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WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 2048

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MESSAGES SMUGGLED TO RAF PRISONERS

Bonn DIE WELT in German 14 Sep 82 p 5

[Article by DW; "Smuggled Notes Keep RAF Prisoners Informed. Security Authorities Accuse Attorneys"]

[Text] Despite tight security, connections between members of the "Red Army Faction" (RAF) in prisons and the "hard core" of the terrorist organization continue to be maintained. A number of defense attorneys, it was maintained in a report issued by security authorities, continue to play a central role in this communication process.

The prisoners and their correspondence partners involved in this information exchange have been employing conspiratorial means to deceive their guards: reports are encoded using numbers and letters as keys—often with reference to specific books. The painstaking evaluation of documents found last year in an RAF hideout in Heidelberg-Rohrbach confirmed the suspicion of a constant flow of information both among prisoners from the terrorist scene and with each other as well as with RAF members still at liberty. Definite clues as to their distribution centers have not yet been uncovered.

The first central information office was formed by the leaders of the Baader-Meinhof gang shortly after their imprisonment in 1972. Messages smuggled out of their cells contained orders as well as instructions for agitation and plans for their liberation from prison. With the assistance of their attorneys, the leading figures of the RAF were able to create an apparatus for regular and reciprocal exchange of information. The RAF ringleader, Brigitte Mohnhaupt, is today full familiar with the infrastructure of this information system from her own time in prison.

Imprisoned RAF members were recently cautioned, according to prison authorities, by smuggled messages: "Once again, don't forget: your replies can only come out by the same route that the things get to you..."
ADVANTAGES OF IMPORTED, DOMESTIC COAL WEIGHED

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHEN in German 20 Aug 82 pp 95-96

[Article entitled: "Saving With Imports"]

[Text] There is of course an abundance of German hard coal in the ground, but mining it is getting increasingly more costly. It can hardly be mined without subsidies. The empty state coffers are a temptation to leave the national energy reserve as is.

With about 24 billion tons of extractable hard coal the ground in the FRG has larger quantities of this resource than anywhere else in Western continental Europe. France's coal reserves with 550 million tons are only about one-fiftieth of that. Of course, the British are sitting on top of even more hard coal: 45 billion tons.

The resources, which are quoted by energy statistics as "economically extractable reserves," have only one drawback: today they are still not exactly economically extractable. Every ton of domestic hard coal, including marketing assistance and direct subsidies, is subsidized by the state in the amount of DM 60 to 70—and is nonetheless still too costly. Coal from South Africa prepaid to Duisburg costs DM 138 per ton of hard coal units (SKE). Polish coal, to the extent it is available at all, can be had for DM 150, U.S. coal for DM 159.

Coal from the Ruhr or, for example, from Duisburg-Walsum, costs DM 243 per ton from the mine. By figuring in the subsidies the price difference between domestic and imported coal is still DM 130 per ton. Coal can be transported on every bulk cargo ship. The enormous excess capacities in the freight market for the present insure low tariffs throughout the world.

It is cheaper to ship coal from North America to the Rhine than to transport it by train from the Ruhr to north or south Germany: Although the German Federal Railways carries domestic coal and EC coal at preferential tariffs, transporting one ton of coal from the Ruhr to the south costs over DM 30. A ton of coal from the United States to a Rhine port costs only $4.25, thus something over DM 10.
In the case of coal there is no need to fear a supplier cartel modeled after OPEC: world reserves are too well distributed. North America alone has coal reserves which are almost as large as those of the entire Eastern bloc, on this side of the Atlantic just under 200 billion tons, and on the other side somewhat over 200 billion tons.

In spite of all that, no one is calling for the total shutdown of domestic mining. That would be foolish for many reasons: starting with guaranteeing national energy sources on up to employment policy and further development of mining know-how in which the Germans--thanks to their difficult mining conditions--are world leaders today.

Yet doubts are in order as to whether domestic mining should be increased using sums running in the billions from the tax money bags or whether it should not rather be left as is until mining is more favorable in terms of cost or until we are dependent on it. People plagued by such thoughts include, among others, VEBA [United Electricity and Mining Corporation] head Rudolf von Bennigsen-Foerder.

Saar-erg head Rudolf Lenthartz likewise does not consider an increase in mining to be relizable. And the Association of German Coal Importers, which believes that prices for imported coal will continue to remain substantially below those for domestic coal, speaks--since it represents a party--first cautiously of the necessary compromise between sure and cost-favorable energy.

Ruhr Coal head Karlheinz Bund meanwhile still wants to increase domestic mining by 1985 to over 90 million tons SKE and by the turn of the century he even sees 100 million tons SKE as a realizable mining target. And this although in 1981 coal stocks at Ruhr Coal grew. In 1982, too, stocks throughout German hard coal mining will continue to increase, there looms a large gap between mining and selling--in spite of the century-long agreement to provide power with hard coal and in spite of commitments on the part of the steel industry to take delivery via the metallurgy agreement.

Yet Bund does not back off from his outlook for the future. On the other hand, coal importers estimate that by 1990 about 20 million tons SKE alone will no longer be there because of coal mine depletion, thus coal from existing mines will be mined out. It would be possible to maintain today's mining capacity of about 80 million tons only by costly sinking of new shafts. This is true at least for Ruhr Coal whose yield of 63 to 64 million tons SKE has the largest share in domestic coal mining anyway.

Importers confirm: "Stabilization of domestic mining at today's level requires large investments for replacement capacities. Whether these investments make sense or should be undertaken only if the basic economic conditions change permanently should be subjected to serious review."
With subsidized coal the FRG still has a large positive foreign trade balance (see Table). There were no bottlenecks in the case of imported coal in spite of drastically reduced deliveries from Poland. The security argument thus has only limited punch. Moreover, in the case of the energy supply guaranteeing is very costly, involving DM 6 billions in coal subsidies. It costs the German taxpayer almost exactly as much as the European agricultural market into whose treasury they will pay about DM 6.3 billion in 1982.

The Dutch, whose DSM sent its last miner home more than 10 years ago are very happy today that in all these years they did not exploit their—admittedly modest—supplies and depended entirely on low-priced imported coal. Today they even prohibit the Germans from mining coal reserves located near the border or which cross the border—who knows when they will be needed more urgently than now.

Table: United States Takes Poland's Place

Imports and Exports of German Hard Coal
(in thousands of tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports from</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>1,572</td>
<td>2,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EC countries</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>1,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td>3,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1,942</td>
<td>1,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1,492</td>
<td>1,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>10,187</td>
<td>11,303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports to</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC countries</td>
<td>17,842</td>
<td>15,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European third countries</td>
<td>1,617</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other third countries</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>19,884</td>
<td>17,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Trade Balance</td>
<td>+9,686</td>
<td>+6,243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12124
CSO: 3103/677
BUNDESBANK SEES FURTHER WORSENING OF ECONOMIC SITUATION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Sep 82 p 13

[Article by Jl: "Bundesbank: Gloomy Prospects for Economy]

[Text] Despite the improvement in a number of important basic conditions, the situation of the economy at mid-year continued to be clouded. While new orders received and production have been stagnating, public budget deficits have been rising, accompanied by diminished tax revenues and rising expenditures for unemployment. Uncertainty about future international economic developments and doubts about the future course of economic and fiscal policy at home have contributed to weakening corporate resolve for investment. These are the central points of the analysis published by the Bundesbank in its latest monthly report.

The Bundesbank holds weakening of foreign demand mainly responsible for the continued worsening of the economic situation. Orders from foreign buyers during the period May through July were down by 8 percent as compared to the preceding quarter; orders were also down substantially from the same period the year before. Sharp production declines among the country's most important trading partners were largely responsible for the drop as was also a further revaluation of the German mark.

At the same time domestic demand has also continued to decline; demand for investment goods from May through July dropped by about 3 percent compared with the same period of the year earlier. While new contracts in the construction industry have again advanced slightly, especially in the housing sector, total construction demand has fallen below even last year's depressed level. With private consumer expenditure down by an adjusted w percent from the comparable 1981 quarter, the production of consumer goods is down by a seasonally adjusted 4 percent from that of the preceding quarter.

Production is down in all major industrial sectors, especially so in investment goods. As a result, factory output in the processing sector has fallen to a mere 77 percent of normal production capacity. As a result of economic stagnation, the number of persons employed during the second quarter was almost a half-million less than it was from April through June of 1981; the number of unemployed has continued to rise sharply.
The Bundesbank maintains that the country will have to expect "a high level of benefits paid to unemployed persons for quite some time." The high budget deficits can thus not be regarded in any way as only "a temporary phenomenon." For the current year a deficit of up to 75 billion marks in Federal and Land budgets will have to be anticipated. If the (expected) recovery is slow in coming, then 1983 will see further shortfalls in tax revenues as well as higher expenditures for unemployment benefits.

On the positive side the Bundesbank cites the continued improvement in what had been a heavily negative balance of payments, falling interest rates, a weakening of inflationary tendencies in prices and production costs: wage unit costs throughout the economy as a whole have not risen any further. This has meant some improvement in corporate profit patterns, though "profit decline during the period from the beginning of 1979 to the end of 1980 have not yet even begun to be compensated. Corporate profits continue to fluctuate at low levels."
CNPF’S BRANA SHOWS DEEP CONCERN OVER FIRMS’ GROWING BURDENS

Paris LES ECHOS in French 15 Sep 82 p 3

Interview with Guy Brana, vice president of the CNPF, by Pierre Locardel; date and place not specified

French enterprise is in peril. That is the leitmotiv of this fall season in which the discontent of heads of enterprise is clearly seen, and at times in very lively forms. But apart from anathemas hurled by some, most heads of enterprise ask the government to become aware of their difficulties, and in consequence to modify its policy, as is explained to LES ECHOS by CNPF vice president Guy Brana.

Question: What do you think of the economic situation?

Answer: Activity is stagnating; there is no growth in France or abroad. That is the truth!

The industrial production index is at the same level in France as a year ago.

The international situation is dull if not depressed.

Prospects for 1983 are not encouraging. Unlike others, who are imprudent or optimistic, we are not making a rendezvous with world recovery. It appears too problematical. We are continuing to base our 1983 forecasts on stagnation of world activity.

I remind you that in France, in the proposed 1983 budget, all forecasts have been revised downward in comparison with last year. For 1982 the projected growth rate adopted was +3.3 percent; actually it will be nearer 1.5 percent. For 1983, +2 percent is projected, but we can ask how that result is to be obtained.

Domestic consumption is to grow by only 1.6 percent compared to 2.3 percent last year. The slack should be taken up by exports, which are expected to grow by 5.3 percent. Is not that very optimistic when we think that for
1982 predictions were for 4.9 percent, while the actual figure was near 0.4 percent. To succeed, we must be able to export, but also to win back the domestic market. Those are "high obligations" which our enterprises wish to fulfill. Will they be able to do so in their present state of weakness?

Profitability Near Zero

่าQuestion: What is the financial situation of enterprises?

Answer: The financial situation of enterprises is grave and very disturbing. We can no longer find words to bring the public authorities and public opinion to share our anxiety. Yet, to be convinced, one need only look at the figures, the official statistics.

Let us take as an indicator the gross savings by enterprises: that is, the sum of amortizations and undistributed profits. To renovate the productive plant, that gross saving must represent 12 to 13 percent of value added by enterprises. Ten years ago, it was on the order of 14 percent. By 1981 it had fallen to less than 8 percent. In 1982 the drop continued. A good many firms which were making money tell us their profitability is near zero; others say they are in the red and losing money.

A second alarming indicator is the number of petitions in bankruptcy. It is constantly growing: 1,507 in the first quarter of 1982; 1,814 in the second; and 2,070 in June. And that even before enterprises had to bear the consequences of the price freeze. Announcement of a period of frozen prices perhaps acted as a trigger by auguring further difficulties. But the effects of the price freeze will not be felt till fall.

่าQuestion: Do you think the public authorities have the means to lighten the burdens of enterprises?

Answer: That is certainly not easy, but it is an absolute necessity. There must be a spectacular lightening of the burdens on enterprises. Everyone is aware of that. Then let us do it! It would restore "punch" to enterprises. And it is they, and they alone, who are fighting and bringing in foreign exchange. That is too often forgotten. It would strengthen the credibility of the government, which for months has been making, but not keeping, a promise to lighten and even reduce charges on enterprises.

A Necessity: Lighter Welfare Costs

่าQuestion: More specifically, of what lightened costs are you thinking?

Answer: The government, alas, has a wide choice. We have the sad privilege of being among the nations in which state exactions—taxes plus welfare contributions—exceed 43 percent of the national wealth, that is, of the gross domestic product.
It is likewise in France that enterprises are subject to the highest tax pressure. At equal production levels, French firms pay twice as much in taxes and welfare contributions than their American, Japanese, or British competitors.

For example, we are the only country in which enterprises finance virtually the full cost of family welfare allowances. That represents 9 percent of wages, or nearly Fr 100 billion. It would be just and necessary to lighten, progressively, that burden on enterprises.

The professional tax, which penalizes employment and investment, could also be lightened or eliminated.

\textbf{Question\textsuperscript{7}} Compared to the former one, does the new savings system represent a decisive improvement for financing of enterprises?

\textbf{Answer\textsuperscript{7}} On the whole, the measures in favor of savings are on the right track. They extend and at times improve what was done by M Monory. The Bourse, moreover, greeted announcement of those measures by a 4 percent rise. But there was in that reaction more relief than enthusiasm. I regret, on behalf of enterprises, that those measures are more favorable to forced saving—that which is invested in loans floated by the state or by large enterprises, whether nationalized or not—than to risk saving, which is invested in shares issued by enterprises. Financing difficulties continue for small or even medium sized firms without access to the Bourse. The fundamental problem remains: why should savings be attracted to investment in enterprises when everyone knows those firms are in ill health? To attract savings, let us begin by restoring the profitability of enterprises.

\textbf{Question\textsuperscript{7}} How is productive investment to be given a new start?

\textbf{Answer\textsuperscript{7}} Enterprises are very much weakened. Investment will start again when they are in better health, when they have rebuilt their profitability and restored their competitiveness.

In a depressed international situation which does not spark entrepreneurial activity, the priority need is to eliminate everything which can impede decisions to invest. For example, the modalities of aid to investment, which link the granting of that aid to immediate creation of employment, are so restrictive that such aid has been little used by enterprises. This must be recognized, and that device must be improved if we wish enterprises to use it.

But there is a very grave menace which weighs on investment by enterprises: the tax on capital equipment. It is in truth an aggression against enterprise. Indeed, it is the personally owned firms, small and medium in size, which often are the most efficient, which take the most risks, and on which rests the future of our economy, that are the hardest hit and most heavily penalized. And the damage done cannot immediately be measured.
A head of enterprise who manages one of our most efficient firms told me: "The tax on production equipment costs me a factory every 5 years." I ask the question: do we want to destroy our working tools?

Free Prices: the Key to Recovery

(question) What corrective measures should the government contribute? Lighten the burdens on enterprises? Correct certain fiscal innovations it introduced, which are errors, certain improvisations? Is all that sufficient to restore balance in the government's policy vis-a-vis enterprise?

(answer) I do not know if that would suffice. It will take time to straighten out the situation of enterprises. But such corrective actions would give a second wind to enterprises and restore the morale of their leaders.

(question) Is not a return to free prices the key factor in the present situation?

(answer) Free prices are indeed the key to our economic recovery. They are an absolute and vital necessity for our economic recovery, for the economy and for enterprise. Unhappily, certain simplistic minds believe that freedom inevitably brings higher prices. It is too often forgotten that prices are not set arbitrarily; they are governed by national and international competition.

