Near East/South Asia Report
NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.


Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.
NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Syria Continues Its Complex Role in Lebanon
(Salim Nassar; AL-MUSTAQBAL, various dates) .................. 1

ARAB AFFAIRS

EGYPT

Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din Discusses Actions in Interview
(Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din Interview; AL-MAJALLAH, 7-13 Aug 85). 14

Cairo's Leadership Role at Nairobi Women's Conference Underlined
(Anji Rushdi; AL-AHRAM, 28 Jul 85) ......................... 20

Industry Minister Discusses Roles of Public, Private Sectors
(Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab Interview; AL-AHRAM, 26 Jul 85). 25

Minister Discusses Issues Concerning Egyptians Abroad
(Albert Barsam Salamah Interview; AL-AHRAM, 27 Jul 85) .. 31

LIBYA

Libyan National Movement's Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar Interviewed
(Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar Interview; AL-DUSTUR, 15 Jul 85) 37

TUNISIA

Defense Minister Inspects Saharan Brigade, Urges Support
(LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE, 16 Aug 85) ......................... 44

- a -
Deposits of Zinc, Lead, Phosphates Discovered in Kef  
(LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE, 16 Aug 85) ..................... 46

ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

IRAQ

Official Discusses New Planting Season  
(AL-THAWRAH, 18 Jun 85) ................................. 49

Pilgrimage Desert Road To Open in July  
(Firyal Jasim; AL-THAWRAH, 27 Jun 85) ............. 52

Roads, Bridges Establishment Surveys Accomplishments, Prospects  
('Abbas Mahdi al-Hadidi; AL-THAWRAH, 26 Jun 85) ... 54

ISRAEL

Alienation of Labor Party From Working Class Decried  
(Yehoshu'a Bitzur; MA'ARIV, 20 Jun 85) .............. 58

Need for Arab Investment in Galilee Urged  
(Me'ir Hare'uveni; MA'ARIV, 14 May 85) ............... 60

New Treasury Department Formed To Combat Black Market  
(Amiram Fleisher; MA'ARIV, 14 Jun 85) ............... 64

Education for Democracy Project Discussed  
(Yo'el Ben Nun; KOTERET RASHIT, 3 Jul 85) .......... 65

Ariel Sharon Assesses Lebanon War  
(YEDI'OT AHARONOT, various dates) ................. 69

Historical Consensus  
Comparison to Previous Wars  
Achievements and Failures  

Shortage of Arabic Speakers in Military Intelligence  
(Eli Tabor; YEDI'OT AHARONOT, 6 Jun 85) .......... 82

English-Language IDF Journal Discussed  
(Ruti Levi'av; BAMAHANE, 3 Jul 85) ................. 84

SOUTH ASIA

AFGHANISTAN

Soviets Launch Search, Destroy Missions in Kabul  
(KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 15 Aug 85) ................. 90
Heavy Fighting Breaks Out in Paktia
(KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 28 Aug 85) ......................... 92

BANGLADESH

Obaidur Rahman, Khaleda Zia Remarks Reported
(THE NEW NATION, 12, 13 Aug 85) ......................... 94

Rahman at Airport, Zia at Meeting, by Hasanuzzaman Khan
Rahman Support for BNP ................................. 95

Seven-Party Alliance Said To Recast Policy
(Kazi Montu; HOLIDAY, 9 Aug 85) ......................... 96

India Asked To Clarify Home Minister's Statement
(THE NEW NATION, 11 Aug 85) ......................... 97

Ministry Reports on Foreign Aid Received
(Syed Badjuzzaman; THE NEW NATION, 13 Aug 85) ........ 98

Delhi Reports on Ganges Accord Called 'Speculative'
(THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER, 11 Aug 85) ............... 99

Moroccan Envoy Tells of Meeting With Ershad
(THE NEW NATION, 10 Aug 85) ......................... 101

Bangladesh, Burma Authenticate Border Maps
(THE NEW NATION, 13 Aug 85) ......................... 102

Nonparticipation in Moscow Youth Meet Examined
(Various sources, 9 Aug 85) ......................... 103

Soviet Representative's Remarks
Letter From Festival Panel Chairman ..................... 103

Briefs
Ambassador to DPRK ........................................ 106
Cooperation With Japan .................................... 106
USSR Carpet Purchase ....................................... 106
Agricultural Wage Panel ................................... 107

INDIA

Article Alleges Rift Between Gandhi, Singh
(R. K. Mishra; PATRIOT, 6 Aug 85) ....................... 108

Singh Quoted Verbétilm on Reservations Issue
(PATRIOT, 9 Aug 85) ...................................... 110

Gandhi Visits Defense Labs in Hyderabad
(THE TELEGRAPH, 6 Aug 85) .............................. 111

- c -
Gandhi's Interview With Dubai English Paper Reported
(THE TIMES OF INDIA, 12 Aug 85) .......................... 112

Punjab Hindu Party Leader Supports Pact
(THE TIMES OF INDIA, 12 Aug 85) .......................... 113

Punjab Communal Harmony Committee Endorses Accord
(THE TIMES OF INDIA, 11 Aug 85) .......................... 114

Analyst Tells Indian Stand on Nonaligned Venue
(G. K. Reddy; THE HINDU, 7 Aug 85) ...................... 116

CPI Leader Meets Press After Kashmir Visit
(PATRIOT, 14 Aug 85) .......................... 117

CPI-M Politburo Meets, Issues Statement
(PATRIOT, 14 Aug 85) .......................... 118

Defense Minister: No Deployment on Borders
(PATRIOT, 14 Aug 85) .......................... 119

Rajiv, Foreign Affairs Panel Discuss Terrorism
(THE TIMES OF INDIA, 18 Jul 85) .......................... 120

Naxalites Gaining Strength in Bengal District
(THE STATESMAN, 8 Aug 85) .......................... 122

Lok Sabha Passes Amendment to Antiterrorist Bill
(THE STATESMAN, 8 Aug 85) .......................... 124

Minister Announces New Moves To Boost Exports
(THE HINDU, 11 Aug 85) .......................... 125

'Significant' Gas Find Reported in Cauvery Basin
(THE HINDU, 7 Aug 85) .......................... 127

Briefs
Gandhi Japan Visit 129
Indo-Jordanian Accord 129
Cooperation With PRC 129
Indo-Afghan Cultural Agreement 130
Dal Khalsa Leader 130

IRAN

Saddam's Downfall Iran's Only Condition for Gulf Peace
(ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW, Jul 85) ............ 131

Kuwait Accused of Collusion With Iraq Against Iran
(TEHRAN TIMES, 31 Aug 85) .......................... 133

Article Examines France's 'Volte Face' in Gulf
(ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW, Jul 85) ............ 135
SYRIA CONTINUES ITS COMPLEX ROLE IN LEBANON

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 8, 15, 22 Jun 85

[Article by Salim Nassar: "Syria's Role in Lebanon"

[8 Jun 85 pp 22-23]

[Text] The U.S. press has recently lamented Lebanon in a series of articles, the most significant being a NEW YORK TIMES editorial describing Lebanon as the "homeland of graveyards" and a HERALD TRIBUNE editorial speaking of Lebanon as a memory passing rapidly through the area's history like a shooting star. It is noticed that the American words, which reflect to a degree the U.S. administration's viewpoint, have been lamenting Lebanon as a result of the decline of Western influence—a decline coinciding with Israel's withdrawal. As a result of the political transformation, these words depict Lebanon as a homeland with a past but with no future, because it has accepted to break away from its past role as a bridge for regional and international relations.

Opinions vary in interpreting this lamentation and on whether Lebanon has actually died in U.S. calculations, at least for the foreseeable future, or on whether the exaggeration in depicting the gloomy future is no more than a premeditated message intended to implant fear in the heart and to spread an atmosphere of uncertainty and despair regarding the sovereignty of this small homeland and regarding its economic and political independence. It is expected that this exaggeration campaign would flow into the sea of rumors that say that it will be difficult for the 10,000 foreign companies and delegations that fled Lebanon prior to the war and that have been waiting in Greece, Bahrain, Britain, France, Cyprus, Dubayy and Kuwait to return to the Middle East graveyard, Beirut, where correspondents are expelled, diplomats are kidnapped and foreigners are killed.

What is interesting is that the U.S. declaration of lamentation expresses a fear of the qualitative transformation in Lebanese society and of the possibility of the development of a fundamental change in roles that will make it impossible to restore to the country the conditions prevailing prior to the 1975 events. It is likely that through this pessimistic viewpoint, the U.S. declaration is indirectly referring to the change that has developed in the strategic evaluation regarding Lebanon's role in the Middle East,
i.e., regarding Lebanon's natural and human reality, its Arab affiliation and its ability to link East with West.

Officials in Damascus say that the 17 May accord was not so much concerned with the Galilee's security as it was concerned with separating Lebanon from its Arab environment, preventing its interaction with Syria and utilizing it to establish new political mainstays contrasting with the historical and geographic contract with Lebanon. This is what President Hafiz al-Asad said when he received U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and conveyed to Shultz his absolute rejection of the accord's contents. The U.S. secretary returned to Washington to speak of the Syrian strategy, saying that Syria reserved for itself the right to abolish the accord with all means, even if this compels it to use armed force. Upon his return, the secretary said that "al-Asad's principle is founded on obstructing any independent agreement with Israel that would include what he describes as the forces existing in Greater Syria, such as Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians." U.S. President Reagan took the occasion of the national holiday to address to the Syrian president a message promising that he will exert efforts for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Golan as part of a comprehensive Middle East settlement in accordance with Resolution 242. But this promise did not reassure anybody, as proven by the fact that the ferocity and violence of the fighting continued even after the withdrawal of the multinational forces from Beirut and after the abolition of the 17 May accord.

That phase witnessed an escalation in the confrontation and intensified fears on the part of Washington and Moscow about the eruption of an Israeli-Syrian clash in Lebanon that would embroil them in the regional conflict. The U.S. administration alleged that Syria's interests in Lebanon are incomprehensible even though Syria reveals its intentions and declares that it wants to strengthen the central government and seeks the withdrawal of the foreign forces from Lebanon. In all the meetings with the U.S. envoys who visited Damascus in that period, the Syrian officials reiterated what they had expressed in the press, namely that Damascus resented and was angered by President Reagan's statements equating it, as a state whose forces were summoned on an official request and on an Arab League resolution, with Israel whose forces invaded Lebanon. The officials then added to this observation some of Damascus' political objectives, saying that they are embodied in canceling the Israeli gains and all the political and military influence achieved by Tel Aviv in Lebanon, in putting distance between the Phalanges and the Lebanese Forces on the one hand and Israel on the other and in preventing the creation of a precedent that may encourage a future repetition of the bilateral agreement process.

The objections which Damascus insisted on expressing to Shultz, MacFarlane and Murphy included what was mentioned regarding U.S. vital and strategic interests in Lebanon. The envoys were told that Washington was seeking to insure its strategy through Israel and without any regard for Syrian interests in Lebanon and that this dictated by necessity a reexamination of the U.S. position and acknowledgment of the impact of the given geographic and political facts on this relationship. It seems that Reagan, along with the leaders of the EEC, acknowledged Syria's role in Lebanon after having
failed to entrench their roles and expressed their positions on the need to exercise deterrent force to stop the infighting and stem the cascade of blood.

Last week, President al-Jumayyil asked Syria to participate practically in order to establish the control of the state in preparation for resuming the national dialogue among the parties to the conflict. It has been said that this request automatically canceled the official message sent to Damascus and the Arab League in the past to request speeding up withdrawal of the Syrian deterrence forces from Lebanon. Since no joint statement has been issued on the timing of the entry and deployment of these forces in the various areas, then the decision to move in the direction of Beirut, al-Shuf or the south continues to be tied to internal and regional circumstances to be determined by Damascus in light of the ongoing developments in the arena. These developments may have their ramifications at the Arab level if the war of the refugee camps is not settled in a manner that does not undermine, weaken or dissipate the pan-Arab cause.

It seems from all the opinions expressed recently by the political and religious leaderships in West Beirut that the war of the refugee camps has assumed Lebanese, Arab and international dimensions whose consequences are difficult to assess. Amal Movement rejects any special security for the camps because, in Amal's view, their security should not be distinguished from the security of their general environment. Meanwhile, Dr Husayn al-Quwwatli, general director of formal legal affairs and coordinator of the Security Committee, said that what has happened in the refugee camps is not within the Security Committee's jurisdiction. The statement he issued on this issue contains a paragraph which reflects the position of a number of Lebanese Sunna leaders and says: "In light of the strategic changes, of the rapidly changing political and security conditions and the given facts in West Beirut and around and inside the Palestinian camps, of the serious ramifications of these changes to the mountain and the south and of their ramifications at the Arab and international levels, a security and political committee must shoulder this responsibility instead of the current Security Committee which has been superceded by events. This is what was expressed to us by Syrian Vice President 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam when we paid him our latest visit to ask him about the responsibility of the West Beirut Security Committee in light of these developments. It is worth noting here that since the eruption of the war of the camps, the security situation is no longer a narrow local Islamic affair concerning a committee emanating from an Islamic conference that was convened in Damascus. This situation has become a strategic security situation concerning Syria, in addition to all the Lebanese national and Islamic forces and all the Palestinian forces allied with them on the basis of fighting the occupying Israeli enemy. Therefore, it has become urgently necessary that this committee be re-formed on a basis of broader security and strategic responsibilities, provided that it include Syrian and Palestinian representatives and Lebanese Muslims, Christian and nationalist representatives from the sons of the same ranks and provided that these representatives be up to the level of decision making, representatives such as ministers Salim al-Huss, Nabil Birri and Walid Junblatt. This is what was fundamentally projected at the Damascus
Islamic conference. Only such a committee, with the Syrian and Palestinian representatives it will include, is capable of establishing the strategy of this phase and its security dictates."

But this argument has not prevented the officials in Damascus from expressing their viewpoint to a number of Arab and Lebanese mediators, from saying that the camps must be like any other camps in any Arab capital in terms of harmony with their environment. The officials objected to those who say that disarming the Palestinians living in the Lebanese camps will affect the liberation of Palestine and stated that the pan-Arab cause does not rely on the camps alone. Minister Birri proposed that Syrian army officers supervise as observers the withdrawal and gathering of weapons from the Palestinian camps so that the Syrian guarantee for the security of the camps may be present.

Regardless of what political interpretations are given to the war of the camps, the timing of this war with King Husayn's visit to Washington has been interpreted as a purposeful blow intended to deprive Abu 'Ammar of his political force, to prevent him from employing his supporters in the camps to put political pressure on the major powers and to confine him to the West Bank. Some commentators have even gone further, saying that using the Shi'ites exclusively in the operation of disarming the camps is no more than a plan intended to abolish the role of the Sunna sect's army, as Prime Minister Karami said, in the existing sectarian equation. The Sunna Muslims of Ra's Beirut have viewed this step as a double opportunity for finally imposing control on West Beirut and for establishing a new umbrella for the national movement to replace the Palestinian resistance that has gathered the leftist parties and the nationalist organizations under its wings since 1970.

European commentators and writers sympathetic to the Palestinian cause have agreed with Moscow's opinion that the primary beneficiary of the war of the camps is Israel. In its comment on these events, NOVOSTY said: "Regardless of all the opinions and interpretations concerning the causes of and motives behind these armed clashes, the event in its entirety ultimately flows only into the mill of the enemies of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples. This certain conclusion is proven by observing the extent of the jubilation with which the Zionist circles in Israel and their allies have received the news of the bloody events coming from the Palestinian camps in Beirut."

It is through this official Soviet position that some Lebanese politicians have tried to interpret the decision taken by Walid Junblatt to stay clear of the war of the camps, keeping in mind that Junblatt helped Amal decide its battle against al-Murabitun. Others have also tried to interpret Junblatt's decision in light of the language Libya used to absolve Yasir 'Arafat of responsibility for the war of the camps, describing him as the victim of a plot seeking to annihilate the Palestinian presence in the area. Between the two positions, Walid Junblatt is awaiting the final decision concerning the legitimacy of the Security Committee and its responsibility for the camps and for West Beirut. Observers believe that this
contradiction in the positions of the leaders of the same ranks can be coor-
dinat under the canopy of Syrian deterrence in case agreement is reached
on the date of entry of the Syrian deterrence forces and on the military
and political tasks agreed upon by Beirut and Damascus. This date may come
as late as the end of next September, i.e., by the time all the forces will
have been exhausted and will have reached a position whereby they will agree
to yesterday’s guarantee, especially since there are a number of leaders
of the predominant forces and of those cooperating with Syria who do not
welcome the entry of the Syrian forces into their areas of influence because
such an entry will deprive them of their dominant power. Or this date may
come at the time when Syria completes its preparations to confront any possi-
bility of deploying its forces beyond al-Awwali River because Israel considers
this river a red line for its security strategy. TISHRIN recently pointed
out that Syria rejects red lines and that it is the side that draws the
line for whatever is in conflict with its principles. This means that Syria’s
entry in 1985 will be at least different in form from its entry in June 1976.
What is interesting is that President Amin al-Jumayyil requested the entry
of the deterrence forces on the same date 9 years later. Will the entry
take place on the date proposed by the Lebanese government or will the wait
be stretched until the end of the summer?

[15 Jun 85 pp 16-17]

[Text] In February 1984, the U.S. Marines, along with the multinational
forces, withdrew from Beirut.

Last Monday, 10 June 1985, Israel declared its third and final withdrawal
from the south. Thus, all foreign forces have departed from Lebanon, opening
the door for the Syrian army to spread anew and fill the security vacuum
in Beirut, the mountain and the various hot areas.

The Israeli withdrawal operation coincided with two important events whose
consequences flow into the type of alternative left by Yitzhak Rabin for
the border strip:

The first concerns the security of the Galilee, considering that the two
rockets which exploded in unpopulated areas reflect the nature of the at-
trition and of the harm and destruction that may afflict the northern settle-
ments in the coming phase.

The second event concerns the South Lebanon Army's abduction of 24 Finnish
members of the UN forces in retaliation for the detention of 11 captives
by Amal Movement. It is obvious from using the UN peace-keeping forces
as a target that the Israeli army considers this UN presence a barrier in
the face of implementing its hot-pursuit plan, meaning that the elimination
of these forces will give the Israeli army a geographic margin to move whenever
the need arises and to penetrate deep into the border villages in order
to carry out retaliatory acts.

The observers link these suspicious activities with Shimon Peres' refusal
to permit deployment of the UN forces all along the borders if the United
Nations continues to insist on the dissolution of Antoine Lahd's army. These observers also link the Galilee's peace and protecting the Galilee from rocket attacks with the security responsibility to be exercised by the Syrian army over all the Lebanese territories, especially since Damascus has recently spoken of its ability to move and since TISHRIN said: "The unapproachable red line is the line that exposes Lebanon to any form of partition or to the squandering of its unity. There is no other red line from the farthest south to the farthest north."

In 1976, Yitzhak Rabin spoke in his capacity as prime minister of three red lines which he claimed to have been submitted to the Americans as mandatory conditions for the Syrian army's entry to Lebanon:

The first red line begins in Sidon and ends in al-'Ayshiyah, with the deterrence forces prohibited from crossing it. The second military line speaks of Israel's opposition to the deployment of surface-to-air missile batteries on Lebanese territory and the third imaginary line concerns the non-use of force against the Christians.

The practical actions indicated that Syria did not observe the Israeli conditions which state that crossing al-Awwali River constitutes a state of war insofar as the security of Israel's borders is concerned. In 1977, the deterrence forces crossed beyond al-Litani River. When Menachem Begin intervened to help the Phalanges and the Christians during the Zahlah siege and ordered the downing of a Syrian helicopter, Damascus retaliated by deploying missile batteries in al-Biq'a', thus abolishing the three red lines defined by Washington through one of the Arab rulers.

What is interesting is that the United States has also ceded on its part its security commitment to protect Lebanon's independence and sovereignty. The United States had underlined this commitment on several occasions, especially when it landed its marines in Beirut in 1958.

It is true that Murphy, the diplomatic mediator, wrote that the decision to intervene was taken in the wake of 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim's coup in Iraq and that the U.S. military presence in Lebanon was no more than a test of Soviet intentions. But it is also true that President Eisenhower justified his intervention by declaring his rejection of any internal change opposed to the legitimate government in Lebanon and supported from abroad. In 1962, U.S. President Kennedy handed Nadim Dimashqiyah, then Lebanese ambassador in Washington, a letter to this effect renewing his country's commitment to Lebanon's safety and to protecting its national sovereignty. All these guarantees and commitments were abolished on 19 April 1976 when the White House declared that Syria was performing a constructive and positive role in Lebanon and that the U.S. administration approved the entry of the Syrian forces to stop the internecine fighting and the chaos.

It seems that President Reagan tried to renew the pledge given by Eisenhower and Kennedy through the deployment of the multinational forces in Beirut and through the expansion of their influence in phases. This military endeavor made by Washington, to contain the June 1982 war. At that time, the
PLO suspended its operations against the settlements in the Upper Galilee in observation of the cease-fire decision. The Labor Party leaders launched at the time an attack in which they criticized Menachem Begin for negotiating with the PLO indirectly. Peres accused him of weakness for giving the PLO some sort of legitimate recognition as a responsible, non-terrorist organization. Sharon became fearful of the consequences of the relationship which the U.S. administration had established with the Palestinian organization, especially since that relationship helped spread among the White House officials the conviction that the organization is capable of upholding its moral pledges and that its commitments inspire respect and trust and encourage strengthening the bilateral relationship. Reagan utilized this political climate to offer a draft proposal asking all foreign forces to depart from Lebanon. The proposal called for a mutual withdrawal in phases during which the PLO forces would withdraw to points beyond the range of Katyusha rockets while Israel would withdraw its guns and forces from Sa'd Haddad's zone. In the second phase, the withdrawal called for the Syrian forces to withdraw beyond the borders. When the proposal was presented to Sharon, he rejected it on the grounds that withdrawal of the Israeli weapons from Haddad's army should take place after the Palestinian forces withdraw from the south and the Syrian forces withdraw from all of Lebanon. The observers interpreted the intransigence of the ex-minister of defense as a suspicious position emanating from his fear that the Palestinian-U.S. relationship would be strengthened during the cease-fire period. This is why Sharon had to choose the path of war with the aim of severing the dialogue and the political harmony between the PLO and Washington. Three years after Sharon's abortive attempt, all the international forces withdrew from the theatre of operations and the responsibility has been turned over, by varying degrees, to Syria, thus declaring that Syria is the only military force capable of intervening with all the parties involved. Even the historical French guarantees have been relinquished by the "tender mother" during Mitterand's administration. This is what Patriarch Hakim heard from the French president during his latest visit to Paris. Mitterand told the patriarch that a neighbor is better aware of his neighbor's affairs and that the distinguished Lebanese-French relationship ended with de Gaulle, with nothing left of it other than sweet memories and changing interests. This opinion is not much different from the Vatican's opinion which was declared when Cardinal (Bertoli) came to Lebanon at the outset of the events to warn the Christian leaders of the consequences of a disastrous embroilment. The cardinal left sad because he heard the leaders' threats in Bkirk and their declaration of rebellion against the Catholic Church if it hesitates to support their cause.

The Vatican has a special viewpoint in evaluating the role of the Christians in Lebanon. It views them through their bonds with the body of the area, not their bonds outside it. Bertoli said that a large faction of the Christians obstructed and ended the Christian role when it abolished the Western countries' need for this role. It is the cardinal's belief that this role began to lose its weight when the State of Israel was created and an organic bond was established between it and the United States. This is why these Christian factions fell into a contradiction when they imagined that they could depart from the body of the area and maintain their traditional
role as if it were a constant role under all circumstances. The events came to prove the opposite and to culminate in pushing the Christians into a crisis they have never experienced since the conflict of 1860. It has become evident that when the pope received the delegation accompanying Husayn al-Husayn, the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies speaker, he put the emphasis on the structure of concord and coexistence, saying, while inspecting the faces of the deputies with his eyes, that he could not tell which of them was Maronite, Druze, Shi'ite or Sunna. With this observation, the pope sought to reaffirm his confidence that Lebanon must be the country of sects, not of sectarianism.

Joint Security and Lebanese Picture

In the light of this historical experience which is being undergone by all Lebanese sects and parties, numerous questions arise regarding the nature and the security and political objectives of the Syrian role, especially since most of the internal and external forces have demanded this role as a factor of salvation and of rescue from the abyss of disintegration and chaos. We should keep in mind that this demand has not often taken the form of a conviction but has been motivated by the need to avert the dangers, to stop the bleeding and to prevent national collapse. This applies to all the Western countries, especially to the United States. It also applies to the losers in the Lebanese arena who are demanding a breather so that they can gather the scattered ranks.

On 20 July 1976, President Hafiz al-Asad delivered a speech enumerating the dangers engulfing Lebanon and underlining the joint interests between the two countries. It was noticed that in the process of reviewing the dangers produced by the civil war, the president's apprehension focused on warning of the rising voices for partition and of one faction seizing the areas of other factions by force of arms for fear that Israel may exploit such actions for intervention and occupation. This means the fabrication of an unequal military battle which Syria may have to wage on the Golan front and in Lebanon at a time when it has not yet completed its armaments and preparations.

When the Syrian forces were alerted to enter, Kosygin was in the area and warned against the consequences of falling into this trap. He asked Syria to exercise self-restraint and not to get embroiled in a battle against its natural allies, such as the PLO and the forces gathered under the canopy of the National Movement. The first clash took place in Sidon where a number of Palestinian resistance men ambushed a tank column, burning a number of tanks and then standing atop of those tanks and raising the victory signs. The second incident took place near Sabri Hamadah's residence on the airport road when a high-ranking Syrian officer was assassinated by three fighters belonging to Fatah. The rest of the story is well known, with Syria demanding that the perpetrators be handed over to be executed and then besieging Abu 'Ammar who contacted on that day the Soviet ambassador and asked him for safe passage out of Beirut via Cyprus. The ambassador expressed his regrets because he did not have the practical means to meet the request. Abu 'Ammar did not know what to do but the Arab ambassadors then intervened
and arranged for him the reconciliation meeting in Damascus from which he proceeded to attend the Riyadh summit.

Have the reasons changed and have the positions altered after nearly 9 years?

Insofar as the Arab decisionmaking is concerned, indifference continues to be the prevalent attitude since the breakup of the unity in the ranks of the axes created by the Camp David accord and the Iran-Iraq war. The latest battles of the camps have left some doubts regarding what is happening. It would have been proper for Rashid Karami, the prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, to attend the emergency meeting of the Arab League Council to express the state's viewpoint on this serious issue, especially since Nabil Birri, the minister of justice, is the official responsible for the decision to disarm the camps. Such a legitimate presence would have strengthened the state's position and enhanced its status and would have obstructed the accusations saying that Lebanon lost its credibility and its independent decisionmaking when it failed to appear in the League Council and when it allowed Syria's minister of foreign affairs to defend a problem occurring in Beirut. This absence has created a negative impression regarding the quality of the new relationship. It is as if Beirut has entrusted Damascus with both its internal and external affairs. This situation is more embarrassing to Syria than it is to Lebanon.

Amal Movement leadership says that its fighters in Beirut are correcting a major political mistake committed by the state in 1968 and 1969 when it allowed the PLO to steal away its national role. This robbery culminated with the imposition of the Cairo agreement and with the transformation of the south into an arena of confrontation with Israel. It was natural for the Palestinians to monopolize the liberation task in response to the state's failure to retaliate for the blowing up of 12 MEA airliners and its inability to uncover the murderers of Abu Yusuf, Kamal Nasir and Kamal 'Adwan. But insofar as the south, particularly the Shi'ites, is concerned, the situation has changed greatly because the south and the Shi'ites have defeated Israel and forced it to withdraw to its international borders. Regarding this accomplishment, Minister Birri said: Throughout 40 years and five wars, the Arab states, along with the Palestinian resistance, have failed to achieve such an accomplishment. From this position, Amal acts as an organization with a unique experience in the world of struggle and martyrdom and it believes that it has gained its right to disarm the Palestinian camps through its struggle against Israel and that this right is different in its causes and objectives from the right which the Lebanese Forces appropriated for themselves in Tall al-Za'tar battle.

A Lebanese mediator in the war of the camps asked an Amal leader if the decision to disarm the camps also applies to the factions opposed to Abu 'Ammar or whether the issue is confined to those representing the PLO. The mediator was surprised with a decisive answer to the effect that the Shi'ite fighters are determined to abolish the past conditions under which emanated an independent armed Palestinian resistance that was not subject to the law. It is the opinion of these Shi'ites that there is no place in the new Lebanon which they have created with the Druze and with the
assistance of Syria for the Abu 'Ammar faction or for his opponents. This means the end of the role which the PLO adopted since its departure from Amman in 1970 when it decided to seek protection behind the Lebanese national movement and to work through this movement so as to make it seem as if its activity were not opposed to the legitimate government and the public opinion. It also means turning over its activity against Israel from the south to the National Salvation Front which will, in turn, be subjected to coordination with the Lebanese army, since this army will move from the position of a party to the truce with Israel, as stated in the 1949 truce agreement, to the position of an antagonist. This is a new phase which will, of course, witness abolition of the Cairo agreement which has fallen automatically in the wake of the war of the camps and of the declaration of Lebanon as a confrontation state in harmony with the new political line that is compatible with the Syrian strategy. This is because the security coordination between the two states is not confined to the limits of just ending the internal war but goes beyond to the fundamental affairs concerning Camp David and the Gulf war. This is unless Damascus allows Lebanon some freedom of movement and some independence in its political decisionmaking. Such a margin is unlikely because Damascus will then have acknowledged Lebanon's neutrality in the conflict of the axes—a conflict which brought to Lebanon most of the Arab and foreign countries seeking to attract and contain Lebanon. The violent conflict has ended and all have departed, with the exception of Syria which has continued to have the strongest and most influential presence in the arena. Any new contract with Syria will have to take into consideration the given political and geographic facts, in addition to taking into consideration the fall of the difficult equation established by Philip Taqla, the former engineer of Lebanese foreign policy, meaning the equation of internal balance and external neutrality. Will this equation survive?

[22 Jun 85 pp 28-29]

[Text] Last Friday, an Israeli military spokesman stated that the reserve mobilization exercise which comprised thousands of troops had been completed satisfactorily.

Earlier, it was announced in Damascus that a combat air formation and Syrian bombers had carried out an exercise with live ammunition. This announcement came in the wake of the deployment of two Syrian battalions in the eastern part of South Lebanon. Gen Moshe Levi, the Israeli chief of staff, said that a number of specialists in the Syrian military intelligence agencies had also been deployed in this sector. Gen Yahud Barak, the Israeli military intelligence chief, interpreted this movement as a prelude heralding Syria's concerted preparation to enter into a new war. General Barak also said that this war will be very dangerous because the Syrian army will use SA-5 surface-to-surface missiles capable of reaching sensitive positions because the range of these missiles exceeds 400 km.

Despite the escalation of tension and mobilization, Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli minister of defense, does not feel that Syria will embark on a comprehensive military confrontation with Israel until it establishes control over Lebanon.
He denied that the firing of Katyusha rockets or the downing of a pilotless spy plane is up to the level of the events that bring the chances of a military confrontation closer. Since the Syrians are, in the Israelis' opinion, currently preoccupied with bolstering and strengthening their control in Lebanon, the main Israeli objective is focused on foiling the Syrians' plans and on harassing Damascus with the South Lebanon Army so that it may hesitate to introduce and deploy its forces beyond al-Awwali River. Such a festering situation helps the internal political, economic and security situation collapse, obstructs development of the state institutions and prevents the establishment of national concord under whose canopy unity, the legitimate government and sovereignty can be strengthened.

It is noticed that the talk about war has been escalating for over 2 months, i.e., since the U.S. press published a report to the effect that 2,000 Soviet experts had left Syria. At the time, the foreign commentators rushed to interpret the meanings of this step, keeping in mind that neither Moscow nor Damascus has either confirmed or denied the report. The official U.S. position was reflected in the commentary published by Jack Anderson. In this commentary, Anderson concludes that Moscow withdrew some of its experts in order to avoid a Soviet-U.S. confrontation in the Middle East. Anderson also said in his analysis that the Soviet Union perhaps sought to avoid a confrontation with the United States over Syrian impetuosity which reflected in some of its aspects a spirit of zeal, adventure and defiance. Moscow perhaps believed that withdrawing its experts in charge of operating the SA-5 missiles would encourage self-restraint and the abandonment of the policy of adventurism. Meanwhile, Israel saw in the presence of those experts a deterrent and a barrier in the face of launching a preemptive strike, since Israel was afraid of spreading the conflict to the spheres of the two superpowers. Now that the elements of self-restraint in Syria and Israel have been nearly eliminated, the question is confined to the matter of which side will commence the firing.

Shortly after the circulation of these rumors, the American AEROSPACE magazine spoke of Israel's deployment of Ariha-2 missiles in the Golan Heights and the Negev Desert. These are missiles with nuclear heads. The magazine said that the Israeli experts had developed these missiles and tested them successfully at the end of 1980 in an unpopulated area of northeast Iran during the shah's rule [as published]. In referring to Israel's preparations, the American magazine also spoke of the truck-mounted missiles deployed in an underground network and linked to an early warning system built in 1975, saying that these missiles have a range of 700 km.

Commenting on the report published by the magazine, an official of the U.S. Department of Defense confirmed that this deployment had actually taken place. At the time, Dr 'Ali 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turayki, secretary of the People's Committee of the Libyan People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison, addressed a message to the UN Security Council chairman in which he accused Israel of deploying these missiles. In his message, al-Turayki said in warning: "This step puts the Arab nation in a position which compels it to exercise its right to self-defense in accordance with the UN charter unless the Security Council takes immediate steps to eliminate the danger of the nuclear missiles in the Golan and the Negev."
Then followed the comments of George Ball, a former assistant U.S. secretary of state, which intensified the fear and increased the chance of pessimism. Ball declared upon his return from the Middle East the emergence of signs in Israel indicating preparations for an attack against Syria in a year or so with the aim of foiling Syria's military armament and of preventing it from achieving the desired balance. Shimon Peres' cabinet hastened to deny this likelihood and claimed that Syria was the side preparing to launch such a sudden operation with the aim of attacking the Golan and of creating a new reality through which to conduct its negotiations.

It is concluded from the various official statements appearing in that period that Israel was actually apprehensive of a Syrian offensive that would last 3 days during the period of the withdrawal of its forces and its confusion in the south. The number of those convinced of this opinion increased and they thought that Damascus would exploit the weakness of the Israeli front and the Israeli army's embroilment in the south to launch a flanking operation through which to achieve some gains in the Golan and to impose new borders from which it would be difficult to nudge it without exposing the two super-powers to the dangers of a confrontation. It is said that in light of these perils, Israel deployed its nuclear missiles in the Golan or announced the presence of these missiles as a preemptive plan and that Moscow withdrew its experts as if to defuse the keg, keeping in mind that this report has not been confirmed yet.

