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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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CONTENTS

ENERGY ECONOMICS

NORWAY

Paper Presents Views on Outlook for North Sea Production
(Jan Ove Ekeberg; ARBEIDERBLADET, 31 Jul 82) .................. 1

ECONOMIC

AUSTRIA

Increased Exports, Lack of Investments Mark Economy
(FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/Blick durch die Wirtschaft,
19 Jul 82) ......................................................... 4

TURKEY

Sevig Calls for Economy Based on Turkish Needs
(Veysi Sevig; DUNYA, 15 Jul 82) ............................... 8

Contractors Abroad Lack Adequate Incentives
(DUNYA, 14 Jul 82) ............................................... 10

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Hesse Campaign's Effects on SPD/FGD Coalition in Bonn
(DER SPIEGEL, 2 Aug 82) ....................................... 12

- a - [III - WE - 150]
Strong Position of CDU in Hesse Election Campaign
(Eghard Moerbitz; FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 8 Jul 82) ....... 16

NORWAY

Observer Commends Conservatives on Reaction to Soviet Violations
(Jahn Otto Johansen; DAGBLADET, 31 Jul 82) ............... 19

Briefs
CP Chairman Kleven's Low Profile 21

SPAIN

Administration Blamed for Military's Influence
(Nicolas Sartorius; EL PAIS, 3 Aug 82) ....................... 22

PSOE Deputy Opposes Purchase of U.S. Jet on Political Grounds
(Jose Miguel Bueno; EL PAIS, 31 Jul 82) ..................... 27

PDL'S Garrigues Does Not Foresee Coalition With PSOE, AP
(Antonio Garrigues Walker Interview; DIARIO, 26 Jul 82) ........................................................................ 30

Agenda, Personalities of Newly Formed PDL Reviewed
(F. Mellado; EGIN, 25 Jul 82) .................................... 35

Fraga's Deputy Summarizes Seven-Point Economic Program
(Jorge Verstrynge Rojas; DIARIO, 29, 30 Jul 82) .......... 40

TURKEY

Rationale for Peace Association Trial Given
(CUMHURIYET, 25 Jun 82) ........................................ 44

Ozyoruk Examines Shortage of Jurists
(Mukhil Ozyoruk; TERCUMAN, 26 Jun 82) ................. 46

MILITARY

FRANCE

Second Foreign Parachutist Regiment's Functions, Exercises
(KEPI BLANC, various dates) ..................................... 48

Firing, Equipment Maintenance Tests
Exercise in Sudan
Practice With Armored Tanks
Alpine Training
City Combat
Bouar Garrison
Foreign Legion Regiments Test Equipment, Varied Terrain
(KEPI BLANC, various dates) .................................

First Cavalry Regiment Tests Tank
Practice at Winter Camp
Engineer-Soldier Battalion Function
Antitank Practice in Alps
Fifth Pacific Regiment

GREECE

Expert Analyzes 'HARRIER' Aircraft Use in Aegean
(N. Kanakakis; AKROPOLIS, 18 Jul 82) ..................... 58

NORWAY

Conservatives' Defense Panel Chief Repledges 'Four Percent'
(Liv Hegna; AFTENPOSTEN, 9 Aug 82) ..................... 63

- c -
PAPER PRESENTS VIEWS ON OUTLOOK FOR NORTH SEA PRODUCTION

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 31 Jul 82 p 6

[Article by Jan Ove Ekeberg: "Out at Sea, Billions Roll Out and In"]

[Text] The numbers from the North Sea are incomprehensible for most people, the sums are so staggering that none of us can really grasp them. From now until the turn of the century it is expected that the total investment out at sea will be somewhere between 450 and 500 billion kroner in today's currency. About 250 billion kroner in direct investment, and a somewhat lower figure in operation and maintenance. Income will be somewhere between 1000 and 1500 billion kroner, also in today's kroner value. For comparison last year's national and insurance budget was 151 billion kroner.

We either will or will not be all the more dependent on money from the North Sea. Politicians argue for and against increased wages, social payments and building new roads and schools, all according to what they think we can earn out at sea. It is obvious that management of the activity out there is steadily becoming more important.

There are different opinions about how strongly we should proceed with oil and gas extraction. Today about 50 million tons of oil and gas are produced per year. This rate will continue 2 or 3 years into the future, and then it will increase again.

Giants

There are several giants in the North Sea. One of them is the Ekofisk field. Ekofisk produces less gas each year. With today's technology the field will be empty in the next decade. Frigg, another great gas field, will be empty before Ekofisk.

But there are several large fields ready to take over gradually, even though the amount of production will stand still for some years to come. Statfjord has come the farthest. Oil production at Statfjord-A has exceeded all
expectations. In December the B platform will be placed in operation, and at the beginning of 1986 the third and last Statfjord platform will be put into operation. Production in the Statfjord field will increase strongly during all of this decade, and reach a peak in the middle of the next.

The much talked about field 30.6, known as the Gold block and now officially named Gullfaks, has come a long way in planning. There is also Sleipner, which will be the next largest gas field in the North Sea besides Statfjord, where the gas is now pumped down to the ocean floor again until all the oil is removed.

Gullfaks is all approved for development, and it is expected that the development of Sleipner will be approved next spring. That means that the first field can go into production in the middle of the last half of this decade, and the other at the end. If everything works out.

But there are also three smaller fields where production is comparatively almost imminent. There are two fields, 1.9 and 2.1, which will be tied to Ekofisk and the pipes from there to Emden in Netherlands, and Ula field. It is still somewhat uncertain whether it will be profitable to produce from Ula.

In spite of the giants Gullfaks and Sleipner, it is the 31 area, now officially named Troll, which will be the really large field in the North Sea around the turn of the century. Troll will be the giant at the beginning of the next century, and it is expected that the field can produce for approximately 50 years.

Four blocks are being investigated in the 31 area. The most important are 31.2 and 31.6. In 31.6 it is expected that half of the total resources of the entire area will be found. The value of the oil and gas in the 31 area is tentatively estimated at 2000 billion kroner in today's currency.

But the field will by no means be easy to exploit. It lies in the middle of the Norwegian channel where the depth of the sea is 300 meters and more. A partly new technology must be developed to exploit the 31 area. It is apparent that Norwegian industry is very interested in participating in this area from the start, participating in the development of the new technology. It will give Norwegian industry priority in international competition both in the North Sea and in the international offshore market. Here the correct management of development is especially important.

In the North

If we move north from the North Sea we come first to Halten bank. Here, for the time being, there have only been found smaller amounts of gas, and it is not possible to begin to speak of profitable fields.
A little farther north is Traena bank, which will be opened for exploratory drilling on 1 April next year. Who will explore on Traena bank is still not decided. The exploration is being negotiated in the Ministry of Oil and Energy.

Probably it will be two Norwegian and one foreign company which will get to start. Traena bank is regarded as being geologically interesting.

Farthest to the north is Tromso floe. Much gas has been found at 7120.8, now named Askeladden. Statoil estimates the reserve basis of Askeladden at 150 billion cubic meters of gas, which puts the gas discovery among the largest on the continental shelf.

Askeladden is also not profitable at this time. Four times as much as Askeladden is necessary before production would be undertaken in the north. The reasons are the long transportation distance to the market and the large development costs.
INCREASED EXPORTS, LACK OF INVESTMENTS MARK ECONOMY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German
19 Jul 82 p 2

[Text] Vienna, 18 Jul--The favorable development in exports with a predicted real annual increase of 5 percent as well as a slight recovery in private consumption are the current impulse generators of the Austrian economy. The negative factors are a marked lack of investments, rising unemployment, a new record of insolvency and a serious crisis in the construction industry. The hopes of Austrians are slowly dwindling that the economy is going to improve during the second half-year, but economists and the Kreisky government have not yet given up hope. Nobody, however, has any idea where the revival is going to come from.

At the middle of the year, the Austrian Institute for Economic Research lowered its predicted growth rate for 1982 from the previous 2.0 to 1.5 percent. According to the findings of the institute, the decline in demand and production during the second half of 1981 was followed by an improvement in the economic situation beginning at the start of this year, but the positive signs are still too weak to promise a strong economic upswing. During the first quarter, the Austrian gross national product was 1.1 percent above the level of the preceding year and 0.7 percent above the figures for the preceding quarter. The increase was almost exclusively due to the brisker private consumption. The range of real income for the broad masses has improved somewhat because of a slowdown in price increases, an income tax reform which became effective at the beginning of the year and wage increases averaging 6 percent of effective wages and salaries. As a consequence, last spring private households bought more but also saved more. Whereas in 1981 spending for consumer products stagnated in Austria, for 1982 the Economic Research Institute predicts a real increase in private consumption of 1.5 percent.

The weak Austrian economy put a strong damper on the growth of imports. During the January-May period imports rose only nominally by 1.8 percent; exports, however, increased by 10 percent. As a consequence the trade balance deficit for the first 5 months--28.4 billion schillings--was more than one-fifth less than during the same period in 1981. Since the foreign-tourist business also showed good results--Austria's net foreign-exchange income from foreign tourism during the January-May period was
Table 1. Industrial Production (1976 = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All Industries</th>
<th>Mining and Raw Materials</th>
<th>Energy and Gas Supplies</th>
<th>Capital Goods</th>
<th>Consumer Goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>114.4</td>
<td>110.5</td>
<td>116.2</td>
<td>117.9</td>
<td>111.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>117.6</td>
<td>108.9</td>
<td>120.4</td>
<td>122.0</td>
<td>115.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>116.3</td>
<td>104.2</td>
<td>123.4</td>
<td>119.0</td>
<td>114.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 April</td>
<td>118.6</td>
<td>106.8</td>
<td>124.7</td>
<td>121.8</td>
<td>116.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 April</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 Jan-April</td>
<td>114.6</td>
<td>108.5</td>
<td>127.0</td>
<td>113.2</td>
<td>113.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 Jan-April</td>
<td>116.0</td>
<td>100.8</td>
<td>130.3</td>
<td>115.0</td>
<td>117.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17.3 percent higher than during the same period last year—the balance of payments has improved significantly. During the first 5 months of this year the deficit was almost eliminated. It was only 0.7 billion schillings (compared to a negative balance of 10.5 billion schillings for the same period in 1981). Nevertheless, the Austrian National bank has no illusions about the fact that this marked improvement in the development of the balance of payments is exclusively tied to economic factors. As soon as domestic demand improves, the negative balance of payments should again "explode."

With respect to its monetary policy, Austria is definitely continuing its hard-currency course. At the time of the exchange rate adjustments within the European Monetary System in mid-June, the schilling was revalued the same as the German mark. Business and industry are complaining because although the Austrian currency is tied to the German mark, the necessary accompanying factors are not in agreement with those of the FRG economy. Since Austrian wage and salary increases were higher than those in Germany, Austria’s unit labor cost for this year—as happened in 1981—should rise by 2 percentage points more than in Germany. For the next round of wage contracts, business and industry is therefore demanding settlements below the rate of inflation. This demand has the support of Minister of Finance Herbert Salcher who—last but not least with a view toward the enormous expenditures for the state budget that accompany every additional percentage point in wage increases for Federal workers—is in favor of an extremely modest round of wage settlements in the fall of 1982.

On the other hand, Minister for Social Administration Dallinger—with the support of the Labor Union Federation—is demanding an increase in vacations at full pay, beginning with 1983. The minimum time for vacations—it has already been announced by Dallinger—is to be increased in three steps from 4 to 5 weeks. The first two additional vacation days are to be granted beginning with January 1983. As a result, Austria's labor costs other than wages, which already amount to 92 percent and are among the highest in the world, will rise even more. In view of the critical profit situation experienced by many Austrian enterprises, representatives from business and industry are urging a stop to additional burdens. Nevertheless, since
parliamentary elections are scheduled for the spring of 1983, the ruling socialists might use the two additional vacation days as an "election sweetener!" to entice the voters. In the interest of job security, the bourgeois People's Party firmly rejected the vacation extension planned by the Austrian Socialist Party.

The Austrian state budget went out of control. Already now it is certain that the net deficit in 1982 Federal budget will be approximately one-third higher than planned in the adopted budget. According to the budget preview presented recently by the Economic and Social Advisory Committee (a social partner body), Austria's state debts will almost double during the 5 years between 1981 and 1986, from 300 to 560 billion schillings, unless drastic measures are taken with respect to expenditures as well as revenues. Every responsible person in Austria knows that cuts must be made, above all, in two areas, in social services and in the gigantic deficits that have accumulated for the Federal Railroad. But the Kreisky government does not have the courage to touch these two areas. The socialists want to maintain the fiction of a "healthy welfare state," because they do not want to lose any votes during the parliamentary elections next year.

Table 2. Foreign Trade (in Billion Schillings)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Import Surplus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>269.86</td>
<td>206.25</td>
<td>63.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>315.85</td>
<td>226.17</td>
<td>89.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>334.51</td>
<td>251.77</td>
<td>89.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 May</td>
<td>27.07</td>
<td>19.24</td>
<td>7.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 May</td>
<td>26.67</td>
<td>20.74</td>
<td>5.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 January-May</td>
<td>134.63</td>
<td>98.79</td>
<td>35.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 January-May</td>
<td>137.31</td>
<td>108.93</td>
<td>28.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now unemployment is also rising in Austria. At the end of June the Economic Research Institute upped its prediction for the 1982 unemployment rate from 3.3 to 3.6 percent. When comparing it to the FRG, it must not be overlooked that many Austrians can "retire" 5 years earlier than people in the FRG (women at the age of 55 and men at 60 as long as they have contributed to the Social Security system for 35 years) and more than half of the workers are already taking advantage of early retirement. Consequently older age-groups, who are particularly suffering from lack of work in Germany, practically are no longer included in Austria's unemployment statistics.

Industrial production: Industrial production, including energy and gas supplies, stagnated at last year's level; without energy and growth rate, seasonally adjusted according to workdays, amounted to 1.0 percent. Another statistical division that experienced a decline consists of mining products and raw materials; compared to last year, production declined by 6.3 percent. Energy production also went down considerably, 6.7 percent. Capital goods did best, showing an increase of 3.8 percent. Within this group, the
production of finished goods increased 7.5 percent over last year, the growth rate for initial products was modest and came to only 1.9 percent; building materials registered a 5.4-percent decline in production due to the crisis in the building industry.

Foreign tourism: During the first 5 months of this year, Austria grossed 32 billion schillings in foreign exchange—about 10.6 percent more than the same period last year—from foreign tourism. On the other hand, foreign-exchange spending by Austrians for trips abroad (including "schilling exports" by guest workers) rose only 1.8 percent to 12.7 billion schillings. Consequently the foreign-exchange net income from foreign tourism—which amounted to 19.3 billion schillings—was 17.3 percent higher than during the 1981 January-May period. During the first 5 months, the number of lodgings by foreigners in Austria rose by 6.2 percent to 20,256 million.

