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TACTICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FIGHTING DESCRIBED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 2 Aug 82 pp 100-103

[Report by Dittmar Hack: "Everyone Is Their Own General"—A German Witnessed the Fight of the Mujahedin in Afghanistan]

[Text] Soviets without infrared detection devices, Afghans without marksman-ship—and both sides with no guerilla warfare experience. For 5 weeks Dittmar Hack, journalist, age 31, accompanied Muslim partisans up to Kandahar. He witnessed Soviet air raids and tank attacks and the suffering it brought to the civilians, but he also experienced that there is "a lot of shooting, but not many hits" in Afghanistan.

The fire of a Soviet RPD machine gun tore into the quiet morning. They had discovered us. The driver of our overloaded jeep had the presence of mind to brake.

Along with 10 Afghan Mujahedin I jumped into a ditch, crawling another 20 meters, because I was afraid that our vehicle's load, Chinese tank mines and ammunition, would be hit.

The Mujahedin shot back only sporadically. I cursed my decision to advance into the Kandahar province. I had been severely warned in Peshawar: There were no mountains there, thus no cover, with the Soviet air force bombarding the area around the clock. Sixteen hours ago we started out from Jaman at the Pakistan border, driving along horrible roads and paths throughout the night. My companions are members of the "Fedayin-i-islam" with headquarters in Quetta, Pakistan. This resistance group was not founded until 1980. Their area of operation is limited to the southern provinces and extends from Kandahar to Herat. The organization is comprised of 20,000 combatants.

Following this incident, we had to cross a valley secured by a Soviet position. This would have been suicide by day, so we waited for nightfall.

The driver started out alone with the jeep, and we followed behind in some distance—a precaution against mines. The vehicle went undiscovered, passing the position which was about 400 m away. When we slid by, a search light suddenly flared up, detecting the group.
All but two of us went down for cover. Those two continued to march in the glaring search light. Machine guns opened fire immediately. Firing a series of tracers, we jumped from cover to cover and thus escaped the fire. Again it became clear that there is a lot of shooting, but very few hits in this war.

The Soviets do not use infrared or residual light amplifiers—a fact that had caught my attention during night fights I had witnessed before. Every Western army carries such devices as standard equipment.

After an hour's drive we reached our destination, a village about 20 kilometers west of Qandahar.

The next morning I was suddenly awakened by the sound of four MiG-21 fighter bombers. After dropping their 500-kg bombs on the neighboring village, they were followed by six Mi-24 helicopters launching their rockets. Each of these 10-ton monsters carries 128 57-mm rockets. From now on I could see air attacks of this type every day.

For the "Shurawi" (Soviets) utilization of their air power in this flat, garden-like terrain involved no risks. In contrast to the mountain provinces the Mujahedin here do not have antiaircraft weapons, not even the commonly used heavy 12.7-mm DSchk machine gun.

During attacks the Soviet pilots never went below the 550-m limit in order to stay out of the range of MGs and rifles. They control the airspace with parade-like formation flights. At least half of the villages here have been bombed, and the losses among the civilian population are accordingly high. One weapon which the Soviets do not use here is napalm.

In the weeks to follow I visited dozens of villages with local Mujahedin groups. These "holy warriors" did not turn out to be very active. Life was monotonous, food supplies were scarce. There was no military training, but the study of the Koran instead. Among the Mujahedin there are a good number of officers and sergeants who deserted from the government's army and could initiate combat training, but no one is interested.

A comparison of the Afghan partisans with the guerilla Vietcong army is absurd: They are a loose association of armed civilians to whom obedience does not mean anything. Everyone is their own general. Those who get tired of the war simply go home.

A few times they asked me to enter a shooting competition. Although I am not a good shot by any means, I won each time. The Mujahedin's reputation of being a deadly sharpshooter is not justified.

After 2 weeks I went to Malatshiat, one kilometer before Qandahar—a village of which 80 percent have been destroyed by almost daily Soviet attacks. Constantly bombarded and attacked by ground troops, yet firmly in the hands of the partisans, Malatshiat stands for the incapability of the Soviet war machinery to force a victory.
My two companions and I had approached the village by bicycle, coming as close as 2 kilometers, when an air attack started. In the shade of a mulberry tree we waited until the last helicopter had disappeared.

The smoking village was severely destroyed. The smell of putrefaction hung over the ruins. The Mujahedin group leader was pleased to see me. While we had lunch, 120-mm mortar grenades exploded nearby. "Greetings from Qandahar," laughed the leader. With every hit the door of the headquarters opened, and plaster came from the ceiling.

Someone brought in a dirty bundle containing the severed arm of a boy, a victim of the air raid. Soon thereafter the boy who had lost his right arm was carried in. A doctor dressed the bleeding stump. Without crying the boy let it all happen.

During dusk we all smoked hashish from a water pipe to escape to the land of dreams, when we were abruptly interrupted by the drop of flares: This was how the Soviets want to prevent partisan troops from infiltrating Qandahar. By day the Soviet control the city; by night the Mujahedin share this control.

On the fifth day I escaped from Malatshiat. I wanted to join a group hiding in an orchard 8 kilometers further. There I witnessed the attack of a Soviet tank unit.

Throughout the day we had to hide from helicopters in the orchards. In the early evening, when we could see the lead of the armor column with our bare eyes, the retreat began: All Mujahedin of this area marched to less dangerous areas during the night. A long trek on tractors, by foot, on horses, bicycles or camels escaped encirclement.

Later it became known that approximately 5,000 Soviet soldiers fought in the attack which was directed toward the villages of Saulaghie, Pashmul, Qualk and Sangisar between June 12 and 14. the victims were 223 Afghan civilians who died after bombardment and artillery fire, during infantry combat and massacres. Here, as in every partisan war, the innocent population is the main victim.

After a few days of rest I returned to Pakistan. As the Soviets had mined the supply runway in the meantime, I crossed the desert with a camel caravan. My destination was Jaman. About 10 kilometers before we reached the border, we saw the searchlights of Soviet tanks searching for border crossers. It took us half of the night to circumvent this danger. We rode into Jaman at dawn.

In the "Fedayin-i-islam" headquarters I heard of the heavy fights in the Helmand province between Mujahedin organizations, leaving hundreds of them dead.

The key problem of the resistance is the lack of unity among the Afghans. There are six major organizations and dozens of smaller ones, and each of them claim to be the true representative of the Afghan people. They justify this by the number of guns and combatants in Afghanistan and the number of typewriters in the Peshawar headquarters.
The tensions between active fighters in Afghanistan and their leaders in Pakistan are growing, because the rivals are not combining their efforts, which would be a decisive factor for the war.

In Peshawar I spoke with a deserted officer of the Afghan army who is now a high-ranking soldier in one of the Mujahedin centers. He complained about the incapability and corruption of the head cadres of the resistance who are more interested in keeping the status quo guaranteeing them a good income than they are in intensifying the fight.

The Mujahedin appear to be just as incapable as the Soviets to adapt to the rules of guerrilla warfare. The Afghan way of fighting corresponds to the traditional "night-blood" tactic by means of which the enemy is lured into an ambush during feuds where he is destroyed in the dark. The Soviet answer to this are counter offensives with the strength of divisions.

Then hundreds of tanks flatten a few pitiful villages while the Mujahedin have long left. The Soviet Government makes its army fight with methods that were successful in the fight against the German Wehrmacht—although not only the enemy is different than it was then, but also their own troops are different: The Soviet soldier is neither trained nor motivated for this type of war. The 6-month duration of their mission is much too short for them to gain experience in combat.

A defense war may be fought with an army of conscripts, but hardly an operation in a far-away country. The United States learned this lesson in Vietnam, and the Argentines on the Falkland Islands.

The Afghan Mujahedin’s willingness to fight and give everything is in sharp contrast to that. He knows every hideout, every path in his surroundings, and he is highly mobile. If he dies, he will be granted access to the places of honor in paradise according to Islamic belief. He therefore fights with incredible toughness and bitterness, all the more because he does not understand the Soviets’ motivation to occupy this desolate country.
TRIBULATIONS OF FRENCH DOCTORS DESCRIBED

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 13 Aug 82 p 5

[Article by Juan Fercey]

[Text]

"Attention, two French prostitutes are going around the Panjshir Valley," announced Kabul television, warning: "They are dangerous." Meanwhile, Soviet artillery bombèd the valley's villages, helicopters droned over the caves and special units of the Red Army tried to crush the "Mujaheddins," the Afghan freedom fighters who organized an important resistance center in the Panjshir. This was the fifth offensive against the Panjshir in two and a half years, probably the biggest attacks since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

But what would French prostitutes look for in a bombarded, poor valley "behind the back of God," with an altitude of 2,000 meters, where the women wear veils when people from other valleys come to their village? In 1946, James Michener wrote in "Caravans," probably his best book, that at that time unfaithful women in Afghanistan were still stoned to death. Wouldn't it be more profitable for these prostitutes to stay in Paris, or go to London, Amsterdam, Frankfurt or Las Vegas?

The two young ladies, called "prostitutes" by the Kabul television, are now in New York for a few days and describe their experiences in Afghanistan, thusly. They are medical doctors representing "Aide Medicale Internationale." Dr. Laurence Laumonier, 29, a graduate of the Medical School of the University of Dijon, and Dr. Capucine de Bretagne, 30, a graduate of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Paris.

"We went to the Panjshir to assist the 100,000 village people in the valley where there is not a single physician" said Dr. Laumonier, a founding member of AMI of Paris. "We organized a campaign of vaccination, we taught the women hygiene, and in desperate cases we even performed operations on wounded men and women. We established a small hospital which was twice bombarded and we performed operations there at night."

The "hospital" was a house, formerly an office of the Communist Party. There is no electricity so they worked under the light of oil lamps. They saved the lives of dozens of gravely wounded people, among them children injured by aerial bombs, artillery fire or mines dropped by Soviet helicopters.

"We operated on some people taking bullets out of their bodies" said Dr. de Bretagne. "Once we had to operate on three men — one of them died, the other two were saved... There was one case too complicated for our primitive hospital; a young woman with a bullet in the stomach. We convinced the family to immediately send her to a hospital in Kabul. But this is a ten hour trip, four hours on foot and six by bus. Upon arriving at Kabul, the young woman died..."

But, continued Dr. de Bretagne, the girl's father and her brothers and
sisters didn’t cry. “Their faith is strong, they believe that she went to paradise. They don’t have anything, they are not materialistic as Europeans or Americans are, for them life in this world is transitory toward a better life.”

The Afghan people are incredibly courageous. They don’t fear death. They are probably the best guerrilla fighters in the world. The Soviet offensive, which began on May 17th against the Panjsher, ended with a Soviet defeat. According to the Afghan resistance organization in New York, the Soviet and Afghan Government forces suffered more than 3,000 dead and wounded, 35 helicopters and MIG warplanes were shot down and 60 armored vehicles were destroyed, most of them on the Salang highway. This was also reported by the only American correspondent in Afghanistan, Edward Girardet of “The Christian Science Monitor.”

During the offensive, the Soviets were searching for the two French doctors, dropping leaflets on the villages demanding to know the whereabouts of “the two French women,” identified as “the prostitutes” of the resistance leaders.

Sharing

Capucine spent eight months and Laurence five months in the Panjsher and the village people were grateful for their humanitarian help. They shared with them the dangers and the simple village life, their diet of corn bread, goat’s milk and sometimes chicken. They taught the children some French and English, they trained two male nurses. They also met Ahmed Shah Massoud, the near-legendary resistance commander of Panjsher.

“Massoud is a 30 year old man, a graduate of Kabul’s Polytechnical School” said Dr. Laumonier. “He is a fine and intelligent man and the people trust him.”

He is also lucky, because the Soviet military leadership chose him as their first target. Massoud, namely, is popular in other regions also, resistance leaders of different factions respect him. Furthermore, by cooperating with other guerrilla leaders of the border zones, they succeeded in expanding the resistance fight into Soviet Tadjikistan. Reportedly there are more than 2,000 Islamic resistance fighters in Tadjikistan.

It is interesting to note that among the first Soviet invasion troops, there were Tadjik and Kazakh units; but after a few weeks, they were withdrawn because they bought the Koran in Kabul’s bazaars and discovered that there are no American or Chinese invaders in Afghanistan, and the Afghan people are not “fascists” but are their brothers.

The Afghan women share the difficulties with the men,” said Dr. Laumonier. “They do the work of the men who are in the resistance; they cultivate the agriculture under the most difficult conditions, since the bombardments have destroyed all irrigation possibilities. They never complain. They don’t have rifles, but they faithfully assist their husbands, fathers and sons who fight.”

Were they, the French women, considered as “mujaheddins”? “There is an Afghan proverb” recalled Capucine, “the one who gives drinking water to a mujaheddin becomes himself a mujaheddin.”

Humanitarian

But these enthusiastic young physicians, who believe that a doctor’s profession is a mission, and chose the most dangerous and abandoned regions in the world to work, emphasize that they and their organization are absolutely “apolitical.” They are not “anti” anything; they just attempt to help people in need where they cannot get help.” “Aide Medicale International” is a purely humanitarian organization, founded two years ago, originally with ten members, now with 46” said Dr. Laumonier.

“We have no sponsors, no intervention from governments or organizations. We are supported by donations and lectures, a few short films and pictures.”

Dr. Laumonier has participated in five medical missions inside Afghanistan — twice in Nuristan, twice in Panjsher and once in Nangrah. She was also in Kurdistan (Iran), and she speaks some Farsi Dr. de Bretagne was in a mission in Kampuchea among the Khmer Rouge guerrillas near the Thailand border zone.

A report of an Afghan resistance center, which reached New York via Peshavar, said that “in the Panjsher, the Soviet Army may have suffered its gravest setback since the end of the Second World War... It is obviously much too soon to hope that the Red Army of Occupation will meet its nemesis on the order of the Anglo-Indian Army’s famous catastrophe of 1842; however, one thing is shattered, and that is the myth of Soviet military invincibility. Even if the Soviets persevere, the ‘Afghan Resistance has shown that they can be beaten perhaps not in the same valley if they keep trying there, but may be they can be beaten in the next valley, or the next, or yet the next.”

INTERCO PRESS
GROWING OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT MEASURES DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 243, 19 Jul 82 pp 27, 28

[Article by al-Salami al-Hasani: "Soft-Spoken Nay from Silent Majority 20 Years after Independence"]

[Text] When the announcement was made in the official media that celebrations for the 20th anniversary of Algeria's independence would be cancelled, it seemed as though the wishes of the man in the street were being fulfilled. Ever since the outbreak of events in Lebanon, Israel's invasion of that country and the siege of West Beirut, the man in the street in Algeria has been asking, "Where is the Algeria of steadfastness and opposition?" If Algerian authorities, starting with the age of Boumediene until that of Chedli Benjedid had not gone too far in their policy of supporting liberation movements in Africa and Asia and had they not unsheathed their swords, this question would not have been asked as it is being asked now. Algeria was one of the first countries to support the Palestinian cause. But Algeria's inordinate support for liberation movements, especially in recent years, has been merely political rhetoric. It was not accompanied by any concrete action except that of sending some medication and food during the past few weeks to Lebanon via Damascus. It is being said that these supplies are stuck in the port of Tartus in Syria. Algerian authorities have increased this aid, and the Algerian man in the street has now come to believe that the lives of civilians in Lebanon depend on such aid.

It may be said that the Algerian people's disappointment with the posture the government and the new administration have assumed toward the Palestinian cause is due to the fact that Algeria today has a "nominal presence" on the Arab scene. In this it is not only conforming to its allies in the countries of steadfastness and opposition, but this is also because of what befell its foreign policy, on the one hand, since the death of Boumedienne and the vacuum he left behind, and, on the other hand, because of the disappearance of Mohamed Sadiq Benyahya who is considered a skillful diplomat in Algeria. For some months now Algeria's foreign policy has depended only on continuing the course that was left by our predecessors. There have been no new initiatives. On the Arab scene, however, Algeria stands [torn] between its previous commitments toward the countries of steadfastness and confrontation, [its wishes] to avoid involvement in Arab disputes and [its wish] to stay away from active participation in Arab politics lest that would have negative effects on its domestic situation. As a result, public opinion in Algeria has been detached from Arab events, while the official media,
because of a predilection for continuing what predecessors had started, are sparing no efforts in talking about Algeria's positions of support for liberation movements in the world.

Consequently, this year's celebrations of the 20th anniversary of independence have been clouded by domestic problems as well as by that [sense of] disappointment which sometimes manifests itself as indifference and other times as veiled criticism of Algeria's absence from the Arab scene. Today, as Algerians try to evaluate the past 20 years, since the departure of the French occupation army, they will most certainly find that, above all else, they've lost their self-sufficiency in food. This is because past economic plans neglected agricultural development and was satisfied with "the agricultural revolution," which was no more than a re-distribution of property by means of nationalizing agricultural land and establishing the state's control over it. Algerians will also find that the industrial effort and industrial projects which took priority in Boumediene's administration did not achieve any results, including those that were set for them. Algerians will also find that most factories are still not producing, either because there is no market for what they produce or because the qualified staff and people who can operate them are not available. In addition to this failure that some official Algerian circles acknowledge at private and party gatherings, there is another failure of no less importance. Ever since independence the government has not built any housing. Thus, today, Algeria is suffering from the greatest housing shortage in the world. Today, even Algerians say that one can become a minister [in government] or anything one wants, but it is impossible for one to find an apartment.

There is also an unemployment problem, which is actually a common problem in most Third World countries. But in Algeria unemployment is a special case: it is the result of "chaotic development in the distribution of the population and in education." While the population in Algeria doubled from 1962 to 1982, economic plans failed to create one fourth of the jobs that are required for such demographic development. Education became widespread without a plan that is commensurate with economic development or at least with the needs that will be generated by development plans. Thus, schools and institutes produced a generation that in most cases was not able to find jobs for which individuals were qualified by virtue of the experience they had gained in the employment market. Other economic sectors, meanwhile, suffered from a major shortage in qualified personnel. In recent years Chadli Benjedid's administration added another comparable question [to those already mentioned]. This is illustrated in the Arabization [program] which is now prevalent in all sectors and fields. Arabization is a significant step, but those who made that political decision, which came as a reaction to numerous pressures and events, did not think about ways and means for applying it. As a result, productivity fell sharply because personnel who can function when using Arabic were lacking. It would have been better to develop such personnel [gradually] instead of forcing personnel to operate the means of production by using new ways and means for communicating.

When Algeria's foreign policy course of "nominal presence" converged upon its domestic problems, Algerian society seemed after 20 years of independence to be living in a paradox. Except for stopgap measures that were used as it were to prevent a disaster, Algeria's domestic problems continued to grow without any solution. On the one hand there was the ruling "establishment," most of whose
chief members are from the army and affiliated with a special agency that is loyal to the president. On the other hand there were the people in general who suffered the ups and downs of the high cost of living, high unemployment and feelings of disappointment. This is beginning to manifest itself in the unrest that sometimes assumes the form of cultural or economic demands; other times it takes on the character of a mysteriously restless social condition whose operative factors are unfathomable.

It seems that the feelings of satisfaction which prevailed when Chadli Benjedid came to power and "the moral purge" he said in many of his speeches he would conduct in state institutions have gradually begun to dissipate, leaving in their place opposition that is both silent and mysterious. There is no doubt that despite the pardons and the rigorous auditing that was being done with members of the past administration, Chadli Benjedid's administration failed to eradicate corruption from society and from "the establishment." The average Algerian now has doubts about these measures; he thinks that their only purpose was to substitute one group that supported former President Boumedienne with another group that is loyal to Col Chadli Benjedid.

This socio-political situation has actually produced in Algeria a "silent majority" which the regime is convinced does not either stand beside it or support it. In fact, the regime seems to have no hope whatsoever of winning it over. The regime is now inclined to preserve the silence of this majority [and to prefer that] to provoking it into action. A historical leader of the Algerian Revolution says, "This silent majority poses a serious problem to the regime and to the opposition at the same time because no one now can determine exactly what its position will be or how it will act. It is likely, however, in view of the spread of education after independence, that this silent majority will go back to the premises of the Algerian National Liberation Movement when there were parties and when the principle of nationalism in Algeria implied both independence and Islam. Islam in Algeria, as it is in the remaining countries of the Arab Maghreb, is inseparable from Arabism. To the man in the street, to the majority of intellectuals and to the elite [as well] Islam and Arabism are indistinguishable. Accordingly, Islam and its slogans in the Arab Maghreb do not have the same political implications they do in the Arab East or in other areas of the world. Thus, in the countries of North Africa Islam continues to be an indication of a person's adherence to an Arab character and an Arab identity. Therefore, most opposition leaders in Algeria, and among them are some historical leaders of the Algerian Revolution, do not understand how we can make a distinction between Islam and Arabism. It is from this logic that the Islamic wave which is sweeping Algeria can be explained. [On the one hand] this Islamic wave is a response to the socio-political crisis in the country, and on the other hand, it is a response to the separatist movement in the tribal area. It is an attempt to return to the premises of the National Liberation Movement in Algeria, but this attempt is still deeply immersed in a "spontaneous Islam" that makes it vulnerable to the risks of corruption, destruction and neglect of basics in favor of slogans. The rise of this wave coincides with reconciliation attempts that are being made among the leaders of opposition movements in Algeria. The decision of former president Ahmed Ben Bella to form a political opposition movement is also not a coincidence. This makes Algeria in the eighties more likely than any other country in the Arab Maghreb to bring about significant changes or at least get out of a state of "ongoing crisis."
Today, 20 years after the Algerian people said yes to independence on 3 July 1962, the National Liberation Army has become the army of the government. The liberation front has been wiped out, and it is no more than a huge building in al-Amir 'Abd-al-Qadir square with some employees in the provinces. The Algerian citizen who said yes to independence in 1962 is now saying "No," to what is happening around him in a soft inaudible voice. It is expected that out of the silent majority's "socio-political mystery," a political force will emerge that will be capable of combining the premises of the National Liberation Movement with the requirements of the age and of present-day Algeria, particularly in the field of democracy and public liberties.
HAYKAL'S POSITION ON AL-SADAT ASSASSINATION

Cairo AL-MUSAwwAR in Arabic No 2997, 19 Mar 82 pp 12-15

[Article by Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal: "My Unequivocal Position on the Assassination"]

[Excerpt] Dear Makram:

I read your article in the last issue of AL-MUSAwwAR, and I understood—and I hope I understood you correctly—that I am the one you were speaking about, in both the kind remarks in the introduction and in the critical remarks which followed.

I am not sure if I deserve your praise, even though I was flattered by it. But I am sure that I do not deserve your criticism. Or at least, the way I interpret you—and every interpretation may be right or wrong—is that you are criticizing me for things that I did not say.

I am going to permit myself to debate you in the last few weeks only, not the others who have been discussing me in their writings as if I were a football in a match. They are doing this for reasons the details of which I will spare you and the readers of AL-MUSAwwAR...I imagine that you and they are not very interested in the details. To stoop to the level of vague recrimination on the order of "You know very well..." and "But they said..." is simply pointless.

It was attributed to me through an interview with the SUNDAY TIMES that I witnessed the assassination of the late President Anwar al-Sadat, that I considered the assassins to be heroes, and that I disapproved of punishing them in any way for their crime. That was not a faithful rendition of what I actually said.

What I said is publicly in print. But allow me to comment that what I said was spoken in the course of a running conversation with the famous British journalist Simon Winchester. It was not on the same order of my articles, in which I judiciously weigh every word and phrase before committing them to paper, and which I then take full responsibility for. You know the difference between an interview and a written article. The former is measured by its spirit and meaning, while the latter is measured by the actual written text.
Having said that, I will admit to anything that anyone attributes to me on the condition that it be placed in context, without distorting my words or their meaning.

A simple, elementary question crosses my mind:

Don't I have the right (and it may be dangerous to put it this way!) to have the text translated and published so that everyone will have the opportunity to know what the issue is, and of what I am accused?

Allow me to ask insistently: haven't we had enough of that old method of accusation— so-and-so "hurt Egypt" by writing that, or "insulted people" by saying that, or "acted against Egypt" by trying that? Haven't we had enough unsubstantiated accusations and unverifiable claims, without any thought given to the circumstances or responsibility?

Isn't it apparent where these methods lead to? Haven't these people done enough?

Perhaps you will excuse me for this introduction. I will now present you with my view on the subject of political violence.

My opinion, as clearly as possible, is as follows: I do not like, nor do I condone, nor do I call for political violence for any reason whatsoever, or on any pretext, or due to any particular circumstances. My reasons for this position do not lend themselves to compromise.

I am first and foremost a journalist. A journalist's profession, mission, and role in life revolves around the spoken or written word. And when words are changed into bullets the entire profession, mission and role become meaningless.

Furthermore, individual violence goes against everything I believe in, my concepts, and experience. Therefore, no matter how good a person's intentions might be or how high his office, I cannot grant him the right to appoint himself judge, jury, and executioner on behalf of a particular belief that is, after all, only a particular, and hence limited, viewpoint. And this holds true whether it be the viewpoint of the government or a particular concept or creed.

Furthermore, I respect human life to the point of holding it sacred. And I will not grant the power over life and death to any human being. That power is reserved for God. It is for Him alone to decide peoples' fate.

Having made my position clear, allow me to add that political assassination has occurred throughout history. It has been experienced by all of the earth's nations from one pole to the other: From where the sun rises to where it sets. Of course you also know that the phenomenon of political assassination has become a subject within the curriculum of foreign policy and political science at the larger universities today.
In the past—as you know—a curriculum on political science would rely for its material on some history, international law, and the charters of international organizations (from the angle of famous historical treaties).

Today things are different. The study of political science is predicated solely on "conflict." Conflict is the core of foreign policy. Today they teach separate courses on "origins of conflict," "conflict management," and "resolving conflict." There is also a separate course on "crises" which incorporates related subjects such as "crises management," resolving crises," and "negotiations." All of this finally led to branching out into another separate course on violence at Harvard University—which includes the study of political assassination.

Therefore, the phenomenon of political assassination is neither an ancient nor a worldwide phenomenon only, but also a contemporary phenomenon addressed by modern science and excelled at by psychiatrists. It is investigated, researched and subjected to analysis, because it is too important to leave to nurses in the mental hospitals, or to journalists' books!

Please excuse me for going on in so much detail. I hope you and AL-MUSAWWAR will be patient with me, for I would like to be done with this subject once and for all....

So I continue: To acknowledge that such a phenomenon exists in history and in modern science is one thing; to endorse it, and call for it, and carry it out is quite another.

Perhaps the least we can do about political assassination is to intuitively understand the motives of the assassin even though we cannot comprehend it with our minds, and let the rule of law, which governs every society, take its course and impose its penalty to the maximum.

This does not only reflect my respect for the law and for the rights of society governed by law. It also reflects my respect for the motives that lead to political assassination. This is a delicate point. Please allow me to explain my point of view. Of course, you have the right to agree or disagree. Let us contemplate the fine difference between ordinary murder and political assassination. Ordinary murder is when one person kills another for personal motives, be it greed, revenge, self-defense, honor or some other reason.

Political assassination is something quite different. The personal motive is not at all apparent here. Usually, in fact, the killer and the victim do not even know each other. The only time they ever meet face to face is in all probability only at the fateful moment of execution.

The motive behind political assassination is of another sort...It is an idea or a belief of an individual. Of course, it is wrong to give it expression. But that does not prevent it from becoming imbedded in the depths of a man's mind, taking over all of his senses until he finally decides: I am ready to sacrifice my life for the sake of ending the life of another!
This point is central to political assassination.

This "value" alone is what makes a man ready to sacrifice his life, motivated by an idea or belief, in order to take the life of another. He is undeterred by the foreknowledge that that life is guarded on every side and protected by law! Therefore, the readiness to sacrifice oneself for an idea or belief is the first step on the road to political assassination. That is the difference between ordinary murder and political assassination, even though we say--and it is certainly true—that they are both a crime in the eyes of society.

The sole "value" involved in political assassination is the general motive—an idea or belief (taking for granted that to give expression to the idea is wrong). At the same time, it is the prior readiness to sacrifice oneself before taking action against another.

As a consequence of this—in my opinion—that any attempt to find excuses or ask forgiveness or determine who was more involved in the assassination, simultaneously destroys in turn the "value" that lays at the heart of the political assassination. It simply transforms the deed from political assassination to ordinary murder committed by some person or group of persons under the impression that they can avoid the penalty by seeking refuge in a Higher Power, or in the sentiment of public opinion!

Hence you see that as a matter of principle:

1) I neither approve of nor call for political assassination for any reason or under any circumstances.

2) I cannot imagine that there could be recourse to anything but the rule of law and the limits of law after an assassination.

3) Recourse to the law is not only the right of society but also that of the assassin himself—otherwise the ideas and beliefs that constitute his motive (given that expressing them is wrong, of course) do not make the deed any different from an ordinary murder!

I hope I was able to explain what I mean.

I want you to know that these views on political assassination are not new for me, nor did I acquire them upon reaching the age of 58. They are the same views I held in the bloom of my youth in 1946—for the last 36 years!

You were not with us at the time, but I urge you to ask our elderly colleagues who were. We were struggling in those days to give the newspaper house lasting foundations—thank God they still survive today.

In those days—the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947—Amin Usman Pasha's assassination was the burning issue insistently holding public attention. In those days a small number of men assassinated Amin Usman Pasha because he made the remark in a public speech that "Egypt's relationship with Britain is as eternal as a Catholic marriage!"
For their part--this small group of men--they considered Amin Usman Pasha's words an unacceptable affront to their nationalist sensibilities. They then decided on, and carried out, an assassination plan for Amin Usman Pasha. And they actually killed him.

Moreover, the same small group of men--alongside a second group--decided to assassinate Mustafa Nahas Pasha, head of the Wafd Party, for what they imagined to be his role in the events of 4 February 1942.

The first group tried to shoot Nahas Pasha, without success.

The other group loaded his car with dynamite and tried to blow him up on the street outside his bedroom window--but by some miracle he escaped!

Perhaps you remember that the late President Anwar al-Sadat belonged to both groups. President al-Sadat--as was found in the subsequent investigation and as he himself mentioned in an official speech--himself led the first group of men that thought of, planned, arranged, executed, and succeeded in the assassination of Amin Usman Pasha.

He also participated in--as is verified by the official record--the second group of men that attempted, but did not succeed in, the assassination of Mustafa Nahas Pasha.

At the time--and I urge you to review the files and old newspaper clippings--there was an attempt by some newspapers to depict political assassinations--which succeeded in Amin Usman's case and failed in Mustafa Nahas' case--as a heroic deed. A broad media campaign ensued to give the deeds the appearance of a "holy mission."

Moreover, there was an attempt to smuggle the prime suspect in the assassination case, Husayn Tawfig, out of jail. He actually was smuggled out of jail with the help some officers from the royal guard, under the command of the royal palace.

The royal palace--and especially Ahmad Hasanayn Pasha, the king's chief of council--considered the events of 4 February 1942 an insult to the king and to the throne. Although the whole story about what happened on 4 February 1942 is liable to different interpretations and explanations, the point is that the royal palace, and especially Ahmad Hasanayn Pasha was intent on revenge:

--revenge on Mustafa Nahas, who accepted the ministerial position offered by the British ambassador (or so it was said).

--revenge on Amin Usman, who was thought to be the link between the head of the Egyptian Wafd Party and the British ambassador.

This is why there was such an outpouring of sympathy and cheers for the assassins of Amin Usman and the would-be assassins of Mustafa Nahas.
With this digression I have tried to refresh your memory about a time which you did not live through yourself. But the point I want to make is that at that time and with all the power I had in the newspaper business, I took a position firmly opposed to the sentimental whitewash of the assassination attempt. And up to this day I still give a shudder of despair when I think of how the prime suspect in the case of Amin Usman's assassination, Husayn Tawfiq, was smuggled to Syria thanks to the intervention of the king and the royal officers' guard. And I wish that my colleague and dear friend Kamil al-Shinnawi—who was present then and participated in those long debates—were alive today to tell you in his inimitable almost cinematic, manner about the arguments we had over principle and professional concerns in those best days of my youth.

My argument then (and it is still engraved in my mind today) was as follows:

1) It is wrong to celebrate over someone's assassination, no matter what difference of opinion exist about the motives or the individuals concerned.

2) It was wrong to smuggle Husayn Tawfiq out of the country to Syria by the palace guard, because that makes him look like a mere hired killer.

3) The best thing to do for Husayn Tawfiq, that is, if you think he deserves it—as to prosecute him to the fullest extent of the law.

Unfortunately, political expediency triumphed over justice...or perhaps I should say, it triumphed over the very rule of law and the source of law itself. We could go on exchanging stories. But what interests me now is to state that my position on political assassination from A to Z, has been clear from the beginning...at least I hope so!

Let us return to the original subject over which this latest tempest—a tempest in a teapot, I say—erupted. That subject was the interview I gave to the SUNDAY TIMES, which printed it over an entire page!

As I write you this letter I have before me the completed text of that interview, from the introduction by that great British newspaper (and which discretion forbids me to disclose) to the very last letter, and all the headings and subheadings in between.

I have more than that before me as I write you this letter.

I have before me the texts of other interviews I have given to almost all of the world's greatest newspapers and to the most influential radio networks covering the civilized world.

And I have before me also tens of other interviews given to Arabic newspapers and magazines. In many of them, what I had to say constituted that day's story, or made the front cover.

All of this is before me now. I read it and then reread it. I review it, and then I review it again. I cannot find a single phrase, or even a single
word, that says anything bad about Egypt or about its people. On the contrary, every phrase and every word that I said during my three weeks' stay in London (where I was consulting with the group of publishers who publish my books throughout the world) was full of trust in Egypt and concern for its people and problems.

Not that I congratulate myself on that fact, nor that I want to be congratulated. These are my true feelings, and not only my patriotic duty. But I cannot help being surprised that some people have the nerve, with one swift move of the pen, to twist what I said into something bad!

(Notice that instead of "nerve" I could have easily said "jealousy," were it not for the fact that I have been taught to believe that man is a civilized animal and he is civilized because he is disciplined in the sense of behavior and values). As I said, I have before me the SUNDAY TIMES interview and many other interviews. Nowhere do I find a single word or phrase that might be construed as an attack on the late President Anwar al-Sadat.

Allow me to remind you of something that happened which I think you know about.

After I was released from prison along with the other detainees, I met that gracious lady, the widow of the late President Anwar al-Sadat. She looked pained and grief-stricken. You know that I had my political differences with President al-Sadat, but I always tried my best to differentiate the political from the human. That is how I felt towards his family, also irrespective of political differences.

There remained many qualities about the man which I valued without reservation. Among these was his great intelligence.

There remained a relationship of friendship between myself and his three daughters and his son--these were all I knew of his family--that I would never, ever deny. That day, there was nothing to make me say anything other than what I truly felt. And I am not the kind of person to change his mind with the changes of the wind, from day to day.

When I met that gracious lady, the widow of our late president Anwar al-Sadat. Our meeting lasted for 2 hours. At the end she requested one thing of me, a request that remains like a melody to my ears: "Muhammad...you won't attack Anwar?" And I replied truthfully and candidly: "I have never attacked him. I disagree with his policies, but not with the man. But you can be sure that I won't say anything about these policies in the absence of the man that I did not say in his presence."

And I added: "I fear that the attacks are coming. But they will come from others, not from me."

I did not say another word. The newspapers at the time were full of insinuations and comments that finally reached the point where they were raising doubts about the late president's mental health.
I must confess (and again I remind you that this is what I really feel—nothing is making me say it) that at no time did I ever feel hatred towards Anwar al-Sadat. Even when he put me in jail, in conditions more terrible than any human being could stand, I did not hate him. There are people who will testify to that, people who because of their (political) backgrounds went through the same experience. For instance, Mr Muhammad Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, Mr Fathi Radwan, who experienced imprisonment. Among them were Dr Fu'ad Musa, Dr Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah, and Dr Jalal Rajab. All of these, and others, had been in jail on other occasions. But they all say that this time was worse than all the previous times put together.

I don't feel any hatred towards Anwar al-Sadat. And I am not ashamed to admit that tears came to my eyes when I heard the news that he was dead. It was a natural, human reaction which was witnessed by (no doubt to their surprise) the prison warden and the deputy investigator for cell block 17. That is where I was held for close to three months.

I don't feel any hatred because I am able to distinguish between the political and the human. Even if other people mix them up, I am always careful not to. I beg you and the readers of AL-MUSAWARNAR to be patient with me as I say what I have to say once and for all. Then I will give a change to others to speak their minds. They are like bicycle-riders to me—either they move or else they fall to the ground. Usually they do not ride, they just talk. For words, any words, are all they have to justify their existence—although what that is worth is another matter!

Since I have spoken about what constitutes that "human," I must also clear up what I mean by the "political."

Yes, I had my differences with the late President Anwar al-Sadat. And yes, our differences were so diverse that we became completely estranged. Nevertheless, I said once and I'll say it again—I am astonished at his attacks on me in almost every speech he gave, even though he knew that I had no right of rebuttal. He knew that in Egypt I fell under his absolute authority—and I will always live in Egypt.

I am sorry to say that we differed on almost everything!

1) I differed with him over the first Sinai disengagement at the end of 1974 and the beginning of 1975. My opinion was that this process would not lead to peace in the region but only to a separate peace between Egypt and Israel. And I wrote about this at the time in AL-AHRAM week after week. This is what caused us to go our separate ways. It was not an easy choice for me to make at the time....

(continued on page 78)
AL-TAWILAH CRITICIZES HAYKAL'S STATEMENTS

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic No 842, 28 Mar 82 p 7

[Article by 'Abd al-Sittar al-Tawilah: "The Strange Silence of the Nassirites"]

[Text] The most backward political grouping in Egypt scored new gains in the current, running battle between those opposed to the horrifying murder of the late President Anwar al-Sadat in the military parade, and those who defend this crime by using apologetic language and by searching for various circumstantial reasons.

One notices that since that crime was committed we have been hearing a lot of talk about the problems and the alienation of the young. Others tried to explain away extremism by pointing to all the torture that goes on in prison—the torture of young men suspected of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood, after which they conclude that ours is an atheistic society.

The gist of these explanations is that these young killers are really only victims, and that they have been indicted for a crime which they should not have to be responsible for. One begins to notice that this concern for the young, and these attempts at justifying the criminal acts of some of them, is nowhere to be found when the youths involved belong to leftist organizations—even when it involves simply distributing leaflets, and not bullets!

One also cannot help but notice the suspicious silence surrounding the subject of the fallacious intellectual grounding of those fascist or extremist groups—even on the part of those in power. So far, we have had only a few articles that don't even touch the intellectual groundings (of the assassins). Even a writer like Salah Hafiz seems intimidated and asks if the National Democratic Party is on vacation!

Fascism is an Everlasting Phenomenon

Indeed, poor socio-political conditions contribute to rebelliousness and a sense of alienation in both the young and the old—this is a healthy sign. But there is always the question: Rebellion against what? And in which direction?
We would like to say that regardless of whether torture occurs or not, and of the openness or the surreptitiousness of social vices, there will always be rebellion and hate in every society—even if democracy were to be exercised to the fullest extent.

There is rebelliousness and hate in Britain, France, West Germany and the United States. But this hate is channeled along certain lines. It is either used by parties seeking to change things for the better, or else it is used by parties seeking to take society backward in time. There are critics to be found everywhere, and progress and backwardness in every case.

We would like to say that neither democracy nor prosperity can prevent the appearance of extremist groups in a given society.

What Happened in Egypt?

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood flourished in the wake of a democratic climate and a popular movement bent on confronting the British occupation. The difference between the two, in content and in direction of their rebellions, became very clear. On the one hand, all of the young people belonging to political parties and groups in 1946 (the Student-Workers Committee of which Dr Fu'ad Muhyl al-Din was secretary general) inclined towards direct confrontation with the colonialists and had as their slogan "Evacuation or Death" and "Down with the Bevin Treaty of Friendship." On the other hand, the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood had their members burning English books in the public squares and proclaiming their confidence in the dictatorship of Isma'il Sidqi.

Those who lived through Egypt's political life then will remember in which misguided directions the religious political factions (both old and new) tried to steer our youth, and how they attempted to influence the country's march of destiny. Terror and assassination were the favorite methods of that faction. Similarly, it used to constitute itself as the regime's most reactionary force, and the cat's paw of the regime for fighting its enemies. There are several history books by a number of authors that reword all of this. They should be reprinted and sold cheaply to teach the young the lessons of the past.

In recent years, this (right-wing extremist) faction has evolved into a number of even more radical factions. It is represented in a number of organizations, it has branches in the universities, the countryside, and the cities. This faction has not moderated its ideas or its objectives. On the contrary, it has lit the fires of religious rebellion in Asyut, al-Minya, and Alexandria against all of the "atheists"—Muslims and Christians—and has proceeded in planning acts.

Haykal and the Truth

How can any political observer, no matter how limited his intelligence may be, help but see these truths?
The last person these truths might elude is a writer like Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal.

This is the writer who said that the party is the "politicalized vanguard expressing the interests of a certain class and which strives to take power in order to realize those interests."

