POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

AND

UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY

by

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An Advanced Research Project

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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**Abstract**: The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the importance of continued engagement with post-apartheid South Africa to United States national security. It is based on the realist premise that the U.S. has limited national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa which would be best served by a regional security strategy explicitly predicated on engagement with South Africa. The paper is presented in six chapters. Chapter One places South Africa in regional perspective as Sub-Saharan Africa's pivotal state through an analysis of its political, economic, and military dimensions of national power. Chapter Two describes U.S. national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. These interests -- South Africa's transition to democracy, continued U.S. access to strategic minerals, the security of U.S. economic interests, and the security of sea lines of communication -- focus on South Africa and the Southern African sub-region. Chapter Three provides an analysis of the Sub-Saharan African strategic environment. South Africa offers the United States the greatest opportunity for meaningful engagement in a strategic environment which is generally characterized by dysfunctional political and economic regimes and their attendant social conditions. Chapter Four describes the emergence of a U.S. policy for Sub-Saharan Africa which implicitly recognizes South Africa as the region's pivotal state. Chapter Five is a critical analysis of U.S. regional strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter demonstrates that there are significant discontinuities in U.S. policy and strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. In effect, the U.S. lacks a comprehensive strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa; there are only a group of loosely coordinated political, economic, security, and informational policy initiatives which provide the semblance, but not the substance of a regional strategy. Chapter Six draws conclusions concerning current U.S. policy and strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa and presents recommendations for development of a regional strategy based on engagement with South Africa.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper demonstrates the importance of continued engagement with post-apartheid South Africa to United States national security. It concludes that there are significant discontinuities between United States policy and strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, and recommends formulation of a U.S. regional strategy predicated on engagement with South Africa.

During the past five years, coincident with the end of apartheid, a new United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa has emerged which implicitly recognizes South Africa’s role as the region’s pivotal state. Policy, however, has not been translated into a comprehensive regional strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact such a strategy hardly exists. United States engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa is executed through a collection of loosely coordinated political, economic, security, and informational policy initiatives which provide the semblance, but not the substance of a strategy.

As the result of this discontinuity between policy and strategy, executive branch agencies continue to execute programs in Sub-Saharan Africa outside of an overarching framework and without a clear strategic objective. Most programs appear to be formulated with little or no regard for the political, economic, or social factors which shape the Sub-Saharan African strategic environment. This approach to policy implementation is inefficient, wasteful of limited resources, and distracts policymakers’ attention from the few issues in Sub-Saharan Africa which are of strategic importance to the United States. United
States national interests would be best served through the formulation of a regional strategy explicitly founded on engagement with South Africa.

Three interacting factors support the formulation of such a strategy. These are: 1) South Africa’s role as the region’s pivotal state; 2) the nature of United States interests in Sub-Saharan Africa; and 3) the nature of the Sub-Saharan African strategic environment.

Under apartheid, South Africa’s modern industrial infrastructure, highly-developed economy, and formidable military capabilities made it the most powerful nation in Sub-Saharan Africa and the dominant state in the Southern African sub-region. Analysis of its political, military, and economic dimensions of national power demonstrates that since the end of apartheid in 1994 South Africa has emerged as Sub-Saharan Africa’s pivotal state. As such, its continued stability and development are critical to peace and prosperity throughout the region.

The United States has identifiable, but limited economic, political, and security interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. With the exception of overall regional stability and Nigerian oil supplies, the focus of the majority of these interests -- South Africa’s transition to democracy, continued U.S. access to strategic minerals, the security of U.S. economic interests, and the security of sea lines of communication -- is the Republic of South Africa and the Southern African sub-region.

South Africa offers the United States the greatest opportunity for meaningful engagement in a regional strategic environment which is generally characterized by dysfunctional political and economic regimes and their attendant social conditions. South Africa is the only major nation in Sub-Saharan Africa currently making a transition to
democracy. While analysis of regional political trends does indicate some degree of political liberalization, the majority of Sub-Saharan African nations remain under authoritarian rule. Their appears to be no widespread regional movement toward either democratization or the development of governing structures based on the rule of law.

Economically, most Sub-Saharan African nations lack a basis for sustained development. Most of these countries are likely to remain producers and exporters or raw materials rather than manufacturers of exported goods. Political and economic development in the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries continues to be hampered by a variety of social conditions which compare unfavorably with those in other developing areas. These include rampant population growth, food shortages, disease, and environmental degradation.

South Africa occupies a unique position. It is at once the most powerful nation in Sub-Saharan Africa and the region’s pivotal state. It is also the focus of the majority of United States national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. The United States should act to end the discontinuity in its policy and strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa through formulation of a regional strategy predicated on engagement with South Africa.
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the importance of continued engagement with post-apartheid South Africa to United States national security. It concludes that there are significant discontinuities between United States policy and strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, and recommends formulation of a U.S. regional strategy predicated on engagement with South Africa.

South Africa occupies a unique position. The country's industrialized economy and military capabilities make it the most powerful state in Sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa is also the only major state in the region making a transition to full democracy. These factors combine to give South Africa a significant capacity to effect regional, and to a limited extent international stability and mark it as Sub-Saharan Africa's pivotal state.\(^1\) In addition to its regional importance, South Africa is also the focus of the majority of United States national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa.

During the last five years, coincident with the end of apartheid in South Africa, a new United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa has emerged. This policy implicitly recognizes South Africa's role as the region's pivotal state. Policy, however, has not been translated into a comprehensive regional security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact such a strategy hardly exists. United States engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa is executed through a collection of loosely coordinated policy initiatives which provide the semblance, but not the substance, of a regional strategy. The majority of these initiatives bear little relationship to
United States national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa and most of their underlying premises are at odds with the realities of the regional strategic environment.

As the result of this mismatch between United States policy and strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, executive branch agencies continue to execute programs in the region outside of an overarching framework and without a clearly defined strategic objective. This approach to policy implementation is both inefficient and wasteful of limited resources. Its focus is so diffuse and widely scattered that it distracts policymakers’ attention from the relatively few issues in Sub-Saharan Africa that are of real strategic importance to the United States.

This paper is based on the realist premise that the United States has limited national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa which would be best served by a regional security strategy based on engagement with South Africa. Chapter One places South Africa in regional perspective as Sub-Saharan Africa’s pivotal state through an analysis of its political, military, and economic dimensions of national power. Chapter Two describes United States national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, most of which lie in South Africa and the immediate Southern African sub-region. Chapter Three provides an analysis of the Sub-Saharan African strategic environment, which offers the United States only limited opportunities for fruitful engagement. Chapter Four describes the emergence of a United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa which implicitly recognizes South Africa as the region’s pivotal state.

Chapter Five provides a critical analysis of United States policy initiatives for Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, Chapter Six draws conclusions concerning current United States policy and strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa and presents recommendations for development of a regional strategy based on engagement with South Africa.
CHAPTER 1

SOUTH AFRICA: THE PIVOTAL STATE

On 10 May 1994 Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as President of the Republic of South Africa. This event marked the climax of one of the most emotionally laden and potentially most important political transitions of modern times. Mandela’s election was of much more than symbolic importance. For his countrymen, the majority of whom were voting for the first time, it signified the end of 46 years of rule by South Africa’s apartheid government. Instituted by the South African Nationalist Party in 1948 apartheid (literally “separateness”) sought the “separate development” of South Africa’s races. Apartheid provided the policy framework for the legal, political, and social segregation of South African whites, blacks, Indians, and “Coloreds” (people of mixed race), and the maintenance of white minority rule. For many Africans, Mandela’s election and South Africa’s transition to majority rule also symbolized the removal of the last vestige of European colonialism from the continent.

At the time of Mandela’s election South Africa’s modern industrial infrastructure, highly developed economy, and formidable military capabilities made it the most powerful nation in Sub-Saharan Africa and the dominant state in the Southern African sub-region. (Sub-Saharan Africa and the Southern African sub-region are depicted at Figures 1 and 2, respectively.) Its racial policies, however, had left it effectively isolated from the rest of the international community. The advent of majority rule in South Africa has ended this previous isolation. South Africa has rejoined the community of nations; its new government
aspires to both a position of regional political leadership and one of influence in international organizations. The end of apartheid has also provided the impetus for even greater South African participation in the Sub-Saharan African economy. South Africa has, in effect, emerged as Sub-Saharan Africa’s pivotal state. A pivotal state is one which

...is so important regionally that its collapse would spell transboundary mayhem: migration, communal violence, pollution, disease, and so on. A pivotal state’s steady economic progress and stability, on the other hand, would bolster the region’s economic vitality and political soundness and benefit American trade and investment.  

During the past five years a United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa has emerged which implicitly recognizes South Africa’s pivotal role in the region. This chapter sets the stage for further discussion and analysis of U.S. policy and strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa by placing South Africa in regional context through an analysis of its political, military, and economic dimensions of national power.

The Political Dimension

Of Sub-Saharan Africa’s three most potentially powerful states, to include Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire), South Africa is the only one making a transition to democracy. The election which brought Nelson Mandela to power also created a South African Government of National Unity with Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC) as its major party. This new government has both pursued an ambitious program of domestic political and economic reform, and has sought to implement a new foreign policy for South Africa.
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Since the end of apartheid South Africa has made significant progress toward overcoming the legacy of a fragile, racially-based political system in which less than 20 percent of its population was accorded full political and economic rights. Despite the initial misgivings of both outside observers and South Africans themselves, the country’s transition to majority rule has been unexpectedly smooth overall. ⁹

Fundamental political change has taken place in South Africa. In 1996 the South African government promulgated a new constitution which explicitly replaced the apartheid-era governing concept of “parliamentary sovereignty” with that of the rule of law based on constitutional supremacy. The preamble to the new constitution, which took effect on 4 February 1997, defines its objectives as:

[to] heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; [and] build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations. ¹⁰

The new constitution provided the basis for the establishment of new, Western-style executive, legislative, and judicial governing authorities and formally organized the country into nine separate provinces, each with its own premier, legislature, and government services. ¹¹ It also formally reincorporated the so-called “homelands” into the Republic of South Africa. ¹²

For the majority of South Africans the ANC earned its most powerful claim to political legitimacy through its role in the long struggle against apartheid. The ANC now faces the challenge of transforming itself from a liberation movement to an effective
governing party. In the words of one former ANC guerrilla, "People can't eat democracy. We desperately need food, hospitals, houses, jobs, land, education, electricity, and water." 13

Apartheid created a society characterized by one of the most inequitable distributions of income in the world. South Africa has a population of 42.3 million, the fourth largest in Sub-Saharan Africa. (Regional population statistics are at Table 1). While the overwhelming majority of the country's population (75.2 percent) is black, whites form a significant minority (13.6 percent). 14 Most of the white one-seventh of South Africa's population enjoy incomes, material comforts, and health and educational standards equal to those of Western Europe. In contrast, most of South Africa's remaining population endures living conditions comparable to those of the Third World. 15 South Africa's overall annual population growth rate (1.51 percent) is heavily skewed toward the poorest segment of its society. The estimated annual rate of growth for the nation's largely impoverished black population is estimated at 2.8 percent. South Africa's more affluent white population, on the other hand, is estimated to be declining by -0.9 percent each year. 16 Demographic trends tend to indicate that, without remediation, a progressively growing number of people at the lower end of the economic scale will be in competition for proportionally reduced amounts of wealth.

In order to ameliorate these conditions the Government of National Unity has formulated an aggressive Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). Initiated as a five-year program in 1995, full implementation of the RDP is estimated to cost at least $37.5 billion. 17 Program objectives include poverty reduction and stimulation of economic growth, human resource development, further democratization of the South African state and society, and a broad range of urban and rural development initiatives. 18
There are at least two potential unintended consequences associated with implementation of the RDP. First, efforts to establish a more equitable distribution of wealth and social services within South African society may create expectations which the Government of National Unity is unable to fulfill. Second, and perhaps even more threatening to South Africa’s successful transition to democracy, would be the widespread development of a culture of entitlement and dependency.

In addition to the residual economic and social effects of apartheid, the overall stability of South African society is potentially threatened by high levels of crime. The violence and pressures of the anti-apartheid struggle in the black townships produced almost an entire generation of young people who lack both basic education and job skills. In frustration, many have turned to crime as a means of support. More recently, former guerrilla fighters demobilized from the military wings of the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups, as well as former special forces personnel of the apartheid-era South African armed forces, have been implicated in the activities of well-organized and extremely violent criminal groups.19 The challenge to internal security is so great in some areas that the government has been forced to augment the South African Police Service (SAPS) with military forces in continuation of a practice which began under apartheid.

Problems associated with curtailing the potential effects of crime on South African society are exacerbated by the low-esteem in which the nation’s police services been held.20 Recent public opinion surveys indicate little confidence in them at the local level; public perceptions that the police themselves are becoming increasingly corrupt have also reduced their effectiveness.21 This may reflect that under apartheid SAPS had developed into a
paramilitary force whose primary focus was perceived to be the maintenance of public order rather than the provision of traditional police services to the community as a whole. As such, SAPS was generally considered to be a highly politicized organization fully supportive of the apartheid regime. The Government of National Unity has made significant efforts to both demilitarize and depoliticize SAPS and to provide effective civilian oversight of its activities. Reports indicate, however, that SAPS continues to experience low morale, indiscipline, and internal divisions along racial lines.

South Africa's transition to democracy is thus far from complete, and the country is likely to experience the lingering economic and social effects of apartheid for several generations. South Africa's next national elections are scheduled for April 1999. Given the ANC's near-dominance of the Government of National Unity and widespread perceptions of its legitimacy, as well as the absence of viable opposition political parties at the national level, it is expected that ANC Executive Deputy President Thabo Mbeki will succeed Mandela as President. The real test of South Africa's transition to democracy will come when Mbeki stands for reelection in 2004. By then the ANC is likely to fragment to some extent and new opposition parties will probably emerge to challenge its political dominance. The ANC's ability to effectively govern in the presence of opposition, or even to peacefully transfer power in the event of an election defeat, will be critical indicators of the success of South Africa's transition to democracy.
FOREIGN POLICY

Shortly before his election to the South African presidency Nelson Mandela wrote, "The African National Congress believes that the charting of a new foreign policy for South Africa is a key element in the creation of a peaceful and prosperous country."\(^{26}\) The Government of National Unity’s foreign policy appears radically different from that of its apartheid-era predecessor. Most of its underlying tenets are far removed from realist notions of international relations. South Africa’s declared foreign policy principals emphasize support for human rights, internationalism, a commitment to promoting regional growth and cooperation, and adherence to international arms control conventions.\(^{27}\)

President Mandela conceives the fundamental goal of the post-Cold War international system as the creation of universal democracy, peace, and prosperity.\(^{28}\) He has repeatedly emphasized the centrality of these concepts to South Africa’s new foreign policy, which also includes a strong commitment to human rights. ("Human rights will be the light that guides our foreign policy."\(^{29}\)) Commenting on apartheid’s corrosive social and economic effects on South Africa, President Mandela has also declared that “a central goal” of South Africa’s foreign policy is the promotion “of institutions and forces that, through democratic means, seek to make the world safe for diversity."\(^{30}\)

The basis of South Africa’s foreign policy is strongly internationalist. "Peace is the goal for which all nations should strive," wrote Mandela, "and when this breaks down, internationally agreed and non-violent mechanisms...must be employed” for its restoration.\(^{31}\) In a speech to the United States Congress on 6 October 1994 President Mandela stated:

...in an age such as this...much revision will have to be done of ideas that have seemed as stable as the rocks, including such concepts as sovereignty and national interest.
What we speak of is the evolution of the objective world, which inexorably says to all of us that we are human together or nothing at all.\textsuperscript{32}

Equating global interdependence with international responsibility, he continued:

...the world is one stage and the actions of its inhabitants part of the same drama...[therefore] each one of us as nations...should begin to define the national interest to include the genuine happiness of others, however distant in time and space their domicile might be.\textsuperscript{33}

Consistent with these principals, the Government of National Unity moved quickly to end South Africa’s international political isolation. In May 1994 the country became a member of both the Organization of African Unity and the Non-Aligned Movement. The following month South Africa rejoined the Commonwealth (after an absence of 33 years) and reclaimed its seat in the United Nations, from which the country had withdrawn two decades earlier. South Africa also became a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in October 1994. Within the United Nations, South Africa has been a leading proponent of restructuring the Security Council in order to afford greater representation to lesser developed countries.

As part of its new foreign policy, South Africa also seeks to fulfill its “African destiny” by playing a leading role in the economic development and integration of the Southern African sub-region. It views the ultimate objectives of its own Reconstruction and Development Program as an integral part of this process. “Southern Africa commands a special priority in our foreign policy. We are inextricably part of Southern Africa and our destiny is linked to that of a region which is much more than a mere geographical concept.”\textsuperscript{34}

South Africa’s new political leaders are bound to their neighbors by self-interest as well as a sense of obligation for the support that many of these countries lent to the ANC and
other groups during their struggle against apartheid. The Government of National Unity has articulated its overarching vision for the Southern African sub-region as

...the highest possible degree of economic co-operation, mutual assistance where necessary and joint planning consistent with socio-economic, environmental and political realities. South Africa seeks to achieve regional economic development through the [Southern African Development Community] South Africa acceded to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Treaty on 29 August 1994. President Mandela became Chairperson of the SADC in on 24 August 1996, and South Africa will chair the organization until 31 August 1999. During that period, South Africa is “expected to provide political guidance and leadership to the region.” The Government of National Unity, and President Mandela personally, are also proponents of the development of indigenous regional conflict resolution and peacekeeping mechanisms. South Africa has played an active role in conflict resolution in the DRC and Sudan, and South African armed forces have participated in at least one exercise intended as preparation for “peacekeeping tasks on the continent.”

Finally, South Africa’s foreign policy includes a declared commitment to the international non-proliferation regime. South Africa actually acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) under its apartheid government on 10 July 1991. South Africa is unique in that it is the only country to have developed, and then unilaterally and voluntarily relinquished a nuclear weapons capability before acceding to the NPT.