Labor market: At the end of June, Austrian employment offices registered 66,194 unemployed people and 19,385 job openings. One year earlier, 38,186 persons were looking for work and 30,674 job openings were listed. It means that the employment situation in Austria has deteriorated significantly. To be sure, the current unemployment rate is only 2.3 percent, but economists expect that the annual average will be 3.6 percent.

Foreign trade: During the month of May, Austria imported goods totaling 26.67 billion schillings and exported products for 29.74 billion schillings. Compared to last year it means that imports rose by 2 percent and exports by 8 percent. During the first 5 months of this year, the development was even more favorable: Imports rose by 2 percent and exports increased by 10 percent. For the January-May period the Austrian negative trade balance stood at 28.38 billion schillings, which was 21 percent lower than for the same period in 1981. The significance of the developing countries for Austrian exports is growing continually, while the trade with the East is dwindling. Last year the share of the developing countries was 14.4 percent of total exports, and it was the first time that it was higher than the share of East bloc states, which came to only 11.5 percent. Austrian exports to the OPEC countries quadrupled between 1970 and 1981. Higher expenditures for petroleum imports from the OPEC area could be compensated to a large extent with increases in Austrian deliveries to the oil states.

Prices and wages: The June consumer price index was 5.9 (May 6.0) percent higher than last year's level. The increase since May was 0.5 percent. According to the calculations of the Economic Institute, the effective 1982 income will be on the average 7.25 percent higher than it was in 1981. The 1982 increase in consumer prices is expected to average 5.5 (1981: 6.8) percent.

8991
CSO: 3103/614
SEVIG CALLS FOR ECONOMY BASED ON TURKISH NEEDS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 15 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by Veysi Sevig: "Haywire"]

[Text] Turkish economic life is still under the influence of some old habits that have nothing to do with a lot of current economic realities. As known, it is just as easy to fail as to succeed in business in an economic climate where free market rules apply. The important thing is to comply with the rules and make a good evaluation of economic developments both when first starting out in business and as long as the business is active.

The type of business ownership and management still under the influence of the old habit of cheap credit which therefore insists on procuring all the business' financial needs through credit is no longer very viable today. Operating on credit is an objectionable method of financing as to cost and risk introduced as well as the burden accompanying it.

Some businesses and establishments refuse to give up old habits. They cling to old economic attitudes, maintaining that their major shareholders should sacrifice as little as possible from their own assets and take maximum advantage of credit, that is, outside assets, and have failed to do anything to bring their attitudes and business structures into conformity with current conditions.

The stabilization measures and fiscal policy now in effect have made things rather difficult for establishments with high credit-use rates. But there are ways and means to save them from the predicament this has put them in. The first of these is to increase their net assets.

Persons in ownership positions of certain businesses and establishments which have hit the rocks in the past 2 years in our country have not been seen to make or be able to make any sacrifices themselves or from their own net assets. The people whose businesses, according to the recent newspaper reports, are on the verge of economic collapse, their organizations being merged, seem hardly affected by what is happening. Indeed, they spend ostentatiously as if they had no responsibility for these situations at all.

It is natural for businesses to cease economic activity. The owner or owners cannot be blamed for the existence of such a situation. When the business ceases operations, their economic life will begin to cave in at the very least.
This is why the business owner is the one hurt the worst. Yet in some cases of the increasing number of business failures in our country, the owners are so nonchalant that one can only marvel.

A business, with its investments, production capacity and personnel, is a dynamic establishment. The partners in this establishment have one expectation and intent when they put their money into it. With the passage of time these people grow in income and earnings resulting from the business activity. Funds which the business obtains by borrowing, meanwhile, contribute to the growth of the business.

Now, some of these establishments are no longer able to repay their debts. Production has stopped. Their personnel have gone. But the owners are completely out of it. Indeed some of them are out chasing speculative investment rainbows.

Some businessmen find it appropriate to leave the country and never return; others to leave their former business to its own fate and look after number one, investing their own private resources abroad or in speculative ventures without regard to those who made those resources possible. The hardest thing of all is to erase the negative impressions left on our economic life by this kind of attitude and behavior.

Any economy, wherever it may be, must be conducted by rules and relationships appropriate to itself. Meanwhile, if some people are always losing confidence in themselves and get in the habit of shifting the blame, the resulting economic climate will become one in which no one operates under normal circumstances. And this is the real danger, the real risk.

8349
CSO: 4654/392
CONTRACTORS ABROAD LACK ADEQUATE INCENTIVES

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 14 Jul 82 p 5

[Text] Ankara (DUNYA) — Sener Oktay, deputy general director of Aryapi Construction Company, said that contracting firms abroad do not get the incentives they deserve. He also said that this development had come about as a result of various decrees issued by the state and the fact that policy is conducted by the public sector.

Sener Oktay pointed out in an interview with DUNYA that contracting services abroad had reached the point of being very important for the economy. "The construction sector, which is the driving force of the economy, suffered a big blow after the 24 January decisions," he said, adding:

"The 24 January decisions were planned for the purpose of giving Turkey a new image. One of the goals was to cut back domestic demand and export the surplus. Then interest rates were decontrolled, and interest added a new burden to operations costs. The tight money-credit policy put hard-pressed companies in a position where they were unable to convert capital assets into operating funds. Small firms began letting their workers go."

Sener Oktay stressed the effects of the construction slump on large segments of industry. He said that opening up to the outside did not suit Turkey's industrial structure in the short term. Stating that increased exports had been unable to close the gap in the balance of payments, Oktay said, "Contractors with shrinking work volumes owing to the lack of money at home found a remedy abroad." Adding that unemployment had accompanied the slump in the construction sector, Oktay continued:

"Contracting services abroad have been a positive development in providing a partial solution to unemployment. Meanwhile, firms finding their opportunities to obtain credit abroad very limited began sending a large part of the supplies they needed from Turkey. While this increased exports, it also helped certain hard-pressed businesses stay afloat. Faced by these difficulties, however, construction firms have received far fewer incentives than they deserve as a result of the state's policies."

Sener Oktay said that foreign exchange to cover requirements abroad such as machinery and equipment was lacking even at the beginning of a job and this led the companies to choose jobs requiring lower technology. He said that with all
the problems they face, the firms were unable to increase their contribution to
the Turkish economy at the desired rate. "Turkish firms' chance to compete with
other nations abroad depends basically on cheap labor," he added.

Stressing that "their liquidity problems, their inadequacy as to machinery and
equipment and the inability of any but a few large firms to take jobs requiring
advanced technology practically eliminate any chances of competition," Sener
Oktay said that Eastern and Western nations which for various reasons could not go
into the Middle East or had been there but left were gradually relinquishing their
positions there to the developing nations. He added:

"The departure of the Eastern and Western nations having advanced technology and
the gradual relinquishing of their positions to the developing nations has created
a climate of intense competition. Jobs have thus begun to go for lower prices.
There are among the competing nations ones which support their contractors with
credit of all kinds and easily work out problems by means of joint committees.
This is not the case for Turkish firms. Turkish firms have to solve their prob-
lems themselves. It seems that it is only when political and trade problems
become serious with a country that reciprocal committees are formed and the prob-
lems ironed out for a while."

8349
CSO: 4654/392
HESSE CAMPAIGN'S EFFECTS ON SPD/FDP COALITION IN BONN

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 2 Aug 82 pp 24-25

[Article: "Target Practice"]

[Text] In Hesse, the battle between the partners—the SPD and the FDP—has begun. If it becomes too violent, the Bonn alliance will again be in danger.

The new companion made a good impression on Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The FDP chief praised Hesse's CDU chairman Alfred Dregger for a characteristic which Genscher has been missing for some time in Helmut Schmidt, his SPD partner. "The man," Genscher said of Dregger, "has charm."

None of his party friends in Bonn or Wiesbaden knew that Sunday before last, Genscher and his wife Baerbel stopped to see the Dreggers in Fulda on their way to a Bayreuth performance of "Parsifal," a drama of redemption.

The leading CDU candidate for Hesse's Landtag election, who had been defamed by the Free Democrats for many years as the ugliest prototype of conservatism next to Franz Josef Strauss, was made presentable by the chief of the liberals himself. Dregger, Genscher stated after the talk, was certainly not any less liberal than, for instance, Lower Saxony's Ernst Albrecht.

The Social Democrats called the FDP chairman's side trip a provocation. Since 17 June, when Hesse's liberals decided in Darmstadt to side with Dregger in the future rather than with Boerner, the comrades are thinking about revenge. Hesse's Bundestag deputy Rudi Walther describes the mood: "Disloyalty must be punished."

The resentment is so deep that the SPD is finding it difficult to contain the conflict. And because now former allies have to fight each other vehemently, the foundation of the Bonn coalition is crumbling again as well. Neither Genscher nor Schmidt can avoid getting involved in this Land dispute.

The chancellor already threatened an FDP member of the presidium: "We will drag you through the mire and you will not know what happened to you."
For the time being it is his secret how he is going to do it. As far as the Social Democrats are concerned, the FDP chairman and vice chancellor is the main culprit for the swing to the CDU of Ekkehard Gries, head of Hesse's FDP, and his liberals. Minister-President Boerner said: "The Darmstadt resolution is his doing."

After he managed to break up the Bonn coalition during the budget negotiations in July, Genscher is now waiting for Hesse's 26 September election, Walther warned, "as if he were waiting for the decision of the oracle of Delphi." Boerner is also certain: "On Monday after the election, the liberals will get together in Bonn and decide whether they should get out."

If Boerner loses and Dregger becomes the head of government with the help of the FDP, all those liberals in Bonn who want to cancel the alliance with the SPD will feel that they have been on the right track.

Consequently the Social Democrats want to teach Genscher a lesson in Hesse to chain him to Schmidt until 1984—a logic which certainly makes sense also in another respect: If the comrades are bearing down too hard on the liberals, it might encourage Genscher even more to seek a change in Bonn at the first opportunity.

The FDP chairman had already warned of consequences. The Social Democrats should think about it, whether it is wise to "thrash" the FDP. At any rate, the FPD is not going to attack Helmut Schmidt and Willy Brandt.

But Boerner has to shake the FDP regardless of losses in Bonn: The only chance the Social Democrat has of keeping Dregger from coming to power is to push the liberals below the 5-percent limit. If the Christian Democrat fails to get an absolute majority against the SPD and the "Greens," Boerner could remain in office for the time being, at least as an officiating minister-president.

Moreover, for Boerner, an SPD rightwinger and a loyal supporter of Schmidt, attacks on the FDP are the best means to keep the grass-roots level of the party united behind the leadership. Since the FDP has been on the other side, Willi Goerlach, the leftwing chairman of the bezirk of Hessen-Sued, feels that the comrades have become "really alive."

The week before last, Boerner demonstrated in the Land cabinet how he intends to deal with the renegades in the future. In the presence of the assembled round of ministers, state secretaries and officials, the minister-president reprimanded his FDP Minister of Economics Klaus-Juergen Hoffie.

During an interview, while Boerner was on vacation, Hoffie had expressed doubt in the ability of the Social Democrats to govern. Boerner's question was whether Hoffie was implying that he was considering to leave the government prematurely. Weakly the liberal replied: He had no plans to leave.

"He needs his official car for the election campaign," the minister-president said later with a grin.
The indignation over Boerner's fracas (FDP General Secretary Guenter Verheugen: "He is completely out of line") may help the Free Democrats to get out of a predicament easily: If they should have to give a good reason for their coalition change, they would have to think of some kind of proof fast.

Hesse's liberals have come up with the weird argument that whoever elects the FDP—and that means Dregger—does, in the end, support the coalition with Schmidt in Bonn. Because: Only if the FDP is seated in the Land cabinet of the Christian Democrats will it be able to influence Dregger's voting pattern in the Bundesrat—in favor of the social-liberals.

The liberals are talking a lot about such a tactical finesse, but they are saying little about anything of political significance. They cannot hide, for instance, that they are primarily concerned about separating themselves from the fate of Holger Boerner, who is expected to be a sure loser in the election.

The attacks on Holger Boerner by the Free Democrats are also conspicuous. At one time Genscher praised him as a "perfect example of a socialist," now he is to be exposed as a leftwing radical.

In April, during the Munich SPD party rally, Boerner had given his support to measures that would destroy the system, Genscher charged. And Wolfgang Mischnick, the leader of the FDP parliamentary group, blasted the minister-president, calling him "the spearhead of the forces who want to change the economic policy, removing it further and further away from the principles of the market economy." Whoever talks like Boerner about labor market policies, whoever demands surcharges on levies and more public investments, Genscher said, "cannot expect us to join him in a new coalition for 4 years."

The liberals are hoping that the SPD will furnish further occasions for disputes that will affect the elections, such as quarreling by the comrades among themselves about the budget. "Day and night," Genscher prophesies with respect to this lucky break, the FDP election campaigners would talk about the budget resolutions that would have to be defended against the socialists.

One of the confidants of the FDP chief was noticing with joy how many prominent comrades from the Laender were grumbling about their chancellor. "Barbarians are taking over, they are doing everything their own way." If the Social Democrats continue in the same manner, the liberals will "come up with a lot of arguments against the SPD."

As a matter of fact, Boerner also intends to argue against the Bonn austerity concept during the election campaign. In his opinion it is wrong to introduce a policy, according to which everybody has to participate in hospital costs, DM 5 per day and patient. He believes that the resolution symbolizes the "change" which Genscher forced on the chancellor.
But the Free Democrats are deceiving themselves when they hope that Boerner will stab the chancellor in the back. Boerner said: "I am not going to play into the hands of the FDP." He is not going to let the entire budget be wrecked because of this "marginal issue."

But there could still be a big quarrel: In September, during the final budget talks, it will become evident that the figures which were the basis for the 1983 budget are no longer accurate. A new gap between DM 3 and 5 million will have to be covered.

Schmidt will have to stick to the promise he made to his comrades, when he said that he will not permit further cuts in the social net. The chancellor said. "We will take care of it with loans."

It is doubtful that Genscher will go along. The right wing of the FDP, like FDP Deputy Juergen Moellemann, has been telling the hesitant party leader for a long time to make the break; they hope that the final showdown with the SPD will come in the fall. Moellemann said: "No more debts, but cutting expenses. There is no room for expansion."

Nevertheless, if Genscher really starts a new dispute about the coalition and the budget, he also risks losing even more voters. Every opinion poll shows that Genscher's party is declining rapidly. "The indecision," the chancellor commented, "was a catastrophe."

According to pollsters, social-liberal voters are turning their backs on the FDP. And following the Darmstadt party rally, which was to indicate the change, Genscher, the chief tactician, dropped in popularity to the lowest point in more than 6 years.

Now Baum and Verheugen want to rebuild the lost FDP profile with new programs: "The party is longing for it."

