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WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

ARMS CONTROL

FINLAND

Officials Breathe Easier as USSR, Swedish Ties Improve
(Lars Christiansson; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 17 Jun 84)...... 1

Officials More Concerned About Cruise Missiles Than 'Zone'
(Paavo Väyrynen Interview; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 25 Jun 84) 4

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

Former Foreign Minister's Political Office Statement
(Editorial Report; 11 Jul 84)........................................... 8

Briefs
Delegation Leader Press Statement.................................. 11

DENMARK/GREENLAND

Greenland To Take Over Export Trade, Set Five-Year Plan
(INFORMATION, 18 Jul 84).............................................. 12

Government Leader Johansen Comments
'Historic' Turning Point for Greenland

Violence Stemming From Alcoholism Continues Increase
(BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 17 Jul 84)................................. 18

FINLAND

Sorsa, Väyrynen Increasingly Dominate Parties in Congresses
(Hakan Hagwall: SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 21 Jun 84).......... 20

- a -

[III - WE - 150]
Polls Examine Support for Parties, Koivisto
(HELSINGIN SANOMAT, various dates; KANSAN UUTISET,
29 Jun 84) ........................................... 23

Gallup: Left Losing Ground
Political Action Losing Interest
Paper Comments on Polls
M Poll: Conservatives Declining
Communist Paper Analyzes Poll
Koivisto Support Remains High

FRANCE

Results of Government Policy for Reunion, Corsica Viewed
(Michel Debre; LE FIGARO, 30 May 84) ......................... 31

GREECE

National Inflated Self-Image, Basic Insecurity Regretted
(Nikos Dimou; TO VIMA, 12 Jul 84) ........................... 36

NORWAY

Poll: Conservative Wave Among Youth Ending; Left Gaining
(Gunnar A. Johansen; ARBEIDERBLADET, 14 Jul 84) ....... 38

Poll Finds Voters Give Willoch Top Marks for Job Performance
(Terje Svabo; AFTENPOSTEN, 24 Jul 84) ..................... 39

PORTUGAL

Abrantes Meeting Founds New Eanist Movement
(Various sources, various dates) ............................... 42

Text of Declaration
Conditions for Eanes' Support
Problem of Alliances
Questions Facing Movement
Eanism—Province Against Capital
President's Neutrality
Eanes Role Termed Essential
Role of Mario Soares
Advantages of Eanist Party

SWEDEN

Poll Measures Extent of Voter Migration Among Parties
(Hans O. Alfredsson; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 25 Jun 84) ........ 61
MILITARY

DENMARK

Haagerup, Thoft Debate Possible Danish Role in WEU
(Ojvind Kyro; BERLINGSKE AFTEN, 29 Jun–5 Jul 84)........... 64

Compromise Defense Plan Commented on by Minister, Forces Chief
(Various Sources, various dates)................................. 70

Shortage of Funds Cited, by John Wagner
Reductions Through Attrition, by Michael Ehrenreich
Socialist Surrendered Reorganization Demand

NORWAY

Foreign Ministry Official Comments on PRAVDA Spy-Plane Claim
(AFTENPOSTEN, 24 Jul 84)........................................ 79

Separate Supply Command for Trondelag Prestocking Planned
(Liv Hegna; AFTENPOSTEN, 16 Jul 84)......................... 80

Disarmament Journal Studied for Security Breach
(Inge D. Hanssen; AFTENPOSTEN, 19, 20 Jul 84)............ 83

Security Police Investigate Group
Articles Listed 'Bomb Targets'

SWEDEN

General Urges Planning for Amphibious Invasion
(Carl Bjoreman; 7 DAGAR, 29 Jun 84)......................... 87

ECONOMIC

AUSTRIA

Increasing Exports, Imports From Poland
(Erich Hoorn; DIE PRESSE, 19 Jun 84)......................... 91

DENMARK

Rapid Expansion in Private Consumption, Threatens Trade Deficit
(Øle Lorentzen, Lennart Weber; AKTUELT, 6 Jul 84).......... 93

Trade Deficit Shows Dramatic Decline
(Svend Bie; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 24 Jul 84, Sect III)..... 97

Farmers Leaving Land at Increasing Rate
(1B Christensen; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 24 Jul 84, Sect III)................................................. 99
NORWAY

Industry Minister Cites Encouraging Trends for Growth
(Terje Svabo; AFTENPOSTEN, 18 Jul 84).......................... 101

TURKEY

Survey of Wavering Campaign To Rescue Economy
(FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT,
6 Jul 84)................................................................. 103

ENERGY

DENMARK

Natural Gas Consortium Meeting Goals for Sales Orders
(Peter Kjelstrup; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 21 Jul 84,
Sect III)................................................................. 107

NORWAY

Oil Responsible for Continuing Trade Surpluses
(AFTENPOSTEN, 17 Jul 84)............................................. 109

Surplus Oil on World Market May Force Down North Sea Prices
(Flemming Dahl; AFTENPOSTEN, 24 Jul 84)....................... 110

OCEAN/POLAR ISSUES

NORWAY

Fishermen From Several Countries Overfishing Near Svalbard
(Roar Eilertsen; KLASSEKAMPEN, 14 Jul 84)...................... 111

Coast Guard Captain Cites Need for Enlarging Svalbard Zone
(Oystein Grue; AFTENPOSTEN, 17 Jul 84)......................... 113

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

European Conservative Parties Join in Environment Stand
(Morten Holler Warmedal; AFTENPOSTEN, 11 Jul 84)......... 115
OFFICIALS BREATHE EASIER AS USSR, SWEDISH TIES IMPROVE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 17 Jun 84 p 5

[Commentary by Lars Christiansson: "Normalization Pleases Finland"]

[Text] Helsinki--The conflict between Sweden and the Soviet Union over the submarine intrusions has caused uneasiness in Helsinki. It is therefore with obvious relief that Finland is watching the normalization that Sweden has now initiated with Moscow.

The official Finnish view is and has been for a long time--regardless of the submarine intrusions in Sweden--that the security situation in the Nordic region is stable. It is noted at the same time that the interest of the big powers in the Nordic region has increased and that military activity in the Baltic Sea has been stepped up. This was expressed most recently by Finland's minister of foreign affairs, Paavo Vayrynen, in an interview with SVENSKA DAGBLADET on 10 June.

In the same interview, Vayrynen made it clear that Finland does not doubt that Sweden has been subjected to violations of its territory, but that Finland has not taken a stand on the question of who is behind them. The difficulty with the problems surrounding the submarine issue is that there is no logical explanation of what happened, says Vayrynen.

At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Helsinki, spokesmen wave aside the idea that the submarine intrusions are due to regional political or military ambitions on the part of a big power. If anything, they reflect the global tension currently existing between East and West, say the spokesmen.

"No Certain Proof"

A prominent Finnish diplomat told SVENSKA DAGBLADET that a possible explanation for the encroachments is that one of the big powers intends to use the Swedish coast in connection with a possible East-West conflict.

Although Finnish foreign policy experts do not say so specifically, it is clear from conversations with them that they do not rule out the possibility that the submarines which have been inside Swedish waters are Soviet.
It was pointed out to SVENSKA DAGBLADET that NATO has been saying publicly for some years that in the event of a crisis, it intends to move its submarines forward to a more offensive position. But that theory is brushed aside in Helsinki when discussing the violations to which Sweden has been subjected.

Finnish diplomats and military men emphasize that all information and all statements from Moscow, whether official or unofficial, have been unambiguous. The Soviet Union says it has not violated Swedish territory. In Soviet messages to Finland on the subject, there are no nuances or hints of anything else, says one very well-informed spokesman.

But at the same time, the same man also says that the Soviet use of language is difficult to interpret and that what the Soviet Union says does not always mean what it seems to mean. For example, the Kremlin used the word "submarine" in commentaries on the violations to which Sweden says it has been subjected, but this does not necessarily rule out the possibility that minisubs or other types of underwater vessels mentioned by the Swedish military may have been used.

One well-informed observer says: "What seem to be irreconcilable ideas when Sweden and the Soviet Union discuss the submarine issue are not necessarily irreconcilable in fact." At the same time, he emphasizes that while Sweden certainly has strong circumstantial evidence, no absolutely certain proof has been advanced concerning which nation sent the submarines into Hars Bay. The Submarine Committee maintained, of course, that they were Soviet. But according to the observer in question and several others, hard facts in the case are still lacking.

Probably no one would deny that it is of crucial importance to Finland to have good relations with the Soviet Union. Finnish diplomats often refer to former President Kekkonen's statement that paradoxically enough, the better Finland's relations with the Soviet Union, the greater the possibilities for pursuing a positive Finnish policy toward the West.

But what will happen if Sweden forces a Soviet submarine to the surface or sinks one? One of the very typical answers that SVENSKA DAGBLADET received to that question goes like this:

"It would put our ability to choose our wording to an unusually severe test."

Or: "It would be a disaster for Finland if the Swedish Navy forced to the surface or sank a submarine that turned out to be from the Soviet Union."

A prominent military spokesman makes it clear that Finland shares the view that the military and political situation between East and West has become more tense. Concerning Finland's situation, he says this:

"The increased tension between the big powers is also mirrored here in the Nordic region. But it is is having an extremely small effect on Finland. Russian-Finnish relations are very encouraging for us. They are what we are striving for and point to a permanently friendly mutual relationship."
Now that relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union have started to follow normalized paths, frankness is also increasing in the Finnish foreign policy and security policy establishment.

"Learn From Finland"

A frequent comment on Sweden's way of handling the submarine problems and relations with the Soviet Union is that we made too big a fuss over what happened.

This does not mean that Sweden should have ignored the submarine intrusions or failed to react. The idea, rather, is that the Swedes should have taken a lesson from Finland on how difficult problems with the Soviet Union ought to be handled.

According to one comment in Helsinki, "The tremendous amount of publicity given to the submarine hunts in Sweden harmed the Swedish Government's chances for handling the problems more successfully."

Another is: "If we in Finland had detected a foreign submarine inside our waters, we undoubtedly would have blocked off the entire area and not allowed a single reporter to be present."

11798
CSO: 3650/239
OFFICIALS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT CRUISE MISSILES THAN 'ZONE'

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Jun 84 p 5

[Report on interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Paavo Vayrynen by Lars Christiansson in Helsinki; date not specified]

[Text] Helsinki--A nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region is not likely to be established in the near future. But over the longer term, it is possible.

That is what Finland's minister of foreign affairs, Paavo Vayrynen, said when SVENSKA DAGBLADET asked him about that issue, which has long been one of the main themes in Finnish foreign policy.

But the question is whether the actual debate about and the process leading to a Nordic zone is more important to Finland than its actual implementation.

Against that background, SVENSKA DAGBLADET asked Vayrynen to talk about Finland's view of the Nordic zone and the possibilities for implementing it within the foreseeable future. This happened during an interview with the minister by SVENSKA DAGBLADET some time ago.

"Our activities for establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region are based on our permanent efforts in the area of security policy. Our starting points are well known. The zone arrangement can be implemented without changing the basic solutions that each Nordic country has chosen in the area of security policy."

Vayrynen said: "The Nordic countries should first reach agreement among themselves. Implementation will require participation by the nuclear powers. When the countries in the zone commit themselves to permanent freedom from nuclear weapons, they have a right to take it for granted that the nuclear powers will respect the zone and promise not to use nuclear weapons against the countries in the zone or to threaten them with such weapons.

"In our view, the issues involved in the zone arrangement are all negotiable questions on which we have not felt so far that there is any reason to take a stand on details."
Vayrynen emphasized that Finland has followed with great interest the discussion in the other Nordic countries concerning the zone. That discussion has grown more lively in recent times.

"In my opinion, the discussion underscores the importance of the Nordic region's freedom from nuclear weapons and the importance of intensifying the discussion. It is not likely that the zone can be implemented in the near future, but over the longer term, it is possible."

Movement Toward Goal

SVENSKA DAGBLADET asked Vayrynen whether the actual process leading toward a nuclear-free zone is not what Finland views as most important in the shorter term.

"Both are important. A process of activity is needed to reach the goal. Naturally, it is very important to establish a zone, but it is also important that the issue be debated in the Nordic region and that progress be made."

Paavo Vayrynen said: "Not because that in itself will implement the zone, but we can influence the actual situation in the Nordic region through debate so as to preserve the nuclear-free status we now have. It can well be imagined that people in Denmark and Norway may have strengthened public opinion in favor of remaining free of nuclear weapons even if there is no zone. That has value in itself."

Lukewarm Interest

SVENSKA DAGBLADET's conversations in Helsinki with well-informed people reinforce the impression that Finland's interest in initiatives that will quickly establish a Nordic nuclear-free zone is lukewarm. The official story is aimed at giving the impression that the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons is the overshadowing goal.

But beneath that lies a realistic assessment that the zone is a very long way off and that Finnish foreign policy today is concentrated more on keeping the debate alive.

As was pointed out to SVENSKA DAGBLADET, the important thing is that some form of process be kept alive in connection with the zone issue. Specific talks among the Nordic countries are not regarded as realistic in the foreseeable future. Considered even less likely is the possibility that the question can be resolved with the nuclear powers. No one that SVENSKA DAGBLADET contacted sees any sign that Denmark and Norway could be separated from NATO's nuclear option.

As a result, the primary goal in Finland's policy on the zone issue has been shifted to a concentration on keeping the zone issue alive. There are even some observers who say that in the long run, establishment of a nuclear-free zone would even have negative consequences for Finland.
Higher Threshold

Consequently, one of the more important goals in Finland's activity on this issue is to help preserve the current nuclear-free situation that prevails in the Nordic region in peacetime. The good thing about the debate and related activities is considered to be that as one result, the threshold at which Denmark and Norway would accept nuclear weapons in a crisis situation is higher than before.

In that connection, reference is made to an interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Väyrynen that was published in the Helsinki newspaper HUFVUDSTADSBLADET on 19 February.

In it, Väyrynen said: "From Finland's point of view, it was of crucial importance that Denmark and Norway, in keeping with their restrictions on bases and nuclear weapons in relation to NATO policy, refused to accept new intermediate-range nuclear missiles on their territories."

It is true, of course, that there was no question of including Denmark and Norway in NATO's deployment program after the two-track decision. And Väyrynen was naturally aware of that when he made his statement.

In a speech before the Paasikivi Association in Helsinki on 10 May this year, Minister of Foreign Affairs Väyrynen did say that Finland was prepared to "negotiate immediately whenever it suits the other Nordic governments."

But even that statement should be viewed in the light of the opinion in Finland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs that at least as far as Denmark and Norway are concerned, and regardless of which government is in power in those countries, negotiations on the zone issue are not going to start in the foreseeable future. Both Denmark and Norway emphasize that a nuclear-free Nordic zone will not seem realistic until nuclear disarmament in Europe becomes a reality.

One of the arguments advanced in the official Finnish debate in support of the idea that the zone must be implemented concerns the threat that might be represented by cruise missiles if they use Finland's airspace on their way to targets in the Soviet Union.

Continued Hope

The impression in Helsinki, however, is that Finland entertains hopes that the problem of cruise missiles can be solved without the absolute necessity of forcing through the nuclear-free zone at any cost. One possibility that is viewed as realistic is that the United States will provide some form of unilateral pledge that Finland's airspace will be respected even in the event of an armed conflict.

Such a signal—although at a low level—did come from the United States in the form of a statement by the former U.S. ambassador to Helsinki and current head of the U.S. negotiating team at the Stockholm Conference, James Goodby, during an interview with HUFVUDSTADSBLADET some time ago. Goodby made it clear that
the United States naturally respects the territory of neutral states, even in wartime.

One more explanation is provided as to why Finland does not want to push the zone issue and why Helsinki sees it as an advantage that Sweden has adopted a more active attitude on the issue.

Finland does not want to give the big NATO countries the impression that it has actively helped push Denmark and Norway into negotiations concerning the zone as long as NATO's attitude toward a Nordic nuclear-free zone is negative.

11798
CSO: 3650/239
FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER'S POLITICAL OFFICE STATEMENT

NC121021 [Editorial Report] The political office of former Cypriot Foreign Minister Nikolaos Rolandhis has released the following Greek-language statement on 11 July:

After a careful study and assessment of all the facts, I have decided to establish a political office which will be in full operation within the next few weeks.

The office will be a political meeting place for the center and the democratic center-right in which, together with my political advisers, I will analyze the national issue, political developments, and more generally, public affairs. The office will also be a political platform from which I will express my views on the Cyprus [problem] and other issues.

From those who think beyond the confines of everyday life, the Cyprus problem has ceased to be merely a problem; it has begun to astonish. It is a question not only of occupation of Cyprus' northern territory which has been tainted with it, but also of the formation of political-military branches with broader ramifications and threats. Perhaps only part of the land is occupied, but all of Cyprus is now in the [gun's] sight.

Why have we reached this point? Why is the course downhill continuing? Why, while official Nicosia extemporizes on occasion with such verbal facility on ultimate vindication, do we lament new faits accomplis every year? Why do we seek every year that which we rejected the previous year as unacceptable?

The Turkish policy which conceived, nurtured, fashioned, and finally implemented the idea of the invasion and occupation is the principal contributor to the drama. Turkey is 85 times greater than Cyprus in both population and area. It covers an area of such political-military sensitivity that it has become for its allies an indispensable partner and for many others a desirable harlot. It derives its strength from the depths of the State Department and the Pentagon to the chancelleries, palaces, and foreign ministries of Europe.

Turkey has occupied us in a manner that is criminal, brutal, legally punishable, and politically impermissible.

And we? With hellenism on our side, how have we confronted the hurricane that has swept our land?
It is precisely in the reply to this question that the second dimension of the Cyprus tragedy lies.

1. We were unable to politick flexibly and cleverly.

2. We sacrificed political realism on the altar of political rhetoric and opportunism.

3. We donned slogans and shed substance.

4. We made bad assessments in connection with the possibilities for the implementation of resolutions by international organizations.

5. We did not realize the meaning of federation.

6. We did not accept political compromise and the policy of mutual concessions as our political philosophy.

7. We do not know and have never decided what we really want.

8. By pursuing the intangible and unfeasible with mathematical precision, we are leading Cyprus first to partition, then to double enosis, and finally to complete occupation by the Turks.

Thus while a few months ago the Greek prime minister declared with disappointment that the resolutions are not "being implemented" and that they will "remain on history's shelf" we are now carrying these resolutions from the walls of China to the Rockies asking for implementation as our only goal!! If, however, the Greek prime minister was right with regard to these resolutions, why are we continuing this erroneous behavior, which in the end will lead to carrying around our own epitaph? Why permit such provocative inconsistency? Why are we chasing an unrealizable dream instead of sitting down to make correct evaluations and appraisals on the basis of what is nationally correct and feasible? Why do we not utilize the resolutions to the extent that they are useful instead of seeking the impossible? Who do we not listen to Makarios' voice about the desirable and the feasible? Why do we not listen to Karamanlis' voice that it is inconceivable to continue the struggle "with vague, conflicting, or unfeasible goals?" How can we allow the Turks to work unimpeded for the recognition of their "state" (which we allowed them by our own mistakes to establish 8 months ago)—something that will consolidate partition and perhaps ultimately Cyprus' complete occupation—while we shall be engaging in dreamy peregrinations?

Our friends, who sympathize with our drama and who support our cause (the non-aligned, the West and the socialists) many times advised us to beware of the course we are following, to differentiate between theory and practice, to be level-headed. Shall we heed them at last?

With courage and determination I shall struggle from my political office for the rational confrontation of the Cyprus issue, for the unreserved acceptance of the summit agreements, for the establishment of a negotiating dialogue between the two communities under UN auspices, and not an academic dialogue as was the case
so far, for the acceptance of political compromise and reciprocal concessions, for the pursuit of the feasible and simultaneously nationally correct, and for the establishment of an independent, sovereign, territorially integral, and nonaligned Federal Republic of Cyprus.

Let not the superficial calm that currently prevails in Cyprus lull us to sleep. The calm is a palliative that conceals the problem but does not cure it. It puts us to sleep when we should be awake, and when we awake it will be too late.

In Cyprus the Turks have committed a crime for which they have already been condemned by international society and history. Our bad maneuvers should not be the fertilizer that feeds and maintains the tree of the Turkish sin. We, the victims of a crime, must not lose Cyprus through our imprudence because then it will not be only our children that blame us. The sacred and historical memory of those who have passed [through this land]—the approximately 300 Cypriot generations—will strike us down with lightening.

CSO: 3521/293
DELEGATION LEADER PRESS STATEMENT--Sofia, 27 Jul (BTA)--In a statement for Bulgarian reporters Mr Polivios Kolokos, [spelling as received] deputy secretary general of the Democratic Party in Cyprus (DIKO), put high the talks which the delegation led by him had in Sofia. The delegation is visiting here at the invitation of the Fatherland Front. Mr Kolokos was received by Mr Pencho Kubadinski, chairman of the National Council of the Fatherland Front, and by Mr Petur Mladenov, minister of foreign affairs. The guest gave full support to the latest initiative of Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar, the UN secretary general, for reopening the dialogue in partitioned Cyprus. "As far as we are concerned, we make all the necessary steps and efforts," he emphasized. In the opening, Mr Kolokos stated everything now is up to the willingness and good will of the Turkish Cypriots. "The Cyprus question is very complicated and should be handled very carefully," he said. "Our goal is the establishment of a state with federal structure, which would turn into a harbour of peace," said Mr Polivios Kolokos. [Text] [AU281455 Sofia BTA in English 1848 GMT 27 Jul 84]
GREENLAND TO TAKE OVER EXPORT TRADE, SET FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Government Leader Johansen Comments

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 18 Jul 84 p 4

[Text] Hunters, fishermen and workers should have influence and share responsibility when the government of Greenland takes over the production sector of KGH [Royal Greenland Trading Company], but the time is not ripe for "experiments with ownership conditions," according to government member Lars Emil Johansen.

"We should not start experimenting with ownership conditions," said Greenland's strong "minister" of business affairs, Lars Emil Johansen, who will return to Greenland tomorrow to continue the preparations for the Greenland government's takeover of the Royal Greenland Trading Company's production and export sector on 1 January.

Along with all the top people in the Greenland government, the "landsstyret," Johansen has been in Denmark for a week to discuss the takeover terms with Greenland Affairs Minister Hoyem. Johansen regarded the results as "quite promising" and he is now ready to complete a 5-year plan for Greenland's business development.

Central Management

When he rejects changes in ownership conditions it is not protecting private ownership of the means of production that he has in mind. But there has been agitation both in Greenland and among Greenland observers in Denmark for a special Greenland development of the cooperative idea as the basis for an independent Greenland business sector. But for the time being Johansen would rather see the "state" own the means of production so that the Danish state-owned trading and production company, KGH, will now be owned and managed by the Greenland home-rule government.

As part of the agreement that produced a coalition government a month ago consisting of the former ruling party, Siumut [socialist, radical home-rule party], and the small left-wing Inuit Ataqatigiit [pan-Eskimo party]
it was decided that trappers, fishermen and workers with the KGH production companies would be included in the planning of Greenland's business development.

The coalition has strengthened Johansen's position in Siumut where he has always been a little to the left of Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt.

Production Committee

"At the moment I am working on a 5-year business development plan for Greenland. We presented this to IA [Inuit Ataqatigiit] when we were negotiating and IA backed it.

"In connection with the takeover of the KGH factories my idea is that the daily operations be handled by a local production committee on which SIK (Greenland Workers' Union) and KNAPK (the fishermen's and trappers' organization) are represented, as well as the local municipal councils. These local bodies would take care of daily operations—but they would be responsible to the home-rule government, of course. And they would also have a real joint responsibility in the form of a budget responsibility."

Does this mean that such a committee would select the local leaders of factories and production sites?

"In addition to taking care of daily operations they will also have decisive influence. But I cannot say at this time whether or not the committees will appoint the leaders.

"I am interested in having this question clarified after consulting as many of those concerned as possible. Next month I will hold a meeting with present KGH factory leaders—if I am permitted to by KGH, which is something we have also had problems with. But I hope that KGH's factory leaders will become our factory leaders on 1 January and I want to discuss things like that with them. Later we will hold a conference in which the organizations, KGH and others involved in production will take part.

"I want as much competence as possible at the local level so that every factory has its own management. This involves animating local feelings of responsibility. It would be nice if people felt on 1 January that the factory is no longer owned by some remote power or another but that it is 'our factory.'"

Cooperative Idea Not Relevant Now

Several people have said that Greenland could benefit from using the cooperative society form in connection with the KGH takeover. What do you think?

