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7 DETAINES HELD UNDER EMERGENCY ORDER FREED

BKO61624 Kuala Belait THE BORNEO BULLETIN in English 31 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] Seven detainees held at Jerudong under the Emergency Order of 1962 were released at midnight on Monday on the orders of His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan.

Brunei's emergency laws were introduced at the time of the 1962 rebellion, but none of the prisoners released this week had been in jail for longer than 12 years.

Government officials said they should not be described as "political detainees" who had been arrested for various reasons.

They are Pengiran Anak Chuchu bin Pengiran Anak Mohd Salleh, Pengiran Haji Sani bin Pengiran Mohd Daud, 48, Awang Nasar bin Mokti, 43, Awang Ismail bin Tengah, 30, Awang Ahad bin Haji Tuah, 33, Awang Abdul Ghani bin Angis, 43, and Awang Sahari bin Abdullah, 55.

Of the seven, one comes from Temburong, two from Kuala Belait and the remainder from Bandar Seri Begawan.

No reasons for their release were given, the only official comment being that they had been pardoned at the Sultan's discretion.

Before their release, they were given a 10-day rehabilitation course consisting of a series of lectures by senior representatives of Government departments.

They were briefed on development projects taking place in the State and on Saturday took an oath of allegiance to the Sultan's Government at the Mohamed Bolkiah Mosque, Kampong Serusop, Berakas.

Before their official release at midnight, the seven were granted an audience by the Sultan at the Istana Nurul Iman.

During their rehabilitation course they also visited Government departments, including Radio Television Brunei's studios in Bandar Seri Begawan.

They represented the second batch of detainees to be sent home to their families.
Three others were released in January last year, coinciding with the independence celebrations.

All had been at Jerudong for 10-12 years under emergency provisions which allow detention without trial.

The three who were given their freedom last year were the first to go since 1978.

With the release of the latest seven the number of detainees still at Jerudong are believed to number about 20, including five or six who have been there since the 1962 revolt.

CSO: 4200/1537
JUSTICE MINISTER ON EXECUTIONS OF CP LEADERS

BK061130 Jakarta THE JAKARTA POST in English 31 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] Jakarta (JP)—Justice Minister Ismail Saleh has confirmed the executions of three former leaders of the banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in Madura, East Java, last month.

The three, Rustomo, 65, Gatot Sutaryo alias Gatot Lestario, 60, and Joko Untung, 64, had been on death row for about a decade.

KOMPAS Friday quoted Saleh as saying the executions were carried out in accordance with due process of law. "Whoever has gone through the existing process of law, from local district court, high court, the supreme court, and if at the end his request for a pardon is turned down must have his sentence carried out. This is for the sake of the certainty of the law."

He said "this is a universal principle and therefore there is no need to make an issue of it." Saleh added: "We are a sovereign state, thus it is we ourselves who decide the law for ourselves, there is no need for foreigners to interfere with our domestic affairs, just as we don't want to meddle with other people's internal problems."

Reports from the Hague said that Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van den Broek called in the Indonesian ambassador to the Netherlands to express his concern and disappointment because Indonesia "did not honor the Dutch appeal made on strictly humanitarian grounds."

The reports said Dutch opposition parties (socialists, communists and socialist-pacifists) have demanded that the Dutch Government enforce sanctions against Indonesia, such as reducing development aid. The communists have announced they will request a debate in the Chamber of Deputies.

Van den Broek, however, said the Dutch Government would not contemplate sanctions.

Saleh said relatives of the three condemned former communist leaders were informed prior to the executions, and were allowed to meet them. Rustomo was a former head of a PKI special bureau. He was sentenced to death by a Surabaya Court on 10 January 1975. His sentence was confirmed by East Java High Court
on 22 October 1980. His final appeal was turned down by the Supreme Court on 30 December 1982, and President Suharto refused Rustomo's request for pardon on 31 December 1984.

Gatot Sutaryo alias Gatot Lestario, a former full member of the news style PKI in South Blitar, East Java, who attempted to state an armed rebellion by reviving the party, was sentenced to death by a local court on 2 January 1976. The sentence was confirmed by the East Java High Court on 17 October 1977. His final appeal was turned down by the Supreme Court on 14 April 1982, and President Suharto refused Sutaryo's request for a pardon on 14 August 1984.

Joko Untung, former head of the PKI's Agitation and Propaganda Department in East Java, was sentenced to death by a Blitar court on 2 January 1976. His sentence was confirmed by the East Java High Court on 12 October 1977. The Supreme Court turned down his final appeal on 18 September 1981, and President Suharto refused Untung's request for pardon on 31 October 1983.

All three were accused of subversion and attempting to overthrow the legal government by means of armed rebellion and reviving the PKI which was banned in March 1966 following the abortive communist coup the previous year.

The justice minister did not say when the executions were carried out, but last May, another former communist party leader, Mohammad Munir, was also executed.

CSO: 4200/1525
MPS ON CAMBODIA, MIAS, VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 27 Aug 85 pp A2, A3

[Text]

Jakarta, August 26 (ANTARA).—Some members of Parliament have stated that the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea in 1990 will be too late. If there is any political goodwill, the withdrawal needs not wait that long, because to withdraw troops is much easier than to station them, said H. Adnan Kohar, vice chairman/member of the Parliament's Commission I (foreign affairs, information, security, and defence), here Monday.

In five years, time, said Adnan, any kind of improvement may happen, and Vietnam's attitude may also change.

Another member of Parliament, Soebekti, agreed with Adnan that the withdrawal in 1990 will be too late.

By 1990, the Heng Samrin government supported by Vietnam may be so strong that it will not worry about Vietnam, he said.

There should be faster political resolution on Vietnamese troops withdrawal, he added.

According to Subekti, Pol Pot problems are Kampuchean government's problems under Sihanouk leadership.

"Although the Pol Pot problems are obstacles for Vietnam, foreigners must not be involved in the Kampuchean government," he said further.

At present, some 180,000 Vietnamese troops are in Kampuchea.

M.I.A.

Adnan has expressed his appreciation on Foreign Minister Co Thach's approval to appoint Indonesia as mediator for MIA's problems.

"The appointment of Mochtar as mediator is in line with his pioneering efforts," said the MP, adding that it is an honourable work to bring peace between two countries.

Touching on the linking of the MIA and Kampuchea problems, Adnan Kohar said it is can be done; however, they must not forget the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.

Adnan also reminded that the existence of the United States in Southeast Asia to balance the Soviet Union does not guarantee peace in that region.
Proximity talks

Commenting on the willingness of Vietnam to agree to the "proximity talks" put forward by Malaysia, Adnan said the suggestion presented by Foreign Minister Mochtar has been received by ASEAN, thus it is not Malaysia's proximity talks any more.

Soebekti also shared the opinion that proximity talks accepted by Viet- nam now is "ASEAN's proximity talks", because the Malaysia's suggestion has been taken over by ASEAN.

Mochtar - Co Thach

Both Adnan and Soebekti welcome the talks between Foreign Minister Mochtar and Foreign Minister Co Thach.

However, Soebekti said no specific improvement has been achieved so far. The solution of the Kampuchean problem seems, to take a long time, because it also involves the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Sihanouk himself, he added.

Refugee

Asked about the reported Armed that Vietnamese refugees at present are not real refugees, because business is also involved Kohar expressed regret over this.

It is a pity if a person does not feel sad to leave his own country. The government concerned should feel ashamed if its residents are forced to flee.

He also hailed Foreign Minister Mochtar's suggestion that the refugees should be returned to their own countries.

Meanwhile, Soebekti reminded that the Galang island in Indonesia is only a transit for the refugees before they reach their final destination. "Of course we do object if the refugees come with business purposes in mind. We have difficulties in taking care of the real refugees, how can we pay attention to the business ones?" Soebekti.

It is better to return them home, suggested the member of Parliament of the Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI.
ROK-INDONESIA JOINT OIL VENTURE TO START PRODUCTION

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 25 Aug 85 p A5

[Text]

Seoul, August 23 (ANTARA-YONHAP).- Kodeco Energy Co. of South Korea will begin producing offshore oil near Indonesia Madura island on September 24, the energy and resources ministry said Friday.

The Madura operation is about two months behind the original schedule, due to delays in the construction of production facilities and the outbreak of a fire at the oil drilling site in March, a ministry official said.

Kodeco, the Korean partner in the Korean-Indonesian joint oil venture, began drilling operations near the island in July 1982.

The oil well is being developed by Kodeco in a 50-50 joint venture with the Indonesian state-run oil company, Pertamina.

The Madura oil field, code-named ke-2, has proven oil deposits of 22.1 million barrels. The oil field has the capacity of yielding 10,000 to 15,000 barrels per day for more than eight years.

Under a joint venture agreement signed in 1981, the Indonesian government will take 50 percent of the total output. About 10 percent of the remainder will be set aside for production costs, leaving 40 percent for the developers -- Kodeco and Pertamina.

After deductions for expenses are made, Kodeco and Pertamina will share the remaining 40 percent of the oil. The Korean company will get 34.1 percent of the remaining oil and the Indonesian firm will receive 65.9 percent.

Kodeco will have to pay 56 percent of its share as corporate taxes to the Indonesian government, leaving about 7.5 percent of the total oil output at its disposal.

The Korean firm is also developing two other oil wells, codenamed ke-6-3 and ke-7, in the West Madura area off the coast of East Java, Indonesia.

The two oil wells, located 30-40 kilometers north of the ke-2 oil field, are believed to contain reserves of more than 100 million barrels, each with an average daily production potential of 20,000 barrels. Oil production of the two wells is scheduled to begin in the late 1980s.
TRADE WITH MALAYSIA INCREASING

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 15 Aug 85 p A5
[Text]

Kuala Lumpur, Aug.14 (ANTARA).— Indonesia-Malaysia trade has shown an increase during the last five years, and in the first four months of 1985 Indonesia's export to Malaysia reached 112.8 million Malaysian dollars (US$1 = M$.2.476).

Indonesian trade attache in Kuala Lumpur A.B.Harahap said here Wednesday that during that period Indonesia noted a surplus of M$.13.1 million.

Indonesia's exports to Malaysia in 1981 stood at M$.159.6 million and in 1984 reached M$.403.9 million. Meanwhile, Indonesia's import from Malaysia increased from M$.135.3 million in 1981 to M$.236.0 million in 1984.

According to Harahap, Indonesia's exports to the country is relatively small compared to Malaysia's total imports. The 1981 total imports reached M$26,693.8 million and Indonesia's share was only 0.6 percent. In 1984 Indonesia's share increased to 1.2 percent of Malaysia's total imports which amounted to M$32,966.7 million.

From January to April 1985, Malaysia's total imports have reached M$9,948.1 million and Indonesia's exports during the first three months of 1985 stood at 1.1 percent.

The most dominant of Indonesia's export commodities, said Harahap, is food which in 1984 reached M$114.4 million. In January-April 1985 period, the commodity was valued at M$29 million.

Malaysia's biggest trade partner in ASEAN is Singapore. Malaysia's exports to the country in 1984 were noted at M$7,913.5 million, whereas its imports were M$4,312.5 million. Following Singapore are Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei.

In 1984, Malaysia noted M$3,908.4 million of trade surplus from other ASEAN countries.
DEFENSE MINISTER RECEIVES THAI ARMED FORCES CHIEF

Jakarta, Aug. 22 (ANTARA) - Defence and Security Minister Poniman Wednesday received the Commander of the Armed Forces concurrently Chief of Staff of the Army of Thailand, General Arthit Kamlang Ek, who is currently visiting Indonesia as guest of the Indonesian Army Chief of Staff, General Rudini.

At the meeting the Indonesian defence minister expressed the hope for cooperation and good relations between the two Armed Forces, in particular both Armies.

In essence our respective Armed Forces have the task to safeguard national stability, because national stability in our respective countries would give a positive impact in the creation of regional stability, the Indonesian minister of defence and security said.

Minister Poniman also congratulated General Arthit on his bestowal of the "Kartika Eka Paksi Star" First Class by the President of Indonesia.

During his visit to the Indonesian defence/security minister, General Arthit Kamlang Ek was accompanied by Indonesian Army Chief of Staff General Rudini.
GROUP OF 77 DISCUSSES FORMING OF SOUTH BANK

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 23 Aug 85 p A1

[Text]

Jakarta, Aug. 22 (ANTARA).-- The Group-77's controversial plan to establish a South Bank will be brought for discussion at a higher-level forum, Indonesian high official at the foreign ministry Abdullah Kamil said Thursday.

He was speaking to the press after a session of the 4th meeting of the Inter-governmental Follow-up and Coordinating Committee (IFCC) of Group-77, which has been proceeding here since August 9 and scheduled to end on August 23.

Meanwhile Egyptian delegation-head Shaaban said the IFCC meeting had also suggested to conduct a further study on the plan at its next meeting.

The South Bank was previously planned to run with a capital of US$1.5 billion to be raised in five years. However, the amount of its initial working capital has not yet been determined.

The plan, which originally covered a wider scope of operational activities dealing with book-closing matters of the balance of payments of member countries, is now limited to touch on trade matters only.

It is also linked to the global trade preferential system as a form of economic cooperation among developing countries in boosting exports.

The session-chairman of the IFCC 4th meeting, Atmono Suryo said the Indonesian side is indeed skeptical about the plan. "In raising the capital, the OPEC countries or richer ones will certainly contribute larger funds", he added.

Like the Indonesian delegate, the one from Venezuela, Enrique Braco also voiced the same pessimism, saying: "It is still difficult to establish a South Bank which will require a monumental capital."

Other issues

One of the other issues which were brought up at the meeting is about the financing of development projects under economic cooperation among developing countries (ECDC).

For the ECDC funds, Abdullah Kamil said Indonesia had in the past three years contributed some US$30,000.
Another one is the forming of Multi Sectoral Information Networks (MSIN) which is aimed at assisting member countries to promote economic and technical cooperation through exchanges of information on various fields, such as trade, technology, food, agriculture, energy, raw materials, finance, industry and technical cooperation.

Its other aim is to facilitate member countries in the use of data resources and information networks at the United Nations.

Preparations for the MSIN project are now being arranged and there is a possibility of setting up a model project.

All members of the Group-77 appeared to realize more the importance of the MSIN project and have agreed to give top priority to the action program of the project.

CSO: 4200/1535
Jakarta, Aug. 24 (ANTARA).—A High Level Intergovernmental Group Experts meeting will be held to review and further study the proposal to establish the South Bank by Group 77.

The 4th meeting of Intergovernmental Follow-up and Coordination Committee (IFCC-IV) which ended today also suggested the chairman of Group 77 to carry out consultations in a wider context to reflect the political involvement of member countries, on latter proposal.

The South Bank issue have been discussed thoroughly by the delegations during the intergovernmental meeting which was opened by Foreign Minister Prof. Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, last Monday.

During the meeting session, several delegations pointed out that they would not change their position and could not associate themselves with the idea of the Bank.

In a report which was tabled today, the delegations were told that the committee also requested the chairman of Group 77 to initiate the necessary consultations with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to finance the multilateral activities of Multisectoral Information Network (MSIN).

During the five-day meeting, the committee also considered the report of technical meeting which was held since IFCC-III in Columbia.

The report covered various scopes such as industrialization, technical cooperation among developing countries, finance, trade, food and agriculture.

On supporting mechanism, Atmono Seeryo who chaired the meeting Friday said that the committee has recommended that the core of assistants from the country of the chairman should continue in office for at least an additional one year.

Such a practice was proposed to ensure the overlap required for continuity of operations.
The committee also stressed the urgent need for all member countries to contribute to Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries (ECDC) programme account at least US$1,000.

In a press conference after the closing ceremony of the meeting, a spokesman of the organizing committee, Abdullah Kamil considered the meeting as excellent.

He said that, the delegations passed a resolution to thank the Indonesian government, especially President Soeharto for the hospitality given to them.
Jakarta, Aug. 21 (ANTARA) -- The Australian Ambassador, Bill Morrison, said today he was happy that despite budget restrictions, the Australian Government in the 1985-86 fiscal year would allocate $A69.02 million (Rp.54.5 billion) for development assistance to Indonesia.

"Indonesia is the largest recipient in South-east Asia of Australian bilateral aid and also the largest recipient of project aid and technical assistance", Morrison said.

"I am gratified that Australia has been able to maintain this level of commitment to the development of Indonesia despite budgetary restraints".

Morrison said Australia was engaged in 20 diverse joint development projects in Indonesia ranging in size from small groups of experts to large infrastructure projects in a number of provinces.

He said the budget provided $A.9.9 million (Rp.7.8 billion) for further Australian assistance to Indonesia under the Defence Co-operation Program.

The ambassador made the comments after the Australian Budget, which provides for Australian government expenditure for the next 12 months, was announced in parliament Tuesday night.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bill Hayden, said in Canberra Australian would provide a total of $A.1025.9 million (Rp.810.46 billion) for development assistance in fiscal 1985-86, an increase of about $A.14.5 million (Rp.11.45 billion) over the actual expenditure last financial year.

Any greater increase in funds allocated to overseas aid this year were precluded by the government's overall policy of budget restraint, Hayden said.

Hayden said the focus and direction of Australia's aid program to South East Asia this financial year reflected more clearly the maturing status of the countries in the region and Australia's economic relationships with these countries.
Focus.

Morrison said today Australia's bilateral aid to Indonesia focussed mainly on public works, education and agriculture: high priority sectors which draw on relevant Australian technology and expertise.

For example, during Repelita IV Australia will supply over 8000 metres of specially designed steel bridging as well as related technical assistance.

In the education sector, Australia is participating in a large joint project to upgrade teacher training centres for technical and vocational teachers. Another major aid project is the Australian Language Centre established in Jakarta in 1983 to provide English language training to government personnel nominated for training in Australia.

Morrison said in agriculture a major focus of attention is research related to animal production, in particular at the Balai Penelitian Ternak in Ciawi and at the Animal Disease Research Institute in Bogor.

Australia has also agreed to take part in a joint development project of flood mitigation, irrigation and drainage on the Lower Bah Bolon River in North Sumatra, the main aim being to increase local agriculture production.

The ambassador said Australia's development training programs include postgraduate awards and a variety of shorter special purpose courses. About 100 postgraduate awards are offered annually and, by mutual agreement, these are increasingly focused on identified priority sectors of education, agriculture, public works and geology/mining.

Besides project and training aid, Morrison said Australia assisted with a range of additional programs:

- Australia helped to strengthen universities in Indonesia through the work of the International Development Program of Australian Universities and Colleges (IDP) and to organise relevant agricultural research through the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR).
- Other programs covered the provision of mixed credit facilities and co-financing.

Morrison said the use of aid is determined jointly with Indonesia at annual planning meetings.
Indonesia

PRC INTERESTED IN NURTANIO PLANES, OFFERS TEXTILE MACHINERY

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 17 Aug 85 pp A3, A4

[Text]

Jakarta, Aug.15 (ANTARA).-- The People's Republic of China (PRC) is interested in purchasing aircraft built by Indonesia's only airplane factory PT Nurtanio both for cargo and passengers, the plant's general affairs director, Suwondo told the press after receiving a Chinese trade delegation in Bandung Thursday.

The delegation was led by Chairman of the Chinese Commission for Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) Wang Yaoting.

Suwondo said the Chinese were interested in CN 235s and Super Puma 332s, but transactions could not be realized too soon. A CN 235 costs about US$ 5 million, and a Super Puma 332 US$4 million.

Nurtanio produces 18 NC202s, 18 NBO 105s and six Super Pumas per year. Five Nurtanio-built aircraft had been sold to Thailand for use in making man-made rain, and two others will be exported to Guam soon for short-haul services, Suwondo said.

The Chinese businessmen also visited the Famatex textile factory while in the West Java provincial capital.

During the one-day visit, the Chinese businessmen offered more to their Indonesian counterparts than what they would buy from Indonesia.

While looking around at the aircraft industry, the Chinese delegation also offered their raw materials for the manufacture of airplanes, and when at the Famatex plant they offered their textile machinery and cotton but did not express interest in buying anything.

During the visits, the Chinese trade delegation was in the company of Vice General Chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) Sukar Samsudi and executives of the chamber's local chapter.
ROK EXPRESSES INTEREST IN S&T COOPERATION, NURTANIO PLANES

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 27 Aug 85 pp A1, A2

[Text]

Seoul, Aug. 27 (ANTARA).— The President of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Chun Doo Hwan, Monday evening in Seoul called for enhancement of scientific and technological cooperation between South Korea and Indonesia for both countries’ development interests.

He made this statement when he received Indonesian Minister of Research and Technology concurrently Chairman of the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology Dr. B.J. Habibie, at the Blue Palace in Seoul to deliver President Soeharto’s personal letter to the South Korea President.

Minister Habibie and party arrived in Seoul, the South Korean capital, Sunday evening from Tokyo for a five-day visit to South Korea, among other things to meet President Chun as well as Minister of Defence Yong Sun Min, Minister of Sciences and Technology Kim Sung Jin, Scientific and Technological Institute Chairman Chun Hak Jen’and to make survey tours of several laboratories and industrial projects.

President Chun told Minister Habibie to be still impressed with his meeting with President Soeharto some time ago, when both leaders laid firmer foundations for both countries’ cooperation.

Minister Habibie on the other hand informed President Chun on the development and progress made in the scientific and technological field in Indonesia in general, and in the field of high technological in particular. He mainly explained on the development of the airplane industry in Indonesia which produced helicopters and passenger planes such as the CN-212 and multipurpose CN 235 passenger-planes.

President Chun was mainly attracted by Minister Habibie’s explanation about the multipurpose CN-235 plane, which could be utilized for passenger and cargo transportation as well as for troops and as survey plane. President Chun said that he would send a team of experts to evaluate the capabilities of the CN-235 plane for possible utilization in South Korea.

South Korean Minister of Defence Yong Sun Min made the same remarks after hearing Minister Habibie’s explanations about the airplane industry in Indonesia during their meeting Monday noon. He said that he would send a team of experts for the possible purchase of CN-235 type of planes for South Korean armed forces needs.
The same day Minister Habibie had also talks with Minister of Sciences and Technology Kim Sung Jin and the chairman of the Scientific and Technological Institute, Chun Hak Jen on possible scientific and technological cooperation between both countries.

Indonesia among other things can give information and experience in the fields of aviation technology as well as technology on utilization of communication satellites. South Korea plans to use communication satellites by the end of the 80s.

Tuesday Minister Habibie and party were scheduled to make survey tours of several laboratories and industrial projects.
SECOND GAS FIELD FIND NEAR BALI CONFIRMED

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 14 Aug 85 pp A1, A2

[Text]

The Britoil Company, based in Glasgow, Scotland, reported on 12 August that it had just successfully tested a second appraisal well some 144 kilometres north-east of Bali.

The first well, completed in June this year, showed there was natural gas and a mixture of gas and oil. In tests the well flowed at a combined rate of 764,000 cubic metres of gas and 240 barrels of condensate per day from sands drilled at a depth of some 1828 metres.

The latest well has been drilled two kilometres south-east of the original well and has produced even more impressive results. Britoil says it has been tested at a combined flow rate of one million cubic metres of gas and 300 barrels of condensate a day from the same sand formations that extend from the site of the original discovery.

A Britoil spokesman said on 12 August: "By proving additional reserves, this appraisal well indicates the feature to be a major natural gas accumulation."

Britoil and a local Bali subsidiary of the U.S. Atlantic Richfield Oil Company are partners in a production-sharing contract covering the area of discovery. Atlantic Richfield Bali North Inc. has a 60 per cent stake with Britoil holding the other 40 per cent interest.

Together they have rights under the contract to extract gas and condensate from the area in return for royalties that will be paid to the Indonesian government-owned oil company, Pertamina.

Britoil is also heavily engaged in the development of oil and gas fields in the North Sea off the north-east coast of Britain.

CSO: 4200/1533
MORE IRIANESE BORDER CROSSES RETURN VOLUNTARILY

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 14 Aug 85 p A3

[Text]

Jayapura, Aug. 14 (ANTARA).—As many as 110 families of Irian Jayan border crossers from the districts of Waris and Web here returned to their home villages from Papua New Guinea on their own initiative last week.

A team from the Indonesian ministry of defence and security led by the general affairs assistant to the chief commander of the armed forces, Rear Admiral Parapat, made an inspection aboard a helicopter on the region Tuesday.

In a meeting with the ex-Irian Jayan border crossers in the Molef village, Senggi, team member Irian Jayan Governor Izaac Hindom said that the return of the people had proven that the Free West Papua Movement could never be able to hinder the will of the border crossers to return to their own villages.

He said the development of Trans Irian Jaya roads in the border area of Jayawijaya proves that the Government always pays attention to the isolated regions. The roads are aimed at breaking the isolation of the regions to make ways for development programs.

The chief of the Kerom tribe that live in Arso, Waris, Senggi and Web districts, Mathias Tabu said that his tribe members had realized that they had been deceived by the members of the Free West Papua Movement and they are now ready to cooperate with the Government to carry out development programs.

The defence and security ministry's team arrived here on Sunday and had conducted some other meetings with the region's public figures.
Ujungpandang, Aug. 28 (ANTARA).—The province of South Sulawesi is scheduled to receive in Pelita IV (fourth five-year development plan, 1984-1989) 4,000 transmigrant families, including 20 per cent among them local migrants.

The government is at present improving the infrastructures and facilities in the projected transmigration resettlement areas in Luwu and Mamuju regencies.

In Mamuju regency roads have been constructed with a total length of 152 kilometers and two bridges with a total length of 240 meters at the total cost of Rp.2.4 billion.

According to South Sulawesi's provincial transmigration office chief J.SM Satioadi, since Pelita I until now the government has resettled 15,000 transmigrant families in South Sulawesi, viz. 12,000 families in Luwu and 3,000 families in Mamuju regencies.
PT PAL-MITSUBISHI COOPERATION AGREEMENT SIGNED

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 26 Aug 85 p A3

[Text]

Tokyo, August 26 (ANTARA).— State Minister for Research and Technology/chief of BPPT (the Agency for Assessment and Application of Technology) in his capacity as president director of PT PAL (Indonesia Shipbuilding Industry) and Mitsubishi's president for heavy industries Yotaro Iida here Saturday signed a cooperation agreement, in which it was stated that PT PAL will produce components for Mitsubishi's turbines and conduct after-sales services.

PT PAL will produce more than 1,000 types of components for steam, gas and nuclear turbines, according to Minister Habilie as disclosed to ANTARA.

More than 70 per cent of turbines operating in Indonesia were manufactured by Mitsubishi. It is therefore expected that Indonesia will take part in the manufacturing of the turbines, Habilie said.

He also said Indonesia is not yet ready to apply high technology to the fullest extent since it will require a lot of experience as well as investment.

On the other hand, within cooperation agreements, Indonesia is able to take part in manufacturing goods at a lower cost and provide more job opportunities.

Yotaro Iida said on the occasion that the company was willing to share "Mitsubishi's wonderful technology" with Indonesia.
TRADE BALANCE WITH FRG

Jakarta BUSINESS NEWS in English 9 Aug 85 pp 7, 8

[Text] Despite the absence of special bilateral trade agreements between Indonesia and the Federal Republic of Germany, over the last ten years West Germany has become one of Indonesia's outstanding trade partners.

West Germany ranks sixth in Indonesian exports with a volume of 900,000 tons worth about US$ 250 million in the last few years, whereas in Indonesian imports it ranks fifth with 400,000 tons worth around US$ 700-1,000 million per annum.

The trade balance between the two countries has over the decade registered deficits for Indonesia, because of the bigger value of Indonesian imports over its exports, according to reliable sources here.

