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USSR REPORT

WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No 8, August 1984

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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ENGLISH SUMMARY OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 8, 1984 (signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 158-159

[Text] CEMA Member-Countries Held an Economic Summit.

STATEMENT on the Guidelines for Further Development and Deepening Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Between CEMA Member-Countries.


Two dates—the coming tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Summit meeting on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the fortieth anniversary of the victory over fascist Germany are additional proof that the peace which was won in the bloody war must be saved and strengthened, that a barrier should be erected to the policy of deliberately placing a fuse of nuclear and chemical war in the European continent notes A. Vtorov in the article "From Helsinki to Stockholm". The article considers the importance of the mutually acceptable agreements reached in Helsinki in 1975 as a factor of peace and cooperation. The Helsinki Final Act is not only a code of laws, but also a program of cooperation between the states on a broad spectrum of issues. The article stresses the role and importance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in applying in interstate practices the norms and principles agreed upon in Helsinki. From such an angle the Act has demonstrated its viability. All ten principles of the Act have been recorded in the Constitution of the Soviet Union. It is emphasized in the article that the policy of the Soviet Union and its allies is particularly constructive against the background of the negative U.S. and NATO activities, that the norms and principles as laid down in the Act will be ever extensively inculcated in practice despite all obstacles. The article focuses attention on the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe which opens up broad opportunities for demonstration of a goodwill by states in the interests of strengthening European and world peace. The relevant Conference can be a success if all its participants approach the subject matter unbiasedly. The article describes the negative U.S. stand on the issues discussed at the Conference and Washington's attempts to draw the participating countries into a discussion of a purely military and technical measures. The USA is continuing to block mutually acceptable understanding.
True to the mandate of the Stockholm Conference, the USSR and its allies stress the necessity to observe the equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, and equal respect for the security interests of all participating states. The socialist countries propose the adoption of a wide range of measures that would really reduce the danger of a military confrontation and bring about positive changes in the international climate, both in Europe and the rest of the world.

S. Medvedkov in the paper "Transnational Corporations and Sharpening of Capitalist Contradictions" portrays the multinational firms, being national by capital and international by the field of its investment. Transnational corporations have become an important element of the world capitalist economy. Their growth inevitably brings about the complex of problems, conflicts and discrepancies within the national framework as well as within the whole capitalist system. Transnational business in the efforts to adjust to the new economic environment on international level mobilizes all its financial, technological and industrial power, close connections with the bourgeois state in order to provide for its further international expansion. The actions of transnationals are the source and the results of the aggravation of capitalist contradictions. On the firm basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology the author analyzes the main contradiction of capitalism namely between the social character of production and the private form of ownership of productive forces, in the light of the contemporary internationalization process and presents his theoretical interpretation of the emergence and evolution of transnational business. Numerous facts and data illustrate his study, specifying the characteristic features of transnational corporations. The assessment of transnationals' impacts on the relations between the leading capitalist countries and the developing world supports the conclusion that it were the giants of multinational business that have accounted for the sharpening of the world capitalist economy contradictions. The controversy, imminent to the growth of transnational corporations exerts an adverse influence upon the various layers of the capitalist society and can be eliminated only by decisive breaking of the existing system of production relations.

G. Vorontsov in the article "Nuclear Free Zones--the Road to Peace and Disarmament" poses the question of the importance of creating such zones in different regions of the world to strengthen the security of the states of the relevant regions and international security as a whole. All this would inevitably help the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, their abandonment and reduction of the level of nuclear confrontation. Interlinked with the measures on nuclear disarmament, nuclear free zones could effectively contribute to curbing the arms race and in the final rule help to maintain peace, civilization and life itself on the planet. The author turns to the history of the subject, to corresponding international agreements, banning the delivery of nuclear weapons to the given regions. The article shows the principled Soviet position concerning nuclear free zones, which has repeatedly been laid down in different Party and State documents. It also touches upon the need to precisely define the obligations the nuclear states must undertake in relation to the state forming such zones. In close connection with the nuclear free zones real, practical steps must be taken to freeze, limit and curb nuclear armaments. Should such a policy be carried out, the author says, it would be of key significance for peace and international security. The USSR and other socialist countries being against
rivalry in the buildup of nuclear arsenals and in favor of prohibition of all types of such weapons, have long since tabled relevant proposals aimed at it. The article exposes the negative approach of the Western countries to the issue of nuclear free zones.

As the importance of Japan in the world economy grows, the Japanese circles determining the country's political course seek to bring its political role in world relations into line with the potential of great economic power. V. Dal'nev in the article "Dangerous Deviation" discusses the ways the Japanese Government is moving to the goal it has set, what trends, forms and methods are being chosen by Japanese diplomacy to pursue its aims. The viciousness of the ruling circles' course lies in their deliberate efforts to take Japan's foreign policy cue from Washington and counterpose themselves to the world community. Japan strengthens its military and political cooperation with Washington, expands the sphere of influence of the "security treaty" to an increasing number of countries of the Pacific Ocean region. All this is accompanied by the raising of militaristic trends in the country itself. The article puts under close examination Tokyo's relations with the Chinese People's Republic and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Japan's foreign policy demonstrates the country's readiness to contribute to bellicose militarism on the global and strategic scale. Active support of the U.S. imperial ambitions on the world arena, of its adventurous course regarding other countries, primarily socialist ones couldn't but tell on the relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. Tokyo's approach to the noted relations is of an openly destructive nature. The article singles out the unfaltering and consistent course of the Soviet Union which meets not only the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries but also the interests of peace and security in the Far East.

The article "On the Question of the Entity of the Modern Global Economy" by Yu. Shishkov is designed to shed light upon the Marxist concept of the internationalization in the field of economic life. The problems of global economy, trends and probable future developments in the sphere of international economic ties deserve the profound examination from both theoretical and practical points of view. The investigation of the politico-economic nature of the notion "global economy", the analysis of the character of the inter-system relations, namely between the world capitalist and the world socialist economies, have significant impacts upon the elaboration of the scientifically substantiated strategy of the East-West relationship. The author speculates upon the methodological pathways and pitfalls in the search of correct answers to a series of the most complicated theoretical questions, discussing the various approaches that exist in socialist economic literature. The author emphatically points out the fact that the very existence of the two heterogeneous world social systems doesn't necessarily deny the being of the global economic entity. On the other hand the global economy cannot be reduced to simple exchange of goods in the international trade. The development of the general approach to the study of the modern internationalization process proves to be an urgent task for Soviet scholars, Soviet economic science has accumulated sufficient experience in the examination of world economy problems. Armed with Marxist-Leninist theory, Soviet Economic science is ready for ideological disputes with the bourgeois counterparts.


CSO: 1812/5-E
USSR POSITION ON CSCE, STOCKHOLM MEETING REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 84 (signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 22-32

[A. Vtorov article: "From Helsinki to Stockholm"]

[Text]

There are dates imbued with such meaning that long before the significant day arrives one begins to feel its effect. The span of a decade is now used increasingly frequently in matters of all-European cooperation: 1 August 1985 will be the 10th anniversary of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The reflection of the forthcoming 40th anniversary of the historic victory over fascist Germany is cast on this event. This is a coincidence, of course, but, if one thinks, history has not concerned itself in vain to follow the anniversary of the Great Victory with the jubilee date of the Helsinki conference. These two dates seem to say: The peace which was won in such a difficult and bloody war must be preserved and strengthened by the joint efforts of the states participating in the conference.

The people's desire for peace has assumed the form in Europe of the concrete obligations assumed by the states which participated in the all-European conference and contained in a prominent document of our time--its Final Act. For Europeans, at least for the overwhelming majority of them, it is not simply 30,000 words or a speculative construction, perhaps, skillfully put together by diplomats but dissociated from life, rather it is the compressed experience of the peoples and the conclusions drawn from their long-suffering past.

An international document gains or loses importance according to the degree to which it serves the requirements of the people and the time. The final document of the all-European conference reflects the aspirations which powerfully motivate international life in our era and which comprise its historical essence--averting the threat of nuclear destruction and ensuring a change in favor of cooperation between states with different social systems. And the Final Act has retained all its relevance 9 years after it was signed.

Of course, the process of all-European cooperation, like any major social phenomenon, has not developed in a straight line. It has known not only achievements and success. The restructuring of international relations begun
in Helsinki is a great and complex process, and the strength of opposition from forces gambling on tension and exploiting people's fear of war is considerable. It is sufficient to compare the international situation in which the Helsinki conference was prepared and held with the present state of affairs for the difference to become obvious: a great deal in the world has acquired a troubling appearance since that time. This could not help but affect European affairs. The path trodden since Helsinki has at times followed a zigzag course and has sometimes even turned back on itself. But one can say definitively; the positive outweighs the negative. The significance of the Helsinki agreements as a factor of peace and cooperation has not diminished, but increased still further. It is enough to ask oneself the question: What would the situation be if the given factor did not exist?

How wretched are the attempts of the current Western interpretation of the Final Act, according to which it is reduced to so-called "humanitarian problems" alone, these being distorted out of all recognition! They treat a document which represents a precisely adjusted balance of interests of 35 states as if it were a private book from which they indiscriminately interpret one and the same page. Surely this is an example of impudence and simple elementary ignorance!

That is why we must remind ourselves over and over again what the Helsinki agreements represent.

They are primarily the international-legal consolidation of the territorial-political results of World War II in Europe. The European states, the United States, and Canada definitely stated that they consider each other's borders inviolable, and the borders of all states on the continent equally so. They committed themselves to "refrain also in the future from any encroachments on these borders" and from any demands for actions aimed at seizing or usurpation of part of or the whole territory of any participant state.

The fact is that during the last decade territorial problems have virtually been removed from the agenda of European political life. For the first time in the history of the continent, a history that is full of disputes between states over practically every square kilometer of land and annihilating wars for the sake of redrawing the political map, not one European states—we emphasize "state" since the question is not one of revanchist groups, which have not only not disappeared, but have become even more active recently—has advanced territorial claims. Even a few decades ago such a thing would have been incredible. Now this is a most important result of fulfilling the principal provisions of the Final Act.

Deciding not to openly oppose the sacred principle of the inviolability of borders, its opponents resort to camouflage. The results of the session of the NATO council held in May 1984 in Washington testify to the fact that the United States and several other countries within the bloc are not against dredging up the question of the so-called "splitting of Europe" and keeping it afloat, or, to put it more simply, feeding the revanchist sentiments which are once again beginning to spread in the FRG. NATO does not stop to consider, of course, whether the structures of European security will hold out if the burden of
territorial claims is added to their already heavy load of the newly-developed American first-strike missiles. But a powerful barrier stands in the path of territorial claims: Since the Helsinki conference the European peoples regard feeble impulses to violate the existing borders in Europe as a violation of their rights and an undermining of the coordinated foundations of stability and security on our continent. No one can ignore the fact that the new geographical and political realities in Europe are consolidated in an international-legal order.

Another most important feature of the Final Act is topical--definition of the principles of relations between the participant states and, if one is to uncover another political stratum, as they say--establishment of peaceful coexistence as the only possible basis of mutual relations between countries with different social systems.

As V.I. Lenin noted, assuming power, Marxist-Leninist parties "create totally different international relations."* The Soviet state proposed peaceful coexistence to the states with capitalist systems the moment it appeared in the world. But it took long decades before the bourgeoisie learned to articulate these words--"peaceful coexistence"--and then a considerable amount of time was needed in order to record the principles on which it is based in an international document--the Final Act. Naturally, no one expected that this would be synonymous with automatic recognition of the new situation in international life by those who, by the very nature of the capitalist system, have been schooled to accept other norms. They will obviously have to undergo a certain period of learning the art of equal cooperation. But this in no way detracts from the significance of the fundamental textbook. Writing it with 35 pens and formulating 10 principles of mutual relations between states was no simple matter. Approximately 10 years have passed and life has proved that these principles have not lost their relevance. What is more, the states which signed the Final Act deemed it particularly necessary at the Madrid meeting in September 1983 to emphasize the significance of the principles contained within it. This is yet further confirmation of the fact that they have no alternative. In actual fact, the West has nothing to offer in place of peaceful coexistence apart from the odious and bankrupt ideas of confrontation and "the eradication of socialism." One can confidently say: The principles of mutual relations between states, as they are expounded in the Final Act, will be increasingly broadly introduced into practice.

The Final Act is not simply a code of laws. It is also a program of cooperation between states across a broad spectrum--from the economy, science, and technology to exchanges in the sphere of culture and information and contacts between people. And from this point of view it has proved its vital force. It is enough to recall the numerous agreements which concretize the Helsinki agreements on a bilateral and multilateral basis, the programs for trade-economic, industrial, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation calculated for long periods, production cooperation between the countries of the East and the West on our continent, the European congresses and symposiums, and many other examples of creating the material fabric of international cooperation in Europe.

Of course, there are also instances of a different kind—attempts to apply restrictions to trade with the USSR and other socialist states, to erect artificial barriers in the way of scientific cooperation, and to resort to economic "sanctions" and even to economic blockade. It would be unrealistic to think that the complication of the situation in Europe and the world in the military and political spheres will bypass the business sphere. But the extensive development of economic, scientific-technical and other relations during the last 10 years covers the losses inflicted on them by opponents of the Final Act. It is also characteristic that the clauses of this document have been successfully used to show the groundlessness of the United States' and NATO's subversive actions.

One feature of the Final Act—the complex approach to fulfilling tasks which the countries of the continent are set by life itself—testifies to the breadth of scope of the problems of Europe's present and future. In connection with the fact that problems of cooperation included in the "third basket" have become so acute (it is probably more true to say that they have been made acute by certain ill-intentioned circles in the West), it is worth emphasizing once again that the Final Act was not and cannot be conceived of as an instrument of "psychological war." On the contrary, it emphasizes that cooperation between states in the humanitarian and other spheres must be attended by "full observance of the principles regulating relations between the participant states" and therefore also by respect for the right of every state to "establish its own laws and administrative rules." Some prefer to "forget" this clause, which is of a principled nature. And it is clear why: It knocks the ground from under the feet of those who try to speculate on the false thesis that, having signed the Final Act, the USSR and the other socialist countries must supposedly fulfill the absurd demands which certain circles in the West make of them in humanitarian matters. No, these matters are resolved and will continue to be resolved on the basis of the internal legislation of each sovereign state, and the Final Act not only does not negate this, it confirms it by unambiguously rejecting claims to interfere in the affairs of others.

The time which has passed since the Helsinki conference has been a period of large-scale events in the numerous spheres of cultural and spiritual activity. And here the same trend predominates—using the Final Act in the interests of fostering cooperation between peoples and cultivating feelings of sympathy and mutual respect between them.

Even a brief selection of the clauses contained in the Final Act and of what it really consists of shows that it has a sufficient reserve of both flexibility and solidity. It's entire essence consists not in intensifying disputes, and certainly not enmity between states, but in bringing them closer together for the sake of strengthening security and cooperation in Europe.

II

The Soviet Union and the other socialist states play a leading role in consolidating the norms and principles agreed upon in Helsinki in international practice and in furthering the cause of all-European cooperation. The steps taken by them for the purpose of conscientiously fulfilling the agreements are clear evidence of this.
As is well-known, the obligations emanating from the Final Act are of a voluntary nature. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union deemed it necessary to fully reflect in its constitution all 10 principles by which the states participating in the conference decided to be guided in their mutual relations. A whole series of legislative acts have been adopted in the development of the constitutional clauses. Some of these acts regulate matters related to the activity of representatives of foreign firms, banks, and organizations in the USSR and to entry into the USSR and exist from it by Soviet and foreign citizens, others contain practical measures improving the working conditions of foreign journalists, others form additional guarantees of the real fulfillment of civic rights and freedoms, and others are aimed at ensuring effective protection of the environment. In other words, the most vital clauses of the Helsinki document have become an organic part of the very foundations of the legal system in the Soviet Union.

In the sphere of foreign policy the USSR is strictly guided by the spirit and letter of the Helsinki agreements and does everything possible so that events in Europe develop in the direction of peace, security, and detente. The Soviet initiative of proposing to agree on a code of certain norms which would control relations between the nuclear powers for the purpose of preventing the beginning of a nuclear war is aimed at this.

The policies pursued by the USSR and its allies--genuine adherents of the Final Act--appear particularly constructive against the background of the United States' and NATO's unattractive actions. The deployment of new American nuclear missiles in certain countries of Western Europe betrays Washington's complete indifference to the fate of the European peoples, as does its disregard for the Helsinki agreements which do not fit in with the present policies of the American administration which are aimed at achieving military superiority. The same can be said of those countries which are the United States' partners in NATO, and primarily those which have given their territories over for the installation of American missiles.

So, what is this? Violation of the Final Act? Yes, of course. Just as the clauses of another determining international document--the UN Statute--have been violated on more than one occasion. But, of course, this does not detract from the significance of the fact that these documents do exist and "work."

There is also another side to the matter. The common sense of the West Europeans is making itself felt. It manifests itself in the mass actions against the deployment of new American missiles in Europe and against nuclear madness. The struggle being waged "from below" is truly an all-European phenomenon and corresponds to the scale of the Final Act. Such sentiments on the part of the broad popular masses cannot help but also have an effect at state-political levels. And surely this is a deep reason why not one country which participated in the all-European conference has shed the obligations it assumed by signing the Final Act? Indeed, all, if one can express it as such, swear by the name of Helsinki, although with some this smacks of hypocrisy.
The Helsinki agreements have been successfully implemented as a whole in bilateral relations between states. Virtually all European states participate in drawing up and concluding appropriate agreements in various spheres. As a result interstate relations in Europe are now based upon a treaty structure which is considerably more ramified and stable than it was prior to Helsinki. It has basically withstood the pressure of the winds of "counterdetente."

The practice of political contracts has kept its ground. It is characteristic that the mechanisms of consultations between states in the East and the West, which are highly sensitive to overfalls [perepad] in the international atmosphere, have turned out to be sufficiently efficient. It will not be simple for researchers of the history of diplomacy of recent years: During the time which has passed since Helsinki there have been as many negotiations, meetings, and talks between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and the heads of the West European states and governments and the leaders of the largest political parties as there were in previous times, perhaps, over the course of many decades. Political contracts reflect the striving of European states with different socioeconomic systems to further develop mutually advantageous cooperation, as well as their interest in seeing the system of bilateral relations function stably. This is fully confirmed by the visits to the Soviet Union in recent months by G. Andreotti, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Juan Carlos I, King of Spain, H.-D. Genscher, FRG Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, F. Mitterrand, president of the French Republic, and G. Howe, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth affairs.

III

The CSCE represented the beginning of a many-sided process of European cooperation. It is appropriate to list in chronological order at least some of the forums:

The conference of experts of 35 states (in Montreal in the fall of 1978 and in Athens of the spring of 1984) to continue the discussion on, and the elaboration of, a generally acceptable method of peaceful settlement of disputes;

the conference of experts in Malta's capital, Valletta, in February and March 1979 on the problems of economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean region;

the conference on environmental protection in Geneva in the fall of 1979, which was held at the initiative of the Soviet Union and which adopted a decision on further joint research work, exchange of information, and the organization of constant observation of the state of the European airspace area; and

the all-European "Scientific Forum" in Hamburg in February and March 1980, which for the first time in European history made it possible to exchange views on questions of the development of scientific cooperation on a continental scale.
The conference of experts in Budapest in November 1984 will mark the beginning of preparations for an all-European "Cultural Forum" that will be also held there in 1985. It is planned to hold, in Venice in the fall of this year, a seminar on economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean region. In May 1985, a conference of experts will be held in Ottawa to discuss questions concerning respect for human rights and all aspects of basic freedoms, according to the provisions of the Final Act. And finally, in April 1986 a conference of experts will be held in Bern to discuss questions of development of human contacts.

It is necessary to dwell separately on the meetings of representatives of the CSCE participant states, the first of which was held in Belgrade from October 1977 to March 1978.

The difference in scale between the Helsinki conference and the Belgrade meeting has become obvious to everyone in time. However, the United States and some of its NATO allies clearly originally intended to challenge the cause of Helsinki, impose a different concept of the all-European process, and push through in Belgrade a final document which would rival the Final Act. The essence of their approach was to cut off from all-European affairs everything except so-called "humanitarian issues." At the Belgrade meeting, the United States and its closest NATO allies did not make a single constructive proposal on the questions of European security, military detente, and on increasing the effectiveness of the implementation of the principles of mutual relations between states. The corresponding initiatives of the socialist countries were rejected. However, the NATO states also did not intend to hold any business-like discussions on the remaining range of humanitarian questions. The United States—the country where the principle of real social justice is treated as sacrilege, where racism is actually promoted by laws, where international terrorism has been raised to the level of state policy—tried to play the role of champion of human rights! The plan was obvious: to make the confrontation between states with different social systems a dominant trend at the all-European forums, and turn these forums into an arena for interference in the internal affairs of socialist states.

However, the attempts to use the Belgrade meeting for the purpose of changing the direction of the path embarked upon in Helsinki failed. It was thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union and other states of the socialist community that the key problems of security and cooperation were unfailingly kept at the center of discussions. This course was also pursued by such proposals as the USSR's initiative to conclude a treaty between the participant countries of the European conference on non-first-use of nuclear weapons against one another, the draft document presented by the GDR on suppressing the activities of fascist, neo-Nazi and revanchist organizations, and Poland's proposal envisaging an obligation to accelerate the liquidation of existing trade barriers and to refrain from setting up new ones.

The attempt to emasculate the Final Act failed to win support even among some Western states, including primarily the neutral and nonaligned states. In the final document, the participant countries confirmed the historical
role of the all-European conference and their readiness to fulfill "all provisions of the Final Act" in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral relations. The gamble on antagonism failed. It was not possible to stop the all-European process. A new meeting was scheduled to be held in Madrid, although it must be admitted that the rest of the final document was rather of a formal nature.

The ring of the "first bell" in Belgrade announcing an increasingly assertive course of confrontation with the Soviet Union in Washington's policy also heralded a new clash between the two opposing trends in the all-European process. The Madrid meeting held from November 1980 to September 1983 was the stage of this clash.

The opening of the meeting coincided with the accession of the R. Reagan administration to power in the United States. The international political context in which it was held—already difficult without this—changed sharply for the worse. Thus, there was an even greater need to achieve positive results and ensure that, even in the deteriorated international situation, the effect of the Final Act of the all-European conference would continue to benefit peace in Europe. A failure of the all-European process in Madrid or even only a standstill, as happened in Belgrade, would only further exacerbate tension. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries strove to achieve important accords on all sections of the Final Act. As regards the United States, it not only failed to show any interest in ensuring success in Madrid but also frankly made it known that what would suit it would be a final document of the most general and formal nature or even a statement on the impossibility of reaching an agreement. The main thing for the United States was to use the Madrid forum for the purpose of organizing diversionary propaganda against the socialist states. The obstructionist line into which other NATO countries were also drawn, although not all of them to an equal extent, more than once brought the meeting to a stalemate and prolonged it beyond all measure.

And yet, it succeeded in ending constructively! This fact once again proved that detente has become deeply rooted in Europe, that the all-European process is alive, and that the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries supporting it has fully justified itself. The statement made at the 26th CPSU Congress on the USSR's readiness to extend the confidence building measures to the entire European part of its territory, provided that the Western states also expanded correspondingly the zone of their confidence building measures in return, untied one of the complex knots in the work of the Madrid meeting. Another great step was undertaken in May 1983 when the Soviet Union proposed to conclude the meeting, having accepted the draft of the final document in the form in which it had been submitted by the neutral and nonaligned countries, even though it failed to take into account some of the essential observations made by the Soviet side. This bold and, for the United States, unexpected action placed the United States in a position of isolation and in the end forced it to consent to mutually acceptable accords.
The final document adopted in Madrid—worked out in a prolonged process of diplomatic struggle and of coordination of viewpoints between the 35 states—represents a balance of interests and has the imprint of compromise. However, the most important thing is that it is founded on the firm principles of relations between states determined by the Final Act and that it proclaims the need to fully respect and implement these principles and employ all measures, both legislative and practical, to promote their greater effectiveness.

