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USSR REPORT

WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No. 3, March 1984

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences.

CONTENTS

English Summaries of Major Articles in MEMO Journal (pp 158-519) 1

Bulletin on CPSU Central Committee Plenum (pp 5-6) (not translated)

Speech of Comrade K.U. Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (pp 7-13) (not translated)

Speech of Comrade N.A. Tikhonov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers (pp 14-15) (not translated)

Speech of Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (p 16) (not translated)

Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko (p 17) (not translated)

CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers Appeal to the Communist Party and the Soviet People (pp 19-22) (not translated)

Bykov Traces CPSU Peace Policy (pp 23-29)
(0. Bykov) ................................................................. 4

European Nuclear-Free Zone Supported, U.S. Opposition Scored (pp 30-44)
(V. Davydov) ............................................................ 13

U.S. Conventional, Nuclear Military Policy Analyzed (pp 45-53)
(S. Karaganov) ......................................................... 31
ASEAN Problems Traced to West Rather Than Indochina (pp 54-66)  
(M. Isayev) ................................................................. 42

Certain Forms of Manpower Employment in the Capitalist Countries  
(pp 67-79) (V. Lyubimova) (not translated)

World Prices Under the Conditions of the Crisis of Capitalism (pp 80-91)  
(M. Gel'vanovskiy) (not translated)

SURVEY OF MARKET CONDITIONS

The Capitalist Economy in 1983 (pp 92-112) (not translated)

AFRICA AND ITS PROBLEMS

France, U.S. 'Aggravating' Chad Conflicts, Libyan Role Downplayed  
(pp 113-122)  
(V. Iordanskiy) ......................................................... 57

CRITIQUE OF BOURGEOIS THEORIES

Monetarism in Italy (pp 123-133)  
(Ye. Aksenova) (not translated)

SOCIALIST'S FINDING

Social-Reformist Quality of Life Concepts (pp 134-142)  
(V. Pan'kov) (not translated)

WE ANSWER READERS' QUESTIONS

The Banking Monopolies' Offshore Business (pp 143-148)  
(V. Kashin) (not translated)

BOOK, AUTHORS

Book on Soviet-Yugoslav Relations Stresses Positive Cooperation  
(pp 149-150)  
(V. Romanov) .......................................................... 68

Yu. Shvedkov review of Bruce Russett's "The Prisoners of Insecurity. Nuclear  
Deterrence, the Arms Race and Arms Control" and "Stop Nuclear War!  
A Handbook" by David P. Barash and Judith Eve Lipton (pp 151-152)  
(not translated)

IMEMO Book on Contemporary Capitalism Reviewed (pp 153-155)  
(V. Kudrov) .............................................................. 72

R. Subayev review of Bill Jordan's "Mass Unemployment and the Future of  
Britain" (pp 155-157) (not translated)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Publication Data</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>English title</strong></td>
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To the Bright Memory of Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov.

O. Bykov in the article "Leninist Policy of Peace and Its Embodiment in the CPSU Activities" regards the significance of Lenin's analysis of the dialectical interconnection between war and economy, politics, class-struggle and socioeconomic conditions of a development of society, private property domination, general crisis of capitalism and formation and strengthening of world socialism. The author points out relevance of Lenin's ideas which have reflected the essence of our epoch, its great class battles and revolutionary struggles, decay and crisis of capitalism, the rise of socialism. The article exposes the bourgeois ideologists' and policy-makers' assertions about "export of revolution" allegedly conducted by socialism and expresses unshakable confidence in the triumph of socialism the world over, for the Leninist peace policy has been and remains an integral part of the general strategy of transition from capitalism to socialism, to a world without exploitation and wars. The article states that the consistent and purposeful struggle waged by the Leninist Party and the Soviet government to save peace follows from the very nature of socialism. The correctness and the revolutionary essence of Lenin's ideas is confirmed by the entire history of the 20th century.

The article by V. Davidov "Nuclear—Free Zone in Europe from Idea to Reality" deals with this topical problem of European security. The deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe and the intensive NATO nuclear preparations are causing concern among the European countries facing the extremely difficult problem of protecting themselves from a nuclear holocaust. In the given situation the realization of the idea of nuclear free zones would become a basic premise for ensuring the security of such areas. The author analyses different projects for turning Northern Europe, the Balkans and Central Europe into zones of lasting peace, free from nuclear weapons. The author maintains that the realization of such a proposal would be conducive to the freeing of Europe from nuclear missiles, both medium range
and tactical. The idea of creating nuclear-free zone met with understanding in the socialist world. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries expressed their readiness to support it. In their opinion the way to strengthening the security of such areas lies in an expansion of all-round cooperation and joint search for solutions that would keep Northern Europe, the Balkans and other parts of the European continent outside the sphere of tension and conflict. Non-nuclear states by undertaking the obligation not to site nuclear weapons on their own territories could contribute largely to the cause of eliminating the nuclear menace in Europe.

S. Karaganov in the article "Adventurism of the US Military Strategy" looks into the present-day military strategy of the United States and points to the presence in it of ever growing adventuristic features, which represent an increasing danger to world peace and international security. The article pays special attention to conventional means of military strategy of the United States with such novelties as "horizontal escalation", "reaction to ambiguous warning" with new types of weapons of enhanced destructive capability. All these but lead to an augmentation of the risk of local conflicts which may develop into a nuclear holocaust. The Soviet Union is convinced that peace can be strengthened and general security be guaranteed by reducing the existing armaments to lower levels.

M. Isayev in the article "ASEAN and the Problem of Peace and Stability in South-East Asia" examines certain economic aspects of the six countries belonging to the association and their dependence upon the world capitalist economy. The author analyses the foreign policy activities of the ASEAN countries especially with the neighbouring states of Indo-China--Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos. The leading imperialist powers are too anxious to consolidate their influence in the Southeast Asian area. Foreign capital does not limit itself to economic expansion and superprofits. It actively interferes in the internal affairs of the ASEAN countries forcing them to pursue home and foreign policy which is to its liking. It does its utmost to draw the ASEAN countries into the military orbit of imperialism, to push them along the road of confrontation with Indo-China, the countries of which have entered upon the road of socialist development. A cessation of rough foreign and hegemonistic interference in the affairs of this region, a frustration of their attempts to hinder a dialogue between the ASEAN countries and Indo-China would contribute to the normalization of political climate there.

V. Lubimova in the article "On Certain Forms of Employment in Capitalist Countries" in the 70s and beginning of the 80s diagnoses widely used forms of employment such as temporary, part-time, home and underground working. The author points out that these forms of employment are stipulated by such factors as economic and structural crisis, reconstruction of the capitalist economy through labour-saving achievements in engineering, resulting in growing unemployment which forces the working people to put up with extremely unstable and low earnings. The new forms of employment meet monopoly capital's aspiration to cut outlays for manpower, increase its mobility, undermine its cohesion and solidarity in the struggle against capitalism. These
forms of employment only add to the difficulties in the labour market. They are evidence of the growing lack of effectiveness of state monopolistic regulation and further aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism.

The early 1980's were marked by the gravest and most durable crisis of world capitalist economy since World War Two. Structural distortions, problems of energy and natural resources, environmental contradictions, monetary discrepancies were intimately bound up with the further economic unevenness, low rate of capacity utilization, decline of rates of growth and in some cases even the curtailment of foreign expansion. These factors have underlied to a considerable extent the upward spiral of prices of the 70s.

M. Guelvanovsky in the article "World Prices Under the Conditions of Capitalism Crisis at the Beginning of the 80's" presents the detailed examination of the new trends and features of global inflation, specifying its major causes in the early 80s. His reasoning suggests that price behavior now is actually under the decisive influence of primarily international factors, namely monetary crises.

International inflation acquires somewhat autonomous character and becomes supra-national, therefore urging the appropriate state regulation mechanism. Prices upswings have become less sensitive to fluctuations in economic conditions especially to cyclical development of capitalist economies which has stipulated in the past subsequent decrease of prices.

The ongoing inflation within world capitalist economy appears now in disguised forms when its driving forces are usually "under the water" owing to monetary fluctuations. Prices upward spiral is reinforced by widespread barter arrangements in international trade which lead to the situation when prices lose their flexibility. This disguised character of soaring prices may prelude their evolution into stormy explosions undermining the whole apparatus of state anti-inflation measures.

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CSO: 1812/153-E
Our period has no precedent in history. Never before have such wide possibilities for constructive development opened up to mankind, but also never before have such mortal threats been made to its very existence. The rapid growth of production forces under the conditions of scientific-technical revolution and the acceleration of social progress are creating real prerequisites for satisfying the vital needs of the earth's population. And at the same time, the hostile antagonism between the two world systems, engendered by the belligerent forces of imperialism, and the existence of colossal stocks of mass destruction weapons in the world carry with them a terrible danger of a general conflict with catastrophic consequences for human civilization and even for the very life on our planet.

The uniqueness of the existing situation demands that unconditional priority in international affairs be given to preventing nuclear war. The interests of progressive social development and simply the survival of the human race dictate the vital need for decisive actions to preserve general peace.

The Leninist peace policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state is subordinated to this noble goal. In the period of an abrupt turn in historical development, the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries of socialism continue to consistently act from positions of devotion to peace and of responsibility for the fate of mankind. The new social system needs no violence for its assertion and development because it is based on the invincible objective laws of social progress. It is precisely socialism that, in relation to the principal issue of the contemporary period, the issue of war and peace, is able to see its class interests not in isolation from the general interests of mankind but rather in close organic relation to them because a double historical mission has fallen to it, the mission of revolutionary renewal of the world and the mission of saving the populace from wars.
Today, just as six decades ago, the genius of great Lenin continues to be the lodestar for all fighters for social and national liberation and for stable peace in the world. "Ending all wars, peace among peoples, stopping all plundering and violence—this precisely is our ideal...." (Footnote 1) (V. I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," vol 26, p 304). These words of Lenin uttered even before the victory of the first socialist revolution held also in our period an enormous ideological and moral-political potential and express the essence of the communist peace philosophy.

It is to the greatest credit of Lenin that he thoroughly worked out the problems of war and peace on the methodological basis of Marxism and in conformity with the imperialist period and the new period which began with the October Revolution. He creatively developed K. Marx's basic thesis on elimination of war: "In opposition to the old society—a new society is being born whose international principle will be PEACE because every people will have one and the same owner LABOR!" (Footnote 2) (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 17 p 5). Proceeding from the reality of the contemporary period, V. I. Lenin enriched the treasury of scientific communism with a comprehensive analysis of dialectical interdependence between wars on one hand and the economy and politics, the class struggle, the socioeconomic conditions of the society's development, the domination of private property, the general crisis of capitalism, and the establishment and strengthening of world socialism on the other. He created a complete doctrine of war, peace, and revolution.

The Great October Socialist Revolution, which marked the beginning of a radical turn in the entire world development, also introduced principal changes in the formulation of the problem of war and peace. For the first time in history, the relations between socialism and capitalism became the axis of international life, and opposition, antagonism, rivalry, and peaceful co-existence between the states with different social systems began to develop on the world scene. The turning stage in the struggle for social progress and firm peace began. The Leninist principles of "liberating mankind from the horrors of war and its consequences" proclaimed in the historical Decree of Peace were matched by the expressed determination of the triumphant proletariat to "successfully carry to the end the cause of peace and, simultaneously, also the cause of liberation of the working people and of the exploited masses of population from all slavery and exploitation." (Footnote 3) (V.I. Lenin. "Complete Collected Works," vol 35, p 16).

The achievement of these loftiest of goals has been naturally accompanied by incredible difficulties. From the very beginning of its existence, the young Soviet authority was compelled to repel the onslaught of internal and external foes. The defense of achievements of the revolution in a just war became a sacred duty of the workers class and the working masses, a sacred duty not only before their own socialist fatherland but also before the entire progressive mankind.
Active peaceableness in combination with a resolute rebuff of the aggressive impulses of imperialism—this is the pivotal direction of the foreign policy of the Leninist Communist Party and the world's first socialist state, an essential component part of the strategy of the international workers class, and the basis of the struggle of all anti-imperialist and antiwar forces. The new society appeared as a realistic embodiment of Leninist ideas, a society that carries out in practice a peaceful and constructive development of productive forces and just social relations for the benefit of the working people and that exercises a powerful influence both on the worldwide revolutionary process and on creating the prerequisites for eliminating wars from interstate relations. The force of example of real socialism is in its steadfastness in the face of imperialist aggressors, its immutable devotion to the cause of peace, and its undeniable ability to constructively fulfill the socioeconomic and political tasks of our historical period.

Nothing is further from truth than the claims of the bourgeois ideologists and politicians that socialism is striving to "export revolution" to the capitalist world. Expressing his unshakable belief in the inevitable triumph of socialism on a worldwide scale, V. I. Lenin developed under the new conditions the idea of the founders of Marxism that the victorious proletariat cannot impose any kind of happiness on any foreign people without undermining its own victory. (Footnote 4) (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 35, p 298). He directly said: "Communism is not introduced by violence." (Footnote 5) (V.I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," vol 38, p 162). He emphasized that revolutions are not carried out by order but mature in the process of historical development and are necessitated by a whole series of internal and external causes. (Footnote 6). (V.I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," vol 35, p 531). Rejecting the possibility of war for the purpose of implanting revolution from outside, V. I. Lenin observed: "...Any peace will open hundredfold bigger and wider doors to our influence." (Footnote 7) (V.I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," vol 40, p 247).

At the same time V.I. Lenin defended the right of the oppressed to start uprising and revolutionary wars and to liberate themselves from foreign enslavers. He resolutely opposed the export of counterrevolution in any of its forms and the imperialist interference in the affairs of other countries and peoples.

This is how it was at the dawn of the socialist society. This is how, also in our period, the CPSU and the Soviet state steadfastly follow the policy of peace in its organic combination with a comprehensive support for the struggle for social and national liberation. The Leninist peace policy has been and continues to be an inseparable component part of the general strategy of transition from capitalism to socialism and to peace without exploitation and wars.

The struggle of the USSR and other fraternal countries of socialism for durable peace among peoples is indissolubly linked with their agreed course of strengthening the cohesion of the socialist community in every possible way and of resolutely repelling any attempts of imperialism to tear away from it any of its detachments by means of gross pressure and undermining
actions. The consistent course of strengthening international security and the policy of peaceful coexistence with the bourgeois states does not in any way signify an absence of resistance against the attempts of imperialism to export counterrevolution, be that in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua or any other countries that have embarked on the road of building a new society.

Since its very beginning, the Leninist peace policy has been notable not only for its principled approach to defending the interest of socialism and of all revolutionary forces but also for its realistic appraisals of the situation and of possibilities for fulfilling the set tasks. When in October 1917, the world's first socialist state began the valiant struggle for peace, V.I. Lenin warned: "Whoever thought that peace could be achieved easily and that it is only necessary to mention peace and the bourgeoisie would hand it to us on a platter, is a totally naive person." (Footnote 8) (V.I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," vol 26, p 116).

History has confirmed the correctness of the Leninist appraisal. Imperialism has not reconciled itself with the appearance of a new social system and has set up the policy of blockade and intervention and of aggression and war against the policy of this new system. It took the Leninist perspicacity and the revolutionary wisdom and steadfastness of the party of Bolsheviks under the desperately difficult conditions to resist both the rightist capitulating attitude and leftist adventurism and to find reliable guidelines for a policy proceeding from what V.I. Lenin called an "objective position." (Footnote 9) (V.I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," vol 36, pp 92-93).

In working out the foreign political line, V. I. Lenin attached decisive importance to sufficiently taking into consideration such objective factors of development of international affairs as the correlation and distribution of forces on a worldwide scale and within the individual countries. And in this connection the Leninist characteristic included not only the sum total of economic, military, and other material indexes but also the moral-political indexes, although they are by themselves naturally extraordinarily important for an appraisal of the balance of forces. Seeing in the "forces" primarily a class content, V.I. Lenin considered precisely from this viewpoint not only the existing situation but also the dynamics of development of the correlation between the forces of socialism and peace and the forces of imperialism and war. According to the Leninist methodology, the analysis and prognosis of correlation of class forces on the world scene emanate from the general appraisal of the principal laws of our period. The Leninist peace policy is based on this only correct and scientific foundation. This is the source of its vitality and of its ability not only to set concrete tasks correctly and in good time but also to point out the effective ways and means of fulfilling these tasks, taking into consideration the long-term historical prospects.

When the young socialist republic appeared on the international scene, imperialism ceased to be the force that held the monopoly in solving the question
of war and peace. And although the force of the just-born social system represented, by all traditional measures, a lesser force as compared with the seeming omnipotence of the old world, V.I. Lenin predicted with unshakable confidence the strengthening of socialism, the intensification of its influence in the entire world, and the growth of its historical role.

The very first years of existence of the land of the Soviets already fully confirmed the Leninist perspicacity. Under the leadership of the party of communists headed by V.I. Lenin, with an extraordinary strain on its forces, and with the support of the working people of the entire world, the young Soviet state not only held out but also strengthened its international position, something that resulted in creating favorable objective conditions to deter aggressive tendencies in the policy of imperialism. "We have seen," V.I. Lenin said, "how the 'infinitely weak' Soviet authority has grown stronger before our eyes and with our efforts and how it has begun to turn into an infinitely mighty world power." (Footnote 10) (V.I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works, vol 41, p 109).

After six decades, the Soviet Union stands before mankind as the main bulwark of social progress and international security. Having passed the severe trials of the civil war, foreign intervention, hostile capitalist encirclement, and the Great Patriotic War, our country has demonstrated the indisputable supremacy of the socialist social and Soviet state system and convincingly demonstrated the great moral-political unity and friendship of its peoples. Having repelled the onslaught of imperialism and having built a developed socialist society, the Soviet Union has thereby made a decisive contribution to radically changing the correlation of forces in favor of preventing a new world war. The rise of the world system of socialism, the upsurge of the revolutionary struggle, and the development of national liberation, democratic, and antiviar movements—all this has erected a powerful barrier in the path of imperialist instigators of war.

Faithful to the creative spirit of Leninism, the CPSU has reached the following scientifically-substantiated conclusion by profoundly analyzing the real significance of changes in the world situation: at the contemporary stage of historical development, which is marked by the preservation of capitalism in a part of the world, world war has already ceased to be inevitable and, under conditions of resolute counteractions against bellicose imperialism, peace throughout the world can and must be preserved and strengthened. The new theses advanced by the CPSU in relation to the fundamental issue of the contemporary period have opened up wide prospects for the struggle along the interdependent directions toward eliminating the threat of war, toward peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, and toward freedom and independence of peoples. These new theses have won the support of all Marxist-Leninist parties throughout the world. The struggle to prevent imperialism from unleashing a war in which the monstrous weapons of mass destruction would be used has become the most important part of actions of progressive social movements.
As V.I. Lenin predicted, the road to stable peace has turned out to be difficult. Imperialism has placed the great discovery of human genius, nuclear energy, in the service of its own egoistic interests and turned it into harm to mankind. Trying to turn back the world development by force, the U.S. ruling circles placed their stakes in the mid-forties on a qualitatively new weapon as a decisive instrument of their hegemonist policy and as a means to destroy socialism.

