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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
No. 2017

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ERRATA: In JPRS 80823 of 17 May 1982, No. 2010 of this series,
in the article entitled "Operations of P-12 Air Defense Radar
Described," which begins on page 41, the equation on page 42
should appear as follows:

\[ r_{\text{max}} = \sqrt{\frac{P_i G^2(\alpha, \beta) \cdot \lambda^2 \cdot \sigma}{P_{\text{Emin}} 64 \pi^3}} \]

- a -

[III - EE - 63]
In the same report, in the article entitled "Mission of Rocket Troop Meteorological Services Detailed," which begins on page 46, the speed of light given in the last sentence of paragraph four should read (300,000 km/s).

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BELGIAN SOURCE DISCUSSES PRISON CAMPS, LACK OF FREEDOM

Brussels LE SOIR in French 15, 16 May 82 pp 1, 3

[Article by Ydriz Basha i Novosejt, member of the Committee of Intellectuals for A Europe of Freedoms (CIEL): "Curious Albania"]

[Excerpts] The people of Skenderbeg and Mother Theresa, known for their courage and generosity, have had, since 1946, prisons and concentration camps which would stand up well against the Soviet gulags. They have the names Tepelene, Lushnje, Kamze, Fier, Burrel, Gjirokaster, Shkoder, Bulqize, etc. Today more than 70,000 Albanians are in these prisons and concentration camps.

The Albanian Workers Party has taken on the task of building a new Albania which does not recognize private initiative or the right to freedom of thought, of conscience and of religion. Article 16 of the Albanian Constitution prohibits private ownership while, through the application of Article 37, Albania becomes the first and the only atheistic country in the world.

Albania, beacon of true Communism, citadel of Stalinism, did not participate in the Helsinki Conference, or in the Belgrade or Madrid conferences, and has not participated in any international conference. Undoubtedly, the AWP leaders have a curious manner of practicing democracy. In light of the particularly serious economic justification, if it is reasonable to maintain such a policy. This is what Mehmet Shehu asked and it cost him his life.

CSO: 3100/673
SIGN OF POOR DISCIPLINE, LAXITY IN NAVY

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 30 Apr 82 p2

[Article by Captain 1st Rank Neno Kirdzhaliyski: "Conversation About Discipline"]

[Text] It is a tradition in this unit not to allow serious disciplinary violations and for friendship and friendly mutual aid to prevail in relations among seamen of different conscriptions. Such was the case this year as well. That is why the few violations and an unseemly act committed in the garrison drew the attention of the senior political worker. There was no cause for alarm. However, it is never useless to speak of the observance of regulations and the moral features of the navy seaman, the more so since the ships were entering the period of active training and were dealing with their most important combat training problems. It was a period during which strict discipline, obedience and a high feeling of duty and responsibility were needed more than ever.

The tone was set by the party organization whose secretary is officer Nikov. It initiated a conversation on the role of staff specialists in strengthening the discipline and ensuring the further cohesion among ship companies. The good traditions must be preserved and multiplied. Along with the issuing of assignments, its was suggested that the political department draw a up a letter-appeal to all Komsomol societies, pointing out that for many years the unit had been in a leading position in the navy in terms of discipline. Recent discipline violations were also analyzed.

Party-member commanders were asked to read and interpret the letter-appeal at Komsomol meetings. This started the conversation on discipline in ship's companies. The results exceeded expectations. The Komsomol members not only strictly condemned the violations but themselves exposed many of them and made valuable suggestions. The unanimous opinion was that while serving on shipboard even the most insignificant omissions could have serious consequences.

The Komsomol meeting at the society where Petty Officer Tsenkinski is secretary was particularly active. Officer Khristakiev, who read and explained the appeal, was surprised at the maturity and principle-mindedness with which the small collective discussed the problems. Misconstrued comradeship was criticized sharply. It was pointed out that the best help one can give one's
comrade is to point out to him his weaknesses promptly and to prevent him from committing a bad action rather than to advise him after the fact.

At the meeting attended by officer Dimitrov many Komsomol members suggested that more talks be given on the proper upbringing of the seamen, manifestations of courage and lofty moral and will-power qualities be recalled more frequently and the psychological climate aboard ship be improved steadily. The Komsomol meetings attended by party-member officers Kurtev, Nikov, Bakalov and others were also held in an atmosphere of frank and creative discussions.

The discussions on discipline and strengthening the ships' companies proved that some commanders, personnel in charge of ship party groups and secretaries of Komsomol societies do not pay the necessary attention to individual work with the men, particularly with those who show a tendency to violate rules. There have been cases of violations of ship daily schedules and rules and operational instructions in handling equipment, mechanisms and apparatus. On one ship, two seamen fell ill and were sent to the hospital but their duties were not reassigned to others so that, back on the job, they found the equipment they were in charge of in poor condition. It also turned out that some seamen, while on liberty within the garrison, hire taxicabs and go home. It was only after the discussion that they realized that although they had returned to their units on time they had violated the rules. Some Komsomol-member petty officers were strictly blamed for not being exacting toward their subordinates and sometimes even setting bad examples.

After the discussions the party members at the staff party organization reported to the political department on the Komsomol meetings and the suggestions which were made. The conclusions drawn from such direct contacts between commanders, political workers and staff specialists most personally involved in the matter and the seamen made taking effective steps for strengthening the discipline and observance of regulations and improving educational work aboard the ships possible. This is a strong guarantee that the forthcoming difficult combat training assignments at sea will be carried out well and fruitfully.

5003
CSO: 2200/99
NATO ALLIES COMPETE IN TANK PRODUCTION

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 30 Apr 82 p 4

[Article by Ilko Nedelchev: "Armored Rivalry"]

[Text] Armament standardization has proved to be one of the most difficult problems facing the NATO members. According to NATO experts, major national differences in weapons systems and military equipment create unnecessary hardships in terms of reciprocal military support and weaken the bloc's power. The Senate Armed Services Committee of the U. S. Congress has determined that the variety of weapons lowers the effectiveness of NATO armed forces by 30-40 percent.

It quickly became clear that Washington is using "standardization" as a pretext for gaining the greatest possible advantages for itself and that it views this sensitive problem through the eyes of the U. S. military-industrial complex of the United States. According to the frank statement of a high military official at the Pentagon, standardization and modernization of NATO armaments are possible only on the basis of American models. This forces the Western European allies to purchase combat equipment from their overseas partner.

The insatiability of the Americans who, on top of everything else, hold dominating positions in terms of nuclear armaments, greatly irritated the arms monopolies in Western Europe. In the course of fierce rivalry the FRG, England and France were able to regain their fame as major producers and exporters of "death goods." The neglecting of their interests put an end to standardization and exacerbated conflicts within NATO. The implementation of the idea of developing NATO's "tank of the future" is a specific illustration of this fact.

It was a question of replacing some 10,000 older-model tanks (M-48, Chieftain and Leopard-1) with a new-type armored vehicle, the offspring of North Atlantic integration. The size of the deal made the military concerns forget any idea of cooperation, for this would have also meant splitting the expected huge profits. Neither intergovernmental agreements nor the decisions of various NATO agencies were able to make the weapon sharks make any concessions. After protracted arguments, the "tank battle" ended in a compromise: "free competition" among producing companies was proclaimed.
It was the American Chrysler and the West German Krause-Mafai companies which won the competition for the best tank. Once again the NATO jury was faced with the difficult question of choosing between the American M-1 and the West German Leopard-2.... While NATO was puzzling over the matter, the tank manufacturers in Munich were producing hundreds of Leopards while 55-ton M-1 tanks were pouring out of Lima, Ohio. In order not to fall behind the Bavarian predators, the latter were named after General Creighton Abrams, a famous tank expert, who had died while serving as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The NATO "standardization" groups were still in session when the Bundeswehr was already receiving the new tanks and shipping the old ones to its allies. Thus, Denmark received 120, Norway 78 and Turkey 77 West German Leopard-1 tanks. The current masters of the Pentagon were also in a hurry, headed by Weinberger, a man of the war industry and, not so long ago, vice president of the powerful industrial corporation which enjoys a good reputation among reactionary Arab regimes. Despite numerous shortcomings, the Chrysler tank was supplied to the Seventh American Army deployed on FRG territory as NATO's main striking force in Central Europe. Seven thousand M-1 Abrams tanks are to be produced by 1988.

All NATO's "standardizers could do was to shrug their shoulders and announce a Solomonic decision: the Budeswehr and some other NATO armed forces would be equipped with the Leopard-2, while the American Armed Forces would use the M-1 Abrams. At that point, Uncle Sam displayed astounding generosity by allowing the installation of a 120-mm smooth-bore West German cannon on its tank, starting with the mid-1980s. Why? Because Washington is planning on deploying on FRG territory 204 Pershing-2 medium-range nuclear missiles and 96 Cruise-1 missiles. This way everyone would be satisfied.

It is thus that the joint efforts of the partners in NATO, which closely remind us of the fable about the eagle, the crab and the pike, wrecked the "tank of the future." Actually it is quite unlikely that such a tank can be created, for no partnership can be developed on the basis of rivalry.
EDITORIAL CALLS FOR BETTER TRAINING IN NAVIGATION FOR COMMANDERS

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 8 Apr 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Navigation Training"]

[Text] The navigation training of ship commanders is not a new question. However, this does not make it any less relevant. Reality makes us go back to it. Years ago, as a result of poor navigational training of the commander, a ship found itself stuck. Damages were caused. This was the bitter consequence of the lack of an adequate feeling of responsibility in carrying out navigation duties by commanders. Justifiably, this commander was deprived by his superior officer of the right to sail the ship.

The ship's regulations make the commander fully responsible "for the safe handling and maneuvering of the ship." In the interest of navigational safety, the commander "must be guided not only by his own experience, knowledge of the theater and data supplied by the navigational combat personnel and technical observation facilities, but systematic personal determination of the ship's position."

The commander's navigational obligations are not limited to navigational safety. Holding the required position, maneuvering in combined navigation, and constant and precise knowledge of one's position in the use of weapons and reliable interaction in the course of the dynamics of naval combat should always be present in the mind of the ship's commander. These important navigation conditions are most closely related to tactics. That is why the high level tactical training of the ship's commander is inconceivable without extensive navigational knowledge. The commander must skillfully combine knowledge of tactics, combat organization and sailing expertise.

Navigational safety and the successful implementation of combat assignments at sea largely determine the professional skill and feeling of responsibility of the ship's commander. He must direct the daily activities and training of the navigation personnel. He must control its combat readiness and guide it in battle. He must try to improve the ship's navigation service.

All of these important statutory obligations of the commander demand of him to be the leading navigator. These are not simply nice-sounding words. They express the concentrated experience of many generations of seamen. This important stipulation has not become irrelevant, as some commanders believe but is becoming
increasingly more urgent and acquiring a new meaning. It is no accident that
the new "Regulations on the Organization of Navigational Training" includes a
section which regulates the duties of the ship's commander in navigation.

Nor should the stipulation that the commander is the leading navigator be inter-
preted literally. Without substituting for the navigator and paralyzing his
autonomous actions, he must skillfully and promptly supervise navigational
activities. He must organize the interaction between the navigator and the
officer on duty and the other units in resolving problems at sea. Good trad-
itions in navigational training of ship's commanders has been developed in the
unit in which Officer Ispanski serves. Frequent navigation involving intensive
combat training calls for the steady improvement of practical sailing skills not
only by commanders but by officers on duty as well. This requires most close
study of errors and the taking of effective steps to prevent their recurrence.

The navigational training of the ship's commander requires the necessary amount
of knowledge and skills needed for the proper execution of statutory obliga-
tions. However, knowledge of such obligations and the skill to implement them
are two different things. Practical experience indicates that with the proper
organization of navigation training and proper appreciation of the importance
for every ship commander to master the necessary knowledge and skills could in-
deed turn him into the leading navigator aboard the ship.

The navigational training of ship's commanders covers two stages: training so
that the commander can control the ship's maneuvering by himself and maintaining
(improving) this skill. The basic methods for achieving this include individual
studies and training under base conditions and practical application of such
knowledge and skills at sea.

The unit commander who, in accordance with the regulations must "individually
train his direct subordinates on the ship," is responsible for and directs their
training as navigators. Even when the unit navigator teaches some classes, the
commander must personally formulate the assignments of the ships' commanders.
At the end of the training (after the exercise) he must analyze the situation.
This is of great educational importance.

Impeccable sailing, successful solution of problems at sea and the precise and
decisive handling of the ship in the course of combat exercises, conducted
either individually or jointly, are the basic yardstick for the quality of the
training of ship's commanders in navigation.

