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BULGARIAN COMPLICITY IN ARMS SMUGGLING, TERROR SCORED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 11 Sep 82 pp 1, 11

[Article by Ugur Mumcu: "Terrorism and the Neutrals"]

[Text] Our administrative attaché in the Bulgarian city of Burgas, Bora Suelkan, was basely murdered by a terrorist organization calling itself the "Justice Commandos of Armenian Genocide." This is the first time those Armenian terrorist organizations have committed this kind of crime in a socialist country. We think this fact has a special significance.

It is known that Bulgaria is wide open to arms smuggling. There is no one unaware of the fact that Turkish smugglers are based in the Bulgarian capital of Sofia. That smugglers of Armenian origin play a role in Turkish-related arms smuggling incidents and that some of them are in Sofia are also topics of general knowledge.

The Armenian smuggler Cemsit Sakuyan, for instance, has been in Sofia for years. Sakuyan works with the Turkish smugglers Fikri Kocakerim and Selahattin Guvensoy. Information has also reached us that Omer Marsan, the man who provided a passport for Mehmet Ali Agca, the Pope's attempted assassin, is one of Fikri Kocakerim's henchmen.

It is further known that the brothers Resit and Saban Vezir live in Sofia and direct arms smuggling traffic from there. Saban Vezir's real name is written "Chaban Rachid Chaban." He was born in Aleppo in 1933, the son of Resit and Makkule, and the Bulgarian police know where he is and what he does.

And Turkish police know that the Izmir connection in an arms smuggling incident in which Vezir was allegedly involved was a jeweler named Savator Kahenka.

The telephone numbers 50-14-12 and 50-12-14 in Sofia belong to the Sofia headquarters of the Turkish arms smuggling connection.

It was in Burgas, where our administrative attaché was killed, that these arms were loaded onto the Greek Cypriot bottom "Vaswola" which was captured in the Bosporus in May 1967 with 495 rocket launchers and 10,000 projectiles aboard. The captains were Greek. The arms were shipped by the Bulgarian Kintex Company. Kintex works in conjunction with the companies "Balkan-Tourist-Ship," "Dop-ek" and "Intercommerce."
Sofia is a den of thieves harboring every smuggler from Saban Vezir to Bekir Celenk and from Bekir Celenk to Abuzer Ugurlu. And all of them are an embarrassment to a socialist nation. Socialism rests on human respect and is damaged by this kind of attitude and behavior. The gravest, most unpardonable crime against socialism would be committed by directing arms smuggling and harboring the smugglers. This is being done.

If the Bulgarian police want to clear up this latest Armenian crime, all they have to do is review the incidents and relationships we have summarized here, each of which is documented.

We have been struggling against the tide in this column for years, demonstrating the external sources of internal terrorism and trying to prove, not in general terms but by documentation, the Armenian-Greek Cypriot cooperation. We tried to expose one by one the Bulgarian connection in the smuggling, the companies and the Turkish ends of this connection. We ran into incredible pressures because of this, as well as relationships and "patronage" that would raise blisters on many a lip when we announced them in the future. We traced with sinking heart who was being protected, and how and why.

There is still today a question of the same "patronage" in certain organizations by certain individuals! Yes, indeed, it is ever so true! We shall prove it when necessary, we shall certainly prove it, it is true!

It does us no good to speak empty phrases about Armenian terrorism; each painful incident we experience should at least prompt us to think about the sources of terrorism.

8349
CSO: 4654/456
MLAPU TRIAL MARKED BY PROCEDURAL HAGGLING

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 9 Sep 82 p 8

[Text] Trial of the illegal Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Union [MLAPU] resumed on 3 September at the Istanbul Military Command Military Court Number Three. At the trial, now at the stage of hearing witnesses and arguing evidence, the court ruled to release 12 more defendants.

At the trial, continuing at the courtroom at Metris, attorney Ali Riza Dizdar spoke in reference to giving photocopies of file documents to the defendants and asked that the court vacate the interim rulings it had issued on this topic at earlier sessions. While filing these requests, attorney Dizdar also requested that copies of the earlier confession of defendant Semsi Ozkan be given to the relevant defendants.

Attorney Dizdar's statement, in which he cited constitutions and laws, was entered in the record as follows:

"Defendants' obtaining file photocopies under article 90 of Law No 353 and article 143 of the Law on Criminal Procedure was forbidden by a circular sent by the Istanbul legal counsel. It was stated in this circular that only attorneys could obtain documents under these articles; but there is one thing which was forgotten in that, just as the introductory articles of both laws begin with the article on the defendant's retaining an attorney, if one examines article 122 of Law No 353, the sense derived is that if the defendant wishes to gather witness, expert or other defense evidence during trial, he may give the court these documents 5 days in advance. Furthermore, article 83 of the 1876 Constitution enables everyone to employ any document legitimus he deems necessary for his defense in court. Article 59 of the 1924 Constitution says everyone is free to employ the legitimate means he deems necessary for his self defense in court. The 1961 Constitution also, inspired by article 24 of the Italian Constitution, says defense is an inalienable right at every stage and state of trial, and article 100 of the Ankara Faculty of Law's draft constitution, drawn up during preparation of this constitution, which says everyone has the right to present evidence and freely defend himself before the legal authorities as well as article 30 of the Istanbul Faculty of Law's draft constitution stipulate that everyone has the right to have his case or petition heard before the legal authorities, the executive and the administration, to make use of all legal means to defend himself and to have his charges heard and that the exercise of
this right may not be obstructed. Article 31 of the 1961 Constitution stipulates that everyone has the right of prosecution and defense as plaintiff or defendant before the legal authorities, taking advantage of all legal ways and means. It says that no court may fail to hear a case under its jurisdiction and duty. Article 6 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, as cited by both the 1961 Constitution and, finally, the draft constitution under discussion in the Consultative Assembly, indeed by the Head of State as well as announced on television every day, says explicitly: Everyone, wherever he may be, has the right to recognition of his legal identity. Article 11 says that everyone suspected of committing a crime is innocent until proven guilty legally by a public trial in which he is provided access to all the preparations necessary for his defense. And the Penal Affairs Directorate General's explication of this in Circular 10897 of 1 April 1955 says: Although it is objectionable to allow defendants to examine the file as it is possible that the file would be destroyed in the process of examination by defendants, they may obtain one copy each of the evidence contained in the case file through the agency of their attorneys. I think it well in my recitation here to point out this: Every defendant tried by Your Honor is a defendant until conclusion of the trial and the defense is his most sacred intermediary whether he has an attorney or not. Although a witness is free under article 146/1 of the Turkish Penal Code to go to his attorney's office and obtain photocopies of all files, the failure of a defendant being detained and tried under 141/5 to receive photocopies of the file by means of his attorney owing to the objection of the court is not a conflict repugnant to his defense. In fact, during the trial of the Revolutionary People's Vanguard, the distinguished prosecutor, notwithstanding the absence of any article of law pertaining to defendants' receiving photocopies from the file, permitted all copies taken from the file to be given to the defendants since this matter was of concern to the defense, and this was done. For these reasons, I respectfully request, in order that the defendants be given the means of defense which is their most natural right both constitutionally and from the standpoint of international agreements, that you vacate your earlier ruling, not as regards Semsî Ozkan alone, but as regards the inclusion of all documents.

The court, rendering a decision after the military prosecutor's statement of opinion that the request should be denied, ruled that "requests by a portion of the counsel for the defense as regards providing defendants copies of all documents existing in the file shall be heard in the next session after examination of the file."

The military court ruled the release of defendants Ozer Kazak, Yuksel Parilî, Isa Kalayci, Necmettin Solhan, Sedat Ulu, Caner Sonmez, Serdar Yardincier, Naim Gultekin, Tayfun Ipek, Mehmet Karapinar, Kemalettin Dogan and Nese Inceoglu.

Trial was recessed until today at 1030 hours.

8349
CSO: 4654/446
PRESENT, FUTURE SITUATION IN ELECTRIC ENERGY ANALYZED

Athens MEISMVIRINI in Greek 18 Sep 82 p l

[Commentary by K. Kolmer: "Toward Forced Forms of Energy"]

Excerpts DEI [Public Power Administration] is the biggest firm in the country, not only from a turnover or business standpoint but from a capital and loan-receiving standpoint. Thus, it is and can become a factor for introducing high technology, something so much needed by our country.

DEI's production increase from 14.6 million kilowatt hours in 1975 to 21.7 million in 1981 was not always accompanied by a corresponding "economy of scale," with the result being a rise in the price of electric current from 2.9 drachmas a kilowatt hour in 1980 to 5.2 drachmas a kilowatt hour in 1982 for household electric power use, and from 1.3 drachmas a kilowatt hour to 2.3 drachmas for high tension power use. The reason for these great price rises of electric power in our country was the dependence on its being supplied by petroleum and the great increase in the wages of DEI personnel, in association with the increase in the number of its employees.

Within this context, the anticipated cutback in petroleum use from 31 percent of the overall electric power production in 1981 to 10 percent in 1985 and to "zero" in 1990 is a DEI policy going in the right direction, as long as it is associated with the increase in productivity of its personnel.

How will this development come about?

1. With stress on DEI's investments in lignite-powered thermoelectric plants which will more than double in power from the present 2.5 megawatts to 6 megawatts in 1992.

2. With five new hydroelectric projects (Gkiona, Sfikia, Asomatou, Stratos and the Aoos springs) that will add 1,100 megawatt hours to the interconnected system up to 1986. Another 500 Gigawatt-hours could be derived from the completion of the hydroelectric projects of Sfikia and Asomatou, while additional power of 1,500 Gigawatt-hours could come from the development of the waters of the Nestos and Akheloos Rivers.

Thus, at the beginning of the next decade, 92 percent of electric power production in our country will come from local resources, while the remaining 8 percent could be covered by the development of peat and the so-called soft fort of energy.
Soft forms of energy are geothermy, wind-powered energy and solar energy, the only ones that leave the natural environment untouched and do not exhaust energy deposits of the planet (except perhaps for geothermy, in a theoretical context).

The recent experimental drilling to 2,000 meters on Nisyros, which is the most promising geothermal plain in Europe as maintained by EEC experts, has encouraged the prospects for development of geothermal electric power, following the successful effort on Milos where an experimental 4 megawatt station exists. Greece could very shortly have available 100 megawatt geothermal electric power stations. Wind-powered generators with 20 kilowatt hour power capacity, that have been set up on Kythnos this summer, can be augmented. All the islands of the Aegean that are "swept" by etesian winds and whose future is darkened by uncertainty could acquire self-sufficient energy with wind-powered generators and undersea cables that will complement the network. And here, aid by the EEC regional fund could be valuable not only financially but politically. The EEC must invest in the Aegean because that is its best defense (coming after aviation).

Last but not least comes the use of solar energy and the establishment of two 100 kilowatt photovoltaic stations on Kythnos and a 50 kilowatt station in Nea Roumeli, near Sfakia in Crete, which could be considered as the first step toward the development of the vast solar energy potential of our country, given the fact that sunlight in southern Greece is prevalent more than 300 days a year.

Nevertheless, despite these encouraging prospects for energy self-sufficiency, our country will never be sure —and from a more general aspect— if it does not turn to nuclear energy as quickly as possible.

It would be proper for Greece to very quickly begin training a new generation of scientists in nuclear energy and technology to be able to be at least on the same level as neighboring countries. Beyond that, nuclear energy will shortly be as cheap as conventional energy.
ENERGY COOPERATION WITH GREAT BRITAIN STUDIED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 24 Sep 82 p 3

Excerpt Favorable prospects are being outlined for cooperation between Greece and Great Britain in the field of energy.

The above was confirmed yesterday during an exchange of views on energy matters of common interest between Greek Minister of Energy and Natural Resources E. Kouloumbis and British Deputy Secretary of State for Energy Mellor.

During the discussions, the possibility of cooperation of DEI /Public Power Administration/, DEP /Public Petroleum Corporation/ and the state refineries with the corresponding British state elements was brought up.

Moreover, in the discussions Mr Mellor had with the DEI administration, he was informed about the developmental program of the organization and about DEI's research programs, as well as the use of solid fuels (lignite and coal).

The British deputy secretary of state emphasized that the margins for cooperation between the two countries in the above fields of endeavor, as well as in the field of geothermy and solar energy, are great.
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF COUNTRY DISCUSSED

Nicosia 0 FILELEVHEROS in Greek 8 Sep 82 p 3

[Text] The economic messages coming to us from abroad are not at all pleasing. Just a few days ago, the delegates of countries which make up the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, known as GATT, told us their forecasts which are exceptionally pessimistic. These forecasts talk about an eventual international economic crisis worse than that known by mankind at the beginning of the 30's, when one business after another declared bankruptcy and millions of unemployed and starving workers in Europe and the United States turned menacingly to the streets.

In Toronto, Canada, the stock-brokers from wealthy countries who gathered for the proceedings of the International Monetary Fund notified the developing countries that future financing of their programs by wealthy countries will not happen in the same way as heretofore. Conditions will be made for taking anti-inflationary and other measures in the countries to be financed. And, of course, these will be measures which some, with the fluency distinguishing them, will hurry to call anti-popular; in any case, they will be measures which the various governments have not considered implementing in the frameworks of their economic programs.

We repeat that we cannot maintain that the Cypriot economy is not going well, despite the fact there are fairly many problems which—if we do not deal with them—will lead us to an economic crisis. But if our economy is not going badly, this is owing, among other things, to the fact that thus far we have had the convenience of having recourse to relatively easy foreign lending. No one conceals the fact that one of the wrinkles of our economic and, more generally, fiscal life is the worries caused by increased foreign lending to Cyprus, the many loans which we have concluded and which we must, with our people's labor, repay some day—with interest, of course. If the opinions of economically strong foreign countries on the way to finance developing countries are sanctioned in the end, this convenience will probably not exist in the future for Cyprus, even though we enjoy the reputation of a reliable country which fulfills its loan obligations and makes the best possible use of every kind of foreign aid.

All these suggest the need for immediate economic vigilance on the government's part. Our dissensions are such that an intense international
economic upset would be enough to drag us to rough grounds, even if we have the impression today that we are far from such undesirable places.

The economic messages which are coming to us from abroad must make us uneasy so they do not find us unprepared.

9247
CSO: 4621/520
INCREASED EXPORTS NOTED IN MAY

Nicosia I ELEVHEROTYPIA in Greek 2 Sep 82 p 8

[Text] Cyprus' total exports in May 1982 rose to 28,333,000 pounds, compared to 20,914,000 pounds in April 1982 and 27,116,000 pounds in May 1981.

Imports amounted to 50,468,000 pounds, compared to 44,736,000 pounds in April 1982 and 45,092,000 pounds in May 1981.

The trade-balance deficit in May 1982 came to 22,135,000 pounds, compared to 23,822,000 pounds in April 1982 and 17,976,000 pounds in May 1981.

These data are reported in the monthly report on foreign trade published by the Department of Statistics and Research.

Further on in the report the following are presented as the principal characteristics of our foreign trade:

1. Industrial products accounted for 56.2 percent of exports of domestic production in May 1982 and amounted to 12,781,000 pounds; agricultural products, at 41.4 percent, amounted to 9,407,000 pounds and ores, at 2.2 percent, amounted to 508,000 pounds.

2. Of the May 1982 imports, 44.7 percent, at 22,586,000 pounds, were raw materials; 24.3 percent, at 12,266,000 pounds, were consumer goods; 14 percent, at 7,080,000 pounds, were petroleum products; 9.6 percent, at 4,826,000 pounds, were capital goods; and 7.3 percent, at 3,676,000 pounds, were transport equipment.

3. In May 1982, imports worth 25,190,000 pounds, 49.9 percent, came from the European Common Market. Eastern countries provided Cyprus with goods worth 2,772,000 pounds, 5.5 percent of the total, while our imports from the Arab countries amounted to 5,268,000 pounds, 10.4 percent. Our imports from other countries totalled 17,237,000 pounds, 34.2 percent of the total.

4. The European Common Market absorbed goods worth 11,997,000 pounds, 42.3 percent of Cyprus' total exports in May 1982, headed by the United Kingdom with 8,749,000 pounds, then Belgium and Luxembourg with 1,243,000 pounds. The Arab countries bought goods worth 10,869,000 pounds, 38.4 percent, in
May 1982. Saudi Arabia absorbed goods worth 2,821,000 pounds; Lebanon, 2,038,000 pounds; Iraq, 1,233,000 pounds; Syria, 1,052,000 pounds; and Kuwait, 903,000 pounds. The eastern countries purchased products worth 2,137,000 pounds, 7.5 percent of the total, and all the other countries absorbed 1,391,000 pounds, 4.9 percent. Finally, goods worth 1,905,000 pounds, 6.7 percent, were sold as supplies to ships and airplanes.

9247
CSO: 4621/516
TRADE AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH SYRIA

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 25 Aug 82 pp 1,7

[Text] Minister of Commerce and Industry G. Andreou, who is in Damascus, signed with the Syrian Arab Republic's minister of economy and foreign trade, Salim Yasin, a trade agreement between Cyprus and Syria.

Speaking during the ceremony, Mr. Andreou stressed the importance Cyprus attaches to its trade relations with Syria and he expressed the certainty that the agreement will contribute to further developing friendly relations and increasing commercial exchanges between the two countries.

Mr. Andreou, speaking on behalf of the friendly feelings of the Cypriot people and President of the Republic Spyros Kyprianou in particular, reaffirmed Cyprus' undivided support to the just struggle of the Syrian and Palestinian peoples for liberation of the occupied lands, and prayed for a quick end to the Palestinians' sufferings, with recognition of their inalienable rights to self-determination. Mr. Andreou thanked the Syrian Government for the continuing and unlimited support which Syria gives to Cyprus' just struggle and underlined the Cypriot people's determination to continue the struggle until the final justification.

Mr. Yasin expressed his government's warm thanks for Cyprus' support to the Arab cause and reaffirmed the Syrian Government and people's support to the just cause of the struggling Cypriot people.

Present at the ceremony for signing the agreement were, on the Cypriot side, the Cypriot ambassador to Damascus, G. Lykourgos, and the trade officer, A. Mavrogenis.

On 22 August, Mr. Andreou attended, as an official guest of the Syrian Government, the opening of the Damascus International Fair, in which Cyprus is participating for the twelfth time with its own booth.

