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WEST EUROPE REPORT
No. 1974

CONTENTS

TERRORISM

CYPRUS

Briefs
Conspiratorial Movement
Arms Cache

FRANCE

International Ties, Destabilization Aims of 'Action Directe'
(Jean-Charles Reix; LE FIGARO, 31 Mar 82)................. 2

Mid-East Diplomacy, Security Policies Aid Terrorism
(Editorial, Alain Griotteray; LE FIGARO MAGAZINE,
30 Apr 82).............................................. 5

Stricter Border Controls, Specialists Needed
(Raymond Marcellin; LE FIGARO MAGAZINE, 30 Apr 82)..... 7

Terrorist Types, Support, Future for France
(Xavier Raufer interview; LE FIGARO MAGAZINE,
30 Apr 82).............................................. 10

Poniatowski Sees Terrorism as Act of War
(Michel Poniatowski; LE FIGARO MAGAZINE, 30 Apr 82).... 15

Carlos, Qadhafi, Syrian Links to Recent Attacks
Analyzed
(Editorial; LE MATIN, 10-12 Apr 82)......................... 17

DST, SDECE Files on Curiel, Others To Be Made Available
(Jacques Bacelon; LE MATIN, 3 Apr 82)....................... 19

- a -

[III - WE - 150]
'Amis de Carlos', Diverse Groups Claim 'Capitole' Attack
(Pierre Gallerey; LE FIGARO, 1 Apr 82).......................... 21

TURKEY

DEV-YOL Trial Gets Underway in Istanbul
(CUMHURIYET, 13 Mar 82)........................................... 24

ENERGY ECONOMICS

ITALY

Legislation on Reorganization, Name Change of CNEN
(STAFFETTA QUOTIDIANA PETROLIFERA, 26 Mar 82)......... 28

TURKEY

Briefs
Oil Production, Import

ECONOMIC

CYPRUS

Briefs
Kyprianou on Economy

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Lambsdorff on SPD Economic Ideas, Coalition
(Otto Graf Lambsdorff Interview; DIE ZEIT, 7 May 82)... 36

GREECE

'I KATHIMERINI' on Government Reshuffle, Economic Policy
(N. Nikolaou; I KATHIMERINI, 23 May 82)..................... 44

Briefs
Housing Construction in Algeria

TURKEY

Gold Exports for Foreign Exchange Permitted
(DUNYA, 19 Mar 82)................................................. 47

AYKIM Aluminum Plant Goes Into Operation
(Kenan Mortan; CUMHURIYET, 20 Mar 82)..................... 49
Briefs
Iron Exports
Dalaman Airport Opened

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

Moscow Allegedly Orders AKEL Cooperation With Kiprianou
(I SIMERINI, 19 May 82, KHARAVYI, 20 May 82) .......... 52

Kliridis Allegation
Kharavgi Rebuttal, Editorial

Missing Persons Issue Said Stifled at Moscow Congress
(O KIRIKAS, 20 May 82, Nicosia Domestic Service,
21 May 82) ........................................... 54

'O KIRIKAS' Claim
Government Denial

Ioannidis Criticizes President Kyprianou, AKEL
(O AGON, 23 May 82) .................................... 55

Briefs
Soviet Note to Turkey
PRC Envoy Concludes Visit
Kyprianou Criticized

DENMARK

Christian People's Party Congress in Midst of Fast Decline
(BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, various dates) ....................... 59

Poll: Party Would Lose All Seats, by Solveig Rodsgaard
Socialism, Liberalism Attacked
Party Would Cooperate With SDF, Conservatives, by
Dan Axel

FRANCE

PSF Executive Outlines Foreign Policy Goals
(Jacques Huntzinger; POLITIQUE ETRANGER, Mar 82) ......... 65

Rumors Aim at Discrediting Grossouvre, Intelligence
Services
(Pascal Krop; LE MATIN, 10-12 Apr 82) ..................... 69
GREECE

Takhidhromos Publishes Poll on Papandreou's Popularity
(TO VIMA, 20 May 82) ............................................ 71

Papandreou Discusses Reorganizing Government
(Adreas Papandreou; TO VIMA, 23 May 82) ................. 72

Government, Averof Clash Over Cyprus Handling
(Athens Armed Forces Radio, 22 May 82) ...................... 74

'I KATHIMERINI' on Growing PASOK-KKE Confrontation
(Editorial; I KATHIMERINI, 23 May 82) ....................... 75

'RIZOSPASTIS' on Difference in USSR and U.S. Support
(Editorial; RIZOSPASTIS, 19 May 82) .......................... 77

Both Right, Left Seen Sharpening Anti-PASOK Stand
(EPIKAIROA, 15 Apr 82) ........................................ 79

PASOK 'Hegemonism,' Anti-Unity Spirit Charged
(RIZOSPASTIS, 18 Apr 82) ..................................... 82

Briefs
Reaction to Kefallinia Incident .............................. 86
Maroudas Statement Rebuttal ............................... 86
Ulusu Visit ...................................................... 86

ITALY

PSDI Reaction to Berlinguer's Remarks on 'Social Democracy'
(Giuseppe Russo; L'UMANITA, 16 Apr 82) .................... 87

NORWAY

Study Claims To Show That Storting Has More Powerful Role
(Arild Isegg; AFTENPOSTEN, 27 Apr 82) ....................... 91

Poll Confirms Continued Decline in Support for Conservatives
(Egil Sündar; AFTENPOSTEN, 30 Apr 82) ...................... 94

Nordli: Nonsocialists Trying To Avoid Deciding Policy
(Odvar Nordli Interview; AFTENPOSTEN, 30 Apr 82) .... 97

Christian Party Leader Airs Problems on Nonsocialists
(Kår Kristiansen; AFTENPOSTEN, 4 May 82) ............... 101
TURKEY

Goze Assesses Impact of Evren's Kuwait Visit
(Ergun Goze; TERCUMAN, 24 Mar 82)......................... 103

Paper Reviews Results of Haig Visit
(Sami Kohen; MILLIYET, 20 May 82)........................... 105
BRIEFS

CONSPIRATORIAL MOVEMENT--A new illegal organization is in the process of being born. Criminal elements are leading in the establishment of this organization, but the state's security forces have dealt with them in the past. According to a statement by a high government official, the security forces were informed a long time ago about certain limited movements aiming at the formation of this illegal organization, whose movements recently became systematic. Despite the fact that the security authorities have no basic facts on the aims of the organization, they, nevertheless, are following its movements very closely. The government official said that this is being done because criminal elements, which also in the past had endangered the public's and the state's security, are playing a leading role in the formation of this organization. The official further stated that it is natural that one has to be careful when dealing with such elements. However, he concluded, there is no reason for any concern, because the security forces are following the organization's movements closely and are ready to intervene whenever they deem it necessary to foil any conspiratorial plans. It should be remembered that only recently AKEL Secretary General Papaioannou said that he had given the authorities facts on conspiratorial plans threatening the country. Simultaneously, the Interior Ministry confirmed that it had received such complaints and added that it has in hand other similar reports from other sources. [Text] [NC230915 Nicosia I ELEVTHEROTIPIA in Greek 23 May 82 p 1]

ARMS CACHE--A police statement reveals that after a search, conducted today with a search warrant at the home and outbuildings owned by Kiriakou Nikola Kouppis in Larnaca, various arms and ammunition were discovered in a cache inside a stable. Discovered were: A total of 14 automatic weapons of various types, including Kalashnikovs, Thompsons and Brens; six pistols; 51 cartridges; a bayonet; 5,500 rounds of ammunition; 33 empty detonators; a large quantity of slow-burning fuses and a homemade bomb, which was disarmed on the spot. All weapons and ammunition are in good order. The owner of the home and outbuildings that were searched was questioned and then released. The police investigation continues. Kiriakou Nikola Kouppis is the mother of Kiriakos Kouppis, who is serving a prison sentence for the murder of Yeoryios Fotiou in Larnaca. [Text] [NC212123 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1900 GMT 21 May 82]
INTERNATIONAL TIES, DESTABILIZATION AIMS OF 'ACTION DIRECTE'

Paris LE FIGARO in French 31 Mar 82 pp 1, 11

[Article by Jean-Charles Reix: "Destabilizing the State"]

[Text] This affair represents a manifestation of the new form of terrorism that is taking hold in France, with other methods and other objectives. Up to the present, the militants of the lost causes, the rebels, the separatists, the radical partisans of violent action would blow up buildings with plastic bombs, demolishing stone in order to touch minds. Sometimes too, people taken as targets at random--policemen, soldiers, magistrates--were struck down as examples, because their functions symbolized law, order and authority.

But for a year now, the terrorism of revolt has yielded to the terrorism of nihilism with international ramifications, the kind that attacks people, hitting an individual or a collectivity blindly and gratuitously, in an attempt to make the authorities bend. And this slide toward German-type or Italian-type situations, tending to destabilize the state, was foreseeable.

The "Action Directe" movement, for example, created in 1976 by a Toulouse man trained in the school of anti-Franco terrorism, has subsequently developed through the support of his clandestine Spanish friends, but also thanks to Italians of "Prima Linea" and the Red Brigades and West Germans of the Red Army Faction--all violent and subversive organizations.

These links were clearly established when, in July 1981, some Italians of Prima Linea and Spaniards of GRAPO [First of October Armed Revolutionary Group] were captured in France in the ne of an action against Action Directe. Previously, in Paris, Toulon and Nice on 28 March, some French terrorists of this movement were questioned in the company of some Italians of the Red Brigades. All these persons had taken part in a monster holdup in Nord, at Conde-sur-Escaut, or else were in possession of the money obtained from that crime, false papers, weapons and explosives.

Despite these overwhelming facts, only a single important member of Action Directe, Gilles Colomb, remains incarcerated today. Last week he was sentenced to 8 months in prison for having been taken by surprise, on Avenue Henri-Martin in Paris, in a car containing weapons. Colomb is a recidivist: he calls him-
self an "offensive communist" and he had thrown a grenade at a police station. The other militants have either received pardons or have come under the presidential amnesty.

This has been to the great displeasure of the police, who in 3 years had managed to infiltrate and dismantle this violent subversive network, the perpetrator of many armed attacks, attacks with explosives, machine-guns and bazookas, against official buildings.

Of course, it is not because Action Directe was born in Toulouse, the city where the "Capitole" went, or because one of its officials is still incarcerated, that it can be suspected of the train attack. But just as one lends only to the rich, the specialists in the fight against subversion suggest that this movement attempted, on 20 November 1980, to cause carnage in the Paris Stock Exchange by means of an infernal device that was fortunately neutralized in time.

Action Directe, which nothing, as we recall, makes it possible to envision that it took part in the massacre on the train, has in any case opened the door in France to an international terrorism that the collaboration of the police of Europe had at one time made it possible to wipe out. After 10 May, the liberal measures, the change of orientation of the police services, and the malaise of that institution enabled the international terrorists to surface again, with Paris becoming one of their favorite strategic bases.

In this context came 16 February, the episode of the arrest in Paris of a Swiss national and a West German. Their car was carrying 5 kilos of a powerful explosive, an ignition device and a map of the area around the City Hall. A curious association this, between the Swiss, one Bruno Breguet, a neo-Nazi who has sold his services to the Palestinians, and that of the German, Magdalena Kopp, a leftist. Carlos subsequently wrote to the minister of interior a letter intended to establish that he was the chief of these two persons, members of the international terrorist movement that he directs. The letter also contained an ultimatum to the French government: release the couple or suffer attacks.

Since then, the police investigation has shown that the car used by the friends of Carlos, a 504, had been furnished to them by two Corsican separatists of the FLNC [Corsican National Liberation Front]. Furthermore, on the evening of the couple's arrest, the FLNC unleashed a new "blue night," a wave of explosive attacks, in the capital and in Corsica. This operation followed by a short time the cold-blooded murder of a Legionnaire in Solenzara.

All this tends to show that the terrorists know neither frontiers nor ideological barriers. They are no more of the right than of the left. They help one another. All causes are good. They form one and the same community of thought centered on nihilism and the destabilization of the Western states. Acting as mercenaries, they receive common training, logistics and financing (Libya, the East European Communist countries). Clandestine types from Europe, Japan, the Arab world and Latin America (such as Carlos) train together in the Near East, Lebanon, Transjordan, South Yemen.
It matters little whether they belong to the "black order" or to the red international. A single manipulator (the KGB, it is said in the DST [Directorate of Territorial Surveillance]) is capable of using them, of aiding them. Is there a clandestine orchestra leader? One is not even necessary, so long as the mutual assistance of the soldiers of all the causes is automatic.

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MID-EAST DIPLOMACY, SECURITY POLICIES AID TERRORISM

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 30 Apr 82 p 88

[Editorial by Alain Griotteray: "Explosive Truth and Bombs"]

[Text] During the election campaign, candidate Francois Mitterrand had informed us that when elected president he would apply to France those miracle remedies he had used to build a large Socialist Party (PS) and rally a majority of the voters to that party. When the PS was an opposition party, it had become a catchall organization which had succeeded in appealing to communists and Poujadists inside France, and to the Israeli Labor Party and the PLO outside the country.

After a year in power, President Mitterrand has kept candidate Mitterrand's promises. The PS has turned France into a country that is a catchall for difficulties. Getting a party congress to applaud both the Israeli Labor Party and the PLO is one thing. Managing a nation's foreign affairs is another.

It's About Time!

When the socialists referred to "the Palestinian state," the resultant displeasure of the Jews took them completely by surprise. To straighten things out, they conceived the president's trip to Jerusalem, thereby infuriating Arab extremists. Now the government is discovering international terrorism. France has become the favorite site for terrorist activities of Middle Eastern origin. After having long made the enemy's task easier, it's about time to convene "war councils" at the Elysee Palace to organize counterterrorist operations and means of protecting French citizens.

In releasing terrorists of the Action Directe movement, and of anti-imperialist, pro-Cuban, and anti-Zionist ideology, the government thereby furnished troops to those it believed to be its friends.

In abolishing the Court of State Security, it thereby complicated the coordination of investigations.

In "beheading" and dismantling police agencies, it demoralized the men who were the only ones capable of halting the activity of foreign secret police personnel serving as diplomats.

5
Even more despicable are those links between Action Directe and Gisèle Halimi, a socialist member of parliament. Everything is happening as if the government were being blackmailed by terrorist circles. "If you move too vigorously against us, we shall spill everything about your friends, and you will be discredited in the public's eyes." LE MONDE reproactively quoted the threats made by Attorney Verges, the lawyer representing Magdalena Kopp and Bruno Breguet, friends of the terrorist Carlos. "They will leave prison, these soldiers of a noble cause....The question of exactly when raises the problem of bloodshed." Verges even went so far as to accuse a cabinet minister of "abuse of authority," because he, Verges, considered the minister solely responsible for having publicly revealed the threats made by Carlos.

This is typical of the accusations that a lawyer can level, with impunity, against government representatives. That is why terrorists attacked the Capitole theater and detonated a bomb on Rue Marbeuf! That is why our diplomats are dying in Beirut! Frenchmen are now paying for the contradictions in their government's foreign policy, and even more so for the lack of consistency between its diplomacy in the Middle East and its internal security policy.

What Wasted Time and Energy

When socialists assumed power less than a year ago, they laughed derisively whenever anyone mentioned international terrorism. They would respond: "rightist extremists." In their view, the sole problem was to make short work of this hydra-headed monster. In collusion with certain sections of the press, they organized a strange witch hunt. For example, after the Rue Copernic [synagogue] bombing, they directed the police onto the "Spanish trail." And when everyone—including the Israeli ambassador—was shrugging their shoulders in disbelief, they continued to pursue that lead!

What wasted time and energy! But what flights of fancy too.

Poor government, off on a wild-goose chase, pursuing imaginary enemies which it says are determined to destabilize it in every possible way.

Poor socialist government that has managed to develop a new political concept, "self-destabilization," but, alas, at the price of France's reputation and the security of the French people!
STRicter border controls, specialists needed

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 30 Apr 82 pp 86-87

[Commentary by Raymond Marcellin, former interior minister under General De Gaulle: "To Combat Terrorism, we Must Pull Out All the Stops"]

[Text] Terrorism is mounting rapidly in France where its escalation of violence has just attained a new high. Terrorists are now shooting and killing in deliberately cold-blooded fashion. Advocates of Corsican independence have killed one Foreign Legionnaire and seriously wounded another. Basque separatists have machine-gunned CRS [Republican Security Companies-State Mobile Police] members at point-blank range, killing two of them. A bomb explosion in the Paris-Toulouse train killed five persons and wounded 27.

Some acts of terrorism are meant to force change in international situations through fear. Hence diplomats are especially targeted. American, Turkish, and Israeli diplomatic personnel have been slain in a series of attacks in the very heart of Paris. And then, last Thursday, a terrorist bomb killed one person and wounded 63 on Rue Marbeuf!

To what extent are the relaxative measures taken by the government over the past 10 months responsible for placing our territorial security in such jeopardy?

These measures include: the abusive granting of amnesty which unlocked our prisons; abolition of capital punishment without any provision made for substitute punishment; demolition of the police and the justice system by a class-warfare oriented trade unionism that is essentially revolutionary and even intends to arrogate to itself the right to appoint high-level officials; abolition of the Court of State Security which specialized in cases of espionage, treason, and infringement of national defense and territorial integrity. This court was also charged with trying terrorists.

All of these legal measures were taken hastily, in a group, as if the government could wait no longer, and so as to have the general public view them as humanitarian acts, whereas they are nothing more than an evasion of responsibilities.
If, for good measure, we add the support being given revolutionary movements in the world, we are somewhat inconsistent when we complain, at the same time, about the actions of these violent revolutionaries on our territory.

When we slide downhill, we always arrive at the bottom, and at the bottom we have anarchy. "He who feigns being an angel acts like a fool," said Blaise Pascal. Our rulers would do well to let this truth sink in.

To combat terrorism, several measures are called for:

a. The best method of combating terrorism—from the standpoint of intelligence, as well as prevention and repression—consists in forming police teams, volunteers as much as possible, specializing in this particular form of fighting crime. This type of combat is not within the purview of routine police work.

To counter terrorism, we must do the same thing and, to use the popular expression, we must pull out all the stops. There is no other way of winning this battle.

b. We must then compile a list of all terrorist organizations. Upon my request, the French police, in cooperation with their foreign counterparts, had counted 44 active terrorist organizations in the world. These belonged to 18 different nationalities.

About 20 of these organizations included persons in France with whom they had had or still had contacts. Some 95 of these persons were dangerous and we placed them under continuous surveillance.

c. A frequent terrorist modus operandi consists in having the terrorist arrive from abroad on the eve of his actual "operation" and then leave the very next day. France's borders are a veritable sieve through which numerous persons slip into our country clandestinely. How can this illegal traffic be stopped? By creating a real border police force.

This border police must, therefore, handle all of its tasks with—to help the police officers of the General Criminal Intelligence Branch (Renseignements Generaux)—840 officers, NCO's, and policemen, augmented by 900 members of the CRS, for a grand total of approximately 2,500 men. But this heterogeneous force lacks effectiveness because it is not sufficiently specialized. CRS units attached to the force are constantly rotated because they are required for performance of their primary mission, namely maintaining order.

It is essential, therefore, that officials assigned to border control tasks be given intensive specialized training.

d. We must also expel from our territory all bogus diplomatic personnel, that is to say those spies or thugs covered by diplomatic immunity.

Is there a global terrorist strategy? Terrorists are convinced they are soldiers in a war being waged mainly against what they call imperialism's global strategy. They are taught that all revolutionary struggles must be coordinated to form a common front in pursuing an increasingly unified strategy.
Thousands of men are very actively engaged in this anti-imperialist struggle throughout the world.

As early as 1968, I explained all of this to Parliament and in the press. At that time, I encountered a great deal of skepticism. Some critics even said that the interior minister was hallucinating.
TERRORIST TYPES, SUPPORT, FUTURE FOR FRANCE

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 30 Apr 82 pp 86-87

[Interview with Xavier Raufer, author of a book, [Terrorisme, demain la France?" [Terrorism: Is it About to Sweep France?], to be published shortly by Garnier; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] [Question] We shall ask you what we consider to be the three principal questions relative to the phenomenon of terrorism. First, could the Rue Marbeuf bombing have been foreseen?

[Answer] Where a terrorist bombing or attack is concerned, you have to realize that, more often than not, the antiterrorist police and other agencies have only fragmentary information, tips, but no strictly precise details. In that case, it becomes a political matter. You can't possibly imagine the steady stream of reports and tips of every description that reach officials responsible for collecting such data. They generally do a good job of weeding out the patently silly reports, phony tips of every kind, and deliberate attempts at deception. Once this filtering process is completed, it is up to the political authorities to take (or not take) a serious view of the information submitted to them. If these authorities have their attention focused elsewhere, if for political policy reasons they expect, for example, an "x" form of terrorism, they will give priority to those pieces of information--regardless of how tenuous they may be--which fit their preconceived ideas, and they will overlook much more disturbing elements of information relative to threats from a different source.

This explanation was a necessary preamble to answering your question. To the extent that our authorities were determined to look in the right direction and make a realistic evaluation of the basic information obvious to everyone, then yes, a bombing--or bombings--was foreseeable in our country. Here is why:

a. All forms of terrorism, irrespective of their nature, have one point in common, namely their expansion into a global phenomenon in the late 1960's, for clear geostrategic reasons. At that time, movements using armed violence as a political weapon developed in areas where the balance of terror had succeeded in stabilizing existing borders, in regions vital to the nuclear powers whose territories became veritable sanctuaries. In these areas, the threat of conflict shifted from the military sphere and spread into civil fields: struggles "inside" countries tended to replace clashes between powers.
They now frequently do their fighting through intermediaries, and "subversion" has obliterated the boundaries between "politics" and "strategy."

b. This phenomenon can be seen in Europe--Turkey included--in the heart of the area of major interest, an area "frozen" by atomic weapons, and also in Latin America and in Japan, two areas explicitly under American protection. In these areas, the armed struggle assumes two distinct aspects, depending on the geographical configuration of the countries concerned: "guerrilla warfare" and "underground movements" in the vast rural and underdeveloped countries, and "terrorism" in the modern urbanized countries. This is the indisputable major fact. In present-day France, there are added diplomatic considerations and circumstantial factors.

c. The attempt to rebalance France's friendships in the Middle East--where more than elsewhere, the operative phrase on both sides is: "He who is not with us is against us"--eventually upset the delicate modus vivendi previously agreed to between our country and the warring factions.