Having realistically appraised in the Leninist manner the menacing situation that had been brought about, the CPSU spared no efforts to strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet Union and of its friends and allies. Just as before, the utilization of the socioeconomic, political, ideological, and other advantages of socialism continued to be a decisive factor but, at the same time, the neutralization of the threat of imperialism in the military sphere became a vitally important task.

A developed economic base, the latest achievements of the scientific-technical revolution, and the selfless work of scientists and workers have enabled the Soviet Union to build its nuclear missile weapons and thereby deprive the United States of its monopoly and of the invulnerability of its territory and, afterwards, to achieve the strategic parity between the USSR and the United States. The military competition that the world of capitalism has imposed on the world of socialism has passed that critical threshold beyond which no attempts of imperialism can restore its ability to solve the problem of war and peace according to its own judgment. Under the conditions of a military and strategic equilibrium, the calculations of the bellicose circles in the United States and in other NATO countries to gain such a "position of strength" by which they would be able to gain the upper hand over the USSR and its allies in the sum total of armed antagonism turned out to be hopeless and unrealistic. Meanwhile, the existing reality is characterized by a new global strategic situation in which the aggressor can no longer count on acting with impunity regardless of the means to which he may resort to unleash a war. No possible advantages derived from a surprise first strike would help him to escape a crushing counterstrike and to emerge from war victoriously. Imperialism has been deprived of the possibility to destroy socialism by force without bringing most certain destruction upon itself.

The general military and strategic equilibrium contributed to a recovery of the international situation. The achieved balance of military forces, combined with the peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist states, provided a starting line for detente, for introducing the principles of peaceful coexistence in interstate relations, and for arms limitation. The Leninist principle of the necessity of impressive material force to strengthen a constructive program of peaceful international cooperation has been strongly and conspicuously embodied in the international activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state. Life has fully confirmed the correctness of the Leninist conclusions regarding, first, the inevitability of simultaneous existence of states with different social systems during an entire historical period; second, the expediency—from the viewpoint of the interests of socialism and an overwhelming majority of mankind—of peaceful forms.
of such a coexistence; and third, the real possibility for and the mutual benefits from a peaceful coexistence of socialist and capitalist states regardless of the opposite positions of the socioeconomic systems and ideologies. (Footnote 11) (V.I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," vol 39 p 197, vol 40, p 145, and vol 43, p 29).

In the situation of a military and strategic equilibrium, a most important task formulated by V.I. Lenin, the task of curbing the arms race, also falls within the range of practical solutions. The Soviet Union proposes for a start stopping the dangerous and ruinous competition in stockpiling and perfecting the means of waging war. In accordance with the principle of parity and equal security, its initiatives are aimed at adopting an entire complex of concrete measures to limit and reduce weapons, including especially nuclear weapons, all the way to their complete liquidation. The Soviet Union is prepared to work out honest arrangements to consistently lower the level of the military confrontation and to mutually curtail the arsenals of lethal weapons.

Under conditions in which imperialism cannot count on victory in the arms race and, even less, in a nuclear war, the implementation of the Leninist idea of renouncing military force in the relations between states also falls within the realm of realistic possibilities. The pledge of the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and its appeal to other nuclear states to follow this example have truly historical significance in this respect. The implementation of the proposal to conclude an agreement between the Warsaw Pact member-states and member-states of the North Atlantic Alliance on mutually renouncing the use of force and maintaining the relations of peace can contribute to a noticeable improvement of the international climate. An overwhelming majority of UN member-states have supported the Soviet Proposal on condemning nuclear war as being contrary to human conscience and reason, as the most monstrous crime against peoples, and as a violation of the most basic human right, the right to life.

The Leninist peace policy of the CPSU and Soviet state is strong not only because it is based on real power and is aimed at achieving concrete goals in a concrete situation. Its effectiveness is multiplied by the very wide support it enjoys throughout the world. In conformity with the socialist policy, the remarkable statement by V. I. Lenin that "the greatest manifestation of democracy is related to the basic question of war and peace" (Footnote 12) (V.I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," vol 40, p 92) has a special current value.

Imperialism follows a different policy. In that policy, the mercenary interests of the monopolist bourgeoisie prevail over the interests of general peace and international security. Although imperialism can in no way count on surviving the fires of a nuclear war ignited by it, its narrow class egoism appears to be stronger than the reason favoring cooperation and coexistence even if only for the sake of self-preservation. Peoples reject a policy of recklessness and adventurism. The times have passed when such a policy could "secure for itself" the popular masses and win their "obedience"
by means of deceptions, unprincipled actions, and intimidation. V.I. Lenin noted: "According to the bourgeois understanding, strength is when masses go blindly to the slaughterhouse, obeying the orders of the imperialist governments" and when it is "possible to throw the masses wherever the bourgeois rulers want them." (Footnote 13) (V.I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," vol 35, p 21). Even though it possesses colossal means to wage war, imperialism under contemporary conditions is evermore losing that most important component of "strength" without which the militarist policy in the end becomes hopeless.

The socialist peace policy appeals to the consciousness of the working and struggling masses and to all people of good will. According to the Leninist expression, when the popular masses "know everything, are able to judge everything, and take all actions consciously," (Footnote 14) (Ibid) then their purposeful actions turn into a mighty factor paralyzing the aggressive forces of imperialism and clearing the road to stable peace. And today, it is the unprecedented powerful development of the antiwar movement and the resolute actions of millions and millions of people throughout the world against the threat of a nuclear catastrophe that convincingly attest to this situation.

However, as V.I. Lenin foresaw, every step on the road of strengthening peace has been and continues to be difficult and requires intensive struggle against the imperialist warmongers. This struggle has especially intensified now when, in the United States and in other Western countries, the most bellicose forces have been activated which have shown their intention of making yet another attempt to gain the dominating position in the world. The international situation has sharply aggravated.

Defying the will of peoples and the interests of general peace, the United States and its allies have begun the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, striving to disrupt the existing military equilibrium to their own advantage. This militarist challenge has been given a worthy response by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. Taking the necessary measures to strengthen their defense capability, they stay immovable in their determination not to allow a military superiority over them and they reliably protect their security.

At the same time, under these conditions, too, the CPSU firmly follows the course of the Leninist peace policy. The Soviet leadership declares with all determination that, if the United States and other NATO countries showed their readiness to return to the situation existing prior to the beginning of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union would be ready to do the same. Then its former proposals on the questions of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons in Europe as well its unilaterally assumed obligations in this sphere would again be in effect.

In his 24 November 1983 statement, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, pointed out: "The Soviet Union declares with all
determination and firmness that it will continue to adhere to the principled course toward ending the arms race and primarily the nuclear arms race and toward reducing and, in the end, completely eliminating the threat of nuclear war. It will further continue to spare no efforts to achieve these noble goals."

The potential of social progress and international security is more powerful than the potential of reaction and war. Averting the threat of nuclear destruction now hanging over mankind is not only vitally necessary but is also a realistic goal. The CPSU and the Soviet State, which steadfastly follow the peace policy bequeathed by great Lenin, are making an enormous contribution, with their consistent international activities to fulfilling this truly historic task.


CSO: 1816/7
EUROPEAN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE SUPPORTED, U.S. OPPOSITION SCORED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 21 Feb 84) pp 30-44

[Article by V. Davydov: "A Nuclear-Free Europe—From the Idea to Reality"]

[Text] The problem of the creation of nuclear-free zones* in Europe has assumed special urgency since the R. Reagan administration, contrary to the cherished aspirations of the European peoples, embarked on the deployment of medium-range missiles on the European continent and thereby frustrated the Soviet-American Geneva negotiations on limiting nuclear arms in Europe. In a situation where the Damocles' sword of an all-extirminating nuclear catastrophe has settled even lower over our continent, the countries which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory are confronted acutely with the question: how to protect themselves against the consequences of a nuclear war if it is not possible to avert it?

Plans for the creation of nuclear-free zones in this part of Europe or the other are currently being examined and discussed not only at the public but also at government level. The Warsaw Pact Political Declaration adopted at the meeting in Prague in January 1983 says: "The states represented at the meeting are in favor of the proposals concerning the creation of nuclear-free zones in North Europe, in the Balkans and in other parts of the continent and concerning the conversion of the Mediterranean into a Zone of Peace and Cooperation. They advocate the appropriate negotiations on these questions." A principal way to strengthen security and consolidate trust is the official legalization of states' nuclear-free status and international guarantees that under no circumstances would nuclear weapons be used against countries which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory, irrespective of their membership of military blocs.

At the conference on confidence-building, security and disarmament measures in Europe A. A. Gromyko emphasized on 18 January 1984: "A number of European states advocates the creation in various parts of Europe of nuclear-free zones. This question is directly linked to a reduction in the military danger and a strengthening of trust. The conference would be right to give it serious attention."

*By the term "nuclear-free zone" here and subsequently is meant a "zone free of nuclear weapons".
The simplicity and clarity of the nuclear-free zone idea—the absence on a given territory of nuclear weapons as a guarantee against a nuclear strike—are nourishing mass antiwar movements in all NATO countries. An endeavor to dissociate themselves from Washington's nuclear preparations is now being demonstrated to this extent or the other by the governments of Greece, Portugal and Spain. The opposition parties in Britain, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, Norway and Denmark are undertaking to contribute to the creation of nuclear-free zones in the event of their coming to office. A broad movement is developing in the West European countries for declaring cities nuclear-free zones. Over 150 of Britain's municipalities and approximately 100 in the FRG and 230 in Belgium have already proclaimed their cities nuclear-free zones.

West Europe is following with growing alarm the militarist actions of the United States such as the installation of medium-range missiles on the continent which has now begun, the plans to deploy neutron weapons, the incorporation of NATO in the Pentagon's global strategy and the plans to spread the arms race to space. In an atmosphere in which Washington is officially putting forward doctrines of the first use of nuclear weapons and the waging of a "limited" atomic war in Europe and is working for the further saturation of its territory with nuclear warheads, its West European allies are becoming increasingly convinced that they are becoming "nuclear hostages" who will be sacrificed first. The "nuclear guarantees" for which the United States' NATO partners are paying by granting their territory for military, including nuclear, preparations appear not only less "reliable" but increasingly dangerous for them. The threatening prospect of a new round of the nuclear arms race is leading to the incontrovertible conclusion that only the complete deliverance of the continent from nuclear weapons is capable in practice of ensuring the very existence and development of European civilization. The path to this goal runs, inter alia, through nuclear-free zones also.

A stimulating influence on the all-European movement for the creation of such zones is being exerted by the USSR's readiness to consent to radical reductions in nuclear arms in Europe. The statement of Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, of 24 November 1983 emphasized: "The Soviet Union, as before, advocates a most radical solution of the question of nuclear arms in Europe. It repeats its proposal to make Europe altogether free of nuclear weapons—both medium-range and tactical." The USSR has expressed repeatedly its readiness to assist by practical measures the formation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the European continent and to embark on the official legalization on an international-law basis of guarantees of the nonuse of nuclear weapons against any country which does not have such weapons on its territory.

The idea of nuclear-free zones in Europe has some history. Back in 1957 the Polish Government presented a plan for the creation of such a zone in Central Europe. It was proposed incorporating four states in this zone: Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and the FRG. The draft stipulated that the participating countries would not produce and stockpile nuclear weapons on their
territory. Supporting this initiative, the Soviet Government then called on all the nuclear powers to undertake to regard the territory of the states which were a part of this zone as excluded from the sphere of the use of nuclear weapons.

Subsequently central characteristics of the nuclear-free zone concept were specified in the course of international discussion. As a result they now appear entirely specific. It is proposed that the nonnuclear states participating in the zone undertake not to produce, not to acquire and not to allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory, while the nuclear states assume countercommitments of respect for and nonviolation of the nuclear-free status and renunciation of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons against the countries which are a part of the zone. Such a "balance of commitments" would really ensure the effectiveness of nuclear-free status. Both whole continents or vast areas and individual states may be nuclear-free zones.

It is important that the corresponding agreements really lead to the conversion of the territory of the states concerned into a zone entirely free of nuclear weapons and preclude any loopholes both for circumventing the nuclear-free status on the part of nonnuclear states and violations thereof by the effective control over observance of the commitments assumed. In a word, the nuclear-free zones must be such in practice.

As has been the case at every step in the sphere of the struggle for disarmament, the first plan for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe encountered the negative reaction of Western countries, primarily the United States, which prevented its realization. However, the very idea gained numerous supporters, and not only in Europe; it enjoyed practical development. The official recognition in international law of such a zone occurred in 1967 by way of the conclusion of the Tlatelolco Treaty banning nuclear weapons in Latin America. The right to create nuclear-free zones is reflected in article VII of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1968), to which more than 100 states subscribe. The final document of the UN General Assembly First Special Disarmament Session (1978) also emphasized the importance of the achievement of agreements and treaties between states of the corresponding regions on the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons; it was said that the creation of nuclear-free zones should be encouraged as a component in the efforts whose ultimate goal is a world completely free of nuclear weapons. The annual UN General Assembly sessions regularly pass resolutions approving the ideas of the creation of such zones. The movement for nuclear-free zones now has a solid basis in international law and it is embracing all regions of the world, primarily Europe.

I

The deployment of the American medium-range missiles on the European continent has been reflected extremely negatively in the security of the North European countries. Henceforward the flight path of the cruise missiles deployed in Britain and also on the United States' surface ships plying the
seas washing the Scandinavian peninsula will lie across the airspace not only of Norway but also central Sweden and also Finland. The palpable nearing of the nuclear threat has confronted the countries of North Europe, in particular, in all seriousness with the question of the urgent need for the official legalization of its nuclear-free status and for it to obtain guarantees from the nuclear powers concerning the nonuse of nuclear weapons against them. On Finland's initiative such a plan has been under discussion in the North European countries since 1963. Advancing the idea of the creation of a nuclear-free zone more than 20 years ago, President U. Kekkonen farsightedly warned: "Proclamation of the North as a nuclear-free zone would considerably stabilize the position of all states in this part of the world. It would fully protect the northern countries against any speculations born of the development of nuclear strategy and would guarantee that international tension would not spread to this zone." Speaking in May 1983 on the 20th anniversary of U. Kekkonen's speech, M. Koivisto, the present president of Finland, emphasized the increased topicality at the current stage of the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in North Europe.

This region is de facto free of nuclear weapons. All the countries located here—Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden and Finland—have undertaken in accordance with the Nonproliferation Treaty not to build nuclear weapons. Norway, Denmark and Iceland—NATO participants—have undertaken not to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime. The entire question thus amounts to nuclear weapons not being imported into these countries in the event of military crises also. However, such a prospect does not suit the United States and the bloc's leadership. The absence of official legalization of nuclear-free status is leading even now to a pronounced erosion of the principles of the nondeployment of nuclear weapons in Norway, Denmark and Iceland. Under Washington's pressure these countries are engaging in actions testifying to their increasingly profound involvement in the bloc's nuclear strategy.

Thus Norway is participating in the planning of nuclear strategy and the creation of the NATO infrastructure. More than 20 airfields on its soil are being actively used by the air forces of the United States, Great Britain and other NATO countries. The existence of a 1974 secret agreement between Norway and the United States became known in December 1983 which gives the U.S. Air Force, equipped with nuclear weapons, the right, given a "crisis situation," to land on its territory unhindered. In the Norwegian fjords there are more than 10 naval bases used by nuclear-missile submarines for patrolling and other measures connected with the combat activity of the naval forces of the United States and NATO in the Norwegian Sea. The American expert S. Jacobson emphasizes in this connection: "Norwegian facilities have long been incorporated in the United States' strategic planning. The American fleet's access to Norwegian ports and Norwegian electronic and other facilities has long been regarded as a most valuable (if not absolutely essential) element in supporting operations of the submarine fleet equipped with Polaris and Poseidon missiles."* In 1980 Norway signed an agreement

with the United States on the storage on its territory of heavy military equipment intended for the American Rapid Deployment Force, which also has nuclear weapons in its arsenal.

Denmark, which is assigned a key place in NATO's plan for blocking the Baltic zone of the straits linking continental Europe and Scandinavia, is being actively pulled into the military preparations. It is planned to transfer here in a "crisis situation" 40,000 servicemen and also 7 air squadrons from the United States and Britain. Denmark's armed forces are also being trained in methods of the use of nuclear weapons and have delivery systems therefor—the F-104 and F-16 aircraft and various artillery systems.

On the territory of Iceland there is the major American base in Keflavik, where more than 3,000 U.S. servicemen are stationed and F-4 aircraft, which are currently being replaced by the more modern F-15's, and various sonar reconnaissance systems are deployed. In the opinion of a number of experts, the Keflavik base could house nuclear weapon dumps, in any event, they are certainly there when U.S. air and naval forces are in transit. The government's repeated attempts made under parliamentary pressure to ascertain from the U.S. Administration whether the ships and aircraft assigned to the base have nuclear weapons have proven fruitless.

The official U.S. position on this score amounts to neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons at this military facility or the other, including aircraft and ships. As a result the governments not only of Iceland but also Norway and Denmark are not in a position to provide convincing guarantees that their territory is not being used even in peacetime for the transit of nuclear weapons. In the event of crises the principle of the nondeployment of nuclear weapons in these states would be canceled out completely, for which the Pentagon is openly preparing in peacetime.

North Europe is of special significance for the U.S. military. As is clear from repeated pronouncements by U.S. Secretary for the Navy J. Lehmann, it is in the seas washing Scandinavia that it hopes to "bottle up" the Soviet Navy and win a "decisive victory" in an anti-submarine battle. During a visit to Norway in September 1983 J. Lehmann declared plainly that the United States had to prevail in the North Atlantic and "have complete control" over the Norwegian Sea. The NATO upper stratum believes that the upshot of military operations on Europe's northern flank will be of decisive significance. This strategic precept presupposes the further integration of the northern countries in NATO's nuclear infrastructure. Reports appeared in December 1983 concerning U.S. plans to deploy cruise missiles (without nuclear warheads as yet, it is true) on the territory of Norway, Denmark and Iceland.

Concentrating attention on the increase in the Pentagon's activeness in North Europe, S. Miller, an expert from Harvard (United States), concludes that "if a nuclear war begins, NATO's northern flank could be the main theater."* S. Lodgard (SIPRI) goes further in his conclusions, believing

that North Europe appears to the Pentagon an even more attractive region for conducting a "limited" nuclear war than the center of Europe.*

In continuously building up their military, including nuclear, potential the United States and NATO are inexorably working for the conversion of North Europe into an area of East-West political and potential military confrontation, under the conditions of which the nuclear-free status of the states located there could be a fiction even in peacetime. The growing threat of the use of nuclear weapons in North Europe dictates the urgent need for the northern countries of the officialization in international law of their nuclear-free status, which as yet actually exists. Speaking in the Paasikivi Society in July 1983, Swedish Prime Minister O. Palme emphasized: "The most important goal of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the North consists of strengthening the security of the northern states. We wish to ease the nuclear threat to the region of North Europe."