Mr. Andreou also had cordial talks with Deputy Prime Minister Kandoura, during which they discussed bilateral issues, with particular emphasis on the Cyprus problem and the two countries' trade and economic relations.

In addition, the minister had contacts with the ministers of economy and foreign trade, industry and tourism, the minister of state for planning
affairs and the president of the Damascus State Fair; he exchanged viewpoints with them on further developing bilateral relations. During these contacts, the two sides affirmed their earnest desire to further expand and strengthen relations between the two countries.

Within the frameworks of the existing Cypriot-Syrian tourist agreement, Mr. Andreou invited Minister of Tourism Nawras al-Daqr to visit Cyprus and take part in the mixed tourist committee which will convene in Nicosia in the fall to discuss methods of tourist cooperation and increasing the flow of tourists between Cyprus and Syria.

Mr. Andreou also had an opportunity to visit the Syrian state industrial units for construction of bottles, ceramics and electrical and telephone wires.

9247
CSO: 4621/520
PROSPECTS FOR TRADE DEVELOPMENT WITH GDR GOOD

Nicosia Kharavigi in Greek 25 Aug 82 pp 1,7

[Text] There is much room for further developing economic and trade relations between the German Democratic Republic and Cyprus. The two sides have not exhausted the huge possibilities for developing trade between them. On its part, the GDR is interested to a great degree in executing large works in Cyprus, in cooperation with Cypriot firms; it is also prepared to work with Cypriot firms to execute works in third countries.

This was reported on 24 August by the trade counselor from the GDR Embassy, Alfred Heigelhaupt, during a news conference on the occasion of the Leipzig Fall Fair which will run from 5 to 11 September.

GDR enterprises, he noted, can take into consideration the needs of the Cypriot market, which can be the basis for closer and broader cooperation in the economic and trade sectors. An example from the past is the GDR's construction of a grain silo with a 30,000-ton capacity in Limassol in cooperation with Cypriot firms.

Mr. Heigelhaupt reported that the GDR created the largest slaughter-house in Iraq; he observed that GDR enterprises could also work in conjunction with Cypriot firms to build the slaughter-house which Cypriot authorities are planning in the area of Kofinou.

The GDR, as a supplier of bridges and other harbor installations in ten foreign countries, could contribute to expanding our harbors. He also added that, last year, imports from the GDR were mainly metal-processing machines, chemical products, typographic machines and others.

Cypriot Participation

Cyprus will be represented at the Leipzig Fall Fair by three exhibiting companies (LOEL [Popular Distillers Company of Limassol], Ieropoulos and Cooperative Movement) which will mainly offer Cypriot products which they have displayed in Leipzig for many years.

Six-thousand exhibitors from 50 countries are taking part; 300,000 people from 100 or more countries are expected to visit the fair.
GDR factories and export organizations will exhibit in all sectors high-level products which confirm and underscore the GDR's reputation as a dynamic and consistent partner. Twelve other socialist countries, including all the members of the Council for Economic Aid, are displaying their economies' dynamism and quite a few achievements of socialist economic cooperation. High-quality products and consumer goods are among the things to be exhibited by 20 export organizations from the Soviet Union.

The Developing Countries

The Leipzig Fall Fair is significant for many countries in Africa and the Arab world, Asia and Latin America for developing trade relations. This fall, ten countries from these areas will use the Leipzig fair to show their economic power and to draw the visitors' attention to their exporting and importing possibilities. Among the countries which will have exhibits are Brazil, India, Iran, Morocco, Syria and Peru.

Exhibitors from 21 capitalist countries and West Berlin will participate in the 1982 Fall Fair. Special interest will be attracted by the chemical branch; participating will be nine of the ten largest concerns in the world-- Hoechst, Bayer, BAS, Dupont de Nemours, Dow Chemical, Union Carbide, I.C.I., Montedison and DSM.

Another point of interest will be the road-vehicles branch, for which the exhibiting area has been expanded. Besides the European colossi in passenger-car construction, like FIAT, Volkswagen, Daimler, Benz, Citroen and Peugeot, the Japanese concern, Nissan Motor, will be exhibiting this year for the first time. Many other exhibitors to be present for the first time are expected from Italy, Holland, FRG, Great Britain and Sweden.

Gold Metals

On the Leipzig Fall Fair program is a special type of jubilee: For the fortieth time, gold metals and diplomas will be given to the best-quality items on an international level. Since 1963, this very honorable distinction has been bestowed on more than 4,800 such items. In the past, these metals have been given to LOEL, KEO and ETKO [Cyprus Wines Corporation] products.

The first secretary from the GDR Embassy, Joachim Vetsig, was also present at the news conference.

9247
CSO: 4621/520
BUDGET DEFICIT REPORTED IN TFSC

Nicosia KHRAVGI in Greek 5 Sep 82 p 12

[Text] According to statistical data of the "ministry" of finance concerning the budget of the "federated" state for 1981, the "state's" revenues in 1981 amounted to 5.195 billion Turkish pounds, while expenditures were 7.220 billion Turkish pounds. The deficit was 2.025 billion Turkish pounds. Expenditures, in comparison with 1980, increased 71.5 percent; revenues rose 94.7 percent. Investments in 1981 increased, in comparison with 1980, 234 percent and rose to 1.47 billion Turkish pounds. The portion of investments in the total 1980 budget was 10 percent, while it increased to 20 percent in the 1981 budget. The portion of current expenses was 89.5 percent, and decreased to 79.5 percent. The total increases in domestic revenues in the 1981 budget were 73.2 percent, while foreign aid increased 158.2 percent.

Domestic revenues were 3.450 billion Turkish pounds, while foreign aid was 1.745 billion Turkish pounds. Despite the increase in foreign aid, aid from the United Nations decreased by 97.2 percent and aid from other countries decreased by 27.4 percent. In revenues, the largest increase, 173 percent, was seen in aid given by Turkey, followed by indirect taxation, 121.3 percent.

During 1981, aid from Turkey rose to 1.656 billion Turkish pounds and revenues from indirect taxation to one billion Turkish pounds. The portion of revenues from indirect taxation was 16.8 percent in 1980 and 19 percent in 1981.
ECONOMY SEEN HURT BY PASOK FOREIGN POLICY

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 19-20 Sep 82 p 1

Article by N. Nikolaou: "The Cancelling of Exports Because of Foreign Policy Reasons is Hurting Our Economy!"

Excerpt Even before winter sets in, a winter that will be one of the most critical for the economy, unemployment has begun to become prevalent in the ranks of workers and employees, while many firms are being led to shut down one after the other. And it is not only the economic slump and the lack of a stable policy and an atmosphere of confidence that are hurting the firms. Certain handling of our foreign policy, which in specific cases is becoming one-sided rather than being multi-faceted, is now beginning to have a grievous consequence for the economy and the workers. It is a common secret that PYR-KAL [expansion unknown], which will gradually lay off its 4,500 workers beginning tomorrow, was prompted to suspend its operations so as not to displease the socialist Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, the personal friend of PASOK's leadership and executive office. And it is also known that 6.5 million pairs of Greek-made shoes, that were scheduled to be exported to the United States, remained unsold because the shoe business in the American market is in the hands of the Jews. As a result, two or three Greek shoe factories will shut down (desperate attempts to sell the shoes to Russia proved fruitless).

The same threat and for the same reasons now involves our food exports to the United States. Official statistics also confirm our great losses on the American market, while a communiqué issued yesterday by the statistical service relates that in the first 6 months of this year, exports of Greek goods to the United States dropped to 5.952 million drachmas, as compared with 12.294 million drachmas during the corresponding period of last year!

The unquestionably proper pro-Arab policy of the country—which, furthermore, was not charted by the present government—is, through certain of its excesses, undermining the long-term economic interests without providing for benefits for the other side, even temporary in nature. Greek officials should have paid more attention especially to the maneuverability and drive of Turkish diplomacy which has succeeded over the past 2 years to decidedly promote its interests in the Arab World without, however, provoking anyone.
Three factors are very characteristic:

1. While up to 1980, Turkish exports to Arab countries made up 56 percent of Greek exports, today the situation has turned around and the Turks are exporting double the value of goods than us. Turkish products and Turkish technical firms are especially sweeping Libya and Iraq, whose "socialist" governments have "indestructable ties of friendship" with PASOK.

2. Tukey recently signed major trade and investment agreements with Iraq and Iran (the government called on its non-interventionism in the conflict to prohibit PYRKAL to export ammunition valued at 165 million dollars), especially with the latter country in the amount of 1 billion dollars, without any of its contractors thinking of setting terms.

3. While we call on certain conservative Arab countries to make short-term deposits in Greek banks to strengthen our meager foreign exchange funds, mass Arab investments are being readied for Turkey. A revealing report by Mr Ath. Papandropoulos on this matter was published in OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS last week.

5671
CSO: 3521/15
TRADE, COOPERATION WITH ROMANIA REPORTED

Trade Deficit Payments

Athens ELEVOTHEROTPIA in Greek 22 Sep 82 p 15

Article by G. Karamanolis

Excerpt Economic cooperation between Greece and Romania is expanding and by
the end of the year a sum of 75 million dollars that Romania owes Greece from
trade will be covered.

This was announced by Mr Giannis Pottakis, acting minister of national economy,
following his return from Romania where he met with President Ceausescu and
other government officials.

Romania with its 22 million inhabitants, the minister added, is an important
market for Greece, and last year bought 45,000 tons of citrus fruits, while
we shipped bauxite, refractory brick, etc. to Romania.

Today, the minister continued, Romania is facing foreign exchange difficulties
and its debt will be covered by our country's import of various means of
transportation, helicopters (being produced with the French firm Alouette),
fertilizer (90,000 tons) and other products, while cooperation will be expanded
with the setting up of joint units as well as cooperation in the field
of energy (petroleum prospecting, expansion of the state refinery, etc.).

With regard to the latter item, Minister of Energy and National Resources E.
Kouloumbis will visit Romania on 1-3 November.

Railroad Signals Contract

Athens TA NEA in Greek 18 Sep 82 p 18

Text Romania will set up automatic signals on 200-250 kilometers of our
railroad net. This was in principle agreed upon during the visit to Romania
at the beginning of the week by Mr Pottakis, acting minister of national
economy and Deputy Minister of Communications Aslanis, who were accompanied
by a large staff.
As revealed yesterday by Deputy Minister of Communications Aslanis, a joint committee of technical advisers will meet in a few days to help prepare the texts of the agreements that basically relate to automatic signals and the procurement of telecommunications equipment from Romania.

These texts will be initialled at the end of October when Romanian Minister of Foreign Trade Constantin or Romanian Vice President Petrescu visits Athens. The final agreements will be signed by Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou when he visits Bucharest next November.

Mr Aslanis said that the basic purpose of his trip to Romania was to prepare the details of the prime minister's trip to Bucharest. He also said that the cost for the automatic signals that will amount to 1.5 billion drachmas as well as the approximately 2 billion drachmas that the telecommunications equipment will cost will be completely covered by the sale of agricultural products.
Non-payment of Libyan Debts to Private Firms Denounced

Article by A. Papandropoulos: "Libya Owes Us 50 Million Dollars and Does Not Want or Does Not Have Them to Give to Us"/

Excerpt: Overall, its international debt is 6 billion dollars that it refuses to pay off, although at the same time it is strengthening its relations with Turkey!

Many Greek firms that maintain trade relations with Libya are encountering many problems. Specifically, the country of Colonel Qadhafi, which in 1980 and 1981 purchased from Greece goods valued at more than 360 million dollars, is said to presently owe Greek firms the significant sum of 50 million dollars, or 15 percent of the overall exports. Consequently, the smaller of these firms are inevitably in serious danger of ceasing operations, while others are scheduled to cover their cash difficulties by recourse to bank loans, something that will increase their general expenditures and unquestionably burden their production costs. (Some of these firms are being saved from closure by the Labor Force Employment Organization by disbursing its appropriations which—of course—are destined for other purposes and not for paying for the wreckage of Qadhafi's regime). Also being confronted with great economic and other difficulties are the technical firms and their personnel who are working in Libya. Characteristic from this standpoint is the case of workers who are not given exit permits from the country of the "people's committees" despite desperate demarches of their relatives to Greek and Libyan officials here.

In order to provide some kind of solution to the problem, initiatives have been undertaken by the Panhellenic League of Exporters and the Greek-Arab Chamber with its chairman being Mr Pavlos Vardinogiannis, president of the chamber and former minister and deputy. Steps are also being taken by banking officials, especially the National Bank of Greece which is being forced to disburse significant amounts to temporarily cover the difficulties that the cradle of Islamic "socialism" is creating for Greek firms. As had been previously written in OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS, the Libyan debts to our country and the conduct of Libyan leaders toward Greek claims were one of the reasons why Colonel Qadhafi's visit to our country was cancelled at the last minute. It is useful to underscore that while Libyan conduct toward "sister" Greece has taken the above-mentioned way, Libya's economic ties with Turkey are becoming all the
more close either through the consigning of projects to Turkish technical firms in Libya or through the establishment of mixed-economy firms.

General Phenomenon

As it appears, however, as we had first emphasized 3 months ago, Libya is insolvent as far as other countries are also concerned. According to information of the international press, Spain has decided to postpone payments for Libyan petroleum until Spanish exporters collect the 130 million dollars owed them by the Libyan Government. As mentioned by Jose Alves, a Spanish journalist, it is a question "of debts that should have been paid 6 months ago but despite diplomatic activities in Tripoli, nothing has been done." According to this well-informed Spanish journalist, "Libyan officials are revealing that they are deceiving the Spanish diplomats, and characteristic of this is the fact that whenever the latter go to Tripoli to discuss the "burning" issues, they meet with different interlocutors." According to the Spanish newspaper EL PAIS, Libya's conduct is attributed to some intense administrative instability which makes evident that the regime is experiencing serious internal difficulties.

However, besides Libyan debts to Greece and Spain, Colonel Qadhafi's country owes 1.2 billion dollars to France and 1.6 billion dollars to Italy. Overall, we estimate that Libyan debts are close to 6 billion dollars, something that is a world record for a country that has only 2 million inhabitants. As is being maintained, the above-mentioned situation is due to thoughtless waste of the regime's "nomenclature," the financing of terrorist organizations, mass purchases of weapons, the expensive interventions in foreign countries and the indescribable bureaucratic growth. As for the remainder, "people's committees," "people's councils" and "people's prisoners," the country is doing very well.

5671
CSO: 3521/9
EEC INCREASE, SOCIALIST BLOC DECREASE IN PEACH IMPORTS

Increase, Decrease Noted

Athens ELEVHEROTYPIA in Greek 23 Sep 82 p 15

Peach exports have set a record. In accordance with statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture, as of 12 September a total of 91,854 tons were exported as compared with 81,231 tons at the same time last year.

Exports to EEC countries showed an approximately 15 percent increase, rising from 63,207 tons last year to 74,743 tons this year. Exports to Arab countries increased about 10 percent, rising from 9,002 tons last year to 10,876 tons this year.

On the other hand, exports to Third World countries showed a decrease, dropping from 4,451 tons last year to 3,714 tons this year. The drop reached 42 percent as far as socialist countries are concerned, going from 4,571 tons last year to 2,521 tons this year.

Reasons for Decrease

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 22 Sep 82 p 9

As of 16 September 1982, the amount of peaches that were withdrawn from the market reached 75,000 tons. Of that amount, 68,000 tons were buried, 7,300 tons were made into peach pulp, while 300 tons were distributed to welfare institutions. Another 10,800 tons now stored in refrigerated warehouses remain unsold—and are in danger of being buried. Last year, 106,000 tons were buried in trenches. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, as of 16 September 1982, 130,000 tons of peaches had been processed, while 127,000 had been absorbed by the domestic market, as compared with 110,000 and 100,000 tons respectively last year. On the other hand, exports on the same date this year were 91,854 tons as compared with 81,231 tons last year. Of the amount exported this year, 74,743 tons went to EEC countries, while the remaining 14,590 tons went to Third World countries and only 2,521 to the socialist countries of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.
The small quantities absorbed by the socialist countries are the result of the obstacles being put up by the EEC to our trade with these countries which in the end impose their one-sided export policy on our country. Moreover, it shows that the government, despite the promises to the contrary, has not moved against the EEC obstacles to open markets toward socialist countries.

5671
CSO: 3521/14
TAX SYSTEM TO BE REVIEWED, REORGANIZED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 24 Sep 82 p 1

"Excerpts" The presently existing tax system will be radically reformed in 1983 so that it will become simplified, more just and help in the increase of productivity. This was announced by Minister of Finance Dim. Koulourianos who added that within the context of this reform the tax scales will be changed, tax factors will be modified, the existing tax exemptions and immunities will be reexamined and the system of family exemptions will be changed. These changes to be decided on in 1983 will begin to be gradually implemented in 1984.

As the minister explained, the radical reform will be studied by a committee of exports which will suggest solutions that will in the end be judged on the basis of certain political choices because, as Mr Koulourianos characteristically said, the reform of the tax system is political matter and not a technocratic one.

The development of the Greek economy and the socially more just distribution of the tax burden will be sought through this reform.

One of the first things to be sought within this framework, the minister explained, is that there is no intention of abolishing immunities or tax incentives of a developmental nature and also that no change is contemplated in the tax system prevailing in the merchant marine.

The Budget

Moreover, speaking about the progress in implementing this year's budget, Mr Koulourianos characterized it as satisfactory because, as he said, expenditures are being held within budgetary levels and the increase in the deficit results from the lag in revenues. And this is very important because it shows that the government is proceeding to the necessary economies by containing expenditures.

As for the lag in public revenues, the minister attributed it to the fact that the revival of the economy was not what was expected, with the result that there was a lag in returns by FKE /Business Turnover Tax/, through stamps, etc.
Increase of Deficits

The minister also said that the deficit in the consumer goods account will not go beyond what was budgeted, just as the Public Investments Program will not get out of hand.

A general increase of deficits from what was budgeted will primarily show up in the management of public enterprises and organizations, while the public sector will show an overall deficit of approximately 400 billion drachmas.

It is noted that it is the first time that it is officially being recognized that the deficit will surpass 330 billion drachmas that was anticipated when the budget was being formulated.

Of course, the opposition feels that the final deficit will be much greater and will perhaps approach 500 billion drachmas.