Since 1975, Indonesia's trade deficits with West Germany have reached around US$ 4 billion, as can be seen from the following figures (processed from data made available by the Central Bureau of Statistics):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>EXPORTS</th>
<th>IMPORTS</th>
<th>BALANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VOLUME (TON)</td>
<td>FOB VALUE (US$)</td>
<td>CIF VALUE (US$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>622,972.7</td>
<td>134,922.2</td>
<td>363,334.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>819,924.2</td>
<td>204,139.0</td>
<td>491,143.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>699,084.1</td>
<td>235,042.8</td>
<td>462,151.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>773,652.7</td>
<td>226,422.8</td>
<td>478,158.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,174,600.7</td>
<td>385,666.1</td>
<td>384,768.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>917,921.9</td>
<td>389,003.4</td>
<td>377,446.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>870,682.2</td>
<td>389,003.4</td>
<td>377,446.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>938,874.5</td>
<td>389,003.4</td>
<td>377,446.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>799,921.0</td>
<td>246,325.2</td>
<td>386,967.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
West German imports from Indonesia cover about 215 kinds of commodities, traditional and nontraditional, including natural rubber, coffee, tapioca, palm oil, tobacco, cacao, cinchona, rice bran, copra, pepper, molasses, plywood, garments, tin, furniture, and various handicrafts.

Indonesian imports from that country comprise 150 kinds of industrial goods, covering automotive products, machines and industrial equipment, pumps and compressors, electronics, iron and steel, other metal products, chemicals, paper and cardboard, rubber and synthetic latex, and chemical fertilizer.

CSO: 4200/1533
Kadin Indonesia (Chamber of Commerce & Industry) has held a seminar on capital investments attended by two hundred people, and two ministers delivered messages, namely State Minister Sumarlin as Chairman of the National Development Planning Board, and Junior Minister Ginanjar Kartasasmita as Chairman of the Investment Coordinating Board.

Private capital investments have to achieve a very big target set by the Fourth Five-Year Plan, and the basic question is: will the target be reached? At present the business people are not so optimistic. The investment climate in Indonesia today is less favourable on account of two main causes connected with the trade cycle and the aspect of policies.

Firstly, the domestic market has weakened since 1982 and it is not certain when this condition will improve. Especially in the field of industry, the profit margin has been much reduced. Secondly, the pattern of policies, sectoral as well as general, under this dull trade cycle still provide less incentive for new investments.

The problem of the world trade cycle is beyond our control. Besides, the US has become a country that imports capital more than it exports. It does not mean that investments from the US can no longer be expected. Multinational corporations that traditionally invest their capital abroad for the greater part still come from the US and they remain inclined to make overseas investments. Though US banks are already rather discouraged to give major loans to the developing nations, particularly Latin America, Southeast Asia is relatively still considered favourable. So whether any of the existing
US companies is prepared to invest capital in Southeast Asia depends more on the situation and policies of the recipient country concerned.

Japan currently constitutes a surplus country that exports capital. However, the urge to make investments in Southeast Asia is at the moment on the decline because Indonesia's economic situation and investment climate are considered less favourable. Nevertheless, if we really persuade the Japanese, and provide several facilities and financial security they need, capital investments from Japan are likely to be again increased. The facilities they want are greater freedom for the employment of Japanese experts and a better guarantee for their capital against the risk of rupiah devaluation.

How about the prospect of PMDN (domestic investments)? Under this weak trade cycle, domestic business circles are also in a weaker position to conduct investments themselves.

Indonesian businessmen could formerly still resort to state banks, such as Bapindo, and borrow the greater portion of investment funds needed. Their foreign partners could frequently provide loans in the form of export credits. If the Indonesian side becomes a partner in a joint venture, the foreign counterpart was also in a position to lend the former an amount of money needed to meet the 20% equity requirement. Such equity could even be derived from the overprice value of capital equipment supplied by the foreign partner. Now all this has become more difficult, after the issuance of Presidential Instruction No.4 (import value checks by SGS) and the banking deregulation involving higher interest rates and debt-equity ratio requirements.

Sectorally there are also various restrictions, such as in the agrobusiness sector. Foreign investors practically will not be interested in this business area. On the other hand, to start operations in large estates domestic private businessmen will not be capable of providing the minimum equity required.

National private companies that lack initial (equity) capital cannot obtain state bank assistance. Conversely, the Indonesian side is required by the government to own 20% initial equity and after ten years the shares must increase to 50%. What happens if the national partner is financially incapable of increasing the equity?
Our conclusion is that all the government requirements have noble aims, viz. to protect Indonesian investors, to guarantee equitable private investments from the initial stage for further gradual increase. The question is: if all these requirements increase risk and cost, while the prospect to earn profit is less adequate, why should the requirements be emphasized whereas new investments are discouraged as a result? The midway solution is perhaps to allow time to investors to fulfil the requirements after their repayment of bank loans, about 8 – 10 years following the commencement of production.
Indonesia's liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports over the last five years have risen in volume by 47%, and in value by 53%. In 1980 the export volume was registered at about 9 million m.tons worth not less than US$ 1 billion (FOB).

In 1984 the volume went up to 14 million m.tons valued at around US$ 3 billion. This year the LNG export value will increase by around US$ 4 billion, according to informed sources here.

LNG exports from this country from 1980 through 1985 can be described in the following table (processed from data provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>VOLUME (1,000 M.TON)</th>
<th>FOB VALUE (US$ MILLION)</th>
<th>AVERAGE PRICE PER M.TON (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>9,739.7</td>
<td>2,186.3</td>
<td>224.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>9,121.8</td>
<td>2,499.0</td>
<td>273.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>10,240.8</td>
<td>2,905.8</td>
<td>283.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>9,919.1</td>
<td>2,492.2</td>
<td>251.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>14,339.9</td>
<td>3,344.7</td>
<td>233.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 *)</td>
<td>4,266.6</td>
<td>1,025.9</td>
<td>240.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) January-February
Indonesian LNG exports, mainly going to Japan, were agreed upon in March 1973 with a 20-year contract at an annual delivery rate of around 7.5 million tons. The first export delivery to Japan took place on December 3, 1977 with Osaka as the port of destination.

LNG has many plus points compared with crude oil or coal, including its relatively high calories, and its minimum effect of pollution. Japan uses it for industries besides also for power generation and household purposes.

Other importers of LNG are the US, with around 700,000 tons in 1981, followed by New Zealand with 600,000 tons, and other nations such as Singapore and South Korea.

In 1983 and 1984 Indonesia only exported LNG to Japan, totalling not less than 10 million tons and 14 million tons respectively, the sources said.
BRIEFS

JAPANESE SHIP ARRIVES—Jakarta, 9 September (KYODO)—Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force [MSDF] training ship Katori, 3,350 tons, carrying 130 newly appointed ensigns, and MSDR destroyer Makigumo, 2,050 tons, entered the Tanjungpriok Port of Jakarta Monday morning. This is the fourth time after World War II that a Japanese MSDF training fleet called at Jakarta. The training fleet is scheduled to leave Jakarta Thursday for Singapore, the next port of call. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 1222 GMT 9 Sep 85 OW]

CSO: 4200/1525
LAOS

COLUMNIST ON UNPOPULARITY OF VANG PAO, RESISTANCE IMPACT

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 23 Aug 85 p 4

[Article by Jacques Bekaert]

[Text]

A FEW days ago the Laotian official media gave considerable time and prominent space to the celebration of the 8th anniversary of the signing of the Laos-Vietnam treaty of friendship and cooperation. It was signed in Vientiane on July 18, 1977, by Mr. Kaysone Phomvihan, the general secretary of the Laotian People's Revolutionary Party, and Mr. Le Duan, his Vietnamese counterpart.

An article in the Laotian party's publication Pasason (July 18, 1985) celebrated "this rare, special relationship and solidarity" of Vietnam and Laos and reviewed the achievements during the past year.

The Lao-Vietnamese and Vietnamese-Lao Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Technical and Scientific Cooperation will, explains the newspaper, intensify discussions and consultation in various areas: promotion of industrial and agricultural enterprises, exploitation of natural resources, development and planning of public services and communication routes, construction of factories and warehouses, training of experts and exchange of delegations, materials and knowledge in specialised fields.

Pasason also notes that the development of sisterhood between provinces in the two countries has gradually become all-round, thus strengthening the strong position of each side in binding and assisting each other from the local and grass-root level upward, resulting in building these provinces into firm and strong strategic units.

The signing of the treaty of friendship, the constant reinforcement of the "special relationship" between Laos and Vietnam was, according to a former official of the communist regime, "one of the main reasons why so many sincere members or supporters of the Pathet Lao started to have serious doubts about the true national identity of their own party and leadership."

SACRIFICE

"Many of us had followed with great sympathy the struggle of the left for national liberation," said the source. "We were prepared to work for the new regime, we were well aware of the numerous shortcomings of the previous regime, of the immense corruption of the right, of the paternalistic attitude of one of our big neighbours. We wanted to be Lao, we were ready to sacrifice a lot of personal convenience for the sake of our country."

A Western diplomat, until recently posted in Vientiane, said that on the other hand several members of the Central Committee while not precisely pro-Vietnamese were nevertheless ready to accept close ties with Hanoi, "just so as to change protector. They felt that in the past they had been treated as little brother by bigger Thailand. For some Laotians at least it was a way to express their own new independence, even at the cost of independence."
Quite possible indeed, although this attitude is probably more prevalent among high ranking cadres than in the rank and file.

But one of the results of the tightening of the "special relationship" with Hanoi, as well as a more recent campaign to draft young people into the People's army, has been to provide the Laotian anti-communist resistance with some new recruits.

Few guerrilla movements around the world are more fragmented than the Laotian's. Anyone trying to establish a list of the various factions would probably lose count after a while. Many groups are extremely local, extending their influence over no more than a few villages, usually in their homes as well as their battlefields.

Leaders from the Sixties have formed a National Liberation Front in 1981. It is doubtful, however, if they control more than a few hundred armed men inside Laos. One of them, Vang Pao, the Hmong general, used to enjoy a certain amount of recognition and influence but this, too, is becoming a thing of the past. "He is living most of the time in the United States, some of his agents are very corrupt. To the young Hmong people he means very little," another Hmong leader told us.

Today the Hmong, along with the Yao, the Khmu and the Muser, constitute the core of the Laotian resistance. Once despised and ignored by the ruling circles in Vientiane, they have shown greater determination to protect their own lifestyle, which, many of them believe, is threatened by the communist authorities.

Their means are limited. They have received some assistance from China, a few hundred have been trained in Yunnan province, but even that source of assistance appears to be more reluctant than in the past. "I went to Yunnan last January," explained Vongkham Darasouk, one of the young leaders of a resistance group led by a former officer of the Royal Army, Chan Souk, himself of Khmu origin. "The Chinese were very polite but when I asked for medicine and other forms of assistance I was told China was still a poor country and priority should go to the Kampuchean resistance." Vongkham came back empty handed.

The resistance operates in a vast under-populated country. Like the people of Laos, many of the movements are extremely poor. "We must be careful not to provoke repression on the people," said Vongkham. It could indeed lead the resistance to lose its popular base.

Last March Chan Souk's men surrounded a village in Namtha province. "We captured six soldiers from the Pathet Lao, some weapons and food." But the prisoners were sent back home free and the weapons and food were handed back to the village headman. "We explained to the Pathet soldiers what we were doing and why," said Vongkham. "And by giving back everything we had made sure that the villagers would not be punished by the authorities."

LACK OF CONFIDENCE

This kind of psychological warfare is not without effect if one is to believe a recent programme broadcast on July 6 by the official Vientiane Radio. Of course, while the resistance activity is blamed on the "Peking reactionaries in collusion with the US imperialists and other reactionaries," the programme explains that "the target of their propaganda is our cadres and combatants..." because they seek to create spiritual disturbance among (them) with the hope of arousing suspicion toward the line and policies of our party and state, causing a lack of confidence in the leadership of our party and state."

The propaganda of the anti-communist is also "aimed at causing our cadres and combatants to be satisfied with a pleasurable line of thinking in order to make them fail to distinguish friends from foes, lose their revolutionary spirit, lower their combat spirit and then defect from their ranks to serve as lackeys and tools of the enemies in carrying out activities to sabotage the line, policies and plans of the party and state."

Certainly, the conclusion of Radio Vientiane is that people should be vigilant because "the enemies' psychological warfare is very dangerous."
Most of the world is unaware of, and uninterested in, the struggle of the Laotian resistance. Its extreme fragmentation makes it hard to be fully comprehended. While the old leaders lack credibility, the young ones have little or no access to the world media. Their approach is often extremely parochial. They lack a real leader, a “general” who could understand and explain the larger picture. Those who fight do so to preserve a certain “Laotian” way of life. Their vision rarely goes beyond the territory they know. Their poverty limits their capacity to welcome new members. And for the moment their strength has as much to do with the weakness of the regime as their own capacity to fight and organise.

But at least Radio Vientiane does not minimise their potential and the danger represented by their “pleasurable line of thinking...”
STRAITS TIMES EDITORIAL ON POL POT REPLACEMENT

BK070955 Singapore THE STRAITS TIMES in English 6 Sep 85 p 20

[Editorial: "Major Obstacle Removed"]

[Text] The replacement of the Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, as military commander of the resistance faction will serve to enhance prospects for a solution to the Cambodian conflict. Long aware of the liability Pol Pot—the chief symbol of the atrocities perpetrated by his regime—carries with him, the Khmer Rouge has gradually pushed its notorious leader into the background. He was first shed of the faction's premiership and now the top military post. Granted that his retirement is not complete—he retains a shadowy role in defence matters—it will nevertheless help to clean up the Khmer Rouge's tarnished image.

In political terms, this represents a major concession by the Khmer Rouge which had resisted external pressure to purge its leadership ranks of those who were responsible for the death of millions of Cambodians. Although the latest move has been described as something designed for cosmetic purposes, and indeed it has been roundly denounced as a farce by Hanoi, the Phnom Penh regime and the Russians, it should not be dismissed so lightly. Since Vietnam has long insisted on the removal of the likes of Pol Pot as a pre-condition for negotiation, it should now respond positively to the overturn if it is seriously interested in peace.

It would not be realistic for Hanoi to insist on the total elimination of the Khmer Rouge from the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), for this would amount to taking the bite away from the resistance forces. And this is clearly not acceptable as the Cambodian resistance forces have to retain their military strength to stay credible. If a diplomatic solution to the Cambodian impasse is to be found, Vietnam must be prepared to come down some way from its hardline position. The ASEAN countries, on their part, have gone as far as they possible could in their search for a settlement. At the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting last July, the group's proposal for proximity talks between the CGDK and Vietnam with representatives of the Heng Samrin regime in attendance was rebuffed. The removal of Pol Pot is yet another overture to persuade the Vietnamese to agree to negotiations.
The dismissal of these serious suggestions at compromise points to an inevitable conclusion—that it has little intention of coming to a negotiated settlement and is determined to drag on the conflict. If indeed such are Vietnam's beliefs, its intransigence remains unabated. After more than 6 years of a costly occupation of Cambodia, it has little to show for its sacrifices. The Vietnamese ability to sustain a prolonged conflict is not in doubt but they must realise by now that their adventurism carries a stiff price. Surely, a more responsible leadership would make every effort to secure peace. The opportunities for a diplomatic solution are always present. All that is needed is the desire to pursue them.

CSO: 4200/1511
OFFICIAL SAYS THAI BORDER SURVEY ALMOST OVER

BK070925 Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 5 Sep 85 p 2

[Excerpt] Kuala Lumpur, Wednesday (BERNAMA)—After 12 years, the survey of the Malaysia-Thailand border is nearly completed except for the area around Bukit Jeli in Kelantan. The survey teams are expected to pull out of the frontier area sometime in the middle of this month.

The acting director-general of the Survey and Mapping Department, Encik Abdul Hamid Mohamad, who said this in the Ehwal Semasa (Current Affairs) programme over TV Malaysia tonight, added, that the survey of the border at Sungai Golok might no longer be necessary.

This is because the 1909 border demarcation agreement provided for the border between this country and Thailand to be based on the mid-dividing line of the Sungai Golok.

Several members of the survey teams had died or been injured in accidents, clashes with communist terrorists, helicopter crash or by booby traps since the survey started in 1973.

He said that in 1975, three members of the survey team died in an ambush by communist terrorists while a survey technician was killed in a helicopter crash 2 years ago.

Encik Abdul Hamid said although the survey of the Malaysia-Thailand border was nearly completed, similar work on the border with Indonesia in the area between Kalimantan and the Sabah and Sarawak sectors would take a further 20 years.

CSO: 4200/1511
MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES CHIEF COMMENTS ON PRASONG REMARKS

HK080608 Hong Kong AFP in English 0533 GMT 8 Sep 85

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 8 September (AFP)--Malaysia's chief of armed forces today disputed a Thai claim that Vietnam may have planted spies among the thousands of refugees who have fled its shores to non-communist Southeast Asia in recent years.

General Ghazali Seth said he was "surprised" by a BERNAMA News Agency report quoting the Thai National Security Council chief, Prasong Sunsiri, as saying that Hanoi had agents among the boat people.

He said that a military-headed special task force set up by the government to handle refugees had never reported the presence of spies since the landings of boat people began in the 1970's.

The task force had screened all refugees, General Ghazali said, adding: "I have yet to see any report from the task force of spies among these refugees."

Security officials said that all refugees with military backgrounds were closely vetted by Malaysian intelligence agencies before being allowed into the temporary holding centre at Bidong Island off peninsular Malaysia's east coast.

Western refugee officials said there are some 9,000 Vietnamese on the island awaiting resettlement in third countries.

The security officials said it would be pointless for Vietnam to send out spies because all refugees were kept under close surveillance and strictly confined to Bidong Island.
THAI BORDER COMMUNIST THREATS—Armed forces members have been reminded to be ready to face any threats posed by communist terrorists when a 25-km long wall in the Malaysian-Thai border areas near Betong is built. A Defense Ministry spokesman said today that the ministry had received several reports on the activities of communist terrorists since the work to clear the jungle began. Communist terrorists have tired on several occasions to enter the country through the border areas but have moved back after their activities were detected by the security forces. The construction work is expected to begin at the end of this year. The security forces have deployed several main strike units along the border protruding into the Betong area. The proposed wall will stretch from Bukit Kobe in the eastern part of Pangkalan Hulu Keroh to the northern part of customs and immigration checkpoints in Bukit (Berakit) situated near the border. The construction of the wall near Betong is designed to check smuggling activities, especially arms smuggling, and infiltrations by communist terrorists. [Text] [Kuala Lumpur Domestic Service in Malay 1230 GMT 7 Sep 85 BK]

RULER CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT AGENCIES—Klang, Thursday—The Sultan of Selangor will continue to criticise government agencies and their officers should they be inefficient or when projects planned for the people are delayed. Individuals in positions of authority will not be spared. The ruler said it was unfortunate that his 25-year reign left in its wake officials and individuals who were angry at the public remarks he had made regarding development. "I only expressed my concern and dissatisfaction—over the delays and lack of efficiency—so that development in the state would be carried out smoothly for the benefit of the people," he said. "If I have to choose between the interests of certain individuals and the people, I would certainly choose the people as a whole." The Sultan was speaking at a ceremony at the Istana Alam Shah to mark his silver jubilee coronation celebrations. Also present were Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Datin Seri Hasmah Haji Ali, representatives of rulers of all states, the Yang diPertuas Negeri of Sabah, Sarawak, Malacca and Penang, cabinet ministers and state executive councillors. [Text] [Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 6 Sep 85 p 2 BK]
NEPALESE KING ENDS VISIT--King Birendra of Nepal has praised Malaysia for its policy of nonalignment and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. Speaking at a banquet in Kuching last night, he said the unity and prosperity enjoyed by Malaysia were also highly commendable. He hoped his visit would help promote greater rapport between the peoples of Malaysia and Nepal. This morning, the king and queen of Nepal were accorded a traditional red-carpet sendoff at the Kuching International Airport after a 2-day visit to Sarawak at the invitation of the state government. The royal couple left for Hong Kong. [Text] [Kuala Lumpur International Service in English 0600 GMT 10 Sep 85 BK]
Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile yesterday [6 September] assured the public that the Defense Ministry will strictly adhere to due process when proceeding against anyone suspected of being involved in unlawful acts. He said that justice applied equally is the key to stability.

The defense minister made the assurance when he spoke before members of the Municipal Trial Judges League at the Ramadan Midtown Hotel. He told the municipal trial judges that the poorer the litigant, the more effort must be exerted to see to it that he does not waste his time in court.

The defense minister also said the emergence of a credible political opposition has worried the communists, because their bid for a violent overthrow of the government may be preempted. As a result, Minister Enrile said, in documents released to the information minister, the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the New People's Army, are giving top priority to the infiltration of the ranks of the political opposition. This is understandable, because at this point in time the dissident movement has every reason to be worried over the possibility that their bid for a violent overthrow of the duly constituted government may be preempted by the emergence of a credible political opposition operating within the gambit of our democratic system.
INFORMATION MINISTER RAPS 'ABUSE' BY RADIO COMMENTATORS

HK070023 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 6 Sep 85

[Text] Information Minister Gregorio Cendana described yesterday [6 September] the abuse of the airwaves by radio commentators through sensationalized stories. He made the remarks at the close of the second training of ASEAN broadcasters in the production of cultural programs in radio at the Century Park Hotel.

Minister Cendana said the Philippines is the only country in the ASEAN region, if not in the world, which does not have a law penalizing the use of obscene and profane language on the air. In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission provides penalties, either a fine or imprisonment of 2 years, or both, for violation of the use of obscene and profane language [as heard]. That's what they call freedom of speech, according to the minister. But in the Philippines, Minister Cendana pointed out, there is no such law that penalizes somebody for indecent language he uses in radio.

He also stressed that foreign media enjoy more press freedom in the Philippines than in other countries.

The information chief also cited the cases of Japan, Indonesia, and Singapore, where radio laws specifically prohibit the use of indecent language on the airwaves.
MILITARY PANEL TO LOOK INTO MISSING NEWSMEN

HK070628 Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 7 Sep 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] A special group of high ranking military officers assigned to investigate the killings and disappearances of newsmen started data gathering yesterday of the disappearance of two newsmen in Metro Manila.

The AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] special investigation group, which was ordered created by President Marcos, is now collating the data gathered by various law enforcement agencies which investigated the disappearance of BULLETIN TODAY correspondents Henry Romero and Tim Olivares.

Romero was snatched by heavily armed men at the BULLETIN TODAY offices in Intramuros sometime in 1976 while Olivares disappeared after attending a party last 4 February.

Brig Gen Eustaquio Purugganan, chairman of the AFP special investigation group and AFP inspector general, said the group will seek the help of newsmen known to be close to the two missing BULLETIN correspondents as well as members of their families.

Purugganan also said public hearings may be conducted by the group in order to be able to get the statements of those believed to have knowledge of the reasons behind the disappearance of the two newsmen.

Purugganan yesterday asked National Press Club [NPC] President Antonio Nieva to send NPC representatives to the hearings in order to help the group gathering data.

On Monday, the group will fly to Mindanao to investigate the killings of several newsmen in western, southern and central Mindanao. The group will stay 3 to 5 days in each of the regions.

The group will hold public hearings in the three regions. Witnesses will be provided with security. They are being threatened with bodily harm to prevent them from giving statements to investigators, Purugganan said.

In his letter to Nieva, Purugganan asked that the hearings be covered by Metro Manila and local correspondents.

CSO: 4200/1512
BRIEFS

WARNING AGAINST U.S. BILL—Labor Minister Blas Ople has urged the support of workers' organizations and labor ministries in ASEAN against a congressional drive in the United States to restrict textile imports under the guise of a trade enforcement act. Meeting with senior labor administration officials from Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines, Minister Ople warned that the Jenkins Bill, if enacted, will cause the loss of thousands of jobs in ASEAN and aggravate balance of payments problems. Minister Ople said that although the brunt of the ASEAN campaign against the Jenkins Bill falls on trade ministries, the trade unions whose own jobs are directly threatened should put their clout behind their governments in a concerted effort to deter the enactment of the Jenkins Bill. [Text] [Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 6 Sep 85 HK]

POL POT RESIGNATION WELCOMED—Acting Foreign Minister Pacilco Castro today welcomed the replacement of Pol Pot by Son Sen as the military chief of the Khmer Rouge. He told newsmen (at the opening of the) ASEAN Standing Committee meeting in Manila that this will definitely help in the search for a political settlement to the Kampuchean conflict. Pol Pot, who headed the Khmer Rouge regime, has been blamed for the genocide of about 2 million Cambodians during a coup. The Khmer Rouge is one of the three groups set up to oppose the [words indistinct] regime of Heng Samrin in Phnom Penh. The two others are the Kampuchean National Liberation Front of Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk's group. All three groups [word indistinct] the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea or CGDK. [Text] [Quezon City Maharlike Broadcasting System in English 1100 GMT 6 Sep 85 HK]

NPA ATTACKS IN ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR—Manila, 8 September (AFP)—Communist guerrillas have killed 12 people in separate incidents in the southern island of Mindanao, the newspaper BULLETIN reported here today. An official of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, a soldier and 10 civilians were gunned down by communist New People's Army (NPA) rebels in separate raids in Zamboanga Del Sur Province over the weekend, the newspaper said. Paramilitary forces killed a suspected NPA "hitman" as he was about to execute a village leader in the Southern town of Domingag, it added. Military spokesmen here were not available for comment on the report which quoting military officials in Pagadian City near to where the reported killings occurred. The government has been fighting the NPA—guerrilla arm of the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines—for the past 16 years. From a rag-tag band of a few hundred guerrillas in 1969, the NPA has reportedly grown into a 12,000-strong force operating in 62 of the country's 73 provinces. [Text] [Hong Kong AFP in English 0450 GMT 8 Sep 85 HK]
A resolution of impeachment has been filed against Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos in the National Assembly citing a variety of charges against him. Actually the impeachment and the charges mentioned in the resolution are unimportant because there is absolutely no chance of its passage. Approval of the resolution requires a two-thirds majority but Marcos' ruling party itself has two-thirds majority.

However, there is a point in what assemblyman Homobono Adaza says. It does place Marcos on the defensive and, if he does not face the complaint and does not convincingly refute the charges, blocking of the passage of the resolution will do further harm. Even before the assassination of Sen Benigno Aquino, Marcos' popularity had been slipping but after the assassination his popularity plummeted.

There are many outside the Philippines who closely watch the events in that country and concluded it is extremely unwise for Marcos to cling on to power when there is so much animosity against him and when he seems to have become completely isolated from the people. When the news first broke about the possibility of an impeachment resolution being tabled, Marcos said he may have to dismiss the assembly and seek another mandate from the people.

The trouble in the Philippines is that there is no opposition which is well-organized and well-coordinated. If one assumes, and there is good reason for such an assumption, that Marcos is an extremely unpopular President an unanswerable question arises:

Who is to replace him? Marcos has been capitalizing on the disarray of the opposition but at the same time been losing grip over the country which, with the rising tide of communist insurrection, seems most necessary.

From all reports coming from the Philippines, the communist rebel group called New People's Army (NPA) is steadily gaining strength. But Marcos dismisses it as a "rag-tag group of about 10,000 men" but whether he is purposely dismissing them as unimportant or is just not in touch with reality is unknown.
However Armed Forces Commander Lt Gen Fidel Ramos calls NPA "a tip of the iceberg". He also says that the NPA was infiltrating the labour movement, the media, student groups and the business communities as well as the legal political parties.