The dangerous feeling of the possibility that the conflict on Lebanese soil would turn into a military confrontation between Israel and Syria first and, subsequently, between Moscow and Washington grew stronger. But Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli minister of defense, finds it unlikely that such a confrontation will occur before the entry of the Syrian forces into all of Lebanon's territory after Israel's full withdrawal because, in his opinion, Damascus is winning on the Lebanese front without a war and without involving its army in direct combat. Damascus has abolished the 17 May accord, has obstructed the signing of any treaty guaranteeing the security of the Galilee and has imposed an unconditional unilateral withdrawal. It is Rabin's opinion that the war will occur in 1986 either to obstruct the second phase of the U.S. peace plan for the Middle East or to regain the Golan. Consequently, the observers believe that Israel is compelled to heat up the southern front and to create practical obstacles that prevent deployment of the Syrian army over all the Lebanese territories so that it may cancel the possibility of a future surprise attack by creating conditions unsuitable for embarking on such a military step.

Gen Aharon Yariv, director of the Israeli Strategic Studies Center, supports the defense minister's opinion and believes that the real Syrian threat to Israel will surface more clearly after completion of the balance and equality process, i.e., within the next 2 years. The study the general has published on this issue contains numerous details that speak of Syria's possession of offensive weapons which could, along with the weapons possessed by the other Arab countries, bring the number close to the number of weapons possessed by Israel. This is why Yariv has stressed the aspects of quality, training and sophisticated equipment. In reviewing the possibilities of a confrontation,
Yariv said that Syria has increased its forces by a large degree since 1982 and that it has added two more divisions to the already existing six divisions. It has also improved its defense means by sophisticated Soviet equipment and missiles. When Damascus completes its preparations, it will inevitably launch a surprise attack to regain the Golan. Yariv believes that the Syrian army, with its new capabilities, can launch a surprise attack more rapidly than the Israeli army. He believes that such an operation may be launched in the future before a cease-fire decision is reached. Israel will then be forced to sit at the negotiation table after having lost all its political cards.

Even though Aharon, the Israeli general, gives the Israeli air force a higher degree of superiority, he warns of the element of time and warns that it will be difficult to move the ground forces with the desired speed and according to orders. Moreover, the Israeli system does not have the freedom to decide on a firm and strict policy, especially in the wake of the harm done to the army's morale as a result of Sharon's rash policy.

The observers have noticed that the comments have focused on the speech which Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad delivered at the beginning of last month upon inauguration of the Ninth Congress of the National Federation of University Students. The observers have selected one phrase to underline and interpret, since this phrase represents a sign of the strategic change in the area. The Syrian president said: "Some Arabs emphasize that we have weakened since Egypt's departure and that our problems have increased since Egypt's departure. But the reality does not support this statement because we are a nation of nearly 200 million. Egypt's departure, important as it is, does not diminish the importance of the remainder of this figure, especially since Egypt is no longer the number-one or number-two military power in the Arab homeland."

With this presentation, the Syrian president was trying to give the Syrian army its important role within the framework of the new strategic change and to classify Syria as the one and only state confronting Israel. This means that he saddles Syria with additional Arab and international responsibilities so as to expand the sphere of confrontation through Lebanon and the Golan. Such a confrontation dictates that the Syrian forces enter Lebanon to settle the conflict of the militias for fear of the continuation of this conflict between them and for fear of the spread of the influence of the private armies. This is because continuation of the present state of disintegration, chaos and collapse in Lebanon will make deployment of the Syrian forces a difficult task in light of what is expected of Israel and of what Israel may plan in order to prevent the entry of these forces into Lebanon and to deny them the ability to embark on a comprehensive military confrontation or on a surprise attack, especially since the Israeli government has been reassuring public opinion by saying that its dilemma is equal to Damascus' dilemma because the internal Lebanese situation that has forced it to depart does not permit the Syrian forces to enter. This means preoccupying Syria further and further so as to prevent it from bolstering its influence in Lebanon. So, will this situation continue?
FU'AD SIRAJ-AL-DIN DISCUSSES ACTIONS IN INTERVIEW

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 7-13 Aug 85 pp 14-16

Interview with Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din by 'Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi in Cairo:
"I Felt the Seat of Presidency Was Shaky Under Me, So I deemed Resignation Advisable"; date not specified

When he felt the seat of leadership shake under him, he submitted his resignation. When the Wafdist gathered around him, calling him the Wafd's undisputed leader and threatened to resign behind him (!), he went back on his resignation. Thus, it became clear who had the power and dominance within the Wafd Party, the largest opposition party in Egypt. Fu'ad (Pasha) Siraj-al-Din, former interior minister, pre-revolution Wafd secretary and post-revolution Wafd leader, is known by all for his political shrewdness. He is always "calculating." In his elegant office at his palace in Garden City, an exclusive area of Cairo, AL-MAJALLAH conducted the following interview with him. His huge cigar never left his hand or lips. He seemed confident during his talk. "My grip never weakened for a day within the party." We brought up with him what was being said in the political arena about the resignation which he had withdrawn, the nature of democratic practice within the party, and the Wafd's relations with the opposition parties and the government.

The least thing being said about your decision to resign from the Wafd leadership and your subsequent change of mind is that it was mere theatrics aimed at underscoring your control over the Wafd Party. What do you think about this point of view?

My intention to resign at that time was not a theatrical move. We are not used to dramatics in our political practice. The reason for my resignation was duly announced and it was no secret to anyone in Egypt. It had to do with my feeling that the failure of the Wafdist Parliamentary Body to carry out my order to them to accept the president's invitation to a tea party was a violation of party obligation on their part. It had two choices, either adopt punitive measures as stipulated by the party's bylaws or submit my resignation, not from the Wafd, but from the Wafd leadership because I felt at the time that the seat of leadership was shaky under me. I was really determined to resign until the last moments. However,
I changed my mind because of the sentiments the Parliamentary Body's members expressed when they came to visit me the day before the Supreme Body's meeting: that they were keen on their party obligations and their actions were prompted by their anger at events during the last parliamentary session because of the way the assembly president behaved only a few hours before the [tea] party. They did not refuse the invitation, but rather regretted and thanked the president in a cable they sent to him.

[Question] On what viewpoint did you base your request to them to go to the party?

[Answer] My viewpoint was that they should differentiate between the assembly president's behavior and the president's invitation. The members of the Parliamentary Body apologized for what happened in a cable to me signed by all of them. Furthermore, the Supreme body's members urgently insisted that I withdraw my resignation. Some of them, mainly Dr Wahid Ra'fat, party deputy leader, and Dr Muhammad 'Asfur, announced that they would resign if I insisted on my resignation. On my way to the body's meeting, I found thousands of Wafdist youths gathered at the party headquarters urging me to withdraw my resignation. I also received hundreds of cables from all over Egypt to this effect. In the face of this tremendous pressure, and in view of the fact that the members of the Parliamentary Body admitted their mistake, I gave up the idea of resigning. The matter was not theatrics in any way, it was genuine. This was my intention until I entered the Wafd's Supreme Body meetings.

[Question] This recent position of submitting and then withdrawing your resignation underscores the fact that the Wafdist leader's grip is the strongest by far within the party and gained strength thereafter.

[Answer] I did not feel that my grip gained strength because it never weakened for a moment.

[Question] Did you expect for a moment that your resignation would be the subject of controversy and conflict among the Wafdist members?

[Answer] I realized of course that it would not be met with acceptance or satisfaction by every Wafdist. I was intent, however, on seeing that the party leadership seat get the right kind of respect for its decisions and policies.

[Question] One viewpoint says that the deputies' position not to attend the president's party was a natural reaction to what had happened, but when you submitted your resignation because of this position, your stance was not fully accepted.

[Answer] (Laughing) The single fact is that my resignation was not prompted by the mere fact that the deputies did not attend the president's party. The main reason was their violation of the decision I adopted to attend the party. The matter developed from a mere decision not to attend to a violation of party obligations, which is more serious. In other words, the resignation was based on the violation of the party leader's decision.
You have said once and again that the Wafd deputies violated their party obligation by not carrying out your decision. Can you explain your understanding of party obligation? Does obligation mean that the party members of parliament, who represent the party's sinew, observe the party leader's decisions or that the party leader understand his deputies' position and point of view?

Party obligation is respect for the party leader's decision. This is what party obligation is all about. I had been informed of what had taken place in the session before I issued my decision. Had I not issued my decision to attend the party, there would not have been a violation of party obligation. Failure to attend the president's party may be wrong in itself, but violation of the party leader's decision is more serious.

In one of your speeches you threatened to silence forever AL-AHALI newspaper, the organ of the Grouping Party.

I pointed to AL-AHALI's incessant attacks on us, saying we would be forced in the end to retaliate. If we were to retaliate, we could silence this newspaper. I do not recall saying I would silence it forever.

Mustafa Shardi, the Wafd editor-in-chief, who was present at the interview, interjected, saying AL-MASA' newspaper mentioned this statement but we in the Wafd did not say this.)

Another viewpoint says the Wafd Party will remain an unexpandible base and a louder voice and that it represents groups of businessmen who benefit from the prevailing economic climate and broad sectors of the National Party bases who sympathize with the Wafd because it is fighting their battle.

This view is wrong on both counts. The Wafd has absolutely no connection with businessmen and does not include in its membership any company owners or board members. This has been the Wafd's law ever since its establishment in 1919. The Wafd has nothing to do with businessmen save for its encouragement of successful work. As for the National Party members' sympathy with the Wafd, it is because it represents their views.

Because it defends their interests?

Because it defends their interests! I wish it were true because we could have avoided many problems and difficulties in parliament. I do not know how this sympathy is manifested. The National Party members have failed the Wafdist opposition in all stances, big and small. The most recent example is this recent session.

Is it a secret sympathy deep down in their hearts?
There is no sympathy whatsoever between us and National Party members if by sympathy you mean something more than secretly expressing to our deputies in parliament that they share with them certain opinions. I wish this kind of sympathy were present.

The question is what does the Wafd offer the government?

This kind of giving by the Wafd must be matched by the government. When I offer the government blank support, what do I get in return? Rarely do you find an ad from a government agency in our Wafd newspaper, and this is our most fundamental right. I have discussed this matter with the prime minister and several ministers. We do not receive government subsidies as the rest of the opposition parties and our newspaper does not receive a paper subsidy as the other opposition parties, nor do we get office space. What has the government offered the Wafd for its silence and truce? This is a groundless false allegation. We have a truce with those who deserve it, and we fight those who deserve it. People must lead this kind of opposition. I challenge anyone to find a wrong action we did not criticize or a right action we did not support. This has always been our way. Therefore, the Wafd gains strength in opposition more so than in government.

There is a form of coordination between the Wafd Party and the Muslim Brotherhood. What is the party's position on the call for and toward the preachers of the application of the Islamic Shari'ah?

Our position is very clear and there is nothing new. In the Wafd's 1917 program and our new program, we demanded the application of the Islamic Shari'ah and the creation of a true Islamic society. I stated this in parliament and the government committed itself to it. This issue is not open to debate, but we do not approve of this matter turning into upsmanship and street demonstrations. The Islamic Shari'ah? By all means. However, we do not believe that it should be the subject to such upsmanship and false slogans. The government committed itself to amend all laws in accordance with the Shari'ah provisions. Should the government undertake this, then well and fine. Otherwise, we will institute such amendments through our deputies. There is no dispute over that. All this we have stated on every occasion.

Why was Wafd journalist and Brotherhood representative Muhammad 'Abd-al-Quddus barred from publishing his article about applying the Shari'ah?

(Mustafa Shardi reminding the pasha: The article Muhammad brought in was late, so we put it off for a week.)

(Siraj-al-Din) Any article by any editor or party member may be barred if it conflicts with party policy. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Quddus does not reflect his personal views in the newspaper. He must adhere to the newspaper's policy. Our policy is the application of the Shari'ah, but
not support for street demonstrations and marches, for example. I remember that this article in particular attacked the government because it banned the green march which was to start out from al-Nur Mosque. We do not approve of that under any circumstances. Therefore, it was quite appropriate to ban an article supporting this. There is a difference between demanding the application of the Shari'ah and defending a march. In the same issue in which Muhammad was barred from writing, I had a statement against such marches. So how can a party leader write against such marches and another writer publish a contradiction?

[Question] The Wafd newspaper seeks to attack any political personality nominated to hold an important political position if such a personality did not have a conciliatory relationship with the party. A case in point is the attack on Dr Mahjub when he was mentioned as a nominee for the premiership.

[Answer] There is no other case than Dr Mahjub. Our problem with him began long before his name was mentioned as a nominee for the premiership. It goes back to the beginning of the parliamentary session and has nothing to do with his nomination. And who says he was nominated for the premiership? Brother Kamal Hasan 'Ali has all our confidence as we testify to all his qualities. As far as I know, there is no intention whatsoever to replace him. President Mubarak has stated more than once that change must not be effected for the sake of change. Our attack on Dr al-Mahjub was for specific and established reasons. There is no other case. Did we ever attack anyone nominated for glory? What interest do we have in attacking someone nominated for glory?

[Question] Do you think the Wafd newspaper policy is in line with the party's policy?

[Answer] I think the Wafd newspaper is completely in line with the party's policy and reflects it very well. I always praise the success of this newspaper which has been able to achieve a record circulation not achieved by any other opposition newspaper before it.

[Question] One criticism of the Wafd newspaper is that it opens several fronts and embarks upon ill-timed and futile battles. A case in point is the attack on Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal and Ashraf Marwan among other battles.

[Answer] In regard to Mr Haykal, we published a short news item about him and he sent us a long reply defending the late president, 'Abd-al-Nasir. We published it although the news item concerning him did not mention Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. As for Ashraf Marwan, we attacked him because his marriage to 'Abd-al-Nasir's daughter is what brought him all this exorbitant wealth and fortune.
You defended the Fayid family against Dr Ashraf Marwan. The Egyptian people could care less about either side and yet you preoccupied them with a case with which they had nothing to do. It was purely a war of millionaires outside Egypt.

We stood on the side of the Fayid family because they are successful Egyptians. We stand on the side of any successful Egyptian, hence our stand on their side.

You said that the party newspaper fully reflects its policy. Is it party policy to attack anyone connected with the July Revolution?

We want the young generation, who did not live through the revolution, not to be deceived by phony slogans or history. That is why we put forth the true history and criticized the revolution's sins. We supported the revolution from the beginning, but we have to examine and export its sins so that, when the Nasirists come forward to form a party, the young generation will be aware of what happened at that time.

Your constant attack on the July Revolution, which has intensified recently, is considered a reflection of your fear of the coming Nasirists now that they have initiated measures to form their own organization, a fear prompted by the possibility of a Nasirist party affecting you in the political street.

We have been attacking the sins of the July Revolution before the Nasirists thought of establishing a party. We are not afraid of the Nasirists. We have our own weight in the street and are capable retaliation.
CAIRO'S LEADERSHIP ROLE AT NAIROBI WOMEN'S CONFERENCE UNDERLINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 28 Jul 85 p 5

[Article by Anji Rushdi: "Conference Concluding UN Women's Decade: Egypt Plays Leadership Role in Overcoming Its Obstacles"]

[Text] Unexpectedly, the UN Women's Decade Conference, held in Nairobi, broke through the dead end which had continued to exist until a few minutes before the opening session.

Inasmuch as pessimism dominated the conference climate and all the preparations to the conference, the hall exploded with great applause to greet the conference secretary when she declared that an understanding had been reached between the countries involved on the bylaws governing the course of the conference.

An understanding had been reached on this point amidst an atmosphere charged with confrontation and defiance by the 77-country group, led by Egypt, which insisted that the conference activities proceed by vote whereas the United States and the group of countries supporting it insisted that the conference resolutions be reached by compromise. The solution proposed by Egypt allowed, by the admission of the UN secretary general, the conference to pass the bottleneck and permitted its activities to begin, even though an hour behind the official opening time.

Egypt's proposal said that while taking into consideration the procedures followed by the United Nations, the conference resolutions should be issued by compromise and without reservations by anybody.

It was an intelligent solution that satisfied all and pleased the conference officials. This solution was reached in 2 days whereas the issue had been pending throughout the past years, whether at the preparatory conference which was held in Vienna last March and which was unable to achieve any compromise satisfactory to the various blocs or at the economic committee conference which was held in New York to find a solution. The outcome of that conference was to leave the question of solving the problem of internal proceedings and the main document to the Nairobi conference.
U.S. Position

It is perhaps beneficial to backtrack in order to appreciate the significance of achieving this solution. At the conference held in Mexico in 1975, which signified the start of the World Women's Decade, the United States and Israel expressed reservations on the conference's final document because it condemned Zionism frankly and equated it with racism. The same position was repeated at the conference held in Copenhagen in 1980, the midway point of the decade, to follow up on what had been accomplished in the previous 5 years. Since then, the United States, along with a number of Western countries, has not stopped renouncing the resolutions of those two conferences as a deviation from the objective of the women's conference, saying that the two conferences turned into a mini-conference of the UN General Assembly preoccupying itself with the political aspects of women's problems. A well-organized and intelligent psychological intimidation campaign was launched and arm-twisting endeavors were made against numerous countries. U.S. official statements and the U.S. press declared that if the situation remained unchanged, then the United States, and along with it a number of Western countries of course, would have no option but to withdraw from the conference.

The most serious material published in this regard was a document entitled "The U.S. Policy Toward the UN Women's Decade," issued by the Heritage Foundation, which declared openly that the United States would not accept any condemnation of Zionism, because such a condemnation ultimately means demanding the elimination of Israel, or any aid to Arab women in the occupied territories by way of the PLO which, in their opinion, is a terrorist organization. The document also declared that in case the conference insisted on these two points, the United States would have to withdraw. Amidst this atmosphere of psychological intimidation and threats, Maureen Reagan delivered at the conference her speech in which she defined the U.S. position toward the issues raised in the conference in a manner contrary to what had been expected. Her speech carried no threat nor intimidation and was a first-class diplomatic speech dealing with the issues given top priority by Washington. But as Maureen Reagan said: I know despite this that there are other delegations that believe that there are other issues that hold top priority insofar as they are concerned. We are here to hear these concerns and we hope to reach through this a better understanding among all women of the world. For example, there are numerous delegations, particularly African delegations, that believe that it is of great importance that the conference examine the issue of apartheid in South Africa and others that believe that the Palestinian women's issue merits special interest. The United States has not and will not oppose discussing these two issues at the conference.

But Maureen Reagan was careful to define her country's policy toward these two issues, saying: "As for racism, it is deplorable to the American people and administration, not to mention its destructive and humiliating impact on the blacks in South Africa. Its impact on women in particular is as hard as can be. The strategy we are required to formulate must deal with the means to overcome the impact of this evil and inhuman system on women.
But she then departed from this definition and voluntary concession to take up a vague formula that carried a veiled threat to the effect that it was necessary to reach agreement on whatever pertained to the Middle East issue, saying:

"We also acknowledge that a number of delegations feel that it is important and necessary to discuss the Middle East issue and its impact on women. We are prepared for constructive cooperation with these delegations with a conciliatory spirit so as to achieve results acceptable to all."

On this particular point, the speech of Mrs Suzanne Mubarak, the head of the Egyptian delegation, was clear, precise and direct. She said: Having pointed out what women in South Africa are subjected to, I also wish to point out what Palestinian and Arab women are subjected to in the occupied territories. The UN general secretary's report has cited numerous cases of mistreatment to which our sisters in the occupied territories are subjected. The longer the occupation continues, the more intense becomes the hardship of the Palestinian woman who has suffered heavily in the past and who is still suffering. This condition can be solved only by ending the occupation because it is unreasonable for women to advance or to contribute seriously to the development of society under foreign occupation and domination. Permit me to appeal to the world's women from this podium to understand the Palestinian woman's issue and to extend to her a helping hand so that she may overcome her tribulation.

Second Obstacle

Through the conference succeeded in overcoming the first obstacle concerning the conference's system of internal proceedings, the second obstacle consisted of the official document which, when approved, is considered to be the desired strategy until the year 2000 for the advancement of women and for involving women in development through equality and peace and through overcoming the obstacles impeding such advancement.

This document went through the same course as the internal bylaws when the 77-country group rejected the paper submitted by the UN General Secretariat to the penultimate preparatory conference in Vienna. This group submitted in turn a document which was rejected by the United States and a number of other countries. A high barrier rose, impeding the attainment of an agreement or an understanding. The document was referred to the economic committee in New York where it met the same fate and finally reached the Nairobi conference with 372 articles, including no less than 100 articles on which no agreement had been reached, especially the articles pertaining to economic policy, apartheid, racism and the Palestinian issue. Insofar as this issue is concerned, the 77-country group insisted, for example, on an alternative proposal restoring what had been previously struck out from a paragraph concerning the right to self-determination and the Israeli practices violating human rights and provisions concerning women in South Lebanon and the Golan. This was a demand which the West rejected.
The same division also developed on the paragraphs concerning the issues of disarmament. Ahmad Hajjaj, Egypt's ambassador to Kenya, and 3 officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs--namely Mirfat al-Tallawi, a minister plenipotentiary; Layla 'Amarah, an adviser; and Nahid al-Manshawi, a first secretary--played, by virtue of the fact that Egypt heads the 77-country group, a fundamental role in overcoming numerous problems and in reaching agreement to leave the hot points dealing with disagreement until after conclusion of the articles over which there was no noteworthy disagreement. An unofficial committee was formed to reach disagreement on a phrasing satisfactory to all insofar as the hot points were concerned.

The visible part of the iceberg called for optimism and relaxation. The address delivered by (Litsya Shahani), the UN secretary general (for the Nairobi conference) was important, realistic and free of all attempts at embellishment. It was heard by 4,000 women delegates representing 160 nationalities participating in the conference. Shahani was not far from the reality when she noted that we are aware that the conditions experienced by the world have affected everything in it, that women have been affected more strongly and that progress, modest as it is, has undoubtedly been made, such as progress in the sphere of equality, with some exceptions. The treaty to end all forms of discrimination against women has been signed by 72 countries and the importance and essentiality of women's participation in development have been acknowledged, even though the slow development of the labor market has been reflected on women in particular; considering that women represent 35 percent of the world's manpower but are employed in the least significant jobs.

She then added: This conference represents a challenge and a hope for women of the world. But this hope must be transformed into reality.

How shall we remember that the Nairobi conference is a conference of governments through the United Nations, and we must emerge from it with a program serving the future interests of women?

Is this possible? There are still obstacles that pose a threat to the conference, such as the issue of realistically condemning Zionism. The delegations concerned say: If we succeed in acknowledging the outcome of the Mexico and Copenhagen conferences and their documents, then this should be enough because the prelude contains a frank condemnation of Zionism. All this is in return for making bigger and greater gains for the Palestinian and Arab women in the occupied territories.

In addition to the beehive filling the Kenyatta glass tower in Nairobi where the proceedings of the women's conference were held, there were 12,000 women and some men arguing, screaming and at times hitting each other over women's issues in symposiums and conferences that numbered nearly 1,000.

It was natural and expected that the Palestinian issue and the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories would gain major importance. But it was feared that the Arabs would enter this arena divided in a manner reflecting the bad divisions in the Arab situation. However, the role played
by Faruq Abu 'Isa, the secretary general of the Arab Lawyers Federation, and by the delegation of the Egyptian Committee for the Solidarity of the Asian and African Peoples to coordinate and unite the Arab efforts or at least to freeze the differences succeeded in achieving the minimum degree of understanding with which the Arabs emerged from this non-governmental meeting which was held at nearly the same time as the official conference. Leading was the Palestinian delegation which was at the highest level of responsibility and which succeeded in refuting the lies and falsehoods and in pointing out the glaring fact concerning the evils of the occupation and concerning the Arabs' eagerness for a just and comprehensive peace. For the first time at the UN women's conference, namely the third conference, the Israeli women departed crying, complaining and shouting for the downfall of the chairwomen of the symposiums where a debate took place and succeeded in exposing the vices and evils of the occupation.

8494
CSO: 4504/453
INDUSTRY MINISTER DISCUSSES ROLES OF PUBLIC, PRIVATE SECTORS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 26 Jul 85 p 7

[Interview with Engr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, minister of industry, by 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Aql: "New Map for Future of Egyptian Industry; Engr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab in Comprehensive and Frank Interview on Egyptian Industry's Hopes and Pains: We Will Continue March of 1960's in Heavy Industries and Public Sector Will Not Tackle Projects Suitable for Private Sector; Protectionism Is Not Damaging As Long As It Seeks Abundant Production at High Quality and Reasonable Price"]

[Text] The Egyptian industrial bastions will continue to be the first line of defense protecting the economy of Egypt and of the 23 July revolution. Thirty-three years after the revolution, Egyptian industry is still lofty and proud of its national role and the industrial public sector is still performing an important and vital role in supplying the needs of the Egyptian consumer and of the local market.

In a comprehensive and frank interview with AL-AHRAM, Engr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, minister of industry, spoke of the hopes and pains of Egyptian industry, stressing the following points:

Egyptian industry will resume the march of the 1960's insofar as the heavy and basic industries are concerned but there is no tendency whatsoever toward further state control over the means of production, even though the heavy industries do not usually attract private sector investments.

The state's primary objective is to develop and improve the production standards so that domestic goods will replace imports from abroad and to direct Egyptian production toward exportation so as to improve the Egyptian balance of payments.

Egyptian industry has achieved tangible accomplishments, with the production growth rate amounting to nearly 18 percent. Wages have also risen by 13 percent. However, there is the problem of the accumulation of commodity stocks, which has risen to nearly 10 percent of the gross production, with this accumulation amounting to the production of 1.5-6 months of stocks in some commodities.
Fiscal year 1985-86 will witness the development of industrial control and standardization agencies so that their tasks may be integrated and that there may be no conflict in their jurisdictions. For the first time, a comprehensive survey will be conducted on the manufacturing capabilities and resources and a map will be drawn up for the future of Egyptian industry.

[Question] For 33 years, Egypt has been living under the experience of transferring the means of production to state ownership and of building a number of industrial bastions whose life has been tied to the 1960's. What is your evaluation so far of the outcome of the experience with whose circumstances and development you have lived?

[Answer] I believe that the nationalization which took place in the 1960's constituted the foundation for big companies whose capital was dominated by public money, such as the 'Abbud companies group and the Bank of Egypt companies. These firms have retained their form as companies. As for the small plants which were nationalized and then combined in big companies, we are still having problems with these small plants because by the nature of their structure, it was impossible to merge them in a big and organized industrial sector. Moreover, the nationalized plants were not the cornerstone. Before them, there were giant plants for war production and for chemical and engineering products. Before the nationalization, there were a number of giant projects, such as the iron and steel plants and al-Nasr Car Plant.

Therefore, Egyptian industry has not been founded on the nationalized plants alone. After the nationalization, the state took control of the elements of production and began to plan for industrial integration. The iron and steel industry and the fertilizer industry expanded. This was the only means for development in a developing country.

[Question] One of the positive features of the 1960's was the adoption of the concept of planning as a means of development. This concept was adopted as a result of state ownership of the means of production and of state control over the main production elements. Can this positive feature continue as a method of work in the future, and will thought be given to greater state ownership of the means of production?

[Answer] We do not need this and the tendency for greater state ownership of the means of production is not in the picture. But planning will continue to be the main axis of industry's basic structure. Whenever the state finds an urgent need to expand the basic structure in order to expand the industry, then the state will undertake this responsibility. The state also undertakes the responsibility of the basic heavy industries because the nature of these projects does not encourage private capital to invest in them. With this projection, we build the pillars for the structure. As for the rest of the structure, i.e., completion of the industrial map, this must be done by the private national economic sector.

[Question] This means that you will give the private sector (national or joint sector) the responsibility for industry's future whereas the recent
past makes us express some reservations. The open-economy sector has experienced losses in several joint industrial firms. Who is responsible for this, especially since the importance of industrialization still plays its traditional role in industrial planning?

[Answer] Insofar as the investment projects in industry are concerned, their image may actually seem unencouraging as a result of the losses in some projects because of mistakes committed. But these are not causes that we cannot overcome. It is certain that when we study the economic, marketing and technical aspects of a project soundly, then it is indubitable that the project will succeed. The faulty thinking and practices that have taken place at times have been in the efforts that seek just to attract a foreign partner for a project—a foreign partner who then supplies the know-how and then supplies, installs and operates the equipment for a long time of the life's project, with the local partner becoming a mere spectator watching the foreign partner whereas the foreign partner's responsibility should not exceed the share by which he participates and which he usually recoups during the implementation phases. This is an unsound industrial approach.

Add to this the fact that it has become evident that the cost of the industrial investment projects encompasses large-scale manifestations of cost extravagance. This pattern has existed not only in the industrial sector alone but also in many other sectors in the past 10 years.

When we deal with the Industrialization Authority's role, then we must put aside the capital divisions—public, private or investment sectors. The authority's new role will begin with a careful study of our needs in the industry sector. This requires the authority to draw up a new industrial map for Egypt and to determine the commodity structure needed by Egyptian society and, the production capacities available to provide this structure or part of it. Thus, the desired industrial projects will be outlined on an industrial map spelling out the name, definition and timing of a project. As to who implements the project, we make no distinction between public, private or joint sector. All that has to be done is to have a philosophy behind the decision.

Here, I can state frankly that the public sector sets up projects which we deem to be essential in the plan and which no other side will set up. This is because the government apparatus does not have a capital legal person, meaning that there is nothing to dictate to the government to select the projects with a likelihood of high profitability and to leave the less profitable projects to the private sector. We will not tackle projects which the private sector can tackle.

Then follows the division of the private sector into a national sector and a joint sector including a foreign partner and a definition of the factors that call for seeking the help of a foreign partner in a project and finding out whether they are factors pertaining to the lack of know-how in a certain industry or to obtaining financing. These issues are studied at the national level and then projects are offered accordingly.
[Question] As long as this is the case, how can private capital be attracted to the industrial sector and be required, at the same time, to abide by implementation of the national industrial plan?

[Answer] The primary criterion for attracting private capital is the protection given to the products of this industry.

[Question] But protectionism can at times be damaging to the national economy. This is what actually happened in the periods when production quality dropped as a result of the protection enjoyed by industry.

[Answer] Protection should not be boundless but should extend to the limit whereby a balance is established in the Egyptian economy. However, I would like to point out that the phenomenon of poor-quality industrial products resulted in two consequences: first, the lack of foreign currency revenues and, second, the final halting of the replacement, renewal and development processes. I have my reservations about the statement that industry has deteriorated because of protectionism. However, it can be said that protectionism must be countered at the same time with the same degree of control. This is what we are advocating and what is within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry. Whoever demands protection must accept control, regardless of his legal identity. With its broad concept, control here means control over quality, over the production methods and over the costs. It is unreasonable for a project to be set up with exaggerated investment costs and with a degree of excessive wages to produce a high-cost commodity and then for this project to demand that I give it protection! Therefore, protectionism is not damaging as long as it seeks to achieve abundant production with a high quality and at a reasonable cost.

[Question] In light of the likely shortage in our foreign currency resources, industry is required now more than ever before to contribute to correcting the trade balance either by replacing imports or by boosting the exportation of manufactured goods. What can industry offer in the near future?

[Answer] Correcting the trade balance deficit through improved production standards and through turning to exportation is the most important issue preoccupying the government, not just the Ministry of Industry, at present. For the first time, a comprehensive survey has been conducted on the production elements in Egypt and on what is imported in terms of variety. In the Ministry of Industry, a survey is being conducted on industrial capacities. Never before in Egypt has a survey been conducted on what is happening in the private sector, which comprises nearly 9,000 private establishments. This is being done to begin implementation of the industrial register law covering industry in its entirety so that we may ultimately have a complete dossier on Egyptian industry and on what it produces and so that we may classify what it produces for exportation and what it produces for local consumption. We will thus be able to determine the features of our policy to replace imports by local production or to channel local production for exportation. Many of the manufactured goods are exportable. But such exportation is obstructed by two factors: first, amidst a circle of broad and unlimited production, a product may not be known and a producer may
may not be aware that his commodity is exportable and, second, the failure of the systems for the encouragement of exports to insure such exports. This is what the Egyptian Export Development Bank has begun to do. Moreover, the leap in local prices has encouraged producers to sell in the local market and not to pay attention to exports. Therefore, I believe that a law requiring the producer to meet his own foreign currency needs should be promulgated. Some may prefer to channel their products toward the local market. But at the level of the industrial sector as a whole, a special foreign currency fund may be established from the revenues of the industrial exports to supply foreign currency for those who do not get the opportunity to export. What is important is that the industrial sector not extend its hand to the state's foreign currency budget and that we leave the state's foreign currency for the state so that it may implement the service projects.

[Question] You announced last week the industrial sector's accomplishments for fiscal year 1984-85, the most important being the growth of production by 18 percent and of wages by 13 percent and a reasonable quantitative growth in production accompanying the growth in the production value. But these accomplishments do not refer to the volume and value of the accumulated industrial commodity store which is one of the important indicators in evaluating industry's position. Why?

[Answer] The commodity store of fully manufactured goods varies from one commodity to another and from year to year. Last year, we found a store of trucks for the first time ever. Earlier, there were waiting lists. The reason for this store is the rush of the Egyptian market to import trucks from abroad. But we have overcome this problem by having al-Nasr Car Company develop its own production. It is the first time that the company has tackled such a problem by converting the Model-A truck it produces into a Model-B truck more acceptable in the market. The commodity store posing the most problems is the yarn and textiles store which amounted in June 1984 to nearly 238 million pounds in value, rising this year to nearly 244 million pounds. With the increase in production and the slow market, it can be said that the store is nearly constant. As for varieties, the store has reached its limit in wools. This is due to the increased importation of wool and of alternative textiles. Generally, it is necessary to reduce the total store in industry. In any case, the value of the total store of fully manufactured goods amounts to nearly 700 million pounds, compared to nearly 7 billion pounds constituting the value of the production of fully manufactured goods.

The total store amounts to the production of 1.5 months. The danger of the store lies in having some commodity varieties whose store amounts to the production of 5-6 months. The reasons for this accumulated store are being analyzed.