South Africa’s nuclear program, which was limited to the production of seven weapons, began as a general research program in 1961 and progressed to weapons development in 1974. South African threat perceptions during this period were driven by the increasing Soviet presence in Africa, particularly in Angola and Mozambique. The South
African government, effectively isolated from the international community due to apartheid, decided to fully develop a nuclear capability based on the assumption that it had no reliable external guarantee of its national security. ⁴¹

The decision to dismantle the program was made in 1989 by State-President F.W. de Klerk, the leader South Africa's last apartheid government and one of the key figures in the country's transition to majority rule. De Klerk's decision to relinquish South Africa's nuclear capability appears to have been predicated on two factors. First, the negotiated withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola had removed the only large-scale conventional threat to South Africa's security. ⁴² Second, de Klerk had become convinced of the need for significant domestic political change in South Africa. It is unlikely, however, that either he or his colleagues would have been willing to transfer control of South Africa's nuclear weapons to a majority government. In this respect, de Klerk's decision to relinquish South Africa's nuclear capability may be seen as one of the first steps toward transition to majority rule. Dismantling and destruction of weapons and weapon components began in July 1990 and were completed by 6 September 1991. By dismantling its nuclear program, South Africa also set the conditions for successful negotiation of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty in 1996. ⁴³ In keeping with the ANC's long-held opposition to nuclear weapons, the Government of National Unity has since become a leading proponent of universal accession to the NPT and other arms control regimes. ⁴⁴

While the principals which shape South Africa's new foreign policy are far different from those which shaped those of its apartheid predecessor, they may also be transitory. The degree to which they reflect a real consensus among South African policymakers, or are
largely an extension of President Mandela’s personal philosophy, remains unclear. South African government officials, however, tend to believe that President Mandela’s successors will take a far more realist view of foreign policy and international relations.\(^{45}\)

**The Military Dimension**

The idealistic tenets which shape South Africa’s new foreign policy are not reflected in its military dimension of national power. South Africa is the dominant military power in Sub-Saharan Africa and the civilian and military leaders of the its military establishment remain firm adherents of political realism.\(^{46}\) Shortly after he assumed office in 1994 Defense Minister Joe Modise stated, “Peace is the ideal situation, but ideal situations are hard to find in the real world. The chances of lasting peace are very remote.”\(^{47}\) In 1995, during debate over the Government of National Unity’s initial defense budget Modise told the South African Parliament:

> The absence of an immediate threat does not guarantee peace. We have to accept that the future cannot be determined with any degree of certainty, as international relations are essentially unpredictable [and] are characterized by national interests competing for trade and natural resources, and in some parts of the world the disintegration of states through ethnic or religious war.\(^{48}\)

Modise stressed that the South African armed forces are “the nation’s insurance policy and the extent of that insurance depends on what we have invested in it. We do not deserve a second-rate army, navy, or air force.”\(^{49}\)

Nonetheless, the advent of majority rule in South Africa has brought fundamental changes to its armed forces. Unlike its predecessor South African Defense Force (SADF), South African National Defense Force (SANDF) is constitutionally mandated as a
strategically defensive organization. South Africa’s constitution specifies the SANDF’s primary role as defense of the nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and “to serve in compliance with international obligations.” The SANDF’s secondary functions include support to the South African Police Service for the maintenance of internal security and border control; the provision and maintenance of essential services to South Africa’s civilian population; and “the preservation of life, health, and property; and support for socio-economic upliftment.”

The constitution envisions as the SANDF as “a professional, balanced and modern Defense Force representative of all South Africans, which ensures a safe and secure environment within which national and regional reconstruction and development, growth and prosperity can be pursued.” White-only conscription into the formerly constituted SADF had ended on 1 January 1994; the SANDF has become a non-racial all-volunteer force which is augmented by reserves. South Africa currently has the only effective reserve mobilization system in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In March 1995 the South African government established a new Department of Defense in order to ensure both effective civilian control of the nation’s military establishment and “transparency in military matters.” (South African Defense Department organizational structure is depicted at Figure 3.) Ensuring effective civilian control of the military was of particular importance to South Africa’s new government. The SADF played a major role in maintenance of the apartheid regime’s power. Military autonomy, repression, and a wide role in decision making and policy implementation characterized the pattern of civil-military relations South Africa’s apartheid government.
South Africa’s military leadership has made a political transformation few would have previously thought possible. With few exceptions, they have gone to great lengths to demonstrate their allegiance to South Africa’s duly constituted civilian government.\textsuperscript{58} This commitment to maintaining the integrity of the civilian government was most recently demonstrated by General Georg Meiring’s decision to retire as Chief of the SANDF after he determined that he had lost President Mandela’s confidence. General Meiring was succeeded by General Siphiwe Nyanda, former commander of the ANC’s military wing and, most recently, Chief of the South African Defense Staff.\textsuperscript{59}

The end of apartheid in South Africa fostered expectations of a “peace dividend” similar to those in the United States following the end of the Cold War. High levels of defense spending were also incompatible with the Government of National Unity’s initial budgetary priority of funding the RDP.\textsuperscript{60} Accordingly, the South African defense budget decreased from $3.5 billion for 1992-1993 (the last full year of apartheid) to $2.15 billion for 1997-1998. The latter figure represented 1.6 percent of South Africa’s GDP.\textsuperscript{61} The defense budget for 1998-1999 has been further reduced to meet the government’s goal of limiting defense expenditures to 1.4 percent of South Africa’s GDP through at least 2001.\textsuperscript{62}

South African military personnel levels are being commensurably reduced. The SANDF currently has a strength of 79,700 regular personnel augmented by 386,000 reservists. Current plans envision the reduction of total active duty strength to 71,500 by 2001-2002. In the absence of an appreciable external threat, SANDF personnel strengths may continue to decline. South Africa’s 1997 Defense Review calls for an eventual SANDF structure comprising 22,000 regular personnel and 69,400 reservists.\textsuperscript{63}
For the present, however, further reductions in military spending and force structure are tempered by four factors:

1. The requirement to maintain core capabilities and competencies which will allow the SANDF to fulfill its primary function. This “core force concept” seeks to maintain the “minimum viable level” of conventional warfare capabilities to meet short-term contingencies, ensure the retention of operational and technical expertise, and provide the basis for future expansion.  

2. The expectation that substantial numbers of SANDF personnel will continue to augment the South African Police Service in the conduct of border and internal security operations. Defense Minister Modise has identified the primary threat to South Africa as “that of the instability around us.” This threat is characterized by increasing flows of illegal immigrants, drugs, stolen vehicles, and weapons into South Africa from neighboring states. South Africa shares more than 1,200 miles of border with Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Mozambique. Much of this frontier is either porous and unguarded or entirely unmarked. Illegal immigration is of particular concern to South Africa, whose population is consistently swollen by an estimated one million illegal immigrants from other African countries. Internally, the greatest threat to South Africa’s security is posed by levels of crime and violence which in some areas have risen beyond the capacity of the police to effectively control.

3. The requirement to protect South Africa’s extensive maritime and marine resources. South Africa is essentially a maritime nation and seaward trade accounts for 55 percent of the value of the country’s GDP. South Africa’s location at the southern tip of
the African continent gives it a strategic position astride a major choke point on the Cape Sea Route linking the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans. The South African economy is critically dependent on the security of these sea trading routes for 95 percent of the tonnage and 80 percent of the value of its imports and exports. South Africa also claims an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles from its coast. (South African maritime zones are depicted at Figure 4.)

4. The expectation that South Africa will play a prominent role in peace operations and regional defense cooperation.

Restructuring of the SANDF also required the integration of all former opponents of the apartheid regime into South Africa’s armed forces. This contentious process required the integration of 85,000 personnel from the previously existing South African Defense Force with 28,000 from the military wings of the African National Congress and the Pan-African Congress, as well as an additional 10,000 drawn from the so-called “homelands” armies. After the conduct of screening and “bridging training” under the observation of a British Military Advisory and Training Team, about 16,000 non-SADF personnel became members of the SANDF regular force.

SANDF ORGANIZATION

Under South Africa’s constitution the President appoints the Chief of the National Defense Force who exercises operational control over the nation’s armed forces. The Chief of the SANDF is responsible to the Defense Minister for the execution of the nation’s defense policy as stipulated by the Cabinet.
South Africa's four military services (army, air force, navy, and health service) are directly subordinate to the Chief of the National Defense Force. Each service has a specific role, mission, and functions articulated in a manner similar to those of United States military services.

**South African Army.**

The South African Army has a strength of 54,300 regular personnel augmented by 312,500 reservists and home defense forces.\textsuperscript{72} The Chief of the South African Army exercises direct command and control over its staff divisions, operational formations, and territorial commands. (South African Army organizational structure is depicted at Figure 5.) The primary role of the South African Army is "the successful protection of the territorial integrity of the Republic of South Africa."\textsuperscript{73} Its secondary roles include: 1) the preservation of life, health, and property; 2) the provision or maintenance of essential services; 3) rear area protection including support to the South African Police Service; 4) support to other government agencies for "socio-economic upliftment"; and 5) compliance with international obligations.\textsuperscript{74} The army's mission is "to render landward military services to the Republic of South Africa."\textsuperscript{75} Functions ascribed to the South African Army include command and control and force preparation, employment, support, and renewal.\textsuperscript{76}

In practice, the South African Army's primary operational functions have become the provision of border security and augmentation of the South African Police Service for internal security. There is widespread recognition among South African defense officials that the army's employment in these roles detracts from its ability to maintain core technical and
operational competencies. There is also some concern that assigning the army to civil police duties may undermine South Africa's new pattern of civil-military relations. Given the threat posed to the nation's internal security by high levels of crime and violence, however, the South African Army is likely to continue to devote an increasing portion of its resources to nontraditional security missions.77

South African Air Force.

The South African Air Force consists of 11,400 regular personnel and 20,500 reservists.78 The Chief of the South African Air Force exercises command and control over the Air Force Staff, separate functional commands, and air bases. The air force also maintains a separate “real time” operational chain of command to deliver immediate air support in response to requests through a command post at Air Force Headquarters and several forward command posts.79 (South African Air Force organizational structure is depicted at Figure 6). The role of the South African Air Force is “to safeguard the Republic of South Africa’s strategic airspace and to provide other air capabilities as required to ensure the security interests” of South Africa.80 Its mission is to supply “professional and cost-effective operational air capabilities.” Through its “inherent flexibility and modern means” it secures South Africa’s airspace and satisfies “the unique needs of the security forces and other interest groups.”81 Functions ascribed to the South African Air Force include “control of intelligence flow related to air operations”; “delivery of air fire-power”; provision of air mobility; and support for special operations.82
In order to execute its primary function of airspace defense the South African Air Force has maintained a “core” force composed of three fighter wings, an airborne refueling/electronic warfare squadron, and a fighter training school. This force is augmented by transport and helicopter units. While still a robust force by regional standards, the air force's overall capabilities have been reduced by base closures and an inability to retain experienced pilots.  

South African Navy. 

The South African Navy has a strength of 8,000 regular personnel augmented by 17,000 reservists. The navy’s command and control system allows for centralized operational planning and direction by the Chief of the Navy and Navy Headquarters, and decentralized execution through subordinate Chiefs of Naval Operations and Naval Support. (South African Navy organizational structure is depicted at Figure 7.) The role of the South African Navy is to “conduct naval operations to defend the Republic of South Africa and to support the maintenance of [its sovereignty].” The navy’s mission is to “provide a seaward service to the State by conducting naval operations to protect safety and security, where naval operations include combat, [maritime] assistance and hydrographic operations.” Functions ascribed to the South African Navy include the conduct of naval operations in defense of the Republic of South Africa, provision of naval services in support of other government agencies, and the provision of hydrographic services.

The South African Navy's own operational concept states:

South Africa protects its maritime interests by securing access to the region through its ports of entry, by guaranteeing its maritime sovereignty, through patrolling its sea lanes and Exclusive Economic Zone, guarding its harbors, fish stocks, and natural
resources under the sea bed, and by ensuring the safety of international maritime traffic around its coasts. 89

During the initial 1995 debates concerning South Africa’s defense budget Deputy Minister of Defense Ronnie Kasrils stressed the importance of maintaining an effective naval force. Reminding the members of South Africa's parliament of their own history, he stated, "The indigenous people of this country have never withstood or repelled a maritime invasion….Africa’s history has been dominated for the last three centuries by external intervention and we would do well never to forget that." 90

Despite such expressions of support, the navy remains the most poorly funded of South Africa's armed forces. 91 Essentially a coastal defense force, it lacks sufficient resources to either defend South Africa's extensive coastline or ensure the security of its maritime interests. The South African Navy currently lacks the surface combatants required to "repel a maritime invasion." It has recently sought to increase its surface warfare capabilities through the purchase of four corvettes, which have been characterized as "the number one purchase priority" within the South African defense budget. Plans for their acquisition, however, appear to be incompatible with the government's desire to further limit defense spending. 92 Despite its limitations, the South African Navy is unique in Sub-Saharan Africa in that it is possess the region's only indigenous submarine force. 93 It also capable of providing limited sea lift support for power projection or peacekeeping operations. 94

South African Medical Service.

Comprising 6,000 regular personnel and 36,000 reservists, the South African Medical Service is organized as a separate service within the SANDF. 95 Under the command
of the Surgeon General, the Medical Service also constitutes part of the South African National Health System. As such, it continues to play a significant role in the execution of the national Reconstruction and Development Program.\textsuperscript{96}

Command and control of the Medical Service is exercised through a system of 10 regional medical commands and specialist permanent force units. (South African Medical Service organizational structure is depicted at Figure 8.) The role of the Medical Service is "to provide a comprehensive military health service to the National Defense Force, the South African Police Service and to assist the health services of South Africa during relief operations."\textsuperscript{97} Its mission is to "provide and ensure...a military health service system that is guaranteed, comprehensive, [and] self-supporting...to ensure the physical, psychological, and social well-being of the entire military community."\textsuperscript{98} Functions ascribed to the medical Service include provision of medical support to the SANDF and the South African Police Service, disaster relief, provision of unique capabilities in support of other government agencies, and "socio-economic upliftment."\textsuperscript{99}

**The Economic Dimension**

The South African economy, which is highly diversified, technologically advanced, and capable of generating substantial amounts of industrial capital, dwarfs those of other Sub-Saharan African nations.\textsuperscript{100} South Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $227 billion accounts for nearly thirty percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's aggregate GDP of $787.62 billion. (Regional economic statistics are at Table 2.) Per capita distribution of GDP in South
Africa ($5,400.00) is nearly four times the regional average, and is equaled only by that of Gabon.

Trade between South Africa and other nations in the Southern African sub-region is asymmetrical. South Africa is the primary source of manufactured goods for most Southern African countries. The total value of South African exports to neighboring countries is four times the value of its imports from the region. In keeping with its commitment to regional development and integration, the Government of National Unity has adopted economic policies intended to foster more balanced trade relations with neighboring states. South Africa now seeks to coordinate its trade and economic policies with those of other SADC member-states in order to "encourage...industrial development throughout the region, in an effort to develop the capacity of its neighbors to export manufactured goods to South African markets." Consistent with this objective, the South African government has actively directed a number of foreign investments away from its own economy into those of other Southern African states.

The basis of South Africa's economic power is an industrial infrastructure that dominates the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. The country's manufacturing industries include automobile assembly, metalworking, machinery and textiles fabrication, iron and steel production, as well as chemicals, fertilizers, and foodstuffs. These represent unique capabilities in a region where agriculture and production of raw materials are the mainstays of most national economies. South Africa's fully developed military-technical base is also unique in Sub-Saharan Africa. Its parastatal Armaments Corporation (ARMSCOR) and largely privatized subsidiaries provide South Africa with an indigenous military research,
development, and production capability. The arms industry is also one of the nation's leading exporters of manufactured goods and annually earns substantial amounts of foreign exchange for South Africa.\textsuperscript{105}

The South African transportation and communications systems are also the most well developed in Sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa possesses 23,000 of the region's 42,000 kilometers of railways lines; 58,000 of its 87,000 kilometers of paved roads; and 5.1 million of its 6 million motor vehicles. South Africa alone generates 75 per cent of Sub-Saharan Africa's total electrical capacity, and its ports annually handle a tonnage of cargo 16 times greater than that handled by all others in the region combined.\textsuperscript{106}

The economies of many Southern African nations are dependent on access to South Africa's transportation system, particularly its rail and port network. (The sub-regional rail and port network is depicted by the map at Figure 2.) Copper and other mineral exports from the DRC, Zimbabwe, and Zambia must exit through South Africa and Mozambique's ports, or take a longer, more costly, and less reliable route through to Tanzania, whose poorly functioning ports are often clogged with traffic. Mozambique is the only other Southern African country that can easily export goods through its own ports, which are managed by South Africa technicians.\textsuperscript{107}

Finally, South Africa possesses the largest reserves, and is a leading producer, of a variety of strategically and industrially important minerals. South Africa's reserves of chrome ore, vanadium, and andalusite comprise the largest found in any single country.\textsuperscript{108} South Africa also has the largest reserves of manganese ore and accounts for 80 percent of known world reserves located outside of Russia and China.\textsuperscript{109} South Africa is the world's
leading producer of alumino-silicates, chrome ore, ferrochromium, gold, platinum group metals, vanadium, and vermiculite. (South African mineral reserves and production statistics are at Table 3.)

Conclusion

South Africa has clearly emerged as Sub-Saharan Africa’s pivotal state. South Africa is the only major country in Sub-Saharan Africa making a transition to democracy. While this transition is far from complete, it already provides an example of peaceful political change for the entire region. The Government of National Unity has promulgated a new constitution and Western-style governing institutions firmly based on the concept of the rule of law. At the same time, it has undertaken an aggressive national Reconstruction and Development Program intended to ameliorate the continuing social and economic effects of apartheid. The objectives of this program include a more equitable distribution of wealth and social services, and the productive development of South Africa’s vast human potential.

South Africa has also ended its long period of political isolation. The country’s new government aspires to a position of regional political leadership, as well as one of influence in international organizations. One of its primary foreign policy objectives is to bring about the greater political and economic integration of the Southern African sub-region. This envisions the development of economic linkages through the SADC and the creation of regional conflict resolution and peacekeeping mechanisms.

Despite resource constraints, South Africa’s armed forces remain the most powerful in Sub-Saharan Africa. The new SANDF has completed the integration of former SADF
personnel with those drawn from anti-apartheid and “homelands” military forces, and has emerged as a non-racial professional military organization. Most significantly, the SANDF appears to have developed a Western military ethos of constitutional loyalty and subordination to civilian political control.

Economically, South Africa has no regional peer competitor. Its economy is more technologically developed and diversified than any other in Sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa’s industrial infrastructure, including its military-technical base, is unique in the region. South Africa is the dominant source of manufactured goods for most of the countries in the Southern African sub-region and its transportation system plays an important role in the area’s economy. The Government of National Unity has declared its intention to redress the asymmetrical trade flows between South Africa and its neighbors; South Africa’s powerful economy is now likely play a major role in spurring growth throughout Southern African sub-region.

South Africa’s stability and continued development are now of vital importance to the peace and prosperity of Sub-Saharan Africa. They are also of great importance to the United States. As the following chapter will demonstrate, South Africa and the Southern African sub-region are the focus of the majority of United States national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa.
CHAPTER 2

UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS IN

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

National leaders are guided in their decisions concerning international relations by values that they and their people hold important to their national well-being. These values, or aspirations, may be subsumed under the term “national interests.” These interests serve as the primary justification for state action and form the basis of a nation’s security strategy.¹¹⁰

United States policymakers have traditionally considered Sub-Saharan Africa to be, at best, of only peripheral strategic interest. Relations with Sub-Saharan African nations have always ranked low on the list of overall U.S. foreign policy interests, after those involving Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas.¹¹¹ Sub-Saharan Africa’s role in United States national security policy has fluctuated between episodic importance in times of East-West tensions to relative unimportance following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War.¹¹²

Since the end of the Cold War there has been no clearly defined consensus within the American foreign policy or national security communities concerning the nature of United States interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. This lack of consensus reflects an often ideologically-driven polarization between proponents of “minimalist” and “maximalist” approaches to United States policy for Africa.¹¹³ Neither approach provides a useful foundation for United States policy or regional strategy.
Conservative minimalists would argue that the United States has few, if any, interests in Sub-Saharan Africa after the Cold War.\textsuperscript{114} As one observer has written, "the implosion of the Soviet Union set America free to pursue its own interests in Africa -- and it found it did not have any."\textsuperscript{115} This approach tends to regard Africa's problems as insoluble, and dismisses continued United States engagement there as little more than "social work."\textsuperscript{116} Liberal maximalists, on the other hand, perceive a broad range of United States interests in Africa and throughout the developing world. Maximalist formulations of United States interests tend to include a wide variety of social, political, economic, environmental, and humanitarian concerns.\textsuperscript{117} These lists are usually so all-encompassing as to be of little practical use to policymakers.

