West Europe Report
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LEGACY OF DANISH POLICIES HEAVY BURDEN FOR HOME RULE ERA

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 11-12 Aug 84 Supplement p 1

[Article by Hannes Gamillscheg: "The Children of the Cold Are Seeking Their Way—Emancipation as the Greenlanders Envision It"]

[Text] Why have they taken you from the breast of your mother, little girl? For 500 years you lay there in your grave of ice. The wind dried out your little body and the cold kept it frozen. Today you lie in a display case in the national museum of Nuuk, in almost the same condition as when they buried you then. You look at us from empty eye sockets, who out of shabby nosiness break into your final resting place. I will call you Issittormiup, child of the cold.

The symbol of the rising sun glitters in a spot where Greenland is at its most depressing. Residential boxes made of cheap concrete do not conceal very well the consequences of a catastrophic misplanning. The waiting list for a new dwelling is still 1,600 names long, and yet not even 10,000 people live in Greenland's capital of Nuuk. Here the writing on the wall is with paint sprayed on concrete: "Danes have a Danish life style. Greenlanders have a Greenlandic one." In the runic sign which the night sprayers have placed next to this, the sun is rising. Two letters are contained in this: IM, for "Issittormiut Meeraat," children of those who live in the cold.

Strange: Nobody thinks of washing off the message. No, it is not Greenland's life style to live here in "Block P" wall to wall with 500 other people. A few fish are hanging to dry on the balcony railing at the third floor, and on the door beside it gleams a set of reindeer antlers. Dried fish and a hunting trophy in the block of concrete buildings: It is as if somebody wanted to put up a grotesque symbol for the discrepancy between the way Greenlanders live here and the way they would like to live.

"Our life style is our strength" has been written on the neighboring house by the group which calls itself Issittormiut. Nobody knows who is hiding behind this name. One morning the slogans were there. Since then they have been a part of the Nuuk scene. "Stop smoking and drinking" challenge the children of the cold. It is not our way to live thus, they admonish, and it is not good for us. The young men and women from Block P read this writing when they go out in the evening. But they are so used to it by now

1
that the admonition no longer reaches them when they move over to the "Mutten," the smoke-filled dance hall on the main street. They see the writing again when they stagger back hours later. But by then they are already too drunk to be able to read any longer.

Why must you lie in the glass display cabinet, little girl from the ice? Hans Gronvold and his brother Jokum are not to blame. They had been hunting for snow grouse among the rocks along the coast. They had heard a muffled sound when they jumped on a stone mound. They cleared away the stones. Thereupon they exposed two graves in which eight people were lying, dressed in furs and so well preserved that they seemed to have just been buried: Mummies without balsam.

Hans and Jokum let the dead rest in peace. They did not make any fuss about their find. They reported it. Then they tended the grave reverently, as if their own ancestors were lying in it. Nevertheless Qilakitsoq, the mummy pit, became known. Then the soldiers of fortune came, who hoped to find valuable burial objects. And then the scientists came, sewed up in burlap what they found, stowed the dead bodies in wooden boxes, and shipped them away from the place where their relatives had laid them to rest 500 years previously.

On new maps of Greenland, Qutdligssat cannot be found any longer. It was the sixth largest town just 15 years ago, with 1,000 to 1,500 people living there. They were supported by the coal mine. Then the mining became unprofitable. Or rather: It had never paid its own way. But at that time the Danish administration found that the island town off the western Greenland coast was no longer worth any more subsidies. Who needed coal anyway? It would be better for the people to go into the fish factories. Workers were needed there, over in Nuuk, which at that time was still called Godthab, because these were the days when Greenland was nothing more than a Danish province. Copenhagen made the decisions as to what was to happen on Greenland.

Thus 12 years ago in Qutdligssat the Danes turned the key. Done with. No more mine, no more town. The people packed up what they had in trunks and boxes. Then they brought in a ship. A few weeks later the families had been resettled, northward as far as Upernavik, to the south as far as Narssak: Which is a span of 1,375 kilometers. They received a few thousand kroner as moving assistance, a few more in a frozen account. But that was actually their own money: Compensation for the houses which they had left behind. Yet the same powers that be which determined that a thousand people were to begin a new life far from their home also decided that these people would not be capable of handling their own money properly. So they froze it, and deblocked it only bit by bit: For the paying of rent, or if someone wanted to start a business. But the empty houses of Qutdligssat were sold wholesale to a Danish master joiner in Holsteinsborg. He paid 65,000 kroner for the town. He dismantled what he could use. Today the sea birds are nesting in the ruins of this ghost town.

On the other hand: What should have been done? Should millions have been invested year after year in a coal mine which was losing money, merely to
permit a few hundred hard-toiling miners to continue to slave away, and to allow to their women and children the meager life which they were living in Qutdligssat? "Perhaps," says Frederik Lynge in Nuuk, who was born in the mining town, "there was no choice at that time but to close the mine."

It was not so much the judgment which incensed the Greenlanders, but the way that it was pronounced. Perhaps, Frederik says, Greenland's politicians would have chosen the same step. But it is one thing when one's own people make a decision, and it is another thing when this is done by a foreign administrative authority without even having bothered to talk in earnest with the people affected. In Qutdligssat a fire was kindled. It continued to burn long after the town had fallen into decay. The Danes closed the coal mine in 1972. Seven years later, Greenland was autonomous. The forced moving of more than a thousand of their own people had opened the eyes of the Greenlanders: The Danish solutions were not good. Greenland was in need of Greenlandic paths.

How did you die, little child of the cold? Did you become ill sometime in the 6 months that you were permitted to live? Or did the boat in which you may have traveled, your mother and you, and your brother, the sisters of your mother, and your grandma, did it capsize? Did you all sit in the same boat as the aunts and nieces who lay in the second grave hole at Qilakitsoq? We know a lot about you and your family, little Issittormiup.

The scientists rejoiced at the rare find. They tested your hair and your skin, examined your clothing and your bones. They made diagrams and showed how you are all related. They know that you had healthy lives: Even the teeth of grandmother are still perfect. Yet they also know that the old woman had cancer. They know that you people had less lead and less mercury in your bodies than your descendants today: Your sins against the environment were less serious than ours. They now know how you sewed your clothing from sealskins and reindeer pelts and lined them with bird feathers. They do not realize only one thing: That those who buried you also mourned for you. That you are not showpieces, you and your people—that is what the scientists do not realize.

When Frederik stood on the airfield of Kangerlussuaq, his life was all over. What was on the other side of the 5-hour flight to Copenhagen was beyond imagining for the 12-year-old youth. Then later on, in the course of the school year in the Danish town of Haderslev, there was even a little laughter and sunshine mixed in with the terrible homesickness. But today when Frederik Lynge thinks back to that time, he thinks first of all of his great suffering.

They had a plan, the Danes did, a plan for their northern territory. They wanted to create a patch of Denmark out of it. They wanted to lead it out of the grim colonial times in which the Danes had viewed Greenland as a storehouse of raw materials and otherwise were happy when they had as little as possible to do with the Greenlanders. Hans Hedtoft, the social democratic head of the government, had visited Greenland. He was shocked. He saw how the Greenlanders were living in wretched hovels and dying of
tuberculosis. In 1950 the average Greenlander died before reaching the age of 33.

They wanted to set up the national homeland of the welfare state beneath the polar sun and among the icebergs as well. They made plans, full of optimism and good will. These were plans of Copenhagen's armchair strategists. They wanted to give young Greenlanders the chance to get ahead. They wanted to give them training. And they sent young people, still children, to Danish schools, uprooted them, alienated them from their homeland, and cast the defenseless children of the cold into the charming pastoral scenes of Danish small towns, where nothing was the way it was back home. Many of these people still bear the wounds of that time today. And those who coped with the readjustment avoided returning to the arduous Arctic and were not around for the construction of a new Greenland.

They had a plan, the Danes, and they called it "G 60." It was a plan for Greenland. This is a paradoxical country, Kalaallit Nunaat, the "land in which people live," as the Greenlanders call their homeland. With some 50,000 residents it is no larger than a Central European provincial town, yet with more than 2 million square kilometers it is so enormous that the EEC will lose more than half of its surface area when Greenland leaves the European Community on New Year's Day. Of course the bulk of this is eternal ice, in volumes so gigantic that the oceans would rise by 6 meters if Greenland were to melt. But even the inhabitable remainder is larger still than the FRG, Austria, and Switzerland combined.

The supplying of so few people in such a large region cannot be accomplished, stated "G 60." Thus there was a proposal made to abandon the small settlements along the coast and to concentrate the inhabitants in four towns. In these places, they could work in the fish factories. That was more sensible than to go hunting as in the old days. In Nuuk, blocks of apartments sprang up, and these were just as ugly as in the Copenhagen suburbs. At that time the Danes did not take into consideration that Danes have a Danish life style and Greenlanders have a Greenlandic one. Not until years later would the "children of those who live in the cold" spray this simple truth on the house walls.

Today, "G 60" is a swearword in Greenland. What Copenhagen had regarded as a plan was a gigantic miscalculation. In their cost-benefit calculation they had forgotten about the human factor. Today nobody talks any more about concentration and forced resettlement. The experience gained from Qutdligssat, the mining town, was bitter enough.

It was a costly lesson, and not only because of the people who lost their homeland. Scarcely had the mine been closed down when the world skidded into the oil crisis. Demark's electric-power plants converted over their electricity generation: Instead of oil they began to use coal. Today this is imported from Poland, Australia, and South Africa: The mine of Qutdligssat has been filled up. The intention was to send the miners into the cod factories. But the cod has become scarce. Three bitterly cold winters, the coldest in recent history, have made it pick other routes to follow. This fish is avoiding Greenland's waters.
For 500 years you have lain on the breast of your mother, little
Issittormiup. That was the right place for a child of 6 months. Your
brother lay in the same grave, your aunt and your grandmother also. Now
you lie in a showcase, your mother next to you. They have put your aunt in
the cabinet beside it. But your brother and your grandmother have remained
in Copenhagen where all of you were studied: These two no longer looked
good enough for exhibiting.

There were men who—when Qilakitsoq had been found—thought that all of you
should quite simply be reburied. Perhaps someone would have placed a
wreath of plastic flowers on your grave, as is the custom at the cemetery
in Nuuk. But these people were not listened to. Perhaps it was good that
this was so. After all, surely others would simply have come here from
elsewhere, people who had heard of the find, and they would have secretly
disinterred and stolen you. So at least you are lying in your own country.
Our world has become too curious and too covetous for it to have been able
to leave a child such as you in peace.

"If the EEC had not arrived, we would not have had any self-administration
even today," says Jorgen Fleischer, the old editor of the newspaper
ATTUAGADLIUTIT. When the gigantic North Atlantic island was incorporated
in the European Community as a part of Denmark even though the Greenlanders
could not feel European however hard they tried, then they began to
understand that the time had come to take their fate in their own hands.

Now they have autonomy, now they are turning their backs on the EEC. It
may be that it would have been wiser to remain with the Community and to
siphon off funds from its fleshpots for the building of the new Greenland.
But whoever struggles for freedom must think of more than just millions.
Not even Copenhagen had understood what it meant to live in Greenland.
What could they expect then from Brussels?

The best hunter and trapper has reason to take pride in himself. A large
kill brings great respect from the neighbors. Whoever has shot a seal
knows that his family will have something to eat and that he will be able
to sell the skin. But nobody who has bagged a seal forgets his neighbors.
On the very same day his daughter will go from house to house and give some
of her father's kill to the others in the village.

The trawlers of the European Community sailed into the waters of Greenland,
which they called an "EEC sea." They caught the fish which Brussels had
allotted to them, and they fished for more. They fished too long, too much,
with nets which were too fine-meshed. They exploited the fact that little
Denmark has only meager resources available for the surveillance of
fishing, and they shipped illegal riches into their homeland ports: That
was the face which the EEC showed Greenland. Whoever struggles for freedom
must also think about his pride. Greenland had to leave the EEC.

Qunsaq was a famous hunter from Tununggasoq. One day, so the story goes,
he had gone hunting with the Danish explorer of Greenland, Knud Rasmussen.
But his sled kept dropping back behind that of the Dane, which caused
Rasmussen to ask in irritation why he was so slow. "I am never in a
hurry," responded the Greenlander. But when Rasmussen continued to make
derisive remarks about his speed, Qunaq challenged him to a race. A
distant cabin on the other side of the lake was to be their goal.
Rasmussen chose the fast route over the ice, Qunaq the difficult one over
land. When after a dashing run Knud Rasmussen neared the cabin, the story
goes, he saw smoke rising from the chimney and Qunaq stepping out of the
door, with hot coffee in his hand: "Would you like something warm to
drink?"

When Sten Malmquist, born on Greenland as the child of Danish parents, was
still a small boy he liked to play in the kitchen best of all. There he
could speak the Greenlandic language with the servants, as he was accustomed
to doing from playing in the street. But in the living room the language
of Greenland was prohibited: There one had to speak Danish. His parents
had not learned the native language.

Only a few of the more than 10,000 Danes who are now working on Greenland
speak this language. The political figures sitting and making decisions in
the "Hjemmestyre," the organ of self-administration, are Greenlanders. But
on the Secretariat are Danes, and these are the people who prepare the
ground for the decisions. Hardly any of them understands the language of
those at whom the decisions are aimed. Is this asking too much? Can
anyone be expected to master an Eskimoan language which has no relationship
whatsoever to any of the common tongues in Europe? "From me to you is just
as far as from you to me" says Moses Olsen, Greenland's finance minister:
For the Greenlanders, Danish is no easier to master—and almost all of them
have learned it.

In Nuuk a brown multistory building towers up conspicuously. It is ugly
and yet also hopeful: It is the "metal school," the basic framework for
training the young generation in various trades. Their older brothers
still had to go to Denmark. They will not receive any secondary-school
education. But the business school has been moved to Nuuk. One can become
a teacher without leaving Greenland, or a journalist, or a minister.
Nevertheless for many years to come Greenland will not be able to get by
without Danish helpers. Some 25 doctors are employed in the "Queen Ingrid
Hospital." Three of these are natives of Greenland. Today 540 more
teachers who speak the language of Greenland are needed in the schools. At
present, 40 teachers per year are being trained.

On Innangaq Street lives Simon Kristoffersen, who knows how to knock out
fine figures from porous stone. Will he open up his house today and sell
his works of art to foreign visitors? Simon has drunk too much and has
slept badly. "Not today," he calls down crossly from his window. They
should come another time.

"Not today" is the thought also of Rasmus Berthelsen, who to tell the truth
has signed up for work at the fish factory in the harbor. Not today.
Today the weather is too fine. Now he prefers to go out fishing himself.
And in the factory his job remains unfilled, and a good many others besides
this. The next morning they have to dump three tons of crabs on the waste
heap: Unprocessed, they had spoiled.
Greenlanders have a Greenlandic life style. Work, hard work, is a part of this. But regular 8-hour shifts are not a part of this. "Imaqa" is their most important word: perhaps. Will the drift-ice permit the trawlers to set sail tomorrow? Will you bag a seal? Or will you come home without a catch? Will the storm and fog let the helicopters with their deliveries of goods to land? Imaqa. Will you feel like standing for 8 hours tomorrow with your feet in cold water at the fish factory? Imaqa. Perhaps, but also perhaps not.

Greenland cannot yet dispense with its pocket money from Mother Denmark. But whereas the mother formerly paid for each sock and each pencil for her child, now she is leaving him more and more to his own devices. One sphere of administration after another has passed over from the Ministry of Greenland Affairs in Copenhagen to the "Hjemmestyre" in Nuuk. Year after year there are more. It is a process of emancipation. Is it going too fast, is it going too slow? "When changes are made via our own hands, then they have the right pace," says Moses Olsen.

Greenlanders have a Greenlandic life style. Only by way of this life style will they get a handle on Kalaallit Nunaat, the gigantic, fascinating "land in which people live." Some distant day, will it also be the land in which the dead are left in peace, little girl Issittormiup?
COMMUNIST PARTY FACTIONS' BATTLE CENTERS ON SPECIAL CONGRESS

Stalinist Paper Demands Congress

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 14 Aug 84 p 2

[Article: "Path Leading to FCP Division and Destruction Must Be Stopped"]

[Text] All the eight SKP [Finnish Communist Party] district organizations, which publish TIEDONANTAJA, have submitted a written demand to the Central Committee for the convening of an extraordinary congress for the purpose of healing the party.

The declaration of the SKP's present division as "irreversible" and its glorification as the party's "strength" reveal the irresponsibility of Arvo Aalto's and Aarno Aitamurto's leadership group toward the interests of the party and the whole working class. It is evident that we cannot continue in this way. It is just as evident that the initiative of eight district organizations is not available for such a congress which intends to expand and firmly establish disruptive activities.

The representation enjoying the trust of the majority of the party membership was excluded from the party leadership by the policy line of the SKP's 20th Congress. Thus the intent was to cut off the party's leftist and unifying development.

The present, rightist direction is leading the SKP into an increasingly serious paralysis and isolation at both the national as well as international level. In the final count it will result in a change in the SKP's position and nature and in the party's destruction. The convening of a congress that will heal the party is absolutely necessary. The struggle for peace and for changing the political direction demands a unification of Communist forces.

At its meeting on 24-25 August the SKP Central Committee must adopt immediate measures to stop the trend leading toward the dissolution of the party. This presupposes a cancellation of the suspension of Central Committee workers and the suspension of disruptive activities directed against the Turku and Uusimaa district organizations. The Central Committee must prevent the dissolution of the election alliances of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] as well as protect in all municipalities the joint election alliances approved by
the 20th Congress without setting up any new obstacles connected with economics, for example.

TIEDONANTAJA's significance as the only Communist newspaper is even greater than before. TIEDONANTAJA is even more necessary as a factor that unites and executes the aspirations of all the members and party organizations supporting the party's chief line and unity. The conservative trend in our country's political development emphasizes TIEDONANTAJA's position as the only newspaper which has a real alternative to the present direction.

The representatives of the districts publishing TIEDONANTAJA and its circulation departments urge the intensification of work throughout the whole country for the purpose of promoting the circulation of TIEDONANTAJA and its further development and support. They are urging everyone who is interested in that about which others remain silent -- the workers' cause and the policy of Communists -- to become familiar with TIEDONANTAJA for a 40-markka introductory subscription until the end of the year.

The representatives of the district organizations publishing TIEDONANTAJA and its circulation departments will repeat the appeal proposed in June in the "Open Letter to All Communists" for the assembling of all unification forces to mount a broader, more decisive, and more organized struggle throughout the whole country to save the party. This will require the efforts of every party organization, every Communist: no one will be a bystander.

A declaration, dated 12 August 1984, of the joint meeting of representatives of the eight SKP district organizations which publish TIEDONANTAJA and TIEDONANTAJA's circulation departments.

Hentila Warns of 'Majority Stalinism'

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Aug 84 p 10

[Article by Kyosti Karvonen: "Hentila Warns SKP of Majority Stalinism"]

[Text] General Secretary Jorma Hentila (Communist), who is resigning from the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL), is warning the Communist Party's leading majority of a superficial unity and majority Stalinism, which smooths over the actual differences in viewpoints.

"The SKP's situation is subject to pressures, which may result in the fact that the majority will begin to avoid issues experienced to be difficult," says Hentila. A new nuclear power plant, for example, could be a an awkward issue.

Hentila, who has been general secretary of the SKDL since 1977, will leave this post in the beginning of November when he will become chief editor of ALKOHOLIPOLITIIKKA.

Hentila, who belongs to the soft-liners of Finland's politics, has been looking for a new job for a couple years. The job transfer became a certainty
after the results of the SKP congress became known. If the SKP's situation had continued as before, Hentila would not have gone anywhere according to his own admission.

The assurance is in itself true. However, it is being said that Hentila is not suitable as a perfect liaison in the smooth cooperation between SKP Chairman Arvo Aalto and SKDL Chairman Kalevi Kivisto (People's Democrat). Hentila's personal relations with Aalto are considered to be quite distant.

It is also being said in the People's Democratic movement that cooperation between Kivisto and Hentila has not been without its problems in the last couple years. Since, in addition, Hentila has occupied various positions in the SKDL for more than two decades, it is no wonder that he is changing jobs.

Hentila has been a member of the Parliamentary Defense Committee. In 1970 he was in Helsinki Municipal Court after having participated in demonstrations against the Shah of Iran. Since last year he has been chairman of the Sexual Equality Association.

"Spiritual Readiness"

In recent years the nonpolitically oriented Hentila has become known for his speeches in which he has promoted positions, which in themselves have become ossified, with respect to environmental questions and democracy, among other things. For this reason he has been chastised by the Taistoites [Stalinists] as well as by Soviet Karelia. Now he is directing his attention toward his majority colleagues:

"The SKP's new leadership has said that there must be room in the party for debate and I do not doubt the leadership's sincerity.

"However, in various quarters there is a kind of spiritual readiness for the kind of posturing that means the majority should now keep its ranks together, be united, and avoid bringing up issues which generate differing views." These "various quarters" cannot be found from the SKP's office according to Hentila.

Hentila will not consent to identifying "majority Stalinists". "If the axing policy means Communists aspiring to a normal organizational life, they are not by my definition majority Stalinists."

Nevertheless, Hentila's jab does not go very much beyond the axing policy line. "There have been those who have been ready for the same kind of procedures as the minority. I am referring only to the dropping of Esko-Juhani Tennila (minority MP) from the list of candidates for the parliamentary elections in Lapland.

So that he would not become labelled as an apologist for the minority, Hentila hastens to point out that the extreme wing of the minority is basing its actions on the principle of "ends justify the means".
Hentila, who voluntarily stepped aside from the Central Committee at the congress, estimated that the SKP has only two alternatives. "One was the present solution and the other is that either Jouko Kajanoja or Taisto Sinisalo take Aalto's place. If Kajanoja were chairman, Sinisalo with his group would, however, make the decisions in the background.

The minority has been able to entrench itself behind the congress demand promoting a new congress. However, Hentila is directing his attention to the differing positions of the SKP's Uusimaa and Turku districts, on the one hand, and the Kymenlaakso and Tampere districts, on the other (all four district organizations are controlled by the minority).

At the time the preparations were being made for the congress, the Taistoite minority made noises that Aalto would drop the word Leninism from along side of the word Marxism from the SKP's vocabulary. However, these magic words retained their place in the SKP's official document.

"For my own part, I will say that this concept should be reconsidered. The concept and the content normally ascribed to it do not correspond to the situation in highly developed capitalist countries." Hentila is urging that the SKP be asked why Leninism is still included in SKP documents.

Hentila, who was inspired by Andrzej Wajda's film Danton, has said that Dantons who have been subjected to a spiritual guillotine can also be found in the People's Democratic movement. Hentila certainly has the distinguishing marks which are required of Dantons in the opinion of many dogmatists.

Moderate Rejects 'Revenge' Charge

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Aug 84 p 10

[Article: "A Waste of Time for Minority to Dream of Revenge"]

[Text] According to SKP Vice-Chairman Helja Tammisola, it is futile for the Taistoite minority to dream of a revenge by which the minority would return the SKP to the same situation that existed prior to the 20th Congress in May.

Tammisola spoke at the 2-day meeting of the SKP Central Committee, which began on Friday at the Sirola Institute, the seat of learning for Communists. The Central Committee is also debating the demand of eight minority district to convene an extraordinary congress. No decisions have yet been made on this matter.

According to Tammisola, it was already confirmed after the May congress that there is no return to the previous situation. For those who are dreaming of revenge, a return to the previous situation of parallel activities, I will say again that there is no return to such a situation, stated Tammisola.

She made the assurance that the goal of the party leadership is real unity. "An extraordinary congress carried out in this sense could be a good thing."
Objectively there are no such conflicts which would justify the existence of two separate parties according to Tammsola.