[Question] The Ministry of Industry controls two major agencies, namely: the Standardization Agency and the Industrial Control Agency. Despite this, the consumer at times finds flaws in the commodity. Does this mean the absence of the role of the agencies concerned with quality control?
[Answer] We have begun to reexamine the industrial control and standardization agencies to prevent, first, the overlapping of jurisdictions which is paralyzing the activities of the two agencies. We are currently defining in a clear manner the responsibilities of the Industrial Control Agency as an agency concerned with industrial litigation and the responsibilities of the Standardization Agency as an agency concerned with industrial legislation. This requires examining the two agencies so that their role may become compatible with shouldering the enormous tasks required of them as industrial legislation and litigation agencies. A committee has been formed to study the status of these two agencies. The situation may require a new legislative form, such as transforming the Industrial Control Agency into a public authority for control over the industries and having the Standardization Agency lift its hand completely from quality control, with this agency issuing the legislation and the standards on which the Control Agency's activity is based. The most important aspects of development in these agencies will be to attract human talent capable of shouldering the responsibility of the work in these agencies.

[Question] A full year has passed since you took over the Ministry of Industry. Can this period be considered a period of diagnosing and surveying industry's problems so that the new fiscal year may be the period of making decisions to get rid of these problems?

[Answer] The fundamental decision is to establish the concept of industry as a business sector during fiscal year 1985-86 through companies with boards of directors which have to achieve plans and to meet the production programs qualitatively and quantitatively. The second decision is to prepare for a national industrial plan, for the ideal use of our resources, for the efficient utilization of foreign loans and for the commitment to repay these loans annually. The third decision is to get rid of the decrees acknowledged to have a negative impact on production. The fourth decision is to reorganize industrial control so that the new year may be the year of industrial control.
MINISTER DISCUSSES ISSUES CONCERNING EGYPTIANS ABROAD

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 27 Jul 85 p 3

[Interview with Albert Barsum Salamah, minister of state for emigration and Egyptians abroad affairs, by Mahmud Sami: "Links Between Mother Egypt and Emigrants: Minister of State for Emigration Answers Question of Hour: Has Return of Egyptians Working in Oil Countries Actually Begun?"]

[Text] The dialogue continues on the Third Conference of Egyptians Abroad, which will be held in Cairo, the motherland's capital, in 2 weeks. Numerous delegations representing workers and emigrants in various countries of the world will come to Cairo to discuss the worries, concerns and problems of these millions who have left Egypt, either temporarily or permanently, to knock on new doors and live in new societies. They are exposed to numerous difficulties and problems but they continue to raise Egypt's name and to belong to the motherland, wishing to return to favor with greater material and moral contributions to reforming the motherland's situation, to pushing the comprehensive development process forward and to bolstering democracy and stability.

On all these concerns and problems, we have had this interview with Albert Barsum Salamah, the minister of state for emigration and the affairs of Egyptians abroad. We began with the urgent question:

[Question] What have you prepared for the Third Conference of Egyptians Abroad?

[Answer] I will say generally that the Third Conference of Egyptians Abroad will be one of the most important conferences for several reasons, the most important being: first, the maturation of experience as a result of the expertise derived from the previous two conferences. Second, the enhanced and deepened link with Egyptians abroad as a result of the projects, activities and accomplishments of the Ministry of State for Emigration Affairs and of the field tours and meetings that have strengthened the bridges of trust, response and firm cooperation between the motherland and its emigrant children in Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, Africa, sister Arab countries and other emigration countries. Third, major fundamental accomplishments have been achieved in the sphere of emigration and of serving emigrants. The most significant of these accomplishments are: promulgation of Law No 111 of 1983 on emigration and on tending to
the affairs of Egyptians abroad and the enactment of the provisions of this law which serve the emigrants, and completion of all the steps and procedures to form the General Federation of Egyptians Abroad. The founding of this federation will be announced during the Third Conference of Egyptians Abroad. This is in addition to the expansion in opening Egyptian houses in numerous foreign places where concentrations of Egyptians live and to the aid and support which the Ministry of State for Emigration Affairs will advance to these Egyptian houses, especially in connection with teaching Arabic to the second generation of emigrants in non-Arab countries.

The accomplishments also include the establishment of the Egyptians Abroad Company for Investment and Development and the inauguration of this company's activities with a great success that serves the interests of the Egyptians abroad who own its shares and that also serves development and investment in the motherland.

The accomplishments further include the facilities and services achieved in the various spheres and in all the agencies with which Egyptians abroad deal while in their places of emigration and upon their return to the motherland. These include the facilities concerning passports, work permits, customs and loan periods [for civil servants sent on loan to work in other countries]. There are, moreover, two issues that concern Egyptians abroad: the first concerns leave without pay and the second concerns the fees set for the work permits.

I have submitted several memoranda on these two issues to the prime minister who has referred them to the Higher Policies Committee, which discussed all aspects of the two issues in its session on 8 May 1985 and issued the following resolutions on them:

1. Leave without pay:

   It has been decided to extend the loan period and the leave without pay period concerning Egyptians working abroad to a maximum of 10 years, excluding scarce specializations and workers employed by authorities governed by special laws, bylaws and regulations. It has also been decided to permit a husband working abroad to take along his wife for the entire period of the loan or of leave without pay in order to achieve a family reunion.

2. Work permits:

   It has been decided that these fees shall be collected for a period of no more than 5 years from those who have not paid them as of 20 July 1978.

   It has been decided to return the sum exceeding the above-mentioned period collected from those working abroad upon their obtaining work permits.

   The fees shall be paid to the Egyptian consulates abroad in dollars or in any currency priced in the country where the payment is made. These fees shall be at the rate of $79.00 for those with higher qualifications and $60.00 for those with middle-level qualifications the first time the permit is obtained.
Insofar as renewal of the work permits abroad is concerned, the fees shall be $135.00 for those with higher qualifications and $116.00 for those with middle-level qualifications. In case the fees are paid internally, the equivalent of these sums shall be paid in Egyptian pounds at the price posted by the Central Bank of Egypt.

This is in addition to all the services connected with residence at home and abroad.

Investment Company's Accomplishments

[Question] At the Second Conference of Egyptians Abroad, the establishment of the Egyptian Expatriates Company for Investment and Development was achieved. What has the company achieved in this period?

[Answer] I believe that full details on this company's accomplishments can be obtained from Engr Mashur Muhammad Mashhur, chairman of the company's board of directors. However, there is no harm in offering brief glimpses of what this company has accomplished.

1. Regarding establishment of companies:

The Egyptians' Trade and Services Company: The contracts concerning this company have been concluded, its shares have been allocated and the shares offered for public subscription have been covered. The company's constituent assembly was convened on 21 April 1985 and the company's practical activity will begin shortly.

The Egyptians' Housing, Development and Construction Company: The establishment procedures have been completed and the invitation for subscriptions is being prepared.

Al-'Amriyah Biscuit Company: The mother company is performing the role of the founders' representative, in addition to contributing 10 percent of the company's proposed capital.

What About Housing?

[Question] The Second Conference of Egyptians Abroad adopted seven resolutions concerning the housing issue. What has been achieved in this regard in the sphere of actual implementation?

[Answer] For the sake of clarification, it suffices to note that the ministry's efforts with the authorities concerned have resulted in the implementation of some of these resolutions, such as the resolution concerning the allocation of a certain percentage of lands and housing units for Egyptians abroad. The Ministry of Reconstruction has decided to allocate 8 percent of the lands and housing units in the new communities to Egyptians abroad and the Ministry of Religious Trusts has decided to allocate 10 percent of the housing units in its projects to returning Egyptians. In accordance with Recommendation No 41, a committee will be formed in the federation.
of Egyptians abroad to coordinate between the cooperative housing associations of the Egyptians in the various countries of emigration and to offer facilities to these associations.

Let me assert, moreover, that the announcement by the Egyptian Expatriates Company for Investment and Development of the founding of the Egyptians' Housing Company and its offering this subsidiary's shares for subscription by Egyptians abroad represents, without any doubt, a response to all the housing recommendations.

The second conference's recommendation (58 recommendations) covered the various issues serving the interests and aspirations of Egyptians abroad.

The Ministry of State for Emigration Affairs began to exert efforts and to work for implementation of the conference recommendations as soon as the conference ended. I have been personally careful to follow up on this task and to contact the various agencies and ministries entrusted with implementing some of the recommendations concerning them. God be thanked, a number of the recommendations have actually been implemented and the other recommendations are being implemented with interest.

As for the social, information and cultural care for Egyptians abroad, this responsibility is a duty to which the ministry has been committed since its foundation.

Regarding participation by the Egyptians abroad in the investment and development projects, I will state that what has actually been accomplished in this respect exceeds by far what had been expected.

Language and Second Generation

As for preserving Arabic among the second generation of emigrants, the ministry continues to exert efforts in this regard in cooperation with the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of State for Emigration Affairs has met the requests it received from the Egyptian houses abroad to supply Arabic-language schools and classes with teachers and textbooks free of charge. This is a right dictated by the Egyptian constitution to the state for the citizens at home. We have tried to expand this free educational service to our children abroad.

On the other hand, the Ministry of Education has welcomed the requests to loan a number of Arabic language teachers and has expressed its readiness to expand its efforts to supply the Egyptian communities abroad with textbooks in accordance with the established curricula.

For example, during my latest visit to the United Kingdom, I held several meetings with the Egyptian communities there, including a meeting attended by Ahmad Qadri, the Egyptian consul general, and members of the Executive Board of the Egyptian Scholars Association in the United Kingdom. At that meeting, the various issues concerning the Egyptians there were discussed, especially the issue of schools and classes for teaching Arabic to the
second generation of the emigrants' children. A plan to establish such schools and to supply them with some facilities and aid was agreed on. It was also agreed that the Ministry of Education would supply them with textbooks.

As for the transfer of expertise and technology to the motherland by way of the Egyptian scientific capabilities abroad, the accomplishments of the (Tukti) project, undertaken by the Scientific Research Academy in cooperation with the UN Development Program and supported by the ministry, are growing constantly in transferring knowledge and expertise to the motherland by way of its scientist sons abroad. The ministry eagerly encourages this national project and supplies the Scientific Research Academy with the wishes and proposals it receives from Egypt's scientists abroad on this matter.

Regarding Egyptian manpower and Recommendations No 32, 33 and 34 which deal with the issues of technical training and cultural and behavioral education, numerous industrial and agricultural establishments, the craft and industrial schools and the various training centers continue to carry out this task with interest, not to mention the armed forces' outstanding and commendable role in this regard. The prevalent tendency in this respect is not just to make up for the manpower working outside the country and in the sister Arab countries, to meet the internal needs in the various craft and vocational specializations and to meet the foreign market needs but also to add to this the objective of creating advanced skills that can keep pace with the inventions of modern technology.

Bank To Attract Savings

[Question] You submitted to the second conference a proposal to study the possibility of setting up a bank to attract the savings of Egyptians abroad. What has been done regarding this proposal?

[Answer] Several studies and surveys have actually been carried out on this project. It is no secret that the role of the Ministry of State for Emigration Affairs stops at the limits of proposing and exploring the opinions of the economists and experts. The ministry has drawn up a memorandum on this project and submitted it to the Council of Ministers. The project has taken its course through the Egyptian Expatriates' Company. On 18 April 1985, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of the prime minister and attended by the ministers of administrative development and economy and by the governor of the Central Bank and it was decided to postpone the project in order to conduct a study on the growing number of banks in Egypt.

On the other hand, the issue of the savings of Egyptians abroad and of exerting efforts to attract their remittances for ideal investment in the motherland in a manner that serves the interest of the savers and contributes to the investment and development projects—this issue will be the subject of detailed studies by the Third Conference of Egyptians Abroad.
Data Card

[Question] Are there precise or approximate statistics on Egyptians abroad?

[Answer] The fact is that the ministry began to exercise its tasks and responsibility in October 1981, relying on approximate statistics we obtained from the various authorities concerned. With the assistance of the Central Agency for General Mobilization and Statistics, we started designing data cards to be distributed to Egyptians in the various countries of emigration through our diplomatic offices abroad. On the basis of this card, a precise count and a complete data graph are being prepared on emigration and the emigrants. Add to this the field tours that delegations of the ministry and I have conducted. Through my contacts and meetings with the leaderships of the Egyptian communities and through the first and second conferences of Egyptians abroad, the ministry has been able to provide some statistics on the basis of which a preliminary graph for the Egyptian emigrants, both temporary and permanent emigrants, has been prepared.

I will add that the ministry receives great assistance from Egyptian embassies in all parts of the world and from Egyptian houses and gatherings in the task of obtaining and gathering data. It is no secret that this is a difficult and constant task because emigration activity is subject to continuous changes concerning the numbers and qualities of emigrants. There are also those who return for good and there are the new emigrants. This phenomenon of constant change is ever-growing insofar as the temporary emigrants—especially students, people sent on scholarships or missions, civil servants on loan and craftsmen and skilled workers, especially in the sister Arab countries—are concerned.

Future of Emigration

[Question] What are your expectations regarding permanent and temporary emigration activity in the next few years?

[Answer] To begin, let me note that during the Second Conference of Egyptians Abroad, which was convened in August 1984, I issued a decree for the formation of a committee to study the issue of "emigration and the factors influencing it internally and externally." President Muhammad Husni Mubarak had called for studying this issue in his speech to the conference. This was in addition to conducting a study on setting up a special agency to provide guidance for Egyptian youths on work locations abroad and on their living conditions. A committee was later formed to follow up on the issue and it held continuous meetings and followed up on the conditions and circumstances of the emigration markets through various studies and field tours. I recall that among the working papers I had prepared on a number of important issues, I presented to the conference a paper on the issue of emigration and of Egyptians abroad. The followup I referred to puts, as much as possible, the potential, expectations and changes in their right places and in accordance with what the field and scientific projections reveal.

8494
CSO: 5404/454
LIBYAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT'S MUHAMMAD AHMAD AL-SUKKAR INTERVIEWED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 15 Jul 85 pp 8-10

[Interview with Secretary General of the Libyan National Movement Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar, conducted by 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Qaysi; in Baghdad, date not specified]

[Text] A prominent Libyan politician, Secretary General of the Libyan National Movement Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar, has disclosed controversial information about Libyan Chief of State Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi and the origins of his mother. The information came to light with the disclosure of a letter in Italian dealing with the subject. The letter was translated by Khalifah al-Muntazir, former Libyan ambassador to Italy. In his interview with AL-DUSTUR, the Libyan politician revealed the extent of the activities of the Libyan opposition at home and abroad, the background on the strategic alliance between Iran and Libya, and other issues which can be summed up perhaps in the contradiction between behavior and doctrine that has become the trademark of Libyan politics since the 1 September Revolution.

AL-DUSTUR: To what point has the struggle against the regime of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi developed and what are your future plans for this struggle?

Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar: The Libyan opposition has faced difficult circumstances internally in Libya as well as in the Arab and international spheres. Despite this fact, despite the criminal nature of the ruling military group in Libya and the pursuit and purges to which the opposition has been subjected at the hands of the Libyan organizations, nevertheless the opposition has been able to make tremendous strides in recent years in exposing the criminal and destructive role that the regime of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi has played at the national and pan-Arab levels. The Libyan opposition has also been able to establish its presence in many Arab and international meetings and has communicated a real picture of the suffering of the Libyan people under the regime of the tribal military band. The opposition has succeeded in exposing the Libyan regime, its policies of deception, and the contradiction between the empty slogans it raises and its actual practice. The thing that disturbs Colonel al-Qadhdhafi at present is the growth of the
forces of the Libyan opposition at home and abroad to the point that the opposition has come to represent a tangible threat to his one-man regime. The situation has reached the point of confrontation with the regime and the occurrence of outbreaks within some army camps by nationalist elements within the army itself. Because of these outbreaks, the Libyan regime has experienced large material losses. What is required now and in the near future is that the forces of the Libyan opposition organize themselves and coordinate opposition groups according to the agreed-upon formula. It must also expand its organized bases on the Libyan coast with the objective of accelerating the elimination of this notorious regime. Work has been in progress on these measures for some time, as has the effort to bring together the largest possible number of groups of the Libyan opposition to reach agreement on them.

AL-DUSTUR: What is your information on the visit of Al-Turayki to Baghdad, and how do you assess this visit in light of current realities?

Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar: Al-Turayki came to Baghdad for two purposes. The first is an attempt to break the ring of isolation around the Libyan regime since it has been cut off from the Arab world. Their move in this direction was through the proposal of a plan for unification among the Arab states. This plan is, in fact, nothing more than an extension of the attempts of the Libyan regime to distort the slogan and meaning of Arab unity among Arab mankind. These attempts have become well-known—and in fact, they have become the object of ridicule. The second objective is an important one for the Libyan regime and pertains to the Libyan opposition in Iraq. Al-Turayki broached to officials in Iraq the possibility of handing over or expelling the Libyan opposition. However, this request was firmly rejected. We believe that Al-Turayki's visit to Iraq did not achieve what the Libyan regime sought in terms of breaking its isolation. Nor did the visit achieve what the Libyan regime hoped for in terms of decreasing the activity of the Libyan opposition against it. All of this was by virtue of the firm fundamental position which the representative of the Libyan regime was met with on the part of the officials in Iraq. If Al-Qadhhdafi's regime is resisted in the same manner by the remaining Arab states, its real importance will be known. It will retreat inside the country, and the task of eliminating it will become easier.

AL-DUSTUR: What is your analysis of al-Qadhhdafi's hostility toward Iraq and his support for Iran, a non-Arab country against an Arab country? What do you believe are al-Qadhhdafi's objectives from this political course of action?

Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar: Al-Qadhhdafi, as a mature soldier and an unbalanced person, bears hatred for Iraq because it is a country in which the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party plays the major role in all areas of life—politically, intellectually, culturally, economically, and socially—and because this party represents the hope for the building of the state for the Arabs which can exist in the world of tomorrow, the world of large blocs. Al-Qadhhdafi also bears personal hatred for Comrade Saddam Husayn as an activist individual who has worked his way through long years of struggle among the ranks of
the masses to attain the leadership of the party and state in Iraq. Al-
Qadhdhafi's hatred for Comrade Saddam Husayn also stems from the fact that
Husayn represents the model of the well-balanced and mature Arab man who
is conscious of the duties of the stage that goes beyond wrangling, qualities
which al-Qadhdhafi finds lacking in himself. When we realize that al-Qadhdhafi
has played and continues to play a hidden and suspicious role in the Arab
sphere which ultimately contributes to the plans of the international forces
that are opposed to the Arab nation, then we know why al-Qadhdhafi always
makes alliances with enemies of the Arab nation. These enemies include
the regime of the oppressive faction in Iran, which does not conceal its
enmity and its ambitions toward Arab territory, and which is waging a hostile
war against the sister Arab people of Iraq. Al-Qadhdhafi's objectives
in this area can be labeled as nothing other than to weaken the Arab nation
and fragment its forces.

AL-DUSTUR: What is the position of the Arab people in Libya on the actions of
al-Qadhdhafi?

Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar: Our people in Libya are an Arab people who take the
utmost pride in their Arab nationality. The honorable nationalist positions
of our Arab people in Libya are well-known, whether it be their stand in
support of the Algerian revolution during its war against French colonialism,
or their position in support of the Palestinian revolution in its struggle
against the Zionist usurper. We know through our experiences of the situation
in Libya today that our Libyan Arab people are not at all pleased with
al-Qadhdhafi's attempts to distort the pan-Arab positions and pan-Arab
feelings of our Libyan people. Al-Qadhdhafi's positions hostile to Iraq
have always been rejected by the Libyan people, but the terroristic style
of rule by which al-Qadhdhafi governs in Libya makes it difficult for our
people to express their will clearly. On the opportunities that have been
given, our Arab people in Libya have said that they are deeply hurt by
the disloyal positions taken by al-Qadhdhafi toward their brothers in Iraq.
Many of them would, if given the opportunity, enlist to fight beside their
brothers in Iraq.

AL-DUSTUR: Al-Qadhdhafi wants to abolish the Arab League and form an Islamic
league which Iran would join. What is your analysis of this desire on
the part of al-Qadhdhafi?

Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar: The fact is that al-Qadhdhafi has accustomed
us to many unification schemes of every sort. He has pursued these escapades
in a flippant and insincere manner with many Arab countries. At one time
he offered unity to the African country of Chad as well as the European
country of Malta. After this, if he calls for the abolition of the Arab
League and the establishment of an Islamic league in its place, the underlying
reason for this is not his dedication to Islam or to Muslims. All of us
know that he is linked so far with the non-Islamic state of Ethiopia by
treaties that are injurious to fateful interests and issues of a number
of Islamic Arab countries and entities such as Somalia, Sudan, and the
Eritrean revolution. Therefore, the issue is in essence just one attempt
to shuffle the cards before the Libyan citizens so that al-Qadhdhafi can
find himself a pretext to carry through his notorious agreements. At the same time, it enables him to carry through the plans that are hostile to the Arab nation, which is the main goal that al-Qadhafi is working for.

AL-DUSTUR: What is the connection between al-Qadhafi's assassination of Musa al-Sadr and his support of Iran? And how do you link al-Qadhafi's relations with Iran and his connection with Nabih Birri, head of the so-called Amal Movement?

Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar: What we know is that the disappearance or assassination of Musa al-Sadr inside Libya was agreed upon by al-Qadhafi and the regime of the oppressive faction in Iran because Musa al-Sadr, as a religious leader with authority and influence inside Lebanon posed a possible threat to the influence and plans of Khamene'i outside the borders of Lebanon. But how can we explain the existence of strong relations between al-Qadhafi and the Iranian regime except by saying that al-Qadhafi's support for the Iranian regime falls in the category of his policies in support of what is foreign and hostile to everything Arab? As for the matter of al-Qadhafi's relations with the Iranian regime and his relationship with Birri, we do not see anything in this that is new or in conflict with al-Qadhafi's actions hostile to the Arab nation. Al-Qadhafi supported Nabih Birri when Khamene'i's regime condoned Nabih Birri. The goal of al-Qadhafi and Khamene'i are one and the same in this area, namely, to destroy pan-Arab movements in the Lebanese arena. Al-Qadhafi's recent position against Nabih Birri is not attributable to the massacres that Nabih Birri committed against the Palestinians since Birri's weapons and financing came for the most part from al-Qadhafi. Rather, the reason for this position is that it began to become clear that Nabih Birri could become Hafiz al-Asad's man rather than Khamene'i's man as indicated by the fact that al-Qadhafi's objections to the butcheries in the Palestinian camps were relayed indirectly to Syria and not to the Iranian regime.

AL-DUSTUR: What are al-Qadhafi's aims in calling for union with Chad and with Nicaragua, in supporting international terrorism, and in embracing the terrorist Carlos?

Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar: Al-Qadhafi certainly knows the absurdity of establishing unity with Chad or Nicaragua or Malta because of the lack of the basic conditions and elements necessary for this unity: a common language; a common history; common cultures, customs, and traditions; and a shared land area. Nevertheless, al-Qadhafi persists in proposing union with these countries. His goal in making such proposals is to distort a slogan that is dear to the hearts of Arabs. After the slogan of unity has been embraced by the unionist activists, who have sacrificed much effort, sweat, and blood for it, this slogan has been transformed at the hands of al-Qadhafi into a mere laughing-stock. Al-Qadhafi may succeed in his goal because the Arab masses are renouncing the slogan of unity. With regard to al-Qadhafi's support of international terrorism and his embracing of criminals and terrorists, it is no longer a secret, and he himself deals with this subject often in his official public speeches, motivated either by foolish boastfulness or by a desire to terrorize his
political adversaries. Al-Qadhafi's goal by persisting in this policy of creating centers of tension in the Arab and international spheres is to be able to stay in the seat of power as long as possible. However, the new factor in the situation is that the official organizations of the state in Libya have begun to be employed for terrorism at the hands of the Libyan regime. Moreover, the embassies of the Libyan regime in the other states have been transformed into headquarters and havens for terrorists and criminals who enjoy diplomatic immunity, not to mention the fact that the revolution of the Libyan people has been distributed among every Tom, Dick, and Harry from the ranks of criminals, terrorists, and imposters of all nationalities.

AL-DUSTUR: Available information says that al-Qadhafi owes approximately $20 billion because of purchases of weapons for Iran while the Libyan people are suffering from poverty and want. What is the connection between the two phenomena?

Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar: Libya's indebtedness for such large sums began to be uncovered years ago when Libya was unable to make payments. Al-Qadhafi resorted to many different measures to obtain the funds he needs, including obtaining an advance on the bill for sales of oil exports and bartering for his imports with quantities of oil at a reduced price outside of OPEC. In return for that, al-Qadhafi irresponsibly spent these sums to buy weapons and pile them up in the desert. After that he began to distribute the weapons to spread operations of sabotage and terrorism in all parts of the world. In recent years, al-Qadhafi has begun to play the role of middleman in the purchase of and payment for weapons for the Iranian regime. We know that when al-Qadhafi delivered ground-to-ground missiles to the Iranian regime, he stipulated that they be launched specifically against the city of Baghdad. At the same time, motivated by his hatred for the Libyan people, al-Qadhafi initiated policies aimed at impoverishing the Libyan people, determined to gradually push them into living on the fringes. One of the means he resorted to in order to accomplish this was the changing of the Libyan currency, which enabled him to confiscate the savings of low-income citizens. Another means was to restrict imported goods under the pretext of dispensing with luxuries. Still another means was to impose taxes and deductions on the incomes of low-income Libyans. Some may think it preposterous today to learn that the Libyan citizen, who lives in an oil-rich country with a small population, sometimes cannot find basic necessities which can be found in the poor neighboring country of Tunisia, for example.

AL-DUSTUR: How do you view the strategic allegiance between the Libyan regime and the Iranian regime? And why was it divulged that al-Qadhafi was not enthusiastic about meeting with Rafsanjani?

Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar: The strategic alliance that has been made between the Libyan regime and the Iranian regime falls within the category of al-Qadhafi's notorious policies hostile to the Arab nation inasmuch as Iraq is an Arab country with a pan-Arab orientation and a strategic view with regard to the Arab region. Al-Qadhafi's alliance with the Iranian regime
is not just an act of hostility toward the Arab nation and its pan-Arab goals. It is also a shameful violation of the principles of the charter of the Arab League and a shameful violation of the provisions of the common defense treaty among the countries of the Arab League. During the past years of aggression by the Iranian regime against Iraq, al-Qadhafi has offered practically everything he could in terms of money and weapons to the Iranian regime. But now he has publicly taken a clear official position by siding with foreign forces, namely those of Iran, against a sister Arab state. This position on the part of al-Qadhafi must not be allowed to pass without punishment by the other member Arab states of the Arab League because it represents a serious violation of the charters which these states have been and still are parties to. With regard to what is sometimes circulated concerning a disagreement among some of the staff of the Libyan regime, this is not true because the dominating one-man government in Libya gives no opportunity for the emergence of such disagreements. If what are believed to be disagreements have developed, the intention behind them is to draw off popular resentment or to leave an opportunity for a fall-back position for the head of the one-man regime to retreat to if he feels any kind of pressure from either inside or outside the country.

It is true that there are differences and competition among the ranks of some of the mid-level cadres belonging to the regime, which has been announced by the centers of authority. However, the reins of authority are ultimately in the hands of the head of the one-man regime, which basically relies on supporting tribal forces. The visit of Rafsanjani to Libya would not have occurred except at the wish of al-Qadhafi himself.

AL-DUSTUR: How does the Libyan opposition view the Iranian aggression against Iraq, and what is required from Arabs under the present circumstances?

Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar: Libya is part of the Arab nation, and the Libyan opposition proceeds from the Libyan Arab reality and from the Libyan Arab soil. Consequently, the Libyan opposition, proceeding from this reality, will remain faithful to the history, culture, land, and nation of the Arabs. The Iranian aggression against Iraq represents an aggression against an Arab people living on a part of the Arab territory and tied historically and culturally to the remainder of the Arab people. The aggression that the oppressive faction is carrying out against Iraq is also an aggression against us. We in the Libyan National Movement—and I do not believe that our brothers in the Libyan opposition groups disagree with us on this matter—are ready to defend the soil of Iraq when we feel that Iraq has reached the point that it needs us. We consider ourselves a reserve for the heroic army and people of Iraq. At the same time that we are deeply afflicted because of the fact that some of the Arab governments have taken negative positions with respect to the hostile Iranian position, we say with full conviction that the Iranian regime would not have been able to continue with this obstinacy if it had been confronted with an earnest position which would restore to it a remnant of sanity. There remains in the end one important thing, namely that Iraq is capable, as are the progressive and noble pan-Arab nationalist forces made up of the natives of this nation, of undertaking the mission of the defense of Arab soil and the honor of the nation.
AL-DUSTUR: What information do you have about the accusations that al-Qaddhafi's mother is Jewish?

Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukkar: Talk about this point is circulating extensively both inside and outside Libya. If we take into account the proverb that where there is smoke there is fire, and realize the nature of the composition of the population and the demographic ties in Libya, we will understand that the talk circulated in the Libyan street represents a large portion of factual truth despite the attempts the Libyan regime has made to obscure such matters. The fact that al-Qaddhafi has a Jewish mother spread when a letter was sent from a priest in Milan, Italy—written in Italian, of course—addressed to members of what was called the Revolution Command Council in Libya. Because there was no one with a command of Italian among the members of the council, the letter was transmitted for translation to a figure prominent in Italian matters, Professor Khalifah al-Muntazir (a former Libyan ambassador). It came as a surprise when it was revealed that the contents of the letter were directed to Colonel al-Qaddhafi in consideration of the fact that he was in position to propose a plan for peace between the Arabs and Muslims, on the one hand, and the Jewish State of Israel on the other, by virtue of the blood relationships that link him to both religions. It is worth mentioning that Italy-colonized Libya and did not withdraw from it until about 1943. Moreover, large numbers of Italians and Jews lived in Libya and did not leave until the late 1960's and early 1970's. Al-Qaddhafi's father himself clung to the Italian colonialist authorities through the job by which he subsisted. All of these factors would make it easy for an Italian individual, particularly a priest, to know some of what was happening in Libya.
DEFENSE MINISTER INSPECTS SAHARAN BRIGADE, URGES SUPPORT

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 16 Aug 85 p 4

[Text] "The national army, with its officers and soldiers, represents the Tunisian people, and it is its duty to defend the homeland and the achievements of the Bourguibian regime.

"It must be constantly vigilant in order to face the challenges and anything that could harm these achievements, and it must remain always ready to accomplish its noble mission."

This was stated by Minister of National Defense Slaheddine Baly when he inspected the Saharan brigade yesterday at Remada.

On this occasion he stressed the importance of this part of the national territory, and reviewed the struggle waged by the citizens of the area, both in the national liberation struggle and in the battle for development.

He recalled the Supreme Fighter's concern for the south, the area where he has stayed a number of times.

Baly urged the region's citizens to contribute to the strengthening of security and protection of the country's integrity, pointing out that Tunisia's overall defense policy based on national solidarity requires of each citizen vigilance, a sense of responsibility, and assistance to the authorities and the army in the carrying out of their duty.

"The defense of the country," he said, "is not the task only of the soldiers."

The minister then stressed in this connection the necessity for complementarity and cohesion in the relations between the military forces and the forces of the security police and the national guard, all of whom have the mission to protect the country and its institutions and protect its sovereignty.

The minister said: In addition to its defensive mission, the national army, which is composed of active and committed Tunisians--contributes--particularly in the Saharan regions--to strengthening the pillars of the state, and settling the people in their regions while assuring them adequate living
conditions, all this so that the army will fulfill its task in making the national sovereignty a reality and in protecting the territory and the achievements.

In this connection, the minister announced the establishment of a regiment for developing the Sahara. He also announced that the prime minister will visit Tataouine governorate soon to gain an understanding of the situation in the region and the activity of the new regiment.

Baly said that total invulnerability can be achieved only if three factors are present, ideological invulnerability, military invulnerability, and economic invulnerability.

In the name of President Habib Bourguiba, the supreme commander of the armed forces, Baly, who was accompanied on his visit by Gen Mohamed Said El Kateb, the armed forces inspector general, and Gen Youssef Baraket, army chief of staff, installed Col Abdelhamid Lajoued in his functions as commander of the Sahara brigade replacing Col Mustapha Darghouth.

Later, the national defense minister held a working meeting with military officers and civilian officials at the brigade's headquarters. The meeting was devoted to reviewing the situation in the area and the contribution of the national army in transporting the citizens returning from Libya. Baly emphasized that Tunisia is able to receive its children, whose place is in their own country. He added that the Supreme Fighter has given instructions so that the Tunisians returning from Libya will receive all the necessary attention for them to be able to reintegrate themselves into Tunisian society and participate in the development task.

9920
CS0: 4519/191
DEPOSITS OF ZINC, LEAD, PHOSPHATES DISCOVERED IN KEF

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 16 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by H.K.]

[Text] Is the mining recovery of Kef a thing of the near future? The development beginning in 1986 of the Sra-Ouertane resources and the discovery of new deposits of zinc and lead will open the door for the Kef region. What discoveries are we talking about, and how long will it be before they go into production?

Kef region's mining reputation is related to Jerissa (280,000 tons of iron per year), Khalaa Khasba (300,000 tons of phosphate per year), but also and particularly to a large number of iron, lead and zinc deposits abandoned to their sad fate since the colonial period: Kbouche, Touiref, Sakiet Sidi Youssef, Garn Halfaya, Sidi Amor Ben Salem, etc.

However, the question arises, why were these mines abandoned? Indeed, several hypotheses have been advanced to respond to this question. Some say it was because they were exhausted. Others cite an increased practice of skimming off in the colonial period. In truth, however, there was an evident lack of information. This did not prevent those responsible from deciding to reopen the mines, because the first indications were encouraging.

There remains a major problem: that of preparing a mineral chart of the region. It would enable locating precisely all the deposits in the region.

In regard to the discoveries, which are producing optimism both in relation to production and jobs, there is the "Kbouche-Bougrine" deposit discovered in 1978. The studies continued into 1984 have resulted in discovery of an area containing 8 million tons, of which 12 percent is zinc and lead. Actual production of this mine will begin in 1990, and will be spread out over 15 to 20 years at a rate of 500,000 tons. The deposit will provide 400 jobs and will require an investment of more than 6 million dinars.

In the same connection, we could mention the Kbouche-sud mine, where exploration has established the existence of 1.5 million tons, of which 8 percent is zinc and lead. Work is continuing in the hope of increasing these percentages.
We should also mention the Garn Halfaya, Khanguet Sehgira, and Nebeur zinc and lead deposits. All this mineral wealth in Kef governorate enables one to say that the northwest could experience industrialization.

In 1965, exploration was begun at Sra-Ouertane in Kef governorate with the aim of production from a new phosphate deposit. These did not produce convincing results. A few years later, new prospecting was undertaken and this time resulted in discovery of a huge phosphate deposit of about 30 square kilometers. A company was established more than 2 years ago: Sra-Ouertane Phosphate Studies Company.