The participant states confirmed their interest in further developing trade and industrial cooperation. They expressed their intention to make efforts to reduce or eliminate all obstacles in this field, something that is very topical in the light of certain actions of the United States and NATO. Regardless of the sharp antagonism in relation to humanitarian questions, in the final analysis recommendations were adopted which can promote cultural exchanges, a wider dissemination of information, and contacts between people, organizations, and institutions.

IV

Among the essential and useful recommendations which were agreed upon in Madrid there are some arrangements that stand out for their significance. They are embodied together in a separate section of the final document and represent a comprehensive decision on convening a conference on confidence building measures and on security and disarmament in Europe.

A long road had to the traversed to adopt this decision.

As is known, the idea of holding such a conference was put forward soon after the Helsinki conference by the Warsaw Pact participant states. France's proposal to convene a disarmament conference was made in the same direction. And a number of other states made similar proposals at the beginning of the Madrid meeting. This showed that the idea of an all-European forum on the aforementioned questions was gaining ground even though the differences in the approach to this conference most certainly did not concern only the name of the conference but also the very concept of holding it and of the tasks which it should fulfill.

As early as during the all-European Conference, the Soviet Union and other socialist states pointed out the organic interdependence between political and military detente and declared themselves in favor of supplementing steps toward political detente in Europe with steps toward military detente. The Helsinki Final Act speaks directly about the mutually complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security. The document includes some confidence building measures in the military sphere, envisages their development and extension, and emphasizes in this connection the need for broader measures "which, by their range of effect and by their nature, represent steps toward achieving in the final analysis a general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and which should strengthen peace and security in the entire world." This was the starting point for the future conference.
The coordination of the tasks or, to use the diplomatic term, the mandate of the conference which would determine the direction of its work, took place in an extremely intensive struggle which continued up to the very last days of the Madrid meeting. The understanding that was achieved included certain tasks of the conference, that is, the tasks of taking by stages "new, effective, and concrete actions aimed at developing progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament."

It was envisaged that, in its first stage, the conference would concern itself with working out the "composition of the mutually complementary measures to strengthen confidence and security" in order to reduce the existing opposing military stands in Europe. It is useful to quote this precisely now, because some western representatives now claim that the USSR has deviated from the mandate worked out in Madrid.

On 17 January 1984, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the participant states of the all-European conference began their work at the conference in Stockholm. In the months since then, two rounds of the conference have been held, the starting positions of the sides involved have been made known, corresponding proposals have been made, and the essence of differences has been determined.

The Soviet Union's principles approach to solving the problems before the Stockholm conference was outlined in the speech by A.A. Gromyko, USSR minister of foreign affairs. He noted in his speech that the task of the conference is to strengthen confidence in the relations between states both in the political and military spheres. The Soviet Union will strive to ensure that, in Stockholm, the Final Act will be practically developed with new important arrangements. In their speeches the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of socialist countries emphasized the main thing: the road to success leads through a combination of large-scale political and international legal steps with the military technical measures.

What, concretely, is the Soviet Union proposing?

- The conference's participant states possessing nuclear weapons must assume the obligation—as the USSR has done—not to be the first to use these weapons. This obligation could be assumed unilaterally by each individual nuclear state or be regulated by an appropriately formulated international arrangement.

- To conclude a treaty on non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. An obligation not to be the first to use military force in general against one another could be the pivotal provision of this treaty.

- The states must assume the obligation to refrain from increasing and to reduce their military expenditures by a percentage or absolutely.

- To strive to free Europe from chemical weapons and, first and foremost, from deployment of these weapons where they do not exist now.

- To agree on the forming of nuclear-free zones in various parts of European continent.
- Taking into account the useful experience in the implementation of the confidence building measures envisaged by the Helsinki Final Act, to move toward working out supplementary measures that would be more significant by nature and broader by their effect.

And what have the United States and other NATO countries brought to the conference? The line of Washington and its closest allies at the Stockholm conference reflects the U.S. and NATO policy of achieving military superiority over the USSR.

The fact that the United States attends the conference represents a certain element of compulsion. The incumbent U.S. administration which invariably tries to present the Helsinki document in the form of a few positions of a humanitarian nature, is now participating in the work of an all-European conference that does not discuss these questions at all and of which Washington did not even want to hear for a long time. This is not a paradox but rather a manifestation of the vital force of the process begun in Helsinki, a process in which the United States also has to join.

The Americans obviously reason this way: as soon as we find ourselves in Stockholm, it is necessary to try to use this forum in the interests of the same policy of force and of disrupting the military balance. And thus, the NATO countries put on the table of negotiations a package of measures, including measures providing for an exchange of annual plans of military activities subject to the notification provisions; exchange of information on the structure of ground and air forces, on non-garrison activities, and on the mobilization measures of states, the obligation to invite observers; and the demand for on-the-spot inspection is prominently conspicuous. The idea of "transparency of military activities" of states in the European region represents the common denominator of all of these proposals and, translated into generally understandable language, this is a question of the importune aspiration to find out facts about the armed forces of the USSR and its allies.

This approach leaves little room for confidence between states. On the contrary, it can only promote growing mistrust and suspicion. And one more thing: since they want to apply the measures proposed by NATO countries to the entire European part of the USSR and, at the same time, not even a foot of the U.S. territory is mentioned in this connection, it is easy to realize what advantages the United States and NATO would derive from the adoption of their approach.

But this is only one aspect of the NATO positions. Another aspect of their positions is no less indicative: the proposals of the states of the bloc provide for no limitations of military activities whatsoever and they completely bypass the very questions which concern the very essence of the problem of strengthening confidence and security in Europe. The United States and their NATO allies have adopted a frankly negative position on virtually all Soviet proposals of a political nature.
To tell the truth, none of the NATO countries has ventured to speak out against the principle of mutually complementary political and military aspects of security. However, the course set in this connection is aimed at bypassing any discussions about the topical political questions raised by the Soviet Union and at trying, without any preliminary permission, to draw the participant countries into considering the military-technical measures as interpreted by NATO.

However, the Soviet proposals have not been removed from the agenda of European political life. At the Stockholm conference, too, the matter is steadfastly—even though slowly—moving toward consideration of the large-scale confidence building measures that have evoked a wide response in Europe, including among the NATO countries. The greatest progress has been noticed in relation to the question of nonuse of military force and of maintaining peaceful relations. Whereas, only recently, NATO countries altogether excluded the possibility of considering this question, now none of them, including even the United States, risks saying this aloud. A majority of the West European countries are beginning to lean toward participating in the search for serious arrangements on nonuse of force.

The second session of the Stockholm conference concluded at the beginning of July. One hopes that the Western participant countries will use this pause to work out more constructive positions that would make it possible to remove the artificial obstacles which are slowing down the work of the conference.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries firmly adhere to the mandate of the Stockholm conference adopted in Madrid and are not striving to win any unilateral military advantages for themselves. Being interested in the success of the conference, they naturally think that the same also applies equally to other participants in the conference. The main direction of the movement forward has been verified by the experience of the all-European process and the Stockholm conference is an essential part of this process. This is how its mandate states directly: "Respecting the equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, and considering equally the security interests of all participant states."

And thus, the road from Helsinki to Stockholm has been difficult but fruitful. It is clearly evident looking back over past years that the establishment of a new system of international relations in Europe on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act is a more difficult task than envisaged in 1975. The active opposition to all-European cooperation is backed by the forces which still have not mastered the lessons of World War II and of the "cold war." To this day they have not learned to adapt themselves to the new realities of the contemporary world and they refuse to realize that the historical controversy between capitalism and socialism cannot be settled by military means. The celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory [in World War II] is yet another reminder of that. But, let us repeat, the positive outweighs [the negative]. And experience of interaction between the continent's states and of cooperation between them in various spheres on an all-European basis has been acquired for the first time in history. The concrete results of the fulfillment of the Helsinki accords by the European countries are clearly visible over a wide range of directions,
ranging from the political dialogue and trade and economic and cultural relations to joint scientific research activities.

The Final Act of the all-European Conference has proved its vitality. The strength of this prominent document of the contemporary period lies in the fact that it is not based on any temporary or currently topical interests of states but expresses a fundamental trend in the development of Europe. Reflecting the aspirations and hopes of an overwhelming majority of its population, the ideas of the Final Act have become a part of the very life of the continent to such an extent and have stirred up such deep strata [as published] that, so far, all attempts by the opponents of detente to wipe these ideas from the consciousness of people have been in vain. Despite all difficulties and complications, the practical implementation convincingly shows that detente in Europe is not a fairytale bluebird [skazochnaya sinaya ptitsa]. It is attainable in reality if the efforts of the signatory states of the Final Act are directed to this goal.

As K.U. Chernenko has pointed out, "a barrier must be set up against the policy which deliberately places the fuse of nuclear and chemical war under the European continent. The task of preventing these sinister plans starkly confronts all peoples, political parties, and social movements. And it must be solved without delay and sparing no efforts." And the most important direction of this solution was determined by the road begun in Helsinki.


CSO: 1816/2-F
NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, NONPROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT

Moscow Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya in Russian No 8, 1984
(signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 47-59

[Article by G. Vorontsov: "Nuclear-Free Zones: The Way to Peace and
Disarmament"]

[Excerpt] The sole politically-legally officialized nuclear-free zone in
densely populated parts of the world currently is Latin America. The treaty
banning nuclear weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty) was made
available for signing in February 1967. It contains the commitment of the
parties thereto to use the nuclear materials and resources under their
jurisdiction solely for peaceful purposes and also provides for a whole
number of other measures aimed at ensuring the continent's nuclear-free status.

A permanent observation body—the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America Agency—was created to monitor compliance with the treaty. In
accordance with Supplementary Protocol I to the Tlatelolco Treaty, nuclear-
free zone status extends to certain territories within the zone of
application of the treaty which de jure or de facto are under the jurisdiction
of states situated beyond the confines of the zone. The treaty confines the
control system in respect of these territories to the application of IAEA
guarantees. Supplementary Protocol II concerns the commitments of states
possessing nuclear weapons pertaining to observance of the status of the Latin
American nuclear-free zone in respect of military purposes.*

All five nuclear powers subscribed to Supplementary Protocol II, making the
corresponding statements in which they set forth their interpretation of
various articles of the treaty and the protocol.

Mention has to be made in this connection of the special position of the
United States, which supports authorization of the transit of nuclear weapons
across the nuclear-free zone. A similar line is also followed by France.
Yet the authorization of nuclear weapons in any form would be contrary to
the purpose of the treaty. According to the treaty, as its preamble says
in this regard specially, Latin America should be completely free of nuclear

weapons. Authorization of transit is incompatible with the nuclear-free status of the subscriber-states and their commitments defined in article 1.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has invariably adopted an understanding attitude toward the ideas of the authors of the draft treaty. The USSR signed Supplementary Protocol II to the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1978. Upon its ratification the Soviet Union confirmed the statement which it had made earlier, in which it had set forth considerations of principle.* It believes that explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes by this party to the threat or the other would be a violation of the nuclear-free status commitments. A solution of the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes by the subscriber-states may be found on the basis of the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and within the framework of IAEA procedures.

The USSR also proceeds from the fact that the treaty does not extend beyond the confines of the subscriber-states, including airspace and territorial waters determined in accordance with international law. Any actions undertaken by these countries incompatible with their nuclear-free status and also the perpetration by one or several of them of an act of aggression with the support of states possessing nuclear weapons or in conjunction with such states will be regarded by the Soviet Union as contrary to these countries' treaty commitments. In such cases and also in the event of any actions on the part of other states possessing nuclear weapons incompatible with their commitments per the said protocol the USSR reserves the right to reexamine its commitments per Supplementary Protocol II.

Upon ratification of Supplementary Protocol II the USSR also declared that it regards the commitments which it assumed per Supplementary Protocol II as also extending to the territories in respect of which nuclear-free zone status is applied in accordance with Supplementary Protocol I. The Soviet position in respect of the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples in accordance with the UN declaration on this question was confirmed here.**

II

The USSR's scrupulous position concerning zones free of nuclear weapons has been set forth repeatedly in various party and state documents and speeches of leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state. A positive attitude toward existing agreements in this connection and possible new constructive proposals, initiatives and drafts was confirmed anew in the quoted speech of K.U. Chernenko [on 2 March 1984], which calls, in particular, for respect for the status of nuclear-free zones which have been created and the encouragement of the formation of others in various parts of the world.


** UN General Assembly Resolution 1514/XV of 14 December 1960.
The Soviet Union was the first state to put forward the idea of the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons. It was formulated in general form in a Soviet proposal of 1956 in a UN Disarmament Committee subcommittee on the creation in Central Europe of an arms limitation and inspection zone and, in particular, on banning the deployment in this zone of atomic military formations and any type of atomic and hydrogen weapon.

Poland came out a year later with a proposal for the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Thus guided by the interests of strengthening peace and international security, the USSR and its allies have from the very outset been in the vanguard of the struggle for the creation of nuclear-free zones.

A PRC proposal for the formation of nuclear-free zones in the regions of Asia and the Pacific was made on the eve and at the outset of the 1960's. We would also mention the initiative at the UN General Assembly 16th Session in 1961 of Sweden, which requested that the UN secretary general ascertain the conditions on which countries not possessing nuclear weapons would assume specific commitments to refrain from the production or acquisition of such weapons and renounce authorization for nuclear weapons on their territory in the interests of any state.

The Soviet idea pertaining to the question of zones free of nuclear weapons was set forth in sufficient detail back in 1975 in the course of an all-embracing study of this problem conducted by a special group of government experts within the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Committee.*

The USSR attaches importance to the creation of nuclear-free zones and is making it its task to contribute to this process in different parts of the world, thereby strengthening the practice of nuclear nonproliferation and international security, as also the security of individual states. In order to be effective any such agreement must provide for the conversion of the territories of the states party thereto into a zone completely free of nuclear weapons and preclude any possibilities of violation of the nuclear-free status. For the purpose of the complete and unconditional banning of nuclear weapons on the territory of the nuclear-free zones the subscriber-states are obliged not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and also not to seek to obtain direct and indirect control over them, not to authorize the deployment and storage of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the territory of the zone and not to authorize the transportation of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices across the territory of the zone, including the calls at ports therein of ships carrying nuclear weapons.**

From the viewpoint of nuclear nonproliferation there is no fundamental difference between nuclear explosive devices used for peaceful or military


** See for more detail "Comprehensive Study... Annex II," pp 76-179.
purposes. Therefore the prohibitions discussed above should also extend to peaceful nuclear devices. Such measures by no means prevent the states which subscribe to the zone conducting peaceful explosions if necessary. They may obtain services with respect to such from the nuclear states both on a bilateral basis and via the IAEA. But such explosions must be carried out under appropriate international supervision and in accordance with the procedures developed by the IAEA.

As far as the boundaries of nuclear-free zones are concerned, they should be determined with regard for the generally recognized rules of international law, including the principle of freedom of navigation on the open seas and in straits used for international shipping. Commitments pertaining to the creation of zones may be assumed not only by groups of states incorporating entire continents or large geographical areas but also more limited groups of states or individual countries even.

An important question in connection with nuclear free-zones is precise determination of the list of commitments which should be assumed by the nuclear powers in respect of the members of the zone. Among the essential commitments here are those such as not transferring to the parties to the zone nuclear weapons or devices in direct or indirect form and also control over them; not helping, not encouraging and not prompting the parties to the zone to the production or acquisition by another method of nuclear weapons or devices and also the gaining of control over them; and not deploying even briefly and not storing nuclear weapons on the territories which are a part of the nuclear-free zones.

The Soviet Union is ready to undertake to respect the status of nuclear-free zones on condition that they will be under all circumstances really free of nuclear weapons and that the other nuclear powers also assume similar commitments.

Prompted by a sincere concern for the fate of peace and struggling consistently for nuclear disarmament, in certain cases the Soviet side goes even further. In June 1983 the USSR expressed a readiness to assume a commitment on the nonuse of nuclear weapons against countries of North Europe in the event of the formation of a nuclear-free zone. It was stated that these countries' security would be more dependable given corresponding guarantees on the part of the NATO nuclear powers. However, the USSR does not make this a condition for its commitment.*

Another problem is connected with the participation in military alliances of states which intend to form or become part of a nuclear-free zone. The Soviet Union believes that this state or the other's membership of a military alliance may not serve as grounds for any exceptions from the list of commitments which are envisaged for states becoming part of a nuclear-free zone. Agreements on the creation of nuclear-free zones should provide for effective monitoring of the observance of their provisions by all parties.

* PRAVDA, 11 May 1983.
The USSR is making efforts aimed at securing firm guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against nonnuclear states and that they will not be threatened with the use thereof. In 1978 it came out with the statement that it would never use nuclear weapons against states which renounce the production and acquisition thereof and do not have such on their territory.* A readiness was expressed here for the legal officialization of an accord with the corresponding states renouncing the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and not having such on their territory.

In September 1978 the USSR presented a draft international convention on strengthening the security guarantees of nonnuclear states based on the principles set forth above. The UN General Assembly instructed the Disarmament Committee to study this proposal. It called in Resolution 35/154 on the nuclear states to make solemn declarations of similar content (with their subsequent approval by the Security Council) on the nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states which do not have such on their territory as a first step toward the conclusion of such an international convention.

The Soviet Union also proposed the conclusion of an international agreement on the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of states where they do not exist currently.** The UN General Assembly supported this proposal in Resolution 33/91 F and also called on all states which do not possess nuclear weapons and which do not have such on their territory to refrain from all steps which would lead directly or indirectly to a change in this situation.

In Resolution 35/156 C the General Assembly requested that the Disarmament Committee embark immediately on negotiations for the purpose of drawing up an international agreement on the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of states where they do not currently exist. In Resolution 36/97 E the General Assembly called on the nuclear states to refrain from further actions connected with the deployment of nuclear weapons on the terrorists of other states. Resolution 37/99 contains an appeal to all nuclear states to freeze qualitatively the nuclear weapons deployed on the territories of other countries.

A step of exceptional importance, which earned the widespread recognition of the international community, was the solemn commitment proclaimed by the USSR at the UN General Assembly Second Special Disarmament Session in June 1982 not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The General Assembly 38th Session approved a resolution which called on the other nuclear states to follow this example, thereby contributing to averting a nuclear catastrophe.

A halt to tests of nuclear weapons could also contribute to the creation of nuclear-free zones to a certain extent. Steps in this direction are closely connected with the practice of nuclear nonproliferation. For this reason the Soviet Union believes it urgently necessary to adopt measures which would


** See A.A. Gromyko, "In the Name of the Triumph of the Leninist Foreign Policy. Selected Speeches and Articles," Moscow, 1978, p 537.
prevent the creation of new types and systems of nuclear weapons. One of these would be an immediate halt to and the banning of tests of nuclear weapons by all states and in all media, which at the same time would contribute to nuclear nonproliferation. Motivated by these goals, the USSR submitted for examination by the General Assembly 37th Session a proposal on an immediate halt to and the banning of tests of nuclear weapons and presented the basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and universal banning of nuclear weapon tests.

Adoption of the Soviet proposals discussed above and also the implementation of a number of other measures aimed at curbing the arms race, preventing the threat of nuclear wear and at nuclear disarmament would contribute to the advancement of the plans for the creation of nuclear-free zones. Mention has to be made in this connection of the great stimulating significance of the treaties and agreements concluded in the 1960's and 1970's, in whose preparation the Soviet Union participated most actively. These include the 1963 Moscow Test-Ban Treaty, the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the 1973 Agreement Between the USSR and the United States on the Prevention of Nuclear War, and agreements signed by the Soviet Union with the United States, Great Britain and France on preventing the accidental outbreak of nuclear war and a number of others.

III

Analyzing the policy of the Western powers on the question of the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons, it should be observed that as a whole it is of a negative nature, despite the numerous statements in support of maintaining peace, strengthening international security and easing the threat of nuclear war. This approach is determined by their military-policy and strategic aims. The aggressive nature of imperialism and its reliance on force as the main means of the solution of international problems and the special role which is assigned nuclear weapons here induce doubts as to the sincerity of official circles' declarations in support of the idea of the creation of nuclear-free zones.

While paying lip service to the creation of nuclear-free zones (excluding Europe), the Western countries essentially do not accept them. This is perfectly understandable insofar as the United States and other imperialist powers pretend to proclamation of entire regions of the world as spheres of their "vitaly important" strategic and political interests and are deploying there their forces with the most modern types of weapons, nuclear included. In particular, manifestly negative is the West's position in respect of a nuclear-free Europe and its adjacent regions. As is known, recently the United States and NATO have been openly gambling on the first use of nuclear weapons. While formally proclaiming such weapons "a means of restraining the enemy," they are in practice prepared to use them for aggressive purposes. In accordance with the strategy of "direct confrontation" adopted by the Reagan administration, Europe is declared "the most suitable theater" and proving ground for an exchange of nuclear strikes and "demonstration" nuclear explosions.
The "arguments" to which the United States and NATO usually resort amount to the following. It is groundlessly asserted that these zones could be attacked by weapons deployed outside of them. They point here to the Soviet Union, which has missiles capable of reaching targets on the entire territory of the European continent. But they "forget" about the nuclear systems of the United States and other NATO countries located in Europe and around it. The fact that in the event of the conclusion of a corresponding agreement a commitment on the nonuse of nuclear weapons in respect of the nuclear-free zone would be an inalienable part thereof is also deliberately circumvented. Speculation, on the other hand, on the fact that the Soviet Union might launch an attack represents malicious slander. It was the USSR and not the United States and its allies which undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It is the United States and NATO which are stubbornly refusing to follow this example.

The NATO side alludes to the possibility in the event of a crisis of the rapid commitment of nuclear weapons to the zone which would earlier have been removed from it, the need for the creation of an effective control and verification system and so forth. However, all these questions could be solved in the course of corresponding negotiations between interested states. The Soviet Union advocates the creation of an effective verification system. It has submitted carefully considered proposals on a number of specific questions (they provide for measures averting the possibility of the rapid commitment of nuclear weapons to a nuclear-free corridor in the center of Europe).

Western "experts" incessantly assert that the creation of nuclear-free zones is capable of destabilizing the balance of forces and leading to military advantages for the Soviet Union. And the natural culmination of such reasoning is the cynical proclamation of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their use as a "stabilizing factor". Essentially the United States and NATO are endeavoring in this way to strengthen their military presence in various parts of the world, maintain vast regions in the orbit of their economic, political and military influence and ensure scope for the solution of this international problem or the other by force.

IV

The greatest number of initiatives aimed at the creation of new nuclear-free zones pertains to the European region. This is by no means fortuitous inasmuch as it is precisely here that the two most powerful military groupings—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—come into contact and the highest degree of concentration of forces and also nuclear and conventional weapons is observed. It is Europe which imperialism, primarily American, wished to make the main battlefield between socialism and capitalism.

The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states have long and invariably been defending the need for the achievement of an agreement on the formation of such zones in individual parts of Europe—in the North, in the Balkans and in other regions—and ideally on the continent as a whole. The importance of the creation thereof was confirmed anew at the meetings of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee in October 1983 in Sofia and in April 1984 in Prague.
The socialist countries' struggle for a nuclear-free Europe goes back, as is known, to the 1960's. There were once extensive repercussions to the proposal put forward by Poland on 2 October 1957 at the UN General Assembly 12th Session: if the two German states express their consent to the imposition of a ban on the production and stockpiling of atomic and thermonuclear weapons on their territories, Poland is ready to simultaneously take similar steps on its own territory. Poland was supported on this issue by Czechoslovakia, the GDR and the Soviet Union.

Following detailed elaboration, Poland's proposal was published in February 1958. According to the plan, the states situated in the zone would undertake not to produce, not to stockpile, not to import for their own purposes and not to authorize the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory; and not to allow on their territory equipment and devices intended for servicing nuclear weapons, including missile launchers. The plan provided for specific countercommitments of the nuclear powers, a detailed control system and the creation of a control body. The Polish plan was repeatedly amplified and altered for the purpose of meeting the objections expressed by the West.* Nonetheless, this plan, like a number of subsequent ones, failed to win the support of the United States and other NATO members.