"The obstacle to real unity is not comprised of differing opinions within the party, but of separate actions, an organized factionalism. If opportunities exist for eliminating this obstacle to unity at an extraordinary congress, the party leadership will certainly put all its weight behind an effort to eliminate such obstacles," assured Tammsola.

General Secretary Arvo Aalto along with his group defeated Chairman Jouko Kajanoja at the congress in May. As a consequence, Aalto became the new chairman of the SKP.

The Communists' minority and majority leaders could not reach an agreement on the division of leadership posts and as a consequence of this dispute the Taistoite remained completely outside of the decisionmaking organs.

Central Committee Delays Congress

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 26 Aug 84 p 6

[Article: "SKP Central Committee Accusation: Minority Dividing Party"]

[Text] The policy line of the leadership of the Communist Party's eight Taistoite districts is aimed at an open split of the SKP. This was the accusation made by the SKP's majority Central Committee on Saturday against the Taistoite minority, which is demanding an extraordinary congress.

At a 2-day meeting in the Sirola Institute the SKP Central Committee named as primary scapegoats the leaders of the Uusimaa and Turku districts, in particular, who have promoted the minority's toughest line.

The Central Committee gave the Politburo the task of preparing issues relevant to an extraordinary congress and decided to return to the issue in October after the municipal elections.

According to the resolution of the Central Committee, these matters were already debated at the 20th Congress at the end of May so that a demand to bring them up for discussion again would mean a desire to be free of the decisions that were made.

The Central Committee expressed its desire "to build a real functional unity in the party by observing the decisions of the congress". The restoration of unity is still possible according to the Central Committee if "the districts which demanded an extraordinary congress want to act in accordance with the party regulations and decisions of the congress".

"Separate Activities Will Not Be Approved"

Organized parallel activities within the party cannot be approved, stated the Central Committee, and after the meeting Chairman Arvo Aalto did not go on to
explain what practical actions the party leadership intends to take in order to discipline the minority and guide it back into the party line.

Aalto emphasized that the aspiration of the party leadership is to restore a course that is in accordance with the regulations. It is essential that Aalto emphasized that even after an extraordinary congress there will be no return to the previous course in the party.

In Aalto's opinion the logic of the content of the SKP's regulations does not presuppose that the same issues that were discussed at the congress just held will be discussed at an extraordinary congress.

The formal aspect of the regulations according to Aalto is that an extraordinary congress must be convened if one-third of the districts so demands. A decision on this matter will be in the hands of the Central Committee at its meeting in October, stated Aalto.

The SKP's chairman referred to the fact that the party's minority districts unconditionally demanded an extraordinary congress, but are talking about reasons conditionally.

However, Aalto considered that in this situation it is not a question of initiating negotiations with leaders of the minority districts.

The preparations for the municipal elections have progressed amazingly well in spite of the internal conflicts among the Communists according to Aalto.

The Communists and People's Democrats have reached a joint understanding in approximately 450 municipalities in the municipal elections and there are problems in only about 10 municipalities and even in them the situation is still being negotiated.

Aalto also criticized the government by stating that the SKP does not intend to become a supporter of the present government's economic policy.

"Meeting Must Be Convened"

Politburo Member Esko Vainionpaa, who presented the Aalto-dominated leadership's view of the SKP's situation, briefed the Central Committee on the extraordinary congress demanded by the Taistoite districts.

According to Vainionpaa, disappointment in the fact that the minority leadership drove itself into the sidelines lies behind the demand of the eight minority districts. "An incorrect assessment of the situation and a desire to control the SKP were in the background."

According to Vainionpaa's assessment, the minority's goal is a previous kind of mechanical unity, which would be based on the independent and separate activities of two or more factions.
He pointed out that separate and parallel activities are not tolerated on the basis of party regulations and the decisions of the congress and that was also the unanimous position of the Politburo.

Vainionpaa made the assurance that the new completely majority-controlled party leadership is ready "for a real functional unity".

He, however, rejected the minority's proposals as a list of issues for a new extraordinary congress. They were all given consideration at the May congress according to Vainionpaa and nothing has happened since that meeting which would warrant a new congress for the purpose of changing decisions.

The text of the demand of the minority districts even demonstrates according to Vainionpaa that the unifying goal of an extraordinary congress has not been presented as a genuine goal.

Vainionpaa placed the responsibility for the future on the leadership of the minority's eight districts "since the Central Committee must convene an extraordinary congress demanded in accordance with the regulations even if there are no relevant reasons for doing so".

New District Organizations

Vainionpaa also estimated that if the actions of the minority districts' leadership continue in the same pattern as they have to date, the probable result will be that the leadership of these eight districts will openly divide the party in half.

Vainionpaa also rejected the arguments that the new party leadership will begin to conduct parallel activities in the areas of the minority districts. The actions of the Central Committee to carry out party decisions are not served by parallel activities, stated Vainionpaa.

The need to establish new district organizations depends according to Vainionpaa completely on whether the leadership of any district organization will consent to acting in a normal manner in accordance with the decisions of the congress and the Central Committee. "The ball is in the court of the districts publishing TIEDONANTAJA."

Revaluation and Interest Rate Reduction

In its economic policy stand the SKP Central Committee decided to demand an increase in the foreign value of the markka or revaluation and a reduction of the interest rate that is tied to it.

The SKP's list of demands also included a more active employment policy, the development of social security, and an increase in the construction of rental housing. Information that has leaked from next year's state budget proposal points in the opinion of the SKP to the fact that the government intends to accomplish the reactionary policy already presented in its economic policy report.
The SKP's list of objectives also includes early retirement, in which the age limit is 55. In the opinion of the SKP families with children should be supported by increasing the child subsidy and by extending the payment period to 18 years of age.

The Communists are also demanding that the state's share of funding to local municipalities not be cut back. Appropriations for development aid should in the opinion of the SKP be increased so that it will remain at the scheduled rate of 0.7 percent of the gross national product.

The SKP would fund its program by increasing the taxes of banks, insurance companies, and large corporations, by eliminating the so-called tax relief for economic incentive purposes, and by making adjustments for inflation in taxes more favorable to low and medium-income people as well as by cutting back the budget's defense appropriations.

10576
CSO: 3617/216
SKDL PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION WANTS CLEARER LEFT ALTERNATIVE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 14 Aug 84 p 7

Article by Larsrik Haggman: "SKDL Wants to Build Alternative on the Left"

The People's Democratic Parliamentary League (SKDL) meeting—which began in Umeåborg on Monday—was marked by a clear will to provide a more distinct alternative on the left in its opposition politics. The first day of the meeting almost totally lacked a sequel comparable to the Communist Party Congress last spring, which ended with a unified clear majority leadership under new Party Chairman Arvo Aalto.

The outgoing Secretary General Jorma Hentila was the only one to express some moderation in criticizing the government and questioning the classical SKDL demand for an expanded role of the government's sector in the economy—according to what HUFVUDSTADSBLADET was able to find out.

In his response, the SKDL leader Arvo Aalto is supposed to have stated that presently all the conditions exist for expanding the public sector and increasing the government's borrowing operations.

The Chairman of the Parliamentary Group Veikko Saarto focused on this in his introductory speech which clearly hinted about what will be found in SKDL's alternative budget—and in Tuesday's resolution—in regard to its basic concepts.

"Revalue"

According to Saarto, employees have a right to demand of the Bank of Finland that the Finnish mark be re-evaluated and that interest rates be reduced. This would compensate for the great restraint shown by the Confederation of Employees in their wage demands last spring for the sake of agreement on income policy.

Saarto stressed that the government's budget proposal is based on a policy favoring the nonsocialist parties and distancing itself from the traditions of the labor movement. Its major goal—according to the SKDL leader—is to further the activities and competition of corporations. In doing so—Saarto claims—the goals of the labor movement are forgotten, i.e. expanded social protection, social income transfers, health care and an active employment policy.

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The employment questions are at the top of the SKDL budget list. In order to do away with unemployment there must be a planned economy, a better quality of growth, shorter work hours and an efficient use of national resources.

Guarantees For Young People

One of the concrete demands made by Saarto was that the government guarantee all young people—who have finished their first stage of training—1 year's employment in the public sector in case they cannot obtain another job. The government should be able to do this—according to him—without any problems, as the trade unions have calculated that there are about 30,000 jobs available in this sector.

Other demands made by the SKDL in their budget included production of new houses and apartments, more daycare centers, lowering the retirement age, alternative measures—instead of cutbacks—at the community level, a loosening of the two-price system of milk, more efficient protection of the environment and increased aid to developing countries.

On Monday it was agreed by all to attempt to attack the budget problems as a whole and to keep the proposals for changes together. There was no direct talk of a shadow budget, but—definitely—about an alternative budget proposal or, at least, an alternative fiscal policy.

Tax on Advertising Favored

The old proposal for tax on advertisements was among the individual economic questions the group dealt with—also an issue studied by the Ministry of Finance in connection with the budget, but not incorporated in its basic proposal. SKDL is thinking in terms of a 10-percent tax and possibly an added-value tax as well.

The recent publicity in connection with the Amer-Yhtymä and Korpivaara affair prompted several speakers to again press the demand for tax on sale and transfer of capital.

The group also expressed some worry about state-owned companies and felt that it was the responsibility of the government to take care of providing capital for these companies. But at the same time there were some protests voiced about the merger plans for Kansallis-Osake-Pankki into a conglomerate within the wood processing branch in northern Finland.

One Without a Job

The subject of factional strife within the Communist Party only came up one time during Monday's meeting. Some questions were asked about the dismissals at the party's office in Helsinki. Party Chairman Arvo Aalto is supposed to have based the notices on a lack of funds and explained that all—except one person—got new jobs.

There seemed to be a consensus by different factions within the movement that the atmosphere was relaxed and that the demands for a clearer opposition policy
were unanimous as well as reflecting a higher profile and a more distinct alternative for the left in domestic politics. Nobody mentioned the possibility of a likely role in the government in the near future.

After the Communist Party Congress last spring, many had predicted hard infighting within the parliamentary group—which is seen as a coalition which differs from that of the leading party organs. But the season's first meeting does not seem to reflect any great amount of tension within the party at this stage. In the field there are, however, great difficulties in coming to an agreement on joint lists for municipal elections in a great many locations. However, the party leadership has urged everyone to strive for unity; similar signals were supposedly also sent out from the leadership of the minority.
U.S. 'INTEREST,' INTERFERENCE IN GSEE ATTACKED

Undermining Efforts Claimed

Athens ELEVHEROTYPIA in Greek 2 Aug 84 p 5

[Article by Asteros Khristodoulidou]

[Excerpt] An attempt is being made from various centers within and outside Greece to divide the GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor] and to undermine the country's labor-union movement, the GSEE is charging.

The response of the workers both at the top levels of their trade-union organization and also among the rank and file cannot fail to boil down to a strengthening of unity and a reinforcing of constructive cooperation among the democratic labor-union forces. The GSEE is even warning that "it will stand the world on its head if anyone dares to lay a hand on any institutional gains made by the workers"—a volley which is openly meant for "the capitalists and the large-scale employers."

The above dramatic remarks were noted in the course of yesterday's meeting of the plenum of the GSEE administration, which was dominated, it is generally agreed, by keen and earnest deliberations characterized by the high quality of the recommendations made and the dialogue which followed.

The Occasion

The occasion for the official charges made by the union leadership (Ravtopoulos, Kostopoulos, and unionist officers) to the effect that the dividing of the labor movement is being plotted by sinister reactionary elements was an article in the weekly periodical ENA, which stated that the "GSEE is characterized as the 'naughty child' of the Western World—in the labor sector—and that there is an American intervention in the Greek trade-union movement via a member of the GSEE presiding body."

These "revelations," their ulterior motives, and their aim were dominant considerations throughout the discussion. The article was unanimously characterized as "inflammatory" and was rated as part of the "more general undermining attempts being undertaken against the democratic government, both in its pursuit of foreign policy and also in the domestic policy which it is following."
The very sharp reaction of the GSEE leadership to the revelations of the periodical ENA and the emphasis put on its decision to defend and protect as the "apple of its eye" the cooperation and unity of the democratic forces in the GSEE are due also to the "painful memories of the past, when American intervention in the labor-union affairs of our country had been officially sanctioned, with the well-known and fateful results for the progress of the labor movement," as a well-known unionist observed pointedly.

The issue of unity at the highest level of the GSEE, or in other words in terms of the cooperation between PASKE [Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union Movement] and ESAK-S [United Antidictatorial Labor Movement-Cooperating] was touched on also in another of its dimensions by the general secretary of the GSEE, Dim. Kostopoulos.

In manifestly addressing himself primarily to certain PASKE unionists who either have reservations about or oppose the cooperation of the two factions, Kostopoulos called on them "to consider also the contingency that the terminating of this unity probably will lead to the creation of a second GSEE."

The speaker made it clear in this connection that "we (editor's note: the ESAK-S) are categorically in favor of the existence of a GSEE."

As for the dominant labor problems of the workers, it was stressed that:

The large-scale capitalists are trying methodically and persistently to subvert basic gains made by the labor movement, and visible behind these aspirations are political expediencies and also pressures. The GSEE has decided to militantly respond to any anti-labor pursuits of such a nature. "We are for an effective dialogue," it was stressed in this connection, but it was also explained that "in no case is the GSEE going to put on the negotiating table any rights which have been gained by the workers."

U.S. 'Pressure' Rejected

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 5 Aug 84 p 42

[Article by V. Tzannetakou]

[Text] Political trouble was very nearly stirred up in the GSEE by the initiative taken recently in Athens by officials of the United States, with their subject matter being their special interest in the course taken by the trade-union movement and above all its ideological orientation and the composition of its administrative organs.

The American "suggestions" about the course and the policy of the trade-union movement cannot be logically isolated from the more general framework of the pressures which the United States has been exerting on Greece recently at almost all levels.
This follows also from the specific nature of the dangermongering arguments which are being raised officially or unofficially: They concern the "leftist" policy which is being followed by Greece both on issues of foreign policy and on questions of domestic policy; from the "anti-Americanism" perceived by the United States up to the orientations of the labor-union movement.

This issue has been the primary question preoccupying the recent plenum of the GSEE administration. The upshot of the entire discussion and the position which the GSEE administration took as a body logically ought to have discouraged the inspirers of the American initiative, to the degree of course that the true objective of these "demarches" was the undermining of inter-factional cooperation in the GSEE and was not in fact its continuation, so that dangermongering "arguments" could be drawn from this.

And this is because the GSEE reacted strongly to these "suggestions," which it rejected, with it going on to declare that the initiatives or at least the intentions concerning a change in the composition of the presiding body are originating in "sinister circles" and "reactionary centers."

The GSEE confined the objective of its counteraction essentially to confirming that the American interventions and "suggestions" were repudiated, and not so much to denying the fact—that is, whether or not the demarches and the contacts had taken place. And this was proper, because in the last analysis it is unacceptable to assume that any contact or conversation whatsoever automatically entails acceptance of the positions of the opposite party who raises the question. If this logic were valid, then it would mean that, for example, when the GSEE meets with the SEV [Association of Greek Industrialists] in order to discuss issues which the employers raise, then the GSEE automatically becomes an "organ" of the industrialists, despite the fact that it may have rejected its positions and assured the SEV that it is sticking it its own views.

The plenum of the GSEE which discussed the issue of the American interventions did not in fact concern itself with the extent and nature of the American contacts, but focused its aim on noting that the "suggestions" of the United States were not acceptable and were rejected unequivocally and unmistakably.

And this is ultimately what is important, because it is neither proper nor expedient to forbid contacts from which the labor movement can derive useful inferences, such as what has emerged from the American demarches for example, which aimed at changing the composition and the political line followed by the GSEE. Because now the GSEE as well as other mechanisms above and outside of this organization know the American intentions and thus are able to confront them directly and to responsibly chart the course they will follow, by using the criterion that anything which benefits the United States cannot be considered good for Greece. In the case at hand, no matter how it is paraphrased there cannot be any applicability here for the well-known American axiom that "what is good for America is good for General Motors" and vice versa.
It is obvious that the coincidence in time of the divulging of the American initiatives and the manifesting of certain movements in PASOK—which have raised questions about the purposes and the usefulness to PASOK of the inter-factional cooperation in the GSEE—has made the atmosphere heavier and objectively acts in the direction of "freezing" any relevant inner-party initiatives.

Precisely this point was touched on by a PASKE officer at the plenum of the GSEE, in arguing for the view that the purpose of the American initiatives—or at least of the "leaking" of these—was not to undermine the presiding body of the GSEE, but on the contrary to strengthen its cohesion and to freeze any move toward a possible change. And he bases this view on the theory that from here on out any move whatsoever toward a recomposition of the presiding body of the GSEE will be criticized and "suspect," since the United States has manifested the same intention with its delegation in Athens.

And when it is considered that the Association of Greek Industrialists as well has expressed in a continually rising tone everything from skepticism to objections with respect to the participation of the ESAK-S in the presiding body of the GSEE, the conclusion emerges that it will be especially difficult for any changes to take place in the GSEE, without the danger that the champions of this course will be portrayed as giving in to extra-unionist pressures, or serving other ulterior motives.

12114
CSO: 3521/337
DEVELOPMENTS OF RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA ANALYZED

Article by Yiannis Roumbatis

Clouds begin to gather on the horizon of the traditionally good relations between Greece and Yugoslavia. This is a development which could have at a given moment, in the future, serious repercussions for the Greek national interests as well as for the overall situation in the Balkans.

Once again, Turkey and the United States are behind these new developments—two countries which "sympathize" with the problems facing Yugoslavia. These problems relate to Yugoslavia's national existence and to its increasingly deteriorating economic situation.

Other factors affecting the relations between Greece and Yugoslavia are the constantly improving relations between Greece and Albania as well as Bulgaria, countries with which Yugoslavia has "unsettled accounts" which flare up from time to time, making the relations between Greece and Yugoslavia even more difficult than they are already.

During the last 3 years, Turkey had embarked on a concerted effort to close ranks with Yugoslavia in order to use it in its Turkey's quarrels with Greece. It is certainly noteworthy that in the first quarter of 1984 at least three economic and cultural missions visited Yugoslavia, while last May two Turkish delegations had talks with the premier of the "Federal Republic of Makedonia."

The increase of bilateral contacts between Turkey and Yugoslavia are encouraged by the United States which has excellent relations with the Yugoslavs. These relations are not limited to economic cooperation. They extend to cooperation on military issues as well. The United States maintains on Yugoslav soil a network of installations which is connected with the worldwide network of electronic spying maintained by the United States.

In addition, American multinational giants such as General Dynamics have economic interests in Yugoslavia. These include plans for the joint production of industrial programs and certain programs related to products concerning the art of technology.
Late last fall, the American Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger visited Yugoslavia. There are now reports that in his talks with them Weinberger spoke of the "need" for some cooperation between Yugoslavia and the NATO member states, in order to deal with some "more general problems" that might come up and which are of interest to NATO as well. These problems relate to Yugoslav concerns over the situation on the northeastern and eastern borders of their country.

The Yugoslavs have had in the past contacts with Greece and Turkey on security matters. Such contacts included talks among the general staffs of the three countries. The Yugoslav generals as well as their civilian superiors expressed concern during the period between 1974 and October 1980 when Greece was out of the NATO military wing. There were, in fact, times when Yugoslav diplomats had passed messages (through their parties) to the Greek government on this issue. When Greece returned to the military wing of NATO the satisfaction of the Yugoslavs was evident.

Turkey, fully aware of these Yugoslav concerns and insecurities, saw an opportunity which was not to be left unused. For this reason, Turkey tries to improve even more its traditionally good relations with Yugoslavia. Already there are signs that, beyond the official bilateral contacts, this Turkish policy has begun to bear fruit.

It is not just an accident that the Yugoslavs have now begun to support discreetly the Turkish allegations about the treatment of the Moslem minority in Thraki.

It is noteworthy that last year in the Third Committee of the UN, dealing with human rights, the Yugoslavs supported the Pakistani question concerning the absence of a Moslem university in western Thraki.

The Yugoslav attitude is not accidental. Turkey also supports Yugoslavia in its quarrel with Greece over the "Macedonian question," aware of course that this is one issue that could cause problems between Greece and Yugoslavia.

These developments have not yet caused unbridgeable chasms in Greek-Yugoslav relations. Both countries believe that their good relations are in the common interest. But because there are others on the international stage who think that poor relations between Athens and Belgrade will serve their national interests, the relations between Yugoslavia and Greece may go through a period of controlled tension.

7520
CSO: 3521/338
PAPANDREOU CHINA VISIT DISAPPROVED

Athens TA NEA in Greek 20 Aug 84 p 4

[From MIKROPOLITIKA Column]

[Text] Premier A. Papandreou will perhaps go to China at Easter.

Initially, the trip had been set for May. It was postponed (because of a conference and the Euro-elections) until September. And the time for the trip is now being moved "to the end of winter or the beginning of spring."

In any case, the Chinese very much want this visit. For this reason they renew the invitation to the Greek premier to visit their country every time.

Because the Chinese insist that he spend no less than 10 days in their country, when is Mr. A. Papandreou going to find the time to go to China?

It will be very difficult for Mr. Papandreou to spend 10 days in China, especially in 1985 when there is to be the campaigning for two important elections.

China is a great country, I don't deny it, but will Mr. Papandreou drop important matters at that time to go junketing?

9731
CSO: 3521/345
GOVERNMENT ACCUSED OF BUNGLING FOREIGN POLICY

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 24 Aug 84 p 1

Between silence and shouts, with no other sound levels in between, is the range of official reactions to the issues touching on the complex Greek-American and Greek-Turkish relations. This phenomenon appears to be more spectacular lately. Understandable high notes and incomprehensible silences--and often the opposite--tend to be the dominant feature of the diplomatic speech of PASOK's government.

To mention specific events, the Turkish premier Turgut Ozal recently made two consecutive "friendship openings" toward Greece, proposing in part a freezing of the Greek-Turkish problems and the starting of cooperation between the two countries. His statements were transmitted officially by the Turkish news agency and by the international wire services.

Regardless of Ozal's actual objectives, the only reaction from the Papandreou government was that it waits for the full text of the statement, through official channels.

After a recent statement by Maroudas that at the governmental level there has never been and does not exist now anti-Americanism, almost the following day were broadcast statements by the premier and the government spokesman on the cancellation of the scheduled NATO exercise "Zeus". These statements castigated the United States and NATO for not recognizing the all-so-visible Turkish threat against Greece. This caused the cancellation by Greece of the exercise.

This was followed by the official reaction of the Pentagon, whose spokesman expressed regrets for the cancellation, saying with astonishing emphasis that the American government does not agree with the view of the Athens government that there is a Turkish threat against Greece! What was the reaction of the Papandreou government to this? The state radio and TV broadcast as the first item--a correct assessment, of course--the important statement of former premier Georgios Rallis! This was followed by a symbolic mini-statement by Maroudas read in a low voice...

On the same day the wire services carried an official statement by a spokes-
man of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, which termed as "ridiculous"--yes,
ridiculous--the claim of the Greek government that there is a Turkish threat against Greece. Until last night, 24 hours after this officially insulting statement was issued, there has been no reaction on the part of the Greek government!

What is the meaning of all this? What can a Greek citizen conclude? Fortunately, we had the courageous voice of Georgios Rallis who gave the proper Greek answer to every direction, with his familiar high sense of responsibility, patriotism, and political courage. In addition to this criticism of the bad moves by the PASOK government, he correctly criticized, "at least as unfortunate," the statement from the Pentagon which continues to ignore the Turkish threat and to keep silent on the question of Limnos.

While we praise the stand taken by Georgios Rallis, who with his patriotic initiative deeply satisfied public opinion, we are unfortunately obligated to criticize the Papandreou government for its so contradictory policies and for the concerns it causes. More specifically, with regard to the--rather insignificant--Zeus exercise, we must state that on the part of PASOK it was not a matter of wrong handling. It was a first-class blunder! And it is even worse still that when the government realized it had made a blunder, it tried "after the fact" to reverse gears, by lowering its tone. And by remaining silent at the very moment it should have spoken.