This is the writer who asked Anwar al-Sadat what his regime represented and where lay its social base.... He cannot understand the religious current in Egypt, its evolution, or the ramifications of the latest assassination.

Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal was not just 'Abd al-Nasir's advisor but his partner in government. He knows about the constant attempts of the Muslim Brotherhood to overthrow and assassinate Nasir.

This is why I said at the beginning of this article that it is the most backward political groups—the fascists—that scored new gains in Egypt.... Haykal, writing for the first time in many years in an Egyptian publication, AL-MUSAWWAR, defended the statements he made to the SUNDAY TIMES. But he did not say a word about the objectives of the religious faction that committed the assassination. In fact, he did not condemn it at all. He was satisfied only to say a few general words about his objections to, and condemnation of, the crime—anywhere and at any time.

He talked at length in a general fashion about political assassination. He spoke about the history of political assassination in Egypt, and gave two examples: the assassination of Amin Uthman and the attempted assassination of Mustafa Nahhas. These examples are noteworthy because of the considerable role played in each by the late president Anwar al-Sadat, insinuating, in a way, that "he who lives by terrorism dies by terrorism." This sort of insinuation doubtless stirs up sentiment toward al-Sadat's murder and the extreme fascist tendencies within the right in their crime.

Details and Boasts

We also find in the above-mentioned writer's article considerable boasting about his books and interviews in the Arab and world press, and about the bond of trust between himself and the late president—how he even spent 12 hours talking with the late president in his bedroom, etc., etc.

The truth is that these kinds of stores reflect poorly on Haykal, and should not be written by a writer of his caliber. I know for a fact the kind of negative reaction that people of all sorts have for this kind of talk.

He should let other people praise, not praise himself!

He goes on to talk about his differences with Anwar al-Sadat.... Every writer is free to give his own opinion.... The ruler is not the same as the nation. The days are gone when one could say, like Napoleon, "I am the state, and the state is me." Haykal should not complain of the criticism he is receiving from some writers for he himself has attacked and insulted his own opponents.
After he was released from jail, Haykal began to think himself superior to other journalists and to the Egyptian press. This air of superiority earned him considerable resentment and harangues from the press.

Full Confession

This was not very important to Haykal. What is really important is that Haykal does not deny any of what his fellow journalists accused him of: sympathy for the perpetrators of the assassination. On the contrary, he confirmed it 100 percent. After much digression and repetition, in his AL-MUSAWWAR article, Haykal said he told the SUNDAY TIMES the following:

"There is a lot of admiration for Khalid al-Islambuli and his comrades on the streets of Egypt."

"If you were to go to Egypt you would find people talking about al-Islambuli as if he were a popular hero. It will be a sad day for Egypt if he is executed."

And a response to Haykal by Mr Musa Sabri, editor of AL-AKHAAR, reveals that Haykal told the SUNDAY TIMES' reporter that "In the eyes of other people, the assassin is a great national saviour."

Why did Haykal bother with the long defense in an 8-page article if he admits to making the foregoing statements? We will disregard his other statements that deal with personal matters.

Here we must make two observations:

Observation number one: We have already indicated the first observation above, when we noted that in his statements to the SUNDAY TIMES and DER SPIEGEL, Haykal does not address a single word of criticism or extend any analysis to the political faction that perpetrated the assassination. He never asks the question: What did this faction hope to gain? What kind of dark picture does it present for the future of Egypt?

Observation number two: At the same time he was speaking about "the people's" view of the killers as heroes, he never said one word intimating that such a view is wrong, or how illusory such a view really is. At the same time, he did not hesitate to describe (in DER SPIEGEL) as a "hashish-induced miracle" the fact that the people supported al-Sadat's initiative. In other words, the Egyptian people were all drugged.

Camp David and the Nasserites

There is another side to what Haykal said in his comments on the Camp David treaty. This treaty led people to believe that it will bring peace and prosperity. Haykal remarked that such an idea is an empty dream meant to mystify and drug people. We do not need to defend Camp David. Its fruits are already at hand—the impending evacuation of our national soil.
Evacuation is evacuation. It still constitutes liberation of conquered land, of sacred national soil. This is lasting achievement of al-Sadat. But we postpone any more talk of this subject until, God willing, a more objective climate prevails (after 6 April).

Once again, defender of Nassirism commit the same old mistakes that tend to damage, if not destroy, their case. Haykal said that there were no mass arrests in Nasir's era, and that al-Sadat arrested more people in a few days than Nasir did in 18 years! I can hardly believe that Haykal said that. He knows full well that the prison camps' doors never closed in Nasir's era. In the period between June 1956 and September 1958 there were 14 people under arrest. The number rose to 2,000 in January 1959, then to the several thousands up until 1964. The prison doors opened again in 1965 and stayed open until Nasir's death.

Nor is it true that al-Sadat arrested more people in a few days than Nasir did in 18 years. Al Sadat stopped all political arrests for a period of 10 years in a row, for the first time in Egypt's history. In September 1981, the number of political prisoners was only 1,600.

Let me repeat what I said in the last issue of AL-SIYASI.

Those writers who condemn terrorism and assassination nevertheless commit a grave mistake when they withhold any description or analysis of the destructive goals of these Islamic groups.

It is an invitation for taking society backward in time, with no solutions for economic, social and political problems.

These Islamic groups constitute the reserve forces of the right for combating any attempts of qualitative change and progress for society.

But the problem is that when these groups seize power they tend to suppress their own supporters and work only for their own benefit. That is when the trouble starts.

These fascist, religious groups represent a widely prevalent political trend in most of the Islamic countries of the Third World. They tend to play almost the exact same role in every case.

Same Role Everywhere

These religious groups use murder and assassination in Turkey against the forces of democracy. They helped the military in Indonesia depose Sukarno and smother democratic life there. They helped bring about the overthrow and execution of Bhutto by Zia ul-Haq.

The events of Asyut at the last 'Id holiday was a dress rehearsal for what was to take place in Hama and the rest of Syria. The city of Hama was taken over by these groups. Terrorism and murder are a daily occurrence in Syria now.
Even in Palestine the Muslim Brotherhood is clashing with the supporters of the PLO. In the universities of Bir Zeit and Nablus, and in the engineering school at Hebron, the Israelis watch Palestinians fight each other.

They oppose any social tendencies in any Palestinian organization on the pretext that anything on the left (what "left"?) is anti-religion!

They even attacked the Red Cross headquarters in Gaza for the second time last January because Dr Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi has socialist tendencies.

They reject the PLO's concept of a secular state in Palestine to bring together Jews, Christians, and Muslims.

They seek to isolate the Palestinian resistance movement by opposing its cooperation movement with other nationalist movements in the world on the grounds that the latter are "un-Islamic."

Isn't it obvious that these groups serve the aims of Zionism every time they resort to demagogery, e.g., "the Jews are heathens and accursed, therefore we must not recognize their state"?

I seek to caution others and to sound the alarm. This mystifying and misguided political trend is dangerous. I urge all democratic, educated writers in Egypt to expose the intellectual origins of this trend.

Trials are not enough to bring a halt to this trend. It must be exposed politically. I believe that forthcoming events in Egypt, especially after the evacuation, will require the reconciliation of all democratic nationalist forces in order to face continuous attempts (by the extrem right) to expand their fascist activities in Egypt.

Haykals' priority, as a Nasirist writer, should have been to join in this effort with his pen--instead of writing in a manner that would stir up sympathy for these reactionary, fascist killers. It is the Nasirist writers who are invited in particular to join the effort to expose (the extrem right). Unfortunately they are nowhere to be seen. Their silence is strange and inexplicable. Their silence is truly a perplexing phenomenon. Would someone please put an end to their perplexity and explain it to us?

9945
CSO: 4504/269
DAILY COMMENTS ON QOTBZADEH AFFAIR

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 16 Aug 82 p 2

[Editorial by S. Moadab: "The Trial of Ghotbzadeh"]

[Text]

It was late on the morning of Oct. 5th, 1978, when Imam Khomeini was expected to arrive at Paris' Orly Airport. Dozens of people, Bani Sadr among them, had received notification of Imam's landing in Paris and gathered on the second floor of the Orly Sud. The scheduled flight from Baghdad failed to arrive at the last moment.

Bani Sadr, pretending he had planned the historical journey, was stung when he found his information was incorrect. He called Najaf in Iraq and announced "The Imam has left Iraq". Except for two people who stayed at Orly, the rest rushed to Roissy Airport to see if Imam had arrived there. Bani Sadr as well as the others drove from the south of Paris to the north. But at Roissy the Imam was not to be found and no plane was due to arrive on that day from Baghdad. All the people went back to Orly. As soon as they arrived at Orly Imam Khomeini was stepping down from the second floor. Only one man knew when and where Imam would come; Sadegh Ghotbzadeh. And he had not revealed this secret even to Bani Sadr, his sincere friend, because of the rivalry they had.

During the almost four months of Imam's sojourn in Paris, Ghotbzadeh was present everywhere. Along with Bani Sadr, Ghotbzadeh did his best to take advantage of Imam's prestige. The situation was such that one day Imam gathered them and insisted that they not behave so that he might have to discredit them.

When Imam came triumphantly back to Iran, from the beginning, Ghotbzadeh started measuring out his turf while Bani Sadr began his famous university lectures.

On February 20th when the whole of Tehran was in revolt Ghotbzadeh received three successive calls from Damavand Street, near the riotous air force barracks, to send a bus with a loud-speaker for an urgent situation. Every time he responded "in a few minutes". Finally, after an hour when
he received the fourth call he said, "But I am busy having an
terview with a foreign correspondent."

On February 12th in Imam's residence, where Mehdi
Bazargan was holding his general staff meeting at seven in
the morning, Ghotbzadeh arrived, unshaved and drowsy. He
was asked to take immediate action and send a group to the
radio and television center to stop the anti-Islamic broad-
casts. He replied "Go and talk yourself."

Later Prime Minister Bazargan appointed him to go with a
group to take over the television and radio center. He takes a
bus with his own guards and goes there. Later he says on the
television that Imam has asked him to take the responsibility
in running the networks. This was pure falsehood and a big
lie. Ghotbzadeh continues to run the media center. In fact he
has a difficult job there. But while he allows the most
important problems to remain unsolved and continues to
distribute the sensitive posts among his incapable comrades,
he simultaneously continues to prepare propaganda for the
presidential election. Incredibly, from the networks budget,
he prints his political campaign leaflets. When the elections
arrive, he achieves less than 700,000 votes. But Ghotbzadeh,
with an unquenchable thirst for power does not intend to let
his old friend Bani Sadr monopolize political power.

Prior to the election he occupied the post of foreign
minister, a position previously occupied by Bani Sadr. He
stays in this post for a few months. Here he gives the
responsibility of running the embassies of the Islamic Repub-
lic abroad to men, most of whom did not have the capability
of being diplomats. Finally in a big political scandal, one
night he participates in a television program in which he tried
to discredit the new republic and he even questioned the
legality of some of the political and judicial organs in the
Islamic Republic. He is arrested but released, promising he
will no longer take part in such activities.

From then on Sadegh Ghotbzadeh lives secretly. Many
people keep asking where is he? Some foreign news agencies
and radios keep repeating that he has fled Iran. But by
personal phone calls he disproves all the rumors. Some people
keep saying Ghotbzadeh is trying to buy an English daily in
Tehran. Others say he is taking part in real estate activities.

But to the amazement of almost every one in Iran, in early
April, the Iranian people see his face on the television and he
is confessing he has taken part in a coup d'etat attempt in
order to topple the Islamic regime. In this plot Imam
Khomeini was to be killed.

To millions of the Muslim people of Iran this seemed
incredible. Is it Sadegh Ghotbzadeh who is speaking on the
television? Impossible! Alas it is true. It is him. A man who
used the prestige of Imam for his devilish ends and now he
wants to kill Imam. The tragic end of Ghotbzadeh is not only unbelievable for the Iranian citizens but it is incredible for others abroad.

Any Iranian who has known this man and the responsibility the Islamic Revolution and Imam had given to him asks for his unconditional death sentence. But his mid-July trial is postponed at his personal request. Since yesterday Sadegh Ghotbzadeh is on trial. The Voice of America and the B.B.C. which said not a word in their world services about the important visit of the Majlis Speaker to India have been repeating that "The former Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh is on trial for his plotting against the government of Ayatollah Khomeini. His sentence is probably to be death by firing squad".

Yes! Ghotbzadeh is on trial for his participation in a coup d'etat plot. When a man decides to act against a political system and a people who have generously awarded him what he indeed did not deserve, all logic orders that he should pay for his treachery.

— S MOADAB
WORLD MEDIA SCORED FOR IGNORING GULF WAR

Teheran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Aug 82 p 1

[Report on speech by President Khamene'i]

[Text]

TEHRAN, Aug. 11 (IRNA). -- President Khamene'i today censured the world printed and broadcast media for having willfully turned their faces from facts which if reflected in the media would have enlightened the world's people in connection with the criminal acts of Saddam Hussein and the Zionist regime. He said many foreign reporters and correspondents who had witnessed the crimes of the Baghdad regime especially in relation with its aggression against the Islamic Republic had kept silent in blatant disregard of their vocational ethics.

Khamene'i who was talking to a group of participants in a seminar of provincial reporters of the Persian daily Jomhuriye Eslami (organ of the Islamic Republic Party) in Tehran reiterated that a principal condition set forth by the Islamic Republic for peace talks with the Baghdad regime had been "the punishment of the aggressor", and that if the "aggressor" is not punished it will be not only an encroachment against the rights of the Islamic Republic, but rather would jeopardize the region's security.

He added if the Baghdad regime should be left unpunished, it would necessarily imply that any potentially powerful government would have the right to make any kind of attack upon its less powerful neighbors.

He said Iran's demand for war reparations was one within the specific interests of Iran, while the punishment of the aggressor was one in the interest of all freedom-loving and independent peoples of the world.
RAFSANJANI EXPRESSES SOLIDARITY WITH INDIA

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Aug 82 p 2

[Editorial by S. Moadab: "Rafsanjani in India"]

[Text]

Ballram Jakhar, the Speaker of the Indian Parliament has been hosting his Iranian counterpart Hashemi Rafsanjani since yesterday afternoon. The first reports by our special correspondent in New Delhi talk of the warm and emotional reception given to the Iranian delegation. The world has been waiting these past days to see what will be the result of this historical visit. But for us it is already evident that with Hashemi and his entourage in India, bilateral relations in many areas will be consolidated.

Indeed, Iran and India have such deep historical and cultural ties that no one can trace them simply in a few lines. For centuries the Persian language has been spoken in the "museum of religion and languages." The Islamic ties joining millions of Muslims in India to their brothers and sisters here give the Islamic Republic very powerful support in the sub-continent of India. News reports say that busloads of friends of the Islamic Republic had been waiting for hours under the heavy rain at the New Delhi airport to greet their Iranian brothers.

Iranian commonality with India dates back hundreds of years. The people of India have always been described in our history as symbols of patience and their interpretation of human experience and their philosophy of living have always given valuable lessons to their Iranian friends. In Kashmir, like Bombay, and in Madras like Delhi, the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran is equivalent to the remembrance of hundred years of historical bonds.

Many of the delegations which have paid visits to India, during the years after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, speak of the full, popular support of the Muslims in India for Iran and especially for Imam Khomeini.

If all these realities giving impetus to the need for better ties between Tehran and New Delhi are not enough we offer political reasons why the two powerful Asian countries
should be proud of the existing relationship and must work to strengthen it. It goes without saying that exactly because of these strong ties between the country of Mahatma Gandhi and Islamic Iran some provocative actions are made from time to time, to create problems in our relations. Needless to say owing to the political sagacity of the leaders in Tehran and New Delhi, these provocations are rendered impotent.

All these counterproductive attempts have failed up to now. Of course some publications in India, until very recently, wrote against Iran. But if we consider the freedom of the press on the one and the infiltration of Ba’athist regime in some press circles on the other hand, we must accept these rare unfriendly approaches made in the Indian press. Maybe we need not mention such minor cases when Haji moteslam Rafsanjani says that “Our relations are excellent.” But everybody knows there is no rose without thorns.

Why India? a question many foreign diplomats residing in Tehran have often asked us. We have never told them India because it is one of the largest countries in the world. Nor have we said because all evidence orders us to develop relations with a country that has millions of Muslims. These are evident facts. But the political reasons for which we must support India and vice versa, is the new political window through which the Islamic Republic of Iran (IR) views the world. India has been among the pioneers in ridding the world of sinister British domination. The same India, despite all its needs, has not been a blind follower of Moscow. This realistic stand between the east and west gives New Delhi and its leaders high credit. Is’t the original slogan of the IR, Neither East nor West? Of course our interpretation of this slogan differs from that of India.

Because of the loyalty of India to its political independence, we observe a high degree of economic self reliance. It is true that Mrs. Gandhi must feed about 650 million people. But the Indian leaders after their independence have shown that they are not ready to exchange their freedom and independence for bread.

All our brothers who have visited India speak of the dignity of the Indian people, but of course a profound class difference still exists there. This is not something we have discovered. Mrs. Gandhi herself said it in a recent interview with an American magazine. As she said and we believe, measures have been taken to help the lower classes to promote their social life while at the same time controls have been imposed on the upper classes so as not to widen existing differences. But the interesting point in present day Indian society is that people from all levels believe in India’s self-reliance.
India has taken great strides towards taking its proper place in the family of great industrial Asian countries. In agricultural, heavy industry, economic self-sufficiency its illiteracy campaign, New Delhi must take pride in its achievements. Rafsanjani in India will witness these gains of the people of India and will underline what the young Islamic Republic has achieved over the past three years. Indian leaders know that Iran must be considered as a reliable friend and relations in all spheres have to be developed.

This is not only the aspiration of millions of our two peoples but it is also a political necessity in order to strengthen our joint stand against the superpowers. In talks with Rafsanjani the Indian leaders will listen very attentively to the open and clear presentation the Speaker of the Islamic Assembly will present for them in all domains. Rafsanjani in turn will try, as well as the Iranian delegation, to take positive lessons from the brilliant background of New Delhi and they will come back with a heart laden with admiration for what they will have seen.

Of course, the enemies of the IR will be very unhappy and the Iranian delegation once back home must wait for new provocations from the side of counterrevolutionaries. Undoubtedly Rafsanjani will have a word to say to the respectful Indian leaders, for effective counterattacking measures which must be taken.

— S. Moosab
TEHRAN (IRNA) — "Post-Revolution Cinema" is the title of a book just published by the Islamic Guidance Ministry's Cinematographic and Research Department. Printed on glossy paper with delux layout and binding and lavish colour pictures it lists post-revolution feature films, as well as short films and documentaries along with capsule discriptions of subject and cast.

The book is an interesting collection of new and old, professional and amateur revolutionary and not-so-revolutionary names in the film making industry ranging from directors and producers down to cast. But perhaps the most descriptive account of Iranian post-revolutionary cinema is an introduction by the chief of the Guidance Ministry's cinematographic department, Mehdi Kalhor.

"Film after film dealt with the lives of thieves, prostitutes, plunderers, drug traffickers etc.," he says commenting on the themes of the Iranian cinema before the Islamic Revolution.

Commercial films of this type were also characteristic of the Iranian films as a whole during this period and were lucrative and gaudy but devoid of any cultural or ideological value.

Kalhor goes on to mention another group of filmmakers of young intellectuals most of them with theatrical experience who made a try at starting a series of meaningful but not commercial films during the past regime.

He notes, however, that they were doomed to fail, firstly because they were too abstract and complicated for the masses to grasp, secondly their films were censored by the SAVAK (secret police of the ex-shah) authorities who were suspicious about this class of filmmakers and their intent. Therefore, things went against this feebly emerging though influential movement in cinema by following an open door policy towards foreign films and easing censorship on sex and violence in domestic and foreign films.
The Islamic Revolution changed things greatly on the other hand. Creative artists emerged and the more experienced and self-committed filmmakers found unprecedented opportunities to present their works for a new generation of people who were well aware of what was happening in this world and who expected more than merely entertaining films. In addition to this, colonial films were discarded in favour of the more committed foreign artists who had a message to a mankind and not merely something to sell.

"In Iran film-making will no longer be a savage portrayal of sex and violence but, will be a true portrait of the 20th century man harassed by the problems and the dilemmas of the technological advancement. It will not be sedative, rather it will show the way to overcome the tyrannies of world exploiters," Kalhor said summing up his introduction.
CLERIC PROMOTES SUNNI-SHI'A ACCORD

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 14 Aug 82 p 2

[Comments by Hamid Akhound-Qoli]

[Text]

GORGAN (IRNA) A member of the Sunni Ulema, Hamid Akhound-Qoli, yesterday talked here about the achievements of his recent trip to Pakistan. He was in Pakistan on a special mission on the occasion of International Qods Day (July 16.)

Akhund-Qoli said that his visit to Pakistan had, in its own right, served to better clarify Iran's official stand vis-a-vis the various world issues.

The mission was also successful in counterbalancing hostile propaganda against the Islamic Republic and in thwarting efforts for sowing discord among Shiite and Sunni Muslims.

The reactionary governments of the region, he said, had invested a great deal of energy and money, for dividing Shia and Sunni Muslims and also for presenting an unpleasant picture of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

He further told IRNA that in his tour he had explained the status of Iranian Sunni Muslims under the role of the ex-shah and given an account of the injustice done to them and had compared their old plight with their much-improved status after the revolution.

The dispatching of missions abroad, he added, especially those composed of Sunni Muslims, to explain the features of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, would be useful in that it helps the people of other countries better appreciate the Islamic Revolution, while it counteracts hostile propaganda against the Islamic Republic.
CONSPIRACY ATTRIBUTED TO IRAQI EMBASSY IN PARIS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 17 Aug 82 p 2

[Text]

AHVAZ (IRNA) – An Iraqi Muslim struggler said to IRNA here Sunday that the Iraqi Embassy in Paris had a special section devoted to contacts with runaway counterrevolutionary Iranians. Among them he said were such personalities as ousted ex-president Banisadr, Shapur Bakhtiar (last prime minister of the ex-shah), and leader and mastermind of the outlawed Mujahideen Khalq Organization Masud Rajavi.

He said the embassy section also housed the Paris branch of the secret police of the Baghdad government and an Iraqi military commission in charge of military purchases from the French government.

He also noted that seven members of Iraq’s military purchase commission and another group of nine, including the Iraqi consul to Paris had been killed in the August 11th explosion which had seriously damaged the building.

The Iraqi Muslim struggler said the Western media had attributed the explosion to a group of fanatic Shias whereas the two sects of Shias and Sunnis equally hated Saddam Hussein, and were pooling their efforts in united struggle against his regime without regard to sectarian consciousness.

CSO: 4600/732

35
WHEAT PRODUCTION GETTING BIG SUBSIDY

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 18 Aug 82 p 2

[Report on speech by Javad Asemi, head of State Cereal Organization]

[Text]

TEHRAN (IRNA) -- The government pays 40 billion rials in subsidy on wheat every year, said the head of the State Cereal Organization, Javad Asemi, in a press conference here Monday morning.

Commenting on the amount of financial aid provided to farmers, he said that during the current Iranian year, the government had paid some seven billion rials in advance payments to farmers and during the same period it had purchased 600,000 tons of wheat from wheat growers. He added that there had been a noticeable increase in the amount of wheat purchased this year, which compared with the purchase of the past year, showed an increase of 120,000 tons. Until the last Iranian year (March 1982) Iran was 90 percent dependent on multinational companies for wheat supply whereas, during the current year it had been lowered to 5 percent, Asemi stated. Instead of signing contracts with multinational companies, he explained, the Islamic Republic government had signed contracts with governments.

As for the capacity of the country's silos, only in the last year, it was increased by some 375,000 tons, half the total capacity of the country's silos before the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The total capacity of the country's silos at present is about 1.150 million tons and it is expected to increase to 3 million tons by March 1983.

CSO: 4600/732
BAGHDAD AZERI ATTACKS REPORTS BY TEHRAN RADIO

GF301500 Baghdad International Service in Azeri 1800 GMT 26 Aug 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Dear listeners: The hellish Khomeyni regime's fascist mass media organs have again begun blowing their horns from the wrong end. These organs, which have been committing treachery against the Iranian homeland and the Iranian people, and which are the mouthpieces of Persian chauvinism, have again begun to slander the peoples of AzARBAYJAN, Ahvaz and Kordestan. In fact, they are issuing misleading propaganda about the bloody crimes they have committed within Iran with the aim of camouflaging the inauspicious attacks they organized in the eastern sector of Boston and the defeats they have suffered. Their objective is to draw the attention of the people to the said crimes. [as heard]

According to a report by the imperialist and Zionist Tehran Radio, a group of the supporters of a daughter of AzARBAYJAN, Ashraf Dehqani Tabrizi, has been arrested and executed by the Khomeyni band. While at the same time, a number of her colleagues were martyred in armed clashes.

It is obvious that Tehran Radio, which is the official mouthpiece of the rulers in Tehran, has declared an open war against Ashraf Dehqani Tabrizi, who is the magnificent [gorkemli] and loyal daughter of the Populist Fighters Movement and of the Azeri people. According to Tehran Radio, Ashraf Dehqani Tabrizi was a corrupt element who, together with other hypocrites, both male and female, and other corrupt elements, resorted to an armed resistance against the central government in Iran--their objective being to wrest the provinces of AzARBAYJAN, Kordestan and Khuzestan under the guise of the right to determine one's own future and to incorporate them with foreign countries.

Undoubtedly, hiding behind their treacherous, hellish and chauvinist policies, the rulers in Tehran are endeavoring to conceal their crimes from the Iranian peoples in order that the latter may not come to know the truth. Their objective is to circulate unfounded reports like their predecessors in order to slander the heroes of the people. In fact, the Khomeyni dregs, ever since they forced the glorious revolution of the people to deviate from its original line and ever since they usurped the sovereignty of the people, have been pursuing an antipopulist policy. The Khomeyni administration is
perfectly aware of the fact that the oppressed Kurdish, Azeri, Arab, Baluchi, and Turkoman peoples and other fraternal communities, who are being crushed under the wave of a nationwide oppression and who have been trying to protect their [words indistinct] traditions and freedoms, only demand the recognition of their legal national rights. They want to establish their own governments in the provinces they live in within the framework of Iran's independence and territorial integrity. They also want to determine their own future. And, since they have been unable to have their legal rights recognized because of [word indistinct] and oppression, they have chosen armed clashes as the proper course to follow. In fact, with their political and military activities, they have been creating social tremors. This wave of social tremors has been shaking the Khomeyni administration from its roots. Seeing themselves in danger because of this state of affairs, the Persian rulers have adopted a blood-dripping policy against the peoples of Iran and against their progressive organizations, sons and daughters. [passage omitted]

[Word indistinct] and they therefore know well that the movement spearheaded by Ashraf Dehqani Tabrizi is not aimed at wrestling Azarbajyan and Kordestan from Iran. This sympathetic daughter of Azarbajyan is endeavoring to facilitate the realization of (?the historic duty) of her brothers and sisters with the support of the Azeri people. This sympathetic daughter of Azarbajyan began her armed struggle in the [name indistinct] mountains on 22 Bahman 1381 [11 February 2002] [as heard]. Thus, she has been making sacrifices and creating legends with heroic achievements. In the light of all this, the executioners who want to slander this heroic girl as being a corrupt element—a girl who is known within the framework of the history of armed clashes as a glorious star and [words indistinct] of unit—will only ridicule themselves. Furthermore, they will [word indistinct] any positive result from the crimes they commit. [passage omitted]

The sympathetic daughter of the Azeri people, Ashraf Dehquani Tabrizi, was not a corrupt element. On the contrary, she was one of the heroic and soldier girls of Iran who, through the force of their bayonets, have been dumping [word indistinct] and turbans into the garbage bin of history. She is also the [word indistinct] of the heroic sons of Iran who are well known for their combatant spirit within the framework of the current era of armed movements. Thus, those who try to belittle her personality and endeavor to present her as one without a strong personality and an enemy of the homeland and the people are in fact themselves without personality, homeland and people. Such people therefore must be eliminated by Ashraf Dehqani Tabrizi and her colleagues.

CSO:  4400/453
IRAQ

BAGHDAD ASSAILS IRANIAN CLAIM; KHARK WARNING

NC241405 Baghdad in Persian to IRAN 0600 GMT 24 Aug 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] What have the Iranian people gained from the revolution? Has there actually been anything but killing and massacres? Oh wretched owl: Why and until when will you be killing Iran's children? You drowned sardasht—that beautiful land of Kordestan—in blood. Yet you still don't stop. You claimed to have mopped up everywhere and you repeatedly spoke of mopping up Sardasht, Marivan, Owraman and the entire Kordestan region. Then why do you continue killing?

A year ago you said that no trace remained of the Mojahedín and that all their communal houses and operation centers were destroyed. But a year has passed since you uttered and repeated those lies. Still the turbaned men do not dare leave their homes alone and even your revolution guards do not dare raise their finger from the trigger of their gun. The people of Sabzevar, who now know who you are, are cursing you and your bloodthirsty regime.

You have been lying to the people for two whole years and are continuing the war. You claim conquests and victories. What conquest and victory are you talking about? The Iranians are never prepared to commit fratricide and do not consider fratricide a conquest. Conquest for the Iranians means ending the war. Conquest for the Iranians means the establishment of security and calm. Victory for the Iranians means low prices, affluence and work for the workers. Victory for the Iranian youths means opening the doors of the universities. Victory is not killing and death to (?several) brothers. Victory for the Iranians is not the intervention in Iraq's domestic affairs.

The clergymen think that saying that some Iraqi soldiers have been killed, this is a victory. No, Mr Khomeyni. This is nothing but disgrace in the face of Islam, of the Iranians and of God.

Khomeyni is once again fooling the people with the attack on Khark Island. This impostor and hypocritical old man says that no one can attack Khark Island at a time when the entire world knows that this island has been bombed. However, we tell this impostor that if his mercenaries continue to shell
Iraq's border cities, we will bomb the vital installations of Khomeyni's regime—just as we did before when we said that we would do so, issued a warning and acted upon our warning. You, Iranian brothers, should be witnesses of how all the installations on Khark Island will be levelled or the island sunk if Khomeyni does not stop shelling our cities and continues to feel proud of this ugly action. We reissue our warning and call you to witness. Let us see where the truth lies—in our words, or in Khomeyni's claims?

CSO: 4400/453
IRAQ

BAGHDAD AZERI CITES NEW CRIME IN IRANIAN PRISON

GF291445 Baghdad International Service in Azeri 1800 GMT 25 Aug 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Dear Listeners, a correspondent of PAYAM-E IRAN, which is published outside Iran, has reported from Tehran that a new and horrible crime has been committed in that city. The correspondent of PAYAM-E IRAN has said in a written report conveyed to the anti-Iranian forces outside Iran that (?after being deprived of) [word indistinct], 24 chained inmates of Evin Prison decided to stage a hunger strike. However, the warden of Evin Prison [title as heard], Lajvardi, appeared in the prison and banned the strike, warning that the inmates who continue to strike would be executed. Nevertheless, the inmates of Evin Prison paid no attention to Lajvardi and continued their hunger strike. In response, Lajvardi moved to carry out his threat. In fact, he ordered that the inmates be executed in the court of Evin Prison.

Hearing about this, the rest of Evin Prison's inmates protested against the incident and [word indistinct] in the prison. In fact, they rushed to the aid of their fellow inmates on strike. At this development, Lajvardi ordered the prison guards to (?open fire). The result was the death of 462 inmates and the wounding of hundreds of others.

Lajvardi and the committee officials [as heard] have been endeavoring to prevent the circulation of reports related to the incident. Their endeavor, however, has failed because the wounded inmates, who have been receiving medical treatment in the [name indistinct] hospital in Tehran, have been talking about the crime. The supporters and [words indistinct] are spreading reports about the incident.

Meanwhile, the crime has been confirmed by the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization. Issuing thousands of leaflets throughout Iran, the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization has disclosed that the majority of the inmates who were killed were active members in the organization. The leaflets further claimed that the revolution guards carried the bodies of the dead out of Evin Prison in trucks during the night and buried them secretly in the desert near Tehran.
The members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization are pursuing these trucks and retrieving the dead bodies from their (?) mass graves. They then transport them in trucks to Tehran and unload them in the Imam Khomeyni Square. Thus, they are exposing the new crime committed by the Khomeyni dregs.

CSO: 4400/453
BRIEFS

KOREAN BUILT RAILROAD—Some South Korean firms have been awarded contracts valued at $960 million to extend 273 kms of railroad in northern Iraq. This electric line will operate on diesel fuel, between Kirkuk, Bayji and Hadithah. A German engineering consulting firm prepared the project plans and will supervise the Koreans' work until the work is finished in 1986. Firms described as "aggressive in method" and of various nationalities, including Brazilian, French, Italian and West German, failed to obtain the project. [Text] [London, AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 245, 2 Aug 82 p 38] 7005

CSO: 4404/617
'HA'ARETZ' ON U.S., ISRAELI POLICY IN LEBANON

TA270847 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 27 Aug 82 pp 13, 20

[Commentary by Poles: "Washington Is Looking for a Policy"]

[Text] There are some people here—including Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir—who believe that Israel's war in Lebanon has made a great improvement in the U.S. position in the area. There is no Arab country that is not courting it and even Syria and Iraq are no exceptions. At the same time, morning and evening we hear over all the media that the Soviet Union has "kept a low profile" and, as a result of this, has been even further weakened.

It is amazing how people are ignoring the fact that it was the Soviet Union that succeeded in imposing on us, through the U.S. President, the cease-fire at the end of the first week of the fighting; a move which in fact saved Syria from what could have been a large-scale military defeat. It is a fact: The Soviets were less concerned for the PLO and we can say that they really abandoned it to its bitter fate, although it can be claimed that without the cease-fire of 11 and 12 June the IDF would not have been stopped in front of Beirut for 2 months.

In any event: The "low profile" of the Soviet Union can only be spoken of meaning that it opted for the discreet appeal, in the form of a personal letter from Leonid Brezhnev to the U.S. President, rather than making noise in the UN Security Council. By this minimal investment the Soviets obtained an almost maximal result: The cessation of the IDF's campaign against the Syrian forces in the al-Biq'a.

No appreciable weakening of the Soviet Union's position in the area can be noticed. The Syria of Hafiz al-Asad and the Ba'ath Party has remained its stronghold, and while Israel is claiming that it has offered Lebanon to the United States on a silver platter, the impression is that in Washington nobody knows exactly "how to eat it." For years the U.S. Embassy in Beirut believed that Western interests in general and U.S. interests in particular required the strengthening of central rule in Lebanon. In fact, the embassy worked to glorify President Sarkis' name and, from this position, conducted an undercover but stubborn battle against the government of Israel. As we saw it, Arkis was no more than a Syrian puppet and any attempt to send a small unit of the National Lebanese Army to the Christian enclave in southern Lebanon
met with vigorous opposition from us and Major Haddad served Israel as a con-
venient screen behind which to hide.

The success of the Begin-Sharon government sprang from the fact that it was
able to convince Alexander Haig that the United States would be able to
obtain what it wanted in Lebanon—the establishment of a central, stable rule—
if the IDF expelled the PLO from there and perhaps the Syrian forces, too.
The PLO in particular was described as the main obstacle and breaking it was
supposed to permit the rehabilitation of Lebanon as a sovereign, complete and
united country.

It is against the background of the understanding that was achieved for the
purpose of the implementation of this plan that the U.S. support was obtained
for the Peace for Galilee Campaign, which was planned from the beginning as a
war in Lebanon. We may doubt whether Mr Haig and President Reagan intended,
in advance, the complete expulsion of the PLO from the internal Lebanese
arena. They may have been satisfied with its weakening. They did not
aspire to its cancellation as a factor that could represent the masses of the
Palestinians who found refuge in Lebanon but were not granted Lebanese
citizenship. Nor is there any certainty that the U.S. leadership was "fixed"
on Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil as the president of Lebanon and would not have
been prepared to also accept Camille Sham'un or any candidate of compromise
between the Maronites and the Muslims, or some of them.

However, our prime minister and defense minister succeeded in dragging Wash-
ton behind them, despite all the difficulties involved in this effort. And if,
finally, the prime minister cut short the defense minister's attempt to exhaust
the military option to its end and Mr Sharon was forced to agree with
Mr Philip Habib on the plan for the terrorists' evacuation, this happened not
because President Reagan was actually interested in rescuing the PLO as a
political factor inside Lebanon, but because he was unable to digest the
sights of the horrors involved in the pounding of broad regions of West Beirut
as they were presented to him and the U.S. public by television.

Superficially, then, the United States has obtained what it wanted and perhaps
more than that, and, superficially, the road is open to move on to the next
stage and demand the "removal of all the foreign forces" from Lebanon. This
in fact means the Syrian forces. But we should not forget that terrorists
concentrations are still there around Tripoli and the al-Biq'a' region of
Lebanon.

How will the United States now be able to bring about the departure of these
forces from Lebanon? One approach—supported by both the prime minister and
the chairman of the Labor Party—claims that the Syrians will come to the
conclusion that it is worth it for them to give up a continuation of their
Lebanese adventure. If, in this way, they can buy the IDF's evacuation from
all of Lebanon, it would be a worthwhile deal for them. But not all Israelis
agree on this with Menahem Begin and Shim'on Peres. In their view, it cannot
be expected that the Syrians will abandon Lebanon from their own goodwill and
the conclusion demanded is that the IDF will have to remove them by force.
U.S. policy, if it has been formulated, continues to adhere to the traditional formulation. But if Washington aims to push the Syrians into removing their forces from Lebanon, it will have to find suitable incentives for this. A large U.S. (and/or Saudi Arabian) loan could serve as such an incentive. But can this really suffice?

And if the president of Syria obstinately insists on his strongholds in Lebanon, will the U.S. administration give its blessing to an Israeli military attempt to destroy the Syrian presence inside Lebanon? Such a blessing, if it is given, could involve taking the risk of misunderstanding between Washington and Moscow. Will the anti-communist knights in the White House and the other administration institutions be ready to encourage an Israeli war against an Arab country which, for more than 15 years now, as been serving as the main prop for Soviet influence in the Arab-Israeli area?

These are questions to which the U.S. leadership will have to find answers and, if its attention is for the moment focused on the management of the terrorists' evacuation from West Beirut, the moment of truth will come when it will no longer be able to delay answering them.

In the meantime voices are being heard in the U.S. capital claiming that the time has come to solve the Palestinian problem. Two evaluations are being expressed in the experimental trial balloons being thrown out by certain circles and people in this regard: There are some who think that Israel's achievements in its war against the PLO will give birth to moods of generosity among the leaders of the government of Israel. Since the terrorist threat by the PLO has been destroyed—and, after all, this is also what is being claimed by the leaders of Israel—Jerusalem will be able to permit itself to agree to full autonomy, as it promised in the Camp David agreements.

Others believe that it is the duty of the United States, since it allowed Israel to break the PLO while destroying large sections of West Beirut and seriously hitting the noncombatant Lebanese and Palestinian populations there, to see to it that the Palestinian problem is solved, and, at least, that Israel grants the Arabs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip full autonomy in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Camp David agreements, signed by Israel and signed by the U.S. President as witness.

It is difficult to ignore the naivete of those holding the first view. It was not actually because of generosity toward Egypt that Mr. Begin agreed to give up all of Sinai, but in order in this way to win Israel's further control over Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district. His success in dragging the United States into the war against the PLO in southern Lebanon and West Beirut makes it difficult to assume that it will encourage Israel in a compromising trend with regard to Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. Without tangible U.S. pressure, it is doubtful if the current government of Israel will make its positions more flexible.

It emerges that President Reagan did not hesitate to threaten pressure of this sort in his telephone conversation with Mr. Begin, when he insultingly demanded refraining from the massive bombardments of West Beirut. But the pressure on that occasion was used less out of political considerations and more from a
humanitarian-emotional ones. The question is asked whether the U.S. administration will opt to behave firmly when it is a question of the affairs of the Arabs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The prime minister apparently expects the U.S. administration to ask him to get down to a more vigorous actualization of the Camp David agreements from now on. After all, the prestige of the United States is also tied up with them and there is also pressure from Saudi Arabia and Egypt which Washington cannot completely ignore. Therefore the prime minister is proposing that the autonomy talks be resumed "as soon as the terrorists are evacuated from Beirut."

Should the conclusion be drawn from this that Mr Begin has changed his spots? It is difficult to believe that he has. It is far more likely that he is prepared to again busy himself in the autonomy negotiations, but not necessarily in order to grant the Arabs of Eretz Yisra'el rights worthy of being defined as the rights of genuine self-rule. The minister of defense leans toward the proposal of the members of the village leagues, who are suggesting that "they be permitted to establish an administrative council headed by them." This refers to a council that would manage the civilian affairs of the West Bank during the first stage of the implementation of autonomy (HA'ARETZ 26 August). It is impossible to know what this "first stage" is. No stages are mentioned in the Camp David agreements and an administrative council to manage the civilian affairs of the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip must be elected by the inhabitants.