In June 1982 the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (the "O. Palme Commission") proposed in its report the creation of a "zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons" approximately 300 kilometers wide.** This zone is to extend from the northern to the southern flank in Europe where the line of contact of NATO and the Warsaw Pact runs. Realization of this plan was linked to agreement being reached at the Vienna negotiations on a mutual reduction in armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The possession of nuclear warheads and their storage and preparations for the deployment of nuclear warheads or maneuvers simulating the use of nuclear weapons in the zone would be banned.

In December 1982 the Swedish Government sent more than 30 states a note proposing an exchange of opinions on the "Palme Commission" initiative.

The USSR's response said that the proposal in question proceeds in the same direction as the efforts being made by the socialist countries. The Soviet Union regards the creation of such zones as an important area of the struggle to consolidate peace and security on the European continent and as a way leading to the freeing of the entire continent from nuclear weapons—both tactical and medium-range. Considering the tactical-technical specifications of the nuclear weapons in question, the Soviet side believes that the proposed zone could be really effective in the plane of a lessening of the nuclear threat in the event of it being not 300 kilometers but 500-600 kilometers wide, that is, 250-300 kilometers east and west of the line of contact of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. The creation of such a zone could be started from Central Europe in the context of the efforts which are being made at the Vienna negotiations.

* See "History of the USSR's Foreign Policy," vol 2, pp 247-248.
As far as the Western powers are concerned, for the umpteenth time they failed and continue to fail to display a readiness to consent to this idea. This position logically proceeds from the general approach of the United States and its allies to the problem of the creation of nuclear-free zones.*

The Warsaw Pact states have repeatedly—both bilaterally and in documents of the Political Consultative Committee—expressed their viewpoint in connection with the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. They believe that a nuclear-free Balkans could strengthen peace and international security both in the said region and in Europe as a whole.

Back in May 1959 the Soviet Union advocated the conversion of the Balkan peninsula into a region of peace free of missiles or nuclear weapons. The USSR officially proposed in June 1959 in its notes to the governments of the Balkan states, the United States, Britain and France the creation in the Balkans and in the Adriatic of zones free of nuclear weapons. The Soviet initiative was supported by the other European socialist states.

And in the 1980's also the question of a nuclear-free Balkans has been raised repeatedly by the socialist community countries in the course of mutual meetings and contracts and also at international conferences. In his speech in October 1981 in connection with the 1,300th anniversary of the founding of the Bulgarian state T. Zhivkov, general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Bulgarian State Council, proposed within the framework of a new initiative on the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the Balkan peninsula the convening in Sofia of a meeting of leaders of Balkan states. Yugoslavia supports the creation of a broader zone of peace and cooperation embracing the Balkans. The declaration of its government that it will seek the removal from its territory of American nuclear weapons deployed at U.S. military bases attracts attention in this connection. A series of meetings and contacts of experts from Balkan countries to discuss the idea of a nuclear-free zone was held in 1983 and 1984.

As far as the Western powers are concerned, they, primarily the United States, are essentially opposed to the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans.**

A significant place among the initiatives concerning the creation of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace and cooperation is assigned the Mediterranean. In May 1963 the Soviet Union handed the Geneva Disarmament Committee the text of a note addressed to the United States, Great Britain and certain Mediterranean states containing the proposal that the entire Mediterranean region be declared a zone free of nuclear weapons.*** It expressed a readiness to undertake not to deploy nuclear weapons or their delivery systems in this region on condition that similar undertakings were adopted by other states. Subsequently the USSR has put forward repeatedly at various forums proposals concerning the nondeployment of nuclear weapons in the Mediterranean.

* See PRAVDA, 28 January 1983.
*** See UN Document DC/208, Annex.1, Sec. M; "Comprehensive Study...," p 23.
The idea of the conversion of the Mediterranean into a sea of peace and cooperation started to become increasingly prevalent in the 1970's. The Soviet Union repeatedly put forward proposals on easing military tension in this region. This was discussed at the 24th CPSU Congress and the Berlin Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties in 1976 and in a number of documents. Struggling for detente in the Mediterranean region, the USSR is actively pursuing the thought of the need for the withdrawal from its waters of all Soviet and American ships carrying nuclear weapons.

Participants in the nonaligned movement also actively support an easing of tension in the Mediterranean region. A number of countries situated here--Algeria, Libya, Yugoslavia and others--has repeatedly advocated the conversion of the said region into a zone of lasting peace and international cooperation. The conference of nonaligned countries in Colombo in August 1976 supported this proposal. It appealed to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe states that they embark immediately on the implementation in full of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act which concern the Mediterranean. Subsequently the nonaligned countries confirmed this position.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist Warsaw Pact states advanced in the 1980's a wide-ranging program of actions in the direction of an easing of military tension in the Mediterranean region and its conversion into a zone of lasting peace. In the USSR's opinion, the achievement of international agreements on such questions as the extension of confidence-building measures to the Mediterranean region; the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of ships carrying nuclear weapons; renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of Mediterranean European and non-European nonnuclear countries; and the nuclear powers' assumption of commitments not to use nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country not allowing the deployment of such weapons in its country would contribute to this.*

In the political declaration adopted at the meeting in Prague on 5 January 1983 the Warsaw Pact states advanced once again the conversion of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and cooperation and the corresponding negotiations on this question. The West, primarily the United States, reacted extremely negatively to the Soviet proposals, giving as the reason for its position the fact that the USSR allegedly wishes to achieve a change in the correlation of forces in the said region in its favor and to the detriment of NATO.

The idea of the convening of a nuclear-free zone in North Europe has become widely known. Back in May 1963 Finland proposed the creation here of a zone free of nuclear weapons. The country's president, U. Kekkonen, observed here that no northern country had acquired nuclear weapons and deployed such on its territory. For this reason the formation of such a zone would merely confirm the existing situation without detriment to the security of the

* See UN Document DC/208, Annex 1, Sec. M; "Comprehensive Study...," p 23.
Scandinavian countries. Finland has returned to this proposal repeatedly, at UN General Assembly sessions and also at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe included. Recalling his 1963 proposal, in 1978 U. Kekkonen came out with the initiative of the conclusion of a special agreement for strengthening the nuclear-free status of the northern countries. The latter have repeatedly exchanged opinions on the question of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in North Europe. Discussion of this subject was stimulated anew in the 1980's. Of all the nuclear states, only the Soviet Union is displaying an active and positive interest in this problem.

In 1981 the USSR again confirmed its positive attitude toward the proposal concerning the conversion of North Europe into a nuclear-free zone. It declared that it was prepared to assume the commitment of the nonuse of nuclear weapons against the countries of North Europe which participate in a nuclear-free zone, that is, renounce the production, acquisition and deployment on their territory of nuclear weapons. This guarantee of the Soviet Union could be officialized by way of the conclusion either of a multilateral agreement with its participation or by means of bilateral agreements with each country participating in the zone. The Soviet Union declared that it does not rule out the possibility of the examination of certain measures—substantial, furthermore—in respect of its own territory adjacent to the zone in North Europe which would contribute to the strengthening of its nuclear-free status.

In the course of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations in Moscow in June 1983 the Soviet side expressed not only a liking for the idea of the formation of a nuclear-free zone in North Europe but also a desire to contribute to its creation. Importance in this connection was attached to the Soviet Union's readiness to discuss with other interested countries the question of imparting nuclear-free status to the waters of the Baltic.*

It is profoundly natural that it is primarily the European states, which the United States wishes to turn into the main field of military confrontation between socialism and capitalism, which are building up their efforts in the direction of the creation of nuclear-free zones.**

In fact, the deployment of American nuclear missiles and the realization of other of NATO's militarist plans entail particular danger not only for the socialist countries but also for the peoples of the states which, accepting the American missiles, are becoming the Pentagon's nuclear hostages, in short, for all the European countries. In particular, the nonaligned and neutral states are expressing extreme disquiet concerning the fact that their territory falls within the sphere of confrontation strategy without their consent.

Let us take, for example, such states as Finland, Sweden and Austria. They are not members of military alliances, and the NATO missile decision does not formally extend to them. However, the fear is being expressed with every justification in their political circles that the United States' Pershings

* See PRAVDA, 7 June 1983.
and cruise missiles, which are first-strike weapons against the USSR, will violate these states' airspace. In this connection the said states are confronted by a whole number of new questions with respect to ensuring their security both on land and in adjacent waters in the air.

The European peoples do not wish their territory to be used as a springboard for thermonuclear war. It is clear that any nuclear conflict in Europe, however "limited," would entail incalculable disasters for all European peoples and states—large and small. In this plane the movement for the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe objectively merges with the antimissile movements and the peoples' struggle for peace and the strengthening of international security. These movements are essentially aimed against the military plans and aggressive actions of the United States.

V

The idea of the creation of nuclear-free zones has also been put forward repeatedly in other parts of the world. Thus Iran has repeatedly advocated the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Near East. In July 1974 it officially requested that this question be included on the agenda of the UN General Assembly 29th Session. Then Egypt subscribed to this request. This initiative was supported by the majority of states of the region and approved by the United Nations, where all five nuclear powers voted for the draft submitted by Iran and Egypt. Supporting the idea of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Near East, the UN General Assembly resolution (3263 of 9 December 1974) called on all interested parties to declare their intention to refrain on a reciprocal basis from the production, testing, acquisition, receipt or possession of nuclear weapons by any other method and to subscribe to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The question of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Near East was also reflected in the Final Document of the UN General Assembly's 12th Special Session (the First Special Disarmament Session),* which proclaimed as particularly desirable the examination of measures "necessary for realization of the proposal concerning the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Near East..., where all the parties which are directly interested have expressed their support for this concept and where a danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons exists." The creation in the Near East of a zone free of nuclear weapons would strengthen international peace and security considerably. Prior to the creation of such a zone in this region, the states located here would have to solemnly declare that they would refrain on a reciprocal basis from the production, acquisition or possession in any other form of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting any third party to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory and consent to their entire nuclear activity being put under IAEA guarantees. The said resolution deemed it necessary to study the question of the role of the Security Council in the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Near East.

Countries of other regions also presented initiatives for the creation of nuclear-free zones. Thus as of 1960 a number of African states has been urging Africa's conversion into a continent free of nuclear weapons (this question was raised in connection with France's start on testing nuclear weapons in the Sahara). At its 16th session the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 1652 of 24 November 1961, which called on all states not to conduct nuclear tests in Africa, refrain from the storage or transportation of nuclear weapons and recognize this continent as a zone free of such weapons.

The question of the creation of a nuclear-free zone here was raised at top-level meetings of African states. A meeting of leaders of OAU states in 1964 approved a declaration proclaiming Africa a nuclear-free zone.* Its subscribers solemnly declared their readiness to undertake not to produce and not to own atomic weapons and appealed to all peace-loving states to adopt such commitments and to all nuclear powers to respect the declaration and abide by its provisions. The question of a nuclear-free zone in Africa has been discussed repeatedly since this within the UN framework and also at other forums.

There are also proposals concerning the formation of nuclear-free zones pertaining to the regions of South Asia, the Far East and the South Pacific. However, they have not been elaborated in such detail and have not gained such extensive recognition as the above-mentioned initiatives.

The negative position of Washington and its NATO allies on the question of the creation of nuclear-free zones shows once again as clearly as can be who is the enemy of a curbing of the arms race and the adoption of practicable steps to ease tension. This position is the principal obstacle in the way of the embodiment of the numerous initiatives and proposals concerning the formation of nuclear-free zones.

As a counterweight to this, the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, which aspire in practice to the consolidation of peace and security, are giving such proposals the most active and full support. They are in the vanguard of the forces seeking the creation of nuclear-free zones and the proclamation of zones of peace and cooperation in various regions of our planet.

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* For the text see "Official Reports of the General Assembly, 20th Session, Appendix, Item 105 of the Agenda, Document A/5975".

'DANGER' SEEN IN CHANGING JAPANESE FOREIGN, SECURITY POLICIES

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 8, 1984 (signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 60-71

[Article by V. Dal'nev: "Tilt Toward Danger"]

[Text] Under the conditions of the complication of the international situation mankind's fundamental interests demand large-scale and effective measures aimed at curbing the dangerous growth of tension and at a recuperation of the political climate. Naturally, much will depend on the practical activity of states and governments. If they occupy a truly peace-loving, honest, open position, the role and authority of the country are correspondingly high. A policy of support for aggressive actions, an arms buildup and encouragement of the forces pushing the world toward catastrophe is detrimental to the prestige of any state, even the biggest and most influential.

What role is being performed in current world politics by Japan—a country which it has for a long time been customary for the West to regard as a purely "economic" power? Truly, Japan has become a kind of capitalist giant,* which is actively competing with the United States and which has reached second place in the capitalist world in a whole number of indicators. The fears being expressed in the United States that by the year 2000 Japan will be capable of overtaking it and will from a country forced to resort to extensive purchases abroad of patents and knowhow have become a state exporting technological innovations, without, furthermore, a race for the resources which it has to run currently, are symptomatic. As Japan's influence in the world economy has increased, circles determining its foreign policy course have come to demand increasingly that its political role be brought into line with the potential of a large economic power and that Japan be converted, if it may be so expressed, into a state of "world level".

The question, however, is by what paths the country's leadership intends to proceed toward the achievement of the set goal and what directions, forms and

* Whereas in 1951 Japan's GNP constituted only one-half of that of the FRG and was much less than that of Britain and France, in 1981 it was roughly equal to that of Britain and France together. In the period 1958 through 1981 Japan increased its share of the capitalist countries' total trade from 3 to 8.5 percent, reaching a level in excess of half of foreign trade turnover of the United States.
methods of diplomacy are being chosen for this in Tokyo. The answer, evidently, should be sought in the policy which the government pursues and in its approach to global problems of international life, primarily to questions of war and peace.

I

Recently Japanese statesmen have been proclaiming the following as fundamental principles of their foreign policy. The first is active implementation of so-called "peaceful diplomacy". The second is reliance on the "restraining power" of the United States and the Japanese-American "Security Treaty", which, as Prime Minister Y. Nakasone emphasized, represents the "cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy." The third is development of the "Self-Defense Forces" "within the minimally necessary limits," as is officially asserted.

Although the adduced goals are formulated in the most general form (not to mention the fact that the "peaceful diplomacy" proposition is pure rhetoric), they nonetheless provide a certain idea of the basic thrust of the country's international policy. And the main thing is that the policy of the utmost strengthening of the Japanese-American military-political alliance is determining Tokyo's approach to many world problems and relations with other states.

A graphic example is Japan's attitude toward the cardinal problem of disarmament and arms reduction, nuclear particularly. For a whole number of years now it has not presented specific and constructive initiatives on this range of questions, entirely supporting Washington's obstructionist policy, in the United Nations included. At UN General Assembly sessions Japan abstains or votes against the passage of resolutions calling for a curbing of the nuclear arms race and the banning of nuclear weapons. At the General Assembly 38th Session it opposed together with the United States a resolution which by an overwhelming majority emphatically and unreservedly condemned nuclear war as a most heinous crime against mankind. The Japanese delegation also opposed a resolution calling for a freeze on nuclear arsenals. One wonders: how can such a position be in accord with the tragic experience of a country which experienced the horror of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

While not formally a member of NATO, Japan signed a declaration adopted at the meeting of leaders of the leading capitalist countries in Williamsburg in May 1983 which gave its blessing to the United States for the deployment of new nuclear missiles in West Europe. While the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear arms limitation in Europe, which were suspended by the American side, were under way, it invariably supported all Washington's steps aimed at the USSR's unilateral disarmament—from the notorious "zero" option through the "interim" option and its modifications. At the same time, however, the Soviet proposals representing a practicable basis for the achievement of a mutually acceptable accord were essentially glossed over in silence in Tokyo. As a result a situation took shape in which while paying lip service to its allegiance to the cause of disarmament Japan actually contributed to the start of a dangerous twist of the arms race spiral. Such a policy could not
have strengthened trust in the aims of the country's foreign policy and contributed to the growth of its international authority. However, the policy of support for the aggressive aspirations of American imperialism in world politics is not changing.

New corroboration of this policy was the speech of the Japanese prime minister from the standpoint of zealous defender of the idea of a "strengthening of the cohesion" of the West at the London summit of the seven leading capitalist states in June 1984. In the opinion of many foreign observers, he rendered the Washington administration considerable assistance in the further " politicization" of such meetings, which were originally intended as a forum for the discussion only of economic problems. Endeavoring to avoid charges of protectionism and fearing a new outburst of the Western countries' dissatisfaction in connection with its foreign trade policy, Tokyo perceived with manifest enthusiasm the American approach, in accordance with which the capitalist world's economic contradictions have, as it were, receded into a secondary position, while in the first place is the task of the Washington's strategic designs. Commenting on the results of the meeting of the "seven," the influential newspaper ASAHI wrote about the lack of pronounced results in the examination of economic issues owing to the fact that "the participants in the meeting, fearing a manifest display of differences, confined themselves merely to an abstract exposition of their positions."* A statement of T. Fuwa, chairman of the Japanese Communist Party Central Committee Presidium, observed in this connection that "the meeting was entirely devoted to a discussion of questions concerning a strengthening of the Western countries' military alliance and disappointed the hopes of the peoples of countries of the world advocating nuclear disarmament."**

At the London meeting Japan signed a number of final documents of a political nature, including the "Declaration on East-West Relations and Arms Control". The principle of reliance on military power is confirmed anew in all these documents. At the same time, on the other hand, they contain no shortage of arguments concerning an aspiration to "political dialogue" with the USSR and its allies. As emphasized in K.U. Chernenko's replies to questions put by PRAVDA, the documents adopted in London "serve the aims of further attaching the big capitalist states, including Japan, to the militarist policy of the U.S. Administration."***

It is significant that even prior to his departure for London Y. Nakasone unequivocally defined his position as being based on an endeavor to demonstrate fidelity to the spirit of the "political declaration" adopted by the "seven" in Williamsburg. While noting that "there is no need to change" the propositions of this document, he advocated that the search for a solution of the problem of nuclear arms limitation be conducted "by proceeding from the fact that the new missiles have already been deployed" by Washington in West Europe. In other words, Y. Nakasone supported more actively than the United States' other partners Washington's verbiage concerning some readiness

* ASAHI, 12 June 1984.
** AKAHATA, 12 June 1984.
*** PRAVDA, 14 June 1984.
for a resumption of negotiations with the USSR, which were broken off through the fault of the United States. At the same time, however, the prime minister preferred not to mention the possibility of a practicable way toward negotiations which consists of a restoration of the situation which existed prior to the start of the deployment of the new American medium-range first-strike nuclear missiles in West Europe. He compensated with interest for this odd "forgetfulness" with other statements, on the question of the Soviet Union's large-scale initiative concerning the other nuclear powers' adoption, per the USSR's example, of a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, which Tokyo had long glossed over in silence, included. Discussing this question on the threshold of the London meeting, Y. Nakasone, as the press reported, emphasized that the nuclear powers have the right to use weapons of mass destruction "at their discretion," while "attempts... to force the United States to renounce the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances are tantamount to interference in its internal affairs." This pronouncement of the prime minister evoked the profound indignation of the country's public and was evaluated as unconvincing defense of the United States' "right" to use nuclear weapons for the purpose of waging an aggressive war. Almost simultaneously a further declaration was made in Tokyo in which a foreign ministry representative pointed to the "inexpediency of the conclusion of a treaty on the nonuse of nuclear weapons in the Far East region of the Tlatelolco Treaty type" (the treaty banning nuclear weapons in Latin America).* Thus the Japanese leadership confirmed as clearly as could be that at the present stage it not only supports Washington's adventurist nuclear ambitions in other parts of the world but is also giving the go-ahead for the United States' attempts to break up the military-strategic balance in the region in which Japan itself is located and to extend the Pentagon's bellicose aspiration to nuclear domination to the Far East region, which created a threat to the security of the Japanese people also.

It is significant that speaking at the London International Strategic Studies Institute immediately following the conclusion of the meeting of the "seven," Y. Nakasone went considerably further than the wording of the documents adopted at the meeting: he made of prime importance the question of the need for the Western countries to formulate a "common strategy both in the short term and in the long term," alluding to the "response to the threat on the part of the USSR." Even the British FINANCIAL TIMES, which it is difficult to reproach with a predilection for criticism of the "defenders of Western solidarity," deemed it necessary to put this statement in quotation marks and note that the Japanese premier "promised to contribute to a strengthening of military-strategic ties between Japan and the other Western countries" and also "emphasized the need for the creation of a joint trilateral front incorporating the United States, West Europe and Japan in order to counterpose it to the Soviet Union."**

* TOKYO SHIMBUN, 6 June 1984.
** THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 12 June 1984.
All this indicates that a dangerous tilt toward Tokyo's direct participation in the implementation of U.S. plans based on the idea of "global confrontation" with the socialist world and the permissibility of the unleashing of both a "limited" and global nuclear war, which entail a threat to peace and international security, has been outlined. Meanwhile Washington has long been orienting itself toward precisely such a change in Tokyo's policy. American diplomatic documents made public in June 1984 testify to this. It follows from these that back at the time of the U.S. aggression in Korea, according to Pentagon plans approved by the President, it was planned to use Japan as a forward base for launching a nuclear strike against the DPRK and the PRC, and confidence was expressed that the S. Yoshida government in office in Japan at that time would "support all U.S. actions," The "confidence" of Washington strategists has now been reinforced, evidently -- after all, representatives of Japan's ruling circles are declaring their complete and unconditional support for their aspirations openly, for all to hear, taking virtually no cover behind "peace-making" rhetoric.

Even a fleeting survey of Japan's approach to the most urgent international issues, including the situation which exists at the planet's "flash points," testifies that in the overwhelming majority of cases Tokyo is following Washington's lead and sometimes openly countering it to the world community even. As is known, following the bandit attack on tiny Grenada, which threatened no one, Tokyo was not slow to express "understanding" of Washington's action. It went further even than the United States' NATO allies, hoping, possibly, that such zeal would be evaluated as an aspiration to do its bit toward the strengthening of "Western solidarity". And once again Tokyo's position was in striking contradiction with the declarative statements concerning "peaceful diplomacy". It is far from fortuitous that the United States is speaking increasingly often of Japan as virtually the most dependable ally.

Of course, it cannot be claimed that the two countries' positions coincide 100 percent along the entire spectrum of international problems. Tokyo's approach to the question of a Near East settlement has its own specific features, for example. The economic interests of Japan, which obtains approximately 70 percent of imported oil from the Near and Middle East countries, make themselves felt here. Being thus objectively interested in a stabilization of the situation in the region, Japan is forced to a certain extent to take account of the position of the Arab countries. It advocates the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territory occupied in 1967, condemns Israel's aggressive actions and declares the need for recognition and respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

At the same time, making common cause with Washington, Tokyo made a positive appraisal of the Camp David deal, evaluated as "constructive" the 'Reagan Plan," which openly infringes the Arabs' interests, and welcomed the dispatch of the Multinational Force to Lebanon, which ended in failure. Each new exacerbation of the situation in the region confronts the ruling circles with the difficult task of maneuvering between the United States and the Arab countries. The result is not a stimulation but, on the contrary, a weakening of the effectiveness of Japanese diplomacy in this part of the world.
There are sharp disagreements between Tokyo and Washington in the trade-economic sphere. The basic source of the discord, which sometimes becomes quite acute, is the trade imbalance in Japan's favor which has been observed since the mid-1960's (in 1983 its surplus balance in trade with the United States amounted to approximately $20 billion). Such disproportions are a cause of acute dissatisfaction in Washington, which in recent years has been demanding particularly insistently that Japan open up the market for its commodities, limit its exports to the United States and raise the artificially low, as transatlantic business circles believe, exchange rate of the yen in relation to the dollar.