This lack of consensus among policymakers results in a United States foreign policy for Africa that has been characterized as "unsteady and reactive, allowing events and crises to drive policy."\textsuperscript{118} If the United States is to have a coherent and effective policy and strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, both must be based on a rational assessment of its interests in the region.

From a realist perspective the United States has identifiable, but limited economic, political, and security interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most of these focus directly on the Republic of South Africa and the Southern African sub-region.
Economic Interests

United States economic interests in Sub-Saharan Africa reflect two factors: 1) Sub-Saharan Africa’s importance as a source of raw materials and 2) the region’s growing, though still limited, importance as an export market for U.S. goods and services.

The United States is Sub-Saharan Africa’s single largest market, accounting for nearly 17 percent of its exports. The value of U.S. imports from the region steadily increased to $15.2 billion in 1996, a 20 percent increase from 1995. The nature of United States trade with Sub-Saharan Africa reflects the region’s global role as a source of raw materials. Crude oil accounted for nearly 70 percent (10.5 billion) of the total value of U.S. imports from the region in 1996 (up from $8.4 billion in 1995). Nigeria was the leading Sub-Saharan African oil supplier to the United States ($5.5 billion), followed by Angola ($2.6 billion), Gabon ($1.9 billion), and the Republic of the Congo ($260 billion). Nigeria itself is the United States’ fifth leading oil supplier; Angola, Gabon, and the Congo rank among its top twenty suppliers of crude oil.

Sub-Saharan Africa also serves as a growing, though still limited, market for United States exports. In 1996, the export value of U.S. goods and services to Africa totaled $6.1 billion and supported approximately 100,000 American jobs. Two countries, South Africa and Nigeria, currently represent 62 percent of the total U.S. export market in Sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa alone accounts for about 50 percent of total United States exports to the region.

Between 1994 and 1996 the total value of United States exports to the Republic of South Africa grew from $2.17 billion to $3.1 billion. In 1996 the value of U.S. exports to
South Africa alone were nearly 29 percent greater than to the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union, nearly equaled those to Russia, and exceeded those to all of Eastern Europe. The value of U.S. imports from South Africa increased $300 million during the same period, from $2 billion to $2.3 billion.

**Political Interests**

Nelson Mandela’s election to the South African presidency was not only a turning point in that country’s history; it also marked the beginning of a new phase in United States relations with South Africa. In the early 1970s U.S.-South African relations began to be severely affected by South Africa’s racial policies. South Africa’s transition to majority rule has allowed the United States to reestablish full relations with Sub-Saharan Africa’s most powerful country, now unencumbered by the moral and political onus of apartheid.

The United States’ primary political interest in Sub-Saharan Africa is South Africa’s full transition to a non-racial democracy. South Africa provides an "object lesson for other African states that the reconciliation of fundamental issues is possible without recourse to violence." Its full transition to a non-racial, multiparty democracy is "at or near the top of the list" of United States political interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. United States policymakers also believe that post-apartheid South Africa can serve both as a “bridge” between the West and the non-aligned movement and as an engine of regional economic growth, particularly in Southern Africa.
Security Interests

United States security interests in Sub-Saharan Africa include the maintenance of stability in the region, access to its strategic minerals, and the security of its contiguous sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

REGIONAL STABILITY

Instability, defined here as significant levels of interstate or intrastate violence, is caused by a variety of factors in the Sub-Saharan Africa strategic environment. Primary among them is the nature of many Sub-Saharan African political regimes which are either unwilling or unable to equitably distribute resources and services to their citizens. Social conditions associated with Sub-Saharan African political and economic regimes also contribute to regional instability. The cumulative effects of these conditions produce a range of transnational threats which include unconstrained immigration, refugee flows, spread of disease, and potential conflicts over diminishing natural resources and food supplies. Maintenance of regional stability constitutes the primary United States security interest in Sub-Saharan Africa. In essence, stability sets the conditions for protection of all other U.S. interests in the region.

STRATEGIC MINERALS

The United States is dependent on Sub-Saharan African nations, particularly South Africa, as a source of strategic minerals. Strategic minerals are defined as those that,
"(A) would be needed to supply the military, industrial, and essential civilian needs of the United States during a national emergency and (B) are not found or produced in the United States in sufficient quantities to meet such needs." The United States most important mineral imports from Sub-Saharan Africa are chromium, cobalt, manganese, and platinum group metals.

Between 1993 and 1996, 44 percent of U.S. chromium requirements were met by imports from Sub-Saharan Africa (37 percent from South Africa, seven percent from Zimbabwe). During this same period Sub-Saharan Africa provided the United States with 19 percent of its cobalt (all from Zambia), 44 percent of its manganese (28 percent from South Africa, 16 percent from Gabon), and 82 percent of its imports of platinum group metals (all from South Africa). All have critical direct or indirect military applications (see Appendix A).

SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION

The United States also has an interest in the security of regional sea lines of communication. The Department of Defense publication National Security and the Convention on the Law of the Sea designates eight geographical regions as "U.S. lifelines and transit regions. Among these are the Western Indian Ocean area including the Suez Canal, Bab el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, the Mozambique Channel, and the Southern Cape Route. (Lifelines and transit regions are depicted at Figure 9) The Southern Cape Route is used for the transit of trade on which the West depends for economic growth. An estimated 40 percent of U.S. oil imports reach the United States from the Middle East via the
Southern Cape Route.\textsuperscript{138} Fully 60 percent of Europe's oil imports and 25 percent of its food supplies pass around the Cape.\textsuperscript{139} While there is no immediate threat to the security of the Cape Sea Route, it would become of even greater importance to the United States in the event of disruption of shipping through the Suez Canal.\textsuperscript{140}

Conclusion

The United States has clearly identifiable, limited national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. With the exception of overall regional stability and Nigerian oil supplies, the focus of these interests is the Republic of South Africa and the Southern African Sub-region. These interests -- South Africa's transition to democracy, continued U.S. access to strategic minerals, the security of U.S. economic interests, and the security of sea lines of communication -- provide the rational basis for a United States policy and strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa founded on engagement with South Africa as the region's pivotal state. As Chapter Three will demonstrate, South Africa also provides the United States its greatest opportunity for fruitful engagement in terms of the overall Sub-Saharan African strategic environment.
CHAPTER 3
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Africa is the world’s second largest continent. Its 11.7 million square miles comprise
over one-fifth of the earth’s surface, as much as the land areas of the United States, Western
Europe, China, and India combined.\textsuperscript{141} Geographers divide Africa into nine distinct
geographical regions: the Maghreb, the Sahara, the Nile Valley, West Africa, the Congo
Basin, the Eastern Horn, East Africa, Southern Africa, and Malagasy.\textsuperscript{142} (Sub-Saharan
African geographical regions are depicted at Figure 10.) Africa is further divided both
physically and culturally by the vast expanse of the Sahara Desert. With an area of over three
million square miles the Sahara is the world’s largest desert and covers over a quarter of the
African continent.\textsuperscript{143} The barrier posed by the Sahara has historically served to differentiate
North Africa (the Maghreb and the northern portion of the Nile Valley) -- with its proximity
to Europe and cultural and religious links to the Middle East -- from Sub-Saharan or “Black”
Africa to the south.

Politically, most of the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa are the products of European
colonialism. European exploration and colonization of Africa began with the Portuguese
voyages of discovery during the 15th Century and reached its zenith in the “scramble for
Africa during the late 19th Century.\textsuperscript{144} This historical process reached its culmination
following the Second World War when changing international norms concerning colonialism
led to a global movement toward decolonization.\textsuperscript{145}
The end of the colonial period left Sub-Saharan Africa demarcated into 48 separate states. In many cases national boundaries had been arbitrarily imposed by former colonial powers with little or no concern for ethnic composition. The small size and limited resources of many of the states formed in this manner continue to discourage both efficient production and foreign investment. As it now exists Sub-Saharan Africa, with an aggregate population of over 600 million people who speak a thousand different languages, is one of the most fragmented regions in the world. The Sub-Saharan African strategic environment is generally characterized by dysfunction political and economic regimes and their attendant social conditions.

**Political Regimes**

The colonial period had long-term political implications for Sub-Saharan Africa. Most European colonies in Africa were demarcated with the assumption that they would not become separate, independent states. Hardly anywhere in Sub-Saharan Africa did colonial boundaries coincide with the territorial limits of indigenous populations. This process effectively destroyed the region’s previously existing ethnically-based political institutions. As the result, Sub-Saharan Africa has a state system imposed from abroad that does not reflect the region’s ethnic realities.

Most Sub-Saharan African states gained their independence during the 1960s. These new nations emerged into the bipolar international system of the Cold War. Competition between the United States and the Soviet Union produced both assistance and, to a limited extent, influence for these new African governments during this period. As long as African
states were supported by one of the two superpowers, actual methods of governance were generally of little consequence. Many of these new African states developed political regimes characterized by corruption, personal rule by “big men” rather than the rule of law, and widespread abuse of human rights.

In the early 1990s, changes in the international system appeared to create a climate supportive of democratization is Sub-Saharan Africa. These included the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of Cold War competition, the end of apartheid rule in South Africa, and the determination of many Western governments to link developmental aid to political and economic reforms. These external influences were complimented by perceived changes in the nature of many African political regimes. The “big men” who had ruled most Sub-Saharan African states during the immediate post-colonial period were now perceived as being replaced by a new generation of leaders believed to be more favorably disposed toward democracy and capitalism. “Africa,” one observer has written, “entered the 1990s in a mood of hope and expectation” concerning anticipated political and economic reforms.

Since 1990 elections have taken place in 40 of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 48 countries. In addition to South Africa, peaceful governmental successions have taken place in Namibia, Cape Verde, the Comoros, Mali, Mauritius, the island nation of Sao Tome and Principe, Malawi, and Mozambique (the last two having had one-party state traditions since their independence). Many optimistic observers believed that this apparent wave of democratic reform would quickly lead to the solution of Sub-Saharan Africa’s wide range of economic and ethnic problems.
Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa has not realized these expectations. Democratic reform in the region has had mixed results and now faces an uncertain future.\textsuperscript{157} Even in many of the countries where elections have taken place, it is doubtful that they have much advanced the democratic process.\textsuperscript{158} Most attempts to introduce Western-style democracy have created problems for both leaders and voters with no experience of operating in open and competitive political systems.\textsuperscript{159} Political liberalization, rather than democratization, better describes what has taken place in most of Africa. This condition refers simply to the relaxation of government controls on the political activities of citizens. It is characterized by: 1) an increase in freedoms of expression and of the press; 2) a tolerance for organized political oppositions; and 3) greater protection of persons and property against arbitrary action by the state.\textsuperscript{160}

Most of the elections which have taken place in Sub-Saharan African nations during the past decade appear to have had little more than symbolic importance. Opposition political parties in many of these nations have maintained that the practice of multiparty politics is a sham, largely devised to placate Western donors who now impose political conditions on aid.\textsuperscript{161} Analysis of election results in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990 reveals that in over half of the elections held during the decade (21) the electoral process has only served to legitimize the power of entrenched rulers. Countries in which this has happened include Botswana, Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Seychelles, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. (Appendix B provides a summary of Sub-Saharan African political regimes and election results).
Election results in four Sub-Saharan African countries have been invalidated by civil war or military coups. United Nations-supervised elections in Angola did not bring an end to the civil war that has wracked the country since its independence. Democratically-elected governments in Burundi and Sierra Leone were overthrown by military coups in 1996. In October 1997 Congolese President Pascal Lissouba was driven into exile after a four month civil war.

The "democratic" nature of elections in Tanzania and Benin is open to question. Benjamin William Mkapa was elected to the Tanzanian presidency with 62 percent of the vote on 22 November 1995. While Mkapa's election ostensibly ended thirty years of one-party rule all opposition candidates withdrew from the election because of alleged "irregularities." In Benin Mathieu Kerekou was elected to the presidency on 4 April 1996. General Kerekou had previously ruled Benin for 17 years as head of a one-party regime which came to power through a military coup on 26 October 1972.

At least two Sub-Saharan African countries, Liberia and Somalia, have no functioning government. Two others, Swaziland and Lesotho, are monarchies. Eritrea remains under a transitional government pending promulgation of a constitution. In the Central African Republic (CAR) Ange Patasse was elected to the presidency on 22 October 1993. The CAR remains mired in an intractable civil war; order in the country is maintained by an African peacekeeping force. In Rwanda President Pasteur Bizumungu was forcibly installed by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan patriotic Front on 19 July 1994. In Zambia Frederick Chiluba was elected to his second term as president on 18 November 1996. Chiluba was first elected in 1991 over Kenneth Kaunda, who had ruled Zambia since 1964.
Kaunda was subsequently charged with planning a coup to overthrow Chiluba; he and 90 of his supporters were initially detained without trial and Chiluba imposed a national “state of emergency” which remained in effect until March 1998. Chiluba has stated that he will not hesitate to declare a state of emergency again if there are “threats to peace” in Zambia.¹⁶⁹

Of Sub-Saharan Africa’s three most potentially powerful countries -- South Africa, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire) -- only South Africa is currently making a transition toward democracy. Both Nigeria and the DRC remain under the rule of dictatorial regimes. Oil-rich Nigeria has been ruled by General Sani Abacha since 17 November 1993 when he declared himself head of state and chief of an 11-member Provisional Ruling Council. Abacha now serves simultaneously as Chairman and Minister of Defense of the country’s Executive Council, which he established in March 1995.¹⁷⁰ The DRC has been under the one-man rule of General Laurent Kabila. On 17 May 1997 Kabila forced Mobutu Sese Seko, who had ruled Zaire since 1965, into exile and immediately assumed sole governing authority in the country, personally appointing all members of a national cabinet responsible only to him.¹⁷¹

It is unclear, however, whether the immediate emergence of democracy would be of any real benefit to either Nigeria or the DRC. In addition to an autocratic government, Nigeria suffers from widespread corruption and economic inefficiency as well as deeply rooted ethnic and political conflicts which threaten its continued existence as a unitary state.¹⁷² In the DRC it will probably take at least a generation to overcome the residual effects of Mobutu’s rule, were Kabila to grant political freedoms.
Political trends have resulted in the differentiation of three groups of states in Sub-Saharan Africa: 1) a small group of states which are functioning democracies; 2) those that are not politically liberal but where the social order has been maintained; and 3) those where the social order has completely broken down as the result of civil war or social unrest. The states in this last group -- Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and the DRC -- constitute about one-fifth of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{173}

**Economic Regimes**

Upon gaining their independence, most Sub-Saharan African nations adopted heavily statist economic regimes characterized by high levels of protectionism and public ownership. For the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries' their strongest economic links remain to their former European colonial rulers, for whom they remain sources of relatively inexpensive raw materials and virtually guaranteed export markets for manufactured goods.\textsuperscript{174} On the whole, such policies have failed to deliver sustained increases in prosperity to the peoples of Sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{175}

By most standards, Sub-Saharan Africa's economic performance is worse than that of any other developing region.\textsuperscript{176} Sub-Saharan Africa contains 11 percent of the world's developing countries and 16 percent of the developing world's poor.\textsuperscript{177} The distribution of the region's aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) of $787.62 billion ranges from $227 billion for South Africa to $1.5 million for Sao Tome and Principe. (Regional economic statistics are at Table 2).
The population of Sub-Saharan Africa remains among the poorest in the world; an estimated 45 to 50 percent live below the international poverty line.\textsuperscript{178} The average annual income, stated as per capita GDP, in Sub-Saharan Africa is $1,494.00. Factoring out the island nations of Mauritius ($10,300 per year) and Seychelles ($6,000 per year), this figure drops to $1,204.67. Distribution ranges from $5,400 in South Africa and Gabon to $400 in Rwanda and the DRC (see Table 2). (By contrast, per capita distribution of GDP in the United States is $28,600.00.)\textsuperscript{179} Some observers estimate that by the year 2000, as many as 43 percent of Sub-Saharan Africans will be existing on incomes of less than $350 per year.\textsuperscript{180}

Sub-Saharan African economies are heavily dependent on agriculture and extractive industries, such as mining and oil production. Africa’s annual $65 billion in exports consists primarily of raw materials such as oil, agricultural goods, timber, and minerals. The composition of Africa production and exports has changed little in past decades, with the share of raw materials about the same as it was thirty years ago.\textsuperscript{181} Agriculture is the largest private sector in the Sub-Saharan African economy. It accounts for 30 to 35 percent of the region’s aggregate GDP, and provides employment for 70 percent of the labor force. Furthermore, an estimated 70 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's poor live in rural areas and are dependent on agriculture and agriculture-related activities for their livelihood.\textsuperscript{182}

Production and development of both fuel and nonfuel mineral resource also constitute a significant part of the economies of many Sub-Saharan African nations. Historically, the region has been a major supplier of strategic and economic minerals to the United States and world markets. Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for between 11 and 45 percent of the world
supply of major mineral commodities, to include chromite, cobalt, diamond, gold, manganese ore, crude petroleum, phosphate, and uranium. ¹⁸³

With the exception of South Africa, transportation and communications infrastructures throughout Sub-Saharan Africa remain poorly developed. Most of the region's road and rail systems date from the colonial era. These were designed primarily to provide a means of transporting commodities to ports for export. As depicted by the map at Figure 11, the region's railways do not exist as a network or system of interconnecting lines across national boundaries. Most of the ports they service were originally designed as general cargo ports for handling small vessels and are inadequate by contemporary standards. The Sub-Saharan Africa road network is also poorly developed; most of the region's key markets are not linked by modern highways. ¹⁸⁴ (Regional road network depicted at Figure 12.)

The current economic crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa has been characterized as one of production. There is great wealth in Africa, but it is usually acquired through trade rather than productive investment. Most Sub-Saharan African countries, even those which are well-endowed with natural resources, do not possess a productive basis for sustained economic development. Largely dependent on a fragile export economy, their economic well-being is dependent on world market conditions and, increasingly, foreign aid. ¹⁸⁵ The principal exception to regional economic conditions is found in South Africa, whose fully industrialized economy provides the nation with a basis for sustained productive development.
Social Conditions

Political and economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa effects, and is effected by, a series of social conditions which compare unfavorably with those in other developing areas. These include rampant population growth, food shortages and malnutrition, endemic disease, and environmental degradation.

POPULATION GROWTH

Sub-Saharan Africa’s population, estimated at 603 million, is growing at an annual rate of 2.69 percent.\textsuperscript{186} The birth rate has remained high because the regional fertility rate (the average number of births per woman) remains exceptionally high, at more than six.\textsuperscript{187} (The United States, by comparison, has a population growth rate of .89 percent and a fertility rate of 2.06 births per woman.)\textsuperscript{188} The rate of population increase in Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to remain steady, with only a slight decline in the growth rate (by 0.1 percent) by 2000. This will result in a population of about 645 million by the end of the century. By 2025, the region’s population could more than double to 1.2 billion.\textsuperscript{189} (Regional population statistics are at Table 1.)

