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USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology
No. 3, March 1982

Translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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FEMINIST MOVEMENT SUFFERS EFFECTS OF REAGAN'S BUDGET CUTS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 3-12

[Article by Ye. N. Yershova: "The Women's Movement and the Reagan Administration"]

[Text] The struggle for equal rights for women in the United States has entered a new phase. Its outcome will determine the future of the movement for a long time and will also have a serious effect on the status of all American women. The deadline for the ratification of the 27th amendment to the U.S. Constitution, declaring the equality of women before the law, by state legislatures is in less than 4 months.

Women's organizations are making a desperate attempt to overcome the resistance of conservative and rightwing forces, which have the support of the Republican administration.

Ronald Reagan was the only presidential candidate in 1980 who refused to support the 27th amendment. The Republican Party platform did not endorse the ratification of this amendment either. This position was so unpopular that Ronald Reagan had to send a special letter to the National Organization for Women (NOW) not long before the election, in October, to assure the organization that although he did not support the amendment, he nevertheless advocated equal rights for women and, if elected, would take steps to eliminate discrimination against American working women. He promised that he would "enthusiastically appoint women to government jobs on all levels" and, in particular, "appoint a highly qualified woman to one of the first vacancies on the U.S. Supreme Court."1

Ronald Reagan was supported by 49 percent of the women who voted in the election. Many women expressed their negative feelings about all of the candidates by not voting at all. Although women constitute the majority of voters, in November 1980 more men went to the polls for the first time in the last decade.2

In the months since that time, Reagan has kept only two of the campaign promises he made to the women's movement: He appointed Jeane Kirkpatrick the permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations and Sandra O'Connor a member of the U.S.

* For more about the movement for women's equality, see the articles in issues 3 and 9 for 1980--Editor's note.
Supreme Court. The discrimination against women when the administration staff was formed was even criticized by some of the more conservative representatives of the women's movement, such as Phyllis Schlafly, the leader of the movement against the ratification of the 27th amendment.\(^3\) On the whole, almost all of the measures taken by the Republican administration have restricted the rights of many women and have had a negative effect on their already difficult position.

Women have responded to this policy with growing discontent, which is reflected in the results of public opinion polls and, what is most important, in a more energetic movement for equal rights.

Public opinion polls indicate, for example, that opposition to the Republican administration's policy has reached such a high level that if congressional elections were held in the middle of 1981, the Democratic Party would have a solid majority in this legislative body, and it would owe this majority to women voters.\(^4\) Women's evaluations of presidential performance are constantly declining. In November 1980 the gap between men's and women's evaluations was 8 percent, but by August 1981 it was 16 percent. Furthermore, the American women who have given Reagan particularly low marks for presidential performance are the ones who are most active politically—the leaders of various women's organizations.\(^5\) It is indicative that American attitudes toward presidents differed virtually not at all in terms of this characteristic in the past. According to Republican Kathy Wilson, one of the leaders of the National Women's Political Caucus, however, "women are more aware and are more inclined to act independently in political matters than ever before."\(^6\) The Gallup Institute sees this difference of opinions as "polarization engendered by Reagan's policy, and the most serious difference ever engendered by presidential actions during the half-century that Gallup has conducting its polls."\(^7\)

It is particularly significant that the public is not only dissatisfied with Reagan's position on matters pertaining exclusively to women's rights, but also all of his domestic and international policy. The Americans are upset, according to the WASHINGTON POST, by "Reagan's hawkish foreign policy as well as matters of great importance to women in their struggle for job opportunities and equal pay."\(^8\)

All of the administration's steps in the social sphere have had a common feature: They injure the most underprivileged and poorest population groups the most. Low-income women belong to precisely these categories in the United States: There is an extremely high proportion of women among the poor. After all, although the persistent struggle of recent decades has resulted in some progress in the American woman's position in society, women in general are still the victims of discrimination.

Nevertheless, women are taking a more active part in sociopolitical, cultural, scientific and economic affairs. During these years, women have even become generals, influential politicians and top-level administrators, which never happened before. According to Frances Parenthold, the first woman member of the Texas state legislature, however, "although women are now more noticeable and have more influence, they have not gained anything tangible."\(^9\) At the June 1981 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the United States of America, Gus Hall said: "The course of economic development as a whole is having a particularly
negative effect on the status of women in general and of working women in particular."10

These words are corroborated by statistics. In particular, only 7 percent of the families headed by a man live below the poverty line, while the figure for the families with a female head of household is 32 percent. Furthermore, 50 percent of the families headed by non-white women live in poverty.11

This is due to discrimination in the sphere of labor relations. Although more and more women are joining the labor force,12 they are usually given the jobs with the lowest pay and the least prestige. Between 1973 and 1978, 11 million jobs were created in the private sector of the U.S. economy; 40 percent were filled by women,13 but almost all of them are petty clerks, waitresses and salesclerks who earn little and have no prospects for professional advancement.14 The special term "pink-collar workers" has even been coined in the United States to refer to women employed in "specifically female" occupations.

The constant increase in the proportional number of women in low-paying jobs and in the overall labor force is widening the gap between average male and female salaries. In 1955 the average woman earned 64 percent of the average man's salary, but now the figure is only 59 percent or, according to some data, 57 percent. This indicator drops to 54 percent for black women and to 49 percent for Mexican-American women.15 Even when men and women perform equivalent or comparable work, the former's salary is much higher. Suffice it to say that even women on the congressional staff earn less than men who perform similar functions there.16

In the 1970's some women employed the provisions of civil rights laws and acquired jobs in "male" fields of employment after a difficult struggle, but they were motivated primarily by economic needs in their desire to become military personnel, miners17 and bus drivers.

Even after a woman acquires this kind of job, however, she cannot feel secure. Her position in the "men's" occupations is particularly unstable and she will be the first to be laid off in the event of a recession.18 Even in other fields the level of unemployment among women is much higher than the average. Suffice it to say that 25.9 percent of all the people who lost their jobs between 1973 and 1978 were women under the age of 25, and 33.1 percent were women over 25.19 Covert forms of unemployment, total and partial, are particularly widespread among women.

The vulnerability of the position of women in the labor sphere is largely due to their low level of professional organization. In the 1970's, women became much more active in labor unions. They were instrumental in the formation and operation of new unions of medical and agricultural workers and formed a number of working women's public organizations, among which the Coalition of Labor Union Women and Women for Racial and Economic Equality have become particularly influential. More than half of the persons joining labor unions in these years were women, and their proportional number among organized labor rose from 10 percent in 1956 to 25 percent by the end of the last decade. Nevertheless, only 6.5 million of the more than 40 million working women are now members of unions.20 In other words, most women still do not belong to unions. This means that tens of millions of working women do not enjoy even the limited protection that is offered to workers by collective
bargaining, have no vacation and pension rights and so forth. It is therefore not surprising that two out of every three elderly American women live in poverty. The NEW YORK TIMES reports that "poverty is mainly a woman's problem" in the United States today.21

Therefore, women have traditionally been discriminated against more than any other population group in the United States. Now, however, ever since the program of social cuts was put in action on 1 October 1981, their position has constantly grown worse and will continue to do so. The NATIONAL NOW TIMES, the organ of NOW, predicts that "the progress of the last 20 years in the status of women will be nullified" by Reagan's socioeconomic policy.22

The cuts in social security and welfare programs, job training for youth, aid to low-income families with dependent children, food stamps for the poor, medical services and several types of assistance are seriously injuring women, both directly and indirectly, because they are harming the status of their families and of individual family members—the elderly and young adults. For example, cuts in some social benefits will put 3 million recipients, 86 percent of whom are women, in a difficult position. Cuts in aid to families with dependent children have completely deprived 400,000 families of support and have reduced the amount of aid paid to 285,000 others. Almost all of these families have a single parent—a woman. The same families have suffered most from cuts in the Medicaid program. They have also been injured by the cuts in the food stamp program, as 69 percent of the households receiving food stamps are also headed by women.23

Cuts in job training programs hurt women in two ways: In the first place, many fewer women can acquire a profession and, consequently, hope to find a job at all, much less a high-paying one; in the second place, many women who were engaged in the operation of these programs lost their jobs. Women will also be seriously injured by the plans to do away with legal aid programs, as 70 percent of the clients are working and needy women who require counseling on problems connected with social security, various cases of discrimination and so forth.24

The raising of the retirement age from 65 to 68 will leave widowed housewives without any means of support for a longer time, as they become eligible for their husband's benefits only when they reach retirement age. And these retirement pensions, as labor unions and women's organizations point out, are not charity or any kind of gift, but the redistributed funds of the very workers who are now being denied the right to these accumulations.

The rights of women will be just as seriously injured by Reagan's policy of gradually revising and cancelling all of the laws of the 1960's which were supposed to put an end to various forms of discrimination in the United States, including discrimination based on sex. In August 1981, Vice President Bush announced the administration's intention to revise around 30 statutes ensuring the fulfillment of the "affirmative action program." It was this program that was supposed to guarantee equal opportunities in employment and education for targets of discrimination. It also served as the legal basis for court cases involving incidents of discrimination. It is true that only educated women were likely to go so far as to take these cases to court. The federal courts investigated around 5,000 such cases a year on the average. Now the administration will relieve employers of the need to
observe these laws in its desire to make concessions to big capital. Women, along
with other victims of discrimination, will thereby lose one of the main achievements
of the 1960's movement for civil rights and equal rights for women.

Even the successes of educated and wealthy women are now undergoing a process of
revision. According to NOW, "the fight for equal credit opportunities for women is
not over." The 1975 law on equal credit opportunities is not being enforced
satisfactorily. Besides this, attempts have already been made in the Congress to
repeal the law. Banks are still refusing to extend credit to single and divorced
women and to give married women credit in their own name. All of this has forced
even bourgeois women to admit that "women are victimized by the absence of com-pre-
ensive national legislation to prohibit discrimination based on sex." It is indicative
that there is not a single woman among the administrators of the 500 largest
 corporations and the percentage of women on the boards of the 1,800 leading firms
is purely symbolic—less than 2 percent.

Women encounter the same problems in all areas of public life. In the United
States, which aspires to the leading role in the struggle for civil rights, women,
who constitute the majority of the population, are still not recognized as citizens
with equal rights. But after all, as the founders of Marxism-Leninism correctly
pointed out, the status of women in a society is one of the indicators of its
progressiveness. The constitutional amendment which would acknowledge the complete
equality of all citizens before the law, regardless of their sex, has still not been
ratified by the states (that is, enacted) in the United States. This struggle has
been going on for around 60 years! The amendment was endorsed by the Senate in
1972 but still has not received the necessary approval of 38 states. The deadline
for its ratification is drawing near—30 June 1982. Although the overwhelming
majority of Americans of both sexes, various party affiliations and all ages say
that they support the amendment, the legislators cannot reconcile themselves to
the idea that women are equal....

American women need the 27th amendment primarily for the protection of their eco-
nomic rights. This has been frankly admitted by the organizations heading the
women's struggle for equal rights. This is why the social base of the movement has
recently become much broader and is continuing to do so. The movement is being
joined by moderate and even conservative people. For example, Barbara Mikulski, a
conservative congresswomen from Maryland, said that "discrimination in social
security and economic matters cuts across all class boundaries and has helped to
broaden the base of the feminist movement." According to NOW data, up to 10,000
people have joined the movement each month since November 1980, or three times as
many as before Reagan was elected.

The political awareness of the movement's members is increasing. It is indicative
that even statements by moderate feminists are sometimes pointedly political. For
example, Eleanor Smeal, who was a housewife not long ago but is now the president
of NOW, is stressing more and more vehemently in her statements that the fight
against the 27th amendment is being led by the "big money" in politics. In her
speech at the mass demonstration on Solidarity Day on 19 September 1981 in
Washington, she said that women are being opposed by the same forces that are
fighting against the labor unions, the civil rights movement and social progress
in any form. They are the people who "profit from the restriction of women's
rights, just as they profit from the restriction of the rights of labor unions, blacks and ethnic minorities."

Although the overwhelming majority of Americans support the 27th amendment, influential forces are against it. Rightwing forces have taken advantage of the errors committed by feminist organizations leading the movement for women's equality to make many average Americans, especially housewives, wary and even suspicious of "women's liberation." Employing the traditional methods of demagogy and intimidation, rightist forces are spreading lies through their broad network of press organs, alleging that if the 27th amendment should be ratified, there will be common locker rooms in sports stadiums, women will have to pay alimony in divorce cases, women will have to serve in the army, etc. The consolidation of anti-feminist forces was largely made possible by the use of the rightwing press and rightist organizations and financial resources.

The rightists are focusing attention on the issue of abortion as well as on the 27th amendment. They have turned this issue into the object of vulgar political speculation. Taking advantage of the majority of Americans' traditional approach to moral questions, which is based on Christian dogma, rightist forces have been successful in convincing them that the legalization of abortion would lead to divorce, the disintegration of the family unit and the legalization of sexual aberrations.

One important factor contributing to the success of the rightists is the inability of feminist ideologists, liberal and radical, to explain the complex and crucial processes that are directly affecting the status of women in society and the family. In fact, their activity has objectively resulted in a great amount of theoretical confusion. Many people have taken the side of the rightists because they have offered simple answers to these complicated questions. In particular, the rightists have blamed the feminist organizations for unhealthy developments in the sphere of morality, family life and economics.

The fact is that no more than 16 percent of all households fit the pattern of the traditional American family—father, mother and two or more children—in comparison to 70 percent in the 1950's. At the same time, the proportional number of single men and women has risen from 10.9 to 23 percent and there are more families with a single breadwinner, usually a woman. Consequently, there are many more unmarried women with children. These facts testify that there is no dominant family type in the United States today. The disintegration of the old family unit naturally disturbs all social groups. And if we consider the fact that Americans, by virtue of their national peculiarities, are much more concerned with their own affairs and matters affecting their own interests than with broad-scale domestic and international problems, it is understandable that questions connected with the family and procreation have become the central issues in a fierce nationwide political struggle.

The bourgeois feminist ideologists' interpretation of all these problems and the solutions they offer have only added grist to the mill of the rightists, who have simply called for a return to the "good old days." All feminist theories contrast men to women—as opponents in society and in the family. The feminists portray the family as an arena of feminine oppression and the history of the development of
society as the history of the battle between the sexes. In this way, the system for the exploitation and oppression of women is not blamed on the existence of a class society, but on sexual differences. On the basis of these theoretical constructions, the radical wing of the feminist movement has concluded that women must struggle against their main adversaries—men—and has advised women to give up the family altogether, and even to give up procreation. Furthermore, one of the primary demands of the radical feminists is "civil equality" for lesbians, whose problems are sometimes given more attention than the struggle for real socioeconomic and political rights for women. The liberal-reformist wing of the movement has been unable to rebuff radical elements and followed their lead at the National Women's Conference in Houston in 1978 by agreeing that the demand for "lesbian rights" was just as important as the struggle against racism and discrimination in the sphere of employment. This has seriously discredited the very idea of women's equality and has also compromised the movement in the eyes of the general public. What is more, it is helping rightist forces to divert public attention away from truly important issues.

Rightist forces have not confined themselves to attacking the 27th amendment and the Supreme Court decision of 1973 which legalized abortion. They have now launched a counteroffensive. Under their pressure, on 30 June 1980 the same Supreme Court upheld the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funds to pay for abortions for poor women. They have launched a campaign for a constitutional amendment declaring the "right to life" (referring to the right of the foetus). In 1980 around 30 versions of this amendment were submitted to the Congress and they are now being discussed by House and Senate committees. To exert pressure on the Congress, rightist forces have formed a number of national coalitions and numerous local organizations. They are being actively supported by the Catholic Church and the "Moral Majority," a fundamentalist organization on the extreme right. For example, during the 1980 campaign, Catholic Cardinal Medeiros asked Catholics not to vote for candidates supporting abortion rights.

These organizations have become a noticeable factor in U.S. politics. Suffice it to say that during the 1980 campaign the "Moral Majority" announced that its main objective was the unseating of six prominent senators, including the leaders of the struggle in support of the 27th amendment and the abortion rights of women in the Congress. Five of the six—G. McGovern, P. Church, J. Culver, B. Bayh and G. Nelson—were defeated by conservative Republican candidates. Of course, their defeat was not completely the result of the activities of the "Moral Majority." But it would be wrong to underestimate the influence of this rightwing organization.

Many of the bills introduced in Congress have a single purpose—to cancel out the achievements of the women's movement. One of the most significant is a law on family planning, the draft of which was submitted to the Congress by a man close to the President, Senator P. Laxalt. The bill won the enthusiastic support of the "Moral Majority." Its 38 articles prohibit the use of federal funds for the purchase of textbooks and other educational materials which "denigrate the traditional role of women," for the desegregation of schools and for legal aid for women seeking help in divorce cases. It proposes that the issue of compulsory prayer in the schools be taken out of the jurisdiction of the federal courts and left to the discretion of school administrators, that parents be granted the right to censor schoolbooks, that school councils decide questions about the permissibility of coeducational sports and so forth—all in the same vein.
The forces supporting these bills have a solid financial base and are backed up by a broad network of rightwing organizations. They are successfully taking advantage of the objective difficulties encountered by American women and the erroneous views of feminist organizations for propaganda purposes. In spite of all this, it is not likely that Congress will endorse the "right to life" amendment or the majority of bills discussed above. Nevertheless, in the next few years much of the energy of women's organizations will be invested in the struggle against these bills, and this will be the energy they need for the resolution of urgent problems. When former Senator E. McCarthy spoke of all the commotion stirred up by rightist forces, he stressed that "for the right wing the issue of the family is no more than an excuse to drive women back into the kitchen and deprive them of the right to make up their own minds about abortion.... This entire campaign is of a counterrevolutionary nature, and women and the poor will be its main victims."33

The members of women's organizations are realizing that the mere election or appointment of a woman to a particular position is not enough, just as they realize that even a number of appointments will not accomplish much. The main thing is that the elected or appointed individuals, regardless of whether they are men or women, must consistently defend the real interests of women. For example, the election of 21 women to the U.S. Congress in 1980 was not any kind of victory for the women's movement. According to the correct assessment of Joyce Miller, the president of the Coalition of Labor Union Women, it was a "total disaster" as many of them support cuts in social programs, oppose the equal rights amendment and favor a ban on abortions. At the same time, many liberal candidates were defeated, including prominent public spokeswoman Elizabeth Holtzman, a former member of the House of Representatives from the state of New York who lost the Senate election to Alphonse D'Amato, the conservative candidate.

In the winter of 1981/82 the women's organizations heading the struggle for the 27th amendment tried to mobilize as much support as possible for the ratification of this exceedingly important document. A conference of NOW, the National Women's Political Caucus, the Coalition of Labor Union Women and several other organizations was held in fall 1981, at which time a broad-scale campaign in support of the amendment was planned. The campaign was organized according to the usual rules of American politics: Contributions are to be solicited (the goal is 15 million dollars), and these funds are then to be spent on attention-getting ads in magazines and on television. Around 500 women have decided to leave their jobs and abandon their families temporarily to devote all their time to voluntary stumping and organizing work in the six states where the women's movement hopes to acquire a vote in favor of the 27th amendment.

Women's organizations are widely publicizing the successes of women in the 16 states which already have articles about women's equality in their constitutions. They are demonstrating, with specific examples, that not one of the horrible pictures painted by rightist forces conforms to reality. On the contrary, several of the laws and court decisions based on these articles have broadened the rights of men as well as women.

Women's organizations have also been enlisting the aid of as many allies as possible, especially labor unions, ethnic minority organizations and antia war and religious groups. They have won the support of the AFL-CIO leadership, several large
unions—the automobile workers, teamsters, miners and steelworkers—the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Congress of Hispanic-American Citizens and many others. It is still too soon to judge how effective the campaign in support of the amendment will be.  

In spite of all the difficulties facing the movement, it was precisely in these difficult years that it grew to the largest dimensions. The number of NOW members exceeded 150,000 and the National Women's Political Caucus is also growing. It now has branches in all states and recently formed Democratic and Republican party caucuses. It is extremely significant that the League of Women Voters, the American Association of University Women and several other organizations which have long served as something like exclusive clubs for women from the privileged social groups joined the struggle for women's equality in the 1970's.

It is essential that the influence of working women's organizations be strengthened and augmented and that their social base be broadened and democratized. These organizations are capable of leading the movement to new frontiers and raising it to a qualitatively higher level, although they now subscribe to the feminist ideology, which is impeding the attainment of this objective. The position of the labor unions, which, as mentioned above, have been increasingly active in the struggle for women's rights, is equally important.

One important result of the 1970's was the consolidation of the feminist movement's ties with antiracist forces and the organizations leading the struggle for civil rights. Today they are increasingly likely to unite in a struggle against the Republican administration's economic policy.

One of the great services performed by the women's movement was its active participation in the struggle for peace and international detente and against the arms race and the danger of nuclear war. Progressive American women have always taken the lead among the advocates of peace: This is attested to by their active participation in the antiwar movement during the years of the war against the Vietnamese people. Now that militaristic circles in the United States are trying to train the public to consider the possibility of "limited" nuclear war, women's contribution to the struggle for peace is of special significance. Throughout the 1970's, women's organizations and average Americans invariably took part in all antiwar campaigns—against the B-1 bomber, against the Trident strategic system and against the MX missile. Objections to the neutron weapon and to President Reagan's decision to deploy additional American medium-range missiles in Europe are being voiced on a mass scale.

American women, along with the women of other countries, especially the Europeans, are becoming more actively involved in the mass movement being launched on our planet against the arms race and for peace and international security.

FOOTNOTES

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 13 October 1981.

3. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 13 October 1981.


6. ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, 30 July 1981.

7. THE WASHINGTON POST, 1 October 1981.

8. Ibid., 15 June 1981.


12. In 1970, 43 percent of all adult American women were hired workers, but the number has now risen to 51 percent, representing 33 and 42 percent of the labor force respectively (NEWSWEEK, 19 May 1980).

13. Around 70 percent of these new jobs are in the service industries. The number of new jobs created in restaurants and fast-food enterprises, in particular, exceeded the number in the automotive and steel industries (UAW WASHINGTON REPORT, 20 February 1981, p 3).

14. Around 80 percent of all working women are in these traditionally "female" occupations.

15. "ERA and Minority Women," p 1; FORD FOUNDATION LETTER, 1 April 1981.


17. Around 11 percent of all the miners hired in 1973 were women (FORD FOUNDATION LETTER, 1 April 1981).

18. In 1978 women represented 16 percent of the workers at Ford automobile plants, but in 1979 the figure dropped to 12.3 percent. This process continued in 1980: The figure dropped another 2 percent. In 1978 there were 12,000 women blue-collar workers at the plants of the Chrysler company, but in 1980 the number was cut in half and dropped to 6,373 (GUARDIAN, 5 November 1980).


