USSR Report

WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No. 5, May 1984
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USSR REPORT

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No 5, May 1984

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ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF MAJOR ARTICLES IN MEMO JOURNAL

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 158-159

[Text] The idea behind V. Shemyatenkov's article "Cold War or Detente: US Foreign Policy Dilemma" is to show that irrespective of the peculiarities of the election rhetoric campaign such vital issues of the political struggle today as war and peace and the fate of detente pose a dilemma. The article discloses the historical inevitability of the failure of Reagan's foreign policy doctrine which revives in new conditions the old line of American imperialism, aimed at destroying the opposing socioeconomic system. The author elaborates the idea that of all concrete historical forms of peaceful coexistence of states with opposing social systems that have so far existed, the easing of international tension is the most adequate one. He critically analyses the bourgeois concepts of detente and believes that their inherent deficiencies are due to the objective contradictions between the imperatives of peaceful coexistence and the specific interests of imperialism, the US above all. Consequently the prerequisite conditions for a return to detente is the firm, consolidated and consistent policy of the socialist countries as well as persistent struggle of all progressive and realistically minded forces.

The article "The Race of Conventional Armaments and How To Limit Them" by V. Makarevsky speaks about the arms race, entering a qualitatively new and far more dangerous phase, embracing all types of weapons conventional included. The author shows the threat of such a race unleashed by the USA and NATO. The threat arises from the fact that present-day widely used conventional weapons are continuously modified. The emergence of conventional weapons of great destructive capabilities as well as whole assault-breaking complexes, combining reconnaissance, command and control and the kill capability systems in the final run bring them close to nuclear weapons of low capacity. The article considers the disastrous effect of conventional weapons in local wars and their threat to universal peace, the state and development of the US and NATO military machine, the correlation of the main indices of military power of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the NATO Atlantic bloc, their relative equilibrium. The article points to the need to find ways to curb all kinds of arms race, conventional included, and to preserve and strengthen world peace. It also stresses the importance of the Soviet initiatives dealing with the problem.
K. Brutenz in the article "Non-alignment in the World of Today" pictures it as a rather stable, epoch-making phenomenon in the present international life. He points out that this movement embodies the aspiration of the peoples which free themselves from colonial and semi-colonial dependence, from imperialism to become independent subjects of international life, to organize themselves on interstate level of the solution of economic and political problems and to make a free choice of the road of development. So the platform of non-alignment acquires a wide social and anti-imperialist essence which determines its political nature and its essential place in the system of present-day international relations. It, in its turn, determines the principled Soviet position on this movement. The author singles out three main interrelated factors influencing non-alignment: the international situation, the correlation of forces on the world arena included; the objective place and role of the developing countries in political and economic relations; the internal conditions in the newly independent countries. The article traces the roots of non-alignment, singles out its basic features in the period from the last 1950 up to 80s which is of prominent importance in its history and promotes a better understanding of the qualitative changes in the movement. The author focuses on the political platform of the movement which was clearly defined at the Havana and Delhi conferences and determines the stand of the non-aligned countries on problems of peace, security, detente, economic development, independence, disarmament, etc. The article concentrates on the large-scale tasks, facing the non-aligned movement, the solution of which presupposes the consolidation of ties with the socialist countries.

In the article "Argentina--on the Historical Turning Point" by I. Zorina and V. Sheynis the authors regard Argentina as one of the countries belonging to the zone of "intermediary" capitalism, noting that by a number of socio-economic indices it is somewhere between the developed and developing countries. Despite its considerable economic and financial dependence upon imperialist centres and TNC, Argentina has a diversified structure of industry and export, a comparatively high scientific and technical potential while being one of the largest producers and exporters of grain and other agricultural products. The article describes the ruling groups, incorporating both the agricultural-financial oligarchy and big national capital, the upper strata of the state bureaucracy and military technocracy. It shows the peculiar socio-political nature of the Argentinean proletariat and the trade-union movement. Peronism, its evolution and role at present is also analyzed in the article. While determining the place of Argentina in the system of inter-American and international relations the authors recognize its historically shaped leading position in the region but at the same time they show that over the last fifty years of political instability Argentina has been steadily losing its positions. As a result of a deep economic and political crisis a transition to civil administration and democratic development as well as a serious re-orientation of the foreign-policy course have taken place.

The so-called Reaganomics as a new version of the Conservative economic policy has been essentially transformed during Reagan's term of being in office. The article "Reaganomics and Stagflation" by S. Nikitin is an
examination of the direct consequences of the U.S. economic policy aimed at solution of urgent problems, namely, inflation and unemployment along with the peculiar combination of the two, named stagflation.

The author gives his interpretation of the "stagflation" concept and investigates the main factors of its emergence and development, backing the analysis by statistical material which relates to the period of the crisis of 1974-1975s. According to his research stagflation is a result of the functioning conditions of the modern state monopoly capitalism, which are heavily influenced by structural and technological shifts, the MNC's activity, fiscal and monetary policy of the bourgeois state, the situation on world markets.

Reaganomics is based on monetarist postulates and concepts of "supply-side economics". Monetarists ignore the interaction between inflation and unemployment, at least in the long run. According to them inflation is caused by the excess of money in circulation, connected with growing state interference with economic matters. Their prescriptions, approved by Reagan administration, focus on anti-inflationary moves, promising the victory over stagflation. The economic reality was all against these remedies because strict control of money supply contradicted with spurring of economic growth and diminishing of rate of unemployment. The second edition of Reaganomics-Reaganomics II, though giving up the main goal to balance the deficit, appeared to be in the same vicious circles, unable to eliminate neither inflation, nor unemployment to counterface stagflation.

V. Martsinkevich in the article "Inter-Industry Technology Flows in the Capitalist Production (the example of the U.S.A.)" examines the major effects of R&D impact on the overall efficiency of production and suggests quite a new scientometric approach purported to measure and assess these effects.

The R&D impact upon the production parametres is two-fold. Firstly, the scales of the performed R&D influence the particular industry, where they are carried out, rising the general level of applied technology, qualification of employees, appropriately altering the conditions of new products commercialization.

Secondly, R&D impact refer to the rate of new techniques diffusion, embodied in high-tech final products of the recipient industries. The author distinguishes the technology generating and technology of receiving industries and presents the abundant statistical evidence supporting his view both in quantity and quality.

The analysis also deals with the interaction between the R&D intensity of capitalist production and the economic environment, promoting for the accelerated rate of R&D efficiency. The characteristic features of this very interaction accounts for the further aggravation of contradictions of technological change within the capitalist framework. These contradictions are closely connected with R&D intensive produce and monopolistic practice of their control, offsetting the very possibility of technology flows.


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3
U.S. FOREIGN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, 'LINKAGE' POLICY SCORED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 3-14

[Article by V. Shemyatenkov: "Cold War of Detente: U.S. Foreign Policy Dilemma"]

[Text] Preparations for the next presidential election are in full swing in the United States. All is customary and familiar in this immense political carnival, which is designed to take the edge off the harsh prose of the domination of monopoly capital. But the conditions under which the present election campaign is being conducted are unusual.

Despite the cyclical recovery, the U.S. economy remains squeezed in the vise of profound structural crisis, mass unemployment and inflation, in the face of which federal regulation is impotent. The gap between rich and poor is greater than ever, and the mood of disenchantment and hopelessness is strong. But, perhaps, the main singularity of present-day America is unprecedented fear in the face of nuclear war and disquiet at the deterioration in the international situation. And it is not fortuitous that for the first time in many decades international problems have proven to be at the center of the election struggle.

The specific features of the present election campaign in the United States are such that not one bourgeois politician is mentioning detente. This is the generally accepted "rules of the game," the reasons for which we will deal with later. But whatever the candidates may say and do, it is precisely the question of the fate of detente which invariably stands out behind their declarations and silences. Detente or a "crusade" against socialism, political realism or reactionary utopianism, a policy of maintaining peaceful, good-neighborly and mutually profitable relations with all states or a policy of aggression and adventurism, dangerous crises and humiliating defeats—such are the real dilemmas currently confronting the United States.

I

"The great Lenin," K. U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said, "bequeathed us the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. We are invariably faithful to this
principle. Now, in the age of nuclear weapons and superaccurate missiles, it is needed by the peoples more than ever."

The objective regularity of the peaceful coexistence of states of the two different socioeconomic systems operates throughout the era of the transition from capitalism to socialism. Throughout this lengthy period it is realized in specific-historical forms. The most suitable of all those as yet provided by social practice is the relaxation of international tension, which underwent the greatest development in the 1970's. It was the result of the interaction and struggle of the two opposite class forces—socialism and capitalism. The concurrence of a number of objective interests of the socialist and capitalist states ensured the possibility of agreements in principle and served as the basis for their practical realization. At the same time, however, the different class nature of the policy of the detente partners—the socialist and capitalist states, primarily the USSR and the United States—became particularly obvious.

For the Soviet Union the aspiration to an extension and consolidation of detente is the strategic line of its foreign policy. This desire expresses the uniform will of the Soviet people. It embodies their historical experience, world outlook and moral values. The Soviet policy of detente was based and continues to be based on a scientific analysis of the processes occurring in the world and an in-depth understanding of the objective, logical nature of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. The Soviet Union is today also doing everything possible for an easing of international tension, a halt to the arms race and the development of international cooperation, that is, essentially under the new, more complicated conditions also is continuing a policy of detente, at the same time, however, adopting the necessary additional measures to ensure the security of the socialist community and rebuff the growing aggressiveness of imperialism.

On the American side the policy of detente was never a consequence of national consensus. In the 1970's it was supported by a significant majority of the population and opposed by the temporarily disorganized forces of imperialist reaction, forces which had not laid down their arms, however. For U.S. ruling circles the transition to a policy of detente was a forced step dictated primarily by the major foreign policy defeats of the 1960's. The political realism of the then U.S. leaders was manifested primarily in recognition of the irreversible change in the correlation of forces in the world and the emergence of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO. A far lesser place in their motivation was occupied by an aspiration to develop mutually profitable cooperation.

Acute contradictions tore the U.S. Administration itself, and it pursued an inconsistent and contradictory policy. As is made clear by material published recently, particularly the memoirs of R. Nixon and H. Kissinger, the prudent statements and actions of the American leaders were frequently combined with unscrupulous maneuvering and sometimes deliberate intrigue even.

The main defect of U.S. foreign policy in the 1970's was the fact that it pursued knowingly unattainable goals: as a maximum, achieving the "softening" and "transformation" of the social system in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, as a minimum, forcing them to unilateral concessions in policy, economics and ideology. Only a very small group of farsighted and realistic figures understood the illusory nature of these hopes, but their voice was drowned in the chorus of unbridled adherents to "peaceful pressure" on the Soviet Union.

The incompatibility of ends and means brought about the short-lived nature of the United States' "soft" policy course of the 1970's and facilitated the assumption of office by reactionary, militarist circles. Official Washington's inconsistent, half-baked readiness to participate in the detente process was replaced by an avowedly aggressive policy aimed at undermining this process. However, with the departure from the principles of detente the contradictions in American foreign policy not only were not resolved but, on the contrary, assumed unprecedented seriousness.

II

The ultraright forces which were victorious at the 1980 election reject the philosophy of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

Reagan proclaimed as the ultimate goal of his policy the extermination of world socialism. "We are in a state of war," he declared back in the 1960's, "and we are losing... simply because we are not aware that we are in a war, but in war there can only be one ending.... In wars one wins or loses."

In office now, he declared world socialism an "evil empire," with which abiding by his logic, it is impossible to negotiate. Reagan called for the start of a "crusade" against socialism, and the entire practical policy of the U.S. Administration came to be switched to the tracks of total diplomatic, propaganda and economic war against the USSR and its allies. Officials in Washington began openly to talk about the possibility of victory in both "limited" and "protracted" nuclear wars. The entire U.S. military machine was pointed in the direction of the material preparations for such wars. In other words, Reagan intended to detonate the policy of peaceful coexistence.

But the objective nature of the laws of social development, apart from all else, is that canceling them is not given to anyone. Achieving "victory over socialism" without total nuclear war is impossible. But nor can it be achieved by means of such a war. As American leaders themselves have acknowledged repeatedly, it would have no winner.

The "intermediate" option—resumption of the cold war—remains. But it has already once led imperialism to defeat. This policy is even more hopeless given the present correlation of forces in the world. The "brinkmanship" policy which is the basis of it—the creation of the U.S. atomic monopoly, which disappeared long since—is now an obvious bluff. This cannot intimidate the USSR. At the same time, however, the danger of "brinkmanship" for imperialism itself has increased sharply in connection with the development of military equipment also.
Implementation of an adventurist cold war policy is being made more difficult by the consistently peace-loving and responsible policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, the resistance of the forces of peace and democracy and, finally, simply the presence of commonsense in the public of the capitalist countries. The entire political, intellectual and moral experience of detente is working against a cold war.

The present U.S. Administration, naturally, cannot fail to perceive the ir reconcilable contradiction contained in its doctrines which is fettering freedom of action and in the long term threatens bankruptcy. For this reason Reagan and his sympathizers are feverishly seeking a way out of the blind alley.

This is being done primarily by way of a deliberate exacerbation of international tension, an arms race, "psychological warfare" and aggressive local wars. At the same time increasingly close attention is being paid to securing "rear support" for the aggressive foreign policy. It is significant that for the failure of his adventures overseas Reagan blames... the U.S. Congress, which allegedly occupies insufficiently decisive positions on questions of the use of military force. Foreseeing the inevitable increase in mass dissatisfaction with the White House's adventurist foreign policy, H. Kissinger, who is close to the present administration, is recommending right now that open discussion of foreign policy problems be limited and that the protest movement not be allowed to assume the proportions of the Vietnam war years. This proves for the umteenth time the old truth: aggressiveness in foreign policy inevitably gives rise to authoritarian trends in domestic policy.

But even were these trends to be materialized in the direct fascistization of the country, this would not save the historically bankrupt strategy of the liquidation of world socialism. As several decades ago also, today this cannot even be contemplated without total military superiority, and this the United States does not have. It is not surprising that the present American leaders, like certain incompetent rulers of the past, are putting their hopes in some "absolute weapon" which could, in Reagan's words, "change the course of human history."

A space antimissile system is designed to be such a weapon. Exorbitant obligations have been assumed by this future bill of exchange--securing for American imperialism military invulnerability and, consequently, the possibility of dictating its will to all the rest of the world and bringing world socialism to its knees.

Upon closer examination, however, this bill of exchange proves to be inflated. According to the data of American scientists, given the current level of technology, a space ABM system costing $20 billion would be capable of destroying no more than 15 ICBM's (on a simultaneous launch). In the future, scientists believe, given a number of major new discoveries, the creation of a large-scale space ABM system costing $400 billion and capable of hitting 1,000 missiles in 100 seconds cannot be ruled out. However, unfortunately for the disciples of thermonuclear war, even if such a system were built, it could not provide 100 percent reliability and, consequently, military invulnerability. On the basis
of the technology which actually exists effective counteraction weapons could be built whose cost would constitute only 1-2 percent of the cost of the system.* But if the latter will not help win a nuclear war, a policy based on its use remains a bluff, an extraordinarily costly and dangerous bluff, it is true.

Certain circles of the international public worried by Washington's adventurist policy are disposed to explain it by Reagan's ideological views and personal qualities. "The sources of the Reagan administration's failures," W. Pfaff, for example, wrote in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, "are to be found in his philosophy of life. The President and his assistants came to office occupying a definite position in respect of the Soviet Union and the world as a whole, but without any ideas and without a serious notion of what such a position leads to and without any serious concept of international relations."

Liberal critics emphasize the intellectual and psychological pathology of the ideologists of modern conservatism. According to G. Kennan, the preoccupation with nuclear war which is typical of them is a kind of sickness. "It is extremely dangerous. It does not hold out any hope.... It can be understood only as some form of subconscious despair experienced by its devotees and a kind of death wish—a state of mind which can be explained only by an incapacity for squaring up to the natural dangers and vicissitudes of human life."**

This is the truth, but not the whole truth. Rephrasing a well-known saying, it may be said that each policy has precisely the spokesman which it deserves. The ignorance and incompetence of the 40th President of the United States have become a commonplace. But by and large they are in harmony with the primitive philosophy and "uncouth" policy of the social forces which brought him to power.

Reagan and his administration are loyally and shamelessly serving the current interests of U.S. monopoly capital, primarily the interests of the military-industrial complex. The common denominator of Washington's present domestic and foreign policy is the aspiration to strengthen by any means the positions of American imperialism. In particular, the myth of the "Soviet military threat" and the spurring of international tension are not least intended to neutralize the constant weakening of the role of the United States in the capitalist world and strengthen "Atlantic" discipline.

But in their loyal zeal Reagan and his sympathizers are sacrificing the United States' long-term national interests. The Reagan administration's rare "successes" are being achieved at a price of tremendous social costs, and this bill is growing inexorably.

The arms race is ultimately not increasing but reducing U.S. security. "When the cold war era began," M. (Raskin), former research assistant of the Policy


** G. Kennan, "On Nucelar War" (THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS Nos 21/22, 1982, p 12).
Research Institute, observed, "ordinary Americans had no reason to believe that their homeland was in serious danger; now our country could be destroyed within the next 30 minutes. Such, it may be said, is the result of all these hundreds of billions which have been spent, all the blood that has been shed and all the energy which since World War II has been expanded to implant the misconstrued concept of national interests."* The program of "rearming America," if it is implemented, will make U.S. security even more shaky.

"Cosmic" military spending, which is enriching the military-industrial complex, is bleeding the American economy as a whole white. For this reason, despite the most vigorous "elbowing," the United States will continue to lose out in the competition with West Europe and Japan.

With its policy the Reagan administration, unbeknownst to it, is exposing the antipopular, antihuman and aggressive essence of the system which it serves. This policy is setting against American Imperialism not only the broad people's masses but also many bourgeois circles in the capitalist and developing countries and increasing the contradictions between the United States and its allies. In a word, Reagan is sowing the wind, and American imperialism is beginning to reap the whirlwind.

A striking example of this is the story of the deployment of first-strike nuclear weapons in West Europe. Formally the Reagan administration won a victory—the Pershings and cruise missiles were brought up to the borders of the socialist community. But in fact? Having adopted effective retaliatory measures, the USSR and its allies are nullifying this disturbance of military-strategic parity. The balance has been restored, but at a higher and more dangerous level of the sides' confrontation. Continuation of the arms limitation negotiations has become impossible. As a result the security of both the United States itself and its NATO allies has diminished.

The obtuse persistence with which Washington pushed through this most dangerous venture has led to the emergence of a multimillion-strong antiwar movement. Many social democratic parties have switched to antmissile positions. The contradictions between the governments of the West European NATO members and the United States not only have not been smoothed over with the deployment of the missiles but, on the contrary, have become even more acute. But, perhaps, the main result of this story is the profound shift in the consciousness of the broad people's masses, which have seen distinctly who is pushing the world toward thermonuclear catastrophe.

As the election approaches, criticism of Reagan's foreign policy is becoming increasingly sharp. It is believed that this manifests not only the situational interest of the political rivals of the Republican administration but also growing recognition of the hopelessness and disastrous nature of the philosophy which is the basis of the current policy. The concepts advanced by Reagan and his associates, (K. Oye), editor of the journal WORLD POLITICS, believes, have proven impracticable; the experiment with them has failed totally.

* WASHINGTON POST, 28 August 1983.
This is explained by the fact that Washington put forward overstated goals for American policy for the 1980's which are not supported globally by the available means and resources of the United States.*

"Reaganism," the American scholars S. Bialer and (Dzh. Afferik) observe, "means... an attempt to influence the internal prerequisites of the USSR's foreign policy behavior." They consider such an approach profoundly mistaken since the West has essentially no real possibility of influencing the internal dynamics of the USSR's political and economic system. "The Soviet Union," they continue, "will neither at the present time nor in the decades to come find itself in the grip of serious crisis since it relies on vast unused reserves of political and social stability sufficient to survive the most serious difficulties. The Soviet economy, like the Soviet political system... will never collapse."**

In election year the Reagan administration cannot, naturally, fail to reckon with these important shifts in the social consciousness. At the start of 1984 there was an abrupt change in the White House's official rhetoric. The figures directly responsible for undermining detente suddenly began to talk about their "love of peace," "aversion to war" and readiness for dialogue and even far-reaching accords with the Soviet Union.

These declarations are in sharp contrast with the foregoing rhetoric and actual policy of the Reagan administration. The majority of observers in the United States and overseas entirely justifiably believes that it is a question of an election maneuver. But the fact that in the race for the electorate's votes the White House is turning in the direction of "peace-loving" and not of even more bellicose propaganda is in itself indicative. It points to the actual bankruptcy of the ideology and policy of the extremely reactionary forces currently in office in the United States and the irreconcilable contradiction between the doctrine of Reaganism and the realities of current international relations.

Only two ways out of the blind alley of Reaganism are logical: a slide toward thermonuclear catastrophe or renunciation of the absurd goal of the extermination of world socialism. The future will show the true worth of Washington's "peace-loving" declarations. One thing is clear: under Reagan or after him the failure of his defective foreign policy doctrine is inevitable.

III

The objective basis for the capitalist countries' pursuit of a policy of detente is sufficiently broad. After all, besides specifically imperialist interests they also have legitimate national interests and share the concern of all mankind for the preservation of peace in the world, the extension of the international division of labor and the development of the scientific-technical revolution, an exchange of cultural values and the solution of global problems.


** FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1982/83, p. 263
The West European countries' interest in detente is particularly great. It is not fortuitous that the leaders of many of them continue to declare their adherence to its principles and, despite Washington's pressure, are maintaining political, economic, scientific-technical and cultural relations with the socialist states.

The peaceful competition of socialism and capitalism on a basis of detente and not political confrontation not only affords an effective guarantee against thermonuclear catastrophe but also, in the language of modern mathematics, represents an incremental-sum game, that is, affords mankind as a whole and each country individually additional opportunities for material and spiritual progress.

It is for this reason that the idea of detente is taking possession of the minds of hundreds of millions of people in the capitalist world. Social democrats and realistic bourgeois politicians are advocating the normalization of relations with the socialist countries increasingly assertively. Scenarios of a new turn toward detente and the pros and cons of its various versions are being played out in the Western scientific press.

Bourgeois supporters of detente include the representatives of various views. There are among them many sagacious politicians who, while not forgoing their class interests, consistently champion truly equal international cooperation. But there are also many of those who are limited in their views and actions by the imperialist nature of the states' interests, the pressure of reaction, the economic mechanism of the arms race and the antidemocratism of their socio-political system.

Nonetheless, as experience has shown, a constructive dialogue is possible with bourgeois supporters of detente. Life also suggests the most fruitful path of this dialogue—a search for points of contact and concurrence of positions, the reaching of mutually acceptable understandings, on the basis of compromise included, and the narrowing of the sphere of disagreements on the basis of mutual trust, mutual understanding and respect for one another's legitimate interests.

It is very important to derive the right lessons from the past, understand the reasons for the failures which occurred and avoid mistakes and distortions in the foundation of the future development of detente. An analysis of the theoretical developments of the Western press shows that far from all lessons of the past are correctly understood there. Many of those who advocate a return to a policy of detente suffer, as before, from a lack of realism in the determination of long-term foreign policy goals. Ultimately everything boils down to attempts by this method or the other to derive one-sided advantages and combine the incompatible—detente and confrontation. There are serious real grounds for their "confusion," unfortunately. It is engendered by the very tenor of life of modern bourgeois society and the objective contradiction between the regularity of peaceful coexistence and the specific interests of imperialism.

In the military-strategic sphere the characteristic manifestation of this contradiction is the idea of "borderline detente". H. Kissinger complains
in his memoirs that "the American position in international affairs had traditionally been based on Manichaeism, that is, on the belief that relations between states are characterized by a state of either war or peace--there is no tranquil middle state between them."

The former U.S. secretary of state is manifestly dissembling: the true problem of U.S. foreign policy is precisely the reverse. Its makers aspire to sit on two stools at once: while availing themselves of the benefits of peace they wish by means of the simple threat of military force or military actions which are painless for themselves to obtain results which even a full-scale war could not produce. They are contemplating having complete freedom of maneuver in the international arena and at the same time insuring themselves against the possible catastrophic consequences of their own madness.

The devotees of such a concept (among whom are also the so-called "pragmatists" in the present administration) essentially urge, while preserving a military-political confrontation not limited in the least and continuing the arms race, an agreement on a "borderline" which the sides must not overstep. They are paying the main attention to technical problems of the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow. It is proposed, inter alia, establishing a "direct" connection between the military departments of the USSR and the United States, installing additional, more modern equipment in both capitals and so forth.

Improving lines of communication and adopting precautionary measures against the accidental outbreak of nuclear war are, of course, necessary. But it has to be seen that technology cannot do away with the defects of policy. And the policy of arms race, power pressure and impudent interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states are inevitably leading to increased tension and local conflicts and creating the threat of a slide toward world war.

The "borderline detente" concept is an example of imperialism's brazen speculation on the legitimate aspiration of the peoples to the prevention of a world thermonuclear war. This ideological discovery of the military-industrial complex expresses with the utmost accuracy its interests in the nuclear age. Its political purpose is to blunt the peoples' vigilance and create favorable conditions for the continued arms race and the expansionist policy of U.S. imperialism. Such pseudodetente is in fact blocking the path toward real, full-fledged detente and disarmament and creating merely the appearance of guarantees against thermonuclear catastrophe, but in practice prompting it.

In the political sphere it is a question of the "linkage principle," which is advertised by its defenders as the height of state wisdom, but which is in practice either a manifestation of short-sighted mercenary-mindedness or a means of undermining detente.

Of course, all spheres of international relations and all countries and regions of the world are ultimately interconnected and interdependent. Social progress and the scientific-technical revolution are making this interdependence increasingly strong and diverse. The increasing unity of the modern world (despite

the deepening of the class confrontation of the two different socioeconomic systems) is a cornerstone of detente.

In the light of this it is obvious that detente is in principle indivisible, but indivisibility may be interpreted variously.

The USSR and other socialist countries proceed from the primacy of detente as a whole and the need for the subordination of the particularities to the whole. Taking the accords that have already been achieved as a basis, they advocate the consistent removal of the disagreements which still exist and a search for reasonable compromise whereby the sides, without forgoing their fundamental interests, would sacrifice particularities in the name of the whole. In other words, it is a question of mutual concessions given strict observance of the principle of the equality and equal security of the sides, that is, of a foundation of diplomacy: equal, honest negotiations.

The devotees of the "linkage principle" stand in opposite positions. They are seeking unilateral concessions and see only this as the purpose of detente. It is not surprising that they turn detente as a whole (or in individual spheres of interstate relations) into a subject of blackmail at the time of the solution of individual questions.

The attempts to win from the socialist countries recognition of imperialism's "right" to interfere in their internal affairs on pain of the breakdown of detente as a whole, which were made throughout the 1970's, are a classic example of the notorious "linkage". It is well known that these attempts remained vain, but they undoubtedly harmed the development of East-West relations.

The gnosiological roots of the "linkage principle" lie in the particular features of present-day monopoly capitalism. Owing to its class limitedness, its disciples identify the socialist states with private capitalist monopolies and interstate relations with monopoly competition.

Actual practice shows that in the bargaining process monopolies do not recognize any ideological or moral limitations. The rules of the game are determined solely by strength. The weak are obliged to make unilateral concessions, the strong have the right to expect unilateral advantages. Ready money serves as the highest yardstick of strategy and tactics here. The parties to the bargaining may consent to any concessions (as far as self-liquidation in the merger process) if the competitors offer them sufficiently good recompense.

Unscrupulous bargaining "rules" have firmly entered the bourgeois consciousness. They have stepped from economics into politics and everyday life.

It is this type of relations which the champions of the "linkage principle" wish to impose on the socialist countries. Confusing private monopoly interests with national-state interests, they are attempting to convert world politics into some kind of bazaar, where everything would be farmed out to imperialism: nations' historical traditions and legitimate interests, states' international sovereignty and internal legislation and people's ideological beliefs and moral values.
Naturally, the peoples of the world will never agree to such an interpretation of the indivisibility of detente. The attempts to make it the basis of practical policy will inevitably lead to failure. The USSR and its allies have sufficient power to protect their legitimate interests. It is possible to do business with them only on the basis of the principles of honest, equal interstate relations and not speculative "linkage".

In the economic sphere the "linkage principle" is embodied in the use of a variety of sanctions. The real roots of this method lie in the same sphere of monopoly competition. The threat of "sanctions" underpins the technology of complicity among the monopolies and makes complicity profitable and, consequently, practicable.

The practice of private monopoly business also largely determines the nature of interstate economic relations in the capitalist world. "Sanctions" are an integral part of bourgeois protectionism, which has become particularly widespread in the era of state-monopoly capitalism. In particular, in the United States the application of "sanctions" is envisaged by the majority of legislative instruments of a foreign policy and foreign economic nature and is employed extensively by the government in relations even with its closest allies. "Automobile," "steel," "wine" and other trade "wars" erupt now and then in the capitalist world.

Bourgeois politicians and ideologists and the leaders of banks and industrial corporations are almost unanimous in acknowledging the harm of protectionism. But as long as capitalism exists it will be impossible to do away with protectionism. The spontaneity of capitalist competition, the unevenness of development and the changes in the correlation of forces between individual states and monopoly groupings which arise in this connection create the objective possibility of the success of a policy of economic diktat and the gain of the strongest at the expense of the weaker (and the capitalist economy as a whole).

The theorists of "linkage" are attempting to extend the "sanctions" method to relations with the socialist states, imparting to them a qualitatively different socioeconomic content. It is proposed using the weapon of situational-economic pressure inherent in capitalism to obtain military-political concessions and even to transform the social system of other states. However, the end is manifestly incommensurable with the means. The devotees of "sanctions" ignore the fact that they are dealing not with weaker partners within the framework of the world capitalist economy but with a fundamentally different socioeconomic system which is not subject to the spontaneity of the capitalist market.

General economic world relations, V. I. Lenin observed back at the start of the 1920's, contains a force greater than the desire, will and decision of any government hostile toward us.* In our day this regularity is underpinned by the economic might, international cohesion and consistent policy of the socialist community countries. Strategically they are vigilantly protecting their

technical-economic independence of imperialism. This determines the political and economic hopelessness of the application of the "sanctions" method against them. No pressure will compel them to consent to unilateral concessions not only in social-political but also in purely economic questions.

In the spiritual sphere the majority of bourgeois politicians believes it necessary and possible to combine detente with "psychological warfare". This is a no less myopic and unrealistic position than the attempts to combine detente with an arms race, power pressure and economic discrimination.

Communists have a sober view of the causes and nature of the ideological confrontation in the modern world. A person cannot be barred from thinking and forming and defending his own opinion and being devoted to the ideals of his class and his country. Truth is born in argument, as they say—the comparison of ideas serves as a powerful source of the spiritual progress of mankind and an essential prerequisite of social development as a whole.

This is why communists consider the calls for a "halt to the ideological struggle" a chimera. No less than the representatives of other political forces of the present day, they value freedom of speech and the right to explain and propagandize their ideas, their experience and their moral values.

As long as classes exist, the struggle of class ideologies will continue. In addition, owing to the specific-historical conditions which have taken shape in the world in the final third of the 20th century, an intensification of the ideological struggle represents an objective regularity.

However, ideas may not only be creative but also destructive. History teaches that malevolent disinformation, playing on the ignorance and prejudices of backward people and fanaticism ignited by the mass propaganda media and underpinned by the power of state authority are sometimes more formidable than any weapons. Mankind has paid with many millions of lives for the use of ideology in the selfish interests of individual rulers, political groupings and the exploiter classes. It would be a crime before the memory of those fallen not to take into consideration the lessons of the past and not to struggle against the system of disinformation and slander and against attempts to turn the honest and rational struggle of opinions into a destructive orgy of "psychological warfare".

The malicious lie and slander and the lengthy subversive propaganda campaigns to which imperialism resorted extensively in the 1970's did not have the desired ideological effect. But they seriously poisoned the international climate and undermined mutual trust, without which political agreement is inconceivable, which became an important factor of the deterioration in the international situation. And this is natural. The true indivisibility of detente is manifested not in chance mercenary-minded combinations but in the need for its consistent implementation in all spheres of international relations.

Experience shows that a politician who says one thing at the negotiating table and another in the press forfeits his partners' respect. Whoever with one hand attempts to build the edifice of detente with one hand and saws it down
with the other inevitably loses the trust of his own people also. All this should be borne in mind by those who are now calling for the adventurist policy of Reagan to be laid aside, but for preservation of the "ideological militancy" of "Reaganism".

IV

While persistently proposing to the capitalist world the path of relaxation of international tension, the socialist community states are not forgoing their class interests. Detente is organically "inscribed" in their foreign policy primarily because these interests objectively coincide with the interests of the working people not only of their own but also other countries constituting in sum the overwhelming majority of mankind.

Essentially detente is a form of practical realization of social progress long since dialectically revealed by Marxist-Leninists, when the fundamental rejection of the "export of revolution" is inseparably connected with the inevitability of socially conditioned revolutionary processes and the liberation struggle of the peoples. Communists advocate the peoples of each country being able to freely determine their fate.

The essence of detente is expressed in the well-known 10 principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Sovereign equality and mutual renunciation of the use of force or the threat of force, the inviolability of the borders and the territorial integrity of states, the peaceful settlement of disputes and noninterference in internal affairs, respect for human rights and basic liberties, equality and the right of peoples to dispose of their own fate and cooperation between states and the good-neighborly fulfillment of commitments ensuing from the generally recognized principles and rules of international law and concluded treaties—each of these principles is filled with the most profound real meaning and may serve as an unerring criterion in the evaluation of this political action or the other. It is precisely the realization of these principles and not an arms race of "position of strength" which ensures the preservation of lasting peace and the prevention of thermonuclear catastrophe. They are not a perfidious invention of the communists, as the champions of cold war maintain. They are human standards forged by the millennial practice of international relations which under the conditions of antagonistic societies have yet to be realized in full. Now, for the first time in history such a possibility has become a reality.

Detente cannot be achieved by way of unilateral concessions. The particular features of the policy of imperialism impeding its development cannot be changed by way of persuasion and exhortation. The main condition of a return to detente is the firm, cohesive and consistent policy of the socialist community countries and the persevering struggle of the working class and all progressive and realistic forces which understand the disastrous nature of the aggressive policy of imperialism in world affairs.