The best ship, the best commander and the best first officer are named on the
basis of the results of navigational training, investigations and other measures
carried out by the ship's commanders and their assistants. This develops in the
commanders the desire to compete and is a good incentive for improving naviga-
tional knowledge and practical skills.

Practical experience teaches us that no compromise is allowed in assessing navi-
gational training. It is strictly necessary for the ship's commander to know
everything and to be able to do everything according to regulations.
Our navy is developing steadily. The duties of ship's commanders at sea are becoming increasingly complex and more responsible. This calls for paying increasingly systematic attention to their training as navigators by senior commanders, political organs and staffs. This is the best guarantee for the successful implementation of assignments at sea and for sailing without breakdowns under all conditions.

5003
CSO: 2200/91
PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT MUST BE IN GOOD SHAPE PRIOR TO NAVAL EXERCISES

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 8 Apr 82 pp 1, 2

[Article by Capt First Rank Dimo Denev: "Before Going Out to Sea"]

[Text] The navy ships have entered the period of active combat training away from their bases. The main objective is for their crews to improve their skills in the use of weapons and technical facilities under realistic conditions of contemporary naval battle. Now, when training activities are increasingly shifting from classrooms and simulators to the sea, particular attention must be paid to preparations immediately preceding a trip to sea.

The experience gained in combat training of the ships in the unit in which Officer Petrov serves and by many other navy units categorically proves that success comes to commanders who carry out thorough advance preparations. They attain the objectives of all exercises at sea with lesser resource outlays and time. It is no accident that a number of navy documents deal with this question. Therefore, why should it be raised again? Because individual commanders, particularly younger ones, who show a certain lack of understanding, consider preliminary preparations on a limited and simplistic basis.

What are the main features of preliminary preparations on which every commander must focus his attention before his ship leaves the base? They are the plan, the equipment and the personnel.

The first mandatory condition for highly effective combat training exercise at sea is its qualitative planning. On the basis of the plan for preparations for the respective training assignment and the results achieved in previous sailing exercises, the commander must define the objectives and the basic problems which must be resolved if they are to be reached. He must then take steps to provide the necessary material and support facilities.

After planning, the efforts must be focused on preparations involving material facilities and the command and rank and file personnel. This mandatorily requires proper organization. Weapons and equipment must be thoroughly checked and regulated so that their parameters may be consistent with operational norms. This will guarantee the further impeccable action and absence of breakdowns at sea. Unfortunately, this is not always done properly. For example, in a recent sea exercise, the ship on which Officer Grozov serves, was allowed to go to sea
with improper material facilities. This was a prerequisite for a breakdown at sea.

The preliminary training of the rank and file personnel is also of great importance. Such training must be essentially practical and focused on exercises with material facilities at the combat positions and classrooms and simulators at the base.

The training of the ship's commander and of all officers and petty officers is of exceptional importance in terms of resolving planned problems properly. The training of the commanders before the sailing calls for concentrating precisely on elements in the respective assignment which is to be carried out at sea. A great variety of methods can be used. This is a question of initiative and creativity on the part of the commander. Particular attention must be paid to the study of navigational conditions and the areas in which the ship will sail and the tactical methods to be applied in the use of weapons and technical facilities. To this effect the personnel is trained at its command centers, with the help of complex simulators, etc. The recent sailing of the ship in which Officer Savov serves is an indicative example of the way inadequate preliminary training of command personnel yields unsatisfactory results. This was the reason for which the organization of the exercise and its results were unsatisfactory and the training objectives were not achieved in full.

The preliminary playout of the plan for the entire exercise is an essential prerequisite for its success. In this case, in addition to testing the individual training of the officers, all the points of the exercise to be covered by the ship (the group of ships) are considered chronologically. Subordinates must be placed under circumstances similar to those in which they will be trained at sea. They must be obliged to make decisions and issue instructions and orders related to ship control (combat facilities) under the specific circumstances which they will encounter at sea. The knowledge of the conditions under which the planned combat exercises and special assignments, and safety measures while using weapons and technical facilities must be tested. In the course of this preliminary practice, it is very important for the commander to bear in mind the weaknesses and shortcomings of previous exercises, their connection with the forthcoming tasks and the steps taken for their prevention.

During the period of preparations, greater attention and more time and help must be allocated for the young officers, petty officers and seamen with little experience in working at sea. The commander must help them properly to define the targets, formulate plans for combat assignments to be carried out, preparations of material facilities and training and exercises with subordinates.

It is also very important for the commander to be able to rely on and capture the attention of the party and Komsomol organizations in order to mobilize the efforts of the personnel for achieving purposeful pre-sailing preparations. The final stage in the work of the commander in the preliminary preparations before going to sea is to organize the socialist competition. He must define the indicators and the methods for encouraging and accounting for the implementation of promises. Such measures must be specific as are the targets and the training features to be mastered at sea.
Let us emphasize in conclusion that only a comprehensive approach to preliminary training could ensure high results in combat training naval exercises, absence of breakdowns and making full use of each mile of sailing.

5003
CSO: 2200/91
SED SOCIOLOGIST CLAIMS 'INTELLECTUAL WORK' INSUFFICIENTLY REWARDED

West German Commentary

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 22 Apr 82 p 2

[Commentary by Karl-Heinz Baum, correspondent, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU: "Social Differences Relating to Property Are Acceptable Also to GDR—Leading Social Scientist: Meaningful As Impulses for Economic Growth—'Too Much Equalizing in Area of Intellectual Work.'" A Translation of the East Berlin JUNGE WELT article cited below follows this commentary]

[Text] Berlin, 21 April—A leading GDR sociologist has been looking into the "old objective of the communists," which is aimed at overcoming social differences. In the GDR the differences have been eliminated which were the result of one class being exploited by the other one; educational privileges for the minority have been disbanded; the village stopped a long time ago to be the embodiment of cultural, economic and intellectual backwardness. Manfred Loetsch, professor for sociology, Academy of Social Sciences, SED Central Committee, stated in East Berlin's youth magazine JUNGE WELT [10 Apr 82] that socialism is setting the "historic goal" of growing into a classless society without social differences.

"Practical experience, however, is now" showing that in the "foreseeable future" the emphasis cannot be on eliminating cooperative ownership of property and soil and capital goods. Cooperative ownership is instrumental in "collective decisions and views," which are the "motivating forces" for economically sensible attitudes.

According to Loetsch, "the same" applies to private ownership of capital goods. In the skilled trades, cooperatives are only meaningful if the work is also organized in a cooperative manner. "To take individual bakeries, for instance, and combine them into cooperatives would not benefit society but only add administrative costs, something that nobody needs, Loetsch declared in JUNGE WELT.

Considering these factors, the sociologist concludes that "social differences in the ownership of capital goods is certainly compatible" with the socialist way of life if it leads to impulses for economic growth. Particularly when it comes to the key word "social differences," the GDR is facing the
complicated task of creating "equality on one hand" and promoting "differences on the other hand." Every individual's accomplishments for society are important; it follows that his "share in society's riches" is also important, Loetsch said. One can only distribute more to everybody if there is an increase in economic power.

With respect to intellectual work in the GDR, there is "almost too much equalization rather than just differentiation." According to the words of the sociologist, the principle of "equal slots--equal salary" no matter how different the performance, cannot inspire anybody to do his best in scientific work. Loetsch, who commented on one of the basic questions of the 10th SED Congress—the socialist way of life—is of the opinion that in the GDR "public moral recognition of intellectual accomplishments" is "...much too low."

When looking at the performance principle in socialism, one must also deal with the question, how to punish "incompetency" more effectively.

Differences in the material standard of living are "justified and beneficial to socialism" if they can be attributed to actual differences in performance. In the brown coal industry, for instance, nobody thought that it was unfair that one of the inventors of a certain kind of coke received an income for which a laborer had to work several months. On the other hand, differences in the material standard of living would deserve "social ostracism in every respect" if it were based on a "deformation of the performance principle": in other words, if certain shortage situations are "shamelessly exploited" and combined with "personal acquisitiveness".

SED Sociologist's Discussion

East Berlin JUNGE WELT in German 20 Apr 82 p 6

[Interview with Prof Dr Manfred Loetsch (44), sociologist, Academy of Social Sciences, SED Central Committee; specialist, research on social structure of socialist society; by Irene Tuengler: "On Fundamental Questions of 10th Party Congress—So That Each Can Give Society His Best, According to His Abilities—Today's Socialist Way of Life and Comprehensive Development of Socialist Personalities"]

[Text] [Question] Everybody feels that he is living as an individual; but how are we then justified to talk about a collective socialist way of life?

[Answer] I believe that every human being not only thinks he is living as an individual, but that in some way he is actually doing it. Everyone has his own interests, needs, likes and he lives accordingly. The way of life of a society, however, is more than the sum total of these millions of individual lifestyles. We must distinguish between several levels. When we talk about the way of life of the socialist society as a whole, we are referring to a way of life in a society where capital goods belong to everybody collectively, where classes and people from various walks of life collectively pursue basic goals, where one class does not usurp the fruits of labor of another one, where the minority does not have political power over the majority. The system of reference for our way of life is the difference when compared to the way of
life of capitalism. The second level is the way of life of classes, walks of
life and social groups within society. The way of life of the farmer is
apparently different from the way of life of a member of the intelligentsia,
for instance. The third level which must be considered when distinguishing
between ways of life is the individual one. There are not only innumerable
lifestyles; they must exist; uniformity in thinking and attitudes cannot
advance society.

[Question] Which factor is primarily responsible for the apparent individual
differences?

[Answer] People's way of life is influenced most by education—and closely
related to it—the intellectual level of work. As a rule it can be said: The
more qualified a person is, the greater the variety is of his intellectual
interests and needs, the greater his feeling of social responsibilities and
related activities.

[Question] Overcoming social differences is an old objective of the
communists....

[Answer] We did not only remove the differences that are connected with the
exploitation of one class by another one but also many other differences.
Educational privileges for the minority were disbanded. The equality of women
was established. Or: The village stopped a long time ago to be the embodiment
of cultural, economic, intellectual backwardness. Yes, socialism has the
historical goal of growing into a classless society without social differences.

Practical experience, however, shows that for the foreseeable future the
emphasis cannot be, for instance, on eliminating cooperative ownership of
property, soil and capital goods. Collective decisions and views are
encouraged, the motivating forces for economically sensible attitudes. The
same applies to private ownership of capital goods. In the skilled trades,
cooperatives are only meaningful when the work is also organized in a
cooperative manner. To take individual bakeries, for instance, and combine
them into cooperatives would not benefit society but only add administrative
costs, something that nobody needs. Social differences in the ownership of
capital goods are therefore certainly compatible with a social way of life if
it leads to impulses for our economic growth.

[Question] When you talk about private ownership, does it not also suggest
"income"? What is the relationship in this connection?

[Answer] When the word "social differences" comes up, almost everybody thinks
first of money. Also in this respect the GDR is facing the complicated task
of creating equality on one hand and promoting differences on the other hand.

In socialism distribution is according to the principle of performance. Each
individual is different when it comes to his performance for society; there-
fore the share of the social wealth also differs. We can only distribute more
to everybody if there is an increase in economic power. Scientists and
engineers have a particularly big responsibility in this respect. But it is in
this area of complicated intellectual work where there is almost too much equalization rather than just differentiation. The principle: Equal slot—equal salary no matter how different the performance cannot inspire anybody to do his best in scientific work.

Furthermore, I feel that public moral recognition of intellectual accomplishments—compared with top performance in sports—is much too low. When looking at the performance level in socialism, one must also deal with the question, how to punish incompetency more effectively. In material production it is simple: Whoever does not fulfill his norm gets less money. Wherever intellectual work is required, the only thing that is left to us is pointing with our index finger in moral indignation.

[Question] In other words, differences in the material standard of living are justified and beneficial to socialism?

[Answer] As long as they are actually based on differences in performance, yes. Here is an illustration: At one time, in the brown coal industry every worker knew that Prof Rammoller from Freiberg, one of the inventors of brown coal high-temperature coke, had an income for which a laborer had to work several months. Nobody thought that it was unfair. On the other hand, differences in the material standard of living that are based on a deformation of the performance principle—shameless exploitation of certain shortage situations in combination with personal acquisitiveness—deserve social ostracism in every respect and have nothing in common with the socialist way of life.

[Question] Another aspect: Is it not a contradiction to educate universally developed personalities on one hand and give early recognition and support to scientific, artistic or athletic talents on the other hand?