In the world today, there are militant individuals--Carlos is their archetype--and groups who are impregnated with global anti-imperialist and revolutionary ideas, and who hire themselves out, on a case by case basis, to anyone wishing to employ them: intelligence agencies, governments, rebellious minorities, etc. Rumors--well-founded?--of a crisis in our country's police agencies, of shakeups in the French intelligence services, should prompt these revolutionary mercenaries to test reactions of a country they now view as more fragile. These mercenaries always conduct such "tests" before launching real full-scale operations.

The foregoing are thus the major features of the terrain through which the machinery of the French state has to maneuver.

Yet compared with what is noticeable elsewhere, France lacks the stamina to deal effectively with terrorism. Our country does not have the immense capacity to absorb punishment like the Italian society which has been accustomed for ages to doing without the protection of a centralized government (except during the brief Mussolini era). Nor does our society have the discipline of the German people in obeying the orders of their police, nor, in fact, American society's unusual capability of "rehabilitating" its terrorists.

There is no miraculous method of combating the various forms of terrorism. Necessary measures are time-consuming and expensive. Their outcome is uncertain. They require a national consensus, something which everything shows is highly difficult to obtain in our country. To make matters worse, an imported form of terrorism may set an example that can "trigger" formation of an indigenous armed action movement. This has actually happened in some countries. The discovery of weapons used in the earlier machine-gunning of an Israeli diplomatic building within an Action Directe movement's weapons cache is proof that such a danger is no illusion.

[Question] Who are the real instigators of terrorism?
[Answer] I am not very fond of using the word "terrorism." In my view, it is a term employed more for propaganda purposes than for the observation of political phenomena. Moreover, it is a source of confusion in that it encompasses very diverse "commodities." The various types of terrorism actually fall into four categories:

a. Ideological: anarchists, Marxist-Leninists, extreme rightists, neo-Nazis, etc.

b. Nationalist: anticolonialists or irredentists (IRA, FLO, ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group]).

c. Ethnic: religious, regional, or linguistic causes.

d. State terrorism: countries settling scores with each other in a third country.

The mere listing of these categories, plus the very broad range of causes and ideologies they encompass, serves to dispel the possibility of any permanent global control of all these movements by a single entity operating out of the Kremlin's situation room, Qadhdhafi's tent, or the Pentagon. The only available concrete and reliable information indicates that:

a. Those nationalist or irredentist movements engaged in fighting against one of the blocs receives aid from the other bloc, with the Soviet bloc supporting its proteges a thousand times more and better than the Western bloc. To be convinced of this, a person need only compare the Ethiopian Army's equipment with, for example, the few "poguns" so stingly—and with what secrecy!—furnished the Afghan guerrilla forces.

b. Ideological organizations are receiving less support from the major powers than anyone is willing to admit, for propaganda reasons. The confusion stems from the fact that the different movements—nationalist, ethnic, ideological—obtain their supplies in what are frequently the same "supermarkets of terrorism." West Beirut has some of the more famous markets in which weapons, explosives, electronic equipment, false documents, etc. are freely bought and sold. Little attention is paid to a purchaser's political beliefs before accepting him as a customer. As a result, Italian neo-Nazis and Red Brigade members supply themselves from the same sources as ardent Moslems from the Phillipines and Eritreans engaged in a life and death struggle against a pro-Soviet enemy. Then there is the case of the international groups I mentioned earlier. They are the sole category to which the term "international terrorist" is entirely applicable. They are not interested in fomenting revolution "inside" their country of origin. They are of varied ideological origin and work to order, as it were. Libya, Syria, dissident Palestinian factions, and many other governments—some of which officially claim to be totally hostile to these terrorist groups—play a complex and ambiguous game around these groups, a game that varies with the times and with de facto alliances of the "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" type.
We cannot say, therefore, that there is a Terrorist International. I would even add that it is very dangerous to pass off as a sort of Comintern, organizations that are foreign to one another and whose connections are limited solely to supplying themselves from the same "distributors."

Experience shows that in the event of threats to the population of a given country, the only effective measure is the "pedagogical device" of telling the truth: "The enemy is all of that, but is nothing more than that." Any underestimation or overestimation of the peril initially leads to arousing or comforting public opinion. After a while, it inevitably makes the general public apathetic.

The truth about terrorism is alarming enough per se so that there is no need to exaggerate. Even if the Soviets, their allies, and obligees limit themselves to "putting a gun on the table" without becoming more deeply involved in controlling or encouraging the ferment of various terrorist groups, they, the Soviets, profit in two ways from the existence of these groups. In our opinion, they benefit, first of all, from a propaganda standpoint, but equally from a weakening of countries forced to use what is often a considerable part of their resources and energy to cope with very real dangers.

[Question] To what extent can this terrorism continue to escalate?

[Answer] As I see it, an increase in terrorist activities within our country depends on three factors:

a. The ability of our government leaders to understand the nature and origin of the threat.

b. The desperation level of the "sponsors" of the terrorist groups operating within our territory. Is their activity a kind of gratuitous warning? Or a bargaining factor? Or the initial skirmishes of a real war? It is still too early to say. If the third possibility were the correct one, it would be logical to assume that by the next stage we would be heading toward either a senseless bombing or attack in a crowded place, such as a rail station, movie theater, etc., or the assassination or kidnapping of a target symbolic of the social sphere the terrorists wish to "punish."

c. The ability of international groups to find support elements on our soil. Upon reaching a certain level of activity, it becomes impossible for terrorists to conduct hit-and-run operations which consist in getting off the plane, carrying out one's "contract," and then taking the next flight out. The fact that the terrorist has to pass through the airport precludes conducting this type of operation repeatedly. Hence he needs local bases, suppliers, etc. Unfortunately, there is every reason to believe it would not be difficult to meet this requirement from circles with which certain members of the present majority would be loath to deal severely.

Strategically speaking, the different forms of political violence do not each constitute a similar danger to our country. No matter how repugnant the methods used by imported terrorism may be, such terrorism is less dangerous to the national community than one—or more--indigenous movements pledged to armed violence. A form of terrorism deeply rooted in French society and finding
therein its "ins and outs;" such is the major danger. In addition, terrorism can be contagious. Terrorist acts of foreign origin can quite feasibly induce--through a "sympathetic" response--emergence of urban guerrilla cells desirous of taking part in the "anti-imperialist war." Only a few years ago, such a possibility would have made an observer shrug his shoulders, and rightly so. Today, however, it can no longer be dismissed. "Breeding grounds" for youths being tossed from pillar to post, from unemployment to precarious jobs, and without any prospects, are being formed in the outlying districts of large cities, at a time when certain cells--very small and effectively "tagged" by the police, up to now--have intellectually arrived to a point where they tend to consider armed struggle as inexorable.
PONIATOWSKI SEES TERRORISM AS ACT OF WAR

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 30 Apr 82 p 87

[Commentary by Michel Poniatowski, former minister of interior: "An Act of War Calls For a Warlike Response"]

[Text] We currently face security problems on three distinct levels: delinquency and crime, national or internal terrorism, and international terrorism. Methods for dealing with each level are different and must definitely not be confused.

a. Delinquency and crime continue to rise at a constantly more rapid rate. The government is directly responsible for this situation. The so-called justice minister is solicitous solely for criminals and delinquents. He has made himself their defender and natural protector. He personally constitutes a high security risk in that he forgets that the justice system must primarily protect law-abiding citizens from scofflaws.

The mass release of criminals and delinquents, laxity, tolerance, etc. are direct incitements to disorderliness and crime. The justice minister really takes the French people for fools when he tells them, as he did Sunday evening, that his policy guarantees them the best possible protection. As for the interior minister, he has contributed to the disorder by disorganizing and discouraging his police force during the past few months.

Yet the means of combating crime do exist. It is well to increase the number of policemen and their equipment. It is better, however, to apply tried-and-true methods. These methods are being ignored. In 1976, I succeeded, for the first time in many years, in reducing crime and delinquency by having the police employ a set of old and new techniques: neighborhood watches, two-man patrols, raid-type operations, "surprise" checks, and special police surveillance during vacation periods. There are also more recent techniques and procedures. Their basic principle is simple: insecurity for criminals means security for citizens.

b. National or internal terrorism is idiotic and cowardly. Its identity is almost always ultimately established. Combating it is a normal function of the police and justice systems. The justice system, unfortunately, is too often characterized by distressing indulgence, in that it overlooks the fact that its
tolerance is paid for with human lives, destruction, and possible recurrent risks.

c. International terrorism. Since 1965, covert or overt conflicts between nations have taken on a new dimension with the systematic employment of techniques of subversion and terrorism.

That same year, the Tricontinental was created in Cuba. This is a sort of federation of terrorist organizations. It is manipulated by the Cuban intelligence service and the KGB.

In the years following its formation, the Tricontinental centered its efforts on destabilizing South America. This program was a failure and ended with Che Guevara's death. The federation then shifted its effort to the Middle East. Today, it is active in Central America.

It is conducting a series of operations aimed at weakening and destabilizing the West. For this reason, terrorism is an act of war and must be considered as such. To be countered effectively, an act of war demands a warlike response. This does not, of course, mean gunboat diplomacy, or a trade or financial war. Such practices are inopportune or ineffective.

It does mean countering terrorist activities of very special intelligence agencies with deterrent actions of the same type against their secret networks, bases, and training camps. Automatic retaliatory destabilization operations, temporary closing of embassies that have become armed terrorist centers, and making an example of a few of the leaders and their terrorist squads in France would all be useful counterblows. A terrorist is anonymous by definition, but his disappearance is likewise anonymous.

War is unthinkable, and so is terrorism, its advanced form. Unfortunately, certain foreign intelligence services and their accredited terrorist agents understand only one kind of argument because they have only one kind of logic, namely the effectiveness of terror and force.

Certain policies and certain ventures constitute such a danger to nations and even mankind, and are such a departure from lawful conduct that they demand an appropriate response.

Failure to give such a response is tantamount to acceptance of their extortion and their destabilization efforts, and also the resultant dangers to our freedom and democracy.

8041
CSO: 3100/633
CARLOS, QADHDAFI, SYRIAN LINKS TO RECENT ATTACKS ANALYZED

Paris LE MATIN in French 10-11-12 Apr 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Secret War in France"]

[Text] The indisputable link established by the investigators between the murder of the Israeli diplomat Yacov Barsimantov and the assassination of the American Col Charles Ray confirms the thesis that a new terrorist network, with its roots in the Near East, has been operating in France for some time. The small-caliber weapon used for the murder of the two diplomats could lead one to believe that the police have some amateurs or terrorists short of resources to deal with. But that is not the case at all: the failed attempt on the life of the American charge d'affaires in Paris, Christian Chapman, appears to be the work of the same network. It is very well-informed: Colonel Ray and Barsimantov probably had activities connected with counterespionage or the fight against terrorism. The assassins are the soldiers of a new secret war that is being waged in France and which the government is impatient to put an end to.

The claiming of the three attacks by an unknown group that calls itself the "Lebanese Revolutionary Armed Unit" seems to confirm that they are related to a long-term action being carried out by the same organization, whose announced "trade name" may be a cover for a more powerful movement. Two or 3 days ago, the Israelis themselves acknowledged that this group contains dissidents from the PLO rather than members of the PLO itself. In any case, the French security services are convinced that the network's base is in the Near East, and more particularly, in Lebanon.

But Lebanon is a country in which anarchy is reigning, and it is difficult to place the people who have decided to reopen secret hostilities on French territory. If Palestinians are involved, it cannot be ruled out that they are manipulated by a Near East country particularly hostile to the United States, since two of their victims have been Americans. It is now known that Syria is not unacquainted with the assassination of our ambassador in Beirut, Louis Delamare, who fell under shots from attackers both barbarous and subtle, whose objective was probably to harm a nation, France, that plays a moderating role in the Near East. On the other hand, the attacks against two American diplomats and an Israeli diplomat have a more distinct coloration: the victims are the designated enemies of Libya, which has not finished avenging itself for the destruction of two of its airplanes by American planes in the Gulf of Syrta. The
Carlos trail is not necessarily different from the Libyan trail: Qadhafi might very well have "reactivated" that only too famous terrorist, who is believed to have been seen in various places in Europe in recent weeks.

The discretion of the French police in these cases--it has known for several days that the 7.65-mm pistol was used for the last two attacks, but revealed this only yesterday--leads one to think that it has other information or definite facts, but that it is concealing them in the hope of making one or more arrests or of going farther in establishment of the facts and responsibilities. One can only encourage its action: terrorism is intolerable in France, especially when the targets it chooses are foreigners who are our guests.

11267
CSO: 3100/626
DST, SDECE FILES ON CURIEL, OTHERS TO BE MADE AVAILABLE

Paris LE MATIN in French 3 Apr 82 p 13

[Article by Jacques Bacelon: "The Files of the SDECE (Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service) and of the DST (Directorate of Territorial Surveillance) Opened to the Judicial Authorities"]

[Text] Pierre Mauroy has decided to provide the examining magistrates with the documents concerning the Ben Barka, Goldman, Curiel, Copernic and Fontanet cases.

On Thursday, Pierre Mauroy announced to the Anglo-American press in Paris that on 19 March he had given instructions for the files on the big police cases held by the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance and the Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service to be sent to the judicial authorities. This measure was in fact taken several weeks ago. Five files will be transmitted to examining magistrates: the Ben Barka case to Judge Pinseau, the Goldman case to Judge Hanoteau, and the Curiel, Copernic and Fontanet cases to Judge Joly. The Curiel file, for example, has already been furnished to the ministries (Interior for the DST and Defense for the SDECE). For others, operations are in progress. It remains to be known what the government's attitude will be about a file such as that of De Broglie.

In the Ministry of the Interior, a magistrate, Roland Kessous, on assignment as judicial adviser to Gaston Defferre, receives the files submitted by the DST. Another magistrate, Olivier Renard-Payen, carries out the same functions in the Ministry of Defense. He gathers the files arriving from the SDECE. After examination of them, he asks that the documents judged to be of interest be handed over for preliminary examination. They can then run into a rejection, either from Marcel Chalet, director of the DST, or from M. Marion, director of the SDECE, who have the authority to invoke defense secrecy. In such case, these two magistrates judge whether this rejection on secrecy grounds can be used to oppose transmission of the document. This procedure is new in one essential point. It is no longer the chiefs of special services but impartial magistrates attached to the two ministries who decide whether defense secrecy is applicable.

The Duriel association is particularly satisfied with this change. As civil party, it had requested communication of the DST and SDECE files well before
10 May 1981 and had run up against refusal both from Andre Chalet and from M. De Marenches, M. Marion's predecessor. The request was repeated, to the prime minister, by M. Joly, the examining magistrate, in December 1981.

Pierre Mauroy's declarations are thus his reply. In a 19 March letter to the examining magistrate, the prime minister further stated: "I can assure you that my government shares your concern entirely and will take all steps to help toward manifestation of the truth." He added: "This procedure, which to my knowledge is unprecedented, marks my government's desire to promote the indispensable clarity which, within a framework of complete independence, it seems to me should govern the relations between the executive power and the judicial authority."

This transmission of files is very directly relevant to the explanation of certain murders. Thus, as regards the case of Curiel, who was killed on 4 May 1978 as he was leaving his Paris residence, a number of essential points should be able to be clarified. The friends of Curiel consider that his physical destruction was ordered after political destruction had failed.

This political destruction began with accusations made in the press in 1976, portraying Curiel as an agent of the Soviet KGB who was aiding the terrorist networks. In October 1977, Curiel was placed under house arrest on the allegation that he was endangering French diplomacy, particularly vis-a-vis the Middle East. This measure was canceled in 1978, and a short time later, his administrative situation was regularized for the first time. Finally, he held a certificate of residence, renewable annually, and a traveling certificate that serves as a passport for political refugees. Four months later, Curiel was assassinated.

It is certain that the minister of interior had, among other things, knowledge of reports from either the DST or the SDECE, or both, in order to decide on setting aside or regularizing Curiel's situation. The documents communicated to the judicial authorities should make it possible to explain these reversals of attitude, and perhaps even as much as the conditions of Curiel's death.

On the practical level, the investigation had implicated two inspectors of the DST who in 1974 had paid a visit to a woman neighbor of Curiel's to install a permanent listening device to function from her apartment. These police officers have never been officially identified. But the problem of listening devices is decisive in the Curiel case. He was killed in the elevator of his building. This required extremely precise timing on the part of his murderers. The simplest explanation has been to consider that they were able to keep surveillance on him from permanent listening posts.

For the examining magistrates who are going to receive the "secret files" between now and the end of the month, the big problem will still be, and will continue to be, to be liberated from defense secrecy. In the De Broglie case, presiding judge Giresse had had access to confidential documents. He made public only some excerpts from those documents.

11267
CSO: 3100/627
'AMIS DE CARLOS', DIVERSE GROUPS CLAIM 'CAPITOLE' ATTACK

Paris LE FIGARO in French 1 Apr 82 p 26

[Article by Pierre Gallerey: "After the Attack on the 'Capitole,' 2,000 Police Officers and Gendarmes in the Trains and Stations--Claims But No Trail"]

[Text] It seems that the police are assigning priority importance to tracking down the "agitated man" that several witnesses say they saw running along the track, carrying a valise, after the attack, and who at the present stage of the investigation could be the prime suspect.

On the other hand, they do not give any credit to the claim of the attack by the Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE), a far-right Spanish organization that has given itself the task of fighting the terrorists of the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group]. According to an anonymous caller, the BBE set a bomb in the "Capitole" "to protest the refuge offered by France to the Basque nationalists." The investigators recall that this organization has on various occasions claimed attacks that it had not made. This systematic exploitation of any sensational event is a classic element of the "psychological warfare" practiced by various extremist movements who always want to remind people of their existence and are delighted to spread confusion. After the theft of weapons from the Clauzel barracks on 8 December last, and just after the bloody attack on two CRS's [Republican Security Companies (State Mobile Police)] at Saint-Etienne de Baigorry in the French Basque country, the BBE claimed responsibility for these acts. The investigation was subsequently to prove that it was not at all.

Some other groups, such as the Terrorist Internationale, the Delta Commandos (far right) or the far-left movement called the Bakunin-Gdansk-Paris-Guatemala-El Salvador Groups also claimed responsibility yesterday for the attack on the "Capitole."

The police were more interested in the telephone call received by the prefecture of police of Paris at 6:30 pm on Tuesday. A mysterious caller, claiming to speak in the name of the "Friends of Carlos," stated that the "Capitole" bomb was only a first warning and that other attacks would follow, each week, for so long as two pro-Palestinian terrorists recently arrested in Paris, Magdalena Kopp and Bruno Breguet, were not freed. But this claim now seems equally fantastic to the investigators. It is not ruled out, though, that Carlos might really have been involved in this operation.
The Chirac Coincidence

It was learned yesterday that Jacques Chirac might have been on the "Capitole" at the moment of the attack, specifically in car 18, certain compartments in which are routinely reserved for political personalities who have permanent transportation passes—deputies, mayors, etc—and have to use this line regularly.

The mayor of Paris, indeed, was supposed to go to Correze on Monday evening with his wife to attend the voting, the next day, of the committees within the general council.

But Jacques Chirac was not free on Monday evening, and a friend had offered to take him to Correze early Tuesday morning in his personal airplane. Were the bomb-setters aiming at the leader of the RPR? There is no way to say for sure. The mayor of Paris, for his part, speaks of a "simple coincidence" and rejects any connection between the attack and the fact that he was supposed to have been on the train.

Furthermore, only a few persons were aware of the planned trip, since Jacques Chirac usually takes the "Capitole" on Friday evening to spend the weekend in his district.

But the hypothesis of a criminal act against him, or a "blind" attack against Car 18, that of the personalities, cannot be ruled out. It is known that the sister of Jean-Pierre Fourcade, former minister of finance, is among the victims.

Deterrent Measures

It will be necessary to wait another 10 days before the boards of experts commissioned by Pierre Delpech, the examining magistrate in the court of first instance of Limoges, submit their reports and the exact nature of the explosive charge is known. According to the first observations, it appears to have been a dry explosive of plastic type, weighing several kilograms and requiring an electrical firing system. But the investigators refuse to confirm that a detonator of this type was found among the debris of the car. Claude Calisti, who is chief of the explosives department in the central laboratory of the prefecture of police of Paris and who was to return to Paris yesterday, is continuing his investigations in Limoges.

Gendarmes and police officers have begun questioning the travelers who were on the "Capitole" Monday evening. But the identity of only 127 of them—out of about 300—could be revealed after the attack. In any case, it does not seem that any person on a police list was among these travelers.

Yesterday, the surveillance measures decided on by the minister of interior with the collaboration of the SNCF [French National Railroads] (600 railroad agents and 2,000 police officers and gendarmes will be assigned to this task), and aimed at protecting the stations and the trains, went into effect. Itinerant teams, each composed of two CRS officers equipped with detectors and two
agents of the national company, are henceforth regularly present on the main
lines--the "Capitole" and the "TGV" in particular--and will do selective checks
on the other lines. It is hoped that such measures will be sufficiently "de-
terrent" and capable at least of reassuring the travelers who might fear a re-
vival of the terrorist blackmail. At Creteil yesterday, on the occasion of the
inauguration of the new headquarters of the general police insurance company,
Gaston Defferre made a point of noting the necessity of a "numerous, active and
vigilant" police force and once again evoked the recruitment of an additional
6,000 policemen--which should not prevent one from tackling "the deeper causes
of insecurity." But what causes could ever justify so frightful an act as the
one committed against a trainfull of travelers on Monday evening?
DEV-YOL TRIAL GETS UNDERWAY IN ISTANBUL

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Mar 82 p 1, 11

[Text] Istanbul News Service--The trial of 159 members of DEV-YOL [Revolutionary Road] began at the Istanbul Martial Law Command No 1 Military Court in the courtroom of the Metris Military Penitentiary and Detention Center. Out of 159, 111 are in custody and 30 are facing death penalty. They are accused of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order by use of force, organizing armed gangs, committing murders for ideological aims, and resorting to various armed actions.

The court accepted the written complaints by the 14 accused, to the effect that they were subjected to torture while under detention, as an offence and decided to send a written warrant to the Martial Law Command asking for necessary action in this matter.

The indictment prepared by the Military Prosecutors office demands the death penalty for 30 accused under article 146/1 of the TPC [Turkish Penal Code] and prison sentences, varying between 1 year and life imprisonment, for the rest.

The defendants are being accused of taking part in several murders, inflicting injuries, robberies, throwing explosives, shooting, unlawful seizure, illegal demonstrations and hanging of placards with explosives.

