The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

DYING FOR PEACE: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF CASUALTIES IN U.S. PEACE OPERATIONS

BY

COLONEL MICHAEL W. ALVIS
U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE
SSC Fellow
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1998

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
Dying for Peace: Understanding the Role of Casualties in U.S. Peace Operations

by

Colonel Michael W. Alvis, U.S. Army

Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program
U.S. Institute of Peace
1550 M St. NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: (202) 429-3872
Fax: (202) 833-1381
mike_alvis@usip.org

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

The attached research project was prepared under the auspices of the Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program and the U.S. Institute of Peace Press and is submitted to satisfy the writing and publication requirements for the U.S. Army War College Senior Service College Fellowship Program. Upon clearance by the U.S. Army War College Public Affairs Office, it will be submitted to the USIP Press as the first in a three-part series for publication as a major peace works, entitled, "The Limits of U.S. Peace Operations: Lessons of the 1990's."

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

June 1, 1998
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Michael W. Alvis (COL), USA

TITLE: Dying For Peace: Understanding the Role of Casualties in U.S. Peace Operations

FORMAT: United States Institute of Peace Press Major Peace Works

DATE: 1 JUN 1998    PAGES: 31    CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

U.S. peace operations policy in the 1990's is influenced by the issue of casualties more than any other single phenomenon. The debacle in Somalia occurred prior to the formal implementation of a national peace operations doctrine, allowing this event to make a disproportionate impact on policy formulation. Historically, American public opinion has been influenced by the casualty issue, however, traditionally the public sentiment called for an escalation of the conflict to achieve a quicker victory, not withdrawal from the conflict altogether and the acceptance of failure. During peace operations this decade, the reaction has been to withdraw from the conflict or "cut and run", as was the case in Somalia, when American lives are lost on missions underwritten in the name of peace. This zero tolerance for casualties has shaped our formal policies, been reinforced in public opinion and influenced the way that military commanders approach their peace missions, including treating force protection as a primary mission rather than one of many impeded tasks entrusted to commanders. My aim in the paper is to outline and discuss the current role of casualties in peace operations and how this role has evolved during America's peace operations decade.
Introduction
The United States entered the 1990's on a roll, victoriously emerging from the Cold War as the globe's single remaining superpower. Less than fourteen months into the decade, America led the allies to a decisive victory in the Persian Gulf War demonstrating competence and confidence in its new role. Vetoes of multilateral initiatives by permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, commonplace during the Cold War, became rare.¹ Once adversarial Council members, such as China and Russia, responded favorably to US leadership while engaging with America economically. Also, early in the decade, the reputation of the United Nations improved following peacekeeping successes in Namibia, Cambodia and El Salvador. With US leadership and a cooperative Security Council, there appeared no limit to what could be achieved—in the interest of peace—as the world closed out the bloodiest century in its history.

Multilateral peace operations became more feasible, in the absence of bipolar superpower stalemate, but regrettably, the United States did not have sufficient time to develop a peace operations doctrine before it was compelled into action.² Intrastate conflicts—resulting from the fall of communism and other dynamics—quickly overloaded the United Nations, defaulting the problem to the United States. For example, the situation with the Kurdish minority in Northern Iraq evolved immediately as a sequel to the Gulf War. Obligations inherited from the 1980s already tied-up a US combat battalion in the Sinai. It quickly became apparent that the United States was in the peace operations business in the 1990’s—policy or no policy.

Without a firm policy framework to provide guidelines for disciplined planning, US military peace operations increased to an unprecedented level in the first half of the decade. By the end of 1995, six major peace operations had been undertaken, increasing missions 300 percent for the Army and 400 percent for the Air Force.³ During the Cold War, the US had participated in UN peacekeeping efforts by providing small numbers of observers and monitors as part of a larger UN presence,
but never large combat units. In non-UN sponsored peace operations, only one large unit—an infantry battalion—was committed in the Sinai as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), and the relative impact on the large Cold War military was minimal.

Civilian and uniformed defense leaders were willing participants during this period of increased demands for peace operations in the early 1990s. In the absence of a finite peace operations doctrine, there was virtually no basis for saying “no” and being able to substantiate their objections to those outside the Pentagon. With the Cold War military machine still largely intact from the Gulf War, no threatening Warsaw Pact, and Saddam Hussein firmly confined within his own borders, there were few competing priorities to justify foot dragging from the Department of Defense. Sufficient forces were in place to counter threats in such places as Korea and the US could forecast no military peer or near-peer for the next fifteen to twenty years.