[Answer] This contradiction actually exists, but it is a contradiction of life, not a logical absurdity. Our society must solve two problems simultaneously. First of all, it is necessary to give every young person an education which is as balanced, comprehensive and advanced as possible. The socialist way of life would be unthinkable if a new polarization between the technical elite on one hand and the untrained person on the other hand would develop. Education is not only necessary for production and scientific-technical progress but it is valuable in itself as a characteristic of a well-developed personality. The ideal of versatility—this term is certainly preferable to "universality"—is also desirable because of the fact that, according to current estimates, a young worker in the skilled trades, for instance, will have to update his entire technical know-how three to four times during his professional career to meet occupational demands. All we can do today is give him a solid general education as a basis. The other side is: Most of the time we are still too late when recognizing and supporting special, extraordinary intellectual talents. We must no longer neglect extreme and early support of special interests and abilities, beginning with the early schoolyears—even at the price of a certain partiality. Otherwise we will have fewer and fewer top specialists available.
[Question] As far as the characterization of the socialist way of life is concerned, there is one question that arises: What is actually the basis for the concept that work is the most important thing in our way of life?

[Answer] The view is wrong that work is an obligation and an evil and that a person does not begin to live until work is done. In the end, work decides the manner in which everyone develops into a personality—which does not mean that areas outside of work are totally unimportant. Sociology has come up with proof: The more knowledge and ability is required of the individual when he performs his work, the richer his activities are outside his work environment. With this in mind, work determines all the aspects of what we understand under way of life in its broadest sense. Actually, nobody is asked to do more work each day than he did the day before. The important thing is to work more intelligently and more effectively. But we also do not want to close our eyes to the fact that occasionally worktime is wasted or "people are loafing." Here we are again reminded of the socialist performance principle. We have to look at its first sentence before we can talk about distribution, which means: Everyone must do his best according to his abilities.

8991
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REGIME'S THREAT TACTICS AGAINST PACIFIST YOUTH DISCUSSED

Bonn VORWAERTS in German No 17, 22 Apr 82 p 3

[Article by Hendrik Bussiek: "The Peace from Above and the Longing from Below--How Is the GDR Reacting to Its Peace Movement?"]

[Text] The peace movement in the GDR is small but apparently very effective. At least, the official reactions by authorities are an indication that this Western virus is considered extraordinarily contagious. Willingness for military service is being mobilized.

"Well, how is the republic?" the visitor from the West was asking in a somewhat snippy manner. The young GDR citizen gave a witty reply: "I do not know. I have not been in contact with it for a long time." The retreat into privacy, into a niche, by many if not most of the people in the GDR can hardly be expressed more tersely.

A young man: "As far as I am concerned, the topic "GDR" is no longer important," he is no longer interested in the politics of his state--neither in a positive nor in a negative sense. "I am no longer beating my head against the many walls around here."

Both of them, however, are becoming political when it comes to peace in the world: They belong to the peace movement in the GDR which--among other things, thanks to the reaction by the state--has by now passed the embryonic stage.

In the meantime the discussion of war and peace has also spread to the schools in the GDR. Many students are no longer listening quietly when teachers and officers give speeches on this topic, as was the case earlier. Some of the students even argue relentlessly. The teachers are helpless. At one school in the republic the saying "swords into plowshares" was discovered on a table: A very embarrassing state action followed, during which the name of the sinner was revealed. She was forced to wipe away the writing--after all, she only fell for Western propaganda. The demand was directed against GDR policies.
German-German Comments

Wrong. For a long time this student has not been interested in the state either: Therefore her small action could not have been directed against it. The GDR apparatus, however, is increasingly "exposing" members of the GDR peace movement as "enemies of the state," who are controlled by the West. And the West itself is supplying more and more "conclusive" statements.

Recently Dean General Reinhard Gramm of the Protestant Church Office for the Federal Armed Forces, for instance, criticized the West German peace movement; simultaneously, however, he expressed "high regard" for the peace movement in the GDR—excellent ammunition for the propaganda cannons of the apparatus.

And they are placed in position in large numbers. The GDR, which since its foundation saw its legitimation primarily as a peace state, must fear an independent peace movement within its own country, particularly one which is operating independently from the state: Its legitimation is in danger.

But "the litmus test for a government's love of peace is its attitude toward nuclear arms opponents in its own country" (Stefan Heym). If this statement is accurate—and it is accurate—almost all governments in the world are in bad shape with respect to their proclaimed love of peace, including the German—particularly the GDR-German—Government. Heym: "When a government strengthens paramilitary drills for its schoolchildren instead of examining in good faith opportunities for alternate service in the social realm, it takes away the credibility of its frequent assurances of love of peace."

Certainly, Heym did not want to doubt the subjective will to peace of his and other governments, but the actions of the GDR government objectively contradict the will to peace. The sewed-on patch "swords into plowshares," for instance, is being persecuted in an absolutely absurd manner: Members of the People's Police confiscate jackets and parkas with the symbol. The following day the piece of clothing may be picked up again at the police station—without the patch but with a bill from the tailor who removed the symbol. And the wearer is threatened with severe consequences ranging from expulsion to the denial of a training position.

The blame—once again—is placed on the West. To be sure, the Free German Youth recently announced its respect for the motives of wearing the patch, but they could not quietly watch when the symbol was misinterpreted by outsiders, as if the protest was directed against the social system of the GDR. And RADIO GDR stated that whoever was recommending "as a day's work" to recast swords into plowshares, must "be blind or deaf or even worse"—perhaps crazy?

"Attacks on this sign are not only directed against individual young people but the entire church" (churches in Thueringen): After all, the churches themselves introduced this symbol in 1981 on the occasion of the peace decade, because it corresponds to their basic position of a "pacifism of political reason."
Already in November 1981, an appropriate study by the GDR churches opposed the "defamation of pacifism in the name of political realities, the reason of state or other goals." This study should be read by GDR State Security officers, who are suspecting nothing but Western subversion everywhere: It is certainly not possible to prove that the ethic of a "pacifism of political reason," to which GDR churches adhere and which takes a critical view of the Eastern as well as Western security policy, has it origin in the FRG, written--of all things--at the desks of the Protestant church in the FRG" (Reinhard Henkys, Protestant Church in West Berlin).

The GDR churches are indeed involved in "an independent peace activity" (Easter pastoral letter by GDR Bishop Werner Krusche)--of course, independent from the West but also (which is not quite so self-evident) from the state in which they are operating: "The church is not just a reinferrer of the foreign policy of the state" (pastoral letter).

It is a harsh word in a state where all social organizations, including Christian ones, are expected to operate according to the wishes of the authorities and be nothing but transmitters of government policies. To be sure, the GDR church sees itself as a church in socialism, in other words, not in opposition to it; but when the state prohibits an official symbol of the church or even indicates that the wearing of patches resembling the symbol signifies "disregard for laws" and encourages their disregard, the church has no other choice but to go the road of harsh criticism.

Congregations are demanding this position from the church leadership. Since the start of the peace movement in the GDR, churches have been filled to overflowing Sunday after Sunday--particularly young people are coming. They appreciate the free space that is granted to them by the churches: A Christian tradition of thousands of years is again becoming timely. At the same time the church is careful--and with good reason--of becoming the organizational avant-garde of the GDR peace movement. There is simply no large-scale organization, there are no large or small groups that have to confer for hours to issue joint proclamations. As a result it is strong and less vulnerable to attacks by the state.

Just recently the state adopted a new military-service law, which will go into effect on 1 May, because: "As much as we will enjoy scrapping our weapons some day--socialism still needs, peace needs our plowshares and our swords" (Army General Heinz Hoffman, minister for national defense). In accordance with this law, everyday militarization in the GDR will be stepped up, because now all state agencies, from the school to the university and to the plant, have the legal obligation "to prepare the citizen for military service," above all, for "the long-term guarantee of new recruits for military careers" and "voluntary completion of military service."

And if You Are Not Willing to Do Military Service....

The GDR military is not only having headaches because the years with low birth rates are approaching. Lack of enthusiasm for military service is spreading also in the GDR, and it has been going on for some time. In 1978
Hoffman demanded that "illusions and naive ideas about the process of detente" be put aside. In the army general's opinion, young people "frequently" draw the conclusion from the politics of detente that now a possibility should exist "to make a few concessions when it comes to the high demands with respect to the readiness for deployment and military action."

But the number of people who are feeling this way is getting larger rather than smaller: Change through rapprochement.

Sometimes, however, the lack of enthusiasm for military service also has quite profane reasons. One 18-year-old, for instance, had decided to do 3 years of service in the People's Army. "I am just interested in tanks." Later, during registration, when an officer shouted at him, asking how long he wanted to serve, he answered quickly: "18 months"--the obligatory period. Nevertheless, this boorish type is the exception. Normally recruiters are "extremely friendly" (GDR draftee) to strengthen--so they think--the desire to do military service.

Unkindness takes place behind the scenes. Students who want to carry on peace discussions in the classroom undauntedly are threatened with a call to their prospective training site: "Then you might as well kiss your dream job good-bye." And, as a consequence, they prefer to remain silent in the future. But the peace movement in the GDR is growing again, adding a few new supporters.

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PROBLEMS WITH UTILIZATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCES NOTED

Budapest TARSADALMI SZEMLE in Hungarian 4 Apr 82 pp 20-30

[Article by Dr Janos Farkas, scientific advisor of the Sociological Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences]

[Text] J.D. Bernal, natural scientist and world-famous Lenin peace prize winner, wrote somewhere that the sciences must play a strategic and not a tactical role in the practice of social policy. The intensive development of our present social relations should be regarded as that strategic goal which the social sciences must serve. The formation recently of the Hungarian Political Science Society is a sign of this requirement. The intensive phase of economic development and the overall social demand for the further development of social and political relations enlarges the role of the sciences, including that of the social sciences. It is not enough, however, simply to declare this, but we must on one hand seek the course that will make the results of the social sciences accessible to practice; and on the other hand we must continue to develop receptivity to science in the sociopolitical decision-making sphere directly reflecting and serving social practice. Following the principle that everyone can do the most for the sake of social causes in his own area of activity, we shall draft principles, hypotheses, requirements and ideas in our article primarily about and for social research, which we regard of course only as one of the possible modes of approach to the problems.

Trend of Social Sciences To Become Social Organizing Forces

The Marxist idea about the trend of the social sciences to become a direct producer is well known. To become a "direct producer force," however, is possible only in the area of sciences whose results are realized in material products and production procedures. Thus we must take it to mean primarily natural and technical sciences. In the past decade or two, though, there has been a great deal of debate over whether the results of the social sciences may become direct producer forces. If they can, then in what form? We cannot speak of such a form in the case of literature, linguistics, music and similar sciences. Their worth appears in other forms. We must frequently encounter the view that the so-called "hard" social sciences do have this possibility like, for example, economics, sociology, demography, certain branches of psychology, and so forth. The form in which the
become producer forces is attributed to the fact that the research results of the above-mentioned branches of science appear and are made use of in decisions and in the regulation of practical activities. We can agree with this process of thought, but we must modify one essential point.

In my view, we cannot identify the process for utilizing social science results with the process of becoming a direct producer force. The results of these branches of science are not used in material production, and thus they do not become direct material producer forces, rather they exert their effect by becoming a social organizing force in the process of "social production" (I might also say social reproduction). This does not exclude the possibility that the results of social science, combining with the research results of the natural and technical sciences, can also succeed in getting directly into the world of material production. But in the social sciences we must place the main emphasis on the process in which results in the form of "social information" are linked into social production in the broader sense of the word as a social organizing force. In the scientific theoretical literature of the recent past, first hypotheses have appeared on the sciences "becoming a direct social organizing force."

Of course, one can conceive of a point of view which would identify the concept of the social sciences becoming "a social organizing force" with their becoming a "direct producer force." In order to avoid an absence of clarity in theory, however—following the endowments of objective differentiation in sciences and functions—it would be worthwhile in my opinion to differentiate between the concepts of "direct producer force" and "indirect social producer force." Let us leave the first concept for the realization process occurring in material production for the results of natural and technical sciences, and with the second let us mean function occurring when the results of the social sciences are used for social planning in the regulation and control of reproduction processes in various areas of social reality. This is not to speak of the fact that the use of knowledge and methods also exists in indirect forms.

In this article, of course, we shall not extend ourselves to basic research works which primarily serve to expand scientific understanding. At the center of our attention at present is applied research, which must directly serve the social practice of building socialism.

