waiting for trial, they were released and placed under the management of the concerned agency.

In November, 1981, the Hanoi People's Organ of Control sent an official letter to the director of the Bach Dang River Transport Enterprise, requesting that he report how the enterprise disciplined the defendants. How much wheat had actually been lost from ship 619? And, he was asked, as the civilian plaintiff, what demands he had of the legal agency as regards the payment of damages.

Exactly 1 month later, the deputy director of the Bach Dang River Transport Enterprise sent an official response to the Hanoi People's Organ of Control, which stated: when the ship arrived at the pier in the Viet Tri port, all 12 lead seals were unbroken (that is, not even 1 kilogram was lost), consequently, the enterprise assumes no responsibility for surpluses or shortages; it also stated: "The surpluses and shortages of ship 619 have been normal compared to other shipments and other ships."
This is truly strange because the criminals confessed that they broke the seals, stole 8 tons of wheat and delivered nearly 23 tons less than they should have, that is, more than 25 percent less. Yet, the people in charge of the means of transportation totally deny any responsibility for this loss. The deputy director even stated that it was normal for the captain of the ship and his accomplices to break the lead seals, steal 8 tons of wheat and deliver nearly 23 tons less than they should have, how frightening! As a result, the enterprise has never invoked any form of education as regards these criminals.

Publicly stating that lead seals were broken, stealing grain, which is socialist property, and conspiring with dishonest merchants to violate the law, are these normal things? Thus, according to the deputy director, is the theft of grain normal, regardless of how many tons are stolen? In fact, it was the deputy director's answer to a legal agency that was not normal. Because, in this way, he gave the green light to thieves to do as they please.

Soon, the case will be presented to the Hanoi People's Court. It is still an issue of deep concern.

7809
CSO: 4209/434
SECURITY SOLDIER PRAISED FOR WORK AGAINST FULRO

Hanoi TIEN PHONG in Vietnamese 13-19 Jul 82 p 1

Article by Phung Dac Loi, the Dac Lac Provincial Youth Union: "The Exploits of Y Ku"

That morning, as soon as cock crowed and the cooking fires began to flicker, Y Ku, the leader of the Y Ung Hamlet security force in E-a Giong Village, Krong Pach District, Dac Lac Province, began walking around the hamlet to schedule his work for the day as he did every day. Just before he arrived back at his home, Y Ku saw a young stranger leaving the home of Y Dot (a member of Fulro). Y Ku worriedly thought: who is that person? Why was he in the home of a Fulro reactionary? The experience of his years of security work helped Y Ku to determine beyond any doubt that Y Dot had returned. Y Dot was a dangerous member of Fulro. Since the age of 13, Y Dot had committed many bad acts. In 1973, Y Dot joined Fulro. In 1975, after he committed his first crime and was arrested and sent for transformation by the revolution, Y Dot escaped from the camp and resumed his life of crime. It was Y Dot who commanded the Fulro group in robberies and kidnappings within the village.

Y Ku thought that he could not single-handedly apprehend such as obstinate, clever enemy who owed many blood debts and engaged in sophisticated activities. Y Ku decided to quickly ride on his bicycle to the state farm to tell the security unit to apprehend Y Dot. Y Ku asked a child to follow the pair. The security unit gave Y Ku and one other comrade the task of stopping the enemy at the E-a Giong Village intersection. Another team set up an ambush on the road from Phuoc An to Ban Me Thuot City.

After they arrived at the Y Ung Hamlet intersection, Y Ku and the comrade who was with him quickly formulated a combat plan. Y Ku predicted that Y Dot would board a bus and mix among the passengers of the bus because no one other than he and the person with him knew that Y Dot was a member of Fulro.

Five minutes later, a white bus came speeding toward the two from Phuoc An. As the bus approached, Y Ku signaled to the driver to stop. Y Ku quickly boarded the bus, immediately saw the colored shirt and shoulder bag of Y Dot, immediately pointed his AR15 rifle at Y Dot's chest and said in a self-assured manner:
"You're one member of Fulro who has been caught!"

As he disembarked from the bus Y Dot reached into his travelling bag with his right hand but the bag was immediately taken from him by the comrade who was working with Y Ku. They opened the bag and immediately confiscated Y Dot's U.S. .45 pistol.

Y Dot was no longer able to deny who he was. He resisted and had thoughts of escaping. Y Ku raised his rifle in warning. However, Y Dot still tried to escape. Y Ku had no choice but to fire and bring his life to an end.

Y Dot was dead. This good news spread quickly to Y Ung Village. The residents of the village were overjoyed and excited because a wild animal had been killed and the quiet, peaceful life of the residents of the village had been protected.

The exploit recorded in early May by Y Ku, the 23 year old Youth Union chapter secretary, excited all of the Youth Union members and youths at the Phuoc An State Farm. "It was an exploit in memory of the birthday of the revered Uncle Ho," Y Ku said.

In his 2 years of working at the state farm, this was the third time that Y Ku had recorded an achievement in maintaining security. The board of directors of the state farm decided to give Y Ku a reward in the form of goods worth thousands of dong.

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GSO: 4209/434
ANTI-FULRO ACTIVITIES--The two Youth Union members Dinh Van Ngu and Dang Quoc Huy of the Gia Lai-Kontum Provincial border security troops have not only recorded achievements in their studies and training, but even in the fight to wipe out the Fulro bandits. In one recent battle, Ngu and Huy, along with the other members of their units, resourcefully and bravely captured nine enemy and confiscated many of their weapons and means of sabotage, as a result of which Ngu and Huy were wholeheartedly praised by the members of the ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands and were given letters of commendation and early promotions by the upper level. [Text] [Hanoi Tien Phong in Vietnamese 13-19 Jul 82 p 2] 7809

CSO: 4209/434
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND REJECTS LOAN REQUEST

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 26 Jul 82 p 22

[Text]

THE International Monetary Fund (IMF) has turned down Vietnam's request for US$150 million in special drawing rights for a balance of payments support loan until changes are made in the economy, Western diplomats reported yesterday.

An IMF team visited Hanoi in February in response to Vietnam's request for a second IMF loan on top of the US$80 million in SDRs granted earlier.

The diplomats from Hanoi said the IMF team decided there was no justification for further support in view of Vietnam's failure to carry out basic reforms to boost exports and improve its stagnating economy. Another IMF inspection team is expected in Hanoi in a couple of months.

At the end of calendar 1981 Vietnam had a balance of payments deficit of US$240 million and its foreign exchange reserves were US$16 million, less than one week of imports.

The IMF decision has affected Vietnam's attempts to negotiate a rescheduling of its US$1.3 billion hard currency debt with non-Soviet bloc countries, the diplomats told Reuters.

About half the debt is with the so-called Paris Club of Western and industrialised OECD countries. The remainder is owed to Middle East and African oil-producing countries, India, Yugoslavia and private banks.

Vietnam has secured a unilateral rescheduling from a majority of the oil-producing countries and India but the Paris Club countries have set terms for a rescheduling based on Vietnam's acceptance of IMF recommendations.

At a meeting a month ago they told the Hanoi government that they maintained their insistence that the debt could only be rescheduled on a multilateral basis. Unilateral terms would be considered if IMF recommendations were carried out, the diplomats said.
CUBAN-AIDED COMPUTER CENTER BROUGHT INTO OPERATION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Jul 82 p 4

[Article: "Electronic Computer Center Provided by Cuba to the Jose Marti Agricultural College Brought Into Operation"]

[Text] On 20 July the Ministry of Agriculture held a ceremony inaugurating the electronic computer center provided by the Government of the Republic of Cuba to the Jose Marti Agricultural College.

Comrade Duong Hong Dat, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Agriculture, expressed his sincere gratitude to the party, government, and people of Cuba for their generous, unselfish, valuable assistance to the people of Vietnam. The presentation by the Cuban government to the Jose Marti Agricultural College of a Cuban-produced electronic computer center, along with many other materials and equipment, as well as its sending technicians to install the machinery and help train our cadres to use the machinery, is a very fine manifestation of the friendly, cooperative relations between Vietnam and Cuba.

Ambassador Phali-re-cho-mon Me-di-a-vi-gia [Vietnamese phonetics] affirmed Cuba's complete support for Vietnam in its undertaking of building and defending the homeland and opposing the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists. He expressed hope that the friendship, militant solidarity, and fraternal cooperation between Cuba and Vietnam will become increasingly strong.

On that occasion, the Ministry of Agriculture bestowed our country's Friendship medal on seven Cuban technicians who contributed greatly to setting up the electronic computer center.

5616
CSO: 4209/439
NEW FATHERLAND FRONT COMMITTEES SET UP ON BASIC LEVEL

Hanoi DAI DOAN KET in Vietnamese 7 Jul 82 P 2

Article by Tach Hong: "Quang Ninh Province in the 5 Years of Building and Strengthening the Front on the Various Levels"

Text Quang Ninh is one of the six provinces along the norther border of the fatherland that lie along the border with China. Quang Ninh is also a province that is famous for its "Ha Long Bay" scenery and the earthshattering victories won in the process of fighting aggression and defending the fatherland, such as the Bach Dang River, which was twice dyed with the blood of enemy tropps when the battleships of the Nam Han Army were sunk in October, 938, which was led by Ngo Quyen, and the great victory of the Nguyen Army on 9 April 1288, which was personally guided by General Tran Hung Dao. In addition, Quang Ninh also has many historic ruins and scenic places, such as the Van Don Estuary, Yen Tu Mountain and so forth.

Today, in the entire country's work of building socialism, Quang Ninh is considered to be an industrial province whose coal production sectors have large domestic reserves and which annually mine from 6 million to 7 million tons, which is gradually increasing as the economy develops. In the past, before the incident involving Chinese persons occurred, Vietnamese of Chinese ancestry in Quang Ninh accounted for one-fifth the province's total population and as much as 100 percent of the inhabitants of some villages were Vietnamese of Chinese ancestry. In addition, in Quang Ninh Province, there are seven fraternal ethnic minorities living amongst one another in unity in the mountainous areas of Binh Lieu, Ba Che, Quang Ha and other districts. Quang Ninh also has some Catholics concentrated in the two cities of Hong Gai and Cam Pha and in a few villages: Hiep Hoa in Yen Hung District, Tra Co and Xuan Ninh in Hai Ninh District and Mao Khe in Dong Trieu District.

Given the characteristics of such a province, front work has the task of strengthening and consolidating the unity of the compatriots of the various nationalities and religions within the province in exact accordance with the line and policies of the party and government, insuring a high degree of political
and spiritual unanimity among the various strata of the people, mobilizing the
various strata of the people to make every effort to comply with the policies
of the party and government and accelerating the productive labor movement and
the successful implementation of state plans.

For this reason, following the success of the 1st United National Front Congress
(31 January to 4 February 1977) and with the new statutes adopted by the congress
permitting the establishment of basic fatherland front committees (village,
subward and street), Quang Ninh, under the guidance of the Secretariat of the
Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, researched and began
guiding the establishment of basic front committees in conjunction with
consolidating and the strengthening the district level organization.

Additionally, it should be stated that before guiding the establishment of
basic front committees, in those villages and towns that already had front
liaison committees (called front committees), the organizations, due to their
name, were only given the task by the basic party committee echelon of
primarily conducting work among elderly people. On the other hand, within the
party committee echelon and the various sectors, there was not a correct
understanding of front work, importance was not attached to front work, the
front was considered only a ceremonial organization tasked with general
mobilization, with organizing commemorative meetings, etc. This led to the
establishment of staffs and the deployment of cadres in a manner not commensurate
with the significance, the function or the position of front work; ordinarily,
the district front staff only consisted of two persons, persons who were
usually old, about to retire, in poor health and lacking in ability, persons
who considered the front to be a place to regain their strength, to be a stage
of transition in order to implement policies. These incorrect concepts and
actions caused more than a few obstacles and reduced both the effectiveness
and the role of the front work of the party in the process of performing the
general political tasks.

As a result, the problem that was faced in guiding the establishment of basic
front committees was to meet the following requirements:

1. To improve the organization and mode of operation through the establishment
   of basic front committees while deepening the understanding of front work on
   the part of the various party committee echelons and sectors.

2. To use this occasion to further strengthen and consolidate the district
   level organization, gradually orient the activities of the front on the various
   levels toward practical, substantive work and avoid general mobilization and
   being purely involved in work among elderly people.

3. To build and improve, through the establishment of basic front committees,
   the four level front organization extending from the central level to the basic
   level in accordance with the established statutes.
In order to meet these requirements, the party group and the standing committee of the province's front organization sought the opinions of the party committee echelons and adopted a detailed plan for guiding the district level front organization and working with the district level to guide a few pilot projects in order to gain experience and promptly publicize their good practices and methods of working.

Before establishing basic front committees, all places established basic level committees representing the elderly (villages, subwards and so forth) in order to clearly establish the organization for elders and appoint the head or assistant head of the elders committee to participate as a member of the basic front committee as the other mass organizations and sectors in the villages and subwards had done. Then, a front congress was held to appoint the basic front committee. Ordinarily, after the basic front committee was established, the head or assistant head of the committee representing the elderly was appointed as vice chairman of the basic front committee and put in charge of work among the elderly in order to establish the teams of elderly that serve as the base and the nucleus of the various activities of the front in the process of presenting the positions and policies of the party and government to the various strata of the people. As a result of this method of working and as a result of guiding pilot projects, the district level was fully capable of guiding the villages following the expansion of the pilot projects to all villages. In the space of only 4 months (the final months of 1977 and the first months of 1978), Quang Ninh virtually completed the establishment of basic front committees and held classes to provide their chairmen with training in awareness and their function, role and work position. Prior to 19 February 1979, when the Chinese reactionaries committed aggression against the northern provinces of our country, Quang Ninh had 187 units on the village and similar levels. Now, excluding Dinh Lap District, where 12 villages were merged with Lang Son Province, and due to the reorganization of a number of villages in Hai Minh District, Quang Ninh Province has 171 village administrative and similar units.

Reviewing the corps of basic front cadres, of the 1,734 members, 707 are party members, of whom 162 are members of basic party committees (party committees or party chapter committees) and the majority of whom are retired cadres who are participating in the front, many of whom were the heads or assistant heads of services, committees and sectors of the province and central enterprises and who now hold the position of basic front chairman, this is very beautiful and encouraging. From the viewpoint of organization, it can be stated that this is an organization which, although in the nature of a front, is a strong organization on the basic level. If we were to stop here, front work would lack a firm base for playing its role. Because we have established the subject of the agitation by the front to be the family (because nearly all segments of society are represented within the family) and the area of operation of the front as the street neighborhood, the village, the hamlet, the lane and the housing complex and, on the other hand, because of Quang Ninh’s characteristic as an industrial province whose population is concentrated in three cities, we have adopted the policy of establishing on each street, within each hamlet, within
each complex and so forth a front affairs committee to conduct front work among the families within each population area.

It is necessary to consolidate and strengthen the unity of the various strata of the people, especially among the ethnic minorities, so that they respond to the campaign to "display the fine nature and increase the fighting strength of the army," establish unity between the army and the people and achieve "one will on the part of the army and the people." We must hold good conferences to review the unity between the army and the people at places where army units are stationed, create a good, wholesome atmosphere and a good relationship between the people and troops and help to thwart the divisive schemes of the Chinese reactionaries and their lackeys.

We must intensify the teaching of politics and ideology and, through this, intensify revolutionary actions in the productive labor movement, the savings movement, the movement to build "Uncle Ho fishponds," the "Uncle Ho fruit orchard" movement and so forth, considering this to be a chance to provide training to the new organization with a view toward directing the activities of the basic front committees toward realistic, practical efforts that benefit the state and the family.

In summary, the mass movement, although it has not been widespread, deep or continuous, which has been due to many other factors, the initial results mentioned above allow the following general statement to be made: the establishment of basic front committees met the widespread requirements and aspirations of the people for a true organization that is the legal representative of the voice and interests of the masses on the basic level.

The coordination and unification of actions can only be truly achieved on the basic level because each position, line and policy of the party and state ultimately affects the people, affects each family and person. Without this coordination and unification, poor results will be achieved or, if results are achieved, they will only be achieved through orders and pressure.

Through the various forms of agitation, education and action, we must raise the level of awareness, resolve concerns over difficulties or negative phenomena, strengthen the confidence in the leadership of the party and thwart the insidious, clever schemes of the Beijing reactionaries to undermine our country's revolution on a long-term basis.

However, front work is not simple. Within the locality, front work must be considered a special mode of political work of the various party committee echelons, which must give each person a correct understanding of the position and role of the front as established by the Constitution.

Recently, the Secretariat of the front Central Committee issued guidance concerning the functions and task of the front committees on the various levels. This also provides a good opportunity for the various levels and sectors to gain
a deeper understanding of front work. However, if we stop there, the essence of the problem will still not be resolved; rather, we must delve more deeply in order to resolve the main difficulties and, on this basis, establish the operational mechanisms of the front and the mass organizations as has been done in the law on the trade unions and define staff organization, manage and train cadres, establish funds and establish expenditure regulations for front activities; it is also necessary that the central level provide guidance to the locality, especially the basic level, to insure the normal operation of each organization and avoid the phenomena of doing as one sees fit, managing to get by or playing for time, etc.