There were other reasons that the Department of Defense supported increased involvement in peace operations. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, military leaders had been looking for new opportunities to define the role of the armed forces and adapt to the post-Cold War Era. Ivan Eland from the Cato Institute stated that: “They don’t really like to do peacekeeping, but they know from an organizational point of view they have to do it to prove their relevance.” The need to prove relevance should not have been necessary, given the continuing need to protect America’s global interests, but the concern among the Pentagon leadership was well founded. In the American tradition, a large draw down in personnel and equipment follows major victory, despite prophetic predictions and disastrous results, when new threats emerged, down the road. The Cold War was being hailed as such a major victory and Americans wanted their “peace dividend.”

The arrival of the Clinton Administration and its expanded national security strategy focusing on “engagement and enlargement” broadened the military’s role in non-traditional missions and increased its relevance in areas other than warfighting.
Although Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and the MFO were all initiatives of the Bush Administration, the engagement aspect of the new strategy increased the viability of peace operations as a means to help shape the international security environment. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations allowed the armed forces, in the early stages of conflict, a potential opportunity to influence a situation, preempting an escalation of conflict later. Also, the possibility of preserving some units from the impending force structure cuts was not lost on military leaders, as the same forces that are used to perform peace operations are also used for the primary military mission: fighting and winning wars. Embracing peace operations was initially viewed by defense advocates as both an opportunity to preempt and prevent conflict and a way to preserve war fighting capability and maintain combat readiness. John Hillen of the Council of Foreign Relations believes that peace operations “may be the key to keeping an Army that has a robust end strength and big budget.”

After almost a decade of experiential learning and evolving policy, America is now beginning to come to grips with the limits of peace operations. What was viewed initially by America’s leaders principally as a positive opportunity to shape a better world and maintain relevance in the post-Cold War era, is now being viewed more comprehensively: in terms of its costs and restrictions, in addition to its opportunities. The greatest limitation to date, and the one that has the greatest impact on peace operations policy, has been the intolerance of the American public to sustain casualties for peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. My aim in this paper is to outline and discuss the impact of casualties on the peace operations policy that was developed in the 1990s and will take us into the 21st Century.

Casualties
To date the greatest limitation on military peace operations has been the reluctance and intolerance of the American people to accept combat casualties on missions underwritten in the name of peace. In the public’s psyche, wars, not peace missions,
warrant the risk of human losses due to hostile fire. In both cases, the sensitivity of the American public to casualties is high, however, each elicits completely different responses and yields different pain thresholds. In war—declared and undeclared—the public reaction to high casualties has traditionally been to expedite the intensity of the conflict and “wrap it up” and achieve a quick victory. In peace operations, where the trigger for the pain threshold is much lower, the reaction is instead to terminate U.S. involvement, as was the case in Somalia. Both pain thresholds are further influenced by a general modern expectation that technology and overwhelming force make “real war” less expensive, from a human standpoint. This concept of “cheap warfare,” when translated to a peace operations, yields a tolerance standard that is close to zero. This near-zero tolerance limitation has shaped our formal policies. Moreover, it is reinforced in public opinion and influences the way that military commanders approach their peace missions.

**America and Casualties.** There is a popular perception—at home and abroad—that America has no tolerance for casualties and that when public opinion erodes as a result of high casualties, the US will withdraw from any conflict short of declared war. However, history is replete with examples of cases where high casualties in US wars led to negative public opinion, yet the fighting continued for years. For example, in the Civil War, the Battle of Antietam claimed 23,000 dead in one day yet the war raged on for three more years. Korea and Vietnam, commonly perceived as being wars that public opinion stopped, claimed over 348,000 casualties, including 81,000 deaths spanning three consecutive decades.

A RAND study addresses this paradox with respect to Vietnam and Korea:

A detailed analysis of polls taken during both wars shows that as the conflicts continued and casualties and costs... mounted, public opinion did indeed become disillusioned with America’s involvement, with more and more Americans regretting the original decision to intervene.

There was however, very little movement in the percentage of Americans polled who wished the United States to withdraw from the conflict. In fact, a growing
number of Americans favored escalation of the conflicts to bring them back to a quick - and victorious - end. 7

Escalation to win appears to be the American experience when faced with the dilemma of mounting casualties in the case of wars and most armed regional conflicts. Polls for Korea and Vietnam showed “an inverse relationship between ‘approval’ of the intervention and the public’s desire to escalate to achieve the decisive results.” For Korea, in April 1952, forty-nine percent of people polled wanted to attack the Communist Chinese while only sixteen percent favored bringing the troops home. There was even at one point a 47 percent approval rating to “attack the Communist forces with everything we have.”8 Throughout the war, 77 percent of those polled opted not to withdraw and “those favoring escalation always greatly outnumbered those favoring withdrawal—from a margin of two to one at the beginning of the conflict to almost five to one for the period after July 1951.”9

Vietnam, the RAND report states, was even a more compelling example of public support for escalation as conflicts continue. As in Korea, public support fell as casualties mounted while support for escalation went up, presumably to complete the mission and get the troop home victoriously. From 1965 to 1968, 77 percent of the people polled in the RAND study favored remaining in Vietnam versus 12 percent favoring withdrawal.