Recent reports say that, according to the military, the PNA is changing tactics, mounting bigger and more daring operations and gearing up for urban terrorism. Terrorism in Manila seems to be NPA's current objective and it is supposed to have set up a special assassination squad called "Armed City Partisans". This group, it has been claimed, killed Manila Police Commander Brig Gen Tomas Karingal in May last year.

Marcos must take all this into consideration in the moves he is likely to take, now that the impeachment resolution is before the assembly. Blocking the resolution is an easy matter, but he must ask himself the question as to whether he has the kind of popular support which will prevent the NPA growing from strength to strength.
SECURITY COUNCIL HEAD CRITICIZES SOVIET POLICY

BK071518 Bangkok Domestic Service in Thai 1300 GMT 6 Sept 85

[Text] National Security Council Secretary General Squadron Leader Prasong Sunsiri said that the present situation in Indochina is still a major cause of unrest in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the Soviet Union is continuing to build up its military strength—deploying MIG-23 fighters and long range bombers at Cam Run Bay and incessantly sending military materials to Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The Soviet Union has obviously and gradually behaved in such a way that threatens regional stability, and shows its real intention of maintaining its influence in Indochina. The National Security Council secretary general said this this morning at a mass media seminar hosted by the Foreign Ministry at the Regent Cha-am Hotel in Phet Buri.

The National Security Council secretary general said that a high-ranking Soviet official's recent visit to Thailand enabled us to learn how the Soviet Union regards Southeast Asia and that it still does not choose to normalize relations with China. The Soviet Union will not change its policy towards Southeast Asia and will continue to support Vietnam and Heng Samrin. It still does not accept the problem in Cambodia, but says that the problem is around Cambodia. The Soviet officials who visited Thailand recently affirmed the Soviet decision to fully support the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

Squadron Leader Prasong Sunsiri also said that the prospect of a political solution to the Cambodian problem, caused by Vietnamese aggression against and occupation of Cambodia since 1979, was still out of reach. Vietnam is still stubborn and intends to set up an Indochinese Federation. At the same time the Soviet Union, who benefits from the conflict, is not eager to find a solution. ASEAN'S efforts to find a solution to the Cambodian issue through political means in line with UN resolutions as well as joint calls for freedom of the Cambodians are still completely opposed by Vietnam and the Soviet Union. During the past 6 years and this year, which is the 7th year, Vietnam's diplomatic and international political campaigns on the Cambodian problem have proven to be failures. The CGDK receives more and more support from the UN General Assembly and ASEAN'S draft resolutions on this issue have also received overwhelming support.

The National Security Council secretary general continued that the Soviet Union still supports Vietnam's stationing of troops in Cambodia because it
gains a long-term strategic advantage in the region. Since 1979, Soviet military assistance to Vietnam has been about $1 billion annually.

Squadron Leader Prasong Sunsiri stressed that when Vietnam and the Soviet Union still adhere to their own way without regard for the majority of the international community, we should stand by the principles of the UN resolutions and not be weak in either willpower or military strength because those who are weak will face a strong offensive while those who are strong will have stability. Both Vietnam and the Soviet Union always seek advantage at the cost of their opponent's weakness—whether struggling on a battlefield or at a negotiating table. If they see that we are firm, stable, and strong, they will be more careful and reasonable. If, however, they think that they can smash us, they will not hesitate. But time is still on our side. No matter how many more years to go, we will not suffer more than now.

The National Security Council Secretary General said that Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thac made a joke again a few days ago. While in Indonesia, he said that Vietnam will withdraw its troops from Cambodia by 1990 or 5 years from now. This is the 2555th joke made by Nguyen Co Thac.

In conclusion, Squadron Leader Prasong Sunsiri stressed that the regional instability is caused mostly by the gang of four in Southeast Asia—the Heng Samrin regime in Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.

CSO: 4207/291
U.S. EMBASSY SAID TO HAVE NOTICED COUP PLANS

BK 111216 Bankok NAEO NA in Thai 11 Sept 85 pp 1, 16

[Text] The 9 September political violence has aroused curiosity among the people both in the country and abroad because the U.S. Government could detect signs of it before the Thai Government. The U.S. Embassy in Bangkok earlier confirmed that a group of individuals was making preparations and planning to seize the power from the government. What the United States worried about really happened on the morning of 9 September.

A source reported that the suspicious behavior of the unrest plotters was noticed several months ago. A number of retired, high-ranking military officers and politicians criticized and complained about the failure of the government in administering the country, particularly in dealing with economic problems, resulting in unemployment among the people and college graduates as well as poverty among farmers who form the majority of the country's population. The resentment was later spread among the victims of the collapse of the extralegal financial system and executives of now-defunct financial institutes who are taking refuge in foreign countries. During a secret meeting organized by two former senior military officers, a huge number of politicians, unsuccessful businessmen, and clients of the collapsed oil share money game business who attended the meeting agreed that they could decrease their losses through a coup d'état.

The source disclosed that the plotters approached Colonel Manun Rupkhachon, former leader of the Young Turk group who participated in the abortive coup attempt 1-3 April 1981 and persuaded him to join the political unrest. Col Manun was misled into believing that the coup attempt would be successful.

As the D-day drew near, a number of military officers and government officials who respect Col Manun promised him that they would support the coup attempt. A meeting was held until midnight, and before dawn the coup soldiers had captured all strategic places.

Col Manun realized that he was trapped soon after his arrival at Sanam Suapa Supreme Command because, besides the Air Force Marne unit under the command of his brother, Wing Commander Manat Rupkhachon and some groups of cavalrmen, other military units failed to show up as they had promised.
The change of situation discouraged the coup plotters. They began to sneak out of the Supreme Command Headquarters compound for fear of punishment from the government. Meanwhile, the Internal Peacekeeping Command appointed Lieutenant General Phichit Kunlawanit to mediate with the coup plotters. Col Manun personally respects Lt Gen Phichit. Being aware of the coup side's position, Lt Gen Phichit decided to send Colonel Phiraphong Sappaphakhphisut, a friend of Col Manun, to negotiate with the coup group.

The source said that Col Manun admitted his guilt in a gentlemanly manner. The government side's peace envoy promised to assure Col Manun's safety until he left the country. Col Manun then went to Don Muang Airport to fly to Singapore before proceeding to the United States, where he will take refuge for a long time.

General Athit Kamlang-ek later invited General Soem Na Nakhon, General Kriangsak Chamanan, and General Yot Thephatsadin to a meeting at the Supreme Command Headquarters on the morning of 10 September to question them about the unrest. The Supreme Command Headquarters has been designated as the place where the investigation of the people involved in the abortive coup will be carried out. Gen Athit praised his subordinates for cooperating in bringing the situation under control quickly.

The two former senior military officers, a number of clients of the collapsed money game business and civilian officials are reported to be summoned for interrogation.

The internal peacekeeping director was scheduled to lead Gen Soem, Gen Kriangsak and Gen Yot to an audience with his majesty the king at Taksinratchaniwet Palace in Narathiwat on 10 September, but the trip was later postponed to 11 September.

CSO: 4207/291
OFFICIAL DENIES INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITH MALAYSIA

Bangkok THE NATION in English 19 Aug 85 p 5

[Text]

A SENIOR military official has denied that Thailand has entered into an agreement with Malaysia for an exchange of experiences in military efforts to combat communist guerrillas in the border jungles of the two countries.

The official, who refused to be identified, said a military team which recently visited Kuala Lumpur discussed no such agreement with its Malaysian counterparts.

The delegation, led by Commander of the Armed Forces Operations of the Supreme Command Lt Gen Prasith Sithikul, visited Kuala Lumpur on August 6-9.

Lt Gen Wan Ismail Mohamed Salleh of the Malaysian Army Corps was quoted as saying on August 6 that the Thai delegation had agreed to a programme under which Malaysia would provide opportunity for members of the Thai armed forces to learn about the Malaysian armed forces' methods in combatting communist insurgents.

He said Malaysia would send its military personnel to Thailand to study the methods employed by the Thais.

The programme is part of the two countries' cooperation in fighting communist guerrillas, he said.

But the Thai military official said no such agreement was reached during the delegation's visit.

He said Thailand and Malaysia currently have bilateral military cooperation through which they hold annual military exercises.
OFFICER ON RTAF CAPABILITIES, PROCUREMENT, POLITICS

Bangkok WIWAT in Thai 30 Jul-5 Aug 85 pp 12-17

[Interview with Air Vice Marshal Kaset Rotchanananin, the assistant air force chief of staff for operations and a senator; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Since you became the assistant air force chief of staff for operations last year, in what activities have you been engaged and what plans have you formulated to develop the air force?

[Answer] Before this, I served as the director of logistics. This stream is responsible for all administrative operations, including communications, armament, the Directorate of Aeronautical Engineering, the Directorate of Civil Engineering and the Directorate of Transportation. The Directorate of Logistics is a support directorate that considers matters and submits recommendations to senior officers. In 1984 I was made the assistant air force chief of staff for operations. I am responsible for things in the same stream as before. Matters are passed to me from the Directorate of Logistics. I screen matters for the air force chief of staff, who then forwards things to the RTAF CINC.

Ever since I served as the director of logistics, I have tried to increase our logistics capabilities so that we can support our combat units. We have tried to develop things by using a computer system. We began using this system last year. Now, our main computer, called Data Phone, is located at the Directorate of Aeronautical Engineering. The Data Phone is used to contact the United States. In procuring items from the United States, we can contact the United States at any time of the day. For example, if we need parts for an aircraft, we use this computer to tell the people in the United States what we need. They know immediately. It takes only an instant.

In the future, we will try to use computers in procuring all the materials and equipment obtained from abroad. Things will be centralized. One problem is that the United States uses a type called cataloguing. What makes things difficult is that the cataloguing system used by the United States is different from that used in other countries. They may use serial numbers not used in other countries or in Thailand. Goods produced
here do not have a serial number. There is no catalogue. But in short, I can say that our air force's logistic system is very modern.

I am also trying to improve the capabilities of our operations units. I am referring to personnel. The personnel problem is a major problem. Even though Thailand and the Thai air force are poor, if we have qualified people, we can make efficient use of our limited funds. We are trying to improve the capabilities of the air force officers concerned with this. They must be honest people. I am very determined about this. This work is very complex.

[Question] How many men does the air force have now, and in your opinion, how efficient are air force personnel?

[Answer] About 40,000 to 50,000. I think that we now have greater capabilities. Our air force uses very modern technology. Our technological base is better than that of the other branches of service. We have to have people with a strong foundation in this field. In the army, the soldiers who shoot rifles do not have to use much technology. But in the air force, our people have to use modern technology. We do not feel inferior to anyone in Asia or ASEAN. We have various capabilities, such as in repairing engines. We have developed things even though we have only limited funds. The directorates of communications and armament have very great capabilities. For example, our Science and Weapons Systems Development Center has the capability to build rockets. We are trying to build a foundation for our people. When air force cadets graduate from school, we send them to study for their master's and Ph.D. degrees. At present, there are many people with a master's and Ph.D. at the RTAF Academy. We have to spend money to keep up with the technology. The air force has more people with master's and Ph.D. degrees than the other branches of service.

[Question] How capable is the air force of carrying on air operations? In modern warfare, has the air force become more important?

[Answer] In a modern war, it will be the air force that will determine whether we win or lose. If our air force is weak, we will have little chance of winning. We have to destroy the enemy before they destroy us. There is no longer any comparison between the ground forces and the air forces. Because in terms of fire power and striking power, the air force can do anything. If our air force is weak and the enemy is stronger, Vietnam, for example, could destroy our country. Our naval and ground forces could not oppose their air force. The destructive power of the air force is much greater. The air force is the decisive factor. The great powers are hurriedly mobilizing ballistic missiles. All it would take would be one attack, right?
[Question] Thus, in a war, if our air force was knocked out, the navy and army would not be able to withstand the enemy, is that right?

[Answer] That's correct. Look at how much flexibility the air force has. Aircraft can fly anywhere or strike anywhere. A couple of aircraft can wipe out a battalion of soldiers. The destructive power of aircraft is greater. Thus, I feel that in modern warfare, it is our air force that will determine whether we win or lose. We have to strengthen the air force and keep it stronger than that of the enemy.

This brings us to the topic of our having to purchase F16 aircraft. Comparing our air force with that of Vietnam, they are stronger than us by a margin of 4 to 1. Our F5 aircraft are a match for their Mig 19 and Mig 21 aircraft. But they have a 4 to 1 numerical advantage. We are purchasing only a few F16 aircraft. But the F16 is superior to the Mig 23. It is comparable to the Mig 25. Today, there are Mig 23 aircraft in Vietnam. But these belong to the Soviet naval forces. They are flown by Soviet pilots. In the future, these will be turned over to Vietnam. But today, they have a 4 to 1 advantage in fighter aircraft. We have two squadrons of F5 aircraft, which is only 50 aircraft. They have about 200 Mig 21 and Mig 19 aircraft. The weapons system of the F5 is superior. It is sure and accurate. Their Mig 21 aircraft are modern and more efficient. However, the weapons system on our aircraft is better.

Besides this, the morale of our forces is better. Thailand has never been defeated. Our forces will fight to the end. Even though the Vietnamese have had more combat experience than us, their experience is in ground fighting. Vietnam has not made much use of its air power. They have engaged mostly in guerrilla operations on the ground. The United States lost the Vietnam War because of its political policy. I served in Vietnam for 1 year and had a chance to learn quite a lot about Vietnam. I feel that even though our forces are small, if our weapons system and morale are superior, we can win.

[Question] If we get F16 aircraft, Vietnam will probably get Mig 23 and Mig 25 aircraft. How can we compete with them since they are given their aircraft while we have to purchase ours?

[Answer] As you know, we have to purchase the aircraft with our own money while Vietnam is given aid. Thus, we can't engage in a "purchasing race." A squadron of 12 aircraft costs 9 billion baht. We can't purchase 100 aircraft. We cannot afford that. But we have hope in our ally, the United States. The United States will not sit by idly if Mig 25 aircraft are deployed in Vietnam. They would have to take action to maintain the balance of power. This is a political matter. They would have to strengthen their bases in this region, in the Philippines, Japan and Korea. They will not let the other side gain naval, ground or air superiority.
[Question] The United States probably feels that the forces are now roughly equal in strength. Or are they selling us the F16 aircraft because they think that there is an imbalance?

[Answer] In Indochina, there is a balance between Red China and the Soviet Union. Fortunately, we have not yet had to fight a real war.

[Question] We are purchasing these aircraft for defensive purposes only, isn't that right?

[Answer] That is one thing. Another thing is that we wanted to test U.S. policy to see how sincere they are toward us. The United States has never sold the F16 to any other country in Asia. Singapore once purchased F16 G79 aircraft, but that is a different aircraft. It has a small engine. The United States sells this to its allies. It has very little power. The F16 A or B is very different from the F16 G79. We do not want that type. Now that they have sold this type to Thailand, Singapore wants this type, too.

[Question] Is the air force sure that it will not have any financial problems?

[Answer] The yearly budget of the air force is approximately 9 billion baht. This is divided into two parts. Approximately 2 billion baht a year is allotted for development. The other 7 billion is allotted for expenses. We plan to use the development funds to purchase the F16 aircraft. We have signed a contract to pay for the aircraft within 5 years. The balance is maintenance funds. We are trying to save money. If something is not absolutely necessary, we don't purchase it. By doing this, we can obtain about 2 billion baht more which, when added to the development funds, makes a total of 4 billion baht a year. We can purchase weapons or develop improvement projects. For example, suppose that this year we purchase the F16 aircraft, improve our air-defense system and develop the weapons system of the F5 aircraft. These are our three main projects. The first is the F16 aircraft, the second is the air-defense system and the third is increasing the capabilities of the F5 aircraft.

[Question] Will all of these projects be carried on within the same time period?

[Answer] The first two are 5-year projects beginning in 1985. The F5 project is a 3-year project that will run from 1985 to 1987. The purpose is to increase capabilities. For example, with the weapons system, we will install computers, which is referred to as HUDWAC. We will also improve the defense system. The purpose is to reduce losses and improve accuracy in hitting the targets.
In short, this will not affect the development activities of the air force since we develop things in stages. This is a system of priorities.

[Question] Couldn't we improve the F5 aircraft so that we wouldn't have to purchase the F16 aircraft?

[Answer] The F5 project is a 3-year project; the F16 project is a 5-year project. Sometimes I, or the air force, can't tell you why we have to do something. That concerns the strength of our forces. If I told you, everyone, including the enemy, would know. The enemy would know everything.

[Question] Aren't there people in the air force who are opposed to purchasing the F16?

[Answer] No. No one is opposed to this.

[Question] What about all the documents and leaflets that have come out?

[Answer] I think that that is a matter of profits. That is, I think that these come from merchants, such as companies that sell aircraft. There are problems in selling the F20 aircraft. Every company wants to sell its products. Such things are not definite. We have purchased the aircraft from a U.S. company. We have purchased them on a government-to-government basis.

[Question] In short, these critical leaflets were distributed by people outside the air force whose interests have been adversely affected, is that right?

[Answer] You know that government secrets are sometimes leaked. Sometimes, everyone knows what was discussed at a secret cabinet meeting. Documents are circulated among various sectors and are sent from the air force to the Budget Bureau and the Ministry of Finance. They are seen by various ministers. Thus, there are many places where they could be leaked, right? Sometimes, they are not leaked by the air force but at higher levels.

[Question] The leaflets charge that a commission was paid and that Mr. William Luis, who is an agent for the producer, contacted the air force.

[Answer] That was one company. It sells weapons. It's normal for such companies to keep in contact with the military, isn't it? They may coordinate matters with the company that produces the F16. But as you know, we have purchased the aircraft on a government-to-government basis. No commission was paid. That is specified clearly in the agreement. He was probably part of the producing company. The leaflet's charge that he is close to the RTAF CINC is ridiculous. Merchants all try to get close. They try to see me, too. We just talk. But we have a
system for making purchases. We did not contact them when we purchased the F16. We contacted the U.S. Air Force at the Pentagon. The RTAF CINC knows nothing about that. Some people just spread rumors to attack him. But he is a very honest man. It's only natural that merchants want to talk with Air Chief Marshal Praphan. Everyone wants to see him. I, too, would like to talk with him. But I don't have too many opportunities. Sometimes, we have to talk to merchants just to be polite. But the charges about profits and corruption are not true. Buying and selling is not a simple matter. You cannot just meet and agree to make a purchase. There are laws and regulations. The matter must be submitted to the cabinet. Things must be done in stages. There are clear stipulations. The RTAF CINC can make a decision when the amount involved doesn't exceed 26 million baht. But when it involves hundreds of millions and billions of baht, the matter must be submitted to the cabinet.

[Question] Do you think the amount of money will keep increasing and that it will be necessary to obtain funds from the government?

[Answer] I can assure you that we will not request special funds from the government's central fund. We will pay for everything from the air force budget. We have agreed on how much money will be spent each year.

[Question] Does that include the cost of maintaining and operating the F16 aircraft, the training costs and other such costs?

[Answer] Those are common matters. We have already figured out what we can do. We will be able to pay for everything from our budget.

[Question] In short, the air force thinks that those leaflets came from outside the air force.

[Answer] Yes. I am sure about that. Before we signed the contract, this matter concerned profits. But after we signed the contract, it became a political matter. The F16 is a factor in attacking the government. This is my personal view as a senator. That is, the opposition outside the government needs things that it can use to attack the government. The F16 was a tremendous factor for them since they could tie this to the country's economic problems. This is a factor that they could use to make an attack after the fact. But that's politics.

[Question] But initially, it should have been the weapons company.

[Answer] Before a contract is signed, they have to fight each other, right? But afterwards, it becomes a political matter.

[Question] Are you sure that purchasing the F16 now will not affect the nation's economy?
[Answer] This won't affect the economy since the money will come from the budget of the air force. The government and the people concerned are trying to solve the country's economic problems. I think that the economy will improve.

[Question] Did Vietnam engage in any unusual activities when we decided to purchase the F16?

[Answer] We are not sure. They probably did, but we are not sure. What we know is based on radar observations. Radar has shown several hundred aircraft in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. They might be trying to upgrade the airfields in Laos and Cambodia so that Migs can land there. We have obtained this information from satellites and other things.

[Question] Major construction projects are underway in Laos.

[Answer] In both Laos and Cambodia. Fighter aircraft can land at Siem Reap. We don't know whether they are Mig 21 or Mig 23 aircraft. In Laos, modern airfields are being built in Xieng Khouang and Vientiane. We know that they have installed radar, missiles and other things.

[Question] As far as Vietnam's air force is concerned, what is the most worrisome thing today?

[Answer] We are concerned about their Mig 23 aircraft. We are concerned about their aircraft. We are not worried about their ground weapons. Aircraft have to be improved with aircraft, not ground weapons.

[Question] What do you think will happen in Cambodia?

[Answer] The fighting will continue. The coalition government does not have strong unity. It does not have strong solidarity.

[Question] Many people feel that our forces are already strong enough to defend the country. They feel that we are not directly involved in the Cambodian war and that we can use diplomatic and political means to solve the problem.

[Answer] That's not right. The border is very long. If they attacked, it would be difficult for us to expel them. We are at a disadvantage in terms of terrain. The terrain is composed of mountains and jungle. Before we could move up troops.... To move ground troops into Surin and Sisaket, the air force has to help. The air force is vital to the border. I can't talk about that. We don't want to expand the war zone, do we?

[Question] We can't purchase the F15, can we?
That exceeds our needs. It's three times as expensive. It is a top-notch fighter aircraft. They don't sell those to anyone. They haven't sold any even to rich countries. That is an excellent aircraft. It has two engines. I flew in one once. Even if they gave us these free, we couldn't use them since they cost so much to operate.

Air Chief Marshal Praphan will have retired before we take delivery of the F16s.

We will get them in 1988. Whoever becomes the RTAF CINC will have to take over.

It is predicted that you will be the RTAF CINC at that time.

(Laughs) That is a matter of fate. You may think that I will become the RTAF CINC. But I might die first (laughs). Such things are not definite. Look at the supreme commander. He was just a major general when the 1 April 1981 Rebellion took place. Within a year, he was a full general. Fate and talent. It's difficult to talk about this. I have never thought about holding a specific position. But it's only natural for people to feel happy when they are promoted. There are many people who have the right to serve in that position. The future is uncertain. We have to help each other. We have to do what is right. We have to work for the air force and do the best job we can.

There have been reports that the air force will build a television station. What is happening at present?

That's true. We thought about building a television station even before the army. The air force has always had an advanced electronics system. But there were political problems. We have been ready ever since the time of Field Marshal Sarit. With our communications system, we can contact all the groups. We have had radar and microwave stations for a long time. We can transfer things. It would require only a small investment since the air force already has things. But it's a policy matter. Sometimes, there is the fear that this will become a trade matter. Initially, we wanted the services to have a chance, to have an hour, to inform the people about what the navy, army and air force are doing. But this is also a real necessity since this involves air defense. We will be able to contact people throughout the country.

Who is considering the matter now?

It is now being considered by the Radio and Television Administrative Committee.
[Question] Do you think that this will be approved?

[Answer] They say it will be. But we will wait and see. If this is approved, we will seek funds to build the station.

[Question] You may view things from the standpoint of a senator. In your view, to what extent is the air force interfering in politics?

[Answer] We are trying to avoid getting involved in politics. But politics is a matter with which senators and all people must be concerned. We don't have to be politicians or MPs. Politics concerns the administration of the country. Thus, the people have to know about the laws that affect them. Everyone is involved with politics. The only thing is in what form. Soldiers can be thought of as a political party, a secure political party, since soldiers are disciplined. They form a large party in a democratic system and can do things easily. They are closely involved. But the question is, in what way are they involved? Are they concerned with interests or as politicians? Everyone must involve themselves in politics. The question is, in what way? What can the soldiers do to ensure that the administrative system is a perfect democracy? Without the military to back up the politicians, there would be great turmoil and the economy would collapse.

[Question] How do you feel about the development of our country's democratic system?

[Answer] I don't think that the present political, or party, system is a perfect democracy. The education of the people is a major matter. What can be done to get the people to elect representatives whom they feel are good people. But look at what elections are like today. The people don't know anything about administration. Many have not completed Grade 4 and are illiterate. How can they know anything about politics? And so they vote for the people who give them money and who have great influence. They like the people with influence, or corrupt people, to put it bluntly. Education is very important. I think that this is important for democracy. As the people become more educated....

[Question] At present there is no complete....

[Answer] We must succeed in educating people. We must do something to ensure that everyone completes Grade 6. That would be sufficient. Education through Grade 6 should be compulsory. There are many people who are illiterate. Look at things in the rural areas. There are not enough schools or teachers. There are many problems. But if we can improve our education system, democracy will improve.

Second is the matter of political parties. The political party law must make it more difficult to establish a political party. Only the large political parties are prepared to play politics. Things will never improve if anyone and everyone is allowed to form a political
party. Because of this state of affairs, there is no security in the political parties. Other countries have only a few parties, that is, a government party, an opposition party and a neutral party. But we have dozens of parties. This is a terrible state of affairs. The government can't survive if there are disputes. The government is composed of four or five parties. What can the prime minister do? If he does something, one of the parties will complain. Whoever wants to criticize something does so. Why? We have to do something. We have to wait and see what the government will do to solve the economic problems.

Third, what can the Thai people do to improve democracy? What can the military party do to build a foundation for politics? The military must step aside gradually. When the time is ripe, the military must step aside completely. When soldiers get involved, they become engrossed. I am speaking about people in the past, in the time of field marshals Sarit and Thanom. They became totally engrossed in this. It was like a family affair, or dictatorship. But today's soldiers are opposed to that. If we have to play a role in politics, we must state what the foundation of democracy is and what the stages are. We have to tell people what will be done this year and the next and when the military will get out of politics. The military must step aside after the people or political parties are secure enough. We must allow them to handle things. This is how today's soldiers feel. What can we do to build a perfect foundation? We must step aside. But it's another matter if things become "soft" again. But that will not happen if we do things properly. This is what all soldiers said just after they got involved. But later on, they became dictators. Do you understand? One group launched a coup d'etat against another in order to maintain a dictatorship. But today's soldiers no longer think like that. We understand things.

[Question] Will today's soldiers have a chance to get involved?

[Answer] They will have to wait. Take Lt Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut, for example. He has democratic ideas. He is a democratic soldier. That is, he has progressive ideas. He listens and studies things. When we have a chance to work together, we must try to perfect democracy. I want us to understand the new generation of soldiers. Don't focus on the dictatorial soldiers. Look at the young soldiers to see what ideas they have. We are in contact with the civilian sector, the press and many other things. Don't think that the military can just use power or guns. That's certainly not true for the air force (laughs). We have technology. There are many people with doctor's, master's and bachelor's degrees. Many consider soldiers to be barbarians. But that is not true today. Soldiers are no longer like that. Even graduates of the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy don't think like that. They are concerned only with developing the country. I can assure you that the soldiers in my generation, including those in the army and navy, all think like this. But timing is important. As citizens, we can say whatever we want. But as soldiers, we can't since there are disciplinary rules by which we must abide.
[Question] From what you say, I get the feeling that there will not be any more coup d'etats.

[Answer] You have to look at the conditions and at the situation to see if the country will survive. If the country is on the verge of collapse, there is no other party that can help. Only the military can help since it is the largest and strongest party.

[Question] What is the situation like at present?