"I will not rule out the idea that this is one way it could be done, of course. But I feel that the collective Greenland takeover of these areas
is so important that I do not believe we should start experimenting with various types of ownership. It is far more important to insure local influence and joint responsibility.

"At the moment we are working on some new products that we hope we can launch when the home-rule government takes over this sector. These are projects that could provide many more jobs and much better incomes for fishermen. I think that these projects, which are included in our 5-year plan, are so important that we should not jeopardize them by starting out the takeover by experimenting with ownership conditions."

Historic

Greenland Affairs Minister Tom Hoyem said the results of the negotiations with the Greenland government last week were "historic" and predicted that the "controversies" that have characterized relations between him and the Greenland government will "diminish substantially" after 1 January.

He said that the disagreements concerning the KGH takeover have been reduced from "more than 100 million kroner and essential principles" to a question of financing to the tune of 17 million kroner.

Johansen used less highflown language but did not entirely disagree.

The KGH production and export sector includes more than 60 production sites, 10 fish factories, trawlers, sheepraising, trading in sealskins, etc. Sales run close to 1 billion kroner a year and there is a sizable deficit.

In the last fiscal year accounted for, 1983, there was a deficit of 89 million kroner. The Greenland affairs minister and the home-rule government agree that in 1985 it will be necessary to provide 105 million kroner for KGH activities, but they disagree on how this is to be done.

So far the Danish government has offered to increase the annual basic appropriation to Greenland by 71 million kroner. But during the latest talks an understanding was reached that the sides would "share" the financing of the 34 million kroner that represent the difference between 71 and 105 million kroner.

The Greenland affairs minister will try to find an extra 17 million kroner and the Greenland government accepted the fact that it will have to match that amount by means of price increases in 1985.

Progress

"I feel this represents considerable progress in relation to the earlier negotiations that both sides are now prepared to try and cover as much of the deficit as possible outside the Greenland funding limits.

"I would regard it as fairly satisfactory if the 1985 subsidy is about the same size as the deficit noted in 1983 of 89 million kroner. And that we
wait and see if the 1985 deficit is bigger than that before we raise the rest through price increases. I think the prospects are very promising after the latest talks."

The Greenland affairs minister also expressed enthusiasm at what he calls a "positive bombshell" that was exploded by the Greenland government during the talks: the home-rule government wants to take over the remaining KGH activities, traffic and supply services, as early as 1986, while in the past a takeover of these activities was not planned before sometime in the 1990's.

A committee was set up during the negotiations to prepare for a speedy takeover.

"We were not expecting any more takeovers in the 1980's after the takeover of the housing area from GTO (Greenland Technical Organization). But since we have established a new home-rule area specifically to work with the takeover of supply services and transportation we feel we can also take over this area quicker than we had planned, perhaps as early as 1 January 1986. Another reason is that we are naturally interested in giving the Greenland government some influence over the areas that determine prices in Greenland as quickly as possible."

Government Matter

The Greenland affairs minister has said that if the speedier takeover succeeds he will revise his past opinion that the Greenland Affairs Ministry will be in existence even after the year 2000. Do you have a positive view of that admission?

"If the Danish government wants to have a ministry for Greenland, it is free to do so, of course.

"After the KGH takeover there will still be areas that come under GTO--electric heat and water supplies and telegraph services, while the building sector will be turned over to the government of Greenland.

"Of course it is an asset to have contacts between the governments of Denmark and Greenland coordinated. I am not the one to say whether this should be done through a ministry or in some other fashion."

'Historic' Turning Point for Greenland

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 18 Jul 84 p 1

[Editorial by EMC: "Greenland History"]

[Text] Last Thursday was a historic day that was overlooked by a summer-jaded public. On 12 July leading representatives of the government of
Greenland and Greenland Minister Tom Hoyem reached preliminary agreement on the basis for the home-rule government's takeover of the production and export sectors of the Royal Greenland Trading Company. It was the minister who stressed the historic significance of the day in JYLLANDS-POSTEN on Tuesday in a personal comment characteristic of the man. One suspects that the comment was also meant to drown out media reports of the imminent resignation of the unfortunate minister, an act that has been repeatedly demanded by Greenland politicians and which JYLLANDS-POSTEN announced on Monday in an article that predicted an extensive cabinet reshuffling on 15 September.

But regardless of his motives, Hoyem's attempt to change the focus in relation to the KGH negotiations is not unreasonable.

"Marxist thinking does not come naturally to me," the Greenland affairs minister admitted, "but it is understandable that the Greenland identity can experience a feeling of impotence when they have taken over the 'superstructure' (culture, religion, education, social relations, etc.) but not the 'foundation': production."

That is what the home-rule government is getting now. And with a government not so unfamiliar with Marxist thinking and under a business "minister," Lars Emil Johansen, whose business policy, which he now has a better chance of implementing than ever before, has been openly and directly inspired by Marxist analyses of society.

Johansen set off an extremely heated debate in Greenland 3 years ago when he presented the basic views of his business policy in a report to the national assembly. One of those behind the report was a Danish economist educated at Roskilde University Center and the arguments in the report were on a very theoretical and clearly Marxist-inspired level. The conclusions were quite drastic. A business policy that guarantees Greenland's independence in the long run and preserves its living resources as the foundation for the national economy must free itself from the capitalistic market economy and be run with reference to the "social wealth" that cannot be measured in terms of profits. The report recommended "expropriations" and "mandatory investments" as ways of achieving this control.

Opposition to the report was so strong that Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt reversed course and tabled the report. During the last election campaign a year ago, Motzfeldt referred to the report as an "old corpse." Johansen does not share that opinion.

During the negotiations on the formation of the coalition government a month ago the little left-wing party, Inuit Ataqatigiit, was talked into giving up almost all its special issues. In return the government agreement was a clear underlining of Johansen's political line. It was determined that a 5-year plan would be created for Greenland business development and that production committees would be established at KGH factories and production sites where trappers, fishermen and workers along with
representatives of local municipal councils will take direct joint responsibility for production.

But despite this essential and creative element of decentralization, KGH will also represent a centrally-run factor in the economy under the home-rule government.

Johansen is pursuing his business policy objectives in other areas as well. One of Greenland's biggest firms, the Godthab Fish Industry in Nuuk, recently went bankrupt and Johansen is investigating the possibility that the Greenland government can take over the assets in cooperation with the municipality of Nuuk, the trade unions and the organization of trappers and fishermen.

Johansen no longer talks about "expropriations" and "mandatory investments" but he wants to obtain through tax policies the portion of private business profits that he feels should be invested with reference to the "social wealth."

Another reason for the current impact of Johansen and his political viewpoints is the weakness of the big opposition party, Atassut [moderate, pro-Denmark party]. Atassut has never been able to outline a Greenland alternative to Siumut's leadership. When Atassut criticized the government of Greenland during the takeover negotiations for "extending the beggar's bowl behind the slogan: We can do it ourselves," it is not just the imagery that makes it hard to grasp the perspective in the criticism. Atassut feels that the KGH takeover will be a "burden" on the Greenland economy under the terms being set now. But the economic terms for the takeover are unlikely to improve later on. Atassut's message can easily sound like: "We cannot do it ourselves."

The real problem Atassut has is that party leaders traditionally adhered closely to the Greenland policies of Danish governments—which were Social Democratic governments in the good old days.

During the polarization of Danish politics, Atassut has clung to the non-socialists, but today the Schluter government's cost-consciousness and the Siumut desires for independence overlap on vital points.

But of course the debate on the size of Danish subsidies that was touched off during the recent "controversies" in the KGH talks is symptomatic. Johansen's business policy visions will encounter a very severe test when the relatively high Greenland standard of living must be maintained with an unchanged Danish subsidy at best and an increased direct Greenland responsibility for the economy.

Decisive for Johansen's project will be whether he and those with similar views can succeed in mobilizing the people of Greenland in the independent shaping of business life. The contrast between the requirements of this mobilization and the strict administration that Johansen with his 5-year plans considers totally essential is striking.

But that is the way things are when one wants to create history and Johansen undoubtedly has better conditions for doing so than Hoyem has.

6578
CSO: 3613/199
VIOLENCE STEMMING FROM ALCOHOLISM CONTINUES INCREASE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Jul 84 p 7

[Text] Violence and murder among alcohol abusers is many times more frequent in Greenland than in the rest of Scandinavia.

Alcohol abuse in Greenland provides some fantastic hospital statistics. Almost half of the admissions—42 percent—are the result of violence, with both victims and perpetrators of violence being intoxicated to a large extent, and in two out of three cases an operation is required.

More than a tenth of the admissions have alcohol in the background.

The figures come from a study made by four doctors at the district hospital in Jakobshavn covering the entire year of 1983.

Few Chronic Consequences

The chronic consequences of abuse have shown up surprisingly infrequently. The doctors speculate that this is because the products have not been available for more than 30 years and they are preparing for a wave of pancreas and liver inflammations, insanity, damage to the esophagus, etc. in the years ahead, well-known symptoms in this country after many years of heavy drinking.

But Greenlanders consume far more than people in the rest of the Nordic region. Translated into pure alcohol, a Greenlander consumes 13 liters a year, a Dane 8.5 liters.

Strong Recommendation

The doctors in Jakobshavn strongly recommend that the authorities put strict limits on access to the dangerous beverages immediately. They have strong doubts that the measures already adopted by various local communities will be adequate.

The Jakobshavn doctors added a study from Narssaq to their own results.
It shows that the frequency of violence in the capital of Greenland is 22.3 times greater than it is in Esbjerg. And 96 percent of the perpetrators of violence and 82 percent of their victims are intoxicated.

Broken jaws are four to five times more common among Greenlanders than among other Scandinavians.

Suicide is 2.5 times more frequent than it is among Danes and the frequency of homicide is 10-14 times higher than it is here.

6578
CSO: 3613/199
SORSA, VÄYRYNEN INCREASINGLY DOMINATE PARTIES IN CONGRESSES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 21 Jun 84 p 2

[Commentary by Hakan Hagwall: "Mainstay Parties in Finnish Governments"]

[Text] Over the past few weeks it has definitely become possible to state that a new party has emerged as the mainstay of Finnish governments.

May and June are the months for party conventions in Finland. The Communists, the "Greens," the Swedish People's Party, the Social Democrats, and the Center Party have now all held their congresses. The most outstandingly dramatic congress, naturally, was that held by the Communists, since it included a violent showdown between the Eurocommunists following the majority line and the Stalinists in the minority. But just as much interest was shown in the proceedings at the congresses held by the two government parties: the Center Party and the Social Democrats.

During the Kekkonen era and even before that, the Center Party could be described as the mainstay of Finnish governments. Kekkonen came from that party, of course. The Center Party achieved a position as the party which, above all others, guaranteed continuity. This was especially true in the field of foreign policy. A government without the Center Party was practically unthinkable. The party often controlled the post of prime minister and, at least just as often, that of minister of foreign affairs.

To some extent, that position eventually became self-consuming. In the president's dominating shadow, it was difficult for Center Party politicians to establish a really strong position of their own. Eventually, there developed a tremendous amount of string pulling in connection with appointments. The split manifested itself disastrously in preparations for the presidential election after Kekkonen's retirement.

Difficult problems arose when it came to agreeing on a presidential candidate. Opposing each other were the two veteran politicians, Ahti Karjalainen and Johannes Virolainen. In a convulsive atmosphere, Virolainen was nominated. He did not stand a chance against Social Democrat Mauno Koivisto.

The Social Democrats won. They now have the presidency and the office of prime minister. Most Finnish observers find it hard to imagine that a government
headed by someone other than a Social Democrat would have been possible. Even so, in Scandinavian terms, the Finnish Social Democrats are a fairly small party. Nor do they hold most of the ministerial posts in the coalition government. But they are dominant. It has been said that with one-fourth of the political support, the Social Democrats exercise three-fourths of the social power.

The Social Democrats have become the mainstay of government. This is not altogether without its problems, as was made quite obvious at the party congress. Everything possible is being done to give the party a double image: partly as the government party and partly as the old socialist people's movement—the worker's party. It is hard to combine those two roles.

Finland's government is pursuing a very cautious policy. The minister of finance has a solid grasp of business: no generous extravagances in social policy are being permitted. Cooperation between Social Democrats and the nonsocialists also prevents most socialist-tinged adventures. Socialists with a burning ideological consciousness are not gaining much from the government's policy.

The party is also hemmed in by its wider social base among the voters. While its membership is still clearly dominated by workers, they do not at all dominate its voting constituency in the same way.

A draft party program was presented at the party congress. It was obviously designed to satisfy the most people. There were no hardline ideological statements. On the other hand, there was a great deal of rather empty phraseology that the reader could interpret to suit himself. It cannot really be said that the proposed program aroused any great enthusiasm at the congress, but the party is well disciplined, and Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa's position is strong. As it had requested, the leadership was instructed to do some further work on the program.

The general impression gained from the conventions by both the Social Democratic and the Center Party is that the parties are united behind their leaders. In the Center Party, the old battles have been set aside, and Väyrynen's position is unchallenged. Unkind commentators have pointed out, however, that part of the reason may be that since the party was previously held on such a tight rein, there was no opportunity for the emergence of a leading figure who could challenge Väyrynen's supremacy. Väyrynen himself is a product of Kekkonen's influence on the choice of leaders in the Center Party.

Kalevi Sorsa's position is even stronger. And his strength is not based only on the members of his party. He is also esteemed by his political opponents. At this year's congress, however, Sorsa announced that this was the last time he would accept reelection as party leader. But not many people believe that he will leave politics after that. A very likely suspicion is that Sorsa is already starting to make plans for the next presidential election.

The thing that attracted most attention at the Social Democratic Congress was without a doubt Sorsa's fierce attack—repeated several times—on Finland's mass media, all of which he tarred with the same brush. Finland is turning into an
"infocracy," said the prime minister. The mass media have become a threat to democracy.

The attack was not his first. Sorsa has tackled TV in the past. And President Koivisto has also indulged in remarkably disparaging and generalized judgments concerning Finland's reporters.

The simple reason is that the mass media have grown less respectful. The tough attitude toward those in power, the interest in antagonisms and scandals and so on that are an obvious feature of political journalism in other Western countries have developed quickly in Finland over the past few years.

The matter can also be viewed as reflecting a political ruler's irritation and lack of experience with criticism. On the partisan level, Finland's government meets with very weak opposition. The Communists devote their attention to internal feuds, and the largest opposition party--the Conservative Party--behaves in a quite confused manner.

The main outlet for political thinkers who disagree with official government policy has become the mass media. What this means is that without that critical scrutiny by the mass media, Finland would be far more monolithic than would be beneficial.

Everyone has a sense of the immobility and lack of alternatives in Finnish politics. Nonsocialist politicians, both inside and outside the government, say it would be good for both Finland and the Social Democrats if there were a purely nonsocialist government to show the Social Democrats that they cannot spread out just any way they please. But extremely few people believe in that alternative.
Support for the Greens has increased by more than 5 percentage points since the parliamentary elections, but the rate of increase in support for them seems to be levelling off. There was no measurable change since the poll in April.

Rural Party support has increased from 8.7 percent in April to the figures of the last parliamentary elections. The SMP [Finnish Rural Party] has made a drastic jump forward since the previous municipal elections.

The Center Party is also now at the level of support achieved in the parliamentary elections. Center Party party support has increased 1 percentage point since April, but it is still far from that share of the votes which the Center Party and the Liberals received together in the 1980 municipal elections.

There have been no perceptible changes in support for the Swedish People's Party, the Christian League, and the Constitutionalists.

Total leftwing support was 37.5 percent in May. The last time it was less than this was in the 1968 presidential elections.

Finnish Gallup asked approximately 1,900 people what party they would vote for in the municipal elections. Gallup has also conducted a poll on the political participation of Finnish citizens.
Party Support (%)

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<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>25.5</td>
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<td>SKDL</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>16.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>22.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center Party (+Liberals)</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swedish People's Party</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finnish Christian League</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constitutional Rightwing Party</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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Political Action Losing Interest

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 Jun 84 p 11

[Article: "Interest in Politics But Not in Political Action"]

[Text] The interest of Finnish citizens in politics has clearly increased in the last 10 years, but at the same time interest in political action and participation in political meetings has decreased.

Finnish Gallup came to such a conclusion in a poll conducted in May—June, in which 903 voting-age Finnish citizens were asked about participation in politics and their opinions on their own opportunities to influence the political process, the objectives of political action, and the Green movement.

Gallup used Pertti Pesonen's and Risto Sankiaho's study conducted in 1975 as a basis for comparison. The questions were primarily the same as those asked in 1975.

Those somewhat or quite interested in politics at the beginning of summer comprised 51 percent while the corresponding figure in 1975 was 41 percent. A record figure of 57 percent was recorded in the excitement of the presidential elections of 1982. Conservative Party supporters are the most interested in politics.

Politics are followed in the newspapers by a slightly greater percentage than 10 years ago and the number discussing politics is approximately the same, but action together with other people has declined from 31 to 19 percent and participation in political meetings has declined from 18 to 10 percent among those interviewed.

Protest Favored

SMP supporters differ from the supporters of other parties with respect to political participation: their activism has increased while activism in all the other parties has decreased. Nevertheless, SKDL and Center Party supporters are still the most active.
Civil protest was also measured in the study and it has clearly increased in the last 10 years. While 19 percent of the respondents signed petitions in 1975, the number this year was 30. Participation in boycotts has increased from 1 percent to 7 percent and participation in demonstrations has increased from 6 percent to 9 percent.

SKDL supporters are the most enthusiastic protestors while SMP members are the least interested in such activities. The Greens are interested in boycotts and petitions, but not in marching.

System Alienates

In the 1975 study it was confirmed that Finns are alienated by the political system and the situation has not changed, alienation has even slightly increased.

Previously, several respondents joined in the argument that officials do not care what people think, MP's soon loose touch with their constituents, and the parties are only interested in the votes they can get from people.

On the basis of the poll, the participation of the SMP in the government has not enamored its supporters to the system. SMP supporters are even more alienated. The second most alienated group is the Greens.

Conflicting Interests

Gallup also asked citizens to express their evaluation of how severe the contradictions are among society's various population groups. The contradictions between environmentalists and the proponents of commerce and industry were felt to be the greatest. Second place was given to the relationship between the rich and the poor and third place to employee—employer.

The confrontation between agricultural producers and consumers, urban residents and rural residents, as well as physical workers and intellectual workers has clearly decreased in comparison with a similar study conducted in 1972.

In asking about social goals the same issues such as keeping one's job came to the fore as in 1975. The prevention of pollution now replaced health care as the second most important issue. This was only in sixth place 10 years ago.

Greens in the Center

Those interviewed were asked where they would place themselves on the leftwing rightwing scale, in which number one represents the extreme left and number ten represents the extreme right.

The newcomer Greens were situated in the center just as Center Party Chairman Paavo Väyrynen described them at the Center Party congress.
From left to right the parties were situated in such a way that the SKDL's position on the scale was 3.14, Social Democrats 4.36, Greens 5.35, SMP 5.54, Center Party 5.82, and the Conservative Party 7.73.

On the basis of this measurement the position of the Greens is thus between the Social Democrats and the SMP, next the SMP but closer to the Center Party than the Social Democrats.

Such linear evaluations have demonstrated that all the parties have moved toward the center in recent years. The most rapid movement toward the center was in the 1982 presidential elections. Now movement toward the center is already coming to a halt.

Greens Comprised of Young Women

On the basis of the poll 7 percent of Finns react very positively to the Green movement and 33 percent rather positively. Those who are neutral make up 38 percent and 10 percent have adopted a negative attitude.

Finnish Gallup has outlined a picture of Green movement supporters on the basis of extensive material. The typical Green supporter is an urban university graduate approaching the age of 30, more frequently a woman than a man.

The SMP does not need to fear that the Greens will take away their votes since the SMP supporter is almost the direct opposite of a Green according to this same material: a poorly educated older male who lives in a rural area.

According to Gallup's assessment, support for the Greens decreased slightly last fall in the Helsinki area, but at the same time their ideas have spread elsewhere in Finland.

Green supporters have considered a clean environment to be a more important objective in society than the other parties, but their other objectives do not really differ from those of the other parties. The prevention of inflation, equality, and competitiveness have not been particularly important issues in the minds of the Greens.

Paper Comments on Polls

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Jun 84 p 3

[Editorial: "Interest in Politics Presents Challenge"]

[Text] Fewer and fewer Finns are striving to improve common issues or participate in political meetings. Citizens do, indeed, follow politics through the media and discuss politics, but their personal participation has decreased.

This alarming but not in itself surprising news is based on a Finnish Gallup poll, which included the same questions as in another study conducted 9 years ago. Thus there is a basis for comparison from that period in time.
Key:

1. Party support
2. Social Democrats
3. Conservatives
4. Center Party
5. Finnish People's Democratic League
6. Finnish Rural Party
7. Greens
8. Swedish People's Party
9. Constitutional Rightwing Party
10. March
11. April
12. May
The parties have also complained about weak participation for a long time. Participation in their events has not been the same as before. Enthusiasm, even otherwise, has not been of the same class as before. Membership has remained the same or even fallen off. The nomination of candidates to general elections has encountered difficulties in that aspirants have been hard to find. Even party votes have been devoid of enthusiasm.

A conclusion can be drawn from reduced participation particularly in party activities: when the management of common causes is not of interest through political parties functioning as a tool of democracy, this is a sign that does not, in general, bode well for the future of democracy.

If one so desires, the same gloomy picture can be supplemented by arguments and studies on so-called political alienation. Indeed, references to this can be found from only half of those answers which were obtained to arguments that were presented to respondents and in some way measured the degree of alienation. The other half of the answers obtained tell a contrary story.

It talks of a definite trend toward greater involvement in politics and of an increased desire to know more about it. In other words, alienation is a worn-out phrase which has become distorted and overused.

Interest among the supporters of the four largest parties in politics has increased on an average of 5 percent in comparison with 1975. All in all, more than half of the people is very interested or quite interested in politics. This is not a small number and development in this respect has not at all been retrogressive even though there are differences among the supporters of the various parties.

The study also confirmed the fact that interest in politics clearly increased during the last presidential elections. Even in this one can draw the conclusion that even though politics does not, in general, generate a lot of interest, an important and interesting event in political life does in and of itself contribute to this interest.

The results of the study are somewhat contradictory: participation is weak on the one hand and interest in politics has increased on the other hand. Understandably, there is no general enthusiasm for participation. If there is sufficient interest in some political event or task, people either participate or they do not.

Increased interest in politics is related to a higher level of education and to the arrival of the media society. In principle this opens up bright prospects from the point of view of democratic development. In order that it would become such in practice also, those who are lamenting the lack of participation must become active. Events, political functions, and opportunities to participate must be organized in proportion to public referendums in order to attract citizens and to get them to become involved in the process. This represents a serious challenge to the parties and to those wielding public power.
M Poll: Conservatives Declining

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Jun 84 p 8

[Article: "Conservative Party Remained Under 20 Percent"]

[Text] According to the most recent opinion poll, Conservative Party support is continuing to decline. The Center Party, on the other hand, is continuing a slow rise and it appears that the increase in support for the Greens is now coming to a halt. These results were obtained from an opinion poll conducted by the M Data Center at the request of SEURA.

The popularity of the Social Democrats and the Finnish Rural Party has taken a downward turn. The People's Democrats have retained their support from the last parliamentary elections.

In this study Conservative Party support is less than 20 percent. The party's share of the votes is now 19.8 percent (down from the 22.1 percent in the 1983 parliamentary elections). A recently published poll conducted by Finnish Gallup at approximately the same time showed a larger support rating for the Conservatives or 20.4 percent.

Support for the Greens has increased almost 4 percentage points since the parliamentary elections or to 5.4 percent. However, this is clearly less than the 6.7 percent measured by Finnish Gallup.

The Center Party is now supported by 18.8 percent of voting-age citizens (17.6). Finnish Gallup came up with a corresponding figure of 17.7 percent for the Center Party.

The Social Democrats have achieved a support rating of 25 percent. The M Data Center gave the party 24.9 percent (26.7 percent) and Finnish Gallup also came up with the same figure.

This newest study gives the SMP, which entered the government for the first time after the parliamentary elections, a support rating of 8.3 percent (9.7 percent) while the corresponding figure given by Finnish Gallup was 9.6 percent.

Support for the People's Democrats has remained almost unchanged since the parliamentary elections (14.0). The SKDL's share was now 13.9 percent. According to Finnish Gallup, party support would be only 12.6 percent. The Swedish People's Party was now given a rating of 5.1 percent (4.9) and the Christian League 3.3 percent (3.0).