Population growth relative to the limited and often fragile resource base is both a cause and a consequence of poverty. The high population growth rate is likely to offset any reductions in poverty, since the rate of population increase among the poor tends to be higher than among the more affluent. The increase in the labor force resulting from overall increases in population, especially the high proportion of young people, will place considerable strain on the labor market unless there is a substantial increase in employment
opportunities. Thus, while poverty in Africa is primarily a rural phenomenon, urban poverty driven by high unemployment is also becoming a growing and potentially explosive problem.

Projected population increases in Sub-Saharan Africa will also place additional demands on the region’s natural resource base and challenge the ability of governments to provide even minimal social services. In fact, the ability of most Sub-Saharan African governments to provide adequate social services for their populations is already extremely limited. This is reflected in regional infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy rates (see Table 1). Infant mortality and life expectancy rates indicate both the overall level of public health and sanitation, as well as the quality and general availability of health services. The average infant mortality rate for Sub-Saharan Africa is 131.4 deaths per 1,000 live births, and the average life expectancy at birth is 50.9 years. (Comparable figures for the United States are 6.55 deaths per thousand live births and a life expectancy of 76.04 years.)

Immunization of children against life-threatening diseases such as diphtheria and measles reached a peak of 54 percent in 1990 and now appears to be declining.

Literacy rates provide a measure of a population’s overall educational level. High educational levels are accompanied by an increased availability of technical skills essential for modern industrial operations. Because freedom of information is generally considered to be a characteristic of democratic governance, literacy levels are directly linked to political participation. A overall regional literacy rate of approximately 54.6 percent reflects the level of education and potential for meaningful political participation throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank estimates that only 59 percent of Sub-Saharan African
males, and 36 percent of females, are considered to be literate.\textsuperscript{195} (The United States enjoys a literacy rate of 97 percent for both males and females.)\textsuperscript{196}

**FOOD SHORTAGES**

Many Sub-Saharan African nations are incapable of producing enough food to feed their populations.\textsuperscript{197} South Africa is the only Sub-Saharan African nation which regularly produces an agricultural surplus.\textsuperscript{198} Agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa increased by about 1.6 percent annually between 1965 and 1980, and by about 1.3 percent per year from 1980 through 1990. During the same period, the region’s population continued to grow at a steady 2.8 to three percent per year. Although there has been a constant increase in levels of food imports (185 percent between 1974 and 1990), many people in Sub-Saharan Africa do not obtain an adequate supply of food. Average daily caloric intake is estimated at about 90 percent of the minimum required to maintain health and economic productivity. The gap between food requirements and availability is certain to grow if historical trends in production and consumption continue.\textsuperscript{199}

**DISEASE**

It is difficult to overstate the effects of disease on the lives of the people of Sub-Saharan Africa. Of all the world’s population groups, Africans have the least chance of survival to the age of five. After that, the effects of malnutrition and disease begin to take a serious toll. The range of life-threatening diseases endemic to Sub-Saharan Africa includes HIV/AIDS, drug resistant strains of tuberculosis and malaria, and otherwise normally
preventable illnesses such as measles and infectious diarrhea caused by typhoid and cholera. Sub-Saharan Africa is also the origin of so-called “hot zone” diseases such as the Ebola virus. \(^{200}\)

In addition to its human costs, the prevalence of disease in Sub-Saharan Africa significantly effects economic development. A regional HIV/AIDS epidemic is creating new pockets of poverty in the region, particularly as survivors sell off assets, surviving children lose time in school to compensate for labor shortages, and the amount of land under cultivation is reduced or even abandoned.\(^{201}\) Since HIV was first documented in 1983 more than 16 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa have become infected with the disease, constituting over two-thirds of the world’s recorded cases.\(^{202}\) United Nations estimates place the current number of Sub-Saharan Africans with AIDS or HIV infection at 14 million, 63 percent of the world’s reported cases.\(^{203}\) The incidence of AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to triple by 2005.\(^{204}\)

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

Environmental degradation is widespread throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, often resulting from intense internal and external pressures for rapid economic development coupled with many Africa countries’ reliance on extractive industries.\(^{205}\) Deforestation, at a rate of about nine million acres per year, has had a particularly deleterious impact on African eco-systems, destroying watersheds and further reducing limited water supplies. Unconstrained population growth and rapid urbanization have also created problems of air and water pollution, waste disposal, and sewage that are expected to intensify.\(^{206}\)
Until recently, one of the often overlooked aspects of environmental degradation has been the effect of large-scale use of land mines in Sub-Saharan Africa. An estimated 20-30 million land mines have been deployed in at least 18 African states. These continue to kill at least 12 thousand people annually, and to injure thousands more. In addition to the human costs, minefields also detract from development, particularly in rural areas where they make farmland unusable.\textsuperscript{207}

Conclusion

The Sub-Saharan African strategic environment offers the United States few opportunities for meaningful engagement. While regional political trends do indicate some degree of political liberalization, the majority of Sub-Saharan African nations remain under authoritarian rule. There appears to be no widespread regional movement toward either democratization or the development of governing structures based on the rule of law.

Economically, most Sub-Saharan African nations lack a basis for sustained development. Most of these countries are, and are likely to remain, producers and exporters of raw materials rather than manufacturers of exported goods. Political and economic development in the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries continues to be hampered by a variety of social conditions which compare unfavorably with those in other developing areas. These include rampant population growth, food shortages, disease, and environmental degradation.

South Africa represents the principal exception to trends in the Sub-Saharan African strategic environment. It is not only the region's most powerful state; it is also one of its few
functioning democracies and the only state in the region with the capacity for sustained self-development. While social conditions in South Africa may be somewhat similar to those in the rest of the region its government has both the organizational capacity and, to some extent, the resources to develop programs for their remediation. As Chapter Four will demonstrate, South Africa’s unique position in the region is reflected, at least implicitly, in United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa.
CHAPTER 4

UNITED STATES POLICY
FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Sub-Saharan Africa has traditionally been of only peripheral strategic interest to the United States. There is now, however, a substantial body of evidence which suggests that the region has assumed greater importance for U.S. policymakers. Over the last five years a new United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa has emerged in which bilateral relations with post-apartheid South Africa play a preeminent role. This policy, however, is not fully articulated in the form of a single, comprehensive policy document. The tenets of United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa remain diffuse and must be gleaned from a variety of sources. These include: 1) broad policy statements contained in the 1994-1997 editions of the United States National Security Strategy; 2) statements by U.S. policymakers; 3) policy-related documents released by the State Department; and 4) the first two annual versions of the Clinton Administration’s trade and development policy for Sub-Saharan Africa.

This chapter presents an analysis of U.S. policy for Sub-Saharan Africa. First, it places United States African policy in the context of evolving United States national security policy and the post-Cold War strategic environment. It then traces the emergence of a new U.S. policy for Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, it draws a series of conclusions concerning the objectives of this policy and its relationship to U.S. national security policy as a whole.
United States National Security Strategy

The United States Constitution unambiguously confers on the executive branch of government the preponderance of responsibility for managing the nation’s foreign relations.²¹⁰ The President bears the ultimate responsibility for defining the national interests and objectives which serve as the basis of U.S. foreign policy.²¹¹ The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 requires each administration to publish an annual National Security Strategy which identifies those interests and objectives, and which establishes a grand strategy for their attainment.²¹²

The underlying concept of the Clinton Administration’s grand strategy has generally been that of “democratic enlargement.”²¹³ The principles of democratic enlargement were first publicly articulated by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake in a speech at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies on 21 September 1993. According to Lake the objective of democratic enlargement, the successor to the Cold War doctrine of containment, was the “enlargement...of the world’s free community of market economies.” This strategy had four subsidiary goals: 1) to “strengthen the community of market democracies;” 2) to “foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies where possible;” 3) to “counter aggression and support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy;” and 4) to “help democracy and market economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.”²¹⁴

Six days later, in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton indicated that democratic engagement had become the basis of United States strategy. “During the Cold War,” he said, “we sought to contain a threat to [the] survival of free
institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions.”

This strategy was formally articulated in the 1994 National Security Strategy. “Our national security strategy,” it stated, “is based on enlarging the community of market economies while deterring and containing a wide range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests.” This strategy was based on three “central components:” 1) enhancing United States security “by maintaining a strong defense capability and promoting cooperative security measures;” 2) opening foreign markets and spurring global economic growth; and 3) “promotion of democracy abroad.” In addition to more traditional security concerns, enlargement recognized the potentially destabilizing effects of a series of “non-traditional” transnational threats. These included terrorism, environmental degradation, rapid population growth, and refugee flows. This formulation of democratic enlargement remained consistent through the editions of the National Security Strategy published in 1995 and 1996.

Democratic enlargement had more of a “geoeconomic” than “geopolitical” foundation, with free trade at its center. Editions of the National Security Strategy published between 1994 and 1996 maintained that United States “economic and security interests are increasingly inseparable.” Democratization abroad was directly linked to U.S. economic interests. “Broad-based economic development not only improves the prospects for democratic development in developing countries, but also expands the demands for U.S. exports.”
Included in the strategy of democratic enlargement was the concept of “selective engagement.” “Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most relevant to our own interests and focusing our resources where we can make the most difference.” 224 This was a rejection of the more expansive view that the United States was duty-bound to promote constitutional democracy and human rights everywhere. 225 “The core of our strategy is to help democracy and markets expand where we have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest difference. This is not a democratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to see freedom take hold where that helps us most.” 226

Democratic enlargement was thus to focus on areas of primary U.S. strategic and economic interests. 227 The United States would also seek greater engagement with “states whose entering into the camp of market democracies may influence the future of an entire region.” 228 Editions of the National Security Strategy for 1994 and 1995 included both Nigeria and South Africa in this category; that for 1996 included only South Africa. 229

The 1997 National Security Strategy seems to have abandoned the strategy of democratic enlargement for a more realistic one of “leadership and engagement.” The United States, it says, “must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors.” The U.S. must also have “the demonstrated will and capabilities” to exert global leadership and to remain “the preferred security partner for the community of states that share our interests.” 230

While eschewing the term “national interests,” the National Security Strategy sets its goal as the protection of the United States “fundamental and enduring needs.” These it lists as the physical security of American citizens, maintenance of national sovereignty, and
national prosperity. It also identified three “core” national objectives intended to satisfy these needs: “to enhance our security with effective diplomacy and...military forces;...to bolster America’s prosperity; [and] to promote democracy abroad.”

The 1997 National Security Strategy defines three categories of threats to United States security. These are: 1) traditional “regional or state-centered threats to...our vital interests” (which are not further identified); 2) “transnational threats” such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, organized crime, refugee flows, and environmental degradation; and 3) “threats from weapons of mass destruction” posed by state or non-state actors. In order to counter these threats the United States will pursue broad “integrated approaches” to its security strategy. These focus on “shaping the international environment to prevent or deter conflict;” responding “across the full range of potential crises” up to theater-level war; and preparing for future challenges.

In terms of its other core objectives -- bolstering American prosperity and promoting democracy -- this strategy retains some of the features earlier associated with democratic enlargement. United States economic and security interests, it states, “are inextricably linked.” It also maintains the linkage between democratization and economic development. “Sustainable development improves the prospects for democracy in developing countries and expands the demand for U.S. exports.” United States support for democratization is “not only just, but pragmatic.” Essentially repeating the 1994-1997 editions of the National Security Strategy, that for 1997 states that the United States remains "particularly attentive" to the development of democracy and market economies in those
states who “may influence the future direction of an entire region; South Africa now holds that potential with regard to Sub-Saharan Africa.”

All four editions of the National Security Strategy published between 1994 and 1997 reflect a high degree of continuity concerning the identification of United States objectives for Sub-Saharan Africa. The national security strategies for 1994 and 1995 (two of the three based on democratic enlargement) stated, “Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, the [sic] U.S. policy seeks to help support democracy, sustain economic development, and resolution of conflicts through negotiations, diplomacy, and peacekeeping.” The 1996 edition of the National Security Strategy reported that United States policy had successfully supported such developments throughout the region.

The 1997 National Security Strategy, which articulates the basis of “leadership and engagement,” retains the concept of integrated regional approaches for policy implementation. It begins its discussion of such an integrated regional approach to Africa by enumerating the threats which emanate from the continent. These it lists as state-sponsored terrorism, narcotics trafficking, international crime, environmental degradation, disease, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It defines the overall United States regional objective as the creation of a “stable, economically dynamic Africa.” This objective “will be impossible to achieve until Africa is fully integrated into the global economy.” The United States’ aim, therefore, “is to assist African nations to implement economic reforms, create favorable climates for trade and investment, and to achieve sustainable development.”
While further integration of Africa into the global economy will have political and economic benefits for the people of Africa, it is also expected to directly serve United States interests by expanding export markets. "The more than 600 million people of Sub-Saharan Africa...represent one of the world’s leading remaining untapped markets....Increasing both the U.S. market share and the size of the African market will bring tangible benefits to U.S. workers and create wealth in Africa." 243

Finally, the National Security Strategy directly links economic and political reforms. "In Africa, as elsewhere, democracies have proven more peaceful, stable, and reliable partners and more likely to pursue sound economic policies. We will [therefore] continue to work to...broaden the growing circle of African democracies." 244

The Strategic Context

During the Cold War U.S. security policy in Africa, as elsewhere, was driven by perceptions of the Soviet threat. United States "policies toward Africa were...determined not by how they affected Africa, but whether [they] brought advantage or disadvantage to Washington or Moscow." 245 For U.S. policymakers Africa represented a "zero-sum game" in which denying Soviet influence in the region subsumed all other policy interests. 246

United States relations with the Republic of South Africa during this period reflected a conflicting amalgam of ideological and practical concerns. Ideologically, South Africa’s apartheid government was an embarrassment to the United States. Formally committed to racial equality at home, the United States Government had an interest in the creation of a pro-Western, non-racial democracy in South Africa. 247 These ideological concerns, however,
were offset by the more immediate requirement to deny Soviet influence in Africa and to protect vital strategic interests in the region.

To the Soviets, apartheid represented a golden opportunity to advance their own interests in Africa. Newly independent African states and "liberation movements" sought Soviet aid in their struggles against white minority rule not only in South Africa, but also in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Angola, and Mozambique. In the context of the Cold War, the United States perceived Soviet involvement in Africa as a threat to American economic and strategic interests in the region. The latter were usually defined as access to strategic minerals and security of the sea lines of communication around the Cape of Good Hope. In order to offset Soviet influence in Africa, particularly in Angola and Mozambique, and to safeguard its perceived interests in the region the United States afforded varying degrees of accommodation and cooperation to South Africa well into the 1980s.248

In the post-Cold War reassessment of U.S. global interests there was no immediate consensus within the national security community concerning the importance of Sub-Saharan Africa. Many policymakers maintained that the collapse of the Soviet Union, coupled with the apparent movement of socialist regimes in Africa toward multiparty democracy and private enterprise, had eliminated the chief threats to American interests on the continent. At a time when the United States confronted both domestic economic problems and crises in other parts of the world, they argued, Africa should be at the bottom of the remaining superpowers' list of international priorities.249

Opponents of this view held that unless the United States took decisive action in Africa to bring escalating political unrest, ethnic conflict, and sectarian strife under control
the resulting instability would eventually jeopardize Western access to the region’s raw materials and military facilities. While these resources were not immediately essential to the United States continued, unchecked violence in Africa could eventually undermine the economic and military strength of both the U.S. and its European and Asian allies.\textsuperscript{250}

This failure to reach consensus resulted in a lack of policy focus. American policymakers neither displayed consistent interest in Africa, nor did they seek to develop mechanisms to ensure regular consultation with a broad range of African leaders.\textsuperscript{251} Crises in Liberia and Somalia, and the domestically important issue of South African governance, were rare instances of U.S. attention being focused on the region during the immediate post-Cold War period.\textsuperscript{252}

The broad outlines of a new United States policy approach to Sub-Saharan Africa began to emerge in May 1993. In a speech to the African-American Institute, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that the United States sought a “new relationship with Africa...based upon our common interests and shared values.” The United States, said Christopher, “will provide strong and visible support for the movement to freedom in Africa...[and] it will work with the nations of Africa to address the health, economic, and population issues that threaten lives and imperil sustainable development.” As part of this new relationship the United States would also “help Africa build its capacity for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.”\textsuperscript{253}

Secretary Christopher’s speech was significant for two reasons. First, it signaled a marked departure from a United States policy approach to Africa which had generally been transient, media-driven, and focused on immediate humanitarian concerns.\textsuperscript{254} Of equal
importance, Christopher also indicated that the United States both desired and expected post-apartheid South Africa to play a major role in its new policy for Africa. This "new relationship," he added, would "be...reinforced once South Africa [had] moved from repression to democracy." 255

This shift in policy reflected the interaction of several factors. These included policymakers' changing perceptions of U.S. interests in the region; the perceived nature of political changes taking place in Sub-Saharan Africa itself; and the opportunity for engagement with South Africa presented by the impending end of apartheid.

With the end of the Cold War, United States interests in Sub-Saharan Africa could no longer be defined in terms of responses to a perceived Soviet threat. Support for specific African nations or leaders no longer constituted part of a larger global contest which at least implicitly required their alignment with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Loss of the Cold War paradigm initially presented U.S. policymakers with two fundamental choices regarding Africa: the United States could either disengage from the region entirely, or it could accept the burden of repeated, often open-ended commitments for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. The first option entailed at least a partial forfeiture of United States moral leadership in the post-Cold War international order. The second was unlikely to receive sustained support from either the United States Congress or the American public. Partially as a result of the American experience in Somalia, U.S. policymakers sought a third alternative, that of providing encouragement and material support for the development of indigenous African conflict resolution and peacekeeping mechanisms. This choice was directly tied to American policymakers perceptions of the changing nature of many African
political regimes. The “big men” who had ruled most Sub-Saharan African nations since the immediate post-colonial period were seen as being replaced by a new generation of leaders believed to be more favorably disposed toward democracy and capitalism.\(^{256}\)

Fundamental political changes had also begun to take place in South Africa. By the late 1980s, it had become clear to most responsible South African political leaders that apartheid was no longer a viable form of government. The social tensions generated by enforced segregation and the continued denial of full political rights to the majority of South Africans had created a nearly self-sustaining cycle of protest and violent repression. By 1989, the country had been driven to the brink of full-scale civil war. International opposition to apartheid had also left South Africa a “pariah state,” effectively isolated from the community of nations. United States relations with South Africa had become virtually one-dimensional, focused on the domestic oppression associated with apartheid. The United States Government had ceased to consult South Africa on many issues. Aspects of bilateral relations had been allowed to lapse; American trade and investment in South Africa were discouraged by sanctions; and the limited aid South Africa did receive from the United States was delivered only through non-governmental organizations.\(^{257}\)

In February 1990 State President F.W. de Klerk, who had only come to power in September 1989, began the process of dismantling apartheid. He “unbanned,” or legalized, anti-apartheid groups such as the African National Congress. This was quickly followed by Nelson Mandela’s release from 27 years of imprisonment. In December 1993, after a long series of negotiations, an interim constitution was promulgated into law which set the stage for the conduct of South Africa’s first non-racial elections the following year.\(^{258}\) The
impending transition to majority rule in South Africa allowed the United States to reestablish full relations with Sub-Saharan Africa's most powerful nation. It also provided the final impetus for development of a new United States policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.


Secretary of States Christopher's May 1993 speech was the first in a series of statements by United States policymakers which have served to define U.S. policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. President Clinton made his first major public statement concerning United States relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, specifically with South Africa, early in his administration.