[Answer] I think that things are all right. Even though outsiders think that the economy is in trouble, the government really is trying to solve the problems. It will take time because of the government apparatus, political party matters, cooperation and interests. In trying to solve the problems, mistakes are made occasionally. There are still party matters, and there is the matter of cooperation. The government is concerned. It's difficult to solve the problems immediately.

[Question] But for the moment, things are all right, is that correct?

[Answer] I think so. Things are improving. But we must keep an eye on things.

The Heir to the Position of RTAF CINC

Air Vice Marshal Kaset Rotchananin comes from Saraburi Province, where he completed lower secondary school. He attended upper secondary school at Triemudom School in Bangkok, graduating in 1958. He then entered the RTAF Academy as a member of Class 1. He also attended the Flight Training School in Korat. Since 1968, he has attended the Squadron Officers School, Class 18; the USAF Squadron Officers School, Air University; the USAF Academic Instruction School, Air University; the Air Command and Staff College, Class 15; and the Air War College, Class 13. In 1984, he graduated from the National Defense College, Class 26.

He served with squadrons for a long time. In particular, during the period 1971 to 1980, he served as a squadron and group leader. In 1980, he was made deputy director of logistics. In 1982, he became the director of logistics. In July 1984, he became the assistant air force chief of staff for operations.

RTAF Academy Class 1 is a class worth watching. Besides Air Vice Marshal Kaset, other members of this class are Air Vice Marshal Woranarot Aphichari, the assistant air force chief of staff for operations, and Air Marshal Kan Phimanthip, the director of operations. Furthermore, RTAF Academy Class 1 and CRMA Class 5 are fellow classes. Thus, it comes as no surprise that Air Vice Marshal Kaset is very close to members of CRMA Class 5 who now command forces in the army.
Insiders know that Air Vice Marshal Kaset has a good chance of becoming the next RTAF CINC in 1987 or 1988. During this year's military reshuffle, at the very least, he will be made the deputy air force chief of staff. At the same time, there are reports that he has a good chance of being promoted to air force chief of staff. We will have to wait and see.

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CSO: 4207/276
"Army Meets the People" program: Interview given by Supreme Commander and Army Commander in Chief General Athit Kamlang-ek to Miss Lalana Watsanasong--recorded

[Excerpts]  [Lalana]  Good morning, your Excellency.

[Athit]  Good morning.

[Lalana]  May I start the first question right away? From our observation, the situation in our country has been relatively calm over the past few months, the situation at the Thai-Cambodian border. As you are directly in charge of the security affairs of the country, I would like to ask you about the border situation, especially that along the Cambodian border, and to what extent our armed forces are prepared to cope with it?

[Athit]  Thank you. Well, the situation at the Cambodian border continued to have an impact on the situation at our border area in Prachinburi Province which is under the jurisdiction of the 1st Army Region. Shots were fired into Thailand's border area causing few casualties and slight damage. Anyway, the losses were not serious. Our soldiers followed my directives that is, warning the opposite side of the overshots. The area hit was at the salient tip south of Aranyaprathet District. We could expect some spilling of artillery rounds into the area. We had earlier warned our people to stay away from the border and to properly build shelters for safety. Other incidents included stepping on land mines. To sum up, the border situation has been relatively calm over the past month. Clashes during patrols and exchanges of fire are something usual in the battlefield. In other words, I consider the situation calm. The same is true with the situation at the border in Aranyaprathet District and the common border between Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. In the north, there was no significant incident. As for the situation inside our country, it is calm.

[Lalana]  Yes, it is good to know that the situation in our country is calm. Well, as we learned from the newspapers that Your Excellency and a delegation of high-ranking military officers last month toured several countries at their invitation. Starting from New Zealand, Australia, to Indonesia. In Indonesia,
we learned that you not only represented our armed forces at the meeting with the armed forces of our friendly neighbor but also attended to Buddhist functions. After Indonesia, you visited Burma. Will you please give the radio audience some accounts on your foreign tours. My question may be too long. Will you please tell us one by one country.

[Athit] Yes, first of all, I would like to remind you that in conducting our national policy we must coordinate our military affairs with the foreign affairs. Thailand is not a big power. We have to depend on other countries in our conduct of foreign affairs as we need their support for our policies adopted in line with our national interests. In this connection, such a tour is necessary. The purpose of the tour is to strengthen ties with the armed forces of those countries. Yet, while paying a visit at their invitation, we also have a chance to meet their leaders and make Thailand's policies and views known to those countries. As we are invited by their governments, we are entitled to present our views we think useful and try to reach an understanding and gain their concurrence with our views. As we are here in Thailand, we can have a clear view about the border situation. But those who are far away in other countries cannot grasp the thorough view of the situation at our border area. I took the opportunity to explain to them about the border situation and its impact on Thailand.

When we read reports from newspapers, we can notice that the views of several leaders differ. This includes the problem of Cambodia. Some leaders indicated that the best solution to settle the Cambodian problem is through negotiations. We have to explain to them that we also think the best way for settlement is through negotiation granted that the two parties concerned agree to talk to each other. [Passage omitted on his visit to New Zealand and Australia]

After visiting Australia, I returned to Thailand for a while before leaving for Indonesia. Again my visit to Indonesia was at the invitation of the Indonesian Army Chief. We paid visits and made observation tours to their units. We worked out for coordination in various aspects of our two armed forces. As you know, Indonesia is a member of the ASEAN bloc. Our foreign policy and military policy must go together. We should not differ in our statements given to the mass media concerning the Cambodian settlement issue. The purpose of my visit is to explain to the Indonesian military leaders about the situation in general. In fact the Indonesian military leaders and myself are good friends. I have known them for quite some time. They have a good understanding of the situation after my briefing, and they reported what I had explained to them to their government leaders. In my opinion, this contributes to our conduct of foreign affairs and our policy.

Incidentally, 1 day after I arrived there, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach also visited Indonesia. We did not see each other because we have different purposes for the visit. I went on military affairs, but he was there for foreign affairs. We stayed at different places. But once when I was leaving the unit I visited, Nguyen Co Thach's convoy was coming in the opposite direction. It was a surprise that we happened to come across each other like that.
The Indonesian Army and Thai Army have good relations. The Indonesian military leaders let us observe everything they have even though it is a top secret. They fully trust us. The Indonesian Army chief is a good friend of mine. We exchanged views on matters concerning our armed forces, our national security, and foreign relations. We are happy with our exchanges. Concerning my visit to Indonesia, I have two purposes. First is for the visit at the invitation of the Indonesian Army. Second is for a religious function. [Passage omitted on his account on Buddhism in Indonesia and his presenting a Buddha statue to Buddhist there]

One day after returning from Indonesia, I had to leave for Burma again. I accepted the invitation to visit Burma because I think it is necessary as our two countries share a common border and we have sporadic border incidents to solve. I think the visit would give us a chance for exchanges of views beneficial to both sides. I went to Burma at the invitation of the Burmese defense minister and chief of the general staff. I was accorded a very warm welcome on my arrival. This reflects the friendship they have not only for myself but also for our armed forces and our country. I learned from Burmese officials that the rare honor accorded to me during my visit was unprecedented. It reflects Burma's friendship to the entire Thai people after a period of absence in diplomatic relations between our two countries. What I must report to our listeners is that I was granted an audience by General Ne Win, chairman of the Burma Socialist Program Party, who is already 76 years old and who rarely receives guests. He took me by my hand and treated me intimately. We had conversation for 1 hour. This is unprecedented. During our conversation, he extended his regards to other Thai he knows, including former Prime Minister Phot Sarasin, Field Marshal Thanom, as well as other previous prime ministers and the present one. What made me so elated is the fact that the first thing he asked when he met me was the king's health. The Burmese chairman also expressed his best regards and concern for his majesty the king. I also met President U San Yu, the Burmese prime minister, and his foreign minister. We had a chance to meet all Burmese leading figures. Our meeting was marked by an atmosphere of cordiality and informality. I told them that border incidents are inevitable for those sharing a common border, but we can solve the problems as good neighbors through negotiations. Burma agreed with our stand. I told them that we have been neighbors for so long and this status will continue. I told them that threats to our countries do not come from any of us, but they come from others. Therefore it is our duty to establish peace and security to this region. This is important. Burma agreed with us. Well, that is how my trip to Burma was. In just a short period of 3 days, we were accorded with such a warm and kind hospitality. I learned from our embassy officials that our delegation had never been accorded with such a rare honor. I went there as a representative of the military but was accorded an audience with their political leaders as well. I think this is good because it will serve as a foundation for us to strengthen our friendly relations in the future. The Foreign Ministry will take further steps toward that goal. I went there on behalf of the armed forces to strengthen ties with the Burmese chief of general staff. They indicated to us that we should contact them directly on any future problems. They would cooperate with us in solving the problems.
I told Burma that in order to prevent misunderstanding between us, Burma too must not listen to others but should contact us directly and talk to us straightforwardly. That is all about my visit to Burma. [Passage omitted on matters concerning the telephone service and on report about Assistant Army Chief of Staff General Mana Rattanakoset's plan to run for Bangkok.]
HUAY YANG, Uttaradit — About 80 per cent of the inhabitants from three border villages, claimed by both Thailand and Laos, have settled down here to pursue a new life.

“We don’t think we’re going back to the disputed areas though our planting lands are located there. It’s too dangerous for us and we prefer being under Thai government control here to being under the Laotian troops control in our old home,” said Sawai Saengpetch, 42, a villager from Sawang village.

Sawai said he and his family migrated to Huay Yang village in November last year because he felt that the situation in Baan Sawang was making it difficult to earn a living.

“There are too many obstacles to doing business since the Laotian troops have poured into my village,” said Sawai.

According to Lt Col Krairiksh Khantongkham, commander of the task force responsible for the border areas close to the disputed villages, about 500 Laotian troopers are stationed in the three villages.

Krairiksh said that after the withdrawal of Thai soldiers in October last year, three regiments of Laotian troops occupied the disputed villages.

However, in February when the situation settled down, Laos pulled out two regiments from the area to Paklai village about 30 kilometres from the border, he said.

The commander said the Laotian soldiers have frequently fired guns across the border at Baan Borbia where the Thai troops have set up their outposts after the withdrawal.

He said 992 out of a total population of 1,072 in the three villages had moved deeper inside Thailand during the height of the conflict.

According to the commander, later during November and February, some of the villagers moved back to their homeland to take care of their lands under cultivation.

However, he said 762 villagers from 127 families or about 80 per cent of the total population have voluntarily settled down well inside Thai territory in Huay Yang village about eight kilometres from their old villages.

Krairiksh said the Thai government are carrying out a plan to issue identification cards and provide arable land of about 1,000 rais to the villagers.

He said the government will also build a reservoir for them to use in the cultivation. So far, the villagers have their own school, comprising four classes from Prathom 1 to 4.

A total of 155 students are being taught using the Thai language by 12 teachers, nine of them from the disputed villages.

Kamla Khamnaowong, one of the teachers told The Nation he graduated from a high school in Sayaburi Province of Laos but he prefers to teach the children with the Thai language because he feels that they should learn in Thai.

He said he knows the Thai language very well because he learned it from his parents.

He said he went back to Mai village for one day in April and came back to Thailand when he found that while living in his old village he had less freedom than in Thailand.

Kamla said he had been asked by Laotian troopers during his trip to Mai village to persuade the villagers who fled deeper inside...
Thailand to come back to the villages. "However I did not do as they told me," he said.

Life in Huay Yang village is almost on the same level as other villages nearby. The villagers, some of them owning television sets, live in houses made of wood and roofed with corrugated iron.

The main source of their food supply is the Thai government which provides them rice daily while the villagers grow their vegetables and have their own livestock.

According to Lt Col Krairikah, the Department of Highways has continued the construction of a strategic road, 60 kilometres long, from Baan Sali of Nan to Baan Borbia of Uttaradit.

He said the road was previously planned to run through the area of the disputed villages but, due to the conflict which has not been settled, the route of the road had to be changed to run through an area deeper inside Thailand to avoid passing through the disputed areas.

According to the army official, one third of the new stretch of the road has been completed.
LEADING academic Dr Anat Arbhabhirama cautioned yesterday that Thailand's natural gas and crude oil resources will begin to dwindle in 1990, and that without exploration and new discoveries the country will be in a difficult position in 10 years.

Anat, who is president of the Thailand Development Research Institute, said that the country must develop alternative energy sources, such as lignite, with clear government legislation.

He disclosed that TDRI is conducting research on the country's overall energy structure which also includes pricing. He pointed out that the current pricing structure is not suitable because it has been in use for 10 years.

Dr Anat said that during the past decade, there has been adjustment in engines and machinery and a change in consumption pattern. This has led to increasing consumption of diesel oil.

"Based on economic theories, it is necessary for the country to have a new petroleum pricing structure. However, the government has to consider political and social aspects and whether there will be serious repercussions," Dr Anat said.

He pointed out that the Sixth Plan envisages daily production for natural gas rising from 300 million cubic feet per day to 500-600 MMcf/d, and crude oil output rising from 20,000 barrels per day to 50,000-60,000 barrels.

If this can be achieved, the country's dependence on imported energy will drop 50 per cent to 35 per cent. "We can achieve the target. But what is worrisome is that after the Sixth Plan, our domestic production will decline gradually. If new resources are not discovered, we will reach a critical point in 10 years," Dr Anat said.

"What the government has to do is be prepared for future development of coal and lignite. Particularly, we have lignite deposits stretching from the North to the South, but we still do not have a specific legislation for optimum utilization of this energy," he said.

Dr Anat pointed out that lignite is an energy source with high potential and its significance will gradually increase. "It is not widely used and only the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand is the major
consumer for power generation. Private firms have to seek concession from the National Energy Administration."

Another potential energy source is firewood from fast-growing trees. So far, there is no study on investment in tree planting and the return on investment. That's why there are no investors in this sector, he said.

Dr Anat explained that the current situation is not favourable for exploration of new petroleum deposits due to falling prices. If this situation persists in the next 10 years, domestic resources will dwindle.

"What needs to be done is for the government to improve terms and conditions, making them attractive for private firms to invest in new exploration projects," he said.

Commenting on a plan by the government to relocate the second crude oil refining unit from Bangchak Petroleum in Bangkok to Larn Krabue where Thai Shell Exploration and Production Co Ltd is producing Phet Crude, Dr Anat said that opinion is divided on this issue.

"Those in the operation sector agree that relocation should be implemented, but some academics oppose it because they doubt the feasibility and viability of the project," he said.

Opponents have pointed out that sales of refined products by Bangchak will face competition from private firms. Dr Anat said a decision on this issue has to be carefully made with enough data to determine economic viability.

TDRI is considered a "think tank," for which initial support came from the Canadian International Development Agency. Funding for the actual research conducted by TDRI, however, comes from a variety of national, international government and private agencies.

The TDRI has established an institutional linkage with the Institute for Research on Public Policy, Canada's leading research organization.

The TDRI will have access to information from Canada's International Development Research Centre. Chairman of the TDRI is Dr Snoh Unakul, secretary general of the National Economic and Social Development Board.
ENERGY OFFICIAL NOTES SAVINGS FROM DOMESTIC PRODUCTION

Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 29 Jun 85 pp 3,2

[Text] Mr Thammachart Siriwattanakoon, deputy secretary general of the National Energy Bureau, announced that during the first 6 months of 1985, Thailand was able to produce 131,190 barrels of crude oil daily for domestic energy uses. This saved 100.83 million baht daily in foreign currency for energy purchases.

Mr Thammachart explained concerning various domestic energy production. For lignite, during the first 6 months of 1985, we were able to produce 100 percent more than during the same period in 1984. During the first 6 months of 1985, 1,918,130 tons of crude oil were produced, a total of 32,936 barrels daily, and 355 million cubic feet of natural gas and 61,899 barrels of crude oil were produced daily in Gulf of Thailand and Sirikit sites.

Concerning oil price conditions, Mr Thammachart stated that even during the beginning of this year, OPEC reduced the price of Arabic light crude oil by 3.45 percent. However, due to the exchange rate adjustment in Thailand, the price was actually reduced only by 1.5 percent, based on the average price for 7 major types of crude oil. The impact of the baht currency adjustment toward the end of 1984 resulted in Thailand's purchases of oil during the first part of 1985 costing 3.35 percent more than the same period in 1984. But at the same time, the volume of Thailand's oil imports was reduced 10.43 percent. As for the fact that the Singapore refinery oil price, which Thailand uses as the base price for fixing its oil prices, decreased from 1984's by approximately $1.54-2.98 per barrel (except benzene); in terms of the current exchange rate, it was still around 0.29-0.94 baht higher than the average price in 1984 prior to the baht rate exchange adjustment. Also, investment in crude oil purchases did not decrease at the same rate as that for refined oil.

Reporters asked about the situation and the plans for utilizing domestic energy. Mr Thammachart replied that, broadly speaking, we will be able to decrease imports of energy up to 1990, so that in that year, we will import very little, around 40 percent. After that, if we do not discover additional energy sites, we must import more.
COLUMN URGES TRADE WITH INDOCHINA

Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 20 Jun 85 p 5

[Column by Chum]

[Text] At a time when national trade is in trouble as it is these days, if we have an opportunity to sell to even small countries, as well as to big countries, we should grab it immediately.

Consequently, I was bursting with happiness when there was news that Thailand and Laos are going to shake hands for a new round of trade after trade had died out and been dull for a long time because of conventional trade barriers or differences in government systems. Two days ago, the lieutenant governor of Vientiane Capital came leading a team across the Mekong River to Nong Khai to talk about trade with the governor of Nong Khai Province.

News was reported that the talks between Mr Khamnon Phantavong, the lieutenant governor of Vientiane Province, and Mr Sakka Ophong, the governor of Nong Khai Province, had been conducted in a most friendly atmosphere.

They agreed on many trade and barter issues at the local level, and trade will start officially in the next 2 months.

It is considered to be a good news for Thailand in the midst of the bad trade news that has been emerging from all directions.

When you flip back through the record book of trade between Thailand and Laos, you can see that Thailand has had trade advantages all along.

Laos is one of the few countries that we trade profitably with because it still cannot produce; it mainly has to buy.

During the first 3 months of this year, namely, to the end of March, Thailand sent a total of 80 million baht worth of goods to Laos and purchased around 12 million baht worth of goods from the other bank.

The balance of trade was over 68 million baht after everything was added and subtracted.
This figure improved a little over last year's, an increase of around 5-6 percent.

But if we compare it to those of years ago, during the period when trade between us and Laos was still smooth and orderly, it is apparent that we used to trade in much larger volumes.

Attempting to roughly calculate, it is apparent that the total volume of trade from the first 3 months [of 1985] compared with those of years ago is a more than 60 percent decrease.

That is why I am saying that I am happy when there are friendly talks, because it means that there is more chance of trade like in the old times.

Hopefully, the provincial governor and all other officials on our side will provide the fullest cooperation for the Lao side.

The should practice being businessmen somewhat, and not take themselves too seriously as civil servants.

We must acknowledge one fact, that the change of politics in this region has made us lose a lot of good customers.

Cambodia and Vietnam formerly were both important customers of Thailand.

Even though they were not big customers like Europe or America, they were good customers that made it possible for us to send out quite a bit of goods.

Trade [with Laos] was easy, involving just talk, not a lot of trouble like [trade with] Europe and America. Slightly inferior quality was forgiven; there were not many set regulations.

The fact that Laos has returned to buy from us, even though it will not be as much as before--we should take it anyway; it is better than not selling at all.

As I said in the beginning, whether it's buying a lot or a little, the thing is to have them be buyers first.

These days, every time I open a business magazine, I am shocked because there is no news of any customers buying goods.

There is only news of people coming into our country to sell.

As soon as they arrive, they boast and advertise and persuade us to buy this and buy that, claiming all sorts of qualities.

I would like to leave the thought with our Thai officials that they should not welcome these guests who only want to sell.
Whoever brings a big project to sell and boasts extraordinary quality, chase them away. Tell them once and for all that the Thai economy cannot tolerate this anymore.

From now on, we must be interested in people who come in to buy our goods and give importance to buyers as much as possible.

Whatever we can do to please them, we should do it.

It is time that we must help sell miscellaneous goods as well as major goods. Whatever we can sell, we should give a helping hand.

Now I have gotten news that we have agreed to buy a new [fighter] squadron costing 8,000-9,000 million baht for sure.

If we do not help to sell goods and we do not help to look for foreign currency or exchange, where are we going to get the dollars to pay for them?

12587
CSO: 4207/256
THE Cabinet yesterday approved a proposal to reduce the royalty on tin by 120 baht per picul (60 kgs) and will also cut by half the 5% premium on tin production, a Cabinet source said.

The proposal, submitted by Industry Minister Ob Vasuratna, was aimed at increasing the price competitiveness of the country's tin exports, while the cut in premium on production is to encourage more local utilisation of the mineral ore for value-added production.

The source said the cut in tin premium to 2.5% would lower production costs of those products using tin as raw material, while at the same time would lessen the problem of tin surplus which could not be exported because of export quota limitations imposed by the International Tin Council.

"The reduction in tin premium on production will serve as an incentive to local manufacturers using tin as raw material," the source said.

While confirming the report, Industry Minister Ob Vasuratna said he had earlier sought more reduction from the Finance Ministry so as to boost the country's export earnings.

He said this was because the reduction was still considered very small when compared with the existing rate collected by neighbouring tin producing countries like Malaysia and Indonesia. At present, the Government, through the Finance Ministry, has set the tin royalty rate ranging between 3,000-4,000 baht per picul.

However, the Finance Ministry refused to further slash the tin royalty as it would affect the Government's income tax collection, Mr Ob said. But he added that "even a small cut is better than nothing."

The minister also disclosed that he was trying hard to boost exports of mineral ore this year to offset a decline in income from export of agricultural products because of a global price slump.

He said he has already instructed the Department of Mineral Resources to speed up its mineral ore exploration in several parts of the country and to award new mineral concessions to investors. But he admitted that the work would take some time.
EDITORIAL BLASTS POLICE BUYING RANK, POSITIONS

Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 1 Jul 85 p 3

[Editorial]

[Text] There has been gossip for a long time that there is lobbying and the buying of rank during the period when transfers of police officers for certain positions are considered. Some police officers must spend hundreds of thousands of baht to get their position, depending on the position and its subsequent utility. Even though the Police Department has been trying to prevent and solve this problem all along, the gossip has never died out.

The Police Department's director, Pol Gen Narong Mahanond, has stipulated new and stricter regulations to prevent lobbying to buy such positions, that those who will hold the posts of inspector up to deputy commander must have been working in their particular units for at least 2 years and must receive salaries for their particular posts.

From another point of view, the new regulations for selecting and promoting police officers, which the Police Department's director has ordered high ranking officers from the command and head levels to implement, are an indirect confirmation that there really has been lobbying to buy posts. This is considered to be the worst point in the nation's administration system.

Previously, various systems were implemented and regulations issued to prevent this kind of incident, but they obviously were not effective, as shown by the continuing gossip concerning this matter. Consequently, new regulations had to be issued, but as usual, they likewise have certainly not been fully effective due to many problems. The only fact is that while there are a limited number of positions, there are more qualified persons than there are posts.

Those who want to advance in government service use various techniques to get higher positions and promotions, such as buttering up the boss or lobbying to buy a position, because the nation's administration system is still not a just system that seriously believes in knowledgeability and ability themselves as the basis for promotion.
The national administration system, especially concerning promotion, is full of nepotism and party politics, which collectively are called "a patronage system." This has made all government servants who do not have patronage support or those who lack money for lobbying lack opportunities for promotion and lose interest in their work.

We believe that patronage exists not only in the Police Department, but everywhere, depending on each working unit's kind of work. Patronage is an important reason that the civil servants are unable to provide services to the public efficiently and fairly, because they themselves are under an unfair system.

12587
CSO: 4207/256
INTERIOR OFFICIAL: POLICE LINKED TO EXTORTION RACKET

Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 16 Jun 85 pp 1,2

[Article: "Two Types of Bandits: One in Uniform"]

[Text] The Ministry of Interior's undersecretary in charge of the South, Anan Ananthakun, has declared that there are bandits calling for protection fees in the southern provinces. The first group are professional bandits, whom the villagers do not fear too much, but the bandits in uniform create a lot of trouble and fear. Persons from whom protection fees have been demanded do not dare to report to the authorities. Motorcycle bandits steal motorcycles in a broad daylight in Nakorn Srithammarat Province. A provincial assembly man is also mugged in the middle of marketplaces. Villagers must help themselves; if they report the thefts to the police, their motorcycles are set on fire. They must pay ransoms to get their motorcycles back.

The incident of Mr Akom Eksuan, an MP from Krabi Province, and a palm plantation businessman, has been reported to Gen Prem Tinsulanon, the prime minister, on his official tour to Krabi. Mr Eksuan was threatened by bandits, who claim to be CPT members, in a letter demanding protection money. Certain bandits demanded as much as 15 million baht. General Prem told him that he does not have to pay those bandits, to let them demand it, that the Region 1 commander is still there.

Yesterday (15 Jun) Mr Anan Anantakoon, the Ministry of Interior's lieutenant governor and director of the Southern Region Border Coordination Center and who is making an official inspection tour of the South with a team of the prime minister's, gave an interview to reporters at Nakorn Srithammarat. Reporters asked why the news about demands for protection money by bandits claiming to be CPT members conflicted, with parliamentary members saying one thing, the public another and local officials another. Mr Anan replied that there are two types of bandits who demand protection fees in Krabi Province and other provinces in the South. The other type are regular bandits, whom villagers are not afraid of and who usually claim themselves to be CPT members.
Mr Anan further stated that the second type are bandits whom the villagers fear. Villagers do not dare to reveal them to the authorities because these bandits are in officials' uniforms. They are government officials, such as village chiefs, and they are also locally influential people, so that people from whom protection money is demanded are very frightened of this kind of bandit. Consequently, the news come out differently, because they do not dare to tell the truth. Mr Anan stated that the bandits who had demanded protection money from the owners of palm plantations and palm oil factories in Krabi Province are uniformed bandits, working on their own.

That same day, Mr Thavin Plaison, a Democratic Party MP from Nakorn Srithammarat, gave an interview to reporters about bandits demanding protection money in the South, especially in Nakorn Srithammarat Province. [He said that] there have been a lot of such demands in the five districts of Thung Song, Chawang, Thung Yai, Phibun and Nabone and that he himself had received complaints from merchants from whom protection money had been demanded by 3 or 4 bandits. One bandits claimed to be a member of the Black Tiger Battalion.

Mr Thavin stated that the most motorcycle hijacking incidents are in the South, especially in Thong Song district. The villagers warn each other with three tips: 1. not to buy a new motorcycle; 2. forbid a woman to ride alone; 3. absolutely not to ride after dark. The villagers have taken these many precautions, but the bandits have not given up: even motorcycles parked inside houses have been pushed out and stolen. Mr Thavin stated further that when anyone's motorcycle is stolen, reporting [the theft] to authorities does not get any results. In addition, the bandits set the vehicles on fire and return the frames. Villagers have to pursue the matter themselves and pay ransoms to get their vehicles back. Even the provincial assemblyman of Thongsong District has been mugged and his motorcycle taken when he rode it to the market in the afternoon. If you react, they shoot you in the arms. Mr Thavin stated that in relating this that he was not seeking for votes, but that this is a matter of fact that villagers are in trouble and that the Region 4 commander has stated that these incidents do not concern the military, that they are a matter for the police and the authorities, with which he himself agrees, and that we should put more pressure on the police.
THE country's unemployment figure has exceeded the 1.7-million mark this year and is expected to top two million by next year, Labour Department Chief Chamnan Pojana disclosed yesterday.

This did not include another two million people who were underemployed at present.