5671
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KAFAOGLU EXPLAINS REASONS FOR 'INTERIM MODEL'

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Sep 82 pp 1,11

[Text] Minister of Finance Adnan Baser Kafaoglu said that the "interim model" is simply a way of "rectifying the problems arising from the implementation" of the existing economic policy which was formulated on a long-term basis. Kafaoglu told journalists: "The term 'interim model' is, in fact, a name you have given to the arrangements we were planning to implement." The minister also said that "relaxing the tight money policy would not be the way to rescue the firms having difficulties."

Kafaoglu, who, together with Minister of State Sermet Refik Pasin, was in Toronto to attend the joint meeting of the IMF and the World Bank, returned home yesterday. Replying to journalists' questions after a short speech at Yesilkoy Airport, Kafaoglu said that he "found Turkey's creditworthiness to have risen to a very high level compared to previous years." Kafaoglu stated that, at the General Assembly meeting in Toronto, he expressed his views in connection with the IMF's new arrangements for this year and the credit policies of the World Bank. He added that he left Toronto with positive impressions about his bilateral talks. Kafaoglu said: "Turkey has the foreign resources to continue the current economic program whose primary goal is the realization of economic stability." Stating that Turkey's "development will continue at an ever-increasing rate," Kafaoglu expressed the hope that the 4.4 percent growth in national income expected for this year will rise even higher next year.

Responding to a question about the outcome of his bilateral talks, Kafaoglu said: "Financing facilities have been arranged for almost all the large projects under way in Turkey. Furthermore, 'borrowing for structural reorganization,' which comes in the form of program rather than project loans, will continue. The 1982-1983 slices of the financing needed for the projects that are under way have all been secured. We do not expect any problems in connection with foreign payments."

The CUMHURIYET correspondent asked: "Since the current policy, in its main outline, will not be abandoned, should one stop using the term 'interim model'?" Kafaoglu replied:

"The term 'interim model' is, in fact, a name you have given to our approach to some of the problems encountered in the existing model. As I clearly stated in my
first press conference, the existing model has its basic instruments and certain primary goals. There will be no changes regarding those issues. The implementation which has been coined as the 'interim model' will consist of measures which will remedy problems arising from the implementation of the existing model and which will prevent any possible problems that may arise in the future. Turkey is pursuing a long-term economic policy. Over the long run, certain changes in course are always necessary to ensure the success of the program. The changes which we have talked about since taking office and which you have termed as the 'interim program' will be of this nature."

The CUMHURIYET correspondent asked: "If the money-credit policy will not change, how will resources be found to help the firms in difficulty?" The Minister of Finance replied: "Relaxing the tight money policy would not be the way to rescue the firms having difficulties." He said that resources for this purpose will be drawn from a fund supported by the 2-percent tax withheld on imports and that 30 to 40 billion Turkish liras are accumulated in this fund every year. Kafaoğlu said: "Institutions having difficulties have structural defects. They have not been able to adjust [to the new economic measures]. We are taking measures which will remedy the defects in the economic structure of such firms. For instance, Guney Sanayi is now in a position to employ 5,500 workers, and is able to meet its export commitments. The measures we will employ with respect to other firms will be along these lines. We are not simply trying to ensure the survival of a firm; we are trying to ensure that the assistance we provide will create resources many times its size. Even if such assistance comes in the form of money injected from outside, it will not have an inflationary effect because it will be matched by an immediate rise in production. Furthermore, we are providing this assistance from real resources. We are not allocating any uncovered resources."

Kafaoğlu said that inflation for 1981 will exceed previous forecasts and will reach 30 percent by the end of the year. He described as "meaningless" rumors to the effect that the economy will improve upon his return. Kafaoğlu also requested that he not be asked about his personal views on issues which have not yet become government policy.
ULAGAY WONDERS IF KAFAOGLU WILL MEET EXPECTATIONS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Sep 82 p 6

["Economic Notes" column by Osman Ulagay: "If Kafaoグル Wears Ozal's Coat"]


At first glance, the issue seems to be one that should interest tabloids and humor magazines rather than the economic columns of newspapers. But assuming that the coat worn is an indication of the economic policies to be pursued, it is possible and, perhaps, necessary to take up this issue in the economic section.

The Honorable Kafaoグル's statements from the day he took office until he left for Toronto to attend the IMF-World Bank meetings reinforced the impression that an "interim model" and a "package of measures" was being prepared to steer the economic policy of our country in new directions. According to the spokesmen of the private sector, the main reason behind the continuing stagnation in the market was the fact that no one knew what was contained in this "interim model" or "package" and the fact that everybody was waiting for them.

Kafaoグル's statements could justifiably interpreted in a number of different ways. There were people who could see in those statements signs of a more relaxed money-credit policy, measures which could revive the domestic market, new arrangements concerning the banking-brokerage sector, limits on incentive measures for exports and an approach which attached more importance to investments and growth than to the control of inflation. These signs, together with the duel of words that raged between Ozal and Kafaoグルl for a while, naturally raised the question of "whether there would be significant changes in the course pursued by Ozal."

One of the most important reasons for the replacement of Ozal by Kafaoグル was the uneasiness the Ozal line caused in some circles. The demands most frequently voiced included: The rescue of the industrial and financial institutions from their critical situation; some relaxation of the money-credit policy; the revitalization of the domestic market; the consolidation of the currency exchange differentials; fair prices and cash payments for agricultural products; and a more understanding approach with respect to wage and salary increases. Within the workings of the democracy calendar, it did not seem too unreasonable to expect a more sensitive economic policy.
However, if an administration which had neither the intention nor the opportunity to radically restructure the economy tried to meet all these demands, one could expect a reescalation in the inflation rate, a growing deficit in the balance of payments and a worsening energy shortage; while Turkey’s need for foreign resources increased, its ability to pay foreign debts could decrease. Consequently, Turkey could not deviate too far from its existing economic policies, that is, it could not experiment with new “models” or “packages,” without the approval of the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD, which hold the key to foreign resources.

Kafaoglu’s talks in Toronto have proven that the IMF and the World Bank will not approve such a course of action and that, on the contrary, they would prefer that Turkey, an “exemplary country,” continue with its “admirable” policies without any compromises. IMF and World Bank officials set the continuation of the policies giving priority to inflation and the balance of payments as a precondition for the continuation of “close support.” These officials said: 1) Do not open the money-credit valves; 2) Continue with wage controls; 3) Do not embark on ambitious investments in the public sector in particular; and 4) Do not abandon the floating currency exchange rate policy. These officials said that, if the Turkish people could tolerate sacrifices for a little longer, then maybe foreign bank loans could also become operative within 6 to 12 months and Turkey could be in a much better position in 3 or 4 years.

It can be seen from Kafaoglu’s latest statements that, following his contacts in Toronto, his views now very closely parallel those of the IMF and the World Bank. Kafaoglu is now careful to emphasize that a new economic program or a package of measures is no longer at issue. Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu’s speech at the Turkish Union of Chambers two days ago also confirms the impression that there will be no deviations from the Ozal line.

At this point, the following questions must be asked: If Ozal’s economic policies will not be changed, then what will happen to the sectors that are suffering from the problems caused by this policy? How will the IMF policies, with their constant demands for more sacrifices from the people, be reconciled with the democracy calendar? Will those who wanted the replacement of Ozal with Kafaoglu find what they were looking for? If they do not, what will it mean if Kafaoglu wears a coat belonging to Ozal, who had the confidence of foreign circles and who would pursue his own line of policy with his own methods?

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ECONOMIC PORTRAIT OF NEW CONSTITUTION DRAWN

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 11 Sep 82 p 2

[Article by Professor Yakup Kepenek, Department of Economics of Middle East Technical University]

[Text] The reasons behind the restrictive attitude of the draft constitution --prepared by the Constitutional Commission of the Consultative Assembly--with respect to basic rights and freedoms is clarified by its arrangements in the areas of economic and social rights and economic policy. The structure envisaged by the draft constitution in the areas of economic and social rights and economic policy is so restrictive and biased as to be considered excessive. Such an arrangement may hamper the process of transition into democracy.

Although two aspects of the draft's arrangements related to the economy, namely, clauses about property ownership and labor relations, are widely discussed in public, clauses related to economic development, monopolization and states of emergency because of economic crisis have not received the attention we think they deserve. This article discusses those issues.

I. 'Severe Economic Crisis' as State of Emergency

The draft constitution considers "severe economic crisis" as part of the set of emergency situations (Article 135). In situations of severe economic crisis, it will be possible to impose upon citizens "monetary, proprietary and labor obligations" (Article 137).

Even if emergency situations based on economic crises are treated separately within the issue of state of emergency, the issue deserves attention since it is based on a relative and uncertain concept.

According to economic theory, severe economic crisis can be sensed through three indicators: Inflation, unemployment and difficulties in foreign payments. Sometimes, excessive drops in production and excessive rises in the number of bankruptcies can be added to these three. Therefore, whenever these variables go above a certain prescribed level, they will be considered to have produced an "emergency situation." However, it is hard to tell from the beginning at what levels of these variables a severe economic crisis will occur.
The point that must be stressed is that the variables listed above as indicators of severe economic crisis are only "relative" concepts. For instance, a given inflation rate can be considered as a sign of severe economic crisis in a certain period and can be seen as acceptable or even desirable in another period. Our country has had this experience: In 1958, an inflation rate of 20 to 25 percent was considered to be a sign of economic crisis, while in the 1980's, the same rate is taken as the "target" of government policies. Similar conclusions can be drawn on the issues of unemployment and difficulties in foreign payments; while an unemployment rate of 15 percent can be considered as too high by one government, another may find even 20 percent as insignificant.

An even more important point is that numerical data on Turkey's economy is so haphazard as to be considered "unreliable" even by government officials. "Estimates" on the unemployment rate are very primitive and are based on very crude techniques. No one knows the number of the unemployed in the country, let alone their professional and regional distribution. The same thing can be said about figures on price and cost of living indexes. Price indexes are compiled by methods used scores of years ago and on the basis of economic of social criteria of those years. Rent payments are not included in the computation of the cost of living index. The list can go on and on.

The conclusion that emerges from the points explained above is that it will be possible to declare a "state of emergency" on the basis of such unreliable data. This is the main drawback of this arrangement. Because with the declaration of such a state of emergency it will be possible to place curbs not only on the money supply but also on basic freedoms (Article 137).

II. Prevention of Monopolies and Cartels?

The draft constitution says that "the government...shall prevent monopolization and the formation of cartels" (Article 60). This arrangement is being presented to the public as a balancing factor against the excesses of private enterprise. However, if this article, together with its rationale, is studied within the framework of the conditions of the country, it is seen that the article is cunningly aimed at another purpose, namely the elimination of public enterprises.

Let us first state that measures "against" the formation of monopolies and cartels constitute one of the basic principles of classical capitalist development, and their purpose is to ensure that the private sector develops in a more suitable atmosphere. In other words, anti-monopolist measures are not designed to inhibit private enterprise. Secondly, anti-monopolist measures in developed capitalist economies are aimed at preventing the monopolization of markets particularly in the case of newly created technologies.

In our country, one of the basic characteristics of industrial production is that many firms produce the same product. This situation is particularly true in automotive products and electrical household goods. For instance, there are 4 major automotive firms in the United States; in Turkey, there are 15 to 20 firms in this field. The same situation applies to industries producing television sets, refrigerators and other similar products. Furthermore, since industrial
production in our country is mainly based on "borrowed" technology, the problem of monopolizing markets by creating new technologies is not an issue. In other words, there is no question of a "monopolization" in this sense by the private industrial firms.

A segment of the Turkish private sector, U.S. experts and IMF and World Bank officials have, for years, been demanding the dismantling of the SEE [State Economic Enterprises] in Turkey. The dismantling of the SEE has been on Turkey's political agenda for more than 30 years. However, governments coming to power by popular vote have not dismantled, or have not been able to dismantle, the SEE under pressure from the public and in their efforts to please their constituencies. In reality, the private sector, too, had an interest in maintaining the SEE, which provided them with cheap goods and services. The draft constitution assigns to the government the task of dismantling the SEE as a constitutional duty. It is clear that this clause of the draft constitution runs counter to the interests of the country and the society and economic realities. An exemption with respect to the SEE is needed in Article 60.

III. Understanding of Economic Development

The draft constitution bases economic and social development on "encouragement of private enterprise" alone (Articles 52 and 160). On the other hand, in our country, public enterprise is well established in almost all economic sectors. Consequently, it is impossible to totally ignore public enterprise, a result of Turkey's social development in the process of economic development. Not only economists but also an important segment of the private sector concede that economic development cannot be based on private enterprise alone.

The biased attitude of the draft constitution toward economic development is even more prominent in its clauses related to economic policy. The draft constitution restricts public spending by a series of detailed arrangements which cover everything from government borrowing to the Central Bank setting the exchange rate (Articles 140 and 141). As is known, tight money policies and the continual readjustment of the currency exchange rate form the essence of the policy package presented to the public as the 24 January stability measures. It is interesting that the stability program, which was put into practice under emergency conditions, with emergency measures and at the suggestion of the IMF, has found its way into the draft constitution, which, supposedly, specifies the rules for nonemergency situations. This approach means that the future of the country is committed to an economic policy whose chances of success are, at best, doubtful. Taking the IMF model as the only way of developing the economy and placing this in a constitutional context counteracts not only the science of economics but also the process of economic and social development of the country. Such an approach can hamper the transition of the country into a democratic political environment.

It is further seen that the draft constitution enlarges the "bureaucratic structure" to deal with economic policy. The Economic and Social Council, the State Consultative Council, the State Auditory Council and the Supreme Arbiters Council are examples of this bureaucratic expansion. Considering that the private sector has complained about bureaucratic "obstacles" since the time of the Ottoman Empire, this arrangement contravenes even the theory of development based on private enterprise.
The draft constitution assigns to the government a number of social and economic duties, or, at least, gives that impression (Articles 60 and 73). However, the clauses on basic rights and freedoms in general and the restrictions on the rights and freedoms of those who live on their labor in particular gives the government the opportunity "not to perform" those duties.

When compared to the 1961 Constitution from a perspective of approach toward economic development, the structure of the draft constitution becomes even clearer. The 1961 Constitution envisaged that economic and social development be "compatible with the goals of justice, full employment and a chance for everybody to live in human dignity" and that development be "planned such that it can be implemented through democratic means" (Article 41). The draft constitution, on the other hand, sees no need for such a statement of principles. Consequently, the important integrity of principles is broken up, and the link between economic development and democratization is ignored. By an extension of this approach, the draft constitution does not concern itself with the need to make development compatible with justice and full employment. This situation exhibits in a concrete manner the type of approach taken by the draft constitution on economic development.

On the issue of distribution of wealth, the draft constitution gives the impression of favoring capital income over labor income. The draft constitution includes arrangements concerning wages, salaries and social welfare (Article 62), but says nothing about capital gains, such as profits and interest. General principles for all income groups must have been established to ensure a healthy economic and social environment and a balanced distribution of wealth, which is one of basic preconditions of democracy.

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CONSTITUTION URGED AS MEANS TO LABOR PEACE, PRODUCTIVITY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 13 Sep 82 p 4

[Article by Halil Tunc: "Rationalizing Worker-Employer Relations"]

[Text] In the rationale for the articles of the draft constitution regulating labor life frequent mention is made of a system directed toward the goal of "ensuring labor peace and increasing production." Obviously there is a direct correlation between labor peace and increased productivity. But when we examine the entirety of the draft constitution, especially when we study the announcements by the commission spokesmen, these rationales are weak. Clearly, the "peace" toward which the commission chairman and spokesmen strive is very different from the concept of the broader sector of society.

First, it must be a well-known fact that "labor peace" is not peace that can be obtained by writing it down in texts. If it were, no country in the world would suffer discord in worker-employer relations, productivity would increase and every country would place the goal of "labor peace and increased production" in its constitution and be rich and happy.

In fact, Turkey is not the only country to place these concepts in its constitution and labor law. The principles of "increased productivity and labor peace," minus perhaps the fine points of distinction in the basic framework of the social systems adopted, usually appear prominently in the labor law and constitutions of socialist countries. The constitutions of these countries also speak of the right to strike and the right to conclude collective labor agreements. In practice, however, one does not often see these rights exercised for the protection and development of the social and economic status of the worker. For example, the introduction to the first section of the East German law governing the basic principles of labor law begins: "Labor law ensures the fulfillment of the fundamental economic law of socialism and its goal is increased production. Considering as one the conscientious creative activity of everyone involved in production, the administration and the central plan serves the realization of the economic plans. It is the duty within this concept of the state organs and workplaces to enforce the labor law."

It is possible to give many such examples.
But the remarkable thing about it is the failure to encounter rationales and theoretical rights of this type in the constitutions and labor law of Western society. This is because Western societies have learned by long and painful experience the fact that peace and increased production cannot be realized by writing them into law.

Western society has paid a very high price to learn that peace cannot be ensured and production certainly cannot be increased unless the social and economic rights are guaranteed and reflected in the worker's everyday life, unless the worker can make a living and unless labor rights and freedoms are placed under credible and firm guarantees.

Western society also knows that the establishment of a harmonious structure for worker-employer relations is the primary condition for preserving social peace, as well as national peace. They owe their present prosperity to this knowledge.

Now when we are trying to reshape our tomorrow with the draft constitution, we must have the foresight to take advantage of the experience of Western society.

The first step on this path is to avoid putting a narrower construction on the rights and freedoms of the Turkish worker than exists in the advanced democratic nations. If this is done, the worker will, by his own efforts and the struggle his unions will pursue by legitimate means, eventually manage to bring the extent of his rights back to the former level. To doubt this is to doubt Turkey's efforts to achieve the level of Western civilization on the road carved out by Ataturk. These rights and freedoms having once been exercised and democracy enjoyed and after becoming a member of the society of democratic nations, this development can no longer be prevented.