The court, consisting of its president, Infantry Staff Col Nevzat Demirel; the trial judge, civilian judge advocate Abdurrahman Yigit; member judge, Navy Judge Advocate Captain Nuh Yilmaz and assistant Martial Law prosecutors, Sirri Cerit and Necdet Kitay began at 1045. Then the names of the accused were read and their presence and identities were checked. Accused Sedat Seyoglu said: "I am continuously urinating blood. If you permit I want to go to the washrooms." The accused was allowed to leave the courtroom and quickly returned. Aysel Cicek was the only woman defendant at the trial. The identity checks were completed at 1200 and then the Military Prosecutor was invited to read the indictment.

Speaking at this point, the defense lawyers asked the court to allow them to take part in the trial and to decide on the names of their clients. Considering this request as a proper one, the court determined the names of the defense lawyers. Speaking later on, Sedat Kesim said: "I have been detained at the

24
[military or police] station for 79 days. During my detention I have been subjected to torture. I had written a letter of complaint demanding punishment for these torturers. This letter has been taken from me before our arrival at the courtroom. I want this application to be read in this court if it is delivered to you." All the defendants speaking later expressed similar points and alleged that because of the attitude of the prison officials they could not see their lawyers and relatives. The defense lawyers, on the other hand, informed the court that they were unable to see the minutes of statements taken from their clients during their examination at the office of prosecutor and police. They asked the court to rule on this matter and allow them to send relevant documents to their clients. The court ruled that the files brought by the lawyers be handed to the defendants.

During the afternoon session of the trial, the reading of the indictment continued. After the reading of 84 pages of the 357-page indictment the court decided to listen to requests. At this point some defense lawyers demanded the release of nine defendants. Defense lawyer Bekir Doganay demanded the adjournment of the trial at this stage and the return of all the files to the prosecution. As an argument to support his demand, Doganay claimed that under subsection 3 of CMUK [Criminal Courts' Procedural Law] investigations into the charges laid against the accused of this nature should be carried by the State prosecutors and judges. Doganay also stated that all the interrogations carried out by security officials cannot constitute evidence, hence should be removed from the files.

Examining these requests, the court rejected this particular request on the ground that it was against the procedures and laws. The court refused the request for the release of defendants on the ground that the reading of the indictment was not completed yet.

According to the court minutes, the court's decision to accept the torture allegations by 14 defendants as a report of offence is as follows:

"Since the applications handed in by defendants Mehmet Gultekin, Mustafa Kumanova, Mehmet Refik Terzioglu, Samim Erdogan, Ibrahim Yakut, Ernur Kalender, Murat Ozenir, Fikret Akovali, Sedat Kesim, Ismail Hakki Ortakoy, Kamer Tayhani, Celal Izcı, Hikmet Guneysu and Ferhat Atesalmaz inform the court that during their detention they were subjected to pressure and torture and that they were manhandled and beaten by the police, considering these information as a report of offence, the court decided to forward these applications to the Martial Law Command for the necessary action...."

The trial adjourned until 17 March when the prosecution will continue the reading of the indictment.

Sentenced to 15 Years

A member of the illegal organization Dev-Sol [Revolutionary Left], Taner Ascioglu, sentenced to 15 years hard labor by the No 1 Military Court of the Istanbul Martial Law Command. Ascioglu has been convicted of being a member of a secret organization, attempting to collect money for the organization by phone, illegal seizure and attempting to seize.
Ankara TCP Hearings Gets Underway

Ankara—Examination of the 215 accused at the Ankara-TCP [Turkish Communist Party] trial began yesterday. One of the women accused, Fethiye Cetin, was forced by the soldiers to sit down when she refused to obey the judge's order to cut her speech short. Cetin also demanded that prison officials be taken out of the courtroom.

The court rejected a request by the defense lawyers during the previous session that the statements taken by the police, Military Prosecution and the examining judge should be declared null and void. The court ruling says:

"The court unanimously ruled to reject demands by the defense lawyers that statements taken from the defendants during their interrogation at the police, military prosecutor's office and examining judge and included in the file must not be presented to the court. The court rejects these demands on the ground that there is no provision authorizing the court to remove certain documents and statements from the file and that there is a provision of the Constitutional and Procedural Law clearly stating that all the evidence submitted and presented during a trial can be examined and evaluated by the independent courts by using their judicial powers on behalf of the Turkish nation...." The court then began examining defendant Cagatay Gunel. Gunel said: "I am a follower of the leftist ideology, but I have no relation with any illegal organization." Gunel further said that as a result of ill treatment at the police, he had suffered head injuries and his interrogation by the examining judge had taken place in the presence of policemen. Gunel then said that "he no longer admits the statements he made to the police, at the prosecutor's office and before the examining judge." Among other things, Gunel said: "The fact that these individuals, whose names I had mentioned during my interrogation, are leftists, the police officials have framed a charge and concocted incidents within this frame to convict me. With this objective in mind they have altered my statement into a written [evidence] statements containing all those fabricated incidents." [as published]

Gunel, who is a pharmacist, rejected all the charges laid against him and claimed that he has no connection with the incidents.

During the examination of Gunel, defendant Fethiye Cetin repeatedly asked for permission to speak and told the court that she will speak on a procedural matter. As a result of this argument the Court allowed Cetin to speak. The way it entered into the court minutes, Cetin said:

"The prison administration prohibited me from seeing anyone because I had presented a report during the previous session of the Court. Because of this restriction I was not allowed to defend myself. I believe that we will not be able to freely defend ourselves in this court. I demand the exclusion of the prison officials from the courtroom."

The defendant Cetin continued to speak despite the warnings by the judge. Following her refusal to obey to the judge's order the soldiers forced her to sit. During this incident other woman defendants were seen standing up and saying something.
Speaking at this point, defense lawyer Metin Sekercioglu demanded that "the hearings must take place by using stenographic and recording equipment and that defendants must not lose their rights because of incomplete entry of statements into the minutes during their defense."

During the afternoon session of the trial, defendant Serhun Ozbalı rejected all the charges and said he refuses to accept the statements he made during his interrogation by the police, at the prosecutor's office and before the examining judge. Ozbalı said: "Like the woman detainees, I too have complaints against the prison officials. At the Kirikkale police station the officials exerted pressure on me to admit that I was a liaison between the Ankara and Kirikkale organizations of the TCP [Turkish Communist Party]. At the Ankara police station they tortured me by putting salt in my mouth and by suspending [as published]."

Another defendant, Cengiz Akca, said that during his interrogation nobody exerted any pressure to admit that he was a member of TCP.

Meanwhile, defendant Seyh Hamit Ceren told the court that he accepts the statements he made to the police but admitted that the statements he made to the prosecution and the examining judge were correct. Ceren maintained that he is not a member of any trade union and that he has no relation with the organization.

Stating that he has nothing to do with the charges, defendant Ibrahim Kaya said: "Ibrahim Ozkan and Minur Karabey, both working for the police, brought me a typed draft statement to sign. That day they tortured me between 2300 and 0400 by hanging me from my legs and my hands were tied behind my back. They also tortured me by passing electric current through my sexual organ and finger tips."

Following the completion of the examination of defendants Hasan Yılmaz and Ekrem Cavusoglu, defense lawyers demanded the release of Cagatay Gunel, Cengiz Akca and Feridun Ozbalı.

However, the court ruled for the release of Cengiz Akca only. The court also rejected the demand for the use of stenographic and recording equipment during the trial.

9558
CSO: 4654/243
LEGISLATION ON REORGANIZATION, NAME CHANGE OF CNEN

Rome STAFFETTA QUOTIDIANA PETROLIFERA in Italian 26 Mar 82 pp 4-6

[Offprint: "Law Instituting the ENEA (formerly CNEN)"; published in the GAZZETTA UFFICIALE No 79, 22 March 1982]

[Text] Law of 5 March 1982, No 84

Modification and integration of the law of 15 December 1971, No 1240, concerning the restructuring of the National Committee for Nuclear Energy.

The Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the Republic have approved and the president promulgates the following law:

Article 1

The National Committee for Nuclear Energy, instituted by the law of 11 August 1960, No 933, and modified by the law of 15 December 1971, No 1240, assumes the title of "National Committee for Research and Development of Nuclear Energy and Alternative Energy Sources (ENEA)" and is exempt from application of the law of 20 March 1975, No 70.

In all laws and regulations in force, the words "National Committee for Nuclear Energy (CNEN)" are replaced by the words "National Committee for Research and Development of Nuclear Energy and Alternative Energy Sources (ENEA)."

For the purposes of the present law, alternative energy is that recovered from sources other than hydrocarbons.

Article 2

Article 2 of the law of 15 December 1971, No 1240, is replaced by the following:

Article 2: Within the framework of the national policy on energy, the ENEA is charged with promoting the development and qualification of national industry regarding health and the environment.
For these purposes, the ENEA:

(1) in collaboration with the other entities affected, shall implement and promote the study, development and demonstrations pertinent to the energy technology under its jurisdiction and to energy conservation in the various phases of production, transportation and utilization, including the disposal of waste products from related processes;

(2) shall implement, promote and coordinate studies, research and experimentation on the ways in which the development and use of energy sources affect the environment and the health of workers and the population; and on the safety of energy-producing plants, including the safety of nuclear plants and protection from ionizing radiation;

(3) shall provide for transmitting acquired knowledge and the results of research and experience to industrial operators in collaborating with them on planning and building prototypes of components and plants;

(4) shall collaborate in scientific, technological and industrial areas with international and foreign entities operating in sectors under its jurisdiction both within the framework of international agreements and on the basis of directives from the ministry of Industry and Commerce and the ministry of Foreign Affairs with information to the ministry for coordinating initiatives in scientific and technological research;

(5) shall issue the regulations and exercise the supervision relevant to nuclear safety and to protecting the health of the workers and population against the danger of ionizing radiation; it shall account for special fissionable materials, raw materials and minerals; it shall verify the application of passive physical measures for the protection of nuclear plants and nuclear materials; and it shall implement international agreements on safeguarding special fissionable materials, raw materials and minerals;

(6) shall promote and support the training of personnel in the field of energy technology;

(7) shall publish and disseminate information on energy problems;

(8) shall give opinions, counsel and technical instruction to the administrative bodies of the nation, regions and local governments on problems connected with the production and utilization of energy. The ENEA is subject to article 107 of the decree of the president of the Republic of 24 July 1977, No 616.

To fulfill the charge under numbers (1), (2), (3) and (4) of the present article, the ENEA:

(a) may make contracts with the regions and local governments;

(b) on the basis of appropriate contracts may entrust to universities, institutes of research and experimentation, other entities and companies the performance of studies, research and experiments in order to carry out its scientific program;

(c) may make collaborative contracts with national industries and may make available to them its expertise, information, patents and other assets;
(d) may promote the formation of industrial consortiums made up of private, international or foreign corporations whose purpose is the industrial development of energy technology, and may participate in them in the framework of programs approved by the CIPE [Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning] and with the authorization of the minister of Industry and Commerce, who shall give prior notification to parliament.

Majority participation is permitted with companies whose purpose is research, development and demonstration in technological sectors under ENEA jurisdiction.

In the case of companies having production and commercial purposes related to the development of nuclear and alternative energy sources (excluding activities reserved to the ENEL by the law of 6 December 1962, No 1643 and subsequent modifications), the ENEA may have only a minority share of participation. In this case, participation quotas in national companies must be represented by patents awarded, information, equipment, plants or infrastructures as well as by expertise.

Article 3

Article 3 of the law of 15 December 1971, No 1240, is replaced by the following:

Article 3: At the ENEA's proposal, the minister of Industry and Commerce shall present the 5-year plan of operations to the CIPE in compliance with its regulations and for its approval, with provisions for financing for the entire period.

Three months before the end of the 5-year period, the minister of Industry and Commerce, on motion by the board of directors of the CIPE, shall present to parliament the plan for the subsequent 5-year period.

In the three months following the CIPE's approval of the 5-year plan, the minister of Industry and Commerce shall present to parliament a bill to allocate necessary financing to the ENEA within the limits of the resources of the state's annual and multi-year budgets; the minister shall also submit a detailed report to parliament on the program and the results achieved in the preceding 5-year period.

Every October, the minister of Industry and Commerce shall submit to parliament a progress report on the program.

The program is, of course, subject to revision, but these procedures shall apply nonetheless.

Article 4

Article 6 of the law of 15 December 1971, No 1240, letter (e) is replace by the following:

(e) shall submit to the minister of Industry and Commerce the prospective budget and statement of accounts payable and, by every 30 April, shall submit a report on the Committee's activity of the preceding year; the report shall be approved by the board of directors.
Article 5

Article 7 of the law of 15 December 1971, No 1240, is modified as follows:

In the first paragraph, No (2), the word "nuclear" is replaced by "energy";

The 4th paragraph is replaced by the following:

The board of directors:

(a) shall formulate the Committee's regulations;

(b) shall supervise the implementation of directives from the CIPE and the minister of Industry and Commerce and, on the basis of these directives, shall formulate the Committee's multi-year program of activity and its possible annual revisions;

(c) shall formulate the budget 2 months prior to the beginning of each fiscal year and shall note possible variances and draw up the statement of expenditures within 4 months of the close of the fiscal year, supporting these statements with the report of results achieved and the progress of operations;

(d) shall consider the allocation of funds not directed to other agencies and offices;

(e) shall consider the business described in letters (a), (b) and (c) of article 2, 3rd paragraph;

(f) shall elect the members of the executive board;

(g) shall approve the regulations and contracts affecting employees' legal and salary status;

(h) shall consider the hiring and training of personnel and the appointment of directors, and the awarding of consulting contracts;

(i) shall consider nominees to the executive board or chairmanship, matters of employee contracts subject to decisions made by the board of directors on the various categories, and shall consider the entity's operating organization within the framework of the general directives issued by the board of directors;

(j) [no (j) or (k)] under the necessary limitations and to the exclusion of matters under (a), (b) and (c) of article 2, shall consider possible delegations of authority to the executive board, chairman, general director or directors of operating units as concerns the allocation of funds, the announcement and judging of competitive bidding, making contracts and placing supply orders;

(k) under the necessary limitations of expense shall consider any delegations of authority to the chairman concerning the assignment of particular study and research projects of a technical, scientific, economic or legal nature to outside contractors having special qualifications.
The 7th, 8th and 9th paragraphs are replaced by the following:

Within the limits of the present law, the board of directors has full management powers and responsibility for the ENEA commensurate with the purposes set forth in articles 1 and 2 of the present law.

The decisions of the ENEA are not subject to approval by the oversight authority.

Decisions under (b) in the preceding fourth paragraph relating to multi-year planning by the ENEA and to possible annual revisions shall be transmitted to the minister of Industry and Commerce, who shall submit them to the CIPE for decision under preceding article 3.

Decisions under (c) and (g) of the preceding fourth paragraph shall be submitted for approval to the minister of Industry and Commerce with notification to the minister of the Treasury within 60 days of receipt of decisions made under (c) and (g) of the preceding fourth paragraph; he shall approve them or return them with explanations for reconsideration by the board of directors. After 60 days, decisions not returned shall become effective.

The quorum of the board of directors is a majority of its membership. On a tie vote, the chairman shall have the casting vote. Votes shall be valid only with two-thirds of the membership present, including the chairman or his substitute.

Article 6

Article 10 of the law of 15 December 1971, No 1240, is replaced by the following:

Article 10: The president of the college of auditors and the auditors shall be appointed by decree of the minister of Industry and Commerce. The college shall have a term of office of five years and be composed of three acting and three alternate members, which shall include an acting auditor who shall function as chairman and an alternate designated by the Treasury minister.

The college shall provide for verifying acts of management, ensure that the bookkeeping is done properly and audit accounts.

It shall write a financial report, report periodically to the minister of Industry and Commerce, and may attend meetings of the board of directors. The chairman of the college of auditors or a member designated by him may attend meetings of the executive board.

The college of auditors shall also exercise its functions during the period of formation of the commission.

Article 7

The second paragraph of article 20 of the law of 15 December 1971, No 1240, is replaced by the following:

The ENEA's board of directors shall establish in advance criteria for determining compensation for performing tests, analyses, verifications and certifications requested by private parties or suggested by public entities and shall similarly
establish criteria for making expenditures for the ENEA's own purposes, as provided by the law of 31 December 1962, No 1860, and by the decree of the president of the Republic of 13 February 1964, No 185.

Decisions made under the preceding paragraph are subject to approval as provided in the 8th paragraph of article 7.

Article 8

The legal and economic status of ENEA employees shall be established by a collective labor contract of three years duration that shall be concluded with the national union organizations having majority representation. Until the first collective contract goes into effect, employee labor relations shall be regulated on the basis of the law of 20 March 1975, No 70.

Participation in contract negotiations shall include ENEA and union delegations, and observers from the ministry of Industry and Commerce, the ministry of the Treasury, and the ministry for Scientific Research.

The work of ENEA employees is incompatible with any other private or public employment and the exercise of any other profession or trade.

Employees shall not hold positions as administrative advisors, liquidators, union officials or officials in a company or entity of any nature except as deemed necessary to the interests of the ENEA by the board of directors subject to the approval of the ministry of Industry and Commerce.

Article 9

ENEA personnel may, with their consent, be assigned to duty in public administrative bodies; Italian or foreign universities; international and community organizations; national, international or foreign centers, institutes or laboratories, research organizations or units of industrial corporations, upon request.

The present law with the seal of state affixed shall be inserted in the official register of the laws and decrees of the Italian Republic. It is the duty of all to observe it and have it observed as the law of the state.

Rome, 5 March 1982

[Signed] Pertini

[Signed] Spadolini, Marcora, La Malfa, Andreatta, Tesini

Seal: Darida

8782
CSO: 3104/166
BRIEFS

OIL PRODUCTION, IMPORT—Turkish Petroleum Corporation Director General Ismail Kafescioglu has said that oil drilling will be carried out for the first time in the Hakkari region this year. He added that a total of 1,050,000 tons of crude oil is expected to be produced in various regions this year and that some 14 million tons of crude oil and 1.5 million tons of petroleum products will be imported in exchange for $4,070 million during the same period. [Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1600 GMT 9 May 82 TA]

CSO: 4654/327
BRIEFS

KYPRIANOU ON ECONOMY--The president of the republic, Mr Kiprianou, has assured the Cyprus chamber of commerce and industry that both the government and he personally believe in the possibilities for economic development which are provided by the existing mixed economic system. He also stressed that there was no intention of introducing measures which could alter the present basic characteristics of the Cyprus economy or which would discourage investments by the private sector. The president was answering a memorandum from the Cyprus chamber of commerce and industry which had expressed concern about the provisions of the program of cooperation between the democratic party and AKEL as regards the economy. [Text] [NC241612 Nicosia Domestic Television Service in English 1540 GMT 24 May 82]

CSO: 4621/348
LAMBSDORFF ON SPD ECONOMIC IDEAS, COALITION

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 7 May 82 pp 9-10

[Interview with Federal Economics Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff by Michael Jungblut and Diether Stolze of DIE ZEIT about the future of the Bonn coalition: "'Horror List of Socialist Instruments of Torture']

[Text] ZEIT: Only 28 percent of Germans still consider the Schmidt government capable of discharging the tasks confronting it. Do you in fact still get any satisfaction out of belonging to a government whose reputation among the public is constantly going down?

Lambsdorff: I think it would not be right to make my participation in a government dependent on whether its public reputation has reached a low point at present. It certainly was easier to be economics minister when I took office. Incidentally, I don't know any economics minister anywhere in the world who takes pleasure in discharging his job.

ZEIT: Yet surely the dilemma is that the problems are getting bigger whereas the strength for solving problems is decreasing because since the time when the coalition was formed in 1969 the two coalition parties have never been as far apart in the sphere of economic and fiscal policy as they are today.

Lambsdorff: I don't think that is quite correct. What is correct is that the problems have become bigger. What is correct is that the abilities to solve them are not always commensurately adequate. What is, however, correct as well is that the possibilities of solving them have decreased. Actually the FDP and SPD have always been quite far apart in questions of economic, fiscal and social policy. Only, this was covered up in times of merrily flowing tax springs, of better government income—in part through monetary expenditures. In part we are still suffering from the consequences.

ZEIT: But don't the Munich decisions mean that the SPD has retreated from Godesberg, that it has become more socialist?

Lambsdorff: What worries me about the Munich decisions—and to that extent I agree with the assertion contained in your question—is that the gap between the economic policy concepts of the two parties, at least as regards the programmatic statement, has now become bigger. But in my criticism I don't
want to overlook the fact that decisions were also made which strengthen the
government coalition—for instance, in security policy and foreign policy.
As regards economic and employment policy, however, it is no longer possible
to find in these party decisions the things that were developed in the Social
Democratic Party by way of economic policy by Heinrich Deist, Klaus Dieter
Arndt and Karl Schiller—to mention three names. And for this reason I
said: This is a socialist economic policy.

ZEIT: The Munich decisions adopted a whole list of things. To enumerate a
few: Supplemental tax, differing taxes for profits withdrawn and not with-
drawn, no waiting-time days, no change in the unemployment benefit (which
too was once the subject of discussion in the coalition), perhaps a profes-
sional training tax after all, investment registration offices, prevention or
even prohibition of lockouts, extension of the codetermination in coal and
iron to other plants, an opening-up clause in the codetermination laws enabling
labor and management to extend things at their own initiative....

Lambsdorff: You could of course go on with this horror list of socialist
instruments of torture for a long time.

ZEIT: Yes, there is quite a bit to come yet.

Lambsdorff: I know, I know.

ZEIT: We wanted to see whether there was anything at all in this entire
package that you consider negotiable.

Lambsdorff: Careful! We have a coalition agreement, we have a government
declaration, and we have a common initiative. These are the three bases for
our cooperation. Let me call to mind that the dispute over and because of
the common initiative was ended with a vote of confidence for the federal
chancellor and that, therefore, the common initiative now really has received
special recognition by the coalition party deputies in the Bundestag. Beyond
that I consider compromises in the direction of the decisions arrived at in
Munich not possible.

There are a few points in the Munich decisions which meet with our approval.
The period of gainful employment [Lebensarbeitszeit] is a subject which was
also addressed in the common initiative. But the fundamental orientation,
particularly the list of massive tax increases, of massive additional govern-
ment indebtedness, cannot count on FDP assent.

ZEIT: In other words, there will be no new coalition talks.

Lambsdorff: That is right. While there cannot be any situation in which the
FDP rejects an attempt at a dialogue, substantively there can be no coalition
talks about those matters.