Voicing his concern over the increasing unemployment problem, Mr Chamnan urged that employers and workers get together to solve their disputes.

This would help prevent employers from resorting to such "cunning" tactic as shutting down plants and then re-employing cheaper labour.

A total of 138,324 workers were laid off by employers last year country-wide, Mr Chamnan said, quoting a Labour Department report. Since October last year about 6,000 workers have lost their jobs in the textile industry alone.

The Office of National Statistics (ONS) has reported that more than 20,000 workers in Bangkok and nearby provinces have been laid off since last October, the majority of which are textile workers.

Mr Chamnan admitted that strict law enforcement, such as the Minimum Wage restriction, would make the unemployment problem worse as employers would stop hiring workers to cushion the additional financial burden caused by higher wages.

The Labour Department chief pointed out that many of the labour problems were instigated by state enterprise labour unions whose members enjoyed better benefits than those in the private sector.

"Workers in the private sector," he said, "overlook the fact that the employment environment in state enterprises is different."

Mr Chamnan said that he was optimistic that the employment situation would improve within the next two years, during which time the world economy is expected to recover from the current slump.

Meanwhile, the Labour Department disclosed yesterday that a new labour law would be enacted soon which would give more protection and better welfare benefits for those in the labour force.

The law, which is to be announced in the Royal Gazette soon, requires that all employment must be on a contract basis and that employment brokers issue receipts to job seekers for every charge they make.
THAMMASAT economist Prof Krirkkiat Pipatseritham challenged the 1.7 million figure which, he said, represents a 6.2% unemployment rate out of a workforce of about 27 million people and claimed that the real figure should be much higher.

Prof Krirkkiat, Thammasat University's vice rector, said that there is a lot of “invisible” unemployment in the agricultural sector which is difficult to produce exact figures for. Thus, the figure released by the Government may not reflect the real unemployment situation in the country.

Acknowledging the worsening unemployment situation, President of the Thai Chamber of Commerce Dr Sompop Susangkornkarn called on the Government to provide better facilities and infrastructure to attract both foreign and domestic investment.

"Most of all, the investors must be allowed to make a profit," he said.

Prof Krirkkiat and National Statistics Office secretary-general Dr Niyom Purakham both agreed that unemployment will worsen in coming years, as a result of a large influx of people from the “babyboom period” onto the labour market. The former pointed out that Thailand's birth rate had been over 3% before 1970.

Dr Niyom also believes unemployment will worsen as jobs are beginning to dry up in the Middle East, where some 200,000 Thais are now working. Besides, he said, the Government has also restricted its recruitment to only 2%.

Dr Niyom advised the Government to look more closely at the education system and tune it into producing more skilled labourers.
ATHIT PLANS MASS WEDDINGS

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 26 Aug 85 p 1

[Text]

THE Army plans to arrange two "mass weddings" a year for non-commissioned and commissioned officers to help relieve the high cost of individual ceremonies, Gen Arthit Kamlang-ek, Supreme Commander said in Jakarta on Saturday.

He said many NCOs were in debt after paying their wedding costs, and the Army's new policy is to help relieve this burden and to this extent there would be one mass wedding a year for NCOs and another for COs with the army paying the bill.

He said those who could not attend the mass weddings would be allowed to use army buildings free for their ceremony.

Gen Arthit returned to Bangkok on Saturday night after an official four-day visit to Indonesia as a guest of that country's military.

Gen Arthit is scheduled to leave today on an official three-day visit to Burma.

CSO: 4200/1531
MINISTRY ISSUES STATEMENT—In connection with a report from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan that the Kabul Regime's Air Force violated Pakistani airspace and bombed a Pakistani village, causing death and injury to many Pakistani people and great property damage, the Foreign Ministry has stated that the Thai Government sympathizes with the victims of the violation of the Pakistani airspace. The Thai Government supports Pakistan's legitimate right to safeguard its territorial integrity, people, and property. It reiterates its support for negotiations for a political settlement of the Afghanistan problem in accordance with relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly. [Text] [Bangkok Domestic Service in Thai 0000 GMT 12 Sept 85 BK]

CSO: 4207/291
SIHANOUK ON CGDK PROSPECTS, BACKERS

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 30 Aug 85 p 4

[Article by Jacques Bekaert]

[Text]

THEY may have changed their names, embraced capitalism and free elections, proclaimed themselves good democrats, praised religion and discovered the virtue of the United Front. But the same old suspicion remains. Honestly, would you buy a used car from Mr Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge?

A couple of years ago in Peking, a senior official told us: "OK, they made mistakes in the past. We all know that. But they have changed, they have recognised their errors. How could the Party of Democratic Kampuchea find any popular support for its struggle if people hate it..."

Others will not be that easily convinced. Some would even say that even if the Khmer Rouge have changed, they still don't want them. It takes indeed more than a few good words to reassure those who have seen the Khmer Rouge in action in the Seventies. The human conscience finds it hard to accept the conversion of such immense sinners.

But whether one likes them or not, or believes they are plain criminals or just misguided pure communists, the fact is that members of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea are there, major actors on the Kampuchean stage. The party is very much a part of the problem, but is also strong enough to impose itself as part of the solution. Ritualistic rhetoric, noble humanitarian feelings, moral repulsion or understandable political rejection, however ethically justified, will not take care of an army of more than 35,000 men, well trained and well disciplined.

The time has come for some practical questions: What is the party today? Who are the true leaders? What do they really want? Would the rank and file follow them to the end? Could a return of the madness of the Seventies be realistically possible?

The party is a tough nut to crack. It does not reveal much of itself. Access to its prominent members is quasi impossible, at least for the independent observers. It is significant that when a commission of the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights sent a mission to the Kampuchean border, the best expert of the group, Stephen Heder, was denied permission to go to the Phnom Malai where several meetings with Ieng Sary took place in November 1984. The Party of Democratic Kampuchea may very well have rejected communism (the party was officially buried in December 1981), but most of the time it keeps acting like the CP of Kampuchea that it once was — the same secrecy, the same extreme suspicion towards any "unfriendly observers," the same language heavily laced with ritual attacks against the expansionist or hegemonist or equally ritual praises of militant solidarity, and the same fascination with grandiose but unbelievable proclamation...

SOCIAL EXPERIMENT

On the other hand, no one will deny the courage of the young soldiers of the National Army of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea and their determination under extremely hard condition. It was very much those men who, in 1979-1980, with the assistance of the People's Republic of China, prevented the "fait accompli."

For whom and for what are they fighting? Do the men and women of the 920th or the 801th division of the NADK sacrifice themselves for the independence of their country because they hate the Vietnamese? Or is it because someone has managed to convince them that another great social experiment awaits them at the end of the tunnel? Or is it simply because they know nothing better, have no choice, and just follow the orders? Most of the NADK soldiers probably know very little about the world, and their choice is obviously limited. Even "defection" to another group of the Coalition is made as difficult and dangerous as possible. But the fact that the desire to join the nationalists appears to exist on a rather large (and untold) scale is probably significant and, many would say, reassuring for the future.

As for the population — the men and women living under the party of Democratic Kampuchea's control — each time they are given the opportunity, a number of them choose the nationalists, and not just for strictly ideological reasons. The debriefing of the Khmers from a group of 592 men and women who ran away from Khlong Wah (a village of the Phnom Malai) in October 1984 revealed that what prompted their action was a certain desire for more freedom, the urge to engage in commercial activities. One of the leaders of the group, Ek Chun, explained: "The Khmer Rouge make us work too hard, give us no freedom, don't give us enough food. They are repressive..." Like most people in the group, Ek Chun used to live in Phnom Chat which, until its fall in April 1983, was under Khmer Rouge supervision but was known as a fairly relaxed place and trading activities were permitted.

So perhaps the group is not fully representative of the DK population. But since the fall of Phnom Malai and the relocation of most of its population at Site 8, many people have made their feelings known. One source familiar with the Party of Democratic Kampuchea told us:

"Only very few people, mostly middle-aged cadres, still want a communist society."

The case of the leadership is less clear. Another defector in the group, Ung Run, said: "Only a handful of Khmer Rouge leaders do believe in such things as the corrupting influence of Western ideas and people, or that the Khmer Rouge system is the only way to save Cambodia."

It is the common belief that Pol Pot is the man in charge. As the supreme commander of the NADK he should indeed control the most powerful and structured organisation. There is a war going on and the army takes priority. According to one of the group: "Pol Pot has the soldiers under him. He gives orders, makes decisions."

Among the people said to belong to the same ultra leftist and ultra nationalist tendency are Ieng Sary and Ta Mok. Ieng Sary once told us that in fact he was not a radical, that during the years 1975-1978 he was a "friend" of the intellectuals and considered by some of his comrades as a bit "bourgeois."

**BLOODY REPUTATION**

As for Ta Mok, few of the DK leaders have a reputation as bloody as this man who is also known under the name of Chhit Choeun. If Pol Pot is still referred to as "Ta Ti Muoy" (The Uncle No. 1), then Ta Mok is said by some of the defectors to be an extremely powerful member of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea. He is the deputy commander of the NADK. Spokesmen for the defectors claim he leads the most powerful faction of Khmer Rouge, the group of the Southwest, made of people from Takeo, Kampot, Kompong Speu. This was indeed the case in the Seventies and Ta Mok was the man who in May 1976 suppressed the revolt of the Eastern Zone (from which came Heng Samrin and Chea Sim, who both fled to Vietnam). The same sources explain that Ta Mok's group is alienating other Khmer Rouge.

If the assertion is correct, it raises the serious question of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea's unity. Do factions still exist? Is there such a thing as "moderate" Khmer Rouge?
COLUMNIST SEES LITTLE CHANGE IN DK LINE, LEADERSHIP

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 2 Aug 85 p 4

[Article by Jacques Bekaert]

IT WAS a bumpy ride and an interesting conversation. In the past this correspondent had interviewed Prince Sihanouk in hotel rooms, at his little French villa in Mougins, early in the morning in Penang or late at night in Kuala Lumpur, while walking around Tatum or eating an American version of crepes suzettes in New York. But never yet in a jeep. It took place on Wednesday afternoon, after the credentials ceremony at Dong Rek, a Kampuchean village I did not even know existed.

The leader of the Khmer resistance was pleased with the diplomatic ritual "because at least it shows the world we are still alive and able to set foot on Cambodian soil."

He always feels better when given a chance to approach his people. "I feel so sorry for their suffering, for the misery of the Cambodians. They are the true victims of political intransigence."

Any solution in sight? "Not for the moment. Not as long as there are preconditions. Look at the recent Phnom Penh communique. The language is clever, but does it really bring anything new? Total withdrawal by 1990? Maybe because by then there will be so many Vietnamese in the Heng Samrin army or just living in Cambodia that Vietnam will be able to withdraw, leaving behind the Vietnamese..."

The Prince expressed surprise at the way the Press reacted to the Phnom Penh communique. "People are so anxious to see Vietnam being flexible, so they imagine it is new and flexible..."

Still, the Prince's main worry is that the war would just go on forever. "China can afford to let it go on for a long time. Of course, the People's Republic helps us a lot, and we are thankful, but it is the Khmers who die... We receive material support, but we cannot win the war. Just like during World War II, the French resistance, even with a leader of the calibre of Charles de Gaulle, could not have defeated the Nazi without the military involvement of Great Britain, the US and the Soviet Union."

Some people are beginning to refer to an Indochinese resistance... "Yes, but there is no real resistance in South Vietnam, let's be honest. Dissatisfaction, yes; armed resistance, no. The Laotians are too divided to be efficient. So we have to fight alone..."

"The Khmer Rouge believe they can beat the People's Army of Vietnam. They don't want to discuss and negotiate. The Vietnamese want the Khmer Rouge eliminated. It is equally unrealistic."

Would Prince Sihanouk talk to the other side? "Certainly. In the past I had indeed offered to talk to Hanoi or Phnom Penh. And last November when I was in Paris, not only Hun Sen but also a high-ranking Vietnamese envoy was ready to meet me. Because of the refusal by some of our sponsors and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea I was unable to see them. And I must admit I felt embarrassed. Sooner or later we'll have to talk. But we must stop imposing preconditions. How can we negociate?"
As we passed a group of Thai villagers, the Prince expressed his gratefulness towards Thailand. "I understand their own national security concern. I will never forget what they do for us. If one day I have some power again in Phnom Penh I would like to make a gesture towards Thailand. I have already told some of my Thai friends that the temple of Preah Viehar, which almost 25 years ago was a source of dispute between our two nations, should instead become the symbol of new friendship linking our countries. I told them I cannot change the decision of the International Court of Justice but that there should be no frontier, no barriers, for anyone to gain access to the temple. Everybody would be free to go to pray or visit the monument. The flags of Thailand and Kampuchea would fly side by side. I would like a Thai specialist to be in charge of the protection and restoration of the temple."

The Prince asked for some information about the situation in Phnom Penh. He does not really think of the Heng Samrin regime as the enemy. They are just other Khmers, on a different side of the political fence. "Many of them have done a lot to help the people of Cambodia. They are not communists, but nationalists, just like we are. I feel a deep responsibility towards every Cambodian, not just the one close to me or the members of the party I represent. So many people are trying to divide us. I would like to unite our people."

Earlier, during the press conference, he said: "What we should do is not just unite the factions, but be united as a people."

Does he believe the Khmer Rouge have changed? "It is hard to think they have. But they represent the major obstacle to a complete Vietnamese domination of our country. They want to fight until the end because they want to go back to power, no matter what they say. At this point they still need us, the nationalists. But if China tells them to behave, maybe they would. In the same way, Vietnam could tell the pro-Heng Samrin communist party to change its stance."

In the coming months, after a few days in Peking, Prince Sihanouk will go to France, Iceland, Belgium and Italy. Then it will be New York for the United Nations General Assembly before returning to France for a new meeting with President Francois Mitterrand. At the end of the year, along with Mr Son Sann and Khieu Samphan, he has been invited for an official visit to China. "The Chinese are very anxious to see us united. I make them a bit nervous because they know that I am not pro-Chinese or pro-Soviet or pro-American, but pro-Cambodia — although I have a great respect for China. I am hard to control. I don't blame them..."

He was surprised and pleased at the recent progress of the National Sihanoukist Army. "But I have the feeling some people do not want to see us too strong. Now that the KPNLF is in trouble some of our friends are worried. They want Sihanouk to be strong, but not too strong..."

The Prince is also happy with the performance of his son and personal representative, Prince Norodom Ranariddh. "He is the future. He deserves all the support he can get."
[Station commentary: "In Speech, They Claim They Are Withdrawing Troops, But in Fact the Vietnamese Enemy Aggressors Are Incessantly Sending More Troops to Cambodia"]

Lately, the Vietnamese enemy aggressors have been vociferously publicizing about their plan to complete troop withdrawal from Cambodia by 1990. They trumpet this through their propaganda apparatuses in Hanoi, on the one hand, and they order their Phnom Penh running dogs to echo this deception, on the other. As for Nguyen Co Thach, Hanoi's foxy diplomat, he has been on a tour to peddle the so-called troops withdrawal which has been repeatedly denounced and exposed by world opinion. The Hanoi authorities claimed that the Heng Samrin running dogs in Phnom Penh can now gradually take care of their own security, a reason behind some partial withdrawals of Vietnamese troops, and so on. However, no matter how vociferously the Hanoi authorities and their Phnom Penh stooges are making themselves heard and no matter how frequently Nguyen Co Thach is going out far and wide in his lying trip, no one will be fooled. They cannot fool the world, nor can they hoodwink the Cambodian people who are fighting them directly on the battlefield. This is because while the Vietnamese Le Duan authorities are shamelessly uttering their so-called troop withdrawals, right on the Cambodian battlefield they are sending an uninterrupted stream of fresh troops from Vietnam to Cambodia. For instance, on 18 August the Vietnamese enemy sent 40 truckloads of about 1,500 fresh troops from north Vietnam to Takeo Province via national Route 2. These fresh troops are now being trained in Takeo to be sent forward to the western front. On 12 August, they sent 60 truckloads of almost 2,000 troops from central Vietnam to Stung Treng via Route 19. This force is also being destined for Cambodia's western battlefront. On 5 August, they sent three truckloads of new soldiers from south Vietnam to Phnom Penh via national Route 3. However, when they stopped over for lunch at Bek Chan market west of Phnom Penh, all the three truckloads of Vietnamese soldiers fled back to Vietnam. These soldiers were elderly people and school children drafted from south Vietnam by the Le Duan clique. These are merely a few examples. The Vietnamese enemy also sent small groups of soldiers to Cambodia in an uninterrupted flow to cope with the attacks of our national army and guerrillas in the interior of the country and also to prepare for the launching of the forthcoming dry season offensive. This clearly shows that the Vietnamese enemy aggressors have not withdrawn,
and are not ready to withdraw, troops from Cambodia. What they have done is to incessantly send additional troops to Cambodia. For this reason, although the Hanoi authorities have announced so many partial troop withdrawals, the number of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia has not decreased.

Moreover, the world is well aware of Vietnam's record of lies and deceptions. When the UN General Assembly session approaches, the Hanoi authorities always come up with some tricks, such as lying and deceiving about troop withdrawals and negotiations or conducting noisy activities in certain areas of the Cambodian battlefield to serve their deceptive diplomatic propaganda in the international arena. Therefore, the latest troop withdrawal announcement by Vietnam is nothing else but Hanoi's shameless and blatant deceptive diplomatic trick at the approach of the 40th UN General Assembly session.

In short, Hanoi's deceptive propaganda claim that they will withdraw their aggressive troops from Cambodia is a complete lie to cover up their acts of sending additional troops, arms, tanks, and artillery pieces to Cambodia in preparation for the forthcoming dry season offensive. Moreover, during the coming UN General Assembly, the Vietnamese aggressors know very well that the independence-, peace-, and justice-loving countries the world over will jointly condemn and denounce Vietnam for its acts of aggression and expansionism and will vigorously force it to withdraw troops from Cambodia. For this reason, Vietnam has been trumpeting so hard about this troop withdrawal trick to fool world opinion into waiting for Vietnam to withdraw troops in deadlines arbitrarily set by Vietnam, and into ending condemnation against and pressure on Vietnam. The world is not as stupid as to be taken in by the Hanoi aggressors' deception and lie. During the coming 40th UN General Assembly session, the world will continue to join voices in condemning and pressuring Vietnam, demanding that Vietnam withdraw all its aggressive troops from Cambodia and actually withdraw them in accordance with the past six UN General Assembly resolutions. As for the Cambodian people, the DK National Army, and all patriotic Cambodian resistance forces, we are not as simple-minded as to wait for Vietnamese withdrawal or for any sham peace donated by Vietnam. The Cambodian people will continue to unite in the struggle against the genocidal Vietnamese enemy aggressors until they are forced to completely withdraw from Cambodian territory.

CSO: 4212/104
CLANDESTINE RADIOS REPORT BATTLEFIELD ACTIVITIES

SRV Kills 23

BK080313 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 7 Sep 85

["News commentary": "The Vietnamese Aggressors Killed 23 People and Wound 11 Others in Sdaeung Chey Village of Kompong Cham Province"]

[Text] At the beginning of September, the Vietnamese aggressors forced inhabitants in Tang Kouk District of Kompong Thom Province to get onto a truck in order to send them out to clear bushes and build roads and camps. The inhabitants protested this forcible recruitment by the Vietnamese aggressors, saying that they were engaged in transplanting rice crops. But, the Vietnamese aggressors turned a deaf ear to this protest and forced the inhabitants at gunpoint to get into the truck. The truck moved from Tang Kouk District along Route 6. When it arrived at Sdaeung Chey Village in Kompong Cham Province, the Vietnamese aggressors fired at the truck. The truck was set ablaze. Twenty-three inhabitants on the truck were killed and 11 others wounded.

This is another criminal act of the Vietnamese aggressors, added to uncountable other criminal acts aimed at exterminating our Cambodian race. In the current rainy season when our people are busily transplanting rice crops the Vietnamese aggressors continue to force our people to build camps and roads and clear bushes along their transportation routes. They arrest, jail, or kill anyone who refuses to follow their orders or protests. They have done this in an attempt to prevent our people from growing crops to earn their living. This is in an attempt to starve our people to death, thus enabling them to exterminate our Cambodian race and annex our Cambodian territory to Vietnam.

The only way to enable our nation and race to survive is for our Cambodian people to jointly struggle vigorously against the Vietnamese aggressors.
Actions in Siem Reap, Battambang

BK090539 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 8 Sep 85

["Report from Various Battlefields"]

[Excerpt] Siem Reap battlefield: On the night of 4 September, our national army launched attacks against a Vietnamese battalion position and three company positions at Kouk Trach village, Trapeang Thom village, Kbal Krapoe village, and Rumduol village in Puok District. We killed 24 Vietnamese enemy soldiers and wounded another 18. We destroyed an assortment of 28 weapons, 32 barracks, a commune office, and some war materiel. We seized 15 weapons, including a Goryunov machinegun, a B-41 rocket launcher, 13 AK's, 2,000 rounds of AK ammunition, 12 B-41 rockets, 10 60-mm mortar shells, 12 cases of Goryunov ammunition, and some military materiel. We liberated three company positions and freed two companies of Cambodian soldiers.

North Sisophon battlefield: On 29 August, we launched a 2-pronged attack against the Vietnamese at Kouk Spean Commune in Phnum Srok District [Battambang Province]. The first prong attacked the Kouk Spean commune office; the second prong attacked the battalion position forming the commune defense network. After a 10-minute battle, we killed four Vietnamese enemy soldiers on the spot and wounded another five. We destroyed 2 commune office buildings, 1 rice stock containing 10 sacks of rice, an ammunition depot which exploded and burned for 2 hours, and 45 barracks. We seized 4 AK's, a carbine, 25,700 rounds of AK ammunition, 10 rounds of carbine ammunition, a pair of binoculars, 7 hammocks, 20 sets of uniform, 10 belts, 20 rucksacks, a radio receiver, and some war materiel. We liberated four villages: Kouk Spean, Kouk Samrach, Koul, and Kandal.

Four Villages 'Liberated'

BK100606 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 9 Sep 85

[Battle reports from various battlefields]

[Excerpt] We launched a sweeping operation against Vietnamese enemy soldiers along the Sangke River south of Battambang town, North Battambang battlefield, on the night of 5 September. We killed three Vietnamese enemy soldiers and wounded five others. We destroyed two AK's, a B-40, and a quantity of military materiel.

We liberated four villages: Prek Narin, Sdei, Roha Huang, and Duong Cha.
38 Cambodian Soldiers Desert

BK100611 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT
9 Sep '85

["News commentary": "Thirty-Eight Cambodian Soldiers Deserted From Anlung Reap Position, Leach Battlefield, and Returned Home"]

[Text] On 30 August, 38 Cambodian soldiers posted at Anlung Reap position, Leach battlefield, deserted and returned home. At present, there are many more Cambodian soldiers who have successively fled this position. The reason is that these Cambodian soldiers do not want to serve the Vietnamese enemy's war of aggression and genocidal war.

This event clearly shows that our Cambodian people do not want to bow to serve the Vietnamese and let them exterminate our race. The Cambodian people do not want the Vietnamese enemy aggressors to achieve their criminal goal of swallowing Cambodia and making it a part of Vietnamese territory.

Through their experiences during past nearly 7 years, fraternal Cambodian soldiers who were forced by the Vietnamese enemy aggressors to serve them have realized more clearly the danger of Vietnam's aggression, expansion, swallowing of territory, and extermination of our race. These Cambodian soldiers have clearly understood that this danger cannot be eliminated and the Cambodian national and race cannot be defended and safeguarded unless they unite with the Cambodian people and our National Army and guerrillas and fight the Vietnamese enemy aggressors.

CSO: 4212/104
VODK RAPS LE DUAN'S NATIONAL DAY SPEECH

BK070707 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT
6 Sep 85

[Station commentary: "The Le Duan Vietnamese Enemy Aggressors Have Not Changed Their Aggressive and Expansionist Stand and Continue To Serve as Cat's-Paws of the Soviet International Expansionists in Carrying on Arrogantly, Savagely, and Stubbornly the Aggressive and Expansionist Strategy in This Region"]

[Text] On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of Vietnam's national day on 2 September, Le Duan, the ringleader of the Hanoi Vietnamese, stated arrogantly that various countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific region have followed the United States in transforming this region into a zone opposing socialist countries, that is, opposing the aggression and expansion of Vietnam and the Soviet Union in this region. Le Duan added that Vietnam is determined to defeat this opposition.

Nobody is interested in this statement by Le Duan because everybody has realized that distortion, trick, and lie are the Hanoi Vietnamese enemy's traditions. All officials of the Hanoi Vietnamese enemy from top to bottom of hierarchy resort to distortions, tricks, and lies. This statement by Le Duan has made everyone realize more clearly that the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressors have not changed their aggressive and expansionist stand and continue to serve as cat's-paws of the Soviet international expansionists in carrying on actively the aggressive and expansionist strategy in Southeast Asia and the Pacific region.

Over the past several years, the international community, especially the countries in the region, have clearly seen the arrogant, savage, aggressive, and expansionist activities of Vietnam and the Soviet Union in this region. Everybody has realized that after signing a military agreement with the Soviet Union on 3 November 1978, the Vietnamese sent more than 250,000 soldiers to attack and annex Democratic Kampuchea—an independent, neutral, and nonaligned state and a legitimate member of the United Nations—in a gross and barbarous manner. The Vietnamese enemy aggressors have attempted to swallow Cambodia and include it in their Indochina federation so that they can use this federation as a springboard for carrying on their aggression and expansion. During the past nearly 7 years, Vietnamese aggressor troops in Cambodia have barbarously killed many Cambodians and have committed genocide against the Cambodian race. Furthermore, they have repeatedly violated Thai territory. This has made the situation in the region permanently tense. This is the main source of tension.
in Southeast Asia. This tension has been caused by Vietnam's aggression and occupation of Cambodia and its implementation of its aggressive and expansionist strategy in this region with the assistance, support, and backing of the Soviet Union.

Concerning this tension, the UN General Assembly successively adopted six resolutions calling on the Vietnamese to withdraw all their aggressor troops unconditionally from Cambodia and to participate in the settlement of the Cambodian problem through political means. Various countries in this region, particularly the ASEAN countries, put forward many proposals asking the Vietnamese to pull their troops out of Cambodia and to participate in the peaceful solution of the Cambodian issue in order to restore peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

The Vietnamese enemy aggressors do not care about the UN resolutions and the ASEAN countries' reasonable propositions. They have continued to carry on and intensify their war of aggression and genocide against the Cambodian race. They have attempted to destroy all Cambodian patriotic forces and completely exterminate the Cambodia race so that they will be able to swallow Cambodia in accordance with their bad ambitions. Concurrently, the Vietnamese enemy aggressors have repeatedly, arrogantly, and savagely intensified the violations of Thai territory in an attempt to threaten Thailand and other countries in the region to stop their support for the Cambodian people's just struggle and to accept their aggression in Cambodia as a fait accompli so that they will be able to achieve their Indochina federation strategy and advance further in conformity with their own regional aggressive and expansionist strategy and the global aggressive and expansionist strategy of their Soviet boss in this region.

Le Duan—the ringleader of the Hanoi Vietnamese—who is a cat's-paw of the Soviet international expansionists, declared once again Vietnam's stand that the Vietnamese enemy aggressors will continue to firmly implement their own aggressive and expansionist strategy and that of their Soviet boss in this region. This has made the international community understand more clearly the stubborn, aggressive, and expansionist stand of the Hanoi Vietnamese enemy aggressors. Moreover, the world community has heightened its vigilance and has united and opposes more firmly Vietnam's aggression and expansion in this region.