On 5 May 1994, immediately following Nelson Mandela's election to the South African presidency, President Clinton announced that the United States Government would undertake a substantial effort to encourage American trade with, and investment in, South Africa. The President stated that "enabling the citizens of South Africa to reach their potential economically is critical to preserving...democracy" in that country. To this end, he announced an immediate aid increase of $60 million, raising the level of U.S. assistance to South Africa for that fiscal year from $83 million to $143 million. President Clinton also gave some indication of the role the United States expected post-apartheid South Africa to play in Sub-Saharan Africa. "I'm convinced," he said, "that South Africa can become a model for the entire continent."
President Clinton went on to describe the nature of United States interests in South Africa. “We have an economic interest in a thriving South Africa that will seek our exports and generate prosperity throughout the region. We have a security interest in a stable democratic South Africa working with its neighbors to restore and secure peace.” And, he concluded, the United States has a “clear moral interest” in the development of democracy in South Africa.\(^{260}\)

President Clinton’s speech set the tone not only for a new U.S. bilateral relationship with South Africa; it also provided the underpinnings for a new United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. For the past four years the linkage of democracy, economic development, and stability has consistently served as the basis for American policymakers’ statements concerning the region.

In October 1994, during President Mandela’s visit to Washington, President Clinton announced the formation of the U.S.-South African Binational Commission. Co-chaired by the Vice Presidents of both nations, the commission was established as a “top-down approach intended to restart a moribund relationship.”\(^{261}\) The commission was envisioned to meet four broad goals: 1) to promote the U.S.-South African bilateral relationship “through a working partnership at the highest levels of government;” 2) to enhance bilateral cooperation by “establishing permanent and vigorous institutional partnerships;” 3) to assist South Africa in meeting its reconstruction and development goals; and 4) to enhance the roles played by private investors and non-governmental organizations in strengthening relations between the two countries.\(^{262}\)
A year after the South African elections, Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown expressed a new American economic interest in Sub-Saharan Africa. In a May 1995 speech to the Third African/African-American Summit at Dakar, Senegal, Brown stated, "The United States no longer concedes Africa's markets to European suppliers." Referring to the pace of economic development in Asia and Latin America, Brown added, "Now it's Africa's turn, and America will be there, as a partner and staunch economic ally."263 A year later, in April 1996, the Clinton Administration published its first annual Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for the Countries of Africa, which presented a "comprehensive policy framework through which the United States will pursue its trade and development strategy with the 48 independent countries of Sub-Saharan Africa."264

The primary objective of this policy "is to work with the peoples and leaders of Africa in pursuit of increased trade and investment, and sustainable economic development."265 This policy statement also directly linked economic development and democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa to United States national interests:

Economic development in Africa will mean expanded trade with the United States. Resulting in economic growth and new jobs for Americans as well as for Africans. The continued development of democratic institutions in Africa will not only stabilize the environment for this economic growth but will also help counter forces that threaten U.S. security, such as terrorism, refugee flows, narcotics trafficking, humanitarian crises, and environmental degradation.266

This document also announced the establishment of the Africa Trade and Development Coordinating Group, "an interagency group to be co-chaired by the National Security Council and the National Economic Council."267 This group's ambitious mandate
was to coordinate and rationalize U.S. and multilateral trade, development, and aid programs for Sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{268}

In June 1996 President Clinton announced the creation of the Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa. The Partnership’s purpose is to “spur African nations to implement significant economic reforms to achieve sustainable growth and development.” By supporting African reform efforts, the Partnership seeks to create opportunities for U.S. companies to trade with and invest in Africa, create American jobs, and further “mutual prosperity.”\textsuperscript{269} Two months later the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs described the long-term goals of United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa as:

…support [for] African efforts to establish democratic institutions and governments; [to] help bring an end to the many conflicts and crises on the continent; [to] encourage sustainable economic growth, trade, and free markets; and [to] gain greater African participation in finding solutions to such transnational issues as narcotics trafficking, AIDS, and environmental degradation.\textsuperscript{270}

On 2 October 1996, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Africa Affairs released its \textit{U.S. Policy for a New Era in Sub-Saharan Africa}. This document defined five major United States policy goals for Sub-Saharan Africa, similar to those mentioned above. These were:

1) active support for regional efforts to develop mechanisms for conflict resolution and peaceful change; 2) support for the development of democratic political institutions; 3) support for sustainable economic development and reduced dependence on external aid; support for efforts to reduce a broad range of transnational threats (AIDS, environmental degradation, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, populations growth, and refugee flows); and 5)
support for efforts to create “smaller, more professional military forces clearly subordinate to civilian control and respectful of human rights.”

Four months later, in February 1997, the White House released the second iteration of its Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for the Countries of Africa, whose “primary goal...is to support sustainable development in the region and to quicken the pace of that development, which would boost U.S. trade and investment in Africa.” This document unambiguously stated the proposition that economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa “is manifestly in the U.S. national interest. Stronger economies in Sub-Saharan nations will contribute to social and political stability in Africa and create more export opportunities for U.S. goods and services and more jobs at home.” Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa would also “reduce costs to the U.S. of emergency humanitarian assistance as [these] countries become better equipped to manage their own emergencies.” This suggests that one of the major security goals of United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa is the development of indigenous capabilities that would relieve the U.S. of any future requirement to commit forces to the region.

More recently, on 12 March 1998 the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs stated that the United States “is pursuing two overarching policy goals in Africa. The first is to accelerate Africa’s full integration into the global economy.” The second is the protection of the United States and its citizens “from threats to our national security that emanate from Africa,” including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state-sponsored terrorism, international crime, environmental degradation, and disease.
Conclusion

Over the past five years, a new United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa has emerged in which bilateral relations with South Africa play a preeminent role. Determinants of this policy include changes in the post-Cold War international order, perceived changes in the nature of Sub-Saharan African political regimes, and, most importantly, the end of apartheid in South Africa. While this policy has not been articulated in the form of a single, comprehensive document, it is consistent with the declared tenets of United States national security policy and strategy.

Since 1994, declared United States national security strategy has tended toward a "geoeconomic" rather than a geopolitical focus. This is demonstrated by the consistent articulation of the tenets of "democratic enlargement" in the editions of the National Security Strategy published between 1994 and 1996. While the most recent (1997) edition adopts the more "realistic" strategy of "leadership and engagement," it still maintains certain features of democratic enlargement. These include the linkages between economics and broader national security interests and economic development and democratization. In terms of United States policy toward Africa, all four refer to South Africa as a state whose political and economic development "may influence the future direction of an entire region."

United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa is, on the whole, consistent with the tenets of declared U.S. national security strategy. Analysis of statements by United States policymakers concerning Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the contents of publicly available documents, reveals a significant degree of continuity in their operational content. This continuity is found in the consistent linkage of economic development, democratization, and
stability in the region. This linkage is fundamentally consistent with the underlying tenets of both “democratic enlargement” and “leadership and engagement.” Characterization of the nature of the transnational threats which this policy seeks to counter (terrorism, refugee flows, organized crime, disease, and environmental degradation) has also been generally consistent. Emergence of a new United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa, and the relative importance given to South Africa, is also demonstrated by the creation of policy coordination mechanisms. These include both the Africa Trade and Development Coordinating Group and the U.S.-South Africa Binational Commission.

Ideally, these consistently articulated policy statements and their supporting bureaucratic structures should serve as the basis for a well-coordinated regional security strategy. Chapter Five presents a critical analysis of United States regional security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa.
CHAPTER 5

UNITED STATES STRATEGY FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The purpose of the President's annual National Security Strategy is to identify United States interests and objectives and to establish a grand strategy for their attainment. This strategy applies and coordinates "the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security." 275 Ideally, this overarching national strategy would then be translated into a series of appropriate regional strategies. The various editions of the National Security Strategy published between 1994 and 1997 have all stated that United States national interests and objectives are to be met through a series of "integrated regional approaches." These are intended to allow U.S. policy "toward each of the world's regions [to reflect] our overall strategy tailored to their unique challenges and opportunities." 276

This chapter presents a critical analysis of United States regional strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. First, it describes the formulation of this strategy. It then describes its components and evaluates their relevance to U.S. national interests and the Sub-Saharan African strategic environment.

Formulation of Regional Strategy

The 1994-1997 editions of the National Security Strategy have clearly identified broad United States goals and objectives for Sub-Saharan Africa consistent with U.S.
declared grand strategy. These goals and objectives have not been effectively translated into a comprehensive regional strategy. Although the Clinton Administration has specified regional goals and objectives for executive branch agencies in other policy areas, it apparently has not done so for Sub-Saharan Africa. National Security Directive 75, *American Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s*, which ostensibly serves as the official basis for United States policy in the region was prepared in 1992 under the Bush Administration. While the Clinton Administration has developed a policy framework for a "new relationship" with Africa, there has been no subsequent Presidential Decision Directive to drive formulation of a coherent regional strategy. This is reflected in the contention of one knowledgeable United States Government official that "There is no U.S. strategy for Africa." There are merely a group of loosely coordinated political, economic, security, and informational initiatives which provide the semblance, but not the substance, of a regional strategy.

**Political Initiatives**

The United States' principal political interest in Sub-Saharan Africa is South Africa's full transition to a non-racial democracy. To this end the U.S. provided $600 million in assistance to the new South African government between 1994 and 1997. The United States also provided assistance in drafting the state's new constitution and in organizing its first non-racial elections.

The wider objective of United States political initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa is to foster the development of democratic institutions and to further the growth of democratic
governance in the region. The State Department’s U.S. Policy for a New Era in Sub-Saharan Africa states that United States policy in the region “focuses on supporting broadly democratic processes and institutions, not personalities or specific political outcomes.” On 7 April 1997 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs stated, “What we seek are stable, functioning democratic governments that are able to represent the wishes of their citizens and that [can] serve as responsible partners in solving pressing global problems.”

In its effort to foster regional democratization the United States supports “programs in 46 African countries to help educate citizens in all walks of life to make their electoral processes work and establish vibrant civil societies” and has “supported the creation of independent electoral commissions in 11 African countries.” Between 1990 and 1995 the U.S. Agency for International Development “invested” over $300 million in Sub-Saharan Africa “in support of free elections, decentralization, constitutional development, the rule of law, and freedom of the press.”

Support for regional democratization and the development of democracy in individual Sub-Saharan African countries reflects Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot’s twin propositions that “In an increasingly interdependent world Americans have a growing stake in how other countries govern, or misgovern themselves,” and that “The American people want their country’s foreign policy rooted in idealpolitik as well as realpolitik.” Most of these policy objectives appear to be poorly focused and reflect a flawed appreciation for the nature of most Sub-Saharan African political regimes.
United States policymakers seem to lack a clear operational definition of "democratic governance." The 2 April 1996 Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for the Countries of Africa stated, "Whereas in 1989, only four African countries were implementing democratic reforms, now nearly two-thirds [suggesting 32 - author's note] are at some stage of democratic transition." \(^{288}\) Four months later, on 2 August 1996, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs said, "in 1989, there were only five African countries that could be described as democracies, today there are 23." \(^{289}\) On 12 March 1998 the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs stated, "...some 25 African states now enjoy some form of democratic governance." \(^{290}\)

Statements by U.S. policymakers have tended to support the contention that "democratic revolutions [are] sweeping through Africa." \(^{291}\) The 1996 Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for the Countries of Africa stated:

> [T]he 1990s are bringing changes to Africa as dramatic as those in Eastern Europe....In the past decade...change has begun to sweep the continent. Leaders in Africa have increasingly committed themselves to policy changes that put their nations on a proven path to success -- market based economic reforms and democratic political systems.\(^{292}\)

According to the State Department's U.S. Strategy for a New Era in Sub-Saharan Africa:

In a new post-Cold War environment, Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing unprecedented political and economic change....No longer content with the victories of the post-independence period, Africans are demanding their just rights along with popular participation and accountability in government.\(^{293}\)

On 19 March 1998 Secretary of State Albright announced, "...in the past ten years the number of democratically elected governments in Sub-Saharan Africa has quadrupled."\(^{294}\)
Rhetoric to the contrary, the principles of popular sovereignty and public accountability continue to be ignored in much of Africa.\textsuperscript{295} As the analyses of election results in Chapter Three and at Appendix B demonstrate, the number of Sub-Saharan African nations with functioning democratic governments is effectively limited to nine (South Africa, Namibia, Cape Verde, the Comoros, Mali, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Malawi, and Mozambique). Of these, only South Africa -- which is both the region’s pivotal state and the focus of U.S. national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa -- is of strategic importance to the United States.

This “excessive emphasis on elections...shows false assumptions” concerning African political institutions.\textsuperscript{296} Voters in Sub-Saharan African nations are likely “to base their votes on cues from village ‘big men’ or ethnic brokers rather than [a] government’s performance.”\textsuperscript{297} Even African leaders considered friendly to the United States are resistant to implementation of multi-party politics and elections. During her visit to Africa in December 1997 the Secretary of State praised Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni as a reliable regional leader and “a beacon in the central African region.”\textsuperscript{298} Museveni, who characterizes multiparty democracy as “unacceptably confrontational and divisive,” has initiated a “no-party” system in Uganda.\textsuperscript{299}

Lack of a clear definition of democratic governance and the demonstrated inability or unwillingness to accept the realities of the African political environment support one observer’s contention that, “Africa’s increasing marginalization has allowed certain groups committed to spreading ‘American values’ an unprecedented ability to shape policy and turn the continent into a liberal socio-political experiment.”\textsuperscript{300}
Economic Initiatives

"By whatever measure one uses...American economic interests in Africa are marginal." Exports to region account for less than one percent of the total value of U.S. exports. On 19 March 1998 Secretary of State Albright stated, "U.S.-Africa trade is booming." The "boom," however, is localized. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, United States economic interests in Sub-Saharan Africa lie primarily in the Republic of South Africa and the Southern African sub-region.

While the total value of United States exports to Sub-Saharan Africa has grown steadily since 1994, they are not evenly distributed throughout the region. Rather, they are heavily concentrated geographically in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) member-states, particularly in South Africa. The total value of U.S. exports to SADC member-states grew from $2.67 billion in 1994 to $3.97 billion in 1996. In overall terms of trade with SADC member-states, the value of United States imports increased from $7.7 billion in 1994 to $5.69 billion in 1996 (primarily reflecting the rising value of crude oil imports from Angola).

Trade flows between the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa are grossly asymmetrical. Sub-Saharan African nations enjoyed a $9.1 billion trade surplus with the United States in 1996, an increase from $7.3 billion in 1995. During the first half of the decade, the cumulative trade imbalance between the U.S. and Sub-Saharan Africa was nearly $38 billion in the latter's favor, representing a major transfer of capital resources from the United States to Africa. The United States' export "market share in the region -- 6.7 percent -- still lags considerably behind the 30 percent market share enjoyed by the European
Union and the growing market share enjoyed by Japan (7.2 percent).” In 1995 the value of U.S. exports to Sub-Saharan Africa totaled $5.4 billion, an increase of 23 percent since 1994. In 1996 the value of American exports to the region grew by a further 14 percent (to $6.1 billion). Despite this steady growth in trade, the United States still ranks fifth among industrialized country suppliers to the region.  

The 1996 edition of the Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for the Countries of Africa states that the United States seeks to redress this trade imbalance through a “policy framework structured around five objectives: trade liberalization and promotion; development of the private sector; infrastructure development; and economic and regulatory reform.” Additionally, the United States Government “aggressively seeks out trade and investment opportunities for American firms and equal market access.”  

As discussed in Chapter Three, regional economic trends and social conditions do not favor widespread economic development. Most Sub-Saharan African nations possess neither an adequate transportation infrastructure nor a productive basis for sustainable development. The majority of these countries most likely to remain producers and exporters of raw materials, rather than to become producers of manufactured goods. Mining, especially, will continue to be a mainstay of the regional economy. (The U.S. Geological Survey estimates the potential value of mineral development and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1997-2003 at $18-21 billion dollars.)

South Africa and its neighboring states are the exceptions to these regional trends. Southern Africa already constitutes a regional economic subsystem more than any other part of Africa. Trade relations are relatively extensive, the region is linked by well-developed
transportation and communications systems, and labor has historically migrated from other Southern African states to South Africa. The end of apartheid in South Africa and its membership in the SADC position it to serve as the region’s “locomotive of growth.”

Security Initiatives

The primary United States security interest in Sub-Saharan Africa is the maintenance of regional stability. The State Department’s U.S. Policy for a New Era in Sub-Saharan

Africa States:

Conflict resolution and peaceful change in Africa are primary U.S. goals since the degree of success in achieving them is the basis for progress in all other areas. The United States actively supports the nascent efforts of Africans to take the lead in resolving conflicts and peace-keeping efforts in the region. However, it is also willing to play the role of catalyst, technical advisor, and honest broker to resolve conflicts.

Sub-Saharan Africa lacks the bases upon which effective, voluntary security cooperation has been founded in other parts of the world. There is no clear distinction between “free” and “unfree” nations, or between market-based or centrally planned economies, on which to premise an alliance or security system. Nor is there a “grass-roots” base of informed citizens to support such a system. The character of most Sub-Saharan African military forces also mitigates against the establishment of effective security systems. With the exception of South Africa, few Sub-Saharan African nations have an indigenous military culture that accepts the supremacy of civilian and parliamentary authority.

The most ambitious and successful U.S. security-related policy initiative in Sub-Saharan Africa has been sponsorship of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The idea of supporting an indigenous African crisis response capability dates to the early 1990s,
but only took specific form in 1996 as a Clinton Administration response to a looming crisis in the small central African nation of Burundi.\textsuperscript{315} The ACRI concept has now gained wide acceptance and seven African countries have agreed to commit a total of eight battalions for its operations.\textsuperscript{316} United States Special Forces began training these units in summer 1997, emphasizing communications, logistics, and leadership.\textsuperscript{317} The United States has also negotiated multilateral agreements for support of ACRI with France, Britain, other European donors, and Japan.\textsuperscript{318}

Essentially, ACRI is "a useful but limited program that seeks to help Africans improve their security options without making unrealistic demands on American resources."\textsuperscript{319} Indigenous conflict resolution and peacekeeping mechanisms for Sub-Saharan Africa are not likely to be fully effective without South African participation, particularly logistics and communication support. No other Sub-Saharan African nation is capable of deploying and sustaining its military forces for any appreciable period of time beyond its national borders.\textsuperscript{320}

With the exception of regional stability and ACRI, there appears to be no consensus among policymakers concerning the nature, or even the existence, of U.S. security interests in the region. The most recent (1995) edition of the Defense Departments' United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa states, "America's security interests in Africa are extremely limited....[U]ltimately, we see little traditional strategic interest in Africa."\textsuperscript{321}

In most of their statements concerning U.S. policy for Sub-Saharan Africa, American policymakers have focused on "nontraditional" security issues. In his May 1993 speech outlining a "new relationship" with Africa Secretary of State Christopher stated that the
United States would "help Africa build its capacity for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution." Subsequent policy statements have identified a broad range of potential "transnational" threats to United States security emanating from Sub-Saharan Africa. These have included state-sponsored terrorism, refugee flows, international crime and narcotics trafficking, humanitarian crises, environmental degradation, AIDS and other diseases, population growth, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Most recently (March 1998), the Secretary of State identified five United States security-related goals in Sub-Saharan Africa: development of a continent-wide counternarcotics strategy; prevention of the spread of terrorism; "to end the threat posed by land mines to civilians everywhere in Africa by the end of the next decade;" to fight malaria and prevent AIDS; and to promote sound environmental management practices. All of these goals reflect the tendency to seek nontraditional roles for American military forces in the post-Cold War security environment.