Insisting on Tokyo's increased burden within the framework of the bilateral military-political alliance, Washington is paying particular attention to its partner's activity in the Asia-Pacific region, assigning it the functions of outpost of the imperialist camp. It is significant that in Tokyo also the role of "spokesman for the interests of the West" is seen through the prism of the utmost strengthening and expansion of military-political cooperation with Washington. Step by step Japan is becoming increasingly deeply involved in the United States' far-reaching dangerous plans in the region and essentially becoming a "nuclear hostage" of the Pentagon here. Thus Tokyo has officially consented to the deployment at the U.S. naval base in Misawa of the latest F-16 fighter-bombers, which are capable of carrying nuclear weapons and which have a great range.

Ships of the American 7th Fleet, including those based in Japanese ports, are already equipped with cruise missiles. U.S. warships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons are calling here increasingly often, which is confirmed by competent American representatives. Nor are high-ranking American military officers concealing their plans for saturating the country with nuclear weapons. Speaking in Sasebo—a basing point of the U.S. Navy in Japan—S. Foley, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, openly stated the possibility of calls in port of American warships carrying Tomahawk missiles, which can carry nuclear warheads. Commenting on this pronouncement, the newspaper TOKYO SHIMBUN wrote in an editorial article: "Three years ago the danger entailed by calls at Japanese ports by American ships carrying Tomahawk nuclear missiles was pointed out. Now, 3 years on, this danger is a reality." Officials' unsubstantiated refutations do not dispel the mounting concern. It is clear that things are coming to a manifest violation of the officially proclaimed "three nonnuclear principles"—not to produce and not to have nuclear weapons and not to permit imports thereof to its territory.

The government has also moved toward a direct violation of assumed political commitments by concluding in 1983 an agreement with the United States on making the latest military technology available to the American side. This runs counter to the principles regulating overseas arms exports proclaimed by Tokyo.

* TOKYO SHIMBUN, 29 May 1984.
Active steps are being taken in parallel to expand the sphere of operation of the Japanese-American alliance and extend it to increasingly substantial areas of the Pacific region, which Washington has openly declared a "potential security zone" of the United States. Tokyo's undertaking to exercise in conjunction with the United States control over sea lanes in a radius of up to 1,000 miles from the Japanese islands, in particular, testifies to this. Preparations are also under way in the country for acquiring the possibility of blocking international straits adjacent to Japan.

The ruling circles are participating very actively in a variety of military-political combinations within the Washington--Tokyo--Seoul "triangle" framework. In recent years they—in accordance with the United States' strategic designs—have cemented ties with the Seoul regime. Y. Nakasone visited Seoul in January 1983, becoming the first Japanese premier to pay an official visit to South Korea. Extensively publicized as "epoch-making," this trip had perfectly specific consequences: Seoul was granted favorable loans totaling $4 billion. South Korea does not conceal that the resources obtained are intended for strengthening its military-industrial potential. Military aspects of Japanese-South Korean relations are beginning to play an increasingly big part, and, furthermore, Washington is the instigator and kind of coordinator of such dangerous propensities. For example, Japanese military observers attended the provocative American-South Korean "Team Spirit" maneuvers, which were of unprecedented scale and in which U.S. warships and aircraft took part. Tokyo is hereby being pulled increasingly deeply into American imperialism's bloc policy in the Asia-Pacific region. The shows of American military power with the enlistment of combat formations of South Korea and Japan, which are increasing with every passing year, testify that the ominous process of the formation of a Washington--Seoul--Tokyo bloc is continuing, creating a dangerous new center of military tension in the region.

Simultaneously a sharp increase in militarist trends may be observed in Japan itself. The "reassuring" statements of the country's ruling circles that the country's military organizational development is being realized "within the minimally necessary limits" and that the corresponding expenditure is not more than 1 percent of its GNP are being greeted by the world and, primarily, the Asian public with caution and disquiet. The absolute amount of Japan's military appropriations has more than doubled in the last 10 years and in the current fiscal year is over $12 billion. According to a number of estimates, movement beyond the limits of 1 percent of GNP is perfectly possible in the next few years, which in principle is not refuted by the government itself. Completion of a program of the qualitative modernization of the "Self-Defense Forces" and their equipment with the latest weapons—both American and those being developed in the country—is being speeded up.

A nonstop buildup of military potential is being sought insistently by the circles which dream of the speediest conversion of the country into a major military power. These forces, with clearly expressed "hawkish" manners, pine for the former "might" of militarist Japan.

Of course, Washington is endeavoring to arrange matters such that the development of Tokyo's military policy not slip from its control. The ramified
system of bilateral consultations on military-policy issues, including the regular meetings of leaders of the military departments, meetings of the "Security Treaty" Commission, sessions of the Japanese-American "Security" Consultative Committee and the Defense Cooperation Subcommittee and others, serves as an important means of the direct exercise of such control.

Such a prospect was unequivocally outlined by Y. Nakasone himself. Addressing parliament in February 1983, he declared: "On the basis of the Security Treaty Japan performs the role of defensive shield in the West's strategy in the Far East, and the United States the role of offensive spear.... Contributing to the display to the maximum of the United States' offensive possibilities corresponds to the interests of the defense of Japanese territory, and Japan will cooperate with the United States in this direction."* It is superfluous to say that this task by no means fits within the framework of Tokyo's officially adopted concept of "defense solely for defensive purposes". It is a question of something entirely different--active participation in the realization of Washington's aggressive strategy and the supplementing of American potential in the region with growing Japanese military power.

II

The orientation toward Washington and the endeavor to consolidate its positions in the Asia-Pacific region as "representative" of the interests of the imperialist camp characterize Japan's approach to the development of relations with Asian states, neighbors primarily. This is manifested, in particular, in activity in the "China direction," which in recent years has become one of the most important in the system of priorities of Tokyo's Asian diplomacy. The country's monopolies are making vigorous efforts for the purpose of the accelerated assimilation of the Chinese market and the winning of firm positions therein, and for the long term, moreover. At the same time, however, Tokyo's diplomacy aspires to underpin relations with the PRC with a firm treaty-legal foundation. The signing of the Joint Declaration in 1972, the conclusion of a number of bilateral agreements and, finally, the signing in 1978 of the Japanese-Chinese Peace and Friendship Treaty created favorable conditions for a considerable expansion of trade between the two countries, large-scale supplies to China of complete-set equipment and purchases of energy carriers, primarily oil and coal, which Japan needs.

Subsequently, however, certain difficulties arose on this path caused by the suspension or indefinite postponement of the realization of a number of agreed large-scale cooperation projects in connection with the "economic regulation" carried out in the PRC. This decline was overcome, and recently reciprocal trade has developed quite steadily. In 1983 the volume thereof constituted roughly $10 billion, which makes Japan the PRC's biggest foreign trade partner.

Bilateral contacts in the political sphere are very active. There are regular top-level visits, there is a broad exchange of delegations and a system of

* ASAHI, 9 February 1983.
intergovernmental consultations has been set up. In encouraging the development of contacts with China in every possible way Tokyo is also pursuing purely political goals, bearing in mind use of the so-called "China card" for anti-Soviet purposes. At the same time, however, Tokyo expects that vigorous activity in the role of conduit of the West's plans and the utmost expansion of contacts with such a big Asian country as the PRC will enhance Japan's authority in the region and the world as a whole and afford it certain freedom of maneuver, within the framework of the partnership with Washington included.

Currently Japan is China's leading creditor, and, furthermore, a very substantial proportion of the loans granted it is allocated along government lines at very low interest. However, in rendering such assistance the Japanese side is increasingly noticeably leading matters toward linking in one way or another its participation in the modernization of Chinese industry and the development of the PRC's infrastructure with the question of Beijing's consolidation of the "open doors" policy and the attraction of foreign investments. The goal being pursued here—in Washington's wake—is that of "pulling China as deeply as possible into the orbit of influence of the capitalist economy.

Indicative in this plane was Y. Nakasone's visit to the PRC in March 1984, in the course of which the granting to China of a new "package" of low-interest government loans totaling 470 billion yen (over $2 billion) was announced and also a promise to examine favorably the question of allocating the country's Export-Import Bank new large-scale credit was made. In parallel Tokyo is insistently raising the question of guarantees of capital investments and profit and discussing the possibility of the creation in "special economic zones" of China not only of joint but also its own enterprises.

The Japanese side's endeavor to put forward in the political dialogue with China such questions as the establishment between the two countries of a regular exchange of opinions "on questions connected with Soviet military power in the Far East" and so forth can be discerned increasingly distinctly against this background. On the other hand, Japanese figures are constantly urging the development of close relations between the PRC and the United States. Commenting on Y. Nakasone's visit to Beijing, the newspaper AKAHATA wrote that the underlying motive for this trip on the eve of U.S. President Reagan's trip to the PRC was the strategic design of winning China over to the side of the "Western alliance".

III

Tokyo attaches paramount significance to the pursuit of active diplomacy in the Southeast Asia region, primarily to the all-around development of relations with the ASEAN countries, which are regarded as a "natural" target of political and economic influence.

Japan is ASEAN's biggest trading partner. It accounts for over 25 percent of total exports of the countries of the association and approximately 25 percent of their imports. At the same time the latter occupy a most important place in Japan's foreign trade. More than 2,800 Japanese companies function here.
For the purpose of consolidating its predominant influence Tokyo is making quite sizable financial "infusions" in the economy of the ASEAN states in the areas most favorable for itself. Currently approximately 38 percent of the aid allocated by the government for "development purposes" is being channeled here. Japan is participating in a variety of programs of a cultural and educational nature, and the purpose thereof is not concealed, furthermore—raising in the ASEAN countries a young generation of businessmen and politicians oriented toward Japanese methods of managing the economy and a "way of thinking" corresponding to these methods. However, Tokyo's expansion is encountering growing resistance. Demands are being made on it increasingly often for a change in the unequal nature of economic relations and the removal of artificially created barriers impeding the sale of commodities from the ASEAN countries on the Japanese market. All this is serving as a source of serious and long-standing disagreements between the sides.

Matters are also far from simple of contacts between Japan and the ASEAN states in the political sphere. Tokyo does not let slip a chance to declare "full support for ASEAN's policy line" and engages in exchanges of high-level visits and other measures. Nonetheless, the country's increasingly active participation in the United States' military strategy and the intensification of militarist trends are increasing anxiety in the ASEAN countries concerning Japan's possible conversion into a major military power.

With regard for the current situation Tokyo is implementing urgent measures to "pacify" its partners in Southeast Asia. During a visit to ASEAN countries in May 1983 Y. Nakasone succeeded with the help of extensively publicized declarations and promises of new economic and financial assistance in getting from certain leaders of states of the association an expression of "understanding" of its "defense" policy. This was interpreted in Tokyo as a major diplomatic success making it possible to continue the policy of strengthening the military-political alliance with Washington and further increasing its own military potential. However, a circumstance of considerable importance was glossed over in silence here: the ASEAN representatives invariably accompanied their words about "understanding" with highly material reservations, emphasizing the need for Japan's strict observance of the provisions of its "peaceful constitution" and the limitation of military measures to purely defensive functions precluding the possibility of a revival of militarism.

It is fitting to refer in this connection to the results of an opinion poll conducted by Japan's Foreign Ministry in the ASEAN countries which were made public in November 1983. According to the newspaper NIHON KEIZI, the results of the poll showed that in the latter there are "strong misgivings" concerning Tokyo's military policy and "grounds exist for a new outburst of criticism of Japanese militarism."* Evidently for this reason a leading Foreign Ministry employee observed, speaking in April 1984 at a meeting in Sapporo, that "the situation in Asia is like a dormant volcano, and it is not known when dissatisfaction will pour out in the form of an anti-Japanese movement."**

* NIHON KEIZI SHIBUN, 4 February 1983.
** HOKKAI TIMES, 14 April 1984.
As a whole, Japan's attempts to stimulate diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region are encountering a very cool reaction in ASEAN circles. For example, Tokyo has been forced to agree to hold back the pace of development of the "Pacific community" concept inasmuch as the association's countries have been unable to conceal their anxiety on this score. Furthermore, disquiet was observed precisely when the Z. Suzuki cabinet attempted in 1982 for the first time to suffuse the said concept with specific military-political content.

Nor does Tokyo's policy in respect of the Indochina states have anything in common with a sincere quest for ways of solving the problems which have accumulated in Southeast Asia. Closing their eyes to the constructive peace-loving initiatives of the latter aimed at an improvement in relations with the ASEAN countries, on each "convenient" occasion Japanese representatives emphasize the so-called "Kampuchean question," which, as is known, is being actively used by imperialist circles headed by Washington for interference in the internal affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and intimidation of the ASEAN countries with the invented "threat on the part of Vietnam". It turns out that while declaring its aspiration to contribute to the cause of a political settlement in Southeast Asia Japan is in practice taking steps in the directly opposite direction. The "freezing" of economic cooperation with Vietnam on all kinds of far-fetched pretexts and also contacts with the groupings opposed to the sole legitimate authority in people's Kampuchea testify to this, for example.

IV

Active support for the hegemonist aspirations of the United States in the world arena and further linkage with Washington's adventurist policy in respect of the socialist countries have been an essential feature of Japan's foreign policy since the start of the 1980's. This could not have failed to have been reflected in the state of Soviet-Japanese relations, the approach to which in Tokyo is of an openly destructive nature.

As is known, under pressure from the United States the Japanese side has adopted a policy of a sharp winding down of political contacts with the USSR. This has in fact led to the undermining of all that was positive that was created by the efforts of the sides in the postwar period. There has been a pronounced stimulation of the campaign, generously financed by the government, of illegal claims to the South Kuriles, the Soviet Union's sovereignty over which was restored as a result of the postwar settlement. Some Japanese figures are coming to the point even of making some "change in the conduct" of the USSR in international affairs a condition of an improvement in bilateral relations. This constitutes the most flagrant interference in the internal affairs and mutual relations of other countries and an attempt to teach them what kind of policy to pursue.

The proposition concerning the mythical "Soviet military threat" is being whipped up in a particularly big way in Japan. The purpose is obvious—kindling chauvinist sentiments, reviving militarist traditions and awakening in a certain part of the population of the country an unfriendly attitude toward the Soviet Union. This line testifies to a policy adopted consciously.
by the country's ruling circles of complicating relations with the USSR. Verbiage about the "Soviet threat" is designed merely to divert attention away from the significant galvanization of Japan's military preparations and the broadening of its military-strategic commitments. Of course, such a line could not have failed to have encountered a firm and emphatic rebuff from the Soviet side.

Tokyo officials' attempts to propagandize the "new view" of the country's history for the purpose of justifying, even whitewashing the country's militarist past represented a highly disturbing feature which introduced additional complications to Japan's relations with neighboring states, including the Soviet Union. The decision of the Ministry of Education to the effect that compilers of school history textbooks avoid using the term "aggression" with regard to the actions of Japanese militarism in Asia during World War II, which acquired the notoriety of scandal in 1982, was, in particular, subordinated to this task. This step evoked legitimate condemnation in many Asian countries, as a result of which the government had to apologize and promise to "correct" the said decision. Nonetheless, the following year, 1983, demands were again put forward in the course of the procedure of a routine "survey" of textbooks for the rewriting in a "patriotic spirit" of the historical facts connected with the USSR's entry into the war against militarist Japan, the comprehensive exposition of the illegal territorial claims against the Soviet Union and so forth.

The growth of revanchist trends and certain circles' cultivation of a feeling of hostility toward Russia, the Soviet Union and its people also made possible such provocative ventures as the reception and naval parade in Kagoshima in May 1984 in connection with the 50th anniversary of the death of Admiral Togo, commander of the Japanese Navy in the Tsushima engagement of 1905, and in connection with the 80th anniversary of the "Japanese Navy's great victory in the war against Russia". As a USSR Foreign Ministry statement of 25 May 1984 observed, "leading circles of the Soviet Union regard the action undertaken in Japan as hostile in respect of a friendly neighboring state."

Striving in accordance with the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress for the establishment of relations of genuine good-neighborliness with Japan, the USSR firmly and consistently adheres to a policy of an improvement in mutual relations. Its numerous specific and constructive initiatives addressed to Japan are aimed precisely at this. The Soviet proposals, which are imbued with sincere concern for an improvement in the political climate in the region, remain valid today also. They represent a realistic and considered program of the achievement of mutually acceptable accords between the two countries, which would undoubtedly be greeted positively by all the peace-loving peoples of Asia.

The constructive nature of the Soviet initiatives is manifested in the fact that they take account in full of the need to lead matters toward the creation of a basis for the development of Soviet-Japanese dialogue, despite the existing differences in approach. Thus taking into consideration the absence in the Japanese side of a readiness to consent to the signing of a peace treaty based on present realities, back in 1978 the Soviet Union proposed
the conclusion of a good-neighborliness and cooperation treaty which would embrace the sphere of mutual relations already ripe for a firm treaty basis to be imparted to them. Discussion of mutual apprehensions and anxieties and agreement on mutually acceptable measures for a strengthening of trust both in the political and military spheres have been proposed to the Japanese Government repeatedly.

Another Soviet initiative is also highly important, particularly in the light of the "concern" expressed by certain circles in Tokyo apropos some "nuclear threat" on the part of the USSR. It is a question of the conclusion of an agreement on guarantees in accordance with which the Soviet Union would record in treaty-legal form an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against Japan, and the latter an undertaking to strictly and consistently observe its nuclear-free status. However, none of these clear and precise proposals has received a positive response from the Japanese side. Nor has it presented any of its own initiatives for an improvement in mutual relations, preferring to unwarrantedly shift the responsibility for the cooling thereof onto the Soviet Union. Such negativism may only be assessed in one way—as a reluctance to reach agreement, despite the existing prerequisites.

The position occupied by Tokyo, which is dictated by the orientation of its foreign policy toward Washington, has been reflected negatively in the state of bilateral ties in trade-economic and other shapes in which both sides interacted successfully earlier. Through the fault of Tokyo, which has zealously adhered to the "sanctions" policy formulated in Washington, there has been a considerable decline in the level of reciprocal commodity turnover. As a result Japan has dropped from second to fifth place among the USSR's capitalist partners and lost many profitable contracts. This trend was traced throughout 1983 also, when the trade volume fell more than 18 percent compared with 1982. In violation of intergovernmental accords Tokyo is blocking the fulfillment of scientific-technical agreements and limiting exchanges and relations in other spheres.

Let us take now such a sphere as fishing. Cooperation here has always been to the benefit of the peoples of the two countries and contributed to preservation of the vital resources of the oceans, be it fishing for such most valuable types of fish as salmon, the organization of joint expeditions for crab and shrimp and other fishing activity in the economic zones of both states. The Japanese side has displayed an interest in ensuring that the said sphere not be subject to market changes. And if the previous position has been maintained here today also, decisive credit for this belongs to the Soviet Union, which takes into consideration the vital importance of fishing in Soviet coastal waters for the fishermen of Hokkaido and the northern part of the island of Honshu.

In recent years Tokyo has been raising the question of the transfer of the existing fishing area agreements to a long-term basis. This is in principle a good thing, of course. However, it will only be possible when there is an improvement in the general atmosphere in mutual relations and changes for the better are discerned in the sphere of political, economic and other contacts.
There is no doubt that the present state of bilateral relations cannot correspond to Japan's national interests. Evidently recognizing this, it has been possible to hear increasingly often from Tokyo recently pronouncements in support of an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the progressive development of dialogue and contacts with the USSR. However, declarations should be underpinned by specific actions. If attempts to advance this prior condition or the other for the development of relations predominate in Japan's approach, a serious improvement is not to be expected. And, on the contrary, if Tokyo chooses in favor of peace and good-neighborliness, as the Soviet leadership has declared with all certainty, the USSR will be a reliable partner in the development of broad relations in the political, economic and other spheres.

Certain conservative Japanese figures sometimes put the question: what policy should their country adopt? Move further along the path of military-political bloc-forming with the United States, putting one's hopes in the "restraining power" of the overseas ally, or strive to become a militarily strong power possessing nuclear weapons even? The far-fetched nature of such an alternative is obvious. Persons advancing the said propositions are manifestly in the grip of illusory concepts of the "from a position of strength" and "balance of fear" policy. And, as historical experience shows, this has never benefited anyone. Something different is expected of Japan--active and independent steps for the purpose of easing international tension and a real contribution to the cause of the creation of an atmosphere of trust, consolidation of good-neighborliness and cooperation and a deepening of mutual understanding between peoples.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is putting its entire international authority at the service of the most noble goal--prevention of a military catastrophe and resumption of the detente process. "...There are many opportunities for contributing with specific deeds to the strengthening of peace and international security," K.U. Chernenko has emphasized. "The Soviet Union is ready to cooperate with all states in the accomplishment of these goals."

* PRAVDA, 9 April 1984.


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INTEGRAL ROLE OF CAPITALIST ECONOMY IN 'WORLDWIDE' SYSTEM

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[Article by Yu. Shishkov: "The Question of the Unity of the Modern Worldwide Economy"]

[Text] Intercountry economic relations are developing more rapidly than ever before, the international division of labor is deepening and the internationalization of economic life is being enriched with new forms under the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution. There are practically no countries left today which are not to this extent or the other a part of the system of worldwide economic relations, which are involving them increasingly deeply in an intricate network of commercial, credit-finance, scientific-technical and production-joint labor relations and interdependences. Furthermore, ecological, energy raw material, food and a number of other global problems have appeared in the latter half of the 20th century whose solution requires unification of the efforts of all mankind.

Under these conditions there is appreciably increased significance in the theoretical interpretation of the economic processes and phenomena occurring on a planetary scale and study of the laws and development trends of the worldwide economy as an integral system. A Marxist approach to economic relations from the standpoints of universality is particularly important. There is a multitude of most urgent theoretical and applied problems here requiring in-depth research. But methodologically precise initial positions and clarity of fundamental concepts and categories are needed for this. "...Whoever embarks on particular questions without a preliminary solution of general ones will inevitably at each step involuntarily 'stumble over' these general questions," V.I. Lenin cautioned. Clarity is needed primarily in an understanding of the most general category in this sphere--the "modern worldwide economy".

The prerequisites of Marxist theory of the worldwide economy were laid down by K. Marx and F. Engels back in the 1840's. They showed that large-scale industry "has for the first time created a worldwide history inasmuch as it has made satisfaction of the requirements of each civilized country and each individual therein dependent on the entire world and inasmuch as it has done away with the former, naturally evolved exclusiveness of individual countries."
This concept was further developed in the "Communist Party Manifesto" and other works of the founders of scientific communism. However, in the middle of the last century the worldwide market and the system of international commodity-exchange relations mainly constituted the basis of the economic interdependence of national economies.

Later it was supplemented by the international interweaving of loan and working capital and the formation of a system of international exploitation—both directly in the sphere of production and via the sphere of circulation—of a vast colonial periphery by a handful of imperialist powers. As a result the worldwide capitalist market began to grow into the worldwide capitalist economy. By the turn of the century this process had been completed as a whole, which enabled V.I. Lenin to speak no longer about the worldwide market but about the "total picture of a worldwide capitalist economy."

With the victory of socialism in our country profound changes began in this worldwide economy which culminated by the end of the 1940's—start of the 1950's in its division into two subsystems fundamentally different in their socioeconomic nature—the world socialist economy and the world capitalist economy. However, it was not immediately possible to correctly evaluate this qualitative shift in the worldwide economy.

The acute political and ideological confrontation between the two world systems and the winding down of trade-economic ties between them under the conditions of the cold war imposed by imperialism engendered confusion on this question in certain theorists of that period. The concept of the disintegration of a single all-embracing world market into two opposed markets—socialist and capitalist—became prevalent as of the start of the 1950's. Whence to the complete denial of a worldwide economy remained only one step. And the "worldwide economy" category disappeared from scientific publications, encyclopedias and economic dictionaries.

To the credit of Marxist theoretical thought this confusion was in time successfully surmounted. The worldwide economy, which had evolved as the result of the long historical development of the production forces and production relations of human society, could not, of course, either disintegrate into parts or "vanish" even from the intensity of the struggle of the two socioeconomic systems. It simply switched to a new qualitative condition. "The separation from capitalism of increasingly new countries does not do away with the worldwide (global) economy but only alters its economic essence," Academician A.M. Rumyantsev wrote in 1969. "The modern global economy incorporates capitalism, which has regressed from a worldwide to a world economy... and socialism, which is progressing from a national to a world and worldwide economy." Such a viewpoint on the modern worldwide economy is also shared by a number of other Soviet experts.