Socialism is a reliable bastion of peace and social progress. The Soviet Union does not infringe the security of any country—in the West or the East. It wishes to live in peace with all countries and is pursuing the principle of peaceful coexistence.
Expressing the profoundest cherished aspirations of the Soviet people, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are doing everything to avert the threat of war and preserve peace for present and future generations. The land of soviets is invariably in the vanguard of the struggle for lasting peace and detente.

The speeches of K. U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum and to the voters again confirmed our country's aspiration to peace—lasting and just for all peoples, great and small. The code of relations between the nuclear powers which he put forward represents a specification and the development of the 10 principles of the Helsinki Final Act with regard for the current situation in the world.

Answering PRAVDA's question of what is necessary for people to cease to live in constant concern for peace, K. U. Chernenko emphasized: "It is first of all necessary that the policy of states, particularly the states possessing nuclear weapons, be oriented toward the removal of the military danger and toward the strengthening of peace.

"The priority efforts should be aimed at halting and turning back the arms race. It is time to switch from general deliberations concerning the benefit of negotiations to the removal of the considerable obstacles which have been put in the way of a limitation of and reduction in arms, the development of trust and the establishment of mutually profitable cooperation....

"The Soviet Union is ready to cooperate with all states in the realization of these goals."


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CSO: 1816/9
CURBS URGED ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS GROWTH, MODERNIZATION

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 15-25

[Article by V. Makarevskiy: "The Race in Conventional Arms and the Problem of Their Limitation"]

[Text] Reagan's strategy of "direct confrontation" with the Soviet Union is being expressed in an unprecedented buildup of the arms race and the growth of both the strategic forces and general forces for preparation for waging nuclear and conventional wars. A constant buildup of arms of all types is under way within the NATO system also. The Political Declaration of the Warsaw Pact states says: "Considering the continuous improvement in and increasing power of conventional weapons, it is essential to exert new efforts for an appreciable lowering of the present levels of conventional arms and armed forces both globally and in individual regions and to conduct the appropriate negotiations to this end."*

I

Nuclear and other types of weapon of mass destruction represent the main threat to mankind. However, the conventional arms in the arsenal of the United States, the other NATO countries and Japan and of a number of other states also perform a very dangerous role. It is determined by their extensive proliferation in the world and by the fact that they are arms in use. In the past 10-15 years many types of conventional arms have approached low-yield nuclear weapons in a number of indicators. Their qualitative development is continuing and enjoying a certain acceleration even.

Modern types of arms are multipurpose: they can be fitted with both nuclear and conventional explosives and also toxic substances. All this makes it more difficult to recognize them and is leading to the erasure of the boundaries between nuclear and conventional weapons. Long-range cruise missiles may serve as an example. Of the 12,000 planned for production, a few thousand may be conventionally armed, the remainder nuclear.

*PRAVDA, 7 January 1983.
The United States has increased the strength of its regular armed forces to
3.02 million. The other NATO powers have also increased their contingents--
in France they number 578,000, Italy 517,000 and the FRG 495,000. As a whole
the overall strength of the armed forces of the NATO bloc constitutes
5,528,000 men, which is considerably more than that of the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries. These figures, like the data adduced below on combat equipment, com-
pletely refute the claims prevalent in the West concerning the virtually
"overwhelming superiority in conventional arms" on the Warsaw Pact side.

The biggest concentration of armed forces and conventional arms is observed in
Europe, where the major grouping of NATO countries, which is supplied with
the most modern combat equipment and which numbers 3.5 million men and 17,000
tanks (not counting the stored reserves)* is deployed. The conventional
arms race is a heavy burden on the as yet infirm economy of the developing
countries, which imperialism is persistently involving in the orbit of its
militarist preparations. In the course of wars and armed conflicts in the
zone of the emergent states, which often occur as the result of the incite-
ment of the imperialist powers, the latter test new types of weapons and
polish up modern methods of their use. These wars are used to perfect the
sum total of weapons and operations included in the concept of "warfare".
The countries which have become the targets of imperialist intrigues become
proving grounds where the latest arms systems are checked out under combat
conditions in the blood and sacrifices of hundreds of thousands of people.
The aggressive actions of the United States and Israel in Lebanon, Britain
in the South Atlantic, the United States in the Caribbean and Central America
and France in Chad are a graphic example.**

The specific conditions of the situation, the scale, duration and stubbornness
of the military operations and other factors determined the scale and types
of the weapons used and the priority of this type or the other. A number of
regional conflicts with the direct participation of the United States enable
us to trace particularly distinctly the evolution of conventional instruments
of struggle and the methods of their use.

A major local war unleashed by imperialist forces was the Korean War (1950-
1953). Here the American forces commissioned new combat weapons—napalm and
other incendiary ammunition; at that same time jet aviation and helicopters
were employed extensively.


**According to data of the London International Stratetic Studies Institutes,
the armed forces of 44 countries each have over 100,000 men. The total
strength of armed forces in the world in the last 10–12 years has increased
by 4.5–5 million or 20 percent and now amounts to 26–27 million. They pos-
se 124,000–128,000 tanks and more than 35,000 combat aircraft (estimated
All types of the U.S. armed forces, which dropped on Vietnam, Laos and Kam- puchea over 15 million tons of ammunition—three times more than in World War II and the equivalent of 700 atomic bombs of the Hiroshima type—participated in the war in Indochina (1964-1975). The monstrous strikes were dispersed in time and place. The Pentagon did not stop short even at the waging of chemical warfare. American-made chemical ammunition, herbicides and combat defoliants hit over 40 percent of the forests and sown areas of South Vietnam, and over 2 million persons were casualties. The consequences of these barbaric actions are still being felt today. Guided aerial bombs and also enhanced-yield bombs with a range of destruction of up to 500 meters were tested for the first time against the peaceful inhabitants of Indochina.

Methods of the use of conventional arms were honed many times over in the course of the wars in the Near East. In June 1967 the Israeli aggressors, who relied on the extensive assistance of the imperialist powers, primarily the United States, used Mirage and Skyhawk aircraft fitted with guided missiles. Aviation was assigned the decisive role in combat operations. Tanks also played an important part. The Israeli expansionists obtained intelligence data from the American secret services, which had at their disposal space observation facilities. Extensive use was made of communications security and radionuclear means of struggle and misinformation, thanks to which Israel managed to achieve operational surprise and to seize the initiative.

The 1973 war was the biggest war in the Near East. All types of conventional weapons were used. The combat operations were distinguished by great tension and dynamism and rapid change in the frontal situation. Intensive use was made of new means of struggle: anti-aircraft guided missiles (ZURS), antitank guided missiles (PTURS), free-flight missiles (NURS) and guided missiles (URS). Of all the losses sustained by Israeli aviation, the ZURS accounted for 50 percent, while tank losses from PTURS constituted approximately 70 percent. This was a new phenomenon since previously tanks were mainly put out of action as a result of the operations of antitank artillery and the tanks of the enemy, and aviation in aerial fighting. In a matter of days of the 1973 war more equipment was destroyed than in whole weeks of major battles of World War II—such was the opinion of certain foreign military specialists.

Aviation made extensive use of concrete-piercing bombs against protected targets and antipersonnel bombs for hitting exposed personnel. Remote-controlled bombs, air-to-air, air-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and also anti-radar guided missiles and the latest means of reconnaissance and jamming were used. The American Rockeye antitank cluster aerial bombs for hitting equipment over large areas were tested for the first time. In the struggle at sea Israel used helicopters fitted with PTURS, which produced high combat results.
The permanent crisis situation in the Near East graphically shows what a threat so-called limited wars represent for universal peace.

Israel's aggression in Lebanon unleashed in 1982 was distinguished from previous wars in the region by the protracted nature, methods and means of the fighting. Among the latter were the American F-15 and F-16 aircraft, E-2C electronic reconnaissance and counteraction aircraft, modernized AZ M-60 tanks and other combat equipment. Extensive and effective use was made of means of radioelectronic struggle. Missiles of all types were used. "Overpressure" or "vacuum" aerial bombs and also shells and bombs with a ball and phosphorus "filling" were a "novelty". Despite considerable superiority in forces and resources, the aggressor came up against the staunchness of the detachments of the PLO and the Lebanese national-patriotic forces, which maintained the defense of West Beirut for 2-1/2 months. As a result bigger losses were inflicted on the Israeli Army—combat equipment and personnel—than in all previous Arab-Israeli wars in the period 1948 through 1973. The aggression proved a serious political and moral defeat for Tel Aviv. Nonetheless, Israeli forces continue to occupy a considerable part of Lebanon to this day.

II

Conventional ammunition of great destructive power are fire means of destruction (shells, bombs, mines, torpedoes, missiles and flame throwers) provided with an explosive of enhanced yield or a special mix. Allied to special design and increased range, effective area and accuracy, they have a more significant destructive and strike effect, bringing them close in a number of factors to superlow- and low-yield nuclear warheads. As a result the boundary between them is being erased increasingly.

The introduction of special weapons—guidance systems has ensured previously unattainable strike accuracy. Several guided missiles, bombs of the American Maverick type and Copperhead guided missiles are now sufficient instead of hundreds of conventional warheads. Complexes combining automated control, reconnaissance and strike facilities are now being set up. The range of such systems is extraordinarily broad: from antitank and air defense complexes through long-range cruise missiles, which makes it possible to conduct large-scale air-ground operations to a great depth.

The destructive effect is increased thanks to the provision of ammunition with explosives of enhanced yield and the increase in the coefficient of the filling of the shells of projectiles, bombs and other warheads with plastic, jelly-like and liquid explosives and special mixtures. Such was the American BLU-82 aerial bomb, which was tested back in Vietnam. "Volume blast" ammunition (the "vacuum bomb"), which instead of conventional explosives contains special liquid and gaseous fillings, has a no less powerful casualty effect. Dispersing in the air in the form of an aerosol, it creates bulk explosive fuel-air mixtures. The American (SVU-55) aerial bomb, which destroys strong ferroconcrete structures, is such ammunition. Its casualty effect extends dozens of meters, and with the new modifications up to 250 meters, that is, four-six times more than high-explosive ammunition of equal weight. Volume blast ammunition is made by the United States, Israel, France, Canada, Great Britain and Japan.
Armor-piercing shells with a core of metallic uranium obtained from nuclear power station waste are another latest invention. They possess, besides increased strike effect, a radiation effect on the crew (detail) of the target. The Pentagon has already ordered about 1 million such shells.

Thanks to the use of aviation, volley-fire missile systems and cluster-ammunition guns, the zone of destruction is no longer measured in hectares, as before, but in square kilometers. A variety of such ammunition is the warhead for the Lance missile, which has already undergone testing and contains 10-15 self-guiding elements for hitting tanks and other armored facilities.

The use of incendiary weapons has assumed great proportions. The United States used them in Vietnam (40 percent of all aerial ammunition), as did Israel in the course of the 1967 war and the aggression in Lebanon. A "magnetic gun," which makes it possible to increase the muzzle velocity of the projectile by a factor of several times, is at the development stage. *

The latest warheads of great destructive power may be delivered the same distances as nuclear warheads with the help of strategic and cruise missiles. The use of warheads with flat and high contact element trajectories is being combined; in other words, a "frontal hit" is being supplemented with a "vertical hit," which as a result leads to the volume destruction of the targets and their spatial envelopment and makes the protection of troops and the civilian population more difficult.

The ultramodern combat equipment (including weapons of great destructive power) being developed and produced in the United States and other NATO countries is being supplied to many developing states. The FRG, France, Italy, Great Britain and Israel possess a wide selection of such weapons.

The endeavor of the ruling circles of the imperialist states—under the conditions of the existence of certain "inhibitors" in the nuclear arms sphere—to obtain where possible and use weapons which are in fact a means of mass destruction serves as a reason for the development of such weapons. They also have to reckon with the imperatively-sounding demand for the banning of the use of nuclear weapons and the assumption by all the nuclear powers, following the example of the Soviet Union, of the commitment not to be the first to use such weapons.

Highly symptomatic in this connection was the appearance of the "Rogers Plan" (named after the NATO supreme commander), which provides for a strike deep into the territory of the Warsaw Pact countries with the use of precision-guided conventional arms against "enemy" troops concentrations behind the front line as they are being moved up. The adoption of the plan, its apologists claim, is allegedly conditioned by the desire to avoid the use of tactical nuclear weapons right at the very start of an armed conflict and thereby ease the nuclear threat to West Europe. However, to whom is it not

*See WEHRTECHNIK No 3, 1983, pp 76-81.
clear that the deployment of the new generation of American medium-range missiles on the European continent not only increases by far the West Europeans' dependence on the U.S. nuclear potential but makes them the Pentagon's hostages to an even greater extent. In reality the "Rogers Plan" means the accelerated buildup of conventional arms fitted with ultramodern reconnaissance, guidance and targeting facilities and new missiles with conventional, nonnuclear warheads, but with exceptionally high technical specifications.

Largely in keeping with the "Rogers Plan" is the far-reaching "NATO reorganization" project recently put forward by H. Kissinger. Claiming that "NATO's nonnuclear forces do not possess sufficient power to repulse a serious Soviet offensive with the use of nonnuclear weapons," he reached the following conclusions: "By 1990 Europe (West--V.M.) will have to assume the main responsibility for ground nonnuclear defense."*

The Pentagon is concocting plans for the mass use of long-range cruise and ballistic missiles not only in the nuclear but also conventional versions. Their launch could provoke a nuclear war. And, finally, a particularly dangerous aspect of the "Rogers Plan" and those similar to it is the preventive nature of the planned strike and the policy of the "maximum" suppression of the forces of the enemy before he has time to react.

The level of science and technology that has been reached is now making it possible to create means of armed struggle which are capable even in a nonnuclear war of rapidly wiping out every living thing over huge expanses and tackling strategic tasks. The policy of Washington and its most bellicose allies promises an exacerbation of the struggle in the military equipment fields, and it is frequently assuming a fundamentally new nature, moreover, which is difficult to predict. However, while adopting forced measures in the defense sphere, the USSR vigorously defends the need for effective negotiations on a broad range of problems of limiting and banning conventional weapons. Soviet diplomacy consistently advocates the quest for sensible, mutually acceptable solutions with respect to these questions.

III

The first cause of the present exacerbation of the international situation are the incessant attempts of aggressive imperialist circles, primarily the United States, to break up the strategic balance which has taken shape in the world and secure military superiority for themselves in order to subordinate the course of world events to their will.

The myth of the "Soviet military threat" is being exaggerated to the utmost and inventions concerning the "lagging" of the United States and NATO in the military sphere as a whole and the sphere of conventional arms in particular are being circulated to this end. However, the actual data, which have been published extensively in the press, incontrovertibly point to the existence

*See TIME, 5 March 1984, p 16.
of approximate equivalence, although the composition of the sides' armed forces is dissimilar and their structure and organization are different. Thus the 89 combat divisions of NATO in Europe (94 with regard for Spain) confront 78 divisions of the Warsaw Pact Organization, and in terms of numbers, furthermore, the U.S. and FRG division (there are now approximately 20 of them) is considerably—by a factor of 1.5-1.8—bigger than the division of the Warsaw Pact states. At the same time the USSR has a somewhat greater number of army divisions, which is explained by the considerable length of its land borders (over 20,000 kilometers).

The slight advantage of the Warsaw Pact in the sphere of tactical aviation (1.2:1) is compensated by the NATO countries' superiority in terms of the numbers of helicopters (1.8:1). As far as tanks are concerned, with Spain's entry into NATO the ratio here is 1:1 (each side now has 25,000), but the countries of the North Atlantic bloc have a considerable preponderance here in anti-tank missiles (in the next few years it is planned to add a further 55,000-60,000 to the 200,000 which already exist). There is approximate equivalence in the ground forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe: according to data of 1 August 1980, they constituted 991,000 and 979,000 (with regard for air force personnel) respectively.

The qualitative improvement in all conventional arms systems made it possible in the last decade to increase their combat efficiency considerably. At the same time there is also a change in the quantitative parameters of the main components of the armed forces in a number of NATO countries. Thus in connection with the introduction of large quantities of new combat equipment 4 army divisions and 5 tactical aviation wings will be formed additionally and 124 warships will be commissioned in the next 5-year period in the United States, which will lead to an overall increase in troop strength of 250,000. According to data of London's International Strategic Studies Institute, in 1982 it grew by 57,000 men and in 1983 by a further 20,000.*

The U.S. general forces, which include ground forces (24 divisions and 40 separate brigades), tactical aviation (over 8,700 helicopters, including 4,500 combat helicopters) and naval forces (excluding atomic-powered nuclear submarines), which include approximately 400 warships of the main types, over 2,600 combat aircraft and 4 marine divisions, are supplied with conventional arms.

Direct spending on the general forces constituted $88 billion in 1982 and $109 billion in 1983, while in 1984 it is supposed to rise to $132 billion or 47 percent of the expenditure of the budget of the U.S. Defense Department.** Thus the conventional arms in the arsenal of the NATO countries are the most costly. These forces are already deployed in various potential "theaters" all around the world (514,000 men); they form the backbone of the RDF (over 200,000 men, 700 aircraft and 20-30 warships) and a 190,000-strong marine corps.


**"Budget of the United States...Fiscal Year 1984," pp 5-10.
The ground forces—the most populous arm of the armed forces (1,431,000 men)—have 200 tactical missile launchers, 12,500 tanks, 20,000 armored personnel carriers, 16,500 field artillery guns and mortars, including howitzers with nuclear missiles, approximately 17,000 antitank guided missile [PTUR] launchers, more than 5,000 anti-aircraft guns and 8,800 army aircraft and helicopters. Production of the new M-1 tank, which is doubly superior in its combat properties to the M-60 tank, has been under way since 1980; it is planned to have produced approximately 7,000 such by 1988. In addition, in the 1980's it is planned to double the overall number of antitank missiles and to increase the number of fire-support helicopters fourfold. Production of the third generation of these systems—the Hellfire PTUR—has begun. The development of the Patriot air defense system, which is based on hitting enemy missiles, continues. The army is starting to receive Copperhead guided missiles with semi-active laser beam guidance (approximately 1 million). The ratio of combat units to support subunits—4.5:5.5 in the past and 6:4 currently—has been changed in favor of the combat units for the troops' increased combat capability.

The general-purpose air force (740,000 men) has 8,700 aircraft of various types, including 4,500 combat aircraft. A long-term program of the qualitative renewal of the tactical aviation fleet, particularly thanks to its provision with all-weather F-15 fighters (in a formation of 400 aircraft) and A-10 ground-attack aircraft (300), is being implemented. It is planned to supply 3,000 such aircraft altogether. Tactical aviation includes 25 Boeing E-2A's of the AWACS system for long-range radar detection and control, which is designed to increase the efficiency of the use of tactical aviation as a whole.

The U.S. Navy (859,000 men) numbers, with regard for the reserves, approximately 850 warships and merchant vessels (of these, 400 are of the main types), more than 5,000 aircraft (2,600 of which are combat aircraft) and 4 marine divisions. Naval aviation has been armed with new ground-attack aircraft and fighters and ship- and short-based ASW aircraft: the AV-8 Harrier, the A6E Intruder and the F-14 Tomcat. The F/A-18 Hornet has been developed and is being tested as a fighter and ground-attack aircraft. Twenty warships, including 2 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, 3 cruisers with the new Aegis anti-aircraft guided missile system (ZURO), 2 attack submarines and a landing ship—a landing dock for marines—and so forth, were purchased in 1983. It is planned to commission 20 warships in 1984.

Great attention is being paid to the development of U.S. military-transport aircraft and seaborne transfers for increasing the strategic mobility of general and, particularly, RDF contingents. Already on line are approximately 1,000 aircraft and helicopters, including over 600 heavy and medium-sized vehicles (not counting the 350 military-transport aircraft and 400 civil aviation aircraft in reserve). It is planned to complete the modernization of the C-141 and C-5A aircraft, purchase 40 new KC-10 aircraft and order 150-200 C-X aircraft. Thirteen supply ships with military equipment and ammunition capable of supporting the combat operations of 12,000 marines for a month are now concentrated at the Diego Garcia base.
The general forces are being trained to tackle combat assignments with the use of the tactical nuclear weapons with which they have been supplied and also with the extensive use of conventional arms of great destructive power. The American forces in Europe remain very important in the NATO system. However, the bulk of the forces and conventional arms in this "theater" belongs to the European countries—80-90 percent of ground forces and tanks and 70-75 percent of aviation. The personnel of the armies of the European NATO countries constitutes approximately 3 million altogether. Almost 1,000 new tanks and armored vehicles, over 270 F-16 and Tornado combat aircraft, 30 warships and 2 submarines were received in 1983.

Thus the powerful grouping of NATO armed forces deployed in West Europe is increasing continuously. Washington is currently demanding of the West European countries an annual increase in military spending in real terms not of 3 but 4-5 percent, and the United States itself has raised it to 7-8 percent.

The reapportioning of the structure of the Pentagon's budget is significant in this respect. In 1983 the pay of the armed forces' personnel accounted for 24 percent of expenditure, the troops' operational activity (including technical support) 27 percent and the development of new weapons (R&D) and arms purchases 44 percent.* The same allocation is maintained in the U.S. budget for 1984 also. Yet just 2-3 years ago these three components of the U.S. military budget were of roughly equal amounts. The tilt in the direction of an increase in both the absolute value and relative significance of the spending on new arms has now become obvious.**

IV

Whereas certain results were achieved in the sphere of limiting and banning certain types of nuclear arms and other types of weapons of mass destruction in the 1970's, very little was done in the sphere of limiting conventional arms. Yet the USSR is constantly expressing a readiness to adopt measures aimed at a reduction in the levels of states' military confrontation, in the sphere of conventional types of weapons included. This was declared with the utmost clarity in the CPSU Central Committee report to the 26th party congress and in subsequent documents.

Addressing the CPSU Central Committee November (1982) Plenum, Yu. V. Andropov emphasized: "We support the quest for a healthy basis, acceptable to the parties, of the solution of the most complex problems, primarily, of course, problems of curbing the arms race, both nuclear and conventional." A practical step in this direction was the USSR Supreme Soviet edict "Ratification of the Convention Banning or Limiting the Use of Specific Types of Conventional Weapon Which May Be Considered To Cause Inordinate Damage or Which Are


**WEHRKUNDE No 4, 1983, pp 160-165.
Indiscriminate," which was adopted on 2 June 1982. The mere fact of the conclusion of the convention serves as a graphic example of the fact that it is possible to achieve concerted decisions in the sphere of the use of conventional arms also given for this the good will and political resolve of the contracting parties.

The said document consists of a general convention and three protocols thereto banning the use of weapons causing damage by fragments which cannot be detected in the human body by X-rays (plastic, for example); limiting the use of a number of types of mines and booby traps for the maximum protection of the civilian population; and banning or limiting the use of certain types of incendiary weapons.

The convention is aimed primarily at protecting the civilian population, the relative significance of whose casualties in wars of the 20th century has been increasing constantly.* It limited to a certain extent the use of certain types of conventional weapons. It envisages the possibility of negotiations for the formulation of supplementary protocols banning inhumane types of conventional weapons.

Questions of the limitation of conventional arms were reflected in the USSR Memorandum of 17 June 1982 "Averting the Growing Nuclear Threat and Curbing the Arms Race," which was submitted by the Soviet Government for examination by the UN General Assembly Second Special Disarmament Session. It analyzed the causes of the standstill with respect to a number of problems of limiting conventional arms such as limiting the sale and supplies of weapons, limiting and subsequently reducing military activity in the Indian Ocean and mutually reducing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. For the purpose of a reduction in the level of conventional arms both globally and in individual regions the memorandum proposed at the first stage agreement not to increase the armed forces and conventional arms of the UN Security Council permanent members and the state allied with them.

The task of limiting the sale and supplies of conventional arms, whose volume already runs to tens of billions of dollars, remains very urgent in this plane. The main "merchant of death" is the United States: in 1982 alone it exported weapons for an amount of approximately $21.5 billion. The Soviet Union is ready to resume on this question the negotiations with the United States which were suspended by the American side precisely at the stage when the contours of a possible accord had begun to be discerned. This readiness was confirmed in the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Pact states which was adopted on 5 January 1983.

The Vienna talks on a mutual reduction in conventional armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, which have been under way since October 1973, are

*During World War I they constituted about 5 percent of the total number of casualties and 50 percent in World War II, while in Indochina and Lebanon this indicator was 80–90 percent.
designed to serve the goals of limiting conventional arms. However, they have yet to achieve specific results. Yet the USSR has demonstrated most convincingly its good will, by way, included, of the unilateral withdrawal from the GDR of a large contingent of Soviet forces and arms and by submitting a number of practical proposals which, it would have seemed, made it possible to bring the sides' positions closer together.

Progress at the talks has been and continues to be blocked by the Western powers, which are continuing to insist on the "preponderance" of the numbers of ground forces of the Warsaw Pact countries over NATO which allegedly exists in Central Europe. As before, the NATO side considers the "question of figures" central, although the repeated exchange of data on the overall numbers of the armed forces of the USSR, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia in Central Europe as of 1 August 1980 has confirmed the continuation of approximate equivalence here.

In February 1982 the socialist states submitted the comprehensive draft "Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments and the Measures Connected With This in Central Europe at the First Stage," which takes account of the mutual understanding reached between the participants in the talks on a number of issues and contains all the elements necessary for the achievement of the first accords in Vienna.

As far as the NATO participants in the negotiations are concerned, only in July 1982 did they submit the draft "Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and the Measures Connected With This in Central Europe". It provided for a stage-by-stage reduction in the numbers of ground forces of both alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—to 700,000 men and in the total numbers of the personnel of the ground forces and air forces to 900,000 men. The NATO countries insisted here that the USSR cut back 30,000 men in a composition of 3 divisions in addition to the troop contingent withdrawn from the GDR in 1980. At the same time, however, the United States, which, according to official data, increased its armed contingent in Central Europe by 26,000 men in the period 1979-1983, would cut back its forces in the agreed region by only 13,000 men, and in small units and subunits, moreover, and one-third of this number in terms of individual servicemen even. As before, a package of "accompanying measures" unacceptable to the socialist states, which go beyond the confines of the area of the reduction and which include a considerable proportion of the European territory of the USSR, was put forward. The question of a mutual reduction in the arms of both sides was passed over completely, although it is clear to anyone, even a person who is not that experienced in military matters, that reducing troops without reducing arms is impossible inasmuch as they constitute a single whole. The abandonment of a reduction in arms merely confirms the unconstructive nature of the approach of the NATO countries, which are blocking progress at the negotiations. Incidentally, this position logically ensues from this bloc's general policy of speeding up military preparations and securing military advantages to the detriment of the legitimate interests of the security of the USSR and its allies.
There is no doubt that, given the political will in all the participants in the negotiations, decisions which, while not undermining the security of either side, would make it possible to lower the level of military confrontation in the center of Europe may very well be found.

Particular importance is attached in this plane to the ideas and proposals contained in the above-mentioned Political Declaration of the Warsaw Pact states of 5 January 1983. They were specified and officially submitted on 17 February 1983 by the Soviet delegation at the Vienna negotiations. Objective foreign observers evaluated highly the Soviet initiatives, which embody a prudent and practical approach aimed at the achievement of real results and the surmounting of the "figures" and other artificially created barriers. On 23 June 1983 the socialist countries submitted a new draft on the all-embracing "Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments and the Measures Connected With This in Central Europe". Its essence is to begin in practice, regardless of the disagreements in the estimates of the numbers of forces of the two sides, the process of a reduction in troops and arms in Central Europe and in no more than 3 years since the moment when the agreement takes effect to have reached equal collective ceilings--900,000 men on each side, including 700,000 ground forces and air force personnel of not more than 200,000. The troops must be cut back by formation, unit and subunit together with all their authorized arms and military equipment.

An initial step which would make it possible to shift matters from dead center and achieve the first tangible results even prior to the elaboration of agreements embracing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe of all 11 direct participants in the negotiations would be a reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States of their armed forces on the basis of mutual example, that is, outside of a treaty framework, of 20,000 and 13,000 servicemen respectively together with their arms. For this arrangements need to be made concerning the specific time and procedure of the withdrawal of the contingents which are cut back and concerning the organization of observation of the withdrawal by representatives of both sides. It is also important that in the interval between the initial cutbacks in troops and armaments of the USSR and the United States and the final agreements there be no buildup of forces and arms in order that all the direct participants in the negotiations assume a commitment on a mutual basis to freeze the levels of their armed forces and arms in Central Europe right until an agreement is reached on bigger cutbacks in the forces of all the direct parties to the negotiations.

Particular significance in the plane of the struggle for an improvement in the political climate on the European continent was attached to the appeal of the Warsaw Pact states to the participants in the North Atlantic treaty containing the proposal for the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual nonuse of military force and the preservation of peaceful relations and the adoption of a mutual commitment not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional arms against one another and, consequently, not to be the first to use against one another military force in general.
Much in the business of removing the military threat may be done by the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security and Disarmament in Europe which is being held in Stockholm. It is a matter of the desire and good will of the United States and its partners.

An examination of the most important aspects of the state and development of conventional arms in the NATO countries testifies to a trend toward a constant buildup in their level both quantitatively and qualitatively. The instigators of this arms race are making an unconcealed attempt upon the parity which evolved in the 1970's between East and West and the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

The new programs for the development of all types of arms being implemented in the NATO countries, the instigator of which is the United States, cannot fail to elicit the retaliatory response of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The stockpiling of arsenals and the qualitative development of conventional arms, besides the direct threat which they entail for peace and international stability, also make it more difficult to exercise surveillance in the event of the conclusion of new treaties and agreements on limiting both conventional and nuclear arms.

Under current conditions the need to find opportunities and ways leading to a curbing of the race in arms of any kind and the preservation and strengthening of peace is assuming a more insistent nature than ever. Addressing the voters on 2 March 1984, K.U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, expressed the hope that "ultimately it will be possible to again turn the course of events in the direction of the consolidation of peace, limitation of the arms race and the development of international cooperation."


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BRUTENTS ON NONALIGNED MOVEMENT'S ROLE, NATURE

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 26-41

[K. Brutents article: "The Nonaligned Movement in the Contemporary World"]

[Text] The Nonaligned Movement is a new and historically significant phenomenon of international life and also a fairly stable one. As with any new phenomenon, it as yet has been insufficiently studied although the broadest stream of both publicist and scientific literature has been devoted to it. In actual fact, the deep analysis of this complex phenomenon has just begun. The main thing is that the Nonaligned Movement expresses the hopes of peoples liberated from colonial and semicolonial dependence to wrench themselves away from the imperialist political system, to become independent subjective factors of international life, and to organize themselves on an interstate level to ensure more favorable foreign political conditions for resolving their specific problems—both economic and political—including the most important one of being able to freely choose their path of further development. These problems are primarily a legacy of colonialism and are now inseparable from imperialism's neocolonial policy.

Thus, the content of the Nonaligned Movement's platform is objectively and generally democratic and anti-imperialist. And this determines the movement's fundamental political nature and its natural place within the system of contemporary international relations. It also determines the Soviet Union's principled position on matters connected with the Nonaligned Movement.

The movement's appearance was made possible and objectively caused by the new situation that took shape after World War II—the utter defeat of the forces of fascist reaction, the formation of the socialist system, and the collapse of the colonial empires. In general terms, the movement's development is proceeding under the influence of three main factors. These are: first, the international situation, including the correlation of forces in the world arena; second, the objective place and role of the developing countries in world political and economic relations; and finally, third, the internal conditions of the liberated countries themselves. Meanwhile, all the aforementioned factors, as well as their combination and correlation, are changing. In accordance with this the movement itself is also evolving. The same slogans ring differently at individual stages of the development of the international
situation and the movement itself. Hence the necessity for a concrete historical approach to nonalignment while taking all the aforementioned factors and their interaction into account.

I

The origins of the Nonaligned Movement date from the Bandung conference of Asian and African countries held 18–24 April 1955, in which 29 states from the two continents participated. This conference was the first collective act in the world arena of countries liberated from colonial or semicolonial dependence. The conference's final communiqué even today testifies to the fact that prominent statesmen from the Asian and African countries showed a considerable amount of insight in being able even at that time to concentrate their attention on certain important trends of international development in the second half of the twentieth century.

The Bandung conference spoke in defense of basic human rights and of basic rights of oppressed peoples, demanded unconditional fulfillment of the nation's right to self-determination, and condemned racial discrimination and segregation. Although the final communiqué did not refer to imperialism directly, the substance of a whole series of points contained in the document are nevertheless clearly anti-imperialist.

The conference decisively condemned the practice of "subjugating peoples to foreign enslavement, domination, and exploitation." (Footnote 1) ("The Nonaligned Movement in Documents and Materials," Moscow, 1979, p 423) This is generally one characteristic feature of the nonaligned countries' documents and statements. Based on the real international situation and reflecting the objective position and interests of these countries in the world, these documents and statements as a rule have a clear antiimperialist ring to them even if at first glance they appear to be addressed to no one in particular.

The participants in the conference also devoted a great deal of attention to another problem of importance of all mankind—the problem of peace and the security of peoples. They expressed deep concern over the international tension then existing in "cold war" conditions and over the danger of a nuclear war, and called for arms reduction, general disarmament, and the destruction of nuclear weapons. Thus, the young states of Asia and Africa unambiguously defined their position on this important problem of international life and made it clearly understood that they did not intend to remain on the sidelines of this problem's resolution.

The demand incorporated in the communiqué, that in accordance with the UN Charter provisions "all countries must enjoy the right to freely choose their own political and economic systems and their own way of life" (Footnote 2) (Ibid, p 425) was a fundamentally new approach for the Afro-Asian countries to problems of social progress.

The anti-imperialist aims first advanced in Bandung, together with the general democratic nature of the main formulated tasks and demands, determined for a long time the basic substance of the developing countries' collective actions in the international arena.
It should be noted that the sociopolitical dissimilarities of the countries represented at the conference and the existence among them of a wing whose leaders acted from positions of anticomunist bias made themselves felt at this conference. This was also shown by certain elements of a compromise approach with regard to imperialist policies.