It is a Tunisian-Kuwaiti company with capital of 4 billion of our millimes. Its headquarters is in Tunis, and the administration is at Kef. Its mission is to study the project and supervise the progress of the operations of prospecting and production of phosphates of Sra-Ouertane. In view of its economic, industrial and social prospects, this will be among the great achievements of independent Tunisia as part of a master plan. It is also part of an overall strategy of developing the northwest, set as a priority by the government, and within which it will be a main sector of industrialization and job creation.

The operation target for the Sra-Ouertane phosphate deposit is production of 10 mt [million tons] in the year 2000 timeframe, of which 70 percent will be processed on site. This will enable Tunisia to maintain its position in this sector, which it is estimated will increase between 4 and 5 percent over the next 20 years. The project will be developed in stages of 3 million tons. It had been planned to extract 1 million tons of phosphate this year as the first stage, pending progressive increase in production. However, the studies and research thus far have modified the data. The conclusion is that it will be possible to extract 1.2 million tons of phosphate by the end of 1986, of which 700,000 tons will be processed on site, thus giving the Sra-Ouertane project an integrated character because of the newly integrated satellite projects.

Project's State of Progress

Currently, a research center is operating in Kef region with an administration, geological division, and pilot factory to test the Sra-Ouedane process. The factory is equipped to be able to process 400 kg of the mineral per hour.

The cost of the studies over the years 1983 to 1985 has totaled 16 million dinars. The studies on development of Cap Serrat port and transport of the phosphate by pipeline are ready.

After the good results obtained by the feasibility study on stage A, the officials are concentrating on the study for stage B, that is, production and choice of the financial partners. It should be noted in this respect that several countries have expressed the desire to cooperate in carrying out the project (particularly Japan).
Although it is still premature to give precise estimates, the first tranche of the investment, 40 million dinars, has been included in the Sixth Plan. It is estimated that 20,000 jobs will be created by the project (at least 600 engineers, and 2,000 to 2,500 higher technicians), with the rest certainly being specialized workers.

Finally, we can justifiably say that Sra-Ouertane will without doubt change the destiny of the northwest.

That is very important for Tunisia as a whole, for which phosphate is one its rare raw materials. For the long-term objective is to produce 10 million tons of phosphate per year; that is, double the present Tunisian production of 5 million tons.
OFFICIAL DISCUSSES NEW PLANTING SEASON

Baghdad 'AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 18 Jun 85 p 4

[Article: "Public Grains Establishment and New Agricultural Season"]

[Text] Securing the people's food continues to be at all times a requirement in the revolution's considerations. There is behind this fundamental and essential task more than just an exhaustive effort and enormous financial expense to supply food easily to the citizens in volume that exceeds their needs and at very low prices.

All the production and marketing links of this commodity affect the country's food security. This is why anybody who contributes to performing this duty deserves Iraq's love and the appreciation of the party and the revolution's leadership. The Public Grains Establishment, which is far from the limelight by virtue of the nature of its daily effort which is visible to all the people, is entitled to review its steps and preparations to receive the agricultural season, considering that this review reveals a bright page that recounts the contributions of the workers of this socialist establishment, the establishment of all the people.

Speaking of these contributions, Ghanim 'Aziz, the establishment chairman, said:

The Public Grains Establishment sets up its marketing and storage plans and its foreign purchases in light of actual agricultural production and derives realistic indicators for this planning by linking the planning process to the given facts in the field concerning the quantities of grains expected to be received and by evaluating these quantities in light of the preliminary planning indicators on which it relies. To achieve this task, the establishment's agencies begin to move in order to implement the steps and preparations before the harvest. Here, the efforts are coordinated with the agricultural, administrative and statistical agencies throughout the country with the aim of providing the requirements needed to receive the planting season.

These agencies also hold meetings with the unions of cooperative associations and with the agricultural authorities to discuss with them the actual situation of the agricultural season, the quantities expected to be delivered and the requirements of the marketing process in light of the experiences of past years.

49
Ghanim 'Aziz also pointed out that the current season is better than the past seasons and that this requires exerting concerted efforts to collect larger quantities of grains in order to strengthen our people's steadfastness and to bolster their victories in the just defensive war against the tyrannical gang in Iran.

'Aziz asserted that the establishment continues to observe the crop and harvest conditions and to make full preparations to collect the entire quantity delivered "so that we may rise to the level of the trust of our people and of our historic leadership, headed by struggler President Saddam Husayn, the symbol of Iraq."

The establishment has, moreover, taken steps to supply the farmers with packaging sacks and to supply the marketing centers with advanced laboratory equipment to test the grains delivered, to store them under cover and to preserve them.

More importantly, to enable the establishment to perform its responsibility, to collect the local production and to pay the farmers directly for the quantities they deliver to the silos and marketing centers, the agricultural authorities have been loaned the sums needed to cover the cost of these deliveries in light of the actual quantities already delivered to these centers. This step enables the farmers to stay close to their fields. We would like to point out here that the Public Grains Establishment posted the crop purchase prices at the beginning of the current season and that these prices exceed last season's prices by 26-33 percent.

Insofar as grade-one fine-grain wheat is concerned, it has been decided to set the price at 140 dinars per ton instead of 110 dinars per ton. For coarse-grain wheat, the price is 133 dinars instead of 102 dinars and for barley 120 dinars instead of 90 dinars, keeping in mind that these increases are not transferred to the consumer price and that they are shouldered by the establishment in accordance with the revolution's policy of subsidizing essential foodstuffs.

As for the establishment's measures to prepare the grain silos to collect the quantities delivered and to wash, treat and grade them, Ghanim 'Aziz said that a number of advanced modern silos located in the production centers have been delivered to the establishment and are prepared to collect the grains. Well-trained and capable elements have been selected to operate these silos. Steps have also been taken to carry out comprehensive maintenance on the existing silos and to prepare the laboratory and accounting cadres needed to collect the crop, to issue laboratory certificates and to settle the farmers' accounts.

The establishment chairman added: A plan has been drawn up to collect and wash the crop at the marketing centers and then to ship it to the silos in the consumption centers and to familiarize the officials in charge of collecting and testing the grains with the standards set for the current delivery season.
In light of the coordination with the production agencies, the requirements needed by the collection centers to perform their tasks have been determined. It has also been decided to set up 68 collection centers in all parts of the country. Samples of the grains delivered are tested in these centers so as to determine the purchase price in a manner that rewards the better crop in terms of quality and standard specifications.

8494
CSO: 4404/427
PILGRIMAGE DESERT ROAD TO OPEN IN JULY

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 27 Jun 85 p 7

[Article by Firyal Jasim: "Construction of Extensive Network of Roads and Bridges in All Parts of Country: All Three Stages of Land Pilgrimage Road Completed and To Be Opened During July Celebration"]

[Text] The Public Roads and Bridges Establishment has built and continues to build an extensive network of roads and bridges in all parts of the country.

Faruq 'Abd-al-Qadir, chairman of the Public Roads and Bridges Establishment, said that the establishment continues to implement the projects included in the current 1985 plan, that arterial and main roads and second lanes are being built and that emphasis is being put on the construction of rural roads. The length of the roads included in the plan currently under construction amounts to 9,200 km of expressways, main and subsidiary roads and local and border roads.

During the plan, construction of the second lane of the Kirkuk-Sulaymaniya road will be started, construction of the fifth bridge in Mawsil will continue and the access roads to the 14 Ramadan bridge--al-A'zamiyah bridge--close to al-Karkh will be built.

'Abd-al-Qadir noted that numerous blueprints and studies for other projects will be implemented during the current plan, such as the study and blueprint for expressway No. 2 which will extend from Baghdad to the Turkish border, passing through most of the northern governorates, the second phase of the Abu Qarib Street and a number of road, intersection and bridge projects in most of the country's governorates.

Regarding the international highways linking Iraq with the neighboring countries, 'Abd-al-Qadir said that despite the conditions of the war of aggression launched by the tyrannical gang's regime in Qom and Tehran against our peaceful country, the establishment is implementing the biggest expressway project, namely expressway No. 1 which consists of 10 parts with a total length of 1,200 km. Construction of the first part was started in 1979. This strategic project is the first of its kind in the Middle East and extends to the Jordanian and Syrian borders to the west and the Kuwaiti borders to the south, passing through the cities of al-Ratbah, al-Ramadi, Baghdad, Hillah, al-Diwaniyah, al-Samawah, al-Nasiriyah and al-Basrah.
He pointed out that this expressway will facilitate land traffic and create the right conditions to boost commercial, industrial, agricultural and service activities.

This expressway consists of six lanes, three in each direction and each with a width of 3.75 meters, except for the part extending from Ratbah to the Jordanian border and the part from the H-3 intersection to the Syrian border which are designed with four lanes, with central isles, each with a width of 10 meters, and with a lane for emergency stops.

'Abd-al-Qadir also said that expressway No 1 includes a number of intersections at various levels, big bridges, car parks, resthouses, gas stations and a traffic control station.

The Baghdad-Abu Gharib expressway is also currently under construction. It is 23 km long and links Baghdad with expressway No 1. It also links the current Baghdad-Ramadi highway (highway No 10) with a two-level intersection, thus facilitating traffic flow and preventing traffic jams.

As for the above-mentioned expressway No 2, the blueprints for certain parts of this expressway have been completed and the establishment will supervise its construction in the coming years. This expressway starts in Baghdad and proceeds in the direction of the Turkish and Syrian borders, passing the governorates of Salah-al-Din, al-Ta'mim, Irbil, Nineveh and Dahuk.

Regarding the phases of implementation of the land pilgrimage road between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, 'Abd-al-Qadir said that all three phases of this road will be opened during our people's celebration of this coming July's holidays. This 256 km highway begins in the area of Qasr al-Ukhaydir on the Karbala'-Ayn Tamr highway and ends in the border area of 'Ar'ar. It will serve the pilgrim caravans in addition to linking Iraq with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Regarding the dimensions and contents of the 1986 plan, he said: The 1986 strategic plan provides for continuing implementation of the projects listed in the investment plan, especially the expressway projects and the important arterial highways and second lanes. This plan focuses, moreover, on implementing the rural road projects in the governorates and completing the top-priority projects and some of the second-priority projects. The coming year's plan also calls for the construction and completion of numerous bridges, especially major bridges, and the construction of special access roads in accordance with set timetables.

The plan also focuses on developing the capability of the engineers and skilled workers by including them in scientific courses, enhancing their executive capability and enabling them to gain experience in order that they may develop the capability of this establishment. This is in addition to completing the studies and blueprints for numerous projects included in the 1986-90 5-year plan.

8494
CSO: 4404/427
ROADS, BRIDGES ESTABLISHMENT SURVEYS ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROSPECTS

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 26 Jun 85 p 8

[Article by 'Abbas Mahdi al-Hadidi: "Chairman of Public Roads and Bridges Establishment: Extensive Road Network To Eliminate Differences Between Rural and Urban Areas"]

[Text] The image of the Iraqi countryside is no longer that of backwardness, ignorance and rampant exploitative relations. It is now a new image beautified by a comprehensive renaissance in all economic, social and cultural fields, because the programs of the party and the revolution's relationship have sought to enhance the countryside culturally and to eliminate the gap between the countryside and the city by linking the rural with the urban areas through a network of paved roads, by supplying electricity to every home and by underlining the state of human continuity in building the new society.

Rural roads play a major and effective role in the life of the rural population by making it easier for this population to transport its agricultural production, by bringing it into better direct contact with the city, by introducing the modern means of agriculture, by enabling rural children to continue their education at higher levels and by enabling this population to benefit from medical and veterinary services and from other services pertaining to its daily life and activity.

The rural roads derive their importance not just from the fact that they are roads but also from the fact that they are a mainstay in building the new man and in making the rural citizen feel that class and social differences have disappeared so that he may enjoy the revolution's offerings and gains and may employ all his capabilities and energies to the building process being experienced by the country despite the conditions of the war of aggression imposed by the tyrannical gang in Tehran on our lofty country and our noble people.

Ceaseless Efforts

With this image in mind, we took our questions to Faruq 'Abd-al-Qadir 'Abd-al-Rahman, chairman of the Public Roads and Bridges Establishment, so that he may tell us about the strides which the establishment has made in this regard. He said: Before talking of our establishment's efforts
in opening and paving rural roads, it must be noted that the task of building rural roads was entrusted to our establishment in 1962 whereas it had been previously given to the Ministry of Local Government, with the local governments in the governorates carrying out the construction tasks.

Despite the big efforts exerted by our establishment in building roads and bridges in the country's various governorates, we have undertaken the task of building the rural roads—a task assigned to the road directorates in the various governorates according to location and under the supervision of the main road establishments. The Public Organization for the Construction of Central Roads undertakes the responsibility for building all the rural roads located within its geographic jurisdiction which includes the governorates of Baghdad, Diyala, al-Anbar and Salah-al-Din. Meanwhile, the Central Euphrates Organization undertakes the task of building the rural roads in Babil, al-Najaf, Karbala' and al-Qadisiyah; the Southern Organization the task of building roads in al-Basrah, Maysan, Wasit, al-Muthanna and Dhi Qar; and the Northern Organization the task of building rural roads in Ninawa, al-Ta'mim, Irbil, Dahuk and al-Sulaymaniya.

The Public Roads and Bridges Establishment had to exert big efforts to liquidate the activities of the abolished Public Organization for the Construction of Rural Roads and to transfer the ownership of its machinery and equipment to the road construction organizations in order to continue the work and its commitment to build the top-priority rural roads, which amount to 65 roads with a total length of 1,065 km distributed in the villages and rural areas of the various governorates.

Seventy Two Rural Roads Under Construction

The establishment chairman said: Our current plan provides for building top-priority rural roads which have been increased to 72 roads with a total length of 1,126 km distributed as follows: 30 roads with a total length of 426 km in the southern area, 15 roads with a total length of 346 km in the central area, 16 roads with a total length of 146 km in the Central Euphrates area and 11 roads with a total length of 208 km in the northern area. It is hoped that 32 roads with a total length of 463 km will be completed by the end of the current year.

As for the 1986 plan, it includes other second-priority roads, depending on the absorption capabilities and executive resources of the road directorates. In light of these absorption capabilities, timetables will be set for implementation and completion of the projects through the exertion of the utmost effort to speed up the implementation in a manner that helps the citizens transport their agricultural and livestock products and that alleviates their daily hardships. The strategic tendencies of the coming 1986-90 5-year plan underline the importance of building the rural roads according to priority and to the requests of the governorates.

The nature of our activity is determined in light of the priorities for construction of the rural roads in each governorate. This is done in coordination with the local governments which determine these priorities.
that are usually based on a governorate's need for such roads and on the resources of the governorate's road directorate, keeping in mind that most of our machinery and equipment is being used to build special roads and other projects connected with the war effort.

Construction of Rural Roads Has Not Stopped

Our rural road construction activities have not stopped because of the utilization of the major part of our technical resources and manpower capabilities to serve our just battle against the aggression of the tyrannical gang. These efforts have been channeled in the direction of achieving and bolstering the victory. We have continued our engineering effort to build and pave roads whose implementation and completion require record times and redoubled special efforts. This is in addition to the other reasons pertaining to liquidating the accounts of the abolished Public Rural Road Organization, to transferring the ownership of its vehicles and machinery and to settling the accounts of the local contractors.

To enable our establishment to continue the construction of rural roads, the necessary requirements have been secured, including modern equipment, specialized cadres, the formation of road construction authorities, the preparation of asphalt plants and other preparatory activities. The new plan is being carried out according to the direct implementation system which relies on the establishment's engineering, technical and worker cadres.

Ceaseless Work and Special Efforts

Here, we must point out the issue of the cadre in charge of the implementation process. Despite the small number of technical and labor cadres and the small amount of machinery and equipment designated for the construction of rural roads, this does not mean that our construction of rural roads will come to a halt or falter. On the contrary, executive activities are going on, thanks to the efforts of the workers who work day and night out of conviction that their effort is not equal to a single drop of blood from the wound of a valiant Iraqi fighter standing fast on the borders for our land, dignity and honor.

Specifications of Rural Roads

As for the technical specifications of the rural roads--level and load--the establishment chairman said that there are various types of such roads and that rural roads are referred to in the road blueprint directories by the letter D. The width of the paved road is 6 meters and that of each shoulder is 1.75 meters, which permits vehicles to travel at speeds of 70 km in flat lands, of 60 km in undulating lands and of 50 km in mountainous terrain. These roads consist of several layers: a sub-foundation layer with a thickness of 20 cm, a foundation layer of gravel or stone with a thickness of 15 cm, a tar foundation layer with a thickness of 10 cm and a single binding surface layer of concrete asphalt with a thickness of 6 cm so as to withstand the weight of a 12-ton single rear-axle vehicle and an 18-ton dual rear-axle vehicle.
Maintenance Teams

When these roads are completed, their maintenance comes under the control of the establishment's agencies, since there are in all the provincial road directorates special teams for the maintenance of rural roads. Considering that no weight limit is set for vehicles traveling on rural roads and that these vehicles often exceed the weight these roads can withstand, such roads require more maintenance than highways. This requires further efforts to maintain these roads in a manner that keeps them constantly fit for traffic.

To protect the rural roads, we urge the traffic agencies in the country's governorates to exert efforts to persuade the drivers of heavy vehicles not to use these roads because such use damages the roads and leads to squandering the efforts of the maintenance teams which work with the resources available to them.

8494
CSO: 4404/427
ALIENATION OF LABOR PARTY FROM WORKING CLASS DECRIED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 20 Jun 85 p 10

[Article by Yehoshua Bitzur: "The Party and the 'Street' "]

[Text] In sessions of the Labor faction that convened recently pronouncements were heard that testify to a gap between these representatives of the people and those public circles that they are supposed to represent. The result is alienation of the working man from those who boast of representing the labor movement.

These discussions centered on very controversial political topics--the question of establishing an investigative commission for the war in Lebanon and the matter of a pardon for the underground detainees. It is only natural that within Labor there were those who favored the establishment of an investigatory commission while there were also others who were bitterly opposed because of the danger of an even deeper split among the people. They were also divided in their opinions about granting a pardon to those convicted members of the Jewish underground.

Particularly grating on the ears were the sharp pronouncements within Labor that on such sensitive matters, one must not take into account the mood in the streets. This was said by Ha'im Tzadoq, considered the senior legal authority in the party to this very day, as well as MK's Nava Arad and Ora Namir. MK Aharon Har'el even claimed that the party and the faction do not have to act according to "the dictates of the street", but should lead the establishment in accordance with what seems best to them for the country and the political tack that it requires.

This is a very serious phenomenon which indicates that things are so topsy-turvy as to blur the basic concepts of the labor class. Labor party MK's should serve here as sensors for the moods of those crowds that they snidely call "the street." Those workers who are not spoiled by life are their natural constituency. Thus a strange process has developed here in which the true proletariat gives the majority of its votes to the Likud, which in no way waves the banner of their class or of socialism, while the Labor party sees its strongholds as the prosperous bourgeoisie of northern Tel Aviv, the central Carmel and Jerusalem's Rehavi'a, which deliver the votes. The pyramid is now upside down.
Political science experts ascertained after the last Knesset elections that Labor's 44 seat winnings represented the very best that they could expect. This seems very strange since the majority of Israel's populace are wage earners and Histadrut members who should be counted as part of Labor's potential. But scorn, estrangement and alienation have depleted Labor's ranks of a large portion of these people. They are not about to be treated as "the street," unworthy of consideration.

MK Simha Dinitz, one of Labor's best political minds, told me a few days ago that his party's problem is that the majority of its members are "hawks" who incline to the right, while in the government faction and the bureaucracy it is precisely the "doves" who rule aggressively. However there is a clear process of neutralization of the "hawks," with the Knesset becoming the exclusive playground of the "doves."

I do not know if it was done intentionally, but it is a fact that the "hawks" in Labor disappeared or were "kicked upstairs." Of the previous Labor faction, Ra'anan Na'im and Micha'el Bar Zohar, who were brilliant activists, were sent home. Shlomo Hillel is "alone" in the office of the Knesset chairman. Arik Nehemqin was politically "neutralized" in the office of the minister of agriculture and Shoshan Arbeli-Almuzelino is constantly occupied with her power struggle with Mota Gur in the Ministry of Health. Their voices are no longer heard in the vociferous political and public debates on controversial topics.

As a result, the Labor party, and especially its Knesset faction, has a very strong "dovish" image, despite the fact that they represent a public that is generally in the center of the political map, as has been shown by polls and public opinion surveys on the questions of an investigatory commission, a pardon for the underground and holding on to Judaea and Samaria. If the Labor party wants to live, it must return to itself and to the constituency that it is supposed to represent. It cannot look down from the temple heights of the Knesset to the street below but must be a part of it. Otherwise it will carry the labor name in vain.

9794
CSO:4423/66
NEED FOR ARAB INVESTMENTS IN GALILEE URGED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 14 May 85 Business Supplement p 10

[Article by Me'ir Hare'uveni: "Enormous Resources Await Initiative"]

[Text] In the outskirts of Galilee there is a population of 153,000 people in 28 Arab and Druze villages. The work force in this community is estimated at about 30,000 people (about 20 percent). In all this enormous territory there are only 214 production units, which employ but 3,750 workers. Only 7 percent of the educated youth are going into scientific-technological professions. Most of the available capital is not being invested in industry. Engineer Raymond Gubran suggests ways to change these tendencies and include the villages in programs for establishing science regions in the Galilee.

At one of the sessions of the steering committee for implementing the programs for establishing the science and industry region in the Galilee ("The Region for the Year 2000"), a luxurious color pamphlet was distributed to those present, containing a large map of the region. A representative of the "workers group" on the staff, Uri Tahon (director of the unit for Arab and Druze development in the Koor concern) pointed to a striking defect on the map: at the center of the area intended for development, between Ma'alot and Karmiel, there was a big "bald" spot, with no sign of an Arab village alongside the Jewish settlements, except for the small lookout posts. "What happened to you, did the Indians run away?" Tahon asked the chairman of the committee and former president, Ephra'im Katzir.

One of the results of this comment was an invitation for a detailed survey of the Arab sector--covering everything having to do with the makeup of the population, existing industry, possibilities and inclinations for local capitalists to participate in initiatives for industrial development, manpower in the villages and the inclination of the youth for professional studies, etc.

The survey was at the request of the northern region of the settlement department of the Jewish Agency and was carried out--as the first scientific work of its type in the Arab sector in Israel--by a native son of the area, Dr Raymond Jubran from the village of Jish (Gush Halab), who completed his studies in business administration at universities in the United States.
There is No Commercial Center Worthy of the Name

Some 153,200 people live within the confines of the region (23,700 families) in 28 Arab and Druze villages. The work force in this population is estimated at about 20 percent—that is, at about 30,000 people. Within this entire area there are only 214 small production units, mostly cottage industries for building products, olive oil products, etc., employing only 3,750 workers. There are 484 grocery stores in the area but no commercial center worthy of the name.

"The public services that the citizens receive from the authorities do not meet their needs, and a lot of improvement is needed in such areas as health, transportation, communications and local planning," Dr. Jubran says. This entire community has 5,061 telephones now, with 6,545 requests waiting to be filled.

The lack of industries and planning offices in the area has influenced the choice of professions studied by the region's youth, and another contributing factor is "tradition," which does not "respect" technological studies. Only 15 percent of high school students in the area are in professional curricula, and of all the students from the area in the universities only 7 percent major in technological professions. Only two schools with technological-professional curricula exist in the entire area, and any effort to change the attitude of the population to the subject of industrial development for the area must also bring about a change in the preparation of manpower that will be needed in the future.

The situation in the area also has an undesirable political implication: In the Galilee today there are 1,361 academica, with another 1,139 Arab students studying in the universities. Only a small portion of all of these are likely to find a position in their chosen field, even if they are prepared to relocate far from home. The employment supply for graduates in the sciences and technological professions is more or less limited. The large employment concentrations (like the defense establishment and Raf' al, for example) and high tech plants that work for the defense establishment are closed to them. Therefore some of them turn to instruction, and additional professional schools will create additional positions for them. With a lack of employment, the frustration increases and these educated youth find their way into nationalist political movements that vent their frustration into channels that are not desirable for the country.

"I invested an enormous amount of work into preparing the questionnaires and smoothing the way in the villages before we began the work itself," Raymond Jubran says. "I ran into other objective problems: the villages there is no awareness at all of statistics and reports. The protocols of local council sessions are set down by hand in notebooks, and I could not always learn from them what was needed. We ran into difficulty in a lack of trust as to our intentions—the villagers have been satiated with promises before elections that were never fulfilled afterwards. The idea of introducing computers to the authorities has not touched area villages—there is no awareness of the subject, there are no budgets, there is no manpower to take on these tasks and there is no compelling support for the matter, either among the local echelons or at the district level."
Raymond Jubran was born in 1948 while his parents were on a brief visit to Beirut. He spent his childhood and youth in Gush Halab. When he was growing up, his father sent him to study in a Jewish school—-in a high school in Safed—-and afterwards he served in the IDF, in the infantry.

In 1968 he left to study in the United States, having received a 5-year stipend at the University of Wisconsin, and completed his work there in business administration and sociology. His master's and doctorate were completed at the University of Los Angeles. At the end of 1981 he returned to his village in the Galilee. He taught for 2 years at the University of Haifa and in 1983 moved to industry where he was assistant to the chief accountant at the Urdan plant in Galilean Hazor. For a year and a half he was unemployed and devoted that time to writing a book in Arabic, not yet published, on the profession of business administration.

Accepted Goals and Objective Are Required

Uri Tahon believes that there are enormous unexploited resources in the Arab sector, and that a turnaround in approach is needed through full cooperation among the sectors and the gaining of Arab trust in order to bring about the utilization of these resources.

Many families have a lot of capital and are looking for investment channels—-whether in modern commerce or in the establishment of industrial plants. There is also high-quality scientific and academic manpower there which can and should be used (even from the national point of view) to the benefit of the entire economy.

According to Raymond Jubran: "Five factors will determine the success of efforts to push development of the Arab sector, both within the sector itself and in cooperation with our Jewish neighbors:

1. A clear policy outlining accepted goals and objectives.
2. The correct choice of the subject for development.
3. Assurance of support of the local and national governmental echelons and of large economic bodies such as banks, workers cooperatives, etc.
5. Readiness to use the available capital.

The report that was prepared points to these conditions and the possibility of meeting them. A large and comprehensive program such as "The Galilee Scientific Region--2000" would be capable of achieving those objectives. It is an established fact that to prepare manpower it will be necessary to establish quality professional schools in the Arab sector, which will require the support of appropriate bodies such as the 'Amal' or 'Ort' networks, and, of course, of the Ministry of Education."
It should be pointed out that the Katzir commission recommended the establishment, along with the comprehensive technological junior college in Karmiel, of a comprehensive-professional high school for the Arab sector near the village of Nahaf (opposite Karmiel), that would serve the villages of the entire Bet Kerem valley.

In the chapter of recommendations concluding the survey, Dr Gubran suggests opening the industrial parks going up in the Galilee (such as those around Kefar Havradim) to Arab and Druze venture capital, whether for independent plants or for partnership with Jewish investors. He recommends encouraging the establishment of modern commercial centers in the blocks of minority villages similar to those set up in the Jewish sector, and, at the same time, assisting the inhabitants and local authorities in setting up an infrastructure—highways, communication and the educational system. He also recommends including the Arab sector in programs for the development of tourism and summer resorts throughout the Galilee, and encouraging the establishment of rest and recreation villages, guest houses and other attractions in the Arab sector, using local capital and investors.
NEW TREASURY DEPARTMENT FORMED TO COMBAT BLACK MARKET

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 14 Jun 85 p 2

[Article by Amiram Fleisher: "Branch Headed by Tzorfati Will Fight Black Market"]

[Text] The Treasury Ministry is about to establish a new black market branch that will be subordinate to the country's revenue administration. The branch will apparently be headed by Avraham Tzorfati, who today serves as deputy director of income tax and is responsible for investigations.

Tzorfati, who headed the commission that dealt with the war on the black market, was mentioned as a candidate for the position of deputy director of income tax in place of Dov Neiger, who is departing. However this week he met with the treasury minister, Yitzhaq Moda'i, who stressed to him the great importance that the government ministers attribute to the war against the black market. Moda'i told Tzorfati of his intention to establish another branch in the country's revenue administration alongside the existing branches: the income tax and customs branches.

In preliminary discussions that took place this week, there was talk of transferring all the open and undercover investigative units, both from the income tax and the customs branch, to the new branch.

Avraham Tzorfati confirmed that discussions are underway for finding ways to fight the black market.

In the upper echelons of the Treasury Ministry support is growing for granting the new branch broad powers, and the position of whoever heads it will be parallel to that of the directors of customs and income tax.

9794
CSO: 4423/66
EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY PROJECT DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew 3 Jul 85 pp 44-45

[Article by Yo'el Ben Nun: "A Little Democracy, A Lot of Hypocrisy"]

[Text] The Ministry of Education and Culture distributed a special review by the director of the main topic for the coming years--education for democracy. Yo'el Bar Nun read the review with deep anxiety.

I read this document with a sense of fear for the future of Israeli society. I remained depressed.

Mr Navon and Mr Shemu'eli are proposing, according to what was written for them by some academics, to save "Israeli democracy" from its opponents through democratization of the public school and kindergarten classrooms. There is no reference in the pamphlet to the functioning of the government and the legislative and judicial establishments. There is no questioning as to whether a country is to be led by experts or by the people. Of course, there is also no such question about the army, the large industrial plants, the media, the parties, the religious institutions, etc. All of these, of course, are run by experts and capable "strong people." But education?! The public schools and kindergartens are institutions which have traditions, authority and discipline. Adults teach the young, who lack the ability to judge for themselves and to decide what is proper, good and desirable. But that is not too good according to the "experts on education for democracy." It has been some time since they have looked around to see what else could be done to undermine the authority of the teacher and principal and to persuade the students that they are the real leaders--that they should determine what is fitting to teach and impart to future generations (pp 5-8 in the pamphlet).

One might think that all the serious problems in the Knesset and the government and the judicial institutions were solved, and that our glorious democracy was being wickedly attacked in the public schools and kindergartens, because of the behavior of the teachers and principals.

The focus of our problems is in administration and not in Weltanschauung. There is no agreement and certainly no majority for "democracy in its deep inner meaning" (p 2 -- the words of the minister), which really means an aristocratic Weltanschauung. This is a renewed attempt at cultural compulsion
"in the name of the majority" (which has not been the majority for a long time), by granting the right to the minority (which has not been the minority for a long time) to express itself—but quietly.

The problem is not one of Weltanschauung: a democratic regime accommodates well to various groups with differing world views on one condition—the governmental establishment must function.

In the State of Israel since its beginning the democratic line has been rather limited. MAPAI took the executive authority and the Progressives the judicial authority, the one area about which MAPAI had an eastern inferiority complex vis-à-vis western Europe. Other groups (especially the orthodox) were left a few scraps and even those were with a constant complaint about "bribery and arm-twisting." That democracy means, first, the application of government force according to just law and not the use of law as a political tool and, second, sensitivity and consideration for the values of various minority groups—something that no one thought about.

It may be that, as a country that has been subjected to a 65-year war for survival, we had no choice. But then why pretend and argue that we have here a pure democracy which Kahane is conspiring against. At the most we could say that Israel is a democracy in its formative stages.

In recent years frustration at the systems of government has been increasing, and it is no accident that the forces of ferment, the relatively young, are expressing themselves outside the closed and whitewashed political party system that has no concept of what democracy is about. In recent weeks we have witnessed a current of complaint and despair. Now there is bigger trouble. All these years the IDF has succeeded in frustrating and paralyzing the attempts to attack us from without as well as breaking the back of organized terror. But Arab terror has moved to a new internal front and is now concentrated on our highways—not just in Judaea and Samaria but at the hitch-hiking stops. It began with stone throwing, now it is a matter of kidnaping and murder.

A government that acts as if this were a police-judicial problem but insists that it is fighting Arab terror because it catches the guilty, judges them and...afterwards makes them retroactively the subject of prisoner exchange negotiations...endangers both our government, with the little democracy that it has, and the basic rights of every traveler on the roads or in the air to move about without fear.

If the public is forced to choose between the two dangers, I am afraid that it will choose the first, because of lack of choice, and will bring a "law and order" administration to power.

If "democratic government" means to choose once every 4 years who it is that will travel the world at our expense (even this now has been limited to the two top guys), then the little democracy that we have had in recent years is likely to disappear. The public is moving to the right, and that cannot be changed via a profound Weltanschauung nor by democratization of the kindergarten.
The pamphlet also contains a philosophical morass. The first principle is the democratic-universal one and the second, the national-Jewish-Zionist and particularist. Here democracy does not work, so a collision is unavoidable.

Therefore a third principle is suggested (p 3 of the pamphlet):

"Preparation and training of the student to confront conflicting values. Such a confrontation is vital for autonomous mature choice, and even if it imposes upon the school and teacher the heavy burden of dealing with sensitive topics, it is preferable to avoiding or circumventing conflicts. Furthermore, within the framework of democratic pluralism the student is not required to relinquish his particular beliefs, preferences and values, except where they conflict with the humanist-democratic principle. After all, in a democratic society there is no prohibition against beliefs and opinions. However, in the event of conflict--the rights of the citizenry derive from the basic principles of democracy and democratic processes are to be decisive and one must act in accordance with them" (emphasis mine, Y.B.).

That is to say: the democratic principle is limited! Sometimes we are forced to act according to the national-Zionist interest. This is the opinion even of the experts on democracy, which is for them the highest value and which derives from "the attitude towards man as the focus of the social process." Who will decide and how will they decide when we cannot act according to the pure democratic process?

In Israel there are minimally democratic political processes, and the hypocrisy and pretense of "our educators" will only contribute further to persuading our youth that the truth is not their heritage.

Let us propose a somewhat different system of values: the democratic-universal principle will have to contend with the principle of preservation of tradition (every nation or group with its own tradition). A third principle will determine the method of choosing between them, and, among other things, the opinions of religious leaders will be taken into account in making that choice. Is this not at least as nice? And perhaps the principle of tradition is a little less egocentric and vulgar than the national-particular?

The height of absurdity is reached at the end of the pamphlet where they deal with Arab-Jewish encounters among youth who lack judgment and discrimination (which thus encourage mixed marriages) in a project for the blossoming of peace, in a citizen's rights club and in an academy in memory of Yig' al Alon. All of these are "non-aligned," "non-party," "democratic" bodies, in the words of the pamphlet (pp 43, 46-47). This clearly explains who has an entry card to the exclusive club that is "non-party," "non-movement," "non-aligned" and "impartial."