Defining the "worldwide economy" concept, each of them emphasizes individual aspects of this multilevel category, placing the accents variously. Thus, according to M. Maksimova, the worldwide economy is "the sum total of national economies linked with one another by a system of the international division of labor of economic and political relations." N. Shmelev observes that "at
the current stage of development the worldwide economy represents a socially contradictory system of the international organization of production and exchange of the results of economic activity encompassing all countries and regions of the world."

"Together with national economic complexes the worldwide economy represents a present-day reality," Academician 0. Bogomolov writes. "...The worldwide economy is a dialectical unity of opposites, and international economic relations of different social types are interwoven therein."10 "The worldwide economy," E. Pletnev believes, "actually exists as a universal link and mutual concern for an exchange of activity between national economies, irrespective of their sociopolitical allegiance... Both political-economic types of communication between countries belonging to whichever coexisting system represent a worldwide economy as a metasystem of the mutual relations of all countries of the modern era."11 In his opinion, it can be defined as "a system with two poles of attraction and repulsion, as an antagonistic unity of two essentially opposite types of world economy."12

The adduced definitions, like others also not quoted here, do not claim, of course, to be an absolute truth. But all of them in one way or another reflect the following objective truth: economically the modern world, despite its entire complexity and contradictoriness, represents a definite integral system unified by the level of international socialization of production which had been reached historically. Like any integral system, the worldwide economy, despite the qualitative distinctiveness of its constituent subsystems, possesses certain regularities of development, common for them, determining the basic direction of its further evolution.

Only on the basis of such a concept is it possible, we believe, to understand the development trends of modern world economic processes and explain the new situation which is taking shape on the planet under the impact of the scientific-technical revolution, which is swiftly raising the level of internationalization of economic life, and also under the pressure of global problems and as a consequence of the economic use of near space and the ocean depths which has begun.

However, this approach has its opponents, who under the conditions of the new exacerbation of tension between the two world systems are attempting to torpedo or at least cast doubt on this concept. A most open attempt of such a kind was made last year by the Soviet economist G. Sorokin. Emphatically rejecting the proposition of the unity of a worldwide economy consisting of two opposite socioeconomic systems, he declares: "It would be wrong to assert some unity and common foundation of the world capitalist and world socialist economies. These are two world systems of different types and incompatible antagonistic economies. They cannot form a unity, even if it is called dialectical."13 He believes that recognition of the unity of the two world systems is even dangerous for it allegedly leads to an underestimation of the historical irreversibility of the victory of the socialist system and "deprives the theory of the worldwide economy of its most important aspect—the prospect of the inevitable onset of the era of the worldwide communist economy."14
And since this is so, there are no grounds for seeking any laws of development common for the worldwide economy. The author condemns those who are attempting to ascertain such laws and declares categorically: "Common laws of the development of the world socialist and world capitalist economies do not exist."15

At the same time G. Sorokin is troubled by "how then to correctly explain theoretically" the division of labor between socialist and capitalist countries and the existence of stable economic relations between them. In order to overcome this hitch he proposes his own interpretation of the worldwide economy. Examining the world socialist economy, back in 1966 he distinguished two aspects therein. "The world economy in the broad sense encompasses two aspects thereof: basic production relations determining this type of production or the other and international production relations and also the interaction of the two aspects. Perhaps it is expedient also to consider the sum total of international production relations the world economy in the 'narrow sense,' thereby emphasizing the need for a special study of the specific laws of the development of international production relations."16

This far from faultless construction contains a certain grain of reason, namely: separation of essential production relations determining the socioeconomic nature of international economic relations from the general mass of production relations taking shape on the basis of the division of labor and exchange of activity between national economies. This idea has been developed and scientifically substantiated in a number of works of other Soviet experts. We would note that, in the author's opinion, the world economy in the "narrow sense" presupposes the existence of certain "laws of the development of international production relations," that is, it has to be assumed, laws common for all participants in these relations.

Seventeen years later the author decided to apply this conceptual outline to the worldwide economy for, as he believes, "such a methodological approach makes it possible... to better understand the nature of the worldwide economy."17 He thereby parted the framework of the world economy to a global scale, that is, essentially substituted the "worldwide economy" category for the "world economy" category. "The worldwide economy 'in a broad sense' (the sum total of production relations determining the type of economy and foreign economic relations) finally disintegrated into two economies, which joined irreconcilable struggle between themselves," he writes. For this reason "...it is possible to speak about the worldwide economy only in the 'narrow sense'."18

Let us try to study the results of this contribution to the theory of the worldwide economy.

First of all, the worldwide economy in the "narrow sense" appears merely as the sum total of foreign economic relations between countries, merely as the "'interaction' of the sides" and no more. A viewpoint close to this is shared by E. Pletnev also, who believed that the worldwide economy is merely the sum total of international economic relations or intercountry (and "intersystem") communication, but not the sum total of national economies.19 O. Bogomolov also occupies a position which is similar in principle in respect of the world socialist economy.20
Given such an approach, the worldwide economy ceases to be an economy in the scientific concept. There remains of it merely a system of intercountry economic relations deprived of the basic subjects of these relations—the national economies—a kind of arena for a global economic performance without the principal characters. A certain sterilized extract results theoretically separated from the vital economic organism which, possibly, is suitable for highly intellectual debate, but obviously nonviable.

It cannot be forgotten that it is precisely in the national economies that the phase of social production which is decisive from the viewpoint of Marxism is accomplished—the labor process itself creating material and spiritual benefits. This phase is, as is known, fundamental not only in the development of the production forces but also in the plane of the formation of production relations. The relations which take shape in the process of direct production, primarily the basic production relationship, are the primary relations, which are the source relations for secondary production relations—distribution, exchange and consumption. It is precisely the national economies which are the basic generators of the entire socially definite system of production relations which subsequently, with certain modifications, are transferred to the intercountry sphere, conditioning the socioeconomic nature of international economic relations. For this reason exclusion of the national economies from the "worldwide economy" category deprives it of the very core, reduces it to some zone of contacts and converts it essentially into the backyard of the economy in the true meaning of the word.

In the light of what has been said the worldwide economy cannot, from our viewpoint, fail to incorporate the sum total of national economies participating in international economic intercourse.

However, if we agree even for one minute with such an abridged idea of the worldwide economy, one further serious hitch arises. In proposing that the worldwide economy be regarded merely as a system of the foreign economic relations of socialist and capitalist countries, as a narrow range of intercountry production relations, G. Sorokin evidently hoped to thereby evade the question of the unity of this economy. But, as is known, international production relations are "secondary and tertiary, altogether derived, transferred, nonprimary production relations."

As already said, they are a continuation in the international sphere of the type of production relations which predominate within socialist and capitalist countries. For this reason the production relations which take shape in the process of the economic interaction of countries of different systems cannot be homogeneous in their social nature. Furthermore, in certain aspects they are diametrically opposite. In other words, the production relations between countries of the two systems also represent a unity of opposites. Thus constriction of the "worldwide economy" concept has not spared the author the insidious question of the dialectical unity of the two world systems. No attempts to defer, chop off or disguise this central methodological question of the theory of the modern worldwide economy allow it to be avoided. "Speaking of the present worldwide economy by generalizing from the confrontation of the two social systems therein would mean embarking on meaningless 'technological' arguments or reiterating the
stale news of the theorists of economics," E. Pletnev rightly observes. "Without antagonistic unity--struggle and contest in all forms of the two opposite systems--there is no worldwide economy of our day."24

Instead of seriously investigating the nature of intersystem production relations, G. Sorokin has merely confused this problem in that he has illegitimately substituted for the "world economy" concept the "worldwide economy" concept. He thus bluntly declares: some experts (meaning primarily himself) "believe that the worldwide economy is the world economy in a narrow sense."25

His arguments go on to form the following syllogism: (I) In the world economy international production relations are socially homogeneous (this is emphasized specially in his article: the world economy "is now defined as the sum total of homogeneous (!!) production relations shaping the mode of production and conditioning the development both of the national economies and their international economic relations")26. (II) The worldwide economy lacks such homogeneity of production relations. (III) Consequently, it cannot be unified.

An error of logic has been made here primarily: the subject of the major premise (I) was a specific concept, while the subject of the minor premise (II) was a generic concept, which incorporates the first as its component. In other words, the author proceeds from the fact that the general concept must unfailingly possess all the attributes of the particular, not the other way about, as the elementary law of logic demands. Meanwhile the specific concept appears particular in relation to the generic (general) concept precisely because it also possesses together with generic characteristics a number of specific features which are absolutely not obligatory for the first. In this case the worldwide economy is by no means obliged to possess such an attribute as the social homogeneity of international production relations, which, G. Sorokin believes, is inherent in the world economy.27

Let us now turn to the content aspect of the author's major premise. Is the world economy really characterized by socioeconomic homogeneity? The entire history of the world capitalist economy from the earliest phases of its development (when it was merely a world market) through our day is the history of a socioeconomically differentiated, profoundly heterogeneous system. It has always incorporated and continues to incorporate countries in the most varied phases of socioeconomic development: from the prefeudal to state-monopoly. Accordingly, nor have the international production relations of these countries, being secondary and derived from intracountry relations, been in any way "homogeneous". Nor are they now. Nor is the world socialist economy, which incorporates countries which differ considerably from one another both in terms of the level of development of the production forces and the degree of maturity of socialist production relations, entirely homogeneous in a socioeconomic respect. While some of them are in the phase of the formation of socialist production relations, others are consolidating and cementing these relations and yet others have entered the phase of developed socialism. It cannot be precluded that as increasingly new countries fall away from the world capitalist economy and are incorporated in the world socialist economy, the socioeconomic differentiation of the latter will increase even more.
So upon very close examination G. Sorokin's system of reasoning against the proposition of the unity of the modern worldwide economy collapses. The worldwide economy is truly heterogeneous, as, incidentally, are the two world economies which form it. Of course, the degree of its heterogeneity is qualitatively different from that in the world capitalist and, even more, in the world socialist economies. But after all, none of the authors whom he criticizes have ever asserted that the dialectical unity of the worldwide economy is based on the social homogeneity of the production relations between countries of the opposite socioeconomic systems. The author is essentially quarreling with a myth which he himself created.

On what, then, is the unity of the modern worldwide economy consisting of two opposite world economic systems based?

Primarily on the high level of the international socialization of production on a worldwide scale attained in the course of the centuries-long development of human society's production forces. The founders of Marxism–Leninism repeatedly emphasized the all-encompassing nature of the international socialization of production and its specific-historical expression—the internationalization of economic life. "...Large-scale industry has linked up all peoples of the world," F. Engels wrote, "united all small markets in a worldwide market, prepared the group everywhere for civilization and progress and led to the point where everything accomplished in the civilized countries has to influence all remaining countries...."28 It is important to bear in mind that scientific-technical progress and the development of the production forces in the countries which are most advanced in this respect influence other, less developed countries, are pulling them step by step onto the path of industrialization and electrification and so forth. Of course, under capitalist conditions this enlistment of the less developed countries costs the latter very dear: for a long time they are a target of exploitation on the part of monopoly capital and colonial or semicolonial aspirations on the part of imperialist powers, for which bloody dictatorial regimes are often implanted here and so forth.

But it remains an incontrovertible fact that the international diffusion of scientific-technical achievements and the spread of progressive means of production, transport and communications are making the whole world an increasingly interconnected whole whose strength is determined by the ramified structure and depth of the international division of labor. The expansion of scientific-technical achievements around the globe is being accompanied by an intensification of economic, political and cultural ties between countries and peoples. All mankind has to this extent or the other long been involved in these processes. "...The entire economic, political and spiritual life of mankind is increasingly internationalized under capitalism even," V.I. Lenin wrote. "Socialism internationalizes it entirely."29

The mutual relations between the two world systems constitute no exception here. Scientific-technical successes in one of them stimulate progress in the other and vice versa. "...The development of science and technology has become a principal direction of the competition between the socialist and capitalist systems," the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree
"Measures To Accelerate Scientific-Technical Progress in the National Economy" says. Mutual influence in this sphere is exerted not only in a roundabout way—through competition—but also by way of direct mutually profitable cooperation in the form of the buying and selling of progressive technology, licenses and knowhow and even direct scientific-technical cooperation (in the sphere of thermonuclear synthesis, in space research and so forth, for example). The objective need for the further development of this process will strengthen in the future, which is recognized by American scientists also.31

The integrity of the modern worldwide economy is also secured by certain elements of international production relations of a "nonessential nature," predominantly exchange relations. It is a question of the international exchange of commodities produced under different socioeconomic conditions, but appearing on the worldwide market simply as vectors of a certain use value and international value. K. Marx repeatedly emphasized the social indifference of commodities circulating on the market. For the existence of commercial capital, he wrote, "no conditions are required other than those which are necessary for simple commodity and money circulation.... Whatever the mode of production on the basis of which the products entering circulation as commodities are produced—be it the primitive-commune farm, production based on slave labor, small-scale peasant and petty bourgeois or capitalist production—this in no way changes their nature as commodities, and as commodities they must equally undergo the process of exchange and the changes in form accompanying it."32

The thought that for the economic intercourse of different modes of production via the international market a minimum—simple commodity and money circulation expressing cost relations, that is, commensuration of the labor expenditure of different commodity producers—is sufficient is methodologically important here. Inasmuch as products of socialist production assume the form of commodities, while socialist management makes extensive use of commodity-money levers, the added proposition of K. Marx also extends to the exchange of activity between socialist and capitalist enterprises. We have, therefore, to agree with N. Shmelev that in the modern worldwide economy "producers who are different in social nature are uniform in one attribute: they are all commodity producers, they are all owners of a commodity seeking via the worldwide market social, worldwide recognition.... The worldwide economy appears in relation to these commodity producers as some supersystem reflecting the levels of labor productivity and, correspondingly, production outlays which have been reached in the world, universal reproduction proportions, the leading directions and basic achievements of universal scientific-technical progress and the supplements and alternatives to national production contained in international cooperation."33

This global connection via the worldwide market, which at first sight might appear the purest abstraction, in practice makes itself felt very perceptibly. It was sufficient for the international oil cartel to artificially maintain monopoly low world crude oil prices for more than two decades for their to occur throughout the world, not excluding the socialist countries, a reorientation of the energy balance toward liquid fuel with all the ensuing consequences for the energy consumption of production and its technology and sectorial structure as a whole. And when the system of artificially low oil prices inevitably collapsed, the whole world perceived its consequences acutely.
If it is considered that for certain socialist countries a considerable proportion of their social reproduction is connected with foreign trade and that the developed capitalist countries account for approximately one-third of their foreign commodity turnover volume here, it becomes obvious that cyclical fluctuations of the reproduction process in the West cannot fail to be reflected in the economic growth rate of the socialist countries. On the other hand, the stable long-term orders of the socialist partners provide for the employment of approximately 2 million working people in the West, which is by no means few even given the present state of East-West economic relations. There is a great multitude of examples of such economic interdependence of the two world economies via international exchange.

In recent years their interdependence has also increased greatly along the lines of such global problems as disturbance of the ecological balance between society and nature, the pernicious consequences of which do not recognize state borders; the growing depletion on a worldwide scale of a number of finite natural resources, which requires a collective search for alternative types of raw material and energy; the rapid reduction in certain renewable resources, particularly biological marine resources, which presupposes the joint efforts of all mankind for their protection and an improvement in their reproduction conditions; and the exacerbation of the world food problem, which is assuming particularly dramatic forms in the developing part of the world capitalist economy, but which through the system of world prices is affecting the economy of the socialist states also.

Nor can we forget the political sphere, the revolutionary processes which are step by step transforming the social appearance of our planet and the attempts of world reaction headed by U.S. ruling circles to turn back the course of history by force of arms. All three main driving forces of the worldwide revolutionary process—the world socialist system, the world workers and communist movement and the national-liberation movement—are linked and interact with one another. Furthermore, contrary to the delirious inventions of the present occupant of the White House, real socialism is contributing to revolutionary transformations in various parts of the world not by inspiring conspiracies and insurrections but by its economic and social achievements. "We are exerting our main influence on the international revolution," V.I. Lenin said, "by our economic policy.... The struggle has shifted to this field on a worldwide scale."

Of course, the growing interdependence of the two subsystems of the worldwide economy has its limits objectively conditioned by the fundamental difference of their socioeconomic natures and the opposite nature of their class content. Practice testifies that a failure to observe these limits could result in grim economic and political consequences. But this is no reason to sink to the other extreme and portray the prospects of the mutual relations of the two world systems as a consistent widening of the gulf between them. But it is precisely such a picture which is painted by G. Sorokin, claiming that the intrinsic regularities "of the development of socialism and capitalism... are 'working' not for the 'unity' of the worldwide economy but for a deepening of the contrast between the two systems" and that "the proposition concerning the unity of the worldwide economy, which ignores the increasing contrast of the
systems, does not reflect the actual historical prospect of the movement of
the worldwide economy and the inevitable development of the contrast between
socialism and capitalism as far as the victory of the worldwide commu-
nist economy."35

No Marxist-Leninist can doubt the inevitability of the historical victory of
socialism and the formation in the future of a worldwide communist economy.
But the path toward this future is not that straightforward since together
with the fundamental, objectively conditioned contradictions between the "two
systems of ownership," as V.I. Lenin said, these systems also have many common
interests. Even in the very grim period of the imperialist powers' blockade
of the young Soviet state he emphasized that "...we are... the builders of a
worldwide economy"36 and explained: "There is a force greater than the
desire, will and decision of any hostile government or class, this force is
general economic worldwide relations...."37

The Leninist policy of the broad economic cooperation of all countries,
irrespective of their social system, the policy of the peaceful coexistence
and economic cooperation of the two systems, was and remains the highway of the
foreign economic strategy of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community.
"The great Lenin bequeathed us the principle of the peaceful coexistence of
states with different social systems," K.U. Chernenko observed at the CPSU
Central Committee February (1984) Plenum. "We are invariably true to this
principle. Now, in the age of nuclear weapons and superaccurate missiles, it
is more necessary to the peoples than ever."

Nor can we acknowledge as impressive G. Sorokin's arguments against Soviet and
foreign Marxists who recognize the existence in the worldwide economy of
certain general economic laws operating both in the world capitalist and
world socialist economies. Incidentally, he is no more consistent here than on
the question of the existence of a worldwide economy. While categorically
asserting that there are no general laws of the development of the world
socialist and world capitalist economies he later declares the modern
worldwide economy a transitional economy from the world capitalist economy to a
global communist economic system and adds that this "transitional period...
is characterized by general regularities."38

We would recall that the founders of Marxism repeatedly pointed to the
existence of certain most general economic laws inherent in several formations.
Political economy, F. Engels observed, "...studies primarily the particular
laws of each individual phase of the development of production and exchange,
and only at the end of this study can it establish a few, absolutely general
laws applicable to production and exchange in general."39 Despite the entire
depth of the fundamental differences in the nature of the production relations
of socialism and capitalism, certain general economic laws exist which operate
in each of these contending formations and in the sphere of economic relations
between them—laws not affecting the deep-lying foundations of the development
of these formations.

This problem has as yet been developed inadequately with reference to the
modern worldwide economy. For this reason we will cite merely some of the laws
of a universal nature operating on the scale of the worldwide economy as a whole.
These are primarily the rise in the level of the international socialization of production as the national and international production forces develop. It is this law which is the basis of the process about which the authors of the "Communist Party Manifesto" wrote: "An all-around connection and all-around dependence of the nations on one another are coming to replace the old local and national exclusiveness and existence thanks to home-produced products." The said law conditions the growth of the inner interconnection and integrity of the worldwide economy despite the entire contrast and historical confrontation of its consistent subsystems.

One further general law could be formulated as the law of the growing involvement of the national economy in world economic relations as a country's production forces develop and the intracountry division of labor deepens. "Mutual relations between different nations," K. Marx emphasized, "depend on the extent to which each of them has developed its production forces, the division of labor and domestic intercourse." It is precisely this law which is discussed by the Polish economist (Ye. Kleyer), who is criticized by G. Sorokin, (Kleyer) calling it the law of the growth of the open nature of the national economy. The felicity of such an appellation and certain of (Ye. Kleyer's) conclusions may be disputed, but there is no reason to deny this objective law, whose action is corroborated by daily practice on a mass scale both in the world capitalist and world socialist economies.

The increase in the objective need for the plan-oriented development of world economic relations as the level of the international socialization of production rises undoubtedly pertains to the universal general laws. This law forms the basis of Lenin's well-known proposition concerning the trend "toward the creation of a single worldwide economy as a whole regulated by the proletariat of all nations in accordance with a common plan, which trend has been revealed perfectly manifestly under capitalism even and will undoubtedly be further developed and fully completed under socialism." The growth of this need on a worldwide scale is also graphically confirmed by the deepening of the coordination of the CEMA states' planning activity and by the attempts (for the most part unsuccessful owing to the profound interimperialist contradictions) by the West's industrially developed countries within the framework of the EEC and the OECD, at meetings of leaders of the "big seven" and so forth to formulate joint action programs in the energy sphere, combating inflation, reducing unemployment and so forth and the developing countries' efforts to coordinate their economic policy.

The said law is blazing a trail for itself in "rivalry" with a number of laws of the spontaneous regulation of world economic relations, primarily with the law of (international) value. This law is the basis of all commodity-exchange deals, irrespective of the mode of production (in the formalional sense of the word) of the exchangeable commodities themselves. We have to agree with E. Pletnev that the law of value performs an important role "at the intersection" of the two confrontational world economies, namely, it "sews together" the two world economic systems "with the threat of worldwide exchange."
Of course, all the above-mentioned general economic laws of a worldwide (universal) nature, like those not cited here, pave a way for themselves in each subsystem of the worldwide economy variously, being refracted via the prism of the predominant production relations here, primarily the basic production relationship of the given formation. The functioning of such general laws in each of the two world economies proceeds variously and thanks to their interaction with the specific economic laws of socialism and capitalism.

We have dwelt merely on a small part of the contentious or insufficiently developed questions pertaining to problems of the worldwide economy. These problems are exceptionally extensive and profound and they contain many blank spaces. Among these are substantiation of the political-economic nature of the "worldwide economy" concept and investigation of the essence of "intersystem" production relations. It is also necessary to ascertain, classify and study the singularities of the action of general (worldwide) economic laws, without a knowledge of which it is impossible to develop a scientifically substantiated strategy of world socialism's mutual relations with world capitalism. A huge complex of research problems is set Marxism science by the mechanism of economic ties between countries of the opposite social systems which is taking shape.

There are many difficulties of a methodological and ideological nature on this path. Furthermore, it is precisely in this branch of economic science that prejudices and fears of sliding into the bog of bourgeois "convergence" theories are particularly tenacious. Just how strong such fears are is indicated by the fact that many authors, evidently trying to "get out of harm's way," prefer when characterizing worldwide intersystem relations to avoid the term "production relations" and call them vaguely "economic relations". While some people even seriously attempt to prove that there cannot be production relations beyond the confines of a given specific formation and, consequently, in the interformational sphere, although every student knows that the international division of labor itself is a production relationship. Such contrivances not only fail to advance our knowledge in this sphere but impede a deepening thereof.

Soviet science has accumulated sufficient experience in the study of world economic problems and is armed with the most progressive Marxist-Leninist methodology, which has been honed in recent years in the polemic with ideological adversaries. It is capable of solving the complex questions of the theory of the worldwide economy being posed by life itself. In a word, it is manifestly time to develop this scientific direction along a broad front.

FOOTNOTES


4. As capitalism develops, V.I. Lenin wrote, "there is a rapid growth of the dense network of channels embracing the entire country, centralizing all sums of capital and monetary income and converting thousands upon thousands of comminuted facilities into a single national capitalist and subsequently worldwide-capitalist economy" (V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 27, p 329).


10. MEMO No 3, 1980, pp 41-42.

11. VOPROSY EKONOMIKI No 2, 1984, p 125.

12. Ibid., p 124.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p 131.

17. VOPROSY EKONOMIKI No 5, 1983, p 130.

18. Ibid., p 133.


21. True, mainly as a consequence of the activity of the transnational corporations there has in recent decades been an internationalization of the production process itself and international production in the direct sense of the word has been taking shape (in the form of international production cooperation and so forth). However, its share of aggregate global production is still relatively small so that in our day also the decisive role is reserved for production within national boundaries.