Nevertheless, as a whole the conference's final documents confirmed the basic course adopted by the countries and peoples liberated from colonialism toward independent development in conditions of peace. This was a great victory and at the same time only a demand that had yet to be confirmed and fulfilled. It must be admitted that this task then was still beyond a considerable number of young states. But all the governments of the Asian and African countries, including those represented at the Bandung conference, showed loyalty to the spirit and letter of the conference's decisions by their actions. The "cold war" atmosphere created by imperialism exerted great pressure on the national liberation forces and undermined the striving of many countries for a truly independent role in international affairs. This pressure also manifested itself to a considerable degree in the fact that the final wish of the Bandung meeting was not fulfilled—the wish to call a new conference of Asian and African countries. Nevertheless, the basic orientation determined at Bandung steadily gathered force.

The second half of the fifties and particularly the beginning of the sixties were marked by the sharply accelerated collapse of the colonial empires. As scores of countries declared their independence the liberation struggle itself acquired deeper content and was already conceived of as a clash not only with concrete colonialism—English, French, and so forth—but also with imperialism as a system. At the same time it was becoming more and more obvious that the achievement of success in this struggle was being impeded by international tension and the "cold war." One of its main factors was the system of military blocs created by imperialism and primarily by the United States. The SEATO and CENTO (originally the Baghdad Pact) blocs directed against the Soviet Union were increasingly utilized by imperialism for neocolonialist purposes.

Such was the situation when at a conference held in Belgrade in September 1961, the Nonaligned Movement was formed organizationally. The movement appeared to carry on the tradition of Bandung. In point of fact, it was precisely the latter's ideas that lay at the basis of the movement's program, which already directly pointed out the need to struggle against imperialism and its policies in general. The Belgrade conference added two more principles to those already existing. One of them gave the whole movement its name—nonalignment in relation to military blocs. This principle was fated to play a large role in disputes that developed both within and outside the movement concerning its platform. The second principle defined aid to liberation movements as one of the main tasks. For many years this clause has served as a kind of criterion of the Nonaligned Movement's concrete success, has rallied the countries participating in this movement, and has objectively led them, on the basis of a concurrence of positions, to cooperation with the Soviet Union and the socialist community.

Such prominent statesmen as J. Nehru, G. A. AN-Nasir, K. Nkrumah, A. Sukarno, Fidel Castro, and J.B. Tito were at the "cradle" of the Nonaligned Movement.
Nehru should be given particular mention as he made an exceptionally great contribution to the development of the ideas of nonalignment and incidentally was the author of the term itself. Nehru understood that the future fate of countries liberated from colonial dependence would be connected largely with their ability to assume independent positions in the international arena. As early as September 1946, Nehru spoke on Delhi radio about how he imagined the future foreign policy of an independent India to be. Defining his attitude on international problems, he deemed it necessary to proceed exclusively from India's interests and to "stand aside from the policy of force pursued by groups opposed to one another..." (Footnote 3) (Jawaharlal Nehru: "India's Foreign Policy," Moscow, 1965, p 31) in the world arena. Of course, the fact must also be taken into account here that the striving in former colonies and semicolonies for independence and for the establishment of independent policies and ultimately national aspirations themselves both on a state level and in social life, frequently take on a nationalist form.

Nehru furthermore precisely defined the substance of nonaligned policy in connection with the signing of the Manila and Baghdad treaties, which established military blocs in Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia. "We think," said Nehru in India's parliament, "that these treaties are pushing the world in the wrong direction. They do not take into account the effect of new factors. Instead of utilizing these new factors operating in the direction of peace, disarmament, and the weakening of tension, they deliberately hold back these factors' development and encourage other trends that intensify hatred, terror, and fear and hinder disarmament." (Footnote 4) (Ibid, p 181) Even India's simple participation, for example in the Manila conference (to say nothing of its joining SEATO) "would mean," in his words, "that we renounce our basic policy of nonalignment." (Footnote 5) (Ibid, p 131) This evolution of Nehru's opinions or, still more, their concrete political meaning are a typical example of how the Nonaligned Movement's slogans sound when they are based upon the real international situation.

If one takes the origin of the nonalignment idea—"nonalignment in relations to blocs"—then the anti-imperialist genealogy and meaning of this idea can be seen clearly. There has never been a single military bloc, just as there are none now, in the zone of the liberated countries that would have been formed by the Soviet Union or with its participation. There have only been blocs organized by U.S. imperialism. For the liberated countries there could be only one question—whether to join these imperialist blocs or to remain outside of them. It is typical that the essence of the position formulated by Nehru was immediately given a hostile reception by imperialism. The not unknown J. F. Dulles qualified the nonalignment position expressed by Nehru as "amoral."

Nehru repeatedly explained: Not joining any of the groups did not mean assuming a position of neutrality, passivity, or isolation in international affairs. On the contrary, he saw in nonalignment the possibility of pursuing an active and independent policy in the world arena and proclaimed India's readiness to cooperate on an equal basis with all states (and to support concretely those states assuming a position coinciding with India's interests). From the very outset this approach laid an objective foundation for cooperation between the Nonaligned Movement and the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community.
It is precisely this kind of approach that imperialism has stubbornly opposed from the very beginning up until the present day, while striving at the same time to draw even some liberated states into following its lead. In this respect it also operates through developing countries that side with it, including those affiliated with the Nonaligned Movement. This feature has played an important role in the so-called concept of "equidistance" from the two main world social forces or, if one is to use the terminology of those years, from the two camps—imperialist and socialist.

It is worth noting that the political meaning and trend of the "equidistant" approach have not remained immutable during the past decades. When this thesis was first advanced the young states that had just won their independence were still fairly closely attached to the imperialist world and did not have any developed relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. As a result—at least with regard to many of these states—"equidistance" could in practice also mean a certain distancing from the imperialist world. But with the passage of time this position is beginning to be aimed almost entirely at undermining the cooperation that developed during the last quarter of a century between the socialist and nonaligned countries, and between the Nonaligned Movement and the world of socialism. And the danger connected with "equidistance" for the Nonaligned Movement's orientation, which has been tested by time, has not only now been preserved but has even increased.

The existence of two basic trends—anti-imperialist and, so to speak antibloc—in many respects even to this day determines in the essentials the face of the Nonaligned Movement and its concrete actions and positions adopted on the most important international questions, and, of course, the existence of and antagonism between these trends reveal the movement's internal socioeconomic and political heterogeneity. The evolution of the Nonaligned Movement, the positions it adopts, and even differences within the movement on these or those questions are affected by changes in the nature of the tasks fulfilled by the liberated countries at this or that stage of their development.

II

What has the Nonaligned Movement demonstrated until now and what are its present basic characteristics?

During the slightly more than 2 decades following Belgrade, the movement's composition in terms of participants has expanded and changed in character and in geographical range. Whereas 25 states participated in the Belgrade conference, by the time of the Delhi conference the movement already had 101 full members—two-thirds of the international community—and 29 observers (liberation organizations and movements are also included among the former and the latter in addition to independent states). By the time the next conference comes around the number of the movement's full members is expected to reach a total of 110.

Until 1973, apart from Socialist Cuba and Yugoslavia, the movement consisted exclusively of Asian and African states and it was only at the fourth—Algiers—conference, that countries representing other continents and regions joined it. During the last decade the movement was expanded not only by new young
states but also by Latin American ones, for example. For them, entering the ranks of the movement has meant a rejection to a greater or lesser degree of their traditional orientation toward the United States and a challenge to political-economic dependence upon imperialism. This once again highlights the real political meaning of nonalignment and its platform. Another important qualitative change in the composition of the Nonaligned Movement is the appearance within it of a group of revolutionary-democratic states alongside the socialist countries (to which Vietnam and Laos have been added). These states include such countries as Afghanistan, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, and the Congo.

At present the movement's members are geographically distributed as follows: Asia--29, Africa--51, Europe--3, Latin America--17, and Oceania--1. During the seventies neutral countries also began to be invited to the movement's conferences as "guests"--Austria, San Marino, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and also the Vatican.

Over the past decades the movement has evolved a completely stable structure, although it has never been regarded as some kind of international organization --it has neither a statute nor a permanent executive organ or apparatus, and it does not even have a permanent budget. Its supreme organ is the conference of heads of states and of governments. In periods between their meetings, conferences of foreign affairs ministers, convened approximately every half year, are a most important forum. The permanent coordination of the movement's activities is implemented by the chairman and the Coordination Bureau (which now has 74 members) and also by the UN group of nonaligned countries. Decisions within the Nonaligned Movement are adopted by means of consensus and are in fact recommendatory. So much greater is the role played by the presiding country, by the positions it assumes, and by the orientation that it strives to give the movement.

The level at which the movement's conferences are convened should be ascribed to the number of its strong points. Thus, 63 countries were represented by heads of state or government at the Delhi conference. Of course, this by no means signifies that the movement exceeds the UN in its potentials. However, the high level of participants and the definite degree of coordination of actions frequently make it possible for the movement to appreciably influence the evaluation and direction of solutions to major problems of international life.

But the Nonaligned Movement also necessarily encounters complications of no small importance if one thinks in terms of its potential for influencing world affairs. Apart from the imperialist policies, these complications are connected primarily with the available economic and political potential of the majority of countries affiliated with the movement, with their dependence upon the imperialist world which still has to be overcome, and with the resulting practical limitations for their participation on an equal footing in international affairs.

The role of the developing countries in world politics is steadily growing. This is an irrevocable process, considering the political, economic, demographic, and geographical-strategic features "working upon it." At the same
time it is a process of long duration with an uneven rate of development, now speeding up, now slowing down. In the seventies this process made a certain qualitative leap forward, primarily on the basis of the raw materials crisis and as a result of a certain improvement in the international climate. Now, however, it is evolving under the appreciable influence of deterioration in the developing countries' economic situation, their sharply increased financial dependence, changes in the world raw materials situation, and also exacerbation of the international situation, and the heightened role within it of a hard element of force introduced by American imperialism and its allies.

Another basic complication springs from the movement's socioeconomic heterogeneity and from the fundamental differences in the positions of its individual members which sometimes are forcibly smoothed over in decisions adopted by consensus but then reveal themselves in practical actions.

Characterizing the present arrangement of forces within the movement, the Indian newspaper PATRIOT, hot on the heels of the Delhi conference, wrote for example about the "three main segments." First of all there are the socialist states, such as Cuba and Vietnam, then countries of a left-wing orientation, and finally states that have embarked on a path of independent economic development—India, Algeria, Syria, and others. All of these, in the newspaper's opinion, make up the core of the movement, representing approximately one-third of the total number of participants. Then, according to the newspaper, come approximately 50 countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia that, through their own bitter experience, have become convinced that their freedom and sovereignty and hopes for restructuring their economies "lead inevitably to a clash with imperialism, and particularly the American variety..." PATRIOT singles out one more group of states connected with the United States along economic and military lines. These include countries such as those making up ASEAN, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, certain states in Central America (Jamaica, for example), in Africa (Zaire, Egypt, Somalia) and others. (Footnote 6) (PATRIOT, 14 Mar 1983). Of course, another variation of classification is also entirely possible, but this one gives an idea of how dissimilar the Nonaligned Movement's participants are from a political and socioeconomic point of view.

Reflecting the definite political and socioeconomic processes in the world of the developing countries, elements of differentiation within the movement are increasing and deepening. The unevenness of political, economic, and social development during the years of independence and the unequal range of the liberation movement is super-imposed on the specific historical features of the member-countries. As a result the world of the former colonies and semicolonies today presents a very varied picture. Indeed, these countries differ from one another in their size and natural resources, in their level of socioeconomic development and "seniority" of the tradition of statehood, and in their political systems and social orientation. They include great India with a population of 700 million and more than 3 million square kilometers of territory and one of the most minute states on earth—the island of Nauru with its territory of 22 square kilometers and population of 9,000.
They include Kuwait, in whose depths are hidden 8.8 billion metric tons of oil and where the per capita annual income is more than $20,000. And there is Mali, a country that, for the present at least, has been almost completely done out of its share of raw material resources and that has a mere $201 annual per capita income. (Footnote 7) ("Handbook of Trade and Development Statistics, 1983," New York, 1983, pp 436-7) Then there are Ethiopia, one of the world's most ancient states, with 3,000 years of history behind it, and Papua New Guinea, whose statehood is not even 10 years old.

Then there are countries where a sector of modern industry has been more or less formed, and where there exists fairly precise social demarcation. But there are also a number of states in tropical Africa where tribal relations are still the basis of life for the indigenous population. There are semifeudal monarchies, bourgeois and bourgeois-parliamentary republics, and there are states of socialist orientation.

However, does this mean that the liberated countries' common features connected with their recent colonial and semicolonial past have devalued or even lost their significance entirely? Of course not. The question is precisely about those particular features that primarily determine the specific nature of these countries in the ranks of the states of the world, and their place in the system of international relations and in the peripetesia of the struggle between two systems. It is considered that these countries:

Occupy a dependent and exploited position in the world capitalist economy and in the capitalist division of labor, and that they are tied to the imperialist states by unequal economic relations, which puts practical limitations on their political independence;

Come up against obstacles that emanate from these limitations and that stand in the way of their enhancing their international role and participating fully in international affairs;

Do not fit in, on the whole, with the imperialist political system;

Serve as an object of neocolonial policies;

Lag behind in economic, scientific-technical, and social respects, since their social forms and their spiritual life bear deep traces of the period of enslavement, and their peoples still retain living and fresh memories of this period;

Are passing through the transitional stage of overcoming precapitalist relations and of building new, and—in the majority of cases—capitalist systems, and also of the stage of forming nations and national institutions;

Show a strong national-liberation and antineocolonial trend in their social development.

And it is precisely all this that also ensures an objective basis for the nonaligned countries to act from common positions.
It is appropriate to cite certain facts that characterize what is now actually termed the "quality of life," or, more precisely, the absence of it in developing countries. It is calculated that more than 500 million of their population are starving; 1.7 billion people have a life expectancy of less than 60 years; 1.5 billion people do not have access to medical services; more than 1 billion people live in conditions of extreme poverty; more than 0.5 billion are either partially or completely unemployed; 800 million people have an annual per capita income of less than $150; 814 million of the adult population are illiterate; more than 200 million children are not given the chance to go to school; more than 2 billion people are deprived of a reliable and stable water supply; and more than 1.5 billion people depend upon firewood for the satisfaction of their vital needs. (Footnote 8) (Fidel Castro: "The World's Economic and Social Crisis. Its Consequences for the Developing Countries, Its Gloomy Outlook, and the Necessity To Struggle If We Wish To Survive. Report Presented to the Seventh Conference of Heads of States and Governments of the Nonaligned Countries," Moscow, 1983, p 222)

As in preceding decades, these characteristics of the liberated countries determine their situation and position with regard to imperialism in the eighties. They play a special role both in the formation of mutual relations with the imperialist states and in the development of cooperation with the socialist world.

The objective community of positions of the member-countries of the Nonaligned Movement is given important support by their vital interest in peace and in opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and diktat. The liberated states are becoming ever more aware that the present exacerbation of the international situation hits at their interests in both political and economic respects. The strategy of a "limited nuclear war" is a real threat to the lives of all peoples. At the same time the developing countries can hardly count upon a radically improved economic situation while the arms race is progressing on such an immense scale and military expenditures are reaching astronomical proportions. In this connection the developing countries themselves are also being drawn into the ever accelerating arms race. Calculated at 1979 prices, the military expenditure of these countries reached $33 billion in 1972, or 7.9 percent of the total world military expenditure. By 1982 their expenditure had increased 2.5 times, exceeding $81 billion and comprising 15.6 percent of total world military expenditure. But what does this nonproductive expenditure of resources mean for the developing countries in practical terms? We will limit ourselves to two examples. The countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America expend 5.9 percent of their gross national product on arms and other military purposes, and only 1 percent on public health care and 2.8 percent on education. In the developing countries taken as a whole, there is one soldier for every 250 inhabitants and one doctor for every 3,700. (Footnote 9) (Ibid, pp 229, 234)

As emphasized at the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "the aggressive policy of domination and diktat pursued by the imperialist powers runs counter to" the objective interests of even those developing countries in which the capitalist system has been established. "Striving to overcome their economic backwardness, these countries need international cooperation on an equal footing and lasting peace. Many of them regard relations with the socialist countries as a means of strengthening their independence."
Despite the existence of differentiating factors, the significance of common features within the Nonaligned Movement was clearly manifest during the movement's last conference in Delhi. It is generally recognized that the work and documents of this conference are of an anti-imperialist trend, and that the movement's fundamental [osnovopolagayushchiy] principles have been confirmed in a complex situation. And, of course, it is impossible not to connect this with the general correlation of forces in the world, with the activeness of the progressive member-states of the Nonaligned Movement, and with the position of the socialist countries.

At the same time there is no doubt that this result would be impossible if the aforementioned common features in the position of the developing countries did not also exist and have an effect.

It has already been noted above that if one traces the evolution of the Nonaligned Movement's platform one finds that, while the basic trends of its development have been retained, accents and even priorities have changed along the way. During the first decade the ideas of decolonization and the strengthening of political independence predominated within the movement. At the beginning of the seventies these ideas had been realized in many ways and the tasks of overcoming socioeconomic backwardness and of gaining economic independence came to the fore.

This was reflected in the program of the new international economic system first formulated at the Algiers conference of nonaligned countries in 1973; H. Boumedienne, president of Algeria at that time, actively contributed to determining this problem as one of the main problems of international life in general. Raising the problem and drawing the attention of the world community to it was made possible by the lessening of international tension that marked the seventies. In this atmosphere the general influence of the developing countries in the international arena also steadily increased.

The 1979 Havana Conference of the Nonaligned Movement seemed to be the culmination of the growth and strengthening of progressive and anti-imperialist trends within the movement. The very fact that it was held at all, which both the United States, the PRC, and some of the movement's member-countries desperately tried to prevent, and the fact that the chairmanship position was moved to Cuba reflected the strengthening of the progressive wing within the movement and of the role played in it by Socialist Cuba and Vietnam and the reinforcing of the movement with new progressive states.

The period from Havana to Delhi was marked, first, by acute exacerbation of the crisis of capitalism, the burden of which the ruling circles of the imperialist powers strive to transfer to the peoples of the developing countries. Second, by a sharp intensification of the aggressiveness of U.S. imperialism and by its switching--particularly during the period of the R. Reagan administration—to the rails of a policy of force and even of direct aggression and to the path of confrontation with the Soviet Union and the socialist community and of a "crusade" against the forces of national independence and progress, including the liberated states.
In this situation it is natural that the problems of ensuring peace and of struggle against the military threat and of protecting the developing countries from the economic ruin that is being brought to them by the crisis of world capitalism in conditions of incredibly increased and, one might say, suffocating financial debts of these countries to the imperialist states, have moved into the foreground, which was also demonstrated by the Delhi conference of the Nonaligned Movement. In this connection an insistent demand was made for global talks with the developed countries aimed at adopting concrete and immediate measures to ease the burden of crisis for the Asian, African, and Latin American countries. This demand was accompanied by the raising of the question of developing collective reliance upon one's own forces, upon "self-sufficiency" within the framework of the so-called "South-South" relations. It must be borne in mind that a considerable number of countries with a strong industrial potential and a fairly high scientific-technical standard now already exist within the Nonaligned Movement itself. These countries are interested in cooperating with other developing states. It is no accident that India is an energetic advocate of the "South-South" formula.

As a whole, the movement's platform, as defined at the Havana and Delhi conferences, can be reduced to the following basic tenets.

The upholding of the nonaligned countries' national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security; struggle against outside interference in the internal affairs of states and against the use of the threat of force; support for liberation movements; the liquidation of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid; and racism, including Zionism, and all forms of expansionism, foreign occupation, domination, and hegemony;

The ensuring of international peace, security, the universal spreading of detente, ending the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control; struggle for the removal of foreign armed forces and the liquidation of foreign military bases; democratization of the system of international relations, equal participation in the resolving of international problems, and the strengthening of the United Nations.

The earliest establishment of the new international economic system, the re-structuring of relations with developed countries, and the promotion of economic cooperation among the nonaligned countries with the aim of collective self-sufficiency.

The general results of the Delhi conference, which determined the face of the movement for the coming years, have already been discussed above. It must be also emphasized that, in addition to the regular political and economic declarations, the special Delhi Appeal was also adopted in which the nonaligned countries demand that "the arms race be ended" and that "the slide toward nuclear conflict, which not only threatens mankind today, but also future generations, be immediately stopped." Conference participants called on the nuclear powers to adopt urgent and effective measures to prevent a nuclear war, to conclude "an international convention prohibiting the resorting to the threat on the
application of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and to cease the further production and deployment of these weapons," and also their testing. All this is in keeping with the principled positions of the socialist states, as is the statement contained in the Political Declaration that "in the contemporary world there is no alternative to the policy of peaceful coexistence, detente, and cooperation among states, irrespective of their economic and social systems, size, and geographical position."

As is well known, the chairmanship of the movement moved from Cuba to India after the New Delhi conference. This was not a simple matter of rotation. Centrist and conservative regimes, encouraged primarily by the United States and also by the PRC, cherished hopes of seriously amending the political platform approved at Havana under the influence, according to them, of Cuba. It would be amended in favor of the infamous policy of "equidistance" from the "superpowers" and of demand to "democratize" the movement's leadership. The latter demand concealed the intention to deprive the progressive states of the opportunity to influence the content of documents adopted by the movement.

The United States displayed vigorous, if not feverish activity. Before the conference their representatives held numerous meetings with statesmen from the developing countries. The U.S. President addressed a message to the conference itself, unprecedented in its amiable tone, in which he greeted the Nonaligned Movement and its principles, assured its participants of the United States' willingness to support the movement, and so forth, thus gaining the real American position. The chief aim of this massed political-diplomatic and propagandist attack was obviously to swing the whole Nonaligned Movement to the right or, if possible, to sow seeds of dissent among its ranks.

While "preparing" for the New Delhi conference, the United States also did not overlook India's internal situation that contributed, in particular, to heightened tension there (in connection with the events in the state of Assam, for example). The American representatives actively lobbied at the conference. A whole team from the State Department made up of 12 officials with work experience in the developing countries arrived for the New Delhi meeting. Pressure was unceremoniously applied to Nonaligned Movement members in attempts to soften the anti-imperialist and especially the anti-American sentiment of the final documents. The United States' main efforts were concentrated on knocking together a group of countries that would act in a way that Washington would wish.

It must be admitted that in many ways the conference owed its success in this complex situation to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Truly major, global problems that united the movement were brought into the foreground. Opening the conference, the prime minister spoke of the vital necessity of struggling for disarmament, detente, and the prohibition of mass destruction weapons. A second and related long-term task, that of liquidating the gap in the economic levels of the developed and developing countries, was advanced alongside this first paramount task. In her speech Indira Gandhi condemned the concept of a "limited nuclear war" and also emphasized that "anti-imperialism lies as before as the basis of our world outlook."
The positive results of the conference are indissolubly linked as a whole with the activeness and constructive position of the Nonaligned Movement's progressive member-countries as well as with the role played by India. Prime mention must be given in this connection to Cuba, Vietnam, and South Yemen whose delegations were headed respectively by Fidel Castro, Pham Van Dong, and 'Ali Nasir Muhammad. The service rendered by Fidel Castro was particularly great. His speeches—and he spoke twice, first at the opening of the conference and then with a report on Nonaligned Movement activities—aroused general interest. His speeches provided a clear and thorough analysis of the international situation in its political, military, and economic aspects and contained an appraisal of the situation in individual regions. The reaction to these speeches and to the whole tireless work of the Cuban Revolution's leader throughout the conference testified to his great prestige within the Nonaligned Movement.

As a result, the attempts of the right-wing bloc, encouraged from behind the scenes by the United States and the PRC, to encroach upon the fundamental orientation of the Nonaligned Movement were frustrated. The documents of the New Delhi conference have an anti-imperialist sharpness, even if on some points they are inferior in this respect to the decisions adopted at Havana. The U.S. position is condemned by name more than 20 times in the Final Declaration in various contexts and on various grounds. Efforts to break up the conference because of the "Afghanistan" and "Kampuchea" problems and to give it an anti-Soviet cast also failed.

The question must also be touched upon of how economic problems on the plane of the so-called "North-South" dialogue were set at the conference. As is well known, the nonaligned countries raised claims against the developed "North" because it not only had not embarked upon the path of equal cooperation but it had not even entered into constructive dialogue with the developing states. It was also emphasized that the gap between the level of economic development of the "Northern" states and the liberated countries is deepening and that capitalism's monetary-financial crisis most directly affects the fate of these countries. The economic declaration of the New Delhi conferences names "a few industrial countries, and one major industrial country in particular" as being mainly responsible for the wrecking of "global negotiations," which the developing countries demand be held. Being familiar with the language which the compilers of Nonaligned Movement documents drawn up by the method of consensus have to use, it is not difficult to guess that this is a reference to the United States.

Nevertheless, the movement's general approach to the "North-South" problem as it stands at present is marked by a tendency to place the responsibility for economic disorders of the developing countries not only on capitalist, but also on socialist states. Incidentally, it is precisely toward this that the imperialist powers are actively urging the developing countries through diplomatic and propagandist channels. The imperialists and their assistants in the Nonaligned Movement utilize the thesis they have advanced of the "global nature" of the contemporary economic crisis to exert the necessary influence on these countries. They try to convince the representative of the liberated states that they not only have to "moderate" their demands upon the imperialist powers and that they must even help them extricate themselves from the crisis (insofar as "everyone's in the same boat"), but that they must also make economic claims on socialist states.
The question of where the next conference of nonaligned countries should be held has been left open. Participants in the New Delhi forum called in the political declaration for an end to the war between Iran and Iraq so as to "create the necessary conditions and decide the question of the location of the conference once and for all at a meeting at the ministerial level which must be held no later than 1985." In addition to Baghdad, the candidates include Damascus, Luanda, and Pyongyang.

The major action of the Nonaligned Movement since the New Delhi meeting has been the conferences of foreign affairs ministers and of the heads of nonaligned countries' delegations at the 38th session of the UN General Assembly. These conferences are held regularly in New York at the beginning of General Assembly session. In recent years decisions for a consistently anti-imperialist note have been adopted at these conferences on a broad range of international problems. This time the draft final communique prepared by India was the center of discussion. The movement's conservative wing tried to have a number of principled decisions of the New Delhi conference revised, but it was defeated. In the final analysis, the communique confirmed the movement's anti-imperialist and antimilitary line, worked out in New Delhi, on virtually every point.

As is well known, the United States sharply criticized the results of the New Delhi conference. The U.S. State Department appraised the Nonaligned Movement's declaration adopted in New Delhi as "an unbalanced and polemical document" in many respects and one which does not reflect the principles of nonalignment proclaimed by this movement. The "lack of balance" was interpreted in the fact that the documents contain "unjust attacks" on the United States and "do not contain criticism addressed to the Soviet Union...."

Speaking at the 38th session of the UN General Assembly, R. Reagan, holding diplomatic conventions in contempt, scored the "false nonalignment" of many states affiliated with the movement and accused the movement of sinking into political demogogy and tolerating countries within its ranks which, as he put it, are "satellites" of the Soviet Union. The newspaper NATIONAL HERALD, which is close to the ruling Indian National Congress, gave a worthy reproof to the American president: "The completely tactless, amoral, and illogical attack upon the Nonaligned Movement stunned the heads of states and governments gathered in the UN...." (Footnote 10) (NATIONAL HERALD, 28 September 1983)

It is completely clear that Washington's reaction fully accords with the general policy pursued by the R. Reagan administration with regard to the developing countries and is embodied in the so-called "Kirkpatrick plan." It is a policy of tough pressure of force and an appraisal of all the actions of the developing countries from the position of confrontation with the Soviet Union which has been inflamed by the United States. Washington not only considers this approach politically advantageous to itself, it also directly strives to turn the developing world into a field of battle for the new imperialist "crusaders" and to create permanent hotbeds of tension there.
Revising the methods of achieving its aims in developing countries, Washington is shifting the center of gravity in favor of military force. The United States is also striving by the same means to delay or slow down resolution of the most acute economic problems that divide the capitalist North and the "developing South." The "Kirkpatrick plan" prescribes the use of force and the utilization of economic and military aid, customs barriers, supplies of foodstuffs, credits, and so forth as methods of exerting pressure upon the developing countries. Washington's crude pressure on Zimbabwe—bordering upon sanctions—when the latter refused to support American positions in the UN discussion of the South Korean airliner provocation and then also the U.S. invasion of Grenada illustrate this approach.

Nevertheless, unlike the past, the United States obviously does not now strive to liquidate the Nonaligned Movement, possibly because it realizes that this aim is unattainable at present. It would rather to use this movement as a channel through which to influence the foreign policy positions of a number of liberated countries friendly to the Soviet Union and also of other developing states pursuing an independent policy. Judging by many signs, American imperialism is striving to increase its penetration of the Nonaligned Movement. By exploiting the developing countries' serious economic situation the United States is obviously trying to draw those states comprising the "center" of the movement closer to itself.

The PRC's attitude to the Nonaligned Movement attracts attention. At first China attacked the movement, accusing it of deviation from the anti-imperialist struggle. Later, the Chinese leadership started to try to penetrate the Nonaligned Movement and make it serve its own interests. It proclaimed the PRC a developing country, propagandized in every possible way the thesis of China's "community of interests" with "Third World" countries, and continued to declare that China was the "true protector" of the interests of developing countries in their struggle against the "superpowers." However, when Beijing adopted the course of moving closer to the United States of confrontation with the Soviet Union, its attention to the developing countries weakened to some extent. The proclamation of very nearly strategic alliance with American imperialism made these countries considerably more alert in this connection.

Recently the PRC has once again increased its attention to the developing countries, and the community of interests of China and the liberated states is now once again emphasized. And in this connection the developing countries and liberated states are requested to adopt the platform of "equidistance" from the "two superpowers" which are both presented as an equal threat to these countries. In an article entitled "Mighty Stormy Trend of the Era--The Nonaligned Movement" published in its second issue in spring last year, the journal GUOJI WENTI YANJIU claims that the Nonaligned Movement has directed the sharp edge of its struggle against the "two hegemonist countries, the United States and the USSR, in view of their growing threat to the cause of peace in the world and to the independence, sovereignty, and security of peoples of various countries and particularly the 'Third World' peoples."

The Chinese strive to undermine Cuba's and Vietnam's positions in the movement, continue to press their anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese approach to the so-called "Afghanistan" and "Kampuchean" problems on the Nonaligned Movement, and
pursue a course of putting together a pro-Chinese nucleus in the movement. Despite the aspirations of a majority of nonaligned countries to preserve the unity of the movement, during the preparations for and the course of the New Delhi conference, Chinese diplomacy directed its main efforts to obtaining a solution of the question of participation of the notorious "Coalition Government" of Pol Pot and Sihanouk in the conference, a solution that would be suitable for itself.

As regards the Soviet Union, its principled approach to the Nonaligned Movement defined by the decisions of the 24th, 25th and 26th party congresses and in the statements by the CPSU and the Soviet state leaders and the very fact that this question is reflected in the documents of each of the latest party congresses attest to the importance the Soviet Union attaches to it. The greetings telegram of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers to I. Gandhi, chairman of the seventh conference of nonaligned countries, stated: "The Soviet Union has always wholeheartedly supported and will continue to wholeheartedly support the Non-aligned Movement's efforts in the struggle for peace and the security of peoples, for ending the arms race and for disarmament, for reorganizing international economic relations on the basis of just and democratic principles, for complete and comprehensive decolonization."

The Soviet Union regards the Nonaligned Movement as a great positive factor in contemporary international relations and sees its potential in the anti-imperialist and anticolonial directions and in its loyalty to the ideals of peace and the security of peoples. It is a force with which the socialist states cooperate in the struggle for peace, against the aggressive, neocolonialist, and racist policies of imperialism, against diktats and discrimination in international economic and political relations, for democratization of these relations, and for practical fulfillment of the right of countries and peoples to their independent development along the path they themselves have chosen. An effective cooperation with this great movement naturally makes it necessary to take into account its specific characteristics and the magnitude of its progressive potential.

The policy of attitude toward the Nonaligned Movement must take into account the dynamics of changes in the position of developing countries on the world scene. Thus, if we consider the seventies, this was--as has been already noted--a period of impressive new successes of the national liberation movement. Under conditions of détente, it was marked by the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism and the appearance of liberated countries whose ruling circles chose Marxism-Leninism as their ideology. It was also a period when there were severe energy crises and, correspondingly, a strengthening of the financial position mainly of the oil-producing states and of an assertion of their definite solidarity in the face of imperialism.

Toward the end of the seventies and at the beginning of the eighties, the situation began to change. Intensification of the cyclical crisis combined with a deep structural crisis of the capitalist system effected the developing countries especially painfully. Their economic and especially financial dependence
on the imperialist states noticeably increased. The rates of growth of these countries' gross national product declined from 5.5 percent in the 1976-79 period to 2.5 percent in 1980 and 0.6 percent in 1981. And in 1982, the absolute volume of their gross national product decreased by 0.7 percent (Footnote 11) (UNCTAD Document TD/272, June 1983, p 3) and, last year, their gross national product at best remained at the level of the preceding year. The foreign (medium-term and long-term) debts of the developing countries increased from $66.2 billion in 1970 to $390 billion in 1979, and to $580.4 billion in 1983.

In addition to this, at the end of last year the short-term debts of countries totalled about $100 billion. (Footnote 12) ("Handbook of Trade and Development Statistics, 1983," p 410) According to current estimates, the medium and long-term foreign debts alone of developing countries will increase to a total of $637 billion by the end of 1984. Accordingly, their foreign debt payments, which totalled about $120 billion in 1982, will come close to $400 billion in 1990—that is, to 40 percent of the value of the exports of developing countries (compared with 20 percent in 1982). (Footnote 13) (Fidel Castro: "Economic and Social Crisis of the World," pp 101, 102)

Life places complex and large questions before the Nonaligned Movement. Their solution presupposes a strengthening of ties and cooperation with the socialist states and the Soviet Union, loyal and steadfast friends of the national liberation movement. The strong effectiveness of the USSR policy in relation to the nonaligned countries is determined by the fact that the principles of its foreign policy and its interests do not contradict but correspond to the legitimate national aspirations of these countries.