22. NATIONAL NOW TIMES, September 1981.

23. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 13 October 1981.

24. Ibid.


26. Ibid.

27. According to a Gallup poll, 63 percent of all respondents supported the 27th amendment in August 1981, and CBS and NEW YORK TIMES polls conducted in spring 1980 and 1981 produced results of 51 and 57 percent respectively. What is more, even 47 percent of the conservatives were in favor of the amendment (the 1981 poll). More than 52 percent of the Republicans support it, according to the data of Republican public opinion analyst Bob Teter (WOMEN'S POLITICAL TIMES, August 1981; CBS NEWS/THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 1981, p 22).


29. Ibid., 1 June 1981.

30. DAILY WORLD, 22 September 1981.

31. Most Americans believe that women should have the right to make their own decisions about family planning and about the cessation of pregnancy with minimal risk. This view, according to the data of a CBS and NEW YORK TIMES poll, is held by 63 percent, including 55 percent of the people who call themselves conservatives (CBS NEWS/THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 1981, p 22).


34. The ratification of the 27th amendment is still an extremely complicated issue. In the first place, rightists are disputing the legality of Congress' decision to extend the ratification deadline--from 22 March 1979 to 30 June 1982. In the second place, the validity of the results of second ballots in a number of states (Tennessee, Idaho, Nebraska and others) which revised their initial positive decisions, is unclear. If the amendment should be ratified on time—that is, before the middle of 1982—the rightists plan to protest it in the Supreme Court (CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, 28 June 1980, p 1813).

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ALLIANCES REDEFINED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 13-23

[Article by A. I. Utkin: "The Question of Allies in U.S. Foreign Policy"]

[Text] From the very beginning of this year, U.S. relations with America's chief allies, especially the members of the NATO bloc, have been a sore issue. After announcing so-called sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union and launching an anti-Soviet, anticommunist campaign involving all of the U.S. mass media, Washington resorted to exerting the strongest pressure—reminiscent of the "Marshall Plan" days—on the Western European states for a show of "solidarity." On 11 January U.S. Secretary of State Haig literally ordered the foreign ministers of the NATO countries, who were present at a special session convened by Washington in Brussels, to issue statements about "the events in Poland" and unceremoniously demanded that they "reconsider all future economic and trade relations with the USSR." This was followed by an entire series of conferences of the Western countries throughout the month of January, at which time Washington spokesmen continued to insist that their allies curtail trade and economic relations with the USSR, and not verbally but in fact. For example, on 19 and 20 January this matter was discussed in Paris in the Coordinating Committee for the Control of Exports to the Socialist Countries (COCOM; its members are the NATO countries and Japan), and on 25 and 27 January it was discussed at special sessions of the council of permanent representatives of the NATO countries.

These facts testify that the present U.S. administration is fully determined to use the North Atlantic alliance as leverage to force the allies to act according to U.S. wishes in international affairs. There is certainly nothing new about this.

The Western Europe of the 1980's, however, has a stronger economy and has experienced—in the 1970's—the beneficial effects of detente and the all-round development of cooperation by countries of the continent, including various contacts with the socialist countries, especially after the Final Act was signed in Helsinki, and is obviously interested in the preservation of detente and in the expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation. Even England, as Lord Carrington, the British foreign secretary, announced, believes that the economic sanctions "are not that good an idea" because "they might harm us more than they harm the USSR." French Foreign Minister C. Cheysson said that France did not plan to reduce the volume of its trade with the USSR. Furthermore, on 23 January—that is, after Washington...
had announced its sanctions—Gaz de France, the French state-owned company, signed an agreement with the Soviet Soyuzgazeksport foreign trade association on the delivery of 8 billion cubic meters of Soviet natural gas to France each year for 25 years, beginning in 1984.

Unequivocal announcements that Bonn also had no intention of renouncing existing agreements with the USSR, including the recent major agreement on shipments of Soviet gas, were made by FRG government officials. At the end of January, French Prime Minister P. Mauroy and FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt met in Bonn, and the resulting talks indicated that neither country approved of the policy of sanctions or, in general, of the departure from the policy of detente and cooperation.

Observers noted long ago that signs of important changes in the Reagan Administration's policy toward the allies had been apparent ever since the inauguration. The "trilateral" concept, which was advertised by the Carter Administration as official policy, might not have been completely rejected as yet, but it has, in any case, been considerably modified—primarily with regard to the return to the policy of "twisting the arms" of the allies. Recent events have shown, however, that this is no longer an easy task for Washington, and it has had to seek other means and methods.

A better understanding of existing and imminent changes in U.S. policy toward the allies requires a brief review of the history of the "trilateral" concept and its results, which have reduced (and might continue to reduce) the significance of this approach as the main U.S. policy line in relations with the allies.

The Evolution of the Trilateral Approach

The adoption of the "trilateral" concept as the fundamental basis and operational plan of allied politics was a necessary process. It began to take shape after an extremely fierce battle within the American ruling class. The initial opposition to the concept was connected with the reluctance of the ruling American elite to "make room" for Western Europe and Japan, lay the bases for equal relations and accomplish the forced but smooth transition from a superior position to more balanced dialogue and cooperation. In essence, a battle was going on within the United States in the first half of the 1970's between the advocates of two approaches to the allies: The first, tougher approach was aimed at the full use of U.S. economic, military and political advantages whenever immediate dividends could be derived from short-term military alliances; the second, which took into account current interests as well as the danger of alienating the allies in the future, proposed that partial concessions and compromises be made today to serve as a foundation for more stable and more advantageous relations with the United States' closest allies in the years and decades ahead. This second approach, which had the blessings of D. Rockefeller (financial) and of H. Kissinger and Z. Brzezinski (ideological), grew out of "Atlanticism" and was called the trilateral approach because the main lobby of this current in the United States was the Trilateral Commission, whose activities (from 1973 on) were based on the belief that simultaneous and concerted action by the United States, Western Europe and Japan in current global matters would be possible and effective.

There is hardly any need to provide detailed evidence of the fact that the bloc of D. Rockefeller, H. Kissinger, Z. Brzezinski and such neophytes as then Georgia
Governor J. Carter, was guided by the interests of preserving America's command position among the developed capitalist countries. Proceeding from the assumption that the combined challenges and problems facing the three centers of present-day imperialism were greater and more pressing than the combined conflicts within the U.S.-Western Europe-Japan triangle, the advocates of trilateral convergence portrayed all forces outside the three centers of imperialism as a single and uniting factor of "hostile encirclement"—hostile to the bases of bourgeois democracy, capitalist enterprise, liberal trade and Western civilization.

In the second half of the 1970's the search for a united trilateral approach to world affairs was not portrayed as one of the possible methods of U.S. maneuvers in the capitalist world, but essentially as the only alternative to increasing polycentrism and the consequent restriction of American possibilities. "The time has come," wrote Johns Hopkins University Professor G. Liska, "to decide whether the consolidation of American strength should be accomplished primarily through the reduction of the geographic zone of influence or if it should be institutional, presupposing the revision of previous standards of sovereignty and autonomy. The new consolidation of empire according to the institutional principle would require significant changes in the functioning of the Atlantic alliance."¹ Liska insisted (and many agreed with him) that the decline of the British Empire began when it was unable to share responsibility with its dominions and that the same fate awaited the United States if it could not quickly delegate some of its prerogatives to its chief allies—the Western European countries and Japan. Viewing the entire capitalist world as a field for the application of American foreign policy, he divided the unofficial American empire into two zones: Western Europe and Japan, representing its "main elements," and the Afro-Asian-Latin American bloc, representing the "periphery."²

In the view of the apologists for the "trilateral" approach, strong U.S. positions in Western Europe are the main prerequisite for U.S. leadership in the capitalist world as a whole. Many of them imply that the duration of the United States' "imperial reign" will depend on Western Europe and Japan.³ This is the reason for their appeals to consolidate the center and establish stronger ties with the chief elements of the "empire," and this is the reason that they recommend that the United States make concessions and even some sacrifices. The ideologists of trilateral convergence insisted that political and military concessions were particularly important. For example, in the sphere of politics, they recommended broader and more intense consultations with the closest allies and more consideration for their specific interests. In the military sphere, they advised broader joint military programs, the augmentation of military budgets strictly according to plan and the allocation of a larger share of armament production to the allies after weapon systems had been standardized.

Some measures were also planned for the economic sphere. For example, the alleviation of competitive pressure was proposed at the end of the "Tokyo Round" and a mutual understanding was to be established within the West during the course of talks with the developing countries (the "North-South" dialogue).

When the Carter Administration chose the "trilateral" approach, it tried to "submerge" or ignore the issue of Soviet-American relations, treating it as a secondary matter and assigning it lower priority than intra-Western relations. The
significance of the annual forums of the "big seven"—meetings of the heads of state and government of the seven most highly developed capitalist countries for the purpose of informational exchange, consultations and the coordination of positions—was virtually a universally recognized fact. Some results (although extremely contradictory ones) were attained at the talks on the reduction of trade restrictions (the "Tokyo Round"), which ended in 1979. Nevertheless, the three imperialist centers could not stop centrifugal tendencies in the capitalist world.

During the 4 years that the Carter Administration adhered to the trilateral approach, it encountered significant difficulties. In brief, no effective system of intergovernmental consultations was ever established. The U.S. military-industrial complex did not want to equip American armed forces with Western European weapons and this impeded the standardization of weapons within NATO. The 15-year program for the modernization of the military bloc, adopted at a NATO Council session in 1978, came into conflict with the economic difficulties of the Western European countries and came to a halt. The conclusion of the "Tokyo Round" was not followed by the renunciation of non-tariff restrictions and protectionism in agricultural trade. Despite the energetic lobbying of such organizations as the Trilateral Commission and the U.S. Atlantic Council, Washington was unable to involve its chief allies in strategic debates and share related responsibilities with them. Although part of the U.S. ruling class applauded the strengthening of ties with the Western European allies and Japan, there were no means of their reinforcement. In general, Washington was not ready to make any real compromises, and this effectively cancelled out the possibility of a closer alliance between the United States and the capitalist powers in Western Europe, and even Japan.

Recently, an increasing number of serious analysts in the United States have said that the trilateral system (as a U.S.-dominated alliance) is a myth of the past. Now that the Western Europeans and Japanese are seeking separate solutions to a number of regional problems, the most the United States could expect to accomplish, the critics of the trilateral concept say, is to merely slow down the self-determination process in Western Europe and moderate the Europeans' attempts to defend their own interests and views when they conflict with the American position. "As the powers making up the allied group gain more influence (for example, as they acquire more economic strength), the leader will have to make greater concessions," critical political scientists write. "These concessions will undermine the leader's dominant position. This will start a complicated, potentially contradictory cycle: Concessions intended to maintain the effectiveness of the system could undermine the influence of the leading power, which is in itself the main pillar supporting the system." This group of disillusioned "Atlanticists" believes that "in many respects, NATO has outlived its political usefulness as a necessary military alliance."5

The failure to "Atlanticize" Western Europe has become almost a compulsory topic in works by the most prominent analysts of American-Western European relations in the United States. "The vision of an Atlantic Europe, which was already illusory even in the 1950's, later led to the overestimation of American potential and the incorrect interpretation of European interests. Both of these facts began to be recognized in the United States in subsequent years.... Politically, Western Europe did not follow the U.S. lead, as Washington had hoped. In short, the days of the great Atlantic design are over,"6 the anthology "Atlantic Community in Crisis" notes.
An unexpressed "grudge" against the European allies can be heard in the following words by American General T. Milton: "We must remember that although we are the allies of our European partners, they are not our allies unless their own safety is at stake. NATO is never involved when our interests are threatened outside the narrow bounds of the alliance. If the United States alone should be threatened, the other NATO countries will quickly focus on their own national interests and the United States will be abandoned, alone and unaided, and even, as was the case with the war in the Middle East in 1973, without passive cooperation. It seems obvious that we will have to conclude some new agreements in coming years and seek the help of new forces outside the bounds of NATO." 7

These statements suggest that American political and military theorists are growing increasingly dissatisfied with the Western European countries as allies. Although it would be a gross oversimplification to say that inter-Atlantic relations have no objective basis, as the social solidarity of U.S. and Western European ruling circles is still the pivotal point of the alliance, it is clear that even known "Atlanticists" are suggesting a search for additional reserves in the sphere of allied diplomacy to broaden and strengthen the spectrum of U.S. ally relations.

The Middle East crisis provides one example of the divergence of U.S. and Western European views. The European Economic Community essentially favors an approach that would lead logically to the recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In the middle of November, U.S. Secretary of State Haig leveled some extremely harsh remarks at the chairman of the EEC Council of Ministers, English Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, who had expressed his willingness to meet with PLO leader Y. Arafat. He recognized the need for the PLO's participation in the process of Middle East regulation and expressed doubts about the American plan to create "peace-keeping forces" in the Sinai. The U.S. Secretary of State publicly described his English colleague's position as "senseless." The main EEC countries have firmly disagreed with the U.S. plan, which would cut Western Europe off from its source of energy and its largest market. In this case, just as in many others, objective considerations turned out to be more important than Atlantic solidarity.

This indicates the critical state of "Atlanticism" and the doubts about the tri-lateral approach. From the standpoint of American political science, the United States must now seek a form of relations with the allies in which it would retain its leading position among these favored allies and simultaneously establish a closer bridgehead for the exertion of pressure on more distant targets of its foreign policy.

The comparison of anticipated and desired results with actual accomplishments led to the gradual growth of quite significant opposition within the United States to the "presentation" of equal rights to Western Europe and Japan. The dissatisfaction of the masters of the American market—the American monopolies—with the encroachment upon their positions within America merged with the dissatisfaction with the behavior of the allies and with the loss of faith in them. There was a mutual fear—on the part of the United States and on the part of its main allies—of losing restrictive methods of control and of being plunged into uncontrollable events as a result of hasty convergence.

The futility of deliberate attempts to denigrate the importance of Soviet-American relations deserves special mention. In particular, this caused
considerable friction in the relations between the United States and its allies, who are less inclined to ignore the East-West connection.

Forces opposing the trilateral concept found support primarily within the right wing of the Republican Party, where the tradition of regarding the Western European allies with suspicion can be traced from B. Goldwater to R. Reagan. This led to the reinforcement of political forces which were far removed from the traditional "Atlanticism" of the northeastern establishment.

The new approach to the allies that is now taking shape in the United States and the search for additional ways of securing a leading position among them reveal a tendency to not confine the circle of strategic planning to the North Atlantic zone but to include other regions as well. This does not mean that the Atlantic approach is being replaced with something new, but that additional efforts are being made to mobilize old and potential allies in regions which had become more important to the United States by the beginning of the 1980's.

There is no question so far that the cornerstone of postwar American foreign policy, the alliance with Western Europe, is still supported without reservations by American foreign policy theorists. But whereas the "Atlanticists" were once unanimous in their views (or, in any case, there were certain basic ideological premises they all shared), there is now a broader range of concepts adhered to by the theorists of this current, indicating that it has suffered some erosion.

The Concept of the Continental Alliance

The policy of uniting clients and allies in the Western Hemisphere around the United States is a solid tradition in American diplomacy: the Monroe Doctrine, the Rio de Janeiro Pact and the Alliance for Progress. In the 1960's, however, the idea of establishing special ties between the United States and its next-door neighbors was regarded by American political scientists as an archaic concept, as something outdated and as a slightly enlarged version of the permanently discarded idea of "Fortress America."

However, the difficulties in interrelations with favored allies and the increasing importance of Canada and Mexico in the 1970's put the issue of the continental alliance on a new plane. The idea of developing a system of special relations with the United States' two closest neighbors--Canada and Mexico--took shape throughout the last decade and had acquired fairly influential supporters by the beginning of the 1980's. It is supported by such prominent figures in American politics as Governor Brown of California and former Secretary of the Treasury Connally.

The idea of a U.S. "return" to the Western Hemisphere and the assignment of priority to alliances with the Latin American countries became extremely popular. For example, the states of South America, especially Mexico, Panama and Brazil, head the list of priority zones, indicating the locations where American diplomacy must concentrate its efforts, in a study by a group of American generals. The oil region of the Middle East is in second place, and Western Europe and Japan came in third.

It is not difficult to believe that the appeal of the Western Hemisphere countries to the United States stems primarily from the acute complications in the raw material
supplies of the capitalist world in the 1970's. The significance of the United States' neighbors directly to the north and south, with their vast territories and exceptionally sizeable quantities of resources, grew in proportion to the difficulty of acquiring access to world sources of raw materials.

The discovery of large oil deposits in Mexico and Canada forced U.S. ruling circles to remember the "eternal bonds" of American-Canadian and American-Mexican friendship. "Mexico is one of the most important countries in the world to us," stressed then Secretary of State C. Vance, for example, in October 1979.11 When President Reagan addressed the Canadian parliament in March 1981 during his visit to Canada, he said that the United States "has no better friend than Canada."

The desire for stronger mutual ties already has solid material grounds. The two neighbors not only represent colossal reservoirs of strategic raw materials and a large and growing market for U.S. goods, but also offer significant opportunities for the investment of capital: American capital investments in Canada exceed 40 billion dollars; in Mexico they account for 70 percent of all foreign capital investments.12 Canada accounts for 16 percent of all U.S. foreign trade and is the United States' main trade partner. Around 750,000 people in America are engaged in the production of goods exported to Canada. The importance of this fact became quite apparent during the debates of the 1970's and 1980's. In 1979 the United States purchased 80 percent of the oil exported by Mexico (in 1980 the figure dropped to 65 percent, but the physical volume increased). It is also significant that American automotive companies are closing plants in the United States and opening branches in Mexico, motivated by the lower cost of Mexican labor.

Therefore, relations with neighboring countries have become much more important to the United States in recent years. This served as the basis for the birth and circulation of ideas about the establishment of fixed and regulated relations within the bounds of the North American continent as a response to the definite orientation of the EEC toward the Mediterranean and Africa and Japan's increased interest in the ASEAN countries and the Pacific zone, as well as the regrouping of forces within the United States, resulting in the growth of the proportional importance and influence of Texas, Florida and California (connected directly with Mexico) and some northern states which operate mainly with a view to the Canadian market and Canadian raw materials.

The Reagan Administration has displayed great interest in the idea of regulating relations with North and Central American countries more precisely. Even before the inauguration, President Reagan met in El Paso with Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo, and after he took office he went to Ottawa. This was the first Canadian visit by a U.S. President in the last 9 years. The President's national security adviser publicly announced in spring 1981 that "one of President Reagan's primary objectives in foreign policy is the improvement of relations with Canada and Mexico. Nowhere is it written that his primary goal should be a trip to Europe."13

During the Canadian visit in March 1981, certain steps were taken to strengthen relations between the two countries (the agreement on the united North American air defense system was extended for 5 years, as was the agreement on the social security coverage of citizens of one country working in the other). When President Reagan addressed the Canadian Parliament, he stressed his approval of the plans to
build the Alaskan pipeline through Canadian territory and for pollution control. The American side promised to offer more military contracts to Canadian firms.

According to reports by White House staff members in March 1981, the American leadership is planning to organize North American summit meetings involving President Reagan, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau and Mexican President Lopez Portillo. The possibility of such meetings was discussed during Reagan's talks with the Mexican president at the beginning of 1981 and during his Canadian visit in March 1981. The American President has proposed the conclusion of a North American treaty during the course of future meetings. He views this as a way of strengthening the position of the United States in this region.

Judging by all indications, the more active continental policy not only indicates a desire to regulate relations with neighbors in the north and south, but also represents an attempt to effectively influence such Latin American countries as Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela. It would be difficult not to view Ronald Reagan's Mexican policy as some kind of "proving ground" to test Washington's approaches to centrifugal forces in the Western Hemisphere. They are intended to curb the desire of some countries, especially Brazil and Argentina, to be less dependent on the northern giant and to diversify foreign political ties by means of contacts with Western Europe and Japan and special policy in other areas (the Middle East and Africa). In this sense, Reagan's continental policy represents a reaction to the loss of U.S. positions in the Western Hemisphere during the 1960's and 1970's (this was reflected in the penetration of Latin America by Western European capital, Japan's trade expansion in this region, Washington's loss of traditional armament markets and the alienation of military regimes during Carter's term in office).

Of course, it would be wrong to assume that the United States believes it would be expedient to exchange Western European ties for traditional contacts within the two Americas: The centers of world gravity for the United States moved across the ocean long ago. However, the idea of conducting relations with allies on the basis of a system of concentric circles is quickly gaining popularity within the American ruling elite: First the ties with neighbors in North America would be strengthened, then the sparks of separatism in the Western Hemisphere would be "extinguished" and then, on the basis of these new and more favorable pan-American surroundings, the United States could begin to deal with more distant allies. This aspect of the Reagan Administration's ally policy is quite clearly reflected in the cultivation of "friendship" with next-door neighbors, in the purposeful "clarification of relations" with Brazil and Argentina, in the ostentatious courting of Venezuela and in the reinforcement of contacts with military and semimilitary regimes in Central America. At any rate, it would be difficult to deny the fact that the arrogance of the Nixon era and the bombastic moralizing of Carter's day have been replaced by energetic efforts to strengthen ally relations with Latin America.

It is obvious that there are still some extremely sizeable obstacles standing in the way of a North American continental alliance. The main one is the disproportionate political and economic importance of the partners. Although Canada and, in particular, Mexico are greatly tempted by the possibility of the guaranteed access of their raw materials to the American market with its virtually unlimited capacity, and although some forces in these countries are hoping that the freer flow of technology from the United States might strengthen their own national economy,
neither Canada nor Mexico is completely convinced that the benefits of an exclusive alliance with the United States outweigh the drawbacks. Furthermore, they are striving to increase the number of their political and economic partners and to diversify their composition by turning to Europe, Asia, Latin America, Australia and, to an increasing degree, the socialist countries. The formation of a strictly regulated continental alliance of any type is also being impeded by the conflicting views and interests within the American leadership, where the competing sides are quite influential.

All of this has diminished the enthusiasm of the "continentalists" and has greatly impeded the implementation of these plans.

