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For three months, from September 18 to December 18, 1984, New York hosted the regular 39th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, an international forum today encompassing 159 states. The Session's agenda incorporated 141 items, including the crucial issues of limiting the arms race, preventing its spread to outer space, eliminating dangerous seats of international tensions, strengthening universal security, educating the youth in the spirit of peace, and restructuring international economic relations on a democratic basis. Over 300 resolutions representing recommendations to states with respect to certain aspects of international life, were approved.

The proceedings and results of the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly were determined by the acute political struggle between the forces seeking to ensure that the least possible quantities of explosive materials remain on our planet, and those which, contrary to realism and common sense, continue piling up armaments and persist in pursuing an adventuristic course for military supremacy and diktat with respect to other states and peoples. Consequently, two opposite approaches to the conduct of international affairs and two styles of diplomacy were also mirrored at the UN forum.

The Soviet Union, together with the other socialist community countries and with a majority of the peace-loving UN member states, maintained that the threat of nuclear war could and should be removed and that the attainment of this goal required an honest and sincere desire to look for mutually acceptable solutions to the existing problems, with due regard for realities, equality and equal security.

An important instrument of exerting positive influence on the Session was constituted by the new major Soviet initiatives put forward in the United Nations aimed at preventing the militarization of outer space and ensuring its use exclusively for the benefit of mankind, as well as at defending the right of the peoples to determine their own future and directed against the policy of state terrorism. As was noted at a Meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, substantial work was performed by the head of the Soviet delegation, Andrei Gromyko.

Professor Petrovsky, D. Sc. (Hist.), has also authored a number of books on international relations and foreign policies of the USSR, the USA and Britain, including "The National Security Doctrine in the US Global Strategy", "Disarmament: Concept, Problems and Mechanism", and "The Diplomacy of Downing Street."
during his meetings with foreign statesmen in the course of his stay in the USA in connection with the UN General Assembly Session.

A most powerful factor which steered the work of the Session in a constructive direction was provided by the concerted action by the socialist community countries. The delegations of the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania did much to secure approval of important decisions on a whole range of issues related to the limitation of armaments and promotion of disarmament. The Declaration on the Right of Peoples' to Peace approved by the Session at the proposal of the Mongolian People's Republic, was still another useful decision of the United Nations. The document stresses that this right is sacred and that it is incumbent on all states to help preserve and maintain it.

The socialist countries' approach to international affairs was consonant with the sentiments of a majority of UN member states, above all the countries participating in the non-aligned movement. Although some countries within that group, particularly those experiencing economic hardships and dependent on Western imperialist powers, displayed some traces of confusion and, in certain cases, gave in to the imperialist pressure, on the whole a main body of non-aligned states held actively antimilitarist, anticolonialist positions.

Elements of realism in assessing the nuclear missile realities also graphically manifested themselves in the positions of several industrialized capitalist states, primarily neutral countries, and in certain cases states members of the NATO bloc such as Denmark, Greece and Spain. On some issues, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, too, dissociated themselves from the extremely obstructionist course of the United States. It should be borne in mind, however, that Western states by and large continued to maintain positions of class and bloc solidarity.

The United States and its closest allies, for their turn, acted at the Session contrary to the desire of a majority of countries to see the United Nations facilitating a turn for the better in international relations. In a bid to introduce in the United Nations imperialist techniques and methods of secret diplomacy, they tried to employ the entire arsenal of means, ranging from political pressure and economic blackmail, especially with regard to smaller states, to blatant demagoguery. Practical actions by the delegations of the USA and some of its NATO allies at the Session turned out to be aimed at emasculating the political content of issues under discussion and draft decisions proposed thereon rather than at searching for substantive solutions.

A distinctive feature of the NATO representatives' behaviour at the Session was the trend on their part to imitate activity, primarily on procedural matters, without propping it, however, by preparedness for practical deeds.

The Soviet Union's proposal on the inclusion in the Session's agenda of an important and urgent item concerning use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind helped focus the attention and efforts of the participants in the Assembly on achieving specific results which would contribute to averting nuclear war, curbing the arms race and preventing its spreading to new spheres. Its consideration spurred on the discussion of issues related to the cessation of the space arms race and prompted states to intensify efforts in this field.

The Soviet Union's opinion that it is now of overriding significance to resolve the problem of space weapons in order to prevent a further increase in the risk of nuclear war, elicited virtually unanimous support at the Session. It was noted in many statements that spreading the arms
race to outer space, unless a reliable barrier be placed in its way, would cancel all the accomplishments in the arms limitation sphere and whip up the arms buildup in other areas. In this context, the US-declared plans for creating a large-scale ABM system with elements of space basing and other militarist programmes regarding outer space were strongly criticized, although many speakers did not explicitly name the United States. The delegations of not only socialist and many non-aligned countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Nigeria, Argentina but also some Western states, France included, specifically emphasized that plans for deploying antimissile and antisatellite systems were fraught with the threat of upsetting strategic stability and heightening the risk of nuclear clash.

Statements by the representatives of developing countries echoed the Soviet Union's thesis that the militarization of outer space would consume enormous human, material and intellectual resources and erect insurmountable barriers to international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space and the use of the accomplishments in this field in the interests of economic progress of states.

Highly assessed within the United Nations was the initiative of the USSR which suggested that states possessing major space potentials be the first to reach agreement on banning and eliminating attack space weapons of all types of basing, designed to hit objects in outer space, and that the use of force in outer space and from space against Earth as well as from Earth against objects in outer space be promptly prohibited for all time. The Soviet Union's inclusion in the agenda of the General Assembly of an important and urgent item concerning use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind made it possible to concentrate the attention of states on the task of preventing the militarization of outer space.

The major thrust of the Soviet Union's proposal found its approval in a resolution jointly elaborated by socialist and nonaligned countries. It was supported by virtually all states but the USA (the American delegation was the only one to abstain during the voting), i.e., 150 members of the United Nations, including American allies which openly demonstrated thereby their disapproval of Washington's militarist course towards the "Sixth Ocean". The Assembly called for early and effective agreements on preventing the arms race in outer space on a bilateral and multilateral basis. It was the first time that a UN document contained provisions on the obligations by all states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their space activities. Thus the idea of banning the use of force in outer space and from outer space against Earth put forward by the Soviet Union, has been formalized in the official UN document which is unanimously supported by all UN member states.

A resolution on peaceful uses of outer space, unanimously approved by the United Nations, was also of considerable significance. This document specifically stresses that all states should actively contribute to preventing an arms race in outer space, this being an important condition for international cooperation in its peaceful uses. The statement of UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar about the urgent need to prohibit the deployment of weapons in outer space before it is too late was a reflection of the sentiments predominating in this organization.

Conclusive proof of the Soviet Union's support for United Nations efforts to cement peace was provided by another major initiative of the USSR, which submitted to the Session for its consideration an important and urgent item entitled "Inadmissibility of the Policy of State Terrorism and Any Actions by States Aimed at Undermining the Socio-Political Systems in Other Sovereign States".

Noting the timely and urgent nature of that issue, the representatives of many states, primarily smaller and developing countries, shared the
Soviet Union's opinion that such a policy and actions constituting a violation of the elementary norms of conduct and morals were particularly dangerous in the nuclear era when they could have pernicious consequences not only for the freedom of the peoples but also for their very survival. They led to the destruction of the very possibility of ensuring a peaceful nature of interstate relations and mutual confidence, a sharp aggravation of tensions and a growing peril of war throughout the world and in some of its regions.

As was shown by the debate at the Session, a majority of UN member states reject attempts to inject ideological disagreements into international relations, which, as is the consensus, should be structured on the basis of strict observance of the United Nations Charter, and the generally accepted principles and norms of international intercourse.

The results of the consideration of the Soviet proposal speak for themselves. The General Assembly approved the Draft Resolution on the Inadmissibility of the Policy of State Terrorism and Any Actions by States Aimed at Undermining the Socio-Political Systems in Other Sovereign States submitted by the Soviet Union and drawn up with due regard for the wishes and considerations voiced at the Session by a good many non-aligned and other countries. The document resolutely condemns the policy and practice of state-sponsored terrorism in interstate relations as a method of dealing with other countries and peoples and categorically rejects any concepts, doctrines and ideologies intended to justify actions of states aimed at undermining the socio-political systems of other states. The Assembly has strongly demanded to cease any such action, including the use of military force. The UN confirmed the obligation of all states unswervingly to respect the rights of peoples freely to choose their own socio-political system, and to determine their future without outside interference.

That UN decision backed by 117 states proclaims, for the first time in the UN record, the principle of inadmissibility of the policy of state terrorism. The refusal by the USA and its closest allies to support that major decision of the United Nations graphically demonstrated the origins of the policy of state terrorism and who really sought to have a free hand in order to take outside actions to undermine the socio-political systems of other states. Thus, the Assembly gave an unambiguous reply to attempts by the imperialist forces to pin the label of terrorism on national liberation movements and states pursuing an independent course in international affairs.

The consideration of the Soviet initiatives at the Session and the adoption of responsible decisions thereon permitted to focus, from a new perspective, the attention of the United Nations, governments and the public of the UN member states upon the most important problems, inherently common for all, such as how to avert a nuclear war, how to stop the arms race and move over to disarmament; and how to settle the existing conflicts and crises and prevent new ones and to create in the world an environment that would allow every country to concentrate resources on accomplishing economic and social tasks facing it.

As the head of the Soviet delegation, Andrei Gromyko, noted in his speech at the Session, it is of fundamental importance to compare the two approaches to the problem of nuclear weapons. Most participants in the Session shared the Soviet Union's opinion that the removal of the nuclear threat was a paramount issue of present-day world politics whose solution would also determine the possibility of overcoming other difficulties facing mankind. Resolutions of the Session once again empha-
sized that “removing the threat of a world war—a nuclear war—is the
most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted
with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament,
or face annihilation”.

The proposal formulated by Konstantin Chernenko on March 2, 1984,
to the effect that the need to prevent a nuclear disaster should be the
aim of nuclear-weapon states’ policies and that they be guided by appro-
riate norms of their mutual relations, was perceived at the Session as a
condensed expression of realism and responsibility for the future of the
world in conditions of the nuclear missile face-off. This idea struck the
most responsive chord among the representatives of developing states.
The representatives of India, Mexico, Tanzania, Uganda, Indonesia, Sy-
ria, Rwanda, Mali and other countries came right out and said that what
with the nuclear confrontation, concern for the preservation of peace
should be made the priority. The same theme was stressed in the state-
ments by representatives of a number of developed capitalist states. In
his speech at the Session Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen of Finland
noted that the “world has the right to expect that the nuclear-weapon sta-
tes, which have the primary responsibility for disarmament, act decisi-
vively to halt and reverse the course of the arms buildup”.

The idea of concerted specific measures among nuclear-weapon sta-
tes to lower the war threat also found its reflection in a good many re-
solutions adopted by the Session. The Assembly stressed that such sta-
tes bear a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and for taking
measures designed to prevent the unleashing of a nuclear war, in parti-
cular by establishing appropriate norms guiding relations among them.

A special resolution adopted by the 39th Session demands that the
other nuclear-weapon states follow the example of the USSR and assu-
me an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Support was
also given to a new idea advanced by the Soviet Union, i. e., to work out
an international legally binding document containing a no-first-use com-
mitment. The Assembly explicitly requested that the Conference on Di-
sarmament take practical steps to this end.

In recommendations on specific matters the Assembly accentuated the
need “to refrain from war propaganda, in particular a nuclear war—glob-
al or limited—and from the elaboration and dissemination of any doctri-
nes and concepts endangering international peace and justifying the
unleashing of nuclear war”. A number of the Session’s decisions, inter
alia those adopted on the initiative of developing countries, point out the
extremely grave danger inherent in the strategy of deterrence officially
accepted by the NATO bloc, which is based on the concept of a salutary
nature of the alleged “deterrent force of nuclear weapons” and the admis-
sibility of being the first to use them.

Two resolutions adopted by the 39th Session contain a call for conclu-
ding a convention banning altogether the use of nuclear weapons, which
would involve the participation of the five nuclear-weapon powers. Oppos-
ing all those decisions adopted by an overwhelming majority of the par-
ticipants in the Session, the representatives of the USA and its closest
NATO allies seemed to openly display the inconsistency between the po-
itical thinking of the bloc’s chieftains and the level of responsibility
which a majority of UN member states were entitled to demand, and de-
manded, from them in the face of the nuclear peril.

Conducive to stronger law and order in the world was the General
Assembly’s decision to continue efforts with a view to working out and
concluding a World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Re-
lations which was initially endorsed by the United Nations, at the propo-
sal of the Soviet Union, in 1976. In this matter as well, the United States and its closest allies, which sought to obstruct the elaboration of a World Treaty, found themselves in a political isolation. Parenthetically speaking, Washington's opposition to the commitment that would ban the use of any weapons, both nuclear and conventional, shows better than anything else the true value of the utterances by US spokesmen to the effect that they cannot agree to renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons and relevant doctrines because that would allegedly legalize the use of conventional weapons.

On the initiative of socialist and major non-aligned countries the General Assembly adopted a decision containing recommendations regarding specific steps towards erecting not only political and legal but also physical barriers to the threat of war in the shape of specific accords on freezing the nuclear armaments and prohibiting nuclear weapon tests.

Decisions at the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly commended the joint declaration adopted by the heads of state or government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania on May 22, 1984, concerning the need to put an end to the nuclear arms race. In practical terms, the General Assembly appealed to all nuclear-weapon states to freeze their nuclear armaments on a global scale starting from a definite date and subject to appropriate verification, and called upon the USSR and the USA to be the first concurrently to freeze their nuclear arsenals on a bilateral basis and as an example for the other nuclear powers.

In several resolutions the General Assembly demanded that the issue of ceasing nuclear weapon tests be resolved without delay. American representatives who addressed the Session with proposals the gist of which was in fact to exchange observers to monitor the carrying out rather than the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, failed in diverting the attention of the delegates from top-priority tasks in that field. The Assembly approved decisions calling for the earliest drafting and conclusion of a treaty on general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, and spoke in favour of a prompt beginning of talks to that effect within the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

It is worth noting that the consideration by the Session of these two major issues, which, as its decisions emphasized, are of paramount importance, further isolated the opponents of the cessation of the nuclear arms race. It is quite typical that only a small group of the USA's closest allies joined it in voting against the resolutions on a freeze. That extremely negative position was not supported even by several NATO countries such as Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain, or Australia and New Zealand which are allied to the USA in the ANZUS bloc. Washington found itself in greater isolation in the matter of ending nuclear weapon tests where votes against relevant UN documents were cast only by the USA, Britain and in one case—France.

The Session adopted decisions charting ways of removing the nuclear menace in other areas, too. For instance, the Assembly strongly advocated the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world, primarily the Middle East and Africa, taking into account the craving of the Tel Aviv's aggressive regime and South African racists for nuclear weapons. The Session spoke in favour of strengthening the security of non-nuclear weapon states and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Session can also take credit for adopting, by an impressive majority of votes, a demand to outlaw chemical weapons, to limit and reduce naval armaments, and to finalize preparations for an International Conference on the Indian Ocean with a view to convening it early in 1986.

All in all, the Assembly approved 61 decisions calling upon states, first and foremost nuclear-weapon states, to contribute by concrete deeds to halting the arms race, primarily space and nuclear armaments. Those
decisions were backed by an overwhelming majority of countries. Twenty-six of the decisions received negative votes of the USA and a group of its allies, with the USA being the only one to vote against on ten occasions. The voting results vividly showed which policy was in keeping with the interests of a majority of the UN member states and which one ran counter to their demands.

An acute political struggle marked the Session’s discussion of both arms limitation and other political problems of today’s world related to strengthening the security and sovereignty of states and defending the rights of the peoples.

The General Assembly devoted much of its time to matters relating to the elimination of the pockets of conflict and war danger in various regions of the world, above all in Central America, the Middle East and southern Africa. In the course of the Session’s discussion of the situations prevailing in specific regions, progressive countries denounced such manifestations of the policy and practice of state-sponsored terrorism as the US undeclared war against Nicaragua, the occupation of Grenada by the USA, and its interference in the affairs of other countries of Central America with a view to imposing an order to its own liking upon the peoples of the region. Such US “strategic partners” as Israel and South Africa were mentioned at the Session as vehicles of the policy and practice of terrorism in interstate relations. The Session endorsed seven resolutions condemning various facets of Israel’s policies and actions with regard to the population of Arab territories occupied by it. Such actions were explicitly described as acts of terror and their repressive and unlawful nature was accentuated. A resolution adopted by a majority of votes unambiguously stressed that the US-Israeli strategic cooperation helps Tel Aviv continue its aggressive expansionist policy. A paragraph to that effect was incorporated in the UN document though in a bid to get the paragraph deleted, Washington launched a most vigorous campaign of pressure and blackmail against non-aligned countries.

Some ten resolutions of the Session concerning the Middle East reflected the basic provisions and ideas put forward by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1984 in its proposals on the Middle East settlement. In particular, the United Nations reiterated an urgent need for Israel’s full and unconditional withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since 1967 as a sine qua non for establishing a comprehensive and equitable peace in the Middle East. The resolutions reaffirmed the call for an International Conference with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the PLO, with a view to achieving a comprehensive settlement in that tinderbox area. They plainly pointed out that only the positions of the two states, the USA and Israel, hindered the convening of such a Conference. Only the USA and Israel voted against some of those decisions of the General Assembly while an absolute majority of other UN member states, including some of the US allies in the NATO bloc, cast their votes for the above resolutions or abstained.

The Session also strongly rebuffed crude attempts by the USA delegation to secure that resolutions contain no mention of the USA and Israel as the major accomplices of the South African racists who are exercising terror in Namibia occupied by them and perpetrating terrorist aggressive acts against independent African countries.

The Assembly approved some 30 decisions in which it firmly and unequivocally advocated the termination of the criminal policy and practice by the apartheid regime and economic, military and political cooperation with it on the part of Western powers. Specifically condemned was
the policy of "constructive cooperation" with South African racists, proclaimed by Washington.

Positions of principle were maintained by the Assembly on matters related to the Namibian settlement as well. The Assembly urged that UN decisions on the immediate liberation of Namibia be translated into life, and reiterated its support for the national liberation movement of the people of that country under the leadership of SWAPO. The General Assembly also advocated granting the right to independence and self-determination to all the peoples who are still languishing in colonial servitude, this fully applying to the people of Micronesia as well.

The USA delegation did not second any of the dozen-odd decisions of the Session on the matter of putting a stop to the criminal terrorist practices of Tel Aviv and Pretoria against the Arab and African peoples. The General Assembly's recommendations call upon states and peoples to do away with the seeds of war danger. Countering the USA's claims to rule the roost in Central America and to impose its will thereto by force, the United Nations associated itself with the search for peaceful solutions within the framework of the Contadora initiative. Indicative were the negative votes cast by American representatives during the voting on resolutions condemning the crimes committed by the military in Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala. Even many of Washington's allies dissociated themselves from the US attempts at the United Nations to take the above-mentioned antipopular regimes under its protection. Suffice it to say, for example, that a draft resolution on Guatemala was prepared by the delegations of Western states, including France, Spain and Scandinavian countries. The USA voted against the draft jointly with dictatorships of Latin America. The same thing happened during the voting on a draft resolution on the crimes of the Salvadorean junta, co-sponsored by France, Greece, Spain and Sweden. On the whole, USA "champions of human rights" refused to support 10 out of 11 resolutions on matters pertaining to that field.

Important decisions (about one-third of all resolutions) were taken by the General Assembly on economic problems. The documents approved reflected many ideas regarding the invigoration of international economic and political relations, advanced at the Moscow Economic Summit Conference of the CMEA Countries in June 1984. The thesis backed by socialist countries concerning a direct interrelationship between the problems of averting a nuclear war and curbing the arms race and the tasks of economic development, evoked a broad response in the statements made by representatives of many developing countries.

On the whole, the economic discussion at the 39th Session was clearly marked by strong sentiments of protest against the neocolonialist policies of imperialist powers. A resolution on confidence-building measures in the economic field, proposed by Poland, was approved by the votes of over 100 UN member states. The document strongly denounces any measures of pressure and sanctions used in international economic relations with a view to bringing pressure to bear upon states.

The struggle against neocolonialism not only in the economic field but also in the spiritual sphere has become a major area of UN activities in recent years. In a special decision, the General Assembly called upon the mass media to make a contribution to strengthening peace and international understanding and to combatting racism, apartheid and incitement to war. The document stressed the need for establishing a new international information order, an order that would be aimed at strengthening peace, enable all people actively to participate in political, economic, social and cultural life, and promote mutual understanding and friendship among all states and respect for human rights.
As a counterbalance to the attempts by the USA and some of its allies to blackmail the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the General Assembly adopted, on the initiative of a group of developing countries, a resolution supporting UNESCO, its noble objectives and its substantial contribution to the struggle for developing moral and psychological guarantees of a universal peace.

It is quite symbolic that the voting at the UN forum is done by pushing buttons: a green one for an affirmative vote, a red one for a negative vote and an amber one for an abstention. This lights up lamps of a corresponding colour beside the name of a given UN member state on a large electronic panel located on a wall of the Assembly Hall. It is noteworthy, indeed, that in taking decisions on major issues related both to the problems of war and peace and to other aspects of international relations, the green light invariably prevailed on the voting panel, symbolizing, as it were, the desire of an overwhelming majority of the UN members to open up the roads leading to a stable peace and constructive international cooperation. As to the red and amber lights, they kept lighting up all but constantly beside the names of the USA, the FRG and some other NATO countries. It is not fortuitous that within the United Nations any voting is called the "moment of truth", i.e., a moment when all masks are cast off revealing the true nature of a country's policies.

"For a number of years," Andrei Gromyko said in his interview to Soviet political analysts on January 13 of this year, "most states of the world, even those states which do not have so cordial state relations with us, have, one can say, instinctively tended to support proposals that promote the cause of preventing war and strengthening peace." This state of affairs is apparently distasteful to the USA and some of the Western states which, together with Washington, pursue a course towards building up international tensions. The voting on the crucial issues in the 39th Session of the General Assembly has shown that the bulk of the world's population represented at this authoritative body expects the US Administration and its closest allies to heed the imperative of time and respect and honour the Session's decisions. Today, these decisions are backed by a broad cross-section of the people on all continents who are coming to realize that the threats and perils facing humanity are indeed formidable, and that no effort must be spared if this peril is to be removed, and a nuclear cataclysm, whose shadow has been hanging over the world throughout the postwar years, be averted.

Although not all decisions taken by the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly, for example, the stereotyped resolutions on the so-called questions of Afghanistan and Kampuchea, live up to the requirement of political realism, the overall balance of the forum's work is positive. It testifies that the forces of human self-preservation are more powerful than the forces of nuclear adventurism. The Session gave an unambiguous reply to the paramount question of today namely whether it is possible to do away with the threat of a global nuclear conflagration. Yes, it is possible.

Those decisions of the Session which have been adopted due to the interaction between socialist and most non-aligned countries are in keeping with the vital interests and requirements of all the peoples of our planet without exception and rest on the authority of collective reasoning. They reflect the interests of the broadest possible range of UN member states. Worked out and approved under the auspices of the UN, the largest political organization of states, those decisions provide a powerful impetus to the efforts by all forces standing on the positions of
realism and responsibility, against a growing danger of war. The Session's useful resolutions contribute to creating moral and psychological barriers to the implementation of the militarist plans hatched by the most aggressive quarters. Those recommendations, which are in line with a new political way of thinking in the nuclear era, cannot be disregarded by any state or government since the latter exist in a certain international environment and have, in one way or another, to take account of the sentiments of social forces.

No wonder the positive decisions of the General Assembly have been greeted with satisfaction by international public opinion and welcomed by the governments of peaceloving states. The Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries regard those decisions as vivid proof of the effectiveness of their foreign policy course towards peaceful coexistence and stronger foundations of universal peace and security. At the same time, those decisions have provoked undisguised irritation in the West, above all in the United States.

The idea of concerted efforts for the sake of a more durable peace was the prevailing subject in the statements by a great many countries at the Session. It is only natural that the idea was advanced in close connection with the forthcoming 40th anniversary of the victory won by the peoples over fascism and of the foundation of the United Nations, to be observed this year. As was stressed by Andrei Gromyko in his speech before the General Assembly, "it is the main lesson of the Second World War that states must stand together in the fight against war". Many statesmen emphasized in the speeches at the Session the need to revive and translate into life the noble idea of united actions of the nations in the interests of peace.

In a decision unanimously adopted by its 39th Session, the General Assembly once again stressed the respect felt by the present generation to the victims of Nazism and fascism and to the struggle of the peoples against Nazism and fascism during the Second World War, as well as to the establishment of the United Nations called upon to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to reaffirm the faith in fundamental human rights, the dignity and value of human life. The United Nations solemnly declared May 8 and 9, 1985, the days of observing the 40th anniversary of the victory over fascism in the Second World War.

Thus, the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly has most graphically demonstrated that on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the great victory of the peoples over fascism and of the foundation of the United Nations a majority of countries are aware of the need to pool efforts in order jointly to overcome the threat of nuclear war facing all the peoples and have outlined top-priority steps which should be taken to that end.

An analysis and objective assessment of the regular UN General Assembly Session allow the Soviet people to assert, with considerable satisfaction, that the USSR, which was instrumental in securing a victory in the Second World War, is at present pursuing a policy supported by the bulk of the UN member states, all those who campaign against nuclear annihilation and for the noble objective proclaimed by the UN Charter: "To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

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TEXT
New York April 26 TASS -- The session of the Special Committee for a World Conference on Disarmament has come to a close at the UN headquarters. The session was attended by delegations of 40 socialist, non-aligned and Western countries. It was pointed out at the session that the proposal to convene an authoritative forum to discuss the problems of disarmament has won a broad international support.

In the present-day international situation, it is essential to do everything to stop the arms race which has been unleashed by imperialist powers, representatives of many states emphasized. This would be promoted in many respects by a world conference on disarmament, the idea of holding which was first put forward by the Soviet Union, stated the committee's chairman, Mr Vijewardane (Sri Lanka).

A number of speakers voiced profound concern over the stand of the United States and its NATO partners which have taken a course towards spiralling up the arms race and towards transferring it to outer space. The United States and its NATO partners are in point of fact openly sabotaging the idea of convening a conference on disarmament, the committee members pointed out. Not a single Western delegate has set out his government's point of view on matters aimed at curbing the arms race and at holding a widely-representative international forum on this matter. Such an obstructionist stand of the USA and its allies has only one explanation: Decisions of such a conference may interfere with the realization of their dangerous plans aimed at stepping up war preparations.

On the eve of the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the great victory over the common enemy -- Hitler fascism -- it is impossible to fail to come to ponder over whether everything has been done to prevent a new war with its horrible consequences, stated Soviet representative S.I. Kislyak. To do everything possible to prevent a war catastrophe is being demanded by the cherished memory of tens of millions of lives given for the victory and by generations to come who must have the paramount thing -- the right to life. The highroad to that, in our firm conviction, lies through disarmament, the Soviet delegate said.
SOVIET REPORTS ON MAY MEETING OF UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

Israeliyan Remarks Reported

LD100908 Moscow TASS in English 0831 GMT 10 May 85

[Text] New York May 10 TASS -- The grim and instructive lessons of the war cannot be forgotten and one of the main lessons is that aggression must be fought against by resolute joint efforts before another fire of war has started, Soviet delegate Viktor Israeliyan said in his address at a meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on Thursday [9 May].

Regrettably, we are marking the 40th anniversary of victory in a dangerous, aggravated situation. It is a result of the U.S. and NATO course of tipping military-strategic parity and achieving military superiority over the USSR and the other Warsaw Treaty countries, he said. It is necessary to make efforts to ensure that the year of the 40th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations is marked with more energetic and concerted efforts of all the states to achieve resolute progress towards arms limitations and disarmament.

The Soviet delegate stressed that the purpose of the Soviet-U.S. Geneva talks should be the drafting of effective accords to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear weapons and to strengthen strategic stability.

Other Delegates' Speeches

LD101927 Moscow TASS in English 1819 GMT 10 May 85

[Text] New York May 10 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Chernyshev reports:

The striving of the peoples to take effective measures to prevent the arms race in space, to achieve its termination on earth was reflected by the general debate which ended at the session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission under way at the United Nations Headquarters. Representatives of many states pointed with concern to the danger with which the Reagan programme of "star wars" is fraught for entire humanity.

There is no doubt that the so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" is aimed at increasing the United States striking nuclear might, said Czechoslovakia's Ambassador to the United Nations Jaroslav Cesar. Mongolia's Ambassador to the United Nations G. Namdoj said that the United States striving to achieve military and strategic superiority by the militarisation of space threatens to increase sharply the danger of thermo-nuclear conflagration.
Bulgaria's Ambassador to the United Nations B. Tsvetkov emphasised in his speech the importance of the Soviet Union's stand at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva where the Soviet side is pressing for the working out of effective arrangements aimed at the prevention of the arms race in space and its termination on earth.

G. Fossoung (Cameroon), 'Ali Alatas (Indonesia), other speakers declared in support of the adoption of effective measures in this sphere, for the need of pressing for their implementation by joint efforts of the international community.

The Soviet Union's representative Viktor Israelyan pointed out that the main lesson of the Second World War is that it is necessary to wage the struggle against aggression jointly and decisively while new conflagration of war did not break out. Regrettably, the 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitler fascism is marked in conditions when the international situation has aggravated, he said. This is a result of the course of the United States and NATO member-countries at achieving military superiority over the USSR, over Warsaw Treaty countries. It is necessary to ensure that the 40th anniversary of the ending of the Second World War and the 40th anniversary of the United Nations foundation be marked by the stepping up of the efforts of all states to ensure peace.

**Soviet Reply To Commission Report**

**LD141949 Moscow TASS in English 1859 GMT 14 May 85**

[Text] New York May 14 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Chernyshev reports: It is essential to make certain that the year in which the 40th anniversary since the end of the Second World War and the formation of the United Nations Organization is observed be marked by stepped-up and united efforts of all states to bring about a radical turn towards arms limitation and disarmament. This was said in the USSR's reply cited in a report issued by the U.N. Disarmament Commission and reviewing the implementation of the U.N. declaration on proclaiming the 1980's the second disarmament decade.

The tasks of the second disarmament decade were not being fulfilled owing to the position of certain states that had embarked on an effort to achieve military superiority and on power politics, the document said. An attempt was being undertaken to blast away altogether the very idea of ensuring security through disarmament and counter it with the so-called strategic defense concept that boiled down to a claim that it was possible to come to eliminating nuclear weapons through the development of new, specifically space attack, weapons. In fact, however, the plans of militarizing outer space and building a comprehensive anti-missile defense system with space-based elements were aggressive rather than defensive. Their implementation would trigger off an uncontrolled arms race in all directions. It would mean in effect an end to the process of limiting and reducing nuclear armaments, dramatically increase the threat of a nuclear war and derail many international agreements now in effect.

The sole sensible way out of the existing situation, the USSR's reply said, was to immediately halt the race in arms, first of all nuclear arms, on earth and preclude it in space. What was needed was measures of both a material nature and a moral-political nature directed at removing the threat of a nuclear war. It was on the accomplishment of that task that the resolution of all other problems facing humanity and its very existence depended.
In this connection the USSR said in its reply that it attached much significance to the Soviet-American talks in Geneva which had recently started on its initiative and whose objective, as the sides had jointly recorded, should be to work out effective accords aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating the arms drive on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. Progress at the Geneva talks would depend on strict compliance with the agreement on their subject and objectives in all its parts. The USSR was resolutely against those talks becoming a kind of screen to cover up the further escalation of the arms race.
The modern approach to safeguarding European security calls for combining the realities of a peaceful coexistence of states having different social and political systems with the tasks of eliminating the increased nuclear war threat. The Soviet concept of European security provides for consolidating and promoting the results already gained by the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community in the efforts to realize the age-old dream of nations about a lasting peace in Europe. Simultaneously, this concept envisages a resolute rebuff to nuclear warmongers, to the anticommunist "crusaders" who hope, for the umpteenth time now, to solve the historical argument between capitalism and socialism by force.

The year 1985 will mark a decade since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The outcome of the Conference inspired the peoples of Europe, and not only Europe, with great expectations which no other collective action has brought about since the joint allied decisions at the end of the Second World War. The Conference summed up, on a collective basis, the political results of the Second World War and of the postwar development and signalled the start of a new phase in detente. It was a new major step towards consolidating the principles of peaceful coexistence and establishing equitable cooperation between states with different social systems. The very fact of holding the Conference pointed to the futility of power politics and the cold war and offered new opportunities for accomplishing the main task of our time—to safeguard peace and security not only for the peoples of Europe, but for the whole world.

But the more aggressive and influential forces of world imperialism, those in the USA above all, alarmed by the successes of existing socialism and the advancement of detente in the world, intensified, almost immediately after the Conference, their opposition to developing cooperation among nations and to adopting peace and security measures. These forces identified their interests with the arms race and staked on heightening world tensions. They have come out to upset the military-strategic parity in the hope of achieving superiority over the socialist world.

These tendencies, dangerous for the cause of world peace as they are, have been generated by the military-industrial elite and the US Administration catering to it. The purposeful struggle against the foundations of a lasting peace and security on the European continent—as they were registered in the Helsinki Final Act—is a major element of US policy enjoying the support of the forces of aggression and revanchism in some West European countries.
The way to the European Conference was not an easy one. "It required," Konstantin Chernenko said, "considerable efforts on the part of the Communist Party and the Soviet government and the fraternal Parties of the socialist countries to overcome the resistance of the forces of militarism and reaction. The top political and state leaders of 33 European countries, and also of the USA and Canada, meeting in Helsinki, signed the Final Act which fully accords—in letter and spirit—with the requirements of peaceful coexistence." 1

The solution of the European security problem is a long-term task of the present epoch, and therefore the convocation of the European Conference and its success proved to be a landmark on the path towards this goal. The attempts made today by the more aggressive forces of imperialism to bring to naught the results achieved during the period of detente, including the results of the European Conference, far from diminishing its significance, reveal that a number of the tangible gains of that period are, indeed, irreversible.

The success of the Conference had been prepared for by many years of struggle conducted by the Soviet Union and all socialist countries, by the working masses and democratic public forces for European security, and also by the efforts of sober-minded forces in capitalist countries which realize that in the nuclear age peaceful coexistence is the only reasonable alternative to the arms race.

The participants in the Conference agreed on the principles guiding relations among states and clearly formulated them: sovereign equality, refraining from the use or threat of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for people’s equality and for their right to determine their own future, cooperation among states, and fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law. These principles, determining the policies and conduct of states on the basis of peaceful coexistence, have offered real opportunities to safeguard European security.

They drew up a Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament as part of the Final Act. Registered in it were understandings, which proved very important for the subsequent period, on complementing political detente with military detente. "The participating states", the document says, "recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political detente in Europe and to strengthen their security". 2 Furthermore, the participants in the Conference recognized that the political and military aspects of security were mutually complementary, that European security was indivisible and inseparable from world security.

They also planned a vast programme of measures on cooperation in the field of economy, science, technology, culture and environmental protection in the whole of Europe.

Thus, the Final Act determined the main components of European security on the basis of peaceful coexistence and cooperation among states.

During the years that have passed since the Conference, the USSR and other socialist states exerted a good deal of effort to carry into life the noble goals and principles proclaimed in Helsinki. Today, we have

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2 In the Name of Peace, Security and Cooperation, Politizdat, 1975, p. 31 (in Russian).
every reason to state that if the Western participants in the European Conference, primarily the USA, showed the same constructive approach to the implementation of the Helsinki accords, then the process of strengthening peace and security in Europe and, therefore, in the rest of the world, would develop steadily and detente would gradually become fuller and deeper in content.

II

However, soon after the European Conference was over, those who from the outset tried to discredit the process that had started in Helsinki and to distort and emasculate its true content, got the upper hand in the political leadership of the USA and in some other countries among its allies in NATO. The USA viewed the collective strengthening of European security as a direct threat to its leading role in the North Atlantic Alliance, a barrier to its hegemonic ambitions. From the unfounded assertions that the only road to peace lay through arms buildup, the US ruling elite went over to the propaganda of the thesis that peace can be preserved only if the USA had indisputable military superiority over all other powers in the world. This thesis was capsulized most crudely by the Republican Administration of the USA, which openly switched over to confrontation with the USSR on a global and regional scale.

In the first place, the US ruling elite began to revise the political and military-strategic approach to East-West relations and to war and peace issues, redirecting it to confrontation with the USSR and its allies and friends actually in every part of the globe, primarily in Europe. To that end, Washington strategists believed it was necessary to provide corresponding political grounds and offer an explanation of why, from their point of view, this strategy must be adopted.

President Gerald Ford, it will be recalled, began to discard the very notion of detente, and his successor James Carter took practical steps towards undermining Soviet-American relations and the all-European process in general. But the present US leadership not only calls the Helsinki accords in questions, but even is trying to reach for the deep historical and political roots of European detente. With their statements about the split in Europe, Washington officials are playing up to the West German revenge-seekers, even though they claim that they are not questioning the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements. These documents laid the basis for safeguarding European peace precisely through collective efforts of all the states concerned. The members of the anti-Hitler coalition noted sagaciously at that time that only with continuing and growing cooperation among all peaceloving nations can the supreme striving of man—sound and lasting peace—be realized.

Today, some leading American (and not only American) politicians are attacking what has been at the basis of European and world peace for forty years now. As they are building up tensions, the imperialist states oppose the truly collective efforts to safeguard European peace and security with pseudo-collective efforts of NATO which, far from ensuring European security, are consolidating the split. In other words, they would like to provide the security of some at the expense of the security of others, while the nuclear age has long since shown that security can only be the same for everyone.

Considering all this, it is hardly a coincidence that there also has been a sudden interest in the Western European Union of seven countries, which in the past adopted a decision, at least formally, barring nuclear

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and other more destructive weapons from the FRG. But in the summer of 1984, the WEU lifted the ban on the manufacture in the FRG of strategic bombers and long-range missiles. In some quarters in the West the revival of the WEU is justified by saying it would, allegedly, make Western Europe less dependent on the USA. No doubt, the WEU invigoration, to some extent, reflects the growth of interimperialist contradictions, the striving somehow to demonstrate the "remoteness" of Western Europe from the USA, and the rivalry flaring up between the military-industrial complexes of the USA and Western Europe. Nonetheless, the very "revival" of the WEU and the way it is being revived show that this military-political alliance is called upon, above all, to rally the West European countries for stepping up military efforts in keeping with the strategic concepts and plans of the USA and NATO.

As a result of the USA's turn towards greater confrontation with the socialist countries, the Soviet-American relations were frozen in the political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other spheres, while East-West relations as a whole came up against difficulties. In short, Washington's policy was undermining detente.

Exploiting the fabricated "Soviet military threat", the US political leaders were pushing the NATO partners onto the dangerous path of military rivalry with the USSR and its allies in Europe. As early as 1977 the USA imposed on its allies the decision on a 3-per cent annual military spending increase and in 1978 NATO adopted, under pressure from Washington, a 15-year programme, costing $80,000 million, of building up NATO's might. The subsequent developments followed a certain pattern. In December 1979 the USA got the approval of the infamous NATO "two-track decision", envisaging a sharp escalation of the arms race on the European continent. In this case, though, it was helped readily enough by Britain and the FRG. The purpose of the "two-track decision" was to deploy, beginning in December 1983, 108 Pershing-2s and 464 land-based Tomahawk cruise missiles in some West European countries. Though the advisability of this move was questioned even in NATO, especially in smaller countries like Belgium, Holland and Denmark, the USA still managed to impose its will on the allies and by the start of 1985 it was to dispatch 63 Pershing-2 missiles to the FRG and 112 cruise missiles to Britain and Italy.

All these years the USA has been trying to prove that the Soviet Union, which deployed SS-20 missiles on its territory, was to blame for such a course of events. However, even those who seemed to stand through thick and thin by this myth now admit there was quite a different motive behind the US plan. The West German Stern magazine reports that in 1983 General Bernhard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, stated in a US Congress committee that most people believe that the USA has undertaken to modernize its weapons because of the SS-20 missiles. We would go through with modernization even if SS-20 missiles did not exist, he declared. 4 That the General's statement was not accidental is proved by the documents of the Trilateral Commission. "The truth of the matter is", says one of the documents, "that even if there had been no SS-20s, we would need the new missiles in Western Europe". 5 Rogers returned to this subject again in 1984. The USA always could reach Soviet territory by aircraft, but when the British Vulcan bomber was scrapped, only the American F-111 aircraft could reach Soviet territory. Therefore, the USA decided that it needed modernization, and not because the SS-20 missiles had appeared, 6 he said in an interview to Stern.