The Nonaligned Movement is now passing through a responsible stage of its development. This situation is primarily determined by the contemporary international situation. This situation is characterized by an intensified antagonism between two trends. One of them leads to peace and detente and to equal and constructive cooperation between states. The other one leads to an exacerbation and militarization of international relations, a sharp increase of the danger of war, pushing mankind to a nuclear war. The fate of all mankind depends to a great extent on the outcome of this antagonism.

This situation makes special demands on the forces that strive against the aggressive and hegemonist policies of imperialism and defend peace and detente and the material and spiritual progress of mankind in the face of the threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe.

At their New Delhi conference, the nonaligned countries once again clearly demonstrated their place in the ongoing struggle. They also confirmed this with the position on the question of war and peace adopted by the 38th session of the UN General Assembly. The moral-political significance of this position is very great, taking into consideration the role of the Nonaligned Movement as an important factor of contemporary international life and as interpreter of the views of approximately two-thirds of the world's states.

At the same time, it is obvious that the nonaligned countries still have large reserves for increasing their contribution to the cause of peace and security.
What is mainly involved in this connection are systematic practical solutions that would concretize their decisions and make them more effective, as well as persistent counteractions to the hegemonist forces that are fanning confrontation.

It is certainly no accident that imperialism is intensifying its efforts to limit the activeness and role of the Nonaligned Movement and to undermine its political importance. Disregarding the will of the liberated countries and refusing to consider their interests, the imperialists are striving to turn the Nonaligned Movement and the movement of developing countries in general into a sphere of battle with the East and, in practice, battle with the anti-imperialist and peace-loving forces. Pressing the position of "equidistance" on this movement, they essentially want to politically disarm it, emasculate its constructive role, and remove it from any active and effective participation in international affairs.

The development of international events in the past and the present incontrovertibly proves that, by following the path of so-called "equidistance," the nonaligned countries cannot implement their foreign political and foreign economic platforms and cannot ensure the necessary prerequisites for solving their most important problems.

The Soviet Union respects the Nonaligned Movement, whose peace-loving policy is making a useful contribution to improving international life. The movement reflects the foreign political platform of the countries that have liberated themselves from the colonial yoke as well as their aspiration to independence and it acts as a channel for these countries to elaborate and implement their independent foreign policies and to strengthen their influence in international affairs.

The USSR has proceeded and will continue to proceed from the fact that the growth of the role of liberated countries in world politics is a legitimate and irreversible process. For this reason the Soviet Union considers the full-fledged participation of nonaligned states in discussing and solving fundamental international problems, including above all the problem of war and peace, very important. However politically and socially diverse the Nonaligned Movement may be and however different certain positions or aspirations of its members may be, their interests coincide in relation to these fundamental questions. And the stronger the voice of the nonaligned countries on behalf of peace, security, and national independence, the more fully this will correspond to the interests of all peace-loving forces of our world.


CSO: 1816/9a-F
ARGENTINE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL CHANGES EXAMINED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 42-57

[Article by I. Zorina, V. Sheynis: "Argentina at a Historic Turning Point"]

[Text] In December 1983 the military junta which had ruled Argentina* for more than 7 years was forced to transfer power to the civilian government headed by President Alfonsin, who had won the majority of votes at the general election in October. In the periodic change of military and civilian regimes which has been a characteristic feature of this country's political history the latest cycle, the fifth in the last 50 years, came to an end.

Governments which have departed the political arena have always left their successors complex problems with which they could not cope, while the regular "swings" of the political pendulum have expressed the chronic crisis in Argentina's social development, which has lasted for dozens of years. However, the situation which has taken shape at the start of the 1980's is exceptional in many respects. Production which has been declining for several years now, galloping inflation, a colossal foreign debt, the grim consequences of the suppression of civilian society, political terror and repression, which were exercised with a cruelty unprecedented in the country's history and which had engendered profound social demoralization, the lost "battle for the Falklands," a small war which resulted in a great deal of bloodshed--such as the results of the last government of the military in Argentina, one of the most developed Latin American countries which for a long time represented virtually the fabled El Dorado.

But it was precisely the depth and seriousness of the crisis--economic, social and political--which led to considerable changes in the correlation of sociopolitical forces in the social consciousness. Having restored constitutional order, Argentina has accomplished an important political change. Whether it will be irreversible will depend on the cohesion of the country's democratic forces and on when, how and to what extent the nation's acute problems are solved.

*Argentina's area is 2,776.9 square kilometers, population 28.4 million (1982).
'The Richest of the Poor Countries'

In UN and UNCTAD classifications Argentina is usually put among the "new industrial states" and in political literature is sometimes ascribed to the "rising powers of the developing world." Both are only partially correct since it was an industrial-agrarian country considerably before the emergence of the "new industrial states" in world markets, while the pronounced economic and political role of this country in the world and Latin America was determined long since, despite all the upturns and slumps of its economy. Argentina belongs among the group of countries of middle-development capitalism and, furthermore, in a number of most important economic and social indicators is outpacing not only many Latin American but also South European states. However, such key socioeconomic characteristics as dependence and relative underdevelopment bring Argentina closer to the developing countries. "We are the richest of the poor countries and the poorest of the rich," A. (Kafiyero), former minister of economy, claimed, and this idea is characteristic of the national self-awareness of the Argentines.

Generously endowed by nature and having absorbed a broad stream of European immigration at the turn of the century, 50 years ago even Argentina was in the top ten countries in the world in size of per capita gross domestic products [GDP] and was ahead of Australia and many European states. It had a strong grain and animal husbandry economy, a relatively developed and gradually diversifying industry and its own energy base and skilled personnel. Extensive commercial relations with Europe and the United States brought it, particularly in the world war periods, considerable revenues. Argentina itself represented, as it were, a "piece of Europe" in America. For many decades this country occupied leading positions in interstate relations in Latin America also.

However, owing to a number of socioeconomic factors, Argentina did not succeed in repeating the path of Australia or Canada. Over the past 40 years of political instability, military and civilian regimes which periodically replaced one another, political terror and relatively slow rate of economic development Argentina increasingly yielded its former positions. The wealth accumulated in the "years of prosperity" and the resources which had come into the country were used unproductively and were to a considerable extent simply plundered by foreign companies and local ruling groups.

The reasons for the increased relative lagging of this Latin American country are manifold. They were determined to a considerable extent by its dependent position in the system of world economic relations. Argentina's dependence was noted by V.I. Lenin even at the start of the 20th century. In subsequent decades the system of dependence was modified considerably and was reflected most distinctly in the expansion of the transnational corporations [TNC], which had deeply penetrated the country's economy and social life. But Argentina's loss of its former positions was determined to no less an extent by the singularities of its internal social development.
The comparatively slow and unstable growth of the economy in the postwar period (the GDP average annual growth rate in the period 1950–1960 constituted 3.1 percent, in 1960–1970 some 4.2 percent and in 1970–1980 2.1 percent, whereas in Latin America as a whole it was 5.3 percent, 5.6 percent and 6 percent respectively)\(^6\) led to a decline in the country's relative significance in the regional GDP. But since the population increase here was relatively small (approximately 1.3 percent per annum—half as much as the average for Latin America) the per capita GDP indicator remained until 1980 even 2.5 times higher than the average for Latin America and 6 times higher than in the developing world as a whole.

Despite the slowing of the growth rate and the relative weakening of economic positions in the region, Argentina remains—and it is important to emphasize this—one of the most developed countries of Latin America.

Table 1. Argentina's Place in the World Capitalist Economy in Terms of Per Capita GDP ($)\(^*\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developed capitalist countries</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>9,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>2,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>5,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>2,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>2,591</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^*\)Compiled and calculated from UN, UNCTAD, IMF and World Bank data.

Table 2. Basic Sectors of the National Economy's Share of the Production of the GDP (%)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Developed capitalist countries</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Developed capitalist countries</th>
<th>Developing countries tina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial sectors</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industry including</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>processing</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services sphere</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^*\)The calculation for the developed capitalist and developing countries made for 1950 on the basis of 1970 prices and for 1980 on the basis of 1975 prices. And for Argentina on the basis of current prices.

As shown in Table 2, the sectorial structure of its economy is closer to the model of the developed than the developing countries. The share of such profiling sectors of processing industry as metal working and engineering constituted in the 1960's even 35-40 percent of industrial output here, that is, had also pulled toward the level of the developed countries. And even stagnation itself in Argentina was relative and did not embrace the entire national economy. This was manifested particularly noticeably in industry. Power engineering developed rapidly; in 1974 Argentina was the first in Latin America to set a nuclear power station in operation, a further two are being built and four are planned. Steel production in the period 1960-1980 increased more than ninefold and the production of cement and automobiles almost tripled. Enterprises adapting the achievements of the scientific-technical revolution and manufacturing modern products, particularly electronics and aviation equipment, were commissioned (predominantly on the basis of foreign investments, it is true). Argentina began to supply abroad whole enterprises ready for startup. Scientific-technical potential enjoyed considerable development.

Argentina remains one of the world's biggest producers and exporters of most important agricultural products: it accounted in 1978 for over 66 percent of the corn, more than 35 percent of the wheat, approximately 40 percent of the meat and more than 60 percent of the meat products (mainly canned) exported from all the developing countries. It is precisely the strong agrarian exports together with the high concentration of land ownership which constitutes the basis of the economic and political might of the "Pampas bourgeoisie"—the animal husbandry-landowning oligarchy and important component of the ruling class.

Particular Features of Sociopolitical Development

The characteristic features of a developed and developing country are combined in Argentina's social system, as in the economy. Its political system combines relatively developed elements of civilian society and democratic institutions with oligarchical, corporativist and authoritarian structures, whose influence and power extends to diverse spheres of social life.

In a number of important social indicators Argentina is at a level closer to the developed capitalist states than to the overwhelming majority of developing countries (see Table 3). Here, in particular, the problem of the "surplus" agricultural population is far less acute than in the majority of developing countries.

[Table 3 on following page]
Table 3. Argentina's Place in the Nonsocialist World in Terms of a Number of Social Indicators in the 1970's-1980's*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Developed capitalist countries</th>
<th>Developing countries</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy 1970-1975 (years)**</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of illiterates in the population over 15 years of age (latter half of the 1970's)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of those involved in education in relation to the corresponding age categories (1977, %):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elementary and high school</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the higher school</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion employed in agriculture (1980)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of urban population (1980, %)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of wage workers among all those in employment (1970, %)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>70.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**A statistical indicator characterizing the average lifespan of the generation born in the said years on condition that the existing demographic situation (primarily the mortality indicator) is preserved.

Argentina is an "urban" country with the manifest predominance of nonagricultural, wage work and a relatively high level of education. Some 53 universities, many of which are among the best in Latin America and practice free tuition, had at the end of the 1970's approximately 500,000 students—twice as many as at the end of the 1960's. This does not mean, however, that its socio-class structure and the appearance of the main social forces which appear in the political arena entirely correspond to the standards of the developed bourgeois society.

The propertied classes are represented by a relatively heterogeneous conglomerate. It is possible to distinguish in it the once powerful and still highly influential landowning and commercial-financial oligarchy; bourgeois groups and strata connected with the development of modern production forces, mainly in the state sector and the TNC sector (top management in the private and state sectors and the so-called "bourgeoisie of the affiliates" of
foreign companies and joint ventures); the upper stratum of the machinery of
state, military and civilian; mass national entrepreneurial strata function-
ing in the sphere of decentralized business; groups of specialists and govern-
ment officials which are part of the amorphous "middle class"; and so forth.

The social and political appearance of the Argentine proletariat is marked by
great distinctiveness. A populous working class took shape in the country
long since, and a considerable part thereof is concentrated at the major
enterprises. It is organized in strong trade unions, which defend not only
the economic interests of their members but also go beyond the framework
trade-unionist activity proper, actively participating in political struggle.
Embracing 70 percent of wage workers, they represent a more powerful factor
of political life than in the majority of countries of the Western hemisphere.
However, the Peronist trade union movement, which has almost monopoly represen-
tation of the working class (and groups of employees) and is populist-
nationalist in prevailing ideological orientation and anticomunist no less
than antibourgeois, has traditionally been imbued with a spirit of caudillismo
and has not possessed a genuine democratic organization.

The trade union elite and the political bureaucracy which came there from
split into rival groups, frequently used the mass, proletarian organization to
establish their own positions. The Pampas oligarchy and commercial-industrial
circles and the army caste acquired in the shape of the trade union bureau-
cracy the corresponding opponent, agent and partner.

Organizations which defended not only the day-to-day but also long-term, funda-
mental interests of the proletariat and championed its class positions, parti-
cularly in crisis situations, also operated in the workers movement. Active
work therein was performed by the Argentine communists, whose struggle de-
veloped under difficult and often illegal conditions.

The unstable balance of opposed social classes and strata and the increased
need of the old and new propertied classes for the creation of a stable me-
chanism of control of the masses, primarily proletarian, predetermined the
high distinctive, albeit with analogies in Latin America, phenomenon of the
Peronist regime (1945-1955). Installed following the 1943 military coup, it
operated under the slogan of the "supraclass," "just" state (whence the name
of the movement—Justicialist, from the Spanish "justicia"—justice) and was
able for a relatively lengthy period to ensure relative sociopolitical stabil-
ity.

Within the framework of the Peronist political system a new balance of forces
took shape between the old land-financial oligarchy and the entrepreneurial
bourgeoisie which had arisen in the process of industrialization and the
workers and employees organized in trade unions. The regime, which stemmed
from a military coup, preserved ties to the army, but, besides, employed
an extensive arsenal of means which secured for it relatively mass support:
social demagogy and an appeal to national feelings, partial reforms and the
ouster of foreign capital from a number of sectors, protectionism and a policy
of import substitution in economic policy, price subsidies for foodstuffs
within the country and an increase in the personnel of the state establishments, which went beyond economically justified limits. It relied on a ramified network of corporativist institutions. The working class was practically united in the General Confederation of Labor, government officials in the General Confederation of Employees and employers in the General Economic Confederation.

This was a Bonapartist-type regime of an authoritarian nature and with strikingly expressed features of the caudillist, charismatic leadership of Peron himself. The strictly "vertical" structure of the political movement of Peronism secured for its leader relative independence in respect of the social forces on which he relied and a certain freedom of action. Peronism as a mass nationalist movement was, in the just observation of the Soviet expert Ya.G. Shemyakin, "the product of a class alliance, albeit concluded between ultimately mutually antagonistic social forces."10

The distinctive historic compromise in the Peronist design could not have continued indefinitely. It had become possible to a considerable extent thanks to the exceptionally favorable economic conditions of the period of the war and the postwar years, when a considerable influx of foreign currency as a result of the high demand for traditional Argentine export commodities supported both further industrialization and the social maneuvering of the ruling elite. The deterioration in economic conditions and the regrouping of socio-political forces led to the fall of the Peronist regime in 1955.

But the unstable balance and the struggle of two trends—reformist-nationalist and reactionary-elitist, pro-imperialist—continued throughout the 1960's-1970's. The state's relative independence both in the economy and in social policy strengthened and simultaneously the role of the army, primarily of its elite, in controlling the country increased in the course of this struggle. The army increasingly became the key element of the machinery of state. After the 1966 military coup, it once again emerged in the political arena and set about the thorough dismantling, according to the Brazilian model, of the entire mechanism of representative democracy.

The return of the Peronists to power (1973-1976) occurred under conditions of the upsurge of the democratic, anti-imperialist movement and the turn to the left in Peronism itself, although the struggle of the different trends within it intensified. On the left flank of Peronism were the anti-imperialist forces which appealed to the mass movement, in the center the liberals, who advocated moderate reforms, and on the right flank fascistizing elements, who sought support among the most conservative army circles. The short-term "second edition" of Peronism culminated in the nominal rule of the spouse of the deceased leader, when state power, which had increasingly lost public support and had grown weak, was torn by rival cliques.

The 1976 military coup led to the creation of a rightwing-authoritarian regime based on an alliance of all forces of the landedowning and financial oligarchy, the haute national bourgeoisie "associated" with foreign capital and the military-bureaucratic elite. An orientation was adopted toward acceleration of the process of the centralization and concentration of capital,
an alliance with the TNC and the most conservative circles of American imperialism and the creation of a "strong Argentina," which, according to the design of the regime's leaders, was to take the place befitting it among the industrially developed countries in the Western world. What did the latest military dictatorship bring the country?

'Most Acute and Severe Crisis'

The world press thus almost unanimously evaluated the situation which had taken shape in Argentina by the start of the 1980's. In the mid-1970's the country embarked on a protracted economic depression: an absolute decline in the volume of the GDP and industrial production compared with the preceding year was observed five times in 8 years (from 1975 through 1982). The Argentine economy had reacted quite painfully to the deterioration in the conditions in the world capitalist economy as of the mid-1970's, although the energy crisis—the immediate cause of this breakdown—had affected it less than other developing countries. Liquid fuel production in the country increased, while the proportion of imported oil in consumption, which was negligible in 1976 even (12.6 percent), had declined by 1980 to 8.2 percent.11

A sharp new deterioration in economic conditions began in the 1980's. In 2 years (1981-1982) the GDP declined 11.2 percent and industrial production 19 percent, that is, below the 1975 level. The income of the majority of the population, particularly the real wages of the working people, fell and unemployment increased (18.5 percent in 1982). Argentina was in one of the first places in the world in the scale of inflation: the retail price index in the period 1970-1975 increased relatively moderately according to Latin American standards, by a factor of 12, but in the period 1975-1981 it jumped by a factor of 420 (1).12

The country's foreign economic positions deteriorated also. The balance of exports and imports of commodities and services, which had shown a considerable surplus in 1978, showed a large deficit in 1980.13 The foreign debt had increased catastrophically: from $4 billion in 1975 to $20 billion in 1981. Argentina was in fourth place among developing countries and third among Latin American countries in terms of the size of the debt.14 The proportion of machinery and equipment in exports declined considerably: it constituted 13.5 percent in 1975, but by 1979 had fallen to 6.5 percent.15 Consequently, a trend toward the "de-industrialization" of exports to the world market was discerned.

The deterioration in Argentina's economic position reflected the weakness, imbalance and dependence of its economy on centers of the world capitalist system, where a new crisis had erupted at the start of the 1980's. But it was determined to an even greater extent by internal factors, including the junta's economic policy. The model developed within the framework of recommendations of experts of the "Chicago School" by Minister of Economy M. de (Os) and his successors provided for "shock therapy". It was proposed effecting a change from the orientation toward state protectionism and the subsidizing of effective demand on the domestic market toward "open doors" for private foreign capital and the TNC and toward capitalist "efficiency and rationalizations," the accelerated centralization of capital and the abandonment
of support for numerous small and medium national enterprises which had sprouted under the hothouse conditions of protectionism.

As already mentioned, Argentina had long been a target of the expansion of international capital. On the eve of World War I it accounted for almost half of foreign investments in Latin America. However, in the 1930's-1950's the sum total of foreign investments declined 50 percent. After the ouster of Peron in 1955, a policy of attracting foreign capital, whose positions had begun to expand (unevenly in time and by sector, it is true), again came to be pursued. According to the estimate of Argentine economists, in the mid-1970's foreign enterprises accounted for approximately 7 percent of the country's GDP. But the real significance of foreign capital in Argentina's economy was greater since its investments, as a rule, were concentrated in the key sectors (engineering, metal working, petrochemistry). The country's receipt of modern technology, the extension of credit to local enterprises, their appearance on world markets and so forth depended on foreign capital to a large extent. The state sector, which in 1975 accounted for 14 percent of the production of the GDP, could have been a certain counterweight to foreign capital. But the junta's economic policy was clearly oriented in the opposite direction: a number of state enterprises was denationalized and the regulatory functions of the state were weakened, while foreign capital's access to the country was facilitated appreciably. The influx of financial resources (almost exclusively private) from the developed capitalist states increased from $174 million in 1970 to $2,671,000,000 in 1980. Argentina was behind only Brazil and Mexico in terms of the absolute amount of foreign capital entering the country.

The Argentine economy was utterly unprepared for such an abrupt change. The "shock therapy" managed to cause shock without providing the economic organism with any therapy. The disastrous consequences of the new economic policy, however, were determined not only by the technological backwardness of many enterprises, the comminution of production, the lack of experience and so forth. The arsenal of means employed for its realization (particularly the pursuit of a strict deflationary policy--reduction in the state budget, a wage freeze and so forth)--had a precise social thrust. The interests of the social strata which constituted the mass base of Peronism (the working class and petty and middle bourgeoisie not connected with foreign capital) were infringed and the positions of the oligarchical groups--agrarian, industrial and banking--and the bourgeoisie of the TNC affiliates and technocratic elements of the machinery of state were strengthened.

Whole sectors of the national economy went into decline. There was, however, a sphere of economic activity which was virtually unaffected by the crisis and which enjoyed the junta's particular attention. Military-industrial potential was built up purposefully. By the start of the 1980's Argentina had become one of the most developed Latin American countries (yielding only to Brazil) in this respect. National production of basic types of modern combat equipment was organized and exports thereof began. A distinctive military-industrial complex took shape, although via a system of licenses and a variety of joint ventures it was heavily dependent on West European and
North American military-industrial concerns. The military regime made efforts to join in the nuclear race also, manifestly hoping for the role of leader in the diverse group of developing countries conducting nuclear research and advocating "autonomy" in this sphere.  

Argentina, as is known, did not subscribe to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1970) and signed, but has not ratified the agreement on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty, 1967), reserving the right to carry out nuclear tests for peaceful purposes with its own forces or with the participation of a third party. Thus by the start of the 1980's Argentina had joined the dozen so-called "near-nuclear" ("threshold") states which already possess an adequate material basis and the scientific-technical potential for making their own nuclear explosives.

The military government undertook a reorganization of the state mechanism in accordance with the general social orientation. Institutions of representative bourgeois democracy were replaced by direct army control at all levels of the machinery of state. The trade unions were broken down into regional subdivisions and deprived of social funds and the right to participate in political life. They were headed by retired colonels. Some political parties were banned and the activity of others (including the Communist Party) "suspended".

Under the cover of a struggle against "terrorism" the military government suppressed civil liberties and did away with constitutional guarantees. This led merely to "decentralized," "grassroots" terror giving way to government, legalized terror. Tens of thousands of opponents of the regime or simply people which it considered dangerous to it and members of their families (including children) began to "disappear". The most refined forms of torture came to be applied extensively in the prisons: rumors about them spread throughout the country. Emigration assumed large proportions, the number of those who left Argentina in 1976 reaching, it is estimated, approximately 2 million.

The strict political regulation, terror and repression weakened the opposition, but did not eradicate it. The military government was unable to create for itself a stable political base in the country. The activity of the political parties and patriotic groupings in the army began to revive and there was a stimulation of the strike struggle at the start of the 1980's.

The crisis phenomena in the economy and society continued to increase. A coordinating committee of five bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties (the Peronists, Radicals, Intransigent Radicals, Christian Democrats and the Movement of Integration and Development) was set up in July 1981. Their program, "Before It Is Too Late," demanded a return to constitutional forms of government, elections and democratization of the country's entire domestic and foreign policy. The mass political demonstration under the slogan "Bread, Peace and Work" in a central square of Buenos Aires organized by the Peronists on 30 March 1982 gave the junta an extreme fright inasmuch as not only economic slogans but also demands for the dissolution of the military government were put forward. The political opposition in the country had manifestly strengthened.
The Falklands Crisis: International Aspect

On 2 April 1982 Argentine troops landed on the Malvinas (Falklands). After many years of unsuccessful Anglo-Argentine negotiations on the status of the disputed islands, an attempt was made to establish Argentine sovereignty over the islands and settle this long-urgent national issue, which had been so painful for all Argentines. It seemed that the goal which no Argentine government had been able to achieve for 150 years had been achieved.

In starting the military operation on the Falklands the junta counted on the support of the United States in the solution of the long-standing dispute with Britain. After all, there had been a considerable rapprochement between it and the Reagan administration at the start of the 1980's, when the Galtieri government outlined, according to the American press, "a program of cooperation with the United States almost unprecedented in Argentina's isolationist history." It assumed certain commitments with respect to participation in the struggle against the revolutionary-liberation movement in Central America, promising to send an Argentine military contingent to El Salvador in addition to the advisers already there in exchange for an expansion of American assistance and the Reagan administration's abandonment of criticism of the Argentine authorities for "human rights" violations. The United States planned to increase its military presence in the South Atlantic and to create a NATO bloc with the participation of Argentina, Chile and South Africa.

The Galtieri government counted on its partners and contracting agents taking account of Argentina's special position as one of the West's most privileged allies in the developing world. The military also counted on Great Britain—owing to the remotesness of the islands and the lack of special interest in them—reacting with restraint, on the United States, tied by commitments of the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty, at least maintaining benevolent neutrality and, finally, on the losses from possible British economic reprisals being compensated by an intensification of relations with the European capitalist states and Japan. As is known, not one of these calculations was realized.

Britain's position proved as inflexible as could be. Intending by force of arms to restore colonial domination of the Falklands (Malvinas), the British command ensured overwhelming military superiority in the area of combat operations by way of concentrating there a large naval grouping. The crossing of the British armada was facilitated by the use of the American military base on Ascension Island. On 2 May a British submarine used two torpedoes to sink the Argentine cruiser "General Belgrano," which was outside of the declared 200-mile zone of combat operations, which caused an explosion of anger in Argentina and throughout Latin America.

Guided by global military-political aims, the United States supported its main NATO ally. This support was determined from the very outset of the conflict in confidential top-level contacts with the personal participation of U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger. The Pentagon supplied the command of the British expeditionary corps with intelligence data on the location of
Argentina's warships and aircraft and, as the conflict grew, organized the transfer to the British armed forces of equipment and ammunition and made their advisers available to them. The United States transferred a military satellite from an orbit in the northern hemisphere to an orbit for observation in the South Atlantic, providing the British with 98 percent of intelligence data on the Argentines' movements. The U.S. Naval Command even intended putting at Britain's disposal one of its aircraft carriers in the event of one of the two British carriers being sunk. "The 1982 British operation on the Falklands," the British journal THE ECONOMIST acknowledged recently, "not only could not have been won but could not have been carried out without American assistance."21

After some hesitation, the EEC countries and Japan displayed "Western solidarity," despite their own considerable economic and political interests in Argentina itself and the Latin American region as a whole. They took part in the economic blockade of Argentina which Britain had organized and consented to a number of measures evaluated in Latin America as "collective economic aggression". As a result of the EEC countries' embargo Argentina's direct losses, according to press data, constituted $600 million and indirect losses $1 billion.

It became clear during the confrontation in the South Atlantic that aim (not only economic and political but also military) could be taken against any developing country, even one proceeding along a capitalist path and adhering to a "pro-West" orientation, if under the slogan of defense of national sovereignty it infringed the interests of this imperialist power or the other.

The goals which had been pursued by the reactionary regime, which had embarked on the military-political action primarily for its own salvation, receded to the background. In the foreground was Argentines' national unity, which, as the failure of the junta became increasingly distinct, lent new impetus to the struggle for the democratization of the country's social-political system.

The natural need for the Argentine Government to seek allies—not in the imperialist West but primarily in Latin America and among the nonaligned states and the socialist community countries—arose. The war, the American expert F. Turner, professor at Connecticut University, wrote, "compelled many Argentines to feel an acute sense of the need for Latin American solidarity and the need to strengthen this traditional direction of Argentine foreign policy.... Argentines again perceived what it means to be a Third World country."

The majority of Latin American countries of various political orientations made common cause with Argentina. The most consistent anti-imperialist position was adopted by Cuba and Nicaragua. A Cuban Government statement observed that "the struggle for the return of the Malvinas is the concern of the Argentine people and, consequently, the concern of Latin America and the Caribbean."22 The struggle for the Falklands (Malvinas), communists emphasized at the meeting of communist parties of the southern cone in Lima (November 1982), had contributed to the unfolding of a broad, powerful anti-imperialist movement of Latin American peoples and governments.
The Soviet Union rendered Argentina political and moral support in its military conflict with Britain over the Malvinas (Falklands). The socialist countries, a political declaration of the Warsaw Pact states observed, view the problem of the decolonization of the Falklands in the overall context of the developing states' struggle for complete national liberation and with regard for "the need for the speediest liquidation of all vestiges of colonialism." During discussion of the Falklands (Malvinas) issue at the UN General Assembly session in November 1982 O. A. Troyanovskiy, permanent representative of the USSR, placed responsibility for the dangerous exacerbation of the situation in the South Atlantic on the government of Great Britain, which on various pretexts had avoided a solution of the territorial dispute with Argentina, and the United States, which is pursuing its own military-strategic goals in this region. "Proceeding from its principle position in respect of a peaceful settlement of contentious issues," he declared, "the USSR advocates that the problem which has arisen in the South Atlantic be settled by way of negotiations within the UN framework and on the basis of UN decisions."

On 4 November 1982 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution which called on the conflicting parties to settle the dispute with the aid of negotiations on the basis of preceding UN decisions. Ninety states voted for, including the USSR, 12 against, including Britain.

The support which Argentina received on the part of the nonaligned movement and the developing and socialist countries contributed to a pronounced shifting of accents in its foreign policy. A manifest change was discerned in the direction of the nonaligned movement and Latin American solidarity. The last military government of President Bignone declared participation in the nonaligned movement one of the country's main foreign policy goals. This was confirmed in the active position of the Argentine delegation at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned States in New Delhi in March 1983. Documents on the resumption of cooperation between Argentina and Cuba were signed at a meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the nonaligned states in Havana (June 1982). Argentina voted for a Nicaraguan seat on the Security Council, refused to send its military subunits to Central America and supported the initiative of the Contadora Group with respect to a peaceful settlement of the conflict in this region.

Relying on the support of Latin American countries and the constructive position of the USSR, Argentina undertook a diplomatic offensive in the United Nations to mobilize the democratic international community in support of its rights to sovereignty over the Falklands. An important result of the Falklands conflict in Latin America was new impetus to the process of democratization in the region, primarily in Argentina itself, of course.

'Transition From Military Regime to Democracy'

This is how the Argentine Communist Party defines the essence of the period which began after the Falklands war. The war and the political crisis which unfolded in the wake of it revealed the difficult set of problems, which had
accumulated over the years, of Argentina's political and economic development, its place in international alliances and its orientations in foreign policy. All these problems in their urgent seriousness confronted the new government.

Having obtained 52 percent of the vote at the elections on 30 October 1983 and having thus beaten his main rival—the candidate of the Justicialist (Peronist) Party (for whom 40 percent of the electorate voted)—Raul Ricardo Alfonsin, leader of the Radical Civil Union (RCU), formed a constitutional government. In his first presidential message he set out the basic directions of a policy aimed at the search for a reformist version of a way out of the profound social crisis within the framework of a system of renewed representative democracy.

The goals set by the new government largely correspond to the objective conditions of the country's development, impress the Argentine people and have won the voters' support. The RCU is a bourgeois party which relies (as also, incidentally, its main election rival), in the estimation of Argentine communists, "on a broad popular base" and incorporates democratic, progressive and anti-imperialist factions. However, its possibilities are limited, and the political argument over how the country should further develop continues.

Exceptionally difficult tasks have to be tackled in the economy. It is essential to break through the long-standing historical trend of the slowing of the rate of economic development, raise the stagnating sectors of the economy to a modern technological level and make the economy more flexible and capable of responding rapidly to the demands of the scientific-technical revolution and the world market.

All this takes, of course, a long time. But problems have built up in Argentina's economy which have to be tackled immediately. It is also necessary to overcome the consequences of the economic policy of the junta, which brought the country's economy to the verge of collapse.

In 1983 the decline in production was evidently halted. A small surplus showed in the balance of trade, but this was achieved thanks to a sharp (almost two-fold) and highly painful reduction in imports compared with 1982. The country's monetary system remains in an utterly confused state. In 1982 the retail price index increased by a factor of more than 2.5 compared with the preceding year and in the first 6 months of 1983 it doubled yet again; the scale of prices had by this time risen by a factor of more than 4,000 compared with 1975. By the end of 1981 the official exchange rate against the dollar was 7,200 pesos, in 1982 48,500 pesos and in October 1983 130,000 pesos (even more on the black market). This is destroying the price-forming mechanism and is conducive to speculation.

The foreign debt, which by the end of 1983 amounted to $43 billion, has tied political and economic problems in a tight knot. The sum which Argentina had to pay on loans contracted earlier (approximately $8 billion in 1983) manifestly exceeded its sharply reduced possibilities of making such payments, and the international financial institutions accompanied the granting of new
loans and deferred payments—thanks to which it was alone possible to avoid national bankruptcy—with strict demands, political included.

Continuing economic crisis, a sharp deterioration in the position of the working people, unemployment (2.5 million) and numerous bankruptcies—such is the economic and social legacy inherited by the new government. A way out of the blind alley is an urgent and exceptionally difficult task. It is perfectly obvious that the economy cannot be restored merely by the spontaneous action of market forces. At the same time the resources and levers on which the state can rely for tackling if only the most urgent tasks are quite limited.

The R. Alfonsin government has set the task of restoring representative institutions and a democratic way of government and in the very first weeks implemented a number of measures in this direction. In implementing the democratization of the country it can not only rely on the preponderance—not very impressive, incidentally—of its supporters in the National Congress (parliament) and certain provincial legislative assemblies but also realize for implementation of the outlined program the shift which has occurred in the consciousness of the people, their broad politicization (approximately one-third of the adult population registered with political parties in the course of the election campaign) and the intensified hatred of dictatorship and lawlessness.

Democratic organizations are reviving rapidly in Argentina. Becoming legal in 1982, the Communist Party, whose numbers together with the youth organization reached 300,000 in 1983, developed its activity. At the 30 October elections the communists called on their supporters to vote for the Justicialist candidates, proceeding from the fact that this was to have contributed to unity of action with Peronist workers. After the victory of the RCU, the party declared that it would adopt a constructive position in respect of the new government, would support all steps aimed at the country's progress and would support constitutional stability.

There are, however, powerful antidemocratic, oligarchical forces, which were dominant in Argentina's state development for a number of decades and which have every reason to be concerned for their future fate if the process of democratization develops and entails not only political but also urgent social reforms. They are primarily the army or, more accurately, the section of the generals and officer corps which has tasted the sweetness of unchecked power, impressive material privileges and high social status. In the years of military rule officers were given many key positions in the running of industry, the banks, the trade unions and the mass media. They headed the intelligence bodies and security services, whose powers in the years of the junta's rule were extended dangerously. A considerable proportion of them is guilty of corruption, abuses and mass terror. And although the military-technocratic groups are having to give way to democratic institutions, it is not that simple to break the threads of corporative pledges.