The 'Pacific Community' Doctrine

In the second half of the 1960's, when the United States escalated the war in Vietnam and other countries of Indochina, the idea of considerably strengthening interrelations with Pacific countries began to make the rounds in the American political elite. It was not just the temporary need for guaranteed communications and organized technical support for half a million soldiers that made this type of alliance appealing to the United States. In the 1960's and 1970's the top place among America's trade partners was taken by the Pacific giant, Japan, and more than 10 other countries in the Pacific basin established solid contacts with the American market and the American monopolies. One of the main forums where this idea was "aired" was the Pacific Conference on Trade and Development in Canberra in 1980, which was attended by representatives of the academic community as well as U.S. officials, particularly Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs R. Holbrooke. This resulted in the idea of the "Pacific Community" (American political scientists use various terms to refer to this kind of regional group--the "Pacific organization for trade and development," the "Pacific free trade zone" and the "Pacific economic community"). This foreign policy aim is firmly rooted in U.S. history.

By the beginning of the 1980's several new economic factors had come to light, and U.S. ruling circles could not afford to ignore them, regardless of how strong their Atlantic (or other) regional sympathies and affiliations might be. It is an established fact that the Pacific region now accounts for more than 40 percent of all U.S. foreign trade, and in 1978 the volume of trade with Asia surpassed commodity turnover with Europe for the first time in American history (it increased from 18.7 billion dollars in 1970 to 76.6 billion in 1978). Considering the fact that the economic growth rates of America's main partners in Asia surpass Western European rates, it is a reasonable assumption that this balance will continue to shift in Asia's favor. In addition to all other considerations, a privileged position in the Pacific basin would, according to U.S. plans, permit the use of seabed resources here, which have already caught the eye of such powerful monopolies as United States Steel, Kennecott Copper and Lockheed.

The belief that the 1980's and 1990's will be the "era of Asia and the Pacific" is fairly widespread in the United States. Advocates of the idea of the "Pacific Community" have rallied round the Center for East-West Studies in Hawaii, the Brookings Institution in Washington and new university centers on the West Coast. By the beginning of the 1980's there were many political scientists who believed
that the creation of a consultative organ, made up of representatives of around 15 Pacific countries, would be the first step toward the most promising way of securing U.S. political and economic interests. More and more American political scientists are now inclined to believe that the best solution consists in combining the rapidly growing economies—with the highest growth rates in the capitalist world—of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the ASEAN countries and the boundless resources of Australia, Canada and New Zealand with the strength, capital and technology of the United States.

Plans for the closer interaction of the economies of five developed countries—the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—and seven developing states—Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore (South Korea is sometimes added to these seven)—are becoming more popular.

In connection with this, American political circles are now underscoring the fact that if the energetic trade offensive of the Asian countries cannot be counteracted by means of import restrictions and protectionism, the alternative will have to be some kind of organizational form of relations with these countries, envisaging, firstly, the more "disciplined" behavior of Asian firms in the United States and, secondly, the coordinated redirection of "surplus" imports to other regions (particularly Western Europe).

A report prepared for the U.S. Library of Congress Research Service, made public by Yale University. Professor H. Patrick, proposes the creation of an organization for Pacific trade and development (OPTAD), modeled on the OECD, as "useful organ for the restoration of U.S. economic influence in the Pacific zone." 16 It also discusses the proposal of a committee for Pacific cooperation, as well as task forces on specific problems, whose conclusions would be turned over to the committee, after which the committee would distribute them to the member governments.

The supporters of the "Pacific Community" idea in the capitol include Chairman L. Wolff of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, who has founded an association for the promotion of the Pacific Community. Chairman J. Glenn of the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs has also become more active in this area. 17 Former U.S. Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger has turned out to be another supporter. It is known that R. Allen, President Reagan's former national security adviser, also favors the creation of this community. The platform adopted by the Republican Party in July 1980 stressed the need to "restore a strong role for America in the Pacific and Asia."

This is probably the first time since the war that there are no unconditional apologists for "Atlanticism" among the President's closest advisers (as H. Kissinger and Z. Brzezinski were in the last three administrations). In part, this reflects the weaker position of the pro-Atlantic northeastern establishment. "After decades of retreat and hesitation," U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT remarked, "the United States has taken the offensive in Asia, armed with the "Reagan Doctrine."" 18 One of the goals of this doctrine is the creation of a coalition with Japan, the PRC, the ASEAN countries and South Korea. In this way, Reagan is putting an end, as it were, to the "post-Vietnam era" and has started to weave a new network of alliances in Asia.
There is no question that there are many obstacles impeding the "turn toward Asia." Nevertheless, the idea of the "Pacific Community" is being actively discussed and is acquiring more and more supporters—as an important additional diplomatic front if not as an alternative to Atlantic hypnosis.

The postwar globalism of U.S. foreign policy was essentially based on the priority of a single region—Western Europe. This priority was underscored by Washington even when the United States was fighting two wars in Asia. Now the situation is changing in some respects. The political climate within the United States is changing. American political scientists, who construct theories to support diplomatic maneuvers, are searching for the best way of relying on favored partners for the reinforcement of U.S. positions in the world and for the pursuit of an extremely anti-Soviet line and a policy of domination and authoritarianism in the developing countries.

The shifting emphasis in ally relations obviously reflects some loss of influence by the northeastern establishment, which has traditionally set the tone of U.S. foreign policy but has now had to make way for western and southern segments of the American ruling class, whose influence and power have grown considerably.

It is too early to attach less importance to "Atlanticism" as the basis of current U.S. policy in the choice of allies. The United States' relations with Western Europe are still the pivotal point of its policy in the capitalist world, and Washington's NATO allies are its most important partners. However, new concepts which emphasize the need for expanded U.S. positions in other regions are taking their place alongside the policy of strong "Atlanticism." In general, American foreign policy theorists would prefer to have mutually supplementary, rather than mutually exclusive, relations with chief allies. This is why the popular ideas of the "new continentalism" and "Asian community" are often portrayed in the United States as an addition, and not an alternative, to exclusive relations with Western Europe. There seems to be no question, however, that forces prepared to pursue a much more active foreign policy in new areas are taking shape in the U.S. academic and political communities.

FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., p 271.


4. For more about the meetings of the Western leaders, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 9, 1979; No 9, 1980; for more about the "Tokyo Round," see No 8, 1979—Editor's note.


8. TIME, 8 October 1979, p 37.


11. TIME, 8 October 1979, p 33.

12. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 11, 18 January 1981. It must be said that both Mexico and Canada rely primarily on the U.S. market in foreign trade. The bilateral trade between the United States and Mexico in 1980 was more than triple the 1975 volume, reaching 27.7 billion dollars. Canadian and Mexican trade with the United States accounts for 70 percent of their commodity turnover (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 6 July 1980).


16. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 26 September 1980.

17. Ibid., 22 August 1980.


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CSO: 1803/10
COMPARATIVE SOCIOECONOMIC FORECASTS OF AMERICAN FUTUROLOGISTS ANALYZED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 24-35

[Article by I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada: "The Future of the United States: Three Consultations"]

[Text] General discussions of contemporary American futurology usually name the works of Daniel Bell, Herman Kahn, Alvin Toffler and a few other prominent people in this field. This kind of description is correct but inadequate. In the first place, in addition to these "conceptualists"—that is, authors of more or less detailed concepts about the future—there are equally prominent "methodists"—or theorists concerned with forecasting methods (O. Helmer, T. Gordon, J. McHale and others). In the second place, Bell, Kahn and Toffler are, by American standards, "stars" of the first magnitude, but would it be possible to make any judgments about contemporary American political economy, for example, after reading only Galbraith, to draw conclusions about American philosophy only on the basis of the works of Dewey or Sorokin, or assess American sociology after reading only Parsons or Merton? The American futurological galaxy also consists of at least several hundred "stars" of varying brilliance and can only be judged adequately after it has been viewed as a whole.

How should this be done?

The most time-consuming method would consist in a systematic study of the several thousand works (including the new ones published each year) which make up the basic currents of futurology. This is the cardinal method but it has a completely understandable drawback: This would require many years of work by a relatively large group of researchers because it would be impossible for one person to accomplish this task even if he devoted his entire life to it. In contrast to American political economy, philosophy, sociology, psychology and other sciences, American futurology is not being studied specifically by any group of scholars inside or outside the United States, although we believe that the last quarter-century has provided ample grounds for this kind of study.

Another method, a more efficient and economical method although one with more modest results, consists in the systematic study of the leading journals in the field, where summaries (or synopses) of the most significant works are generally published. The leading ones in American futurology are THE FUTURIST,
We have even used this method for an analysis of American scholars' current ideas about the future of the United States.²

Finally, there is a more efficient but probably more difficult method. It consists in studying the materials of the most important scientific conferences in the field, where, presumably, the newest and most meaningful information about the state of this field of knowledge is exchanged. The difficulty of this method does not stem so much from the fact that conference materials are generally not published in full as from the problems involved in separating meaningful information from the "noise" that is generated and compounded by the anachronistic rituals that are characteristic of most of these meetings. The fact is that these conferences, according to a bad tradition, consist less of the exchange of purely scientific information than of various types of pseudoscientific diplomatic rituals, performed for the sake of decorum. Nevertheless, if the researcher knows the essence of the topics discussed and learns to separate the informational "wheat" from the "chaff," conference materials can provide something like a snapshot of the state of a particular field of knowledge at a particular point in time.

This method seems particularly tempting in the case of American futurology because it has a special (and fairly representative) futurological association for the study of alternative futures (the World Future Society),³ which has held three congresses (or assemblies) in the last decade, in 1971, 1975 and 1980, attended by the majority of the most important American futurologists.⁴ By their nature, these conferences have been something like physicians' consultations to discuss the critical state of the patient's health (in this case the patient is the United States, but in the broader sense it is all of bourgeois Western civilization).

The material they provide for the study of predictions about the United States' future is made all the more valuable by the opportunities it affords to trace the evolution of this unique collective expertise over the course of an entire decade and single out the most meaningful predictions for coming decades and, in a number of areas, for even half a century or further into the future.

Let us examine the materials of each of these assemblies.

The World Future Society's first assembly took place in Washington on 12–15 May 1971. It was attended by more than a thousand people, including foreign guests, and consisted of plenary meetings, so-called free (or unofficial) discussion groups and around 50 section meetings on seven general topics: the theory and practice of forecasting and scientific-technical, economic, social, sociocultural and ecological forecasts. Unfortunately, the assembly materials were not published in full, but only in the form of the preliminary plan or prospectus, listing the main speakers and notes on each section meeting. The FUTURIST's editors promised to correct the matter later with a report on this assembly, but they never kept their promise. More than 10 of the papers the editors found most interesting, however, were published in six issues of the journal the following year. They indicate the proposed agenda and the actual topics discussed.

The general theme of the first assembly was "Measuring the Future: The Study of Crucial Events and Methods of Transition"—in other words, events capable of
engendering changes in the future, and the methods of adapting to these changes. In line with this, reports were prepared on anticipated and desirable changes—in the sphere of labor and leisure, population and environment, production automation, public health and education, urban development and the mass media, politics and culture, etc. Questions connected with the training of forecasters, forecasting techniques, the history of futurology, criticism of previous forecasts, new global problems and the goals and values connected with them, the development of social utopias and science fiction, the social role of futurologists, the social consequences of scientific and technical progress and other topics were discussed at separate sessions. Apparently, at that time it was still not clear which of these questions would become the main issues and which would remain "forecasting background."

Some idea of how the main discussion topic was to be approached could be gathered in advance from a report prepared by Jan Wilson, "The New Reformation: Changing Values and Institutional Goals." The report ascertains the beginning of a period of change in human values of approximately the same scale as during the Age of Reformation 450 years ago. The author felt that this process would be more important than economic or technical changes and suggested that it would make the 1970's a "decade of doubts, uncertainty, confusion and tension." He was referring specifically to the changing American attitudes toward the great-power policy of the United States (in connection with the war in Vietnam), the glorification of "mass consumption" and technological progress, the "Third World," the emphasis on manufacturing quantities rather than on the "quality of life," the glorification of individualism, etc. The author saw this "new reformation" as a reflection of the law of rising demands, with primary emphasis on self-determination, self-development and self-realization (social and intellectual demands) rather than on self-preservation (physical demands). He did not suggest any new solutions and hoped that the "collective wisdom" of the persons attending the conference would stimulate a search for the truth.5

All of this was completely consistent with the spirit of the new stage in the evolution of American futurology which was beginning at that time, cancelling out the major predictions made by H. Kahn in his book "The Year Two Thousand" (1967) and dispelled the mirages of the recently proclaimed "post-industrial society." This new stage6 was connected with the political upheavals and the social, ecological and other developments of the late 1960's. It was most clearly reflected in A. Toffler's book "Future Shock" (1970). Wilson expressed the same views as the author of this work, but he did not expect a change in futurology as radical as the one "prefaced" by this assembly.

The main aspect of the assembly, which objectively determined the nature of bourgeois American futurology throughout the 1970's, was the report on the Club of Rome's research, conducted (in accordance with a concept worked out by Massachusetts Institute of Technology Professor Jim Forrester) by Dennis Meadows, the head of a research group from the same institute. In fall 1972 it was published in book form under the now famous title "The Limits to Growth."7 The publication of the report was accompanied by some information about the then little-known Club of Rome and its founder, A. Pececi, and a detailed review of J. Forrester's book "World Dynamics,"8 which served as the basis for "The Limits to Growth." The report stated that scientific, technical and social progress throughout the next century
did not seem possible for our planet’s projected population of 14 billion. Due to the limited nature of the planet’s natural resources and to their gradual depletion, population growth would lower the standard of living in the developed Western countries within the next three or four decades. Standards of consumption in the developing countries could not rise to the Western level. It would be highly probable that the developing balance between birth and mortality rates would lead to a catastrophic reduction of the earth’s population.9

These conclusions later created quite a stir throughout the world because they warned that current trends would bring about a global catastrophe for mankind within the next 50 years at most; they are still being discussed in the West.10

It is absolutely amazing that this report did not arouse any particular interest in the specialists at the assembly! It is just as amazing that most of the assembly speakers continued to view the future of the United States and of bourgeois civilization in general through their old rose-colored glasses although the storm clouds of global problems were gathering. The impending crisis, which stunned the capitalist world a few years later, was not foreseen by the persons who assembled at this gathering. The first consultation was not up to par as far as the future of the United States was concerned either: Most of the assembled "physicians," metaphorically speaking, argued about a minor head cold, a few suspected that the patient might die of cancer in the distant future, but no one foresaw an acute heart ailment within a matter of days....

The second assembly took place in Washington on 2-5 June 1975. It was attended by more than 2,800 members of the society and guests. The session reminded many of the previous one, but it was vastly superior in the eyes of researchers because of the collected assembly works that were published.11 The collection consists of the 47 reports judged the most important by the organizational committee. Along with the papers published in the FUTURIST, they provide some idea of what took place at the assembly.

The second assembly met when the crisis was raging. It is not surprising that its theme was worded as "The Next 25 Years: Crisis and Opportunity." The most prominent American futurologists were invited to speak on the first half of the theme (prospects for the next quarter-century) at the first plenary session: R. Amara (director of an institute of futurological studies), D. Bell, T. Gordon, W. Harman (director of the Stanford Research Institute’s Center for the Study of Social Policy), H. Kahn and J. McHale; the speakers who reported on the second half of the theme (the strategy of attaining the desirable future) were L. Brown (director of the Institute of World Policy Studies), J. Forrester, L. Lecht (director of the National Planning Association’s research center), J. Platt and A. Toffler.

The contents of the reports presented by these prominent speakers became widely known quite quickly through the attention-getting books of the past decade. Not long before that, Bell had published "The Coming of Post-Industrial Society" (1973) and completed his work on "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism" (1976). In his report, Kahn had essentially narrated sections of his new book "The Next 200 Years" (1976). Brown had just published "In the Human Interest" and "By Bread Alone" (1974), and other recently published works were Forrester’s "Collected Papers" (1975), Gordon’s "Political Science and the Study of the Future" (1974)
and "Some Thoughts on the Future" (1975), Lecht's "Dollars for National Goals: Looking Ahead to the 1980's" and "Evaluating Vocational Education Policies and Plans for the 1970's" (1974) and Toffler's "The Eco-Spasm Report" (1975), Harman was finishing up "An Incomplete Guide to the Future" (1976), and so forth.12

In essence, the assembly was the scene of one of the general battles between the "techno-optimists" and "ecopessimists," the two main currents of American futurology, and Western futurology in general, in the 1970's. The first continued to rely on the omnipotence of scientific and technical progress, which they expected to help them overcome the difficulties connected with the social consequences of the technological revolution under the conditions of the general crisis of capitalism. The latter expressed doubts about the ability of science and technology to overcome the impending ecological crisis unless there were serious changes in the system of human values and a move toward an absolutely different way of life. The first current was most lucidly and consistently represented at the assembly by H. Kahn, and the second by J. Forrester. The other speakers can be arranged on a scale between the two or, more precisely, closer to one or the other, although their views quite naturally differed considerably in some cases.

Kahn's report contained an appendix with a concise comparison of the views of the "techno-optimists" and "ecopessimists" (the "post-industrialists" and "neo-Malthusians," according to Kahn's terminology) on some major global problems.

The "neo-Malthusians" believe that natural resources will be depleted, there will be "diminishing returns" in the sphere of technological progress, the effectiveness of capital investments will decline, systems of management will grow less effective, the rate of population growth will be catastrophic, as will the growth of pollution-causing industry, the gap between the "rich" and "poor" countries will widen, the futility of continued industrialization and urbanization will be acknowledged and the quality of life will deteriorate. Their conclusion is that global catastrophe will be inevitable within the next century if current trends should continue.

The "post-industrialists" believe that resources can be created with the aid of science and technology and that the rate of technological progress will continue to accelerate, systems of management can and should be improved, there are signs of a move toward stability in demographics and economics, the gap between the "rich" and "poor" countries might narrow and, for this reason, industrialization and urbanization should continue, the quality of life will improve and the world situation also shows signs of improvement.13

In his report, H. Kahn said that our planet has enough resources to cope with any new problems. In his opinion, this will only require the choice of the best policy. He maintained that the countries of North America, Northwest Europe and Japan would essentially have put an end to ecological problems by around 1985 and would move ahead considerably in the resolution of economic and social problems.14 These theses were then developed in his book "The Next 200 Years."

Forrester, on the other hand, said that new scientific and technical achievements could only complicate and aggravate the problems facing mankind until the size of the world population could be stabilized. He associated population growth with the threat of devastating wars and other catastrophic events. The speaker warned
that even the developed Western countries would be affected by these upheavals, especially since their economic development had displayed a tendency toward stagnation and decline. This particularly applied to the United States. In accordance with this state of affairs, Forrester regarded the curtailment of population growth as the key problem "standing in the way of world harmony." In his opinion, the resolution of the energy, food and ecological crises and other global problems will depend precisely on this. His report concluded with an appeal to pay more attention to the social "limits to growth" than to the physical ones, to search for specific local solutions rather than global ones and to choose the ethical, legal, religious, psychological and social approach rather than the economic, scientific, technical or ecological one.15

The basic premises and conclusions of both reports are far from indisputable, particularly now that several years have gone by. Nevertheless, it is significant that the overwhelming majority took Forrester's side and that it was precisely his statements that served as the basis for the preparations for the next assembly, the third.

Before and after the assembly, when the first chapters of A. Toffler's "Eco-Spasm Report" were published in an American periodical and when he addressed the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution, he proposed the institution of state economic planning backed up by long-range forecasts, active social policy (particularly in employment-related matters) and a transfer from "formal democracy" to "participatory democracy" (presupposing the active participation of the population in legislative and administrative matters).16 He regarded the latter as the key issue and made it the subject of his report at the assembly.17 The pertinence of Toffler's proposals in present-day America is obvious, but we are now concerned primarily with his position on the abovementioned "scale of concepts about the future of the United States." It is easy to see that he is one of the "post-industrialists," far ahead of the much more "moderate" Bell and Kahn, although he proceeds in general from the opposite standpoint, close to the previously cited views of Forrester. This illustrates the relative nature of the differences between the currents of American futurology and their common ideological basis.

The views expressed by R. Amara were close to Toffler's. He advocated a new development concept which would give equal consideration to economic and social indicators. Gordon tried to reduce all global problems to a single system. This was one of the first attempts to do this. W. Harman, just as R. Amara, concentrated on the "new paradigm" in approaches to future problems, but he went even further, insisting on the need to "tie in" such categories as "intuition," "mysticism," "psychic perception," "religious experience," etc. Brown built his speech on an attempt to determine the "turning points" in observable trends in global development and to use the network of these points as a forecasting aid. Platt tried to determine the most probable "critical situations" of the 1976-1985 decade and listed the growth of international tension and terrorism, the fierce struggle for oil, the threat of starvation for millions of people in the developing countries, economic catastrophes stemming from the oil crisis, the failure of the developing countries' plans to escape the clutches of underdevelopment and poverty, the growth of the national liberation movement and the establishment of dictatorships as a reaction to this, the problem of distributing natural resources and the mineral wealth of the world ocean, religious differences and the increasing activity of multinational corporations.18
The main speakers displayed a tendency to prefer conceptual constructions of the most general, primarily global nature. Their speeches were not overly specific, particularly as far as the near future in the United States was concerned. Nevertheless, more specific matters were mentioned at the assembly, such as the "family of the future," "national goals and planning," "government and politics," "urban and regional planning" and so forth (although they were not reflected adequately in the materials of the session). The approach taken to these problems can be judged from the forecast for 1976-1985.19

Summing up the results of the second consultation, we must say that there were differences of opinion once again about the state of health of the United States and the capitalist world in general. According to some, the alarming state of the patient's health could be cured with scientific, technical and political medicines. According to others, the state of health was deteriorating and only a radical change in the patient's way of life could stop this process....

It is indicative that the second opinion was the prevailing one, and this was quite apparent at the third assembly.

The third assembly, officially known as the first global conference on future problems, was held in Toronto in July 1980. It was attended by more than 5,000 members of the American and Canadian futurological associations and scholars from 45 countries, including the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In view of its gigantic dimensions (more than 1,000 speeches in almost 400 discussion groups--formal and informal), the assembly was divided into three main currents (or "concerns"), which were then subdivided into specific currents or sections (or "topics").

In the most general terms, the structure of the assembly was the following. First concern: social problems (topics--social psychology and social organization, the food crisis, population settlement patterns and housing problems, public health, value systems and religion, art, leisure and tourism, the transformation of the individual and the planet). Second concern: global problems (natural resources, energy, outer space, the world ocean and the polar regions, science and technology, information and communications, the environment, population). Third concern: problems in social management (social and industrial changes, education, forecasting methodology and techniques, labor and social advancement, the development of business, economics and finance, politics and administration). Besides this, certain general problems which did not fit into the framework of the "concerns" were discussed separately, and there were also informal meetings (or "exchanges of views").