By November 1967, those favoring escalation exceeded those fighting at the same level of effort by nearly five to two, and those favoring escalation exceeded those favoring withdrawal by nearly five to one. ‘Approval’ of the war was inversely related to the desire to escalate the conflict.10

The Persian Gulf War provides a contemporary example that is consistent with the aforementioned desire of the public to gain victory and “not quit,” despite the fear of high US casualties. Although initial public support to “drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait” only yielded 37 percent to 52 percent approval ratings in Gallop polls in the six weeks leading up to the Senate vote on Iraq, support rose to 83 percent once the
war started. This support existed despite the fact that 83 percent believed that “high numbers of casualties would result on both sides” and that “Iraq will use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons (82 percent).” More surprisingly, 67 percent of the public wanted to exceed the UN mandate, not stop once the stated objectives were met, “they wanted America to press on until Saddam was removed from power.” Clearly, America wanted a “decisive victory” and the casualty issue was subordinate to this overarching goal.11

Despite occurring in the single superpower era and before the same post-Cold War audience as that of Desert Storm, the same level of success could not be achieved in Somalia — less than three years later. Clearly, Somalia demonstrated that peace operations are not viewed in the same context by the same American public that reacted positively to the use of force in the Gulf. In fact, the reaction to peace operations more resemble another category of military operations where the populace has shown a low tolerance to accept casualties. These are:

... prolonged interventions in complex political situations in failed states characterized by civil conflict, in which US interests and principles are typically much less compelling, or clear, and in which success is often elusive at best. Past examples of this type include interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965) and Lebanon (1982-1984).12

Eric V. Larsen argues that the relative importance of the casualty issue can be linked to the perception of benefits and prospects. There are cases where the benefits may be “as—or more—important than casualties in determining support... “ However, he adds: “There is strong evidence that declining perceived benefits or prospects erode public support. In short, Americans do not want to sacrifice lives for causes they do not consider compelling.”13

A study of Somalia clearly shows that peace operations, despite their noble goals and wide public support, don’t fall into this category where the desired benefits were equal to or more important than casualties. Initially, there was strong support from the people and Congress for providing forces for the safeguarding of humanitarian
supply deliveries, even though the area had little geo-strategic importance to the US and was not compelling in terms of vital interests. However, that support for providing forces was never synonymous with a willingness to incur any casualties, as was the case in traditional military interventions. In fact, Larsen feels that public support was not only contingent upon the pursuit of the initial humanitarian objective, but, in fact, had another component: the mission had to be accomplished with few-to-no casualties.\textsuperscript{14}

In Somalia, the US forces were withdrawn after a failed raid on a clan leader claimed the lives of eighteen American servicemen on October 3, 1993. Following this setback, the US simply gave up the mission rather than bolster security—with additional forces—as was consistent reaction in previous military commitments throughout history. Although the catastrophic results of the Battle of Mogadishu provided the ultimate trigger for this major policy decision, public support had been waning in the months since the reality of casualties had become apparent. In June, twenty-six Pakistani peacekeepers were killed followed by seven US deaths in two incidents during August and September. By the end of September, public support had totally eroded for the mission, prompting Congress to threaten to cutoff funds on the 15\textsuperscript{th} of November, 1993, if the mission continued. In Washington, the long-overdue draft policy on peace operations—a fairly solid document—was nearing approval, but now had to be completely rewritten to address the political fallout of the Somalia debacle.

“No single event has done as much to influence peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era,” states Mark Bowden, who authored a study on the incident. He argues that the Somalia mission continues to haunt American peacekeeping decisions to this day and served to delay American involvement in Haiti, Rwanda and Bosnia.\textsuperscript{15} Bowden argues that: “In the five years since the humanitarian mission dissolved into combat, Somalia has had a profoundly cautionary influence on American foreign policy. He concludes that the lesson to be learned from Somalia is: If the mission is not worth the loss of life, you don’t undertake it.”\textsuperscript{16}
**The Pain Threshold in the 1990's.** The low pain threshold for peace operations evolved from a general low pain threshold for military operations in general, including combat operations. Desert Storm is a classic example of the current American view of war. The allies could have ejected Saddam Hussein from Kuwait early in the conflict and attained a traditional military victory but only at a great cost, for both sides. However, by introducing additional combat units and high-tech force multipliers—over an extended period of time—extra maneuver options became available to the commanders avoiding an “up the guts” linear confrontation and preserving American lives. However, even with this approach, the results of the four-day ground war exceeded the most optimistic predictions and set an unrealistic standard for future military operations. During four days of massive combined arms warfare conducted at lightning speed, less than 150 Americans were lost. Although it was a tragedy for the affected families and friends, Desert Storm was nothing short of a miracle for an operation where some 2,500 casualties was predicted in just one of the front line divisions.\(^{17}\)