When talking about organization, we are talking about a complex, long-range matter; the past 5 years have been a short period of time compared to the process of the formation of the front under the leadership of the party. On the other hand, the Secretariat has still not summarized or evaluated shortcomings, weaknesses and good experiences along with the various localities in order to provide guidance or select "models" in this area for the various provinces to study.

As a province that was formed early, has the tradition of the country's working class and is located in strategically important terrain in a war to defend and protect the fatherland, those who are engaged in front work in Quang Ninh, having determined their responsibility, are determined to make worthy contributions to the various activities, to mobilize the entire army and all the people of the province to strengthen their unity, take united action and accelerate the emulation movement to record achievements in celebration of the fatherland front congress while joining the army and people of the rest of the country in successfully implementing the resolutions of the 5th Party Congress and the work programs of the front, thereby making a positive contribution to socialist construction and the protection of the socialist fatherland and being worthy of being on the frontline in the northeastern region of the beloved fatherland.
PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

BUREAUCRACY, CORRUPTION PRODUCE FEELING OF INERTIA IN SOUTH

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 11 Jul 82 p 19

[Article by Michael Fathers]

HO CHI MINH CITY, Sat. — There is a sense of disillusionment among many intellectuals in southern Vietnam who had welcomed the Communist takeover in 1975 as the beginning of a new dawn for their war-weary country.

"We had an idealistic view of a socialist society and it's not to be found in the regime we have now," Ngo Cong Duc, former editor of Vietnam's only privately-owned newspaper, Tin Xang, said.

"People will criticise me for saying this. We wanted liberal changes. We wanted to create an enlightened socialist country. What we have now is not that."

The most outspoken critic is former deputy health minister during the war, Nguyen Hinh, who in 1977 became the only Communist minister in Vietnam to leave office without the approval of the party.

A southerner and former health minister in the Viet Cong Provisional Government (PRG), Mrs Hoa said that a stifling bureaucracy, lost opportunities for using people's talents and official corruption had produced a feeling of inertia throughout the South.

She said in an interview, "There is no opposition nor resistance to the regime. There is just indifference, and the euphoria at liberation has been dissipated."

Mrs Hoa is director of the Children's Hospital Number Two, Saigon's former Gialt Hospital for seriously ill children.

She said she resigned her portfolio so her talents could be better used for the benefit of her country.

"When I was a deputy minister I even had to get a chit from the Minister before I could visit a hospital. No one will take responsibility. People just pass paper and nothing gets done, so the country will not develop," she said in reference to Vietnam's bureaucracy.

The thing about the bureaucracy here is that it's a chain and many people are living off it. If it's cut back, as some party leaders want, the effect would touch all levels of Vietnamese society.

"Corrupt civil servants are difficult to punish in both the North and the South. It's like a mafia. If you try to punish the offenders you risk touching the hierarchy," Mrs Hoa said.

Mr Duc, 46, a former deputy in South Vietnam's National Assembly under the American-backed government of President Nguyen Van Thieu, fled the country in 1977 to escape charges of associating with the Viet Cong. He was sentenced to three years in jail in his absence for leaving South Vietnam illegally and his property was confiscated.

He lived in Sweden and France and returned to his home in Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon, in 1976 after North Vietnamese-led troops defeated the Thieu army and captured the city.

Known as a member of the "third force" — nationalists who were not Communists and who wanted an end to the war and the American presence in Vietnam — he was permitted to buy the newspaper Tin Xang and run it independently of the Government. It was later turned into a co-operative.

The newspaper was closed by the Hanoi authorities in June last year, bringing to an end the only independent public platform in Vietnam. Mr Duc now manages a laquer factory.

Tin Xang espoused socialism. "We accepted the leadership of the Communist Party. We were an independent voice although we imposed our own self-censorship," he said.

"We published several articles about the economy and urged that professional people, such as doctors, be allowed to operate privately in addition to their Government work. This is now happening to some extent," Mr Duc said.

"We wanted the authorities to give encouragement to people from the old regime so that their talents could be utilised. Many people do not know how to operate under socialism. Those people from the former regime have much to contribute and they must be allowed time to change. It is a principle of this socialist government that the private sector must not be allowed to develop."

"We criticised the party's bureaucracy and we were strongly criticised in turn. Our circulation was about 125,000, which was competitive with the 40,000 circulation of Ho Chi Minh City's official Government newspaper, Sii-gon-Gui Phong."

The interview with Mr Duc took place in the presence of an official from the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry. Mr Duc refused to discuss politics in detail.

He said that after 15 years as a politician he considered his best contribution to the reconstruction of Vietnam to be in the economic field.

Mr Duc said he and his journalistic staff decided to close Tin Xang in accordance with the principles of the Press in socialist countries.

"We felt it was time to close because we knew many people in Hanoi were concerned that we deviated from this principle that the Press in socialist countries belongs to the Communist party," he said.

Mrs Ngo Ba Thanh, a former prominent figure in the so-called Third Force, an opposition lawyer during the Thieu period, and now a deputy to the Vietnamese National Assembly, said it was unrealisitic to imagine an independent publication could continue indefinitely.

"I was asked if I would contribute to Tin Xang but I would not. Mr Duc was required to sign an agreement with the authorities that at an appropriate time the newspaper would be closed down," she said.

"It is not possible to have two voices in Vietnam today." — Reuter
THAI BINH'S PROBLEMS IN PARTY BUILDING DISCUSSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Jul 82 p 3

Party Building column by Vu Giang: "Thai Binh Continues To Improve the Quality of Party Members"

Thai Binh has completed the issuance of party membership cards in all basic organizations of the party. In the face of the requirements of the revolution in the new stage and not stopping at the results that have been achieved, the standing committee of the provincial party committee has established for the entire party organization the task of continuing to strengthen basic organizations and constantly improving the quality of party members with a view toward increasing their fighting strength and their ability to lead the implementation of the resolution of the 5th Party Congress. The immediate requirement is to evaluate the results that have been achieved and the shortcomings and weaknesses in the process of implementing Party Secretariat directive number 83 and, on this basis, correctly evaluate the situation surrounding the basic organizations of the party and the corps of cadres and party members and gain practical experience for putting party building on a regular basis.

The Results of the Issuance of Party Membership Cards

Thai Binh carried out the issuance of party membership cards in seven phases. Some 92.6 percent of the total number of party members were issued membership cards. Some 5.6 percent of the total number of party members were deemed unqualified and expelled from the party. The issuance of party membership cards was truly a major political campaign conducted within the party organization over the past 2 years with the active participation of all cadres and party members. The study of the directives of the Party Central Committee and the provincial party committee and the process of self-criticism and criticism in the various party chapters together with obtaining the opinions of the people participating in party building and the evaluation of the qualification of party members had a distinct effect in heightening the awareness of the party, deepening the understanding of party member standards and raising the spirit of responsibility as well as the sense of organization and discipline of party members. The corps of party members was forged and purified and the quality of party members was
further improved. Progress was made regarding vanguard, exemplary revolutionary activities on the part of the party members. The basic organizations of the party were further strengthened and many basic organizations that had been weak and deficient for many years changed for the better. The number of basic organizations meeting the standards for strong, solid organizations increased. The corps of key cadres at basic organizations was further consolidated and strengthened.

However, the basic organizations of the party and the corps of cadres and party members are still weak in some respects: the basic party organizations, especially those that are weak and deficient, although they have been strengthened, have not undergone uniform change and are, at some places, unstable. Following the issuance of membership cards, the provincial party committee and the various district party committees conducted an inspection of basic organizations and observed: 14 percent of the basic party organizations at agencies and enterprises and 17 percent of the basic party organizations in the countryside are still weak and deficient. The quality of party members, although it has been raised, does not meet the requirements of the new tasks. The expulsion of unqualified members from the party is still being carried out slowly and without true determination; face saving still exists. Party members to whom the issuance of membership cards was temporarily postponed constitute 15.8 percent of the total number of party members. The effort to teach these party members and reach clear conclusions concerning them has been carried out slowly. Since being issued membership cards, some party members have been working in a half-hearted manner and have not made additional progress. A small number of corrupt party members have had their membership cards cancelled. The provincial party committee has classified and evaluated party members as follows: at present, 35 percent of party members have not made clear progress since the issuance of party membership cards; 5 percent are weaker than before; and 1.2 percent have committed shortcomings so serious that disciplinary action has been taken against them and their membership cards have been revoked. Over the past 2 years, the party organization has accepted 2,440 new members but the development of the party is still proceeding slowly and is not uniform at the basic organizations.

A Number of Lessons and Experiences

The first lesson we have learned is that the improvement of the quality of party members must be closely linked to strengthening and consolidating the basic organizations of the party and must involve a constant struggle to overcome the incorrect thinking of separating these two tasks. Strengthening and consolidating the basic organizations of the party and improving the quality of party members are closely related. Each party member lives and forges himself within a basic party organization. Only when the basic party organization is strong is it possible to teach, forge and select party members and possible to develop the party well. Improving the quality of each party member is the basic factor in increasing the fighting strength of a basic organization. Party Secretariat directive number 83 points out: the issuance of party membership cards must be closely linked to strengthening the basic organizations of the party. The evaluation of the
qualifications of party members and the accurate classification of party members depend, to a very large degree, upon whether the basic organization of the party has been strengthened well or not. Facts have shown that some basic organizations, because they do not have a grasp of the spirit of the Party Central Committee's directive, consider the issuance of party membership cards to be merely party work, work that they want to perform quickly and perform at a time when the basic organization of the party has not been strengthened. As a result, the evaluation of party member qualifications cannot be accurate and must be repeated many times. At some places at which membership cards were issued, the movement has not developed strongly, the spirit of unity and enthusiasm has not increased, marked changed have not occurred in the quality of party members and many negative phenomena are continuing to occur. The provincial party committee has promptly corrected these deviations, intensified its inspections before deciding to approve the issuance of party membership cards to basic organizations and adopted a plan for gradually strengthening basic organizations in preparation for issuing party membership cards.

Firmly adhering to party membership standards is the basic prerequisite in the evaluation of the qualifications of party members. The foremost standards are the spirit of engaging in revolutionary struggle to complete the political task that has been assigned, the attitude of setting examples in complying with the lines and policies of the party and state, the spirit of organization and discipline, the maintenance of revolutionary qualities and the maintenance of a close relationship with the masses. At those places that conducted good propaganda and educational activities and gave everyone a full understanding of party membership standards, party member qualifications have been accurately evaluated. At those places that have not performed these jobs well, standards have generally been reduced, a determined struggle has not been waged against party members who have committed mistakes and this has led to a less than accurate classification of party members. Party members who have committed shortcomings are not being thoroughly educated nor have plans and deadlines been adopted for them to rectify their shortcomings. Some party members who are truly not qualified are still being protected instead of being forthrightly expelled from the party.

The work of strengthening and consolidating the basic organizations of the party and improving the quality of party members requires that many jobs be performed, that many positive and well coordinated measures be taken, measures that are suited to each basic organization and for which specific deadlines are adopted. The key matter is to strengthen the corps of key leadership cadres, the nucleus of which is the party committees and party chapter committees. Many basic organizations have been weak and deficient for many years primarily because their corps of key cadres has been deficient in ability and qualities, has been replaced slowly and because a serious lack of unity has lasted for many years and the line between that which is correct and that which is incorrect has not been clearly drawn. The difficulty regarding many of the basic organizations of this classification is that of immediately finding cadres who possess the necessary ability and qualities for assignment to key positions. The provincial party committee has sent many competent cadres and members of the provincial and district
party committees to help strengthen basic organizations. The long-range and most reliable measure is to select cadres who are on the basic level from within the mass movement and include them in the plans for elementary and advanced training. The level above the basic level must intensify its inspections and provide direct help.

Mobilizing the masses to contribute their opinions concerning party building, evaluate the qualifications of party members and criticize cadres are correct measures that have been widely employed at all basic organizations and which have had a strong impact in stimulating the practice of self-criticism within the party as well as strengthening the alliance between the party and the masses. Developing upon this result, the basic party organizations in Thai Binh are making it a regular practice to obtain the opinions of the people and their criticism of party members and cadres once every 6 months.

The party chapters must truly concern themselves on a regular basis with improving the management of party members and establish regular procedures for conducting inspections and maintaining discipline. Experience has shown that the shortcomings of party members are primarily due to the failure on the part of such party members to cultivate good qualities and forge themselves; however, at many basic organizations, light attention is given to the management of party members and this management is marked by many loopholes. The forging of party members and the management of party members are not closely linked to economic management and social management, to the implementation of the principles, regulations and policies of the party, the laws of the state and the internal rules of each agency and unit, especially the units engaged in economic work. The exemplary role of leadership cadres and unit commanders and close coordination and unified guidance and management on the part of the basic party committee echelon and unit commander are vital factors in insuring that cadres and party members are managed and educated well.

Moving Forward To Meet the New Requirements

Thai Binh is concentrating its efforts in the immediate future on strengthening and consolidating the basic party organizations and further improving the quality of party members while continuing to intensify the campaign to build strong, solid party organizations and party chapters. The building of basic party organizations is closely linked to the performance of the political task and the building of production and business organizations and combat units through the revolutionary movement of the masses. Thai Binh is endeavoring to bring itself to the point where it no longer has any weak, deficient basic party organizations.

In order to continue to improve the quality of party members, the basic organizations of the party must establish study regulations, put their activities on a regular basis, assign party members to jobs and improve their education, inspection and management of party members so that there are no longer any weak,
deficient party members or average party members. The requirements of party members in the new stage are that they be persons whose outlook, thinking and actions reflect the essence of the vanguard revolutionary warrior, who are able to lead the masses, who are recognized as being good persons by the vast majority of party members and the masses and who, regardless of their job, are communist fighters who think and act in accordance with the line of the party. The provincial party committee is concerned with intensifying educational and training activities to improve the qualifications, skills and revolutionary qualities of party members and has formulated planning and plans for training cadres and party members in political theory, scientific-technical knowledge and knowledge of the social sciences and economic management. Through inspections of the implementation of the directives and resolutions of the party, we will deepen the understanding that cadres and party members have of the line of the party, heighten their sense of organization and discipline, heighten their spirit of responsibility and accelerate the struggle against negative phenomena.

Rapidly reaching conclusions concerning unqualified party members and determinedly expelling them from the party are jobs that must be performed to make the party pure and strong. The provincial party committee has given the various basic party organizations the responsibility of overcoming the thinking of relying upon the upper level and the fear of difficulties as well as personal feelings, saving face, hesitancy and the failure to determinedly expel unqualified members from the party. The various party committee echelons must intensify their inspections, maintain close contact with basic organizations, improve the building of basic party organizations and improve the quality of party members.
ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

SPREAD OF VENDORS BRINGS CALL FOR CRACKDOWN

Hanoi DAI DOAN KET in Vietnamese 7 Jul 82 p 11

[Article by Truong Thanh Nghia, Lang Song Province: "A Story About Production 'Exploding'!"

In production, the matter of production "exploding" so that society has additional products, the state budget has additional revenues, collectives have additional welfare funds and the living conditions of each cadre, manual worker and civil servant are somewhat improved is something that must be encouraged and assisted so that it occurs in the correct direction.

Recently, however, at a number of densely populated areas and in some major cities, such as Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam Dinh and so forth, a number of production "explosions" have occurred that do not take the correct direction and have no other purpose other than earning much money for individuals; in some cases, this production has developed strongly.

In Hanoi, we have encountered more than a few markets that lack organization and order and are not convenient for either buyers or sellers. At many spots and places, merchants buy and sell products to one another and hawkers and even vendors selling vegetables, fruit and food products spill over the sidewalks and clog intersections and streets. At some cloth, general merchandise and food counters and stores, hawkers compete with buyers for space. At a number of places, they have brazenly set up stores and counters and display their goods in baskets in front of state stores.

In the town of Huu Lung in Lang Son Province, there is only one state-operated food and beverage store but immediately in front of this store are dozens of private stands that were set up against the brick wall of the store and form a long row, stands that sell everything that is on sale within the store. There isn't even a path left for customers who want to enter the store to follow!

In Haiphong, the same sort of "explosion" has occurred. In particular, the spread of private means of transportation, such as three-wheeled vehicles, motorized pedicabs and so forth has been rather rapid. Here, these vehicles
even enter the Niem Nghia Truck Depot to compete for customers with state trucks and have monopolized a number of routes.

In the face of this vigorous, random development, a number of questions arise in our thinking, one being: are such strong "explosions" necessary? This is also one aspect of the struggle between the two ways of life and confirms the socialist trend in the organizing of everyday life.

7809
CSO: 4209/435
AGRICULTURE

PROVINCES CONCENTRATE ON 10TH MONTH, SUMMER-FALL RICE CROPS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Jul 82 pp 1,4

[Article: "Entire Nation Concentrates on 10th Month Crop; Hau Giang Province Plants 84,000 Hectares of Summer-Fall Rice"]

[Text] According to the Statistics General Department, as of 15 July the nation as a whole had transplanted 1,148 hectares of 10th month rice, 226,000 hectares fewer than at the same time last year.