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Thus, from the outset the USA contemplated not a response to an imaginary danger allegedly arising from the modernization of Soviet missiles (whose number and yield was even decreased in the process), but the deployment in Europe of first-strike weapons targeted on the USSR. But if at the dawn of the nuclear era the USA could expect to be in the lead in nuclear arms and could, therefore, think that it could do anything it wanted, then in the early 1970s, when approximate parity was achieved between the USA and the USSR and between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, the situation was much different. It was then that the idea of a "limited" nuclear war, including in Europe, was conceived. This scenario of US political strategists was embodied in President Carter's Directive 59, and it was first mentioned by the US Secretary of Defense speaking in New Port on August 20, 1980.

A "limited" nuclear war required medium-range nuclear weapons. And precisely these weapons were to ensure NATO's "two-track decision". The Republican Administration which succeeded Carter went still farther. It adopted a new document on national security, which replaced Directive 59, and openly proclaimed that the goal of US policy was to "win" a protracted nuclear war as well.7

All the reasoning about a possibility of winning a nuclear war and its admissibility in general set off an angry outcry, also in the West. Evidently Washington and NATO leaders must have taken all this into account when they set out to devise a "new" strategy which would not sound so horrible.

There are quite a few facts to prove this. Thus, on November 9, 1984, the NATO Defence Planning Committee approved a doctrine of delivering non-nuclear strikes at the enemy's "second line". The public is told that this "new" development is an attempt to raise the nuclear threshold or, in other words, to make the use of nuclear weapons more remote in time or perhaps to rule it out altogether. But a closer look at the new doctrine will make it clear that now NATO intends to threaten the Warsaw Treaty countries also with conventional weapons, though it keeps nuclear systems with brief flight time, "invulnerable" weapons, and even "impregnable" ABM systems in reserve. To accomplish this task in practice a division of labour of sorts is being effected in NATO: the USA sees to the nuclear "defence" of Western Europe, while Western Europe handles defence with conventional weapons. The idea is far from being new. When in 1982 General Rogers offered it to West Europeans in a more comprehensible way for them, the NATO allies argued with one another over the share each was to contribute in escalating the arms race on the so-called near-nuclear level, on the level of "thinking" weapons. Now it looks like the Americans have persuaded the allies.

Thus, yet another step has been taken in implementing the dangerous US plans on preparations for an armed conflict in Europe involving the more aggressive forces of Western Europe. It is not for nothing that the FRG showed great zeal in backing the Rogers Plan and declared the "strengthening of conventional defence" to be "a European task, first and foremost". But what is really meant here is not defence but the same old strategy of the first strike, both nuclear and, now, conventional.

It is worth recalling that it is in Western Europe that the USA stores a large portion of its powerful arsenal of chemical weapons (over 3 million shells, tens of thousands of aerobombs, and hundreds of thousands of mines and demolition bombs). Of late, the number and capacity of storage facilities for toxic agents have been increasing on the territory of the USA's European allies.

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All those actions by the more aggressive circles in the USA and their minions in Western Europe have really imperilled peace and security not only on the European continent but elsewhere in the world.

III

Recent developments have reaffirmed that the principle of equality and equal security is of vital importance for stable peace in Europe. The Soviet Union has insisted on implementing this principle at every stage of postwar development and at all talks related to the elimination of the threat of war and to the limitation and reduction of arms.

Ever since the European Conference, the USSR and its allies have worked hard to promote European detente along all lines in keeping with this basic principle, the chief aim being to rid the peoples of the continent of the war danger. A departure from this principle would only encourage the more aggressive forces of imperialism.

In 1976, the Warsaw Treaty countries proposed that all participants in the European Conference sign a treaty repudiating the first use of nuclear weapons and presented to them the draft of the treaty. The NATO countries turned down the proposal, alluding to the "indisputable superiority" of the USSR and its allies in conventional weapons. But the facts show this assertion to be totally unfounded. Objective assessments have revealed that NATO exceeds the Warsaw Treaty in the total numerical strength of the personnel (4.9 million against 4.8 million people). And in the land troops in Europe NATO’s superiority is greater—2.1 million against 1.7 million. NATO and the Warsaw Treaty have roughly equal amounts of artillery and armoured hardware (counting the tanks concentrated in West European depots). NATO has a superiority in fighter-bombers, which is balanced by the Warsaw Treaty by means of a somewhat larger number of interceptor-fighters. On the whole, there is an approximate parity between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty in conventional arms, which is actually confirmed by a recent issue of the journal Military Balance 1984-1985 issued by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies.*

* See Nouvelles atlantiques, O-12, 1984, p. 4.

However, considering the West European concern over the conventional forces of the Warsaw Treaty, in March 1979 the USSR proposed that NATO should renounce the use of not only nuclear but also conventional weapons and sign a kind of a non-aggression pact. NATO ignored the proposal.

In 1982, the Soviet Union displayed goodwill by assuming a unilateral obligation to refrain from being the first to use nuclear weapons and called upon the USA and other nuclear powers to follow suit. They refused, however.

In January 1983, the Warsaw Treaty countries addressed the NATO countries with a proposal to sign a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of armed force and on the maintenance of relations of peace. That move was motivated by the wish to restore detente and, considering the increased mutual apprehensions, to find a way out of the present situation. There was no response to that either.

At the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on the limitation and reductions of nuclear arms in Europe, the USSR again suggested that Europe be cleared of nuclear weapons, medium-range and tactical, and formulated a number of proposals taking into consideration the interests of the parties concerned. It declared its preparedness to conclude a comprehen-
sive agreement covering all types of medium-range nuclear weapons in
Europe, that is, all nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles. At the same
time, the Soviet Union, wishing to take due account of the considerations
expressed in the West, made relevant correction in its proposals. For
instance, it agreed to halt the deployment of its medium-range missiles
not only on the territory of Europe but in those regions of the USSR
from which these missiles could reach West European countries. It also
expressed a readiness to take into account not only delivery vehicles but
also the warheads and to destroy its missiles which would be reduced if
a relevant treaty were signed, and not to deploy them in other regions
of the USSR.

But the American side made only proposals which would give NATO
an advantage in medium-range weapons, and ultimately deadlocked the
talks by starting the deployment of its medium-range missiles in Europe.
As a result, the Soviet Union was compelled to take counter-measures to
maintain the nuclear parity and to ensure its own security and the security
of its allies.

Some people in the West (even in the antiwar movement) doubt whether
it was necessary to continue military preparations at all, since the sides possessed overkill potentials: let the USA alone go along this road
of no return. But the point is that the existing parity, which is at the
basis of talks on equal terms, should be maintained, and the US Admin-
istration seeks to upset it in order to deal with the USSR "from the posi-
tion of strength", and it does not even conceal this fact. And since the
addition of new medium-range missiles to the mass-destruction weapons
already stockpiled by the USA means only that the United States seeks
ways and means of delivering the first and disarming strike at the USSR,
to leave these plans without response would be to open the way for any
US venture in the world arena. This is what the USSR and its allies cannot
allow to happen, all the more so since their concession may be inter-
preted by the United States as confirmation of the correctness of its posi-
tion: pressure supposedly yields results.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union believes that parity can and must be
preserved, preferably on a lower level, so that disarmament could be
gradually achieved, for which honest and constructive talks are needed.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union, an important way of decreasing
nuclear confrontation in Europe would be to create zones free of nuclear
weapons in various parts of the continent: in the north, in the centre,
and in the south. The USSR backs up any concrete initiatives facilitating
the solution of this problem.

At the Vienna talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and arma-
ments in Central Europe, the USSR and other socialist countries have
long been working to achieve practical results. To that end, the USSR
proposed that the sides reduce the armed forces in Central Europe down
to agreed levels: 900,000 effective, including 700,000 in land forces. This
would put an end to the protracted and futile dispute over the number
of troops to be reduced by this or that country. The USSR and the USA
would be reducing their armed forces on the basis of mutual example,
not limited by treaties: by 20,000 and 13,000 effective respectively. And,
finally, the participants in the talks would freeze their armed forces and
armaments in Central Europe before reaching an ultimate agreement.

At the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the USSR and its allies proposed
a constructive way of combining large-scale political and international
legal measures with military-technical ones. These are, above all, renun-
ciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, signing of a treaty on the
non-use of force and the maintenance of relations of peace, ridding Euro-
pe of chemical weapons and cutting back military spending. As before,
the USSR and its allies are prepared to elaborate additional confidence-building measures in the military sphere—more significant and comprehensive ones—on the basis of what was proposed in Helsinki and has proved its worth.

IV

It is in Europe that the borderline runs between two opposite socio-political systems, and, therefore, Europe is the main zone of military confrontation between the two largest military-political alliances, while the struggle for more reliable European security still remains a major condition for safeguarding world peace.

At the same time, it is precisely in Europe that during the 40 years after the defeat of fascism new principles of international relations are being established, principles which reject security only through force or the threat of force. Europe was the venue of the Conference on Security and Cooperation whose results met the long-cherished aspirations of the peoples. Therefore, no matter how difficult the present international situation may be due to the actions of the certain imperialist circles, those in the USA above all, the Soviet Union is convinced that peace in Europe and in the rest of the world can be preserved. "To achieve this," Andrei Gromyko said, "joint actions of all countries adhering to the positions of peace and of all social strata are required, whatever the social system and size of the states."

At the same time, the favourable opportunities offered to Europe by the results of the European Conference have never been looked upon by the USSR as a godsend. One should always remember what regularities and what combination of the chief motive forces gave rise to a particular system of international relations.

The way towards ridding humanity of imperialist wars, towards establishing democratic peace and solving European security problem was paved by the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Victory over the Nazi aggressors in the Great Patriotic War. With the emergence of socialism on the world scene new regularities and motive forces were brought into play and the entire system of international relations began to be reshaped on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Now the masses have come to the fore in the world arena and are increasingly joining the struggle for restructuring international relations, for ensuring stable peace and security. Herein lies the earnest of stable peace. It is not without reason, one supposes, that a French paper pointed out that the present leaders of Britain, France, the FRG and Italy "cannot infinitely agree with the position [US position—E. V.] of constant resistance to Soviet proposals, if they want public opinion in their countries to support them".

Socialism, which is conducting a historical offensive, compels capitalism to agree to a peaceful competition between the two world systems. As to Europe, the Warsaw Treaty is an invincible force safeguarding the gains of socialism. It serves reliably the cause of strengthening international security.

The working class and the Communist and Workers' Parties in capitalist countries are a powerful force fighting in the world arena for peace and against the threat of war. No mean role in the struggle for peace is played by the non-aligned states, which greatly contribute to curbing the arms race and strengthening world peace and security.

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The antiwar movement, which has been growing especially in Europe, is having an increasing impact on the course of events in the world. The movement comprises people of various segments of the population espousing different political, social and religious convictions. Every sensible person cannot fail to understand that today, when huge amounts of lethal weapons have been piled up in the world, while the arms race is going on, mankind is faced with the choice between life and death, between the arms race and a nuclear catastrophe on the one hand, and peaceful coexistence on the other. The participants in the antiwar movement have made their choice. Meanwhile, the course of the NATO countries towards whipping up the arms race and preparing for war is evoking growing alarm among people on every continent. They demand that the governments of these countries display a sober approach to war and peace issues and curb and ultimately end the arms race.

Today it should be abundantly clear to every serious politician or statesman who is aware of his responsibility for the development of the world situation that a realistic policy cannot be based on force and confrontation. It is not merely dangerous today—it may be suicidal. There are ever more signs of growing opposition in Western Europe to the deployment of nuclear and chemical weapons there, and to the doctrines envisaging the use of these weapons. This opposition is rising in the quarters which really influence political decision-making. In this context it is symptomatic that realistic-minded figures in all countries, whatever their ideology or political and other convictions, are pooling their efforts in search for ways of safeguarding security in the nuclear-missile era. Among such efforts mention should be made, for instance, of the joint actions within the framework of the Palme Commission which presented in 1982 at the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament a report on concrete measures to strengthen security in Europe and the world at large and in 1984 elaborated a number of specific proposals to curb the arms race. There are, among other things, the joint action by the heads of state or government of the six countries—Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden—which proposed, in May 1984, a programme of measures leading to general and complete disarmament; proposals by individual countries, as, for instance, by Greece, which suggested in August 1983 the idea of postponing the deployment of US medium-range missiles to give the Soviet-American talks a chance to continue with a view to reaching mutually acceptable understanding, to name but a few.

The struggle carried on by the USSR and its allies for safeguarding peace and security in Europe is concrete and purposeful. They suggest that the most pressing problems related to world and European security, primarily problems concerning the prevention of nuclear war, should be solved immediately through negotiations on the principle of equality and equal security. Precisely their struggle has made it so that the USA agreed to hold new talks with the USSR to achieve mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of issues related to nuclear and space weapons.

It was noted at a session of the Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held last December in Berlin that the ongoing deployment of American medium-range missiles in a number of West European countries has further worsened the situation in Europe—a fact which is evoking growing concern everywhere. The vital interests of all European nations today, the session communique reads, require efforts towards halting the stockpiling of new nuclear devices on the European continent and towards a radical reduction thereof, up to and
Including the ridding of Europe of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. Calling to mind the proposals advanced by the socialist countries to resolve this fundamental issue of our time, the Ministers' Committee definitively reiterated the fact that "the Warsaw Treaty Member States have been and remain devoted to the continuation and deepening of the European process of detente, the strengthening of security and the promotion of cooperation in Europe on the basis determined by the Helsinki Final Act".

All the peace forces are convinced that sooner or later the idea of strengthening security by joint efforts of all countries will strike root and make peace in Europe and the rest of the world more stable and reliable.
Throughout its history the Soviet Union has worked vigorously and persistently towards having the use of force banished from the practice of international relations and putting an end to aggressive wars unleashed by imperialist powers, wars defined by Lenin as a bestial means of settling conflicts in human society. In the present international situation, dangerously aggravated owing to the policies of the US ruling circles, the USSR is doing its utmost to stop humankind's precarious sliding into the abyss of thermonuclear catastrophe and to achieve a radical turn towards the strengthening of peace, limitation of the arms race and development of international cooperation.

It is of paramount importance to curb the nuclear arms race and renounce the use of military force if we are to consolidate peace and security. In this connection, Konstantin Chernenko pointed out: "The world has radically changed. Force cannot resolve its problems. This has been proved more than once, including by the experience of the United States of America itself. It is impossible to strengthen one's security at the expense of the security of others. Just as unrealizable today are the calculations to gain military superiority in the hope of winning a nuclear war."

The Soviet Union bore the brunt of war against German fascism and Japanese militarism. In 1985 all progressive mankind will mark the 40th anniversary of that Great Victory. The USSR also played a leading role in creating the organizational forms of postwar international cooperation intended to secure a lasting peace on earth and prevent a new world war. As a founding member of the United Nations, the Soviet Union was to a great extent responsible for a whole number of progressive democratic principles and provisions included in the UN Charter, first and foremost the all-important principle of inadmissibility to use force or the threat of force to resolve international disputes that might arise between countries with different social systems.

According to the UN Charter, not only the use of force should be banned but also threats to resort to force both against the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of any state and for any other purpose incompatible with the goals of the United Nations. The ban on the threat or the use of force is formulated comprehensively, unambiguously and unequivocally, and leaves no room for partial interpretations, which is recognized by some bourgeois analysts. Its import is augmented by the fact that certain exceptions from the ban are envisaged, in a clear-

1 See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 8, p. 567.
out form, by the UN Charter, which provides for any state's right to individual and collective self-defence.

In the postwar period, pursuing the Leninist policy of peace, the Soviet Union, jointly with other socialist countries, has persistently fought for the strict adherence by all states to the basic goals and principles of the UN Charter, above all the non-use of force or threat of force in international relations and peaceful settlement of all international disputes at the negotiating table, rather than by force of arms. The USSR and other socialist countries have perseveringly sought to have the non-use of force principle enshrined in international treaties and agreements and in UN declarations and resolutions.

But the imperialist states resorted to force to suppress revolutionary and national liberation movements and to grossly interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states, thereby violating the UN Charter, above all the principle of non-use of force or threat of force. They have on many occasions resorted to threats and used force to achieve their expansionist aggressive plans.

The international situation has become especially strained of late, what with the US administration having sharply stepped up its dangerous militaristic policy. Underlying this policy is the concept termed by its authors “peace through strength”. The US President, speaking in Michigan in October 1984, declared plainly that thereafter the USA would negotiate from a position of strength.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries counter the military preparations and nuclear arms brandishing with a well-considered, responsible approach to international issues. The USSR calls for setting up reliable guarantees of international security. In a speech at the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly, the head of the Soviet delegation, Andrei Gromyko, said: “A nuclear age requires that political thinking be consonant with its realities. Where categories such as ‘strength’, ‘deterrence’ and ‘superiority’ still prevail in this thinking they must be replaced by concepts of the non-use of force, confidence, equality and mutual regard for security interests.”

It is towards these ends that the Soviet Union has directed all its efforts.

In evaluating political processes in the world the Soviet Union, in the first place, seeks to pinpoint the main cause of the growing tension, the main factor of destabilization, and, correspondingly, the necessary ways and means to remedy the situation.

The chief source of tension is the policy of the more aggressive forces of imperialism, the USA in the first place. The Washington Administration accelerates, one after another, widescale programmes of production of the latest arms, nuclear arms heading the list, and attempts to dictate, from positions of strength, to other states and nations how they should go about their internal affairs. This policy saps international confidence and directly contradicts the UN Charter.

Besides, this policy, whenever applied, serves to prove that no interstate dispute has ever been, or can be, settled reliably and equitably through the use of force or a threat to resort to it. On the contrary, the use of force for aggressive purposes, for territorial annexations and oppression of other nations, has always generated nothing but animosity, hatred and sprouts of new conflicts, resulting in death and huge material destruction. The nuclear arms stockpiling has radically changed the notions of the outcome military conflicts may have for the nations,

and, meanwhile, the probability of a crisis or a conflict growing into a nuclear confrontation has increased many times over.

The CPSU and the Soviet state work persistently to have the renunciation of force and the threat of force in disputes made a law in international relations. This principle is reflected in numerous treaties and agreements the USSR has concluded with other states (for example, with the USA, France, Italy, Britain, and the FRG) and in many of the UN resolutions. The clause concerning the non-use of force in international disputes is contained in such USSR-sponsored important international documents as the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security and the Definition of Aggression. At the 27th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1972, the question of the meaning of the principle of non-use of force and the possibility of making it binding was discussed in detail at the initiative of the Soviet Union. Following the discussion, the Assembly passed Resolution 2936/XXVII On the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons for All Time. This resolution marked an important step forward on the way of effectively implementing the principle of non-use and non-threat of force and represented a major contribution to the struggle of all peace-loving people to block the efforts of trigger-happy politicians.

The non-use of force principle was most profoundly elaborated at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975. It was included in the Final Act of the Conference as a priority principle. In the Declaration on Principles the participants proclaimed that they would "respect and give effect to refraining from the threat or use of force" and expressed their conviction of the necessity "to make it an effective norm of international life". The Final Act noted that the implementation of non-use of force and other principles would be a major element in detente.

Those who stake on force do not confine themselves to building it up. They use it, claiming dominance in the world and seeking to halt and reverse the objective process of world development. In the Middle East they encourage Israeli aggressive policies and overtly use force in Lebanon; they have committed aggression in Grenada; they resort to force to keep up the puppet junta in El Salvador; exert mounting pressure on Nicaragua and continue their threats and subversion against Cuba. They support and arm the counterrevolutionary gangs waging a war against Afghanistan. In southern Africa they launch aggressive actions against sovereign states, Angola in the first place.

The policy of strength adherents trample upon the basic norms of international law; they show no respect for the sovereignty of states and the inviolability of their borders. Moreover, Washington openly declares its intention to act with brute military force.

Countering the nuclear war threat, the Soviet Union has set forth a package of constructive proposals whose main thrust is towards the formation of effective and lasting guarantees of international security and above all ensuring consistent observance of the principle of non-use of force in international relations, which in today's nuclear age is tantamount to the survival of mankind.

Over a hundred constructive initiatives have been proposed by the Soviet Union from the rostrum of the United Nations. As is known, the USSR was the author of the most radical proposal—one on general and complete disarmament under general and complete international control. Other exceptionally important Soviet initiatives include proposals on an early termination and prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, on a ban to
the development and production of new types and systems of mass destruction weapons and on prevention of the militarization of outer space.

Of great moral and political importance is the draft declaration Condemnation of Nuclear War which the Soviet Union tabled at the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1983 and which an overwhelming majority of member-states voted for. The adoption of this declaration, just as of the Soviet-sponsored Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe adopted in 1981, was a major UN act designed to thwart the danger of nuclear force being used.

It will be recalled that in the course of the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament in 1982 the USSR undertook a unilateral pledge not to initiate a nuclear exchange. Had the other nuclear powers followed suit this would in practice have been tantamount to a total ban on the use of nuclear arms. The Soviet Union took that important step in a situation where the NATO nuclear powers, above all the USA, make no secret of the fact that their military doctrine not only does not rule out first use of nuclear arms, but is actually based on this dangerous concept. The Soviet Union proceeded from the indisputable fact that a nuclear war, should it flare up, could mean the end of human civilization and, probably, life itself on earth.

The Soviet initiative adds a new dimension to the entire set of problems involved in arms (especially nuclear) limitation and reduction. It generally facilitates disarmament and effective enactment of a ban on the use of force in international relations.

The NATO countries, however, try to cast doubt on the Soviet commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to belittle its importance. They allege that the USSR seeks freedom of action for itself to employ conventional arms and that the above commitment is essentially meaningless if the USSR does not declare its readiness to abstain from the use of conventional armed forces. Yet concrete actions by the Soviet Union and its allies have convincingly refuted these assertions. A case in point is the Political Declaration adopted in Prague in January 1983, in which the socialist countries proposed a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of armed force and on the maintenance of relations of peace between the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries.

The core of this treaty should be a mutual commitment by participants in both alliances not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons, against one another, which means not to be the first to use military force in their relations altogether. This commitment would cover the territory of all countries parties to the treaty, and also their military and civil personnel, sea, air and space craft and other objects and sites in their possession wherever they are located. A significant element in the treaty could be a commitment of the signatories not to threaten the security of the international sea, air and space routes crossing the territories beyond any national jurisdiction.

It would seem reasonable to combine the non-use of force commitment specified in the treaty with a pledge to conduct in good faith talks on effective measures to stop the arms race, to limit and reduce armaments and achieve disarmament, or else to employ other means available to promote the success of the talks so as to gain practical results through them. The treaty could also provide for joint consideration of practical measures to prevent the danger of a sudden attack. It could also incorporate clauses on the strengthening of the United Nations as a world instrument of collective security. In this context, it would seem reasonable to stipulate in the treaty its signatories' readiness to cooperate in making the UN more effective in fulfilling its mission, specified in the Charter, of peacefully settling international disputes and conflict situations, of suppressing aggression and eliminating the threat to interna-
tional peace and security. The treaty, of course, is not expected to restrict its participants' inherent right to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

These and some other proposals were tabled by the Soviet Union at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. However, the USA and other Western countries have taken an obstructionist stand vis-à-vis these initiatives. Meanwhile, it is clear to all that an agreement on the non-use of force between the two groups of countries would facilitate a breakthrough for the better in international affairs, and would signify a step forward of immense political significance.

In the context of these and other measures proposed by the Soviet Union so as to block the possibility of war, above all nuclear, it would be extremely useful to have a World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations. This treaty would reiterate and consolidate the non-use of force principle as applied to the conditions and requirements of the present stage in international relations.

It will be recalled that the proposal on a World Treaty, initiated by the Soviet Union, was submitted to the UN in 1976. Since 1978, it has been under consideration in a committee specially set up for the purpose, which sends regular reports to the sessions of the UN General Assembly, the 39th Session being no exception.

The underlying idea of the World Treaty is to banish the use of force from the practice of international relations, to make renunciation of the use of both nuclear and conventional arms an immutable law of international life. The World Treaty could radically solve the problem of banning the use of nuclear arms.

The conclusion of the World Treaty would be a globally important event creating a qualitatively new situation in the world and securing a lasting peace for the future. While in no way diminishing the non-use of force pledges contained in the UN Charter and the many post-war multilateral, regional and bilateral treaties and accords, it would reinforce them, envisaging not only a general ban on the use or threat of force but also inadmissibility of using any types of arms, whether nuclear or conventional.

The conclusion of the World Treaty would serve as a measure to prevent both a nuclear war and military conflicts in general. It would be an underpinning of peace based on an order guaranteeing security for all states. By confirming the "dominance of law" instead of the "dominance of force" in international relations it would create favourable conditions for practical measures to reduce and, in the longer run, eliminate war threat altogether through arms limitation and reduction.

The World Treaty would provide a vivid example of how, in the present situation, international treaties and agreements on important political problems should be worked out within the UN framework. It would considerably enhance the role of the United Nations as a genuine center coordinating international actions and helping develop relations of peace and cooperation among all member-states, implementing, in accordance with its Charter, its tasks of peacefully settling international disputes and conflict situations and eliminating the threat to international peace and security.

The Soviet Union opposes attempts to replace the drawing up of the Treaty with an "examination" of specific cases of the use of force in international relations, a "consideration" of the arguments of those who seek to justify the use of force, and a "study" of the mechanisms and
procedures for peaceful settlement of international disputes and conflicts. Endeavours of this kind serve no useful purpose, only leading astray from the drafting of the World Treaty, the job that is on the order of the day. Insolvent are also the attempts to adopt, short of a World Treaty, a resolution or a declaration on the issue. It is a treaty, legally binding on all signatories, that we should strive for.

The Soviet Union highly appreciates the efforts of the non-aligned countries aimed at speeding up the preparation of the text of the World Treaty—acceptable for all, based on the Soviet draft and taking into account the pertinent proposals by non-aligned and Western countries. In the present sharply aggravated international situation, the speedy preparation of the World Treaty becomes an insistent task brooking no delay.

Recently, the problem of the prevention of an arms race, nuclear one included, in outer space has acquired special urgency. The USA seeks to turn outer space into a bridgehead of war. The Soviet Union stands resolutely for immediate measures ensuring that the principle of non-use of force in outer space and from space against the earth is strictly observed.

The Soviet Union feels that it is absolutely necessary that effective measures are urgently taken to prevent the extension of the arms race into space. With this in mind, it introduced in the UN in 1981 a proposal on a treaty to ban the deployment of any type of weapons in outer space. The proposal was endorsed by the General Assembly. However, because of the US opposition, no concrete talks on the issue have been started at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

At the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1983, the Soviet Union proposed an agreement to prohibit the use of force both in space and from space against the earth, and tabled a corresponding draft. It specified the participants' commitment by envisaging a ban on the threat or use of force in the atmosphere, in outer space and on the earth with the help of striking weapons deployed for this purpose in the earth's orbit, on space bodies or in some other fashion in space. It also envisaged a ban on the use or threat of force with regard to space objects.

An overwhelming majority of countries assess this Soviet proposal as a sound basis for negotiations and for positive practical measures to make the non-use of force principle more effective. The Soviet Union has declared a unilateral moratorium on orbiting anti-satellite weapons as long as the USA and other countries do likewise.

A new important development was the Soviet initiative for Soviet-American talks on preventing the militarization of space. The underlying idea of this Soviet proposal is that the pioneers of space exploration—the USSR and the USA—must do everything to keep peace in space, and, specifically, they should lay the foundation for a multilateral agreement. However, through the fault of the American side the talks never took place.

Finally, at the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly, the USSR proposed the question of the Use of Outer Space Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes, for the Benefit of Mankind as an urgent point on the agenda. In coming out with this proposal, the Soviet Union proceeded from the fact that now as never before it is important to bar the arms race from outer space, making it a strict standard in international politics, a universally recognized commitment, so as to block all ways for the militarization of space. The idea, therefore, is to ban immediately and forever the use of force in space and from space against the earth.
The Soviet Union proposes achieving a radical solution to the question of preventing space militarization. This includes banning and eliminating space-based weapons and also all ground-, air- and sea-based weapons designed to hit space targets. The United Nations should have its say in support in the immediate achievement of reliably controllable agreements on this score on a bilateral and multilateral basis. No doubt, the implementation of this proposal would considerably help establish non-use of force in international relations and open the way not only towards peaceful cooperation in space but towards the solution of other urgent problems of the day, above all, the key problem of removing the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

As distinct from the USA, which sees no way to peace other than a military buildup and war preparations, the Soviet Union considers the prevention of war as a task which, though difficult, yet can be resolved. It requires the efforts of all countries through joint and effective measures to put an end to the arms race, to bar any eventuality of war flaring up and to ensure strict observance by all states without exception of the universally recognized principles of non-use of force or threat of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Guided by this consideration, the Soviet Union submitted to the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly, as an important and urgent point of agenda, the question: Inadmissibility of the Policy of State Terrorism and Any Actions by States Aimed at Undermining the Socio-Political Systems in Other Sovereign States.

In tabling this proposal, the Soviet Union had in mind that the policy of attaining military superiority adopted by certain countries and the implementation of the policy of terrorism in international affairs sap the very possibility of peaceful relations and mutual trust between states, that such policies and actions boost the war threat and constitute a violation of norms of international law. They are especially dangerous in the nuclear age, as threatening not only the freedom of nations but their very existence. The Soviet Union feels that the policy and practices of state-sponsored terrorism should be unambiguously condemned; that an end should be put to any actions intended for forcible change or subversion of the social system in sovereign states, for destabilization and overthrow of their legitimate governments; that no military action should be undertaken for this purpose under any pretext, while those already under way should be stopped.

All states should respect people’s inalienable right to decide their own destinies and to independently shape their own political and other development. The Soviet proposal stems from the consistent approach to the historic goal of ruling out the use of force from the international practice. The adoption of this principle would greatly contribute to the creation of political guarantees of peace, to the security of individual countries and greater international security in general.

In its approach to the goal of banishment of the use of force from the life of human society, the Soviet Union shares the view of many states that a special responsibility lies with the nuclear powers, and is fully aware of its own responsibility. As is known, Konstantin Chernenko, in a speech on March 2, 1984, proposed that relations among the nuclear powers be regulated by certain agreed upon and mandatory norms intended to prevent nuclear war. These norms should include renunciation of nuclear war propaganda, commitment not to be the first to use nuclear arms, not to allow their proliferation in whatever form, to promote nuclear-free zones and to pursue the policy of nuclear arms reduction up to their liquidation altogether.
The USSR has made these principles a basis of its policy and has expressed its readiness at any time to agree with other nuclear powers on jointly recognizing these norms and making them binding. Should the other nuclear powers agree to this proposal and strictly observe the enumerated norms, this would create political, moral and legal safeguards against the use of force in its particularly dangerous, nuclear form: in other words, the nuclear war threat would peter out.

An analysis of the Soviet proposals concerned with the establishment of non-use of force in international relations shows that they represent a highly practicable programme which can make the renunciation of force an immutable law of international affairs, can rid mankind of the nuclear catastrophe threat and radically improve the situation in the world. An important feature of these proposals is their comprehensive, universal nature, by which they combine an overall ban on the use of force with the inadmissibility of employing any types of arms, whether nuclear or conventional. This places all states on a par, consolidates the security of each, and gives no one unilateral advantages or military superiority.

The proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries organically combine measures of a material, organisational, political, legal, and moral nature, with the key goal of the day, the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe menace, moved to the foreground. Importantly, these proposals are distinguished for their accord with the vital demands of the peoples concerned about the continual deterioration in the international situation and the spiralling arms race. The implementation of these proposals would benefit all countries irrespective of their social system, the size of the territory or population, of whether or not they possess nuclear arms.

The Soviet Union's policy is aimed at putting an end to the arms race imposed by those who would like to dictate their will from strength. The Soviet Union strives to have the policy of strength excluded from international relations altogether and will continue to work persistently to attain this goal.

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BRIEFS

SOVIET-FRENCH CONSULTATIONS 6-7 May—Soviet-French political consultations were held at the USSR Foreign Ministry 6-7 May during which an in-depth exchange of opinions took place on questions of preventing an arms race in space, banning chemical weapons, and other disarmament problems. The sides also discussed in detail the state of affairs at the Stockholm Conference on Conference-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe. Taking part in the consultations were V. F. Petrovskiy, member of the USSR Foreign Ministry Collegium, special envoy O. A. Grinevskiy, (I.) Renoir, chief of the French External Relations Ministry's strategic problems and disarmament department, and other senior officials of the two countries' foreign policy departments. (I.) Renoir and J.-B. Raimond, French ambassador to the USSR, were received by A. G. Kovalev, USSR deputy foreign minister. [Text] [Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May Morning Edition p 8]

CSO: 5200/1162
Geneva, May [dateline as received]—Round one of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms has ended in Geneva. The subject and goal of the talks are well known.

As a result of the January meeting between the USSR foreign minister and U.S. secretary of state, it was agreed that the subject of the talks would be a range of questions—the prevention of an arms race in space, the reduction of strategic nuclear arms, and the reduction of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe—with all these questions being examined on the basis of their interrelationships. The goal of the talks would be to elaborate effective accords aimed at preventing an arms race in space and stopping it on earth, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability.

Thus, the approach which prevailed acknowledged that it is impossible to consider either the question of strategic arms or the question of medium-range nuclear weapons without also considering the question of preventing the militarization of space.

The creation of a favorable atmosphere for the achievement of concrete results at the talks has been aided by the Soviet Union's recent major peace initiatives: proposal that the USSR and United States impose for the duration of the talks a moratorium on the creation, including scientific research, testing, and deployment of space strike arms and freeze their strategic offensive armaments; and also the USSR's decision to unilaterally impose, until November this year, a moratorium on medium-range missiles and suspend other countermeasures in Europe. These were seen by the international public as practical steps in the interest of easing tension in the world and as a sincere wish on the part of the USSR to contribute to the success of the Soviet-U.S. talks. No matter how hard the White House tried to belittle the enormous political importance of these new peace initiatives by the Soviet Union, calling them a "propaganda" step, the USSR's proposals are already having and will continue to have an ever increasing favorable effect both on the international situation on the continent and on the course of the Soviet-U.S. talks. This is the view of many local observers and representatives of diplomatic circles.
Even before the round began many people were wondering what the U.S. side would be offering at the talks, to what extent its approach would correspond to the subject and goals of the talks, and whether it would confirm through practical action the statement that the White House intends to "carry out what was agreed on in Geneva in January" and that it "treats its commitments seriously."

Washington's propaganda acts accompanying the start of the talks and the pronouncements by U.S. statesmen left the impression, an observer on the Swiss paper LA TRIBUNE DE GENEVE noted, that the U.S. delegation came to Geneva "without any particular wish" to comply with the existing accords between the two superpowers, especially on the question of preventing the militarization of space. All this time vigorous efforts have continued, on various pretexts, to at least push into the background the key question of the elaboration of concrete measures on preventing the militarization of space. Washington is resorting to all manner of demagogic subterfuge, preaching about the "need to take a new look at the correlation of forces," and talking about the "purely scientific research" nature of the work being carried out within the framework of the "star wars" program.

Naturally, this approach is bound to complicate the talks situation. At this time nuclear arms cannot be limited, not to mention reduced, without taking effective steps to prevent an arms race in space. The world is well aware of the enormous danger posed to mankind by the creation and deployment of space strike systems. The "Strategic Defense Initiative" is being actively discussed among the broadest political and scientific circles because it is an unprecedented challenge to the desire of all peoples for peace. The "star wars" program is officially represented as a project to create antimissile defenses with a number of space-based elements that hypothetically would render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," but, in fact, it is a new attempt to impose on the international community another dangerous militarist concept whose possible implementation is fraught with incalculable dangers for the future of all mankind.

People will hardly be misled by the "defensive" terminology which the White House uses to conceal the true aggressive nature of the "star wars" program and the U.S. desire to secure unilateral advantages at all costs. In spite of this, people in Washington, far from being willing to renounce the "star wars" program, are involving their NATO allies in it. It is no accident that this question is appearing increasingly frequently in many European newspapers: If the United States intends to continue to elaborate its "star wars" program, as the facts indicate, then why did it agree to talks? Is it really possible to use talks in whose successful outcome the whole world has an interest, as a screen for the implementation of hegemonist plans?

The Soviet Union's position was expressed clearly at the recent CPSU Central Committee April Plenum. The Soviet Union believes that the arms race and disarmament talks are incompatible; that is clear, unless you plunge into hypocrisy and set the goal of deceiving public opinion. Our country will not promote such a course, and those who are currently engaging in a political game rather than serious politics must know this.
"In the light of the Soviet Union's concrete peace initiatives," Armand Magnin, general secretary of the Swiss Labor Party, told your correspondent, "it must be noted that the United States is trying to minimize the exceptionally great importance and topicality of the USSR's proposal, get away with generalizations, and avoid adopting practical decisions to prevent the militarization of space. It seems to us that although the talks now taking place here in Geneva are bilateral, all countries and peoples have a great interest in their success."

So the first round of the talks has ended. It gives grounds for saying that Washington is not steering a course toward an accord with the Soviet Union. This is clear if only from the fact that it absolutely refuses to discuss the question of not spreading the arms race to outer space simultaneously with the discussion of the question of nuclear arms limitation and reduction. Therefore, the U.S. side is violating the agreement reached in January on the interrelationship between the three avenues -- preventing an arms race in space, reducing strategic nuclear arms, and reducing medium-range nuclear arms in Europe.

What the American delegation brings to the next round of the talks, which, it has been announced here, will begin in Geneva on 30 May, is therefore very important. Will Washington be able to amend its position, renounce its futile attempts to achieve military superiority over the USSR, display political will, and take practical steps along the path to the attainment of real success at the talks? The Soviet Union, for its part, will do everything in its power to seek solutions that will lessen tension in the world and help bar the path of the arms race.
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET COMMENTS ON REAGAN V-E DAY EUROPARLIAMENT SPEECH

'Tough Policy' Toward USSR

LD081633 Moscow TASS in English 1451 GMT 8 May 85

[Text] Strasbourg, 8 May (TASS)—United States President Ronald Reagan today delivered a speech devoted to the 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitlerite fascism to a special session of the European Parliament. The speech sounded a now-familiar call for "reconciliation in Europe." But the president's speech also made it clear that the "reconciliation" formula covers only Washington's Bonn partners. So far as the USSR and other socialist countries are concerned, the United States intends to pursue a tough policy towards them, which is characterized by a striving to gain military superiority.

It is amazing but the fact that the U.S. President in his speech did not mention with even a single word the Soviet Union's participation in the hardest-fought war in the history of mankind, during which the Soviet people lost 20 million people. On the contrary, his speech abounded in rude attacks on the socialist system, flagrant distortions of facts and unfounded charges of "aggressiveness" against the USSR.

Basing himself on this blatantly false premise, Reagan urged the Americans' partners in NATO to keep and upgrade their strategic nuclear arms. He stressed that the United States would maintain an up-to-date and viable nuclear potential in all legs of the nuclear triad, sea-, land- and air-based.

He paid special attention to his aggressive "star wars" program aiming to create a capability to deal the first disarming strike in the hope of being able to do that with impunity, to achieve military superiority, this time through space.

Faced with widespread anxiety over the implications of carrying out the "star wars" program as well as over Washington's continued buildup of first-strike nuclear arms, the president put forward a number of pseudo-peacemaking "initiatives" which had been advertised by the White House even before the Strasbourg speech. Those included NATO-proposed "confidence-building measures" which boil down to such secondary steps as exchanges of military observers at military exercises and locations, high-level contacts between military leaders, and the setting up of a permanent military communications line between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Once those U.S. proposals have been accepted, Reagan said, the United States would be prepared to discuss non-use of force. He chose to ignore in his speech the truly radical confidence-building measures already adopted by the Soviet Union. Thus, the USSR made a unilateral pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons way back in 1982 and after that has of late taken a series of constructive steps towards lessening the nuclear threat.

The USSR's decision to introduce a moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles and suspend also other countermeasures in Europe has riveted the special attention of West European and all world public opinion.