The Functions of the Social Sciences

It is a question in what forms and by what mechanisms the practical utilization is effected of social science results that are ripe for the purpose. To establish the basis of the answer, we must survey our knowledge of the functions of the social sciences. The basic function of social sciences (and in this respect it does not differ from the natural sciences) is cognition. Cognition of social phenomena and processes represents the first and most decisive step in the direction of seeking later to carry out changes in the life of society. The precondition of every kind of purposeful intervention is to know the original, real and internal nature of the objects that we desire to change. Only in possession of the casual relationships will we be capable of setting such goals as will seek to bring the given interrelationships to a new, higher level and a necessary condition.
The cognition of the social processes inevitably goes together with the development of functions that evaluate the sciences studying them. The discovery of casual interrelationships—with the first step—occurs in the form of making judgments of fact. But in society various interests are moving and conflicting. Different life conditions, which are expressed by different—and frequently contradictory—political-ideological-consciousness judgments and conditions, can be found. Since society can never be perfect and complete, no one is ever fully satisfied actually with existing situations and conditions. Great social forces move improvements, and greater perfection should occur in economic, political, social, cultural, and so forth living conditions and possibilities. At the same time, forces that are no smaller oppose, as a result of their interest ties, certain planned social changes.

Therefore the leading organs and bodies of society are raising increasingly higher requirements that specialized experts in the framework of social work distribution should not only form judgments of fact about the phenomena of society they examine, but they should also evaluate these, that is, they should also develop them into value judgments. The judgments of fact regularly made by researchers—as experts, citizens and political beings—regularly include value judgments as well, and even in the selection of their subjects and the making of their hypotheses they go about their work on the basis of values. Thus research is not free of values in any of its phases.

The "critical" function of the social sciences comes about as a result of summing up value judgments. The characteristic of this function amid the relations of socialism is the characteristic that it extends its immanent, inner criticism to the existing situation. For this reason it plays a constructive role in the improvement, development and restructuring of social phenomena and processes that have lived past their time or are not up to an adequate level. In this way the critical function derives from the cognitive function and leads to the fulfillment of the practical function. The historical development of the functions indicates that in addition to the initial ideological function there is also a development of the function serving sociotechnical and social planning.

Possibilities of the Social Sciences, Its Task in the Service of Practice

At this point I have arrived at the central point of my essay: are the social sciences capable of fulfilling, in addition to their cognitive and critical tasks, also the function of servicing social practice.

Let us review briefly in what forms the social sciences can participate in the reproduction process of the most varied levels of social life and social guidance.

By and large, we can break down these forms to several possibilities of principle and to concrete influence-exerting activities. Of course, the limits among these forms are rather relative. The expressions of "service
of the political" or "social practice" do not limit the utilization of scientific results at the most comprehensive macro-level of society. Policy, however, has the special role of creating those conditions in which even at the lower level of guidance the results of social science research become suitable.

We may mention among the possibilities in principle that the researchers may take on themselves the analysis of various social institutions, give advice to the preparation of the different social programs of the decision makers, take a position in support of planned social changes, directly take part in the making of decisions, and educate with instruction in sciences the representatives in the sphere of practice, politics and decision making. The theoretical and conceptual orientation of the sciences—which assure the scientific understanding of society—can give orientation to politics. Instead of the deliberations that are based on so-called "common sense," they can give the decision makers a general and well-ordered point of view. The social sciences shed light on marco-social conditions; they expose asymmetries in the realities of various opinions (beliefs); they change ingrained attitudes, modes of thinking both in politics and in public opinion; they can dispel false beliefs; and they can point to the fact that social "events" are not simple but complex.

Among the concrete influence-exerting activities, for example, we can mention the influence on legislation; the effect of development programs on social conditions; the fact that the social sciences afford the representatives of practice new types of information, methods and techniques; they reveal latent (hidden) functions, and the unexpected consequences of a given measure; they develop proposals for the better operation of society and certain of its institutions; they point out the social matrix, interrelations (the context) of a given decision-measure and phenomenon; they critically clarify those preconditions on which policy rests; they make possible the charting and selection of alternatives; they evaluate social action programs, and may evaluate the results of policies; they may study policy itself as a social process; they may perform for policy the functions of persuasion or of participation in actions, and so forth.

Of course, the above-listed influence-exerting forms, the utilization of possibilities, and the functions exist frequently only in principle. In the complicated process between scientific cognition and practical application many contradictory effects and factors emerge. The reason for this is not the lack or the existence of good will on part of the "receiver" but rather objective differences in the interests of the various social groups and work distribution spheres, the interest-determined differences among the social science "proposals," or the multiple meaning of the same concepts in essence. Therefore, we can count only on a certain probability of the utilization of research results.

The question is how to bring together sociopolitical practice and the most varied levels of practice in the decision sphere with social science. The material base for this convergence is latent in the identity of their
differences; in the fact that both spheres are nourished by one and the same social practice. Their theoretical bases and final goals are the same. By virtue of the ideological nature of social science it also has an immanent political substance. But sociopolitical practice, if it does not sink into narrow, daily practicality, builds on the objective laws of society by raising above the particular, and in this it carries in itself the elements and basic requirements of science. All this, however, does not solve automatically anything from the indicated problems. Therefore, let us proceed from the aspect of social sciences in researching the tasks.

The social sciences must participate in the diagnosis of social phenomena, then in their planning and finally in their development. The diagnostic phase is identical with the operation of the traditional cognitive function, and therefore we shall not particularize this sufficiently well-known area of questions. There is a great deal more misunderstanding and lack of clarification around the functions for fulfilling planning and development. On one hand, we must develop a sense of obligation for scientific planning in researchers. On the other hand, we must convince the decision makers that social planning must be "scientific." What does the attributive "scientific" mean here? It means that planning should be rational, comprehensive, deliberative, weighing of alternatives, evaluative of consequences, and ready to use specialized methods and techniques.

In the following we shall emphasize the scientific study of policy from among the tasks of the social sciences according to the views of its cultivators.

Importance of the Scientific Study of Policy

One of the characteristic types of social science research is represented by the approach where researchers investigate policy itself, or they cultivate political science, or participate in the execution of policy. These are indeed possibilities which mean differing roles, but quite common to them is the effort of the researchers to satisfy the following three requirements of principle in their activities that are linked to policy: 1. contextually, their task is to show how every decision is part of a large decision process; 2. in respect to problem orientation, they are called on to come up with goals, trends, conditions, projections, and alternatives; 3. the essence of their diversification requirement is that the methods used should not be limited to a narrow scope but should be extended also to the broader environment of a given problem. These three attributes of principle for the consideration of interrelations, for providing orientation in problems, and for extending methods are indispensable for the research that investigates and studies sociopolitical practice.

We cannot evaluate the role filled by the social sciences in policy until we know more about how the results of scientific work affect practical activity. Of course, researchers are not obligated to know this above, there is no possibility for them to trace these processes. At the same time, within political science research we should urge research tasks
whose results can be used by other researchers in society. It would be well for us to know more about such questions as for example: a) what is the nature of policy as a practical activity; b) what kinds of ideas play a role at all in political decisions (what ideas get there at all); c) what kind of "package" should the final product of intellectual work come in; d) in what kind of ways can researchers take part in politically important work; e) who initiates the relationship and who plays the determining role; f) what kind of role is played by the scientific experts, how does their work come to the decision makers; who is chosen for this kind of role and how; what are the social and ideological values of experts; how should they conceive their work if they want to be useful; g) at what level do the theory, the methods and the knowledge materials of a given branch of science stand in comparison with requirements of a political kind; h) what kind of ideas, values, or what kind of political, economic, historical social and cultural factors influence the decision makers and the decision process?

It presents a great problem that some social scientists do not in reality understand (and of course it is difficult for them to do so) the nature of policy. The consequence of this will be that the concept of the researcher about policy will not be verified by policy. The way in which we conceptualize and carry out our research work projects at present hardly coincides with real requirements. We do not see with sufficient clarity the political features of our own research work and activity, and this is why we suffer so many reverses in social planning.

Therefore, we should see more clearly the more important variable of policy, and how the sciences could contribute to influencing social changes. (In this case the starting and ending points would be represented by the variables of policy and not the variables of science.)

The researcher in society can well serve social planning if—he relying on politological research—he comes to recognize, on one hand, the true nature of political processes; and on the other hand if he only plans and organizes its research methods on their basis. First of all, the nature of the problem must be clarified as it appears in the goals of society's policy. Then establishing the hierarchy of goals follows. And then it is necessary to establish the modes and methods of attaining the goals, taking into account the widest possible scope of their expected consequences. The selection of alternatives can be linked with the evaluation of the social costs, And then follows the information gathering phase. When the political bodies have decided on a series of actions with the use of information, the program evaluation follows, and the linking back of the results into the political process. During this time, they will eliminate unexpected problems and improve the effectiveness of the whole program.

It must be examined where the political model described in the foregoing comes from and how it becomes a part of applied research. What are the conditions under which party and government organs are capable of scientifically based planning? How in practice does the decision-making mechanism operate? How must we study the starting points and our
operations within social science research work in order that we may thereby increase the receptivity of political organs to science? (Of course, in addition to social science results, the decision makers must have technical, ecological, foreign trade and other information in the course of preparing their measures.)

A social scientist who wishes to serve practice, therefore, must be politically oriented. In this connection, he must be able to perceive what is politically possible; what kind of interests are moving in society; that the acceptance of compromises also belongs to the essence of policy; that without the selection of political alternatives, it is not possible to set specific goals since in the absence of basic goals it is not possible to conceive alternatives either; that political power is diffuse and segmented, and therefore frequently rather difficult to identify with the actual decision makers, and as a consequence, policy and decision making does not depend on certain persons but is rather of a cooperative nature; that requirements of rationality and social stability can come in conflict; therefore that in addition to scientific rationality there is also political rationality; and that the final argument is in the hands of the politician; that the scientifically possible or desirable is not certainly so politically; that the social researcher may best hope for his results to be accepted if he also takes into account political possibilities (if, for example, he accepts the principle of gradualism, which derives from the conflict-minimizing function of the political sphere; if he selects the variables of the study in a carefully thought out way; if he recognizes that in the relationship of science and politics, the latter is dominant; if he studies the actual operation of the political process, and so on).

We are given a sense of the objective differences in scientific and political convergence in the following little table; it points out that in respect to goals, problems, basic questions, time, theory, and the final product, differences can be found between these two important social activity forms and institutions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Science</th>
<th>Policy</th>
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<tr>
<td>Goal: to understand society</td>
<td>to act in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem: born within the scientific branch (by transposition, frequently in reaction to practice)</td>
<td>arises outside of policy, in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic question: what do we know?</td>
<td>what should we do?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory: it should embrace the largest number of variables</td>
<td>only variables that can be influenced are important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final product: publication of scientific results</td>
<td>practical measures</td>
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Therefore, in the knowledge of the nature of policy, social science research, in formulating proposals, will follow not only scientific logic but will also take into account to whom the proposals will be beneficial and to whom harmful; who will finance it; who will introduce it; in what time frame can it be realized; what kind of opposition can be expected and what negative demands need to be counted on.

The scientist who knows the nature of policy will use the categories of policy in the research operation. He will not start with a so-called excessively "big" and "unmanageable" question, and he will not without cause demand big, radical changes. He will study how and in what form the decisions are made. He will take into account what is important to the politicians, the decision makers. He will reckon with the closed nature, the openness, the choice possibilities of the "political area." He will structure his theoretical model in such a way that it will be as simple and strong as possible, that is, controllable and exchangeable, flexible, and with a small number of variables. The demonstrated results should be convincing, particularly if more radical changes are seen as timely. He will develop his proposals in real social time and not in abstract time. In his studies he will not say first of all "what do we know?" but mainly "what must we do?"

The Causes of "Indifference" to Research Results

It is a rather widespread view among scientists that politicians are indifferent to scientific results. This is shown in that many research results are not used by the decision makers. In fact, we cannot idealize the receptivity of the political sphere to science. There are decision makers who regard science only as a prestige symbol: they merely wish to justify, legitimize their decisions with science. Frequently they wait for an automatic solution to problems. Many regard science as important, and still they rarely use scientific knowledge. They only support proposals which are in harmony with their interests and prior—perhaps largely bypassed—organizational and political—ideological values. Sometimes their intellectual background is wanting. At the same time, the practical people complain that in general there is no applicable scientific knowledge. Who is right? Obviously, both situations exist in reality, and there is truth in both positions. I myself am inclined to the view that in the case of results which are regarded as useful by the researchers but are not used by the politicians, these are for the most part, as regarded from the viewpoint of practice, only quasi—useful works—although scientifically varified—because they are not yet ripe for introduction.

The sphere of decision-preparation and decision making, to be sure, shows receptivity to the outlook of science and moreover to various kinds of measuring techniques and information, but only if these can be fitted into the possibilities of policy and if they have taken into account their ties with policy. Both partners must strive for effective cooperation, but within this cooperation it is primarily social science research that must
adjust more to the nature, requirements and values of policy if it wants
its results accepted. The researcher who is serving social practice must
not only produce good professional results but must be capable of having
these accepted by others, in the given case by the people of practice.
This "market research" which takes into account the needs and interests of
the "consumers" makes it necessary for the researchers to develop a new
type of "convincing" techniques and methods. The institutional-
organizational chain still has not been constructed for transforming and
using knowledge for decision making.