The urgent need is to restore greater versatility, flexibility, and adaptability to enterprise. We must remove the threat of an administered economy, and organize the quickest possible return to liberty.

Let us bet on the public spirit and sense of responsibility of heads of enterprise. They are determined, at least as much as the government, to fight the inflation which weakens us in the face of foreign competition.
SOUTH KOREA SHOWS INTEREST IN TECHNOLOGY, CLOSER TRADE TIES

Paris LES ECHOS in French 14 Sep 82 p 3

Article signed J.-M. L.

[Text] South Korea holds a less prominent place in French opinion than its big brother Japan. Nevertheless, the constant flow of Korean exports has for the past three years resulted in an annual trade deficit of approximately Fr 1 billion. And the few large contracts recently obtained in pinpoint sectors will have no impact until 1983 or 1984.

Circumstances are thus favorable for a readjustment in the terms of trade—a central objective of the talks held yesterday by Minister for Foreign Trade Michel Jobert with several Korean ministers. But competition is stiff, particularly from Japan and the United States, in a country where political dimensions count. From that standpoint, France has the benefit of a presumption in its favor. It is not certain, however, that Seoul's economic difficulties will not negate it.

In 20 years South Korea, with a population of 39 million, has attained a level of development, with a growth rate averaging 9 percent.

According to a Quai Branly expert, M. Ducharne, the market will progressively open: "This country is destined to become the Holland of Asia." Despite a foreign debt estimated at $32.8 billion in 1981—comparable to that of Poland—Korea remains "a good risk." Though there have been recent riots, political hazards do not appear to be bringing that judgment back into question.

By 1981 the Koreans had barely returned to their 1979 living standards, which is an indication of the damage caused by the 1979-1980 crisis. Concurrently, the current balance of payments deficit progressively fell: to $5.3 billion in 1980, $4.7 billion in 1981, and $724 million for the first quarter of 1982, with a probable imbalance of $2 billion for the year.
That recovery coincided with the start of the fifth five-year plan (1982-1986), of which one ambition is to diversify cooperation with Europe as a counterweight to Japan and the United States.

In that context France, which ranks but twelfth in volume of exports to Korea and accounts for 1 percent of Korea's imports, finds a choice partner in several sectors, even though its position is far behind Japan with 25 percent, the United States with 24 percent, West Germany with 2.6 percent, and the United Kingdom with 1.5 percent.

After five good years from 1975 to 1979, due to Airbus, cement plant, and thermal power station sales, there was a marked slump in 1980. But a recovery is taking shape. After last year's loss of the Seoul subway contract to the Anglo-Americans, French industry has good hopes of obtaining the Pusan subway contract valued at Fr 2 billion.

Also in favorable positions are projects for water purification, a petrochemical complex, and renovation of thermal power stations by substitution of coal for fuel oil.

We recall that the contract signed by Framatome in 1980 calls for training in France of many Korean specialists. Some 140 engineers will come to France for periods from three months to three years. Conversely, 100 French engineers will work in Korea from two to four years. That will be a path leading to technical cooperation.

The advantage for French technology is real, with the high-speed train, the Garolín Bay tidal power station, and a new nuclear power station. But at the end of August the government announced cancellation of nuclear power stations 13 and 14. Since France is already building stations 9 and 10, for Fr 8 billion, it will have difficulty bidding for phases 11 and 12. Our exporters are also bidding to supply a telecommunications satellite for the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988. Moreover, the French banking presence, with six establishments, is considerable.

Seoul, for its part, complains of impediments to its exports to France of textiles, ships, and electronics; and there are quotas on radio-television receivers, umbrellas, toys, and dishes. In 1981 French imports rose to Fr 1.917 million, and exports to Fr 806 million. For the first half of 1982 the respective figures are Fr 1.141 million and Fr 444 million. The deficit is deepening.

6145
CSO: 3100/980
INTERVIEW WITH GEORGIOS IOANNIDIS

Athens O AGON in Greek 22, 24 Aug 82

[Interview with Georgios Ioannidis, presidential candidate, by Andreas Kaouris, date and place not given]

22 Aug 82 p 3

Text We publish below the first part of the interview by Andreas Kaouris with Georgios Ioannidis, former interlocutor at the inter-communal talks and now presidential candidate.

Question: What is your position on the AKEL-Democratic Party cooperation and how can it be confronted?

Answer: As is known, I have expressed my opposition to the AKEL-DIKO cooperation because I sincerely believe that it will harm the interests of the Cypriot people and our national cause. This opposition is based on my steadfast position and belief that for the success of the Cypriot struggle it is necessary to have the people’s complete unity on a common policy and course, on a common national program which will lead to the salvation of our country. I believe that the preconditions for achieving such unity exist if the whole issue is confronted nationally as the present difficult conditions demand and not factionally. The more time passes, the more the people realize that the AKEL-DIKO cooperation harms our nation.

The Cyprus question faces difficult deadlocks and its handling is not easy. The more our internal front remains weak and shattered, the more the National Council remains inactive and the more our relations with Greece remain frigid, the harder the situation becomes.

It has already been proved in practice that the minimum AKEL-DIKO program not only does not promote the unity of the people but leads to its disunity and strong partisanship, to polarization and confrontation with harmful consequences to the future of the country. In addition, it is contrary to the national course the Greek government has charted and puts to test the Greek-Cypriot relations at a critical and decisive time for the future of our country. The president and the government of the republic are placed under the guardianship of the two cooperating parties and especially AKEL which is the strongest of the two. Thus, the president of the Republic of Cyprus is demoted from an authoritative spokesman of the whole Cypriot people to a president of that section of people which accepts the minimum program, thus reducing also his authority domestically and internationally--a fact which irreparably harms our national cause.
Under such conditions which lead the country to certain catastrophe, all the parties and all the Cypriot people face the duty to halt this march toward disaster. Let us not forget that Cyprus is under occupation and must follow a difficult road for its survival. Our population is small and all of us are needed to defend the Thermopyles of our fatherland, to defend them unitedly. Unity, unanimity, universality and collectivity are the answer to our problem, to the serious problem of our survival, and the course on a commonly acceptable national program for survival and salvation in cooperation with Greece—the course which will save Cyprus and avert disaster.

Question: How do you face the approaching presidential elections?

Answer: With purely patriotic incentives and motives without any personal ambition. My candidacy aims at unity and cultivates such a goal.

In the presently existing political deadlock and in view of the dangers a possible success of the AKEL-DIKO cooperation portends, I believe that I am offering the people a sound choice under the present adverse conditions—a choice for unity and for the salvation of the fatherland. My objective is not to satisfy a personal ambition but to achieve the unity of the people or the preconditions for a broader unity of the people.

Question: What will the impact be in Cyprus and abroad in the event the AKEL-PASOK alliance prevails in the presidential elections?

Answer: The hopes for uniting the people will disappear and the division will become permanent and ordinary. The polarisation and confrontation will become reality. Petty politics and controversies will prevail in the daily life of the people. Passions and hatred will increase. Cyprus’ cause will be led to permanent deadlock and complete stagnation. Factionalism in the civil service will be a regular phenomenon. The prospects for a just solution of the Cyprus problem will be nullified and the voice of Cyprus on the international scene will disappear. I will outline the situation in general as follows:

The domestic front will remain weak and we will be at the mercy of circumstances. The National Council will remain inactive and a substantial sector of the people will be far from the developments of the Cypriot problem. Without the National Council and the people’s unity our national cause will stagnate and the danger to consolidate the "accomplished fact" of the invasion will be immediate. We shall always be on the defensive and the Turkish side on the offensive, thus dealing with the Cyprus problem as it pleases. Unfortunately, we shall be the spectators to our tragedy.

For this reason, I repeat: At this moment the responsibility of all of us—parties and people—is immense. All of us must rise to the great circumstances and unitedly must struggle for our salvation and survival. There is no other path to salvation. The common struggle for survival and peace must be established above parties and persons and on the basis of a national program.

Question: In order to cope with the AKEL-DIKO alliance, did you have any contacts with the other parties for a common front in the presidential election?
Answer: I had contacts with some parties as well as with party leaders and various political partisan and non-partisan leaders and exchanged views on the presidential elections for the purpose of finding the best possible solution for the country.

I believe that for the country's salvation every effort should be exerted in a spirit of sincerity and patriotism. Any effort which aims at unity and the salvation of the country is welcome and desirable.

Question: What are the problems which have until now prevented the creation of a front against the AKEL-DIKO cooperation?

Answer: It is natural for each political party to want to assume power. It is a legitimate and physiological pursuit. In this context it is logical that each party should assess its strength and take stock. If it has the possibility to win the election then it wants to govern. If not, it develops conditions of cooperation with other parties and other political leaders in order to assume control.

In Cyprus we have peculiar conditions which derive from the fact that our island is under occupation and lives the unspeakable tragedy of refugees and missing persons. Cyprus must undertake a multi-dimensional struggle for its survival and needs the assistance and influence of all. This struggle cannot be won by one party even though it may have a small majority.

For this reason it is necessary to establish a salvation front—the broader it is, the better. Personally, I favor a front which will include all the people and all the parties which, however, will maintain their independence. Only such a front will save the country. And to avoid any impression that I aspire to be the leader of such a front and the president of the Republic of Cyprus, I declare that in such a case I shall not entertain any aspirations and I will consider myself very happy to serve as a plain soldier under any person the parties would choose. My only aspiration is the salvation of the country.

As long as the AKEL-DIKO alliance is becoming harmful to Cyprus and the struggle of our people, then the unity of the people which is against it is necessary in order to avert the dangers threatening Cyprus and thus save it. Despite the problems which exist in achieving such unity, it is necessary to strengthen all elements which bring together the people and to have sincere efforts made by all for the realization of this unity.

Question: What are your views on the Athens-Nicosia relations and how could they be restored?

Answer: Athens and Nicosia must march together and cooperate in the struggle for the salvation and the survival of Cyprus. The Athens-Nicosia relations must not be formalistic; they must be placed in the broader framework of Hellenism's interests. That is, they must be nationalistic. This preassumes the determination of a common line and policy and the coordination of all activities as well as sincere cooperation. Nicosia must speak to Athens sincerely and should never allow the defamation of Greece.
The relations between Cyprus and Greece must be restored for the sake of Cyprus' struggle. All of us, especially the president and the government of the Republic of Cyprus, must make efforts to restore these relations. For this reason all elements which led to the crisis must be removed and the relations between the two countries restored.

Personally I believe that if unity and a strong domestic front can be developed in Cyprus, the relations between the two countries can be consolidated on a healthy and true basis.

Question: Do you believe that Greece's support has been used to best advantage by our side? Yes or no and why? If no, then what must be done?

Answer: I believe that our side not only has failed to exploit Greece's assistance but has discouraged it, not to say that it has neutralized it. Yet it is a fact that the president of the republic has from the very first moment encouraged it, has accepted it and has praised it to the skies only to torpedo it later with the minimum program.

We all remember the visit of Premier A. Papandreou to Cyprus and the beneficial impact it had on the fighting spirit of our people. The people enthusiastically have approved Papandreou's policy of support and the Greek premier proceeded with affection, concern and determination toward the internationalization of the Cyprus question in the European area. Unfortunately, the minimum program has given a new form to the situation.

The president must now take a decisive step to restore things to their place and to create the basis for a sincere coordination of the Athens-Nicosia efforts and for the adoption of common line and policy on the Cyprus question, a policy acceptable by the whole Cypriot people. Such a line is the one charted by Premier Papandreou.

Question: How do you see the issue of the by-election for filling the vacant parliamentary seat in Famagusta?

Answer: The unexpected death of a humanist and selfless professional man, a fighter for social and national causes, a man who honored with exceptional dignity the parliamentary seat he occupied and raised with his moral stature the country's political standard, has deprived the Democratic Rally (DISY), Famagusta and Cyprus in general of an eminent person who inspired confidence and respect in all regardless of party affiliation.

At the same time, the adoption of the proportional electoral system opened the way for the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives. I believe that all parties should show respect for the man who left us and for his ideological beliefs as well as to the philosophy of the proportional system.

On the basis of the proportional system this seat belongs to DISY and should be given to it if we want to be true to the philosophy of the proportional system. Now this by-election adulterates the whole proportional election system and we will be the first country in the world where such a preposterous action is taking place--
to apply, that is, the majority system and to have, moreover, two parties contest the election thus changing the character and composition of the House of Representatives, a composition which is the outcome of the proportional system. It would at least be proper and just if all parties which participated in the general election contested the seat and not just two. Theoretically, at least, we would be applying the proportional system. Without doubt there is the legal side of this issue. Nothing, however, prevented the political parties from taking an ethical stand on the issue. Instead an inconsistency prevailed to such an extent that the president of the republic is campaigning everywhere for the candidate of his party in a by-election which should not be given the importance it received.

I mentioned that the proportional system is being adulterated and I must give an explanation. Let us imagine that DISY lost not one but two deputies and that by-elections took place under the present conditions. Let us say further that the AKEL-DIKO alliance succeeded in electing two new DIKO deputies. Then in the House of Representatives DIKO and DISY would have 10 deputies each while the electoral strength of the parties would be: DIKO 19.5 percent and DISY 32 percent. In other words, the proportional system would represent just form and theory, not substance and reality.

For this reason I believe that the Famagusta seat morally and logically and for reasons of justice belongs to DISY.

24 Aug 82 p 2

We publish today the second part of the Ioannidis interview.

Question: What steps must be taken toward solving the Cyprus problem and how do you see the possibility of an appeal to the UN?

Answer: The Cyprus problem is in a critical and difficult phase and especially now that we face many weaknesses in the domestic front: unity of the people, the National Council, our relations with Greece—all are passing through a crisis. We also have the intensive and sharp partisanship, the personal disputes, the pre-electoral fever the temperature of which climbs constantly along with polarization and fanaticism. All these will impede the making of decisions or the making of the right decisions.

The Turkish side hardens its position and makes new threats because it knows our weakness. It takes advantage of our difficulties, exercises blackmail tactics and follows an offensive policy.

Unfortunately we are prisoners of our weaknesses and our political passions. We cannot easily overcome them and pursue our national interest which dictates the need for national unity. Two days ago Premier Papandreou called on us to show unanimity and to cooperate with Greece in our difficult national march. Unfortunately, we occupy ourselves with passions and our party politics while Attilas occupies our land.
I sincerely believe that first and above all the country's leadership must consider its immense responsibilities, must abandon the policy which divides the people and destroys our struggling ramparts and must work to build the foundations for unity and cooperation with Greece.

This is the first basic step in the direction of solving the Cyprus problem. It is the first step which will lead Cyprus away from party disputes and will open the way toward the reactivation of the National Council which for months now has been inactive at the expense of our national cause.

It is a great mistake on the part of the government to handle the Cyprus problem without informing the rest of the political world and listening to its views. Today the Cyprus problem is handled in the absence of the Cypriot people. To be fair and honest, the responsibility for the Cyprus question has been assumed in essence by the AKEL-DIKO alliance which decides its future handling. This will prove to be a terrible mistake in the course of further developments concerning the Cyprus problem.

Already for the first time the Cyprus problem is being considered by the UN but the National Council has nothing to do with the whole handling of our appeal. And in this case, both the handling and the substance of the appeal are important.

What should we ask from the UN, how should we ask it and what argument should we use in order to be convincing, what resolution can we achieve—all these must be considered carefully and in detail. Of course, the advice and contribution in this effort by the country's political forces are necessary as was the case in the past. Because the Cyprus problem, being a national one, concerns all the people and their future.