It was in this sphere that the R. Alfonsin government adopted in the first days of its existence the most decisive measures. A reduction in the military budget from $4 billion in 1983 to $1.5 billion (approximately 2 percent of the GDP) was announced. The supreme military command was reorganized: the
positions of commanders of the army, navy and air force (the persons who held these positions and actually controlled the entire military machinery of the state constituted in the past the military junta) were abolished. Henceforward general leadership of the armed forces via the Ministry of National Defense will be exercised by the president himself, who is, according to the constitution, the supreme commander. The dismantling of the infrastructure via which military coups were formerly accomplished was supplemented by personal transfers: more than half the officers were retired, and legal proceedings were instituted against the nine generals and admirals who ruled the country in juntas in the period 1976-1982.

The latter circumstance is particularly significant. Immediately following the Anglo-Argentine armed conflict the question of "those who have disappeared without trace" in the course of "counterinsurgency warfare," the number of whom, according to official data, constituted 6,000, and according to the estimates of public organizations, 30,000, became the focus of the country's political life. Approximately 2,000 officers, from lieutenant to colonel (not to mention the generals who gave the orders), carried out the "dirty work"—participated directly in the kidnapping of people, torture and the execution of illegal sentences. How to deal with them? On the point of quitting the scene, in September 1983 the junta enacted the "Law on the Country's Reconciliation" (or on "self-amnesty," as the people called it), which consigned to oblivion the state terror and exempted the participants in the reprisals from punishment. The National Congress rescinded this law as "unconstitutional and invalid," and the new government ordered the arrest of a number of prominent military and police figures of the former regime.

Demanding an investigation in an atmosphere of full publicity in the civil courts, Argentina's democratic forces are endeavoring to make the change in the country's development irreversible and teach for the future a lesson to all who believe that lawlessness and torture may be "forgiven" and that the role of simple executant of executioner's orders exempts one from responsibility.

But the "account with the past," which is necessary and still pertinent, is only the first step in the country's social and political renewal. Time will show whether the dramatic events of 1982-1983 were the point of departure for fundamental change. The distinctiveness of the current situation in the country is that the ruling party—the RCU—which obtained 7.6 million votes, and the opposition party—the Justicialist—which collected 6.7 million, differ from one another not so much in program goals as in historically evolved traditions and relations.

Despite its extreme ideological eclecticism and social heterogeneousness, Peronism as a political current had for many years a power which seemed almost mystical. It has managed to survive and lay serious claim to participate in deciding the country's political fate in the 1980's. To a considerable extent this "survivability" was conditioned by its considerable change from corporativism to the ideas of representative bourgeois democracy and, in the social plane, to the increased appeal to the working people, the organized proletariat and the mass women's organizations.
The RCU is usually defined as the "party of the middle class," which has the blessing of European social democracy and the Socialist International, but which is not purely bourgeois and, even less, conservative. His supporters from the Movement for Renewal and Change (within the RCU) predominate in R. Alfonsin's government, there is not a single rightwing figure in it, there is even a former printing worker, the minister of labor, and experts from the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and supporters of the doctrine of R. Prebisch have been invited in as economic advisers. The social base of both parties is formed by relatively heterogeneous conglomerates; different currents are in control in each of them: left and right, democratic and authoritarian.26

Argentina's political future will largely determine the outcome of both the interparty and intraparty struggle: which forces prevail among the Peronists, among the Radicals and in the popular movement, A. Fava, general secretary of the Argentine Communist Party Central Committee, declared at a plenum thereof in December 1983. Popular and worker unity is essential, the communists believe, to ensure political stability.

The government is already having to experience strong pressure on the part of both internal reactionary forces and powerful external factors—international financial organizations (the IMF and the World Bank)—whose hands have a tight rein on Argentina's huge debt, on the part of the TNC and the West European partners and contracting parties and, finally, the U.S. Administration, which is endeavoring to restore the former closeness of relations with this South American country under its financial and political control.

Setting forth the foreign policy program, R. Alfonsin declared that it would be constructed on the principles of noninterference in internal affairs and respect for peoples' rights to self-determination and the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states and on the principles of the preservation of peace and a curbing of the arms race, independence and nonalignment. His government intends to establish contact with the countries of the Contadora Group and assist in the performance of their mission for settling the crisis in Central America by way of negotiation. Alfonsin condemned the United States' invasion of Grenada and Britain's actions aimed at converting the Falklands into a military base and the deployment there of nuclear weapons. He confirmed his resolve to continue the struggle by political means for the restoration of sovereignty over the Malvinas within the framework of negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations and relying on Latin American solidarity.

The new Argentine Government intends to continue the policy of rapprochement with the nonaligned movement in order to find its own place therein. Simultaneously it attaches importance to the strengthening of Argentina's commercial-economic relations with the USSR and the other socialist states as a factor stabilizing the country's world economic position and facilitating its maneuvering in its the "difficult and unequal," in R. Alfonsin's words, relations with the United States and West European countries. Soviet-Argentine economic relations are distinguished by expanding cooperation and a mutually profitable nature. The USSR's imports from Argentina increased from an average of R237 million in the period 1975-1977 to R1.6 billion in 1980-1982. The
USSR is the principal purchaser of Argentine grain, meat and wool. In 1980 Argentina, not submitting to Washington's demands that it impose an embargo on grain supplies to the USSR, signed a 5-year agreement on wheat supplies to the USSR in an annual volume of 4.5 million tons. Having been informed at the start of January 1984 about the trip to Argentina of a Soviet delegation headed by A.S. Barkauskas, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo deemed desirable "the further development of good mutually profitable relations with this country."

A difficult search is under way for a foreign policy course which would ensure for Argentina the solution of its main economic and domestic political problems and help find sufficiently reliable allies in the increasingly complex political structure of the world, both developed and developing. The concurrence of views among radicals, Peronists, communists and other political parties on a number of international problems, Argentine communists believe, is creating favorable conditions for the implementation of a truly independent foreign policy corresponding to the interests of the entire Argentine people.

On the way from the reactionary military regime to constitutional democracy Argentina has crossed an important intersection. The problems confronting the country are difficult and the forces capable of solving them have yet to achieve the necessary consolidation and unity. Nonetheless, the change which was accomplished in 1982-1983 affords a prospect of the country's democratic development. Together with the liberalization of the political system in Brazil, the increasing erosion of the authoritarian regimes in Chile and Uruguay and the stimulation of democratic forces in many Latin American states and even more widely—in the wake of the collapse of the rightwing dictatorships in Portugal, Greece and Spain—the events in Argentina allow us to see a more general historical context. A certain breakthrough was achieved in the majority of countries of middle-development capitalism in the 1970's-1980's by the difficult and nonrectilinear process of getting rid of reactionary regimes which fettered the society's activeness and the restoration of representative democracy. The progressive forces are endeavoring to impart new political and social content to this process.

FOOTNOTES

1. See TIME, 7 June 1982.

2. For more detail see MEMO No 9, 1977, pp 105-124; 150-157; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA No 1, 1979, pp 63-73; No 2, pp 128-130.


4. More than 90 percent of Argentina's population are descended from European immigrants: Italians, Spanish, Germans, French, British and others.


8. Some 5.7 percent of landowners in Argentina own 74.5 percent of all land.


13. Imports exceeded exports by 31 percent. Calculated from MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS, July 1983, p XXXIII.


16. In evaluating the positions of foreign capital in Argentina it has to be considered that it was represented by firms competing with one another and that in accordance with state affiliation there were constant movements in its structure. Thus in the 1970's the United States' share of total foreign capital investments declined from one-half to two-fifths, second and third places (approximately 9 percent each) were occupied by Switzerland and the Netherlands, and Great Britain (6 percent) was moved back into fourth place. For more detail on foreign capital in Argentina see "Argentina: Economic and Sociopolitical Development Trends," Moscow, 1980, pp 98-111; "Capitalism in Latin America," Moscow, 1983, pp 147-162.

17. See "Handbook..., 1981," pp 298-299 (the flows of capital are given in current, not entirely comparable prices, but the order of magnitudes speaks for itself).


19. For more detail see MEMO No 6, 1982, pp 129-134.

20. Relying on considerable economic potential and traditionally close relations with West Europe, Argentina maintained a certain independence of the United States in continental affairs, which in political literature came to be called an "isolationist policy".


23. PRAVDA, 7 January 1983.

24. Diplomatic relations between Argentina and Cuba had been restored in 1973, at the time of the second Peronist government, but were practically frozen in the years of military junta rule.


26. For more detail on the ideological and political struggle in Argentina at the current stage see A.V. Grishin's article (LATINSKAYA AMERIKA No 1, 1984, pp 70-82).


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CSO: 1816/9
EFFECT OF 'REAGANOMICS' ON STAGFLATION, U.S. ECONOMY

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian Number 5, May 1984 carries on pages 58-67 a 4,500-word article by S. Nikitin entitled "Reaganomics" and Stagflation" which assesses the impact of the Reagan administration's changing policies on past and present U.S. economic problems. The author asserts that the policy of "Reaganomics" has undergone substantial changes since its inception, which has led to a discussion "not on the end of 'Reaganomics', but on its serious transformation." He makes reference to a MIDLAND BANK REVIEW article (Summer/Autumn 1983, page 29) on U.S. debate over the transformation from "Reaganomics I" to "Reaganomics II", and covers the economic effects of each in his article.

The author begins with a definition of stagflation in narrow terms as the combination of a crisis decline in production accompanied by rising costs, and broader terms as the parallel coexistence of high unemployment and rising prices in a time of growth. An analysis is presented of the 1974-1975 period as an example of stagflation in the narrow sense. The accompanying rise in inflation is attributed to 1) an increase in money supply along with a reduced supply of goods; 2) monopolist price setting; and 3) such external factors as increases in world raw material prices by 7 times, energy prices by 17 times, oil prices by 21 times, and a U.S. dollar devaluation to stimulate exports. The 1976-1979 period is examined to study the causes of continued relatively high unemployment rates, given favorable economic growth. Among the factors noted are greater investment in new technologies and automation; related higher demands for specialized skills; and new labor force entries, including baby boom workers and more women in the job market.

A major portion of the article discusses "Reaganomics" as a conservative variant of new economic policy in the USA, one based on theories of monetarism and a "supply economy." The monetarist approach to control inflation through limiting the growth of money supply and government budget deficits is covered, followed by a quotation from the "Economic Report of the President" (1982, pages 22-23) which notes that economic deterioration in the United States can be partially attributed to external events such as oil price hikes of the 70's, but that government policy was more at fault. "The growing role of the federal government in the economy--manifested in help for the poor and the aged, in protection of the consumer and the environment, or in stabilizing the economy--brought about a deterioration in the economy's functioning... In short, federal economic policy carries fundamental responsibility for stagflation, left to us as an inheritance."
In describing the basic task of the original "Reaganomics", a swift reduction and consequent liquidation of federal budget deficits by 1984, S. Nikitin argues that "In the end, an important policy direction for the current administration was a turn to the sharp escalation in the arms race and a corresponding swift increase in the share of military expenditures in the budget. While this point was not formally included in the economic program, in essence it plays a key role." On the changeover from "Reaganomics I" to "Reaganomics II" the main features are seen to be abandonment of the balanced budget, raised ceilings on Defense Department expenditures, and the reduction of social expenditures. "If one discards the rhetoric of announcements by the President himself and members of his cabinet, three real goals of the current administration are clearly stated: to provide for financing the growing arms race, at any cost; to create and maximally preserve tax and other financial privileges of large corporations and the richest layers of the population; and to practically ignore many long-term problems and needs as if they were not serious, in order to obtain short-term gains." The article quotes figures from Western sources to show that "Reaganomics" led to a deeper economic crisis in 1980-1982, with a fall in production and a "jump in the rate of unemployment."

A reduction in the U.S. inflation rate is attributed to events on the world market, particularly the drop in oil prices, as well as to a stronger dollar resulting from the administration's budgetary and monetary policies. "Holding down inflation is fully used by the government for propagandistic praise on the success of its economic policy. At the same time, it is completely silent or it significantly downplays the costs linked with this, primarily serious aggravation of the 1980-1982 recession; a growth in unemployment, sharp and unprecedented in the entire post war period, and unheard-of high interest rates (even in 1983, their real level was 6-8%) which is not comparable with the low rates for the U.S. exit from all previous crises."

The article ends in a statement criticizing the goals and achievements of the Reagan administration's economic policies. "Regardless of whether the administration manages to achieve a short-term gain (for example, for the election campaign of 1984), in the long run this policy acts as a strategy of the most reactionary and conservative circles of monopolist capital in the USA, and is directed at attaining openly militaristic goals at the cost of including serious destabilizing elements in the economic mechanism (a rising government budget deficit, high interest rates, et cetera). Regarding the proclaimed task--liquidating inflation--'Reaganomics II' turns out to be in the same vicious circle as 'Reaganomics I'. A deformed and one-sided reduction of inflation (suppressing a rise in prices under high interest rates) was accompanied by a new, sharp jump in unemployment and all of the vast economic and social afflictions related to it."


CS0: 1816/95-P
WORKERS CLASS POLICY, IDEOLOGY DEMAND 'CREATIVE APPLICATION'

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 80-92

[Yu. Krasin article: "The Correlation of Ideology and Policy in the Revolutionary Movement"—words between slantlines appear in boldface]

[Text] The correlation of ideology and policy in the revolutionary struggle of the workers class is an extremely important problem for revealing the complex mechanism of the connection between theoretical thinking and practical action, and between revolutionary ideas and revolutionary practice.

Ideology usually means the system of views, beliefs, and ideals of a certain class or social stratum. Marxism-Leninism is the scientific-theoretical expression of the class consciousness of the proletariat and its ideology. The basic features of proletarian ideology were clearly characterized by K. U. Chernenko in his report at the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee plenum: "The scientific nature and democratic spirit and the revolutionary nature and humanism of this ideology fundamentally distinguish it from bourgeois ideology, which justifies and blesses exploitative systems and the aggressive policy of imperialism and preaches nationalism and chauvinism. In contrast to bourgeois ideology, communist ideology attracts the minds and hearts of millions by its truth and honesty as well as integrity and optimism. It is the ideology of the ascendant class, the ideology of the new society, and the ideology of peace and friendship between peoples." (Footnote 1) (Materials From the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 14-15 June 1983, Moscow, 1983, p 30).

The very definition of the concept of "ideology" indicates the organic connection between its theoretical content and politics. The latter concentrates within it the interests of the class, which ideology substantiates theoretically. Unlike the economy, which is concerned with material relations, politics is the sphere of those social relations which, before they take shape, definitely pass through the consciousness of classes, social groups, and individual people. Here, in the crucible of social awareness, ideology exerts a formulating influence upon politics. As V. I. Lenin repeatedly noted, there can be no revolutionary movement without revolutionary theory. It is precisely for this reason that the introduction of socialist awareness of the workers movement acquires such exceptional significance. The revolutionary party of the workers class itself is the conjunction of the theory of scientific socialism and the workers movement.
In what is the internal and organic mutual link between theory and policy in revolutionary practice of the contemporary era expressed? On the one hand, scientific communism arose and is developing as the generalization of the multifaceted international experience of the struggle of the proletariat under the leadership of the advanced vanguard for its liberation. On the other, the revolutionary policy of the workers class is founded upon the scientific theory which determines the program aims of the communist parties and their political strategy and tactics. Isolating revolutionary theory from policy in the history of the workers movement has invariably led either to a fruitless doctrinaire attitude or to opportunist pragmatism, and frequently to both at the same time.

The necessity of scientific theory for the workers movement is stipulated by the fact that the successful fulfillment of practical tasks is possible only on the basis of a scientific representation of society and of the objective laws of its functioning and development. Marxist-Leninist theory taken in the unity of its component parts—philosophy, political economy, and scientific communism—ensures the world outlook basis of the revolutionary policy of the workers class and provides it with that objective system of social coordinates and those fundamental historical guidelines without which a precise analysis of a concrete political situation and the adoption of the correct decisions are unthinkable.

Revolutionary policy also requires theory in the more narrow sense of the word. It not only relies upon a comprehension of the general laws of history, but also upon a knowledge of the specific laws of the political life of society and its development. Defining politics as a science and setting communists the task of "operating upon scientific foundations," V.I. Lenin wrote: "Science demands, first, that the experience of other countries be taken into account, particularly if the other...countries are undergoing or have recently undergone a very similar experience; second, that /all/ forces, groups, parties, classes, and masses operating within a given country be taken into account, and that policy by no means be determined only on the basis of the wishes and opinions and the degree of awareness and readiness for struggle of one group or party alone." (Footnote 2) (V.I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, vol 41, p 65). Thus, in Lenin's opinion, politics as a science considers and generalizes the rich and varied international experience of the revolutionary movement and comprehensively analyzes class interests and the correlation of concrete sociopolitical forces.

Despite the whole specific nature of political phenomena and processes and their direct dependence upon the subjective factor, these phenomena and processes possess their own objective logic which is ultimately determined by economic interests and factors. Any political action is woven into the objective fabric of historical development and in this sense is the subject of political theory. Lenin's opinion that revolution is "a wise, difficult, and complex science" is widely known. (Footnote 3) (V.I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, vol 36, p 119). The effectiveness of the revolutionary policy
of the workers class depends in many ways upon the degree to which it is
formed in accordance with the laws of this science which have been mastered
by the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution. It is understandable that
these laws manifest themselves in different ways under different concrete
conditions and, consequently, their application is of a creative nature and is
implemented while taking the specific features of every country and of the
contemporary historical stage into account.

At the same time, the influence of some of the basic principles of the policy
of the workers class is perceived through this diversity. These principles--
the class approach, revolutionary attitude, and internationalism--are deter-
mined by the very position of the workers class in the system of social pro-
duction and by the historical mission which the workers class is called upon
to fulfill.

The revolutionary policy of communists is also built on the basis of some even
more general principles which have their roots in Marxism-Leninism, as, for
example, the principle of comprehensive analysis of the real processes of
social life considered from the historical perspective. "Only an objective
consideration," Lenin wrote, "of the entire aggregate of mutual relations
between all classes of a society, all classes without exception, and, con-
sequently, and objective consideration of the development of that society and
a consideration of mutual relations between that and other societies, can pro-
vide the fulcrum for the correct tactics of the workers class. And in this
connection, all classes and all countries are considered not in their statis-
tical, but in their dynamic aspects, that is, not in their motionless state,
but in their state of movement (the laws of which emanate from the economic
conditions of existence of every class)." (Footnote 4) (V.I. Lenin, Complete
Collected Works, vol 26, p 77)

This Leninist precept reveals not only the organic link of the strategy and
tactics with political and economic theory, but also their organic link with
the philosophy of Marxism and with dialectic and historical materialism. The
indifference of a workers class political party toward philosophical theory
inevitably results in its loss of scientific methodology, the instrument of a
concrete analysis of the situation, something which, in its turn, deprives the
policy of firmness and principled character and turns it into the likeness of
a weather vane turning here and there as the wind blows. This is seen very
clearly by the example of the spiritual father of revisionism, E. Bernstein,
whose revision of the revolutionary principles of Marxist policy was combined
with a renunciation of dialectic materialism and with the aspiration to re-
place it with Kantianism. In the activities of the contemporary social demo-
ocrats, too, the neglect of philosophical approach is used in the final analysis
to justify opportunism and conciliatory policies.

However, is it perhaps possible that, in solving completely concrete and urgent
problems of the day, there is no need to link these problems with the philo-
sophical and theoretical questions and that the latter can be left to discus-
sions among scientists? Practice has shown that this should not be done.
"--Whoever takes up," Lenin warned, "particular questions without solving
beforehand the general questions--he will inevitably and unintentionally
'stumble' on these general questions at every step. And stumbling on them blindly means in every individual case condemning one's policy to worse vacillations and an unprincipled attitude." (Footnote 5) (V.I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, vol 15, p 368)

The policy of the workers class and its advanced vanguard needs a clear definition of the goals of the class struggle and of the ways and means of achieving these goals, as well as a clear program of revolutionary actions and a correct understanding of the existing situation and all of its opportunities. And all this is unthinkable without the scientific theory which arms the policy with the methodology of revolutionary thinking and revolutionary action.

The link between ideology and policy is by far not exhausted by the need of the latter for theoretical substantiation. Although theory, as a definite system of views, represents the main substance of ideology, the latter is nevertheless much wider by its scope and function. It would be a great simplification to treat it simply as a specific reflection of social reality in social consciousness. The matter is much more complex. Ideology is an inalienable component part and an inseparable aspect of the social-historical practice in which it performs a number of diverse and complex functions.

First of all, this is the cognitive function of ideology which enables the class and its political leaders to understand the numerous facts and events of the actual reality and makes it possible to prognosticate the further course of historical development. Another of its functions is the social one: the expression of the interests of the class and the unification and mobilization of its forces and of the forces of its allies for the purpose of achieving the class goals. No aggregate of social ideas can be free from the social-class content. It is deprived of all real importance if it is not built on its function: social-class interests. "The idea has invariably disgraced itself whenever it became separated from the 'interest,'" K. Marx noted in this connection. Ideology also fulfills the function of ideological substantiation and motivation of the political actions of the class or party and represents a prerequisite for their programming. The axiological function of ideology is also important. It substantiates those social values and orientations which guide the class in its struggle. Of no small significance is also the function of propaganda and defense of the world outlook and ideals of the class, and of their antagonism with other ideologies that also strive to win for their side as wide a strata of the society as possible.

Social reality is reflected in the awareness of classes and social groups through the many-sided prism of social-historical practice. In this respect the degree of adequacy of reflection always depends upon the place of the social class, whose interests are expressed by a given ideology, in the system of social relations and upon its historical role.

II

Contradictions frequently arise in the process of social development between the theoretical-cognitive and social functions of ideology. The nature and
acuteness of these contradictions once again depend upon the position of the classes in the system of social relations. If we are talking about the ideology of a class whose interests coincide to a greater or lesser degree with the progressive course of history then the contradiction may not be of an acute nature. But if class interest is at variance with the prospects of social progress then this contradiction assumes a conflicting form: Ideology distorts reality to please interest. Marx clearly illustrated this using the example of bourgeois political economy which was able to remain scientific only until the acute class antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat had revealed itself and matured. But when it had "the last hour had tolled for scientific bourgeois political economy... Disinterested research gives place to the battle of hired scribblers and impartial scientific research is replaced by biased and obsequious apologetics." (Footnote 7) (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, vol 23, p 17)

Speculating on the real contradictions between the social and theoretical-cognitive functions of ideology, bourgeois critics of scientific communism try to declare these contradictions, primarily as applied to Marxist-Leninist ideology, unresolvable. The position of the American political scientist, O. Gouldner, is indicative in this respect. He strives to find a fatal contradiction in Marxism between science, which proves the historical inevitability of the downfall of capitalism, and the philosophy of practice, which proceeds from the class interests of the proletariat and mobilizes the masses to the achievement of socialist aims. Gouldner is of the opinion that, as a science, Marxism can full well manage without its conclusions, is moving towards its own ruin, which is objectively inevitable. However, as a policy, it is obliged to address itself to the people and to their class interests and consequently becomes a philosophy of practice. "At times," writes O. Gouldner, "Marx regards science as his paradigm of knowledge and at times addresses himself to 'criticism' engendered by philosophy." (Footnote 8) (O. Gouldner, The Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anomalies in the Development of Theory, New York, 1980, p 64) The author arrives at the "conclusion that "Marxism is a great contemporary synthesis of science and religion." (Footnote 9) (Ibid., p 117)

The thesis that Marxism-Leninism supposedly contains elements of eschatology and religious belief has something in common with the assertions of those critics who identify it with mythology and religion and call it "secularized religion," "secular teaching on salvation," and so forth.

Because of the deep contradiction between the exploitative classes and actual reality, the ideologists of these classes resort to social mythology and distort social reality every time it comes into conflict with the aims and tasks of these classes. Marxism-Leninism is the only ideology that has no need of mythological camouflage. This is explained by the fact that the interests of the workers class coincide with the progressive course of historical development and consequently the ideologists of this class have no social-class need to distort perception of the surrounding reality or to turn to various illusory representations of this reality.
There are no unresolvable contradictions in Marxist-Leninist ideology between its social and theoretical-cognitive functions. Of course, a contradiction can periodically arise in the actual practice of development of the revolutionary movement, in those cases when, for some reason or other, ideology does not rise to the level of scientific generalization of the worldwide historical experience of the workers movement. For example, feelings of technophobia have sometimes arisen in the workers movement of some capitalist countries during the course of development of the scientific-technical revolution, since scientific-technical progress under capitalism has led to the growth of unemployment and man's alienation in the labor process. These feelings sometimes also reflect upon theoretical awareness. But these contradictions are quickly overcome when ideology corresponds to the level of theoretical generalization of the whole aggregate of the practice of scientific-technical progress and scientifically reveals its connection with the predominant production relations and with the fundamental class interests of the working people. Then the possibility opens up of working out a democratic alternative to the policy of contemporary state-monopolistic capitalism. This alternative is aimed at profound democratic transformations ensuring the utilization of the fruits and achievements of the scientific-technical revolution in the interests of the workers class and of the broad strata of the population, in particular for resolving the problem of employment. With such a broad approach the scientific aspect of ideology is in harmony with the social-class aspect.

In connection with what has been said, F. Engels' well-known thesis that the party "needs socialist science, but that this science cannot exist without freedom of development" is always relevant. (Footnote 10) (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, vol 38, p 77) By "freedom of development" Engels means the ability of theory to rise above direct practice and above the direct and immediate interest of the workers to the heights of truly scientific generalization of the international experience of the international workers movement.

On the other hand, a contradiction can arise from the dogmatization of theory. If theory loses contact with the practice of class struggle and with the living realities of the revolutionary process and slips into the sphere of inanimate abstractions this leads to a contradiction arising between the social-class and theoretical-cognitive aspects of ideology. In this case sooner or later the class interests of the proletariat rise up against the fact that theory is lagging behind life and compel this theory to creative development and to the overcoming of outdated formulas.

There is not and there cannot be conflict in Marxism-Leninism between the social-class and theoretical functions of ideology. Contradictions in this sphere, when they arise, are removed by the very course of social development on the basis of a deeper and more comprehensive interpretation of the fundamental interests of the workers class and the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory. As a whole both these functions are contained in Marxism-Leninism in close unity. If one can put it as such, they are identical in the dialectical understanding of this word. Once again, this is explained by the fact that, as a whole, the correctly understood interests of the workers class coincide with the progressive course of social progress. Consequently, the historical experience of the workers movement makes it possible to objectively reveal the laws of social development without distorting their real meaning.
III

In the close interdependence of ideology and policy it is the latter that plays an exceptionally important role. One can say that political practice is the generator of ideology's development. Both the direction of development of theoretical thinking and its basic substance depend upon political practice. Through policy, class interest is transformed into an idea and, conversely the conclusions of theory are put into practice. Policy seems to be at the junction of the objective and the subjective, at the point where the transition is made from practice to theory. Only when organically connected with policy does theory acquire the ability to be a guide to action.

The mechanism of this connection is extremely complex as it includes a multitude of interacting and interstitial links. Policy cannot proceed only from general theory in its conclusions and prognoses. It also proceeds from social-class interests and from political reality. It is precisely on the ground of living reality that the line of contact between theory and policy takes place. They are organically combined in concrete analysis of a concrete situation, on analysis which reveals the position, dynamic features, and potentials of social-class and political forces. This analysis itself is never a purely empirical search which every time begins afresh without the initial appraising prerequisites. It presupposes the existence not only of general methodological principles, but also of general ideological guidelines which make it possible to understand the logic of a concrete situation and to interpret it as a stage of the historical process and as a link in the complex system of world relations. With this analysis the particular is explained through the general which itself represents the result and the sum of the preceding revolutionary experience reflecting the laws of revolution. Experience which is generalized in theory is a necessary prerequisite and obligatory component of analysis. Any disregard of theory reduces the latter to the level of simple registration and formal systematization of facts.

With a doctrinaire approach a general theory can give little to revolutionary policy. But this means that it is not general theory which must be repudiated but the doctrinaire attitude and that one must be guided by a dialectical and understanding of the general laws of revolution. These laws represent guidelines for action that have been repeatedly tested in practice and that constantly demand creative application. Not these general laws per se, but in their creative application—only by examining them in this way can one comprehend the dialectics of Marxist-Leninist theory and of the revolutionary policy of the workers class.

Theory provides policy with guidelines. But in this respect its principles must be freshly applied every time to revealing the inner logic of the development of a concrete phenomenon. Otherwise theory will be reduced to a simple sum of examples and will cease to be an effective instrument for the cognition and transformation of reality. Of course, reflecting reality, theory is also an aspect and a part of life. But by virtue of its specific features it generalizes facts, phenomena, and events and thereby inevitably simplifies life. Consequently, practice is always much richer than any theory, even the most complete.
One can consider this by taking the example of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the most important idea of Marxism-Leninism. V.I. Lenin considered it the touchstone on which the Marxist point of view is verified and the differences between it and the revisionist and opportunist points of view are revealed. This principle of Marxian theory is constantly enriched by the practice of the revolutionary process. Every socialist revolution demonstrates its own original ways of forming a dictatorship of the proletariat and its own specific forms of implementing it. The immutable essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat—the political supremacy of the workers class with the transition from capitalism to socialism—takes many and varied forms. Today the Marxist-Leninist parties of capitalist countries are conducting a creative search for a solution to this problem while taking into account both the changes in the composition of the allies of the workers class and their particular features. This creative search and interpretation of new experience on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism are prompted by political reality itself.

Policy continually reproduces theory in life, seems to "signal" the insufficient elaboration of this or that thesis and the necessity to develop it further, and constantly urges theoretical thinking on to new search.

Failures, errors, or mistakes in political practice are far from always explained by a poor knowledge of theory alone. One can cite examples of this or that party being guided by well developed theory. Everything looked fine in the program documents and articles. In practice, however, no significant results could be achieved. And the reason for this is that policy is not simply a science relying upon theory, it is also an inspired art. It is impossible to scientifically establish all the probable trends of its development. Here intuition and perception are also required. Sometimes it is important to "divine" this or that turn of events.

If history developed along one line then in principle it would be possible to predict everything beforehand while sitting in one's office. Then theory would indicate in advance all the turns of historical events which lay ahead. But in reality new and frequently unexpected paths of development of the revolutionary movement are continually being revealed. Revolutionaries always operate in real life situations which do not make it possible to calculate in good time all the effects of social and political forces in every detail. In the conditions of a revolutionary situation, wrote V. I. Lenin in his article "On Our Revolution," and influences by the hopelessness of their position, people may throw themselves into a struggle which provides any chance of breaking the capitalist system. (Footnote 11) (V.I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, vol 45, p 38). In spite of the doctrinaires shouting that victory was impossible because of the country's economic and cultural backwardness, Lenin and the Bolsheviks determinedly joined battle in the conditions of the revolutionary situation, calculating that the very course of the struggle would create new possibilities for developing the revolution and consolidating its achievements. And these possibilities did arise—the Brest peace and the new economic policy, for example. No one could foresee these possibilities earlier, at the moment of the October breakthrough itself. Utilizing these
possibilities not only made it possible to defend the achievements of the October Revolution, but also opened up the prospect of socialism triumphing in the country under the conditions of capitalist encirclement.

In a word, political practice is a mobile and highly dynamic activity which refuses to leave theory in peace. It obliges one to not simply apply theory to surrounding reality like a stencil, but to constantly interpret and reinterpret scientific theses and conclusions, proceeding from the concrete historical development of practice itself. Only then can policy serve as a living source of new experience and as a kind of foundation for the advancement of theoretical thinking and provide real material for generalizing concrete phenomena and processes which arise in the practice of revolutionary struggle.

IV

The problem of the correlation of ideology and policy also concerns those problems that arise today in the international communist movement. The broadening of the composition of social and political forces participating in general democratic and anti-imperialist movements demands that communists adopt a broad approach, and one free of sectarianism, to the strategy of class and political alliances. One can say that communists have really rocked the whole world, having begun a new historical era by revolutionary means. Now the world is simmering: at the world-wide historical initiative of communists, non-communist progressive forces have also been aroused which are now capable of actively participating in resolving the cardinal problems of renewing the world. Another important factor should also be added to this: the threat of a thermonuclear war which is hanging over the world compels one to regard the fundamental meaning of the activity of the whole communist movement not simply as a struggle against oppression and exploitation, but also as a struggle for the preservation of human civilization and of man's very right to life.

Realization of the ruinous nature of a world war in the present conditions and of the absolute necessity to preserve peace for the continuation of human progress is becoming more and more widespread among people. In this connection people have begun to talk more and more frequently of a "planetary," "global" awareness, and an "awareness of vision." Real changes in social awareness are ably testified to by the fact that more and more people are realizing that their interests are in opposition to the narrow, class, mercenary policies of monopolistic capital and to the very essence of capitalist civilization which is becoming obsolete. At the same time, these real changes by no means signify that the struggle of ideologies is coming to an end, giving way to some kind of "above-class awareness common to all mankind" in the spirit of the reactionary utopias of the "sociology of knowledge" of the German sociologist Karl Mannheim, who strove to substantiate society's need for "above-ideology social knowledge" free of class-ideological limits. He considered the bearer of this knowledge to be the "socially free, soaring intelligentsia," whose specific mission "lay in expressing the spiritual interests of the whole." The so-called "technocratic ideology" which is widespread in the West also proceeds in this direction. Its advocates adhere to the point of view that the present development of technology and the scientific-technical revolution have an imperative need of some kind of unified and rational knowledge which must replace "a one-sided class" approach.
Both the scientific-technical revolution, the vital need for lasting peace, and the acuteness of global problems emphasize the common historical fate of mankind as a whole in the face of the dangers threatening it and the pernicious outlook opening up before it. But realization of this fact by no means eliminates the profound social-class differences between, and opposing nature of the social systems co-existing on this earth, neither does it eliminate the real grounds for an antagonism of ideologies—so it will be until all peoples, each by their own experience, choose the most advanced form of social structure which meets the requirements of contemporary productive forces and contemporary culture. Until that time comes the only rational position to adopt is that of considering the differences between ideology and policy. Whereas ideological struggle represents a clash of principles and is therefore uncompromising, in policy one has to take concrete conditions and possibilities into account, consider the real correlation of socio-political forces and, proceeding from this, show necessary flexibility in fulfilling aims. Waging a political struggle, wrote V.I. Lenin, "and refusing in advance to maneuver, to utilize any conflict of interests (however temporary) between enemies, and to make compromises with possible (however temporary, unstable, unreliable, and conditional) allies,—surely this is an infinitely laughable thing?" (Footnote 12) (V.I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, vol 41, p 54). What has been said also fully applies to international policy. Clashes of ideas must not be spread to relations between states. "Transferring ideological contradictions to the sphere of interstate relations," emphasized Yu. V. Andropov, "has never brought any good to anyone resorting to this in foreign affairs. Now, in the nuclear age, this is simply absurd and inadmissible. Turning antagonism of ideas into military antagonism would cost the whole of mankind too dear." (Footnote 13) (PRAVDA, 29 September 1983)

The striving for peace common to all mankind does not bring with it "an end of ideologies" or their convergence. But it does demand that paths to peace be sought, despite ideological differences. Consequently, while it is important to be aware of the ruinous nature of nuclear war for the whole of mankind and for all strata and classes of contemporary society, it is necessary to warn against illusions of the possibility of forming some kind of "above-class social awareness" called upon to supposedly replace rival world outlooks.