Every hour of instruction spent on this pamphlet will contribute new recruits to the ranks of Kahane and his followers because of the hypocrisy and stupidity that completely cover the good intentions. If there is anything that youth will not buy, it is hypocrisy.
Instead of confronting the dangers in such a non-serious manner, with lip-service to principles that have few adherents, deal with the real problems: the functioning of the government and the other national institutions, saving the Israeli economy and truly and decisively preventing terror, many of the perpetrators of which are running around scot-free with no one to disturb them.

The functioning of government also means that the president will not sign the wholesale release of mass murderers simply because the minister of justice says "there is no other way," and "the government has decided," that the Supreme Court will not determine when "the political consideration outweighs every other consideration" and also that the judicial advisor will not say that the suspension of due process without his signature is not invalid (it is not invalid but it is illegal).

To all of you who are "holding on to the horns of the altar" and to all who lack sensitivity and understanding--with your deeds and behavior you are hastening the end of the little bit of democracy that was built here with hard work, much suffering, complete honesty and deep faith. Please give us the opportunity to set it straight.

9794
CS0:4423/66
ARIEL SHARON ASSESSES LEBANON WAR

Historical Consensus

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 24 May 85 Weekend Supplement p 7

[Text] "Now, for the first time in the history of the Israeli people since 1948, a right-wing government has gone to war...From a friend of mine I heard it said recently: Let's tell the truth, many of the people have not reconciled themselves to the change. They have not accepted it for one day and that is where the trouble is" (Ha'im Guri, "Rules of the Game," DAVAR, 16 Jul 1982).

From every possible point of view the Peace for Galilee campaign was proper and no less justified than any of our other past wars--and in many respects, more so than most of them.

We need to explain how and why this campaign became the most slandered and derided of all our wars, not only to set the historical record straight, which is very important in itself, but primarily because the condemnation of the Peace for Galilee Campaign goes far beyond the specific question of the defense of the Galilee from the PLO in 1982.

From Security to Opportunism

June 1982 saw the harsh, de facto destruction of the traditional, agreed-upon national security understanding (or the historical Zionist consensus), which is the lynchpin of the existence of the State of Israel as the independent state of the Jewish people. Between the outbreak of the Peace for Galilee campaign and the slaughter at Sabra and Shatila and the completion of the PLO's withdrawal from Beirut--with its concomitant practical annihilation as a military and major Arab element that had been gaining strength at our expense in the international arena--something happened: the Zionist left, with the Labor party at its head, turned its back on this historical defense consensus and instead adopted the opposite and contradictory conception--in today's parlance it can quite properly be called "opportunism" [literally "nowism"]: peace--now, concessions--now, withdrawal--now, with no regard for the hard reality that we have been living and acting in for the last 100 years.

"Opportunism" means the leftist conception of the world--the non-Zionist left and the "mad fringe elements" of the Zionist left. A concept born of an
intellectual brew that has been fermenting among the Jewish left for a long time: a mixture of cosmopolitanism and communism with self-hatred so pronounced that it amounts to "Jewish anti-Semitism." The total denial and rejection of Jewish nationalism and active warfare in its demands along with blind partisanship for Arab nationalism. Total capitulation to the worst of its leaders and decisive hysterical support for all of its demands, to the point of de facto identification with it [Arab nationalism].

In the area of national defense, this opportunism means "anti-defense" in seeing a reliance on military strength for our existence as unethical "power politics." It would have us believe that non-independence without war is preferable to indendence, that peace, not secure Jewish independence, is "true Zionism."

The use of force, certainly the first use of force, is completely invalid: no national goal or purpose can justify the loss of lives on our side or the destruction of Arab lives by us, in warfare.

Before we examine how the left came to adopt this sick, alien doctrine, the embodiment of defeatism through the abandonment of the traditional security understanding or the consensus, we need to dispel the misleading clouds that surround this term "consensus."

The National Consensus Versus the Party Consensus

There are two totally different meanings to the terms "general agreement" or "consensus." The one gets down to substance and issues, to wit: what is a just war? When are we permitted or obligated to go to war? How should we plan and conduct it in the political and military spheres? From whom, when and how are we to look for decisions? To whom, when and how are we to render account? What is the proper relationship between the declared goals of war and the goals that develop during the conduct of war and its final accomplishments?

What is permissible and forbidden in the conduct of war, both on the military and political plane and what are we to do with the opportunities that are created for us—or that we can create—during the course of war? How are we to exploit the results of war and what use must we make of them? And so forth and so on in all these various matters.

That is to say, the first meaning of "consensus" is the sum of all the various norms that, on the one hand, guide our defense policy and conduct of war and, on the other hand, the criteria that enable us to judge every act of war, from all angles, and reach a judgment—-from the point of view of necessity and the contribution to the defense of the State of Israel's existence.

This is the "national consensus," the sum of Jewish-Zionist norms in the realm of national defense. It first blossomed more than a hundred years ago with the Jewish resettlement of the Land of Israel. It crystallized during the course of our wars since 1947, as we learned from them. Indeed, there is no official document that explicitly lists those norms one by one, but they are
all a clear and necessary outgrowth of our national defense efforts and our wars.

This is one meaning of "consensus." But, as we indicated, there is another meaning to "consensus." In this other meaning, totally separate and distinct, the essence of "consensus" is the agreement between the main Zionist parties. This consensus is organizational, ceremonial—"party consensus."

In the Peace for Galilee campaign the national consensus was neither violated nor broken because, from beginning to end—including the siege of Beirut and the deployment along the lines afterward—the campaign was planned and conducted in complete and unparalleled accord with the norms of the consensus.

What was broken in the Peace for Galilee campaign was only the technical, organizational party consensus. It did not break by itself, rather the Zionist left brought about the break by its decision to turn its back on the values of the national consensus and its adoption of opportunism in their stead.

This decision was not engendered by some sort of ideological coup in leftist ranks, but by a more prosaic and haphazard situation; because the Peace for Galilee campaign accorded perfectly with the national consensus (it fit the traditional Zionist security understanding) and embodied it completely, it was impossible to deride the campaign and condemn its leaders except at the price of the de facto renunciation and abandonment of the national consensus by adopting the norms of "opportunism."

The Left Betrays Itself

In so doing the left—and especially the Labor movement—betrayed itself: the traditional security understanding (which will be detailed in the next article, comparing the Peace for Galilee campaign to the previous wars) has, as we said, been firm for many long years. That is, it came into being in the period when the "labor movement" was in power and fashioned the national norms in all spheres, especially in everything having to do with defense.

The security understanding of the left became "agreed upon" or a "consensus" because it was in fact accepted and adopted by the nationalist camp as well—despite the fact that it basically embodies a very minimalist security outlook from the point of view of the Herut movement and its ideology.

Yig'gal Alon of blessed memory is held to be the outstanding formulator of the understanding, but in no way is it to be identified with his specific ideas such as the "Alon plan."

"Opportunism," in its various incarnations, has always been the patrimony of a minority that was vomited up outside the camp and despised by the Zionist left because of its contradiction of the Zionist effort, its defeatism and its effect in undermining our spirit and ability to stay the distance. After being squashed by Ben Gurion at the time of the War of Independence and subsequently, opportunism tried to raise its head at the time of the "War of the 1000 Days" (the official name of the War of Attrition). The cynical idea
of publishing the pictures of the fallen day after day—the number of dead between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War was 1,370—hurt our national morale more than any previous media exercise. But the government and the opposition jointly stopped this "bathing beauty" spirit.

Thus, in adopting opportunism, the Zionist left has been doubly treacherous to itself: It has abandoned the security concept of its own creation and instead has enslaved itself to those very norms that it previously fought against and decried as invalid and dangerous.

The reason for this turnabout is painful but simple: The Labor party (the historical MAPA) is—according to the testimony of its leading policy makers—a political and economic entity that was established to take power and hold it forever. Its leaders, functionaries and various components do not see themselves as able to exist for very long out of power. For a normal party, power is a desired situation, allowing it to realize the ideas which are the purpose for the establishment of the party and its existence. For MAPA and certainly for its organizations of today, power is a goal in and of itself, the highest goal, and being in power is not a means but a matter of life and death. For that kind of party the national interest is subordinate to the party interest and serves it, and its people and components are ready to manifest national responsibility—but only on the condition that they be in power.

The leadership and functionaries of the left discerned correctly that the way to power led through the Peace for Galilee campaign: To say that it was justified would institutionalize the Likud in power for a long time, and it was therefore vital for them that the campaign, as "Likud's War," terminate in failure, or at least that it be possible to denounce it as an unnecessary and unsuccessful war. As to whether they succeeded in doing that—the price of success was not just the blow suffered by Likud, but the mortal blow, more dangerous than any before, that was struck against the security of the State of Israel.

(Next week: the Peace for Galilee campaign compared to the previous wars)

Comparison to Previous Wars

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 31 May 85 Weekend Supplement pp 2, 7

[Text] In the Peace for Galilee Campaign the foundations of our security were undermined and cracked. The real damage is far more serious than we see or imagine.

Apparently, exactly the opposite should have happened. For the government came back, even if only in part, to its "rightful owners" and we are withdrawing from Lebanon in accordance with the plan of the Zionist left. In fact, without preconditions and with a maximum effort to dwarf the achievements of the Peace for Galilee Campaign, including semi-official declarations that the war ended as a victory for greater Syria.
Thus, as it were, the "accident" has been eliminated (the leftist term for the political upheaval of 1977) and "Likud's War" has gone down the drain. That is to say, the preconditions set by the left to launch its national and security campaign have been met.

Astounding, Frightening New Development

But in practice the process of erosion actually seems to be gaining strength: the Jewish public waits with a feeling of helplessness for what is again to be expected in the north. From people in the know it has been learned that the IDF is no longer capable and no longer intends to guarantee the citizenry more than "reasonable security," which is, as declared, "security" with Katyushas.

For it seems today that the IDF no longer can and no longer feels obligated to struggle alone against the terrorists, and the Jewish population must take upon itself a portion of the military burden and bear some of the losses. With the "elimination of the results of the Peace for Galilee Campaign," civilian settlements and traffic within Israel are again natural terrorist targets instead of the IDF positions and units in Lebanon.

This situation constitutes an amazing, frightening new development. The fact is that for the first time in our history we have initiated the retreat of the IDF in a way that is interpreted by friend and foe alike as an unconditional collapse. It has to do with the fact that the above-mentioned excuses are aired in public as proper norms upon which our national security will be based from here on out.

The Norms of Opportunism—Erosion of the Fundamentals

Everyone feels that their security world has collapsed: Those very reasons that now "require" total retreat, giving up even the minimum accomplishments of the Peace for Galilee Campaign—"no more Katyushas on Kiryat Shemoneh"—are exactly the ones which, prior to "Likud's War," were mouthed by those very same speakers as excuses to deepen and perpetuate the IDF holdings, at any price, in the captured "security space."

Where did this "no choice" come from as a categorical imperative? Until May 1977 this dangerous lunacy stood in complete contrast to the security concept that guided us until then and which guaranteed our independent Jewish national existence for a long period.

A Comparison With Previous Wars Is Vital

Looking at the Peace for Galilee Campaign from the viewpoint of the preceding wars, we find some of the principal reasons to be the following:

--The norms of the agreed upon Zionist security concept (the "consensus") resulting from past wars and embodied in them are the only ones that we can and must use as criteria to judge our wars from every angle. Certainly we would not consider for that purpose the false norms of opportunism, even though they are in vogue today.
--The real permanent advantage of the Zionist left in its struggles within the national movement has long been the combination of ability with a readiness (lacking on our side) to conduct brainwashing campaigns, with no restraint whatever, using phony propaganda and dependent upon media that are either controlled or purchased. The effort to instill opportunism into our heads makes use of a narrow, selective and false picture of our wars.

--It is therefore necessary to examine the Peace for Galilee Campaign in light of past wars for precisely those reasons that the Zionist left, with its followers who are always first to come forward, refrains from doing so. Here we shall have to make do with a few main points.

"No Choice"--a Stupid and Mortal Danger

In the spirit of opportunism, the leaders of the left have condemned the very essence of the Peace for Galilee campaign as "political" and "we have a choice." This is a strange innovation since it has long been accepted that war may only be conducted for political purpose, as in the words of Clausewitz: "War is a continuation of politics by other means."

What, in general, is a security objective? The concept of a security objective is very precisely defined: "only when there is a present danger to a settlement or a portion of it" (Shim'on Peres, HA'IR, 25 June 1982). Mr Peres also derived as a "national lesson" from Lebanon that we "must go to war when we have no choice and withdraw from the territories when we have a choice...whereas we entered when we had a choice and are leaving when we have no choice--exactly the opposite of what should have been and what was the case in the past" (BAMAHANE, 17 April 1985).

Since the prime minister did not summarize the positions of the government in this interview, I have the right and obligation to clarify things: First of all, it is not the Peace for Galilee campaign but these lessons derived by the prime minister that are the opposite of "what should be" and "what we have done in the past." Second, we never ever adopted the opportunistic norm of "no choice" and as long as there is a breath of life in us, we never will.

Only the Warsaw ghetto revolt was a "no choice" war, where they wanted to prove that Jews know how to die in battle. Such a war is impossible for those who control their own destiny since there is always the choice of submission. Thus in the War of Independence we are "guilty" of setting up a state right away despite Arab opposition. It was for that reason that the opportunists of those days sought to prevent the declaration of statehood. In their eyes peace was preferable to independence, and subjection, to war.

All of Our Wars Are 'Political' and Such That 'We Have A Choice'

The norm that we only fight 'political' wars (which are also wars in which 'we have a choice') was established as early as the War of Independence. David Ben Gurion defined it: "Until the first truce we were fighting for our lives. Afterwards we carried out mainly political actions through military means" (Diary of the War, 914).
Shim'on Peres himself expanded on this norm in his book: "What we fought about (in the Sinai campaign, 1956) and will continue to fight for was not a geographic but a political point—the right of free passage for Israeli shipping (through the straits of Elat)." Right at the end of the campaign Ben Gurion declared that we fought to establish the "third Kingdom of Israel." What could be more political?

Indeed, all our wars were "political," in which "we had a choice." Generally they were explicitly defined as such by those responsible for conducting them. The variety of objectives ranged from the creation of a "new order" in Egypt (the downfall of Nasser) to the prevention of a "new order" in Jordan—by way of claims of sovereignty over Sinai, the annexation of territories in the Land of Israel and the Golan and the securing of economic interests, and even the (correct) persistence in refusing to bow to pressure and withdraw without peace on our terms. This was how leftist governments themselves behaved in the pre-opportunism era.

After all: What "danger to a settlement or a portion thereof" were we trying to remove in the War of Independence, the conquest of the Negev, Elat, 'En Gedi or Nazareth? And what danger in conquering Sharm al-Shaykh (twice)? Or in the blood-soaked battles that lasted for years all along the Suez Canal? What settlement did Idi Amin threaten from Entebbe? And this is just one end of the list!

It is thus completely accurate to define the Peace for Galilee campaign as "political" and one in which "we had a choice" since, as in all our wars, this, too, was a carefully considered war, waged by a responsible government, according to logical principles and the requisite agreed upon Zionist security concept.

When Will We Go To War?

Yig'AL AlON, may he rest in peace, is generally acknowledged to be the formulator of the Zionist security consensus norms (which does not make his specific plans a part of the consensus!). In his book A Sand Curtain (1969) AlON stated, on the basis of his analysis of our wars and needs:

"There are four situations in which Israel may consider the necessity and correctness of crossing the cease-fire lines for a short sortie or for a longer stay.

A. In order to extinguish a small war, terror or sabotage carried out from bases across the cease-fire lines, which cannot be stopped by more limited means.

B. In order to aid potential allies in neighboring countries.

C. In the case of a threatening change in the status quo in a neighboring country.

D. And, of course, in the case of an offensive, or the concentration of enemy forces for an offensive."
Certainly every situation must be weighed cautiously and courageously according to the circumstances in the regional and global arenas."

The Peace for Galilee campaign is the only one which fits, to a greater or lesser degree, all of Alon's criteria. In all the preceding wars only one or two of the situations obtained, although with a higher degree of severity.

A Small Preemptive War Rather Than a Big One Later

Alon, of course, is talking about a "political" war in which "we have a choice"—which should also be a "preemptive war" (or a "preventive war"): "It is doubtful if any normal people in the world would be ready to permit the enemy, certainly in Israel's grave geographical circumstances, to take the initiative, even if it should thereby incur the censure of a significant portion of world public opinion." At times we must move months in advance (with a preventive counter-strike) and at other times only a few days will suffice...but we must strike first." "There is no greater folly than to allow the enemy to dictate the time and place of the occurrence, and certainly not the method" (The Sand Curtain, 1969--after the Six Day War--pp 74, 76, 348).

Mr Shim'on Peres, for example, as might be expected, went even further (HA'ARETZ, 28 Oct 1966): "The Sinai campaign was a substitute for a larger war later. It was a limited war instead of a general war." And what was the basis for it? "We had a lot of evidence and simple logic (1) to show that he (Nasser) intended to hit us." Those, according to Peres were sufficient reasons for going to war—and his argumentation is sound.

The 11 months prior to the Peace for Galilee campaign were a time of unprecedented consolidation and preparation by the PLO in the framework of a well-defined plan to initiate acts of violence at the time of its choosing with the aim of dragging the other Arab states into an all-out war with Israel.

However the Peace for Galilee campaign was also a "preemptive war," a substitute for a more general war later since, as we have indicated, it was a carefully considered war, in accordance with the consensus.

(Next week: the Peace for Galilee campaign--the objective and the balance of success and failure)

Achievements and Failures

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 7 Jun 85 Weekend Supplement pp 10, 26

[Text] In the previous article we showed that the Peace for Galilee campaign was a correct war dictated by reality, certainly in accordance with the agreed upon Zionist security concept which is the "national consensus." But the Peace for Galilee campaign not only fit the real consensus but was also completely and objectively justified from the point of view of international law.
According to Yitzhaq Rabin (in Newsweek, February 1983), "I believe that it (the invasion of Lebanon) had to happen sooner or later because the Israeli government could not permit a situation in which 200,000 of its citizens were hostage to the threats of the PLO in southern Lebanon".

In 1982 almost the entire leadership of the Labor party and even central figures in Mapam (who meanwhile paid for it with their careers)—considered the Peace for Galilee campaign justified, at least in its essential aspects, and some, completely, including the siege of Beirut.

In October 1982 the World Congress of Jewish Lawyers and Judges convened in New York, on the occasion of the presidency of former supreme court judge Ha'im Cohen. The newspaper HA'ARETZ (October 1982) reported that "the congress...emphasized that the Peace for Galilee campaign is anchored in paragraph 51 of the UN charter, which grants every state the right of self defense...The president of the organization...said that the Peace for Galilee campaign was in the nature of a defensive war as defined by the UN charter." These words came after the siege of Beirut and the Sabra and Shatila massacres. But who would recognize that view now? Had the congress decided the opposite, it would be loudly and ceaselessly quoted today.

The Objectives Were Well-Known and Publicized in Advance

The Peace for Galilee campaign was the first and only of our wars in which everyone knew the declared aims fully and precisely in advance. Everyone was clear about the possible objectives and the political and security advantages that we hoped to derive from it. Anyone who claims to have been "deceived" (and who is not a fool or completely cut off from the media and what is going on in Israel) is simply not telling the truth—whether he be a minister of opposition leader of the time, a man in the street or a reservist.

As a representative example we could quote Ha'im Bar-Lev himself: "I do not think that we have been led astray. At the start of the war the government did intend to push the terrorists 40 km from the border...Nevertheless there were plans for continuing the fighting, even including the conquest of Beirut and the installation of Bashir al-Jumayyil over Lebanon, the 'big plan'...We knew that it existed...At that time it was not their intention to implement it. What actually happened? The first objective of the Peace for Galilee campaign was achieved without any reaction from the United States and the USSR...the Syrians did not rush to the aid of the terrorists. Therefore Israel tried to achieve further objectives...but the first cease-fire, declared on Friday, 11 June did not go into effect because the terrorists arrogantly rejected it. Thus they "invited" the continuation of the war" (YEDI'OT AHARONOT, 23 Feb 1983).

The Peace for Galilee campaign had one unique and specific goal, "to remove all the settlements of the Galilee from the terrorists' firing range, from both their headquarters and their bases in southern Lebanon." Had the terrorists stopped the war and the firing after the first stage of the campaign, at which point the IDF stood 40 km below Beirut, the war would have ended at that point. The terrorists did not stop the war and explicitly rejected the cease-fire proposal.
In so doing, the terrorists confirmed the earlier appraisals that we could secure the Galilee from long-term danger only by destroying the "PLO state," i.e., by uprooting the terrorist infrastructure from all of southern Lebanon, including their positions in Beirut.

In everyone's opinion (including the left) we were obliged to force the terrorists 40 km back. But there was no question of our remaining on the 40 km line when to the north of us the PLO state still functioned, with the major portion of its power and infrastructure intact, and continued to fight an increasingly ferocious war of attrition. In this circumstance a one-sided withdrawal would also, rightly, have been perceived as a military, political and strategic defeat for us. The PLO position would have been given a big boost, in the eyes of the United States as well. Therefore our only reasonable alternative was to continue the advance until we destroyed the PLO state.

The War Against the Syrians

The war against the Syrian army was deliberately limited to the degree that was necessary for the annihilation of the terrorist threat. Therefore the IDF was stopped by the political echelon when it reached the 40 km line in the Lebanese al-Bīqa'. The advance on the central axis was intended at first to threaten the Syrians and thereby to try to get them to withdraw from al-Bīqa' without fighting. Afterwards we called for the "crawl" to the Beirut-Damascus highway, because cutting the highway was essential to cutting off Beirut, i.e. to the realization of the goal of eliminating the terrorists. We planned, and succeeded, in avoiding and preventing an all-out war with the Syrians.

The "crawl" toward the Beirut-Damascus highway was not the first of its type nor the hardest. Much harder and much more costly, for example, was the "crawl" to complete the encirclement of the 3rd Army during the Yom Kippur war, after the cease-fire declaration. This "crawl" was, indeed, fully justified, but cannot be compared in its degree of urgency for the security of Israel to the "crawl" of the Peace for Galilee campaign.

The "new order in Lebanon," or the achievement of a peace treaty, were not the goals for which the IDF was sent into Lebanon "to kill and be killed." A particular degree of stupidity or malice is needed to distinguish between "goal" and "means," even if it is defined as a desired goal. The achievement of peace, which was the constant goal until May 1977, suddenly became a false or unrealistic one. But was it really? In Labor's last election platform (the end of June 1984) its approach to the Lebanese question is set down as follows: "1. A Labor-led Israeli government would strive for the achievement of a peace treaty with Lebanon and her people, on the basis of the existing border between the two countries." That is to say, only when the Likud is in power is peace a "pipe dream"--according to its opponents.

We desired a peace treaty because it is the best possible "means of defense." Its achievement would have made it possible to withdraw the IDF immediately from Lebanon and assure the security of the northern border by the Lebanese government and armed forces.
The Achievement of the Peace for Galilee Campaign

With the removal of the terrorists from Beirut Israel put the cap on a strategic success of the same historic magnitude, importance and effect as that of the Six Day war.

--The PLO was eliminated as a major political and military element that had been increasing in strength (at Israel’s expense) in the international arena and certainly in the Arab world. Israel’s most bitter and determined enemy suffered a defeat from which it will not recover—unless Israel creates the conditions for its revival with her own hands. I do not mean here the "elimination of terror." After all, as long as there are just two young enemies and a hand-grenade, there is terror. However it is not this terror that constitutes the mortal danger to Israel, but the PLO. The defeat of the PLO engendered the most positive effect in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip as well as among the hostile elements within Israel’s own Arabs.

--The campaign for "defense areas" all along the border of "old" Israel was completed: In 1967 no shots were fired at us from Lebanon, and only for that reason were the Hashomer Hatzair kibbutzim in the north able to apply sufficient pressure to capture the Golan Heights, i.e., they were able to forget about Lebanon. It was only later that danger appeared from Lebanon—first from the terrorists and then, from 1976, from the Syrian army, and it became clear that our northern border was the most exposed.

--Our deployment deep into Lebanon and on the flank of the Damascus plain in effect destroyed the Syrians' ability to attack us in the Golan as well, that is, the essence of their ability to start a war with any chance of success.

--Israel's "preventive interdiction" jumped several stages ahead in one fell swoop (thus continuing from the annihilation of the Iraqi nuclear reactor): Israel proved that it will not shrink from implementing the traditional doctrine of "preventive warfare" (or, in the words of Mr Shim'on Peres—"a small war instead of an all-out war"—HA'ARETZ, 28 Oct 1966) and that when necessary it is ready to go all out—even to the point of capturing an Arab capital or an entire Arab country.

--Our real political and strategic situation—which depends on astute evaluations of circumstances and not on hostile media fashion—has improved immeasurably.

Eroding the Accomplishments

We all know and feel that all of these achievements have been greatly eroded, and there is no certainty that this continuing erosion has as yet been halted. The tragedy is that we did it with our own hands.

But the Peace for Galilee campaign did not fail. It was compromised. The responsibility for the erosion of our gains just as for the prolongation of the siege of Beirut and the unrest within the IDF lies squarely on the shoulders and conscience of the leaders of the Zionist left, their excesses, their propaganda and those who do their bidding.
We felt this "offensive" as early as the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. We know who those certain people were from the opposition at that time who, upon hearing of the success of the mission, went about with covered heads in mourning. In some instances they acted in such a way that could easily arouse suspicion of efforts intended to sabotage the mission. These things were only published after the fact.

After a short quiet spell at the onset of the Peace for Galilee campaign, the left (then in the opposition) began taking an increasingly greater part in protest activities that began with the initiatives of the "mad fringe elements." These demonstrations, prior to Sabra and Shatila, constituted Yasir 'Arafat's last ray of hope and thus contributed directly to his stubbornness and to the prolongation of the siege of Beirut. Because of them the siege hovered by a hair's breadth between success and failure, for which reason it is best to refrain from any evaluation of their supposed significance and result.

In the city squares and in the demonstrations--which drew upon the mighty organizational resources of the left--the latter sold their soul, little by little but quickly enough, to opportunism. In the name of "freedom of expression," the obligation of the opposition to criticize and its right to take power, the Israeli left was dragged into deeds that in practice caused very effective damage to the war effort. Some of these deeds were of the type that even in England, the mother of democracy, were termed "treason" during the Second World War.

In de facto cooperation with the unprecedented slander campaign of the world media, and dependent upon Israeli media that were controlled or bought, the Zionist left organized an unprecedented platform of brainwashing against its government and army. Apart from an open call to soldiers to refuse to fight, the left did everything possible to hurt their motivation and erode their belief in the righteousness of their deeds. The results were clearly felt in the field, and it does not matter whether this was the intent of the instigators.

The Single Decisive Difference--Who Is In Power

The erosion of the accomplishments of the Peace for Galilee campaign and the turning of its successes into failures were not required by objective reality. The terrible picture of difficulties painted by the new and old opportunists could not be more phony: The difficulties facing the IDF immediately after the end of the Six Day War, when it was trying to preserve its achievements, were incomparably greater and more severe than those it faced after the conclusion of the Peace for Galilee campaign and on the lines that were created.

But in 1967 it was the left that was in power and the Likud that formed the loyal opposition or the very loyal junior partner in the government. In 1982 the Likud was in power and the left was in opposition. This is the entire difference and the entire explanation. "Here," in the words of Ha'im Guri cited at the beginning of the article "is where the dog is buried".
All hope is not lost and it is still possible to guarantee peace in the Galilee and the security of Israel. But a clear recognition of the difficulties and their source is a necessary condition for correct, effective action in the future.

It must come quickly. We must stop running from our own shadow, stop eroding the fundamental from within. Above and beyond everything, we must correct the most serious and dangerous distortion of the Peace for Galilee campaign—we must return the Zionist left to its values, to its true security "Weltanschauung," to the "consensus."

9794
CSO: 4423/56
SHORTAGE OF ARABIC SPEAKERS IN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 6 Jun 85 p 13

[Article by Eli Tabor: "Hatred for Arabs Is Causing the Young to Hate Their Language As Well"]

[Text] Arabic expert Rahamim Raju'an says that the intelligence corps has developed a computer assisted instructional program in Arabic to train its regular army personnel quickly.

For the first time since independence there is a serious shortage of Arabic speakers among new IDF recruits, and the intelligence corps has been unsuccessful in locating Arabic speakers in sufficient quantities to satisfy its ongoing needs. This demographic fact was revealed yesterday for the first time by intelligence corps commanders on intelligence corps day.

Intelligence corps commanders yesterday noted that it was precisely at the time of IDF cuts that the importance of a high-level advance deterrence system has increased. "Every deterrence system is based mainly on a knowledge of Arabic, and a lack of speakers of Arabic will seriously affect the level of deterrence," they said.

Rahamim Raju'an, one of Israel's veteran Arabic teachers and a former lieutenant in the Iraqi army, who served as supervisor of the intelligence corp's Arabic language school and wrote over 40 Arabic textbooks for the IDF before he retired, said that, in contrast to the heightened awareness of the need for the study of Arabic that was felt in the Jewish community in Israel after the Six Day War and after the conclusion of the peace treaty with Egypt, awareness of the problem today is almost nil.

"The hatred of Arabs among the younger generation is bringing in its wake a hatred for the Arabic language", Raju'an said. "The number of Arabic speakers among the youth has been declining, and even those whose families come from Arab countries do not like to hear the language nowadays and are actually ashamed of it".

Because of the lack of speakers of Arabic and the need to train rapidly intelligence operatives who have had no connection with this language, the intelligence corps' training base has developed sophisticated methods of
computer assisted instruction. As far as is known these instructional programs, which focus primarily on the acquisition of military terms in Arabic and which have taken three and a half years to develop, are the first of their kind in the world.

9794
CSO: 4423/66
ENGLISH-LANGUAGE IDF JOURNAL DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 3 Jul 85 pp 34-35

[Article by Ruti Levi'av: "It Sounds Better in English"]

[Text] At first glance it looks like a rich bonbon: a journal chock full of pages and colors, intended to sell a nice image of the IDF abroad. The story of the IDF JOURNAL begins in 1982 as a pamphlet put out by one and a half crazy guys--and today is distributed in 10,000 eye-catching copies. The editor and founder feels that he need apologize to no one; he has a project in hand that not only pays for itself but even makes a small profit. How is it that it does not cost anything?

One hundred and twenty-four shiny colorful pages, snappy graphics, the smell of something made abroad from which you would only accidentally recognize familiar images; a rich colorful bonbon that falls naturally on foreign newsstands. In Israel, at least for now, it is to be purchased at exclusive news agencies--e.g., Steimatzky's at Ben Gurion airport on the way out of the country.

This creation is called the IDF JOURNAL. Any attempt to translate that into Hebrew is futile. A literal translation just does not have the catchy sound that it does in English. It does not go well with the smell of the paper and the giant color ads that hawk such well-known products as the aviation industry, Raf'al, the military industry and even "Libi", the serviceman's organization--in the sophisticated get-up of foreign advertising agencies. Did we already say that it has the smell of something made abroad?

The last issue of the IDF JOURNAL, brilliant and huge (general editor, IDF spokesman Brigadier General Ephra'im Lapid; editor-in-chief, Lt Colonel Yehuda Weinraub), is the envy of all military journals.

Lt Colonel Yehuda Weinraub, the editor-in-chief, gave me a disappointing answer to my question as to how much all that beauty costs the Israeli taxpayer and how much it cuts into the very tight defense budget. Weinraub's reply was that it does not cost anything at all!

We will come back to the question of the budget and why it does not cost anything. Meanwhile we will look at what we have in hand and how the IDF is
sold in a shiny, colorful wrapper. Anyone who knows the army from the inside will see this journal as a somewhat ornamental store window presenting the best of the season's fashions.

Even someone who looks closely will not find any hint of the ethnic gap, AWOL's or desertions, the fringe population, "small-headedness," traffic accidents. The daily problems that the army has to contend with are not currently documented in this journal.

Weinraub does not let this provocation get to him. He also does not accept the idea of "store window." He says it would be more accurate simply to say "window." Somewhat "positive," because we certainly put the emphasis on what is positive in the IDF and not on the negative, but we are not deaf to criticism, he says, and we do not insulate ourselves from unconventional problems and opinions.

He Promises Not To Sweep Things Under the Rug

The latest issue of the English language IDF JOURNAL includes, among other things, an interview with the commander of the air force, an article on Israeli pilotless drones, on women in the air force, on the air evacuation unit. Also published in it is the "Entebbe Diary," an account of the events of the action as documented by a reservist IDF spokesman (Louis Williams), an article on computers in the air force; Walter Cronkite interview of General Ehud Barak. Everything is impressive, fascinating and, of course, colorful. Yehuda Weinraub sees this periodical as the answer to military journals produced abroad. The goal, he says, is to show the uniqueness of the IDF, to provide up-to-date information about it and, even more important, to show that the IDF includes people who think.

On the first page of the journal there is an open invitation to anyone who considers himself a thinking individual to come and present his views. Weinraub wants to make the journal into a free forum for the exchange of ideas on the strategic situation in the Middle East, Israel's defense problems, the defense industries. The writers come from within the military senior command, academia and various other experts, including those from abroad.

I go back and press the issue of the amount of freedom given his writers. Underprivileged populations in the IDF, battle shock--topics considered sensitive and which, perhaps, do not show us too well abroad but which are human and taken straight from life. I remind him, for example, that the United States army has been struggling for many years with a serious drug problem. They write about it openly. They do not sweep it under the rug. Weinraub promises that he, too, will not sweep anything under the rug. An article on battle shock will appear in the next issue. There will also be a piece on the fringe populations serving in the IDF. He means articles with a research flavor, based on precise statistics, not on heart-throbs or moods.

The fact that the IDF has managed for many long years with internal Hebrew-language journals (BAMAHANE, SEQIRA HODSHIT, MA'ARKHOT) and only now, or, more precisely, 3 years ago found it proper to express itself in English so as to compete with similar journals of other armies, appears to be deliberate.
timing. Three years ago the IDF entered Lebanon and for the whole period of the war, but especially in the first days, Israel and the IDF suffered from the most hostile foreign press it has ever known. There was much talk about poor public relations; about closing information sources to foreign journalists; about the damage that this PR failure caused Israel and from which we still have not recovered.