In a confidential 21-page paper for Genscher, Baum listed the items which must be the future "determining factor for the politics of all leading FDP people." Among other things, the liberals are to assume a leading position in the movement for detente and disarmament, fight for a nuclearfree zone and not see itself only as a party that favors "technocratic budget cuts" (Verheugen).

Goal of the action: During the November Federal party congress, the FDP is to agree to the continuation of the coalition until 1984.

To guarantee the success of the plans of the left wing of the liberals, it must be avoided that Schmidt and Boerner cause irreparable damage to the FDP chairman in Hesse. Baum said: "Schmidt and Genscher will have to talk about it."

8991
CSO: 3103/611
STRONG POSITION OF CDU IN HESSE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 8 Jul 82 p 3

[Article by Eghard Moerbitz, Bonn: "CDU's Fear of Overconfidence--Two Losers Are Clear Months Before Hesse Landtag Elections: Social Democrats and Liberals"]

[Text] If the hopes of the Union, the dreams of the Greens and the fears of the SPD and FDP can be trusted, the Hesse state elections of 26 September have already been decided. Comrade Trend is in retreat.

For centuries pundits have been at odds with each other over whether the ancient maxim "vox populi--vox Dei" (the voice of the people is the voice of God) can be taken for granted. One thing is sure—that the so-called 2,000 polls of the opinion surveys are a long way from being the judgment of the Almighty since too many things can still happen in the next 11 weeks. But the basic trends which have been traced out with almost seismographic precision by the various party headquarters in Bonn all point to the likelihood that Holger Boerner will have to clear out his desk as minister-president this fall.

The most recent opinion polls conducted by the Allensbach organization of Prof. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann last June produced the following picture: CDU 48 percent, SPD 34 percent, FDP 6, Greens 11 and others 1 percent. Party experts do not accept these estimates as being carved in stone. Even the Christian Democrats are saying that the SPD's 34 percent has been underestimated and that the Greens 11 percent has been heavily overrated.

There is no question that the SPD, CDU and FDP have pretty much accepted the fact that the Greens have shaken the long established party structures in Berlin and Hamburg and are about to do the same thing in Hesse. One prominent Hesse SPD figure concludes from the election results in the two city-states that if the Greens succeed in capturing potential votes mainly from the SPD and the FDP in Hesse as well, then the Free Democrats will be left standing outside the parliamentary gates and that Alfred Dregger will take his place in the Wiesbaden parliament with an absolute majority.

The CDU and the FDP of course fear such predictions like the devil fears holy water. The Liberals are haunted by the possibility that FDP sympathizers, after the party's zigging and zagging at both Land and national levels over recent weeks, could throw up their hands altogether and scatter to the winds.
The Union, on the other hand, knows all too well that a good part of their constituency might simply not show up at the polls on election Sunday if they have been unceasingly bombarded with premature announcements of victory for weeks before 26 September.

CSU national party manager Peter Radunski expresses his optimism very cautiously: "Ever since the CDU, under Alfred Dregger's leadership, succeeded in becoming the strongest political force in Hesse over the past three elections, analyses of the political situation and the CDU's own surveys offer the realistic prospect that the CDU can attain its election goal and be able to bring about a change of government in Hesse."

Even the chief political analyst at the party's Bonn headquarters, Baldur Wagner, preferred to keep things in a low key when he summed up, on the basis of four Hesse opinion polls, that their results made it appear that a change of administration in Hesse was "within reach." His own prediction for 26 September, expressed in round numbers, was as follows: CDU 48 percent, SPD 38 percent, FDP 5 and 8 percent for the Greens. One percent was left to cover the remaining spread from the far Right to the far Left.

What must be frightening to the SPD when looking at the results of the CDU's surveys is the fact that workers in Hesse are threatening to desert the party not because it is doing too little to halt the rearmament of NATO and too little for the protection of the environment, but because they are anxious about their jobs. On the basis of the Frankfurt "Contest-Institute," which has undertaken opinion research on behalf of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, employment security is regarded as the absolute problem of first rank by some 85 percent of all persons polled in Hesse.

This concern is closely matched by their judgment on the general situation of the economy. Although 57 percent of those polled in Hesse were content with their present personal situation, 54 percent were also concerned for the future. Of SPD followers who, in 1978, judged the general economic situation as "good to very good," only 19 percent now felt the same way. The conclusion drawn by CDU headquarters in Bonn: "Workers, more than any other social group, are looking forward with concern at future political developments in Hesse. Their heavily economic focus on problems will increasingly tend to bring them into the camp of the CDU."

With respect to political developments, it is not primarily the self-employed and entrepreneurs who are "concerned" about Hesse's future, but the workers with 51 percent. When this piece of evidence is combined with two other figures, the conclusion could be reached that workers in Hesse are taking a dim view of things because Alfred Dregger's ascent can no longer be halted; 42 percent of Hesse residents polled are, according to CDU experts, convinced of Dregger's electoral victory and only 22 percent are persuaded that the incumbent minister-president, Holger Boerner, can remain in office.

Could this be the reason why 11 percent of those who voted SPD in 1978 (and even 28 percent of FDP voters) have defected to the CDU, as the opinion pollsters found to be the case for the voting intentions in 1982? To join up with the forces of the expected victor, while it may not be the most praiseworthy motive morally, is certainly one that seems to evade becoming extinct.
The party that will be most heavily affected will be the FDP, to whom the social science research institute of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation last May credited 4 to 5 percent of all votes to be cast. This, of course, preceded the Hesse FDP's resolution of 17 June to form a coalition with Alfred Dregger in the event that the CDU did not gain an absolute majority. The fact that the Allensbach Institute estimated an FDP share of 8 percent after that party's resolution, does not say a great deal; the survey took place before the FDP went into a complete skid as a result of the wrangling over the 1983 Federal budget. The FDP's situation certainly is not going to improve if they continue to contradict themselves in the same way.

Still, at the same time that the honorary chairman of the FDP in Hesse, Wolfgang Mischnick, has been tuned to the same wavelength as Hans-Dietrich Genscher and has been seeking to convince workers in Hesse that the Greens policies pose a danger to their jobs, the FDP secretary general Guenter Verheugen continues to cling stubbornly to his thesis of "cooperation on specific issue" with the Greens.

Why the entire top leadership of the FDP cries "shame!" when Hamburg's SPD Mayor Klaus von Dohnanyi tries to stay in office with the help of the Greens and the Alternatives is something beyond the comprehension of voters in Hesse. It only becomes clear when the CDU general secretary, Manfred Kanther, despite the FDP's change of course in Hesse, states very emphatically: "Our goal is an absolute majority. We don't have a single vote to give away."

9878
CSO: 3103/586
OBSERVER COMMENDS CONSERVATIVES ON REACTION TO SOVIET VIOLATIONS

Oslo DAGBLADET in Norwegian 31 Jul. 82 p 2

[Commentary by Jahn Otto Johansen: "Soviet Sea Serpents"]

[Text] Is a government capable of learning from its own mistakes, not to mention the mistakes of others? As a rule this ability does not seem to be very well developed. But now we are suddenly seeing the conservative government--personified by permanent secretary Elvinn Berg in the Foreign Ministry--demonstrate that it has learned from the mistakes committed by the previous administration. I am thinking of this week's item in the newspapers about occasional Soviet violations of Norwegian territorial waters, and what happened in 1978.

That time it was in the middle of summer, when the newspapers and broadcasters were short of news. In July 1978 the newspapers, radio and TV--DAGBLADET not excepted--ran a number of great "disclosures" about Soviet border violations. From day to day, yes, almost from hour to hour, expectations were raised that we really had a big crisis here. The Soviet Northern Fleet was visualized in far northern Norwegian waters. In the daily news broadcasts, with a fairly high pulse, we heard the news reader begin his broadcast with, "No Soviet border violations have taken place during the past 24 hours."

In all there were supposed to have been 13 Soviet border violations during that hectic summer of 1978. All the world's policemen and naval officers contributed with dramatic inputs. At the central government questions were answered with silence or with conflicting and confusing statements. The Norwegian people must have had the impression that something really big and serious was going on.

But then the waves--not only out at sea--subsided, and it was learned that of the 13 alleged violations there were only three with any substance to them. In one case the skipper paid a fine, in another case the skipper was so drunk after a long sojourn at sea that it was impossible to get anything sensible out of him, and the third episode was also somewhat unclear. All the other 10 episodes proved to be political sea serpents.
I began to suspect that we were reliving the story about the boy who cried "wolf" when the free-speaking American ambassador, Louis Lerner, phoned me and asked what in the devil was going on in this dear little country. The Americans, who are usually well informed in these matters, had no information which could confirm the sensational disclosures in the mass media. When the responsible Norwegian authorities were able to collect themselves, they released a clear statement that there had not been any large-scale Soviet border violations. There was no pattern to what had happened, it was more coincidental.

When AFTENPOSTEN recently reported that there were several Soviet ships which had recently violated Norwegian waters, it was a reminder of the sea battles of 1978. But the new leadership in the Foreign Ministry had learned a lesson from the lack of information and poor crisis control of the summer of 1978. Even though the Foreign Ministry called in Minister Smirnov, AFTENPOSTEN reported yesterday that the Norwegian regulations on sea limits were unclear, and the Foreign Ministry had taken the initiative to clarify them. The Defense Ministry knew—obviously—that there were several Soviet ships in the inner leads, but denied that it was approved.

Since there was such a lack of clarity on the Norwegian side, it was not easy to beat the drums about Soviet border violations. And permanent secretary Eivin Berg did not do that. In a sober statement to DAGBLADET he said that there was no suspicion that Soviet ships are conducting any systematic violation of Norwegian waters. He said that it was more likely coincidental, and possibly a demonstration of poor seamanship and defective equipment on the Soviet side. He was polite enough not to mention the possibility of drunk driving at sea. So the affair now has the dimensions it really should have—and should have had in 1978. It is satisfactory that in this way our bilateral relations were undramatized. And thus we have more time and energy to devote to the real problems which continue to exist between the two countries. But that is another story.

9287
CSO: 3108/145
BRIEFS

CP CHAIRMAN KLEVEN'S LOW PROFILE--Hans I. Kleven has been chairman of the NKP [Norwegian Communist Party] for over one-half year now. Week after week and month after month we have waited for him to get the hang of things and distinguish himself. Perhaps not as much as his predecessors, but enough so that we could get acquainted with him. We have been interested in which profile he would choose. We had almost given up hope. He made no advances. But then finally we read that the chairman has become involved in something in Ostfold. The Fredrikstad newspapers report that he had a decisive role in getting a top ice hockey player from Czechoslovakia for the team The Stars. FRIHETEN reports the good news that Kleven was the arranger of contact for bringing over the back Vladimir Bednar from the club Skoda Pizen to Norwegian ice hockey. He took up the issue during a visit to the country earlier this summer. We think this first action by the chairman of NKP deserves respect. Kleven is clearly a man who only deals when he can get concrete results. And in that respect he is different from his predecessor, who was always moving about without accomplishing anything.

[Text] [Oslo NY TID in Norwegian 28 Jul 82 p 2] 9287

CSO: 3108/145
ADMINISTRATION BLAMED FOR MILITARY'S INFLUENCE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 3 Aug 82 pp 9-10

[Commentary by Nicolas Sartorius: "Reflections on the Military Question"]

[Text] From the very beginning of the transition, we Spanish readers of daily newspapers have introduced into our regular political lexicon the concept of de facto powers in order to describe those material or spiritual powers that are not part of Montesquieu's famous trilogy but which many people think are basically the ones that are truly decisive with respect to decisions on important questions. We include among them -- even if we do not usually mention them by name -- the armed forces or their top leaders, whom we consider, rightly or not, to represent them at all times. Whatever the case, we are becoming accustomed to a situation in Spain in which the constitutional powers exist: Parliament, the administration and the courts, accompanied by others about which one has the impression, even if not backed by incontrovertible evidence, that to a great extent, they have influenced and continue to influence recent events of crucial importance to political life in Spain. One hears talk of the stepping down of the previous head of the government, the change in strategy toward a polarization into two main options, the entry into NATO and LOAPA [expansion unknown] and the decision on the 23-F, to such a point that a former deputy prime minister was heard to utter the very Iberian "I am up to here!" on the occasion of the last UCD [Democratic Center Union] political council meeting. The fact is that whether we like it or not, a large number of our citizens think or, better still, feel that that is where those powers that determine, or at least affect, decisions which the constitution reserves for the civilian government lie. They even have the impression that during the most recent period, from the time of the 23-F, to be precise, the civilian government has counted for less and less, which creates an atmosphere of insecurity, if not fear, that is detrimental to the participation of the people and the operation of our institutions.

The dialectical tension between civilian and military power in the contemporary history of Spain is an old question. But unlike other major questions -- viewed as filled with contradictions -- that have been at the root of periodic traumas in our national events, such as the religious question, the question of nationalities versus centralism, the social question in its agrarian and labor aspects, none of which are now manifested with the virulence they once exhibited and that even follow channels not unlike those seen in neighboring
Europe, the same cannot be said about the military question as an essential part of the problem of the definitive modernization of our nation. Whatever we might say, whether or not it is true and no matter if we express ourselves openly or whisper it to one another, Spanish people who are aware have the nagging impression that one day, the armed forces or some part of them could try to put an end to democratic freedoms, to the constitution we approved in December 1978. This is so because, among other reasons, military intervention in Spanish political life has been a chronic phenomenon and because, as everyone knows, it is the only institution with the strength and capability of doing so, this despite the fact that what most of our armed forces truly want is very likely to serve their country effectively and for things to go well in Spain. But we must admit that in no other country in West Europe, not even in Greece or Portugal, do the people live with this feeling. It is one that must be effectively combatted because I am one of those who believe that Spanish policy cannot be influenced one more day by alleged or real de facto powers, not because they do not exist, for it would be naive to ignore them, but because the best way to strengthen the civilian government, the only one recognized by the constitution, is by not making the slightest concession to the logic of de facto powers -- without forgetting that the problem exists -- but by giving our institutions our participation and popular support. That is precisely what we have not done sufficiently.