At the forthcoming UN General Assembly session, the international community will continue to support Democratic Kampuchea's legal seat at the United Nations. The world community will intensify its voice in condemning the Vietnamese and calling on them to withdraw all their aggressor troops immediately and unconditionally from Cambodia and to let the Cambodian people determine their own destiny so that Cambodia will be able to be an independent, peaceful, neutral, and nonaligned country again and peace and stability will be restored in the whole of Southeast Asia.
Before the convening of the forthcoming UN General Assembly session, the Le Duan Vietnamese enemy aggressors have made every effort to maneuver and propagandize on the settlement of the Cambodian problem.

The Le Duan Vietnamese enemy aggressors have tried to mislead everyone that the Indochinese and the ASEAN countries have found a number of common points on the Cambodian issue. They have attempted to discourage the UN General Assembly from adopting any resolution on the Cambodian question. On the other hand, the Le Duan Vietnamese enemy aggressors have striven to divert the issue of Vietnam's aggression in Cambodia into a regional issue among their so-called Indochinese countries and the ASEAN countries. They have appealed to everyone to resolve the problem on a regional basis in an attempt to lessen their crimes of aggression in Cambodia.

In the past several days, the Vietnamese enemy's propaganda machine in Hanoi have repeatedly performed this maneuver. Moreover, Nguyen Co Thach, attending the meeting of foreign ministers of nonaligned countries in Luanda, has made every effort to dupe everybody. He stated that Vietnamese troops will not be withdrawn from Cambodia unless all foreign troops are withdrawn from Southeast Asia. This maneuver has clearly shown that the Hanoi Vietnamese enemy aggressors are not seriously interested in resolving the Cambodian problem nor are they prepared to withdraw their aggressor forces from Cambodia, or let the Cambodian people determine their own destiny as they have repeatedly promised. They have staged tricky maneuvers and created various pretexts to excuse their gross and barbarous aggression in Cambodia. They have attempted to annex Cambodia forever.

But the Vietnamese enemy aggressors have not been successful in creating any pretext or performing any maneuver to hide or excuse their gross and barbarous aggression in Cambodia. The world clearly realizes that at the end of 1978, with the full assistance and support of the Soviet international expansionists, the Hanoi Vietnamese enemy aggressors sent more than 250,000 soldiers to grossly and barbarously attack Democratic Kampuchea, which is an independent,
peaceful, neutral, and nonaligned state and a legitimate member of the United Nations. This aggression has been an arrogant, savage, and flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the UN Charter. This is the main source of the Cambodian problem. The Vietnamese cannot divert the issue of Vietnam's aggression in Cambodia into a regional problem. Furthermore, the tension in Southeast Asia is a result of Vietnam's aggression against Cambodia.

During the past nearly 7 years, not only have they massacred the Cambodian people, Vietnamese aggressor troops in Cambodia have violated and shelled Thai territory many times. In fact, during the 1984-1985 dry season, Vietnamese troops violated Thai territory 30 times. During this rainy season, they continue to repeatedly violate and shell Thai territory. This has caused bloody clashes with Thai troops. Furthermore, many Thai inhabitants have been killed and wounded. A lot of Thai property has been damaged. Thousands of Thai inhabitants have been obliged to leave their homes and take refuge in safer areas deep inside Thai territory.

Therefore, the international community and the United Nations have clearly determined that in order to resolve the Cambodian problem and restore peace and stability in this region, it is necessary to eliminate the main source of this problem, that is the Hanoi Vietnamese must unconditionally withdraw all their aggressor troops from Cambodia and respect the Cambodian people's right to self-determination. There is no need to settle the so-called regional problem or other issues raised by the Vietnamese enemy aggressors trying to divert world opinion from the Cambodian problem. Everyone clearly comprehends that until the present tension in the region is eliminated, the Cambodian people cannot live peacefully in their own territory as an independent, peaceful, neutral, and nonaligned nation. And peace and stability cannot be restored in Southeast Asia until all Hanoi Vietnamese enemy's aggressor troops are withdrawn from Cambodia.

At the forthcoming 40th UN General Assembly session, the international community will continue to raise its voice to denounce and condemn the Hanoi Vietnamese enemy aggressors more vigorously. The world community will continue to call on and pressure the Vietnamese until they withdraw all their aggressor troops immediately and unconditionally from Cambodia and respect the Cambodian people's rights to determine their own destiny without any external interference.
VODK: NGUYEN CO THACH CLAIM ON ASEAN TALKS REJECTED

BK091143 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 8 Sep 85

[Station commentary: "As the UN General Assembly Session is Nearing, the Vietnamese Enemy Aggressors Once Again Attempt to Fool World Opinion"]

[Text] In a message dated 30 August and circulated by the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry among the ambassadors of various countries accredited to Hanoi, the Hanoi authorities deceptively said that there had been fruitful talks between Nguyen Co Thach, as representative of the so-called three Indochinese countries, and His Excellency Moktar Kusumaatmaja, minister of foreign affairs of Indonesia, as representative of the ASEAN countries. In this message, the Hanoi authorities also called on other countries to contribute actively to the smooth process of the purportedly nascent talks.

However, hardly had this trick been hurled out when it was immediately denounced by the ASEAN countries. The world once again sees the extremely tricky, shameless, and deceitful nature of the Hanoi authorities.

Last year, as the UN General Assembly session was approaching, Nguyen Co Thach also tried to fool public opinion by claiming that talks on the Cambodian issue were underway between the ASEAN countries and what he called the three Indochinese countries. However, this Vietnamese lie was ignominiously exposed and rejected by the ASEAN countries and the whole world. This year, at the approach of the 40th UN General Assembly session, the Hanoi authorities again have tried to fool world opinion.

What are all these Vietnamese lies and deceptions for? They are aimed at reducing the voices condemning their acts of aggression in Cambodia and demanding that they withdraw their aggressive forces from Cambodia at the forthcoming 40th session of the UN General Assembly. This trick of the Vietnamese enemy aggressors once again clearly shows to the world that:

1. The goal of the Vietnamese enemy aggressors remains unchanged: They want to occupy Cambodia by military force forever.

2. However, they are experiencing serious difficulties in their aggression in Cambodia and in the international arena: The world incessantly condemns their war of aggression against Cambodia.
3. The greater their difficulties, the more shameless they become in their lies and deceptions. They deceive opinion in their speeches, their official statements, their theatrically staged conference of the so-called three Indochinese countries, and all their contacts with this or that quarter. They deceive opinion to serve their goal of militarily occupying Cambodia forever.

In all Vietnam's deceptive diplomatic maneuvers, it tries to avoid all demands for the withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia while promoting everything that favors the legalization of its aggression in Cambodia and its puppets in Phnom Penh. It tries to take advantage of everything that could cause discord and dispute within the CGDK, the Cambodian resistance forces, or the international front supporting the Cambodian resistance forces.

However, the world clearly sees Vietnam's extremely tricky, deceitful nature, its nature of aggression and expansion, the fact that Vietnam relies on the Soviet aggressive and expansionist strategy to serve its own aggressive strategy, and its nature of being a military base for the Soviet Union. The world is well aware of Vietnam's record of deceptive diplomatic policy: It can no longer use the Paris talks trick.
BRIEFS

VONADK—PRC COMMENTS ON DK LEADERSHIP CHANGE—Recently, responding to a question about the readjustment of the Democratic Kampuchean leadership, a spokesman for the PRC Foreign Ministry noted: This is an internal affair of Democratic Kampuchea. China welcomes this move. The Chinese side regards that this would enhance the Cambodian people's struggle against the Vietnamese aggressors. Asked about China's comment on the CGDK's acceptance of the ASEAN foreign ministers' proposal for indirect talks with Vietnam, the spokesman said: This shows that the CGDK is sincerely seeking a political settlement of the Cambodian issue. The question now is that Vietnam—the aggressor—is still stubbornly refusing to make any response to the ASEAN proposal. [Text] 

(Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 6 Sep 85 BK

ANDREOTTI, SIHANOUK MEET—During his meeting with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, president of Democratic Kampuchea, in Rome on 8 September, Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti stated that concerning the Cambodian problem, Italy will continue its diplomatic efforts which could result in a peaceful settlement of the Cambodian issue and allow the Cambodian people self-determination. [Text]

(Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 10 Sep 85 BK

CSO: 4212/104
CHEA SOTH RECEIVES LAO DELEGATION 4 SEPTEMBER

BK050834 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0435 GMT 5 Sep 85

[Text] Phnom Penh, 5 Sep (SPK)--Chea Soth, member of the Political Bureau of the KPRP Central Committee and vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, on Wednesday afternoon received in Phnom Penh the Lao delegation from the Medals Institute attached to the Council of Ministers led by its director Heuangmani Bouahan.

On this occasion, Chea Soth spoke about experiences gained from the emulation in Cambodia and difficulties left by the Pol Pot genocidal regime. He briefed his guest on the resounding military victories scored during the past dry season by the Cambodian people and their armed forces with the assistance of the Vietnamese volunteers and the internal conflicts of the tripartite coalition of the Cambodian reactionaries.

The Cambodian leader said he is convinced that the relations of friendship, solidarity, and multiform cooperation between Cambodia and Laos will further develop.

For his part, the head of the visiting Lao delegation, in Cambodia since 28 August, praised the achievements made during the past 6 years by the Cambodian people under the judicious leadership of the KPRP. He pledged to do what he can to further strengthen the cooperation among the three Indochinese countries and between Laos and Cambodia, particularly in building each respective country and in the struggle for peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the world.

CSO: 4219/75
LEADERS GREET BULGARIAN COUNTERPARTS ON NATIONAL DAY

BK080720 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0403 GMT 8 Sep 85

[Text] Phnom Penh, 8 Sep (SPK)—On the occasion of the 41st anniversary of the victory of the People's Republic of Bulgaria's socialist revolution, 9 September, the Cambodian leaders sent their warm congratulations to their Bulgarian counterparts in a message signed by Heng Sarin, general secretary of the KPRP Central Committee and chairman of the Council of State, and Hun Sen, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and addressed to Todor Zhivkov, general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Council of State, and Grisha Filipov, chairman of the Council of Ministers. The message reads, among other things:

We highly appreciate the glorious victory won during the past 41 years by the fraternal Bulgarian people in the construction of advanced socialism in the fatherland of Georgiy Dimitrov, the eminent son of Bulgaria.

While always pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence with states of different social regimes and the policy of constant unity within the socialist community, of which the Soviet Union is a solid bastion, the People's Republic of Bulgaria under the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party has contributed to the maintenance of lasting peace in the Balkan region as well as in the whole world, particularly to warding off the danger of nuclear war provoked by U.S. imperialism. We are convinced that the bonds of friendship, solidarity, and multiform cooperation between the parties, governments, and peoples of our two countries will develop and strengthen in the interest of the establishment of peace and security in our countries and in the world as a whole.

On the same occasion, Cambodian Foreign Minister Hun Sen also sent his message of warm greetings to his Bulgarian counterpart, Petur Mladenov.
MORE THAN 2,000 MISLED RETURN IN SIX MONTHS

BK070619 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0412 GMT 7 Sep 85

[Text] Phnom Penh, 7 Sep (SPK)—Five returnees were presented at a press conference held in Phnom Penh on Friday afternoon [6 September—FBIS] in the presence of UN Dara, vice chairman of the misled persons persuasion movement committee. In front of local and foreign journalists, the returnees condemned the expansionists, imperialists, and other reactionary forces for their activities against the Cambodian revolution. They also denounced Thailand for giving the remnants of the Polpotists and other reactionary Cambodians shelter, food, arms, and ammunition enabling them to carry out sabotage activities against the Cambodian people's rebirth.

The returnees admitted that the reactionary Cambodian groups are now having a difficult life along the Cambodian-Thai border and revealed that the conflicts within the so-called "coalition government" are worsening with each passing day and that large numbers of soldiers of the three factions are killing each other in daily armed conflicts. The returnees expressed their thanks and gratitude to the PRK party and government for their lenient policy toward them.

During the first six months of this year alone, 2,176 misled persons presented themselves to the revolutionary authorities, bringing along 1,296 assorted weapons and a quantity of war materiel, it was learned at this press conference. At present, the aforementioned returnees are living with their families and enjoying the use of all kinds of facilities.

CSO: 4219/75
BRIEFS

GIFT TO FLOOD VICTIMS—Phnom Penh, 1 Sep (SPK)—Kamffman Fred, representing the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), handed over in Phnom Penh on 30 August to Cambodia's Red Cross Chairman Phlek Phirun aid from his organization to Cambodians affected by the latest floods. This gift, the third of its kind, comprises 1,200 metric tons of rice and more than 16 metric tons of clothes. Phlek Phirun expressed her thanks to the MCC for its aid to the Cambodian people. [Text] [Phnom Penh SPK in French 1126 GMT 1 Sep 85 BK]

LAO DELEGATION FROM MEDALS INSTITUTES DEPARTS—Phnom Penh, 5 Sep (SPK)—The delegation from the Medals Institute attached to the Council of Ministers of the LPDR led by its director, Heuangmani Bouahan left Phnom Penh this morning at the end of its 10-day visit in Cambodia. It was seen off by Sar Not, deputy director of the office of the Council of State in charge of the emulation movement, and Soukhala Phakomkham, Lao acting charge d'affaires to Cambodia. During its stay, the Lao guests were received by Chea Soth, member of the KPRP Central Committee Political Bureau and vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, and visited the Cambodia-Laos friendship village, a tire factory, the Cheung Ek mass graves (Kandal Province), the National Museum, the former Royal Palace, and the Angkor Wat temple (Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province). [Text] [Phnom Penh SPK in French 1123 GMT 5 Sep 85 BK]

CSO: 4219/75
SRV FRIENDSHIP DELEGATION VISITS CUBA

OWO91243 Hanoi VNA in English 0718 GMT 9 Sep 85

[Text] Hanoi VNA 9 September---A delegation of the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity and Friendship with other peoples and the Vietnam–Cuba Friendship Association led by Phan Hien, minister of justice and Presidium member of the committee, paid a friendly visit to Cuba from 28 August to 8 September as guest of the Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples (CIFP) and the Cuba Committee for Solidarity with Vietnam (CCSV).

While there the delegation attended celebrations of the 40th National Day of Vietnam in Havana and Santiago de Cuba. It was cordially received by Jesus Montane Oropesa, alternate Political Bureau member of the Communist Party of Cuba Central Committee and head of its General Department of Foreign Relations.

Jesus Montane expressed the Cuban party and state's heartfelt support for the communique issued by the 11th Indochinese Ministerial Conference in Phnom Penh. He reaffirmed the Cuban close solidarity with and great assistance to Vietnam's revolutionary cause.

Phan Hien and his party had working sessions with Rene Rodriguez Cruz, president of the CIFP and CCSV. The two sides exchanged views on further strengthening cooperation between the two countries’ friendship organizations in order to contribute to promoting the friendship and militant solidarity between the two countries.

Phan Hien also met with Carlos Amat Fores, acting minister of justice. The two officials discussed measures to enhance the cooperation between the two ministries.

The guests visited a number of economic, cultural and social establishments in Cuba.
FRIENDSHIP GROUP PRESIDENT MEETS DANISH COMMUNISTS

OWL11556 Hanoi VNA in English 1537 GMT 11 Sept 85

[Text] Hanoi VNA 11 September—The visiting delegation of the Communist Party of Denmark (CPD) led by its chairman Jorgren Jensen today cordially met with a delegation of the Vietnam committee for solidarity and friendship with other peoples led by its presidium member Tran Lam, who is also a member of the communist party of Vietnam Central Committee.

Tran Lam warmly welcomes Chairman Jorgren Jensen and his party who have paid an official visit to Vietnam, and brought to the Vietnamese communists and people their friendship and militant solidarity, thus encouraging the Vietnamese people in their socialist construction and national defence. He also expressed profound gratitude to the Danish communist party and people for their valuable support and assistance to Vietnam's struggle for national independence and freedom in the past and revolutionary struggle at present.

Jorgren Jensen, for his part, thanked the communist party and people of Vietnam for their hospitality. The Danish communists and people, he said, always stand side by side with the Vietnamese people and consider the support for the Vietnamese people's just cause their noble international obligations. He expressed his wish for the strengthening of friendship between the Danish and Vietnamese communists and peoples.

Earlier, the Danish guests visited the Danish-funded Hoang Thach cement factory, a number of economic and cultural establishments in the port city of Haiphong and in Ho Chi Minh city, and visited the 85-exhibition fair on economic and technical achievements in Hanoi.
LEADERS GREET ETHIOPIAN NATIONAL DAY

OW11600 Hanoi VNA in English 1531 GMT 11 Sept 85


The message, jointly signed by Le Duan, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee; Truong Chinh, president of the state council; and Pham Van Dong, chairman of the council of ministers, says:

"Over the past 11 years, the Ethiopian people have, under the leadership of the Ethiopian workers' party and the provisional military administrative council headed by You, strengthened their unity, surmounted all difficulties and hardships, and gained great successes in their glorious revolutionary cause.

"We highly value the Ethiopian people's successes in all fields, especially the success of the founding party congress on 12 September, 1984, which have constantly raised the prestige and position of the socialist Ethiopia in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in the non-aligned movement and the world as a whole.

"The Vietnamese people sincerely wish the fraternal Ethiopian people still greater successes in their national construction and the defence of their national unity, thus making a positive contribution to the struggle of nations against imperialism, old and new-colonialism, zionism and the apartheid, for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress.

"May the militant solidarity and friendship between our two countries be constantly consolidated and developed."

On this occasion, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach also sent a message of greetings to his Ethiopian counterpart, Goshu Wolde.

CSO: 4200/1541
NHAN DAN LAUDS REMARKS--Hanoi VNA 12 September--The Reagan administration cannot pressure the Soviet Union to accept the limitation of nuclear and other weapons while the United States refuses to agree on the demilitarization of outer space, says Nhan Dan today. Commenting on General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's interview with the U.S. magazine TIME, Nhan Dan notes: "Public opinion has shown understanding of the Soviet Union's firm declaration that in the event the U.S. conducts tests of its anti-satellite weapons aimed at targets in space, the Soviet Union will consider itself not bound by its former unilateral commitment not to introduce anti-satellite means into space. The paper says that the U.S. feverish activities of late to gain military superiority have laid bare the deceitful allegation of U.S. Vice President George Bush on 10 September that President Reagan was working day and night to ensure real progress at his coming summit meeting with Soviet leader M.S. Gorbachev in order to move towards peace. "The Soviet Union's stance as expounded in Comrade Gorbachev's interview with TIME is a clear and righteous one. It is another show of goodwill and high sense of responsibility towards the ardent aspiration and genuine interests of peace-loving people all over the world," Nhan Dan stresses in conclusion. [VNA headline: "Paper Demands U.S. Response to Soviet Union's Goodwill"] [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 0709 GMT 12 Sept 85]

BULGARIA'S NATIONAL DAY MARKED--Hanoi VNA 10 September--A meeting was held in the northern border province of Hoang Lien Son today by the Provincial Party, People's and Fatherland Front Committees to honour Bulgaria's 41st National Day. It was attended by Ha Thiet Hung, alternate member of the communist party of Vietnam Central Committee and secretary of Hoang Lien Son's Party Committee; Do Khac Cuong, chairman of the Provincial People's Committee; and representatives of the foreign ministry and the Vietnam-Bulgaria Friendship Association. Bulgarian Ambassador to Vietnam Philip V. Markov was also on hand. Speaking at the meeting, Do Khac Cuong brought out the great achievements recorded by the Bulgarian people over the past 41 years under the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party. After praising the friendship, solidality and comprehensive cooperation between Bulgaria and Vietnam, Do Khac Cuong expressed the profound gratitude to the party, state and people of Bulgaria for their valuable support and assistance to the Vietnamese People's National Liberation cause in the past and national construction and defence at present. For his part, Ambassador Philip V. Markov expressed his joy at the great achievements recorded by the Vietnamese people in the past 40 years and wished them still greater successes in building and defending the socialist Vietnam. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 0830 GMT 11 Sept 85 OW]
JAPANESE YOUTH DELEGATION VISIT—Hanoi VNA 8 September—A 300-member delegation of the Japanese Youth Organization "Peace Boat" has paid a visit to Vietnam. While in Ho Chi Minh City from 5-8 September, the delegation had working sessions with representatives of the city youth organization and visited the Cu Chi "steel land," the U.S. war crimes display house, and various cultural, social and historical establishments in the city. In Hanoi, the central coastal province of Binh Tri Thien and the Vung Tau-Con Dao Special Sector, the delegation was briefed by delegations of local youth organizations and people of various strata on the Vietnamese revolutionary tradition and the new life of the Vietnamese youth, students and people. On this occasion, the delegation signed with the Ho Chi Minh City Chapter of the Federation of Vietnam Youth a joint communique on the struggle for peace, happiness, development and solidarity among nations in the world. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 0806 GMT 9 Sep 85 OW]

SRV-USSR FILM SHOW—Hanoi VNA 9 September—The feature film entitled "Coordinates of Death," co-produced by Vietnam and the Soviet Union, is continuing its run here as part of the celebration of the 40th National Day. This is the first film made by the Vietnam feature film studio in cooperation with a foreign film studio. It is about the fight and victory of the Vietnamese people faced with the U.S. bombings and blockade of North Vietnam's ports in 1972. It is almost a war chronicle since most shooting was done at the very places which saw action and with the participation of men and women who had taken part in the fight. The film is also a tribute to the Soviet sailors who, braving the danger of being bombed, continued to ship necessary supplies to the fighting Vietnamese. The American people's struggle against "Nixon's war" played no small role in the victory of Vietnam's cause. Their judgment of the war is represented by Kate Frensis, an American woman singer. The screenplay is by A. Lapsin and Hoang Tich Chi and the film was directed by Sergey Gasparov and Nuyyen Xuan Chan. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1601 GMT 9 Sep 85 OW]

SRV NATIONAL DAY GREETINGS—Hanoi VNA 10 September—Le Duan, general secretary of the CPVCC, has received messages of National Day greetings from Humberto Vargas Carbonell, general secretary of the People's Vanguard Party of Costa Rica Central Committee; Herbert Mies, chairman of the Presidium of the German Communist Party (DKP); and E. Papaioannou, secretary general of the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus (AKEL). Also on this occasion, the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee has got messages of greetings from the Central Committee of the People's Vanguard Party of Somali; the secretary general of the Communist Party of Sri Lanka; the Central Committee of the Swedish Workers' Communist Party; the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Australia; and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Japan. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 0701 GMT 10 Sep 85 OW]
SRV EXHIBIT IN MOSCOW--Hanoi VNA 6 September--Y.P. Ryabov, member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee and vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers; V.V. Listov, minister of chemical industry; M.I. Busygin, minister of timber, pulp and paper and wood-working industry and other Soviet senior officials on 5 September called at the exhibition on Vietnam's export articles in Moscow. Dinh Van Tran, Vietnamese trade representative in the Soviet Union, and Thai Chuoc, director of the exhibition, showed the guests round the exhibition. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1514 GMT 6 Sep 95OW]

ARMY PAPER ON CAMBODIA--The Vietnamese Army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN calls on all countries in Southeast Asia to enter substantive dialogue. In a commentary on Thursday, the paper stressed that the important and full of goodwill decisions and proposals put forth at the 11th foreign ministers conference of the three Indochinese countries (have a capture of) public opinion. These proposals are practical conditions to contribute to easing tension in Southeast Asia and promoting dialogue aimed at seeking a perfect solution acceptable by all sides concerned. The paper stressed that the recent visit to Indonesia by Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach is a vivid manifestation of the Indochinese countries' efforts to carry out their initiatives. The paper affirmed that the most correct and suitable way to solve the Kampuchean problem in particular, and peace, security, and stability in Southeast Asia in general, is substantive dialogue between parties concerned. [Text] [Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 6 Sep 85 BK]

USSR DELEGATION DEPARTS--Hanoi VNA 7 September--A delegation of Volgograd led by its party committee Secretary Khvatov left here today after an 8-day visit and attending the celebration of Vietnam's 40th National Day. While in Vietnam, the Soviet delegation paid a tribute at Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum and visited the late president's home and office. It also had working sessions with leading officials of the party committees of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and the port city of Haiphong. The Soviet guests were warmly received on 31 August by Vo Chi Cong, Political Bureau member and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1538 GMT 7 Sep 85 OW]

DPRK NATIONAL DAY MARKED--Hanoi VNA 9 September--A meeting was held this morning at Thai Nguyen town, capital of Bac Thai Province, in celebration of the 37th National Day of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The meeting was jointly sponsored by the party, people's and Vietnam Fatherland Front committees of Bac Thai. It was attended by Nguyen The Dat, deputy secretary of the provincial party committee; Hoang Linh, vice president of the Vietnam-DPRK Friendship Association; and DPRK Ambassador to Vietnam Kim Chong-song. Speakers at the meeting brought out the great achievements recorded by the Korean people over the past 37 years in national construction and defence under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea and formulated wishes for further consolidation and development of the friendship and cooperation between the two countries. They also voiced support for the just struggle of the Korean people for national reunification. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1640 GMT 9 Sep 85 OW]
TRADE UNION COOPERATION—Hanoi VNA 6 September—The Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions and All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) signed here today documents on bilateral cooperation in mass education and culture and on cooperation between the Vietnam-USSR friendship workers' cultural palace (Hanoi) and the cultural palace of the Muscovite Automobile Factory (Moscow). Present were Vu Dinh and Vu Xuan Can, members of the VFTU Secretariat; Pham Loi, Secretary of the Hanoi Federation of Trade Unions and Le Tu, Director of the Vietnam-USSR friendship workers' cultural palace. On the Soviet side were L.A. Zemlyannikova, secretariat member of the AUCCTU secretariat and head of a visiting AUCCTU delegation; A.F. Kozolov, vice president of the Muscovite automobile factory's trade unions; and Ali-Zade Rconf Maned Ogly [spelling as received], representative of the Soviet embassy in Vietnam. Under these cooperation programs, the two sides will help each other accelerate the mass education and culture work aimed at constantly raising the working people's general knowledge and their cultural life. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1529 GMT 6 Sept 85 OW]

REVIEW OF STAND ON CAMBODIA—The Thai paper SIAM RAT said it is time to reconsider the Kampuchea problem. In a recent issue, the paper said: The communique of the 11th foreign ministerial conference of the three Indochinese countries should be considered, especially its decision to hold talks with Thailand. The paper also noted that the Khmer Rouge have become a monster in the eyes of the world people. They had brutally killed the Khmer people when they were in power and it is a shame that Thailand recognizes and supports them. The paper emphasized that it is time Thailand should abandon the Khmer rouge. [Text] [Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 9 Sept 85 BK]

PHA LAI PROJECT—Vietnamese workers and Soviet specialists at the construction site of the Pha Lai thermoelectric power plant are trying to complete the assembling of turbines of the machine unit No. 3. Thanks to their great effort, many projects were completed from 3 to 10 days ahead of time. [Text] [Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 9 Sept 85 BK]

CSO: 4200/1541
PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

LE DUAN—LE DUC THO REGIME CALLED 'NEPOSTITICAL—DICTATORIAL'

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French summer 1985 pp 137, 143-151

[Article by Thai Quang Trung: "Degeneration of Vietnamese Regime"]

[Excerpts] The author, Thai Quang Tung, is a jurist and historian. His numerous articles on communism and Asia have appeared in POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, DEFENSE NATIONALE, POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES, REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, and other publications. His "Factionalism and Collective Leadership: an Essay on Ho Chi Minh's Legacy" is to be published shortly by the ISEAS [(? Institute of Southeast Asia Studies] of Singapore.