7520
CSO: 3521/338
NO MORATORIUM SEEN IN PASOK-KKE RELATIONS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 3 Aug 84 p 3

Article by Giannis Roumbatis

KKE is using harsh language in criticizing the government's decision to go ahead with the purchase of 80-100 fighter planes from the United States and France. The government, and indirectly PASOK, answered with an equally harsh tongue. Thus, once again in the last 8 months people are asking, 'what is the state of relations between PASOK and KKE?'

On occasion, many have spoken about cooperation between the two major parties of the wider Left, about an "idyll" between PASOK and KKE, about "summit agreements," about a "moratorium". Almost all of these analyses seem to leave out a "constant" which characterizes KKE's attitude toward PASOK. This "constant" is the KKE criticism over the way PASOK is "moving toward the Change."

Selectively, one could recall the "assessments of the KKE Central Committee on the recent developments" last February, the recent decision of the KKE Central Committee Plenum after the Euroelections, and a recent talk 3 weeks ago between this reporter and a leading KKE personality, to reach the conclusion that the disagreement between KKE and PASOK on the way PASOK is "moving toward the Change" is and remains real.

The KKE Politburo stated last February that "lately certain circles of the local and foreign establishment are trying to push the government's policy toward a more conservative direction, to bring it into confrontation with the progressive forces and to push it further away from the popular expectations."

The resolution of the Central Committee Plenum insists that "PASOK is at a crossroads. The electoral results objectively raise the question of PASOK's further course. Yet its leadership does not seem to draw the proper conclusions. It does orient itself toward the policy of the real change, but toward certain scattered, minor improvements, tolerated by the liberal bourgeoisie."
Finally, according to a leading KKE personality, the present government "has not understood something very serious," namely, that true change is impossible without a break with at least one part of the establishment. In essence, according to this source, the government and PASOK believe they can move forward to radical changes with the consent of the very forces that are hurt by those changes. This, in KKE's view, is preposterous.

The recent "sparring" between the two parties and between KKE and the government must be assessed by taking into account this constant in the criticism exercised by KKE for many months now. In essence, one cannot reach general conclusions on the relations of the two parties by isolating the statements on the purchase of the new fighter aircraft. In any event, the intensity of the criticism, as well as that of the reply, is raised. Yet, neither PASOK nor KKE appear prepared to move toward "a broader conflict," at least for the moment.

Of course, according to KKE, there are elements in the government's decision to buy the aircraft which show that if the purchase eventually takes place there will be wider repercussions, domestically as well as abroad.

"After such a purchase," according to KKE's Central Committee Politburo, "the Americans will move forward, unhindered, to impose their terms on domestic policies and anti-national solutions in our outstanding national problems."

However, in its latest resolution, the KKE Central Committee Plenum states that "the party will continue to shape its attitude toward the government on the basis of the program for real change and not merely on the partial pluses or minuses of government policies."

It appears, then, that for the time being, KKE will continue to shape its attitude toward the PASOK government on the basis of the above view of the Plenum. Both parties accept the dialogue but this does not mean an idyll or a moratorium between the two parties. According to the views of leading cadres in both parties, their differences are not going to disappear. However, for the moment, there is no indication that these differences will lead either party toward a confrontation that could create unbridgeable chasms between them in the future.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: POSSIBLE PAPANDREOU CANDIDACY

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 29 Jul 84 p 3

Article by Bousmbourellis

"Do you expect me to tell you now that what you wrote was objective? But you must know that in our country whoever attempts to be objective is attacked from both sides as is the case with me. The same thing will happen to you and you should know it..."

This was the short but public comment of the president of the Republic last Tuesday on what I wrote in this column last Sunday. This comment, coupled with the premier's statement that as far as he is concerned the elections must take place in October 1985, unless something unforeseen takes place unexpectedly, allow for a further examination of the prospects and possibilities in the next 14 months with greater disrespect and--since today is the last Sunday of July--with a summer disposition which could approach the limits of political phantasy.

A sense of things to come is the beginning of wisdom. No sooner was the celebrations for the Republic's anniversary over and the rumors began spreading. The notion to have PASOK nominate Karamanlis to a second presidential term appears to have created some reactions in the governing party's ranks (not that in the ND are several who suffer an allergy from the idea that they will support PASOK in a presidential election of a man whom they wanted to remain as their leader and whom they accuse of not having done so).

For this reason in his press interview last Friday, the premier made a fundamental clarification. He separated his position toward Karamanlis from the decision the Movement and the government will take when the time comes.

Earlier, however, during the meeting he held with the second group of PASOK deputies last Wednesday at the Maximos Mansion, the premier said, among other things, two phrases which have a special meaning. He said, specifically, that the question of Karamanlis' re-election is at this moment untimely and that this question does not exclude the possibility of holding early elections in June.
Since Karamanlis is withholding his decision whether to accept or not a second term and leaves the matter undecided until the last moment, it would, of course, be useless for Andreas Papandreou to commit himself now. This, however, does not change the position he has taken with his original declaration: "Do you see anyone who is better?" But he does not promote this position to the point where he can lose the possibility of intermediate handlings; to the point of creating the impression that henceforth all initiatives are only in the hands of the president.

The premier said also that the question of electing a president may lead to early elections in June. This will be a fateful ending, if Karamanlis finally decides for reasons of his own not to accept a second term.

A person to be elected president of the Republic by the present Chamber of Deputies needs 180 votes out of 300/7. The strength of the parties today is such that theoretically it is practically impossible for a person to get this majority of three fifths.

Thus, at the end of April, the failure of the present Chamber of Deputies to elect a president after successive unsuccessful votings, the Chamber should be dissolved and new elections should be declared. Then, according to the constitution, the new Chamber will elect the president with the simple majority system of "half plus one" or 151 votes.

From this point on we touch, if not go beyond, the boundaries of political fantasy. Because before we can visualize which party will have the majority after the new elections, we must clarify other more critical points. Not so much as concerns the climate in which the elections will be held, but as concerns the electoral system to be applied. Among all these future and uncertain things, one of them is certain. That the electoral system the government will introduce in the Chamber of Deputies in October will not be radically different from the one presently in force. It will not be the simple proportional first introduced by Papanastasiou, nor the two-round system which provides the distribution of 200 Chamber seats with the simple proportional system and the distribution of the remaining 100 seats among the first 2 parties in a second election on the following Sunday.

Therefore, if the elections are held with a proportional system less strengthened than the present electoral law provides, it will be necessary for the first party to receive a percentage somewhat higher than 42 percent—and enough luck in the seat distribution by regions—in order to win more than 151 seats and to elect its own president of the Republic.

In other words, if we reach that point—since we dare surpassed the limits of political fantasy—the logic of things and the dynamics of the pre-election struggle by necessity will lead to the personalization of the confrontation, to the claim of the presidency by Andreas Papandreou.

7520
CSO: 3521/338
POLITCIAL GREECE

POLL SHOWS OPPOSITION TO ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN, EXPENSES

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 5 Aug 84 pp 1, 5

The large majority of the public does not approve (on the contrary, it condemns) the style nor the methods of the recent pre-election campaign--and, naturally, it disapproves of the immense waste of money by the parties in the recent Euroelections.

This is the result of a public opinion poll taken by a specialized office on behalf of TO VIMA. The poll was conducted with internationally accepted scientific methods in the Athens-Piraeus area as a representative sample and its results have obvious political importance and value:

--Only 25 percent of the total asked agree that the expenses made by the parties helped to enlighten the voters.

--On the contrary, 72 percent do not agree or disagree completely that the pre-election tactics help to enlighten the electorate.

--Ninety four percent (almost everyone) fully or in part agree that the money spent by the parties could be used for public benefit projects.

--Of those asked, 77 percent doubt to some extent or absolutely the effectiveness of the means used (portable banners, posters, large gatherings). On this point both the PASOK and ND followers agree.

--The "sharpest" reaction of the public: 67 percent agree absolutely or in part that the parties wasted so much money because they "began to fear that the voter did not believe them so easily any longer."

--The voters' dilemma as well as his willingness to proceed with an "autocriticism" is evident in the following poll conclusion: 35 percent agree wholly or in part that "their party" did not waste money during the campaign. Yet, on the other hand, 50 percent disagree with this position and therefore believe that "the party it voted" did make unnecessary expenses. The same view is expressed by 54 percent of the PASOK followers and 64 percent of the ND followers.

Analysis of the Public Opinion Results
The analytical data of the public poll on the expenses and on the general behavior of the political parties during the recent campaign (Euroelections) are of special interest.

TO VIMA publishes the complete table of the answers given by those asked. By cross checking their answers, those asked were placed into categories according to their political views. This made it possible to find out how much the followers of a party would agree or disagree with the tactics of a noisy (and wasteful...) election while, on the contrary, other followers of another party would disagree. It is characteristic that the percentages of those who take this or that position do not differ considerably between them no matter to what party they belong. The pollsters asked the voters the following question:

"We heard or we have read that the parties spent a lot of money in the campaign for the Euroelections. We have listed some views on this subject. Each of these views will be read to you and tell us if you agree.""

The table shows the results to each question by the total of those asked, by the PASOK followers and by those of the ND:

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Horizontally = 100

a. These expenses should be made because only in this way could the voter be informed

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<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>PASOK</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>56</td>
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b. The money could be spent for public benefit projects--hospitals, children's parks, etc.

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<td>ND</td>
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<td>8</td>
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c. The money was wasted on posters, banners, gatherings which have no relation with the real enlightenment of the voters

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<td>PASOK</td>
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<td>ND</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
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33
d. I think the two large parties spent large amounts of money because they began to fear the voter did Total 44 23 11 14 8 not easily believe PASOK 39 25 13 19 4 them any more ND 50 17 15 8 10

e. I believe the party I voted did not waste any Total 20 15 12 38 15 money in the PASOK 18 19 14 40 9 campaign ND 18 5 11 53 12

The poll was conducted by the Metrix Research Center between 4 and 12 July for the Lambrakis Newspaper Organization. The sampling was limited to 800 men and women 15 to 64 years old. Of the total 52 persons or about 6 percent do not yet have the right to vote. These persons are between 15 and 19 years old.

The sample was representative for the country's whole population. On the basis of the numbered maps of the National Statistical Service which give the number of constructions and the population in each square, 110 squares were chosen for the interviews (8 in each square). All interviews were held at the home of those asked by specialized crews which are greatly experienced in this type of work. In all, 23 specialists were used, headed by 3 supervisors. The objectives of the poll were:

--How do (those questioned) assess the campaign for the Euroelections?

--What is their opinion about the results?

--What form of a campaign do they prefer?

The gathered data were transferred to tapes. The whole preparation was made on the basis of the special program, Quantrum of the Quantdata Company.

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<td>d. I think the two large parties spent large amounts of money because they began to fear the voter did Total</td>
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<td>e. I believe the party I voted did not waste any money in the campaign Total</td>
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CSO: 3521/338

34
COMMENTS ON CANDIDATES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Athens TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 9 Aug 84 pp 6, 7

Many months separate us from the presidential elections which many think will take place next May. But, since the term of the present president expires in May 1985, his election, according to Article 32, paragraph 1, of the constitution, must take place "at least one month before the term of the active president of the Republic ends." In other words, it must take place in April. The same article provides that "three votings must take place for the election of the president."

It is understood, however, that if Karamanlis is again the candidate and if PASOK supports (as is believed) his candidacy, no second vote will be necessary since he, with the help of ND, will have more than the two thirds (200) of the votes required as the constitution provides.

Another point which occupies those interested in the presidential election is whether there will be a second candidate for the office. It must be said that the constitution does not provide the procedure about "submitting names and nominating the candidates." But there is the Chamber of Deputies' regulation (Article 100, paragraph 2) which institutes almost the monopoly of the parties in nominating candidates. The regulation states specifically:

"Submitting nominations of candidates is not permitted nor are the names announced of those who have declared such intentions." And adds: "Ballots with the names of the persons nominated by the two parties as well as blank ballots are given to the deputies."

Despite these provisions of the Chamber of Deputies' regulation, some experts on the constitution insist that one should not exclude the election of a person even though he was not nominated by one party. Otherwise, they say, Article 31 of the constitution would spell out between "the qualifications of eligibility" of the candidate for president of the Republic and his nomination by a party. But such a definition is not included in Article 31.

I decided to write the above because many are there who examine--and re-examine--the question of the presidential election.

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CSO: 3521/338
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE DISCUSSED

Athens ENA in Greek 9 Aug 84 p 10

The question of premature elections seriously pre-occupied the government and PASOK's leading party cadres. Many ministers point out that it was a mistake not to hold the national elections in June together with the Euroelections and propose that they be held early—in the last months of this year or the first 2 months of 1985.

This fall is proposed as the best period since the increases the government gives employees (Public Power Corporation, Greek Tourist Organization, Communications, Athens Water and Sewage Company [EYDAP]) have not yet been budgeted nor the real confrontations for the new collective bargainings have not yet begun. It is thus believed that the climate would be more favorable to the government majority while even a possible change in the ND leadership would not have the time to bring about any results.

On the contrary, some ministers among whom National Economy Minister G. Arsenis are against the premature elections believing that the economic situation will be more favorable in the fall of 1985. They think that holding elections now would show defeatism with all its consequences to the electorate. Of course, those who propose that the government complete its full term have in mind only the "technocratic" facts and forget the "obstacle" of the presidential elections in May 1985.

It appears that the question of the time for the elections has not been definitely settled between the two top leaders of the country (K. Karamanlis and A. Papandreou). Perhaps it will be the main or the only topic of discussion at their new meeting which is expected to take place late in August or early in September.

Another question, that of the electoral law, is still under study since the preparation and evaluation of the data of the last Euroelection has not yet been completed. If the government decides to hold elections with a new electoral law, such election cannot take place earlier than the end of November since the plenary session of the Chamber of Deputies, which will vote the new law, will begin its sessions on 7 October.
If the government decides to complete its 4-year term, then in September or early October it must make its last reshuffle in order to give the impression to the public that "the government now works at a faster rate."

The reshuffling plans submitted to the premier are many. But he appears to have already rejected the prospect of drastically decreasing the number of ministries, not because he is against "a government with 15 ministers and without deputy ministers," but because such an action would not bring any improvement and could, moreover, create internal difficulties to the governing party.

The most prevailing plans of reshuffling appear to be two: one, proposed by the members of the Executive Office, refers to the limited "recycling" of the ministers and to transfers of some deputy ministers. The second is proposed by members of the premier's environment and calls for more substantial changes. Specifically, the second plan proposes two vice premiers, I. Kharalambopoulos and A. Tsokhatzopoulos, who would assume corresponding sectors of jurisdiction. Kharalambopoulos would take over the Ministry of Defense (K. Simitis would substitute him as minister of foreign affairs) and would assume the responsibility of overseeing the international relations.

Tsokhatzopoulos, while keeping the Ministry of Public Works, would also oversee the technical sector of the ministry as well as the other "independent" ministries (education and culture), while Gennimatas would assume the Ministries of Health and Interior. The other proposed changes are: the transfer of K. Laliotis--it is pointed out that "this is a matter he, himself, will decide"--to the Ministry of Agriculture or the transfer of K. Vaitos or V. Kafiris, present governor of the Agricultural Bank of Greece. It is proposed that Simitis assume the responsibility of all matters connected with EEC.

Finally, the plan calls for the elimination of the Ministry of Commerce and its merging with that of the National Economy. The plan also proposes some other limited changes of deputy ministers.
INTERNAL CHANGES IN ND ANNOUNCED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 12 Sep 84 p 1

[Text] Yesterday two significant changes were announced in the party of the official opposition in the context of the gradual changes that were expected after the change in leadership in the ND with the appointment of Mr. I. Varvitsiotis to the position of secretary general of the parliamentary group and of Vice Admiral I. Vasileiadis as director general of the party.

The Political Council, the informal, but supreme, organ of the party remains, as previously composed, of five members, "during the present stage," as reported in the announcement on the subject. The deferment of changes in this body is considered to be a recognition by the new party president, Mr. Mitsotakis, of the political prestige of its present composition. The only innovation is that the new secretary general of the parliamentary group will be invited to attend for matters within his jurisdiction.

More specifically, the following are contained in the announcement:

"The president of the New Democracy, Mr. Konstandinos Mitsotakis, accepted the resignation of director general, Mr. G. Matthaoudakis, and that of alternate director general, Mr. E. Kostopoulos, to whom he expressed his thanks for their priceless contributions to the party. Retired Vice Admiral I. Vasiliadis is appointed to the position of director general. The position of alternate director general, which is not contained in the statutes, is abolished.

"The position of secretary general of the parliamentary group will be held by deputy of the 2nd Athens District, Mr. I. Varvitsiotis, with the deputy of Fokis Mr. Nik. Ngelesthathis as alternate. The alternate general secretary is selected from among the younger deputies of the party and his term will be for 1 year.

"During the next party congress a proposal will be made to elect the secretary general by the parliamentary group.

"The Political Council will remain, in the present phase, a five-member body with its present membership which is composed of the president of the party, Mr. K. Mitsotakis, and Messrs. Kon. Papakonstandinou, K. Stefanopoulos, Ath. Kanellopoulos and I. Mboutos."
"The secretary general of the party, Mr. I. Varvitsiotis, will be invited to attend the Political Council's meetings for matters falling within his jurisdiction.

"The committee on elections, whose creation had been previously decided, will function under the chairmanship of the party president, Mr. Kon. Mitsotakis.

"Mr. Ath. Kanellopoulos is appointed chairman in charge of the ideological information and planning committee.

"Mr. I. Palaiokrassas is appointed chairman of the economic committee.

"A scientific and technical committee for updating and monitoring international political developments is created within the party."

Within the next few days it is expected that Samos deputy, Mr. Th. Sofoulis, who had been expelled 2 months ago, will return to the party.
ARMS SALE TO QADHDAFI DENIED

Athens EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 17 Aug 84 p 3

[Text] The various "disinformation" and intelligence services of the US have made a new attempt to slander Greece abroad for the purpose of allowing the Reagan administration to grant a greater amount of aid to Turkey.

In essence, they send "reports" to members of Congress that our country sold NATO military equipment to the Libyan government of Qadhdhafi.

Government circles questioned on the subject characterized these reports as being "unsubstantiated and false" and emphasized that there is, however, Libyan interest in purchasing arms of Greek manufacture. In any event, this matter has been the subject of talks, which took place in Athens last June, between Foreign Minister Giannis Kharalambopoulos and his Libyan counterpart, Ali Turayki.

The government again issued the statement made public on 22 June after the Kharalambopoulos-Turayki talks where no mention is made of the supply of arms to Libya while it does mention that a draft of cooperation in various areas, with the exception of the military, has been signed. Newspaper reports stated that the draft of cooperation contains a paragraph where Libyan interest is expressed in the purchase of arms of "Greek manufacture."

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CSO: 3521/345
LALIOTIS ON INTERNATIONAL YOUTH COOPERATION

Athens ELEVHEROTYPIA in Greek 23 Aug 84 p 6

[Text] The multilateral international relations for the development and promotion of programs and exchanges between youths of several countries and Greece are on a high priority list of the vice ministry of New Generation. This was emphasized yesterday by Deputy Minister Kostas Laliotis in a statement to the representatives of the press regarding the basic principles of a protocol of agreement of cooperation between Greece and Hungary, which was signed during his recent visit to that country.

The vice minister also remarked that the talks to reach similar agreements with the governments of France, Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, India, Sweden, Spain, Algeria, Yugoslavia and Cyprus are progressing well.

"It is natural, of course," Mr. Laliotis remarked, "that these relations with other nations on the youth and sports level go hand in hand with the foreign policy of our country, which is independent and multilateral."

More specifically, regarding the 2-year agreement which was signed for Hungary by the Secretary General of the State Committee for Youth, Mr. Sandor Nagyi, deputy minister for the New Generation, Mr. Kostas Laliotis, said that it includes:

Views on the existing plans for youths and the practical problems for their implementation.

Views on the work procedures and the ways for youths to spend their leisure time.

Different measures that help youth cultural activities as well as those that are related to the popularizing of tourism for youths.

The description, exchange and promotion of scientific work methods, both in competitive sports and the exchange of experience in the development and implementation of popular sports for the masses.

Afterwards, in referring to typical experiences of his visit, Kostas Laliotis dwelled especially on the municipal youth camps where children up to 14 years of age can, by paying 10 drachma per day, get involved in educational, training, recreational and sports programs for 10 hours daily. This helps their families
which, especially during the summer months, do not have a place to leave their children during their working hours.

"We believe," the deputy minister of the New Generation concluded, "that the development of international relations does not constitute a mere experience, a simple acquaintance and information. We believe that it opens the way for ties among youths from different countries with different traditions, civilizations, political and social systems. Ties of brotherhood, friendship and understanding."
CONSERVATIVE CONGRESS ELECTS NEW LEADERSHIP FOR 1985 ELECTION

New Chairman Addresses Congress

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Terje Svabø: "Chairman Erling Norvik to National Congress: Glow in Conservative Party to Return"]

[Text] "The objective must be to ignite the glow in all the almost 150,000 members who have the Conservative Party in their hearts. There must be more of an effort, optimism and faith in the future. Let every day be a Conservative day!" This was the message from the Conservative Party's newly elected chairman, Erling Norvik, when yesterday he thanked the party's national congress for its confidence. Norvik asserted that he is now going to a harder job than the last time he was chairman. The chairman stepping down, Jo Benkow, maintained, "You are not alone, Erling; everybody here in the auditorium will help you in the time to come."

Yesterday Jo Benkow handed back the chairman's gavel he himself took over from Erling Norvik four years ago. None of the two key people at the conclusion of the national congress bore traces of the bitterness which must have arisen in connection with the action to get Norvik back in the chairman's seat. Benkow and Norvik praised one another and assured the delegates that it is a united and agreed Conservative Party which is now starting the last lap toward the decisive Storting election in the fall of 1985.

In his concluding speech, Jo Benkow emphasized that the Conservative Party is now grouping forces and everyone has found his place and will do what they can. Regarding Norvik's future role, Benkow said, "Yes, Erling, we are certainly expecting much of you in the revitalization and revival movement you are now to begin."

Benkow made no secret of the fact that Norvik and the Conservative Party are now confronted with a tough job and that it is good that Norvik has been out in harsh weather previously, too.

The newly elected chairman pointed out that Jo Benkow had made an extraordinary contribution in two demanding jobs at a demanding time. Norvik recalled that even Kåre Willoch himself in 1974 requested to be relieved of the chairman's
post in order to be able to concentrate on his job as parliamentary leader.

"Not even Jo can do the job of two," Norvik said.

With reference to his departure as chairman in 1980, Norvik said that he knows from experience that it is not easy to go, but added that there are also situations in which it is not easy to come. With reference to his own re-entry into the chairman's seat, Norvik said that these days it is certainly most sensible to thank Benkow for his contribution during this period as chairman.

The newly elected trio of chairmen, Erling Norvik, Kaci Kullmann Five and Arne Skauge, at the national congress arranged a press conference. The questions to a great extent came to concern precisely the circumstances around the change in chairmen. Norvik was asked whether he thinks that the change occurred in proper form.

To this the Conservative chairman answered that both he himself and, probably to a greater extent, Jo Benkow, had preferred that the change had taken place in another manner. In spite of a number of questions, Norvik did not want to place the responsibility for the course of action on any particular person or group in the party. He denied quite firmly that Willoch had pressured Benkow out of the chairman's seat, and he added that the prime minister the whole time had advocated that the posts of chairman and parliamentary leader preferably should not be held by one and the same person.

To questions regarding what will now be the priority objectives of the Conservative Party, Norvik said that the national congress's conclusion was a demand for an increased effort in care for the elderly, the public health and social policy, and education and research.