Power Vacuum

The historical causes of what has been called the military question in Spain are well-known and have been accurately summarized in a splendid book by Diego Lopez Garrido, on "La Guardia Civil y los Orígenes del Estado Centralista" [The Civil Guard and the Origins of the Centralist State]. It is an army that ends up acting, during a large share of the 19th and 20th centuries, like an actual military party, used by the different factions of a weak bourgeoisie unable to achieve a social consensus by any other means, unable to exercise its hegemony, build a modern state, a strong and autonomous civilian administration and that will in the end, as the author lucidly states, become a "prisoner of the role assigned to it by a social class that impedes its democratization, even at the risk of occasionally losing control over it." In the final analysis, as always occurs in these processes, one does not know who controls whom, for the army has been allowed to become a state within a state, with its own autonomy, establishing special, privileged direct relations with the Crown, both over and under successive governments, as if it were obeying the highest magistracy in the land and not the Executive Branch, deciding on its own when an alleged power vacuum legitimized its intervention, assuming national representation. With respect to the idea of the power vacuum, the justification for all military intervention, one must state once and for all that in a democratic system, the very acceptance of the idea that a power vacuum can exist is in itself the budding recognition that a coup d'état is legitimate. In a democracy, there can be no power vacuum because if we truly believe that sovereignty resides in the people, they are always there to engender democratic power through their votes. Those who speak about power vacuums -- some consciously, others without realizing it -- are actually denying that sovereignty resides in the people. What is more, they do so because they basically fear that the nation might exercise that
sovereignty. Nevertheless, after this digression, let us return to the main subject. In addition to the historical reasons that have shaped the military question in Spain, there are the vicissitudes our armed forces have experienced over the past 40 years and the way the transition to civil liberties has come about. Not only do we have a weak bourgeoisie in Spain — it is less so now than in the 19th century — and not only do the democratic institutions not have sufficient strength — they have more than some think — the fact is that to a great extent, our armed forces have emerged from a victory against democracy and what democracy means. For 40 years, they have been trained in the cult of what that victory meant, in the execrable role of the political parties, in the philosophy of the "internal enemy" and essentially organized to fight that adversary, and so on. One cannot deny, however, that the transition from the dictatorship to democracy was accepted on the whole by the Spanish armed forces in a disciplined fashion, which is a credit to them, even though there have been individual cases of rebellion, extremely dangerous actions, such as that of 23-F, and although there does exist a latent, diffuse atmosphere whose precise extent is not well known among officials and officers, one contrary to the democratic system and of sympathy toward those who have tried to put an end to it. It is no less certain that during the transition, especially the successive UCD governments and perhaps the political parties as a whole, we have not acted with the clairvoyance and energy that such a serious, delicate question required. Parliament has not debated these questions in depth and to date, there has not been any coherent line of military policy. We have reached the Calvo Sotelo-Oliart phase, truly negative, during which one had the impression that neither Parliament nor the government counted for anything. As a result, we have given way — to what extent I do not know — to the old idea, an idea harmful in our history, that the political parties, Parliament and the press have to leave the military in peace so that it will leave them alone. The concept has reigned — dear to involutionists of all times — that the army should move in its own sphere, without contact with what civilian society does, running counter to the opinion of illustrious military men who preach the necessary fusion of the people and the armed forces as a guarantee of democracy and their own effectiveness.

It is therefore urgent that the civilian government act in this field so that the armed forces are not — if they are — a de facto power and so that the doctrine put forth in the opening session of the Santander UIMP [expansion unknown] a few days ago by Lt Gen Gutierrez Mellado is a fact, to wit, that the armed forces are not a de facto power because there is no other power here than that existing in the legislative, executive and judicial branches. This should be the case but unfortunately, doubt exists that it is, for Spanish democracy inherited a government apparatus from the previous regime practically intact, an apparatus whose basic structures have not been modified in the slightest. Our transition from the Immutable principles of the caudillo to the 1978 Constitution has been gradual, as in the case of the shift from the old regime to the liberal government in the 19th century, and, as Lopez Garrido lucidly points out, "the catlike instinct of the ruling classes will produce a controlled transition, enabling the old absolutists to get a foothold in the liberal government." Today we have all the servants of the old regime installed in the constitutional government and, in my
opinion, there can be no question of recommending personal purges that would be neither possible nor desirable, except those determined by the courts as the result of wrongdoing. Other measures will have to be adopted so that in Spain we may cease talking about the military question as we now are doing. In our country, everyone, beginning with the political parties, social forces, the Church, Parliament and the press, has, at different times and in varying degrees, embarked upon a process or organizational and mental adjournment in order to make a connection with the new times and overcome what we have called the respective traditional cultures. The Spanish armed forces also have to overcome their traditional culture, go beyond their backward way of thinking and gradually adopt practices in keeping with the principles of the constitution. We must start from the principle that there is no longer any "internal enemy" other than those violating the constitution itself, whether with pronouncements or through terrorist acts, paying heed to Sieyes' statement quoted in the book previously named: "The soldier must never be used against the citizen. He may only be ordered to act against external enemies."

Starting now, the entire culture and organization of the armed forces must be modified, conscious, through the observance of other processes, that changes in ways of thinking are more costly and slower than those which affect structures. Whence the exceptional importance of anything having to do with military training at all levels and times, with the training and selection of professors in academies and courses for promotions, with the journals read and commented upon daily before officers and troops in the way of orations, which gradually forms the minds of those in the military, and with information reaching the men in the military, information whose diversity and objectivity must be guaranteed. Is it true that EL ALCAZAR is the most widely read daily newspaper in the military? These are extremely important areas in which we are behind, as correctly pointed out by an EL PAIS editorial on the reform of military training, announced since 1979.

There can be no doubt that military doctrine oriented toward the defense of Spain's sovereignty, of its territorial integrity and constitutional order, requires substantial modifications in the organization and deployment of our armed forces. Perhaps these are not essential questions from the technical point of view, but many people are wondering: How long will the instrument of the general captaincies, which go back to the Catholic kings or the military governments that were the heirs of a tradition consisting in superimposing a complete military administration on the civilian administration, last as a manifestation of mutual distrust? From the standpoint of armies, facing a hypothetical external enemy, the effectiveness of the armed forces depends on three essential factors forgotten by our antidemocratically-oriented apprentices: the strength of civil institutions, the identification of civil society with its armed forces and the degree to which the historic inversion of the armed forces in Spain — perhaps involuntary — has been overcome. The more a nation's army is confined to matters of domestic policy, whether in action or latently, the less effective and operational it is as a deterrent or in confrontations with the outside enemy. That is one of the lessons relearned from the Malvinas conflict. In Spain, the military question has not been resolved to the extent required by our democratic life at the present time. If it is not taken up with clarity and determination by a strong civilian government, we shall not consolidate democracy, nor shall we have
effective armed forces able to deal with the objectives set forth by the constitution. Nor can these problems be solved by silence, taboos, concessions (which no one may even be requesting), half truths, rumors and discord, but rather, only through the clarity, rigor and energy that our citizens and armed forces deserve.

11,464
CSO: 3110/193
POLITICAL

PSOE DEPUTY OPPOSES PURCHASE OF U.S. JET ON POLITICAL GROUNDS

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 31 Jul 82 p 10

[Article by Jose Miguel Bueno, Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) deputy from Salamanca and secretary of the congressional Defense Committee]

[Text] The author of this article, the PSOE's defense expert, believes that choosing the F-18A as our country's future jet fighter plane is a "gross political blunder" and emphasizes the date chosen for the governmental decision, at a time when Parliament is in recess.

The government has just approved the purchase of 84 American F-18A fighter jets from McDonnell Douglas for a sum of over 250 billion pesetas. With this choice of the government, the FACA (future attack-fighter aircraft) program gets underway. This program responds to Spain's need to update its tactical and fighter aircraft, whose obsolescence will be a fact by the middle of this decade. Any observer concerned about Spanish security could not ignore the disadvantage of our country with respect to the powers surrounding us, mainly in the south, the source of possible serious threats to our sovereign territory. It is a simple fact that within the merely regional context, our current air force, which is mainly responsible for the defense of the national territory and which controls our air space, is seriously deficient given the scope and size of our territory and the magnitude of Spanish air space.

It is not within the framework of this article to analyze other overriding needs, such as the defense of our aircraft on land, but the plain fact is that they do exist and place the air force in a delicate position. This means that we are aware that we must buy planes and solidify our air defense. However, this is one thing, while the way of purchasing, choosing and using the money of the Spanish people is quite a different manner. That is where we believe that the government has proceeded in a suspiciously blundering way.

Vacation Recess

The Calvo Sotelo government has accustomed us to unexpected surprises when it makes decisions on important matters concerning foreign policy. It was on a Saturday in Zaragoza, the day of homage to the flag, that we learned
that Spain had suddenly submitted the document of membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We learned that Spain and the United States had signed the defense agreement between the two countries at the close of the period of sessions of the Cortes Generales. An equally bitter pill to swallow was the government's decision to choose the F-18A, not before or after, but in the middle of summer. None of the decisions were preceded by clear information or an open debate in the Chamber of Deputies, as should be the case with an expenditure of 250 billion pesetas of the people's money.

One might think that the government is afraid of parliamentary debate or that it wants to keep certain important matters behind closed doors before a foreseeable transfer of power. There is only one excuse behind both matters: the weakness of the fragmented and increasingly smaller UCD [Democratic Center Union], and two very closely linked objectives: to satisfy specific minority groups of Spanish society and respond to certain external pressures. In the FACA affair, Oliart himself has recognized the existence of such pressure.

Political Decision of Great Importance

There can be no doubt about the importance of spending 250 billion pesetas abroad to buy 84 extremely complex fighter aircraft. It is also a matter of far-reaching political importance. First of all, one must mention that any intelligent government would have used the choice of the plane as a bargaining tool in other areas of foreign action, in keeping with a coherent foreign policy. The government did not do this, or at least did not do so with regard to matters of top priority on which all political groups agree. I am referring to Europe. The government preferred to lean toward the United States and it did so at a very delicate time for relations between Europeans and Americans. It is a time when Europe has been hard hit by the harsh American monetary policy, at a time of conflicts between both sides because of the iron and steel industry, at a time when the United States is trying to carry out a rigid technological embargo in Europe that could impede construction of the Soviet gas pipeline of great interest to the energy policies of West European countries.

In other words, it is a time when Europe needs to strengthen its political role and seek internal harmony and agreement, tasks to which Spain could contribute a great deal. Furthermore, one must not forget that our country is now negotiating its membership in the EEC with an abundance of problems. Consequently, in such a sensitive atmosphere, any sign of continental evasion can hurt more than help us. With this international picture, the Calvo Sotelo government has just chosen the American firm of McDonnell Douglas for its 250-billion purchase, with the resulting long technological and spare parts dependency that it entails. It did not even choose General Dynamics, which co-manufactures the F-16C with four European nations. And let them not tell us that the F-18A is better than the French Mirage 2,000 or that the Italian-German-British Tornado-Fanavia, because the three are of the same generation and in their different versions, were designed for similar purposes. Thus the government lost one more bargaining tool with respect to Europe and showed Europeans its weak political will to make a move toward integration in the Community.
A contract such as the FACA should have more investment potential than what the government gave it. As it is, it has been reduced to a mere expenditure without any decisive counterparts. Here is also the political importance which the choice involves. We are not going to have technology, participation in or any share in manufacturing. Only the maintenance of the aircraft will be done in Spain. This is clearly not enough. Our aeronautical and electronics industries and all their related industries need to plunge into the arena of research and peak technology in the field of complex aircraft.

Let us not be deceived: We shall only obtain this type of operation in Europe. In this sense, in addition to extending negotiations to other aspects, little attention was paid to the Mirage 2,000 alternative or even to the Tornado-Panavia, which was perhaps more promising. Little thought was given to the great number of jobs that would be created by a project of such scope. In short, there was a failure to consider the opportunity to raise the level of our industrial sectors, which presume raising the technical threshold of Spain. Consequently, is the choice of the F-18A not more of an expenditure than an investment?

Summary

The government has given our country a cold shower that makes our possibilities of maneuvering abroad, mainly in Europe, even more difficult. It will become increasingly difficult for us to free ourselves from foreign, in this case American, dependency, which grows from day to day. In addition, it would appear that the government has not yet realized that there are uncertain dependencies. The United States is a country with varicolored alliances which, through its military equipment deals, opens and shuts doors in allied countries based on its strategic interests. This trait can have an excessive effect on us in the southern peninsula. Consequently, the government's decision to choose the F-18A is a gross political blunder whose cost will be excessive.

Underlying reasons, strategic considerations, the absence of anything real or serious obtained in exchange and the lack of any firm, overall negotiating position all point to the false step taken by the officials of the current government, a false step that may point to the need for future rectification, difficult but possible, that will benefit an air defense system with more reliable and less dependent bonds, one that would mean more tangible advantages for our industrial progress in terms of the creation of jobs and technological prospects.

11,464
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PDL's Garrigues does not foresee coalition with PSOE, AP

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 26 Jul 82 pp 6, 7

[Interview with Antonio Garrigues Walker, promoter of the Liberal Democratic Party, by Carlos Santos; date and place not specified]

[Text] Antonio Garrigues Walker, who has just put the Liberal Democratic Party [PDL] into operation, unveils his political plans to DIARIO 16 and, in the course of this interview, makes a concrete offer: the creation of a center coalition from the remains of UCD [Democratic Center Union], headed by Landelino Lavilla, the liberals and Oscar Alzaga's Christian Democrats. This "great center" or "natural center" operation, which Garrigues would like to call Union for Liberty, would in his opinion serve to curb Fraga and PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], with which he does not discern any pacts.

[Question] The Liberal Democratic Party set as a goal at its constituent assembly the occupation of the political center. Does this mean that you take for granted the disappearance of UCD which, theoretically, occupies that space?

[Answer] The survival of UCD would be extremely difficult. It would require such a degree of solidarity and magnanimity among its members that it would be utopian to expect it. But I am sure that it will be attempted because, in our country, there is delay in deciding on the elimination of anything, and there is a very strong natural resistance to disappearance.

[Question] During the assembly, you gave the impression that UCD as such has already disappeared....

[Answer] I would say more than that: it has carried out its historical and political mission. Unless it finds another mission, another objective, its acceptance by the electorate will be symbolic, or residual.

And UCD needs not only a concrete program, but also an ideology to back that program. The current situation is one in which individuals are doing and do not know what they are doing, and individuals are moving, but not of their own will, rather driven by the tide of political uproar. And I am certain that this program and this ideology are nothing other than liberalism.

[Question] It seems as if you were repeating an offer.....
The fact is that it is obvious; looking at the political map of Europe and the Spanish situation, the only salvation is liberalism.

And do you think that this salvation lies in your party, PDL?

UCD could opt for an advanced Christian humanism too, although I doubt it, because between Fraga and Alzaga there is little of Christian Democracy left to defend.

Landelino Lavilla....

Is an option, actually a Christian one; but Lavilla will have to operate with extraordinary force to make his differences from Oscar Alzaga's PDP [Popular Democratic Party] visible and distinguishable.

The Great Center

And can the Liberal Democratic Party alone occupy UCD's present political space?

It will depend essentially on the financing and the degree of weakness in UCD. If it becomes thoroughly weak and PDP reaches an agreement with Fraga, our political space would become larger and, in that case, I would not hesitate to form it independently. That would be the ideal situation. Since I doubt that it will happen, the logical thing would be to seek a coalition between PDL, PDP and UCD; a coalition that might be called Union for Liberty, which I think could be a solution replete with positive elements for the Spanish political situation.

That seems like an attempt to construct a new UCD, the coalition which was UCD in origin.