For this assembly, we also have a detailed prospectus and a volume of collected reports, published before the conference began.20

In accordance with the demand for "global thinking," which had been persistently voiced at the previous assembly, and with the proposal that the resolution of future problems be approached with a view to the peculiarities of each separate part of the world, the general theme of the third assembly was "Through the 1980's: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally." This title reflected certain realistic and, we could say, even dialectical trends. It is true that we cannot ignore the general problems facing all mankind, but we also cannot disregard the existence of more than
150 states and significant regional and local peculiarities of economic and social development.

An attempt to integrate all that transpired at the assembly's 400 sessions would serve no purpose due to the abovementioned peculiarities of this kind of scientific conference. A study of the plenary sessions would not help either. The speakers at these sessions were "stars of the first magnitude" (the same L. Brown, H. Kahn, R. Amara and T. Gordon, as well as renowned guests—B. De Jouvenel, R. Jungk, E. Masini, A. Peccei, A. van Dam, A. King and others), but each was allotted no more than 10-15 minutes to address an audience of thousands without any hope of feedback. It is obvious that in this situation they could not say anything significant beyond some words of welcome. This brings us back to the discussion groups, where there was, in essence, a discussion, but most of this discussion was either not recorded or was recorded in forms inaccessible to anyone who did not personally attend the session.

The volume of collected works also presents sizeable difficulties. On the one hand, it contains more than 60 papers covering almost the entire broad range of topics outlined above. On the other, many important speeches were not included in the volume because they were prepared later. The FUTURIST had made up for these omissions to some degree in the previous cases. This time, however, the journal editors apparently put their trust in the volume of collected works and published very few of the materials of the assembly, although they did present a general report, which is certainly of value to the researcher.21

Therefore, after selecting the most characteristic speeches on our topic (the future of the United States), we will attempt to integrate them for the purpose of presenting the positions of the main sides taking part in the assembly debates.

The side of the "optimists" was again represented by H. Kahn and a few other speakers. With the proverbial persistence of the American futurologists, he repeated the major premises of his report at the previous assembly and of his book "The Next 200 Years," developing them in greater detail with the aid of materials from his new book "World Economic Development: 1979 and Beyond," in which he expresses the same views.22

The "pessimists" retained their numerical superiority and made a tremendous effort to lend their concepts a constructive tone. In other words, they tried...to stop being pessimists without taking the side of the "optimists." This was due to something like mental fatigue on the part of the futurologists and, what is more important, their audience, the world public, which had been living for almost a decade under a hail of forecasts about a global catastrophe within the coming half-century. It seemed as though everything that might have been said about it had already been said. It was learned that the human mind was incapable of enduring this kind of stress for long. The public had "grown accustomed" to predictions about the "end of the world" and its reaction took the form of a demand "to see the light at the end of the tunnel," a demand for some kind of tangible means of salvation. The third assembly had to deal with this demand.

Besides this, it is important to remember that even the very pessimism of the American futurologists had lost its purely economic nature by the beginning of the
1980's, in precisely the same way that optimism ceased to be associated only with the expectation of new scientific and technical achievements. Both attitudes were largely determined by the different approaches to the anticipated and desired changes in the entire way of life.

The situation was concisely defined in the introduction to the report on the results of the gathering: "In spite of the profound concern about a great multitude of problems, the general atmosphere of the conference was an atmosphere of unconcealed hope." The same idea was expressed by one conference speaker, Canadian futurologist K. Simmonds: "The chief message of the conference was that the time has come to renounce the now customary negativism, search for hidden opportunities to overcome obvious dangers and make these opportunities available to the general public. Furthermore, a special effort must be made to develop a realistic view of these opportunities."24

What kind of realistic opportunities did American futurologists discover outside the framework of "techno-optimism"?

The origins of a new, as yet largely unformed concept were probably most vividly described by A. Toffler in his report "The Third Wave," which was built on his new book of the same name and turned out to be the key work in the collected papers of the conference.

Basing his arguments on concrete facts, Toffler develops the idea that the technological revolution of our day is a qualitative advance (or "wave") in the history of mankind that far surpasses, in terms of scales and consequences, the first two "waves"—the transition from gathering and hunting to farming and livestock breeding several millennia ago and the industrial revolution a few centuries ago. Within decades, the "third wave" should radically change the human race's entire way of life, and the "dying contemporary world" should be replaced by a "new civilization," a "post-industrial" and "post-imperialist" one, having nothing in common with the "customary state of affairs."

The first signs of a "new civilization," the author stresses, are already visible. They include, for example, the heightened interest in "clean" and renewable sources of energy, the crisis of mass assembly line production and the plans to mechanize, automate and computerize the production process, the desire to create a family of a new type to replace the disintegrating old institution and the design of energy-efficient homes with comprehensive electronics, including "eye-witness impact TV," which will be installed in the home along with video recorders and projectors transmitting information from special electronic "libraries," which will make many trips for business and entertainment purposes unnecessary and will consider enhance the comfort of people at work and in the home. The "new civilization" presupposes radical changes in the system of education, the organization of production and human values, an absolutely new code of ethics and standards of morality and human behavior, the resolute renunciation of the present trend toward the standardization, synchronization and centralization of production and life in general and the refusal to concentrate resources, finances and political power in the hands of a few individuals.

Only the "new civilization," Toffler concludes, can build a bridge between the Scylla of Armageddon, with which the "pessimists" are trying to frighten people,
and the Charybdis of "more of the same," with which the "optimists" are trying to comfort themselves. It can help to "prepare people for the future" and "change the present." But this will require a "different paradigm"—that is, an equally radical change in prevailing views.

Approximately the same views were expressed by almost all of the other main speakers at the conference—B. De Jouvenel, A. Pececi, R. Jungk, E. Masini, W. Harman, R. Amara, J. Platt and others, backed up by a series of articles in THE FUTURIST and other Western futurological journals. All of this indicates that we are dealing here with the "last word" of bourgeois futurologists regarding the near future of the earth and mankind. It is also important to note that several speakers at the conference made interesting and largely critical remarks about methodological and gnosiological aspects of forecasting (see, for example, the report by H. Cleveland from the Aspen Institute of Forecasting and International Relations and others).

At first, the bourgeois futurologists' concept of the "new civilization" seems extremely reminiscent of the anarchistic utopias of bygone days in some specific features. But we must not hasten to draw historical analogies and paste on labels. We must not forget that the bourgeois world is in a state of crisis, is definitely moving toward a catastrophe and is desperately seeking an escape from the clutches of the contradictions that are tearing it apart. This has been acknowledged by almost all leading Western futurologists, who simultaneously represent almost all of the significant currents of contemporary non-Marxist economics, sociology and philosophy. Without these scholars, bourgeois ideology would be confined to the hysterical propaganda written by journalists and would cease to be a serious opponent of Marxism.

There would be nothing easier than to ridicule the impotence of the "new civilization" in the face of the omnipotent military-industrial complex and present-day state-monopoly capitalism and under the conditions of the new round of arms race, launched by imperialism, with its far-reaching consequences for mankind. It would be easy to portray, with some degree of irony, how Toffler's "Third Wave" will be dashed against the rocks of Kahn's "World Economic Development" or to make more jokes about the "patient and doctors" and about how the third consultation again acknowledged that the state of the patient's health was critical and prescribed treatment in a fabulously beautiful sanatorium called the "New Civilization" (but could not give the patient directions on how to get there or tell him who might pay for the trip). However, it is enough to remember the actual state of affairs in the world today, particularly the immediate prospects for social development in the United States and other Western countries, to approach the conference conclusions with the necessary spirit of serious investigation.

We must also remember that the general atmosphere at the assembly was a kind of "enclave of liberalism" in a society dominated by reaction. The American futurologists at this assembly and previous gatherings were precisely the people who are appealing for united effort to solve the global problems facing mankind, for detente, for the establishment of a new world economic order and for the development of cooperation by states with differing social structures. The humanitarian aims of these appeals are obvious. They must be borne in mind when the struggle between reactionary and progressive currents in American futurology is analyzed, because it is precisely this aspect of the matter that is of the greatest scientific interest (and is also extremely constructive).
A. Cornish, the president of the World Future Society and the editor of the FUTURIST, whose report is the concluding paper in the collected works of the conference, published an article entitled "The Great Depression of the 1980's" just before the assembly, where he speculated on the probability of a repetition within the near future of the crisis of 50 years ago, but on a broader scale and with more severe consequences.

A similar article had been written for the same magazine not long before by J. Forrester. His article asked "Does Another Great Depression Lie Ahead?" He argued that the "long wave" of economic growth of the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's had passed its peak and had begun to ebb, and that this would lead unavoidably to mounting depression and crises like the ones in the 1830's, 1890's and 1930's, but of much greater dimensions. Cornish's article was followed by an article by an authority of equal stature in American futurology, S. Edmunds, who reduced the six scenarios of possible U.S. development within the near future, which he had worked out just 2 years before, to the three he found most probable: either financial crisis, or continuous stagnation coupled with inflation ("stagflation") or an attempt to artificially stimulate economic development. It is not surprising that American futurologists are longing more and more for a "new great American dream," which could be an alternative to a "new great American depression" and would serve as the basis for setting priorities for a less dismal future.

Is there any real hope of this? The following data were cited in a recent FUTURIST article. In 1976 less than 4 percent of the employed population in the United States was engaged in agriculture, but even this handful of people received colossai bonuses from the government for the incomplete use of the potential capabilities of their farms because purchasing power precluded the use of "surplus" under the conditions of the capitalist method of production. Less than 30 percent of the population was engaged in industrial production, approximately 17 percent worked in the service industries and more than 7 percent of the able-bodied population was unemployed even then. Only a small percentage of the remaining half of the working-age population was engaged in spiritual production and the overwhelming majority of the rest foisted unnecessary goods on the consumer, occupied various bureaucratic sinecures and either imitated various "occupations" or led an openly parasitical way of life. Unemployment, crime, drug addiction and mass demoralization continued to grow, particularly among youth. By the year 2000, according to the same article, the proportional number of people engaged in agriculture will drop below 2 percent, the figure in industry will drop to 20-22 percent and the figure in the service sphere will drop to around 10 percent. Given the capitalist method of production, it is hardly likely that the number of people employed in education, public health and cultural institutions will rise significantly.

What will the remaining 66 percent—no longer half of the U.S. population, but two-thirds, the overwhelming majority—do? Can we assume that the growth of unemployment, crime and human demoralization will slow down? Can we be certain that a "great depression" will not repeatedly strike America? And what about the "great dream" and the "standard model of the desirable future"?

American futurologists were highly pleased with the results of the third assembly. Without waiting for the customary 5 years to elapse, they made plans to hold their next assembly, the fourth, in Washington on 18-22 July 1982. They also decided on
the general theme: "Communications and the Future." This was supposed to motivate
speakers to discuss one of the main features of the "new civilization"—the con-
siderable augmentation of the importance of the mass media in the life of the indi-
vidual and society, especially the new type of television mentioned above. Lively
preparations are being made for the new assembly and preliminary discussion materi-
als are already being published.

We will wait until summer 1982 and see what the fourth consultation of forecasting
experts can tell us about the future of the United States and the capitalist world.
One thing is already clear: Regardless of how the futurologists describe the "new
civilization," the one which will replace the present one, this "new civilization"
is obviously incompatible with an outdated method of production and social order
and will require the kind of radical social reforms that are dictated by the con-
temporary technological revolution and its social consequences.

FOOTNOTES

1. The last of these journals is ostensibly international, but it is actually
Anglo-American, with an extremely high percentage of its articles written by
American futurologists.


3. This is ostensibly an international association, but in fact it is primarily
American, with branches in all of the states of the union. It publishes
FUTURIST magazine.

4. The third of these assemblies was held in Toronto (Canada) jointly with the
Fifth Annual Conference of the Canadian Future Society and was officially
called the First Global Conference on Future Problems.


6. For more about the evolution of American futurology, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA,


9. THE FUTURIST, No 4, 1971, pp 143-144.

10. For a review of the first five reports of the Club of Rome, including this
one, see I. Bestuzhev-Lada, "Krizis burzhuaznykh kontseptsiy budushchego
chelovechestva" [The Crisis of Bourgeois Ideas—About Man's Future], Moscow,
1979.


35


15. Ibid., No 5, 1975, pp 231-234.


17. Ibid., No 5, 1975, p 224.

18. Some of these reports were included in the collected papers of the assembly and some were published in THE FUTURIST, Nos 3-6, 1974, Nos 1-6, 1975. Some were published in the collected papers and in the journal.

19. For a review of this forecast, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 10, 1980, p 62; also THE FUTURIST, No 4, p 192; No 3, 1975, p 132.


24. Ibid.


27. Ibid.


31. Ibid., No 6, 1978, p 379.

32. Ibid., No 6, 1980, p 12. It is significant that the Reagan Administration is now following the third scenario, although the new round of the arms race certainly cannot be interpreted solely as an attempt to pull the American economy out of the abyss of depression.


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8588
CSO: 1803/10
CAMP DAVID TALKS FAIL TO SETTLE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Moscow SSA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 36-41

[Article by A. K. Kislov: "The Middle East and the Camp David Impasse"]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803/10
HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS SALUTE CONCENTRATION CAMP LIBERATORS IN WASHINGTON

Moscow SSA, EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 42-46

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union H. B. Goffman: "For the First Time Since the War (Bells of Memory)"

[Text] The first international conference of the liberators of the Nazi death camp inmates was held in the capital of the United States at the end of last October. It was attended by delegations from the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, including the USSR. The conference was convened at the initiative of the United States Holocaust Memorial Council.

When I attended this conference in the United States as a member of the Soviet delegation, I learned, much to my regret, that American young people, and even people of middle age, know almost nothing about World War II. I, who fought in the Great Patriotic War, was upset when I was told that, according to the data of the Gallup Institute, 16 percent of all American students do not know "on whose side" the Soviet Union fought, and 9 percent think that the Soviet Union was... on Germany's side.

This lack of awareness, to put it mildly, is being used by the authors of the publications (dozens have been put out in the United States in recent years) implying that there were no victims of Nazism and that all of this has been "invented by communists and liberals." Imagine the state of ignorance of the people who believe these lies!

It was precisely to remind Americans of what actually happened that the Holocaust Memorial Council convened the international conference in Washington.

Addressing conference participants, Elie Wiesel, the chairman of the council, said:

"I cordially welcome you on behalf of my friends who lived through the horrors of the ghettos and death camps. You will never be able to forget what you saw then, just as we will never forget the sorrow, anger and pity we felt. Did you know, could you have realized what your arrival meant to us? Of course, it meant life, but not only life: It meant the return of hope, the belief that waiting is not always in vain, that the solitude of survival and the holocaust are followed by human brotherhood. To us, you—the officers and soldiers of the Allied armies,
represented what inspires and excites people more than anything else: You personi-
fied man's desire for freedom. You brought us living proof that in the struggle
against Hitler's attempts to dehumanize and subjugate people and to establish the
preeminence of fear and terror, people could unite for a common struggle, in the name
of a common cause. When we welcome you today, we repeat what we said to you then:
"Thank you, thank you a thousand times for fighting for the honor and dignity of
the human being."

Conference participants—generals, officers, diplomats, scholars, former members of
the military tribunals who investigated Nazi war crimes, doctors and nurses—were
extremely moved by this speech. Wiesel was himself an inmate of the Buchenwald
fascist death camp and his words brought tears to the eyes of many former concen-
tration camp inmates, and to the eyes of their liberators.

He concluded his address with the following words: "We are all united by a desire
to prevent the victims from being betrayed. They were destroyed once by the Nazis
and they must not be killed again by our failure to remember them."

Speeches were presented by a Soviet general, an American officer, a nurse from
Virginia, a rabbi from the Bronx (a New York neighborhood), a French official and
an English army colonel. One of the participants was John Eisenhower, the son of
General Eisenhower, who fought with his father in Europe.

One of the men who liberated Buchenwald, Leon Baas, a teacher from Philadelphia,
said: "The truth must be told, so that there will be no distortions of history like
the ones perpetrated in the sugar-coated stories about the negro slaves in America,
which essentially imply that they loved the plantation owners."

Baas recalled that it was a mild and sunny spring when he and the other soldiers of
his company, who had come to Europe to fight in the final battle of the war, reached
the city of Weimar. From there they moved on to a spot whose name none of them had
ever heard. It was called Buchenwald. There they saw scenes they would remember
with horror all their lives.

"I saw the living dead," L. Baas said. "The eyes of the inmates had no light in
them. They wore striped clothing and wooden clogs, their heads were shaven and
they were so thin that it looked like their bones could pierce their skin. My
friend glanced into one barracks and then I also looked inside and saw people who
were too weak to sit up in their bunks. I thought: My God, who did this? We
walked along and saw corpses, with their eyes and mouths wide open, stacked up
near the crematorium. Piles of clothing were lying near the crematorium wall. All
of the clothes had been sorted meticulously, with sweaters, shirts, shoes and
children's clothes lying in separate piles. On the way back none of us could talk.
We did not want to. No one could understand how people could have done this and
how other people could have let it happen."

According to Baas, after the war he and other soldiers did not want to remember the
horrors they had seen. They started families, got jobs and "made money." This is
how their lives went. Now, however, they sometimes have to answer young people's
questions. Baas continued: "A student recently asked me the hardest question,
and it woke me up, so to speak. He said: 'Mr. Baas, you have known about all of
this since 1945 and you have never said anything in all that time. Why? I did not know what to tell him. I had simply been preoccupied with myself all that time. Now I think: Leon, you wasted your time. And here is the result: Young Americans do not know what Nazism was and they do not know anything about World War II."

Now Leon Baas wants young Americans to know what he saw with his own eyes. He continued his story:

"A woman who had survived the horrors of Auschwitz asked for my help. She had decided to speak to the students at one school and tell them about everything. The students laughed at her. They simply did not believe her. I went to that school. I told the children that this woman had told them the truth. I was there. I saw it."

After this meeting, Baas began to speak at other schools, telling the students about the Nazi death factories.

"I realized," he said, "that none of us, the liberators, would be around in 20 years or so. Who will tell the children what happened then? Many history books describe slavery as a happy time for the blacks. This must not happen now. This is why I want to tell children everything. As long as I live. I told myself, if you do not do this you will be committing a crime."

On the first day of the conference the WASHINGTON POST printed an article by journalist H. Allen. It told of the work of the special investigations division of the Department of Justice, headed by A. Rajan. This division investigates Nazi criminals now living in the United States. Rajan and his colleagues (there are around 50 of them) have investigated the cases of 216 Nazi monsters. Only 22 have been taken to court so far.

For example, a man named M. Derkach, who now lives in Astoria (New York), has been accused of serving on the auxiliary police force of Hitler's occupation authorities, which regularly participated in executions in the Ukraine. The accused was personally involved in the executions of civilians. According to his testimony, the fascist stooge told the U.S. immigration authorities in 1949 that he was a simple peasant. This executioner's case has been taken to trial. But he is not being tried for the atrocities in which he took part, but only for concealing his service to Hitler from the U.S. immigration authorities.

Rajan himself had this to say about these people:

"They usually say: 'I was not there.' Then we show them their own papers, identifying them as concentration camp guards, and we show them their promotion orders, signed by Hitler. Then they say: 'Yes, I was there, but I only guarded the fence.' We reply that there are live witnesses who saw them near the gas chambers, and then they say: "Yes, this is true, but I was forced to do it.' They heap lies on top of lies, they use every trick to distort the facts and they say that communists are trying to slander them."

According to Rajan, most investigations begin with letters sent to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Many of the letters start out something like
this: "My neighbor is a former Nazi." "We begin to verify the documents, search through archives and encounter horrifying crimes," Rajan said. "We are now investigating the case of a certain Demianchuk, who worked in the gas chamber in Treblinka. One witness told us: "He dragged a little girl out of the police station while she screamed in Polish: "Mama, he wants to shoot me. I want to live!" I ran out in the street and heard a shot. I am a mother myself and I felt so sorry for this child."

We were told that the fascist mongrel Demianchuk had lost the case in court but was appealing it. He is not threatened by a jail cell or hard labor. He only risks the loss of his citizenship, and not even for his atrocities or the blood he shed, but merely because he concealed some details of his biography when he entered the United States. Furthermore, he might not even lose the case if it is tried in a higher court.

In any case, he faces only the prospect of deportation (eviction from the country). As a rule, however, the matter rarely goes as far as the deportation of these individuals.

Here is another typical case. A certain F. Fedorenko served as a lance corporal in the same camp, in Treblinka, and has now taken refuge in the United States. Six Treblinka survivors have testified that they saw this degenerate beat arrested persons with an iron bar and personally shoot them.

And what has happened to him? The Nazi criminal has still not even been deported. The investigator, on the other hand, is the recipient of constant phone calls and threats.

Apparently, even offal like this has some value now that the United States is living through a period of militaristic passions. For example, the American authorities have stubbornly refused to deport the Brazinskis pair, the father and son who shot stewardess Nadezhda Kurchenko when they hijacked a Soviet plane, to the Soviet Union for just retribution.

But let us return to the conference hall. Former soldier Walter Meites is speaking. He walked 400 miles through blood and death from the Rhine to the city of Weimar. He and his fellow soldiers saw prisoner-of-war camps and heaps of corpses. One day his sergeant ordered him to ride to Buchenwald on a truck with some other soldiers.

"What we saw there is best forgotten," he said. "After the war I tried hard to forget it. At first it seemed simple. We lived in Germany for 8 months after the end of the war. We dreamed about going home and finding jobs. We simply tried to take some joy in life. Articles in newspapers and magazines mentioned Treblinka, Dachau and Auschwitz, but my friends and I did not even discuss them. We discussed trivial matters: How we had exchanged a carton of cigarettes for a camera or four cartons for a Volkswagen."

When Meites returned to Chicago he did not discuss the Nazi death camps because he thought that people would not believe him. He rarely remembered the terrible scenes he had witnessed. He now teaches at the University of Maryland and his war souvenirs are packed away somewhere in his basement. A few years ago, however, he

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received a letter from another university, asking him to relate his experiences for an anthology that was being compiled. "I began to think about it," he said. "It would be tragic if we did not learn from experience. And I cannot forget that the German soldiers wore belt buckets inscribed: 'God is on our side.'"

Douglas Kelling, a doctor who was present when Dachau was liberated, recalled:

"When we arrived, the crematorium ovens were still warm and there was a strong smell of burning flesh. More than a hundred corpses were stacked up, like wood, near the ovens. Many were blindfolded and had their arms tied behind their backs. Around 3,000 other bodies lay outside. There were also many corpses on trucks. They had been driven to the crematorium for burning. If I had not seen all of this with my own eyes, I would never have believed it."