It is obvious that Mr Begin will be aware of the fact that the Egyptians and the Americans together can regard the above proposal as an attempt to bypass what is written in the Camp David agreements about autonomy and how it is to be established. But for the moment there is no authoritative confirmation of the assumption that he will allow whoever conducts the autonomy discussions, when they are resumed, to show much greater compromising that he let them show from 1978 to 1980.

At the same time, it would be better for the prime minister and the other ministers not to be trapped in delusions: The U.S. administration will not give up a renewal of the attempt to actualize the promises the Camp David agreements made to the Arabs of the administered territories. And Israel will not be able to get out of the commitment anchored in an international treaty, signed and ratified.

Israel will be able to reject and deny Mr Caspar Weinberger's claims that a Palestinian state agreed upon between Israel and Jordan would be no danger to us. But the Camp David agreements are still valid and there is no point in the attempts we are now making to prove to the Americans that the problem of Lebanon must be solved first of all. These claims will certainly be interpreted as excuses covering up for Israel's aim to not pursue autonomy as promised by it.

It is possible that among the people determining Israeli policy there are some today who think that we have the power to win the support of the current U.S. administration even if we go to war against Syria and even if we continue to play the same game as in the past with the autonomy discussions. Both these assumptions may be proven wrong.
ARENS ON U.S. TIES, LEBANON

TA131900 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 13 Aug 82 p 16

[Interview with Israel's Ambassador to the United States Moshe Arens by unidentified correspondent; date and place not given]

[Text] Question: For years the U.S. media have been sympathetic to Israel and have supported us in the realm of public opinion. How do you assess the deterioration in their position regarding Israel, especially with respect to Lebanon?

Answer: I agree that there has been a change for the worse. When I arrived in Washington in February of this year at the beginning of my tour as ambassador, we put together a kind of gauge of the press, including in it the commentary pages of 50 U.S. newspapers containing the editorials, commentaries and letters to the editor. In comparing the positions sympathetic to Israel with those attacking it, we found that at that time there was a negative balance. During the week in which the withdrawal from Sinai was completed there was a sharp increase in the sympathetic positions. Afterwards, there was again a decline. During the first week of the Peace for Galilee Operation there was again a sharp rise in the sympathetic positions: The operation's objectives were accepted as reasonable and justified. In the weeks since then, there has again been a sharp decline, mainly because of the television broadcasts and the press photos, things that are well-known: Columns of smoke in Beirut, a girl crying beside ruins, a child thirsty for water. These things, of course, have a negative impact: Friends feel uncomfortable, asking themselves if this is the Israel they knew to have reservations about brutality. That is to say, there is ammunition here for hostile elements and considerable bewilderment for sympathetic elements.

Question: Do you, then, share the opinion that this is partly a result of deficient Israeli information?

Answer: Information can always be improved and this must be done. However, in view of the nature of television, which loves the dramatic and the violent, this presentation of matters is almost inevitable. During my current visit to Israel, I was also in Beirut. I found there something entirely different from what the television broadcasts had led me to expect: I did not find destruction similar in extent to that portrayed in the United States. I also did not find an atmosphere like that described there, and the number of victims
I was informed of different completely: Not 10,000, and it is doubtful if there are even 1,000.

Question: In your opinion, would our information effort abroad benefit from other directing element, in addition to the foreign ministry?

Answer: Frankly, no. In my opinion, Israel's information effort abroad must be concentrated in the hands of its official representative bodies there. However, this is not only the embassies. It also involved other branches and elements. Personally, I am disturbed by the fact that the various Israeli branches in the United States each constitute a kingdom unto themselves—be it the tourism office, the representative body of the treasury, and so on. We are now trying to concentrate them, literally, under one roof so that they can act in concert on information. They would then meet in the morning, exchange information and impressions, and consult and take action. In other words, I think that our information effort must unite the existing elements, and not have another element added.

Question: How would you describe the moods characteristic of the U.S. Jewish community?

Answer: The difficulty in making an accurate assessment is the same as that in trying to assess the moods in Israel. Many people are confused. Attitudes are unstable. In the U.S. Jewish community also there is a feeling of discomfort. However, there is definitely a substantial amount of support for Israel—certainly in the Jewish establishment—accompanied by readiness to mobilize for an information drive and political activity. Outside of the establishment are groups who have reservations about the war in Lebanon: Here and there people have announced they were no longer donating. But I do not think that the dimensions of this phenomenon are significant.

Question: The Jewish community in the United States is not turn between their country's government and Israel because the declared objectives of the war in Lebanon are identical. But what will happen when this situation changes?

Answer: It is true that strategically there is a coincidence of positions, but there is a dispute over tactics. The United States has sometimes thought that our tactics were undermining the strategic objectives. I do not think that a dispute between the administration and Israel will find the Jews in a state of perplexity. In the United States, they feel free and independent enough to take positions that seem appropriate to them, and an obvious example of this was their opposition to the supply of AWACS to Saudi Arabia in diametric opposition to the administration's position.

Question: How is it then, that congressmen who support Israel find that it does not particularly help them even if their constituents are friendly to Israel?

Answer: I do not think that a change has occurred in the positions of the congressmen. What has happened in the wake of this war is that those who were hostile to us before now speak louder, whereas our friends, at least some of
them, are not heard as much. It is true that this reflects the feelings of their constituents on the issue. However, it is hard to say if this feeling is correct. Public opinion surveys do not indicate a uniform trend, apparently because of the confusion people feel.

We must distinguish between processes involving longer-term change and an atmosphere of change created in the wake of the Peace for Galilee Operation. The more prolonged processes spring from a change in values, a fuzzing of the horrible tragedy of the holocaust. These are more fundamental processes, while the influence of the war may be transitory.

Question: You are known as a hawk from the period when you were active in Israeli politics. We do not suspect that you have changed your positions. Still, it is interesting to know what recommendations you made during the war and now during your visit.

Answer: First of all, I am no hawk at all: Not universally speaking. Second, these days it is not such a bad thing to be a hawk in Washington. On the contrary, as Alexander Haig learned, when you are suspected of being a hawk, that is not good... I did not think I had the right to raise suggestions about the actual fighting. I restricted myself to recommending that every step be taken to insure that the campaign would be as short as possible.

The way I conceive of my job is between the maximum—obtaining total agreement [haskama] between the United States and Israel—and the minimum—preventing misunderstandings from evolving in one capital regarding the other's position and the motivation for that position. Incidentally, I have learned that there is indeed great danger that such misunderstandings will be created. That is why I try to avoid shaping policy in my reports. Rather, I strive to convey the fullest and most plausible picture possible regarding the elements at work, their conceptions, their predicted reaction to any sort of development. In the United States I try to explain Israel's interests, its motivation and the degree to which these are identical with U.S. interests. With respect to the war in Lebanon, I believe the Israeli operation has had some very important results and outcomes for the United States.

Question: Could you be a bit more specific on the last point?

Answer: The operation in Lebanon has caused a change in the U.S. strategic balance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union on a universal scale. It has been proved that the West has a response to Soviet arms. The assumption was that NATO would not be able to withstand the combination of the quality of the Soviet systems multiplied by their quantities and that at most there would be a 2-day war in which half the West's air forces would be destroyed, leading up to an escalation ending in nuclear war. They said it is impossible to face the Soviet antiaircraft systems both as a lesson from the war of attrition and the Yom Kippur War in which hard as we tried, the air force was unable to help the ground forces. Some even believed that the fighter bomber was becoming obsolete. Now all of this changed: Today it is clear that Israel—and ultimately the entire West--has an answer that neutralizes the antiaircraft systems.
The T-72 was thought to be the best tank in the world, with no antiarmor ammunition that could penetrate it from the front. Special means were specifically developed to combat this and some crazy ideas were conjured up such as stealing one to bring in for a test. In the war in Lebanon we both penetrated the T-72 and destroyed it. As for the West's aircraft, I—and many others—have always believed that they are superior to soviet aircraft, but has anyone thought about them to the extent of a ratio of 86 downed against zero? Such results must have an impact on the concept and the reassessment of the balance of power. I am convinced that the Soviets will now talk differently to the West—and right now they have been quiet altogether.

Question: If this is so, then logic would have it that of all the U.S. elements the Pentagon is the only friendly body, but we have seen that this is not so?

Answer: I think this will change. In my opinion, the Pentagon is gradually learning this lesson. Possibly here and there is some dissatisfaction with the fact that the junior partner was also capable of developing its own means of warfare and work out its own theory of battle. But this is not the main issue. There is a great desire to learn details, and slowly their significance is being perceived. It will take another few months before everything sinks in. At any rate, the U.S. standing in the Middle East has improved. The Soviets have virtually been silenced. No one is rushing to them to buy arms—even though this does not necessarily mean that Washington will automatically be grateful to us, or say thank you.

Question: The United States and Israel have both declared that all foreign forces must leave Lebanon, and this includes the Syrians in Tripoli and al-Biq'a as well. If the Syrians do not want to move out—and they may well have such a deal with the United States in return for the agreement to take in the terrorists—does this mean that we could take military measures to oust them?

Answer: To the best of my knowledge, there is no American-Syrian deal. The removal of the foreign forces—the Syrians included—is truly an objective shared by the United States and Israel, and that objective still stands. This does not mean to say that it has to be implemented at once, nor does it mean that it has to be implemented at all costs and by all means.

Question: Does this mean that we will remain in Lebanon for as long as the Syrians do?

Answer: We do not have to spell it out right now. In my opinion there is a good chance that if a sovereign, independent government is established in Lebanon, one that enjoys U.S. and Israeli support and if it demands that the Syrians get out, they will have a very hard time leaving their forces in. So far, in justifying their stay in Lebanon the Syrians have emphasized that it is the desire of the Lebanese Government. I suggest that we not be hasty and first see what the chances are of establishing such a Lebanese Government.

Question: Do you not feel that the PLO's defeat was precisely what made the awareness of the Palestinian problem more poignant, making it rise to the top of the agenda soon? And so you not sense that it has also climbed up in order of priority in U.S.-Israeli relations?
Answer: That is true. The war in Lebanon enhanced the interest in finding a solution to the Palestinian problem, enhancing the awareness of this issue. I believe the two have nothing to do with each other. Suppose we solve the problem of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza; suppose there is an autonomy agreement. Still the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon will not have come from there and will not be absorbed there. Their solution will have to be separate anyway. And since I see no logical connection, I think the special feeling of urgency will dissipate and the issue will die. I am not saying that it will be removed from the agenda altogether, but it will resume its normal dimensions.

One must remember that in the approach to the Palestinian problem there is a fundamental difference between the Carter administration and the incumbent one. The previous administration actually had an ideology of a Palestinian homeland. The Reagan administration has no such ideology. It entertains no Palestinian fad. It will be pragmatic.

As for the PLO itself, I can sense no U.S. tendency toward holding a dialogue with it. I think the PLO is greatly weakened, and consequently the temptation to hold talks with it has declined.

Question: The Tehiya's joining the government coalition heralds an impetus to the settlement drive in Judaea and Samaria, or at least gives it more emphasis. Do you think this will change anything in the relations with the United States?

Answer: Right now I can find no great enthusiasm for the settlements. Let us wait and see to what extent we will succeed in explaining things and bringing about a change in positions. I can only say that already since February when I first got here I was convinced that sooner or later we will have to carry out an operation in Lebanon and I began to prepare the ground and to make clear in all my talks that such a thing would be inevitable. I do not purport to take all the credit for this, but I repeat that all the differences were over the tactics, whereas the strategic goals have been, and remain, the same. However, the United States thought that our military operations are hampering the attainment of the strategic goals, whereas we thought they promoted them. I think in the final analysis we were right: I do not believe that without the military pressure Philip Habib would have been able to succeed.

Question: Do you think the phenomenon where Israel is being admonished and there are anti-Israeli feelings such as we discussed are a passing phase or will they leave a residue?

Answer: I never jump to conclusions. Some think one way and others another. I can only say that when I first got here everyone talked about anti-Israeli erosion in the U.S. position, but I could not find any clues to prove it. It is a fact that the Senate increased the aid to Israel this year compared with the administration's proposal, and it also passed an unprecedented decision that the increase in U.S. aid to Israel will, in the next few years, have to be such that it precludes an increase in the Israeli debt to the United States.
Question: Was this not a result of the completion of the Sinai evacuation and in order to encourage Israel to take that step?

Answer: Perhaps, but again I still expect the positive result of the U.S. achievements in this war to have its impact, looking forward to their being absorbed as the cannons quieten down and the lessons are learned.

CSO: 4400/451
COMMENTATORS ANALYZE DEFENSE MINISTER'S POSITION IN CABINET

Sharon's Standing in Cabinet

TA131454 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 13 Aug 82 pp 1, 3

[Report by Military Correspondent Eytan Haber]

[Text] The concentrated attack yesterday by the prime minister, and most of his ministers, on the defense minister raises the question of whether Sharon has disgraced himself and, through the multiple bombardments yesterday which shattered hundreds of houses in Beirut, has not shaken his own political standing.

There were several reasons--political, personal and military--for the attack on Sharon yesterday. All in all, they combined to produce the events in the cabinet room:

--The feeling--whether warranted or mistaken--on the part of ministers that Sharon in effect wants to torpedo the political negotiations, and that his intention is to grind down the terrorists and liquidate them physically.

--The ministers' alarm at the immense political harm done to Israel through Sharon's initiatives. One minister said: "Together with the flames in Beirut, it is also the image of the state of Israel that is being reduced to ashes."

--The frustration cabinet ministers have been feeling that during the 2 months of warfare they have been put in the shade and have been made to look--rightly or wrongly--like a herd of yes-men, saying "amen" to all proposals put to them by Begin and Sharon. (Said Ge'ula Kohen yesterday: "It does not matter what the cabinet decides, Sharon does what he wants anyway." And she added that she concurs with what Sharon wants. Another minister declared: "If I had known that there would be a hundred dead in the war, I would not have raised my hand in favor of it").

--A group of ministers has organized itself and gained support in ever-hardening opposition to Sharon's initiatives. Deputy Prime Minister David Levi may be regarded as the "leader" of this group, which originally comprised Ministers Tzipori (who did not attend yesterday's cabinet meeting, as he is in the Far East), Berman, Pa, Hammer, Burg. This group has also been joined by
hawkish ministers, apparently due to the feeling that the war is leading Israel toward objectives and in directions not previously anticipated or faced.

--In yesterday's attack on Sharon, there was perhaps the additional element of Begin's stand--not least or last, to be sure. Begin seems to want to present the evacuation of the terrorists from Beirut as virtually his personal achievement. Sharon's men are convinced that Begin wants to set a trap for the defense minister and do to him what in the distant past he did to many leaders of Herut and the revisionist movement and also to Dayan and Weizman in recent years. Begin, it is said, wants a "solo show." He does not care for partners. At Sunday's cabinet meeting, Begin gave the signal for the attack on Sharon when he said--half in earnest, half in jest—that he always knows of IDF operations, sometimes beforehand and sometimes in retrospect. In Sharon's entourage this remark by Begin is seen as a sort of signal to other cabinet ministers that henceforth "Sharon's blood may flow freely."

But whoever expects the same scenario as with Dayan and Weizman may be in for a surprise. Sharon is made of different stuff; he is "thick-skinned," and he has no intention of playing into Begin's hands. He will bend, wait out the storm, reconcile with Begin and come riding up on top of the waves.

Sharon Endangers Israeli Democracy

TA161022 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Aug 82 p 9

[Commentary by Eliyahu Salpeter: "The Choice"]

[Text] It may be that Ari'el Sharon as defense minister and Israel as a democratic country can no longer exist together. The people of Israel will have to choose between the two.

What happened in Beirut, Jerusalem and Washington at the end of last week required that we cope with this question as soon as possible.

The unnecessary deaths and wounding of Lebanese civilians and also of IDF soldiers and the almost complete severance of relations between Israel and the United States last Wednesday and Thursday were the result of three democratic assumptions that did not pass the test of reality:

--The IDF troops are obeying orders on the assumption that they are implementing the wishes of the elected civilian authority.

--The officers transfer the chief of staff's orders to the troops on the assumption that the chief of staff is responsible for the fact that they are indeed in keeping with the government's wishes.

--The minister of defense implements the government's wishes in their spirit and language.

Nobody should have been surprised--and Mr Begin, perhaps, less than anyone--that Mr Sharon did not act as expected of a defense minister in a democratic country. Mr Sharon has a long tradition of "independent considerations,"
beginning with the killing of dozens of women and children in Qibya, going on through the bloodsoaked battle in the Mitla Pass during the Sinai campaign and encouraging opponents of the Sinai withdrawal, bombardments that damaged civilian objectives in Beirut over the last few weeks and up to the continuation of the bombardments after the cabinet had in principle accepted Habib's arrangement.

Mr Begin himself recognizes Minister Sharon's attempts to foil him personally and not just from yesterday. Mr Begin of course remembers the "imaginary towers" Mr Sharon established in northern Sinai which so angered President al-Sadat. Mr Begin is certainly aware of Mr Sharon's attempts to torpedo the Sinai evacuation over the Tabah Affair. And Mr Begin undoubtedly heard about the encouragement that Mr Sharon gave to the opponents of the Sinai withdrawal, encouragement that led to the tragic vision of the Yamit evacuation.

Mr Sharon's attitude to democracy in Israel is no secret. It has been given expression in several spheres:

--Mr Sharon regards the free press as "poison" and is trying to strangle free expression on IDF radio.

--The restrictions imposed on the IDF spokesman and the distortion of announcements have not only contributed to severely damaging Israel's image in the world, they have also undermined the basis of credibility of the official announcements and--for the first time in Israel's wars--have cut off both the nation's elected representatives and public opinion molders and the public itself from the facts, awareness of which is a basic condition for the functioning of a democratic regime. The announcements about the advances of IDF forces, the degree of damage and size of the arms caches in southern Lebanon did not fit in with the reality; the claims that "we only react to terrorist fire" have turned into a joke, not only among the soldiers, but also in Israel; the reports about "direct hits at terrorist objectives" have been contradicted the next day by reports and photos of dozens and hundreds of civilian killed and wounded.

--The defense minister has not always reported the entire truth, even to his ministerial colleagues, and thus put into question their ability to do their duty as cabinet members.

A country can lose its freedom in one of two ways:

A) The regime ceases to reflect the wishes of the electors;

B) The country loses its independence.

It is customary to think of the first possibility in terms of a regime being taken over by force. But there are cases in history in which nations have lost their freedom gradually, with those who took over the rule not killing, not jailing and not dismissing the legal government, but, in the first stage, perverting and distorting its desires.
A country can lose its independence as a result of a military coup. But there are cases in history in which independence was lost when the country failed to keep the delicate balance between its dependence on the support of a superpower and freedom of political action, despite the dependence. The loss of U.S. support and an imposed arrangement in the Middle East are closer today than they have been for a long time.

The special danger facing Israel today is that if it goes too far, it could lose its internal and external freedom at the same time.

Sharon Strongest Cabinet Member

TA130729 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 Aug 82 p 13

[Commentary by Yo'el Marcus: "And What About the Sharon Ouster?"]

[Text] Mr Ari'el Sharon emerges from this war not as the most popular man in the cabinet, but certainly as the strongest man in it--stronger than the prime minister himself.

The status achieved by Mr Sharon is more exceptional than anything we have known until now in this country in the arena of power games. His power does not derive from strong political backing, from the cabinet's dependence on his vote, from his having stood out for his intelligence, nor from his ability to lead as the first among equals. His strength springs only from his tenacity in achieving whatever he wants. There was never a minister in such a strong position who is feared instead of admired by his cabinet colleagues. There was never a minister who achieved so many of his aims while his colleagues supervised him, supposedly, very carefully, and while their association with him was dictated by the rule: Suspect him and respect him--in that order. Sharon's strength is somewhat reminiscent of legendary characters from the history of the middle ages and from the 19th century who imposed their will on weak regimes and rulers.

He voided the foreign minister of his authority and shaped the policy of the cabinet's second term more than the prime minister himself.

It is a fact that he managed to make the whole cabinet--his greatest success was in converting the prime minister to his side--support his plan for a large-scale invasion of Lebanon, about which, in fact, the majority had reservations. It will, of course, be difficult for the ministers to admit--but I will not be far from the truth if I say that even in their worst dreams they did not imagine that they would face a situation in which their sole remaining alternative (if terrorists do not agree to leave willingly) would be to approve a break into Beirut and a war soaked in blood and destruction in a built up area. It is true that pushing the cabinet to the verge of making such a decision is what ultimately convinced the terrorists that they had better leave, and this achievement is to Sharon's credit--but behind the compliments on his staying power and strong nerves, is hidden a trauma the ministers will find hard to forget.
On 14 May, 3 weeks before the beginning of the Peace for Galilee Operation, I published in this column the fully detailed plan of Sharon's operation in Lebanon: Capturing Lebanon up to Beirut, destroying the terrorists' infrastructure, advancing to Beirut, uniting with the Christian forces and destroying the Syrian missiles with "2 hours." This actually was not a journalistic scoop. The plan was known to wide circles and was a conversation topic at social gatherings and among military and political people. It was so imaginative that even the military censors did not take it seriously and allowed me to publish it in advance. Mr Sharon devised his grandiose plan even before becoming defense minister, while at the same time he indirectly criticized the purposeless bombing in Beirut and the cease-fire agreement with the terrorists, which turned us into their hostages—two things done in the days of the former defense minister, namely Mr Begin.

From excerpts of speeches made by Sharon and his associates it was possible to understand that he saw the solution to the Palestinian problem in several stages: A "new order" in Lebanon, elimination or removal of the terrorists from Lebanon and the pushing out of the Syrian forces, and finally—turning Jordan into a Palestinian state by substituting the Hashemite regime with a Palestinian one. In a newspaper interview at the beginning of the war, Sharon confessed that he began implementing his plan (for Lebanon) right after he became defense minister. His one and only attempt to get support in the cabinet for his general conception did not turn out well. Most of the ministers rejected it. But despite that, in half a year, the cabinet found itself, headed by Mr Begin, approving what it did not want. The fact that from time to time during the war reports leaked of dissatisfaction of the ministers, of their reservations and suspicions that he might be dragging them into something into which they did not mean to be dragged, only confirmed to what extent Sharon has become the leading man in the cabinet.

The question of how such a thing could happen could probably be extensively discussed after it is clear if the Lebanon War has truly ended. At first glance it seems that Mr Sharon brought one slice of salami at a time to be approved by the cabinet, until the cabinet found itself holding a sausage reaching to the heart of Beirut. Every day they approved another tree without seeing the woods as a whole. I doubt if the cabinet would have approved on 5 June a general logistic plan in the clear advance knowledge that the intention would be to reach into Beirut. Mr Begin, personally, knew of course much more than the ministers, and in actual fact was a full accomplice of Sharon in manipulating the cabinet. Mr Sharon won Begin's heart with his military expertise and his courage, and while Dayan in his time influenced Begin in the direction of compromising, Sharon strengthens his Eretz-Yisra'el ideology. He was like Hur and Aaron holding up the weary hands of Moses during the war on Am'alek. What will be hard to ascertain now (one day we might read it in Begin's memoirs) is to what extent did Begin know about all the military moves; did he have sufficient control over them; was he aware that there was going to be a war of a few months? And the main point, did Begin know in advance that he might reach a stage of being on the verge of a military entry into Beirut? And if he knew, why did he not order already in the second week reaching the situation that we only reached practically in the third month? According to the last remark of Mr Begin, who is very sensitive to victims, that he is happy that we were saved from entering Beirut, it might
not be presumptuous to assume that he did not estimate or did not know in advance that he might be on the verge of giving such a difficult order. It is true that he supported Sharon for a great part of the way, here and there he might have been dragged and only lately did he show signs of hesitation and about going all the way and the unknown.

Now, when there is an impression that the terrorists will leave of their own free will, Begin is quick to promise the country that lost 350 of its sons and sustained about 2,000 wounded that from now on the land would "rest for 40 years" and that there will be no more wars with Syria and Jordan. But this promise has not yet received Sharon's confirmation and surely does not in keeping with his known outlook. In his greater plan there are, as is well known, a few more elements awaiting realization: The ouster of the terrorists from all of Lebanon, the ouster of the Syrian forces, and finally the Palestinization of Jordan. It is still too early to know whether the reservations the ministers, and even Mr Begin himself have about the defense minister will diminish his fervent adherence to his goals and his ability to reach them. "The achievement of the Beirut ouster will not be complete if Sharon is not ousted from the defense ministry" one of the prime minister's supporters commented sarcastically.

When Sharon is at the peak of his power and Mr Begin has set a date for his retirement, it is easy to talk.

Sharon's Cabinet Position Analyzed

TA160731 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 16 Aug 82 p 3

[Commentary by Sra Honig: "'Anti-Sharon Union' Jumped the Gun"]

[Text] Sources in Prime Minister Menahem Begin's office told THE JERUSALEM POST yesterday that "the prime minister never did and does not now entertain any notion of replacing Defence Minister Ari'el Sharon or of taking over his portfolio."

The idea has "not even been considered and was not suggested by any individual minister of group of ministers." Should any number of cabinet ministers approach Begin with such a proposal, "it would be summarily and unequivocally rejected," the sources said.

Begin would tell any such ministers, THE POST was told, that "Sharon is the best defence minister Israel could have." The sources maintained that "the difference of opinions between Sharon and Begin had been exaggerated out of all proportion. No crisis exists and there is certainly no rift between the two."

Such pronouncements are seen as part of an effort by Begin to mollify Sharon and to warn off his party foes who were encouraged after Begin had openly rejected Sharon's recommendations at last Thursday's cabinet session, usurped his authority to decide on aerial strikes and even scolded him.
Likud sources confirm that Sharon's staunch rivals in Herut and the Likud took Begin's utterances at the meeting to mean that Sharon is vulnerable and that attacks on him would even have Begin's sanction. Begin is now striving to call the various anti-Sharon forces in the party to order.

A number of cabinet sources also predicted that Sharon would soon find himself with renewed backing from Begin, though this would clearly be conditional on "good behavior."

Sharon's long-time party opponents "will have to wait for a more opportune moment to renew their campaign against him, a liberal minister admitted to THE POST.

The liberal minister went on to say that "if there is one thing events of the last few days have demonstrated beyond a doubt, it is the total masterful control of the situation by Begin. When he felt Sharon was assuming too much, he saw to it that he was put in his place and even in a humiliating fashion. But when Sharon's political rivals took it to be open season on Sharon, Begin quickly indicated that they were mistaken. Neither side can make a move without Begin's assent," he said.

The situation is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that no sooner had Begin put Sharon in a corner at last Thursday's cabinet session, then he made it a point to call Sharon out of a Knesset foreign affairs and defence committee session. Begin summoned Sharon for the specific purpose of reassuring and pacifying him, and he is expected to publicly express his confidence in Sharon in coming days.

Sharon's star, say high-ranking Herut sources, has not waned, since it was always dependent on Begin as its source of light. Sharon's popularity among the Herut rank-and-file notwithstanding, he does not have sufficient support in party forums. His status always hinged on Begin's protection. Sharon is well aware of this, and is unlikely to commit 'Ezer Weizman's or Shmu'el Tamir's efforts and cross swords with Begin. Unlike those foreign minister, he will ride the storm, say his supporters.

According to Herut pundits, "Sharon's opponents were out to get him long before the war. His popularity endangered them in the contest for the number two position in Herut. They never forgot that in the spring of 1982, during the first vote for the Herut slate of Knesset candidates, Sharon outpolled all other candidates and even garnered more votes than powerbroker David Levi."

With the defence portfolio and following the battlefield victories in Lebanon, it was feared that Sharon would win the behind-the-scenes war of succession in Herut and become Begin's heir. Would-be interim heir, Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, with long-term hopefuls Finance Minister Yoram Aridor and Deputy Prime Minister David Levi, banded together in what is called in Herut "The Ministers' Anti-Sharon Trade Union." But this union "did not dare make a move until they thought Begin had removed his protective mantle from Sharon," it was noted in Herut headquarters.
The Liberal Party, Herut's main partner in the Likud bloc, was thrown into confusion by the latest affair. Sources in Herut and in the liberals alike identify Deputy Prime Minister Simha Ehrlich as mainly responsible for the whispers about a cabinet campaign to dismiss Sharon. But while at first other liberal ministers were emboldened by the belief that Begin had turned his back on Sharon, the anti-Sharon move seemed to have cooled for most of them. This is coupled with the fact that, given the deep animosities in the party, Ehrlich taking one position was enough to drive some fellow liberals to adopt the opposite stand.

Thus one Liberal Party leader told THE POST yesterday that it would be "prudent for the liberals to keep their fingers out of Herut affairs. It is beyond their power to stir up trouble between Begin and Sharon. If Begin does not abandon Sharon himself, all those who are after the defence minister's blood will be powerless."

CSO: 4400/451
LEVI INTERVIEWED ON CABINET SITUATION

TA131641 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 13 Aug 82 p 5 of Weekend Supplement

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister David Levi by Yesha'yahu Ben-Porat; date and place not given: "It Is Impossible That Due to the Fact That Begin Exists Everyone Else Stops Thinking"]

[Excerpt] Question: Mr Deputy Prime Minister, you have recently been presented as a trouble-maker [last word in English] in the government, as the person who sometimes dares to say "no" to the prime minister and ask embarrassing questions. What happened to you David Levi?

Answer: Trouble-maker [last word in English] is a journalistic expression. I see myself as a person who behaves according to his ideas. I like equipping myself with maximum information; I like to analyze situations and examine developments in order to guarantee that we have control over matters so as to obtain the most achievements from a seemingly complicated and complex situation. Throughout the campaign I did not think that it was our task just to defend ourselves. The action was necessary and vital. We had to do it; so we reached the decisive point. We should obtain the maximum benefit now. This consideration is what has guided me. In my opinion there are three essential points:

A. To be careful about human lives, first and foremost about our soldiers' lives.

B. To prevent our isolation and to maintain, as much as possible, understanding and cooperation with the United States.

C. To prevent a situation where there is no way out.

The argument over these matters is conducted in this government, which is a team in which you have to be convincing--that is, when you are at peace with your positions. My considerations have never been personal and I never said "no" automatically. I tried to treat affairs in a matter-of-fact manner. This sometimes entails an unsympathetic argument but since the discussed issues are major affairs in the life of the state one should not get excited about having an argument, provided you are at peace with yourself.
Question: I can hear the no in your yes and the other way around. Is it correct to assume that something has happened to you in this war, that you have awakened to topics that are normally outside the sphere of your ministerial activity.

Answer: I do not think so. I have not changed. These are matters that I have always carried within me. When there is no avoiding it, it is necessary to fight for existence and guaranteed security. However, this does not mean that I allow a free rein throughout. In my opinion, the military aspect, as important and vital as it may be, is only a means of guaranteeing a political objective that I see as also being a goal for the future and not just for the present. But just as the chance is great, so is the risk, and vice versa. Every phase of the war necessitates a different treatment according to the circumstances and the situation.

Question: Up till the war you had the image, perhaps mistakenly so, of a loyal and obedient Herut member who did not question the prime minister's decisions. On the basis of what has been learned from cabinet discussions you are depicted as an element who questions things, and not just once. What has happened?

Answer: It is no secret that I have great appreciation for Menahem Begin as a statesman, as the party leader, as one of the greatest men I have known in my life. I certainly rely on his reasoning. Nevertheless, I do not dismiss myself—not at all. It is impossible to have a situation where, because there is Begin, everyone else stops thinking. Thinking together creates additional, vital channels. It is thus that I saw and still see my duties as cabinet member.

Question: However, there were cases where Begin was mad at you.

Answer: There were cases when he was angry. This hurt, but against the topic in hand the anger passes.

Question: At the cabinet meeting on Sunday [8 August] you asked the prime minister an embarrassing question—whether he knew in advance about a certain military move.

Answer: I will only say that I have never done anything in order to embarrass anybody, least of all the prime minister. The prime minister, on whom I rely, is absolutely entitled to make decisions on his own, as is customary in every correct state. He can also choose for himself the people with whom he consults. If he determines—and this is what we are proud of—that the entire cabinet will decide on certain issues then you, as a cabinet member, must be particular about every point and especially points which are not compatible with the rule that the entire cabinet decides. When you are confident that there was a deviation, you cannot but check out the entire issues. If you skip it, do not be surprised if there are larger deviations in the future and do not voice post-factum complaints. Therefore, I asked questions for clarifications so that the above-mentioned rule would be implemented. Under no circumstances did I mean to embarrass anyone. My question came to insure that there is order in the government's affairs and I do not regret this.
Question: However, the prime minister's answer is that the moves are known to him "sometimes before the implementation and sometimes after" has exacerbated the matter.

Answer: I do not want to refer to what the prime minister said.

Question: Were you content with the answer to your question?

Answer: I did not look for content. I sought a clarification and I am glad to know that the course of affairs is now in the hands of the prime minister.

Question: You are saying "now." This implies that it has not been so all along.

Answer: I am not entitled to get into this argument. I accept the way the prime minister is handling affairs and I rely on him.

Question: At the basis of all my questions is a rife supposition that the cabinet divides into two groups—one less moderate and the other more moderate. On what does the dispute center, and if you want I am willing to put dispute in quotation marks?

Answer: I do not accept the supposition that there are camps or groups in the cabinet. The attitude to subjects is not always the same, and certainly not according to groups or camps. Sometimes you are forceful, sometimes flexible—in keeping with the subject and the objective. At the same time, it is no secret that at a certain stage of the battle the attitude to the next stage was a matter for different assessments by the ministers. We are fortunate that it is so, since the multiplicity of thought allows for the selection of the golden mean or the path of success. Nevertheless, it is no secret that at a certain stage of the campaign the attitude toward the next stage was subject to various ministerial assessments. We are fortunate that things are like this, because the abundance of schools of thought allows for the golden medium to be selected—or as some call it, the path of success. Everyone knows that no government member was anxious to go to the end—that is, to enter west Beirut, exhausting the military means to the fullest. When it looked as though a political approach, with the same objective, could be attempted, then the political line should have been encouraged, without neglecting the military means which should be used as a threat. That is to say—as a whip used as a means to achieve a political end. Hence, the whip cannot become the plough. The whip should only be the whip....

Question: Do you agree with the whip-like bombings even at the stage where the political negotiations are at their final stage?

Answer: Look, when it is necessary to defend the lives of our soldiers there is no room for second thoughts or criticism. In this I have no doubt. But when the agreement [heskem] is nearly at its peak, then disproportionate bombings achieve nothing. I am pleased that this was discussed in the cabinet and that a decision was made that everyone will abide by. The word on this was given by the prime minister.
Question: Let me make things a bit more complicated for you: Should one gather from your response that the latest bombings were in the proportion required by the cabinet resolution?

Answer: I would like to hope so. I would like to believe that they are being conducted at the instruction of the prime minister, who expressed the wishes of the majority of ministers.

Question: I would like to grasp the bull by the horns: There are some ministers—although I do not know whether you can be numbered among them, I have no proof of that—who have the vague feeling, which they express in private conversations, that during the war they found themselves in situations that they did not know about in advance. Are you aware of that?

Answer: I believe you when you say you have heard such things. I can neither confirm nor refute the personal feelings of other ministers. Each one had their own sentiments. At any rate, a cabinet minister should not regard himself as one who is only briefed. If a minister feels that something is out of order, it is his duty to express his view and say what he feels.

Question: Can you attest that this is what you did when you had dissenting views?

Answer: I would not like it to sound as though other ministers did not do so while I did.

Question: Why not?

Answer: Look, everyone makes their own contribution, and everyone works as he thinks he should.

Question: When we went to war, did you think—or assume—that ultimately we would be stationed where we are today?

Answer: It is not a matter of an assumption or an assessment. In the course of the war, given the circumstances and the development, the cabinet was forced occasionally, from time to time, to make decisions which, if you wish, you might call complementary to the original resolution. I refuse to accept the view that the cabinet adopted a certain resolution the night of 5 June and that consequently it is not allowed to make another decision until the 8th of that month, if the circumstances merit one. Indeed, the cabinet adopted the necessary resolutions.

Question: I respect and accept this, but the public has been asking a more fundamental question: On 5 June did the cabinet really not know where, and how far, we were going? Many knew that "grand scheme." If anyone wants to draw a comparison between what evolved and that "grand scheme," it is his right to do so; but the cabinet decided on the various stages according to developments in the field, not according to some "grand scheme." If you ask me to what extent the developments in the field did not somewhat come to promote the "grand scheme", I would have no answer to that.
Question: Allow me to tell you that you have indeed raised a good question, but your reply to it seems to me to be somewhat deficient....

Answer: But I have no answer to it. I can only say that I am fully confident and I firmly believe every report on information given to the government by the military echelons. Nonetheless, I do not have to agree to accept as self-evident the decisions I get reports on. I weigh them, examine them, and I may make my own assessment. However, in regard to the information the cabinet has been given during the war, I cannot imagine that it was not truthful information, period.

Question: Would I be far from the truth if I said that you do not harbor complete faith in the defense minister?

Answer: I have faith in the defense minister; there is no question of that. But it will have to be the defense minister, not me, to answer you as to whether he always acts precisely in accordance with the degree of trust I place in him.

Question: There has been rather open criticism of the foreign minister's functioning during the war. Do you share this criticism?

Answer: I criticize no one.

Question: Are you not surprised that the foreign minister is truly not playing a central role in the negotiations with Philip Habib?

Answer: I would not like to judge a minister with regard to the areas he is in charge of, nor am I in charge of grading my fellow colleagues, the ministers.

CSO: 4400/451
'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTATOR ON BEGIN-SHAMIR RELATIONS

TA130808 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Aug 82 pp 9, 11

[Commentary by Mati Golan: "The Crown Prince Is Naked"]

[Text] A plane which brought Israeli ambassador to the United States Moshe Arens landed on Monday, 9 Aug, at Ben-Gurion Airport. The initiative for this visit came from the ambassador himself, who explained that in his opinion a situation was created which demands that he give a detailed and full report to the government on what is happening in the United States.

On the face of it there is nothing special or strange in bringing an ambassador to Israel so that he can give a first hand report and take part in consultations concerning the nation in which he is posted. Of course it is understandable in the case of Arens, against the background of the tensions created lately between Washington and Jerusalem. What gives this visit its outstanding meaning is the fact that 4 days before, on Thursday, another plane landed in Ben-Gurion Airport, bringing with it Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, coming back from tiring days of meetings with heads of the administration and congress in Washington.

Shamir's visit to the United States was no secret to the prime minister. Shamir's varied schedule was also known to Begin, as to anybody who listened to media reports. It seems reasonable to assume that Begin's reaction to Arens' initiative would be different: "Look here, my ambassador friend, I appreciate your meaning and your wish to be in our presence. But only recently our foreign minister visited Washington and I am quite sure he will be able to give us a substantive and updated report. Therefore, we will be happy if you come at a later date."

As mentioned, this was not how the prime minister behaved. Despite the foreign minister's visit to the capital of the United States, he thought it right to invite Ambassador Arens as well. The usual but inevitable conclusion is that the prime minister prefers the reports and estimations of Ambassador Arens over those coming from his foreign minister.

This affair may shed some light on the attitude of other Likud heads toward Minister Shamir. People in the Knesset corridors were surprised 2 weeks ago when MK Eliyahu Ben-Elissar, head of the Knesset defense and foreign affairs committee, severely criticized Shamir and his office for their failure in the
information area. Such criticism is not customary in the Herut movement, whose people are accustomed to following the leader's line. Ben-Elisar has always been one of those faithful to this school. What happened to him? Many wondered. Did his fear of the results of this failure overcome his natural instinct of obedience and loyalty to the movement?

It is now clear that whoever suspected Ben-Elisar of being influenced by his pure concern for state interests in his criticism, suspected the innocent. It is true that the information failures caused him much grief. But to the same extent there is no doubt that he would not have expressed it publicly if he did not know that Minister Shamir is no longer liked by the prime minister.

This message was immediately understood by the rest of the Likud members as well. In the meeting of the Knesset defense and foreign affairs committee on Monday this week, they gave free reign to views whose gist is clearcut: The crown prince is naked. The image of the man who up till a few weeks ago seemed like Begin's almost certain heir was dwarfed to nearly zero dimensions.

Herut MK Roni Milo asked in the committee: "Why was it Ari'el Sharon and not the foreign minister who met with U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib?" Liberal MK Dror Zeigerman expressed himself even more clearly: "Why did Shamir give up his participation in the negotiations with Habib? By so doing he emptied the foreign ministry of its content.

The phenomenon of the Likud members leveling criticism is new, but not the content. Whoever is trying to attribute this blame also to Minister Sharon is wrong and misleading. He was not the man who removed Shamir from the contacts with Habib. Had the foreign minister been resolved to direct these contacts or take part in them at least, nobody would have prevented him from doing so.

The astonishing truth is that Shamir, since his appointment as foreign minister, has distanced himself from every matter involving real works. All major foreign policy issues have been entrusted to others while Shamir looked on in silence. Relations with the United States are being handled by the prime minister; the autonomy talks have been relegated to Interior Minister Yosef Burg; the defense ministry has taken control of the normalization of relations with Egypt; Sharon went to Africa and he was the one who signed the agreement for the renewal of relations with Zaire; and Begin and Sharon have stood at the center of the negotiations about Lebanon.