Assessing Reagan's "initiatives," political observers point out that their purpose is to distract attention from the militarist tilt of the U.S. course which has made itself particularly felt during the current tour of Western Europe. Reagan had to resort to that maneuver to dampen the intensity of the outcry caused by his visit to a cemetery of Nazi cut-throats in Bitburg which revealed the genuine political meaning of the call for "reconciliation." According to the NEW YORK TIMES, discussing proposals for lessening tension in relations with the Soviet Union White House officials admit that they have been devised predominantly for solidifying support for Reagan in Western Europe.

A number of deputies to the European Parliament refused to attend or demonstratively left the meeting hall during the U.S. President's address in protest against the policy of the United States. In their statements to newsmen they denounced the "star wars" program and the economic boycott of Nicaragua and, also expressed indignation over the wreath-laying by Reagan at the cemetery where members of the Waffen-SS are buried.

U.S. Said Seeking Advantage

LD081745 Moscow TASS in English 1705 GMT 8 May 85

[Text] Moscow, 8 May (TASS)--TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

The speech by U.S. President Ronald Reagan to a special session of the European Parliament has been widely publicized by his advisers and assistants in advance. They proclaimed that the President would suggest the ways of easing tension in relations between the United States and the USSR, that the speech would contain peace initiatives. What turned out in reality?

The speech indeed abounds in high-sounding phrases and bombastic slogans. Those who compiled the speech did wonderfully well. If the President's words and deeds are compared, the real value of his "peaceable" pronouncements is clearly seen.

Our task... is to keep the peace with the Soviet Union... to introduce greater stability in our relationship with it, and live together in the world, the President declares. And goes right into insinuations, direct distortion of the Soviet Union's foreign policy which can in no way be regarded as conducive to greater stability in Soviet-U.S. relations. Perhaps, the U.S. Administration renounced the policy of "countervailing" the USSR and other socialist countries at long last? No, one will look in vain for any evidence of that both in that address and other statements by the present U.S. Administration officials.
"We cannot and should not seek to build our peace and freedom perpetually upon the basis of expanding nuclear arsenals," the President declares. This premise is in principle correct. But what follows it? The chief of the White House declares that the United States should preserve a modern and viable nuclear arsenal in all three elements of the strategic triad—sea, ground, and air-based weapon systems. He specifies that this is needed, allegedly, not for the quest of superiority, but simply for the quest of balance. For what purpose does the United States prepare to install in silos 100 first-strike MX nuclear missiles, is speeding up the production of the B-1 strategic bomber, is building up the nuclear potential of surface and underwater weapons, is deploying Pershing missiles and cruise missiles in Europe, is manufacturing 17,000 new units of nuclear ammunition?

It is absolutely clear that this is being done not for the "quest of balance" but for quite a different purpose.

The President states: "The Soviet Union, ... does not share our view of what constitutes a stable nuclear balance". He is right here for the Soviet Union cannot share the United States' treatment of the notion for "balance" American-style means the advantage on the United States side. The chief of the White House was obviously pining for the past, when he recalled that early in the 70s the United States lost its superiority over the Soviet Union in the sphere of strategic nuclear arms. Ronald Reagan who announced in October 1981 his "strategic programme" for the 80s, who planned for a decade ahead a huge build-up of the United States strategic nuclear potential, asked from the rostrum in Strasbourg: "Must we accept an endless process of nuclear arms competition?" Absolutely unabashed he said emphatically: "I don't think so". Is not this example of how Washington's deeds differ from words?

And what "peace initiatives" does the President of the United States suggest? Maybe the United States at last decided to follow the Soviet Union's good example and also assume the commitment to keep from the first use of nuclear weapons? Maybe Washington heeded Moscow's peaceful call and agrees to freeze nuclear arsenals and stop preparation for the creation of weapons to be deployed in space? No, nothing of the kind is mentioned in the President's speech, for this would interfere with Washington's ambitious plans. Reagan's "peace initiatives" turned out to be very modest and not at all new -- exchange of observers at military exercises and locations, establishing contacts between military leaders and military-to-military communications link, the expression of the readiness to "discuss" the Soviet proposal on non-use of force and then only provided that the Soviet Union agrees to military-technical confidence-building measures suggested by NATO countries in Stockholm.

But then there was "novelty", unexpectedly, in another part of the President's speech. According to him it is not the United States, but the Soviet Union that, allegedly, decided to build nuclear forces aimed at dealing a first strike. This is something new indeed. A greater absurdity is difficult to imagine. It is as if not the Soviet Union, but the United States assumed unilaterally the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. But even the most obvious lie must have a certain purpose. What is the purpose in this concrete case? The explanation is very simple. This lie is needed to "substantiate" in a new way the need for the United States to create a large-scale ABM system with elements of space basing, to work out the technology of "star wars".

By his statements and his practical deeds, the chief of the White House clearly shows that Washington's ways of "lowering tension" can carry the world into dangerous entanglements of "star wars", can lead it to nuclear catastrophe.
British Labourite's Criticism Cited

LD091631 Moscow TASS in English 1605 GMT 9 May 85

[Text] New York May 9 TASS -- An obvious fiasco -- this is how American mass media described the speech, couched in sharply anti-Soviet, confrontation tones, which was made by President Reagan at the special session of European Parliament in Strasbourg.

The session was planned to be a demonstration of Western unity, but the President's speech showed what deep differences his policy brought to Europe, the NBC television company points out. While conservatives noisily approved Reagan's pronouncements, almost half of members of European Parliament refused to applaud the President or to give him a standing welcome. According to the television company, Reagan's call for realisation of the "star wars" programme was received with disapproving exclamations, and when the boss of the White House started talking of the U.S. policy towards Nicaragua, about 30 parliament members demonstratively left the session hall.

The NBC, summing up the impression of the President's speech, stressed that it was one more blunder in his trip. The newspaper WASHINGTON POST points out that the speech made by the boss of the White House added to the impression that Reagan's European trip is an unsuccessful mission.

A provocative speech of an instigator of war -- this is how President Reagan's speech in Strasbourg was described by Barbara Castle, first deputy chairman of the socialist group of European Parliament, member of the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party. The President, she said in an interview to the ABC television company, made it clear that he would continue insisting on the development of the "star wars" programme. But our slogans are: "No to 'star wars'", "Hands-off Nicaragua", "No to cruise missiles and Pershing-2 missiles in Europe". We want deeds from the U.S. President not just words on "reconciliation", Barbara Castle stressed. As is reported by the newspaper NEW YORK TIMES, at a press conference in Strasbourg, Barbara Castle said that Reagan piled one provocation upon another, and did not mention Russia's contribution to the victory 40 years ago.

PRAVDA Sees 'Miscalculation'

PM101820 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 May 85 First Edition p 5

[TASS report under general heading: "Washington Politicians' Miscalculation. What the U.S. President's Visit to Europe Showed"]

[Excerpts] Washington, 10 May--President Reagan's 10-day trip to West European countries is over. The visit showed how deep and acute the contradictions between the United States and its allies are and how strong the alarm and indignation are in West Europe at the U.S. Administration's hegemonist course, which is fraught with a lethal threat to peace and international security.
As for the results of the conference of the "Seven" in Bonn, as THE WASHINGTON POST admits, Reagan's efforts to get its participants to approve Washington's course both in the sphere of foreign and military policy and in the economic sphere were unproductive. Reagan, the newspaper points out, ran up against "exceptional difficulties" during the conference: The West European participants refused point-blank to approve Washington's policy vis-à-vis Nicaragua, and, above all, the economic blockade that Reagan has announced against that country. The majority of the meeting participants expressed the most serious doubts about Reagan's "star wars" program, and France rejected practically all economic and foreign policy aspects of the administration's course.

Reagan's speech to the members of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, whose aim was to rally his West European partners in the "crusade" against communism proclaimed by the head of the present U.S. Administration, is assessed here as an ignominious failure. Shamelessly falsifying history, the U.S. President, saying not a word about the Soviet Union's decisive role in routing Hitler's reich, set about "overturning" the results of the postwar structure in Europe and lauded his administration's militarist, hegemonist policy as being aimed, or so he alleged, at strengthening peace, democracy, and freedom and even...reducing the threat of nuclear war. As a sign of protest many parliamentarians ostentatiously left the hall, and those who remained repeatedly interrupted Reagan's speech with shouts of "Hands off Nicaragua!" and "down with the 'star wars' program!"

In this connection many political observers, not without reason, are assessing the results of Reagan's trip to West Europe as a major miscalculation by the Washington politicians.

European Resistance to SDI

LD102248 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 10 May 85

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Nikolay Shishlin]

[Excerpt]

Another thing not without significance is the rather transparently manifested desire of America's allies to distance themselves from Washington's overtly imperial ventures. Let us ask ourselves these two relevant questions: Can one consider that, after this visit, Reagan has 100 percent support for his plan for a Strategic Defense Initiative? Certainly not. It goes without saying that class solidarity is class solidarity. It is being demonstrated, and that's a reality, and yet, with regard to the "star wars" plan, America's partners seem to be entertaining more and more reservations and doubts. Has the President achieved economic harmony as far as that area of his relations with his partners is concerned? Again, the correct answer to this question is also in the negative. It's no coincidence that U.S. representatives are themselves saying that the President is disappointed with the results of the meeting of the Seven. This was the 11th meeting in the framework of the capitalist Seven, and they failed yet again to elaborate or compile a collective prescription for the treatment of the disease of the capitalist economy. So, altogether, Reagan's disappointment is understandable, even if we don't share it.
Yet, the American President did score some success during his visit. He succeeded in displaying his nonacceptance of the realities that resulted from the Second World War. He was certainly successful in his unwillingness to acknowledge the outcome of post development, and he was successful in demonstrating his readiness to conduct the arms race in every conceivable or inconceivable direction. I don't think this was a mis-
calculation on the part of the President himself. It was intended. The United States is anxious to keep international relations inflamed because they see tense international relations as a sort of hoop for the allies. It's not for nothing that just at this time the United States is applying all the brakes to prevent any improvement of international relations.

The brakes are, of course, various, but this concerns, above all, the problems connected with military detente. Let's be frank, the first round of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva has been rather dismal. Yet, the well-known Soviet initiatives, given a thoughtful attitude to them on the part of the United States, could create the right atmosphere for fruitful work by the diplomats in Geneva. Another brake that the U.S. is using to prevent an improvement in international relations is their way of dealing with crises. They not only shun any just political settlement of existing conflicts.

SDI Appeal Scored

PM150857 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 May 85 p 9

[Fedor Burlatskiy "Political Observer's Notes": "The Price of 'Reconciliation!'"]

[Excerpt]

At the same time, these mass news media note with bewilderment and, in some cases, with obvious anger the opposite tack adopted in R. Reagan's Strasbourg speech. It is top-heavy with attacks on the Soviet Union and on our political system and domestic and foreign policy. NEWSWEEK magazine puts the new burst of anti-Soviet rhetoric down to the fact that the White House apparatus is giving increasing preference to ideological considerations and is "indulgenty allowing Reagan to be himself, without regard for the political consequences." That is certainly not the whole story. It seems that the main aim of the Strasbourg speech was to strengthen the NATO countries' unity and overcome their vacillation with regard to the U.S. program for the modernization of armaments, above all the "star wars" plan.

Was the aim achieved? Here is NBC correspondent (K. Uolles') remark from Strasbourg: "The President's speech showed what deep differences his policy has caused in Europe."

It was more than strange to hear the U.S. President's spokesman Larry Speakes complain at a briefing that the Reagan administration had been "surprised" by the "Soviet leader's tough speech." Now that is really the pot calling the kettle black.

Yes, our country has once again stated that it will never allow the strategic military balance between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO to be destroyed. But we will never, under any circumstances, give in to the temptation to imitate the United States in its policy of confrontation or in its rhetoric of hostility. Our people realize that if we, the socialist countries, do not struggle for detente, for a world without war, for a world without weapons, for civilized relations among all states, then who will? We sought and achieved, overcoming all obstacles, unity of action in World War II. Today our country is sparing no effort to achieve tangible successes in organizing active cooperation with all states in the interests of a peaceful future.

CSO: 5200/1160
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR MILITARY JOURNALIST HITS 24 APRIL SPEAKES' COMMENT ON GENEVA

LD251502 Moscow TASS in English 1432 GMT 25 Apr 85

[Text] Moscow April 25 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

At a news conference April 24 Larry Speakes, White House deputy press secretary, expressed the reaction of official Washington to the Soviet Union's assessment of the approach of the U.S. Administration to the Geneva talks. And yet another time, as is the custom of the U.S. Administration, the remarks of the deputy press secretary contained denial of hard facts, distorted interpretation of the subject and objectives of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space arms and, to be sure, unrestrained publicity for the White House's pseudo-peaceable intentions.

It turns out that Washington was offended by the appraisal of the first stage of the Geneva negotiations which states that Washington does not seek accord with the Soviet Union. Larry Speakes said that the U.S. was approaching the first round of the Geneva talks with the determination to work for radical reductions in nuclear arms, determination to lay the groundwork for a more stable strategic relationship, the White House spokesman maintained.

Well, if it was, it never did approach. Perhaps additional numbers of MX first-strike intercontinental ballistic missiles which the U.S. Administration tried to get from Congress in the duration of the first stage of Geneva talks are proof of its determination to work for radical reductions in nuclear arms? Perhaps the exorbitant military budget of the Pentagon standing at hundreds of billions of dollars is intended for laying the groundwork for stability? It is evident that U.S. President Reagan himself gave a more accurate assessment of the U.S. Administration's intentions and actions when he stated with satisfaction not so long ago that the United States had achieved progress in implementing a large-scale program for America's re-armament. It is clear to the whole world that the content of that program is not reduction but a buildup of the strategic nuclear potential of the United States and its objective is not stronger stability but the attainment of military superiority over the Soviet Union.

Larry Speakes tried to justify another aspect of Washington's actions — that the United States allegedly is not violating the Soviet-U.S. agreement on the interrelationship of the three guidelines at the talks: on preventing an arms race in space, on reducing nuclear strategic arms and reducing nuclear intermediate-range arms in Europe. Speakes admitted that for many years the United States kept saying that there existed a conceptual interrelationship between questions discussed at Geneva. However, Larry Speakes failed to disclose how and what exactly the U.S. was saying. Let us...
remind him, for example, what General Curtis Lemay, one of the organizers of the atomic
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, told the U.S. Congress way back in 1963. He said
that many people were opposed to the idea of developing space weapon systems in the
belief that the transfer of the arms race to space would not change the balance of
forces on earth. Nonetheless, the general also said, the future destiny of the world
would in all probability depend on the development of new weapon systems. Having
neutralized the nuclear missile systems of the enemy, the victor-country would be able
to dictate its own terms to it.

Senator Barry Goldwater was even more outspoken on the objective of space militarization
when he said that the one who controlled aerospace rules the world. This is the
essence of the conceptual interrelationship between space and offensive nuclear arms as
Washington understood and understands it in actual fact. It uses peace rhetoric only
to conceal its real aims.

Alleging that from the point of view of the United States the question of reducing
offensive nuclear arms cannot be regarded separately from a broader question of inter-
relationship between offensive and defensive forces, the White House deputy press
secretary is not saying the truth, to put it mildly, for Washington exactly does not want
and flatly refuses to discuss and resolve at Geneva the question of preventing the
spread of the arms race to outer space.

In a bid to justify at least to a certain extent the unconstructive U.S. position in the
Geneva negotiations Speakes went so far as to say about [as received] a unilateral inter-
pretation of the January accord by the Soviet Union. The question arises whether
Mr. Speakes gave himself the trouble of reading through the joint Soviet-U.S. statement.
For it says clearly and unequivocally that the objective of the negotiations will be to
work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating
it on earth. Let us emphasize: preventing, not "coordinating" the race in space weapons
which evidently the White House is eager to do. This means that it is exactly the U.S.
Administration that interprets the January accord unilaterally, or to be more straight-
forward, misinterprets it.

And finally the expression of the hope that the Soviet Union would demonstrate a con-
structive approach when the negotiations resume on May 30 was an ultimate in pharisism.
These words are clearly addressed to the wrong quarter. For the Soviet Union has
demonstrated its constructive approach with its practical actions, and not mere words,
by announcing a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of other counter-measures in
Europe, by proposing to introduce a moratorium for the entire duration of the talks on
the development of space weapons and to freeze nuclear arsenals.

The world over, that move was regarded as an important and constructive one, promoting
the success of the negotiations. But, as one Russian classic put it, "the whole company
is marching out of step, except the lieutenant" -- the White House yet another time
demonstrated its own, very distorted idea of constructiveness, it failed to make a
single gesture of goodwill in response to the Soviet initiatives, and even announced
them to be "propaganda". So who is to be urged to embark on the road of constructiveness?

If it gives up the intention of misleading public opinion it will become clear that the
incompatible with disarmament negotiations. The Soviet Union firmly
not encourage such a course. It is high time all those who

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I have already written about the Heritage Foundation in a military-political review. It is a scientific-research organization in the United States of a profoundly conservative nature, even by U.S. standards. It serves as a kind of "think tank" for the extreme right wing of the Republican Party and, on its behalf, gives the administration recommendations on a wide range of domestic and foreign policy problems. It included 1,300 proposals for the White House in its "Leadership Mandate 2" report, published on the eve of Reagan's second inauguration. The core of the foreign policy part of the recommendations was the demand to build up arms even more vigorously, to wind up any arms control talks, and to gamble on confrontation with the USSR in all directions.

Thus, quite recently the Heritage Foundation deemed it necessary to give the Reagan administration another piece of advice. It called for a final renunciation of the USSR-U.S. SALT II treaty, since even its formal recognition, in the opinion of the participants in a Heritage Foundation symposium held in Washington, makes it difficult to implement programs such as the production and deployment of the MX, Trident II, and Pershing II missiles, air- and ground-launched cruise missiles, and B-1B bombers, and to keep the existing arsenals of strategic arms untouched.

So far there have been no reports that this recommendation has been adopted. Obviously, the White House thinks it inconvenient at the moment to renounce the aforesaid treaty, which the United States declined to ratify after signing, though it announced that it would observe it. However, the implementation of the programs for a race in strategic arms that were discussed at the symposium is continuing at full speed, just like the programs for preparations for "star wars." In an attempt to wreck the military equilibrium established between the Soviet Union and the United States, Washington is undermining stability in the world, complicating the international situation, and sometimes bringing Soviet-U.S. relations to the brink of acute tension.
These actions by the Washington administration have brought the development of world events to a dangerous line. The peoples of the world are demanding increasingly insistently that the development of events be reversed and efforts be made to prevent this line from being crossed and to stop mankind from being plunged into the abyss of a nuclear catastrophe.

Such a catastrophe can and must be prevented. The way to do this is opened up by the Soviet Union’s consistent and principled policy in the international arena and the new Soviet initiatives.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that it is impossible to build international relations successfully without taking into account the realities of the modern world, that is, that there are two diametrically opposed social systems — socialism and capitalism. At the same time, it is necessary to take account of the fact that dozens of new and active states with their own history, traditions, and interests have emerged in the international arena. This must be recognized and the interests of other states also cannot be ignored; still less can attempts be made to deprive them of their right to choose their own path of development.

With what, specifically, could things start? Here too the Soviet Union has stated its case and indicated a constructive and sensible path.

The Soviet Union has proposed that for the entire period of the Geneva talks the USSR and the United States declare a moratorium on the creation, including scientific research work, testing, and deployment of strike space arms, and freeze their strategic offensive arms. At the same time, the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and, correspondingly, the buildup of Soviet retaliatory measures should be stopped.

Showing its goodwill, the Soviet Union is at the same time introducing a moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles and halting the implementation of other retaliatory measures in Europe. The moratorium will remain in force until this November. What decision the Soviet Union makes after this depends on whether the United States follows the example it has been set: whether it stops deploying its medium-range missiles in Europe.

These far-reaching and topical proposals put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in conversations with the editor of PRAVDA and the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives have attracted close attention from broad circles of the world public. They have again seen for themselves that the Soviet Union strives to create a favorable atmosphere for normalizing the overall international situation and improving Soviet-U.S. relations, which are an exceptionally important factor in international politics. Eminent statesmen, public figures, and the mass media in foreign countries are making a high assessment of the political will shown by the Soviet Union to prevent an arms race in space, end it on earth, and embark on radical reductions in nuclear arms, with their complete elimination as the ultimate goal.

Just how did the U.S. Administration react to the Soviet peace initiatives; what was its attitude to the Soviet proposals, which were addressed above all to it? Its spokesmen announced their negative attitude to the new Soviet proposals with strange haste.
Obviously without bothering to study the substance of the proposals, White House Deputy Press Secretary Speakes announced his negative attitude to them straight off. Moreover, the same Speakes stated that the Soviet Union's unilateral declaration of a moratorium until this November on the deployment of its medium-range missiles and and halting of other retaliatory measures in Europe "will not influence" the U.S. plans to site Pershing II and cruise missiles in West Europe.

It may be said that Speakes is just a civil servant, albeit a high-ranking one, but how did the White House chief himself respond to the Soviet proposals? Essentially the same way. In a long interview with THE TIMES of London, he avoided directly answering the questions posed by the Soviet side, which has put forward constructive new proposals. The U.S. President asserted that the decision announced by the USSR to introduce a moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles and to halt the implementation of other retaliatory measures in Europe until this November was a "propaganda" move. He ignored the Soviet Union's call for the adoption of a sensible stance which could help in stopping the accumulation of nuclear arms and in embarking on their reduction. Judging by Reagan's statements, he takes the opposite position.

Recently, members of the U.S. Administration have started resorting to a long-standing favorite trick overseas. They publicly state that the Soviet Union's proposals are propaganda. In this connection it is apposite to recall that when people in Washington do not want to agree with their opponent's opinion, his arguments are categorized as propaganda.

Yes, people in Washington make no secret of the fact that they are gambling on force and counting on a superior force which would subordinate the rest of the world to America. A special role in this is allocated to the plans for the militarization of space.

The authors of these plans want to make people believe that it is a question of harmless scientific research, and research which allegedly promises technological benefits. They want to convince people that it is possible to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons through the creation of space weapons. This is what is said in statements for public consumption, so to speak. But in essence?

Here is what the news agencies reported from Washington the other day. A Pentagon report published there notes that "great progress" has been achieved in the creation and deployment of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements. The "successes" in the sphere of the creation of high-energy particle beam weapons intended to destroy enemy ballistic missiles were particularly stressed. On the admission of a ranking official in the military department, the progress has been so marked that there is already talk of deploying particle beam weapons in orbit. The report contains the conclusion that these "achievements" make it possible to considerably accelerate the pace of preparations for the implementation of the space military programs.

Everything is happening as the Soviet Union has indicated. They talk about defense and prepare for attack, they publicize a space shield and forge a space sword, they promise to eliminate nuclear weapons and in practice build them up and improve them. Other U.S. military plans are also geared to the same goal. In a recent report Defense Secretary Weinberger, according to THE WASHINGTON POST, pointed out: "The United States must maintain a powerful deterrent potential; that is, the potential to inflict a destructive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union threatening the existence of the society itself." The use of this potential, the newspaper writes, is determined by the so-called Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP), which defines the targets for all the approximately 10,000 nuclear warheads in the U.S. strategic nuclear weapons arsenal. According to the same newspaper, SIOP is a plan to wipe out the Soviet industrial infrastructure and other strategic targets and to destroy cities. SIOP is constantly updated and is reviewed and refined roughly twice a year.
The Washington administration intends, so foreign observers are noting, to reaffirm its line of confrontation with the Soviet Union at the forthcoming conference of presidents and prime ministers of seven Western countries in early May. Although the conference should formally be devoted above all to economic problems, the United States will strive to slant the discussions toward politics and military strategy. This has already happened at the previous conferences in Versailles, Williamsburg, and London, but now in Bonn the U.S. partners will be instructed to approve Reagan's "star wars" program, which is the core of Washington's present course.

People in the Soviet Union are following the U.S. Administration's actions attentively. At the same time, it is believed in the USSR that the potential exists for improving Soviet-U.S. relations and ameliorating the international situation. Political will is necessary to implement this, and the Soviet Union does not lack this will. The United States continues to regard confrontation as virtually a natural state. Is it not time for Washington to respond to the imperative command of the time?

Chernyshev Commentary

PM290924 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Apr 85 Second Edition p 3

[Article by V. Chernyshev, colonel of the reserve: "Washington's Futile Ambitions"]

Relations between the USSR and the United States are an exceptionally important factor in international politics. The 25 April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum reaffirmed the Soviet Union's readiness to improve relations with the United States to mutual advantage and without attempts to enroach upon one another's legitimate interests. Interpreting both the positive and negative experience accumulated during the history of USSR-U.S. relations, one cannot conclude that the most sensible thing for our countries and the whole world is to seek ways leading to the smoothing out of relations and to build a bridge of cooperation from both sides.

For its part, the Soviet Union is building this bridge in practice. Everyone knows that its unilateral pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons has been in effect since 1982 and that the unilateral moratorium on being the first to launch antiasatellite weapons into space has been in effect since 1983.

The USSR recently proposed introducing for the entire duration of the USSR-U.S. talks in Geneva a moratorium on the creation (including scientific research work), testing, and deployment of strike space weapons, and also freezing the strategic offensive weapons of both the Soviet Union and the United States at the present quantitative level. In order to prove its goodwill, it announced that it will unilaterally halt until November of this year further deployment of its own medium-range missiles and suspend the implementation of other countermeasures in Europe.

All these proposals could be a substantial factor ensuring a higher level of trust between both countries, improving the general climate at the talks, and facilitating progress toward the attainment of mutually acceptable accords.

How did the U.S. Administration react to this? Immediately, with a haste that caused astonishment throughout the world, it announced its negative attitude toward the Soviet initiatives and refused to take any answering [vstrechnyye] positive steps.
Furthermore, official Washington is doing its utmost to misrepresent the USSR's actions aimed at alleviating the military danger and attaining accords and creating distrust of them.

The U.S. Administration is totally unwilling to make its contribution to building the bridge of cooperation. The first stage of the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons, which has just ended, gives grounds for saying that Washington is not steering a course toward agreement with the Soviet Union. It is obvious that certain U.S. circles still want to attain a dominant position in the world, primarily in the military sphere.

Washington is demonstrating by practical deeds its unwillingness to even slow down the flywheel of the arms race, which is spinning at enormous speed. All components of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces are being modernized at full speed. The deployment of MX ICBM's is being stepped up, production of launchers for the Midgetman mobile missiles has started, and the deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in West Europe is continuing. The Air Force has completed the modernization of 98 B-52 bombers, refitting them as cruise missile delivery vehicles, and has started series production of the B-1B strategic bomber; the Navy is continuing the construction of Ohio class nuclear missile submarines and is installing cruise missiles on warships at full speed. In an interview with THE WASHINGTON POST, President R. Reagan announced with satisfaction that the United States "has made progress in implementing the broad program for America's rearmament," which, as is well known, is aimed at gaining military superiority over the USSR.

Having spent almost $1 trillion on military purposes during its first 4 years in power, the administration is already planning to appropriate $2 trillion for these purposes in the next 5-year period (1986-1990). The plans envisage faster implementation of the program to develop and deploy the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a strategic advanced technology bomber using "Stealth" technology, an aircraft which, according to the Pentagon's calculations, cannot be detected by modern air defense means, and so on and so forth. In the current decade alone the United States is planning to increase by at least 50 percent the potential of its strategic forces to deliver nuclear munitions in a single launch or flight.

All these and many other militarist actions in no way accord with the "interest" in reducing nuclear arms which has been proclaimed by official Washington.

Let us take an important problem which is perturbing all of mankind, the problem of preventing the militarization of space.

Here too we see the same picture. Having proclaimed the "Strategic Defense Initiative," which envisages the creation of large-scale ABM defenses with space-based components, Washington is totally unwilling to give up its plans which are dangerous for the cause of peace.

At the Geneva talks the United States is altogether refusing to discuss the question of not extending the arms race to space simultaneously with the question of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons. It is thus violating the accord reached last January on the interconnection of the three directions -- the prevention of an arms race in space, the reduction of strategic arms, and the reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. High-ranking representatives of the administration, and primarily the President, keep on declaring that "research" on the "star wars" will continue in any case. THE WASHINGTON POST wrote that the President's idea that the United States
can simultaneously create defenses along the "star wars" lines and reach agreement on disarmament is regarded as unconvincing by almost everyone who is carefully observing these problems from the sidelines. Out of all the instances of dishonesty now permeating the discussion of these problems, probably the most dishonest is the assertion that the creation of a system on "star wars" lines will somehow put an end to the arms race.

Washington's objectives were very aptly described by the U.S. journal ARMS CONTROL TODAY: "The fact that strategic defense makes sense only as a means of obtaining the potential for a first strike against the enemy is one of the most destabilizing and dangerous aspects of the whole enterprise... ABM defenses, in all probability, will fuel the dream of nuclear superiority and at the same time step up the race in offensive arms."

All this clearly shows that in the "defense" sphere Washington is by no means pursuing the goal of strengthening trust.

The peace-loving public is also expressing serious concern about other facts. The present U.S. Administration, which neither concluded nor ratified a single nuclear arms limitation agreement in its first 4 years in office, is now threatening to destroy the system of previously reached accords.

The 1972 ABM Treaty is in jeopardy. E. Rowny, special consultant to the U.S. President and secretary of state, has stated outright that unless the USSR nevertheless accepts the idea of the "Strategic Defense Initiative," the "question of terminating the ABM Treaty will have to be considered." Many U.S. politicians and specialists realize what serious consequences this might entail. For instance, a report by the U.S. "National Campaign To Save the ABM Treaty" points out that in the next few years the "Strategic Defense Initiative" will "contravene" the treaty, and the undermining of this treaty will lead to an expensive new arms race.

The public is also seriously concerned at the position regarding the 1979 Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the SALT II treaty). It has not been ratified by Congress, but the U.S. side stated its intention to "refrain from actions" undermining the treaty and "not to evade it in any way." Yet recently, U.S. Secretary of State Shultz was asked in a Senate subcommittee whether the Reagan administration intends to continue to adhere to the provisions of the SALT II treaty. The secretary of state replied: "We will have to decide that question when the time comes... I cannot disclose here what I will recommend..." In saying "when the time comes" Shultz was thinking of the sea trials planned for this October of the Ohio class nuclear submarine Alaska, whose commissioning would lead to the limitation laid down by the treaty being exceeded.

Sober-minded figures in the United States recognize that it is necessary to stop the arms race. The key to curbing and ending the arms race does not lie in "defensive" technology.

The best way of reducing the threat lies in immediately declaring a freeze on strategic offensive arms and introducing a moratorium on the pursuit of any work in the sphere of strike space arms. The Soviet Union is prepared for these cardinal decisions and has already unilaterally taken an important practical step. The ball is now in Washington's court.
The Soviet Union expresses the hope that the current U.S. position will be amended. This would open up the possibility of reaching mutually acceptable accords and would serve the cause of strengthening international security.

As for Washington's hopes of military superiority, those ambitious plans are futile. The achievement of military-strategic equilibrium with the NATO bloc states is an exceptionally important historic gain by the socialist countries, and this parity must be guarded in every possible way for the sake of peace. "We will continue to spare no effort," the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum stressed, "to ensure that the USSR Armed Forces have everything necessary for the reliable defense of our fatherland and its allies and that no one can take us unawares."

CSO: 5200/1135
WESTERN MEDIA SAID TO 'DISTORT' GORBACHEV PLENUM REMARKS

LD251032 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 25 Apr 85

[From the "International Diary" program, presented by Viktor Levin]

[Excerpts] Hello, comrades. The foreign mass news media are allotting paramount attention to the materials of the CPSU Central Committee plenum which took place on 23 April. To judge from the reports on it [Gorbachev's speech to the CPSU Central Committee plenum] which have come in to our editorial office, along with, I would say, the traditional interest in the foreign policy section, questions on internal policy touched on in the report are attracting no less attention.

While the bourgeois press is trying to interpret acute problems and criticisms raised in the report as a sign of weakness in the Soviet economy, our friends justly consider the critical analysis, on the contrary, as a sign of strength and conviction in the inexhaustible potentials of the socialist system.

The bourgeois press -- I won't say all of it, but a significant part of it -- is trying to interpret the analysis of the international situation as a virtual attack on the United States of America, but in those cases where the newspapers reproduce corresponding evaluations of the report, both ends clearly do not meet. For example, the NEW YORK TIMES writes, and I quote: As the Soviet leader stated, the first stage of talks on space and nuclear weapons in Geneva has shown that the United States is not striving to reach an agreement. Moreover, it tries to cast aspersions on the Soviet position.

If one turns to the report, however, then everything fits in its proper place. The analysis of Soviet-U.S. relations begins with the confirmation of the Soviet Union's readiness to improve relations with the U.S. for mutual benefit and without attempts to infringe on each other's lawful rights and interests. This fundamental proposition is for some reason ignored as a rule, and what is said about the Geneva talks is ripped out of context, and what's more, with distortions.

What was said is as follows: The stage of the Geneva talks which has ended gives grounds for saying that Washington is holding a course not set for accord with the Soviet Union. This conclusion is substantiated, and to conclude, it is again repeated: We would like to express the hope that the United State's present position will be corrected. It would open up the possibility for attaining mutually acceptable accords. Such a readiness, stressed the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is evident from our side.

So attempts to heap the blame on us for the state of affairs at the Geneva talks are absolutely groundless. Our position is honorable, constructive, and principled.
With what did the United States answer our initiatives? A hasty no. After it had put itself in an unattractive position, it found nothing better to do than to set in motion dirty slander against the Soviet Union.

I have in front of me a DPA telegram from Brussels. It reports a statement by Richard Burt, the head of the European department at the U.S. State Department, in which he alleges that the Soviet Union is still installing launchers for medium-range missiles, thereby violating its own decision on the introduction of a unilateral moratorium.

The aim of this slanderous fabrication is to discredit the Soviet Union and cast doubt on its integrity, and thereby to justify the United States, but if it is necessary to resort to deliberate lies for justification, then it is futile to count on success. It is not the first time that we have come up against attempts to distort the Soviet Union's peace-loving foreign policy, and from all appearances, it is not the last, yet we believe in things working out for the best.

CSO: 5200/1133
GORBACHEV COMMENTS ON TALKS AT WARSAW PACT RENEWAL MEETING

LD290909 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 85 First Edition p 2

[Speech by M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, at a reception 26 April in Warsaw in honor of the participants in the Warsaw Pact conference]

[Excerpt] It is not the Soviet Union and other socialist states that have initiated the split of Europe and the post-war world. That has been done by the creators of NATO, while our alliance was formed only 6 years later. Since then, we have expressed our readiness more than once to dissolve the Warsaw Treaty if NATO agrees to respond in kind. This principled position wholly stands. However, regrettably, the other side did not and does not have such an intention. On the contrary, new aggressive doctrines are being put forward there and a crash effort is being exerted to build up both nuclear and conventional arms before our eyes. This now makes us think of further strengthening the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Mankind has been confronted with the following choice: Either it is able to rectify the unfavorable course of events or the risk of outbreak of a nuclear war will continue to grow. This risk is multiplied by U.S. military plans in space. No matter what their authors say and how they justify themselves, the essence of these plans is clear: to acquire the possibility to deal the first nuclear blow and do that with impunity. Since the United States and NATO flatly refuse to follow the example of the USSR and pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, their intentions assume an especially dangerous nature.

The development of weapons for "star wars" is just beginning. However, it is already making the present-day world develop a fever and leading to the destabilization of the entire system of international relations, to even sharper political and military confrontation than at present. This should not be forgotten by both the initiators of the above provocative undertaking and by those who are being invited to share it.

We take a fundamentally different approach: not to make space into a new source of the threat of war, not to create space attack weapons, and to scrap the existing anti-satellite systems. Simultaneously, we propose coming to terms on a radical reduction of nuclear systems and moving towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons altogether.
Such a simple and natural move, as a freeze on nuclear potentials of both sides, prompts itself. An objection is put forward: To agree to that means to solidify the Soviet military superiority. However, first of all, there is no such superiority. We have repeatedly proved that, citing figures, and Washington has failed to disprove them a single time. And second, who said that we want to stop at a freeze? On the contrary, we insist that a drastic reduction in nuclear arms follow it.

We have already suggested that both sides reduce strategic offensive arms by one-quarter by way of an opening move. However, we would have no objections to making deeper mutual cuts. All this is possible if the arms race does not begin in space, if it is peaceful.

The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries seek no superiority either on earth or in space. We are not striving to compete over who will build a higher nuclear fence. However, we shall prevent the military-strategic parity from being upset. This is a common and firm position of the Warsaw Treaty members. If preparations for "star wars" go on, we will have no other choice but to take response measures, including, of course, a buildup and improvement of offensive nuclear arms.

The just ended first round of Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space arms has demonstrated that they are not plain sailing. It is clear that the negotiations can only be a success on condition that the principle of equality and identical security is observed and the accord on the objective of the negotiations and interrelated resolution of the questions discussed is adhered to.

The Soviet Union, as has already been announced, unilaterally halted the deployment of intermediate-range missiles and implementation of other response measures in Europe. The moratorium went into effect as of 7 April. The world public and many sober-minded American and Western European politicians have estimated that move of ours at its true worth. We have the right to hope that Washington and the capitals of other NATO countries will be more serious and thoughtful in evaluating our initiative and, in turn, show restraint on the issue of siting of U.S. missiles in Western Europe, for mutuality on that issue would assist in directing the Geneva negotiations to the plane of practical decisions and play its role in the settlement of more complex problems.
FRG PRESS REPORTS ON ZIMYANIN REMARKS DURING VISIT CRITICIZED

LD271526 Moscow TASS in English 1448 GMT 27 Apr 85

[Text] Bonn April 27 TASS -- The West German mass media are fond of calling themselves "free", "independent", "non-partisan" and "open to all standpoints and views". These, however, are just beautiful words, nothing more than a propaganda myth and an attempt to pass the desirable for reality. This has been borne out once again by the coverage by the mass media in the Federal Republic of Germany of a recent visit here by a delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR led by Mikhail Zimyanin.

When representative delegations come to the USSR from the FRG and their leaders make speeches at receptions or other official meetings, in the editorial offices of West German news agencies, newspapers and magazines they pull rulers out of their tables and use them to see if the Russians have abridged speeches by this or that delegation member in their papers. As a matter of fact, such speeches are published regularly in the Soviet press and as fully as possible in order to enable the readers to familiarize themselves with the position of a representative of another country on this or that issue in the undistorted, original form. In Bonn, in particular at the Federal Government's Press and Information Department which is the main center for official propaganda, they keep a careful and pedantic watch on the publication of such speeches in Soviet papers and immediately send forth a command to raise an outcry and expose mythical "intrigues of censorship" if they suddenly miss some insignificant line.

But how do matters stand with the presentation of the Soviet standpoint on the more important political issues of the times and bilateral relations in the FRG itself? Can an ordinary West German reader see relevant material published in newspapers in the original form, without additions of what one has not said and without obtrusive commentary? Hardly, that is, in most cases it is impossible.

During the nearly week-long visit the head of the Soviet delegation spoke before West German members of parliament more than once, summarizing the USSR's principled position on a number of important questions of international politics as well as bilateral relations. He spoke about how baneful the continued arms buildup is, called attention to the new Soviet peace initiatives that had been put forward in a PRAVDA interview by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and set forth the USSR's view on Ronald Reagan's "star wars" plans and the FRG's possible involvement in their realization.
It is to these problems, which disturb public opinion in the FRG profoundly, that Mikhail Zimyanin's speeches were devoted, in particular, at a meeting with members of the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Commission and at a press conference in Bonn.

And what did common West Germans learn of the USSR's position on these questions? Virtually nothing new. Instead of the authentic Soviet position they once again were fed, as had been repeatedly the case before, the same old anti-Soviet soup concocted at the Bonn propaganda kitchen. At first the FRG's mass media tried to hush up those statements altogether. But then, having apparently been issued an order from the Press and Information Department, they responded with a gush of malicious articles cooked up in keeping with the identical primitive recipe "the Soviet threaten", "the Soviet charge", "the Soviets blast".