For this study the M Data Center interviewed 1,039 citizens from 10 May to 11 June. Correspondingly, Finnish Gallup polled 1,900 citizens during the period from 29 April to 23 May.
Communist Paper Analyzes Poll

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 29 Jun 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Gallup Result and Finnish Communist Party Meeting"]

[Text] The most recent poll published on Wednesday seems to say that the downward trend in support for the SKDL is coming to a halt and is turning upward. Support is now at the same level as it was in the parliamentary elections a year ago.

The study was done primarily after the 20th Congress of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] and would seem to support the assumption that the SKP's 20th Congress has had a positive effect on support for the People's Democratic movement.

According to certain polls, the number of supporters is increasing particularly among women, youth, and functionaries.

It is not correct to draw any far-reaching political conclusions from one single positive poll. However, this result does point to the fact that it is logical to continue to carry out the constructive policy line of cooperation, by which the path was last opened up at the SKP congress.

Koivisto Support Remains High

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 1 Jul 84 p 6

[Article: "Poll: More Than Half Support Koivisto"]

[Text] President Mauno Koivisto is supported by 62 percent of Finnish citizens according to an opinion poll conducted by the M Data Center at the request of ILTALEHTI.

The M Data Center interviewed 1,260 voting-age citizens from different parts of the country in May-June.

Attorney General Kai Korte received the second highest support rating (6 percent) in the "presidential game". He was followed by Bank Director Harri Holkeri (Conservative) and SKDL Chairman Kalevi Kivisto with a 5-percent support rating. Center Party Chairman Paavo Vayrynen was given a support rating of 4 percent.

City Manager Raimo Ilaskivi (Conservative), Finance Minister Ahti Pekkala (Center Party member), and Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa (Social Democrat), each received 2-percent support ratings.

A similar poll was conducted in November 1983. At that time President Koivisto received a 68-percent support rating.

10576
CSO: 3617/187
RESULTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR REUNION, CORSICA VIEWED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 30 May 84 p 2

[Article by Michel Debre: "Unity of the Republic in Danger"]

[Text] The French nation, the creation of centuries and of men, is the guarantee of the freedom of the people of France, of their dignity, of their opportunity for advancement. In a world in which the most warlike, military indeed but also ideological, economic and demographic competition prevails, the French nation must safeguard the power of France.

This is why I note with anguish that inflation and inadequate investments, deterioration of the state, a decline in education, and finally a dropping birth rate are striking at the heart of the nation. But one of the most worrisome symptoms of this indifference of our government leaders and to the essence of our future is provided by the direct threats to national unity.

Without a doubt there still is a supranational ideological movement which is delighted by anything which can threaten the integrity of the territory of the republic. Without a doubt agitators motivated by a kind of modern nihilism and willing to use any means, however blind or bloody, and in addition welcoming the complicity of foreign enemies of France, also are plunging into separatist maneuvers.

But the government? The parliament? The political parties? They are forgetting their primary duty, which is France. Two examples of this official indifference, among others, deserve to be denounced. The advantage offered by these two examples is that they reveal concretely, and denounce to the public and to history, a deplorable line of conduct.

Reunion--A Deliberate Shipwreck

The readers of LE FIGARO may be interested to learn how the government goes about putting down a rebellion in an overseas department, where 80 or more likely 90 percent of the people claim to be French, and, despite their feelings, to push it along the path of rupture. Behind the words spoken, with which the ministers involved, indeed the prime minister, are not chary, there is a triple desire to alter the institutions, to create an explosive slum, and to change the economic conditions. This triple desire is a conscious one on the part of the leaders of the Reunionese Communist Party, which, on the
strength of the privileged status of its secretary general within the Communist International, exerts an influence over the government and the administration, through the French Communist Party, which for the past 3 years has been decisive. And the socialists in Reunion are following it all, touching their necks, around which they feel the halter placed upon them.

First, the change in institutions. The Department of Reunion is, like all the overseas departments, administered by a general council. One of the first actions of the government was to have its majority vote for the elimination of the General Overseas Departments Council. The Constitutional Council put a stop to this. Never mind that Reunion, like the other overseas departments, was provided with a regional assembly which, elected by universal suffrage, also serves, on the same territory, parallel with the General Council. On the one hand, the proportional system allows the communist party to obtain heavy representation there. And on the other, a law currently being drafted deprives the General Council of authority to the benefit of the new assembly. Thus the status of an overseas department, like Reunion, is moving away from the metropolitan norm, and the influence of the communist party is being artificially strengthened.

The Army of the Frustrated

Next comes the destruction of the human links with the mother country. Reunion is a very young department, thanks to a high birth rate, but it is poor both because of its limited fertile land area and the lack of assets in its subsoil, and the distance which makes imports costly and exports difficult. The Fifth Republic, by establishing both an excellent educational system and free travel for candidates for education in the home country or desirous of finding jobs there, gave hope to the young people. Taking into account the families which have gone to join these migrants and the children born to them in the mother country, the number of citizens of Reunion now living in metropolitan France comes to about 100,000. Thanks to the socialist ideology involving "working in the country," the communists have achieved a halt to all migration.

Under these conditions, there are about 10,000 young people who join the number of job seekers each year, although this does not greatly concern the National Employment Agency, because these unemployed persons, entirely French though they be, are not deducted in drafting the national figures. Not even those citizens of Reunion trained in high-quality institutions are allowed to apply to work in the mother country, just as they are practically blocked from enrollment in the continental French training centers.

Along with this, housing credit is declining. With the thousands of young people without jobs and without housing, a small army of unhappy and frustrated individuals, ready to provoke social outbursts, is being created. After having prepared for these explosions carefully, the communists are waiting to denounce them and to blame them on a government and an administration whose only error (serious from the point of view of the public good) in their actions was in listening to them.
The Worrisome Communist Party Ploy

Finally, the effort to change economic life. Production in this distant Reunion follows few rules: the integration of sugar in the common market, the investments which, whether public or private, sustain equipment, ensure crop diversification, and thanks to tax advantages, develop industries for the domestic market, and last of all tourism and perhaps fishing in the southern waters. The communist party decided to destroy confidence by harsh strikes, to discourage enterprise managers and to frighten off investors. For example, it has attacked the facilities which attract tourists, beginning with the Club Mediterranee, and the activities, such as cement production, on which construction and public works depend. And we are only at the beginning of the process of these political strikes which have led to a general strike desired and staffed by the communist party, which was a failure. Meanwhile the administration receives orders from Paris to do nothing—not even to execute court judgments, which might arouse the anger of the communist leaders.

And, moreover, since decentralization eventually means, for a poor department, a decline in the aid which, in the name of national solidarity, makes its modernization possible, what will follow is readily seen and is under our very noses: a decline in activity, a loss of confidence, stagnation of the economy.

How Long?

To these three guidelines--changing the institutions, creating an explosive ghetto, and altering economic activity, some so-called cultural measures must be added. The policy of teaching in the native language is a failure, because parents have refused a policy which shut their children off from any opportunity of advancement. But this nefarious and morbid desire continues.

The appointment of a communist to head the radio and television news broadcasting department is, one can readily see, pregnant with consequences, as is, moreover, the constant attempt to put an end to the republican tradition, characteristic of Reunion, of merging ethnic groups, by seeking to individualize each and thus to encourage division and to provoke internal disputes.

Reunion is resisting. The General Council, properly interpreting the people, is establishing a system to provide trips to the mother country in order to satisfy the aspirations of the young people, for whom, despite the difficulties, France represents the only hope. Also, angering the communists, the General Council is trying to increase financing for low-cost housing. But these are but palliative measures.

And while the communists play the good apostle and complain openly about a government which once again has followed their directives, a cry from the depth of the heart of the people is beginning to be heard, despite the propaganda and the open infiltration of agents devoted to the Reunionese Communist Party: "How long will the government try the patience of those of us who are distant Frenchmen, whose sole error is to reject any secession?"
Corsica: Abdication by the State

The stagnation of the economy, the deterioration of the state, and the social confusion are not the only consequences of a blameworthy policy. Indifference to the threats hanging over national unity is, in the final analysis, the worst sin.

The example of Corsica in this connection is important and distressing.

Those serving the new 7-year term, it is true, did not inherit a good situation. For some 10 years now the policy of a handful of men, who with admitted foreign aid are seeking by various means to discourage Paris and continental France, so that they will allow Corsica to become the prey of a minority, has been ignored. But since the present term of office began, the keeping of senseless promises made during the electoral campaign, indulgence with regard to the "terrorists," and the refusal to take the profound feelings of the vast majority who deplore the abdication by the republican state into account, have led to a more explosive situation than ever before.

It is time, and high time, to become aware of the seriousness of this policy and of the faint-heartedness, if not indeed incompetence, of the government. The policy with regard to Corsica can be defined in terms of four points: letting the separatists do as they will, encouraging the systematic distortion of the truth, multiplying false pretenses concerning real problems and, finally, abandonment of the basic prerogatives of the state.

The separatists know that they have no chance of rallying the Corsican people. The so-called moderates represent 10 percent, the violent faction a still smaller percentage, by far. Naturally, their policy is intimidation. Intimidation of the majority, by proving that they can multiply the number of outrages with full impunity, can conceal "racket" operations with political motives, can drive away tourists and can intimidate government officials.

Tolerance and False Pretenses

After winning approval for the amnesty, capitulating to the demand that a part of the army stationed there be withdrawn, and passively accepting the forced departure of teachers, the government tried to make an effort, by dispatching an excellent head for the police department. But it is to state an open secret to note that this excellent leader received no support, and that behind the fine words and the promises to the gallery, political intervention is still continuing to the same end—tolerance.

Audiovisual reporting and beyond the news, the general tone of broadcasts, are characterized by a partiality which in some instances has been almost shameless. The good French citizens are deliberately ignored to the point that patriots, whether supporters of the parliamentary majority or not, see their proposals deliberately ignored, while the slightest suggestion of separatist challenge is played up. The people of Corsica sometimes wonder if they are still living in France.
False pretenses are the law. By the nature of things, and because of blame-worthy inaction for several years now, some decisions which were made pointed in the right direction. This was the case in particular with those individuals who wanted to organize agricultural and industrial development and to promote vocational training, much more needed than the development of university courses, soon diverted from their goal at the expense of the interests of the general public and the young people.

But to place all of these responsibilities in the hands of an assembly proportionally elected represented a wager lost in advance. And the same electoral system which was designed to give an exaggerated role to the minorities, whose rejection would be clearly demonstrated by an ordinary balloting process, led, following grotesque convulsions, to an inevitable admission of impotence.

This complex reveals the basic fact: the abandonment of the prerogatives of the state. Corsica needs intelligent action, and to make this possible, a clear affirmation of authority. The activity undertaken, dominated by electoral considerations, is not intelligent. And the authority collapses in the face of the intrigues among agitators, ministerial cabinets or party general staffs, in particular that of a socialist party which looks for voters everywhere, and without too much concern from the national point of view.

The patriots decided to react. With the sponsorship of certain exasperated men, the people of Cargese undertook a movement which, in the name of republican and French Corsica, is spreading. The purpose of this movement is clear: to make the French citizens on the continent understand that the heart of Corsica is what it has been for generations. Legalist and even legitimist, it seeks nothing other than to remind the state officials that it is not by allowing themselves to be impressed by a handful of men who balk at no compromise that the problems of Corsica can be understood, and above all, that its future, which can be only be a French future, can be determined.

Decentralization has value when it is undertaken within a state determined to carry out its mission, a priority mission, which can have no spirit other than that of national unity.

But alas, the republican and French citizens of Corsica, representing the vast majority of our Corsica, are treated as malcontents, and the real malcontents are given consideration! Neither Corsica nor France deserves this humiliation.
NATIONAL INFLATED SELF-IMAGE, BASIC INSECURITY REGRETTED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 12 Jul 84 p 20

[Article by Nikos Dimou: "Look at Me!"]

[Excerpts] You know him. You surely know the fellow on the ferry-boat, who stands in front of you as you are trying to park your car and shouts:

"Here, look at me!"

He peremptorily orders you, sometimes banging on the hood of the car:

"Here, look at me!"

He thus encourages confusion, which makes him even more insistent. He upsets the driver, who then makes a wrong move: that gives him a chance to triumph:

"See, it's because you were not looking at me!"

"Look at me." This could actually be the new Greek slogan. The slogan that is based on one's inflated idea of self and on underestimating others. ("Don't do anything, just look at me!") Which means: "You cannot do it alone, you will hit another car, don't take any initiatives on your own, leave it to me." This reminds me of all those who are attempting to define our lives, who demand complete attention to their orders, and who, in the long run, create only confusion and--sometimes--panic.

He is totally sure of my incompetence. He does not leave me any power of decision, of movement, he deprives me of all freedom.

"Here, look at me, only me!"

Why should I look at you? Tell me where you want me to go, and let me do it by myself. It may be that I know what to do. I have traveled a lot, I have parked cars in many ferry-boats. Most of them have lines to guide you and don't use the "look at me" system. No one treats the driver like an idiot.
Why is it so in our country? Do we know less than other people? Are we dumber? No, it must be because we are more tolerant. Somehow, our basic insecurity allows the survival of small dictators, of the type "Here, look at me." Fed by the same sense of insecurity, they acquire an overinflated idea of themselves.

I don't want to look at anyone! I want to decide by myself. Is it possible to do it?

CSO: 3521/323
POLL: CONSERVATIVE WAVE AMONG YOUTH ENDING; LEFT GAINING

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 14 Jul 84 p 7

[Article by Gunnar A. Johansen]

[Text] The conservative wave among young voters is over. Since the beginning of this year, young people have turned more and more to the socialist parties—and especially to the Labor Party.

This is indicated by the figures from the monthly political opinion poll taken by the Norwegian Opinion Institute (NOI). The Conservative Party, in particular has noted a decline in support among voters between 18 and 29 years of age.

There are strong indications that a leftist political wave is developing among young people. In the NOI opinion poll, the Conservative Party now has less support among young voters than among the general voting public. From being a net plus for the Conservative Party, young voters have now become a minus for the party.

Left Side

In the June NOI poll the parties on the left were supported by 58 percent of the young people between 18 and 29 years of age. This is due primarily to the fact that the Labor Party was supported by 40 percent of this age group in the monthly poll. At the same time, the Progressive Party (FRP) suffered a serious decline in support among young voters.

The strong showing by the left in the June poll may be coincidental. Nevertheless, it is a clear trend in recent months. Young voters are turning to the parties on the left.

Earlier this year the Labor Party was supported by 30 percent of the 18 to 29 year age group. Now the figure is 40 percent. SV (Socialist Left Party), which has traditionally been strong among young voters, received the support of 11 percent of this age group in June. The Conservative Party received 29 percent, while the Christian People's Party and the Center Party received 2 percent and 6 percent, respectively. FRP has 7 percent of the voters between 18 and 29. The Liberal Party has 5 percent and NKP (Norwegian Communist Party) and RV (Red Election Alliance) have 1 percent each.

The change in attitude among young voters seems to have come about over the winter.

9336
CSO: 3639/137
POLL FINDS VOTERS GIVE WILLOCH TOP MARKS FOR JOB PERFORMANCE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Terje Svabo: "Willoch and Rokke at the Top"]

[Text] Prime Minister Kare Willoch and Minister of Justice Mona Rokke have achieved the best results in the NOI [Norwegian Opinion Institute]/AFTENPOSTEN poll of voter opinion of the work of members of government. Minister of Developmental Aid Reidun Brusletten is in last place, but it is a general trait of polls that the positions of ministers are determined in relation to the previous round of questions. Willoch has a unique position in the Conservative Party; fully 92 percent of the Conservative Party voters polled believe that the prime minister is doing a good job.

The opinion poll by NOI/AFTENPOSTEN was taken in June, and about 1,000 people over age 15 were asked for their opinions as to whether individual ministers are doing good or poor work. There is reason to believe that the responses largely depend on the ability of the individual minister to present himself, and how this presentation is interpreted by the voting public.

Reading the results of this poll will show the government that individual ministers have a definite need for clearer identification. Minister of Justice Mona Rokke, on the other hand, can once again confirm that her input is valued highly. Fifty-nine percent of those polled believe that she is doing a good job, but there were 63 percent who felt that way in the previous poll in March.

Prime Minister Kare Willoch can see an advance from 50 to 57 percent. That says something about Willoch's position, that he can achieve such results despite his long absence due to illness.

At the bottom of the scale is Minister of Developmental Aid Reidun Brusletten, with 30 percent. Several other ministers are also in the 30's. These are Minister of Agriculture Finn T. Isaksen (33), Minister of Fisheries Thor
Listau (35), Minister of Health and Social Affairs Leif Arne Heloe (36),
Minister of Industry Jan P. Syse (37) and Minister of Environmental Affairs
Rakel Surlien (38).

Forty-one percent believe that Minister of Foreign Affairs Svenn Stray is
doing good work, Minister of Finance and Customs Rolf Presthus 49, Minister
of Oil and Energy Kare Kristiansen 42, Minister of Transport and Communica-
tions Johan J. Jakobsen 48, Minister of Trade and Commerce Asbjorn Haugstvedt
40 and Minister of Labor and Municipal Affairs Arne Retteadal 45.

In addition to the prime minister and the minister of justice, the following
ministers received marks of over 50 percent: Minister of Consumer Affairs
and Administration Astrid Gjertsen 51 percent, Minister of Defense Anders C.
Sjaastad 54, Minister of Culture Lars Roar Langslet 55 and Minister of
Church and Education Kjell Magne Bondevik 53 percent.

NOI/AFTENPOSTEN can also give figures on how the individual ministers are
judged by their own voters exclusively. Here Prime Minister Willoch's po-
sition is superior, in that 92 percent of the Conservative Party voters
believe that he is doing a good job. The only minister who registered sup-
port of less than 50 percent of his own voters was Christian People's
Party's Asbjorn Haugstvedt. Only 48 percent said that Haugstvedt is doing
a good job.

The ministers who should be satisfied with the support of their own voters
are Minister of Finance Presthus, Minister of Transport and Communications
Jakobsen, Minister of Church and Education Bondevik, Minister of Culture
Langslet, Defense Minister Sjaastad and Minister of Justice Rokke.

Despite weak support from their own voters, both Minister of Developmental
Aid Reidun Brusaletten and Minister of Agriculture Finn T. Isaksen showed
substantially better support than in the previous poll in March.

Prime Minister Willoch is more popular among men than among women by 60 to
54 percent. For Johan J. Jakobsen the percentages are 50 and 45, and for
Kjell Magne Bondevik 52 and 54. Willoch received his greatest support in
Oslo and Akershus, Jakobsen in Ostlandet outside of Oslo and Akershus, and
surprisingly enough lowest in North Norway and Trondelag. Bondevik also
gets his greatest support in Ostlandet.

The leading representatives of the Conservative, Center and Christian
People's Parties get the highest marks in the higher income groups. It is
furthermore a general picture, even though the differences are small, that
evaluations of ministers' efforts are more positive the higher the family
income is.

It is not surprising that among members of LO [Federation of Trade Unions]
members of the government scored lowest in relation to those who are members
of other trade union organizations. For example, 43 percent of LO members believe that the prime minister is doing a good job, while 46 percent believe that he is not. The figures for voters who are members of other unions are 71 and 25 percent respectively. For Johan J. Jakobsen, the poll shows that 47 percent of LO believes that he is doing a good job, 33 percent a poor job. For other organizations the figures are 53 and 30 respectively. Kjell Magne Bondevik is pleasing 44 percent of LO members, while 43 percent are dissatisfied. Members of other union organizations are divided into 63 and 25 percent respectively.
ABRANTES MEETING FOUNDS NEW EANIST MOVEMENT

Text of Declaration

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 6 Jul 84 p 12

[Text] The Abrantes meeting on 30 June attended by supporters of the Commission for the Support of the Candidacy of President Eanes (CNARPE) issued a communiqué which, because of its meaning and possible importance, we are quoting in full. "The supporters of the CNARPE, meeting in Abrantes on 30 June 1984, and having analyzed the development of the national situation in various sectors, specifically the institutional and political fields, and having debated the possible forms of action, in order to contribute as their consciences dictate and as they believe that the interests of Portugal require, so as to find a democratic and patriotic alternative to this situation, have decided:

1. To set forth their deep concern about the progressive deterioration of the image and the credibility of the democratic regime and the conditions of life for Portuguese citizens;

2. To emphasize that the crisis in Portuguese society at this time has to do basically with the increasing neglect of ethical values and loss of prestige by our institutions, including some sovereign bodies;

3. To reassert the fact that the parties are basic elements in democracy, but their policy has not corresponded to the desires of the majority of Portuguese citizens;

4. Further to stress, as a consequence of the previous points, that only the creation of a new hope, through another policy and another way of pursuing politics, with the capacity to mobilize the people of Portugal, can make it possible to overcome these difficulties;

5. To establish, in terms of the reality briefly outlined, what might threaten the regime itself if other innovative alternatives capable of resolving the impasse, renewing confidence and saving democracy are imposed;

6. To conclude that an essential alternative involves the establishment of a new political force oriented exclusively toward the pursuit of what are believed to be the interests of Portugal and its citizens;
7. To stress that this political force will not be against anyone, much less against the parties, but rather will seek to function on the basis of the positive, on the basis of dignity, competence, consistency and honesty;

8. To place special emphasis on the fact that a new political force must be characterized at the outset by its internal democracy, by the ethics underlying it, by the methods it uses, by the seriousness and efficiency it reveals, which does not exclude the need to define the political and ideological space it will occupy clearly;

9. To emphasize at the outset that this space is undeniably that of freedom and social justice, in other words, not only that of pluralistic political democracy, but of economic, social and cultural democracy as well;

10. To make it clear, in this light, that what is needed is to reweave the social fabric, to put an end to the unfair distribution of sacrifices which have fallen above all on the shoulders of the most neglected, and to launch the economy again, putting an end in particular to the false dilemma between the private sector (a basic sector which must in fact be supported and dynamized) and the public sector (which must be made profitable);

11. To defend at the outset, among the essential political reforms, the need to change the electoral laws, to allow elected officials to represent the people who elect them in all cases, and not the leaderships of the parties to which they belong, while independent candidates should be able to run at least for the elections for the chambers;

12. To defend also the need to strengthen the presidential orientation of the system, which was challenged in the last constitutional revision, in order to strike a blow at the president of the republic, General Ramalho Eanes, concerning whom all those present reassert the honor of having aided to reelect him, for whom they state their support, and to whom they render their homage;

13. To stress again, in this connection, that since the coming presidential election is essential to the future of democracy, they must support their own candidate in 1985;

14. To establish, in order to begin to give shape to this new political force, while simultaneously giving shape to the hope it is intended to represent, that the organization of provisional council and district structures should be initiated, utilizing the basic method of proceeding from the base toward the top;

15. To urge these structures to engage in a debate in full depth of the text being distributed today, which is designed to serve as a basis for the future program parameters of the new force; and

16. To establish the headquarters of the Provisional National Commission in Santarem, and to hold the next national meeting at a place to be designated by 30 September 1984."
Conditions for Eanes' Support

Lisbon 0 JORNAL in Portuguese 6 Jul 84 pp 12-13

[Article by Fernanda Mestrinho]

[Excerpts] "We are committed to reveal nothing, as we do not want to repeat
the errors and vices we criticize in other parties," one of the key officials
of the new political force which met last Saturday in Abrantes and has al-
ready taken the name of CNARPE informed us.

This pact of silence has been honored, and one of the individuals with whom
we talked told us: "Telephone Hermínio Martinho. If he authorizes it..."
He did not, and all that could be learned was that, for example, the
document was presented by a group of 10 organized individuals from the dis-
trict of Santarem, and that the group included Hermínio Martinho himself,
Armando Fernandes, Olimpio de Matos and Paulo Guedes de Campos.

It was engineer Hermínio Martinho himself, moreover, who initiated the pro-
ceedings at the Abrantes meeting with a long speech. Speeches by other
former officials followed, including Prof Sergio Machado dos Santos (Braga),
Dr Dias Carvalho (Castelo Branco), engineer Luis Ramos (Beja), Dr Francisco
Feitinha (Portalegre), Dr Agostinho de Sousa (Viana do Castelo), engineer
Jose Vieira (Leiria) and Dr Alípio Melo (Guarda). Other speakers included
Prof Sa Furtado, soccer player Delgado, and Jose Luis Araujo (Oporto), rep-
resenting the CNARPE in various districts. Many of them were critical of the
present political situation.

The Letter of Intent

For the time being, the base document is only a "letter of intent" which may
come a party program.