Rather than a new UCD, it would be a new center, less pretentious, less hegemonic, but with greater structure and, in particular, more clarified and simplified.

And what do they think? Have you made this offer to Landelino Lavilla and Oscar Alzaga?

The fact is that I have not. There have been no serious negotiations in this area, but I am willing to begin discussing this topic starting now, provided that UCD is in a position to do so and shows the slightest interest.

In other words, instead of thinking, as was believed, about the "great right," Garrigues is thinking of the "great center."

Precisely.

The term "great center" is a new contribution to the political vocabulary. We could ask for a copyright.

You have it. That is very good: the great center, the natural center.
[Question] And would this operation serve to stop Fraga?

[Answer] It would serve both to curb Fraga and to curb the growth of socialism. The Spanish people still have great doubts as to what the real offer of the right and the real offer of the left are; because in both there are tendencies toward extremism which could emerge at any time.

In Popular Alliance there is still a percentage of the right which is a centimeter from New Force; and in PSOE there is a clearly Marxist, revolutionary left which would only accept a break in the economic and social model.

Therefore, that great center or natural center could perform a similar mission, but one clearly different from the one that UCD discharged in 1977 or 1979.

Neither PSOE Nor AP

[Question] With these statements you seem to preclude any possibility of an agreement with either PSOE or Popular Alliance.

[Answer] For the time being, of course, and without any vacillation. But in the realm of political coalitions, changes can be important; and, furthermore, in all those coalitions there is a pragmatic component that cannot be overlooked. It is not that the end justifies the means, although there is always something of that in many public decisions.

[Question] What end would justify a coalition of the liberals with Manuel Fraga?

[Answer] We would have to begin with a change in the AP political position and definition of principles. At the moment, the differences are very deepseated, both with respect to the autonomous model and the concept of the relationship between the individual and the state.

Fraga, and in this respect he resembles Felipe Gonzalez, still believes in a strong state and, in particular, a dogmatic state, which knows what must be done and what need not be done, and tells the citizens what is good and what is bad.

That is the fundamental difference on which we cannot give in, unless we were willing to lose our identity in exchange for a group of seats. And this liberal operation has served to lend us a strength and cohesion that would preclude this type of pragmatism.

[Question] Would PDL make a pact with Fraga to prevent a socialist government?

[Answer] No, we have not come into existence to prevent the victory of anything or anyone. A party which comes into existence to prevent the victory of others is a party which comes into existence badly.

[Question] That seems directly aimed at Alzaga's party.

[Answer] That is your assessment, in which I have no part.
[Question] And what role would PDL play if it succeeds in becoming a parliamentary force, faced with a socialist government?

[Answer] I have always said that liberalism operates better with social democracy than with other ideologies. The problem lies in finding out what type of social democracy PSOE represents; because what is clear is that liberalism is actually a model opposed to historical socialism. We shall have to wait for the facts.

Concrete Problems

[Question] You mentioned previously the differences that exist between Popular Alliance and your party, and now the incompatibility with historical socialism. But, actually, no one knows the concrete political offers of the liberals. They have not yet explained what they are offering, what specifically makes them different from Fraga, and what their position is on the issues of the state, or the autonomies, for example.

[Answer] The liberal is an advocate of a federal concept of the state, and we are ready to defend it firmly and without reservations. But it is a matter of priority to select the goal, to choose among different models of federalism. We would have to proceed toward a federalism inspired by the European models, geared to our circumstances, and with an intelligent sense of gradualism.

[Question] And what is your group's position on concrete problems, such as LOAPA [Organic Law for Harmonization of the Autonomous Process]?

[Answer] My personal position is that it is an untimely law, because it does not confront the real problem. The nationalists are tired of saying that it is a tool for curbing the autonomous process. PSOE and UCD argue that it is a mere clarification and regulation of that process. Between the one position and the other, we believe that it would not be superfluous, apart from these discussions, to decide on the final goal.

[Question] According to PDL, what should the role of the Armed Forces be?

[Answer] The relations between the de facto powers and the liberals have always been involved and difficult.

With regard to the military class specifically, we advocate affirming the absolute primacy of the civilian authorities and the neutralization of the aggressive positions that still remain among a percentage of that class.

We intend to begin a real campaign to integrate the Armed Forces into the civilian society. I consider this a far less crucial problem than it is thought to be, and the major problem is still the lack of clarity, and the secrecy with which we deal with these issues in a very shy and insecure society.

For example, the Spanish society, when confronted with 23-F, showed signs of a certain feeling of abandonment, like a latent desire to forget things.

[Question] Forgetfulness is a legitimate defense mechanism; when confronted with fear, in this instance.
The fear exists, and of course it is justified; but we need not allow that fear to manipulate us. We need not conceal nor forget. We must face things, not attempt to ignore what has happened. If that is not accepted, this is not an adult society, but rather a childish one.

A third problem of the state: terrorism in general, and the so-called "Basque problem" in particular....

Starting from a clearcut position of rejection, such as that of the most foul attack on human liberty, there was a need to combine the political solution as a basic remedy with those of a policing type, which were also necessary.

But the problem is not one of magic or overwhelming prescriptions. In the economic area, for example, we liberals will fight against state intervention, but we shall have to remember, at the same time, that this battle only makes sense if the business owners are willing to assume their responsibilities.

The Businessmen

It is a fact that businessmen, some businessmen, approve of the creation of the Liberal Party.

That is so, but the financial authorities are also maintaining a justified position of reservation, waiting to see what will happen to UCD.

Understandably, they will set conditions....

And they are setting them. It does not seem a bad thing to me that they should do so, provided they are not impositions or demands.

Have you had to say "no" to a condition already?

The fact is that I have not. The widespread impression that the financial authorities advocate a "natural majority" and are willing to do anything to prevent PSOE from winning does not correspond to the truth. The businessmen have expressed their views, but they have the same degree of confusion as all the others. And, of course, they have not imposed on me either a coalition with Fraga or a non-coalition with PSOE.

2909
CSO: 3110/200
AGENDA, PERSONALITIES OF NEWLY FORMED PDL REVIEWED

Guipuzcoa EGIN in Spanish 25 Jul 82 p 11

[Article by F. Mellado: "The Exotic Pleasure of Being Liberal"

[Text] Just when UCD [Democratic Center Union] is submerged in a deep crisis that will be difficult to resolve, and early elections are on the agenda, liberalism now appears to be an edifying virtue for the Spanish right. Last Friday and yesterday, Saturday, the newborn Liberal Democratic Party [PDL], headed by Antonio Garrigues Walker, held its constituent mini-congress at a Madrid hotel; the general congress is scheduled for October.

Studying the times intensively, the liberals became organized, at first, in the well-known clubs of the same name, there engaging in some fictitious work devoted to research and debate "dissociated from partisan activity." Later, in February of this year, they proceeded to set themselves up in a federation of clubs. And, as a climax, during that same month, they created the Liberal Democratic Party, aware that the countdown for the next elections had already started.

The individuals who have put this option into effect, their manifesto of principles, the potential future electoral alliances and further details are what is reflected in this report; because, in view of the picture of diversification and confusion with which the right appears at the present time, it has become necessary to explain who is who, so that there will be no repetition of the little refrain of "you need not know who I am, nor where I am from, nor where I am going."

Some observers are agreed on the view that the liberal operation has been mounted from Moncloa Palace, aimed not only at playing a role of a pale reflection of the Restoration liberalism, but also at making room for personages who are highly influential from an economic and political standpoint, of course, individuals such as Antonio Garrigues Walker. As background, it befits us to recall September of last year, when the president of the government offered the latter the Justice Ministry of the dismissed Fernandez Ordonez. Well-informed rumors claim that, at Moncloa Palace itself, Garrigues telephoned his father (Antonio Garrigues Diaz-Canabate) to ask his advice, and the latter recommended patience and hope to him; possibly because the head of the family (a man with experience in politics) foresaw that embarking upon collaboration with UCD at that time was unnecessary suicide.
The liberal operation also had strong external backing. For example, in January, Antonio Garrigues was invited to Bonn for 2 days by the German Liberal Party (FDP). While there, he made contacts on a high level with the party's president and foreign affairs minister of the FRG, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the secretary general, Guenter Verheugen, and also with the FRG's future ambassador to Madrid, a distinguished member of the FDP, Guido Brunner. Not to mention the good image that Antonio Garrigues has for those on Wall Street. It is worthwhile recalling that he was one of the introducers of the Trilateral in the Spanish State, and that the legal advice for many multinationals was provided from his attorney's office in Madrid, engaged in business law.

The Fellow Travelers

Organizations such as the Market Economy Institute (IEE), the Center of Economic Studies and Communications (CECE), the Association for Progress and Leadership (APD), and institutes and chambers have served as a shelter for the liberals, so that they might develop their political option and launch it at the right time.

The individuals surrounding this plan comprise a colorful picture, which prompts one to doubt the existence of ideological homogeneity. For example, in this amalgam, there appear persons ranging from long-standing sympathizers of PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia] or the extinct Popular Socialist Party (PSP) to personnel from Opus Dei and old members of the Movement.

No is there a lack of prominent personnages from the government party, such as the minister of culture, Soledad Becerril; former Ministers Ignacio Camunas and Antonio Fontan; the Centrist spokesman in the Senate, Luis Miguel Enciso; Deputy Joaquin Munoz Peirats; and the recent ex-UCD members, Eduardo Punset and Eduardo Merigo, the former an ex-minister for relations with the EEC.

Other names now associated with liberalism coming from the former regime are those of Eduardo Tarragona and Mauricio Duran (Catalonians), who belonged to the organic Cortes owing to family intervention; or the one from Albacete, also an attorney and counselor of trade unions, Abelardo Sanchez Moreno. The Cuenca liberal, Constantino Palomino, was deputy provincial chief of the Movement; and, in Gijon, Jose Maria Roces was deputy local chief of the Movement.

Despite the fact that the term liberal appears to bear a parallel relationship with the term secular, this operation even includes leading representatives of the Christian world. This applies to German Yanke, the organizer of the liberal clubs in Euskadi, which have been given the name "Euskal-Herria Association," for the purpose of appropriating the prestige which that former Basque organization used to have. His second in command in Vizcaya, Juan Luis Barandiaran, was, until very recently, giving lectures to Christian couples; and his third in command, Daniel Busturia, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo's former adviser when the latter was minister for relations with the EEC, is a frequent speaker in the lecture series organized by the major school of the Work in Bilbao, the Bidealde. All three are personnel from Opus.

As an oddity, we might mention that even Dr Alfonso Cabeza himself (former head of the Madrid Athletic Soccer Club) has joined the liberal operation. Is a
luscious pastry such as the one prepared by UCD in 1977 being seasoned? The worst thing that could happen would be for history to repeat itself when it was time for the distribution: the anger, the small portion and disenchantment, the heroics and the internal strife....

The Route Leader

Antonio Garrigues Walker, aged 45, 1.75 meters tall, with an annual income of 30 million and personal assets exceeding 20 million, according to statements made to the national treasury, has put the liberal offer in motion for an electorate which does not yet feel that it is represented in the political area.

His aesthetics and personality lend his image an obvious assurance and initiative, in addition to the fact that he is a person free of political contacts with General Franco's regime. His political message lies outside of the involucionist orbit, and opts for progress, which in his philosophy is economic liberalism.

He is not an entrepreneur in the strict sense of the word, but rather a promoter, a high-level business executive. His professional activity is concentrated in a lawyer's office engaged in business law. This office has offshoots in Barcelona, New York and Brussels. The attorneys affiliated with it have accumulated 80 administrative consultants' offices, over a dozen of which have Antonio Garrigues as their owner of record. They include offices of Blast Furnaces of Vizcaya, Rolex, IBM, Ford Espana, Colgate, Hertz, Sears and RCA.

Also as a hallmark of his liberal and professional bent, Antonio Garrigues has defended the return of the union holdings to CNT [National Confederation of Labor], amounting to 2 billion pesetas.

Moreover, Antonio Garrigues was the one to introduce the Trilateral Commission into the Spanish State in April 1979. And since 1977 he has been a member of the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, a private club confined to the area of Western Europe, North America, Japan and Australia, the purpose of which is to serve as "NATO's public branch."

This circumstance whereby he personally as well as the rest of the family are always in the high realms of financial and decision-making circles has prompted many to talk of the "Garrigues clan." His mother, Helen Walker (an American), was a daughter of the ITT chief engineer for Spain, when the telephone company was established. Another member of the family, Jose Miguel (Michu), married Frances Aldrich, a first cousin of the Rockefellers.

According to the clan chief, "Creating wealth is a gift as natural as that of creating art, science, literature or any other work or product that can be made by a man made in the image and likeness of a creating God. It may be claimed: yes, but the wealth is in the hands of a few. No more nor less than in any other creative activity: in literature, poetry, philosophy, science, the art of politics or the art of war. In short (he 'concludes'), the same thing may be said of wealth that is said of nobility: wealth obliges. The one who has this gift must use it, but he must use it well. How much harm can be done when it is used pervertedly!"
Antonio Garrigues has proven to be a faithful heir of his father's philosophy. In his statements, he asserts "that capitalism is the only solution, that the world of business is his, that the cultural revolution encounters resistance in the political group, that it is inevitable that there be a return to economic planning, that it would be a good thing for the socialists to come to power, that the political authorities should reach concrete agreements with the so-called de facto authorities and that, within a year, he will be preparing to be president of the government."

The Future Fellow Travelers

The PDL manifesto states, among other things, that they are seeking ties "with the most progressive tradition of Spanish liberalism," and want to incorporate "into their values the lessons of science and history." They intend to strive on behalf of a state of law, "wherein there are limits on the power of some individuals over others, and that of the society over the individual"; as well as for "the reinforcement of the civil society with respect to the state, and the defense of the territorial autonomies with respect to democratic centralism." As for equality of opportunity, they will strive for "the banishment of ignorance and the elimination of dependent relations."

After the routine declaration of principles, which are more or less bombastic and attractive and which all parties draw up when it is time to submit their statutes at the window of the Ministry of Interior, the mystery lies in finding out how the liberals will appear in the next elections.

In May, Antonio Garrigues stated: "We liberals aspire to occupy the political space of the center." To gain that coveted electoral area, they consider only a few "natural fellow travelers": the Social Democrats affiliated with UCD who have not followed Fernandez Ordonez.

The liberals are of the opinion that Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo's image, although they admit that it has been damaged and that his popular appeal is slight, "is recoverable, provided he heads a renewed political option." "But that renewal," according to their calculations, "means that Calvo-Sotelo must count on them."

They appear to be absolutely opposed to the "great right." And they claim: "They must not count on us for that operation. Our electorate belongs to a broad center which does not have confidence in the present UCD and which does not want to see the same faces as usual again."

But other rumors indicate that the aloofness of the liberals from the "great right operation" may be short-term; in other words, to prevent the pact between Fraga and Calvo-Sotelo, so that the latter will have to count on the liberals and, after the next general elections, to make a legislative agreement with Popular Alliance.