At this moment we do not know how the government intends to handle the appeal and what its content will be. Therefore, events render impossible the expression of specific views. I would say, however, that the appeal is necessary in view of the fact that for many months now the Cyprus problem has remained stagnant and the hardening of the Turkish position makes the continuation of the intercommunal talks problematic and without substantive content. But I repeat that the whole question of appeal at this critical phase of the Cyprus problem should be studied sufficiently in all its detail. As concerns the handling and content of the appeal all parties and the National Council should be asked to give their views and to work for its being achieved in the UN. At the same time, the actions of Cyprus and Greece should be coordinated at all stages—from the time the appeal is prepared to the final stage of the debate in the UN.

If the above basic factors are overlooked and our appeal is made only for reasons of making impressions and petty politics, then things will lead to a difficult adventure for which the government will bear the whole responsibility while the whole Cypriot people will suffer the consequences.
KOHL, STRAUSS DISCUSS STRATEGY FOR GOVERNMENT CHANGE

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 6 Sep 82 pp 23-24

[Article: "Resignation on Mountainside"]

[Text] Following a change of government in Bonn, Franz Josef Strauss would prefer to stay in Munich: The Bavarian feels that the chances for a Kohl government are too uncertain.

While they were hiking together through the wooded mountainsides of the Wilder Kaiser, Franz Josef Strauss entrusted Helmut Kohl, chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, with a personal decision. The mountain companion from Bonn found it difficult to hide his joy.

If the coalitions should fall apart in the near future and the Union should be able to form the next Federal Government jointly with the Free Democrats, the CSU chief told the CDU chief on Tuesday last week, he would no longer want to be considered for a ministerial office in Bonn. He did not want to be one of those who stand in the way of others.

The disclaimer of Bavaria's minister-president came at the right time for Helmut Kohl: Now he feels that he can more easily shake the suspicion of being chancellor under Franz Josef Strauss. And the disclaimer increases his hope that the Free Democrats will soon switch to his side.

It is true that Hans-Dietrich Genscher let it be known in intimate conversations that he would welcome the Bavarian as a member of a Kohl cabinet. But something that is more important to the FDP chairman is the fact that many Free Democrats would say yes to the switch but no to a Minister Strauss--Minister of the Interior Gerhart Baum, for instance, said in a memorandum to his party chief: The image of Strauss "is the symbol of a total and destructive confrontation."

And the ecstasy of the opposition leader was complete when Strauss gave him the assurance on the mountain that he would remain Strauss' candidate for the chancellorship. It would be absurd to start a new debate right now on personalities. Stoltenberg, Kohl's rival, should not expect any help from Munich.

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The two agreed that in a coalition government with the FDP, Kiel's minister-president is to be appointed to the key post of minister of finance—the office which Strauss wanted for himself not too long ago.

Subsequently both of them railed at Stoltenberg: His intentions had not been completely honorable, but he had had his own interest in mind when he publicly attacked Strauss' demand that the Union should reject all tax-change plans to put the 1983 FRG budget on a sound basis.

Apparently Stoltenberg felt that his own ambitions of becoming chancellor would be better served if he helped Helmut Schmidt a little longer to win a few more rounds—and that time would be on his side and against Bonn's parliamentary-group leader.

The CSU leader, dressed neatly in a Bavarian outfit, could not help but take a stab at his hiking companion—wearing light trousers and a pullover: Who is speaking for the CDU anyway? The multiple-voice chorus of CDU minister-presidents and the CDU presidium, who had expressed doubts about Strauss' blockade plans? Or CDU Secretary-General Heiner Geissler, who was carrying out his anti-Strauss attack in such a manner as if he were "alone in the world"? Or the CDU/CSU parliamentary group which like Strauss had rejected the tax plans of the Bonn government?

But aside from that there were no clouds over the summit meeting, which Strauss had arranged discreetly and without annoying witnesses. The Bavarian spoke of his wife's aversion to moving to Bonn. Kohl, on his part, talked about the contacts he had had with FDP Chairman Hans-Dietrich Genscher while he was on vacation: "He burned his bridges behind him."

According to Kohl, Genscher is ready to make the jump. If the 26 September elections in Hesse go well for the Free Democrats, the change in Bonn would only be a question of a few weeks. At the end of October there will be the final quarrel between the liberals and the SPD over the 1983 budget; the FDP ministers will leave Schmidt's cabinet; nothing would remain in the way of a change of chancellors, probably following the FDP party rally at the beginning of November.

Kohl is convinced that the consequences will be uncertain if the FDP fails in Hesse: Genscher will either resign or try—if he sees any chance at all—to force the FDP to form a coalition with the Union by threatening to resign.

What Strauss and Kohl would like best is to have the new beginning in Bonn confirmed by the citizens through preferential Bundestag elections, perhaps next spring, to gain 4 years of time.

But they agreed on the Wilder Kaiser that the liberals cannot be trusted. To be sure, Genscher is saying that he also wants the blessing of the voters for the change. Nevertheless, there should be enough opponents to new elections in the FDP Bundestag parliamentary group—the understandable concern of losing a well-paid deputy mandate is enough of a reason. The liberals realize that their current 54-member parliamentary group would be severely decimated—if the party can even get the 5-percent minimum.
Consequently Kohl does not think much of making himself available as a candidate for the chancellorship for a constructive vote of nonconfidence and new elections. He is afraid that he would not get the required majority in this case.

Of course, the CDU/CSU and the FDP combined would have a solid majority of 30 votes. But it could melt quickly—if the declared and secret opponents of a Kohl chancellorship in the FDP and the CDU/CSU were joined by those no-votes who want to avert a premature loss of their mandate.

Kohl is only interested in a constructive vote of nonconfidence without a promise of new elections. If the Union and the FDP should cause the fall of the chancellor in parliament, the new bourgeois coalition is not to face an election until the fall of 1984.

But Strauss does not like the idea. He feels that the probationary period is too short. The Kohl government would only have barely 1 and 1/2 years to bring the state budget under control and to be successful in the fight against unemployment—in Strauss' opinion a hopeless undertaking.

In addition, the new chancellor would be under massive public pressure due to the NATO double resolution. Because beginning with the fall of 1983 the new U.S. missiles are to be deployed in the FRG.

Thus, it is by no means pure unselfishness when Strauss gives up any claim to be in Kohl's cabinet. He would prefer to remain Bavaria's minister-president instead of wearing himself out as Bonn's minister of finance.

In case there should be new elections next year after all because public pressure will become too great, Franz Josef Strauss will be back in Bonn and he will certainly be in the way: If the Union receives an absolute majority, he will claim for himself Hans-Deitrich Genscher's double-job—as vice chancellor and as minister of foreign affairs.

8991
CSO: 3103/668
CDU SPOKESMAN ATTACKS INTERIOR MINISTER BAUM

Bonn DIE WELT in German 16 Jul 82 p 3

[Article by Manfred Schnell: "An Interior Minister Baum would be Intolerable for the [Christian Democratic] Union. Karl Miltner to DIE WELT: The Interior Minister undermines the principle of Allegiance [to the State]"]

[Text] The Union substantiated their allegations against Interior Minister Baum and declared—apparently with a possible coalition with the FDP in mind—that "with such a minister the Union is unable to reach their political goals of internal security on the federal and the state level. The chief representative of the CDU/SCU in the parliamentary committee for Internal Affairs, Karl Miltner, said in an interview with DIE WELT that it was above all Baum's attitude towards allegiance [to the state] in the Civil Service "which showed that he disregards the constitutional principle of a vigilant democracy".

The ability of a democratic state to function would depend on a cooperation, based on trust, between federation and [member] states, in the realm of inner security, Miltner emphasized. In significant interior policy questions, however, Baum would act "in the spirit of the political objectives of his party, [according to which] the FDP would have to be a controversial, even opportunistic party. In Miltner's words, the Union blames Baum in particular and above all for the following:

Item: With his draft of a bill that distinguishes different functions of loyalty to the constitution "Baum undermines the constitutional principle of allegiance of civil servants". "Instead of abandoning this dubious policy", the Interior Minister "rather puts up with serious doubts about its constitutionality and a [political] break between federation and [member] states". Miltner emphasized that this bill would create "mistrust and legal uncertainty", for the minister "knows very well that his objectives can have devastating consequences in the special, security sensitive domain, as can be observed in individual cases already today". Therefore, so Miltner demanded, the security organs and the parliament would have to "hold the minister personally responsible for future blunders in this area". In any case, the Union would use all political and legal means to prevent this draft from becoming law.
Item: The federal and the state police forces would for the most part feel abandoned by Baum, Miltner suggested. "The security organs are disappointed, because important improvements were not accomplished despite years of announcing them, as for example the introduction of forgery proof car license plates, or forgery proof personal IDs for [more effective] police searches". The tense relationship between Baum and the Interior Ministers of the states [of the federation], so Miltner, "has blocked many promising beginnings".

Item: With regard to the right to demonstrate, Baum had prevented the introduction of more precise language "with shaky arguments", and "thus deprived police officers of important prerequisites to successfully react against persons resorting to violence". This refusal was to the disadvantage of the police officers. "In addition they had to make the bitter experience that Baum stood only half-heartedly by their side when discussions about the course of demonstrations were held after the event", Miltner explained.

Item: Concerning the cooperation between agencies and the protection of [personal] data, so another of the Union's complaints goes, "the minister has alienated the security organs by publicly questioning the legality of their actions. Then it took about two years until he saw himself fit to issue cooperation guidelines for the administrative bodies reporting to him". Here too, a final consultation of the Interior Ministers of the states was lacking.

In the domain of the security organs, so Miltner explained, the protection of [personal] data, which was favoured by all authorities concerned, "was several times pushed to a point where their [i.e. the security organ's] ability to function was impaired". Baum wasn't doing anything to remove the uncertainties in this area. "For years massive allegations about illegal activities of the security organs have remained uncontradicted. Baum acknowledges complaints of the officers concerned with indignation only; the allegations, however, are not being removed", the CDU security expert said in his talk with DIE WELT.

Miltner had special criticism for Baum because of his attitude towards the Civil Service. Here Baum would "not play his hand well". His positive announcements for the Civil Service were "again and again invalidated by his actions". Miltner: "If one considers the amount of publicity with which the minister intended to issue new performance guidelines for Civil Servants, and afterwards everything remained as it was before, or when he ignores a parliamentary mandate to cut down on [government] bureaucracy, then this is typical".

Regarding employees, during collective bargaining, Baum failed to enforce the one percent pay cut for Civil Servants provided for in the second statute outlining the structure of the federal budget. During the same collective bargaining sessions Baum agreed to an increase of the salaries and wages of white collar and blue collar workers, effective March 1, "and then he wants to demand a special sacrifice from Civil Servants by changing the
date of their salary increase from May 1 to August 1, 82. Baum wanted to
do this despite the fact that his own department stated in a release from
June 8 that "compared with the overall economy and the complete Civil
Service", Civil Servants, Judges, and Soldiers "are at the lower end of
the scale of salary increases". Therefore the protests, coming from the
ranks of the Civil Service, against the delay in the adjustment of
salaries this year, are "only understandable", Miltner said.

12196
CSO: 3103/597
STRUGGLES BETWEEN FDP'S TWO RIVAL YOUTH GROUPS

Bonn DIE WELT in German 15 Jul 82 p 4

[Article by Gunther Bading: "Young Democrats [JUDOS] and Young Liberals JULIS] Fighting for the Money of Mother FDP"

[Text] In the FDP there will be a decision on the political work of the party youth, presumably by fall. In the opinion of leading members of the FDP, the vocal protests of the Young Democrats [DJJD] against the delays in the transfer of the money allocated to them, for this year, by the party, originate by no means in a financial crisis of the organization, which is still recognized as the official youth organization of the FDP. The JUDOS receive some two million marks annually from public means to promote the political work of the youth. The 50,000 marks coming out of the party's own budget are thus practically insignificant. Leading FDP circles see the true motive for the protests of the JUDOS in an attempt to influence the decision of the federal executive board of the party on an application of the Young Liberals [JULIS] for financial support by the FDP.

The Young Liberals had submitted their request for financial support to the executive board already four months ago. So far this association, which, in contrast to the Young Democrats, consists exclusively of FDP party members, was financed through donations. "As long as we are not the official youth organization of the FDP, or at least recognized as a political cooperative, donations will be few" the JULI chairman Hans-Joachim Otto complained already some time ago. For the JULIS even some DM 10,000 from the party budget would be enough to guarantee their survival. Only a total replacement of the JUDOS, however, would give the JULIS access to the money allocated for the "official" youth of the respective parties, which abundantly flows from the federal budget, but mainly from the state budgets. This, of course, would call for some changes in the party statute at the Berlin party convention this year in November. While motions on this behalf can be expected, it is very likely that they fail to secure the necessary two thirds majority, the more so because, as everyone knows, the representation of the JUDOS among the party delegates is unproportionally high. Thus the JULIS hope for recognition as a working group.
The Young Democrats still report the number of their membership to be 20,000. At the FDP headquarters in Bonn, however, the number of genuine names in the membership charts is estimated to be not higher than 3,000 to 5,000. The JULIS, whose federal organization was officially founded only in November of last year, are at this point approximately one and a half thousand members strong.

The clear differences between the party and its official youth organization in almost all principia issues is not the only concern of leading politicians in the FDP. The main concern of the party leaders is that for quite some time now the Young Democrats have failed to produce any successors for the party leadership. Here, so sympathizers with the Young Liberals argue, a cooperation with the Young Liberals would offer a better chance.

While the leadership of the JUDOS, but also Secretary General Verheugen, see the rise of the JULIS as some kind of a proxy war for the conflict between the left and the right wing of the party, the Young Liberals reject such an assessment vehemently. Their Chairman Otto: "The FDP needs a youth organization of its own which is united with her in critical sympathy and solidarity. Despite some differences in particular issues, there is an elementary liberal basic consensus which unites us Young Liberals with the FDP".

12196
CSO: 3103/597
ARON EVALUATES SOCIALIST ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE

Madrid ABC in Spanish 1 Sep 82 p 20

[Article by Raymond Aron: "Socialist Government Experiencing Difficulties"]

[Text] Post-Gaullism perished in 1981, a victim of discord within the majority; the party that posited itself as the true voice of the General suffered until the end, in keeping with constitutional doctrine, the supremacy of the president of the Republic. It took its revenge during the electoral campaign, and on voting day, for the humiliations it had suffered. It preferred the triumph of the leader of the opposition to the reelection of a president it reproached, above all, with being not one of its own.

François Mitterrand was brought into power by the PS [Socialist Party], of which he was first secretary, and, constructively, he broke the umbilical cord that had bound him to this party, which he had reorganized and won in Epinay, 10 years prior to his victory. In 1981, it was not only a man of the 4th Republic who rose to the magistracy that had been conceived by and for the man of 18 June, but rather a man who carried with him the PS. And this man, despite the length of time that has elapsed and the renewal of personnel, still maintains a kinship with the parties of the 3rd and 4th Republics. By the mere force of having been excluded from government for so long, the opposition had gained a reputation for morality and represented virtue, ideals above self-interest. Hence the deeply felt indignation of some commentators when the minister of interior proposed fragmenting Paris and later Marseilles and Lyon.

The erstwhile majority, in selecting officials to fill important positions, took into account the political and party affiliations of the candidates. The current practice goes further, transfigured by the role of the two parties—the PS and PCF [French Communist Party]—and by the nationalization of an entire sector of the national economy.