The Soviet Union fully shares the northern countries' concerns for their security and has repeatedly declared principled support for the idea of the creation of a nuclear-free zone here. The USSR has emphasized repeatedly that it is ready to undertake not to use nuclear weapons and not threaten their use against the Northern European countries which participate in a nuclear-free zone, that is, renounce the production, acquisition and deployment on their territory of nuclear weapons. This guarantee of the Soviet Union could be made official by way of the conclusion either of a multilateral agreement or bilateral agreements with each country participating in the zone. Understandably, these states' security would be more reliably ensured if the appropriate guarantees were also extended by NATO's nuclear states. But the USSR does not make this a condition of its undertaking. During Finnish President M. Koivisto's visit to the Soviet Union (June 1983) Yu. V. Andropov declared: "The Soviet Union is not merely sympathetic to the idea of a nuclear-free zone in North Europe but is prepared to assist its establishment. We would not only undertake to respect the status of such a zone but would be prepared to examine the question of certain measures, appreciable, moreover, with reference to our own territory adjoining the zone which would contribute to strengthening its nuclear-free status. The Soviet Union might also discuss with the interested parties the question of imparting nuclear-free status to the waters of the Baltic Sea."**

A high evaluation is being made in the northern countries of the USSR's readiness to contribute to recognition of a nuclear-free zone in international law. Many prominent politicians of Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark have emphasized in this connection that this position of the USSR makes it possible to switch from discussion to actual negotiations on the practical realization of the idea of a nuclear-free zone, without waiting for the Soviet Union's example to be followed by the West's nuclear powers.


**PRAVDA, 7 June 1983.
Speaking at the conference on confidence-building, security and disarmament measures in Europe on 18 January 1984, A.A. Gromyko again confirmed that "the Soviet Union supports the proposal to declare North Europe a zone free of nuclear weapons. The creation of such a zone is, we believe, both desirable and possible."

As distinct from the USSR, the position of the United States in respect of the idea of a North European nuclear-free zone has been and is of a sharply negative nature. Fearing that its creation would frustrate American efforts to drag the northern countries into NATO's nuclear preparations in this part of Europe and complicate the deployment of medium-range missiles on the European continent, the Reagan administration is putting unprecedented pressure on the states of the region. NATO propaganda is going on incessantly about the fact that a nuclear-free zone is a "dangerous illusion" and that the NATO bloc is capable of ensuring "genuine" security against a "threat from the East." High-ranking U.S. figures such as Vice President G. Bush, Defense Secretary C. Weinberger, Secretary for the Navy J. Lehmann and B. Rogers, supreme NATO commander, Europe, visited the northern countries in 1983 to indoctrinate public opinion. In order to make more difficult the mobilization of forces supporting a nuclear-free zone Washington is attempting to compromise the initiators of this undertaking, primarily Finland. In an interview with the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat Rogers declared in December 1982 that the "Soviet threat" hung over Finland and that he had doubts as to the Finns' possible "behavior". U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger also spoke in the same key, declaring that Sweden could not remain neutral indefinitely. These utterances were preceded by official demarches of the State Department in 1981 addressed to the social democratic governments of Denmark and Norway, which had expressed a readiness in conjunction with Finland and Sweden to embark on practical steps for the creation of a nuclear-free zone.

However, despite Washington's open opposition, the idea of a nuclear-free zone has sunk deep roots in the frame of mind of the public of the northern countries. The communist and social democratic parties, trade union associations and politicians and public figures are advocating the immediate creation of such a zone. Recommendations are adopted at annual Northern Council conferences calling for a start on the practical realization of this project. In August 1983 the question of a nuclear-free zone was discussed at a meeting of prime ministers of the northern countries. The governments of Sweden and Finland are continuing contacts with their neighbors for the purpose of formulating the draft of a possible agreement.

II

Northern Europe is not the sole place on the European continent where the question of the practical creation of a nuclear-free zone is being actively discussed. This concept is supported in the Balkans and also in many Mediterranean countries.

Nor is the idea of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans new. Back in the 1950's-1960's the socialist states repeatedly proposed neutralizing
the nuclear threat here and a halt to the process of militarization of the Mediterranean and its coastline, but the NATO states were invariably opposed. However, at the start of the 1980's this concept was supported by the Greek Government. During the visit of N.A. Tikhonov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to Greece in 1983 Prime Minister A. Papandreou emphasized: "The proposal concerning the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, which, we hope, will lead to the removal of the threat of nuclear catastrophe here, is gaining increasing recognition."* The growing relevance of and the urgent need for realization of the idea of a nuclear-free Balkans is noted regularly at bilateral official meetings of the governments of Balkan countries—Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania. There was a meeting in January 1984 in Athens of experts of Balkan countries on the question of the creation of a nuclear-free zone attended by representatives of Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia (a Turkish delegation was present as an observer).

The general increase in political and military tension on the European continent has also been reflected negatively in the situation in this region. The deployment of American cruise missiles on Sicily (Italy) has become a factor threatening the security of all Balkan countries, both those which are a part of alliances and neutral and nonaligned countries. The American missiles have not only an eastern but also southern orientation. Like the U.S. forward-based nuclear missiles already deployed on the ships of the 6th Fleet and at military bases in the Mediterranean, they are an instrument of nuclear blackmail in respect of the independent states situated here. Experts draw attention to the fact that the range of these missiles encompasses not only the Balkan peninsula but also the entire Near and Middle East region and also North Africa. Within the NATO framework and also on the basis of a number of bilateral agreements the Pentagon already has an entire network of naval and air bases situated in Italy, Turkey, Greece and Spain. Submarines and aircraft carriers equipped with nuclear weapons, strategic bombers and also the Rapid Deployment Force are based there. These are now being supplemented by medium-range missiles, which are tying NATO's Mediterranean participants even more closely to the Pentagon's global nuclear strategy, turning them into targets for a retaliatory strike. The "attachment" is fraught with palpable danger, considering the Balkans' geographical proximity to such an explosive region as the Near East. There another American ally—Israel—is incessant in its aggression against Arab countries with the direct participation of the United States and the support of other NATO countries. The flight paths of the cruise missiles, as in the case of the North European countries also, runs over the territory of the nonaligned and neutral states of the Balkans and the Mediterranean. This calls in question not only their sovereignty but also their security. The Yugoslav journal KOMUNIST wrote with alarm in December 1983: "Implementation of the plan to deploy cruise missiles in southern Italy could strike a severe blow at the security of a number of European states which are not part of military blocs and which support disarmament in Europe. It represents a direct threat to Yugoslavia's security." In this situation a nuclear-free zone could be

* PRAVDA, 23 February 1983.
an appreciable barrier in the way of the growth of the nuclear threat in the Balkans and simultaneously a factor of a lowering of tension and an improvement in the political climate in the region. N. Bekhar and I. Nedeva, scholars from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, emphasize in this connection: "Considering that the majority of small and medium European states belongs to the two main military blocs in the world--NATO and the Warsaw Pact--regional nuclear-free zones could contribute to greater trust between the leading military powers and thereby exert a global influence on the situation in Europe and the world".

At the same time, however, a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans could facilitate realization of the idea of the conversion of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and cooperation, which is supported by the majority of littoral states, and could be a step en route to the liberation of the entire Mediterranean from nuclear weapons.

Together with a nuclear-free zone in North Europe a similar zone in the Balkans could be an important element for European security neutralizing the threats engendered by the present nuclear confrontation in Europe. "A nuclear-free axis running from the north to the south of Europe would separate the main forces of the military grouping and make the European continent a safer region and control over arms in Europe more dependable," the Bulgarian scholars assert.

The initial positions for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans at this moment are such. All states of the region, with the exception of Albania, have undertaken in accordance with the Nonproliferation Treaty not to produce nuclear weapons. While not subscribing to the treaty, Albania nonetheless is actually a nonnuclear country. American forward-based nuclear weapons are deployed on the territory of Greece and Turkey. The Greek Government has declared repeatedly that it supports their removal. Athens also repeatedly opposed the deployment of the latest American medium-range missiles in Europe. Turkey also perceives the minuses of the American nuclear presence, but Washington puts strong pressure on it on nuclear issues, demanding observance of NATO "solidarity". SIPRI employee S. Lodgard expresses the following opinion in this connection: "Turkey's participation in a nuclear-free zone should not necessarily presuppose the removal of all nuclear weapons from this country. It is perfectly conceivable that Turkey could be incorporated in the zone by its European territory." Despite the ideological, social and political differences between states of the Balkan peninsula, recognition of the community of their interests in the plane of countering the nuclear threat hanging over them is growing. T. Zhivkov, general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Bulgarian State Council, warned that if a thermonuclear

I "Nuclear Disengagement in Europe," p 94.
** Ibid., p 95.
***Ibid., p 10.
conflict exploded here, the countries of the subregion—with all their na-
tional, religious, ideological, political and other differences—would burn
as a single torch.

Here also the Reagan administration is engaged in assertive actions aimed
at impeding the advance of the nuclear-free zone idea. Attempting to sow
mistrust and enmity, American and NATO propaganda are instilling in Greece,
for example, the thought that the creation of a zone will entail increased
"danger from the North." However, as the Greek leaders have noted repeatedly,
their country has no problems in relations with its northern neighbors, the
main danger, in their opinion, emanating from an intensification of nuclear
preparations in Europe. It is natural that at the current stage the Mediter-
ranean countries are increasingly actively opposed to the presence and further
stockpiling of nuclear weapons in the region.

The Soviet Union has declared repeatedly that it supports the withdrawal of
ships carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean, renunciation of the
deployment of such weapons on the territory of Mediterranean nonnuclear coun-
tries and the nuclear powers' adoption of commitments not to use nuclear
weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit deployment
of these weapons on its territory.

III

The movement for the creation of nuclear-free zones has also embraced the
Central European states which have traditionally and willingly made their
territory available for the deployment of American nuclear arms. In the FRG
and the Benelux countries hundreds of municipalities have declared their ci-
ties nuclear-free zones, attempting "without prior permission" to prevent
NATO's missile action.

An increasingly large number of politicians and broad masses of the popula-
tion are coming to recognize the simple truth that the risk of nuclear con-
frontation would be diminished considerably if nuclear weapons were cleared
away from Central Europe, where the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
are directly contiguous. It is here, in the most densely populated part of
Europe, that the arsenal of the so-called "battlefield nuclear weapons,"
which is colossal in its power of destruction, is located.

The colossal stockpiles of such weapons in forward positions in proximity to
the line separating the armed forces of the two military-political alliances
has long been causing concern both in the supporters of peace and disarma-
ment and in many farsighted politicians and military figures of the West.
There is a real threat that these weapons could be activated at the earliest
stage of an armed conflict, that reliable control over their use in the "smoke
of war" would be impossible and that the crossing of the "nuclear threshold"
opens up the ominous prospect of nuclear escalation. Field Marshal Lord
Carver, chief of staff of British Armed Forces in 1973-1976, emphasizes:
"Activating these nuclear weapons...would in my view be criminal and ir-
responsible."*

However, secret NATO documents have repeatedly been published in the West German press from which it has become clear that NATO envisions the use of "battlefield nuclear weapons" even on the territory of neutral Austria and also Finland. In December 1983 the French general P. Gallois reported in an interview with the Swiss newspaper TRIBUNE DE LAUSANNE that France has plans to use nuclear weapons on Swiss territory.

The Pentagon has openly adopted a policy of saturating the center of Europe with a broad selection of nuclear weapons, tactical included. However, as L. (Fridmen), professor at the Royal Military Studies Institute (Britain) rightly emphasizes, "in practice any use of tactical nuclear weapons will develop into a full-scale exchange of nuclear strikes."*

American propaganda claims that the very automatism of the commissioning of "battlefield nuclear weapons" increases the effect of "deterrence" and, consequently, the security of West Europe. But sober-minded specialists like, for example, Prof G. York, President L. Johnson's military adviser, emphasizes with full knowledge ability, that "these arguments are used by those who are unwilling to see a difference between nuclear and conventional warfare" and consider "limited" nuclear wars on others' territory possible.** It is well known, however, that the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe have become the material basis of the Pentagon's arguments apropos the "usefulness and expediency" of the waging of a "limited" nuclear war on the European continent.

The obvious negative consequences which such approaches to the problem of battlefield nuclear weapons in the center of Europe have for European security predetermine the desirability of and need for the creation of a kind of nuclear-free corridor in the zone of the direct contiguity of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A report of the Independent Disarmament and Security Commission chaired by O. Palme submitted to the UN General Assembly Second Special Disarmament Session (1982) directly recommended the creation of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons beginning in Central Europe and extending ultimately from the northern to the southern flank of both alliances. "We believe," it said,"that the creation of the proposed zone would be an important confidence-building measure which would raise the nuclear threshold and reduce certain incentives prompting the use of nuclear weapons at an early stage of a conflict."

According to the plan put forward by the "Palme Commission," "nuclear warheads...and the creation of nuclear stockpiles" in a zone on both sides of the line separating NATO and the Warsaw Pact are to be "banned." It would be impossible to conduct exercises simulating the use of nuclear weapons in this zone. Preparations for the deployment of nuclear landmines and also the stockpiling of such weapons would be banned. Rules are also to be drawn up regulating the presence in this zone of artillery pieces and short-range

* THE TIMES, 21 October 1983.
** See THE BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, October 1983, p 55.
missiles which would be used for firing both nuclear and conventional warheads. The geographical determination of the zone should be agreed by way of negotiation with regard for the corresponding conditions of the actual areas. Its depth could constitute 150 kilometers on both sides of the boundaries. Negotiations for formulating the regulations governing measures for verifying observance of the said prohibitions are essential. They should provide for a limited number of inspections on the spot upon demand.* As many disarmament experts have observed, the concept of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons is from the viewpoint of its practical realization comparatively simple—it has preserved the existing configuration of military alliances and contemplated a readiness simply to remove, not even liquidate, tactical nuclear weapons from the center of Europe. There would thereby be a considerable reduction in the danger of nuclear confrontation in Europe. (B. Blekhman) and (M. Mur), American military specialists, emphasized: "In our view, the plan put forward by the commission is a practically and politically possible way to immediately reducing the risk of nuclear war in Europe."**

The majority of West European disarmament experts, who are endeavoring to find a way out of the dangerous deadlock of nuclear confrontation in Europe, also joins with this opinion.

What has the reaction to this idea been?

When, in December 1982, the Swedish Government addressed a proposal to the Warsaw Pact states, the NATO members and also the neutral and nonaligned European states for the creation in Europe of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons approximately 300 kilometers wide, that is, 150 kilometers on both sides of the line of contiguity of the Warsaw Pact and NATO states, the USSR and the other socialist countries were not slow to respond. The USSR's reply to the Swedish Government observed that this proposal lies in the same direction as the efforts being made by the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, which consistently support the formation in different parts of Europe of zones free of nuclear weapons, including North Europe and the Balkans. The USSR regards the creation of such zones as an important direction of the struggle for the consolidation of peace and security on the European continent and a way leading to the liberation of the entire continent from nuclear weapons—both tactical and medium-range.

The creation in Europe of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons would contribute, the Soviet side believes, to an easing of the tense atmosphere of nuclear confrontation which has come about on the continent, particularly in its central part, and is continuing to deepen as a result of the actions being undertaken by the NATO countries. The Soviet Union declared its readiness to participate in negotiations concerning the creation of the proposed zone. Considering the tactical-technical specifications of the nuclear weapons, which the Swedish proposal dealt with, the current possibilities of tactical aviation and also the increased range of strategic weapons, the Soviet side proposed—for the increased effectiveness of such a zone in the

** SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, April 1983, p 38
plane of a reduction in the nuclear threat—increasing its width to 500-600 kilometers, that is, 250-300 kilometers east and west of the line of contiguity of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries.

Sweden's initiative was also evaluated positively by the overwhelming majority of neutral and nonaligned states. However, Washington gave it a hostile reception. A State Department representative declared: "Such proposals are unrealistic and ineffective. We do not believe that they contribute to security and stability in Europe. We are concerned that such proposals can only distract attention from the serious efforts we are making in Geneva and Vienna to achieve a sharp reduction in nuclear and nonnuclear forces in Europe." In accordance with Washington's orders, similar statements were also made by official NATO representatives, who claimed that the removal of nuclear battlefield weapons from such an important region as Central Europe would be contrary to NATO's "flexible response" doctrine, that is, to the preparations for waging nuclear war in Europe. Bonn, in turn, turned down the GDR's proposal to make the two German states free of nuclear weapons. After the deployment of Pershings and Tomahawks on West European territory had begun and the American-Soviet negotiations in Geneva had been broken off, the position of the United States and NATO should be understood in the sense that Sweden's proposal would "distract" the NATO countries' attention from the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe and a sharp increase in conventional arms, for which Washington is now calling from its allies.

For the purpose of neutralizing the impact of Sweden's proposals on a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons in the center of Europe in December 1983 the NATO Council session announced its decision to cut back 1,400 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe over the next 5 years. This action was presented by NATO propaganda as a manifestation of the West's "good will" and even as an aspiration to lower the level of nuclear confrontation. However, upon verification it transpired that only obsolete nuclear weapon systems would be written off and their place would be taken by more refined ones. Many observers are coming to the conclusion that the administration plans in the wake of the Pershing 2's and cruise missiles to deploy neutron weapons on the European continent at the time of talk about the writing off of the old systems. The above-mentioned (Fridmen) emphasizes in this connection that this action is unrelated to the idea of the creation of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons. "This does not diminish the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons for NATO," he declares.

The sharp exacerbation of the nuclear confrontation in Central Europe which followed the deployment of American medium-range missiles emphasizes as starkly as possible the importance for the security of the European peoples of the creation here of as broad a zone as possible free of battlefield

* THE TIMES, 21 October 1983.
nuclear weapons. In December 1983 the Swedish Government declared that it advocates a stimulation of efforts of all countries for the creation of a nuclear-free corridor.

IV

Having unilaterally assumed the historic commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union treats the concern of European countries with problems of their security in the face of the threat of nuclear war with complete understanding. It has emphasized repeatedly that if the opportunity for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in this part of Europe or the other emerges, the USSR will give practical steps in this direction the most active support. The very formula advanced by the Soviet Union—"A Europe free of nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical"—presupposes a broad range of measures corresponding to the aspiration of the peoples to deliver Europe from nuclear weapons.

Attempting to substantiate the unacceptability for the West of the concept of nuclear-free zones in Europe, Atlantic ideologists claim that only a policy of "deterrence," which is based on a readiness to be the first to activate nuclear weapons, has made it possible to preserve peace in Europe throughout the postwar years. Nuclear-free zones, they say, would weaken the strategy of the nuclear "restraint" of the USSR. This proposition is not only utterly false but serves to camouflage the self-seeking calculations from which the American ruling circles proceed, preserving and building up the nuclear presence in Europe.