The northern provinces had transplanted 499,486 hectares, equal to 37.5 percent of the plan norm. The time for transplanting early 10th month rice has passed, but the provinces have transplanted only 137,000 hectares. At the present rate of transplanting and seasonal schedule of early 10th month rice, difficulties will be encountered in expanding the winter crop area. The provinces in the former Zone 4 transplanted relatively rapidly. Binh Tri Thien attained 85 percent, Nghe Tinh attained 64.3 percent, and Thanh Hoa transplanted 41.7 percent of its acreage. The delta provinces have only transplanted 10 to 30 percent of their acreage. A widespread situation is that paddies have lacked water for transplanting. Therefore, the rice seedlings are too old.

In seven provinces the drought-stricken areas amount to 13,028 hectares. The insect-infested areas in 12 provinces amount to 20,886 hectares.

It is necessary to extensively use facilities to take water to the paddies in order to plow and harrow on time. Examples are opening sluice gates to obtain alluvial water, using buckets and water wheels to bail water, using electricity-powered and diesel-powered pumps, etc. Nearly 50 percent of the rice seedlings are ready for transplanting, but more than 620,000 hectares have not yet been harrowed and plowed. It is necessary to expand the area harrowed by tractor, accompanied by the use of water buffaloes and oxen to work the soil and the use of manpower to dig up the paddies. Recently, steady rain has created additional advantages for the localities to concentrate on working the soil and increasing the transplanting rate of the 10th month crop. Attention must be paid to tending the rice seedlings and sowing and sowing reserve rice seedlings.

The 10th month rice that has been transplanted is developing well. The cooperatives are weeding the rice for the first time. To date the bases have transported more than 2.2 million tons of fertilizer for the main fertilizing of the rice seedlings and rice.
The southern provinces have transplanted or broadcast-sown 648,000 hectares of the 10th month rice, 32 percent of the plan norm and a more rapid rate than at the same time last year. The provinces south of Thuan Hai have transplanted 537,000 hectares, 30 percent of the plan norm. The Mekong Delta provinces have transplanted 493,000 hectares, 33.1 percent. The weather is favorable, the rain is steady, and the rice is developing well. From now until the end of the season the southern provinces must endeavor to transplant nearly 1.4 million additional hectares. However, the 10th month rice transplanting rate in some eastern Nam Bo provinces is still low.

As of the beginning of July Hau Giang had completed the transplanting of 84,000 hectares of summer-fall rice, an increase of 4,000 hectares over the plan norm and an increase of more than 11,000 hectares over last year. During this year's season there was not only a large planted area but new varieties were planted, especially IR42 (Nong Nghiep 4B), which provides high yields and resists a number of insects and diseases.

Ke Sach, a rice-growing district with a high output, completed the planting of 11,500 hectares at a very early date, and has now harvested nearly nearly 1,000 hectares and attained a yield of 3.5 to 4 tons of paddy per hectare. Chau Thanh District has a summer-fall area of 14,500 hectares, the largest in the province. Phung Hiep District has an area of 9,400 hectares, Thot Not District has an area of 11,000 hectares, and O Mon District has an area of 12,300 hectares. The rice is developing well. Long Phu, a district in the saline water area, has the largest summer-fall (seed propagation) area (4,300 hectares), more than 1,000 hectares of which are concentrated in Truong Khanh, and provide a yield of more than 5 tons per hectares.

5616
CSQ: 4209/439
PRODUCT CONTRACTS BOOST RICE OUTPUT IN HAI HUNG

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Jul 82 p 4

VNA News Release: "Hai Hung Reorganizes Economic and Financial Management at Agricultural Cooperatives"

Text The provincial party committee and people's committee of Hai Hung are guiding the agricultural, finance, statistics, banking and control sectors within the province and its districts in helping cooperatives to establish good economic and financial management consistent with product contracts for groups of laborers and individual laborers.

During the recent 5th month-spring season, as a result of expanding the use of product contracts, the cooperatives in Hai Hung Province provided incentive for cooperative member families to transplant their crops on schedule, to transplant all land and provide good cultivation and pest control, consequently, yields averaged 34.44 quintals of paddy per hectare and output increased by 29,000 tons compared to last year's 5th month-spring season.

Having recorded a bumper harvest, the families of cooperative members rapidly delivered their product, thereby creating favorable conditions for the cooperatives to rapidly and systematically fulfill their grain obligations to the state. However, in the three seasons that product contracts have been in use, many cooperatives, because they do not have a correct understanding of the Secretariat's directive concerning product contracts, have not fully implemented the keeping of initial records and have discontinued the practices of taking inventory of their property and making public financial statements to cooperative members. Planning, economic-technical quotas and bonus and penalty regulations are not specific; there is no unified attitude concerning payments, the settlement of accounts and the collection of product and sweeping waivers are granted, consequently, the actual value of the manday has not increased.

In order to rapidly perfect product contracts, the cooperatives in Hai Hung have implemented well coordinated product contracts for rice, subsidiary food crops, industrial crops, livestock production and the trade sector in order to
comprehensively develop the economy, rapidly improve the standard of living of the people and increase the contributions to the state. The districts of Phu Tien, Nam Thanh, My Van and Cam Binh have held training classes in financial activities for the heads and chief accountants of cooperatives in keeping with the requirements of the new management mechanism. The districts of Nam Thanh and Tu Loc have formulated plans from the production units and cooperative member families upward along the lines of balancing the production of grain and food products in order to, on the basis of contracted fields and families practicing intensive cultivation and multicropping, increase the sources of agricultural products and supply additional grain and food products in order to resolve the food and clothing problems for each family in the years ahead. Phu Tien, Chau Giang and Kim Thi Districts have balanced the supply of grain within the district and stabilized the amount of area under the cultivation of jute in order to have jute and adequate grain and increase the sources of export goods. As a result of setting good economic-technical quotas, improving the management of capital and supplies and promptly settling accounts with cooperative member families, the Trung Hung, Nhu Quynh, Trai Trang and Lac Dao Cooperatives in My Van District and the Gia Tan, Phuong Hung, Nghia Hung, Thong Nhat and Quang Minh Cooperatives in Tu Loc District mobilized cooperative member families to practice intensive cultivation, thereby achieving a 5th month-spring rice yield in excess of 50 quintals per hectare and satisfying the three interests in product distribution.

7809
CSO: 4209/441
HAI HUNG, HA NAM NINH MOBILIZE FIFTH MONTH-SPRING RICE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23 Jul 82 p 1

[Article: "Hai Hung Surpasses Over-All 5th Month-Spring Grain Mobilization Norm; Ha Nam Ninh Requisition-Purchases 17,000 Tons of Paddy Beyond the Obligatory Amount"]

[Text] As of 19 July Hai Hung Province had deposited in granaries grain amounting to 100.5 percent of the over-all 5th month-spring grain mobilization norm assigned it. Some 82,828 tons of paddy were obligatory and 17,684 tons of paddy were mobilized beyond the obligatory amounts. With regard to the obligatory mobilization of 5th month-spring rice, Hai Hung surpassed its norm by 7.5 percent and attained 75 percent of the stabilized annual grain mobilization norm. The districts of Kim Mon, Ninh Thanh, Kim Thi, My Van, Nam Thanh, Chau Giang, and Cam Binh attained from 100 to 102 percent of their over-all grain mobilization norms.

Cam Binh District attained the highest level in the province, depositing in state granaries 14,507 tons of paddy, including 3,157 tons mobilized beyond the obligatory amounts. Six cooperatives in the province -- Thang Long in Kim Mon District, Hung Dao in Chi Linh District, Hong Quang and Duc Hop in Kim Thi District, and Viet Hwa and Phung Hung in Chau Giang District -- have fulfilled their grain obligations for all of 1982 in the present season.

After fulfilling its obligatory grain mobilization norm for the 5th month-spring season by attaining 101.2 percent of the norm assigned by the central echelon, the Ha Nam Ninh grain sector organized an extensive purchasing-merchandise exchange network, introduced the various kinds of materials and goods, and set prices so that the peasants would take the initiative in setting aside paddy to sell to the state.

More than 70 grain stores opened additional stands to facilitate exchanging and purchasing. In addition to cash, materials, and goods sent by the central echelon, the province prepared more than 300,000 meters of cloth and 1,500 tons of nitrogenous fertilizer to exchange with the peasants. Within a brief period of time the grain sector purchased, or exchanged for materials and goods, 17,000 tons of paddy more than the obligatory amounts, about 3,000 tons more than during the same period last year. Hai Hau District, the unit which fulfilled its over-all grain mobilization norm with the greatest amount in the province, purchased or exchanged 2,218 tons, about 800 tons more than during the same period last year.
Nam Ninh District, the second unit to fulfill its over-all 5th month-spring grain mobilization norm, purchased or exchanged 1,643 tons, 543 tons more than called for by the norm assigned by the province.

5616
GSO: 4209/439
LACK OF TRANSPORTATION CAUSES FISH SAUCE SHORTAGE IN NORTH

Hanoi DAI DOAN KET in Vietnamese 7 Jul 82 p 7

[Investigative Report by Hoa Lu: "Should Some Places Have an Excess and Others Be Short?"

Text] The Central Maritime Products Business Corporation has its main offices in Ho Chi Minh City and operates nationwide, with its main method of operation at this time being "buying in the South and selling in the North." Although it was only established a little more than 1 year ago, the corporation has shown itself capable of purchasing very large quantities of product. However, the operations of the corporation have been restricted partially due to a shortage of long-distance means of highway transportation, a shortage of bags and the failure to delineate areas of responsibility in a truly clear manner.

More than anyone else, the cadres, manual workers and personnel of the corporation clearly understand the very large consumer needs of the cadres, soldiers, manual workers and people of the northern provinces and the rather abundant quantities of maritime products to be purchased in the southern provinces. In the recent past, the corporation has looked for every possible way to purchase and transport maritime products from the South to serve the provinces of the North but the results have been very limited. Why has this happened? Which problems must be urgently resolved in order to establish a balance between supply and demand on a nationwide scale?

Excesses at Some Places, Shortages at Others and the Means of Transportation

Along with dried fish and salted shrimp, fish sauce is a product that is very necessary in the daily lives of the compatriots of the northern provinces, especially the soldiers and compatriots of the border provinces. In 1981, the corporation only met a portion of this need. In 1982, increasing difficulties have been encountered. Therefore, from the start of this year until recently, the Railroad General Department and the Ministry of Home Trade had a very good policy: improving three tank cars that were once used to transport gasoline for use as tank cars transporting fish sauce from the South to the North. As
a result of these tank cars, the transportation of fish sauce was very convenient: the fish sauce was stored well, none was lost, its quality was maintained and packaging was unnecessary. However, each tank car carried only 20,000 liters, made only one trip and never returned. At present, in the North, the Railroad General Department is managing as many as 100 tank cars that have not been used for many years, that are lying idle at various railroad stations along the Hanoi-Lang Son line. If all 100 of these tank cars were refitted (refitting is not complicated and does not require much labor), ample means would be available to transport tens of millions of liters of fish sauce each year from the South to the North. In Hanoi, the directors of the Gia Lam Locomotive Factory and the Ministry of Home Trade Machine Works stated: with the permission of the Railroad General Department, these two factories will refit and put into use three tank cars every 15 days to transport fish sauce. In 1982, the Maritime Products Business Corporation of the Ministry of Home Trade estimated: only 30 tank cars are needed for the North to receive the fish sauce required to meet minimum consumer needs.

At present, the fish sauce storehouse at branch number 1 in Hanoi (of the Maritime Products Business Corporation) is empty, not even 1 liter of fish sauce is being stored there. Meanwhile, in the South the total quantity of fish sauce backlogged in the provinces of Thuan Hai, Kien Giang, Hau Giang, Phu Khanh, Nghia Binh, Vung Tau-Con Dao and so forth exceeds 10 million liters, the majority of which is famous "special quality" and "grade 1" fish sauce, such as Phu Quoc fish sauce and Phan Thiet fish sauce. If the more than 10 million liters of fish sauce mentioned above are not promptly transported, the southern provinces will not have containers with which to make salted fish for next year when the fishing season starts in the near future.

I think that we should rapidly provide scores of container cars to transport fish sauce this year and in subsequent years. This is truly necessary, is truly consistent with the requirements set forth in the resolution of the 5th National Party Congress and would meet the needs of the compatriots and soldiers of the northern provinces very well.

Where Do the Several Thousand Tons of Dried Shrimp Go?

Each year, the coastal provinces in the South produce as many as several thousand tons of dried shrimp. Frozen, exported shrimp only constitute a small percentage of the shrimp catch.

But where do these several thousand tons of dried shrimp go each year? At present, the provinces only purchase a very small percentage because their purchasing organization is still very weak with regard to purchasing dried shrimp and dried fish. Meanwhile, the Central Maritime Products Business Corporation has very strong purchasing forces but has not been able to deploy them. Where does the problem lie? According to the corporation, the dried shrimp purchased by the corporation in the various provinces is very rarely transported outside
the province. According to the provinces: "each province that has a maritime products business operates it in a closed cycle in all elements of fishing, purchasing, processing and circulation-distribution. And, according to the regulations of the upper level, the central corporation is not permitted to make purchases in the provinces." In actuality, the dried shrimp market is being ignored, is not controlled by anyone and practically all of the several thousand tons of dried shrimp falls into the hands of private merchants. The purchasing of dried shrimp and dried fish for marketing throughout the country should be assigned to the Maritime Products Business Corporation because the corporation has the responsibility of regulating the supply of dried fish, dried shrimp, dried squid, shrimp sauce, fish sauce and so forth throughout the country and because it has the forces and the capabilities needed to perform this work. Under the guideline "purchasing products at their source and selling them where they are needed," the Maritime Products Business Corporation has, over the past year and more, not only helped to bring prices down, but also met a portion of the needs of the provinces throughout the country. Only by following this guideline can these several thousand tons of dried shrimp each year be controlled by the state and the consumer needs of the people of the entire country be met better in the years ahead.
AGRICULTURE

STATUTES GOVERNING MARINE PRODUCTS COOPERATIVES PROMULGATED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 July 82 pp 1,4

[VNA News Release: "Marine Products Cooperatives Statutes Promulgated"]

[Text] Recently the Council of Ministers issued Decree No 51-HDBT regarding the promulgation of marine products cooperative statutes intended to ensure the leadership of the Party, ensure the bringing into play of the collective mastership right of the cooperative member masses, and fully implement the state's management of the marine products sector. Those statutes are applicable to all marine products cooperatives nationwide (the marine products cooperative production teams may apply them).

In drafting the marine products cooperatives statutes the marine products sector recapitulated the process of 20 years of transforming and building the sector's socialist production relations, recapitulated the experiences of the advanced cooperatives, and studied and learned from the experiences of some other sector in drafting statutes. Therefore, the marine products statutes deal with a number of new topics: the cooperatives' right of autonomy, autonomy with regard to production and commerce, products, finance, property, etc.

The Ministry of Maritime Products has issued a circular to guide the implementation of the marine products cooperatives statutes which stresses that the long-established marine products cooperatives must, on the basis of the statutes, investigate and review their organization and operations. They must continue to maintain and develop what is correct and promptly rectify what is incorrect, thus getting the cooperatives onto the right track in correct accordance with the stipulations of the statutes.

The newly established marine products cooperatives must, on the basis of the stipulations in the statutes, apply them and ensure that the cooperative's organization is in accord with the principles and stipulations of the statutes.

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630: 4209/439
THANH HOA SURPASSES GRAIN MOBILIZATION NORM

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Jul 82 p 2

[Article: "Thanh Hoa: a Successful Experience in Mobilizing Grain"]

[Text] As of 14 July Thanh Hoa had surpassed its over-all grain mobilization norm for this year's fifth month-spring crop, with a volume of more than 80,000 tons of paddy, including 30,000 tons purchased beyond the obligatory amounts. That is the greatest amount ever and the greatest victory ever in the mobilization of fifth month-spring rice in the province.

When evaluating that victory the members of the standing committee of the Provincial Party Committee and the Provincial Party Committee place it in the framework of the fight waged by the cadres and people in the province to resolve the grain problem, encompassing everything from production to mobilization for the state. Prior to the fall of 1981, every year Thanh Hoa depended on aid from the central echelon amounting to 30,000 to 50,000 tons of rice-equivalent grain, in order to balance the supply and demand of the locality and of the central-level forces stationed in the province. October 1981 signified a new turning point; for the first time Thanh Hoa achieved self-sufficiency by means of the grain produced and mobilized in the province.

In 1981, because of high yields and output attained in both the 5th month and 10th month season, the province as a whole was able to mobilize 137,000 tons of grain, of which the 5th month-spring crop accounted for 64,000 tons, the greatest amount ever. This year's 5th month-spring crop was the third successive successful crop. Its output amounted to 307,796 tons, an increase of more than 11,000 tons over the 1981 5th month-spring crop.

5616
CSO: 4209/439
AGRICULTURE

PRODUCT CONTRACTS LEAD TO LAX MANAGEMENT AT CO-OPS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23, 24, 25 Jun 82 p 2

[Article by Huu Tho: "Agricultural Product Contracts, an Attempt To Analyze the Problems Being Faced"]

[23 Jun 82 p 2]

[Text] It has been more than 1 year since the expansion of product contracts to the entire country. As journalists who have been able to observe the agricultural movement since the very first days of cooperativization, we maintain that this campaign has been rather closely guided. In slightly more than 1 year, numerous preliminary reviews have been conducted to gain experience in Haiphong, Quy Nhon, Ho Chi Minh City, Ha Nam Ninh and Hue. A few scientific conferences have been held on the central, provincial and district levels and two or three preliminary reviews and summaries have been conducted. This time, the summary is being conducted on the cooperative level.