At the outset the party stresses the "ethical-cultural principles of a new
model of society," to which subject 13 of the 42 pages were devoted. The
"political organization and role of the state," with the strengthening of the
"presidential orientation" and economic organization, with dynamization of
the private sector and making the public sector more viable, may place this
new organization (as Hermínio Martinho himself told O JORNAL last week)
within the area of "social democracy and democratic socialism."

The Actions of Men

"Seriousness and efficiency" are two of the main slogans of this new organi-
ization, which thus hopes to introduce new habits into a large part of the
present political class.

Conditional Support From Eanes

While Major Salgueiro Maia, a stranger to meeting halls and public "state-
ments," was present at Abrantes, Lieutenant Colonel Bernardo (of the Presi-
dency of the Republic) was the "eyes and ears" of Belem.
According to some CNARPE members, and this was stated at the meeting itself, the "new party" can only be viable with the endorsement of Gen Ramalho Eanes who, at the end of his term of office, is expected to lead this new political force. Otherwise it may become just one more of the frustrated and ineffective small parties. Other participants in the Abrantes meeting are less "dependent" on the president of the republic. Moreover, Hermínio Martinho, the main organizer of the movement, told O JORNAL last week that the response from Eanes "will depend on us. If the movement succeeds in representing what we want..." When Ramalho Eanes responds will depend on this. A good-humored political commentator told us: "That is, if the interim phase proves worthwhile, Eanes will go on to the final stage."

Five Parties With 20 Percent

"Renewing confidence and organizing hope" constitute the goal of the CNARPE. However, according to what a social democratic leader told us, "If the polls say that the 'Eanists' come to a little over 20 percent, this means that we would have five parties with 20 percent. What then?" To begin with, shuffling and dealing the cards, trying to change the electoral laws and to intensify the presidential system.

Apart from the independents, the politicians without party affiliation and in search of a "home," there will also be some "transfers," despite the fact that politics in Portugal is "club-oriented." Many would prefer to remain in the "reserves" rather than change the color of their shirts.

This will be the test which the officials of the "Eanist" party will launch beginning now, with the results to be analyzed at a national meeting held prior to 30 September. To achieve these results, many of these men will forgo their "vacations." Unless a "document" and a name (Eanes) suffice.

For a movement, perhaps, but for a party it would be better to wait and see.

Problem of Alliances

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 2 Jul 84 p 3

[Editorial: "Eanist Movement Takes Shape"]

[Excerpts] The Sao Miguel do Rio Torto Firing Range was the scene of the birth, according to the 120 CNARPE supporters present, of "a new and indispensable political force" at the end of the month of June. Whether the shot fired on 30 June will go straight and true to the heart of the "system," or whether it will be modified by "reflections," "contemplation," and "seminars"—this is the question in the minds of many citizens of this country.

Thanks to a 42-page text and the political will produced by the 120 citizens who participated in the event at the Sao Miguel do Rio Torto Firing Range, the Eanist movement cast off the garb of messianic salvation and presented itself to the country as a national program for regenerating public life by political action of a party nature. The new political force is not concerned
with whether or not the designation "party" will be used, because as one of its sponsors, engineer Herminio Martinho, has already admitted, the new political force will act as a party, and will take steps and have a function corresponding to that status.

Obviously the fact that the "Eanist party" is emerging as an organized political force does not mean that it is the "party of Eanes," or that Eanes, while he remains in office as the president of the republic, will assume direct leadership of "a party." But the new political force, established on the basis of the initiative and the organizational capacity of supporters of a second candidacy for Gen Antonio Ramalho Eanes, claims affiliation, on the ideological level, with social democracy and democratic socialism. These are both positions in which, as a politician, the president of the republic is to be found.

We note, however, that at the meeting of the 120 "ex-CNARPE supporters" at the Sao Miguel do Rio Torto Firing Range, the creation of "a new and indispensable political force" was discussed, which would paradoxically fall within the areas of the Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) in terms of the present party framework. A "new and indispensable" force, or the supreme effort to unsettle the foundations of these parties, to promote rebellion and schism and to divert the voters within these organizations? It should not be forgotten that the 1985 presidential election is approaching, and that those who pretend to be unconcerned with it are in reality dominated thereby, in both the positive and negative aspects, because of the concern with candidacies.

From now until the end of October, with the organization of the movement-party concretely reflected in its regional foundations, we will be able to assess to what point the creation of the "new and indispensable political force" will be oriented toward sponsoring a candidate for the presidency of the republic or not. It will be difficult, insofar as can be foreseen, for the movement-party to become capable of developing and competing in the areas of democratic socialism and social democracy without proposing a credible alternative to the electoral body. But an "Eanist candidacy" (not to be confused with the candidacy of Eanes, prohibited by the Constitution) will have to be made viable through a system of alliances.

This fact poses a problem for the "Eanists" in the movement-party which they cannot avoid. It is either the problem of alliances, or of adopting a position with regard to the existing political forces.

Thus far, it has all been easy. There was a negative definition: they condemned the "system" and censured the "political class." The critical discussion created sympathy and favorable expectations.

Now the time has come for definition, for tactical and strategic clarity. A strategy of political change is and must be a directed strategy. The movement-party cannot take a position of "ideological neutralism" or of "ideological sectarianism." The militants in the areas of "democratic socialism" and "social democracy" in Portugal, given the ideological flow and political
availability, are characterized by sectarianism, a factional spirit, the practice of patronage which has compartmented public life, has excluded worthy citizens, and has reduced the "power area" to feudal holdings and party "subsectors."

However, if it is essential to reestablish morality in public life, if the elimination of partisanship in the life of the self-governing bodies is the very guarantee of local administration and progress, it should not be believed that a wave of "Eanism," an ideology which is open only because it has not been specified, can do without the contribution of those in the parties who want the country to change and for democracy to be consolidated, in the nationalist challenge and the demand for democratic participation. When the province rises up without the capital, and even against the capital, this is the expression of a criticism the organizational realization of which can be positive.

If...if the movement–party overcomes the ambiguities of evasive discussion and, with the necessary directness, contemplates a Portuguese future which measures up to the hopes of April.

Questions Facing Movement

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 9 Jun 84 p 2

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa: "The Eanist Party—Dreams and Reality"]

[Text] Despite the acute crisis in the Central Bloc and the ever more frequent reports of a possible conversion of the CNARPE into a movement or even a political party, the feeling a close observer gets is that Gen Antonio Ramalho Eanes is continuing to lose esteem in the eyes of the public, while his speeches, even those most publicized, have more to do with the past than the future.

The end of his term of office approaches relentlessly. Within a little over a year, the president of the republic will lose the institutional weapon of parliamentary dissolution, and beginning then, his already dwindling prestige is likely to suffer the rapid disappearance of his fading star.

Moreover, all of the polls taken in recent months confirm this trend. The president of the republic is suffering a decline, thanks to his long exercise of power and the share of responsibility assigned him for all of the government experiments tried. The citizens who take a positive view of his political position do so more in terms of the post than the man (in a proportion reaching 85 percent against 15 percent). His initial situation in the center of the party spectrum gave rise to the inclusion of the Socialist Party itself on the left-wing frontier. When questioned about the foreseeable future, the citizens of Portugal reveal the deepest skepticism about the possible political career of Gen Ramalho Eanes after he ceases to carry out his presidential duties.

All of these and other conclusions of the public opinion polls perhaps explain the worry in the speculation in Belem (or in neighboring areas) about
the advantages and the disadvantages of the advance of a movement or party directly or indirectly linked with the personality of the president soon to be out of office.

The presidential advisers and the analysts should ask themselves what strange reason caused the notorious deterioration of the Central Bloc to expand the maneuvering room of the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], and, in general, an inorganic leftist front movement, without the emergence of General Eanes as a symbol for the future, of hope, rallying the expectations of the now more than 25 percent of those interviewed in successive electoral polls.

To add to the perplexity of the analysts and the advisers, there is the restlessness of the activists, who are not resigning themselves to the sad fate of waiting for years on end for a movement or a party which does not develop, running the risk of emerging only when the political conditions are still more clearly unfavorable to it.

To the sectors which are in this way experiencing the anguish of the question of the logic, the viability and the timeliness of a new movement or party, five questions conditioning the choice to be made within the coming weeks or months could be put:

1. Should the real structure to be launched be organized only as a movement, or should an effort be made to legalize it as a political party?

2. Should its establishment be undertaken within the next few months, or only after the 1985 presidential election?

3. Should the new institution be the product of a spontaneous dynamism at the base, or should it be carefully controlled from Belem?

4. Should it be situated on the left ideologically, including the voters to the left of the PS and a part of that party, or should it seek a more central location, oriented toward polarizing the social democratic and centrist voters?

5. Should its leadership be expeditiously identified with a presidential candidacy, should it maintain some link with it, or should it be oriented toward autonomy?

For a distant observer wishing to place himself in the specific situation of those who must make choices on these five different levels, the responses do not appear, theoretically, very complex.

To speak the truth, the launching of a party, in theory, is more logical than the protection of a movement, above all in a state which confers a privileged status on political parties, with a prohibition on other forms of association, and in which the experience of movements, even those relying on the base and with good intentions, has been characterized by a terrible lack of credibility at politically decisive moments. It is a fact that protests against the parties are plentiful, but it is equally true that, due to
institutional reasons and psychological dictates, the real space staked out for the activities of alternative associations is extremely limited.

As to the time of establishment, it will be difficult to maintain the logic of its functioning after the term of General Eanes ends, with a scenario which is unpredictable but in which the vague idea of a second DeGaulle as a "state reserve" can only be contemplated with an acute sense of humor.

Between the summer of 1984 and the end of the spring of 1985 would be the theoretically ideal time for any political undertaking designed to modify the Portuguese party systems. It also seems clear that there is no activism at the very base which can take the place of a minimum of centralization in launching a party (with risks even including the possibility of introducing or strengthening, depending on the viewpoint, the penetration of another group, such as the PCP, in this movement or party).

And it would appear preferable, again theoretically, for the sponsors of the new reality to avoid total identification of their leadership with the presidential candidacy, although they should protect some political and functional links with such a candidacy.

There remains the more complex problem of choosing between a small party (even if clearly limited to the left, and even if representing only 5 percent) designed to take the initiative from the PS, and a broader front seeking to occupy the center of the Portuguese political chessboard.

In theory, the proper response should be a central front oriented toward leadership of the political process in terms of the triple dimensions of Belem, Sao Bento and Gomes Teixeira. The leftist miniparty is almost inevitably destined to dwindle in size and fail, becoming in the blink of an eye a second MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission] of the PCP—the MDP/CDE of the most shameless, the most naive or the most Banist.

Only there is a practically impassable chasm between theory and reality, and the answers to the same five questions, no longer in the realm of illusion but in terms of the real country (an expression which we agree came from Maurras, but which was also voiced, without outside influence, by Antonio Sergio) yields completely different results.

1. In fact it is very difficult to create a new party in a system so closed, with an electorate so definitely identified, and with such obvious continuity of positions, and without the prospect of intraparty convulsions which would make the obvious success of the new project likely.

2. If a launching after December 1985 would be tardy, it is obviously premature now, and only a primitive enthusiasm at the base, nurtured by the mass media or possible outside pressures, can explain this leap forward, which here, too is leading the CNARPE to dream of immediate front movements or parties. The objective conditions for the purpose are unfavorable, and one must wonder if they can improve any time between now and June of 1985, in view of
the fact that the party system (and the government system) is going through the most critical stage, which will tend to improve, even if only slightly, within 3 or 4 months.

3. Controlling the primitive enthusiasm at the base is not an impossible task, but there is almost no way to quantify the types of Eanism. They exist for all purposes and of all hues: logical and irrational; of the militant left (many) and the dreaming right (few); for convenience (vast) and out of conviction (some); situational (the majority) and structural (the exceptions); with the PCP and against Mario Soares for the conquest of the PS, desirous of attacking the PSD; the seducers of certain sectors of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party]; pro-party and antiparty; pure presidentialists and pro-presidentialist semipresidentialists. When the day comes when Gen Ramalho Eanes has to act as arbiter for this "potpourri," the sweet illusion of many will be destroyed, and perhaps without winning the mythical support of the rest.

4. Nor is it easy to separate a hypothetical leadership of the new reality from the dream of a presidential candidacy. Basically, political action always has to do with the exercise of power, and what this will be in 1984-85 (and after 1985) has greatly to do with the presidential election, in which connection a futile request will be made of the Eanist activists, who are that because of a man who is president of the republic, to set aside their electoral desires for 1985 and to pursue paths throughout the whole country on an educational mission, teaching civic duty and preaching doctrine.

5. Finally, the reality indicates the virtual impossibility of the concrete realization of a large central front, of "rallying" the antisocialist left along with the presidentialist right, not only because definite divisions separate the Portuguese electoral body, but also because the overwhelming majority of the important PS structures, including the former secretariat, and of the PSD and the CDS, is not willing to sponsor an appreciable change in the present party system. And without such a change this great front would be a collapsing balloon, a nod of sympathy without support, a wink without a promise, discussion without acceptance of responsibility.

These are five reasons to show the extent to which the dream of the new Eanist movement or party is very problematical.

But they are five reasons which taken all together are less important than a sixth and decisive one: Gen Antonio Ramalho Eanes.

General Eanes is not General DeGaulle. He never was and he is tending to be ever less so. He is not the same as a human being, nor in intellectual dimensions, nor in charismatic legitimacy, nor in national importance.

Without a doubt he has learned much in 8 years of presidential service. And his personal and political characteristics, which merit emphasis in his role as a candidate and then as president, elected in 1976 and reelected in 1980, are not in question.
But between this statement and the assertion of the characteristics needed for effective party leadership lies an abyss, precisely that which General Eanes cannot cross.

One of his virtues, however, should be recognized: good sense. And it is this good sense, the knowledge of his value and of what he is capable, this programmatic concept of his limitations and his inadequacy for the challenge so many are offering him which, in the final analysis, may hinder the frenetic restlessness of so many Eanists harking back to bygone days.

What a supreme indication of good sense it would be to see a clear concept that the existence of Eanists does not suffice to make General Eanes the leader, it being necessary instead for General Eanes to be the leader to prevent the sacrifice and the devotion of so many Eanists from becoming nothing more than another fleeting midsummer night's dream.

Eanism—Province Against Capital

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 7 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva in the column "Politics in the Portuguese Fashion": "The Future of Eanes"]

[Text] Fifteen days ago, we wrote in this column that "the personalities in urban politics who flattered the president for years and frequented the drawing rooms in Belem will certainly not occupy an outstanding place" in the Eanist party launched by the CNARPE supporters in the province. Last week, one of the organizers of the meeting in Abrantes summarized the position of the movement with regard to the "national personalities" who have surrounded General Eanes up to the present as follows: "It is they who will have to adapt to our proposal, rather than the proposal adapting to them."

Thus Eanism is emerging increasingly as a movement of the province against Lisbon.

Note the following:

The Eanist movement has no doctrine.

The Eanist movement has no political hue (presuming that it will be made up of communists, socialists, social democrats and Christian democrats).

The Eanist movement has no relations on the international level.

What, then does it have?

The sponsors of the Eanist movement have two things in common.

The first is a shared lack of confidence with regard to everything which is in Lisbon or comes from there.
In their view, Lisbon is the vice capital, and the province is the territory of virtue.

In their view, low politics motivated by personal ambition and dark interests is the practice in Lisbon, while in the province politics is serious, linked with the real interests of the country.

In a word, Lisbon is for them the capital of evil, and the province the stronghold of good.

The second thing the Eanists in the province have in common is a shared sympathy for Gen Ramalho Eanes. They believe that their movement should have a head, and that this head should be the current president of the republic, who it will be noted is a military officer with an image as a serious, unblemished and uncorruptible man.

The fact that Eanes is a military officer fits well, moreover, with the nature of the Eanist movement. The military, because of the fact that they are members of an institution which belongs to the entire nation, are normally regarded as the symbolic representatives of the deeper interests and the unity of the fatherland, unlike politicians, who represent private interests and therefore divide the citizens of Portugal instead of uniting them.

The Eanist movement, originating on the provincial level, thus appears as a movement capable of representing the real interests of the people of Portugal and of rallying their unity on the basis of a common project.

It now remains to be seen what Gen Ramalho Eanes thinks of it.

In other words, whether he is prepared to assume its leadership, or on the contrary, will refuse it his support.

In the latter case, Eanes will continue to be a respected figure who lunches on Sundays with his political friends and delivers addresses at commemorative meetings, but he will lose all political influence and will not be able to influence the course of events.

In the former case, Eanes will in the end become, like it or not, a "condottieri," heading a group of men with disparate voices, full of good intentions but difficult to control because of their eagerness to put "the country on the right track."

Apart from this, he will lose some friendships which have been patiently cultivated throughout the past 9 years.

Jose Rabaca made the following statement to DIARIO DE LISBOA on Wednesday: "I want the success of the new party to be so obvious that I myself need no affiliation, which like all affiliations, requires discipline. Because what I am is undisciplined by nature."
It is plain that for a man who has invested his energy in the struggle for the emergence of the new party, and who is the most historical of the "historic Eanists," to say that he would prefer not to join it means that he is truly unhappy with the form in which the movement has been launched.

President's Neutrality

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 7 Jul 84 p 1

[Text] Jose Rabaca, Joao Botequilha and Miguel Caetano, three members of the Central Commission of the former CNARPE, dined early in the week with Ramalho Eanes at the English Bar in Cascais, having indicated to him their support of the movement to establish a new party and the resolutions of the Abrantes meeting. EXPRESSO learned that these three individuals also believe that Eanes should commit himself to the movement when it reveals firm operational characteristics. This however would contradict other reports according to which some national leaders of the ex-CNARPE have some reservations about the Abrantes suggestion.

Moreover, the president of the republic is reported to have forbidden his advisers in Belem to adopt a position on the matter, making it clear that he wants his Civilian Household to stand aside from the process of the establishment of a new party, such as to avoid any pretext for a confusion of the presidential functions with any other type of political activity. Eanes is reported to have even asked Lieutenant Colonel Bernard, who went to the Abrantes meeting, not to show the document approved there to his other advisers.

However, it is known that one of the advisers, Joaquim Aguiar, has made no secret of his opposition to the process launched for the creation of the Eanes party.

Eanes Role Termed Essential

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 7 Jul 84 pp 17-18R

[Article by Vicente Jorge Silva: "Eanism--Rehearsal for a Party"]

[Text] What if, at the crucial moment, Eanes says: "No"? The doubt which still lurks in many minds does not seem to have affected the participants in the meeting held last weekend in the environs of Abrantes, where the initial impetus was provided for the party structuring of the Eanist movement. At first glance, it all seemed as if the 140 Eanists present, including organizers, participants and invited guests, felt encouraged to advance through an invisible signal sent from far off, from Belem, and confirmed by the discreet presence in the corridors outside the meeting hall of Lieutenant Colonel Bernardo, one of the men on the presidential staff. "Everything depends on us," one of the main sponsors of the project said. "If following this gathering, we succeed in proving that we have profound support throughout the country and that the new political force has the capacity to move ahead and to prevail in electoral terms, the president will assume his responsibilities."
New Timing

The atmosphere in which the Abrantes meeting took place is said to have exceeded the expectations of the main sponsors of the undertaking, both in terms of the tone of the vast majority of the addresses delivered, which reflected a desire for active involvement in the process of party structuring, and in the proposal that the provisional foundations for organization on the national, district and municipal levels be established beginning immediately. The traditional division between the advocates of a "speedy" and a "slow" schedule seems to have evaporated as soon as the timing for the subsequent steps, which will culminate in another meeting to be held by 30 September, was defined. The contemplative document of about 40 typewritten pages which was distributed to the participants at the meeting in Abrantes will be the subject of discussion all over the country, with the provisional organizational structures considering the proposals resulting from the discussion, which may give rise to a program statement when the new "political year" begins in the autumn. Only then will it be known whether the definitive launching of the operation is likely, and whether Ramalho Eanes, although required to observe an attitude of political caution while he is still in Belem, will give his royal blessing to the formation of the party.

The CNARPE--and Afterward?

"Party? Probably it will not be called that, although its structure corresponds to that of a party," says Herminio Martinho, the main sponsor of the undertaking, and at this time one of the politicians most in the public eye in the country. The desire to make a clear separation from the dominant "pro-party" spirit, which was one of the major themes in the addresses delivered at the Abrantes meeting, clearly inspires this "singularity." On the other hand, the political and efficient capitalization on the CNARPE acronym, due to the greater ease of identification in the launching stage for the new political movement, was shown preference in Abrantes, to the detriment of other possibly more seductive possibilities, which were however deemed less effective. It is even considered possible that the acronym CNARPE may continue to be used, although with a new designation, after the creation of the party, along with the possibility that another, shorter acronym might gradually take its place as a clear new element for the voters' reference develops. In any case, the protagonists in the process, who are retaining their natural headquarters in Santarem, fear anything close to a name which might be associated with the National Union, while on the other hand, they are confronted with a political area already populated with party acronyms making ideological demarcation difficult.

This issue, seemingly secondary and at first glance superficial, does however give some clues to the atmosphere--and the spectres--to be found in the anterooms during this first public effort to convert Eanism into a party force.

Leftist Document

One of the concerns evidenced had to do with the sense of frustration with the existing party conduct and the possibility that a simple rejection of the
current political spectrum would prejudice the need for a positive assertion. The document distributed by the participants in the Abrantes meeting sought to encourage this need, although it kept the program definition of the new party open, and without a conclusive answer. In fact, the contemplative document is simultaneously very imprecise and vague as a program outline and, on the other hand, much more markedly leftist, including references to the socialist and social democratic areas, than would have been foreseeable initially. Beyond the aspects having to do with institutional reform—strengthening of the presidential system, new electoral system, decentralization and regionalization of authority, the document proposes a policy of "social solidarity" through the distribution of the sacrifices required by the austerity measures, the present logic of which is challenged, linking the role of the market and a new planning model, a "drastic and immediate alteration in financial dependence," through renegotiation of the foreign debt, "reduction of technological dependence," which involves imposing serious reservations on the nuclear option, refusal to accept the "excessive destruction of productive capital," or again, revision of the operational conditions for the nationalized banks, with a cautious position with regard to the liberalization of the sector. In general terms, what emerges between the lines, containing a clear reference to the Eanist speech, represents an effort to give expression to a certain "leftist nationalism," halfway between some characteristic Third World aspirations and a European political orientation.

A New Profile

The challenge is how to combine these lines of ideological inspiration with the sociological profile of the new party, and beginning now, this challenge will face these sponsors of the Eanist party project. The participants in the Abrantes meeting represent a significant socio-professional range, which may come to be the guiding elite of the new party, with preponderant influence on the provincial level (and the concern with stress on the roots of the Eanist movement outside Lisbon was stressed at the Abrantes meeting). Thus the new leading class has its greatest centers of strength in areas traditionally well-represented in the leadership of the party groups of an extreme nationalist cut, with businessmen and managers of PMEs [small- and medium-sized businesses] affiliated with the productive sector, engineers and professors (particularly in the university research sector), and doctors, apart from a category emerging from and created by the local government system—the self-governing bodies. The lawyers, identified with the present category of leaders, are obviously represented, and in Abrantes, the only participants from Lisbon were, moreover, two men with legal training, Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos and Jorge Sa Borges. However, this presence seemed in a way characterized by an original "sense of guilt" and a desire for a new image.

Dangerous Support

One question which is beginning to worry the sponsors of the new party is the influx of "orphans" from other party groups, excessively characterized by past political frustration, and seeking only personal "revenge," or motivated by pure opportunistic desire to "hop on the bandwagon." "We must pay very
close and continuing attention to the influx of supporters," one of the organizers says. "We have no doubt that we are being and will be sought out by individuals for whom our project represents only a platform for the satisfaction of the greed for power or the implementation of dark political designs. But if we remain vigilant and clear-headed, we can discourage the efforts of these parasites."

The usual charges that the Eanist movement offers fertile ground for infiltration by the PCP, in terms of deserters from the APU [United People Alliance] will tend to grow louder as the establishment of the new party advances. Even recourse to caricature cannot be excluded, an example being the statement this week attributed to, and denied by, Jose Rabaca in TARDE, stating that Herminio Martinho is affiliated with the PCP. But beyond the guerrilla war of adversary counterpropaganda, it is obvious that the emergence of the new party can only be viewed in a positive way by the communists, in search of a bridge allowing them to escape from their "ghetto."

What will be the political response to the efforts toward rapprochement and cautious seduction ventured by the PCP? This is one of the next and most interesting tests the sponsors of the new party formation will have to pass.