The way must not be opened to decisive struggles that would cleave society on behalf of these rights and freedoms whose attainment is inevitable. We still have the power to ensure this. Those in the position of drawing up the constitution must make the most of this opportunity. This is rationality.
INADEQUATE NATIONWIDE PORT FACILITIES SURVEYED

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 6-9 Sep 82

[Article by Namık Ahiska: "From Port to Port"]

[6 Sep 82 p 4]

[Text] The ports, the gateways to the sea and the juncture points of transpor
tation systems, are inadequate in Turkey despite its being surrounded on
three sides by seas and having extremely favorable conditions. The fact that
the country's only chance under present economic conditions is to export more
and that the ports are in the forefront of its ability to make sufficient use
of this chance indicates the need to pay more attention to them. However,
under-investment, deficient technology and lack of management know-how prevent
utilization of the ports to the extent required. Nothing is being done to build
new ports, despite the need, and adequate resources cannot even be found to make
improvements at the existing ports. Furthermore, while more efficient use
cannot be made of the existing facilities, nothing is being done about the
proposals of the organizations which export out of these ports.

The ports have significant deficiencies in dock length, water depth, existence
of mechanical hydraulic facilities and bonded warehouse capacities. Despite the
improvements being made, almost all ports face difficulties in responding to
growing traffic and the needs of large ships.

Another problem is that docks built to former standards are being used today
when the increased tonnage of ships has multiplied their displacement. One must
look upon the failure of top management as the source of the inadequacy of the
ports. The lack of uniformity at the ports run by the Maritime Bank, the State
Railways, the Coal Works and local administrations leads to inefficiencies,
and the different practices ensure that they persist.

Heading the list of technological deficiencies at almost all ports are the lack
of needed cranes and the inability of wharf drafts to allow the approach of all
types of ships. Also, the fact that loading and unloading must take place at
sea at some ports wastes time, money and labor.

The technical characteristics and deficiencies of Turkey's ports, especially the
ones where minerals are exported, and proposals for improving the efficiency of
these ports may be listed as follows:
Antalya Port

Antalya Port, under the Ministry of Communications and Transportation, has an average loading capability of 1,000 tons a day. Port Depth is 5.5 and 10.5 meters and loading and unloading is done dock-side.

The port has two open stock areas of 1,000 and 2,000 square meters which may be considered a plus, but the fact that these areas are 50 and 200 meters from the port is described as a time-consuming factor in the operation of the port. Moreover, the lack of pier cranes and a lighting system at the port's six docks heads the list of deficiencies. This allows the port to operate on only one shift, preventing night work, it is noted.

Time is lost as off-loading must be done by ship cranes owing to the lack of permanent cranes. In addition to all this, equipment at the port is not kept in working order and this is said to keep the port from providing the necessary services.

Bandirma Port

The installation of pier cranes at Bandirma Port, whose capacity is inadequate, reportedly will give the port a new structure, making its docks second in importance only to Izmir. The port also has the distinction of stock areas close to the docks.

Despite a capability to off-and-on load more than 20 ships at once at Bandirma Port, the State Railways' inability to find enough personnel to handle more than six ships at a time prevents efficient operation. Exporters are able to get the job done only by using their own personnel. Bandirma Port is touted as the best port for exporters, but even if the firms do their own loading and unloading, they still have to pay the authority the posted labor, wharfage and time fees.

The port has a daily capacity of 4,000-6,000 tons and employs 130 workers. The port, which operates on weekends and holidays, has four docks and also houses the Eti Bank facilities. The location of its [main] stock areas at a distance of 5-8 kilometers on the Canakkale Road approaching Bandirma is portrayed as the port's only drawback. They are used by exporters because of the excessive fees charged for the small stock areas located on the docks.

In addition to Bandirma Port's need for more employees, there are also criticisms of the inability to load during bad weather. While it is noted that giving the port a loading capability in all kinds of weather is a must here at one of our largest export ports, it is also desired that the port be equipped so as to reduce dependence on manual labor for loading.

Dikili Port

Dikili Port, with a loading capability of 1,000-1,200 tons a day, is described as falling short of providing adequate service because of the [lack] of pier cranes. Dock-side loading is done with ship cranes.
The remoteness of Dikili Port's stock areas also is described as one of its biggest drawbacks. Cargo is trucked from the stock area and taken on pier by ship crane. Activity at the port reportedly fell off after it became a Maritime Bank monopoly. There are also complaints about the steep loading fees set by the bank. A price increase of 300 percent–400 percent on loading done outside particular hours is blamed for reduction of the area's exports of perlite, iron and coal.

Moreover, declining activity at the port, portrayed as the major employer for the town of Dikili, has led to a significant unemployment problem in the area.

It is therefore desired that cargo fees be set to conform to current and regional circumstances in order that the port be able to operate efficiently and provide the desired services.

Gulluk Port

Gulluk Port, operating under the Izmir Port Authority, is a center capable of handling ships up to 10,000 tons. Its small size prevents it from providing the services desired. The authority provides workers for the port, which can load only two or three ships at a time because of its size. There are reportedly no cranes, pulleys or similar equipment for loading.

Exporters using Gulluk Port have to provide the needed equipment themselves and suffer a further hardship owing to the lack of stock areas near the docks. They store their cargo in pre-rented areas or fields near the port and truck it in on loading day, with negative consequences timewise. Night loading can be done at the port only insofar as ship lights will suffice.

The port, with the opportunity for weekend and holiday operations, is convenient for all kinds of loading and unloading, but reportedly cannot avoid congestion as long as it continues to offer services under its present circumstances.

One view is that Gulluk Port will not be able to avoid the effects of rising costs for demurrage, especially for ore exporters. It is argued that loading and freightage expenses are inappropriate because of the inability to handle large ships and ships without cranes, a factor in lowering costs, and thus prevent exports.

[7 Sep 82 p 4]

[Text] Istanbul Port

In addition to the Haydarpasa and Salıpazarı docks in the central city, under the State Railways Port Authority, there are also the Zeytinburnu docks on the Istanbul shore and the Maltepe Port on the Anatolian shore. The two city docks, known as the Port of Istanbul, are the only ones belonging officially to the state. Sand dealers [kumcu] located on the docks are a source of complaint by exporters. Exporters complain bitterly about these ports, claiming that the presence of the sand dealers prevents the export of bulk minerals in particular. These sites, able to handle ships of 3,000–4,000 tonnage at most, have no cranes
or loading equipment of any kind. Even though exporters take care of their loading themselves, they pay the State Railways a supplemental fee.

Meanwhile, the lack of stock areas on the docks is portrayed as a major cause of the port's inadequacy. For exporters to get their ships loaded on time, they bring their minerals from the mine beforehand and store them somewhere near the docks and, when the ship comes in, either the cargo is dumped by truck alongside the ship and transferred by crane to the ship's hold or hoppers loaded on the trucks are lifted by ship cranes and emptied into the hold or it may be done with bagged cargo on pallets.

Getting rid of the sand dealers is said to head the list of measures that must be taken if these docks are to provide adequate service and they should be overhauled to allow the efficient handling of mineral exports in particular, both in bulk and in bags. It is stressed, moreover, that a series of heavy-duty cranes and lighting to allow night work need to be installed.

As mineral exports are important to these docks, where only a few ships can come in at once, it is desired that ships to be loaded be given priority when they approach.

Izmir Port

Izmir Port does not have adequate capacity, but it is Turkey's most important export gateway. Pointed to as one of its most important features is its capability to load three ships at once as it has both dock-side space and pier cranes.

Another important feature is that it has near-by stock areas, allowing services to be completed in the time allowed.

The port is run by the Maritime Bank Corporation and has a loading capability of 350-400 tons per work hour. Another important feature is an off-shore loading capability for hazardous cargo. This port, said to be one of the best organized, allows weekend and holiday operations by application at double rates.

Fourteen ships can stand in Izmir Port and take on container and large general cargo with the aid of two 10-ton mobile cranes and forklifts with various tonnage capabilities, as well as the ships' own cranes.

Izmit Port

Operates under State Railways. Even though offshore loading is employed, it has a loading capacity of 1,000 tons per 12-hour work day. Loading is done by the employees of private transport firms and the port operates on weekends and holidays. The firms and establishments utilizing the port say that even though the State Railways provide no services at the port, they pay their own mooring and personnel fees, plus overtime on weekends and holidays. The port has no dock crane and its 10,000-ton capacity stock area, scales and pier are at the Izmir [as published] Train Station. Cargo is trucked to the motor launch pier, loaded onto motor launches and taken to the ships standing 500-600 meters offshore, where it is taken on with the aid of ship cranes.
Nevertheless, the question of eliminating the stock areas under the project to make room for the Izmit train terminal on shore as well as the State Railways' offer to provide space for certain firms at the Derince port is described as a positive undertaking. Though it is impossible to make even an estimate of the daily loading capability at Derince, it is desired that loading be handled by the firms should this situation come about. Measures said to be necessary are for the State Railways to improve the very poor physical conditions and step up loading procedures.

[8 Sep 82 p 4]

[Text] Maltepe Port

Operated under Haydarpasa Port. Loading capacity is 300 tons daily and only ships of up to 2,500 tons can come into port for loading. The lack of dock cranes is described as the port's biggest drawback, as ships or firms must use their own cranes. Large ships pay a triple loading fee at Maltepe Port and there are no stock areas. Firms provide their own transport and storage and the poor state of the port's access roads makes work conditions very difficult. Improvement of the road is desired by both the port administration and the factories in the area. The monopoly port fees for large ships are said to add significantly to f.o.b. export prices, especially marble exports.

Meanwhile, a source of complaint is that ships must wait for space in port as only two ships can be handled at once. It is stressed that this drawback requires payment of demurrage, that the port roads must be hard-topped and that better organization of loading and discharge procedures would save time.

Marmara Island Port

Marmara Island Port, administered by Saraylar Village, has an annual loading capacity of 100,000 cubic meters of cargo. Ships are able to come in to the loading docks and the stock areas are 3 kilometers from the port. The port is divided into two sections. The first is 105 meters long and the second, 115 meters. Loading cranes are an absolute necessity for the port, and it is desired that the Saraylar Village council go to the Ministry of Public Works for this purpose.

The port permits the approach of 6,000-ton ships, but loading is accomplished by the ships' own cranes. Cargo is transported by truck. Though the port is used for the export of marble, transport facilities are said to be inadequate for this purpose. The road is muddy and rutted, affecting loading capacity. Proposals for bringing the port up to world standards for marble export include equipping it with cranes and building a road with a smooth surface. A concrete port area is also desirable.

Mersin Port

Mersin Port, run by the State Railways, is described by importers and exporters as the country's best port. Able to load 23-25 ships, the port can handle almost all types of ships. Both the port's cranes and its nearby stock areas are said to be adequate for its needs.
It is noted that the port, operating on two shifts, is working beyond its capacity owing to the transit trade and, for this reason, ships have to stand off waiting to load. The need for small forklifts for use in ships' holds is described as one of Mersin Port's biggest drawbacks in providing a more orderly, systematic loading capability for export ships to allow loading on the announced dates.

The port has 19 piers where ships can dock. Ten of them have permanent cranes and the rest have ship cranes. All open areas are under the State Railways Commercial Warehouse Authority and cargo is transported from the stock areas by truck.

Meanwhile, some exporters note that the port's monopoly cranes are old and it has to switch engines and suggest that for the port to be fully functioning and efficient the cranes should be repaired and stock areas built closer to the port.

[9 Sep 82 p 4]

[Text] Mudanya Port

Administered by Mudanya Municipality, the port has an average daily loading capability of 3,000 tons. There are no cranes as the port has no docks and loading is done by coming in to shore. Only three ships can come in at once, depending on their slip tonnage, while others must wait offshore, and this is the port's most important drawback. Also, cargo stands in the crane ship spaces as there are no dockside cranes at Mudanya Port, and ships in section A of the port have to stand off during bad weather, giving rise to such problems as demurrage and failure to ship goods on time. Mudanya Port also lacks covered warehouses for storing bagged cargo.

The port works three shifts a day, but its small size requires ships to wait in line. Some of the ship cranes do not have the heavy equipment to lift cargo hoppers, leading to further loss of time and extra expenditures for overtime pay. Lighting at Mudanya Port is considered inadequate also. On days when National Maritime Line ferries are scheduled, ships must stand off for the ferries to come in.

It is proposed that dockside cranes and lighting be installed to avoid loss of time.

Samsun Port

Supervised and run by the State Railways, Samsun Port is the most important export point on the Black Sea and loading is done dockside. There are dock cranes, one with 25-ton capacity and the other, 14-ton capacity.

There are complaints that workers are disorganized at Samsun Port and the cranes are also described as inadequate for the need. The shifting about of cranes during loading while ships stand empty as the 25-ton crane is used both at the stock area and ship-side is said to cause loss of time. From this standpoint,
expansion of the stock areas is described as both desirable and possible. The present location of the stock areas 700 meters from the port also causes increased costs.

It is proposed that two cranes (15-ton and 30-ton) be purchased both to prevent penalty payments and to allow orderly and efficient loading. The cash deposit required on cargo and stocks at Samsun Port is also criticized and the institution of payment facilities is desired.

Trabzon Port

Attached to the National Maritime Line Port Authority, Trabzon Port has a daily loading capability of 800 tons. Loading can be done dockside and the port works two shifts a day. There is no stock area and loading can be done only by truck and the hauler's own containers. The port has 1 25-ton, 3 5-ton and 2 1-ton fixed cranes as well as 1 10-ton, 3 5-ton and 1 3-ton crane ships.

Trabzon is one of our less adequate ports.

Zonguldak Port

Zonguldak Port, attached to the Turkish Coal Works Enterprise, has a daily loading and discharge capacity of 1,500 tons. It usually works two 8-hour shifts, but can work two 11-hour shifts if needed. Exports leave from the cargo dock only. There are two cranes, one 5-ton and one 15-ton. The cargo dock needs mechanical equipment and the location there of customs warehouses makes stock areas extremely limited. Removal of the warehouses from the dock would reportedly be a great advantage.

Zonguldak Port has no problem other than expansion of its stock area.

8349
CSO: 4654/445
EDEK PRESIDENT MESSAGE TO QAHDHAFI, SWAPO

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 2 Sep 82 p 1

[Text] The president of the Socialist Party EDEK [United Democratic Union of the Center], Dr. Vasos Lyssaridis sent the following telegram to the leader of the Popular Revolution, Colonel Qadhafi

On the occasion of the 13th anniversary of the Successful Revolution and the achievements of the Libyan people we convey our warmest congratulations. We believe that with the peoples' struggle, the forces of occupation, Zionism and the forces of oppression and exploitation, as well as the proxies of imperialism, will be defeated and that peace will prevail in the region.

The Socialist Party EDEK of Cyprus, its president, Dr. Vasos Lyssaridis, and all the progressive masses of Cyprus wish you more successes and victories in your struggle for the welfare of the Libyan people.

To SWAPO

At the same time, on the occasion of the 16th anniversary of the beginning of the armed struggle by SWAPO of Namibia, the president of the Socialist Party EDEK sent, on 30 August 1982, a congratulatory message to the leaders of the movement with his wishes for greater successes in the struggle against the racist regime of South Africa and the installation of an independent state of the people of Namibia, with the certainty of a quick victory because SWAPO is struggling for the principles of all humanity.

9731
CSO: 4621/515
EDEK RAPS AKEL-DIKO POLICIES

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 31 Aug 82 pp 1, 3

[Text] "They resort to base schemes because, on the one hand, the leadership of AKEL cannot convince its honest followers to accept an unacceptable alliance with Kyriacoudis, whom they themselves call ineffective and the wrecker of Cyprus, and on the other hand the leadership of the DIKO [Democratic Party] faces the same problems with honest people who at one time believed in it," so stated yesterday the spokesman of the press office of the Socialist Party EDEK [United Democratic Union of the Center] in reply to the disgusting fabrications which appeared in recent days in the newspapers of the Coalition.

It is evident the spokesman stated, that the Directorate began to operate because there appeared simultaneously identical articles and fabricated news both in KHARAVGI and ELEVHEROTYPHA.

The EDEK spokesman denounced also the hiring of a newspaper which recently began circulation, evidently because the Coalition partners are ashamed to be the first to print the monstrous fabricated "news."

He denies, with proof, "meetings" and "candidacies" which the Coalition dreams up.

He added, "How can the people entrust their fate to liars and lowly insultsers?"

The statement of the Socialist Party's spokesman is as follows:

"When the governing powers (AKEL-DIKO) change into common fiction fabricators, the people are not only disgusted, but suffer because even today the former hold their fate in their hands.

"In its effort to convince its honest followers to accept an unacceptable alliance with the individual who, according to their own statements, they qualify as ineffective and the wrecker of Cyprus both on national and socio-economic matters, the leadership of AKEL is attempting to slander the leadership of the Socialist Party by disclosing meetings at the archbishopric, black fronts, third candidates, etc.

"For its part, the leadership of DIKO, facing similar problems from honest individuals who at one time believe them, are resorting to the same base inventions."
"It appears that the Directorate has begun to operate regularly because both KHARAVGI and ELEVHEROTYPIA simultaneously publish similar articles and fabricated news.

"However, the adherents of AKEL are not beings without will and thus do not accept the transformation of the unworthy into a savior and subscribe to a national and economic policy which is dictated by an overprivileged oligarchy.

"Nor are the followers of DIKO about to accept easily the abandonment of the national policy in order to ensure a submissive presidency.

"Sometimes they are ashamed to be the first to lie. For this reason they hired a newspaper which began circulating recently whose objective it is to publish fabricated news which others are ashamed to print first.

"Thus, meetings with Kliridis were disclosed, the candidacy of Kranitidis and the meeting of Lyssaridis and Sofianos with the archbishop at Stato.

"The Socialsit Party had and will always have the courage of its opinions and all its actions are open to the scrutiny of the people. The day that the lying newspapers reported Lyssaridis meeting, he returned to Nicosia immediately after the ceremonies in honor of the Virgin along with Mr. Tombazos and his wife.

"How are the people to entrust their fate to liars and lowly insulters?"

"It is sad because the person who undertook the presentation of these falsehoods is someone who, because of his long journalistic experience, should have avoided it."

9731
CSO: 4621/515
JUST SOLUTION OF CYPRiot PROBLEM THROUGH DIALOGUE, INTERNATIONALIZATION

Nicosia Kharavgi in Greek 9 Sep 82 p 3

[Text] The inseparable interconnection of the domestic and international wrinkles in the Cyprus problem, and the resulting imposed tactics of promoting a total solution of the problem through intercommunal talks and the activity of the international factor, was noted by KKE Secretary General Khar. Florakis in his recent news conference in Athens. "We do not agree on the wrinkles in the Cyprus problem being separated," stressed the Greek communist leader. "At any rate, the Cyprus problem will pass through the dialogue because how will a solution be found otherwise. It is enough for this to be combined with the struggle of the Cypriot people and international public opinion for a just solution."