What is left for the foreign ministry?—information. One would think that since Shamir has unburdened himself of all the other matters, most of his time and talents would be devoted to promoting this important subject. The problem is that this reasonable assumption is not accepted by Shamir.

Since the war broke out, he has not convened even once his ministry's information officials. In the first days of the war foreign correspondents were not provided background briefings, and the destructive result was that the first and crucial impression in the world media was influenced by the other side's reports.
Some of the blame for the information oversight perhaps rests with the smoke-screen policy determined by the defense ministry. However, none of the cabinet ministers recalls ever having heard Shamir express any protest or reflection on the injudiciousness of this policy, about which he must have had an opinion.

Shamir's personal contribution to the information effort was expressed in repeating remarks stated earlier by the prime minister. Since he entered office as foreign minister, he has never expressed any unusual or original idea. He did not deviate from this practice even during the war period.

Where does this passiveness come from? Is this a result of organic impotence or is there a coll and intention calculation of a man who decided that since he was marked as an heir he better sit down quietly in order not to jeopardize the inheritance?

It seems that the answer is positive to these two questions. Shamir has impotence of both thought and action which the inheritance calculations serve and excuse. He is not a man capable of great things or original thoughts. Had he not entered politics, his traits and abilities would have advanced him to the status of mediocre official. With a lot of luck we might have reached the stages of senior officialdom.

This fact, however, must not mislead anyone. A man with a spirit and image of a mediocre official may also harbor great ambitions, and these ambitions with Shamir are burning. Surprisingly, and apparently also to his great surprise, he found himself in a front jumping position to the prime minister's position. This fact has totally possessed his thoughts and acts, and particularly his lack of acts. How should one behave so as not lose this position? One must not step on toes, especially not of those of the man who may crown the heir. How does one do this? Simply, one does not do a thing and does not express any thought which is not compatible with the accepted thought.

An independent and capable man would have found it difficult to live for long in the framework of such a passive strategy. In Shamir's case, the character and qualifications serve what seems to him to be the measures necessary to achieve the goal.

In normal times such a strategy can yield the expected fruit.

War, in contrast, highlights the creation of a constitutional vacuum which severely impairs the process of decisionmaking by the government. Since the voice of the foreign ministry was not heard, the result was that the government's decisions mainly relied on the reports and assessments of the defense ministry. Thus the vital balance between the political and security interests was disrupted. "The government"—one of the ministers said in a private conversation—"turned into a branch of the IDF general headquarters."

It may be that Shamir was unaware of this fact. It is also possible that he was aware but could not transcend things and deviate from his practice. In any event, the Lebanese war has shown the passive strategy as a wrong calculation. This strategy made things difficult for the prime minister by increasing his dependence on the defense minister who, in the absence of an active foreign
minister, became a decisive political element in addition to being a major security element. Begin himself had to play the role of a foreign minister as a balancing factor, and this fact was not too appealing to Begin.

In the government today free use is being made—also by ministers who had supported the foreign minister in the past—of definitions such as "bad disappointment" and "irrelevant." However, these expressions of sobriety and discontent are not enough anymore. After the war in Lebanon is over Israel will face difficult political decisions, maybe the most difficult in its history, ministers such as David Levi, Yram Aridor, Yitzhaq Berman and others who have proven independent thought and an ability to withstand will be charged with the task of throwing all their weight in favor of replacing Shamir by a man who will be a foreign minister not only in theory but in practice as well.

CSO: 4400/451
FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS BACK SHAMIR AGAINST SHARON

TA150639 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 15 Aug 82 p 2

[Report by Diplomatic Correspondent Asher Wallfish]

[Text] Foreign ministry officials at the middle and upper-middle levels are becoming increasingly disillusioned with Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir because of the way he lets Defence Minister Ari'el Sharon push him into the back seat.

The officials have come to the conclusion that Sharon has grabbed the limelight because Shamir is apathetic and not because Sharon has elbowed Shamir aside--something which we would not dare to do.

The officials assume that should Shamir wish to assert himself more, Sharon would defer to him.

Despite the fact that Shamir is universally liked in the foreign ministry, and is known to be very receptive to new ideas, he has acquired the image of inactivity because he usually does nothing about the new ideas he is fed, beyond expressing his approval.

Officials have said that Shamir's political support within Herut is known to be so massive that he could break Sharon's monopoly of the diplomatic negotiations with ease if he so desired.

This feeling among foreign ministry officials came to light after a veteran cabinet minister told THE JERUSALEM POST on Thursday night, that Sharon must not be allowed to monopolize the diplomatic conclusion of the Beirut episode. "We cannot leave them in the hands of an elephant," THE POST was told.

The argument for giving Shamir greater responsibility in diplomatic contacts was advanced last week by Likud MK Roni Milo of the Herut Party, whose importance in the party is steadily growing.

CSO: 4400/451
TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY ALLOWS ISRAELIS' ENTRANCE

TA201551 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1420 GMT 20 Aug 82

[Excerpts] Tel Aviv, 20 Aug (ITIM)--Following international pressure last week the Turkish foreign ministry removed its opposition to the entry of two Israeli researchers--Minister Professor Yuval Ne'eman and Helena Eisenber from the Tel Aviv University--to an International Conference on Theoretical Physics slated to open in Turkey on the coming Sunday.

As may be recalled, the Turkish Government barred the entrance of Professor Ne'eman and of Helena Eisenber claiming that these Israelis "belong to the people bombing Lebanon," although the conference involved deals with a pure scientific issue.

On Thursday of the past week the organizers of the conference in Turkey announced that the Turkish foreign ministry removed its opposition to the entry of the Israeli researchers but Professor Ne'eman announced he will not go to the conference. Only Mrs Helena Eisenber will travel to the conference.

CSO: 4400/451
W. BANK REACTIONS TO BEIRUT EVACUATION

TA221354 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1230 GMT 22 Aug 82

[Report by Correspondent in Judaea and Samaria Gabi Shefi]

[Text] Jerusalem, 22 Aug (ITIM)--Certain pro-PLO personalities who asked to remain anonymous told the ITIM correspondent in Judaea and Samaria that the terrorists will now operate against those Arab leaders who had ignored them in their difficult hours and will, at the same time, proceed with their activities both in Lebanon and against Israeli targets in Israel and overseas. They added that even if the PLO was now leaving Beirut it will not abandon its military activities and they expressed their belief that Palestinian fighters would remain even in Beirut itself. Others will concentrate in the al-Biqa' Valley and, along with those in Tripoli, will perpetrate operations against the IDF forces in Lebanon. At the same time, they will continue with their political activities and information campaign in the world in order to arouse the world against Israel. In their opinion, the last war has provoked a great outcry and Israel will now be unable to ignore it. They expressed their belief that the Palestinian problem will be solved in the long run.

The ITIM correspondent adds that contrary to these personalities, in their latest announcement published in their organ, Umm al-Qura (mother of the villages), the heads of the village leagues have reiterated that in view of the PLO's devastating defeat the inhabitants of the territories must now stand up and extend their hands to peace with Israel, just as Egypt did after the Yom Kippur war, and immediately abandon the path of struggle and the dreams that it is possible to defeat Israel.

The heads of the village leagues also denounced the PLO leaders who had entertained illusions that it is possible to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. Other personalities who are trying to turn the PLO's defeat into victory, are now at odds in everything pertaining to the way in which the terrorist organizations must proceed in the future, and among them there are many who favor the political path. Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj has said he is convinced the inhabitants of the territories wish the Palestinian leadership would now concentrate only and solely on the political struggle since this is the only way likely to lead to large achievements in the future.
Personalities in Judaea and Samaria, both moderate and extremists, told the ITIM correspondent that the decision of the terrorist organizations to leave Beirut had been right. According to them, this decision was made in order "to prevent the destruction of Beirut and the bloodshed among the civilian population of the city."

The ITIM correspondent in Judaea and Samaria points out that the general feeling among the inhabitants of the territories in the wake of the departure of the terrorists from Beirut has improved.

Public figures in East Jerusalem claim that in the first days of the war the inhabitants of the territories had been in utter shock but that their feelings had improved as the fighting progressed. According to the editor of AL-FAJR, the Palestinians' resistance had changed the mood and had "planted in us the faith that we will continue to exist and demand our rights."

CSO: 4400/451
TRADE RELATIONS WITH GREECE UNAFFECTED BY WAR

TA220848 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 22 Aug 82 p 3

[Text] Trade relations between Israel and Greece have not been harmed by the war, and Israel will even participate in two international exhibitions to be held in Greece in November and December 1982. This has been reported by Israel's commercial attache in Greece.

The exhibitions in which Israel is to participate are "Index", an industrial-economic exhibition, and "Index 'L'," an exhibition of electric products.

In January 1983 an additional lowering of customs duties at the rate of 20 percent on industrial products from Israel is scheduled to be implemented, as a continuation of the drop in the rate of 10 percent annually in 1981 and 1982.

Israeli exports to Greece totalled about $70 million in 1982 compared with $37 million in 1980.

Greece has been a member of the EEC since 1981 and imports about $12 billion worth of products annually.

CSO: 4400/451
'HA'ARETZ' URGES PATIENCE IN RESOLVING MIDEAST

TA231042 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Aug 82 p 7

[Commentary by A. Schweitzer: "Haste Is From the Devil"]

[Excerpt] As important as it may be that the whole wide world, including the U.S. superpower, be interested in resolving the Palestinian problem along the spirit of granting the Arabs of Eretz Yisra'el more rights, one must admit that the two local partners to the conflict--Israel and the Eretz Yisra'el Arabs--have a preferential status in this respect, or at least an equal one, compared with the other interested elements. Apparently neither Israel nor the Palestinians are currently prepared to budge from their positions, all of which can be summed up in the phrase "it is all mine" with respect to content, and with "only thus" in regard to the method of implementation. The aspirations of those of goodwill who truly wish to effect peace in Eretz Yisra'el will be to no avail at all before there is some change in at least one party's stand, or in both.

Neither Mr Begin nor PLO strongman Yasir 'Arafat need to be introduced in public, but one should once again remind Mr Shultz and those who hold similar opinions that the incumbent Israeli prime minister is firmly determined to hold on to--at the minimum--all of Eretz Yisra'el; whereas even though he was virtually on the hangman's gallows, Mr 'Arafat was not tempted to recognize Israel's existence or even declare a moratorium on the measures which the organization subordinate to him has so far employed. The real as opposed to the declared positions are thus as intransigent as ever, and there is hardly any cause to think--although many evidently still hope so--that the future will soften them.

Beginism, to apply an aphorism, was nurtured on PLO soil: Together both block the road to conciliation, or what other nations have been calling handling the heart of the conflict. If one was to give a practical tip to the well-versed realpolitik personnel in Washington against the backdrop of the balance of power, as well as against the background of the historical past and present, they would be well advised to work hard at disintegrating the PLO, bringing about its disappearance from the Palestinian Arab awareness; Beginism might then follow the same fate. However, these dovetailing processes need time, and what even more requires time is for the lessons learned from events in the last few years in the Middle East to sink into the minds of the Arabs, and then their drawing political conclusions from the events. What point, then,
is there in making demonstrative haste in the West, particularly in the United States? Haste will only breed conflicts with Israel and will result in false Palestinian promises along the same pattern as the McCloskey note.

Policy means, among other things, having the wisdom to wait, even if this does not fit in with the interim periods between presidential terms. The Palestinian issue has been put in abeyance for 34 years now, it can wait the few more years it takes for the Israeli and Palestinian peoples to get tired of Beginism and PLO'ism respectively. This weariness is the necessary and most likely also sufficient condition to find a realistic—that is, compromising—answer to the conflict between the two nations. Dr Kissinger is right: All that could be achieved in the near future is interim agreements [hesderey]. Those who are in a hurry, wanting a comprehensive solution at once, are actually placing a hurdle on the road to mutual conciliation.

CS0: 4400/451
'HA'ARETZ' ON PROBLEMS AFTER BEIRUT EVACUATION

TA201610 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 20 Aug 82 p 13

[Commentary by A. Schweitzer: "After Beirut"]

[Text] It looks like the PLO will leave Beirut. I am saying this with the last-minute anxiety that their leaders might have second thoughts still lurking somewhere in the background. Such shifts occur in novels, not in reality, however, the momentum of departure is too strong, and the message of the departure was accompanied by a feeling of relief throughout the whole world.

The evacuation itself is a success. The question remains though whose success it is. This question is not merely academic, because the question could provide the clue for demands for greater implementation of the objectives of the Peace for Galilee Operation. Paradoxically, the more stubborn we grow in attributing the evacuation of Beirut to the blows the IDF dealt to the PLO and the Syrians, the more we will be forced to concede that ultimately we will be required to embark on another war in order to liberate Lebanon from all alien military presence.

The war in Lebanon was either in fact or post factum conducted thanks to Israeli-U.S.-Lebanese cooperation: the IDF supplied the fire power, the United States provided the political backing and the Lebanese provided the local Arab influence. This cooperation was proved sufficiently strong to remove the PLO from Beirut and push Syria back from its hegemonic standing in all of Lebanon. If this is really the assessment, one could hope that the cooperation would emerge to be strong enough to lead Syria to the conclusion that its days in Lebanon have reached their end. This, provided that the tripartite partnership continues to apply its pressure toward the expulsion of the Syrian Army and the PLO personnel hiding behind it in the north and east of Lebanon.

But if it is maintained that it was only the IDF, with a little bit of marginal help by Mr Philip Habib and Messrs Shafiq al-Wazzan and Sa'id Salam, that effected the evacuation of Beirut, then the foregone conclusion is that the IDF will have to furnish the lion's share of the persuasive factor in the next stage too; and everyone understands that the IDF can only utilize military measures in a move called war. One could, on the other hand, also agree that these means have already been employed with the utmost success and that therefore there will not be need for another round. However, it appears that this argument is somewhat overoptimistic, and it is a fact that Syria has not
budded from its strongholds. This is proof enough. As far as Damascus is concerned, what is at stake is their overall investment in the course of the past 7 years. Their presence in Lebanon. Consequently this should not be given up unless under massive pressure and with no other alternative. If one minimizes the value of the diplomatic-political component provided by the United States and Lebanon to attain a decision in Beirut, then the IDF alone will once again be required to do what is necessary in order to persuade Damascus into giving up what it has so painstakingly achieved on Lebanese soil, at the cost of a lot of financial and political sacrifices.

Damascus will balance its considerations not only according to declarations coming from Israel, yet it would be safe to expect that the more the Israeli leaders highlight the IDF's role in effecting the Beirut evacuation, and the less the credit given to the two other partners, the more Syria will be inclined to challenge Israel by saying: If you so much want to expel us, come and get us out in your ways. The Israeli interest, on the other hand, is that they should be ousted, but with minimal Israeli input which is naturally military input. Such a Syrian calculation, if it actually exists, is not illogical, given what Damascus has learned about the moods even within the Likud and the cabinet.

The question we must consider after Beirut is whether the United States and Lebanon are sufficiently committed to pursuing the effort to remove the foreign forces from Lebanon. If this is so—and this can be clarified through accepted practices between countries—then positions and tactics, including the deployment of forces, should be coordinated with them and a political campaign should be launched for the removal of the Syrians simultaneously with the demonstration of an Israeli readiness to similarly withdraw. Moreover, incentives such as a proclamation that the primary security interests Syria has in Lebanon will be honored should be created. These two elements, the parallel withdrawal and a recognition of the Syrian interest in events in Lebanon, should contribute to the diplomatic effort to reinstate Lebanon's independence. The chief diplomatic effort had better be left for the United States and Lebanon.

But if it transpires that the U.S.-Lebanese commitment is not strong enough, or that conversely Syria is determined to hold on to its remaining assets inside Lebanon, even at the cost of renewed clashes with the IDF, we had better reconsider whether the goal is worth the price. According to what our leaders—Sharon included—have been saying, the IDF has been sent into Lebanon in order to push the PLO outside the range of the settlements in the Galilee—an objective that was remarkably achieved. The presence of the Syrians and the terrorists in the al-Biqa' Valley and in northern Lebanon is no casus belli, and the danger involved in having friction between the various forces can be neutralized with the help of a disengagement of forces without the IDF totally forfeiting the territorial assets (such as the artillery proximity to Damascus) it gained in the first weeks of the war.

Between the two possibilities—neither of which is desirable—of either having a second round of combat in Lebanon, this time against the Syrians, or preparing for a prolonged stay—either ourselves or by proxy—in southern Lebanon,
the second seems preferable. The better we convey this preference to the
United States and even more so to the Lebanese and the Arab countries in
general, the greater the chances for the removal of the Syrians by nonmili-
tary measures and at the minimal price in life and property. True, treading
this course demands patience and steadfastness, neither characteristic
especially typical of Israel, but it is nonetheless the right path and it
harmonizes with the definition of war as being the kings' last word. The
truth behind this definition has double significance and validity in the
age of democracy and television, as we have personally experienced in the
last 2 months.

CSO: 4400/451
'JERUSALEM POST' ON FUTURE OF WEST BANK

TA230853 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 23 Aug 82 p 8

[Editorial: "Elastic But Breakable"]

[Text] There is, as Secretary of State Shultz said at a press conference in Washington on Friday, "a lot of room within the Camp David language" for "different interpretations." These interpretations are certain to come out, and noisily clash, if the U.S. does what President Reagan pledged it would do now that the Lebanese war appears to be drawing to an end—which is to move "quickly in the context of Camp David to resolve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, as well as the other unresolved issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict."

The question is whether some interpretations may not stretch the admittedly very elastic text of Camp David to the point where it snaps, and becomes useless.

Israel's own understanding of Camp David is summarized in the Likud government's policy guidelines, issued just over a year ago.

"The autonomy agreed upon at Camp David spells neither sovereignty nor self-determination." This is unexceptionable. The final status of the territories is indeed to be settled under Camp David before the expiration of the five-year transition period jointly by Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the "elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza." This means that each one of the participants is to have the right of veto over decisions.

Thus it is wholly unwarranted to claim, as Egypt does, that the Arab residents of the territories should, under Camp David, enjoy the right of self-determination, which may override the wishes of the other parties.

This does not, however, rule out the possibility of the eventual emergence of a Palestinian state in the territories. Nothing, in fact, is ruled out in advance. Under Camp David, all options are supposed to remain open pending the final settlement. It is, therefore, puzzling for Israel's government to state categorically that "the autonomy arrangements set down in Camp David are guarantees that under no conditions will a Palestinian state emerge in the territory of western Eretz Yisra'el."
The only sense in which this is true is that a Palestinian state will not emerge before the end of the autonomy period. But the Palestinian state may well be placed, along with Israeli sovereignty and a territorial arrangement with Jordan, on the agenda of the talks on final status that are to start not later than the third year of the autonomy. The government, however, is evidently not planning to enter into such talks at the prescribed time.

"At the end of the transition period...Israel," the guidelines state, "will raise its claim and act to realize its right of sovereignty over Judaea, Samaria and Gaza."

How Israel will "act to realize" its claim of sovereignty, except by raising it, is not specified, but the plain suggestion is that Israel will have the right, under Camp David, to force its own favoured solution, based on the proposition that, as the guidelines put it, "the right of the Jewish people to Eretz Yisra'el is an eternal right that cannot be called into question, and which is intertwined with the right to security and peace."

In fact, Israel, as the government sees it, does not have to wait so long to start realizing this claim. The instrument for its realization is, obviously, settlement. "Settlement in Eretz Yisra'el is a right and an integral part of the nation's security. The government will act to strengthen, expand and develop settlement." Thus, even if Israel's partners ultimately refuse to sanction its sovereignty claim, the process of the incorporation of the territories into Israel will have become practically irreversible.

Some of Premier Begin's confidence in the acceptability of this recipe for Palestinian autonomy; at least to the U.S. must have come from Mr Reagan's remark, during the presidential election campaign two years ago, that Israeli settlements in the territories are not illegal. From which Mr Begin deduced that, to President Reagan's mind, they are entirely legal, and quite proper.

Mr Reagan has now sought to correct that impression. In Mr Reagan's view, Mr Shultz recounted on Friday, the question is not whether the settlements are legal or illegal but whether they are "constructive in the effort to arrange a situation that may, in the end, be a peaceful one and be one in which the people of the region can live in a manner that they prefer." His answer to that is no. "Expansion of those settlements is not a constructive move."

Mr Reagan's view, needless to say, is not binding on Mr Begin. But it should perhaps be given some weight if the intention is not to keep Camp David as a mere incantatory formula but to make it into a workable means of reaching an agreement on the autonomy and to forestall the search for an alternative solution.

CSO: 4400/451
MK RUBINSTEIN SAYS GOVERNMENT'S CREDIBILITY GONE

TA191200 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Aug 82 p 9

[Commentary by MK Amnon Rubinstein: "These Also Went Up in the Fire in Beirut"]

[Text] The imminent departure of the terrorists from Beirut constitutes a beneficial development and an accomplishment for Israel. The PLO had taken over parts of Lebanon and had foiled all chances of a revival and restoration of its independence and sovereignty. The terrorists' departure from the Lebanese capital can and must turn a new page in the unfortunate history of our northern neighbor. Nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore the heavy price Israel has paid and will pay for what has been happening in the Lebanese war in the last few weeks.

Houses went up in flames; hospitals collapsed on patients; the elderly, the women and the children were killed and burned alive in the Israeli bombings of the Lebanese capital. The prime minister himself defined the extent of the bombings when he compared them to the vast bombings of World War II and when he drew an analogy between Beirut, on the one hand, and Dresden and Hiroshima, on the other. The prime minister holds 7,000 PLO terrorists in the same category as the satanic Nazi empire. Hence, everything is permissible just as in the life or death war the world waged against the cruel reich.

Such a conception does not leave room for any limitations on the use of force: Beirut may be bombed; its houses may be sprayed with a hundred tons of sophisticated bombs supplied by the United States to Israel for its self-defense; Beirut may be mercilessly shelled from the sea and from the ground; its streets may be crushed—and there is no need to pity its inhabitants. Everything is permissible. There are no longer any inhibitions. The pointed question of Avraham Burg—what would have happened had there been a Jewish community in Beirut—has gone unanswered because there is no answer to it.

The descriptions of the destruction and death, of whole families who were buried alive in their homes, the pictures of bombed pediatric wards in hospitals, the smell of putrified bodies—these cannot be explained. The astonishing numbers—169 civilian casualties in last Thursday's bombings alone; Sharon's "private bombing" about which even the Cabinet had reservations—have become routine. One watches television, listens to the radio, reads the press, sighs and goes on with his daily business.
However, it is not only Lebanese citizens that went up in flames in the Beirut bombings (the official name is "Peace for Galilee"); several other things collapsed under the downpour of the shells and bombs:

--The credibility of the official announcements by the Cabinet and the army went up in flames. Never before had such a thing happened in Israel: the only credible announcements the Israeli public received were from Radio Monte Carlo and the Lebanese radio stations. The blackout imposed by high echelons on the Israeli announcements does not serve any security purpose. After all, why is it necessary to maintain a blackout when in question are a lengthy siege and air raids on a city lacking in antiaircraft defense? The blackout was aimed at confusing and diverting the attention of the Israeli public from what is being perpetrated in its behalf. The official announcements were either half-truths or sheer lies, and the serious damage they will inflict in the future has already been analyzed in YEDI'OT AHARONOT by Yesha'yahu Ben-Porat. It is easy to destroy a credibility that was built up for many years in the pre-Sharon era, but it will be extremely difficult to restore it.

--The Cabinet's authority as the supreme commander of the IDF has collapsed. MK Ge'ula Kohen was right when she told the defense minister that he would have done as he pleased anyway—and what he does pleases her. Such phenomena had never before happened in Israel: the defense minister suggests to the Cabinet that an all-out war in Lebanon—"the big thing"—be undertaken, but the Cabinet rejects his proposal and opts for a limited operation. The limited operation comes to an end and the Cabinet announces that the IDF has completed all its missions and sends its condolences to the bereaved families, which only numbered 30 at the time. Shortly afterwards, without the previous approval of the prime minister and without notifying the Knesset, the war wished for the defense minister—and rejected by the Cabinet—develops, as if by itself. This war, whose substance and nature totally differ from the limited operation, evolves into one of the most difficult and cruel wars ever experienced by Israel. The number of Israeli casualties grows tenfold—yes, by 10 times and even more!—and the international complications send Israel to an unprecedented political low. How did this happen? In his speech to the Knesset last week, the prime minister only furnished one explanation: We were responding to the cease-fire violations by the terrorists. And the defense minister added that the response to the violations takes place not in the same place where the violation occurs. A Syrian soldier fires one shot near Al-Qir'awn Lake, so we raid Beirut. This is the explanation we must swallow and digest.

The national consensus over wars went up in flames; this traditional consensus, however, could still have been saved at the beginning of Operation Peace for Galilee. The majority of the Knesset members voted against the no-confidence motion; the Labor Party supported the war and its members volunteered or were drafted in to the fighting units. But as the war turned into this "big thing" rejected by the Cabinet, as the siege of Beirut became more and more horrid, as the killing of the Lebanese population grew, so did the national consensus erode and disappear. For the first time in Israeli history the affair of Lt Col Eli Geva' happened, a man who was characterized by the communications
minister as a "brilliant commander" of Operation Peace for Galilee; for the first time demonstrations and hunger strikes against the war took place during the war, not by fringe groups but by soldiers who were led to these struggles by what they saw.

--The tradition of solidarity in mourning and bereavement was undermined. I remember those not very distant days when a gloomy atmosphere would descend on the Israeli street when we lost soldiers in retaliatory operations or in the war of attrition. In the war in Lebanon we lost more than 300 of our best boys and men; we sustained more than 2,000 wounded, among them many disabled for the rest of their lives. This loss has left no sign in the Israeli street and in the current political arena. No one offered to give even some official expression to the mourning of the families. An atmosphere of a festival--and not only the official one--has descended on our streets; and the sound of this festival silences not only the sound of the bombings in Beirut but also the crying of those who lost their loved ones in the war.

--The Israeli information system was totally destroyed. There is nothing more to explain. The sights of Beirut speak for themselves and their voices will not be easily forgotten.

But, another thing went up in flames in Beirut. I know I am speaking for a minority. I know the great majority is "satisfied" with the war, that there are many who do not care at all about the killing in Lebanon, and others who would like to have more and more. For Na'omi Shemer [Israeli poet who supports the Greater Israel concept], for instance, there are no Arabs at all, and if there are no Arabs, then there are no dead Arabs. They simply do not exist in the consciousness and minds of people like her. But there is a minority that cannot forget what was done in its name. This minority does not have any electoral weight and it does not threaten the Likud's rule. But the stomachs of this minority turn when they see the destruction, and something very basic, deep and essential inside them goes up in flames when they see Beirut going up in flames.

CSO: 4400/451
BURG ON NEW JORDAN CROSSING

TA270634 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Aug 82 p 3

[Report by Judy Siegel]

[Text] Interior Minister Yosef Burg said yesterday that he hopes a new border crossing to Jordan, near Elat and al-'Aqabah, will be opened to facilitate moslem pilgrimage to Mecca. The traditional Hajj to the holy site in Saudi Arabia this year will take place at the end of September. Burg made the announcement during a visit to the interior ministry's population registry office in East Jerusalem.

The minister said he hoped the opening of the border post would lead to the establishment of a permanent border crossing "that would be a help to the tourism of both countries." At present, access to Jordan is by way of the bridges over the Jordan River.

Israel's policy, he added, is to allow people of all religions to visit their holy places in Israel, even if they are citizens of countries with which Israel has no diplomatic relations. "All visitors will be received warmly," he added.

Asked why Burg said only that he "hoped" for a new border crossing a ministry source said that the decision is also dependent on Jordan.

In the past two months, according to the ministry spokesman, 4,000 residents of the Gaza district have applied for permits for the Hajj. An additional 2,700 from East Jerusalem and elsewhere inside Israel and 2,500 from Judaea and Samaria have also requested permission.

The spokesman had no comment about reports that most of the Israeli Moslems who planned to make the pilgrimage to Mecca cancelled their plans earlier this month because of restrictions imposed by the Jordanian and Saudi authorities. The two countries had announced that the number of Israeli Moslem pilgrims would be limited to 3,000, and that all pilgrims must fly from Amman rather than travel by bus. They claimed that they were unable to mobilize enough buses to carry all the pilgrims.

"We are doing all we can to help the pilgrims," said the ministry spokesman. "I don't know about restrictions by Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
POLL SHOWS ON WAR'S POLITICAL BENEFITS

TA270620 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Aug 82 p 2

[Report on Poll by Political Correspondent Mark Segal]

[Text] Tel Aviv--An overwhelming majority of the population back the war irrespective of the cost and some 90 percent of the public insist that political benefits be extracted from the military victory.

This emerged from the August JERUSALEM POST poll conducted by the Modi'in Ezrahi Research Institute. The survey was held between 10-19 August among a sample of 1,937 adults, with Institute Director Dr Sara Shemer noting the under-representation of the call-up age group of male adults.

Q. "If you had known before 6 June all that you know now, would you have supported the government's decision to launch the operation?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Respondents</th>
<th>Pro-Likud</th>
<th>Pro-Labour</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
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<td>Yes, but only to 40 kilometres beyond the border</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
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<td>Yes, but not into Beirut</td>
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<td>Yes, including Beirut</td>
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Shemer pointed out that over 80 percent backed going to war even if they had known the outcome and the cost. Pro-war sentiment is especially strong among Likud supporters (over 90 percent), with 73 percent of Labour supporters sharing this view.
She also pointed out that 64 percent of all respondents would have supported the campaign beyond the 40-kilometre limit.

The hawkish mood of the public was indicated by the support given to entering Beirut by 46 percent of all respondents, with Likud and Labour voters divided on this issue.

Q. "In your opinion when should we pull out of Lebanon?"

Now, unconditionally -- 3.9 percent.

Only after PLO leaves Beirut -- 32.3 percent.

Only after PLO leaves Beirut and international forces arrives -- 31.3 percent.

Only after stable government established in Lebanon -- 15.7 percent.

Only after a peace treaty with an independent Lebanese Government -- 11.9 percent.

Never leave Lebanon -- 2.9 percent.

Undecided -- 2 percent.

Shemer noted that 90 percent were for extracting political benefits from the military victory. One-third would suffice with the PLO exit, another third links the IDF withdrawal to the arrival of the international force, and just over a quarter insists on tougher terms -- either a stable government in Lebanon or a peace treaty.

The pollster noted a correlation between those for the limited war aim of 40 kilometres and those not placing too many conditions on the army's pull-out, and those who favoured maximalist war aims and tough terms for Israel's withdrawal.

CSO: 4400/452
POLL SHOWS LIKUD POPULARITY HAS SOARED

TA270607 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Aug 82 p 1

[Report on Poll by Political Correspondent Mark Segal]

[Text] Tel Aviv--In the wake of the war the Likud has soared to its highest peak ever in popularity, and if elections were held today it would be returned in a landslide victory. This emerged from the August poll conducted for THE JERUSALEM POST by the Modi'in Ezrahi Research Institute. The survey was held between 10-19 August among a sample of 1,937 adults. However, as Institute Director Sara Shemer pointed out, the call-up group of male adults was of necessity under-represented in the sample.

Shemer noted a floating bloc accounting for 29.8 percent of the electorate (20 percent undecided, 2.8 percent won't vote and seven percent won't say). Some 39 percent of the floating bloc are new voters, she said, while 15 percent chose Labour last time and 11 percent were disenchanted Likud supporters.

She pointed out that voters are favouring the two big parties, which together amount for 84 percent of the poll. The smaller parties are seen to be withering away. Telem and the CRM have disappeared from the electoral map. Tami and Tehiya have both lost ground since the 1981 Knesset elections, and only Shinuy has held its ground.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
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<th>June '81 Elections</th>
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<td>Rakah and others</td>
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SIGN S INDICATE MORE OIL IN NEGEV

TA270814 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Aug 82 pp 1, 2

[Report by Charles Hoffman]

[Excerpts] Government experts concluded yesterday that the Zuk Tamrur I Oil Well is the country's first major oil discovery since the Heletz Field was opened in 1955, according to the energy ministry.

The significance of the well, according to the energy ministry spokesman, lies not in the relatively small output expected from it, but from its indications of a larger reservoir of oil in the eastern Negev-Dead Sea area.

In about two weeks the well is expected to start producing from 50 to 100 barrels a day for close to five years. The total output during this time is estimated to be from 90,000 to 180,000 barrels, making the well commercially viable.

Yet the maximum anticipated output only equals what the entire country consumes in one day.

Dr El'azar Baraq, director of the Israel National Oil Company (HANAL) said, however, that new tests would have to be made in the coming weeks before a firm assessment of the well's commercial and geological significance can be made.

Investors in the Zuk Tamrur I well include HANAH and its parent company, the Israel National Oil Company (HANAL), together holding a 26 percent share; Nafta and Lapidot, the government drilling subcontractors with 40 percent; Paz Oil Exploration, 25 percent; Paz Consortium, 5 percent; and private Israeli investors, 4 percent.

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COMMENTATOR ON SHARON'S INTENTIONS, LEBANON

TA271140 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 27 Aug 82 p 4

[Commentary by Dalya Shehori: "The Next Stage"]

[Text] One day before Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon left for the United States it was revealed that while visiting there he will meet Secretary of State George Shultz. There was also a possibility that Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger might agree to see him. Sharon, who always prepares his homework carefully, although he does not always reveal it to someone, did three things before leaving the country: He met with representatives of the village leagues in the territories, toured the settlements and landed for a surprise visit in Elon More ("Continue the development" he told them), and concluded the continuation of the evacuation ("expulsion" to him) of the PLO and Syrians from Beirut with U.S. Special Envoy Philip Habib. On this occasion he also passed on, for the fourth time at least, a strict warning to the United States about the cease-fire violations by the terrorists acting under the Syrian directives or aegis. Therefore, Sharon took care to come to the meeting with the heads of the U.S. administration supposedly updated on subjects that, even without checking them out, he has firm stands about:

--He is convinced that following the "terrorists expulsion" from Beirut new possibilities for talking with the West Bank Arabs have emerged.

--He likes waving the Israeli option of annexing the West Bank, and his visit to Elon More is a reminder of that.

--The cease-fire violations by the Syrians, or with their consent, were something that Sharon ordered not to react to, but in the future, at a time chosen by him, they will be used as a lever for his intentions, and the Americans will not be able to say they were not forwarned.

What we do not know, and which is a good reason for questioning the ways of the Israeli Government, is Sharon's intentions for the next stage in Lebanon. The defense minister, who went to war when he was also an acting foreign minister, runs Israel's policies, meets with heads of the U.S. administration, but no one here knows his intentions. And all this while Sharon is known to us more as a policymaker and less as a passive listener to other people's ideas, Weinberger and Shultz in this case.
Did he open his heart to the prime minister? This is a question that only Menahem Begin can answer, and Begin, until today, did not even reveal if he knew in advance about Sharon's intention to get to Beirut.

From Begin's overt expressions until now it can be deduced that he is in no hurry about the evacuation of all the "foreign forces" (the Syrian Army and the PLO at the same time with the IDF) from Lebanon. In the last session of the cabinet, on Sunday, he promised, on his own initiative, that after the end of the evacuation of Beirut the cabinet will hold a summing up discussion on the Peace for Galilee Operation, the reasons for it, its development and its military and political consequences. It might be that in that framework, the "military and political consequences," Begin meant a discussion of the next stage of evacuating all the foreign forces from Lebanon. Anyhow, he did not say that. And all of a sudden, toward the end of the week, when he met with a delegation of congressmen, Begin told them that the first thing he intends to do after the end of the evacuation from Beirut is to go to the Egyptians with a proposal to renew the autonomy talks right away, meaning, the autonomy talks are the next aim in his eyes, and not the withdrawal of the foreign forces from Lebanon.

Begin did not explain his intentions and all we can do is try and ask: Did Mr Begin say he will address the Egyptians. Because he believes it will be easier to renew the autonomy talks than to bring about the withdrawal of all the foreign forces from Lebanon? If this is so then the IDF and Israel can expect a long stay in Lebanon that might, besides the burden of it and its other unwanted national implications, end with a war against Syria. Or maybe Begin only meant to provoke Mubarak? As might be remembered, Mubarak said that Egypt will not renew the autonomy talks before the last Israeli soldier leaves Lebanon. He can expect a long period of not renewing the talks and he better consider it.

Either way, it is still unknown whether Begin and Sharon are coordinating when the one talks to a U.S. congressional delegation about addressing the Egyptians about the renewal of the autonomy talks and the other goes to Washington for talks with the heads of the U.S. administration. But even if we presume, in order to feel better, that Sharon did coordinate his positions with Begin prior to going to Washington, we still cannot be totally calm because we know beyond any doubt, that there was no discussion of these matters in the cabinet. In other words, the defense minister went to Washington for policy talks while no one in the Israeli cabinet knows what he intends to say—or even suggest—about subjects that will be on the country's political and military agenda in the next few months. And this is happening needless to say, at a time when the cabinet is far from being a rubber stamp for Sharon's demands. The fact that the IDF did not enter West Beirut and the ending of the massive bombing there will testify to this fact.

We do not know then what the defense minister is brewing in regard to ousting the Syrian Army from Lebanon. What can be discussed with ever increasing clarity is the crystallizing of the will of some cabinet members, maybe even among the majority of them, not to get involved in a war with Syria. They are talking about a possibility, maybe even of an initiative, through U.S. mediation, of a disengagement of forces between the IDF and the Syrian Army in the
first stage, in order to minimize the chance of a military clash and in order to prepare the ground for negotiations about a mutual withdrawal from Lebanon. When they recommend a withdrawal from Lebanon that will be as quick as possible, they also meant that the winter will be here soon and if Israel does not take itself out of Lebanon until then the world will associate it with the blame for the sad and heart-rending situation of the homeless Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

People with a wider perspective have been warning that the longer Israel remains in Lebanon the stronger the inclination will be to dump the responsibility for solving the Palestinian problem on it, and in the widest possible interpretation of the term. On the other hand, the sooner Israel leaves Lebanon, they argue, the firmer the impression in the world will be that it should only be responsible for solving the West Bank Palestinian problem. Clearly to continue their logic, Israel should know what it is interested in. It should wish to reduce the Palestinian problem to the dimensions it occupied prior to the Lebanese War. In particular this is so since world attention has been alerted most acutely to this problem due to the film clips on the suffering of the civilian population and the Palestinian refugees hit by the IDF bombings during the war.

A cabinet minister told me last week that the most important thing at this juncture is to alert the Israeli public opinion to demand a withdrawal from Lebanon as soon as possible. Political observers believe that the United States too is interested in having the IDF return from Lebanon. In their opinion the United States will very soon give thought to the proper cure that would lead to the withdrawal of the "foreign forces" from Lebanon, or at least to neutralizing the possibility of a military clash between the IDF and the Syrian forces.

The fact of the matter is that no member of the political community in Jerusalem knows today what the U.S. administration has in mind for the next steps of what is called "The Middle East Peace Process." Here and there reports have filtered in on "Camp David II", pronouncements are made on objection to any more settlements in the West Bank and hints have been made that UN Security Council Resolution 242 also includes the possibility of a territorial compromise. These hesitant signals emanating from Washington are not viewed favorably in the cabinet. Again, no one knows for sure what the administration plans to do, and it is even very likely that the administration itself has not yet fully worked out its own positions. However, to be on the safe side and in order to prevent any far-fetched ideas from taking shape in the administration leaders' heads, Begin announced at the cabinet session right after his announcement that a debate will be held on the war in Lebanon, that "the cabinet will initiate action toward implementing a comprehensive peace in the Middle East on the basis of the Camp David accords," and that "there will not be any negotiations on any proposal that departs from the framework of peace as established as Camp David."

As we have learned so far, Begin's pronouncements should not be underestimated—beginning with "there will be many Elon More's" through the warnings that "Jewish blood will not be spilled in vain" either in Israel or abroad. When Mr Begin informs the United States that the only solution that would be
considered is one founded only on the Camp David accords, he is issuing a
warning that if there is any deviation from them, he would have the option
of annexing the West Bank to Israel. Let it be known that this would not
even require legislation. The government has the authority to apply Israeli
law and jurisdiction on Judaea and Samaria in a resolution, and is not in
need of Knesset approval of that. Thus Mr Begin has a bargaining chip which
the United States should realize he would not hesitate to use.

Therefore, when we say that the U.S. administration is currently in the phase
of working out and consolidating positions, we can similarly assume that what
we have here does not regard the maneuvering space that involves a substan-
tial change of policy, but only in fact the crystallization of facts; how to
bring about the resumption of the autonomy talks in their old form—with the
question being whether to take simultaneous action to achieve peace in Lebanon
and at the same time resume the autonomy talks; or perhaps to set an order of
priorities where Lebanon takes first place, followed by the autonomy; or vice
versa. Yitzhaq Rabin, for one, has suggested that the cabinet get down to
the autonomy talks at the latest possible time so that the bitter residue
created in U.S. and world public opinion following the Israeli bombings of
Lebanon dissipates. Begin, on the other hand, supports an immediate resump-
tion of the autonomy talks—or is he merely suggesting this as a gimmick,
knowing that in any case this is unrealistic?