Waiting for Eanes

Meanwhile, other questions arise now. In particular, there is the question of how the undertaking launched by the provincial CNARPE will be welcomed—and supported—by the CNARPE advocates in Lisbon, and what sympathy or rejection will be evidenced in the antechambers of the Belem Palace, where the displeasure of Joaquim Aguiar, for example, is a known fact. Will Lisbon agree to be led by the province, or will it merely wait to reap the fruit of the strategy set forth by the Santarem sponsoring group? Will the influence of some presidential advisers, who are hesitant concerning a process about which they were not consulted, benefit from difficulties encountered along the way, and possibly compromise the viability of the project? The emblematic reference to Eanes makes the sponsors of the undertaking virtually prisoners of whatever the will of the president proves to be. Which means, specifically, that even rejecting the possibility of a presidential negative and assuming that the response is positive, the CNARPE sponsors whose headquarters is now in Santarem are basing the reason for the existence of their project on a link with the personality of the president. In other words, the project will be sponsored by Eanes, or it will not become a reality.

The Spectre of Lourdes Pintasilgo

In this connection, the choice of an "Eanist" candidate for the presidency comes up, and the most recent report from the opinion polls indicates the emergence, as a test, of the name of Garcia dos Santos, and the revelation that Lourdes Pintasilgo could not command all of the "Eanist" votes, although he remains by far the candidate most deeply dividing the voters supporting the PS, a key strategic group in terms of a victorious outcome. In any case, the provincial CNARPE supporters view the personality of Pintasilgo, and his demonstrated capacity for assertion on the subjective and ideological level,
in a realm which seems to them fuzzy and even enigmatic, with ill-concealed mistrust. Although the MAD has chosen to abandon the "party temptation" it experienced following the Manifesto of the 199, and is today returning to its original cultural orientation, the image of Lourdes Pintasilgo continues to be one of the most bothersome and typical spectres of the Eanist movement.

Role of Mario Soares

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 4 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Soares Rebelo: "Soares Hastens Eanist Conversion"]

[Excerpts] In Abrantes last Saturday, the ambiguity ended: anxiously awaited by some, visibly feared by others, the new political force with Eanes as its point of reference became an irreversible fact.

Later this year, no one doubts, Portugal will have yet another party group, based on the structures of the former CNARPE, which is now being reactivated throughout the country, and taking up the key ideas of the program for another candidacy for Gen Ramalho Eanes, set forth in a base text designed to become, with the changes which will be proposed district by district, a program manifesto to be presented to the electorate in the future. Curiously, it will have been Mario Soares who precipitated events, with his insistence, pari passu, on the lack of any alternatives to the present coalition in power. Considering these statements "serious, disturbing and an attack on the democratic regime itself," many of the activists in the former CNARPE were not chary with their criticism of the prime minister, waging the battle in Abrantes for a clear and unequivocal response: immediate conversion of the Eanist movement into a real alternative to the Central Bloc.

When, following a series of generally cautious speeches, repeatedly stressing the absolute urgency of proceeding with tact and full security, voices were raised to denounce the policy of the current government and the parties supporting it in categorical fashion, the facts were truly and quickly set forth. And a proposal signed by Dr. Armando Fernandes of Santarem and Paulo Campos and Eurico Rosa of Tomar calling for the reactivation of the structures of the former CNARPE was approved shortly thereafter.

Since the embryo of the future program statement, drafted by a Santarem group headed by engineer Herminio Martinho, was ready for distribution, and in addition Gen Ramalho Eanes himself had been informed of it the previous evening, "just as a matter of courtesy and respect," as we were told by that operational group, it is impossible to understand in fact why the establishment of the municipal and district structures essential to the sponsorship of the national debate to be encouraged on the subject was not carried out right there. The fact that the movement is organized "from the base toward the top, and not the contrary, as is the case for the present parties," is in fact a point of honor with the Eanist supporters.

This, moreover, explains the absence of national figures in the former CNARPE from the Sao Miguel de Rio Torto meeting, where representative parity was
given to all the districts, with each having the right to send only four individuals. These individuals, will, however, be incorporated later in the structures of the movement in their respective localities.

By 30 September, as was also decided in Abrantes, a national meeting will be held in a place yet to be designated. At that meeting, according to every indication, final approval will be given the program guidelines and, it is also believed, the legalization of the new party will also be launched then.

But what about later? All of the activists in the CNARPE with whom we had an opportunity to talk in Abrantes were categorical: only a clear position on the part of Eanes, one of unquestionable support of this new political force, they told us, will guarantee its establishment and credibility. They recognize, however, that until his term ends, the president of the republic will have to remain "president of all the citizens of Portugal." Therefore, although he is being kept constantly informed of all the steps of the movement, he has not been asked, as Herminio Martinho emphasized to us, to make a public statement on the matter. "Only on the basis of the uprightness and honesty of Ramalho Eanes can any new project be pursued in the country, but for the time being, we do not expect of the president the slightest personal involvement," the former official stressed in Santarem.

Advantages of Eanist Party

Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese 3 Jul 84 p 2

[Commentary in column entitled "The Human Factor" by Jose Miguel Judice: "Let's Have an Eanist Party!"]

[Text] This time it seems serious. We will have an Eanist party, formed moreover from the base upward, focused on the province and with a definite intention to position it in a leftist sector. It is emerging full of ambitions, whether it is a primary political force or nothing more than an alternative to the present coalition. In other words, there is a determination to make it a party with the support of the majority of the citizens of Portugal. It appears that two military officers are moving in that direction, and it is only a matter of time until the chief of the general staff of the army makes it clear to us if they have his backing or if, on the contrary, we are headed for a return to the days of the First Republic, with the military engaging in activity within the framework of the political parties.

Whatever the case, and even if Ramalho Eanes, with his fearful manner of never risking anything, stands apart from the matter, his supporters will advance, as we predicted here some weeks ago. And that is just as well, for the health of the political regime, for the health of the political parties, and so that the conditions for the recovery or Portuguese society will develop.

The emergence of the Eanist party is good for the health of the political regime.
In fact, whenever, in a given society, a political movement or a substantial group of individuals with a political will and a leader of national dimensions and familiarity fails to act in accordance with the rules of the game, fails to submit to the judgment of the polls, and does not organize to win power, a situation of disloyal competition which undermines the political regime and does not contribute to regenerating it develops. The fact is that a mythical force is always more attractive than a real one, with the imperfections and the faults characteristic of any reality. The persistence of an Eanist movement and the feeling that Eanes was about to become a Pirandello personality, and all of this without any true appearance on the political scene, was a politically divisive factor. For my part I believe that the best solution for the country is a bipolar system, with two parties on each side. The Central Bloc, in less than a year and as I always said it would, undertook to create a fifth party. As soon as this was a mythical reality, it was just as well that it should become physical reality.

The emergence of the Eanist party is good for the other political parties. In reality, the choice of the Central Bloc was to lead to a paralysis of the political system, in a framework in which the concept of political passion had to disappear. Portugal was at risk of seeing the ever weaker PS and PSD feeling obliged to remain linked because of that weakness, without the development of any alternatives, either because it was impossible for the PCP to emerge from its fossilized state, or because of the inability of the CDS to gain enough speed of growth to bring it close to 35 to 40 percent of the votes. The politicians were on the way to becoming a purely administrative group in a purely technical structure which reproduced itself in a closed circuit, in a kind of excessive complicity cooked up during the long discussions in the Assembly of the Republic. One day our professional politicians would reach agreement with the door of Sao Bento closed, without even any possibility of deciding that they lacked enough courage or determination to struggle for their privileges. A new party, which might in addition make the political system ungovernable, and which has ill-defined demagogic outlines for the purpose of hunting in all terrain, will serve as a goad for the existing parties. These are the advantages of competition. Those who are complacent about the market, dividing up its quotas and segments, run the risk of seeing new products arrive to complete for the consumers' favor. For this reason the good humor and easy-going semicomplicity which have characterized Portuguese political life for several years, above all since the death of Sa Carneiro, have ceased to prevail.

The emergence of the Eanist party is good from the point of view of the recovery of Portuguese society. The current situation, where civilian society is concerned, undoubtedly reflects an increasing disillusionment about the self-regeneration capacity of the system. This crisis of convictions and confidence is seen to escalate to the point of filling all the interstices in the social fabric. Portugal needs a supplement of energy, determination, will, dreams and hope. The political subsystem is a sector with a special capability to give society a kind of strengthening shock. Now the entry of a new political party on the scene to compete on a political market which has not expanded (among other things because the polls show that the percentage of abstentions is not tending to decline sharply) will result in more arduous
political competition and the possibility of more intensive political punishment. For those who believe, as I do, that conflict within the system is a requirement for progress and regeneration can only be pleased by the challenge this new party represents, above all for the Socialist Party, which is in danger of dropping overnight from the first to the fifth Portuguese party.

It is obvious that all of this will apply if this new party rises above some of its blatant contradictions and succeeds in achieving popular support of about 20 percent, which would be excellent, although it is far from guaranteed. The fact is there is the threat that this effort will result in the creation of a miniparty, because, naturally, when it comes to moving from luncheon discussion to a formal and public commitment, there will be there many enthusiastic supporters who will wait for an indication of success before deciding to offer aid. The truth is, in a country of small sectors, mediocre complicity, great fears and cautious ambitions, it is left to the devil to make bold decisions. This could be fatal to the new party.

For almost 6 years now I have fought an honest and frontal battle against Ramalho Eanes, against a political myth which slips through the fingers. For me, a less sticky form of Eanism is a relief. Let us have an Eanist party, a strong and capable one, for I was already beginning to feel rusty!

5157
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POLITICAL

POLL MEASURES EXTENT OF VOTER MIGRATION AMONG PARTIES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Jun 84 p 6

[Article by Hans O. Alfredsson]

[Text] The Social Democrats are losing supporters chiefly among younger voters, low income groups, and members of the LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions]. Three percent of those who voted for the Social Democrats in 1982 have gone over to the Conservatives. Only a little over half that many have moved in the opposite direction.

That is the conclusion one can draw from the analysis by SIFO [Swedish Institute of Public Opinion Polls] of voter sympathies, changes of party, and voter flows during the second quarter of the year. The poll was based on interviews with just over 3,000 randomly chosen men and women between the ages of 18 and 74.

The analysis shows that party loyalty is greatest among those who voted for the Conservatives in the last election, 89.3 percent of whom still support that party. Loyalty is almost as great among Social Democratic voters (86.8 percent), while only 71.2 percent of the Center Party's supporters and 71.6 percent of the Liberal Party's supporters still feel that the Center and Liberal Parties respectively are best.

Of the Liberal Party's voters, 12.6 percent now lean chiefly toward the Conservatives, and 7.7 percent like the Social Democrats. Of the Center Party's voters, 11.3 percent now prefer the Conservatives, 8.9 percent prefer the Liberal Party, and 5.6 percent prefer the Social Democrats.

Of those who voted for the VPK [Left Party-Communists] in 1982, 3.6 percent—that is, a higher percentage than among the Social Democrats—have gone over to the Conservatives, while 12.2 percent prefer the Social Democrats.

"Typical Voter"

Who is the typical Social Democrat, Conservative, Liberal, and so on? From the voluminous material presented in tabular form, the following rough picture can be drawn:

A Conservative belongs to the highest social groups, is just as likely to be a man as a woman and over 40 as under 40 years of age, earns a high income, and
belongs to SACO [Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations] or the TCO [Central Organization of Salaried Employees] (but almost 10 percent of the LO's members prefer the Conservatives). He or she is just as likely to be found working in the private sector as in the public sector (23 percent of those employed in the public sector like the Conservatives best).

A voter for the Liberal Party also belongs to the highest social groups, is somewhat more likely to be a woman than a man, is just as likely to be under as over 40 years of age, earns more than 120,000 kronor in most cases, is a member of SACO, and is just as likely to work in the private as in the public sector.

A voter for the Center Party may belong to any social group, is more often a woman than a man, is twice as likely to be over 40 years of age, earns less than 120,000 kronor, belongs to the LO or the TCO, and is often employed in the public sector.

A Social Democrat belongs to the lowest social group, is more likely to be a man than a woman, is over 40 years of age in most cases, earns less than 120,000 kronor, is a member of the LO, and may work in the private or the public sector.

A voter for the VPK also belongs most often to Social Group III [the lowest], is most often a man under 40 years of age, earns less than 120,000 kronor, may be a member of the LO, the TCO, or SACO, and in most cases works in the public sector.

So the Center Party and the Social Democrats find most of their sympathizers to be older rather than younger, the VPK's sympathizers are clearly in the younger age group, and sympathizers with the Conservatives and the Liberal Party are about equally divided as far as age is concerned.

Intention To Vote

The intention to vote is clearly greatest among the Conservatives: 90.4 percent of the Conservative Party's sympathizers say they intend to vote for that party in the next election. Hesitation is greatest among those who like the Liberal Party best. Only 78.5 percent of them say they will vote for the Liberal Party in the 1985 election.

When it comes to migration among the parties, the Conservatives and the Liberal Party show almost equal gains, while the Center Party has the biggest deficit and the Social Democrats have the next biggest deficit. The Conservatives have attracted almost twice as many younger voters as older voters from the other parties, while the opposite is true of the Social Democrats.

Among those who have left the Conservative Party, three times as many have chosen the Liberal Party as have gone over to the Social Democrats. From the Social Democratic side, defectors have gone over to the Conservatives and the Liberal Party in equal numbers.

Among those who have left the Social Democrats, there are more from the lowest than from the highest social groups, most are under 40 years of age, most earn less than 120,000 kronor, and more belong to the LO than to the TCO.
More Women

The Conservatives have attracted more women than men, more from the higher than from the lower social groups, more who are under 40 years of age, more who earn over 120,000 kronor, and more who belong to the TCO than to any other union.

The Liberal Party has attracted more from the higher social groups than from the lower groups and shows a remarkable surplus of SACO members. The Center Party, on the other hand, has had big losses among SACO members and low income groups.

In all, 3.5 percent have shifted from the socialist to the nonsocialist bloc, while 1.8 percent have moved in the opposite direction.
HAAGERUP, THOFT DEBATE POSSIBLE DANISH ROLE IN WEU

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 29 Jun-5 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Ojvind Kyro: "A Whiff of Militarism and Reaction"]

[Text] Shall Denmark take part in new security policy cooperation in West Europe? This question has again become timely after France and West Germany have tried to revive the 30 year old West European Union (WEU). Last week the seven member nations -- Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg -- held a meeting for the first time in ten years in the Council of Ministers of WEU, and last week two Danish observers took part -- Ole Bernt Henriksen (Conservative Party) and Lasse Budtz (Social Democratic Party) -- in WEU's parliament, which meets every year in Paris. WEEKENDAVISEN, which covered the Paris meeting, followed the matter up by inviting four politicians to a debate meeting on the possibilities of Union cooperation and the consequences for Denmark. The four are: Lasse Budtz -- security policy spokesman for the Social Democrats, Ole Bernt Henriksen -- foreign policy spokesman in the Conservative Party, Niels Jørgen Haagerup -- up to now parliamentary member of EU for the Liberal Party. Starting next year, Administrative Director for the Danish Foreign Policy Institute and the Foreign Policy Society, and Jens Thoft -- security policy spokesman for the Socialist People's Party.

Lasse Budtz: If Denmark is to go along, it looks from a purely legal point of view as if one cannot directly join the existing treaty. Either Denmark must have a plebiscite or the treaty must be done over.

But I don't believe that full membership will become reality anyway. On the contrary, I think that the seven member countries in their next meeting of the council of ministers in Rome will conclude that at present they do not want to expand WEU or to offer other nations membership or observer status. Even if they did, there is no evidence that they would make Denmark such an offer. The West German foreign minister Genscher said himself at the meeting last week in Paris that if Denmark and Greece should come in, we could not come with a new veto right.

64
I think we should concentrate on finding out what the whole thing is about -- and then we can take a position.

Niels Jorgen Haagerup: There are three reasons for having selected WEU as a forum. First of all, because it is an organization that was established with a view to defense, even though it has never played a very great role. The other is probably that the French are not eager to embark upon anything in the EU that could have a supranational flavor to it. Their attitude toward defense is of course that their decision-making power over the French forces must in no way be touched. The third reason is that Ireland, Greece, and Denmark are not members, and we have much evidence that this is considered to be a paradise, because in this way one avoids a lot of trouble.

Budtz: It must be stressed that the French government denies very strongly that the reason it wants to revive WEU is that Denmark and Greece are not members. That is just stupid drivel.

Haagerup: Here we have assertion against assertion. I have much evidence that the opposite is true.

BERLINGSKE AFTEN: Will Denmark seek membership or observer status in WEU?

Ole Bernt Henriksen: The government's position is that if we receive an offer from WEU we will consider it, and it will certainly be observer status. In connection with observer status, it will also be reasonable for us to talk to Norway about the matter. Besides this, there will also be some conversations to determine what WEU will occupy itself with, for example, possible coordination of weapons production. There is a very lopsided trade relationship between West Europe and the U.S. as far as weapons are concerned.

Besides this, the Americans have for many years expressed the wish that the West Europeans would reach an agreement, and I believe this is the nucleus of the whole thing. For many years they have expressed surprise that the West Europeans never have never thoroughly discussed their affairs before they met for negotiations with their adversaries.

BERLINGSKE AFTEN: Does the government find it urgently necessary to have a close connection to WEU?

Bernt Henriksen: We have some interesting negotiations ahead of us in the Folketing on Danish security policy, and I am convinced that the government wants to talk with the Social Democrats on this. But it is my impression that when we receive such an offer from WEU a majority in the Folketing will accept an observer status in the Council of Ministers.

BERLINGSKE AFTEN: You are also the spokesman for the Conservative Party. What does one think in the party?

Bernt Henriksen: We do not think it practical to stay outside. If an offer should come, I believe that there will be broad agreement that we would like very much to go along.
Haagerup: I don't think we should sit passively and wait for some form of invitation to come from WEU. I don't think that the question of membership will become timely — and this hangs together with my opinion of WEU's relatively limited role in relation to thoughts of a widened West European cooperation in security policy and possibly also in defense. I don't believe that WEU will become the only instrument in peacetime that will be the coordinator of West European security and defense policy.

But the most important thing is that from the Danish side one give the impression of positive interest in what happens on the European level — even if one does not know in any way what institutional form this possible connection will have.

Jens Thoft: All this talk of a West Europe with two speeds and of WEU is closely connected. There are several countries that would like to ride faster, and they can certainly do this if they don't pull us along. The thawing out of the power blocks, something we want, will not be achieved by creating cooperation in the armaments industry.

BERLINGSKE AFTEN: A left wing Social Democrat such as the Dutchman, Klaas de Vries, says that it is necessary to be present at all places where one discusses European security policy. Why should Denmark stay away from such cooperation?

Thoft: Because every time one enters into such work, particularly in the defense policy area, one gives up sovereignty and the right to determine oneself. And we don't wish to give up this right.

BERLINGSKE AFTEN: In this case will Denmark just come to a table in NATO where the others have already decided everything beforehand?

Thoft: We also wish to leave NATO. We are not the least bit dissatisfied that NATO is doing things without Denmark's agreement. The more they do without Denmark the better.

BERLINGSKE AFTEN: Isn't that quite a hopeless theory?

Thoft: The development cannot be prevented by a little country. We are being sucked into the whirlpool and we are drowning from cooperation. If we are to remain an independent national unit, one must struggle against integration. I can understand well that the large countries would like to see an integration because it will take place on their terms. Therefore it is clear that a small country must remain very reticent.

BERLINGSKE AFTEN: Lasse Budtz, is it reasonable to keep out of WEU?

Budtz: In contrast to the SF men, we think that it is necessary to have international security policy cooperation in NATO. On principle we favor international security policy cooperation, but it is clear that when it is a matter of what we are to cooperate on, we want to investigate it before we take a position on anything at all.
I have now been an observer of WEU's parliament four times, and I don't really like the organization because there is also a whiff of militarism and reaction, which is definitely not the Social Democrats' cup of tea. But this is not the decisive problem. On the contrary, it is: how shall this cooperation be put together, how can it develop?

If, for example, one can move WEU from being this definite deterrence union over to being an international organ in which security policy and possibilities of relaxation of tensions are discussed, then the situation will begin to be completely different.

In the Social Democratic Party we do not just think that we should be members of NATO, but also that we must have a defense. If we are to have a defense, they must also have weapons, the poor fellows in defense, and if one now thinks that we can get these weapons easier and cheaper and more standardized with the help of a possible observer in WEU, one must analyse whether there are any advantages in it.

But I don't want to bind the Social Democratic Party to anything, because we must not take a position until after we have seriously investigated the problem. We will certainly not knock on the door now, but we shall wait for the Rome meeting and see what initiatives come.

I must admit that I am not wildly enthusiastic about WEU, but there is need for one form or another of European cooperation. We cannot use the EC and EPS, we cannot use NATO, and we cannot create a new union -- developments have clearly shown this.

Bernt Henriksen: An observer post in the council of ministers is in my opinion just as good as full membership -- there is no great difference. Denmark has a great interest in being there to influence the development, and I think that we are regarded by all as a country very much interested in relaxation of tensions. I can agree with Lasse Budtz that a discussion of relaxation of tension in Europe will probably go pretty well in WEU -- but no opposition to the U.S. must develop, because then we would be back again where we started. Lasse Budtz and I also agree that we must investigate the matter.

Haagerup: I think we are too much concerned with the constitutional framework of WEU. The West Union had at the start the task, and they still have it, of maintaining cooperation between the three Benelux countries, France, and England. Germany did not, of course, even exist as an independent country at that time. There was also the beginning realization that something was with the Russians, but it was not a clearly anti-Soviet organization such as NATO later became. One succeeded in creating a staff, which Montgomery became the chief of. He later became second in command in NATO, and after this time, WEU played no role. But as in all international bureaucracy, a little staff remained, even if the organization no longer meant anything.

In 1954-55, thoughts moved toward a European defense community because France turned it down. And to get West Germany in, Eden thought of using the West
Union. One took the Germans and the Italians into WEU but subjected them to certain limitations in armament. Since then there has been silence on WEU up to now when one is trying to reactivate the organization.

It is first and foremost the attitudes among the individual countries that is important, and not so much the institutional framework. Defense cooperation, if anything came of it, does not depend upon WEU but upon how far the various countries are willing to go. My main position goes a little farther than both Ole Bernt Henriksen's and Lasse Budtz' because I do not think that one should sit and wait for an invitation.

I think one is overrating oneself. I am more worried about our being locked out because one says: "As long as the Danes keep their mouths shut, we are free of them."

Budtz: I am not far from thinking that Haagerup is close to being correct there. I am not at all sure, you see, that they are interested in just any kind of expansion. There are some who say that WEU is primarily concerned with the central areas, and that the flanks have completely different defense problems.

Thoft: I think that Lasse Budtz has given me all the arguments here for why one should be extremely skeptical of WEU. We are definitely in favor of international cooperation, but the cooperation that is taking place in WEU, in NATO, and in EC is being done on completely wrong premises, besides the fact that they are not international because they are of course limited to a little group of Western countries. In reality, Denmark has much more in common with Poland and Rumania, Norway and Belgium that we have with France and the U.S.

Haagerup: This expression, "a whiff of militarism and reaction," that Budtz used, I find to be an expression of an unbelievable arrogance and condescension that has no place when we are to take a position on cooperation, the contents of which we do not yet know. WEU is just an instrument.

Thoft: When Lasse Budtz still expresses a certain expectant sympathy, it reminds me of the mouse that hopped into the snake's jaws to change it from within. At a rule it came out as excrement and this is the same result we have had when we have tried to work with the large countries. Our chances of making this military forum anti-military and disposed toward disarmament are as good as zero.

BERLINGSKE AFTEN: There was not much talk of disarmament and relaxation of tension at the meeting last week in Paris. On the contrary, one spoke of manned military space stations and common weapons production. Do you believe, Ole Bernt Henriksen, that it is possible to get the Social Democrats, with whom you must decide security policy, to go along with WEU?
Bernt Henriksen: Yes, I think so. I also think that the debate on space war was very useful because it was a very original report on a problem that exists. And I do not think that anyone was angry that this problem was dealt with.

But I assume that foreign ambassadors in Denmark will read our discussion on how we approach WEU. I represent here a part of the Folketing and a part of the government, and what we say here in WEEKENDAVISEN they will certainly read. If they understand it in such a way that we actually would like very much to hear from WEU, then they will have understood it correctly. I would be concerned if Denmark knocked at the door now, but I would be very glad if WEU, after the meeting in Rome this fall, turned toward Denmark and asked if we would like to have observer status without the right to veto. In this case, we would consider it with those who form the basis for Denmark's NATO policy.