It would be idealistic to assume that the researcher did his maximum when
he became cognizant of something and compiled and published his results in
book or monograph. It is hardly conceivable that these results—without
the researcher taking a single step on its behalf—will by themselves
circulate and penetrate with suggestive power into the brains of the
decision maker and become the means for the scientific founding of social
institutions. Of course, I am not speaking now of that form of basic
research where the goal is nothing more than the understanding and
description of some kind of phenomenon. In this essay I am speaking of
that form of research which is directed at social practice which we may
call either applied or goal-oriented. In the case of the latter kind,
the researcher must proceed primarily from the needs and interests of the
"consumer," the employer. If he does not do this, he surrenders the
transfer process which extends from scientific cognition to practical
application. Despite the best of efforts, the paradoxical situation may
arise that certain procedural requirements of science may make the
practical acceptance of the results more difficult. For example, models
which serve many goals are unnecessarily complicated for the needs of
decision making; nor is there frequent need for excessively fine methods
of measurement; the formalized languages of science (mathematical equations,
formulas, complicated specialized terminology, and so forth) make under-
standing more difficult; the overparticularization of certain results is
superfluous for the decision maker who is curious about the larger
interrelationships; proposals which are otherwise of an expert nature do
not reckon with political relations, and so forth.

When I emphasize the importance of policy and of taking it into account from
the viewpoint of social practice, I am of course not thinking of some kind
of uncritical and servile compliance. The scientist must not uncritically
accept the views of the one who places the order; he cannot permit him to
intervene in the research operations; he must protest if he is not given
the time for well-grounded work; he must consider that the one who orders
does not always know what he wants; he must not put his blessing on
erroneous or mistaken practical measures; he cannot accept arbitrary
limits set by the decision maker; he cannot take into his work the
preconceptions of the politician, the one who orders. From all this we
can draw the conclusion that although it is important to perfect knowledge
directed at action, it is still impermissible to give up the cultivation of
knowledge directed at action, it is still impermissible to give up the
cultivation of knowledge for the sake of understanding. In most cases,
scientific cognition must maintain its relative autonomy vis-a-vis
political and practical action being realized over the short term. This may also guarantee that science will not be used for goals of practicality or perhaps manipulation. Only in this way can the scientist remain loyal to serving the long term goals of social planning, and only in this way can it extend help in the solution of acute problems.

The Limitation of Isolated Scientific Branch Cognition

We must still inspect a very big problem among the impediments to the practical utilization of research results. The essence is that the partial results of the social sciences are isolated from one another whereas social problems are complex. The separation of scientific branches also divides results from one another. Therefore, the political sphere, or the decision maker, frequently does not know what to do with a given research report, because it does not make evident the relationship with other areas and processes of social life. Practical synthesis is, first of all, the task of the political sphere, but it will be able to do this only if the "free valences" or "receptors" of the links between the scientific results as discovered by the social sciences are available to political practice. The scientific branch (discipline) outlook puts its stamp to a decisive degree on the social sciences. Frequently, we leave out of account the historical, political and social contexts. Our research work, therefore, has a scientific branch character to a decisive degree. Our research operations, steps derive from sociology, economics, historical science, and so forth, as from disciplines, even when we would like to do research work that is useful in practice. But because of their isolated and partial character, the disciplinary results do not meet the demands of total reality. The scientific branch approach can come closer to the requirements of totality if research moves from theory to method and then proceeds toward political relations.

Research should start our from previously defined social problem areas and arrive at those methods and results which put the political problem at a higher level. In an outlook and activity that relies exclusively on the scientific branch, the application of methods occurs in the same way as in any "basic" or "nonapplied" research. The final product is "taken home" to the discipline, and it is not even visible to the politicians that a new knowledge was born. If we looked at matters from the perspective of policy a) we would have to change the sequence and nature of research methods and activities, since in this case the goal is to adapt methods to the problems. The problems, however, can and do have many relations and variables which fall outside the horizon of the scientific branch or science "as a whole." The emphasis, therefore, falls on the adaptation of the problem to the method; b) in such a case the final product should become public property and not intellectual private property. Then policy could use the new knowledge for applied goals, and the researcher can and could use them for further specialized scientific and theoretical goals.

If we were to study the fate of social science results in an empirical way, we would find that the so-called "applied research works"—even though they reveal worthwhile results—rarely contain proposals for policy that
applicable in practice. And even if such recommendations are made, they are not applied because policy does not regard them as realistic or they do not even pass into policy's "field of vision." As I have mentioned, the causes of this syndrome are latent on one hand in the sciences and on the other hand in policy. The receptivity of policy to science is also conditioned by variables which fall outside the horizon and scope of the powers of science. At the same time, social life has to be regulated and guided by taking into account many variables which fall outside rationality points of view of the individual specialized sciences.

On the New, Application-Oriented Social Science Research

When we seek to use available scientific knowledge and methods for practical goals, we are speaking of that type of cognition where we want to create knowledge from the start for political-practical considerations. Then the political and practical points of view are built organically into the process of knowledge production. But knowledge production with a scientific branch outlook is born without political considerations. In such a case, we start studying the knowledge only after its "creation": how we might "plant" knowledge produced independently of the political context into the political, social environment, and use it there.

The latter approach undoubtedly contributes to specialized science cognition, but at the same time the chances are slim that it will be used for social planning. The first type of knowledge production, on the other hand, strives directly for political and practical use. In this way, their application chances have increased, but at the same time from the specialized scientific point of view it will not be comprehensive or demonstrated. That is, science must pay a "price" for the direct service of policy and practice as there is also a "price" if research seeks development of the discipline as its goal. Then its practical use will become mediated and potential to such an extent, that in the extreme case, none of its results will pass into social practice.

We have to decide what kind of function we want results to fulfill. In all certainty, both types of knowledge production have use value: in the first case, science itself develops directly, and in the second policy and social practice receive direct help. Of course, the scientific type of cognition can also exercise an effect on social planning in mediated forms and over the long term. Social needs may also raise problems of such a nature that the theoretical answer will enrich scientific cognition.

In the future, we shall have to concentrate our attention more on that type of cognition and its function which is directed at social practice and policy and not merely at the self-development of discipline. In my view, this type of cognition has not yet adequately achieved its right to existence in Hungarian social science. But let us add that the right to live of both types cannot be disputed. The resolution of their contradictions, in our opinion, is possible through an effort to shape their ratios taking into consideration the needs of society. To avoid misunderstanding, I would like to emphasize that the differentiation I have made does not coincide with the division of basic and applied research that is in use among us.
Thus in my opinion cognitive activity, according to its direction, may be oriented on one hand toward policy, or practice, and on the other hand toward a scientific branch. In the first case, cognition has functions in the direct development of social planning and indirect function in the development of the scientific branch. I would, in fact, call this applied research since it proceeds from practical problems. (In contrast, research which is now termed as "applied" is only "quasi" or "apparent applied" inasmuch as research which is started from the level of a given science can rarely arrive at practice.) We may use the term basic research, on the other hand, when function is directly for the development of the scientific branch. Potentially, this kind of cognition and knowledge may be used in time—with strong mediation, it is possible—in the practice of social planning.

Social science cognition already has a role, of course, in sociopolitical decision. Such, for example, was the role of economics in the reform of the economic mechanism introduced in 1968. The sociological research works and analyses which were made on the life style and the transformation of the village social structure—which were initiated by the Central Committee Agitation and Propaganda Committee—filled a similar role. At present also it is on a similar recommendation by the party that a study plan on innovative and adaptational readiness of our society is being constructed and coordinated by the Sociological Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The drafting of the practical requirements and thereupon these useful mechanisms of theoretical answers have been developed since the 1969 publication of science policy guidelines. At the same time, we are still nowhere near where the social sciences will influence to any great extent decisions for regulating social reproduction. Obviously, there never will be such a comprehensive social decision which will be based exclusively on scientific deliberations, but we must correct the "priorities" of the present situation.

Nowadays there is a real social need for scientific results. In all certainty we will be able sooner or later to satisfy these needs in a demanding way. These reflections were written with a desire to contribute to this with observations on the possible and necessary convergence of sociopolitical decisions and social science research. This convergence is at the same time a way to make the social sciences a social organizing force, without which the possibilities are very limited also for the natural and technical sciences to become direct producer forces. Only a leadership system which integrates the social sciences can develop the political and production relations in such a way that they will be favorable for an economic development nourished on sciences that have become producer forces.

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WIESLAW GORNICKI INTERVIEWED BY SERBO-CROATIAN JOURNALIST

Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian No 345, 10 Apr 82 pp 32-34

[Interview with Maj Wieslaw Gornicki by Zoran Petrovic-Pirocanac in Warsaw: "The Political Confession of Wieslaw Gornicki"; date not specified]

[Text] Maj Wieslaw Gornicki is the only man through whose mouth Gen Jaruzelski, the Polish prime minister, speaks unofficially with the world: one might say that he gives the general's interviews. How did he consent to take this job? How does he assess his boss? How does he look upon the "Grunwald" organization which he accuses of anti-Semitism?

There is no way to get to see Gen Jaruzelski in Warsaw. He is unwavering in his decision not to give interviews to anyone at all. Among the slightly more than 100 newsmen from all over the world who are in Poland at the moment, certainly a majority would like to interview the general. The Americans most of all, but Jaruzelski does not want to speak. In this he is similar, they say, to the late and very popular Cardinal Wyszynski, one of whose principles was to never talk with newsmen.

Jaruzelski has chosen a man who will speak on his behalf for the world public. Wieslaw Gornicki (51), newsmen, author of many books, world traveler and reporter, a correspondent in the United States for many years.

Slender, wearing thick glasses, beginning to go bald. A man who likes to show off his knowledge of the West, of the life there, of the pattern of thought, a man who knows how to charm the person he is talking to. A man who at any moment can call upon many American sayings, a man who knows how to disparage the West in Western terms. It is Gornicki's duty--I got the impression during the interview--to put himself entirely at the service of his fellow journalists from abroad. Later he would go into the street from the INTERPRESS building without a word so that Jasmin Krpan could take a few more pictures of him.

Here is how the conversation went between Wieslaw Gornicki and me.

[Question] You have just been promoted to the rank of major. To what do you accredit such rapid advancement? I assume that you would have waited for that considerably longer in a normal situation.
Gornicki: I am a reserve officer. For years I have held the rank of lieutenant, and on 13 December 1981, as you know, I was mobilized. With that rank one automatically obtains a higher military rank in wartime. If that had not happened, of course, I would have waited 4 years for promotion. And in view of the post I hold, I certainly could not have a lower rank. But I am not a professional soldier. When I receive the order to return to civilian life, I will do so.

[Question] Much is being said these days about how they are preparing you to replace the minister Jerzy Urban in the near future as the spokesman of the government, while he would be reassigned to the post of editor in chief of the weekly POLITYKA, which is now being run by Vice Premier Rakowski.

Gornicki (laughs): That is an obvious falsehood. I must tell you that there have been a great many such "pieces of news" about me recently. It is also said that they want to make me a new head of PAP [Polish Press Agency], and then the director of television, and so on. That is a falsehood, and I will not leave this post.

[Question] Nevertheless, marshal law is in effect in Poland, and among other things that means that nothing depends on whether or not you want to leave that post and go to another one. What if you are ordered to be the spokesman of the government instead of Urban?

Gornicki: If I get that post? That is impossible! Urban is there, and he is a very able man, an excellent organizer. I am not referring merely to his excellent sense of humor, but also to the fact that he is very painstaking....

[Question] Let us go back to your present job. Can you describe to me your typical workday?

Gornicki: My workday begins at 1000 hours, and it ends at best at 2300 hours. Over the last 11 days, I have figured out, I have lost 100 hours of sleep. There is something else I can tell you that the foreign newsmen do not know. My boss has a character and habits of his own. He almost never sleeps. His favorite time to work is between 0200 and 0400 hours. As for me, I have two functions. First, I am an adviser to Gen Jaruzelski, but not for press affairs, as is usually thought, but I am simply an adviser. My other function is to maintain liaison with the government press center (since the introduction of marshal law INTERPRESS, author's note). My time, then, is for all practical purposes divided into three parts: reflection, writing and discussion. The discussion is with my colleagues, foreign newsmen. There is no need to tell me that in these activities the least time is left in the day for reflection. I also try to prepare for my boss all the materials so that I might make it possible for him to extricate himself a bit from ordinary daily affairs. I see him daily, which is quite normal. I must say that Gen Jaruzelski has introduced many new things into Poland's political life. One was to create the posts of his advisers. I am not the only adviser; there are also economic advisers. In addition, there is now the office of the secretariat of the PZPR Central Committee, which is concerned with the problems of the party. And there are military advisers as well. Gen Jaruzelski is very modern in that respect. He has organized that staff service in a modern way.
But he is not modern, it seems, in that he grants no interviews at all.