In terms of the substantive order of things it looks as though first of all
it is necessary to end the IDF intervention in Lebanon, and only then, with a
clear head, to once again sit at the autonomy talks negotiating table. Then
there will be room to examine whether the war in Lebanon has really brought
Israel some gain—such as the Palestinians' readiness to join the negotia-
tions—as Sharon maintains.

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ARABS' REQUEST TO VISIT LEBANESE RELATIVES REJECTED

TA181621 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1610 GMT 18 Aug 82

[Text] Rosh Haniqra, 18 Aug (ITIM)--The authorities have recently turned down the requests of hundreds of Israeli Arabs to visit their relatives in Lebanon. The ITIM correspondent reports that the appeals are usually rejected on a security basis. On the other hand, Lebanese inhabitants who have family in Israel are allowed to visit here. Even though the number of visitors is not large, it is still far higher than that of Israeli Arabs visiting Lebanon.

The permit to visit Israel is issued by the interior ministry following receipt of approval from the IDF. They are usually given for a period of 48 hours, but immediately upon their arrival in Israel the visitors begin applying pressure on the government ministries to extend the visit, arguing that after a period of 34 years with no contact at all 48 hours do not seem to be enough, especially when their relatives are usually spread all over the country.

Meanwhile there has been mounting pressure by the Israeli Arabs to obtain licenses for visits to Lebanon, since many of them fear for the well-being of their relatives who left Israel after the war of independence. Now, as a result of the fighting, all contact with them has been severed and they do not know what has happened to their relatives.

CSO: 4400/451
POLISH YOUTH DELEGATION VISIT CANCELLED

TEL AVIV ITIM in Hebrew 1330 GMT 19 Aug 82

[Excerpt] Lohame Hageta'ot, 19 Aug (ITIM)—A Polish youth delegation that was scheduled to arrive here on a visit in the next few days will not arrive. The cancellation of the visit was attributed to the "dire economic straits in which Poland is currently embroiled."

Polish Minister [as received] Jerzy Kuberski, who heads the International Korczak Council, recently sent a letter to Mr (Binyamin Anevky) at Kibbutz Lohame Hageta'ot. The letter is to the secretary general of the Israeli branch of the council.

In his letter Kuberski wrote: It is my honor to inform you that our pledged commitments regarding cooperation between those who honor the doctrines of Korczak in Poland and in Israel still remain, but that the serious situation in Poland might render necessary the postponement of their implementation. Due to economic difficulties, we will be unable to send a group of our youth to Israel this year. At the same time, we would be willing to host an Israeli group in Poland next year, or even this year. We are ready to maintain cooperation among writers committed to the theories of Korczak and with the publication of Israeli writings."

CSO: 4400/451
LIKUD TO PUBLISH NEW MORNING DAILY

TA81106 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 18 Aug 82 p 7

[Text] Central Likud functionaries are currently trying to establish a new morning daily that will reflect the Likud's views. They want to begin publishing the paper at the beginning of next year.

The entrepreneurs include well-known Likud businessmen such as Yisra'el Saharov, Yitzhaq Mitelman, Ibi Ne'em an and others. The group is led by public relations expert and businessman David Agmon, who was the Likud's spokesman in the last elections. It has been learned that the entrepreneurs have already begun accelerated negotiations over the paper's publication. Contacts with the entrepreneurs are being conducted by Minister Ya'qov Meridor on behalf of the Likud.

As recalled, during his last trip to the United States Prime Minister Menahem Begin raised over $0.5 million to finance the publication of the paper, the name of which has not yet been chosen, but the choice apparently is between either HALIKUD [THE LIKUD] and BOQER TOV [GOOD MORNING].

CSO: 4400/451
'MA'ARIV' ON AL-JUMAYYIL MEETINGS WITH ISRAELIS

TA271350 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 27 Aug 82 p 18

[Article by Shmu'el Segev: "Bashir al-Jumayyil's Secret Meetings With Israel's Ministers"]

[Text] The European diplomat turned over and over the cable of congratulations sent this week by Prime Minister Menahem Begin to Lebanon's elected President, Bashir al-Jumayyil. He spent a particularly long time over the title of the addressee—"My Friend"—and the signature of the sender: "Your Friend." This intimate attitude toward the Seventh President of Lebanon left no doubt in the European diplomat's mind: Begin knows Bashir al-Jumayyil personally and he certainly met with him on one of the many visits the commander of the Christian Phalange made to Israel over the last 6 years.

And, it is true, with the Phalange commander's election to the highest operational post in Beirut, we can now reveal a little of the continuous contacts that al-Jumayyil has maintained with the elite of Israel's political and military echelons on the eve of and at the peak of the Lebanon War.

The practical preparations for the Peace for Galilee campaign began last spring when, even before the snows had melted, the Christian forces took control of Mt Sannin, which controls the al-Biq'a' region of Lebanon. The observation post on Sannin permitted a constant surveillance of traffic along the Damascus-Beirut artery, and in good visibility conditions it was possible to see from it beyond the Israeli border, into the Galilee panhandle, too. The Syrians then tried to bring their commando corps closer, and with the aid of Gazelle assault helicopters they captured the observation post and the mountain top from al-Jumayyil's soldiers. In accordance with a previous promise that had been given to al-Jumayyil, the Israeli Air Force tried to intervene for the Christian militia, and it even downed two Syrian helicopters returning from missions in the Shatifrah region. As a reaction to this, the Syrians introduced into the al-Biq'a' several surface-to-air missile batteries. The failure of the U.S. political effort to remove the batteries was the beginning of the "countdown" for the Peace for Galilee campaign.

The Israeli promise to come to the aid of Bashir al-Jumayyil's forces was given by the highest Israeli military authority. Foreign elements then were able to tell that the chief of staff, Lt Gen Refa'el Eytan, made a secret visit to Juniyah and was received there with full military honors. An Israeli
flag was then flown from al-Jumayyil's headquarters beside the Lebanese flag, and an honor guard of Pahlangist soldiers presented arms in honor of the chief of staff. According to the same foreign sources, "Raful" had made three secret visits to Juniyah by then and, in his talks with al-Jumayyil, he discusses cooperation between the two sides, procurement plans by the Christian forces and the IDF presence to help the Phalangist soldiers. Later on, the Israeli commitment to al-Jumayyil was to serve as a topic of internal argument in Israel—whether this commitment was given verbally or was written. The end of the argument was that all thoughts about an Israeli military initiative against Syria, in connection with the stationing of the missiles in the Lebanese al-Biq'a were in the meantime put aside.

In an interview on Moqed last week Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon disclosed that he had made a secret visit to Beirut in January 1982 and met there with various Christian leaders. Sharon did not disclose the names of the leaders with whom he met, but it is known that Bashir al-Jumayyil was among them.

The contacts with al-Jumayyil in connection with the Peace for Galilee campaign were very frequent.

When the IDF completed the destruction of the terrorists' infrastructure in southern Lebanon, and broke through to the coastal plain as far as ad-Damur, al-Jumayyil expressed dissatisfaction over the Israeli decision to hold back the fire. He claimed that if the IDF did not finish the job and destroy the terrorist headquarters, the achievements of the first week's fighting would be as though they did not exist.

And, it is true, the fighting was resumed, and the connection between the IDF and the Phalangist soldiers was created on both sides of the Beirut-Damascus Highway, northeast of the Lebanese capital. But al-Jumayyil refrained from sending his troops into battle and the encirclement of Beirut was entirely done by IDF soldiers. Al-Jumayyil's going back on his promises aroused great dissatisfaction with him in Israel, and there were those who cast doubt on his reliability. The main doubt was aroused about his willingness to sign a peace pact with Israel if and when he was elected president of the country.

At any rate, until the agreement for the terrorists' evacuation from Beirut was achieved, the Phalange did not intervene in the fighting and the IDF soldiers alone bore the brunt of the fighting in the Beirut suburbs.

It is a duty to point out that al-Jumayyil's contacts were not restricted only to operative matters, but also touched on the Phalange's behavior toward the other sects in Lebanon. Thus, for example, when the tension between the Christian-Maronites and the Druze increased, an Israeli personality met with Bashir al-Jumayyil and advised him to moderate his soldiers' behavior toward the Druze. The Israeli explained to al-Jumayyil that if he really wanted to be elected president, he must have an interest in obtaining the support of the Druze, and so he must appease the leaders of that sect and prevent bloody clashes between his soldiers and the Druze.

The first contacts between Bashir al-Jumayyil and Israeli leaders were already created in 1976, when Yitzhaq Rabin was prime minister. The defense minister
at the time, Shim'on Peres, admitted this week that he has known Bashir al-Jumayyil since that time. It is reasonable to assume that on his visits to Israel at that time al-Jumayyil also met with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the late Foreign Minister, Yig'el Allon.

But from the beginning of the contacts with al-Jumayyil, there has been a noticeable difference between the Israeli attitude toward him and toward Maj Sa'd Haddad. In contrast to al-Jumayyil, Haddad worked in the security belt next to the Israeli border, and so Israel had a supreme interest in guarding the continuity of the three Christian enclaves in southern Lebanon. Because of the Israeli security interest, Israel did not stop at training Haddad's soldiers—as foreign sources claim—but also paid their salaries and supplied them with the weapons and temporary equipment they needed. In contrast to this, Israel sold al-Jumayyil the weapons for full cash and the aid then given to his forces was restricted to the fields of training and planning. The contacts with Christians in Beirut and Juniyah were not limited to Bashir al-Jumayyil, but also covered the members of Camille Sham'un's family. Foreign sources at one time published that Peres had met with Dani Sham'un, who was the commander of his family's militia, and on other occasions the former defense minister met with al-Jumayyil on the deck of an Israeli naval vessel off the coast of Beirut.

However, already at that time the contrast in the attitude to al-Jumayyil between the Rabin and Begin governments was outstanding. The commander of the Phalange always claimed that the Palestinian and Syrian presence in Lebanon should not be destroyed other than through a direct Israeli military action. Bashir al-Jumayyil then urged Rabin and Shim'on Peres to enter into a war in Lebanon. But, as Peres admitted this week, it was explained to al-Jumayyil that Israel was prepared to help the Christians help themselves, and it was prepared to supply them with weapons and instruction, but Israel was not prepared to fight for them.

The change of regime in Israel in May 1977 led to an increase in the direct Israeli aid to the Christian forces. At a certain stage attempts were also made to increase coordination between Major Haddad and al-Jumayyil's soldiers. But since the Litani Campaign in March 1978, and especially since Unifil soldiers were stationed in southern Lebanon, a severance took place between Haddad and al-Jumayyil.

About a year ago, it seemed that there was going to be a rift between al-Jumayyil and Israel. This was after the incident in the Mt Sannin area, when al-Jumayyil claimed that Israel had not kept its commitment and had not entered a war against the Syrians. The commander of the Phalange even declared in public that he was severing his ties with Israel. The prime minister treated this announcement with indifference and be believed that in any event the Christians would need Israel's aid, and so al-Jumayyil's announcement should not be taken seriously. It was known that al-Jumayyil was under appreciable Syrian-Saudi Arabian pressure, and the explanation was put forward that his public announcement was made under pressure. And, indeed, not many days had passed before the Syrian-Palestinian pressure increased on the Christians and al-Jumayyil returned to correct relations with Israel and the Israeli leadership, right up to the last few days.
SCHIFF ON MISTAKEN MILITARY CONCLUSIONS

TA271130 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 27 Aug 82 pp 13, 20

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "The Danger of Mistaken Conclusions"]

[Text] It is no coincidence that despite the air force's impressive success in the war, the force's commander, Maj Gen David 'Ivri, has refrained from appearing in interviews and in the media, apart from his appearance on Air Force Day. Major General 'Ivri has turned down all the proposals, in Israel and abroad, to be interviewed or to speak at briefings about the air force successes. David 'Ivri is modest by nature, but it has emerged that he behaved in this way mainly because of the possibility that, while dealing with successes, it will not be possible to avoid self-aggrandizement and spilling over into euphoria; something similar to what happened after the 6 Day War. By his restrained behavior, not only has he hinted to his personnel what they should be cautious about, he has also set an example of both good behavior and learning the morals of the war. It is good that such a man as David 'Ivri is today at the head of this important corps, and this is also true because genuinely learning the morals of the military campaign depends a great deal on the air force.

It is not at all easy to stand up against the public and political pressure to satisfy the desire of many who want it to be said again and again how great and successful we are militarily. Because of the public argument over the aims of the war and the question of whether it was justified to expand it beyond the defensive objectives, the political echelons are bubbling over into far-reaching descriptions of the "most brilliant victory in the history of Israel." It has been said that we succeeded in trampling on the Soviet Union's prestige in this war and strengthening the security of the entire West. It is being said about the Arabs that no Arab country will be able any more to take the risk of war. It seems that the leaders' memories are most short and people here are again speaking in the old style, as in 1973 when they promised the nation 10 years without a war and declared that our situation was never better and that the Egyptians would never succeed in crossing the Suez Canal (and those who then said such things were not only Alignment members).

There are some of the leaders who for a few moments, sense the risks in this style, and this is also true when certain elements claim that Israel is today the fourth greatest power in the world from the military viewpoint. These
claims generally come from hostile elements and what emerges from them is that Israel no longer needs military aid against the Arabs. When these things are said outside Israel, people here make formal denials and at once bubble over again into self-aggrandizement, for domestic purposes, of course.

It may be assumed that this is how every regime generally behaves and even Ben-Gurion did not refrain from boasting after the Sinai Campaign in 1956. However, it seems that this time matters are different. The nation is being told that the Peace for Galilee War not only gave security to the northern settlements, it succeeded in liberating us from the trauma of the Yom Kippur War. People are trying to say that the campaign has proved that the genuine and authentic model is the 6-Day War and the Yom Kippur War was an accident.

The danger involved in this approach is that the work of learning lessons will also be indirectly affected by it. After personally experiencing both the 6-Day War and its results and the Yom Kippur War and what preceded it, we are aware of the fact that public opinion also has an effect on the war lessons of the war are learned. Many army and intelligence personnel agree that there is a close psychological link between the boasting after the 6-Day War and the blindness from which we suffered on the eve of the Yom Kippur War and which, in the final analysis, was expressed in the intelligence evaluations, and not only in them. Such a danger is also arising today, when people speak as they are speaking about Israeli military power and the Israeli military machine and also try to detract from and dismiss the cost of the war. The danger is even greater when it is a question of such a dominating minister as Ari'el Sharon, who dictated and conducted this war and, even before that, caused the weakening of the forum of the general staff and its silencing.

Because of this we must again emphasize that the Peace for Galilee Campaign is an unusual war from the military viewpoint in comparison with Israel's previous wars. It is certainly not the model of the 6-Day War, neither militarily, politically nor in its goals. When people speak of the greatest military success in the history of Israel, the special balance of forces in this war should not be ignored. This is the first time in the history of Israel's wars that we have appeared as a Goliath. We fought in one arena, or to be more precise, in part of an arena. We succeeded in concentrating in a small area a greater force even than during the Yom Kippur War. And it is worth recalling that in 1973 the air force was hard hit and in 1982 it was the air force that was the initiator from the beginning and it was larger and with much more modern aircraft and more sophisticated weapons systems. In Lebanon the IDF force faced about a division and a half of the Syrian Army and several hundred fighting terrorists who tried to contain the advance of our columns. From the aspect of balance of forces, this was a rare situation, since we have never enjoyed such an edge in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Not only did the enemy have no aerial defense against our planes, this time our forces, in all the sectors of the front, were not under massive artillery fire. This was has also been unusual in other military aspects, such as the small amount of electronic fighting by the PLO. It would, therefore, be a mistaken moral if we conclude that such a situation, in which we initiate and attack, fighting on less than one front with the air force at the disposal of the land forces and with the enemy succeeding in using only between a quarter and a third of its land forces, is the permanent model of our wars.
While in a general view of the war we must beware of mistaken analogies, in the tactical and techno-tactical fields, as well as in the field of the composition of the formations and their use, this war has given the IDF an opportunity to learn important and instructive lessons. In the Peace for Galilee Campaign our forces had the chance to use varied fighting: Fighting in difficult, hilly terrain, in built-up areas, against a standing army using armor and also commando squads and against guerrilla fighters. Modern missile batteries were attacked and there was a large landing from the sea, although almost without opposition from the shore. This war was an experimental field for many weapons systems and types of ammunition that were used for the first time on a large scale, from the Merkava tank, the assault helicopters, the unmanned plane, modern missiles of various types, the armor penetrating "Hetz" shell, new communications and observation systems and extending modern equipment for intelligence purposes.

For security reasons it is impossible to detail the conclusions and morals from these fields. Various hitches that were met with in the Yom Kippur War and during the rapid growth period that followed it were corrected in the course of time. The emergency stores, for instance, were proved to be orderly. It also emerged that a generation of professional, experienced group commanders has matured amongst us. But it would be mistaken to say that all the hitches of the past have been fully corrected, that no new problems arose, and we can rest on our laurel's because there are those who have said that Israel is the fourth largest military power.

One of the issues about which there is a question is the speed of advance of our armored columns. This question is of great importance if one wants to examine the influence of the many and various antitank weapons on the armored columns. It turns out that despite the absolute advantage we had in the balance of forces, full aerial control and almost an absence of the enemy's artillery, in various places our armored columns were held up for a fairly long time. And there is no better proof of this than the fact that during the first week of the war the army in fact did not obtain all the objectives set by Sharon. The forces that had been supposed to reach the main Beirut-Damascus Highway were held up and did not reach their target and the plan to outflank the Syrian Army, which the prime minister called by the name of Hannibal, was also not carried out in the end. Even in the western sector, where we fought against the terrorists who were not equipped with tanks, the fighting lasted until the end of the week when we connected with the Christians in Beirut. In Sidon almost 2 days passed until the bottleneck was opened.

In other words, anyone who measures the advance of armored columns in a day's fighting in kilometers will certainly ask why the advance in the 6-Day War was so much faster. At first glance, it is clear that it was not actually the enemy's tanks that slowed the advance. It seems that it was the plentiful antitank weapons that contained and slowed the armored columns, even when these weapons were used by small squads. It is also possible that it was the feeling of some of the commanders, that they had a surplus of strength, that caused them not always to hurry, since, after all, we were going to win. This phenomenon requires a basic examination of the influence of antitank weapons when they are used as they were used, and also of the fighting methods of the Syrian commandos, who opted to act, for the most part—in small squads and
groups—as a frontal screen for the Syrian armor, with the aim of containing the advance of the Israeli armor.

However, it is also possible that it is actually from our victory in a war in which we used our preferred forces that slowly pushed the enemy's systems backward (the Syrian Army was not broken, nor did we pursue it, and when it did retreat, it did so in an orderly fashion) that the above lesson will be learned, that despite the IDF's armored power and despite the increase that has taken place in its formations, it is doubtful if we have the ability to implement at one and the same time several breakthrough attempts in different and widely separated fronts if confronted with a large containment force. This, as stated, is a possible moral, which for the moment appears to be logically contradicting our military success. In the meantime the IDF has established investigations teams to learn the various lessons and it is to be hoped that they will do their work independently and professionally, detaching themselves from the street roar and the political bellowing.

CSO: 4400/452
INTERVIEW WITH GAZA EX-MAYOR AL-SHAWWA

TA271058 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 27 Aug 82 pp 6, 7

[Interview with former Gaza Mayor Rashad al-Shawwa by Orit Shohat; time and place not given--in the HA'IR Weekly Supplement]

[Text] [Question] Although the last several months have been very stormy--in the Gaza Strip, in Lebanon, and for you personally because of your dismissal from the mayoralty--you have not given many press interviews and made public your ideas?

[Al-Shawwa] I no longer see any sense in anything. If I am asked for an interview, I give one. Israeli journalists are not interested in me or in what is happening here. The foreign press comes here. Officially I am barred from granting interviews--those are the administration's orders from 2 years ago. An interview is considered as engagement in politics, and I am forbidden to engage in politics.

[Question] Also when you were mayor?

[Answer] Because of this fact I am no longer the mayor. During my last period in office I was forbidden to sit in a room with two persons and discuss the future of the territories.

[Question] But in any case you grant interviews without fear. In other words: Everything is not so bad, at least in terms of your rights under the government of occupation.

[Answer] I have no rights, and therefore I have nothing to lose. Now I am talking with you. And in another hour an officer can come and take me to the Allenby Bridge. After every interview I grant, sanctions of one sort or another are imposed on me. Every time I say that I will settle for nothing less than the realization of my right to self-determination, I am delivered a blow and there is no limit to the inventions that an occupation regime with so much power can come up with.

[Question] You are known as a man of wealth. Have you remained so under the Israeli government of occupation as well?
I own orchards and my family has been involved in this for more than 600 years in Gaza. My entire life is based on growing citrus fruit, packing them in my packing house, and exporting them via the Jordan bridges. Last winter I was barred from exporting because of voicing political views opposed to the civilian administration. The loaded trucks I sent to the bridges returned the way they came. I closed my packing house. I lost $450,000. But there are more humiliating pressures. For 2 years now I have been barred from leaving Gaza—I and my four children. My daughter who is visiting in Israel and who lives in London with her husband has not been able to leave the country now for 2 months to return home—as a means of pressure on me to accept the civilian administration.

Did Gaza accept your dismissal from the mayoralty quietly?

Israel is here by virtue of force and not because we want it. Anything can be done by force.

Perhaps this proves that Sharon's policies are right? The war in Lebanon, like the dismissal of the mayor's in the territories, also went quietly.

The war in Lebanon was such a severe blow that people simply do not know how to react. This cannot be denied: We were struck, we were wounded. There is shock and deep sorrow here. There is mourning for family members who fell in Lebanon, but it is impossible to even mourn them out loud for fear of reprisal of the authorities. No one wants to admit that he is connected with the PLO fighters. If this description—this sick quiet, this quiet born of loathing—if this description proves that Sharon is right, then he is right. Everyone can be smashed with force. Any opposition can be broken. What you interpret as calm is actually quiet loathing. Force solves problems in the short term. But in the long term you will be unable to live here in tranquility with this accumulating hatred. Neither will Sharon last forever, nor will you be forever so powerful. What became of all the large powerful empires?

Do you not blame the Palestinian liberation movement for anything? With terrorism against women and children, with intransigence, did you not create conditions conducive to the rise of Begin and Sharon to the government?

The murder of children? You are talking? You have F-15's and F-16's and Merkava's and who know what else. We have nothing. We use the only methods of fighting possible for us. I do not agree with everything that the PLO has done over the years and I have much to say about this matter. However this is an opposition movement of the weak against the fourth largest army in the world. What are you talking about? The murder of children? Israelis can no longer use this concept to attack us. You have no moral right to do so! This suffering people. Arik Sharon murdered in one-half hour more people than the PLO did in 10 years.

This is a good answer after the war in Lebanon. But what would you have answered me 3 months ago?
[Answer] One thing: I am a human being like you. A human being with rights and self-respect. My family has been living here for 600 years. I am entitled to live here as a human being, and not as your slave.

[Question] What would you say to the Israeli peace movement, which recognizes your rights but has difficult coming to terms with your methods? Did not the PLO bring the last war upon itself to a large extent? Did it not err in its methods?

[Answer] The only mistake to have been made in the Middle East was the establishment of the state of Israel on the ruins and remnants of the Palestinian people.

[Question] Since it is impossible to return to 1948, let us perhaps start with 1967. Has the PLO since then, in your view, adopted the correct methods to get a Palestinian state established?

[Answer] Impossible to return to 1948? Are you suggesting that we forget all that? You did not forget 2,000 years? There are 4 million Palestinians—2 million under Israeli occupation, as 10th-class citizens. We are not second class citizens as the moderates among you say. Tenth class.

[Question] You are not answering the question.

[Answer] You do not understand the problem. You are belititng it.

[Question] I am trying to leave aside what can no longer be changed, trying to continue onward.

[Answer] If we start from the point you want, we will invariably reach the same thing: Is there or is there not a Palestinian people. If there is, then to which country does it have an attachment? You carried the idea of the return to Zion for 2,000 years. We are no different from you, and our memory is clear. What is the meaning of the proposal to set up a state for us in Jordan? Did you want to establish your state somewhere else? Did you accept the alternative solutions? The Jordanian solution exists only in Sharon's head. By what right do you bring in immigrants from Russia and want to send me to Jordan? With F-16's and Merkava's you can do anything. Even expel us to Jordan. But do not expect me to accept it.

[Question] Let us return to the original question—the question of means. Let us begin from the supposition that we agree on the objective—the establishment of a Palestinian state. Do you not think that the PLO's methods have radicalized the Israeli public, distancing the possibility of a solution?

[Answer] What methods? Do we have any means at all? We only kick where we can. If someone tries to rape you and he is armed, will you think about methods or will you use whatever you can find at hand to hit the rapist? There is tremendous exaggeration in the attitudes toward the PLO's methods. All of you have been brainwashed by your governments. This inflating of the PLO's power is intended to justify actions such as the war in Lebanon.
[Question] The PLO has not given the peace camp in Israel a chance to develop. Every time someone in the PLO says, "We want all of Israel's territory," such as Abu Jihad said on leaving Beirut this week, the peace camp in Israel loses several thousand people.

[Answer] And what do you say? The same thing: All of Eretz Yisra'el is ours. But unlike Abu Jihad, you do not make do with just Israel. You want the Golan Heights. You want southern Lebanon. Who knows what else. Abu Jihad said what he did under special circumstances--after losing his entire world, on his departure from Beirut. Meanwhile, you say it from a position of strength and with complete awareness.

[Question] With Begin on one side and Abu Jihad on the other, what chance is there of a solution?

[Answer] And if you do not talk with Abu Jihad? And if you talk to me? I suggest one state alongside the other. Is there someone in this government, or in former governments, who is willing to start from this point? The fact that you are not willing to digest is that you simply do not want us to exist.

[Question] Do you see a difference between the Alignment governments and that of the Likud?

[Answer] There is no difference. They all have the same objective; only the tactics are different.

[Question] What is the objective?

[Answer] To be rid of the Palestinian people.

[Question] Do you think that Israeli politicians are so unrealistic?

[Answer] Why unrealistic? Do you think this is impossible? Today, you are the fourth [most powerful] army in the world. Perhaps you will one day be the first. In 1948 some of the Palestinian people were gotten rid of. In 1967 a few hundred thousand more were gotten rid of. It was said at that time too that the people left the country willingly. But it was a lie then, too. Pressures were exerted and people could not withstand them. I know. I received scores of appeals for help from powerless people whom the security forces had taken to the bridges. Today also you are doing everything to get us to leave. This may be more difficult, but it is clearly your objective. This is our great fear. I am afraid of you. I do not know what will become of me a year from now. Today I am sitting with you. Tomorrow I may find myself on the bridge to Jordan.

[Question] You had a special relationship with Moshe Dayan. Did you respect him more and understand him better than other defense ministers?

[Answer] Yes. Moshe Dayan was a man who understood what compromise is—not just the word, but the deeper significance of the concept. 'Ezer Weizman also understood though less than Dayan. Shim'on Peres understood less than both of them. Begin does not understand anything. Begin wants a large Israeli empire.
[Question] But all the same, you did not cooperate with these defense ministers.


[Question] Perhaps on the basis of an autonomy agreement that would gradually lead to an independent state.

[Answer] Who proposed autonomy before Camp David? And what is the autonomy of Camp David if it is accompanied by Begin's statement that a Palestinian state shall never sprout from it? What hopes does that leave us? Begin pledged that any Palestinian leaders in the territories who regard autonomy as an intermediate stage on the path to statehood cannot operate in the territories and will be thrown in jail.

[Question] I do not remember such a statement.

[Answer] But I remember everything. Begin said exactly that and repeated it several times. The proof of this is the dismissal of the mayors in the territories. The reason I was dismissed was that I voiced—and I stress the word voiced—views against the civilian administration and in favor of an independent Palestinian state.

[Question] Why did you boycott al-Sadat? Because of the PLO's terrorism in the territories? Did you see no opening for a solution?

[Answer] Al-Sadat wanted us to sign a suicide treaty. Camp David says that there will be four sides to the autonomy talks: Jordan, Israel, the United States and representatives of the Palestinian people. Each of the sides will have the right to veto any proposal. What will I have the right to veto? You are changing the country day after day. In the 3 years since Camp David, when there was supposed to have been a freeze on settlements, you set up more settlements than ever before. Soon Begin will say: A Palestinian state in the West Bank? Where? It is full of Jewish settlements; and then only the annexation option will remain.

[Question] Do you expect the annexation of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip?

[Answer] I do not know really. I also look at things through the eyes of Begin. It is hard for me to understand what benefit will spring from this for him. He wanted a pure Jewish state. No? In terms of his aspirations, he definitely wants to annex tomorrow, to grow, to expand. So that the annexation will be easier, efforts are being made to get rid of the inhabitants of the territories. But it is hard to convince people who have nowhere to go to leave their homes.

[Question] For years you have said that there is no chance of peace with the Arab countries without a solution to the Palestinian problem. Do you not think that you were mistaken in view of the peace with Egypt and the peace-on-the-way with Lebanon?
[Answer] I do not believe in Israel’s peace with Egypt. This is a forced peace. As for Bashir al-Juamyiil, it seems to me that he will fulfill this promise to Israel just as he fulfilled his previous ones.

[Question] Why do you call the peace with Egypt a forced peace?

[Answer] The Americans are maintaining the peace with their dollars.

[Question] Do you only believe in peace based on mutual love? Can there not be true peace in which the common interest of the two sides is in the absence of war and U.S. support?

[Answer] The day will come—and it is not far off—when you will see that this peace is a piece of paper. This is the fate of forced peace not based on mutual understanding. Such also will be the peace with Lebanon, if there is one. You will have to live forever by the sword, buy more tanks and more planes, increase time and again the size of your army. Your country will be all army and one that understands nothing but the language of force. In that you excel. I see a great future for you. You will import and export arms. I told you, I am convinced that you will yet move up from the fourth position to the first position. But one day also the flood will come.

[Question] Did you expect the war in Lebanon?

[Answer] Not in these dimensions. I did not think you would sweep up an entire country.

[Question] Did you expect the U.S. reaction? The lack of Soviet reaction?

[Answer] The Russians acted exactly as I thought they would. They do not need to fight in this region because the communist doctrine spreads in the Islamic countries in any case, to my regret. As to the Americans, I thought they had more intelligence. Not more morality, but more intelligence.

[Question] Intelligence in what sense? Did this war not serve U.S. interests?

[Answer] In my view, no. The Americans will be unable to win long-term influence in the Arab world if they continue to so clearly favor the Israelis. They cannot give $2 million a year to the Palestinians in the West Bank and $75 [as published] to the Israelis, not including the arms, grants, loans and the devil knows what else.

[Question] Perhaps the Americans do not believe that the Palestinian movement has a future?

[Answer] The fact is that there are 4 million of us. We have not assimilated in other countries. We were not wanted and we did not want to assimilate. We can not be gotten rid of.

[Question] This happened to the Zionist movement. The majority of Jews stayed in other countries.
[Answer] The Jews who stayed in their countries did not want to return here. The Palestinians do.

[Question] How do you rate the strength of the PLO after the war?

[Answer] The PLO is now stronger than ever. Thanks to you, of course. It was always said in Israel that the inhabitants of the territories are influenced by the PLO because it uses terrorism against them. Now it will become clear that this theory is false. The PLO today has, in my view, more moral support in the territories than ever before. Today more need is felt for the existence of the organization. We are on the brink of annexation, of further dispossession. What victory did you win in Lebanon? Did anyone in the territories think that the Palestinian army in southern Lebanon would liberate us? Conquer Israel? What foolishness! What disappointment with the PLO are you talking about?

[Question] Did you always regard the PLO as the political body representing you?

[Answer] In 1967 I suggested to Dayan the establishment of a political body from among the Arab leaders in the territories that would conduct negotiations with the Israeli government for a solution to the Palestinian problem. Dayan told me that this was "high politics" and that he had to consult with the prime minister. I heard no more from him about this subject. Today it is impossible to speak about alternative leadership.

[Question] Have you become more radical over the years? You once were considered a moderate pro-Jordanian.

[Answer] To my sorrow, I have become more radical. It depends, of course, in what sense. When I was called moderate I did not understand then either the fine differences. Is a moderate one who is not interested in destroying Israel? I do not think that there is a single Palestinian in the world who believes in that possibility.

[Question] Has the Israeli administration become more severe over the years?

[Answer] This is the nature of occupation. Once there were meetings of mayors. Appointed officials now administer the territories. They bar me from speaking. Not only from acting. A week ago I was invited to go to the United States to be interviewed on the Meet the Press Program. The government refused. Officially I am not allowed to grant any interviews. I am not allowed to talk politics. I can only talk about raising cattle. These are the facts. I am not just making propaganda. We are slaves without rights. I have before me a piece of paper on which is written "stateless." A human being without identity! Not even a human being. An animal. So I should cooperate with this fabrication, with the civilian administration? Am I stupid? What do they think we are? One day someone came and changed the sign on the military administration building to "civilian administration." They did not even bother to change the officer, Yosef Luntz.
[Question] Do you not blame the PLO—not even a bit—for what is happening to you today?

[Answer] Everyone makes mistakes. The PLO has made scores of mistakes. I do not automatically agree with them in every matter. I did not like their domination of Beirut. On the other hand, I am not willing to tolerate the Israeli propaganda about what the Palestinians did in ad-Damur, as an excuse for not being able to talk with them. The example of the massacre in ad-Damur is distorted. Chronologically, ad-Damur was a reaction to the murder of Palestinians in Tall Aaz-Za'tar. Thus behave people who are pushed into desperation.

[Question] On what do you pin hope, all the same? On Israeli public opinion? Perhaps on 'Ezer Weizman?

[Answer] To my regret, on nothing. Certainly not on Israeli public opinion, which becomes more radical every year; even if Weizman returns, he will be compelled to be radical in order to win public support.

[Question] Have you had talks with Arik Sharon since he became defense minister?

[Answer] One discussion, 2 weeks after he entered his post he was here. But I do not have to speak with him. I have known him well since 1969.

[Question] Has he changed?

[Answer] He is much worse. He has more power.

[Question] Sharon has said that when the war in Lebanon ends he will begin talks with the local leaders in the territories.

[Answer] I do not think that he meant me. He knows me and I know him. I do not think that we have anything to talk about.

[Question] If he wanted to meet you, would you cooperate with him?

[Answer] I will cooperate with whomever gives me hope of self-identity, air to breathe, selfrespect.

[Question] Would you be ready to compromise?

[Answer] What can I propose? What is there to give up? You have everything. Only you can compromise.

[Question] Would you be ready to give up terrorism, to say that there will be no more Ma'alot, Munich or the coastal road incidents.

[Answer] Your problem is that your children seem to you dearer than our children. Two weeks after Beirut you continue to talk about Ma'alot.

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EHRLICH INTERVIEWED ON LEBANON WAR

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[Report on interview with Deputy Prime Minister Simha Ehrlich by Ya'ir Kotler--date and place not given]

[Excerpt] Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Prime Minister Simha Ehrlich calls for an end to the war in Lebanon. He regards the military, warlike activity in Lebanon as "nearing its end." He declares: It is necessary to put the sword back in its sheath after Beirut is cleared of terrorists. He is adamant: Every political effort should be made to ensure that the war is not renewed. Only if there is no other choice will Israel use force. He cannot foresee such a situation of "no other alternative" at present or in the future.

He is extreme in his antiwar approach: Our generals should be sent on leave and confinement orders should be issued to our politicians so that we could operate primarily only on the political plane.

Despite his dovish stand--and I would call him a dovish hawk, or a hawkish dove--he sums up the results of the "Peace for Galilee" operation thus far in three words: "A tremendous achievement." He says that in order to guarantee Lebanon's sovereignty and the integrity of its borders, the free world, headed by the United States, should demonstrate interest in this painful issue. The independence of Lebanon will be ensured and achieved only if all foreign forces, the IDF included, are evacuated.

He does not evince any special concern over Syria and the terrorists hiding behind its apron. Experience has shown Israel that when Damascus wants to, it will honor agreements. A case in point is that it did not allow the terrorists to operate against Israel from inside its territory. Ehrlich "is convinced" that after the withdrawal from Beirut the emotions will calm down and the Syrians will "take a moment to think things over," or perhaps they have already done so, and will reach the conclusion that it would be advisable for them to nip in the bud any terrorist activity against Israel.

Simha Ehrlich is convinced that "there will not be war with the Syrians because of the terrorists." This will be so even if they initiate a warming up of the border. In that case, then, Israel will know how to warn, and if that should not help, a controlled yet bitter reaction will suffice.
Ehrlich says that Israel should not worry itself too much about a future settlement with Syria. He believes that it will really come, mainly due to Washington's initiatives. "Israel should not spill even one drop of blood because of Lebanon." The problem is strategic and global. We must first of all take care to restore the cease-fire and obtain complete calm among the cease-fire lines with Syria in Lebanon.

He wishes to make it clear that if Syria does not evacuate Lebanon, the IDF will not budget for fear that the situation might regress to the situation as it was on the eve of the Peace for Galilee Operation. He cannot say how long Israel will remain in Lebanon, which is a country that devours any foreigner in it. He knows this, but has no answer.

Is a strong regime in Lebanon possible at all, even under Phalangist leader and elected President Bashir al-Jumayyil, Israel's (somewhat concealed) ally?

Ehrlich--And he is not alone in this--does not know. He again approaches the savior: The United States. It is clearly in the U.S.--as well as Western--interest to guarantee the establishment of a stable and strong government in Lebanon. Is asked: Are you optimistic?

Ehrlich: It is not up to us, much depends on the behavior of the Syrians.

As for himself he does not have that much trust in the profuse promises the Christians showered on Israeli personalities before the Peace for Galilee Operation, such as: After the PLO and the Syrians are removed from Lebanon, a peace agreement will be reached between Israel and Lebanon, and other similar pledges. He wants to exercise caution. One must wait and see how committed the United States will want to be in setting up a strong, new Lebanon.

As far as he is concerned, the terrorists "are no longer a problem that should cause concern." The PLO's minisate in Lebanon and its military branch have been "liquidated." The dispersal of the PLO personnel among seas and continents means their "actual annihilation" as a military factor. However, a new danger may rise: The PLO as a political element whose leaders spend a lot of time in the parlors wearing coats and ties.

Neither Tunisia, nor Jordan nor Iraq will "let" the PLO presume too much. Syria will "disarm" it. If it operates against Israel this will boomerang--just as such action in the distant as well as the near past has wrought havoc on Jordan and Lebanon. No country wanted its men. They were only accepted after heavy pressure was exerted by the United States and Saudi Arabia, and for a lot of money to boot.

Israel "will not accept" a package deal with Syria on the partitioning of Lebanon: The Golan in return for the al-Biqa' Valley, as two scholars--orientalist Dr Yitzhaq (Beily) and military strategist Professor Edward (Lutwak)--have proposed. Israel, Ehrlich says, is a small country. It is not the world's fourth military superpower, not even the tenth. It will not agree to divide Lebanese territory up with Syria from either a moral or political point of view. "If we were to act that way, we would be asking for similar things to apply to us." Says Ehrlich: "I read the (Beily-Lutwak) proposal carefully,
and I am amazed at it. It is cynical. The two do not demonstrate a long his-
toric view."

He asks: "Why should Israel want a deal with Syria over the Golan in the first
place? The Golan is ours! It has always been part of Eretz Yisra'el, only it
was chopped off by the British and the French after World War I and handed over
to Syria. Nor is Israel in need of Syrian recognition that the Golan is
Israeli—and the al-Biq'a Valley is Lebanese."

Ehrlich points out that Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad came back from Moscow
empty-handed at the height of the Lebanese War. Now one must wait and see how
the United States handles him. Maybe Washington will strive to get closer to
Damascus, as it did after the Yom Kippur War, so as to push it away from
Soviet influence?

Simha Ehrlich confirms: There were military transgressions during the war,
but any "substantial" diversion was carried out following a prior consent
by the government. It is true that there were "nearly substantial deviations"
that were only approved post facto because "it was impossible in the heat of
the battle to stop the war to ask for a cabinet endorsement."

Ehrlich was the acting prime minister (who in turn was in Washington) between
12 and 23 June. In that week the military hold—he calls it only a hold
[he'ahzut]—on the Beirut-Damascus Highway was strengthened, through the cap-
ture of Bhamdun. That same week, he emphasizes, "I had nothing to complain
about." Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon "behaved appropriately." He was
"cooperative." There was nothing Sharon did not report to Acting Prime
Minister Ehrlich, "including even the most top secret things." He adds: "I
was not faced with any fait accompli."

If things were so good, and Sharon was loyal and cooperative, what was the
media furious about?

Ehrlich pulled out a readymade answer to what appeared to be his anticipation
of the above question: What can I do if they write the opposite of the truth?
He vouches for himself in saying that he read in the papers what ministers
allegedly said and found "a great discrepancy" between what was said and what
was written throughout the days of the fighting. "Some 90 percent of every-
thing that was written was not true."