9124
CSO: 3613/190
COMPROMISE DEFENSE PLAN Commented ON BY MINISTER, FORCES CHIEF

Shortage of Funds Cited

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 6-12 Jul 84 pp 1-2, 12

[Commentary by John Wagner: "Denmark's Future Armed Forces Chief, Lieutenant General O.K. Lind, Disturbed Over the Consequences of the New 'Non-Solidarity' Armed Forces Compromise: We Are Counteracting NATO's Attempt to Raise the Nuclear Threshold"]

[Text] The armed forces compromise between the government parties and the Social Democratic Party which was entered into last Friday will have a sequel at the political national congresses in the fall. There is great dissatisfaction with the compromise's economic limits in the armed forces and in the grass roots of the non-socialist parties. In the Social Democratic Party there is grumbling over the fact that the compromise was entered into before the congress in September.

"Out of consideration for stability in the armed forces and the performance of adjustments, I think that the future agreement regarding the development of the armed forces should cover a five-year period," Defense Minister Hans Engell said when on 29 March he published his motion for a new armed forces compromise.

The compromise was in the house precisely three months later—on Friday, June 29—when the Folketing was in session to approve the choice of the Danish members of the EC Parliament.

Again the present government parties (the Conservative People's Party, Liberal Party, Democratic Center Party and Christian People's Party) and the Social Democratic Party were successful in reaching agreement on an armed forces compromise—or, put more correctly: Again the non-socialist parties bowed to such an extent that the Social Democratic Folketing group could not refuse entering into a compromise, although many Social Democrats have an increasing desire to mix up the general economic policy and armed forces organization in such a manner that the defense budget in the future will be established from year to year as a part of the usual political horse trades prior to the passing of the Budget.
But it did not turn out to be the armed forces compromise which the armed forces and Hans Engell had dreamt of. It turned out to be a three-year compromise. The budget limits suggest a zero solution—and will presumably turn out to be a minus solution—and important decisions regarding new purchases have been postponed.

"I would like to have seen greater mobility on the part of the Social Democratic Party in the direction of my first compromise motion in March of this year, but this was not possible," Hans Engell stated after the compromise had been entered into.

**On the Edge of Starvation**

Denmark's future armed forces chief, Lieutenant General O.K. Lind, says to WEEKENDAVISEN:

"The armed forces have lived on the edge of starvation for many years and this existence has involved sheer postponement of necessary purchases. Not least, the navy needs new ships. Therefore, it is a great disappointment for everyone in the armed forces that this time too it was not possible to break the reduction line. Of course, 12 billion kroner is a lot of money, so much that many will say that if it is necessary to save in all other areas, the social sector, for example, the armed forces must also bear the brunt. To this I will say that the greatest social benefit a government can give its people is the right to live in peace and freedom. It must also be taken into consideration that the armed forces had large cutbacks forced upon them when others were permitted to go on a spree in the 60's and 70's, and that the 'few percent' extra which we should have had plays a big role for the armed forces, for it is this marginal amount which would go for new purchases."

O.K. Lind expresses understanding of the fact that the government in this round did not find it politically possible to get a better compromise.

"In spite of everything it would have been worse if we had not gotten a compromise at all but instead a haphazard treatment of the armed forces budget in the annual Budget. There are—in spite of everything—also bright points in the compromise. We received political support for leasing submarines, although new submarines would have been preferred, and we received a promise of 12 new F-16 airplanes and a sorely needed extension of the period of service for some draftees," the lieutenant general said. But he makes no secret of the fact that the armed forces would prefer to have seen a five-year compromise "at a considerably higher financial level," as he puts it.

"The budget is so austere that it quite naturally will provide our NATO allies with an occasion for new anxiety. This supports an increasingly more widespread feeling among the American people along the line that it cannot comprehend that it must pay more for the defense of Europe than the citizens of Europe. It is my opinion that as a member of a defense alliance one ought to display solidarity in sharing of the financial burden. We have never been diligent about this and this is not at all the case with the new armed forces compromise. But then, on the other hand, we have shown solidarity in political
sharing of the burden—until the missile discussion arose. Now we are running the risk of being perceived as not contributing to solidarity both one way and the other. We cannot continue like this if we want to continue to demand that our NATO allies show consideration for us," O.K. Lind says, and adds:

"There is agreement in NATO that we must make a considerable effort in order to raise the nuclear threshold. It is a widespread opinion that the simplest way to do this is to strengthen conventional armed forces. This is not exactly what is being done with so austere a budget as the one we have to live with for the next three years. On the contrary."

In spite of the armed forces compromise, the future armed forces chief looks brightly on the situation in the armed forces.

"I have not seen anything of the decay or regard for personal career opportunities which Knud Damgaard (Social Democratic Party armed forces policy spokesman (ed.)) and the daily AKTUELT talk about and write so much about. On the contrary, the mutual understanding and total lack of armed services jealousy I have experienced are a good basis for the future economizing measures to get the most possible out of the tight budget limits," O.K. Lind says.

It is not only in the armed forces that the new compromise has been received with skepticism. This has also occurred in the compromise parties' own ranks. Immediately after the compromise had been entered into, the government parties' group chairmen (Knud Østergaard, Iver Hansen, Frode Nør Christensen and Jens Steffensen) said:

"The agreement will provide occasion for criticism among our alliance partners and it is therefore important that in the immediate future we demonstrate our solidarity with NATO."

WEEKENDAVISEN has learned that characteristically armed-forces-friendly circles among the Conservatives and in the Liberal Party and Democratic Center Party, all of whom are holding a national congress in the fall, want to raise a discussion at the national congresses regarding where the limits should be and what the government can accept of defeats in the foreign and armed forces policy area.

Conservative Folketing Member Helge Adam Møller, who is a major, says:

"The compromise will quite certainly entail a discussion—at our national council meeting, too—regarding to what extent we were too obliging to the Social Democratic Party. This is the opinion of many in the armed forces and of many young Conservatives. But the alternative to a compromise was so frightening that it was right to bow. To take a vote on the matter would be the same as to gamble with the future of the armed forces."

The chairman of the Liberal Party's armed forces committee in Copenhagen County, H.H. Mathiesen, LL.B., who is the former secretariat chairman of "Defense for Denmark," says:
"I think that there are many who are going around and clenching their fists in their pockets. It is obvious that we cannot avoid a debate about this compromise when we hold our national congresses in September."

The former chairman of the Folketing Armed Forces Committee, Democratic Center Party Member Director Paul Emmert Andersen, says:

"The compromise is a scandal, but the best that could be achieved in the present situation. The Democratic Center Party was--forced by circumstances--compelled to say yes to the compromise, but if we cannot achieve a better one in three years we ought to consider saying no."

"There is much to indicate that the time will soon be here for a Folketing vote on our foreign and armed forces policy. It will not surprise me if this demand is raised at our national congress in November."

There is dissatisfaction with the compromise in the Social Democratic Party, too. At the group meeting at which the compromise was to be approved, there were three--Jytte Hilden, Lissa Matthiasen and Kaj Poulsen--who made certain reservations. The argument was, for one thing, that the government should not be helped to put an armed forces compromise through when the government will not oblige the Social Democratic Party's demands for "social restoration."

"I quite certainly expect that the compromise will provide occasion for a discussion at the congress in September. It is catastrophic enough in itself that they did not wait to enter into a compromise until the congress had had its say about it," Kaj Poulsen says.

There is a widespread opinion that it was precisely fear of the effect which the Social Democratic Party congress could attempt to exert on an armed forces compromise that the government wanted to have the compromise in the house in the middle of the summer vacation.

Government Bowed to Social Democratic Party's Demands: Three-Year Minus Solution

Defense Minister Hans Engell must again disappoint Denmark's NATO allies. Once more Denmark cannot live up to NATO's goal of increasing expenditures for the armed forces by three percent per year--three percent above the rate of inflation, mind you. The armed forces compromise which was entered into last Friday entails the fact that expenditures for the armed forces in 1985, -86 and -87 are frozen solid at 11.4 billion kroner per year, as a part of the appropriation, however, is to be tied to the cost-of-living index.

"An assessment of the security policy situation does not dictate changes in the present military forces."

This is written in black and white in the ten-legal-size-page armed forces agreement between the government parties and the Social Democratic Party--a three-year compromise which--Prime Minister Poul Schlüter also admits this--was entered into on Social Democratic premises.
"The government realizes that in the area of the armed forces it cannot accomplish more than the Social Democratic Party will agree to," as the prime minister expressed it hours after the compromise had been entered into.

The present military strength consists of a scant 104,000 officers, enlisted privates and draftees in the army, navy and air force. Almost 80,000 of these are in the mobilization forces.

It is stressed in the compromise that "in peacetime importance is attached to the fact that a military preparedness effort be maintained which on short notice can be put into action to solve combat problems and create time for the accomplishment of mobilization and preparedness measures."

Therefore, the length of basic training for rank-and-file draftees in the combat forces and corps of engineers will be increased from the present 9 months to 12 months. This will result in improvement of the mobilization force as well as of permanent preparedness in the army. It is presupposed that lengthening of the period of service 'will be carried out voluntarily insofar as possible,' and a panel is to be appointed which will analyze the use of draftees in the armed forces, including possibilities for a differentiated period of service.

Aside from the lengthening of the period of service, there is more Social Democratic than non-socialist stuff in the compromise. The government especially had to make concessions to the Social Democratic Party as far as the term of the compromise and the size of the armed forces budget are concerned. Originally Defense Minister Hans Engell proposed that the compromise would be a five-year one and that the budget in comparison with 1984--over and above tying to the cost-of-living index--would be increased by 330 million kroner per year in the first three years and an additional 50 million kroner in the last two. But the outcome was a three-year compromise, because--as it is put in the negotiation circle--"the Social Democratic Party could not tolerate more in the present situation," and regarding the budget it reads in the agreement: "The armed forces budget is to be kept unchanged during the period of the agreement, in relation to the appropriation in the 1984 Budget, i.e., of 11.442 million kroner (January 1983 price level)."

In line with what holds true for the rest of the government sector, the armed forces budget is tied to wage increases which become the result of agreement negotiations with the respective labor organizations representing the armed forces personnel.

In addition, the armed forces budget is to be adjusted for rate-of-exchange fluctuations and price changes for materiel, fuel, etc., which it is necessary to import.

Expenditures for the armed forces' installations are to be adjusted according to the same rules as for the rest of the government sector.

Other operating expenses of the armed forces are to be adjusted by two percent in 1985.
The parties to the compromise will discuss in the middle of 1986 whether there is reason to change adjustments for the rest of the term of the compromise. This presupposes agreement between the parties to the compromise.

In each year of the term of the agreement, 30 million kroner will be added to the National Guard budget, 20 million kroner to the armed forces budget for supplies, including equipment, and 30 million kroner to the civil defense budget for the procurement of new lifeboats. However, the sum for lifeboats has been reduced to 15 million kroner for 1985. All amounts are at the January 1983 price level.

Included in the budget is the Danish contribution to NATO's joint infrastructure programs, of 225 million kroner in 1985; but, however, the contribution can be foreseen to increase substantially in the time to come. Infrastructure programs in Denmark are expected, among other things, to include ammunition and fuel depots, airplane shelters, expansion of the pipeline system and modernization of coastal radar stations.

As granted hitherto, compensation for the armed forces' participation in the war against pollution and similar non-military tasks, as well as for peacekeeping operations under the UN, is presupposed.

The budget agreement, with its minimal adjustments for a large part of the armed forces' operating expenses (two percent in 1985), implies that the compromise is more of a /minus solution/ [in italics] than a zero solution. Social Democratic Party Chairman Ex-Prime-Minister Anker Jørgensen has said diplomatically that the armed forces "now will have to modernize and take efficiency measures heavily in order to get the money to last."

What Anker Jørgensen, among other things, means when he talks of modernization and efficiency measures can be seen in the agreement. An example:

"Frigates of the PEDER SKRAM class (Peder Skram and Herluf Trolle (ed.)) are to be laid up by the end of 1986 with their key crews. It is expected that additional mobilization crews will not be trained after 1986 and that the frigates after the term of the agreement will be deleted as their duties are taken over entirely or in part by units from the STANDARD-FLEX program, etc. (Standard Flex 300 is a new Danish invention on the drawing board for the time being—a battleship equipped with various materiel modules all according to which defense problems it is to solve (ed.)). The last two submarines of the DELFIN [DOLPHIN] class will be deleted in 1986 and 1988, and it is expected that three submarines will be leased, so that the number of submarines will be five in 1986/89."

According to the Social Democratic Party's armed forces policy spokesman Knud Damgaard, it is a "historic innovation" that the defense minister is to appoint directly under his ministry "an independent advisory and analysis panel" which is precisely to "follow weapons technology development in the domains of the East and West and to transform it in specific armed forces, including structural, contexts." As a beginning, the panel is to analyze the need for a Danish submarine force, the possible use of land-based naval-target missiles
in Denmark, the possible use of synthetic aperture radar in F-16 airplanes in connection with reconnaissance, the possible use of real naval helicopters in Denmark, and materiel replacement for CENTURION tanks.

By way of conclusion, it is maintained in the armed forces agreement that "changes in the agreement presuppose agreement between the parties." This was also the case with the old armed forces compromise of 1981—but this did not prevent the Social Democratic Party during the term of the compromise from getting new armed forces budget cutbacks pushed through.

Reductions Through Attrition

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Michael Ehrenreich: "No One to Be Fired in Armed Forces"]

[Text] Defense Minister Hans Engell denies that there will be a question of discharges among the armed forces' regular personnel in the coming three years as a result of the armed forces compromise between the government and the Social Democratic Party.

"No one imagines that discharges will be carried out in the armed forces. The adjustments in the personnel sector which are planned in the compromise will be carried out by attrition," Hans Engell says.

A discussion arose yesterday regarding to what extent a number of addenda to the agreement on the armed forces can be interpreted as a portent of heavy discharges among, especially, the army's contract personnel. In the appendix the peacetime force's regular personnel in 1984 have been set at 8350 men, and 6000 men in 1987. Correspondingly, the number of draftees in man-years has been set at 6665 in 1984 and 8050 in 1987. The army's combined peacetime force is reduced in the appendix from 21,470 men in 1984 to 20,390 men in 1987.

"The figures in the compromise are range figures, but they will be able to be adjusted in relation to one another after a more definite agreement between the parties to the compromise, depending on the outcome of the panel which according to the compromise is to be appointed now in order to analyze the use of draftees in the armed forces," the defense minister says.

The panel will, for one thing, look at the possibilities of a more differentiated period of service than we know today—including whether some duties within the armed forces can be performed with less than the now normal nine-month period of service. The panel will, in addition, consider the possibilities of a contractual agreement in the first three months of the period of service.

The Social Democratic Party's defense policy spokesman, Knud Damgaard, also denies, with reference to the panel, discharges within the armed forces as a result of the compromise.
"The compromise sets a goal, and it is entirely up to the panel to find the balance between the number of regular personnel and draftees," he says.

In addition, no changes will take place in retirement arrangements and training and retraining arrangements as a result of the compromise. The new agreement expressly confirms these arrangements according to the same guidelines as in the armed forces regulations which expire at the turn of the year.

Socialist Surrendered Reorganization Demand

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 2 Jul 84 p 1

[Editorial by "tok": "The Subscription"]

[Text] With characteristic fear of what the neighbor, however, will not say, government politicians and non-socialist newspapers have already begun to be ashamed of what our little country will have to show shearly militarywise in the next three and a half years. The armament level which can be achieved by virtue of the armed forces agreement just entered into is far from sufficient to make an impression at NATO headquarters in Brussels, let alone in NATO's main country, the USA, it appears in the first commentaries. Now one could certainly think that it would be just as important what kind of impression our military forces' capacity made in the Warsaw Pact, since it is certainly a presumed attack from /that/ [in italics] side they purportedly are to be brought into action against. But we have still not seen any statements regarding the impression our armed forces' combined firing power is expected to make in Moscow and other East European capitals.

That the worries are directed westward can, however, not cause wonder. A constant ingredient of the Danish armed forces debate over the last 35 years has been allegations that we have not been making ourselves deserving of participation in NATO. We are freewheeling while we are letting others bear the heavy brunt, especially the USA. This form of moralizing gained expression once again yesterday in JYLLANDS-POSTEN's leading article, in which it read that "the armed forces compromise in Denmark will provide new nourishment for this well founded American dissatisfaction." The supporters of Danish armament have always entertained a weakness for letting the norms of others be valid for what ought to take place in the military sector here at home.

This is associated with the fact that they have such terrible difficulty in accepting the fact that a Danish military /in itself/ [in italics] is in the best case a useless device. The only reason to maintain it is really membership in NATO, which the very same circles attach such great importance to. While Iceland and Luxembourg are so small that they can be a part without maintaining their own military, Denmark has to pay a little more conspicuous share. The approximately 11.5 billion kroner which now constitutes this share annually can, in other words, be considered the subscription Denmark pays in order to take part in NATO. It is, to put it mildly, a considerable amount, which there is not the remotest reason to increase further.
The conception of the military expenditures which constitute the NATO sub-
scription can be traced back within the Social Democratic Party to Per
Haekkerup's term as foreign affairs minister in the middle of the 1960's.
The attitude with which the Social Democrats went to the now-over armed forces
negotiations must accordingly be said to reflect a fine continuity. The party
is disposed toward spending as much of the taxpayers' money as is necessary
in order to be a member of NATO; but, then, no more. JYLLANDS-POSTEN and
those similarly disposed can be right that there is not much valor in such an
attitude. On the other hand, it can be said to be quite matter-of-fact.

This is, however, not completely logical. For at the same time as the Social
Democrats make a matter-of-fact economic assessment as far as the big figures
are concerned, they, however, cannot entirely free themselves from a notion
that what is called interest in defense among the Danish people ought to be
supported and encouraged. And therefore additional money was allotted for
the sparetime activities carried out in the National Guard. Since this no-
toriously has nothing to do with the security of the Danish nation, the addi-
tional appropriation of 30 million kroner can be understood only as an expres-
sion of the fact that the Social Democratic Party, too, finds it healthy and
educating that Danes be trained in the use of weapons and military drills.
But a certain militaristic attitude is certainly also necessary in order to
ensure popular acceptance of annual military expenditures of 11.5 billion
kroner.

That the new compromise to a great extent reflects how far--or not so far--
the government parties could get the Social Democratic Party to go along was
promptly emphasized by Prime Minister Poul Schlüter. It was indeed also
necessary to establish to the critical non-socialist backwater that the so-
called broad agreement was the decisive thing. The distribution of seats in
the Folketing meant that the Social Democratic Party could dictate in advance,
so to speak, the content of the new armed forces compromise.

Precisely against this background it is noteworthy what the Social Democrats
chose to place emphasis on. They were obviously satisfied to keep the increase
in expenditures over the years to come within very tight limits. When this
had first been achieved, their big ideas of reform regarding the future orga-
nization of the Danish military slipped away, if not into oblivion, then, in
any case, into committees. The criticism of the fact that Denmark has con-
tinued to organize its military as a mini-edition of the big powers' with the
division into an army, navy and air force was heard loud and clear several
months ago now. It was accompanied by thought-provoking reflections regarding
the fact that the Danish military's duties consisted to a great extent in
watchdogging and that it should be organized accordingly.

Of this will to reform there is nothing else left than the appointment of a
so-called analysis and advisory panel. Social Democratic Spokesman Knud
Damgaard called this "a historic innovation." This reflects undeniably very
simple notions of what can be called history. The Social Democratic Party can
stress that it, in all essentials has stipulated the limits for military ex-
penditures from now to the end of 1987. But most of Knud Damgaard's
contemporaries of course lack the imagination to picture this as a contrib-
ution of historical dimensions.

8985
CSO: 3613/189 78
FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON PRAVDA SPY-PLANE CLAIM

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Jul 84 p 7

[Article: "PRAVDA Strongly Criticizes Norway"]

[Text] Moscow, 23 July. (NTB-TASS). The northern parts of Norway are being turned into a base for American military intelligence, wrote the Soviet party organ PRAVDA. Under the title "A Dangerous Act" the newspaper especially criticized flights of an AWACS radar surveillance aircraft from Orland Air Base near Trondheim.

PRAVDA reports that the aircraft is an American spy plane and that as of this year it has carried out regular flights in the immediate vicinity of the northwest border of the Soviet Union. The newspaper claims that Minister of Defense Anders C. Sjaastad, in a recent interview with REUTERS news bureau, really did not deny that the Defense Ministry was in close cooperation with the Pentagon and NATO about spy missions against the Soviet Union.

According to the newspaper, Sjaastad said that the flights are necessary to assure readiness in certain crisis situations, and that the location of Norway gives a unique possibility to obtain information about the Soviet Union. "But he forgot to say that spy operations conducted from the territory of his country do not promote good neighborly relations," said PRAVDA.

"I can not say that there is anything new in the PRAVDA article. We have heard claims that we are conducting espionage against the Soviet Union many times before," said Undersecretary Torbjorn Froysnes in the Foreign Ministry.

Froysnes did not, however, make a secret of the fact that it is necessary for Norway to survey military activity in Norwegian offshore areas and areas in the vicinity of the country.

9287
CSO: 3639/140
SEPARATE SUPPLY COMMAND FOR TRONDELAG PRESTOCKING PLANNED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Jul 84 p 5

[Article by Liv Hegna]

[Text] Trondelag—A separate supply command will be set up in Trondelag. This will happen in connection with the district command's efforts to streamline maintenance procedures in the context of stockpiling materiel for an American Marine brigade, among other things. Two dozen 155-mm guns, carts, 57 trucks and 2000 tons of ammunition have already been stored in temporary depots in various locations in Trondelag. The next shipment of materiel to be stockpiled will arrive in the fall. It will include equipment for mountain flying as well as field equipment for the storage and distribution of fuel.

There will also be some engineering supplies such as 16 wheel loaders and aggregate. With respect to air defense the Americans have indicated that they will take along so-called "improved Hawks" of the same type that Norway is acquiring.

At Trondelag District Command they are busy preparing to receive the next shipment of materiel for stockpiling from the United States. Interim procedures for maintenance are being reviewed:

"The Americans have agreed in principle that Norwegian maintenance procedures will be followed. Naturally that will make our work much easier. It would be extremely difficult if we had to work according to two different maintenance systems," said DKT [Trondelag District Command] chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Knut Bekkevahr in a talk with AFTENPOSTEN. He added that when it comes to supervising the 2000 tons of ammunition that are stored in various locations in Trondelag the Americans will do that while the Norwegians will make an inspection once a year.

Under any circumstances, Trondelag District Command will function as the local contact point and they are now setting up a separate supply command that will gather technical weapons services, quartermasters, communications and engineering materiel services under one hat.
Who is paying for the maintenance of the American materiel?

"The United States, but we are doing the job within the framework of our total capacity. Some of the procedures for conserving materiel are probably different here from those used in the United States but we have had visits from leading American politicians and military men who said they were satisfied with the Norwegian system," said Lieutenant Colonel Bekkevahr.

The sketch shows temporary and permanent storage sites in Trondelag for the materiel being stockpiled for an American Marine brigade. (Source: FAKTA BLADET, Defense Ministry)

Key:

1. Temporary storage sites
2. Permanent storage sites
3. Unloading ports
AFTENPOSTEN took a trip with the chief of staff to look at various depots. The storage sheds at the new Formo camp would never have been approved for storing 155-mm guns if they had not set up a system that blows warm dry air through the pipes while a plastic hood takes care of excess pressure inside the guns.

"This prevents vital parts from rusting. The system is just as good as if the entire building was dehumidified," said Bekkevahr.

The roads through the Trondelag forests are narrow but during the last exercises it was shown that the Americans are capable of hauling the guns to their intended locations. The gun itself is over 12 meters long and the piece of ordnance weighs around 8 tons. It has a range of 3000 meters and has a dimension of 155 millimeters, the same as Norwegian guns of the same type. The ammunition, trailer beds and trucks are located somewhere else in Trondelag. Artillery shells are located at a safe distance from houses, highways and railroads. They are being stored in old German-built bunkers and there are plans to add higher doors to these so that regular vehicles can be used to remove the stacks of shells from the bombproof shelters.

6578
CSO: 3639/138
DISARMAMENT JOURNAL STUDIED FOR SECURITY BREACH

Security Police Investigate Group

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Jul 84 p 7

[Article by Inge D. Hanssen]

[Text] Articles in the journal IKKEVOLD and materials confiscated by police at the journal's headquarters last October contain information that should be kept secret for national security reasons. AFTENPOSTEN learned that this was the conclusion of the two experts investigating the case, director Finn Lied and Cdr Jacob Borresen. The experts believe, in particular, that information published by the journal on an alleged listening post on Andoya Island conflicts with paragraphs 90 and 91 of the Criminal Code.