Norvik firmly refused to give figures for future tax relief, but made it clear that there will be tax relief in the coming State budget. He answered a distinct no to the fact that the economic plan for 1985 will be easier to defend than that which was presented for the current year.

Kaci Kullmann Five Deputy Chairman

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Terje Svabø: "Narrow Victory for Skauge in Election Thriller"]

[Text] Erling Norvik and Kaci Kullmann Five were welcomed with acclamation by the Conservative Party's national congress to their new posts as, respectively, chairman and first vice-chairman. The expected election thriller regarding the post of new vice-chairman came true: Arne Skauge was elected with 188 votes versus Wenche Frogn Seløe's 171. The latter together with Per-Kristian Foss was unanimously elected as a member of the Labor Committee. The new Conservative leadership is gathering for its first meeting early today.
During the entire national congress the tension around the elections was associated with who would be the new second vice-chairman. There has never been any doubt that Erling Norvik would return as chairman and Kaci Kullmann Five would move up to first vice-chairman. The tension was first relieved when the count was finished and Arne Skauge with a majority of 17 votes could enter the party's executive committee of chairmen.

Arne Skauge and Wenche Frogn Sellaeg had two campaign speakers each, and in common to all four was the fact that they emphasized that the choice was between two very capable candidates. To Arne Skauge's advantage, his ability to be able to function daily as a vice-chairman was especially emphasized, including the fact that on Friday he takes over Erling Norvik's undersecretary's post at the prime minister's office.

Supporters of Wenche Frogn Sellaeg placed emphasis on her broad commitment in the public health and social policy and view of values. It was precisely Wenche Frogn Sellaeg's Christian foundation which was pointed out as important ballast to have for the Conservative Party's top leadership. However, she did not become vice-chairman, but one of the five elected at the national congress to the party's labor committee.

Workwise there is little doubt that the Conservative Party has now gotten an executive committee of chairmen which both can and will use the essential portion of its time on party work. Erling Norvik has been "set free" and will not have other work duties than the chairman's job. Kaci Kullmann Five will assure contact with the Storting group, and Arne Skauge with the government.

Polls which AFTENPOSTEN took after the elections indicate that individual delegates actually changed their opinion during the campaign speeches, to the benefit of Arne Skauge. Oslo Conservative Party Chairman Per Ditlev-Simonsen, who was one of Skauge's spokesmen, gets the credit for this. There is reason to believe that Skauge united approximately unanimous support in Sogn and Fjordane, Vest-Agder, Rogaland and Hordaland.

Wenche Frogn Sellaeg's strongest counties were to have been Hedmark and Oppland, in addition to her home county of Nord-Trøndelag. The remaining delegations, including the Conservative Women and Young Conservatives, were split in their view of who should be second vice-chairman.

The national congress also elected six members to the Conservative Party's central committee. The following five were re-elected here (votes in parentheses): Kari Vik Mariussen, Nordland (286), Jan Petersen, Akershus (318), Kari Thu, Rogaland (345), Hans Svelleland, Oslo (334) and Kristian Sundtoft, Aust-Agder (321). Tromsø Mayor Erlend Rian (339) became a new member of the central committee. Sør-Trøndelag's Fylkesting [County Chief Administrative Body] Chairman Ivar Ytreland was nominated from the floor but did not succeed with his 156 votes.
Erling Norvik has again taken over the chairman's seat in the Conservative Party. The national congress with a big ovation chose him to succeed Jo Benkow. We should believe that this spontaneous tribute from the party must have seemed reassuring and inspiring at the same time after a period which hardly can have been especially pleasant for those directly involved. The tolerance which is becoming of a party like the Conservative has been definitively re-established, and Norvik can set to work on his new revival movement with the sure conviction that he has a united party behind him. He will receive support and help in every nook and cranny of our long and narrow country.

Under the circumstances at hand, the choice of Erling Norvik was undeniable. When Kaci Kullmann Five was then just as naturally also clapped in as new first vice-chairman, the suspense at the national congress was exclusively concentrated on the post of second vice-chairman. So this ended with the fact that Norvik's successor as Willoch's undersecretary, Ex-Commerce-Minister Arne Skauge, won by a slim margin (188 to 171) over Wenche Frogn Sellaeg. This had to be of necessity natural, when the choice was between two candidates who, it could be argued, looked convincingly forward, as in this case.

We fully understand that this vision of stronger emphasizing of the Conservative Party as a conservative values party perhaps should grant that Frogn Sellaeg would be preferred. In terms of philosophy of life, she represents attitudes which always must be central in a party which was founded on Christian basic values. The high vote count for Frogn Sellaeg can, nevertheless, be interpreted as a vote of confidence, and her unanimous re-election to the Labor Committee provides a good platform for new offensives to the benefit of pliable policy lines.

For Arne Skauge, who has been characterized by many as the Conservative Party's "crown prince," it must be thought-provoking that his election as second vice-chairman was not regarded as more obvious. With the big challenges which confront him in his newly acquired positions, he will, however, have ample opportunity to show what he is good for. Skauge's versatility, ambitions and great capacity for work ought now to be able to be displayed completely and produce the results which very many in the party expect.

The new executive committee of chairmen implies a vitalizing of the Conservative Party's party organization and will quite certainly contribute to a bigger effort and activity on many different planes. So we for our part hope that the glow of enthusiasm which characterized the anniversary national congress will little by little be able to spread also outside the social hall and call forth new enthusiasm among non-socialist voters. Without this happening, one must certainly admit that the situation before next year's Storting election does not provide grounds for the quite great and unrestrained optimism.
From now to the election in 1985, the Conservative Party—like the remaining coalition parties—confronts an unusually difficult and demanding task. Mobilization in non-socialist quarters must again take place. It is for this reason not the least odd that hopes are being placed on Erling Norvik.
CENTER PARTY SEEN AS KEY IN 1985 ELECTION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Aug 84 p 19

[Article by Vesa Santavuori: "Center Party Success Decisive in Norway"]

[Text] As far as Norway's 1985 fall elections are concerned, the most interesting problem from a political and technical point of view will be how well the Center Party (SP) succeeds.

The so-called "5-percent threshold" applies in Norway. Any party that obtains more than 5 percent of the votes nationally, also obtains proportionately more representatives in the 155-seat parliament.

The Center Party in Norway now has 11 MP's in parliament. In the previous elections it received 6.59 percent of the votes. If the Center Party receives only 5 percent of the votes in the fall of 1985, its number of MP's will drop to approximately four or five.

Narrow Majority

A defeat of the Center Party in the main elections would also mean that Norway's right wing would lose the elections. The Conservative Party directs the coalition government, which includes the Center Party and the Christians. The parliamentary majority of the current government is, however, minimally small -- in many questions it is dependent on only one or two votes.

The manner in which the Conservative Party intends to secure its own victory in addition to raising the Center Party well above the dangerous 5-percent threshold will be an especially interesting question when one considers the elections.

Merits Up Front

Erlins Norvik, the new chairman of the party leading the Conservative Party's election struggle, answers the Center Party question very cautiously. He says that the main theme is only to relate what good the Conservative Party has accomplished in the government since 1981.
In this connection it is also recognized that the present government's policy has only been 60-percent right-wing. The political center's small parties have also been included for approximately the last year.

"We clearly intend to turn the 1985 fall vote into a government election," emphasizes Norvik. In other words, the choice will be either the present right-wing government or the transition of Norway back to a left-wing line. Ideological talk in the right wing and the left wing can very well have an effect on voters near the center.

On the other hand, a definite "distribution of money to the peasants" is not possible. The strict economic policy of Norway's conservative government will not permit an increase in budgetary expenditures in the form of subsidies, for example.

Also the left-wing opposition believes that the Conservative Party is merely striving to increase its own support figures. Even though the leadership of the Workers' Party recognizes the Center Party's attack as a "tactically interesting" problem, it will still consider its primary opponent in the election campaign to be the Conservative Party.

Four Central Election Themes

The government question, management of inflation, employment, and the media policy are those central questions by which the right wing and the left wing will determine their mutual superiority in next year's elections.

There are several ideologically clear questions of dispute. Among others things, questions such as whether advertisements should be allowed on radio and television, whose monopoly in Norway is now being rapidly dismantled, and whether additional money should be pumped into the management of employment.

Foreign policy is also being discussed, but according to the assessments its problems will not become burning issues inasmuch as there are no great upheavals in international politics. The Euro-weapon dispute is already over and nearly forgotten and no party dares to use the Treholt spy scandal to its own advantage.

10576
CSO: 3617/217
LUSOPHONE COUNTRIES' INDEPENDENCE SEEN IN NATIONAL INTEREST

Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese 14 Aug 84 p 3

[Commentary by Manuel-Maria Murias]

[Text] The so-called "model decolonization" has profoundly altered the geo-strategy of the entire world--thanks to the congenital stupidity of the American presidents of the last 10 years, thanks to the neocolonialist furor of most of the European governments, thanks also to the ravenous greed of the multinationals, which felt their interests would be more easily defended by dealing with black chiefs than with pragmatic and clear-thinking statesmen like Oliveira Salazar. The imbecility, the exaggerated idealism, the foolish ignorance and venality of the "April revolutionaries" also played a part, but they did not bear the greatest responsibility for the crime; it was primarily the great international imperialist powers, the Russians and the Americans, who have always considered the stubborn resistance of the Portuguese as the major obstacle to their plans for economic and revolutionary expansion.

If there was any virtue in the "decolonization," it was the preservation of the geopolitical borders of the former Portuguese overseas provinces, with the tragic exception of Timor and now the ludicrous conveyance of Macau, picturesquely delineated by Almeida Costa, to the great confusion of the Chinese. The big drawbacks were soon visible, in the strategic possibilities which [the decolonization] offered to the Soviets in waters never before navigated by the Russian fleet, in the disorder that was immediately installed in the "liberated" territories and in the hunger and the climate in health and education which is becoming more serious by the day.

Portugal went bankrupt as it lost its African markets. We are poverty stricken. Separated from the mother country, the new states were ruined when they lost their European market and the cadres that made their economy function productively. They are now living under the most archaic subsistence economy. They are going hungry.

After 10 years, also because of the stupidity and incompetence of our governments, mainland Portugal runs the risk of losing its political sovereignty to the FFC and, by the very nature of the economic phenomena, of being absorbed by Spain. The former overseas provinces all risk being "Timorized" or splintered according to the geostrategic interests of the great powers and of their more powerful
neighbors. Samora Machel has delivered himself, bound hand and foot, into the hands of the Republic of South Africa, which activates the Mozambican National Resistance whenever Mozambique resists its demands; Jose Eduardo dos Santos is watched over by the Cuban praetorians, at the mercy of UNITA, with less and less territory to govern; Sao Tome is transformed into an Angolan colony and hence a Cuban colony; Guinea-Bissau is having trouble defending itself from the expansionism of Senegal and Guinea-Conakry; Cape Verde has become the revolving base of the South Atlantic, living on the remittances of emigrants, the favors of South Africa and the good will of the Americans and the Russians, a tiny people tragically malnourished because of the continuous drought that, for centuries, could only be overcome with the nationalizing aid of Portugal.

If it proves impossible to define a common foreign policy for the six Portuguese-speaking countries (Portugal, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome, Angola and Mozambique), the next 10 years will see the political disappearance of these countries, victims of the "model decolonization," incapable, by themselves, of an effective and coherent defense against plutocratic and Marxist internationalism. Without the aid of the new Lusophone states, Portugal will soon be integrated in the Iberian Union. Without Portugal's aid, the former overseas provinces will soon lose their new independence, either annexed by more powerful neighboring countries or divided into several states, "protected" by other powers that are now taking advantage of ethnic differences to weaken them and institutionalize civil war.

So far, in Lisbon, the highest leaders, occupied with a diplomacy of "croquet" and with partisan games, do not appear to have taken notice of this process. In Lusophone Africa, at least Nuno Vieira has already cried out to the four winds; the announcement that the president of Guinea-Bissau had proposed that the Portuguese-speaking countries restore the escudo zone is inarguable proof that Commander Nuno Vieira has a precise vision of what the future holds for Guinea-Bissau if it does not reestablish strong relations with Portugal. This is the way to maintain the independence of a state whose only claim to sovereignty is that its official and common language is Portuguese. After the crime of "decolonization," it is our responsibility to maintain our own sovereignty, to defend the independence of Guinea-Bissau.

After the passing of a decade, and considering the political separation to be naturally irreversible, we must look to and look out for the future; we must defend the independence of the Lusophone states, in order to defend our own independence, threatened by Masonic Iberianism and by communist internationalism. We must start from the inescapable principle that we are all dependent on one another, politically, culturally and economically. Today Portugal is the only Western state that can take an interest in its former African territories without any notion of neocolonialism. It does not have the military and economic power for it. Our diplomatic actions (and the diplomacy of the former provinces) must be directed toward economic and cultural communitarianism, possibly arriving at a unitarian policy, after every possibility offered to us to form a community is exhausted.
ANGOLA'S JORGE BLAMED FOR LACK OF COOPERATION

Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese 14 Aug 84 p 21

[Article by Antonio Maria Zorro]

[Excerpts] The purpose of the ministerial conference of the five Portuguese-speaking African countries, held in Bissau during the first 3 days of last week, was— or appeared to be—to analyze the progress achieved with the cooperation program approved in December 1983.

Undesirable Paulo Jorge

Two conclusions emerged: for now, cooperation among the five countries lacks substance and, for now, the five are not interested in joint cooperation with Portugal. Whatever cooperation there is will have to be bilateral, and only what is possible, giving time for each of them to "clean house"—in the witty expression of the spokesman for the conference, who may have been referring to the rebellion in Angola and in Mozambique and the risks that cooperants run there.

In the interest of truth, it is noted that the five countries' shared indifference to cooperation with Portugal is somewhat odd, considering the lively interest which some of these five had shown in such cooperation in all areas. In this matter, the disappointment of the Bissau conference, with the foolish shattering of the hopes placed in it by Portuguese statesmen and businessmen, must be laid to the Marxist radicalism of the MPLA and its obedience to the Havana-Moscow axis.

Whether regarding Portuguese cooperation or the solution of the conflict between Luanda and Pretoria, the Conference of the Five was obviously sabotaged by Angola's Minister Paulo Jorge. The undesirable foreign minister of the MPLA is not the least interested in improving relations with Portugal as long as the Communists are not represented in the Lisbon government and, regarding South Africa, the only thing that is important to him is to keep it under the fire of international condemnation. It is Paulo Jorge who perpetuates the crisis between his country and Portugal, demanding as he does that the Portuguese Government scrap the right to freedom of information and prohibit the news media from referring to the civil war which is devastating Angola.
An awkward statement from our Foreign Affairs Ministry regarding Jaime Gama's conversation with Paulo Jorge, when Jorge was here in transit between Bissau and Luanda, sought to convince public opinion that this was "a constructive stage in establishing relations of trust between the two governments," but public opinion—which is not the same thing as the opinions which are published—did not and could not take seriously this "rubbish" from the tolerant and tolerated tenant of the Palacio das Necessidades.

It is quite clear that, in the audiences with his Sao Tomian, Mozambican and Angolan counterparts, granted in the ashes of the Bissau conference, Jaime Gama mainly wanted to disguise the disappointment which the final communiqué of the Five represented for his government. But it was not worth the trouble to fret so much over so little. If the audiences with Sao Tome's Maria da Graca Amorim and Mozambique's Joaquim Chissano actually served to discuss some viable possibilities for bilateral cooperation, in the case of Angola's Paulo Jorge, it was a waste of time. It was simply an attempt to renew an impossible dialogue.

The MPLA of Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Paulo Jorge does not want dialogue with anyone—it only wants to carry the despotism of its regime to the final consequences, the abandonment of a people to wretchedness and hatred. Moreover, a foreign minister of the likes of Paulo Jorge, who permits himself to demand the reestablishment of censorship in Portugal, is not anyone to be received at the Palacio das Necessidades—unless it is to box his ears which he has so richly deserved for a long time.

6362
CSO: 3542/115
EANIST PARTY PROMOTERS CONDUCT LARGE-SCALE CAMPAIGN

Lisbon 0 JORNAL in Portuguese 24-30 Aug 84 p 36

[Article by E.A.]

[Text] While the big parties are relaxing, the promoters of the future Eanist party are taking advantage of the summer holidays to dynamize the new party formation through a major campaign at district and municipal levels throughout the country.

The document containing the basic program of the future party—for the time being, a "letter of intent," which came out of the Abrantes meeting—is being debated at the national level, after being broadly disseminated by the structures of the former CNARPE [National Action Committee to Reelect President Fanes].

According to [a] source connected with the new party formation, this 42-page document, authored mainly by Lt Col Melo Antunes, defines some ethical-cultural principles considered essential to a new model of society.

A large portion of the document is devoted to political organization and to the role of the state, from a perspective favoring a stronger presidential weight in the regime. It defends the suitability of partially revising the electoral system and the vital need for real regionalization.

The letter of intent, to which 0 JORNAL has already referred in general terms, also urges the need to overcome the current situation of degradation, skepticism and resignation, so as to create "new hope," as the document declares.

Social Democracy

Several district meetings were held during July and August. Many of them were well attended and, according to a former CNARP source, through the contacts that were made, it was possible to put together a "quite impressive picture " of the interest and curiosity which the new party is arousing.

The same source said the movement is picking up adherents at a good pace; he specifically noted the statements from several dozen local leaders and cadres of various party affiliations.
The source alluded to very specific statements from PSD [Social Democratic Party] presidents of chambers, as well as district political leaders of this and other parties, expressing an interest in closely following the activity undertaken by the supporters of the former CNARPE.

However, many of these comments revealed a certain amount of ideological confusion. In the end, it is asked, what is the party going to be? "It will be in the social democratic area," answer the major promoters. But which social democracy—that of the PSD or of the PS [Socialist Party]? And how will General Ramalho Eanes appear publicly in this context? How to overcome conflicting readings or divergent ideas as to how to reach the same objective? These are some other questions that come up persistently.

National Meeting in September

Meanwhile, along with the district meetings and the action to establish the future party at the municipal level (a phase which the promoters identify with the need to broaden and strengthen the base of support), it has already been announced that a great national meeting will be held in September, at a location to be announced. The promoters are planning to use this meeting to assess the situation, to put together the data and references that will be channeled to the various organizing committees and, after that, to proceed with immediate action to define a general strategy to consolidate the work that has already been done.

Presidential Candidate

The Lisbon meeting, to be held next month, is being organized with extreme caution. The question of the presidential candidate will not even be aired, according to sources close to the former CNARPE, which does not mean in the least that the subject of the presidential elections is being forgotten by those who are directly involved in the birth of the future political party.

No definite choice has been made yet, not for reasons of political timeliness or untimeliness but, according to the same sources, because the question is unquestionably sensitive and there are not many solutions to it. A military candidate, perhaps, but what candidate? A candidate who could take votes away from the PS but who could also make inroads in the PSD. "And this candidate," a reliable source told us, "cannot be Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, whom even the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] says does not correspond to the profile of a candidate who could attract the communist vote.

"The PCP itself," the source added, "does not look favorably on a candidate who is unable to penetrate the social democratic area, which is the only way to emerge the victor."
GOVERNMENT DECIDES ON HUMANITARIAN AID TO AFGHANISTAN

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 31 Aug 84 p 8

[Article by Ingrid Synnemar]

[Text] The government decided Thursday to give the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan 5 million kronor for continued humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan. In addition the government approved a contribution of 4 million kronor for aid to Afghan refugees living in Pakistan.

"The money is to be used for continued efforts at the Swedish clinics inside Afghanistan and the funds are not tied to a certain time period," said Peter Ekelund of SIDA [Swedish International Development Authority].

This means that the catastrophe aid from SIDA will be distributed in October, but it will not necessarily have to last until next October. If the funds run out before then the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan can request more money from SIDA.

Before this the committee has received a total of 5.5 million kronor from SIDA's catastrophe fund.

The government's decision was announced Thursday morning at a press conference with Swedish freelance journalist Anders Fange, who recently returned to Sweden after spending 3 months with various guerrilla forces inside Afghanistan.

Anders Fange, who used to be the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan's representative in Peshawar on the Pakistan border, went to Afghanistan with photographer Henrik Alderin on 2 May and returned to Pakistan at the beginning of August.

"People say it is so risky to go in, but 90 percent of the time we traveled through a peaceful landscape, a pastoral idyll even though one could hear bombs at a distance on the other side of the mountains," Fange said.

Minutes later he told of a Soviet offensive with high-altitude bombs in Panshir Valley. He was forced to flee into nearby mountains and spent a week there with civilian refugees.

6578
CSO: 3650/276
TIES WITH LABOR MOVEMENT SEEN DECISIVE FOR 1985 VOTE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Sep 84 p 8

[Commentary by Sven Svensson]

[Text] The "war of the roses," the many jousts over next year's wages and the clouds of scandal surrounding the closing of STOCKHOLMS-TIDNINGEN—unity in the labor movement is now being put to a hard test. The tension in the government party is the most prominent feature now that the political season is really getting under way. The Social Democrats will hold their congress 2 weeks from now and the election is just a year away.

Over the summer Olof Palme became something of a crisis-ridden king at Rosenbad. Restoring domestic peace in the social democratic labor movement became the primary task, ruling the nation had to take a back seat. The tension in the Social Democratic Party livened up the nonsocialist opposition, which regarded the conflicts with growing satisfaction.

The war of the roses, the jousts over 1985 wages, the civil war over Swedish defense and the scandal-clouded closing of STOCKHOLMS-TIDNINGEN all sorely tried the unity of the social democratic labor movement.

Will these divisions, which have brought such undisguised joy to the opposition, last until the 1985 election?

It is certain that all these conflicts will still be in existence in some form by the time the 1985 election comes around. That is why words of warning are being heard from old Social Democrats like former Foreign and Defense Minister Sven Andersson as well as from construction worker boss Bertil Whinberg. Stop fighting among yourselves, the warnings say.

Restoring Order

Therefore Olof Palme, as prime minister, must restore order to things so he can govern the nation on a full-time basis. The idea is that Deputy Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson will handle the party up to the election while Olof Palme takes care of the nation.
We will see when the SDP congress is held in mid-September if this division is likely to succeed.

History has generally shown that in critical situations Social Democratic Party leaders have had to step in to straighten things out. That was the case in Tage Erlander's day with regard to the Swedish atomic bomb and the forms of affiliation with the European Community and it was also the case in Per Albin's day.

Raising Taxes

During their lengthy period at the head of the government, the Social Democrats in the past shared the prosperity through rising production and higher taxes. Now it is not possible to raise taxes. Instead the problem is to divide up real wage reductions in a fair way.

That is an uncommon situation and there is no government routine to cover it. And in addition while in the opposition, but perhaps especially during the 1982 election campaign, the Social Democrats committed themselves to increased public spending.

The campaign promises have created headaches in the government office building.

That is why Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt has devoted himself in interview pamphlets and elsewhere to demolishing some of the most popular Social Democratic myths.

It is not popular to be reminded of the crude realities of the mixed economy. It has led to a conflict between Kjell-Olof Feldt and, among others, the new LO [Federation of Trade Unions] chairman Stig Malm, who was appointed to guard the interests of 2 million wage earners.

In this situation Olof Palme has been forced to try to keep the peace between two power centers in the social democratic labor movement. Palme cannot repudiate Feldt, for that would break up the government, and he cannot back Feldt, because then Malm would rebel.

That is the background of the war of the roses. The war will probably keep going indefinitely. Not even a sharp increase in production would solve the state fiscal crisis since in that case wage earners would just demand even larger wage increases after 7 lean years. The money that would flow into the treasury as a result of higher wages would probably be used up several times over by new budget demands, the campaign promise on improved parental insurance, pensions, etc.

But why doesn't Palme dare tell Malm off?