The KKE, like AKEL, is confronting the intercommunal talks as a necessary, inseparable part of the whole effort for a just settlement, parallel with the Cypriot people's struggle and mobilization on the international field. It does not make the mistake of underestimating or eliminating one process and making another absolute. The one process loses its meaning, its effectiveness, when it is cut off from the other and promoted unilaterally. Internationalization, which is a decisive factor for a peaceful and just solution, is unable to bear fruit if the process of the intercommunal dialogue is abandoned and put out of action. Even more, the intercommunal dialogue is not going to bear fruit if it is not combined with intensive, systematic promotion of the Cyprus problem in the international arena, with the UN at the center. This is for the simplest reason that the Turkish side will only abandon its no-compromise policy and unblock the road of the dialogue when it feels suffocating international pressure resulting from our own efforts in the international field.

Further internationalization is an inevitable necessity today and, at the same time, a weapon for achieving a just solution to the Cyprus problem. Unquestionably, the highest point of internationalization is convocation of a representative international conference, in the frameworks of the UN, which will be occupied specifically with the problem. In his statements, Khar. Florakis stressed this need--particularly timely today--which was acknowledged in the past by the Greek and Cypriot governments. From our own standpoint, we firmly believe that every step occurring in the direction of achieving the international conference is a step for substantial internationalization, a step for Turkish implacability to give way and for opening the road to desirable settlement of the Cyprus problem.
Nicosia 0 FILELEVThEROS in Greek 9 Sep 82 p 3

[Text] Recent journalistic information on the plan U.S. President Reagan is preparing for the Cyprus problem (to be presented after the presidential elections in Cyprus) are based on some probably logical conclusions which it is not unusual for newspaper columns to express. But the statements made by the head of the U.S. Senate's Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Percy, that an effort will be made to give a priority position to the Cyprus problem in what relates to the interests of U.S. policy, is a fact. It is not a presumption.

We want to hope that the personal experience Mr. Percy took with him on returning to his country will be a valuable advisor and leader in dealing with the Cyprus problem. We based hopes on his country playing a role in the just solution of our problem because, whether we agree with its policy or not, we cannot not acknowledge the significant role it plays in shaping events in our area. As in the Middle East issue it is the essential supporter of Israel, so in the Cyprus problem it is Turkey's fundamental provider in money and military aid. And Turkey's role in solving our problem is of the highest importance. It is as a result of Turkey's policy that the Cyprus problem remains unsolved and all the efforts--particularly those being made in the intercommunal dialogue--have thus far been fruitless.

Most assuredly, we are aware of our disagreements. We know well that it is not at all easy for us to influence U.S. policy which is based, like the policy of all the countries in the world, on cold calculations of what serves a country's interests and what does not.

The U.S. leadership must recognize, however, that solutions to problems imposed by ignoring reality and the principles of freedom, democracy and basic human rights are not solutions. They may stand temporarily, but the time comes when the unnatural is upset.

We believe steadfastly that it is in the United States' interest for the current dangerous, uneasy suspense in our area to be ended. And additionally, that it is in the United States' interest for the solution of the Cyprus problem—like that of the Middle East—to be a lasting one. It would be an unprecedented tragedy for a new crisis to break out in the area, which would have its source in an unacceptable solution which a strong force could probably impose.
DATA ON GREEKS IN NORTH

Athens TA NEA in Greek 1 Sep 82 p 3

[Text] Salonica, 1 September (From our correspondent)--Only one thousand and five Greek Cypriots remain in Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus--according to last week's data--and if the Turkish authorities continue to expel them, soon none of the 20,000 who had been trapped there in 1974 after the invasion will be left.

In these phrases is contained the continuing drama of the Cypriot people; they were stated by the Greek Cypriot negotiator at the intercommunal talks, Mr. Ioannidis, in a lecture he gave in Salonica in the frameworks of the first term of classes at the Institute of Public International Law and International Relations. The subject was "The Turkish invasion in Cyprus. The missing and the refugees."

He added:

1. All the Greek Cypriots who had been left in occupied territories--except for 1,005--were gradually driven out and took shelter in free Cyprus.

The 1,619 Missing

2. The fate of 1,619 Cypriots and Greek Cypriots is unknown, and even though there is reliable information that after their capture they remained alive, the Turkish side refuses to give any information about whether they are alive or where their graves are.

3. The 37 percent of Cyprus in which 70 percent of the country's economic potential is concentrated is under Turkish military occupation.

4. Two-hundred thousand Greek Cypriots are living as refugees in their own homeland far from their homes and property, while 50,000 houses have been destroyed.

5. Five thousand families lost their protector and one child in every 125 was left an orphan.

6. Of the total Greek Cypriot population, 1.4 percent have lost their lives or are missing.
In addition, Mr. Ioannidis termed Greek Prime Minister Papandreou's effort to internationalize the Cyprus problem positive.

As concerns the objections of Cypriot political leaders to Mr. Papandreou's statements about the Cypriot leadership's political maneuvers, Mr. Ioannidis stressed—in an interview last night in Salonica—that he does not think this is meddling by the Greek prime minister in Cyprus' internal affairs. And he added: The Turks are seeking a bisection of Cyprus, creation of a "quasi" federation, a "fédération," that is, which in essence will be two separate states.
LIBYAN OFFICIAL DISCUSSES RELATIONS

Nicosia I ELEVHEROTYPID in Greek 1 Sep 82 p 8

[Text] One-fourth of the 27 million dollars Libya owed to various Cypriot businessmen for exports has already been settled, while another 25 percent is on the way to being worked out. Negotiations on the remaining amount will begin next month between the Cypriot and Libyan governments in order to settle the matter.

This was reported on 31 August by the secretary of the Peoples' Libyan Arab Office in Nicosia, Mr. Zubayti. Mr. Zubayti, who was answering journalists' questions during a press conference on the occasion of today's thirteenth anniversary of the revolution in Libya, added that the Libyan people express solidarity and support to the Cypriot people who, he said, are struggling in the same trench with the Arab people. He also reported that his country is looking towards further strengthening the close bonds of the two countries' peoples in all sectors.

Referring to the crisis in Lebanon, Mr. Zumbayti said that his country does not agree on the dispersing of Palestinians to various Arab countries. The Palestinians, he said, either should remain in Beirut or should go to front-line countries like Egypt, Syria or Jordan.

He also said, among other things:

This year's thirteenth anniversary of the 1 September Revolution is marked with the fingerprints of the tragedy in Lebanon, which was the clear product of the U.S.-Israeli strategic alliance and the treacherous Camp David agreements. No one can forget that Colonel Qadhafi called all the Arab states to send substantial military and air aid to the Palestinian and Lebanese fighters, in a general Arab counter-attack against the Zionist enemy.

The thirteenth anniversary of the revolution calls all the oppressed Arab masses to rise up, in unity and with steadfastness, against the reactionary leaders, who today are not only mere instruments, but also the executors of all the U.S.-Zionist conspiracies against the Arab nation. Let all the Arabs ignite the fuse of the national peoples' revolution in a total battle to overturn the old reactionary regimes.
The principal goals of such a national peoples' revolution must be:

1. Termination of all forms of power and all the symbols of oppression throughout the Arab world.

2. Termination of the U.S. presence, as it is expressed either by military bases or by companies.

3. Rending of all the banners of surrender and uprooting of all the symbols of betrayal like Fahd and Nimeiri.

4. Completion of the holy duty for revival of the Palestinian revolution's power and viability until complete liberation of Palestinian and other Arab lands.

9247
CSO: 4621/514
COOPERATION BETWEEN GREEK AND TURKISH JOURNALISTS

Comments by Editors Union

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 5 Sep 82 p 12

[Text] Yesterday, the administrative council of the Union of Cypriot Editors issued the following communiqué:

"The Union of Cypriot Editors, in reply to the recent document of Mr. G. Sertis, dated 2 September 1982, wishes to state once more that it considers absolutely correct its policy for the creation of a socialist journalists component in cooperation with the organization of Turkish Cypriot colleagues. The Union of Cypriot Editors steadfastly believes that this policy in no way is opposed to the national interests of Cyprus nor does it constitute an act which accepts as an accomplished fact the aftermath of the Turkish invasion and occupation. The demand of Mr. Sertis that the Turkish Cypriot journalists may be part of the socialist union only if they have first joined the Union of Cypriot Editors, is to be classified as unrealistic, groundless and even antidemocratic because it pretends to dictate to a professional group which organization to join. Also because we should not, under any circumstances connect the Turkish Cypriot professional organizations with the self-named "administration" of Denktas.

The union of Cypriot Editors strongly rejects the insinuations of Mr. G. Sertis about a "control by AKEL," by "manufactured majority" and editors who are not editors and repeats that it is a purely professional organization, stands away from partisan influences and is interested in the solution of professional problems of the press family, the promotion of the journalistic operation, the protection of the freedom of the press and, as much as possible, a more dynamic contribution to the subject of liberating our country."

Meeting Held

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 28 Aug 82 p 1

[Text] The presidents of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot editors' organizations, Messrs. A. Kannouros and A. Tziomal emphasized the great significance of a regular contact and cooperation between Greek and Turkish journalists during a reception for them hosted at the "Lidra Palace" by Mr. Keith Bevan, departing UN representative in Cyprus.
The two speakers expressed the desire and the eagerness of their organizations to take the necessary steps in that direction and to realize an earlier decision for the foundation of a common press club in the "Lidra Palace" or in another suitable location to be provided with the help of the United Nations.

The leaders of the Union of Cypriot Editors and of the Turkish Cypriot Journalists Association agreed to meet next week to discuss subjects concerning the future cooperation of the two organizations and, specifically, their agreement to found a Cyprus branch, affiliated with the Socialist Journalists Union.

The reception was honored by the presence of Mr. Ngobi, special representative of the secretary general of the UN as well as that of the speakers Messrs. Mavrommatis and Onan and their staff.
EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CRISIS, SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT CN UNIONS

Paris ESPRIT in French Jul-Aug 82 pp 160-166

[Article by Daniel Mothe]

[Text] It is hardly likely that the French trade union movement of these recent years can remain the same. It will be impacted by two important events:

1. The crisis experienced by the industrial economies in respect to growth has begun to produce repercussions in the other European countries where (as in Germany and Great Britain) the labor unions have been accepting a wage freeze in exchange for a reduction in layoffs. We should remind ourselves that France is the only industrial country to record a rise in the standard of living of wage earners for 1981—a year in which wage agreements were negotiated and concluded as if economic expansion were destined to continue.1

2. The difficulty entailed in the satisfaction of wage demands is now situated in a new political context: the Left is in power, hence one more inducement to moderate the demands. The three great labor federations (CGT, CFDT, FO [Workers Force] consequently find themselves in a situation for which they are unprepared. Whereas their role of an opposition within the expanding capitalist system of the 1960’s served to justify their strategy of harassment, their participation in the management of an economic system that is in the throes of stagnation will have many disadvantages.

The criticism that the French unions used to make of social democracy and "labor partyism" was that they had sold their soul in return for no more than the crumbs from the capitalist table. The trouble is that these unions are now constrained to sell their own soul by collaborating with a capitalist system that must substantially reduce the distribution of crumbs.

The French trade unionists, generally speaking, had never conceived of being associated with the government except in a world freed from capitalism. They were not at all prepared for a devastating revision of their class ideology. The concept of the class struggle—the pivotal point of their explanation of

the social universe—involved other concepts which have constituted the basis of the practice of trade unionism: the concepts of conflict and of power.

A. Conflict

"Conflict" has always had an ambiguous meaning within the French trade union movement. It has on the one hand been presented as the inevitable consequence of a class society wherein the poor are set against the rich and the exploited against the exploiters.

The trade unionists have always tended to present themselves to the employers as mediators of good will, ready to avoid for them the disastrous forms of conflict. It was in the employers' interest to satisfy the demands of their employees: the price to be paid would in any case be less than the price of future conflict. Recently—at Citroën—the CGT representatives did not fail to present this argument, namely, that losses in terms of production are greater than the cost of meeting the workers' demands.

When the trade unionists say that they do not go on strike "out of sheer wantonness" or "for the fun of it," they do so to show that they are not the cause of disputes which are inherent in the system, adding however that these disputes are not inevitable inasmuch as economic measures adopted as a result of trade union mediation would make it possible to avoid them. Not infrequently, at the monthly personnel meetings, the union representatives play the role of advisers to management, warning employers of the risks they run in rejecting the workers' demands. Here the workers are presented as an autonomous force—motivated by their class instincts—who vigorously defend their interests by means of actions that can go as far as actual conflict, while the union mediators seek to avoid conflict through negotiation. Conflict—overt or latent—accordingly becomes the justification for the existence, and for the institutional role, of the trade unions.

In these circumstances, conflict has two causes: on the one hand, the class instinct which is inherent among wage earners; on the other, the ignorance that prevails among employers together with their inability to comprehend the workers' desires and to take conciliatory measures.

Here we have a point of view—based on traditional demands—that is held not only by the revolutionary unions (CGT) and self-management unions (CFDT) but also by the reformist unions (FO, CFTC) and that does not differ from the point of view of the social democrats or laborites. In this context, two scenarios are possible:

1. The conflict is only latent; the mediators utilize its potentiality and carry on negotiations while brandishing the conflict as a possible risk but only rarely—in France—as a threat. Unlike the Swedish, German and American unions, the French unions rarely say that they are going to call a strike, in the event they do not receive satisfaction of their demands. Their condition of weakness and division prevents them from making such a threat; most often they limit themselves to "warning strikes."
2. The conflict exists; it has been initiated. In this case the unions will intervene as mediators to negotiate an end to the strike, and in France there is the special circumstance that the results of the negotiation are presented to the strikers for approval prior to definitive ratification.

The French trade unionists, however, also utilize the concept of conflict in a sense that is entirely different from the one outlined above. For the revolutionary trade unionists (and especially for those who take their inspiration—overtly or otherwise—from Marxism) the conflict is not solely the consequence of a class society but is also a necessary factor in enabling the wage earners to become aware of their condition as victims of exploitation or alienation.

The wage earners' spontaneous opposition to their employers has been in vain; despite everything, they do not have a clear vision of the social relationships involved, nor are they aware of the political and historical role that they must assume. Their general awareness does not, generally speaking, rise above the level of their immediate interests. In order for this awareness to rise to the overall level of society, they must be shown that the very society and business establishment from which they are demanding additional wealth are unable to provide it for them.

The conflict is accordingly viewed as an educational factor—as a means of raising consciousness. For the purposes of negotiation the mere threat of conflict is sufficient, but "consciousness raising" entails actual conflict. It is as agents for consciousness raising that the trade unionists are motivated to proclaim that "only struggle brings results."

Only a revolutionary point of view can underlie a principle which is so deeply rooted that open struggle—as a living reality—is preferable at all events and that any maneuver tending to avoid that final stage could not be other than a betrayal of one's class. It is therefore implicitly acknowledged that open struggle (meaning strikes) is always more profitable for the workers than for the employers. From the point of view of revolutionary maximalism even short-term defeat is beneficial, because it brings the workers to a higher level of political awareness.

One can therefore understand why the revolutionary trade unionists are so vigorously opposed to negotiations in an atmosphere of calm: they believe that negotiations should be held only in a climate of conflict, and that negotiations in a climate of calm constitute betrayal.

The French trade union movement has never been disturbed by the contradiction that exists between these two theories with respect to conflict—theories which it uses in alternation.

Since 1975 the reformist theory has appeared to be considerably less credible than in the past: in the midst of a developing crisis, and threatened by competition and shrinking markets, the industrial society deserves the pessimistic judgments of the revolutionaries. Paradoxically enough, it is precisely at this moment that in France the unions and the revolutionary parties
are abandoning a theory that was successful during the years 1950-70, at a
time when the attitude of the capitalists appeared instead to invalidate it.
Now, at a moment when capitalism is no more, the unions and the Left are
becoming reformists. Are we not seeing an "Auroux Law"--passed by the Left
and supported by the trade unionists--compelling the enterprises to negotiate
with the unions on a regular basis? Under the Auroux Law we have not only
preventive negotiation (for negotiations are scheduled to take place annually)
but also "preventive preparatory deliberations" prior to all negotiation.

In an astonishing reversal of circumstances, it is a government of the Left
that is instituting direct deliberations with the workers--deliberations which
until now, we repeat, was a tactic of "reformist" management and was denounced
by the unions. Even the social democratic unions have never gone this far in
respect to collaboration between classes.

Such deliberations consist of the direct communication of information by the
workers of their wishes and their demands as well as information in respect to
working conditions, in order that the management of the enterprise may take
this information into account--a process that has always been denounced as
paternalism. The expression of the views of the workers at the workplace tends
to take the form of rational deliberation; it does not base social relation-
ships on class strength and class confrontation. The CGT, to be sure, reiter-
ates that the struggle of the workers themselves cannot help but facilitate
rational management of the enterprises. This, however, is a way of integrat-
ing its own ideology into the dominant ideology, and proves that the classic
thesis regarding "consciousness raising" is now meeting with little acceptance.

If we turn to the problem of employment, the abandonment of the revolutionary
theses is all the more striking. In the space of 1 year there have been theo-
retical metamorphoses that are hard to evaluate. The defense of national
employment--which has become an obsession--does not square well with yester-
day's internationalism.

The fact that the unions and revolutionary parties are discarding their theo-
ries could, after all, be nothing more than a secondary phenomenon of interest
only to intellectuals. It could be said that the French working class has in
fact never taken any of this seriously and has remained indifferent to this
debate between revolutionaries and reformists. It is remarkable, however,
that in rallying--very belatedly--to a reformist theory that is even milder
than that of the social democrats, the French trade unionists have nonetheless
not changed in any respect their system of relations with the working class.