The main goal of the policy of the USSR and the other socialist states on the European continent is peace, good-neighborliness and mutually profitable East-West cooperation. It was on the socialist countries' initiative that the historic Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was convened and Helsinki Final Act signed. "For almost 40 years—more than ever in modern history—Europe has been living under conditions of peace. This has been possible thanks to the consistent peace-loving policy of the socialist community countries, the efforts of the continent's peace-loving forces and also the realistic position of sober-minded politicians in the West," Yu. V. Andropov emphasized.

Who benefits from an exacerbation of the nuclear confrontation here?

The Reagan administration has proclaimed the "horizontal escalation" concept, the essence of which is that the United States should not confine its operations to the area of the outbreak of a conflict but may resort to "appropriate actions" in other areas where, as Defense Secretary C. Weinberger declared, the United States "has more suitable positions from the geographical and tactical viewpoints."** In the Pentagon's opinion, Europe is primarily such a "more suitable" area.

In terms of their specifications (greater accuracy and time taken to reach Soviet territory being 5-6 minutes) the Pershing 2 missiles are in the American arsenal a most effective type of aggressive weapon which may be activated first in the event of Washington unleashing a military adventure in any part of the world. "With the deployment of the American missiles on European soil there is an increase not in Europe's security," Yu.V. Andropov warned, "but in the real danger that the United States will bring down catastrophe on the peoples of Europe."*

Washington's assertions that the American missiles deployed on the European continent strengthen the United States' "guarantees" to the NATO allies are being received with increasingly great mistrust in West Europe. It is becoming the generally accepted conclusion that the United States will hardly sacrifice Chicago for Hamburg, say. Former U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger made it clearly understood in this connection in his speech at the Brussels conference of the North Atlantic Assembly in 1979 that the West Europeans should not count on the United States automatically activating its strategic forces to "defend" the interests of West Europe. And, indeed, the Reagan administration has confirmed allegiance to the "limited" nuclear war strategy. If the Americans can still comfort themselves with illusions of "limiting" a nuclear war to other countries or even "winning" it, there are no grounds for such hopes for densely populated Europe. Europe would not survive a "limited" nuclear war, its civilization would simply be annihilated—such is the common conclusion of the most authoritative experts both in the West and in the East.

In a situation where the fate of "nuclear hostages" is becoming increasingly less tolerable for the peoples of the West European countries and the tactics of crude pressure are misfiring, NATO leaders are attempting to invent new methods and arguments. Washington is incessantly intimidating its allies to the effect that in the event of the creation of nuclear-free zones, there would be an increased risk of military operations with the use of conventional arms. Deliberate silence is maintained here about the fact that the core of a treaty on the reciprocal nonuse of military forces and preservation of peaceful relations, a proposal for the conclusion of which the Warsaw Pact states addressed to NATO countries in January 1983, consists of reciprocal commitments not to be the first to use against one another not only nuclear but also conventional arms and military force in general.

The United States asserts that nuclear-free zones could be of one-sided benefit to the USSR. For example, a nuclear-free zone in North Europe would encompass the territory of certain of the United States' NATO allies and could allegedly limit this bloc's freedom of action. But after all, a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans would encompass the territory of the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies. Such a "limitation of the freedom of action" would embarrass neither the Soviet Union nor its friends. At the same time, however, participation in the nuclear-free zone by no means signifies countries'

departure from the alliances and their automatic renunciation of other treaties and agreements. But the NATO camp is reluctant to notice this.

Atlantic ideologists claim that nuclear-free zones are possible only if nuclear weapons cannot be-fired at them. However, the existence since 1967 of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America testifies that although theoretically it is possible to deliver a nuclear strike against Latin American countries, nonetheless, all nuclear states without exception have given legal guarantees against doing this. These international guarantees of nuclear-free status are considered perfectly sufficient and reliable in Latin America.

As distinct from the United States and other nuclear countries the Soviet Union assumed back at the UN General Assembly First Special Disarmament Session in 1978 the unequivocal commitment not to use nuclear weapons against states which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territory. Subsequently the USSR has repeatedly expressed a readiness to conclude the appropriate agreements with any nonnuclear country. It is this commitment which is a decisive element of the security of the states participating in nuclear-free zones, and it should be observed by all the nuclear powers.

NATO is imposing on the West European countries which do not have American nuclear weapons on their territory the thought that there is no need for the official legalization of their nuclear-free status inasmuch as they are in fact nonnuclear. However, historical experience testifies that the opportunities which exist today may disappear tomorrow owing to the militarist actions of Washington, which aspires to saturate the territory of the European countries with new types of nuclear arms and use them while pursuing its nuclear strategy. Essentially there are no guarantees that the United States will not cancel the principle of the nondeployment of nuclear weapons even in peacetime in the countries where NATO and the United States have military facilities—Norway, Denmark and Iceland—and where there are American military bases—in Iceland and Portugal, on Crete or on Cyprus. The very logic of the Pentagon's nuclear strategy allows of the "expediency" of delivering nuclear strikes from where they are not expected by a potential enemy, from the territory of states which formally do not have nuclear weapons included. It is understandable why the United States rejected the USSR's proposal on the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the European states where they do not exist at the present time. The Pentagon's far-reaching calculations on involving these countries in realization of Washington's nuclear policy may be discerned distinctly behind this rejection.

Speculating on the interest of the majority of its allies in a lowering of the level of nuclear confrontation on the continent, the Reagan administration has persistently foisted on the governments of Norway, Denmark and Greece the thought that the creation of the zones would complicate in the extreme the achievement of results at the American-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on limiting nuclear arms in Europe, that bloc solidarity is more essential than ever for the purpose of nuclear disarmament and that the autonomous actions of individual NATO members would harm the interests of the entire North Atlantic alliance. In practice, however, the Reagan administration used the
Geneva negotiations as a cover for the preparation of the deployment of the American missiles and the start of a new round of the nuclear arms race on the European continent. Life has shown the soundness of the farsighted European politicians who gave notice that nuclear-free zones not only would not complicate but, on the contrary, would contribute to a reduction in nuclear arms. O. Palme emphasized: "Progress in the creation of a nuclear-free zone could in itself make a constructive contribution to the efforts aimed at the gradual weakening of the role of nuclear arms in Europe and a numerical reduction therein."

In an atmosphere in which, through the fault of the Reagan administration, the American-Soviet negotiations in Geneva have been broken off, the non-nuclear countries' adoption of commitments not to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory becomes a practicable path capable right now of leading to an easing of the nuclear threat in Europe.

The growth of the threat of nuclear confrontation on our continent inevitably confronts all, including the nonnuclear, European countries with the question of what kind of independent contribution they can make to the cause of lowering the level of East-West nuclear confrontation and reducing nuclear arms and whether this is possible at all.

Washington asserts that only the nuclear powers are capable of solving problems connected with the nuclear arms race, and therefore, it is said, the European countries should wait for the resumption of the American-Soviet negotiations. The Soviet Union has always opposed the nuclear powers monopolizing the solution of questions connected with European security. It believes that all the European countries should be tackling the problems of nuclear disarmament and the tasks of strengthening European security. Speaking at the Madrid meeting of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko emphasized: "All these problems and tasks are of direct concern to each state participating in the All-European Conference, irrespective of its size, geographical location and social system and also irrespective of whether it possesses nuclear weapons or not and is a member of this military-political grouping or the other or not or is nonaligned or neutral."*

Realization of the idea of the creation of nuclear-free zones affords all European countries the possibility of making a tangible contribution to the cause of easing the threat of nuclear war and the relaxation of tension. The more states there are in Europe which have proclaimed a refusal to make their territory available for the deployment of nuclear weapons, the more obstacles there will be to their use and the less the risk that they will be fired.

Nuclear-free zones in Europe are capable of paving the way to the continent's complete liberation of nuclear weapons. They would sharply constrict the geographical parameters of nuclear preparations and knock the ground from under the feet of the dangerous concepts of fighting a "limited" nuclear war.

* PRAVDA, 8 September 1983.
The European states which do not possess nuclear weapons and do not permit them on their territory have every legal and moral right to expect that all the nuclear powers provide guarantees in treaty form not to use these weapons against them ever and under any circumstances. For its part, the Soviet Union has declared repeatedly that it is ready at any time to embark on the officialization of such guarantees in international law with any European countries. In answers to questions to the representatives of a number of Finland's public organizations Yu.V. Andropov emphasized that implementation of the proposals concerning nuclear-free zones "would contribute to delivering in the future all of Europe from nuclear weapons."

The European peoples' extensive approval of the proposals of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries concerning a radical reduction in nuclear arms in Europe and the creation of nuclear-free zones on the continent and the powerful sweep of the antinuclear movement testify to the urgency and vital importance of the liberation of Europe from the nuclear confrontation threatening all European countries, both of West and East, without exception. A nuclear-free Europe could pave the way to the truly reliable security not only of the European but other peoples also.

* PRAVDA, 11 May 1983.

In seeking world hegemony the parvenu Washington "crusaders" are mobilizing all instruments of foreign policy—political, economic and ideological. However, the key role is assigned the accelerated buildup of the military might of the United States and its allies in NATO and other aggressive blocs.

The core of the militarist programs of the present U.S. Administration and what is called "direct confrontation" strategy is formed by its aspiration to strict "pressure" on the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries. The nuclear forces of American imperialism are set the task here of being capable of "doing away with the entire Soviet military and political system," as the Pentagon "Defense Directives for 1984-1988," said, inter alia, in this connection.

The militarist policy, which has been taken to extremes, is also aimed against the majority of young states seeking genuine economic and political independence. Thus the American missiles now deployed in West Europe are intended to hit targets on the territory not only of the USSR but also of many African and Near East states. Making the decisive gamble on the arms race, Washington is also counting on a redistribution of forces in the capitalist world favorable to itself, the utmost strengthening of its own positions and use of the partners in these interests, particularly for a frontal offensive against socialism.

It is perfectly understandable that the bosses of the White House and the "theorists" serving them, in the grip of such cravings, present as the most important goal of the Republican administration the achievement of a "position of strength" which would enable them to run things in the world unchecked. Delivering a program speech in May 1982 at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, W. Clark, then the President's national security adviser, asserted that U.S. strategy "should consist of the use of the armed forces for specific political purposes."
In accordance with this orientation, the R. Reagan administration has under peacetime conditions increased the rate of growth of the military budget to an annual 12-14 percent. Washington is putting the emphasis on breaking up the existing approximate equilibrium and gaining a preponderance over the USSR at practically all levels of the military balance.

Toward the end of the first year of its term the administration put into circulation the term "safety reserve," which was designed to justify the buildup of the quantitative parameters of the strategic forces.

Primarily Washington has intensified the qualitative strategic arms race, seeking a sharp increase in "counterforce" potential, that is, the capacity for hitting launch installations, command posts and other military targets. Practically all the systems which the present administration has put or is preparing to put in production are designed to hit fortified, highly-protected targets, primarily the Soviet ICBM's. The Pentagon intends to add to its armory 100 MX missiles with 10 warheads each and as of the end of the 1980's to begin deployment of the superaccurate Trident-2 SLBM with 14 warheads each. The Trident-1 SLBM, which are already deployed, possess increased accuracy, which subsequently will increase even more. It is planned to build 1,000 highly accurate monobloc Midgetman missiles. In the next few years the United States intends to deploy 3,000-4,000 cruise missiles on B-52 bombers and on the new B-1B bomber. According to Pentagon outlines, approximately 4,000 sea-based cruise missiles fitted, as a rule, with nuclear warheads are to have been introduced to the fighting strength by the start of the 1990's. The Pershing 2 missile with its high accuracy and short flight time to target is a "counterforce weapon".

In the race for military superiority the U.S. leadership has declared its intention of creating an all-embracing ABM defense system and actively spreading the arms race to space. This system, according to Washington's calculations, is to supplement the "counterforce potential" of offensive arms aimed at weakening the power of a retaliatory strike. Course has also been set toward the accelerated creation of antisatellite weapons. Tests thereof have already begun. It is thus a question of an entire set of measures leading to the destabilization of the strategic situation and the increased threat of nuclear war.

The U.S. leadership began deployment of the new American missiles in West Europe fully in accordance with its initial aims. This step, which is hostile to man's interests, was taken contrary to the will of the majority of the population of the West European countries, which is aware of the dire consequences of the White House's actions. It is perfectly obvious that with the deployment of the American missiles on European soil there is an increase not in Europe's security but the real danger that the United States will bring down an irreparable catastrophe on the European peoples.

NATO occupies a central place in the United States' military strategy. While building up its own military preparations the administration is at the same time attempting to shift onto the allies a large part of the burden of military spending and commitments, expand NATO's "sphere of responsibility" and increase the bloc's overall military power. Washington is making considerable efforts to harness Japan also to its militarist team.
Those at the helm of U.S. foreign policy are manifestly attempting to impart a material basis to the "limited nuclear war" doctrine, the basic point of which amounts to making nuclear war not only conceivable but also permissible, while, prior to the unleashing of such a war, using nuclear weapons as a means of political blackmail.

The leaders of the Pentagon now consider possible also a "prolonged controlled nuclear conflict," in which they hope to "prevail". It is contended here, of course, fighting a nuclear war primarily in Europe "without the involvement therein of U.S. territory." Here we have a striking example of unlimited adventurism and an incomprehension of the realities of the nuclear age.

Describing the United States' current nuclear strategy, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, emphasized: "The idea of military superiority has become an outright obsession. It determines the content of all the actions of the U.S. Government and the United States' demands on its allies. Superiority is simply understood here as attaining the capacity for striking the Soviet Union where and when Washington deems it expedient in the hope that the retaliatory strike against the United States will be of less power than under other conditions."4

E. Rostow, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, formulated the United States' goals thus: "With the assured potential for a retaliatory strike (it is in fact a question of first-strike potential--S.K.), we will be able to use our military power to defend our interests if this should prove necessary, and not only in Europe but also in many other strategically important parts of the world. In my view—and here I speak on behalf of President Reagan—this is and should remain the minimum goal of our nuclear potential...."5

Let us also hear the "revelations" of a current character--Assistant Secretary of Defense R. Perle: "I have always been less concerned as regards what might happen in the event of an exchange of nuclear strikes than about the impact which the nuclear balance could have on our readiness to take a risk in the event of a local crisis."

It is clear that the plans of the American leadership are aimed at achieving advantages which would untie its hands for the use and threat of the use of both conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons in a number of regions of the developing world. In other words, Washington intends to use military power to realize its imperial ambitions and underpin the economic expansion of the transnational monopolies.

The Soviet Union's achievement of parity in the military-strategic sphere with the United States has markedly reduced the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war, removed nuclear weapons from the category of applicable means of warfare to a considerable extent and made hopes for victory in a nuclear encounter illusory for the unleashing thereof would signify the self-destruction of the aggressor and, in addition, a mortal threat to human civilization and life on Earth itself even. The equilibrium in the military-strategic sphere objectively cannot fail to bridle the aggressive circles of imperialism.
II

Proceeding from the general aim of a change in the correlation of forces in the world in its favor, primarily of a disturbance of the balance between the strategic potentials of the USSR and the United States, Washington has embarked on a wide-ranging buildup of all components of its military power at all levels, in the sphere of conventional arms and armed forces included. What brings about the increased attention currently being paid in the United States to conventional forces? The reason is the following: The Pentagon considers these forces the most flexible and suitable for the performance of gendarme functions. It is being impressed upon the public that their use allegedly makes it possible to avoid the outbreak of large-scale armed conflicts. Such assertions do not withstand criticism inasmuch as even a local crisis could grow as a result of the escalation of tension into a nuclear confrontation.

Washington's policy of building up conventional armed forces and arms is characterized currently by the following particular features.

First of all, the Pentagon is expanding the sphere of its military "intervention," including therein practically all regions of the world, which it intends to "defend" against the "Soviet threat," which it itself has fabricated. "American military strategy," the report of the Chiefs of Staff Committee for the 1984 fiscal year observed, "should proceed from the need to be prepared for military operations in all parts of the world."

The spirit of confrontation in relations with the USSR and the falsehoods concerning Soviet defense measures which are breaking all records serve simultaneously also as an attempt to conceal the U.S. imperialists' own aggressive plans and actions and as a propaganda cover for power pressure both on the developing countries and on the capitalist partners. Consequently, the true basis of the spirit of confrontation consists of an endeavor to establish unconditional American hegemony in the nonsocialist world.

Speaking in San Francisco on 28 April 1981, C. Weinberger declared: "Our military policy should be regarded primarily in a global context, our interests are of a universal nature and the threat which we are encountering is also universal.... Many energy resources and many other minerals are several thousand miles distant from our shores. In order to ensure access to these resources for ourselves and the entire free world we have to increase our military and naval power." It is a long time since the hidden motives of imperialist policy were emphasized so manifestly and unequivocally.

It is in this connection that the United States is making concentrated efforts to increase the offensive possibilities and combat readiness of the conventional forces. It is planned to build up their numbers in the next few years by more than 200,000 and increase the number of army divisions from the present 16 to 25 and carrier groups from 13 to 22 by 1991. The number of air force fighter aviation wings will increase from 24 to 38 (approximately 70 aircraft in each of them); all-weather F-15 fighters, A-10 close-support ground attack aircraft and F-16 fighter-bombers will be part of the armory. It is planned to supply 8,000 aircraft altogether for the air force, army, navy and marine corps.
The Pentagon also intends to acquire by 1988 some 7,058 new M-1 Abrams tanks, increasing the total tank fleet by 40 percent, and almost 7,000 new infantry combat vehicles. Provision of the ground forces with homing weapons is continuing at the same time. Electronic warfare facilities are being perfected and new types of particularly lethal weapons are being developed. A decision has been made on starting the large-scale production of a new generation of chemical weapons—so-called binary weapons—and also their delivery systems—155 mm artillery shells and aerial bombs. The new types of weapons approximate nuclear warheads in their power of destruction, which is in fact leading to the "erosion of the nuclear threshold" and making the development of wars with the use of conventional arms into nuclear wars more probable.