It looks as if Palme believes that the age of miracles is not over. After all any other government alternative would be so much worse for Malm than the present one.
And many marginal voters will be hanging on a thin thread if Malm gets a chance to repeat his demand for a freeze on marginal tax reductions.

If the government as a whole is to survive the 1985 election in view of the current economic situation, it is necessary to reduce inflation. That will require lower wage demands for several years to come, for it will not be possible to back up wage increases that are too large with yet another devaluation.

Tearing Their Hair

The government's talks with the labor market factions have fastened the employer label on Palme and his government colleagues. The government sounds just like the gentlemen in Blasieholm. Many wage earners around the country are undoubtedly tearing their hair in sheer amazement.

What is the aim of these talks?

At least one of the aims is educational. An effort is being made, with the help of the mass media, to tell the Swedish people that they cannot ask for immoderate wage increases without affecting employment and the social safety net.

The educational effort is aimed directly at various branches of the social democratic labor movement.

The government has had at least one success. LO has given a verbal promise to limit wage increases to 5 percent in 1985.

We will have to wait and see what really happens. But there will be no agreement to present when parliament opens in October. The government will be disappointed there. It may be possible to blame things on the private employers in SAF [Swedish Employers' Association], who are desperately opposing the demands of a coordinated contract movement.

Kjell-Olof Feldt's poetic sigh on the wage earner funds probably came straight from the heart. The government is not much taken with the wage earner funds and they are primarily a concession to LO.

What is now known is that the funds will not help to restrain wage demands and that journalists will be appointed at 400,000 kronor a year to head the various funds. This will not be much of an asset in the Social Democratic arguments in the next election campaign. So far the bold investments in the future have not amounted to more than stock purchases in ASEA [General Electric Company] and Electrolux.

STOCKHOLMS-TIDNINGEN was started before the 1982 campaign with the help of Social Affairs Minister Sten Andersson, Industrial Affairs Minister Thage G. Peterson and vice chairman of the Metalworkers' Union Sivert Andersson.
Abrupt

Now LO has demonstrated its power by abruptly forcing a bankruptcy in the best capitalistic style.

Olof Palme has taken this bankruptcy very hard. The shutdown could also be very costly to the Social Democrats in the next campaign. The whole affair has an inherent and self-perpetuating dynamics that could peak right around the time of the next election. Then it would be hard for the non-socialist parties, who have been almost totally silent this summer, to conceal their glee.
ARMAOGLU POSITIVE ON TURKEY'S 'ARAB ALTERNATIVE' 

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 4 Sep 84 p 4

[Article by Professor Fahir Armaoglu :"A Changing Turkey"]

[Text] It is impossible to claim that the legislative guidelines the great Ataturk gave the Turkish nation did not take root. And it is probably for that very reason that it is equally impossible to think of turning away from those guidelines. Westernization and secularization are chief among those guidelines.

However, it is also a fact at the same time, in particular as the result of the fast development and changes of which Turkey was the scene in the past 20 years, that some changes have occurred, even if not in the essence, in the application of those guidelines. The democratic regime which we have adopted is one of the most important factors that have played a part in this respect. The free debate climate of democracy affects even fundamental concepts to which we have become used and attached and it inevitably gives rise to some alternatives to those concepts. In other words, in democracies it is not possible to preserve concepts for a long time within their initial molds. This has also been the case for Turkey in the past 20 years.

Foreign policy developments in recent years added 2 new elements to this situation. One of them is the constant rejection of Turkey by the West and against that the increasing importance Turkey gives to its relations with the East, that is with the Arab and Moslem world.

Essentially, both elements carry their own numerous complexities or, at best, their paradoxes. For one thing the West, from the standpoint of military views and concepts, is at one with Turkey but at the same time, from the standpoint of the philosophy of life and social concepts, it rejects Turkey and keeps it at arm's length. The West is worried about the possibility of some kind of manipulation Turkey might concoct from the strategic standpoint and while it rejects Turkey from the viewpoint of social concepts, at the same time it fears that Turkey might come to belong entirely to the East. For it is well aware of the changes in the balance of power that would result from adopting such a position.

This stance of the West turns the East into an alternative for Turkey. But while Turkey avails itself of this alternative it is also careful not to cut itself off entirely from the West. No matter what, it cannot be denied that this new alternative is a far more profitable one for Turkey.
And the most important result of Turkey's "Eastern factor" is that it puts it in touch and even in communication with "Eastern Culture" which has the Islamic element. If one takes into consideration that with every passing day "Islamic Radicalism" prevails in this culture, our joining the Middle East and those cultural exchanges will inevitably influence some of our fundamental concepts and lead to some changes in those concepts.

12278
CSO: 3554/314
OYMEN DETAILS 'MENU' OF OZAL-GENSCHER MEETING

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 5 Sep 84 p 7

[Article by Orsan Oymen in The Column "The Political Cauldron": "The Turks Are Coming"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] As you are reading these lines Premier Turgut Ozal has not yet sat at the table with the German Premier Kohl and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher.

They are to have a private lunch together.

The fact is that while Ozal's trip to Germany is private it has acquired willy nilly an official character.

And for that reason the lunch menu is also different:


Ozal is a sharp premier.

He timed his trip in such way that both the German Premier Kohl and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher are on tenterhooks.

For one thing, as soon as the Bonn Parliament opened and the political chronometer began ticking away, a debate which tended to turn to ashes within the coalition government was rekindled:

/-The Issue of Foreigners./

Meaning in Turkish:

/-The Turkish Question./

On the very first day that he assumed his functions, in his first television interview, Premier Kohl let the cat out of the bag:

"The number of Turks in Germany has far exceeded limits; we will decrease that number."/
Was it possible that the slogan "Turken raus"/ that is: "Turks out"/ which is written on Berlin walls was taken up in the government program in an overt manner?

Something of the sort.

The Minister of Labor Blum who says he was the first guest worker in Turkey since he hung the chandeliers of the State Theater, has prepared a law which encourages Turkish workers to return voluntarily to their country. It is called the "paid return"/ but it is in fact a system whereby the premiums paid out by the worker himself are reimbursed to him without interest. It is an accounting game which ensures in the long run a 2.5 billion mark profit to the German Retirement Fund by incorporating voluntary renunciation of social rights.

This year over 100,000 expatriates jumped head first on this voluntary exodus.

By the end of September, according to official figures, 300,000 Turks and their families will have returned home.

We read in the papers:

The children of those who are returning are learning the Turkish National Anthem and about Ataturk in "adaptation"/ courses.

And so were 300,000 deducted from the numbers of Turks in Germany?

Indeed they were.

But presumably the Kohl government is still not satisfied with this figure which rather exceeds their initial estimates since Minister of the Interior Zimmermann is now hanging on to a new law:

"Those who live here must not bring over their children who are older than 6."

"Young people who marry in their country must not bring over their spouses."

In other words husbands and wives must live apart.

The Law on Foreigners will end up legislating on the Turks conjugal life.

If the liberal wing of the coalition, the FDP, had not opposed this, it would have happened a long time ago.

The Constitution, family life [untranslatable pun], human rights are in a turmoil.

And so on the very eve of this dispute Ozal arranges for a private trip to Germany.

And just before this trip, Premier Kohl and the minister of foreign affairs Genscher started beseeching their fellow party members who had began to fight among themselves:

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"Friends, quit fighting, stop, desist, do not, Turgut Ozal is coming."

This - Ozal is coming - warning brings to mind the method Viennese parents used in the past to make naughty children go to bed:

"The Turks are coming."

The idea that lies behind the nightmare of "The Turks are coming," is "The right to move freely for Turkish workers," which will come into force in 1986 in accordance with the EEC agreement.

15% of our workers who are in Germany and 20% of those who are in Turkey are moving about freely at present, their hands in their pockets, in front of employment agencies.

The real issue for Germany is the following.

What if to the 15% who are already here the 20% who are in Turkey are added? Because of that they intend to shut the gates ahead of time.

Ozal is sharp. He is aware of Germany's nightmare.

He will use his trump card beautifully.

"Do not press us too hard or else we will come," he will say. To which they will reply: "Do not let the Turks comes, better that we go there."

They will soften a bit the law on foreigners. They will extend further military aid. As a government they will not talk too loudly about human rights, the DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Unions], the MISK [Confederation of Nationalist Labor Unions (NAP-associated labor confederation)]. They will lean heavily on Kapikule, with their atomic power plants which they were unable to sell to their own people, with their airbuses which they could not even get Lufthansa to order, with their M.A.N. factories and their chamber of commerce and industry branches.

It looks like wily Ozal will not return empty handed from Germany.
MISSION, STRUCTURE, WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF NAVAL AIR ARM

Stuttgart MARINE RUNDSCHAU in German Jul 84 pp 300-305

[Article by Rear Admiral Juergen Dubois: "Naval Aviation--The Arrow of the Fleet"]

[Text] History

By means of the order "Construction of an Aircraft Suitable for the Navy" in 1910 from Admiral Tirpitz to the imperial shipyard in Danzig, the then state secretary of the Reich Naval Office laid the cornerstone for a naval aviation component in the fleet.

On 1 June 1913, by a "supreme cabinet order," followed the command to construct an independent organization, when a "Naval Flying Section" in Putzig (near Danzig) and a "Navy airship section" in Johannistal were formed. The task given the Navy was initially limited to reconnaissance tasks, but during the course of World War I it was expanded to include combat duties. The reason for this lay in the extremely rapid development experienced during this period by the new means of naval warfare.

The first phase of the Navy flyers ended with the close of World War I. Not until 1932, after the relaxation of the Versailles Treaty regulations, did the training of Navy flyers resume. After the declaration of military sovereignty in 1935 they began to rebuild their organization. On 1 February 1939, by creation of the position of a Luftwaffe General within the office of the commander in chief of the Navy, the Navy flyers were administratively and tactically incorporated into the newly created Luftwaffe branch. During World War II this action contributed decisively to the failure of promising naval operations.

Because of these momentous experiences, the members of the American Naval Historical Team in 1951 decided again to propose that the flying forces be integrated into the Navy. In addition to dealing with the experiences of World War II, this body had to develop a concept for a German naval contribution to the European Defense Community. Besides Vice Admiral Ruge (ret), Admiral of the Fleet Schniewind (ret), Vice Admiral Heye (ret), Rear Admiral Wagner (ret) and Rear Admiral Godt (ret), Colonel on the General Staff Walter Gaul (ret) belonged to the group, which later in the Blank Office had a considerable share in the implementation of the plans for the Navy's own flying units. The studies drawn up by Rear Admiral Wagner (ret) foresaw, in addition to the surface units, the establishment of:
--2 groups of 66 combat aircraft
--2 groups totalling 84 fighter aircraft
--1 group of 30 helicopters
--1 group of 30 reconnaissance aircraft and
--1 naval aviation training group.

The entire contingent was to be distributed among three naval air bases. This attempt at planning is of interest as it almost corresponds to the dimension later arrived at. On 16 June 1957 former General Staff Colonel Gaul as Captain took over the command of the Navy fliers, later the Navy Flying Command. Over the following years, in addition to training the flying and technical personnel, expansion and supply of the naval air bases and implementation of the task force aircraft operation, the organization of the Navy fliers was expanded in a concentrated manner. By 11 July 1969 the Navy Flying Command had advanced to a Navy Flying Division. The assignment of duties, which is valid even today, is the following: "The concentration of specialized duties, which in the naval forces have been assigned to the various special and technical commands, demonstrates an effort to place a competent naval staff opposite the various Air Force staffs, which are occupied with naval aviation matters. This is also demonstrated by the necessity of being competent in all those matters, which for reasons of personnel and expertise cannot be undertaken by other Navy staffs."

The expansion and equipment of the Naval Air Squadron with aircraft and technical equipment took place parallel with the buildup of the staff of the Naval Air Division. At present naval aviation with about 7,000 members makes up about one-third of the fleet; they are not only an integrated component of the fleet, but its largest and most powerful type command.

Threat

The main objective of the Warsaw Pact in the event of war will be to break NATO's sea links, in particular in the North Atlantic, and hence the "sea lines of communication between the United States of America and its European allies." In order to achieve this goal the Baltic Fleet must push into the Atlantic. That route leads directly through the operational area of the German Navy. On the other hand, the naval forces of the Warsaw Pact already operating in the Atlantic and in the Norwegian Sea would need access to the Baltic Sea, since about 50 percent of the shipyard and repair capacity of the Soviet Union is located there. Extensive operation in the Atlantic presumes that the Warsaw Pact will succeed in acquiring control over the approaches to the Baltic Sea. For this a multitude of different means of naval warfare is available to the Warsaw Pact. The concept of a "balanced fleet" is motivated by being able to counter effectively this complex potential.

* Excerpt from the "Hinweise und Erläuterungen zum Teil I A der StAN MfIgDiu" [References and Explanations for Part I A of Strength and Equipment Information for the Naval Aviation Division], finally enacted on 24 Feb 1971.
Task

"In modern naval warfare there is almost no task, to the fulfillment of which aircraft do not directly or indirectly contribute." This statement by former Navy Inspector General, Admiral Luther (ret), explains the extensive importance of naval air forces. But it also makes it clear that the Navy fliers do not have an independent task. Their duties are derived from the mission of the Navy. They are embedded in the duties of the fleet and refer exclusively to naval warfare. From the generally formulated instruction—commanding the war at sea from the air—the following main duties can be derived:

a) Reconnaissance and carrying out surveillance at sea in the Navy's operational sectors,

b) Combat enemy surface forces and landing units, as well as other enemy traffic at sea,

c) Combat enemy submarines,

d) Carry out search and rescue operations,

e) Undertake transportation of personnel and materiel,

f) Electronic and signals intelligence.

Organization

Just as other types of commands, the Naval Aviation Division, in which the airborne weapon systems of the Navy have been concentrated, is an integrated component of the fleet. The staff consists of the classic admiral staff divisions for personnel, intelligence services, operations, logistics, and telecommunications, as well as the special staff sections air safety, medical services, administration and geophysics. The Naval Air Division has 4 wings, MFG 1, 2, 3 and 4 under it. The commander of the Naval Air Division is responsible to the commander of the fleet for the establishment and maintenance of operational readiness by the Naval Air wings he commands. This chain of command assures uniform leadership for all means of naval warfare and thus unlimited control over the naval fliers by one commander in chief (see Fig. 1).

The structuring of a Naval Air Squadron corresponds essentially to the organization and structure of an Air Force Wing (Fig. 2). All four naval air squadrons are headed by a commodore, under whom a wing staff and 3 groups, the Flying Group, the Technical Group and the Air Base Group are ranked. The squadrons subordinate to the group commanders constitute the lowest command level (company) in the division area.
Weapon Systems

In the buildup phase of the naval aviation components in 1958/59, the squadrons were equipped with the following weapon systems:

--68 Sea Hawk naval fighter bombers
--16 Gannet submarine-hunting aircraft
--6 Pembroke training and supply aircraft
--4 Sycamore rescue helicopters
--4 Skeeter communications helicopters
--5 Albatros amphibious aircraft
--5 Fouga Magister jet trainers
--9 Dornier 27 communications aircraft
--5 Piaggio communications aircraft

Due to the technical progress and development of modern weapon systems over the last 25 years, these aircraft were soon obsolete. Meanwhile, the third generation of combat aircraft is being given to the wings.

MFG 1

Naval Air Wing 1 at Schleswig-Jagel is equipped with 2 squadrons of naval fighter bombers of type PA 200 Tornado. With the introduction of this weapons system the naval aviation forces experienced a considerable increase in combat efficiency, which is based on

--the 2-man concept
--a significantly greater weapons load
--better penetration capability in an enemy environment
--greater range and longer staying power in the operational area.

The duties of the naval fighter bombers equipped with air-to-surface missiles, rockets and bombs consist in eliminating enemy surface forces, in particular protected landing units. Armament with long-range air-to-surface missiles puts the aircraft crew in the position of attacking enemy surface forces outside the range of antiaircraft weapons. This fact, as well as the capability of defense by means of air-to-air rockets against enemy fighters, increases the penetration capability. Considerable self-protection is afforded by utilizing the active as well as passive electronic countermeasure equipment.

The complexity of the Tornado weapons system requires particularly intensive training of the crew's pilot and weapons system officer. High effectiveness is achieved with competent use of the programmable navigation and attack system, the flexibility of the entire system and the means of self-protection.

MFG 2

Naval Air Wing 2 is stationed at Eggebek by Flensburg. It commands 1 squadron of naval fighter bombers and 1 squadron of reconnaissance aircraft of type
Key to Fig. 1:  1) Commander of the fleet  5) Patrol boats
               2) Amphibious units  6) Minesweepers
               3) Supply units  7) Destroyers
               4) Submarines  8) Naval Aviation Division

F-104 Starfighter, which in 1986 will be replaced by the Tornado weapons system. The duties of this wing are equivalent to those of Naval Air Wing 1. The aircraft of one squadron are equipped with cameras and are used as reconnaissance planes. The armament of the Starfighter includes:

--500 Kilograms of bombs,
--70-mm rockets
--Cluster bombs consisting of 146 bombettes
--Sidewinder air-to-air missiles
--20-mm aircraft cannons
--Kormoran air-to-surface missiles.

Defense against the Kormoran missile, as well as its aiming system is extremely difficult, since it approaches its target at low altitude and is self-guiding. Additional development of the Kormoran and its integration into the Tornado weapon system began in March 1983.

The weapons effects of the naval fighter bombers are sensibly and effectively complemented by a guided missile of type HARM (High Speed Anti-Radiation
Missile), which approaches and destroys electromagnetic radiation. This anti-radar weapon is characterized by high speed and long range. Even with a very brief emission of radiation by the radar equipment, this guided missile is capable of homing in on its target and destroying it.

MFG 3

Naval Air Wing 3 at Nordholz near Cuxhaven has the task of carrying out long-range reconnaissance at sea, submarine hunting and electronic communications intelligence. For these duties it has available two squadrons of type MPA (Maritime Patrol Aircraft) Breguet Atlantic and one squadron of type Mk 88 Sea Lynx (helicopter).

Key to Fig. 2:

1) Commodore
2) Wing staff
3) Flying group
4) Technical group
5) Air base group
6) 1st, 2d, 3d Squadron
7) Aviation operations
8) Geophysics
9) Air base fire squad
10) Maintenance
11) Repairs
12) Electronic Warfare Squadron
13) Supplies
14) Security Company
15) Anti-aircraft squadron
16) Motor vehicle squadron
17) Health
18) Maintenance Squadron
19) Marine protection company
The Breguet Atlantic, which has had its combat capability increased in the last 3 years, has, in addition to the sensors needed for submarine hunting, a modern radar, a precise inertia navigation system and a computer-supported ECM facility. This equipment enables the crew to produce an exact picture of the situation and to transmit it to the commander at sea. Yet another of the wing’s duties is to safeguard convoys against enemy submarines. Armed with torpedoes and depth charges this weapon system constitutes a major threat to enemy underwater combat forces. The task given the wing can be accomplished until the 1990’s with the aid of these systems. Five aircraft of this type are equipped with sensors for electronic communications reconnaissance.

In addition, Naval Air Wing 3 has a third squadron, which is equipped with ship-based helicopters. These are deployed on 122-Class frigates and are equipped with diving sonar as well as anti-submarine torpedoes. The duties of the helicopter crews is to trace and fight enemy submarines located outside the range of their own surface units. With their capability for target data transmission they also enable their own surface forces to utilize fully the situation and the range of their missiles, which is greater than its finder range.

MFG 5

The duty of Naval Air Wing 5, stationed at Kiel-Holtenau, reads: Undertake rescue operations as well as transport and liaison flights. The first squadron is equipped with the type Mk 41 Sea King helicopter and conducts SAR (Search and Rescue) missions in the North and Baltic seas, while the second squadron uses aircraft of the Dornier 28 model to fly personnel and materiel transports for the fleet.

Over the next few years the intent is to refit the Sea King helicopter into a combat helicopter. Plans are to arm the helicopter with missiles in order to be able to fight light surface units and to deploy it as a higher altitude search platform in tactical-operational combination with missile torpedo boats. The conversion includes

--Installation of modern radar equipment
--Equipping with missiles
--Capability for target data transmission
--Installation of a radar warning receiver and a jamming transmitter.

Vulnerable Point Protection

All naval air bases lie within the range of Warsaw Pact land-based missiles. In order to protect the airborne weapon systems and the command installations an extensive hardening program has been undertaken at the naval air bases. The airfields are guarded against enemy aerial attacks by the effective installation of heavy marine defense companies and anti-aircraft squadrons--equipped with anti-aircraft artillery, field cannon, anti-tank grenade launchers and machine guns.
Means of Command

The outstanding properties of airborne weapon systems in the field of reconnaissance, surveillance and combat can only be optimally utilized through adequate command in connection with other means of warfare at sea. This requirement is taken into account by the Naval Air Wing Command Post (MFGG) command and information system. The MFGG is a largely self-supporting computer-supported subsystem of the naval command system. It contains data processing components for the gathering, storing, processing and distribution of information and a situation description. The MFGG's are to be installed in fixed, hardened shelters in the late 1980's at the squadrons.

Direct communication with the headquarters of the commander of the fleet assures reasonable reaction capability and flexibility in command and coordination of the means of naval warfare.

Evaluation

The past history of naval aviation shows that during every chronologically, technically and tactically conditioned change in warfare at sea, modern airborne weapon systems are indispensable, with their capabilities for flexible action and rapid reaction.

The sea is always there; sea power--regardless of what form it takes--requires for its realization forces that can maintain control of the sea and deny it to the enemy.

For the fulfillment of the duties in the operational sector of the German Navy, within the framework of the "balanced fleet," the naval air forces are a significant means of deployment in the hand of the commander of the fleet.

11949
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BUNDESMIRCH CHIEF ASSESSES PACT THREAT, FORWARD DEFENSE

Zurich WELTWOEHE in German 30 Aug 84 pp 9, 11

[Interview with Gen Wolfgang Altenburg, Bundeswehr chief of staff. Interview conducted by Marcel H. Keiser, date and place not indicated: "General Wolfgang Altenburg, Bundeswehr Chief of Staff, on the Strategic Situation After Counterarmanyement: "'Europe Alone Can Never Deter by Way of an Ultimatum'"]

[Text] An Open Prussian
For 5 days this week, General Wolfgang Altenburg, Bundeswehr chief of staff, is visiting the army of Switzerland and is being briefed on the individual elements of Swiss security policy. The highest-ranking German officer—born in 1928 in Schneidemuehl in northern Germany, father of 3 children as well as trained hotel expert—is everything else but a Prussian military mind; in the interview he shows himself to be unconventionally open. Altenburg entered the Bundeswehr in 1956 and commanded diverse units and forces (lastly the 3rd Corps), served both in the defense ministry in Bonn and in the NATO-Headquarters in Brussels and was promoted to Bundeswehr chief of staff on 1 April 1983 with the rank of a four-star general.

WELTWOEHE: There are numerous scenarios for a possible future war. How does the Bundeswehr chief of staff, hence the highest-ranking German officer, assess the current risk of a war?

ALTENBURG: In this region I regard a war as highly unlikely, provided that we succeed, in the same manner as up to now, to guarantee that an aggression against us entails a sufficiently high risk. That, to be sure, must take place.

WELTWOEHE: Are not conflicts on the periphery of our continent conceivable, for example in the Near East, which then extend into Europe?

ALTENBURG: I cannot exclude conflicts on the periphery of Europe, but I believe that a reasonable policy can guarantee that they do not filter through to Europe.

WELTWOEHE: Has the FRG, as a result of the NATO counterarmanyement with Pershing-2
rockets as well as cruise missiles and the counter-counterarmament with SS-22 missiles now undertaken by the Warsaw Pact in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, not become even less secure, even more of a nuclear bullet trap?