It Began in Beirut

Yehuda Weinraub denies any direct connection between the birth of the journal and the bad press coverage abroad. Even if the journal had existed on the first day of the war, he says, he would not have been able to sway the press one way or the other. He does admit that the prohibition against foreign newsman entering the battle zone in the first week was a mistake. Had we allowed them to go along with our forces, they might have reported things through our eyes. By not allowing them to participate from our side, we did not prevent them entry to the area since it was provided by the other side, and the reporting was biased, from the enemy's point of view.

This war, says Weinraub (who served in it for a year as a representative of the IDF press office in Beirut), was a media war, a war of electronic communications, which played the lead role in it. Anyone trying to discover why our image was not what it should have been will find the answer in the mistakes that were made on all sides. The foreign journalists, when finally permitted entry from our side, photographed only the destruction. At times it was destruction from before the war, but they still photographed it. It may be that there was prejudice against us, it may be that the natural inclination of the world is to identify with the weak. I myself, he says, analyzed texts of the press coverage from the first month of the war and arrived at several very interesting results. For example, there was a very strong tendency on the part of foreign newsman to introduce their personal feelings into the straight facts, which turned the reporting from objective to subjective. In TIME and NEWSWEEK I found a regular tendency to use superlatives with associations of the Nazi conquest—"blitz" and "blitzkrieg," concepts which recurred again and again and tended to sway public opinion in a particular direction. Similarly there was imagery from the world of Christianity, which portrays the Jewish God as one of vengeance and retribution, of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.

One way or another, whether connected with the poor PR or not, an English-language IDF journal was born in the first months of the war, not as the result of any staff decision but because of one man's crazy persistence.

The Best Name

Weinraub: "I sat in Beirut and the idea occurred to me during that service of a professional level military journal comparable to that of many other countries. I brought the idea to the IDF spokesman at the time, Ya'akov Even, and we started the ball rolling. We began with nothing, me and another guy, one and a half crazy people, with no typewriter, no office, nothing. I worked at it in my free time in addition to my other duties. Slowly the thing began to come together. In September of 1982 we published the first issue in
stencil. It was a sort of emergency issue. Three months later, in December, we came out with the first printed issue.

They optimistically called that first printed issue journal number 2, volume 1. It contained 55 black and white pages devoted mostly to the Peace for Galilee campaign: analyses, evaluations, field reports. The pictures and some of the written material were borrowed from BAMAHANE in an English translation. Leafing through the first issue leaves no doubt that had it been published at the beginning of the war and had it reached the right hands, it would have prevented or at least moderated a portion of the foreign press poison.

On page 4 of that issue, for example, there is a shocking document from July 18, 1981, signed by Yasir 'Arafat. Its title: "Instructions for Shelling the City of Safed, the Northern Border Settlements and Other Targets in Israel." Quotation: "We must hit the enemy in his weak spot, and this enemy's weak spot is its civilian population... absorption centers for new immigrants are a convenient target of attack that we should try to hit...we should hit tourist spots during the summer vacation season...we must hit the markets and other public places in which many people gather, especially during holidays and vacations..." The document, one of many cited verbatim in that issue, was found in the possession of terrorists captured during the battles in Lebanon.

The first issue of the journal was sent as an experiment to various groups abroad in order to test their reaction. The response that Yehuda Weinraub received brought in its wake issue number 3 and those that followed afterward. The transition from black and white to color was rapid and business-like. The first issues borrowed color photos from BAMAHANE, without a single commercial advertisement. How much that cost then, 2 or 3 years ago, they have already forgotten. Today huge ads finance the cost of the journal, the paper, printing and production. Apart from the defense industries, Libi, the servicemen's organization, and Raf'al, all of Israel's civilian support industries promote themselves in the IDF Journal--firms dealing in computers, optics and electronics. Most of them transferred a large part of their advertising budget, formerly spent on advertising in foreign military journals, to the IDF JOURNAL. The value of that shift is easy to gauge: the IDF JOURNAL is distributed, in the case of current issue, in 10,000 copies, to congressmen, newsman, government officials, senior staffs of foreign armies, decision makers and molders of public opinion the world over. Distribution is handled through military attaches and foreign embassies.

At the Paris air show the journal is distributed gratis and is snatched up there like fresh rolls. The free distribution is a long-range investment. The income at this stage is mainly from the ads, but a subscription system is already under development. In one of the recent issues there was an insert offering a year's subscription for $12, shipping charges included. There were responses and, more importantly, comments that the respondents sent back with the insert.

Caught Up in Madness

The editor of DEFENSE, a very prestigious military magazine, writes: "An important journal, very valuable...interesting articles, good photography."
WORLD UNION PRESS of the United Nations writes: "Highly recommended, a valuable magazine, eye-opening, honest, balanced, superb editing." "From the very first issue I have enjoyed the professional approach by which the IDF is presented to the world," writes the editor-in-chief of JOURNAL OF DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY.

The IDF JOURNAL already has mutual agreements with 15 foreign military journals including the American ARM Forces, the British DEFENSE, the Italian REVISTA ITALIANA DELLA DEFENSA, the Swiss REVUE MILITAIRE SUISSE and many more. According to these agreements each side may quote or publish in its entirety any material appearing in the other side, without special permission or the payment of royalties. Weinraub prefers, of course, to be quoted by the competition rather than the other way around. Recently the American DEFENSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS published the full text of an article on the Merkava tank as it appeared in the IDF JOURNAL. He is very proud as he pulls the copy from the book shelf and shows it to me. Selections from the "Entebbe Journal" that appeared in the last issue were quoted in the daily press abroad.

Weinraub knows that there are people who are "looking for him," hoping to hear that all this costs the IDF an arm and a leg. Without taking pleasure at their discomfort, he announces that up until now he has had no budget and no billets apart from one female clerk and himself. His own billet cannot be considered since he continues to fulfill his other duties in the IDF spokesman's unit.

Lt Colonel Yehuda Weinraub is in fact a new immigrant. He came to Israel only 14 years ago from the United States with degrees in political science, French literature and linguistics from the Universities of Cornell and Paris.

Both in Israel and abroad he has managed to teach in academic institutions. It was a short trip from there to the IDF spokesman's unit. As part of his reserve training he was sent to an officer's course and was ultimately asked to sign up for permanent duty. The proposal sounded interesting and so he wound up in uniform at a relatively advanced age. He stayed in Beirut for a year, was abroad as an emissary of the Foreign Ministry for a short time, returned and got caught up in this madness of an English-language IDF JOURNAL.

He Does Not Owe Anyone

He has no budget for writers and does not need them. They do not pay anyone, he says firmly, certainly not the IDF officers who express their opinions and not the reservists in the IDF spokesman's unit, who do that as part of their reserve service. And academia? They write for free. They are happy to write for us, Weinraub says, because they are aware that the material reaches the hands of senators, senators' aides, generals in foreign armies, VIP's.

The translation of the articles, set-up of the material for printing and the distribution of the write-ups are done by a small staff of men and women soldiers, new immigrants, speakers of foreign languages (French and English), who are in service for relatively short periods, with high levels of education, occasionally with a background in journalism and who generally do not fit in very well in the army. For me it solved a problem of manpower and
for them it provides a challenge and the opportunity to put their intelligence to good use. Of course there is also a Zionist element here—for those of them who have gone through real soul-searching as to their place and future in Israel, this service certainly contributes to their decision to remain.

The contribution of these soldiers occasionally comes from an unexpected direction. For example, one man who found his way to Weinraub nearly had a master's in marketing. He took up the task of marketing the journal, at his own initiative made contacts with marketing firms and is today responsible for most of the commercial ads that finance the journal.

The 10,000 copies of the last issue cost $25,000. The price of the journal in the few places where it is sold is $7, but most of the income derives from the ads, which not only cover the expenses but even turn a small profit, which is plowed back into production.

Weinraub is proud of the fact that his journal is no burden to the IDF budget. He does not have to apologize to anyone. He has in hand a project that not only benefits IDF PR abroad but also pays for itself and even makes a small profit.

In one of the upcoming issues the journal will host journalists in a symposium on the function of the press in wartime. Weinraub knows in advance that they will be very critical, that they will have something to say about the last war. That does not frighten him. The forum will be free. Everyone is responsible for what he writes. It is true that much in his journal emphasizes the positive in the IDF. So what? Can anyone say that the IDF is not unique in having a youth corps, women in special assignments and youth rehabilitation? All of this exists and is true and is uncharacteristic of any other army apart from our own. This is what we want to emphasize and we do not have to invent it for the benefit of public relations. It is simply a part of the army and the world should know about it. Is there anything wrong in that?

9794
CSO: 4423/58
SOVIETS LAUNCH SEARCH, DESTROY MISSIONS IN KABUL

Tehran Kayhan International in English 15 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] NEW DELHI, Aug. 14 (Dispatches) — Soviet forces launched search and destroy missions around Kabul to destroy Mujahideen positions, who fired rockets and machine guns in a fierce attack on the Afghan capital, western diplomats said Tuesday.

Islamic freedom fighters killed as many as 21 Afghan government troops in rocket attacks on Kabul and more than 15 soldiers in convoy ambushes north of the city, the diplomats said.

In the strategic Shomali Valley just north of the capital which controls Kabul's supply line from the Soviet Union, there have been "persistent skirmishes" between the Mujahideen and government forces in the last week, the diplomats said.

On Aug. 9 the Islamic freedom fighters hit two Afghan tanks close to Karizemir, the diplomat said. "Several soldiers are known to have been killed in the incident, they said.

Two days earlier, Mujahideen attacked a convoy at Charikar, destroying many trucks and killing 15 soldiers, the diplomats said.

The Mujahideen assaults have caused the Kabul government "deep concern," one diplomat said. Security in the capital has been "visibly greatly tightened," he said.

The diplomats said more nervous-looking Afghan troops, many with field packs and extra ammunition loads, have started patrolling the streets.

Soviet armored vehicles have started to take up positions round key government and military installations well before the curfew at 10 p.m., the diplomats said.

Also in Kabul, Afghan citizens began voting on Aug. 11 in elections for local councils, the diplomats said. The candidates, one for each seat, were introduced to voters gathered in open areas and elected by a show of hands, the diplomats said.

Observers in Kabul were "taken aback by the utter absence of the normal voting process," one diplomat said. "The whole process seemed to underline the Kabul regime's retreat from reality," she said.
Raid on Labor Camp

Another report from London said the Mujahideen have released dozens of persons from a labor camp in Qandahar City while injuring two guards. The report added that the Karmal regime is indulging in putting those people who are suspected to be companions of the Mujahideen in forced labor camps.

The Mujahideen attacked the camp in Qandahar on Aug. 3, where dozens of people were engaged in forced labor in the presence of armed guards. Two guards were injured.

Afterwards, the Soviet troops started a search in the suburban areas but it was also frustrated after a sharp reaction from the masses.

In related news, the report said Afghan Mujahideen killed or injured 40 Soviet-Karmal troops and destroyed three tanks during an attack on a military column in Farah Rud area of Bala Bulok subdivision in Farah Province on July 29.
HEAVY FIGHTING BREAKS OUT IN PAKTIA

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 28 August 85 p 1

[Text] NEW DELHI, Aug. 27 (Dispatches) — Soviet forces backed by tanks and helicopters launched a massive assault on the Mujahideen besieging a town in eastern Afghanistan near the Pakistan border, a western diplomat said Monday.

The town of Khost, 22 miles (35 km) from the Pakistan border in Paktia Province, has been under siege by Islamic fighters for the last year, despite efforts by Afghan government troops in the city to resist them with mines and artillery fire.

"Heavy fighting broke out between the Mujahideen and Soviet forces in the border area of Paktia involving tanks and helicopters," the western diplomat told reporters on condition she not be named.

The diplomat said details of the attack which began last week were unclear. "But the fighting continues at a high level," she said.

The diplomat said one source saw a column of 200 Soviet armored vehicles leaving Kabul for the Khost area.

"No Afghan forces were included in the column," the diplomat said.

However, the diplomat could not say whether Afghan troops had been excluded entirely from the Khost offensive. Most large scale ground attacks include both Soviet and Afghan government forces, but diplomats say the Soviets sometimes exclude government troops to prevent intelligence leaks.

In June, a Soviet division spearheaded by 4,000 special forces launched a similar operation to end a Mujahideen siege of the town of Barikot in Kunar Province, also close to the Pakistan border.

Massoud Offered Cease-Fire

In the Panjsher Valley, which controls the vital Salang Road from the Soviet Union to Kabul, the Mujahideen are still active despite heavy fighting with Soviet-Afghan forces in July, the diplomat said.

"A column of Soviet armored vehicles including some self-propelled howitzers were seen entering the Panjsher Valley on Aug. 19," the diplomat said.
The diplomat quoted one unconfirmed report saying the Mujahideen from the Panjsher Valley in a recent raid on Kabul walked past an Afghan military post and told the soldiers to keep quiet until they completed their operation.

She said the Afghan soldiers obeyed the Mujahideen who fired rockets unhindered at the headquarters of the Afghan army's 8th division headquarters in the western suburbs of Kabul.

The Soviets have offered a cease-fire to Ahmad Shah Massoud, chief of the Panjsher Valley Mujahideen, but Massoud has not yet responded, the diplomat said.

Diplomatic reports are difficult to verify since western journalists have been barred from Afghanistan since Soviet forces invaded in 1979 to install President Babrak Karmal's government.

Diplomats estimate as many as 115,000 Soviet troops are now deployed in the country.
OBADUR RAHMAN, KHALED ZIA REMARKS REPORTED

Rahman at Airport, Zia at Meeting

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 12 Aug 85 pp 1, 8

[Article by Hasanuzzaman Khan]

[Text] BNP leader K. M. Obaidur Rahman was heartily received at the Dhaka airport by enthusiastic party workers on his return yesterday noon from Sylhet where he was detained for organising resistance against upazila election in May last.

S. A. Bari AT, Atauddin Khan and Farida Rahman were among the BNP leaders present at the airport to receive him.

While talking to this correspondent, Mr Obaidur Rahman said, he was still with BNP and his loyalty to Party Chief Khaleda Zia was hundred percent. When asked whether he had met Khaleda Zia after his return from Sylhet, the BNP leader said, not yet. But, he added, he talked to her over telephone. He did not have any conversation with her on politics. They exchanged greetings only, he said.

Khaleda Zia held her usual informal political gathering at the residence of Mirza Gholam Hafiz yesterday too. The arrival of Obaidur Rahman was widely expected there. At one stage, there was an intimation from a party worker that Obaidur Rahman was coming there. Khaleda Zia waited till 10 last night at the residence of Mirza Gholam Hafiz but Obaidur Rahman did not turn up there.

Addressing the party workers gathering yesterday the BNP chief rejected outright reports that the BNP has been undergoing policy and structural changes. She said the party had made no policy shift, so far and it still remained what it was during the time of its founder late Ziaur Rahman. She said, our policy was nationalistic in nature. There was no question of abandoning the party's anti-Soviet and anti-Indian posture if it proved vital for survival of our nation, Khaleda Zia said adding the anti-Soviet and anti-Indian forces were hardcore BNP supporters. There was a conspiracy to divert the support of that forces to a particular quarter, she said.
Turning to the law and order, the BNP chairman said, the women were falling victims to the prevailing situation and nothing had been done to remedy this.

Knowledgeable circles opine that the release of Awami League leader Tofael Ahmed and Obaidur Rahman is a positive indication that indoor politics is coming very soon and a source well-connected with the government circles predicted it may be allowed before President Ershad begins his haj pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. The president is scheduled to leave for Saudi Arabia on 20 August.

Meanwhile, the composition of the proposed pro-government front was almost complete with formal participation of Janadal, BNP (Shah), Muslim League, UPP and Ganatantric Party.

The knowledgeable circles further said the launching of the front and allowing open politics were two sides of the same coin at least to the present government and it was not ready to accomplish one without the other.

The BNP high command, meanwhile, had stepped up surveillance over the possible defectors and a source close to the party chairman said they will not let the party be eaten up by the vested quarters using the slogan of Bangladeshi Nationalism.

It is now widely believed that there will be two political forces in the country—one is of Bangladeshi nationalism and another professing Bangalee nationalism. There is an attempt by powerful quarters to amalgamate all forces believing in Bangladeshi nationalism into one single party.

Rahman Support for BNP

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 13 Aug 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] BNP leader K. M. Obaidur Rahman yesterday met Begum Khaleda Zia, his party chief, at the residence of Mirza Gholam Hafiz where he reiterated full support to the programme of the party. Mirza Gholam Hafiz and Barrister Rafiqul Islam were, among other party leaders who were present on the occasion.

Obaidur Rahman later talking to this correspondent lastnight dispelled the rumour about him that he might quit the party. He said, the "BNP is his passion and he will uphold the banner of the party at any cost." The defection of opportunist elements had rather strengthened the party, he said.

The BNP leader denied that any emissary of the government had met him in the Sylhet Jail. He said, he was out of touch of politics during the three-month captivity and he had only link with his family.

CSO: 4600/1874
SEVEN-PARTY ALLIANCE SAID TO RECAST POLICY

Dhaka HOLIDAY in English 9 Aug 85 p 1

[Article by Kazi Montu]

[Excerpt] The seven-party combine has decided to abandon its "anti-Soviet and anti-Indian politics" and oppose any move to corner the Awami League since, it considers its foremost task is to free the nation from the yoke of military rule.

This decision came after discussions of the combine leaders on Wednesday. Those who participated were: Begum Khaleda Zia, Farida Rahman, Majedul-Huq and Ferdous Qureshi of BNP, Tipu Biswas of Biplobi Communist League, Shamsul Arefin of UPP, Abu Zafar Chowdhury of NAP (Ali Ashraf) and Abdur Rouf Chowdury of his faction of Democratic League. Five of the seven components were represented in these discussions.

They resolved that the expulsion of UPP Chairman Kazi Zafar Ahmed and Ganatantrik Party chief Sirajul Hossain Khan from the combine was automatic since they had joined the cabinet of President Ershad by "betraying the five-point demand and drifting away from the politics and programme of the combine."

A segment of the UPP led by its vice chairman, Shamsul Arefin, has severed its connection with Kazi Zafar Ahmed and the supporters who have joined hands with the military government to launch a political front with the Janadal in the centre. The Ganatantrik Party was not represented in the discussions.

The seven-party combine has resolved to determine its politics and rapport with other organisations on the basis of "fraternity with all democratic parties opposed to the military junta."

Meanwhile, the question of expanding the combine, which has been reduced from six components to five, was also discussed. It is learned that Jatiya League of Ameena Begum, Ganatantrik Karmi Shibir of Nurul Islam Chowdhury, Jagga of Shafiul Alam Prodhan, Oli Ahadled faction of Democratic League and Garib Newaz-led People's League have expressed their willingness to join the seven-party combine.

But a consensus exists in the combine that for the time being it will not go for expansion in order to check "intrusion by any agent of the power structure."
INDIA ASKED TO CLARIFY HOME MINISTER’S STATEMENT

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 11 Aug 85 pp 1, 8

[Text]

Bangladesh has already made its point of view “amply clear” to India opposing the latter’s controversial move of erecting barbed wire fence along her border with Bangladesh.

A spokesman of the Foreign Ministry said this yesterday when this correspondent drew his attention to the reported statement of Indian Home Minister S.B. Chavan at Gauhati on Friday on the controversial issue.

“We have made our point of view regarding India’s proposal of erecting barbed wire fence amply clear to the Indian authority,” the spokesman said.

According to the press report, the Indian Home Minister, at a press conference at Gauhati on Friday, had said a parallel road would also be constructed along the proposed barbed wire fencing to keep constant vigil on the border.

The Bangladesh government is learnt to have sought clarification from the Indian government on the statement of the Indian Home Minister through the Indian High Commissioner in Dhaka. A reply in this regard is expected from Delhi within a couple of days.

The spokesman said “it is not proper” the way the press report quoted a spokesman of the Indian External Affairs Ministry put the two issues together the sharing of the Ganges waters and India’s proposal of erecting the border fence as discussed by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s special envoy during his Dhaka visit recently.

Mr. Shiv Shankar, as special envoy of the Indian Prime Minister had discussed all the bilateral issues with the Bangladesh leaders giving more emphasis on the vital issue of sharing the Ganges waters between the two neighbouring countries.

Press Trust of India (PTI) earlier reported from Delhi on August 3 saying that Mr. Shiv Shankar had submitted his report to the Indian Prime Minister on “the talks he had with the Bangladesh President Lt Gen H M Ershad on important bilateral issues including the disputes over sharing of Ganga water and fencing of the border between the two countries.”

The Indian Prime Minister’s special envoy himself admitted to newsmen in Dhaka before his departure for Delhi that the controversial barbed wire fencing issue would be discussed when his attention was drawn to Mr. Chavan’s statement in Indian parliament on the issue.

During the visit of Mr. Shiv Shankar to Dhaka, all important bilateral issues were discussed and the important bilateral issues that still remain unresolved are the sharing of the Ganges waters, implementation of the 1974 Indo-Bangladesh land boundary agreement along with the handing over of Tin Bigha corridor following another agreement signed during the summit in October, 1982: ownership dispute over South Talpatti island and maritime boundary between the two countries.

So far as India’s proposal of erecting barbed wire fence along her border with Bangladesh is concerned, no less a person than President Ershad himself had lodged protest through a public statement immediately after the issue came up long ago. Later, the government also made its point of view absolutely clear to the Indian government regarding the fencing issue.
MINISTRY REPORTS ON FOREIGN AID RECEIVED

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 13 Aug 85 pp 1, 8

[Article by Syed Badjuzzaman]

[Text]

The country received commitment of foreign aid totalling 15,797.8 million US dollars while the actual disbursement stood at 11,438.6 million dollars upto June 30 last year since independence.

According to a just-published report of the External Resources Division of the Ministry of Finance, the aid commitment included 4,096.8 million dollars as food aid, 5,037.3 million dollars as commodity aid and 7,623.7 million dollars as project aid.

The report on “the flow of external resources into Bangladesh” (as of June 30, 1984) said the total disbursement included food aid of 3,046.3 million dollars, commodity aid of 4,411.6 million dollars and project aid worth 3,920.7 million dollars.

The rates of disbursement of food and commodity aid which have been described “unsatisfactory” were 98 per cent and 89 per cent respectively over total availability while that of the project aid lagged behind with only 31 per cent of the commitment.

A project cycle may extend to over five to seven years but the project aid is usually committed for all the expenditure in one go, the annual report on the upto date position of foreign aid said adding, as a result project aid pipeline grows large and disbursement fails.

Country’s heavy dependence on food aid is still continuing due to a gap between production and requirement caused by growing population as well as frequent natural calamities and unfavourable weather conditions. Food aid which constitutes about 19.6 per cent of the total quantum of foreign aid to Bangladesh is therefore a critical item in her import programme, the report noted.

The commodity aid is another critical element in the total aid package for the country. Bangladesh has been suffering from chronic balance of payment difficulties since independence. Commodity aid extended by the donors is used as a support to meet the balance of payment gap and also for local currency generation for financing development projects. Without a substantial increase in commodity aid disbursement, it is difficult to sustain a liberal import policy.

The level of commitment of commodity aid has been fluctuating. It may be pointed out for instance that from a commitment of about 600 million dollars in 1978-79, it came down to 285 million dollars in 1979-80, which somewhat improved to about 428.2 million dollars in 1983-84. Presently commodity aid is available in tied, untied and partially untied forms.

However, the report said the developing countries need untied aid particularly commodity assistance as much as possible.

The report mentioned that despite measures taken for accelerating project implementation by the government, disbursement rate has been lagging behind or at best improving slowly and said “donors’” conditionalities, tied nature of aid and occasional lack of adequate local currency support, among other factors, have contributed to slow disbursement of project aid”. It, however, said the situation could be vastly improved even in the short run by improving the terms of aid.
DELHI REPORTS ON GANGES ACCORD CALLED 'SPECULATIVE'

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 11 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] The Foreign Office spokesman on Saturday declined to comment on New Delhi Press reports which claimed India and Bangladesh had worked out an agreement on sharing the Ganges waters saying, "It's a speculative news item."

"If and when an agreement is reached," the spokesman said here Saturday "we will naturally let everyone know."

"It's not to our knowledge," an official told BSS.

Press reports in Delhi on Thursday had claimed the two countries worked out a broad outline of an agreement on sharing the Ganges during Indian Prime Minister's Special Envoy Shiv Shankar's visit to Dhaka last week.

The reports also said the details of the agreement would be worked out by the officials of the two sides later.

A New Delhi report adds: Press reports here Friday claimed that India has proposed a broad outline of an agreement on the sharing of the Ganges waters.

This includes formula for augmenting the lean season flow of the Ganges at Farakka news agency UNI said quoting authoritative sources. It added that the outline was worked out during Indian Prime Minister's Special Envoy Mr Shiv Shankar's recent visit to Dhaka.

Mr Shankar on return had submitted a report to Mr Rajiv Gandhi on his talks in Dhaka with President Ershad and other Bangladesh leaders.

According to the agency, details of the agreement "are being worked out by officials of the two countries who would soon hold their final meeting."

The Prime Minister's Special Envoy on his way back from Dhaka reportedly told newsmen in Calcutta that a Bangladesh delegation will be in Delhi soon in as a follow-up of his mission.
Meanwhile, a noted Indian columnist Mr Inder Malhotra has referred to Mr Shankar's Dhaka talks and hinted that "a three-point new and promising approach" on augmentation of the Ganges waters has now been suggested by India.

Water Law Experts

In an article "Briefing the Neighbours" published on Thursday in THE TIMES OF INDIA here, Mr Malhotra made a comparison on Pakistan Foreign Secretary's visit to Delhi and the special envoy's mission to Bangladesh last week and said as for Mr Shiv Shankar's talks in Dhaka "the outlook seems far more encouraging than can be said of the Indo-Pakistan dialogue as it stands today."

In the first place he said, India had offered to extend the existing arrangements for the sharing of the Ganges waters for five years at a stretch rather than from year to year as was being done since the 1977 accord's expiry.

The three-point "new and promising" approach as suggested by India according to Mr Malhotra, is first that the entire eastern river basin--consisting of the Ganges Brahmputra and Meghna--should be treated as one. Second, while trying to solve the problem the two sides should act as if the area concerned was one entity even though it is undoubtedly divided into two sovereign states. And, third, instead of each side producing a proposal that the other rejects, the problem of augmentation be remitted to Indian and Bangladeshi experts with the mandate that they should produce a joint scheme.

CSO: 4600/1872
MOROCCAN ENVOY TELLS OF MEETING WITH ERSHAD

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 10 Aug 85 pp 1, 8

[Text]

Moroccan special envoy Mohamed Benaisa yesterday expressed the hope that "something very constructive would come out of his visit to Bangladesh."

The special envoy of King Hassan II, talking to BSS before his departure for Sri Lanka said he handed over to President and CMLA Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad yesterday morning a message from the monarch containing the latter’s view on a number of issues including the Sahara situation.

Mr Benaisa, who is Minister of Culture of Morocco, said he also apprised the President of the issues of the King of Morocco to solve the problem.

On arrival here yesterday after visiting Pakistan and India on similar missions, Mr Benaisa said Morocco "genuinely wants" to avoid confrontation with Algeria on the Sahara question.

Algerian President Chadli Benjedd’s special envoy Mohammed Benahmed Abdelghani visited Dhaka last month to convey a message to the Bangladesh President.

The Moroccan envoy said President Ershad had "very constructive position" on all the issues discussed.

"I leave with the feeling that something very positive will come out of this meeting," he said.

The Moroccan envoy expressed his country’s optimism about a peaceful solution to the Sahara situation through a referendum under U.N. supervision which he thought could facilitate and enlarge the scope for Afro-Arab Union for Regional Cooperation among the Maghreb countries—Morocco, Mauritanian, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.

"That's why we give priority to a peaceful solution to the Sahara situation," he said.

Mr Benaisa said, "we feel that Bangladesh, as an active member of the OIC, can contribute to peaceful solution of the problem."

He said that during his meeting with the President he also briefed him about the views of King Hassan on various issues likely to come up before the forthcoming Non-aligned Foreign Ministers’ meeting.

He also conveyed to the President King Hassan’s desire for further strengthening of bilateral relations between Morocco and Bangladesh. He said Morocco will open its resident mission in Dhaka by next year.

The Foreign Secretary, Mr Farooq Ahmed Chowdhury was present on the occasion.

Earlier, the Foreign Secretary called on the Moroccan special envoy at the State Guest House and had detailed discussion on bilateral matters.

Deputy Minister for Education Ziauddin Ahmed Bablu saw him off at the Zia International Airport.

CSO: 4600/1871
BANGLADESH, BURMA AUTHENTICATE BORDER MAPS

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 13 Aug 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] Bangladesh and Burma yesterday authenticated maps, prepared jointly by the two survey departments, demarcating their 123 mile (196.8 kms) common land boundary, Foreign Office sources said.

The sources told BSS that Bangladesh ambassador to Rangoon Mustafizur Rahman and Burmese Foreign Ministry Director General Thein Han signed the maps in Rangoon on behalf of their governments.

The signing of the maps, the sources said, meant the completion of the demarcation of the common land boundary stretching from the northern end of the river Naaf to the tri-junction of Bangladesh-India-Burma boundaries.

Actual demarcation work and preparation of the strip maps were taken up under the land boundary demarcation agreement signed by Bangladesh and Burma on 23 May 1979.

In all 53 boundary pillars were set up to demarcate the common boundary.

The strip maps show all the pillars, as well as, the pillar to pillar boundary alignments on a 1 : 50,000 scale.

The maps were prepared both in Dhaka and Rangoon by photo-grammetric method.

The demarcation through extremely difficult terrains and dense forests in unfavourable climatic conditions was done with "mutual understanding" demonstrating a high sense of cooperation, responsibility and courage by the surveyors of the two countries, the sources said.

Praising the work they said the demarcation was completed on schedule.

CSO: 4600/1874
NONPARTICIPATION IN MOSCOW YOUTH MEET EXAMINED

Soviet Representative's Remarks

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 9 Aug 85 p 8

[Text] The chief of the Soviet Press Information Department in Bangladesh, Mr. A. N. Pleshkov on Thursday regretted the non-participation of Bangladesh youth in the just concluded 12 International Student-Youth Festival in Moscow.

Speaking at a briefing on the Youth Festival Mr Pleshkov told newsmen at USSR PID that the assembly of youths numbering over 20,000 from 157 countries was a success, Mr Pleshkov said that it was organized by the international and national committees of youths in respective countries. The Soviet Government did not organize it officially and there was no invitation to the Bangladesh Government about the conference.

Mr Pleshkov outlining various aspects of the eight-day festival from 27 July said that a 300-strong delegation from the United States participated in it along with groups from West Germany, Italy and other western nations. Youths freely discussed the problems they are facing today.

Referring to the free world youth festival in Jamaica this year Mr Pleshkov said that Soviet youths did not receive any invitation to go there. He described the Jamaica festival as a propaganda festival.

Letter From Festival Panel Chairman

Dhaka HOLIDAY in English 9 Aug 85 p 2

[Text] Dear Editor:

Our attention has been drawn to the report, titled "Youth Team's Moscow Trip Cancelled," published in the 26 July issue of HOLIDAY. About the 12th World Festival of Youth and Students (12 WFYS) which was held in Moscow from 27.7.85 to 3.8.85 and the participation in it by a team from Bangladesh, your report missed many of the pertinent information and in many cases, appeared to carry misinformation. As because such misinformation and misinterpretation of facts may lead to misgivings among your readership and wider public, we would like to bring to your notice some of the following points:
1. First of all, WFYS is not an event observed by the USSR, rather the Festival is organized by the students and youth organizations of the world through the formation of an International Preparatory Committee (IPC). For example, in the IPC of the current 12th WFYS there are as many as [figure indistinct] members and it is not at all necessary that the Festival should be held in the Soviet Union. In fact, of the last 12 Festivals, it is only for the second time that Moscow is hosting the Festival. Even the current Festival was originally scheduled to be held in Paris. But due to some unavoidable circumstances the venue was later shifted to Moscow.

2. Incidentally this year happens to be the International Youth Year, declared by the UN. While the UN is observing the Youth Year under the slogan of "Participation Development and Peace," the main theme of the 12th WFYS is "Anti-imperialist Solidarity, Peace and Friendship." Thus on proper contemplation, one can find no contradiction between the UN theme of IYY and the main slogan of the 12th WFYS. This has found confirmation in the fact that a good number of UN, affiliated agencies, including UNESCO, is represented in the 12th WFYS.

3. In order to participate in the 12th WFYS, the youth and student organizations of Bangladesh actively came up with different programmes. Back in September 1984 in a widely represented gathering held in TSC of Dhaka University, a 101-member NPC was formed to steer the programmes in Bangladesh. Therefore, your reporter grossly misinforms when he writes of a National preparatory committee formed "only a few months back." The NPC comprises of representatives of 8 national student's organizations, 5 national youth organizations, 8 socio-cultural organizations, 2 national children organizations, science club and leading youth personalities of all walks of life including teachers, doctors, engineers, painters, poets, singers, performing artists, etc. So it was an insinuation to tie such a widely represented national body to a particular political organization.

4. It seems that your reporter is not aware of the fact that it is the tradition of the IPC to extend invitation to NPC's of different countries to participate in the Festival. Accordingly, the invitation to participate in the 12th WFYS was put forward by the current IPC to the NPC, Bangladesh. So the invitation come "directly through a political party" is totally untrue and we don't understand how the "official channel" comes into the picture. It may be added, even in the 10th WFYS /73 of Berlin, the only Festival in which Bangladesh participated, the delegation team was constituted by the NPC, Bangladesh of that time, not by the government even though the government of that period had a very positive attitude towards the Festival. Therefore, making a fuss about the "Channel of Invitation" is only a pretext on the part of the government to stop the youth and students of Bangladesh from participating in the Festival.

5. To participate in the 12th WFYS, the NPC of Bangladesh constituted a 40-member delegation. The team included the representatives of the different youth, students, children, sociocultural organizations, and youth luminaries from different professions. It is therefore sheer slanderous to term such a delegation as being backed by a particular political party. It is a disgrace that such a well-constituted national delegation was barred from participating
in the Festival programmes of Moscow. In fact barring them from participation and going to the extent of raiding their houses and seizing their passports was a direct violation of the basic human rights which no one can expect.