Insofar as concerns the PS, only innocent minds or cynical ones can have been surprised by the fact that a communist, by chance a minister, addressed himself to the secretary of the CGT [General Confederation of Labor]—and member of the PCF—as to a superior. The hierarchical relationship between two members of that party does not depend on the functions each may be entrusted to fulfill from time to time. The title of minister of state has been bestowed upon Charles

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Piterman as the result of a negotiation between the PS and the PCF. This title in no way impresses Georges Marchais, who remains the party's No. 1. Piterman states he is in agreement with Mitterrand's foreign policy, although L'HUMANITE distances itself from the positions taken by the government in which four members of the PCF are participating. Appearances are being abided by and the deception finds its way up to the highest levels of state. Francois Mitterrand harbors no illusions about his communist colleague, but he is compelled to pretend a confidence he does not actually feel.

In the ministries headed by communists, a network has been installed that parallels the official network. The PS also extends its networks--although less rigorous and disciplined ones--throughout the government or along the fringes of it. Neither Pompidou nor Giscard d'Estaing had the benefit of an apparatus comparable to that of the PCF or even to that of the PS.

The government has just recently appointed, to head the Rhone-Poulenc enterprise, an administrator of scientific research who has never in his life managed an enterprise. Replacing a conservative by a socialist in a Faculty of Arts can hardly be seen as suspect by anyone. Competence is of course desirable, and both of them have comparable academic qualifications. Perhaps they will not perform equally well, but the change does not imperil national interests. However, when it comes to the president and general manager of Rhone-Poulenc, the selection affects the fate of an entire sector of the national economy.

I am not attacking the person concerned, whom I know, but this example illustrates the mortal danger that is created by the nationalization of big enterprises, combined with an amplified system of substitutions in vital positions of the national economy.

The supreme magistracy of the nation has fallen to a man of letters, while the state is expanding out of all proportion and is taking on functions that an orator or a machinator are hardly qualified to carry out. Francois Mitterrand belongs to a respectable family of political leaders and ministers who were highly placed among the staffs of the 3rd and 4th Republics. Professors and writers approach economic matters with a boldness that is suspect; they are motivated more by preconceived ideas of which they are convinced, than by knowledge and experience, which they distrust. And there, manifestly allergic to economic analysis, out of touch with management of the state for more than 20 years, we have the president who is responsible for the final decisions. If he has made various mistakes, it is less because of ignorance than because of ideological conviction.

He wanted to nationalize the big industrial conglomerates and all the banks. He was advised that the state, by buying 51 percent of the capital stock, would obtain and be able to wield full power over these entities at less expense to itself. But he wanted ownership of 100 percent of the capital. Why?
The president of the Republic finds himself comfortably ensconced in the role of his predecessors. And every day, he blesses the Constitution that he had so frequently cursed. Without the Constitution, the changing of parties in power would entail even worse consequences. But is he reigning without governing? Who governs for him?

Much more so than Giscard d'Estaing, he behaves like a superminister of foreign affairs and multiplies visits from one capital to another. On the other hand, he leaves to the prime minister the management of public affairs. Only a few days following his press conference, in which he appeared euphoric, the franc was devalued and a general freeze of wages and prices decreed. The head of state said not a word. Giscard d'Estaing wasted himself by appearing entirely too frequently on television and taking upon himself the policies of his prime minister. Mitterrand is managing to guard against this mistake. But for how long?

I doubt that he will be able to take shelter behind Pierre Mauroy and his ministers for very long. Under our Constitution, the prime minister is expected to serve as the scapegoat. But on condition, at least, that he not become the master of the palace and that the sovereign not be accused of seeking refuge in the sublime.
EDITORIAL ONCE AGAIN CALLS FOR REMOVAL OF BASES

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 5 Sep 82 p 12

Speaking at the PASOK Youth Festival, Premier Papandreou stressed that as long as foreign bases exist on our soil "we cannot say that we have achieved the goal of national independence." This is a sound assessment on the part of Papandreou but the question is justly raised: Why does the government not initiate procedures for removing the bases? And why did Papandreou in his interview with the French /Press/ Agency, take for granted the keeping of the bases saying that the aim of the forthcoming Greek-American negotiations will be to determine the conditions of their presence and operation? It is not difficult for one to see the contradiction in the two Papandreou positions. To the PASOK Youth he rightly points out that no national independence can be understood as long as the foreign bases remain, while to the French Agency he maintains that if the status of the bases is improved their presence will not be incompatible with the independent policy of Greece! The truth of the matter is that in the face of the Greek people's consistent demand for the removal of the bases--at the PASOK Youth Festival the slogan "away with the bases of death" was repeatedly and loudly heard--the government is compelled to give reassuring promises. But if such promises are not to be empty, they must be accompanied by deeds. And in the case of the bases the people and the PASOK followers are waiting for a definite determination of the timetable for their removal from our country. Any other "solution" will not be but an effort to keep the "nest of death," even if some cosmetic "changes" are made.

7520
CSO: 4621/517
GOVERNMENT RAPPELED FOR NOT DISCLOSING AIR INCURSIONS

Athens I AVGI in Greek 8 Sep 82 p 4

We cannot understand what purpose the government serves by avoiding to disclose the recent violations of our air space by Turkish aircraft. By hook or crook it wants to give validity to the agreement concerning the notorious "moratorium" by indicating that Turkey respects and observes it. This, moreover, was the meaning behind the statement the Greek deputy press minister made during an interview with political editors. However, according to a report of an afternoon paper which contains specific detailed information, on 3 September at 1449 hours our air space was violated at point 37°26-2705A (INM from Samos Island). The report states, moreover, that all the relevant information is in the file of Air Force General Staff Chief Brigadier General Kouris and mentions a second violation in recent days. Of what value, then, are the contradictory reassurances of the deputy press minister? We said that we should respectfully observe the agreements we sign but we should not reach the unacceptable point of reluctance in revealing to public opinion violations by the other side. Because, after all, we are not cooling down but instead encouraging Ankara's provocative tactics which are but an indispensable part of the Turkish junta's policy.

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CSO: 4621/517
KKE(INT) WOMEN'S OFFICE ISSUES STATEMENT ON EQUALITY OF SEXES

Athens I AKII in Greek 8 Sep 82 pp 1, 8

In a statement issued by the KKE-Int. Women's Office it is pointed out that the Advisory Council for the equality of the sexes should be so organized and operate as to convince women that it is in their service and not in the service of the government. The full text of the statement is as follows:

Last week the Chamber of Deputies voted the article of the draft law which provides for the establishment of an Advisory Council for promoting the legal and real equality of the sexes.

The government decision to establish such a council and the approval of its establishment by the Chamber of Deputies shows PASOK's effort and desire to fulfill its pre-electoral promise to regulate definitely the issues concerning women through an act which will prove to common opinion the party's responsibility and courage. However, the way the article on the Advisory Council was enacted without the women's participation and without considering their views coupled with the overall delay and surrender on issues concerning the revision of the Law on Family will not satisfy, we are certain, the totality of women. The rational promotion of the equality of sexes with reservations and "prudence" shows an overall undergrading of women's issues.

The vagueness of the article with regard to the composition and responsibilities of the council coupled with the fact that it is under the premier's absolute control--he can appoint, dismiss and increase the number of the council members--is proof that no possibilities exist for the council to function as a living cell capable of dealing effectively with issues concerning women within the framework of the state machinery. The only precondition for positive results in the council's operation is to combine it with the active and multi-shaded women's movement without attaching any conditions or expediencies in its orientation toward promoting issues raised by the women themselves.

The PASOK government must fully understand that the one thing which will justify the establishment of the council is to persuade all women that, as concerns its operation and orientation, it will be in their and not the government's service.
COMMUNIST JOURNAL ATTACKS VIEWS OF PARTY DISSIDENTS

Amsterdam POLITIEK EN CULTUUR in Dutch Sep 82 pp 257-265

[Article by Gis Schreuders: "A Look Without Blinkers at Peace Policy, Class Conflict, and the Wrongness of the Conservative Communists"]

Let me begin with what has our absolute priority: peace policy.

Class Conflict and Peace Policy

Even conservative communists recognize that the upbuilding of socialism is inconceivable without warding off the threat of an atomic war.

They are thus in agreement with the priority of the fight for peace. But is that really so?

For complete clarity I present the conservative criticism of the party policy on the basis of an article by a number of Amsterdam party members (Laurens Meerten, René Dammén, et.al.) calling for a "horizontal communist discussion":

"Practice shows the transformation of the N-bomb movement into a general peace movement. Mind you, a movement with good intentions and important political effects, but essentially pacifistic, neutral, classless orientation. The N-bomb movement has collapsed as an organization. In reality this collapse is the result of the ideological disorientation of the party, in which an independent peace movement is not defined as a movement developing apart from political parties, but as a movement that rejects violence. But for communists the use or non-use of violence is not a purely ethical question. Such an approach as has now evidently been adopted by the party leadership sacrifices the peace movement to every new Falklands hysteria. The peace movement has prospects only if it takes sides against imperialism. If in its strategy and tactics it accounts for the neocolonially oppressed peoples. Since 1945 the world has been divided into two power blocs. The coming into existence of the Soviet bloc must be regarded as a positive development."

The notion that a movement independent of parties can collapse as a result of ideological disorientation of our party can occur only to people who want to make the Cooperative Union Against the N-Bomb suspect as a cover organization of the CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands].
But what is it that shows our ideological disorientation?

Evidently it is our arguments for an active peace policy that does not stop with a mechanical association of capitalism with war.

A number of early Marxists regarded war as an inevitable consequence of the economic system.

Particularly in early German Social Democratic circles these thoughts of Kautsky's and Bebel's became common property:

"War is ineradicable in the goods-production society, which evokes not only class oppositions but also national oppositions. There is only one way to put an end to war: to overcome the oppositions that bring it about. Only the workers can do that." (Kautsky)

"Wars thus lie in the character of capitalism. They will not cease until the capitalistic economy is abolished." (Bebel)

The consequence of this view is that fighting for peace in itself is completely senseless and only the overthrow of capitalism can prevent a war. The mechanical equating of an economic system with a war is not demonstrable from the economy. What is demonstrable is that imperialism brings about instabilities and tensions as a result of a mutual competition for markets, raw materials, etc., and that the possibility of controlling these tensions depends in part on the strength of the peace movement.

The automatic coupling of capitalism with war has led the German workers' movement (in the tradition that is represented by the above quotations from Kautsky and Bebel) to neglect peace policy as subordinate to the class struggle, and this is a tragic factor in the history of this century.

Peace policy is anything but a pure derivative of a class interest.

Anybody who is unwilling to allow himself to be convinced on this point by history should at least realize that the present state of weapons technology makes possible the destruction of all mankind.

But those who set the class struggle "above" the struggle for freedom, who regard war as an inevitable accompaniment of the class society, and who in 1982 deny any prospects to the peace movement if it fights not "against imperialism" but against atomic war... are committing a fatal blunder where Kautsky and Bebel erred.

There is another side to this coin. Just as capitalism and war were declared identical, the workers' movement since its beginning has, in hopeful anticipation of the future or in the security of faith, equated socialism with peace. Wherever the capitalist society was overthrown, militarism would not merely disappear but actually become unthinkable. Hence not only would imperialism be warlike by a law of nature, but the Soviet bloc would also be peace-loving by a law of nature.
Historical experience with countries where capitalism has been overthrown has not confirmed this hope. The disappearance of the profit motive as the impetus for build-up of armaments has not, as is dramatically apparent in Poland, meant the disappearance of militarism as such.

Conflicting economic interests, territorial claims, and threats of violence also occur in the international relations between the states that call themselves socialist (Soviet Union-China, China-Vietnam, etc). No theoretical desire for peace can be construed from the facts, which show that the Soviet Union and China are ready to protect by military means their interests as defined by them within their spheres of influence. In particular, the strict maintenance of the existing political system in the countries within its sphere of influence is defined by the Soviet Union as an interest that justifies the use of force in international relations. Thus, toward these states as well, a peace policy is a demand to be made of our party.

But our critics have still other arrows to their bow. For the sake of a "class orientation" the peace movement would not only have to abandon a peace policy with respect to the states of the Soviet bloc; it would also have to abandon the repudiation of force in international relations, out of solidarity with the revolutionary struggle of oppressed peoples.

But unfortunately, the "socialist countries" have not shown, any more than they have shown a natural desire for peace, that their military interests under all circumstances, from the nature of the system, coincide with the aspirations of the liberation movements in the Third World toward independence and self-determination.

Sometimes this is the case; sometimes the state rationale wills it otherwise. In a number of cases the Soviet Union, China, and other countries where capitalism has been overthrown give extremely important support to the struggle against reactionary régimes, but there are also examples of support of these countries to reactionary régimes (China-Chili) and of the suppression of the Third-World countries' right of self-determination (Soviet Union-Afghanistan). The theory of justified revolutionary violence finds an application dictated by state opportunism in practice, as was made clear by the appeals for "moderation" addressed to the Vietnamese freedom-fighters in the 1960's.

But apart from the uncertain practice, the very theory of justified wars is extremely problematical in the atomic age, in which international relations are "stabilized" by mutual deterrence.

A policy directed toward avoidance of violence is an end in itself, possesses an inherent value, and cannot be swept off the table as a problem by recognition that the liberation movements may be compelled to react militarily to the violence of internal or external oppressors.

The struggle against reactionary régimes, even if it is rightly conducted by military means as a result of violent oppression, is far from being a justification of Von Clausewitz's time-honored proposition that "war is the extension of politics by other means." The disdain for peacetime ethics among those who declare it subordinate to the class struggle is certainly not shared by the
liberation movements, which see themselves confronted with a conflict between different goals and aspirations.

Avoiding war is a goal. In the atomic age this holds absolutely; atomic arms build-up is not a means; it serves not a single purpose other than deterrence.

Precisely this policy of deterrence, arising from the situation of a bloc confrontation, evokes the greatest danger to our future.

For that reason our struggle is to break through the bloc system, and equating the foreign-policy interests of the Soviet Union and the efforts of the peace movement is ruled out. This does not detract from the significance of the Soviet proposals for reduction of nuclear armaments and the abundantly clear interest that the Soviet Union has in détente in Europe. In this respect the interests are certainly parallel. But Soviet policy is based on the idea of deterrence, as was hammered in on us recently by the press bureau NOVOSTI with the warning that the Netherlands, if it admits the latest American rockets, runs the risk of being wiped off the earth by Soviet rockets.

Who can find any consolation in the thought that in any case it will be "anti-imperialistic" rockets to which we, our country, our children succumb?

The politics of "class against class" in questions of war and peace has been bankrupt for half a century; with the current development of weapons technology it has become a crime.

Therefore, the reproach of the CPN for a "neutral, classless orientation" in the struggle for peace is absurd. The conservative communists who utter this reproach are taking a neutral position in regard to the policy of deterrence.

Alternatives Instead of Dogmas

Then is the CPN no longer a class party?

To approach this question in anything like a meaningful manner we must first be clear on what it is that determines the class character of a party.

The struggle of the working class is a struggle for social justice, which is not to be realized within the bounds of the capitalist "order." The CPN will wage this fight for social justice, for the overthrow of the capitalistic class society. The question is thus not whether it is a party of the working class, but what paths it wants to follow to bring about socialism. The conservative communists' reproach concerning the class character of the CPN turns the question around. Their criterion is whether a party considers itself as "the leading party of the leading class"--and that is the blind alley.