ALTENBURG: No. On the contrary, I believe that the FRG has become considerably more secure as the result of the counterarmament that has begun in our country. As is well known, it was our intention to neutralize the newly-developed threat potential against us below the strategic level—and this is the decisive point—that is, through negotiations. However, when we did not succeed in this, we were forced to neutralize the new threat of medium-range missiles through weapons on our part. They give us the possibility of threatening damage below the strategic level and below that level which the Soviets can regard as a threat in the sense of "decapitation", which is sufficient to prevent Moscow from the use of its potential. Because it is effectively superfluous, the additional counterarmament with SS-22 and SS-23 now introduced on the territory of the GDR and the CSSR does not substantially increase the threat beyond the degree that exists anyhow already.

The Soviets must allow themselves to be asked why they deployed the SS-20 to begin with. In the SALT-negotiations with the United States, they achieved a stalemate situation in the strategic sphere. On the conventional level they have a gross superiority, while the force ratios in the sphere of nuclear medium-range weapons up to now was more or less equal. Why, then, here, too, the effort to achieve a striking superiority? As far as means capable of reaching the Soviet Union were concerned, we had, after all, only 150 planes in Great Britain, which possibly could be equipped with one nuclear warhead each. If one considers this complex [of questions] without prejudice, with all its imponderables, one is forced to arrive at the conclusion that the two-track decision by NATO was a necessity.

WELTWOCHE: Pershing-2 rockets and cruise missiles, in other words, are intended to neutralize the threat newly directed against the West below the strategic level, where a state of mutual paralysis has existed for some time. Some armament experts, however, assert that such an intention on the part of NATO is already being undermined by the additional counterarmament of the East with SS-22 and SS-23.

ALTENBURG: This conception is wrong. The Pershing-2 rockets and the cruise missiles, to begin with, are not stationed in our country in order to destroy the SS-20, but rather to prevent their use. To this I must add a relatively high damage potential below the strategic level, a potential which is appreciable as a damage dimension for the Warsaw Pact. In so doing, we do not achieve a first-strike capability—for this, we would have to have many times more the 108 Pershings. If the East deploys a few more dozen SS-22 or SS-23, this in the final analysis is not relevant: It is not the quantity that is important, but rather the perceptible damage threat.

WELTWOCHE: What is your perception of the threat posed by the SS-22 and SS-23?

ALTENBURG: Of course, it is as great as that posed by the SS-20. In the addition of the systems available to date, the SS-20 represents a devastating damage potential against all of Europe. If the Soviets now build up a further
overkill capacity, which they do not need at all, then they act exactly contrary to what they demand from us. They now threaten us to kill us not once or twice, but three times in the future. Does the fear increase as a result? I need a potential that prevents the Soviets from the use of their nuclear weapons, that entails unacceptable damages for them. And that is precisely what we have done, more I do not need.

WELTWOCHE: Specifically from Paris, signals are being increasingly received again in recent times which envisage a European nuclear strike forcé, since it is by no means assured that 220 million Americans will always defend 318 million Europeans. Could the more intensive German-French military cooperation, aspired to in the abstract, one day not lead to a European nuclear strike force?

ALTENBURG: But we do not need it at all. Why still more or other nuclear warheads? A European nuclear strike force could develop only from the consideration that no reliance can be placed on the use of the American systems. But there is not the least reason for such an assumption. Anyway, deterrence against a world power must in its dimensions be congruent with the target—but to bring the ultimate into the deterrence the Europeans would not be in a position to do, even with the inclusion of France. Deterrence is effective through the combination of its elements, not through the individual element: And that means precisely and cogently the tie to the alliance with the United States.

WELTWOCHE: Your political superior Manfred Woerner, the minister of defense, in public, too, reacted very brusquely to the demand by General Bernard Rogers, the commander-in-chief of NATO, to increase the inventory of chemical weapons with binary ammunition. Viewed from military perspectives, would you, strictly speaking, not have to assist the American general?

ALTENBURG: No. The Eastern Bloc has constantly improved its chemical potential during the past few years, modernized it and supplemented it in quantitative terms. On the other hand, the United States did not produce chemical weapons at all for 13 years, hoping to accomplish something through this advance commitment. Because it did not succeed in this endeavor, it is now considering renewed production. We, to be sure, believe that a chemical counter-threat does not have a sufficiently high deterrence value. Where, after all, are we to use these weapons? One must not forget one thing: Since we merely react to aggression, a conventional war would take place on the territory of the FRG. If I make a counter-threat against something or a preventive threat, it must have a high degree of credibility. However, in the case of chemical weapons sufficient deterrence, in our view, is lacking. In the sense of a countermeasure, which is also permitted by international law, we must, however, nevertheless continue to keep them in the arsenal—but for this purpose the already available and extraordinarily modest American potential is fully sufficient.

WELTWOCHE: With a beautiful regularity, projects for a nuclear-free zone in Europe enrich the political discussion. What is the position of the Bundeswehr chief of staff with regard to this?
ALTENBURG: I can understand the fear people have in regard to a nuclear war. Only: We must not forget that conventional wars, too, because of the effect of the weapons used in them, would produce devastating damages in such a highly-urbanized area as the FRG—let us merely recall the bombing nights of Hamburg, Dresden, Essen, Cologne or Frankfurt during the Second World War. We must, therefore, proceed from the premise that it is not in our interest to prevent nuclear war at the expense of the danger of a conventional war on our territory: We do not want either. And we believe that it is precisely the threat of escalation into the nuclear sphere which makes it impossible for war to become possible again on the lower level, which after all likewise is no walkover, or, as Weizsaecker correctly says: "Wars are fought where people believe that they can win."

WELTWOCHE: Henry Kissinger, former American secretary of state, and Helmut Schmidt, one-time German federal chancellor, characterize the condition of the Western defense alliance in part as hopeless. Do you share the conception that NATO is in need of a new strategy?

ALTENBURG: No. The condition of the alliance is by no means so hopeless as the two gentlemen make it out to be.

WELTWOCHE: Concretely, please.

ALTENBURG: I am of the opinion that the alliance of the West European alliance partners is sufficient to form a conventionally high enough hurdle. Furthermore, I am convinced that the—politically also significant—presence of American armed forces in Europe has a high war-preventing effect. These are decisive factors which, incomprehensibly, are denied by some critics. I am absolutely incapable of following all the ideas which support the uncoupling of the United States from Europe and vice versa, since this would initiate a devastating process. On the other hand, I agree with the statement that the Europeans should considerably more for conventional defense in order to make this element supportable in itself and to give it more credibility.

The important thing is to really completely fill out the framework of the effective strategy—which up to now it never quite was because the conventional element was not given a real leading significance in the transition from the strategy of "massive retaliation" to "flexible response". What is decisive is the fact that, on all conceivable levels of escalation, NATO represents a sufficiently high risk, for its primary objective is to prevent war, not to attack an enemy and defeat it decisively. If a conflict should develop, however, it is to be ended as quickly as possible and at the lowest possible level. I believe that I serve this purpose in wanting to bring about a really strong improvement in conventional defense.

WELTWOCHE: Could a "no first use strategy", the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, serve to emphasize the non-provocative character of the Bundeswehr?

ALTENBURG: If the Soviets make trouble in this direction, I do not quite understand it since in that case they most likely include the conventional first use among the possibilities of their strategy. Our "first use", i. e.,
a selective nuclear first use conceived primarily as a political signal, is intended to force the end of the war through the threat of a higher risk, after the aggression--for which the conventional defense evidently did not have a sufficiently deterring effect--has taken place. If necessary, we want to be able to give a politically motivated signal that this war must be ended because it threatens to grow into dimensions that are for us conventionally unacceptable.

It is interesting that the Soviets are intent upon eliminating something that would be the consequence of their aggression. For this reason I take the position that the politicians cannot give up the threat of nuclear first use as a political means after an aggression. Only (and here I get back to Schmidt and Kissinger): A steadfast conventional defense brings this necessity constantly further back into a political dimension, onto a level at which then practically only political decisions have to be made and not already on the basis of difficulties of the battle.

WELTWOCHE: The key-word of conventional armament has now been mentioned a number of times. But do the Bundeswehr and also the other NATO-armies not simply lack the money in order to strengthen this component of the weapons mix adequately?

ALTENBURG: In my view, substantial possibilities of strengthening the conventional capabilities lie in the optimization of the available major items of equipment. That amounts to a great deal if we succeed in optimizing the major items of equipment through the use of the most modern technologies--I would mention ammunition, guidance systems, reconnaissance, real-time situation, and similar things. If the optimization succeeds, we will be more reticent when purchasing new major items of equipment. I am surprised, however, how little industry, for example, has followed the trend towards types of ammunition of the third generation--known as "fire and forget"--weapons: Apparently industry has too great an interest in building the airplane, the ship, the tank or the vehicle. The civilian aircraft is optimized for the transport of passengers. The point is now to educate industry to optimize the military aircraft for the transport of weapons: The weapons are part of the system and must correspond to the value of the aircraft. Here a clear point of emphasis must be laid.

With respect to the costs: We have the declared political will to strengthen conventional defense in order to make ourselves more independent of the nuclear battlefield options, to push the use of nuclear weapons as far away as possible. This has my full support although the financial means necessary for this will be enormous.

WELTWOCHE: General Rogers is troubled by the concern that, in the case of an attack, NATO will not succeed in stopping the following echelon of the Warsaw Pact in time. Do you share this fear?

ALTENBURG: The Warsaw Pact has deployed 57 divisions in its approaches--the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Another 35 divisions of reserves are located in the Belorussian military district. Then it has another 18 divisions as a strategic reserve. Compared with this, we have deployed about 24 divisions in
peacetime, which, if necessary, can be increased by a few divisions. That is sufficient in order to stop the first echelon in accordance with the classic ratio of 1:2 or 1:3.

Our reinforcement is made up of 6 American divisions, which have to be transported by air or sea over a distance of 6,500 kilometers and which, in addition, are in part identical with those forces which the United States holds in readiness for worldwide rapid deployment. In comparison with this, the Soviets have 35 divisions with overland movement of 650 to 1,000 kilometers. And they are the initiator: When they start marching, they are already fully combat-ready.

These 35 divisions, if they appeared on the battlefield FRG in full strength, could be the tip of the scale that forces us into nuclear escalation. Now we believe that if we should succeed in smashing the 35 divisions with respect to their main combat value on the march between the White Russian military district and the battlefield FRG, this would be of advantage for our defense. Meanwhile the problem arises, which parts of the airforces, which during the first hours will also be engaged to the fullest extent elsewhere, can be called upon to stop the approaching second enemy echelon at terrain defiles and natural obstacles—for example, during the crossing of the Vistula and Oder rivers.

Now critics come along and shout: Battle in depth, which means to bombard the GDR and Poland. But we do not want to bombard Poland and the GDR, but rather the approaching enemy forces—in the case of an aggression by the other side. Why should I let my own population bear the burden of my defense alone—where is that written?

WELTWOCHE: But for the chief of staff Altenburg and the NATO-commander-in-chief Rogers the priorities, after all, cannot be identical?

ALtenburg: But they are identical! Our priority is the battle against the first echelon, against the 57 divisions that are deployed against us. Here, as a German, I think somewhat differently than the other alliance partners. For of what use is it to me if the second echelon is stopped, but the first could not be stopped—in that case the war, after all, is already over for me. Consequently, from the German perspective, I must insist on the following priorities: Battle against the first echelon, air defense, destruction of the second echelon.

WELTWOCHE: This week you are inspecting the national defense of Switzerland. Is the neutral mini-state in the heart of Europe a vacuum in military terms?

ALtenburg: A vacuum is out of the question. The analysis probably would show a possible aggressor that the risks are too great.

8970
CSO: 3620/438
VARSTA 84 EXERCISE INVOLVES FOURTEEN THOUSAND TROOPS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Aug 84 p 9

[Article: "Military Exercise Moved From Sea to Land"]

[Text] Lappohja--The primary military exercise "Varsta 84" has gone according to plan, and at sea there was even a feeling of great strength from time to time. This was how the assistant director of the exercise, Colonel Pekka Kunenmaa, described the feeling in observing the landing of coastal infantrymen in Lappohja on Sunday.

The emphasis of the military exercise, which has been going on for 6 days already, was transferred over the weekend from sea areas in the vicinity of Saatistomeri and Hankoniemi to the mainland.

Short Hair and "Camouflage Paint"

At the same time that the assault boats arrived in Hango, two helicopters arrived at two different times and off-loaded approximately 100 paratroopers, who had cut their hair short in military fashion and painted their faces black and green with camouflage paint.

Troops of the Parola Armored Tank Brigade began to arrive in Hango's Lappohja on Sunday evening. Part of the brigade was transported to the exercise area by train and part of it conducted a motorized march from Hameenlinna. A total of 10 tanks and 50 other armored vehicles from Parola participated in the exercise.

"Final War" for Recruits

The permanent personnel of the defense forces are being trained to direct the activities of large numbers of military troops in these exercises. Emphasis is being placed on cooperation among the different branches of service.

This exercise represents the "final war", in which the skills gained in military service are applied, for recruits, officer candidates, troop leaders, and others fulfilling their 11-month obligation.
For the reservists included in the exercises, participation means the assumption of "one's own duties" in military staffs, troop units, and maintenance work.

According to Lieutenant General Lauri Koho, the director of "Varsta 84" and commander of the Southwest Finland Military District, the exercise is perhaps more important for the reservists than it is for the recruits. Reservists participating in the exercise can thus become familiar with their own units.

Two Years of Preparation

The military exercise in progress is part of the normal training activities of the defense forces. Preparations for the exercise have been underway for nearly 2 years, and provisions were made for this primary military exercise in the budget also.

It has not yet been possible to calculate the total cost of these exercises, but transportation, for which 2 million markkaa have been allocated, is mentioned, among other things, as one of the individual expenditures.

One Hundred Markkaa Per Day

Approximately 100 markkaa per day is paid out of state funds as reservist wage and per diem for the 5,000 reservists participating in the exercises. A total of more than 14,000 men is involved in these military exercises.

President Mauno Koivisto will be the honored guest of the command post for the 10-day exercises in the municipality of Pohja. Also the Defense Council is observing the exercises today.
SATISFACTION OVER REPAIRED 'LEOPARD' TANKS OPERATION

Athens TA NEA in Greek 21 Aug 84 p 3

[Text] The defective "Leopard I" tanks were tested yesterday at Litokhoron after undergoing repairs in Greece at a cost of 60 million drachmai.

The test was made under real battle conditions during the "Steel Armor" exercise in the presence of alternate minister for National Defense, Andonis Drosogiannis, and the highest ranking officers of the Armed Forces, who afterward expressed their total satisfaction with their performance after the repairs.

Yesterday's phase of "Steel Armor," which will last 5 more days, had as its main objective to ascertain whether and to what degree the "Leopard I," after the modifications to the sighting system—which was found to be defective after their purchase in 1981—are in operational readiness.

The Squadron

For this purpose the main "burden" of the exercise was placed on a squadron of 62 of the 104 "Leopards" of the 24th Armored Brigade stationed at Litokhoron and, naturally, the attention of the observing officers of the three Services was focused on them.

During the exercise, which took place with live ammunition, the "Leopards," and the 647th Motorized Infantry Battalion, occupied, with artillery support and four fighter aircraft of the "Corsair A-7" type of the 110th Fighter Wing, the pre-assigned objectives in the uninhabited area near the villages of Vrondos-Kondariotissa and Agios Spyridonas.

At the end of the "battle," Mr. Drosogiannis made the following statement to NEA:

"Today I observed an exercise with live ammunition carried out by the 24th Armored Brigade, which is equipped with "Leopard I" tanks and has completed its operation readiness in May."

The Readiness

"The exercise was carried out with live ammunition, artillery and air support and demonstrated that the degree of readiness of the unit is excellent and thus can guarantee the undertaking of any mission.
"I must congratulate all those who participated in any way in the exercise."

Afterwards, Mr. Drosogiannis inspected the tanks of the squadron, followed by the passing in review of the military units.

Yesterday's operation was observed by the chief of GES [Army General Staff], Lt. General Kourkafas; the chief of GEETHA [National Defense General Staff], Air Force General Deliannis; the chief of GEN [Naval General Staff], Vice Admiral Pappas; the chief of the Army, Lt. General Karavanidis; the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Army Corps, Lt. Generals Arambatzoglou and Kolomvas; and others.

9731
CSO: 3521/345
PROPOSAL ON WAR PREPAREDNESS, MILITARY SERVICE PROCEDURES

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 26 Aug 84 p 3

[Excerpts] "Battles are dangerous business," the great and ancient Chinese general Sun Zu said and a more contemporary general of the French Army, Etienne Copel, adds that an army's greatest victory is to prevent an invasion of the national territory by anyone.

This is, on the other hand, the main—although not the only one—mission of the Armed Forces of the Greek Republic today: to prevent any invasion whatsoever of the national territory. One does not have to be an expert to understand that it is better to prevent an invasion than to repel it successfully, just as it is not necessary for one to be an economist to foresee that the price of prevention cannot be such as to bring the economy of the country to its knees.

Greece still finds itself in the underdevelopment stage, as the experts call it. It is therefore, still a country which if not poor is surely not rich. A fact that means that it cannot economically support a military structure based on an exclusively volunteer army and on complex and extremely expensive weapons systems. In other words—hard and bitter—it does not have sufficient funds to prevent the danger of spilling blood.

However, it does not have an abundance of that either. The male Greeks 20–24 years of age will fluctuate from 350,000 to 380,000 up to the end of the century, while our neighbors beyond the Aegean will have available, in the year 2000, five to seven-fold men of the same age.

Whether we like it or not, we must accept that we have neither the manpower nor the resources. We are few in numbers and we have limited economic means with which to permit ourselves the luxuries that we tolerate in matters of defense.

We must understand once and for all that, after Attila, the military-foreign policy establishment of Ankara has developed a superiority complex that is reinforced by significant economic and foreign policy successes in the Middle East and by the substantial success of General Evren in the area of reorganization and modernization of his country’s Armed Forces. (The Turks are also poor, but they have brains and they know how to use them. The percentage of infantry units that has been converted into special units—paratroopers, rangers, marines, etc.—is today near 50 percent!)
Those who plan Ankara's policy towards Greece do not believe that, when they will finally move (at the appropriate moment they will choose, such as the time of the coup in Cyprus), they will meet effective resistance, that the cost of an operation will be prohibitive for them.

They are almost sure that the Greeks have not psychologically accepted the eventuality of an armed conflict, and, perhaps for this reason, they may risk it the moment they judge opportune.

The "Clumsy Ones"

This is the reason why it is not enough to allocate these 10 billion dollars to purchase aircraft, tanks, missiles and warships. We should also make it clear that we will fight and that we are prepared to do so on a larger scale than that of the weapons systems we will purchase. Let the possible adversary understand clearly that the nation can rise to a war-footing within hours with devastating effectiveness.

Whoever believes that the adversary is "clumsy" is naive and does not know his arithmetic in order to subtract from the numbers published by the statistical service, the number of male students of AEI [Supreme Educational Institutes] and TBI [Technological Training Institutes] so as to find out, with minimal margins of error, how many young Greeks join the three Services every year. (How many combat recruits join the Service when they are 29 or 30 years old is another matter.) Especially when the composition of the units in both armies is patterned after American models, it is extremely easy for the adversary to figure accurately how many vacancies exist in the first and second echelon units that are deployed against him.

Thus, we arrive at the grave problem of the country, the subject of military service that nobody dares to touch because it will upset the youth sections of the parties. The fact is that the subject is serious and has more than one facet.

An unjustifiable indolence of thought, wrapped in the fear that youth may rise in revolt, has frozen all initiative, all search for a solution. The easiest one would be the immediate abolishment of all deferments for military service and the corresponding reduction of the length of service. It is the easy, and perhaps the wrong, solution, unless it is a temporary and transient one.

At some time the political leadership must decide that the message of preparedness and decisiveness must be sent to the other side in such a way as to set straight permanently the evaluations by Ankara. The message will be given the moment a serious study is undertaken of the radical reorganization of the Armed Forces on an up-to-date basis and by Greece's taking the example of the experience of other small countries.

It would be a prerequisite to get rid of certain handicaps and rhetoric about praetorians and other similar high-sounding phrases because, as opposed to the past, progress in the technological area today demands a much higher number of career noncoms and volunteer enlisted men with at least a 5-year enlistment. The Air Force, the Navy and certain Army units must be made up of volunteers with
long-term enlistments. How to attract youth to the military profession is something for the experts to study.

It also would be a prerequisite to accept the fact that we are being threatened and that we must prepare, at a very early age, to defend ourselves. Also that women, who have gained equality, must be prepared to take the place of their brothers in the rear, in public service organizations, in transportation and communications.

In 5 Hours

Much planning, work and discussion will be needed in order to arrive sometime at a system where young men and women at age 18 will undergo a 3-week period of basic training and afterwards only the young men will receive specialized training for 3 months, and be brought up-to-date for 2 weeks every year—in the same unit, with the same noncoms and companions—until age 35 so that these units may be operationally ready for war within 5 hours.

If, on the other hand, there is preparatory military education in the schools, under the guise of sports, and with a national competition on military preparedness as is done in other countries, if there is a timely familiarization with the idea of military service for both the youths and their parents, then the tragic situations, which have increased so much in the Army in recent times because of the inability of the young men to adjust to life in the barracks, will disappear.

All this is nice and easy on paper. They would not be impossible to put into practice if there were either political will or the decision to psychologically prepare the Greeks. Psychological preparation in a climate of democracy.

Ten years after the restoration of democracy is it not perhaps time for the Army to symbolically do away with the gray-green, American-inspired uniform the dictators put on the officers—to make them different from those of the soldiers as was done with the boyars and the mujiks—and for all of it to wear the khaki that it wore when it got as far as the Gordion?
CIVIL DEFENSE OFFICIAL ON RESULTS OF SURVEY

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 22 Aug 84 p 7

[Article by Doctorandus J. P. Heck: "Civil Defense--Poorly Understood But Still Necessary"]

[Text] The author, who is giving his personal opinion here, is connected with the civil defense staff of the Ministry for International Affairs.

At the beginning of this year, the results were made known of a survey, performed during the summer months of 1983, of around 800 Netherlanders of 18 years and older concerning their knowledge and/or opinion of civil defense (1) [this "1" looks like it's referring to a footnote, but none to be found--translator]. It is clear from the survey, carried out at the instruction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Information Service, that things are not in good shape as far as knowledge is concerned. Nearly half of those questioned say they are not acquainted with the term civil defense, and the people who do know what civil defense is define it imperfectly.

To give a good notion: Civil defense includes all the non-military preparations and measures primarily directed towards continuing and maintaining communal life in the event of war, the threat of war and related or connected circumstances. In this connection, it should also help, wherever possible, in meeting the consequences of large-scale emergencies that may arise in peacetime. The preparations involve, among other things, distribution and rationing, supply of vital materials, (emergency) legislation under extraordinary circumstances and wartime disaster control.

I do not, however, want to stop at the meaning of the concept of civil defense. It seems more interesting to look for an explanation of the apparent lack of familiarity with this subject. This despite the fact that civil defense preparation has been recognized as forming a part of government policy for more than 30 years.

The position taken in the explanatory memorandum to the 1980 Internal Affairs budget, as if the answer to the question of whether or not one consciously participated in the war had any influence on one's familiarity with civil defense, no longer seems tenable to me. The survey results do not show any
significant differences in this respect. There are doubtlessly other, more
structural factors to the controversy, a number of which I want to mention
here.

--Only two political parties (D'66 [Democrats '66] and VVD [People's Party
for Freedom and Democracy]) have included a passage on this subject in their
election programs. Parliamentary interest for civil defense remains, in gen-
eral, limited to posing parliamentary questions, usually about the sense and
nonsense of fallout shelters, which incidentally do not exist in the Nether-
lands. True, reorganization of disaster control does come up at periodic
intervals, but this is only a matter of a partial facet. Most of the parties
lack a total vision of civil defense.