The floor was then turned over to Soviet General and Hero of the Soviet Union Vasily Yakovlevich Petrenko, who traveled all the roads of the Great Patriotic War. During the final stage of the war, he held the rank of colonel and commanded a division whose soldiers liberated Auschwitz. But General Petrenko talked about more than Auschwitz. He discussed the hundreds of camps of this kind that the Hitlerites had set up on occupied Soviet territory: in Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Belorussia, the Ukraine and Rostovskaya Oblast. Millions of Soviet people were brutally murdered in these death factories. The Soviet people made countless sacrifices to put an end to fascism forever. Our victory cost us 20 million lives. The United States lost almost half a million people. Is it possible that these sacrifices taught us nothing? Why are certain forces striving for an arms race instead of disarmament and peace? In comparison to modern nuclear weapons, even such death factories as Dachau and Auschwitz seem like mere playthings. After all, a single hydrogen bomb can reduce millions of people to ashes. And will there be any people left on earth at all if a nuclear war should break out? If this kind of war is permitted to start, it is unlikely that there will be anyone left to attend a conference to commemorate its victims.

General V. A. Petrenko, a battle-hardened soldier who had been through the entire war, could not control his emotions when he discussed what he had seen in the hell of Auschwitz. Some of those who attended the conference remember their liberator. Jerzy Zborowski is one of them. This Polish Jew survived Auschwitz by a miracle. If the soldiers of Petrenko's division had been held up for even a day, Zborowski would have been dead when they arrived. The meeting of the Soviet liberator and the Auschwitz survivor was affectionate and joyful. They were photographed and interviewed by newsmen and were shown on American television.

Jerzy Zborowski invited the Soviet delegation to his home. There, where many guests were gathered, the reminiscences continued.

Monroe Erickson, a farmer from South Dakota, said:

"I also have pictures from the concentration camp. I did not look at them for about 20 years because I cry every time I see them. I kept them hidden. But now I have decided to show them to everyone so that new horrors can be avoided."

Farmer Erickson expressed our common beliefs: The crimes of the Nazis and their stooges must be told; everyone must remember them; the crimes against mankind must never be repeated.

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8588
CSO: 1803/10
SECRET SERVICE RESTRICTIONS LIFTED IN UNITED STATES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 46-48

[Article by I. A. Geyevskiy: "A Completely Free Hand for the Special Services"]

[Not translated by JPRS]

REAGAN ADMINISTRATION MOBILIZES FORCES AGAINST SOVIET PROPAGANDA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 48-51

[Article by O. A. Alyakrinskii: "Project 'Truth'—A Throwback to the 'Cold War' Era"]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803/10
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S RESOURCE POLICY JUDGED INJURIOUS

Moscow SHSA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 51-56

[Article by I. G. Vasil'yeva: "The Republican Administration and Problems in the Use of Resources"]

[Text] The start of the Reagan Administration was marked by changes in many important areas of federal government policy, including the areas of environmental protection and resource conservation. As one American magazine ironically remarked, Reagan certainly does not believe that trees pollute the air, but even during the campaign the new President seriously argued that existing environmental and conservation standards were one of the reasons for the country's economic difficulties. Reagan's closest economic adviser, D. Stockman, agrees with him. He has said that many existing environmental standards and programs are unnecessary and even harmful because they lead only to the senseless waste of government funds. He was referring in particular to emission control standards, the standards regulating the installation of air purifiers, the programs controlling the use of dangerous and toxic waste and others.

During the transition period the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), just as all other links of the administrative system, was manned by a commission made up of members of the Heritage Foundation—the "brain trust" of the Republican Party's ultra-right wing. The commission made recommendations regarding the activities of this major American environmental agency under the new administration. The authors of the report sharply criticized the work of the agency and recommended the cancellation of many of its standards and programs. In particular, it said there was no need to attain such goals as "zero run-off" to ensure the purity of rivers and other bodies of water or the elimination of noise pollution. It proposed a shorter list of dangerous and toxic substances, the considerable restriction of EPA activity to control the utilization of waste products and so forth. It was a fairly long time before an EPA director was appointed. Finally, the appointment went to 38-year-old Ann Gorsach, a jurist from Colorado with virtually no experience in environmental protection. In general, the new director is in favor of limited government regulation in this area.

Judging by all indications, the present administration plans to launch the attack on existing achievements in the area of environmental protection in two directions. The first will involve the revision and amendment of existing laws. A bill
envisaging reduced government regulation and stronger congressional control has already been introduced in the Congress. Its adoption will seriously limit the government's ability to take effective steps to protect the environment. The second method will consist in cutting the budgets of certain environmental agencies. For example, Reagan has already proposed cuts in allocations for the EPA and the Council on Environmental Quality. These proposals have not been enforced as yet.

The increasing volume of resources used in the United States is intensifying conflicts between various types of conservation. It has also been accompanied by the exacerbation of ecological problems.

The United States recently came to the realization that the balanced use of resources would depend on a number of factors. Firstly, the development of natural resources will have to be planned. This must be based on an all-encompassing legislative foundation, functioning on the national level and envisaging the appropriate statutes for state and local government. Secondly, there is an urgent need to improve the management of natural resources. Finally, and thirdly, all of this must be accompanied by environmental protection measures. The last condition is exceptionally important. The anthropogenic load on natural systems is constantly growing and the disruption of their ecological balance has already had irreversible effects. Conservation measures have become an essential condition for economic development and they simply cannot be ignored any longer.

It is significant that a number of problems in the sphere of resource utilization can only be solved over the long range. This means that funds invested in a particular area now will produce an economic effect only after the passage of many years. This often places considerable restrictions on the possibility of taking effective measures. In particular, this is the case in the battle against soil erosion. Measures to combat erosion produce no immediate benefits and, for this and other reasons, are not regarded as priority allocation objectives.

In order to augment food exports, the United States is enlarging farming areas without taking the necessary anti-erosion measures. As a result, according to the eloquent testimony of one American expert, twice as much soil is "exported" (or lost) as wheat. The negative effects of this process are often nullified by the use of large quantities of fertilizer to heighten productivity: Crops are put on a "chemical diet."

Even before the inauguration, people were worried that the new President would take a hard line in the area of resource utilization and restrict the influence of conservationists in every way possible. It was assumed that the process of allocating territory for wildlife preserves would be slowed down considerably, logging operations in national forests would increase, the number of licenses issued for mining on federal land would rise, etc.

The validity of all these worries has now been corroborated. The U.S. secretary of the interior is James Watt, whose appointment was sharply criticized by conservationists. President R. Peterson of the National Audubon Society, one of the oldest organizations of American conservationists, stressed that Watt's activity in the past made him an absolutely unacceptable candidate for the office of the "custodian" of the nation's natural resources.
James Watt is the founder and president of an independent branch of the National Legal Center for the Public Interest. This "public" organization was founded in the 1970's by private business and openly announced its intention to fight against environmental legislation. The board of directors of this branch, the Mountain States Legal Foundation, consists of representatives of the largest energy and mining companies—Phillips Petroleum, Amoco, Chevron, Exxon, Shell and others—and they have complete control over the organization's activities. The lawyers employed by the foundation collect and prepare information which discredits the activities of government environmental agencies or at least casts suspicion on them.

The present administration's position on environmental matters will have a considerable impact on the nation's economy. All federal territory, 200 million hectares, is under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. Around 80 percent of all oil-bearing shale deposits, 50 percent of the coal, 35 percent of the uranium and 15 percent of the petroleum are located on federal lands. National forests produce almost 20 percent of the nation's lumber. Water resources are of vital importance, particularly in the West, for many branches of the economy.

Up to the present time the economic development of federal lands has taken two directions—the development of resources and the protection of certain territories with unique ecological, aesthetic and recreational features, for which specific regulations have been established to control their use. These are the national parks, game sanctuaries, wildlife preserves and everglades. Until recently their area was constantly enlarged and new categories were added to the list—scenic rivers, hiking trails, etc. The felling of trees was generally restricted on these lands and prospecting, mining and other forms of economic activity were prohibited.

The present administration is expected to act primarily in the interest of industrial and energy companies. The protection of nature will be of secondary importance. For example, more land is to be allocated for logging and mining operations, the zone of off-shore oil and gas drilling along the California coastline is to be enlarged, restrictions on pit mining are to be relaxed, the national park system is to be revised so that some parks will be under the jurisdiction of state governments and so forth. This program is fully approved by the Reagan Administration. Besides this, it looks as though the so-called "Sagebrush Rebellion" will also be supported. This movement is now being launched in the western states to gain state government control over federal possessions, which occupy a considerable amount of territory in these states (for example, 97 percent of the state of Nevada is under the jurisdiction of federal agencies, mainly the Department of Defense). Former Secretary of the Interior C. Andrus objected to this because he felt that this kind of decentralization would lead to the curtailment of environmental programs.

Let us take a closer look at some of the resource policy decisions the present administration will have to make.

Oil-Bearing Shale Extraction: This branch of the mining industry has recently become more important in connection with the exacerbation of energy problems. At the beginning of 1975 the Department of the Interior announced a program of broader scientific research on the derivation of oil from shale and the installation of experimental equipment on the site of mineral deposits.
The United States now has four small enterprises engaged in the extraction and refining of oil-bearing shale in Utah and Colorado. The previous heads of the Department of the Interior took a fairly cautious view of broader operations in this area. Broad-scale extraction would require large quantities of water, but the water supply in the western states is quite limited and there is a serious shortage of water for the needs of agriculture, industry and public utilities. Besides this, shale extraction could have serious ecological consequences—air and water pollution and the accumulation of large quantities of waste in the form of slag heaps.

There is reason to believe that the administration will expand the scales of this extraction. Two companies of the largest shale extraction concerns in the United States, Occidental Oil Shale and Exxon, are lobbying for much broader operations on federal lands.

Off-Shore Oil Drilling: The sale of licenses for off-shore drilling along the central and northern California coastline has long been debated in the United States. There are significant reserves of fish in these coastal waters and they serve as the basis of the state's fish industry. Therefore, oil drilling would undermine its resource base. Besides this, the drilling will lead to serious changes in land use patterns, causing industrial use to prevail over agricultural use, and this would be undesirable from the standpoint of state interests. Before the previous secretary of the interior left his office, he prohibited the sale of licenses for half of the designated locations. He advocated the gradual growth of oil production here. Ecological considerations also led to the postponement of drilling off the Alaskan coast, where the world's richest fish resources are located. The present administration, however, is expected to support the oil companies' attempts to expand oil drilling off the California coast.

The Department of the Interior's intention to issue licenses for 31 areas in this part of the United States was announced in April 1981. Representatives of the state of California and a number of organizations, including the Natural Resource Defense Council, took the department to court. They won their case because, among other reasons, Washington has no right to dispose of the property of a state, such as the California coastline, without the consent of the state. In July the sale of the licenses was declared illegal by a district court. Nevertheless, the department heads declared their intention to defend their plans right up to the Supreme Court level. The new director of the Office of Management and Budget, D. Stockman, feels that the oil resources of the Alaskan continental shelf must be developed as quickly as possible. Considering the fact that numerous American monopolies are stubbornly trying to acquire licenses for the development of shelf deposits, it is likely that the administration will conduct a quite definite policy in this area.

Open-Pit Coal Mining: The coal industry has been developing rapidly in recent years in the western states. This has been promoted by the large deposits of hard coal, much of which can be extracted by the open-pit method, and the increasing importance of hard coal in the country's fuel and energy balance. Pit mining seriously damages the environment, and large areas of Montana and Wyoming are now marked by a ruined landscape and severe air and water pollution. According to forecasts, the coal mining volume should quadruple by 1985 and the western states will produce half of the national volume. The accuracy of these forecasts will depend largely on the
amount of federal land made available for mining. The future scales of mining operations and the methods of mining and of restoring damaged lands will have to be determined within the near future.

According to reports in the American press, there is the possibility that some provisions of the law passed in 1977 to control pit mining and land reclamation might be dropped. Up to the present time the mining companies have had to restore the original appearance of a location, and in such a way as to make a return to previous types of economic activity possible. This requires the preservation of the productive layer of soil, and this is also provided for in legislation. Particular attention is paid to the restoration of the vegetative cover on reclaimed lands and the preservation of the hydrological balance. Now this requirement is to be relaxed and reclamation work will be conducted with a view to the projected subsequent use of the location. This is much more convenient for the mining companies because it costs much less. Besides this, pit mining controls are also to be relaxed.

The present administration's resource policy is based on the assumption that the United States must free itself of excessive dependence on imported minerals to ensure national security. The United States is now importing large quantities of 9 out of 13 strategic and industrially necessary raw materials, mainly from the developing countries. In essence, the leaders of the American administration have announced the start of an era of "resource warfare." The people who advocate the limitation of government's regulating role have raised the issue in a new light--"environmental protection vs. national security."

This concept is completely in line with the present administration's foreign policy, which is intended to escalate international tension. Besides this, the cuts in funds for social needs affected environmental programs as well. It appears, however, that the Reagan Administration's attack on some of the "ecological" gains of the recent decade will encounter widespread public opposition. There is a sufficiently strong conservationist movement in the United States, and public opinion polls testify that most of the U.S. population is disturbed by the state of affairs in this area. After Reagan took office, he announced a temporary 60-day moratorium on environmental legislation. His campaign statements and later announcements about the cancellation of certain standards connected with ecological control are still only plans. Time will tell if they can be carried out.

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8588
CSO: 1803/10
MOSCOW UNIVERSITY AMERICAN AREA STUDIES COUNCIL MEETS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 56-58

[Article by A. M.: "The Study of the United States at Moscow University"]

[Text] The scientific coordinating council for U.S. area studies was established at the MGU [Moscow State University imeni M. V. Lomonosov] 7 years ago. The council's most important undertakings include a universitywide scientific conference on "The 200-Year Evolution of the United States: History and the Present Day," the series of books on "American Area Studies," the organization of "readings on Americana" and the discussion of problems connected with the analysis of the state of specialization in various departments.

At a recent session of the council, its chairman, History Department Professor N. V. Sivachev, presented a report entitled "The 26th CPSU Congress and the Further Development of MGU American Area Studies." The speaker stressed that the 26th CPSU Congress had assigned important tasks to VUZ scholars, including experts on American affairs. American area studies in the Soviet Union represent one of the foremost social sciences and touch upon the very center of the ideological struggle. In our country, the speaker noted, American area studies are being conducted on a broad scale. Various aspects of life in America--politics, economics and ideology--are studied by a number of institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences. University scholars of American affairs, on the other hand, must train highly qualified and ideologically strong young specialists in U.S. studies.

This important work would be impossible without the constant improvement of all links of the scientific training process and the enhancement of its effectiveness. At the MGU various aspects of American life are studied in seven departments (history, law, philology, philosophy, geography, economics and journalism) and in the Institute of the Asian and African Countries. The group of MGU experts on American affairs is quite large, numbering over 50. They can cope with truly sweeping assignments. In the last 5 years university scholars published many thorough studies of various aspects of U.S. history, economics, social thought, literature and culture (A. V. Goncharova, V. I. Dobren'kov, I. P. Dement'yev, V. F. Zhelezova, A. M. Karimskiy, I. M. Kuzina, A. S. Manykin, M. N. Marchenko, A. A. Mishin, A. S. Mulyarchik, N. V. Sivachev, I. P. Fominskiy, Ye. F. Yaz'kov and others). A great deal was also accomplished in the preparation of textbooks and teaching aids (V. F. Zhelezova, Yu. A. Kolosova, I. M. Kuzina, A. S. Manykin, N. V. Sivachev,
V. M. Kharitonov and Ye. F. Yaz'kov). They also published several collective surveys of state-monopoly capitalism, the activities of the propaganda-news complex, the problems of geographic-economic forecasting and so forth.

In 1977 a problem laboratory on U.S. history was opened in the MGU School of Modern and Contemporary History. The laboratory associates are studying the history and present state of the two-party system. Articles explaining the methodology of the comprehensive study of the two-party system have been written and published. A special course on the two-party system was taught for a few years. In 1981 the course materials were published in book form. Two collections of articles on "Political Parties in Modern American History" and "Political Parties in Contemporary American History" have been edited. The first book has already been published and the second will come out in the beginning of 1982.

The speaker went on to focus attention on the problems the university experts on American affairs will have to work on in the current 5 years. One of them is the need to raise the level of scientific research as high as possible. The solution is obvious: Scientific collectives must concentrate on a few pivotal themes. The most important of these are the comprehensive analysis of various facets of state-monopoly capitalism in the United States, the integral study of the U.S. political system and its elements, the analysis of the theory and history of the U.S. labor movement and the study of public opinion and public awareness in the United States. It is important that the main topics be researched on a broad scale, through the coordinated efforts of representatives of various branches of American area studies. A definite step in this direction has already been taken. Experts on American affairs in three different departments (history, law and philosophy) have begun to write a major work on "The Constitution of the United States: History and the Present Day," in conjunction with scholars from institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences. It should be published by this document's bicentennial anniversary in 1987. For the first time, the reader will find interpretations of constitutional legal doctrines by historians, philosophers and jurists all in the same book. The continuing study of the two-party system also holds out great promise in the elaboration of a comprehensive approach to the analysis of problems in the development of American society. Jurists and journalists are already helping historians elaborate this approach. Geographers and economists also have specific assignments.

Discussing the MGU's role in the development of Soviet-American scientific contacts, N. V. Sivachev noted the variety of forms this cooperation has taken. They include scientific assignments in the United States, work with American trainees, the exchange of instructors and lecture series, the publication of works by Soviet scholars in the United States and the translation of American works into Russian, and participation in joint scientific conferences.* Conferences, the speaker stressed, are an integral part and an important form of scientific work. It would be best if each department would hold scientific conferences on major topics at

* The MGU has contacts with the State University of New York, a midwestern university consortium and Caltech, based on special agreements on cooperation, as well as with Columbia and Harvard Universities and other higher academic institutions through the International Research and Exchange Council. For more detail, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 8, 1981, pp 69-71.
least twice in each 5-year period and conduct a universitywide conference, inviting scholars from institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, other universities and pedagogical institutes, at least once every 5 years.

During the discussion period, Professor A. A. Mishin (law department), a member of the council, spoke about problems connected with the improvement of specialization in U.S. studies in the law department. He stressed that the department is concentrating on training young experts on the theory of bourgeois government and law. The head of the overseas historical analysis and information sector of the World History Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, V. V. Sogrin, said that the council had performed a great deal of productive work to stimulate and coordinate U.S. studies. He agreed with the speaker that the analysis of different facets of the same phenomenon should be abandoned in favor of the comprehensive study of the fundamental problems of American society. Another council member, Docent A. S. Mulyarchik (Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences), said that closer contacts between MGU experts on American affairs and the scholars of academy institutes would be desirable and necessary. He favored the regular organization of broad-scale universitywide scientific conferences on the United States and told of the work experience of some sections of the coordinating council of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Another council member, Professor I. P. Fominskiy (economics department), stressed the need to arrange for quick and reliable information about MGU research projects pertaining to U.S. studies. He said that council publications should devote some space to brief reviews of dissertations on U.S. area studies defended at the MGU and agreed with the speaker about the need to concentrate the efforts of research groups on the investigation of major themes. Council member Professor Ya. N. Zasurskiy (journalism department) told of his department's experience in the organization of annual scientific conferences on U.S. literature and journalism. He said that the council should engage more deeply in publishing activity and make the series of works on "American Area Studies" more multifaceted and all-encompassing. Others who took part in the discussion were Yu. N. Rogulev, A. V. Goncharova and V. A. Nikonov. A resolution adopted by the council stipulates the particular ways in which objectives will be attained in the next 2 or 3 years.

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JAPANESE-U.S. JOINT VENTURES IN NORTH PACIFIC

Moscow SSHA:  EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 59-69

[Article by A. V. Korneyev: "The United States and Japan: The Exploration of the North Pacific"]

[Text] One of the characteristic features of the present era is the sharp intensification of scientific and technical progress, which has established the necessary conditions, for the first time in history, for the economic development of previously inaccessible areas like the world ocean, which is distinguished by colossal resource potential. Under the conditions of today's economic upheavals, now that sharp production cuts and increased unemployment in the majority of capitalist countries are interwoven with serious structural crises in the world capitalist economy—the currency, energy and raw material crises—the imperialist states, headed by the United States and Japan, have launched an energetic struggle for the exploitation of the resources of the world ocean in general and of its largest element, the Pacific Ocean, in particular, regarding them primarily as a means of improving their own economic, military and strategic positions.¹

In the second half of the 1960's the economic exploitation of the ocean became a major economic and political issue, not only on the level of individual states but also within the framework of various international organizations and within the context of specialized international and regional agreements. This is attested to in particular by the importance the majority of countries now attach to the topics discussed at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. This is why it is so important to examine the causes, motives and machinery of economic international relations in the area of ocean resource exploitation, both in general terms and as exemplified by specific parts of the world ocean.

American and Japanese industrialists have taken much more interest in the maritime resources of the North Pacific² in recent years. This interest is far from coincidental. The North Pacific region, which occupies an area of 89.4 million square kilometers, or approximately 60 percent of all dry land and 25 percent of the entire world ocean,³ is the location of large deposits of valuable industrial raw materials and colossal energy resources and borders directly on the shores of the United States and Japan (see map [map not reproduced]). It is here that the main economic interests of the two countries, which have begun the extensive economic exploitation of the world ocean, are concentrated. It is also significant that

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this body of water is extremely important in the strategic sense because it is bordered on the east by the Pacific coastline of the United States, and on the west by the shores of the USSR, the PRC and a number of Southeast Asian countries. This has had a considerable effect on the system of international relations connected with the development of the economic potential of the Pacific Ocean.

An analysis of the major fields of resource exploitation in the North Pacific by the United States and Japan—the extraction of fuel hydrocarbons and deep-sea minerals and fishing—indicates that these branches have had an increasing effect in recent years on American-Japanese economic relations and on the entire complex of international economic and political contacts in this huge part of the world ocean. It was here that American-Japanese economic and political relations in the new "oceanic" sphere were established and developed, and Japan's greater dependence on ocean resources has been actively used by the American side in its own interest. The economic development of the ocean is one of the new sources of internal conflicts in the relations between these capitalist partners and rivals.