Director Finn Lied, who was chosen as an expert investigator in the case after being recommended by the prosecutor, also was an expert witness in the case against peace researchers Owen Wilkes and Nils Petter Gleditsch in the spring of 1981. Commander Borresen was appointed at the request of the 12 defendants in the IKKEVOLD case. AFTENPOSTEN has learned that the two experts reached similar conclusions, although their evaluations of the case differ somewhat.

The experts' task has been to evaluate the published material from a security standpoint to see if the indictment is justified and to determine if the information should be considered secret. The experts were particularly interested in articles contained in three issues of IKKEVOLD. All these issues were published between April and September 1983.

One of the articles, entitled "Bombing Target Norway," contains information on 78 military installations. The installations are arranged by county. The article then presents information on the types of installations involved and gives detailed information on their locations.

The next article evaluated by the experts is entitled "Nuclear Strategy and the Garden Fence." It is a report on a trip to military facilities undertaken by members of the organization People's Revolt Against War (FMK). The report is illustrated with photographs taken by the FMK members themselves, even though military personnel prohibited the taking of photographs.
The third article that was evaluated is an unsigned report on a military installation on Andoya Island, which FMK believes is a SOSUS listening post. This is a facility designed to locate foreign submarines. The system was developed in the United States.

AFTENPOSTEN learned that the experts consider publication of information on the SOSUS station to be the most serious aspect of the FMK and IKKEVOLD activities. The intelligence agencies of foreign powers will see this as an important target. Norwegian authorities have made a major effort, from both an economic and a technical standpoint, to protect this station. AFTENPOSTEN learned that the experts believe the information published in this article should have been kept secret, especially to protect the station against sabotage or other acts that could be undertaken by a foreign power to put the station out of operation.

Oslo police headquarters is almost finished with its investigation of the case. It is believed that the evidence will be sent along with the police report to the public prosecutor in Eidsivating in early August. The attorney general has the ultimate responsibility in deciding whether or not the case will be prosecuted, since the indictment refers to paragraphs in the so-called espionage section of the Criminal Code.

Whether a possible court case against the suspects will be brought before the Oslo Magistrate's Court or the Eidsivating Criminal Court will depend on which paragraphs of the Criminal Code are quoted in the charges.

FMK Activities Watched By Police

For several years, Norwegian authorities have followed the activities of FMK. This was indicated, according to information obtained by AFTENPOSTEN, in a memorandum sent to the police last spring by former commander in chief Gen Sven Hauge in connection with the IKKEVOLD case. In 1978 the surveillance division of the police asked its officers throughout the country to keep a close watch on the activities of the organization. In 1982, in a letter to the various departments of the military, the commander in chief warned that one of the people now indicted in the case, assistant secretary Ivar Johansen, was attempting to gather information on the military.

The Security Police were eventually brought into the investigation because FMK, in its membership journal IKKEVOLDSAKTIVISTEN, called on its members throughout the country to collect information on military facilities in their vicinity.

In this way, the members could support the organization in its effort to document militarism in Norway. The Security Police believed that this call by FMK was a violation of the law on military secrets, but after an investigation by Oslo police headquarters, the case was dropped by the police.

During the police raid of IKKEVOLD headquarters last October, evidence was found indicating that rank-and-file members of FMK had answered the call and

84
provided information on local military installations. Military officials believe that leading members of FMK have conducted illegal intelligence operations. A letter from one of the suspects in the case to another suspect states: 'Am in Fauske digging up information. Am sending two films that are important. They contain close-ups of the facilities. You know which ones.'

In 1982, as stated above, the commander in chief warned against the activities of Ivar Johansen in connection with military matters, even after he had been convicted in 1978. The military believes there is a significant danger that secret information could be compromised by the systematic gathering of information such as that conducted by Johansen. After studying the methods and circumstances of the 1978 case and the case against peace researchers Owen Wilkes and Nils Petter Gleditsch, the commander in chief has concluded that these cases provide a picture of a circle of individuals who have long conducted a systematic and purposeful intelligence operation against military facilities. It is of vital significance to the military's effectiveness to keep this information secret. The commander in chief stated that foreign intelligence services would be unable to conduct operations of this type and that the FMK activities must be a dream-come-true for foreign intelligence services.

Articles Listed 'Bomb Targets'

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Jul 84 p 4

[Article by Inge D. Hanssen]

[Text] "I believe it was reasonable for the police to ask for an opinion from the Military Command in such a complicated case as the IKKEVOLD case, but I object strongly to the type of response given by the commander in chief. He has made violent attacks against the accused and has brought in new aspects that have expanded the entire scope of the case." This was stated by one of the defense attorneys, Ole Jakob Bae, in his comments on the commander in chief's memorandum on the case.

"I believe the police should have kept the memorandum and possibly used it as internal background information for further investigation into the case. When I have studied the reports from the two experts, director Finn Lied and Cdr Jacob Borresen, I will decide whether or not to request additional investigation and the calling of more witnesses, in order to clarify the points presented in the report from the military," Bae said.

Attorney Bae believes that, if future treatment of the case is based on the military report, the case will take on a political character, which will considerably expand the scope of the case. For this reason, he has asked the police to withdraw the memorandum from the case documents, but because of vacations he has not yet learned whether or not the police will agree to his request.
The two experts reached similar conclusions on one of the three articles in IKKEVOLD mentioned in the indictment against the 12 members of the editorial board, namely a report on an alleged listening post on Andoya Island for locating submarines. Both Lied and Borresen believe that publication of this information is damaging to the nation's security.

With regard to an illustrated report in the journal on a number of Norwegian military facilities, Lied believes it violates the law on defense secrets but, in his opinion, the damage caused by the article is not so serious as to be a violation of the Criminal Code. Borresen, on the other hand, does not believe the article contains secrets or information that is damaging to the national security.

The third article presents information on 78 military facilities in Norway that are characterized as bomb targets. The type of installation and detailed information on their locations are presented. Commander Borresen believes the article contains information that it would have been desirable to keep secret. At a press conference on this article, however, Borresen stated that it presented information on military radio communications that should have been kept secret.

Director Lied also stated that it was highly probable that the information in this article had been made known previously, so that the article caused only limited damage. But information that was presented at the press conference reinforces his conclusion that the People's Revolt Against War has overstepped the permissible bounds of presenting systematized, detailed information. Although the damage is limited, Lied believes that the case should be prosecuted under paragraphs 90 and 91 of the Criminal Code.

9336
CSO: 3639/137
GENERAL URGES PLANNING FOR AMPHIBIOUS INVASION

Stockholm 7 DAGAR in Swedish 29 Jun 84 p 7

[Article by Carl Bjoreman]

[Text] A major power could invade Sweden at any time. For this reason, we cannot simply plan for a "shell" defense or downgrade the defense of certain sections of the country. Maj Gen Carl Bjoreman states this in his reply to an article by Hans Lindblad in 7 DAGAR (No. 22, 1984).

Hans Lindblad's uncertainty in the area of strategy and operations is demonstrated by his treatment of a possible attacker's use of surprise.

Actually The Opposite

Lindblad maintains that it would be easier for an attacker to surprise us strategically, i.e. regarding the time at which war or the threat of war occurs, than operationally, i.e. regarding the region of the country that is to be attacked when the threat of war is at hand. Lindblad, like others who use the term, has a vague understanding of the concept "surprise attack," but it clearly refers to an attack occurring before we are able to mobilize, i.e. a surprise in the strategic sense.

Hans Lindblad does not believe, however, that an attacker could surprise us from an operational standpoint, as the allies did against the Germans in 1944. As we know, the Germans were well aware of the threat of invasion and the manner in which it would occur, but they were surprised by the place and exact time of the invasion. It is difficult to imagine that this could happen to us, according to Hans Lindblad. His argument in this area forms the basis for the proposed "gap defense" that appears near the end of his article.

There are many indications that the opposite of Lindblad's conclusion is true. (We must understand, of course, that an attacker always tries to utilize surprise.) In the shadow of nuclear weapons and the danger of mutual destruction, the superpowers and superpower blocs proceed with extreme caution in strategic matters. The use of military force—and even the threat of such
force—is preceded by extensive analysis.

Before they use weapons, or even rattle them, they want to calculate the political effect on their primary adversary. Despite what Hans Lindblad claims, this should give us time to discover the danger and mobilize our forces—of course, assuming that our politicians have learned to detect the security and strategic warning signals, rather than simply concentrating on military technology.

From the standpoint of operational forewarning, we are in no significant way in a more favorable situation than were the Germans in 1944. Technological advances after World War II have favored the attacker. Transport technology is capable of delivering large quantities of supplies per unit time to a selected region. Modern weapons technology permits surface and point warfare within a short time. Intelligence technology permits an attacker to follow our troop movements carefully. Thus, a possible attacker can keep us in uncertainty as to what part of the country he intends to attack.

Forgetting Enemy's Alternatives?

In my opinion, Hans Lindblad has ignored strategic and operational factors that are just as important for our evaluation of the Normandy Invasion (which is still of significant value) as the tactical and military-technology factors he has considered. As a result, he has missed the mark in important matters, despite his meritorious treatment of tactics and military technology. His article, in its entirety, illustrates what 7 DAGAR wrote in its editorial in issue no. 39 of 1983 concerning a "fundamental weakness" (in military doctrine), namely the belief that the enemy will behave in a manner that will make one's own weapons most effective.

The risk of such misconceptions is implicit in the special long-range military planning we use here in Sweden. It has certainly contributed to our procurement of advanced weapons systems at relatively low costs. Its theoretical foundations may have been worked out by our best military minds, but in its practical application there is a considerable risk that Hans Lindblad will not be the only one who forgets about the enemy's options and concentrates too much on the effects of our own actions. They forget that the other side constantly seeks to keep open as many options as possible in an "interaction of wills that utilize means of force to settle their mutual conflicts (Beaufre)."

This risk is the result of an approach that tends to concentrate on comparing the composition of the two sides' forces (to see which forces are better) rather than on the question of whether or not one's own forces are capable of countering the various options of the enemy. Upon closer consideration, it may be seen that this approach is well suited to the interests of the service branches (i.e. those of arms producers). But this approach makes it difficult for the commander in chief to convince the Military Council of the significance of certain strategic and operational factors. By the way, Sweden must be one
of a very few countries whose military commanders, i.e., those who must lead defense operations under the commander in chief, are not included in the highest military consultations, the Military Council.

Military planning in a closed circle of planners may have been acceptable during the detente of the seventies, when it was believed that military defense would be used only in some vague, distant future. Now, in the more tension-filled eighties, operational studies are of great importance, even when considering the future composition of our defense system.

When properly applied, operational studies (unlike the application of "long-range studies" indicated above) consists of weighing the concrete options of each side against those of the other. Modern operational studies tell us that an attacker can gain a significant advantage by invading undefended or weakly defended coasts instead of invading defended coasts and that airborne troops are of great importance in taking a bridgehead. Whoever believes he can determine where the battle will take place can be easily outmaneuvered both from the air and by amphibious invasions along undefended (weakly defended) coasts.

Seventies' Dream Invalid

Hans Lindblad's proposal to downgrade the defense of certain parts of the country is not good enough in the present security and strategic situation in and around the Nordic countries, which will probably continue. It would significantly increase the operational possibilities of the enemy and our own vulnerability to threats and pressure. During the detente of the seventies, many dreamed they could rule out the "invasion model," thereby reducing the cost of our defense system, without reducing its ability to maintain peace. This approach was based on the belief that the major powers would limit themselves to infringements against Swedish sovereignty and long-range strikes against Sweden.

This dream no longer holds in the tense climate of the eighties. The major powers have (and can expand) the resources for an invasion (and occupation) by land, sea, and air. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact practice invasions. We must remember that they can utilize all their resources—and all our vulnerable points.

A corollary to Hans Lindblad's reasoning—which is based primarily on military-technology observations—is that we will have a defense system with considerable gaps, primarily in two areas: geographic gaps, whereby certain parts of the country are not considered targets for an attacker, and functional gaps. The "shell" defense, in which the aggressor is not permitted to land, is his model. A major power can destroy such a shell at any time or outflank it by attacking the geographic gaps.

Hans Lindblad's defense model is not a viable security instrument for maintaining our independence in the security situation that presently exists and
will exist in the Nordic countries. He has overlooked the importance of indurance and versatility.

Ruling out—in whole or in part—the invasion model in our defense planning makes an invasion a genuine threat to our security.

Our security policy will be adequate only if it provides for defense against invasion and occupation, a defense of our nation's existence. This policy must consider all the real options available to the aggressor and take advantage of the defensive might represented by our materiel and our troops.

9336
CSO: 3650/248
INCREASING EXPORTS, IMPORTS FROM POLAND

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 19 Jun 84 p 7

[Article by Erich Royn: "A New Beginning with Poland? Austria's Exports Are Rising Again"]

[Text] Having overcome a low point, Austrian exports to Poland are on the rise again. Although their value is still half what it was in the 70's, the order books at many factories are full again. Of course the firms have not lost any money on the Polish market, for Warsaw's more than 30 billion schilling debt in Austria goes against the accounts of the commercial banks and the Austrian Control Bank [Oesterreichische Kontrollbank]. But Poland complains that commerce cannot flourish without new credits.

Austrian firms have literally stormed this year's International Trade Fair in Poznan. While last year there were only 40 exhibitors represented in the Federal Chamber's group exhibit, the number rose this year to 60. In addition there were another 18 (1983: 11) individual exhibitors. However, in a conversation with DIE PRESSE, The Austrian trade delegate in Warsaw, Josef Altenburger, ÖBA, emphasized that at the present time, there are export opportunities only in certain areas. Above all, the investment and consumer goods sector must be excluded. There are hardly any large projects, at most modernization or renovation of existing plants. Still there are good possibilities for deliveries of spare parts, industrial raw materials and semi-finished goods, because Poland needs these products to get its economy moving.

Since Poland receives no credit from Austria—the exception was a credit for grain deliveries—payment is negotiated in principle against letters of credit. Interestingly, Poland only seldom demands reciprocal transactions. The pressure varies, however, depending on the sector.

Poland's debts in Austria exceed 30 billion schilling, of which one-fourth fall to the commercial banks; the remainder are state and state-guaranteed credits. In the latter group, Austria is one of Poland's five biggest creditors, with about a 13 percent share of the total debt. There is no
predicting when agreement will be reached within the framework of the "Paris Club" on the government credits. Poland is demanding long-term conversion of its debt and new credits, and would like to join the International Monetary Fund. These steps should make a new beginning possible for Polish trade, since Warsaw could defer the repayment of its debts. It is hard to say how far the West will play along. Namely, it is also a political problem. Poland has already carried out a number of debt conversions with the commercial banks.

After an increase in exports last year of 36 percent, to 3.1 billion schilling, Altenburger expects this year a further rise of about 10 percent, to 3.5 billion schilling. Imports should expand from 3.6 billion schilling last year to about 5 billion schilling this year, marking the third year of a balance of trade deficit with Warsaw. This large Polish trade surplus can be traced to the increase in coal imports (including coke) from one billion to 1.8 billion tons. Electricity imports will also rise from 400 million kWh to 1.6 billion kWh. Austria now hopes to reduce the 1.5 billion schilling deficit with additional exports.

Talks on Big Projects

There is talk again about big projects like, for example, Austrian participation in a hydroelectric power plant on the Vistula and a thermal power plant in Opole, as well as in the establishment of a coal mine in the Lublin district, where there are said to be 50 to 60 billion tons of coal reserves. Altenburger believes that these projects would have to be financed in advance, or achieved within the framework of a joint venture, whereby payment would be possible in the form of electricity or coal. Indeed, the law to that effect on joint ventures is still in Parliament. Within the framework of the joint Austrian-Polish commission, a working group on energy is being established to study these projects.

There is also discussion, within the framework of a yet-to-be established working group, of Austrian participation in Poland's second priority area, namely the foodstuffs industry and agriculture, for example of help in the mechanization of agriculture and in building up the foodstuffs industry. Austria's chances of participating in the completion of the numerous "dead investments" in Poland are scant. For one would have to accept products from these factories which hardly anyone needs.

Of the approximately 20 cooperative agreements with Poland, only a fraction are functioning, because in view of its precarious foreign exchange situation, the country hardly has the money for the necessary deliveries from Austria. Nonetheless, VOEST-Alpine has just concluded a cooperative agreement for expansion of cooperation in coal mining machinery (Alpine-Miner). While until now, only small propulsion machinery had been manufactured jointly, the large apparatus has not been included. At a cost of 130 million schilling, VOEST-Alpine is expanding the ore transhipment port in Szczecin (Swinooujscie); in return the harbor is expected to provide services for ore imports to Austria.
RAPID EXPANSION IN PRIVATE CONSUMPTION, THREATENS TRADE DEFICIT

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 6 Jul 84 p 7

[Commentary by Ole Lorentzen and Lennart Weber]

[Text] The new figures from Denmark's Statistics on the powerful growth in private consumption are making life even more unpleasant for Prime Minister Poul Schluter (Conservative Party).

He must now, together with the inevitable restructuring of the government, begin to plan new economic measures for fall.

If the present developments in consumption, imports, and other things continues -- and it looks as though they will -- it is absolutely necessary to have new belt-tightening if the government's policy is not to lose its credibility completely. Things are bad enough as they are.

Economics Minister Anders Andersen (Liberal Party) does not understand a bit of what is happening, either. In a statement he expresses great surprise that imports, consumption, and interest rates are rising at a record rate. "The rise in interest rates in the U.S. is causing reactions here at home, but I cannot completely understand this. Interest rates in Western Europe are not rising," he said.

Just before the last economic compromise was agreed upon between the Radical Liberals and the government, the economics minister said that interest rates would fall to 13 percent as soon as the compromise went into effect. Since then they have risen to 16 percent.

Finansminister Henning Christophersen (Liberal) made it crystal clear in the newspaper, JYLLANDS-POSTEN, that the government cannot survive if the development continues. "We expect that the development will turn because we will have a trade surplus in the second half of the year. Therefore the government will wait a few months before deciding whether anything should be done," Christophersen said.
Value Added Tax the Last Chance

The problem for Schluter and his economic ministers is that they have tried practically everything possible to limit consumption. The only thing the last compromise did not contain was a higher value added tax.

Stubborn rumors claim, however, that in the treasury they have long evaluated the possible consequences of a rise in the value added tax.

The coming national convention of the Radical Liberals -- which will take place at the same time as the Social Democrats' congress in the middle of September -- can make it more difficult to gather a majority for new, drastic cut-backs and belt-tightening.

There is a big difference between the resolutions at the Radical Liberal Party's national meeting last year and the policy that was carried out afterward. The social imbalance in the actions carried out cries out to heaven. There are limits to how long the Radical leader Niels Helweg Petersen can convince himself and his delegates that the most social policy is the lowering of unemployment no matter what it costs.

New Government a Painful Matter

On top of all this comes the long awaited restructuring of the government. Up to now, Poul Schluter has been able to postpone the governmental restructuring by pointing out that it has not been determined whether Henning Christophersen is to go to Brussels as commission chairman or just commissioner.

But the decision will be made in a very few weeks. After this, Schluter cannot avoid adjusting the government according to the new representative count. In particular it must seem strange to the Christian People's Party that they only have one minister with five representatives while the Democratic Center has four with eight representatives.

The problem with the restructuring of the government is simply that it will really open things up for the expression of internal disunity in the government -- the disunity that during most of the spring has dragged Poul Schluter into every single little matter that could not be handled in a purely administrative way, but needed a political decision.

Cars and TV are Draining Foreign Exchange

Danish consumption is on the way up. Figures from Denmark's Statistics show that it is namely expensive, durable consumer goods that are being increasingly imported. We are buying more TV sets, video machines, and cars abroad.

While our exports rose 14 percent in the first five months of the year, imports rose by 22 percent. Part of this is due to increased industrial investments.
But private consumption is rising greater than the "healthy" imports that in the long run can assure us more industrial exports.

Part of the explanation is the price rises and the build-up of inventories. During the crisis period, many businesses operated with small inventories. Among these were car dealers and radio and TV firms. Now purchases are being made in the belief that an economic upswing is coming.

But these two items cannot explain away the fact that a real expansion in consumption has taken place. It is difficult, for example, to get delivery right now on certain types of cars, and this stresses the point that only a part of the car imports is going to build up inventories. Another factor is that the rules for tax write-offs on cars have eased.

Imports of 71 billion kroner

In the year's first five months, we imported 71 billion kroners' worth of goods compared with 58 billion kroner during the same period last year. This is a rise of 22 percent.

The 13 billion rise is divided into the following main groups:

- Farming and fishing goods, among other things, feeds and fertilizers: 0.9 billion kroner, a rise of 29 percent compared to the same period last year.

- Factory and construction goods: 0.4 billion kroner, a rise of nine percent.

- Goods for urban employment, mainly raw materials and partially finished items for industry: 4.7 billion kroner, a rise of 22 percent.

- Energy: 1.7 billion kroner, a rise of 16 percent.

- Machines, mainly for industry: 1.1 billion kroner, a rise of 21 percent.

- Transportation: 1.2 billion kroner, a rise of 42 percent. Included in this figure is the import of personal cars, which rose by 0.8 billion, a rise of 52 percent.

- Goods for direct consumption: 2.7 billion kroner, a rise of 27 percent.

Imports for urban employment and machine imports are a "healthy sign." It shows that more is being invested in employment.

On the other hand, the rising import of cars and consumer goods has caused concern. This part of our total import has risen steadily over a long period. Even if part of it comes from inventory buildup, the bill must be paid. It will contribute to the increase in our unfavorable balance of trade.

What do we buy more of?
Surveys taken by Denmark's Statistics show that besides car imports, foodstuffs and luxury items together with durable consumer goods are growing very rapidly.

Of the import rise of 2.7 billion kroner for private use, 600 million is for the category of "durable consumer goods" alone. They are mainly TV equipment, radios, and video. This part of our import has risen by 40 percent in the first five months of the year.

"Foodstuffs, alcohol, and tobacco" has risen by 0.9 billion kroner, or 34 percent in the first five months of the year.

Luxury vehicles and camping vehicles, one of the lesser items in the total import picture, has risen by 33 percent.

Import Rise January-May 1984 Compared to the Same Period Last Year in Main Groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Bill. Kr.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Fishing</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plants and Construction</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Employment</td>
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<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
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<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machines</td>
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<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of the above: private cars</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct Consumption</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>27</td>
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9124
CSO: 3613/190
TRADE DEFICIT SHOWS DRAMATIC DECLINE

Copenhagen BERINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Jul 84 Sect III p 1

[Article by Svend Bie: "Trade Deficit Declines Drastically"]

[Text] The trade figures for the month of June are more positive than expected. The import of consumer goods has fallen, according to the chief economist of Handels Bank. The investment boom is putting a heavy strain on the balance of payments.

In June Denmark had a deficit in the trade balance of 390 million kroner, and that is much less than the month before, when the deficit was 1,130 million kroner; almost four times greater.

Corrected for trade by ship and seasonally, the deficit amounts to 670 million kroner. Even though this is a large negative figure, it was seen as positive because it shows a development in the right direction, and both the stock and bond markets reacted positively yesterday—although weakly.

"These are the best figures for foreign trade this year. If next month's figures are as good I will have no doubt that the turnabout has come. We will surely have a strong improvement in the trade balance during the last half of 1984," said Svend Moller Nielsen, chief economist of Handels Bank.

The large deficit for May upset many, and some people said that it would be necessary to intervene in the area of private consumption. Svend Moller Nielsen does not believe that would be a good idea.

"Things should not be tightened up prematurely. The import of consumer goods has been large, but we can not turn back the clock, and I am sure that the import of consumer goods has leveled off."

It Hurts Imports

When the trade figures are so bad, any improvement necessarily hurts imports, said Svend Moller Nielsen.
Every time there is public expenditure of a krone, an average of 9 ore goes abroad, and every time a krone is used for private consumption an average of 26 ore goes for foreign goods.

On the other hand when a krone is invested in machinery, an average of 55 ore goes abroad, said Svend Møller Nielsen.

Burdened

"The present improvement is a special burden for the trade balance, as it calls for investments, and thereby imports."

The chief economist's viewpoint is entirely in agreement with the recently published business barometer. It showed that the economy has built up large stocks of raw materials, and that more has been invested than expected, and that both factors call for imports. On the other hand the order situation is good, especially on the export market.