Sincerely yours,

Rafiqun Nabi,
Chairman,
National Festival Preparatory Committee,
Bangladesh

CSO: 4600/1870
BRIEFS

AMBASSADOR TO DPRK—The government has decided to concurrently accredit Mr A.Z.M. Enayetullah Khan, at present ambassador of Bangladesh to the People's Republic of China, as ambassador of Bangladesh to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, says a PID handout. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 13 Aug 85 p 3]

COOPERATION WITH JAPAN—Bangladesh and Japan on Tuesday signed an agreement for conducting a feasibility study for the extraction of heavy minerals in the country a Press release said reports BSS. Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) signed the agreement for the study to begin next month. The report of the feasibility study which is expected to be completed before March 1987 will eventually lead to the establishment of a commercial plant for mineral extraction BAEC said. Geologists of the Atomic Energy Commission had made an extensive mineral survey along the beach and offshore islands of the country in the mid-sixties and discovered a good reserves of heavy minerals, the Press release said. BAEC later set up a Beach Sand Exploitation Centre (BSEC) at Cox's Bazar and some products from this pilot plant have already been used locally. The proposed commercial plant will enable Bangladesh export substantial quantities of zircon rutile and ilmenite the Press release said. The agreement was signed by Dr. M. A. Mannan, member (Physics) BAEC and Mr Takeshi Izumi, leader of the Japanese survey team which is now on a visit to Bangladesh in the framework of technical cooperation. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 10 Aug 85 p 3]

USSR CARPET PURCHASE—Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation sold carpets worth Taka 1.20 crore to the USSR under an agreement signed in Dhaka on Thursday. Under the terms of the contract, shipments of the carpets "Golden Tiger" will be shipped by November, a press release of FJMC said. The Golden Tiger carpets manufactured by Baghdad-Dhaka and Purat Karnafuli Carpets Mills both situated in Chittagong have found markets in a number of countries including the USSR, Canada, Australia, the United States, UK and West Germany, since their production began in 1980, the press release said. BJMC after a worldwide survey have standardized some designs of the carpets to meet the taste of the consumers abroad. [Text] [Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 10 Aug 85 p 3]
AGRICULTURAL WAGE PANEL—The government has constituted a Council of Minimum Wages and Prices for Agricultural Labour, a Gazette Notification said, reports BSS. Headed by the Minister for Agriculture the Council comprises nine other members. Other members of the Council are: Member (Agriculture) Planning Commission, Secretary, Agriculture and Forests Division, Secretary, Ministry of Land Administration and Land Reforms, Director-General, Department of Agricultural Extension, Chairman, Minimum Wage Board, Mr F. R. Chowdhury, Managing Director, Camelia Limited, Dhanmondi, Mr M. C. Mortoja, Labour Adviser, Bangladesh Employers' Association, a retired district and session judge (to be nominated by Ministry of Law and Justice) and Director, Directorate of Agricultural Marketing Member Secretary. [Text] [Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 13 Aug 85 p 1]

CSO: 4600/1875
ARTICLE ALLEGES RIFT BETWEEN GANDHI, SINGH

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 6 Aug 85 p 1

[Article by R. K. Mishra]

On 4 July, the Rashtrapati Bhawan issued a statement denying newspaper speculation about a rift between the President and the Prime Minister. The statement was taken with a pinch of salt by many in view of the numerous signals to the contrary. However, the denial gave rise to the hope that the situation would now take a turn for the better and the relations between President Zail Singh and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi would begin to follow the pattern set by their predecessors.

That differences did crop up between the previous Presidents and the Prime Ministers is no secret. But these had not surfaced in the public. In the present instance, the fact that the relations between the two had cooled off was being discussed publicly. On 3 April, we referred to the rumours floating about the President. Our worst apprehensions were confirmed when the issue became a hot topic of frenzied debate in the media all over the country. The 4 July clarification has not helped matters. In fact, the situation has worsened since then.

In its issue of 25 July, The Hindustan Times carried a report by one of its senior correspondents who claimed "I have it on good authority that the two (Mr Zail Singh and Mr Rajiv Gandhi) did not see eye to eye with each other over the Punjab situation. Informed sources today went to the extent of suggesting that the date of meeting between the Prime Minister and Sant Longowal was fixed keeping in view the fact that the President will be away from the Capital on 23 July. The Prime Minister reportedly feels that the President, for whatever reasons, has been taking extraordinary interest in Punjab affairs which amounts even to interference."

The report went on to say that "in view of the apprehensions in the Prime Minister's mind he has not consulted the President on the situation in Punjab for quite some time. There was no consultation whatsoever with the President on the contents of the package which the Prime Minister signed with Sant Longowal. Even though the President, who was in South was scheduled to return at 3.30 p.m. this afternoon, came back nearly three hours earlier, he was not consulted by the Prime Minister on the subject."

Though the message the report conveyed was loud and clear, it left some room to place the differences within the narrow confines of the Punjab settlement. In any case, the Prime Minister is not obliged to consult the President on the manner in which he proposes to handle a particular problem and in the general jubilation about the accord the issue did not attract much public attention.

However, with the passage of time the matter again became a subject of animated discussion in political circles. Those who had always suspected the nature of Mr Zail Singh's interest in Punjab affairs pointed out that the President had not made any public comment welcoming the accord. This, it was said, is mystifying and intriguing. Not that he had not made statements on various aspects of the Punjab situation earlier. In fact, after Operation Blue Star he had come on television and put up a strong defence of the Government's action. As recently as on 18 July, while addressing members of the Sikh community at
Visakhapatnam, Mr Zail Singh called upon the Sikhs to disown the few militants whose acts were putting the entire Sikh community under suspicion. He also said that gurdwaras were not places for storing arms and sheltering bad elements.

Why then has the President remained silent on the Rajiv-Longowal accord? These observers asked—especially when there was an occasion when it would have been natural for him to refer to it at the Sikh congregation at Guru Nanak Matriculation School in Madras on 28 July.

Of course, it was possible to explain that the President is under no obligation to publicly welcome every Government action. This explanation would be flimsy because of the importance of the accord and the value of his comment on it. One could also say that the President, having been kept out of the picture, was annoyed and, therefore, maintained public silence.

Differences widening: But the area of differences now appears to be widening. Mr Zail Singh’s remarks in Calcutta on the reservation issue have come as a bombshell. It has been reported that “Mr Zail Singh called for extension of constitutional facilities enjoyed by the Scheduled Castes and Tribes to other backward communities.” As everyone knows, this is a highly explosive issue. Gujarat has been passing through a prolonged period of turmoil and violence on this question and the State Government has been forced to reverse its earlier decision to extend reservation for the other backward communities. Some Opposition parties have threatened fresh agitations in support of reservation in Bihar. Some groups have threatened to extend the anti-reservation stir to other States and organise demonstrations in the Capital.

The Prime Minister has called for a national consensus on this vexed problem. It is obvious that the President has chosen to take a position on this question which is at variance with the Prime Minister’s stand. This gives rise to a controversy which has no relation to the Punjab issue.

Does it mean that Mr Zail Singh has come to the conclusion that the rupture between him and Mr Rajiv Gandhi is irreparable and therefore, he now wants to give it a political dimension to build support for himself on that basis? How will the Congress and other political parties react to it?

It is no longer possible to ignore or understate these ominous developments. What began as suspicion about Mr Zail Singh’s role in Punjab affairs has now aggravated into a complete rupture of confidence. And, obviously, Mr Zail Singh has decided to make his own moves. His meeting with former President Sanjiva Reddy would, against this background, acquire greater significance than was attached to it earlier. Will this storm blow over? Or will we have a serious constitutional crisis on hand?
SINGH QUOTED VERBATIM ON RESERVATIONS ISSUE

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 9 Aug 85 p 1

[Text]

On 5 August, two Delhi newspapers carried reports from their correspondents on President Zail Singh's speech at Calcutta on the occasion of unveiling the statue of Dr B R Ambedkar. Both these reports began with his comments on the reservation issue. The relevant paragraphs of the reports are:

"Mr Zail Singh today called for extension of constitutional facilities enjoyed by Scheduled Castes and Tribes to other backward communities"—Statesman.

"President Zail Singh said here today that there should be reservation for other backward classes along with Scheduled Castes and Tribes"—Hindustan Times.

On 6 July, in a front page article, we quoted one of these reports and referring to the explosive nature of the reservation controversy said, "it is obvious that the President has chosen to take a stand on this question which is at variance with the Prime Minister's stand".

A tape of Mr Zail Singh's speech has been made available to us from the Rashtrapati Bhawan with the remark that the President has been misquoted. We have carefully heard this tape. Speaking in Hindi, Mr Zail Singh made a detailed reference to Dr Ambedkar's childhood, education, his role in drafting the Constitution and his fight for poor and backward classes. The President also referred to Maharshi Valmiki and Ravidas and the place of honour the latter enjoyed in Sikh scriptures. And then referring to the present condition of poor and backward classes, he made certain observations leading to his remarks on the reservation issue. The following is an English rendering of this portion of his speech:

"There are two castes in India which are victims of untouchability—Valmiki and Ravidas Chamars. Valmiki and Ravidas were both, born in Chamar families. Even today, as far as I can see, the enthusiasm that is there for Dr Ambedkar among Chamars is not there among other castes. But he had not come to this world only for Chamar. He was a great man for the entire humanity.

"When Ravidas' birth anniversary is celebrated then only the poor Chamars gather together. And when Maharshi Valmiki is remembered only the Valmikis collect together. When the upper caste people go there they do so as if they are obliging them by their presence. Is it not their duty? Don't they remember that like Janmashtami or Ramanavami or Guruparava, and other sages and saints Valmiki and Ravidas also ought to be remembered?

"India should be proud that these people taught us religion, but they taught us as revolutionaries. They fought with valour against the ills of the society. But valour does not work as much as law does. If Dr Ambedkar did not have this new Constitution in his hands, and if under the new Constitution all these protections had not been granted, then we would not have been able to do good to these communities notwithstanding all our propaganda. There are other backward castes in the society from among whom to date no one has become an MLA; to date no nominations have been made; and none could become a big officer. It is a different matter that because of reservation Harijans got this opportunity. Girlajans (tribals) also got it. SC and ST also got it. But some others, who are called 'other backward classes'; for them too it is necessary to take revolutionary steps so that they can go forward".
GANDHI VISITS DEFENSE LABS IN HYDERABAD

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 6 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] Hyderabad, 5 Aug (PTI)—The Indian missile programme has reached a crucial stage and the country will have an advanced missile by next year.

A separate research centre for assembling, testing and check-out of the indigenously developed missiles is being set up at a site 22 km from here at a cost of Rs 1,100 million.

The Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, who laid the foundation stone for the research centre on Saturday, said he was very happy at the progress of research in three of the major defence laboratories he visited during his one-day visit to the city.

Defence scientists briefing Mr Gandhi on the missile project showed him a simulated flight of the indigenously developed missile. He also witnessed static firing of the missile's rocket engine at the test bed in the defence research and development laboratory (DRDL).

The Prime Minister was briefed by Mr Abdul Kalam, chief designer of the satellite launch vehicle of the space department, and presently director of DRDL.

The new defence research centre, which will be part of DRDL, will be fully operational in three years. Sources said that half the work would be completed by next year itself. The indigenous missile will have solid and liquid propellant motors. Its range and payload capabilities are classified.

Public sector companies like the Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited are involved in the project which is one of the major programmes under the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO).

DRDO's successful missile project is a successor to a similar project code-named Devil that was launched in 1971 but was abandoned seven years later.

Besides the missile project, Mr Gandhi had an exclusive briefing on the electronic warfare system being developed at the defence electronics research laboratory.
GANDHI'S INTERVIEW WITH DUBAI ENGLISH PAPER REPORTED

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 12 Aug 85 p 9

DUBAI, August 11 (UNI).

THE Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, says he is determined to end terrorism. In an interview to Dubai’s English daily “Gulf News”, Mr. Gandhi said terrorism had to be “fought politically with the help of the people. It will take a while but we will get rid of terrorism,” he said.

He said the recent Punjab accord signed between him and the Akali leader, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, has been widely accepted and praised.

Besides India, the interview covered Indo-Pakistan affairs, the West Asia crisis, Iran-Iraq war, non-aligned movement, United Nations and New Delhi’s relations with the Gulf, particularly the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.).

N-FACILITIES

About Pakistan’s proposal that the two countries open up their nuclear facilities for mutual inspection, Mr. Gandhi said that experience elsewhere had clearly demonstrated that “no existing form of mutual inspection of nuclear facilities is foolproof. Therefore, such an agreement on mutual inspection might even endanger and encourage clandestine activity rather than eliminate it.”

As for the no-war pact and a peace and friendship treaty for which both the countries have made different proposals, he said that what was needed was a comprehensive treaty of peace and friendship “which will stimulate contacts between our peoples and build upon the natural goodwill and affection which they have for each other.”

Mr. Gandhi, who is the current chairman of the non-aligned movement, expressed concern at the continuing Iran-Iraq war which enters its fifth year next month.

“We are doing what we can to bring about a de-escalation and cessation of hostilities”, he said, but did not disclose Indian peace moves.

Several Indian officials, including the minister of state for external affairs, Mr. Khurshed Alam Khan, and the foreign secretary, Mr. Ramesh Bhardwaj, have visited the Iranian and Iraqi capitals of Teheran and Baghdad during the past months.

Mr. Gandhi reiterated India’s support to the Palestinians’ cause for their own homeland.

Peace in West Asia could only come about “through the exercise of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to a homeland of their own,” “Gulf News” quoted him as saying.

But Mr. Gandhi said India preferred negotiations to armed conflict “as the path of promoting a settlement” and hoped that a dialogue among all the parties concerned would help realise this aim.

Mrs. Aasha Bhatia, who interviewed Mr. Gandhi, asked him about his perceptions of world problems following his tour of the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries.

Mr. Gandhi replied that the world was facing the threat of nuclear destruction and there was need for economic progress for all.

The issues were interlinked because the vast sums being spent on “armaments could be released for economic development.”

“What is basically standing in the way of progress to nuclear disarmament is fear and distrust. It is these raw emotions that lie at the base of the sophistry of the technical arguments advanced,” he observed.

DISARMAMENT ISSUE

Mr. Gandhi said that the non-aligned movement was composed of non-nuclear-weapons states and accordingly they had to keep the focus of attention “on the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament which cannot be attained if the balance is sought to be achieved at progressively higher levels of sophistication in the economic sphere. The world must move towards a new international order.

“Tinkering with the present system might solve one specific problem or the other but it cannot be a throughgoing answer.”

Asked if there was any clash between the members of the non-aligned movement and the various regional groupings like the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Arab League, Mr. Gandhi replied in the negative.
JALANDHAR, August 11.

The Punjab Hindu party chief, Mr. Lachand Sabharwal, told a press conference here today that his party firmly supported the accord reached between the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and Sant Longowal. The accord was just to all concerned.

The chief merit of the accord was that it had brought peace to Punjab and ended the three-year-old state of tension and confrontation, he said.

Replying to a question, the Hindu party chief supported the government policy of releasing all those not involved in cases of murder, arson or looting and demanded that Hindu detenus, numbering about 50, should also be released along with the Sikhs under detention.

The party had called upon the Akali leaders to take Hindus of the state into confidence and try to rebuild mutual bonds of trust and confidence that had suffered during the last three years.

DIVIDE & RULE?

Mr. Sabharwal said the Congress had been trying all the while to keep Hindus and Sikhs divided and exploited their differences for narrow political interests. It was time that leaders of both communities tried to undo the results of this "divide and rule" policy of the Congress. Akali leaders should also try to remove apprehensions created in the minds of Hindus "due to the false propaganda of the Congress."

Replying to questions, the Hindu party chief assured newsmen that if the Akalis tried to gain the confidence of the Hindus and showed concern for their feelings and sentiments, the Hindus would surely reciprocate in a positive manner.

He said he would soon meet both Baba Joginder Singh and Sant Longowal to persuade them to unite. It was in the interest of the Congress to keep the Akalis divided. But such division would not be in the interest of Punjab as a whole since the continued rift among the Akalis would create difficulties in the way of Hindu-Sikh unity.

The Hindu party, he said, had opposed early elections to the Vidhan Sabha because it felt that if elections were held in the present circumstances, it would again strain relations between the two communities and would again generate tension. Congress leaders and their supporters were pressing for early elections because they felt that conditions were favourable for the Congress now, he added.

Patiala, (PTI): The Union minister for agriculture and rural development, Mr. Buta Singh, said at Lakhbasinwala, village, 50 km from here today, that the Punjab accord was the biggest achievement and it would open up an era of prosperity in the state.

He alleged that the agreement between the government and the Akali Dal had been reached long ago and at one stage settlement was nearing finalisation. But Mr. Gurcharan Singh Tohra, president, SGPC adopted a negative attitude and put forth 35 more demands, he said.
PUNJAB COMMUNAL HARMONY COMMITTEE ENDORSES ACCORD

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 11 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] Amritsar, 10 Aug (PTI)---The Punjab state-level communal harmony committee at its historic meeting here yesterday, which for the first time was attended by the Akalis, hailed the Punjab accord describing it as a "great settlement."

Differing views were, however, expressed on the holding of elections in the state. The Akalis kept mum on this point.

The accord was later also welcomed at an all-party meeting over which the governor, Mr Arjun Singh, presided. The Akali representative, Mr Harbhajan Singh, said the accord would greatly benefit Punjab and urged for a united fight against terrorism in the state. The communal harmony committee meeting at which six leaders of the Akali Dal (L) were present in a unanimous resolution said the settlement had brought to an end an era of misunderstanding, misgivings, anxieties and agonies, that the country had to bear during the last couple of years.

While thanking the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, and the Akali Dal president, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, for signing the accord the resolution said the settlement represented the victory of the forces of rationality and brotherhood over the agents of destabilization, disintegration and destruction.

The Akali Dal (L) leaders, present at the communal harmony committee meeting, which was also presided over by the state governor, were Mr Balwant Singh, Mr Sukhdev Singh Dhindsa and Mr Jiwan Singh Umranangal, all former ministers, Mr Balwant Singh Ramoowalia, former MP and secretary-general of the Akali Dal (L), Mr K. S. Dhaliwal, vice-president of the SCPC and Mr Surjan Singh. Thekedar, former convenor of the Akali Dal. Mr Swaran Singh, former external affairs minister, was also present along with leaders of various political parties, social organizations and intellectuals.

The lone representative of the United Akali Dal, Mr Jagdev, Singh Talwandi, boycotted the meeting.
Meanwhile the Punjab BJP president, Dr Baldev Prakash, today strongly opposed early elections in Punjab and said that it could "spell disaster."

In a press statement he requested the Punjab governor not to recommend early elections to the Centre.

The BJP leader said that if the consensus obtained at the state-level peace and communal harmony committee meeting here yesterday was any indication of public opinion, all the speakers spoke for consolidating the gains of the accord and were against early polls.

Elections demanded: Mr Umrao Singh, a senior congress leader and former state revenue minister, on Saturday demanded immediate elections in Punjab and installation of a popular government before next 6 October.

GSO: 4600/1863
ANALYST TELLS INDIAN STAND ON NONALIGNED VENUE

Madras THE HINDU in English 7 Aug 85 p 9

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text] The Indian emissaries who have been sent to various non-aligned countries to assess the consensus on the choice of venue for the next summit conference have returned with the impression that, though there is no hot favourite in the field, Yugoslavia might manage to marshal the necessary support for hosting the event in Belgrade.

After Iraq opted out, it became relatively easy for Yugoslavia to muster additional support with the plea that, in the absence of any other widely acceptable country seeking this honour, it would be more appropriate to have this summit in Belgrade for the second time coinciding with the 25th anniversary of the first one held there in 1961 heralding the start of the non-aligned movement.

The other countries which have been seeking this privilege with varying degrees of enthusiasm include Algeria, Libya, Syria, Indonesia, Peru and Zimbabwe, and to some extent even North Korea, but none of them has been pressing its claim with any great fervour as Yugoslavia has been doing with almost single-minded determination. There would have been many others who would have sought this special distinction but for the prohibitively expensive burden of arranging such a big summit conference with the participation of a hundred heads of Government.

Luanda meeting to decide on venue: It is customary for the mid-summit conference of Foreign Ministers to decide on the venue for the next summit after assessing the consensus, while bearing in mind the claims of different geographical regions. The Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries who will be meeting in Luanda, Angola, from September 2 to 7 have to decide the venue for the next summit and also determine the broad agenda for it.

If no clear consensus emerges in Luanda in favour of the Yugoslav offer to host the next summit in Belgrade in September, 1986, it is quite possible that India might be requested to continue as chairman of the non-aligned movement for at least one more year after the completion of its current three-year term to give some extra time to the Coordination Bureau to persuade one of the member-countries from some other region to bear this responsibility in the larger interests of the movement. Though India is not averse to the idea of extension of its term as a sort of stop-gap arrangement, the Government feels that this would hardly be a solution to the problem of evolving proper conventions for holding the summits by rotation in different regions.

Inter-Arab squabbles: At one stage, India urged Tanzania to host this conference, but Dr. Julius Nyerere, who is due to relinquish the Presidency of his country soon, was reluctant to burden his successor with the responsibility involving, among other things, an expenditure of at least $100 million. If not more. It is only Libya and Syria who have been pressing their claims, but neither of them stands any chance of being chosen by consensus because of Inter-Arab squabbles.

The other interested countries like Indonesia and Zimbabwe have the money and the infrastructure required for hosting this summit, but they do not want to seek this honour unless they are requested by the non-aligned community as a whole through a clear consensus to bear this burden.

As current chairman of the non-aligned movement, India is not particularly interested in where the next summit is going to be held, but it is very keen that the country chosen for this honour should be experienced enough to provide imaginative leadership to the community during its three-year term.

Rajiv wanted Tanzania to host: It is for this reason that the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, wanted Tanzania to play host so that a highly experienced and widely respected African statesman like Dr. Nyerere could head the non-aligned movement at a time when the Namibian issue is going to be one of the major tests for the ability and determination of the Third World to fight the remnants of racism and colonialism in the African continent.

There have been seven summits so far of the movement since its inception in 1961 and the next one will be the eighth in the series coinciding with the 25th anniversary of the first summit held in Belgrade. It is for this reason that India has sent out several special envoys to different non-aligned capitals to assess and harness the consensus, if possible, before the Foreign Ministers meet next month in Luanda to decide the date and venue of the next summit conference.
CPI LEADER MEETS PRESS AFTER KASHMIR VISIT

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 14 Aug 85 p 5

[Text]

Srinagar, Aug 13—CPI national council secretary M D Farooqi today demanded immediate dismissal of the GM Shah Government and said his party would welcome a "Punjab-type accord" between Dr Farooq Abdullah and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi for "restoration of democracy in Kashmir".

Addressing a press conference after his week-long visit to the valley, Mr Farooqi described Mr GM Shah as a "security risk" and charged that his Government had been patronising and encouraging Janaat-e-Islami and other secessionist elements. The CPI leader claimed that continuation of the Shah Government was detrimental to national interests as it was responsible for undermining the State's ties with the rest of the country because of its unpopularity and its collusion with anti-national forces.

Mr Farooqi pointed out that perpetuation of the existing uncertain situation in this sensitive border region was all the more undesirable in view of the known fact that the US was rearming Pakistan in its scheme to destabilise India. The growth of anti-national forces from within with the support of the Shah Government was a matter of serious concern for even the Congress party whose backing was made available to Shah.
CPI-M POLITBURO MEETS, ISSUES STATEMENT

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 14 Aug 85 p 5

[Text]

The CPI-M has come out against 'certain moves' that have been taken recently to reach a solution to the Assam tangle as the party feared that the proposed formula would harm genuine Indian citizens who are being accused of being foreign nationals.

In a statement issued on Tuesday, which gives the gist of discussions held during the party's politburo meeting last weekend, the CPI-M has appealed to all secular-democratic forces to resist efforts to deny genuine citizens their fundamental rights and, thereby, thwart moves to the contrary.

The party has clarified that while it was in favour of an early settlement to the Assam problem, this should be reached so that the cultural and political rights of the Assamese are safeguarded but not at the cost of other genuine Indian nationals.

The politburo meeting, called essentially to prepare grounds for preliminary discussions on the draft documents for the Calcutta party congress, also took up current issues such as the Punjab accord, the situation in Tripura, Gujarat and Kerala, the Supreme Court judgment on Government employees, the Government's economic policies and CPI-M's relations with the CPI.

On Punjab, the CPI-M has said that while the accord reached between Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and Mr. H S Longowal was a welcome development, the situation in the State was still not right for elections.

The Marxists have warned that there was danger of the Gujarat agitation spreading to other States. The division of the down-trodden into "backwards" and "forwards" would harm national unity, they have added.

The CPI-M has accused the Congress-TUJS alliance in Tripura of aiding extremists in carrying out their terror campaign. It has also charged the Centre with viewing the Tripura problem as one purely of law and order instead of helping the State Government bridge the gap between the tribals and the Bengalis.

While attacking the Congress-led UDF in Kerala of helping Islamic fundamentalists in the recent controversy regarding Shariat, the CPI-M has commended the LDF for resisting pressures from the AIMP and taking a principled stand on the issue.
DEFENSE MINISTER: NO DEPLOYMENT ON BORDERS

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 14 Aug 85 p 5

[Text]

'Defence Minister P V Narasimha Rao told the Lok Sabha on Tuesday that the Government had found no indication of any unusual deployment of sophisticated weapons either by Pakistan or by China on India's northern borders.

Mr Rao assured the House that the Government "keeps a constant watch on all developments that have a bearing on our national security and takes appropriate measures from time to time to ensure full defence preparedness."

The Defence Minister said that China had built a few highways and feeder roads that connect Tibet with the Chinese mainland, but there was no information about Lhasa being connected by rail. However, Mr Rao said that the Government was aware that an oil pipeline between Gorno and Lhasa had been laid.

Replying to questions pertaining to his Ministry, Mr Rao said that during the last six months there have been a "few" cases of violation of India's airspace by Pakistani aircraft and all such cases have been taken up.

He said the Pakistani troops made an attempt to dislodge Indian troops from their positions in the Siachen glacier area in Jammu and Kashmir in February 1985 but this attempt was "effectively thwarted by our troops".

The Minister said that the incident resulted in some casualties on either side.

CSO: 4600/1866
RAJIV, FOREIGN AFFAIRS PANEL DISCUSS TERRORISM

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 18 Jul 85 p 9

[Text] NEW DELHI, July 17--THE Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, assured the parliamentary consultative committee on external affairs last night that the government was taking effective action to curb terrorism.

However, it was recognised by all that it was not an easy problem to deal with. It was felt that all countries should evolve a code of conduct with view to curbing terrorism.

Several proposals were considered for coordination at the bilateral, regional and international levels to fight terrorism.

The members also drew the government's attention to the nuclear dimension of terrorism as small nuclear weapons could be misused by extremists. They expressed concern over the increasing activities by terrorists.

The use of a triggering device, acquired by Pakistan in a clandestine manner from the US was discussed at the meeting as members expressed concern over that country's nuclear programme.

Mr. Gandhi also gave a brief account of his recent talks with the leaders of the U.S. the Soviet Union, France and other countries which he visited recently.

The members were critical of the countries which had not responded adequately to the challenge of terrorism. They said terrorism required a "strong and uncompromising" response.

The members also witnessed a documentary film regarding an interview with Frank Camper, who ran a school for mercenaries in the U.S. This school was attended by four Sikh terrorists who have been implicated in the plots to assassinate the Prime Minister and the Haryana chief minister, Mr. Bhajan Lal.

Reuter adds from London: Britain has said it would tighten security at its airports in response to recent terrorist attacks.
The transport secretary, Mr. Nicholas Ridley said in a written reply to the House of Commons yesterday that existing measures to check baggage stored in airport holds were being reviewed.

He also said check-in facilities for baggage away from airports, such as those at London's Victoria railway station for flights departing from Gatwick airport, would be scrapped unless they met "adequate safe guards,"

CSO: 5650/0208
NAXALITES GAINING STRENGTH IN BENGAL DISTRICT

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 8 Aug 85 p 9

[Text] Krishnagar, Aug. 7. - Notwithstanding factional differences, the Naxalites are re-emerging as a "tangible force" in Nadia district, according to official sources. While maintaining their separate identity, at least seven factions have accepted a "common umbrella" under the leadership of the Indian Peoples' Front.

They have aired their voice against the principle of annihilation and are trying to identify themselves with the aspirations the people, particularly the downtrodden, the sources say.

The believers in the doctrine of annihilation, particularly the Second Central Committee are, however, maintaining a sharp difference with the IPF and its allies. Factional rivalry and armed clashes between them have become frequent. More than 12 people were killed in factional feuds since January 1984, the sources say.

Although weakened by the arrest of its leader, Mr Ramen Saha in 1982 and desertion of a large number of activists, the Second Central Committee is now gathering strength under the leadership of Mr Subir Talukdar. Its members organized a bandh at Krishnagar, Santipur and Ranaghat areas on July 28 and killed a man at Santipur just Sunday as part of their programme to observe the death anniversay fo Charu Majumdar.

Last year, they observed this period as Charu Majumdar fortnight (a fortnight from July 28), killed a person and took away two double-barrels guns in the Santipur area. A bandh was also observed then, the sources said.

However, the IPF and its allies are becoming increasingly powerful. Their strength is easily perceptible, says a CPI(M) member of Parliament. Although a majority of the people of the district are polarized between the CPI(M) and the Congress (I), a large number of non-commitals and dissident Marxists have already displayed their preference for this newly emerged combine.

Recently at Nabadwip, the IPF took up leadership when the town's peace committee came into conflict with the police. At Krishnagar the Front organized a well-attended convention, set up a citizen's committee for peace
and demonstrated against the "deteriorating" law and order situation, the CPI(M) M.P. said. In the Santipur area the IPF combine has built up a strong support base among the weavers, according to a senior official.

The peasant forces of these Marxists-Leninists, the official says, have penetrated deep into the interior villages. They are trying to cash in on the alleged corruption indulged in by the gram panchayats and the District Rural Development Agency and the discrimination in the distribution of khas land. In Chapra, Nakshipara, Kaligunj, Hanskhali and the rural areas of Ranaghat and Santipur the peasant fronts of the Naxalites are "really active", the official says.

The official feels that failure of the gram panchayats and the DRDA to meet the aspirations of the rural poor and the district administration to maintain law and order may have paved the way for the resurgence of the Naxalites.

CSO: 5650/0231
LOK SABHA PASSES AMENDMENT TO ANTITERRORIST BILL

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 8 Aug 85 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, Aug 7. - The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (prevention) Amendment Bill, which seeks full application of the original enactment of Jammu and Kashmir, was passed by the Lok Sabha today, after the Home Minister, Mr S. B. Chavan, assured members that the amending Bill has been brought forward with the concurrence of the Jammu and Kashmir Government and that it did not violate Article 37 of the Constitution.

Mr Chavan assured members that the present measure would not be used against normal trade union and political activities and guidelines on this had been sent to the State Government, with the suggestion that the measure be used sparingly.

He added, however, that anybody exceeding legitimate trade union and political activity would certainly attract the provisions of the measure.

Mr Chavan told members that both the Centre and the State of Jammu and Kashmir were interested in ending the present atmosphere of terrorism and subversion in the State.

Answering a point raised by some members, the Home Minister said the Government was thinking of a new orientation course, and an altogether new type of training, for the police forces, so as to enable them to cope firmly with the present pattern of crime. Plans for such new orientation were being prepared.

He added that intelligence service would also have to be given proper training. "Also, some of their problems will have to be looked into".

Answering Opposition criticism of the present J and K Government, Mr Chavan said that if Dr Farooq Abdullah felt that he had the majority with him, he could give notice of a no-confidence motion in the State Legislative Assembly, press it, and thus test his strength. If, instead of doing that, the existing Government were to be dubbed a puppet Government, it would be very wrong. "If you don't command a majority, that is the only thing you can say", he added. The measure passed by the Lok Sabha today replaced a Presidential Ordinance promulgated on June 5 so as to secure the full application of the original Act to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

CSO: 5650/0231
MINISTER ANNOUNCES NEW MOVES TO BOOST EXPORTS

Madras THE HINDU in English 11 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, 10 Aug.--The minimum export price for tea is being abolished in view of the increased production and falling international prices.

This was announced by the Union Finance and Commerce Minister, Mr V. P. Singh at the open house discussion he had with the trade and industry here today. This is the sixth in the series he had started since he became Commerce Minister at the Centre in the Indira Gandhi Cabinet.

The industry had been pleading for doing away with the minimum export price for quite some days now. The plea, reiterated at the open house discussion today by the representative of the consultative committee of the Plantation Association, Mr R. L. Rikhye, evoked a favourable response and the minister announced the decision to abolish MEP in the afternoon session.

More Benefits

The following were some of the other spot-decisions announced by Mr Singh on the representations made at the meeting today by the captains of trade and industry.

The international price reimbursement scheme, covering steel items, would be extended to alloys.

A separate export promotion council would be set up for computer software and electronic goods.

The cash compensatory support (CCS) scheme would continue even beyond 31 December 1985 though with necessary modifications.

Custom bonding charges would be reduced from 250 per cent to 150 percent.

Auction system for cardamom would be introduced this year.

Chemicals for laboratories would be allowed to be imported for stocks and sale. Switchover from merchant-exporter to manufacturer-exporter category would be allowed provided the specific growth rates were attained in the original category.
Mr Singh sought to remove doubts about the future of the CCS. The government had accepted the view that the scheme was meant to neutralise the tax disadvantage suffered by the exporter and as such it would come out with a scheme having a longer time frame.

As regards duty relief for man-made fibres, Mr Singh said he hoped to come out with some concrete proposals by the month-end. He, however, stressed that the relief should be passed on to the consumer, particularly in the low income and middle income group. The intention was to lower the price. Referring to complaints about the duty draw-back scheme, the minister said a task force would be set up to go into these and report in two months.

Stable Policies

Around 100 representatives of the trade and industry attended the meeting. In his opening remarks, Mr V. P. Singh said the government would endeavour to provide a stable economic policy whereby year to year uncertainties were minimised. He wanted the trade and industry to respond in a constructive manner, to the environment already created by the government. Though the export performance had been creditable, it was inadequate to meet the economy's needs. "We have to strive for a quantum jump," he added.

The FICCI representative Mr K. K. Modi called for a pragmatic export policy. Enterprises exporting more than 25 percent of their total output should be accorded priority status for uninterrupted supply of power, raw material and other inputs. He wanted rationalisation of tax system for export units. The incidence of direct taxes now worked out to over 25 percent of the cost. Even after allowing for duty drawback, etc., the product still remained non-competitive in the world market.

Mr Ramesh Maheshwari, president, Association of Indian Engineering Industry, highlighted the gaps between government policies and their implementation. He said it took two years to implement a 100-percent export oriented project as against one year for a non-export oriented unit project. This was due to the delay in getting clearance.

PTI reports: Mr Singh said the government had decided to release Rs 10 lakhs to the Cardamom Board which would start the auction system this season.

On a demand for a tax holiday for certain industries, Mr Singh said the government would look into it.

The Abid Hussain report on import-export trade would be made public. There would be six-day operations in the Customs, he said.