It is not possible in an economically, politically, and culturally highly developed country like the Netherlands to bring about a social consensus for overthrow of the capitalist production system with this ("Leninist") concept. That is not to be thought of without recognition of the actual pluralism of social attitudes and of cultural and political views.
It is a difficult task to exchange thoughts with dogmatists. The difficulty lies in the nature of every dogma. Instead of bringing out arguments and facts, the adherents of a doctrinal truth content themselves in debate with putting forward a programmed picture of the world. Thus in an earlier number of this journal Jules de Leeuwe was able to account for the problems of our society, afflicted with atomic risk and crisis, on the basis of a "Klein Politisches Wörterbuch" (German: Little Political Dictionary) that had proven "Hoekstra et al." wrong in all sorts of ways.

Such a debate is neither absorbing nor meaningful. But it would be showing contempt for some deeply motivated and effective communists to brush aside the conservative criticism of the development of our party at this level.

(I always use the word conservative to indicate that this criticism, unlike that of the dogmatists, does not come from a refusal to think, but from concern about the content of a number of values and traditions that have played a big part and sometimes a positive part in the workers' movement.)

The aim of our class policy is social justice, and the starting point is recognition of the drastic deficiencies in living and working conditions, the need of a new manner of living and working, in the face of the unlivableness, oppression, and inequality of today's society.

Now that we are confronted with a demolition policy on a hitherto unseen scale, now that all the results and achievements of the trade union struggle are under pressure, now that the young have no opportunities for the future, now that the women's movement is attacking discrimination in social and personal life, now that the big companies are running amok in the field of standard of living, social security, and social services... now the demand for social justice is more timely than ever.

But where do we find the fundamental elements for a socialist policy? Not in the societies of the "real socialism," which are not capable of creating an alternative that is acceptable to their own masses, let alone to a population in the highly-developed capitalistic countries.

Marx's opinion of the arbitrary and anti-humane character of the capitalistic system holds good today more than ever; it is felt that way by millions. But the condemnation of arbitrariness and inhumanity also applies to the development of the countries where the exploiters have been dispossessed and production and distribution according to a state plan have begun.

The central question is thus how an alternative to the systems existing today in the west and in the east should look.

In essence this set of problems constitutes the subject of our party discussion of the draft of a program of principles, just as it forms the subject of the debate that is being carried on all over West Europe within the Left. Both the Italian communists and an interesting movement within the West German "Greens" are conducting this debate under the name of a "third way." For our own party discussion it is enlightening to put a few fragments of this into the picture. For this purpose I rely for the Italian variant on Enrico Berlinguer, for the
German on Wolfried Heidt (one of the founders of the Greens). The search for alternatives—the essential issue of our party discussion—is not restricted to individual countries. It is a "Euroleft" debate, and examples can be equally drawn from France, England or Sweden.

The arguments for a "third way" show that our party discussion is not isolated and is not sterile.

Berlinguer outlines the problem as follows: "We have said that the impetus of the models of socialism as they have been realized in the Soviet Union and other East European countries is exhausted. This certainly does not mean that fewer reasons exist today of a material, political, and ideological nature for socialism or fewer movements to realize it in the most divergent way." In this connection he points to the experience of the struggle for socialism in the countries of the Third World, which must be defended "both against those who want to suppress their authenticity and autonomy by means of orders that are typical of the capitalist west, and against those who admire the schemata and arrangements of the East European régimes and want to impose them."

But the decisive condition for releasing new impulses toward socialism on a worldwide scale (and also for a real contribution to a process of democratic renewal in East Europe) is "that socialism be built up starting at the highest points of capitalist developement, beginning in West Europe."

Berlinguer calls it a "misunderstanding" that this means looking for a middle course between capitalism and socialism.

"It is a matter of overthrowing capitalism in the state in which it exists here among us, in the industrialized and developed west, and overthrowing it while building up a socialism that guarantees the protection of the democratic freedoms that have already been attained in our development."

But a middle path, but a new phase following upon the first appearance of the labor movement and following upon the first experiments with a non-capitalist development model of society:

"Lenin was important because he overthrew all doctrines and ideas in the labor movement according to which the revolution would be the outcome of a capitalist development to its culmination... With the October Revolution a second phase began in the struggle of the labor movement of the world for socialism... We are talking about a third phase, not because the social-democratic movement has faded out... but we are talking about the organic insufficiency of the social-democratic solution, in that in spite of all achievements and improvements, it has not effected the overthrow of capitalism. Furthermore, we are today in a crisis of capitalism in which the material foundations on which social democracy's opportunities in the metropolises arose are in danger. Thus for social democracy, too, the necessity arises of seeking and testing new paths..."

"The facts have definitively shown

- That the path that was taken in Russia in 1917 is not practicable at the high level of development of capitalism in the West today,
- That the régimes that have arisen on the basis of the Soviet model are not transferable to the West, and

- That such régimes are now undergoing a crisis even in some countries of the East.

"Herein lie the grounds for the fact that we are taking as our basis a third phase in the fight for socialism. It is certain that without the experiences, the mistakes, the tragedies, without the lessons and achievements of the preceding phases we would not stand here and could not think, work, and struggle. If we today are contemplating surmounting those two phases, that is because they have reached their limits with regard to the revolutionary renovation and transformation in the direction of socialism in the highly developed capitalist West."

Wilfried Heidt, one of the founders of the "Green" party in the Federal Republic of Germany, has a different angle in the search for a "third way" for the West-European progressive movements. His starting point was the politicization of the environment and energy questions, the "madness of growth." But confronted with zero or negative growth, unemployment growing by leaps and bounds, and social collapse to an extent hitherto regarded as impossible, not economic growth but the existing economic system has become the object of doubt and then of opposition.

"The question of the system is connected with the concept of growth. From our point of view the ecological crisis is merely one of many symptoms (albeit a very dramatic one) of an economic and social order that bypasses man and the coherence of nature... The struggle of the labor movement has been directed against the antisocial character of the system. But essentially this struggle has thus far not changed the system. The antisocial phenomena of this economic order have merely been driven to other continents; the basic antisocial character of the system remains untouched. The characteristic antiecological feature of it has not really interested anyone as long as the definite signs of, e.g., shortage of raw materials and the limits of pollution of the biosphere by chemical wares, etc., do not show up so that they can no longer be denied... The problem is thus not whether we--taken abstractly, hence in the gross product--have growth or not; the problem is that at present, because of the capital relationships, we are under a growth compulsion in all fields, so that all economic decisions must be directed toward what makes for profitability, not what the people really need and what is ecologically justifiable."

From this point of view of the environmental activists, "Greens" like Kiehl come to the conclusion that it makes no sense to combat the present crisis with "system-immanent" prescriptions which miss the "economic madness" of unemployment and continue to regard labor as a (purchasable) commodity instead of regarding it as the central point of human self-determination and human responsibility.

But nothing will be undertaken in this direction by the established parties, and therefore--Kiehl contends--"New majorities" must arise: "If the present situation is really as disturbing militarily, ecologically, economically, etc., as many say, then the immediate aim absolutely must be a change in the majority relationships. For the time being that appears impossible... Socialists, Christian, liberal-thinking people in the various parties already possess a common
fundamental political consensus; with different arguments against the background of different traditions, they are looking for a democratic alternative to the 'really existing capitalism' and to the 'really existing socialism,' and thus for a 'third way.' A union of socialists, Christians, liberals, 'greens' on the basis of a work perspective: that is the imperative of the hour and the historical opportunity to break up the 'bloc in power' by alliance for a new democracy."

Obstinate Resistance to What Is New

The above brief impressions of arguments for a "third way" serve in the context of this article only as examples to show what the nature of the polemics is that is being carried on throughout West Europe concerning socialism. The discussion of tangible alternatives is not intended as propaganda for a reformism, as conservative communists such as Boe Thio, member of the CPN executive committee, complain, and has nothing in common with the adaptation policy practiced by the social democrats, but is directed toward fundamental changes in the structure of society: toward socialism.

The most urgent demands that come up in the present crisis (counteracting social collapse, a different division of work between men and women, diversion of the streams of money that are now going to multinationals and into arms build-ups, general shortening of hours of work, changes in the social conditions in such fields as energy, the environment, housing, and health) are at the same time the materials for a socialist policy.

It is about this that discussion is necessary.

These demands are brought forward by social movements, each of which for its own part comes in conflict with the existing conditions; whether it be unions demanding a say in investments, or environmental activists, or feminists, or squatters. But there is still no thought of a programmatic union.

Nor is there any thought of a representative parliamentary expression of the society-renovating demands, while contenting oneself with extraparliamentary initiatives cannot lead to establishing results and to continuity.

Those are our problems.

Those who appeal to Marxism-Leninism have no answer to offer to any of these current and urgent problems with which our party is concerned.

To quote Berlinguer once more: "Blindness, schematism, resistance to what is new characterize those who continue to assert that there are only two paths to follow: the Soviet path and the social-democratic path, as if the course of history were not capable of producing what it has already developed."

The conservative critics of the development in our party have not been able to formulate a single positive proposal concerning the questions that (must) concern us; they only formulate anxieties. In our criticism of the military coup in Poland they perceived an attack on the socialist countries' right to exist; in our fight against "bloc thinking" they saw a smear on the achievements of the October Revolution; in our taking feminism seriously they saw a class
betrayal; in the search for tangible alternatives, reformism; in the rejection of Stalinist organizational practices, an action "shoulder to shoulder with open anticommunists and procapitalists." (De Leeuwe)

In these attempts to block the continuation of the discussion by hurling anathemas, the editors of DE WAARHEID are made to suffer quite particularly; they are not only accused of "neutralism" or even "Reaganism" in the fight for peace, but are also accused in writing of "regularly taking positions that weaken the people who are still struggling." (Dammen, Meertens et al.)

And all that because the paper is trying to come to terms with reality and thus does not offer enough "identifying marks," or shows too little resistance to what is new.

It is necessary to point out that communists jointly have the task of defending DE WAARHEID both materially and ideologically against these forms of criticism. It is even necessary to warn that name-calling in the matter of revisionism and reformism, etc., if it is continued, will yield no better results than in the past, and so can help to reinforce the historical picture of splits and self-imposed isolation in the workers' movement.

Let us honestly admit that communism is in a crisis internationally and that cannot allow ourselves to come out with yesterday's answers to today's problems.

Conservative communists are wrong when they ascribe weaknesses in the party to an "ideological disorientation" and want to withdraw to old certainties in the happy conviction of a holy righteousness and in certain incapability of any change whatever.

If anything leads to organizational weakening, it is that.

Our critics do not hesitate to declare that a party that is developing in the direction indicated in the draft platform is no longer a communist party.

Various answers to this reproach are possible.

Whether we constitute a communist party we decide for ourselves, we the members of the CPN. There is no "Holy Office" that can make our "doctrine" clean enough to be called communist. There is no catechism to test it by; even the "Klein Politisches Wörterbuch" offers no way out. Only the members of the CPN determine what the content, the characteristics, and the aims of their party are.

It may also be replied that our greatest concern is not under what label a political organization strives for fundamental changes in society. "A rose by any other name will smell as sweet."

But a better, albeit more difficult, answer is: Time will tell. It is not a settled thing. We must be prepared to risk a great deal. If we are not, we shall certainly lose everything.

This realization obviously evokes deep emotions in all who have invested their ideals in our party. Our party is a Netherlands creation of radical workers,
brilliant poets, and brave fighters. They have not fought in vain; that is why we must move forward.

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OPTIONS OPEN TO EANES ANALYZED

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 2 Sep 82 p 6

[Article by Jose Rocha Dinis in "The Political Chessboard" column]

[Text] Accepting the challenge posed in a statement reported to be "off the record" (which might well be ours, if it were not for this institutional figure!) by a "very close associate" of Eanes, O JORNAL newsmen "are thinking of D. Sebastião as of someone about to return. But what they have not yet understood is that Eanes is not about to return, but to depart." And we are attempting to predict the next steps in the Belem strategy, explaining them in a horizontal fashion, which entails known dangers (the "interplay" goes back and forth into infinity) but has the advantage of allowing easy reading.

On this Thursday early in September, after Eanes met with the representatives of the four major parties (it would be difficult to imagine that Balsemão's absence did not cost something) just prior to an address to the nation and the promulgation of the new constitution, the paths of future action available to Eanes can be summarized as follows:

1. The PR [president of the republic] leaves everything as before. This is a choice which is always possible in Portuguese life, either because the capacity of our leaders for political decision is no more than a mere "brand image," or because a certain balance prevails among the existing forces.

It would continue to be a good period for the daily newspapers, for front page headlines fed by what is called the "institutional guerrilla warfare," but would pose an inglorious task for those of our weekly publications which seek to develop a picture of the cloakroom prophesies in political-party life.

Let us then set aside this hypothesis (before it is forced into disuse) and quote without comment the statement by Jose Miguel Judice to the effect that "Our proverbial tendency not to choose between two relative evils will tend to lead us toward a development which would be a much worse evil than either of the other two... Everyone will complain about everything, denials and statements will follow one after the other, and the citizens of Portugal will become increasingly indifferent to the complex juggling which will be draining what remains of such intelligence and will as the politicians may have been fortunate enough to possess."

2. The PR resigns. Some sectors believe that this would be an excellent way for General Eanes to emerge the "winner" from the present crisis (in which there are international factors difficult to overcome), making possible a "forceful return" for him in the near future.

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This hypothesis, which has basically already been described by Joaquim Letria in a statement which became notorious, if not particularly clear, would however cost the current president of the republic dear, for he would not be able to run as a candidate in the next presidential elections, and it is clear that whoever his civil candidate might be (there is occasional mention of Souto Cruz) in a contest with another civil candidate—Mario Soares or Freitas do Amaral, to judge from what is clear now.

Although it is no absurdity, it is then highly unlikely that Eanes will choose this path, such that the "about to depart" statement attributed to his "close associate" may not be that dramatic in meaning, representing instead a "step forward" or advance with specific proposals. This remains to be seen.

3. The PR gives the "green light" to the new party. After all the statements and denials, the indications that a new party will be formed shortly, with characteristics very like those Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos defended (for Eanes, but not necessarily with him) are becoming more numerous. It is thought that in his address to the country toward the middle of this month, the president of the republic may give or tacitly suggest the necessary "green light."

Timing is now a basic question, and entirely consistent with what we have always suggested here, this new party is likely to emerge prior to the elections for the self-governing bodies, in order to give viability to the candidacies of a whole series of "local notables" whom Ramalho Eanes has been able to attract in the course of his movements about the country.

It is a fact that some sectors would willingly endorse such a move, because on the local level, Eanes is reported to have "infiltrated" a number of individuals in all the parties (with the exception of the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party]), and such names have been mentioned to me, for example, as Dr Mendes Silva (possible PS [Socialist Party] candidate for the presidency of the Coimbra chamber) and even Paulo Valada, who after having been an "adamant" Balsemao supporter, is now reported to be closer to Eanes.

These sectors naturally realize the strength of the local party leaders who, particularly in the PSD [Social Democratic Party] (because they believe that the leadership lacks strength) or the PS (still reflecting the struggle between Soares and the former secretariat), are in an excellent position to demand acceptance of their slates of candidates.

However, it seems to me that these sectors overlook the not unimportant fact that those they call the "submerged elements" must and will be revealed in the future by the president of the republic, representing a strategic error which the Belem strategy (slow but sure) cannot allow, at least on the local level.

Everything can be more easily understood within the perspective of the creation of a new party oriented, at least in the first instance, toward the self-governing bodies, among other things because it is in the shadow of the municipal councils that the local and national economic forces exist and prosper, more or less—what in one of his "statements of proof," brilliant as usual, Vasco Pulido Valente called the "great economic bourgeoisie"—protectionist
and speculative, and with the characteristics, in the best of cases, of the "petty shopkeeper and fishwife."