The present administration is paying unflagging attention to increasing the mobility and flexibility of the armed forces. The "projection of military power" concept, which implies the possibility of resorting to intervention at one's discretion, is being revived. This is what is signified in practice by the buildup of the military-strength "background" mentioned above. Former CIA Director S. Turner and G. Thibault, head of a department of the National Military College, wrote: "We did not foresee in advance the use of our armed forces in Korea, Vietnam... or in Iran (the attempt to free the hostages).... We cannot predict where our national interests will be challenged next time. Therefore, we need to build into our armed forces the capacity for flexible response to unexpected events."10

The new naval strategy, which contemplates, inter alia, together with an increase in the number of carrier commands, a one-third increase in the number of main warships, bringing it by the start of the next decade to 610, is aimed at accomplishing this task. The American leadership is openly advertising its intentions. "A key element of American strategy should be a strengthening of the navy," the report of the Chiefs of Staff Committee for the 1984 fiscal year declared, "...for the United States and its allies to have superiority in the most important ocean areas."12

The creation of the Rapid Deployment Force and the resources ensuring its mobility is designed to contribute to a sharp increase in the possibilities of "projecting power" and the potential for interventionist actions. Whereas the J. Carter administration planned an RDF numbering 100,000 and subsequently 200,000 men, these outlines have now been exceeded: it already has 230,000 men, but even this figure seems insufficient for the Pentagon. It is planning to double it, which will make it possible to incorporate in the RDF 5 army divisions, 2 marine divisions with attached aviation, 10 air force tactical and strategic aviation wings, 3 carriers with support ships and also 12 ships with weapons, equipment and ammunition which are to be permanently in the Indian Ocean in the event of the dispatch here of three marine expeditionary brigades.13

It is planned to purchase eight high-speed container ships (six of which will be refitted for transporting an army mechanized division) and also other maritime means for the strategic transfer of troops. There will be a sharp increase in the potential of military-transport aviation as a result of the purchase in the next 5 years of approximately 100 C-5 and KC-10 military-transport aircraft.
The Reagan administration is displaying the greatest activeness in the Near East, in Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean. At the start of 1983 the Pentagon created a "Central Command" for this region with its headquarters in Karachi, subordinating to it all the American armed forces in it or intended for it. U.S. strategists are now putting the Persian Gulf on the same level of significance as West Europe. Thus the Pentagon's "Directives in the Defense Sphere for 1984-1988" say: "The first goal of the strategy of conventional warfare is defense of U.S. territory, then of West Europe and the oil resources of the Persian Gulf." 

Building up its power in the Persian Gulf and in proximity to it, Washington has embarked on the path of the creation of a new network of bases in the region, attempting here to arrogate to itself the "right" to military intervention both in the event of local interstate conflicts and in response to internal social changes which do not suit it. "Forcible incursions" into this country or other of a pro-imperialist orientation, even in spite of objections of the ruling regime, cannot be ruled out. 

Explaining Reagan's statement that he would not permit "another Iran," C. Weinberger declared that were something reminiscent of an "internal revolution" to occur in Saudi Arabia, the United States would not stand passively by.

Following the "Carter doctrine," the present administration is attempting to justify its claims to the role of gendarme by the need "to defend access to oil" for the West. The legitimate question, however, arises: how can this be achieved by turning the region into a staging ground of militarist preparations and a powder keg? "U.S. military intervention," D. Newsome, who was undersecretary of state in the J. Carter administration, wrote, "carried out, for example, for the purpose of supporting a ruler friendly to the United States who found himself in a difficult position would summon forth very extensive opposition to the United States on the part of the population of the Persian Gulf region.

What is more, military intervention would most likely lead to what it was designed to prevent: a sharp decline in oil production. Political upheavals could lead to a halt to oil production or to Western countries' loss of access to it, but not necessarily; outside intervention, on the other hand, would necessarily culminate in both."

Washington's feverish militarist assertiveness in the Gulf zone has a perfectly apparent hidden motive. In the first 20 years after the war the American monopolies, which relied on the military domination of the United States, virtually completely controlled Near East oil. Washington had the opportunity of throwing the oil noose over its junior partners, forcing them to bow to its will without the direct use of military power. During the 1956 Suez crisis the D. Eisenhower administration resorted for the purpose of putting pressure on Britain and France to a direct threat to shut off oil supplies to Europe from the Near East oilfields. Now the situation is different. The deposits of "black gold" have been nationalized, and the companies of West European states and the oil-producing countries themselves have put a considerable squeeze on the Americans. For this reason the United States is attempting to establish military control over the Persian Gulf not least in order to again acquire a powerful level of pressure on the NATO allies and many developing states.
Washington is not only encouraging and subsidizing the expansionist policy of Tel Aviv; American marines themselves are participating directly in military operations on the land of long-suffering Lebanon, while ships of the U.S. 6th Fleet, which are massed on the shores of this country, are shelling its cities and hamlets with heavy guns. The presence of the United States and other NATO powers in the Near East is resulting in new devastation and suffering for the Arab peoples.

A very important place in the administration's military-political strategy has been occupied by Central America and the Caribbean. Using former Somocistas, it is inspiring and directly organizing sabotage against Nicaragua, threatening Cuba and increasing military assistance to the antipopular regimes of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. Military maneuvers of a provocative nature are being conducted almost incessantly in the region and the surrounding seas. The reason for the United States' sharply increased activeness in the said region is contained in the fact that Washington is attempting therein to give "instructive battle" to the peoples' movement for social and national liberation. Marines and gunboat diplomacy have become, to judge by everything, the main "argument" of American policy. In the fall of 1983 Washington did not stop short at the bandit attack on and occupation of tiny Grenada, where it set up a repressive antipopular regime. But this "victory" proved "pyrrhic". U.S. imperialism's brazen aggression brought forth a wave of condemnation of its actions and an upsurge of anti-American feeling throughout the world.

III

The growth of the United States' bellicosity was also reflected in the Pentagon's adoption of the new army manual "FM 100-5," which stressed an increase in the offensive power of the conventional armed forces and strikes to a considerable depth of the enemy's tactical order of battle (up to 200-300 kilometers) with the aid of new types of particularly lethal arms and also chemical and nuclear weapons.

The so-called "Rogers Plan" has been extensively discussed since the later half of 1982. Gen B. Rogers—supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe—pays lip-service to a certain departure from inordinate emphasis on nuclear weapons allegedly for the purpose of reducing the threat of nuclear war. Nonetheless, he by no means rules out "preemptive" nuclear strikes. In an interview with the newspaper LIBERATION on 11 January 1983 Rogers stated plainly: "It is essential to use nuclear weapons in good time in order that it be possible to hit targets which are not on our own territory."

The "horizontal escalation" concept, which implies the United States' readiness in the event of a conflict to attack the USSR or its closest allies not only in the area of the outbreak of the conflict but far away, in any part of the world practically, serves as the doctrinal "innovation" of the present administration intended for combating the countries and regimes not to Washington's liking. The Reagan administration has announced the abandonment of the "1 1/2 wars" concept and the preparation of the armed forces such that they might simultaneously or consecutively participate in wars practically everywhere.
The interventionist nature of the present administration's military doctrine was also manifested in the circulation of the "response to uncertain signals" concept. In the defense secretary's report it is formulated thus: "We... must change our approach in respect of the response to warnings. Our armed forces... must be ready to respond to warning signals which could be extremely uncertain." Inasmuch as it is possible to understand by "uncertain signals" anything one wishes, it is essentially a question of the U.S. Administration's desire to preserve for itself "freedom of maneuver" in any situation.

A further concept, which would be called "preventive intervention," can be discerned in the speeches of U.S. leaders. Speaking in Chicago on 7 May 1981, C. Weinberger said: "We must increase our military presence in vitally important areas, forestalling potential aggression before it becomes a fait accompli." The invasion of Grenada was also justified by the "prevention of aggression and subversive activity" on the part of this small state.

Such doctrinal niceties testify with absolute certainty to the increased likelihood of the outbreak of armed conflicts in the world on the initiative and with the participation of the United States. Take just the example of Washington's operations in Lebanon, where it has not only taken the path of open interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state but raised the Near East conflict to a new and more dangerous level and expanded it. The armada of the United States and other NATO countries, including the carrier "Eisenhower," serves as a visible reminder of the doctrine which bears the name of this president and which "blessed" U.S. aggression in Lebanon in 1958.

If it is considered that the United States is again building up the numbers of its combat contingents abroad (from 1980 through the end of 1982 they increased by more than 60,000—from 480,700 to 543,400 men), preparing to deploy the latest arms in certain developing countries, the AWACS system in Saudi Arabia, for example, and installing new bases and strong points, we cannot fail to conclude that Washington intends extending the so-called "trigger" concept to virtually the whole world. It is understood there that the presence of American troops in this country or the other serves not only to ward off an outside "attack" but also to "suppress civil disorders" affecting U.S. "interests".

"On any far-fetched pretext," the statement of Yu. V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, of 28 September 1983 observed, "the American military presence expands thousands of kilometers from U.S. territory. Staging grounds are being created for direct intervention with the aid of armed forces in the affairs of other states and for the use of American weapons against any country which rejects Washington's diktat. As a result there is increased tension in all parts of the world--Europe, Asia, Africa, the Near East and Central America."

The United States' military expansion under the present administration has reached an unprecedented level, and its imperial ambitions an unprecedented scale. It is with good reason that a number of America's top military figures, including Gen J. Wickham, army chief of staff, have begun to express fears that the new tasks and commitments could prove beyond the armed forces.
The "Defense Directives for 1984-1988" set the task of "strengthening the special operations forces to project American power where the use of conventional armed forces would be premature, inappropriate or impossible." The present administration has embarked on an increase in the numbers of the so-called Green Berets, which specialize in all kinds of subversive operations, sabotage, psychological warfare, terror against the peaceful population and the recruitment of saboteurs. The potential of the "special forces" is being created not only in the event of a "big war" but also for undeclared wars aimed at destabilizing and ousting regimes not to Washington's liking. The United States is already fighting such a war against the people of Afghanistan, training and financing armed bands of counterrevolutionaries operating from abroad.

Simultaneously the Washington administration is working for the accelerated armament of puppet regimes in the developing countries at whose hands it hopes to suppress the national liberation movement and social protest demonstrations. Direct military pressure with the use of American armed forces is combined with the prompting of countries allied with or dependent on Washington to interventionist actions. So it was in Lebanon, which Israel invaded on the basis of a conspiracy with the U.S. Administration. Washington also gave the go-ahead to South Africa's attacks on Angola. The White House regards Honduran territory as a beachhead for sallies against Nicaragua.

With R. Reagan's signing on 8 July 1981 of a directive on arms sales abroad the present administration rejected all appeals for "restraint". Huge consignments of the latest and costly combat equipment are being sent to countries laying claim to the seizure of the territory of other states and pursuing an expansionist policy. In 1982 sales of American arms constituted $22 billion, having increased by more than one-fourth compared with the final year of the previous administration's term in office. This position is fraught with consequences which are hard to predict and a further destabilization of international relations.

Now, after 3 years of the R. Reagan administration's term in office in the United States, the conclusion of the 26th CPSU Congress is more relevant than ever: "Adventurism and a readiness to gamble with the interests of mankind in the name of their narrow selfish goals--this is what is being revealed particularly undisguisedly in the policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles." Washington has in fact declared war on history and has gone onto the offensive not only against socialism and the movement of the peoples for national and social liberation but even to a certain extent against its own allies, in short, against the whole world, intending with the fist to halt and turn back its entire complicated development. But such a policy is ultimately inevitably doomed to fail. And for this reason it is doubly adventurist. Resistance to the policy of militarism, diktat, crude pressure and confrontation is growing everywhere. The modern world cannot be changed by force of arms.

However, the situation that has come about through the fault of the United States is forcing the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries to adopt all the necessary measures to protect their interests and preserve peace for present and future generations. This noble aspiration was confirmed once again in the USSR Supreme Soviet decree "The International Situation and
the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State". Our country's highest organ of power expressed confidence that wisdom can and must save mankind from a nuclear catastrophe, and the parliaments and peoples of all countries can and must make their contribution to the solution of this most burning problem. All peace-loving forces of the world must rally closely together in the struggle against the ominous plans of imperialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. In his annual report to Congress, which was released in February 1982, the U.S. defense secretary spoke of a "safety reserve essential for preserving peace," explaining that he referred to a "safety reserve" which the United States possessed in the first 15 years after the war, that is, when Washington had manifold superiority over the USSR in the strategic arms sphere. Gen J. Vessey, chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, resorted to this same formula in April 1983 (See "Report of Secretary of Defense C. W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1983 Budget, FY 1984 Authorization and Fy 1983-1987 Defense Programs," 8 February 1982, Washington pp 1-3).


4. Ibid., 12 July 1983.


7. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 30 May 1982


9. Ibid., p III-7

10. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Fall 1982, p 129


15. See ibid., 2 February 1981.


18. PRAVDA, 29 September 1983.

19. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 30 May 1982

20. Ibid., 14 March 1982; SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, 8 September 1982.


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CSO: 1816/7
ASEAN PROBLEMS TRACED TO WEST RATHER THAN INDOCHINA

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 21 Feb 84) pp 54-66

[Article by M. Isayev: "The ASEAN Countries and Problems of Peace and Stability in Southeast Asia"]

[Text] For several decades now the region of Southeast Asia has been a center of tension on our planet. The incessant interference of imperialism and the forces of international reaction forming a bloc with it, aspiring to impede the growth of the influence of socialism in this part of the world, hold on to their positions at any price and subordinate the peoples to their diktat, remain at this stage also the main cause of the continued political instability in the region.

Two groups of states have taken shape in Southeast Asia in the postwar period. On the one hand these are the three Indochina countries—the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea—which after their peoples had won victory in the long struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression have been proceeding in single formation along the path of building a new life. On the other, the countries which are a part of ASEAN, which was created in 1967—a subregional organization consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Brunei.* It is this grouping which imperialism and the forces of international reaction, which were defeated in their aggressive, hegemonist hankerings against the peoples of Indochina, are attempting to draw into the confrontation with the states of the region which have opted for the path of socialist building and use for their own purposes, which are hostile to peace and socialism.

I

The increased attention which the capitalist countries are currently displaying in ASEAN is easily explained. At the junction of Asia and Australia and the Pacific and Indian oceans, the countries of the grouping occupy strategically important positions on the international lines of communication. The land

*The question of admittance of Brunei as a member of ASEAN was decided officially after it had been granted independence in January 1984.
area of the states of the association is over 3 million square kilometers (that is, more than 5 times the territory of France and 8 times that of Japan), while their population is now 265 million. The countries of the grouping taken together occupy a leading place in the world in terms of reserves of mineral and agricultural raw material and play an appreciable part in the world production of a number of important raw material and food commodities, including natural rubber, tin, coconuts and palm oil. The significance of these countries as exporters of a whole number of most important raw materials is great. In the 1970's they provided approximately 83 percent of world exports of natural rubber, 84 percent of palm oil, 72 percent of tin and tin concentrate, 64 percent of coconut palm products, 54 percent of black pepper, 10 percent of rice and so forth. *

The interest of the leading capitalist countries in ASEAN is also brought about to a certain extent by the fact that the growth rate of its members' economy, particularly in the past decade, has remained quite high. Thus at the end of the 1970's it constituted 7-8 percent. Total exports of the countries of the association amounted to $44.5 billion in 1979. The trade volume among its members also increased (from $5 billion in 1975 to $14 billion in 1979).

In the time of its existence ASEAN has traveled a far from simple, straightforward path of development. Originally ASEAN was oriented toward the establishment of regional cooperation mainly in the economic, social and cultural spheres. Thus the Bangkok Declaration, which was adopted at the time of the creation of the association, defined the association's basic goals and tasks thus: acceleration of economic growth and social and cultural progress by means of the joint efforts of the states of the region in a spirit of "equality and partnership".

A foundation of the political cooperation of the ASEAN members was the idea of the conversion of Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and neutrality free of foreign interference in any form (it was assumed that the Indochina states and also Burma would be incorporated in this zone). The concept of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality proposed by Malaysia back in 1968 was incorporated in November 1971 in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of the ASEAN countries. Its advancement in a situation where the U.S. aggression in Indochina was continuing was aimed at preventing the spread of this conflict. The concept provided, inter alia, for the withdrawal of all foreign powers from the region and their abandonment of all attempts to turn the region into a center of tension and wars.

At the same time it was intended to erect a kind of barrier in the way of the spread of the "communist threat," by which was understood primarily the impact on the countries of the region of the national liberation struggle of the Indochina peoples. The leadership of the association's countries could not have failed to have recognized that the courageous struggle of the patriotic forces of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea had evoked profound sympathy in the peoples of the neighboring states, contributed to the development of democratic movements

in them and thereby led to a weakening of the positions of local reaction. The ruling circles of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines deemed it necessary under these conditions to resort to the coordination of joint action to stabilize the positions of capitalism in their countries and suppress internal opposition.

Incidentally, even prior to the creation of ASEAN the ideas of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia had quite assuredly blazed a trail for themselves, although imperialism and local reaction intended from the very outset to impart to them a reactionary content and use the integration processes primarily to strengthen the positions of capitalism in the region. In the light of this the interests of capitalism and local reaction in certain Southeast Asian countries in the process of the formation of ASEAN largely coincided, and, furthermore, the aspiration to, as a minimum, preserve a kind of status quo between the forces of socialism and capitalism in Southeast Asia was predominant in them. These aspects in the activity of the association strengthened markedly after the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the mainland part of this region as a result of the victory of the Indochina peoples.

The establishment of subregional cooperation was complicated by the fact that in the geographical plane the grouping does not represent a compact whole. The territory of the ASEAN countries, which encompasses part of continental Asia and a number of archipelagoes adjacent thereto, is characterized by great discreteness. Thus the Philippines archipelago consists of more than 7,000 islands, and the Indonesian archipelago of more than 3,000. The natural national differences between the association members are increased by the motley nature of their internal ethnic composition. As a whole the process of the formation of nations here is evidently not yet complete. Numerous national minorities in individual countries, particularly the Chinese, are contesting political and economic "leadership" with the national majority. Linguistic difference even within the framework of individual countries are great. Religious beliefs are dissimilar also. Thus in Indonesia and Malaysia it is predominantly Islam, in Thailand Buddhism and on the Philippines Christianity and also Islam, which enjoys a certain prevalence in the southern parts.

Appreciable problems in the way of the expansion of cooperation within the ASEAN framework arise as a result of differences in economic development levels. Although all members of the association are in the developing countries category, Singapore, for example, is already on the threshold of developed capitalism, while Indonesia in terms of basic indicators is barely above the level characteristic of the least developed countries. Despite the fact that appreciable absolute economic growth was observed in all countries of the grouping throughout the 1970's, in relative terms the gap which had existed here earlier increased even more. At the start of the 1980's Singapore was 15 times ahead of Indonesia in terms of per capita GNP, 7.5 times ahead of the Philippines and Thailand and 3 times ahead of Malaysia. With the exception of Singapore all ASEAN members are still agrarian countries with a comparatively highly developed extractive industry. Agricultural products account for approximately 30 percent of GNP in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines and approximately 50 percent in Indonesia; the share of processing industry products in them, however, constitutes less than 20 percent of GNP. Naturally, the differences in the economic levels,
the level of development that has been reached and the availability of natural resources are creating considerable problems now also for the establishment of cooperation among ASEAN members.