This is striking when one considers how relatively eagerly many politicians
have plunged into social defense. Even the extensive and detailed publica-
tions of the IKV [Interchurch Peace Council] on civil defense ("war prepara-
tion" in IKV jargon (2) [again, seemingly a reference to a non-existent foot-
note—translator] seem to have wholly escaped party-political consideration.
The silent dismantling in 1982 of the standing parliamentary commission on
civil defense put the seal on a situation that already existed de facto.

--On paper, every minister has his proper responsibility with respect to civil
defense. In practice, however, this field of consideration is far removed
from everyday departmental affairs.

This circumstance is for the most part directly proportional to the amount of
consideration given to civil defense within a department. The result: Of-
ficials of the civil-defense divisions operate in an isolated position within
the departmental organization, which weighs heavily on the motivation and
quality of the personnel. Internal channels of communication are as good as
blocked, and communication to the outside also suffers from this.

--The conditions necessary for giving—in light of the survey, desirable—
systematic public information on civil defense, are wanting for other reasons
as well. While Defense, for example, has an independent information director-
ate at its disposal and there are various intermediate organizations that
regularly provide information on aspects of military defense, civil defense
has to do with the hope of being included in the department's everyday infor-
mation. The consequence of this—taking heed of the above-mentioned problems
with internal communication as well—is easy to guess. At the provincial and
community level, things are not much different. The Interdepartmental Consult-
ing Group for Civil Defense Information, established in 1982 (1), can be view-
ed then as a bright spot. Recommendations for improving information in this
area can be expected in the foreseeable future.

Forming an Image

--Not the least role is played by uncleanness in the policy itself, or at
least in the image that has been formed of it. Sometimes, civil defense is
(irincorrectly) identified with disaster control, and sometimes not. For ex-
ample, the professional journal ALERT, which appeared in May of last year,
was presented as the "official magazine for civil defense, relief work and disaster control." Is disaster control under extraordinary circumstances thus not one of the components of civil defense? Another question is whether civil defense constitutes part of the security policy. According to the coalition agreement of 1982, civil defense would be a component of "Defense's security policy." In the Defense note of 1984, the relationship between military and civil defense is broached for the first time. Within NATO, they have been convinced of the importance of that sort of relationship for a long time. But in Internal Affairs' policy reports on peace and security, not a word has been breathed on the subject of civil defense, as is also the case in a recently published informational brochure "On Security and Peace" by two coworkers of this department. It is obvious that as long as there is no clarity concerning questions of this sort, which are essential for policy, even information professionals will be confronted with a nearly impossible task.

In summary, it can be stated that political parties, departments and successive governments in past decades have, in general, shown strikingly little real interest for civil defense preparation as a whole. A factor that decidedly has not promoted an interest in this matter among the public. In this respect, the survey results reported in the first paragraph are not surprising.

Civil defense will never become popular as a topic. Given the policy's goal, namely to meet the consequences of emergencies as well as possible, this is not to be expected either. With other governmental tasks, moreover, it is often a matter of a more dynamic approach, directed towards improving existing conditions, and whose results are normally visible or noticeable. But this fact must not ultimately influence the struggle to achieve realistic goals in a responsible manner and with the necessary patience—goals which must be formulated, however, not just in the official world of civil defense.

The minister of internal affairs, as coordinating minister for civil defense, announced that he was going to deliver a note on civil defense to the Chamber after the currently running summer recess. Perhaps, this will be the opportunity for civil defense to be brought permanently out of the political slum, where it has been for years and years.

12507
CS0: 3614/117

89
INCREASE OF REPORTS ON FOREIGN SUBMARINE INTRUSIONS

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 16 Aug 84 p 3

[Article: "More Than Before Have Seen Submarines"]

[Text] The armed forces this year received more reports than usual from people who think they saw foreign submarines. The number of observations which have been characterized as so-called possible submarines is also somewhat above average for the coast along South Norway, while fewer possible submarines have been observed in North Norway this year as compared with last year.

Captain Bjørnar Kibsgaard of the North Norway Armed Forces Command reports to NTB [Norwegian Wire Service] that hitherto this year 16 reports have been received regarding suspicious objects in the sea along the northern part of the country, while there were 14 reports all last year. Of the year's reports, 10 have been completely analyzed, and only one observation was characterized as a possible submarine. Seven possible submarines were recorded in this part of the country last year.

In South Norway submarines are reported once a week on average, relates South Norway Naval Armed Forces Commander, Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen to NTB. He says that this is an increase as compared with previous years. A fourth of these observations have been characterized as possible submarines, and this, too, represents an increase in number.

Rear Admiral Pedersen says that people have become more aware of the possibility of foreign submarines in our waters after the submarine hunt in Hardanger Fjord last spring and the actions in Swedish waters. He thinks that it is positive that people have become more aware, and that the increase in the number of reports is not problematic for the armed forces.

Sweden has recently established three special units with a total of 1000 men who will continually cruise for foreign submarines. At both armed forces commands it has been stated that it is not possible now on the basis of existing resources to implement a similar system for Norway. This is due to the fact that we have a considerably longer coast and deeper waters than the Swedes have.

However, we are keeping informed in detail regarding new methods of hunting for and going after submarines.

8985
CSO: 3639/154

90
OFFICIAL PESSIMISTIC ON HOPES FOR MAJOR UNEMPLOYMENT CHANGE

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 20 Jul 84 pp 27-29

[Interview with Ursula Engelen-Kefer, vice president of Federal Labor Office. Interview conducted by WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE editors Sigrid Matem-Rehm and Wolf-Dieter Michaeli; date and place not indicated]

[Text] The reduction of working hours was intended to help create new jobs. Nevertheless, the unemployment rate will remain as high as ever. In an interview with WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE, Ursula Engelen-Kefer--Vice President designate of the Federal Labor Office and hitherto the DGB's [German Labor Union Federation] labor-market expert--explained current labor market problems and talked about her future tasks in Nuremberg.

[Question] Mrs. Engelen-Kefer, for the last few months, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate has not been declining any more. On the contrary: last month it even went up again. Are the labor market politicians baffled in view of this situation?

[Answer] We feel the present development unfortunately confirms our predictions. At the DGB, we have pointed out again and again that the economic upswing, which became apparent as early as last year, would not sufficiently affect the labor market. This year the unemployment figures practically remained at last year's level. Even if business activity showed only a slight decline, unemployment would rise again from its present plateau of close to 2.2 million. Thus, in bad months we would very soon reach what we fear in regard to the next few years: a total of 3 million registered unemployed.

[Question] Is this not too dramatic a view?

[Answer] I really do not want to dramatize this subject. But we cannot simply ignore the fact that in spite of a considerable economic upturn last year and early this year we have not had any significant and lasting decline in unemployment. If one takes into account the present slowing of business activity, the figure of 3 million unemployed cannot be considered excessive pessimism or inappropriate dramatization; rather, it derives from a realistic
view of things. Moreover, in the course of the technological development, which we as trade unionists have to face up to, the number of jobs will be reduced even further. On account of inadequate growth, other sectors have not been able to compensate for this by creating new jobs.

[Question] So there is pessimism even in regard to economic growth.

[Answer] Once a national economy has attained a certain GNP level, growth rates cannot be increased at will. At present, if we wanted to attain a growth rate of 5-6 percent—such as would be necessary to eliminate unemployment—we would have to produce an output volume equivalent to a 20-25-percent growth rate in the 1950's. This is totally unrealistic. Today we have to proceed from the assumption that the increase in products and deductible services and in the resultant job openings will no longer be as pronounced as in the past. Thus the attainable growth will not make up for the jobs lost on account of rationalization measures.

[Question] What is to be done?

[Answer] We urgently need an active employment and labor-market policy. And here priority should be given to the employment policy, i.e. to economic and structural problems. The labor-market policy would be a supporting element. This will not be sufficient, however. We have therefore been focusing our efforts on reducing the working hours—a reduction of both working week and working life. We hope the recent wage agreements will help to curb unemployment.

[Question] You have been speaking in your capacity as DGB department chief. Does the vice president of the Federal Labor Office speak the same way?

[Answer] As yet, I am working for the DGB and I have been answering your questions as a DGB employee. As vice president of the Federal Labor Office, I would have to represent broader interests, but my assessment of the labor-market development would not change at the new post. As vice president, however, I could comment only on the potential effect of specific labor market-oriented measures.

Ursula Engelen-Kefer
is the vice president designate of the Nuremberg Federal Labor Office. Thus, beginning on 1 September, the administration of this institute will for the first time include a woman. But the 41-year-old economist, who holds a doctorate in her field, is anything but a token woman at the federal agency. The committed trade unionist, who for the time being is still holding the post of department chief at the DGB, is respected even by her harshest critics on account of her subject matter expertise. She vehemently advocated reduction of working hours—for other people, to be sure: upon assuming her new duties, the mother of two children is likely to work even longer hours.
[Question] Let us assume that 1 September is past and that you have assumed your new duties. What measures would you propose?

[Answer] The measures of the Federal Labor Office cannot touch the core of the unemployment problem. Theirs can only be a supportive function. But they can make an important contribution just the same; they can help us, for example, to cope with the increasingly urgent problem of long-term unemployment. We were shocked to see that the number of unemployed who are without a permanent job for more than a year is increasing year after year. Through measures such as the work-providing program of the Federal Labor Office or the advanced-training programs, this group of unemployed is at least given the chance to maintain their employability and thus to facilitate their reintegration. We also must try to improve the specificity of the work-providing measures taken by the Federal Labor Office in the structurally weak areas. It is imperative that we reduce—at least to some extent—the growing disparity that exists between the North and the South in regard to unemployment.

[Question] Regarding the creation of new jobs, you are placing strong emphasis on an active unemployment policy. In the United States, however, it was economic growth that created millions of new jobs.

[Answer] As far as the creation of new jobs is concerned, the United States can hardly be compared with the Federal Republic. There are certainly a few measures we might profitably consider, e.g. financial assistance to small enterprises, to people with ideas who want to establish their own business. On the other hand, the present strong growth in the United States is financed by a gigantic budgetary deficit.

[Question] In the creation of jobs, the deficit undoubtedly has been a factor; but there is also the fact that some workers were prepared to do without raises.

[Answer] I doubt whether so sweeping a statement is justified. Besides, the workers in the enterprises concerned had as a rule obtained considerable raises in the preceding years so that it was easier for them to go without a raise for a year. In our country, the workers in the last few years have not even been able to maintain real wages. The American example therefore is not applicable to us. Besides, as trade unionists we are also concerned with protecting the workers. We cannot allow creation of jobs at all costs, i.e. jobs involving bad working conditions and low wages. The positive results the trade unions have achieved in the last few years in regard to wage agreements and social benefits must not be jeopardized.

[Question] Nevertheless, there is an argument one hears more and more frequently, namely that our labor-market problems are to some extent attributable to the (by international standards) high labor costs.

[Answer] Well, you know, our export situation is not so bad as to compel us to reduce wages to improve our competitiveness.

[Answer] The absolute wage level is not a good yardstick for international comparisons. If incidental personnel costs are added to wages, then we are certainly at the upper end of the scale, but not at the very top. Along with relatively high wages, however, we have a relatively high level of productivity. Only by comparing labor costs and productivity in terms of labor costs per unit does one get objective data regarding cost-related competitiveness. In regard to labor costs per unit, however, we are internationally in mid-position or even below that. In our view, creation of jobs by means of reduction of wages would plainly be a redistribution at the expense of the working people. We feel there is no cause for this.

[Question] Could it not be argued that trade union flexibility in regard to questions concerning wage policy and industrial law might facilitate the enterprises' adaptability to new structures?

[Answer] Flexibility in regard to wages and protective rights would certainly be advantageous to the economy; but it would be exacted at the expense of the workers' protection, working conditions and earnings. This would be unacceptable to us. We are prepared to consider flex-time arrangements, but we will not consider a reduction of the workers' protective rights such as is outlined in the employment-promoting bill introduced by Federal Labor Minister Bluem.

[Question] The new wage agreements introduce flexible working hours, but at the same time they intensify the pressure toward increased rationalization.

[Answer] Every wage agreement effects a compromise between the interests of the employers and the interests of the employees. It would certainly not have been possible to rule out all rationalization effects by means of the new collective arrangements concerning the reduction of working hours. The entrepreneur is interested in rationalization measures. As far as we are concerned, this produces part of the cost savings used for financing the reduction of working hours. Exactly how this is implemented and, above all, how one can prevent inadmissible health risks to the workers and an undoing of the positive employment-related effects of the reduction of working hours—all this cannot be assessed by an office worker; it is the responsibility of the workers' councils and trade union representatives in the enterprises.

[Question] Do you think there is a risk that the increased responsibility the workers' councils will assume as a result of the wage agreement may weaken the position of the trade union leaders?

[Answer] This risk cannot be ruled out. The transition from a collective to an individual arrangement of the contractual relations calls for a new way of thinking on the part of the trade unions. The DGB's member unions realize that this will be the key problem in connection with wage policy. The DGB will soon make known its ideas concerning these problems. The individualization of the wage agreement will affect organizational and wage policy as well as the work of the workers' councils. We will have to intensify the cooperation with the workers' councils and intermediaries.
[Question] Going by the latest pronouncements made by the DGB, one is tempted to say you will be doing an about-turn next month. At your new post, will you try to prevent the measure called for by DGB board member Gerd Muhr, namely increasing the unemployment benefits by means of the surplus likely to be realized by the Federal Labor Office?

[Answer] This problem is a result of the continuous reduction of benefits by the legislature since the early 1980's. This is why more and more unemployed have to fall back on welfare. At present, 30 percent of the registered unemployed are not entitled to either unemployment benefits or unemployment relief. A mere 35 percent of all registered unemployed receive any unemployment pay. Yet during their employment many of these unemployed paid their social security premiums to the Federal Labor Office or they at least paid income tax. So we are not asking for charity here, but for insurance or state benefits that the individual worker has earned through his or her premiums or taxes.

[Question] Would it not make more sense to use the expected surplus of DM 3 billion for streamlining the work of the Federal Labor Office?

[Answer] What with 3 million unemployed, it would not be sufficient to use the surplus exclusively for improving the financial situation of the beneficiaries. Naturally, we also have to increase the number of staff at the Federal Labor Office, streamline the work procedures and expand the financial basis of our labor market policy. We expect the Federal Government to support these measures. In 1981, when we had 1.3 million unemployed, the Federal Government paid DM 11 billion in support of the Federal Labor Office and of the unemployment relief program. It is unacceptable that this year only DM 7-8 billion are allocated to unemployment relief, even though the number of unemployed has nearly doubled. We feel the Federal Government must not shirk its financial responsibility.

[Question] You have just pointed to a potential source of conflict. In what areas would you want greater authority?

[Answer] I want all the authority I need to take action on behalf of the Federal Labor Office's contributories and beneficiaries. We are presently discussing exactly what forum this is going to take. I do not want to forejudge the outcome.
THREAT PERCEIVED FROM TURKISH INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 4 Aug 84 p 17

[Article by G. Kraloglou]

[Text] "Turkey's new activity in the sector of industrial infrastructure confirms our anxieties, and it also should be of concern to the economic ministers," authoritative spokesmen of industry said yesterday in reference to the reports which TO VIMA published about the industrial zone which American companies are planning along the Aegean coastline of Turkey.

The same sources pointed out the possibilities which this industrial zone offers for the development of heavy industry and the raw-materials industry in Turkey, activities which are expected to strengthen secondary industrial production in this country. Also pointed to is the possibility of creating a goods-transit center along the coastline of Turkey for the Middle East and Africa which will compete with that of Volos in markets where Greek-Turkish commercial competition is already intense.

In connection with the Turkish competition, in a memorandum the Association of Industrial Products Exporters points out to the authorities that:

"Neighboring Turkey, with strong governmental support and thanks to the modernization of its industry and the creation of many new investments with an outwardly directed orientation, has developed into a powerful competitor with regard to many industrial products which are of primary importance to domestic production, with these products being exported both to the countries of the EEC and to other countries.

"In the last 3 years, exports of textile products of Turkish origin to Community markets have increased significantly. And they would be at incomparably higher levels if the EEC Commission had not taken drastic measures to limit imports to EEC member countries of products from the Turkish textile industry. It must also be emphasized that within the last 3 years Turkey has achieved a strong penetration into the markets of many Arab countries, with the consequence that industrial products of Turkish origin are supplanting corresponding products from Greek production.

"To round out this topic, we stress that whereas the Greece-Turkey trade balance was strongly positive in favor of our country up to 1980, ever
since 1981 a steady downturn has been observed in our exports to Turkey, while at the same time the imports of Turkish products to Greece have been increasing at a growing rate.

"It is striking that during the year 1983, imports realized in our country from Turkey came to 2,531 million drachmas, while the exports we effected to Turkey during the corresponding period of time amounted to a level of 1,331 million drachmas—that is, they offset a percentage representing about 55 percent of the value of our imports from Turkey."

12114
CSO: 3521/337
SIGNIFICANT DROP IN COMMERCIAL FLEET STRENGTH

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 17 Aug 84 p 7

[Text] The strength of our merchant marine fleet has dropped significantly. Specifically, it has gone from 3,490 ships with a total capacity of 39,14 million register tons in June 1983 to 3,057 ships with a tonnage of 35,143 million tons one year later.

This is stated in yesterday's announcement by the minister of merchant marine, which adds the following:

The number of ships newly registered during the above period of time came to 228 ships with a total tonnage of 3,993,734 register tons, and those stricken off the registers came to 661 ships having a total tonnage of 7,990,945 register tons. Thus, during the period of time from 1 July 1983 to 30 June 1984, the strength of the fleet decreased by 433 ships and by 3,997,211 register tons. That is, an annual decrease was seen of 12.4 percent with respect to the number of ships and of 10.2 percent with respect to tonnage.

Moreover, on 30 June 1984 the number of ships with Greek ownership and flying foreign flags whose crews are insured in the Seamen's Retirement Fund (NAT) came to 360 ships with a total tonnage of 6,595,703 register tons, while on the same date in 1983 there were 440 such ships with a total capacity of 7,885,776 register tons.

Consequently, the overall strength on 30 June 1984 of the merchant fleet consisting of ships which are 100 gross register tons and above and flying the Greek flag, or Greek owned and flying foreign flags with crews which are insured in the NAT, amounted to 3,417 ships with a total tonnage of 41,739,098 register tons.

In detail, the strength of the merchant ships under the Greek flag was as follows on 30 June 1984, according to categories:

a. Cargo boats—2,002, with a total capacity of 22,001,733 register tons, representing in tonnage 62.6 percent of the total Greek capacity.

b. Tankers—424, with a total tonnage of 12,398,690 register tons, representing 35.3 percent of the total Greek capacity.
c. Passenger ships—346, having a total tonnage of 660,681 register tons, representing in tonnage 1.9 percent of the total Greek capacity.

d. Other ships in addition to the above categories (tugs, fishing boats, salvage vessels, cable-layers, silo boats, and so forth)—285 ships with a total capacity of 82,291 register tons, representing in tonnage 0.2 percent of the total Greek capacity.
BRIEFS

FUTURE SALE OF NATIONALIZED ENTERPRISES—[Text] "Whoever wants to" will be able to buy the problematic enterprises after their reorganization. Of course, such a person will do this by purchasing their shares on the basis of the new price. This was stated yesterday by Minister of National Economy and Finance Gerasimos Arsenis. Excluded from this prospect, stressed the minister, are strategic branches of industry such as the military industry, the mineral resources industry, and the pharmaceutical industry, which in accordance with the government's program are being socialized. In any case, added Arsenis, all of these things will be done in 2 or 3 years, and what is important now is to reorganize these industries and increase their production. [Text] [Athens TO VIMA in Greek 4 Aug 84 p 1] 12114

CSO: 3521/337
LABOR PARTY CALLS FOR 25-HOUR WORKWEEK BY 1994

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 24 Aug 84 pp 1, 3

[Text] The Hague, 24 August--In the next ten years, a 25-hour workweek will have to be introduced in industry and government. The social security system will have to be replaced by a system in which all unemployed workers receive a minimum-level basic benefit.

These proposals were made to the Second Chamber group of the PvdA [Labor Party] by a commission headed by ex-minister Van Kemenade. The report, "Towards a Workable Future," indicates a direction in the socioeconomic field for the PvdA up through 1994. The party will take a position on the report this weekend.

The proposals of Van Kemenade's commission (the other members are the Rotterdam economist Dr J. Ritzen and party-member Woltgens) are directed towards restoring full employment. The commission calls the current high unemployment "economically unjustified and socially unacceptable."

Along with a far-reaching redivision of labor, they want to achieve a restoration of full employment through economic growth that yields new jobs. They have chosen a policy that will make labor less expensive. They want to reduce the costs for labor-intensive industries by transferring the social costs to the government.

Small-scale industry--where most jobs originate--must be stimulated and the application of new technologies (which create new jobs) must be promoted.

The commission wants to effect the far-reaching redivision of labor and the introduction of a new social security system by making agreements binding the government and social partners in a "social covenant." This agreement would have to come into existence at the beginning of a new cabinet's term of administration. A act of covenance would have to ensure that the agreements were followed.

The introduction of a 25-hour workweek would have to be achieved within ten years. Thus, the work hours would have to be brought down to 25 hours per
week for 200 to 250 thousand jobs per year. Newcomers to the labor market would be immediately tied to a 25-hour job.

The income for 25-hour jobs would initially be 85 percent of a full-time job and would then be gradually reduced. The commission expects that the buying power of the lowest income groups would be maintained in any event. The lowering of income would be compensated for by a reduction in social premiums and taxes.

The new basic benefit proposed by the Van Kemenade commission is intended for everyone who is not working. Along with people who are involuntarily without work, the aged or the disabled, the commission wants to give a basic benefit to youths starting at the age of 18 and to students who are unable to provide their own support.

The payment level would come to 50 percent of the minimum wage, based on the assumption that most people do not live alone. For single people, it would go to 70 percent of the minimum wage.

Accepting the basic benefit would obligate an unemployed person to let himself be schooled so he will be able to find work. Furthermore, it would have to be possible to obligate him to perform work in return for the benefit.

Private citizens and social partners could voluntarily make arrangements for insuring themselves against loss of pay, along with the basic benefit paid by the state. The government would then have to make rules to prevent the differences from industry to industry or between branches of industry from diverging too sharply.

12507
CS0: 3614/118
REGIONAL PLAN ENVISAGES MAJOR CANARY ISLANDS INVESTMENT

Madrid YA in Spanish 5 Aug 84 p 19

[Text] The government of the Canary Islands has drawn up a Regional Economic Plan (PER), which will be developed during the period 1984-87. The investment will total more than 145 billion pesetas. The plan has been submitted to the labor-management organizations and the unions of the archipelago for their input and assent. In the fall it will be sent to the regional parliament for approval as a law. The economic counsellor of the autonomous government, Rafael Molina Petit, announced that the executive has available only 110 billion pesetas for the plan, which means that 35 billion must be cut. The cuts will be made in accordance with the suggestions of the business and labor sectors.

The PER gathers and organizes not only the investments of the autonomous community but also those of the state. It divides them by councils and years, from 1984 to 1987. It is implemented through programs. The plan took more than a year and a half to develop. Its principal objectives are to reduce unemployment, support small and medium businesses, correct the economic imbalances of the islands and augment the level of quality of life.

The investments planned for the PER during the next four years, financed by the autonomous community and the central government are: 22,203,100,000 pesetas in 1984, 34,395,200,000 in 1985, 32,303,900,000 in 1986 and 29,641,600,000 in 1987. In addition, 6,135,500,000 will come from other entities, aside from over 2 billion pesetas in lines of credit.