The year 1985 will be marked by a plethora of anniversaries which the Vietnam Communist Party is preparing itself to celebrate. These anniversaries include the following: the 40th anniversary of the August Revolution and establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1945), the 10th anniversary of the final victory of 1975 and reunification of the country, the 55th anniversary of the foundation of the Indochinese Communist Party (3 February 1930), the 95th anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth (9 May 1890) and the 700th anniversary of the victory over the Mongol hordes (1285). On these exceptional and grand occasions, the Vietnamese communist leadership clearly intends to reaffirm the party's unity and infallibility plus, of course, Hanoi's resolve to stand up to China.

Yet as the Vietnam Communist Party prepares to convene its Sixth Congress, scheduled for the spring of 1986, the climate in Vietnam is somber indeed. The atmosphere is one of national disaster, popular disillusionment, and war scares. Will this coming congress help resolve the profound loss of confidence currently sweeping the party? Should the present party general secretary, Le Duan, depart the political scene, what realignments will occur within the power relationships between members of the gerontocracy currently in power in Hanoi? When members of the Old Guard depart, exactly how will the new generation of leaders replace them within the Vietnamese communist hierarchy?
Degeneration of Collective Leadership with Le Duan

Ho Chi Minh had not designated his successor by name. Still it certainly was under Ho's auspices that Le Duan became the de facto, if not de jure, party leader. After Ho's death, Le Duan was confirmed as primus inter pares. Despite his pledge to uphold the principle of collective leadership, Le Duan progressively consolidated his personal position by using, according to Hoang Van Hoan, a former member of the Political Bureau, "every conceivable device to place his most faithful hatchet men in key party positions." According to the same source, Le Duan, having become chairman of the all-powerful Central Organization Committee with the help of Le Duc Tho, was then able at the Fourth Party Congress in 1976, to have one-third of the Central Committee members removed and replaced by a new majority loyal to him personally. The ouster of Hoang Van Hoan from the Political Bureau and some 30 members from the Central Committee was but the forerunner of subsequent massive purges which the Le Duan-Le Duc Tho twosome was to conduct within the party's pro-Chinese wing. Bolstered by this new majority, Le Duan was finally able to obtain adoption—at the Fourth Plenum in July 1978—of the principle that China had become "Vietnam's direct and most dangerous enemy."

After the Socialist Republic of Vietnam had joined CEMA in June 1978, it signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union on 3 November 1978.

Neutralization of the pro-Chinese faction at the Fourth Party Congress was but the culmination of a lengthy process. Pro-Chinese elements in Hanoi had been left dangling, as it were, following Richard Nixon's dramatic visit to China in the spring of 1972, a visit that had initiated a normalization of Sino-American relations. The final victory in the spring of 1975 had, in fact, also marked an important victory of the pro-Soviet faction over the pro-Chinese faction. The break in internal and external balances of power then became public. The Fourth Congress adopted Le Duan's position on Vietnam's "internationalist mission," thereby heralding the country's integration into the Soviet system. Contrary to all appearances, Hanoi had renounced Ho Chi Minh's legacy which held that it was imperative to preserve the balance of power between the Soviet Union and China. Domestically, the factions were henceforth no longer compelled to be of "one mind", a constraint imposed upon them by the pressures of the war. Partisan conflicts had definitely become more intense than the sense of survival which had united the factions for decades. Factionalism, which had paradoxically served as a sort of internal driving force during the war, had become in peacetime, consistent with its very nature, a factor of divisiveness, if not weakness.

The myth of party unity was soon to suffer a severe blow. In February 1980 on the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the party, there occurred what is conventionally called a peaceful coup d'etat in Hanoi. Four historic figures of Vietnamese communism were removed from governmental positions, thereby inflicting "a substantial setback on the collective leadership's infallibility." General Vo Nguyen Giap, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, Interior Minister Tran Quoc Han, and State Planning Committee Chairman Le Than Nghi, were dropped from the Political Bureau at the Fifth Party Congress in March 1982. These four former comrades in arms of Ho Chi Minh were accused of being "soft" on China. Actually, the Le Duan-Le Duc Tho clique considered them much too unreliable to be retained in the party leadership. Especially
as the Fifth Congress was about to officially proclaim Vietnam's alignment with the Soviet Union. These moves definitively completed the break in the balance of power within the Vietnamese communist leadership.

The fact that Le Duc finally emerged after the Fifth Congress as the party's "esteemed leader", without any apparent factional contention, was due to the efforts of his ally Le Duc Tho, the principal architect of the purges conducted since 1976. The alliance between Le Duan and Le Duc Tho was more likely a matter of convenience, if not necessity, inasmuch as Le Duan was not in a position to consolidate his power by himself alone. The party general secretary did not possess Uncle Ho's stature and had never obtained the unanimous support that would have enabled him to act as a respected leader. In fact, Le Duan had always conducted himself as the figurehead of Hanoi's pro-Soviet faction. He had depended on Le Duc Tho to rally to his side those who shared the same interests, if not designs. Le Duc Tho, in turn, relied on Le Duan to strengthen his own authority as a means of gaining control of the party organization and activities. Thus Le Duan had steadily increased Le Duc Tho's authority by making the Central Organization Committee the most powerful of the Central Committee agencies. Cooperation between the two men was so close that Le Duc Tho had been disparagingly dubbed "Le Duan's shadow."

As a matter of fact, it was with Le Duc Tho's help that Le Duan had secured control of the management of military affairs. During the major shakeup of 1980, Le Duc Tho was named chairman of the party's powerful Central Military Affairs Committee. The latter formulates all of the regime's military policy and particularly that policy with regard to Cambodia and China. Le Duc Tho was now in a position to assure himself of the loyalty of the officers of the People's Army. In fact, he lost no time in ousting all of General Vo Nguyen Giap's former associates. The Le Duan group likewise made extensive use of the internal security machinery to assure itself of the loyalty of party members. In February 1980, Le Duan appointed his most trusted lieutenant, Pham Hung, already a member of the Political Bureau, as minister of interior. In a related development, Le Duc Tho's brother, Mai Chi Tho, was named deputy minister of interior responsible for security matters in South Vietnam.

Such a concentration of police power in the hands of the Le Duan group made a mockery of collective leadership within the party. According to Hoang Van Hoan, internal security agents were intervening more and more at all levels: "They (Le Duan and his associates) made it a rule to have representatives of the Department of Public Security present in all party organizations and at all party committee levels. These agents were assigned the task of maintaining surveillance of party committees and spying on those individuals who did not belong to their clique. The persons "under surveillance" frequently became the objects of false accusations. By these actions, Le Duan and his henchmen scuttled the party principle of internal democracy. Party members were muzzled and could no longer vent their views on party and governmental affairs. Even the Central Committee and Political Bureau had ceased to function as collective leadership bodies."
To make matters worse, the Hanoi regime was turning into a sort of "nepotistical-dictatorial system". The party and government were stricken with what is conventionally called "the Albanian syndrome". Family centralism, an obvious sign of political degeneration previously observed in Albania and North Korea, gradually replaced "democratic centralism" within party activities. The regime was now actually under a dual family dictatorship inasmuch as the party and government were controlled by two clans: Le Duan's family on the one hand, and Le Duc Tho's brothers on the other.

Well-informed sources have confirmed the fact that Le Duan controlled through his son Le Hong the special forces attached to the Political Bureau and Central Committee. Another of his sons, Le Anh, commanded the Hanoi regional air defense missile system. A son-in-law, Tran Lam, a colonel in the Intelligence Service, "unofficially" but nonetheless effectively supervised the Central Propaganda Committee which exercises supreme control over all radio, television, and propaganda services. Lam's brother, Tran Quynh, headed the Nguyen Ai Quoc Institute, the holy of holies of the regime's ideological orthodoxy. He served as chairman of the State Planning Committee until March 1982 when he became Vietnam's permanent representative to CEMA. Dao Dinh Luyen, Le Duan's son-in-law, commanded the Vietnamese Air Force while his second wife maintained a vast network of influential connections among party committees within her native region, the southern Delta. Although this list is by no means exhaustive, it does show to what extent Le Duan was bent on securing control of the regime's most sensitive agencies and organizations.

Le Duc Tho and his brothers displayed a similar proclivity for family centralism. Le Duc Tho's role as an all-powerful apparatchik was well-known. At the Fourth Party Congress in December 1976, Le Duc Tho had appropriately earned the nickname of "godfather" by placing his three brothers on the newly-elected Central Committee. As we have already indicated, Mai Chi Tho, who headed Ho Chi Minh City's People's Committee, had become South Vietnam's strongman in charge of security matters. General Dinh Duc Thein, the People's Army director of logistics, was appointed minister of communications and transportation in February 1980. Le Duc Tho's third brother, Nguyen Duc Than, was also named general secretary of the Federation of Vietnam Trade Unions. At the Fifth Party Congress in March 1982, another one of Tho's cousins, Nguyen Duc Tam, even became a member of the Political Bureau, succeeding Le Duc Tho as chairman of the Central Organization Committee. This was how power was being transmitted inside the family. Oddly enough, Le Duc Tho and his brothers or cousins do not share the same surname. This is a deliberate attempt to camouflage what is really happening and to obtain a better division of labor. Nevertheless, the truth will always out in Hanoi's "factionalized" political community.

Naturally, such outright cases of nepotism aroused serious opposition within the party. This inevitably gave rise to successive purges. Personnel changes these past few years have created a state of confusion, if not paralysis, within the system, thereby even further exacerbating the bureaucratic muddle. The selection of new cadres by the Le Duan-Le Duc Tho group was made on the basis of criteria so contrary to party custom that Nguyen Duy Trinh himself
felt compelled, as early as 1976, to denounce—in a now famous article published in the review HOC TAP—"the practice consisting in employing and recommending cadres on the basis of personal relationships and feelings of sympathy or antipathy, and on the basis of a common geographical origin, a practice which inevitably fosters the formation of factions within the party."27 The regime's internal crisis had led to such a degree of degeneration that the former justice minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government was prompted to characterize it as follows: "Le Duan is obsessed with power. He intends to rule with and through his family. The Le Duc Tho system is a party within the party. The Pham Van Dong administration is continually running into obstacles erected by Truong Chinh. Everyone obeys solely the instructions of his own clan".28

It is against this backdrop of a decaying collective leadership that the party is currently readying itself to convene its next congress. When that congress opens, it will face a series of uncertainties. How much longer will the Le Duan-Le Duc Tho coalition last, an entente that has so well served the personal interests of both men since 1976? In the event Le Duan, who is in declining health, should leave the political scene, how will power relationships then evolve? When the Old Guard departs, how will a new generation assume leadership of the Vietnam Communist Party?

At all events, factionalism has been triumphant within the Hanoi leadership ever since the Le Duan-Le Duc Tho coalition's uncontested victory. The old traditional groups no longer exist and their leaders are now merely the political hostages of a degenerate system. To all appearances, Truong Chinh retains his number two ranking in the regime's hierarchy. Yet his election as chairman of the State Council in July 1981—primarily a protocolary position—cannot conceal the fact that with the downfall of his lieutenants he has gradually lost all his power bases such as the National Assembly, the Federation of Vietnam Trade Unions, the Fatherland Front, and the Communist Youth Movement.29

As for Pham Van Dong, he is in no better position inasmuch as his influence has greatly waned with the departure of his moderate colleagues and, in particular, of his old friend Vo Nguyen Giap. The historic figures who were removed at the Fifth Congress and could have somewhat challenged Le Duan, no longer have any chance of returning to power. Today, Pham Van Dong is exhausting his last reserves of energy combating the bureaucracy at a time when he is surrounded only by "technocrats" selected by Le Duc Tho.

While Le Duan as the party's "esteemed leader" does seem to hold an uncontested position, Le Duc Tho appears capable of profiting from the concentration of power in Hanoi within the near future. The second generation of Political Bureau members elected in 1976 and the third generation of newcomers promoted in 1985 should most likely secure Le Duc Tho almost unshared power in the event of Le Duan's death. Indeed, the present 15-man Political Bureau includes a solid group of Le Duc Tho lieutenants who are unconditionally loyal to him personally. These include: Generals Van Tien Dung, Le Dung Anh, and Dong Si Nguyen; Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach; and Nguyen Duc Tam, the party's senior organizational official.30 In addition, Le Duc Tho's political following and connections within the Central Committee are by far the most imposing. Le Duc Tho will, therefore, be in a position to exercise direct control
over the entire intricate machinery of government, including party organization, military affairs, internal security, diplomacy and the Cambodian question. Yet Le Duc Tho also belongs to the gerontracy—one of the most durable in communist annals—which has continuously led the Vietnamese communist movement for nearly half a century. Considering his advanced age—75 in 1985—Le Duc Tho's ascension to the supreme position could be but a transitional phase, as was the case with Yuri Andropov. Hence Le Duc Tho's death should trigger a prolonged successional crisis.

As in the past, factionalism continues to play a dynamic role among Vietnamese communist leaders. At each decisive turning point in its history, this Vietnamese communist movement has been radicalized by the one-upmanship maneuvering of extremist rival factions. For example, in December 1946, Viet Minh radicals, at the urging of Truong Chin, rejected the policy of compromise with France—a policy desperately desired by Ho Chi Minh—and imposed instead a policy of war to the death. In 1958, southern activists under Le Duan's leadership succeeded in gaining party authorization to move from "a peaceful line" to a policy of armed struggle in South Vietnam, thus embroiling Vietnam in a new cycle of endless warfare. The respite following the final victory in 1975 was short-lived. Once again, the regime's hardliners—led by Le Duc Tho—chose integration into the Soviet bloc, the Cambodian adventure, and confrontation with China, even at the price of massive purges. Today, factionalism is in the driver's seat in Hanoi. This explains why the Vietnam Communist Party refuses to budge even one inch from its Cambodian policy despite widespread pressures from many people, diplomatic isolation, the economic blockade, and Khmer resistance. Like a devouring machine, martial communism continues to abide by its one-sided logic, while still ruled by the same gerontocracy.

FOOTNOTES


15. Ibid.


17. Author's conversations with a few high-ranking dissidents living in exile in Europe and China, May-August 1980.


19. In Vietnamese, "Duan voi Tho nhu bong voi hinh".


22. Statement by Hoang Van Hoan, NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 31 August 1979.


24. Information on Le Duan's family were obtained from several concordant dissident sources. See P.J. Honey, CHINA NEWS ANALYSIS, No 74, pp 3-4.


26. In Vietnamese, "Cau Cau", in reference to one of Ngo Dinh Diem's brothers.


29. Until the Fifth National Congress of March 1982, Truong Chinh ruled the National Assembly, whereas Dang Quoc Bao controlled the Communist Youth Movement, and Hoang Quoc Viet controlled the trade unions and the Fatherland Front.

30. All of these men worked directly for Le Duc Tho during more than a decade (1970-1982).
The senior general begins his article as follows: Exactly 40 years ago, on 7 September 1945, President Ho Chi Minh ordered the founding of our Army's General Staff and staff service. When personally assigning this task, he pointed out many fundamental and important questions determining the orientation, building, operations, and progress of the General Staff and staff organs at all levels of the entire Army.

The gist of what he said was this: We have just regained independence and freedom, and the entire country is actively building the liberation army and self-defense forces to join the entire people in safeguarding this independence and freedom. The provisional government has decided to organize a Ministry of National Defense. Now our mass organization must set up a General Staff to command and direct the Armed Forces nationwide. The General Staff is a secret military organ of the mass organization and the nerve center of the Army, entrusted with the tasks of efficiently organizing and training the Army; organizing a meticulous study of the enemy's situation and ours; devising clever stratagems; and taking realistic, secret, expeditious, timely and accurate organizational and command actions to vanquish all enemies and safeguard the revolutionary gains. At present, we face difficulties because of our lack of experience in staff work, but we must strive to learn while carrying out this task. With resolve, we will succeed, no matter how difficult this task may be. We will certainly be able to build a strong and competent staff service worthy of the resourceful, creative, heroic, and undaunted Vietnamese people to defend the fatherland's independence and the nation's freedom.

In compliance with President Ho Chi Minh's instructions, we immediately set out to build the general staff, our Army's highest staff organ, at a time when none of our cadres had ever done any staff work and when we lacked almost everything needed, including maps, information, telephones, and offices. The general staff began to take shape in September 1945, manned by a number...
of cadres coming from the various resistance zones, some cadres who were members of the Youths for National Salvation Organization, and patriotic soldiers who once served in the enemy's army and were sent by the party organization of Hanoi. Aided by a party cell, these cadres were quickly organized into combat, intelligence, personnel, equipment, signal, and cryptographic components. Thereafter, the staff organs of various levels were successively set up.

Following this introduction, the article deals with the general staff's activities in the initial stage of the anti-French war of resistance. The first achievement was that the general staff lost no time in unifying the command of the Armed Forces in the north and organizing the provision of assistance for the southern battlefield, an extremely important and urgent task at that time.

During the early days of the revolutionary administration, the country had to face an utterly complex situation and cope with numerous foreign aggressors and internal enemies. But, benefitting from the leadership of the party Central Committee, the General Staff, despite its lack of experience, undertook to carry out many harrowing urgent tasks. It guided the building and development of the People's Armed Forces; urgently organized and sent hard-159-the-south detachments to assist the Nam Bo and southern Trung Bo administrations in their anti-French wars of resistance; struggled against Kuomintang militarists and their henchmen to protect the revolutionary administration; and led the struggle to force France to implement the 6 March 1946 Preliminary Agreement. But, most importantly, it guides the preparations in all fields for protracted war of resistance of the entire people under the party leadership.

In the 1st year of the nationwide war of resistance, in the face of the French colonialist scheme of expanding the war to occupy our entire country, the general staff, executing the party Central Committee Standing Committee's directive and heeding President Ho Chí Minh's appeal, instructed the Armed Forces to coordinate with the entire people in mounting simultaneous attacks against enemy troops in a number of towns and cities, guided and directed the fight for several days in the cities, and shifted the entire country to a state of war. It concentrated on guiding the building of the Viet Bac base, capital of the resistance, and later successfully led the preparation for and execution of the 1947 fall-winter counteroffensives in Viet Bac, thereby following the enemy's strike-fast strategy.

Next, Senior General Hoang Van Thai briefly describes the activities of the General Staff during the anti-French and anti-U.S. wars of resistance.

After the fight for national liberation and entering the period of defending the independent, unified, and socialist fatherland, he writes: The General Staff began to implement the party's policy of consolidating national defense and defending the fatherland. Despite all the early difficulties brought about by the new tasks in the new period and by the confrontation with new combat targets under new conditions, the General Staff, under the direct leadership and guidance of the Political Bureau and the party Central Committee Military Commission led by Comrade General Secretary Le Duan, adopted a correct
viewpoint toward our nation's new enemy, and on this basis, it actively and urgently provided guidance and directly organized activities in all fields to defeat all of the enemy's acts of aggression.

The successive victories scored in the two wars of national defense against the new enemy at both ends of our country to defend the fatherland firmly and help the Cambodian people escape from the genocidal clique were glorious armed exploits of our Armed Forces and people, and, at the same time, they were the successes of the various commanding echelons and the General Staff is organizing the people's war for national defense in accordance with the party's military line for the period of building and defending the socialist fatherland.

Ending this part, [word indistinct] senior general stresses: Over past decades, along with outstandingly fulfilling the tasks of guiding the organization and building of the Armed Forces, organizing military training, and providing combat guidance, the General Staff has, together with the Political General Department, the Rear Service General Department, and the Technical General Department, guided the Armed Forces in carrying out economic construction tasks satisfactorily, participating in the maintenance of public order and security, helping the people prevent and control typhoons and floods, and stepping up production to partially meet the Army's material needs. [passage as received] In recent years, the General Staff has directed the Armed Forces to coordinate activities with the various sectors and the entire people in countering the multifaceted war of sabotage and the border-nibbling war by the enemy.

Under the direct guidance of the Political Bureau and the party Central Committee Military Commission, the General Staff has concentrated all intellect and energy on studying and reviewing the experience gained during the 30 years of the war for liberation to help supplement and constantly improve the Vietnamese military art in the people's war for national defense, to consolidate the all-people national defense system, to build the People's Armed Forces, and to ready the country in all respects for struggle against aggression by any enemies under any circumstances.

Imbued with the party's internationalist line, firmly grasping the viewpoint that Indochina is one battlefield, and thoroughly understanding our Army's internationalist duty, the General Staff, together with the various general departments, has guided our troops in realizing a strategic and militant alliance with the fraternal peoples and armies of Laos and the PRK on the battlefields of these two friendly countries in all the wars of resistance against the French, the Americans, and the expansionists-hegemonists, thereby contributing to building the firm alliance of the three fraternal countries on the Indochina Peninsula.

Continuing, Senior General Hoang Van Thai once again asserts the practical meaning over the past 40 years of the instructions given by President Ho Chi Minh when he ordered the General Staff to be set up.

The article says in conclusion: It is necessary to make the General Staff and the staff organs at all levels firmer and stronger. Proceeding from
the major lessons of experience gained during the past 30 years and based on the requirements of the current tasks, we must compile, perfect, and promulgate a regulation on staff work and resolutely perform all tasks in accordance with the standardized pattern laid down in the regulation. The General Staff and the entire staff service must strive to bring their capability up to the level required by their tasks so as to be worthy of being the staff of the powerful People's Armed Forces; of the standardized and modernized people's revolutionary army; of the people's war for national defense in modern times, and of the comprehensive, modern, and allied all-people national defense system.

It is necessary to continue fostering the existing contingent of cadres and urgently train their successors. Proceeding from the general requirements concerning cadres' qualifications and capabilities as well as from the special characteristics and requirements of staff work in the new situation, every staff cadre of any unit throughout the army, first of all those belonging to the General Staff, must remain totally loyal to the revolution; absolutely abide by the party's leadership; and resolutely carry out party directives and resolutions, state law, and directives and orders of their commanders. At the same time, they must be well versed in staff work operations; forge a highly principled character; develop a strict sense of organization and discipline; adopt an urgent and precise conduct; improve their political sharpness; and possess comprehensive knowledge in the military, political, economic, legal, scientific, and technological fields.

These are the inevitable and pressing requirements for staff work, staff organs, and the contingent of staff cadres. They are designed to contribute to making the staff service strong and capable so that it will be worthy to serve the resourceful, creative, heroic, and indomitable Vietnamese nation as instructed by President Ho Chi Minh.

CSO: 4209/637
RADIO DIRECTOR'S STATEMENT ON 40TH ANNIVERSARY

BK091317 Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 7 Sep 85

[Statement by Tran Lam, member of CPV Central Committee, chairman of the Vietnam Commission for Radio and Television, and director general of the Voice of Vietnam—recorded in Vietnamese fading into English translation; date not given]

[Text] Mr Tran Lam says: Exactly 40 years ago, at 1130 on 7 September 1945, the Voice of Vietnam was officially on the air, just 5 days after our late President Ho Chi Minh gave birth to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, now the SRV.

Right after seizing power, President Ho Chi Minh and the party Central Committee found it necessary to set up a radio station for the purpose of communications and propaganda at home and abroad. Through our overseas services, very important at that time, the voice of justice and militancy of the Vietnamese people tore off the obscure curtain of imperialism, extending far beyond our frontier to all parts of the world to confirm the existence of Vietnam, a newly independent and free nation.

The foreword of our first program read as follows: Under the gold-starred red flag, the Voice of Vietnam goes together with the entire compatriots and struggles for a plentiful and happy life of the entire nation and for the unity of all Vietnamese nationalities, thus materializing the oath of independence and never returning to the life of slavery.

That program was broadcast not only in Vietnamese but also in French, English, Chinese, and Esperanto. One week later, our senior editors transformed the two daily French and English bulletins into printed media style to be telexed to the world in the name of VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY. Born in the seething atmosphere of the August revolution, radio the Voice of Vietnam enjoyed warm sympathy from the great majority of domestic and foreign listeners, though in the first days its transmission capacity was very small and its staff very thin and mostly inexperienced. I myself was then a law student.

Dear listeners, over the past 40 years, the Vietnamese revolution has gone through extremely serious trials but has won glorious victories. The Voice of Vietnam is very proud of standing in the ranks of the revolutionary army.
Every hour of the day and night, the Voice of Vietnam informs its listeners of the historic developments of our nation and, moreover, is very active in the revolutionary process. For this very reason, our enemies have sought every means to stifle the Voice of Vietnam. In the past resistance war against the French colonialism, our radio staff followed President Ho Chi Minh and the party Central Committee into the Viet Bac resistance base area. Therefore, we became the target of the mopping-up operations and air raids by the French colonialists. Highly vigilant and well protected by the people, we remained safe to be the first to inform the world of the Dien Bien Phu victory on 7 May 1954.

When the United States conducted its air war of destruction against North Vietnam, our correspondents, producers, and technicians had to work under U.S. bombing. Many correspondents laid down their lives during their missions. During this period of time, the Voice of Vietnam had different programs for target audience in the south. The overseas service, broadcast in 12 languages, also paid much attention to its target audiences in different parts of the world. Particularly, the English programs for U.S. expeditionary forces greatly affected American G.I.'s in South Vietnam and on board the U.S. Seventh Fleet. To help make the American people understand the realities in Vietnam, from 1968 to 1976, the Voice of Vietnam had a group of correspondents working in Havana, Cuba, for the programs beaming to the United States through Radio Havana.

Being aware of the effects of the Voice of Vietnam, the United States pursued a search-and-destroy policy in an attempt to gag the mouth of Vietnam's voice of justice. On the morning of 19 December 1972, U.S. B-52 stratofortresses and tactical fighter bombers conducted five air raids and carpet bombings against the Voice of Vietnam, razing to the ground its transmitting station in Me Tri. But the Voice of Vietnam was choked for only 9 minutes and then immediately continued its broadcasts with an undaunted voice.

CSO: 4200/1523

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VO VAN KIET SPEAKS AT CONFERENCE—A press conference on the first national sports festival was held at the Ba Dinh club here Wednesday in the presence of Vo Van Kiet, political bureau member of the communist party of Vietnam Central Committee, vice chairman of the council of ministers and head of the steering committee of the festival. Speaking at the conference, Vo Van Kiet said the sports festival will be a demonstration of the strength of the solidarity and unity of the country's physical training and sports movement. The festival, he went on, will be one of important forms to gear up the sports movement to serve the cause of socialist construction and national defence. The festival is due to be held from 22-29 September. More than 1,300 athletes from 42 cities, provinces, and special sector and from the army and security services are expected to take part in the event. They will compete in seven games including swimming, track-and-field, table-tennis, volleyball, wrestling, shooting and gymnastics. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1529 GMT 12 Sept 85 OW]

LE DUAN ATTENDS ANNIVERSARY—More than 200 cultural and artistic activists and cadres of cultural and information service have gathered here recently to mark the 30th founding anniversary of the cultural service. It was attended by Le Duan, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, who was briefed by Minister of Culture Nguyen Van Hieu on the efforts and achievements made by the cultural service over the past 30 years, particularly since the reunification of the country. Speaking to the participants, General Secretary Le Duan commended the service for all its efforts and achievements in building a new culture and the new socialist type of people. He urged the cultural workers to make culture a common property that binds every people, every family to the entire society. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1526 GMT 11 Sept 85 OW]

COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE DAY MARKED—The communications service of the VPA Monday [9 September] held a meeting to mark its 40th anniversary, 9 September. Do Muoi, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers attended the meeting. On this occasion, President of the State Council Truong Chinh sent a letter to all officers, combatants, and workers of the communications service. [Text] [Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 9 Sept 85 BK]
MAUSOLEUM ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION--Hanoi VNA 10 September--More than 8 million visitors have paid tribute at the President Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum in Hanoi, according to the Management Committee at a ceremony marking the 10th anniversary of the mausoleum's formal dedication. The event was attended by, among others, Do Muoi, Political Bureau member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee and vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers. The visitors included 136,770 foreigners from 111 countries and 61 international organizations. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 0719 GMT 10 Sep 85 OW]
VIETNAM'S HOANG LIEN SON PROVINCE FEATURED

OW111211 Hanoi VNA in English 0809 GMT 11 Sept 85

[Text] Hanoi VNA 10 September--Hoang Lien Son was the first mountain province in Vietnam to obtain the annual rice yield of five tons per hectare, double the national average. The merger of three former provinces of Lao Cai, Yen Bai and Nghia Lo Oang Lien Son is a buffer zone between the northwest and Viet Bac, the old base of the revolution.