22. As V. Slavinsky shows convincingly, with the appearance of international production rudiments of intrinsic primary production relations not transferred from the national economies and relations of distribution, exchange and consumption derived from them take shape in the international sphere (EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI No 5, 1980, p 70; MEMO No 7; MEMO No 7, 1983, pp 83-85). However, their role in the worldwide economy remains for the reasons indicated in the preceding footnote as yet limited, which enables us to generalize from them.


26. Ibid., p 129.

27. It has to be said for fairness' sake that the "Large Soviet Encyclopedia" gives grounds for confusion on this question. It contains together with the "world capitalist economy" and "world socialist economy" concepts the "world economy" concept in general. In the article under this title written by V.V. Rymalov it is a question not so much of a general description of the world (socialist or capitalist) economies (which might, possibly, have justified such a title) as of the evolution in the modern structure of the worldwide economy, which the author calls "worldwide economic relations" (see "Large Soviet Encyclopedia," 3d ed., vol 16, pp 319-320).


30. PRAVDA, 28 August 1983.


33. SSHAEKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 12, 1983, pp 15-16.


35. VOPROSY EKONOMIKI No 5, 1983, p 133.


37. Ibid., vol 44, pp 304-305.


40. Ibid., vol 4, p 428.


PART II OF ROUNDTABLE ON 'NIEO'

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 8, 1984
(signed to press 17 July) pp 84-104

[MEMO roundtable: "Struggle for a New International Economic Order: Results of
the Decade"]

[Excerpts] L. Zevin: The Socialist Countries' Contribution to the Movement
for a NIEO

From the very start of the emergence of the movement for a NIEO the socialist
countries have actively supported all its progressive demands. They believe
that this movement reflects the objective nature of the process of
internationalization of the production forces, which has intensified particularly
under the impact of the scientific-technical revolution and under the conditions
of the coexistence and confrontation of the two socioeconomic systems.

The reorganization of society on socialist principles in certain countries, the
formation of the world socialist system and the process of formation of the
world socialist economy conditioned the end here of the action of the law of
uneven development immanent in the capitalist formation. It was replaced by
the regularity of the rapprochement of the socialist states and the equalization
of their economic development levels. The group of European socialist countries
has already accomplished the basic tasks of equalizing their development levels.
This process is now shifting to the sphere of quality indicators and criteria
of the efficiency of social production. In recent years the "second wave" of
CEMA states (the MPR, the Republic of Cuba and Vietnam) has also in a number
of important socioeconomic indicators markedly pulled itself up toward the level
of the European socialist community countries. Special mechanisms have been
created within the framework of socialist economic integration stimulating
interstate cooperation for the purpose of accelerating the development and
increasing the efficiency of the national economies of the MPR, the Republic
of Cuba and Vietnam.

* Conclusion. For part I see MEMO No 7, 1984.
Thus the new social system has already demonstrated a capacity for solving a complex of cardinal socioeconomic questions, including problems at whose solution the NIEO program is directed.

The commercial, economic and technical cooperation of the CEMA countries and the emergent states is developing rapidly. Trade between the two groups of countries has become a most dynamic sector of international economic relations (the average annual increase in trade turnover in the period 1971-1982 was over 21 percent). It is important to emphasize here that even on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's, when the world capitalist economy had entered a period of crises and international trade was developing sluggishly, trade exchange between the CEMA countries and the emergent states did not lose its dynamism. Its average annual rate of increase in the period 1976-1982 constituted almost 20 percent, which was 1.7 times greater than the rate of increase in trade between the developed capitalist and developing countries in the same period. If it is considered that the CEMA states import from third countries a comparatively negligible quantity of oil, the young states' relative significance in the foreign trade turnover of the socialist community countries (one-fifth) already roughly corresponds to these states' place in world trade.

With the assistance of the CEMA countries interconnected groups of production facilities have been created in a number of developing states which constitute the nucleus of a modern economy, by relying on which they can embark on the modernization of the entire national economy. In India, for example, these are three major foundries, four oil refineries and oil production, plants producing alumina and aluminum, heavy machine building and electrical equipment, mine engineering, machine tool-building and instrument-making enterprises, several large-scale power stations and so forth. Territorial-production complexes are being formed in Egypt based on the Aswan hydropower giant and a number of modern industrial enterprises; in Syria the Euphrates hydrosystem, the production and refining of oil and land development.

Approximately 2 million workers, technicians, engineers and other highly skilled specialists from the ranks of local citizens have been trained to cater for the efficient operation of more than 6,000 facilities built in the emergent countries with the assistance of the CEMA countries. Approximately 100,000 students from the developing states are being trained currently in higher and secondary specialized educational institutions of the socialist countries.

Such is the direct contribution of the CEMA countries to the accomplishment of the tasks of the movement for a NIEO. They have declared at numerous international forums their readiness to further extend and deepen commercial-economic and scientific-technical cooperation with interested developing countries. They believe that such new forms of cooperation as the following will contribute to this:

the conclusion of long-term (up to 10 years and more) intergovernmental agreements embracing trade, credit relations and technical assistance, including various forms of production cooperation and specialization, and scientific-technical cooperation;
gradual enrichment of the content of economic and technical cooperation and the development of higher forms thereof;

the creation by joint efforts at the time of the socialist countries' economic and technical assistance in the emergent states of specialized production capacity oriented toward both the national market and the market of the CEMA members;

the conclusion of agreements on the joint construction in the developing countries of enterprises on a compensatory basis and general contract ("turnkey") terms and on the creation of enterprises according to the "finished product" and "finished product and sale" principle;

the organization in the developing countries of planning offices and consultant firms rendering engineering-type services and also the creation there of production capacity on a contract basis with the extensive enlistment of national firms as subcontractors;

the development of all-around scientific-technical cooperation and also the expansion of the training of personnel for the national economy at various levels; and

an expansion of the CEMA countries' assistance on a multilateral basis.

P. Khvoynik: The West and the NIEO Program

The West's refusal to satisfy the developing countries' many complaints against imperialism contained in the NIEO program signifies a deliberate nonfulfillment of its corresponding clauses. At the same time the results of the UN General Assembly Sixth Special Session can in no way be underestimated. The approval at such an authoritative forum for the program of a NIEO containing a condemnation of colonialism and outlining many elements of a democratic reorganization of world economic relations was a big political victory for the progressive forces and a serious defeat for the West. In the eyes of world public opinion the broad support for the developing countries' demands for the establishment of a NIEO far outweighed, of course, the formal aspects of the vote.

The next stage may be termed the period of the West's interpretation of the situation which took shape following the proclamation of the "new order" program and also following the adoption of the Charter of States' Economic Rights and Duties at the end of 1974 and the resolutions of international economic cooperation at the General Assembly Seventh Special Session in 1975. The adopted documents not only reiterate the main ideas of the said program but in some instances specify, supplement and even develop them. This is grounds for regarding the said UN resolutions as fundamental resolutions on problems of a NIEO and not reducing its program merely to the two initial resolutions of May 1974 (the Declaration and the Action Program).

The West recognized the import of what had happened far from immediately. An incomprehension of the sources and essence of the movement for a NIEO, which
sometimes ran to manifestly absurd interpretations, predominated initially. Thus according to the American expert F. Bergsten, the purpose of the NIEO is the "prevention of international investment wars, which may be achieved only by the imposition of a new international economic order.... The multinational companies have a vital interest in the creation of such a new order."* Equally, many efforts went on discrediting the very idea of a new economic order and proving the salutory nature of the existing system for, as G. Hofbauer, representative of the U.S. Treasury Department, for example, claimed "what is needed for future development is not so much a new order as resolute defense of the old."**

However, gradually even the ideologists of neocolonialism are beginning to reach the conclusion as to the need for changes and adaptation to the new balance of forces in the West's relations with the developing countries, although, of course, all these questions are viewed primarily through the prism of the interests of the imperialist powers. Furthermore, the main emphasis is put on the idea of "interdependence," which is used to substantiate both the need for and profitability of economic cooperation with young states. The American political scientist T. Smith concludes from this even that "had the South not called for a new international economic order, the North itself would have had to have insisted on this."*** This approach ultimately led to attempts "to direct the train along the required track," to, as it were, the West's "semi-approval" of the NIEO program.

However, somewhat closer to the end of the 1970's there appeared signs of a modification of Western policy, which became not only more subtle but also more negative. The growth of the economic difficulties in the developed capitalist countries reduced the opportunities for maneuver in relations with the young states, while the structural reorganization of the economy and the system of energy use with reference to the new conditions of the supply of oil strengthened somewhat the positions of the imperialist powers in this sphere. The West's economic diplomacy is now switching increasingly often from hypocritical recognition of the importance of a NIEO to outright obstruction of this program. It is indicative, for example, that whereas the head of the U.S. delegation at UNCTAD-V in 1979 assured those present that his country is, "like any other, attached to the idea of the creation of a new international economic order," appealing merely for this "not to be done in haste,"**** at the next UNCTAD session in 1983 the American representative made no mention of NIEO problems.

Such a metamorphosis was hardly brought about by a chance confluence of circumstances. It evidently reflects both a certain change in the balance of forces in West-South economic relations and a toughening of the general foreign policy course of the most reactionary circles of imperialism, particularly following the assumption of office in the United States of President Reagan's

**** DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, September 1979, p 65.
administration. The West's growing resistance to the realization of the majority of the provisions of a NIEO is ultimately connected with this. It was obvious in the first years of the proclamation of the said program that, as J. Pronk, former Dutch minister of economic cooperation, acknowledged, "the main reason for the sparse fruitfulness of the efforts to create a NIEO is the lack of political will on the part of the industrial powers. The majority of them is still reluctant to change the present system."* Subsequently, however, according to UN experts, "developed countries with a market economy... have emphasized the need for the preservation of the postwar system of international economic relations."**

Together with growing resistance to the realization with the framework of the establishment of a NIEO of the generally quite modest measures to which with the utmost reluctance the Western powers consented the latter have stepped up the political and ideological attack on this program. On the one hand the insufficient precision of its fundamental documents is stressed. On the other, the proposition that in itself the NIEO program still provides nothing is being whipped up in every possible way. At first sight this is indeed the case since, after all, UN resolutions are not binding, and even if they were, no documents would be capable in the twinkling of an eye of miraculously altering the entire system of international economic relations which has taken shape over a long historical period. It is now becoming increasingly apparent that removal of the outmoded capitalist "rules of the game" and the true democratization of world economic relations will indeed require much time and growing efforts to overcome the resistance of imperialism. However, in the mouths of representatives of the West emphasis of the permanent nature of the NIEO process is essentially tantamount to a revision of the program adopted by the United Nations and a call to begin everything from scratch, as if the decisions of the UN General Assembly Sixth Special Session did not exist.

Under these conditions the developing countries raised the question at the end of the 1970's of global negotiations within the framework of the world community on the establishment of a NIEO. It is as yet still too early, perhaps, to judge to what extent this initiative reflected disappointment with the slow pace of realization of the NIEO or was dictated by a desire to place these negotiations at the focus of the constant attention of the United Nations and thereby politicize them to the maximum. It cannot be ruled out that in the face of the actual obstruction of the NIEO on the part of the West the young states could find no other method of emphasizing the importance of the said problems for the highest forum of the world community. However, at the UN General Assembly 11th Special Session in 1980 this question remained uncoordinated owing to the resistance of the imperialist powers. Subsequent major international meetings (the top-level North-South meeting in Cancun in 1981 and the negotiations of heads of the "seven" in Versailles in 1982 and Williamsburg in 1983) produced nothing other than nebulous declarations of the West's consent to global negotiations. Their fate is as yet no clearer than when this idea arose.

At the same time the as a whole negative picture of the imperialist powers' attitude toward the NIEO program as such, not to mention their open resistance to a broader cardinal reorganization of the entire system of world economic relations on progressive, democratic principles, can hardly be painted in just one color. The darkest spots of this picture are the imprint of the tough line of U.S. diplomacy, although this country also is beginning to understand that "the stronger it resists the emergence of the new economic realities, the greater the isolation it finds itself in."* A more flexible policy is being pursued by certain West European powers, particularly the Scandinavians, and Japan. This is explained to a certain extent by their relatively greater dependence on raw material sources in the developing world and in some respects has evidently been conditioned by a kind of "division of labor" in the Western camp, where the frontal attack against the emergent countries is delivered by the United States, which is less vulnerable to counterstrikes, while the flanking maneuvers are conducted by its allies. According to R. Cooper, former U.S. undersecretary of state for economic affairs, "the overall picture is such that Western governments have a skeptical attitude toward the majority of proposals in the name of a new international economic order, differing only in the extent to which they are prepared to discuss and, if necessary, apply them, ... while Europe and Japan, furthermore... appear more responsive in words."**

Of course, it would be an oversimplification to depict matters such that imperialism has succeeded in completely neutralizing the NIEO program and the West is not having to consent to some concessions to accommodate the developing countries' demands. Certain changes with respect to a solution of the young states' complex problems are now noticeable in many spheres of international economic life. That such changes as yet lag far behind actual requirements and also the proclaimed goals of the "new order" is another matter. However, imperialism can no longer openly ignore the needs of the emergent countries and the urgent problems of a reorganization of world economic relations.

For this reason the West, while pursuing as a whole a policy of blocking the NIEO program and emasculating its progressive elements, is nonetheless avoiding direct confrontation with the developing world, preferring by way of small concessions and demagogic promises to create the appearance of its readiness for cooperation. It is from these positions that imperialism regards the North-South dialogue, attempting to instill within the framework thereof in the young states the idea of the need merely for "mutually profitable" compromises which are profitable primarily for the Western powers and international monopoly capital.

Thus if we abstract ourselves from the West's tactical dodges, the evolution of its policy with respect to a NIEO, at least in the form recorded in UN General Assembly resolutions, appears approximately as follows: at first confusion, then an endeavor "to direct the train along the required tracks," stronger than which sometimes proves the desire to apply the brakes to the "train" and, sometimes, to derail it altogether.

** FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1977, pp 73, 74.
However, life has already shown the irreversibility and strength of the broad movement for a democratic reorganization of international economic relations. It is also clear that although this movement may ebb and flow, the more the NIEO program advanced by the young states is suffused with general democratic, anti-imperialist content and moves in the channel of the struggle of all progressive forces for peace and against imperialism, neocolonialism and the domination of the transnational monopolies, the more difficult it will be for the West to defend its positions. Under these conditions particular significance is attached to the task of exposing the ideological covers and tactical tricks with which imperialism is attempting to conceal the true essence of its foreign economic strategy with respect to the developing countries.

E. Obminsky: Technology Transfer Problems

Questions of overcoming scientific-technical backwardness have from the start occupied an important place in the NIEO program. However, their interpretation is undergoing a considerable evolution. If we turn to the documents of the Group of 77 and the nonaligned movement and also to decisions of the UN General Assembly UNCTAD, UNIDO and other forums, the path by which the developing countries are proceeding toward a reinterpretation of the place of technology transfer problems in the strategy of economic development may be seen distinctly.

In the first years of the struggle for economic independence and the reorganization of world economic relations the demand for facilitating in every way possible the developing countries' access to obtaining outside scientific-technical knowledge and removing every conceivable restriction on its practical use was the most precisely formulated demand. The NIEO program and subsequent resolutions and decisions of the UN General Assembly and other bodies right up until the end of the 1970's stressed attention precisely to this aspect of the question. At the same time the young states' recognition of the true scale of the problem under the conditions of the rapid spread of the scientific-technical revolution is bringing them to the need for an evaluation of the significance of technology questions and their place in the general context of the NIEO program.

In fact, what were the developing countries seeking and in what did they see progress (or the absence thereof) in the solution of the technology transfer problem? Outwardly the young states' program appeared quite impressive. As the Group of 77 emphasized at the UN Vienna Conference on Science and Technology for Development (1979), "global and fundamental structural changes have to be made to the existing world distribution of scientific-technical potential to ensure the expansion of the developing countries' participation in the search for new scientific and technical knowledge and in its introduction, use and dissemination.... Such changes must embrace, inter alia, liquidation of the monopoly and oligopoly conditions of the international flow of technology, reorganization of the existing international-law structure of technology transfer in accordance with the goals and cherished hopes of the developing countries and also the granting to the developing countries of the opportunity to participate in financing mechanisms created for the purpose of scientific-technical development.'"*

In the language of specific actions this program was translated as demands for the young states' preferential access to existing technology, the creation of special industrial-technical information banks and centers for the development and transfer of technology and compensation for the "brain drain". It was essentially a question of an adjustment to the mechanism of the functioning of technology transfers, but did not affect the mechanism itself, which was born of capitalist production relations and is constantly reproduced in the world capitalist economy. Accordingly, the developing countries channeled their main efforts into the solution of questions of undoubted importance for them connected with the manifest discrimination against the young states on the part of the imperialist powers and their monopolies. Meanwhile, however, the operating mechanism of the interrelations of the imperialist powers and the developing countries in the technology sphere continued to introduce the program "contained" therein of the incorporation of the latter in the system of the international capitalist division of labor based on the young states' long-term and ramified dependence on the technology "chain," whose main links are in the hands of the West.

The range and influence of this mechanism are increasing markedly as the emergent countries' economy is enlisted in the world capitalist economy and the process of internationalization of the young states' economic life accelerates. Increasingly broad social strata in the developing world are being pulled into production and exchange connected with the introduction of production processes directed from outside. In turn, it is these processes which are to a growing extent determining the developing countries' new specialization which is taking shape in the world economy.

For this reason additional "hidden reefs" were clearly discerned in the technology transfer problem. Much became apparent against the background of the discussion concerning facilitating access to scientific-technical knowledge, broadening the young states' rights in the sphere of the use of patents and licenses and application of the latest "intermediate" or "corresponding" technology. Even the corrections to the self-interested actions perpetrated by Western companies in the course of technology transfers (overstatement of cost, transfer prices, unwarranted restrictions on use and so forth) which have been achieved in a number of cases do not alter the main thing. The flow of Western technology, regardless of whether its owners succeed in "grabbing" superhigh profits for themselves in the course of its introduction and further use, serves the main goal of the economic strategy of imperialism in respect of the developing countries—tying them more tightly to the world capitalist system. Frequently many of the emergent states' demands arise or assume new proportions essentially when the "train has gone," when this state or the other has been attached to the corresponding links of the capitalist economy and fundamentally different approaches for overcoming the rapidly growing new forms of dependence are required.

The point being that the developing countries' difficulties in the world capitalist economy begin not as of the moment their products appear on the world market but far earlier—back at the time of the very "laying" of the foundation of their specialization with the "aid" and given the active assistance of the transnational corporations [TNC]. Proceeding from their
global interests, they introduce in the young states technology which
predetermines this country or the other's "calling card" on the world market.
Therefore upon a change of conditions and a tightening of trade-policy
practices in the purchaser-countries, particularly with the onset of crisis,
the TNC possessing an initial and strong scientific-technical base, are
capable of rapidly changing the scale and structure of their operations. At the
same time, on the other hand, the developing countries find themselves in the
position of a "broken" part of the reproduction cycle without external markets
and an organic link with the national reproduction mechanism.

Thus the problems of the viability of the new economic structures created in
the young states with the aid of imported technology should be pondered at
the very first stages of construction to prevent their becoming facilities
entirely dependent on the "procacies" of the developed capitalist states for
this structural reorganization or the other of the world economy. And for
this it is necessary, evidently, not only to struggle for preferential
conditions of technology transfers but also have a clear idea of the place
the acquired technology will have in the development of the production forces
of the country as a whole and what its overall effect will be for an
acceleration of socioeconomic progress. Such a comprehensive evaluation is
possible only given an efficient system of planning on a national scale
combining both socioeconomic and scientific-technical development indicators.
Only an official strategy of the use of scientific-technical achievements in
the interests of the development of the national reproduction mechanism is
capable of confronting the chaotic process of technology imports. Otherwise
autonomous economic structures will arise which are insufficiently
interconnected and which are "optimum" only from the viewpoint of the
international monopolies supplying the technology, but by no means for the
economy of this developing country or the other.

On the basis of their own experience the emergent states are increasingly
seeing for themselves that the problems of commodity specialization,
diversification of exports and the creation of the optimum structure of the
entire economy are rooted in the purposeful introduction in practice of a
certain combination of scientific-technical achievements dictated by statewide
interests. It is from this viewpoint that it is necessary to examine all
questions of technology transfers. Actual recognition of the need for such
an approach was contained in the UNCTAD-V (Manila, 1979) decisions.
Resolution 112(V) emphasized the importance of and need for the formulation of
a strategy of the "technological transformation" of the developing countries.
At UNCTAD-VI (Belgrade, 1983) the question of the technological reorganization
of the young states was discussed given the availability of a number of studies
of the secretariat of this and other organizations concerning the ways and
methods of such a reorganization. Resolution 143(VI), "The Technological
Transformation of the Developing Countries," which was adopted by the Belgrade
UNCTAD session, points out that the acquired technology should serve both the
growth of the young states' scientific-technical potential and a rise in the
level of their all-around socioeconomic development.

How is this to be achieved? Important considerations on this score are
contained in the UNCTAD Secretariat report "A Strategy for the Technological
Transformation of Developing Countries*. Emphasizing that such a strategy "should not only correspond to but also be an organic part of each country's long-term development strategy," the authors of the report point out that what is essential is planning for the long term and not "a short-sighted approach to technology case by case."*

Without going into details, we may mention the main thing: the technology transfer problem requires for its solution the utmost strengthening of the mechanism of statewide long-term planning and by no means the "freedom of maneuver" for private capital on which the Western powers insist. As the UNCTAD Secretariat report rightly observes, the need to plan for the long term is now more urgent than ever: "On the one hand there is a manifest deterioration in the international economic climate, which requires new strategic approaches. At the same time, however, highly promising opportunities are appearing in connection with the progress of technology at the forward boundaries—microprocessors, computers, automatic machinery, genetic engineering and so forth."**

The speediest development of national programs of the use of technology within the framework of state planning taking account of both the financial and material and social aspects, for which the UNCTAD decisions call, would undoubtedly make it possible to analyze more deeply and comprehensively the questions currently being discussed at various international forums within the framework of the technology transfer problem. And the list of only the basic such questions is sufficiently impressive and at different stages of development, revealing profound contradictions between the interests of the emergent states and the developed capitalist powers. At the same time, however, the positions of the developing and socialist countries on the basic questions concur or are sufficiently close. There is no doubt, however, that the existence in the young states of scientifically substantiated, socioeconomically progressive long-term plans of the use of technology would enable them to formulate their attitude toward many, if not all, questions of technology transfers far more precisely.

We shall cite just some of the aspects of the problem in respect of which the developing countries' positions would obviously acquire a more consistent and precise nature. First of all, the planned management of the economy would permit a new approach to the question of selection of the necessary technology. Given an absence of plan-gear selection at the state level, the main suppliers of modern technology on the world capitalist market—the TNC—"push" their production processes in the emergent countries, tearing their economic fabric (or increasing the gaps) into individual components of the monopolies' global production. Strict selection in accordance with a plan determined in advance would make it possible, first, to limit the unchecked and costly influx of "different-sized" technology and, second, make technological demands of the

** Ibid., p 14.
world market for the long term. All this would contribute to a considerable rise in the efficiency of economic and scientific-technical relations with the socialist countries, which are guided, as is known, by the goals and tasks of the long-term planning of foreign economic ties.

Such a question as "reverse technology transfers" or the "brain drain," which has currently assumed menacing proportions, could also be viewed differently. Whereas in the period 1962-1966 a little more than 4,000 specialists from developing countries settled annually in the United States, for example, in the past 15 years the average annual indicator has increased more than threefold and is in excess of 13,000 persons.* The Western powers are refusing to seriously discuss this question and are actually boycotting the work of the group of UNCTAD experts on "reverse technology transfers".