One cannot learn from West German papers what it was that the Soviet representative really said to West German parliamentarians, what the USSR's position on the urgent problems of disarmament is, where the Soviet Union sees the main danger of the arms race extending to outer space, and which arguments it uses in this connection. The broad readership was deliberately deprived of this possibility. Instead of the concrete and substantiated Soviet stand it was offered only fragments of individual phrases torn out of their context and laced with a sizable amount of tendentious commentary and conjectures. This is what is demanded by the much-vaunted "freedom of information" in the FRG. It is apparently out of the question that the broad West German readership be able to see for itself the Soviet Union's sincere interest in the preservation of peace, which has prompted its recent initiatives.

Some people need that anti-Soviet prejudices persist in the minds of the citizens of the FRG and that they believe in the myth about a "threat from the East". For them propaganda will find it easier to ram it down their throats that it is "beneficial" for the FRG to share in Ronald Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative". Another attempt to do that was made the other by Christian Geisler, secretary-general of the Christian Democratic Union [CDU], as he spoke at a meeting of the CDU-CSU [Christian Social Union] faction in the Bundestag. He did not, and could not, say anything new in favor of the Reagan initiative. But that official, who occupies what is far from the last place in the hierarchy of the ruling coalition, lost all sense of proportion and decency in his rudely anti-Soviet allegations which he invoked to justify the "expediency" of plans to militarize space. According to Geisler's perverted logic, the evil for civilization lies not in the threat of war and not in the pernicious arms race, including that in space weaponry, but "in the existence of the Soviet regime". It is this that "the Germans should be told more frequently", Reagan's disciple demanded, letting himself go in his zeal. So is it really surprising against the backdrop of such vicious dictation that the much-praised "free" West German press conceals the truth about the political position of the USSR, replacing it with home-manufactured insinuations in the guise of "commentary"?
WEEKLY USSR RADIO ROUNDTABLE VIEWS U.S. STANCE AT TALKS

LD281741 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 28 Apr 85

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Boris Andrianov, All-Union Radio foreign policy commentator, Dmitriy Antonovich Volskiy, member of the editorial board of NOVOYE VREMYA, and Edgar Anatoliyevich Cheporov, APN political observer]

[Excerpt] [Cheporov] The Soviet Union is ready to improve relations with the United States. There is no kind of fatal inevitability about confrontation between the two countries. This was emphasized at the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum. The experience accumulated during the history of Soviet-U.S. relations testifies to the fact that the most reasonable course is to seek ways to even out relations: Thus it was in the 1970's, when American politicians acknowledged that it was in policies of peaceful cooperation with the Soviet Union that strengthening of United States' national security should be sought. It was at this time that a series of agreements and accords were concluded by which both sides undertook not to strive for military superiority and to respect the principle of equality and trust in relations.

The situation and atmosphere at present, however, are quite different, and the blame of for this lies with Washington, which is pioneering the arms race, sabotaging disarmament and does not wish to take account of its previous agreements.

[Volskiy] This position, indeed, was reflected in the current Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, negotiations with whose successful outcome mankind's hopes for a peaceful future are linked. The first round of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue in Geneva has ended. Summing up the results of this, Kampelman, the head of the American delegation, commented that this round, I shall quote his words, served a useful purpose in promoting understanding of one another's position. Kampelman's evaluation in fact went no further than this. Well, the positions of the sides did indeed become clear in the course of the Geneva discussion. It became clear that Washington is maintaining a course not towards agreement with the Soviet Union, but is trying to use the negotiations in its own interests and to the detriment of the interests of its partner and, indeed, of mankind as a whole.
Such a conclusion follows first and foremost from the fact that the United States altogether refuses to discuss the question of not spreading the arms race into space at the same time as discussing the question of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons. This, however, is nothing other than a violation of the agreement reached in January between USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State Shultz, on the interrelation of the three aspects: preventing the arms race in space, reducing nuclear strategic weapons, and reducing medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Such a position can be explained by the fact that certain circles in the United States still want to attain a dominant position in the world, primarily a military one. With this in view Washington is currently urgently recruiting supporters and, I might add, people who will implement its plans for space militarization. Is it succeeding?

Andrianov] Washington's Atlantic and other allies are beginning to take an increasingly skeptical view of the American "star wars" program. One weighty piece of evidence of this is the results of a session of the Western European Union Council at the foreign and defense minister level, which recently ended in Bonn, results that gave rise to obvious anxiety on Washington's part. Those participating in the session never did reach a unanimous opinion on Reagan's initiative; that is, they did not express unconditional support for it.

Cheporov] Those in the West who failed to fall for the old wives' tale about the exclusively defensive nature of Reagan's initiative cannot fail to take account of the fact that the realization of this initiative will make the entire system of evaluating the strategic balance and calculating the correlation of forces almost impossible. In other words, the strategic situation in relations between the USSR and United States and also between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO will inevitably be destabilized. As a result of this, the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war will increase immeasurably. Such is the prospect prepared for mankind by the creators and supporters of the "star wars" strategy, a prospect to which the public does not want to be reconciled and that sober-minded politicians also oppose.

The hope in the Soviet Union is that the present position of the United States will be corrected. This would open up the possibility for reaching mutually acceptable agreements. We are in favor of preventing space militarization and reaching an international agreement banning the use of force in space and from space against the earth. It was to these ends that as far back as 1983 the Soviet Union declared a unilateral moratorium on launching antisatellite weapons into space until such time as other states acted likewise.

Volskiiy] Yes, our country proposed that the Soviet Union and United States should introduce, for the entire period of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations in Geneva, a moratorium on developing, including scientific research projects, testing, and deploying strike space weapons, and that both sides should freeze their strategic offensive weapons. At the same time, deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe was to be halted, as, correspondingly, was the increase of our countermeasures. Once again demonstrating goodwill, the Soviet Union has introduced up to November of the current year, a moratorium on deployment of its medium-range missiles and has halted implementation of other countermeasures in Europe.
[Cheporov] The Soviet Union is thus making the most natural and reasonable proposals: first and foremost, to stop a further increase in nuclear arsenals on earth, stop preparations for creating weapons for deployment in space, and on that basis, in the conditions of mutual confidence thereby strengthened, at once to start drawing up an agreement on reducing stockpiled weapons. In Geneva the Soviet Union will work persistently for specific and mutually acceptable agreements that would make it possible not only to put an end to the arms race but to promote the cause of disarmament.

[Andrianov] Speaking at the reception in Warsaw last Saturday, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev expressed his firm conviction that war can and must be prevented, by joint efforts. Such is the will of the peoples of our countries, said the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and it is toward this, the Soviet leader stressed, that the policy of our parties and governments and the entire activity of the defensive alliance of the socialist states is directed.

Our roundtable meeting has drawn to a close. All those who took part thank you for your attention, esteemed comrade radio listeners.
HUNGARIAN COLONEL GIVES BACKGROUND ANALYSIS OF TALKS

Budapest NEPHADSEREG in Hungarian 16 Feb 85 p 5

[Article by Engineer Lt Col Gyorgy Szentesi: "Before Geneva: Concerning the Interdependencies"]

[Text] Compared to the lack of success of arms limitation last year, the meeting of the Soviet and American foreign ministers at the beginning of January must be counted as a step forward. In their talks Gromyko and Shultz not only decided on a renewal of the bilateral dialog but also agreed to concentrate their attention on three organically interdependent themes at an entirely new discussion forum.

The close linking to one another of these three partial areas—strategic offensive weapons, medium-range nuclear weapons and space weapons—significant even in themselves, does not count as something new for the experts. What is new is that the Soviet Union has succeeded in getting the Reagan government to put the three groups of questions in one "basket."

Fundamental Goal of Talks

The question might arise: Why is it not sufficient to deal with just one sphere of problems, the weapons of a strategic character in the Soviet-American relationship, as in the earlier SALT or START (SALART) talks? The answer is obvious: It is not sufficient because the fundamental goal of the talks is to work out an agreement which would prescribe a mutual, balanced arms reduction on the basis of equality and equal security and which would also prescribe significant developmental limitations. This must be done in such a way that the strategic parity actually existing between the two powers should not change in the process, i.e. that one side should not try to change this determining factor of international security at the expense of the other.

In this regard the goal of the new talks has not changed in comparison to earlier ones, for from the beginning this was the theoretical starting point of the SALT process which began in 1969. As will be remembered, the SALT 1 treaty signed in 1972 was based on this understanding; on the one hand it froze the number of offensive strategic missiles at the level of that time and on the other hand it limited the further development of and the number of anti-missile systems which could be deployed. The SALT 2 agreement signed in
1979 (but not ratified) reduced somewhat—as a further step—the devices which could be used for strategic purposes and also contained numerous developmental restrictions.

One of the most important substantive elements of the new agreement to be worked out might be—and should be—a significant reduction of the quantity of strategic missiles or of the nuclear warheads which can reach determined targets with them. But this question cannot be studied by itself, and talks limited exclusively to this theme could hardly lead to a satisfactory result.

Strategic Power Relationship

We must note that from the beginning the question of medium-range, land-based nuclear weapons disturbed progress in strategic arms limitation. The American nuclear missile devices in this category deployed in Europe have a quite different significance in the Soviet-American strategic power relationship than the similar Soviet weapons also placed in Europe. While the Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons on our continent have strategic significance only in Europe—the territory of the United States cannot be reached with them—the character of the American medium-range nuclear weapons also deployed here is practically equivalent to that of the missiles on board submarines.

Without doubt this causes a serious problem for the Soviet Union. Let us presume that progress is made in the area of strategic weapons in the absolute sense and both sides limit to a corresponding degree the quantity of land intercontinental missiles or on-board submarine missiles and the nuclear warheads which can reach a target with them. At the same time, however, in the absence of a valid international agreement, the Western European deployment of new American medium-range nuclear weapons continues. What would this mean? Obviously it would mean that Euro-strategic devices would take the place of a certain number of American submarine on-board missiles being disassembled in accordance with the hypothetical agreement, upsetting the strategic balance defined by the agreement.

Warheads Capable of Reaching Target

From the viewpoint of the Soviet Union and its allies it is essentially entirely the same—that is, is judged in the same way—whether their territory is threatened by warheads which can reach a target with on-board submarine Poseidon or Trident missiles or land Pershing 2 missiles or cruise missiles. Indeed, as for the Pershing 2's in the FRG, the danger to the socialist community is actually greater than that from the on-board submarine missiles to the extent that the former are deployed a good bit closer to their planned targets, and so could reach the installation to be destroyed more quickly. So the effect of medium-range nuclear devices on the Soviet-American strategic power relationships cannot be ignored. For this reason one cannot imagine a mutual and considerable reduction in strategic weapons if the Western European deployment of the new American medium-range Pershing 2's and cruise missiles continues. The interrelationship—as we can see—is striking even logically.

Speaking of space weapons, it is not hard to understand that this comes into the foreground especially now in regard to the stability and durability of the
Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreement to be signed. If, while the agreement is being worked out, factors come into the foreground which with very great probability may upset the strategic balance of the two powers within a few years then is there any sense in signing the agreement? From this viewpoint any effort which would make possible missile interception offering either side absolute or almost absolute security in space would certainly be destabilizing. Building such a system and winning the strategic advantage going with it would give the attacking side the possibility of a risk-free first strike, because in the possession of this defense it could ward off the counter-blow. Such a defense might be provided by missile intercepting ray beam weapons guided from space—which might be realized in 10-20 years.

Winning Absolute Superiority

Taking all this into consideration one might have doubts whether the American partner sincerely desires an honorable agreement. While it is apparently inclined toward working out an agreement resulting in a significant reduction of strategic weapons, at the same time it is conducting intensive research and development work to develop a missile interception system aimed at winning absolute superiority.

The aspiration for missile defense which can be carried out from space and the expressed desire in connection with limiting strategic missiles are also contradictory simply because the advantage offered by space defense systems can be counterbalanced most simply by a great increase in the quantity of offensive missiles.

To the extent that the United States finally commits itself to realization of a missile defense in space, the Soviet Union will not decrease but must increase the quantity of its strategic missile weapons, because only in this way can it prevent the American side from winning absolute superiority. In the final analysis, a failure to limit space weapons might endanger the stability of the strategic balance, so this sphere of questions cannot be avoided when limiting strategic weapons.

Of course, it can be imagined that the talks beginning on 12 March might yield partial results in the limitation of medium range or strategic nuclear weapons, but we can take it as certain that there is a realistic prospect for a new, truly worthy Soviet-American agreement only if progress is made in all three partial areas.

8984
CSO: 5200/3037
Vienna May 14 (CTK)—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko stressed the need to exert big effort for a halt to the adverse development in world affairs, and a turn to the better in Soviet-U.S. relations, when he held talks with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz here today.

He was critical of Washington's policy in general, and especially in the questions of security, and voiced concern over the non-constructive attitude of the U.S. at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons.

Andrey Gromyko stressed the need for strict observance of the January agreement on the subject and objectives of the Geneva talks, providing for the discussion and solution of questions connected with averting the arms race in space and halting it on earth as a linked issue. A significant first step at the talks could be realization of the proposal to declare a mutual comprehensive moratorium on the development and deployment of nuclear and space weapons, submitted by Mikhail Gorbachev. The attitude of the American side to this moratorium will show the orientation of its policy and its intentions in the military sphere.

Statements by George Shultz did not indicate U.S. willingness to translate into reality the U.S. Government's declarations in favour of limiting the arms race.

Discussing topical international issues, Andry Gromyko said that attempts of certain circles to dictates their will to independent states and interfere into their internal affairs create hotbeds of tension in the Middle East, Central America, the south of Africa, and in Asia. Collective effort to seek a peaceful and just solution of conflict situation would be in the interest of all states and international security.
ROMANIA, CANADIAN LEADERS DISCUSS GENEVA ARMS TALKS

Remarks on Gorbachev Proposal

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 16 Apr 85 p A8

[Excerpts] OTTAWA (CP) — President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania — the only country still constructing Candu nuclear reactors — won't see one in action because Ontario Hydro has cancelled a scheduled tour of the Pickering plant due to labor problems.

"There was some problem with the visit to Pickering," said a senior Canadian government official, who spoke to reporters yesterday on the condition he not be identified.

Yesterday, Ceausescu met Prime Minister Brian Mulroney for about an hour, discussing peace and other international issues, the official said.

They were later joined by cabinet ministers from both countries for a luncheon at the Prime Minister's residence.

Ceausescu also met Energy Minister Pat Carney, presumably to discuss nuclear energy, while Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei held a separate meeting with External Affairs Minister Joe Clark.

Arms talks

The official said Mulroney and Ceausescu discussed a range of international issues, including the resumption of arms control talks in Geneva, and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's recent proposal for a seven-month freeze on the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Mulroney said medium powers like Canada and Romania — both non-nuclear countries with small armed forces and no territorial ambitions — should explore these issues whenever possible, the official said.

The official said Ceausescu, considered something of a maverick among Communist leaders, commented on Gorbachev's proposal during lunch, calling it a "positive sort of gesture," and urging the West to respond.

Clark apparently reiterated Canada's view that the Soviet proposal would merely lock in their existing nuclear superiority in Europe, the official said. But he cautioned the minister was indicating "our perception of the situation," rather than official policy.
OTTAWA (CP) — Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu spoke hopefully yesterday of the prospect that his country would do $1-billion worth of business a year with Canada by the end of the century.

Yesterday's talks between Mr. Mulroney and Mr. Ceausescu focused mainly on the Geneva arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and how medium powers could "influence the leaders of our alliances," one official said.

"Both agreed it would be vitally important to keep themselves intimately informed of, abreast of, aware of developments in Geneva and each would take every avenue it could to not only keep abreast of but influence, encourage our alliance partners and particularly the leaders of our alliance to seek peace in every conceivable way," the official said.
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

CHINESE COMMENTARY ASSESSES PROGRESS OF GENEVA TALKS

OW121136 Beijing in English to North America 0000 GMT 11 May 85

[Text] United States and the Soviet Union will start the second round of the arms reduction talks at the end of this month. The just ended economic summit in Bonn provides some clues about how these talks may go. Here is (Fang Huiqiang) with a Radio Beijing commentary:

Leaders who attended the Bonn summit welcome the resumption of the arms control talks in Geneva and propose further high-ranking talks between the East and the West. They want these talks to seek cuts in existing nuclear weapons, restrictions on conventional weapons, and a ban on chemical weapons. This shows the participating countries, especially those in Western Europe still pin a great deal of hope on the current (session) of arms reduction talks, despite the failure of the first round. The United States intends to continue the talks with the Soviet Union, but the Bonn summit gives no indication it will make any concessions in its stand during the next round. France has announced it will not take part in the American space weapons research program, and other American allies at the Bonn summit said they have not yet made up their minds. Despite this, almost all say they support the American decision to go ahead with research into a space defense system. This will certainly encourage the United States to stick to that position, rather than give in to Soviet pressure to stop the project.

Western observers expect the support expressed at the Bonn summit for the overall American position in the negotiations will lead to a firmer stand by Washington. The seven leaders at the summit paid no attention to the peace proposal made by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. This shows once again that the Soviet proposal is absolutely unacceptable in their eyes. The United States is going to continue deploying missiles in Western Europe, and the two sides will again tackle the issue of intermediate-range missiles during the next round of talks. The looming deadlock at the Geneva arms control talks is the fault of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Bonn summit indicated the United States is not about to compromise, and has the support of its allies in this stand. At the same time, the Soviet Union also seems determined to stick to its position. Neither is prepared to yield to the other, and the obvious conclusion is that their prospects for the next round of Geneva talks are dim.

CSO: 5200/4038
APRIL PRESS COMMENTS ON WEST EUROPEAN RESISTANCE TO SDI

NATO Apprehensions, Divisions

PM190910 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 15, Apr 85 pp 10-11

[Article by Yu. Gudkov: "Causes of Disagreement"]

[Text] Richard Perle, U.S. assistant secretary of defence, publicly scolded Geoffrey Howe, British foreign secretary, in a speech made during a visit to London. The British side admitted that the incident was unprecedented, but decided not to make a fuss. A U.S. Embassy spokesman declined to say whether Perle's speech had been sanctioned by Washington. The British Foreign Office declined to regard it as official.

However, there was a sequel to the affair. The U.S. ambassador in London met with Howe, this time undoubtedly with Washington's sanction -- but not only to tender belated apologies. According to an official communique, they discussed Howe's recent speech at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies on the implications of Reagan's "star wars" programme -- the very speech that had evoked Perle's displeasure. After the meeting with the ambassador, Howe reverted to a more streamlined official position in his prepared speech in Paris and later in his interviews to two West German papers.

Can the incident be considered closed? Hardly.

The disagreement clearly formulated by London cannot be seen as episodic. The apprehensions aroused by U.S. policy are too serious to be dismissed even for the sake of Atlantic solidarity, his loyalty to which Howe stressed so emphatically in Paris. In an effort to explain the cause of the open flare-up of differences, the London Times pointed out that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's credo consisted in combining outward support for Reagan's "star wars" programme with private warings. In his speech Howe voiced his concern over the fact that Britain's reservations had passed unnoticed. The director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs put it more bluntly. The "star wars" programme, he said, is "the most potentially divisive issue the NATO alliance has faced."

In his speech, Geoffrey Howe set forth for the first time substantively -- and publicly -- the causes of these divisions. Their list, in itself, amounts to a military-political assessment of the programme and of its likely consequences for the world community. While admitting that the programme proceeds from a concept which may, in the final analysis, prove unrealizable, Howe does not see that as grounds for
complacency and is of the opinion that "research may acquire an unstoppable momentum of its own. We must take care that political decisions are not preempted by the march of technology."

This is not just caution. Recent history knows of many instances of the "necessity" and "expediency" of this or that weapon being argued for after the weapon was already past the development stage and about to go into production. (Former secretary of state Henry Kissinger in his time insisted that the MX missile should not be taken seriously, it was only a trump card at negotiations, he averred.) In line with this practice, the Americans brush aside all objections to the "star wars" programme and decline to discuss it on the grounds that it is still a "research project."

Such an approach is apparently aimed at obscuring the fact that this is research of a highly specific kind. The intellectual prowess of the nation's best brains and enormous sums of money are being channelled to an effort that can only lead, in the final analysis, to a new arms buildup spiral — the costliest and the most dangerous ever. Hence the urgency of the "political decisions."

There indeed is no time to lose, for Washington has already made up its mind. Caspar Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defence, said he ruled out the possibility of renouncing the strategic defence concept either at the research stage, or, if it proves realistic, at the deployment stage.

It is in place to recall that under the agreement reached during Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's visit to the United States, the deployment of the anti-ballistic missile defence systems (after they emerge from the research stage) is subject to discussion at negotiations among the NATO member states. Weinberger's statement ignores this agreement and turns it into a mere formality.

Incidentally, the United States' true attitude to such commitments can be judged by its plans for the deployment of nuclear weapons in Canada, Iceland, Puerto Rico and other countries, plans adopted not only without the consent of the governments concerned, but even in secret from them (just as the "star wars" programme was announced by the U.S. without any preliminary consultations with its allies). It logically follows from the above that the emphasis on the research aspect of the programme is designed to divert the attention from its true character and gradually to accustom the public to the idea that a new arms spiral is inevitable.

The absence of "political decisions" at this juncture gives the green light to a very dangerous scheme. If the scientific and technical problems involved in this scheme are solved, Howe says, there will be the risk of "a radical alteration of the present basis for Western security." "Could the process of moving towards a greater emphasis on active defences by managed without generating dangerous uncertainty?" he asks and recalls that in his "star wars" speech in March 1983 Ronald Reagan admitted that "a mix of offensive and defensive systems could be 'viewed as fostering an aggressive policy.'"

Up till now, "deterrents" guaranteed an approximate parity of nuclear forces, which meant that retaliation to aggression would be intended to upset this parity, thus creating a threat to the whole of humanity.

In the first place, by giving the illusion of invulnerability the "space shield" may prove to be a temptation to deliver the first strike, which would trigger off a nuclear
war. Secondly, we know from history that to every action there is a counteraction. This means a further buildup of offensive nuclear weapons in the world in addition to the huge stockpiles already existing.

In his "star wars" speech Reagan said that space defence would make offensive weapons unnecessary. This assertion, now widely used by the propaganda media, is utterly false, and the example of the U.S. itself bears this out. The battle in Congress over the allocations for another batch of MX missiles ended in the defeat of their opponents. The U.S. is thus speeding up the development of the latest and the most destructive offensive weapons. Add to this the D-5 missiles for the Trident submarines which are to remove the chief shortcoming of sea-based nuclear missiles — low aiming accuracy. Add also the B-1 and Stealth bombers.

On the drawing boards now are cruise missiles, tactical nuclear facilities and other weapons against which even the best of "space shields" can offer no protection. This is another channel for carrying on the arms race which the "star wars" programme can only intensify.

What's more, the London Observer reports that a top-secret programme for the development of "means of penetration," intended to outdate the as yet nonexistent anti-ballistic missile system, is being carried out at the Norton Air Force Base, California.

"The implications for arms control must also be carefully considered," Howe says. "Would the prospect of new defences being deployed inexorably crank up the levels of offensive nuclear systems designed to overwhelm them?" This is a legitimate, though rhetorical, question. The answer to it has been given by the American side, which believes that the road to disarmament lies through superarmament.

The 1972 treaty on limiting anti-ballistic missile defence system, described by Howe as "the keystone in the still shaky arch of security," is supposed to close all openings for the spread of the arms race to new fields. Today this treaty is already listed among the victims of President Reagan's "defence initiative." In the U.S. this is done quite brazenly.

It is not by chance, therefore, that the Soviet side has been insisting, from the very beginning, on discussing the problems of space and nuclear arms (both strategic and medium-range) in their interconnection. Geoffrey Howe also underscores the "integral relationship" between them. And developments confirm the need for such an approach. More, they show that the renunciation or the de facto violation of this understanding (the U.S. makes no secret of such an intention) will make the talks a cover for militaristic preparations. In any case, it is easy to see that while seeking "consent to the restructuring of the foundations of strategic stability," the United States is trying not only to impose the militarization of space on the world, but also to keep intact its $1.5-trillion programme for the renewal of its arsenal — the nuclear missile arsenal, above all.

As we see, the doubts besetting official London relate to a vital sphere of state interests. These doubts are shared by other West European capitals. In Paris, the prospect of the military-strategic situation being destabilized, and of the arms race getting out of control and of the expenses involved running into astronomical figures, have already caused serious anxiety. At a March 22 press conference, Roland Dumas, France's minister for external relations, put it plainly: "The American plan does not
only lead to superarmament, which the militarization of space would amount to -- and, consequently not only add to the risk and danger -- it does not accord with the desire for a guaranteed security."

Bonn wonders about the fate of its "Ostpolitik," about the role assigned to Europe in America's plans to "space-shield" itself from a nuclear war -- and voices the hope that the Geneva arms talks will render the "star wars" programme unnecessary. "More stable U.S.-Soviet relations are of decisive importance for fruitful development in Europe," a government statement of March 28 says. At a Munich seminar on military matters -- which snowdrifts in London kept Caspar Weinberger from attending -- "the converts to the American point of view might have fitted comfortably in the back of the NATO jeep," the New York Newsweek ironically commented.

It looks as if Washington did not expect the disagreement to be made public. Hence the sharp increase in pressure. U.S. representatives, from Weinberger and General James Abrahamson, who is responsible for the implementation of the "star wars" plan, to middle-ranking officials, are besieging West European capitals. A session of the Nuclear Planning Group in Luxembourg was used to secure, within the 60-day period set by Washington, the group's consent to the "star wars" programme and to impose a common commitment on the doubting and the vacillating. A series of bilateral talks were to be held after the session closed. Letters have been circulated to 17 governments demanding that they subscribe to Reagan's "initiative." So far results have not been too conclusive. Luxembourg has announced acceptance in principle of the SDI. West Germany, however, has replied that it will not give a definite answer before the deadline set.

Greece is opposed. Spain has decided not to commit itself. France and Israel keep silent so far. Australia has answered in the negative.

However, the pressure continues and will be increased in the coming weeks. And not only in the political sphere. Seeking to calm fears that the "star wars" plan assigns the role of theatre of hostilities to the European continent, Washington has promised to consider setting up a "tactical nuclear defence system" for its NATO partners. Big hopes are pinned on financial bail. Fat contracts to be funded from the $26 billion allocated for research are being offered to West European companies not least of all with a view to capitalizing on the considerable influence they have in government circles.

All this naturally has its effect, but does not change the substance of the matter. Whatever maneuvers Washington, as well as its partners, who have to reckon with public opinion, might resort to, the problems and risks engendered by the Reagan "initiative" remain. Howe's unusually frank statement amounted to recognition of this fact, and was prompted, no doubt, by the extraordinary gravity of the situation. The fate of international relations in the coming decades is at stake.

The Reagan Administration has won the battle in Congress over allocations for the further production of the MX missiles. However, the very sharpness of such debates has shown, once again, that the further buildup of nuclear missiles is steadily losing support even in the top echelons of power which have to reckon with the anti-war movement unprecedented for its determination and scope. The transfer of the arms race to outer space under the pretext of changing its character from offensive to defensive spells the continuation of this race on an unheard-of scale. It guarantees further existence of and more profits to the military-industrial complex. At the same time, the Washington "initiative" multiplies the dangers threatening the true national interests of all countries without exception. To blindly follow that initiative means to betray these interests.
Allies See 'Hypocrisy'

LD201624 Moscow TASS in English 1610 GMT 20 Apr 85

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Leonid Ponomarev writes:

According to an AP agency report, the Belgian Government has refuted claims in the press recently that Belgium "agrees in principle" to participate in the first stage of "research" according to Reagan's "star wars" programme. The AP quotes the statement by the office of the Belgian prime minister as saying that the Belgian Government "has not yet discussed" the possibility of such a participation.

Caspar Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defence, is known to demand last month almost in the form of an ultimatum that the allies of the United States in NATO should join in research work according to the "star wars" programme and give the U.S. Administration an answer on that issue within 60 days. The point at issue is, however, that President Reagan's "Strategic Defence Initiative", as the American programme for "star wars" preparations is euphemistically called, is far from being such a harmless venture as the American leaders are trying to present it.

The "Strategic Defence Initiative" programme is nothing else but camouflaged plans to militarize outer space in order to wage "star wars" against the socialist countries. Way back in January this year, when reports appeared that President Reagan had signed the notorious Directive 119 on the start of the so-called research into the creation of a large-scale anti-missile system with space-based elements, the newspaper WASHINGTON POST wrote that the term "research" is just a euphemism and everybody realized (sic) that certain research and development was to be made.

The direction of this effort can be seen at least from the statement made in March this year by Fred Ikle, U.S. under-secretary of defence for political issues, at a conference of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States. Ikle described as a "mistake" the agreements reached between the USA and the Soviet Union in the last decade, including the anti-missile defence treaty of 1972. The practical steps of the current Washington's administration show that it has embarked on the path of bypassing these agreements and, in the final analysis, of torpedoing them. The space militarisation programme is evidence of precisely this policy of the United States.

The West European allies cannot, naturally, but see the hypocrisy of official Washington claiming that it has a vested interest in putting an end to the nuclear weapons race and is concerned only with "defence." Reagan's "star wars" programme is a source of doubt in Europe as regards the prudence of such designs and also of serious apprehension that a militarisation of outer space will boost the weapons race in all directions. Then it will be senseless to speak of any arms control in outer space.

The Norwegian Government has weighed these circumstances and announced that Norway refuses to participate in the "star wars" research programme. According to the Norwegian press, an overwhelming majority of the country's population demands that the government strongly condemn the dangerous plans of the United States to militarize outer space. The Danish Folketinget (parliament) has decided by a majority vote that the government should oppose Denmark's participation in research into the development of space weapons.

All this indicates that the Europeans are by no means indifferent whether they will be drawn into the American plans of a militarisation of outer space or not. Historical experience and common sense prompt that it is necessary to close all channels of putting any types of weapons in outer space.
Opposition in FRG

PM221319 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 85 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Sharp Criticism: Speeches by Representatives of the Opposition in the FRG Bundestag"]

[Text] Bonn, 19 Apr — A government statement by FRG Chancellor H. Kohl in the Bundestag in which the head of the Bonn cabinet supported Reagan's notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" has generated sharp criticism from the parliamentary opposition in the form of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] and the "Greens" Party. In his 18 April speech, the chancellor expressed himself in favor of the FRG's participation in the implementation of the U.S. President's dangerous designs aimed at the militarization of space to achieve U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union. "The U.S. research program initiated through the 'Strategic Defense Initiative,'" he asserted, "is justified and accords with general Western interests." Here the chancellor ignored the fact that Reagan's "star wars" program is giving rise to widespread protests and anxiety among the public and political circles in West Europe. Reiterating the U.S. "arguments," Kohl has gone so far as to claim that the "initiative" can make possible "a far-reaching reduction of nuclear arms."

H. Ehmke, deputy chairman of the SPD faction in the Bundestag, has come out with a detailed analysis of Washington's "Strategic Defense Initiative" and the dangerous consequences of its implementation. He noted that in the opinion of the majority of U.S. scientists, the creation of this "defensive" system is technically impossible. A new spiral of the arms race is already threatening us, H. Ehmke stressed, in the field of offensive and defensive space weapons, and the so-called "defensive" system contains an offensive potential. Thus, he said, there exists a danger that the militarization of space will not be prevented, but on the contrary, forced on. Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative," he continued, contains the threat that the path to a practical solution with the aid of negotiations will be closed and the danger of a new spiral of the arms race. That would mean not greater, but less security for Europe.

H. Ehmke cast doubt on the U.S. Administration's assurances that it is merely a case of a "5-year research program." These assurances, he said, are in blatant contradiction with President Reagan's statements concerning the fundamental important of his initiative, which the Pentagon also assesses as a reflection of a fundamental change in U.S. strategic thinking.

If we do not want to assume political responsibility for a space armaments program highly dubious in its fundamental aspects, a program which President Reagan has announced without any consultations with the West European allies, H. Ehmke said, we do not have the right to swallow the bait and allow ourselves to be drawn into the "Strategic Defense Initiative" program.

In turn T. Lange, member of the Bundestag commission for defense and a "Greens" party deputy, noted that Reagan's "initiative" is an attempt by the United States to "gain the ability to deliver a first-strike." Its implementation, he said, would lead to the extension of the arms race into space and would cancel the agreements concluded so far on arms limitation and make it impossible to reach such agreements in the future.
West German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner recently gave an extensive interview to the newspaper WELT AM SONNTAG. One would have thought that the interview's topic — military questions — fell within his sphere of competence. The minister, however, blundered.

To the question "Why is the Soviet Union attacking American plans to create space weapons?" obligingly proffered by the Springer publication, Woerner solemnly answered: "There is clearly an opportunity here to drive a wedge between the Americans and Europeans."

But how can one prevent oneself from saying here: "You'll see wedges wherever you look, Woerner! That wedges are being driven in is a fact. But surely it is the spokesman for the Washington administration, and especially the Pentagon, who are increasingly showing themselves as masters of this art and who are driving in those very wedges with regard to their allies in the economic, political, and military-strategic spheres?

The notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) foisted by the United States is causing an adverse reaction in virtually every European country, and even many leading politicians do not want "to constitute an exception." For example, the stone thrown into the NATO pond by British Foreign Secretary G. Howe is still causing ripples. "Research" within the SDI framework, he warned, will lead to the production and siting of space weapons, and this will ruin the hopes for arms limitation and undermine East-West talks.

Not only in London, but in other NATO capitals there are doubts, worries, and even protests regarding the Pentagon's plan. A protest movement, and not just on a so-called elementary level, is growing in the United States itself. Official Washington was clearly displeased by the negative statement on space weapons made by former U.S. President J. Carter in THE NEW YORK TIMES.

There are in fact more than enough critical statements at the moment. We will cite just one, which, we think, is apposite and typical. "Europe is doing everything it can to prevent becoming an 'eternal scapegoat,'" James Eberle, former NATO admiral and now director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, said. "The SDI program is potentially the most divisive problem in European-American relations."

That is precisely how they think in Europe, including the FRG. It is not fortuitous that M. Woerner failed to mention in his interview the fact that 17 percent — a mere 17 percent! — of his fellow citizens accept the idea of the "Strategic Defense Initiative," whereas around two-thirds of them categorically reject it. He also passed over in silence the fact that a number of his cabinet colleagues have in recent weeks made "statements which are to say the least inconsistent."

For our part, we would like to remind the Bonn defense minister of a recent happening. At the annual international conference of the West German Wehrkunde military-scientific society in Munich (which, incidentally, Pentagon chief Weinberger only missed "for technical reasons"), the "star wars" plans did not receive any backing.
As NEWSWEEK ironically put it, "The delegates converted to the American belief could be comfortably fitted onto the back seat of a NATO jeep."

Manfred Woerner would certainly have no competition in getting a place in the back seat of the jeep following the "star wars" route. The back seat may be small, but there is no crush. There are not many people wanting to trail behind this adventurist policy.

So, you see, minister, it is not at all a case of "Russian wedges!"

French Papers on ABM Impact

LD232107 Moscow TASS in English 2029 GMT 23 Apr 85

[TASS headline: "Washington Is Out To Subvert ABM Treaty"]

[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS--TASS news analyst Leonid Ponomarev writes:

Having studied a paper released by the U.S. Defence Department last week, a number of French newspapers, including LIBERATION, believe that the Pentagon is prepared to violate the 1972 Soviet-U.S. treaty on ABM defences. The paper points out, in particular, that the Pentagon "reserves the right" to disregard a number of provisions of the Soviet-U.S. agreement on ABM systems to test weapons under President Reagan's "Strategic Defence Initiative," dubbed the "star wars" program. LE MONDE for its part points out that the Pentagon's statement is at odds with Washington's earlier assurances that research and testing under the SDI program would be carried out in accordance with the 1972 ABM treaty. L'HUMANITE states that the United States disregards the agreement signed by it and, moreover, openly states its intention to view the treaty as nothing more than a piece of paper.

These newspapers, reflecting the views of different segments of the population, share the opinion that the U.S. administration is about flagrantly to breach agreements signed by the United States with other countries. This tendency has been manifest since the early days of the present U.S. administration. What all this amounts to is Washington's attempts to subvert the existing practice of international relations and to substitute its arbitrariness for the age-old principles of those relations.

The 1972 treaty was concluded to limit the sides each to two areas of deployment for ABM systems to avert the outbreak of nuclear war. Subsequently, following summit talks in 1974 in Moscow, the USSR and the United States signed a protocol reducing the number of deployment areas for ABM systems to one for each. The trend therefore was to reduce those systems, to be followed by reductions in nuclear arms arsenals. At present, however, the Reagan administration is about to increase the number of ABM systems through the development of a "space shield" under the SDI program in the United States and Western Europe.

It is an obvious manifestation of Reagan's infamous concept of building up armaments under the cover of disarmament rhetoric. As a consequence, we have mountains of weaponry of new types and a runaway arms race. This Washington
philosophy of escalating militarisation gives reason to believe that the U.S. leadership is an extremely unreliable and unbalanced partner which disregards its own signature on international documents if those documents put any limits on Washington's global ambitions.

Whatever peaceable rhetoric is used as camouflage, Reagan's "star wars" program put in this context is at variance with the purposes of the 1972 ABM treaty. The SDI is a program for the development, production and deployment of weapons of fundamentally new types in space. But the goals of Washington are the same. That new weaponry is to be used against socialist countries, primarily the Soviet Union. That is why all the realistic people in the world view Reagan's SDI program as plans of war preparations, which are slightly camouflaged for the time being. The dangerous character of the "star wars" plans, however, does not change for all that.

Norwegian, Danish Rejection

PM221435 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 85 First Edition p 5

["Commentator's Column" by Yuriy Kuznetsov: "Sensible Decision"]

[Text] Norway has refused to take part in the plans to militarize space which the United States is imposing on its allies in ultimatum form. This was announced by an official Norwegian Government spokesman, who added that Oslo expresses grave concern at the intensifying arms race and the danger of its extension into space.

The step taken by Norway, the first NATO country to refuse to take part in Washington's program to prepare "star wars," is timely and sensible: That is how the broadest strata of the Norwegian public assess it. The Pentagon's adventurist program has been very sharply criticized in the country. Representatives of virtually all public circles, political parties, trade unions, and women's and youth organizations have actively protested it. Many parliamentary deputies have repeatedly appealed to K. Willoch's bourgeois coalition government to dissociate itself from the U.S. position. Describing the Norwegian's mood, the newspaper NY TID wrote that "the absolute majority of Norwegians demands that the government display political independence and resolutely denounces the Washington administration's intentions, which will result in the further buildup of nuclear arms both on earth and in space and the growth of the threat of a world thermonuclear catastrophe."

In less than 5 months regular parliamentary elections are scheduled in Norway. The leaders of the parties in the government coalition have been unable to disregard the clearly expressed opinion of the obvious majority of Norwegians.

Speaking of the decision which has been made, it is perhaps worth recalling that the population of Denmark, the second Scandinavian NATO country, also actively oppose the U.S. course toward the militarization of space. The Danish Folketing (parliament) voted by a majority to compel the government to oppose the deployment of armaments in space and to oppose the country's participation in space weapons research and development.

There is thus a clear-cut stance on the part of the majority of the population of two Scandinavian countries against Washington's danger plans. The Scandinavians' antinuclear feelings merged with the similar, increasingly strengthening sentiments of the peoples of other West European countries. With every passing day the positions of the people of goodwill in the struggle for peace are becoming firmer.
Limited Nuclear War Fears

LD291650 Moscow TASS in English 1623 GMT 29 Apr 85

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS — By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev

Western European public noticed with apprehension the direct link existing between U.S. plans of preparations for "star wars" with the Pentagon's concept of a "limited" nuclear warfare in Europe.

A prominent figure of the Social Democratic Party of West Germany Horst Ehmke, speaking in the Bundestag a few days ago, stressed that a "limited nuclear war would become even more probable" as a result of the realization of U.S. plans for the development of a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system.

And really, as follows from the concrete military preparations conducted by the Pentagon, the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" of President Reagan is underlined by the same old course toward preparation for a nuclear war in a theater of combat operations in Europe, far from the territory of the United States. With the help of a large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense with space-based elements Washington hopes to acquire a possibility for delivering the first strike and doing so with impunity. A shield over the territory of the U.S.A. is called upon, in keeping with Washington's idea, to "make more acceptable" plans of unleashing a nuclear war in the European Continent, creating an illusion of impunity of the aggressor.