In the fight against the French as well as U.S. imperialists and more recently against the Chinese expansionists Hoang Lien Son was always a firm resistance base. The population of Hoang Lien Son shot down 116 U.S. aircraft, and put out of action 19,200 Chinese soldiers in February 1979.

In agriculture, the cultivated acreage has increased five-fold over the pre-revolution period when slash-and-burn single-cropping of rice was the only farming practice in the province. Food output rose from 173,000 tons in 1975 to 265,000 tons in 1984. In 1983, Hoang Lien Son was the first mountain province in the country to pass the "five-ton" hurdle. Last year, it got 5.4 tons of rice and other food crops per hectare. Unlike in the past the ethnic minorities on the highlands (?) now) are planting high-yield rice strains and chemical fertilizers [as received]. (?A) strong boost has been given to the growing of industrial crops especially tea. The tea area has extended to 10,000 hectare complete with a series of tea-processing factories capable of curing more than 3,000 tons of dried tea yearly. Before the August revolution, transport in the province was done only through the Hanoi-Lao Cai railway, and a few dozen kilometers of highway linking the Yen Bai and Phu Tho townships. Today, Hoang Lien Son has more than one thousand kilometres of carriageable roads leading to all districts and two thirds of the villages including remote mountain hamlets.

In 1984, another 100 kilometres of roads were built to connect the district towns with the remote villages and hamlets lying 1,000 metres above sea level.

Industrial production in Hoang Lien Son is blessed by the existence of the Thac Ba hydro-electric plant, the Lao Cai apatite mine and the apatite ore sorting plant. The province has built a number of small industrial establishments producing porcelain and earthenware and building materials or processing dried tea and cinnamon.
Before the revolution, 98 percent of the local population were illiterate. Today, all villages have basic general schools and all districts have secondary general schools, one out of every five inhabitants is going to school. The whole province counts 1,635 medical doctors and secondary-level physicians many of them of minority origin, compared with barely two doctors in the colonial day.

CSO: 4200/1541
PERIODICAL AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES REVIEWED

OW130156 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 10 Sept 85

[Text] According to the Statistics General Department, by 5 September the entire country had planted more than 2,459,500 hectares of 10th-month rice, or 75.9 percent of the planned area, including 1,255,400 hectares in the northern localities, or 94.1 percent of the planned area, and 1,204,120 hectares in the southern localities, or 63.1 percent of the planned area.

The pace of planting the 10th-month rice in southern localities was slow because efforts had been concentrated on the summer-fall rice harvest. Tien Giang and An Giang Provinces have completed the rice harvest. Hau Giang Province had completed harvesting 60 percent of the planted area, while Kien Giang and Quang Nam-Danang Provinces had harvested only 30-35 percent of the planted area.

About 360,000 hectares of rice planted in the north after the beginning of autumn must be properly tended to ensure the rice yield and volume of production. The 10th-month rice area currently affected by harmful insects and diseases has appeared to be on the rise. In fact, this affected area has increased to 152,000 hectares from 131,000 hectares in the past week.

Typhoon No. 3 and the tropical depression in the past week have triggered rainfalls in many localities, but have helped reduce the drought-affected area by more than 100,000 hectares. Due to the heavy rain, as many as 100,000 hectares of rice have been waterlogged, including 20,000-30,000 hectares each in the Provinces of Ha Nam Ninh and Ha Bac, and rice plants in some areas have rotted, including Thai Binh and Hai Hung Provinces with 1,500 and more than 2,000 hectares, respectively. Since the water level in the rivers has risen and the majority of drainage sluices have been closed, it has been suggested that, along with mobilizing manpower to fight waterlogging, the Ministry of Power continue to intensify the electricity supply to water pumping stations in order to drain water from rice paddies.

According to the Meteorological and Hydrological General Department, there will be heavy rain in vast areas in various localities in the coming 10 days. Therefore, the supply of electricity to water pumping stations must be intensified in order to protect the 10th-month rice.
According to the statistics General Department, the planting of vegetables and subsidiary and industrial crops has not been accelerated. In general, the cultivated area has diminished. For instance, the planted sugarcane area has reached only 47.9 percent of the area planted in the corresponding period last year.

The Ministry of Agriculture has urged the northern localities to concentrate efforts on fighting waterlogging, tending the 10th-month rice, working out the winter rice planting plan, and vaccinating domestic animals against epizootic diseases. As for the southern provinces, they should use all available means and manpower to quickly harvest the summer-fall rice and prevent flashfloods, and should concentrate efforts on planting the 10th-month rice. Long An Province should concentrate on winter rice cultivation. Domestic animals should also be vaccinated against epizootic diseases.

CSO: 4209/637
HEAVY RAIN REPORTED IN BAC BO DELTA, MIDLANDS

September 1985

[Text] Due to the recent tropical depression, since 9 September rainfall has been recorded at 200-250 mm in the provinces of the Bac Bo delta and midlands areas. Heavy rain was also reported in various localities. Rainfall in Thanh Hoa and Nghe Tinh Provinces measures more than 300 mm: Thieu Son District of Thanh Hoa, 450 mm; Vinh City of Nghe Tinh, 400 mm. In Nghe Tinh and Binh Tri Thien Provinces the rain has helped solve the water shortage caused by the recent drought. The water levels in various rivers have increased.

Heavy rain caused by Typhoon No. 4 on 24 August caused waterlogging of 132,000 hectares of 10th-month rice in provinces of the Bac Bo Delta and midlands areas and Thanh Hoa. The recent downpours caused additional waterlogging of areas in the region. According to preliminary reports from localities as of 10 September 145,000 hectares of rice had been submerged, mostly in Ha Nam Ninh, Hai Hung, Ha Bac, Ha Son Binh, Thanh Hoa, and Thai Binh Provinces and outskirt areas of Hanoi.

These localities are striving to fight the waterlogging to save the 10th-month ricefields. Ha Nam Ninh, Hai Hung, and Ba Bac have provided most of their electric power to various water pumping stations, supplied more gasoline to water pumping posts. Various low-lying districts in Ha Nam Ninh, Ha Bac, and Hai Hung have supervised various grassroots units in strengthening and repairing dikes and accelerating drainage work. Thai Binh, Ha Son Binh, and Ha Nam Ninh have urged cadres and workers to properly maintain water pumping machines, keep a close watch on the water levels in rivers, and use all facilities to drain water from ricefields.

The rain is likely to continue, thus waterlogged areas in the north will increase. In addition to efforts made by localities to cope with waterlogging, the state is striving to supply more electric power to localities on a 20-24 hour a day basis, starting from 11 September. The Water Conservancy Ministry has also supervised localities in drainage work to optimally save ricefields.

CSO: 4209/637
HEAVY RAINFALL WATERLOGS 200,000 HA OF RICE

BK130924 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 12 Sept 85

[Text] Due to the Typhoon No. 3 and tropical depression, there was moderate and heavy rainfall in the northern provinces in the past few days. Heavy rainfall has waterlogged more than 200,000 hectares of 10th-month rice. All the area of 10th-month rice in Gia Vien and Hoang Long Districts of Ha Nam Ninh Province has been waterlogged.

Waterlogging is serious in Thai Binh, Ha Bac, Ha Son Binh, Hai Hung, and Thanh Hoa. The water level in the Red, Cau, Thai Binh, Hoang Long, Chu, and Ma Rivers has risen very high, causing heavy floods.

According to a forecast of the meteorological service, the rain will continue to fall in the next few days and will be likely causing heavy waterlogging in ricefields and floods in rivers. Faced with such a situation, the Central Flood and Typhoon Control Committee has sent out a message urging provinces to simultaneously fight waterlogging and flood with determination to protect dikes and minimizes damages caused by flashfloods.

As electricity is still in short supply, provinces must concentrate all electricity on fighting waterlogging. On high areas, people should be mobilized to make the most use of all water baling buckets and water wheels and to raise ricefield plot embankment in fighting waterlogging to save rice.

The Flood and Typhoon Control Committees of all provinces, villages, and districts must send their forces to the dikes and concentrate all manpower on fighting waterlogging. They must be ready to cope with all possible occurrences. Arrangements must be made by all sectors to protect goods and facilities in rivers and be prepared to fight waterlogging. Army units must also be ready to help fight waterlogging in localities of their duty station.

CSO: 4209/637
HEAVY RAIN REPORTED—Heavy rain in the past few days has submerged many ricefields and raised the water level in all rivers in northern provinces. Rainfall is over 500 mm and, in some places, over 700 mm. According to the initial statistics, 300,000 hectares of ricefields in 9 provinces around Hanoi were flooded. The water level of the Red River is much higher than the normal one. All localities in northern Vietnam are concentrating efforts on fighting flood and protecting dikes. The Hanoi municipal people's committee instructed all districts and services to take necessary measures to fight flood. In Thanh Hoa Province, 35,000 hectares of earring rice and subsidiary crops are submerged. All people are mobilized to fight the flood. In Tho Xuan and Thieu Yen Districts, 200,000 people take all available means to protect the dike system and fight floods. [Text] [Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 13 Sept 85 BK]
HCM CITY MARKS VOICE OF VIETNAM'S ANNIVERSARY

OW130005 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 11 Sept 85

[Text] A report by a resident correspondent of the Voice of Vietnam in Ho Chi Minh City says that recently, the representative organ of the Vietnam Radio and Television Commission held a grand ceremony in the city to mark the 40th founding anniversary of the Voice of Vietnam and the electronic newspaper sector [nganhf baos chis dieen] tuwr] for the southern provinces.

Attending the ceremony were Comrade Nguyen Van Linh, member of the Political Bureau of the CPV Central Committee and secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee, and Comrade Le Van Triet, alternate member of the CPV Central Committee and vice chairman of the city People's Committee. Also present were delegates from the radio and television stations of the provinces and municipalities from Thuan Hai to Minh Hai; representatives of organs and services under the Vietnam Radio and Television Commission in the city; representatives of the Can Tho and Ho Chi Minh City television stations; and many comrades who had taken part in building and leading the sector when it was first created.

During the ceremony, Comrade Nguyen Thanh, director of the representative agency and representative of the Vietnam Radio and Television Commission, read a sector report in which he reviewed the 40-year tradition of the Voice of Vietnam and the electronic newspaper sector as well as the 15-year tradition of the television sector.

The report pointed out: Starting from scratch, over the past 40 years, the radio and television sector, through the development of its spirit of self-reliance, daringness and determination to overcome all difficulties, has developed and matured step-by-step in its efforts to carry out the party's varied tasks in all stages of revolution.

The report also emphasized the sector's faithfulness to the party's policy lines.

Addressing the participants, Comrade Nguyen Van Linh hailed the continuous efforts of the radio and television sector in implementing the party's tasks. He recalled the radio sector's emotional momentoes during the wars of resistance. He stressed the role and impact of radio stations in mobilizing
and educating the masses and in guiding their revolutionary actions. He expressed the hope that the radio and television sector, developing that role, will become a genuine link between the party-administration and the masses and serve the masses in a more practical and efficient manner.

The radio and television sector, he added, should firmly grasp the party's policy lines and closely reflect the masses' life and aspirations. In doing so, it will enhance the quality and efficiency of radio and television programs. He reminded the sector to concern itself with remote rural areas and to adopt measures to better resolve problems concerning the facilities for the people's public radio listening and television viewing.

CSO: 4209/637
VNA HISTORY, ACTIVITIES IN PAST 40 YEARS REVIEWED


The first bulletin of Vietnam News Agency released in Vietnamese, English and French for both domestic and foreign audiences on 15 September 1945, contained the Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam read by President Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi on 2 September 1945.

Starting from a small technical base with a handful of receivers and transmitters of the 50-100 watt category, VNA has within forty years grown into an information service, a news and photo bank with a constantly modernizing technical base, with bureaus throughout the country and at important centres abroad.

Giai Phong (Liberation) News Agency (GPA), the information service of the national front for liberation and the provisional revolutionary government of the Republic of South Vietnam, was founded on 12 October 1960.

After the complete liberation of South Vietnam and the reunification of the country in 1975, GPA and VNA were unified to become the single national news agency.

At present VNA receives each day:
- 80 hours of newscast from its bureaus in the country
- 220 hours of newscast from foreign agencies, and its bureaus abroad.
- 22 hours of telephoto cast from some foreign agencies, photo international and member countries of the European Press Agency (EPA)

Each day VNA transmits:
- 15 hours of newscast for its bureaus in the country.
- 10 hours of telex for newspapers, the radio and six bureaus of foreign agencies in Hanoi.
- From 12 to 15 hours of newscast in English, French and Spanish for foreign audiences.
- 5 hours of telephoto cast for home and foreign monitors.
VNA maintains round-the-clock satellite communications with TASS in Moscow, direct links with MTI in Budapest, with Prensa Latina in Havana and PTI in New Delhi by satellite via TASS.

The total of words received and transmitted reaches 150 million a year.

Apart from daily bulletins, VNA has been publishing three weekly bulletins:

1) NEWS WEEK dealing with political, economic, cultural and social issues at home and abroad.

2) THE SPORT AND CULTURE WEEKLY dealing with sports and culture and cultural and artistic issues in Vietnam and the world.

3) THE WORLD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMY WEEKLY introducing achievements in science, technology and economy of various countries in the world.

The Vietnam PICTORIAL is published in Vietnamese, Lao, Khmer, Spanish, Russian, English, French and Chinese for foreign readers. So far, VNA has signed bilateral agreements on the exchange of photos and news with the following agencies:

1. AAN (Nicaragua)
2. ADN (DGR)
3. AGERPRESS (Romania)
4. AFP (France)
5. AIN (Cuba)
6. ANA (DPR of Yemen)
7. ANTARA (Indonesia)
8. ATA (Albania)
9. BAKHTAR (Afghanistan)
10. BERNAMA (Malaysia)
11. BTA (Bulgaria)
12. CTK (Czechoslovakia)
13. INA (Iraq)
14. KCNA (DRPK)
15. KPL (Laos)
16. KYODO (Japan)
17. MONTSAME (Mongolia)
18. MTI (Hungary)
19. NOVOSTI (USSR)
20. ORGIS (Czechoslovakia)
21. PAP (Poland)
22. PRENSA LATINA (Latin America)
23. PTI (India)
24. SANA (Syria)
25. SPK (Kampuchea)
26. XINHUA (China)

Besides, VNA has signed a memorandum on professional relations with INTERPRESS SERVICE (Latin American News Agency based in Rome).
VNA is a member of the news agencies pool of non-aligned countries and is a member of its coordinating committee and one of its redistribution centres.

VNA is also a member of the organization of Asia-Pacific News Agency (OANA). VNA is one of the redistribution centres and members of the technical group of OANA.

Over the past 40 years, VNA has moved from morse to teletype, then satellite communications.

VNA is doing its best to make full use and improve its existing equipment while striving for more international cooperation and technical assistance in computerization and application of informatics.

CSO: 4200/1541
BIOGRAPHIC

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Nguyễn Manh Ai [NGUYEEN MANH AIS]

Chairman of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Committee, Haiphong; on 1 Jul 85 he attended activities marking the 41st anniversary of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 24 Jul 84 p 15).

Trần Xuân Bách [TRAANF XUAAN BACHS]

Member of the CPV Central Committee; on 25 Jun 85 he attended a farewell party for a delegation headed by Lê Duẩn General Secretary of the CPV Central Committee that was going to visit RUSSIA (NHAN DAN 26 Jun 85 p 1).

Mai Văn Bay [MAI VAWN BAYR]

Member of the Standing Committee of the CPV Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Secretary of the Trade Union Federation, Ho Chi Minh City; in the last days of July he was among a group that met with Premier Phạm Văn Đông (NHAN DAN 1 Aug 85 p 1).

Lê Bằng [LEE BAWNGF] *Colonel

His article about the Vietnamese People's War and its influence appeared in the cited source (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Jul 85 pp 30-40).

Hoàng Hữu Bình [HOANGF HUWUX BINHF]

Head of the Specialist Co-operation Board of the Council of Ministers, Vice Chairman of the Vietnam sub-committee of the Board (Trưởng Ban Hợp Tác Chuyên Gia cục HDBT, Phó Chủ Tịch Phạm Ban Vietnam). On 29 Jul 85 he welcomed an economic delegation from Angola (NHAN DAN 30 Jul 85 p 1).
Nguyễn Đức Bình [NGUYENX DUWCS BINHF]

Member of the Central Committee of the CPV; Director of the Nguyen Ai Quoc Advance Party School; his article "Building Socialism in Our Present Conditions" appeared in the cited source. (NHUONG VAN DE HOA BINH VA CHU NCHIA XA HOI Mar 85 pp 56-62)

Nguyễn Chánh [NGUYENX CHANHS], *Lieutenant General

*Head of the Rear Services General Department; his article on his department appeared in the cited source (NHAN DAN 8 Jul 85 p 3)

Trương-Chinh [TRUWOWNGF CHINH]

Chairman of the Council of State; on 21 Jun 85 he was present at the opening ceremony of the 9th session of the 7th National Assembly in Hanoi. (NHAN DAN 22 Jun 85 p 1).

Lê Kim Chung [LEE KIM CHUNG]

*Acting Head of the Permanent Observer Mission at the United Nations in New York. Recently he welcomed a group of Congressmen of New York State (NHAN DAN 8 Jul 85 p 4)

Nguyễn Phú Chút [NGUYENX PHUS CHUTS], *Colonel

His article 'Problems Relating to the Training Of Cadres And Organizations And Today's Mission In Training And Combat' appeared in the source (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Jul 85 pp 23-29)

Nguyễn Diệp [NGUYENX DIEEPJ] Colonel

His article 'Problems Relating to Signal And Liaison In The Local People's War' appeared in the source (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Jul 85 pp 41-46)

Lê Duan [LEE ZUAANR]

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPV; on 21 Jun 85 he was present at the opening ceremony of the 9th session of the 7th National Assembly in Hanoi. (NHAN DAN 22 Jun 85 p 1).

Nguyễn Đăng [NGUYENX DAWNG]

Vice Minister of Agriculture; his article "The Technological Progress That Should Be Brought Into Agricultural Production This Year" appeared in the cited source (NHAN DAN 1 Aug 85 p 3)

Pham Văn Đồng [PHAM VAWN DOONGF]

Chairman of the Council of Ministers; on 21 Jun 85 he was present at the opening ceremony of the 9th session of the 7th National Assembly in Hanoi (NHAN DAN 22 Jun 85 p 1).

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Bùi Nam Hà [BUIF NAM HAF] *Major General

Vice Chairman of the Vietnam-Nicaragua Friendship Association; on 19 Jul 85 he attended the 6th anniversary of the Nicaraguan Revolution in Hanoi (NHAN DAN 20 Jul 85 p 4)

Vũ Ngọc Hải [VUX NGOCJ HAIR]

*Vice Minister of Power; his article on the electric power branch appeared in the cited source (NHAN DAN 1 Aug 85 p 3)

Phí Triệu Hậm [PHIS TRIEEUJ HAMF], Major General, deceased

Born on 25 Dec 1925 in Tu Cuong Village, Thanh Mien District, Hải Hưng Province; standing member of the Executive Committee of the Hanoi municipal CPV organization; political director of the Capital Military Region; he died after a period of illness on 23 Jul 85 at Military Hospital 108. (NHAN DAN 25 Jul 85 p 1)

Phạm Duy Hiển [PHAMJ XUY HIEENR]

Deputy Director of the Nuclear Research Institute in Da Lat; recently he welcomed Trương-Chinh who was visiting his Institute. (NHAN DAN 26 Jul 85 p 4).

Nguyễn Khắc Huỳnh [NGUYEEX KHAWCS HUYNHF]

*Ambassador to Mozambique; on 26 Jun 85 he attended the 10th National Day celebration in Mozambique (NHAN DAN 1 Jul 85 p 1)

Trần Quang Huy [TRAANF QUANG HUY]

Chairman of the Legislation Committee of the National Assembly; on 21 Jun 85 he was present at the opening ceremony of the 9th session of the 7th National Assembly in Hanoi to report on the draft of the penal code of the SRV. (NHAN DAN 22 Jun 85 p 1).

Nguyễn Văn Ich [NGUYEENX VAWN ICHS]

Deputy Chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers; on 4 Jul he was present to greet the delegation that returned from the 40th session of CEMA (NHAN DAN 5 Jul 85 p 1)

Phan Văn Khải [PHAN VAWN KHAIR]

Member of the Central Committee of the CPV; *Chairman of the People's Committee, Ho Chí Minh City; in the last days of July he was among a group that met with Premier Phạm Văn Đồng (NHAN DAN 1 Aug 85 pp 1-4)

Nguyễn Lam [NGUYEENX LAM]

Secretary of the CPV Central Committee; on 25 Jun 85 he attended a farewell party for a delegation headed by Le Duan General Secretary of the CPV Central Committee that was going to visit RUSSIA. (NHAN DAN 26 Jun 85 p 1)
Binh Nho Liem [DINH NHO LIEEM]

SRV Ambassador to Russia; he was with a delegation that visited Russia on
27-28 Jun 85 (DOI LAP 10 Jul 85 p 2).

Nguyen Duc Lai [NGUYENX DUNC LOWIJ], Colonel

His article on army barrack management appeared in the cited source (NHAN DAN
5 Aug 85 p 3)

Vu Khac Man [VUX. KHAWCS MAANX]

*Chairman of the Science Committee of the Water Conservancy Ministry; his
article on the task of the Water Conservancy Ministry appeared in the cited
source (NHAN DAN 30 Jul 85 p 3)

Nguyen Thi Thu Nguyet [NGUYENX THIJ THU NGUYEETJ]

*Charge d'Affaires of the SRV Embassy in the German Federal Republic; on 29-
30 Jun 85 she attended the 4th Congress of Association of Vietnamese Residents
in Frankfurt (DAI DOAN KET 31 Jul 85 p 7).

Huy Nh Minh Nhut [HUYNHF MINH NHAATJ]

Deputy Secretary of the CVP Committee, Lam Dong Province; recently he was pre-
sent to welcome Truong-Chinh who was in his province to attend a conference on
implementing the resolution of the fifth Party Central Committee's Eighth
Plenum. (NHAN DAN 26 Jul 85 p 1).

Nguyen Huu Phat [NGOO HUY PHATS]

His article "The Battle Stance And The Opportune Time In The Counter Attack
Campaign" appeared in the cited source (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Jun 85
pp 58-67)

Tran Sanh [TRAANF SANH], Major General

Deputy Commander of the anti-aircraft missile group; on 24 Jul 85 he attended
the 20th Victory Anniversary of his group (NHAN DAN 25 Jul 85 p 1).

Vu Song [VUX SONC]

SRV Ambassador to Czechoslovakia; on 1 Aug 85 he was in a meeting with Foreign
Minister Nguyen Co Thach and V. Bilak, Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Czech Communist Party (NHAN DAN 3 Aug 85 p 1)

Pham Hong Son [PHAMJ HOONGF SOWN], Lieutenant General

His article "Applying Wartime Military Training to Today's Training" appeared
in the cited source (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Jun 85 pp 30-38)
Hoàng Thúc Tân [HOANGF THUCS TAANS], previously reported as Hoàng Trúc Tân [HOANGF TRUCS TAANS]

Deputy Standing Representative of the SRV to CEMA; on 20 Jun 85 he was among a delegation that went to Poland to attend the 40th meeting of CEMA (NHAN DAN 21 Jun 85 p 4).

Trần Thao [TRAANF THAOR]

*Director of the National Economy Plan Formulation Department, State Planning Commission [Vụ Trưởng Vụ Tổng Họp Kế hoạch Kinh tế Quốc dân UBKHNN] his article "Plan Formulation" appeared in the cited source (TAP CHI KẾ HOẠCH HOA Jun 85 p 5)

Nguyễn Nam Thăng [NGUYEENX NAM THAWNGS], *Major General

His article 'The Task Of Controlling And Protecting Socialist Legislation' appeared in the cited source (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Jul 85)

Trần Ngọc Thêm [TRAANF NGOCJ THEEM], *Colonel

Commander, T Engineer Group, 2nd Military Region; he was mentioned in an article about his unit. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 26 Jun 85 p 2)

Nguyễn Hữu Tho [NGUYEENX HUWUX THOJ]

Chairman of the National Assembly; Vice Chairman of the Council of State; in June 85 he was appointed to the committee that organized the funeral for Xuân Thuy. (NHAN DAN 20 Jun 85 p 1).

Lê Tiến [LEE TIEEN], Colonel

His article 'The People's Armed Forces And The Mission To Defeat The Enemy's Multi-faceted War' appeared in the cited source (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Jun 85 pp 47-57)

Nguyễn Ngọc Trí [NGUYEENX NGOCJ TRIUF]

Minister of Agriculture; his article on agro-sylviculture appeared in cited source (NONG NGHIEP 25 Jul 85 p 1).

Đào Thế Tuấn [DAOF THEES TUAANS] Professor

Director of the Agricultural Science and Technology Institute; his article on the new planting system appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 29 Jul 85 p 3)

Vũ Quang Tuyên [VUX QUANG TUYEENS]

Deputy Head of the State Planning Commission; on 20 Jun 85 he was among a delegation that went to Poland to attend the 40th meeting of CEMA (NHAN DAN 21 Jun 84 p 4).
Le Quang Vinh [LEE QUANG VINHJ]

Chairman of the Vietnam Students Association; on 5-6 Jul 85 he attended a conference of this association (NHAN DAN 7 Jul 85 p 1).

Nguyen Xien [NGUYEENX XIEENR]

Vice Chairman of the National Assembly; Member of the Presidium of the Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was listed as one of the Members of the funeral committee for the late Xuan Thuy. (NHAN DAN 20 Jun 85 p 1).

Tran Vi [TRAANF VIX]

Member of the CPV Central Committee; Chairman of the Vietnam-Nicaragua Friendship Association; on 19 Jul 85 he attended the 6th anniversary of the Nicaraguan Revolution in Hanoi. (NHAN DAN 20 Jul 85 p 4).

Nguyen Thanh Vinh [NGUYEENX THAHF VINHX]

Member of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Democratic Party; Chairman of the Propaganda and Training Department of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Democratic Party; on 1 Jul 85 he was present at a meeting to commemorate the 41st anniversary of his party. (DOC LAP 24 Jul 85 p 15).

Nghiem Xuan Yem [NGHIEEM XUAAN YEEM]

Vice Chairman of the National Assembly; Member of the Presidium of the Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was listed as one of the members of the funeral committee for the late Xuan Thuy. (NHAN DAN 20 Jun 85 p 1).