The continued infusion of high technology into the military—since Desert Storm—has only served to reinforce the notion of casualty-free military operations. “A disturbing element in recent US military theory is the stubborn belief that computers and laser-guided bombs will some how make war almost bloodless,” reports Earnest Blazar. “...it can lull the public and civilian leaders into thinking the use of military force is risk-free and without consequence.”\(^{18}\) Stephan Blank, a professor at the Army War College, feels that those that hold this perception do “not understand modern war.” He dismisses the concept that war can be “sanitized” by the use of “surgical strikes” a myth.\(^{19}\)

Any of us who have had surgery knows there is not such things as a ‘surgical strike.’ It is called an invasive procedure for a reason. You just don’t get up and walk out of the hospital when it’s over.\(^{20}\)
**The Peace Operations Standard.** Unfortunately, this perception of “cheap war” persists, which has also translated to an even stricter definition for peace operations, as well. The so-called “Desert Storm standard,” when translated to peace operations, has produced a tolerance for American casualties that is very close to zero. Some people have referred to this as the “curse of Desert Storm” for the way it has hamstrung governmental leaders in employment of the military during peacetime. Additionally, the fact that the word “peace” appears in the term peace operations provides a significant psychological barrier to the notion of accepting risk from hostile fire. The standard has imposed limitations on all aspects of peace operations from the initial policy debate to the type of peace operation, its duration, and the way military commanders approach the actual conduct of the mission.

During the aftermath of the Somalia operation, the America took a step back on full spectrum multilateral peace enforcement operations. By the US government’s own definition—articulated by the Department of Defense—peace enforcement covers “the application of military force to compel compliance with resolutions and sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.” In addition, the UN Charter, while it doesn’t specifically address peace enforcement operations, does allow the use of force to “maintain or restore international peace and security” in its Chapter VII. However, in the wake of Somalia American support for restoring peace by fighting a way into a conflict remains highly unlikely as an instrument of US foreign policy. As a result of the low casualty tolerance brought to the fore in Somalia, subsequent multilateral peace operations have focused on traditional peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations where consent of the parties is a precondition.

The US participation as part of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, in December of 1995, is a good example of the self-imposed narrowing of the scope of multilateral peace enforcement operations. Despite a genocide and the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II, the U.S. was unwilling to get involved on the ground until all parties to the conflict formally agreed to stop fighting.
Only after peace was codified in the form of the Dayton Peace Accords, would the U.S. allow its military to enter, as part of a multilateral effort to enforce the accords and maintain the peace. Given the US policy that emerged after Somalia, interjecting ourselves into the ground fighting in Bosnia during the fighting—although consistent with our own definition of peace enforcement and legal if invoked by the Security Council under Chapter VII—was never a realistic option considered by the United States. Those imploring an American response during the heaviest fighting in Bosnia failed to recognize the new casualty limitation and its affect on the American policy. This policy, although not formally prohibiting mid to high intensity peace enforcement operations, is limited by the influence of “cheap victory” in Desert Storm and the peace operations standard that evolved from it that tested against the public in Somalia.

The limitation that the fear of casualties has placed on the use of the military have some in Congress troubled. Rep. Donald Payne (D) of New Jersey stated that “This whole question about the reluctance [to put] the United States military at any place that is dangerous has to really be rethought ...” He feels that such a philosophy weakens the ability of the US to act independently and effectively and believes that “we have to get a redefinition of what a military force is and the realities of a military force. No one wants to hear about casualties.”\textsuperscript{24} Then-senator Sam Nunn made the same observation when Congress was debating Bosnia:

I don’t want to see us evolve to a point where we have expectations in this country of a war where nobody gets killed on either side, and where we don’t have any collateral damage on the other side.\textsuperscript{25}

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed. GEN John Shalikashvili responded, “I think maybe that issue is an outgrowth of Desert Storm, followed by our experience in Somalia, and I am very concerned about that.”\textsuperscript{26}

This reluctance appears to manifest itself most with respect to cases where troops have the potential to be committed on the ground. Other aspects of the application of US military power in support of peace operations have enjoyed greater
freedom from public scrutiny, particularly when the total numbers of Americans at risk are small. For example, NATO airstrikes in Bosnia prior to Dayton proved very effective in enforcing UN resolutions under UNPROFOR and was one of many significant factors in bringing the Serbs to the bargaining table at Dayton. However, when US Air Force pilot Captain Scott O’Grady was shot down on June 2, 1994, the resulting press coverage brought the support for the UN Operation in Bosnia to an all-time low.