President Reagan's adviser and a well-known advocate of the concept of the possibility of U.S. victory in a nuclear war Colin Gray wrote in the spring issue of the journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS in 1984 that no matter how the United States refined its nuclear strategy oriented toward offensive operations it is absolutely clear that American society would not be able to withstand a retaliatory attack of the enemy. According to that "theoretician" a large-scale ABM defense over the United States should supplement the U.S. nuclear strategy oriented toward offensive operations so that with its help American society would withstand a retaliatory attack of the enemy.

The Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger was no less outspoken on the purpose of the "Strategic Defense Initiative". Speaking in an interview to the NBC television company on March 23, 1983, he said that a U.S. ARM system should stamp out the fear of a retaliatory attack.

Even convinced "Atlantists" in Western Europe are beginning to admit that the realization of Washington's plans of preparations for "star wars" is fraught with disastrous consequences for the U.S. allies. Touching upon the prospects of heightened threat to the security of NATO countries as a result of the development of an ARM defense over the U.S.A., British Admiral James Eberle said that Europe is trying not to become an eternal scapegoat.

In his turn West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who very seldom raises doubts concerning Washington's military and political moves, said that a U.S. ARM system must not be allowed to erode the basic interests of European security.

A shield for the aggressor and a "limited" nuclear war for Europeans — such is the essence of Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative". Ever broader sections of the Western European public come to realize the extremely dangerous character of that military and political course of Washington.
An eminent West European figure recently complained that the United States treats its allies "like vassals." You don't have to look too far for examples. Thus, at the end of March, U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger sent the allies a message which, in the form of an ultimatum, demanded that they say within 60 days whether they will participate in research work on the program for the militarization of space, which is demagogically passed off as a "Strategic Defense Initiative." The pressure, exerted in a sharply categorical tone, caused a considerable shock on this side of the Atlantic and grated upon even the most "loyal" U.S. allies. This was understandable: Who wants to publicly acknowledge his status as Washington's "vassal"?

Having clearly overdone things, the administration decided to moderate its ardor somewhat. The very same Weinberger sent out new messages in an attempt to mitigate the initial unpleasant impression. This time the Pentagon chief, substituting grace for insolence, wrote that the term "deadline" apparently should not be taken literally. Furthermore, anonymous "U.S. officials" put all-out pressure on the press, inspiring reassuring statements. It appears from these reports that, as Washington has "admitted," the pressure to secure an official statement of support from the allies could produce the opposite results. REUTER reported as follows: President Reagan has apparently given up even the hope of convincing the participants in the forthcoming summit conference of Western countries in May to approve his "star wars" program.

This is a new story, so to speak, but let us assume that Washington diplomacy has given up the crude pressure and slipped on the "velvet gloves" of gentlemanly behavior toward its allies. What does this change? Well, sharp language will no longer be heard from across the Atlantic, there will be no more ultimatums, accusations, and charges of "disloyalty." However, the goals will remain the same, namely, to harness them to the adventurist enterprise and place the partners' scientific, intellectual, and, of course, financial resources at "big brother's" service, which, in fact, is what the "vassals" are being told to do. Horst Ehmke, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany faction in the Bundestag, spoke very accurately in this connection when he declared: "The U.S. proposal does not pursue the goal of enhancing our competitiveness in the sphere of modern technology. The proposal is based rather on the U.S. desire to take advantage of West European knowledge and abilities for their program..."

In other words, it is a question of, and this is obvious to many people in West Europe, the transformation of the allies and partners into appendages of the U.S. military-industrial complex, which, while not forgetting the earthly affairs of militarism, is now straining toward space militarism. However, this is a costly and heavy burden even according to Washington, which loves to boast that anything is within U.S. power. As they plan to appropriate $26 billion, people on the banks of the Potomac are aware that the federal treasury is not bottomless and that, given the gigantic federal budget deficit and increasingly frequent troubles of the U.S. economy, it will be very hard to drag this adventurist "cart" alone. Therefore, they are tempting the West Europeans with a "technological gold mine" that apparently guarantees not only a "space shield" but also a "vast technological leap into the future."
In reality, however, everything appears much more prosaic. On the basis of press reports the following assumption can be made: In dragging the allies into the "star wars" program, the United States is striving to burden them with a substantial share of the expenses.

That way it can channel its own funds primarily into those spheres of advanced technology that will enable it to recapture the commanding heights.

It is possible to cite numerous facts in support of such a conclusion, facts which testify to Washington's all-out attempts to prevent exchanges of not only technology but also scientific research. Last January, for example, the White House sanctioned the introduction of stricter Pentagon controls over the exports of modern U.S. technology to the capitalist countries, let alone other states.

Are there therefore any grounds for believing that the United States will "share" its technology with the allies harnessed to the "space chariot"? Who can guarantee that Washington will not at some moment use its traditional pretext for discrimination against its partners in the form of "foreign policy interests" or "national security," as happened, for example, in the case of the purely civilian construction project of the Siberia-West Europe gas pipeline or Belgium's deliveries of a boring and milling machine to the USSR? The answer is obvious: Any cooperation by West Europe in the "star wars" program, regardless of how specific any contribution may be, will promote only abstract benefits, accruing, furthermore, on "vassal" terms.

Of course the most important element in all this is the extremely grave danger with which the insane project for the militarization of space is fraught. Gaining its own momentum, the "star wars" program will inevitably lead from research to practical tests, which will be a qualitatively new stage in the deadly arms race.

In other words, the "worthwhile cause," as people in Washington now try to convince absolutely everyone, will in that case result in inconceivable damage to the common security of our common planet, damage as a result of which the "technological leap into the future" may well be a leap onto the radioactive ash of mankind.

CSO: 5200/1136
U.S. PROTEST ON FINNISH PREMIER'S SDI REMARKS NOTED

PM151530 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 May 85 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Finland: Home Truths Are Hard To Swallow"]

[Text] Helsinki, 14 May — "Home truths are hard to swallow" -- this is the only way one can describe the protest expressed by the U.S. Embassy to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with statements made by K. Sorsa, chairman of the Finnish Social Democratic Party [SSDP] and the country's prime minister.

Addressing an SSDP event, K. Sorsa criticized the U.S. "star wars" program. He spoke of the "completely false view that the transfer of the arms race to outer space will lead to a reduction in the quantity of arms on earth and will boost anyone's security." "The development of any new types of weapons will without doubt lead to countermeasures and will signify the unleashing of a new and more dangerous round of the arms race. This is why the prevention of the deployment of any types of weapons in space must be sealed in international treaties," the prime minister emphasized.

Touching on the situation in Nicaragua, he drew attention to the fact that the U.S. actions toward this country "are an undisguised position of strength policy."

This is not the first attempt by trans-Atlantic diplomats to indicate what the leader of one of Finland's largest political parties and prime minister of the country can say and when. Some 3 years ago, the U.S. Embassy was annoyed by K. Sorsa's statement that "it is hard to expect a fundamental improvement in the international situation while Reagan is President of the United States." Such attempts at diktat by the United States cause indignation in the Finnish press.

"The expressions used by K. Sorsa are not, in the U.S. Embassy's view, suitable for a prime minister. K. Sorsa in fact voiced the common opinion of broad political circles in Finland," KANSAN UUTISET writes. "The protest was expressed," the newspaper points out, "on the very day when Reagan, while in Portugal, repeated his call for a crusade against communism. On that very same day the peoples of the world celebrated the 40th anniversary of the downfall of the previous crusade against communism. Some people really have no understanding of the lessons of history."

CSO: 5200/1163
PRAVDA CITES BELGIAN REACTION TO SDI INVITATION

PM151557 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 May 85 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Drobkov dispatch under the general heading "Joining in the 'Star Wars' Plans"]

[Text] Brussels, 6 May --- U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Abrahamson, director of the "star wars" program, has visited the Belgian capital. He is touring West European capitals with the aim of persuading the NATO allies to take part in carrying out the U.S. plans to militarize space. The press here reports that in Brussels the general lectured those Belgian ministers whose departments could be involved in the "research" connected with the creation of space arms systems. He did his utmost to present Washington's dangerous venture as harmless "scientific research" and tried to prove that involvement in them does not in any way commit the NATO countries to take part in the future in the creation or deployment of space weapons.

Gen Abrahamson gave the ministers a whole list of different areas of research and development in which Belgian firms and companies could take part. He urged his interlocutors to report back as soon as possible about the projects with which Belgium wants to be associated.

Broad strata of the Belgian public and leading opposition political parties oppose this country's involvement in the insane "star wars" plans. At the same time, members of the government, particularly Prime Minister W. Martens and Foreign Minister L. Tindermans, have already expressed their sympathy more than once for the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" [SDI], as NATO prefers to call the program for creating space armaments.

CSO: 5200/1163
By all accounts, the fit of "star sickness" which has struck the American administration has become more severe; it is a recurrence of the mania of "rolling back communism" from which American politicians suffered in the 1950's. If anyone still has any illusions about the nature of the present epidemic in Washington, acquainting oneself with the unremittingly hostile speech by Secretary of State George Shultz, delivered 22 February in San Francisco at the "Commonwealth of Nations Club", is enough to dispel any doubts.

The lofty phrases of the leader of US foreign policy department on the fact that the world situation has "ripened" to the point that the "forces of democracy"—as he describes the forces of imperialism and reaction—should mount a global counteroffensive under the leadership of the USA, conceal the strategic plans of American imperialism to achieve world hegemony. The turbid flow of such speeches by the leaders of the US administration, which preach the export of counterrevolution, unwittingly gives one pause: If even now, in the year of the 40th anniversary of the defeat of Fascist Germany, the proteges and lackeys of the American military-industrial complex are openly and importunately making claims for world domination, then what can one expect from them in the event Ronald Reagan's so-called "strategic initiatives" are put into practice?

The "Star Wars" program, no matter how Washington's masters of psychological manipulation of public opinion serve it up, is in no way a defensive program. The creation of a vast anti-missile defense system with elements based in space is considered by the Pentagon to be part of a plan for creating the potential for dealing a first strike with calculated impunity.

The plan for creating an "antimissile shield", which is aggressive in its very essence, represents in actuality an attempt to achieve decisive military superiority.

Even the Americans themselves do not believe in the official Washington version with respect to the "defensive nature" of the "Star Wars" program. The Bureau of Technical Analyses of the American Congress has prepared an analytic report, from which it follows that the vast antimissile defense
systems with elements based in space is directed toward preparations for nuclear war by the United States against the Soviet Union. The report was hardly prepared by dilettantes; taking part in its preparation were former Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara, and former chief of the American delegation to the SALT-I negotiations, J. Smith. The report makes it clearly understood, the WASHINGTON POST sums up, that "Reagan's goal is to provide a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union without excessive risk". In other words, the paper notes, the report by the Bureau of Technical Analysis assumes that "Reagan wants to perfect a nuclear defense, and then take advantage of it to blackmail the Russians, in order to force them to dance to his tune, or to become reconciled to the possibility of an American nuclear strike which Moscow would be unable to repel".

It is self-evident that the Soviet Union cannot stand by idly in the face of these dangerous plans. In his 1 March speech in Madrid, Comrade A.A. Gromyko warned with all seriousness: "If they want to turn space into a battleground, thereby hoping to subject other states to their will, the answer of the Soviet Union is: They will not succeed in their plans to achieve military superiority, neither on Earth nor in space. The plan to hide behind an antimissile shield to escape retribution for their aggression is an illusion. Would it not be better to seek honest and mutually-acceptable understandings for the purpose of bringing the arms race to a firm halt in all respects? The Soviet Union will be doing just that in the forthcoming Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva".

Many prominent American specialists share our estimate of the danger to world peace posed by the "Star Wars Plan". Speaking the other day before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives on the armed forces, former Presidential Assistant for National Security, P. Scowcroft and former Secretaries of Defense G. Brown and J. Schlesinger, made an urgent appeal to the Administration to abandon the program of militarization of space. All three expressed grave doubts that it would ever be possible to create a truly effective antimissile defense system with space-based elements, and warned that in any case the Soviet Union would take the proper retaliatory measures and would be forced to increase its arsenal of offensive nuclear weapons if the USA attempts to create a powerful antimissile space defense system.

McGeorge Bundy, former presidential assistant for national security, in turn, declared that the plans revealed by the American administration for the militarization of space would lead to undermining the arms control agreements, and are a serious obstacle to achieving an understanding in the course of the Soviet-American talks to be held in Geneva beginning 12 March on a whole range of questions of demilitarization of space, limiting strategic weapons and medium-range nuclear weapons, which the two parties have agreed to examine and solve together.

The USSR is setting out for Geneva ready to achieve concrete results on the basis of the principle of equality and identical security, honestly and strictly observing the premises of the January joint Soviet-American statement to the effect that the goal of the negotiations will be to work out effective understandings aimed at preventing an arms race in space and
stopping it on Earth, on limiting and reducing nuclear weapons, and on strengthening strategic stability. Against this background the attempts of the American administration to place outside the framework of the talks in advance the basic problem of preventing the militarization of space cannot be interpreted as anything else than steps which preclude concrete results.

As the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs noted, it cannot but put one on one's guard that on the eve of the Geneva negotiations the American side is resorting to unscrupulous methods, clearly calculated from the very beginning to poison the atmosphere around them, and to make it difficult to examine the problems which must be solved in a businesslike manner. It is obvious that it was just for this purpose that the White House report was published, which brings out the unsubstantiated and groundless accusations of the alleged "violations of their international obligations" committed by the Soviet Union.

For the sake of deceiving the public, official Washington is trying to camouflage its "Star Wars" program with all kinds of "high moral considerations". In actual fact the present administration has promised a new mother lode to the military-industrial complex—an arms race in space, which will cost the United States, in the most conservative estimates, one trillion dollars, and which promises gigantic profits for the military concerns. It is characteristic that the overwhelming majority of contracts connected with the militarization of space are already in the hands of the aerospace corporations whose headquarters are in California. In order to ensure the prosperity of these corporations, which have put the present administration into power, the White House has proposed reductions of almost 50 billion dollars in fiscal year 1986 in allocations for socio-economic needs and in domestic programs vital to the United States. "The country," declares Ronald Reagan, has "more important interests". And what are they? It goes without saying—the arms race, for which the proposed federal budget for fiscal year 1986 is allocating the unprecedented sum of 322 billion dollars.

All of this is needed, not for the defense of the national security of the USA, which no one is threatening, but for conducting a policy of state terrorism and international piracy; for putting down the national liberation movement; for crude imperialistic interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states; and for imposing systems suitable to Washington.

A vivid example of this policy of power diplomacy of the USA is the undeclared war against Nicaragua. Having paralyzed the Contradora process and having rejected the latest peaceful proposals of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, the American administration now has openly declared that its goal is to overthrow the Sandaniste government. Since the invasion of Nicaraguan territory by a band of Somosist sore-losers did not achieve the desired results, the CIA and the Pentagon are now pursuing the cause of direct US military intervention against revolutionary Nicaragua. In order to cover up their preparations for invasion, they've once again trotted out the lie about the fact that Nicaragua is allegedly being turned into a "Soviet base". In actual fact, in Central America as in other regions as well, there are only American bases. It is not the USSR but the USA that has inundated the world with 1,500 of its military bases.
The USSR respects the right of the nations to independent existence and development. But if one considers the imperialist, piratical logic of the Washington leadership, then one must ask how should the Soviet Union carry on affairs with those nations where there really are American military bases! This question is all the more objective, when one speaks about the American bases established right on the borders of the USSR and other socialist countries for preparing for and waging war against them.

Looking on foreign military bases as a serious threat to the peace and security of the entire world, the USSR will continue to place before the USA the question of the numerous American military bases in the various regions of the world. Sooner or later the widespread network of American military bases abroad must be eliminated.

The interests of international security demands not the establishment of new centers of confrontation, but the liquidation of the existing ones, and a search for ways to improve the health of the world situation. The reckless policy of imperialistic piracy must be brought to an end.

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9006
CSO: 1807/252
SPACE ARMS

FRG FOREIGN MINISTER ON REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT, SDI

AU151038 Vienna Television Service in German 0915 GMT 14 May 85

[Interview with Foreign Minister Genscher by correspondent Paul Schulmeister in Vienna, date not specified—recorded]

[Text]

Schulmeister: You have mentioned the CSCE meetings, including the current one in Stockholm, where the neutrals have frequently played a mediating role. But will this remain so? Is not the development trend hardening rather than softening positions?

Genscher: The long-term prospects lie in the direction of cooperation. This is the direction for which the road has been set, among other things by the U.S.-Soviet declaration of 8 January 1985, which is aimed at cooperative solutions for the grave security problems between West and East, and this cooperative security policy needs to be augmented by cooperation in all other political sectors, that is, in the political and economic sector, cooperation regarding environmental protection, in the cultural sphere — I think that Basket Two of the Helsinki Final Act, whose centerpiece is cooperation, calls for wider application, greater activity, and we should make use of 1 August, the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, to this end. I hope that at that time a meeting of the foreign ministers of the signatory states can take place in Helsinki.

Schulmeister: Do you also expect a summit meeting between U.S. President Reagan and Soviet party chief Gorbachev in the United States this fall?

Genscher: I hope that this will materialize, and I also hope that the Vienna meeting [of Gromyko and George Shultz] will serve to prepare for such a meeting.

Schulmeister: How do you assess the relationship between the two world powers? Are there any chances for overcoming the enormous distrust existing on both sides?

Genscher: A policy of confidence building — and not only in the military sense, but also developed through the cooperation I just mentioned — is urgently necessary. I consider it encouraging that the United States and the Soviet Union came to terms on 8 January, not merely on the opening of negotiations, but also on their aims. Both the United States and the Soviet Union committed themselves, specifically committed themselves, in the declaration of 8 January 1985, to avoid an arms race in space, in other words, to not even permit it to start, and to end the arms race on earth. And every step in the negotiations, any attitude in the negotiations, will be measured by this yardstick of avoiding an arms race in space, and ending it on earth.
Only today you stressed again in the Bundestag debate in Bonn that the West Europeans should react to the U.S. space research defense program with a common attitude. But even today there are rather substantial differences, say, between London, Paris, and Bonn.

We had a session of the foreign and defense ministers of the West European Union a few weeks ago in Bonn, where the aim of working out a common position was underscored by all participants, but the matter is indeed very involved and poses complex problems. We continue to work on achieving a common position, because it is obvious that the security interests of the European democracies who belong to the Western alliance are identical. Naturally here, as in all other aspects of European integration, the FRG-French relationship is the centerpiece of these efforts to achieve a common European position. And today I have reduced our common interests with France to a very simple formula: I said what is good for France cannot be bad for the FRG, and what is good for the FRG cannot be bad for France.

Actually, the United States to date has not been able to come up with the final answers regarding the aims of the program, regarding its workability and its effects. Indeed this could not be otherwise at the beginning of a research phase. To us Europeans the decisive aspect is that one principle remains absolutely inalienable -- namely, that the strategy of the Western alliance is to aim at preventing a war, war prevention. This war-prevention strategy must not be called in question under any circumstances, because in view of the intensive worldwide arms buildup, especially in view of the arms potentials piled up in Europe, there is no alternative for which anyone could take responsibility to a strategy of preventing war. This is the yardstick, and if there are possibilities of more securely reaching this aim of preventing war, then one must not limit himself in considering them. But as long as no such possibility exists, the existing strategy must be upheld.
FRG SECURITY COUNCIL, FDP, SPD FOCUS ON SDI

Council Studies French Rejection

LD081514 Hamburg DPA in German 1414 GMT 8 May 85

[Excerpt] Bonn, 8 May (DPA)—Amidst the greatest secrecy, the relevant foreign policy and security circles of the Federal Government have begun an analysis of the situation created by French President Francois Mitterrand's rejection of the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]. The focus was a new session of the Federal Security Council which was convened on Tuesday in the Federal Chancellor's Office.

This "phase of analysis," as the attempt at a new assessment was called by diplomatic circles, focused on the question of which conditions can realistically still be a basis for West European participation in the U.S. SDI research project. This precondition was the basis of the working paper of the Federal Security Council of 27 March which was declared to be the unchanged and valid foundation for Bonn's SDI policy by a government spokesman, on Tuesday. Normally sessions and papers of the Federal Security Council are among the most stringently guarded secrets in the FRG. Clarification is expected next week at the earliest when Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher will meet his French counterpart, Roland Dumas, and the other three foreign ministers from the World War II victors in Vienna on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty.

Parties Condemn Kohl Position

LD081959 Hamburg DPA in German 1234 GMT 8 May 85

[Excerpt] Bonn, 8 May (DPA) -- FDP defense expert Olaf Feldmann has urged the federal chancellor to reject SDI. According to tomorrow's [9 May] edition of the Cologne EXPRESS, Kohl should return to the government statement and rectify his promise to President Ronald Reagan of FRG participation in the SDI program. "It is now high time for this, so that at the next meeting with French President Mitterrand at the end of the month, the way will be free for a civilian, European solution." Instead of SDI, the Europeans should jointly press ahead with space research under a civilian flag.

SPD defense policy spokesman Erwin Horn has accused Kohl of chaining his government for good or ill to the U.S. program. He spoke of a "star wars crisis!" in NATO between the United States and the European partners in the alliance. By trying to please everyone, the government has failed to please anyone.
FRG INDUSTRIALISTS BRING MIXED RESPONSE TO SDI R&D PROPOSAL

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 6 May 85 pp 44-51

[Text] During his visit to Moscow in mid-April, Friedrich Wilhelm Christians, representative of the Deutsche Bank, casually expressed his desire for a particular engagement. The banker said that at the next opportunity he would like to pay his respects to the new Soviet party chief.

Mikhail Gorbachev responded more quickly than expected. A short time later, the new man in the Kremlin received the guest from Duesseldorf for an unusually long talk. For 2 hours, longer than with many heads of state, Gorbachev spoke with Christians about his plans for industry and about new loans in the billions of marks.

The two went over the new major projects in detail. German concerns are to furnish several plants—a steel works, a factory for the production of chemical fibers, and a pipe works near Volgograd. The pipe factory, valued at DM 3.5 billion, could be built by Mannesmann, where Christians happens to be chairman of the board of directors.

Also under discussion are facilities for the transporting and storage of foodstuffs and farm products. According to Gorbachev, by this means the Soviet Union is hoping to gradually become less dependent on wheat deliveries from the United States.

The offers from the Kremlin are not particularly startling in terms of their size. What is remarkable is only that after years of sluggishness in orders, the Soviets are just now bringing themselves into the picture—at a time when German politicians and industrialists have fixed their attention on the other superpower: On the disputed participation of domestic firms in the missile defense system of the United States in outer space, the so-called SDI [strategic defense initiative] program.

The offers from Moscow and the civilities toward the head of the Deutsche Bank have a political dimension. The Kremlin bosses evidently want to keep German businesses from focusing on the outer-space plans of the Americans.

In Moscow, Christians and his companions were forced to listen again and again to the expressed fear that if they participate in SDI, German
concerns might be more easily blackmailed into supporting the embargo plans of the United States against the East Bloc. But such warnings could mean: There will be steady orders from the East only if the FRG's industry keeps out of the SDI program.

Thus the debate on whether the Germans should take part in the American arms buildup in space is being heightened by a different reading of the situation. It was already confusing before this.

The Americans, who are interested in sharing the astronomical development costs, are enticing the Germans with attractive industrial contracts. The subliminal threat is that whoever does not participate in SDI will lose out on modern technological developments.

The planning staff in the Federal Ministry of Defense has made a list of the fields in the German economy that can expect impellents from SDI. At the top are key technologies such as data processing, radar engineering, microelectronics, and optical systems. Eventually perhaps civilian applications would be found in connection with laser technology for medicine, optical sensors for robots, and industrial materials for lightweight construction.

Two Union-party politicians not directly linked to Bonn have been urging participation for weeks now: The head of Bavaria, Franz Josef Strauss, and Baden-Wuerttemberg's minister president, Lothar Spaeth.

Strauss: The enormous research projects connected with this space program will lead to technological advances hitherto undreamed-of. Therefore German firms as well should become involved in this program.

Spaeth: "If the Europeans are to be left behind in this sector, then we must already talk about the question of jobless workers in the 1990's."

Germany's industrialists are not as sure of themselves as these Union men from the southern rails. There are fans, but there are also skeptics.

Heinz Duerr, the easily enraptured head of the electrical engineering concern AEG, is among the SDI proponents. "The push toward new technologies," says the Swabian, "is enormous, and therefore we must be in on this at all costs." Willy Korf, an unsuccessful steelmaker from Baden-Baden, agrees: "If we want to continue to play a role as an industrial nation, we have to get involved in this business."

Some industrial leaders have zealously offered their assistance at Bonn's defense ministry. Smaller manufacturers have been asking around in Bonn with regard to how they could establish contacts with SDI.

Such eagerness to get a few crumbs of the $26 billion in the budget impresses experienced managers as being rather odd. Siemens board member Hans Baur finds it curious that so far "nobody is quite sure exactly what SDI really entails."
His colleague on the board, Karl Heinz Beckurts, says that Siemens and other businesses by no means are "madly" chasing after contracts from the SDI project. Beckurts: "German industry is not waiting spellbound for a technological push from this military space project."

The caution of the Siemens men is understandable. They know only too well that any billions in research spent by Bonn for SDI are no longer available for other projects—for assistance to civilian research from the ministry of Heinz Riesenhuber, for example, or for the European space research in the civilian sector.

And they also fear that this work on the space project, which will be directed by the Pentagon, could produce very little for their quite routine day-to-day business. Beckurts doubts that "German businesses will receive direct contracts from the Pentagon to a significant extent."

It is by no means the unanimous opinion that without SDI participation the Germans will be left behind technologically, as steel manager Korf says. Such views are opposed by precisely those business leaders whose firms would come into consideration as SDI suppliers. "On purely technological grounds," says managing director Knut Heitmann of the Leitz optical firm, "SDI is not momentous."

Together with firms such as Zeiss and Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB), Leitz is a part of the small circle of Apollo and Spacelab equippers. The optical sensors and field glasses from the firm of Leitz as well as the heat pipes from MBB are considered to be world-class by the planning staff of the defense ministry.

Their reticence is due above all to the fear of being excessively taken advantage of by the United States in connection with SDI. The Americans have not yet shown, says the Paderborn computer manufacturer Heinz Nixdorf, that they are "ready for cooperation" in the exchange of technological information.

According to these objections, ultimately the Germans would have to pay up, but they will have gained little to the benefit of their commercial impact. "I fear" says Walter Reis, a small-scale manufacturer of robots and control equipment from Bavaria, "that we are merely supposed to deliver over the money to the Americans for SDI."

Thyssen head Dieter Spethmann, like others as well, doubts that the Federal Government is getting enough for German industry in the SDI negotiations. He says that he fails to see much staying power in Bonn. This, he says, was shown by the many years of steel negotiations in Brussels.

The critics regard the most recent deal by Defense Minister Manfred Woerner as above all a confirmation of their skepticism. At his Washington visit, Woerner negotiated over an Identification Friend-Foe system for NATO. The German knew that Siemens has on hand a technically superior product. Nevertheless he let his Washington hosts talk him into a system developed by the U.S. concerns Texas Instruments and Bendix.
It seems entirely conceivable to experienced industrial leaders that the Germans will be tricked in a similar way in connection with the SDI program. Therefore the computer manufacturer Heinz Nixdorf is also demanding: "If we are to spend money for this, jobs must also be created in Germany thereby."

A leading banker fears that this would not help much. "In the end the result of this will be that we will be allowed only to produce the heat-resistant exterior paint finish."

Neither those who are advocating participation nor those who want to remain aloof are quite sure of their ground. Everybody is speculating about whether the Germans must accept the latest American challenge or whether they should leave it to American industry to develop the sort of high-tech devices with which Soviet missiles flying along in space can be located and destroyed.

Must Germany's industry, the question goes, participate in this probably most enormous defense program ever in order to be able keep pace on the world markets for civilian products? Without SDI participation, without all that which supposedly is picked up entirely on the side for civilian projects ("spin-off effect"), is a danger posed in the long run to our so highly valued FRG prosperity?

The thought that more cannons also provide more butter is nowhere so widespread as in the United States. Up to the present the Americans have taken heart from the experience that it was only World War II that helped their industry to overcome the last effects of the Great Depression; Americans living today have never seen in their own country the harm that weapons can do. Therefore many U.S. citizens are convinced that war and weapons production can only be beneficial to their prosperity.

In 1944 Charles E. Wilson, former head of General Motors and later secretary of defense under President Eisenhower, had instructed the politicians. Delighted by the recovery of the U.S. economy induced by the world war, the auto manager called for a "permanent war economy." The alliance between big business and the military has to be "an enduring program," he said.

This alliance did in fact become a long-lasting policy. But whether this confederation was of benefit to the Americans in the decades following the war is disputed at the very least. And whether a super-program such as Star Wars will enhance the prosperity of the ordinary citizen in the future is certainly questioned by many experts—in contrast to Spaeth and Strauss.

It was the development of microprocessors above all which reinforced the belief in war as the father of all things within and outside the United States. This seemed to have been demonstrated anew: The crash program of the moon rockets, with which the development of extremely fast computers had been stimulated, had given a powerful impetus to America's microelectronics sector. When John F. Kennedy's order for the conquest of the earth's satellite had been fulfilled, the fruits for America's computer...
sector seemed to be even more significant than the color photos of the U. S. flag on the moon.

But neither the computer nor the microprocessor is an invention produced by the designing engineers of the moon rockets. The development of microtechnology had been in progress for a long time when the Americans geared up for the conquest of the moon by quasi—military means.

The enormous dollar sums that were concentrated on the outer—space program in the 1960's certainly helped to accelerate improvements in micro—electronics. Thus, for a number of years the United States had gained a lead in this technology.

This did not hold up for long. As early as in the 1970's the Japanese—who had conducted electronics research and development only in the civilian sphere—caught up with the Americans. Today the Eastern Asians are ahead of the Americans in memory chips.

In any case the American example does not seem very suited as a proof of the thesis that an SDI project in the billions of dollars could force those nations that keep aloof from it into a technological decline. If anything, the case of the United States gives rise to a different suspicion: That participation in the expensive SDI project could be detrimental to prosperity.

A report which John Young, the head of the computer firm of Hewlett Packard, recently delivered to the White House presented evidence for this conjecture. This survey, which had been ordered by Ronald Reagan, comes to the conclusion that America's economy is falling behind in the international competition.

It mentions as one of the primary reasons for this the drastic shifting of American high—tech research in the direction of defense. Today the positive effect of military research on the private economy, according to the Young Commission, is substantially less than formerly.

Even before this, a report by the OECD—an organization of the Western industrial states—had come to a similar conclusion. The OECD experts suggested that the "extent of the spin—off in Europe has been greatly overestimated."

After all, military research not only diverts money which otherwise would be available for civilian research. In addition, this weapons development requires qualified engineers and scientists who are in short supply in non—military laboratories and design offices.

The fact that America's entertainment electronics have been put out of the running by the Japanese, that Detroit automakers are able to sell almost none of their technically outdated autos outside the United States, that the American machine-building industry does not measure up to the highest world standards—all this probably also has to do with the circumstance
that America has put less money than average into civilian research and that much more money into military research.

In 1982, about 2.4 percent of the FRG's gross national product flowed into non-military research and development. The Japanese spent 2.5 percent of their output for this purpose.

In contrast, for the Americans the figure was a meager 1.8 percent see graph.

Graph: United States Falls Behind—Expenditures for Civilian Research and Development in Percent of the GNP

Key: 1. Federal Republic of Germany

The U.S. scientist Robert W. DeGrasse Jr. concludes: "There are a number of indications that our military expenditures have stunted America's technological growth in the commercial markets."

Lee Iacocca, the reorganizer of the U.S. auto concern of Chrysler, confirms this thesis in his recently published biography. This successful manager seeks to explain why Japan's auto firms are sweeping from one victory to another in the United States. One of the reasons, according to Iacocca, is the low taxes paid by Japanese businesses, the lowest in the Western world. The Japanese can afford to do this only because they are spending so little for their military sector, he says.

The Chrysler head: "How is one to compete with a country which spends only $80 per citizen annually for defense, whereas we spend more than ten times that much?"
The fact that massive expenditures for war materiel are not likely to enhance civilian prosperity becomes evident also from a comparison between military expenditures and capital expenditures. After the British, the worst performance is by the United States, where from 1960 to 1980 capital expenditures constituted just 18 percent of the national product on the average.

On the other hand, the leaders in the capital-expenditure list are countries such as Japan (33 percent), Norway (30 percent), Austria (27 percent), or Finland (26 percent)—all of them states which do not spend more than 3 percent of their national product for defense. By contrast, the Americans spend more than 7 percent for this purpose.

Basic arithmetic cannot be invalidated merely by a war economy. The greater is the fraction of the country's output diverted for military uses, the less remains for civilian purposes. That is true also for the field of research and development.

Naturally, now and then military research yields things which are commercially useful. But as a rule the way via weapons technology turns out to be an expensive circuitous route. It does not contribute directly to the enhancement of prosperity.

"Every billion-mark project," says German robot manufacturer Reis, "has its spin-off effects." He says that this is not exclusively a product of astronautics or the arms industry alone.

At present the American project leader for SDI, Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, is using much inventiveness to make it clear to politicians as well as industrialists that the Europeans as well will profit much from the war of the stars. For Abrahamson, SDI is a brave new world.

Someday, the lieutenant general enchants his audiences, solar power plants could be established in space and major cities could be illuminated by gigantic mirrors in outer space. Again and again Abrahamson swears to the sincere intention of the United States with respect to technology transfer.

It seems appropriate to German industrialists to question this sincerity precisely in light of their most recent experiences. Many are saying that never before have business relations with the Americans been so difficult as at present.

With a growing commitment, Washington is watching to see that high-technology goods do not get outside its zone of influence. These controls are proving to be extraordinarily onerous and obstructive to the normal export business of its allies.

By no means does this always have to do with necessary military secrecy. "Behind this are massive commercial interests," says Otto Schiele, president of the German Machine Building and Plant Construction Association.
Such intrusions could multiply if there were participation in the SDI program—especially since in the case of major undertakings it would be difficult to neatly separate the research projects associated with SDI from the other purely civilian projects. Such a development would certainly be detrimental to normal civilian business dealings.

Here the idea of research minister Riesenhuber certainly seems sensible. He would like to get for the Europeans a precisely defined portion of SDI and thereby keep German firms from being dependent on Pentagon contracts.

Even though the Riesenhuber plan could provide more technical independence for German SDI participants—in the last analysis, as recipients of orders from a military project conducted by the United States, they would be subjected to strict secrecy and marketing regulations.

The German SDI fans refuse to be bothered by all of this. Above all the Union lords Strauss and Spaeth are certain that with SDI they will lead their Federal Laender into a golden future.

Their calculation is apparently shrewd: The billions of marks for the outer-space adventure would have to be defrayed by the taxpayers from all over the FRG. But if there are any SDI contracts to be gotten at all, they would be received by firms with futuristic technologies, and these have settled primarily in the south.

However, even if they really were successful with their massive SDI lobbying, it remains to be seen whether Strauss and Spaeth would actually do that much good in the long run. Ultimately they would make their industries dependent on weapons production to an increasing extent.

But these industries are bound to one or only a few ordering agencies. When these firms have finished with certain arms programs, or if the government runs short of the funds for new procurements, then there is no work to do.

At MBB the management does not know as yet what is to be built in its factories 3 years from now, when all of the ordered combat aircraft of the "Tornado" type have been delivered to the Bundeswehr. Similarly uncertain is the future of the tank manufacturer Krauss-Maffei, which in 1986 will hand over its last "Leopard 2" to the German armed forces.

But successes in non-military markets, where as a rule there is a far more steady demand, have fallen to the lot of weapons manufacturers only seldom hitherto, whether they are in the FRG or in the United States. The U.S. scientist DeGrasse has investigated with some colleagues whether U.S. firms which survive primarily on Pentagon contracts could hold onto or expand their market shares outside the weapons scene.

The result of the study: "In all cases, the opposite proved to be true."

12114
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FRG MINISTER ON TALKS WITH BUSINESSMEN ON SDI

DW151137 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0515 GMT 14 May 85

[Interview with Wolfgang Schaeuble, minister for special tasks, and chief of the Chancellor's Office, by correspondent Zagatta; date and place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Zagatta] What have scientists and representatives of firms said [about SDI]? Has the chief of the Chancellery a clearer picture now?

[Schaeuble] Yesterday, we had an informative talk with representatives of firms which might possible take part in such a research project, or which could contribute something to it.

We discussed the individual research and technology fields of SDI one by one, we discussed the current state of FRG research, the know-how of FRG firms, specific FRG interests in further development, problems that might come up if we did not take part in such an initiative, and the consequences for research and technology development in the civilian sector.

We discussed all that systematically. We also discussed the experience which the organizations and firms have achieved in cooperation with the U.S. and European partners, and we have naturally also discussed European options and alternatives. It was not a talk that should lead to a decision, it was a talk for gathering information, and it was very useful.

[Zagatta] Did you draw some first conclusions?

[Schaeuble] No. We will carefully evaluate this talk in the government. I think that in a second step, we will send a government delegation together with representatives of organizations and firms, with the help of the federal industry association, BDI, to the United States to obtain more information there, because the decisive things are the conditions on which one can possibly agree with the United States. However, that has not been stipulated in detail so far. When we have passed through this enlightenment round in the States, and when we will have further coordinated our position with our European neighbors and friends -- especially with France, Great Britain, and Italy -- when we will have a more accurate picture of common research and technology policies developing in the European community, then we will be in a position to make decisions.
[Zagatta] The chancellor has named a condition for FRG participation, namely partnership with the U.S. with equal rights. However, the responsible general has made it clear this weekend that Washington is not prepared to accept that. Are you unimpressed by that?

[Schaeuble] Different opinion has been heard from the United States. We keep to what President Reagan said when he visited Bonn. He clearly said that participation as a partner in SDI cannot be a one-way street, but must be a two-way street, that is, a system with equal rights and equal advantages. How this is to be achieved is a question we could not answer yesterday night. We could only outline our conditions and expectations to a certain extent, also on the basis of experience gathered in cooperation with U.S. authorities on other projects. It is a problem that must be further clarified in the United States and which, naturally, must be eventually discussed and agreed on in talks with the U.S. Government.
FRG CONTROVERSY OVER SDI PARTICIPATION REPORTED

BND Study Denied

LD081508 Hamburg DPA in German 1210 GMT 8 May 85

[Excerpt] Bonn, 8 May (DPA) -- The Federal Chancellor's Office has denied the existence of a study by the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) which allegedly contains reservations about the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) research program. A spokesman said in Bonn today: "The BND did not make such a study.

According to speculation in Bonn, the BND study is said to have been presented to the Federal Security Council, which met on Tuesday [7 May] after a Cabinet session. At the same time, press reports of differences of opinion between Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) and Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) on the SDI project, were denied. Such differences have not so far been noticeable. The day before, government spokesman Juergen Sudhoff told the press that the position of the Federal Government had been fixed for some time.

Kohl, Genscher 'Differences'

DWO90603 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 8 May 85 p 5


[Text] Bonn, 7 May -- Following the regular Cabinet meeting in Bonn on Tuesday, the Federal Security Council -- a group of ministers that meets secretly under the chairmanship of the chancellor whenever it convenes -- dealt with the U.S. SDI. Since the assessments of French President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl on the SDI program diverged at the economic summit in Bonn, the Federal Security Council sought to clarify the matter. U.S. President Reagan had promised in Bonn that there would be no one-sidedness in the technology transfer between the Federal Republic and the United States if Bonn decided to participate in Washington's research program. He also said that NATO's deterrence strategy remains valid as long as no other solution has been found. However, Reagan did not provide any specific details about the U.S. research plans or about options for participation by Europe. Foreign Minister Genscher was alarmed by Reagan's remark that "individual" cooperation was possible. Bonn quarters say that Reagan meant accords with individual West European governments as well as with individual European companies and scientists. In contrast, Chancellor Kohl had said coordination among West European states was desirable. In this connection, he stressed that such an agreement need not include all European partners, but could include only those who are willing and able to participate in SDI. This indicated that it could be done without France. It was said that France's interests were different anyway because it is a nuclear power.
In contrast, Genscher reportedly would consider it a serious impediment in Bonn's relations with Paris if the Federal Government were to talk now with other European governments, for example with the British and Italian Governments, about a common stance on Washington's research plans, and, in so doing, bypass France. In the opinion of some coalition politicians, London seems to be interested in an individual agreement with Washington. The Federal Security Council presumably also discussed the French proposal to form a European technology community -- called Eureka -- for the time being in the civilian field. In Genscher's view, only through such a community could Europe wield the weight that would be of interest to the United States. Genscher apparently assumes that if there were individual agreements between European governments and Washington, the negotiating advantage would be more on the U.S. side. So far, Finance Minister Stoltenberg has said that it would be impossible to finance a Eureka program.