Gornicki: That is right. So far the general has granted only one interview. One and only one, which was presented simultaneously for Poland and for abroad. That was in October last year, for the American TV network PBS.

I will make use of yet another rumor to help me to put the next question. I have been told that you are a Jew, but well-informed people have also said that that is not so. The so-called "Jewish problem" has become topical again over the last 15 months. One piece of evidence to support this is the existence of the "Grunwald" organization, which does not have exactly a good opinion about the Jews.

Gornicki: I am glad you asked me that and that you were so direct. I would like to clear up that matter altogether. As for my origin, I really thought that that question had been laid to rest in 1968 once and for all. I have not heard about this for 12 years now. As for "Grunwald," I have the worst possible opinion of it. You can quote this verbatim: I am unequivocal. That organization is made up of people who are mentally unbalanced, and that is the mildest way it can be put. These are people whose views date from 1890. But they should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, the very fact that "Grunwald" exists—is not to our credit. This entire so-called "Jewish problem" is based on the fact that many people still see the Jews, including the polonized Jews, as in some way the cause of our trouble. That is an incurable malady. Do you know why? Simply because there are no Jews. But it should also be said that the right wing of Solidarity, headed by Mr Jurczyk of Szczecin, did everything to promote the revival of anti-Semitism in Poland. For example, on 12 November he publicly stated "that Poland is not being run by Poles, but by Russian Jews with Polish names." That is a stupid and wretched opinion, and it angers the Polish people.

Does Gen Jaruzelski hold a similar opinion concerning anti-Semitism?

Gornicki: Gen Jaruzelski hates anti-Semites. He despises them. I cannot speak about what he thinks in general about certain matters, but this is something which I can state with confidence.

Since the introduction of marshal law the activity of many organizations has been frozen. Yesterday, however, "Grunwald" had its first "summit meeting" since back to 13 December 1981. Which means that it can operate publicly?

Gornicki: I feel an aversion toward fanatic nationalists and anti-Semites. I will attempt to simplify the problem a bit more. Within "Grunwald" there are also a certain number of participants in the resistance movement, war veterans; some of them are also members of the organization ZBOWiD [Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy]. There are people there whose mentality is petrified in notions about the glory of the homeland. They even have their motto written on an Uhlan (cavalry) saber. These are people, some of whom
fought bravely in the war, in both wars, who have to be reckoned with. Never-
theless, I think that "Grunwald" is not really a big problem in the country.

[Question] You said that you work from 1000 to 2300 hours. What is your
monthly income?

Gornicki: Let me explain that my salary as a commentator is 7,100 zlotys.
Actually I earn threefold more than that, if we count fees from radio and tele-
vision. In addition, I am the author of 14 books. My average monthly income
was 23,000 zlotys. At the moment I earn 14,100 zlotys, and not a fraction
more. I do not have the time to finish my new book, which has been nearly
finished for months now.

[Question] Will that new book be related in subject matter to your many trips
throughout the world, to the journalistic pieces you have been well known for
in Poland?

Gornicki: To tell you truth: a year ago I had already reached the point of
being sick of journalism. Yet I had to earn a living, and I resorted to a
pseudonym in signing the book. Thus I published a book whose cover price was
40 zlotys, but cost as much as 850 zlotys on the black market. This is some-
thing like a Polish Ian Fleming.

[Question] As a newsman you wrote journalistic accounts from everywhere in
the world. By and large they were strictly political in nature. You were re-
garded in Poland as a "franc-tireur." All of a sudden, after 13 December, you
emerged in the role of an adviser to Gen Jaruzelski. You must admit, after
all, that this was a radical and shocking change of direction in a man's
life....

Gornicki: What you say is true. I was a journalist until last October. That
is the balance after 32 years of journalism and--I simply got sick of it all.
I lost confidence in the written word, in the capability of words to change
anything. Aside from that, it is well known that most newsmen who write about
politics enter a phase at some point when they themselves want to engage in
politics. I am not doing that. You have such examples even in Yugoslavia,
and numerous politicians have come from the ranks of one-time journalists.
Recently someone said maliciously of the Polish Government that it is a gov-
ernment of former newsmen and generals. To tell the truth, there are now
three of us in the government: Mieczyslaw Rakowski as vice premier, Jerzy
Urban as spokesman, and I. I have still another explanation for my new job,
one more reason: Journalism as a formula is becoming passe all of a sudden.
I realize that. That is why I have been involved in other things. For exam-
ple, in Gdynia, near Gdansk (also well known for shipbuilding, Z. P.), they
are now putting on my musical in a theater. It is an excellent thing, not be-
cause I wrote it, but because the composer was exceptional. The tickets are
sold out into July, and I would gladly invite you to a performance if you had
more time. There is one scene in that musical which I am sure would please
Yugoslavs particularly. It takes place in the United Nations. There is a
session under way which is debating the problems of disarmament. All the rep-
resentatives of the countries in the world are at their wit's end: They do
not know what to do. Two ambassadors are an exception. One represents the
country Computeria; he is 197 cm tall and blond. The other is a representa-
tive of the Voluntary Union, he is only 160 cm tall, rumpled, poorly dressed.
They are the only ones who carry on the dialogue. The search for new ways of
expression, the writing of film scenarios and the like, would not take me far,
since I think that I have no marked talent for that. It interests me more to
operate in a field in which I am more competent.

[Question] The West European mass media, beginning 13 December 1981, have
struck fierce blows against WRON [Military Council for National Salvation].
It has somehow happened that your photographs, taken from the TV screen, have
become a symbol of marshal law, that is, a negative symbol. Are you aware of
that?

Gornicki: It is certain that I do not bear the principal "blame" for that.
As far as such treatment goes, I have been attacked from all sides all my
life. My most cherished client, my favorite attacker, dating back to 1954, is
Radio Free Europe. I have also been attacked in Poland itself. I can cite
you two attackers: the people in "Grunwald" and the Polish weekly TYGODNIK
POLSZECHNY. This is a Catholic newspaper. Aside from that, I have never been
a favorite among my colleagues either: They did not like me particularly. I
think the main reason for that was my habit of always saying everything that I
really think. It even went so far as my being thrown out of an editorial off-
Ice last year by newsmen who belonged to Solidarity. What can I say: We
have to get used to everything. I appreciate the tactfulness with which you
put that question. One Danish newspaper, for example, honored me with the ex-
pression: Gornicki is a Polish Goebbels. One has to get used even to that.
At this point I will quote Gen Jaruzelski to you. At the Seventh Plenum of
the PZPR Central Committee he quoted Tadeusz Kosciuszko, leader of the upris-
ing at the end of the 18th century: "At times the situation is such that one
must sacrifice much in order to rescue everything." That also applies to me;
I also adhere to that. Without any beating about the bush I can tell you:
were I to suspect the decisions of the government, were I not to believe in
its policy, I would leave that very moment. I have done something of the kind

[Question] The public is well aware that you have been an intimate friend of
Mieczyslaw Rakowski for a number of years now. Does he deserve some of the
credit for your now being an adviser to Gen Jaruzelski? If Rakowski was not
involved, then who did recommend you?

Gornicki: It is true that we are close friends. We have known each other for
all of 7 years now. We are very fond of one another and respect one another.
It is true that Rakowski was the man who suggested this post to me. Our posi-
tions on most things are always almost identical. The only thing I have
against him in the recent past is that he granted an interview to Oriani Fal
laci (laughs).

[Question] Probably you have talked about that as old friends. Did you crit-
icize him for that interview?
Gornicki: We have not yet had occasion to meet and talk. Quite recently there have been several important political events: I traveled to Moscow with Gen Jaruzelski, while Rakowski was in Cuba.

[Question] There are many people holding positions in Poland who were born in rich aristocratic families or come from the families of prewar intellectuals. Gen Jaruzelski himself, for example, comes from a rich family of landowners. Is your family line also like that?

Gornicki: No. I can tell you that I come from a very poor worker family. Up to the age of 14 I was not even able to speak Polish properly. That is, I spoke the slang of the suburbs.

[Question] I would like to hear your frank opinion about the so-called party nomenklatura. Over the last 1.5 years the working class has also reacted because of deformations arising out of the way in which the top level of the party functioned. The party rank and file has been especially sensitive to those manifestations, feeling that that first team of the party was the cause of the social crisis. What, then, do you think about the so-called nomenklatura, or about the members of the party establishment?

Gornicki: A so-called nomenklatura exists everywhere in the world, in all systems. Its existence is not in and of itself a problem. The problem lies in who is on that nomenklatura. For example, if it includes a specialist with a university degree in political science, that is better than if the nomenklatura includes only sons of owners of large American concerns. It is obviously bad for people to get on the nomenklatura in Poland because of personal connections rather than because of personal abilities.... I am today convinced that the new head of the personnel department in the PZPR Central Committee, Gen Dziekan, will reform the nomenklatura so that we will not have to be ashamed of it or fear it. Let me clarify this: I personally am not on the nomenklatura, nor do I need that. I also think that you have a poor understanding of the problem. The nomenklatura means a list of cadres in the country, and that comprises 150 percent [sic] of the responsible leaders in Poland. This nomenklatura must exist and function. I am even in favor of its extension. The question is who will be on it? To make it simple for you, this is a cadre pool.

[Question] The polemics between the Communist Party of Italy and the CPSU has aroused the world working class movement. Poland was the reason for this fierce ideological confrontation which is nevertheless waning today....

Gornicki: I have expressed my opinion this January in Copenhagen. I am a member of the World Peace Congress. At the beginning of our January meeting I had harsh words to say about the polemics between the two parties. I think that matters stand this way with the Italian comrades: The opinion they are expressing is such that there can be no discussion of it. The Americans have a saying: No one can be against motherhood and peace. Everyone everywhere wants democracy, freedoms.... I would like for the Italian comrades to hear Jurczyk, the Solidarity leader in Szczecin, when he talks about the people who should be hanged.
[Question] The instigators of a crime in a Warsaw streetcar, in which a policeman was killed, have been arrested. The crime was committed by a 16-year-old boy. What do you think about this?

Gornicki: I know nothing about it. I cannot say anything, that doesn't interest me. If that is the case, I think that it truly was only an incident, and that it has no political importance whatsoever.

[Question] John Paul II was supposed to make another visit to his homeland this year. Marshal law is in effect, and it seems that Gen Jaruzelski will not abolish it soon. This greatly complicates the pope's coming. You are certainly a person who could say whether or not that important visit will take place.

Gornicki: As I was coming to work today, I read on the wall of a church in my neighborhood that the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Black Madonna will last until August 1983. In other words, that is not something we invented. The invitation we sent has not yet been answered. The pope will himself decide when he will visit Poland. It is a question of a celebration which will last a year, and that fact indicates the circumstance that the pope himself is choosing the most suitable moment. (Looks at his watch.) I must go now, but I will tell you that this is the first interview during which I have not been bored.
INTERVIEW WITH CHAIRMAN OF 'GRUNWALD' ORGANIZATION NOTED

Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian No 345, 10 Apr 82 pp 34-35, 51

[Interview with Bogdan Poreba, film director and leader of the Polish "Grunwald Patriotic Association," by Zoran Petrovic-Pirocanac in Warsaw: "The Political Confession of Bogdan Poreba"; date not specified]

[Text] Film director Bogdan Poreba is the leader of the Polish "Grunwald Patriotic Association," an organization accused of nationalism and anti-Semitism. Why has Solidarity been attacking his association from the outset? Why does he feel that its program is not anti-Semitic and nationalistic?

Even today many Poles do not have a clear idea of what kind of forces stand behind the name "Grunwald Patriotic Association" or about exactly what that organization's aim is. "Grunwald" began to be talked about in March 1981 during the culmination of one of the numerous crises in relations between Solidarity and the Polish Government. Even from that moment the "Patriotic Association" emerged as a fierce opponent of independent and self-managing trade unions.

Those well-versed in Polish events have always warned about ties between "Grunwald" and the current in the PZPR gathered around the "Warsaw" group, the ideological articulator of the dogmatic current in the party.

In its activity "Grunwald" has pushed its "strong trumps" such as advocating the course of suppressing the Polish worker movement that emerged after the signing of the Gdansk Accords.

The members of "Grunwald" often use the term "bridge." They see their role, among other things, in establishing ties with the church; they even see themselves as intermediaries between the church and state.