At the same time the ruling circles of the countries of the association are united primarily by their social homogeneity: after all, a bloc of major landowners and the top commercial and bureaucratic bourgeoisie is in power here. The ruling elite of these states is known for its allegiance to an orientation toward capitalism and it actively implants private-capitalist enterprise and adheres to positions of anticommunism. Propaganda of the ideas of scientific socialism is officially banned here, and the communist parties have been outlawed and deprived of the right of legal activity. Taking social proximity as the basis, the leading circles of the ASEAN countries assign cooperation in the business of "defense" of their regimes against the so-called "communist danger" an important place. The "national and regional capacity to resist concept," which was advanced by Indonesia at the start of the 1970's and which with time has become a kind of political basis of the mutual relations of the association's members, serves as the ideological-theoretical basis of such cooperation. The essence of this concept is that the governments of the ASEAN countries must cooperate closely in preserving their class-related regimes. They proceed here from the fact that the fall of one of them could be a "destabilizing factor" for the remaining members of the grouping.

The political aspect of the cooperation of this subregional organization was enshrined officially for the first time at the Bali meeting of the heads of government of the countries of the association in 1976. It adopted the ASEAN Declaration of Consent and the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which contain the principles by which these countries are guided in the development of relations among themselves when settling disputes and conflicts which arise. The legal consolidation of the principles of political cooperation in fact signified the ASEAN members' recognition of the fact, which they had long denied, that the association represents by nature a politico-economic grouping whose main task is to prevent the further spread of socialism in this part of Asia.

Subregional economic cooperation within the ASEAN framework, even taken "in itself," separately from the said sociopolitical considerations, is a sufficiently complex and contradictory phenomenon. Whereas in the first decade of its existence the association's main task amounted to defense of the commercial interests of the participants in the grouping on the world raw material and agricultural product market, as of the end of the 1970's their interest in the development of intraregional trade and economic cooperation has increased. Specific measures are being adopted to this end for the creation of preferential trading conditions based on a mutual reduction in customs tariffs and the conclusion of payments agreements. The preferences system now extends to several thousand commodities (mainly auxiliary), whose value constitutes over 15 percent of the aggregate commodity turnover of the members of the grouping.

Considerable problems also arise on the path of implementation of joint economic projects. A decision to build an industrial enterprise in each country was adopted 9 years ago. It was anticipated that copper-smelting works would be
built on the Philippines, a diesel engine plant in Singapore, an enterprise for the production of soda ash in Thailand and plants for the production of urea in Malaysia and Indonesia. By this time something has actually been done only in the two latter countries, particularly in Indonesia, where the construction of the envisaged facility has begun.

An analysis of the results of the cooperation of the ASEAN countries in the sphere of credit-finance and trade relations and also in the industrial sphere shows that the results that have been achieved are modest and may be evaluated from the viewpoint of the requirements of capitalist economic integration as the first approaches to serious economic cooperation. The association has essentially not yet embarked on cooperation in the agricultural sphere. Nor have its joint measures in the social and cultural spheres gone beyond the framework of trial steps.*

Subregional economic cooperation within the ASEAN framework is developing under conditions where its members find themselves in strong economic and political dependence on the imperialist powers, which at the current stage is becoming even greater as a result of the association's endeavor to effect industrialization by way of the maximum attraction of foreign investments in the national economy and the strengthening of the local bourgeoisie's relations with the West's monopoly capital. As a result the countries of the grouping are linked more closely economically with the United States, Japan and West European states than among themselves.**

II

The slow pace of trade-economic integration prompted the association's members to seek methods of compensating for the failures of subregional cooperation on the paths of the development of external relations. Given the development of joint approach to the problems of trade-economic relations with the developed capitalist states, the participants in the grouping proceeded from the community of the foreign economic tasks confronting them ensuing from their dependence on the world capitalist economy, particularly under the conditions of the exacerbation of the economic and financial crises of the capitalist world, the growth of protectionist currents and the deterioration in general economic conditions in the developed capitalist states. The leaders of the association pursued to the utmost here the thought that a "cohesive and prosperous" ASEAN would serve as a reliable barrier in the way of the "spread of communism". It was believed that this "argument"—and it is employed extensively in negotiations with Japan, the United States, the Common Market countries and Australia—would help extract from them various, primarily trade-economic, concessions and privileges.

At the same time business circles of the association's members cannot fail to be alerted by the fact that the influx of private foreign capital into ASEAN is taking the form of the expansion of the transnational corporations [TNC], which now control the key positions in the local economy and have an appreciable

* See M. Khaldin, "ASEAN Without Illusions," Moscow 1983, p 130.
impact on the integration processes in the association. On the eve and at the
outset of the 1980's the developed capitalist states accounted for up to 60 per-
cent of ASEAN's total foreign trade turnover, including Japan for 24 percent,
the United States for 17 percent and the EEC countries for 14 percent. At the
same time, however, the developing countries' share constituted 37 percent of
the association's foreign trade turnover, including intrazonal trade within the
ASEAN framework less than 15 percent. Trade with the socialist countries, on
the other hand, constitutes only 3 percent of its total commodity turnover.

The industrial capitalist powers play the leading part in the export of private
foreign capital to the economy of this subregional organization. At the end of
the 1970's they accounted for 92 percent of all foreign private investments in
Indonesia, 70 percent in Malaysia, 100 percent in Singapore, 86 percent in
Thailand and 92 percent in the Philippines. At the start of the 1980's over
30 percent of total foreign private investments in the ASEAN economy were Japan-
ese, 25 percent American and 13 percent West European.

The inexorable laws of capitalist competition operate on both the domestic and
foreign ASEAN markets, and this makes it easier for the transnational monopolies,
primarily Japanese and American, to exercise control over its economic develop-
ment. The imperialist powers continue to regard the association mainly as a
raw material supplier. Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the
grouping's members to supply their export products to the American and West
European markets owing to the protectionist measures of the developed capitalist
states and growing rivalry on the part of other developing countries. Further-
more, having economic structures of the same type, the countries of the associ-
ation have been forced to compete with one another on the quite narrow intra-
ASEAN market.

It was not surprising that the economic growth rate slowed in the ASEAN coun-
tries at the start of the 1980's. Whereas in the 1970's the increase in GNP in
them amounted to 9 percent in some years, as of the start of the current decade
it has been at the 4-percent level. The economic indicators of the association's
members proved lower than planned. Only the level of inflation in the majority
of countries was not as high as before.

The annual study of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific for 1982 pointed out that the unprecedented economic recession in the
West had also had a negative impact on the economy of Southeast Asia. The
states of the region began to experience more sharply than before the influence
of the growth of the balance of trade deficit, unemployment and a number of com-
plex sociopolitical problems. A particularly deep recession was observed in
Malaysia and Singapore. Thus the growth rate of Malaysia's GNP constituted 3.9
percent in 1982. The analogous indicator in Singapore in 1982 was the lowest
since 1976. The sharp fall in the price of a whole number of commodities pro-
duced in the ASEAN countries was painfully reflected in their economy. Intra-
ASEAN trade, on the other hand, was unable to play here the part of shock ab-
sorber inasmuch as it is not of determining influence. Even such a comparatively
developed country as Singapore sends its partners less than 20 percent of na-
tional exports, while the Philippines sends only 4 percent.
Proceeding from military-political and economic considerations, the ruling circles of the United States and its main imperialist partners are displaying ever growing interest in keeping ASEAN countries within the framework of the world capitalist system and assigning them the position of raw material and agrarian-industrial "rear" of the imperialist centers. It is believed in the capitals of the West that the further consolidation of the association corresponds to their long-term strategic interests in Southeast Asia.

Dissatisfaction is growing in ASEAN with the discriminatory policy of the West's leading industrial states, which are attempting to preserve this integration grouping as their raw material appendage. It was just such a role which representatives of the United States and a number of other capitalist states assigned the association at a meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers in Bangkok in June 1983. The representatives of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines sharply criticized the Western powers' policy on questions of international economic relations. They noted that the meetings of the leaders of the leading Western capitalist states in Versailles and Williamsburg had not led to any progress in the reorganization of world economic relations and that as a result of these states' protectionist measures the North-South dialogue was in danger of breaking down. The ASEAN countries emphasize their allegiance to an all-embracing approach to the solution of problems of international economic relations and the speediest start on global negotiations on this question.

Simultaneously the ruling circles of the grouping's states are continuing to put their hopes in a strengthening of the role of the private sector in the economy of their countries and are urging an increase in the influx of foreign investments as a means of improving their economic position. The following evaluation of the journal AFRIQUE-ASIE, which is published in Paris, is symptomatic in this connection: "It is striking that although Japan, West Europe and the United States are erecting increasingly new customs barriers, impeding the imports of commodities from Third World countries, the Southeast Asian countries, which are dependent on them economically, intend... tying their fate even more closely to the world capitalist market. In a period of world recession this is nothing other than suicide."*

The class kinship of the ruling circles of the ASEAN states is manifested in the sphere not only of the economy but policy also. Their foreign policy is characterized as a whole by a pro-West orientation. Although all members of the association are, as mentioned, among the developing states, only Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore participate in the nonaligned movement,** and the membership of the latter two therein, moreover, is put in doubt by their participation in a military agreement signed by, besides them, Britain, Australia and New Zealand. In the developing states' joint struggle for a reorganization of international economic relations on democratic lines the association's members usually occupy positions to the right of center and sometimes on the right flank of the Group of 77.

* AFRIQUE-ASIE, 11 April 1983.
**The Philippines participated in the Seventh Conference of Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries as an observer.
III

The complexity of the problems currently confronting the ASEAN countries on the one hand and, on the other, the acuteness of the rivalry of the imperialist powers in their attempts to pull these countries into the channel of their policy can be discerned in relief against the background of the far from simple relations of the association’s members with the United States, Japan and the West European states.

The increased attention which the present U.S. Administration is paying to the Asia-Pacific region is well-known. It is clear from press reports that it was planned in the course of the U.S. President’s trip to a number of states of this region, including certain ASEAN states (Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines), scheduled for November 1983 to proclaim something akin to a "Reagan doctrine," which, apart from anything else, would have confirmed Washington’s resolve to "restore"—after the failure of American aggression in Indochina—the role of the United States as the leading Pacific power and at the same time attempt to enlist the members of the association in realization of these plans. The mass anti-American demonstrations on the Philippines and the growing dissatisfaction with Washington’s adventurist policy in the other ASEAN countries made this trip by R. Reagan impossible. However, Washington manifestly does not intend abandoning the spurring military-political tension in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in Southeast Asia. The results of R. Reagan’s recent visit to Japan and South Korea point to this.

The U.S. Administration links particular hopes, as is known, with the idea of a so-called "Pacific community"—a broad military-political and economic regional association, among whose possible participants together with the United States, Japan, Canada and certain other countries it is planned to include members of the association also. The United States manifestly sees the creation of a "community" as an additional opportunity for enclosing in a single chain the NATO and ANZUS blocs and Washington’s bilateral alliances with Tokyo and Seoul and at the same time converting the countries of the association into coparticipants in its imperialist intrigues.

Economic interests occupy by no means the last place in Washington’s policy in respect of this integration grouping. The United States is one of the biggest investors of capital in the economy of the association’s countries. By the start of 1984 American capital investments in these countries were in excess of $7.3 billion. As ASEAN’s second trading partner after Japan, the United States takes from there more than 90 percent of its rubber imports, 76 percent of its tin and a considerable quantity of oil, sugar and textiles. The association accounts for up to 10 percent of the United States’ total trade with the developing states.

The economic "assimilation" of the ASEAN countries is being effected in parallel with military-political pressure. Intimidating these countries sometimes with the "Soviet," sometimes with the "Vietnamese" threat, Washington is expanding and modernizing its military bases in Southeast Asia and seeking the creation of new strong points there. Plans are being put forward for the accommodation in Southeast Asia of arms dumps for the American Rapid Deployment Force in the event of "special circumstances arising". The Pentagon is hoping by any means to involve the association’s states in an Asia-Pacific military system and compel them to
increase arms spending. U.S. military supplies to the ASEAN countries are growing. American "aid" to Thailand is now appreciably more than the amount which it was allocated at the height of the U.S. intervention in Indochina. American military aircraft use Thai airfields, particularly on flights between the bases on the Philippines and the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The Pentagon is urging the standardization, on an American basis, naturally, of the arms with which the armies of the ASEAN members are being equipped. The number of exercises and maneuvers of the armies of the countries of the grouping conducted jointly with U.S. troops is growing. A special place in Washington's strategic plans in Southeast Asia is assigned the Philippines, where the American Clark Field air base and the Subic Bay naval base are located. U.S. "military-economic assistance" to this country in 1983 amounted to over $155 million. The American military presence has long been a source of a "crisis of confidence" in relations between Washington and Manila. The Philippines public is seriously disturbed by the fact that the United States can deploy at its bases short- and medium-range missiles and also chemical and bacteriological weapons, and virtually without the knowledge and consent of the Philippines, furthermore. There is also another aspect of the problem. The military bases on the country's territory are a constant source not only of a threat to the Philippines' security but also of a kind of "moral erosion" of the local society which is occurring under the influence of the "American way of life".

Washington's aggressive policy in Southeast Asia does, nonetheless, have supporters in the ruling circles of the ASEAN states. Even today they are allocating considerable resources for military purposes. Thus in 1981 the spending of the association's members for this purpose constituted $7.6 billion, which was 170 percent more than in 1975. The growth of the armed forces of the ASEAN countries is being accompanied by a rapid buildup of their firepower, thanks to home-produced weapons also. Singapore is turning into a kind of subregional "workshop" for arms production. According to data of the local newspaper BERITA HARIAN, Singapore's proceeds from arms sales—and they are sold exclusively to "noncommunist countries" and "Singapore's friends," among which are, incidentally, the "coalition government" of the notorious "democratic Kampuchea"—currently constitute $50 million a year.

True, despite the increasing pressure of outside forces and also the attempts of internal reaction to change the nature of ASEAN and turn it into a military-political grouping, the governments of the countries of the association declare that they do not intend in the future either to take the path of the creation of a military bloc. They are treating the plans for the creation of a "Pacific community" with a great deal of caution, understanding both the hidden military-political motives of the designs of Washington and Tokyo and the danger for ASEAN connected with these. Nonetheless, it has to be seen that the association's countries are expanding military cooperation on a bilateral basis, not concealing here the fact that it is aimed against the states of the Indochina peninsula—Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. This is manifestly contrary to the aspiration proclaimed by its participants to turn Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality.

Many problems are also engendered for the association by the development of its relations with Japan. The countries of the grouping are a most important sphere

* See BULLETIN TODAY, 29 April 1983
of the Japanese monopolies' capital investment. At the end of 1982 their total investments in the ASEAN states were in excess of $10 billion, that is, Japan has far outpaced the United States here. The primary processing of local valuable material performed by enterprises built with Japanese capital, given the low cost of manpower, secures for it huge profits. It is not fortuitous that the number of firms in which Japanese capital participates grew from 400 there in 1970 to 3,200 in 1980.

Today the ASEAN countries are the market second in importance (after the United States) for the sale of commodities from Japan, accounting for up to 13 percent of its exports. On the other hand, Tokyo is constantly erecting artificial barriers and establishing high tariffs, low quotas and also foreign economic restrictions in the way of a whole number of commodities in the marketing of which the ASEAN countries are interested. As a result the association states' debit in trade with Japan is measured in hundreds of millions of dollars. Thus Thailand's deficit in trade with Japan increased from $325 million in 1973 to almost $1.1 billion in 1982.

A significant event in the ASEAN countries' relations with Japan was the visit to these countries (from 30 April through 10 May 1983) of Japan's Prime Minister Y. Nakasone. The Nakasone tour took place in the wake of the understanding reached between Japan and the United States on an expansion of the sphere of operation of its navy to 1,000 miles from the shores of the Japanese archipelago, which could not have failed to have caused serious disquiet here. The grim recollections of the aggressive policy of Japanese militarism, which cost the Southeast Asian countries hundreds of thousands of human lives and 4 years of occupation, are still fresh in the memory of the peoples of this region.

To justify Japan's present military policy Nakasone resolved to have recourse, together with the use of the fabrication of the "Soviet threat," which sets the teeth on edge, to yet another myth—the "threat" allegedly emanating for the ASEAN countries from Vietnam, particularly in view of the presence of Vietnamese volunteers in Kampuchea. Tokyo would like, to all appearances, to take advantage of the continued destabilization of the situation in Southeast Asia to justify Japan's pretensions to the role of self-styled "defender" of the interests of this subregional grouping.

Concerned at the deterioration in the economic position of their countries and putting big hopes in obtaining Japanese assistance, the ASEAN leaders deemed it best not to irritate Tokyo with "undue criticism" in connection with its increase in military preparations. The reaction of sober-minded politicians and business circles of the states of the grouping, however, to Nakasone's trip was unequivocal—the visit did not justify the hopes placed in it.

ASEAN's relations with the EEC are regulated by the cooperation agreement signed in March 1980 in Kuala Lumpur. The Common Market is displaying considerable interest in penetrating this zone. The countries of the association are also interested in the development of relations with the EEC, hoping thereby not only to diversify their foreign economic relations but also balance to a certain extent the dominant positions of the United States and Japan here. But here also the main obstacle in trade remains protectionism in respect of imports of finished products from the countries of the association, whose share of EEC trade constitute approximately 1 percent.
Deeply involved in the capitalist system of the economy and strongly dependent on the imperialist powers, ASEAN is today encountering a number of acute socio-economic problems. Unemployment is growing here, and the association's foreign debt, which is now over $65 billion, has risen sharply. The imbalance in trade-economic relations between the association and the industrially developed capitalist powers and the negative impact of the West's protectionist measures on the economy of its members are giving rise to growing protests in the countries of the grouping. The contradictions between the participants in the association and their Western partners are objectively tending to increase.

A complex foreign policy problem of the ASEAN countries affecting the interests of each of them is the question of relations with the PRC. Regarding the Southeast Asia region as some 'traditional sphere' of its influence, China is attempting to use in its own interests the local Chinese communities, which occupy key positions in the national economy of the countries of the association, and relying on the ethnic Chinese—(Khuatsyao)—whose numbers here are over 20 million. Recently the PRC has been displaying growing interest in the establishment of closer economic and political relations with the ASEAN members. The relatively active exchange of delegations, high-level included, between China and certain states of the association was evidence of this. The Chinese leadership is paying particular attention to preserving the alienation and mistrust of the countries of the grouping in respect of the policy of the three Indochina states.

IV

Subject to the strong influence of the imperialist powers and the PRC, ASEAN's policy in respect to Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea is distinguished by inconsistency and contradictoriness. Yet the general political climate in Southeast Asia will depend to a decisive extent on how relations between the countries of the association and the three Indochina states take shape.

Real prerequisites took shape for the establishment of peaceful cooperation in this region in the mid-1970's as a result of the Indochina peoples' victory. Under the influence of the process of the relaxation of international tension the ASEAN countries began in that period to defend their right to independently choose the development path more consistently. There was greater understanding in them that the policy of imperialism was a serious threat to the freedom and independence of the peoples and that a united Vietnam and its allies—the peoples of Laos and Kampuchea—represented a significant barrier in the way of the realization of the plans of the opponents of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. As a result diplomatic relations were established in 1976-1978 between Vietnam and all the ASEAN participants, the treaty principles of their relations were laid down, in the economic sphere included, and there was an improvement in Laos' relations with Thailand and other countries of the association.