Caption: Import's share of 1 krone used for:
Public consumption 9 ore
Private consumption 26 ore
New machinery 55 ore

Source: Handels Bank

9287
CSO: 3613/198
FARMERS LEAVING LAND AT INCREASING RATE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Jul 84 Sect III p 2
[Article by Ib Christensen: "More Than 3,000 Farms Closed in 1983"]

[Text] Denmark's total number of farms fell to under 100,000, the rate of closures is increasing steadily and thereby the remaining farms are growing in size.

The number of farms fell in 1983 by 3,300, and the total thereby declined to below the "magic" number of 100,000 to 98,680 farm businesses, or by about 3 percent. That corresponds to an increase in closures of 10 percent in comparison with 1981-82, according to a new report from Danmarks Statistik.

The number of closures is probably even higher, because Danmarks Statistik now no longer registers farms under five hectares. The reason why these businesses are omitted in this way is that the Danish National Farmers Union believes that most farms are closed because the farm couple has reached pension age.

That is very typical on small farms of 5, 10 or perhaps 15 hectares. They get dispensation from their farming obligation, and the land can be sold to a neighbor and the couple can remain living in the farmhouse, or they can sell the property as a "farmyard idyll" to a rich cityperson.

Less Land

At the same time the cultivated land area has only slightly shrunk. While the number of farms is reduced by the 3 percent mentioned above, the amount of cultivated land has only dwindled by 15,000 hectares out of the nation's fully 30 million. That amounts to half a percent, and shows that in the great majority of cases the land is joined with that of a neighbor.

Therefore farms grew in size from 33 to 38 hectares in 1982-83, and in general a considerable number of farms were closed up to about 50 hectares, so there will be more over this limit.
On the other hand it does not appear that farmers as an economic group, for example after a forced sale, have any difficulty in finding employment again.

Most active and younger farmers who leave their farms usually have a relatively easy time finding new jobs at slaughter houses, grain and feed businesses, machinery stations and as teamsters. "They often prefer farmers because they know it is stable manpower," said Elsebeth Andersen of the National Farmers Union.
INDUSTRY MINISTER CITES ENCOURAGING TRENDS FOR GROWTH

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Terje Svabo]

[Text] The Industrial Ministry's latest market report contains encouraging figures. The decline in industrial production in recent years has stopped and turned into a moderate upturn. The report estimated that industrial production will increase by 3 to 4 percent from 1983 to 1984. Industrial Minister Jan P. Syse said in a comment to AFTENPOSTEN that the study presents a picture of advances on a broad level. Growth is no longer limited to export industries, Syse pointed out.

Cabinet minister Syse said that the Industrial Ministry's experts review developments branch by branch at regular intervals. The market report just issued has been called the most encouraging one to be released for several years.

The report estimates that industrial production will increase by 3 to 4 percent from 1983 to 1984. On the basis of estimates made by the Industrial Ministry's branch offices it can be assumed that growth will occur at about the same level from 1984 to 1985, although perhaps it will occur at a slightly lower rate. If these figures prove correct, industrial production in 1985 would approach the 1974 level. Industrial production has not been that high since the peak year of 1974.

The market report also shows that there has been a necessary and important structural adaptation in recent years with respect to production, finances and ownership in sections of industry. It is pointed out that production capacity is gradually being curtailed in firms and branches where Norwegian opportunities to compete seem limited. Many firms have built up larger capital reserves and have acquired more favorable loan packages.

"Domestic conditions can gradually replace export growth as the major reason for industrial production growth. On an annual basis exports will increase considerably in volume from 1983 to 1984 but growth in 1984 is expected to be weaker. The metal industry in particular is approaching its capacity limit while there is still room for growth in the area of wood
products. At the moment the strongest investment growth is expected from 1984 to 1985 in the metal branch but it will take several years before that results in increased production capacity," the report said.

The Norwegian Industrial League's estimates for industrial production growth in 1984 and 1985 were commented on. It was said that the estimates of .5 and 1.5 percent respectively are very pessimistic signals.

Industrial Minister Jan P. Syse told AFTENPOSTEN that the report is a confirmation that things are going in the right direction. He stressed that it is a major goal for the government's economic policy to encourage reorganization.

"Tax relief for companies and individuals, the fight against inflation, the revival of the stock market, the stimulation of new business starts, deregulation and increased freedom of action for the business sector are all government measures designed to encourage reorganization," said Jan P. Syse.
SURVEY OF WAVERING CAMPAIGN TO RESCUE ECONOMY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German
6 Jul 84 p 2

[Report by jbn, datelined Ankara: "Turkey: Inflation Continuing Unabated"]

[Text] The economic bottom line of the 6-months old new Turkish Government headed by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal shows both plusses and minuses. Though all independent observers agree that no new government could have been expected to make much progress in restoring the health of the economy, Ozal is getting low marks with respect to the fight against inflation. Indeed, inflation rose by another 9 percent in April alone. Inflation in the first 5 months of 1984 stands at more than 55 percent in terms of the annual rate. Prices continue to rise so that no slackening is likely. Gasoline prices were raised 5 times in quick succession. The price of bread rose by 30 percent, postal and telephone charges and public transport fares by 150-200 percent. At the beginning of the year, the price of onions (a staple of the masses) amounted to 5 Turkish lira (about DM0.05). By the end of May it had climbed to 200 lira (roughly DM2) on the markets of Istanbul and other large cities.

Both the middle class and the poorer strata are hard hit, all the more so because the (gross) minimum monthly wage amounts to the equivalent of DM185 and the minimum monthly wage for young workers up to 16 to DM110. Ozal blames his predecessors for these enormous price jumps. He points out that the Bulent Ulusu military government blocked any price rises for 15 months so as to maintain its prestige among the public. The government considers the continuing devaluation of the Turkish currency another decisive reason for the rising prices. Since the beginning of this year the Turkish lira lost more than 33 percent of its value vis-a-vis the U.S.dollar and more than 27 percent against the D-mark.

For all these reasons, the agenda of cabinet meetings regularly includes the introduction of a central price supervisory system to fight "abusive" price increases and protect the consumer. Several ministers are said to have proposed assigning price supervision to a "strong personality" able to make quick and independent decisions based on sweeping legal powers. So far liberal Prime Minister Ozal has successfully opposed such recommendations. In his opinion, any type of supervision would infringe the principles of a liberal market economy and free competition. Moreover, the most extreme
price increases of the past 5-months originated with public corporations, because they were no longer to be subsidized by the government. Semi-official reports emphasize that public corporations, such as the state railways, the national airline and the state shipping company recorded their first substantial profits at the end of 1983—following 50 years of enormous deficits. That was due entirely to the corresponding increases in prices.

It remains to be seen whether the economy will revive in the second half of 1984. Many people expect the opposite. Recovery is complicated by the caution of Turkish industry; in view of the raging inflation and the inevitable consequences of the severe devaluation, it is afraid to embark on investments. The high interest rates for loans (ranging from 60 to 80 percent) also act as a deterrent to the inclination to invest.

Times are particularly hard for wage earners. The 25 percent wage raise granted them up to now by the YHK [Supreme Court of Arbitration], a remnant of the military government, is inadequate in the face of an almost 60 percent inflation rate and causes increasing unrest among workers and also among many employers who assess the situation realistically. At the latest negotiations for the conclusion of collective wage agreements, therefore, employers (specially public corporations) consented to wage raises exceeding the 25 percent limit fixed by the YHK. Consequently the government is in an insidious situation with regard to civil service salaries. Despite Ozal's expansive promises during the November 1983 election campaign, it hesitates to adjust salaries to the advancing inflation, though it is well aware of the distress among civil servants.

Due primarily to devaluation, the budget inherited from the former military government no longer suffices to meet expenses. The government asked Parliament for a supplementary 790 billion Turkish lira budget (around DM61 billion). The opposition strongly objects to this, considering it more fuel for the inflationary fire. About 55 billion lira—some DM420 million—are likely to go to a 10-15 percent hike of civil service salaries. Vural Arikan, minister of finance, comments: "We cannot spend more than that."

Unemployment is yet another problem. For the first time a member of the cabinet, Minister of State Alptemocin, admitted that unemployment had achieved the record figure of 3.5 million. This is not really surprising in view of a 2.5 percent birthrate and a population of almost 48 million.

According to reports from government circles, the government intends to spend 200 billion lira (roughly DM1.7 billion) until the end of the year in order to revive construction. The construction of 60,000 housing units is planned; the money needed will come from a fund financed by taxes levied on the importation of so-called luxury goods. To encourage building, the government has proclaimed a 5-year tax exemption on housing units of up to 150 square meters in undeveloped regions. Turkey is short more than 2 million housing units.

The international monetary agencies evidently regard developments in Turkey with some approval. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
have decided more often to send their representatives to Ankara to more closely observe economic developments there. It seems that both institutions are inclined to consider Ozal's market economic attitude as a model and to think that its possible success may serve as an example to other developing countries. They already expressed their appreciation to Ozal about the results achieved so far, such as the growth of exports in the first 4 months of 1984, the devaluation of the lira to fall in line with the free market rate but also, indeed quite particularly so, the government's efforts to make an end of the system of subsidies. At the same time the IMF requested Ozal to avoid an excess expansion of the money supply and make the fight against inflation the main target of economic policy. The reasons for this latter request are obvious: Though Ozal reduced subsidies and tax exemptions for exporters by about 50 percent, the subsidies still in effect represent a serious burden on the budget.

Ozal, though, seems firmly resolved to spur Turkish exporters to even greater export performances. Ozal regards the almost 50 percent rise in exports in the first 4 months 1984 compared with the previous year as the "shining light," offering hope to Turkey. His respected Finance Minister Vural Arikan adds: "If this lasts, we will soon be out of the tunnel." Exports rose to more than $2.3 billion from January through April 1984. Exports to OECD countries accounted for 56.5 percent, to Islamic countries in the Arab region, mainly Iran and Iraq, for 36.9 percent. Turkish exports to Japan rose by 162.3 percent to $248.5 million, to the United States by 41.1 percent to $124 million. On the other hand, exports to the Soviet Union declined by 45.5 percent to $20.6 million. According to provisional figures, exports to the FRG in January-May rose by 78 percent to $349 million.

Up to now the largest share of Turkish exports (about 48 percent) has gone to the EC countries. Ankara is afraid that the new Community restrictions on Turkish textile exports may result in a decline of the exchange of goods with the EC. The "protectionist" restrictions have aroused much anger toward the EC, especially France and Greece. Ozal is reported to have talked about the lower EC textile quotas with Bavarian Minister President Franz Josef Strauss, on the occasion of the latter's visit to Ankara in May last. Reliable sources relate that the Turkish Prime Minister requested Strauss to ask the Federal Government to intercede strongly with Brussels on behalf of Turkey. Strauss reminded Ozal that 80 percent of total Turkish textile exports go to the Federal Republic. According to Strauss, the situation will gradually improve. He is said to have recommended to Ozal to stop quarreling with Brussels about the textile issue. There are, after all, other Turkish products of great interest to the EC, in particular the FRG--mining products, for example. The largest part of Turkish natural resources is still below ground. Strauss is said to have offered Ozal German cooperation in the development of specific mining areas and the joint processing of Turkish minerals for export.

The primary concern of the Strauss visit to Ankara, though, was of a quite different nature. In his capacity as chairman of the advisory board of the Airbus industry, Strauss approached Ozal about a Turkish order for Airbus aircraft for the Turkish airline. Airbus here competes with the
American firm Boeing of Seattle, which has offered the Turkish corporation its 767 model. In a public statement in Ankara Strauss said that it was not in Turkey's best interest to remain "subject to U.S. monopoly pressure" with respect to its civil aviation.

By comparison with the previous year, Turkish tax revenues have risen by 52 percent. Although experts consider this also a consequence of rising inflation and currency devaluation, the increased tax revenues do reflect diminished tax evasion. After all, Ozal's market economic policy has inspired confidence in the business world. Nevertheless Istanbul Treasurer Adnan Barlas (Istanbul is the commercial and industrial center producing two thirds of tax revenues) said that many corporations might be late paying their taxes, due to lack of liquidity. To preserve commerce and business from shocks, the Ozal Government intends to assist the tax payers in arrears by offering a repayment plan at moderate interest rates. The tax liabilities of public corporations and local authorities alone amount to more than 250 billion Turkish lira (some DM2 billion).

Finance Minister Vural Arikan is respected and popular in many circles. He has espoused economic liberalism even more strongly than Ozal, and it is his intention to simplify the tax system. From January 1985, virtually all indirect taxes are to be abolished and replaced by the value-added tax. With the assistance of experts from the FRG Ministry of Finance, the appropriate preparations have been under way for quite some time in the Turkish Ministry of Finance.
NATURAL GAS CONSORTIUM MEETING GOALS FOR SALES ORDERS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Jul 84 Sect III p 3

[Article by Peter Kjelstrup: "DONG Close to Its Goal for Gas Sales"]

[Text] If last month's figures for gas sales continue, the power plants are going to escape having to buy some of the gas which they were forced to obligate themselves for. DONG [Department of Natural Gas] now estimates that 80 percent of the gas coming in the next heating season has been sold.

DONG is now much more optimistic about the possibilities of selling the target amount of gas when the Danish Underground Consortium seriously begins gas deliveries on 1 October. 1 October is the official date for the start of the Danish natural gas project. Previously the gas came from Germany.

The consortium estimates today that about 80 percent of the gas which will be received in the coming year has been sold. And if the development which has been seen during the past few months continues, and the acceptance of many new customers continues as planned, the chief of information at DONG, Poul Dons Christensen, anticipates that the power plants will escape having to receive at least a part of the gas that they were committed to take by an agreement between the power plants, the government and the gas company. The power plants were forced by the government to take the gas which DONG, a few months ago, anticipated that they would be unable to get rid of next year and for some years in the future.

In the coming year DONG will sell a total of 833 million cubic meters of gas. Of this they have signed sales contracts for 311 million cubic meters to the general customer categories, which include single-family houses, industrial activities and block or remote heating plants. All figures are cubic meters of gas per year.

In addition there is the export to Sweden and the deliveries to Sundby gas works, which converts natural gas to town gas before it is sent out to the gas customers in the municipalities. In all this amounts to a theoretical
sale of close to 800 million cubic meters. But the rate of orders and plant conversion time will cause the figures to be not completely fulfilled in the "gas year" which begins on 1 October.

In addition offers have been made to the larger customers for the sale of a total of 375 million cubic meters, which however have still not been accepted, and even if they were accepted they could not convert their combustion systems and be tied to the gas net in time, so the full effect of the sale would not be felt in the coming heating season.

By 1 October 1985 and in the year following the gas which comes from the North Sea will be doubled. And beginning 1 October 1986 full production will be achieved, namely 2.5 million cubic meters per year [as published].

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Caption: There are indications that the sales of natural gas are beginning in earnest. Summer sales figures are creating renewed optimism in DONG.

Key: (1) Small consumers  
(2) Remote heating  
(3) Industry

9287
CSO: 3613/198
OIL RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTINUING TRADE SURPLUSES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Jul 84 p 9

[Text] There was a surplus in Norwegian trade with other countries of 20.7 billion kroner in the first half of the year, an increase of 37.6 percent over the first half of last year. The big export surplus was due to growth in oil exports. If we take out the oil sector, the figures from the Central Bureau of Statistics show that the traditional mainland businesses had a foreign trade deficit of around 17.9 billion kroner in the first 6 months of this year, an increase of 32.1 percent over last year.

The preliminary figures from the Central Statistics Bureau for the month of June show that imports, excluding ships and oil platforms, rose 17.3 percent to around 9.6 billion kroner. Exports, also excluding ships and oil platforms, rose as much as 29.7 percent in June to around 12.6 billion kroner. But of these exports, oil exports made up around 6.5 billion kroner and rose as much as 42.2 percent.

So far this year total imports rose by 15.4 percent while total exports rose by 21 percent. But this strong export growth was also a result of oil and gas exports which have risen as much as 23.8 percent. Growth in traditional exports was at 18 percent.

Oil and gas exports in the first 6 months of this year added up to around 38.7 billion kroner.

6578
CSO: 3639/138
SURPLUS OIL ON WORLD MARKET MAY FORCE DOWN NORTH SEA PRICES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Jul 84 p 4

[Article by Flemming Dahl: "Surplus on World Market--Norwegian Crude Oil Price Could Be Depressed"]

[Text] The price of Norwegian crude oil, which is now about $30 per barrel, could in the near future be adjusted downward as a result of the oil surplus on the world market, say people in the oil business.

Statoil has agreements with its customers for about $30 per barrel in the current quarter. Observers, however, will not exclude prices being pressed down before that period expires.

The chief of information at Statoil, Willy Olsen, said that he is confident that the price will hold for the period. But he said that thereafter a lower price can be forced if the prices on the spot market continue at their current low level.

During recent days spot prices have been around $28. The difference between contract prices and spot prices has not been so great in over a year. A new outbreak of fighting in the Middle East could, however, very quickly cause the spot prices to rise again. This would protect the Norwegian price level.

If the Norwegian oil price is adjusted downward in the near future by a few dimes, that would not be an economic catastrophe either for Statoil, the other companies which produce oil, or for the nation. Their incomes during recent months have been much higher than budgeted, because of the high dollar exchange rate.

9287
CSO: 3639/140
FISHERMEN FROM SEVERAL COUNTRIES OVERFISHING NEAR SVALBARD

Oslo KLASSEKAMPEN in Norwegian 14 Jul 84 p 23

[Article by Roar Eilertsen: "Extreme Overfishing"]

[Text] Norwegian inspection ships have, during recent days, discovered as much as 62 percent of young fish in the catches taken in the Norwegian fishing zone around Svalbard. There are about 20 East German, Portuguese, Spanish and Russian trawlers which have engaged in this extreme overfishing. The Fisheries Directorate takes a very serious view of what is happening, and over the weekend will propose that the zone be closed. It is said that the taking of young fish represents a serious threat to stocks of cod.

The foreign trawlers have been fishing in an area west of Bear Island for several weeks now, but this is the first time that surveillance from Norwegian inspection ships has disclosed the serious violations. According to the rules for the fisheries protection zone, the number of small fish must not exceed 15 percent of the catch, said counsellor Aksel Eikemo of the Fisheries Directorate in Bergen to KLASSEKAMPEN. This zone was established in 1977, and is a so-called nondiscriminatory fishery protection zone, said Eikemo. That means that ships of all countries have equal rights to fish there, but Norwegian authorities have the responsibility for the resources situation and for enforcing applicable regulations.

Every individual ship is also obliged to report to Norwegian authorities when it enters the zone. This is largely observed by all except the Russian trawlers. The Russians refuse to recognize the limited Norwegian jurisdiction in the area.

Coast Guard

At the coast guard station on Sortland it was announced that the inspection ships "Nornen" and "Sorfold" have conducted continuous surveillance in the zone in question during the entire time there has been fishing there. They have now begun to request the trawlers to leave the zone as soon as possible.
Closed

Until the Ministry of Fisheries makes the decision to close the zone for all fishing, the Norwegian inspection ships have only the authority to make requests. At the directorate in Bergen it was announced that during the weekend they will probably recommend that the zone be closed. According to the information which came in to the coast guard station yesterday afternoon, it looked as though some of the trawlers were requested to leave the area immediately.

It is the Spanish trawlers which are most often taken with the largest amount of young fish in the catch. It is also the Spaniards who show the greatest reluctance to terminate fishing and leave the area, according to the coast guard.

'Mikal Sars'

The ocean research ship "Mikal Sars" is now being sent north to establish closer registration of the fish species in the area. The results of this investigation will form the basis for the decision as to how long the zone will remain closed.

9287
CSO: 3639/140
COAST GUARD CAPTAIN CITES NEED FOR ENLARGING SVALBARD ZONE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Jul 84 p 4

[Article by Oystein Grue]

[Text] "Expand the Svalbard zone from 20 to 40 nautical miles." That was the personal advice that Lieutenant Commander Einar Stensholt of the Coast Guard ship "Nornen" gave to the Fisheries Directorate. "Large quantities of young cod will continue to be caught without our being able to control it," he said.

On Monday night there were 29 foreign trawlers from four nations in the Svalbard zone area. And although the Coast Guard was able to get the vessels out in deeper water by means of diplomatic requests, a Spanish trawler was recently seized with 64 percent of its cod catch below the size limit. This means cod that are less than 42 centimeters. The legal limit is 15 percent of fish that are below size.

In the last 2 weeks 11 Soviet, 10 Spanish, 6 East German and 3 Portuguese trawlers have come to the Svalbard zone area which is an important area for developing North Atlantic codfish. There are no Norwegian trawlers there. They have fixed fishing quotas that regulate the catch season.

Norwegian fishermen are concerned that the foreign trawlers are taking a heavy toll of young cod close to the exempt Svalbard zone which extends 20 nautical miles out from Bjoroya. The Fishing Boatowners' Association of Alesund has asked in a new letter to the Fisheries Ministry and the Foreign Ministry for the adoption of stronger reactions toward boats fishing illegally in the Svalbard zone. The association thinks a committee should be set up to evaluate both new measures such as a closed season on fry and better ways of enforcing the regulations that apply to the zone. The Fisheries Ministry is waiting for a reaction from the Fisheries Directorate.

Lieutenant Commander Einar Stensholt says that most of the trawler fleet in the area has complied with the Coast Guard's request to withdraw to deeper water. "Our theory that this would produce a smaller proportion of undersized fish proved correct. The Spanish trawlers were somewhat
reluctant and claimed they were not equipped for fishing at greater depths. But in the last few days the Spaniards have also moved further away from the zone."

Random control checks made Monday showed a mixture of 19.5 percent undersized cod (42 centimeters is the minimum size) on one Spanish trawler. "That is a radical improvement compared to the grotesque example of 64 percent undersized fish that we encountered a while back," Einar Stensholt told AFTENPOSTEN.

Stensholt is of the opinion that the preserved zone around Bjornoeya should be expanded to twice its present size in order to safeguard the growth of young fish.

"I think all the nations who have fishing boats up here would go along with that," Stensholt said.

6578
CSO: 3639/138
EUROPEAN CONSERVATIVE PARTIES JOIN IN ENVIRONMENT STAND

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 11 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Morten Møller Warmedal]

[Text] "The conservative parties of Europe are on the offensive for international cooperation on environmental protection!" That is how personal adviser Kjell Wickstrand of the Municipal Affairs Ministry summed up the report on environmental protection that a committee of the European Democratic Union (EDU) recently presented in Oslo. Wickstrand was the Norwegian member of the committee. Binding international cooperation, including cooperation with eastern nations, a market economy as a vital framework factor, the exchange of technology and harmonizing legislation are among the most important proposals in the report.

Kjell Wickstrand, who was personal adviser to former Environmental Affairs Minister Wenche Frogn Sellaeg (Conservative), told AFTENPOSTEN that the idea that the Social Democratic parties in Europe have a kind of "monopoly" on the battle against acid rain and pollution is both wrong and misleading.

"In the countries where conservative parties hold government power developments are quite positive, especially in West Germany. Helmut Kohl's government stands foremost among the champions of environmental protection in Europe," asserted Wickstrand, who added that the Conservative Party in this country has nothing to be ashamed of in the context of environmental protection either.

The committee Wickstrand served on began its work a year ago under the chairmanship of Austrian member of parliament Dr Sixtus Lanner.

The statement of principle included in the report, which was approved by the EDU meeting in Oslo, says that the goal of environmental protection efforts should be to prevent pollution, not to repair the damage when it has occurred. The committee felt that environmental protection efforts in the last decade have been largely aimed at repairing the damage that has already occurred. "It is obvious that there are limits to how long one can lime acid fishing waters, for example," said Wickstrand who felt he could detect a far more offensive attitude toward environmental protection in EDU than was the case before.
The report stresses the principle that polluters should pay the cost of environmental protection measures and says that cooperation across national boundaries must be emphasized. The committee underlined the point that directives and regulations should not dominate the work but that economic incentives such as tax reductions and favorable depreciation rules for firms and businesses should be implemented. The report stressed that environmental protection activities should be pursued within the framework of a market economy and that financial capacity, individual responsibility and cooperation should be given a high priority. A competitive shift among various countries should not be the result of efforts against international pollution, the report said.

The exchange of research results, new technology and experiences are among the steps recommended by the committee. Uniform pollution limits, methods of measurement and evaluations of toxic emissions are also quite necessary in the view of the committee. Legislation should be harmonized and the responsibility of citizens for environmental protection should be written into national constitutions, the report said.

Japan was mentioned as a pioneer nation when it comes to environmental protection.