Did the fighting over the Beirut-Damascus not assume dimensions above and
beyond what was called for, beyond the original plan and the cabinet resolu-
tions on the Peace for Galilee Operation?

Ehrlich explains that the operation was undertaken following a prior approval
(his, by virtue of being the acting prime minister) and that there were no
surprises. In war "it is necessary to secure strategic positions." The one
captured along the Beirut-Damascus Highway was not enough to tighten the noose
and to form a line of separation between Damascus and Beirut. That is why a
decision was made to expand the control up to 20 km, and this is how "a most
important hold [he'ahzut] was obtained, with the cabinet's approval."
--In other words, you were not at all surprised by that operation on the highway initiated by Sharon?

"I am not one of those so-called beautiful people, the pacifists. There is nothing to be ashamed of about this achievement."

The cabinet was not disappointed with the Christians' behavior. It realized that their power is limited and did not hinge any hopes upon them. Ehrlich in general refuses to address himself to the reports claiming that the Christians had promised to act in Beirut against the terrorists when the IDF formed contact with them in the eastern part of the city, but that the Phalangists did not live up to their commitments to the defense minister. "We knew we had to do the job."

He promises that Israel will not forsake its "friend" Maj Sa'd Haddad, will not throw him to the dogs as though saying he has done his job and now he can go to hell. Indeed, Haddad's enclave belongs to Lebanon, but Israel never deserts its old-time friends, especially not those who stood at its side in times of need like Haddad. The projected political arrangement "will not be without Haddad." Any dialogue "must" include him, too.

He is optimistic in regard to future U.S. steps. He incessantly repeats emphatically that the Israeli operation in Lebanon served U.S. interests "immeasurably," but he hurries to add that Israel would not have undertaken even one step for the United States if it were not first and foremost in its own interest. Now, during the defense minister's visit to the United States, he will reveal to his U.S. hosts the content of secret documents captured in the course of the operation. Some of them disclose the nature of the special relations that formed between Moscow and PLO over terrorist activity throughout the world and against Western interests, particularly those of the United States.

No country has served the U.S. interests that much, but not always will Israel be able to take into account only Washington's interests when they have nothing to do with those of Israel. He says that the United States wants to maintain a balance in its relations with Israel vis-a-vis those it has with the Arab countries. Hence Israel will not always be palatable to the United States and there will be ups and down in the relations between the two countries. He hints that Israel should prepare itself mentally for a clash with the United States if and when it should want to harm its own interests, but this could be avoided if Israel is prepared for such an eventuality.

The potential clash between Jerusalem and Washington stems from the plans Washington is concocting for a desirable arrangement of the Palestinian question. Israel has been warning that the basis for every arrangement must be the Camp David accords, because this is the only agreement Israel feels committed to.

The United States was not surprised by the war. In saying this Ehrlich seems to want to underline Defense Minister Sharon's statements when he said similar things a few days ago, but was confronted with a denial by U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. "It is true that it did not know when we would
launch the war, but neither did the Israeli ministers." He reports that on
Thursday, 3 June (2 days before the cabinet decided to open the war), he par-
ticipated in a dinner with Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir in honor of FRG
Foreign Minister Genscher and the Israeli and FRG ambassadors. No one
imagined that within a few hours there would be an assassination attempt on
the life of Ambassador Shlomo Argov, which later served as the spark to ignite
the war in Lebanon.

Sharon was in the United States 2 weeks before the fighting broke out. He told
the administration leaders that there would be no other choice but to go to war.
Last week former President Jimmy Carter said that "the United States gave
Israel the go-ahead." But Ehrlich counters: Things were not this way.
Carter's remarks were intended "for internal consumption" because of "the
domestic fighting in the United States between the parties."

Did the war in Lebanon "kill" the autonomy plan, putting an end to its life?

Ehrlich still believes that autonomy "is the best solution for the Palest-
innians," and Begin said that without it the Camp David agreement would not
have been reached, but it looks as though Egypt "is not interested in the
talks." Cairo wants to get renewed hegemony over the Arab world. Its aspira-
tions conflict with the notion of signing new agreements with Israel, because
such agreements would be rejected by a large part of the Arab world. Yet
there is still another reason for this: Cairo knows that it would not be
able to win the cooperation of the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip for implementing the autonomy plan. They do not want it and it will be
impossible to impose it on them by force. Hence it follows that it is more
convenient for Cairo to evade the talks because of the Lebanese War, which is
the official argument it has been employing.

Simha Ehrlich is not worried. He demonstrates optimism on every issue, and
to the same degree, whether it is a tough issue or an easy one. What is going
to happen? "Do not fret; time heals all wounds."

--But meanwhile there will no doubt be a creeping annexation of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip?

Ehrlich elegantly evades this direct question, bypassing it. He says that for
as long as the interim period of 5 years continues, as included and stipulated
in the Camp David accords, he thinks there will not be such a step.

But later, will each party be free to act if the autonomy is not established?

Ehrlich: "I am no prophet."

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BEN PORAT INTERVIEWED ON PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

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[Text] Minister of State Mordekhay Ben Porat today invited the Arab countries to cooperate with Israel in order to find a solution to the problem of 480,000 Palestinian refugees who have living in camps since 1948. Ben Porat said that the experience gained from five wars has proved that a solution can be found, not by force, but by understanding and peace. Colleague Fu'ad Shabi met with the minister and sent us the following report:

[Begin recording] [Question] Minister of State Mordekhay Ben Porat: You have recently toured some Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, Judaea and Samaria. What are your impressions after this tour?

[Answer] I came out with the impression that today the Arab countries are showing more understanding of the real situation and more readiness to find a solution to the refugees' problem and to the evacuation of the armed Palestinian organizations from Beirut to Arab countries. These two facts persuaded the Palestinians who are living in the camps that the road of peace is the only road which the Palestinians and Israelis should follow. After this tour I feel that the dreams of returning to the villages and places which exist or existed in Israel are today baseless because the Israeli territories absorbed the Jewish refugees who emigrated from the Arab countries. Their number is larger than that of the Palestinians who left Israel at the invitation of the Palestinian and Arab leaders in 1948 after launching a war against Israel in an attempt to destroy it. Since then, 35 years have passed during which the Arab countries launched 5 wars. The state of Israel did not collapse. On the contrary, it always got stronger. During my tour I tried to talk to the inhabitants in the camps as cousins talk to one another. We and they were victims of the same problem and wars since 1948. It is time to talk with one another on the new basis of peace, tranquility and understanding in the Middle East.

One of the painful problems which affects us as Israelis, who are known for their humane feelings, is the problem of 480,000 Palestinian refugees who are now living in camps in the Middle East under the supervision of Unrwa.

[Question] Mr Minister: You have talked about Unrwa. What is this agency's participation in a solution to the refugees' problem?
[Answer] UNRWA tries to preserve the present conditions of the camps. It is not its duty to liquidate these camps and find a solution to the problem of the inhabitants in them. In view of its limited capabilities it cannot improve these conditions. Therefore, the issue must be solved in a new manner by means of direct understandings between the Palestinians in the camps and the United States, which contributes 60 percent of the UNRWA budget. The Arab countries can contribute to this solution if they choose a positive approach. We want to cooperate with them in order to solve the problem.

[Question] Mr Minister: Perhaps the destruction of the Palestinian organizations' military apparatus and the evacuation of these organizations' military apparatus and the evacuation of these organizations, what is your opinion?

[Answer] As a result of my talks with hundreds of Palestinians in 15 camps the destruction of the organizations' military power has undoubtedly influenced their way of thinking and their realization of the facts. They have ascertained that no solution can be attained through force, but only through understanding.

[Question] Thank you, Mr Minister. [End recording]

This was Mordehay Ben Porat, minister of state and chairman of the ministerial committee in charge of refugees' affairs.
AL-FAJR CRITICIZES TEHIYA PARTY FOR JOINING COALITION

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 26 Jul 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Price of a Deal"]

[Text] Now that the ultra-right Tehiya party has joined the ruling Likud coalition in Israel, Prime Minister Menahem Begin has strengthened his position considerably and has assured himself of a comfortable majority in Israel's Knesset. This not only makes him more capable of tightening his grip on the country's political life, but it also gives him more control over economic, legislative and social affairs.

Some people are underestimating the danger of this occurrence because they think that the price of the Tehiya party's joining the ruling coalition in Israel will not exceed a few thousand housing units and the establishment of settlements on occupied Arab land. There is, however, no doubt that this has helped a misconception that greatly oversimplifies matters.

Anyone who knows Menahem Begin's stern religious background can only reject this narrow framework and see things as they are. Anyone who knows Menahem Begin will recall an old imperviousness that points to the ambitions he has had for achieving all his religious dreams by strengthening Israel's right wing and giving it control over matters in Israel for a long period of time. This would come about after the right wing gets full control over political and legislative establishments [in Israel]. This would make any possibility for changing the appearance of political life, at least in the foreseeable future, through constitutional frameworks in favor of the international community a mere fantasy.

This means quite simply that unless surprising and unexpected developments occur in the sequence of events unfolding now in the area, whereby this notable shift to the right in Israeli society would come to a standstill, it is most likely that the price for the fact that Tehiya party has joined the ruling coalition in Israel will be much more dishonorable than a mere settlement here or there on occupied Arab land.
NAZARETH RESISTS LAND ALLOCATION CHANGES

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 26 Jul 82 p 4

[Article: "Nazareth Rejects a Plan To Separate Certain Areas from the City for the Purpose of Getting a Stranglehold on the City"]

[Text] A meeting was held last Monday in the office of the governor of the northern district. This was a meeting of the special investigating committee that was formed by the Israeli Ministry of the Interior to look into upper Nazareth's request that certain areas of Nazareth be separated [from the city] and annexed to it.

The investigation indicated that the municipality of upper Nazareth had not given serious consideration to its request and that it did not know much about the aforementioned area. It did not know how large an area of land it was; it did not know how the land was being used; it did not know about the municipal slaughter house that is located on that land; and it did not know about the plans that the municipality of Nazareth had for developing that area. Furthermore, it does not yet know what it will do in the land whose separation from Nazareth it had requested.

The delegation of the Municipality of Nazareth, chaired by Mayor Tawfiq Ziyad, totally rejected the separation plan. They considered the request part of a plan to put a stranglehold on the city of Nazareth, especially since the area that is supposed to be separated [from the municipality] had been prepared in the context of the city's new structural plan for the establishment of a significant industrial and commercial center.

The municipality's delegation considered the entire matter a provocation intended to prevent the development of Nazareth and put a stranglehold on the city in the context of Israel King's plan to Judaize the Galilee.

At the end of the meeting the municipality's delegation made a counter offer. The delegation proposed that previously confiscated areas of Nazareth, which have become quite indispensable, be restored to keep them from being strangled and to ensure the possibilities for their normal development.

It is being noted that the committee is made up of Israel King, the governor of the district; Ibrahim Nimr Husayn, the mayor of Safa 'Amru; the director and general manager of the Local Authorities Center; district committee engineer, Liebowitz; and Shahrur, representative of Israel's Ministry of the Interior.

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W. BANK LISTENING, READING HABITS REPORTED

TA150920 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Aug 82 p 3

[Text Poll]

[Text] The first survey of its kind on the newspaper-reading and radio-listening habits of the Arab sector has recently been conducted by Pori for the Ari'eli Advertising Agency, which commissioned the survey. The results of the research, carried out in March and April of this year, which have been tabulated in the last few days, indicating that some 79.1 percent of the inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria read at least one daily newspaper (with a similar percentage for the adult Jewish publication--82.5 percent).

Interesting differences regarding the popularity of weeklies emerged between the Arab sector and the Jewish readers in Israel. Thus it transpires that the percentage of males who read weeklies in Judaea and Samaria (54.3 percent) is higher than the percentage among the female population there (41.4 percent). This differs from the Jewish readership, where there is a higher level of female readers (54 percent) than male readers (48.9 percent). Subscribing to weeklies in Judaea and Samaria is more popular among the educated young males in Judaea and Samaria, whose income is at or above the average level. It is likewise higher among urban residents than among the villagers or the residents of refugee camps.

The survey also examined the popularity of the Arabic programs of the Voice of Israel. The findings show that it is much more popular than people had originally thought.

The survey was conducted in order to examine the popularity of the media among the Arab population of Judaea and Samaria.

The poll was conducted by local interviewers among a representative cross-section of the adult population of age 18 and above, and it encompassed the eight districts of Judaea and Samaria; Hebron, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Jericho, Ramallah, Nablus, Tulkarm and Janin. Twelve towns, 37 villages and 9 refugee camps were included.

The poll shows that nearly all the families in Judaea and Samaria (92.7 percent) consume Israeli goods such as food, cleaning products and household effects.

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U.S. OIL COMPANY TO DRILL FOR OIL IN ISRAEL

TA160736 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 16 Aug 82 p 6

[Report by Yitzhaq 'Oqed]

[Text] An American oil company is to start prospecting for oil in October, confident that they will find oil with the aid of new drilling methods.

King David Oil and Gas Corporation, established specifically to look for oil in Israel, last week signed an agreement with El'azar Baraq, managing director of the government-owned Israel National Oil Co. The agreement is to be approved this week by Israel national's board of directors.

Under the agreement, King David will start drilling by mid-October. For the initial stage they have been granted drilling rights at Gurim (in the Zin Desert), Gezer, Karmon (near Helez), and two unspecified sites near Tel Aviv.

The agreement also grants King David an unspecified dollar-linked loan through an Israeli Bank. The Israeli Fuel Company Delek will cooperate with King David with an option to participate in all of the latter's drilling operations.

King David is now negotiating with the Israeli Drilling Company Lapidot for it to be its drilling subcontractor.

The main investors in King David are Gerry Oren, the company's chairman, Irving Pasternak of Shar Allen Oil Company, which has oil wells in Colorado, Oklahoma and Texas, and Leo E. Bromberg. The three are due to arrive in Israel today, and are scheduled to meet this week with Energy Minister Yitzhaq Berman and Israel National Oil Co. officials.

The Shar Allen Company has signed a know-how agreement with King David, to share new drilling methods, which have proven successful for Shar Allen.

This system is called fraking and stimulation. The drillers stop at different levels and, by enlarging these levels sideways, they check the presence of oil horizontal to the drilling hole.

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BRIEFS

W. BANKERS RECEIVE CASUALTY REPORT—Nabulus, 9 Aug (ITIM)—Judaea and Samaria residents have recently received reports that about 80 of their sons and relatives, all of them regional residents, have lately fallen in Beirut either while in the PLO ranks or as residents who, for various reasons, stayed in the area before the battles broke out. The ITIM correspondent in Judaea and Samaria reports that families in Nabulus have received announcements on about 30 fallen Nabulus residents. Families in Tulkarm received announcements on 20 fallen, families in Ramallah on 15, families in Janin on about 10, and families in East Jerusalem about 3. These families are now trying to confirm the reports via the International Red Cross. Circles in the region say that there are reports of a larger number of casualties from among Judaea and Samaria and East Jerusalem residents. It should be noted that so far six obituaries have been published in the East Jerusalem papers on terrorists who were regional residents and who have fallen in the war in Lebanon. A Nabulus notable told the ITIM correspondent that many families know about the fall of their sons and relatives but prefer not to publicize this in view of their fear of the Israeli authorities. [Text] [TA090907 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 0935 GMT 9 Aug 82]

MOSCOW HONORS RAKAH MEMBER—MK Tawfiq Tubi, a RAKAH leader, was given one of the Soviet Union’s highest medals in Moscow today. He received the medallion of friendship with the Soviet people from the vice president of the Supreme Soviet. It was said that he was found fit for this medal because of his services in the fight for peace, democracy and social progress. [Text] [TA251616 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 25 Aug 82]

NEW SETTLEMENT IN SAMARIA—Yesterday a group of private individuals from Tel Aviv, Nehalim and Mevaseret Yerushalayim began preparing a road to a new settlement north of (Kafr Hadjah) between Qarne Shomron and Qadumim. The Samaria Regional Council has approved the work. The settlement will cover 460 dunams in five lots with no continuous link between them. The land was purchased by 200 families through land agent Moshe Zer. Some of the land purchased has not yet been provided with a business licence from the military government and some of it is still being examined. It has been reported that the inhabitants of Elon Shvut in Gush Etzion recently purchased 360 dunams in the area. ''We are going to prepare a location plan and submit it to the Ministerial Committee for Settlement Affairs,'" the settlers said yesterday. [By 'Amos Levav] [Text] [TA111128 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 11 Aug 82 p 16]
GOOD FENCE CLOSURE CONTEMPLATED--A proposal is now taking shape in the interior ministry to close the good fence crossings from Lebanon into Israel and to allow the passage of citizens in both directions only at the two official crossings, at Rosh Hanikrah and Metulla. [Excerpt] [TA161229 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1140 GMT 16 Aug 82]

IDF OFFICER ON TERRORIST MINES--A top engineering corps officer, Brig Gen Avishay Katz, has said that the terrorists have blocked roads in West Beirut with destroyed earth embankments and mines. Engineering corps men encountered some of these barriers during the conquest of the al-Awza'i Camp, north of the airport. Avishay Katz was speaking to our correspondent Mikha Friedman, on the occasion of Engineering Corps Day. Brigadier General Katz said that the terrorists demonstrated great knowledge in mining and laying obstacles. Many tunnels were found which had facilitated the defense and storing of arms and ammunition. The terrorists also had sophisticated drilling devices, among the most advanced in the world. In the minefields they planted, five modern types of mines were found that had not been known about until now. Sappers had to enter the minefields to make roads there. In this activity, the engineering corps used for the first time modern equipment that had been developed in Israel and abroad. [Text] [TA081628 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 8 Aug 82]

PROTECTION OF LEBANESE DRUZE--Prime Minister Menahem Begin has asked the chief of staff to issue the appropriate orders to prevent the Lebanese Druze from being harmed in any way. The prime minister sent a letter to this effect to the spiritual leader of the Druze community in Israel, Shaykh Amin Tarif, in reply to a letter by the latter which included serious complaints about the attitude of the Phalangists to the Druze in Lebanon. Our correspondent Rafiq Halabi points out that a committee to gather information and follow the Lebanese Druze situation has been set up among Israeli Druze. [Text] [TA261957 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 26 Aug 82]

IRON TRANSPORTED FROM LEBANON--Iron worth 140 million shekels is being transported from southern Lebanon to Israel. The iron belonged to George Habash's terrorist organization. [Text] [TA261415 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 26 Aug 82 p 4 TA]

ARGENTINA INTERESTED IN MIRAGES--Argentina is conducting negotiations for the purchase of 22 Mirage planes from Israel as part of its efforts to re-build its air force, which suffered grave losses in the war with Britain over the Falkland Islands. The newspaper BUENOS AIRES HERALD, published in English, writes: "In the war with the British, the Argentine Air Force was the only fighting arm to score impressive achievements—far greater than those of all of the army's other branches." The Argentines are well aware of this, and are now seeking to strengthen and re-build the air force. [Text] [TA261237 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 26 Aug 82 p 2]

NEW PRESETTLEMENTS IN SAMARIA--The IDF will build five new Nahal presettlements in the Samaria area. These are arm presettlements and not civilian settlements. The IDF and the Defense Ministry are responsible for these. It was decided that the presettlements will be populated by Nahal soldiers who were recruited this summer and who are about to finish their basic training. The presettlements already have names. These are: Berakah, Ginat, Hermes, Mano'ah and Anhil. [Text] [TA251105 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 25 Aug 82 p 1]
PERES 'SECRET MEETING' WITH ARAB NOTABLES--Paris (exclusive to Davar)--Labor Party Chairman Shim'on Peres extended his visit to Paris by one day and will only return to Israel today. Sources in Paris said that the visit was extended in order to enable a secret meeting with Arab or Lebanese notables. [By Gid'on Kutz] [Excerpt] [TA181100 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 18 Aug 82 p 1]

JORDANIAN PRODUCE BAN--The authorized agricultural officer in the city of Janin has recently refused to grant farmers in that district certificates of origin to export melons and watermelons to Jordan. This refusal was in accordance with a Jordanian government decision. It is known that instead of importing watermelons and melons from the occupied West Bank, Jordan is importing these items from Turkey. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 27 Jul 82 p 4] 8592

WATER PAYMENT REFUSED--The municipal council of 'Arrabah met in an emergency session 2 days ago and decided not to pay water costs to the Israeli Regional Water Company unless the problem caused by the Israeli army at the new Fahlmah camp is settled. The army had removed from the camp water meters belonging to the city of 'Arrabah and had used water without meters. It is known that the municipality of 'Arrabah is suffering from a severe financial crisis due to the fact that authorities have refused to turn over funds earmarked for the municipality from tax and fuel revenues. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 27 Jul 82 p 4] 8592

GAZA RED CRESCENT FINANCES--Because of its large financial deficit, the Red Crescent Society in the Gaza Strip has been forced to put a freeze on a number of its humanitarian programs for citizens, especially those in refugee camps. Dr Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi, president of the society stated that the society lacked the necessary funds [to operate]. Not only did it not have funds for programs, but it also did not have the funds [to pay] the salaries of employees and workers this month. This lack of funds is due to the ban imposed on the society and on numerous societies in Gaza by Israeli authorities. They are not allowing the societies to receive their own funds from banks abroad. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 27 Jul 82 p 4] 8592

OPPOSITION TO VILLAGE COUNCIL--Leaders and residents of al-Ram, northeast of Jerusalem, sent a petition to Israel's minister of defense and minister of the interior denouncing the formation of a rural council in al-Ram that does not represent the villagers. The petitioners said they were not prepared to cooperate with this council in any way. The petition stated: "We were surprised by the appointment of a rural council for our village, al-Ram. The current makeup of this council does not represent the people and residents of al-Ram. The petition was signed by about 150 residents. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 27 Jul 82 p 4] 8592

CSO: 4423/612
JOINT FORCES POSITIONS, CONTINUOUS FIGHTING REPORTED

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 749, 23 Jun 82 pp 26-29

[Article: 'A Report on the Israeli Invasion by a Joint Forces Fighter']

[Text] We had a meeting with a fighter with the Joint Forces before leaving Kuwait to rejoin the fighting. The interview was on the military situation. He had come to Kuwait on a hurried mission, after which he would return to take up his position in Lebanon. We talked about the nature of the Israeli military invasion that disproved the pessimistic picture that was placed by the Arab and foreign media before our Arab masses to the effect that the military invasion by the enemy was able to occupy and encompass a large area of land. Occupation as defined by military dictionaries means to settle into a territory after having combed it and controlled it.

This brother fighter sat down to delineate the situation and give a detailed account of what is going on in those areas claimed to be occupied by the enemy. But there is a different version to the story, for at the same time, enemy radio itself is admitting that operations are still being carried out in Sidon, Tyre and Nabatiyeh. This means that the presence of the Joint Forces in its mountain locations and in the surrounding towns and countryside cannot be denied. This presence itself expresses the continuation of the lightening-like operations which fighters of psychological warfare excel at.

And now we invite our brother fighter to speak to us in detail about the positions of the Joint Forces:

"Before I begin speaking in detail, I must emphasize that the Zionist enemy is capable of occupying all of Lebanon, with its huge military forces. But it will absolutely not be able to control the areas it occupies, even if it multiplied its present forces by several times. The peoples' experience are full of martyrs and examples which attest to this.

"With this in mind, we are able to demonstrate the truth of what I say by a detailed elucidation of the reality of what is going on in Lebanese territory. Here we should expose the extent of deception being practised by the Arab media when it uses the expression 'Israeli devastation'. This expression attempts to depict the Zionist enemy as having uprooted the seeds of resistance in all areas between the furthest southern part of Lebanon and West Beirut, including the mountains, the Biqa', Chouf, etc. This compels us to give a more accurate
picture than the distorted one conveyed by the Zionist media and, unfortunately, by the Arab media, which has imbedded itself in the minds of the Arab masses. From the start, the Zionist enemy launched its attack in two forms: the first, the interjection of its ground forces through three axes, according to the number of bridges found at the Litani River. The other form is by way of sea and air landings in certain disparate areas of Lebanon. We ourselves, as well as observers, have noted there is an objective which the enemy desires to accomplish as soon as possible: to extend its invasion forces to the north to link up with those around Beirut. That's why we noticed that the invasion forces were trying not to run into the principal positions, with the exception of Beaufort Castle which hindered the advance of the Israeli forces along one of the three axes that could not be avoided.

"This objective may be explained by the fact that the invasion forces aimed at striking a mortal blow to the morale of the fighters by depicting itself as having completed the occupation of all of Lebanon. The most extreme attempt by the enemy in this regard is its claim that its forces have completely surrounded Beirut, and its demand that the leadership of the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National surrender.

"But the more time passed, the more exposed became the military aims and methods of the invasion forces. And this is not the place to speak about political aims, since the politicians are better able to analyze them.

"This is not only to confirm the failure of the invasion forces at the military level, but also to affirm that the forces of the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement are still militarily victorious. Even up to the present moment, we are able to propose the following:

"The invasion forces were able to occupy and comb Beaufort Castle and al-Bas Camp, just as it occupied al-Sa'idiyat and a number of villages in the Chouf region. And when we say that it occupied a place, we mean only what the military lexicon calls combing and controlling that place. In our estimation, there are numerous reasons for the success of the invasion forces in occupying these areas:

"First, linking up together with the intent of acquiring a tactical military advantage, for example with the taking of Beaufort Castle and al-Bas Camp. The invasion forces incurred heavy losses for this success.

"Second, other areas were devoid of any Joint Forces presence, which means that the Zionist forces entered them without any real fighting.

"Third, the invasion forces' ability to pass freely through the Jazin region where the Deterrent Forces are located.

The Tyre Area and the Surrounding Camps

"As for the other areas of southern Lebanon, and the mountains, the situation is completely different from what the invasion forces claim.
"In Tyre, the furthermost southern Lebanese city, enemy forces were able to surround it after pouring thousands of tons of bombs on it from the land, sea, and air. Nevertheless, they were not able to enter the city until they had secured the main street. In this regard we may note that Tyre's utility building is located at the entrance of the city and at the head of the main street. This building appeared in all the media to illustrate that Tyre had been occupied. And with the exception of the pictures taken of the main street, the news agencies and media did not print any pictures from inside the city at all. The other picture in which certain citizens appeared were of those people from the surrounding countryside who had taken refuge in Tyre during the shelling. If the invasion forces had occupied Tyre, then one of the most prominent sights would have been the display of the Joint Forces' leaders, either as martyrs or as prisoners, since this would have a great impact on morale. Similarly, the killing of the traitor Sa'd Haddad's deputy in Tyre is an indication that there continues to be resistance and a heroic presence by the Joint Forces. The claims of the invading forces are lies.

"As for the al-Burj al-Shamali camp, it lies 5 kilometers to the east of Tyre. There continues to be resistance there. Nothing could be more indicative of this than the words of a Zionist journalist who said that the invading forces attempted to draw near to the outskirts of the camp and were met with a hail of rocket shells.

"As for the Rashidiya Camp, the enemy forces and their radio station continue to broadcast calls for the camp's defenders to surrender. They have still not claim to have taken the camp.

"In Nabatiyah, what applies to Beaufort Castle also applies to this city. There was no doubt about the occupation of this city so that the invading forces could continue to advance to the north. For this purpose the enemy concentrated huge military forces, and the fighters in the city withdrew to the surrounding hills. Fighting is still going on in that area.

"And this is by the admission of the enemy itself.

Sidon and 'Ayn al-Hulwa

"Sidon is still fighting, despite the enemy's boasts that it has been occupied many times, and rumors of a curfew in the city. The truth is that the enemy was able only to enter the city's main street, despite its employment of five military brigades. The pictures that were broadcast by news agencies of enemy soldiers washing their clothes were taken at the Awali River, which is almost 2 kilometers from the northern entrance to Sidon.

"Here we must also ask, where are Joint Forces' leaders Mustafa Sa'd, Hajj Isma'il, and the other leaders, if enemy claims are true? Similarly, we must ask, how can the city be occupied if it is still being shelled from land, sea and air?

"As for "Ayn al-Hulwa Camp, the enemy is still making attempt after attempt to reach the outskirts of the camp. And in order to justify its forces' inability to do so, the enemy claims that the resistance is on the brink of collapse.
These claims are parroted by the foreign news agencies which are accompanying the invasion forces and which, unfortunately, supplies our own Arab media with information, including the idea that there are only 200 fighters in the camp. Here we must point out that these fighters, called militias, are the camp's own people. They are also called professional fighters. This exposes the lies of the enemy. There is still a large number of fighters in Rasnidiya and 'Ayn al-Hulwa, and in all of the camps, towns, and other locations. There are also many witnesses to these lies that claim Damur has been occupied. Perhaps the most glaring indication of these lies is, why haven't the enemy's media exploited for propaganda the fact that emigrants are returning to Damur (who are really phalangists from the eastern sector).

The Mountain: An Attempt to Surround it Because its Impossible to Control It.

"As for the Mountain, we would like everyone to know that 'Alay Bhamdun, Suq al-Gharb, and the surrounding areas have become the principle strongholds of resistance since the invasion began. The headquarters of the Joint Forces in the mountain is in 'Alay. This area still constitutes the chief point of supply operations, whether in volunteers or in relief supplies.

"We must also alert our people that to take control of the mountain entails numerous difficulties; indeed it is almost impossible, considering the nature of the terrain and the presence in it of thousands of Joint Forces fighters. An indication of the truth of this statement is that the invading forces attempted to encircle the mountain by occupying 'Uyun Siman and 'Aynturah and then descending to Zahlah in order to accomplish the twin goals of cutting off the road to Damascus and surrounding the Joint Forces in the mountain. But the presence of the Joint Forces and Syrian forces in 'Uyun Siman and 'Aynturah will repel any attempt in this direction.

"The Chouf region is another matter entirely. The invasion forces entered it with almost no fighting, due to the fact there were no Joint Forces positions in it since it was considered a secure and distant region. Therefore, the entry of invasion forces in this region was unexpected.

"The enemy was aided in this by the ease with which it passed through the Jazzin region, which was controlled by Deterrent Forces.

Beirut: The Graveyard of the Invasion

"Therefore we can deduce from this quick picture the reality of the military situation, in which we can confirm the presence of Joint Forces in all of the regions of the south, the mountain and, of course, West Beirut and its suburbs.

"As for Beirut, this subject needs some focusing so as to confirm a number of truths.

"First, the enemy's entry into the eastern sector, where the Phalangists, Ba'abda, and the presidential palace are found, are no more than publicity stunts aimed at affecting the morale of the fighters in Beirut, since these
areas have been hostile to the Palestinian revolution since 1974. Israeli forces have been there in one form or another throughout the war of the last 2 years.

"From a military point of view, the entry of the invasion forces into this area is to the benefit of the Joint Forces. This is because any attempt by the enemy to strike Beirut from there would lead to a response by the Joint Forces that would have a profound impact. That's why it would be very difficult for the invading forces to gamble on exposing its allies to destruction, which would likely be the case. For this reason, the invasion forces are obliged to shell Beirut by land, sea and air from the southern part of Lebanon.

"It follows that an attempt at invading Beirut from the eastern sector would be suicidal and costly. The fascist forces have already experienced this in 1975-1976.

Second, to attempt to enter through Khaldah is not an easy matter at all. This area is already planted with mines in every square foot, just as it is heavily concentrated with fighters in the areas of al-Uzza'i near the sea, and Burj al-Barajnah and al-Raml al-‘aly near the airport. So if the invasion forces advanced, they would be caught in a pincer. Therefore, such an attempt would be exorbitantly costly with minimal chance for success.

"Third, even if the invasion forces suffered these human and material costs and succeeded in advancing to the gates of Beirut, they will thereupon apprehend that it has entered their own graveyard. The people should realize that in all the battles that have been fought so far, personal arms have not been used. But this is what awaits any attempt at a sea landing on the Beirut coast or any success in crossing the resistance's defenses in southern Beirut.

"The Arab people must realize, just as the invasion forces now realize, that the Zionist enemy has entered the quagmire of Lebanon with all its contradictions. The enemy will try very hard to search for a way out. Everything it is now attempting is nothing but obstinacy. The Arab masses throughout the Arab homeland should know that the invasion forces will only leave Lebanon because it has met with run. The road to ruin will be final, even if the road is winding and some temporary halts transpire. To achieve this goal, the Arab masses must support the Joint Forces with human aid so as not to allow the invasion forces to lengthen its stay in Lebanon. Everyone should know that the battles are not only being fought in Beirut alone, but everywhere. Our lines of supply, communications and transport of forces are operating in a contagious manner: the enemy cannot strike at these lines because we possess hundreds of them. We are determined to keep our grip firmly on our guns. We will not be distracted by peace proposals because they lead only to surrender. Thousands will see martyrdom before there is any surrender. We are resolved to meet either victory or martyrdom. It will be our victory that is inevitable and that will bring the enemy's forces to run."

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CHRISTIAN–PALESTINIAN RELATIONS IN LEBANON

TA120738 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0518 GMT 12 Aug 82

[Text] Christian–Palestinian relations in southern Lebanon have deteriorated to a state of serious tension. There was a violent incident in a hamlet near Sidon, and, in the opinion of certain sources, it reflects the general situation in the field. GABI ZOHAR reports from southern Lebanon:

[ZOHAR] The background to the violent incident in the hamlet of Al–Miyah Wa Miyah begins with the murder of a father and son, inhabitants of the hamlet, committed by the terrorists 6 years ago. From that day to the Peace for Galilee Campaign the tension between the Lebanese inhabitants and the Palestinian refugees who have been living there since 1948 has grown ever greater. After the conquest of Sidon and the refugee camp in 'Ayn al–Hulwah, tension between the Palestinians and the local Lebanese reached an unprecedented peak. The mayor of Al–Miyah Wa Miyah, Dr Sam'an (Busbah), says that the Palestinian women were in the habit of threatening and cursing the Lebanese inhabitants of the hamlet and accusing them of conquering Lebanon through the IDF. The latter did not remain indifferent, and tension between the inhabitants increased. In reaction to this, the phalangist leaders stationed a small force of soldiers in Al–Miyah Wa Miyah a few weeks ago to supervise order. However, the result was actually an increase of tension between the Palestinians and Lebanese.

Last Saturday, 7 August, following a quarrel between two children, the Palestinian women reacted sharply against a phalangist force on the spot. The Lebanese women took the law into their own hands and fought back. The result: 15 houses belonging to Palestinian inhabitants were burned and many of the Palestinians left. An IDF force arrived there only 5 hours after the incident began. In the mayor's view, the tension between the Palestinians and the Lebanese will remain the same in Lebanon as long as no permanent solution is found to the Palestinian problem:

[Begin (Busbah) recording—in English] We should get rid of this problem, which is the Palestinian problem, because leaving the Palestinians as they were, they might be a problem for us in future. Their problem should be solved completely and absolutely. [end recording]
IDF sources have refused to comment officially on this issue. This is an internal affair of the Lebanese, and the IDF should not intervene. This is what an officer in Sidon told me. However, in the IDF, too, people are convinced that the incident in the hamlet of Al-Miyah Wa Miyah certainly reflects the worsened state of relations between the Lebanese and Palestinians in Lebanon.

CSO: 4400/453
SAMIR FRANJIIYAH VIEWS PROBLEMS FACING AL-JUMAYYIL

PM261049 Paris LE MONDE in French 26 Aug 82 p 3

[Interview with Lebanese National Movement Central Council member Samir Franjiyah by Jean Gueyras in Beirut: "Lebanon Cannot Survive Without the Notion of an Arab Hinterland"--date not given]

[Text] Beirut--Lebanese National Movement Central Council member Samir Franjiyah is the nephew of former President Sulayman Franjiyah although he does not share all of his political views.

In the past he formed the Christian Patriots Movement, which is now disappeared, and thinks that the essential problem at present is the creation of a democratic unitary movement grouping the forces which believe in Lebanon's unity and in its having a place in the Arab region. He thinks democracy is the only way of overcoming community conflicts.

When replying to our questions, Mr Franjiyah said he thinks the problems which Bashir al-Jumayyil will have to solve are so numerous and complicated that there is little chance of the new president of the republic being able to succeed in his mission. "The Israelis' behavior in Lebanon is likely to turn him into a puppet," he said, "and I am not sure that he is aware of the danger hanging over his political future." In addition Mr Franjiyah said that the refusal to have dialogue with the Muslims before the elections was a mistake which could cost him dearly. The problem, he added, is whether he will be able to adjust his aim and do so in time.

To be able to succeed in his mission, Mr Franjiyah continued, Al-Jumayyil must restore the democratic climate which prevailed in Lebanon before the civil war. "That necessarily presupposes," he added, "first the restoration of democracy in Christian circles where the bulk of the power is at present held by the Phalangist Party. The role played by that party must be reduced considerably and assurances given to all those who do not belong to the Phalangists."

Moreover Mr Franjiyah thinks the Phalangists made a serious mistake in sending their militia into the Israeli-occupied region, into the Ash-Shuf Mountains and the southern part of the country, particularly Sidon.
"The result of that policy," he said, "was disastrous at all levels and an atmosphere of civil war reigns in those regions. Many Muslims think the Phalangists' sole objective is to increase their hegemony in the shadow of the Israeli presence."

One of the future president's main tasks, he stressed, "will be to provide real and not just verbal guarantees on the democratization of society precisely to dispel the Muslims' prejudices."

[Question] Is Al-Jumayyil capable of effecting such an about-face? [Question ends]

"Judging from the way in which the Phalangist Party has developed," Mr Franjihay replied, "that will not be easy but he must realize that he cannot aspire to govern the whole country and at the same time be military leader of one of the communities. It is up to him to overcome that contradiction. One thing is certain: The Israelis will do nothing to make his task easier, because it would be they who would pay the price of any new-found popular unity. Moreover, that is demonstrated by the fact that they are still supporting Major Haddad's forces in the south and are still preventing the governors of that region from resuming their activities. They do not seem to have any interest in tolerating a stable government in Lebanon."

Maintaining Lebanon Within the Arab World

In Mr Samir Franjihay's view, the second essential guarantee which Al-Jumayyil must give the Muslims concerns the maintenance of Lebanon within the Arab world. "Lebanon," he said, "cannot be an Israeli protectorate because of the communities it comprises, its cultural heritage and its economic interests. Since 1975 Lebanon has been living mainly from the contribution of Lebanese living in the Arab world and especially in the Gulf region. Lebanon's Arab option is not an ideological option but is based on common interests; the existence of a common cultural world and on ties woven over centuries."

In practice, he added, that means that "Lebanon cannot conclude a separate peace with Israel unless there is Arab consensus on that point. It also means that it is impossible to demand the Syrians' departure from Lebanon without reaching an agreement with Damascus. Lebanon cannot survive without the notion of an Arab hinterland. Those are the facts which Al-Jumayyil must take into account."

Is the new president-designate not too closely linked to the Israelis to be able to guarantee himself scope for freedom of maneuver? "The existence of close relations between the Israelis and the Phalangist Party," Franjihay replied, "does not need to be proven. The fact remains, however, that while this alliance has enabled them in previous years to confront the Syrians, it now constitutes a heavy burden inasmuch as the Israeli Army is itself represented in force in Lebanon. In the past the alliance with Israel could—at a pinch—be justified by virtue of the principle that my enemy is my friend. With the Palestinians' departure and the persisting Israeli
occupation, this alliance can no longer be justified," Mr Franjiyah said, stressing that the Israeli Army's behavior in Lebanon says a great deal about Jerusalem's aims in Lebanese territory. "The destruction of the country's economic infrastructure, the thefts and pillaging committed and the systematic refusal to allow the legal authorities to exercise their powers—all this indicates a deliberate desire to ruin the country."

Disagreements With Northern Maronites

These are problems that Bashir al-Jumayyil will be unable to resolve unless he gives absolute priority to consolidating the unity of the Lebanese people. "Until this unity has been restored, the new president of the republic cannot legitimize his accession to power. Observance of constitutional forms alone is not enough."

Last, with reference to the problems posed in the north of the country by Al-Jumayyil's advent to power, Mr Franjiyah believes it is up to the new president of the republic to take the first step in peacefully settling the differences with the northern Maronites. "The reunification of the Maronite community," he said, "is certainly one of the essential stages on the road to the country's reunification; just as the restoration of democracy within the Maronite community is a stage in the restoration of democracy within the country. The Maronites cannot preach tolerance with regard to all Lebanon's problems while being intolerant themselves within their own community."
LEBANON

DAMASCUS ON LEBANESE MOVES AGAINST AL-JUMAYYIL

JN262022 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1915 GMT 26 Aug 82

[Text] Lebanese nationalist and Islamic leaders issued a statement today calling for unifying efforts to resist the Zionist occupation. The statement was issued by about 30 Lebanese nationalist and Muslim personalities including former prime ministers, ministers and deputies of parliament, following a meeting held today in the house of Sa'ib Salam, former Lebanese prime minister. It said that the participants in the meeting agreed to continue their efforts to organize national confrontation of the new situation and hold contacts with the brothers all over Lebanon to reach a unified stand, end the Israeli occupation unconditionally and defend a unified, sovereign and free Lebanon within a framework of sound democracy.