The possibility of positive changes in Southeast Asia objectively increased even more with the fall of the puppet Pol Pot regime, the victory in January 1979 of the national-democratic revolution in Kampuchea and the formation of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. However, such a development of events was not part of the calculations of the opponents of detente in Southeast Asia and beyond. Unprecedented pressure was put on the ASEAN countries on the part of imperialism...
and the forces of international reaction for the purpose of forcing them to abandon the policy of the establishment of good-neighborly relations with the independent Indochina states. Unfortunately, together with a recognition of the seriousness of the danger emanating from the forces which aspire to undermine the peaceful development of the Southeast Asian peoples other sentiments were manifested in the countries of the association, primarily attempts to "sit it out," "adapt" and avoid by any means candid evaluations of the actions of the opponents of the three Indochina states.

Avowed anticommunists, who feverishly joined in the campaign of persecution and slander of the people of Kampuchea unleashed by imperialism and the forces of international reaction, also have raised their head in the ASEAN countries. Under the pressure of Washington and other forces hostile to the Indochina peoples the ruling circles of these countries have occupied a malevolent position in respect of Kampuchea and its loyal ally—Vietnam, which has rendered the Kampuchean people internationalist assistance. The capitals of the association declared a desire to maintain relations with "democratic Kampuchea," which has sunk into oblivion, that is, with the remnants of the Pol Pot bands which were driven out by the insurgent people and which ensconced themselves on Thai territory. For the fifth year running now the ASEAN countries and the United States has foisted on the UN General Assembly discussion of the so-called "Kampuchean question". They have as yet managed to retain a seat in the United Nations for the notorious "coalition government" of "democratic Kampuchea".

Despite the obstacles which are being put in the way of a normalization of the situation in Southeast Asia by the opponents of detente in this region, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, which are filled with a sincere aspiration to improve the atmosphere in the region, displaying patience and political flexibility, are continuing to seek ways of normalizing relations with the ASEAN countries. Particular significance for the determination of approaches to the development of a dialogue between the two groups of Southeast Asian countries has been attached to a whole set of constructive initiatives presented at conferences of the foreign ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea which have been convened regularly since January 1980. These states presented a proposal for an international conference on problems of making Southeast Asia a zone of peace and stability with the participation of the Indochina countries, ASEAN, Burma and the five participants in the previous international conferences on Indochina—the USSR, the PRC, the United States, France and Britain—and also India. An appeal to ASEAN for a political dialogue was also heard at a meeting of the highest leaders of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea in Vientiane in February 1983.

However, on this occasion also the "operational interference" of outside forces concerned to undermine such a dialogue was disastrously reflected in the association's position. An unconstructive approach to the questions of relations with the Indochina countries again prevailed at an ASEAN foreign ministers' conference in Bangkok in June 1983. As the Vietnamese press pointed out, the conferees "were under the thumb of the forces of international reaction, which are in a conspiracy with imperialism. The results of the conference do not correspond to the true interests and cherished aspirations of the peoples of Southeast Asia, which want a dialogue between the Indochina states and the ASEAN members in the name of turning this region into a zone of peace, stability, friendship and cooperation."*

*NHAN DAN, 28 June 1983.
"Appeals" were again heard in Bangkok for a withdrawal of "foreign forces" from Kampuchea. The Vietnamese press emphasized in this connection that the latest partial withdrawal of Vietnam's volunteer forces from people's Kampuchea which took place in June 1983 was "confirmation of the all-around strengthening of the positions of the revolution in Kampuchea and evidence of the good will of Vietnam and Kampuchea and of their aspiration to contribute to the struggle for peace and stability in Southeast Asia. However, as long as a threat to the security of Kampuchea and all Indochina countries on the part of imperialism and the forces of international reaction remains, the Vietnamese people will continue to perform their international duty in respect of the peoples of Laos and Kampuchea."*

The aspiration of the three Indochina states to a dialogue with the ASEAN countries was also confirmed at the seventh conference of foreign ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea in Phnom Penh on 19-20 July 1983. Its participants emphasized that thanks to the efforts of the working people of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea and their close fraternal alliance with the Soviet Union and the other socialist community states, the development of the socioeconomic and political situation in the Indochina countries had acquired a trend toward further stabilization. Regret was expressed at the fact that the ASEAN countries had essentially without any serious arguments rejected the numerous constructive proposals put forward by the Indochina states and declined to respond to acts of their good will, particularly the withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteers from Kampuchea. While acknowledging the existence of certain differences in the positions of the Indochina and ASEAN countries on a number of problems, primarily on the "Kampuchean problem" which has been artificially exaggerated by the opponents of detente in Southeast Asia, the conferees confirmed that there is only one way to surmount the differences—to begin a dialogue without any prior conditions between the two groups of countries. The ministers expressed a readiness here to adopt the proposals of the association's countries concerning the creation of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality as a basis for discussion between the Indochina and ASEAN states on making Southeast Asia a zone of peace and stability.

The position of the three Indochina states concerning ways to solve the problems of Southeast Asia was developed in documents of the eighth conference of foreign ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea on 28-29 January 1984. Its participants made an in-depth analysis of the present situation in Southeast Asia, placing responsibility for the continued tension here in imperialist and hegemonist forces. They confirmed their countries' sincere aspiration to live in peace and friendship with their neighbors. It was emphasized at the conference that both groups of states have a common interest in the preservation of lasting peace and stability in Southeast Asia, the exclusion once and for all of foreign interference in this region and the concentration of the efforts of the peoples inhabiting it on the solution of problems of national development.

At the same time differences remain between the two groups of countries, it was pointed out at the conference, concerning the sources of the present situation

*NHAN DAN, 30 April 1983.
and the methods of restoring peace and stability in the region. The viewpoint of Thailand and certain other ASEAN members that before embarking on a settlement of the situation in Southeast Asia it is necessary to solve the "Kampuchean problem," and on terms, moreover, manifestly contrary to the fundamental interests of the people of Kampuchea and their sovereign right to self-determination, was criticized.

The Indochina states believe that there is only one sensible way leading to an improvement in the political climate in this region—consultations between the two groups of countries for the purpose of settling all questions raised by them on the basis of equality, respect for each other's legitimate interests and the absence of outside interference. The experience of recent times, the conferees observed, testifies that this is the sole path to an easing of tension, the strengthening of mutual understanding, the surmounting of differences between the Indochina states and the ASEAN members and gradual movement toward peace and stability in accordance with the interests of all countries of the region. As far as the form of the negotiations is concerned, whether a regional or international conference, this, in the opinion of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, is a question on which the two groups of countries can and should reach agreement on the basis of equality and renunciation at the imposition by some of their viewpoint on others.

As the Laos press emphasized, "the decisions and conclusions of the eighth conference of foreign ministers of the Indochina countries are confirmation of the consistent position fo the three countries and testify to their good will and tireless efforts aimed at making Southeast Asia a zone of peace, stability and genuine cooperation."

The constructive position of the Indochina states is encountering growing understanding and support in the ASEAN countries, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, whose public is supporting increasingly actively a broadening of the dialogue with Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea and condemning the incessant interference of unfriendly outside forces in the affairs of Southeast Asia.

In the 16-plus years since its formation ASEAN has become an association performing a pronounced economic and political role. Despite the subordinate position in the world system of the capitalist economy and the orientation of their economies toward the industrially developed Western states, the ASEAN countries have acquired certain experience in the development of economic cooperation among themselves, in the sphere of industry and trade included. This is creating opportunities for the gradual surmounting of their one-sided economic orientation toward the developed capitalist states and their formulation of a strategy of more diversified foreign economic relations.

An understanding that business relations of the association's states with the socialist countries, which have been expanding and deepening in recent years and which are built on the basis of equality and mutual profit, enable its members to strengthen their economic positions and oppose more effectively the pressure

of the TNC is growing in ASEAN. While consistently opposed to exclusive military-political blocs, the Soviet Union notes the declaration of the leadership of the ASEAN countries that the association aspires to the development of regional economic, social and cultural cooperation and will not be of a military character. As observed at the 26th CPSU Congress, the USSR does not see "impediments to the establishment of good cooperation with Indonesia or other ASEAN countries." The fact that in the international arena the countries of the association are acting from realistic standpoints on many urgent problems of the struggle for peace and international security and opposing the nuclear arms race is also a significant point here.

The Soviet Union is entirely sympathetic toward the constructive policy of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea aimed at an easing of tension in Southeast Asia, the conversion of this region into a zone of peace and the development of mutually profitable, good-neighborly relations with countries of the region. The USSR, as is known, has also repeatedly supported ASEAN's initiatives concerning the creation of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia, which contain, as noted above, a number of positive aspects. It considers essential a continuation and deepening of the dialogue between the ASEAN and Indochina states in the name of making Southeast Asia a zone of peace, stability and cooperation. For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared to participate in conjunction with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council in guarantees of the agreements which may be reached between the Indochina and ASEAN countries.

The normalization of the situation in Southeast Asia would undoubtedly contribute to a halt to the flagrant interference of outside forces in the affairs of the region and their attempts to undermine the dialogue between the Indochina and ASEAN countries. As Soviet leaders have emphasized repeatedly, the USSR, true to its Leninist peace-loving foreign policy, will continue to act in the direction of securing peace and stability in Southeast Asia.
FRANCE, U.S. 'AGGRAVATING' CHAD CONFLICTS, LIBYAN ROLE DOWNPLAYED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 21 Feb 84) pp 113-122

[V. Iordanskiy article: "Internal and External Causes of the Conflict in Chad"]

Excerpts] Situated in the center of the continent, at the intersection of the historically evolved routes from North Africa to its tropical regions, the Republic of Chad has for more than 10 years now been an arena of turbulent events. The peasants uprising which erupted here gradually developed into a civil war of broad strata of the people against the neocolonialist regime.

But when the possibility of the victory of the country's patriotic forces began to come into view, the imperialists powers intervened in the events. France and the United States are today sparing neither forces nor resources to keep Chad, which is strategically important, under their control. Their interference in the country's internal affairs has complicated its emergence from the political crisis and condemned the Chadian people to new sufferings.

Arena of Struggle

In attempting to explain the essence of the Chad crisis, the Western mass media readily operate with glib, easily comprehensible, but superficial cliches. The description of the situation in Chad given by Reuters is typical: "The basis of the conflict, which arose in 1965, is the belief of the Arab nomads in the north of the country that the settled Christians and animists in the south are appropriating to themselves a disproportionately large share of Chad's resources."

This same theme—the clash between north and south, nomads and farmers, Muslims and Christians—is also repeated in various ways in other commentaries, outlines and reports on the events in Chad. Such oversimplified outlines provide a knowingly tendentious picture of the real contradictions and conflicts in Chad.

The impact of both ethnic and social factors has long been reflected in the political life of this country, but their influence has not been equal. The ethnic map of Chad is extremely complex. According to certain estimates, the
country's population breaks up into 11 main ethnic groups and 192 small ones. The South, which has five prefectures—(Mayo-Kebbi, Tandzhile), East Logone, West Logone and Central Chari—had, according to the 1968 census, 1.53 million persons, whereas 1,678,000 persons lived in the remaining nine prefectures, which occupy the bulk of the country. Since then the population of Chad, according to rough estimates, has grown by more than 1 million, reaching 4.5 million, but the numerical correlation of northerners and southerners has remained as before.

The social nature of the struggle begun by the people is perfectly obvious. The basis of the peasant anger was the protest against the policy of the bloc of the administrative stratus and the bosses of the countryside. According to witnesses, many peasant rebellions began with a refusal of the population to pay taxes. This was essentially a kind of "vote of no confidence" passed by the countryside on the state authorities.

In a country with such a complex ethnic composition of the population as Chad the peasants' protests with their social demands were inevitably accompanied by certain fissures in the sphere of the mutual relations of individual ethnic groups. But they never went beyond the framework of isolated, although in certain bases bloody, clashes. The contradiction caused by the fact that the bulk of the civil servants consisted of southerners was more serious. In a number of prefectures, particularly in Ouaddai and Bourkou, Ennedi and Tibesti (BET), social oppression was intensified by national enslavement. However, the anger of the insurgent peasants, and there were southerners among them also, was invariably directed primarily against the representatives of power, despite their ethnic origins. None of the leaders of the uprising put forward slogans of the country's division by ethnic zone. On the contrary, many of them adopted special measures to cut short manifestations of tribalism and ethnic intolerance.

Although an organized political opposition to the regime existed in Chad which operated even after the banning in 1962 of all parties and political movements (apart from the Chad Progressive Party, which was in office), its influence in the countryside had for a long time been negligibly slight. By virtue of this, the uprising also originally was of a spontaneous nature. The situation began to change gradually only after the creation in 1966 of the Chad National Liberation Front (FROLINAT).

Organizer of the Peasant Struggle

In time FROLINAT united many active organizations. But the chief initiator of the formation of this bloc was the Chad National Alliance association, which was headed by Ibrahim Abacha. In addition, certain members of the National Front for the Liberation of Chad, which had arisen in 1965 on the basis of General Union of Chadians in Sudan, participated noticeably in this.

The influence of the natives of the Ouaddai mountain area, who were the instigators of antigovernment armed protests primarily in this region, which borders Sudan's Darfur Province, was strong among the activists of the National Front for the Liberation of Chad. The front's program set the task of
overthrowing the neocolonial regime, freeing the country from all forms of foreign domination, achieving national unity and equal rights for all ethnic groups and, in addition, a rise in the population's living standard.* The leader of the National Front for the Liberation of Chad was the politician Ahmed Musa, who was well known in the country.

As far as the Chad National Alliance is concerned, it took shape back in 1958. Many future leaders of the people's armed struggle against the neocolonialist regime—Ibrahim Abacha, Mahamat Ali Taher, Abubakar Jalabo Otman and certain others—cooperated therein. The young patriots adhered to leftwing views and dreamed of the homeland's total independence and social justice. I. Abacha had lived in Ghana for several years, where he had experienced the influence of the ideas of Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah. Preparing for the start of the armed struggle against the government, he obtained support for his plans on the part of a number of Chadian students in Egypt. Some of them subsequently became leaders of the peasant war. Striving for the cohesion of all opposition groups, I. Abacha organized a meeting of their representatives in the Sudanese town of (Niala). The creation of FROLINAT was proclaimed there on 22 June 1966.

In the peasant war the front's organizing role manifested itself very quickly. The First Army, which operated in the country's central and eastern provinces, was formed in 1966, the Second Liberation Army, whose zone of operations embraced Boubkou, Ennedi and Tibesti, in March 1968. FROLINAT had a political and military apparatus in each prefecture. The organization's influence spread rapidly throughout the country.

By 1969 the uprising had reached its high point. According to official data, 332 "incidents"—attacks, ambushes, extermination of government officials—were recorded from January through August 1969. What goals was FROLINAT putting forward at that time? Abba Siddick, general secretary of the front, said in an interview with LE MONDE that FROLINAT aspired "to suffuse Chad's independence with content and form a government which would not be a screen covering the real power of France. We are not, as some people have sometimes believed, a splittist organization but a secular and progressive opposition movement in the face of a reactionary government. There will be neither a Katanga nor a Biafra in Chad. We are striving for an administration free of mediocre elements imbued with a tribalist spirit. The (Tubu), the Muslims of the North, rose up against the Sarh satraps, who had come from the South, not because they were Christians and strangers in the region but because they were violating justice."**

Active work was performed among the insurgents on explaining the FROLINAT program. It provided for struggle by all means to overthrow the dictatorial


** See LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE, January 1972, p 42.
and neocolonialist regime which France had imposed on Chad; the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the liquidation of military bases; the creation of a government of popular and democratic national unification; radical agrarian reforms; elimination of all arbitrary fines and other impositions; provision of employment; removal of the imperialists countries' economic monopoly; recognition of French and Arabic as the country's official languages; and the establishment of diplomatic relations with all countries apart from Israel and South Africa.*

This program was undoubtedly of a progressive nature. At the same time we cannot forget the existence of a certain contradiction between on the one hand the content of the peasant struggle, which was objectively of an anticolonialist, antimonopoly thrust, and, on the other, the level of self-awareness of considerable masses of the peasantry, which were captive to local interests, ethnic prejudice and religious intolerance. It contributed to the emergence in FROLINAT of currents connected with individual ethnic groups and isolated geographical zones. Religious, conservative circles sometimes acquired great influence in them.

Incidentally, these trends were manifested in full only at the latest stages of the uprising. At the end of the 1960's FROLINAT's activity introduced a decisive element to the peasant movement—organization. And it rapidly scored major successes. By the start of 1969 the government's position had become so difficult that a special appeal to Paris followed requesting urgent military assistance. F. Tombalbaye, president of the republic, insisted that France intervene in the civil war immediately, supporting his shaken positions.

French paratroops and Foreign Legion units managed to halt the onslaught of the insurgents. The poorly armed peasants were powerless against aviation and helicopter gunships. The strikes were inflicted primarily at FROLINAT bases and their camps. The insurgent forces sustained considerable losses, but even under these most difficult conditions they did not cease to put up resistance, and ultimately France's military intervention was unable to put an end to the uprising. It secured for the regime of President Tombalbaye merely a more or less protracted breathing space.

The Chadian authorities recognized the precariousness of the military successes which had been achieved. The president's French advisers told him this. A new policy—the "policy of national reconciliation"—gradually began to be implemented. The first amnesty of political prisoners was announced in April 1971, and several weeks later—on 23 May—the government was reshuffled: natives of provinces of the center and the north obtained ministerial posts. Contacts were also established with certain leaders of the insurgents, and operations against the insurgent detachments ceased in a number of areas.

But this policy was not pursued for long. On 27 August 1971 even the capital's radio announced the discovery of an antigovernment conspiracy. Arrests began again, and the army and police took ruthless reprisals against the population in the zones captured by the uprising. There was a marked strengthening of Zaire's influence and advisers from Haiti appeared in F. Tombalbaye's entourage. At their prompting he embarked in 1973, in the wake of Kinshasa, on the implementation of an "authenticity policy" in Chad's southern prefectures: people were forced to change names of European origin into local names, and it was required that they undergo tribal initiation rites (initiation as full members of a tribal community). All this merely increased the social tension in the country.

The president himself, who suffered from persecution mania, accelerated the approach of the end of his rule. Having announced on the radio plans for a reorganization of the armed forces, he prompted the highest army command to protest. A military coup occurred on 13 April 1975 in Ndjamena, and the president was killed on the spot. Power switched to the Supreme Military Council headed by Gen F. Malloum.

The coup created a new situation in the country. A significant proportion of the ruling stratum—the top officer body—recognized that continuation of the former social and economic policy and also the use of the former methods of control had become impossible. At the same time, however, the members of the Supreme Military Council hesitated to move toward satisfying the demands of the insurgents, although they were very quickly persuaded that they would not succeed in suppressing the peasant protest movement by military measures. Enmeshed in contradictions, they took the path of maneuver and adopted a wait-and-see policy, not noticing that the disintegration of the machinery of state, which had begun under President Tombalbaye, was acquiring an irreversible nature. This "crisis of authority" would have been even more acute if the rivalry of the different groupings in the anti-government camp had not intensified.