As regards the new contract mechanism within agriculture, the resolution of the 5th Party Congress, as we understand it, contains three points: establishing product contracts as a moving force stimulating the emulation movement to develop production and raise economic returns within agriculture, thereby permitting the widespread application of these contracts; reminding us to resolutely and promptly rectify the shortcomings in the organization and guidance of implementation; and requiring that the contracting policy be upgraded to a comprehensive planning and management mechanism for the collective production units within agriculture.

We have attended numerous meetings, some of which have lasted for weeks, and listened to and read numerous reports of both theoretical and practical value by various inspection groups of the government as well as the provinces; we have seen that there is agreement concerning the basic matters involved in evaluating the achievements as well as shortcomings and also seen that many new problems have arisen from practice that must be analyzed so that we can perfect the new contract mechanism within agricultural cooperatives.

It is also in the hope of making a small contribution to the summary being conducted by the party that we have studied the situation at a number of places,
places that have been evaluated as good, in order to determine the possibility that production will be developed and cooperatives will be strengthened through the new contract mechanism and determine what else the mechanism needs; we have also studied the situation at places rated as poor in order to analyze their shortcomings in the guidance of implementation. Along with the baggage we took to districts and villages this time were problems raised in the various meetings and by public opinion, problems to which we sought answers in practice.

To Begin With, Unanimity in the Evaluation of Results Must Be Discussed

In truth, it must also be stated that it is not easy to gain an understanding of the actual situation. The statistical data of installations are not always completely reliable and show only what the installations want them to show. In order to directly assess the situation and ask "difficult" questions without hurting someone's feelings, we decided to go to places with which we are familiar because we had some knowledge of the fields, the management situation and management cadres at these places and could try to create a warm atmosphere in face to face meetings in the hope of opening sources of "substantive" information.

In the districts of Cam Binh, Tu Loc and Chau Giang in Hai Hung Province as well as in Kien Xuong District in Thai Binh Province and Hoai Duc District in Hanoi, some places have worked enthusiastically from the very outset while other places have been somewhat cautious and moved forward steadily. At these places, we saw that everyone is in agreement concerning the evaluation of the results of the policy to broaden product contracts to groups of laborers and laborers in the following five areas:

1. Labor is being utilized better and the number of productive hours and days worked has increased. Everyone emphasizes the quality of work, most importantly on the jobs for which cooperative members accept contracts.

2. Arable land, the basic reserve fund within agriculture, is being utilized better, both in breadth and depth. Marginal land is being fully utilized. Additional fertilizer is being applied and land is being used in a more reasonable manner in order to retain fertility.

3. The techniques of intensive cultivation are being applied better. Seasonal schedules are being maintained. Fertilizer is being applied in larger quantities and, generally speaking, in a more correct manner. Weeding is being performed more frequently. The cultivation of fields is improved.

4. Costs are being cut, primarily in the areas of seed and mandays. Less product is being wasted.

5. As a result, the output of grain has increased rather significantly.

These facts are not new. For this reason, despite the availability of much specific data, we feel that it is unnecessary to present these data in this
article. We use the term "better" cautiously when describing the progress made in a given comparative relationship. Actually, concerning each job, even at the best cooperatives, there is still very much to discuss.

At the advanced cooperatives, the effort to make full use of arable land has been put on a regular basis but there is still marginal land that is not being used. Within the scope of one district, a district that lacks land, such as Hoai Duc, which lies next to Hanoi, rice production has been increased by 50 hectares in 1 year. In districts in which rather good guidance has been provided, such as Tu Loc, rice production has increased by a few hundred hectares. However, arable land is still not being used as best possible. Even under the new contracts, the allocation of land is somewhat less confusing, but confusing none the less.

In fields, there are no longer any plots on which unexpectedly high yields are achieved through intensive cultivation but everyone agrees that the degree of uniformity is better. The chairman of the Tu Loc District People's Committee stated: "This is good. We do not need a few dozen high model yields, rather, we need a high total output. This is achieved through uniformity." Places that were once weak or average have made marked progress. How are the techniques of intensive cultivation being applied at advances places? I asked the head of the Cam Dinh Cooperative, a cooperative in Hai Hung Province that is well known for its intensive cultivation and which, after hesitating for an entire year, finally began to implement the new contracts during this year's spring season, the following question:

"Tell me the truth, do you think the new contracts are better than the old way of working?"

"You are no stranger to my village but never before have cooperative members worked as intensely as they did during this season, never have the fields been as flat as they are this year, never has the transplanting density been so good. In the past, it was very difficult to meet transplanting density requirements, now, everyone meets them."

"Have you retained the same allocation of varieties?"

"This season, we only used four varieties: Nong Nghiep 8, Nong Nghiep 2, Can Tho and 75-6. There were a few families who lost their seedlings and had to 'jump' to other varieties but they still maintained the same allocation and planted in the same area."

With good intensive cultivation, such as Cam Dinh's, the confidence in the new contracts, which is universal, becomes even more firmly based.

And, in general, in the course of gradually advancing agriculture to large-scale socialist production at a time when we have no large-scale industry, the product contract is clearly a method for developing our largest and greatest capabilities,
namely, our arable land and labor, as stated in the resolution of the 5th Party Congress, in order to increase grain output.

Shortcomings and Suggested Methods of Analysis

As regards shortcomings, both the comrades whom we questioned and the actual situation told us that there are more than a few shortcomings and, at some places, these shortcomings are serious. At the conference to review agriculture throughout the country which was held in the spring of this year in Hue, held in an atmosphere of enthusiasm over a year of bumper crops and good management, the Minister of Agriculture said in his opening statement: now, the new contracts have been expanded to practically all cooperatives and it is necessary to correctly evaluate their results; however, it is also necessary to seriously review shortcomings in order to rectify them and guard against being overly impressed by the achievements that have been recorded. Of course, the report on management presented a rather large number of shortcomings and contained rather harsh statements concerning them. At that time, we stated among ourselves that such an attitude is scientific, strict and very necessary.

However, the most common shortcomings are that contract output is still low, fields are still fragmented, management is not good, less than the entire product is collected, distribution does not satisfy the interests of the collective and so forth. Now, there is also the problem of the methods used to analyze the problems in the new contracting mechanism. On the day that opinions were being exchanged in order to guide the debate on the basic level, we and Minh Dat, the member of the Standing Committee of the Hanoi Municipal Party Committee in charge of agriculture, stated:

When analyzing the various aspects of agricultural production, one must be both objective and scientific and not blame everything on contracts because such would not be consistent with the actual situation. The development of agricultural production is the result of the plans and policies of the state, the weather, technical conditions and the management mechanism. The product contract is only one of several agricultural cooperative management devices that has the effect of encouraging each collective and laborer to make full use of natural conditions that are favorable and implement technical measures better.

When analyzing shortcomings, one must also be objective and scientific. As a result:

1. It is necessary to present all shortcomings but not to blame all shortcomings on contracts. There are many aspects of cooperative management that are still weak and deficient and there are still many problems that must be resolved. To strengthen cooperatives and continuously develop production, we must perform many jobs, not just implement contracts well, even though contracts are very sensitive to the production requirements of the masses and even though many other management jobs must be performed well in order to implement contracts well.
2. The expanded use of product contracts has only been in effect for two seasons. To implement Party Secretariat directive number 100, we must perform many jobs, some of which are not simple. The cooperatives must make an effort to perform these jobs correctly but we cannot demand that all units perform these jobs well in the space of only a little more than 1 year. It can be asked how many cooperatives are implementing the "three contracts for units," which were initiated in 1960 and have been in effect for more than 2 decades. I posed this question to the secretary of the Cam Binh District Party Committee, a district in Hai Hung Province that provide good guidance in management, and he said: about one-third of the cooperatives are implementing them relatively well while the rest are using "pour it on the plate" contracts.

3. Developing upon strongpoints, rectifying shortcomings and supplementing policies are jobs that must be performed on a routine basis: we should not think that our work has been completed when we have focused our efforts on uncovering and rectifying shortcomings once. When a new management system is established, we should not think that we need only provide guidance in its implementation once, that everything is right the first time and nothing need be changed," that it is not necessary to supplement or revise things that are deemed unsuitable.

In this spirit, we will present and attempt to explain the problems regarding the strengthening of cooperatives and the development of production that are being faced and delve into the problems faced in life as requested in the resolution of the Party Secretariat on ideological work.

What Is a Non-Specific Contract? The Problem of Improving the Quality of Contracts

The directive of the Party Secretariat reminds installations not to use non-specific contracts. However, when we asked the three district leaders and the five heads of cooperatives what they considered a non-specific contract to be, their answers were not the same. Non-specific contracts are generally understood as lying within the scope of those areas that are under the management of the collective. Therefore, when asked "Are non-specific contracts used in your locality?", we received the same answer at the places at which we were working: "We do not see any places using non-specific contracts exclusively, but such contracts are used in individual areas of work."

We understand that non-specific contracts are not new, having been in use since the issuance of directive number 100, but they have been a shortcoming that we have had to guard against ever since contracts were initiated, that is, ever since the start of the cooperativization movement. A review of the various documents summarizing the agricultural cooperativization movement since 1960 clearly shows this. Thus, the non-specific contract is not a "fellow traveller" of the new contract. It is incomplete to understand a non-specific contract as a contract that is only used in a few jobs in the production of rice as this attitude results in trying to overcome this shortcoming in a onesided manner.
What is a contract? Socialist economic organizations are not the only organizations that use contracts. However, within the organizations of the socialist economy, a planned economy that adheres to the principle of distribution in accordance with labor, a contract is a way to manage production and pay remuneration on the basis of economic-technical quotas for the purpose of implementing the state plan and the principle of distribution in accordance with labor well. The primary guideline in contracting work is: closely linking responsibilities to the interests of the collective and each laborer for the purpose of providing more incentive to each collective and each person to endeavor to meet and exceed production plan quotas.

As a result, within an organization of the socialist collective economy, in order to implement contracts well, certain prerequisites are necessary. They are: production guidelines, the production structure, production plans, technical regulations, remuneration standards and reasonable economic quotas. When contracts are not based on planning or plans, their nature changes. Without the prerequisites mentioned above, the quality of contracts cannot be high, contracts cannot be implemented in exact accordance with the state plan and fair remuneration cannot be made.

Contracts involve persons who grant contracts and persons who accept contracts. These units and persons accepting contracts insure the fullest possible implementation of the plan permitted by circumstances. The planned output must be commensurate with the availability of water, seed, fertilizer and so forth. Without these specific conditions, how is it possible to balance certain materials in order to achieve the proposed yield?

As a result, in our opinion, non-specific contracts are contracts that are not based on production planning or plans, the allocation of crops, technical regulations, remuneration standards or economic quotas and do not provide the conditions for the units and persons accepting contracts to meet and exceed plan quotas. A non-specific contract means, as one leader in Thai Binh confided to me: "plant whatever you want to plant, do whatever you want to do, I will not provide anything to you but you must deliver the entire crop to me." Thus, the nature of the contract is changed to some extent. This is something that we clearly must wage a determined struggle to prevent.

Thus, if the analysis presented above is correct, we understand the following:

1. Non-specific contracts are a tendency that must be stopped in socialist economic management. They occur to one degree or another in contracting with units as well as individuals, in work contracts as well as product contracts. The secretaries of the Cam Binh and Chau Giang District Party Committees in Hai Hung Province and the Kien Xuong District Party Committee in Thai Binh Province stated: the three contracts were also non-specific contracts.

2. In the present situation, having improved their management many times, cooperatives have adopted production guidelines and production plans but their
quality varies widely, being high and some places and poor at others. In Hai
Hung Province, a province in the Red River Delta that has a relatively high level
of management, an investigation resulted in the following initial observations:
planning in approximately 67 percent of the cooperatives is still weak and, at
some places, is very deficient, usually involving nothing more than a number of
production norms and a bank credit plan. Production, labor and financial plans
are still rudimentary. Economic-technical quotas, which are the basis for the
formulation of plans, are not truly scientific and, at many places, are not
promptly adjusted; some places only develop "models" and do not use them in
planning.

We must perform the jobs mentioned above in order to improve the quality of
contracts. However, performing these jobs is not a simple matter. Because
the quality of plans differs, the quality of the contracts of cooperatives, be
they piecework contracts or product contracts, also differs.

3. In the implementation of rice product contracts for groups of laborers and
laborers, cooperatives could do a better job of controlling the important
technical elements with their existing material-technical bases in order to
support the cooperative members who accept contracts. However, cooperatives do
not always have the conditions needed to support these cooperative members. At
present, "the upper level assigns output norms to the lower level and stipulates
that certain conditions will be met but these conditions are not always provided
in the quantities or at the time stipulated." In this way, is not the upper level
using something of a non-specific contract with these cooperatives?

In the past, when we operated in the style "do whatever you can with the supplies
delivered by the upper level, start production whenever the supplies arrive,"
everything appeared to go "without a hitch" in the style of administrative
management and subsidization. We can no longer operate this way. If the upper
level does not provide the production conditions needed by the cooperative, the
cooperative cannot provide the conditions needed for production units and
production units cannot uphold their contracts with cooperative members. As the
head of the Co Bi Cooperative said: "The management board can only lie back
and allow its stomach to be patted by cooperative members." The struggle to
uphold economic contracts is rather sharp and even somewhat confusing at some
places; however, this is part of the forward momentum of the process of gradually
abolishing the outmoded bureaucratic-subsidization management mechanism.

The effort to provide the conditions needed for production does involve
difficulties and these difficulties will persist but, over the long range, it
must be realized that only by providing stable production conditions is it possible
to hope to stabilize the production plans of installations. There are many
problems regarding planning that must be discussed.

Thus, non-specific contracts are not solely the product of the new contracting
mechanism and the shortcoming of non-specific contracts must be rectified by both
the upper level and the basic level. This matter is related to the following
portion of this article.
Concerning Management

Recently, the localities and production units have been frequently talking about the term "management." This is an important matter which, in our opinion, is not understood the same way by everyone. Besides the shortcoming of "non-specific contracts," the Secretariat has also reminded us to guard against the shortcoming of "lax management." Lax management and non-specific contracts generally go hand in hand. Providing no management at all is also a form of non-specific contract.

The cooperatives are not just starting to talk about management now. Once an organization has been established, unified management is a necessity. Now, with the new contracting mechanism, the term "management" is not being used by many places in its fullest sense; they maintain that it only means controlling the several jobs undertaken by the collective.

We generally talk about the management of a certain job, such as the management of a production process by a cooperative, for example. Management means insuring that this process proceeds in exact accordance with planning and plans and yields the highest possible returns. Thus, management is dependent upon three conditions: having a good plan and an established management mechanism, having the tools needed to provide management and having cadres who possess the necessary qualities and management skills so that the various labor organizations and production factors are coordinated with one another and work to achieve the same objective.

Within a socialist collective economic organization, which has the plan as the center of its operations, management primarily means managing the formulation and implementation of plans, launching an emulation movement, establishing a mechanism that provides incentive and using the primary levers to encourage units and each person to implement the unit's state plan well.

Constantly improving the quality of planning, formulating good production plans for each season, each year and the next 5 years, perfecting the system of technical standards and economic-technical quotas democratically debated and adopted by the congress of cooperative members and launching a socialist emulation movement are the elements of foremost importance in management.

In a more narrow sense, management means guiding the implementation of plans on the basis of an established management mechanism to insure the best possible coordination of the various elements and factors. In the new contracting mechanism, some jobs are performed by the collective while others are performed by the individual families, consequently, management must be different than it was before. Now, some cooperative management boards do not have a correct understanding of management, maintaining that the cooperative's management only involves performing those several jobs undertaken by the collective well. It should be remembered that the new contracting mechanism is only a method for organizing labor and remunerating labor; the cooperative must manage all the various elements of the
production process, as was concluded at the summary conference held in Ha Nam Ninh. Not controlling the jobs that the collective can and must perform is also "lax management." However, allowing cooperative members to do whatever they want to do in those jobs for which they accept contracts provided that they deliver the full quantity of products is also a kind of "loose management," one which leads to a number of households not fulfilling their contract quotas and a number of field areas being transplanted with miscellaneous varieties and not being transplanted in accordance with planning, thereby impeding the effort to provide irrigation and prepare the soil in accordance with the seasonal schedule for the entire. Management cannot be called good management if there is not smooth coordination among these various elements.