ZEIT: You assumed a 1.5-percent growth for this year. Are you still that
confident after the Munich party congress?
Lambsdorff: I am firmly convinced that the Munich decisions will have a paralyzing effect on the readiness to invest. They have already had such an effect as a result of the public debate.

ZEIT: As economics minister you are bound to be worried about the fact that decisions made by a partner in the coalition are jeopardizing jobs—in other words, are having the opposite effect of what the government is promising to accomplish.

Lambsdorff: Sure, I am worried about it. I cannot prevent anyone from passing decisions. I can only do one thing, that is, say that this is not the way. That I have done, and I say so here now.

ZEIT: Hans-Dietrich Genscher went even further. He called on the federal chancellor to state that the SPD party congress decisions will not become government policy. Is Helmut Schmidt going to give you a clear answer?

Lambsdorff: You ought to direct these questions first to Helmut Schmidt. He has told us that he will give us an answer. And in fact, owing to the effects on the climate in the coalition, we will have to get a clear and unequivocal answer to that question.

ZEIT: You are facing not only new decisions but new people. Having not been named with the enthusiastic approval of the SPD and therefore having to take greater account of the SPD deputies in the Bundestag, is Manfred Lahnstein not going to be a more difficult partner than the previous finance minister?

Lambsdorff: The FDP has always said that a reshuffle of the cabinet is the Social Democrats' business. The FDP is not affected by it. For that reason alone, I would not find it proper now to comment on the changes the chancellor has made in the SPD part of the government. In addition, I also think, however, that the new colleague must be given a fair and appropriate chance. The fact that the new finance minister in any case has only a very limited "close season" (as they used to call it) at his disposal is a result of the way things stand.

ZEIT: The new minister for labor and social affairs is not all that unimportant either. The budget discussions are going to become difficult. The FDP is bound to see further possibilities of economies in the field of social expenditures. On that subject the new minister has, however, stated that they will not be touched any further.

Lambsdorff: That will have to be discussed in the budget consultations. In the case of the supplementary budget alone, we will have to confront the question of additional demands of at least DM 5 billion, a good part of which (about 2 billion in my estimation) is not a deficit due to the recession and therefore is not to be financed any longer through the taking up of credits.

ZEIT: The Social Democrats say they are not prepared to make further economies. The FDP says that additional indebtedness because of structural deficits are not admissible. These positions being irreconcilable, will there be another "summer spectacle" of the coalition parties?
Lambsdorff: There is no doubt but that the negotiations are becoming exceedingly difficult. The degree of difficulty may reach the same dimension as last year. The debate at that time, which is described disparagingly as a "summer spectacle," also had its good points. All the participants and the public clearly became aware of the limits of government possibilities, and if "operation 82" had not taken place, I am not sure that our deficit might not have increased by DM 15 or 20 billion. Despite this effort, the aim of consolidation for 1982 was not attained completely, however.

ZEIT: Hans-Dietrich Genscher has now stated that the Liberals today have a leadership task in the sphere of economic and fiscal policy....

Lambsdorff: Yes.

ZEIT: With what right does the smaller of the coalition partners claim a leadership role vis-a-vis the bigger one?

Lambsdorff: On the basis of the government declaration, the coalition agreement and the common initiative.

ZEIT: But this claim implies, doesn't it, that the SPD as the bigger coalition partner, in the estimate of the FDP apparently is not in a position any longer to embark on the right road on the basis of insights of its own. Has it now become necessary for the tail to wag the dog?

Lambsdorff: There are many figures of speech concerning this which I do not want to use; you are familiar with them. But it is true that as far as the Free Democrats are concerned market economy principles prevail in economic policy, in fiscal policy. And here we must make it clear after the results of the Munich party congress that there is a need for Liberal policy to cope with the economic problems.

It is incomprehensible to me how supposed experts as recently as 3 weeks ago, in the Bundestag and up and down the country, could employ the slogan "A lowering of interest rates is the best employment program" and then advocate in Munich an enormous expansion of government indebtedness, which is bound to have the effect of raising the interest rates. I cannot reconcile that in my brain, which perhaps is not orderly enough.

ZEIT: But doesn't this mean that one has to expect the "summer spectacle 82" to become even more dramatic than last year's?

Lambsdorff: Not necessarily. But I don't want to rule it out absolutely.

ZEIT: One of the causes of it, of course, was that last year the chancellor kept out of the debate for a very long time. This can also be called weakness of leadership. Are the prerequisites for more effective political management any better this time?

Lambsdorff: I hope that the chancellor when he reads this will not consider it to be an indiscreet remark invading his privacy: He definitely is in better form than he was a year ago.
ZEIT: The cabinet reshuffle casts some doubts on that.

Lambsdorff: I cannot rid you of your doubts.

ZEIT: In Hanover you made an economic forecast, Graf Lambsdorff. Why don't you now make a political forecast in Bonn. How great is the danger of the coalition breaking up over the budget consultations this year?

Lambsdorff: All forecasts entail a large factor of uncertainty. But if the coalition finds the strength to stick to what it has agreed on and what it has jointly resolved to do, it will overcome this hurdle. If not, there may be serious configurations. I am sure it would be unrealistic to dispute that.

ZEIT: Do you think that the coalition may fall apart as early as this summer?

Lambsdorff: As soon as I say yes in answer to such a question, there is a big hullabaloo. Of course such a thing can never be ruled out. But though it may now sound somewhat stereotype, I will add this time too that this government will not founder on the Free Democrats.

ZEIT: You said not all that long ago: In many points we certainly have more in common with the CDU.

Lambsdorff: That was before Mr Geissler's speech.

ZEIT: But in the past it was by and large foreign policy—particularly Ostpolitik [policy of accommodation with the East]—concerning which you said that currently you could not yet work together with Mr Kohl. Has that changed? Helmut Kohl said a short time ago that the FDP's value for the CDU was going down every day. In other words, it must hurry up.

Lambsdorff: Well, perhaps he will have to hurry up. But our value is not only determined by the offered purchase price Mr Kohl imagines. The value of a possible FDP coalition partner is determined by our attitude toward an alternative existing at the time. We would, however, reduce our own market value if, as a matter of principle, we ruled out an alternative to the existing state of affairs.

As regards the basic CDU/CSU political positions, I don't have the slightest doubt that cooperation between the FDP and the CDU/CSU would not be an unalloyed pleasure either. There can be no such in any coalition. After all, we were in coalitions with the CDU/CSU in the past, and those coalitions were anything but pleasurable. Particularly in the human sphere, they were more disagreeable.

Germany policy and foreign policy altogether have played a very large role since the 1950's as far as the FDP is concerned. Since that is so, I said at the start of our interview that I find it quite exceptionally important for the Social Democrats to have backed the chancellor and foreign minister in Munich in this question—in foreign and security policy. I can only hope that in the CDU/CSU the first signs of a process of viewing the foreign policy possibilities of the Federal Republic more realistically will develop further.
ZEIT: In connection with the government reshuffle you said clearly: The FDP part of the cabinet is our business; it is up to the coalition partner to decide everything else. Would you adopt the same attitude in the case of a coalition with the CDU and CSU? Would a CDU/CSU coalition partner have a free hand in filling its positions, particularly in filling the office of federal chancellor? Or would the FDP pose conditions regarding the identity of the chancellor if there was a change in coalitions?

Lambsdorff: The FDP has stated unequivocally that it will not help Franz Josef Strauss become chancellor. I can hardly imagine that it would pose other conditions in the case you have posited.

ZEIT: Economic policy is not just policy for the moment but changes society over the long term. Does not the drifting apart of the SPD and FDP show that in the long run the alliance between liberalism and socialism is an unnatural partnership?

Lambsdorff: I have always thought the expression "historical alliance" was wrong and never used it. Similarly I reject the formula "unnatural partnership." There has to be a possibility of forming coalitions between all three political parties represented in the Bundestag. A stand such as "conservatives and liberals, never" or "socialists and liberals, out of the question," I find unacceptable.

ZEIT: Sure, it is reasonable, as a matter of principle, for all democratic parties to state that they are capable of forming coalitions with one another, but let us talk about the actual situation. In economically and socially difficult times, the gap always becomes greater. While the liberals put their stakes on the strength of the individual, the socialists, including democratic socialists, expect salvation from "society" or "the state," from the collective. So surely reasonable compromises—politics, in other words—are not possible any longer....

Lambsdorff: When the scale between these two points—which you have described but which I do not fully accept—is not in balance any longer, things become difficult. As far as the Liberals are concerned, the demand for social justice is not something which we can, or wish to, simply erase. On the contrary. But wherever equality and social justice are only possible through an excess of bureaucracy, of government control, of interference in our individual rights and freedoms, we sit up and take notice. In that case we ask: Is it still defensible to restrict the elbowroom of the individual in favor of supposedly greater justice? Karl-Hermann once said: Total equality leads to total lack of freedom.

ZEIT: In the United States neoconservatives speak of "man's rebellion" against bureaucracy. Have we not in this country too already gone much too far in keeping people on a string? Have we not hindered man's creative forces, which surely are the prerequisite for performance, and thus also for social justice—which must be paid for in the end? Is not Hans-Dietrich Genscher's demand for a "change" also addressed self-critically to his own party?

Lambsdorff: No doubt this is right. And grosso modo [by and large], as the Swiss would say, I agree with this description of the state of affairs. But I
also say this: The CDU, having had an absolute majority and having participated in the Grand Coalition, definitely shares in bearing the responsibility for it. We all have sinned there, and all of us must now make an effort to develop the insights which are needed to go back part of that road. That is not retrograde, but it is a necessary correction, a reform in the truest sense of the word—that is, in the sense of improvement.

ZEIT: Among the unions and even more so among the Social Democrats, one time and again hears the argument, "For heaven's sake let us not get any Reaganism or Thatcherism!" If the FDP could act without regard for its coalition partner, would its economic policy contain elements of the U.S. and British strategy?

Lambsdorff: By and large I would pursue the same economic policy as now—which I do not find unsuccessful. It does not solve all our problems from one day to the next, I know. I also know that it has some weaknesses. But on the whole the things we are achieving in this country under conditions that have become more difficult, the things we have accomplished by way of improving the overall conditions are definitely presentable, particularly in comparison with abroad. Our rate of inflation is going down, our interest rates are dropping, our exports are rising, our deficit in the balance of goods and services will disappear by the end of this year. We do not have as much cause for pessimism as I hear being expressed in a number of assessments by management and labor associations. It is the unemployed who have cause for pessimism, because we cannot solve their problem quickly.

And my reply to your question concerning Thatcherism and Reaganism is this: I would not adopt those recipes. Never in my life have I been a 100-percent monetarist.

ZEIT: Nevertheless the question remains as to whether we also cannot learn something from those two experiments—for example, from the debureaucratization, the deregulation in the United States.

Lambsdorff: Of course that is a slogan that is also going through my head. I see where the CDU/CSU is constantly being reproached for going to pursue a policy a la Reagan or Thatcher if it came to power. But, first, the CDU/CSU—if it comes to power at all—will not come to power alone, and, secondly, I really think it is out of place constantly to display the U.S. President and the British prime minister as a bugaboo. Where would it get us if we constantly anchored our national party-political debate in the politics of our friends in our neighboring countries? I am beginning to consider that to be a debating style detrimental to the country.

ZEIT: One gets the impression, then, that the only thing left in the way of agreement between the two coalition partners is questions concerning which no immediate decisions need to be made. To continue a policy of detente and peace, to maintain a liberal policy of the rule of law, not to jeopardize the integration in the Western alliance—about all that there is agreement, at least in the government. But when it comes to the question of what is to happen as regards taxes, an employment program, a reduction of indebtedness—about that there is disagreement.
Lambsdorff: I do not wholly share your description of the state of affairs. Foreign policy, including security policy, is a constant decisionmaking process as well. But you are right: the people in the country see economic and employment policy as the number 1 problem. For that very reason we have to demonstrate this government's ability to act.

To come back to your initial question: I am not at all keen on belonging to a government approved of by 28 percent of the population and one which in the end may suffer failure. I will do my bit to help the government to be successful. I have always preferred to be part of enterprises which, as far as possible, are successful.

ZEIT: But the coalition also has its problems in foreign and security policy. Surely it is possible that the negotiations for reducing nuclear weapons in Geneva to fail because the Soviets are not prepared to do their bit to contribute to a reduction in atomic armament in Europe....

Lambsdorff: Then there will be a stationing....

ZEIT: Do you seriously think that this government would have the strength to put across the nuclear counterarming by NATO in this country that would then become necessary—against the will of a large part of the SPD, in the face of disgruntlement in the FDP as well, against a predictable definite opposition of large parts of the population?

Lambsdorff: Yes.

8790
CSO: 3103/461
'I KATHIMERINI' ON GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE, ECONOMIC POLICY

NC231829 Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 23 May 82 pp 1, 3

[Article by N. Nikolaou: "Reshuffle Will Be Combined With a Government Turn Toward New Economic Policy"]

[Excerpts] Sudden complications in Greek-EEC relations and the freezing of economic activity at low levels appear to be hastening development of the prerequisites which will, in the end, dictate to the government that it bring its economic policy down to earth and adjust it to more realistic goals. The prime minister's unexpected appearance on the occasion of the 75th anniversary general meeting of the Association of Greek Industrialists, SEV, was a spectacular advance confirmation of this expected government act (to be ratified by the awaited midsummer government reshuffle).

The appearance of Andreas Papandreou at SEV's general meeting and what he said in his short address to it constitute a political development of the first magnitude.

The prime minister's arrival while the general meeting had already started surprised everyone, most of all his own ministers.

The prime minister's appearance, which was decided upon at the very last moment, gains particular political significance in view of the fact that Papandreou undertook this action with the full knowledge that it would revive the "guerrilla war" already launched by the KKE. This in fact did happen when Rizospastis headlined its relevant report with the headline: "Priority to the Industrialists."

It is obvious that with his spectacular gesture (which became necessary after he personally verified that the progress of the economy is in trouble and its prospects are uncertain) the prime minister wanted to stress his own desire for sincere cooperation with the business world.

Authoritative circles described the prime minister's recommendations as extremely serious. In his short address he:

1. Stressed that if the country is to overcome a recession there must be increased productivity. (It is obvious that the meaning of this sentence was
directed toward the workers and not the employers. As authoritative govern-
ment officials complain there is such a laxity of discipline at places of work
that productivity is dropping despite the fact that there are no strikes this
year).

2. He reiterated what he stated in the chamber of deputies that it is not the
industrialists who are the ruling class but the middlemen.

The same economic circles stressed that the prime minister once again avoided
setting time limits for private initiative while he gave every assurance that
the government will support every productive effort. (It is known that in
speaking at Iraklion, Crete, in the winter he set June as the time limit for
the undertaking by private initiative, threatening the industrialists that
otherwise the government would take over investment activities).

It is, in any eventuality, too early to talk of a turn in economic policy.
There are indications but no proofs. It is difficult to make forecasts on
prospects since contradictory elements in the entire government policy continue
to coexist.

It is not coincidental that the governor of the Bank of Greece, Arsenis, who
addressed the meeting after the prime minister left many gaps and questions
about the "government trends." There is a strong impression that the government
got itself involved in "third world aspirations" and that it cannot clearly see
reality and clearly understand that Greece is a European country with a satis-
factory rate of development and that, as a result, it does not require treat-
ment suitable for Zambia or Nicaragua.

CSO: 4621/349
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION IN ALGERIA—Greek technical companies, in cooperation with the state, will construct 10,000 houses worth about $100 million in Algeria in 1982. This is only part of the entire program for the construction of 1 million houses in Algeria over the next 5 years! The above was stated yesterday by A. Tsokhatzopoulos, minister for public works, in an interview he gave to Greek radio-television. Public Works Minister Tsokhatzopoulos also mentioned that "in addition to the above the Algerian side has made concrete proposals for the participation of Greek technicians in the construction of road works, hydraulic works like dams, irrigation and sewage works and so forth and the construction of communication works of a more general nature. At the same time, the minister for housing with whom I met has made a specific proposal that we participate from the outset in the study, planning and construction of an entire satellite town in the middle of Algeria." A group of Greek experts will visit Algeria early in June. [Excerpts] [NC212134 Athens ELEVThEROTIPIA in Greek 21 May 82 p 11]
GOLD EXPORTS FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE PERMITTED

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 19 Mar 82 p 1

[Text] Ankara—Deliberations regarding the removal of the ban on the export of gold are continuing. At a meeting held at the Ankara Chamber of Industry, the high ranking officials from the Ministries of Finance, Energy and Natural Resources, Customs and Monopolies, Industry and Technology and the State Planning Organization met with the representatives of the private sector and discussed proposals on this subject.

In its proposal disclosed at the meeting, the Ministry of Finance noted that the export of gold is possible provided that this is done on cash foreign exchange basis and that gold stamped by the mint can directly be exported in special parcels. The Ministry of Finance also noted that up to 24 carat the quantity of gold to be exported must be reimported and that foreign exchange earnings can be secured by labor. Speaking at the same meeting, the representatives of the private sector maintained the view that irrespective of its value the export of gold must be left free. They also noted that despite the demand for the Turkish gold legal restrictions do not permit them to satisfy these demands. Explaining their views, the private sector representatives stated that the benefits of gold trade for the Turkish economy can be materialized by opening to the foreign markets in this area. They also claimed that the economic potential of the gold trade can be exploited only if the bureaucratic restrictions in this field are lifted. The private sector officials made the following proposals: "The goldsmiths and the craft will be adversely affected by the export of precious metals and stones, which constitute the raw material of the craft, and also by the drain of the national wealth to foreign markets. In order to prevent this, the import of raw material equal in value to the precious metals and stones to be exported, must be left free. The foreign exchange earned by the export of precious metals and stones must be used for the export of the precious metals and stones. Craftsmen specializing in precious stones are urgently waiting for the solution of their problem. The import of precious stones and their process are possible. However, the existing laws do not permit this. Unless a solution is brought about the existence of our craft will be in danger."

Pointing out government order No 17 which says "the power to authorize the import and export of precious metals and stones shall be given to the Ministry of Finance by the Council of Ministers" constitutes the greatest obstacle to
the export of gold, the representatives of the private sector said the removal of this kind of obstacles and creation of an atmosphere of confidence are a must for a sound export process.

Noting that the gold market is very dull, the goldsmiths said that creation of export possibilities will to some extent help to overcome this situation. According to a view shared by many goldsmiths, "the brokers" are the main culprits behind the diminishing purchasing power of the people and the stagnation in the gold market. Speaking on this subject the President of the Ankara Goldsmiths Association, Zeki Obadan, said:

"The main problem of the goldsmiths is "the brokers." The people were cashing their gold [jewelry] and depositing their money with the brokers. They were then buying gold with the interest on their deposits. This was resulting in an active gold market. However, when the depositors lost their money to the brokers the gold market slowed down. Since gold is not an essential commodity, as a result of economic hardship people reduced their purchase of gold."

While the Ankara goldsmiths put the blame on the unstable market conditions, the representative of the goldsmiths at "the Great Bazaar," where most of the Ankara goldsmiths have their shops, and the owner of "Burma [twist] Goldsmith Shop," Kemal Colakyilmaz, said: "The gold market will not revive as long as the tight money situation continues. Moreover, as a result of falling sales goldsmiths are being forced to raise their prices. The liberalization of gold export will, to some extent, solve these problems."

9558
CSO: 4654/240
AYKIM ALUMINUM PLANT GOES INTO OPERATION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 20 Mar 82 p 6

[Report by Kenan Mortan]

[Text] Aydin--The Menderes highway which links Izmir and Aydin also connects Incirliova and Kocarli. From that junction we take a long narrow road. Cotton fields seen here and there on the fertile soil of Menderes. We are now travelling through a typical farmland. In the middle of green fields we come across an unusually large industrial plant. In the eyes of local residents this plant is a monument. For, never before the residents of Kocarli had seen a factory in their town. Moreover, they consider this factory as their own property. For, AYKIM is owned by shareholders. In the summer of 1979, 3500 shareholders, 2000 of them Turkish workers abroad, joined forces and laid the foundation of AYKIM. Today, on a cold winter day, AYKIM goes into operation for test production.

We pay a courtesy visit to the District Governor of Kocarli, Erol Ertugrul. He briefs us on the latest developments concerning AYKIM like a weatherman. Seeing the surprised expression on our faces, he says: "AYKIM is already a solid part of Kocarli. We are responsible for the development of this kind of projects as much as the maintenance of law and order in the town." We kindly ask for permission to visit AYKIM. The governor refuses to leave us alone and takes us to the factory himself. On our arrival there we find the Director General of the plant, Dr Akay Bilgili, waiting for us at the gates. Dr Bilgili, a graduate of the Berlin Technical University, was involved in all the phases of the project since 1976. He greets us very warmly. Now one can see aluminum sheets rolling through the mills. While walking through workers Dr Bilgili speaks with enthusiasm. He says:

"AYKIM became a reality with the participation of 3500 shareholders, the Aydin Private Management, TSKB [Turkish Industrial Development Bank] and the National Bank of Aydin. Our production of semi-manufactured goods, the right choice of site for the factory and the firm support of our shareholders constituted our greatest advantage. In no part of Turkey investment projects are suppressed, provided that the first steps taken are the right ones and the objectives of the investment becomes compatible with Turkey's needs." Those who predicted that this plant--which was built after 1979, at a time when widespread investment fervor in Turkey was being suppressed--"can only become an animal shelter" were in majority. However, the feasibility of the investment and its skilled
management convinced all financial circles which had doubts about the project. While touring the units of the factory that spread over a wide area, Dr Bilgili goes on telling his story:

"Would you believe that several individuals and establishments, not heard of in Turkey, came here from different regions of the country to buy the factory at a cheap price. Moreover, in exchange of the 51 percent of the capital they offered a mere nominal price. However, the firmly united stand of 3500 shareholders and the moral support given by the state prevented such a sale."

Well, will the existing 200 million [Turkish Liras] capital be sufficient enough to run this plant with an official price tag of 1.5 billion? Dr Bilgili says: "Undoubtedly not." And he adds: "During March our capital will be raised to 400 million. As a result of our contribution to the return of Turkish workers [from FRG] the West German Economic Cooperation Ministry will open a long term credit account. Thus, without exerting any pressure on our shareholders we are going to raise the necessary capital within a prolonged period of [appeal]."

Answering a question if "there is any possibility for such an establishment to export its products," Bilgili says: "Yes, there is such a possibility. Under the conditions created by government decisions we are now able to import aluminum at $1400 and after processing it, putting out a product ready for export at $4000. According to our preliminary contacts, the Middle East can become a very favorable market for us. We will achieve this. This is our patriotic duty."