For now the autonomous government does not plan to emit public bonds for this plan, although the counsellor reminded his listeners that this year 2 billion pesetas worth of bonds will be issued for the fight against unemployment. This is the final goal of all of the objectives that have been defined in several large areas. The first of these is assistance to small and medium businesses, costing 19.5 billion pesetas. This money is destined primarily for the fishing, transportation and agricultural sectors, and will be used for their reconversion, for research, and for improvement of professional qualifications.
Reduction of Imbalances

The reduction of imbalances in the infrastructure of the islands is the third program of the PER. It will require 4.7 billion pesetas, along with 3.8 billion in subsidies for the inter-island transportation of merchandise.

Improving the quality of life and raising the level of education is the fourth program, considered the most important. The maximum investment of 91.954 billion pesetas will be divided mainly among education, 29.034 billion; housing, 15.45 billion; health, 14.202 billion; and highways, 13.735 billion.

The fifth and final objective is the increase in scarce strategic resources such as water, soil and energy. This has been budgeted at 25.127 billion, the largest portion of which, 6 billion pesetas, is to make water potable.

By areas, water and education make up 32.8 percent of the plan, at 36.9 billion pesetas. They are followed by housing and highways. Commerce, at only 984 million, is the least endowed area. Those of social welfare, culture, tourism and agriculture and fishing take up about 2 percent of the total investment of the PER.
LABOR-MANAGEMENT STRIFE INTENSIFIES IN ALMADEN STRIKE

Madrid YA in Spanish 5 Aug 84 p 19

[Text] Ciudad Real--Labor-management strife has intensified at Almaden Mines. The positions of the workers and management are irreconcilable for the moment, and mutual accusations have become sharper. Although management considers the one-hour strike that the workers have been maintaining for several days to be illegal, the employee's council and workers' representatives have announced new methods for applying pressure.

Last night nearly 10,000 people participated in a demonstration of solidarity with the 25 members of the employee council who are shut up in "Saint Theodore's Enclosure," one of the Almaden's oldest shafts. The secretary of the council expressed appreciation for the massive participation of citizens and stated that the occupation would not be abandoned until the conflict was resolved. Next, the secretary general of the State Federation of Miners of the UGT [General Union of Workers] informed the demonstrators about the workers' effort to obtain an agreement in accordance with their claims.

The call for a general strike made by the council has been seconded by the businesses, shops and bars of the area, which are backing the claims of the workers. They close daily from 11 until 12 a.m., when a large part of the populace gathers in support of the claims of the workers at the terrace which leads to the mining installations. According to several sources, it appears that the information that management is providing to the media is erroneous. It mixes up concepts in a confusing way and by no means clarifies the truth.

As may be recalled, the enterprise has for many years obtained substantial revenues, despite the considerable reduction in the personnel of Almaden Mines. In the latest bulletin it has published, the employee's council reiterates its decision to increase the pressure of the syndicate in its actions and that it will maintain a firm stance regarding the shut-in as long as the petitions that have been formulated remain unsatisfied. The council is disposed to remain inside the mine, even at the risk of health, until its desires have been fulfilled.
The council has expressed its appreciation to the populace in general for the moral support the latter has been offering the workers, as well as for all of the signs of solidarity which it is receiving from various parts of Spain. The meeting between the representatives of the employee's council of Almaden Mines and spokesmen for the board of directors, which was held in the town hall with the mayor Joaquin Iniguez and the director of labor of the province Ramon Gallego, did not have positive results either. At this meeting, management made its latest offer to be considered by the council, and it promised to search, along with the latter, for a way to get the administration to raise salaries to the average established in the metal-mining sector.
MAJOR GOVERNMENT OUTLAY TO PURCHASE HARVEST SURPLUS

Madrid YA in Spanish 29 Aug 84 p 15

[Article by Melchor Enrique]

[Text] Madrid. The good harvest, which will certainly equal last year's record figures for some items with the largest surpluses, such as wine and oil, is going to force the government to make a major financial outlay to purchase the major surplus commodities. Even in the most optimistic calculations, the expenditure involved will not be under 200 billion pesetas.

Wine, with forecasts between 45 to 50 billion pesetas (see YA of 22 Aug 84) leads the other commodities in budget needs, along with oil, and probably grains. In the case of grains, though, the good behavior of the market and Spain's chronic shortage of grains used for fodder may mean that the government's purchases will not be very large, despite the production of 21 million tons. In any case, the surplus of these products, along with the sugar and meat surpluses, will increase the problems of the FORPPA [Agricultural Prices Regulation Fund]; last year the FORPPA had items stored with an estimated value of 117 billion in storage, but whose sales price was barely 42 billion. This is equivalent to theoretical losses of over 70 billion because of this price differential.

Even though the amount of money needed to regulate the grain season is still an unknown factor, particularly because this year the state will not necessarily be the only purchaser of wheat, two significant precedents can be cited. During the past season, with a short wheat and barley harvest--11 million tons, compared with over 16 million tons expected in this year's crop--and with the wheat trade under government control, the SENPA [National Service for Agricultural Products] spent 70 billion pesetas on crop purchases. In the 1980 season, a record to date with a production of nearly 15 million tons of both
grains, the purchases amounted to about 150 billion pesetas. The amount would probably have been similar this year if wheat had not been released from government control. In any case, it is very unlikely that the government's purchases this year will be under 50 to 60 billion pesetas.

Rivers of Oil

A production of 650,000 to 700,000 tons of olive oil is expected. This would exceed the 1982 harvest, when the crop amounted to 600,000 tons. Since internal consumption in Spain is estimated to be about 350,000 tons, the surpluses may be similar: enough to meet the worldwide demand for this product which, excluding Spain, is somewhat less than 400,000 tons. Worst of all is the fact that the FORPPA has almost 300,000 tons of oil now in storage—surpluses from past harvests. This, in addition to the huge financial drain, means serious storage problems for the coming harvest.

Two years ago, with a production somewhat less than what is expected this year, 45 billion had to be spent on oil purchases, so it doesn't seem likely that anything less than 50 billion will be spent this year. To this amount would also have to be added at least 10 billion for financing for the producers, and the very high costs of storing this surplus oil. Storage costs, with everything included, are calculated at about 40,000 pesetas per ton a year.

Bitter Sugar

Given this situation, the FORPPA is negotiating with a number of countries, including Japan and some South American nations, attempting to export oil at any cost. The results to date have not been too encouraging. In addition, it seems that the sugar beet harvest will produce new sugar surpluses, essentially because domestic consumption of this product is continuing to decline, and now stands at about 930,000 to 940,000 tons. This is the result, as the growers have complained time after time, of the uncontrolled expansion of "isoglucosa." In southern Spain the sugar beet production goals—2.69 million tons—were slightly surpassed, but it is the Duero area that will provide most of the surplus, since it is feared that its production goals of 4.24 million tons will be exceeded by approximately a half million tons. As a result, the sugar production goals (1.06 billion tons) will be surpassed, and that will certainly require large purchases by the FORPPA, which will have to spend from 8 to 10 billion pesetas on this item.
Sugar surpluses now stand at over 300,000 tons, and this surplus has led to a bitter controversy among opposition groups which criticize the sugar imports, without fully grasping the fact that the current imports are the sole result of the exporters' legal right to purchase this item abroad, by virtue of the active improvement traffic system.

7679
CSO: 3548/331
SURVEY OF FLUCTUATING MINISTERIAL PUBLIC INVESTMENT

Madrid ABC in Spanish 29 Aug 84 p 39

[Article by Vicente Clavero]

[Text] Madrid. The prime ministry, defense, and labor are the ministries which will have the largest cuts in their investment budgets for the coming fiscal year. Foreign affairs, culture, and justice will have the largest increases. Capital transfers to RTVE [Spanish Radio and Television Broadcasting System] will be eliminated.

According to documents submitted by the administration during the Monday meeting on the economic agreement, in 1985 the ministries will be allocated 931.5637 billion pesetas for public investments. This is a 4.8 percent increase over the current year's spending, but a decline of 2.2 points in real spending possibilities, since the expected price increase is 7 percent.

The ministry with the largest relative investment gain is foreign affairs, up from 1.1253 to 1.688 billion, a 50 percent upturn. The items going up most are improvements in Spain's diplomatic and consular representations abroad, which will total 833.4 million; the diplomatic communications network, in which 404.2 million will be invested; and the construction of a new headquarters for the Hispano-Arab Culture Institute: 122.2 million.

The ministry of culture is in second place in terms of projected investment. In 1984 its investments amounted to 12.3894 billion; in 1984 it will spend 16.1926 billion. A good part of this increase is due to the purchase of the Vistahermosa Palace, which will cost 2.92 billion. It will be used for the expansion of the Prado Museum.
The third ministry on this list is justice, with an 18 percent increase, bringing its investments to 18.2269 billion. This is due essentially to the court construction and improvement program. This program will receive 6.3282 billion, 1.454 billion more than in 1984.

On the opposite side, the prime ministry, defense, and labor have the largest cuts in their investments. In 1985 the prime ministry will have 3.2481 billion, somewhat less than half of its investments this year. This is due to the elimination of capital transfers to the public entity RTVE, which in the current fiscal year came to approximately 3 billion.

The cutbacks in defense will not affect the armed forces modernization plan, which lies outside the total calculation of the state's public investments, as this funding was committed by law earlier. For this plan, there is a 201-billion peseta allocation scheduled in 1985. The investment budget of the ministry of labor and social security is being cut by 4.429 billion, as the program of loans to cooperatives and small industries in a state of crisis is down by 3.5 billion. The government wants this activity to be taken over gradually by official credit institutions.

The largest growth in absolute value will take place in the ministry of industry and energy, because of the INI [National Institute of Industry] and the cost to the state of the reconversion of sectors in a state of crisis. In 1984, investments by this ministry came to 175.02 billion, and the projected investments for 1985 are 197.425 billion, a difference of 22.405 billion. Allocations for the National Institute of Industry for the acquisition of stock in the group's companies are up by 20 billion, bringing the total to 100 billion. The reconversion and reindustrialization plans program is going up by 9.405 billion.

In public works, highway investments are up, at 8836.2 billion; investments for water resources infrastructure are up by 3.28 billion, and investments for coastal and shore areas are up 1.2 billion. In the ministry of the interior, investments are being cut by 1.24 billion pesetas. This reduction will have an impact on the general division of state security, both for the construction and motorization programs of the Guardia Civil, and for National Police programs.
GAZ DE FRANCE MASTERS NEW STORAGE TECHNIQUE

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 8 Aug 84 p 12

[Text] Etrez--As is known, gas is a volatile substance. This makes its storage a more complicated technical task than that of petroleum or coal--a task which therefore is difficult for the ultimate consumer to accomplish. Nevertheless this task cannot be avoided when gas--above all natural gas--plays an important role in the energy supply of a country. In France the share held by gas in the primary energy supply comes to about 13 percent or 25 billion m$^3$. In 1990 it is supposed to be about 15 percent or 30 billion m$^3$. Thus it is important to even out the large fluctuations in gas consumption over a day's time and in the course of a year and also to be able to get through any supply interruptions--a possibility which must be kept in mind even more in view of the strong dependence on individual suppliers. In addition there is the fact that long-range supply contracts such as with Algeria and Russia designate minimum purchases according to the motto "take or pay," for the purpose of being able also to amortize the expensive transport equipment used. Thus for these reasons Gaz de France (GdF), the national French gas monopoly, must also concern itself with storage capabilities.

A New Pattern for Gas Sources

Whereas today 46 percent of French gas consumption is provided for by supplies from France itself and the Netherlands, from sources which in both cases are characterized by a rather considerable "flexibility," in 1990 this figure will be only 18.5 percent. Instead, at that time 13.5 percent (today: 8.5 percent) is supposed to come from Norway, where for technical reasons there is no flexibility, 30 percent (31.4 percent) from Algeria, where because of the political circumstances variations in purchases are scarcely possible, and 35 percent (12.4 percent) from the USSR. Although in calling for an annual standard purchase of 8 billion m$^3$ the delivery contract with the latter country designates a leeway of 20 percent downwards and 5 percent upwards, nevertheless this could become too narrow in view of the size of this contract and considering the certainly restrained sales trends. Therefore the present storage capacity in France is to be doubled, from 5 billion m$^3$ to between 10 and 11 billion m$^3$. By these means and through so-called breakable contracts with ultimate purchasers who commit themselves to keeping on hand a second source of energy at all times, the aim is to be able to counter a discontinuance of supplies from
the most important supplier throughout a year, accompanied by the loss of
the second most important supplier during a few winter months. Even today,
with the present storage facilities it is possible to provide a cushion for
about 20 percent of the annual consumption, and with the "breakable"
contracts for roughly another 15 percent.

Modern Technology

As a part of this long-range ensuring of supplies, ever since 1979
construction has been going forward in the small community of Étrep (Ain
Department), roughly 60 km from the Swiss border, on one of the largest
underground storage facilities in France, and in any case the largest in
saliferous rock. For the visitor this business is not so spectacular.
Sandwiched in between two groves, a few enormous pipes and some flat-roofed
buildings reveal the intrusion of the 20th century into this rustic-rural
area.

But the gas is stored 1,400 m beneath the surface of the earth in
saliferous stone, in which first of all pear-shaped hollow spaces must be
washed out. There are six of these today, and by the end of the century
there are supposed to be about 30 of them. Each of these pits has an
average volume of 200,000 m³, with a height of 100 m and a diameter of 80 m
at the widest point. About 2 million m³ of water is needed each time to
wash out these hollow spaces from the salt rock. The brine thus obtained
is conducted away via a pipeline almost 75 km long and is further utilized
by the Solvay company in Poligny for the recovery of the salt. The quite
precise control over the shape of the hollow space—it must be imagined
that the entire "excavation work" is done over a distance of 1,400 m and
through the simple injection of water—is a special skill which is
comprehended by nobody else to the same degree, according to information
from Gaz de France. Meanwhile, it has proved possible to sell this know-
how by now to Iraq by way of the Société française d'études et de
réalisations d'équipements gaziers (Sofregaz), and people in this state-
owned company are hoping for additional customers.

Since in the "caverns" of Étrep the permissible pressure comes to 220
bars—the rock pressure is about 320 bars—this means that in each hollow
space 44 million m³ of gas can be accommodated. But only 28 million m³ of
this are really usable for the orderly leveling off of fluctuations and for
emergencies. That is, since the pressure in the hollow space must not drop
to as low as 80 bars if the space is not to cave in, a minimum level of 16
million m³ must be maintained at all times. About 1 million m³ of gas can
be injected into each chamber per day, or 1.5 million m³ of gas can be
withdrawn. Thus when the facility is completed it will be able to hold
about 1.3 billion m³ of gas, roughly 800 million m³ of this as an available
store. This corresponds to more than 7 billion kWh. By then (1997) the
total capital costs will have reached at least nearly 1.9 billion French
francs (on a 1983 basis), about 2.5 French francs per m³ of available
storage. All told, according to information from the GdF, the need to keep
these stores of gas adds about 10 percent to the prime cost of the gas.
In Business with Switzerland?

Etrez is linked up to the network of Gaz de France primarily by way of two lines. A line to the north with a diameter of 800 mm serves to take delivery of the gas from Russia, and the other somewhat smaller line (diameter of 600 mm) establishes the connection with the storage facility of Tersanne lying south of Lyon—a facility which is based on the same technology. In the opinion of GdF officials, the facility's nearness to the Swiss border would likewise make a direct connection in this direction a thoroughly practical matter, which would even be justifiable in terms of costs. In such a case Switzerland could share in the use of the storage facilities or could rent chambers. In view of the opposition to underground stores of any sort which is found even in France, and because it is known at the Gaz de France as well that the climate in Switzerland is especially responsive in this regard, it seems that a business opportunity can be sensed here. By the way, right today France has connections with Switzerland in the sector of natural gas. Up to now the region around Geneva and Lake Geneva has been supplied from Switzerland. With the extension of the Chambery-Annecy line up to Annemasse which has now begun, it will be possible shortly to pay back this "borrowed" gas once again.

12114
CSO: 3519/474
MINING OFFICIAL DISCUSSES 'NATURAL GAS RUSH' ON SVALBARD

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Aug 84 p 14

[Article by Lars-Ingmar Karlsson]

[Text] Svalbard—"Norsk Polarnavigation is very enthusiastic."

That is how Johannes Vik, mining inspector on Svalbard, described Swedish Polar Energy's Norwegian partner.

Johannes Vik must approve all new mineral finds made on Svalbard. He is the responsible Norwegian official on the island group and as such he would not criticize the Norwegian company in more detail.

"At present Norsk Polarnavigation is not active here. They have not done any drilling here since 1981," he said.

Polarnavigation is just one of several companies now looking for gas on Svalbard. The giants in the area are the English firm BP [British Petroleum] and the Norwegian Statoil. Each has put down between 5 and 10 million kronor, in Johannes Vik's opinion.

 Compared to them Polarnavigation is a midget. But the company is still a big one and even bigger than the two giants if we look at the number of areas in which it has indicated an interest.

Interested

One explanation is that Polarnavigation has long been interested in the oil and gas on Svalbard. The activities of BP and Statoil are now part of a "second wave."

"Around 10 years ago many major oil companies were looking for gas and oil up here. Later the interest dwindled. In the last 2 years there has been a new rush," Johannes Vik said.

New geological theories have emerged in recent years and that is one of the things BP wants to test.
It can be difficult for Johannes Vik to really determine whether an individual or a company should make a mineral claim in an area.

"When it involves other minerals, such as coal, it is easy to decide. I can also check that on the spot," he said.

Claims

"But it is harder for me to check on gas and oil."

Instead his decision in these cases is based on whether geological conditions for finding oil or gas exist. If so he approves a "claim."

Within 5 years the property owner must also show that the find contains something. Otherwise there is a danger that the property owner will lose his claim.

"But it also happens that someone 'breaks off' a small piece of bedrock and shows that it contains a mineral that can be mined. However he may be thinking of mining something quite different," Johannes Vik said.

This is a different way to try to lay claim to areas that could be of future interest in the production of oil and gas.

But there are also very serious reasons for searching for oil and gas on Svalbard.

Learning

"Searching on land is one way of learning more about oil and gas in this region. It is a 'cheap' way of acquiring knowledge. After that one can go out to sea," Johannes Vik explained.

It is a common Norwegian assessment that the really valuable deposits of oil and gas are not found on land but out on the continental shelf off Svalbard. But so far no test drilling has been performed and thus it is not known if this assessment is correct.

Johannes Vik would not predict what the Svalbard mainland might have to offer.

"But so far no one has found any oil or gas worth extracting here," he pointed out.

6578
CSO: 3650/276
SWEDISH CONSORTIUM SEEKS TO DRILL FOR GAS ON SVALBARD

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Aug 84 p 14

[Article by Peder Carlquist]

[Text] The Industrial Affairs Ministry is now trying to form an opinion as to whether plans to extract gas on Svalbard are valid or an unrealistic daydream.

Within a few weeks the government must say yes or no to an application for prospecting funds from the Swedish consortium that was formed for the project. The consortium consists of geologist and polar enthusiast Fred Goldberg, Gota Bank and the consultant firm of Asbjorn Habberstad. They will pay for 50 percent of the project. The remaining 50 percent will be invested by Norwegian interests, represented by the small prospecting concern, Norsk Polarnavigation.

The state Energy Department is recommending a 15 million kronor prospecting subsidy for the project, corresponding to the costs of one drilling hole.

Poor Basis

But the Industrial Affairs Ministry has a report from Swedish Petroleum that questions most of what is in the application.

The consortium estimates that the quantity of gas represents a value of $100 billion, but the figure is cautiously limited in calculations to $25 billion.

According to SP [Swedish Petroleum] there is no basis today for making any estimates as to how much gas is there. Gas has been found several times on Svalbard in connection with coal mining and each time only small pockets were involved. There is nothing yet to suggest that Polarnavigation's claims are any better, according to SP Exploration.

The statement also questioned the possibility of extracting the gas on a number of other points.
Hydroelectric Positive

The report from the Hydroelectric Company was less discouraging.

It is a high-risk project, but since the commercial prospects look so promising, why not try? That about sums up the Hydroelectric attitude.

The commercial advantages of the project consist in the fact that to a large extent production will be untaxed due to Sweden's status as one of the signers of the so-called Svalbard Treaty. It is also considerably cheaper to extract gas on shore than it is to get it from the bottom of the sea. Most gas sources today are found out at sea.

Thanks to that the price of the Svalbard gas could be a good bit lower than prices on the LNG market.

LNG involves gas that is cooled and transported by tankers in liquid form to consumers.

Market Dropping

There are also doubts about whether the gas can be sold, since the market is dropping. This is denied by Sverre Pedersen, executive director of Norsk Polarnavigation:

"The market is falling today, to be sure. But that will change in the 1990's when we can start delivering the Svalbard gas. In addition the price will be so competitive that we can also makes sales on a shrinking market," Pedersen told DAGENS NYHETER.

In its decision the Industrial Affairs Ministry must also consider the prospects for selling the Svalbard gas in Sweden. One of the conditions for receiving prospecting subsidies is that the project could contribute to supplying energy to Sweden.
IMPACSA BLAMED FOR TOXIC POLLUTION OF SEGRE RIVER

Barcelona AVUI in Catalan 22 Aug 84 p 4

[Article by Anna Gomez: "A Toxic Agent Causes the Death of Many Fish in the Segre River"]

The Pollution Affected 14 Kilometers of the River

[Text] Lerida (Segria)—Friday night and especially on Saturday, along a 14-kilometer section from Balaguer to Vilanova de la Barca, the water of the Segre appeared black in color and very thick, with much fibrous residue. This situation caused a big fish kill of the four species that live in the area. Only the adult carp, which is the heartiest species, survived. All eyes are on the IMPACSA paper factory in Balaguer, which a year ago was reported for polluting the river, although lately it appears that their purifier has been working perfectly. The manager of IMPACSA denied that it was guilty of the fish kill.

For the time being, the toxic substance that caused the occurrence is not known since the Generalitat still does not have water samples or fish that were gathered. Nor is it known exactly how many fish were killed, but it is estimated that many thousands of barbels, small carp, etc., were killed. Since Saturday, the river has looked very ugly and been covered by a layer of foam about 30 centimeters thick. Yesterday afternoon a river hake nearly a meter in length was observed which the fishermen of the area say was unusual, since it is rare to find any that big. The same fishermen expressed surprise that the river lately had become repopulated. The reactions in these districts, both of businesses and institutions, have not been long in coming. Artur Surroca, general secretary of USAC-JA (Union of young farmers), stated to AVUI that in the electoral publicity, everybody talks about saving the environment, but afterwards, when it comes time to enforce the laws, they are strictly enforced only when it comes to a few private parties, but that the powerful companies can afford the luxury of ruining tons of river fish and the event goes by more or less unnoticed. Artur Surroca does not doubt that IMPACSA of Balaguer has made an effort to improve its purifier; indeed this had been noted in the water quality despite the fact that it is still impossible for use in bathing to drink, but according to him it is evident that what caused this fish kill was undoubtedly the aforementioned company of the capital of La Noguera. On the
other hand, and in order to back up his accusation, he cites the fact that there is no other industry in that district that could generate the amount of liquid and residue that is flowing, even today, down the Segre River. The USAC will file an official protest so that these abuses will stop once and for all, independent of what may have been accomplished so far. In making this report, the union wants the person responsible for inspection of the toxic residues to realize that it is not possible to act this way for the good of the environment. The firm accused directly by the USAC and by public opinion in general asserts that IMPACSA is working with absolute normalcy and that no accident or emergency has occurred, and therefore it believes there must have been another factory that caused the damage. Pere Ayguade, representative to the Parliament of Catalonia for the PSC, has denounced the passivity of the Generalitat for not having stopped these crimes against nature, against the fish, and also, according to him, against the people in time. Now it is hoped that the analysis that is being carried out by the environmental service will be done quickly, that the results will move quickly to the place concerned, that it will yield clear results, and that, for the future, suitable steps will be taken so that events such as this will not recur.