The SANA correspondent in Beirut says that a number of delegations are heading toward the Al-Biaq' area and the northern region to meet with former president Sulayman Franjiyah, former prime minister Rashid Karami and the deputies of Ba'labakk and Al-Hirmil who did not take part in the theatrical of Bashir al-Jumayyil's election. These deputies include Hasan ar-Rifa'i, whom the Phalangist gangs have attempted to assassinate. One of the former Lebanese prime ministers was asked to contact Raymond Iddih in Paris.

After these contacts, a unified, decisive and comprehensive stand will be declared against the appointment of Bashir al-Jumayyil as president of the republic, contravening the will of the Lebanese people.

CSO: 4400/453
OFFICIALS CALCULATE $4 BILLION IN ASSETS LOST

CN301302 Paris AFP in English 1235 GMT 30 Aug 82

[By Henri Maamarchachi]

[Text] Beirut, 30 Aug (AFP)—Lebanese officials calculate that the Israeli war machine has destroyed 4,000 million dollars worth of assets in three months, a figure that compared with a cost to Israel of 2,000 million dollars.

The 4,000 million dollars, equivalent to the Lebanese budget in its entirety, is not the whole story. Losses to the economy have to be counted, and no overall figure has been officially advanced yet.

Taking industry alone, the three months' losses are provisionally estimated at 400 million dollars, which is about half the export figure of 1980. These statistics take account solely of output and export losses, and exclude material losses and total or partial destruction at numerous factories during the Israeli attacks in and around Beirut.

In south Lebanon and Al-Biya’, destruction is estimated at hundreds of millions of Lebanese pounds.

Losses in the commercial and services sectors, formerly among the most flourishing in the Middle East, are also very high: over 1,500,000 pounds, it is said. This shortfall stems partly from the closure of the port and airport.

As to agriculture, Israel has dealt the sector a death blow, many are saying. Crops, equipment, buildings and various other installations have been destroyed in vast quantities in the rich Al-Biya' lowlands. In addition, Israel aims to sell its produce in Lebanon at the expense of Lebanese farmers. Losses per month to farmers here are estimated at some 200 million pounds, or 40 million dollars.

There is also of course the massive destruction of highways and buildings in several parts of Lebanon. In west Beirut about one-quarter of the buildings have been badly damaged or destroyed. Other damage has occurred at the
ports of Tyre and Sidon in the south, at the Az-Zahrani oil refinery and the Beirut international airport.

The newspaper AS-SAFIR, citing Lebanese officials, says the state needs 15,000 million dollars for reconstruction. This figure, the paper says, will be quoted by Lebanon in a report to the current Arab foreign ministers' conference at Mohammadiah and at the Arab summit in Fez.

The 15,000 million dollars includes the revised cost of the public sector reconstruction plan voted in 1978, and state participation in rebuilding private property.

This plan, which was to have extended over an eight-year period, is only one-tenth completed, due to persistent lack of security in this country over the past few years.

Lebanon will put forward several requests to the Arab countries for economic and reconstruction aid.

It will urge the payment of aid promised at the Tunis Arab summit of 1979, amounting to 2,000 million dollars over a five-year period. Only 384 million dollars have been received so far.

It will also ask for 2,000 million dollars earmarked at the last Arab summit to help plug the accumulated Lebanese budget shortfall.

At the same time the government of Beirut hopes for long-term assistance from Arab development funds, Western countries and international bodies.

Economists here say there should be no trouble getting these loans, in view of the underlying vitality of the Lebanese economy and the basic healthy state of its finances in terms of gold and foreign currency reserves.
HADDAD ON ILLEGAL BUILDING, DEPUTIES' DEPARTURE

NC290725 Marj 'Uyun Lebanon Voice of Hope in Arabic 0630 GMT 29 Aug 82

[Text] Free Lebanon Commander Major Haddad has made the following remarks to our correspondent:

1. Free Lebanon Commander Major Haddad has noted that a number of people are exploiting the current transitional period by building homes without obtaining a legal building license. For this reason, everyone, without exception, is prohibited from starting construction before obtaining a valid license in accordance with the laws in force from the competent departments. The internal security forces are asked to send patrols to stop these contraventions. In this respect the An-Nabatiyah gendarmerie platoon is allowed to send patrols in the eastern sector, and the Tibnin gendarmerie, in the western sector, until the basic gendarmerie posts are established in both sectors.

2. Free Lebanon Commander Major Haddad has also noticed that certain quarters are illegally exacting fees on the beach. Therefore, any quarter not empowered by law is forbidden to take such fees. The taking of sand by citizens is limited to the place that has been previously fixed by the government authorities.

3. Certain deputies are trying to leave the country from the liberated areas to keep the cabinet that will be formed by the new era from winning a vote of confidence or from endorsing a peace treaty with Israel in the future. Thus, we propose to those who are concerned to close the border to the deputies in order to prevent them from leaving Lebanon and to treat any deputy who wants to leave with rigorous and deterrent measures.

CSO: 4400/453
HADDAD TO PRESERVE MILITIA UNTIL TREATY SIGNED

TA270606 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Aug 82 p 2

[Report by Menahem Horowitz]

[Text] Metulla--Major Sa'd Haddad said yesterday that he would only agree to reintegrate his forces in the Lebanese Army if there was a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon.

At a news conference here, the commander of the south Lebanon militias said this was the only way that peace in the south could be guaranteed.

"We don't want to cause the partition of Lebanon," declared Haddad, "but it should be remembered that we fought on our own for Lebanese independence for seven years."

Observers here felt that Haddad was hinting at concern that he would be excluded in a deal made over his head between the Israeli Government and President-elect Bashir al-Jumayyil. Sources close to Haddad expressed concern that his status had become problematic for Israel. They noted that the militia commander has not met with an Israeli political leader since the dramatic meeting with Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Beaufort Castle in the second week of the war, though he met last week in Marj 'Uyun with Chief of Staff Rav-Aluf [Lt Gen] Refa'el Eytan.

However, Haddad officially welcomed the election of Al-Jumayyil who he turned "one of us." Haddad said that Al-Jumayyil's victory was his victory also and a victory for Israel.

The militia commander intimated that he had met with Al-Jumayyil in Beirut. Haddad's followers would like to see Haddad appointed as representative of the president-elect in south Lebanon.

CSO: 4400/453
INTERVIEW WITH LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER

OW291035 Tokyo AKAHATA in Japanese 26 Aug 82 p 7

[By correspondent Haruo Ogata]

[Text] Paris, 24 Aug—Lebanese Communist Party politburo member (Albert Faraat), granted an interview to this reporter (Ogata) on 24 August in Paris where he is staying. He spoke of the Israeli aggression and the Lebanese situation under occupation. He particularly denounced the 23 August presidential election in Lebanon as an effort to establish a new fascist regime under Israeli occupation, vowing to carry out a national campaign to nullify it. He said the Lebanese Communist Party wishes to further develop its relations of friendship and solidarity with the Japan Communist Party [JCP], adding that they have been fostered by the dispatch of a Lebanese Communist Party delegation to the 15th JCP Congress and by talks with JCP leaders including incumbent Chairman Tetsuo Fusu and Vice Chairman Tomio Mishizawa.

A summary of the interview follows:

Question: What do you think of the Lebanese situation?

Answer: Israel invaded our country, occupied two-thirds of our territory and is violating our sovereignty and interfering in our domestic affairs. The Israelis are aiming to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon, wipe out the Lebanese national movement in which our party is also participating, destroy the constitutional political system in Lebanon and set up a new fascist regime and a satellite state. This is designed to hamper Lebanon's democratic development and cut off its bonds with the Arab countries. The election of Bashir al-Jumayyil in the presidential election accords with this design.

Question: What is your view on the election?

Answer: A broad segment of the progressive forces, including our party, does not recognize it, declaring that the election is null and void. The election in question was held under the threat of rightist terrorism and blackmail, in a military environment under the guns of Israeli tanks, not in parliament. Two days before the election, Parliament Member (Rifai), who opposed the holding of this election, was raided. The constitution
stipulates that 62 or more of the members of Parliament (92 at present) form a quorum. Those who voted in the election numbered 62 but some of them had been taken there by force; 30 members were absent. That election is extremely dangerous to the independence and freedom of our country and that is why a majority of the people, including not only the progressive forces but also some rightists, oppose it.

We will create a broad patriotic, democratic national front and keep on fighting. Even after the PLO's withdrawal from Beirut, Lebanese progressive forces will stay on and carry out activities calling for an immediate, unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanon.

Opposition to the invasion and intervention from outside is a question of principle; there can be no compromise.

Question: The "Arab silence" is drawing public attention. What do you think of this?

Answer: That is true. In the course of its development, the Arab liberation movement has been stressing social class factors, with the result that reinforcement of the PLO or the Lebanese leftist forces looked dangerous in the eyes of the leaders of the Arab states. This time they hesitated to take action against the Israeli invasion and kept silent in the most important stages.

Our party believes that the Arab national liberation movement has plunged into a crisis and, in its present state, cannot defeat imperialism, Zionism and reaction. Regrettably, the recent events have proved this to be true.

This is a question still to be discussed within the movement; it is a question facing the communist parties in the Arab countries. Differences of views have become wider than ever before, differences between those parties that attach importance to facts and set forth policies suited to national circumstances and other parties that keep advocating the same formulas and doctrines irrespective of realities. Without overcoming the latter's opposition, the communist parties in the Arab states cannot extricate themselves from playing a secondary political role.

Question: What about the U.S. administration's strategy?

Answer: Since the collapse of Iran's shas (in 1979), the United States has been directly intervening in the Middle East by dispatching the 6th Fleet and the rapid deployment forces and establishing bases. While strengthening its partnership with Israel in accordance with the U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation agreement concluded last December, the United States is trying to curry favor with the Arab countries by stressing that it shares strategic interests with them under the pretext of facing the Soviet threat and the danger of "international terrorism." It is also aiming to liquidate the progressive forces in the Arab countries and expand the Camp David Accord. If Lebanon's "Israelization" is achieved, it will be a big "gain" for the U.S. administration.
Question: What about the future struggle?

Answer: There is no feeling of disappointment among us. In the past we have been acquiring bitter but precious experience. The struggle for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops who number as many as 100,000, the restoration of Lebanon's independence and sovereignty and the establishment of the Palestine people's right to self-determination begins now.

CSD: 4400/453
BURG AL-BARAJINAH SUPPORTS AL-JUMAYYIL—The people of Burj al-Barajinah today sent the following cable of congratulations to the president-elect: His excellence the president-elect: We, the people and sons of Burj al-Barajinah, send you warmest congratulations on your election as president of the country. We wish you success. We know that you have always defended right, justice and equality. On this historic occasion in the life of the homeland and in view of the tragedies, pain and hardships that this homeland has encountered, we place ourselves at your disposal and remain with you to work for a united, unified and independent Lebanon and to end all alien ambitions in our beloved Lebanon. In the meantime, the people have asked for the deployment of the Lebanese Army in Burj al-Barajinah area to take over security duties in the area. [Text] [NC280839 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 0815 GMT 28 Aug 82]

AL-JUMAYYIL’S ARAB POLICY CITED—Kuwait, 27 Aug (WAKH)—The newspaper AL-QABAS today quotes sources it describes as close to the newly-elected Lebanese president as saying that Bashir al-Jumayyil will focus in the near future on Arab affairs and will give priority to Syria. The sources added that the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon depends upon the execution of the final stage of the withdrawal agreement. The sources point out that Al-Jumayyil believes that the tripartite Palestinian-Syrian-Israeli withdrawal agreement from Lebanon should be completed because the presence of these forces on Lebanese territory is interrelated. Also the sources say that Al-Jumayyil will not attend the upcoming Arab summit conference if it is going to be held as scheduled on 6 September. The sources expect that Al-Jumayyil will meet with former Lebanese Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam, who boycotted the election session, via U.S. Envoy Philip Habib, before Al-Jumayyil officially takes office on 22 September. [Text] [GF271546 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0925 GMT 27 Aug 82]

UTILIZATION OF ABANDONED HOMES—In the eastern sector the IDF is now readying abandoned homes for use as living quarters and headquarters in preparation for the winter, and is careful in checking that their residents have indeed abandoned them. The IDF will not set up permanent camps in the eastern sector. [Text] [TA250546 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 25 Aug 82]
ISRAELIS ASSIST OIL REFINERIES—Israeli engineers and technicians took part in the rebuilding of the oil refineries of the oil companies in Lebanon which were damaged during the war. Israelis are still working in those plants with the approval of the Saudis and the U.S. companies that are producing the oil. The oil reaches the plants through the Tefline pipe, going through the Golan Heights. [Text] [TA251126 Tel Aviv HA'OLAM HAZE in Hebrew 25 Aug 82 p 10]

HADDAD PREVENTS UNIFIL MOVEMENTS—Maj Sa'd Haddad's men are now allowing UN vehicles to move in southern Lebanon. Our correspondent Hayim Hecht reports that this comes in reaction to the restrictions UNIFIL has imposed on the movements of Haddad's men in the areas under its control. Major Haddad is currently [words indistinct] through his own initiative Brig Gen Maarten Woerlee from Holland, the deputy UNIFIL commander. Our correspondent has learned that Haddad conferred this week with Chief of Staff Refa'el Eytan at his home in Marj 'Uyun. [Text] [TA201059 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 20 Aug 82]

CSO: 4400/453
ATTACK ON CORRUPT OFFICIALS

Tripoli AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in Arabic 12 Jul 82 p 11

[Article by Sa'id 'Ali 'Uwaydan: "The Opening Up of a Black Market: A Decision Made by the Secretary of the General People's Committee!"]

[Text] The forces of the revolution have been working night and day to urge the popular masses to eliminate, once and for all, all forms of exploitation, domination, haughtiness, discrimination, and favoritism practiced against the masses. They have thus achieved brilliant victories by eliminating the symbols of the demolished former regime and uprooting the vestiges of this regime after stripping [corrupe government officials] of their weapons, criminally prosecuting them for their actions and deeds, and by exposing to the eyes and ears of the masses [their faults, those of] their families, their friends, and those who have been sharing and dividing the booty and facilitating their movement and travel by providing them with immunity, defending them, and protecting them from the "center of power loyal to the forces of the revolution and the authority of the people." In particular, the revolutionary organization, the "Revolutionary Committees," has been striving to propagate the revolution and urge the masses of the world to eliminate and destroy exploitation and slavery and to do away with the world of tyranny, class society, and capitalism—with all of its milieu and its despotic domination of political life, the economy, which do not attach any value or importance to human beings, only respect an individual who has achieved status, power, immunity, and wealth—even if he obtained all this by swindling, trickery, exploitation, and falsification.

The General People's Committee tells us that the "venerable Council of Ministers regrets" the decision made to revive and continue all of the underpinnings of the remnants of the old and defunct society of exploitation. It regrets the stupid, offhand, superficial behavior which confirms the provocative mentality of those who—even today—behave with a pre-revolutionary mentality, exploiting our atmosphere and circumstances of austerity and the blockade by the imperialists and reactionaries, in order to perpetrate their faculties and intrigues, to attempt to curtail and stunt the growth of the revolution, to keep the revolution in a traditional mold and form, and to attempt to encircle the revolution in order that they be able to continue exercising their domination in accordance with their aristocratic mentality and daily work routine. They are thereby exploiting the trust of the masses that put them in their high
positions, so that they can destroy our country's economy and participate in the imperialist blockade of the Arabs of Libya.

Arabs of Libya!

Your economy is threatened with destruction, your achievements are threatened with annihilation. You can expect the return of exploitation and all its phenomena. Be ready to surrender the markets, installations, and factories which you appropriated to live at the mercy of wages, rents, commerce, the dogs of Idris, the stooges of the Jews, Italians, and profiteers from development. You can expect that those whom you put in the administrative and technical committees to oversee the plan for your transformation and to carry out your decisions will betray you, will steal what you have worked for as new employers, and will demand your assets while no one checks up on them. The decision is being made to establish a black market in which all types of foreign currencies--U.S., British, French, and German--are sold after they set a limit of 300 dinars a year per individual as foreign travel allowances. At the same time, some of the secretaries--and others of their stripe who have infiltrated the revolutionary organization, the "Revolutionary Committees," and who are protégés of the forces of the revolution--have telegrams sent ahead to the People's Bureaus in order to facilitate their actions, have aid be provided to them, have travel tickets issued to them at the expense of the society, and have suites in the plush hotels of Europe reserved for them while they are on annual leave. All of these expenses are paid for by society and are at the expense of the "wretched" citizens. Furthermore, some of the secretaries, and those of their stripe, are not limiting themselves to the clearly defined amount in decree of the secretary of the General People's Committee. Thousands of dinars are being taken out of the country illegally for the purposes of medical treatment, tourism, and purchases of the most modern attire for themselves, their wives, and their relatives.

These are the actions and behavior of those who have wanted to use their official positions as a means by which to look down on people and be snobbish, thereby demonstrating, by means of their actions and behavior, the mentality of "Sa'ib Salam Bey" who has power and influence, as well as curses, in his trousers.

Arabs of Libya!

Did you know that the secretary of the General People's Committee, who has all this status, influence, and power, compensated the (Exxon) Co. to the tune of $90 million while it was participating in the imperialist blockade imposed upon Libya and after it had halted its operations in Libya, in compliance with Reagan's orders? This action puts him on the bench of the accused. How do the Revolutionary Committees stand with regard to the person who signs what is dictated to him and serves his friends, their families, and their in-laws who are employees in international organizations, especially UNESCO, not giving a hoot for the decisions and recommendations made by the People's Congresses, thus doing harm to the authority of the people—who are the only authority? The phenomenon of enabling relatives, protégés, and friends to work abroad, entrusting them with leadership assignments, exploiting the wealth of society in their interests, granting them powers and facilities, and restricting these
for other people--these are only examples of the practices engaged in by the official of the General People's Committee whose in-laws occupy the following positions in organizations abroad: One of them is head of the Trade Bureau in Milan, Italy; another is a Libyan delegate to UNESCO; a third in-law is an official of the Libyan Arab Bank in Paris--and there are others on the waiting list.

What a difference there is between the true and sincere forces of the revolution and these despotic, selfish practices?

The forces of the revolution demand that criminal charges be brought in connection with the actions of all these people who possess archaic and fossilized mentalities and are afflicted with the diseases of bureaucracy, influence-peddling, bribery, and favoritism.

9468
CSO: 4504/426
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Tripoli AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in Arabic 12 Jul 82 p 6

[Article: "Abundant Production and Poor Marketing!"]

[Text] Agricultural products go to waste because of administrative neglect.

We are a nation which is always striving to achieve self-sufficiency in agriculture and industry, both of which are closely interlinked. However, self-sufficiency cannot be achieved and a strong economy cannot be built unless there is really serious concern for agriculture, since agriculture is a sector which provides industry with raw materials.

So necessity requires that joint scientifically-based programs be formulated for all of the parties concerned with agriculture. If we manage to formulate a programmed and long-range plan, we will then certainly have saved ourselves from the specter of famine which haunts the world. Also, if complete coordination is achieved between the General People's Committee for Agriculture, the General People's Committees for Agriculture in the municipalities, the Special Committees for Agriculture within the framework of each municipality, and the Secretariat of Agricultural Reclamation, this will mean the end of the chaos involving seasonal crops which are inconsistent in terms of production quantities and which face the danger of being ruined and going to waste—as has happened with onions and potatoes which have been produced. This would also mean the end of another problem, which still exists, and which is the problem of poor marketing practices which palgue the farmers who produce the crops.

What Is Wrong With the Marketing?

'Ali Muhammad al-Shawish, who resides in the al-Mutrad area, is, along with his family, a full-time farmer. The first thing he said was: "This year I grew a lot of watermelons and grew an especially large crop of onions. But my problem was with the bad marketing practices! For example, one brings a truck-load of watermelons to the Agricultural [Products] Marketing Co. and hopes to sell his crop as quickly and as efficiently as possible. But what happens is that you have a long and tiresome wait which lasts for many hours, and sometimes days, until the truck belonging to the marketing company comes [to take your crop]. The red tape takes its course in the monotonous sequence [of bureaucratic actions] before they even unload your crop that you want to market.
They classify your crop and, if more than one classification is involved in the case of your crop, they give the [whole] crop the lowest classification. All of this goes on while we farmers are waiting and having to have the patience of Job. You wait in a long and broad line. And when your turn comes, you should not be surprised if they have given your crop a low classification and priced it lower than ever before. One time I brought a potato crop and when my turn came to weigh my crop, I was told that the price had changed from 300 dirhams per kilo to 200 dirhams per kilo. I was really astounded and began to wonder whether prices could change so rapidly." Mr al-Shawish went on to say: "Bad marketing practices caused me a huge loss this year. During the onion-growing season I lost many hectares of onions which are now rotting under the ground. And bear in mind that seed and chemical fertilizers cost me 1,000 dinars!!"

"The direct cause of this loss was the Agricultural Products Marketing Co. which did not accept my onion crop. This year I was happy when I heard about the decisions permitting farmers to sell their crops directly to individual citizens inside the municipality. But some municipalities are self-sufficient in terms of agricultural crops, whereas other municipalities need [to buy additional] agricultural produce. Often the growers take the initiative in marketing their crops outside their own municipalities. But surprises occur such as farmers being forbidden to sell their crops in municipalities—which are not their own municipalities—which they come to market their crops. Just for your information, a kilo of potatoes in Tubruk now costs 450 dirhams. We should bear in mind that the price per kilo [was] 70 dirhams plus 40.5 dirhams for shipping costs. But now the price has spiraled all the way up to 450 dirhams!! [Only] the Agricultural [Products] Marketing Co. and its branch organizations and facilities know for sure [why the price is so high]."

"Actually the Agricultural Products Marketing Co., in addition to inflicting losses on the farmers, is also striving to fleece them by any means possible and is consequently causing them to acquire negative attitudes—and this results in the farmers not trying to increase production or achieve higher production rates. The Agricultural Products Marketing Co. is tightening the noose around the farmers and venting its anger on them, and the result is a decrease and curtailing of their production. What would your opinion be of a company which sells a farmer empty onion bags at a price of 100 dirhams per bag and then does not take this 100 dirhams into account when the farmer sells his crop? And this is not all. Five percent is deducted from the amount of money which the crop is sold for, and another percentage is deducted as taxes." We also talked to 'Ajuz Khalifah, another farmer. At first he did not want to talk, but then he said: "I waited 4 days in order to sell 12 kantars of onions to the Agricultural Products Marketing Co. I and my son took turns waiting for 72 hours near my truck loaded with the onions so that we would not lose our turn."

Another farmer had the following to say about the marketing process: "This year I had a good potato crop both in terms of quantity and quality, and I was expecting to receive a good price for my crop to compensate me for all the sweat and effort which I had put into it. When I brought my crop to the company to sell it and after a very long wait, my crop was rejected and no significant reason was given for this. After I and my friends made considerable efforts [to get the company to accept the crop], the crop was accepted.
and was classified as Grade 2. The reason for this was as follows: Most of my potato crop was Grade 1, but it was mixed with a small quantity of potatoes which were Grade 2. I had to accept this action in order not to lose the reward for all the effort and sweat that I had put into the process of growing and watering the crop."

We also talked to an old-time farmer who had farmed for many years and asked him his opinion about the marketing. He said: "The marketing of the crops takes place in an unjust fashion. Often the officials of the company favor their friends and acquaintances and allow them to finish ahead of the others. Some of them do not have to wait long. The procedure of accepting their crops takes place surprisingly fast. The reason for this, as I have said, is that [the company officials] allow their friends and acquaintances to come to the back doors to sell their crops."

Another farmer said: "One day I took my lettuce crop to the company. The company rejected the crop after I had spent 12 continuous hours endeavoring [to get them to accept the crop]. In order to compensate myself after the company had refused to buy my crop, I resorted to selling the lettuce directly to individual citizens. But then I was disagreeably surprised by the fact that the Municipal Police prohibited me from doing this! When I went to the [People's] Congress of my municipality and told them that my crop had been rejected, they told me to go somewhere far away so that I could quietly finish the process of selling my crop!!"

The world of the Agricultural Products Marketing Co. is enveloped by secrecy and surrounded by mystery from all sides. This marketing channel, which the farmers must go through, sometimes is wide enough to let camels pass through it, but at other times it is so narrow that even ants cannot pass through it. Furthermore, this company suffers from total ignorance. It has happened that great quantities of onions have been brought to the company after the company had thought that onions were virtually non-existent.
BRIEFS

DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT WITH UN--The second agreement between the UN Development Program and the Omani Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs was signed on 17 July 1982 in order to help implement the national program for developing the local communities during the period 1982-1985. By virtue of this agreement, some specialized UN organizations will provide aid in the form of technical expertise in order to implement the second stage of the program in all the provinces of the Sultanate and in accordance with a specific timetable. [GF232019 Muscat Domestic Service in Arabic 1300 GMT 21 Aug 82]

CSO: 4404/450
U.S. MOVING TOWARD NEW POLICY TOWARD MIDDLE EAST

LD241658 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 24 Aug 82

[Text] Anyone who follows the statements of U.S. officials such as Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, will have noticed a turning point in U.S. policy toward the struggle in the Middle East. News and reports which preceded their statements indicate that there is a move toward a new U.S. policy in the Middle East, in an attempt to understand the facts and the recent developments in Lebanon.

The lessons which the U.S. people have learned from the Lebanese crisis are a fundamental and important (?factor) in the new policy of the U.S. administration. George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger, when they each stressed the need for a long-term solution to the Palestinian problem based on an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip, were in fact indicating the conviction of the Reagan administration that an end must be put to the wars and conflicts in the region, particularly since we know that the United States has great influence over Israel by virtue of their mutual ties and relations.

Recently too, the Americans, including President Reagan, began to reconsider their assumptions and their attitudes toward the PLO as well as their supportive attitudes toward Israel. Such reconsideration is natural since it has become clear to the U.S. Government that all previous attempts at finding a settlement were futile thanks to Israel's militaristic policy, which relies on killing and destruction. It was a policy that met with rejection and condemnation from the American people on whose aid Israel lives.

Observers agree that the Middle East will yet see many a problem and many a crisis. The departure of the Fedayeen from Beirut is not the end of the debate over their problem. Peace will not return to the Middle East until every Palestinian gets his full right, particularly since the whole world now recognizes that finding a homeland for the Palestinians is an absolute condition for stability in the Middle East.

Observers add that Israeli-U.S. relations have been extremely strained since the siege of Beirut and following the statements of Shultz and Weinberger. Observers are asking whether the U.S. Government's call for a Palestinian state is serious this time. Will such a state become a feasible reality or will it become the relic of a (?shameful act)?

CSO: 4404/450

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COMMENTARY URGES AMERICAN NEUTRALITY

LD221910 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 22 Aug 82

[Commentary by (Mubarak Harb al-Ghazi)]

[Text] Through numerous indications, the follower of U.S. policy in the Middle East would be able to see something new in the pro-Israeli course. The United States might not become completely neutral yet it could consider the Arab viewpoint, even to a limited degree.

The United States is not called upon to adopt stances that the concerned parties have not adopted. In view of the current situation, any change in the American attitude toward the Arab cause could be considered an achievement. This does not mean that the Arabs are called upon to accept minor gains at the expense of the Palestinian issue as a whole and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state. We should develop the American attitude in order to push it toward neutrality; American neutrality would mean the end of Israeli arrogance and military rampage.

Begin and his comrades are not ignorant of the fact that American neutrality would mean the defeat of Israel. The Israelis want to keep American-Arab relations at a level of confrontation so that they would continue to receive American aid. However, Begin and Sharon, having gone too far in the Lebanese war, have placed America face to face with its responsibility as a superpower, as a founding member of the UN Security Council.

In light of international media reports on what is happening behind the international political scenes, no Arab country has had any positive effect on U.S. policy except the kingdom. The contacts of His Majesty King Fahd with President Reagan resulted in the American president firmly warning the Israeli enemy to close the gates of hell, which Sharon opened.

Through the results of the Saudi stance, a new vision is appearing before the Arab world about what Arab solidarity could achieve in submitting proposals for a Middle East peace. The Saudi peace plan was the first logical, Arab proposal for a just solution to the Middle East situation. This peace plan preserves the rights of the Palestinian people more so than what the UN resolutions have called for. When the Arabs realize where their strength lies and put their shattered energies to work in all spheres victory will be near, God willing.

CSO: 4404/450
PAPER URGES AL-JUMAYYIL TO DISARM PHALANGISTS

GF241353 Al-Dammam AL-YAWM in Arabic 24 Aug 82 p 4

[Editorial: "Will the Missing Lebanese Reconciliation Be Achieved?"]

[Text] The election of Bashir al-Jumayyil to the presidency of Lebanon has taken place at a time when Israeli military forces are occupying Beirut and more than half of Lebanon. The election has taken place while the blood of thousands of victims in west Beirut is still wet—blood that they shed in their courageous stand against Israeli aggression.

During the next month the new "legitimate authority" will assume office while Lebanon is still under the yoke of occupation and there is an absence of national reconciliation.

Undoubtedly, the experience of west Beirut and its inhabitants will be one of the priorities of the new "legitimate authority" which will discuss radical solutions to the Lebanese crisis that has lasted for more than 7 years.

No one of course can forget the role of the commander of the Phalangist forces during the Lebanese crisis, and his role as one of the principal parties in the crisis. The enormous responsibilities which await Lebanese president No 13 are represented in his ability to bypass his leadership of the Phalangist Party and concentrate on one task only; namely, the achievement of the missing national reconciliation.

The achievement of national reconciliation will not be easy. It cannot be imposed by force on the Lebanese Arab society. Indeed, the use of force would make the situation more flammable and could ultimately lead to the implementation of plans to partition Lebanon into sectarian statelets.

Prior to the elections, the candidate of the Lebanese front—the Christian coalition—said that he will approach Lebanon as a single society, and that he will strive to restore national reconciliation to Lebanon through a new ambitious program that will tackle all the intractable problems that has faced Lebanese Governments. Foremost among these problems is to disarm
the various parties and hand over these arms to the government, which should safeguard Lebanon's internal security, just as it should defend Lebanon's borders.

Will the new Lebanese president begin by disarming the Phalangists, whose forces he still commands, as a first step in which he can affirm his determination to achieve the Lebanese reconciliation to which he aspires?

The question is posed until the new Lebanese president, Bashir al-Jumayyil, assumes office next month.

CSO: 4404/450
RIYADH VIEWS ARAB UNITY, FES SUMMIT GOALS

LD121548 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 12 Aug 82

[Report from "Political Analyses" program; presented by Hashim 'Abd al-Hashim]

[Text] It can now be said that the most important elements for the success of the forthcoming Arab summit conference are already there. It can also be said that the Arab and Islamic nation has reached the maximum degree of understanding of the priorities it has to study and toward which it has to adopt a unified stand. It can also be said that the Arab and Islamic nation is now more aware of the gravity of the situation, all its circumstances and the need for cohesion, solidarity and agreement. The only option now open to the Arab nation is unity. Without it it will have to pay a dear price.

Division has been the weapon which enabled the enemy to gain supremacy over us. The enemy has used his weapon to fight us and overcome us throughout history. This is because we have squandered all that would bolster our steadfastness in the face of challenges. But today, when reason and logic have triumphed, we have a great opportunity to make a vital stand of which the Arab man would feel proud and for which he would offer greater sacrifices after having had his dreams shattered for so long by acts seeking to frustrate or outbid each other.

Unity is the best guarantee for the independence of Arab countries that will enable them to face their enemies with the most effective weapons. Material force alone cannot destroy the enemy. Likewise threats uttered from a position of weakness can never attain the aspirations of the Arab peoples. What will actually help to move it from a state of desperation to one of self-confidence is to see itself led by a leadership which has unified views and objectives and which is determined to take revenge against the enemies through the strength of solidarity and the effectiveness of unified action.

There is no need to remind anyone that the steadfastness of the Palestinians in the face of the destructive Israeli war machinery, supported by the Lebanese people, provides the catalytic force that could bolster a true Arab nation.

If the Arab nation has any options at all, it is first and foremost to bolster Arab morale, safeguard and maintain the spirit of struggle based
on faith in the objectives, and work with all our abilities to ensure the realization of the joint objectives.

Everyone is unaware of these objectives. Everyone knows that the way to achieve them is through a unified Arab action. It should also be clear to all that the most effective way to control the enemy and guarantee the continuity of the Arab struggle is from the position of military, economic and material strength.

The attendance of the Fez conference this time, in the spirit of unity, will help to retrieve many of our rights. We have lost many of these rights as a result of the failure of our methods.

What is more important, perhaps, is that the summit should have a new driving force which has the ability to study and analyze matters instead of blindly confronting the unknown under the pressures of the present situation which might result in actions which lack wisdom and the means of implementation.

We must keep in mind that the Israeli enemy pursues its evil objectives according to carefully drawn plans which are based on the exploitation of inter-Arab contradictions, to which it contributes or outright creates, to undermine Arab efforts in order to secure the best conditions for the realization of its treacherous designs.

The Arab nation does not seem to act but only react to the unexpected blows of its enemies. We are, however, more confident than ever before that the spirit now prevailing the Arab nation is completely different and the results of the summit will live up to the expectations.

CSO: 4404/449
AL-QADHDHAFI SHOULD NOT ATTEND SUMMIT

GF150427 Jidda AL-MADINAH in Arabic 10 Aug 82 p 2

[Editorial: "The Fes Summit: It Should Be Held"]

[Text] The number of Arab countries responding to the initiative by the two Yemeni presidents to hold an emergency Arab summit conference is increasing and so is the number of countries responding to King Hassan II's call for holding the proposed summit in Fes, considering it an extension of the suspended Arab summit.

Amid the increasing response to this call, Libyan Colonel al-Qadhdhafi refused to attend the summit and set conditions contrary to his known stands on the dilemma of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples--stands called in question publicly by the steadfast struggler Yasir 'Arafat. Al-Qadhdhafi's stand objecting to the holding of the Arab summit in Fes comes in terms of his own failure to hold the African summit because many African leaders are concerned with safeguarding the OAU from the fragmentation that would result should it be subjected to the trend which al-Qadhdhafi wants.

None of those who pursue al-Qadhdhafi's tortuous and contradictory course, which is far from the welfare of Islam and the Arabs, expects any good or positive results from al-Qadhdhafi's participation in an African or Arab summit. Moreover, what positive achievements has al-Qadhdhafi realized for his country and his people? We thus wonder about what he could achieve for or with others.

Evidence and data coincide about the disasters he has brought to his country and Libya's neighbors, even the distant ones. He supports the Soviet Union in its invasions of Afghanistan and Ethiopia in its invasion of Somalia. Also, his embroilment in Uganda, Chad and the countries abutting the Great Sahara (the Moroccan-Sahara war) and the like is well-known.

If the African summit had been held, its agenda would have been changed into a trial for al-Qadhdhafi's role in shredding Africa. If the Arab summit is held and attended by al-Qadhdhafi, the attendants will find it difficult to avoid discussing al-Qadhdhafi's role in the schism of the Arab fold and the damage which his regime inflicts intentionally upon many Arab countries peoples and territories.
Therefore, logic and reason and an examination of developments of events urge us to say that preventing al-Qadhdhafi from attending the Arab summit is better. It will provide an argument-free atmosphere and is more apt to focus objectively on what serves our problems. Moreover, we cannot imagine al-Qadhdhafi's presence at a summit without him causing flagrant vexation among countries whose peoples and regimes al-Qadhdhafi has harmed, starting with his role in the Qafsah events, his organization of invasion operations in Sudan, his support for Ethiopia's war against Somalia, his support for Iran against Iraq and, last but not least, his stand on the beleaguered valiant fighting commandos in Beirut as expressed clearly and eloquently by Yasir 'Arafat's cable in reply to al-Qadhdhafi's call to the commandos to commit suicide.

After all, does ignoring al-Qadhdhafi's attendance of the Arab summit undermine Arab solidarity? Furthermore, we broach this key question: Can al-Qadhdhafi's presence in any Arab congregation contribute to Arab solidarity?

Al-Qadhdhafi, who spent his life working on intellectual misguidance, dogmatic pollution and fomentation of sedition on the Arab, Islamic, African and international levels, can offer nothing aside from what is innate in him: Evil and the pursuit of evil. Therefore, Arab welfare in the current circumstances requires holding the Fes summit open to those who want to attend and are willing to give what they can in order to discuss the saddening and painful situation we, Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance are experiencing and to put forth an urgent long term strategy to save what can be saved.

If al-Qadhdhafi was serious about participating in any effective way, he would attend the Fes summit and present what he announced yesterday about sending armies to save Lebanon. Would anyone stop him from presenting and discussing his ideas?

Therefore, the procedures for holding the Arab summit in Fes should be set forth, hoping that all Arab countries and leaders realize the significance of this summit and broaching ideas and plans that would help gain us some respect after what has happened to us in Lebanon. We trust that this meeting, when held, will sooner or later bring good results, God willing, if everyone is sincere and concerned with serving the cause with all available means. As for those eating their hearts out with envy and suffering from rabies, who launch propaganda campaigns against the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its role in serving issues—al-Qadhdhafi in particular—they will not benefit from this but will gain the repugnance of the Arab and Islamic world and its peoples because the kingdom's role and participation are too great to be concealed by a hateful person or to be belittled by an al-Qadhdhafi or others. The tragic events in Lebanon and the action by His Majesty King Fahd on all levels and with all forces are evidence of the Saudi effort that has won the respect and appreciation of the Palestinians and Lebanese first of all and also the appreciation of the world's countries concerned with the dilemma in Lebanon and the tragedy of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples. We look forward to the forthcoming Fes summit before which the facts about the whole situation will be laid. Then our nation will learn who works and who does not.

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DAILY URGES ACCEPTANCE OF FAHD PEACE PLAN

GF181908 Al-Dammam AL-YAWM in Arabic 18 Aug 82 p 4

[Editorial: "The Only Solution"]

[Text] Egypt's suspension of the autonomy talks obliged the United States to face up to its direct responsibilities regarding the fact that it is responsible for supervising the execution of the Camp David accords.

Reality proves that since the beginning, autonomy has been faced with Israeli-Palestinian rejection. However, the Egyptian "freeze" might open doors for Egypt to review and re-evaluate all the articles of the agreement, in accordance with the Zionist "expansion" principles which have been confirmed by its invasion of Lebanon. This is not the wish of the United States, which wants to continue using this agreement as the basis for peace in the Middle East--according to the U.S. interpretation of it.

The Arabs today are required to make use of the Egyptian move, which is regarded as a step forward along the road of regaining the Arab solidarity that came apart for the most part because of the "Camp David" accords. The Egyptian and Arab steps should be united in order to reach a collective view on realizing the necessary peace in the Middle East.

Certainly a united Arab proposal for this solution will be stronger and more important than any other proposals in the international arena.

Egypt, which was totally aware of the deficiency of the Camp David accords in encompassing the basis side--the Palestinians--due to Israeli arrogance, knows very well that the Arab-Israeli struggle will continue. Thus, we are left with only one clear proposal that presents a basic solution to the problem: The Arab peace plan that was proposed by the kingdom to the Arab brothers to review and comment on so that we will reach a united view, which we are most in need of.

That is the point at which the big countries, with whatever power they use, will be unable to impose a fact refused by all the Arabs.

The Arab peace plan, established by the kingdom as a result and synopsis of all Un resolutions on the Palestinian cause, remains the most important
assembly point, particularly since the PLO, through its leadership, fully agreed on all international resolutions that confirm Israel's right to exist and the Palestinian right to establish a state and establish a homeland in their usurped land. An Arab consensus on that plan will be a practical and realistic response to Israel. This is why Israel strongly opposed the Arab peace plan when it was proposed at Fes. It knew that this project will be the decisive deterrent to its expansionist ambitions which are at the expense of Arab rights and will.

CSO: 4404/449
ISRAELI, SYRIAN CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL

GF260520 Jidda 'UKAZ in Arabic 23 Aug 82 p 1

[Text] 'UKAZ has learned that the U.S. envoy Philip Habib will start an intensive dialogue between the Syrians and Israelis during the next few weeks to complete his efforts aimed at the withdrawal of all military forces from Lebanon.

Well-informed sources mentioned that the Syrians have linked their withdrawal from Lebanon to two conditions:

1. The issuing of an Arab decision on this issue, because the entrance of Syrian forces into Lebanon was within the framework of the ADF and in accordance to Arab will.

[2.] The obtaining of binding and clear U.S. guarantees in which a specific Israeli pledge to withdraw from entire Lebanon is provided.

Sources close to the U.S. envoy believe that the Israelis will ultimately withdraw from Lebanon but only after exhaustive negotiations in which they aim to achieve the following:

1. A peace agreement with Lebanon.

2. Retaining 40 km of Lebanese territory to establish a so-called Israeli security belt for the upper Galilee region.

3. A Syrian pledge of nonintervention in Lebanon regardless to any events in the future.

However, these sources are sure that the Israelis will not achieve any of these at present, especially if they continue to insist on keeping the so-called adjusted borders with Lebanon, that is, remaining 40 km within Lebanese territory.