9558
CSO: 4654/240
BRIEFS

IRON EXPORTS--Some 55,000 tons of iron were exported to various countries by the Turkish iron and steel works during the first 4 months of this year. Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Libya are among the chief importers of iron from Turkey. Officials also said that another 100,000 tons of iron will be exported by the end of July. [TA091842 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1000 GMT 9 May 82]

DALAMAN AIRPORT OPENED--The Dalaman Airport has been opened to international traffic. A British charter plane brought in the first group of passengers today. Scheduled services to be operated by Turkish Airlines between Istanbul and Dalaman and between Vienna and Dalaman will begin on 18 May. [TA091842 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1600 GMT 13 May 82]

CSO: 4654/325
MOSCOW ALLEGEDLY ORDERS AKEL COOPERATION WITH KIPRIANOU

Kliridis Allegation

NC190750 Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 19 May 82 p 1

[Excerpts] AKEL's decision to support Mr Spiros Kiprianou as a presidential candidate was adopted at the East Germany Embassy. AKEL Secretary General Papaioannou was present at the meeting and the discussion and adoption of the decision was done upon Moscow's instructions. This was revealed by democratic rally Chairman Kliridis at a meeting of the democratic rally women in Nicosia.

Mr Kliridis added: This was Moscow's choice, accepted by AKEL, to prevent the Cyprus issue from coming under Western influence.

Mr Kliridis also referred to AKEL's attacks against the Greek prime minister in view of the latter's statement on the constellation and criticized President Kiprianou for tolerating these attacks against Mr Papandreou.

Kharavgi Rebuttal

NC200840 Nicoisa KHRAVYI in Greek 20 May 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Glavkos Kliridis' Shameless Lies"]

[Text] Among the many lies told by Glavkos Kliridis at the democratic rally women's gathering the day before yesterday, there was also this one: AKEL's decision to support Spiros Kiprianou as presidential candidate was adopted at the East Germany Embassy. Secretary General Papaioannou attended the meeting and the discussion and adoption of the decision was done upon Moscow's instructions." (I SIMERINE, 19 May).

Of course, the issue is not the false information obtained by Mr Kliridis from his untrustworthy friends. The issue is that it is a deliberate, shameless lie, another tale that he himself made up to slander AKEL and the socialist countries that support our struggle.

Mr Kliridis knows very well that the AKEL Central Committee makes the decisions are made. Kliridis is not a beginner in political affairs. Therefore, his gossip tales have an ulterior motive: To present AKEL as being dependent on
outsiders and to present the friendly socialist countries—that firmly, un-selfishly and multisidedly support the Republic of Cyprus—as interfering in our domestic political affairs.

This lie is not only dishonest but also very clearly against the Cyprus struggle. Fortunately, however, all Cypriot patriots know what foreign forces interfere in Cyprus' domestic affairs and what catastrophies these imperialist interferences have brought. It is also known that Mr Kliridhis and his party not only have not condemned and do not condemn the deadly NATO imperialist interferences, but they insist that only the West can solve the Cyprus issue for us. Furthermore, Mr Kliridhis and his party accept the imperialist plans and solutions and they pursue them. This is why Mr Kliridhis' shameless lies turn only against him and the foreign-dominated party of the extreme right.

GSO: 4621/346
MISSING PERSONS ISSUE SAID STIFLED AT MOSCOW CONGRESS

'O KIRIKAS' Claim

NC211427 Nicosia O KIRIKAS in Greek 20 May 82 pp 1, 7

[Excerpt] According to authoritative reports received by O KIRIKAS from the republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the Moscow congress on disarmament and peace held from 10 to 14 May, the sponsors of the congress exerted an organized and systematic effort to prevent any reference to the issue of the missing persons in Cyprus. Furthermore, the Soviet Embassy in Nicosia did not issue a visa to the secretary of the committee of relatives of missing persons. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and particularly the minister of foreign affairs himself intervened behind the scenes to conceal this. Yesterday, political observers stressed: The Soviet Government must furnish explanations on this major issue so that the Cypriot people's feelings for the Soviet Union will not be shaken because of its attitude toward the missing persons question.

Our reports add that the government has prevented the release of a statement by the committee of relatives of missing persons denouncing what happened. Both the committee and the relatives of the missing persons are annoyed.

The argument used by the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs is that such a statement would undermine and harm the climate for the AKEL-Kiprianou cooperation for the forthcoming elections for the office of president.

Government Denial

NC211429 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1030 GMT 21 May 82

[Text] Referring to this morning's newspaper report that the missing persons issue was prevented from being raised at the pan-religious congress in Moscow and that the Foreign Ministry and particularly the foreign minister himself intervened behind the scenes to cover up the issue, the government spokesman has stated that there has never been any intervention either by the Foreign Ministry or by the minister himself to cover up the issue. The spokesman added that during the days that the congress was in session the foreign minister was away from Cyprus and that only recently was he briefed on the matter.

CSO: 4621/346
IOANNIDIS CRITICIZES PRESIDENT KYPIRIANOU, AKEL

NC231017 Nicosia 0 AGON in Greek 23 May 82 pp 1, 14

[Text] In an exclusive interview with 0 AGON, Mr Ioannidis, former interlocutor and a candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections, stressed: "President Kyriianou is answerable before the people because he has kept silent about the national issue. His silence has made him an accomplice in the perpetuation of the crisis [with Greece]. He has also proved that he doesn't have the political courage to tell the people his position."

Mr Ioannidis stated that President Kyriianou should have already taken a position against AKEL's weighty expressions against the Greek Government. He said: "He has not done so, preferring to remain silent, which in this case means the acceptance of the expressions and guilt."

Mr Ioannidis strongly criticized the AKEL-Democratic Party [DIKO] minimum program, stressing: "This is dividing the people's unity and leading to polarization, opposes the national course of the Cyprus issue that was charted by the new Greek Government, embitters Athens-Nicosia cooperation and relations and is leading the Cyprus issue into a stalemate, that is, to the preservation of the faits accomplis of the occupation."

Mr Ioannidis added: "The minimum program also places President Kyriianou under the tutelage of the two cooperating parties and particularly that of AKEL, which is the largest party. In addition, it demotes the president from a president of the Republic of Cyprus and all Cypriots to a president of a party of Cypriots, and it also diminishes his domestic and international authority." Mr Ioannidis pointed out:

The minimum program, under these prerequisites, will not only be fatal to the Cyprus cause and will lead the country into political insecurity but it also does not offer any guarantees for a qualitative change and social liberation."

In other points of his interview Mr Ioannidis said, among other things, the following:

--The situation on the domestic front is sad and pitiful. Substantively, there is no domestic front.
--The AKEL-DIKO minimum program destroys Athens efforts to extract the Cyprus issue from the present deadlock.

--There must be a national and popular reconciliation, collectivity and a course for a general unity and unanimity.

--The deadlock over the three basic freedoms creates a serious and crucial development in the course of the intercommunal dialogue. In essence, the dialogue is now aimless and contentless and is continuing as a dialogue only for the sake of a dialogue, which is undesirable.

--The accusations against Greece are unjust, unjustifiable and baseless.

--Papandreou's policy for the first time opens new prospects and gives new hopes to our people.

--The undermining of Papandreou's and Greece's efforts irreparably hurts our national cause and leads us to dangerous paths and deadlocks.

--Ulusu's visit is a hostile action for which the Cyprus Government should have reacted in a systematic and planned way.

CSO: 4621/347
BRIEFS

soviet note to turkey--Answering a question, the government spokesman stated that the Cypriot Government was briefed on the Soviet Union's verbal note to Ankara in connection with the Cyprus issue. Asked if the intercommunal talks would continue in the event of a deadlock over the question of the three basic freedoms even if there were a consensus of views on other points, the government spokesman said: Deadlock means deadlock on any serious matter. However, he added, it is correct that all serious issues be discussed before a final decision is made. Answering a question if the implementation of the Democratic Party-AKEL minimum program has begun and if the watchdog committee has been formed, the government spokesman said the minimum program is the framework for government policy and added that the watchdog committee has not yet been formed. In answer to a question on AKEL Secretary General Papaioannou's speech the other day in which, among other things, he said that well-known coupists have again begun to make threats and that AKEL briefed the government accordingly asking it to take strict measures, the government spokesman said AKEL has given its information to the interior minister who gave instructions for an investigation of the whole matter. [Text] [NC81130 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1030 GMT 18 May 82]

PRC envoy concludes visit--Foreign Minister Rolandis today conferred with PRC governments envoy He Ying. During their 1-hour meeting, they discussed the Cyprus issue and received the international situation. The Chinese official gave assurances of his country's support of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. He also stressed that the PRC favors a peaceful solution to the Cyprus issue through dialogue. He lauded Cyprus' positive role within the nonaligned movement. In conclusion, He Ying expressed full satisfaction with his official contacts in Cyprus. The Chinese official departed Cyprus at noon. He was seen off at Larnaca Airport by senior foreign ministry officials and the PRC ambassador to Cyprus. [Text] [NC231322 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1300 GMT 23 May 82]

Kyprianou criticized--We register one more week of silence by the president of the Republic of Cyprus regarding the abuse and slanders of his political partners against our country's prime minister. Does he think that the Greek people--as well as the majority of Cypriot hellenism--suffer from amnesia? Or could it be that he accepts the newest version that, more or less, absolutely nothing was said? Unfortunately for him there are documents, and these texts are burning ones. We would have had absolutely no desire to point out the
self-evident duty of Mr Kiprianou if fulfilling his duty was not, among other things, also to the benefit of absolutely imperative good relations between Nicosia and Athens and the joint struggles which we still face for a successful outcome of our national cause. Consequently, a courageous public, but not through private letters, statement--expected by the people but not undertaken at this moment--is not only a moral and political duty but also a national duty.

CSO: 4621/347
CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY CONGRESS IN MIDST OF FAST DECLINE

Poll: Party Would Lose All Seats

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 May 82 Sect II p 1

[Article by Solveig Rødgaard]

[Text] The Christian People's Party, which uses the motto "A Rebuilt Denmark--Culturally and Economically" for its national congress, is undergoing a continued decline, and the latest Gallup poll throws the party completely out of the Folketing.

"A rebuilt Denmark--culturally and economically." Under this slogan, the Christian People's Party will next Friday start its national congress. However, most of the delegates to the national congress will probably have their own feelings about the possibility of the Christian People's Party to be the leading party in the reconstruction. Since the elections in December to the Folketing, the party, with its 4 seats in the Folketing, has been moving very close to the minimum number of votes required under the election law in order for it to be represented in the Folketing. According to the latest Gallup poll, the party will drop completely out of the Folketing.

And the Christian People's Party cannot even with a clear conscience refer to the earlier balancing act of the Center Democrats on the borderline of exclusion and then the party's soaring flight today. Neither the Christian People's Party nor, for that matter, the other parties, have an Erhard Jacobsen who, in the final spurt of the election campaign, manages to pull the voters into the warmth with the Center Democrats.

The Christian People's Party has Chr. Christensen, Arne Bjerregaard, Inge Krogh, and Jens Steffensen. The Party wants to put the family in the center. And there are still leading issues, such as opposition to free abortion and free pornography. But the voters fail to appear.

In the elections to the Folketing on 8 December 1981, 72,174 voted for the Christian People's Party. That was approximately 10,000 less than in the elections in 1979. That gave the party 2.3 percent of the votes and four seats in the Folketing. A loss of one seat. In the last three elections, the party has each time lost one
seat, and, as stated before, the Gallup poll now places the party at less than 2 percent of the votes.

The political leader of the party, Chr. Christensen, does not want to attach any importance to the Gallup figures. "It is fractions of percentages which decide it. For we have been very close to the borderline. And I do not find that there has been any major shift."

Low Profile

Since the election the Christian People's Party has been keeping a low profile in the Folketing. The party maintains a loyal cooperation within the 'Four-Leaf Clover' (group of four parties, consisting of the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, the Center Democrats, and the Christian People's Party), and it also maintains that Henning Christophersen must remain the prime minister candidate of the 'Four-Leaf Clover.' However, from a purely political point of view, it has had difficulty asserting itself.

It has not helped either that there are also fractions within the four-member group. In one fraction is Arne Bjerregaard. In the other one, the rest of the group, led by Chr. Christensen. As it is being said in the Folketing: "Arne Bjerregaard has always been moving about a bit freely." "This has not become less pronounced after the election," others will say, who do not always know whether they are to make appointments with Bjerregaard or with Christensen.

Protest Party

The Christian People's Party was born as a protest party in 1970. Protest against the liberalization of the abortion law and the repeal of the ban on pornography by the Liberal, Conservative, and Radical Liberal government. In the landslide election in 1973, the Christian People's Party got into the Folketing with 7 seats, especially through voters who had fled from the Liberals and the Conservatives.

The party has many times tried to have the free abortion law changed. But without result. The party now suffices it to propose, in the Folketing, compulsory counseling for women seeking abortion. Also that is being rejected by a large majority in the Folketing. The Christian People's Party has also joined actively the anti-video violence campaign. But the most important thing is to secure the family as the pillar of the society, the party says.

Leadership

Even if voters disappear, the party has got faithful members. Today, there are approximately 11,000 of them, and they carry out a vast job on the local level. On the other hand, during the existence of the party, there have been changes at the top.

The first chairman of the Christian People's Party and the founder of the party, Jacob Christensen, chief physician, left the party in 1973 together with a number of members of the central committee after an internal dispute on the line of the party.
The deputy chairman, Jens Møller, school principal, became chairman but left this post in 1979 because he wanted to devote his efforts to his work in the Folketing. He was allowed to do that for some months. In the elections in October of 1979, he lost his seat in the Folketing. He became a bitter man, who, recently, said that he had dropped his national policy work entirely. His bitterness did not abate when, recently, he also had to leave his seat in the Radio Council. The Folketing group of the Christian People's Party gave the seat instead to the present chairman of the party, the Rev. Flemming Kofod-Svendsen.

Folketing Group

However, it is the chairman of the Folketing group who is the most important person of the party. Chr. Christensen, 57, school principal from Ringkøbing, has had this post since the party got into the Folketing. He is popular, hard-working and has a pronounced political flair even if there is not much to use it on at the moment.

Also Inge Krogh, 61, chief physician from Funen, and Arne Bjerregaard, 44, school principal from Fjerritslev, have been members of the Folketing group since the party got into the Folketing. In the most recent election, however, Inge Krogh nearly lost her seat. Only the recount showed that she was a few votes ahead of Flemming Kofod-Svendsen. Jens Steffensen, 51, former principal of Sommersted Continuation School, got into the Folketing in 1979.

At the national congress of the Christian People's Party to be held at the Apostolic Folk High School at Kolding, the four members of the Folketing will become subject to a cross fire following the political introduction by Chr. Christensen. Many members of the Christian People's Party probably are happy that the cross fire will take place indoors among the members and not among the voters.

Party Lacks Responsibility in Folketing

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 May 82 p 8

[Editorial: "Ideology or Responsibility"]

[Text] In quite a few respects, the parliamentary development and fate of the Christian People's Party are reminiscent of the conditions under which the Radical Liberal Party existed during the years from 1920 till the mid-sixties. The point of resemblance is, in particular, that direct political responsibility is assumed to give vital force to a movement which is slowly disintegrating. The Radical Liberal Party believed that it would find its vital force in a close cooperation with the Social Democratic Party and with the clear objective of getting its share of the government power. During its much shorter parliamentary existence, the Christian People's Party has been seeking its justification by cooperating closely with the government in power at the time in question. The present government is the first one since 1973 toward which the Christian People's Party has not undertaken any fairly far-reaching obligations. It should be noted in time that,
because of this course, the party has been carrying burdens which have been heavy, and it has displayed a courage which ought to give rise to a certain amount of admiration.

This should be noted in time, for it may soon turn out to be too late. The Christian People's Party is probably not undergoing any dramatic crisis, but the party is subject to a slow wearing-down process which may lead to disaster seeing that the party is so close to being excluded from the Folketing. This is the somber background to the national congress which will be held this week. Since the elections in December of 1981, the party has had difficulty getting into a position where its messages will have any impact. The way the parliamentary conditions are, or may be expected to be, it is not easy to catch sight of the road leading back to influence.

In its somewhat desperate situation, the leadership of the Christian People's Party has chosen to become closely involved in the nonsocialist cooperation which was formed with the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party and the Center Democrats. This is an understandable course of action, not least because other possibilities were largely non-existing during the weeks following the December elections. Nor may the possibility yet be excluded that the 'Four-Leaf Clover' (the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, the Center Democrats and the Christian People's Party) may have to take a responsibility which, to a high degree, requires both broad shoulders and courage. However, the national congress must realize that a situation is developing in which the Christian People's Party will no longer have the possibility of maneuvering freely between the two main groups in Danish politics.

This, in turn, gives rise to the question whether the Christian People's Party will be able to survive as a political force without getting its nourishment through the parliamentary responsibility. The party has a relatively strong organizational network, and it will probably be a general theme at the national congress whether it will be possible to find a basis of existence through stronger efforts in the organizational work in the individual districts. If, in this way, a more ideological policy is created, this may, of course, become an obstacle in the pursuit of parliamentary responsibility. But this cost may presumably be born if the parliamentary responsibility nevertheless proves to be unprocurable.

Socialism, Liberalism Attacked

Copenhagen BERLINGSKES TIDENDE in Danish 8 May 82 p 6

[Text] "The hour of destiny of the government is now approaching," the national chairman of the Christian People's Party, the Rev. Flemming Kofod-Svendsen said yesterday in his political report at his party's national congress at Kolding. "Whoever is prime minister, we need a cooperation across the center. For that is the way in which the voters have composed the Folketing. The actual opposition parties should be the Socialist Left Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Progressive Party."

The national chairman went on to say: "In this situation, the Christian People's Party stands as an independent center party. We reject socialization projects
and increased bureaucracy. But we do not want either to be the protectors of the rich (applause). I do not want to accept the socialist doctrine which divides people into two classes, the working class and the non-socialists. I do not want to be called non-socialist. To me, that word suggests being comfortably off, self-sufficiency and the lack of social responsibility.

On the other hand, the Christian People's Party wants a rebuilt Denmark both culturally and economically. Then, old-fashioned socialism and old-fashioned liberalism will no longer do. Instead, we need new political thinking and action on the basis of the Christian idea of administration. But, then, it is also clearly necessary to have politicians who have a clear ethical attitude."

The Christian View

Presumably against the background of the poor Gallup figures of the Christian People's Party, Flemming Kofod-Svendsen asked:

"Is the policy of the Christian People's Party a thing of the past. What are the future perspectives for the party's philosophy?" And he answered the questions himself by referring to the party's fundamental values, the three main pillars of which were: the Christian view of man, the message of love of one's neighbor, and the responsibility of administration, i.e. the responsibility for the proper administration of the world's resources.

In all of the fields covered by these three watchwords for the party's view of values, the Christian People's Party is faced with great future challenges, the national chairman said. The ensuing debate showed great support for his ideas.

One participant asked whether the Christian People's Party--from an ethical point of view--would be at all able to enter into a close political cooperation with the leader of the Center Democrats, Erhard Jacobsen, who had used the expressions "rats and moles with the Danish Radio."

Party Would Cooperate with SDF, Conservatives

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 8 May 82 p 6

[Article by Dan Axel]

[Text] "I do not want to hide the fact that I would prefer a government cooperation among the Social Democratic Party, the Conservative Party, and the Christian People's Party."

This statement was made yesterday by one of the four members of the Folketing of the Christian People's Party at the 12th national congress of the Christian People's Party at Kolding.

He thus dissociated himself from the political speech made by the group chairman, Chr. Christensen, which, in particular, focused on a cooperation with the Center Democrats--and also with the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party--thus the
well-known 'Four-Leaf Clover' alternative. And to make the confusion complete, a proposal to "tear one of the leaves off the four-leaf clover," viz. the Christian People's Party. This proposal, which was not commented upon by the Folketing group, was made by Bjarne Nederby Jessen of the Copenhagen county.

In his political report on the party, Chr. Christensen, incidentally, blamed the Radical Liberal Party for the fact that no effective measures have as yet been taken to solve the problems of agriculture and the building industry.

"And after 2 years of cooperation with the Radical Liberal Party, I fail to understand how it is possible to support such a policy with a good conscience," said Chr. Christensen, adding that the next 2 weeks will be decisive for the political future of the country.

"The Social Democratic government is, at the moment, obstructing solutions, and I hope that when the negotiations among the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Radical Liberal Party collapse, the government will have the courage to let go of the reins and let others take over," Chr. Christensen said.

The criticism of the Folketing group on the part of many of the rank-and-file members of the party concerned the party's lack of profile in the debate. "We are not proficient enough at asserting ourselves. The Progressive Party and the Center Democrats are much better at asserting themselves in the debate," the critics said.

"That may be so," said Chr. Christensen, "but I am no Erhard Jacobsen, nor a Mogens Glistrup, not to mention a Glensgaard, who reports people to the police. I do not want to participate in any cult of personality within the Christian People's Party."

Although it was done in a neat and decent manner, there was hidden criticism of the four members of the Folketing for not asserting themselves well enough in the press.

"It may also be the fault of the press," said Chr. Christensen. "Last year, we were in the focus of attention when we cooperated with the Social Democratic Party. This year, there is more for the press at Skive." He thus implied that the problems of the government at the moment are more the cooperation with the Socialist People's Party, which is holding its national congress at Skive, and the cooperation with the Radical Liberal Party.

7262
CS0: 3106/112
PSF EXECUTIVE OUTLINES FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

Paris POLITIQUE ETRANGER in French Mar 82 pp 33-44

[Article by Jacques Huntzinger]

[Excerpt] Socialist Party's International Policy

It can be summed up as centered about a few major objectives: an independent, Western, European France that is solidary with the Third World.

An Independent France

At the bottom of any foreign policy we find a people's awareness of and taste for their freedom of action. Of course, dependence has its comforts, but that is not the system we have chosen for France. We prefer the discomfort of independence to the comfort of dependence. A determination to have national independence does not lie in the vanity of a rooster, but in political reasoning. The best way to act in order to facilitate the gradual transformation of the international system is to acquire the broadest possible freedom of expression and action within the framework of existing communities of interest, alliances and interdependences. Independence does not mean national egoism; on the contrary, this determination is the opposite of autarchy.

To be strong abroad, we must be strong at home. An economic, industrial and research policy and a strong currency are the very bases of a foreign policy and national independence. But we must also reject any integration, whether it be European or Atlantic. In the end, the road to independence is through a security policy that must at one and the same time be a policy of defense and of disarmament.