CSO: 4600/1864
'SIGNIFICANT' GAS FIND REPORTED IN CAUVERY BASIN

Madras THE HINDU in English 7 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] A significant discovery of oil and gas in the Cauvery basin in Tamil Nadu was reported to Parliament today by the Union Petroleum Minister, Mr. Naval Kirshore Sharma.

He said an initial flow of 15,400 cubic metres of gas and 250 barrels of oil a day has been observed from an exploratory well—Narimanam 1—10 km. south-west of Nagapattinam and about 11 km. south-south-west of Karaikal in Thanjavur district.

The well has been drilled to a depth of 2,321 metres by E-760, an ONGC rig, and was spudded on March 28 last.

Production testing in progress

In identical statements in the two Houses of Parliament, Mr. Sharma said production testing was in progress to ascertain the stabilised flow rate of oil and gas.

Narimanam I is the second hydro-carbon strike in the onland Cauvery basin in recent months, the first having been Kovilkaileppal 4, 10 km from the present location, last January and it is a much smaller deposit.

More discoveries possible

The Minister was of the view that these oil strikes in the lower tertiary sediments in the Karaikal-Nagapattinam area enhanced the petroleum potential in this sub-basin and more discoveries could be expected in similar geological conditions in the basin.

At present two rigs are engaged in drilling in the onland Cauvery basin and another rig would be added shortly to increase the pace of exploratory drilling.

PTI, UNI report:

Members in both Houses greeted the announcement with thumping of tables.

Replying to clarifications sought by members in the Rajya Sabha, Mr. Sharma said all efforts were being made to achieve self-sufficiency in oil but it was difficult to make any prediction on this matter.

He said the country was 70 per cent self-sufficient in oil by the end of the Sixth Plan. The annual growth rate in consumption was 7.6 per cent. Mr. Sharma said exploration efforts would be concentrated on sedimentary basins with high prospect of oil and gas.

The Minister said that the Seventh Plan allocations for oil exploration were yet to be finalised, there is going to be some cut, which, he hoped, would not be substantial. "If the cut is substantial, we would have to slow down our exploration work at least in the less important oil-bearing areas," he said.

Mr. Sharma did not foresee any cut in the oil prices in the near future, which, he said, compared favourably with the world prices.

The Minister said gas has been found in the Dakshina Godavari basin, but oil has still not been found there.

More prospective

Our Madras Staff Reporter writes:

The discovery of oil and gas in Narimanam in Thanjavur district, coming close on the heels of a similar discovery in Kovilkaileppal, also in the same district, has confirmed the ONGC's seismic findings that the Cauvery basin is much more prospective than it was thought of earlier.

The oil struck at Kovilkaileppal is of very light variety of 50 degrees API (American Petroleum Institute) grade.

The ONGC has already stepped up its exploration in the Cauvery onshore area and drilling is going on at Tiruvur in Thanjavur district. The rig at Narimanam will be moved to Kovilkaileppal II for fresh drilling. Drilling will begin at Bhavanagiri I and II in South Arcot district next year.

Narimanam, where oil has been struck at a depth of 2,321 metres, is 10 km from Nagapattinam. It is a highly prospective area, with the oil-bearing structure extending right up to the offshore region.

ONGC highly optimistic

The ONGC "is highly optimistic" of its exploration efforts in all the three basins—Krishna-Godavari, Cauvery and the Andamans. Currently, four rigs in the Krishna-Godavari onshore and two rigs in the Andaman offshore are operating. Two more rigs onland and one or two rigs in the offshore are expected to be deployed during the current year.
Till May, 1985, the ONGC has drilled 29 onshore and 18 offshore wells in the Cauvery basin, nine onshore and 26 offshore wells in the Krishna-Godavari basin and four offshore wells in the Andamana.

At Karaikal, oil was struck in 1984 and gas was discovered offshore in the Porto Novo basin in 1980. Oil was also struck in the Palk Bay in 1981.

CSO: 4600/1861
**BRIEFS**

**GANDHI JAPAN VISIT**—New Delhi, 11 Aug (PTI)—The Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, will pay a visit to Japan sometime in the last week of November, according to present indications. The Tokyo visit is seen as part of India's efforts to secure greater industrial and technological cooperation with the industrialized world. India is keen to take advantage of the recent decision of the Nakasone government to open up its economy and liberalise imports. The Japanese Government has resorted to substantial liberalisation of imports and recently dispensed with non-tariff barriers. It has reduced tariff by a significant margin to enable manufacturers of developing nations to take advantage of such measures. In recent years, the Indo-Japanese business cooperation committee has been striving to bring the two countries closer in the economic field. Industrialists of the two countries met in the second week of July in New Delhi as part of these efforts. [Text] [Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 12 Aug 85 p 16]

**INDO-JORDIAN ACCORD**—Amman, 4 Aug (UNI)—The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) of India and the Royal Scientific Society (RSS) of Jordan have concluded an agreement for technical and scientific cooperation. The agreement, signed here by Dr M. Ramaiah, Director of the Structural Engineering Research Centre in Madras, and RSS president Fakhreddin Dagestani, provides for exchange of scientists and specialists for research, training, consultation and exchange of experience in fields of mutual interests. [Text] [New Delhi PATRIOT in English 5 Aug 85 p 6]

**COOPERATION WITH PRC**—New Delhi, 5 Aug—China has expressed keenness to import iron ore from India to feed its shore-based steel plants. The visiting Chinese Minister for Metallurgical Industry, Mr Li Dongye, indicated this today during discussions with the Minister of Steel Mines and Coal, Mr Vasant Sathe. Mr Dongye said, China was producing 42 million tonnes of steel per annum and that his country expected to double the steel production by the end of this century. China had been increasing steel production by two to three million tonnes per annum in the recent years. It also said that China had over 13 million tonnes of mineable iron ore reserves. Mr Li Dongye said that China was setting up a modern steel plant at Baushan with the assistance of Nippon Steel of Japan. He also informed Mr Sathe that, China was producing over 760 million tonnes of coal per year. Besides Mr Sathe, the Indian side included Mr B. K. Rao, secretary (Mines), Mr S. B. Lal, secretary (Coal), Mr S.V.C. Raghavan, chairman, State Trading Corporation and Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation, and Mr Tirlochan Singh, Joint Secretary in the Department of Steel. The Chinese delegation included Mr Zhuang Yi, Director of Metallurgical Industry, Mr Wang Shaoliang, Director of the Department of Mines, and Mr Wang Yaitin, Chief Engineer in the Chinese Department of Mines.—PTI [Text] [Madras THE HINDU in English 6 Aug 85 p 9]
INDO-AFGHANI CULTURAL AGREEMENT--New Delhi, 7 Aug--India is to provide 10 scholarships to Afghan nationals for doctoral studies and other fellowships for visiting scholars for training in public cooperation and child development, reports UNI. India and Afghanistan today signed a programme of cultural exchanges for 1985-87 which also provides for imparting training to Afghan nationals in repair and preservation of historical monuments and manuscripts, the agreement also covers sports coaching. The agreement was signed on behalf of India by Mr Y. S. Das, Secretary in the Department of Culture, and on behalf of Afghanistan by Mr Mohiuddin Shahrzad, Deputy Minister in the State Planning Committee. [Text] [Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 8 Aug 85 p 9]

DAL KHALSA LEADER--Jalandhar, 5 Aug (UNI)--Harsimran Singh, former 'mukh panch' of the outlawed Dal Khalsa was released from the central jail here today. His counsel Surjit Singh Minhas said that the release followed the Supreme Court order which set aside his detention under the National Security Act ordered by the Amritsar district magistrate. Harsimran Singh has been in jail since 12 January 1982. Harsimran Singh, who claimed that he had joined the Akali Dal led by Mr Harchand Singh Longowal while in jail, hailed the Centre-Akali accord on Punjab immediately after coming out of the jail. Harsimran Singh said he would meet Mr Longowal soon and offered his services for the Akali Dal and "panth." [Text] [New Delhi PATRIOT in English 6 Aug 85 p 1]
SADDAM'S DOWNFALL IRAN’S ONLY CONDITION FOR GULF PEACE

East Burnham ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Jul 85 pp 32-33

[Text]

For the first time since the advent of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the foundation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal visited Teheran on May 18-20. The Prince, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency, was invited by Iran’s foreign minister, Ali Akbar Velayati. Sensitivity or even tension between the two countries was felt in 1980 after the outbreak of the Gulf war, which threatened stability in the area, but it appears that Iran’s repeated reassurances to the affected non-belligerents have made rapprochement possible between Teheran and Riyadh.

Before leaving Teheran, according to the Saudi Gazette, Prince Saud al-Faisal said that his visit had strengthened Saudi-Iranian relations on the basis of friendship and Islam. He was previously reported in the Iranian press to have stated that Iran and Saudi Arabia are neighbouring countries with historical mutual interests and relations, and they should regularly review problems they face. Although both the Saudi minister and Iranian officials were very discreet about the actual talks, Prince Saud al-Faisal had said, on his arrival in Teheran, that the issues to be raised between the two countries would include mutual relations and the regional situation. On the latter, he remarked: “We are living in a sensitive situation, where severe disputes have been arising from years ago.”

The new turn in Saudi-Iranian relations was actually sought by both Riyadh and Teheran with a view to reaching peace on grounds different from those wanted by Iraq. Iran is known to be seeking an accord with the Gulf state on ending the war — at the price of removal of the Iraqi president.

The Iraqis, who, according to the French daily Le Monde, have not been able to use efficiently the formidable airpower France and the Soviets endowed it with, started the “war of the cities” against the Islamic Republic in a second desperate move aimed at forcing Iran to negotiate peace. But mounting casualties among civilians in air raids on Teheran and other cities with 500kg bombs has not yet created popular pressure on the Iranian authorities to sit at the negotiating table. On the contrary, Iran responded with missiles, none of which were launched on Baghdad, in a short period in March and April this year. Missiles again hit Baghdad early in June, after Iraq had resumed its air strikes against major Iranian cities. In addition, Iraq’s repeated use of chemical weapons has provided Iran with a good propaganda coup.

However, as the war continued the Islamic Republic established contacts with the UAE. Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar and appears to have successfully conveyed to them its goodwill in promoting cooperation and good neighbourliness. This policy has at the same time aimed at isolating Iraq, and the best evidence of its success was the positive response by the Saudis to Iran’s invitation for talks and the optimism about the outcome of the visit.

Saud al-Faisal’s trip to Iran brought about an immediate reaction. Two bombs exploded in Riyadh on May 18, the first day of al-Faisal’s visit: while an
anonymous phone call claimed responsibility for the Islamic Jihad organisation, the Iranians immediately stated that "there exists evidence that, through these explosions, the Iraqis are trying to bring pressure to bear on the Saudi government." Meanwhile, on May 25 a car full of explosives was driven into the motorcade of Kuwait’s Emir Sheikh Jaber Ahmad as-Sabah, who narrowly escaped death. Saddam Hussein accused Iran of having organised the assassination attempt, and his Baath leaders announced the resumption of the cities war against Iran "to punish" Teheran.

Iran, which forcefully denied the charges, has been patiently building up good relations with its Arab neighbours and would gain no political advantage by killing a sheikh, who would soon be replaced by a close relative. On the other hand, there is every chance that the aborted attempt was a not very intelligent action by Baghdad — as observers believe — designed to accuse the Islamic regime of exporting “terror” to the Gulf countries and thus sabotaging the rapprochement underway between Teheran and the neighbouring kingdoms. This action is very likely to inspire mistrust of Saddam Hussein rather than of the Iranian authorities, as already reflected in the curtailment early this year of oil aid to the Baathist regime — from 500,000 to 250,000 barrels a day. In the meantime, if the news that 13 Iraqi agents were arrested in Bahrain — accused of forming secret cells in the army — is confirmed, it would be yet further indication that the Iraqi leader’s strategy is self-destructive, pushing the Gulf countries to friendlier relations with Iran.

Already the Iranians and the Saudis appear satisfied with their first talks. Iran’s Foreign Minister Velayati was given an official invitation to visit Riyadh, and his response was that more visits would follow. A goodwill gesture from Saudi Arabia had already indicated the Kingdom’s desire to normalise relations with the Islamic regime: a communiqué from the session of the Mediation Committee held in Jeddah on May 2, without naming Iraq, condemned the use of chemical weapons, the impediment to air navigation, and the non-observance of the June 1984 UN-sponsored agreement on the non-bombing of cities — all of which have been committed by Iraq.

Thus, along with the Saudi-Iranian contacts, the count-down for Saddam Hussein appears to have started — and with it, the dynamic of peace. In his talks with Prince Saud al-Faisal, Hojjatoleslam Rafsanjani referred to Saddam as "the factor of tension in the region," otherwise "Iran can live in peace and friendship with all neighbouring Muslim countries."
KUWAIT ACCUSED OF COLLUSION WITH IRAQ AGAINST IRAN

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 31 Aug 85 p 2

TEHRAN (IRNA)— In its Wednesday editorial, the Persian daily Ettela'at said that Kuwait has aided and abetted Iraq in perpetrating war crimes in Iran while on the surface it has been engaging in a sham war with Baghdad. It said the terroristic acts committed by Kuwait against the Islamic government are outrageous enough to be interpreted as a "declaration of war" against Iran and because of Kuwait's collaboration with Baghdad in hitting Iranian oil wells and oil installations in the Iraq-Iran war and also because of its unwarranted detention, "torture and expulsion" of law-abiding Iranians in Kuwait in the past few years it was now time the Islamic Republic reconsidered its policy of good-neighborly relations with the Kuwaiti government.

The daily also accuses the Kuwaiti government of selling out the aspirations of the Palestinian movement on the one hand and also, under the pretext of peace efforts, trying to undermine the liberation struggles of Mujahideen Moslems in Afghanistan by getting into secret dealings with the Soviets with the eventual goal of helping the Soviets extricate themselves from the quagmire in Afghanistan so that they may later join the camp of countries hostile with the Islamic Republic and antagonize Iran.

The following are excerpts from the daily's editorial:

"During the past few days the media reflected on the contemptuous expulsion of hundreds of Iranian nationals from Kuwait... the media said, also that five Iranians had died in the prisons of Kuwait, though in fact the group of five had been killed in the wake of continuous torture...

"The Kuwaiti government has been acting like that because as the (Persian daily) Jomhuri Eslami put it the other day, "It is confident that we will
not show any reaction," since the ruling government in Kuwait is the same that disbanded its Parliament upon the first order of the ruling Satan in Iran (the ex-Shah) who himself was a lackey of the United States.

"In order to give its contribution to the world terrorist acts against the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait has brought itself into a position to benefit from the protective propaganda of reactionism, the Ba'ath Party of Iraq and international Zionism...

"Thousands of Iranians have been tortured in Kuwait ever since the culmination of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and their assets have been seized and many have been expelled from that country... the Kuwaiti government #voels Iranians, despite valid employment contracts between them and their Kuwaiti employers, for political considerations which makes it a political act...

"The Kuwaiti government kidnaps Iraqi nations (defecting people, Iraqi army deserters and drafted youth) and delivers them to the Iraqi Embassy in Kuwait, it shells foreign embassies in daytime or showers bullets on diplomatic corps, without later arresting one single suspect...

"Another instance of Kuwait’s participation in war crimes against Iran has been its role in promoting turbulence in the waterways of the Persian Gulf. It lets Baghdad use its floating and stationary radars as well as its own airspace.

Two years ago the Kuwaiti government helped Baghdad in its shelling of oil wells in Iran. Kuwait also provided much facilities to the hijackers of an Iranian plane helping them to get to their ultimate destination sometime ago... the Kuwaiti minister of state personally conducted operations when an Iranian Jumbo jet was hijacked to Kuwait...

"Its now time the Islamic Republic did something to show that her patience is not unlimited and that while it adheres to the text of the Holy Quran, it can punish on the principle of an eye for an eye..."
ARTICLE EXAMINES FRANCE'S 'VOLTE FACE' IN GULF

East Burnahm ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Jul 85 pp 31-33

July 1981, the French authorities turned his residence at Over-sur-Oise into a Veritable fortress in order to deter murder attempts, and a squadron of 70 paramilitary police as well as two "anti-terrorist barriers" have — until recently — protected his house day and night. The French counter-espionage organisation DST has also assured protection for the Iranian opposition; it is reported to have foiled several plans to assassinate Iranian opponents in 1983 and 1984.

The protection that Paris has devoted to Massoud Rajavi is an indication not only of the extent of support the French government has granted the Iranian opposition, but of the credibility it has given to the Mujahedin-e-Khalq leader's political significance in Iran — a fact admitted by Jean Perrien, former French chargé d'affaires in Teheran.

The withdrawal on February 1 of most of the guards and the removal of the anti-terrorist barriers around Rajavi's residence has left him with only 20 policemen to protect him. Does this not convey a change of attitude by France with regard to Iran? It seems that the Mujahedin's leader had no other choice but to put up with the decision. In a statement to the press on February 3, he said that government officials assured him that France's policy towards him had not changed and that the scaling down of his protection was due to "administrative and technical problems."

Press reports said that the recrudescence of terrorist action by Action Direct — a leftist anti-military organisation — the Armenian ASALA, the Corsicans and so on have stretched the French police to a point where
 redeployment of units has become necessary. The explanation, however, does not sound convincing. Terrorist actions were particularly rife in France in 1983 and 1984, but that did not prevent Rajavi from enjoying the most impressive security ever enjoyed by a political refugee. A reason for the relaxation of security around Rajavi is to be found elsewhere.

Observers reported discreet, low-level French-Iranian contacts through a third party towards the end of summer and autumn 1984. Parallel to this, Rajavi's National Council for the Resistance (NCR) noticeably reduced its public criticism of the Islamic Republic — although it continued its practical propaganda work and movements unimpeded. This indeed reflects a slow change of attitude at the Elysee, which was transmitted to the Iranians by Jean Perrien on the eve of his definitive return to France.

Perrien, who was received by Majlis speaker Hojjatoleslam Rafsanjani on March 30, explained that a new atmosphere has been created between Iran and France since the appointment of Dumas. "A short time after his appointment to the French foreign ministry, Dumas called me to Paris to have talks on relations between Iran and France... He asked me to convey the message to Iranian leaders that he is interested in improving relations between France and Iran during his period in office."

On the question of Iranian opponents within France, the outgoing chargé d'affaires told of developments since last autumn. "France is trying to limit their activities as much as possible and I think there has been some success in this area, because all these things take place gradually." Perrien went on to say that Iranian opposition groups have maintained relations with socialist parties in France and Europe, but he dismissed such contacts as "not important." He specified that although the socialists are in power, their party's views "in general" do not influence the political decision-making of President Mitterrand who is advised, among others, by Roland Dumas.

Perrien also admitted that his government's hostile position towards Iran was "a misunderstanding." "There were individuals... who thought that it was the opponents of the Islamic Republic who represented the revolution and that another Islamic revolution did not exist." Hashemi Rafsanjani rejected the idea of a misunderstanding and retorted: "At present, our ships in the Persian Gulf are being hit by your missiles. Our money has been kept in your banks. Our terrorist enemies, who have assassinated the best leaders of our people, are now under the protection of your police... Among European governments, the French government has chosen the worst policy towards us, while it could have been cautious and acted like Germany and Britain."

While the Majlis speaker dismissed the French government's enthusiasm to normalise relations with Iran as mere "words," Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati recognised in mid-April that there had been some change towards Iran. Speaking to Le Monde's special envoy, he said: "We have noticed... lately that France has reduced its military aid to Iraq. We think this is a positive step." After his mediatory visits to Baghdad and Tehran in April, UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar confirmed the new development in France's Middle Eastern policy. "The French now refrain from giving the Iraqis too many sophisticated weapons," he noted. The arms referred to are thought to be Exocet missiles. It seems true that France is no longer supplying Baghdad with them, yet there is probably no need for them currently as Iraq reportedly has an adequate stock of this weapon.

In any case, the French change of attitude towards Iran is quite perceptible, and several reasons underlie this change. First is the stability of the Islamic regime. After more than five years of war, in spite of the total arms and economic embargo and the extremely high arms prices in the black market, the Islamic Republic has survived and its economy has endured the impact of the war successfully. Moreover, the Elysee has observed the determination in Iran to continue the war.

On the other hand, France is now well aware of Iraq's reported inefficiency in using French weapons. Besides, the repeated rescheduling of its debts started raising questions about, and opposition to, France's unsreserved support of such a small country as Iraq. Finally, it dawned on the French government what observers had warned about in 1982 and particularly in 1983, when France stepped up its arms sales to Baghdad — namely that Iran has been, and will be in the long run, the sine
qua non power in the Gulf and that sooner or later France will have to reckon with it.

Apart from the political issue between Iran and France, there is a financial problem. France has blocked $1bn which the Shah had lent to Eurodif, a French uranium enrichment company. Unconfirmed reports say that Iran is also demanding the payment of interest, now reaching $300m. Perrien stated that Dumas would like to solve this issue to which Rafsanjani replied: “While you have blocked our money, you have given (recently) a new deadline to Iraq to repay its debts.”

Behind the hesitation on both sides, Iran is keen on neutralising France’s considerable support for Iraq, while the French government has realised that the time has come for a new policy towards Teheran. However, delicate calculations of a political, economic and strategic nature are involved — how to deduce support for Iraq and normalise relations with Iran, without endangering its economic and military assets among the Gulf Arab states, is the problem now facing France.
PROBLEMS, DIFFICULTIES FACING NON-OIL EXPORTS ELABORATED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 1 Aug 85 p 4

Economic Service--In a special interview with a ETTELA'AT reporter, the director general of the export expansion center of Iran answered questions about the country's export affairs, the problems of non-oil exports, the 1984-85 export-import bill, the exemption of certain goods from foreign exchange promissory note deposits, export encouragement, frontier cooperatives and other foreign trade questions.

In response to a question at the beginning of this interview about the condition of the country's exports after the Islamic revolution Mr. Akbari, the director general of the export expansion center of Iran said: "The country's non-oil exports is one of the affairs ignored before the revolution. Availability of overflowing income from the export of 6 million barrels of oil a day distracted attention from the value of non-oil exports which at its highest level was around 6 billion dollars.

No basic foundation was laid for export industries and the export situation has not been the victim of fundamental changes. After the Islamic revolution, special difficulties were created for exports of which the most important were: the imposed Iraqi war against Iran which created problems for transporting and producing a portion of export goods, problems related to the smuggling of goods, the apparent differences of the foreign exchange rate on the black market and banking system, the essential need for collecting foreign exchange promissory notes, careful supervision in determining prices, the economic boycott of Iran by oppressive superpowers, increase in competition at the international level especially in regard to rugs and dried fruits, the decline of some exports like cotton which had been exported for years, and a series of other factors. The mentioned factors led to a decline in the country's exports during 1981-82 but continuing policies adopted during 1983-84 prevented the decline of exports. In 1983 the nation's exports increased 43 percent in weight and 30 percent in value compared to 1982. Fortunately, in 1984 export growth continued and in that year the nation's exports amounted to 264,000 tons which is a 15 percent increase in weight and a 6 percent increase in value compared to the previous year. We hope this process will be continued in the coming years."
The Export-Import Bill

In response to the question "What is your view in regard to the export-import bill of 1984-85 which was recently ratified and can this bill stimulate exports?" he answered: "The ratification of this bill by the honorable members of the Islamic Majlis and honorable members of the council of guardians has been met with great enthusiasm by exporters. This law is comprehensive from every point of view and answers most questions including the policies for encouraging exports. The important points of this bill are as follows: The exemption of income from export goods from income tax. An indication of policies in regard to prices and export facilities and the establishment of a relationship between prices and the price increase of goods in order to eliminate the export of those goods which cannot make enough foreign exchange profit and whose foreign exchange balance sheet is not satisfactory. A revision of the composition of the pricing committee in order to stimulate decision making and expedite the intended activities. Approval of the export mechanism in lieu of exports and exemption of those goods under the cover of this mechanism from the rules of forced distribution and creating means in order to facilitate the system of obtaining foreign exchange promissory notes."

In regard to the execution regulations of this bill he added: "In regard to these regulations we hope the suggestions we have made will become effective in the execution of this bill. For example, one of the articles of this bill indicates that imports of any kind of container or case which is used in packing is prohibited. A note in this article indicates that producing and exporting units which need containers with special specifications are excluded from this law. Another example is that recently 106 goods have been exempted from the requirement for depositing foreign exchange promissory notes by the council of ministers. In this case we have proposed that the exemption from depositing foreign exchange promissory notes be made retroactive as long as the grace period of the promissory note has not expired."

Growth of Country's Exports

In response to the question "According to custom's estimates, the country's export growth in the first 2 months of the current year has increased 45 percent compared to the same time last year. In the view of the export expansion center what factors caused the export increase?" the director of the export expansion center answered: "Various factors have affected the export increase of which the most important is the special export facilities which according to the sanctioned laws, the council of ministers has given to the exporters. Revisions to the method of pricing export goods, presentation of the goods in international and private exhibitions especially the special exhibition of Iran's export goods in Dubai and other considered facilities among them the revision of the purchase rate of foreign exchange for exports have been effective in the export expansion of the country. For the same reason, the export of dates, raisins, pistachio nuts, dried apricots, cumin, furs intestines, berries and textiles have increased considerably in the first two months of the current year."
In answer to the question "In your view, what is the motive of the recently ratified decree that exempts exporters from the foreign exchange promissory note requirement?" Mr Akbari said: "As you know, there is plenty of unused and potential capacity in the agricultural sector. But at present, various problems exist in this regard such as packing, transport of goods, non-observance of obligatory standards, smuggling of goods, and intensified competition. With the coordination of the related units, we can be hopeful that the amount of exports of fruits, fresh vegetables, and medicinal and industrial herbs will increase as expected. According to this decree, the export of 106 agricultural products have been excluded from foreign exchange promissory note deposits, in order to enable exporters of these goods to expand their activities in export markets and be able to compete favorably."

"Other positive points of this decree are that we have demanded the governor's offices of the nation's provinces to be more active in campaigning against the smuggling of export goods. Since the border cooperatives have been very active in export affairs, according to this decree, the export expansion center is required to organize classes to furnish guidance and information to border settlers.

The fourth session of these classes was held during the second half of the month of Tir /June 22-July 22/ in Sistan and Baluchestan Province. In these classes, specialists lectured about customs affairs, standards, the central bank and improving imports and exports for the proper authorities of these cooperatives." He added: "Certainly in this regard we will try our best so that these cooperatives can organize a union in order to make their activities more profitable. As a matter of fact, the lack of skills in exporting and importing will cause tremendous losses for these cooperatives. At present, 41 frontier cooperatives exist in the south of the country with about 250,000 members. The lack of coordination of activities of these cooperatives has created difficulties. For example the pistachio nut price which was 37 dirhams in the gulf sheikdoms has decreased to 8 dirhams as a result of the lack of harmony in the cooperatives. Also the single-handed move of these cooperatives to purchase domestic pistachio nuts resulted in a price increase and created shortages. We believe these cooperatives must be administered by experienced persons in order for their weak points to be eliminated and in the meantime with the establishment of a union, their dependency on the Persian Gulf markets will be reduced. It is only possible for specialists to participate in the activities of these cooperatives through the establishment of a union. At present a union for these cooperatives is in the process of being established."

Policies to Encourage Exports

The director general of the export expansion center of Iran in answer to the question "What are the systems for the encouragement of exports in our country and what are your operations?" stated: "Export encouragement in Iran briefly is the following: The use of preferred rates to purchase
foreign currency to aid exports. In this regard a committee consisting of representatives of the central bank, ministry of commerce, and the ministry of the related goods will be organized. This committee will determine what goods need encouragement and the rate for purchasing foreign currency. The exporter can use the foreign currency from exports to import goods, sell it to a licensed importer, or sell it to licensed banks at the preferred rate which was referred to previously. The income from exports is exempt from tax. In addition, the government will refund duty fees and trade profits of export machinery products to exporters. Transport facilities for goods have been considered by the government land, air and sea transport institutions, which are mentioned in the export-import laws of the current year." He added: "In general, in regard to the question of exports, obtaining foreign currency is one of our aims. But another important question which is considered by the ministry of commerce is the job creation potential of exports. We suggest that the foreign exchange agreements for some goods be omitted or adjusted. For example, the export of rugs and dried fruits feed a few million people and any kind of difficulties in exporting these goods will create unemployment and migration."

Tehran International Exhibition

Mr Akbari referred to the establishment of the Tehran international exhibition on 21 August of this year and the possibilities for the sale of licensed industrial goods exhibited at these exhibition to government organizations which are interested in purchasing them and said: "In this regard, we are of the opinion that all the related organizations, among them the industrial ministries, the agriculture ministry and the central bank relinquish power. This means that the justification for imported goods must be issued by the ministry of industry and the ministry of commerce and due to the exclusive and limited amount of imported goods the total authority should be given to the ministry of commerce." In regard to the participation at international exhibitions and its quantitative value he said: "Our participation in foreign exhibitions has political and economic aspects. Certainly we will attempt to gain economic benefits from these exhibitions. For example, our special exhibition in Dubai resulted in drawing contracts and we hope to succeed in their execution."

At the conclusion of this interview, the director general of the export expansion center of Iran in regard to the difficulties of the export expansion center in its execution and aid to exporters said: "We have some difficulties that I hope will be solved with the help of other organizations. Among them, we hope that with the agreement of the central bank and the ministry of economic affairs and finance, steps can be taken to eliminate these difficulties and to encourage the payments of exports. Also, our difficulties with the plan organization can be solved by paying the allocation of credits on time. Also I must mention that the problems of the nation's export expansion are two-fold. Some of these problems need a long time to be solved like the increase of industrial goods exports and regulating their price, eliminating transportation difficulties
and the shortage of raw materials for industry and as a whole, strengthening the industrial units which could be active in exports. Also the problems related to the low quality of some export goods, and the lack of applicability to the standards of the consumer market, poor packing and other similar problems could be solved in the medium term. But we have to mention that the lack of allocated credits and the lack of allocating them on time by plan and budget organization for the execution of the export program, dispatch of marketing missions, participation in international exhibitions, and contact with international information organizations and performing the activities related to exports has made us face some difficulties which have resulted in reducing the efficiency of this center.

"We hope that with the recognition of the importance of exports by the proper authorities in other ministries and government organizations, among them the plan and budget organization and the central bank the elimination of the problems related to encouraging exports could be expedited and with the cooperation and help of those who are active in this regard, to reduce these problems as much as possible.

9815
CSO: 4640/681
KHOMEYNI REGIME SAID TO BE ON SLOPE OF GREAT DOWNFALL

London KEYHAN in Persian 22 Aug 85 pp 1-2

[London KEYHAN Weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] The discussion continues about whether theocrats, whose previously designed plans for the desolation of Iran, remain in power or through their incapability and ignorance, push a flourishing country to the extreme.

In over six years of theocratic rule, the country has been hurled to such a dreadful abyss that it could be a prelude for complete devastation. Their job is not to rule the country but usurpation. This is not how to administrate the affairs of a nation, it is plunder. Even in the mirror of the false and retouched statistics of the regime you do not see the reflection of an image in which to revive optimism.

In over six years theocrats have built no dams or power stations. They have not established an industrial complex or opened a new university. Let us forget about these offerings as even every remnant of the previous era is continuously degenerating or becoming unservicable. Long electricity cut offs, water shortages, shortages in teaching and health services, crippled industry and agriculture are painful daily realities that the Iranian people perceive every hour through their skin and bones. Look at the enormous Bandar Shapur petrochemical complex. Not only does it not produce one gram of product, it is also a huge open-mouthed monster that only swallows petro-dollars. Take a look at the Sarcheshmeh copper mine. According to confessions of officials of the Islamic Republic regime, it only operates at 25 percent capacity. Look at the vast units of agro-industry; you can expect anything from them except products.

The false statistics and figures published by the regime brag about the nation's agricultural situation yet the long lines to purchase groceries indicate something else. Hordes of several million unemployed say something about the job producing policies of the Islamic Republic and the statistics published by the ministry of labor. In this wayfaring there is no need to emphasize what is true and what is false.

Definitely Ayatollah Khomeyni has the time to review preview promises once, look at the actual facts of Iran today, and then answer the people's questions.
Has electricity become free? Is water gratis? Has transportation become free? He only emphasizes that people did not revolt for the sake of bread and melon and up to now, his regime has not even been able to provide bread and melon for the people.

Mere survival in Iran depends on oil income which the Islamic Republic, pretending to be the guardian of the people's wealth, has put under the auctioneer's hammer in international markets. A regime which intended to free Iran from economic dependency is more than ever unilaterally dependent on international markets. A regime which before its rule was so critical about a single product economy for oil, has today the most single product economy in the economic history of Iran.

Khark Island is the world economy's naval card for the nourishment of this regime. That is the reason why the raw oil of Iran pours into international markets at unbelievable and secret discounts in order to obtain foreign currency for purchasing raw materials, food, and more than anything else, weapons and war supplies. Strangely, the regime through its adventurous whirlpool warfare, has severity endangered the only source of its single product economy's nourishment like the story of the man sitting on top of the branches cutting the bottom of the tree. Maybe there are some inside the Islamic regime who are concerned about the future, but the only thing Ayatollah Khomeyni is not concerned about is the future since he does not have one. Yet he does not want his downfall to be only limited to the height and length of one person, in his view, the abyss should be so big that an immense land like Iran will go down it.

His danger is this very thing. He who finds all the doors of the great victory closed to him is riding at full force towards a big downfall. The destruction of the Khark Island is the prelude of such a downfall. But we, as the nation of Iran, warn Iraq, that while we are trying with all our power to depose Khomeyni's regime, we will not allow the amputation of Iran's vital arteries at any cost. The point that separates us from Ayatollah Khomeyni and places us together as opposers is the same. We want ourselves for the sake of Iran, while in order to stay a few days longer in Jamaran and on the throne of power, he is willing to not only drive Iran but also his beloved Islam to the slaughter house. That is why we declare that our beloved country is undergoing the most sensitive era of its historic events. Khomeyni's downfall is certain but we must prevent him from taking Iran with him.

On the other hand Iraq must realize that Khark Island is not the family inheritance of Ayatollah Khomeyni. It was built before the Islamic revolution with Iran's capital and as a result, the nation of Iran cannot be indifferent to its devastation. The enmity of the Iraqi regime towards Ayatollah Khomeyni must not cause our vital arteries to be threatened or amputated.

The Iraqi government must not get involved in an adventure and flame the fire of vindictiveness between two nations. The devastation of Khark Island would provoke such vindictive feelings in Iran that no government could ignore them.

Iraq must know that peace with Iran can never be achieved amidst the ruins of Khark Island.