The mysterious Gen Mieczyslaw Moczar is numbered among those political figures who harbor no sympathy for "Grunwald." The president of ZBOWID [Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy] held the post of minister of internal affairs in 1968, and that is the time of the anti-Semitic euphoria, when thousands of Poles of Jewish origin left the country. Anti-Semitism has escalated
several times in postwar Polish history, and it is "Grunwald" that many people accuse for the most recent such events.

The organization took its title from the name of the place near which the Polish king Wladyslaw II defeated the Teutons in 1410 and thereby made it possible for the Jagiellons to expand their state, which was to encompass the zone from the Baltic to the Black [original reads "Red"] Sea. The organization has always extolled Polish history to the skies and actually sees this image of extreme nationalism as one of its most useful weapons in consolidating Polish society, wounded and disunited by crisis in recent years.

Be it also said that there are no reliable data on the number of members or makeup of the membership of "Grunwald," but it can be confidently said that it has brought together a wide range of political orientations reconciled and unified by a fervent nationalism, so that room has been found in it for Catholics, for communists, for a portion of the intelligentsia, and for war veterans.

The founders of the "Grunwald Patriotic Association" certainly could not have chosen a more suitable person to head their organization than Bogdan Poreba. He is considered to be one of the good Polish film directors. His work is mainly made up of films which are markedly patriotic in character. His well-known films are "Polonia Restituta" and "Polonia Rediviva." He is working at the moment on a new patriotic film project. His deputy is also a well-known cultural figure, the actor Richard Filipski. Filipski even tried his hand at directing once, with the film "Zamach stanu" ("Coup d'état"). This is the story of the putsch by Marshal Pilsudski on 12 May 1926. Those who are very familiar with Polish history have tried to persuade me that Pilsudski's putsch (which in 1926 won the support of the Polish Left) had many features of the maneuver executed by Gen Jaruzelski on 13 December 1981.

At INTERPRESS in Warsaw I insisted that they arrange an interview with Poreba for me. Some of the malicious natives had assured me that this would not be difficult and that "Poreba also has the duty to make as many statements as possible to foreign and domestic newsmen, just like Gornicki." Nevertheless, I did manage to meet him, after the third attempt, in the offices of INTERPRESS, on Victory Square.

[Question] Over this past year there has been quite a bit of talk about your organization, but "Grunwald" has still remained mysterious and rather vague to the general public. Perhaps, then, we might begin with its "identity card"....

Poreba: It is true that no one in Poland is sufficiently familiar with "Grunwald." The situation in the mass media has in this past period been such that not a word of ours, not an interview, has been able to get through to public opinion. They have simply closed off all possibilities. The idea of the Patriotic Association dates back to 1956, but realization of the idea was not allowed at that time: It was said to be nationalistic. Last year, on 8 March, we held a meeting of our members and at the same time arranged commemorative ceremonies for the victims of Stalinism, all those who were victims of unlawful torture and unjust death sentences. The ceremonies were held in the
offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Patriotic Association is very diverse in its membership. There are Catholics and party members and war veterans. Anyone may join who wants to realize the goals of the organization which have been mentioned. We are unceasingly repeating one and the same thing: The most important thing to the Poles is the Polish state. Our ancestors fought for the state, and we have also fought. For all of 123 years we have been under the Russians, the Germans and the Austrians. We have paid a high price for that and today we want that state to be ours. It should and must be defended.

[Question] You are criticized for excessive expression of nationalism, excessive emphasis on national history. What do you hope to achieve by that?

Poreba: In Poland's history, especially over the last 50 years, there are many dark passages which need to be elucidated. "Grunwald" sees this as its principal role. Our organization is fighting for the truth, for authentic Polish political thought, which already has a long tradition and which is not sufficiently known. We are unceasingly advocating a fight for Polish history. Our organization came into being in precisely the period when Poland was beginning to burn and when it declared itself in favor of democratization of society, of renewal. You know, it is an old rule: A people which knows its own history does not allow itself to be manipulated. Never. Goebbels once said: You kill a people if you kill its history. So, if you do not know what happened in your history, be it good or bad, you cannot move on to the future. You are like a man with amnesia.

[Question] The patriotism which "Grunwald" advocates takes a dim view of cosmopolitanism, which indeed your members do not hide....

Poreba: The Patriotic Association's war against cosmopolitanism is very important to me personally. The issue is clear: How can I love the world more than my own country? You cannot love people and not love your own mother. The only sincere man is one who is fighting for his country, but in so doing also understands others who have that same sentiment for their own country. Now, this must not be realized at the expense of others. Cosmopolitanism in Poland is a weapon for shattering Polish patriotism. Patriotism in this context is for us a notion of true love, while nationalism is sick. It is nationalism which follows the logic: I love what is mine, but at the expense of others. All men are equal to me, and every one has an inalienable right to love what is his.

[Question] We hear that one of the most serious charges against "Grunwald" is anti-Semitism....

Poreba: Those are out-and-out stupidities and insinuations. For example, I have just mentioned our commemoration of the victims of Stalinism in March 1981. After that event the newspaper Zycie Warszawy attacked us for anti-Semitism. Yet we only called attention to those who were killing Polish officers after the war. All those who signed their names to that attack were actually Stalinists. Those are people who were once in the government, who are today out of office, mainly retired, but still very active. They have their people in various institutions, in the newspapers.
[Question] You talk of Liberals and are obviously referring to the intellectuals gathered around Solidarity. According to you, all of them, or a majority, are former Stalinists?

Poreba: I could list for you many such examples along with many details from their biographies which say enough in and of themselves. For example: Adam Michnik. He is young, and I admit that he cannot be held accountable for his parents. Nevertheless, his father was one of the principal fencers after the war. His brother's name is Swedowicz, he lives in Sweden. Their true family name is Szelter. His father changed his last name to Michnik. Back in the fifties Swedowicz worked in a court in which the parties did not have counsel. This was an army court, referred to as the Kapturowy sad, a kind of inquisition. We know that he was 21 at the time, but he condemned people to death in a military uniform. Or, if you carefully examine the list of KOR [Committee for the Defense of the Worker] you would see that the bulk of them are former Stalinists. All of 90 percent of those in KOR are those who caused the commotion in 1976. Or, yet another example: Jerzy Andrzejewski. He is considered a great writer, and even I think he is a good one. But in 1952 he wrote a book in which he literally organized Jewish ideas into a system and fervently advocated socialist realism. When a man does that, he ought to say out of common honesty: "Yes, I did do that, but now I am of a different opinion." He has never done that. There was a man working as secretary in Tygodnik Solidarnosc who in the Stalinist period held a post in the high political command. His name was Artur Hajricz. How is one to believe in the honorable intentions of such a man? It is characters like that who have caused so much trouble and disunited our people. And what is one to say about the great Liberal Karol Malczynski, the newsman who in 1950 wrote the book "Behind Him/It They Set Fire to Warsaw," in which he speaks about the 1944 Warsaw Uprising. The author asserted in the book that every command position among the rebels was held by Gestapo people. Actually, this was written in a time when there was a need to demonstrate at all costs that all the participants in the uprising were Anglo-American or Nazi spies.

[Question] I have it on good authority that the people in Solidarity are by no means well disposed toward you and that you in "Grumwald" have also been opponents of the new trade unions?

Poreba: That is not so. We in "Grumwald" are in favor of worker association and solidarity, but we knew that Solidarity was using those former Stalinists as an instrument for taking power, as a tool of forces which do not have honorable intentions. And those are the Americans, the Germans and Israel. There also existed in Solidarity an internal reaction, and it was operating in the other direction. I think that even the workers themselves would sooner or later rise up against them. The agitation of those forces consisted of the effort to create a mythology around those sinister people from the time of Stalin, those who today have only turned their coats inside out.

[Question] What is the function of your newspaper RZECZYWISTOSC (REALITY), and for whom is it actually intended?
Poreba: RZECZYWISTOSC is not our newspaper; I must first clear that up for you. This is a party paper, though a persistent effort is made to pass it off to the public as ours. The "Grunwald Patriotic Association" ought to have its own paper; that is a condition for the normal operation of our organization. We would also like to publish our own books. On 24 December of last year our journal devoted to history and tradition was actually supposed to appear, but the introduction of marshal law postponed all that. Yet we hope that we will soon manage to publish that journal.

[Question] Does "Grunwald" have any vision of ways of emerging from this most serious of Polish society's postwar crises?

Poreba: To answer that question I must mention the fifties in Poland, the period which I call odchylenie prawicowo nacionalne (national turn to the right). Gomulka was at that time in prison, Cardinal Wyszynski as well. This is the period when the Polish communists, who in the war were with the people and had a clear national program, left the true road. That is when even the so-called pro-tito orientation was subjected to a pogrom. Police totalitarianism began. In "Grunwald" there are many of those who were in prison at that time. Later, when a judgment was rendered concerning that orientation, those who were most to blame shouted: That was done by those others! And they themselves simply changed into Liberals, turned their coats inside out. Those forces have pursued the same goal even from that time: undermining Poland. Even today the most numerous among them are those who would even like to see a civil war here, who do not take international considerations into account and who are constantly involved in manipulation. A stop has to be put to that, and we ourselves will see to achievement of a large portion of Solidarity's demands. Cardinal Wyszynski was himself opposed to breaking up Solidarity and said that he "wanted Solidarity to be Poland." If we carry out the Gdansk Accords in peace, we will become one of the modern states in Europe. We would at the same time be a socialist and democratic country. We would be a bridge between East and West.
ASPIRATIONS OF YOUNG WORKERS CONSIDERED

Warsaw WALKA MŁODYCH in Polish No 3, 18 Apr 82, pp 3, 16

[Article by Ludwik Luzynski, "Where Are They and What Do They Want?"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] /Until recently there was still a great deal of noise about them. They moved within the aureole of those who had accomplished the August events, they were dominant in the strike committees, albeit somewhat more rarely on the negotiating committees, they created the strike guards, and they passed judgment without hesitation upon the suitability of this or that representative of the authorities. In short, they were the subject of those times. At least, that is what was said about them, and a considerable portion of them were piously convinced of this./

Bewitched by the mission which their dramatic development of the history of People's Poland presented them, they failed to perceive that with each passing day their role was becoming markedly smaller. Apparently, everything from August to December seemed to occur spontaneously and naturally, but, beginning some time around the Bydgoszcz events, at first discreetly and then without any camouflage, the core of steering and disposition took control of the movement. Not many perceive this subtle difference, although the period preceding the Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the PZPR, as well as its debates, have inclined many to reflect on these matters. There have been, to be sure, only a few defections from Solidarity—resignations from functional positions along with criticism of the leaders. A definite majority has continued to remain faithful to the principles inscribed on the strike banners during the summer of 1980, believing limitlessly in the Union leadership, that the struggle deals with nothing more than specifically implementing those principles to the end. If a certain action is distinctly political in nature, then it is interpreted as being in the higher cause of Union interests. It was also in the name of these Union interests that there began the creation of the sections of the workers' guard—where the young workers again had occasion to convince themselves that they had obtained the opportunity to become the defenders of the honor of the workers' cause. What could confront them, what kind of
goal were they pursuing to the end, and to what could they be exposed? But they could no longer know this, for this was within the domains of the gentlemen engaged in discussions in the salons which had blossomed in Warsaw, Gdansk, and Krakow. And they were no longer being invited there.

Subsequently 13 December occurred. Yes, that was a shock for society, for many all the more so in that they had been strongly convinced that the changes which had been initiated in the country during the summer were simply inevitable, for in the opposite case sooner or later we could anticipate a national tragedy, or, in the best case, we would be treated as middlemen. It is precisely among these persons that the young workers have found themselves. As soon as the very next day after 13 December, some of them undertook attempts to strike, and again a portion of them was convinced that this was necessary for the sake of higher goals. They did not admit that, in order to safeguard the fundamental interests of the state and the system, the authorities have had to have recourse to unavoidable means.

The individual consequences are well known. However, we do not know to a sufficient degree what is happening throughout their entire midst. At first glance they seem to have been thunderstruck. One sees them at their places of employment or meets them on the street, but these are not the same as we remember. In contrast to students and secondary-school pupils they have not been enticed by a conspiracy, and there are fewer of them than usual in the party or the ZSMP [Union of Socialist Polish Youth].

Let us try to reach the reasons for this. For a considerable portion of them the raising of prices turned out to be like a bucket of iced water, despite the compensatory aspects of its results, the relatively well-to-do social groups have maintained themselves with difficulty. But what do the young people have to say about this? To be sure, at the suggestion of the ZSMP, the government has raised the ceiling on credits for young married couples, its principles have been modified, and an unavoidable number of items has been put under such credit, but, on the other hand, not all young people are young marrieds. Their percentage would be higher if there were more housing. Weakened by the strikes, the shaky economy does not often provide the chances for better wages. And so one must rack one's brains in order to go out on one's own, all the more so if there are one or two small, crying children, and, at any rate, it costs a great deal of money just to rent some very modest-sized rooms.