If to this we add the weight of the church (which does not criticize and even in some cases supports Eanes) what the Belem strategy is betting on becomes clearer.

4. The PR dismisses the present cabinet. On such a sensitive issue, opinion is naturally divided, although it is a fact that last week this sector saw an unusual complex of moves which foretells imminent decisions.

"Squeezed" by the PCP and PS proposals (3 years from now, they could accuse him of failing to use all the means available to him to halt or slow the economic and financial crisis), Eanes could dismiss the cabinet, indicating his lack of political confidence, prior to the promulgation of the new constitutional text, and initiating a period of consultation with the main parties with some weight in the AR [Assembly of the Republic] on the new prime minister to be appointed.

And here the problem of foreseeing what all the possible alternatives are arises, not because there are none, but because it is doubtful that Eanes could gain anything thereby, and thus in the final analysis the result might be a direct clash—if the PSD were to suggest Pinto Balsemão as a candidate again, which would lead to an impasse.

But if we add together all the indications—not always coinciding—of the recent movements, we can surmise that Eanes has information unknown to us, and that it tells him that there is no risk of such a clash. We might note very rapidly the statements by Ribeiro e Castro and Leonor Beleza concerning an end to the institutional guerrilla warfare, the surprising statement by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa that he will leave politics (a skillful way of "puling the carpet out from under" Balsemão), Vitor Sa Machado's proposal that another PS/CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] coalition be formed, which could not have resulted from any temporary enthusiasm.

Another curious indication is the rise of Freitas do Amaral throughout this process—the use of state language of clearly defined harshness (departure from Belem was exemplary), and the sponsorship (up to what point?) of the PR during this rise. One might speculate about the meeting held in Belem with General Walters, Freitas do Amaral, Basílio Horta and Paulo Marques, which resulted in the departure of the last mentioned for Africa on "business" which the CDS does not by a long shot regard as its own.

This complex of indications does not lead to any major conclusions. It is possible that Freitas Amaral has moved closer to Eanes, or vice versa, which might suggest that some alternative has been planned. Nor does it cease to be true that at this time, the CDS would do anything to ensure the holding of intercalary legislative elections—the PSD would be "disarmed" (such that, according to reliable reports, Eurico de Melo's acceptance of nomination for the presidency of the PSD at the next congress will soon be announced), and the PS could be blamed for the "failure to advance" in the constitutional revision, thus destroying the moderate image Soares has attempted to create.
All of this is possible, although it is not the style of the CDS or its leader, who deals slowly but surely. But is it not on the other hand equally hard to understand why Soares is urging early elections?

5. The PR dissolves the parliament. Not now, but within a month and a half, Eanes could in fact have an excellent reason for dissolving the parliament, carrying the strategy of wear and tear on the parties (and contributing to their errors) which he successfully launched to its final consequences.

The fact is that following the promulgation of the constitutional text, the parliament has to approve the organic law governing the constitutional court, without which the life of this country could be blocked, if Eanes were to continue (which is regarded as juridically reasonable) to fail to "oversee" the constitutionality of legislation on the necessary day-to-day basis himself.

Only the constitution dictates that a two-thirds majority, which is difficult to win, is needed for such approval. The socialist deputies have no commitments on this issue, and there are even those among them who think that this is the ideal moment for a break (Tito de Morais has never ceased to say so in ACCAO SOCIALISTA), and the dilemma would enable Eanes to dissolve the parliament with full justification.

It remains, however, to be demonstrated that the dissolution of the legislature would serve the president's interests in the future, for he would be faced with the seating of a parliament legitimatized by the popular vote, wherein it is hard to imagine he would have great influence, since the party being formed would be linked with the self-governing bodies.

Thus it is thought that Eanes will do no more than to keep party wear and tear on a "low burner," even if this means losing a good opportunity to dissolve a parliament which he believes does not represent the current political-party reality.

With which view, with other things in mind, many other excellent people seem to agree.

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CSO: 3101/66
CDS LEADER EXPRESSES VIEWS ON AD, EANES

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 2 Sept 82 p 10

[Interview with Ribeiro e Castro, Social Democratic Center Party leader and assistant secretary of state to the vice prime minister, by Carlos Basto; date and place not given]

[Text] "The CDS (Social Democratic Center Party) is not thinking of any scenario as an alternative to the AD (Democratic Alliance). But the CDS is not in the AD simply because there is no alternative. It is there because the AD is the choice." This statement was made by Ribeiro e Castro, the CDS leader and assistant secretary of state to the vice prime minister. In an interview granted to TEMPO, Ribeiro e Castro discussed important current political issues such as the approaching elections for the self-governing bodies, the possibility of early legislative elections, as well as the constitutional revision and, basically, the institutional guerrilla warfare between the cabinet and the president which the country has been witnessing recently.

The interview granted to TEMPO by Ribeiro e Castro comes at a decisive moment in the development of Portuguese political life. The constitutional revision law is already in Belem for promulgation; elections for the self-governing bodies are only 3 months away; the institutional guerrilla war is intensifying. And, in this connection, the CDS has proved to be one of the calmest, most discreet forces, at least in public statements. Ribeiro e Castro recalls on this point that the fourth centrist congress discussed the fact that after the presidential elections, the autonomy and the full exercise of its mandate by the AD should not be affected on any point or at any time. But it was also noted that the electoral campaign had ended and that the CDS and the AD should not encourage the institutional guerrilla war. If one exists, it is not because of us," Ribeiro e Castro stresses.

The Most Recent Facts

TEMPO: The differences between the president of the republic and the cabinet, or even the Assembly of the Republic, have assumed much greater proportions recently. Particularly with the threats, at least at present, of a veto of important documents.

Ribeiro e Castro: It is important that people realize that neither the Assembly of the Republic nor the cabinet has any power, or at least their
power is extremely limited, to prevent the execution of any actions which come within the authority of the president of the republic. The president, on the contrary, does have powers which enable him in some instances to prevent the execution of acts which fall within the powers of the Assembly of the Republic and the cabinet. This is something which has often given rise to criticism and public disagreement.

In fact, it is the president of the republic who has the authority to promulgate legislative acts originating with the cabinet or the Assembly of the Republic, or not to promulgate them, and this is the source of some of the problems which have developed. Our answer where institutional guerrilla warfare is concerned is this: it is negative and should not exist. But neither should the cabinet or the majority in the Assembly of the Republic abandon their freedom or the full exercise of their mandates. What is needed is for the rules of consistent, serious and normal institutional relations to be properly clarified.

**TEMPO**: But the situation tends to remain the same. There is the prospect of new presidential vetoes. What is the position of the AD and the cabinet in the event that this possibility becomes a fact?

**Ribeiro e Castro**: The facts in the issue are clear: In the case of the electoral law (self-governing bodies), there was first of all a draft law proposed by the cabinet and approved by the Assembly of the Republic with various changes in detail, some of which, moreover—the basis for the portions challenged by the president of the republic—even had their origin in suggestions from the Socialist Party parliamentary group. The draft law pertaining to the ANOP [Portuguese News Agency] was also approved by the cabinet.

Now it naturally falls to the president of the republic to indicate whether he will promulgate these documents or, on the contrary, will veto them. If he vetoes them, obviously there will be a conflict here, or perhaps even some disputes of a different kind. But at this point, the cabinet neither knows officially that these documents have been vetoed nor has any certainty that they will be. We shall see.

**CDS and the Constitutional Revision**

**TEMPO**: Throughout the process of constitutional revision there was the impression, and it was even stated by some analysts, that almost the sole goal of the CDS was to eliminate the Council of the Revolution, and that it would use absolutely every means to achieve this goal. Is this true?

**Ribeiro e Castro**: In fact, the CDS regarded the elimination of the Council of the Revolution as one of the most important points in revising the constitution, and always has. We have believed that the revision of the constitution should basically be undertaken in three areas, and in all of them, with a common orientation toward liberation and the elimination of tutelage. First, in the realm of the state organic system, the elimination of structures which do not have democratic form, but sponsoring functions, which is unsuitable in a democratic regime. And this was reflected in the elimination of the Council of the Revolution.
Second, in the doctrinal sector, we believe that the constitution should not contain ideological sponsorship either. It should not impose any doctrinal straitjacket.

And third, in the realm of economic and social organization, it has been our belief that the constitution should not endorse any preestablished model, much less one heavily characterized by state control and collectivism, in order to favor the greater energy of civilian society and the free economic initiative of the citizens.

TEMPO: But in fact has the CDS used every available means? Has it reached the limit of total intransigence?

Ribeiro e Castro: We have firmly set forth our point of view and it was accepted, for reasons you know. Among other things, it was bad that it was the Council of the Revolution which analyzed the constitutionality of its own laws governing the conditions of its elimination, such that in the end it could indefinitely extend its own functions beyond the time the amendments to the constitution went into effect, also seriously and extensively affecting their efficiency and full implementation.

No Interest in Legislative Elections Soon

TEMPO: There is not much time left before elections for the self-governing bodies will be held, and the most recent polls have shown significant variations among the voters, given the hypothesis of legislative elections held now. Up to what point can the local elections serve as a test?

Ribeiro e Castro: I believe that the elections for the self-governing bodies, like all such elections, lend themselves to political interpretations on the national level. And there is no point in establishing whether the national importance is greater or lesser, since we know—we have already had such elections in the country earlier—that what they reflect is always interpreted by the commentators and political leaders on the national level too. What the elections for the self-governing bodies do not produce is direct political effects on the level of the sovereign bodies, which is a different matter.

But it is often said, and it is true, that the elections for the self-governing bodies, particularly in a system such as ours which has party candidates, constitute a test of the national influence of political forces, and they also represent a public opinion poll of natural dimensions.

TEMPO: In connection with polls, the most recent ones have shown a considerable increase in the influence of the CDS on the national level. Does that party plan to use the self-governing bodies as a base of support for the legislative elections, should they be held early? Or would the CDS be interested in legislative elections soon?

Ribeiro e Castro: We are not interested in the holding of legislative elections soon, and we put forth no proposal to this end. On the contrary, we believe that it is necessary to respect the electoral mandates as they were defined. There were legislative elections in 1980 resulting in mandates for 4
years, and I believe that the will of the people must be respected and therefore that this term of office should run for the time planned.

In other words, we believe that there should not be legislative elections prior to 1984.

TEMPO: However, the CDS will make a serious effort in the approaching elections for the self-governing bodies.

Ribeiro e Castro: We always make a political effort, in all elections, to defend our positions and to improve them. We do in fact see indications pointing toward growth, but at this point in time this is not even our main concern. Our party is a member of the Democratic Alliance, and we do not believe that the country needs anything less than the AD. On the contrary, we believe that the country increasingly needs the AD, one which is ever stronger, more cohesive and determined.

No Plans for PSD/PS Agreement

TEMPO: Again with a view to a possible change in the balance of forces among the parties, wouldn't the CDS like to occupy a sector very close to that occupied at present by the AD as a whole? Even up to the point of the already discussed agreement between the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and the PS [Socialist Party]?

Ribeiro e Castro: We are not thinking of this. If any PSD leader is thinking in fact of destroying the AD and reaching agreement with the PS, this is their problem, in my view, and it would be wrong. Although I must say, from the party point of view, that this is a possibility which does not frighten us at all. On the national level, it would be negative.

And it would be negative in several ways: because it would represent a betrayal of and a serious attack on the commitments of the Democratic Alliance, not so much with regard just to the parties, but above all the voters, because such a step would again lead to a loss of credibility in the political forces and democratic institutions. It would be negative because it would take the country back to a period of great instability, uncertainty and ambiguity, and because, finally, it would reduce the conditions needed for the solidity and credibility of the political authority, therefore reducing its capacity to face up to and resolve the problems of the country and to overcome the present economic and financial difficulties.

This is the reason that we for our part believe that all of the partners in the AD should continue to work toward and contribute their portion of the effort for effective and dynamic development of the AD undertaking, under ever more secure, determined and clear conditions. This, after all, is our commitment to the Portuguese electorate.

TEMPO: Isn't the CDS, however, contemplating an alternative scenario?

Ribeiro e Castro: I have heard it said that we have the AD because there is no alternative. Now I would like to make a correction which seems to me an
important one: We do not believe in the AD solely because there is no alternatives. We believe in the AD because in our view, the AD and its program constitute a choice. The AD is the proper choice which we established on 19 September, and which has proved to be an effective alternative for the stable political development of the country, and one which the Portuguese people want and believe in.

To reduce or in any weaken or erode it, after we have won election to the government and won the confidence of the country, would be a total error, in addition to representing betrayal and leading to the loss of the country's confidence.

Eanes Should Not Support a New Party

TEMPO: Both in connection with the institutional guerrilla warfare and the proposed revision of the constitution, there has been a great deal of talk about the emergence of a party sponsored by Ramalho Eanes. And it has also been said that the CDS could even profit thereby.

Ribeiro e Castro: I have no idea if we would profit from it or not. This is a matter for others, one which does not concern us, since obviously, it is not we who are the promoters of the presidential party.

On the subject of the presidential party, on the one hand, we obviously would regard it as negative for the president of the republic as such to undertake to establish a party. This would be a contradiction and an inconsistency on the part of one who was elected on a platform offering himself personally to serve as the "president of all Portuguese citizens." It is not a suitable act for a president of the republic to sponsor the establishment of any party.

Secondly, this would be negative because if it were to occur, it would always have a political significance, and to that extent it would have to be analyzed.

Thirdly, a presidential party, if one developed, would perhaps be useful at least for the clarification of this issue. If it were finally to emerge from the mist, issues would be clearer and the Portuguese people would be called upon to voice their opinion directly, because this future party would have to participate in the elections like all the others, and the people would be the sovereign, the just, and certainly a particularly rigorous and negative judge of it.

But fourthly, although we have nothing to fear, I also think that the country has nothing to gain and would not gain by yet another party, with this party in addition. The rule of democracy is the majority, and its efficiency depends on the winning of a majority. Now it has already been demonstrated, in my view, particularly with the experience of the AD, that what the country needs is not more division, but more agreement.

Therefore, a new party, this presidential party, would in no way contribute to a solution, but would complicate everything. But in the final analysis, this is a problem which is not mine, and those who so desire can take it up. Each
individual is free to assume the responsibilities he sees as his own and to deal with the resulting disappointments.

TEMPO: In conclusion, on the subject of the disagreement you voiced recently with the statements made by the secretary of state, Dr Leonor Beleza, on the Family Support Law, won't this lead to new difficulties or a crisis?

Ribeiro e Castro: Well, I began by saying that nothing has happened between me personally and the secretary of state. What might happen is something between the cabinet and Dr Leonor Beleza, or vice versa, on the proposed Family Support Law, which the Council of Ministers has approved and submitted to the Assembly of the Republic.

It is a fact that I personally approve of the law drafted by the cabinet, and I disagree with the comments made about it by the secretary of state. But that is not even the problem, and at this point I have nothing to add to what I have already said on the matter. There is a duty of solidarity with the government which prevents us from disagreeing with what falls within the jurisdiction of others, much less the collective directions pursued by the cabinet and the Council of Ministers, unless we want to move in the direction of a new style, wherein everyone states what he would like. And this would be an innovation, indeed, but would lead to great confusion, disturbance and negative effects on the political actions of the government.

For the rest, this is now above all an issue within the competence of the prime minister, on whom all of us in the government depend, and I have nothing more I want to add.