When NATO considered action to persuade Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to ease up on his crackdown on the rebels in Kosovo, it decided to launch Operation Deliberate Falcon, a show of force consisting of 89 aircraft, as a first step. “Was this the best way to send a message?” Earnest Blazar asked. “Perhaps, but it sure was the best way to employ US forces without ruffling the feathers of the people at home.” Brigadier General Charles F. Wald, head of the Air Forces long-range strategy office explains:

The only alternative is to go and put 13,000 troops on the ground. You don’t hear the American public arguing over Albania.... They aren’t [protesting] in front of the White House saying we can’t have that. You put 13,000 troops on the ground, and I guarantee you the president is going to hear about that.

The public—and some political leaders—tend to object to casualties among U.S. forces employed in non-ground missions only when they occur, rather than during the planning, as is typical in the case of the commitment of large ground formations. This phenomenon seems logical, as ground forces are subject to a wide variety of “around-the-clock” dangers such as terrorism, mines and counter-attack that are not applicable to offshore vessels or distant airbases that are sometimes used for peace operations. The danger for non-ground forces is perceived as being smaller and more sophisticated, due to its high-tech nature, and apparently more acceptable, to the public—until something happens.
If ground troops are involved, the casualty limitation has been observed to influence even the most benign missions. For example, the US contingent that is part of the 750-person UN force in Macedonia came under criticism in the media during April, 1998 as the violence in Kosovo highlighted peacekeeping operations in the region. Although the official mission of the 350-person force was only to monitor and report, rather than stop the fighting should it erupt, the Washington Post reported that the US took extraordinary precautions to ensure that US troops are kept “farther from harm’s way than troops of other nations.” 30 Specifically, the Post reported that American troops were under strict instructions not to venture within 300 yards of the border and monitored two thirds less of the border area than that patrolled by the Nordic Battalion, whose sector included volatile Kosovo. The Scandinavian soldiers, it was reported, greatly resented these restrictions and accused the Americans of not being able to observe key territory in their sector. A foreign official stated that the US approach was for “... domestic consumption” and that: “They do not want to risk having to explain to Congress why any American became a casualty in Macedonia.”31

Although the US public may be reluctant to put US peacekeepers in Macedonia and elsewhere at risk for fear of casualties, there appears to be a different public tolerance to non-combat deaths and injuries during peace operations, although they often receive equal coverage in the media. Task Force Eagle, the initial US ground force into Bosnia following Dayton, experienced higher than average accident rates in all safety categories, including double the average number of aviation accidents and personnel injuries.32 Even small personnel losses from mines were accepted by the public as tolerable, when it was determined (and portrayed in the press) that the mines were placed during the Bosnian civil war and were not directed with hostile intent toward the US peace enforcers in the post-Dayton Era. After two and one-half years in Bosnia, there appears to be a universal recognition and acceptance that peace operations are more dangerous than other peacetime activities but less dangerous than war, where casualties routinely result from hostile fire.33
Policy Implications. The low tolerance for casualties brought to the fore by Somalia resulted in the clearly defined policy for peace operations doctrine that America badly needed but had failed to develop in the early 1990s. Presidential Decision Directive 25, “The Clinton Administrations Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations” was finally released in May 1994, just six months after the Battle of Mogadishu. It called for U.S. peace operations to be more “selective and effective” and recognized peace operations as just one tool, in the foreign policy suite of potential options to prevent and resolve conflict. PDD-25 listed numerous factors that must be considered before the US would participate in multilateral peace operations, including a cease-fire and the consent of the parties involved in cases where traditional peacekeeping (Chapter VI) operations were being considered.\(^34\)

Although PDD-25 provided drastically needed discipline on the decision to commit to new peacekeeping operations, it has come under much criticism due to the influence of the Somalia experience and the casualty limitation. Adam Roberts writes that:

PDD-25 is vulnerable to many criticisms. In particular, the characteristic and understandable US anxiety to work out in advance an end point to an operation, coupled with the equally understandable US worry about casualties can actually encourage local leaders to be obstinate, knowing that they can outlast an embattled peacekeeping force.\(^35\)

There are also some other policy implications evolving from the low casualty record of recent peace operations, and the perceptions they reinforce. In December of 1997, The Washington Times reported that the “zero tolerance” for casualties makes it easier for an administration to send troops abroad. If the Pentagon can nearly guarantee zero casualties, opposition to a deployment narrows.”\(^36\) However, such an expectation puts tremendous pressure on the military leaders on the ground to focus on force protection instead of the primary mission and begs a difficult question: If some casualties are incurred, as a cost of doing business, will this undermine an otherwise sound policy? The zero tolerance limitation has also been turned around to support
extensions of ongoing peace operations. For example, in the case of Bosnia, former
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and retired general George Joulwan
both cited no combat casualties as a justification for continued operations in Bosnia
past the summer of 1998.