Over the course of many years the reformists have succeeded in establishing a
strong trade union movement that is an interlocutor recognized and feared by
the employers far more than is the CGT, for example. Little by little the
reformists have organized the working class into strong bureaucratic organiza-
tions similar to the other organizations that are governed by an almost
immovable political class, and have obtained improvements in the workers'
situation together with reforms that are more daring than those that have
taken place in France. It is a policy that without any doubt is open to
criticism but is rational.
In France, on the other hand, revolutionary policy finds its support in organizations that have established very fragile relations with the working class—relations that are based on annual elections and on a form of competition that virtually prevents any sort of political coherence. Trade union strength can be founded only on the voluntary and revocable adherence of workers who are solicited continuously. The resultant bidding for the workers' support tends to depoliticize the workers and to lead the union organizations into a pattern of demagogic behavior which makes it impossible to carry out a continuous policy whether that policy be reformist or revolutionary. Those whom the unions should therefore be "seducing" are the wage earners, not the unemployed: workers who are situated in strategic positions where essential functions and production can be shut down more often because the workers are not subject to the insecurity and difficult conditions of the PME [Small and Medium-Size Businesses]. It is the workers in the protected sectors who constitute the strength of the unions; it is they who impose their brand of politics on the unions. The civil servants reject the solidarity tax, and the workers refuse to give up the remuneration for their 40th hour even though their wages are three to four times the SMIC [expansion unknown].

The revolutionary theory of conflict is therefore not merely an intellectual phenomenon: it is a kind of link between the organizations, on the one hand, and a rank and file that is in a position of strength vis-à-vis the employers as well as the unions.

B. Power

The pro-centralization concept held by the PCF and CGT has always made them believe that influence can be acquired only by the acceptance of positions of power. The nationalizations—and the quarrels with the socialists—illustrate this principle very well. Within the enterprises themselves, the objective is to increase trade union power. This concept might be summed up as follows: the PCF and CGT must be at the top level with the managers, either to collaborate with them and implant an appropriate policy or to control them and prevent them from carrying out a policy harmful to the workers.

Today this objective has been attained. If a given union opposes the policy of a given nationalized group, it is no longer because management is at the service of profit but because management is either insufficiently enlightened or harbors ill will. Ever since the PCF has been in the government, the criticism has been mild. The socialists are scolded for not having gone far enough in respect to change; this, however, is ascribed not to any Machiavellian intent on their part (as had been the case previous to 10 May) but only to the fact that their analyses were divergent. Because of the discrediting of Sovietism, no good countermodel is any longer available.

The government is in part in the hands of the trade unionists or of their friends, but the situation is nonetheless not being rectified. Inflation continues, the trade balance is unfavorable, and unemployment persists despite the promises. The trade unionists are no longer able to criticize at will; they no longer have any political alternative to offer. When one has acquired the habit of ascribing all difficulties to the nature of government, it is hard to be at the controls and discover oneself to be powerless.
The stagnation in the growth of the membership of the union organizations, and the increased incoherence manifested by the latter at the theoretical level (that is to say, at the level of ideas), reflect a certain distance that persists between the organizations and the workers (as for example in the Renault strike at Flins). We shall, however, be witnessing the development of union responsibilities in the enterprises and in the institutions (as for example in Social Security).

In other words, weak organizations (certain members of which have been integrated into the circles of power) will have to delegate many of their members to sit on a large number of commissions for the purpose of carrying out tasks that are far from being exciting but require complex skills. A new elite will in this way be formed— one that will doubtless have little political motivation and even less ideological motivation. This elite will soon develop a tendency to replace the benevolent spirit of the party member with the spirit of the civil servant. One is justified in fearing that it will not be very effective in rendering the services that the workers expect of it. Here, too, the possession of power may well prove to be disappointing.

The greatest number of union representatives—those appointed to the boards of directors of the nationalized enterprises and those appointed to the shop councils—will have to coexist with the cadres and managers of the enterprises in order to accomplish tasks which will for them be far more complementary in nature than adversarial. How could they refuse to administer the penury in the nationalized enterprises that they have just conquered in such a lofty struggle? But in what way will this entry in force—in the part of union members—into the representative system be able to appease the hunger for better wages that had been intensified prior to 10 May 1981?

The union members—who have often received nothing more than ideological training—will be compelled to do and say something entirely different from what they have been prepared to do and say. What good is it to have learned to organize the wage earners to defend themselves when one must above all encourage economy, technical innovation, and solidarity in respect to sharing hours of work, jobs and wages? It will be necessary to unlearn and relearn; above all, it will be necessary to return to a "militant modesty." "Triumphalism" will soon be no more than an old veteran's memory. Let us hope that revolutionary militancy will understand that this is the price which must be paid if the Left is to remain in power.

The ways in which the unions can cope with a situation of this sort are not new. They are:

1. "Forward Flight." This constitutes a temptation that must surely exist among certain trade unionists, and particularly within the CGT, which could revert to its policy of rallying the discontented even at the price of ruining some sectors of the economy. Such a course would imply that these union activists have another model, but the model that could be provided by the

2. Under the terms of the Le Garrec bill concerning the nationalized enterprises.

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Eastern Bloc countries seems to be less and less attractive—even to the old-line Stalinists. Moreover, the GCT would need to have sufficient prestige to be able to rally the discontented in suicidal struggles; and this does not appear to be the case.

2. Integration. Formation of a "sacred union" to safeguard the national economy would be to resume—after decades of delay—the policies of the social democratic or Japanese trade unionists. We would then have bureaucratization of the union members within the structures of each enterprise—that is to say, unless prospects for democratization of the enterprises inspire these members to introduce original innovations into the management of the enterprises and into the search for a more collective operation of the enterprises, one inspired by the principle of self-management.

3. Renewal Through a Search for Ideological Coherence. The basic criticism that we have made of the trade unionists is not that they have ideas but that they do not believe in the ideas they do proclaim, and that they do not draw the appropriate ideological conclusions from their daily practice. Only certain trade unionists of the CFDT have attempted to draw the appropriate conclusions from the principle of solidarity, and in order to do so they have had to confront the other unions—and sometimes their own comrades and wage earners themselves who are susceptible to demagogy.

Only the CFDT has for years struggled with perseverance to obtain a reduction in wage differentials—a struggle that is another form of solidarity and that involves a policy which runs counter to the will of the organized workers.

Solidarity through job sharing is an idea that is enjoying favor among the various alternatives. Research and experimentation are being carried out by some marginal groups which include many members of the CFDT.

International solidarity demands that our consumption of raw materials and energy be restrained by the creation of goods that have greater durability, and by the development of small maintenance enterprises.

Solidarity is a policy which in order to be coherent cannot be content to combat international capitalism; it must also combat our own life style. In order to be coherent and effective, this commitment requires an intelligent effort in the field of research and experimentation so that we may learn other kinds of "know-how," other life styles, and other methods of struggle.

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DIFFERENCES OVER INDEPENDENCE ISSUE POSE THREAT IN GUADELOUPE

Paris LE MONDE in French 29, 30 Jun 82

[29 Jun 82 p 10 Part I]

[Part 1 of two-part series by special correspondent Philippe Boggio: "Gua
deloupe: The Fever, Again: I. Promise of Doom"]

[Text] Pointe-a-Pitre--Like a scratchy beguine on a French Colonial Army
gramophone, here comes the old tropical tune starting up again. You are regaled
with the promise of doom in approximately the same terms as last year. The
Great Social Upheaval--or rather, "complete disorder," to reuse West Indian
Frantz Fanon's phrase--is going to happen tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow
in the best of circumstances. Guadeloupe is rising up in rebellion, ready to
tear itself apart; it's for certain.

No sooner have you landed than you are served up the hackneyed hurricane com-
parison again, a comparison already carefully chosen in spring 1981 to make it
possible for you to grasp the Guadeloupian situation. That old hurricane that
builds up and restrains itself only to break on the sugarcane fields of Basse-
Terre. A deceptive calm, a period of long silent submission, punctuated by a
social explosion, a radical one, that forces a break and forces the parent
country into a reckless way of "talking."

Even the stages of the insurrection are familiar to you: repeated dockyard,
university and distillery strikes; attacks of all kinds; punitive raids by a
CCRM (Clandestine Committee of "Metro" [Metropolitan French] Resistance Fighters);
constant police checks. Soon there will be clashes following an isolated inci-
dent--some stupid skin-color quarrel, the first urban martyrs around the law
courts, unemployed blacks against white gendarmes. By this time the Commune
[a reference to the revolutionary municipal administrations of Paris in 1789
and 1871] will be winning the campaign. There are murders of Beke planters
(white creoles) entrenched in their banana plantations. There is an armed
underground force of farm workers on the gullied flanks of La Soufriere....

There is nothing missing from this picture of the tropics gone mad--a picture
imagined in Pointe-a-Pitre but borrowed from Caribbean or African history.
How is one to take these alarms seriously? This spring, Guadeloupe still appears like a stout good-tempered woman, calm and all done up in her Sunday best, busy stubbornly filling out her waistline within the framework of the French Republic. Pointe-a-Pitre even has more shop windows with hi-fi systems and new restaurants serving tournedos with imported red wine, scorning bluff [fish stock make of conch, clams or sea urchins with onions, limes and spices] and petit punch-style local culinary arts. At bingo hour in one of the hotels in the seaside resort ghetto of Cosier, Mr Damnyck Zandronis, editor of MAGAZINE GUADELOUPEEN—a monthly closely associated with supporters of independence—is making reference to "the current deep-seated unrest," and a few meters away a Wester Indian master of ceremonies wearing a tropical helmet is giving a cooking course in Creole to some tourists who are delighted to be speaking "Petit-Negre" [pidgin-type French-based Creole].

How, then, is one to believe those alarms? In the talk one hears, how is one to show understanding for the analysis and for the feelings expressed aloud—those completely verbal acts of violence, somewhat ritualistic, that have been, at worst, used here as exorcism ever since the abolition of slavery? It is true that this time a unanimous assessment seems to prevail in Guadeloupean political circles. Pro-department elected representatives, right-wing as well as left-wing—neutral observers—supporters of independence—high-level "Metro" officials—all the people we spoke with give you all the descriptions you could ask for of "an objectively tense situation." In the opinion of a colleague of the perfect's who is a regular visitor to the DOM [Overseas Departments], the conditions are even ripe for "political debate to move to the streets."

Some signs are tangible. Attacks, first of all, which have been less violent but more numerous than during 1980–1981. A series of nasty hits by groups with acronyms unheard of up to now has been saluting the Left's accession to power in Metropolitan France ever since "the 10th of May." Twenty or 30 attacks, of unequal importance and not always with very precise objectives, have taken place in the space of a few months. There have been fires in a supermarket in Saint-Francois, the "Saint-Trop[ez]" of Grande-Terre; in the garage of a Beke automobile importer; and, finally, at the premises of SODEG (Guadeloupe Development Company). Stones have been thrown in broad daylight by commando groups of youngsters wearing hoods at shopwindows of white merchants and at Raizet Airport; the office of the newly elected president of the regional council, Mrs Lucette Michaud-Chevry, was turned upside down.... And in the last few weeks, two cars were burned in front of the "Syrian-Lebanese" Gosiers-les-Bains Casino late one April Saturday evening, and the day before the 1 May demonstrations, an incendiary device was thrown at the Basse-Terre prison.

Each group has its own style. The ALN [Army of National Liberation] favors action by fire. The "Committee Against Genocide of Blacks Through Substitution" (CGNS)—a name borrowed from an idea popularized by the mayor of Fort-de-France, Mr Aime Cesaire—has a marked taste for store windows. As for CAMUS, which makes raids into the regional council's offices, nobody in Guadeloupe has yet uncovered the secret of its mysterious acronym. These groups are considered to be more or less close to the "patriotic camp"—the pro-independence domain. They are evidently following the path made in 1980 by the "Armed Liberation of Guadeloupe Group"—that GLA that had scoffed at the police for 8 months and

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whose members, well, at least the five suspects arrested in April 1981, have been granted amnesty in part.*

"Several Hundred Weapons"

The GLA used to accompany its attacks with long theoretical texts. The novice terrorists send no more than terse communiques—as if everything has already been said. Their predecessors were professionals or intellectuals. The successors in 1982 might instead be young people from any social environment—dropouts, unemployed, but in any case left out of the nation’s prosperity if one is to judge by the suspicions hanging over a 29-year-old Creole, Mr Hugues Dalon. He was questioned on 3 March after the effort by the CGNS to lay waste to the airport. "He is the victim of an injustice," his sister protests. "He was without work after having spent 7 years in France.** To hang around with his pals, where else could he be but in the streets? He was charged and locked up without evidence." For some observers, the very proletarianization of these underground protagonists is a sign of Guadeloupe's gradual slide toward tragedy.

Here is another sign—"revealing the real atmosphere to a much greater extent," as Mr Camille Jabbour, a local PS figure, says, and undoubtedly more of a determining factor for Guadeloupe's future: the assassination of Max Martin, one of the beacon of the white Creole bourgeoisie—"the caste" they say here—on 15 February in front of his Capesterre-Belleau residence. Martin, chairman of the board of directors of the general social security office, an influential member of the employers' association, but, above all, sole head of the Fruit- and Citrus Fruit-Growing Company (SCEFA), the island's largest banana plantation (500 hectares)—was the planter-boss par excellence, tough on the job and completely impervious to trade union negotiation. "A slave system grower," the officials of the General Union of Guadeloupean Workers (UGTG; pro-independence) say about him. "A militarist, found armed with his Cobra submachine gun and a big revolver at the time of his death. His death is quite a handy foreground symbol in any case, in a department in which social conflicts, especially on the plantations, still refer to Guadeloupe's history—slaves, wretched of the earth, against colonists and white soldiers.

The murders of Max Martin are still at large. "Are they really being looked for?" wonders Mr Raymond Vivies, Pointe-a-Pitre regional councillor (Miscellaneous Opposition). It doesn't matter much, it seems, since Guadeloupe is apparently convinced that even if the Beke planter's murder has not yet been laid to specific perpetrators, its instigator is very much marked out: "the patriotic camp"—more specifically, its trade unions, the UGTG and the UTA (Union of Agricultural Workers). Didn't the gendarmerie question 10 or so trade union members in February, for anywhere from several hours to several days? Aren't two well-known Capesterre activists, Alexander and Marc-Antoine, suspected of having

* Three presumed GLA members—Luc Reinette, Jean-Claude Mado and Rene Elise—remain charged with "destruction of buildings involving death of persons" for an attack on Raizet Airport. An army staff sergeant died trying to defuse the explosive charge.

** Guadeloupian are losing the habit of referring to the metropole. The term "Metro" is in the process of disappearing.
thrown an incendiary bottle on the plantation at the empty car of Max Martin's "manager" (plantation foreman), being kept in jail? That misdeed does not deserve 2 months of preventive detention. They are incarcerated, in fact, to righteously remind whomsoever it may concern that the government has pinned a trademark on the assassination.

"This is the first pro-independence murder," maintains Mr Dannyck Zandronis. The opinion is no exaggeration. Many are the Guadeloupians convinced that the death of the planter-boss is the tragic but logical outcome of violent social conflict on the banana plantations—how in late November 1980, when the seasonal workers and the small Indian planters had called for the "occupation" of certain estates, the plantation world had again launched an assault on Max Martin's citadel for wage increases, growing rights and official recognition from the SCEFA for the UTA and UGTC.

Murder to order? An unfortunate mistake—an isolated disturbance of thoughtlessly aroused collective violence? The Beke community is not concerned about the details. It has already learned a lesson. Aware that from now on it is positioned in that line of sight, it is preparing to face up to things. "Several hundred weapons have arrived in Guadeloupe during the last few months," a "Metro" policeman confided. "There have been reports of bazookas from the island of Saint Barthelemy."

"Gaston de fer" [Iron Gaston]

Political circles, for their part, note that Max Martin's death, far from being the outcome of chance, and having occurred in a context of social crisis, in fact fits a strategy as old as Herod: "Destabilize—keep pressuring the already moribund economic structure—to weary the government and cause it to turn repressive." Increase the number of clashes and launch a new strike per week, like the strikes in the hospital, government services, agricultural and construction sectors during the last few months, to exhaust the will for social dialogue advocated by the government and to erode the patience of the whites, Creoles and Metropolitan French.

Also, persuade people that the old "colonialist" adversary has not softened since 10 May. "Menn Bet, Menn Pwiel!" ("Same beast, same coat of fur!")—there's the slogan! Dijoud-Emmanuelli—fighting the same way against a Guadeloupe enslaved as a result of being a department. To retain an influence, the "patriotic camp"—with too few activists still and absent from the official political scene—has for a year been having to force the action, confronted with a central government that is more conciliatory and most of all careful not to worsen naturally tense social relations. Thus, for Mr Rosan Mounien—in charge of the Movement for the Unification of Guadeloupe's Forces of National Liberation (MUFLING), the broadened pro-independence structure created in January—the Socialist government is "hypocritical": "It makes pro-Third World speeches in Mexico and comes and carries out repression in the West Indies like any colonial power."

For that colonial image to conform to the sought-after model, the pro-independence ranks are relying a great deal on the firm attitude of the minister for
interior and decentralization, Mr Gaston Defferre, called "Gaston de Fer" [Iron Gaston] here. Or rather, relying on his "cops, who remained in place after the departure of Valery Giscard d'Estaing." The "patriotic movement" makes no secret of the risk of a confrontation, since that movement is certain that tomorrow or the day after tomorrow it will see the police forces stand up in the face of demonstrators—police forces that themselves are less inclined toward social dialogue and are surely upset by the rumors regularly moving through white circles of rapes of white women, of coup d'etats in preparation and of imminent race riots.

Such a risk is acknowledged at the prefecture. "It is difficult for a white CRS [Republican Security Companies (State Mobile Police)] man to stand for a black man's aggressiveness," a high-level official feels. "Especially the aggressiveness of a black woman who is shouting." Always that ancestral fear, those fantasies of Negro savagery that, should the situation arise, the streets in both Pointe-a-Pitre and Basses-Terre know how to play on at will.

"Violence Time" was MAGAZINE GAUDELOUPEEN's front page headline in its April issue. The department's press was already making that same announcement last year, what with the GLA's final convulsions, before a sleepy summer was to pass.

This time, however, people insist, Guadeloupe finds itself confronted with a new strategy from its most activist fringe, the clandestine groups that nobody yet takes very seriously aside from the "patriotic movement." That movement is said to have renounced its habitual guerrilla warfare tendencies during the last few months. The GLA's odyssey proved that "the island is too small to hold up for a long time." "The only violence possible is the kind that advances the mass revolutionary struggle," asserts Mr Rosan Mounien. Putting that in plain language, the kind that can create the opportunity for an exploitable social conflict.