The only reference to the United States' other real security interests in Sub-Saharan Africa -- access to strategic minerals and the security of the Southern Cape Route -- is found in the United States European Command's (USEUCOM's) mission statement for Sub-Saharan Africa:

USEUCOM's mission in Africa is to support overarching U.S. policy by implementing and overseeing activities which ensure access to key facilities, lines of communication, and natural resources; to protect U.S. citizens and interests; to conduct nation assistance activities in friendly states; and to conduct disaster relief, humanitarian, and evacuation operations as direct by the [Joint Chiefs of Staff].

The security of the Cape Sea Route and access to strategic minerals no longer figure prominently in United States policymakers' consideration of Sub-Saharan Africa. This
may reflect an ideological aversion to the formulation of a security strategy based solely on geopolitical considerations. It may also be reflective of assumptions concerning the inviolability of sea lines of communication and the availability of alternate sources of mineral supplies.

There is admittedly no immediate threat to the security of the Southern Cape Route. Given its importance to the United States and Europe, however, its security should not be taken for granted. An estimated 90-100 supertankers pass around the Cape each month carrying five million tons of oil to the United States and Europe. Interdiction of the Southern Cape Route may easily be achieved at several points along the Southern African littoral, where ships must navigate close to the coast to avoid dangerous currents and storm conditions.

Assumptions concerning the availability of alternate sources of mineral supplies may not be valid:

Those who would dismiss the concern for access to strategic minerals and critical resources simply because the United States is no longer threatened by the Soviet Union misunderstand the importance of these resources to the economic element of national power. For many of these materials there is no substitute.

Not only must the United States compete with other industrialized countries for these resources on the world market, but alternate sources are either limited or found in countries whose long-term prospects for political stability are questionable. About 95 percent of the world’s chromium resources are located in Southern Africa, and alternate sources of supply include Russia and Kazakhstan. South Africa and Russia account for more than 80 percent of the world’s identified manganese resources. As discussed in Chapter One, South Africa alone accounts for more than 80 percent of the total found outside of Russia and China. The
greatest concentration of known platinum group metal reserves are also located in South Africa.\textsuperscript{332} (World production figures and known reserves of strategic minerals are at Tables 5-8.)

**Informational Initiatives**

Informational initiatives concerning Sub-Saharan Africa serve three broad objectives: support of regional democratization, to convince Africans of the United States' seriousness of purpose on the continent, and to convince the American people of the value of engagement with Africa.

To quote the State Department's *U.S. Policy for a New Era in Sub-Saharan Africa*:

*Strong U.S. programs to encourage democratic values and practices are essential. Projects advancing human and civil rights, the rule of law, freedom and diversity in the press, effective government, the status of women, and other pillars of a democratic society should reinforce direct assistance for holding elections...A strong information program which shares and promotes democratic values is integral to U.S. efforts to encourage lasting reform.*\textsuperscript{333}

From the African perspective, when outsiders have engaged the continent at all, they have almost always done so in the interest of extraction. The products they have taken, from salt to slaves, from gold to oil, have consistently served the interests of prosperity elsewhere.\textsuperscript{334} In Secretary of State Albright's' words, "...the people of Africa should understand -- and many of them need convincing -- that when the United States says it wants to work with them on the basis of shared interests and mutual respect...[w]e mean it."\textsuperscript{335}

President Clinton's 22 March-3 April 1998 visit to Africa was intended to symbolize a new United States commitment to the continent. Over 12 days the President visited six African countries -- Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, Botswana, and Senegal -- the
most extensive visit to Africa ever undertaken by a sitting American President.336 One clear aim of the President’s trip was “to persuade an American audience with few notions of the continent that Africa not only exists, but matters.”337 As Albright said, “we...want[ed] the President’s visit to spotlight...the new and forward looking Africa that is eager to participate in the world economy.”338

The editions of the National Security Strategy for the years 1994-1996 all speak of “strengthening the American constituency for Africa, drawing on the knowledge, experience and commitment of millions of Americans to enhance our nation’s support for positive change in Africa.”339 This is tacit recognition that there is no broad-based United States constituency for Africa.

There is no African counterpart to the American lobbies for Israel, Ireland, or other overseas interests. The influence of African-Americans on foreign policy continues to be quite low considering the community’s significant size. This may be attributed to a variety of factors including their relatively poor economic status, the domestic focus of their politics, and a general lack of interest beyond the elite.340 In practice, leaders have produced no new agenda for U.S. policy in Africa since the end of apartheid, save for vague calls for more aid and more involvement.341 This attempt to build a constituency where none exists may reflect both domestic political concerns, as well as the knowledge that most Americans will resist commitments to regions largely peripheral to United States interests.342
Conclusion

There has apparently been no effort made to translate the goals and objectives of the National Security Strategy into a comprehensive regional strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. Executive branch agencies of the U.S. government continue to execute policy initiatives in the region outside of any overarching framework and without a clear strategic objective. With the exception of support to South Africa’s transition to democracy and sponsorship of ACRI, the underlying premises of most of these initiatives are at odds with the realities of the Sub-Saharan African strategic environment and contribute little toward safeguarding the United States’ real interests in the region.

United States efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa are poorly focused and its resources poorly employed. Its national interests in the region would be better served through a strategy based on engagement with South Africa. The following chapter presents an analysis of South Africa as the region’s pivotal state.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

During the past five years, coincident with the end of apartheid, a new United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa has emerged in which bilateral relations with South Africa play a preeminent role. While this strategy has not been articulated in the form of a single, comprehensive policy document, it is consistent with the tenets of declared United States national security policy and strategy.

Analysis of statements by U.S. policymakers concerning Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as publicly available documents, reveals a significant degree of continuity in their operational content. This continuity is found in the consistent linkage of economic development with democratization and stability in the region. This linkage is fundamentally consistent with the underlying tenets of the Clinton Administration's declared grand strategies of "democratic enlargement" and, more recently, "leadership and engagement." The emergence of new United States policy for Sub-Saharan Africa and the relative importance given to South Africa is also demonstrated by the creation of policy coordination mechanisms, particularly the U.S.-South African Binational Commission. Ideally, these consistently articulated policy statements and their supporting bureaucratic structures should serve as the basis for a well-coordinated United States regional security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa.

This ideal has not been realized. There are significant discontinuities between United States policy and strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. While the Clinton Administration has developed the policy framework for a "new relationship" with Africa, there has been no
concerted effort to translate this into a comprehensive U.S. regional strategy. In effect, the United States wholly lacks a coherent regional strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. In its place are merely a group of loosely coordinated political, economic, security, and informational policy initiatives.

As the result of this discontinuity between policy and strategy executive branch agencies continue to execute programs in Sub-Saharan Africa outside of any overarching framework and without a clear strategic objective. Most of these programs appear to be formulated with little or no regard for the political, economic, or social factors which shape the Sub-Saharan African strategic environment. This approach to policy implementation is inefficient, wasteful of limited resources, and distracts policymakers' attention from the few issues in Sub-Saharan Africa which are strategic importance to the United States. United States national interests would be best served through the formulation of a regional security strategy explicitly founded on engagement with South Africa. The remainder of this chapter presents recommendations for the formulation of this strategy and a discussion of its potential advantages and disadvantages.

**Strategic Rationale**

There are three interacting factors which support the formulation of a United States regional strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa explicitly predicated on engagement with South Africa. These are: 1) South Africa's role as the region's pivotal state; 2) the nature of United States national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa; and 3) the nature of the Sub-Saharan African strategic environment.
THE PIVOTAL STATE

As discussed in Chapter One, South Africa’s fully industrialized economy and military capabilities make it the most powerful state in Sub-Saharan Africa and the dominant state in the Southern African sub-region. Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has also emerged as the region’s pivotal state. As such, its continued stability and development are critical to peace and prosperity in Sub-Saharan Africa.

UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS

As demonstrated in Chapter Two, South Africa and the Southern African sub-region are the focus of the United States’ identifiable, limited economic, political, and security interests in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Economic Interests.

United States trade with Sub-Saharan Africa is heavily concentrated in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), particularly in South Africa. In 1996 the value of United States imports from Sub-Saharan Africa grew to $15.2 billion, over a third of which ($5.69 billion) was from SADC member-states (including $2.3 billion from South Africa). In the same year, the export value of U.S. goods and services to Sub-Saharan Africa was $6.1 billion. Over half of this total ($3.1 billion) reflected the value of sales to South Africa. In 1996 the value of U.S. exports to South Africa alone were nearly 29 percent greater than to the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union, nearly equaled those to Russia, and exceeded those to all of Eastern Europe.
Political Interests.

American policymakers have characterized the United States' primary political interest in Sub-Saharan Africa as South Africa's full transition to a non-racial democracy. South Africa provides an example for other Sub-Saharan African states that the reconciliation of fundamental political issues is possible without recourse to violence. United States policymakers believe that post-apartheid South Africa can both provide a political linkage between the West and the non-aligned movement and can serve as an engine of economic growth, particularly in the Southern African sub-region.

Security Interests.

The United States' primary security interest in Sub-Saharan Africa is the maintenance of regional stability. In essence, stability sets the conditions for the protection of all other U.S. interests in the region. Beyond this, United States security interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are focus directly on South Africa and the Southern African sub-region. These interests include continued U.S. access to sources of strategic minerals and the security of the Cape Sea Route.

South Africa and the Southern African sub-region are the United States' primary sources four strategic minerals (chromium, cobalt, manganese, and platinum group metals) all of which have critical direct or indirect military applications. Of these four, the United States domestically produces only limited amounts of platinum group metals. South Africa has the largest reserves of chrome ore found in any single country and possess 80 percent of the world's manganese reserves located outside of Russia and China. Not only must the
United States compete with other industrialized countries for these resources on the world market; alternate sources of supply are either limited or found in countries whose long-term prospects for political stability are questionable.

South Africa's location at the southern tip of the African continent gives it a strategic position astride a major choke point on the Cape Sea Route linking the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans. This route is used for the transit of trade on which the West depends for economic growth. An estimated 90-100 supertankers pass around the Cape each month carrying five million tons of oil to the United States and Europe. Approximately 40 percent of U.S. and 60 percent of European oil imports from the Middle East transit the Cape Sea Route.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The analysis presented in Chapter Three indicates that South Africa affords the United States the greatest opportunity for successful engagement in a strategic environment which is generally characterized by dysfunctional political and economic regimes and their attendant social conditions. South Africa is the only major state in Sub-Saharan Africa currently making a transition to democracy. The Government of National Unity has already instituted fundamental political reforms in the country through the promulgation of a new constitution and the creation of Western-style governing institutions based on the rule of law.

Economically, South Africa has no regional peer competitor. Its industrial infrastructure and supporting transportation and communications systems are unique in Sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa is the only state in Sub-Saharan Africa with a demonstrated
capacity for sustained self-development. While social conditions in South Africa may be somewhat similar to those in other Sub-Saharan African nations, the country’s new government appears to have the political will to institute effective programs for their remediation.

**Strategy Formulation**

Formulation of a new United States strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa based on engagement with South Africa must include the definition of a clear strategic objective and coordination of supporting elements of strategy.

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE**

The United States’ strategic objective in Sub-Saharan Africa should be South Africa’s emergence as a fully functioning non-racial democracy whose government is both willing and capable of assuming a position of regional leadership. Accomplishment of this objective will provide the United States with a strong democratic partner in a region dominated by authoritarian political regimes.

**ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY**

Execution of this proposed regional strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa will require the coordinated application of the economic, political, military, and informational instruments of United States national power. This will require the rationalization of United States programs in Sub-Saharan Africa and a substantial reallocation of resources.
Economic.

The objective of the economic component of United States regional strategy should continue to be to expand U.S. market share and encourage sustainable development. The focus of these efforts, however, should be shifted to South Africa and the Southern African sub-region, where U.S. trade is already concentrated. The United States should support South African initiatives for greater regional economic integration within SADC and to take maximum advantage of the already-existing economic system in Southern Africa. This proposed reallocation of the majority of U.S. development aid to Southern Africa would concentrate U.S. resources in the area where they are most likely to directly support American national interests. Such a reallocation would probably effectively limit the provision of U.S. aid to other nations in the region to humanitarian assistance.

Political.

As stated above, the objective of United States strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa should be South Africa's full transition to a non-racial democracy. This objective is compatible with interests already articulated by U.S. policymakers. To this end, the United States should reallocate resources dedicated to democratization elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa to South Africa. Increased support for democratization in South Africa is likely to be more beneficial to U.S. interests in the region than the conduct of social engineering programs in states whose political regimes do not welcome, and whose civil societies do not support, the introduction of multiparty democracy.
Military.

The primary United States security interest in Sub-Saharan Africa will remain the maintenance of regional stability. To this end, the United States will continue to support the development of indigenous conflict resolution and peacekeeping mechanisms. Properly developed, indigenous peacekeeping forces will relieve the United States of the burden of regional intervention and humanitarian assistance. Regional peacekeeping efforts, however, are not likely to be successful without South African participation. South Africa is the only state in Sub-Saharan Africa capable of deploying and sustaining its armed forces beyond its national borders for any appreciable length of time. Therefore, the United States should actively support greater South African participation, and eventual leadership, in these organizations.

The military component of U.S. strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa should also include expanded military-to-military contacts with South Africa. These contacts would be based on a common military culture and potentially common interests. The South African National Defense Force (SANDF) has developed a Western military ethos and professional ethic almost unique in Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, its roles, missions, and functions are articulated in a manner similar to those of the United States armed forces, and its organizational structures are generally consistent with those of Western military organizations.

If the United States were required to commit forces to Sub-Saharan Africa, the SANDF is probably the only regional military force with which it could readily establish any degree of interoperability. Utilization of South Africa’s military and civilian logistics
infrastructure would significantly ease any U.S. deployment to the region, and the South African armed forces have a degree of knowledge and expertise of Africa far beyond that maintained in the United States armed forces.

Informational.

As discussed in Chapter Five, one of the primary objectives of current United States informational initiatives for Sub-Saharan Africa is to convince the American people of the value of the engagement with Africa. This is essentially a tacit recognition that there is no broad-based United States constituency for Africa. Attempts to develop such a constituency where none exists may reflect domestic political concerns, as well as the knowledge that most Americans will resist commitments to regions largely peripheral to United States interests. It will be far easier to articulate the basis of a United States regional strategy predicated on engagement with South Africa than to develop a constituency for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.

Discussion

Formulation of a regional strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa explicitly predicated on engagement with post-apartheid South Africa would have clear advantages for the United States. Primarily, such a strategy would serve to focus both U.S. policymakers' attention and limited resources on the one area in Sub-Saharan Africa where the United States has clearly defined national interests. This strategy would provide the overarching framework and clear
strategic objective which are currently lacking in the formulation and execution of United States policy initiatives for the region.

The greatest political advantage which would accrue to the United States as a result of this strategy would be South Africa's full transition to democracy and its assumption of a position of regional leadership. Economically, this strategy would allow the United States to fully participate in the development of the Southern African sub-region. South Africa is already the leading market for U.S. exports in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Government of National Unity's plan to integrate South Africa's economy with that of the Southern African sub-region promises significant opportunities for growth in what is already the only functioning sub-regional economic system in Sub-Saharan Africa.

A United States regional strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa founded on engagement with South Africa would also safeguard United States security interests in the region. It would enhance overall regional security by supporting the continued development of Sub-Saharan Africa's pivotal state and ensure continued U.S. access to sources of strategic minerals and the security of the Cape Sea Route. Finally, such a strategy would be compatible with the tenets of declared U.S. grand strategy, particularly the concept of "selective engagement."

This strategy would also have advantages for South Africa. Increased United States aid and assistance would directly benefit implementation of the Government of National Unity's Reconstruction and Development Program. Successful amelioration of the effects of apartheid will not only enhance the government's stability and legitimacy; it will also be a key factor in South Africa's full transition to democracy.
There are two potential disadvantages associated with this proposed strategy. First, greater United States engagement with South Africa may be perceived as abandonment of the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. Critics of this proposed strategy may argue that its implementation would represent at least a partial forfeiture of United States moral leadership in the post-Cold War international order.

Engagement with South Africa does not presuppose denial of U.S. humanitarian assistance elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. It will, however, require reallocation of resources to the only state in the Sub-Saharan African strategic environment which offers the United States an opportunity for meaningful engagement. The purpose of United States national security policy is to safeguard the United States’ national interests -- this focus has been lost in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The second potential disadvantage is that the United States may be premature in deepening its engagement with South Africa prior to the country’s full transition to democracy. In fact, greater engagement with South Africa is only likely to hasten that transition. Waiting for the results of the 2004 elections, or some other event, also presents the United States with opportunity costs. As South Africa moves to integrate its economy more fully with that of Southern Africa, the United States will find itself in competition with other nations for profits and market share. Failure to deepen engagement with South Africa and to take full advantage of this opportunity may effectively exclude United States businesses from the most lucrative market in Sub-Saharan Africa.

South Africa occupies a unique position. It is at once the most powerful nation in Sub-Saharan Africa and the region’s pivotal state. It is also the focus of the majority United
States national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. The United States should act to end the discontinuity in its policy and strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa through formulation of a regional strategy predicated on engagement with South Africa.
FIGURE 2. THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN SUB-REGION

FIGURE 3. SOUTH AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

CHIEF OF STAFF OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

INSPECTOR GENERAL

CHAPLAIN GENERAL

CHIEF COMMUNICATION DIRECTORATE

ADJUDANT GENERAL

CHIEF OF THE SERVICE CORPS

PERSONNEL DIVISION

OPERATIONS DIVISION

FINANCE DIVISION

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

LOGISTICS DIVISION

DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS UNIT

ARMS OF THE SERVICE

SA ARMY

SA AIR FORCE

SA NAVY

SA MEDICAL SERVICE

COMMANDS, SCHOOLS, MILITARY BASES AND UNITS

Source: South African Department of Defense.
FIGURE 4. SOUTH AFRICAN MARITIME ZONES (SOUTH AFRICA AND PRINCE EDWARD ISLANDS)

Source: South African Navy.
FIGURE 5. SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Source: South African Department of Defense.
FIGURE 6. SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Source: South African Department of Defense
FIGURE 7. SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

C NAVY

- CNS Pers
- CNS Int
- CNS Ops
- CNS Log
- CNS Fin
- CNS Plans
- CNS Reserves

CN Operations

- Task Force Commander
  - Naval Base Smst
  - SAS SIMONSBERG
  - SAS SCORPION
  - SAS CHAPMAN
  - SAS HUGO BERGMANN
    - 3 x EW Stations
      - 3 x COMCENS
    - 4 x Mine Hunters
    - 4 x Mine Sweepers
    - 1 x Diving Support Vessel
    - 3 x Submarines

- SAS OUTENIQUA
- SAS DRAKENSBERG
- SAS PROTEA
- 9 x Strike Craft
- 4 x Mine Sweepers

- Dockyard Smst
- Log Base

CN Support

- Staff College
  - Naval College

- Naval Works
- SAS WINGFIELD
  - SAS SALDANHA

- Stores Depot Durban
- Stores Depot Wingfield

- Armament Depot Smst
- Armament Depot Durban

- Publications Unit
- SAS MAGALIESBERG
  - SAS RAND
  - SAS INKONKONI
  - SAS PORT REX
  - SAS DONKIN
  - SAS YSELSTEIN
  - SAS UNITIE

Source: South African Department of Defense.
FIGURE 8. SOUTH AFRICAN MEDICAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

SURGEON GENERAL

Chief Medical Force Application

Director Medicine

Director Pharmacy

Chief Medical Staff Operational Support

Director Nursing

Director Veterinary

Director Oral Health

Director Environmental Health

Director Social Work

Director Dietetics

Director Psychology

Director Ancillary Health

Chief Medical Force Support

Chief Medical Staff Personnel

Chief Medical Staff Logistics

Chief Medical Staff Finance

SSO Legal Services

Medical Commands (10)
2 and 3 Military Hospital
Military Base Hospitals (6)
Sickbays (48)
Military Medical Clinics (53)
Veterinary Clinics (11)
Medical Subdepots (2)

Part-time Force Units
1 Medical Battalion Group
2 Medical Battalion Group
3 Medical Battalion Group

Specialist Permanent Force Units
1 Military Hospital
7 Medical Battalion Group
SAMS Academy
Medical Command Post Army Battle School
Institute for Aviation Medicine
Institute for Maritime Medicine
Military Psychological Institute
Medical Base Depot
SAMS Technical Support Unit

Source: South African Department of Defense.
FIGURE 9. U.S. LIFELINES AND TRANSIT REGIONS

FIGURE 10. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS

1 Maghreb
2 Sahara
3 Nile Valley
4 West Africa
5 Congo Basin
6 Eastern Horn
7 East Africa
8 Southern Africa
9 Malagasy

Source: Food and Agricultural Organization.
Source: Food and Agricultural Organization.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>POPULATION (MILLIONS)</th>
<th>GROWTH RATE</th>
<th>INFANT MORTALITY RATE (1)</th>
<th>LIFE EXPECTANCY RATE (2)</th>
<th>LITERACY RATE (3)</th>
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<td>50.61</td>
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TABLE 1. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN POPULATION STATISTICS (CONT.)