Gaining experience in organizing and managing the various elements is very necessary. In general, the cooperative controls five elements but how they should be organized and managed is a detailed process that must be carried out in a manner suited to each place. Many localities have begun to gain experience. They are all elements in the rice production process but, now, the economic coordination between the collective and each person cannot be haphazard. While talking with the leaders of Tu Loc and Cam Binh Districts, we analyzed the reasons for the dissolution of cooperative seed units. In Tu Loc, only 23 of 51 seed units remain and, in Cam Binh, only 23 of 37 cooperatives still have seed units. This is a shortcoming. The cooperatives have loosely managed seed production while cooperative members are very concerned with seed. Therefore, when they hear that a good variety of seed is available somewhere, they try to obtain it. The names of these varieties are not standard names. One variety is called "tractor" because it was introduced by a tractor driver. One variety is called "Miss Van" because an engineer named Miss Van introduced it. Some cooperatives transplant as many as 10 different varieties. After travelling around a district, we said to ourselves: at a number of cooperatives that no longer have seed units, where one would think that main rice crops consist of many different varieties and rice production is declining, why is rice production not declining and they make no secret of saying that their crop is better than last year's crop or the crop of the year before last? Analysing this truly complex matter, a number of comrades stated: in the past, when every cooperative had a seed unit, some units were good but the rest were units in name only; fields were not very good, granaries were not very good and much rice spoiled. Cooperative members concerned themselves with obtaining seed for their 5 percent plots but let the cooperative worry about collective fields. Now, the good seed units are still in existence and poor seed units have been dissolved. At some cooperatives, even though they have retained their seed units, the seed of the seed units is not considered by cooperative members to be as good as their own seed. And, they are correct. If a cooperative has made the decision to retain its seed unit, cooperative members will use their own seed if the seed of the seed unit is not good. "However, with close guidance we can produce good seed"—said the secretary of the Cam Binh District Party Committee. Clearly, if the cooperative does not organize and perform the jobs for which it is responsible well, cooperative members will demand that they be allowed to perform them themselves. Looking at the positive side of
this matter, this is an opportunity for cooperatives to strengthen their specialized units.

When talking about the management of production work within a cooperative, the important role of the district level closely linked to the basic level is more evident than ever before. A meeting of cooperative and sector heads of Cam Binh District truly involved a sharp struggle, which I, myself, saw as enthusiasm over the forward momentum in management.

The cooperatives have praised the agricultural supply sector for the efforts it has made but suggest that the sector give attention to delivering supplies on time and to weighing, measuring and counting them accurately. In the past, supplies were delivered in a slipshod manner; now, if a delivery is 1 kilogram of nitrogen fertilizer short, it is not complete because the distribution of supplies must be coordinated with the plan. Despite this, trucks still arrive in villages with 3 tons of chemical fertilizer when they are supposed to be delivering 4!

Engineer Dao, the chief of the Cau Ghe pump station, the leading pump station in the North, told me: at first, when cooperatives began using product contracts, she was very worried. She received numerous letters inquiring about the situation from pump stations in Binh Tri Thien and Nghe Tinh. Now, however, she is enthusiastic. "In the past, we would ask and ask but no one would do what you asked them to do; now, there are ditches everywhere, now water is truly reaching fields. This area has a winter crop and uses direct sowing. At first, I was concerned but the area has been maintained, the allocation of crops is still good and the amount of area being scientifically irrigated has been expanded"—she happily told me.

The chiefs of some tractor stations are still concerned. Although the size of fields has been maintained, at some places cooperative members have changed the allocation of varieties and not transplanted their crops in accordance with the common schedule; consequently, crops at some places mature early while crops at other places mature late, thus making it necessary for tractors to go from one place to another to prepare fields. In the past, an entire station would use 12.5 kilograms of diesel fuel to prepare one standard hectare for planting; now, the station uses 13.5 kilograms and still does not meet the quota of the ministry. Everyone has welcomed this observation, saying "bring the problem up and we shall struggle to correct it."

When talking about managing production in accordance with the plan, we are talking about the role of the basic level and the upper levels, primarily the district level. The economic-technical sectors of the district, such as the agricultural supply station, the tractor station, the water conservancy sector, the pump stations, the planning sector, the bank, the finance sector and so forth are services supporting agricultural production that must operate in a more effective manner so that they can closely coordinate with the various cooperatives in the
new contract movement. The district people's committee must tightly control
the sectors, the stations and farms of the district in order to manage the
production work of each area and each cooperative. Many cooperatives have
requested that these sectors sign economic contracts in order to clearly define
production responsibilities.

Unit cadres, an important force in the management of work, are posing a problem.
The head of the Cam Vu Cooperative stated: "Unit chiefs are now operating in a
very slipshod manner"; "once they have finished assigning fields, they only
concern themselves with working contract fields." The purpose of cadres is to
provide management. To perform this job well, it is necessary to correctly
select and regularly train cadres; however, there must also be an appropriate
system of remuneration. In order to achieve good management, the remuneration
paid to cadres must first be based on management results. Should not suitable
regulations be adopted whereby cadres focus their efforts on managing the work
of the production unit?

Can the Material-Technical Bases of Cooperatives Continue To Be Built and Utilized
Well?

As regards product contracts, some comrades are concerned because they do not
know how the material-technical bases of cooperatives will continue to be
built and used? In actuality, some material-technical bases are unusable and
some in need of repair have been abandoned, thus causing concern on the part of
some persons.

According to a report by the Hai Hung provincial joint agriculture-statistics-
finance-banking sector, the fixed assets of each cooperative increased by an
average of more than 50,000 dong during the year that product contracts were
expanded to laborers and after deducting depreciation. Thus, it cannot be said
that additional material-technical bases cannot be constructed. However, the
degree of construction varies from one cooperative to the next.

On the basis of an investigation, we have classified the various types of assets
of cooperatives in the following groups:

As regards stationary assets, the most obvious of which are farmland water
conservancy projects, projects are still being protected and repaired and ditch
systems have developed rapidly in order to irrigate each field plot. In three
contract seasons, Hoai Duc District has excavated an additional 300,000 cubic
meters of dirt. In 1981, Tu Loc District excavated more than 500,000 cubic
meters. A number of cooperatives are still using the drying years and storehouses
for seed units (26 cooperatives in Tu Loc District and 23 cooperatives in Cam
Binh District) or constructed handicraft shops; however, some places are not
using them well and are allowing cooperative members to raise seedlings or make
bricks in drying yards while other places, such as the Thuc Khang Cooperative,
are allowing cooperative members to take the bricks from drying yards. As
regards livestock pens, when the decentralization of collective livestock
production among families was initiated, many pens were abandoned and allowed to fall into disrepair but this, of course, has not been due to product contracts.

As regards machinery, water pumps have been repaired, many new pumps have been purchased and all places want to buy additional pumps. Attention has been given to repairing and purchasing additional insecticide spray tanks. Hoai Duc District has purchased 1,000 additional tanks. The use of improved vehicles has developed very strongly at all places; at the Hong Phuc Cooperative in Ninh Thanh District, Hai Hung Province, every family has an improved vehicle. Rice threshing machines are not used at many cooperatives because of the shortage of electricity and because they do not know how they are used under the new contract mechanism. The protection and use of small tractors and the various machines at cooperatives are a matter to which particular attention must be given. The Cam Dinh Cooperative, an advanced cooperative that has been equipped with 10 Bong Sen tractors over the past 5 years, has allowed all 10 of them to remain out of operation due to the lack of spare parts and improper maintenance which, of course, is not the fault of product contracts.

As regards those assets that are livestock, many more buffalo and cattle have been purchased. In Hoai Duc District, more than 300 buffalo and cattle have been purchased by collectives and more than 2,000 cattle have been purchased by families. In Hai Hung, some cooperatives have purchased 10 to 12 additional animals. Wherever good management is practiced, cattle and buffalo herds are healthy. However, wherever management under the new contract system is not good and the use of buffalo and cattle is shared, many have died. In 1 year, one village (Co Bi) allowed 25 animals to die and another village (Cam Vu) allowed 17 to die.

Recently, there has been a considerable loss of sluice gates (all of which were constructed using one of the four types of construction wood) and theft of buffalo and so forth in the countryside.

If the situation mentioned earlier becomes universal in nature, it is clear that the material-technical bases of cooperatives are being strengthened. Those types of installations that are suited to the new management mechanism are purchasing additional equipment. Some installations have constructed based without complete planning and must soon abandon them. For example, Tu Loc District loaned cooperatives the money, some 25 million dong, to build a rather large number of brick kilns; however, due to the lack of careful planning and the lack of coal now, these kilns will fall into disrepair in only 1 year. There are also some installations that constructed material-technical bases in the past that are not suited to the new management method, consequently, they should adopt a clear attitude concerning these bases. Consider, for example, collective hog pens. In Tu Loc District, there are enough hog pens to raise 10,000 hogs but now they are only being used to raise 2,000 or 3,000 hogs. The Tan Hung Hoa Cooperative has enough pens to raise more than 1,000 hogs but is only raising a few hundred. For the next several years, we surely will not be able to raise enough hogs to fill the pens that now exist. A cooperative head said to me: "It is very difficult for us when the upper level has no clearcut ideas. If we do not use these pens and allow them to fall into disrepair, we will be destroying a material-
technical base. If we use them for another purpose, we will be accused of miscellaneous management. On top of this, we must still depreciate these assets each year."

The further we went into the countryside, the more we saw that, in recent years, we have not very carefully planned the construction of material-technical bases for cooperatives and the more we saw that protecting and using the material-technical bases within a cooperative are a very large problem. Many cooperatives that I visited, including advanced cooperatives, have gone for 1 decade (not just since the adoption of product contracts) without plans for equipping with and using material-technical bases and without strict internal management and use regulations; their depreciation has been very low in order to increase the value of the manday and, meanwhile, fixed assets are unusable after only 5 to 7 years instead of being used for 20 to 30 years!

Are Workpoints Being Awarded for Work Not Done? The Problem of Well Coordinated Product Contracts

I remember the day that I talked with Tao and Thanh in Haiphong after the locality expanded the use of product contracts. They stated that the awarding of workpoints for work not done still existed and that they were taking a number of measures on a pilot project basis in the hope of stopping this practice. Immediately thereafter, I went to the two cooperatives that were conducting the pilot project but still did not fully understand the statement mentioned above. However, one question haunted me; are workpoints being awarded for work not done, how serious is this practice and how can it be corrected? To date, the workday is still the most important basis for distribution within cooperatives. When workpoints are being awarded for work not done, the workpoint system is disrupted and workpoints are no longer a measurement of the actual labor expended, consequently, how can distribution in accordance with labor be carried out?

This time, I saw the matter more clearly; actually, under the product contract for rice production, the management of rice production is tighter (I say management of rice production, not the management of the entire cooperative). However, there are still many problems regarding the management of mandays within cooperatives.

At present, the difference between the number of mandays worked in crop production and the number of mandays worked in the trade sector is rather large at many places. The secretary of the Cam Binh District Party Committee and the vice chairman of the Cam Binh District People's Committee in charge of agriculture said to us; "The persons in the 202 units, livestock units and the blacksmith, carpentry and brick trades work many more days than the persons engaged in crop production. Even at the Cam Dien Cooperative, only 120 days are worked in crop production but more than 230 are worked in the trade sector." The chairman of the Tu Loc District People's Committee and the Kien Xuong District Party Committee secretary raised similar problems. The quotas of the trade sector
are not good and although the awarding of workpoints for work not done no longer exists in rice production, it is still prevalent in the trade sector and throughout the cooperative. Thus, distribution cannot be fair. Now, at many places, the persons who only work under contracts earn the lowest incomes followed by the persons who have labor in specialized units who also accept contracts and persons engaged in the other trades who accept rice contracts. There are many workdays to be managed. It is necessary to expand product contracts within the various sectors, tightly manage workpoints within the sectors and practice cost accounting with appended bonuses and penalties for each sector on the basis of unified distribution. Whatever method of operation is employed, it must be researched and tested and there must be respect for the innovations of the localities on the basis of respecting the goals and principles of management.

The problem of mandays worked outside contracts is very serious. Sometimes, hundreds of "workdays" are worked building roads, building cultural centers, moving cemeteries and so forth and all of these workdays are included in distribution. A number of sectors of the district and the village people's committees are using mandays and then "charging" them to cooperatives as contributions. In Gia Xuyen Village, 171,000 mandays were spent in crop production while 59,000 were worked outside contracts.

The awarding of workpoints for work not done still continues, economic-technical quotas are unreasonable and product contracts have not been expanded in a well coordinated manner. However, why have we been so slow to correct this situation? A number of comrades told me: "Village and cooperative cadres do not want it to be stopped. Some installation cadres, considering only their personal interests, see three benefits to be derived from allowing the awarding of workpoints for work not done to continue: first, they have a "workday fund" which they have the authority to use and can control; secondly, they are able to give jobs to their relatives and acquaintances that earn many workpoints for them; thirdly, and this is an important reason, because we have stipulated that indirect mandays are related to the total number of mandays of the cooperative, the higher the total number of mandays is, the higher is the number of indirect mandays worked by cadres!"

It is hoped that policy researchers will give their attention to these opinions.

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\[\text{Text}\] The Management of Products and the Methods Employed To Resolve the Problem of Product Not Being Delivered for the Repayment of Debts

While implementing the new contracts, many persons have mentioned the problem of products not being delivered for the repayment of debts.

At the places that we have studied, the quantity of products not being delivered for the repayment of debts within each district usually constitutes 2 percent of
output. At places where this percentage is low, such as Cam Binh, the amount of product not delivered for the repayment of debts for the entire year was 661 tons, with total output being 80,000 tons. On the average, the quantity of product not delivered for the repayment of debts accounts for 2.8 percent of output in the eight districts of Hai Hung Province. At a number of cooperatives, this percentage is much higher.

For a long time, cooperatives have had the problem of unpaid debts. In 1981, at a number of cooperatives in Hai Hung Province that had not yet implemented product contracts, paddy was owed to the cooperative: at the An Binh Cooperative, cooperative members owed 115 tons of paddy to the cooperative, with new debt amounting to 65 tons; at the Viet Hoa Cooperative, cooperative members owed the cooperative 32 tons. However, with the new product contract, when harvested paddy is taken to each home and delivered in accordance with the contract quota, the conditions exist for debt to increase. Despite this, many cooperatives have managed to collect all the product due to them.

The amount of paddy not being delivered for the repayment of debts at the cooperatives we investigated in Hai Hung Province amount to 2.8 percent of output, with new debt amounting to 2.3 percent. This percentage is not high and does not go beyond projections. However, in order to resolve this problem, some cooperatives have taken payment for debts from the paddy distributed on the basis of the number of mandays worked and a number of others have taken payment for debts from the social fund, the reserve fund and the paddy allocated for livestock production; one place is even taking payment for debt from the subsidies given to families encountering difficulties. Therefore, this matter should not be considered insignificant as a result of which no effort is made to resolve this problem in order to avoid influencing the overall management of the cooperative.

Each place computes the product not being delivered for the repayment of debts in a different way. The secretary and vice chairman in charge of agriculture in Chau Giang District said to me: "Cooperatives have very many ways of computing debt. Some places compute the debt owed in meat in paddy equivalent at the rate of 40 kilograms of paddy for every 10 kilograms of meat. In the second phase of management improvement, some places that have gardens measuring 3 or 5 sao reduced the size of these gardens but stipulated that the area by which the garden was reduced be used to raise paddy for the repayment of debt each year. Some places contract for the production of subsidiary food crops and then convert 3 kilograms of potatoes into 1 kilogram of paddy for the repayment of debt. Therefore, you must be vigilant because not all new debt is the result of product contracts. However, at some places, product contracts have also resulted in rather heavy debt!" Assessing the situation at the places we investigated, we saw the following:

--Some cooperatives have not managed work well and not implemented contracts well while not making prompt payments, consequently, some cooperative members have held their paddy back (as is the case in Xuan Lai).
--At a number of places that have had difficulty collecting old debts, cooperatives have, when seeing that their members recorded a bumper harvest, applied the paddy of cooperative members to old debts and used the rest to pay product debts during the year (Ngoc Ky and Quang Hung).

--Some cooperatives and production units have not routinely inspected or supervised production and have not promptly determined which families are encountering difficulties in production in order to help them, consequently, the output of these families has fallen far short of contract quotas, they have not been given prompt waivers and, as a result, have not delivered all the paddy required under their contract.

--A number of cooperatives formulated distribution plans, especially plans for production units, late, with one place not formulating its distribution plan for 1981 until March of 1982 and have not implemented bonuses or penalties regarding the completion of plans for the delivery of products. Because cooperative members do not know what the situation is, they have held back some of their paddy (Long Vu).

--At a number of places, cooperative members have held back their paddy because cooperatives have not withdrawn money from the bank to promptly pay cooperative members (Ngo Quyen and Hiep Guong). The state still owes many payments to cooperative members, in the form of grain for industrial crop production areas, payments for the sale of meat, the sale of jute and so forth, consequently, some cooperative members, having made incorrect calculations, have kept some of their paddy.

There are some families at all places who engage in wasteful consumption, have the habit of not paying debts and, when they do have paddy within the house, consume it and allow their debt to remain unpaid, saying: "Who worries about being forced to repay a debt to the collective!"

--Wherever cadres and party members do not set an example, cooperative members allow their indebtedness to grow. In Tu Loc, the party chapter consists of 12 comrades, 8 of whom have not delivered all the products required, consequently, this unit has a rather large quantity of products not being delivered for the repayment of debts. Cooperative members tell one another: "Let's wait and see whether the party members deliver all the product required or not?" Thus, there must be a classification of debt so that the repayment of debt can be computed on a seasonal and annual basis; management must be reorganized to uphold contracts with cooperative members and guide production so that everyone, especially the families of war invalids and war dead who are encountering difficulties, meets or exceeds contract quotas; production and distribution plans must be adopted at the start of the season and there must be prompt payments and fair bonuses and penalties. Educational and administrative measures must be taken regarding those families that intentionally do not repay their debts and do not deliver the full quantity of products required.
At the start of this season, every cooperative discussed ways to guide the collection of contracted products. Many additional measures have been adopted. For example, cooperative members are informed of distribution plans in advance so that each production unit can calculate the income of each family and determine how much product they must deliver. Cooperatives have adopted product collection plans for each main crop as they are harvested and, at the same time, have announced the bonuses that will be paid if the delivery of products is completed, have established product collection teams in each unit, etc. "If shortcomings are promptly rectified and specific agreements are adopted, the collection of products will not be a major issue"—said the chairman of the Kien Xuong District Party Committee to us.