The North Pacific's potential maritime oil and gas resources, according to various estimates, are equivalent to more than half of all world maritime reserves of hydrocarbons, but the reserves and extraction volumes in the 200-mile economic zones of the United States and Japan are relatively small. According to our estimates, for example, by the beginning of the 1980's, off-shore drilling along the Pacific coastline was covering around 1.7 percent of total U.S. annual consumption and not more than 0.04 percent of Japan's consumption. It is indicative that whereas this low level of marine deposite exploitation in the United States is primarily the result of the government policy of energy conservation, in Japan the main obstacle is the absence of sufficiently large underwater oil and gas deposits at depths accessible from the Japanese coast. The major known "oceanic" fuel deposits in the Pacific are concentrated within the economic zones of the developing countries of Southeast and South Asia, which, at a time of energy crisis, is constantly intensifying expansion in these areas with relatively low overhead costs by fiercely competitive American and Japanese monopolies.

The policy of the United States and Japan on the extraction of deep-sea ferromanganese concretions, most of which are concentrated on the Pacific Ocean floor, is based on the desire to find a new and stable supply at a time of intense struggle between capitalist states for sources of minerals. Besides this, the exploitation of concretions is also viewed as an effective way of pressuring the developing countries, particularly those exporting scarce nonferrous metals—manganese, copper, nickel and cobalt. The main technical problems connected with the extraction of concretions have already been solved in both countries and the main reason for the delay in commercial operations is their still uncertain international legal status.

Several facts testify, however, that the United States is actually encouraging its own mining corporations to take unilateral action by passing the appropriate national laws while verbally advocating the institution of the necessary international regulations. This is also the reason for the Reagan Administration's new attempts to urge the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea to accept a statute on the exploitation of the international seabed region which would benefit American monopolies. As far as Japan is concerned, its position at the conference has also undergone significant changes. Whereas Japan and the United States previously
disagreed on such matters as the size of maritime territorial and economic zones, the limits of the continental shelf and maritime pollution controls, strong U.S. pressure has motivated the Japanese Government to support American maritime policy in recent years. In the belief that the United States is trying to form some kind of pool of the industrially developed capitalist states, operating on the basis of the mutual recognition of the special rights of its members to exploit deep-sea mineral concretions, and in an attempt to become a member of this pool, Japan was one of the few capitalist countries at the 10th Session of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1981 to support the new American administration's attempts to change the provisions of the international accord that had been drafted and approved by the overwhelming majority of states. Japan, which has encountered more serious problems in its raw material supply than the United States, is involved in extensive scientific and technical cooperation with American firms in this area, is participating in most of the international seabed mineral consortiums and has founded a national association for the exploitation of sea and ocean minerals which enjoys considerable government financial and organizational support.

The North Pacific is the largest commercial fishing site of both countries, but whereas Japan acquires more than 90 percent of its catch here, the U.S. figure is only around 30 percent. Whereas Japan is primarily trying to increase its self-sufficiency in the area of food supplies and reinforce its export positions in the American market, the United States is mainly striving to take advantage of Japan's much greater dependence on sea food as additional economic leverage and as a means of strengthening the American-Japanese military and political alliance in this region.

The traditional forms of U.S. economic pressure on Japan in this field are customs tariffs, export quotas and the imposition of "voluntary" restrictions on Japanese fishing zones and volumes during the course of bilateral and multilateral negotiations. After the 200-mile economic zones were established in 1977, the inequity of the situation became even more pronounced. In Japan the proportion accounted for by imports in total sea food consumption had risen to 11 percent by 1979 as a result of rising internal demand and the exclusion of Japanese fishing vessels from the coastal waters of the United States and other countries. The United States, on the other hand, increased its exports of fish products 2.8-fold between 1976 and 1979; furthermore, by the beginning of the 1980's the Japanese market already accounted for more than 50 percent of this export volume. Under these conditions, the Japanese customs tariffs which had been instituted in the past to guard the Japanese market against the cheaper products of the developing countries impeded large purchases of American sea food. During this stage, U.S. pressure on Japan took the form of demands for lower Japanese customs barriers and the purchase of more American products. This issue is directly related to the imposition of quotas on Japanese vessels in the U.S. fishing zone. In response to this, Japan adopted a new economic strategy to protect its interests, including more intense coastal fishing and fish farming, the establishment of joint overseas enterprises and the development of new distant fishing regions and previously unused fishing zones. In other words, it adopted a strategy aimed at reducing its dependence on the United States in this area.

The main feature of the economic exploitation of the Pacific Ocean in the United States and Japan is the multifaceted nature of economic activity within this complex
branch and the existence of many internal connection between similar and even absolutely different goals. At present, the economic exploitation of the North Pacific in the United States and Japan takes the form of more than 20 types of activities, which fall into seven main categories: environmental analysis and control, the use of maritime minerals, chemicals and renewable energy and biological resources, the exploration of the seas and the conduct of maritime engineering operations. An analysis of the approach taken by these two countries to the exploitation of the Pacific Ocean indicates two major, conflicting tendencies: cooperation based on scientific and technical exchange and the outbreak of various conflicts which require mutual concessions or unavoidably exacerbate the inter-imperialist struggle.5

Whereas now, during the initial stage in the economic development of the ocean, scientific and technical exchange and cooperation are still prevalent in the sphere of American-Japanese relations, in the future, despite the absolute increase in the number of fields of cooperation, their relative significance is likely to decline. We can assume, in particular, that American-Japanese cooperation will be affected by such new problems as the use of American osmotic power plant technology for the distillation of water in Japan or the use of the Japanese experience in laying underground tunnels in the construction of tidal power plants in the United States. In the majority of cases, however, scientific and technical cooperation will develop in the branches where it already exists, such as, for example, off-shore drilling technology or the control and prevention of ocean pollution. The possible causes of conflicts in the North Pacific might include the extraction of seabed concretions and the operation of power engineering equipment based on oceanic thermogradients in equatorial seabed regions; the negative effect of the use of tidal energy on coastal fishing or, for example, the artificial modification of the climate; the use of marine biochemical energy, etc. The most critical areas of current and possible future conflicts and cooperation between the United States and Japan in the North Pacific are fishing, off-shore gas and oil drilling, aquaculture, shipping and various forms of marine pollution.

Therefore, a thorough analysis of qualitative connections indicates that the unavoidable increase in the number of areas of mutual contacts will be accompanied by a clear tendency toward an increase in potential and actual conflicts. This corroborates V. I. Lenin's conclusion about the inevitability of constant friction in American-Japanese economic relations in the Pacific zone.6 It applies completely to this fundamentally new and purely oceanic sphere.

The general outlines of the legal and organizational basis of American-Japanese economic relations in this area have already taken shape. Several basic levels can already be discerned in the present system for the coordination and regulation of the activities of these countries in this sphere: intergovernmental agreements covering the three main areas of American-Japanese cooperation—fishing, marine environmental protection and scientific and technical contacts in the study of seabed resources; bilateral committees and councils on economic and technological cooperation; mutual coordination on the ministerial and executive levels; technological and commercial contacts between Japanese and American private firms.

The main element of the system for the coordination of U.S. and Japanese scientific and technical activity in the exploitation of natural resources in the Pacific
Ocean is the permanent coordinating commission for maritime resources and technology of the American-Japanese committee on natural resources, founded in 1970. Different sections of the commission deal with the extraction of marine minerals, marine engineering equipment, electronics and communications, underwater technology and physiological problems, the study of seabed regions, marine geology and environmental observation and forecasting. Regular consultations between American and Japanese specialists are also conducted within the joint American-Japanese Trade Committee, established in 1977, and the international non-governmental Technical Committee on Oceanic Resources, which has been functioning since 1971. The great importance attached to these aspects of American-Japanese economic relations is attested to by the lively discussion of the possibility of using alternative oceanic sources of energy, along with more general questions of foreign trade, relations with the developing countries and industrial policy, during the third conference of representatives of the Japanese and U.S. business communities in Houston at the end of 1980.

The key factor in the present initial attempts at the practical use of new types of Pacific Ocean resources in the United States and Japan is the active use of scientific and technical achievements within the framework of special long-range state-monopoly programs, whose total cost reached 9.8 billion dollars between 1967 and 1979 (see table). American expenditures represented around 92 percent of this sum, totaling 8,997,400,000 dollars, while Japanese expenditures represented around 8 percent, or 813 million dollars. Japan has been trying to approach the U.S. level of government expenditures on oceanic development within the national budget structure, which was 2.5 times as high as the Japanese level at the beginning of the 1980's. During this period the annual rate of increase in Japanese expenditures was much higher than the U.S. rate and the relative proportion of Japanese allocations increased 20-fold.

It is indicative that the expenditures of U.S. private corporations on ocean development were 25-30 times as great as maximum federal expenditures on the average during the 1970's. In Japan, on the other hand, government expenditures accounted for at least 50-60 percent of total capital investments in ocean development during the same period. The reason for this difference is that Japan was only beginning to develop its "oceanic" industry during these years and was spending most of its funds on preliminary research and development projects instead of investing them in commercial operations producing immediate profits, as the United States was doing. This difference also indicates that the overall level of state control and regulation in the economic development of the ocean is indisputably higher in Japan than in the United States, and this is connected with the desire of Japanese ruling monopolistic circles to maximize the impact of, and return on, capital investments with relatively limited funds.

The structure of the American and Japanese national ocean resource development complexes is approximately the same. They consist of six main groups: the exploitation of marine biological, mineral and energy resources, the study and control of the marine environment, the comprehensive use of the coastal zone and measures to heighten navigational security. The American complex includes a much broader range of objectives, covering the entire world ocean, and envisages several international political undertakings to seize the initiative in the drafting of the new law of the sea for the purpose of obtaining unilateral advantages and taking the lead in
new universal and regional international maritime economic organizations. The scales of Japanese objectives are much more limited and are focused primarily on the resource development of the coastal zone and the Pacific Ocean seas surrounding the country with a view to local natural conditions.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Japan/United States, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>438.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>431.8 (-1.4%)</td>
<td>4.7 (+74.0%)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>463.4 (+7.3%)</td>
<td>8.8 (+87.2%)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>513.3 (+10.8%)</td>
<td>13.0 (+47.7%)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>522.0 (+1.7%)</td>
<td>21.2 (+63.1%)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>626.2 (+19.9%)</td>
<td>29.4 (+38.7%)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>637.2 (+1.8%)</td>
<td>96.5 (+228.2%)</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>667.5 (+4.8%)</td>
<td>101.7 (+5.4%)</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>782.5 (+17.2%)</td>
<td>83.8 (-17.6%)</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>802.9 (+2.6%)</td>
<td>65.2 (-22.2%)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>922.7 (+14.9%)</td>
<td>83.0 (+27.3%)</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,065.3 (+10.7%)</td>
<td>163.1 (+96.5%)</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,124.6 (+5.6%)</td>
<td>139.9 (-14.2%)</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,997.4</td>
<td>813.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures in parentheses are relative indicators of the annual rate of increase in expenditures. The calculations are based on the official exchange rate of the yen in relation to the dollar at the end of each year.


Certain features of the Japanese approach, such as its openly practical aims, precise distribution of resources, strict governmental control, precise management and intensive interdepartmental centralization of all necessary research and development, have made it much more effective. The American system for the regulation of ocean development with the aid of primarily indirect methods and pluralism in state economic policy has been less effective. As a result, although the United States has retained its overall technological superiority, by the beginning of the 1980's Japan was taking the lead in a number of new fields, such as large-scale aquaculture, the use of the energy of ocean waves and currents, the construction of navigational canals, coastal land fills and industrial islands, the development of remote-control environmental monitoring and natural disaster warning systems and the compilation and implementation of comprehensive coastal development programs. The systems of state-monopoly regulation of ocean economic development in the United States and Japan are based on governmental administrative structures, established expressly to manage activities in this area. An important common feature of the U.S. and Japanese ocean management systems is the simultaneous participation of
many sections and subdivisions of various state agencies and ministries in this process. This approach is the natural result of two characteristic features of ocean economic development—the complexity and multifaceted nature of economic activity and the fact that several of its elements, such as ocean fishing, oil and gas drilling, etc., have long been independent developed branches of the economy. For this reason, when the specialized structures were being established in the two countries, the primary objective was the overall coordination of all types of activity within the framework of existing government bodies by means of adding a comparatively small number of new special establishments to this already complex system. These elements of the governmental system of "oceanic" administration are directly connected with the largest industrial and financial groups in both countries, which have a say in all government decisions in this area. Furthermore, all of the marine economic activities which are already producing commercial profits in the United States and Japan are carried out exclusively by private companies, while government bodies generally perform the functions of distributing zones of exploitation and regulating the conditions of these operations.

The specialized business associations of American and Japanese industrialists with an interest in oceanic development occupy a prominent place in the general program drafting and decision-making mechanism. At this stage of the development of state-monopoly capital, they are one of the main links of the system of business community interaction with the government.

These associations influence national policymaking in each of these countries by drafting petitions and bills, working with government bureaucrats on special committees, commissions and expert councils in the government's legislative branch, maintaining constant contacts between association administrators and government leaders and influencing the personnel policy of executive and legislative bodies connected with the regulation of marine resource exploitation.

At present, as a result of rapid scientific and technical progress, marine natural resources are moving on a constantly broader scale from the category of potential and inaccessible resources to the readily accessible category. Now that the world is divided into two opposing systems, the world ocean is being used as a resource base and site of productive forces in the world socialist and capitalist economic system. The main political factor affecting the development of specific international economic forms of exploitation in the North Pacific is the overall state of relations between the two systems within this region. The process of détente in the 1970's created favorable conditions for the peaceful and constructive development of the political situation in the Pacific, but there is still considerable tension in the zone, and it largely determines the nature of relations between Pacific states.

The fundamental principle of the Soviet approach to ocean resource development in the Pacific is the systematic search for constructive ways of coordinating the resolution of all existing and potential problems in international relations on a mutually acceptable and non-discriminatory basis. "The Soviet Union," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev said at the beginning of the 1970's, "is willing to engage in deeper mutually beneficial cooperation in all spheres with any state desiring this. Our country is prepared to work with other interested states in the
resolution of such problems as environmental protection, the development of energy and other natural resources...research and the exploration of outer space and the world ocean. Our country, as a Pacific power, possesses the inalienable right, along with other states of this region, to use ocean resources not only in its coastal zone in the Far East, but also the seabed of the North Pacific. The Soviet Union wants to guarantee the freedom of shipping in the open seas and international straits, as well as unimpeded access to the open seas for the exploitation of various marine industrial and economic facilities and for engineering operations. The USSR has been just as consistently in favor of the establishment of all necessary political conditions for extensive and equal international technological exchange in the area of ocean development.

At the same time, the policy of the United States and Japan has indicated a desire to reduce and "control" the access of the USSR and other socialist countries to the Pacific basin and isolate them from the international economic ties developing here while simultaneously reinforcing their own military presence and economic dominion. A statement by former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State R. Holbrooke is quite indicative in this respect: "The hope of a stable and prosperous Pacific community can only be realized if the United States plays the main economic role in this community and assumes the responsibility of maintaining the strategic balance."

In recent years Japan and the United States have been giving considerable scientific, technical and economic assistance to China in its intense efforts to carry out a national program of coastal resource development. The absence of normal diplomatic and trade relations between the United States and the PRC prior to the end of the 1970's contributed to the success of Japanese maritime equipment and technology in China, while American business could only serve as a reserve supplier. All of this caused new economic friction between the United States and Japan. Therefore, ocean development represented a new area of economic activity in which the economic and political interests of the United States, Japan and China were closely interwoven, which has had a direct effect on American-Japanese relations in the Pacific.

It should be noted that the United States, because of the relative reduction of its own economic role in the capitalist world, has had to assign Japan more responsibility in the "direct management" of economic development in the Pacific. Nevertheless, Japanese capital is obviously in no hurry to take on any sizeable commitments in regional economic projects but is intensifying its own expansion in this region. Under these conditions, several other Pacific countries, especially China, have had a chance to take advantage of certain international legal problems in their own political interest, such as the problem of delineating the boundaries of coastal economic zones and the determination of reciprocal rights in disputed areas. Two internally contradictory tendencies can be seen clearly in the Chinese tactic of taking advantage of such conflicts. On the one hand, Beijing is trying to keep existing maritime territorial disputes and claims alive as a convenient way of exerting pressure on neighboring Asian countries in political and economic matters, particularly if anti-Soviet purposes can be served. On the other hand, although China has been actively attracting foreign technology and capital investments for the development of marine deposits in recent years, it is also striving to avoid any conflicts with Japan and the United States which might impede its modernization efforts or the development of the Chinese oceanic resource program. Besides this, the objective process of the economic development of Pacific Ocean resources is
constantly limiting the actual opportunities of the PRC and other states in the region to make use of territorial disputes in their own political interest without running the considerable risk of seriously injuring their own economic interests.

The United States is also fully aware of this. For example, a long report, published by the RAND corporation in 1979 and called "Asian Security in the 1980's: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition," notes that political risk is an extremely important factor in the capital investment process in off-shore oil drilling and the extraction of marine minerals in disputed areas. If the risk is great enough, capital will not be invested even when geological conditions are optimal and the oil is of high quality. Decisions made on drilling will always give preference to regions that are more favorable in the political sense, and these regions are much more numerous than the disputed areas. It is therefore not surprising that the majority of bodies of water in which China is now working with American and Japanese companies in joint marine oil and gas projects—the Bohaiwan Gulf and others—are in regions which are not the object of territorial disputes and are under Chinese jurisdiction.

In addition to cooperating with the PRC in marine oil drilling and prospecting operations, the United States is actively collaborating with China in oceanographic research and the collection of oceanological data. In May 1979, for example, the PRC Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration signed a special agreement on cooperation in five main areas of ocean development: the creation of a Chinese national center of oceanological information, the joint study of marine deposits and the structure of the ocean floor, the development of marine fresh-water aquaculture, American technical assistance in oceanic fishing and the organization of a marine environmental control service. In accordance with the Japanese-Chinese 20-year governmental agreement on fishing, signed in 1975, Japan is assisting in the technical modernization of the Chinese fishing industry. Therefore, there is a clear tendency in U.S. and Japanese policy toward the systematic expansion of "oceanic" cooperation with the PRC.

It is particularly significant that the detailed plans for international regional cooperation in the development of the ocean and the use of marine resources have been thoroughly analyzed in numerous American and Japanese government documents and the papers of private groups studying cooperation in the Pacific basin within the framework of the idea of the so-called "Pacific Community." The main factor here is the U.S. and Japanese plans to find collective ways of exerting pressure on developing countries in the region by using scientific and technical leverage. Political considerations lie at the basis of the U.S. plans for the use of this kind of economic, and later political, integration. Washington wants to broaden the American-Japanese alliance by including most of the non-socialist Pacific countries in this bloc in a covert and less obligating form, and to give this alliance the proper economic basis by using the exploitation of new marine types of natural resources, such as seabed polynuclear concretions or renewable sources of energy. Now that the United States' role as the trade partner of the majority of Pacific states is being usurped more and more by Japan, Washington also hopes to shift the balance in this competitive struggle in its own favor.

There is reason to believe that the American and Japanese approaches to the development of marine operations in the Pacific basin will attach increasing importance
In coming years to regional bilateral agreements, which will become one of the main forms of implementing the provisions of the general accord drafted at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. In the United States, the North Pacific is obviously viewed as a convenient region to perfect the concept of "maritime regionalism" for the purpose of its subsequent application in other large parts of the world ocean. For example, the authors of "Economic Interaction in the Pacific Basin," a recent joint analytical report by the Brookings Institution and the Japan Center for Economic Research, state that "the debates over questions of regional development, such as the expansion of national jurisdiction with regard to the economic potential of the ocean within the limits of 200-mile zones, can also be useful. Their purpose should not be the organization of a restricted regional conference to influence the UN conference on sea law, but the elaboration of regional solutions to problems in those cases when a universal policy is unattainable." They go on to make the telling comment that "in a world where global solutions to problems look less and less promising, regional approaches must be considered." According to the plans of U.S. and Japanese politicians, regional agreements should be an effective instrument in the resolution of problems in the delineation of the territorial waters, continental shelf and economic zones of neighboring states; the coordination of measures to protect and utilize fish resources of the anadromous species, migrating between regions under the jurisdiction of neighboring countries, and measures to regulate the exploitation of underwater oil and gas deposits located on the borders of such regions; the organization of joint oceanographic studies and measures to protect the marine environment against pollution; the planning and management of maritime operations.

While the United States has been turning its West Coast into a bridgehead for economic expansion in the Pacific Ocean and has been setting up a center in Hawaii for maritime regional cooperation with developing countries, it has made every effort to employ the concept of regionalization as an alternative to a universal international treaty. The general U.S. position in the Pacific was quite frankly described by M. Mansfield, the American ambassador to Japan, in an interview: "We must stay here because this is in our national interest. We are beginning to realize that the future of our country lies in the Pacific Ocean and in East Asia, including Japan." In line with this, U.S. relations with developing Pacific countries clearly indicate a desire to learn these countries' specific views on the development of maritime operations, establish channels for separate relations with the developing countries of East Asia and Latin America, form restricted regional alliances which will benefit the United States and take action to give American capital easier access to the maritime economic zones of the countries belonging to these associations.

An analysis of the basic trends in the development of international relations in the Pacific region suggests that any action taken within the near future on the ideas of regional economic cooperation will unavoidably exacerbate existing U.S.-Japanese conflicts and give rise to new and more serious ones, both within the sphere of bilateral economic relations and during the course of the apparent new stage in the fierce struggle for influence in the developing countries of this region, which, in turn, have no intention, as experience has shown, of accepting the role of submissive raw material appendages of their more highly developed partners. It should also be noted that these conflicts will be connected more and more with the economic exploitation of ocean resources because the main types of
resources in which the United States and Japan are both interested are concentrated in the North Pacific, and not in these countries' own economic zones, but beyond their limits—either in the open seas or in the territorial waters of developing states.

There is no question that the American concept of "maritime regionalism," interpreted as an alternative to the global approach, will not in any way promote the relaxation of international tension, the reduction of the number of conflicts and the reinforcement of international cooperation by states in the peaceful use of the Pacific Ocean. This is why an important factor counteracting the essentially neocolonial attempts by the United States in the future will be broader cooperation by existing and new regional organizations with the USSR and other socialist states in the development of the economic potential of the Pacific Ocean.

FOOTNOTES


2. The boundaries of the North Pacific basin are the equator and the shoreline of the land to the north.

3. The ocean's waters cover more than 361 million square kilometers of the planet's total area of 510 million square kilometers (or 70.8 percent) and its land covers 149 million square kilometers.


5. The sources of initial statistics for qualitative estimates were the government reports on national oceanic development programs in the United States and Japan, UN documents, analytical studies by government and private organizations, reports and hearings of the U.S. Congress and articles in American and Japanese scientific publications between 1975 and 1980. The results were obtained with the aid of matrix analysis.