Since the January 1978 agreement, the Socialist Party has taken into account the nuclear reality and feels that France's security is linked with the operational maintenance of a strategic and tactical nuclear force, naturally accompanied by other conventional elements. This national defense policy should try to cover France's vital interests. At the present time a lot of thought is being devoted to this topic. Is it a matter of turning France into a refuge or does it not go beyond that? If we interpret the provisions of the "White Book" and the 1977-1982 programming law, we may assume that France's vital interests do not stop at its territorial limits, at its borders, rather that they
go beyond them. Of course, we have to maintain a margin of uncertainty, but the problem that is posed today and will be tomorrow is knowing whether in the longer run France's vital interest will not be to assure a certain amount of nuclear protection beyond the borders of France. This is a question that deserves to at least be raised.

A Western France

Generally, this problem has not been posed very often. For geographical, cultural and historical reasons, France is part of the West. But what does this mean in relation to the analysis we may make of the Western system? Is the West an economic system? What do economic interdependence, the play of investments, the play of the free market, free trade represent in their positive and negative aspects?

The West has a military magnet, the Atlantic alliance, with its constraints and obligations. It also and especially is based on an ideological cement which is the common attachment to democracy and the various freedoms. France is part of this Western world. But France today wants to be a socialist society, within the Western world. One of the Western world's prospects is certainly the advent of countries that will be governed and vitalized by socialist governments or inspired by the ideology of democratic socialism.

This has already been the case, but what can we say about the social democratic experiments conducted up until now? We are forced to admit that, despite enormous positive gains in Sweden, Great Britain, Austria or in Germany, they have not finally ended in those substantial transformations that permit us to regard them as having flowered into socialism. The fact that the European social democratic parties have floundered in reformism and that most of them have been caught up in the economic crisis clearly shows that they have very often confused socialism with the sharing of the fruits of growth.

A European France

From a socialist point of view, Europe will be the decisive factor. Europe is where the big political democracies are, where the big industrial companies are with the exception of America and Japan, where the working classes have acquired the most maturity and experience, where the ideological confrontation is the most sharply defined, where the showdown is most evident. For all these reasons, what goes on in Europe is decisive. It is therefore a matter of simultaneously developing Western Europe's identity and relations between the two Europes, Western Europe's identity is today going through a common solution to the problems posed by the economic and social crisis. The failure of the social democratic experiments and the foreseeable failure of the monetarist experiment in England clearly show that the European debate will tomorrow hinge on the choice of economic and social policies that emerge from the earlier failures. And what is happening in France today is a formidable gamble. If we fail, one channel will risk being closed; if we succeed in getting France out of the economic and social crisis, there will obviously be all sorts of repercussions to the debate between the societies of Western Europe as to the ways of getting out of the crisis.
Policies of economic renewal, the fight against unemployment, industrial investment, planning and nationalization interest the European socialist parties a little more each day. For several months now we have observed a veritable beehive of activity in the European socialist parties, which are interested not out of simple curiosity, but for themselves because we have begun to get involved here in France.

This gives us a chance to aim at what has been referred to as Eurosocialism, at new relations between the Western European socialist and social democratic parties and certain Western communist parties. But that should not be enough for Europe. It is a question of establishing party-to-party relations: with the Soviet, Polish, Hungarian and Romanian parties, with the Yugoslav League, even though these relations have at times been quite episodic. It is important to develop an Eastern policy. Such a policy should enable us to reconcile social change and the maintenance of peace. A true "Eastern policy" for a socialist France should for obvious reasons be different from German-style Ostpolitik because we are not in the same geographical and historical situation, more particularly we do not have the same inter-German interest. A French policy in relation to the East should permit the East to make changes within the framework of the maintenance of peace. This is the direction Socialist Party action with regard to Poland has taken for the past few weeks. But even before that, since the beginning of the Polish process, this has been the direction of our action in the Socialist International and elsewhere. This is why we attach essential importance to the final Helsinki accord and why we feel that Michel Jobert was wrong in saying what he did about this. The final Helsinki accord involves three fundamental gains, in the name of which the chances for change in Europe are possible:

The principle according to which respect for human rights in each nation that is a signatory of the final accord concerns all of the signatory nations and it is in the name of this principle that we can today say what we do say with regard to Poland.

The principle according to which each people has the right to freely choose its own political, economic, cultural and social system without interference from outside, that is, a condemnation of the Brezhnev doctrine. The negotiators of the final accord are well aware of the difficulties there were in achieving the establishment of this principle.

The principle of freedom of exchanges in the domain of information and in other domains.

These three essential gains mean that Helsinki was a compromise advantageous to the camp of partisans of freedom and it would be absolutely irresponsible to forget or denounce it.

A France Solidary with the Third World

The Socialist Party is in close contact with Third World progressive forces in Latin and Central America, the front line in South Africa, Arab world progressive forces, the FLN [National Liberation Front] and the POLISARIO Front.
We think that these forces represent these countries' or these future countries' chances for the future.

Our policy toward the Kurds, the Eritreans, the Afghan resistance and Prince Sihanouk, all of whom we consider to be the recipients of peoples' right, is an example of our attitude toward peoples and minorities. Aside from this, as far as two regions in particular are concerned, the Socialist Party has constantly developed its program of action for several years now: Central America and South Africa.

In conclusion, we may ask ourselves what the Socialist Party's new internationalism is. Actually, there is diplomacy and there is strategy. Behind the diplomatic action, the politician seeks ways of attaining the objectives that seem fundamental to him. He may be evasive, employ camouflage, resort to trickery and bear in mind the slowness of history, but he will have permanent objectives. The Socialist Party wants to do everything in its power to develop socialism on an international scale. But the real question is "how"? Do we have to construct a socialist system in a single country and develop a foreign policy that essentially aims at reassuring people in such a way as to permit the development of a difficult experiment in an international context that is as favorable as possible? Certainly. In the first phase of the construction of a socialist society, we must first of all think of protecting ourselves, and it would be irresponsible and risky to dream of setting out on a crusade to the four corners of the earth even before having laid the bases of the society we want to create at home.

But at the same time for the Socialist Party it is a matter of developing the major acquisitions of the Socialist International and on the basis of the latter the chances for achieving socialism provided by the socialist and social democratic parties that are members of the Second International, by the communist parties that are closer to it and lastly by the progressive forces of the Third World.

It is this alliance that we should in due time look into. The alliance should be developed between the Socialist International, certain communist parties and the progressive forces of the Third World.

11,466
CSO: 3100/650
RUMORS AIM AT DISCREDITING GROSSOUVRE, INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Paris LE MATIN in French 10-11-12 Apr 82 p 2

[Article by Pascal Krop: "Maneuvers against the French Secret Services—False Rumors Are Widespread, and Hoaxes Are Perpetrated by Telephone to Discredit Our Agents"]

[Text] The attempts at disinformation have curiously been following one another for several months. False news spread in the press, hoaxes by telephone, attempts to pit the administrations against one another—everything seems ripe for an attempt to discredit the French secret services. In particular, this campaign has had the aim of hindering the cooperation of France with its allies, including the Americans. In the Elysee, they seem concerned by the diffusion of these rumors, and they have now decided to put an end to them.

"Hello, give me one of the officials of the Paris Airport. The Elysee would like you to have 10 tickets available for it on 3 April." The person listening on the other end, entirely dumbfounded, asks a few details about this curious request. The caller answers: "It's for the secret services."

In a recent period, the highest officials of the Ministry of Defense were also the victims of several hoaxes by telephone. Anonymous callers passed themselves off as belonging to the entourage of Francois de Grossouvre, who is responsible, in the Elysee, for supervising the activities of the French secret services. Each time, the perpetrators of these manipulations asked to obtain confidential information in different areas of defense. The repetition of calls like this led one to think that they represented an attempt to break in mechanisms that could one day be used in a real destabilization attempt. The persistent rumors about Francois Mitterrand's "illness" go in the same direction too.

Even more recently, several newspapers have echoed the rumors aimed at isolating Francois Grossouvre. According to these rumors, this familiar of Francois Mitterrand has had a large part of his assignments in the area of intelligence taken away from him and transferred to Pierre Beregovoy, secretary general in the Elysee, and Jean Saulnier, private chief of staff to the president of the republic. But the fact is that Francois de Grossouvre, one of the chief of state's most intimate advisers, has not been relieved of his assignments at--quite to the contrary!

69
It is François de Grossouvre who has just personally, in close collaboration with Pierre Marion, chief of the new DGSE (General Commission for External Security), formerly the SDECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service], reorganized the services. It appears that he has even partially resolved the conflicts that pitted the former SDECE against the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST). And he is the person in the Elysee who sees to it that the various French services do not resume their traditional clan war. In order to carry out their missions well, François de Grossouvre's services are going to get bigger in the near future. Spacious premises are being fitted out for them in the Elysee.

So what purpose can this false information serve? On the domestic level, it is not taken so seriously and has hardly been of any advantage to its perpetrators. But on the other hand, it has begun to bear fruit on the international scene. Both by the Pentagon and by the CIA, the French officials have been asked on several occasions to explain these repeated rumors. The American services, which previously had maintained excellent relations with their French counterparts, have been disturbed about possible leaks abroad. Until now, François de Grossouvre has always managed to calm the fears of the services of France's allies; but he must now cope with the campaign of denigration recently launched against him.

11267
CSO: 3100/626
TAKHIDHROMOS PUBLISHES POLL ON PAPANDREOU’S POPULARITY

NC201606 Athens TO VIMA in Greek 20 May 82 p 9

[Text] Seven months after the elections prime minister and Pasok Chairman Andreas Papandreou appears to be without competition in the political lime-light.

Of the inhabitants of the 8 largest cities 1 out of 2 approve of the way in which the prime minister deals with the issues and only slightly more than 1 in 10 do not approve.

This is shown in a poll published by Takhydromos, which went on sale today. The poll was made in Athens, Thessaloniki, Larisa, Agrinio, Patrai, Iraklion, Serrai and Alexandroupolis.

The more general conclusion drawn from this investigation is that A. Papandreou maintains his electoral strength undamaged, whereas the opposition is not able to garner even 1/3 of its voters against him.

In the poll a little more than 2 out of 10 (24 percent) replied that they have no opinion ("I do not know") and also a little more than 1 in 10 (16 percent) refused to reply to our question.

Characteristically, people 25-34 approve of the prime minister's dealings by a greater percentage (57 percent) than people of other ages.

Characteristically, the entire city of Thessaloniki supports Papandreou by a greater percentage (59 percent) while in other urban centers the percentage in favor of the prime minister remains high (52 percent).

Athens is the exception. It gives a lower percentage to Papandreou (44 percent) when compared with the other cities but shows a higher percentage of people (29 percent) who refuse to take a position.

The poll began on 24 April and was concluded on 30 April. The number of people asked was 1,386 men and women between 17-64 [years of age]. The question which was submitted was: "Would you like to tell me in general whether you approve of or disapprove of the way new prime minister A. Papandreou deals with the issues?"

CSO: 4621/345
PAPANDREOU DISCUSSES REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT

NC231724 Athens TO VIMA in Greek 23 May 82 pp 1, 2

[Statement by Greek Prime Minister Adreas Papandreou in a "conversation" with VIMA political editor Mikhalis Dimitriou 22 May]

[Excerpt] "Any restructuring of the government presupposes the drafting and passing of a new law on the council of ministers. We have really established that certain government functions are not satisfactorily productive under the present, inherited structure of the council of ministers.

"Thus, the framework of the government's operation must change--because this is of importance--and then any changes in personnel will follow."

The above statement was made to VIMA by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou yesterday morning during his return from Kefallinia.

According to reliable reports, minister to the Prime Minister Koutsoyiorgas (who accompanied the prime minister on his tour of the Ionanian Islands) has been entrusted with the drafting of a new law on the council of ministers and it is reckoned the new draft bill will be completed within the next 3 months and, in any event, not later than the fall.

According to the same reports, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou is obliged to intensively deal with foreign affairs until the end of June. For this reason, it is estimated that the drafting and working out of a new law on the council of ministers (with rearranging the role of certain ministries; establishing new ministerial and deputy ministerial positions; institutionalizing bodies such as the government council on foreign and defense affairs, government council on economic policy, central legal experts committee [Kendriki Nomotekhniki Epitropi], and so forth) could be scheduled from next July onwards.

In a conversation with to VIMA political editor Mikhalis Dhimitriou, prime minister Andreas Papandreou also stressed:

"Not one of us--the prime minister, ministers and deputy ministers, or other cadres--is permanent and immovable. It is the fundamental principle of Pasok and the government of change that all of us are nothing else but servants of the Greek people whom we have to serve from any position. We are all conscripted for this purpose, exactly because the specific difference between the
government of change and former governments is that not only do none of us have personal fiefs or airtight compartments but we are not characterized by arrogance, soliciting for positions or haughtiness in ruling."

Further in his conversation, the prime minister said that "we are all new in the government; we are tested by the people every day and we have taken successful examinations if one is judged not merely by the credit of time given to us by the people but by the people's militant support as manifested in big popular gatherings."

At another point [in his conversation], the prime minister stressed that "Pasok and, more generally, the entire movement of change has many worthy, expert, honest and new or experienced cadres who can certainly render their services to the government—and they will be called upon to do that."

The prime minister clarified that the context of his statement to VIMA that "none of us is permanent and immovable"—as well as the meaning of a similar excerpt in his speech at a banquet in Argostolion yesterday evening—does not mean a barb against any minister or deputy minister and, moreover, he does not intend to give rise to conjectures about a "forthcoming reshuffle."

Concluding his conversation with the editor of VIMA, the prime minister stressed in this connection that "this does not mean that I am facing or that there are some problems of cooperation with the ministers and deputy ministers. The meaning is deeper and related to the new political character which the government of the change wants to establish in the country's public life. It means that the principles and climate by which we should all be characterized within the government is nothing else but how to serve the cause of change and how we will vindicate the people's vote and confidence."

CSO: 4621/345
GOVERNMENT, AVEROF CLASH OVER CYPRUS HANDLING

NC221856 Athens Armed Forces Radio in Greek 1800 GMT 22 May 82

[Text] Averof, the chairman of new democracy, commenting on what Prime Minister Papandreou reiterated at Kerkira, that the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation troops from Cyprus is a prerequisite for the inter-Cypriot dialogue, made the following statement among other things:

Theoretically this position could also be correct, but in practice if the Turkish troops refuse to withdraw as a result of political measures, if the necessary military measures to achieve this purpose are not found, would this mean that no dialogue would start? In such an eventuality, however, we have another question: Whose interest is served by the protracted continuation of the military occupation? And another question: Through a dialogue or through the mediation of strong organizations is there, to say the least, any hope of discovering a tolerable solution and bringing about an end to the military occupation?

Any handling of these implacable questions with the usual patriotic fiestas and declarations about alignment and not of support, about an unyielding internationalization and so forth does not comprise the implementation of a foreign policy. It is muddled diplomacy aimed at serving the expediencies of domestic policy. And there is nothing more dangerous in the course of nations that this. We stress this.

Replying to the statement of the leader of the official opposition, Averof, the government spokesman made the following statement:

Averof does not understand what the position of the Greek Government is: Its position is not to sever the dialogue. Its position is that the dialogue being conducted is not a dialogue between the president of the Republic of Cyprus and the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community so long as the Turkish occupation troops remain. It is, of necessity, a dialogue between the Cyprus Government and Ankara.

Does Averof consider that under these conditions the dialogue could conclude in a just solution? We await this reply.

CSO: 4621/345
'I KATHIMERINI' ON GROWING PASOK-KKE CONFRONTATION

NC231755 Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 23 May 82 p 9

[Editorial: "The First Clash"]

[Excerpts] The exchange of blows between Pasok and dogmatic KKE followers Friday at Argostolion, while Prime Minister Papandreuou was speaking from a balcony in the city's central square, was one of the expected incidents in the mounting friction between the two parties. There will be many more, and much more serious. They will make the rift between the two dissimilar "partners" of today's authority totally unbridgeable. They will also seriously threaten social peace.

The government publicly protested against these incidents in the "government spokesman's" statements.

The government's reaction is wrong on two counts: First, because it asks for respect of democratic functions by the KKE and second, because it argues that "democracy is functioning in our country together with a free expression of ideas."

Dogmatic communist parties have incorporated into their very existence and political behavior, in an organic manner and with a pseudotheoretical wrapping, a total lack of respect for the rights of the majority, and consequently a lack of respect toward democracy.

Socialist parties and "movements," more than anyone else, know this truth. It is for this reason that they have rejected the Soviet precedent as a social and economic process and refuse to align their own "socialist goals" with it. In other words, they have rejected the regime which places the party-bureaucratic authority against the workers. The KKE is the implacable defender of this system in our country.

When, however, "socialist movements" and parties ask for the support of dogmatic communist parties in the exercise of their function as a government which is based—as they insist—on the strengthening of democracy and the rights of the majority, they do nothing more than undermine the sincerity of their own intentions and their devotion to democratic functions.

75
Because the KKE is not prepared to allow Pasok to "eat up" its voters and followers and even its own extremist slogans (NATO, the EEC, bases, class and trade union struggles and so forth); because it justly believes that the government needs it as an additional support for its authority, it is now counterattacking in order to expose the government and Papandreou as being unworthy of being followed in a "national" or "proletarian" spirit and, as a result, unworthy of any respect from the KKE.

If right from the moment of its formation the government behaved toward the KKE in exactly the same way that it was going to behave toward the followers of any other democratic party; if it had not recruited among KKE's followers persons to fill responsible positions in order to restore, if possible, through them the democratic functioning of the state and its organizations; if it had not rushed to take over leading trade union positions; if it had not allowed its "branch" organizations to order dismissals, transfers, and demotions of their colleagues and even supervisors solely on grounds of party affiliation; if it had showed more respect toward parliamentary processes for advancement of legislative bills—if it had observed all this and a few other things in its daily function, then the followers of the KKE would not even have thought of doing what they did at Argostolion, which they will again repeat on a larger scale. This is because the "functioning of democracy" in our country in accordance with the principles of Pasok and the KKE does not provide for respect of the democratic process. On the contrary, it destroys it.

Will the "government circles" at long last understand this principle in order to become wiser?
'RIZOSPASTIS' ON DIFFERENCE IN USSR AND U.S. SUPPORT

NC191416 Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 19 May 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Measure For Comparison"]

[Text] It has again been proved that there are no obligatory one-way streets in the country's international course.

Nothing compels either our people or the government to succumb to the pressures that are being exercised strongly from the other side of the Atlantic—in the name of difficulties in the international juncture.

Nothing compels either our people or the government to receive Haig actually offering him certificates of "understanding" and "good intentions" so that he can declare from the heart of Athens the blunt demand—without anything in return—that Greece should be a factor of "stability in NATO's southern wing."

Nothing compels either our people or the government to cancel prospects for beneficial cooperation with progressive Arab regimes for the sake of a "good atmosphere" in Greek-U.S. relations.

Nothing compels our people or the government to become a party to Spain's accession to NATO—that is, to a double crime against the Spanish people and European detente and peace.

Nothing compels our people and the government to make dangerous interventions, without pretexts in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus.

No. Regardless of how strong the pressures may be. Regardless of how difficult the international juncture may be—such a course is not at all mandatory—and even less, beneficial.

Currently there are possibilities to repeal pressures, to change our foreign policy's course. An independent, genuinely nonaligned and actively pacifist Greek policy could easily secure effective guarantees and lead our national problems out of the deadlock.

This truth has again been confirmed by the important Soviet note to Ankara. The Soviet Union gave notice that it will not remain indifferent to any retrogression of tension in the Aegean or Cyprus and thus once again it was proved that the country need not pay a heavy price on the altar of Atlanticism to
guarantee an uncertain peace. It need not succumb to Haig's extortions and merely receive his refusal to confirm even the pseudoguarantees of the Kissinger letter.

The people can compare: On the one hand Haig's extortionist provocative visit and on the other the clear, honest Soviet position which does not demand anything in return. One reasonably wonders whether in the wake of all this the government will persist on a course which both cancels the government's "strategic goals" and in many ways damages national interest.

CSO: 4621/345
BOTH RIGHT, LEFT SEEN SHARPENING ANTI-PASOK STAND

Athens EPIKaira in Greek 15 Apr 82 pp 14-15

[Text] The four-day-long debate of the budget by the Chamber of Deputies and its turbulent outcome is considered a watershed of the post-electoral course of our political affairs. The result of the evaluations is that both the "New Democracy" and the KKE consider as ended the period of tolerance or grace towards the PASOK government and are reorienting their policy by escalating a harder opposition.

Several factors contribute to this reorientation of tactics, some of which are common to both opposition parties and others stem from different considerations.

Dominant in the ND-KKE considerations, is the conviction that the government is undergoing an acute erosion and the official opposition party is rushing to take advantage of the situation while the extreme Left is severing its ties, envisaging the recruiting of a considerable portion of the dissatisfied PASOK followers for itself.

These views of the KKE were expressed with frankness during a recent plenary session resolution in which it is mentioned that "The KKE must develop its contacts with the popular masses, with their immediate claims and aspirations for change, must faithfully follow and express correctly their dissatisfaction created by the policy of the government..." etc.

Municipal Elections

A second common factor of the calculations of the parties of the opposition is connected to the forthcoming municipal elections. The "ND" has already attributed special political significance to the result of the elections in the local self-government. Knowing that the present electoral system encourages the alliance of PASOK with KKE—especially during the final elections for mayor—the "ND" is intensifying its struggle on the ideological level, giving it an anti-front character. At the same time, it is opposed to the early holding of elections, figuring that by October the erosion of the government will have increased to a point where the results will allow it to challenge officially for the first time the majority which PASOK obtained last October.

For its part the KKE has set as its principal pursuit "the election of as many communist and other democratic mayors and councilmen" so that the municipal election "will constitute a significant turning point in the life of the country, in the direction of the anti-imperialist, democratic course towards change in the country."
Dissension KKE-PASOK

For the analysts of communist dialectics these expressions mean total dissension between PASOK and the KKE within the framework of the plan of "democratic cooperation," even more so when the government party is accused by the extreme Left of an "anti-unity, domineering policy."

A third common evaluation which leads to a hardening of the Nd's and the KKE's position vis-à-vis the government is the extensive partisan politicization undertaken by PASOK in the administration and its efforts, as a single party to capture the labor movement.

Thus, to the previous KKE denunciations about the appointment of "single-party administrations" in the trade union sector, another has now been added. "Despite the declarations about leadership based on merit and the use in the governmental machinery of militants devoted to change, in effect the discrimination against communists still exist" is stated in a recent resolution in the plenary session of KKE.