However, attention must still be given to guarding against years of crop losses, to areas in which crop fail.

The Matter of Helping Families that Are Encountering Difficulties and the Problem of High Interest Loans

One comrade said to me: in view of the fact that you have an opportunity to study the situation in the countryside, you should examine and discuss the matter of the difference between the income and living conditions of the families encountering difficulties and other families and the problem of interest bearing loans. In actuality, these matters are very closely related.

When implementing distribution in accordance with labor, we acknowledge one reality, namely, differences in income due to the different amount and quality of the labor contributed. While studying the situation this time, I calculated the income of some families within a few production units and saw that their incomes vary very widely, by more than 200 percent at some places, such as several cooperatives in Hai Hung and Thai Binh Provinces. However, I also learned that the excessive difference in income is not due to product contracts but primarily due to poor economic and social management on the part of the cooperative. The difference is not due to the contribution of additional labor or the investment of additional money in intensive cultivation, rather, it is due to poor social management, to a lack of fairness in the payment of wages, which is the greatest cause for concern because it does not provide incentive for legitimate laborers.

Let us set the matter of social management aside for the time being and deal directly with the matter of cooperative economic management.

At the five cooperatives we studied, we found that some families, even families of young, healthy couples who do not yet have many children, earn the lowest number of workpoints, even when they exceed contract quotas, because they only work in crop production, only accept contract fields; after deducting the contributions that they must make to the cooperative, their remaining income is not enough to provide the grain needed by a family. Due to inaccurate quotas and the lack of tight management, some families accept contract fields, work many mandays in other trades, work mandays outside their contracts (which not everyone accepts) and also receives credit for mandays worked in administrative work,
consequently, they work many mandays and unreasonable income differences are created, which do not provide incentive for laborers in the production of grain. Many places are not providing good labor management, as described above, and not complying with the spirit of Council of Ministers' resolution 400 as regards determining the number of mandays included in distribution within the cooperative. We exchanged opinions concerning this situation with the secretaries of the Cam Binh and Kien Xuong District Party Committees and the chairman of the Tu Loc District People's Committee, all of whom maintained that this is correct. In the present situation, if additional labor is invested, the quality of labor is improved and "those who do much, earn much," this is the fairest kind of distribution. However, we should not allow the situation to exist wherein a number of persons earn a high income at a time when they do not contribute a commensurate amount of labor, earn a high income through illegal activities or as a result of the unreasonable differences in workpoints among the various trades. This has caused dissatisfaction on the part of some laborers who specialize in grain production.

Whether this situation is resolved or not, our countryside will continue to have poor families who have little or no labor and a low income. We visited the family of a youth in Cam Binh District; yesterday, he had much labor but, today, his wife has just given birth and he, himself, is sick; yesterday, this was a family without difficulties but, today, it has become a family that is encountering difficulties. This situation exists today and will exist tomorrow at places where the level of production is low and at places where production is high. Many persons whom we questioned said: "We should not resolve this problem by returning to distribution on the basis of averages or to assigning jobs not for production purposes, but for the purpose of guaranteeing income. This is nothing more than a deadend course. If production does not develop, it is not because a few persons are encountering difficulties, but because the entire village is encountering difficulties." However, helping families that are experiencing difficulties is the responsibility of all society and of each person, a responsibility based on love and help for one another. In the socialist system, there must be distribution in accordance with labor but this is not the only form of distribution. In the present situation, when the price of paddy is regulated at the lowest possible level for families that are experiencing difficulties, 2.5 dong per kilogram—the equivalent of the price paid for obligatory sales to the state—helping families who are experiencing difficulties primarily involves creating the conditions for them to contribute mandays to the production of ample products for consumption or providing them with subsidies from social funds. Sending laborers in these families to perform necessary jobs so that they work an adequate number of mandays and earn an income is being done and is something that should continue to be done. Observing and helping families that are encountering difficulties and helping them to meet and exceed contract quotas are also things that can be done. We asked the secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union and the secretary of the Women's Union of the district: "Can you mobilize Youth Union members, members of the Teenagers' Unit and members of the Women's Union to help the families that are encountering difficulties, especially the families of war invalids and war dead?" They said: "This is being done and should be done!"
Some families that are encountering difficulties, that is, families that need labor and must hire labor at cutthroat prices, must borrow money to pay their daily expenses, especially unexpected expenses. In the countryside, some persons borrow money to build a home, to provide their children with lavish weddings and so forth. I am only talking about those persons who must borrow money because their daily lives truly involve difficulties. There are many types of interest bearing loans in the countryside: loans made at an interest rate of 30 or 40 percent and advances against main crops with paddy being purchased at low prices. Everyone we asked said that this situation has existed for a long time. Some persons said that it is not very widespread. No one, however, would clearly tell us how widespread this practice is or where it exists. Having heard that this problem exists in C. Village, I went and met with the secretary of the party committee, the member of the standing committee of the party committee in charge of organization and the head of the cooperative in the village, all three of whom replied that the problem does, indeed, exist but they do not know the extent of it. Could it be that they actually knew what was going on but concealed it from me? And, to not know that such exploitation is taking place even within their own village is something deserving of reprimand. I asked them:

--"What are the activities of the credit cooperative in your village?"

None of them could answer me.

--"Does your village have an emergency fund?"

--"We have not had one of them for a long time!"

I was angry. This is a tool that the party has instructed us to establish and operate properly in order to help farm families that are encountering difficulties in production and combat high interest loans, which are a form of exploitation that is not permitted to exist in a socialist society but the party organisation and government of this village were giving very little attention to it. Thus, upon whom do persons who are encountering difficulties and need a small amount of money to meet daily expenses, a small amount of capital to purchase breeder hogs, depend?

I sincerely hope that the situation described above is not universal.

A Few Words in Conclusion

We have raised a number of problems and tried to find answers to them in the actual situation.

The product contract is a strong force stimulating the development of agricultural production. The actual situation over the past year and more proves this. However, contracts, regardless of how important they are, are only one element of cooperative management. And, to improve the quality of contracts, it is
necessary to organize production well, constantly improve planning and constantly improve the comprehensive management of the cooperative. This involves a process of continuous struggle and we should not think that this struggle will be won overnight. For example, we have been providing guidance in individual campaigns concerning quotas probably, if I am not mistaken, since 1960 and improvements have been made each year; however, even in the advanced provinces, the majority of the cooperatives are not doing a very good job with quotas. Developing upon strengths, rectifying shortcomings and continuously improving the quality of management should be routine efforts following each production season.

It is necessary to perfect the product contract mechanism, primarily by implementing contracts in a well coordinated manner. Many forms must be developed for broadening the use of contracts and bonuses to the various types of crops, livestock production, the artisan trades and the seed, water conservancy, capital construction, crop protection and contract implementation units, with bonuses paid for each job, such as the management of machinery, tools and other material-technical bases. Any job to which contracts and bonuses are applied that is correctly performed is good. Every contract should be closely linked to the final product so that everyone concerns himself with the final results of production. If well coordinated contracts are not based on reasonable quotas, one sector will encroach upon another, one crop will overtake another, thereby creating unreasonable differences in income and making it very difficult to expand the trade sector, which is one of the great potentials we have in agriculture.

As regards production and management services, such as tractor stations, water conservancy stations, supply stations and technical and cooperative management cadres, economic contracts with appended bonuses and penalties should be expanded to installations. A number of places have done this successfully and we should review their experience and expand this effort in order to mobilize every force, primarily within the scope of the district, to participate in agricultural production.

Attention must be given to providing cooperative and production unit cadres with training in personal qualities and skills and more correct incentive policies must be adopted. At present, cooperative leadership cadres are concerned over the decision to not include the time they spend leading the cooperative in the amount of work time included in their retirement. As regards the remuneration paid to cadres, although guidance has been issued, their income is, to some extent, closely linked to the income of the cooperative but not closely linked to the final results of production of each unit so that management cadres devote their talents and intelligence to management work.

I ended my assignment in the countryside feeling very happy. Bumper crops are being harvested even though many efforts must still be made on the grain production front. At those places that are implementing contracts correctly or relatively correctly, many persons are enthusiastic, production is developing
and management has changed for the better. Intensive cultivation is being restored. Output has increased. Crop production areas still exist. New crops and new, good varieties are being included under the new contracts. One final question will be raised: "Over the past year and more, the new contracts have resulted in millions of tons of paddy. However, can the output resulting from these contracts be increased or will it stop there?"

Say! Has anyone ever said anything about making the product contract a separate entity? The product contract is an element of the cooperative management mechanism, one that is having a good impact. Closely linking the improvement of management to the gradual construction of material-technical bases and the introduction of technological advances in production will create the ability to constantly raise yields. Here, let us take a look at the Nam Binh Cooperative in Thai Binh Province. During this season, the cooperative recorded a yield of slightly less than 60 quintals of paddy per hectare, which represents a new stage of development, one that ranks in the category of producing grade A shoes. This yield was not merely the result of contracts, but also the result of advanced technical regulations, adequate irrigation, the introduction of new varieties, good pest control and so forth. However, as the head of the cooperative said to me: "The new contract has created the condition for everyone to devote his energies to implementing new technological advances better." Advancing at this rate and with the new management mechanism stimulating the use of new technological advances, who can dare say that the possibilities for raising yields are limited! Anyone who questions this should direct his inquiry to the Ph.D. in charge of the Crop Protection Institute, which is the scientific agency that has organized the introduction of technological advances at the Nam Binh Cooperative.
TAY NINH CARRIES OUT LAND READJUSTMENT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by Do Thanh Phong, Deputy Head of the Agricultural Section of Tay Ninh Province: "Land Readjustment in Tay Ninh"]

[Text] In Tay Ninh, as in the other provinces in Nam Bo, there is a very great disparity in the land owned by the peasant households. A survey revealed that 2.86 percent of the households belonged to Category 5, but they owned 10.4 percent of the land; 14 percent of the households belonged to Category 4 and owned 29 percent of the land; 54.53 percent of the families belonged to Category 3 and owned 54 percent of the land; and 22.58 percent belonged to Category 2 and owned only 6.3 percent of the land. On the average, each person in Category 5 had 6,716 square meters of land, while those who are in Category 2 had only 576 square meters. The disparity with regard to land between those in Category 5 and those in Category 2 was 11-fold.

After the south was completely liberated Tay Ninh, implementing directives No 235 and No 43 of the Political Bureau, between 1976 and 1978 mobilized the peasants to recover more than 2,000 hectares of public land and land belonging to the reactionaries, landlords, and bourgeoisie and distributed it to more than 3,000 peasant families which had no, or insufficient, land; organized 2,000 work-exchange teams; and began to prepare to enter into collective production. Those were initial results. However, in the rural areas of Tay Ninh more than 20 percent of the peasant households still had no land, or had insufficient land, while 2 percent of the households owned much land and operated by exploiting workers and collecting rent.

The Provincial Party Committee and the People's Committee decided that it was necessary to strongly and fully carry out a land survey and readjustment, accompanied by organizing the peasants to enter upon the path of collective livelihood.

In its leadership and guidance, as well as in organizing implementation, Tay Ninh emphasized, and did a good job of carrying out, the following tasks:

-- Ensuring that the lines, stands, and policies of the Party were fully understood from top to bottom, and both within the Party and among the masses. The Provincial Party Committee studied the documents of the Party and state and reviewed and evaluated the movement to achieve cooperativization, abolish exploitation, and readjust landowning. At the same time, it compiled materials and organized study for each category of people and drafted a specific plan to carry
out that study at each echelon and in each sector in the province, and then in the districts, villages, and hamlets. The party members carried out self-criticism and criticism, which enabled the entire party organization to have a high degree of unanimity toward the transformation and adjustment of land. The cadres and party members voluntarily relinquished their land which was beyond the average amount and which their families could not farm, while also finding out which comrades were eligible to share in land distribution. Cadres and party members were assigned to persuade the families which owned more land than they could farm to give up their surplus land.

-- Encouraging the masses to contribute opinions to the district and village committees and to the party members regarding the leadership of the agricultural cooperativization movement and to report their land holdings and method of operation, especially with regard to families which had more than the average amount of land and could not farm all of it. At a meeting the masses pointed out landowners who still exploited workers in the manner of rich peasants or the rural bourgeoisie. The People's Committee and the Peasants' Association were responsible for explaining the policy and for encouraging them to strictly observe it and accurately report to the Peasants' Association their landholding and their method of operation.

-- Setting up village and hamlet land survey committees made up of representatives of the peasants', youths', and women's associations. The land surveys had to be carried out rapidly, with careful attention being paid to Category 5 and Category 2. The survey method was to encourage the families to voluntarily declare their landholdings, with verification being the responsibility of the Peasants' Association and the old people in the rural areas. After the surveys were completed the Party Committee, the People's Committee, and the Peasants' Association worked with the village and hamlet survey committees in considering, judging, and resolving instances of incorrect reporting. With regard to the exploiting elements, if, after the People's Committee and the Peasants' Association encouraged them to turn over their land according to the policy, they refused to do so, such administrative measures as denying rents were applied and they were dealt with according to the policy, after which a report was submitted to the upper echelon.

-- When carrying out the survey, grasping the specific facts with regard to the land and the number of households which should be distributed land, and drafting a land readjustment plan. The plan clearly stated to whom the land was to be redistributed, how much land was to be redistributed, and where the land was to be redistributed. With regard to the exploiting elements, it stated from whom, how much, and where land would be taken over. The plan clarified how much land would be distributed to each household category. That matter was discussed collectively, and each household was approved by the party, the government administration, and the mass organizations. When the land readjustment policy was made public the assigning and receiving of land were organized and the peasants were encouraged to submit applications to enter solidarity teams or production collectives.

With regard to leadership and guidance, the party committees and governmental administrations were responsible for closely guiding and leading the elimination of exploitation and the readjustment of land, accompanied by organizing peasants
into production collectives. They helped the base-level party organizations organize land survey and readjustment committees. At the provincial echelon the agricultural committees served as staffs which assisted the Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Party Committee.

The province selected An Hoa Village in Trang Bang District as the test point for surveying and readjusting the land, combined with organizing and building production collectives. After carrying out a survey, An Hoa accepted over 592 hectares that were offered to it, recovered 90 gia [one gia = 40 liters] of tax rice, 8,860 dong, and 23,000 dong which had been received for the illegal selling of land, and distributed land to more than 900 households which had no land or insufficient land, including 57 families of wounded soldiers and families of war dead, and 30 families of active-duty servicemen. It assigned 217 hectares to collectives. An Hoa organized three production collectives. During the 1980-1981 winter-spring season many difficulties were encountered in production, but the three production collectives had higher rice yields than when its members were earning their living individually. Collective production began to have a new spirit and the confidence of the peasants was strengthened.

To date, 54 out of 82 villages in 8 districts and cities in the province have organized study and carried out land surveys and readjustments, combined with the organization of production collectives and socialist villages and hamlets. They have recalled more than 3,500 hectares assigned to production collectives and distributed them among more than 3,000 peasants which had little or no land so that they could produce. Three villages have completed their land survey and readjustments. To date, Tay Ninh has organized 151 production collectives, 4 cooperatives, and 1,315 production solidarity teams. Cam Gian Village organized 25 production collectives and 90 percent of its farm land was brought under collective production.

The cadre task received adequate attention. The province assigned core cadres to each village. In the course of study those cadres were able to grasp the Party's cooperativization policy and the task of surveying and readjusting the land.

In addition to its transformation work, the province boldly applied to production such advanced techniques as building water conservancy projects and introducing new, high-yield varieties, supplied materials to meet the needs of production, and at the same time demonstrated concern for the spiritual and material lives of the masses, especially for the families of wounded soldiers, war-dead, and active-duty servicemen, and headless families. In An Hoa, in the course of the land survey and readjustment 57 wounded soldiers and families of war dead were granted 28.9 hectares, 30 families of active-duty servicemen were granted 15.5 hectares, and 330.6 hectares were distributed to 900 other landless families.

Tay Ninh has attained encouraging initial results. However, few results have been attained in land readjustment and the readjusted area is not yet very large. Guidance is not yet very tight and land readjustment has not been carried out uniformly. A number of policies have so far failed to stimulate collective production, so the results are still limited.
AGRICULTURE

'NHAN DAN' EDITORIAL CALLS FOR ANTI-WATERLOGGING PREPARATIONS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 16 Jul 82 pp 1,4

[Editorial: "Prepare in Advance to Guard Against and Fight 10th Month Season Waterlogging"]

[Text] The 10th month season is the last production season of the year and has the largest planted area. The fulfillment of the annual plan depends to an important degree on the results of the 10th month season. Nationwide, the 10th month season takes place during the rainy season. Therefore, every year a considerable area is inundated and waterlogged, which reduces the yield and the total rice output.