A significant part of them expects a great deal from Solidarity, reckoning that only in its ranks and under its banners can one truly struggle for Poland. All the more so in that legends and myths have already sprung up, and these, as is well known, can maintain their hold on the heart right up to the grave. Nor is there any lack of that counterfeited light-heartedness which demonstrates flaunting and nonchalance.

In my opinion, despite everything, these are symptoms which do not get to the bottom of the matter. The answers and explanations must be sought in affirming that for the second time within a relatively brief time period
their trust has been abused and cheated. During the 1970's they were supposed to be the vanguard of the generation of great opportunity, whereas in the past 16 months they have been told that here now they have mastered history. Previously they were mobilized by the slogan of "another Poland," but lately it has been that of "another Japan." After December 1970 they willingly and en masse engaged in production and social deeds without knowing how apparent a benefit this was bringing to the economy, but after August 1980 they equally willingly began engaging in strikes without bothering to inform themselves as to what a deadly effect they were having on the economy. Their subjective role turned out to be an illusion in both cases, because in practice, despite assurances, it did not increase but decreased the scale of their participation in the solution of the country's important matters. Today it can already be stated that they formed a good background for the guides and leaders, especially at the time when our own and the foreign television cameras were operating. They expressed their attitude toward the decade of the 1970's in August 1980, placing in Solidarity their hopes as well as their most noble intentions. Imparting to this movement their own most valuable attributes—a love of truth and justice, a desire to serve the country under conditions far-removed from hypocrisy and distortions, with youthful energy and a high skill—they reckoned that at the same time the choice which they had made was truly the best chance for their generation.

Admission of defeat does not belong among well-liked activities, and it is certainly not easy when one is made a fool of for the second time. Perhaps it is to frivolous and bold a, like a paraphrased problem in a play, but "how many times finally can one allow oneself to be taken in within the course of a brief life?" one of the young Poznan workers gasped out bitterly in a conversation with me. They are not entirely deluded that this opinion is shared today by all the young workers; a significant portion of them does not even distinguish between the specific benefits which were obtained after August as important and inevitable and what became a menace in this process from the beginning.

On the other hand, I will not conceal my fears as to the future. Before I develop these ideas further, a small digression. Here in the discussions concerning the intelligentsia one must pay heed to the apparent despondency even in the utterances of the Marxists—as to whether it is possible to implement the goals of the system without the participation of the intelligentsia. This maxim gives cause for concern only if it becomes a basic fundamental for the future of Poland, but such a situation appears in prospect only if the attitude of the working class, farmers, and especially that of the young workers, is passed off in silence. Before long it is on their shoulders that the main burdens will be placed concerning the development of the material and social foundations of the people's everyday life under socialist conditions. It is they who will be creating the necessary benefits and things for technical and material progress—for the village and for the city. Of course, I am profoundly convinced that the country will be brought out of its crisis all the more rapidly insofar as this process is engaged in by an ever-increasing number of our fellow-countrymen, regardless whether they are young, old, workers,
farmers, or whether they represent the intelligentsia. But I am appalled by the simultaneously repeated, entirely unofficial view that constantly full shop shelves along with a well-functioning economy should be the measure of the post-crisis status. Whoever does not realize the superficiality of such an opinion has not understood much about what happened in Poland during August 1980.

One hears the opinion today that this generation is already definitely lost for socialism. But if some substitute is offered, then it is only because there is no other choice. If the young people achieve some sort of individual success, then it is in order to achieve something of value for themselves from time to time or to earn some definite material profits. They may also bring up their own descendants in this spirit. The rest may be anticipated; in every case if this opinion were to be realized, these would be serious consequences for us in building socialism. I am of the opinion, and this is confirmed by the preponderance of what has happened between August and December, that, despite everything, the principles of our system have been sufficiently strongly encoded in the mentality of society, as well as among the young people. But then there is a chance that these attitudes may be reversed. Already today in conversations on private occasions young workers are showing signs of something new, and if they do not emphasize this publicly, and, moreover, do not assist it with their own innovations, then this is merely because they are anticipating a greater number of suitable movements equally on the part of the army, the party, and the government. During this time, however, they will look on from the sidelines. This fact, alas, must be taken into consideration, despite the fact that there is a particular need in Poland today for a different type of attitude, but that the party and the authorities are proving daily that they are determined to carry through the process of renewal until they reach a status which is in accord with the expectations of the people. In sum, it will not be easy to reach the consciousness of the working youth, but this must be accomplished if we are serious about the taught of socialism's future in Poland.

What can and must be done? Above all, as it seems to me, become aware of the range of this problem, for it is not obvious everywhere. We know a great deal about young workers, but, up to now, we have come by this knowledge thanks to a few amateurs who have conducted research in this environment almost in a "homemade" way. Other quite important cores which are capable of performing a certain amount of work in this matter have not had much willingness to be "spotted" with this type of research. Without them, however, it is difficult to have a rational—current and future—policy.

Let us also reach back to the beginnings of People's Poland, and let us find there examples (subsequently not repeated) of a practically subjective treatment of the workers—they felt at that time that they were actually a fundamental force in the new system.
Without overlooking one or the other, we must more equitably and without beaurocratic habits remove the glaring injustices which are visible to the naked eye. Otherwise, we will be abandoned by many young workers: political illiteracy and the loss of historical identity have not yet been sufficiently removed. Lacunae in school education as well as the specific social reality had to produce these and not other results, which our political opponents took advantage of so easily. On the whole, it is valuable to find in the margin the answer to the question of what in the workers' protests has become their original contribution, and what was put in there from the outside. It is a paradox of our postwar history that, while glorying in the world revolution on the one hand, on the other hand, for years we have had to adapt ourselves to a lack of equal chances and preferential points, so that for several years already every year one-fourth of the secondary-school graduates have accepted work which is not in accordance with the profession which they have learned. In this case we should not blame our learned sophists so much; it is more a question of specific decisions. Furthermore, let us look at what blocks are encountered by young efficiency experts at workplaces and how much institutional patronage has remained in the realm of dreams and not because there was a lack of the so-called transforming force but rather because the bureaucracy proved not to capable of defeat. This same reason has delayed in many instances the emergence of young people's work cooperatives and young people's building cooperatives. There are considerably more examples, although for years the ZSMP has been striving to remove these barriers.

Bearing in mind that daily life underscores consciousness, the young workers will be dependent for a long time in their attitude toward the country on the conditions under which they will be living, nor is it any consolation to them that retired persons are even worse off. To be sure, a portion of them have adopted a "gimme" attitude, but no less a majority is interested in such decisions by the authorities as would create conditions for developing innovations and concepts as well as profiting for a high degree of skills. A well-prepared system of wage payments along with new regulations for a cadre policy should correspond with this. At the conclusion of the matter, as I judge it, is the fundamental principle. The young workers truly do yearn already now to be complete masters of their own country—partly because of the matter of the post-August period but also because such aspirations have been aroused in them for years, formed in the process of education and the activity of the youthful movement. We cannot treat this as a difficulty or become impatient with it, but rather we must find such solutions thanks to which both the country as well as the workers will be benefited. For this reason, I think, we should return as rapidly as possible to the ideas of workers' self-governments, in which I detect not only chances at economic reform but, above all, the possibilities of fulfilling the vital aspirations of the young workers.

2384
CSO: 2600/556
WEST GERMAN TRIAL OF ACCUSED YUGoslav SECRET SERVICE AGENT

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL 3 May 82 p 69

[Article: "Murder on Call"]

[Text] A Frankfurt grand jury is looking into the methods employed by the Yugoslav Secret Service to eliminate undesirable emigrants in the FRG.

When the 34-year-old locksmith Rasim Zenelaj, an exiled Yugoslav of Albanian descent and a co-plaintiff in a Frankfurt murder trial, wants to get to his seat in the courtroom he needs help. He is in a wheelchair, paralyzed from the waist down and has to be carried up the stairs.

Among the four defendants is a young woman who is watching the scene, trying not to show any emotion: Zorica Aleksić, a 25-year-old Serb, who 5 years ago put five bullets into the locksmith, using a "Ceska" pistol. "I was only a tool," she said about the bloody deed, "there are really other people behind it."

Frankfurt's public prosecutor has called a number of witnesses, and he wants to use their testimony to document who is really responsible for shooting Zenelaj. During the jury trial, which is to begin all over again this Friday (the first major hearing had to be discontinued because the judge became ill), there will be frequent mention of the Yugoslav Secret Service, the "Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti: (SDB) and officials of the Yugoslav consulate general in Frankfurt—once again a spotlight is falling on the underground war between exiled Yugoslavs and Yugoslav Secret Service agents.

The German Criminal Police feels that two Yugoslavs were behind the assassination attempt. They were able to escape arrest by the police on the day of the attack, 14 May 1981:

--Svetozar Mirjacic, 42, called "Tozo" by his contrymen. He was registered at Hesse's state chancellory as first embassy secretary of Frankfurt's consulate general, in charge of customs affairs;

--Rade Surla, 55, a former bank director from Split. He managed the "Sideta Bau" construction firm in Frankfurt and was respected among exiled Croats as "an old partisan fighter."
It was not until Surla's escape (last trace: a hotel bill of more than 363 francs in Strassbourg) that the investigators felt certain that a Secret Service agent had slipped through their fingers—although among the Yugoslavs in Frankfurt there had been rumors about him for a long time. In 1980, for instance, when Nikola Mihcevic, an exiled Croat, bled to death in a Frankfurt parking lot after six shots had been fired at him by unknown killers (SPIEGEL 4/1980).

In spring 1981 a rumor was circulated in the "Hajduk Split," a Croatian restaurant, according to which new actions were about to happen. Anonymous voices on the telephone warned Zenelaj, one of the coowners of the restaurant and treasurer of an Albanian emigrants circle, to take part in demonstrations in connection with the Kosovo riots. Zenelaj was annoyed: "If you want to shoot me, go ahead, but do not call me here all the time, you are getting on my nerves."

The calls, the police seems to be certain now, came from the office of Rade Surla's construction firm. It did not remain a secret that the boss received frequent visits from home, at one time a general from Bosnia, at another time a courier from Kosovo; the conferences were always behind closed doors.

Occasionally a Volvo of the Sideta construction company was lent to the Yugoslav consulate general for "special jobs." Occasionally the building contractor was driven to an ominous "green house" in the vicinity of the Rothschildallee, he walked the rest of the way—to the conspiratorial apartment. "The less you know," he told his chauffeur, "the better for you."

In the consulate there were rumors that following the war Surla played an important role in the Yugoslav Security Service. Former confidants told the police that in 1950 he had had a falling-out with President Tito, as a Stalin supporter he had spent some time on the prison island of "Goli Otok" (bare island) and lost his officer's rank.

Others described how Surla had been "kicked out over there after working for 30 years only because he did not want to sign a statement that somebody had embezzled money": According to Criminal Police investigations, Surla had been dismissed in 1971 as director of the investment bank in Split, because under his patronage "black money" was to have flowed "to ministers."

Detectives are only speculating that Surla—being an emigrant—may have reestablished contact with the Secret Service to work on his rehabilitation at home. One thing is certain, Surla met regularly with the confidant "Tozo," sometimes in the consulate and sometimes in the "green house."

Discussions supposedly dealt with confidants, with bribes, forged passports, with tapping telephones and murder plots. In the case of Zenelaj, Iso Dautovski also played a part. He had been hired in 1980 by Surla for the Sideta construction firm—according to the Criminal Police he was one of several SDB agents trailing Zenelaj.

Dautovski is said to have found out that the Albanian functionary Zenelaj did not only stay in constant contact with KOSOVO, but that he also had
"a weakness for women." Zorica Aleksic, a female worker from Weiterstadt and a Serb, apparently made her criminal debut in this manner. Dautovski introduced her to Zenelaj and finally gave her, according to available information, the crime weapon including ammunition.

When Zorica Aleksic finally pulled the trigger—at the beginning of an intimate get-together—Zenelaj suffered a cerebrospinal wound. The perpetrator, who was arrested the day of the assassination attempt at the Frankfurt airport, later revealed the details of the plot. When Surla found out that Dautovski was no longer able to flee, he called for his car. Since then DM 300,000 have been missing at the Sideta construction company.

Since then Surla has been seen in the "Slavija" hotel in Belgrade. An international warrant of arrest has been issued, but Interpol Belgrade is not answering.

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