It is not at all a matter of opposing ideologies being replaced by some kind of "planetary awareness," but rather one of ever broader strata of the population become aware of the fact that today peace is the people's most vital need, irrespective of their class affinity or ideological beliefs. The greatest historical responsibility of most fully expressing this common interest of mankind and of heading the movement of the peoples for the preservation of peace on earth rests with the international workers class as the progressive class of the era and the bearer of a scientific ideology. V. I. Lenin once noted that the interests of social development are higher than the interests of the proletariat. (Footnote 14) (V.I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, vol 4, p 220) What did Lenin have in mind? He was opposed to corporative narrowness in the understanding of workers interests and emphasized that the interests of the workers class are much broader than those direct needs and requirements which stem from its economic position and that this struggle for political freedom is not only waged in its own interests, but also in the interests of social development as a whole.
The policy of peace and social progress requires the workers class and its party to adopt a large-scale approach to spiritual-ideological processes. This approach definitely includes the ability to conduct a dialogue with people holding different opinions. This certainly is not "convergence" and has nothing in common with attempts to join Marxism with some other non-Marxist theoretical concepts. Ideological independence by no means excludes the ability to conduct a dialogue with other social forces which will draw them into a joint struggle for peace and make it possible to consider the specific interests of these forces in the policies of the Marxist-Leninist parties. As the parties of the progressive class of the era they boldly take the initiative in raising problems which trouble the whole of mankind. An important factor in this respect is aggressiveness in ideology and the ability to set new problems advanced by life in good time and, the main thing, to theoretically and practically resolve them.

But there are also cases of theory lagging behind political practice to a certain extent. Thus, in a number of capitalist countries life more and more persistently places the problem of communist participation in government on the agenda; a whole series of topical political problems are connected with this which still need to be theoretically resolved. Let us take the correlation of the immediate and ultimate aims of the class struggle for example. Can reforms under capitalism, implemented by the government with the participation of communists and answering the immediate and direct aims of the class struggle of the proletariat be considered socialist? If not, then what are the conditions for implementing profound democratic reforms which are steps toward socialism? The answers to these questions require a precise definition of the sequence of, and connection between the historical stages of the struggle of the workers class for democracy and socialism.

The new phenomena and processes of the contemporary political life and consequently also of the contemporary political practice of the workers movement in capitalist countries dictate the necessity of a creative approach to resolving theoretical problems. At the same time, a one-sided interpretation of these new phenomena and processes creates a certain danger of liquidating the ideological heritage of Marxism-Leninism. This kind of danger is clear to be seen in the theoretical concepts of a "third way" to socialism and in the new "models" of socialism. These hypothetical, if not highly dubious ideas, which have been proven by no one and untested in practice, are frequently openly opposed to the accumulated experience of real socialism and to those achievements which the international workers class won in practice in a difficult and rigorous struggle to fulfill the socialist social ideal.

In fact, this kind of liquidator position leads to a rejection of the revolutionary heritage of the workers movement and consequently also to theoretical disarmament. In actual fact, all talk of a "third way" to socialism turns out to be words with no positive concept behind them. It cannot be otherwise since today it is impossible to talk about the concrete substance of the socialist ideal and socialist "models" while disregarding the practice of real socialism. That is why those who assume negativist positions with regard to real socialism, which confirms socialist ideals in practice, are very rhetorical in their discussions as to what socialism "must not be" and are not at all clear on the question of what it must be. Life shows that "distancing" from
real socialism and negativism with regard to the historical experience of the international communist movement inevitably lead to one result—to the loss of the very substance of the socialist ideal.

What is ideology's place when a policy of unity of revolutionary and democratic forces is pursued? There are two extremes in the resolving of this question. The first is a doctrinaire-sectarian policy that undermines the foundation of the policy of alliances, because ideological differences are treated as an insuperable barrier that divides one class or party from other classes or parties. Basically, this kind of approach leads to a rejection of any policy of alliances. The sect of like-minded people is locked within its own circle.

The second extreme is the pragmatic-opportunist line that is characteristic of the social democrats in particular. This is a line of stripping policy of all ideology for the sake of adaptation to the existing situation. It is no accident that the social democrats use the philosophy of "critical rationalism" as the theoretical platform for their activity. This philosophy suits their pragmatic course in the best possible way because it substantiates the need for special separate theoretical instruments for every individual situation. In other words, the policy is completely released from any kind of principles and from all obligations in relations to theory and the widest possibilities are open in every concrete situation for acting according to arbitrary subjective rules.

The Marxist position is to avoid the two aforementioned extremes and, while strictly preserving loyalty to the principles of scientific ideology, to demonstrate at the same time flexibility in relations with other political forces that are capable of becoming allies in the struggle for common goals. In this connection the Marxist-Leninist approach implies that, for the sake of unity of the sociopolitical forces on the revolutionary platform, the main reliance must be placed on what realistically unites these forces and not on the appraisals and differences that separate them.

The Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th party congress notes: "As the influence of the communist parties grows, the tasks facing them become increasingly complex and diverse. And this fact at times results in the appraisals with different meaning and in differences in approach to solving the concrete questions of the class struggle, and also provoke discussions among parties." The fact that this is a natural condition, however, does not imply a passive reconciliation with differences in views. On the contrary, the question that arises in this connection is the question of selecting the ways and methods of overcoming disagreements and of struggle for strengthening the ideological and, especially, political unity of the international communist movement. Whenever disagreements and differences in appraisals occur among the communist parties, priority must be given to unity in what is the main thing.
Let us consider, for instance, such a vitally important issue as the struggle for peace. It is noted in the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress that the struggle for peace is the great uniting principle and mighty factor of cohesion of the world communist movement and the political platform of the broadest alliance of democratic and progressive forces of the contemporary period. At the same time, however, the very understanding of peace and of the ways to maintain and strengthen it is also a matter of ideological struggle. There are various interpretations of this concept. Some apologists of "cold war" claim in words that they, too, struggle for peace. And in this connection the criterion of political practice is of fundamental importance. It is this criterion that helps to distinguish those who are really working for peace from those who are trying to distort its very understanding by means of various ideological tricks.

The question of the attitude of Marxism-Leninism to other democratic and progressive ideological-political trends of the contemporary period is of great political importance. The comprehension of the ideological views of these trends on the basis of the development of political cooperation with them is extraordinarily important. This is also a form of ideological struggle. Some or other ideological-theoretical and political weaknesses of democratic and progressive allies of the workers class show up in the process of a constructive dialogue. At the same time, this dialogue also enriches Marxist ideology and helps to elucidate more clearly any kind of new branches of the contemporary historical experience appearing in the activities of other social movements.

Of course, this kind of dialogue has nothing in common with the so-called "ideological pluralism," which in practice implies a dialectical blending of different viewpoints. The Marxist-Leninist ideology expresses the fundamental interests of the workers class. It is through this prism that the mutual relations between Marxists-Leninists and other democratic and progressive forces should be considered.

V

Under the present conditions, the question of correlation between politics and religious ideology assumes a major importance and this fact is connected with a noticeable revival of the activeness of religious trends and of churches. This applies both to the countries of developed capitalism and especially to the countries of the East where an active inclusion of the forces of revolution and reaction has been noticed in recent periods.

As a matter of fact, the ties between religion and the liberation movements of the masses are nothing new. This has happened before in history and especially in the history of some European bourgeois revolutions. For instance, F. Engels wrote in his "Peasant War in Germany," dealing with the religious wars of the 16th century, the following: "If this class struggle was waged at that time under the guise of religion and if the interests, needs, and demands of the individual classes were concealed under a religious guise, this in no way changes the cause and is easily explained by the conditions of the period." (Footnote 15) (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, vol 7 p 360) Engels repeatedly returned to this thought. Thus, in his work "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy" he noted in particular that in the
first stages of the bourgeoisie's struggle for its liberation, the "general historical movements assume a religious coloring," (Footnote 16) (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, vol 21, p 294) and that, at certain stages of historical development, "it was necessary to present to these masses their own interests in a religious dressing." (Footnote 17) (Ibid., p 314) Engels emphasized that the "reformation, both Lutheran and Calvinist, itself represents the No 1 bourgeois revolution with the peasant war as a critical episode." (Footnote 18) (Ibid., p 417) Lenin also called attention to a special kind of the general law of the religious coloring of the liberation movements at the early stages of development of bourgeois revolutions: "The appearance of political protest in a religious guise," he wrote, "is a phenomenon that is peculiar for all peoples at a certain stage of their development...." (Footnote 19) (V.I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, vol 4, p 228)

In this way we find in the Marxist-Leninist inheritance a whole series of very important indications that help us to more clearly understand also the contemporary facts of participation of religious trends in the revolutionary movement.

As regards the particular characteristics that have so distinctly manifested themselves in the East in our period, especially in the Iranian revolution, they consist of the fact that Islam is the religion of such a variety as, under the contemporary conditions, most deeply penetrates the sphere of sociopolitical relations and comes especially close to politics. Academician V.V. Bartold also pointed out these particular characteristics. He wrote that the Islamic concepts are used "not only in the form of a religious but also in the form of a political doctrine and mainly as a means of achieving completely definite political goals." (Footnote 20) (V.V. Bartold, Works, vol 6, Moscow 1966, p 402)

Of course, various orientations, ranging from reactionary to progressive, exist among the Islamic trends. It is for this reason that an extraordinary importance is attached to the thesis of the 26th CPSU Congress that, first and foremost, it is important to see the main thing, that is, the real substance of the sociopolitical movements operating under Islamic slogans. Under certain conditions, the religious trends that participate in the mass political struggle can assume revolutionary-democratic characteristics and can even prepare the ground for a transition to the path of noncapitalist development. (Footnote 21) (See Article by E.M. Primakov "Islam and the Processes of Social Development of Foreign Countries of the East:" VOPROSY FILOSOFIGI, No 8, 1980)

The church certainly does not always act from a position that is hostile to the revolution. A differentiation quite often takes places in the church community under the influence of a broad liberation movement. Wherever the church is linked with the masses, it itself participates in the movement in one form or another. A striking example in this respect is provided by Nicaragua where a considerable section of the church assumed progressive positions during the development of the liberation process. This is what Tomas Borge, one of the Nicaraguan leaders, says in this connection: "Why should the church be removed from the revolutionary activity? Prior to the victory of the revolution, I had talks with my friend, priest Don Guillermo. And we
came to the conclusion that it is very important that the church participate in the struggle against Somoza because, for a half a century, hatred had reigned in our country and, after the victory of the resolution, only the church could convince the people of the need for forgiveness and magnanimity. In Nicaragua, the church is an integral part of the revolution.... The church and the Sandinist revolution worked with one another shoulder to shoulder." (Footnote 22) (GIORN0, 22 August 1980) The fact that also clergymen now hold several ministerial positions in the new government attests to the activity of churchmen in the Nicaraguan liberation movement. Clergymen in several other Latin American countries also actively participate in revolutionary movements.

The unity of ideology and policy is one of the laws of the revolutionary movement of the workers class and its allies. Expressing the class interests in a theoretically systematized form, ideology unfailingly comes out as the policy that concerns itself with the classes and their relationship with the state power as the principal lever of the achievements of class goals. It is in the policy and through the policy that the ideology obtains the means of real influence on the social development. The policy also needs ideology to substantiate the action program of the class or party. No matter which of the aspects of mutual relations between the ideology and policy we may consider, the close ties between them are always clearly seen. The study of these ties is indispensable for consciously combining the Marxist-Leninist ideology with the revolutionary policy of the workers class and of its political vanguards. Herein lies one of the conditions for the workers class' successful fulfillment of its historical role of the predominant force of the contemporary revolutionary process and of the builder of the new society.

Today, too, the interdependence of ideology and policy permeates the CPSU's entire activity. Theoretically interpreting the social practice, the Marxist-Leninist ideology provides the scientific foundation for the party's domestic and foreign policies. "The party," K. U. Chernenko notes, "devotes great attention to interpreting the contemporary period and to soberly defining, without a shadow of utopia, the level of the socioeconomic maturity of the new society achieved by us. Determining this, we work out the strictly scientific foundations of the CPSU policy." (Footnote 23) (PRAVDA, 3 March 1984) The theoretical conclusions of the Marxist-Leninist ideology thereby assume an importance of principle. They make it possible to more clearly perceive the entire picture of social development in all its complexity and in all its contradictory and multifaceted nature and contribute to fulfilling the ripe tasks in good time and effectively.


CSO: 1816/9a-F
U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA 'UNHOLY ALLIANCE' ATTACKED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 118-121

[A. Urnov commentary: "The South African Knot"]

[Text] On 16 March 1984 the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa [RSA] signed a treaty of "nonaggression and good-neighborly relations." Maputo regards this event as a victory of Mozambique's diplomacy. Pretoria presents the signing of the treaty as its own victory. Washington also claims the laurels in this connection. Western propaganda assiduously draws the picture of its "peacemaking" initiatives and adds to the assets of the RSA and the United States the opening of negotiations between them on one hand and the People's Republic of Angola on the other, together with the agreement between Mozambique and South Africa.

What is really behind these initiatives?

I

Let us recall the recent past. Following the assumption of power by the R. Reagan administration, an alliance was quickly formed between the United States and racist South Africa which independent Africa justly called a new "unholy alliance," analogous to the alliance that at one time united the RSA, "white" Rhodesia, and the colonial fascist Portugal. Washington's and Pretoria's common goals in the region were essentially and openly proclaimed as suppressing national liberation forces in the RSA and Namibia, destabilizing and liquidating progressive regimes on the subcontinent, and transforming that region into a zone of imperialist and racist hegemony. Military force and undermining actions were used as the primary means of implementing this policy.

However, partners of the "unholy alliance" reached the 1983-84 period with results that were inauspicious for them. The policy of destabilizing frontline states--primarily Angola and Mozambique--that inflicted countless calamities on the peoples of these two countries failed to achieve its main goal: that is, the goal of overthrowing the governments of the Labor Party of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA] and the Party of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), and pushing these countries from the path of progressive development.
In September and October of 1983 the puppet bands of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] suffered a serious defeat in the central regions of Angola. The boastful promises of their chief, Savimbi, to conclude 1983 with a victory turned out in fact to be a bluff. The new largescale aggression against the People's Republic of Angola undertaken by Pretoria in December 1983 and January 1984 encountered staunch resistance by the Angola Army, which demonstrated its increased combat efficiency and was able largely to retain its positions and inflict appreciable losses on the South Africa forces. The communique on the Soviet-Angolan-Cuban consultations held in Moscow in January that year at which the additional measures of assistance to the People's Republic of Angola in ensuring its security and territorial integrity were coordinated, provided a stern warning to the enemies of People's Angola. The Armed Forces of the People's Republic of Mozambique carried out a number of successful operations against the so-called "Mozambique National Résistance" (MNR), yet another puppet of Pretoria and Washington in southern Africa.

The unsolved Namibian problem caused increasingly greater difficulties for the United States and the RSA. Their demand to "link" settlement of the Namibia problem with the withdrawal of Cuban soldier internationalists from Angola was rejected indignantly by the OAU, the Nonaligned Movement, and the United Nations.

It was noted everywhere that the question of Namibia's decolonization had no relation to the Cuban presence in Angola and that the demand of the United States and the RSA represented an intolerable encroachment on the sovereign right of the People's Republic of Angola to seek the assistance of friendly states in the face of South African aggression. It is significant that even Washington's closest allies did not dare to support the idea of "linkage." Washington's clumsiness and unceremonial actions resulted in a situation in which the Western "Contact Group" ceased to function and France withdrew from it.

Pretoria's attempt to strengthen the puppet "internal parties" in Namibia and to form neocolonial administration organs there have also been unsuccessful. The partisan struggle of Namibian patriotism continues. Regardless of the tricks of the racists and their henchmen, the South-West African People's Organization [SWAPO] continues to be the leading political organization of Namibia's African population and its international authority is steadily growing. The outflow of the white population from Namibia has intensified and economic activity has declined. The racist regime's expenditures for the occupation of that territory have reached over one billion rand annually. Speaking in the RSA Parliament in February 1984, P. Botha, RSA prime ministers, was compelled to admit that the policy in Namibia "must be dearly paid for in purely material resources as well as in international condemnations and the lives of our young men."

However, the main thing in this connection is that all efforts of Washington and Pretoria to stop the growth of the national liberation struggle in the RSA itself have failed. The constitutional and other reforms introduced by P. Botha which have been received with tender emotions by the White House
have been resolutely rejected by the African majority. The African National Congress [ANC], "annihilated" and "buried" by the racists several times al-
ready, is growing stronger from day to day. It is under its banner that
the native population is developing extensive action against the apartheid
system. It is indicative that the program of the United Democratic Front,
formulated in the RSA in 1983 with a current total of more than 1,000,000 mem-
bers, is in many respects consonant with the ANC program document, the Free-
don Charter. The detachments of the congress's military organization, the
"Umkhonto we Sizwe" ("Spear of the Nation") are operating more and more
skillfully and actively. Their attacks on military and economic targets
seriously damage the regime and raise the fighting spirit of the oppressed
masses.

It must be added that, under the effect of economic confusion in the world
capitalist economy and of the burden of ever increasing military spending,
the RSA economy, by the admission of its minister of finance, is experiencing
"its greatest difficulties since the time of the great depression." (Foot-

Thus, the hard and openly aggressive course pursued by participants in the
Namibia's "unholy alliance" relative to the "frontline" states has failed to
guarantee the attainment of the goals desired by these participants, but it has
been accompanied by great material, political, and human losses. At the same
time, it has diverted increasingly significant forces and means from fulfillment
of the task Pretoria and Washington have always considered one of priority,
consolidating the apartheid regime in the RSA itself. As a result of
this, it has become necessary to make certain corrections to this course
by softening it externally to reduce tension around the RSA and enable
P. Botha's government to concentrate its forces on suppressing the national
liberation movement within the country.

Washington and Pretoria understand that a tactical turn of this kind demands
that they make certain concessions in their approach to Angola and Mozambique.
But they count on compensating for these concessions by strengthening Pre-
toria's foreign political positions and pulling it out of international
isolation, even if only partially. According to their plans, this in its
turn should create more favorable conditions for the economic and political
penetration by the United States and the RSA into the "frontline" states and
for gradually subordinating the latter to the imperialist and racist diktat.

Working out a "new" policy for southern Africa, participants in the "unholy
alliance" strive to fully exploit the consequences of the difficulties they
themselves have created for the development of African countries of the region,
the weariness of these countries as a result of many years of confrontation
with the RSA, and their understandable interest in a respite of peace. The
old imperialist policy of threats and promises has been set in motion. The
RSA's neighboring countries are promised extensive material assistance and
a termination of military piracy and undermining activity against them and
they are requested, in return, to "normalize" their relations with the RSA
and refrain from supporting the ANC and SWAPO armed national liberation strug-
gle.
The splash of U.S. activities in southern Africa is explained to a considerable extent by election campaign considerations. The R. Reagan administration badly needs visible diplomatic successes to divert the American public's attention from a number of failures its policy has suffered in southern Africa, the Middle East, and other regions of the world. Washington would also like to rid itself, even if only partly, of the reputation of a militarist and aggressor that has become attached to it, and cover itself with the cloak of "peacemaker" on the eve of the coming elections.

It is no accident that U.S. and RSA initiatives are being presented as a "peace offensive" in the subcontinent, an offensive designed to ensure "stability" and "regional security" there. In his February 1984 speech on U.S. policy in Africa, Secretary of State C. Shultz spoke particularly about this. Formulating the question in this way, he distorts the essence of the southern Africa conflict and hides the real reasons for the tense situation in the region. The fact is that the very existence of a repressive regime in the RSA and its continued occupation of Namibia are the main causes of tension there. It is precisely this that inevitably engenders the resistance of the oppressed peoples of South Africa and Namibia and causes them to resort to armed forms of struggle for national liberation. As for the actions of other African--including "frontline"--states in extending their aid to this just struggle, they fully accord with the norms of international law and the UN and OAU decisions.

Thus, the central problem of the region is that of liquidating its last hotbeds of colonialism and racism. But the American concept of "stability" and "regional security" is designed to prevent the solution of this task. At the same time it corresponds wholly and completely to the foreign political ambitions of Pretoria, which hopes to establish its hegemony in the subcontinent by drawing the neighboring liberated countries into a military-political and economic bloc under the RSA aegis called the "constellation of states of southern Africa."

The agreement between the RSA and the People's Republic of Mozambique provides for limiting ANC activity in the territory of the People's Republic of Mozambique, and the RSA has promised to stop supporting its henchmen in the "national resistance." At the same time, it was emphasized in Maputo that the signing of the treaty does not indicate a recognition of the apartheid regime and that the ANC would continue to enjoy Maputo's political, diplomatic, and moral support.

During the negotiations with Angola in Lusaka this February, the RSA agreed to withdraw its troops from the southern regions of the People's Republic of Angola by 31 March 1984. This fact was presented in Pretoria and in the West as a striking demonstration of Pretoria's "peaceableness" although the RSA essentially only promised to fulfill the universally recognized international legal norm: that is, to withdraw from the territory of another state which it had unlawfully occupied. And in this connection it not only refuses to give any guarantees that it will not resume the aggression, but on the contrary continues suspending the withdrawal of its troops and threatens to deal a new blow to Angola.
As a result of all this, the occupiers have continued to stay in the territory of the People's Republic of Angola after 31 March.

Precisely in the same way, no guarantees were given regarding any termination of support for UNITA. And what is more, as providing this support has become more difficult in view of the events in southern Angola, measures have been taken to increase the aid to the counterrevolutionary bands through Zaire; Israel has actively joined this action also. At the same time, the United States has launched activities aimed at putting together a "united front" of Angolan counterrevolutionaries that would include, in addition to UNITA, its formal ally, the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (or more precisely, what is left of it), as well as the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave, the organization of the Cabinda separatists. In March 1984, the leaders of two of these groups visited Washington. The enemies of People's Angola obviously have no intention of renouncing in practice their undermining activity against the government of the MPLA-Labor Party.

There have been really no noticeable changes in the Namibian question. In January 1984, Pretoria moved toward direct contacts with SWAPO. The latter promised for its part that it would respect the truce agreement in southern Angola but would continue the armed liberation struggle in Namibia until the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement between itself and the RSA as stipulated by UN Security Council Resolution 435.

However, the United States and the RSA have not committed themselves to move toward implementing this resolution and are making new efforts to block it or to even completely bypass it. On 11 March, the F. Botha government rejected SWAPO's appeal to open negotiations on a cease-fire in Namibia and proposed a conference of "all sides" that participate "in the Namibia-Angola conflict." (Footnote 2) (THE NEW YORK TIMES News Service, 11 March 1984) Among these "sides" were the RSA, Angola, SWAPO, the puppet "internal parties" of Namibia, and UNITA. UN participation in the conference was not even mentioned. C. Croker, U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, hastened to appraise the RSA initiative as a "positive event." (Footnote 3) (Ibidem)

Pretoria's proposal attests to its continuation, together with Washington, of its former policy aimed at undermining the political platform for a Namibian settlement, the platform formulated in the UN decisions, including the UN Security Council Resolution 435.

What is symptomatic in this connection is the recently observed revived activity of the "internal parties" at the so-called multiparty conference in Windhoek where they announced, with the blessings of the racists and contrary to Resolution 435, their intention to start working out the "political-constitutional framework of Namibia's statehood." The "initiative," however, does have one positive aspect: It attests to the final and definite failure of the "Turnhull constitutional principles" worked out by Pretoria and its puppets near the end of the seventies, were aimed at turning Namibia into a bantustan-like region.

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In its statement the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Angola characterized the RSA proposal as a step that "casts doubt on the seriousness of the Pretoria regime's attitude." The statement noted that convening the conference would have meaning only if it were held under the aegis of the UN secretary general and would aim at studying and elaborating the measures designed to promote implementation of Resolution 435. The main participants in the conference should be the RSA and SWAPO whereas Angola and other "frontline" states could take part only as observers. Luanda categorically rejected any dialogue or negotiations with UNITA, which it called in its statement a "band of Angolan criminals and traitors supported by Pretoria."

What was emphasized as especially impermissible was any consideration by the conference of questions unrelated to the substance of Resolution 435, because the United States and the RSA, simultaneously with their attempts to bring UNITA into the conference, also continued to insist on the "linkage" of a settlement in Namibia with the presence of the Cuban military contingent in the People's Republic of Angola. Angola and Cuba outlined their principled position on this question as early as in their joint statement on 4 February 1982. In August last year, President J. E. dos Santos emphasized on the basis of that statement that the question of the Cuban military presence in the People's Republic of Angola falls exclusively within the competence of the two countries. He outlined the following main conditions whose fulfillment would enable Angola and Cuba to consider the possibility for a gradual withdrawal of the Cuban military contingent: The departure of the RSA troops from Angola, termination and nonresumption of aggression against Angola, renunciations of support for UNITA, and early implementation of Resolution 435. This position was again confirmed during J.E. dos Santos' visit to Cuba from 17 to 20 March 1984. Expressing "admiration for and solidarity with the heroic struggle waged by the peoples of Namibia and South Africa under the leadership of their only legitimate representatives, SWAPO and ANC, against the disgraceful apartheid regime." The Governments of Angola and Cuba confirmed their conviction that "that detestable regime is historically doomed to disappear."

The results of J.E. dos Santos' visit to Cuba caused great dissatisfaction in the United States and the RSA. Pretoria again threatened to discontinue implementation of the "Lusaka accords." It appears, according to the statement in parliament on 21 March by RSA Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Botha that, regarding a Namibian settlement, there is now already a double "linkage"—that is, linkage with the withdrawal of Cuban soldier internationalists from the People's Republic of Angola and the legalization of UNITA. On the same day Van Niekerk, RSA general administrator of Namibia, made a significant statement in Windhoek pointing out that Resolution 435 "is not the only path" of decolonization of the territory. (Footnote 4) (THE WASHINGTON POST, 22 March 1984) In other words, the racists and imperialists are miring yet another obstacle on the path to implementing that resolution. Invoking the views of local observers, the newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST has written in this connection that "if the elections envisaged by the UN plan were held now, SWAPO would win an overwhelming majority of votes. Therefore, they believe that the RSA basic strategy is to find some way to
renounce the UN plan and work out some kind of a plan of internal political settlement that would prevent SWAPO from coming to power or, as the last resort, would at least not enable that organization to win an absolute majority."  (Footnote 5)  (Ibidem)

Commenting on the development of events in the region, the Mozambique newspaper NOTICIAS correctly notes that the RSA current strategy pursues the goal of achieving in this way what could not be achieved with arms.  (Footnote 6)  (NOTICIAS, 5 March 1984)  However, as is apparent from the statement by R. Botha, Pretoria continues to see military force as the "guarantee for the success" of the RSA in southern Africa.  It is significant that, in the 1984–85 financial year, the RSA military spending increased by more than 20 percent.  (Footnote 7)  (THE NEW YORK TIMES,  29 March 1984)  In other words, force has been and continues to be Pretoria's main argument in a "peaceful dialogue" with the African peoples.

Washington, too, is striving for its former goals there, although it is using somewhat new methods in the process.  Liquidation of the RSA apartheid regime and a just solution of the Namibian problem represent an indispensable condition for stable peace in southern Africa.  Neither Washington nor Pretoria want this.

Experience of history shows that never and nowhere has interference of American imperialism resulted in establishing just peace, but has only created new hotbeds of tension and dangerous armed conflicts.

K. U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has clearly revealed the true essence of the current maneuvers of the imperialists and racists in southern Africa:  "Using the carrot-and-stick method and speculating with the interest of the African peoples in living in peace and under stable conditions, the United States and some of its allies strive to impose their will on peoples of the southern African region.  However, peoples will appraise the southern Africa situation according to whether the security of African states, victims of the RSA's aggression, will be truly guaranteed, whether the Namibian people will be able to achieve their freedom and independence, and, finally, whether an end will be put to the shameful apartheid system."


CSO:  1816/9a–F

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'GREENS' SOCIOECONOMIC POLICY EXAMINED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 122-126

[Article by V. Zarin: "Socioeconomic Platform of the 'Green' Party"]

[Text] A sharp decline in the economic growth rate, the increased frequency and deepening of crisis recessions, "stagflation" and the increase in unemployment by leaps and bounds have considerably increased social tension and the polarization of class forces. These processes, which in this form or the other are typical of all the developed capitalist states, have affected the FRG also.

In the latter half of the 1970's West Germany entered a qualitatively new period of development. It is characterized by a considerable deterioration in the conditions of reproduction, the reduced efficiency of traditional methods of state-monopoly regulation of the economy and a fall in the population's real income. The exacerbation of the contradictions brought about a critical reassessment of values within the framework of the orthodox directions of bourgeois thought and the emergence of new programs of sociopolitical and economic development.

The Christian-Liberal coalition came to office in the FRG in 1982. The volte-face in political life also meant new accents in the "social market economy" concept—the West German version of neoclassical synthesis which has for many years served as the main reference point for the pursuit of economic policy. Government circles calculate that the economy will become increasingly more a market economy and increasingly less a social one.

The measures of the new coalition are aimed primarily at strengthening the base of private monopoly accumulation, reducing state interference in economic life, limiting trade union rights and winding down a number of social programs with a simultaneous increase in military spending and the granting of tax privileges to major corporations.

Monopoly capital's frontal offensive against the positions of broad strata of the population undertaken under the "economic recovery" slogan could not have failed to have elicited a retaliatory reaction. Some representatives of the
workers, intelligentsia and the students, abandoning traditional support for the social democrats, voted in March 1983 for the "Greens" alternative party and thereby for the first time brought it out at the federal level.

The Greens surmounted the 5-percent barrier and gained representation in the Bundestag, only slightly inferior in the number of seats to the Free Democrats. The party is also represented in the Landtags of Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Baden-Wuertemb erg and Lower Saxony and has approximately 30,000 activists.*

I

The Greens have acquired the greatest celebrity in the FRG and abroad thanks to their actions for the preservation of peace and the habitat on the planet, which they view as a single task. Active opposition to the deployment of American missiles in West Europe and criticism of Washington's militarist policy aimed at destabilizing international relations have encountered support among broad strata of the FRG population troubled by the role which is being assigned their country in NATO's nuclear strategy.

At the congress in Duisburg in November 1983 the party's Federal Board proposed for ensuring a policy of peace "a switch from protests to resistance." The document adopted at the congress sharply criticized the West German Government, which, "following U.S. policy, has adopted a decision on a start to the deployment of the missiles, despite the will and opposition of the overwhelming majority of the country's population."

From April through October 1983 deputies of the Greens submitted for examination by the Bundestag over 30 demands and also bills aimed against the build-up of militarist preparations in the FRG. "The peace movement in our country," the newspaper UNSERE ZEIT wrote at the end of 1983, "has active advocates in the Bundestag. The deputies of the Greens have set forth here the demands of the peace fighters and, having advanced numerous arguments, have shown that our country has a chance of a peaceful future only if it succeeds in putting an end to the nuclear arms race." During the budget debate in the Bundestag the Greens demanded a reduction in military spending of DM9 billion. They also brought suit in the federal Constitutional Court against the deployment of American missiles in the FRG and expanded their foreign policy contacts to prevent an intensification of the arms race.

II

The Greens attach great significance to the development of socioeconomic policy. Under the conditions of the widespread discussion concerning the choice of further development strategy the party is attempting to put forward its own platform.

The Greens' socioeconomic views were formed over several years and are an integral part of the programs of the Land organizations. They were expounded in most concentrated form in the 1982 federal program and the document submitted to the special election party conference (January 1983). This document formulates a program of urgent actions, including actions with respect

*See on the "Greens" movement L. Istyagin, "The 'Green' Party on the FRG's Political Landscape" (MEMO No 2, 1983).
to the struggle against unemployment. It represents a certain compromise between the views of the pragmatists headed by R. Trumpert, who back at the November 1982 congress had proposed that they confine themselves to a "moderate" ecological policy and economic reforms within the framework of capitalism, and the radical grouping of P. Kelly. The latter is opposed to an alliance with other movements of the left and demands the pursuit of a consistent ecological policy.

Despite their contradictory nature, the Greens' socioeconomic concepts possess one important property—they are alternative in practically all their provisions to the official policy of the ruling parties. The Greens' program contains demands for a reorientation of the one-sided strategy of the quantitative growth of the economy, which serves the interests of big monopoly capital, and appeals for a change in the existing nature of ownership and distribution of the national income. It is opposed to the "inordinate" concentration of capitalist production, the "dehumanization" of the labor process, the ruin of the small and medium enterprises, the reduction in the amount of already scant social spending and to unemployment.

The Greens, like the trade unions, demand the introduction of a 35-hour work week, increased leave and the extension of state appropriates for socioeconomic purposes. They believe that industrial growth has ceased to be a means contributing to a reduction in unemployment. The revolution in the microelectronics sphere and robotization is bringing about a need for "ecological" investments in alternative forms of technology and energy systems. The change in the structure of the economy presupposes not only protection of the natural environment but also the creation of new jobs. Consequently, the Greens believe, the reorganization of the economy in accordance with ecological and democratic demands would entail an end to unemployment.