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CSO: 1803/10
LABOR-SAVING DEVICES INSTITUTED IN U.S. SERVICE INDUSTRIES

Moscow SSA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 69-78

[Article by V. B. Supyan and I. M. Sheyman: "Intensification Trends in U.S. Service Sphere"]

[Text] One of the main features of U.S. economic development is the rapid expansion of the service sphere.¹ This is now a large sector of the capitalist economy, with considerable influence on the level of public consumption, production efficiency and economic growth in general. A majority of the labor force is already concentrated here.

The augmentation of the role and place of service industries in the economic and social structure of present-day capitalism has already been comparatively well researched in Marxist science.² This research has indicated, in particular, that one of the main prerequisites for the expansion of the service sphere is a higher level of labor productivity in physical production, which makes manpower available for the service industries. This conclusion was drawn from analyses of the first, extensive stage of the evolution of the service sphere, during the course of which its production base took shape. Its current development calls for a new approach. It does not seem likely that the service sphere could continue to expand only as a result of heightened labor productivity in industry, agriculture and other sectors, although this is still an extremely important growth factor in the service sphere. An increasingly important means of its development in the United States is intensification—the widespread use of technical equipment and industrial methods of labor organization, capable of reducing expenditures of labor and material resources in relation to the cost of services.³ Specific factors and signs of this trend and some of its more common socioeconomic consequences are the subject of this article.

The service sphere is quite heterogeneous. It takes in branches and types of services with diverse technologies and levels of orientation toward consumers. For example, mass service methods are used in transportation and communications, providing opportunities for the widespread introduction of technical equipment. The situation is quite different in such areas as personal services, retail trade, the hotel industry and several other industries. Their orientation toward a specific consumer and toward demand in territorially limited markets makes the mass manufacture of standardized products difficult. The heterogeneity of the service sphere means that different approaches must be taken to the analysis of labor-saving factors and trends and the correlation between extensive and intensive

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sources of labor savings. Nevertheless, a comprehensive approach to this kind of analysis seems quite valid. All other groups of economic branches also contain heterogeneous elements (for example, there are branches with different technical levels and labor-saving potential in industry), but this does not refute the conclusions about the presence of common trends in their development.

Factors of Scientific and Technical Progress

In recent decades the development of the majority of service industries has been marked by considerable changes in the material and technical base, technology and methods and principles of labor organization. Machines are being used more widely and are becoming an integral part of the service process. This is most apparent in areas with more or less homogeneous products.

Possibilities for scientific and technical progress in the service sphere are growing in connection with the development of production concentration. Net profit per enterprise in U.S. retail trade increased 2.7-fold between 1958 and 1977, and the figure in wholesale trade increased 1.7-fold (in constant prices). Large self-service stores are now quite common, representing around 20 percent of the total number of grocery stores and more than 80 percent of their total receipts. The dimensions of the average hotel, motel, vehicle service station, dry cleaning establishment and repair shop have grown perceptibly.4

An important factor in the acceleration of technological progress in the service sphere is the sizeable influx of the capital of large industrial and other corporations. It has aided in the rapid enlargement and renovation of the service sphere's production system on the basis of scientific and technical achievements. During the course of monopoly expansion, many enterprises in this sphere have adopted technical and organizational innovations and have been reconstructed in accordance with the industrial "model."

Technical progress in the service sphere has been conditional upon the rapid development of the newest science-intensive branches of physical production—electrical engineering, the computer industry, instrument building, the medical and pharmaceutical industry, trade equipment manufacture and others. One branch of machine building now specializes in the manufacture of equipment for hotels, dry cleaning establishments, laundries, banks, etc. The dispatch volume in this branch (in constant prices) increased by an average of 7.6 percent a year between 1958 and 1976—a higher rate than in most other branches of machine building.5

Businessmen who installed technical equipment were also motivated by the rising wages of service employees, attained primarily as a result of labor's persistent struggle. Between 1950 and 1974, real wages rose 40 percent in trade, 80 percent in transportation and communications, 47 percent in finance and insurance, 79 percent in production and personal services and 72 percent in the civil service (64 percent in the processing industry).6 The installation of machines and equipment ensuring a savings on the rapidly rising cost of raw materials, semimanufactured products and energy has become an increasingly important way of raising the profit level of services.

Another important factor in this area is the relatively slow rise in the prices of machines and equipment used in the service industries: an annual rate of only

66
1.2 percent between 1958 and 1976. As a basis for comparison, the average rate of increase in prices was 3.5 percent for agricultural equipment, 4.2 percent for construction machinery and 4 percent for metalworking equipment.7

The value of fixed capital rose more quickly in the service sphere than in the entire economy during the postwar period. This sphere (excluding transportation and communications) now receives 57 percent of the capital investments in the nation's economy, including 58 percent of all the funds used to purchase office equipment and computers and respective figures of 62 percent for trucks and buses, 54 percent for instruments, 74 percent for electrical equipment and 75 percent for new construction.8

The evolution of the material and technical base of the service sphere is following the same general patterns as in physical production: simple and complex mechanization, electrification, chemization, computerization and automation. There is also no difference in the sequence of technical innovations: first in breadth (the construction of new hospitals, schools, stores, etc.) and then in depth (the augmentation of the technical equipment of existing enterprises). It should be borne in mind, however, that the modern production system in the service sphere was established within such a short period of time that it is incomparable to the formative period of the technical base in the majority of physical production branches. Fixed capital is renewed at a rapid rate. For example, the average age of equipment in the service industries is only 10 years—less than in most other branches.9

The capital-labor ratio has risen more rapidly in the service sphere (excluding transportation and communications) than in industry and in the economy as a whole in the postwar period. This sphere is gradually rising to the technical equipment level of physical production. An increasing percentage of non-material products now come from large enterprises, few of which are surpassed by industry in terms of the scales on which technical equipment is used. In the middle of the 1970's the value of fixed capital per full-time worker in the private sector of the service sphere was only 25 percent lower than in the processing industry and 30 percent lower than in the economy as a whole. Furthermore, the proportion accounted for in the total fixed capital of the service sphere by active elements—machines and equipment—is growing: 27.4 percent in 1947 and 35.6 percent in 1974. It is true that in terms of this indicator the service sphere is still far behind the processing industry (60.3 percent in 1974) and the economy as a whole (44.3 percent). For this reason, the difference between levels of machines and equipment in relation to the labor force is still quite perceptible: In 1974 this indicator was 44 percent in the service sphere in relation to the processing industry and 55 percent in relation to the economy as a whole.10 In the second half of the 1970's the rates of accumulation and the capital-labor ratio dropped sharply as a result of the general deterioration of economic conditions and critical upheavals.

The most significant changes have taken place in the technical base of the finance and credit sphere, public health care and trade. In the first of these, the widespread use of computers has essentially revolutionized the processing of checks and other monetary documents, various types of monetary transfers, cashier transactions and market research and analysis. Something like an assembly line has been developed for the processing of monetary documents, with a computer taking the necessary information off checks, making calculations and recording the results in a magnetic
memory. Terminals installed in trade enterprises are plugged into local bank computers. When a customer pays by check, these terminals can be used for a virtually instantaneous credit check. There are more than 8,000 automatic tellers in the country, each of which is essentially a "mini-branch" of a bank. These are located in stores, hotels, airports or simply on the sidewalk, as well as in banks, and can be used at any time of the day or night to deposit or withdraw funds, obtain a cash advance within a certain credit limit or transfer funds from one account to another. This has broadened the variety of services for enterprises and the public, sharply accelerated the circulation of funds in bank checking accounts and ensured the quicker mobilization of available capital for its subsequent investment.

The latest equipment and devices are now being widely used in public health care. Computers are being used extensively in diagnosing illnesses, monitoring treatment, automating the registration procedure and the recording of medical histories, conducting analyses, billing patients and collecting patient information. The latest x-ray machines and laboratory equipment are reducing the amount of labor involved in examinations to a fraction of the previous amount and are speeding up the examination process. Deliveries of electronic devices and other equipment to medical establishments increase at a rate of 10-13 percent a year.

The "technization" front is extremely broad in trade and is constantly growing. The greatest opportunities for the replacement of live labor have been found in the mechanization and automation of labor-intensive operations involving loading and unloading, moving goods within the store, packing and unpacking goods, monitoring stocks and assembling package lots. Electronic equipment has become an essential element of the large trade enterprise. In wholesale trade it is used primarily to accelerate and simplify the recording and monitoring of stocks. In the mid-1970's these operations had been computerized in almost half of all wholesale firms. In retail trade computers perform a variety of functions in customer services, market analysis, forecasting, inventory control, information, etc. Vending machines are now a common sight: They account for more than half of all sales of tobacco products, soft drinks, candy, sandwiches, milk, etc.

It is easy to see that technical changes have affected primarily intermediate and auxiliary operations, at least in public health care and trade: These operations lend themselves more readily to standardization and streamlining. The possibilities of mechanizing and automating (and, consequently, of saving) labor in direct customer services are more restricted. This is most apparent in personal services, the hotel industry and many branches of the recreation and entertainment industries. Here live labor still represents the basis of production processes.

Most of the fruits of technical progress are being reaped by monopolistic capital, which has seized the leading positions in the service sphere. Large banks, stores, repair centers and so forth are in no way inferior to industrial enterprises in terms of their level of technical equipment, and some are even superior. Small shops, studios, snack bars and other such establishments, on the other hand, are the last stronghold of manual labor. This widens the gap between the economic indicators of large and small production units. This, in turn, leads to the formation of an extremely sizeable enclave of hidden unemployment and, when economic conditions deteriorate, to the devastation of small businesses.
Organizational Innovations

The development of the service industries has been accompanied by the broader use of industrial methods of production organization. They are particularly significant as a means of augmenting labor productivity because the possibilities for the mechanization and automation of labor are much more restricted here than in physical production.

Scientific and technical progress is lending strength to the "technocratic" approach to production problems in the service industries. The variety of administrative methods employed in this sphere has grown dramatically. In addition to various aspects of the labor process, the fundamental principles of service are being revised. The transformation and improvement of the entire complex of service technology is being emphasized in enterprise management. Standard systems of service, aimed at satisfying mass homogeneous demands, have been developed and are being widely used in a number of branches and types of services.

A vivid example of the use of industrial methods of organization is the practice of self-service in retail trade, which ensures a considerable savings in labor. The modern American supermarket, which sells primarily packaged foods, is a large enterprise with a total area of 1,500-3,000 square meters and an annual turnover exceeding 1 million dollars (and often 5-6 million), where all trade operations are performed by 10-20 permanent employees and the same number of temporaries (part-time workers). Self-service technology is also being used more widely in wholesale trade, public eating establishments, gas stations, laundries, etc. This is due largely to the rapidly rising overhead costs in the service industries. For the businessman, the economic purpose of self-service consists in the use of the unpaid labor of the customer.

The operation of the network of McDonald's restaurants is another example of the industrialization of services. The technology used here differs radically from the traditional type. Its main features are speedy service, a relatively limited selection of foods (chiefly hamburgers), uniformity and precisely planned operations. These establishments do not prepare food; they simply heat up (in microwave ovens) virtually prepared foods and serve customers. They receive their products in the form of pre-cooked portions, which precludes the need for time-consuming cutting, weighing and other such operations. The restaurant buildings and their simple equipment have been designed for maximum standardization. They have no stoves or any of the other traditional features of public eating establishments. The employee virtually has no choice as to what he should prepare, how he should prepare it and how he should serve the customer. Everything is standardized in advance. This system saves labor. It represents precisely organized production modeled on the industrial enterprise, with a lower degree of individualized service and a larger operational volume.

The tendency to standardize services conflicts with the tendency to individualize it even more, with a view to the growing variety of individual tastes, needs and inclinations. In addition to the enterprises which perform standard homogeneous services, there are enterprises offering a large variety of services, intended to satisfy needs of a higher order. The former are distinguished by speedy and uniform service and the latter offer convenience, a closer relationship with the customer.
and a strictly individualized approach. The former operate with minimum labor expenditures and the latter generally need many employees. The division of functions is mediated by the extremely high level of price differentiation and readily available information about the variety of services offered.

The automatic tellers, laundries, dry cleaning establishments, retail stores, public eating establishments and other establishments which are brought closer to the consumer are one example of individualized service. For example, the popularity of convenience stores is growing. These are small stores, chiefly groceries, dry cleaners, newsstands, repair shops and so forth, which are situated in the consumer's neighborhood, guarantee high-quality service and keep longer business hours, sometimes even staying open all night.

Under the conditions of the capitalist countries, the existence of two types and levels of service reinforces and perpetuates the differences between various segments of the population in terms of social status and promotes the growth of the parasitical demands of the highest social strata. Within certain limits, however, this dual structure is also an important factor in the efficient operation of the service sphere as a whole because it helps in distinguishing precisely between the functions of various types of enterprises and putting an end to the monotony and impersonal nature of the services offered by large enterprises. It should also be borne in mind that differences in levels of service reflect the extremely broad range of demands within social groups and among persons on the same income level. Depending on their traditions, habits and a multitude of other subjective factors, they can use the services of either type of establishment.

Another type of labor-saving innovation of a structural nature in the service industries is the enlargement of enterprise dimensions. Large dimensions allow for the extensive use of technical equipment, skilled labor and industrial technology. All of this produces a considerable savings in labor. In the sphere of production and personal services, for example, output per worker at enterprises with an annual turnover exceeding a million dollars is 1.6 times as great on the average as the output at enterprises with a turnover of 50,000-100,000 dollars, and is more than 5 times as great as at the smallest enterprises (under 10,000 dollars).12

The inclusion of various small businesses within a large-scale service system is an effective way of augmenting the operational efficiency of small enterprises. In the United States and other capitalist countries this is accomplished through the creation of "chains" of similar, relatively small enterprises, operating under a single administrative unit, as well as through "franchise" contracts between large firms and independent small enterprises.13 Each operational subdivision of these associations retains its flexibility and maneuverability and can respond rapidly to changes, undetected by the large firm, in the demands of its permanent clientele. In addition, however, it receives technical and financial assistance from the large company and the necessary professional training. Many of these firms employ modern equipment designed for a small operational volume and have a standard service technology (like the one in the McDonald's chain) and similar buildings, which also serve as the living quarters of the operators. Accounting, bookkeeping and administrative functions are either reduced to a minimum in the small firm or are centralized and performed by "headquarters." As a result, the objectively necessary coexistence of large and small businesses requires less labor than their independent functioning.
The integration of the service sphere with industry is another important labor-saving process. This occurs when service and industrial enterprises are united under a single administrative unit within the framework of large diversified firms or through the establishment of permanent production contacts without a business merger.

An example of this can be seen in the interrelated functioning of the food industry and the public dining sector. In addition to all that was mentioned above, we will add here that the "stoveless" public dining enterprises are much more mobile than the traditional cafe, restaurant and so forth. They can be set up in offices with a small staff, on isolated construction sites, in railway cars or in resorts with many tourists. These enterprises already account for more than 80 percent of the total turnover of the American public dining system.14

Commercial-industrial and agrarian-sales associations have also become popular. They are replacing trade enterprises whose contacts with suppliers are impermanent and sporadic. This is conserving a great deal of labor in the production and distribution of goods. These vertically integrated forms of trade account for 72 percent of the retail commodity turnover and around 50 percent of the wholesale turnover.

Another form of integration consists in the unification of industrial enterprises with repair and maintenance services. This ensures the coordination of production programs and service requirements. The technical parameters of equipment are planned in such a way as to reduce the need for repairs and speed up maintenance operations. Close contacts create additional incentive to enhance the reliability of technical equipment and allow for the standardization of many occupational functions. Within the household appliance maintenance sphere, for example, there are enterprises which specialize in the replacement of standard industrially produced assemblies. This is an extremely effective labor-saving practice.

Considerable advances have been made in the organization of labor and work schedules in service establishments. The main ones include the employment of more people for a partial work day or work week (part-time employment). It is in the service sphere, where the production load is not uniform, that there are great opportunities for the institution of non-traditional work schedules. More than 10 million people are working part-time in this sphere. What is more, at the beginning of 1981, part-time workers accounted for 29 percent of the total labor force in trade, 22.7 percent in production and personal services and 11.7 percent in finance and insurance.15 This system gives organizations and establishments better service during peak hours by scheduling personnel in accordance with the intensity of work. Besides this, paradoxical as it may seem, the more extensive use of part-time employment conserves labor in the service sphere. In the first place, the permanent staff (full-time) no longer needs to perform short-term jobs requiring little skill. In the second place, the intensity of labor is much higher over short periods of time (for example, a waiter or salesclerk who works 2-3 hours a day can serve more customers in an hour than the full-time employee). As a result, labor productivity rises, the number of absences decreases and the rate of personnel turnover declines.

The ultimate result of new methods of labor and production organization in the service sphere is the development of a tendency toward heightened efficiency.
The Labor-Saving Impact

The processes listed above conserve labor in the service sphere. Defects in American statistics of cost indicators of the volume of services performed make it difficult to determine the actual scales of the savings. The main defects are the underassessment of changes in the quality of service and the tendency to calculate some indicators (for example, the service volume of financial establishments) according to employment data based on the unrealistic assumption that output does not vary. The labor savings recorded in existing indicators are understated to the degree that the quality of service improves and the proportion accounted for by services whose volume is calculated according to the number of employees grows. 

Even these indicators, however, testify that labor-saving processes are characteristic of many service industries in the United States as well as physical production.

Table 1

Average Annual Rates of Increase in Service Volumes per Man-Hour in Private Sector, 1958-1976, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branches</th>
<th>Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motor transport</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water transport</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air transport</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale trade</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail trade</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grocery stores</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobile dealerships</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel industry</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas stations</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal and repair services</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbershops and beauty salons</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundries and dry cleaning establishments</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business services</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobile repair and maintenance</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movie production and distribution</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation and entertainment industry</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services of private physicians</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital services</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other medical services</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing industry</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy as a whole</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The figures presented in Tables 1 and 2 provide grounds for the following conclusions. Above all, there is a fairly clear natural connection between increased
output and a higher percentage of identical production operations and broader opportunities for the use of industrial production methods. The highest rates are found in transportation, communications, wholesale trade, automobile repair and maintenance and the movie industry. In these branches output increased more quickly than in the processing industry and the economy as a whole. Higher rates were also noted in a number of branches which serve strictly individualized demand: hospital services, gas stations and the automobile trade. Relatively low rates were characteristic of the majority of personal and repair services, the recreation and entertainment industry, out-patient medical care, business services and the hotel industry.

In general, the growth rates of labor conservation in the service sphere do not correspond to the rates and scales of technical retooling and the accelerated rise of the capital-labor ratio. The labor-saving impact of technical equipment in the majority of these industries is much lower than in physical production. This means that the growth rates of fixed capital per worker far surpass the growth rate of labor productivity. As a result, the return on capital decreases (Table 2). These tendencies are almost the direct opposite of the situation in the processing industry, where the rise in the level of labor productivity was virtually parallel to the level of technical equipment right up to the mid-1970's.

### Table 2

**Dynamics of Capital-Labor Ratio (A), Labor Productivity (B) and Output-Capital Ratio (C) in Private Sector of U.S. Economy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Service sphere</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(exc. transportation and communications)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (dollars)</td>
<td>6,363</td>
<td>8,473</td>
<td>9,268</td>
<td>12,274</td>
<td>13,625</td>
<td>14,003</td>
<td>220.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>10,187</td>
<td>11,985</td>
<td>13,477</td>
<td>13,864</td>
<td>14,621</td>
<td>14,279</td>
<td>140.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Processing industry</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (dollars)</td>
<td>9,759</td>
<td>13,379</td>
<td>16,554</td>
<td>16,857</td>
<td>17,763</td>
<td>18,619</td>
<td>190.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>8,388</td>
<td>10,034</td>
<td>12,747</td>
<td>13,148</td>
<td>15,276</td>
<td>14,522</td>
<td>173.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>90.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This type of reproduction, distinguished by the higher "price" of each percentage of increase in output, is connected with the objective presence of a number of factors in the service sphere which restrict the conservation of labor. For example, this sphere has a relatively higher percentage of slowly circulating passive
elements of fixed capital (buildings and facilities) and many types of technical equipment are not used for long because they satisfy occasional demand. Most of the technical equipment is employed less for the purpose of labor conservation than for the improvement of the quality of service and the creation of essentially new consumer values. Besides this, most of the service industries entered the stage of industrialization much later than physical production did. During the postwar period only the first steps were taken in this direction, and these naturally involved huge expenditures of social labor. Mass capital investments are still not accompanied by an equally massive labor savings and are aimed primarily at the reorganization of production for the improvement of services. In essence, the service industries are repeating the experience of branches of physical production: First the basis of the production system is laid, and then the return of each of its elements is augmented.

It is quite obvious, therefore, that extensive factors are more significant in the development of the service sphere than intensive ones (the opposite trend was apparent in U.S. industry in the 1950's and 1960's). The augmentation of service volumes is due more to the use of new labor and material resources than to higher output.

Intensive factors are becoming more important in the development of the service sphere, however. The main reasons are that the service sphere has had a constantly increasing effect on all facets of societal life, raising the level of employee knowledge, qualifications and skills, saving the customer's time and heightening the efficiency of physical production. In general, the service industries are distinguished by a highly flexible and variable production structure and quick reactions to changes in the market. All of this must be taken into account when we attempt to determine the type of reproduction in this extremely distinctive area of economic activity, where the results of labor are reflected primarily in indicators of the quality of services and their external impact, which is not always recorded accurately in national statistics. Another reason is that the conservation of labor—live and embodied—is also being accomplished by means of internal development trends. In particular, the volume of crude resources and other materials per dollar of gross product is decreasing in this sphere: According to the data of intersectorial balances, the level of material-intensiveness in the service sphere (excluding transportation and communications) was 16 percent in 1958, 13.5 percent in 1963 and 10.9 percent in 1972 (the most dramatic decrease was in trade and finance). In the 1940's and 1950's, when the production system of the service industries was taking shape, there was an opposite trend.

In general, we can assume that the service sphere in the United States is now making the transition from the extensive type of reproduction to the intensive one. Several branches—transportation, communications, wholesale trade, finance and many repair services—have already entered the stage of primarily intensive development. The service volume in these branches is being augmented from within—with the aid of internal labor-saving factors. These factors will probably play an increasingly important role in the future, although the complete "equalization" of reproductive proportions in the majority of service industries and in physical production will not take place within the near future. The replacement of live labor with embodied labor in the service sphere, particularly personal services, the hotel industry, the recreation and entertainment industry, public health and education, will take
longer than in physical production. The indicators of total impact, reflecting the savings in live and embodied labor, will also be lower.