To these basic evaluations of the two opposition parties there should be added certain particular factors which dictate the termination of the period of tolerance of the government.

Grassroot Pressures

More specifically, the "ND" is subjected to intense pressure at its popular grassroots level for a more militant confrontation with PASOK's policy, especially in the domestic sector. It is mainly the economic measures of the government and, theoretically, their fiscal structure, (in favor of the poorer classes) that shape these popular pressures which indicate—as an "ND" spokesman recently observed—that even those who voted for PASOK as "underprivileged" are now becoming aware that they are persecuted as "privileged."

This pressure becomes more intense when exerted by thousands of white and blue collar workers who are confronted in their places of employment as partisan opponents of the government or as "underminers of change."

It is said that PASOK contributed to the sudden hardening of the position of the "ND" because it did not follow the customary rules of political truce. In essence, as the "ND" points out, the government party attempted to focus the popular disappointment at the worsening of the economic situation on the "scorched earth" policy and the "chaos which it inherited," while, at the same time it incited, instead of blunting, partisan intolerance thus reinforcing the suspicions that it is looking forward to laying the foundations of a one-party system.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the harder opposition contributes to the strengthening of the party's leadership by blunting the anti-unity tendencies that still exist.

Ferment in the Extreme Left

Correspondingly, the most important on-the-spot evaluation by the KKE leadership for the reformulation of its strategy involves the danger of leakage in its ideological
and political water-tight compartments which separate its followers from the territory of PASOK. Actually, the leaders of the extreme Left have ascertained that the tolerant stand towards PASOK encouraged reformist tendencies within the KKE and, chiefly, it contributed to some revitalization of the KKE-Interior. To date, these events constituted an ambiguous element within the inner circles of the leadership with diverging views as regards the anticipated gains and the possible damages. But, from what appears from the last resolution of the plenary session and the performance of the KKE in the budget debate, it was the hardline wing that prevailed in the end.

Warnings

Under these circumstances, the counterbalancing pressures operating against PASOK are being escalated by the Right and the Left.

The warnings directed by Mr. Averoff in the Chamber of Deputies are past due and ultimatum-like:

He demanded the immediate abandonment of the "cloudy-socio-marxist" policy of the government and reminded the Chamber of Deputies that the country "with our socio-political systems began from zero and reached Western European levels," and he added "If you do not conduct yourselves with more responsibility and useful effectiveness we will oppose you objectively, but inflexibly, and you, leaving behind you a truly scorched earth, will soon lose power."

A few days earlier the KKE had denounced that until now the policy of PASOK "is characterized by distortions and contradictions and, despite certain measures of a generally democratic nature, does not promote change..." "Thus, the government policy, if it does not substantially change its orientation, will confine itself, in the end, simply to certain updatings and improvements within the framework of state monopolistic capitalism and foreign dependence."

These statements were accompanied by the warning that the "KKE will decidedly contribute to the development and correct orientation of a wide popular mass movement which will demand from the government that it promote measures to direct the change and, at the same time will thwart the efforts of the reaction to turn back the clock."

It is evident that these positions and the change of strategy of the two parties towards PASOK restrict to the minimum the ease of maneuvering and the balancing policy of Mr. Papandreou. It is common belief that sooner or later the present premier will be forced to a political and ideological definition of his party's identity—to choose in other words—either the "single front"struggle against the Right, retreating to his former leftist ramparts or to move towards the Center converting his struggle to a two-front one.

9731
CSO: 4621/320
PASOK 'HEGEMONISM,' ANTI-UNITY SPIRIT CHARGED

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 18 Apr 82 p 6

[Text] One very important question which is occupying the minds of the working class is not only how much, but rather if, the PASOK government can lead to real change. According to our party's opinion, the so-called "third road" which PASOK has followed is characterized by distortions and contradictions. It cannot lead to real change regardless of the good or bad intentions of the members and followers of PASOK. The policy of the "feasible" as its called by PASOK is the consequence of the strength gained by the ranks of the technocrat-reformist and city liberal tendencies (opinion of the recent plenary session of the Central Committee of the KKE).

One of the most significant reasons that the "third road" of PASOK and the policy of the "feasible" of its government do not lead to real change is the fact that they constitute a coalition of a divisive policy and hegemonist position vis-à-vis the communists.

The hostility towards the policy of unity with the forces of the Left completely bypasses the decision of the ninth session of the Central Committee of PASOK. The manner in which is written often gives the reader the impression that the PASOK leadership believes that the main problems of change—who and by whom—have already been solved. There is no other way to explain a peculiar self-complacency which pervades this text. However, everybody knows that the main concerns of the change at the socio-economic level, in the area of governmental authority have not yet been faced. To be sure, not only has the course of the "third road" towards socialism not yet been confirmed, but in many areas this has been demonstrated as having been very vague and unable to counteract the power of the monopolies to free the country from dependence and not retreat before the chairmanship of "private enterprise..."

Unity of Action or Similarity of Points of View

The PASOK rejects the unity of the various progressive forces in the name of non-identification of their beliefs with its own. It is only natural for political, ideological, tactical and strategic differences to exists between PASOK and KKE. Had there been complete similarity, they would have merged into a common organization; there would not even be a problem of unity.

The lack of uniformity of points of view does not mean that the development of a coinciding planning of policy and action should not be sought. When it seeks unity,
our party does not seek it with the precondition that the other forces conform, in the entirety of their programs to its overall perception of socialism. It pursues unity on a minimal program of anti-monopoly, anti-imperialist-democratic objectives which will open the door to change. Whether or not the leadership of PASOK agrees with our concrete proposals, does not, initially, constitute a negative step for the popular movement. The problem lies in the fact that its policy is so much against unity that it does not even feel the need to give a reason for its actual refusal for the unification with other political forces or to talk about the principles, the contents, the presuppositions and even the methods which it con necessary to begin discussing this unity.

The explanation of this anti-unity policy given by the leadership of PASOK does not involve the substance of the political duties of the moment nor the contents of the change. The explanation is full of abstract generalities.

Our insistence on the value and meaning of the political unity of the socialists-communists does not mean that we believe there "exist prefabricated remedies with dogmas" (paragraph four of the resolution of the Central Committee of PASOK), as is attributed to us by PASOK leadership. We believe though that each illness requires its own remedy. One cannot attempt to cure the cancer of dependence and reaction with an anti-unity aspirin capable of curing only a headache, but not a cancer.

The change will be the work of the majority of the people. If one agrees with this—and one must agree—that unity is not the "result of the totalling of vote quotas" in other words, of a united front of the communists with the socialists, then the position of the PASOK cannot be understood. That such a unity "which results from a total of perhaps more than 50 percent negates, preempts and annuls the possibility of any initiative for unification" (paragraph 18). The logic of the above position is, to say the least, strange. The leadership of PASOK refuses the unity of the majority of the people because something like that would interfere with its future "initiatives for unity."

Behind this contradictory point one finds the logic of hegemonism of PASOK, which is contained in the slogan of "national-popular unity"(ELE). According to this, the unity of the people is postponed until the Left is "cut off" from its popular base so that this base will join the banner and program of PASOK. There is in this logic some sort of extortion: either you submit and find yourselves "united" under PASOK, or there will be no unity and ... it will be your fault.

PASOK, according to its Central Committee's resolution, still pursues the objective of "implementing its program" under its own power, without "concessions and contaminations, without untimely leaps," and stands fast in the "conscious rejection of whatever cooperation might be offered by a political front, in order not to alter the nature of its objective and the rhythm of the change." (paragraph 19)

"The PASOK is not against unity," a great number of its followers stated before the election. "It only wishes to win over as many right-of-centrists as possible." It is a pre-election maneuver," they said. "You will see how much it will work towards unity after the elections." With this dream, they calmly voted for PASOK. Unfortunately it has been demonstrated that we communists were right. Once more the "maneuvers" of PASOK reveal a steady line of retreat before anti-communist alarmism
and the "anti-popular frontism" of the reaction. The "concessions and contaminations" of its program did not come, nor could they come, as a result of a move towards unity because such unity did not materialize. Neither can the rejection of unity be justified by the different "stages" because, according to PASOK they are, allegedly, "those in a hurry." (paragraph 12). The problem of change is only, and mainly, a problem of "speed," as PASOK wants to make it appear. First of all, it is a matter of direction. The right direction will make the setting of the rhythm easier as well as the discussion of the means of realizing the objectives for a real change. Our difference with PASOK lies in the direction, based on the fact that the policy which it follows is a policy of reforms and updating. The KKE, and of this every worker can be sure, is neither "in a hurry" nor wishes the government to speed up the rhythm of such a policy.

In addition, the accusation is leveled against us by the Central Committee of PASOK that we reject its practice "with suspicion, with rejection and with ostracism in the name of an abstract, metaphysical purity." (paragraph 16). The question of unity is neither abstract nor metaphysical. It is a concrete, practical necessity to confront the principal enemy of change. If there is, somewhere, suspicion and a tendency towards "metaphysical purity" it is to be found in those who refuse unity, thus, contaminating the program themselves in real practice and not metaphysically in the everyday exercise of governmental power.

"Equi-Distance" or Incredible Double Front

PASOK refuses to form a common front with the communists.

It demands that all leftests abandon their political views and follow it. PASOK itself says that the policy it follows does not mean that the "ND" and the Right are not still the only target of PASOK's criticism and confrontation. "To be sure, PASOK is not about to leave unchecked, without criticism and unanswered...those who fractiously and capriciously, think, dream up pressures, pivotal negotiations and alliances." (paragraph 21). This position is also the most characteristic of domineering mentality which permeates certain PASOK circles. In the end, under the pretext that the KKE has its own points of view, PASOK tends to take an equi-distant position between ND and KKE.

However, if one wishes to struggle successfully against the Right, he should remain firmly attached to two truths. First, the struggle against the Right would be made easier by the degree of unity on a correct policy of the anti-Right forces. Beyond, whatever purposes PASOK may have, the fact of the matter is that the anti-unity way in which it wishes to struggle against the Right is neither the most appropriate nor the most effective.

Second, that the Right is not composed only of the "New Democracy" party. As Right we simply define, in our country, the dominant socio-economic forces of the reaction, the monopolies, the whole system of dependence on the political forces of which they are the expression and which are broader than the extreme Right and the "ND." The concessions to the monopolies, the retreats before the American-NATO imperialists, certain discriminations against communists in the governmental machinery, do not constitute anti-Right policy, despite all the parliamentary confrontations there may be with "ND." It is natural that they provoke our critical observations. This criticism is not based on narrow perception of criticism for the sake of criticism
nor on "struggles for the sake of struggles." (paragraph 270. On the contrary, it has as a criterion the needs of change. It constitutes an answer to the faulty practice of PASOK or to the effort being made in certain sectors of the population to isolate the communists.

PASOK is trying to reverse reality, the cause with the effect. Its hegemonic, anti-unity spirit, which it often shows, appears to be the result of our criticisms, because in the end, when this reversal takes place, it will present it as being forced upon it, making the change of its anti-Right policy one of equal distance between the forces of reaction and the KKE and giving the appearance to be against its wishes.

PASOK's anti-unity policy, or its leaning toward an equal distance, became crystal clear in the listing of the "precious conclusions" which, according to the Central Committee of PASOK, "have everlasting validity and duration." (!) These conclusions, are supposed to be the nucleus of PASOK's policy of unity.

The duty of PASOK to set free and reform even more politically the "popular base of the Right and that of the traditional Left as well" is quoted as being a "basic conclusion." (paragraph 11).

PASOK, its Central Committee continues, without "underestimating" the democratic forces which exist and the "margins of common action with them in the area of the masses" (when the "exclusive judge," the people wish it...), "is directed at the overwhelming majority of Greeks and invites them to overcome partisan dependences, and sentimental ties." (paragraph 20).

The policy of equal distance, the call for reforming and breaking free from all political sectors means that, for PASOK, the unity of the anti-Right forces, can neither nor must be based on a common action, by the united front for change, of the communists with PASOK's followers, but on the dispersion of the former and their submission (euphemistically "reforming of ranks") to the latter...

Our party's desire for unity stems from a responsible stand for the needs of the country. We, of course do not want unity for the sake of unity. Nor with unity do we mean submission by others to our points of view as other forces perceive it when they speak of unity. We mean the cooperation of all those forces which advocate change, based on equal values, of the real correlation of forces over a minimal program of common action. A unity of action in order to pull the country away from the rationale that, in view of the fact that it is necessary to do everything here and now and, because this is not "feasible," then the whole matter can be confined to an updating of the system. The unity of the progressive forces can make the matter of real change feasible.

9731
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REATION TO KEFALLINIA INCIDENT—The Athens news agency reported that as a result of an incident created yesterday at Kefallinia by a group of KKE followers during a speech by Prime Minister Papandreou, deputy minister to the prime minister in charge of press affairs, Maroudas, stated that these acts were a clear attempt to prevent the prime minister's speech. This, he added, is unprecedented. Maroudas has said the people gave Pasok the majority so that it can implement its own program and no other program. The agency reported that in answering a question, Maroudas stressed the efforts of the KKE and of AKEL to protect, as he put it, the president of the Republic of Cyprus who, he added, has asked for no such protection. [Text] [NC222000 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1630 GMT 22 May 82]

MAROUĐAS STATEMENT REBUTTAL—In answer to the statement made by Deputy Minister Maroudas, the KKE spokesman has said that it was not a Pasok party gathering but rather a people's gathering which was held in Kefallinia with the presence of the country's prime minister. Instead of resorting to fabrications about guardianship by the KKE and so forth, the government spokesman ought to denounce the acts of hooliganism and not cover them up, which consequently encourages them. [Text] [NC221954 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 1830 GMT 22 May 82]

ULUSU VISIT—The provocative visit of the prime minister of Ankara's junta, Ulusu, to occupied northern Cyprus certainly constitutes a premeditated act aiming at the imposition of a NATO "solution" to the Cyprus problem. From this viewpoint, it is most revealing that Ulusu is making the visit-provocation immediately after Haig's visit to Ankara and his brazen statement that the Cyprus problem is entirely similar to the Falkland problem! It thus becomes obvious that the American imperialists and NATO are behind the act of Evren's junta. At the same time, Haig's hypocrisy has been uncovered because the other day he appeared in Athens as the supporter of an "equitable" solution of the Cyprus problem with the result that delusions were created in the government concerning an "understanding" of its positions on national issues, including the Cyprus problem. The American imperialists and NATO, who are the instigators of the Turkish invasion, remain the same deadly enemies of the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. Their irrevocable goal is the abolition of the Cyprus Republic and its transformation into an advanced base for the United States and NATO, for the implementation of their adventurist plans in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. It is at least a delusion for the Greek Government to believe in the "good intentions" of the United States and the EEC in pursuing an equitable solution to the Cyprus problem. Ulusu's most brazen provocation would not have taken place if there had not been undisguised encouragement and urging by the masters in Washington. [From the "Radical" column: "Visit-Provocation"] [Text] [NC211631 Athens RTZOSPASTIS in Greek 21 May 82 p 2]
PSDI REACTION TO BERLINGUER'S REMARKS ON 'SOCIAL DEMOCRACY'

Rome L'UMANITA in Italian 16 Apr 82 p 3

[Article by Giuseppe Russo: "Replacing Capitalism by Gradualism and Reformism"]

[Text] Now that the PCI is beginning to define the course it is taking, we would be unwise to reject a priori the confrontation it is soliciting daily with the other parties of the Italian Left, even though most of us are convinced that nothing would come of it. The latest stakes marking the direction of the PCI's new plan were planted by party secretary Enrico Berlinguer himself in a long interview published in UNITA on 21 February.

We cannot ignore his statements if only because they involve us directly in the final--and most interesting--part of the dialogue, entitled "Capitalism and the Social Democracies;" it could just as well have been called "Communism and the Social Democracies." Sidestepping any attempt at an exegesis, the authoritative interviewee announced that he has arrived at the very heart of the problem: "The essential thing is something else. Partly because the old colonialism no longer exists, the capitalist nations no longer claim those economic margins upon which the powerful social democratic parties founded their programs and fortunes."

The loss of these margins is already obliging--and will continue to do so more and more--the social democratic forces to search for solutions and new approaches departing from the traditional one, to face the question of superseding capitalism. In other words, the prolonged crisis and decline of the welfare state, result of a slowdown and a prolonged stagnation in the Western European economies, will inevitably compel the social democrats to reinsert in their programs a design to establish a system different from capitalism, leaning heavily on the new way of Italian communism.

The European social democratic parties which, in the past, pointed on the need to supplant capitalism but then abandoned this objective to make amendments in the prevailing system--which proved possible in terms of Keynes' theories on
the introduction and growth of social services and expenditures—now see themselves obliged to revert to their old point of departure, says Berlinguer. But had I been his interviewer, at this point I would have interrupted the conversation to bring up such considerations as these:

1. You attribute the loss of those margins that made the welfare state possible to the end of colonialism. Then how do you explain this causal connection in the case of the Scandinavian countries, which had no empires or colonies? Wouldn’t it be more exact to say that the decline in the development rate in both the industrialized western nations (but not Japan) and the collectivist nations of Eastern Europe can be imputable to the effect of the recurrent petroleum crises in the 1970’s on decreasing capital yields, which manifested itself much earlier in the capitalist countries and described, in the systems of forced collectivization, a leap from adolescence over the full maturity of adulthood to senescence?

We can also think of other factors common to the East and West, such as the end of a long postwar reconstruction period and modified scales of subjective priority values, with the decline of labor, for various reasons, in the economy of human life. Some symptoms, like the lack of manpower in the communist countries—the shortage in Czechoslovakia, for example, and the spread of narcotics in the Soviet Union—suggest these hypotheses.

If confirmed, these factors would refute the social democratic parties’ claim that a simple change in the economic system would be sufficient to allow for a spontaneous recovery of financial margins, which would renew the development of the welfare state.

2. What are the limitations reducing—and which will continue to reduce—the economic margins which the capitalist states can allot to the welfare economy? Certainly it is difficult to give a precise answer to this question, which depends upon a combination of elements: the future average rates of development according to various hypothetical estimates of demographic dynamics and a negligible progress, if not regression, in some states. We need only note that if the demographic and economic dynamics move in the same direction or if both decelerate, the latter will attenuate the negative aspects of the former.

If the traditional component of social expenditures is an example, then an aging population will surely require higher pension and health costs, but at least a part of the additional outlay can be recouped, given the end of the burgeoning youth population and almost full employment predicted for the end of the 1980s, by different kinds of part-time jobs for the elderly, by rational economies in the management of services, by voluntary interventions in some types of services in the welfare state the socialists are projecting, and by an increase in taxes to be paid by high-income earners.
But despite everything, we can formulate a scenario not altogether pessimistic in the Western capitalist systems more or less adjusted to preserve the social security benefits thus far won. The big problem, however, is whether workers will be content with the gains they now enjoy over a long period of time without demanding further benefits. Apart from these quantitative considerations, there are also new qualitative factors, such as the employment of leisure time, professional training advantages, the wintering of the elderly, and control over psychological equilibrium.

Future conflicts might arise over aspirations to improve existing services and the introduction of new ones with the financial resources available in a national economy. This could renew the discussion on the relationship between the well-to-do and the workers. All the same, it is not impossible to foresee new balances in the capitalist systems, but it will be necessary to demand that they be put into operation.

3. The third question, closely linked to the second, is this: is there any possibility that capitalism can evolve by itself? This question revolves on the definition of capitalism, which could be rewritten to mean that it depends upon the proprietors of production means to ascertain whether, how much, what and how to produce and continue to produce.

History shows that so many changes, both spontaneous and induced, have marked the passage from paleocapitalism to neocapitalism that they hardly seem to be the same system. This is true not only of the growth in the public sectors (steel, petrochemicals, etc.) parallel to private enterprise and equivalent, if not superior, to it, but also of transformations in the societal forms of industry, reviewed by Galbraith, who sees the power of the giant corporations largely transferred to the technostructures (management, etc.), which often follow policies of company expansion not adopted to meet the shareholders' primary concern, which is to reap maximum profits.

Qualitatively, this change is no less radical than entrusting production and organizational policy to workers in a cooperative system, or to a system of traditional capitalists and worker-capitalists through a shareholding, institutional, general and progressive participation.

These latter two innovations would seem feasible without overturning structures in a traumatic upheaval, yet preserving the freedoms inherent in a democratic state. On the other hand, no one, including Berlinguer, knows of any organizational system that does not stem from capitalism and that would guarantee civil, political and economic freedom and still function efficiently, just as the PCI secretary recommended in his interview. Thus, it is hard to see why we social democrats should abandon our policy of transforming the capitalist system through reformism and gradualism to replace it with another system based on the third way, which is still vague and lacking in political guarantees.
If, however, capitalism should fail to evolve internally but leave freedom and parliamentary democracy intact, our reformism would be valid as a progressive civil and social design to apply to new structures and balances.

4. On the premise of his positive declaration that socialism is not a model system, Berlinguer proposes his third way, and tells us—enigmatically—that:

a) change in the relationship between property and production is an essential condition, but not in itself sufficient. Hence we can only suspect that what he left unsaid refers to the Marxist concept of the relationship between economics and politics;

b) in any event, such a change must come to pass, not in terms of petitions of principle but (and we should think about this from time to time) on the basis of "their demonstrated incompatibility with satisfactory social and collective interests."

5. If a political content—beyond cultural—must be given to his assertion that "class and anticapitalist consciousness, so strong among Italian workers, must not be dispersed, undervalued, neglected or mortified," then how is it possible to unite the other non-working classes if not by subordinating and instrumentalizing them?

In this last declaration, reviving the political concept of class, Berlinguer persists in upholding one of the major obstacles that separate social democracy from communism.
STUDY CLAIMS TO SHOW THAT STORTING HAS MORE POWERFUL ROLE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Apr 82 p 3

[Article by Arild Isegg]

[Text] Storting's power position has been weakened. The assertion is not new in our parliamentary history, but one might think it had even more validity today in our expert-ridden, complicated society in which many others in addition to the authorities designated in the constitution have a hand in the political decision-making process. The claim has been studied by two prominent sociologists. They have found no evidence to support it. On the contrary, it is their conclusion that in the last half of the 1970's, Storting has become more, rather than less, important as an institution. And moreover they expect this trend to continue.

Professor Johan P. Olsen and university instructor Per Laegreid of Bergen University are the ones who made a scientific analysis of the claim that Storting has become weaker. It was their contribution to a recent international conference in Madrid on the role of parliamentarians in modern democracies. They called their study, "Storting--Last Bastion of the Political Amateur."