Also, the Federal Government obviously has the impression that by rejecting participation in SDI for the time being, the French Government is trying to create a favorable negotiating position for itself, while at the same time being able to control participation in individual U.S. projects via state companies so as to subsequently have directly at its disposal, if necessary, a "bridge" leading to participation in the U.S. developments.

Government spokesman Sudhoff said on Monday that the Federal Government statement in March that had termed the U.S. research program justified but left Bonn's participation open, continues to fully reflect the entire cabinet's view. Still, differences between Kohl and Genscher were obvious in Bonn, at least prior to the Security Council's meeting. Suggestions dropped by the FDP indicate reserve on the part of the foreign minister. The chancellor is said to foresee Bonn's participation in SDI once Washington has provided the answers requested to questions about details of the concept. According to Bonn circles, CSU Chairman Strauss, who talked with Reagan about SDI, is even more "positive" in his assessment of participation than Kohl. Strauss goes "a bit farther" and is possibly even now recommending, for moral reasons, the eventual deployment of non-nuclear space weapons for antimissile defense. Reportedly, the Federal Government's "basis for a decision" on SDI participation will be improved by a conference, scheduled to be held in the chancellor's office next Monday. During this conference, to be chaired by Minister Schaeuble, industrial representatives will discuss the preconditions and possibilities of FRG companies. A group made up predominantly of technicians is to travel to Washington later to explore areas of technical cooperation. Research Minister Riesenhuber continues to have reservations about SDI. He seems to think that his ministry's cooperation with FRG universities could suffer if it were to become involved in a military project.

Genscher will probably discuss the connection between the Geneva disarmament negotiations and SDI with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State Shultz in Vienna next Wednesday. During the festivities commemorating the State Treaty to which Austria owes its neutrality, the foreign ministers of the signatory states and of Austria's neighbor states will meet. Bonn circles assess this meeting as one of the three most important East-West meetings of the year -- together with the meetings at the UN General Assembly in New York in September and in Helsinki in early August on the anniversary of the conclusion of the European security conference 10 years ago. On the weekend after next, Kohl will have an opportunity to seek clarification during his long-planned meeting with British Prime Minister Thatcher at her country residence. He will have an opportunity to do the same with President Mitterrand at the end of May.
[Text] Hamburg, 11 May (DPA) — Despite statements to the contrary from Bonn, the Federal Intelligence Service [BND] in a report at the end of last year, expressed doubts about Bonn's participation in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative space program, according to the news magazine DER SPIEGEL. The federal chancellor's office denied the existence of such a study at the end of last week.

DER SPIEGEL's latest edition says that the chancellor's office did not even bother to distribute to other ministries the critical study, which was not in accordance with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl's line.

According to DER SPIEGEL, the study reads as follows on page 20: "conclusion — in view of the many technical problems and countermeasures, including the use of new or other offensive weapons, the prospect of a comprehensive ballistic missile defense system for the United States being constructed has to be judged rather skeptically."

The magazine says that well-known representatives from industry have been called to Bonn this Monday [13 May] for an exchange of views with Ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Heinz Riesenhuber, Martin Bangemann, Wolfgang Schaeuble and Manfred Woerner about a Federal German participation in the U.S. SDI program.

Officials, Businessmen Meet

LD131848 Hamburg DPA in German 1614 GMT 13 May 85

[Excerpt] Bonn, 13 May (DPA)—The minister of state in the Chancellor's Office, Wolfgang Schaeuble, had a meeting on Monday evening with representatives from research institutes, economic organizations, and individual firms to discuss the U.S. project for a nonnuclear missile defense system in space (SDI). Representatives from the federal offices concerned were also at the meeting. Government spokesman Juergen Sudhoff told the press that the talk was intended to form a consensus. He described the meeting as a process of listening and of presenting individual views.

Sudhoff affirmed that in the course of the next few months a Bonn delegation would travel to the United States to investigate the possibility of FRG participation in the research project.
COMMENTATOR ASSAILS BONN'S AMBIVALENCE ON SDI ISSUE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 Apr 85 p 1

[Editorial by Robert Held: "Bonn is Playing Hard-To-Get"]

[Text] With respect to SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative], the initiative for missile defense, ambiguous signals from Bonn arouse curiosity as to what the government will say in the Bundestag debate. Their official position paper of 27 March, at any rate, offered a text which cannot be understood without expertise. Anyone drawing the conclusion: "Our objective: renunciation of space weapons" is mistaken, if only for the reason that it must first be made clear what is meant: nuclear weapons in space or non-nuclear defense against nuclear weapons. Because of its convoluted argumentation, the text as an historical document is not laudable.

Small wonder that, since that time, there have been American newspaper captions claiming that "the Germans do not want SDI." For after the forthright speech by Kohl in Munich, was there not more and more talk about conditions and preconditions? The opposition played its opposition role, and the peace movement used the occasion to open a new campaign. Whether the statement "The Germans do not want SDI" is appropriate—or if one only wants to hold on to a few cards prior to talks with Reagan, cannot be obscured in the upcoming Bundestag debate.

What seems to be certain is that the Germans would not have wished for SDI. They would have liked it best of all if no one had hit upon the idea of intercepting missiles in space. Difficult tasks face the government as a result, not only because it must assume the responsibility, but also because it must be mindful of its own existence and the shaping of opinions in the majority supporting it.

On the other side of the Atlantic, our seemingly [that is, for internal consumption] self-confident talk about preconditions and conditions appears provincial. There is only one condition which should be set in all seriousness: in a new strategic order involving the closure of space, what happens to the protection of Central Europe? This the Americans have not yet thought through. We are hardly asked about anything else, for good reason. Between Europe and America there is not
only a difference of opinions, but there is also an awareness gap.
The situation here is like that in the high-technology sector, about
which an American said dryly: "It does not look as if Europe will
still be able to catch up."

The concept of "space weapons" conjures up the idea that now the war
is to be carried into space, that the killing is to be done there.
That, however, is not the intention: non-nuclear devices are to prevent
the atomic bombs from reaching their targets. The possibility of an
atomic world war is to be reduced.

The American argument is: the train has long since left the station.
The theory of parity through reciprocal deterrence, through mutually
agreed upon vulnerability of the Soviet and American "homeland" with
cities and people, can in reality not be implemented indefinitely.
For one thing, because the Soviets circumvent it: they are building
shelters, air defense and also missile defense—which was not envisioned
in the theory of mutual vulnerability. The American people, on the
other hand, are more and more refusing to be the unprotected pledge
in this calculation of atomic parity.

For that reason, the European lament that the "balance of terror must
be maintained" has increasingly become a cry over spilled milk. At
the same time, the apologetic demand that one would approve of SDI only
to bring about an even more sweeping AMB agreement (in other words,
a more comprehensive ban on missile defense) is either dishonest or
a mistake based on a lack of information. The Americans will first
of all see how far their researching the technological possibilities
brings them. They are leaving hardly any doubt, however, that if
necessary they would continue in a "flying start" toward their goal
of a new strategic order through the blockage of space. In this
connection, they do not view the ABM agreement as a sacred cow, but
as an agreement which can be abrogated with 6 months notice.

Yet in another respect, too, we are playing hard-to-get, miscalculating
the situation: the technological cooperation of Europe first needed
to be set into motion. Considering the speed with which Europe tends
to proceed in such matters, that is little more than an empty phrase
designed to gain time. The American determination to make reality
of a specific project is once again being underestimated. There is a
lot more going on here than the Europeans see or want to see. A large
undertaking--like the former "Manhattan" project for the construction
of the atomic bomb--is being driven ahead. Whatever the Americans
need for their purposes from Europe, from the FRG, they will get:
technology, knowledge, people. The recruiters are already on the move
in Europe. The governments cannot even prevent this. The French may
protest publicly, but behind the fog bank they are already busy boarding
the moving train, with great skill and good offers. For the British,
high-level technological cooperation with the Americans has already become
a traditional component of the "special relationship." The Germans,
meanwhile, are threatening to engage, with religious fervor, in a
time-consuming controversy.

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FRG'S GENSCHER SAID TO CRITICIZE KOHL ON SDI POLICY

DW150539 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 13 May 85 pp 19-21

[Unattributed article: "The Chancellor Has Good Reasons for Goose Bumps"]

[Text] Chancellor Kohl has irritated the French with his hasty statement that Bonn would participate in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]. Resistance to "star wars" is also developing in the Cabinet with Ministers Genscher and Riesenhuber arguing against FRG participation.

In an unusually frank manner, Genscher confirmed the opposition's fears about the Federal Government's situation. During the state reception for U.S. President Reagan the Sunday before last in Augustusburg castle, Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the FDP took Hans-Jochen Vogel of the SPD aside and complained about the way foreign policy is being conducted in Bonn under Helmut Kohl. Genscher's conclusion was that it was plain amateurism. The next day, together with his Foreign Ministry experts, the foreign minister assessed the damages. According to them, the damage caused by the CDU chancellor during Reagan's visit and the economic summit in Bonn was considerable.

It was said that Kohl's friend Reagan went home with the impression that the Germans would participate to a great extent in the U.S. President's "star wars" project. The pressure on the U.S. President to visit the Bitburg military cemetery has indebted Kohl so much to Reagan that the price could be costly for the government. It was said that Bonn could be "blackmailed" by Washington.

Bonn's standing with Paris has also deteriorated. It was said that a high political price will have to be paid to French President Francois Mitterrand -- who left Bonn irritated by Kohl's absolute loyalty to Reagan -- so as not to cause a permanent chill in FRG-French relations.

The conclusion is that Kohl has unnecessarily reduced the FRG's foreign policy leeway.

Last week the shocked people in Bonn tried to restrict the damage by making friendly signals to Paris, and they apparently had success. The FRG Embassy in Paris cabled that the French president wanted to forget about the summit quarrel for the time being. According to Genscher's assessment, the reason for this is that Mitterrand, who has domestic political difficulties, found that the summit in Bonn provided an ideal opportunity for him to appear to the French as the defender of national and European interests. This is the only way to explain why he acted so stubbornly in the quarrel over a common trade and currency policy.

In any event, the Kohl government will pay its first political price on 28 May when the CDU chancellor will meet with the socialist president, yield to his pressure, and agree to FRG participation in a planned French spy satellite project.
The estimated cost for Bonn is DM1 billion. Even so, it is questionable whether the Germans can still get special requests through. One diplomat said: "We stand there only as petitioners."

Mitterrand is deeply irritated by the summit, particularly by the fact that the U.S. President reduced the Europeans' role in the SDI program to that of mere "subcontractors." French diplomats say that during a talk with Mitterrand, Reagan "read this from a paper." These diplomats add that, therefore, it could not have been a slip of tongue. Mitterrand was also irritated by the fact that host Kohl asserted to the U.S. President in the Chancellery's NATO Hall that only those European states should participate in the SDI program that are "willing and technologically able to do so." For Mitterrand this meant without the French, if need be. Mitterrand was really irritated because the Bonn government chief made the U.S. SDI project a topic for public discussion and because he places so much emphasis on it.

Mitterrand defended himself by creating the impression in Bonn that he was the only one who could defend European interests and oppose the demands of the leading Western power. In this connection, because of Genscher, the French had believed in an FRG-French alliance up until the Bonn talks. During the previous weeks, Genscher had practically urged French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas to jointly resist unreasonable U.S. demands.

The chancellor, hastily trying to avoid irritating the Americans even more, who were already unhappy over Bitburg, meanwhile upset European positions. His predecessor, Helmut Schmidt, is afraid that the summit mistakes made by foreign policy amateur Kohl may have led to "more than just damage to the atmosphere" between Bonn and Paris.

Kohl's partners in Paris see it the same way. Mitterrand's close friend, EC Commission President Jacques Delors, says that Mitterrand had believed "that this Bonn government can display more independence toward the United States than the Schmidt government."

Unlike the case of the social-liberal coalition, there is no suspicion in Washington that the Kohl government is not moored solidly enough in the West. Thus, Mitterrand believed that Kohl would be the better partner for him in helping Europe gain greater independence, and this was an important reason for the show of friendship with the FRG Christian Democrats.

The French are now reacting with all the more disappointment. Jacques Huntzinger, foreign policy expert of the French socialists, said: "The gap between Kohl's speeches and the Federal Government's actions is simply too wide." The Mitterrand adviser became even more outspoken when he said: "Kohl is simply not a bright boy, and this is becoming increasingly evident."

Foreign Minister Genscher considers this to be an opportunity to play the role of the savior of FRG-French relations -- a savior called on to patch over the mistakes made by the chancellor and his advisers. Even before Kohl and Mitterrand meet at end of this month, Genscher plans to present himself as a friend of the president when he meets with his French counterpart, Dumas, in Paris on 22-23 May. Genscher thinks that Mitterrand's project for a European technology community is more reasonable than the readiness for Bonn's participation in SDI as rashly indicated by the chancellor.

During the past few months, the FRG Foreign Minister's feelings have been hurt too by Kohl and his staff to such a degree that he will no longer unreservedly abide by his longstanding principle of never publicly criticizing the governing chancellor in a coalition. What has annoyed Genscher most of all is the fact that Kohl's Chancellery has side-stepped the Foreign Ministry and established exclusive ties with leading people in the Reagan administration.
The foreign minister must consider it an affront when Horst Teltschik, a ministerial director in the Chancellor's Office, and Kohl's foreign policy adviser, boasts that he is the only one to whom all important Americans report. As officials have complained to Genscher, Teltschik usually rejects offers for cooperation from the Foreign Ministry with such remarks as: "No, thank you. We do not need your advice. The chancellor has his own ideas." Kohl has appointed Teltschik SDI coordinator. The 44-year-old man has taken advantage of this opportunity by setting up a parallel foreign ministry through working groups now made up of more than 50 officials. In this way, the Foreign Ministry is cut off from all important information.

In a report prepared for the Chancellor's Office late last year, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) came out against Bonn's participation in SDI because of technical, strategic, and alliance policy concerns. The chancellor's office did not pass along the critical study, which did not conform with Kohl's line, to other ministries. Requests from the Foreign Ministry about what was behind press references to the unknown BND paper were answered last week by the Chancellor's Office to the effect that the report does not exist at all.

However, it does exist. For example, page 20 of the document reads: "Conclusion -- in view of the many technical problems and countermeasures, including the use of new or other offensive weapons, the prospect of a comprehensive ballistic missile defense system for the United States being constructed has to be judged rather skeptically. Smaller yet are the possibilities for European NATO partners to adequately protect themselves against the Warsaw Pact's offensive strategic weapons.

Genscher's people are viewing with glee the difficulties Teltschik now has because of his chief's haste to join Reagan's SDI plans.

Leading industrial representatives have been asked to come to Bonn this Monday for an exchange of views with Ministers Genscher, Heinz Riesenhuber, Martin Bangemann, Wolfgang Schaeuble, and Manfred Woerner on FRG participation in the U.S. "Star Wars" Project. However, the chancellor's office will be unable to tell the economic experts what kind of participation the Americans have in mind for Europe.

The Federal Security Council was also wondering last Tuesday about Washington's intentions when it asked whether the Americans intended to simply give orders on their own to FRG firms so as to exploit their research results and then commit them to strict secrecy, or whether the Germans and other Europeans should finance and develop a "technology package" that will be offered as part of the entire SDI system to the United States.

Only one person -- Research Minister Heinz Riesenhuber -- provided some clarification at the Federal Security Council meeting. He announced at the secret session that, from a civilian point of view, the FRG's participation in SDI would be irresponsible. Riesenhuber during a long talk in mid-April, agreed with Genscher that there should be skepticism about SDI. He later complained that in the general enthusiasm of the Chancellor's Office over the Reagan visit, too little thought was being given to the fact that any scientists working on SDI would be unavailable for medical and industrial research, and this would be to the disadvantage of the FRG's ability to compete. In the Federal Security Council, Riesenhuber steadfastly refused to assume responsibility for one of the SDI working groups of the Federal Government. Later on, the minister expressed dismay over the lack of rationality and competence of the CDU members taking part in the session.

These are hard times for a CDU chancellor who has given Reagan his word on SDI and who has irritated the French president, his best ally against unreasonable U.S. demands. Moreover, his freedom of action is somewhat restricted because the foreign minister is fighting to survive and, therefore, wants to maintain a higher profile. "Actually," an adviser of Kohl mused, "the chancellor has good reason to get goose bumps."
WEST GERMAN SPD LEADER VOGEL ADDRESSES BUNDESTAG ON SDI

DW141403 Cologne ARD Television Network in German 0742 GMT 14 May 85

[Speech by SPD floor leader Hans-Jochen Vogel to the Bundestag—live]

[Excerpts] The summit was not only unsuccessful, it even created some dangerous discord, which you did not mention in your long statement, namely the discord between Paris and Bonn, especially the discord between President Mitterrand and you in the assessment of SDI. Your almost zealous approval of the initiative, which you later tried to take back somewhat, is opposed by Mitterrand's rejection.

Mr Chancellor, your approval of SDI is wrong and dangerous. Now this approval threatens to split up Europe and to block the way to European unification in a decisive moment. [applause]

The motion submitted by us urges emphatically: Accept the European alternative suggested by Paris. Turn back as long as there is time to do so, before the new arms race round has not further accelerated the mad race, and before it destroys the hope for European unification. This is a hope which you have strained very much due to the fact that your finance minister demands austerity in Brussels, while your agricultural minister simultaneously demands with the threat of a veto additional expenditures running into billions, and while you yourself demand that the veto be abolished.

We do not need your embarrassing advise with regard to what we owe the United States and the American people, we know what contribution the United States has made in the frame of the anti-Hitler coalition in the war to free Europe and us from despotism. We know how much the United States has helped under its Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy to rebuild our country, and in critical situations to safeguard our freedom and the freedom of West Berlin. [applause]

We also know about the liberal traditions, the vital strength, and the worldwide responsibility of this great country. But exactly for this reason, we do not owe it advanced obedience [vorauseilenden gehorsam] and assiduous acclamation, but sincerity. [applause]

By the way, we maintain that we are friends and allies of the American people, but we are not vassals of the administration of the American people. [applause]
Mr Chancellor, I must also remind you of this, because you have accepted it in silence that the current U.S. President has made a highly political decision—it was known that it contradicted your political attitude, if I see it correctly, or at any rate that of your foreign minister—namely the Nicaragua embargo, not before his departure from Washington, but immediately after his arrival in the FRG.

Mr Chancellor, do you believe that Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, or Helmut Schmidt would have been faced with such an affront? Or do you believe that these men would have accepted such an affront without comment, as you did?

One last question, Mr Chancellor. You said today again that the purpose of the visit by the U.S. President has been reconciliation. I do not doubt the honesty and sincerity of this motive on any side. However, Mr Chancellor, how does it fit the purpose of reconciliation that in the program of a reconciliation visit there was no place for a talk with the chairman of a party which has made the gravest sacrifices from the very first hour of the fight against Hitler, and which was the only party to warn in 1932 on its election posters: Who votes for Hitler, votes for war. [applause]

Mr President, esteemed ladies and gentlemen, I fail to see for whom the scheduling of the state visit, for which you are responsible, has been of advantage. For our people, its reputation in the world, or German-American relations, this scheduling did more harm than good. We will feel the consequences for a long time in the foreign policy field.

CSO: 5200/2621
BRANDT URGES EUROPEAN SPACE INITIATIVE IN RESPONSE TO SDI

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 19 Apr 85 p 4

[Excerpt] Brussels, 18 April. After 2 days of conferences in Brussels, the members of the Socialist International have appealed to the superpowers to be mindful of their special responsibility at the negotiations on disarmament in Geneva. The 77 Socialist parties of the oldest international organization call upon the Soviet Union and the U.S. to negotiate seriously and come up with results. Although the negotiations are welcomed, the international organization of Socialist parties expressed skepticism regarding the future.

Chairman Brandt, who summarized the results of the conference, stated that there was general agreement that proposals such as those of Soviet party chief Gorbachev for a moratorium on the installation of medium-range missiles in Europe should receive a constructive reply. Fears were expressed that a breakthrough at the Geneva negotiations will not be achievable until the U.S. has clearly decided whether to retain their option for testing and stationing weapons in space.

Brandt noted that none of the participants had supported the idea of extending the armament race to space. Referring to the French position, Brandt stated that Europe should develop an initiative of its own for a peaceful research program in space. This would be financially and technologically possible. In the years ahead, it would be more necessary than ever for Europe to protect the identity of its own interests and play an appropriate role in the area of security. Brandt emphasized that the SPD supported this analysis and its goals. The Socialist International also advocates the idea that everything possible be done so as to give a joint European reply to the American offer. Even if efforts to achieve a European initiative of its own are unsuccessful, Europe should give a joint reply.
GENSCHER BUNDESTAG ADDRESS ON SDI, SUPERPOWERS

DW141439 Cologne ARD Television Network in German 0911 GMT 14 May 85

[Speech by Foreign Minister Genscher to the Bundestag--live]

[Excerpts] We should mention SDI once again here. On this subject we have the clear position of the Federal Government as expressed by the chancellor in a government statement and by the Federal Security Council.

Ladies and gentlemen, we must recognize that it is now important to develop our position toward the project within the context of European cooperation. We know that cooperation between France and Germany in security policy is of extremely decisive significance. It is quite clear that there is no such thing as a solution to security problems that would be bad for France and good for Germany, or vice versa. All of us together, as the core of the European integration process, are anxious to support common European security policy within the framework of the alliance because only the European Atlantic partnership provides the secure foundation for the indefeasible policy of overcoming the partition of Europe and of eliminating the elements of separation.

For this reason, the common European reaction to SDI is important in the interests of strengthening German-French cooperation, promoting European unity, consolidating the Atlantic and European pillars of the alliance and, ladies and gentlemen, in the interests of meeting the requirement of showing special caution in security questions that are particularly sensitive for historical and geographical reasons and of making important decisions jointly with our European partners.

Quite apart from that, and even if there were no SDI research program, it is necessary for Europe, in its effort to find its identity, to also become technologically what can only be a guarantee for a system of social justice, namely, a technology community in which the states of Western Europe, the European democracies, strengthen and pool their abilities to cope with progress also by combining their technological aptitudes.

Ladies and gentlemen, this world economic summit was so decisive because the political statement made all these goals a common political aspiration of the seven states gathered here. This common platform provides the strength to continue the police that we, on the line between East and West, consider to be so decisive.
At the NATO ministers conference in Lisbon, we will, by implementing what has been said here, ensure that the alliance's unity is not jeopardized and that our strategy is reaffirmed. Ladies and gentlemen, the NATO strategy of preventing war—the strategy as we have it now—has as a component the two-track decision. We cannot, either in German-French friendship or in NATO partnership, pick and choose what we like and reject whatever we do not like. [applause]

It is quite decisive for me that here in Bonn the necessity for cooperative solutions to questions of armament and disarmament involving East and West was emphasized with reference to the Geneva negotiations. After all, it represents great progress for the United States and the Soviet Union to have agreed to discuss and solve the problems that are at stake—disarmament involving long-range missiles, intermediate-range missiles, the military utilization of space—and to pursue cooperative solutions, just as the Federal Government proposed in the Federal Security Council resolution.

It is important for us to overcome Europe's partition in a process of cooperation. For that purpose, we must jointly map out the possibilities. In this house, we ought to try to find common platforms. Nobody must ignore the fact that, on the one hand, the West declares its readiness to contribute to the elimination of partition through cooperation, while, on the other, however, SED general secretary and state council chairman, has said: Together with our friends, we will contribute to overcome the partition of Europe.

We can only hope that the U.S. President will receive a positive response to his invitation for a meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev because the dialogue between the two great powers that we have demanded for so long and so often has now started and because we have repeatedly demanded meetings between the leaders of the United States and of the Soviet Union.

We should draw conclusions from the political statement that supports our national goals and shows common prospects for the Western democracies. These conclusions should be: Strengthening the process of European unity and strengthening our alliance's defense capability, but also its capability of political cooperation. This will work only if we preserve the common basis of this policy and if we cease becoming emotional in connection with our most important alliance partners.

What has been repeatedly said from this rostrum continues to apply to the Federal Government: We support the goal of negotiation the United States and the Soviet Union posed for themselves in their statement of 8 January 1985 -- a negotiating goal that has been defined in the joint statement: preventing an arms race in space and halting it on earth.

As small-and medium-size states, we can make significant contributions to this end. However, we must do so in the confines of an alliance that is capable of action and of a European Community capable of acting politically. Our weight will in no way increase if we work ourselves into controversies, or if we seek polemics with our partners. However, our weight will be increased only through the consistent implementation of all commitments and responsibilities we have undertaken within the alliance.
Ladies and gentlemen, this is the requirement placed on us, and from its fulfillment can we then raise the demand that all others support the policy of cooperation with our Eastern neighbors together with us. It must be absolutely clear that that there is no doubt whatsoever about our commitments. Thus, it can only be our goal to initiate developments in East-West relations on a long-term basis that will confront the Soviet Union with the decision of either seeking to join with technological development in a peaceful world through cooperation with the West and all consequences emerging in all fields as a result, or enforcing military ambition through confrontation.

There must be no doubt that only the course of cooperation is in the interests of the peoples in East and West. A West that is in agreement and that supports this political strategy, as is also expressed in the political statement of Bonn, is bound to make an impression in the East so that no one there may speculate that he might be able to split the West. [applause]

The precondition for security policy is the common advocacy of what we jointly pursue. I think it would be a gain if, after all the polemics contained in the first speech on behalf of the opposition, we would now hear whether the opposition supports all points of the political statement of Bonn.

If this happens, ladies and gentlemen, then the debate would have been worth while, if not, we will be facing serious differences of opinion for a long time to come. Your responses are invited. Thank you. [applause]
DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES SDI PROJECT

PM151821 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 10 May 85 p 3

["Own correspondent" report: "Van den Broek: Evaluation Is a Condition of SDI Participation"]

[Text] The Hague, 10 May — According to Foreign Minister Van den Broek the European nations must make their participation in U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) dependent on involvement in the step-by-step evaluation of the program. Van den Broek who said this in a speech devoted entirely to the SDI, said that the European nations "could deal with the political and strategic criteria of special importance to the security of Europe" in such an evaluation. The most important consideration here is that strategic defenses must not be allowed to develop at the expense of conventional defense efforts.

Apart from European participation in evaluation, Van den Broek mentioned another two conditions to members of the Society for International Affairs and the Atlantic Committee: the transfer of technology must be guaranteed in the form of "real two-way traffic" and, it must be perfectly clear that "possible Netherlands participation in SDI" is not an advance indication of the Netherlands "final position" on strategic defenses.

Van den Broek stressed that a final judgment on strategic defenses will be formed "only gradually." He considers critical testing of successive phases to be necessary, but he rejected the argument that once SDI is set in motion it will be impossible to stop. According to Van den Broek the rapid increase in the costs of the U.S. research program will "form the true and solid threshold."

Van den Broek did not give a direct answer to the question of whether European participation in SDI is desirable simply for technological reasons. However, he pointed out that many SDI projects do not have a specifically military nature and mentioned sensors and data processors as examples. Eureka, the French plan for a joint approach to technological development, must, according to Van den Broek, be implemented in the EEC context. "But Eureka cannot serve as a way of running away from SDI," he said in response to a question.

In his remarks on the security implications of SDI, which did not offer any new angles, Van den Broek argued that the prospect of strategic defenses should not be allowed to damage efforts toward reciprocal disarmament. The United States "must be held to" its express promises that it will respect the ABM treaty. The ABM treaty limits antimissile defenses.
Van den Broek said that the Soviet view that the SDI is an offensive system "must be taken seriously." He expressed the hope that the Soviet Union will realize that the development of strategic defenses is still in its early stages and that this fact "will make it attractive for Moscow to limit this process as much as possible through arms control." The minister said that it is essential that the Soviet Union is not allowed to succeed in using SDI to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States.

According to Van den Broek the government ascribes "great urgency" to the U.S. determination to find defenses against shorter-range missiles, cruise missiles, and bomber aircraft which, unlike the Soviet SS-20 missiles, "cannot be repulsed" by strategic defenses. Finally, Van den Broek said that he regrets that those for and against SDI are already taking up their positions. "There is again the threat of polarization in national politics because of premature and categorical stances that have a paralyzing effect," Van den Broek said.

CSO: 5200/2621
DANISH PARLIAMENT REJECTS SPACE DEFENSE RESEARCH

PM101029 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 8 May 85 p 14

[Article by Sigyn Alenius: "Danish 'No' to Space Defense Research"]

Copenhagen -- Denmark has said "no" to President Reagan's invitation to the Danes and other NATO nations to participate in the U.S. space defense program, the so-called "star wars" project. This was announced by Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen yesterday. With the security policy majority which exists in the Danish parliament (the left-wing parties and the Radical Liberals) on 26 March the Folketing voted through a resolution calling for Danish rejection of the militarization of space and, as a consequence, of all forms of Danish participation in the research and development of space weapons programs. Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen has said at a press conference for foreign journalists in Copenhagen. In line with this Folketing resolution Denmark's response to President Reagan's invitation is most clear: Denmark says "no."

Asked if he thought Washington would be offended by such a response, the minister replied: "It is hardly likely to make much difference on way or another in Washington if a little country like Denmark says 'no' to an offer like this." As Ellemann-Jensen has stressed, the offer would have had some technological advantages for Denmark. Through on-the-spot participation in the space research program, Denmark would have been able to acquire high-technology expertise. "However, politically the answer is a crystal clear no thank you," the minister said.

CSO: 5200/2617
DANISH POLL MEASURES ATTITUDES ON U.S. SDI PROPOSAL

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Apr 85 p 5

[Text] The politicians have asked for a public debate and an airing of opinions on the American plans to develop the so-called star wars weapons.

These weapons have been widely discussed, but no real debate can be said to have taken place, perhaps because the subject is difficult to put into concrete and physical terms or to make tangible in other ways.

The Gallup Institute has studied the attitudes of the public toward the American plans at the present stage of the debate, where it has been said that the Soviet Union has already started development but not production of star wars weapons.

A representative cross-section of the population, roughly 1000 respondents, was asked this question:

"A great deal has been said about the desire of the American President Reagan to develop what are called star wars weapons and in this connection it has been said that the Russians have already started to develop star wars weapons. If it is true that the Russians have started developing star wars weapons do you think one should accept that the United States also begins developing star wars weapons or do you think that under no circumstances should the United States develop star wars weapons?"

The answers were as follows:

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<th>Party affiliation</th>
<th>Should accept</th>
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<td>To right of Social Democrats</td>
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<td>Social Democrats</td>
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About an equal number of people (38 percent and 40 percent) approved or opposed the American plans for star wars weapons on the condition that the Russians have also started developing such weapons.

But on the other hand a majority did not reject Reagan's plans, since almost a quarter of those asked (22 percent) did not take a stand on the question. So with respect to the expression of public opinion that was requested, one cannot say at the present early date that the debate has shown overwhelming opposition to the American plans.

Naturally enough the question has been discussed in the context of NATO and as the results indicate it seems—as far as the public is concerned—a logical consequence of Denmark's security base in NATO to accept the American star wars weapons, still on the condition that the Soviet Union is working to develop these weapons too.

This appears from the fact that a majority of voters who support Danish NATO membership—which is true of almost two-thirds of the electorate—accepted American star wars weapons.

(Reproduction permitted if BERLINGSKE TIDENDE and the Gallup Institute are cited as sources.)
FRENCH STUDY VIEWS PROSPECTS FOR EUREKA SUCCESS

[Article by Philippe Lemaitre: "According to an External Relations Ministry Study the Eureka Program Must Offer a Broader Field of Civilian Applications Than Reagan's Strategic Project"]

No matter what is being said in Paris, at the present stage Eureka is scarcely more than a defensive reaction to the American proposal, an idea that needs elaboration. However, the French are motivated to get things moving since they believe that the involvement of European enterprises in SDI will likely prove to be a disappointment. This is the upshot of a report prepared by the Analysis and Prediction Center (CAP) of the Ministry of External Relations in conjunction with representatives of public institutions (the Atomic Energy Commissariat, National Center for Space Studies, and General Secretariat of National Defense) and industrial groups (Matra, Thomson). There is no doubt, the authors acknowledge, that SDI will boost the American economy's research capacity. The interjection of 26 billion dollars into advanced technology will help to increase the country's technological maturity and its industry's competitiveness.

We are also talking -- and this is not a negligible factor -- about a psychologically motivating program: The atmosphere in research centers, universities, and industry is highly exciting, comparable to the time of the Apollo Program. The first negative consequence is that European researchers could be attracted to the United States. However, according to the CAP, if it is plain that SDI is inherently likely to exacerbate European technological backwardness it is not at all certain that the involvement of European enterprises in the U.S. program is the right response to the challenge it constitutes. SDI is predominantly a military program whose civilian spinoffs will not necessarily be substantial. Moreover, the authors of the report note, the involvement of European enterprises in the SDI program is only conceivable in areas where their technology is at the highest world level. Otherwise why turn to them? But in the key areas of SDI -- lasers, microcomputer technology, space -- the European technological level is inferior to that of the United States. Europe is equal to the United States in a not inconsiderable number of areas of know-how, but with a few exceptions -- such as propulsion and software--they are not of central interest at the industrial level.

The report notes in passing -- and this is almost a surprise -- that in Europe France is the country with the biggest presence in the field covered by SDI, closely followed by the British with the Germans a clear distance behind.

The CAP experts are convinced that the response to the technological challenge of SDI must be sought not within the Europe-U.S. relationship but among the Europeans themselves. How can partner governments and, especially, the leaders of European industrial
groups be persuaded of this? How is it possible to counter the arguments which, for some Europeans, favor SDI. They hope to garner a proportion of the contracts and, in the event of deployment of the space shield, they hope to move from doing research to being involved in production, which could be accompanied by fabulous orders.

leaving aside its political interest, of which all the European principals are not necessarily convinced, Eureka's principal advantage is that it offers a field of applications that is broader than SDI and, above all, more interesting from the civilian viewpoint. Interested French circles seem to consider that the most appropriate means to make Eureka more attractive is to come down as close as possible to the market and define a production strategy for the chosen themes.

They believe that this approach corresponds to the needs of Europe, where the major lag lies not so much at the research level as at the production level on an industrial scale, and that it is feasible given flexibility and a large variety of options in the organization and funding of Eureka. This implies a case-by-case examination, in each of the areas affected, of the degree to which it is possible to move on from precommercial [precommercial] research.

Digital Wind Tunnel Simulator and Artificial Intelligence

In view of the lead already built up by the American and Japanese teams and also of the very restricted market prospects, it would be unrealistic to compete with them in the production of supercomputers. For the Europeans, the solution could be to concentrate their efforts on the joint construction of a number of big computers meeting specific needs, for example a digital wind tunnel simulator (footnote) (use of a computer to study the effects of the atmosphere on aircraft; equipment of this kind makes it possible to cut the cost of building prototypes), which in this specific instance would be ordered by a consortium of European enterprises and jointly funded by the state and aeronautical industries.

A second example: In fields like new materials, which are characterized by a proliferation of products (ceramics, adhesives, carbon fibers) and outlets (the automobile industry and space...) public intervention should be more diffuse, the principal problem being to promote joint efforts by enterprises. The funding for European projects could be provided by the enterprises themselves with a contribution from the public authorities should the need arise. The experts cite as models to be explored the American centers for cooperative research or even the French hydrocarbon support foundation (supported by a special levy, it allows joint funding — 50 percent by the state and 50 percent by the enterprise — of research projects selected by the participating enterprises themselves).

In the field of artificial intelligence, it is suggested that enterprises be mobilized to pursue certain specific objectives where research in Europe has reached an advanced level, such as in computer-assisted medical diagnostics, equipment to help disabled people, and computer-assisted translation. Such a concentration of the collective research effort on areas with considerable prospects would make it possible to envision various public financial techniques for intervention: a system of repayable advances, cooperation between public laboratories and research institutes, and guaranteed purchases by the state.
The outline of a diversified and multiform Eureka program is thus beginning to emerge in Paris. The preoccupation that can be detected certainly does not rule out the continuation, not to mention the intensification, of programs like Esprit [European Information Technology Research Program] carried out within a classical Community framework. But such programs collide with budgetary obstacles: The member states are refusing to put much money into the kitty, and Esprit, the Community's flagship project, is impoverished. Since public funds are limited it is worthwhile to seek other means and to display imagination in order to convince the enterprises to embark on the adventure of European technological cooperation, undoubtedly a difficult exercise.
SPANISH ARMAMENTS DIRECTOR GENERAL COMMENTS ON NATO, SDI

PM201100 Madrid ABC in Spanish 26 Apr 85 p 24

[Interview with General Jose de Andres Jimenez, director general for armaments, by Andres Garrigo in Brussels--date not given]

[Excerpt] Brussels--Will Spain, as a NATO member, accept the U.S. invitation to participate in "star wars"?

General Jose de Nadres Jimenez, director general for armaments, replied to this question from ABC that Spain has specialists capable of cooperating in such a program but Madrid will take some months before giving an answer.

"First," the general told us following a meeting with NATO colleagues, "there must be a political decision from the Spanish Government, and it is not expected that this can be made within a reasonable period of some months." [sentence as published] So it seems as though Spain, like other European countries, will not give its answer within the 2-month deadline proposed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.

As for the program itself, which half of Europe is debating at the moment, the Spanish general believes that its realization will be "in the very long term, and embraces all fields of knowledge; but we already have some specialists -- physicists, mathematicians, and so forth -- capable of participating in it."

The director general for armaments believes that if the right decisions are made now, Spanish high-technology industry will be on a par with that of friendly countries within 15-20 years. "Our country has made the decision to make this effort, and it will use the budget to resolve at the same time the requirements of both defense and the modernization of industry."

The general pointed out that in 1945 the French or German defense industries were virtually nonexistent, but that they took the lead after 15 years of efforts.

With regard to more urgent and accessible projects than "star wars," the one now occupying the most time among experts in Spain and four other countries is EFA, the future European fighter plane, which promises to be on a larger scale than the "contract of the century," the F-18.

CSO: 5200/2624
NORWAY APPOINTS COMMISSION TO EVALUATE SDI

PM081217 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 May 85 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Norwegian SDI Study"]

[Text] The Prime Minister's Office has appointed a group of experts who will collect factual information and undertake an evaluation of the technical and scientific aspects of the U.S. research program for a possible space-based ABM defense system. The goal is to give the authorities and the general public a more independent foundation for Norwegian assessments of some of the questions raised by the so-called SDI program. The expert group, under the leadership of director Erik Klippenberg of the Armed Forces' Research Institute, will not make an assessment of the strategic repercussions or other purely political evaluations. The study will not be classified and will also be available to people without special military or technical qualifications. The study will include the following points:

A short resume of the background of SDI;
A description of the concept of ABM defense embraced by the SDI;
A discussion of critical aspects of the concept and what repercussions these could have on the realization of the concept;
A discussion of the possibility that the concept could also be used in European defenses against attack by ballistic missiles;
An assessment of the SDI research program's absolute and relative scope and of its possible effect on developments in the largely civilian research sector;
An attempt to assess the Soviet Union's position in the research sectors embraced by SDI.

CSO: 5200/2617
AUSTRIA'S GRATZ ADOPTS 'PRAGMATIC' ATTITUDE TOWARD SDI

[Text] Vienna -- Despite a categorial rejection of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI (better known as "Star Wars"), Austria's Foreign Minister Leopold Gratzer intends to adopt a fully pragmatic attitude toward the United States on this matter, focusing primarily on benefits for Austria's economic progress.

Gratzer told NEUE KRONEN ZEITUNG yesterday: "Austria's economy should profit from the technological research program now being started in the United States. I am taking quite a pragmatic view of this. If Austria's economy in the high-technology sector can profit from it, we should not, and do not want to prevent Austrian firms from such cooperation. Even if we wanted to do that, we could not, because the various economic sectors and their research have become so complex that they can no longer be simply divided into 'peaceful' sectors and sectors which perhaps ultimately lead to arms technology. Microchips are today used in every washing machine. If U.S. firms should approach economic partners in Austria regarding their participation in new research programs, then one should not keep our firms from doing this. What is important is that such a program not emanate from war laboratories, and that the Republic of Austria is not linked to President Reagan's SDI. The same pragmatic attitude would, incidentally, also apply toward the Soviet Union, provided that purely Austrian technologies were involved."