The intensification of the service sphere will bring about serious changes in the nature of labor and the status of workers at enterprises and establishments. The methods listed above for the capitalist enhancement of production efficiency will turn the functions of more and more hired workers into nothing more than performance operations and will make their work monotonous and mechanical. In the service industries, where the average educational level of workers is higher than in physical production, there is a particularly noticeable disparity between the higher quality of labor (the level of education and qualifications) and the increasingly industrialized and monotonous work of many categories of blue- and white-collar workers, particularly in branches where intensification processes have been most pronounced. As a result, the subordination of employees to capital acquires broader dimensions and alienation and job dissatisfaction become more prevalent.

The intensification of the service industries will have a significant effect on the U.S. labor market and will aggravate the unemployment problem. Traditionally (particularly in the 1950's and 1960's), these industries have been regarded as the sector of the economy which "absorbs" part of the labor force excluded from industry and agriculture. This is still the case, but to a lesser degree. For example, the number of persons employed in the industries increased by 36.3 percent in the 1960's and 34 percent in the 1970's. The more highly technical structure of capital, the augmentation of the productive power of labor and intensification in the service sphere are reducing the need for manpower in relation to total capital. For example, the number of persons employed in telephone communications decreased by 100,000 between 1974 and 1978.

In addition to this, the service sphere itself has been responsible for more and more unemployment. For example, whereas it accounted for 40.7 percent of all unemployed persons in the country in 1949, the figure was 46.8 percent in 1971 and 52.2 percent in 1979. The level of unemployment has also risen in some branches. Although the national average was approximately the same in 1949 and 1979, the rate of unemployment rose from 6.2 to 6.5 percent in trade, from 3.1 to 3.9 percent in the civil service and from 2.1 to 3 percent in finance, although it decreased somewhat in other branches (education, public health and business and personal services). Besides this, there are large areas of hidden unemployment in the service sphere. Of course, many small enterprises which are always on the verge of bankruptcy manage to survive because their owners tighten their belts. Nevertheless, in spite of all their efforts, intensification has sharply accelerated the process by which these enterprises are excluded from the market.

In connection with these processes, intensification has considerably changed the dynamics of employment in the service sphere during periods of crisis. For example, in the 1950's and 1960's the number of persons employed in this sphere did not decrease, and even increased—at an average rate of 0.7 percent—in crisis years. (in physical production this number decreased at a rate of 8.3 percent). During the crises of the 1970's, however, this sphere was distinguished by an opposite trend. In the crisis year of 1980 employment in the sphere fell 1.5 percent (6.2 percent in physical production).
In summation, we can say that the development of processes of intensification in the U.S. service industries is heightening the economic efficiency of their functioning. They are having a stronger effect on the level of labor productivity throughout the economy. These tendencies reflect the development of productive forces and promote their growth. Under the conditions of capitalist production relations, however, these tendencies are distinguished by an internal contradiction in the service sphere and in physical production: In addition to heightening economic efficiency, they promote the more intense exploitation of the laboring public, the growth of unemployment and the exacerbation of social antagonisms in the country.

FOOTNOTES

1. In this article the term "service sphere" refers to the group of industries whose products are primarily non-material and take the form of a positive impact, inseparable from the performance of consumer services. They are transportation, communications, trade, the public dining sector, finance and insurance, production and public services (personal, business, repair and other services), public health care, the civil service and others. The author's analysis does not include the service branches whose immediate purpose is the maintenance of the exploitative order—especially the military-police, ideological and propaganda networks of the bourgeois government.


3. There are differences of opinion about the nature of labor in the service sphere (whether it is productive or non-productive in nature) and the limits of social production. One of these views excludes all or part of the service sphere from the area of productive labor. Without indulging in a discussion of this issue, we will simply note that in spite of all the differences between the supporters of the narrow and broad interpretations of the reproductive role of the service sphere, no one doubts the expediency of comparing resources to results and determining the nature of reproductive processes in this sphere. This approach has been widely used in the analysis of the development of service industries in the socialist economy (see, for example, V. Ye. Komarov and V. D. Ulanovskaya, "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaya effektivnost' sfery uslug" [The Socioeconomic Effectiveness of the Service Sphere], Moscow, 1980; V. M. Rutgayzer, "Resursy razvitiya neproizvodstvennoy sfery" [Development Resources of the Non-Production Sphere], Moscow, 1975).


11. Commercial success here is connected primarily with speedy service—4 minutes on the average (22 minutes in supermarkets). The customers are passersby and neighborhood people who come in to buy single items, and generally for rapid consumption ("How To Start Your Own Small Business," N.Y., 1973, p 235).


13. For more detail, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 12, 1978, pp 72-76.


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REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S MILITARY POLICY CRITICIZED BY AMERICAN WRITERS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 79-81

[Article by N. B. Pustokhina: "For a Realistic Approach"]

[Text] A year ago, the January 1981 issue of one of the oldest magazines in the United States, THE ATLANTIC, printed a warning about the danger of political tension in the relations between the USSR and United States by renowned scholar and diplomat G. Kennan. In an article entitled "Cease This Madness" he noted the "extreme militarization of the entire complex of East-West relations," stressing that the arms race would certainly lead to a conflict that would benefit neither side. Military rivalry between the United States and the USSR, the author wrote, creates the impression that there is a total conflict of interests between the two societies, although there are spheres in which cooperation by the two states is possible and necessary (for example, in combating environmental pollution, in the efficient use of natural resources, etc.).¹ In November 1981 Kennan expressed the view that international peace was being endangered by the deliberate distortion of Soviet foreign policy goals and methods practiced in the United States by the mass media and a number of specialists in this area. The practice of using "an extremely subjective and far from realistic" assessment of the Soviet Union's intentions as a guide in politics "is not only counterproductive but also extremely dangerous," he stressed. He expressed the same view in an article published in 1982, underscoring the fact that the beliefs about the Soviet Union "subscribed to by our government and much of our press," all of these "endless distortions, oversimplifications and now customary exaggerations of Moscow's military strength" along with "the reckless application of a double standard in the evaluation of Soviet behavior and our own are not signs of the maturity and realism that could be expected of the diplomacy of a great power."²

A realization of the danger inherent in the present U.S. administration's attempts to resurrect the cold war policy motivated Professor S. Hoffmann, renowned expert on international affairs and director of Harvard University's Center for European Studies, to write a series of articles on U.S. foreign policy for the NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS. He stated that the revival of the policy of cold war and the "containment of communism" would be unsuccessful because it does not take the actual state of world affairs into account. "Attempts to associate all protests against injustice and oppression with Soviet intrigues or Soviet-sanctioned terrorism are not likely to convince anyone," Hoffmann wrote. In his opinion,
the question of national security is only one aspect of foreign policy, inseparable from others: "Our ability to solve security problems will depend on our ability to solve other problems."  

In an article entitled "Foreign Policy: What's To Be Done?" he appeals for the retention of all the positive results of Soviet-American relations. Hoffmann, just as G. Kennan, is firmly convinced of the need for Soviet-American cooperation in areas of interest to both countries. The most important of these areas, in his opinion, is the curtailment of the arms race. The Soviet-U.S. talks on strategic arms limitation would serve as a basis for future talks on various vitally important matters. Joint action in this area could be supplemented by concerted effort to promote nuclear non-proliferation, regulate political instability in the Middle East, advance economic cooperation and so forth.

Johns Hopkins University Professor M. Harrison has analyzed the present state of international affairs and has criticized the current U.S. administration's attempts to undermine detente. In "Reagan's World," an article published in FOREIGN POLICY, he criticizes the Washington administration's "bipolar" view of world problems. "Conflicts and victories, allies and enemies, problems and interests are all considered in relation to extremely unhealthy Soviet-American rivalry," he wrote. According to Harrison, the 1980's will be the decade in which states begin to act in accordance with their own realistic interests. The success or failure of Reagan's foreign policy, the author continues, will depend on the administration's ability to adapt to this model. Harrison suggests that, despite all of its tough rhetoric, the administration will find it difficult to renounce all of the commitments, treaties and achievements of the 1970's because there are a number of restricting factors, including factors in the sphere of military spending. Besides this, the United States' allies no longer wish to blindly uphold the foreign policy line of the United States. Harrison advises the administration to resume the arms control talks and notes that Washington's misunderstanding of the international situation "could put the West and the entire world in grave danger."

The need to revise the bases of American foreign policy and the U.S. approach to relations with the Soviet Union is also the subject of an article by W. Blake in the May issue of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL. The author writes that the United States has no other choice but to resume the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. "This is so important," Blake stresses, "that it must be done regardless of the state of relations between the two countries." Blake advises the resumption and development of trade and cultural contacts and the cancellation of trade restrictions, particularly the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and other restrictions instituted for political reasons.

The same issue of the journal contains an article by Professor D. Neuchterlein, an expert on international relations and the author of several books about American foreign policy. He stresses that the United States has a vital interest in continuing the strategic arms limitation talks with the USSR. This is so important, he writes, that the United States must give up its attempts to "make this process contingent upon Soviet behavior in the Middle East, in Africa and even in Latin America."

Similar conclusions were drawn by the authors of a report submitted to the President by the Commission for a National Agenda for the 1980's. The sixth chapter of the
report, which specifies recommended U.S. government policy in relations with the USSR and other socialist countries, was reprinted in THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY QUARTERLY. In particular, the authors advised the reduction of lethal weapon stockpiles and broader cooperation between the USSR and United States.8

A realistic foreign policy approach and more consideration for objective factors are also advocated by G. Ball, a prominent figure in politics and the former U.S. under secretary of state, in an article published in the WASHINGTON POST. Seeing the "hand of Moscow" in all "unrest" in the world is "not a policy but an obsession," he wrote. "Diplomacy, they tell us, is the pursuit of the spineless, and a resolute America should develop more and more destructive weapons while simultaneously arm- ing any regime (the fact that it might be corrupt or repressive is immaterial) that loudly shouts anticommunist slogans." Ball criticizes the Reagan Administration's attempts to "link" arms limitation with Soviet behavior toward other countries: "How can any sensible person regard mutual efforts to establish some kind of control over the arms race as a favor we are doing for the other side? It is as if this is something that will benefit only Moscow or something that we can prohibit!" He went on to say: "We cannot expect restraint from others if we do not practice it ourselves."9

Former Chairman F. Church of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee criticizes the present administration's foreign policy from the same standpoint in a NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE article: "Reasonable American policy...must be made with a view...to the real world in which we live. The first 6 months of the Reagan Administration were marked by clashes between this real world and the one-sided anti-Soviet ideology of the President and his chief advisers." Church expresses the hope that "the invete-rate anti-Sovietism of the administration, including the futile attempts to attain unattainable nuclear superiority, will be replaced by a realization of the urgent need for mutual strategic arms limitation. In the thermonuclear age there is only one reality: There can be no victor in a nuclear war."10

A realistic approach to relations with the USSR is also advised by prominent expert on international affairs B. Blechman. In an article in the 4 June 1981 issue of the WASHINGTON POST, he said the following about American-Soviet confrontation: "No reasonable person can see any advantage in starting a war. The maximum potential risk--the complete annihilation of our societies--clearly outweighs any vague ideas about minimum and relative advantages.... We must maintain dialogue with the USSR."

When General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev visited the FRG, he made some new, far-reaching proposals with the aim of arriving at a mutually acceptable agreement and guarding Europe against the dangers of a nuclear conflagration. These proposals were not only addressed to the FRG and other Western European countries, but, as the decree of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers on the results of this visit11 states, they are also addressed to the United States, in connection with the start of the Soviet-American talks on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe on 30 November 1981 in Geneva.

There is no question that a realistic approach to these talks would be in the interest of the Soviet and American people and all other people in the world.
In spite of all this, recent statements by U.S. officials and, in particular, the loud anti-Soviet and anti-Polish campaign launched by Washington testify that American ruling circles do not want to give up the methods of intervention and pressure in foreign policy and that the obsessive desire to "throw back socialism" is dimming the eyes of the U.S. leadership and obscuring its view of reality.

FOOTNOTES


11. PRAVDA, 1 December 1981.

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AMERICAN BOOK ABOUT FASCIST ELEMENTS OF U.S. POWER STRUCTURE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 82-91


[Not translated by JPRS]

POLUTION CONTROLS CHANGE U.S. AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 92-100

[Article by V. A. Sedov and V. I. Sokolov: "The Automobile and the Environment"]

[Not translated by JPRS]

ECONOMIC INSTABILITY COMPLICATES ADMINISTRATIVE PROGRESS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 101-105

[Article by V. P. Averchev and Yu. A. Ushanov: "Management Innovation Problems"]

[Not translated by JPRS]

POTATO STORAGE, TRANSPORT, SALES PROCESS EXPLAINED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 106-114

[Article by A. A. Rodionova: "The Storage, Transport and Sale of Potatoes in the United States"]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803/10 82
BOOK REVIEWS

Beijing's Current Promise

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 115-117


[Not translated by JPRS]

Southwestern State Legislatures

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 118-120


[Not translated by JPRS]

Mental Health and Quality of Life

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 120-123


[Not translated by JPRS]
Far Eastern 'Junior Partners'

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) p 123


[Text] The subject of this work is the role of the Taiwan and Korea questions in American-Chinese relations in the last decade—that is, during the period of active Washington-Beijing convergence. The author goes beyond this subject, however, and this makes the book more interesting. He analyzes the basic premises of the Asian policy of the United States and China, the peculiar forms they have taken during various stages and the place of China, Japan, the United States and their "junior allies" in the balance of power in the Far East.

The author compares the Asian aims of the foreign policy doctrines of Nixon, Ford and Carter and concludes that all of them had the common aim of guaranteeing the United States a special role in the balance of power in the Far East, which would give it an opportunity to "take one side or the other, depending on American imperialism's own interests" (p 180). At the same time, the author stresses, all of the Washington administrations of the last decade have tried to establish a new military and political structure within the region of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea bloc.

The author concludes that the concept of U.S. alliances with "junior" partners in the Far East has undergone changes during the period in question. This has been reflected in the differentiated U.S. approach to Taiwan and South Korea and in Washington's willingness to sacrifice any military and political treaty with one of its allies for the sake of the fundamental class interests of American imperialism (p 182).

The author also examines specific aspects of American-Chinese relations. He stresses that both sides tried to ignore the Taiwan problem during the period of normalization. Beijing's position on this matter is distinguished by a lack of principle and a willingness to sacrifice the Chinese people's legitimate right to national unity for the sake of practical benefits.

The author also analyzes the evolution of the U.S. and Chinese positions on the Korean problem during the process of the Washington-Beijing rapprochement on an anti-Soviet basis and underscores the United States' efforts to strengthen South Korea as a continental stronghold in East Asia.

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Changing U.S. View of Detente

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 123-124


[Text] The author of this work presents a detailed analysis of the basic aspects of U.S. foreign policy from the postwar period to our day and its evolution under the conditions of relaxed international tension in three areas: in relations with socialist countries, relations within the capitalist system and relations with developing countries.

The author cogently proves that the pressure in favor of a policy of detente was already being felt in the 1950's and was particularly apparent in the 1960's. Western historians and political scientists mistakenly associate this trend with the Kennedy Administration, dating the beginning of detente to the time of his presidency and deliberately closing their eyes to the fact that the periods of relaxed tension in international relations at that time were quite brief. The cold war momentum in the foreign policy of the imperialist states was still too strong at that time and led more than once to situations which put the world on the verge of catastrophic wars. This applies to the crises connected with West Berlin in 1961, the "Cuban missile crisis" in 1962 and the U.S. aggression in Indochina.

By the end of the 1960's the old system of international relations which had taken shape during the cold war era ceased to conform to the new balance of power in the international arena and inhibited the further development of intergovernmental relations. At that time the United States was also experiencing severe domestic political difficulties, some of which were related to failures on the foreign policy front, especially in Vietnam. This is why the author is correct in concluding that detente was made possible not by the foreign policy of the American administrations of the 1960's, but by the peaceful efforts of the USSR and other socialist states and by the active involvement of the Western European states in the normalization of relations in Europe.

An important part of Usachev's research is his discerning analysis of American concepts of detente, the authors of which have tried to portray it as something invented by Soviet diplomacy, something which is allegedly intended to camouflage Soviet "expansion" and the spread of communist ideology, or as a process benefiting only the Soviet Union and its friends, and to portray Soviet-American relations as nothing more than rivalry. This clearly echoes the primitive Beijing theory about the struggle of the two "superpowers" for "hegemony."

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Neocolonialism and Economic Aid

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 124-125


[Text] The problems examined by V. V. Mayorov are the central issues of today's ideological struggle. Many studies of African affairs have been published in the United States in recent years. Although the authors of these works criticize some of the more odious aspects of Washington's African policy, most of them are nevertheless inclined to exaggerate the elements of "liberalism" in this policy, to justify the United States' support of colonizers and racists and to argue that cooperation with the United States can give the African countries economic and other advantages.

With a great deal of factual data, the author reveals the real motives of U.S. policy in Africa. He exposes the neocolonial essence of American "aid" to the Dark Continent.

Describing the activities of American monopolies in Africa, the author proves that their main purpose was and is the robbery of natural resources and the exploitation of the African people. In addition, the book notes, the development of state-monopoly capitalism after World War II led to the appearance of a new function of the imperialist state—the function of preserving and strengthening capitalism as a world system. On the one hand, government strength and resources have been used for the military and political counteraction of socialism and the national liberation movement. On the other, state-monopoly methods are now being widely used to regulate intergovernmental economic relations so that the newly independent countries can be directed into the capitalist channel of development. The main form is imperialist "aid" to the developing countries.

Mayorov stresses that the main purpose of the policy of "partnership" and other similar Western concepts is to make the developing economies of the young countries a "natural extension," or, more precisely, an appendage, of the economies of the highly developed capitalist states. Furthermore, anticomunism lies at the center of all forms of neocolonial "partnership" and "aid" (p 118).

The underlying motives of "wheat diplomacy"—U.S. shipments of food to the African countries—are also cogently revealed in the book. Mayorov believes that the U.S. attempts to use food shipments to influence the economic development of the recipient countries on an ever-increasing scale represent the most important trend in the policy of U.S. food aid to the African countries (p 133).

A particularly interesting section of the work is the one in which the author describes several new features of U.S. neocolonialism's economic expansion in Africa, particularly the growing interest of U.S. monopolies in the processing industry, the expanding sphere of the exploitation of young states, the growing
dependence of the African countries on imported scientific and technical achievements, the growing number of American specialists sent to Africa and the heightened U.S. interest in the education and training of Africans in these countries.

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Current American Events

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) p 125


[Text] The authors' intention was to relate, in a concise and systematic form, the history of the leading country of the capitalist world during the period of the general crisis of capitalism.

Each period or stage of American history is described primarily from the standpoint of socioeconomic development, on the basis of which the authors analyze questions of party politics, the labor and democratic movement and foreign policy. The dominant theme is the state-monopoly evolution of American capitalism. The authors underscore the objective nature of this process—the stronger societal nature of production, which capitalism is directing into the state-monopoly channel (p 6). What we find particularly interesting is the authors' thorough examination of the origins and development of the basic aims of the state-monopoly ideology.

State-monopoly evolution is described within the historical context and from the standpoint of its main aspects—economic, political and ideological. The authors cogently prove that the establishment of state-monopoly capitalism as a system under Franklin Roosevelt was promoted by the entire course of U.S. socioeconomic development. It was promoted by the more highly organized nature of big capital in the 1920's, the creation of sectorial associations which later took an active part in determining the "rules of honest competition" and the plans for "industrial democracy" and ideas about the "social responsibility of business," which raised the ideology of state-monopoly capitalism to a new level.

During World War II, the authors stress, "American monopolistic capitalism's evolution into state-monopoly capitalism was essentially complete" (p 142). This augmented the role of monopolies and sharply restricted government activity in the area of social reforms.

The period of postwar reconstruction, as the authors point out, was the time when "the regulating intervention of the government took more extraordinary, more subtle forms" (p 159). A new stage in the development of state-monopoly capitalism began with the commencement of the technological revolution. The authors give special attention to this matter.

The description of Richard Nixon's "new economic policy" and James Carter's socioeconomic measures will give the reader a better understanding of the purpose and aims of the new Republican administration's economic program.

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Criticism of Optimistic American Forecasts

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 125-126


[Text] The subject of this review is a critical study of the ideological aspects and current features of futurology and social forecasting in the United States. The author analyzes theories which retained their significance throughout the 1970's. During this period, the problem of capitalism's survival and the means of its "modernization" were the subject of lively debates by scholars and politicians in the United States. The crisis of social and economic structures grew more severe and the criticism of the myth about American exclusivity became more pointed. Recent changes in mass political thinking have also been reflected in the basic premises of the bourgeois social sciences.

The author examines the peculiarities of the futurological boom and its influence on the concepts of the future in the works of W. Rostow, J. Galbraith, H. Kahn, Z. Brzezinski and D. Bell. Bell's concepts have had particularly widespread repercussions. An analysis of the ideas connected with these concepts takes up much of the book.

Bell's social-critical arguments are derived from the pessimistic theories about the "mass society," which were intended to substantiate utopian programs for the "gradual evolution of antagonistic social structures." The anti-Marxist purpose of Bell's theoretical constructions has consisted in his discussions about the "end of ideology" in social forecasts based on the concepts of "modernization." On the whole, what Bell proposes is not new, but it is a considerably renovated version of the "neotechnocratic" explanation of social progress. The concepts of Galbraith, Rostow and Aron are also known to have undergone certain changes during that period. These concepts cover an extremely broad range, but their influence has steadily declined. The doctrine of "convergence," to which many of them subscribed, has been discredited. Bell's theory was distinguished among these concepts by its criticizing tone. But like the rest, "post-industrialism" did not propose any fundamentally new courses of action and was, according to the author, only a variation on the theme of "social functionalism" (p 95), adapted to current political needs but providing no solutions to the contradictions of contemporary society or a scientific interpretation.

Garibadzhyan's book is more than just criticism of certain concepts of American bourgeois futurology. The author provides scientific proof of the common false premises of all bourgeois futurological concepts. He proves that bourgeois theories about the future are nothing more than illusions because they have no real prospects. Their authors are incapable of suggesting how their own predictions might be carried out. This is understandable because, after all, the ideological essence of futurological concepts is the result of the theoretical invalidity of
their authors' approach to the assessment of the causes of societal progress, and this is cogently traced in the book being reviewed.

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Updating the Protestant Religion

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 126-127


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