At the same time the system of training personnel by the developing countries themselves is still insufficiently linked with the immediate tasks of socioeconomic development and is frequently oriented toward Western academic science. This is creating a big discrepancy between the country's urgent requirements and the specialization of the scientific-technical personnel. A survey of 50 scientific research centers in 13 developing countries showed that "...as a whole their activity was unrelated to internal problems.... This also, evidently, applies to scientific research in the universities, which is toward recognition in the international scientific community. Insufficient attention is being paid to local problems, particularly problems connected with social and economic development."**

Under current conditions the comprehensive planning of the training of personnel for the developing countries' national economies would make it possible to regulate the social composition, scale, specialization and allocation of future specialists being taught in the country and abroad and to train people aspiring to and capable of contributing to their countries' socioeconomic progress. In this case the machinations of various Western establishments and firms for enticing specialists would be regarded at the international level primarily (apart from calculation of the financial and professional damage) as attempts to disrupt the young states' national economic plans requiring application of the appropriate sanctions.

Long-term planning contributing to a strengthening of stable and prolonged scientific-technical ties at an interstate level could help ease and clear up the "passage" of a range of questions connected with the developing countries' access to foreign technology and limitation of the monopoly practice of Western companies. A portfolio of orders for such technology compiled in advance would make it possible to opportunely select the most acceptable proposals and reduce the TNC's opportunities for imposing "package deals," that is, maintenance of the technology made available by purchases from the license-holder of equipment, components and technical services.

Such an approach would contribute to ensuring that technology transfers along state lines would acquire a mutually profitable, nondiscriminatory nature. The growth of mutual interest in an increase in permanent supplies of technology on a healthy commercial basis would reveal even more fully the groundlessness of the arguments being put forward concerning the "decommercialization" of technology transfers along state lines.

I believe that greater clarity would also be introduced to the question of the applied law and procedure of the settlement of disputes which is being discussed in the course of the elaboration of a code of conduct in the technology transfer sphere. The developing countries believe that the law of the state purchasing the technology should be applied and, equally, that disputes should be settled in the courts of the given state. True, the Group of 77's Arusha Program acknowledges arbitration "as the means of settling disputes if the method of selection of mediators and procedure is of a just and equal nature."* However, it emphasizes that the legal basis applied in respect of technology transfer deals should be the provisions of the code and legislation of the recipient country.

This position of the Group of 77 can be understood entirely in the event of it being a question of increased control over deals with the participation of TNC, particularly over their intrafirm transactions (with affiliates) in recipient states realized frequently in circumvention of the national legislation of the latter. But when equal partners of sovereign states participate in conventional technology transfer deals, it is these interested parties which should have the opportunity in the event of a dispute arising to select with common consent the law to be applied or the path of its solution via arbitration.

Finally, the appearance of the developing countries at international technology transfer forums with precisely outlined national programs would make it possible to bind more closely together questions which are now scattered and avoid duplication and additional expenditure on increasingly new "institutional mechanisms".

Thus a more profound, purposeful approach by the developing countries to planning at the state level is capable, we believe, of imparting new impetus to the struggle for the establishment of a NIEO, particularly in the technology transfer sphere. An important role could also be performed here by the recommendations of the "Modern Technology and Development" international symposium which was conducted in Tbilisi under the aegis of UNIDO (April 1983). As Academician D.M. Gvishiani observed, "the great experience accumulated by the Soviet state shows convincingly that the socialist planning system, which protects against the impact of market factors, creates a firm basis for the stable development of the sphere of science and technology and international scientific-technical cooperation." The symposium requested that UNIDO study the possibility of the convening of a high-level conference on problems of technology in order to examine the consequences of scientific-technical progress.

for world development and formulate a new concept of the development of
technology in the interests of mankind. The documents of the symposium
reflected the peoples' profound concern at the growing use of the latest
achievements of science and technology for military purposes, which is directly
connected with the exacerbation of the international atmosphere. It has to
be assumed that UNCTAD, UNIDO and other bodies and establishments whose activity
is connected with questions of technology transfers will use their
opportunities to make a substantive contribution to the struggle for the use
of scientific-technical progress for peaceful purposes and for the good of all
mankind.

I. Dyumulen: The State of World Trade and Development Problems

The start of the 1980's has been characterized by an exacerbation of the
difficulties in the sphere of international economic cooperation and,
consequently, a sharp deterioration in the external conditions of the development
of the emergent states. This is largely connected with the disorders in the
world capitalist economy. At the same time it would be wrong to explain the
negative processes in the system of world economic relations solely by the
influence of the economic difficulties being experienced by the centers of
capitalism. An increasingly great negative influence on the state and
development of these relations is being exerted by the trade-policy measures
being implemented by the imperialist powers and to a considerable extent by
their use of discriminatory and other restrictive measures in trade.

Among such phenomena are the attempts of the United States and certain Western
states to employ sanctions and embargoes in respect of a number of developing
and socialist countries and demands that the emergent states open their doors
to private foreign capital, grant the TNC freedom of action and abandon
progressive socioeconomic transformations. Through the fault of imperialist
circles, confidence in international economic relations has been undermined and
the delaying tactics and direct resistance to the developing countries' endeavor
to extend decolonization to the economic sphere have complicated and made
impossible an improvement in world trade. Simultaneously the West has
developed a counteroffensive against the young states, putting forward a whole
series of amendments and proposals aimed at emasculating the progressive content
of adopted decisions and resolutions pertaining to questions of a NIEO.

As a result the process of the reorganization of international economic relations
at the start of the 1980's slowed down and subsequently came to a halt altogether.
Simultaneously the growing involvement of the developing countries' economy in
the world capitalist economy and the increasingly complex problems of their
economic development moved to the forefront the question of a normalization of
external, primarily trade-policy, conditions of development. This is why in the
present decades the confrontation between the developed capitalist states and
the developing countries in respect of trade-policy and legal questions of
international economic relations has increased sharply.

Throughout the 1970's the emergent states gradually specified their demands,
switching from general declarations which raised the question of the imperfect
nature of the modern trade-policy and legal infrastructure of world capitalist
trade, to a more specific program of demands. As a result a comprehensive and
detailed program of the developing countries' trade-policy demands had taken
shape by the start of the 1980's. Its components are contained in a number of
documents: the Manila Declaration and Action Program (1976), the Arusha
Program for Collective Self-Reliance (1979), the Buenos Aires Platform (1983),
economic declarations of the nonaligned countries adopted in Colombo, Havana
and Delhi, and developing countries' proposals in the course of multilateral
trade negotiations in the GATT and in the draft resolutions submitted to the
UNCTAD fifth and sixth sessions.

What is the essence of the developing countries' demands?

They aspire to curb the growth of trade barriers in Western states by way of
the introduction in practice of the so-called "status quo" provision, which
prohibits the imposition of new protectionist restrictions, and a provision
obliging the developed countries to gradually remove restrictions which have
already been imposed (the "rollback" principle); and seek their renunciation of
the application in respect of the developing states of trade restrictions:
blockades, embargoes and other economic sanctions as a form of political
pressure. The emergent states are demanding that they be granted preferential,
that is, special, more favorable status than that which exists in trade between
developed countries, primarily by way of extension of the system of general
preferences in favor of the young states and the imparting to it of a
nonreciprocal and nondiscriminatory nature. They are striving for recognition
of their right to employ restrictions in trade in the interests of the
development of the national economy; the creation of a new system of legal
provisions and principles regulating trade relations between the developed and
developing countries which would correspond to the interests of the emergent
states and provide for a nondiscriminatory approach to the developing countries;
and a revision of GATT articles and the incorporation therein of the above-
mentioned provisions for the protection of the trade-policy interests of the
young states.

Both the general and the specific proposals of the developing countries for a
reorganization of capitalism's world trade system encountered a negative
attitude on the part of the imperialist powers. However, attempts to ignore
the demands of the former colonies and semicolonies and avoid discussion thereof
failed, and on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's these questions were at
the center of a multilateral diplomatic struggle, primarily in UNCTAD and GATT
and also in a number of other international economic organizations.

In the course of a complex struggle in UN bodies, as the result of numerous
conferences and meetings of leaders of developed capitalist countries, a trend
came to be discerned toward these countries' development of what might be called
a kind of program for the reform of capitalism's trade system corresponding to
the West's interests or, to use the colorful expression of the British journal
THE ECONOMIST, "the formation of a rich man's world economic order". Many
elements of this trade-policy order can already be discerned clearly enough.
They include economic pressure on the developing countries by way of imparting
a legitimate nature to the use of discriminatory protectionist barriers,
differentiation in the granting to them of trade-policy benefits and their
involvement in economic blocs (of the Lomé Convention type), limitation of
most-favored-nation status and the development of new methods of non-tariff
protectionism of the so-called "voluntary limitation" of exports type,
agreements on the regulation of markets and others. It is essentially a question
of the elaboration and inclusion in the legal system of world trade of
principles requiring that the young states renounce protection of their national
economies and open their domestic markets for enterprises of the developed
countries (the principles of graduation and selectivity and reciprocity in the
granting of benefits and concessions).

In this connection it is not surprising that Western states' trade-policy
measures have become a serious problem of the economic and political mutual
relations of the capitalist and developing countries, and many acute aspects
of this problem, furthermore, have been brought into focus in discussion of
the question of protectionism.

Throughout 1979-1983 this question was on the agenda of many international forums,
including the UN General Assembly, UNCTAD and GATT and UN regional economic
commissions. A quantitative evaluation of protectionism under current
conditions is complicated owing to the fact that a growing proportion of
protectionist resources is not of a public nature and is not recorded officially.
However, according to various estimates, the proportion of world capitalist trade
which has fallen within the compass of various forms of restrictions began to
grow rapidly in the latter half of the past decade and at the start of the
current decade passed the 50-percent mark. The most rigid and discriminatory
forms of restrictions employed by the developed capitalist states are
directed against the socialist and developing countries.

The main and dangerous aspects of this direction in the developed capitalist
states' trade policy have been manifested distinctly in recent years. The
selective and discriminatory nature of protectionist measures is increasing;
and a legal base is gradually taking shape in the developed capitalist states
creating a basis for the practice of discriminatory restrictions in trade and
circumvention of most-favored-nation status. Increasingly extensive use is
being made of measures of concealed protectionism flouting existing provisions
and standards of international law, including GATT rules, and also means of
economic pressure on exporting countries for the purpose of compelling them to
limit exports of their commodities. An entire system of "voluntary" export
restrictions is being created. Instances of Western states' imposition of
import restrictions for political reasons are becoming more frequent.

Protectionism and the entire range of trade-policy problems was the subject of
sharp debate at the UNCTAD Sixth Session (June 1983 in Belgrade). The
conference emphatically condemned protectionism and the policy of commercial
blockade and economic sanctions. The resolutions adopted on these questions
contain definite positive recommendations and an action program in this sphere.

At UNCTAD-VI the socialist countries again emphasized their aspiration to achieve
a reorganization of international economic relations on a just basis and the
restoration of an atmosphere of trust in world trade. The declaration
"Restoration of Trust in International Trade" submitted by East European socialist states and Mongolia points out that the new wave of protectionism in a number of developed capitalist countries has led to the regular and more frequent application of trade restrictions, including numerous unilateral measures of a discriminatory nature. It observes that the bulk of these restrictions was imposed in complete denial and even violation of the principles, provisions and rules of international trade enshrined in bilateral and multilateral agreements, including GATT. The restrictions being applied also represent a departure from the aims and principles of UNCTAD and the Charter of States' Economic Rights and Duties.

The socialist countries noted with particular concern the increasingly extensive application for noneconomic reasons by certain developed capitalist countries of restrictive measures, a trade blockade, embargoes and other economic sanctions incompatible with the provisions of the UN Charter. They expressed the belief that under these conditions the UNCTAD members' efforts should be aimed at the restoration of trust in international economic relations. Simultaneously the socialist countries emphasized that progress in world trade and development is inseparably connected with an improvement in the political climate in the world, the curbing of the arms race and the strengthening of the international security.

A. Chekhutov: Currency-Finance Problems of the NIEO

The United Nations' adoption of the NIEO program was the first large-scale attempt to make appreciable adjustments to the system of international currency-finance relations with regard for the interests of the majority of states, primarily developing, at the expense of the illegitimate privileges of the Western powers.

The particular significance of this sphere was determined, first, by the fact that currency-finance relations represented the most internationalized sphere of world economic relations. Reflected in concentrated form here were the shifts and upheavals in foreign trade, the rendering of a variety of services, production cooperation and in other spheres. Further, these relations themselves were experiencing a profound and acute crisis. The Bretton Woods currency system with the gold-dollar standard and fixed currency exchange rates had collapsed. Deficits in the balances of trade and payments of unprecedented proportions in all the oil-importing countries had arisen. The mass influx of petrodollars caused the international banking system to be extremely overstrained. Currency-finance relations thereby become not only a transmitter but also an independent source of the serious disorganization of world economic relations. Finally, this sphere contains a most powerful mechanism of the monopoly bourgeoisie's domination in the world capitalist economy and its exploitation and enslavement of the less developed countries. At the same time, however, the positions of the young states here were weaker than in other spheres. This prompted the developing countries to concentrate efforts on achieving changes and the developed capitalist states to strive to preserve their advantages.
The NIEO program pertaining to currency-finance questions consisted of two parts. The first set forth the principles, rules, provisions, long-term goals and tasks intended to become the political-legal principles of interstate relations in this sphere. The second provided for specific measures of a financial, credit and currency nature which were to have contributed to the realization of these principles and thereby secured an improvement in the currency-finance position of the Asian, African and Latin American states.

The political-legal principles in the Declaration and Action Program for the establishment of a NIEO and the Charter of States' Economic Rights and Duties record a number of fundamental provisions oriented toward the democratic reorganization of international currency-finance relations. The right of the complete and effective equality of different countries during the discussion and solution of world economic problems was proclaimed. Each state's freedom to choose its own social and economic system and forms of organization of foreign economic relations was recognized. The complete sovereignty of any state over its natural resources and all forms of economic activity, including foreign currency-finance policy, was confirmed. International currency reform was envisaged for an improvement in the system of foreign economic settlements and payments and the steady growth of world production and exchange. The arms race was condemned and the use for development needs of the resources released in the course of disarmament was proposed. The least developed countries were endowed with particular benefits. An important place was assigned the granting to them of assistance in the form of financial resources on preferential terms and economic and technical assistance. The rendering of assistance was directly linked with the reimbursement of and full compensation for losses which were and are still being caused the emergent countries and peoples as a result of foreign colonial domination and racial discrimination and also diktat for the purpose of forcing them to renounce sovereign rights and privileges or to submit to all forms of neocolonialism. It was specified here that responsibility for the losses is borne by the states which caused them.

Specific measures were aimed at satisfaction of the developing countries' urgent needs: an increase in the volume and an improvement in the terms of the preferential and commercial resources transferred to them, preservation of the purchasing power of export revenues and currency reserves, an easing of the burden of payments for loans and credit granted on stiff terms, expanded participation in the control of the international currency-finance establishments and an extension of benefits to individual groups of emergent countries experiencing the greatest difficulties.

Closing Remarks

The discussion of questions connected with realization of the NIEO program was, as I. Ivanov, deputy director of the IMEMO, observed, perfectly opportune. Never previously in the entire postwar period, perhaps, has the capitalist world experienced such pressure of economic and political difficulties created ultimately by the senseless arms race which has been unleashed and is being encouraged in every possible way by the ruling circles of the United States.
Imperialism today is openly refusing a comprehensive examination of the most urgent world problems, including the NIEO program. Having lost a sense of reality, the leaders of imperialism are again endeavoring to divide the developing world into spheres of their "special interests".

The results of the discussion enable us to draw certain important conclusions concerning the role and place of a NIEO in the struggle to secure for the present and future generations the absolutely essential living and work conditions.

It would appear that the participants correctly drew attention to the main danger threatening the NIEO directly—imperialism's attempt to divert the emergent states onto the path of the examination of comparatively minor technical issues while preserving practically untouched the existing system of international exploitation engendered by capitalism. It should be emphasized that this now troubles many developing countries, which was reflected in the decisions of the Delhi Conference of Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries (1983).

The analysis of individual aspects of the NIEO program has shown that in such seemingly purely "commercial" and technical-economic fields as, for example, trade, technology transfers and the currency-finance sphere imperialism's manifest endeavor to keep hold of the main levers of regulating international economic relations, using for this to an increasingly great extent instruments of the financial and technological dependence of the developing countries, can be discerned.

The diverse positive contribution of the USSR and the socialist countries to the emergent states' economic development and the struggle for the reorganization of international economic relations was shown in the course of the discussion.

The top-level meeting of CEMA countries in June 1984 confirmed with new force the consistency and invariability of world socialism's support for the developing states' just demands. "The CEMA countries," the declaration adopted by the participants in the meeting says, "support the developing states' progressive demands in the struggle for economic decolonization, complete sovereignty in respect of their natural and other resources and their economic activity and for broad and equal participation in the solution of international economic problems, a halt to the outflow of capital and the drain of skilled personnel and the unconditional application of a general system of preferences, bearing in mind the need to counteract the deterioration in the developing countries' economic position and to contribute to their progress."

We hope that the analysis of the course of the developing states' struggle for realization of the NIEO program made in the course of the discussion will be greeted with interest by both the Soviet and foreign progressive public. The concurrence or proximity of positions of the emergent and socialist countries on the most important problems of the NIEO afford a practicable opportunity for the closer coordination of their actions in the world arena.
Of course, the exchange of opinions which has taken place has not exhausted the entire depth and range of problems of a NIEO. It is necessary, inter alia, to carefully analyze the role which a NIEO could perform in the process of realization of the commercial-economic aspects of disarmament. Recognition of this by the young states themselves could impart new impetus to the movement for its realization and enlist for it the mass support of the forces of peace and democracy.


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[A. Kravtsevich book review: "Present-Day Monopoly Capitalism"]

[Text] The book in question* is the second attempt by a practically unchanged group of authors to theoretically interpret and collate the experience of numerous individual studies of various facets and aspects of the life of present-day Japan. But this is not a "revised and enlarged" reprint of the preceding monograph** but a new, entirely independent study summing up an entire stage of analytical developments of the most important processes and problems in the economy and policy of the Land of the Rising Sun. Whereas in the preceding work the main place was assigned a comprehensive analysis of the "Japanese phenomenon" in the form which had evolved by the start of the 1970's, that is, in the period of the high rate of growth of the Japanese economy, in the present work the main accent is put on an investigation of the new trends which developed in the 1970's, in the period of completion of the transition to a moderate growth rate.

The fact that the book opens with a chapter comprehensively illustrating Japan's place in the modern world should be put among the undoubted merits of the monograph in question. On the basis of a vast amount of statistical and factual material it draws the substantiated conclusion that, despite the considerable strengthening of Japan's positions within the framework of the world capitalist economy in the 1970's, Japanese imperialism is "the weakest of the three centers of imperialist rivalry" (p 17). At the same time, however, it is noted that by the start of the 1980's this country's significance in the global system of economic and political relations had risen appreciably. "It has become an active participant in the international division of labor and begun to play an important part in the solution of the urgent foreign policy problems" (p 29) confronting the world capitalist system.

The book may provisionally be divided into two large parts. Five chapters (II-VI) are devoted to an examination of the present level of development of Japan's production forces and a revelation of the economic mechanism of the functioning of Japanese state-monopoly capitalism under the conditions of the completion of the transition from an extensive to an intensive growth model. Considerable attention is paid to the problem of the reorganization of the economic structure and an analysis of the technical-economic changes summoned into being by realization of the "fruit" of the scientific-technical revolution and also of the questions connected therewith of economic efficiency, the basic parameters of the intensive model, the rate and proportions of production of the social product and the singularities of the investment process. It is significant that the authors' theoretical surveys make it possible to provide a cogent explanation of the reasons for the success of Japanese monopolies' foreign trade offensive on world markets: "Japan at the end of the 1970's possessed the latest production potential among the developed capitalist countries" (p 70). Mention should also be made of the important conclusion concerning the direction of the structural reorganization of industry--"the nucleus of the sectorial structure is beginning to take shape around science-intensive sectors of the material-saving type" (p 72). The role of the state in this process should possibly have been dwelt on in more detail.

The analysis of the singularities of the processes of the concentration of production and capital and the rise in the level of monopolization of the Japanese economy is underpinned by a wealth of factual material and accompanied by wide-ranging international comparisons, which makes it possible to highlight the distinctive features of the formation of the contemporary structure of Japan's finance capital. The examination of the extraordinarily important problem of the "dual structure" of the Japanese economy, which is impeding "the process of Japan's rapprochement with Western countries in respect of the overall level of GNP per employed person and per capita" (p 83), is of undoubted interest here. The dialectical approach to an analysis of this problem enables the authors to determine that on the one hand a process of the disappearance of the "dual structure" is under way thanks to a reduction in the number and relative significance of small and medium enterprises and, on the other, there is a process of polarization within small business itself, as a result of which some of these enterprises are being "pulled up" to the medium level thanks to a reduction in the difference in labor productivity. Cogently showing that the "existence of a more or less significant sector of small and medium enterprises is inevitable and entirely logical" (p 80), they justifiably believe that the prospects of the Japanese economy depend to a considerable extent on how the "dual structure" will be overcome (p 83).

A merit of the group of authors is a discursive examination of the forms and methods of state-monopoly regulation of the economy and revelation of the complex and contradictory nature of the state-monopoly capitalism of present-day Japan. The work's analysis of such a special phenomenon for this country as the system of public corporations--the basic form of state enterprise--merits particular attention. The book draws the important conclusion that their role in the reproduction process "ultimately... consists of the creation of favorable conditions for the functioning of private capital" (p 132).
The monograph studies in detail the basic features and contradictions of the reproduction process with the emphasis on the specifics of postwar cycles and crises in the economy. There has been much discussion on this question in Soviet Japanese studies. The present position of the group of authors, albeit not expressed all that precisely, appears perfectly justified: in the postwar period the Japanese economy has experienced two cyclical overproduction crises (in 1958 and 1974-1975) and two partial crises (in 1965 and 1971) of the nature of a serious deterioration in economic conditions. The authors selected the most essential criterion for a detailed delineation—the dynamics of production—which enabled them to resolve this complex problem.

The authors' interest in an analysis of the causes, course and consequences of the 1974-1975 economic crisis as a turning point in the dynamics of the reproduction process over more than three decades is natural. Particular significance is attached here to the theoretical conclusion that "cyclical factors were interwoven in this crisis with manifestations of lengthy structural disproportions in the development of the Japanese economy and the profound structural crisis of the world capitalist economy" (p 182) for this interweave predetermined the singularities of the course of the crisis and the accelerated transition not so much to capital-intensive as science-intensive methods of retooling industry with the emphasis on the universal introduction of energy- and material-saving technology. Very important—in both the theoretical and practical aspects—in this sense is the proposition providing a qualitative evaluation of the crisis in the long-term development of the sectorial structure the start of a new stage connected... with a new type of Japanese industry's participation in the world capitalist division of labor" (p 186).

Intimate incorporation in the international division of labor is a basic characteristic of the present-day Japanese economy. The foreign policy factor is "built in" to the reproduction mechanism, and for this reason the large space devoted in the book to an examination of the entire complex of the country's foreign economic ties: foreign trade, overseas investment, currency problems and scientific-technical relations and also the role of the state is entirely justified.

The second part of the monograph (chapters VII-X) studies problems of Japan's socioeconomic development and analyzes the class structure and socioeconomic position of the working people. Use of the procedure tested in preceding studies superimposed on a scrupulous study of statistical data made it possible to draw the important conclusion concerning an expansion of the boundaries of wage work and a rise in the class structure of the relative significance of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which "testifies incontrovertibly to a deepening of polarization trends in Japanese society and its continuing and increasing split into a negligible handful of exploiters and tens of millions of exploited" (p 255).