At the same time, however, the clause on the nationalization of key industrial sectors which is contained in the basic program of the Joint German Trade Unions is not supported by the Greens. In their opinion, the land and its interior, natural resources, the means of production and the banks should be converted into "new forms" of public ownership.

To ensure self-management the Greens propose, where possible, liquidating big industry and breaking down production and marketing concerns into smaller enterprises. All this is also necessary, the Greens assert, for preserving the environment. "The main place in our ecological demands," P. Kelly emphasized in an open letter to W. Brandt, "is occupied by structures which are as decentralized and simple as possible. This is an essential element of our anticapitalist world outlook."

H. Marcuse, a representative of "neo-Marxism," resorted to such reasoning. Back in 1968 he wrote that a break "with the technical machinery of production which, as Marx saw it, is preserved in the socialist society also..." is essential. "The severance of this connection would signify not a lagging

*There are certain concurrences with the views of leftwing social democrats, particularly since they have been in opposition.
behind technical progress but a reorganization of the technical machinery in accordance with the needs of free people and their developing requirements and in accordance with their independence.** Otherwise, according to Marcuse, there will be virtually no differences between capitalism and socialism since the scale of modern technology requires the corresponding centralized socioeconomic structures.

Equipment and technology and large-scale machine industry of themselves are not, as is known, socioeconomic categories. The use of the achievements of the scientific-technical revolution under the conditions of public ownership of the means of production makes it possible to economize on raw material and energy and maintain the ecological balance between production and nature for whose preservation the Greens are concerned.

Correlation of the economic growth rate with the ecological balance, the nature and scale of state intervention in economic and social processes and determination of development priorities under the conditions of modern capitalism are most acute and debatable problems. At first sight there is no shortage of different approaches here. From "zero growth" models through various "qualitative growth" concepts to "new life style" proposals and changes in the structure of requirements. In contrast to the "zero growth" idea, the "qualitative growth" concept has been supported by all FRC parties and has been made a part of official economic policy.

The Greens' program also contains the "qualitative growth" concept. "We are opposed in principle to any quantitative growth," their federal program observes, "particularly when it is motivated by a thirst for profits alone. But we support qualitative growth, if it is based on the same or less use of energy or raw material...."** An "ecologically justified economy" means, the Greens believe, not a renunciation of the "quality of life" concept but merely its modification and support thanks to income redistribution.

Speeches in defense of the environment and attempts in political doctrines and theoretical research to tie in the economic process with the degradation of the ecological system and the use of natural resources are not in principle new. They became prevalent at the start of the 1970's. Works of institutionalists of a left persuasion going back to the legacy of the American scientist (K. Kapp) served as the theoretical substantiation of the Greens' view on environmental problems. The recently published material of the conference "Alternative Scientific-Economic and Industrial-Political Development," which was held in Frankfurt-am-Main under the aegis of the Evangelical Academy, testify to the considerable influence of institutionalism on the Greens and leftwing social democrats on a broad range of problems.*

*Quoted from MEMO No 4, 1969, p 95.
Back in the 1950's (K. Kapp) advanced the idea of the interdependence of ecological, economic and social factors of societal development. His criticism of the dehumanism of "pure" economic theory, "social cost" concept and so forth are the points of departure for the models of the contemporary representatives of West German institutionalism, on the basis of which the Greens' programs are being developed. The works of scientists of the institutional school are concentrated on such problems as the threat to human existence owing to unsuitable economic development, lack of the basic requirements of a material and psychological nature and the disruption of vitally important ecological processes.

The institutionalists and the Greens propose solving the urgent problems of the "industrial society" by way of a change in distribution relations between different groups of the population and between developed and developing states. They advocate a social system which is oriented toward social and economic reproduction over the life of several generations and also plans the correlation between production and consumption. The need for institutional reforms inevitably raises the question of democratization of the political system and a reduction in the role of the market. Only limitation of the market mechanism by state regulation, the Greens believe, will solve the problem of satisfying the minimum requirements of all strata of the population and ensure the possibility of "ecodevelopment".

The Greens' socioeconomic views are being shaped against the background of the deepening crisis of the "abundant society". As the authors of the federal program anxiously write, "people in the FRG are today threatened by an economic and ecological crisis of the industrial society. It is characterized by the growing destruction of the foundations of the life of mankind and man's exploitation of man."* The squandering of finite natural resources and destruction of the habitat are leading to consequences which cannot be compensated. This, it is noted further on, is being done for the sake of deriving short-term profit.

According to the Greens, the ill-considered urge to growth is negatively influencing the number of jobs, lowering the quality of social services and reproducing mass poverty. "For this reason," the program's authors believe, "the unification of the ecology and workers movements are essential," the more so in that the policy of the traditional parties is oriented toward the destructive growth of the economy and "...is contributing to the growing concentration of the economy, a reduction in employment and the ouster of small and medium enterprises."**

The market economy and the concentration of economic power in the hands of private and state monopolies are causing, the Greens believe, constant price increases and increasing income inequality. Federal tax policy and the practice of subsidizing large-scale concerns are contributing to this. The Greens have declared that they are opposed to a production process in which

**Ibidem.
economic power predominates and which is leading to the few disposing not only of the results of labor but also the actual existence of the majority.

III

Such a realistic assessment of present-day reality in the FRG testifies to the deepening differentiation of political doctrines and theoretical concepts. Two basic approaches to the strategy of socioeconomic development may be distinguished, the basis of the differences between which being the attitude toward the market system. The first group includes the "professional" economists influencing the development of government policy. These are representatives of the neoclassical and neo-Keynesian schools, who, despite certain disagreements on the question of the choice of means for the economy's way out of the protracted crisis, do not question the "fundamental" values of bourgeois society. Associated in the other group are critical "neo-Marxists," representatives of "new political economy" and institutionalists.*

The ideological-theoretical platform of the Greens movement is formed on the basis of the concepts of "neo-Marxism" and leftwing institutionalism. In accordance with their models, the Greens advocate a new type of production, consumption and way of life in which growth loses its target function and conventional measures of economic policy are regarded as unacceptable.

The assessments and goals of the Greens movement are expressed in most striking form in the program of the Hamburg regional organization. The capitalist market economy with its spontaneity of competition and aspiration to profit maximization subordinates people's fate to crisis development, it notes, and sacrifices the natural resources of society. The economic and ecological crises have much in common since they have a disastrous impact on the production forces.

"Our goal is the formation of production relations which make it possible to prudently plan the satisfaction of requirements, the preservation of natural resources and their restoration. Working people must have the opportunity to democratically determine their production conditions and cooperate with other groups of the population in the distribution of products and social services. Economic policy may be considered social, ecologically responsible and democratic only when its specific measures contribute to the establishment of production relations aimed against the squandering of manpower and natural resources and also against social injustice."**

In the opinion of the Greens, the existing production forces could provide all members of society with sufficient material well-being. But a change


both in the nature of production and product distribution is required, however. Such changes represent by no means an isolated economic strategy. On the contrary, it is necessary to develop an "integrated policy" in which environmental protection, social and economic measures, the democratization of society and provision of jobs are raised to a practical level.*

As measures necessary for solving the problem of unemployment, the Greens propose a reduction in the period of production activity and increased leave with retention of the former level of wages. The employment program, the Greens believe, should be under public control and advance to the forefront social and ecological requirements at the time of the creation of new jobs.

The Greens are sharply opposed to the limitation of appropriations for health care and education, which are canceling out the gains made over decades and leading to the destruction of the "social state". The policy of economies being pursued by the coalition is in reality a policy of income redistribution. The increase in taxation and the reduction in social services are leading to resources being confiscated from wage workers and pensioners for the arms race and for securing employers' profits. The Greens demand a change in the existing state of affairs both by way of a reform of the taxation system and better use of the production forces.

The Greens, the federal program observes, support all movements for the decentralization of production units and also for control over newly introduced equipment and technology. They advocate the comminution of the concerns and their "democratic" management by the workers. Small, medium and "alternative" enterprises should be encouraged in every possible way, while investments in new technology leading to dismissals should be highly taxed. It is primarily necessary to subsidize enterprises which manufacture products which cause no harm to the habitat, economize on raw material and energy, do not take up much space and utilize a large amount of manpower.

The negative attitude toward the quantitative growth of the economy would inevitably exacerbate the problems of employment, income and social stability. This is one of the most contradictory parts of the Greens' program. They criticize the state-monopoly structure and capitalist model of the economy based on the aspiration to maximize profits and the market mechanism of the distribution of resources and income.

However, the Greens propose effecting the socioeconomic reforms basically thanks to the increased intervention of the state, a policy of income redistribution in favor of the needy strata of the population, the selective subsidizing of enterprises and free services in the sphere of health care, education, housing construction and so forth, but without a fundamental breakup of the relations of ownership of the means of production.

The proposals aimed at supporting small and medium enterprises and the creation of a particularly favorable atmosphere for their functioning are an important component of the Greens' strategy. These enterprises, the Greens believe, do not pollute the environment, utilize a large amount of manpower,

are "democratically" controlled and so forth. There involuntarily arise associations with the illusions of Sismondi, who back at the start of the 19th century advocated limiting the dimensions of industrial production with a simultaneous expansion of the regulating role of the state.

The positive part of the Greens' socioeconomic program lacks specific and practicable proposals which could attract the progressive part of the working class. But the very nature of the problems which the Green Party raises is so urgent for the FRG's social-political and economic life that it potentially creates a basis for a broadening of the composition of its electorate. The Greens, the Yugoslav journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA POLITIKA observes, raise interesting questions, although they do not yet have clear answers.

Evaluating the activity of the Greens movement, West German communists emphasize that "for the Marxist workers party and socialist forces the Greens are an important partner in the alliance against the right for economic and social progress...."*

So, the Greens' socioeconomic program is characterized by a certain gap between the critical exposure of many defects of the capitalist society and positive recommendations. The latter are not of an independent nature, largely following various concepts of bourgeois economists. Nonetheless, the Greens' protests concerning a fundamental present-day problem—the prevention of war—on which American, and not only American, imperialism is counting, invest this movement with particular significance.


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IMEMO TESTIMONIAL SESSION FOR ACADEMICIAN ARZUMANYAN

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 133-135

[Text] A meeting of the Academic Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations [IMEMO] was held on 27 February 1984 devoted to the memory of Academician Anushavan Agafonovich Arzumanyan.

The meeting was opened by introductory remarks from IMEMO Director A. N. Yakovlev. The Academic Council, he said, has met today to commemorate the 80th birthday of Anushavan Agafonovich Arzumanyan and pay tribute to the shining memory of our institute's first director. Academician A.A. Arzumanyan was a scholar with world renown, an outstanding specialist in the sphere of political economy, the world economy and international relations, a gifted organizer of economic science in our country and an important public figure.

A.A. Arzumanyan belonged to the generation inseparably connected with the Communist Party's struggle for the victory of socialist revolution, socialism and communism in the USSR. He joined the CPSU in 1921 as a 17-year-old youth. His name rightly figures among the founders of the Komsomol in Armenia and among the party workers who struggled actively for the economic and cultural burgeoning of the Armenian SSR. A.A. Arzumanyan was elected to the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee in the period 1926-1937.

All the years of the Great Patriotic War A. A. Arzumanyan, volunteering for the front, was in the army in the field. As a communist and political worker, he performed a great deal of party-political work among the personnel of the units and formations of the Black Sea group and at the Transcaucasus, North Caucasus and First and Fourth Ukrainian fronts and took part in the fighting south of Novorossiysk, in the Ukraine, in the Transcarpathians and fraternal Czechoslovakia.

In the postwar years A.A. Arzumanyan gave himself wholly to scientific research and pedagogical work. It was at this time that his creative activity as a theoretician-researcher unfolded. In 1956 the party Central Committee entrusted to him the organization of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, and he headed it unchanged for 9 years until death mercilessly ended the life of this remarkable man at the height of his creative powers. I will not be
exaggerating in the least if I say, A.N. Yakovlev observed, that under his leadership the institute became an acknowledged center of scientific research in the sphere of the world economy and international politics.

The development of Marxist-Leninist theory in inseparable connection and in unity with the requirements of communist building, the requirements of the national economy and the demands of the USSR's foreign policy and boldness in the formulation and solution of new problems of science and practice—such were the characteristic features of the creative activity of A.A. Arzumanyan. A scholar of the new, Soviet formation and the Lenin school, he skillfully combined a strict scientific approach with party spirit, with the struggle for the purity of Marxism-Leninism and with irreconciliability to bourgeois ideology, to all distortions of Lenin's ideas and to reformism and revisionism, dogmatism and textualism.

The range of Academician A.A. Arzumanyan's scientific interests was very extensive and diverse. Both his own fundamental scientific works and the monographs of the large groups of authors which he headed were devoted to central problems of contemporary world development, the confrontation and economic competition of the two antagonistic systems, new phenomena in the economics, politics and social relations of contemporary capitalism, the general crisis of the world capitalist system and state-monopoly capitalism and the position and struggle of the working class in bourgeois countries. He studied the ongoing development of the world revolutionary process and questions of the international communist and workers movement, national liberation revolutions and international relations. It is roughly 20 years now that we have not had Anushavan Agafonovich with us, but his studies and theoretical and political conclusions have not lost their relevance.

Academician Arzumanyan—an outstanding pedagogue and teacher—devoted much attention to the training of young scientific personnel. He shared with the young scientists, graduate students and undergraduates new ideas and boldly promoted gifted youth to executive work. A pleiad of highly skilled specialists, candidates and doctors of sciences and corresponding members and members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, who now themselves head scientific research institutes and sectors and departments of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, grew from the young personnel in the years of his activity in the institute.

The shining life of A.A. Arzumanyan and all his powers, mind, talent, inexhaustible energy and tremendous erudition, A.N. Yakovlev emphasized in conclusion, were given to selfless service of the party and people and the victory of communism in our country.

Recollections of A.A. Arzumanyan were presented at the meeting of the Academic Council by A.M. Rumyantsev, V.A. Martynov, G.A. Arbatov, S.M. Men'shikov, V.G. Solodovnikov, T.T. Timofeyev, I.A. Sokolov, A.I. Shapiro, T.A. Novozhilova and G.S. Akopyan.

The speeches emphasized A.A. Arzumanyan's outstanding role in the formation and coming into being of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO as a major
Theoretical center and in the creation of a new school in Marxist-Leninist science of the world economy and international relations, a school now represented by the activity of a whole group of academic institutes of an international profile.

The fraternal communist and workers parties valued highly A.A. Arzumanyan's research, his development of topical problems of the world economy and the international proletarian movement and the Marxist-Leninist analysis of post-war capitalism adequate to reality and contributing both to the development of the anti-imperialist struggle and the successes of Soviet foreign policy. His name and his works are well known not only in our country but far beyond it. He was a participant in a large number of international scientific conferences and symposia and a member of delegations of Soviet scientists and public figures abroad and participated actively in the Pugwash movement. Many of the theoretical and political propositions advanced in his works and reports at international conferences had big repercussions and were discussed and commented on extensively in the foreign press.

Those who spoke at the meeting of the Academic Council noted that in heading the USSR Academy of Sciences Department of Economics and a number of scientific and academic councils and being a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium, A.A. Arzumanyan lent much effort to the most important business of the organization of Soviet economic science. He performed a great deal of work on the coordination of scientific research and concentration of the forces of Soviet scientists in the most important areas of this science and on the tackling by the country's scientific-economic establishments of urgent national economic problems and the theoretical and practical tasks of an improvement in the mature socialist society.

A.A. Arzumanyan wrote repeatedly in the central party press—in PRAVDA, the journal KOMMUNIST and EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA—big fundamental articles which raised topical problems of the Soviet national economy. He devoted many of his articles in the press and papers at various conferences to questions of the development of economic science and economic education in the USSR.

A.A. Arzumanyan's scientific literary and editorial activity is widely known. He was a member of the main editorial office of Politizdat, the scientific council of the "Sovetskaya entsiklopediya" Publishing House and the editorial boards of the 10-volume "World History," the "Diplomatic Dictionary," the five-volume work "Socialism and Communism" and many other Soviet and foreign publications. He worked for a long time as member of the editorial board of the journal VOPROSY EKONOMIKI. The journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA and the periodically published scientific collections "Competition of the Two Systems" were formed on his initiative and under his direct leadership.

Great attention was paid in the speeches in the Academic Council to A.A. Arzumanyan's high moral attributes as a man and scholar. Party-minded adherence to principle, a sense of duty and the highest responsibility, an ability to subordinate personal interests to public interests, wisdom and
kindness, responsiveness and sensitivity to people, exactingness toward himself and others, charm, democratism and modesty were inherent in him.

A.A. Arzumanyan possessed a precious feeling for the new and theoretical boldness in the formulation and solution of new, relevant problems. A categorical rejection of scholastic and abstract theorizing and an invariable aspiration to be at the very heart of life and political events and provide an in-depth Marxist-Leninist interpretation of them—such were traits characteristic of Anushavan Agafonovich Arzumanyan as a theorist of the Lenin school. He always directed the institute toward this and by his example taught people to think not about personal scientific interests and, even less, about "thesis goals" but about the urgent requirements of the practice, national economy and foreign policy of the Soviet Union. He had no interests other than those of science and he spent his whole life in science subordinated to the tasks of communist building.

Knowing in depth the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, A.A. Arzumanyan returned to the works of the classical authors again and again, and each reading always revealed to him something new, which he skillfully applied to an analysis of the contemporary era. He was an impassioned polemicist and had no patience with servile appeasement and demanded objections and scientific arguments and creative discussion in the formulation of theoretical standpoints on problems which arise.

Closing the session of the Academic Council, A.N. Yakovlev thanked all those who spoke. It was, he said, a council at which, it turned out, there were no differing viewpoints: all the comrades were united in their appraisals of A.A. Arzumanyan—a great scholar and good man who made a significant mark in the history of our science, in the history of our policy and in the history of our party and state.


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CSO: 1816/9
NONNUCLEAR CITY MOVEMENTS IN NATO COUNTRIES LAUDED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 143-145

[V. Davydov article: "Nuclear-free Cities--Outposts of the Antimissile Movement"]

[Text] Many cities and other centers of population in the countries of the West are proclaiming their territories nuclear-free zones. Readers of our journal have requested that we describe this new phenomenon, which is playing an increasingly important part in the antiwar, antimissile movement.

A particular place in the powerful antimissile movement which unfolded in countries of West Europe in connection with the deployment of the Pershing 2's and Tomahawks is occupied by the declaration of cities and other centers of population nuclear-free zones. Emphatically dissociating themselves from the policy of their governments, hundreds of municipalities of Britain, the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy have adopted a decision to ban the deployment, production and transportation of nuclear weapons on territory under their jurisdiction. This phenomenon is unprecedented in the antiwar movement. Nuclear-free cities have become not only an eloquent indicator of the negative attitude of the overwhelming majority of the population of the West European countries toward the adventurist policy of the United States and NATO but also an independent vector of the strength of the manifold protests of the broad people's masses in defense of peace. The ruling circles of the NATO states are forced to reckon with it.

A striking situation is to be observed: the governments of the FRG, Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands contributed to ensuring that the American missiles be "registered" on their territory, while at the same time the overwhelming majority of the population of these countries, unwilling to become Washington's "hostage" and a target for a retaliatory strike in the event of it unleashing a "limited nuclear war," is declaring the territory on which it lives prohibited for the deployment of nuclear weapons and demanding of its governments strict observance of their nuclear-free status. Prior to the adoption in 1979 by the Brussels session of the NATO Council of the decision
on so-called "nuclear rearmament"—the deployment of a new generation of first-strike missiles in West Europe—there was not a single city which would have officially proclaimed itself nuclear-free. Today there are approximately 1,000 cities and centers of population with nuclear-free status. This attests the growing understanding by the peoples and the public of the continent of the disastrous consequences of the nuclear race for the continued existence of European civilization and the need for immediate steps to remove the exceptionally serious threat, which is to a considerable extent the fault of their governments also.

In November 1980 the English city of Manchester became the first city in West Europe to declare itself a nuclear-free zone. Currently there are 170 British municipal councils which have followed Manchester's example. Among them is the capital of Great Britain—London. According to a decision adopted in 1982 by the Greater London Council, which is headed by representatives of the opposition Labor Party, the deployment and conveyance through London's territory of any types of nuclear weapon and radioactive materials are banned. The struggle of the residents of British cities against the country being turned into a launch pad for nuclear missiles is assuming increasingly extensive proportions. In the wake of the cities, whole territories in different parts of Britain are also becoming nuclear-free zones. For example, Wales' peace supporters are fully resolved to prevent the deployment here of nuclear weapons and to perform the necessary actions against plans to conduct any military exercises at all in this region. More than 50 million residents of the British Isles, that is, the overwhelming majority of the population, live on the territory of municipal councils which have declared themselves nuclear-free zones.

As is known, Britain was the first West European country to consent, in 1948, to making its territory available for the basing of American B-29 bombers, which carry nuclear weapons. Currently on its soil there are over 100 American military bases and facilities, which play an important part in the United States' militarist preparations. The deployment of American cruise missiles, the total number of which is to reach 160, began here in 1983. Particularly comprehensible to the British now is W. Churchill's forced acknowledgment, pertaining to 1951: "We must not forget that in setting up an American base in Britain we are turning ourselves into a target and, perhaps, the center of the target." It has to be acknowledged, however, that Churchill himself contributed by his policy to the emergence of this situation to a considerable extent.

Urban municipalities are in the vanguard of the struggle of ordinary Britishers against the nuclear policy of the Conservatives and they have proven their strength. "War games" named "Solid Rock," the biggest since 1945, scheduled by the government, did not take place in 1982. The exercises were intended to convince the population that Britain could survive a nuclear war if the "proper" civil defense measures were adopted. Approximately 140 municipalities refused point-blank to take part in them, giving as the reason for their position the fact that they did not intend to delude the population as regards the effectiveness of civil defense in the event of nuclear catastrophe. And
now also Britain's municipalities are engaged in extensive explanatory activity among the citizens concerning the threat of nuclear war and its inevitable consequences.

In response to various propaganda publications of the Home Office such as "Defense and Survival" and "Nuclear Weapons," which contain manifestly falsified estimates of the consequences of a nuclear conflict and even conclude that, given the adoption of precautionary measures, the majority of the population will survive, the municipality of Leeds—the first [sic] nuclear-free city—published the brochure "Leeds and the Bomb". On the basis of official data it cogently shows that the inhabitants of this city, with a million-strong population, would not survive even the explosion of a single 1-megaton atomic bomb and that its consequences would be irreparable for those living both in the center and in the suburbs. The brochure contained warnings that the people of the city "not allow themselves to be fooled, believing that the solution of questions connected with the bomb is best left to the discretion of experts" and also an appeal to form one's own opinion on this score and "convey it to members of parliament or to the defense secretary even." The brochure had extensive repercussions in Britain and abroad. The mass media, including the respectable THE TIMES, were forced to acknowledge its huge success. Orders for the brochure were received not only from leading municipalities of Great Britain but also from the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and the United States. Nuclear-free cities are becoming a thorn in the side of the Conservative government, which, apprehensive of a further intensification of the antinuclear and antimissile activity of the urban municipalities, has initiated a campaign to cut back their rights and powers.

The movement for nuclear-free cities in the FRG, where the deployment of Pershings has begun, is growing rapidly. The country's territory is already literally larded with American nuclear weapons (there are approximately 5,000 tactical nuclear weapons here). In October 1983 the FRG had more than 30 cities and communities which had declared themselves nuclear-free, while in January 1984 their number had risen to 78. They include Munich, Nuremberg, Kassel, Bremen, Landau, Darmstadt, Oberhausen and others. Proposals concerning nuclear-free zones put forward by representatives of the opposition parties—the SPD and the Greens—are now being studied in more than 100 other urban municipalities. In the FRG the nuclear-free status of a city or center of population means the banning by the local authorities of the deployment not only of all types of nuclear but also chemical and bacteriological weapons and the liquidation of existing dumps of weapons of mass annihilation.

The situation appeared so threatening to the Land governments in Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony and Bavaria, which are headed by the CDU/CSU, that the interior ministries were given instructions to compel urban communities to abandon the adoption of such decisions. The Bavarian Interior Ministry circulated a letter in 1983 banning the local authorities from henceforward adopting decisions concerning the deployment and storage on the territory of the cities, districts and communities of this land of nuclear weapons. The cities and districts which had declared themselves nuclear-free zones were
ordered to annul the adopted decisions as, it was said, "not being within the
jurisdiction of the local authorities." H. Waffenschmidt, parliamentary
secretary of state of the FRG Interior Ministry, declared even in an inter-
view with the newspaper KOELNISCHE RUNDSCHAU that whoever advocates a nuclear-
free zone is "betraying the fatherland" and jeopardizing the defense capability
of the FRG and NATO as a whole.

However, these deliberately provocative methods are not having any impression
on the supporters of the antinuclear movement. They know full well that the
Krefeld Appeal against the American missiles has been signed by almost 4 mil-
lion citizens of the FRG. At the same time the charges against the municipal-
ities of having "exceeded their authority" are built on sand. As W. Holtvort,
chairman of the Federal Lawyers Association, explained, the decisions of cities
and communities on the creation on their territory of zones free of nuclear
weapons are absolutely legitimate for the deployment of nuclear weapons in
this part of the country or the other represents a direct threat to its
inhabitants, and for this reason they have a complete right to counteract
such plans. Although, in spite of public protests, the deployment of Pershings
on West German territory has begun, the supporters of the antimissile move-
ment have not lost heart. Nuclear-free cities and communities are becoming
outposts of the antinuclear movement, which is reflected in the change in the
position of the opposition parties with respect to the deployment of the Ameri-
can missiles. In particular, the SPD officially opposed their deployment and
supported the creation in the center of Europe of a zone free of battlefield
nuclear weapons.

In Belgium more than 280 cities and centers of population have already declared
their territory nuclear-free zones. The biggest success was scored by the
peace supporters of Flanders, where there are over 180 nuclear-free areas.
They include Belgium's biggest city—Antwerp—and one of the oldest—Bruges—and
the cities of Leige and (Audergeme). A kind of referendum is being con-
ducted in many cities and communities in the course of which the majority of
inhabitants is advocating the establishment of nuclear-free zones. Such a
referendum was organized, in particular, in the city of (Florenn), not far
from which NATO plans to deploy 48 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The majority of
its inhabitants voted against their deployment. The authorities of the major
Walloon industrial center of Charleroi also declared their territory a
nuclear-free zone. The Wallonia Regional Assembly—the representative body
of the south of Belgium—acted similarly.

There are approximately 100 cities and centers of population which have de-
clared themselves nuclear-free zones in the Netherlands. In Italy the mayors
of declared nuclear-free cities (the country has more than 50 of them) have
appealed to parliament to renounce the deployment of 112 cruise missiles in
Sicily. The nuclear-free cities movement is also developing in other NATO
countries—France, Portugal, Greece and Denmark. In Spain the Antinuclear
Coordinating Committee adopted a document in January 1984 which supported
the initiative of the country's municipalities which have advocated declaration
of their territory as nuclear-free zones.
This movement has also spread across the Atlantic. Some 25 cities have already declared themselves nuclear-free, as have 5 in Canada (including Vancouver—the biggest industrial and port city on the West Coast). A number of cities in Australia and New Zealand has been proclaimed nuclear-free.

The activity of the municipalities of nuclear-free cities in West Europe is not confined to the territory of the countries in which they are located. It is assuming an increasingly extensive international nature. The first conference of mayors of nuclear-free cities from five countries—Great Britain, the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy—was held in April 1983 in Brussels, where, in accordance with NATO plans, American medium-range missiles are being deployed. The conference emphasized that the urban municipalities are the "first echelons" of authority, which are obliged to defend the interests and rights of their population in the face of the growing nuclear threat, and that the growth of the number of nuclear-free cities and the creation of nuclear-free zones could be an impressive contribution to the strengthening of security and disarmament on the European continent.

The participants in the Brussels meeting appealed for the proclamation as nuclear-free zones of the territory of new cities and centers of population and advocated active explanatory work among the public in support of nuclear disarmament. They demanded that the NATO governments take specific steps along the way to creating a nuclear-free Europe.

The movement for nuclear-free cities in Europe and on other continents is at the very start of its path. The governments of the countries which are harnessed to the chariot of American imperialism and which are turning their territory into a thermonuclear beachhead and thereby into targets of nuclear war will yet have to deal with its serious consequences. Nuclear-free cities are symbols of the increasingly great incorporation of the broad people's masses in the struggle for the salvation of mankind and civilization from the adventurer criminal intentions of the rulers of the last exploiter formation, who are losing reason and conscience. Nuclear-free cities have even now become the harbingers of a future world free of nuclear weapons, which all peoples of our planet are advocating and fighting for.


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REVIEW OF S. WOOLCOCK ARTICLE ON EAST-WEST TRADE

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 146-148

[R. Simonyan review: "British Scholar's Realistic View"]

[Text] Trade and, in the broader sense, economic relations between East and West have both for the socialist and capitalist countries a significance which goes far beyond the framework of purely commercial interests and do not amount to the simple use of the advantages of the international division of labor.

In the relations of countries of different socioeconomic systems the economy is inseparably interwoven with policy and the trends of economic relations are simultaneously both the prerequisite and consequence of the development of mutual political relations and the international situation as a whole.

The scrupulous policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state aimed at the development of equal and mutually profitable economic cooperation with all countries, capitalist included, is well known. But it is perfectly obvious that the state and prospects of East-West relations and their nature, scale and forms largely depend on the foreign economic policy of the capitalist countries in respect of the socialist states.

The article by S. Woolcock—the third of his published works in the journal THE WORLD TODAY in the past 2 years*—is mainly devoted to an analysis of a number of specific directions of this policy. The journal is published by the British Royal International Relations Institute, where, incidentally, S. Woolcock works.

His article reflects not only the author's personal views but also the sentiments and position of many representatives of scientific, business and government circles of West European countries concerned at the negative trends in East-West economic relations, primarily the policy of the U.S. Administration aimed at undermining these relations and using them as an instrument of political pressure on the USSR and other socialist states.

*See THE WORLD TODAY, February, July-August 1982.
The basic thought pursued by S. Woolcock, as in his preceding publications, is perfectly definite: there are fundamental differences between West Europe on the one hand and the United States on the other in the approaches to East-West economic relations.

It is not fortuitous that the British scholar takes as points of departure for an examination of the contradictions in the foreign economic policy of the capitalist countries conferences of the leaders of the "big seven". These annual meetings are the West's most representative forum for the discussion of key questions of the economic development of the leading capitalist countries and their relations with other groups of states and world development as a whole.

And what is not mentioned in the final documents of the meetings sometimes testifies more eloquently to the position of the Western countries than the wording which they do contain. S. Woolcock gives in the article his interpretation of why the communique of the last meeting in Williamsburg (United States) essentially failed to reflect the question of East-West relations.

The events of recent years have revealed many examples of serious disagreements, going as far as open clashes, between the West European countries and the U.S. Administration on problems of economic relations with the socialist countries. These disagreements assumed particular intensity in connection with the construction of the Urengoy--Pomara--Uzhgorod gas pipeline, when the U.S. Administration (immediately following the meeting of the "seven" in Versailles, incidentally) undertook a number of actions, including those aimed directly against its West European allies, to frustrate the realization of the project. The United States was subjected in West Europe to criticism which was essentially unanimous and very sharp in tone. The nebulous and brief mention of East-West economic relations in the final document of the meeting in Williamsburg reflected an attempt to smooth over, albeit outwardly, the existing disagreements.

But as S. Woolcock rightly observes, the disagreements remained and will continue to be very serious. Unfortunately, the author confines himself merely to acknowledgment of the said fact and does not set himself the task of analyzing the main causes which are the basis of the contradictions. He speaks a priori of West Europe's economic and political interest in stable East-West economic relations as a counterweight to the United States, which, under the present administration, is subordinating these relations to military-strategic, political and ideological goals.

Of course, making a thorough analysis of such an important problem is highly complicated. It is necessary to determine to what extent the shaping of positions is influenced by the class interests of the ruling circles common for the capitalist countries and to what extent by national (political, economic and such) interests specific for individual states; and in what way specific directions of foreign economic policy are tied in with the program goals and doctrines of the parties and politicians in power and how its directions, forms and methods influence the alignment of forces within the country, including the positions of business circles, the trade unions and
so forth. Finally, an important question is that of how changes in foreign economic policy are connected with the overall change in the correlation of forces in the world, primarily between socialism and capitalism, and with the development of the international situation as a whole.

Here we have a far from complete list of questions requiring if not a direct answer, then at least formulation upon an analysis of the problems studied by S. Woolcock. Otherwise it is difficult for the reader to blend in his mind, for example, the author's proposition concerning West Europe's adherence to the ideas of detente and economic cooperation with the socialist states on the one hand and the deployment in the same West Europe of the American Pershings and cruise missiles on the other.

Let us dwell on a question of key significance for an elucidation of the main economic motives of the disagreements between West Europe and the United States.

What do the USSR and the other socialist countries represent as a trading partner for West Europe? It is not only a source for obtaining many most important commodities, like oil and gas, for example. It is also a huge sales market. Thus in 1981 the Common Market countries supplied the USSR and other CEMA countries with products worth five times more than the United States. The Common Market exported to the socialist countries products four times the value of those to Japan and almost two-thirds the value of exports to the United States.

But it is not only a question of qualitative indicators. Whereas for the United States the main export item to the socialist countries is foodstuffs, primarily grain, for West Europe, the USSR and the other CEMA countries are a sales market mainly for machinery, equipment and other finished, primarily industrial, products. Thus, for example, the CEMA countries account for over 15 percent of total exports of metal-working machine tools and equipment from the countries of the Common Market beyond its confines. These exports exceed in value the volume of exports of these products from the Common Market to the United States and are more than six times higher than the exports thereof to Japan. Trade with the socialist countries is very important for the development of a number of industrial sectors of West Europe both from the viewpoint of strengthening its competitive positions on the world market and from the viewpoint of the solution of difficult problems of the domestic economic development of individual countries, with reference to the capacity load, employment and so forth.