In the Red River Delta and the former Zone 4, during years with ordinary rainfall levels nearly 300,000 hectares of cultivated land are waterlogged. In the Mekong Delta, every year the Mekong Delta inundates more than 1 million hectares of cultivated land during the 10th month season. During the 1976 10th month season there were large rain storms in some northern and central provinces, and in Nam Bo the flood waters of the Mekong River arrived earlier and in greater-than-average volume, and ruined several hundred thousand hectares and about a million tons of paddy. During the 1980 10th month season rain caused major waterlogging in the Bac Bo Delta, causing the loss of 800,000 tons of paddy.

Effectively dealing with the flooding and waterlogging every year is a permanent, difficult, complicated task. A rather large low-lying area in the Bac Bo Delta has no anti-waterlogging works, while the existing anti-waterlogging works have a designed capacity that is only sufficient to cope with 300 millimeters of rain in a 3-day period. During the U.S.-puppet period the southern provinces had practically no anti-waterlogging works. Since the liberation anti-waterlogging works have been built, but they are still too few for an area of millions of hectares that must be drained.

Flooding and waterlogging usually occur rapidly and unexpectedly. One day it is necessary to fight drought, while the next day a single large rainstorm inundates a number of low-lying areas.

This year, according to weather forecasts there are many signs that the rain will exceed the yearly average. The Mekong River may flood a large area earlier than usual. The fight on the flood and waterlogging prevention front will be fierce and will require the drafting of a truly scientific, positive, and detailed plan to protect and save each paddy and cluster of rice fields.
When commanding the anti-waterlogging effort the anti-flood and storm command committees must foresee adverse situations that may occur in order to draft plans to effectively cope with them. They must categorize fields according to their elevation, in relation to large and small rainstorms and the degree of flooding and waterlogging, in order to take appropriate measures.

In fighting flooding and waterlogging it is necessary to stress the spirit of on-the-spot self-salvation, take the initiative, and flexibly apply all measures. That fight must meet the following requirements: limiting damage to the minimum and isolating, and gradually reducing, the waterlogged area. Areas must be saved on a selective basis, with emphasis on the heavily waterlogged areas that can be saved, in accordance with an order of priority, with some crops and fields being saved first and others being saved later. Spreading out such efforts evenly must be avoided. Priority must be given to saving rice seedlings and recently transplanted rice. During the first hours of the anti-flooding effort it is necessary to create initial capabilities for the plants to survive by bailing out water until the tops of plants stick out of the water so that they can breathe. After the water recedes it is necessary to straighten up the seedlings in the destroyed areas or retransplant the fields that have been completely wiped out, if the seasonal schedule permits.

The "bury water, spread water, and drain water" method of fighting waterlogging has been tested under actual production conditions and has been proven to be completely correct. First of all, the system of area, border, and field dikes must be complete, solid, and compartmentalized, in correct accordance with the anti-waterlogging plans. It will thus be possible to spread and bury water over a large area and prevent water from accumulating and deeply flooding a number of areas, thus creating difficulties for the anti-waterlogging effort. Water should be drained directly to the drainage ditches according to plan, without spilling the water over into other paddies thus causing more flooding and waterlogging.

The necessary forces and facilities must be deployed to fight waterlogging rationally and effectively, but they must not be wasted. Places which need only rudimentary tools (bailing buckets, waterwheels, etc.) should not install pumping machines. Places which require only diesel-powered pumping machines should not install electricity-powered pumping machines. Places which require only a small number of people should not deploy a large number of people to do the job. Draining standing water from the drainage ditches is a strict technical requirement during the rainy season.

The southern provinces, especially in the Mekong Delta, must pay attention to combining fighting waterlogging with cultivation measures, early planting, and rapid harvesting before flooding and waterlogging occur. They must dig and dredge drainage ditches to drain waterlogged fields, combined with the embankment of surrounding dikes to prevent water from flowing in from other places to flood the fields.

The entire nation is in the midst of the rainy season. During the hot, sunny periods it is necessary to guard against large, unexpected rain storms. The localities, bases, and responsible sectors must closely coordinate all methods and measures to fight flooding and waterlogging with the highest possible effectiveness throughout the rainy season and ensure a victorious 10th month season.
SHORTAGE OF PARTS FOR WATER PUMPS CALLED SERIOUS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Jul 82 p 2

Article by Bui Ngoc Lien, the Ministry of Water Conservancy: "Resolving the Problem of Spare Parts for Water Pumps"

In past years, our state and our people have invested very much time and money in the construction of irrigation and drainage systems. We now have more than 7,000 kinds of irrigation and drainage pumps, all sorts of electric pumps, tens of thousands of diesel pumps and universal pumps and hundreds of thousands of gasoline pumps. The irrigation and drainage capacity of the various types of pumps constitutes 50 to 60 percent of the total irrigation and drainage. The pump stations have made efforts to maintain, repair and operate projects and regularly provide irrigation and drainage in support of agricultural production. However, the pump stations that have been in continuous operation for many years now lack very many spare parts, consequently, some places must dismantle reserve pumps in order to obtain spare parts. There is also a shortage of spare parts for diesel pumps and universal pumps and these spare parts are not supplied in a well coordinated manner. Many diesel pumps managed by cooperatives are broken and in need of spare parts. The production of spare parts for water pumps is directly related to numerous sectors: the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Engineering and Metals, the Ministry of Water Conservancy, the Ministry of Supply, the Ministry of Power, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Chemicals General Department and so forth.

In order to promptly repair the various types of water pumps, we suggest: as regards parts for large water pumps, attention must be given to experimental production and mass production. Parts for large water pumps are numerous and their production is complex, with some types requiring the use of ferrous metals, consequently, a policy must be adopted that provides incentive for the production of these parts. As regards electrical components, ball bearings and so forth that are special purpose parts for the water conservancy sector, it is suggested that the Ministry of Power and the Ministry of Supply immediately inform the water conservancy sector when they receive such products so that they can take delivery of them and distribute them for use.
Electric pumps and diesel pumps are put under the management of the water conservancy sector by the state; in actuality, however, the sector is only permitted to manage the norms governing the distribution of pump housings, the other parts, such as motors and rubber, are controlled by other sectors. Even within pump housings, there are some parts, such as ball bearings and the power train, that are supplied by the Ministry of Supply; the same situation exists with transformer components. It is suggested that the Ministry of Supply and the Chemical General Department organize the convenient supply of parts to localities. There is a serious shortage of spare parts for water pumps and this situation is the greatest concern to the irrigation and drainage pump stations in agricultural production. It is hoped that the various sectors will give appropriate attention to this matter and truly resolve this problem in the direction of reorganizing production with a view toward insuring that pump stations operate on a regular basis and support agricultural production well.
HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

FOURTEEN KEY PROJECTS SURPASS ANNUAL PLAN

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 14 Jul 82 p 1

[Article: "Fourteen Key Construction Projects Surpass Annual Plan By More Than 50 Percent"]

[Text] During the first 6 months of the year the 42 key state construction projects attained 47 percent of the plan norm regarding the value of construction for the entire year. Units of the Ministry of Building are serving as the construction contractors for more than half of those construction projects, 14 of which fulfilled more than 50 percent of their annual plan norm. Those units were the Pha Iai thermoelectric plant (65.9 percent), the Hoa Binh hydroelectric plant (53.2 percent), the Bim Son cement plant (91.4 percent), the Hoang Thach cement plant (66.7 percent), the Ha Tien cement plant (159.5 percent), the Lam Thao superphosphate plant (105.9 percent), the Nha Trang yarn mill (84.2 percent), the Hanoi yarn mill (61.1 percent), the Vinh Phu paper mill (66.4 percent), the La Nga sugar mill (53.4 percent), the Cam Pha machine-building plant (51.5 percent), the Gia Lam railroad project (77.4 percent), the Vinh fiber mill (57.5 percent), and the Labor Capability Recovery Center in Hai Phong (76 percent). Four construction projects -- the Pha Iai thermoelectric plant, the Hoa Binh hydroelectric plant, the Nha Trang yarn mill, and the Hanoi yarn mill -- made progress with regard to all three aspects: output value, attainment of scheduled objectives, and project quality. The Nha Trang fiber mill brought its cotton fiber yarn department into operation.

The production units supplying construction materials overcame difficulties, promoted production and transportation, and promptly transported cargo to the key construction projects. During the 6-months period the Hai Phong Cement Mill produced nearly 150,000 tons of cement, an increase of 7,000 tons over the same period last year and about 50 percent of the annual plan. The brick-tile-earthware-porcelain and rock-sand-gravel enterprise combines reorganized production in order to improve transportation to the key construction projects. Therefore, in the Hanoi area each quarter they saved eight tons of POL in comparison to the previous quarter and prevented the dumping, breaking, and loss of millions of bricks and tiles because they had to be transported via round-about routes. The construction machinery enterprise combine fully utilized old iron and scrap ferrous metals and attained 56 percent of the annual plan norm with regard to faucets, water tanks, water valves, and locks in order to complete the construction items on schedule.
The administrative-professional management elements of the ministry, enterprise combine, general corporation, and corporation organs began to reorganize and reduced the number of their employees by 6 to 8 percent. The redundant employees were assigned to the key construction projects and to base-level construction units. A number of state policies and regulations regarding economic management were implemented more effectively at many construction sites.

However, progress is not yet uniform, and some key construction projects have fallen short of their construction plans. Recently the construction sector held a meeting and recommended many specific measures to overcome deficiencies in the management of labor, materials, and equipment, to improve the management of construction and the supplying of materials, and to promote competition in order to rapidly and efficiently complete the project items and victoriously fulfill the 1982 state plan.
HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

HON GAI PRODUCES 300,000 TONS OF BRIQUETTE COAL

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23 Jul 82 p 1

[VNA News Release: "Hon Gai Coal Corporation Produces Nearly 300,000 Tons of Briquette Coal"]

[Text] During the first 6 months of the year the Hon Gai Coal Corporation produced nearly 300,000 tons of briquette coal, 50 percent of the annual plan norm and an increase of 14 percent over the same period last year. Coal supplied to the railroad sector amounted to 56.5 percent of the plan and increased by 1,800 tons over the same period last year.

The Hon Gai Coal Grading Enterprise made a regular practice of assigning salary funds and paying salaries according to final output in the briquette coal production department. Much progress was made in the various aspects of management, especially in labor management and technical management, by the department. The number of hours of useful machinery operation per shift was between 5 and 5 and one-half. The absentee rate declined by 2 to 3 percent. Eighty percent of the shifts surpassed their production norms by from 280 to 320 tons per day. The average income per worker in the principal production phases increased by from 30 to 50 percent, which encouraged the workers engaged directly in production to increase the number of work days, do a good job of implementing the method of "working continuously and taking turns resting," and increase the utilization rate of the machinery system's capacity.

The Hon Gai Coal Corporation and the Coal Grading Enterprise improved relations with their customers and with the transportation sector, rapidly liberated the facilities at the wharf, and went all-out to supply coal regularly to the railroad sector in accordance with quarterly plans. The average volume of briquette coal shipped every month from the Hon Gai port was more than 5,500 tons, a larger volume than in the past.

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HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CAPACITY INCREASED

Hanoi LAO DONG in Vietnamese 15 Jul 82 p 1

Article by Huu Tinh: "A New Success for the Van Dien Phosphate Fertilizer Plant"

Following 2 months of work filled with creativity in the emulation movement to successfully implement the resolution of the 5th Party Congress, the cadres and manual workers of the Van Dien Phosphate Fertilizer Plant recently put into operation a blast furnace with a capacity of 50,000 tons per year which produces phosphate fertilizer using domestic coal. In 1974, the state invested 13 million dong in the construction of this furnace which produced phosphate fertilizer by means of imported coke. However, due to numerous difficulties and the lack of sources of imported coke, the majority of this production line could not be operated.

Having accepted the new task and making every effort to use domestic coal in order to put the blast furnace into operation producing phosphate fertilizer, the plant assembled highly experienced technical cadres and manual workers and improved many of the components of the production line; such as the raw material loading system, the auger and the heat input chamber; in particular, they adjusted and improved the high pressure fan system to insure stable temperatures, etc. In the past, the plant achieved success in putting a blast furnace with a capacity of 10,000 tons per year into operation using domestic coal but it took 16 hours to produce one batch of product. Now, the cadres and workers of the plant, having become the masters of technology and having made many bold improvements, are using domestic coal exclusively to operate the furnace at high capacity, 50,000 tons per year. The first tons of product emerged from the furnace after only 3 hours of operation. After 1 day of production, each technical parameter was stabilized. The capacity of the furnace on the first day was 3-3.5 tons per hour.

Caption: the phosphate fertilizer blast furnace of the Van Dien Phosphate Fertilizer Plant, which has a capacity of 50,000 tons per year and is operated entirely on domestic coal.
CEMENT PRODUCTION INCREASES DESPITE SUPPLY SHORTAGE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Jul 82 pp 1, 4

\[ VNA \text{ News Release: } "\text{During the Past 6 Months, the Total Output Value of Cement Increased 36.5 Percent Compared to the Same Period of Time Last Year; Minh Hai and Ben Tre Urgently Plant Summer-Fall and 10th Month Crops}" \]

\[ \text{Text} \] During the first 6 months of this year, the cement production sector only achieved 41.7 percent of its total output value for the entire year but exceeded its total output value for the same period last year by 36.5 percent even though its supply of materials and fuel was not increased. The output of cement increased by 15.8 percent and the output of semi-finished clinker increased 49 percent primarily as a result of two factors: first, the Haiphong Cement Plant has made many improvements in its production management and virtually met its production plan quotas, having completed 49.5 percent of its plan for the entire year, which represents a 22 percent increase in its total output value compared to the first 6 months of last year; secondly, the Bim Son Cement Plant was put into operation in February of this year, thereby making a significant contribution to the total output value of the entire sector, even though this plant only met 20 percent of its cement output quota and 45 percent of its clinker output quota for the entire year.

The Haiphong Cement Plant has established better coordination with the units supplying materials and fuel and with transport units; if it had received a full supply of electricity, it would have completed a larger percentage of its plan. In the emulation movement to make innovations and practice economy, the plant collected for reuse some 570 tons of steel and 250 tons of fire resistant bricks and reconditioned 360 tons of spare parts worth 8.6 million dong.

The Bim Son Cement Plant, which has been in trial production and adjusting its equipment, still managed to operate its grinder and furnace at design capacity even though it did not receive a stable supply of electricity, coal or gypsum.

The cement plants in the South have made an effort to organize the contract production of spare parts in order to repair equipment and manage production more closely and effectively. During the months that it received a full supply of oil,
the Kien Luong Cement Plant has produced 889 tons of product per day. During
the months that the Thu Duc Cement Plant has received an amply supply of clinker,
it has equalled the output of December, the month during which it achieved the
highest level of production last year.

The local cement enterprises that were established in 1967 and 1968 did not at
first meet product quality standards; now, however, 50 percent of the units
have stabilized the quality of 300 strength cement and many batches have reached
the 400 level. Against the background of an irregular supply of electricity and
coal, the advances made by the small cement production plants have been the
result of cooperation and assistance from many sectors and levels as well as
the large cement plants. The 46 cement production units of the various localities
and economic sectors produced nearly 50,000 tons of cement during the first 6
months of the year, which represents an increase of nearly 8 percent compared to
the same period of time last year. The cement production installations at
Nguyen Binh in Cao Bang Province, Thu Thinh in Hoang Lien Son Province, Ha Tu in
Quang Ninh Province, He Duong and Ninh Xuan in Ha Nam Ninh Province, Da Nang
in Quang Nam-De Nang Province and Binh Hoa in Dong Nai Province as well as
Enterprise 195 in Military Region 4, Enterprise X78 of the Air Defense Command,
the Bo Ha Enterprise of the Ministry of Forestry and so forth were the units
that produced well during the first months of the year.

Recently, the Federation of Cement Enterprises (the Ministry of Building)
re-examined each aspect of the preparations for establishing balance in
production during the final 6 months of the year and expressed its determination
to overcome difficulties and complete the plan for the entire year. The
various plants have the ability to compensate for the shortfall during the first
months of the year if they tighten their management. The Hoang Thach Cement
Plant is urgently preparing for test operation at the end of the 3rd quarter
and the start of the 4th quarter. The Dong Nai Fibro Cement Enterprise has
made investments in depth and increased its production capacity in order to
meet the plan quota of 2 million square meters of roofing material this year
and eventually produce 3 million to 5 million square meters in the years ahead,
thereby meeting housing repair needs in the cities and housing construction needs
in the key rice growing areas of the South. The local cement enterprises can
undertake the grinding of clinker sent from Bim Son and create additional
commodities for use in trade with the countryside for grain and food products.
The export needs for cement products are also significant.

Now that rain has fallen, the farmers of Minh Hai Province are using their labor
and draft power to transplant thousands of hectares of summer-fall rice and
plow and harrow 183,800 hectares in order to transplant 10th month rice.

Vinh Loi, Phuoc Long, Gia Rai and Hong Dan Districts and the cities of Ca Mau
and Minh Hai, which put from 2,800 to 28,000 hectares under the cultivation of
10th month crops, have established committees to guide the preparation of
fields. The state rice farms of the province have improved and plowed more than
3,300 hectares. The farmers of Phu Tan, Tran Van Thoi, U Minh, Ngoc Hien, Cai Duoc, Nam Can, Thoi Binh and other districts have spent tens of thousands of mandays digging ditches to leach fields of sulfates and have improved more than 28,500 hectares of lowlying fields in order to transplant 10th month rice. The districts have sown nearly 15,000 hectares of 10th month seedlings, enough to directly transplant and retransplant 10th month rice crops.