CSO: 5200/2617
OTTAWA — Canada may ignore a U.S. deadline for a decision on joining the controversial Star Wars research program, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney says.

The federal government will consider the U.S. offer "during our own time frames, not with regard to any limitations on time imposed by anyone else," Mulroney said yesterday in the House of Commons.

Mulroney also announced yesterday that Arthur Kroeger, a former deputy minister of transport and economic development, will head a team of Canadian officials who will study the U.S. proposal and recommend what steps the cabinet should take.

Canada has until May 25 to accept or reject the U.S. offer to participate in the program, officially called the Strategic Defence Initiative.

The deadline was set last month by U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who made the offer at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting in Brussels. The offer was made to all NATO allies, as well as Japan, Israel, and Australia.

One NATO country, Norway, has already announced it will not join the project. Australia, which is not a NATO member, has also rejected the offer.

Kroeger will take a "hard look" at the issue, but won't work to "any artificial deadline," External Affairs Minister Joe Clark told reporters.

Mulroney recently said he will seriously consider Canadian involvement in the Star Wars program if it results in jobs in Canada.

But yesterday in the Commons Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy urged the government to reject the U.S. offer quickly.

"It is clear that this government's own sense of uncertainty is only causing dissension in the government caucus and deep anxiety in the country," Axworthy said.

Earlier this week, Progressive Conservative MP Allan Lawrence said he is "fed up" with the government's refusal to say where it stands on the invitation.
OTTAWA — The federal Government inch ed closer yesterday towards accepting a U.S. invitation to participate in Star Wars research.

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said yesterday that the Government had appointed a senior Ottawa bureaucrat to examine the Star Wars research invitation.

Mr. Clark told reporters outside the House of Commons yesterday that the Cabinet had chosen former deputy minister Arthur Kroeger to head a small team of experts to assess the invitation.

The move indicates that the Government has at least decided to pursue the possibility of involvement in Star Wars research.

Two days ago, Defence Minister Erik Nielsen told a Commons committee that the Government did not have enough information to decide whether it wanted to accept the U.S. invitation and it had not even decided whether it would ask for the data.

Yesterday, Mr. Clark said that the Government needed more precise information and that Mr. Kroeger and his team would "take a hard look at exactly what is being proposed.

"We want to take a look at its strategic implications, its scientific implications, its economic implications so that the Government of Canada will be in a position to judge knowledgeably whether Canadians would want to become involved in the research," Mr. Clark said.

Mr. Clark said that Mr. Kroeger and his team did not have a date set for reporting, but that the Government wanted the information as quickly as possible.

When the United States issued the invitation late last month, it asked for a response within 60 days. Canada has recently been indicating, however, that it is not under any deadline.

Mr. Clark said that Mr. Kroeger and his team, which has yet to be appointed, would be in touch with U.S. officials next week.

Mr. Kroeger, who served as secretary of the Ministry of State for Economic and Regional Development, was also a key organizer of the Government's much-maligned national economic summit in Ottawa last month.

The United States extended its invitation to participate in the $36-billion program to its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, as well as to Japan, Israel and Australia.

Already, Denmark, Australia and Norway have rejected the invitation.

The Canadian Government has given mixed signals.

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney has said Canada would consider participating if the $36-billion research project offered sufficient job prospects for Canadians. At other times however, the Prime Minister has indicated that he considers it a problem that Canada would not have control over the parameters of the project.

Arms Control Center Official

SINCE ITS unveiling in March, 1983, President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) has turned up few really ardent supporters among the Western allies. Justifiable worries concerning its undermining of strategic stability and arms control have led even such hard-liners as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to give SDI only qualified approval.

The dangers inherent in SDI ought to have spawned more forthright criticism by allied governments. That their doubts have been muted can be explained by at least three factors.

First, there has been a reluctance to confront Mr. Reagan on what has become for him a personal crusade. Second, the U.S. Administration has succeeded in convincing the allies that public criticism
of SDI could harm the U.S. bargaining position at the Geneva arms-control talks. Third, the allies are being lured into a willing suspension of disbelief about SDI's substantive merits with promises of lucrative research contracts. More than that, so the sales pitch goes, through participation in SDI they can avoid being left behind as space technology rockets into the twenty-first century.

At the recent Shamrock Summit, Mr. Reagan added to the debate on SDI with an offer to share the development of SDI technology with Canadian industry. U.S. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger repeated the invitation again recently at a meeting of North Atlantic Treaty Organization defence ministers in Luxembourg.

Since then, Defence Minister Erik Nielson, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and even Prime Minister Brian Mulroney have spoken of keeping our options open in light of the possible employment benefits and spilloffs in such areas as communications and data-processing technology.

Before our critical faculties concerning SDI are completely dulled by the lure of economic gain, and we forget that this program risks setting off an arms race in space that would upset the strategic balance on which our security depends, we would do well to ponder just how credible and significant the economic benefits of SDI are likely to be for Canada.

First, although the $26-billion allocated for SDI research over the next five years is a great deal of money, our slice of the pie is bound to be small. Remember, Canada's isn't the only political support for SDI being solicited with that money. Skeptical European allies, each with its own hungry high-tech industries, are also being serenaded. And of course most of the money will be going to U.S. firms anyway.

This relates to a second point. Being at the cutting edge of technology, SDI research is sure to be highly classified. According to John Simons of Canadian Marconi, in many of the strategic technologies involved in SDI, such as high-energy lasers, "Canadian companies would be totally blocked in obtaining American information," so "it would be impossible for us to operate" in those areas. Our place would, accordingly, be at the lower end of the SDI technology spectrum.

Third, this should raise considerable doubts concerning the thesis that Canada's space industry can ride into the next century on the coat-tails of SDI. Because we will be largely shut out of the top end of the SDI line, at the end of the day we could well find ourselves further behind the industry leaders than we are today.

Fourth, Canadian space policy has always placed a premium on commercial spinoffs. While the dichotomy is not strictly provable, most economists agree that fewer commercial spinoffs result from research designed to develop technologies for specific uses than from research aimed at expanding general knowledge about those technologies. According to a recent study by the New York-based Council on Economic Priorities, most of the research in the three major programs of SDI (comprising 90 per cent of the total) is directed toward developing specific applications and a number of prototypes. As the report notes, moreover, the commercial utility of such SDI-associated technologies as particle beams, large optics, infrared sensors and high-energy lasers is "not immediately obvious".

Once again, even in areas that do have spilloff applications, such as very high speed integrated circuits (VHSIC), commercial production would be hindered by security restrictions arising from fears that these technologies could be copied by the Soviet Union. Such problems have already surfaced in connection with VHSIC technologies.

Finally, there's jobs. Canada's space industry directly employs more than 3,000 technical and professional people. Opportunities to expand this pool of talent obviously need to be looked at. However, there has been a great deal of loose talk about SDI's potential for generating jobs in Canada.

To begin with, space is a capital-intensive, not labor-intensive, industrial sector. In any event, what's in the offer with SDI is not a production line that could generate considerable employment, but rather research. In numerical terms, the jobs created would be few.

When the Reagan Administration found that SDI could not be sold to the NATO allies on its strategic merits, it appealed to their economic interests. Having failed to convince Canadians that SDI research is merely a prudent hedge against Soviet research programs, the Mulroney Government may be on the verge of adopting the same tactic. Evidently the Cabinet is split on this issue.

While participation in SDI research would entail economic benefits for Canada, the points raised above suggest that these benefits are not so certain or significant as to warrant being made a major determinant of Canadian policy toward SDI. In contrast, the danger to global security posed by SDI is clear and significant. This danger rather than commercial opportunities should be the decisive consideration in the formulation of Canadian policy toward SDI.
Push is going to come to shove on SDI before long. As the evidence mounts that SDI is threatening arms-control agreements (notably the 1972 ABM Treaty) and confounding the talks in Geneva, opposition to it in Congress and among NATO governments in Europe is likely to grow. A recent speech by Britain's Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, strongly critical of SDI (in spite of his Government's official endorsement of the program), is a sign of things to come.

Ambiguous language has thus far enabled the Mulroney Government to keep its diplomatic options open on support for SDI. Should the Government succumb to the lure of SDI's dubious economic benefits, those options could quickly disappear.

While refraining from imposing a ban on participation in SDI by Canadian companies, the Government should guard its diplomatic options by maintaining an arms-length relationship to such private-sector involvement. In particular, it should resist sanctioning that involvement through industrial support programs.

Canada's space industry needs to be nurtured. But it should be oriented in a way that will enhance our security and serve Canadian efforts to build a safer and more peaceful world. Tying our space industry to SDI in the expectation of a large commercial gain would be to defeat that higher purpose in a most short-sighted fashion.
OTTAWA (CP) — The Defence Department should know within five years whether Canada can afford and produce a "space-based surveillance fence" to guard the country's borders and warn of unfriendly intrusions, a top defence planner said yesterday.

LeRoy Nelms, the department's associate chief for research and development, told a conference of astronautics specialists that, by the late 1990s, Canada will need a satellite system that can track interlopers and relay the information.

The satellite, which would be a large device using high-powered radars and jam-proof telecommunications, would track low-flying missiles and aircraft and pinpoint the location of intruding ships. Studies now under way and scheduled for completion within five years will determine the system's needs and feasibility, Mr. Nelms said.

He said the military also is undertaking research into space-based communications systems, aids to navigation and enhanced capability for search and rescue services along the country's 20,000 kilometres of coastline and in the interior.

In January, a special Senate committee studying territorial air defence recommended that Canada's military role in space be studied and that the country develop a national military space program.

Mr. Nelms's remarks at a meeting of the Canadian Aeronautics and Space Institute followed comments by L. D. (Larry) Clarke, chairman of Spar Aerospace Ltd. of Toronto, who said his company has determined that a high-technology "peacekeeping satellite" is technically feasible.

"There is a need ... to examine those objects in space whose role is uncertain and to determine whether they are capable of committing a hostile act," Mr. Clarke told reporters. Spar analysts have determined that the need can be met by a new kind of satellite.

The so-called Paxsat A, which could be built in Canada using existing technology, would be a mobile satellite that could spot suspicious objects, move in for a closer look and determine from their configuration whether they are capable of being used as weapons.

The information would then be relayed to earth-based analysts who would complete the assessment and take whatever action was deemed fit. Mr. Clarke said it is unlikely that hostile satellites could be camouflaged to hide their true uses from Paxsat.

Mr. Clarke suggested Paxsat could be opened to use by all countries under an international pact to ensure adherence to space-weapons treaties and to the peaceful use of space.

But a senior Spar executive in Toronto said the technology could be used in space-weapons programs such as Star Wars, the space defence plan proposed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

The Spar study, paid for by the External Affairs Department, determined merely that such a system is possible using state-of-the-art technology.
WARSAW NOTES FRG, JAPANESE SUPPORT FOR SDI

LD041543 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0400 GMT 4 May 85

[Andrzej Zychowicz commentary]

[Text] Speaking of NATO policies, we think of policies agreed and coordinated at the headquarters in Brussels by the European and American signatories to the pact. Meanwhile, another quite shareholder in mutual military and political plans is looming on the horizon—Japan. During the summit of the world's seven industrial powers which is taking place in Bonn, a political declaration supporting the American position in the Geneva negotiations with the USSR has been adopted. Among the signatories there was also Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.

The United States has offered its NATO partners participation in the research program connected with a space defense system. The star wars plan has also found its way to the Bonn agenda. On the eve of the summit, two statesmen supported the American research in the field—the Federal Republic's chancellor, Kohl, and Japan's prime minister, Nakasone, that is the heads of government of the two most powerful countries in the capitalist world after the United States. I leave the military aspect aside. Both Kohl and Nakasone are known for their support of American military plans. But I would like to look at the scientific-technical and economic aspects. New telecommunication systems, extremely fast computers, and artificial intelligence are to be the nucleus of the star wars program. At the same time, this is the technology on which 21st century information systems will be based. It is greatly tempting for Japan and West Germany to have their share in an enterprise of that kind. These prospects make it possible to belittle the dangers carried by an arms race in space. In Tokyo and in Bonn the argument is frequently advanced that so far this is merely greatly promising research. So far.

CSO: 5200/48
AUSTRALIA COMMENCES DISARMAMENT TALKS—The minister for foreign affairs, Mr Hayden, has told the United States delegation Australia was a little perplexed and was not totally convinced about the American space weapons program. Mr Hayden's comments came at the beginning of 2 days of discussions on disarmament with a 9-member United States delegation led by the director of the country's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr Kenneth Adelman. Mr Hayden said the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative for developing weapons in space represented lofty ideals, but Australia was still a little uncertain about some of the consequences. The minister also said that the government had no qualms about justifying and supporting United States military installations in Australia because it saw them as instruments that preserved and contributed to stability in the world. The leader of the American delegation, Mr Adelman, said America had both the desire and the need to hear the Australian view on these issues. Mr Adelman said President Reagan took advice and policy recommendations from Australia very seriously. [Text] [Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0430 GMT 1 May 85]
SALT/START ISSUES

PAPER OPPOSES AUSTRALIAN DRIFT ON MX, SDI ISSUES

Sydney THE AUSTRALIAN in English 6-7 Apr 85 p 10

[Editorial: "Fears Over Our Foreign Relations"]

[Text]

SINCE the end of the war in Vietnam, Australian political debate has been dominated by domestic questions. But the Government's conduct of its foreign relations is arousing widespread fears in Australia and overseas that it lacks a coherent and principled approach to the needs of our national security.

One of the most commonly held beliefs about Australian politics is that foreign policy is little more than a distraction about which no more than a tiny minority concerns itself. This view is so far from the reality of our political history as to be a myth, and a myth which can imperil any government or party which does not recognise its proven fallaciousness.

Last Sunday 300,000 people marched throughout Australia in support of nuclear disarmament and of other goals which, notwithstanding the efforts of some Labor politicians to suggest the contrary, are opposed to the Hawke Government's expressed policies on foreign affairs and defence. Almost all of the marchers would normally support Labor in preference to the Coalition, and a large number of those taking part were members of the ALP and included the party's national president and other leading politicians.

While it is still true the Prime Minister and his closest colleagues reject the aims of their party's anti-American wing, there has lately been a series of incidents which can only arouse doubts about the Government's sense of direction and firmness of purpose. The refusal to help the US with its MX missile tests and with research into the so-called "Star Wars" program, particularly when taken in conjunction with the Government's increasingly "even-handed" approach to disarmament negotiations, show a marked drift from the strong commitments to the American alliance given by Mr Hawke before and after he took office. Our pending withdrawal from the Sinai peace-keeping force will be a denial of the Government's declared resolve to take part in effective international action to preserve world peace.

Economic questions were to the forefront of the election which brought Labor to government, but without a general public confidence that Mr Hawke was dedicated to the maintenance of our defensive alliances with the democracies, the ALP could still be in opposition. In recent months this confidence has been weakened by the Government's shifts and changes in its foreign and defence policy.

These uncertainties are reflected overseas. The collapse of the Australian dollar cannot be ascribed solely to economic factors. It is evidence of a growing international disillusionment with this Government's consistency and reliability, even though we have not yet reached the pariah-like status of
New Zealand. The proposed appointment of such a senior US State Department official as Mr Paul Wolfowitz as his country's ambassador to Indonesia could be a sign that Washington no longer regards this country as its firmest friend in our region.

As has been demonstrated by the French socialist Government and until recently by the West German Social Democrats, a left-of-centre government can follow foreign and defence policies which take full account of the dangers of Soviet aggression. So, too, could an Australian Labor government if given the proper leadership. But so far such leadership and the willingness to alienate some party colleagues in the national interest has been only too obviously lacking.
USSR PLACES 60 SS-21'S NEAR INTRA-GERMAN BORDER

LD101244 Hamburg DPA in German 1205 GMT 10 May 85

[Excerpt] Bonn, 10 May (DPA) -- According to the FRG Defense Ministry, Moscow has stationed at least 60 SS-21 nuclear short-range missiles near the intra-German border. The ministry announced in Bonn on Friday that the missiles have a range of 120 km. It is assumed that in all 19 Soviet divisions in the GDR the outmoded "FROG" missile system is being replaced by the modern SS-21's. Compared with their predecessors, they have significantly higher accuracy and can be deployed more quickly.

It appears that the Soviets are not adhering to the unilateral 6-month moratorium on the stationing of the SS-20 medium-range missiles which Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced 7 April. In its statement, the Defense Ministry pointed out that construction work on seven new sites is continuing west of the Urals. The Ministry says that so far 414 SS-20 missiles with 1,242 warheads are operational, with 243 missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union.

The stationing of the new SS-X-25 intercontinental missile, with one warhead and a range of 10,000 km, will follow shortly. It could be either mobile or deployed from a fixed position. Another new development is the SS-X-24 with the same range but 10 independently targetable warheads. A year ago, about 50 SS-12/22 "Scaleboard" short-range missiles with a range of 900 km were noted in the GDR and the CSSR.
USSR SAID TO HALT SS-21 DEPLOYMENT NEAR BORDER

DW131339 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 13 May 85 p 16

[Unattributed report: "Moscow Stops SS-21"]

[Text] According to reports by Western intelligence services, the Soviet Union has stopped deploying new SS-21 short-range nuclear missiles near the intra-German border. At present, the divisions are equipped with about 80 of these missiles (one warhead, range 120 km). Moscow called the deployment a countermeasure against the deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. The deployment of SS-22 missiles in the GDR and CSSR has also apparently been interrupted. About one-half of the approximately 100 systems (one warhead, range 900 km) are currently deployed with the Soviet Armed Forces near the borders of the USSR. Western intelligence services are still debating whether there are technical reasons for Moscow's decision, or whether the decision was made out of concern for the mood against further rearmalement in the GDR and the CSSR.
Montreal (CP) — People believe doctors who speak out against nuclear war because they best understand its medical consequences, says the head of a delegation of high-ranking Soviet doctors who arrived Monday for a 10-day “peace” visit to Canada.

Dr. Mikhail Kuzin and eight colleagues have been invited by the Canadian branch of the Physicians for Social Responsibility to tour 11 Canadian cities, including a two-day peace conference in Toronto this weekend.

Kuzin, director of the Vishnevsky Institute of Surgery in Moscow, noted the visit came at the same time as the announcement of a moratorium on the stationing of nuclear weapons in Europe by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Gorbachev’s move was “very nice” and showed “the Soviet government has the same goal as our movement,” said Kuzin. His group, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, was founded in 1981 by three American and three Soviet physicians and now claims a membership of more than 120,000 doctors in some 52 East and West-bloc countries.

Last June, it appealed to Washington and Moscow to agree on a mutual freeze on the production and basing of nuclear weapons, to declare no first use of nuclear weapons, and to halt development of new nuclear weapons.

Asked whether the Soviet unilateral moratorium was not merely a publicity stunt by Gorbachev, Kuzin said he was sure the Soviet leader “is sincere.”

He repeated the familiar line that the Soviet people do not want war because they still feel the toll of the last one, in which 20 million of their countrymen died.

He politely sidestepped further questions on the Soviet and U.S. arms race, pleading political ignorance and noting that “the world is full of disinformation.”

Speaking occasionally through an interpreter, Kuzin said Soviet pro-disarmament doctors see their role as educators of public opinion. For example, he said, joint conferences with western colleagues on the medical and social consequences of nuclear war have been televised in the Soviet Union.

“Many people believe that the effects (of a nuclear war) will be like that of a conventional war,” he said. “People believe physicians because they know the medical consequences better than journalists.”

The delegation will take part in a peace conference in Toronto on Friday and Saturday organized by Physicians for Social Responsibility in association with the medical faculties of the University of Toronto and Hamilton’s McMaster University.

The conference, called Waging Peace in the Nuclear Age: A Family and Community Affair, will also be attended by Canadian and U.S. physicians and is open to the public.
Nuclear-Free Canada Urged

Vancouver THE SUN in English 10 Apr 85 p A17

[Text] Two members of a Soviet peace delegation said in Vancouver Tuesday that good relations between their country and Canada should continue despite closer Canada-U.S. ties under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.

Marat Vartanyan and Simon Khetchinashvili, two members of a delegation of Soviet doctors who arrived in Canada Monday for a 10-day visit, said in interviews following a city hall press conference Tuesday that they believe there are "no great changes" in Canadian-Soviet relations since Mulroney's election. Vartanyan, a psychiatrist, and Khetchinashvili, an ear, nose and throat surgeon, were joined at city hall by two other members of the delegation, Galina Savelieva of the Moscow Medical Institute and Alexander Tscherbakov, a specialist in social hygiene and public health.

Khetchinashvili said the perception in the Soviet Union is that "we have good relations with Canada" and that "I feel no great changes (since Mulroney's election)."

He said Canada could, however, contribute greatly to the non-nuclear movement by declaring the country a nuclear-free zone and by "probably stopping the (cruise missile) tests."

Vartanyan, Khetchinashvili and eight other doctors have been invited by the Canadian branch of the Physicians for Social Responsibility to tour 11 Canadian cities, including a two-day peace conference in Toronto this weekend. Funds for the visit is provided by the national committee of the Soviet Union.

While here, the physicians will also visit medical schools in 11 Canadian cities to discuss Soviet medical advances with students and faculty.

Vartanyan said the doctors' main reason for visiting Canada is to "promote our main goal, to do everything (we can) to prevent nuclear war and describing the consequences."

"Personal contacts," he added, are crucial to spreading international understanding.

Cruise Missile Tests Criticized

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 18 Apr 85 p 4

[Article by Lawrence Martin]

[Text] MONTREAL — The Soviet population has a calmer, less fearful attitude about the possibility of nuclear war than do North Americans, a member of an organization of Soviet doctors dedicated to the prevention of nuclear war said yesterday at the close of a tour of Canada.

Dr. Galina Savelieva, of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences, said the attitude is due to a realization among Soviets that the party and the Government are doing everything they can to prevent an outbreak.

She said that in Canada, for example, the people didn't get their wish against the testing of the cruise missile on their soil, but in the Soviet Union there is agreement between the Government and the anti-nuclear movement.

Also accounting for a calmer Soviet attitude, Mrs. Savelieva said, is the fact that "we don't feel that the Canadian and American people are our enemies." This contrasts, she said, with the U.S. attitude that "the Soviet people are the enemy of the Americans."

Nine physicians of the Soviet chapter of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War spent the past week in Canada in an effort to enhance communications with their Canadian counterparts.

Dr. Mikhail Kuzin, the head of the delegation, said 60,000 Soviet doctors now belong to the organization. He and the other physicians talked of a rapidly growing disarmament movement in the Soviet Union and described the population as becoming very sensitized to the horrors of a nuclear conflict.

Dr. Kuzin said that his group has produced TV programs for a Soviet audience of 150 million and that the group's work is reported extensively in the Soviet press.

While he said that the organization makes recommendations to the Soviet Government, he said that there were no disagreements with Kremlin policy.
When pressed for his views of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he said that this constituted a political question which he was not qualified to answer.

"As everybody knows, the Soviet Army is in Afghanistan by invitation of their Government," he said.

Somewhat aggravated, he listed countries where there was a U.S. presence. "Why are you asking me about Afghanistan, not about Lebanon? Why are you not asking me about Nicaragua...?"

When he suggested that the questions should be on medical subjects, a reporter inquired as to the health of Andrei Sakharov, the dissident Soviet physicist living in isolation in Gorki.

Dr. Kuzin responded that this was a stereotypical question used for anti-Soviet propaganda. "All these questions are used for dragging up mistrust between the peoples. ... We came to Canada in search for new ways of creation of trust. We are here to try and understand each other much better."

Dr. Marat Vartanyan, director of research at the Centre for Mental Health in Moscow, said that a chief focus of the group had become the East-West propaganda problem, a look at "what are the main mechanisms in the causes of the stereotyping of thinking, which is the main obstacle between East and West?"

The group met Canadian disarmament ambassador Douglas Roche during its stay and saw some members of Parliament, though not the party leaders. Dr. Edward Crispin, Canadian organizer of the tour, said that the tour had lived up to all expectations and that he hoped Canadian physicians would soon get the same opportunity in the Soviet Union.
BRIEFS

CANADA REJECTS SOVIET CALL—OTTAWA (CP)—Canada has lined up with the United States and Britain in rejecting a call from the Soviet Union to match its seven-month freeze on deployment of more intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The Soviets' proposal would merely lock in their nuclear superiority in Europe and is "clearly designed to influence western public opinion," the external affairs department said in a statement issued in Ottawa yesterday. However, the statement added that Canada welcomes the willingness of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to meet U.S. President Ronald Reagan. [Text] [Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 12 Apr 85 p A14]
TASS REPORTS NEUTRAL FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING

LD301821 Moscow TASS in English 1723 GMT 30 Apr 85

[Text] Stockholm April 30 TASS — A meeting of foreign ministers of neutral and nonaligned countries participating in the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe drew to a close here. The meeting discussed the role and contribution of these countries to the European confidence and security building process and the work of that major political forum in the Swedish capital.

In a communique on the results of the meeting the ministers stressed that the Stockholm conference and the measures discussed by it are of major importance in the existing international situation, promoting the lessening of the threat of military confrontation in Europe. They urged the participating states to pass on as early as possible to more substantive talks at the forum.

The document reflects the significance of the participating states reaffirming at the Stockholm conference their pledge to renounce the use or threat of force both in bilateral relations and in their relations on the international scene as a whole.

The ministers stressed the need for all the states attending the Stockholm forum to promote the process of building security and promoting cooperation in Europe and reaffirm the readiness of their countries to continue working to attain these aims. In this connection the communique emphasizes the importance of the forthcoming celebrations at a high political level in Helsinki of the 10th anniversary of the Final Act of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

CSO: 5200/1164
SOVIET REPORTS ON OPENING OF SESSION 14 MAY

Session Opens

LD131924 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 13 May 85


There is every possibility for the sixth session to become the turning point in the work of the Stockholm conference. In the past, working groups have created and every country or group of countries submitted its specific proposals on security measures and disarmament in Europe. The possibility of attaining perceptible results arose after the Soviet Union submitted for the consideration of the participants in the conference a new document: the main provisions for a treaty on the mutual nonuse of force and for maintaining peaceful relations. While taking into account the wishes of the neutral, nonaligned, and a number of Western countries, it specified provisions on the subject and obligations of a treaty, the list of those who would participate in it, the holding of consultations, and the prevention of sudden attacks — in brief, the whole spectrum of questions arising in the preparation of such an important act of international law. The socialist countries also presented a number of new initiatives on strengthening confidence-building measures and security in the military sphere. Unfortunately, our proposals are not receiving their merited response from the NATO side. Their package of new proposals, so to speak, which was submitted at the previous session, is still an attempt to attain unilateral advantages for themselves.

Grinevskiy on 'Practical Talks'

LD131747 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 13 May 85

[From the "Vremya" newscast; comment by Oleg Grinevskiy, USSR envoy to CSCE talks]

[Text] The sixth session of the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe opens in Stockholm tomorrow. Taking part in our program is the head of the Soviet delegation, Oleg Alekseyevich Grinevski, emissary for special missions.

[Begin Grinevskiy recording] The Stockholm conference, not for the first time, has to resume its work in a complex and dangerous international situation created by the United States. In this conditions it is still more urgent to work out confidence-building measures that will lead to a reduction in military confrontation in Europe and to an
improvement of the political climate there. However, it must be frankly admitted that matters are moving slowly, unpardonably slowly, in Stockholm, particularly against the background of the acute international tension. Although the United States was forced to agree to discuss the question raised by the socialist countries on the nonuse of force, nothing so far shows that it is seriously ready to move toward solving this problem. Judge for yourselves. The Soviet Union and the socialist countries propose a treaty which in strict legal form would ban the use of military force in any form. The United States proposes a repetition of that which is already recorded in the UN Charter and in the Helsinki Final Act on the subject of the nonuse of force. To what avail would such a simple repetition be? It seems that the United States is still playing at negotiations.

There is no sign so far of any serious desire on the U.S. part to get down to major confidence-building measures in the military field. Instead of this, we hear the same old song about some sort of X-ray photography of the activities of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviet leaders have frequently, clearly, and unambiguously declared that our country favors honest and equitable talks that could lead to the working out of substantial accords on strengthening peace in Europe. The Soviet delegation will hold strictly to these instructions.

At the Stockholm conference, it is time to go from words to deeds, to begin practical talks. It now depends on the United States and its allies whether the conference can pass this landmark. [end recording]

Military Expert Semeyko Remarks

LD132337 Moscow International Service in Finnish 1430 GMT 13 May 85

[Interview with Soviet military expert Colonel Lev Semeyko on the opening of the sixth session of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe with unidentified interviewer — recorded in Russian with superimposed Finnish translation]

[Text] [Semeyko] The countries participating in the conference have attended the sessions for 1 and 1/2 years, but, unfortunately, they have not been able to reconcile their serious differences in attitudes. The reason for the differences is that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries regard political decisions as the most important for fundamental changes in the military-political climate of Europe, while the Western powers emphasize military-technical aspects. What is concerned here are factors quite obviously linked with the strivings of the NATO countries to achieve one-sided military advantages. This is impossible. If we really want to strengthen confidence and security, it is necessary to observe the principle of equal and similar security of all participating countries.

[Interviewer] Has any rapprochement in the attitudes of the different sides taken place during the work of the conference?

[Semeyko] There has been certain progress. The nature of the dialogue, both on questions of political and military confidence measures, has become deeper. This is important. The Soviet Union favors the businesslike and concrete discussion of problems so that the attitudes of both sides can be based on positive practical actions.
In this sense, I would like to emphasize the Soviet announcement that from 7 April until November it has frozen the deployment of medium-range missiles and other countermeasures in Europe. Through its freeze decision the Soviet Union has made its own contribution to strengthening confidence.

At the end of January the Soviet Union tabled for the conference discussion a document called, "The Main (Principles) of the Treaty on the Mutual Renunciation of the Use of Military Force and on the Maintenance of Peaceful Relations." According to this, all the participants of the treaty would undertake an obligation not to be the first to use any nuclear or conventional weapons against the others, and, accordingly, not to use military force in general against the others. The renunciation of force is becoming the nucleus of the discussion in Stockholm, thus inspiring increasing hopes of progress.

[Interviewer] What obstructs the Stockholm conference?

[Semeyko] It is obstructed only by the NATO countries that state they are ready only to confirm the principles of the renunciation of the use of force. But this is not enough. Now we need concrete international obligations. The Western countries are not prepared to undertake such obligations. By stating that they are only prepared to confirm the principle of the renunciation of the use of force, the Western countries oppose taking into account nuclear and chemical weapons. This speaks for itself. The NATO countries, and above all the United States, placed their hopes on force before and are doing so now.

[Interviewer] Because the situation is such, we can probably not speak, either, about the possibility of a fundamental strengthening of confidence?

[Semeyko] Confidence is one of the sensitive aspects of security. Security must not be condensed into the military aspect. If we examine more closely the attitude adopted by NATO in the field of the military views of confidence, we cannot fail to see the obstructing factors in it. The NATO countries condense the entire matter into the so-called extra-garrison activity. [sentence as heard] (If) [words indistinct] confidence measures, they will try to extend them only to apply to the land forces. In NATO’s view there must be among them also those measures that we can only call legalized espionage. Why then is information needed, for example, about the places where staffs or the organizations of military commands are situated? In order that the U.S. nuclear forces in Europe can more efficiently fulfill their task of making the Warsaw Pact alliance [word indistinct] At the same time, the NATO countries continue to oppose reporting the exercises of the important services of the military forces, the Air Force and the Navy. Those exercises being organized in the sea areas and air space bordering on Europe directly concern the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. Naturally, all this obstructs the situation at the Stockholm conference.

[Interviewer] In a few months' time it will be exactly 10 years since the signing of the Final Act at the CSCE conference in Helsinki. This became an important factor for strengthening détente in Europe and the whole world. Are there now possibilities for improvement in the international climate?

[Semeyko] Naturally there are, if only the West shows political will. The Stockholm conference is one part of the development, which began in Helsinki. The Soviet Union supports its expansion and deepening, an honest dialogue, and the just settlement of all difficult questions. Let us now wait and see to what results the sixth session of the Stockholm conference leads. We would not like to lose hope, but very many things here depend on the attitude of the West.
Stockholm May 14 -- TASS -- The regular session of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe resumed its work in Stockholm today. It is attended by representatives of 33 European countries and also the United States and Canada.

Head of the Polish delegation Ambassador Wlodziomersz Konarski drew attention of the participants in the conference to important appraisals and provisions contained in the communique of the meeting of top party leaders and statesmen of the Warsaw Treaty member-states on April 26 this year. He stressed that the socialist countries would continue exerting efforts to ward off the threat of a nuclear war from the world, to end the arms race, above all nuclear, on earth, and to prevent it from spreading to outer space, to come over to disarmament, to strengthen confidence and security in Europe. With this aim the socialist countries are ready to develop the peace dialogue with other states in the spirit of goodwill and confidence to establish broad international cooperation in the interests of ensuring universal peace and security.

The USSR delegation distributed among participants in the conference the address of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "To the Peoples, Parliaments and Governments of All Countries on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the end of the Second World War.

Chairman of the Government of Spain Felipe Gonzalez, now on an official visit here at the invitation of the head of the Swedish Government, made a speech at the conference. He called upon the participants in the Stockholm forum for the early elaboration of measures of building confidence and security that would help improve the political climate of the European Continent.

CSO: 5200/1164
Some positive aspects have been apparent at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, but the results attained so far can hardly be described as satisfactory.

Due to the non-constructive attitude of the United States and some other NATO countries, the deliberations have made practically no progress, although the present international tension in the world and Europe in particular would have require immediate and resolute measures.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have tabled at the conference a number of proposals at essential improvement of the political climate in Europe. Especially important was the Soviet proposal for approval of the main principles of an agreement on the non-use of force in any form. This agreement should contain guarantees of all participants in the conference that they would not be the first to use against each other nuclear or conventional weapons, that they would not threaten the safety of international naval, air or space routes under nobody's jurisdiction, and that they would not use force against third countries. Conclusion of such agreement would logically help avert the militarization of space, halt the arms race and finally disarmament.

Unfortunately, the United States and other NATO countries have not yet shown willingness to meet the socialist countries half way. They were finally forced to agree to discuss their proposals, but nothing indicates that they are ready for serious debate on all aspects of renunciation of force.

The same old NATO "package" of proposals practically repeats what has already been included in the Helsinki Final Act, and in addition, shows efforts to gain unilateral, especially military, advantages.
Delegations of the socialist countries came to the sixth round of the conference firmly determined to continue striving for concrete, honourable, and equal agreements which would really contribute to stronger security and disarmament in Europe.

In the current stage, the conference will work in groups, and the Soviet Union and its allies take the view that this will make it possible to discuss to a bitter depth a whole complex of measures to build confidence in Europe, and finally to advance from proclamations to business-like talks.
On 14 February at the Vienna negotiations on mutual reductions of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe, the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Valerian V. Michailov, in the name of the CSSR, the GDR, Poland, and the USSR—direct participants in those negotiations—submitted a proposal for Basic Provisions of an Agreement on Initial Reductions in the Ground Forces and Weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States in that region. What led the above socialist countries to this constructive step and of what does its substance and significance consist? Before it is possible to answer these questions, it is useful to recapitulate briefly the situation at this disarmament forum.

It is appropriate to recall that the Prague session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in January 1983 passed on to all the Western participants in those negotiations an urgent appeal to overcome rapidly the long-term stagnation and in the shortest possible time to complete successfully the negotiations which have now been going on for 10 years, by concluding a comprehensive agreement. The highest representatives of the socialist countries which are members of the Warsaw Pact at the same time clearly expressed their position on these disarmament talks when they emphasized that they "again speak out for a reduction in the armed forces and weapons in Central Europe and consider it especially necessary to achieve progress at the Vienna negotiations, which have already been going on for a number of years" and gave assurances that "on their part, they will do everything possible to assist in this matter."

A New Approach

It is not the practice of the socialist countries to pass on to the world public any political declarations which are not based on concrete actions, which can also be demonstrated in their relations to their further approach in Vienna. Immediately in February 1983, they thus made more specific the resolutions from the Prague Political Declaration at that forum in the form of a set of new proposals which contained a radically new and practical approach to solving the greatest obstacles which have blocked the Vienna negotiations for years, the so-called number barriers and a concrete plan to achieve the goals agreed
upon in keeping with the mandate of the Vienna negotiations. The new approach contained in the proposal was to do away with the endless conflict over the starting point for the numerical levels of the troops of both sides in the area, an argument which was started and artificially heated up by NATO, and to concentrate on the "final" numerical levels which would be achieved after carrying out reductions in troops and weapons on both sides to the agreed-upon and collective ceiling, which is 900,000 soldiers on each side, of which 700,000 soldiers would be in the ground forces and 200,000 personnel in the military air force.

This way each party would itself determine the numbers which it would be necessary to reduce in order to achieve this parity of troops at the lower level. As far as the process of reductions is concerned, the socialist countries proposed carrying them out in three steps. The first and symbolic step would be to reduce the ground forces of the USSR and the United States on the basis of mutual examples. Subsequently their would be a freeze on the existing level of armed forces and weapons of all the direct participants in the negotiations (the CSSR, the GDR, Poland, and the USSR on the part of the Warsaw Pact and Belgium, Canada, Luxemburg, Holland, the FRG, the United States, and Great Britain on the NATO side) on the basis of political commitments of the parties as the second step. The third step would be making a comprehensive agreement on carrying out a substantial reduction in the armed forces and weapons to the same agreed-upon collective levels stated above.

Then, in June 1983, the leader of the Czechoslovak delegation submitted in the name of the Warsaw Pact states a useful and comprehensive text of the proposal for an Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and Weapons and Related Measures in Central Europe. In later months, the representatives of the socialist countries patiently explained the individual parts of the set of their proposals and further developed some portions of those far-reaching initiatives.

The response from NATO, even though it took a long time and was designated as the "initiative from the West of 19 April 1984", neither constructive nor adequate. The apparently modified approach still totally preserved the problem of numerical data and also the absurd concept of asymmetrical reductions, on the basis of which the Warsaw Pact countries would have to reduce their troops to a substantially greater extent than the NATO countries, which would obviously lead to gaining a one-sided military advantage and a reduction in the security of the socialist countries. This proposal did not resolve even one of the key questions of the negotiations; did not resolve, but instead intensified the differences in the positions of the two parties in a number of aspects; and did not create any way out of the blind alley in which the negotiations were stuck because of the West. The socialist countries therefore called on the Western participants to do a basic reevaluation of the unconstructive attitude.

Concentrate on the Problems Where the Positions of the Two Parties are the Closest

In evaluating the situation at the negotiations at the end of last year, the socialist countries came to the conclusion that if further negotiations were to be to the point and productive, it would be useful to concentrate on those
areas where the positions of the two parties were the closest and where it would therefore be possible to arrive at concrete arrangements which would finally make it possible to begin the process of actual reductions in the armed forces and weapons in Central Europe. Guided by their continuous efforts to stop the arms race and with the intention of giving the Vienna disarmament negotiations an additional push, they decided to submit a new constructive proposal which is a logical development of their 1983 proposals and which is aimed right at those areas where a relatively greater level of agreement had been reached. As can be seen right from the title itself of the document submitted, this concerns the area of initial reductions in the ground forces of the USSR and the United States and subsequent freeze on the troops and weapons of the Warsaw Pact member states and NATO countries which are located in Central Europe.

In these areas, many questions had been worked out, which thus created a good opportunity for achieving the first concrete agreement, which would have been possible to implement over a short period and without unnecessary delays.

The proposal assumes a treaty of legal obligations to reduce within one year from the time the agreement goes into effect the ground forces of the USSR and the United States in Central Europe by 20,000 men and 13,000 men respectively by military combat units together with their weapons and combat equipment, while up to 10 percent can be made up of individual members of the armed forces.

The proposal starts from the agreed-upon position of both parties that the process of reducing and limiting the armed forces in Central Europe should be begun by the Soviet Union and the United States, that this initial reductions should be completed within one year, and that the method of reduction should be the same for both the USSR and the United States. The wishes of the Western participants were respected regarding the ratio of combat units and individuals in reducing the troops (90 percent and 10 percent).