They regard Landelino Lavilla as being incompatible "for ideological reasons." And an understanding with Adolfo Suarez is unthinkable, in view of the differences, both personal and political, that exist between Garrigues and the former president.
of the government. It has been commented that someone remarked to Antonio Garri-
gues in a sarcastic tone: "You, European and modern? The one who is European and
modern is Adolfo Suarez. There is his career as a 'self-made man,' starting at
the bottom and struggling without resources, rising in the political structure,
step by step. You, on the other hand, have always reached the lawyer's offices,
the professional practice and everything, from the top. You were the fairest
child, the best hockey player. You have had all the facilities, like any of
the privileged individuals in a banana republic."

2909
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FRAGA'S DEPUTY SUMMARIZES SEVEN-POINT ECONOMIC PROGRAM

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 29, 30 Jul 82

[Two-part article by AP Secretary General Jorge Verstrynge Rojas]

[29 Jul 82 p 3 Part I]

[Text] An Economic Program for the Crisis

The need for solutions for Spanish democracy necessarily entails an economic proposal. But, considering the evolution in Spain during recent years, our economy would appear to be heading toward bankruptcy.

Any attempt to provide solutions for the serious problems besetting Spanish democracy must (obviously) include an exhaustive analysis that will reflect the conditions surrounding the issue that we want to settle.

Therefore, in order to decide upon economic solutions that will set in motion the key devices which would help us to emerge from the current economic crisis, we shall point out the present defects in the economic policy now, in the opinion of those of us in Popular Alliance [AP] who are attempting to provide an economic model.

Inability

If there is anything clear at present, it is the government's inability to bring Spain out of the economic hole in which we find ourselves, as a result of a repeatedly proven ineffectiveness and the persistence in erroneous economic theories.

The evolution of the Spanish economy has experienced troubles which were really avoidable, such as:

A drop of 30 percent in the value of the peseta over the past 2 years, without any evident benefit to exports;

More than 2 million unemployed, in other words, twice the number 3 years ago;

A 14 percent hike in prices, three points higher than that estimated by the government;
An anticipated public deficit for 1982 amounting to 647 billion, which has already been exceeded in June;

A foreign debt totaling $28 billion, in other words, during the past 3 years it has increased by over 50 percent, with the resultant decline in reserves, and with the aggravating factor that over 60 percent of that debt is short-term;

A drop in consumption as a result of the decline in available income;

An absolute lack of incentives for private investment, as a result of the decline in net profit, high financing costs and a lack of hope;

An unfortunate operation of public enterprise, which has caused the INI's [National Institute of Industry] losses in 1981 to total 95 billion pesetas;

A decline, between 1980 and 1981, in the profitability of government credit to less than a quarter, suggesting as a remedy an increase in the cost of financing, as if its cost were not high enough already;

A rise in the state tax pressure through indirect taxes, with the resultant negative repercussions on consumption;

Bankruptcy

An increase in the local tax pressure, which will rise far more still, in view of the financing needs of the new autonomous communities.

That is to say, an economy headed for bankruptcy if measures are not adopted within a short time and if there is no change in the plans on which the government's action is based.

The problem confronting us is serious, but not impossible to solve. It is ridiculous to persist in maintaining that public deficit, which is covered only with taxes, inflation, an increase in the foreign debt or issues of public bonds which are provided with tax incentives and a profitability (paid by all of us) that makes them compete with private bonds, hampering private investment, as is proven by the fact that the state retains a quarter of the available credit, so that the state is therefore a non-subsidiary economic agent, but in direct competition with the private sector. And this despite the acknowledged ineffectiveness of public enterprise, which has made it quite clear that it is impossible to continue rewarding the public sector to the detriment of the private sector.

This is actually the essential problem: that the state, which exists to support the society, is swallowing it, and where one first notes this is in the economy.

Hence, we need a radical change in the orientation of the economic policy, based on a serious, well thought-out program, which we shall attempt to set forth in the second part of this article.
A Model Economic System

An erroneous series of decisions contrary to our economic model is the cause of the persistence of the crisis. In view of this, it appears necessary to uphold the substance of the model based on private enterprise.

In the first part of this article, we analyzed something that is becoming obvious to everyone: the fact that the depth and permanence of the economic crisis are due largely to the erroneous decisions made, based on propositions essentially contrary to the logic and substance of our model economic system.

We cannot continue any longer with this kind of irrational "stalemate" wherein the government is not governing, nor is the opposition behaving as such.

We are witnessing with astonishment a constant lack of private investment in Spain (while Spanish investment abroad has increased by 26.6 percent), a drop of over 1 percent in consumption, a foreign debt of $28 billion, the repeated decline in our foreign exchange and the presence of a kind of "Keynesian vicious circle" comprised of over 2 million unemployed, combined with a high inflation rate of over 14 percent; none of which could be stopped with what in the past was a magic formula of state intervention, because the latter has reached such a volume that it represents an element at odds with the logic of our economic system.

Principles

The main thing at the present time is, primarily, not to allow ourselves to be confused by the morass of statistics, and to know how to detect logically the threads that have woven the crisis, so as to establish a new policy founded upon the basic principles of the economic system. We shall explain this briefly:

First: There is no possible solution to the crisis situation if there is a lack of political authority, disparity or instability in economic views and, finally, discord between the essence of the system, which is economic freedom, and the government's economic position, which is one of intervention of such a volume that it has embarked on a phase of declining yields and growing lack of economy.

Second: The essence of the system, economic freedom, is based on the private economy, combined with public action as an element subordinate to the first one. Hence, there must be a restoration of private economic capacity, so as:

Not to hamper private investment with a tax system that penalizes savings and therefore makes the former more costly; which requires the revision of the tax rates based on not creating economic damage and raising the minimal income tax exemption to 500,000 pesetas, as well as making investment tax-exempt to the maximum extent in the tax on business firms.

Not to make the state an economic competitor of the private sector, which demands that its action not be unlimited, thereby requiring it to stabilize the social
security budget and to reduce the public deficit; which will be reflected in a reduction in the state tax pressure, less resorting to the foreign debt to cover it; a reduction in the public debt (now highly competitive with the private bonds) and a possibility of cutting inflation by several points which are now "structural" and, nevertheless, reducible, if we do not resort to the comfortable procedure of financing through inflation. The public deficit should be limited to a percentage of the GDP.

Third: The activity of the public sector should be subsidiary, in other words, it should take place where the private sector does not suffice. But the first thing that must be required is discipline for public enterprise and fulfillment of the goals of its leaders. The leadership posts should cease to be a political reward, and become a place that is occupied with subsequent requirements for answerability when there is nonfulfillment or failure in administration.

In addition, we must begin calculating not only the profit, or the unfortunately more widespread losses of public enterprise, but also the extent to which the INI's steady deficits have a negative effect on the economy.

Fourth: The monetary policy, instead of curtailing the private supplies and allowing the public sector all the luck, should be consistent with the need for financing the private sector.

Fifth: The advent of autonomous communities and the spread of the activity of the local entities entail the need to control their financing requirements, which are a new source of reduction in funds.

The Peseta

Sixth: The drop in the peseta and the difficult situation of our products abroad should prompt the wage, as a controllable element in the cost of production, not to represent such a fraction of the latter that it reduces the external competitiveness. Hence, any hike in wages must be matched by the corresponding rise in productivity.

Seventh: The primary sector is one of the basic underlying problems. An increase in the sector's income is a fundamental requisite for economic stability and a cut in the emigration from the rural areas. Agrarian industrialization, a suitable price policy, regulation of markets, health control of agricultural and livestock production, rural electrification and an improvement in communications, protection of forests accompanied by reforestation and an increase in penalties for those who destroy them and an end to the lack of protection in the fishing subsector are all essential measures.

To summarize, it must be said that, apart from the mistakes that have been made, what is missing is the basic principle: the lack of consistency of the state's action with the principles of the market per se; and hence the first thing that Popular Alliance requests is that the state not distort the market system as it has been doing up until now. And so, it is time to achieve the model economic system that our Constitution recognizes which is, moreover, the only means of surmounting the deep-seated economic crisis.

2909
CSO: 3110/201

43
RATIONALE FOR PEACE ASSOCIATION TRIAL GIVEN

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 25 Jun 82 p 10


Early in January 1981, the military prosecution made its initial request for the detention of the 44 persons elected to the board of directors of the Peace Association at its convention on 5 April 1980. This request, however, was denied on grounds of "insufficient evidence for arrest" by the Istanbul Martial Law Command's Second Military Court ruling no 1981/3151-1722, 8 January 1981.

Nine months later, the military prosecution again requested the arrest of the suspects, claiming "alteration of the evidence." However, the Istanbul Martial Law Command Second Military Court again denied this request by ruling no 1981/3451-1878, 20 October 1981, on the rationale that "the arrest petition was denied earlier and no subsequent new evidence or strong implications have been established."

This time, the military prosecution protested this ruling within 7 days before the Istanbul Martial Law Third Military Court. The Third Military Court, however, denied the protest by ruling no 981/2545-1527, 28 October 1981, stating that "although the suspects are known to have perverted the purpose of the association and, through their speeches and statements and the leaflets and brochures they distributed, to have converted the said association into an organization which patronized extreme leftist militants and foci which committed various crimes inside and outside Turkey and although this is understood from the contents of the file, it is necessary under articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code that recourse be made to expert opinion, and no report to this effect is present in the file."

The military prosecution then went to Professor Dr Sulhi Donmez and Assistant Professor Duygun Yarsuvat for an expert report. These individuals refused to do the expert report, however, so an expert report prepared by Professor Kayihan Icel, Assistant Professor Erol Cihan and Assistant Sukru Alpaslan was placed in the investigation file to complete it.
The expert report completed, the military prosecution presented the changes in the evidence and repitioned the court on 22 February 1982 for arrest of the suspects. The file was then examined by Judge Advocate First Lt Necdet Cekkan of the Istanbul Martial Law Command Second Military Court, and ruling no 1982/422-197, 23 February 1982, was issued for the arrest of the suspects, reading: "In view of the strong implications existing in the file to the effect that they committed the alleged crimes and bearing in mind, moreover, the description and nature of the alleged crimes, all suspects [are ordered arrested] in accordance with article 71/A,B,D of Law No 353."

After summonses had been served and 25 of the suspects detained, protests were filed against their detention. These protests were denied, however, by ruling no 1982/2719-308, 15 March 1982, signed by Judge Advocate Capt Muzaffer Intepe, judge of the Istanbul Martial Law Command First Military Court.
OZYORUK EXAMINES SHORTAGE OF JURISTS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 26 Jun 82 p 6

[Article by Mukbil Ozyoruk: "Judge, Prosecutor Shortage"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] A festering sore has once again opened up, as it does ever so often, in the daily news and newspaper columns -- the problem of vacancies at the Ministry of Justice. Judgeships and prosecutor positions are vacant, and being vacated. Crushed under an intolerable workload, Justice employees are now "scrambling" to leave their jobs.

According to a report in the newspaper BULVAR (21 June 1982), there are 5,970 judge and prosecutor billets in the justice organization, but only 3,259 judgeships and 1,940 prosecutor billets are filled, leaving 771 vacancies. /The vacancy rate is 13 percent./

One must not belittle this rate, because even if all the vacancies were filled in the first place it would fall far short of meeting the need. There is a sizeable shortage. The caseload and work volume increase steadily without a concomitant increase in staff and professional personnel. Indeed, there has long been an on-going, disabling shortage of qualified administrative and office personnel. Now alongside the steadily growing deficit in the minimum required professional personnel, the ability to find judges for the projected juvenile courts and other new courts has certainly became an impossibility. If the deficit could not be made up before, how much less can extras be procured?

Our judges and prosecutors are leaving the justice organization, but "where" are they going? How many of those leaving have reached retirement age and are retiring? How many of them are switching to a law practice to augment their income? What percentage of those leaving have not reached retirement age? How many of them are switching to the practice of law and how many to other positions?

In the absence of positive answers to these questions, it is not easy to define and remedy completely the causes of this "erosion" at the justice organization. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that rather more of those choosing a practice come from among the young element not yet at retirement age. The practice of law is a hard job requiring physical exertion. In fact, it's a rat race. If one takes some of the cases that come up and turns down the rest, it means a significant reduction in one's professional earnings. Young men just starting out cannot readily afford to pick and choose their cases. Only an attorney with an
established reputation in a particular field of law who has a regular, if small, income on the side, such as a retirement pension, can afford to do this. Before measures can be taken, therefore, it is necessary to /find out how many and what percentage of the legal professionals leaving their jobs are young/. It would also be an important piece of information to find out how many and what percentage of them have reapplied for their old jobs. If those leaving for reasons other than retirement reach significant numbers and if they do not come back, /the cause is obvious: they need the money/. Although this difficulty in making ends meet has been around for some time, it seems to be worse now, with the general increase in the cost of living. For those leaving without even waiting for their retirement, there is no doubt but this is the primary reason.

Our justice organization employees have been deprived all along of certain advantages -- "housing," for instance -- available to many other routine civil service positions. No one at about chief or deputy director level at any one of the SEE's [State Economic Enterprises] is without such coverage.

The special "net compensation" given in addition to their basic salaries seems /to cover virtually everything and rises periodically as well/. But what they can get with this compensation is not even equal to one-third of the comfort and advantages of SEE housing. Another example is that they have nothing like a recreation facility such as the "Education Centers" which these SEE personnel and even Forestry workers and others have. Once in a while, a very few of our upper court judges are given a "complimentary" allocation of a room or two in the least desirable, least comfortable, least plush of these recreation facilities. Those who go, come back not rested, but worn to a frazzle by the spartan living conditions. The housing and recreation facilities aside, however, the real heartbreak at present is the state of the Justice Ministry buildings themselves everywhere in the country except certain large centers.

There is a great deal of red tape, neglect and inefficiency in any area of service, we know, but the /conduct of justice/ is different from all of them. When billets are vacant like this, when judges and prosecutors are weighed down under a caseload numbering in the millions each year and when they are struggling to make ends meet as well, it is /right and justice/ that suffer. When the citizen cannot get his due from the state, /he tends to "take justice into his own hands."/ And of what happens next, no description is necessary.
SECOND FOREIGN PARACHUTIST REGIMENT'S FUNCTIONS, EXERCISES

Firing, Equipment Maintenance Tests

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Jul 82 p 21

[Article: "A Month with the CEA (Scouting and Support Company) at Canjuers"]

[Text] For some, it was a challenge, a "mission impossible," and all the more so in that the DCT [expansion unknown] review was expected upon return.

The rookies had, in effect, been given two missions:

--to train hard so as to achieve very good results in the firing of our support weapons at Canjuers and put in a good performance in the Cerfaut maneuver, led by the airborne group and taking place in the Pergueux region;

--to bring back all materiel in ready-for-use condition, so that the CEA would not lose points for the regiment in the DCT review.