This technique of predicting unrealistically low casualties to help support
operations that are inherently dangerous has been a cause of concern for Executive
Branch leaders and Congress. In his remarks to the National Defense University
class on January 29, 1998, President Clinton reminded military leaders (and the
American people) that: “It is not easy to wear the uniform and it is never a completely
safe proposition.” He went on to add:

We must be strong and tough and mature as a nation—strong and tough and
mature enough to recognize that even the best-prepared, best-equipped force
will suffer losses in action ... Every casualty is a tragedy all its own for a parent
or a child or a friend. But when the cause is just and the purpose clear, our
military men and women are prepared to take that risk...The American people
have to be, as well.

Force Protection

The near-zero tolerance for combat casualties has raised the premium on force
protection disproportionately. What was traditionally just one of many important
tasks for a military commander has now evolved into the top priority to many as a
direct result of the new peace operations standard. This new primacy of force
protection is often at the expense of the mission. Although civilian leaders—including
the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense—have
been careful to keep force protection in its proper perspective as “an integral part of
mission accomplishment,” rather than the mission itself, that feeling is not accepted
universally down the chain.

If Somalia is the watershed on casualty tolerance for peace operations, then
Khobar Towers provided the watershed event for force protection. On June 25, 1996,
a terrorist truck bomb explosion at the US forces housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi
Arabia claimed the lives of 19 airmen in support of the Operation Southern Watch. Fortunately, the public viewed this operation—which occurred in a active combat zone—in the context of US-Iraq confrontation, rather than a peace operation, or even a traditional peacetime operation. Had they done so, it would have jeopardized the entire US operation in the Persian Gulf. The application to peace operations is that, like Somalia, it brought the issue of casualties to center stage and, in this case, raised the standard of personal accountability to an unprecedented level that impacts US peace operations.

Following the terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia, an exhaustive investigation was undertaken resulting in a report to the President outlining massive institutional changes in the Department of Defense, including appointing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the DOD-wide focal point for all force protection activities. Additionally, in July, 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced he was removing the responsible commander, Brigadier General Terryl Schwailer from the two-star promotion list despite the fact that he “ably discharged his primary mission of enforcing the no-fly zone in Southern Iraq ...,” further citing that “we expect a high standard of performance of our commanders in the field who are entrusted with the safety of our troops.” He added that “field commanders ... are accountable for all that their units do or fail to do.”

Although the Secretary made it clear in his statement that enforcing the no-fly zone was the primary mission of Operation Southern Watch, the personal accountability issue for force protection reverberated down through the services. He stated that: “All in the chain of command need to draw from this experience those lessons, however painful, which may help others who follow, and who will be at similar risk.” Regrettably, many careerist commanders began treating this as their primary mission. An example of how some have interpreted these developments can be found in this innocent and well intentioned US Air Force announcement entitled, “Force Protection Is Job One For US Forces In Saudi Arabia.” The criticism that
avoiding casualties has become the primary purpose of the military rather than accomplishing the mission at hand is well documented in peace operations all over the globe, including Bosnia.

A review of the Department of Defense’s definition of force protection reveals some ambitious tasks and challenges, however, all are defensive in nature. Implementation of this program, sure to preserve lives, will not in itself accomplish the mission. The DOD dictionary defines force protection as a security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.\(^{42}\)

In combat, a commander cannot substitute force protection—or any other important task—in place of mission accomplishment without jeopardizing the successful accomplishment of the campaign or battle. If he is too conservative and lacks the aggressiveness to pursue the objective, then this will be apparent in the outcome where he must balance force protection and operational freedom. Force protection, and other important priorities compete with each other and are balanced delicately to achieve overall mission success. In peace operations, since success revolves around so many other factors—economic, governmental, diplomatic, humanitarian—the military can rarely carry the entire operation to a successful conclusion, on its own. But, given the American intolerance to casualties, the military component can certainty cause it to fail in the court of public opinion. Therefore, the temptation exists today for military commanders to decide to play “not to lose,” rather than “to win.” The Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR I) Conference Report published by the US Army Peacekeeping Institute concluded that:

In OJE (Operation Joint Endeavor) the force protection effort rose to the level of actually being part of the stated mission and above the level of the other three battlefield combat dynamics (firepower, leadership, maneuver)...Additionally, the perception among the participants was that force protection measures in OJE...
were not based on a valid risk assessment, often stifled the operational commander’s flexibility, and clearly fostered the overall perception of a “zero defects” mentality/environment.\textsuperscript{43}

Many political and military leaders now feel that risk management, integral to all military operations, does not include taking risk with the lives of America’s sons and daughters in the name of peace. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili expressed his concern to Congress.