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<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>POPULATION (MILLIONS)</th>
<th>GROWTH RATE</th>
<th>INFANT MORTALITY RATE (1)</th>
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<th>LITERACY RATE (3)</th>
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<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>POPULATION (MILLIONS)</th>
<th>GROWTH RATE</th>
<th>INFANT MORTALITY RATE (1)</th>
<th>LIFE EXPECTANCY RATE (2)</th>
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<td>1.26%</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>40.84</td>
<td>85%</td>
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AGGREGATE POPULATION (ESTIMATE): 603 MILLION
AVERAGE GROWTH RATE: 2.69%
AVERAGE INFANT MORTALITY RATE: 131.4 DEATHS PER 1,000 LIVE BIRTHS
AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY: 50.9 YEARS
AVERAGE LITERACY RATE: 54.6%

COMPARABLE FIGURES FOR THE UNITED STATES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POPULATION (MILLIONS)</th>
<th>GROWTH RATE</th>
<th>INFANT MORTALITY RATE (1)</th>
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<td>267.9</td>
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<td>76.04</td>
<td>97%</td>
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(1) Number of deaths per 1,000 live births.
(2) In years, for total population at time of birth.
(3) Estimated percentage of total population over age 15 who can read and write.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>GDP ($ BILLION)</th>
<th>PER CAPITA GDP</th>
<th>GROWTH RATE</th>
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<td>ANGOLA</td>
<td>$8.30</td>
<td>$800</td>
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<tr>
<td>BENIN</td>
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<td>$4.60</td>
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<td>$740</td>
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<td>$4.00</td>
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<td>GAMBIA</td>
<td>$1.10</td>
<td>$1,100</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>$27.00</td>
<td>$1,530</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUINEA</td>
<td>$7.10</td>
<td>$950</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUINEA-BISSAU</td>
<td>$1.10</td>
<td>$950</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENY</td>
<td>$39.20</td>
<td>$1,400</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESOTHO</td>
<td>$3.70</td>
<td>$1,860</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERIA</td>
<td>$2.40</td>
<td>$1,100</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MADAGASCAR</td>
<td>$12.10</td>
<td>$880</td>
<td>3.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALAWI</td>
<td>$7.50</td>
<td>$800</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALI</td>
<td>$5.80</td>
<td>$600</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
</tr>
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<td>$2.80</td>
<td>$1,200</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAURITIUS</td>
<td>$11.70</td>
<td>$10,300</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOZAMBIQUE</td>
<td>$12.20</td>
<td>$670</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMIBIA</td>
<td>$6.20</td>
<td>$3,700</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGER</td>
<td>$5.90</td>
<td>$640</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>$143.50</td>
<td>$1,380</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWANDA</td>
<td>$3.80</td>
<td>$400</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAO TOME AND PENCEPE</td>
<td>$0.15</td>
<td>$1,500</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENEGAL</td>
<td>$15.60</td>
<td>$1,700</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEYCHELLES</td>
<td>$0.45</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>$4.70</td>
<td>$980</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMALIA</td>
<td>$3.60</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
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(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
TABLE 2. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN ECONOMIC STATISTICS (CONT.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>GDP ($ BILLION)</th>
<th>PER CAPITA GDP</th>
<th>GROWTH RATE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>$227</td>
<td>$5,400</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUDAN</td>
<td>$26.60</td>
<td>$860</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAZILAND</td>
<td>$3.80</td>
<td>$3,800</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA</td>
<td>$18.90</td>
<td>$650</td>
<td>3.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOGO</td>
<td>$4.45</td>
<td>$970</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGANDA</td>
<td>$16.80</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>7.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td>$9.70</td>
<td>$1,060</td>
<td>6.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIMBABWE</td>
<td>$26.40</td>
<td>$2,340</td>
<td>5.50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AGGREGATE GDP: $787.62 BILLION

AVERAGE PER CAPITA GDP: $1,494.00

U.S PER CAPITA GDP: $28,600.00

Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
### TABLE 3. SOUTH AFRICAN MINERAL RESERVES AND PRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Reserve Base</th>
<th>World</th>
<th>% Yield</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum-silicates</td>
<td>kg</td>
<td>50,800</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anhydrite</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromite</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>55,333</td>
<td>106.6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluorspar</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>37,300</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>5,930</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phosphate rock</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>2,310</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platinum group metals</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>62,816</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titanium minerals</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>177,100</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanadium</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermiculite</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zirconium</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>14,300</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Reserve Base is that part of an in-situ resource that meets specified minimum physical and chemical criteria related to current mining and production practices, including those of grade, quality, thickness and depth. It is the only demonstrated resource from which reserves are estimated. It may encompass those parts of the resource that have a reasonable potential for becoming economically available within planning horizons but which may not have demonstrated economic (demonstrated reserves) or marginally economic (demonstrated marginal reserves). A kg or t is 1000 kg or t. A contained metal is 100% of contained ore. A contained ore is ore-yielding that can be recovered at a cost of less than US$ 8000/t. A depth refers to 200 m.

### South Africa's role in world mineral supply production* 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aluminium</td>
<td>kg</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anhydrite</td>
<td>kg</td>
<td>208,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromite</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>206,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>1,386,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese ore</td>
<td>kg</td>
<td>709,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferronickel</td>
<td>kg</td>
<td>945,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferronickel</td>
<td>kg</td>
<td>174,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>32,700</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>2,210,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese ore</td>
<td>kg</td>
<td>3,198,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phosphate rock</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>2,210,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platinum group metals</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>181,077,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silicon</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>174,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titanium minerals</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>751,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>1,688,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanadium</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermiculite</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>223,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zirconium</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Where 1995 figures were not available, the most recent figures were used.

Source: South African Communications Service.
TABLE 4. WORLD PRODUCTION AND KNOWN RESERVES OF CHROMIUM

Data in thousand metric tons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>MINE PRODUCTION</th>
<th>RESERVES (2)</th>
<th>RESERVE BASE (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1997 (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBANIA</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>6,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAZIL</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIA</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>67,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAN</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAZAKSTAN</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>320,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSSIA</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>460,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>5,018</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,500,5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIMBABWE</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>930,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORLD TOTAL (MAY BE ROUNDED)</td>
<td>12,190</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) All production figures for 1997 are estimates.

(2) "Reserves" are defined as, "That part of the reserve base which could be economically extracted or produced at the time of determination. The term reserves need not signify that extraction facilities are in place and operative. Reserves include only recoverable materials."

(3) "Reserve Base" is defined as, "That part of an identified resource that meets specified minimum physical and chemical criteria related to current mining and production practices, including those for grade, quality, thickness, and depth. The reserve base is the in-place demonstrated (measured plus indicated) resource from which reserves are estimated."

## TABLE 5. WORLD PRODUCTION AND KNOWN RESERVES OF COBALT

Data in metric tons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>MINE PRODUCTION</th>
<th>RESERVES (2)</th>
<th>RESERVE BASE (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1997 (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>860,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>270,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONGO, REP. OF</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUBA</td>
<td>1,970</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW CALEDONIA (4)</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILIPPINES</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSSIA</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>140,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>360,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>2,920</td>
<td>2,920</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORLD TOTAL (MAY BE ROUNDED)</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) All production figures for 1997 are estimates.

(2) "Reserves" are defined as, "That part of the reserve base which could be economically extracted or produced at the time of determination. The term reserves need not signify that extraction facilities are in place and operative. Reserves include only recoverable materials."

(3) "Reserve Base" is defined as, "That part of an identified resource that meets specified minimum physical and chemical criteria related to current mining and production practices, including those for grade, quality, thickness, and depth. The reserve base is the in-place demonstrated (measured plus indicated) resource from which reserves are estimated."

(4) Overseas department of France.

### TABLE 6. WORLD PRODUCTION AND KNOWN RESERVES OF MANGANESE

Data in thousand metric tons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>MINE PRODUCTION</th>
<th>RESERVES (2)</th>
<th>RESERVE BASE (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1997 (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAZIL</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>40,000</td>
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<td>GABON</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
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<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
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<td>INDIA</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>24,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEXICO</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
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<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>370,000</td>
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<td>UKRAINE</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>SMALL (4)</td>
</tr>
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<td>WORLD TOTAL (ROUNDED)</td>
<td>7,730</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>680,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) All production figures for 1997 are estimates.

(2) "Reserves" are defined as, "That part of the reserve base which could be economically extracted or produced at the time of determination. The term reserves need not signify that extraction facilities are in place and operative. Reserves include only recoverable materials."

(3) "Reserve Base" is defined as, "That part of an identified resource that meets specified minimum physical and chemical criteria related to current mining and production practices, including those for grade, quality, thickness, and depth. The reserve base is the in-place demonstrated (measured plus indicated) resource from which reserves are estimated."

(4) Quantity not further specified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MINE PRODUCTION</th>
<th>PGM RESERVES</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLATINUM</td>
<td>PALLADIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,840</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,100</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>570,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>8,260</td>
<td>8,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,270</td>
<td>5,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>311,000</td>
<td>380,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSSIA</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>18,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,220,000</td>
<td>6,600,000</td>
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<td>117,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48,900</td>
<td>49,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62,800,000</td>
<td>69,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,730</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>666,000</td>
<td>730,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORLD TOTAL</td>
<td>146,000</td>
<td>148,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ROUNDED)</td>
<td>111,000</td>
<td>116,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70,600,000</td>
<td>77,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) All production figures for 1997 are estimates.

(2) "Reserves" are defined as, "That part of the reserve base which could be economically extracted or produced at the time of determination. The term reserves need not signify that extraction facilities are in place and operative. Reserves include only recoverable materials."

(3) "Reserve Base" is defined as, "That part of an identified resource that meets specified minimum physical and chemical criteria related to current mining and production practices, including those for grade, quality, thickness, and depth. The reserve base is the in-place demonstrated (measured plus indicated) resource from which reserves are estimated."

APPENDIX A

STRATEGIC MINERALS APPLICATIONS

Chromium
Chromium is obtained primarily from chromite or chrome iron ore (ferrous chromite).\textsuperscript{343} The United States has no chromite ore reserves and only a limited reserve base; its only domestic source of chromium is recycling. Access too adequate supplies of chromium have been a major concern for U.S defense and defense-related industries during every national emergency since World War One.\textsuperscript{344}

Chromium is of critical importance to three primary industrial-consumer groups: the metallurgical industry, the chemical industry, and the refractory industry. Chromium usage in the United States is most closely linked to the steel and chemical industries, which together account for about 92 percent of U.S. chromite consumption.\textsuperscript{345} The principal metallurgical application of chromium is the production of ferroalloys. Chromium improves their ability to withstand stress at high temperatures, resistance to corrosion and oxidation, and hardening ability. Chromium ferroalloys are primarily used in the production of stainless and heat resistant steels.\textsuperscript{346} About 70 percent of metallurgical industry chromium consumption is as feed material for stainless steel production.\textsuperscript{347}

The chemical industry consumes chromite for the manufacture of sodium bichromate, chromic acid, and other chromium chemicals and pigments. Sodium bichromate itself is the base material from which a wide variety of other chromium chemicals are made. The refractory industry uses chromium principally in the form of chromite for the manufacture of refractory bricks for metallurgical furnaces.\textsuperscript{348}

Chromium has a wide range of direct military applications. Many items of military equipment and their sub-components are manufactured of stainless steel. Superalloys containing 5-10 percent chromium are used in the manufacture of jet engines. Weapons barrels are chrome-plated for longer life; zinc-chromium paint is used on helicopters to meet military specifications for oxidation resistance; and chromium green pigment is used in camouflage. Indirect military applications of chromium include the chemical industry, which uses corrosion-resistant stainless steel pipes and tanks. The military, in turn, depends on the chemical industry for provision of fuels and materials. The electronics industry is also dependent on chromium for hardware and manufacturing tools.\textsuperscript{349}

There is no substitute for chromite ore in the production of ferrochromium, chromium chemicals, or chrome refractories. Likewise, there is no substitute for chromium in the production of stainless steel or superalloys.\textsuperscript{350} Technological changes are likely to increase demand for chromium as an alloying agent. Demand projections show a steady long-term growth of about three percent annually both in the United States and worldwide.\textsuperscript{351}

Cobalt
The United States is the world's largest consumer of cobalt, but has no domestic production.\textsuperscript{352} Cobalt seldom occurs in sufficient quantities to be mined other than as a by-product, usually of nickel, copper, zinc, or platinum group metals production.\textsuperscript{353} As a result
it is only economical to produce cobalt in conjunction with another material as the main product. The lowest cost-significant deposits of cobalt for production as a byproduct of other materials exist in Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{354}

The primary direct military application of cobalt is the production of superalloys used to make aircraft turbine engines. Cobalt is also used in the production of camouflage paint because cobalt pigments are not easily detected by infrared illumination. Indirect military applications include the fabrication of industrial tools for the armaments industry and turbines which produce electricity for the production process. There is no substitute for cobalt in most of its current applications.\textsuperscript{355}

**Manganese**

Manganese is essential to iron and steel production by virtue of its sulfur-fixing, deoxidizing, and alloying properties. Steel making accounts for 85-90 percent of the U.S. domestic manganese demand. Manganese is also a component of widely used aluminum alloys. There are neither practical substitutes for its replacement in the steel industry nor methods of obtaining the bulk of U.S. requirements from domestic sources.\textsuperscript{356} Although there are few direct military applications for manganese, it is vital to the production of steel for the armaments industry.\textsuperscript{357}

**Platinum Group Metals**

Six metals -- platinum, palladium, rhodium, indium, ruthenium, and osmium -- make up the platinum group metals (PGMs).\textsuperscript{358} All but osmium are considered strategic minerals.\textsuperscript{359} The metals’ unique combinations of chemical inertness, refractoriness, and catalytic activity give them a wide variety of uses. Platinum group metals are used as catalysts in the automotive, chemical, and petroleum refining industries. They are also widely used in the electrical and electronics industries.\textsuperscript{360}

The primary direct military application of PGMs is advanced electronics. Contacts fabricated from PGMs tarnish very slowly, if at all. This is particularly important in the manufacture of electronic components whose reliability is essential in spite of long periods of dormancy. Indirect military applications of PGMs include the production of advanced materials for military and aerospace applications, especially advanced carbon-fiber production.\textsuperscript{361}
APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN

POLITICAL REGIMES AND ELECTION RESULTS

Angola
Civil war has been the norm in Angola since its independence from Portugal in 1974. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos was elected to the presidency as the result of elections held 29-29 September 1992. Dos Santos gained 49.6 percent; his opponent Jonas Savimbi 40.7 percent. Electoral results required a run-off election which was not held. Savimbi and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) disputed the election results and the civil war has resumed.\(^{362}\)

Benin
Mathieu Kerkou was elected to the presidency on 4 April 1996. Gneral Kerekou had previously ruled Benin for 17 years as head of a one-party regime which came to power through a military coup on 26 October 1972.\(^{363}\)

Botswana
In Botswana the National Assembly elected Sire Ketumile Masire to the presidency on 15 October 1994. Masire has been in power since 13 July 1980, when he became president following the death of Sire Seretse Khama. Prior to Khama’s death, Masire had been the country’s vice president.\(^{364}\)

Burkina-Faso
President (Capatain) Balsie Compaore was elected on 1 December 1991 with 90.4 percent of the vote. Compaore was the sole candidate in an election with an abstention rate of 74.7 percent. Compaore first came to power on 15 October 1987 when a commando unit loyal to him murdered President Thomas Sankara, who had himself come to power through a coup in 1983.\(^{365}\)

Burundi
On 25 July 1996 President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya was overthrown in a military coup. Major (Ret.) Pierre Buyoya has served as the country’s interim president since 27 September 1996. Buyoya had first seized power in Burundi through a coup in 1987, and relinquished control of the country to an elected government in July 1993.\(^{366}\)

Cameroon
On 10 October 1992, amid widespread allegations of fraud, Paul Biya was reelected to the presidency of Cameroon with 40 percent of the vote. Biya first assumed office on 6 November 1982 upon the resignation of Ahmadou Ahidjo. Prior to becoming president Biya had, since 1975, served as Cameroon’s prime minister.\(^{367}\)
Cape Verde
Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro has served as President of Cape Verde since 22 March 1991. He was originally elected as the result of elections held on 17 February 1991 in which he defeated incumbent President Pereira.  

Central African Republic (CAR)
Ange Patasse was elected to the presidency on 22 October 1993. The CAR remains mired in an intractable civil war; order in the country is maintained by an African peacekeeping force.  

Chad
Chadian President (Lieutenant General) Idriss Deby remained in office following elections held on 2 June and 11 July 1996. Opposition political parties maintained that both elections were fraudulent. Deby, leader of the Popular Salvation Movement, overthrew the government of President Hissen Habre and declared himself president on 4 December 1990.  

Comoros
Mohamed Taki Abdulkarim was elected President of the Comors with 64 percent of the vote on 16 March 1996. Comoros has had 18 coups in its 21 years of independence.  

Congo, Democratic Republic of (DRC, formerly Zaire)
The DRC remains under the one-man rule of General Laurent Kabila. On 17 May 1997 Kabila forced Mobutu Sese Seko, who had ruled Zaire since 1965, into exile and immediately assumed sole governing authority in the country, personally appointing all members of a national cabinet responsible only to him.  