The title goes to the heart of one of the indictments against Storting. People who feel the national assembly no longer has the power it should have say that one of the reasons is the recruiting method--those elected are not the most competent people.

When the authors refer to Storting as a kind of playground for amateurs, they mean it in the best sense, however. They review the historical heritage. The introduction of parliamentarianism in Norway toward the end of the last century was part of a democratizing process and a struggle for national self-determination. The idea of rule by laymen as opposed to domination by officials was strong. Therefore the ideal Storting representative was seen as being a political amateur who had another occupation and devoted himself to
politics during the brief period Storting was in session for a meager stipend, thus bringing healthy common sense into the political decision-making process. At the same time a power struggle occurred among the branches of government. "All power in this hall," was the slogan.

These traditions have lived on into our own period. The current complaints about the incompetency on Lovbekken are echoing Fridtjof Nansen's scathing reference to Storting in 1911 as an institution of laymen and dilettantes in an era calling for expertise and strong leadership—something only a strong government could offer.

Much has changed in Norwegian society during this century, but the Storting recruiting method has not changed much. It is still not an elite group, either socially or economically, that finds its way to our national assembly. More than half the representatives since 1945 came from working-class, farm or fishing backgrounds. As far as their own occupational backgrounds are concerned, the number of farmers and fishermen has been cut in half since 1945 while teachers have become the leading group numerically. Business leaders have declined in number and university people have relatively weak representation.

Storting has retained its character as a place for the political amateur, the authors state. Its aversion to equipping itself with a staff of professional people further emphasizes the layman tradition.

The concept of political amateur in reference to today's members of parliament is really misleading. As the authors themselves point out, most of the representatives do not have a strong occupational or educational background. But almost all of them have extensive training in party and organizational work and experience as elected representatives at the municipal and county level. They may well be said to enjoy amateur status compared to many professional fields, but as politicians they are professionals.

Olsen and Laegreid found no support for the view that Storting's importance is declining because the qualifications of representatives have declined. Nor did they find any basis for the flat charge that representatives manage their time poorly—in the sense that they spend too much time on trifles and too little on the big important issues. Such an allegation is based on debatable assumptions concerning the proper tasks of Storting.

All in all, their conclusion is that Storting is an important institution, but only one in a network of institutions competing and cooperating with each other. Ideas about an "all-powerful" Storting belong to the past—today such concentration of power is not possible. The general observation of Olsen and Laegreid is that things have not gone steadily downhill for Storting after its period of greatness at the end of the last century, but that things have gone slightly up or down under varying conditions. And Storting's position was actually strengthened in the last half of the 1970's. But, mind you, not as a result of its own efforts. Storting has not recruited a new and better-qualified type of politician nor have there been big changes in its agenda or
internal organization. The explanation lies in external circumstances and these same factors will cause Storting's position to become even stronger in the years ahead, according to Olsen and Laegreid. They mention three causes in particular.

A stagnating economy will reduce the push for reform and with it, the number of moves—bills and reports—from the government, giving Storting more elbow-room for what it does best—finding political compromises.

Changes in the population make it likely that more people with a higher level of education and professional expertise will end up in Storting, which could speed up "modernization"—in other words, more people employed, better working conditions and higher wages.

Less political stability as a result of weakened class solidarity and party loyalty among the postwar generations will prevent any party from gaining a single-handed majority in the near future. One-party majority governments usually mean strong governments while minority or coalition governments mean increased power for Storting.

6578
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POLITICAL

POLL CONFIRMS CONTINUED DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR CONSERVATIVES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Apr 82 p 3

[Article by Egil Sundar]

[Text] With reference to the future balance of forces between the socialist and nonsocialist parties, it is imperative that the Conservative, Center and Christian People's parties unite on the major tasks. That is Conservative chairman Jo Benkow's comment on the latest opinion poll from Norwegian Market Data which confirms a declining tendency not only for the Conservatives but for all the nonsocialist cooperating parties as a whole. According to Norwegian Market Data's poll for March-April, the Conservatives declined 1 percent to 28.2 while the Labor Party could register a support level of 39.7 percent compared to 38.6 in the previous poll. Together, AP [Labor Party] and SV [Socialist Left Party] outdid the three cooperating parties: 44.9 percent compared to 43.2.

The latest opinion poll should give rise to particular concern for the Christian People's Party. The party now has a support level of 8.2 percent—the lowest level since the 1967 municipal election (when the party had 7.1 percent). In the election last fall, which was the party's weakest Storting election since 1965, the Christian People's Party got 9.3 percent of the votes. It can safely be said that neither KRF [Christian People's Party] nor the Center Party has gained anything from remaining outside the government.

Although the last two opinion polls gave contradictory trends—a gain of 1 percent for the Conservatives, according to the Norwegian Opinion Institute (29.3-30.3) and a corresponding decline in Norwegian Market Data's poll (29.2-28.2), Conservative chairman and parliamentary leader Jo Benkow said there is no reason to explain away "a weak declining trend for the party." Incidentally, it is a mutual characteristic of new governments all over West Europe that opinion polls show a declining tendency. In that perspective, the Willoch government can rejoice in a relatively high degree of stability compared to the socialist Mitterrand government in France, for example, not
to mention the West German Social Democrats under Helmut Schmidt's leadership. This shows that the governments in power at any given time are assigned an objective responsibility and reflect the new and very large problems characterizing the beginning of the 1980's.

"Of course we are not primarily interested in getting good figures in the opinion polls," Benkow maintained. "We feel it is more important to do what is politically necessary in our opinion, even though this can produce temporary problems. The substantial decline in the Norwegian economy and in production which is a result of faulty assessments in the 1970's is now hitting with full force. One must simply bear in mind that the consequences of this, as we have pointed out time after time, cannot be corrected the minute there is a change in course. Our job is to continue to hold a steady course and to implement a long-range policy. And we must set in all our forces to make a correct policy better known. We are faced here with a big information and communication task. The party is prepared to carry out this task."

The Conservative chairman reminded us that the Conservatives have never allowed their positions to be swayed by shifts in opinion polls. This was true both when the party was down around 16 percent and when it could note a support level of close to 35 percent. But in the current situation, it is important to realize that the Conservatives are at a different and considerably higher normal level than they were just a few years ago.

Labor Party chairman and parliamentary leader Gro Harlem Brundtland told AFTENPOSTEN: "From our viewpoint, the latest opinion poll shows a good tendency. The three solid polls show the same development that started for the Labor Party during the election campaign. This was clearly shown in the re-election in Buskerud and Troms. The voters remember the main themes and promises of the Labor and Conservative parties from the campaign. Many believed in the Conservative promises that we could get more for less."

Poll Results

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95
Norwegian Market Data's political barometer for March-April is based on interviews conducted in the period from 22 March to 20 April. Interviews were conducted with 1360 people over the age of 18 and 1174 indicated a party preference. The barometer was set up by weighing each party against the 1981 Storting election. The estimated statistical margin of error can range to as much as 3 percentage points for voter percentages of close to 50 percent, while it is around 2 percentage points for voter percentages of 10-20 percent and around 1 percentage point for lower voter percentages.

6578
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NORDLI: NONSOCIALISTS TRYING TO AVOID DECIDING POLICY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Apr 82 p 3

[Interview with former Prime Minister Odvar Nordli by Eivind G. Karløsen; date and place not given; words enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] "The middle parties should realize quickly how hopeless it is to 'bet on two horses'--both supporting and opposing the Conservative government. The Christian People's Party, the Center Party and the Conservative Party could contribute to useful political clarification by entering into a binding government cooperation and there is no other realistic government alternative in this period." These remarks were made by Odvar Nordli (Labor), former prime minister and now Storting vice president, in a talk with AFTENPOSTEN in which he also accuses the Willoch government of pursuing tactical considerations on a number of important issues.

Nordli, as we all know, resigned last February as prime minister, citing poor health as the reason. Now he has fully recovered, in a manner of speaking, and is thriving as vice president of Storting--and tomorrow he will deliver the May Day speech in Hamar and in Vang, "on the home turf" for the first time in 20 years in that particular capacity. But when this Storting period is over, he will really go back to serve as district commissioner.

[Question] Was it "just" reasons of health that led you to step down after more than 5 years as head of the government?

[Answer] That was the most important reason--and fortunately it was only temporary.

I made a total evaluation and the most essential element was that I felt it was /politically/ irresponsible to continue in a very decisive Storting election campaign--well aware that I did not have the strength to do the job.
[Question] It has been said that the Labor Press Office, which made the news public, really messed things up.

[Answer] The Labor Press Office intervened and interrupted the process. It became more hurried than was necessary and I was unable to carry out the prime minister and government shift as I had planned, in the way I still think this should have been done in Norway.

[Question] But then the Storting election ended up with a nonsocialist majority and the Labor Party in the opposition anyway.

[Answer] It is my own opinion that the election provided a basis for a political change. But the election did not clearly indicate the /content/ of the policy a new government should pursue. Nor does the situation in the new Storting indicate that the Conservative program—and that alone—should serve as the basis for government policy.

As far as I can see, the middle-spectrum parties have chosen the hopeless starting point for their work of being in opposition to and /simultaneously/ acting as support parties for the Willoch government. But if one views the government's desire to carry out the Conservative program in conjunction with the betting by the middle parties on two horses at once, one gets a picture of an unclear and in the long run untenable situation. Here it would be useful to provide clarification—and in my opinion this can happen only if the Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party take the consequences of what was "in the cards" before the election and work /together/ in a /binding/ government cooperation. There is no other government alternative either now or later in this 4-year period.

[Question] You evidently think the Labor Party should prepare itself to be in the opposition for the time being. What are your main views of the role of the party in that case?

[Answer] The starting point for the Labor Party, of course, is our programs and the former government's long-range program. Our duty to the voters is to stress what we said before to the extent this is possible.

But in my opinion this also means that the proposals we submit must have the kind of form and content that would make it possible to carry them out /the very next day/ if this became relevant.

We must also be willing with regard to individual issues of practical political value to us to negotiate our way to a solution that has a chance of gaining passage. I think it is preferable to get such proposals passed even if they do not totally fulfill our program rather than back resolutions that deviate even more from it.

[Question] You were also an active participant during the Labor Party's opposition period under the Borten government. Can you make comparisons?
[Answer] The conditions are really too different for that. The most outstanding feature is the division of power—the government then was made up of parties "in the same weight class." Now the situation is quite different due to the pronounced Conservative gain and the equally pronounced decline of the middle parties. This has also led to a much clearer polarization between the Labor Party and the Conservatives. In addition, the situation of the /nation/ in the golden 1960's and early 1970's was quite different from conditions today.

But on that basis, I would say that Norway faces much bigger tasks now than it did then, both nationally and internationally. The key factor for the former is our oil resources and the opportunities and obligations they provide.

In foreign policy, we see a move toward Europe and Europeanism which actually was one of the main issues in my own involvement in support of Norwegian EC membership—but now it is all too often and much too simply made into a question of relations between Europe and the United States.

[Question] What about security policy?

[Answer] In my opinion, we have an /even greater/ responsibility today than we did then to safeguard our security and sovereignty within NATO—and at the same time make a /realistic/ contribution to arms reduction, to a halt in the development of weapons of mass destruction.

The debate on nuclear weapons is important, we must have it. But I am concerned about one aspect of it, namely that people seem to forget that the /conventional/ weapons today are many times more dangerous than those used in World War II, as well as the substantial threat now represented by chemical weapons. Therefore there is an increasingly precarious need to find a political basis for /general/ detente and arms reduction. But of course this requires a greater degree of trust between the superpowers.

[Question] To return to domestic policy, what do you think of Kare Willoch as prime minister?

[Answer] Let us not talk about personalities.

But my honest and candid opinion is that the Willoch government will not survive long if it continues on the tactical course it has mapped out in dealing with vital political questions.

[Question] What do you mean by that?

[Answer] I am thinking of some quite concrete issues where the government is obviously making tactical moves. A few examples: The government issues a note on changes in the concession law—and creates a confused impression /outside/ Storting, since there is clearly not a majority supporting the Conservative stand /inside/ Storting. The same thing is evident in the review
of the government's first half year which gives the impression that the ques-
tion of the establishment law for doctors has been solved although not one
word has been said in the documents sent to Storting about when the law
should be repealed. And the same tactical move is evident when they give the
impression that it will be possible to implement /substantial/ reductions in
public spending that will lead to /real/ tax relief, when they /know/ that
the hard realities in the parliamentary situation will not allow such a
policy.

[Question] Will you really settle down as district commissioner in Hedmark
in 1985?

[Answer] I have said this is my last period in Storting in which I have al-
ready served for more than 20 years.

But I cannot cast off my political convictions and my involvement like a
"dirty shirt." Therefore, I hope no one expects this to vanish from one day
to the next. On the other hand, I know quite well where the line between
official duties and politics lies, added Odvar Nordli.

6578
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CHRISTIAN PARTY LEADER AIRS PROBLEMS OF NONSOCIALISTS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 4 May 82 p 2

[Article by Christian People's Party chairman Kare Kristiansen]

[Text] A number of politicians and writers have recently examined in detail the nonsocialist cooperation and the real and supposed problems it is confronting now. Some have based their remarks on the fact that the parties have voted somewhat differently on certain issues in Storting, while others have started with Gallup polls showing declining support for the parties.

For my own part, I will not make any attempt to tone down the seriousness of the observations made on these two matters. On several occasions and in several speeches I have pointed out that a situation in which only one of the cooperating parties is in a government based on all three parties in Storting will necessarily lead to problems for the cooperation. The fact that the three parties view a number of practical political issues differently is not the most important factor. The problems are especially difficult when a clarification must occur among the parties in Storting--quite often on center stage. It is immediately clear that this gives the opposition to the left and to the right of the cooperating parties maximum opportunities to make use of the situation.

In this context, several people have pointed out the unfortunate aspect of the government pushing bills in Storting which it knows in advance are not covered in the joint program of the three parties--and which therefore will be voted down in recorded votes in Storting, with the government party ending up on one side and the two support parties on the other. Personally I understand that when we have a pure Conservative government, it is hard to reproach it for promoting viewpoints and proposals from its own program. But since the same government campaigned on a joint program with the Christian People's Party and the Center Party and since the government is totally dependent on these parties' support in Storting, it would be natural to be very cautious about making moves that in the long run will only benefit the socialist parties and possibly the Progressive Party.

Now the three parties have a consultation arrangement which gives the two support parties some influence at a somewhat earlier date than the Storting debate. But in relation to the vast complex of matters the government deals
with, it is clear that such a consultation arrangement in its present form addresses only a very small number of issues, limiting its value. However, it is possible this system could be expanded somewhat, thus producing a higher level of coordination before issues are presented to Storting and the public.

Even so, it is obvious that there will continue to be matters on which the three parties disagree when they come up for debate in Storting. That is something we have to live with and I think one should be quite careful not to allow any kind of panic mood to arise on that account. It would be much worse for the cooperation if any of the members tried to impose their views on the others on matters where there is factual disagreement. It is more important to manage to keep an objective, serious and trusting attitude toward each other even when dealing with such controversial issues. The efforts we have seen in some quarters to cast doubt on motives, to downgrade the stand of cooperating partners, are a greater threat to the cooperation and the climate of cooperation than the differences of opinion themselves. Incidentally, I have the impression that in the anxiety and anger over the lack of harmony in the march of the cooperating parties, people tend to overlook the many times when the cooperation both in Storting and elsewhere worked smoothly and strengthened the position of the three parties. In my view, the course and outcome of the so-called "Reksten issue" is a typical example of this.

I am more familiar than most people with the concern over developments for the three parties in the opinion polls. In this context too, I will not try to downplay the gravity of the situation. Ever since the election, the Christian People's Party has concentrated on what can be done to correct this situation. Steps have been set in motion that we hope will improve the party's situation to the extent this is due to our own actions or lack thereof. But for a party of ideas such as the Christian People's Party, there will always be clear limits to the tactical maneuvering possible in political waters. Part of our decline is due to lack of understanding of idealistic policy and of the ethical spiritual values we consider it our main task to promote in society. To the extent such things are the reason for declining voter support we view it as a big challenge--not to change our own program but to motivate voters toward a different view of values, favoring more idealistic attitudes.

I would like to stress again the necessity of not losing our heads and acting in panic. Let us all avoid the unworthy spectacle it would present if the cooperating parties concentrate on blaming each other for temporary declines in the polls. Instead, let us try to find the most effective pattern of cooperation possible and within this framework let us learn to tackle the problems we disagree on--respecting each other's views and in full awareness of our mutual goal--insuring a nonsocialist majority in the next Storting period too.

A future expansion of the government must be a result of the internal debate and clarification going on in the three cooperating parties. Out of respect for this process we should strive for a relaxed attitude and a trusting cooperation among the three parties on the basis on which things are operating now.

6578
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GOZE ASSESSES IMPACT OF EVREN'S KUWAIT VISIT

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 24 Mar 82 p 6

["Street Corner" column by Ergun Goze: "Kuwait Trip of Our Head of State"]

[Text] [Deputy Prime Minister Turgut] Ozal has visited Syria, [National Security Council Member Gen Nurettin] Ersin has visited Pakistan and Head of State Kenan Evren has visited Kuwait. Partly as a result of existing circumstances, Turkish diplomacy has finally taken the course it should have taken long ago. Clearly, the "peripheral policy," which began with Pakistan, continued with Bulgaria and has now reached Kuwait, must be considered as the beginning of a new era for Turkey. It is also clear that this new era promises auspicious results for the future.

In the past, whenever we proposed that we establish better relations with our Moslem neighbors, we were told by some of our "excellencies" and frequently by our "Marxists" that such an move "would be against secularism." This opposition came either from diplomats who do not know what diplomacy is and who want to be assigned to "posts without minarets," or from communists who are so blind that they cannot think: "Even the Kremlin with which I am affiliated supports the Arabs against Israel. What will I say when someone tells me that?"

Now we are witnessing a clean form of diplomacy. This is a diplomacy which is practiced with the disciplined comfort and the credible openness of soldiers who will not put personal feelings above everything else, but who will not neglect such feelings after weighing all diplomatic factors. It would be appropriate to call it a soldier's diplomacy. This is a soldier's diplomacy which has won the respect of friends and foes, which is seen as it is and which can no longer be dismissed.

Head of State Kenan Evren is aware of the intergovernmental friendship shown by Pakistan and other Islamic countries. The fact that he has "personally" witnessed the role international moral ties can play in friendships between governments is an auspicious event. Evren's speech also showed that he has a complete grasp of diplomatic conditions. We believe that in its obsession to choose "posts without minarets," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not give previous governments the healthy advice and opinion it was supposed to provide. In fact, we believe that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has done exactly the opposite of what it was supposed to do by heeding a "crowd of appeasers" and by sticking to a policy of
"pro-Westernism at any cost."

Our Head of State is a soldier and a military man. This means that he has an integrated "strategic" view of the issues. Our people are aware of and saddened by the fact that even Greece, which will not miss a single opportunity to hurt us, is implementing a more active policy with respect to Russia and our neighbors which used to be part of our fatherland. Turkey seems to have been left with no other course of action.

The words of our Head of State on Jerusalem reflects the feelings of the world community which does not support Israel as well as the conscience of the Turkish nation:

"For historical and moral reasons, Turkey has an affinity toward Jerusalem. For many years Jerusalem has been an Arab and an Islamic city, and it should continue to be so. Turkey strongly rejects Israeli acts aimed at changing the Islamic and Arab identity of Jerusalem."

The following words by our Head of State on Israel are of "monumental" significance:

"Turkey is well aware of the dangers involved in the policies implemented by Israel." That is the truth. All our neighbors must be aware that Israel has become the most powerful country in our region. With its small population, Israel has transformed itself from a "roaring mouse" into a "tiger armed to its teeth" thanks to the indulging support of the United States. Evren's words are justified especially when Israeli maps show Turkish territory as part of their own land and when the Israeli government is headed by people who have attained their positions through bloody terror acts. The least a soldier can do is not to permit the formation of an armed force which can threaten everybody around it.

Yes. Evren's visit to Kuwait is the opening of an era in our diplomacy and an important economic step. However, one must not expect that the other side will open its purse just because a few words have been uttered. Serious projects and working teams are also necessary to please the other side. The "bureaucrats" will take over from here on. We will see what will happen.

9588
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PAPER REVIEWS RESULTS OF HAIG VISIT

NC250840 Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 20 May 82 p 2

["Looking at the World" column by Sami Kohen: "What a Trip Has Taught Us"]

[Excerpts] U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig's visit to Ankara and Athens has helped to clarify Washington's stand toward certain issues of paramount importance to Turkey.

Prior to this trip, certain circles had harbored some worries about the attitude of the United States particularly toward the Turkish-Greek disputes. There were even people who suggested that the United States would compel Turkey to make certain concessions to secure continuation of the U.S. bases in Greece as well as the active participation of the Papandreou administration in NATO.

Haig's contacts in Ankara and Athens have revealed that no change has occurred in Washington's predetermined attitude.

The truth is that it has been understood once again that Papandreou has urged the United States to impose certain conditions on the Turkish administration, that is to compel Turkey to "foot the bill" for the U.S. military bases and Greece's cooperation in NATO, and that Haig's response has disillusioned the Greeks.

Naturally, the United States and the West in general want Papandreou to abandon his threats which he frequently repeated during his election campaign in the form of "I will not give bases to the United States," and "I will get out of NATO and the EEC." But it is clearly seen that the Reagan administration does not intend to pay the price which the Greek leader indirectly demands from Turkey, that is providing assurances against a "Turkish attack."

Haig has most appropriately expressed his conviction both in Ankara and Athens that the only way to a settlement of the outstanding disputes between Turkey and Greece was the resumption of the dialogue which was interrupted after Papandreou assumed office.

This fundamental view is compatible with Turkey's stand.

The same thing can be argued for Cyprus. Haig stressed the need for the continuation of the intercommunal talks, adding that this was the only way to

105
a settlement. In this respect too, the views of the United States coincide with those of Turkey. Greece's behavior in this matter too runs counter to this policy. Because Papandreou has no faith in the intercommunal talks. He prefers to take the issue to international platforms.

Undoubtedly there are those who, for various reasons, oppose the reinforcement of this cooperation [between Turkey and the United States]. On the U.S. side certain circles in congress will want to create difficulties. But Haig's recent visit has shown that the entire U.S. administration and all its branches attach great importance to relations with Turkey and that they desire to eliminate all these difficulties.

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END