Not only are we setting a standard by which this country will judge us but ... that might begin to have an impact on our young [commanders who] have the sense that if they go into an operation, and despite their best efforts, suffer casualties, that someone’s going to be looking over their shoulders. How tragic it would be if we did that because we would grow a group of leaders who, through their hesitancy, would begin to endanger people.\textsuperscript{44}

For example, today’s military commanders in Bosnia are often being criticized by civilian relief agencies and think tanks for not doing more to enforce the non-military tasks of the Dayton Peace Accords in Annexes 1B through 11. The BHAAR I reported that:

Many participants that US force protection measures seemed to be politically motivated and clearly not based on a realistic threat assessment...Force protection requirements severely limited CSS (combat service support) availability to support non-military functions.

More importantly, the US levels of force protection were significantly different from other nations. These inconsistencies lead to two specific areas of concern. First, stringent US force protection measures directly hampered civil-military cooperation and the ability for US soldiers to move away from the peace enforcement mission only mindset. Second...many non-US members were concerned the this inconsistency was sending mixed signals to the warring factions.\textsuperscript{45}

This move to political motivated accountability, stemming from the fear of casualties has raised the premium on force protection. Military leaders can not be faulted for their reluctance to limit their involvement to their formal tasks, given the peace operations standard and the stakes involved. Casualties in peace operations have
national political and policy consequences that military leaders feel they are not empowered to risk. The key leader and organizational energy that many people feel the military should expend on other tasks outlined in the Dayton Peace Accords is being expended, first, on Annex 1A, “Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement” and then force protection. Annex 1A states what the military is formally expected to accomplish, and taking on other non-specified tasks are interpreted, by many, at putting a top priority at risk—force protection.

The caution in Bosnia is not without precedent in the post-Cold War peace operations world. The aforementioned Macedonia experience occurred prior to Bosnia, chronologically. When Major General W.H. Yates, deployed an infantry battalion from The Berlin Brigade to perform the first US peacekeeping mission in the Former Yugolsav Republic of Macedonia, he noted:

My initial concern for the task force deploying to Operation ABLE SENTRY was force protection. Some UN military commanders don’t understand our preoccupation with this issue because they are not faced with the same threat as US forces. They don’t understand that because we are the American Army, we are an isolated target of opportunity.

To mitigate some of this danger, US commanders and diplomats have been forced to take a harder line in the types of missions the US is willing to accept during particular peace operations. Traditionally it was often assumed that the military would provide a wide-range of functions commensurate with its overall capabilities, particularly during times of peace where competing priorities were minimal or nonexistent. These expectations were particularly high in areas where the environment is austere, like Somalia, or where the infrastructure has been destroyed, as in the case of Bosnia. However, given the renewed emphasis on force protection and the development of a more defined doctrine in PDD-25, the military is shying away from additional tasks that are not specifically mandated by the national command authority.
A specific area that has come under criticism in Bosnia is the issue of the apprehension of indicted war criminals, particularly Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic, the Serb political and military leaders during the war. While most agree that this is one of most significant tasks still to be completed in Bosnia, there appears to be little US military support for an operation to secure their arrest. Although conventional combat and special operations forces are more than capable of such a task, some casualties would be enivitable, military planners believe. Since the apprehension of war criminals is not a formal task outlined in annex 1A of the Dayton Peace Accords (the military annex), the military is not formally compelled to perform such a mission. In the absence of such direct guidance, the focus shifts to force protection, which, in the case of Bosnia was a formal task in the military plans.

Many argue that the main reluctance to apprehending war criminals is the unwillingness to accept casualties either in the apprehension themselves or potential retaliation by their parent groups, after the fact. In Somalia, the conflict between UN forces and the Habre Gedir clan and its leader, Mohammed Farah Aidid, underscores the dangers of going after specific groups or individuals. Over time, the original security mission there escalated into a war between the clan and the US peacekeepers. In Bosnia, a more aggressive campaign toward apprehending war criminals by the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) was viewed by some as an unnecessary risk to peacekeepers, a carry-over from the experience in Somalia. Many military leaders resent the notion that the problems encountered in recruiting, training and standing-up of an International Police Force should automatically default this problem to the military component of the operation—IFOR.

By the summer of 1998, the issue came to a head and The New York Times reported that decisions had been made to abandon plans for a secret military operation to apprehend these individuals, citing concerns over the military over casualties. After an estimated expenditure of $100 million on intelligence gathering and the deployment of special operations forces to Europe, “White House officials—including
President Clinton—could not convince the military that arresting the indicted men was a risk worth taking, present and former administration officials said.\textsuperscript{49} Ambassador Peter Galbraith, the former US ambassador to Croatia, a strong supporter of apprehension stated that “They’ve [the military] been cautious. One wants one’s military to cautious and careful, but still operational.”\textsuperscript{50}

\textit{Force protection is a task not a mission statement.} Despite the potential danger to American personnel and the increased emphasis on accountability, it is essential that the task of force protection not escalate in importance to eclipse the mission in importance. Commanders are particularly vulnerable to this when public opinion and the Congress have not fully demonstrated their support for an operation, as was the case during the initial stages of the Bosnia operation. In Europe, where the Bosnia force originated, some commanders allowed force protection to take on a disproportionate importance, jeopardizing other troop leading procedures of equal or greater importance. Commanders and units that are overly concerned with force protection not only jeopardize the mission but could be placing the force at greater risk—down the road. All military operations involve risks and peace operations are not exempt from the dangers of military life. While “a top priority” as stated by the Commander-in-Chief and the two ranking civilian leaders in the Pentagon, it’s not “the priority.” That can only be reserved for the mission at hand.