The proposal also maintains the existing mutual understanding on the fact that the troops of the USSR and the United States involved in the reduction will be pulled back to their own territory and deployed to new locations so that there will be no threat to the security of any of the states participating in the negotiations, including participants with special status, the so-called flanking neighbors of the Central European area (Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Greece, and Turkey).

The proposal further assumes that after completion of this initial reduction, the signatories of the agreement would commit themselves collectively and on a national basis for a period of 2 years not to increase the level of their armed forces and weapons in Central Europe. Here again this is based on the existence of basic agreement of both parties to the idea of a freeze, while it again takes into consideration in many ways the position of the Western participants in the negotiations, particularly the legal contractual expression of obligations to the freeze and setting a specific time period for the validity of that obligation.
The proposal contain concrete measures for ensuring fulfillment of the agreement which depend on the use of the national technical means of verification and the exchange of appropriate information, as well as the creation of three or four control posts on each side in locations through which the withdrawal of the Soviet and American forces from Central Europe would take place.

Get On to Practical Steps

One of the especially important provisions of the new proposal is the legal contractual obligation of the parties to continue in the negotiations on a further, more extensive reduction in the armed forces and weapons, with a goal of achieving the same collective level of armed forces of 900,000 men, of which each side would have 700,000 in the ground forces.

It is fully understandable that the proposal assumes that the reduction of part of the ground forces of the USSR and the United States will take place together with their weapons and combat equipment, just as the freeze will affect not only the armed forces, but also the weapons, since only this approach can lead to an actual reduction in the level of military confrontation.

It is an indisputable fact that the new proposal by the socialist countries is constructive, flexible, based on compromise, and easily implemented. It expands the sphere of mutual agreement achieved and in the interest of facilitating the possibilities of achieving an agreement, albeit a limited one for the time being, it does not include any problems of conflict, which obviously will have to be resolved within any comprehensive future agreement.

Its main advantage is that it opens up a path to an actual reduction in the armed forces and weapons in the area of Central Europe on the basis of the first actual and tangible results. In the opinion of the socialist countries, it is time to end the theoretical discussions and to go on to practical steps toward disarmament. The Warsaw Pact member states are proceeding on this basis in putting forth their new project, which is based on the principle of balance and the same security for both parties and which is open to material discussions. It now depends on whether or not the answer from the West will be a constructive one. The nature of the NATO states' answer will be a test of their political will to begin the process of reducing the excessive concentration of troops and weapons in Central Europe, that sensitive part of Europe where the two most powerful military-political groupings stand opposite each other and where the largest military forces in the world are concentrated.

Signing and implementing such an agreement would have great political and military significance. It would positively affect the atmosphere of further work at the Vienna negotiations, demonstrate in practice the preparedness of all participating parties for actual reductions in the level of military confrontation, and contribute to the stabilization of the military-political situation in Europe. It would give the first practical experience in troop reductions and in applying adequate verification measures and the functioning of the freeze. Not the least of its benefits would be a strengthening of trust between the states and peoples of Europe and it would create favorable
conditions for achieving the final goal of the negotiations, which is a substantial reduction in the armed forces and weapons in Central Europe and achieving their parity at a lower level.

Such a result would have special significance this year, which is the 40th anniversary of the victory of the anti-Fascist coalition in the most destructive war in the history of humanity.
CHINESE COMMENTARY DEPLORES USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

OWI32120 Beijing International Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 10 May 85

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] During the First World War, the German Army was the first to use the chlorine-filled bomb, inflicting heavy casualties to the allied armies. Due to their atrocious ravages, chemical weapons have been protested and condemned by the world's peoples from their inception. By 1925, 38 countries had signed a Geneva protocol banning poison gas, similar lethal materials, and biological means in war.

Sixty years have passed, but in World War II, and even in the postwar period, some aggressors have continued to stealthily use chemical weapons. At present, owing to scientific and technological advances, there are more kinds of poison gases, their lethal capacities are more powerful, and, consequently, their danger is greater.

The two superpowers have the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons. While seeking by all possible means to achieve supremacy in nuclear weapons, they have not relaxed their rivalry in chemical weapons.

In 1968, the United States decided to stop production of chemical weapons, but, in February 1982, it reversed its decision and resumed production on the grounds that the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons had been outstripped by the Soviets. The two superpowers' chemical weapons rivalry has worried the world's peoples. Some time ago, the FRG Government called on all nations to sign a new treaty banning chemical weapons. Some European governments have advocated holding international talks on establishing a chemical weapons free zone in Europe. That proves the European countries' great concern about chemical weapons, and their determination to ban such weapons.

Chemical weapons have been condemned by all; however, in South Asia and Southeast Asia, some people are still using chemical weapons, causing human casualties. More and more people in the Asian and Pacific region have protested the use of that inhuman weapon in contravention of international law.

Chemical weapons are related to human interests and world peace. Therefore, banning chemical weapons is part of the effort to achieve world disarmament.

CSO: 5200/4037
NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 3, Mar 85 pp 15-20

[Article by M. Shelepin: "Nuclear-Free Zones: A Means of Reducing the War Threat"]

Since the outset of the nuclear age the Soviet Union has been consistently advocating non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was largely owing to the USSR's efforts that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was prepared and put into effect and an international nuclear non-proliferation regime set up on its basis, which has since proved its viability and effectiveness. At the same time, the Soviet Union has advocated other means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

In 1956, when there was no precise concept of nuclear non-proliferation, and the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons became tangible, the USSR put forward the general idea of regional, geographic limitation of the possible spread of nuclear weapons by means of setting up nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world. Thus a new concept was added to the international political lexicon, which implied a package of measures to prevent access for nuclear weapons to any part of the world.

The nuclear-free zones idea promptly gained in popularity. The peoples of the world saw in it not only a reliable means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons but also a way to reduce tensions, promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, strengthen regional and international security, and curb the arms race.

Starting in 1957, concrete proposals to set up nuclear-free zones followed one another, to include Central Europe, the Balkans, the Adriatic and Mediterranean seas, Northern Europe, Africa and Latin America. Later proposals envisaged the setting up of denuclearized zones in the Middle East, South Asia, South Pacific and other regions of the world.

The evolution of the nuclear-free zones concept and its implementation in the 1960s was largely affected by the discussion and elaboration of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. For its parts, the denuclearized zones concept played a positive role in the elaboration and ultimate conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

A comparison of the "non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" and the "nuclear-free zone" concepts shows that the latter presupposes broader commitments by states in comparison with those assumed by signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indeed, states participating in a nuclear-free zone commit themselves not only to refrain from acquiring or developing their own nuclear weapons but also not to allow deployment of nuclear weapons belonging to a nuclear power on their territories. By contrast, participation in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons does not automatically demand the withdrawal of foreign nuclear weapons from the territory of a state signatory to the treaty.

It follows that the setting up of nuclear-free zones serves the aims of nuclear non-proliferation. On the other hand, struggle to extend the membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to reinforce the international non-proliferation regime objectively contributes to the establishment of nuclear-free zones, creating material prerequisites for the
process. "The establishment of nuclear-free zones is an important aspect of the struggle to strengthen security," noted Konstantin Cheriienko. "Such zones are not a Utopia. Efforts in this direction have already yielded some results. These efforts ought to be redoubled in every respect ridding earth step by step of the nuclear plague."²

Naturally, it is the non-nuclear states that should primarily have a vested interest in the creation of nuclear-free zones. However, it is equally obvious that whether the zones can actually be set up and whether they are to be viable and effective largely depends on the nuclear powers' stand.

The Soviet Union has been consistently supporting the idea of setting up nuclear-free zones, and it went on record as being prepared to commit itself to observing the status of all nuclear-free zones that may be set up, should other nuclear powers assume similar commitments. The Soviet Union's thinking was that commitments to set up nuclear-free zones could be made not only by groups of states covering entire continents or vast geographical areas, but also smaller groups of states or even individual countries. The Soviet Union especially stressed the importance of setting up nuclear-free zones as a means of effectively limiting the deployment and use of nuclear weapons in the regions of the world where there exist large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and there is a greater risk of a nuclear conflict. The USSR has always regarded setting up of nuclear-free zones as a significant norm of relations between nuclear powers.

What are the pledges that could be made by states signing agreements on the setting up of nuclear-free zones? In order to close all loopholes for possible breaches of the denuclearized status of these zones, such agreements must include commitments by member-states not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, not to seek direct or indirect control over them; not to allow deployment and stockpiling of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the zone's territory; not to allow transportation of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and their transit through the nuclear zone's territory, including the calling of ships with nuclear weapons on board at ports situated in the zone. As for the legal status and boundaries of nuclear-free zones, they are to be defined in accordance with the universally recognized norms of international law, including the principle of the freedom of shipping in the high seas and international straits.

At the same time the Soviet Union has always held that there can be no automatic recognition of any nuclear-free zone. In line with this approach, the USSR abstained from voting at the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly (1975) on the draft resolution on "the general principles for the creation of nuclear-free zones" introduced by Mexico, Argentina, Zaire and some other countries. The draft would have the General Assembly, contrary to the UN Charter, empowered to recognize the establishment of nuclear-free zones by any group of states with consequent commitments by nuclear states. Without defining specific obligations of non-nuclear states-members of the zone agreement, the draft simultaneously contained specific obligations for nuclear powers to observe the status of any nuclear-free zone which could be set up by a group of states and approved by the General Assembly irrespective of the specific content of the agreement on its creation and of the fact whether the Soviet Union had taken part in its preparation or not.

Proceeding from its principled stand, the Soviet Union was the initiator or vigorously supported the drafts of the formation of nuclear-free zones in Central Europe, the Mediterranean and Adriatic seas, the Balkans, Northern Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

From the outset of the nuclear age the Soviet Union has accorded particular importance to reducing nuclear confrontation, above all where it is especially dangerous. This applies to those continents and regions where the interests of states threateningly conflict with one another, where only a narrow strip of land divides opposing military-political groupings, and where there is a great concentration of armaments and armed forces. Europe undoubtedly was and remains such a region. The Soviet Union views the creation of nuclear-free zones as an important aspect of the effort to strengthen peace and reduce the military danger on the European continent, and as one of the ways to rid Europe of both tactical and medium-range nuclear weapons.

It is a known fact that debate on the issue of forming a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe has intensified of late. Unlike other regions of the European continent there is still no nuclear weapons here, and it is important that there not be any in the future as well. The nuclear-free status of this region should be formalized appropriately. This would be useful both for the Scandinavian countries and for neighbouring peoples.

The USSR has declared its willingness to pledge not to use nuclear weapons against North European countries which become participants in the nuclear-free zone, i.e., which do not produce, acquire or deploy nuclear weapons on their territories. This Soviet guarantee could be formalized either through a multilateral agreement with its participation, or a bilateral agreement with each of the zone's member countries. The Soviet Union is prepared for this at any time and does not make this pledge conditional on the positive attitude of other nuclear powers to the zone, although the importance of such a zone would be greater for its participants if such guarantees were to be given to them by the NATO powers, too. The Soviet Union also stated that it did not exclude the possibility of discussing in the context of nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe certain other measures on Soviet territory contiguous to the zone, adding that the extent of these measures could be considerable. In 1983 the USSR made this proposal more specific, expressing its preparedness to discuss the denuclearization of the Baltic Sea. In doing so the Soviet Union stated that in certain cases it was prepared to guarantee the status of the nuclear-free zone without the participation of all other nuclear powers and to consider making certain commitments in respect of its own territory contiguous to the nuclear-free zone. The Soviet Union also stated that the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans would also be of no small significance in terms of strengthening security in Europe. The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared its positive attitude to the formation of such a zone in this region.

The Soviet Union was the first to speak out in favour of the draft proposal advanced by Sweden on the creation of a zone free of all battlefield nuclear weapons. The practical implementation of such a zone would help to boost confidence and stability not only in the centre of Europe but throughout the continent as well, and would further the process of reducing armed forces and armaments.

However, considering the tactical and technical characteristics of nuclear weapons which are at issue in the Swedish proposal, the creation of a zone whose depth would stretch just 150 km on either side of the Warsaw Treaty-NATO borderline would not lead to any substantial reduction of the nuclear danger. For this reason the Soviet Union has stated that the zone being proposed can be truly effective only provided its width is not 300 km, but between 500 and 600 km, i.e., 250 to 300 km.
westward and eastward of the Warsaw Treaty-NATO borderline. The
creation of such a zone could be begun with Central Europe in the con-
text of the efforts which are being taken at the Vienna talks on armed
forces and armament reductions in this region.

The USSR's 1978 proposal to the UN not to deploy nuclear weapons
on territories of states which are presently free from them also contribu-
ted greatly to the implementation of the nuclear-free zones idea. The pro-
posal calls for agreement not to emplace in future nuclear weapons, whe-
ther in the form of the deployment of combat-ready nuclear systems,
stockpiles of nuclear warheads, bombs, shells and mines, on the territo-
ries of states presently free of such weapons. Such an agreement would
not only have a stabilizing effect on the existing strategic parity but
would also provide the basis for the effective recognition of the denu-
clearized status of countries in a discussion of the status of nuclear-free
zones under international law. If all nuclear powers pledged not to de-
ploy nuclear weapons and reached an agreement to this effect in accord-
cance with the international law, this would bring out into a sharp relief
those territories on the map of the world which militarily and strategical-
ly could qualify for inclusion in nuclear-free zones.

The implementation of the Soviet initiative would also considerably
strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime without detriment to the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Having a direct bearing on the setting
up of nuclear-free zones, this Soviet proposal creates broader possibili-
ties for attaining this objective through collective or individual efforts of
the international community.

Unfortunately, its implementation was blocked by the West led by the
USA.

It is symptomatic that the USA and its NATO allies in fact adopted
a negative stand towards the nuclear-free zones concept since its incep-
tion. In justification of their position they said that the setting up of nu-
clear-free zones would be feasible only if "it did not result in unilateral
advantages for a state or group of states." When applied to the nuclear-
free zones concept, this demand, perfectly legitimate in itself, was regar-
ded by the Western powers as violating "the balance of forces" and cre-
atiiog additional military advantages for the Soviet Union. These far-fete-
hed "arguments" were most frequently used in the discussion of the
establishment of nuclear-free zones in Europe and particularly in its cen-
tral part.

To date, most plans for the setting up of nuclear-free zones have not
been implemented, primarily as a result of the negative attitude of the
USA, Britain and France and differences between prospective partici-
pants. The only exception is the creation of a nuclear-free zone in La-
tin America, enshrined in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Wea-
pons in Latin America, better known in international practice as the
Treaty of Tlatelolco which was opened for signing on February 14, 1967.

The Treaty as a whole might be described as a good foundation for
the creation of a solid and durable status of a nuclear-free-zone in Latin
America. So far this is the first and only example of a nuclear-free zone
in a populated area of the world. The signing of the Treaty has thus pro-
vided convincing proof of the feasibility of denuclearized zones as an
effective means of blocking the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the effectiveness of the Tlatelolco Treaty is limited
by a number of its provisions which might be interpreted as enabling

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both the participating countries and certain nuclear powers to violate the status of the nuclear-free zone in Latin America. This is largely a result of the reluctance of the Western powers, primarily the USA, to abandon their positions of military and strategic predominance in this part of the world. Some of the Treaty’s shortcomings stem from differences in the approaches of Latin American states themselves to the key issues of limiting the arms race and of disarmament, primarily to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

Presently, 23 Latin American states have acceded to the Treaty. For some reasons Argentina, Brazil, Chile and other states have not yet done so.

Additional Protocols No. I and II to the Treaty, which call on non-Latin-American states to pledge to observe the status of the nuclear-free zone in Latin America, have played an important role in asserting the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

Protocol I commits states to extend the status of the nuclear-free zone to territories for which they bear international responsibility de jure or de facto and which are situated within the boundaries of a geographical area defined in the Treaty. Protocol II calls on all nuclear powers, that is the USA, the USSR, Britain, France and China, to commit themselves to observe the status of nuclear-free zone in Latin America. All five nuclear powers are signatories to Protocol II of the Treaty. In signing and ratifying the Protocol they went on record about their attitude to the treaty’s individual provisions.

The Soviet Union signed Protocol II on May 18, 1978, “although” as USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said at the time “we had some doubts on that score because of some well-known weak points in that Treaty”. The statement made at the signing ceremony formulated the USSR’s principled stand regarding several provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and pointed to the practical ways following which the participating countries as well as countries signatories to additional Protocols I and II can ensure the genuinely denuclearized status of the zone set up in Latin America.

The record of the Tlatelolco Treaty has shown that the participating states have not developed their own nor acquired foreign-made nuclear weapons. This means that the status of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America has been observed so far. This is an important positive result.

At the same time it must be pointed out that a number of the Treaty’s provisions have not been fully implemented. This primarily concerns the imperfect functioning of the system monitoring its fulfilment, as a result of which there remains a possibility of its violations in the absence of a built-in mechanism designed to block such violations.

Latin America’s hopes that the Treaty will help them accelerate the process of the peaceful use of nuclear energy have largely remained unfulfilled. Atomic energy for peaceful uses has developed with greatest strides in Argentina and Brazil, two countries which did not accede either to the Tlatelolco Treaty or the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

One of the stated purposes of the Tlatelolco Treaty was facilitating progress in curbing the arms race in Latin America. However, even the modest efforts towards this objective which were made by Mexico and other states in the 1970s (the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho) failed.

A set of measures is called for in order to guarantee henceforth the genuinely denuclearized status of Latin America. The Tlatelolco Treaty must become a truly universal agreement in Latin America, which primarily means that it must be joined by Argentina and Brazil which have

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advanced nuclear energy programmes and the potential for developing their own nuclear weapons.

Accession to Protocol I of all countries concerned without exception is an important element of reinforcing the status of the nuclear-free zone in Latin America. Meanwhile France has not ratified it and, by all indications, is not going to do so in the near future. It is also imperative that the USA, Britain and France sign an agreement with the IAEA on the application of its safeguards system to territories covered by Protocol I.

All Latin American states must accede to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons because, among other things, this would enable these countries to more fully use the IAEA potential in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Since the Tlatelolco Treaty does not prohibit transit of nuclear weapons through territories of participating countries, this built-in deficiency could be rectified by unilateral declarations of all participating countries about prohibition of transit. (Mexico has already made such a declaration, providing a good example and precedent for other Latin American countries). The problem has acquired a special topicality in the light of the Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Malvinas (Falkland Islands).

All parts of the Tlatelolco Treaty mechanism must be set in motion. From this point of view it is especially important for all Latin American states to sign agreements with the IAEA on the extension of the Agency's safeguards system to all nuclear activities.

Today, when Washington openly seeks to upset the existing military-strategic parity to the detriment of not only the USSR and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation but also that of many other countries, the peoples of the world view nuclear-free zones as an effective means of curbing the nuclear arms race and reinforcing security.

It is highly significant that lately the UN has been engaged in animated discussion of plans of nuclear-free zones in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia. One of the permanent items on the agendas of government-level meetings in Europe has been the creation of nuclear-free zones in the continent's north and the Balkans, as well as the establishment of a zone free of all battlefield nuclear weapons. In 1982, on Finland's initiative, the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly, unanimously approved preparations for a study of all aspects of nuclear-free zones.

In late August 1984 the Tuvalu Conference of countries of the South Pacific reached an agreement of principle on the main provisions of a treaty which is to proclaim the area a nuclear-free zone. Even before that New Zealand and Vanuatu barred access to their territories to ships and aircraft with nuclear weapons on board.

The international public at large is increasingly pressing for the creation of nuclear-free zones. The first international conference on nuclear-free zones which was held in Britain in 1984 and was attended by representatives of local governments from many countries is sufficient proof of this. This stand of the public is quite natural, for the setting up of nuclear-free zones is an important step towards the elimination of the nuclear threat looming over mankind and towards the complete banning and ultimate elimination of the most terrible of mass destruction weapons.

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FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTRY'S TORNUDD SAYS ZONE PLAN STILL ALIVE

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 19 Apr 85 pp 30-32

[Article by Jaakko Okker: "The Zone Can Be Established Immediately"]

Text] HELSINGIN SANOMAT proclaimed in its editorial that the Nordic countries' nuclear-free zone is the big corpse of Finnish foreign policy. Klaus Tornudd, assistant secretary in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, is unwilling to deliver the funeral oration. On the contrary, he says that Finland's foreign policy proceeds from the idea that the zone can be established immediately.

Rumors of the death of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Nordic countries began to circulate when a study group of 21 states, which had plodded along under the leadership of Assistant Secretary Klaus Tornudd, was compelled to finish its work without reaching a mutual understanding.

In 1982, on Finland's initiative, the United Nations' General Assembly appointed a study group to update and supplement the research on nuclear-free zones completed in 1975. India was the only country in the General Assembly to vote against appointment of the group but nevertheless got its representative included. The end result: 180 pages of text, including 12 paragraphs on which no agreement could be reached.

The work was not completely useless, according to Tornudd. "For example, the chapters on the duties of the nuclear-free-zone states and the states with nuclear weapons were unambiguous, even though they also contain different viewpoints. Most of the paragraphs which remained unfinished were in the report's historical section. These would have been cleared up, too, if there had been goodwill, but there was not."

Followup measures are being deliberated right now. The UN secretary general or the General Assembly can decide on them. It is possible to name a limited group or a consultant to finish writing the report. Or any member state of the group whatsoever can publish the subject matter. Finland, too.

Great reading enjoyment should not be expected, however.
"The text is somewhat ponderous, to be sure... Nor are there any profound changes or changes of principle in comparison with the 1975 study," discloses Tornudd.

What sort of causal connection is there between the failure of the study group and the nuclear-free zone of the Nordic countries?

Tornudd: "There is no causal connection, in my opinion. A nuclear-free zone in the Nordic lands has been discussed for over 20 years. It has its own problems irrespective of the study group's difficulties.

"The intention was to include in the report a chapter on the Nordic countries' nuclear-free zone, but there were no appreciable difficulties with respect to that, and its treatment was relatively easy."

The debate on a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic countries has been a continual repetition of slogans. Very few debaters have bothered to explain how the zone would alter the current absence of nuclear weapons in the Nordic lands.

Tornudd: "There have certainly been attempts at enlightenment, anyhow. I have also spoken and written about it. As a rule, I have said that the Nordic countries have always been free of nuclear weapons and will probably remain that way. There is no question about that, but formation of the zone would mean something else.

"Establishment of the zone would mean that extention of a nuclear weapon strategy to the Nordic countries is ruled out more clearly than before and that a more reliable system is created which assures that the Nordic lands are left out of computations for nuclear strategy and nuclear war. Moreover, it would increase trust, reduce tension and stabilize the situation.

"The precondition is, of course, that the superpowers—the nuclear powers—give guarantees for the zone. The fact that the superpowers would thus be involved in joint arrangements for guaranteeing the Nordic countries' security would serve to reduce tension and strengthen security in the Nordic lands.

"In addition, it has been given to understand that some supplementary measures would be linked to formation of the zone. All in all, the zone would thus mean quite a considerable enhancement of the nonnuclear situation which now prevails in the Nordic countries. It would entail superpower assurances and security in general. It would be a positive contribution to the security of Europe as a whole."

In the opinion of certain experts, a nuclear-free zone is sensible only if its creation reduces the threat which is targeted on the area. For example, Anders Thunborg, Sweden's current defense minister, said about 10 years ago that if the nuclear powers ever support the zone's formation, then they must remove the tactical and intermediate-range nuclear weapons which are located in the vicinity of the zone and which are intended for use on targets in the zone because—with formation of the zone—weapons of this kind become unnecessary.

Are the guarantees given on paper sufficient then?
Tornudd: "Agreements are made on paper, after all. If some party wants to make its promises as believable as possible, then it can act otherwise, or remove weapons in the vicinity of the Nordic countries. The Soviet Union has pointed in this direction, although it has not wanted to make its offer more precise because it feels that the Nordic countries must first reach an agreement on the matter among themselves."

Are there not plenty of paper promises already? There is the UN Charter, which forbids all forms of violence. In addition, it is explicitly promised that nuclear weapons will not be used against nonnuclear states.

Tornudd: "Quite correct. The nuclear powers have pledged—within a global framework—not to use nuclear weapons against the nonnuclear countries. Reiteration and renewal of these guarantees should be an issue in the Nordic countries. Furthermore, these global guarantees have been given with certain stipulations and formulated in different cases in various ways. There is no complete certainty that the effects of nuclear weapon strategy would be excluded from the Nordic lands.

"The only functional nuclear-free zone in the colonized world is the Latin American region. When they reached an agreement on it, the superpowers gave guarantees which were assembled in a separate protocol. Signing that protocol, the superpowers set forth their own interpretations and explanatory statements which, in a certain sense, have weakened the given guarantees and made one mindful of global guarantee statements which differ from one another.

"Norway and Denmark have a so-called nuclear weapon option, which means that under prescribed circumstances they can ask the allies to come to their aid with nuclear weapons, in short, to bring nuclear weapons to the Nordic countries."

The option of Norway and Denmark has no military significance, in the opinion of experts. Neither country could hardly ask the allies to discharge nuclear explosives at targets on its territory. If, on the other hand, the intention is to use nuclear weapons on targets which are somewhere else, they would not be brought to Norway and Denmark first—it is more efficient to utilize the nuclear weapons on submarines.

Tornudd: "It is difficult to imagine that nuclear weapons could be used on or from Norwegian and Danish territory. These possibilities exist, however, and they mean that the influence of nuclear weapons extends to the Nordic countries. If this kind of influence can be eliminated beforehand, security is increased. I would regard the zone above all as the kind of preventive measure which strengthens trust and increases security."

In the opinion of some experts, the superpowers' guarantee of a nuclear-free zone could be unenforceable in war and politically dangerous in peacetime. A superpower could threaten a small state, for example, by abrogating the agreement and thus interfere in another country's internal affairs.

Tornudd: "After all, the superpowers can always threaten the smaller countries, regardless of what kind of treaty arrangements are in effect. It is good, however, if additional political obstacles can be amassed before such threats."
Does the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance] Agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union have an effect on potential security arrangements?

Tornudd: "In my opinion, no. It is an independent matter."

According to the American formulation, the guarantee's validity depends on the fact that the nonnuclear state is not in league with a nuclear power which attacks the United States or its allies. With ill will, the YYA Agreement can be interpreted as an alliance relationship, due to which the guarantee collapses.

Tornudd: "With ill will, very many agreements can be interpreted in very many ways..."

If the Nordic countries' nuclear-free zone is not a big corpse, then is it alive?

Tornudd: "The creation of a nonnuclear situation—strengthened by agreements—in the Nordic countries has progressed considerably since 1963. After all, the Nordic countries are parties to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Only the Norwegian-Danish option is actually a problem.

"Support for the plan has grown. The Swedish government has largely adopted the same line as Finland, although it has its own emphasis on the Baltic Sea. Support has also increased in Norway and Denmark.

"So in this sense at least the plan is not a corpse; on the contrary, it is supported more strongly than before. It is another issue that numerous factors influence implementation of the plan. Norway and Denmark refer to their own alliance connection and explain that broader disarmament arrangements are needed. And if one is waiting for a decisive breakthrough in European disarmament, one will end up waiting a very long time perhaps.

"Our starting point has indeed been that a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Nordic countries can be established immediately. On the other hand, we stress that the cooperation of the superpowers is needed. And if certain superpowers do not want to be involved, the plan cannot be carried out."

The Norwegian-Danish option seems to be important above all politically, from the standpoint of NATO's internal stability. The Americans, therefore, easily dismiss the entire debate. And then again some want to debate for that very reason.

Tornudd: "The plan is still not sufficiently enticing from the standpoint of certain Western powers. It is hard for me, too, to speak about the separate nuclear option of Norway and Denmark. Rather, they are involved in the entire alliance's option."

Can anything be done other than wait?

Tornudd: "Well, we can at least continue the debate. In my opinion, the debate has already greatly clarified the issue so far. In addition, extensive reports and studies have been made in the Nordic countries. The problems tied to the zone are now better understood."
How are the cruise missiles connected to efforts to create the zone?

Tornudd: "The global guarantees given by the superpowers are negative. They promise not to use nuclear weapons or threaten anyone with them. Finland has brought up the cruise missile problem and suggested that a third element is also needed: the use of cruise missiles cannot be planned in such a way that it leads to the violation of other states' airspace.

"Cruise missiles are such a new issue that they could not be taken into account when global guarantees were given. They should be included in those earlier security arrangements as well as the new arrangements concerning zones."

What is the outlook for progress at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe?

"Everything can be included in this process which first and foremost occurs in different countries to implement the document decisions. The goal is to examine it closely at the new followup conference which opens in Vienna in the autumn of 1986. No one knows how long it will last. After all, they were in session for quite a long time in Madrid.

"Then there are these extraordinary conferences and conferences for specialists. Disarmament and measures to increase trust are being debated in Stockholm. At best, its own process can come out of it, especially if they get an opportunity to discuss true disarmament. In May and June, specialists are gathering in Ottawa to discuss human rights. There is a cultural forum in Budapest in the autumn, and in Bern next year there is a conference which deals with interpersonal contacts. Cooperation in the Mediterranean area has already been debated in Venice."

All governments do not actually allow their human rights practice to influence the state's international relations. Will the experts at the Ottawa conference succeed in speaking the same language?

Tornudd: "Hard to say. It may turn out to be a raucous meeting. In my view, the veneration of human rights and the principle of noninterference do not need to be in conflict. Or it depends on what is meant by interfering in internal affairs. In my opinion, it is not interference if we discuss what happens in another state, if we express hopes and appeals to another country's government, or if we let the conduct of another country's government influence our relationship to it."

Appealing to the principle of noninterference is a common way to fend off criticism.

Tornudd: "It is a much used method, but if human rights are flagrantly violated, the principle of noninterference does not have the kind of weight which enables some state to achieve immunity and behave any way it pleases in all tranquillity. This is demonstrated by the example of South Africa."
Is a professional in foreign policy annoyed when amateurs demand a more active foreign policy?

Tornudd: "If the conditions exist for championing a good cause, then activism is a fine thing. Mere activism cannot be an end in itself, but rather everything depends on what is done with this activism. It should at least be stated what the issue of substance is for which activism is desired."

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ANZUS might well be dead as a trilateral alliance, but thanks to the Minister for Defence, Mr Beazley, the defence and intelligence links between the three countries have been salvaged.

As a result, it could re-emerge as a far stronger alliance if and when the present disagreement between the United States and New Zealand is resolved.

For all its faults and limitations, ANZUS has always been the cornerstone of Australia's defence policy. As a result, the sudden stand taken by New Zealand over its refusal to accept visiting nuclear warships and the hard-line response by the United States presented a major political problem for Australia.

It was even more of a problem at the working level when it became obvious the United States was determined to deny intelligence and other military benefits of the alliance to New Zealand.

It would be fair to say the New Zealand Government had - and still has - no appreciation of its loss. It would also be fair to say the United States responded with an uncharacteristic over-reaction, leaving itself open to charges of bullying a small nation.

But it is very easy to understand the US position. For years it has borne the brunt of the defence of the West, with little appreciation and fewer thanks.

When New Zealand took it stand, the Americans, buoyed up by a new Reagan-instilled sense of national pride and faced with the beginnings of a backslide from their treaty commitments by other more important allies, such as Belgium, obviously felt they had had enough - certainly, from what one senior US source described as "a pissant little country south of Nowhereville".

To Australia, New Zealand is more than that. It is a natural defence partner with common links in the security of the South Pacific and strong political, economic and cultural ties.

There is a shared military heritage that stretches from Vietnam all the way back to the beaches of Gallipoli.

Faced with such a situation, Mr Beazley's mission was simple - to try to forge new bilateral defence links with New Zealand without jeopardising Australia's special relationship with the United States.

The first line of attack lay in the resurrection of the old ANZAC agreement, a now-moribund treaty known as the Canberra Pact signed in 1944 as the precursor to the ANZUS alliance. This, it was felt, could form a convenient framework on which to hang the wide range of separate
defence links that would have to be refashioned.

It was expected the agreement would be exploited to the full at the annual meeting of the ANZAC Consultative Council, a usually low-key meeting of defence ministers and their military advisers which was the ostensible reason for Mr Beazley's visit.

The wording and terms of the treaty, however, were far too outdated. It called for closer links between the two countries but also included the now sovereign State of Indonesia in its area of influence and called for a conference of colonial powers long gone into oblivion. It obviously carried too many political penalties and was abandoned.

This forced the planners to look elsewhere, and careful bargaining is believed to have taken place at the staff talks before Mr Beazley's arrival in Wellington. As a result, New Zealand was able to come out with a new formula before the meeting between Mr Beazley and his New Zealand counterpart, Mr O'Flynn, that made a solution a lot easier.

This was spelled out in a paper issued two days before the final discussions which stated that New Zealand's fundamental security interests had not changed as a result of its disagreement with the United States over ANZUS and that New Zealand should move towards a greater defence self-reliance to meet a wide role within the South Pacific.

New Zealand's aims, it said, were to secure:

A PROSPEROUS South Pacific region, including strategic denial of the region to the Soviets.

SOUND and growing bilateral relations with Australia, Japan and the United States.

IMPORTANT interests with the ASEAN nations and the European Community.

A DEMILITARISED Antarctica.

CONTINUATION of the East-West balance of power in order to ensure the necessary peaceful environment for a worldwide political and trading base.

This gave the key to Mr Beazley, who said his mission was to minimise the differences between the two countries and to retain New Zealand as a strong if separate ally in the South Pacific.

In the minister-to-minister discussions that followed, it became obvious that both countries agreed to disagree over their obligations under ANZUS, an acceptable formula had been found in a new security mission in the South Pacific that would make any increased bilateral links between New Zealand and Australia acceptable to the United States.

This was confirmed in the wording of the joint communiqué by the two ministers after their final meeting which, while accepting a difference of opinion over ANZUS, agreed that there were “demonstrable and important shared defence interests and a clear need to collaborate on regional security issues”.

Both nations reaffirmed the relevance and importance of the ANZUS treaty and the Western alliance and pledged themselves to moving towards greater levels of defence self-reliance.

This new level of bilateral co-operation presented no real difficulty since there has long been a close integration and co-operation between the two defence forces under various memoranda of understanding. The intelligence links, however, presented a more serious problem.

It is believed that a separate intelligence cell has already been set up to filter and sanitise US source material and to handle the closer exchange of regional Australian-New Zealand intelligence reporting.

This, it seems, is enough to satisfy the Americans, who have been reassured by Mr Beazley's undertaking that Australia will respect any caveats on US source material “to the letter”.

More detailed arrangements for the denial of less sensitive areas of military and intelligence co-operation will be hammered out later on at staff talks which will go on all this week.

Mr Beazley underlined Australia's conciliatory attitude and determination to build new bridges by throwing open a range of new defence procurement projects under consideration in Australia for participation by New Zealand industry.
It is hoped this might lead to a closer integration of the two defence industries and greater levels of co-production and joint purchases aimed at a closer standardisation and commonality of equipment.

The past record of such joint ventures has not been good and most of the present defence projects in Australia are out of phase with New Zealand’s timing or requirements.

Mr Beazley held out the prospect of a selective exchange of technology between the defence scientific establishments of the two countries, in particular in the area of fixed underwater arrays and other mine countermeasure research where New Zealand is believed to have a specialised expertise.

Plans were also announced to increase the number of exchange officers and for a closer integration between the two defence forces and a greater use of each other’s training areas. All this was welcome news to the under-equipped and over-extended 13,000-strong New Zealand armed forces. Though highly professional, they lack any real mobility despite plans for a ready reaction force and an extended role within the South Pacific.

There are also strong doubts within the military whether the New Zealand Government will be able or willing to meet the cost of making good Mr O’Flynn’s promises of defence self-sufficiency, which he said would be funded “even at the cost of other programs”.

There is little doubt it will be Australia that will have to bear the brunt of the cost of additional exercises and new separate intelligence links, Mr Beazley said this increased burden would receive priority despite an already over-taxed defence budget, but warned that these costs should not be underestimated.

Mr Beazley was quick to deny charges Australia would be subsidising New Zealand’s stance over ANZUS.

Despite the fact that Mr Beazley says the United States has been informed of these Australian initiatives, sources in Washington are already expressing fears that by moving so quickly to reassure New Zealand by the setting up of new bilateral defence arrangements, Canberra could be seen as condoning New Zealand’s ANZUS stand and shielding it from the consequences of its actions.

These are legitimate fears, especially since the New Zealand Government believes the fundamental guarantees afforded by ANZUS will remain, since any threat to the region would affect Australia and by inference New Zealand as well. This is beginning to be accepted in Washington as New Zealand having its cake and eating it, too.

It is to be hoped Washington accepts the background aims of Australia and the fact that Mr Beazley’s riding instructions stemmed from a very carefully considered Cabinet policy of trying to maintain strong links with both the United States within what remains of ANZUS, and separate bilateral links with New Zealand.

It may well be that all three countries will benefit from the new policies of self-reliance and independence that have emerged from the present difficulties – if the money is forthcoming to redeem those promises.

There is also the chance that in time, there could be a reversal to the trilateral arrangements that prevailed under ANZUS.
AUSTRALIA and New Zealand should make a virtue of necessity. With Anzus, if not consigned to a watery grave, at least becalmed and out of action at present, the Anzac alliance has taken on a new meaning. The Minister for Defence, Mr Beazley, has returned from New Zealand with a package which should, in the circumstances, keep everyone happy. It really was an exercise in sailing through a minefield: the United States still wants New Zealand to be seen by the world to have paid a price for applying its anti-nuclear principles to Anzus; the New Zealand Government, while showing no signs of relenting on its stand on the visit of nuclear-powered or armed ships, does not want to be driven into isolationism; and Australia, as the ally in the middle, has to avoid taking sides, and must maintain and strengthen bilateral links without doing anything which would hamper the resurrection of Anzus.

New Zealand's reading of the Anzus Treaty does seem idiosyncratic. Article II says: "In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this treaty, the parties separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." It is a narrow definition indeed of mutual aid and collective capacity when only conventional US ships may visit New Zealand — a stipulation which would mean the breaking of the proper American rule not to reveal whether ships are nuclear-armed. Perhaps it would have been better for the US to let the mouse roar away. But its fear of the spread of the nuclear allergy to Nato allies certainly led to some rhetorical overreacting.

The banning of intelligence sharing with New Zealand is a puzzling reprisal. To ensure that New
Zealand is less aware of global and regional shifts seems counterproductive. Ignorance, blissful or otherwise, might encourage blindness to the need for an Anzus agreement in which all partners carry a share of the burden. As it is, the ban will increase the burden on Australia. Mr Beazley has announced that Australia will undertake special intelligence analysis and evaluation on New Zealand's behalf. "Australia is prepared to absorb some extra costs in developing bilateral relations with New Zealand," he said. It is to be hoped that the acknowledgement in the joint communique that increased defence cooperation would require additional commitment of resources means that New Zealand will feel some pain too.

Neither nation has paid much more than lip service to self-reliance. If both, as promised in last week's talks, now work harder and closer on intelligence gathering and procurement of equipment and if both play a bigger and more constructive role in the region, the shake-up will be all to the good. For its part, the Australian Government has quite properly resisted Opposition pressure to be America's bully by proxy, and America, for its part, should realise that Australia's better bilateral arrangements with New Zealand do not represent partisanship. Anzac can never be a replacement for Anzus. And a more responsible Australia and New Zealand will mean a stronger Anzus, come its hoped-for revival.
NUCLEAR–FREE ZONES PROPOSALS

NEW ZEALAND TALKS ON SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR–FREE ZONE

Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 6 Apr 85 p 4

[Text]

Plans for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific are moving ahead with forum discussions now taking place in Wellington.

A South Pacific Forum working group, chaired by Mr David Sadleir, an assistant secretary of the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will meet in Wellington until about the middle of next week.

The group, represented by officials from all Forum nations, with the exception of Tonga and Vanuatu, is working on a text for a draft treaty. This will be considered by heads of Government at the next South Pacific Forum conference, in Rarotonga in August.

The group's work is understood to be well advanced. It held its first meeting in Suva and met in Canberra this year.

Forum nations decided to push ahead with a nuclear-free zone proposal at the Forum conference in Tuvalu last year.

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