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PS LEADER EXPLAINS OPPOSITION TO PRESIDENTIAL PARTY

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 26 Aug 82 pp 13-14

[Interview with Socialist Party leader Dr Rui Mateus by Ribeiro Ferreira; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] "The Eanist party, should such develop, can only be of interest to the communists," PS [Socialist Party] leader Dr Rui Mateus told TEMPO. He went on to explain to us that in the specific case of Portugal, "The emergence of such a party, as defined by Medeiros Ferreira, Henrique de Barros, Jose Carlos Vasconcelos or Sousa e Castro, should it be successful, could only serve the purposes and strategy of the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], which has never abandoned the idea of winning power by means of what it calls a leftist majority which it would control."

A member of the permanent commission and the international relations official of the party of Mario Soares, Dr Rui Mateus was unforgiving, throughout the long talk we had with him, of those who "know that by themselves, they do not enjoy a minimum of political acceptance by Portuguese society while on the other hand, they can survive in the muddy waters of certain profascist forces engaged in a surreptitious struggle against the political parties." Knowledgeable about the intrigues of international politics, and the IS [Socialist International] in particular, Dr Rui Mateus discussed, during the interview reproduced below, Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the significance of the presence in Beirut now of Dr Mario Soares, in his capacity as president of the IS ad hoc commission for the Middle East. Reacting sharply to the reports suggesting a decline in the international prestige of the socialist secretary general, Dr Rui Mateus hesitated before telling us that "These intrigues are designed to discredit the democratic politicians of Portugal, and traditionally serve strategies alien to Portugal's interests."

TEMPO: If the president of the republic imposes a political veto on the electoral law for the self-governing bodies, how will the PS react? Is a PS/AD [Democratic Alliance] agreement which would guarantee the votes needed to obtain the required two-thirds majority, thus making presidential promulgation compulsory, a possibility?

Rui Mateus: The Socialist Party leadership has not yet discussed this problem, nor has the president of the republic as yet vetoed the electoral law for
the self-governing bodies. It should be remembered, moreover, that the PS ab-
stained from the vote on this law, which in any case was not declared uncon-
stitutional. Thus it falls to the PR [president of the republic], if he
vetoes it, to explain why, and no one should expect inconsistent attitudes on
the part of the PS. In a democracy, it is expected that the political par-
ties and the sovereign bodies will be consistent and will assume full respon-
sibility for their actions.

TEMPO: What is the current status of the relations between the PS and the
president of the republic? What is the value nowadays of the agreement
reached in 1980 between the PS and Gen Ramalho Eanes?

Rui Mateus: I think that it is the president of the republic who should be
asked what the status of these relations are, to the extent that he continues
to refuse to meet with the main opposition party, which was, curiously, the
party which also gave him the main support for his reelection. The PS does
not believe that the president of the republic has the same view as Dr Alvaro
Cunhal of political parties and their democratically elected leaders, differ-
entiating between the party and its leadership. The PS today is the same as
it always has been, and is therefore the same party which supported the re-
election of the present PR, even signing an agreement with him in 1980. For
our part, we honor the agreement and we will not renounce it without reasons
to justify that action.

TEMPO: Does the PS fear the possible emergence of a presidential party?

Rui Mateus: Your question contains important nuances which it would be well
to identify. The PS regards it as normal in a democracy for new parties to
develop, and it even regards as useful the emergence of a party launched by
individuals described by the press as "close to" Belem, and in particular,
those who have been the greatest defenders of the need for a new party, such
as Dr Medeiros Ferreira, journalist Jose Carlos Vasconcelos, Maj Sousa e
Castro, Prof Henrique de Barros and Jose Rabaca, among others. If this
happens, it would be a rather curious party, to which the proper response of
the electorate would be ridicule, in terms of what this combination of indi-
viduals represents politically in Portuguese society.

TEMPO: But is this a legitimate attitude?

Rui Mateus: In principle, yes. What I do not regard as legitimate is for
such a party, with knowledge at the outset of the confusion it could cause, to
appear under the direct or indirect auspices of the PR as such, since he is
the president of all Portuguese citizens and was not elected either to create
parties or to combat those now in existence, which are no better and no worse
than their counterparts elsewhere in Europe.

An Antidemocratic and Populist Abuse of Power

TEMPO: Is the present party picture consistent with your understanding of the
so-called "real country?" In other words, doesn't the political space for a
new party exist?
Rui Mateus: The parties which exist at present in our country represent all of the ideological trends in the great European political families. Therefore I believe that the sponsorship of the new party by the PR or his failure to put immediate public distance between himself and a new party which would seek his support would represent an abuse of power which would have a profoundly antidemocratic and populist connotation, posing a serious threat to the democratic system and placing the most serious responsibility on Gen Ramalho Eanes.

TEMPO: Are you persuaded that the PR will adopt one of these two attitudes of which you speak?

Rui Mateus: I believe that Gen Ramalho Eanes will have the good sense to refuse to let himself be carried along by politically insignificant individuals, who know that by themselves they do not have a minimum of political acceptance in Portuguese society while on the other hand they can survive in the muddy waters of certain profascist forces engaged in a surreptitious struggle against the political parties. All dictatorships begin, moreover, when institutions, sovereign bodies and the mass media report or promulgate the statements of antiparty forces excessively, and launch an appeal urging the need for a rescuing party to appear. On the other hand, in the specific case of Portugal, the emergence of such a party as defined by Medeiros Ferreira, Henrique de Barros, Jose Carlos Vasconcelos or Sousa e Castro, if it is successful, could only serve the purposes and strategy of the PCP, which has never abandoned the idea of winning power by means of what they call "a leftist majority," which it would control. In other words, the so-called Eanist party, if such should develop, can only serve the interests of the communists.

The PS Will Not Be Cunhal's MDP

TEMPO: Could there be a "leftist majority" without the PS?

Rui Mateus: Certainly. This party will only win electoral success if the PR uses the prestige of the post to which he was elected to win votes through a maneuver to confuse the voters, which no new party established on clear ideological bases and concrete programs of action could win. Now the PCP leadership, which always acts in predictable fashion in these matters, knows that with Mario Soares and the present socialist leadership, the PS can never become anything like the MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission] headed by Dr Alvaro Cunhal. Thus, in the view of the PCP, the PS leadership and not the right wing is the main enemy. Thus the PS does not fear the development of new parties, provided they are clearly defined in democratic terms, but only fears, on behalf of the Portuguese democratic system, the development of obscure things.

TEMPO: How do you interpret Dr Vitor Constancio's recent decision to interrupt his mandate as deputy for 6 months and to resign from the political commission? Was this a victory or a defeat for Mario Soares?
Rui Mateus: I do not know if the personal decisions freely made by Dr Vitor Constancio can have anything to do with Mario Soares, in the sense of your question. Dr Vitor Constancio has taken the trouble to make public the reasons which led him to abandon his mandate as deputy, and there is no reason to speculate on or dramatize these reasons.

The Essential Condition for Zenha's Candidacy

TEMPO: In the event that Dr Salgado Zenha runs again for the presidency of the parliamentary group of his party, how will the socialist leadership react? Will the political commission of the PS veto that candidacy?

Rui Mateus: I cannot answer that question now, because it has never to date been discussed by the PS leadership. When the time comes, we will learn if Dr Salgado Zenha wants to run for the presidency of the parliamentary group again or not, and if he does so, it will be because, the constitutional revision having been completed, he wants to commit himself to the defense of the political line approved by the PS at its last congress. This is the sine qua non if any leader of the parliamentary group of the PS is to represent his party in the Assembly of the Republic legitimately and with credibility.

Plot Against Soares

TEMPO: Various political sectors have been saying that the prestige of Dr Mario Soares in the IS, of which he is vice president, is clearly declining. By way of example, they point to the removal of Central and South America from the socialist secretary-general's responsibilities. What comment can you make?

Rui Mateus: I have repeatedly denied this plot, which developed out of an article published in EXPRESSO by its interim editor, a clearly distorted report lacking an iota of truth. There are no areas of competence within the IS making its vice presidents responsible for any specific area. The choice of Mario Soares to head the present commission on the Middle East gives the lie to intrigues of this nature, moreover, which are designed to discredit the democratic politicians of Portugal and which traditionally serve strategies alien to the interests of Portugal. For this reason they are characteristic of the newspaper DIARIO. The choice of Mario Soares over any other leader for this or that IS mission never indicates any lack of respect for any of his colleagues. On the contrary, there is great solidarity among the key leaders of the IS, rising above the normal differences in viewpoint which occur among democrats. To summarize, and so that I make myself clear, the IS has never removed any nonexistent responsibilities from Mario Soares or any other leader.

TEMPO: In conclusion, let us discuss the PS and national politics. Up to what point is the PS the "likely loser in the elections for the self-governing bodies," as Dr Magalhaes Mota, secretary-general of the ASDI [Independent Socialist Democratic Association] recently told TEMPO it is?
Rui Mateus: I do not know on what sources Dr Magalhaes Mota based this statement. For my part, I go by the information received from the base levels of my party and I note what the public opinion polls, based on scientifically proven methods, have to say. You must know of a poll which the TEOR was commissioned to undertake and which was recently reported in a Lisbon evening daily which shows that the PS would win more votes at the present time than the AD itself, if elections were held. Curiously enough, certain mass media have given this poll little publicity (purposely, I would say), while they are making every effort to emphasize reports of another poll entrusted to the same source, which shows that only 34 percent of the citizens of Portugal regard the president of the republic, who was elected on the first voting round by 56 percent of the votes, as the sovereign authority providing the greatest stability. Speaking objectively, it occurs to me at this point that what is wanted is to make impossible comparisons, while at the same time concealing the importance of a poll showing the actual increase in the electoral strength of the PS.

Integration of Democratic Socialists in PS

TEMPO: Dr Antonio Vitorino said, again in an interview granted to TEMPO, that "The integration of the UEDES [Leftist Union for Socialist Democracy] in the PS is not to be excluded." How do you view this possibility?

Rui Mateus: I view it with the same sympathy as I view Dr Antonio Vitorino and the main leaders of the UEDES, and the possibility of the integration of all democratic socialists in the PS.

TEMPO: The New Left accuses the PS of avoiding dialogue, and there are even individuals in this political sector working on the creation of new parties. Does the PS in fact seek a "pole to rally the Democratic Left?"

Rui Mateus: The PS, which is the only large party on the democratic left in Portugal, adapts its actions to the continuing desire to maintain open dialogue with all other groups and individuals who claim affiliation with this political sector. I think that it is therefore undeniable that any dialogue on domestic or foreign politics pursued among democratic socialists involves the PS, a party which is always open and the most firmly committed to dialogue, for the good of the democratic regime itself, and to prevent distortion of it.

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ARME D FORCES ACCUSED OF VARIOUS FORMS OF CORRUPTION

Lisbon DIABO in Portuguese 31 Aug 82 p 5

[Article by Luis Rodrigues: "Corruption and Favoritism Are Creating Instability in the Armed Forces"]

[Text] The prison sentence imposed on Brig Gen Carlos Azeredo for alleged violations of the RDM [Rules of Military Discipline] bring to the fore the self-interested processes still occurring within the military establishment, and the resulting instability to which these actions are likely to give rise. Since 1974/1975, when the armed forces, and the army in particular, were the focus of the most daring infiltration, as a result of the hegemonic campaigns pursued by the communists, there have been those who believed it possible to reestablish, above and beyond the necessary hierarchic chain of command, an operational atmosphere in the armed forces to make them immune to party quarrels and the interplay of interests which continue in civilian society. Ramalho Eanes represented himself as the champion of such reorganization. However, it has not occurred, and the traffic in influence continues.

On 25 November, on the pretext of "normalizing" the military establishment, the reassignment of the "triumphant" military was undertaken, without, however—and very strategically—eliminating those who were "defeated." When all is said and done, this was an alteration to the upward advance of the 25 April process for the purpose of subverting the traditional institution. It was necessary then to restrain those who wanted to move too quickly and who, in acting in this way, caused political-military radicalization and paved the way to a triumphant reaction, which would inevitably be harmful to all.

Meanwhile, the chessboard changed slowly but surely. The Eanist military factions seized the command posts which would benefit themselves and the position of Ramalho Eanes as president of the republic and therefore commander in chief of the armed forces.

The Personality of Garcia dos Santos

It was in this preestablished context that Garcia dos Santos appeared. He has been an engineer, businessman, was a member of several cabinets under Goncalvo and Pinheiro de Azeredo, a member of the Council of the Revolution, head of the civil household of the PR [president of the republic], chief of the army
general staff and chronic debtor of the nationalized bank. But Ramalho Eanes knew of the past record of Garcia dos Santos, and this was why, during the discussion of the appointment of the new CEME [army chief of staff] at a meeting of staff officers held at the Institute of Higher Military Studies in 1978, Eanes put forth the name of Rocha Vieira, because he did not think the nomination of Garcia dos Santos was suitable, because of his knowledge of the cloudy activities in which he was involved, mainly where the problems he had with the bank were concerned. These reservations of mine about the present CEME were reiterated a short time ago at a meeting held at the general headquarters of the Northern Military Region. It is obvious that this did not prevent the closest relations between the two individuals, as the present situation of the two demonstrates, nor did it prevent Ramalho Eanes from accepting loans from the Construction Company, of which Garcia dos Santos was a co-owner, for projects to improve his Madre de Deus residence. Also, a certain courtesy assured his attendance at a banquet with the military engineer elevated to the status of a businessman by his marriage. Despite the certainty with which the two move their pawns, the games are not always easy. There is always resistance to overcome, pride which is slow to bow and which must be dealt with. Carlos Azeredo has been punished, following Jaime Neves and Rodrigo da Silveira, and it is the pride of the army which is on trial.

Letter From Carlos Azeredo

It can be stated that Brig Gen Carlos Azeredo embodies in himself the standard of military rectitude and discipline, having been awarded, as was Jaime Neves, the War Cross First Class, as well as various other military medals. His arrest, which came about as a result of a private letter he sent to the CEME in April, and which has already cost him his position as second-in-command of the Northern Military Region, was ordered by Gen Garcia dos Santos himself, on the basis of the Rules of Military Discipline. However, the entire process which led to the arrest of Carlos Azeredo was heavily conditioned by the activities in which Garcia dos Santos engaged, particularly the presumed debts he contracted with the Overseas National Bank for the pursuit of his businesses.

In the letter he addressed to his hierarchic superior, Carlos Azeredo protested forcefully, specifically about the fact that he, the target of serious charges about a debt to the bank, had not been given full clarification, nor had he been allowed to face his accusers, as Sa Carneiro had done. The behavior of Garcia dos Santos, like that of one whose silence seems to give consent, is, Carlos Azeredo believes, likely to affect the prestige of the army, such that his resignation would be the only action consistent with the circumstances. The same letter also makes mention, as a target of criticism and factor in instability, of the promotion of officers to the rank of general proposed to the Council of the Revolution by the CEME, and opposed by the Higher Military Discipline Council. He also voiced his protest against the reinstatement of the officers who were involved in plotting and who launched the rebel attempts on 25 November. In this same letter, Carlos Azeredo referred to the presentation of the sword of a staff officer to Samora Machel by President
Eanes during his visit to Mozambique, although the normal preliminaries for this singular gesture—soliciting the opinion of other officers or generals and the drafting of a decree law setting forth the terms of the act—had been omitted. On the other hand, and as if this were not enough, the sword was accepted by soldiers of the FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front], which in itself makes a symbolic comment on a hypothetical defeat of the Portuguese army.