At 1730 hours on 5 March, the tank-landing craft "La Dives" made an "operational" arrival at Calvi. It took on the 62 vehicles in the middle of a storm. It moved out of port successfully, but the seas were a nightmare that was to last until 0400 hours on 6 March. We got to Toulon at 1300 hours, with yellow complexion, dull eyes and stomachs turned inside-out. We were happy to get to terra firma and Canjuers.

First Week:

Practice with the CTE's [expansion unknown], the Milan, and the 20-mm cannon. Marching training, firing with individual weapons, topography, NBC [expansion unknown] exercises and automotive instruction. The weather was rough, very rough, and we had to be well-organized and help one another.

Second Week:

Firing with crew-served weapons: 12.7, Bren gun, antitank rocket launchers, grenade launchers, etc. Sessions on explosives and grenade-throwing. Combats in the local settlements: Bayon, Chardan, and especially Broves (what memories!). Exercises in habituation to infantry fire in movement under live fire.
Third Week:
Twenty-four Milan missiles fired, and 24 on target. Two thousand 20-mm cannon rounds, and very good results by the young troops. In the heavy-mortars section, 120 F-1 practice rounds and 108 F-1 explosive rounds fired—not to mention the 200 81-mm mortar rounds fired from land or from VLRA's [Light Vehicles for Reconnaissance and Support].

We knew the operational SML [Heavy-Mortars Section]—but with such equipment and such a profusion of rounds, what a spectacle!

On Tuesday 23 March, General Lardry honored the SADAA [Antiaircraft Self-Defense Section] and the SML by a visit to the very theater of their exploits.

Fourth Week:
The company is mustered for a barbecue. Faces are tired and and heavily lined, noses and ears are sunburnt, but the sun and outdoors have awakened our bodies. We are ready for a long week, one that will be very hard on the personnel and the materiel. For the 120 drivers and the leaders, a 2,000-km endurance run is about to begin. At 0630 hours on 27 March, the engines start up and the rookies leave for Perigord and the Gerfaut maneuver (but that is another story!).

At 0700 hours on 7 April—33 days later—the rookies are back on Corsican soil. We have come back home, to Calvi. It is confirmed—the DCT will arrive on the 13th. To work!

Exercise in Sudan

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Jun 82 p 46

[Article: "Operation Birao—the 3rd Company at the Sudan Border"]

[Text] We have just returned from a tour at the Cameroon border. We are already looking toward the northeast. This is not to be a routine run through a province, but rather a special mission whose operational aspect can develop as our searches proceed.

Situation:
Taking advantage of the movement of the Sudanese herds toward the CAR [Central African Republic] pasturages, some irregular elements coming from Sudan or Chad are infiltrating the game reserves and are poaching.

Our task is to make contact with the local administration, which has practically been cut off from the capital since the beginning of the rainy season, and give it the aid necessary for protection of the reserves and assistance to the population.

A Base Out of the Sky
Noir 3 company leaves its post and, in three Transall trips, sets up a logistical base on the Birao airfield, which, 150 kilometers from Chad and 80 from Sudan, will be our umbilical cord for a month.
Noir 1 and 2 companies, for their part, travel the 1,500 kilometers between Bangui and Birao in 4 days, opening up a route that had not been traveled in 6 months.

Encountering Virgin Lands

After an initial contact in the Birao region, the company turned toward the border with Sudan, along which wild animals and poachers move without benefit of any track, so rough is the country.

For a week, the sections, taking turns, opened up a track, at the rate of 40 km on the best days and 5 km on the worst ones, and the exploits of our Marmons were worthy of the most sophisticated cross-country vehicles.

At the end of our long run, Col Le Guen, commander of the French units in the CAR, who had come to the Ouanda Djalle airport for an on-the-spot report, expressed to us his satisfaction and the gratitude of the Central African Republic.

Hats off to the drivers and mechanics, who, working day and night, enabled the company to carry out its mission, despite the technical difficulties and the obstacles encountered.

Practice with Armored Tanks

Paris KEPI BLANC in French May 82 p 24

[Article: "The 1st Company Smashes Tanks at Mourmelon"]

[Text] The tanks were waiting for us under a dark sky, but the gusts of wind obliged us to cancel the jump planned and make our approach in trucks of the 1st RCS [Headquarters and Support Regiment].

The 1st Company readied its weapons as the hide-outs of the tanks, whose rumblings and rattlings could already be heard, were approached. But the tank troops had a warm and friendly welcome for us, and even the gloomy weather of the first evening turned fine.

For 10 days, the company, and especially the young troops, became familiar with the presence, in our tactical exercises, of all sorts of armored vehicles: VTT [Cross-Country Vehicle] 13's, AMX 10's, AMX 13 cannon, and AMX 30's. Many thanks to the 1st DB [Armored Division], whose collaboration enabled us to train in antitank combat every day and which showed us its working methods and formidable vehicles.

The evening before departure was spent in reflection and was marked by a ceremony of arms before the Foreign Legion ossuary of Souain.

It was a fine sortie on the continent, and rich in lessons in antitank combat. The Legionnaires of the 1st Company look forward eagerly to the next maneuver.
Alpine Training

Paris KEPI BLANC in French May 82 p 26

[Article: "Fifteen Days at More than 2,000 Meters"]

[Text] On 4 January last, the 2nd Company of the 2nd REP [Foreign Parachute Regiment] left Calvi for Briancon, where the 159th Alpine Infantry Regiment always offers a warm welcome. This much-appreciated stay in the Alps, which has become a tradition, enables the regiment's mountain company to perfect its technique, and gives the young troops the opportunity to obtain their military-skier rating.

To achieve this objective, the "reds" do not always have the feeling of being on vacation, even though they are in the agreeable setting of the Montgenevre station.

The days go by, and technique is refined little by little. Soon the first sortie comes up: an endurance run on skis, with bivouac in the snow.

A night in igloos at an altitude of 1,800 meters, 30 kilometers away: this is not enough to damp the ardor of the 2nd Company, which on the morning of 16 January, with its skis on, bounds out toward the Izoard pass. Once the objective is arrived at, the hardest work remains to be done: build its shelter. The work has to be perfect, for the reward or penalty is an immediate one: a comfortable night, or waiting for the morning in cold and damp. At dawn, the 2nd Company leaves its quarters. The night in the snow has left no after-effects, and since morale is good, the company permits itself a little extra treat before heading back: a climb to the Ourdets pass, to an altitude of 2,420 meters.

Three days later, the last test awaits us: the BSM [Military Skier Rating] run. The candidates—Legionnaires and Alpine troops of the 159th RIA [Alpine Infantry Regiment]—take off. Among them is a participant who galvanizes the zeal of the "reds": the commanding officer of the 2nd REP. Results: out of 39 candidates from the 2nd REP, 38 win their rating, and 1st-class stripes go to Legionnaire da Silva, who, though a nonskier on 5 January, did the fourth-best time after only 15 days of preparation.

Once again, the 2nd Company has fulfilled its mission. It already has a new objective to aim for: jumping onto Lake Nino with skis in case. The Legionnaires of the 2nd Company will go out the door of the Transalp at more than 2,000 meters altitude.

City Combat

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Apr 82 p 36

[Article: "Red 1 Is in Raffali"]

[Text] In the history of recent conflicts, the urban milieu has been the theater of many combats: Stalingrad, Berlin, Beirut, Kolwezi, etc. That is why a good part of the tactical training of the 2nd REP involves combat in settled areas.
Tuesday, 0700 hours: the 1st Section of the 2nd Company, carried by Super Frelon helicopters to the immediate vicinity of the objective, has the mission of seizing the first two buildings in the western corner of Camp Raffali. Reliable intelligence confirms that an element of the enemy's CP [Command Post] is installed in them.

After a rapid and quiet approach making use of the terrain, the three combat groups take up position, ready for action. The first group approaches a secondary installation so as to support Red 12, which for its part will attack the main building.

The action is started by the firing of a Red 13 LRAC [Antitank Rocket Launcher] at the windows of the first rooms to be occupied. Following up immediately, the GV's [Grenadiers-Light Infantry] of the assault group get rapidly to the second-storey level, by the use of a telescoping speleological ladder.

The first rooms are taken, and on order, the support group fires the LRAC into the following windows.

The sharpshooters also keep an eye on every opening, to be ready to take action against any objective that might reveal itself as they advance. The assault teams mark their advance with signals at the windows so as to avoid mistakes and facilitate the forward movement of fire.

In the ground-floor entrance, a Legionnaire is wounded in the chest by enemy elements attempting to flee. The AA 52 and the FRF-1's [expansions unknown] of the second group cut them down when they cross the main street. The section corpsman, called to the wounded combatant, gives first aid.

With the search of the building completed, the assault unit goes on guard outside, ready to carry out a new mission.

This mechanism exercise, approaching reality as closely as possible by means of extensive simulation of live fire, made it possible to familiarize all levels of the section with this particular kind of combat constituted by [illegible].

Bouar Garrison

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Apr 82 p 37

[Article: "The 'Blacks' at Bouar"]

[Text] Arta, Dzaoudzi, Regina, Mururoa—all these names evoke overseas of duty in the minds of all Legionnaires. Bouar has just been added to this list. The personnel of the 3rd Company (the "Blacks") of the 2nd REP, who have already done a tour in Djibouti, now know the Central African Republic.

After a brief stay in Bangui, we boarded the C-160's. After an hour and a half of flight, we set down on a dirt runway: we were now assigned for 4 months to the Bouar Group, an integral part of the French Operational Assistance Element, the successor to the famous Barracudas.
The Group--still installed, and in a makeshift manner, in the camp built by General Bigeard more than 20 years ago--is composed of motorized and parachute companies and a squadron supported by a CEA of reduced strength.

The Bouar garrison, perched at an altitude of 1,000 meters, is 450 kilometers north of Bangui, not far from the borders of Cameroon and Chad. From this location, the company does sorties of between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometers into the bush. These patrols can take us both into the equatorial forest and into the savannah.

Between our excursions, continuing with the work of our Marine Infantry, we improve the cantonments, respecting the traditional style.

11267
CSO: 3100/826
FOREIGN LEGION REGIMENTS TEST EQUIPMENT, VARIED TERRAIN

First Cavalry Regiment Tests Tank

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Jul 82 p 36

[Article: "AMX 10-RC - Sagaie"]

[Text] An AMX 10-RC platoon of the 1st REC [Foreign Cavalry Regiment], com-
mmanded by Lieutenant Michou, and a Sagaie platoon of the RICM, commanded by
Lieutenant de Saint-Slavy, have been designated to carry out comparative trials
of this materiel.

On 8 March, the Michou platoon left Orange. First halting-place: 15 days at
Satory, where the materiel was put through rough trials. Second halting-place:
the 2nd Hussar Regiment at Provins, where it took part in tactical exer-
cises. Third halting-place: the Mailly camp, where the AMX 10-RC's met with
the Sagaies for a firing session (50 rounds per vehicle).

Then the journey went on: to the 12th Light-Infantry Regiment at Sedan, the
8th Hussar Regiment at the Valdahon camp.

On 8 April, the two platoons arrived at Orange, and the two vehicles were pre-
sented to all the Legionnaires of the 1st REC.

After a pause for Easter, they left again together for the 11th RC [Cavalry
Regiment]-CIABC [Armored-Weapons and Cavalry Training Center] of Carpiagne and
the Canjuers camp, where they again carried out a firing session, and then pre-
pared to leave for Djibouti on Wednesday 5 May, to continue the tests there.

The current balance-sheet per vehicle: 3,500 kilometers traveled and 250 rounds
fired.

Practice at Winter Camp

Paris KEPI BLANC in French May 82 p 29

[Article: "La Courtine 1982"]

[Text] After the big autumn rendez-vous at Valdahon, the regiment returned
to La Courtine for its winter camp, from 25 February to 12 March 1982--a
brief stay, but full of activity.
First of all, so as not to lose time and get into a jam, a marking exercise was carried out along the run from Orange to La Courtine—a trip that the crews know well.

The stay itself was marked this year by an exercise entitled Navarin—a veritable operational checkout of the regiment in the reconnaissance and holding missions. And all of this took place in a chemical environment—which did not, of course, simplify matters!

This winter camp also gave the regiment's personnel the opportunity to do a lot of firing. Despite the often unfavorable weather conditions, the results were satisfactory, and even excellent.

The regiment then returned to Orange, maneuvering all the way, pursuing the enemy right up to the entrance to the Labouche district.

The balance-sheet was positive on the whole. But now, all the same, may the AMX 10-RC come soon!

Engineer-Soldier Battalion Function

Paris KEPI BLANC in French May 82 p 52

[Article: "Topographical Unit"]

[Text] The topographical units of the 61st BMGL [Mixed Engineering-Foreign Legion Battalion] are part of the works department, which is divided into a small administrative unit and a topographical unit as such. The personnel of the unit are divided into several teams, distributed among the camps of Caylus, des Garrigues and Larzac.

The work of a topographical team is both complex, long and highly structured. In general, it comprises:

--reconnaissance of the terrain by the team leader;
--placement of boundary markers, surveying marks and coordinate markers;
--surveying details of the terrain;
--drawing-up of a detail plan in the drafting room;
--laying out footprints of construction sites;
--setting up construction sites on the ground;
--surveying of heights and levels of all construction sites set up;
--drawing up plan of long section;
--laying out cross sections;
--calculation of cubic volumes of earth to be moved;
--setting up complete files of plans;
--monitoring of construction projects;
--checking works before handing over to the local service.
Antitank Practice in Alps

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Jun 82 p 51

[Article: "1st Section of 1st Company at Camurac"]

[Text] With the last hiccupps of the tired engines, the final efforts by our old GMC's, here we are at Camurac, a peaceful Pyrenees village in the middle of a white and silent plateau.

It is a silence that the 45 Legionnaires of the 1st Section, who are fanatics for snow and sliding, find it difficult to respect.

While skiing was to be the focal point of this stay's fearlessness, LRAC [Anti-tank Rocket Launcher] instruction is not forgotten.

Kneeling, prone, standing or nearly standing—these are the good marksman's positions, but also those of a very unstable skier!

Let us skip over this kind of awkwardness. With his weapon strapped over his back, the Legionnaire of the 4th RE [Foreign Regiment], transformed into a real Alpine trooper, is no longer stranger to the sunlit joys of the skier or the damp pains of the snow fighter.

Fifth Pacific Regiment

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Apr 82 p 19

[Article: "Delivering Supplies to Tamatangi"]

[Text] Monday, 2000 hours: EDIC (Infantry and Tank Landing Craft) 9073, carrying the officer responsible for outlying posts and 17 tons of materiel, prepares for the beaching from Mururoa.