The low tolerance for casualties in a perceived era of “cheap war,” coupled with the tragic circumstances in Somalia have created the major limitation of American military peace operations as we enter the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century. It has shaped a more restrictive policy on multilateral peace operations in PDD-25, molded public opinion and influenced the way that military commanders execute their peace missions. The long-term impact on peace operations will be major, leading to increased reluctance to enter into peace operations at the national level. This concern caused the BHAAR I Conference to conclude that:

This issue has the potential to have significant implications in our ability to project national power. There is a clear international, and even US, perception
that our overwhelming concern over force protection greatly reduces our willingness to use our military as an effective tool in peace operations.\textsuperscript{51}

In execution, the potential effectiveness of the limited peace operations that are undertaken will be hampered even more, as many military commanders confine themselves only to their formal obligations, choosing to play it safe. Implied tasks, not formally directed to the military, will be looked upon warily by commanders as "mission creep," of the nature that escalated Somalia from a humanitarian mission to armed conflict with a tribal leader. This reluctance will be rewarded by conserving critical assets for force protection where accountability will remain high, as emphasized by the Secretary of Defense at the Khobar Towers press conference and the President in his state of the Union Address, where he stated emphatically "We must also demand greater accountability."\textsuperscript{52}

2 Peace operations is a broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Peacekeeping operations are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Peace enforcement involves the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary, Revised through April 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1994), 401-402. (hereafter, Joint Pub 1-02).

3 These six major operations were Operation Provide Comfort in relief of the Kurds in Northern Iraq; Operation Restore Hope in Somalia; Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti; Operation Able Sentry in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Operation Joint Endeavor Bosnia, (later Operation Joint Guard) and the MFO mission in the Sinai, a product of the Camp David Agreement. The MFO mission is the only mission that carried over from the 1980s.

4 Steven Komarow, "For Military, Bosnia has Become a Blessing." USA Today, December 22, 1997.


6 Steven Komarow, "For Military, Bosnia Has Become a Blessing." USA Today, 22 December 1997.


8 This is significant, given that the fact the U.S. possessed an impressive arsenal of atomic weapons at this time.

9 Ibid., 12-13.

10 Ibid., 14.

11 Ibid., 17-20.


13 Ibid., 50-51.

14 Ibid., 245.


17 The 24th Infantry Division, the unit that conducted the famous left hook and attacked the Republican Guard, anticipated up to 2,500 casualties in their tactical planning prior to the attack. This was based on the chemical threat and forecasted losses due to conventional means.


19 Ibid., A9

20 Ibid., A9.
21 Joint Pub 1-02, 401.

22 Chapter VII, Article 42 of the United Nations charter states, "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations." United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations* (San Francisco, CA: United Nations, 1945).

20 "Low end" peace enforcement operations, such as in Bosnia are not limited, per se, by formal U.S. policy articulated in Presidential Decision Directive 25. Although peace enforcement operations, by definition and policy, do not require consent of the warring factions, it was considered a critical component of the U.S. position, in practice, following the experience in Somalia. It is highly unlikely, given the emphasis on preventing casualties, that the U.S. will ever fight its way into a situation to enforce a peace. In application, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are virtually the same.


26 Ibid., A1.

27 Another major factor attributed to bringing the Serbs to the table in late 1995 is the Croatian successful counter-offensive in the Krajina earlier that year.


29 Ibid., A9.


31 Ibid., p. 24.

32 This was later attributable to unfamiliar terrain, poor weather and higher operational tempo (OPTEMPO). Department of Defense, 1st Armored Division Safety Office, "Task Force Eagle Safety Update," typescript, August 31, 1996. Safety categories tracked were: aviation, wheeled vehicle accidents, tracked vehicle accidents and personnel injuries.

33 The U.S. military incurs over 200 fatalities in training accidents and other routine peacetime operations, including peace operations, in the course of any given year, on average.


37 Bosnia, for example, is classified as a hostile fire zone. Military personnel serving there are given allowances, tax breaks and awards commensurate with the expectation of coming under hostile fire.


42 Joint Pub 1-02, 218.


45 BHAAR. 23-24.

46 Department of State. The Dayton Peace Accords (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1996).


49 Ibid. 1.

50 Ibid. 1.

51 BHAAR. 24.