We have been able to learn that Garcia dos Santos answered Carlos Azeredo with a personal letter, stating that this was in the nature of a private matter between them, since both were staff officers, and where his debt to the bank was concerned, his situation was no different from that of thousands of Portuguese citizens. The fact is that the position of Garcia dos Santos obviously cannot be compared to that of "thousands of Portuguese citizens," because he has been invested with a political and military status on the basis of which he has allowed himself to act outside the law with the fullest impunity. Garcia dos Santos should explain the reasons which led him to file disciplinary charges against Carlos Azeredo, and whether in fact the conclusions pointed to any punishable violation or not. It is also urgent that the reason for the two charges be made clear, because according to the investigating officer, Brig Gen Torres de Magalhaes, the first indications point toward exoneration. The brilliant service record of Carlos Azeredo, who carried out an assignment in India at a time when the difficulties were most acute, as well as two assignments in Guinea and one in Angola, would in itself justify our challenge to the honesty of the author of this action.

The Gomes da Silva Case

The confused situation into which the military establishment has been plunged had yet another confirmation recently. The Ramalho Eanes-Garcia dos Santos "team" has stepped up its campaign for control of the army, with the appointment of the son-in-law of Brig Gen Henrique Calado, Lt Col Gomes da Silva, as director of the NATO Brigade. However, Gen Aurelio Trindade, commander of the infantry branch and apparently an individual enjoying the confidence of Ramalho Eanes-Garcia dos Santos, objects to this appointment, claiming in a message sent to all the units under his command that the CEME has appointed an officer who lacks the curriculum background necessary to carry out that NATO brigade assignment. These considerations, which in addition threaten the image and the pride of a military officer, reveal what dubious credit is given the recommendations of the Ramalho Eanes-Garcia dos Santos team. This is the more evident when one remembers that Aurelio Trindade is the brother-in-law of Luis Moreno, who is a member of the board of directors of the Overseas National Bank, and was directly involved in the scandalous plot to conceal the debt of Garcia dos Santos to that banking establishment. On the other hand, the reinstatement of Luis Moreno as a member of the board of directors of that bank last week allows us to assess the extent of the commitment of certain leading individuals linked with politicians in this "anything goes" atmosphere.
What is at stake, however, is the prestige and the dignity of the military establishment, above all the overwhelming majority of its officers, who while remaining uninvolved in these filthy maneuvers, are included, as a result of hasty generalization, in the negative image of that establishment provided to the public.

The position of Gen Aurelio Trindade in violation of discipline is somewhat paradoxical, since reliable reports suggest that he will be the replacement for Gen Garcia dos Santos as commander of the army general staff. Can it be that General Eanes wants to pull the rug out from under the feet of his engineer comrade once and for all? There are those who say that it is hardly likely that this will happen. On the one hand, there are many involvements between the two, and obviously, there are rumors that Ramalho Eanes has asked Garcia dos Santos if he would be willing to come to the Belem Palace as a member of his staff.

The action taken against Carlos Azeredo by Garcia dos Santos is becoming most suspicious (or indicative). And it is the more curious when one realizes that the letter sent by Brig Gen Carlos Azeredo to the CEME was received last April. The letter of response from Garcia dos Santos was sent in May, but Carlos Azeredo was only informed of the disciplinary action taken in the middle of July.

This lack of synchronization in time, which was not the result of any mature consideration of the contents of the letter which led to the penalty imposed, was the product, according to what we have been able to learn, of the pressures exerted on Garcia dos Santos for punishment of that officer. It is believed that the main pressure to impose punishment on one of the most prestigious military officers in our armed forces came precisely from Ramalho Eanes and the Council of the Revolution, which, moreover, the same sources say, no longer looked favorably on the appointment of Carlos Azeredo to the post of second-in-command of the Northern Military Region.

5157
CSO: 3101/66
CONTROLLER TO OVERSEE FINANCES IN DEFENSE MINISTRY

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 13 Sep 82 p 26

[Article: Just Clarity"

[Text] The bureaucracy of the Defense Ministry is to work better with controllers—trim the fat from the personnel.

At the foreseeable end of his career as a minister Hans Apel experienced a success which he had long done without. On Wednesday of last week in the cabinet the defense minister voiced his happiness: "Finally I get good press."

The reason for his satisfaction was the public response to plans with which Apel wants to pull the organizational consequences out of the financial mess of the Tornado fighter aircraft. According to the industrial model a "controller" is to see to it that the figures on the Hardthoehne agree. "Courage to do something unpopular," was even the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE's endorsement of the defense minister, who up to now has been without much luck.

Apel's action is unpopular above all with the military, for whom the opposition immediately made itself the spokesman.

The deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, Manfred Woerner, spread the word about what the Hardthoehne soldiers call the planned overseer: "informer in chief." Peter-Kurt Wuerzbach, the spokesman on defense policy for the Union's Bundestag group, accused Apel of wanting to "exclude the experienced knowledge of the ministry."

In this respect it was primarily the opposition which in its stubborn efforts to topple Apel more clearly than ever brought to light in the committee investigating the Tornado how in a monstrous bureaucracy expertise dissipates into organized irresponsibility.

The efforts, documented by the parliamentarians, of officials and the military always to make sure that in the end no one can quite be held responsible, just barely helped the politically responsible minister through the Tornado scandal. Since last week Apel has been able to refer to the independent judgment of management consultant Manfred Emcke and the consulting...
firm of McKinsey. Emcke: "Under today's circumstances the ministry cannot be managed with the existing set of means."

At the beginning of 1981, at the height of the Tornado crisis, Apel had hired the former head of Reemtsma for the task of thinning out the planning procedures and making proposals for a reorganization.

Emcke, known from his time as manager as a tough rehabilitator, quickly saw the weak spots of the mammoth agency: unclear or overlapping areas of competence, too many participants in the decision-making processes, but above all serious shortcomings in the information system.

The admonishment of the McKinsey examiners hints at how plans and decision were made in the past on the Hardthoehr: In the future the leadership of the agency must "give up the costly production of consensus proposals" and reject everything which comes "without a basis in fact, without extensive proof of risk factors and without clear differentiation between recommendations." Apel seconded with self-criticism: "There can be no consensus about data, only clarity."

An example of such clarity: Emcke and McKinsey were just barely able to establish that the federal armed forces have stockpiled material in the amount of DM 12 billion and turns over 2 billions' worth of it annually— but in detail what is stored where and what is being turned over "no one here on the Hardthoehr knows," according to the minister.

It is no wonder that under such conditions (Emcke: "antediluvian") even the oversight over current spending gets lost for those responsible. This has become even more the case since in the last few years the Bonn military bureaucracy has also absorbed tasks which according to Emcke should sensibly have remained with the "lower authorities," such as for example the Procurement Office in Koblenz with its 19,000 employees. Consequently, the acquisition of a reconnaissance missile is being unnecessarily processed by Apel's office as well as the Tornado billion-DM affair.

The demand for a controller, who is to restore order in the chaotic mass of data and thus enable realistic planning, was brought up a year ago by the dollar-a-year advisor Emcke. The firm of McKinsey studied the proposal at a cost of DM 724,000 and found it to be a good one.

If he is still in office by then Apel will name his present armaments chief, 51-year-old former budget director Heinz Padberg, as controller—and as subordinates so-called area controllers, who are to guarantee unembellished data in the Army, Air Force and Navy.

To the present opposition, according to Manfred Woerner, it is already clear "that under a Union government there will be no controller." A mediocre man in this position, the Christian Democratic defense expert complains, would "paralyze the office," but when the controller is really good, he "becomes a superminister."
Woerner: "Then the minister is the poor sod, and the inspector general becomes a fringe figure, who must always ask the controller whether they could perhaps get one more truck."

SPD defense politicians have found another message in Emcke's testimony. "If in the field studied about 400 employees out of 1,000 are really useful, Apel's advisor noted, then it is obvious that it might "also be possible to achieve considerable savings" among the other 4,000 Hardthoehe employees.

SPD Bundestag member Horst Jungmann: "My words exactly—in that swollen agency there are 2,000 people too many."
MILITARY TRUCKS TO BE SOLD TO IRAQ

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 20 Sep 82 p 14

[Text] The matter seemed clear to Ernst Waltemathe, representative to the Bundestag: German companies are supplying war materiel into a war zone. In Bremen and Bremerhaven, according to the parliamentarian, dozens of special military transporters stand ready for shipment to the Near East. Recipient: The Iraqi Defense Ministry.

Under contract number 980/A+S/1113 Daimler Benz ships "Unimogs" in a sand-colored military version to Bagdad, equipped with radio and telecommunications facilities from AEG. They are shipped through the Jordanian port Al Aquaba. From there the army transporters are brought into the Iraqi-Iranian war zone.

All of this, the Bonn Ministry for Economics informed the representative, is legal. An on-the-spot investigation has shown "that in this regard without exception it does not involve military vehicles in the sense of the export list."

According to the ministry's instructions, export would be inadmissible only if the vehicles were "especially constructed for military objectives."

The export examiners are not interested in the fact that "Ministry of Defense" and "Iraqi Air Force" appear as the addressees on the windshields. After all, these are "commercial vehicles" with only "slight modifications."

Also, according to the interpretation of Bonn lawyers, the extra-heavy truck tractors and other vehicles of the companies Blumenhardt and Faun for transporting tanks, now in Bremen being made ready for delivery to the Iraqi Army, do not fall under the export provisions.

However, the putative civilian vehicles are equipped with camouflage illumination and sight cross hairs for nighttime use in a military formation.

The representative from Bremen was not satisfied with the reassuring answer by the Economic Ministry. On Monday of last week he alarmed the work committee for arms exports in his parliamentary group. According to Waltemache, "politically it simply cannot be justified" that a country at war such as Iraq would be supplied with army materiel from the FRG.
INTERTECHNIQUE WORKS ON INFRARED SELF-GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEM

Paris ELECTRONIQUE ACTUALITES in French 10 Sep 82 pp 1, 11

Article by G. Bidal

With a first contract for the feasibility study of a new type of infrared self-guided missile system, the firm of Intertechnique is emerging as a serious contender in that field by exploring a new path to a self-guided system with extended capacities for image processing and recognition. A first prototype intended for an air-ground missile is in process of completion, and manufacture is expected within two to three years.

To see Intertechnique bidding for entry into the already numerous club of French self-guided system builders is perhaps surprising; yet that is the ambition officially expressed by the firm's managing director, M Maillet, to the press at the company's last general meeting (see ELECTRONIQUE ACTUALITES for 18 June 1982).

A Missile Department

The project stage, moreover, is largely past, since a missile department was quietly set up two years ago within the aeronautical division. That decision arose first from concern for diversification, and no doubt also from ambition to become established in the manufacture of more "decisive" types of equipment than systems for oxygen regulation or fuel measurement in aircraft, even though the firm has a world position in that field.

The choice of infrared is at first glance surprising, since the company as yet has no past experience with it; but at Intertechnique it is considered to come within the broad context of imagery, with emphasis on on-board real time processing, a domain in which the expertise of the data processing division would join that of the aeronautical division in on-board equipment. Nor should we forget that Intertechnique perfected the cryogenic cooling system for the IR Mira camera in the Milan missile.
But it was first necessary to acquire a technological working base in the field of captors. The firm initially considered collaboration with an American company. Contacts were made with Ford Aerospace, then with Rockwell, but that cooperation apparently met with political obstacles, and did not go beyond the exploratory development stage. That nevertheless allowed department heads to strengthen their belief in the validity of their approach. Since then, the company has had a thermic camera mockup made by a very small American firm, but it figures for the present as a solitary outsider at the gates of the self-guided systems industry.

A "Futuristic" Program

It was also necessary for it to define a framework of specifications. The problem was treated very comprehensively by designing a complete air-ground missile system, which M. Caron, head of the missile department, considers "futuristic." In summary, the idea is to transfer from the launching aircraft to the missile itself a considerable portion of the target designation and processing tasks, not only in relation to the objective affected by the weapons system—as is the case with present self-guided systems—but also to real-time examination, on board the missile, of a large part of the theater of operations, for example in antitank actions. No longer a simple "tracker," the self-guidance system would then become a complete thermic camera with its own means of storage, processing, and "choice."

At Intertechnique they are obviously very discreet about the project, but one can discern the general profile of the product aimed at: a totally passive infrared self-guidance system having autonomy and very high discernment power, but one reduced in volume and particularly in cost, since it is to equip munitions—a system, as we see, resolutely turned toward the next generation.

The means deployed are indeed considerable. The department is equipped with a 32-bit SEL/32 computer with AP120B parallel processor, and an official contract from STET (Tactical Missiles Technical Service) valued at Fr 9 million has capped the initial self-financing effort.

A first prototype, or rather a feasibility mockup, making broad use of simulation, will come before year's end to materialize the project. The next phase will consist of developing an on-board model which should fly within two to three years, with pre-series fabrication planned for 1984.

In addition to the difficulty of gaining recognition in a field new to the firm, and already largely occupied in France, Intertechnique is faced with that of finding a carrier program, for development of the future guidance system apparently does not fall into any specifications envelope corresponding to a specific program. More than a product, it is a concept which Intertechnique will have to "sell," perhaps for the successor to the ASMP (medium range air-ground missile) at the end of the decade.
Concerning the inevitable question of the new competition brought by Intertechnique within the group of French builders, let us point out that manufacture of captors proper is not contemplated. They appear to consider at Intertechnique that such technology is today "available"—in France as elsewhere—even though the crucial stage of perfecting retinas up to 150 mm in diameter is not yet attained beyond question. Intertechnique should concentrate on the processing and conditioning phase; and it may be supposed that the firm, though a "loner" for the moment, will probably have to consider cooperative relationships. We add that the specific character of developments in progress do not in the short run threaten any particular established positions, since SAT and TRT [expansions unknown] are little involved with air-ground systems, and ESD [expansion unknown] and Thomson-CSF—officially at least—continue to concentrate on the electromagnetic self-guidance system. Infrared developments by Thomson-CSF are particularly concerned with tank turrets.

It is nonetheless true that if the slot chosen is precisely defined, it can in theory lead to a rather generalized competence in infrared imagery: one can cite FLIR [forward-looking infrared] systems for aircraft, which do not really exist on the market today, or civil uses for surveillance and security, which cannot do without compact low priced cameras. Nor can it be ruled out that such spinoffs may explore in the direction of pleasure uses.

6145
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HELICOPTERS, TANKS TO TAKE PART IN 1ST ARMY CORPS EXERCISES

Paris LE MONDE in French 11 Sep 82 p 10

The army is organizing for the second half of September large open field maneuvers by two of its three corps.

From 19 to 24 September the 1st Army Corps, commanded by General Bertrand de Montaudouin, will train in the departments of Côte d'Or, Haute-Marne, Vosges, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Meuse, and Aube. During that exercise, christened Langres 82, 20,000 men and 7,000 vehicles, including 1,000 armored, as well as 130 helicopters, will maneuver in open terrain. Those elements belong to the 7th Armored Division at Besancon, the 10th Armored Division at Chalons-sur-Marne, and the 4th Armored Division at Nancy.

For Langres 82 it is planned that the tactical air force commanded by General Michel Forget will execute over 500 sorties.

From 20 to 24 September the 3rd Army Corps, commanded by General Alban Barthes, will conduct an open terrain exercise in the Loiret. Called Sully-82, that exercise will group 18,000 men, 4,200 vehicles, including 750 armored, and 60 helicopters belonging to the 2nd Armored Division at Versailles, the 8th Infantry Division at Rouen, and the 6th Marine Parachute Infantry Regiment at Mont-de-Marsan. The 3rd Army Corps logistical brigade will also be mobilized for the maneuver.

According to the defense ministry the operational duration of this exercise, from 21 to 23 September, will permit simulated spreading of chemical agents, with application of appropriate decontamination measures, and simulated nuclear strikes with the participation of six Pluto tactical nuclear missile launching ramps.

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