Congo, Republic of
Pascal Lissouba was elected President of the Congo in August 1992. In 1997 he was driven into exile following a four month civil war. The country is now under military rule.  

Cote d'Ivoire
Henri Konan Bedie was elected to his second term as president on 22 October 1995. Bedie originally assumed the presidency on 7 December 1993 upon the death of Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who himself had served continuously as the country's president since November 1960. Opposition political parties boycotted the October 1995 elections, and Bedie was reelected by an overwhelming 95 percent of votes cast.  

Djibouti
On 7 May 1993 Hassan Gouled Aptidon was reelected as President of Djibouti against three opponents with 60.71 percent of the vote. He has been in office since 24 June 1977.  

118
Equatorial Guinea
On 25 February 1996 brigadier General (Retired) Teodoro Obang Nguema Mbasongo was reelected as President of Equatorial Guinea without opposition. Mbasongo originally took power through a military coup on 3 August 1979. Turn-out for the 1996 election was estimated at 30 percent of those eligible; international observers judged the election to have been a sham.\textsuperscript{375}

Eritrea
Eritrea declared its sovereignty on 24 May 1993 after a popular referendum held 23-25 April voted 99.8 percent in favor of independence from Ethiopia. Eritrea remains under a transitional government. Isaias Afwerki was elected president by the country's transitional legislature pending promulgation of a constitution.\textsuperscript{376}

Ethiopia
In Ethiopia the presidency is now a ceremonial post; executive power rests with the country's Prime Minister. Meles Zanawi has served as Ethiopia's Prime Minister since August 1995. Zanawi originally became the country's president in 1991 following the ouster of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam.\textsuperscript{377}

Gabon
In Gabon President El Hadj Omar Bongo was reelected to the presidency with 51 percent of the vote on 5 December 1993. Bongo has been President of Gabon since 2 December 1967.\textsuperscript{378}

Gambia
A military junta led by Lieutenant Yayah Jammeh seized power in a bloodless coup on 23 July 1994. Jammel (now a colonel) was elected to the presidency on 26 September 1996; although Gambia's constitution authorizes a small parliament, he continues to govern the country through a Ruling Military Council.\textsuperscript{379}

Ghana
Jerry Rawlings was reelected to the presidency on 7 December 1996. Rawlings had first come to power in Ghana 18 years before as the result of a military coup on 4 June 1979, as head of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Having relinquished power to an elected civilian government in June 1989, Rawlings seized power for a second time on 31 December 1981. Rawlings has ruled the country ever since, first as chairman of the Provisional National Defence Council and then, since 3 November 1992, as President.\textsuperscript{380}

Guinea
In Guinea Lansana Conte was elected president with 51.7 percent of the vote on 19 December 1993. Conte, who is also the country's Minister of Defense, seized power through a military coup on 3 April 1984.\textsuperscript{381}
Guinea-Bissau
In Guinea-Bissau President Jose Bernardo Vieira was reelected with 52 percent of the vote against a single candidate in August 1994. Vieira originally assumed power on 14 November 1980 when he deposed President Luiz Cabral.  

Kenya
On 5 January 1998, 73-year old Daniel arap Moi began is fifth five-year term as President of Kenya. Moi garnered 40 percent of the votes cast in Kenya’s December 1997 presidential election, with the other 60 percent divided between a dozen challengers. Government ministers had earlier declared Moi “President for Life” at a 1991 political rally.  

Lesotho
Lesotho is a modified constitutional monarchy. Ntsu Mokhehle has served as the country's Prime Minister since 2 April 1993.  

Liberia
Liberia remains under a transition coalition government; the country has no functioning civil administration.  

Madagascar
Didier Ratsiraka became President of Madagascar on 10 February 1997 following the impeachment of his predecessor.  

Malawi
President Bakili Muluzi was elected on 21 May 1994. Muluzi was democratically elected after a new constitution promulgated on 17 May 1994 ended the “life presidency” (30 years) of Hastings Banda.  

Mali
Mali is a functioning democracy; Alpha Oumar Kanare was elected to the presidency on 8 June 1992.  

Mauritania
On 17 January 1992 Colonel Ould Sid Ahmed Taya was reelected to President of Mauritania with 62.8 percent of the vote. Taya seized power through a military coup on 12 December 1984.  

Mozambique.
Joaquin Alberto Chissano became President of Mozambique on 6 November 1986; he was reelected to a second 5-year term on 9 December 1994.  

Namibia
President Sam Nujoma was elected on 21 May 1990 and reelected to office in December 1994.
Niger
Ibrahim Bare Mainassara was elected President of Niger in July 1996. Barre came to power on 28 January 1996 when he overthrew the country’s first democratically-elected president, Mahamane Ousmane. Bare dissolved the nation’s parliament on rules Niger through a National Safety Council.\textsuperscript{389}

Nigeria
Nigeria has been ruled by General Sani Abacha since 17 November 1993 when he declared himself head of state and chief of an 11-member Provisional Ruling Council. Abacha now serves simultaneously as Chairman and Minister of Defense of the country’s Executive Council, which he established in March 1995.\textsuperscript{390}

Rwanda
President Pasteur Bizumungu was forcibly installed by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan patriotic Front on 19 July 1994.\textsuperscript{391}

Sao Tome and Principe
President Miguel Trovoada was elected to the presidency on 4 April 1991 and reelected in July 1996.\textsuperscript{392}

Senegal
On 21 February 1993, Senegalese President Abdou Diouf was reelected to office with 58.4 percent of the vote. Diouf first assumed the presidency on 1 January 1981, following the resignation of Senegal’s first president, Leopold Senghor. Prior to assuming the presidency Diouf had, since 1970, served as the country’s Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{393}

Seychelles
France Albert Rene was reelected President of the Seychelles as the result of elections held 20–3 July 1993. Rene originally seized power through a coup on 5 June 1977.\textsuperscript{394}

Sierra Leone
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected as President of Sierra Leone on 29 March 1996. His government was subsequently overthrown on 25 May 1997 by Major Johnny Koroma, leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

Somalia
Somalia has no functioning government.\textsuperscript{395}

South Africa
Nelson Mandela was elected to the South African presidency as head of transitional coalition government the result of the nation’s first non-racial elections in April 1994. The country’s next elections are scheduled for April 1999.
Sudan
Brigadier General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bushir overthrew the country’s civilian government in a military coup on 30 June 1989. Sudan’s constitution remains suspended, and the country is ruled by as 12-member Revolutionary Council in which now-Lieutenant General Bashir serves as both President and Minister of National Defense. (Bashir was elected to the presidency by an overwhelming 75 percent of votes cast on 22 March 1996.)

Swaziland
Swaziland is a monarchy. The country has been under the rule of King Mswat III since 25 April 1986. Swaziland has no functioning constitution. The country has both a prime minister and cabinet which serve at the pleasure of the king.

Tanzania
Benjamin William Mkapa was elected to the Tanzanian presidency with 62 percent of the vote on 22 November 1995. While Mkapa’s election ostensibly ended thirty years of one-party rule all opposition candidates withdrew from the election because of alleged “irregularities.”

Togo
In Togo General Gnassingbe Eyadema was reelected president with 96.5 percent of the vote on 25 August 1993. Eyadema originally took power through a military coup on 14 April 1967.

Uganda
Lieutenant General Yoweri Kaguta Museveni was elected President of Uganda with 74 percent of the vote on 9 May 1996. Museveni originally seized power in Uganda ten years earlier on 29 January 1986.

Zambia
Frederick Chiluba was elected to his second term as president on 18 November 1996. Chiluba was first elected in 1991 over Kenneth Kaunda, who had ruled Zambia since 1964. Kaunda was subsequently charged with planning a coup to overthrow Chiluba; he and 90 of his supporters were initially detained without trial and Chiluba imposed a national “state of emergency” which remained in effect until March 1998.

Zimbabwe
During elections held 26-27 March 1996, Robert Mugabe was reelected as Zimbabwe’s Executive President, an office he has held since 31 December 1987. Mugabe was reelected without opposition.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION


2 “Realism,” often equated with the German concept of realpolitik, is one of the dominant schools of thought in international affairs. Realism is distinguished from contending approaches by three basic assumptions regarding the nature of international politics. First, Realists consider the international system to be anarchic and based on the principle of self-help. Anarchy in this sense does not imply chaos, but rather the absence of any meaningful political authority higher than the state. Second, states are the dominant actors in world politics. While nongovernmental and international organizations do play a role in the international system, they are only of secondary importance to national actors. Third, states act to maximize their national interests, the foremost of which is security. This is not to imply that moral values, ideals, and laws are irrelevant to international relations. They must be tempered, however, by the vision that the national interest must be rendered secure enough to make action in their name effective. For discussions and critiques of Realism see Joel Krieger, ed. The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993), 771-773; Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1982), 395; and Jay M. Shafritz, Phil Williams, and Ronald S. Calinger, The Dictionary of 20th Century World Politics (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 1993), 564-565.

CHAPTER 1


6 Chase and others, 37.


8 Earl W. Tilford, Jr., Strategic Challenges in an Uncertain World (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 5 February 1996), 25. Tilford writes, “To a great extent, Africa’s future will be determined by events in the region’s three strategic giants: Zaire [DRC], Nigeria, and South Africa.”


12 The "homelands" of Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, and BophuthaTswana were established by the apartheid government to provide separate nations, and consequently separate citizenship, for South Africa's black population. See Sparks, 199-200.


14 Other racial groups include Coloreds (8.6 percent) and Indians (2.6 percent). Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook 1997* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997), 428.

15 Ibid., 429.


17 Crawford, 89.


20 Ibid., 13.

21 Ibid.

22 South African Communications Service, 303-304.


27 Crawford, 88 and 96.


29 Mandela, 87-88.

30 Ibid., 89.
31 Ibid., 87.


33 Greenhouse, 3, quoted in Crawford, 96.

34 Mandela, 89.

35 Cilliers, 44.

36 South African Communications Service, 192.

37 Ibid., 193. At time of writing the SADC member-states are Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

38 Ibid.


41 Muller, 31.

42 For an account of South African threat perceptions and operations in Angola during this period see Heitman, South African Armed Forces, 202-226.


44 Muller, 39.

45 This observation is based on discussions with several officials at the Embassy of South Africa, Washington, DC, 7 April 1998.


49 Ibid.


51 South African Communications Service, 312.
Ibid.


Cilliers, 41.

South African Department of Defense, 1.


Cilliers, 47.

On 5 February 1998 General Meiring provided President Mandela with an intelligence report which indicated that several high-ranking members of the ANC were intentionally working to destabilize the Government of National Unity. A three-member commission appointed by President Mandela subsequently found the report to be without merit. Upon announcing his resignation General Meiring said, “The action that resulted from my giving the report caused certain...mistrust. I feel it is my duty to do the honorable thing.” Tom Cohen, “South Africa’s Military Chief Steps Down,” *Associated Press*, 6 April 1998, <http://www.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/world/040698/world14_8680_body.html> (6 June 1998).

The South African government ceased to directly finance the RDP in July 1996. It now exists as a fund to hold foreign grant money, which is managed by the Ministry of Finance. *South African Communications Service*, 53.


South African Communications Service, 312; Campbell, “The South African Air Force at 75,” 49.


South African Communications Service, 312.


International Institute for Strategic Studies, 258.

South African Department of Defense, 63.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Cilliers, 44-45.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 258.

South African Department of Defense, 78.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Campbell, 49.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 258.

South African Department of Defense, 93.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Mills, 11.


International Institute for Strategic Studies, 258.

One ship, the SAS Outeniqua, can carry 320 containers or 60 armor fighting vehicles, or some combination of both. It can also carry 120 troops and provides limited sickbay facilities. Keith Campbell, "Preparing for the New Role," Naval Forces, Number 3, 1996, 45.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 258-259.

South African Department of Defense, 106.

Ibid., 107.
Ibid.

Ibid.

Heitman, South African Armed Forces, 2.


South African Communications Service, 194.

Mr. Jan van Vollenhoven, Economic Counselor, Embassy of South Africa, Washington, DC, interview with author, 8 April 1998.

Central Intelligence Agency, 430.


Cilliers, 43-44.


South African Communications Service, 139.


CHAPTER 2


114 Ibid., 95.


117 See, for example, the American Assembly's final report on its 1997 conference on "Africa and U.S. National Interests." The report's introduction states: The end of the Cold War has radically reconfigured our world, producing a new series of foreign policy challenges and opportunities for the United States. This is particularly true in Africa. The United States must embrace a bold, new futurist vision of Africa, recognizing that its economic, security, and human rights issues are also our issues, and that their lack of resolution will pose a continuing threat to international peace and stability. (The American Assembly, *Africa and U.S. National Interests*, 1 July 1997, <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/amassembly/future/afrika/report.html#report> (23 March 1998). For an extensive list of potential U.S. national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa see Henk, 96-103.

118 Henk, 95.


121 Ibid.


129 Henk, 96.

CHAPTER 3

131 Department of the Interior, 44.
132 Ibid., 48.
133 Ibid., 104.
134 Ibid., 126.
138 Butts, 2.
139 Heitman, South African Armed Forces, 4.
140 Chase and others, 46; Butts and Thomas, 44-45.

143 Pollock, 166.
144 For a discussion of this period see Pollock, 21-37.
Herbst, 120.

Higgs, 90.

Ibid.


A U.S. Government official who wishes to remain anonymous, interview with author, 6 April 1998.


Ibid.

Chabal, 83.


Chabal, 84.


Central Intelligence Agency, 270 and 427.

Ibid., 443 and 269.

Ibid., 146; Hunter, 467.

Central Intelligence Agency, 393.

Central Intelligence Agency, 393.


Hunter, 989.

Central Intelligence Agency, 108.


Ibid.


Central Intelligence Agency, 489.


World Bank, 36.


Chabal, 90.

These figures are derived from those reported for each country in the Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook, 1997. The World Bank estimates Sub-Saharan Africa's population growth rate to be three percent per year. World Bank, 33.

World Bank, 33.

Central Intelligence Agency, 488.

World Bank, 33-35.

Ibid.

Ibid., 18.

Central Intelligence Agency, 488.

Ibid., 20.
194 Bruce, 23.
195 Ibid., 20.
196 Central Intelligence Agency, 488.
198 Heitman, South African Armed Forces, 5.
199 World Bank, 36.
201 World Bank, 18.
204 World Bank, 28.
205 Henk, 102.
206 World Bank, 44-45.

CHAPTER 4

208 National policy is defined as, “A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Pub 1-02) (Washington, DC: 23 March 1994), 254.
210 Henk, 93.
In this sense an objective is defined as a future set of conditions which a government aspires to bring about by wielding influence abroad and by changing or sustaining the behavior of other states. K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 131.


Brinkley, 116.

Ibid., 119.


Ibid., 2.

Ibid.

Ibid., 1.


Henk, note 30, 107.


Brinkley, 116.


Brinkley, 116.


231 Ibid., 5.

232 Ibid., 1. These are also stated, with minor differences, in The White House, July 1994, i; The White House, February 1995, i; and The White House, February 1995, i.


234 Ibid., 14.

235 Ibid., 18.

236 Ibid., 19.

237 Ibid.


239 The White House, February 1996, 43.


241 Ibid.

242 Ibid.

243 Ibid.

244 Ibid.


248 Ibid., 26.

249 Volman, 3-4.

250 Ibid.

251 Ibid.

252 Butts, 1.

253 "Secretary Christopher Promises 'New Relationship' with Africa."
Butts, 95; Higgs, 91.

"Secretary Christopher Promises 'New Relationship' with Africa."

A U.S. Government official who wishes to remain anonymous, interview with author, 6 April 1998.

Lyman, 118.

Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, <gopher://gopher.state.gov:70/00ftp>.


Ibid.

Mr. John F. Scott, Officer-in-Charge, South Africa, Office of Southern African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, interview with author, 6 April 1998.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

275 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 254-255.


277 Henk, note 5, 105.


279 A United States Government official who wishes to remain anonymous, interview with author, 7 April 1998.

280 A United States Government official who wishes to remain anonymous, interview with author, 7 April 1998.


282 “Remarks by President Clinton and Vice President Gore Following South Africa Elections, May 5, 1994.”


291 Higgs, 90.


Makinda, 571.


Makinda, 557; Gordon, 57.

Moss, 189.


Bienen, 72-73.


These countries are Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Tunisia, and Uganda. Ethiopia offered two battalions, the other countries one each. Henk, note 37, 107.


Henk, 104.

Henk and Metz, xi.

For a discussion of potential South African contributions to a regional peacekeeping force see Brooks, 108-120.


“Secretary Christopher Promises ‘New Relationship’ with Africa.”


A United States Government official who wishes to remain anonymous, interview with author, 7 April 1998.


Butts and Thomas, 45.

Kent Hughes Butts, Strategic Minerals and the New World Order (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), 11.

Ibid.

Department of the Interior, 48-49.

Ibid., 127.


340 Moss, 198.

341 Representative Harry Johnston, Chairman of the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on African Affairs, 5 March 1993, quoted in Moss, 198.

342 Chase and others, 35.


346 Weston, 17.

347 Papp, 178.

348 Ibid., 170.

349 Allen and Noehrenberg, 16.


351 Ibid., 17.


353 Weston, 18; Allen and Noehrenberg, 20.


357 Allen and Noehrenberg, 24.

Allen and Nochrenberg, 27.

Rssese, 619.

Allen and Nochrenberg, 28-29.

Central Intelligence Agency, 11-12; Hunter, 48.


Central Intelligence Agency, 74; Hunter 257; Africa South of the Sahara, 210.

Central Intelligence Agency, 78; Hunter, 266; Africa South of the Sahara, 226-227.

Central Intelligence Agency, 82; Hunter, 275; Africa South of the Sahara, 245.

Central Intelligence Agency, 87; Hunter, 330.

Central Intelligence Agency, 393.


Central Intelligence Agency, 106; Africa Review 1997, 44.

Central Intelligence Agency, 108.

Central Intelligence Agency, 117; Africa South of the Sahara, 376.

Central Intelligence Agency, 131; Hunter, 434.

Central Intelligence Agency, 144; Hunter, 463-464; Africa Review 1997, 68.

Central Intelligence Agency, 146; Hunter, 467.

Africa Review 1997, 74; Central Intelligence Agency, 150.

Central Intelligence Agency, 168.

Africa South of the Sahara, 538-539.

Central Intelligence Agency, 179; Africa South of the Sahara, 489-493.

Central Intelligence Agency, 197.

Central intelligence Agency, 199; Hunter, 608.


Central Intelligence Agency, 270.
385 Central Intelligence Agency, 287; Hunter, 865.

386 Central Intelligence Agency, 303; Hunter, 893; Africa South of the Sahara, 677.

387 Central Intelligence Agency, 325.

388 Ibid., 324.

389 Central Intelligence Agency, 344; Africa Review 1997, 158; Hunter, 983.

390 Hunter, 989.

391 Central Intelligence Agency, 393.

392 Ibid., 405.

393 Central Intelligence Agency, 409; Africa South of the Sahara, 869.


395 Central Intelligence Agency, 427.

396 Hunter, 1195-1196.

397 Central Intelligence Agency, 443.


399 Central Intelligence Agency, 460; Hunter, 1245.

400 Central Intelligence Agency, 478.

401 Central Intelligence Agency, 519; Hunter, 1628.
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