The U.S. pulse checking of the Syrian and Israeli sides started 2 days ago to agree on a suitable date for starting the negotiations.

CSO: 4404/449
RIYADH VIEWS ISRAEL'S LONG-TERM PLANS IN LEBANON

LD182306 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 18 Aug 82

[Commentary by Husayn al-Askari]

[Text] Israeli sources have said that the departure of the Palestinian resistance from Beirut will not inspire an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, since the real aim of attacking Lebanon will be announced after the departure of the Palestinian resistance from Beirut, and it might not be announced in the near future.

Several months before Israel embarked on its aggression against Lebanon, the Palestinian resistance and Arab and foreign military and political circles were expecting an Israeli invasion of Lebanon on the pretext of the presence of the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon and on the pretext of protecting the inhabitants of the Zionist settlements in the north of occupied Palestine.

It was common knowledge to everyone that Israel had political, economic and social ambitions in Lebanon. It timed its invasion so as to make its presence in Lebanon capable of influencing the Lebanese presidential elections so as to ensure a government agreeable to the signing of a peace treaty with Israel, which would consequently lead to establishing trade and tourist relations, exploiting the position of Lebanon and its trade and tourist relations with all the Arab countries.

Since Lebanon is the weaker side, it will offer no resistance to what will be imposed on it. This will place Lebanon under an Arab boycott and at the same time will make the Arab world confused as to what decision to adopt. This is because any Lebanese Government which comes in the circumstances of the Israeli occupation will have no choice but to follow the Israeli course at a time when it needs the support and help of the entire Arab world in establishing the foundations of much of the state machinery necessary in the reconstruction of Lebanon. As far as Lebanon policy makers are concerned, this will be a gain which will consolidate their position within the Zionist entity.

Since the Israeli invasion, Lebanon is in need of a strong Lebanese Government that realizes that Lebanon's higher interest and independence both depend on ending the Israeli occupation and removing all its political
legacy. This is because the soundness of Lebanon's economy and the prosperity of its people are based on trade and tourism and also on Arab deposits in Lebanese banks and Arab investments in Lebanon.

This being the case, the Arab states and peoples are awaiting the outcome of the Chamber of Deputies meeting scheduled for tomorrow, Thursday, to choose the president, and the degree of influence of the Israeli occupation on the freedom of this choice.

In the light of this reality and without overlooking Israel's ambitions to cut off part of the south of Lebanon and to obtain some of the water from the Litani River to set up Israeli settlements there, the Arab states are primarily responsible for the continuation of the aggression against Lebanon and the submission of the Lebanese will to Israel's whims and wishes, if Israel is to continue to have the freedom of movement which it has now.

Without exaggeration of the situation and without overstating the Arab capability in its present condition, one must underline the fact that the present style of Arab action will not achieve for the Arab nation anything but grave losses on all levels. One must acknowledge the fact that the coming phase of Arab struggle demands a (?concentrated) Arab effort so as to benefit from the change in world public opinion in the interest of the Arab cause and to work for (?developing) some states, most important of which is the U.S., in a positive manner so that the solution of the Lebanese crisis will become a part of a just and lasting solution of the Palestinian cause, and to prevent Israel from exploiting its aggression on the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples to consolidate its usurpation of the occupied Arab territories.

CSO: 4404/449
DAILY SCORNS REJECTIONISTS

GF201700 Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 19 Aug 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Arab and Palestinian Affiliations"]

[Text] At last leader of the Palestinian Marxist left, Nayif Hawatimah, has spoken. He talked about many things including his blame on Syria, saying that it did not fight with the Palestinians on the battlefield despite its closeness and alliances and that had it done so, it could have reduced the siege pressure. He also said that the current problem is not a lack of technology or arms but the absence of collective political action.

Although now is the time to save the PLO, whose biggest affiliation is Arab and Islamic, and not a time for dialogue or settling scores, Hawatimah's logic requires us to pause and ask him how can a collective political decision be found when there is no unified Arab vision or policy and when international commitments are employed in hostilities and insults and in rendering information media services to this international camp or that, without giving the Arab issue any support?

If we admit that the Arabs' views, stands and friendship are not politically independent, then how can they be unified in a collective political decision at a time when we saw that the debacles during recent Arab summits were more serious and bitter than when the Golan Heights and the West Bank were annexed and when permanent settlements were established?

The more we lose, the farther apart we become as if our loss at the hands of the enemy is intended through Arab stands and policies to weaken our position and consequently to make it more responsive to the solutions which Israel wants and favors.

We have rejected international and Arab peaceful settlements and it has become clear that we do not have an alternative that might compensate us for some or our losses brought about by these rejections. Some of us used to refuse to allow the name of the Soviet football team to pass through their media and press without adding the word "friend" to it; when the names of East European countries were used, they used to couple them with the phrase "peace-loving countries which advocate just Arab causes," while the information media of some moderate Arab countries, which are friendly with the
United States because of economic interests, do not hesitate to question the
nature of the West, to criticize it and even to describe it, on many occasions,
as being hostile to us and assisting Israel. This occurs at a time when the
Catholic marriage between the Arab left and communist countries has not
succeeded in making these highly influential world countries take a positive
stand in supporting the leftist Arabs or the outspoken leftist resistance
[leftist PLO groups].

Beirut showed that we are alone and that some of us need a political divorce
that ensures a collective Arab political decision under Arab and Muslim
inspiration. At the same time, moderate powers, led by Saudi Arabia, have
independently entered the field of dialogue and pressure, adopting the
position of being the first and only defender of the Palestinian resistance
and the fraternal Lebanese people.

Moderates who have been trying to create a unified Arab stand through
consultations, cooperation and summit conferences, have always been faced
with the fact that bargaining is taking priority over the general good and
that bidding hinders some from thinking freely and objectively.

It is these independent moderates who are working and struggling with the
political decision; their fate will probably make them bear the full responsi-
bility and thus adopt the military decision in the future. Regardless of
what has been discussed, which is very serious on the Arab map and on the
Arab citizen's future, we begin to wonder: What is the Palestinian resis-
tance's interest in political affiliations, particularly when even some
established countries have achieved nothing from such affiliations? Why
should there not be an Arab Muslim resistance on the field of confrontation?
Why should all the resistance just be Yasir 'Arafat?

The PLO's presence in political and military fields under one slogan and one
command is now more urgently needed to bring success to its struggle through
unified action than what is required from the Arab countries on which the
Palestinian resistance could impose a collective political decision if it is
able to extricate itself from its international and Arab affiliations and
propose the Palestinian affiliation as a principle, means and goal under
'Arafat.

CSO: 4404/450
BEIRUT WITHDRAWAL WILL NOT END PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE

LD201556 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 20 Aug 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] With the departure of the Palestinian resistance from Beirut will the Palestinian struggle stop, and will the Palestinian people lose confidence in the PLO and its leadership? This is what Israel hopes and has planned for.

But the truth is otherwise. The fact that the Palestinian people were evicted from their homeland and scattered all over the world and were made to substitute tents for their homes and pain for their homeland is not the PLO's fault. But the PLO is one of the results of the sufferings of the Palestinian people. So long as the tree is still alive, the branch will not be damaged because life will once again return to it. The Palestinian people still exist on their occupied land, will not abandon their legitimate rights, and will continue to insist on their rights no matter how long this may take. So long as the Palestinian people exist on and outside their land the PLO will remain their sole legitimate representative; the PLO leadership and fighters will remain as legends of Arab heroism at a time when the world imagined that there were no more legends.

The picture relayed to the world from Beirut has revealed two facts which have turned the balance of Israeli thinking upside down. The first fact is that the Palestinian people have not and will not die if Israel so decided, no matter what support Israel may receive from the influential forces in the form of military, economic and diplomatic assistance, as the United States is giving Israel. This is because nations may be subjected to defeats and a large number of their sons may die, but these nations remain steadfast, looking for an opportunity to take revenge on their enemies who have imposed sufferings and hardships on them. The Palestinian people's history is full of more various and unique kinds of heroism than that of any other people. The Palestinian people will continue to give more martyrs until victory is achieved, God willing. The second fact is that a small number of people stood their ground against a vast number of men armed with destructive weapons, which are internationally banned, for approximately 2 and 1/2 months without any fighter raising his white flag to surrender, as the hero Commander Yasir 'Arafat who waged the fighting with his men from one trench to another said.

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Israel erred when, based on its racist thoughts, it embarked on the liquidation of the Palestinian resistance, because this savage attack did not realize its aim; on the contrary, it has cemented the cohesion between the PLO and its masses in the occupied areas and elsewhere. The departure of the resistance from Beirut will not realize for Israel its hopes to get rid of the Palestinian headache. This is because the next arena of conflict will be political. The PLO has won the first round in this arena after having been able to acquaint with much skill the peoples of the whole world with the facts of the Israeli terror, and to prove to them that it is capable of facing the situation with full realization of its responsibility, and that it enjoys all humanitarian characteristics, a matter which has resulted in the protection of the lives and properties of innocent civilians in west Beirut against the Israeli criminal thoughts and actions.

CSO: 4404/450
COMMENTATOR VIEWS ARAB OPTIONS IN CONFRONTING ISRAEL

LD201722 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 20 Aug 82

[Political analysis by Hashim 'Abduh Hashim]

[Text] Is it true that the political option now offered to the Arab nations is less effective in confronting the Israeli arrogance and the foreign support it receives? Is it true that the military option, the method of sharp confrontation and the use of the various capabilities are capable of swinging the Arab plan in the coming phase and forming the required pressure for expelling Israel from Lebanon? Is it true that the continued military confrontation in Lebanon of the huge Zionist force prevents Israel from having a free hand in Lebanon, from dominating Lebanon's affairs and from imposing a new form of the Lebanese state in the coming phase?

These three questions are becoming more (pressing) with the departure of the first Palestinian struggler from west Beirut in implementation of the Arab decision. It is not easy to answer these questions now. There are many signs that provide the political observer with an opportunity to reach a conclusion in light of the information available. The military option which has been adopted more than once cannot be effective without the political option. Under suitable conditions, the military option becomes a necessity when there are no other means by which to reach the goals. Perhaps the most important suitable conditions needed for the use of force are the following: The Arab nation must reach unanimity after settling outstanding issues, unifying varying attitudes and eliminating the odd elements which are against this unanimity. The Arab nation must convince the international community of the justness of our demands from a position of strength, which it can achieve through the cohesion of the Arab states, and act from a unified position which the world respects and complies with, instead of having our supporters scattered everywhere whenever differences among ourselves increase. The Arab nation must make all possible political efforts to compel Israel to acknowledge the Palestinian people's legitimate right to establish their independent state on their national soil and complete the process of putting Israel under political siege by way of a strong international rejection of Israel's expansionist policies. The Arab nation must positively exploit its relations of friendship with foreign forces in the interest of the positions that serve our rights and shrink these forces'
open cooperation with our enemy, finally obtaining balanced attitudes which neutralize these forces' pro-Israel attitudes and their continued support for Israel.

Without all these conditions the desire to adopt the military option does not justify barring the road open to the political option and does not give the Arab nation a winning card in any coming round. Lest we repeat the mistakes of the past, we should be very enthusiastic about maintaining our options, although our most pressing concern is that we be one nation. Will we attain this? This is what we hope for.
DAILY ON FUTURE ROLE OF PLO

GF240520 Jidda 'UKAZ in Arabic 20 Aug 82 p 3

[Editorial: "Facts in the Region and Factors for Peace"]

[Text] The kingdom has affirmed that peace and stability in the Middle East cannot be achieved without a fair and permanent settlement that recognizes the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. It has made it clear through its UN delegate during the UN General Assembly's special session on Palestine that it cannot just stand by and watch the critical developments in the Middle East. This confirmation is a result of the kingdom's persistent conviction that any move or initiative that does not contain the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, foremost of which is their right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state on their national soil, will not succeed in reaching a peaceful, comprehensive and permanent settlement in the region.

The events resulting from the Zionist invasion of Lebanon, the siege of west Beirut and the haphazard Israeli bombardment using the deadliest, most destructive and internationally restricted weapons have revealed the aggressive Zionist nature which is aimed at liquidating the Palestinian resistance and at silencing the Palestinian voice forever. However, the results of the fierce Israeli military campaign have presented the world with a number of facts:

1. Despite its huge military capabilities and despite the claims about its military superiority, the Zionist entity could not destroy the PLO or undermine the Palestinian spirit of struggle. The Palestinian resistance has proved that it is a strong rival and an antagonist that cannot be ignored in the longest Palestinian-Israeli war and the longest Arab-Israeli war as well.

2. The annihilation campaign, to which the Palestinian and Lebanese people were subjected in Lebanon and the invading Zionist troops has revealed the essence of the aggressive Israeli nature and has revealed at the same time how politically flexible is the PLO. It has also revealed how much the Palestinian people trust their sole and legitimate leadership and how much they follow this leadership.
3. Despite all manifestations of Israeli terrorism, the PLO has decided to withdraw from the military arena only to avoid the destruction of Beirut and the Lebanese people and to avoid further destructive acts by the invading Zionist troops. Although the PLO was exposed to a strong military attack, it managed at the same time to direct a strong political strike that smashed all Israeli claims about peace.

4. Through its fierce attack on Lebanon, Israel has revealed its expansionist intentions at the expense of more Arab lands, at a time when the officials of the terrorist Begin government affirmed their determination not to quit the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

5. By its continuous rejection of UN resolutions, the Zionist entity is defying the wish of the international community.

6. The Israeli enemy exploited the political and moral support and military and economic aids offered to it by the United States to escalate aggression against Lebanon and to carry out its annihilation campaign against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples and expand tension in the region and this contradicts the purpose for which Washington has offered such aid. Moreover, Israel has not respected its commitments to the United States regarding the use of U.S. arms such as the cluster and phosphorous bombs.

Since the United States began to neglect the events in Beirut in order to think about a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East crisis, there are basic factors on which any initiative for establishing a comprehensive, permanent and just peace in the region should be based. Among these factors are the following:

1. The end of the Beirut crisis does not reduce the Palestinian voice nor lessen its weight. It also means that the Palestinian issue continues to be the key for resolving the crisis in the region.

2. The political flexibility shown by the PLO in accepting the UN resolutions concerning the Palestinian issue represents a proper approach toward direct negotiations between the United States and the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

3. The United States should play a positive and effective role to put an end to Israeli ambitions which are aimed at annexing the West Bank and Gaza Strip in a way that can explode the Camp David accords, in which the United States was a full partner and consequently, can smash the confidence in the ability of the United States to adopt any positive position toward events which threaten the future of peace in the region.

4. The obstinacy, arrogance and tyranny shown by the Israeli authorities, acts which prompted U.S. anger, should lead to a reconsideration of the essence of U.S.-Israeli relations and the volume of material, military, economic and political support offered by the United States to Israel either through bilateral relations or through the United Nations.
5. The Arab countries, foremost of which is the kingdom, will not accept
the continuation of an Israeli policy of defiance, provocation and threats
to the region. The Arabs will not abandon a just and honorable settlement
for the Palestinian issue that guarantees the right of Palestinian people
to self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian
state within the framework of a comprehensive resolution in the region.

CSO: 4404/450
INFORMATION MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

LDI71430 Riyadh SPA in English 1310 GMT 17 Aug 82

[Text] Riyadh, 17 Aug (SPA)--Saudi Arabia has recorded a 12 percent increase in its gross national product (GNP) during the last fiscal year, Saudi Information Minister Dr Muhammad 'Abduh Yamani has said.

In an interview with the Mecca-based AL-NADWA, published today, Dr Yamani highlighted the kingdom's huge development projects which, he said, would ensure a prosperous future for the Saudi people. He stressed King Fahd's keenness to "follow up the progress of work on these projects and the Saudi monarch's deep concern to ensure safety, stability and welfare for every citizen in the kingdom."

Dr Yamani expressed pride over the kingdom's enormous development projects and said the 12 percent rise in the GNP during the first year of the third development plan had "outnumbered the expected rate."

Dr Yamani hailed King Fahd's concern to spread education throughout the kingdom and highlighted the Saudi Government's ambitious educational program to expand educational programs in the country. He said present enrollment at the kingdom's schools and educational institutions had reached a figure of 1.5 million students.

Noting the government's special attention to develop the transport and communications sector, Dr Yamani said the kingdom had allocated SR 25 billion in the past 10 years to establish a nationwide road network. He said the kingdom had asphalted 23,838 kms of roads and built new sea ports and airports and introduced modern and sophisticated telephone and telecommunications services.

Commenting on the kingdom's oil policy, Dr Yamani said the Saudi moderate oil policy had "saved the world from economic catastrophes and crises which affect developing as well as industrialised countries." He referred to King Fahd's statement in which the monarch had said the oil policy was based on economic studies relating to the situation in the oil market and the world economic conditions.
Dr Yamani said the kingdom's industrial policy "is unique and reflects the government's keenness to protect national industries against foreign competition." He noted the influx of foreign investments and their contribution towards the construction and industrial boom in the country.

Dr Yamani said the government issued 1,695 licences with loans amounting to SR 30.5 billion to set up new industrial projects in the country and had a labour force of 93,944 during last year. He hailed the positive role of the Saudi industrial development fund to help finance national industries. The fund had extended loan totalling three billion Saudi riyals to finance 190 projects in the kingdom, during last year he added.

The information minister said since its inception in 1974 the fund extended industrial loans amounting to eight billion Saudi riyals and gave SR 26.9 billion to national electricity companies to increase their capacities and extend their services throughout the kingdom. Dr Yamani lauded the government's rapid development plans including the setting up of al-Jubayl and Yanbu' as the centers of the kingdom's heavy industrial development during the third 5-year development plan.

Dr Yamani said basic industries and a number of secondary and auxiliary industries including refineries, petrochemical, fertilisers, iron and steel industries were being established at al-Jubayl and Yanbu'.

These industries would "form the strong base for the kingdom's economic development and reduce its dependence on oil as the main source of national income," he added.

Commenting on the medical facilities offered by the government on a country-wide basis, Dr Yamani said the kingdom had recently built modern hospitals at a cost of SR 3.84 billion at Jidda, al-Madinah, Jizan, al-Hafof [spelling as received] and al-Khubar. He added that there were now 70 hospitals and 975 clinics besides a number of dispensaries and first aid centers to meet the people's medical needs.

CSO: 4404/450
EQUIPMENT FOR JUNAYD PROJECT ARRIVES

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 22 Jun 82 p 1

[Text] Equipment valued at $15 million has arrived for the Junayd project, and another $22 million worth of equipment from West Germany is expected to follow. This is in addition to a $100 million loan as part of the Decade of Arab Development within the framework of an objective plan to utilize $225 million in financing to raise sugar production. This announcement was made to the farming masses 2 days ago by Mr Muhammad al-Bashir al-Waqi', the minister of industry. He also spoke about the organization's incorporation and told the farmers about the flexibility of the administrative measures under the corporation law, explaining that the factories need economic management to raise the general level. He reported that the factory had in fact incorporated. In a special statement to AL-AYYAM his excellency said that indications point to a production increase of not less than 50 percent at the Junayd Sugar Mill for the final growing season. Signs of this have begun to appear. It can be seen that the rainy season will ease the severity of the irrigation crisis that was brought on by the interruption of electric service. During an inspection tour of the Junayd Sugar Mill that he made yesterday and the day before yesterday his excellency announced that a major effort would be made to improve the project's low level of productivity. He said that the project was not making any profit and that correction of this requires a reexamination of every facet of its activities, including regulation of production relations with the farmers, particularly since the organization's incorporation under the corporation law. The minister held a wide-ranging meeting attended by the plant's director general and the farmers at which he explained the economic conditions surrounding the plant's low sugar production during the past season as the result of many factors, in which the farmers and the administration each had a part, as well as the interruption of electricity and the shortage of petroleum products. The minister urged the workers not to worry about who made the mistakes, but to look to the future for a revival of production within the framework of cooperation among all parties.

9123
CSO: 4504/392
NEW TELEX SYSTEM INAUGURATED

[Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 22 Jun 82 p 1]

[Text] At 8 am yesterday Mr Khalid Hasan 'Abbas, the minister of transport and communications, opened the new Telex office in the Telephone Building. It is the first of its kind in North Africa. It will provide Telex service to 2,000 subscribers during the initial phase, and it could expand its equipment to serve more than 10,000 subscribers in subsequent stages. The minister inaugurated the Telex office by sending a Telex message to the West German minister of post and telecommunications in which he expressed the thanks and appreciation of the Sudanese people and government for the efforts which brought this important project to fruition. He said that this center will stand as a symbol of the sturdy relations between the Sudanese and German peoples. The chairman of the board and the director general addressed the large crowd. He said, "The idea for this central arose after it became impossible to increase the number of subscribers above 512. It occurred after a tour made by the minister of transport and communications in which he inspected the new equipment and heard the explanations of the technicians." Mr Khidr Khalil, the director of the new central project, told AL-AYYAM that no other African country, with the exception of racist South Africa, and no Middle Eastern country, with the exception of Saudi Arabia (which will soon be implementing it) uses this type of central. Some of the features of this central are that it can connect a large number of subscribers simultaneously whenever they request international connections; it can connect any computer center in the various parts of the Sudan with another in Khartoum, which will promote the exchange of data between the various regional universities and the University of Khartoum; it will enable airline companies to use it as an on-line reservation center; it will help to link most telegraph offices.

Mr 'Abbas has directed that a central firefighting system be installed to protect the country from losses from fires. He specifically called for an early warning unit to be established in the central for the sole purpose of issuing a warning in the event of fire. It should be noted that the contract for building the new central was signed in March 1980 with the Standard Electric Company Lorenz (symtr). The project, which cost DM 21 million, was financed by the West German Government through KSW. Work on the project began in January 1981. The cost of an annual subscription to the system is reported to be 1,000 pounds plus an additional 1,000 pounds for insurance.
SYRIAN DAILY RAPS SHULTZ ON ISRAEL'S SECURITY

PM271147 Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 22 Aug 82 p 8

['Isam Dari article: "The Israeli-American Security"]

[Text] The U.S. administration has once again demonstrated its flagrant hostility toward the Arabs and its alignment with the Israeli aggressors. It has reaffirmed its unlimited support for Israel and has again given Israel the green light to launch any fresh aggression against the rest of Lebanon and other Arab countries.

In his first press conference since becoming secretary of state, George Shultz put the emphasis on an old claim, invented by Israel and adopted by the United States and its allies, about the "threat to Israel's security."

The strange thing is that this claim is the complete opposite of the truth and a contradiction of the simples rules of logic.

Ever since it was created by the imperialist states to be their base in the Middle East, Israel has been claiming that it is threatened by the Arabs who want to throw it into the sea. The 1967 Israeli aggression and subsequent events have disproved this Israeli lie which in the past won Israel the sympathy of most countries, including some developing countries. World public opinion had accepted this false claim because the Western media were under the influence of the Zionist movement, and some of these media still fall for the Israeli lies.

However, the U.S. administration's revival of this claim is both unbelievable and completely unacceptable now that Israel's acts of aggression have repudiated this claim and exposed its false and deceptive nature, even to European public opinion.

How can any sane person believe the secretary of state of the biggest power in the world when he speaks about U.S. commitment to Israel's security at a time when the Israeli forces are occupying one-third of a sovereign UN member state? How do the minds of the American leaders work? They simply follow Israel's logic on everything, as is evident in the following:
1. In one of his press conferences, U.S. President Ronald Reagan described the Syrian surface-to-air defensive missiles as offensive weapons and, prompted by his abounding love for Israel, he went one step further and said that they are offensive weapons threatening "Israel's security."

2. Now Shultz is claiming that there are certain dangers, which he did not specify, threatening Israel's security. Does this Shultz think that Lebanon, with half of its capital besieged and the other half occupied by Israeli troops, is the source of this threat to Israel's security?

Or is the new U.S. secretary of state—new to the profession—just repeating phrases passed on to him by his predecessors who uttered them before him?

How could "Israel's security" be threatened when Zionist War Minister Sharon boasts that Damascus is within range of his artillery and when he puts the Israeli forces in Al-Biqa' on a state of alert?

The fact overlooked by the Americans is that Arab security is threatened by Israel and which overtly and covertly participates in its aggression because, as admitted by Shamir, Sharon and all other Israeli and U.S. officials, their objectives are the same.

Now, as Israel prepares for another phase of aggression, Washington will go all the way because the "Israeli-American security" in the regime means imposing dual hegemony on it and striking at the Arab forces standing fast against this objective and against all other aggressive objectives threatening our Arab people.

CSO: 4400/453
PAPERS ON POSITION OF LEBANON, WEINBERGER'S VISIT

JN290910 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0630 GMT 29 Aug 82

[Press review]

[Text] Today's papers highlight the meeting which took place between President Hafiz al-Asad and former Lebanese Premier Rashid Karami, and the president's assertions that Syria will remain with Lebanon and that it highly appreciates the stands taken by Lebanese nationalist figures and forces against occupation and the current attempts to turn Lebanon into an Israeli protectorate.

The papers also prominently report Khaddam's statement upon his arrival in the Moroccan city of Mohammedia to attend the Arab foreign ministers' conference that the current situation experienced by the Arabs is a result of the Camp David policy. Khaddam asserted that the Arabs have no choice but to confront the Zionist enemy, which is backed by the United States.

Under the headline "For the Sake of Lebanon's Arabism," TISHRIN discusses Syria's firm and principled stand on Lebanon. The paper says: What leader Al-Asad has affirmed strongly and clearly reflects Syria's constant daily struggle to foil the objectives of the Zionist invasion, to blow up all attempts to undermine Lebanon's Arabism and to defeat all plans to force Lebanon to completely surrender to the Zionist enemy.

The paper adds: Syria is fully aware of the fiendish plans which the enemies of Lebanon, including the Zionists and their U.S. supporters, are considering to impose a despotic regime on the Lebanese people. Syria will continue to adhere to its principles and to assume its pan-Arab responsibilities and tasks. Syria will continue to sincerely and bravely defend Lebanon and every Lebanese citizen who is sincere in his patriotism and Arabism.

Commenting in its "Opinion" column, AL-BA'ATH says: Just as it has stopped the bloodshed in Lebanon, Syria is now strongly supporting everyone who resists Zionist occupation and those who collaborate with it. Syria will not allow Lebanon to become an Israeli protectorate or a new American state in the region. Syria will struggle, through the cohesion which was sanctified by blood between us and the nationalist forces in that fraternal country, to foil Zionist plans.
Commenting on the visit which Weinberger and a delegation from the Pentagon plan to pay to Lebanon, the Egyptian regime and the Zionist entity, ATH-THAWRAH says: It seems Washington is moving to a new phase in its aggression against the Arabs, the phase of imposing the provisions of the Camp David Accords on the Arabs. It seems that Defense Secretary Weinberger's scheduled visit to Lebanon, Egypt and the Zionist entity is for the purpose of distributing roles to impose Camp David's second phase on Lebanon—the phase in which Lebanon is to sign a peace treaty with Israel and in which the autonomy conspiracy is to be reactivated as part of the grand U.S. plan to dominate this vital part of the world and enable the Zionists to dominate, expand and attack other Arab countries.

CS0: 4400/453
DAR'A INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 17 Jul 82 p 5

[Article by 'A. S. "29 Villages in Dar'a Province To Be Provided With Drinking Water Next October"

[Text] The revolutionary government, since assuming power in Syria under the leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, has tirelessly worked to provide the citizens with all their needs and to offer them all services. This was especially true after the correctional movement was undertaken, led by our fighting comrade, Hafiz al-Asad. The movement embarked on rapid efforts to put this country on the same level as the advanced nations, and to have the citizenry enjoy all contemporary requirements, in terms of water, electricity and other services.

The Revolution's Water Project

Dar'a Province is one of the nation's provinces that has been dry for a long time, but recently the revolutionary government has embarked on a program to supply the province's villages with water. Studies to provide this basic necessity of life were made. After the study, it was decided to establish a water project for the province. This is the Revolution Water Project, whose work is divided into two stages:

Al-Ash'ari Water Project

29 Villages

A. First stage:

Work began in 1980. It was decided to put it into active service the first part of October of this year, when this stage will provide drinking water to 29 villages in the province. The most important of these villages are Kahlil, Bakham, Basri al-Sham, Zayzun, al-'Ajmi and Umm al-Miyadin. It is expected that their population by 2006 will total 175,000. The total amount of water to be supplied to these villages is 31,000 cubic meters per day. The project will supply water from the springs of al-Ash'ari, located in the province, and for which this project is named (al-Ash'ari Project). It is composed of
several springs that can supply about 800 liters per second. This amount will be distributed over the first and second stages. In this stage, eight pumping stations will be built to propel the water through some 170 kms of water pipes.

Water for 15 Villages

B. Second stage:

The cornerstone to begin this stage was laid during our people's celebrations of the April holidays this year. This stage will provide approximately 15 of the province's villages with drinking water, including Tafas, Da'il, al-Harrak and Basri al-Harir. This stage will be implemented during the next 2 years.

Work on this stage is composed of laying the main and feeder lines, and all the construction work pertaining to the project, including:

1. The 16 main pump lines

2. The feeder pump lines from the distribution rooms to the storage tanks of the villages concerned, and from the storage tanks to the watering places, to be collected in accordance with diameter and length.

Construction work is as follows:

1. First pumping station:

This will be built near the project's third pumping station near Tafas, at a level of 446.50, natural ground level. It will have a capacity estimated at 310.10 liters per second, which is the project's total capacity, at a pressure of 191.14 meters.

2. Second pumping station:

It will be built near the village of 'Alma, at a level of 585.80, natural ground level. Its estimated capacity is 159.51 liters per second, at an estimated pressure of 175.51 meters.

3. First generator station:

It will be located near the first pumping station built in the first stage of Project al-Ash'ari. It will be jointly used by the first pumping station (from the second stage) and the third pumping station of the project's first stage.

4. Second generator station:

It will be built near the second pumping station. As for the storage tanks, they are of two types. There are 14 elevated storage tanks of various capacities, and two ground tanks.
5. Distribution rooms

There are 16 main and lateral distribution rooms on all project lines, in addition to the control rooms located at each washing lock and ventilation ingress.

Problems Awaiting Solution

A responsible source in the Water Directorate of the Ministry of Housing says that there are several problems blocking completion of the project, including:

Giving the civilian installations in the project to the State Water Company, and then giving the mechanical equipment to a company to implement industrial projects. This would create a conflict in implementation and would delay the completion of the project at the projected time.

Therefore, it would be preferable for projects like these to be done by one company, so that all the responsibilities would rest on it, and so that one of the two companies does not shirk responsibility at the other's expense.

7005
CSO: 4404/617
BRIEFS

DRUZE UNITY--Syrian efforts continue to unify the ranks of the Druze sect in Lebanon and to thwart attempts aimed at fragmenting the sect and diverting some of its factions from the national and pan-Arab line. After a number of meetings and contacts made by Syrian-influenced factions with the leaders of the Druze sect in Lebanon, three of the most prominent Druze shaykhs in Syria (al-Hinawi, al-Hindawi and Jarbu'a) issued a statement in which they urged their brothers in Lebanon to maintain their national and pan-Arab legacy and to unify their ranks in opposing the Israeli invasion. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 285, 7 Aug 82 p 16] 7005

CSO: 4404/617
INTERVIEW WITH CHAIRMAN OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANK

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 240, 28 Jun 82 pp 34-35

[Interview with Abdullah al-Sinyani by AL-DUSTUR: "Yemen Believes in the Policy of an Open Market"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Yemen—The banking sector is one of the important sectors that has achieved tremendous growth and remarkable success in the Yemen Arab Republic. Banking has played a part in modernization efforts in Yemen, in the various economic fields of commerce, industry, agriculture and the building industry. In the process of building a modern state with all the relevant institutions, it was necessary to establish a state central bank that would undertake the basic and traditional task of controlling the financial and banking affairs of the country. The Yemeni Central Bank was established in 1971 and has since played an effective and successful role in the service of the national economy and the protection of financial affairs. The governor of the Central Bank, Mr Abdullah al-Sinyani, gave us his replies to several questions posed by AL-DUSTUR concerning the Central Bank and banking in Yemen generally.

[Question] When was the Central Bank established, and how has it developed since?

[Answer] In the beginning, the country did not adopt the policy of establishing a central bank. The task of such an establishment was carried out by the Yemeni Committee of Finance, established according to Law 6 for the year 1964.

In 1971 a presidential decision was made adopting Law 4 for the year 1971 concerning the establishment and concerns of a Yemeni Central Bank. The law also articulated various regulations relating to the Yemeni currency and to carrying out the task of a state bank via the newly established Central Bank, as well as other duties relating to banks and financial institutions active in Yemen, overseeing insurance and reserve affairs, etc....

The Central Bank began operations on 8 July 1971, and by the end of June 1972 its budget had reached 676 million riyls, which at the end of 1981 increased to almost 10,629,000,000 riyls. This sixteen fold increase in the budget reflects the progress and advance in the bank's activities in all banking affairs.
Besides the role the Central Bank plays as a bank and an advisory body to the government, serving financial and banking affairs of the ministries and the various government and public sector institutions, it also manages the government reserves of foreign currency, investing them in the best perceived way. Later there appeared a separate law related to banks called "Banks Law No 8 for the year 1972," with the purpose of upholding the role of the Central Bank in overseeing other banks.

In the administrative field, the main headquarters of the bank is already finished. It is located in the capital, San'a'. The bank's administration saw to it that the architecture was a combination of traditional Yemeni style and modern architecture. There are also ongoing efforts to modernize the performance of the bank. A new accounting system was successfully introduced. The bank's administration also adopted a project to introduce advanced computer systems. The first stage of this project has already been completed, and work is being conducted on the second stage.

The bank is also expanding horizontally by opening new branches and offices throughout the country.

To train a staff in banking skills and create new cadres to satisfy the expanding needs of the banking activities, a college for banking studies was opened. It now conducts continuing courses for the workers in that field.

[Question] It is well known that the Central Bank oversees the activities of other banks. Is it possible to outline the extent and type of the relationship that exists between the Central Bank and the other banks established by the state?

[Answer] One can say that Yemen has only recently entered the field of specialized banking. The three existing banks (Cooperative Agricultural Loans Bank, the Yemeni Industrial Bank and the Housing Loans Bank) are all quite new. The Central Bank though it was best to allow them some time before implementing its oversight role.

Gradually, the Central Bank started asking for statements and reports about the financial centers in these institutions, to study them and be in a position to offer them the needed advice. The Central Bank also carries out inspection duties, within limits, until such time as these institutions clearly understand the role of the Central Bank.

It is also no secret that the Central Bank plays a role in financing these specialized institutions when needed.

[Question] What are the extents and limits of the oversight efforts of the Central Bank concerning the private and foreign banks, for protecting the interests of the citizens?

[Answer] The bank law gave the Central Bank enough authority to oversee such institutions to the extent that this would achieve positive results for the public interest and the interest of the banks.
The Central Bank is ever mindful of the best interest of the national economy and the interest of the citizens, within the correct limits of banking practice.

There is no doubt that one of the purposes of such oversight is to guarantee the security of these banks' financial centers and to establish policies and directives that would aid the banks in achieving this security, e.g., using conventional ways of adhering to certain limits in reserve rates and liquidity.

The Central Bank also has the right to limit the structure of interest rates and follow up on its suitability from time to time in the light of its adopted policies. It can also determine exchange rates and announce them to the public and the banks.

The Central Bank also limits the charges the banks receive for conducting banking services for their clients, so that each party is well informed of its rights and liabilities.

Using the bank's right to inspect banks, it studies the complaints it receives from clients. This is usually conducted through field studies of the banks involved.

[Question] What are the conditions required by the law for foreign banks to be allowed to operate in Yemen?

[Answer] It is no exaggeration to say that we have complementary jurisdiction concerning banking activities, both with regards to the Central Bank as an institution and to its relationship with other banks.

The Bank Law No 8 of 1972 prohibits any company from conducting banking activities in Yemen unless it obtains a permit from the Central Bank, which has the right to issue such permits after they are approved by the cabinet according to any conditions that the Central Bank sees fit to impose.

Any individual who intends to conduct banking activities in Yemen has to apply in writing to the Central Bank to obtain a permit. The application should be accompanied by:

1. Certified copies of the charter or the certificate of establishment and the internal guidelines or copies thereof.

2. Copies of the latest budget.

3. Any further information requested by the Central Bank.

When any application is studied, the Central Bank conducts the investigations it deems necessary to verify the legitimacy of the documents, the background and present conditions of the applying party, his administrative skills, his capital, the possibilities of success in his venture and society's need for his services and their adequacy.
The other conditions that must be fulfilled when applying for a permit for a foreign institution are:

1. Paid capital should be no less than $10 million.

2. A special capital of no less than 3 million riyals should be kept in Yemen, under the condition that 30 percent of this capital is earmarked for investment. The Central Bank has asked the commercial banks to increase their capital, and it did increase until some of them reached 12 million Yemeni riyals. The Central Bank decides and announces to the banks concerned the method adopted for determining the size and type of the bank's capital.

3. The bank has to keep a reserve, before any profits are distributed or returned to the headquarters or any other place. This reserve should be no less than 10 percent of its profits, after taxes and other liabilities. The Central Bank has the right to announce to the banks from time to time what method it is adopting in estimating the size and type of the reserve account.

[Question] What is the size of the monetary system in the republic, and how big is the covered reserve as required by law?

[Answer] With the increasing growth of the national economy, there is more need to increase the amount of currency issued, and thus the amount of currency on hand. At the end of December 1981, currency in the hands of the people reached some 7,043,500,000 riyals. As you very well know, the Central Bank is the sole authority with the right to issue currency in Yemen. It is also the authority in charge of providing the monetary coverage necessary. Since reserves of foreign currency are plenty in Yemen, they constitute the largest part of the coverage.

[Question] What are the bases for the stability of the Yemeni currency? And what is the official policy vis-a-vis currency limitations, dealing in foreign currency and the movement of capital? Are there any limitations?

[Answer] The official currency is based on the freedom of dealing in foreign currency, in changing money and in the movement of capital without limitations. However, the monetary authorities have maintained a stable and fixed exchange rate for the riyal in relation to the dollar since 1972. One American dollar equals 4.562 Yemeni riyal.

The other factors contributing to the stability of the exchange price of the riyal are most importantly the policy of an open market, which results in a great influx of money from Yemenis working in the oil producing countries and other countries. This opens up the Yemeni economy to resources of foreign currency that exceed its need to finance imports of foreign goods and services.

In short, the main factor in the stability of the exchange rate is the supply and demand of currency, which is apparent in the balance of payments. From 1971 to 1977 the balance of payments had shown a surplus; lately, there was a deficit due to excessive importing necessitated by development. But the reserves of foreign currency available to the Central Bank were enough to ensure the stability of the Yemeni currency.
In 1980, the inflation rate in the Yemen Arab Republic reached 10.6 percent. The final statistics for 1981 are expected to show an inflation rate below that number, as a result of the improvement in the price of the dollar, which led to a reduction in the costs of imports and the removal of the monetary difficulties that blocked the distribution of goods, now that the facilities of the Hudaida port have been improved.

The Central Bank closely monitors price developments, and it receives a periodical that lists in relative numbers the retail prices in San'a and the other major cities.

[Question] What are the major projects that the Central Bank financed, and what is the general policy of the bank vis-a-vis financing and loans?

[Answer] It is the accepted norm that Central Banks do not generally give direct loans to projects, private ones in particular. This does not mean that financing is not offered; rather, it is done indirectly through the money it feeds into the state general budget. Besides, the Central Bank is considered the ultimate source of loans, since the commercial banks seek its help when they need to. Therefore, financing is offered to the banks, which in turn offer it to their clients and the companies engaged in projects.

The Central Bank also monitors the needs of the national economy for monetary liquidity. Whenever such a need arises, the bank provides the economy with what is needed within the general policy as it sees fit. This takes the shape of rebates and loans to the institutions of finance and banking (commercial banks and specialized banks).

The Central Bank has in fact offered such financing when it gave out loans to some commercial and specialized banks. On other occasions, it gave direct necessary financing to some public institutions.

[Question] Since the bank was established, has it ever relied on foreign or Arab expertise? And does it currently employ such expertise?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the developing countries need foreign expertise to help them in some fields. The Central Bank is in a unique position where it can develop with the help of the national expertise of the Yemeni citizens and with the additional use of technical help available through the International Monetary Fund, which has given us available expertise in some specialized and limited fields.
BRIEFS

PRESIDENT RATIFIES PRESS LAW—Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, president and commander in chief of the armed forces, has ratified Law No 42 for 1982 on organizing the press. The law emphasizes the freedom of the press as one of citizens' rights to freedom of speech, writing and drawing. The seven-chapter law deals with the circulation of newspapers, the organization of press activity, the main principles in publishing, legal protection of journalists and financial supervision of the press. The law includes 110 articles and will be published in the official GAZETTE. [Summary from poor reception] [GF161942 San'a' Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 16 Aug 82]

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