Together with preparing fields for 10th month crops, the farmers of Vinh Loi District, as a result of preparing their draft power, seed, fertilizer and supplies early, have transplanted 5,700 hectares of summer-fall rice, thereby exceeding their plan quota by 700 hectares and transplanting 50 percent of the summer-fall rice of the entire province. The districts that have much land transplanted with summer-fall rice have cultivated and fertilized their rice crops on schedule.

As of the end of June, the farmers of Ben Tre Province had plowed and harrowed more than 40,000 hectares of land and transplanted more than 25,000 hectares of summer-fall rice and early 10th month rice. As a result of preparing their draft power, labor and supplies well, many districts have transplanted rice three times faster than last month. The districts of Mo Cay, Cho Lach and Chau Thanh have transplanted from 60 to 70 percent of the fields being put under the cultivation of 10th month rice.

Together with preparing equipment and deploying labor to combat floods and waterlogging, the agricultural sector of the province has closely guided the various localities in implementing technical regulations well, from plowing to transplanting, cultivating and fertilizing summer-fall rice in an effort to achieve a yield of 29 quintals of paddy per hectare.
TEXTILE ENTERPRISES STABILIZE PRODUCTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Jul 82 p 4

[Article: "Many Textile Installations in Ho Chi Minh City Find Additional Equipment and Raw Materials and Stabilize Their Production"]

[Text] During the first 6 months of this year, Textile Enterprise Number 3 (the Hong Gam Federation of Textile Enterprises in Ho Chi Minh City) produced 655,000 meters of finished cloth of various types and printed 255,000 meters of cloth. Some 87 percent of the cloth produced was grade A, the highest amount ever.

The enterprise has been concentrating the utilization of its labor on restoring and putting into production a sizing machine with a capacity of 4,000 meters per shift and a high pressure dyeing machine with a capacity of 900 meters per shift, repairing and equipping with parts and improving 100 looms. The enterprise has expanded the use of contracts to many agencies and units in order to provide a supply of raw silk, thread, dyes and sizing with a view toward stabilizing its production.

Also during the first 6 months of this year, the Binh Minh Textile Enterprise Number 8 found more than 100 tons of raw materials of various types and produced 575,304 meters of finished cloth and 313,000 meters of various types of canvas. The enterprise repaired its raw material self-feeding looms in order to weave 600,000 meters of fabric for tire production installations. The enterprise has signed a long-term contract to produce this type of fabric for these installations, thereby increasing its output value and providing stable work for its workers.

At the Thanh Cong Textile Mill, in addition to attaching importance to making technological improvements and implementing advanced techniques, the mill has established good relationships with many installations for the purpose of finding new raw materials. Cadres and manual workers have subsidiary work with which to improve their living conditions.

Caption: emulation warrior Nguyen Thi Hong (the Thanh Cong Textile Mill), a person who works a high number of mandays and always produces grade A products.
HAIPHONG PORT UNITS FALL SHORT OF EMULATION PLEDGES

Hanoi LAO DONG in Vietnamese 24 Jun 82 p 3

Article by Thu Nho: "United Emulation in the Haiphong Port Area"

The united emulation campaign, the purposes of which are to help increase cargo handling capacity, rapidly unload ships, rapidly transport goods from the port and reduce the volume of cargo backlogged in warehouses and storage yards, between the Haiphong Port Enterprise and the Bach Dang River Transport Enterprise, Motor Transport Enterprise Number 4 and the Haiphong railroad station has been underway for one-half year. What have been the results of the campaign and what is being revealed by the united emulation with which we must concern ourselves?

"Kho-ra-so! Kho-ra-so!" Vietnamese phonetics

The cargo handling capacity at the port has increased rather significantly compared to the same period of time last year. Generally speaking, an average of 5,500 tons of cargo were handled each day during the first two quarters of the year. (Each year, in late April and throughout the month of May, few foreign ships dock at the port. Otherwise, the average amount of cargo handled could be higher.) In the emulation drive to celebrate the 5th Congress of the Party, there were a number of days during the past year when productivity records were set: 10,000 and 11,000 tons.

As regards the rate at which foreign ships have been unloaded, especially ships of the Soviet Union, there has been nothing about which to complain. The transportation of cargo by river route, railroad and highway from the port for the purpose of reducing the amount of cargo in warehouses and storage yards has been urgently carried out in accordance with the pledges made by the various parties.

The above are the most general, the most evident results of the united emulation. They mean that the emulation goals are gradually being fully implemented and met by the various parties.
In order to meet the goals established for the port of Haiphong, the port enterprise has taken many steps to improve the organization of production and the management of production on the basis of the opinions and assistance provided by the group of Soviet specialists. On the other hand, we and our friends have engaged in socialist emulation with a view toward fully utilizing the production capacity of the port and gradually making the port of Haiphong an advanced support of the entire country. The Soviet specialists have welcomed the new steps taken by the port of Haiphong very much. M.A. B-go-rop [Vietnamese phonetics], the head of the group of specialists, and A.I-u. Pa-np-ma-ren-co [Vietnamese phonetics], the secretary of the specialists’s trade union, both said: "Kho-ra-so! Kho-ra-so!"

The largest achievement recorded by the transporters involved the prompt and safe transportation by river route of six heavy pieces of cargo for the Pha Lai Thermoelectric Power Plant construction site. This cargo consisted of transformers, stators and a coal grinder weighing from 100 to 230 tons. The piece of cargo weighing 230 tons, which was 12 meters long, 3.5 meters wide and 5.2 meters high, was a piece of cargo that caused unprecedented concern and anxiety to everyone throughout the trip from the Gulf of Ha Long (where it was loaded from the side of the Soviet ship Sta-kha-no-vich Co-top [Vietnamese phonetics]) to the Pha Lai wharf. When this piece of "super cargo" was safely hoisted onto the wharf, the Soviet specialists working there said in praise: "Kho-ra-so! Kho-ra-so!"

"Kho-ra-so," which means "good," is a Russian word that has become very familiar to us. This word of praise was primarily directed toward the Back Dang River Transport Enterprise.

Things That Are Difficult To Say to One Another

However, each of the transport units mentioned above has circumstances that it finds difficult to discuss forthrightly with the port, circumstances that are generally called "delicate matters."

Let us examine the united emulation between Motor Transport Enterprise Number 4 and the port. Basically, they have pledged the following to one another: to handle and transport 700 tons of cargo per day, including transporting 550 tons to warehouses outside the port and 150 tons from the port to the various provinces while combating every negative phenomena in cargo handling and transportation. As a result of accelerating the emulation campaign to maintain means of transportation and improve the number of good vehicles, "enterprise 4" has been sending vehicles into the port on a more regular basis. As a result, the amount of cargo backlogged at the warehouses and storage yards of the Chua Ve port has declined. However, there are still complaints about the need to "grease palms" before someone will load cargo onto a truck. The port has requested that each such case be reported in detail. Because it wants to have work on a
permanent basis and avoid conflicts, "enterprise 4" finds it difficult to talk about this practice. There is no third party to serve as an arbitrator in this matter.

Below, is the united emulation between the Haiphong railroad station and the port. The main commitments they made to one another are; each month, the railroad station will supply to the port from 2,900 to 3,000 railroad cars so that the port can load them with 55,000 to 60,000 tons of cargo each month. Facts have shown: in the first month, the railroad station supplied 831 cars and the port only had 19,573 tons of cargo, which was only enough to load 780 cars. In the second month, the railroad station only supplied 770 cars and the port only had enough cargo, 17,354 tons, to load 682 cars. In the third month, the railroad station supplied 1,591 and the port loaded 35,181 tons of cargo on 1,426 cars. In the fourth month, the railroad station supplied 1,074 cars and the port loaded 21,501 tons of cargo on 868 cars. Thus, neither side has fulfilled its commitments for one-half year. However, the two sides have not sat down to discuss the matter and gain experience.

Finally, there is the united emulation between the Bach Dang River Transport Enterprise and the port. The main commitments they made to each other are; the Bach Dang enterprise has guaranteed to supply to the port 2,000 tons in barge capacity, which includes 500 tons of special purpose barge capacity for transporting iron and steel and 1,500 tons of barge capacity for transporting packaged cargo and other products. During the 1st quarter, the two parties did the following: the Bach Dang enterprise supplied to the port an average of 4,063 tons of barge capacity each day, which included 698 tons of barge capacity for the transportation of iron and steel and 3,365 tons of barge capacity for the transportation of other products. The port only loaded an average of 127 tons of iron and steel per day (which resulted in a surplus of 517 tons of special purpose barge capacity) and 715 tons of packaged cargo (a surplus of 2,650 tons of other barge capacity).

Specifically, during the 1st quarter, there were 14 days on which the port met its iron and steel loading norm and 13 days when it met its packaged cargo loading norm. There were 10 days when the Bach Dang enterprise did not meet its norm as regards supplying barge capacity for the transportation of packaged cargo and 24 days on which it did not meet its norm on supplying barge capacity for the transportation of iron and steel.

Neither party has set time aside to discuss the matter and gain experience.

Steps That Should Be Taken

All of the above mentioned units in the united emulation mentioned above have encountered very harsh objective difficulties. They Haiphong railroad station is experiencing a shortage of coal for its locomotives. At the port of Haiphong, there is a shortage of electricity for modern cargo handling equipment. At Motor Transport Enterprise Number 4 and the Bach Dang River Enterprise, there is a shortage of fuel and so forth.
However, the reasons why they have failed to fulfill their commitments could be that they have failed to make full use of existing cargo handling capacity; many large owners of cargo want to use the warehouses and storage yards of the port instead of renting means of transportation to transport their cargo; and there are also large owners of cargo who lack the money needed to rent means of transportation. Therefore, it often occurs that when means of transportation are available, cargo is not or when cargo is available, means of transportation are not. Another reason is that the commitments that were made were too high and have not been flexibly revised to suit the actual situation. For example, if 2,900 railroad cars have never been supplied in any month and 55,000 tons of cargo have not been loaded in any month, should these norms be maintained? Or, if the ability to load and unload cargo from barges is low, is it necessary to send 2,000 tons of barge capacity into the port each day? And, why have the port and Motor Transport Enterprise Number 4 not established a unit to supervise cargo handling in order to stop the "greasing of palms" or to verify that no such negative phenomenon is occurring within the port?

As a result, the steps that these four units should take can be stated as follows:

---Organizing united emulation with the large owners of cargo.

---Revising the commitments that have been made so that they are consistent with objective reality and incorporate these commitments in economic contracts between the two parties.

---The trade unions of these units should take the initiative and assist in immediately holding meetings to conduct preliminary reviews and gain experience.
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

FIRST PHASE OF CAN THO PORT EXPANSION COMPLETED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 July 82 p 1

[Article: "Hau Giang Completes First Phase of Project to Expand Port of Can Tho"]

[Text] After 8 months of construction, on the morning of 20 July Hau Giang Pro- vince held a ceremony marking the completion of the first phase of a project to enlarge the port of Can Tho. The old 59-meters-long jetty was improved, lengthened to 242 meters and broadened to 193 meters, and can accept ships with capacities of 5,000 tons. The warehouse was also expanded by thousands of square meters. The communications-transportation sector also surveyed and dredged the channel passing through the Dinh An river mouth so that larger ships could be accommodated.

During the past 2 years more than 167,000 tons of grain and food products have been shipped from the port of Can Tho and thousands of tons of fruit have been exported to the fraternal nations. The port has received thousands of tons of cargo, including fertilizer, coal, cement, iron and steel, logs, etc. During the first 6 months of this year the port took in more than 1.8 million dong, a 37-fold increase over 1980.

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HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

'NHAN DAN' EDITORIAL URGES BETTER CARE OF WAR VICTIMS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 15 Jul 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Take Care of Wounded Soldiers, Families of War Dead"]

[Text] The concern of our Party and state for wounded soldiers, families of war dead, and families with merit toward the revolution is manifested above all in concern for their material and spiritual lives, in accordance with the slogan of the state, the people, and the beneficiaries of the policies working together to ensure that everyone has stable living conditions, in ordinary times as well as when difficulties are encountered.

During the past several years, endeavoring along those lines many provinces and municipalities, such as Hai Hung, Hanoi, Quang Nam-Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City, Thai Binh, Son La, Vinh Phu, Song Be, Hai Phong, Cao Bang, Cia Lai-Kon Tum, Phu Khanh, Ha Son Binh, etc., have attained a number of results. They have provided most of the wounded soldiers and families of war dead with jobs and considerable incomes. The nurturing of the old and dependent parents of war dead and the children of war dead who have lost both parents has been expanded in many base-level units. A number of schools still provide good educations for the children of war dead.

Because production still has not met the many essential needs of social life and because of deficiencies in the organization of the implementation of policies in a number of localities, difficulties are still being encountered in the lives of wounded soldiers and the families of war dead.

Better care for the lives of wounded soldiers and families of war dead is an aspiration of the entire Party and the entire population and a requirement of the present situation. No matter how great the difficulties, that aspiration must be realized. In order to practically commemorate the 35th Wounded Soldiers and War Dead Day, we must perform the following tasks, in order to contribute positively to carrying for the lives of wounded soldiers and war dead in the present situation.

We must exploit the latent capabilities and on-the-spot forces of the localities in order to organize the correct, full, and meticulous implementation of the policies and regulations regarding wounded soldiers and war dead which have been promulgated by the Party and state. The results of that task will help the wounded soldiers and families of war dead to overcome their difficulties and gradually stabilize their living conditions.
We must continue to develop the campaign for the entire Party and the entire population to care for the lives of wounded soldiers and war dead and expand it all over the country, with such practical contents as providing them with labor, production capital, and experience in order to increase labor productivity so that the wounded soldiers and families of war dead can accept and surpass contracted-out work norms, and expand the form of nurturing the old, weak, dependent parents of war dead and children of war dead who have lost both parents in the base-level units, thus preventing the occurrence of negative phenomena because of a lack of care. The graves of the war dead must be located, disinterred, centralized, and kept up, and the war dead commemorative halls and cemeteries must be promptly renovated.

The deficiencies of some clinics and hospitals in examining and treating wounded soldiers and the families of war dead must be overcome. Efforts must be concentrated on treating the recurring wounds and illnesses of wounded soldiers.

The quality of study must be improved and the children of war dead attending general schools must be given vocational guidance. It is necessary to ensure that the children of school age can attend school and study well from the first year of school to the end of the educational process. There must be close coordination among the schools, the local economic bases, and the families in order to organize vocational guidance for the children of war dead.

Providing better care for the lives of wounded soldiers, the families of war dead, and individuals and families with merit toward the revolution is an important, urgent task which demands many all-out efforts. The actual situation in many localities has demonstrated that although production conditions have not yet developed and many difficulties are being encountered in social life, with the correct leadership and guidance of the party organizations and the governmental administrations, it is possible to mobilize a movement for the people to voluntarily help out. Therefore, care for the living conditions of wounded soldiers and war dead is something that is entirely capable of being achieved with good results.
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

CENTRAL COMMITTEE ISSUES CIRCULAR ON HONORING WAR VICTIMS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 15 Jul 82 p 1

[Article: "Secretariat of Party Central Committee Issues Circular on Organizing 35th Wounded Soldier-War Dead Day"]

[Text] In order to organize the 35th Wounded Soldier-War Dead Day so that it has real significance in the present situation, the Secretariat requests the echelons and sectors to do a good job of performing the following tasks:

1. The echelons, sectors, and mass organizations from the central level down to the base level must strictly review the implementation of the policies regarding wounded soldiers and war dead, within their spheres of operation and authority and in view of the actual situation, during the past several years, in order to illuminate the good points and deficiencies in that work, while also applying practical measures to overcome the deficiencies and weaknesses in their echelon, unit, or base.

The organs in charge of the war invalids-social welfare work at the various echelons must carefully review their responsibility toward guiding and implementing the specific regulations, policies, and stipulations that have been promulgated regarding wounded soldiers and the families of war dead, rectify and perfect their organization, ensure that that work is entrusted to reliable people, and strictly implement the policies of the Party and state regarding wounded soldiers and the families of war dead.

2. It is necessary to promote the propagandizing and broad dissemination throughout the entire population of the policies regarding war dead, wounded soldiers, the families of war dead, and families which have merit toward the revolution, in order to continue to bring into play the tradition of patriotism and solidarity and set a good example for society; mobilize all people, families, organs, and mass organizations to meticulously implement the policies; and enable that work to become a broad mass movement with profound political significance and sentiment.

The Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union at the various echelons, especially at the base level, must organize a brief activity cycle with the topic of developing the revolutionary tradition which emphasizes the lessons and noble examples of war dead and wounded soldiers, in order to educate youths and teenagers.
3. The Ministry of War Invalids and Social Welfare must review the policies that have been promulgated regarding wounded soldiers and the families of war dead and recommend that the state promptly supplement and complete those policies under the present economic conditions and capabilities, in order to manifest the all-out concern of our Party and state for the people and families with merit toward the revolution and the homeland.