The U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research prepared a special work on the possible economic consequences of an East-West trade embargo. According to the results of the analysis, if the countries of the West had reduced by half their exports of industrial products to the USSR in 1982-1983, the overall losses for the Soviet economy in the 2 years would have constituted only $4.5 billion, whereas the GNP of the capitalist countries exporting these products (that is, essentially the West European countries) would have declined by roughly $30 billion. Given a total embargo, the amount of the losses would increase proportionately.*

The reasonable question arises: against whom, then, are the measures to restrict East-West trade, primarily trade in industrial commodities, being implemented by Washington aimed, whom may they harm first of all?

Commonsensical statesmen in West Europe cannot fail to know the answer to this question. Regardless of their political beliefs and personal sympathies and antipathies, they are forced to reckon with actual economic reality. Here largely are the sources, according to S. Woolcock, of the transatlantic contradictions.

The article pays particular attention to an analysis of questions of multilateral control of exports, policy in the credit sphere and discussion in the United States of the new export-regulating act.

As is known, the U.S. Administration has adopted a policy of a sharp tightening of control over and a limitation of supplies of advanced equipment and technology to the socialist countries on the pretext that these supplies could be used by the socialist countries for military purposes. It is attempting to employ the instruments of multilateral control which already exist in the West inasmuch as the failure of a variety of "sanctions," embargoes and other measures undertaken by the United States in respect of East-West relations has revealed the utter ineffectiveness of unilateral actions.

The so-called Coordinating Committee for the Control of Exports to the Socialist Countries (COCOM), which incorporates all the NATO countries (except Iceland and Spain) and also Japan, has been operating in the West for more than 30 years now. This committee, with its headquarters in Paris, functions on an unofficial basis and in an atmosphere of strict secrecy. Approximately once every 3-4 years it reviews three lists of commodities, agreed by the participating countries, supplies of which to the socialist countries are prohibited (army, nuclear technology and, finally, commodities which may be used for military purposes). In the years of detente the third list was reduced, and the capitalist countries annually acquired roughly 1,000 exceptions from the export of banned commodities.*

The United States is now insisting on a significant broadening of the lists, mainly thanks to a list drawn up by the U.S. Defense Department of so-called "critical technologies," that is, essentially all advanced spheres of knowledge and technology. At the same time the United States is taking steps to enhance the role of the military in deciding questions of multilateral control, cancel the practice of granting exceptions from the list, change the institutional nature of COCOM and increase its impact on the formation of the capitalist countries' national policy in respect of the socialist states. It is perfectly obvious that it is not easy for the United States to win the allies' support for its actions. Essentially only the Japanese Government has as yet displayed a willingness to extend the ban in accordance with U.S. demands.

*See THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 24 January 1984.
West Europe's concessions in the sphere of credit policy, which S. Woolcock mentions in his article, have been expressed mainly in a reclassification within an OECD framework, undertaken at the insistence of the United States, of the countries obtaining credit, which has made the terms of the extension of credit worse for many socialist states.

And, finally, concerning discussion in the United States of the new export-regulating act. It was not fortuitous that S. Woolcock devoted at first sight a disproportionately large amount of space to this question. Discussion of the bill is eliciting heated debate not only in the United States but beyond also.

The particular concern of the West European countries is caused by the fact that R. Reagan has attempted to use this act to put direct pressure on his allies and sanctions against West European companies using American technology.

Going beyond the bounds of national jurisdiction, the so-called extraterritorial use of powers and application of the retrospective principle to concluded international contracts—all this has been evaluated with complete justification by the leaders and the public of the West European countries as a flagrant violation of the generally accepted rules of international law and an infringement of these countries' sovereignty.

President Reagan lifted the "sanctions" aimed at frustrating the building of the gas pipeline, but the conflict has not been exhausted. Proposals are being put forward in the new bill and in the course of its discussion aimed at legalizing the right of the U.S. Administration to interfere in the affairs of other states and to control their activity in the sphere of economic relations with the socialist countries. Proposals are being submitted, in particular, for a ban on imports to the United States of products of the companies of other capitalist countries which export to the socialist countries commodities and technology subject to export control in the United States.

Essentially it is a question of giving the U.S. President powers to dictate his will to other states. It is difficult to expect such a step to find support in the West European countries.

Thus S. Woolcock's article touches on a number of questions of fundamental importance both for mutual relations between capitalist countries and for the prospects of East-West economic relations. The author has concentrated his attention on the disagreements. It would undoubtedly be an oversimplification to see merely the contradictions in the foreign economic policy of the Western countries in respect of the socialist states. There are always in this policy, as V.I. Lenin once observed, two trends, and the class solidarity of the bourgeoisie in the face of socialism is by no means an abstract concept. The experience of recent years has shown that the West European countries, not to mention Japan, have not only resisted but also in many instances have gone half-way to meet the demands of the U.S. Administration in relations with the socialist countries, which, of course, cannot fail to have exerted a negative influence on the state and prospects of East-West economic relations.
Yet under current conditions it is particularly important that East-West economic ties not be sacrificed to the interests of the moment and the ambitions of this statesman or the other but serve as a factor of the stable development of relations and mutually profitable cooperation and contribute to the rapprochement of the peoples and an improvement in the political climate in the world.


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ARTICLE ON POST-WILLIAMSBURG EAST-WEST TRADE DEBATE

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 149-152

[S. Woolcock article: "East-West Trade Following Williamsburg--Problem Raised, But Not Solved"]

[Text] As distinct from the developed capitalist countries' top-level negotiations on economic issues in Versailles (June 1982), the problem of East-West trade was not at the center of the discussion at the Williamsburg meeting (May 1983). In the period between the two meetings the United States and West Europe managed to smooth over the contradictions on this issue, although no successes of any significance were achieved in this sphere.

Two different trends have been discerned in recent years in the approaches of the United States and West Europe to trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union and the East European countries.** The governments of the West European countries are attempting to preserve a situation whereby strategic interests come to the forefront only when it is a matter of technology suitable for direct military use. The policy of the United States, on the other hand, in which strategic and political considerations prevail, has always been distinguished by greater toughness. This trend, which was manifested under President J. Carter even, has become more distinct with the Reagan administration's assumption of office.

In June 1981 in Ottawa the United States endeavored to win West Europe's support concerning a fundamental revision of Western policy in the East-West trade sphere. Its purpose was a change toward a winding down of relations with the East and a kind of revival of the 1950's policy of the economic containment of the Soviet Union. The attempts to frustrate the plan for the construction of the Urengoy--Pomara--Uzhgorod gas pipeline were in the channel of this policy.*** When support on the part of West Europe was not forthcoming,

**For more detail see THE WORLD TODAY, February 1982, pp 51-59.
***For more detail in connection with the plan for the construction of the gas pipeline see FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1982, pp 21-36.
the United States embarked on unilateral actions, declaring an embargo on supplies of equipment and switching as a whole to a tougher policy in the sphere of technology transfers and the granting of credit.

On the eve of the Versailles meeting the Reagan administration attempted unsuccessfully to force the governments of the West European countries to follow American policy. However, West Europe put up resistance to the reliance on the winding down of economic relations with the East. At the same time the West Europeans consented to certain changes in the system of multilateral control over commodity and technology exports within the COCOM framework. The EEC also consented to limit the practice of subsidies when granting the Soviet Union export credit.

This failed to satisfy the supporters of the abandonment of economic relations with the East, who called the tune in Washington.* The United States resorted to the extraterritorial application of the Export-Regulation Act. The European governments again put up resistance and in the summer of 1982 openly disregarded the American embargo on supplies of oil and gas equipment for the USSR. In the face of this united position the Reagan administration was forced in November 1982 to abandon the embargo on supplies of equipment for the gas pipeline.

Current Contradictions

Following the lifting of the embargo, agreement was reached between the United States and the West European countries on a number of multilateral studies and negotiation within the COCOM, OECD and NATO Economic Committee framework. A regular review of the COCOM check lists was planned for the fall of 1982. The sides also came to an arrangement on negotiations in connection with so-called "other latest technologies". As an integral part of the policy of enhancing the effectiveness of multilateral control the United States wished to revise the approach to control, taking as the basis the list of "critical technologies" which had been drawn up mainly by the U.S. Defense Department. The ambiguity of the United States' specific goals forced many West European governments to oppose the adoption of such a criterion. They attempted to ascertain whether the list of "critical technologies" was to be confined merely to those which could be used directly for military purposes or whether it should also include technologies of predominantly economic significance. In any event, the European governments are of the opinion that the COCOM lists are capable of fulfilling their purpose if the sides are united and consistent in their application. As a result of the introduction of a vague list of technologies subject to control, both could be jeopardized, as distinct from more specific check lists of equipment.

Having failed with the embargo on supplies of equipment for the gas pipeline, the Americans intended to raise the question of supplies of energy equipment within the framework of the "other latest technologies" negotiations. However, the fact that oil and gas are of primarily economic and not military

significance contributed to the West Europeans' increased concern at the ideological thrust of the United States' foreign trade policy.

The United States' endeavor to include robot technology on the COCOM check lists confirmed this thrust for the umpteenth time.* For the purpose of increasing labor productivity the Soviet Union had set the task of increasing the number of industrial robots to 100,000 by 1986 and had for the accomplishment of this task concluded agreements on specialization and cooperation with other CEMA countries. The question arose once again in the West: to impose a complete embargo on the transfer of robot technology or to think about a ban only when this technology has a direct military application.

Striving to ensure that COCOM correspond more to the strategic interests of the United States, the Reagan administration is also proposing a number of institutional changes. In addition to the coordination of existing control measures, in respect of which the Europeans act mainly from common positions, the United States would like to set up a consultative group of military experts. This would balance the evolved predominance in COCOM of representatives of West European business circles and contribute to its orientation toward realization of U.S. strategic interests. The governments of the majority of West European countries have yet to agree to such measures.

The United States also wishes to formalize and strengthen the COCOM institutional framework. Its present consultative status means the efficacy of decisions depends on the complete unanimity of the participants, while as a consequence of the lack of a secretariat endowed with the appropriate powers, decisions are made in the national capitals with regard for national trade interests.

The OECD and the International Energy Agency did their bit in the course of the debates, preparing as yet unpublished reports on trade, credit and European security from the viewpoint of energy supplies. The OECD report attempts to analyze whether commercial and credit relations with the East (with the exception of trade controlled for considerations of national security) are developing in accordance with generally accepted economic criteria. It emphasizes that the spread of compensation of barter deals by the CEMA countries could create certain difficulties for the further development of trade.

Agreement was reached in the sphere of credit policy in 1982 on measures appreciably limiting subsidies in the granting of Western export credit. For this reason the problem of the state guaranteeing of credit, in particular, determination of the proportion which is backed by guarantees, and also the more general question of the linkage of the minimum credit interest rate with its market level were the center of attention at the current negotiations.

The opinions of the United States and West Europe as to whether state guarantees of credit are a form of subsidy differ. The United States is inclined

*See THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 13 May 1983.
to consider a subsidy everything that is not determined by the "market," including state guarantees of export credit, given which the volume of extended credit increases. The Europeans speak of subsidies only in instances when the state assumes the direct costs, which is untypical when extending guarantees, with the exception of instances of the nonfulfillment of payment obligations.

The Europeans will hardly adopt the American approach. More probable is an agreement on limiting the maximum guaranteed proportion of credit, which currently stands at 85 percent. The question of the linkage of minimum credit interest rates with the market rates as a whole evokes less disagreement.

The study of the International Energy Agency hardly helped resolve the transatlantic contradictions on questions of East-West cooperation in the power engineering sphere. The agency's report makes vague mention of the need to avoid "excessive dependence" on Soviet fuel supplies and recommends greater efforts for the development of Western sources of supply. The United States has failed to impose on the West European countries any upper limit of permissible "dependence".*

In view of the low demand for natural gas in West Europe, energy plans will most likely be linked with supplies of Western equipment for increasing energy consumption by the Soviet Union, as envisaged by agreements on the creation of coal-gasification capacity.

The analysis of the strategic consequences of East-West trade conducted by NATO evidently merely confirmed the existence of disagreements in the American and West European positions. The United States continues to regard East-West relations (and, consequently, trade also) from the ideological viewpoint, whereas West Europe is, as before, oriented toward long-term goals of detente and a pragmatic approach to trade.

Compared with the spring of 1982 negotiations between the allies following the lifting of the American embargo were more constructive. Although agreement was not reached, signs of a smoothing of transatlantic disagreements were discerned. Under the conditions of the growing recognition of the need to avoid a split with the Europeans, which followed the top-level meeting in Versailles, and increased pressure on the part of American business the State Department refrained from adopting any unilateral measures.

Changes in the overall thrust of American foreign economic policy are not, however, to be expected. Secretary of State G. Shultz observed at a meeting of ministers of OECD countries on the eve of the Williamsburg meeting that he regarded the transfer of technology as "affording the East benefits incomparable to the benefits from the raw material and semimanufactures which we (the West—S.V.) obtain in exchange."

*See INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 10 May 1983.
A few weeks prior to Williamsburg it seemed that the United States could again take advantage of the summit to increase pressure on the Europeans on questions of East-West trade in connection with the lack of progress it desired at the negotiations following the lifting of the embargo. Then European governments and the European Communities Commission emphasized that such a development of events would be emphatically rebuffed on the part of West Europe and would jeopardize the outcome of the meeting. This position of Great Britain and the FRG probably influenced the White House. The governments of these countries are President Reagan's closest allies in West Europe, and they might have been expected to soften somewhat France's serious criticism of the United States' huge budget deficit and high level of interest rates, which are threatening the possibility of a recovery of the West European economy. Apprehensive about losing the support of these influential states, the White House decided not to put the question of East-West trade at the forefront. As a result the communiqué merely noted that "East-West economic relations should be in conformity with the interests of the West's security."

Grounds for Future Disagreements

The disagreements were smoothed over for a time, but the grounds for some real rapprochement of interests are very shaky. The experience of the past 2 years has strengthened the Europeans' opinion that the United States is incapable of in any way consistently exercising control over exports in East-West trade. For this reason the governments of the European countries intend to an even lesser extent than hitherto to follow the American course, which is undermining the status quo.

Whereas West Europe has an economic and political interest in stable East-West economic relations, the viewpoint prevails in Washington that the West's present policy is profitable only to the Soviet Union, enabling it to use Western technology and credit to surmount economic difficulties. Considering the endeavor of West Europe to maintain the situation which has taken shape, the outcome of the transatlantic negotiations will again depend on what conclusion the United States draws from the unsuccessful attempts to subordinate European economic interests to its own political and strategic goals.

The debate in the United States is now concentrated on legislative procedure and the Export-Regulation Act. The plan to revise the act proposed by the Reagan administration reflects its endeavor to introduce more effective instruments of limiting East-West trade.

The question of the extraterritorial application of the Export-Regulation Act (that is, with respect to overseas affiliates of American companies) became a bone of contention between the United States and West Europe at the time of the attempts to impose an embargo on supplies of equipment for the Urengoy—Pomara—Uzhgorod gas pipeline. The U.S. Administration not only wishes to acquire this right but would like also to extend it in the form of bans on imports of products of the foreign firms which ignore the American control measures for ensuring national security.
The Export-Regulation Act draws a line between foreign policy control measures and control measures with national security considerations which are predominantly within the jurisdiction of COCOM. The need to ban imports is substantiated by the fact that they increase influence on the countries (particularly those which are not a part of COCOM) which reexport American technology to the CEMA countries.

However, such a ban would afford the United States the opportunity to use it unilaterally, without resorting to the system of multilateral control within the COCOM framework. For example, if the West European governments did not agree to include robot technology on the COCOM lists, the United States could put it on national control lists. Any foreign company belonging to the Americans, controlled by them or using American technology would find itself here faced with the threat of a ban on supplies of products to the United States. Control over the export of robot technology could, consequently, be achieved without multilateral agreement.

The governments of the West European countries, the U.S. Congress and U.S. business circles are opposed to the introduction of import bans. American business is concerned that extension of the principle of extraterritoriality could subsequently harm American exports since the companies of other Western countries will cease to be oriented toward American technology for fear of restrictive measures adopted by the U.S. Government from political motives.

The interests of American business were reflected in a counterbill in the U.S. Congress' House of Representatives. The liberal Bonker bill provides for the removal of the bans on imports and the need to obtain licenses to export American commodities to the COCOM countries. The bill also provides for a narrowing of the U.S. President's powers in respect of foreign policy control measures, demanding the strict observance of treaties and agreements. This means that effective contracts cannot be subjected to foreign policy sanctions without the consent of Congress. It also requires congressional approval in the event of the extraterritorial application of control measures implemented for foreign policy motives. The Bonker bill appears for this reason to Europeans as less of an evil than the plans of the Reagan administration or the Garn-Heinz bill, which has been submitted for examination by the Senate. The latter allows of bans on imports and stipulates only that the government's application of extraterritorial measures must not negatively influence relations with the allies. Similar provisos are contained in the 1979 Export-Regulation Act, but essentially had no influence on the U.S. Administration's actions in 1982.*

Both bills will be discussed in the House and the Senate in July 1983. In view of the differences between them, certain negative provisions of the Senate bill also could perfectly possibly end up in the compromise version.**

For the present the outcome of the debates is unknown, and American business

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**See for this page 148 of this issue.
circles and Congress, which have constituted the opposition to "cut-out diplomacy" in respect of control over exports and the use of embargoes, have put the emphasis on questions of foreign policy. It is politically difficult to oppose the control measures which are justified by considerations of national security. This explains the fact that the Bonker bill demands congressional approval of the extraterritorial application of the Export-Regulation Act only in connection with foreign policy control measures, but not measures for ensuring national security. Provisions out of national security considerations may therefore prove more limiting than in the Export-Regulation Act in effect, as a result of which the contradictions at the negotiations with West Europe within the COCOM framework will continue.

The businessmen's lobby in Congress could evidently be successful in limiting the U.S. President's freedom of action if we are speaking of foreign policy control measures. This applies to such questions as the extraterritorial use of control measures, observance of contractual commitments and determination of the fitness of the United States' unilateral sanctions when West European companies substitute in contracts for American companies. It is highly doubtful, however, that the final version of the Export-Regulation Act will refuse the President the right to use foreign policy sanctions.

Inasmuch as differences in the fundamental positions of the United States and West Europe toward East-West economic relations continue, to that extent grounds for disputes in connection with the use of foreign policy sanctions remain also, just as the question of what should and what should not fall under unilateral and multilateral measures for ensuring national security also remains unsolved.

IMEMO REVIEWS OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC DISSERTATIONS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 153-157

[A. Ognev review: "The Activity of the Specialized Councils of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO"]

[Text] Twentyfive dissertations--2 doctoral and 23 candidate--were examined in the period from October 1982 through July 1983 at sessions of the specialized councils attached to the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO. Three of them were defended in specialty 08.00.01--"Political Economy"--4 in specialty 08.00.14--"World Economy and International Economic Relations"--12 in specialty 08.00.16--"The Economy and the Location of the Production Forces of Capitalist Countries"--2 in specialty 08.00.17--"The Economy and the Location of Production Forces of the Developing Countries"--and 4 in specialty 07.00.05--"History of International Relations and Foreign Policy". All the works submitted for defense were executed in the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO.

Doctoral Dissertations

Valintin Andreyevich Nazarevskiy, "Organization of the Development and Assimilation of New Products in U.S. Corporations"

The economic mechanism employed by U.S. state-monopoly capitalism for organization of the control of scientific-technical progress in the interests of an increase in the efficiency of the process of the development and assimilation of new products is studied comprehensively. Factors determining the quantitative and qualitative parameters of R&D in contemporary capitalist reproduction according to the "research--production" outline and influencing the concentration of scientific-technical potential are examined. The author analyzes the upper limit of this concentration, over and above which there is a decline in the efficiency of the process of the creation and assimilation of new products. New features of the interaction between monopoly capital and small business in the creation of new products are revealed and a comparative evaluation of the fruitfulness of the functioning of concerns and small firms is made.

On the basis of specific factual material the dissertation characterizes in detail the forms of the development of elements of plan conformity under the
conditions of present-day state-monopoly capitalism, the factors influencing optimization of the basic parameters of research subdivisions, the efficiency of their different combinations and the basic forms of interfirm cooperation and specialization and the influence of the internationalization of the production forces on the realization of the most complex and capital-intensive projects. The motive forces leading to changes in organizational structures and also practical experience of the use by the corporations of various combinations of economic levers for the purpose of stimulating scientific research work are examined.

The positions of the main schools and directions of bourgeois political economy are subjected to cogent criticism.

Inna L'vovna Sheydina (deceased), "Theory and Practice of the United States' Power Approach to International Relations in the Period 1960-1970 (Nonmilitary Aspects)"

A summary study of the nonmilitary levers of U.S. influence (economic, "technological strength," ideological and political-diplomatic influence) in their totality and the singularities of their "total" use by American imperialism in the plane of global or regional influence on international relations is undertaken.

The work characterizes the power approach to international relations traditional for Washington's imperialist policy, reveals the evolution of the concept of "power" in the interpretation of the theorists and practitioners of U.S. foreign policy and uncovers the material prerequisites of the advance of nonmilitary factors to a place of prominence together with the buildup of military potential.

A critical analysis is made of the theoretical concepts of American bourgeois specialists concerning the nonmilitary factors of power and their role in contemporary international relations as a whole and as a reserve of U.S. foreign policy influence in particular.

On the basis of an analysis of the historical experience of the 1960's-1970's the author of the dissertation attempts to draw a number of conclusions of a long-term nature making it possible to foresee with greater justification the parameters and limitations of U.S. foreign policy's capacity for maneuver in the use of nonmilitary factors of power in the future.

Candidate Dissertations

Sergey Borisovich Andreyev, "Formation of the Agrarian-Industrial Complex in the FRG Economy (an Analysis of Singularities, Trends and Problems)"

The work studies the most important singularities, trends and problems of the process of the formation of the agrarian-industrial complex in the FRG and the methodological principles of a structural analysis of the agrarian-industrial complex as a whole and of the specific intersectorial relations of agriculture with related sectors of the economy under the conditions of
scientific-technical progress. Changes in the interconnected processes of the accumulation of capital in agriculture and the reorganization of the socio-economic structure of the sector, the parameters of the West German agrarian-industrial complex, regional problems of agrarian-industrial integration and also the influence of foreign economic relations on the formation of the agrarian-industrial complex and the prospects of the FRG's participation in the agrarian-industrial system of the EEC which is taking shape are examined.

Ol'ga Stanislavovna Borisova, "Financial Methods of State-Monopoly Regulation of the FRG Economy"

The author analyzes the attempts of the Bonn government to influence the economy with the aid of budget resources and evaluates the effectiveness of this activity. Government measures in the sphere of finance, possibilities of the use of financial levers in the pursuit of sectorial structural policy, methods of stimulating the development of scientific-technical progress in the country and also special aspects of financial policy are examined.

Aleksey Mikhaylovich Volkov, "Capital Accumulation in Sweden in the Postwar Period"

Features of accumulation which are both common for all the developed capitalist countries and specific features thereof inherent only in Sweden, the basic singularities of the development of the economy of the latter and the internal and external conditions of capital accumulation are characterized. The role of domestic sources of accumulation and the significance of the credit market in the financing of investments, the dynamics of the accumulation norm and the changes in the structure of capital investments and the main directions of state-monopoly regulation and the degree of its impact on the process of capitalist reproduction are studied.

Viktor Ivanovich Golubchik, "Marketing Problems in the FRG"

The dissertation is devoted to a comprehensive political-economic analysis of the essence of marketing in the practical activity of the West German monopolies in the plane of adaptation to the new conditions of production and sale. The basic socioeconomic causes of the emergence of marketing, the evolution of this category and its content, the essence of this phenomenon and also the basic elements of the theoretical concept and the practice of the application of marketing in the sphere of control of the monopolies' production-sales activity are examined. The new forms of the organization of capital and production's ties to the market, methods of planning the production-sales process and price policy, the intensification of marketing and other measures aimed at ensuring the sale of goods and services under the conditions of a "buyer's market" are characterized.

Yelena Ivanovna Gorokhova, "Basic Directions of the Structural Changes in France's Economy in the 1970's (Material Production)"

The basic directions and trends in the development of sectorial ratios, the reasons for the advancement or lagging of individual spheres of economic
activity and industrial sectors and singularities of the process of the structural reorganization of production in France are studied. The author analyzes the main aims and methods of current state structural policy, the actual structural changes in the country's economy and the degree of influence of foreign economic relations on the reorganization of the economic system; and the changes in the sectorial structure and the dynamics of the main production forces—labor resources, fixed capital and capital investments—and the role of France's science-production complex in the structural reorganization are characterized.

Mikhail Vladimirovich Grachev, "Current Trends of the Development of Control of the Labor Process at Capitalist Enterprises"

The class and economic essence of contemporary bourgeois control of labor in the process of the change of its specific forms and the most important features of the central element of control of the labor process at capitalist enterprises are examined; and the content of the new forms of organization and control of the labor process under the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution is revealed on the basis of specific examples and their efficiency is evaluated.

Yelena Valentinovna Gumennyuk, "Great Britain's Economic Relations With the European CEMA Countries"

New phenomena and the totality of problems of Great Britain's foreign economic relations with the socialist community countries in the 1970's and the start of the 1980's are analyzed. The place and role of the CEMA states in Britain's world economic relations, the degree of influence of the conditions of Great Britain's economic development, which changed at the frontier of the two decades, on relations with the socialist countries and the main factors determining British foreign economic policy are revealed. The main groups of British industrial, commercial and financial monopolies interested in the development of cooperation with the socialist countries and the prospects and possibilities of a broadening of Great Britain's economic relations with the European CEMA countries are studied.

Vladimir Yevgen'yevich Dyakin, "Means of International Settlements in the World Capitalist Economy"

Current problems of the means of international settlements in the world capitalist economy and the evolution of the settlement-payment mechanism in the postwar period and its qualitative singularities currently are examined; and the new phenomena and processes ensuing in the sphere of international capitalist settlements are evaluated and the bourgeois plans and practical attempts to solve the problems of international payments and settlements in the world capitalist economy are criticized.

The dissertation is devoted to a study of the singularities of the development of the North European states' military-political relations with other West European partners. The role and significance of the countries of North Europe in the confrontation of the states of the two systems and the contribution of the states of the subregion to the easing of political and military tension in Europe are examined from the military-political viewpoint and military-political relations in the subregion are systematized. Together with a characterization of the correlation of Atlantism, regionalism and subregionalism in the military-political relations of the West European countries and the singularities of the policy of ensuring the security of Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Sweden the author studies the confrontation of two trends: on the one hand the growing aspiration of democratic and peace-loving forces to exclude the countries of North Europe from the sphere of international tension and, on the other, the attempts of reactionary, pro-NATO circles to impede the development and strengthening of positive trends in the policy of the countries of the subregion.

Mariya Vadimovna Kozyreva, "The 'Basic Needs' Strategy in the Economic Development of Emergent States (Critical Analysis)"

The author makes a comprehensive study of a new direction in the theory and practice of the Asian, African and Latin American emergent countries—the "basic needs" strategy—and reveals therein both democratic and anti-imperialist elements critical with respect to capitalism and utopian and religious aspects depriving of it the role of real alternative in development and studies various interpretations of this strategy in the socioeconomic activity of the United Nations.

Sergey L'vovich Komlev, "Vertical Integration in U.S. Domestic Trade"

The causes and essence of vertical integration as a form of the concentration of capital and production and a particular form of intersectorial relations and its contradictory nature under capitalism are revealed. Its scale, dynamics, basic directions and forms and the economic and social consequences of this process in trade both for the sphere of circulation and for the country's entire economy are characterized.

Ivan Tikhonovich Kofanov, "Mineral Raw Material in the Economy of the Developing Countries"

Problems connected with specialization in the production of metalliferous minerals of a number of developing countries, in which mineral raw material and products of its primary processing account for more than half of exports, are analyzed comprehensively. The connection of mineral-raw material specialization with the conservation of socioeconomic backwardness, the possibilities afforded by this form of specialization for these countries' economic development, the influence of specialization in the sphere of the production
of mineral raw materials on the basic parameters of the developing countries' economic growth and the modification of the conditions of the attraction of foreign capital into the mining industry of the periphery of the world capitalist economy are examined. The changes in the price-forming mechanism on the world capitalist mineral raw material market, problems of the stabilization of international trade in raw material commodities, the mechanism of the influence of narrow specialization on the emergent countries' economic development and the possible paths and forms of their struggle to overcome economic backwardness are studied.

Viktor Aleksandrovich Krasil'shchikov, "Problems of Exploitation of the Working Class in Left-Radical Political Economy: Critical Analysis"

The work is devoted to a critique of the anti-Marxist propositions put forward by the representatives of left-radical political economy concerning questions of the exploitation and position of the working class and capitalist income distribution. The author of the dissertation examines the legitimacy of the declarations of left-radical economists concerning their allegiance to Marxism, analyzes specific instances of left-radical concepts, despite their antibourgeois thrust, ultimately proving to be a subtle falsification of Marxist-Leninist teaching, shows the heterogeneousness of left-radical political economy and evaluates the role of the criticism to which the capitalist system and bourgeois apologetics are subjected from the left-radical standpoint.

Yuriy L'vovich Levin, "Interstate Regulation of the World Capitalist Raw Material Trade"

The author makes a comprehensive study of the question of the specification of scientific ideas concerning the essence of interstate regulation of the world capitalist trade in raw material commodities and the causes of the increase in and nature of the need therefore of the developed capitalist and developing countries. The role and place of such regulation in the solution of a number of global problems (energy, raw material, surmounting the backwardness of the emergent countries) and in the process of the reorganization of international economic relations are shown; and the prerequisites, objective possibilities and limits of the stabilization of commodity markets with the aid of operating and proposed forms and mechanisms of multilateral regulation are evaluated.

Vladislav Leonidovich Luk'yanov, "The Influence of Automation on the Professional-Qualifications Structure of the Workers of Processing Industry of the United States"

Different levels of the development of automated production in processing industry and the extent of their impact on the professional-qualifications structure and content of the labor of industrial workers are examined; the particular features of the division of the labor of workers of industrial sectors in an atmosphere of ongoing automation are compared and a number of problems connected with the struggle of the U.S. working class in defense of its rights and interests under the conditions of the current scientific-technical revolution is illustrated.
Valeriy Sergeyevich Makarov, "Problems of the FRG's Money Circulation"

Singularities of West Germany's monetary system, its foreign exchange position and the effectiveness of the state's influence on total money turnover are studied. The author analyzes the evolution of money circulation in the country, the role of gold and gold coins in the development of the monetary system, the essence of modern cash credit and the emission mechanism. The FRG's foreign exchange position throughout the postwar period, the level of influence of the main items of the balance of payments on its economic situation and the methods of state regulation of the FRG's intranational money circulation and currency policy aimed at reducing the negative influence of the external sphere on the country's economy are examined.

Yevgeniy Borisovich Markevich, "Intensive Use of the Biological Resources of the Oceans as a Way of Solving the Food Problem (in the Example of Japan)"

The trends and regularities of the development of aquaculture as a special sector of the world economy producing alimentary, fodder and industrial raw material, the economic, technical-economic, organizational and international law problems of its development and the place and role of this phenomenon among other areas of scientific-technical progress in the development of the biological resources of the ocean are analyzed.


Evaluating the possibilities and results of the adaptation of the state-monopoly capitalism of the Netherlands to the changing conditions of development since World War II, the author concentrates attention on a study of the distinguishing singularities of the country's economic development in the said period and the main directions of the specialization of Dutch industry. The structure of the Netherlands' monopoly capital, the role of its individual components in the emergence and development of specialization, the changes in the country's social sphere as a consequence of the changes in the economic structure and the problems of the position and struggle of Dutch working people are examined.

Tat'yana Glebovna Parkhalina, "Franco-American Relations in the Western Mediterranean: Cooperation and Contradictions (1966-1981)"

On the basis of specific-historical material the work studies a set of problems of imperialist cooperation and the interimperialist contradictions of major capitalist states—the United States and France—at the current stage of the general crisis of capitalism under the conditions of the confrontation of the opposite socioeconomic systems and the development of the world national liberation movement. The community and differences of the foreign policy courses of the United States and France, which are exerting a considerable influence on the development of interimperialist cooperation and contradictions of a global and regional nature and international relations in the Mediterranean as a whole and its western subregion in particular are evaluated.
Stanislav Anatol'evich Prozorovskiy, "Current Research Into Peace Problems in the West (Critical Analysis)"

The new area of scientific research of Western specialists pertaining to the acute questions of the ideological struggle in respect of problems of war and peace in the present-day antiwar movement is critically investigated. The author reveals the class roots of the bourgeois science of war and peace and examines the basic results and trends of its development in the period 1950-1980 and the results of the interaction of the scholars studying this set of problems with the main political forces and currents, the foreign policy course of a number of capitalist countries, the activity of international organizations and the mass antiwar movement in the West.


The author of the dissertation analyzes the processes of the concentration of capital and production in the sphere of primary energy resources, the nature of monopolization in American power engineering and the dependence of the dynamics of the oil corporations' profit norm on the level of vertical integration which has been achieved and the structure and dynamics of production costs in the oil industry. The system of federal tax concessions and privileges for the oil business, indicators of the profit norm in the postwar period in the energy sectors, the singularities of the formation and use of the accumulation fund of the main oil companies, the structure and dynamics of their capital investments and the connection of the earning power of the oil business with the conditions of the formation of oil rent and the singularities of the formation of differential rent are examined.

Ivan Sergeyevich Tselishchev, "The Trade Sphere in the Economy of Present-Day Japan"

The regularities and development trends of Japan's domestic trade in close connection with the place and role of this sphere in the country's economy and social life are studied. The author analyzes the internal structure of trade, its role in the sociopolitical system of Japanese state-monopoly capitalism, its relative significance in the national economy, the nature of the impact of the trade sphere on the economy as a whole, the process of concentration and interfirm relations and sectorial efficiency.

Aleksandr Nikolayevich Sharov, "New Phenomena in the Money Circulation of the Developed Capitalist Countries"

The work is devoted to a characterization of the regularities of the development of the capitalist economy conditioned by the inevitability of the demonetization of gold and the growth under current conditions of the role and significance of credit money and an examination of the various changes in capitalism's currency-money relations which have been occurring in recent years under the impact of the growing internationalization of capitalist production and the attempts to cope with market spontaneity in this important sphere of the capitalist economy by way of supranational regulation.


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