Last March, 100 people pretty nearly did in a Pointe-a-Pitre "Metro" cafe owner who had been violent with his Guadeloupian waitress. The incident—which, fortunately, was rapidly brought under control—reminded Guadeloupe that from March to May 1967 the racist provocation of a Pole residing in Basses-Terre had touched off several days of riots whose final toll, which was never made public, was about 50 killed by CRS bullets. Several Pointe-a-Pitre firms were on strike then.

[30 Jun 82 p 7 Part II]

[Part 2 of two-part series by Philippe Boggio: "Guadeloupe: The Fever Again: II. Have At the Elected Representatives!" ]

[Text] In a tense atmosphere through which run rumors of imminent violence (29 June LE MONDE), and at a time when there is still much comment in Guadeloupe on the murder in February of planter Max Martin, that department has just provided itself with a woman, Mrs Lucette Michaud-Chevry, as president of the regional council, and it is pinning its hopes on her management of its affairs.
Basse-Terre--A woman, after all. Guadeloupians, especially the men, are using the entire range of Creole magic to greet her accession—a gift from heaven. We had been told, "It is a woman who will save Guadeloupe." As if men had only been, at bottom, "fearful niggers" under slavery and since its abolition—adolescent gesture-makers, fragile behind their arrogant appearance; as if in order to endure misfortune, and having been placed at the crossroads of Africa and Europe, men still felt the need to recleanse themselves by turning to the "doudous" [native West Indian women], those wives and, above all, mothers and grandmothers—background figures in Creole imagery because of how stable they are—bearers of tradition and family values.

Madam President's "Hats"

It is the men again who maintain that Delgres and Ignace would never have been those liberator heroes so dear to their memory without the women. Without the women, the men would themselves be only "strutting cocks," spendthrifts and fine talkers, never-satisfied womanizers. When storms are brewing, and when an anxiety attack occurs or when a man is seeing things with too much clarity, male imperialism runs looking for comfort.

"The Guadeloupe of 1982 isn't doing any differently," confides Mr Raymond Cipolin, director of FR 3 ["France Regions 3"]. "At a time when our institutions are changing and the power of locally elected representatives is being strengthened, it is a woman that we have elected to lead us in our leap into space." A woman—Mrs Lucette Michaud-Chevry (mod.) [expansion unknown], lawyer of the Basse-Terre bar, elected president of the regional council on 26 March. Her appointment is bieng moved toward baptism by a strange unanimity. One hears in the very exclusive actively macho clubs that she alone might be able to organize the transfer of authority from the prefecture to the department. Her "proud, sometimes irascible temperament" would make it possible for the Guadeloupian community to avoid the trial and error and inevitable traps of taking on responsibility.

So be it. Let us take a look at this "doudou" who is being turned to—who on the Mount Olympus of great Guadeloupian women is already joining Gerty Archimedé, postliberation deputy and member of the Guadeloupian Communist Party (PCG), and the RPR's local ex-Passionaria, Mrs Albertine Baclet, "the woman from Marie-Galante" who was the Gaulist deputy in the National Assembly from 1967 to 1968. It is true that Madam President is, let's be frank, impressive.

This morning she was juggling her "hats" with a rare skill and sense of theatrics. At about 1000 she was still on the trial court defense bench for the trial of Patrick Delmez, a mentally unbalanced Belgian who committed a murder before bar closing time.

She made a quick stop in the shaded courtyard of the old tropical white Law Courts building, long enough to sharply reprimand an FR 3 journalist who was coming toward her all smiles on the outside. "You haven't broadcast my inauguration speech. But it was pretty good. You don't seem to realize that my election is an event!" The bad student just stood there, his polish gone.
Within half an hour Mrs Lucette Michaud-Chevry crossed the street to get to her regional council office, with a secretary who already thinks she is assisting the president of the French Republic and who checks even the stamps on press cards. "The Iron Lady of the Caribbean," as her enemies call her, only has time to tick off a few heartfelt frank comments, swinging her head of flaming red hair that is reminiscent of Mrs Gisele Halimi's. The style and speech are similar as well—heated and quickly irritated. On the situation of women: "Women here are only good for producing kids. We are thought of as personal property." Regarding her perpetual rival, Mr Frederic Jaltton, the Socialist deputy and mayor of Abymes: "He's a lazybones who doesn't know anything." Finally, with respect to the political situation: "Guadeloupians are fed up with electioneering maneuvers. We aren's white man's niggers any more."

Mrs Lucette Michaud-Chevry suddenly toned down, and even took the time to come out with a coaxing smile, to explain her election. The subject is certainly a trickier one. Mrs Michaud-Chevry, the Saint-Claude-Gourbeyre (Basse-Terre) regional councillor, was an unexpected candidate on the third round of voting and gave the Right a majority in the Assembly just when the two rival camps were at a standstill with exactly equal numbers of votes. But to hear her talk, that was just a matter of circumstances. The department's first lady dreams, in fact, of leading a "pro-department working majority"—a sacred union for crisis times that on its right would exclude the supporters of a narrow pro-department position, "Do nothing, change nothing," and on its left would exclude the PCG, which is still suspected of supporting "gradual" independence without admitting it.

Moreover, this unity would be somewhat left-leaning. Wasn't Mrs Michaud-Chevry herself a Guadeloupan Socialist Federation activist for a long time before she broke with the Federation on the eve of the 1981 presidential campaign for reasons of temperamental incompatibility with the locally elected Socialist representatives? Isn't the department, when you think about it carefully, long-time "social issues and socialist" territory that gave itself to Giscardism because in 1974 Francois Mitterrand had clumsily promised independence to the DOM that might wish it?

Return to the Fold

Guadeloupian right-wing? Not at all. Opportunists—not afraid of bailing out—"dirigonfistes" [translation unknown] (always to be found wherever the rice is swelling up) out of love for the French Republic—but nothing more. In spite of the opposition's official victory in the cantonal elections, Guadeloupe has been carting out its old left-wing testimonials in recent weeks. People take the opportunity to point out that Mr Lucien Bernier (UDF)—the mayor of Saint-Francois, former president of the regional council and long-time leader of pro-Giscardism—only founded "pro-department socialism" because of the lack of cohesiveness of the local Socialist Party. But he is definitely a left-wing man, like one finds produced here by the West Indian teachers' SFI [French Section of the Workers International (French Socialist Party)], which is very finicky on the matter of "indestructible ties." People explain that since it appears that the president of the [French] Republic no longer intends to deprive France of its overseas departments, nothing is preventing 10 or maybe 20 representatives labelled "Miscellaneous Majority" or UDF from returning to their original fold.
Even Mr Raymond Vivies—Pointe-a-Pitre regional councillor, the white Creole community's lone activist and referred to as a "strongarm politician" by all those who criticize him for his populism, which plays up to his supporters, and for "shooting his mouth off"—even he may very well be part of this pink pro-departmentalism. To convince us of that, he showed us photographs at his home of Francois Mitterrand that were just waiting to be personally autographed before ending up beside wall photos of General de Gaulle, Jacques Chirac and Valery Giscard d'Estaing. "I have never attacked the president of the republic," he explains, "and when Gaston Defferre came last March, he completely reassured me as to the government's intentions."

Poor PS!

In this atmosphere of pro-Mitterrand stupor, one might all but forget about the official PS—the real one, the one of the bad years of ambiguity (1974-1981). The unanimous diagnosis, from prefecture to political observers, and from pro-independence types to pro-department types, is that the fault for that lies in the lack of responsible party professionals and in the weakness of the elected representatives, incapable at present of providing a basis in the populace for government—except, perhaps, in Abymes, Mr Jalton's stronghold, even though in everyone's opinion he owed his election last year only to a providential electoral swing.

Guadeloupe is subjected to frequent verbal confrontations between supporters and opponents of independence, and it does not tolerate indecisive orientations or middle-of-the-road fence-sitting ideologies very well. One must make strong proclamations to make oneself heard by a population for which politics often boils down to the eternal question of social gains.

Pro- or anti-France—the choice is a simple one. Because the local PS did not make it clearly known that the Left was pro, that party lost the cantonal elections, since it was faced with opponents who did not hesitate to sow confusion, blithely mixing the Socialists' beliefs from successive time frames—those from 1974 with those from 1981. "The government lacks human intermediaries, information media and capable men here," explains a high-level civil servant with socialist leanings. "We would need a visit by at least one minister a month for things to be clear."

The poor PS seems so weak, between its quarrels among individuals and chronically losing its voice, that a great many people seek to bypass it. And heading the healers is Mrs Michaud-Chevry, discreetly supported by a governmental administration that is studying how to bring the department back to a broader-based Left at the time of future elections for the single assembly that is the planning stage. A single method, apparently, would make it possible to succeed in that: discrediting the elected representatives, joining in chorus with all those who proclaim to Guadeloupe that "the politicians are rotten," elected only by scant hundreds of votes, too old (the average age of the councillors is 50) and already made outdated, of course, by upcoming prospects for decentralization.
This also means getting those who take refuge in electoral abstention to join in—abstention that because it regularly goes over the 50-percent mark must certainly entail a form of resistance, a form of scorn for the political game. Young people must be appealed to, therefore, because we are talking first and foremost about them; sharing the same opinions, they are situated voluntarily on the fringes of society and prefer to go and express their unemployment anxieties and their Creole bad behavior on the side of the pro-independence types.

It's a difficult job. The recent SODEG (Guadeloupe Development Company) affair, a misappropriation of public funds, further increases the discredit cast on the quality of elected political representatives (LE MONDE, 1 September 1981). For some of the island's leading economic officials to be implicated in that scandal is, while it's possible, one thing; but how is one to account for the fact that the company, in charge of projects for urban center financing and facilities, was able to put itself outside the law since 1978 without awakening the slightest suspicion on the part of the regional councillors, who are members of its board of directors? For an excuse, Mrs Michaud-Chevry resorted to the traditional argument: the state—the state most of all—didn't see anything either. "We're really less expert than a [departmental] chief treasurer and paymaster, aren't we?"

Hunt for Young People

Nevertheless, Madam President must certainly have some doubts, since she hastens to tell each new visitor that up to now she has not delegated any power to her assistants. "I want to surround myself with Guadeloupian experts," she explains, "who will help me to prove my competence as a manager." Again we're talking about young people—this time, the kind one could make elected representatives out of; the hunt for them is now in full swing. Thus, from the prefecture to the PS to the regional council, people are extolling the budding merits of Jean Girard, Regional councillor of Marie-Calante, Guadeloupe's "large dependency" located 30 km from its shores. He seems so full of good will that one might well forget that he favors independence. The independence of Marie-Calante, of course.

Ah, this sudden passion for incorruptible youth! One name in particular is on everyone's lips. Reinette—the name of a large family born to a couple of pro-Third World teachers, from among those that the metropole sent to Africa at the time of decolonization. There are 11 children, all of them with degrees, all capable and intelligent. Pierre, the eldest, should be the next head of the DASS [expansion unknown]. Michel, kept out of television for 10 years, has finally been fitted into FR 3. And Luc was recently acclaimed in Fort-de-France at the Frantz Fanon commemoration. What a pity that Luc was the man behind the GLA and that he cannot be budged from "Guadeloupe liberation." As soon as he left prison last summer he started Radio Unity with his comrades. Determined to change his style and without waiting for the "patriotic camp" to complete its never-ending discussions, Luc—the HLM [Low-Cost Housing Program] Office director—embarked on intensive rice farming and this month established his own party, the Popular Movement for Independent Guadeloupe (MPGI).
Will these young people let themselves be persuaded by the government and the regional council president to go a little further down the road with France? That is where the current political plan's problem lies.

One evening in late April, Pierre Reinette and his family and friends were celebrating a baptism. They were practically all there—lawyers, doctors, high-level bank and airline managers—in a nightclub lent for the occasion. Between dances, they vowed that they weren't going to be had by the republic or the department any longer.
DIFFERENCES WITH NICOSIA OVER CYPRUS ISSUE

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 7 Sep 82 pp 1, 3

[Text] The decision of the government of Greece and Cyprus to postpone until next March the bringing up of the Cyprus issue before the General Assembly of the UN is due, according to reliable sources, to several reasons and considerations. These are based just as much on the need not to involve the national issue in the electoral campaign of Cyprus, as stated in the joint communiqué of last Saturday, as on the present international situation and the possibility of obtaining a favorable vote in the UN General Assembly in the context of such a situation.

These reasons are closely connected and, it was from the common talks and assessment that the two governments reached the decision to postpone the bringing up of the issue until next March, for a better, or at least "not worse" solution under the present circumstances.

The fact is that there were, at least until Saturday, certain differences of opinion between the two governments regarding the contents of the proposed resolution to be submitted to the General Assembly of the international organization.

According to the customary practice and procedure, any interested party submitting a resolution on any subject to be voted upon by the General Assembly, goes beyond the real or attainable demands of the interested party in order to leave a sufficient margin for maneuvering during the behind-the-scenes negotiations preceding or during the debate itself, so that the demands will remain within the original limits.

If, however, the subject matter of a resolution goes beyond certain "high limits," if, that is, it goes beyond the feasible "maximum" it becomes unacceptable even for negotiations and there is thus danger of unanimous defeat. The difference of assessment between Athens and Nicosia is attributed exactly to this point, that is, if and by how much the the overextending the limit of the demands in the text of the resolution to be voted upon, could bring about the unanimous defeat of the resolution to bring the issue before the assembly.

The Greek Side

The Greek side insists that the continuation of the intercommunal dialogue be contingent on the withdrawal of the Turkish invasion and occupation troops and their replacement by UN forces. This withdrawal would constitute the focal point and the
and the main and basis subject of the resolution. On the other hand, it would not accept the expediency of including in the proposed resolution the convocation of an international conference on the Cyprus issue, as the Cyprus government wanted, by arguing that it would be outright unattainable in view of the fact that it is not acceptable (and therefore they were not about to participate in it) either by the United States or by Turkey and Great Britain which is among the guarantor forces of the Republic of Cyprus.

The Cypriot View

The Cypriot side considered this Greek plan as the "maximum" in the sense that, while it set desirable goals, these were unattainable in view of the present situation, with the risk of having the opposite result from the one sought, that is, not to be accepted by the non-aligned nations and thus be unanimously defeated, a fact that would result in very serious consequences. It counter-proposed, for talks and as "working text," a plan which had as its focal point and main topic the activation of the intercommunal dialogue (with the creation of a special committee by the secretary general of the UN to monitor its course), the convocation of an international conference (with the participation of the two superpowers), and the withdrawal of all foreign troops (including the British stationed at the British bases which are British territory) and their replacement by UN forces.

The Cypriot side, based on its experience with previous UN General Assemblies and the resolutions on the Cyprus issue, maintained that such a plan had better chances of success than the Greek one, that is, that it had far more possibilities of being accepted, even with certain modifications, by the majority of the UN General Assembly members and indeed by the non-aligned nations—despite the reasoning of the Greek side which characterized the Cypriot plan as "soft" and "minimal."

In addition to the indecision created by this disagreement, and in order to overcome it, time and certain negotiations will be necessary, it was taken into consideration by both sides that the electoral campaign for the presidency of Cyprus next February would have adverse effects on the handling of the national issue at the UN General Assembly.

In the past, in similar situations, the leaders of all the principal political parties of Cyprus (Gl. Kliridis, V. Lysaridis, the AKEL representative, etc.) were part of the Cypriot delegation and, cooperating for the common cause, each of them worked—in the direction that he could and according to his capabilities—towards obtaining the best possible resolution.

This year, because of the electoral dispute, such cooperation is not possible. On the contrary, every political line-up and every candidate as well as the press supporting each coalition might perhaps attempt to exploit the handling of the national issue in order to obtain electoral advantages and to create impressions for vote-getting purposes with evident great damage to the national cause.

Finally, the president and the government chosen in the elections, keeping in mind the recent popular mandate, will be able to handle the question with added authority. Until then, the exploratory soundings which in the meantime will have taken place at the UN General Assembly, would have given a clearer picture of the existing
possibilities and limitations. This fact will allow the formulation of a well-aimed plan for a resolution—a "happy medium"—of the desirable and the attainable considering the circumstances, which at present are unclear and uncertain because of the known developments in the Middle East.
PANEL ASSAYS EXECUTIVE UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 28 Aug 82 p 11

[Open forum with Celal Yardimci, Hasan Esat Isik, and Taylan Sorgun, moderator]

[Text] Celal Yardimci was born in 1911. He completed Istanbul University Faculty of Law in 1932. In 1950, he was elected deputy from the Democratic Party. He served as National Assembly acting chairman, deputy prime minister, minister of national education, and minister of justice. He was sentenced to Yassıada. In 1977, he was elected deputy of the Justice Party, which is banned at present.

Hasan Esat Isik was born in 1916. He graduated from Ankara Faculty of Law. He was elected Republican People's Party deputy. He has been minister of national defense and minister of foreign affairs.

Sorgun: When the draft constitution is discussed by the public, various views regarding the various statutes of the proposal are brought forth. Mr. Yardimci and Mr. Isik, who are participating in this open forum of ours, have served in various capacities in our political lifetime and are known by the public for their political activities. Both held seats in parliament prior to 12 September. In this open forum, the two politicians will discuss "the executive body in the new constitution." Now, I give the floor to Mr. Isik and ask his views.

Isik: Constitutions are as important as life in communities. For this reason, the importance of open forums of this nature becomes self-evident. Before going into the topic we will discuss in this open forum, I wish to explain my understanding of a constitution.

I believe that there is a large difference in goals of constitutions. If the ambitions of those who wish to establish sovereignty over communities are set aside, it can be seen that each community expects the achievement of economic and social development by means of its constitution. But, in addition to this, there are also constitutions that are liked and some that are disliked. This means that, in order to evaluate a constitution, it is not sufficient to look at its purpose only. It is also necessary to consider the course chosen to reach the goal.
Three elements are fundamental in the Turkish constitution. They are respect for democracy, republicanism, and social justice. When we assess the draft constitution on the basis of these elements, we are met with the following scene:

In the nation, the path was chosen so that concepts such as freedom, justice, and equality are to be entrusted to state authorities and even state forces rather than be ensured through the participation of citizens. As a natural result of this, personal rights and freedoms have been left to another plan. In the proposal, these instructions are given to citizens, "You are free to do what you wish, but do not do anything unless I tell you that you may."