This conclusion reveals the groundlessness of the claims of official propaganda and bourgeois sociologists concerning Japan's growth into a "classless state of general prosperity". At the same time the authors show that the development of the class structure in the direction of "pure bipolarity" is occurring by no means rectilinearly but is accompanied by a growth of class-heterogeneous
intermediate strata consisting basically of administrative-managerial personnel of the state and private sectors and also the semiproletarian strata of rural proprietors. Attached to the study of this question is the extraordinarily interesting problem of changes in the social consciousness and the crisis of the traditional mechanism of labor motivation, on the basis of an examination of which a conclusion is drawn concerning the appearance of "inerasible breaches in the still tight curtain of class-personality relations between labor and capital" and the trend "toward the revelation of truly class relations" (p. 271).

A special chapter is devoted to the position and struggle of Japanese working people. It pursues the thought that, despite somewhat of an improvement in the material position of the working people, "a growth of monetary income alone is incapable of solving the problems of a rise in the overall well-being of the nation and, consequently, of the laboring strata of the population" (p. 287). While rightly noting the underdevelopment of the social infrastructure and social security in Japan compared with the other major capitalist countries, the authors nonetheless lose sight of the appreciable positive changes in this sphere which the Japanese proletariat achieved throughout the 1970's. Furthermore, we believe, during examination of the Japanese trade unions' struggle for an improvement in the position of the working people the authors should not simply have confined themselves to a statement of the number of labor conflicts (the less so in the protracted and intrinsically heterogeneous period from 1965 through 1978) but have attempted to provide an explanation concerning the modest scale of the strike struggle of the Japanese proletariat compared with the other imperialist states (with the exception of the FRG).

The work comprehensively examines problems of domestic policy, the alignment of class forces, the political platforms of the ruling and main opposition parties and the increased confrontation of the forces of democracy and reaction. The authors show convincingly that the lack of unity in the ranks of the opposition (particularly between the Japanese Communist Party and the Japanese Socialist Party) is considerably weakening the possibilities of the struggle of the country's progressive forces against the monopolies and for social progress and a democratic alternative to the rule of the conservatives.

The final chapter traces the basic directions and singularities of foreign policy, analyzes the foreign policy concepts of the ruling circles and reveals the driving forces and methods of realization of the long-term policy of Japanese monopoly capital aimed at building up the military potential as a means of achieving its foreign and domestic policy goals and ambitions. Proceeding from the particular features of Japan's foreign policy, distinguishing its relations with the United States, the Southeast Asian countries, China and the USSR as a special subject seems perfectly justified.

Together with the undoubted merits of the book in question it has certain omissions. Thus evidently taking into account the existence of corresponding Soviet literature on Japanese studies, the authors sparingly illustrate problems of the financial oligarchy, the monopoly alliances and the situation in agriculture and omit entirely an analysis of the systems of taxation, hiring and social security. More attention, possibly, should have been paid to the question of Japan's relations with the West European countries.
The book contains a number of propositions with which it is difficult to agree. This applies to the assertion concerning "Japan's leading role" within the framework of the "Pacific Community" concept (p 21). Bearing in mind the participation in this community of the United States, an interpretation presupposing advantage being taken of this idea for strengthening Japan's economic and political positions in such an important part of the world (this is precisely how the question is posed on page 375) would in this case seem more accurate and balanced. The same applies to the assertion that "Japan has been unable to achieve a principal foreign policy goal, which was set back in the 1960's--expanding its political influence in the world arena in accordance with its growing economic power" (p 338). Japan's participation as an equal partner in meetings of the "seven" and the Trilateral Commission and many other facts, which, incidentally, are adduced extensively in the monograph, testify to the reverse, we believe.

Certain vagaries and inaccuracies are encountered in the work. Thus speaking of Japan's commitment (at the Tokyo meeting of the "seven" in 1979) to limit oil consumption up to 1985 to 6.3 million barrels a day (p 192), the authors view it as a "considerable concession" (to whom, incidentally, is not clear). We would note in this connection that the energy-saving policy adopted following the first "oil shock" proved in Japan the most effective among all the developed capitalist countries: daily oil consumption here constituted 5.17 million barrels in 1979 and subsequently declined constantly to the level of 4.4 million barrels in 1981 and 4.14 million barrels in 1982.

Another example. Against the background of a thorough examination of the system of state-monopoly regulation in the sphere of credit and finance mention of the activity of "Confidential Fund Office of the Ministry of Finance" allegedly controlled "by a Confidential Fund special account" (p 148) looks like an irritating slip. In fact such an office has not existed and does not now exist, and there is only a special account which, we believe, it would be more correct to call an investment fund special account since the resources accumulated therein are the basis of the investment and loan program. The confusion stems from a literal translation of this special account—"sükın umyébu." There was indeed a special department for managing the special account of deposits of the "Yëkinbu" postal-savings system within the Ministry of Finance framework, but it ceased to exist after World War I.

However, the said shortcomings do not detract from the overall positive impression of the work, which undoubtedly represents a comprehensive study of the problems of present-day monopoly capitalism and an important landmark in the development of Soviet Japanese studies.

CONGRESSIONAL STUDY CITES REAGAN EAST-WEST TRADE POLICY

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 8, 1984 (signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 146-148

[A. Parkanskiy book review: "Short-Sighted Policy"]

[Text]. Trade-economic relations between the USSR and the United States in the 1980's are developing under the difficult conditions artificially created by the enemies of detente. Spurring political and military tension in the world, Washington has not only itself imposed restrictions on economic and scientific-technical relations with the USSR and other socialist states but is also endeavoring in every possible way to undermine the normal trade with them of the West European countries and Japan. It is doing everything to destroy East-West economic cooperation and with the aid of "sanctions" and a trade-credit blockade to force the Soviet Union to consent to political concessions.

This short-sighted policy is giving rise to sharp disagreements both between the United States and its allies and also within the United States itself, where there is a growing understanding that the policy of "cowboy attacks" on mutually profitable trade-economic relations is hitting primarily at the interests of American business. The book in question,* "The Premises of East-West Commercial Relations," which collates the material of a special seminar organized by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Library of Congress [Congressional] Research Service, testifies to precisely this. Congressmen, business representatives and scientists took part in the seminar.

The main subject of the analysis are the points of departure of the R. Reagan administration's economic policy in respect of the USSR and the other socialist community countries. The main prerequisite on which Reagan's policy in this sphere is based is, as the American specialists emphasize, the fact that the Soviet economy is allegedly "vulnerable" in respect of a cessation of trade with the capitalist states. The R. Reagan administration, the book observes, proceeds from the fact that this "vulnerability" can and should be used to obtain concessions from the USSR in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy. The scale of the Soviet Union's "losses" here and the "benefits" which it hopes to obtain allegedly justify the "limited" negative consequences of such a policy for the economy of the United States itself. Furthermore, as the authors

observe, the White House is calculating that Washington will succeed in
subordinating its allies to the American policy in the sphere of East-West
trade (p 5).

The R. Reagan administration's policy in this sphere is being sharply criticized
in all its aspects. Thus J. Hardt, assistant director of the Library of
Congress Research Service, emphasizes that it is profoundly contradictory
inasmuch as it is aimed at achieving mutually exclusive goals: for example,
at a limitation of trade with the USSR and a simultaneously its increased use
as a lever of pressure on the Soviet Union; and at a reduction in West European
countries' imports of energy resources from the USSR for the purpose of a
reduction in the latter's currency receipts given these states' lack of
competitive and reliable alternative sources of such imports (pp 11-13).

In the opinion of E. Hewitt, senior scientific associate of the Brookings
Institution, an analysis of the consequences of the embargo imposed by the R.
Reagan administration on trade with the USSR shows that Washington has to learn
some lessons for itself. The "potential benefits" for the United States from
the embargo are far less certain than the losses caused the Americans themselves
by this action. Specific firms suffer from these losses here, while "the
benefits, if they exist at all, are spread so widely as to be practically
imperceptible." The negative consequences of the embargo will last for a long
time, when the "benefits of the moment" from it have long since disappeared.
Countries allied to the United States which have absolutely no connection with
the adoption of the embargo decision may suffer from these negative consequences
(pp 79, 80).

Examining the present administration's policy in the sphere of equipment and
technology exports to the socialist countries, H. Lewis, assistant vice
president of the National Association of Manufacturers, observes that the
measures to tighten "control" over exports not only undermine the competitiveness
of the United States' manufacturing industry but are also leading to a
deterioration in their domestic economic position as a whole.

We would recall that R. Reagan is by no means being original in his attempts
at the economic blackmail of the USSR. Reactionary transatlantic forces have
done everything to prevent Soviet-American commercial cooperation: they have
twice tried to organize an economic blockade of the Soviet state, striven in
individual periods for practically a complete severance of economic relations
between the two countries, attempted to impose deals beneficial to themselves
and so forth. As practice has shown, all this damaged the interests of the
United States itself.

However, as K. Jenkins, former president of the American-Soviet Trade-Economic
Council, acknowledges, Washington has never attempted to take account of the
experience of past American actions. Such is the present situation also. In
his opinion, the decisions on various sanctions and embargoes are being made
by the Reagan administration for reasons primarily of a domestic policy nature.
Perhaps the President's actions do contribute to a certain extent and in certain
periods to a strengthening of his positions in the United States itself, but
they are wholly ineffective in the plane of influencing the Soviet Union, while
in the long term they will lead to damage to the United States, K. Jenkins emphasizes (pp 115-116). He is perfectly justified in noting that the various sanctions are leading not simply to a loss of contracts of significant value for American corporations and to their being ousted from the Soviet market; as a result of the fulfillment of Soviet orders West European and Japanese competitors are expanding their production and organizing the manufacture of machinery and equipment which they did not produce hitherto, which is strengthening their positions on world markets as a whole (pp 61-62, 113).

The USSR's tremendous economic and scientific-technical potential, the planned system of the economy and an active policy aimed at the preservation of peace bring about stability and favorable prospects for the development of the Soviet national economy and condemn all American attempts at economic blackmail to failure. The authors of the book also are forced to admit this. Analyzing the "foreign economic vulnerability" of the Soviet Union, they reach a conclusion as to the practical absence of such.

The work observes that although the purchase of machinery and equipment abroad plays an appreciable part in the USSR's economic development, it acquires in the West merely a negligible quantity of the latest technology. Standard equipment available in many countries accounts for the bulk of the purchases here. In real prices, Soviet machinery and equipment imports from the industrially developed capitalist states in the period 1978-1981 declined.

As a whole, according to data of J. Vanous, senior economist at the Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Associates research firm, Soviet exports to all the developed capitalist countries, like imports therefrom, constitute merely approximately 1.5 percent of the USSR's GNP (p 84). It is not surprising, the American specialists are forced to admit, that the scale of the "losses" caused the Soviet Union by the sanctions and embargoes "is unclear, but in any event limited" (p 11). Despite all the attempts of the R. Reagan administration, the Soviet economy is continuing to develop at a high rate, which in the present 5-year plan, as previously, will be above, according to American estimates, the rate of the United States and the West European countries.

The groundlessness of Washington's economic policy in respect of the USSR has led, in the authors' general opinion, to increased disagreements with its allies on questions of East-West trade. As C. Wolf, leader of the Rand Corporation's research program in international economic policy, acknowledges, the United States and West Europe have different approaches to this problem, which are a consequence of the differences in the evaluation of the detente process of the 1970's and its results. The West European countries as a whole are satisfied with the results of detente and advocate its continued development, in the economic sphere included, where they have already considerable benefits (p 149). In the apt definition of A. Stent, professor at Georgetown University, the main topic of the discussion under way in West Europe on East-West trade problems is not that of whether to sell or not to sell to the Soviet Union but how to build its relations with the United States in this sphere (p 154). The book says plainly that the United States, if it wishes to achieve unity with West Europe in the pursuit of economic policy in respect of the socialist countries, must abandon the present practice of the use of sanctions and embargoes for political purposes (p 159).
The authors of the work in question by no means harbor sympathies toward the Soviet Union. The main purpose of the analysis they have made in a search for ways and means of most effectively, from their viewpoint, securing the United States' imperialist goals in the sphere in question or, more simply, how to damage the Soviet Union and avoid damage to its own interests here. There is no doubt that had the analysis led them to a conclusion concerning the practical expediency of a policy of sanctions and embargoes, they would have supported it. A number of highly dubious recommendations contained in the book testifies to the class positions of the participants in the seminar. For example, the opinion was expressed that an intensification of military programs, expansion of the activity of subversive radio stations, the organization of new American military bases overseas, NATO military maneuvers in individual regions, increased arms sales to certain countries and so forth would be far more effective means of "pressure on the USSR" than economic sanctions (pp 67, 117). Whereas in the analysis of the economic policy of the R. Reagan administration in respect to the Soviet Union the authors were forced to come to terms with reality and appeared as realistic experts, here they displayed a high degree of incompetence: like others also, the enumerated means of pressure on our country are futile.

As a whole, however, the material of the book testifies to the quite serious opposition which exists in scientific-political and business circles of the United States in respect to the R. Reagan administration's policy in the sphere of East-West economic relations and the growing recognition of its pointlessness and short-sightedness.


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U.S.-USSR WAR TIME COOPERATION RECALLED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 8, 1984 (signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 152-154

[I. Kuznetsov book review: "Historical Example of Effective Cooperation "]

[Text] The book in question appeared in the year of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the United States. The half-century experience of the interstate ties of the world's two biggest powers has been complicated—allied relations in the war years were replaced by a long and dark period of cold war; there have been moments of acute international political crises; and the detente process which strengthened in the 1970's was undermined at the start of the 1980's by reactionary circles in the United States, who were the organizers of an anticomunist "campaign" against the USSR and the socialist community countries. Through the fault of imperialist circles, which have initiated a new twist of the arms race spiral, the level of tension in the world has risen.

It is not fortuitous that the author has chosen precisely the period in the history of Soviet-American relations when under the dangerous and grim conditions which had been created for the USSR and the United States they operated as allies in the struggle against fascist aggression. A. Borisov's study merits attention primarily because it is a question of a historical example of the cooperation of states with different sociopolitical systems in the years of World War II. The significance of the historical experience is in no way diminished for the formulation of a sober and sensible approach to the normalization and development of Soviet-American relations at the current stage.

The book makes an objective evaluation of the domestic and foreign policy factors which forced the U.S. leaders to renounce the policy of "isolationism"—actually complicity with the aggressors—and regard the USSR as a potential ally in the anti-Hitler coalition (p 44).

The class evaluation of the motives and intentions of the U.S. ruling circles which the author made the basis of the work made it possible to avoid

oversimplifications in the analysis of the foreign policy course pursued by President F.D. Roosevelt and to determine the nature and sources of the deeplying processes in American society influencing the alignment of forces in the country's ruling circles and subsequently facilitating President H. Truman's transition to a "from a position of strength" policy in relations with the Soviet Union (p 232).

A defense of the interests of monopoly capital, which the F.D. Roosevelt administration undoubtedly represented, was combined with its representatives' realistic perception of the international military-political situation. This largely explained the fluctuations and inconsistency of the American side in the fulfillment of allied commitments and the need for the USSR's vigorous diplomatic struggle for the actual practical embodiment of allied relations, particularly for the opening of a second front (p 155).

The successful solution of the question of the opening of a second front at the Teheran Conference in November-December 1943 advanced to the forefront throughout the structure of interallied relations problems of a postwar peace settlement based on the right of the peoples liberated from the fascist yoke to self-determination and independent choice of social development path. It was in just such a multifaceted and complex sphere of political mutual relations that class differences in the approach of the USSR and the United States to the solution of these cardinal problems were to be manifested.

The class nature of the socialist state, the Leninist principles of the USSR's foreign policy and the interests of its security were, as the work shows, reflected in the firm and uncompromising position of Soviet diplomacy in respect of the attempts at imperialist interference in the affairs of the European states which had been liberated from fascism and the expansionist ambitions of U.S. monopoly capital and its endeavor to counteract the revolutionary changes in the world (p 169).

At the same time there was an objective need for a solution of the problems of a postwar settlement in the interests of international peace, security and the development of relations of cooperation.

The consolidation of the position of Soviet diplomacy at the concluding stage of the war was secured by the Soviet Army's victories at the front, the new correlation of forces which was taking shape, the democratic revolutionary upsurge of the people's masses as the result of the approaching defeat of fascism and the growth of the USSR's political influence in the world and the attraction of its foreign policy (p 170). It was these factors which performed the decisive role in the successful completion of the conferences of the allied powers at Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta and Potsdam.

A. Borisov makes extensive use of little-known archive and memoir sources making it possible to refute the false assertions prevalent in Western historiography about the USSR as "an unreliable and unpredictable partner" and pronouncements distorting the aims, character and content of allied relations in the war years and to reveal the real causes of the emergence of the dangerous tension between the former allies after the war (p 257).
The Soviet Union displayed an exceptionally high sense of responsibility for the
fate of the postwar world and did everything possible to preserve constructive
relations of cooperation with the United States in the postwar period also.
The transition from allied relations in the war years to postwar confrontation
was, as the material of the book confirms yet again, connected primarily with
the toughening of U.S. foreign policy and the attempts of this country's
ruling circles to force the USSR to consent to the organization of a postwar
world on American terms (p 261).

The acute international crises provoked by imperialist circles of the West, the
powerful anti-Soviet campaign developed in the United States and the growth of
the aggressiveness of American imperialism and its aspiration to world
domination were the reasons for the emergence of such a negative phenomenon
in international relations as the cold war. In the light of the facts adduced
in the work bourgeois propaganda's assertions concerning Americans' alleged
"disenchantment" with postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union do not
withstand criticism; the split of the anti-Hitler coalition came about as a
result of the U.S. ruling upper stratum's change toward cold war and the "from
a position of strength" policy.

The analysis of a substantial volume of diplomatic documents makes it possible
to authentically portray the history of the development of Soviet-American
relations in the war years and the flexibility and constructive nature of
Soviet diplomacy's approach to the accomplishment of a principal task of our
country's foreign policy—the achievement of stable relations on the basis of
the principles of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries which
were the USSR's allies in the anti-Hitler coalition (p 211).

Not confining himself to a study of the diplomatic aspects of USSR—United
States mutual relations, the author reveals the entire complex structure of
Soviet-American interaction in the war years. In particular, the monograph
touches on questions of military, economic, cultural and scientific-technical
cooperation and shows the mutually beneficial nature of the relations which took
shape.

The reader's attention is also drawn to such an important aspect of relations
between the USSR and the United States as the movement of the progressive
American public in support of the Soviet people and for the opening of a second
front and the development of good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union after
the war.

Nonetheless, it would seem that the work could have reflected in greater detail
the dynamics and content of the 1941-1945 domestic political struggle between the
"anticoalition" currents and the supporters of allied relations with the USSR,
which exerted an appreciable influence on the United States' fulfillment of its
allied commitments, lend-lease agreements included. The activity of anti-Soviet
political groupings in the United States in the war years contributed to the
subsequent reorientation of the country's foreign policy course toward
confrontation with the motherland of October.

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It would also have been expedient for the monograph to have made more extensive use of graphic factual material attesting the actual significance and scale of American military supplies and the USSR's efforts in the achievement of victory over fascism and exposing the attempts of bourgeois ideologists to consign to oblivion the decisive contribution made by the Soviet people to the rout of fascist Germany and its allies.

A. Borisov's study is topical from a scientific-historical viewpoint and useful in the practical-political plane. The book will undoubtedly be of interest both to international affairs specialists and a broad readership.

INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK FOR 1982 REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 8, 1984
(signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 156-157

[I. Lebedev book review: "Chronicle of International Life"]

[Text] In our time readers interested in problems of world economics and politics encounter such an avalanche of information that they need a kind of guidebook affording them an opportunity to distinguish from the kaleidoscopic picture of events, facts and processes occurring in various countries and regions the main, most important ones determining the appearance of the modern world.

Such a guidebook has for many years now been the publication in question,* each edition of which enables us not only to familiarize ourselves with the facts of the past year, that is, essentially with the immediate prehistory of current international life, but also helps us discern long-term processes and trends behind specific phenomena which are sometimes capable of seeming particular. The combination of the informative with the analytical approaches and the abundance of factual material with a profoundly scientific study is a characteristic feature of this publication.

We would add that the reader turns repeatedly to editions of the "Yearbook" when new events of international life compel a recollection of events of 3, 5 and more than 10 years ago. It may be said without exaggeration that the 26 editions which have appeared as of the present constitute altogether a concise chronicle of international life in the last quarter of a century. And this chronicle is, moreover, a comprehensive scientific work annually supplemented by the latest material on world economics and politics.

The structure and nature of the publication in question has evolved over many years. The stability of the "Yearbook," the comparability of each new edition with preceding ones, retention of the proven principles of the selection and analysis of material--all this facilitates the use of its books by all. The latest opens, like the previous ones, with a section devoted to general problems of international relations and current world politics. The article by V. Zagladin here, "Karl Marx and the International Policy of the Proletariat,"

* "Mezhdunarodnyy yezhegodnik. Politika i ekonomika. Vypusk 1983"
examines K. Marx's propositions concerning foreign policy issues and shows convincingly the relevance and value of Marx's analysis of international relations and the role of the working class in them for the contemporary international workers movement.

O. Bykov's article "The USSR's Foreign Policy and International Relations in 1982" surveys the vigorous activity of the Soviet Union and its allies in the world arena aimed at counteracting the aggressive propensities of imperialism, preventing a nuclear catastrophe and preserving and further developing everything positive that has been created in international relations as a result of detente. There are also articles by Yu. Kharlamov, "The Mass Antiwar Movement--New Stage," and I. Kapranov, "The USSR's Economic and Technical Cooperation With the Socialist and Developing Countries".

The section on the socialist countries is anticipated by O. Chukanov's article "CEMA in 1982," which contains an analysis of the economic position of the CEMA countries, graphically shows their successes and unsolved problems in the sphere of socioeconomic development and outlines the tasks confronting the fraternal socialist states on the paths of the further deepening of economic cooperation between them.

The surveys on individual socialist countries provide a vast amount of factual material on their economic and political development. I. Pogosov's article "The Soviet Union in the Year of the 60th Anniversary," which contains numerous data on the results of the USSR's political and economic development, will undoubtedly attract special attention. Upon familiarization with this section the reader can obtain answers to many questions connected with the economics, domestic policy situation and foreign policy of the socialist countries.

The section on the developed capitalist countries open with two summary articles (L. Grigor'yev's "Economy of the Capitalist Countries in 1982: Deepening of the Crisis" and M. Maksimova's "The EEC: Certain Results of Development") which provide a broad idea of the deepening and exacerbation of the socioeconomic and political contradictions of modern capitalism. The material of analytical surveys with respect to individual developed capitalist states also serves as convincing confirmation of this.

Ye. Dmitriyev's problem-solving article "The Near East Conflict in 1982" opens the section on the developing countries. It analyzes the situation in this explosive region and sets forth the Soviet proposals for an all-embracing peace settlement in the Near East. Surveys on individual states, whose very titles ("Argentina: Armed Conflict With Great Britain"; "Afghanistan: Defense of the Revolution, Strengthening of People's Power"; "India: 35 Years Along the Path of Independent Development"; "Ethiopia: Policy of Progressive Transformations"; and so forth) testify that they examine most urgent problems not only of these countries proper but also of international relations as a whole, will undoubtedly be of interest to the reader.

The final section—"International Organizations and Conferences. Chronicle of International Events in 1982"—contains articles on the activity of the United Nations (V. Petrovskiy) and the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference (L. Lyubimov) and provides a chronological list of the year's most important events (A. German, Ye. Natov).
This edition of the "International Yearbook," like preceding ones, is distinguished by breadth of coverage and depth of analysis of economic and political problems, the substantiated nature of the selection of factual material and the breadth of reference data. As mentioned repeatedly in our press, the publication serves as a reference book for the large readership actively interested in questions of international life (its sizable edition--100,000 copies--also testifies to this).

Although the nature and structure of the "International Yearbook" took shape long since and undoubtedly correspond to the tasks of the publication, familiarization with the latest edition provides grounds for expressing certain expectations. Thus it would be expedient, we believe, to include among the developed capitalist countries permanently represented in the "Yearbook" Canada, the growth of whose significance in world economics and politics is obvious. It is sufficient to say that it is a member of the "seven" leaders of the capitalist world. Regular inclusion in the editions of material on Australia and Oceania would also be desirable.