2100 hours: The atoll's narrows are passed. It takes 10 hours at sea to resupply the Tamatangi post, which is 100 nautical miles from Mururoa (1 nautical mile = 1,852 meters). At Tamatangi, six military personnel (Legionnaires, sailors and airmen) and four Polynesian civilian employees await this arrival, which is to bring them food, fuel and mail. The last boat called 3 weeks ago. On the post, everyone is up at 0500 hours, the meteorological noncoms have made their observations, and the cook has baked fresh bread.

Tuesday, 0600 hours: The EDIC arrives off the post. The whaler is put in the water. It is the only means of getting to land, because the breaking waves and the coral barrier make it impossible to dock at land. The whalers are piloted by Polynesian civilian crews employed by the Navy to carry out missions on ships. Each team is composed of a whaler pilot and two assistants. All the personnel of the post take part in the unloading while the officer responsible for outlying posts and the senior warrant officer responsible for the post inspect the atoll and study the administrative problems and the mess and housing problems and consider works projects to be carried out.
1200 hours: Everything stops. This is the favorite moment in the visit, when one can get news of the regiment and France. The cook has made a special effort, appreciated by all.

1330 hours: The unloading resumes.

1730 hours: The mail sack is closed. Everyone goes to the unloading point, and the post's inhabitants watch the EDIC move out to sea.

Organization of the Outlying Posts

It is:

--1 officer of the 5th RMP [Mixed Pacific Regiment] (OCPP) [expansion unknown];
--4 senior noncommissioned officers of the 5th RMP;
--11 Legionnaires;
--3 noncommissioned officers of the Medical Corps;
--6 to 18 meteorological noncommissioned officers and petty officers of the Air Force and the Navy;
--16 Polynesian employees.

Its mission:

--to operate the three weather stations;
--to provide the command with intelligence;
--to give support to the organisms of the Mururoa Experimentation Center, one BDC (Tank Landing Craft) or EDIC visit to each post per month, 600 tons of goods loaded or unloaded in whalers per year, 1 week at sea to "do" the three posts.

One command unit on Mururoa:

--one captain;
--one noncommissioned-officer assistant;
--one secretary;
--one storeman.

Three posts:
Tureia, Reao, Tematangi.

Each post is commanded by a senior warrant officer, who acts as military commander, manages his mess and barracks, and pays his employees.

He has three Legionnaires, one cook, one electric-power generation operator, one mechanic, one Medical Corps noncommissioned officer, two to six meteorological specialists for operating the station during firing periods and when they are not in progress, and six civilian employees.

11267
CSO: 3100/827
EXPERT ANALYZES 'HARRIER' AIRCRAFT USE IN AEGEAN

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 18 Jul 82 p 7

Article by N. Kanakakis: "Interceptor Aircraft for the Aegean"

Vigorous efforts have recently been made in our country to compare the Falklands situation—especially from an operational and tactical standpoint—with the defense of the Aegean. Even more so, a very hurried—I would say extreme—reaching of conclusions is being undertaken. These are the so-called "lessons." One of these lessons is the tactical use of the vertical landing "HARRIER" aircraft. Just a few days ago, the concept for the use of this type of aircraft in our country was once again brought forth in an article written by a Greek-American political scientist.

More specifically, it was presumed that the use of the vertical landing "HARRIER" aircraft over the island areas of the Aegean would create conditions for Greek air superiority. Our purpose today is to examine to what extent the tactical use of "HARRIER" aircraft is possible and advantageous. Even if our air force were to acquire "Harriers," to what extent would this increase its strength? Or better yet, would Greece acquire air superiority in the Aegean?

In other words, there is only one substantive question: Can the "Harriers" guarantee the air defense of the Aegean?

To answer this very general question, we must, first of all, take into consideration a series of factors that make up the substance of any argument.

In essence, the relationship between the benefits that are to be derived and the possible consequences or drawbacks from the use of a given weapons system determines its indispensability.

Consequently, the air forces of all nations, before deciding on the purchase of a type of combat aircraft, ask for answers to such questions as the following:

- What are the technical specifications of the aircraft?
- In accordance with this data, where can they successfully be stationed, supplied and maintained?
- How easy and how economic are their upkeep?
- What kind of weapons and loads can they carry in their varying missions?
- What are their capabilities?
- Where is the likely enemy located?
- Where and what kind of bases and what type of aircraft does the enemy have?
- Where is it advantageous for me to confront him or to attack him? In the air or on the ground?
- What are the geographic and atmospheric conditions of the region that is scheduled to be used?

Finally, all of these questions are contained in one more general one:
"What do I want to do with these aircraft?"

Of course, as far as the tactical use of "Harriers" in the Aegean is concerned, there can be viewpoints from both sides. In these viewpoints, however, there are a few points that do not leave any room for any great dispute.

Error....

1. The reaching of conclusions from the operations carried out on the Falkland Islands, in such a short period of time, is an error. An even greater error is the attempt being made to compare the Falklands with the Aegean. There are fundamental differences in these two regions, as to the area involved, distances, number of islands, capabilities of the likely adversaries and many others.

At this time there are no conclusions, at least from an operational and tactical standpoint, that have any practical application in the Aegean. The data is still being studied. Therefore, what will surely be done in the future is the evaluation on more accurate bases of the tactical use, efficiency and effectiveness of specific weapons systems. For example, the Exocet missile, radar, various types of bombs, etc.

In this case, the interest in practical application that has been mentioned is not Greek in nature but takes on universal proportions.

Advantages

2. The tactical solution offered by "Harriers" in England cannot be implemented in the island areas of the Aegean. Unfortunately or fortunately, the method of utilization of a weapon depends on the geomorphological conditions of the area where it is going to be used. In the case of the Falklands, half
of the "Harriers" (20 aircraft) were transported and remained on the aircraft carriers for the purpose of providing air defense of the armada. The other half originally flew in to Ascension Island, being refueled in flight. This second group of "Harriers" were stationed on the Falkland Islands once the British forces established a secure bridgehead. During the period of the attempt for an effective use of the "Harriers," the British undertook the destruction of the air bases of the islands for the purpose of taking advantage of vertical landings. Here, of course, there is no doubt about the value of the "Harrier" aircraft because, in fact, its contribution was significant.

Simply stated, it is indicated that it is not possible that there could be an equivalent use of this weapon in an area so different and under completely different conditions.

What Is Needed

3. We are talking about the use of the "Harrier" aircraft in the Aegean without having first asked something very simple: "What kind of aircraft do we need in the Aegean area?" In the Aegean, we need a multi-role aircraft with broad interceptor capabilities. So, if combat aircraft are to be stationed in the Aegean, they must be interceptors.

"Harriers" are not interceptors. Their primary mission is "close support." Their normal armament consists of at the most three 1,000-pound bombs, two 30 mm machine guns and one or two 68 mm rocket launchers. In the Falklands, "Harriers" were forced to carry out interceptor missions using two air-to-air "Sidewinder" missiles.

The stationing of "Harriers" on the islands will not strengthen the interceptor capabilities of our air force. Even more so, it will provoke reactions since it will consist of a threat and not a counter-threat, as is believed. The two types of "Harrier" aircraft are the GR. Mk 3 close-support aircraft of the British Air Force and the FRS Mk 1 with limited interceptor capabilities, of the British Royal Navy. A-74 /as published; most probably A-7H/ "Corsair" and F-43 /as published; most probably F-4E/ "Phantom" aircraft used by the Greek military air force have all the necessary requirements for their successful participation in operations. They can admirably play a decisive role both in close-support operations and in the destruction of ground targets, taking off from mainland Greece.

4. It is true that our Aegean Islands can be considered unsinkable aircraft carriers. However, whereas aircraft carriers can move about and change course, whatever bases are located on the islands are hard targets for an adversary. In accordance with this logic, the stationing of "Harriers" on the islands is not to differentiate the targets to be destroyed by an adversary air force or artillery, etc.
The "Harrier" aircraft is a very complicated and sensitive mechanism. It requires the same, perhaps greater, support together with other combat aircraft. It is obvious that it is not possible to station aircraft on the islands without the required installations and the support infrastructure and administration.

If, therefore, anyone decides to use his islands as "aircraft carriers," whether or not he has "Harriers" is one and the same thing. The only difference is the use of airfields. On the other hand, the plethora of Greek islands gives Greece an easy choice among a rather large number of likely solutions to the problem.

For example, if there are a large number of "service," supply and maintenance bases in the Aegean region, the available operational time per combat aircraft is increased considerably. Instead of having the aircraft traversing the entire Aegean to be resupplied on mainland Greece, they would stopover on the island bases.

Servicing

Each base will service at least three to four aircraft per hour. The ground workshops will service one aircraft at a time. This means that there will not be a crush of aircraft that are awaiting servicing, something very bad in case where the base is subject to air attack.

Still, let us consider that it is not possible for all bases to be put out of commission at the same time. Therefore, this increases their viability.

And if again we want to look back to the Falklands for "lessons," we will note that the destruction of air bases is not as easy as we think, at least without the use of laser-guided or other guided missiles.

A fourth mission of "Vulcan" aircraft was needed on the Falklands, without making it possible even then to destroy the Port Stanley air bases.

The bases and the aircraft we have and those that we will acquire can serve the needs of the various air force missions. "Harriers" will not add anything new to Greek air power.

Standardization

5. We have said that the use of "Harriers" on the island areas of the Aegean is not going to be the decisively significant weapons system of the air force. Even more, it is not going to change the value of the targets that will receive the fire of an adversary. What we have not up to now thought about is that many years will pass before we could get "Harriers." This aircraft is a very complicated and sensitive piece of machinery and it requires the creation of a suitable infrastructure that could accept it and properly use it.
The existing infrastructure, with the direction that it has taken and the likely development that it could take, is easier to accept any type of aircraft, even after several years. Today, Greek strategy requires standardization. How, therefore, is it possible for us to add "Harriers" when, in fact, there are no possibilities for such a change? For "Harriers" to come into the Greek air force, an infrastructure would be required that would be "a state within a state" in the already existing one.

Finally, the "Harrier" aircraft is still being improved. For example, after years of daily use, the replacement of the "Blue Fox" radar system has been decided on. For that reason, Ferranti is designing a new radar system, the "Blue Falcon," because the older system had problems spotting targets flying at low altitude with the sea or ground behind them. This decision was made before the Falklands campaign. The new radar system will not be ready for use before mid-1985.

Costs

6. Another issue that must concern us is the relation between cost and effectiveness. When someone purchases an item, he compares the money he will spend with the result or effectiveness the item will have. In the case of the purchase of aircraft, it is not only the initial cost that must be considered. If to the cost of the "Harrier" (which is not small), we add the requirements in spare parts and expenditures for the creation of the technological, engineering and operational infrastructure, in comparison with what it offers us, there is no doubt that this aircraft is unfavorable. It has been stressed above that its primary attribute is close support. We also need suitable interceptors.

Even if we were to use the Sea Harrier of the British Royal Navy which has been classified as a multi-role combat aircraft, its procurement would once again be unfavorable. This is so because it does not suffice as an interceptor, while as a close-support aircraft the corresponding cost/effectiveness becomes prohibitive, given that it carries a limited load: only three 1,000-pound bombs.

Conclusion

In this analysis we could have compared more technical data that would have sufficed in themselves to prove if the "Harriers" are or are not suitable for our air force. At this stage, however, this was not deemed necessary. In accordance, however, with what has been described above, the conclusion is reached that the entry of the "Harrier" into our air force and its use in the island areas of the Aegean is not so—the wise idea. Despite, this, however, a dialogue on this issue cannot be excluded, nor would it be constructive to stop here.

Even more so, the examination or re-examination of the issue by competent officials cannot have anything but beneficial results.

Note: The author is a specialist in international issues, a military expert and a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies of London.

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CONSERVATIVES' DEFENSE PANEL CHIEF REPLUGES 'FOUR PERCENT'  

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Aug 82 p 3

[Article by Liv Hegna: "The Promise of Four Percent Growth in Defense Spending Will Be Kept"]

[Text] Does the conservative government expect to keep its promise of four percent real growth in the defense budget? This question has been asked by several Labor Party newspapers. The leader of the conservative faction in the Defense Committee, Storting representative Thor Knudsen, told AFTENPOSTEN, however, that there is no reason to doubt the Conservative Party's will to strengthen the defense. "Nothing in our judgment of the national security situation indicates that there is reason for a reduction," he said.

In other countries, Sweden for example, the defense leadership speaks out and says what percentage of security in relation to the estimate of the threat the budget gives at any time. That is not the case in Norway. Here it is almost a tradition that the chiefs of the services say that they are "reasonably satisfied with the defense budget, considering the governing economic conditions."

Storting representative Thor Knudsen said to AFTENPOSTEN, however, that it is not only the national security judgment that a four percent increase should be approved, but if we are to avoid the use of atomic weapons we must maintain a conventional defense. That further emphasizes the necessity for honoring the promises of the Conservative and other bourgeois parties.

For some time now in defense circles the allegation of undercompensation has been discussed, meaning that the defense budget is growing while there is not full compensation for price increases during the budget period. Individual voices claim that Norway would have come up on the minus side if that factor had been taken into consideration. In Denmark, for example, they have zero percent growth in the budget, but compensate for price increases with postponements, something which simply means that the Danes come out of it only temporarily.
Storting representative Thor Knudsen told AFTENPOSTEN that a unanimous Defense Committee has said that compensation will be given for price increases, and that the Defense Department will not suffer under today's difficult economic situation. He maintains that the reason why there is dissatisfaction from time to time with compensation is because it is often difficult to make factual calculations of such conditions.

Thor Knudsen emphasized, however, that he interprets the opinion poll concerning the defense, where 86 percent of those asked believed that we must have a strong defense, as an expression of broad unity that the government can not fail to honor the promise of the three bourgeois parties for four percent real growth.

"What about compensation for increased expenses in connection with compliance with the labor environment law?"

"That is a question which is still under negotiation by the Defense Department in cooperation with the officers' and noncommissioned officers' organizations. I want to wait for the results of these negotiations before I comment on this question," said Thor Knudsen.

"Claims recently appeared in the press that the army lacks the most necessary equipment in amounts of tens of thousands for mobilization. Any comment?"

"I have been told by the defense leadership that those claims were perhaps exaggerated. It also appears to be clear that we need additional supplemental weapons for a mobilization army. That further emphasizes the need for a good defense budget."

"But there are large shortages elsewhere in the Defense Department also. According to the professionals there is a frightful lack of antiaircraft for our priority air bases, there is urgency to get a submarine agreement, and still no position has been reached on the destiny of the frigates which was asked for in the Defense Committee's recommendation."

"As to the antiaircraft missiles and submarines, there is urgency about reaching a solution, but I find it difficult to comment in more detail before I am familiar with the actual agreements on the improved Hawk missiles and the submarine purchase. It is also positive that we now finally have some movement on these questions. We have been standing still entirely too long," said Storting representative Thor Knudsen.