Peace Cannot Be Achieved Through Silence

Sorgun: Will you give an example?

Isik: For instance, it is said, on one hand, that freedoms are unrestricted, and, on another hand, they are limited by means of the constitution. On one hand, it is said that national sovereignty will be used by the TBMM [Turkish Grand National Assembly], and, on the other hand, authority is given to the executive branch to issue decisions that have the quality of law. It is possible to give a number of other examples. There is not enough time for this, for there are innumerable examples.

I can say that the draft constitution confuses peace with silence, seeks to attain peace through silence. However, it is not very possible to achieve peace through silence. The silence will give the appearance of tranquillity for a period of time, but it is necessary to expect storms to follow in the future. And it is also not possible to ensure peace in a nation by relying on police force. This draft constitution appears to have chosen, to attain peace, the means I mentioned. There is, however, a need to correlate personal freedom and justice. There must be absolutely no doubt about this. Just as it is not possible for anyone to say no to this, it is necessary for each person, at every level of responsibility, to do what he can to ensure this. Everyone must say no to the idea of replacing personal freedom with state authority.

This draft constitution admits that those who possess rights can cause their rights to lose their qualities, but does not admit that the authority to limit rights is capable of any flaw whatsoever when using these rights. This imbalance shows itself throughout the entire draft constitution. In this draft, the Middle Ages' concept of the universality of the state authority reigns while the people, the individuals are neglected. Even if I could not believe that those who designed this draft were able to possess such a mentality, what a pity that there is such an appearance.

Edicts, Constitutions

There are two means to achieve order in a society. One is through edicts, and the other, constitutions. Edicts restrict the rights of individuals while constitutions restrict the rights of administrators. This draft constitution, however, has the quality of restricting the rights of individuals. It is for
this reason that it would be appropriate to say that it is more a draft edict than a draft constitution. I wish to give an example. Looking at the bill carefully, one sees that specific statements are always used when listing the duties of the state. There is one exception, and that is Article 4, which is related with basic rights and freedoms. In contrast to other articles, in this article, it is deemed sufficient to say that "work will be carried out to ensure proper conditions for these basic rights and freedoms." Because my profession is diplomacy, it is possible that I have a much better concept of the meaning of the word, "work." The same view dealing with the same issue prevailed in the 1961 Constitution, but the phrase, "work will be carried out to ensure proper conditions," was not used. A definite statement in the form of "preparations" was used. This example also demonstrates the degree to which freedoms are given importance in the draft constitution.

Coming to the question of political authority in the new draft constitution, a parliament formed through elections is proposed, but it has been chosen to center political authority within a single person rather than entrust it to this parliament selected by the people. This is demonstrated by the wish to render the president influential over the National Assembly and the government. In fact, one of the basic conditions of democracy is a straightforward, pluralistic, populist administration, not a personality administration.

Another point that must be discussed is this. This draft does not pay much attention to contemporary development on the issue of a social state and economic obligations. Workers are neglected, and value is placed on capital and strengthening the private sector. What is wanted is to establish an apparent balance by saying that equal statutes are being issued related with employees and employers. Yet, the fact that there is a difference between workers and employers is taught in lycées. The powerlessness of the worker has been forgotten. These are my general views on the bill. And within all these images, one cannot detect what the executive will do.

1924, 1961 Recipes

Sorgun: Mr. Isik, you know that a huge argument broke out in Turkey shortly after the 1961 Constitution became effective. And this argument goes on at present. As you recall, the 1924 Constitution stated that sovereignty would be used by an "assembly" chosen by the people, but the 1961 Constitution introduced into the recipe the use of sovereignty by "bodies." From the standpoint of the use of national sovereignty, the difference between the recipes of the 1924 Constitution and the 1961 Constitution is still being debated in our political lives on election platforms. In your opinion, with which recipe is this draft constitution closer? Or does it introduce a new recipe regarding use of sovereignty? Of course, this is with respect to general structure.

Isik: This draft constitution exaggerates further the explanation deemed necessary because of the discrimination among forces in the 1961 Constitution and strengthens and deepens the possibility of placing the government into the hands of a specific class of people.
Sorgun: There is an argument that began yesterday and continues at present. It is said that the recipe of the 1961 Constitution left the state powerless.

Isik: Some people do think that, but I do not. It seems to me that the phrase, "discrimination among forces," is not an appropriate one. It is necessary to say instead, "distinctions between duties." This, too, is a necessity. Recalling the period of the first TBMM, it can be seen that the TBMM appointed even the ministers. Of course, to limit the possibilities of the executive is not a situation that makes one's work easier. In this respect, the recipe introduced by the 1961 Constitution was not in the direction of limiting human rights. To the contrary, the path chosen was to reduce the influence of politicians on the courts. However, never was the authority of parliament turned over to the executive. This draft constitution, though, does transfer to the president a series of powers that must be used by parliament itself. In that case, this draft has taken as basic the solution of the nation's problems by means of an individual. Stated more clearly, it resembles more a constitution of a monarchy than a constitution of a republic. It bears that mentality.

Sorgun: Mr. Yardimci, you have heard Mr. Isik's general views on the draft constitution, his views on the subject of the executive, and his answers to questions. Now, I ask you for your opinions about these.

Yardimci: I wish to leave my words concerning the executive to the end and state at the beginning that I do not agree with Mr. Isik's views on the 1961 Constitution. The 1961 Constitution rendered parliament, the assembly, the executive branch, and the state powerless. Splitting up powers pushed the government into an inoperable state.

Sorgun: I would like to come to this point here. Does the draft constitution eliminate these objections, or does it bring with it new dangers?

Yardimci: I wish to touch on these basic points. In my opinion, the state revolves around three elements. They are the parliament, the president, and the executive. If these three exist and if all elements have been installed with responsibility and understanding, the state will have made "a decision for eternity." If these have not been installed, it has not made the decision. The points that I find dangerous in this regard in the draft constitution are:

As is known, after the TBMM comes into existence, this assembly chooses a president. The president names a prime minister to form a government. After the cabinet set up by the prime minister is approved by the president, the prime minister goes to the assembly and asks for its approval. The assembly gives its approval to that government. Despite the fact that this is the way the government functions now, this draft makes it possible for the president, having obtained the view of the State Advisory Council, to dismiss the prime minister. On another hand, the prime minister will be able to release a minister. Now, the dismissal by the president of a prime minister who has a vote-of-confidence from the assembly and the dismissal of a minister by the prime minister is nothing other than interference in the rights of the assembly.
An example that demonstrates another mistake is this. A government will receive a vote-of-no-confidence from the assembly because of the bad job it does and it will be ousted. This is normal in democracies. However, under the new draft constitution, the head of the government that has fallen may apply to the president requesting the dissolution of the assembly. This creates sovereignty over the assembly. It is not possible to correlate this with the parliamentary system of government and the will of the people. If this statute passes the referendum, it will be appropriate to consider the TBMM as non-existent.

What is Council For?

Another aspect which I do not approve is this. There exists a state slogan that cost Turkey dearly. It is not expensive in essence, but the creation of a set of unnecessary places of recourse and bodies has cost the state plenty. Now, a state advisory council is being established. How it will be formed and how crowded it will have been spread out before our eyes in the draft. What will this council do? When necessary, it will give its opinions to the president. Why was it deemed necessary for such a committee to perform such a simple act? There is absolutely no need for this. I see, however, that, as a result of debates on the constitution and criticisms in the press and from the public, this issue, about which I feel strongly, has been reconsidered, and various restrictions have been placed on the manner of organizing this body. The number of members has been reduced in part.

Isik: Mr. Yardimci, I believe you are mistaken on that point. A very small limitation was set.

Selected from outside Assembly

Yardimci: In that case, I feel as strongly as I did previously. On another hand, there are countless objections to selecting the president and the prime minister from outside the assembly. The interference that will be able to emerge against the constitution and the parliamentary system will be able to be the basis for these objections. Mr. Aldikacti gave his opinion of this issue. He said, "It is certain that the president, when selecting a prime minister, will look at the strength of the existing parties, will ask whether or not the prime minister will be able to obtain a vote-of-confidence from parliament, will conduct tests to determine this, and if it is necessary, will appoint a prime minister from outside." Aldikacti claims that such a situation exists in Holland and Denmark. I admit that I cannot keep from smiling at this statement and similar statements. How is it possible to compare conditions in Holland and Denmark with those in Turkey? It is not possible to understand this. Turkey has lived through the results of quota senate seats and the removal of those quota senate seats. The consequences of governments formed by quota senators are known. It is necessary to devise a constitution in Turkey that meets conditions in Turkey and using a model that suits Turkey. If you ask what conditions are in Turkey, the answer will be as follows: These conditions are links in a chain that stretch from 1946 to 1950, 1950 to 1960, 1960 to 12 March 1972, and 12 March 1972 to 12 September 1980. No other country in the world possesses a treasury of such conditions, such experiences. It is astonishing to make use of conditions in this or that country rather than to make use of our own. Don't the members of the Constitutional
Commission know how the Erîm government was formed and how it obtained a vote-of-confidence? To select a president from outside will produce the same result. I have a political belief that I will never lose. A person not chosen by the people cannot do a thing. A son of the people appropriate to conditions and who has appropriate qualities must be chosen by the people. However, he can be elected by the people directly or by the assembly. That is another issue, and I have no opinion on the subject.

Sorgun: Mr. Yardimci, the scale of the powers given the president by this draft constitution have become a subject of debate in this open forum. In your opinion, are all these powers excessive? If not, should they be placed into categories?

Yardimci: Such powers have been given to the president that it is no longer necessary to dwell on those that remain. The National Assembly, not the president, should be able to remove a prime minister. There is an institution for resignation in state life. There is nothing else that protects the dignity of personal honor as much as the resignation institution in state life. A prime minister or a minister should not pack up and go because the president makes a malicious remark or frowns. If there is a prime minister who does, he is not my kind of prime minister.

Another Pressure on Assembly

A vote-of-no-confidence from the assembly is one thing. Dismissal of the prime minister by the president is an entirely different thing. Removal of a minister by the prime minister is the same thing. And this means that there is another pressure on the assembly. If a prime minister from within the assembly cannot obtain a vote-of-confidence from within the assembly, how can a prime minister from outside the assembly obtain one? Reliance on force is certain. There is, here, a very delicate and sensitive point. It is necessary to draw attention to this point. I also wish to draw your attention to the same point regarding a president selected from outside. These are my views, in short.

Sorgun: Mr. Yardimci, I would like to ask a question at this time. Are there no statutes in this draft that receive your approval?

Yardimci: There are some aspects that I wish to accept as being necessary. The statute prohibiting associations from dealing with politics is an example. The prohibition against associations' being involved in politics is the greatest measure to ensure the permanence of the state. Such events took place in my political life, in our political lives, that there is not enough time to list them. It was seen how the politicization of bodies that were required to remain nonpartisan and how associations that were involved in politics heaped trouble onto this state.

Sorgun: Are the bodies that you say became politicized some judicial bodies? If so, does this draft prevent this? I am asking this question in reference to executive power.
Yardimci: It is necessary that judicial supervision categorically not get the better of the state. It is necessary that it not get the better of the executive. The judicial and administrative fate must be under the control of the state as with the 1924 Constitution.

Sorgun: Mr. Isik, we have listened to Mr. Yardimci's views. He emphatically brought up a point that has not to date received much attention during discussions. This is the question of a prime minister's removing a minister. He also spoke of a constitution that meets conditions in Turkey and said that he finds the statute in the draft constitution preventing associations from dealing in politics appropriate. What are your views on these subjects?

Isik: With your permission, I wish to reply to the view regarding the 1961 Constitution of Mr. Yardimci, whom I call a friend and whom I deeply respect. The 1961 Constitution was drafted in order to take Turkey to a higher level of civilization. However, the opportunities provided by the constitution in order to do this could not be utilized.

Council, Assembly

Mr. Yardimci put forth his views regarding the draft constitution with never-decreasing sincerity and with emotion. I feel fortunate because of this, and I wish to say that I agree with a large part of what he says. If this draft constitution passes as is, it will not be possible to look upon parliament as an institution that makes final decisions regarding solutions to the nation's problems. The draft is one that will give legality to a de facto government. These are the points to which I wish to draw attention here.

I do not know to what degree the council spoken of by Mr. Yardimci is necessary, but I do know one thing. Under statutes of the law, members of the state advisory council will possess the same rights as National Assembly members elected by the people. This is a faulty policy. It has even gone so far that the oaths taken by these people who are not elected are, word-for-word, identical to the oaths taken by those elected by the people. This is a mentality that will lower the respect for the TBMM. In the draft constitution, it is said that a unicameral system is being introduced, but with this council, a bicameral system, and one without elections, is produced. This cannot conform with the parliamentary system. I wish to add here quickly that the unicameral system is appropriate and is even a return to Ataturk, for it was Ataturk's wish never to help brake the assembly from outside.

It is not necessary to choose the president and prime minister from outside parliament. The TBMM is a laboratory. Persons who enter learn how to correlate the needs of the state with the wishes of the individual. If we entrust the state to men who have not done this, who have not learned this, then it is certain to where this will lead. It is said that politicians are responsible for the coming of 12 September. I do not find it at all difficult to admit this and to say that I am included among them. But, I wish to ask one thing. If we had elected presidents from among men trained in politics, would they have diagnosed the problems in the assembly and have issued warnings earlier and appropriately? The 1961 Constitution gave former presidents senate
seats, but not a single word was spoken, no warnings were made when catas-
trophies struck the nation. My respect for all of them is boundless, but this
means that they are men who chose to remain silent when they shunned respon-
sibility. For this reason, it is necessary that there be no more place for
this in the new draft constitution.

Sorgun: Mr. Isik, it has been seen in our political lifetimes that parlia-
ment is frequently shackled. Included among the powers given the president
in the new draft constitution is the power to lock up parliament, to dissolve
parliament. What is your opinion on this issue?

Isik: It is necessary to discuss this, but such a power must be related to
physical events. For example, if a president cannot be selected over a
3-month period, this is a statement of impotence. There must be a measure to
deal with this.

Sorgun: And your view on the subject of a prime minister dismissing a minis-
ter?

Isik: The French have a saying, "The prime minister is the first among
equals." A minister is not at the command of the prime minister. He is his
colleague. He does not take instructions from the prime minister. He works
jointly with him. It is necessary to draw attention to this.

Coming to items in the new draft constitution that I approve, lowering the
number of assembly members to 400 will not create many problems. However,
5-year terms are excessive, because events in the world and in Turkey take
place rapidly. In this respect, 4-year terms are more correct.

I wish to add quickly that it is not possible to accept lack of responsibility
from a president who is given so much power. There is an axiom for democracy
that states, "It is not possible to differentiate between power and respon-
sibility."

Powerful Executive

Sorgun: Mr. Aldikacti said that this draft strengthens the executive. What
criteria do you see are needed to create a strong executive?

Isik: In my opinion, the executive must be powerful, but it must always be
responsible to the TBMM. However, in order to be able to administer the
nation itself and to implement the program that has been approved, it must
not return to the assembly every moment and ask, "What should I do?" This
bill has not strengthened the executive in any manner whatsoever.

Another power given the president of which I do not approve is the power of
the president to declare war.

On another hand, it is wrong for the president to appoint the TRT [Turkish
Radio and Television Administration] director general and the Central Bank
chairman. It is wrong to give to the president the power to make these and similar appointments. My view is the same on the issue of the language academy. Giving the president this much power will create a return to the palace intrigues of the past.

I wish to respond to Mr. Yardimci's views in regard to associations. Unions are being left powerless through external nonpartisanship. Where there are unions, the employers are powerful. Their strength is their factories. Workers, however, do not have a single power. In particular, I deem it imperative for workers' unions to cooperate with other organizations in order to be able to solve their own problems without resorting to violent methods.

I wish to make another point immediately. The chairman of the Constitutional Commission made a statement that "the government does not belong to parliament, but to the president." This viewpoint is valid for the monarchial system. For example, the English call theirs the government of Her Majesty. Those who prepared this draft say they are taking measures to avoid a return to 12 September. Lucklessness has already begun to appear here. For a constitution to be successful, it must be drafted with an eye to past events and with measures directed toward the future.

Sorgun: Mr. Yardimci, there is a difference of opinion between you and Mr. Isik on specific points. In your opinion, what is the criteria for a powerful executive?

Yardimci: The executive means the government. The entire responsibility rests with the government. As I said earlier, the executive is not rendered powerful in this bill. The criteria for a powerful executive are related to the stability of governments. In order to secure stability, it is necessary to introduce logical statutes regarding relationships between the government and the assembly by revising the election law and the political parties law.

My view on the question of unions being involved in politics is this. Despite the existence of statutes in our laws prohibiting this involvement, the statutes have not been adequate. For this reason, they must be preserved in the draft constitution as well.

I wish to state that I oppose the entire 1961 Constitution. There are statutes in the constitution that is being drafted that do not correlate with the parliamentary system of government as well as statutes that are useful. The 1924 Constitution must serve as a basis for the constitution that is being drafted. It would be beneficial to utilize its spirit, purpose, and philosophy.

Sorgun: Mr. Isik, what is your opinion regarding the use of the 1924 Constitution as a basis for the new constitution?

Isik: It has already been determined that my view of the 1961 Constitution differs from that of Mr. Yardimci. Therefore, it is easy to guess what I will say on this subject. The 1961 Constitution must be taken as a foundation,
without ignoring the 1924 Constitution, and the new constitution must be drafted by examining the development of ideas in the world.

Sorgun: While the participants in this open forum have expressed differences of opinion over the 1961 Constitution, they are in agreement regarding several statutes of the new draft constitution. While stating that the executive is rendered powerless in the draft, the participants stressed that the powers given the president do not conform with the parliamentary system of government. They did, however, agree on the topic of giving certain powers to the president. In the meantime, it was seen during the discussion that there are aspects of the draft constitution that they find positive. Mr. Isik spoke of the positiveness of some details whereas Mr. Yardimci stated that the ban on unions' participation in politics, which is one of the basic statutes, is appropriate. Mr. Isik did not agree with this and explained that unions should cooperate with various organizations.