Although the French expeditionary crops had been withdrawn from Chad in 1971, French troops permanently stationed at military bases remained here. They continued to assist the government army in the struggle against the insurgents. Nonetheless, FROLINAT gradually restored its armed forces. In 1974 the First Army had approximately 2,000 fighters. Its strength could have been increased markedly if FROLINAT had had an adequate quantity of weapons. The Second Army had 850 fighters in 1975.*

The country was divided into seven military regions, two prefectures in each. Each region was represented in the First Army's military council by the commander and a delegate elected by the fighters. A detachment of 10 men and a commander was the lowest component in the armed forces. Three such detachments formed a combat group. As a rule, a section consisting of three combat groups numbering 103 men was the biggest permanent formation.

FROLINAT forces struck frequently at the government troops and were able to purge several important zones of them completely. Only the presence of French units saved the Ndjamen armed forces from being completely routed. In the first half of the 1970's, however, the insurgents also experienced considerable difficulties. They lost many experienced commanders in battle and they lacked arms and provisions. Finally, in 1971 there was a sharp deterioration in relations between the command of the Second Army and Abba Siddick, general secretary of FROLINAT, who had replaced the deceased I. Abacha in this position.

At that time the Second Army was headed by two persons—Goukouni Oueddei and Hissene Habre. They are both (Tubu), but Goukouni Oueddei belongs to a branch of the (teda), whereas Hissene Habre, who was born in the oasis town of Faya Largeau, is a Daza. The first is the youngest son in the family of a religious leader, the second the son of a poor shepherd. Hissene Habre received a higher legal education in Paris and had a successful administrative career under the F. Tombalbaye regime. On the other hand, Goukouni Oueddei's efforts to obtain even the lowest position in the judicial machinery of the city of Bardai were emphatically turned down. He had been an organizer of the uprising in BET, and three of his elder brothers had fallen in the fighting. Habre joined the movement in 1971.

What did the conflict between the Second Army and the FROLINAT leader consist of? Not without grounds the army command reproached the organization's general secretary for not paying attention to supplying the (Tubu) insurgents with provisions and arms. It also protested A. Siddick's endeavor to deprive the Second Army of autonomy, subordinating it together with the First Army to a uniform military leadership. However, it was not these issues, apparently, which were of decisive significance. Having dreamed, probably, of a dominant position in FROLINAT, Hissene Habre sought a congress of the front and the reelection of the Politburo and general secretary. A. Siddick emphatically rejected this demand.

In the fall of 1971 it came to clashes between the Second Army and FROLINAT units loyal to the general secretary. A break occurred. At the end of October 1972 Goukouni Oueddei and Hissene Habre organized the Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North, which headed the struggle in Tibesti and Bourkou against the Ndjament regime. A. Siddick maintained control over the First Army in the central and eastern prefectures and also in Ennedi. The transport route along which arms, food and medicines were transferred to the insurgents ran through this region.

Having isolated itself from the FROLINAT central leadership, the Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North encountered a number of most complex problems. Among them the question of mutual relations with Libya was particularly delicate. The point being that the Second Army was supplied with all essentials via Libyan territory. In this situation the two leaders of the Second Army occupied opposite positions. Goukouni Oueddei thought it necessary to maintain friendly relations with Libya. Hissene Habre, on the contrary, was sharply hostile toward it. The dispute led to a break between the leaders. With a group of supporters Hissene Habre made the decision in October 1976 to rebase in the eastern areas, closer to the border with Sudan. Goukouni Oueddei maintained control over the Armed Forces of the North.
The new crisis could have had serious consequences for the insurgents if the disintegration of the machinery of state had not been far advanced by this time. Such a factor as the restoration of the unity of action of the First and Second armies following the removal of A. Siddick from the FROLINAT leadership was of considerable positive significance. The fifth congress of the armed insurgent organizations—the People's Liberation Forces—which removed A. Siddick from his position, was held from 12 through 29 August 1977 in the small town of Karanga in Oueddai. At the decision of the congress the organization's headquarters were transferred from abroad to the country's territory, and the Provisional Council of the Revolution, which was intended to lead the front's entire military and political activity, was formed. The congress appealed to all insurgent movements for unification, and this had results. A special conference was held from 12 through 16 March 1978 in Faya Largeau in which delegates of the "Vulcan" Army, which had operated in the east, on the border with Sudan, Goukouni Oueddei's Armed Forces of the North and the First Army participated. They approved the decision to merge the different armed organizations in uniform "people's armed forces" and elected the Council of the Revolution under the chairmanship of Goukouni Oueddei. In addition, the conference adopted a program which largely repeated the FROLINAT platform of 1966. The Command Council of the Western Armed Forces or the Third Army (several dozen men), whose zone embraced (Kanem), and also the Hissene Habre grouping remained outside of the framework of the new organization.

The unity that was achieved was not strong inasmuch as the unified forces preserved exclusive organizational structures, but it immediately brought about a resuscitation of the insurgents' military operations. In 1978 they developed such a broad offensive that the fate of the N'djamena regime again, as in 1969, hung by a thread. In addition, the contradictions in the Supreme Military Council between the supporters of an agreement with FROLINAT and the supporters of a "military solution" increased. And once again the regime found itself forced to appeal to France for military assistance. It was given this support.

Incapable of controlling the development of events, the Supreme Military Council attempted to play on the disagreements in FROLINAT. In Khartoum its representative made contact with Hissene Habre, who, isolated from the patriotic forces, was himself seeking a compromise with the government. After lengthy negotiations, an agreement was signed in accordance with which Hissene Habre was granted the position of prime minister, while General Malloum remained head of state. But the general underestimated the new partner's lust for power. On 12 February 1979 the latter raised a rebellion. In N'djamena hundreds of people were killed in the crossfire between the rebels and the troops which had remained loyal to the president, and thousands fled into neighboring Cameroon.

The disintegration of the Malloum-Habre tandem confirmed that the forces connected with neocolonialism are incapable of tackling the task of establishing peace in Chad. At the same time, however, the instability of the unity of the patriotic, progressive forces was revealed in full. In this situation Chad's problems ceased to be its internal concern but became a general African
problem. The OAU initiated negotiations which were conducted between the various Chadian groupings first in northern Nigeria, in Kano, and later, when the compromise which had been arrived at broke down, resumed in Lagos. As a result of the negotiations a Transitional National Unity Government [TNUG] was formed in which all Chad's main political groupings were represented. The chairman of the TNUG was Goukouni Oueddei, deputy chairman was Col Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue and war minister was Hissene Habre. The new government took office on 10 November 1979, and peace was established in the country.

Foreign Intervention

The situation in Chad was extremely difficult. The war and the protracted droughts had had a devastating effect on farming and animal husbandry. By 1979 the cereals' harvests had declined by one-third, the cotton harvests had fallen more than 50 percent and the numbers of livestock had declined to one-fifth of the prewar level.* Of the 200 industrial enterprises which had existed, only 5 continued to operate. According to analytical data of the WHO, by 1979 the country had lost 20,000 persons in the civil war. This figure had undoubtedly increased many times over in the years that had elapsed since then. The machinery of state had practically ceased to exist.

Main centers of the uprising and the zones where the government was in steady control of the situation had been defined in the time of the civil war. Geographically the influence of the insurgent movement extended primarily to the prefectures of BET, Oueddai, (Bata), (Gera), Biltine and Salamat, particularly because the influence of the stormy political and social life of the neighboring Arab states was perceived noticeably there. The five southern prefectures and the areas adjoining Lake Chad were from the viewpoint of the previous regime relatively safe. But in these parts also the public opinion of the countryside had been aroused, and the insurgents' liberation slogans were enjoying a sympathetic response.

The peasantry remained the main social support of the insurgent movement. Sympathy with its aims was also displayed by the small tradesmen and the urban lower masses. On the other hand, while treating the neocolonialist regime with a certain reserve, the wealthy Arab merchants nonetheless had supported its basic policy. With the assumption of office of the coalition government headed by Goukouni Oueddei they, according to certain evidence, perceived a threat to their own interests.

As already mentioned, the Daza from the oasis of Faya Largeau had long been connected with the Arab merchants of Abeche, to whom they sold dates and grain. Probably tradition and also the origins of Hissene Habre helped the latter establish contacts in this environment. His personal interests and the interests of the said social group concurred, and on 21 March 1980 he acted against the government. At that time the new national army was only just being formed from the military formations of the various political groupings and was not in a position to swiftly put down the rebellion. The government deemed it necessary to appeal for help to Libya, and On 28 November 1980 an agreement was signed between the two countries by virtue of which Libyan troops entered Chad. Hissene Habre took refuge in Sudan.

Nonetheless, neocolonialism had not renounced revenge. Chad found itself the focus of the most complex diplomatic maneuvers directed by France and also a new power in this part of Africa—the United States. Using its African "allies" and by way of direct pressure, Paris sought the withdrawal of the Libyan contingent from Chad. Washington was at the time assisting the rearmament of Hissene Habre's routed detachments. Referring to secret documents of the U.S. Congress' House Intelligence Committee, the American journalist J. Campbell wrote that, according to the evidence of a CIA employee, secret support for Hissene Habre was expressed in the granting to him of $10 million.* The weekly NEWSWEEK, for its part, reported: "Sources connected with the Reagan administration have confirmed that the CIA assisted the Habre rebellion last year, despite doubts caused by his unsavory reputation."

At the same time, however, the United States' mass media unleashed a propaganda campaign of rare impudence and cynicism. One of its main themes was accusations against Libya, which had allegedly virtually occupied Chad, is engaged in "subversive operations" against a number of African countries and is endeavoring to create its own "empire" in Africa. France, for its part, put diplomatic pressure on Goukouni Oueddei. In an interview with LE MONDE President F. Mitterrand declared later that it was France which "secured from Goukouni the withdrawal of the Libyan Army from Chad."*** On 3 November 1981 the Libyans quit N'djamena and, as the British weekly NEW STATESMAN observed, thereupon "the United States facilitated Hissene Habre's attack on the TNUG.****

The rebel detachments entered the Chad capital on 7 June 1982. Paris and Washington did not conceal their satisfaction. However, their protege had encountered resistance inside the country which presaged serious complications for him in the future. Only by 27 August were Habre's troops able to take Sarh in the south of the country and only by 4 September (Mundu). Control over the south was established by mid-November. But, despite the bloody repression, demonstrations in support of the TNUG and its democratic program continued.

The supporters of the TNUG did not abandon the fight. The government itself resumed its activity in the oasis town of Bardaí and in the mountains of Tibesti. An experienced officer—the southerner (Nege Nzatongo Dzhogo)—was in charge of the headquarters of the government forces. When, at the end of May 1983, they set out on the march, their success was total: Faya Largeau was taken on 24 June, Abeche on 10 July.

Washington learned of the start of the military operation thanks to satellite information. The Reagan administration hastily set about rescuing its

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* WEST AFRICA, 4 July 1983, p 1541.
*** LE MONDE, 26 August 1983.
**** NEW STATESMAN, 12 August 1983, p 17.
ward: $25 million were allocated from the urgent military measures fund for financing supplies to N’Djamena, two ANACS reconnaissance aircraft were transferred to the region to monitor the area of military operations and military advisers were sent to the Chad capital.

Not without pressure from the United States the Zairean Government agreed to transfer 2,000 paratroops to Chad, demanding compensation for this from Washington. Originally the Reagan administration promised that no less than $5 million of military equipment would be transferred to Zaire from the resources allocated for direct assistance to Hissene Habre. This deal, however, ran into opposition in Congress, and then the administration found a roundabout way. It undertook to purchase in Zaire 6.5 million pounds of cobalt. The price, however, was not announced.*

Intimidated by the military successes of the supporters of the TNUG, Washington began to press Paris, seeking from it more active support for the N’Djamena regime. But the Elysee Palace was alarmed by Washington’s actions in the country, which it regarded as a zone of exclusively French influence, and were angered by the "tactlessness" with which the Reagan administration was exerting its pressure. Endeavoring to preserve its prestige in the eyes of African public opinion, Paris attempted in every way possible to avoid giving the impression that it was operating in Chad together with Washington.

At the same time in the conflict between the forces supporting a strengthening of Chad’s national independence and the forces which are oriented toward a deal with the West, France openly took the side of the latter. Beginning with the dispatch on 10 August of "military instructors," the French Government later transferred there approximately 3,000 soldiers and officers. They took up positions in the towns of (Salal) and Abeche, which were taken back from TNUG forces.

At the end of August—start of September 1983 military operations practically came to an end. According to data of French sources, the force of the TNUG numbered at that time 5,000–6,000 fighters. Hissene Habre had at his disposal approximately 12,000 soldiers and officers. Although the troops of the N’Djamena regime had numerical superiority, the political and moral preponderance was on the side of the armed forces of the TNUG. The southern regions joined increasingly decisively in the anticolonialist movement. At the end of November a Reuters correspondent reported: "Military observers say that Habre’s capacity for maintaining control over the capital and the center and the south of the country will be seriously tested if the French leave."

How to settle the present crisis in Chad? A search for a compromise initiated by the OAU is currently under way between the belligerents. Negotiations were to have been conducted between TNUG and Habre regime delegations at the start of January this year in Addis Ababa. But they were frustrated by H. Habre, who refused to go in person to the Ethiopian capital. The position which he has adopted reflects the unwillingness of his "patrons"—the United States and France—to permit the TNUG to control the country. The solution

* NEW STATESMAN, 12 August 1983, p 18.
of the Chad problem depends primarily on the extent to which the Chadian people will be able to express their will independently, without foreign interference in their internal affairs. However, the exacerbation of the situation in Chad as a consequence, in particular, of the military operations undertaken by France testifies that the imperialist powers have by no means abandoned plans to enslave the country.

BOOK ON SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS STRESSES POSITIVE COOPERATION

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 21 Feb 84) pp 149-150

[V. Romanov review: "Vistas of Friendship"]

[Text] The CPSU and the Soviet Government give priority attention to the development of comprehensive relations with the fraternal socialist countries.

Historical experience testifies convincingly that the development of close cooperation between socialist countries, corresponding to the fundamental interests of each partner, contributes to a consolidation of the positions of all the forces supporting peace and social progress. Present-day imperialism is making persistent efforts to prevent the cohesion of the socialist countries and sow dissension and mistrust between them. The numerous subversive propaganda campaigns aimed at the "erosion" of world socialism and the division of the socialist countries are designed to serve the attainment of this goal.

Not least in importance in the arsenal of weapons of the enemies of socialism is the deliberate distortion of our state's foreign policy and the history of the socialist countries' mutual relations. The profound and cogent repudiation of such ideological sabotage, an all-around interpretation of the Soviet Union's present and past relations with the socialist countries and a portrayal of their prospects is an urgent scientific and political task confronting Soviet scholars.

The monograph in question* is a notable contribution to the accomplishment of this important task. Thanks to the breadth of coverage of politically topical issues and the relevance of the generalizations and conclusions drawn by the author, which largely go beyond the framework of the subject of Soviet-Yugoslav relations proper, the book contributes to an enrichment of the ideas concerning world socialism. It shows how complex and diverse the socialist world is by virtue of the differences in ways and methods of tackling the tasks of socialist building. At the same time the study confirms that

these differences are incommensurably fewer than what unites the builders of the new society and that the socialist system is creating all the opportunities for harmonious mutual relations between the countries, which are realized by means of the correct policy line of the ruling parties.

Great significance is also attached to the cogent repudiation, with the enlistment of a broad range of Soviet and foreign sources, of a number of anti-Soviet myths which have taken hold in foreign historiography. Their purpose is to distort the Soviet Union's policy during World War II and in respect of Yugoslavia, particularly, to belittle the significance of Soviet assistance to the enslaved peoples in the deliverance from fascism, attribute to our country, great-power, hegemonist aspirations and to whitewash the antipopular reactionary designs of the ruling circles of the United States and Britain aimed at imposing at any price bourgeois practices on states liberated from the fascist yoke, including Yugoslavia.

The monograph convincingly reveals the complete groundlessness of the inventions stubbornly repeated in the works of a number of foreign authors for several decades concerning the USSR's alleged "negative" attitude toward the national liberation struggle of the Yugoslav working people and its results. Exposing the intrigues of imperialism against the popular Yugoslav state which sprang up in the course of the war, the author rightly emphasizes that "the class, Internationalist policy of the USSR, its consistent moral and political-diplomatic support of people's Yugoslavia and disinterested material and military assistance played an important part in frustrating the plans which had been hatched in the war years in the West and which were aimed at depriving the Yugoslav peoples of the fruits of their selfless struggle" (p 39).

As the material of the book testifies, the Western powers, primarily Great Britain, whose leadership regarded Yugoslavia as a country within the sphere of traditional British influence, gambled in realization of their reactionary designs on the Yugoslav emigre government and its military formations in the country—Mihajlovic's Chetniks—who collaborated openly with the occupiers in the struggle against the partisans. Using documents which became accessible to research workers in the 1970's, the author discursively proves that the basis of this position was by no means "inadequate information" about the state of affairs in Yugoslavia, as bourgeois historiography attempts to portray it, but the class interests of the ruling circles of the Western allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. He traces in detail W. Churchill's persistent attempts to achieve the suppression of the national liberation movement in Yugoslavia by means of intervention in the Balkans. The book shows that, preventing by skillful diplomacy the export of counterrevolution to Yugoslavia, the USSR contributed to a considerable extent by its position of defense of the interests of the Yugoslav national liberation movement to its forced recognition by the Western powers as the decisive not only military but also political force in the country. An undoubted merit and success of the author is the documented portrayal of the fact that at the Soviet-British negotiations in October 1944, in which connection there is a multitude of fabrications and falsifications in foreign historiography, as also as other negotiations with the Western allies, the Soviet Government firmly and consistently defended the vital interests of the Yugoslav working people. It was not fortuitous that J. Broz Tito, evaluating the role and
significance of Soviet support, said in 1946: "Our peoples know that without the help of the Soviet Union we would never have achieved what we have now, that is, a free federative independent republic of Yugoslavia" (p 130).

Examining Soviet-Yugoslav relations in the postwar period, Yu. Girenko does not avoid the difficult period when, in 1948-1953, they were seriously clouded and practically wound down. As the author observes, the formation of the new type of international relations and the inception and development of broad cooperation between socialist countries and communist and workers parties is a complex and multifaceted process (p 133). Historical practice testifies that this does not come about of its own accord: painstaking daily work in this field and a correct policy line are needed.

The virtual rupture of relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1948-1953, the book observes, was contrary to the fundamental interests of the peoples of the USSR and Yugoslavia and the interests of socialism as a whole. For this reason the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government displayed an initiative aimed at purging, for their part, Soviet-Yugoslav relations of everything extraneous which was harming them (p 134). An important part in the normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav relations was played by the principles and understandings agreed in the course of the top-level negotiations in Belgrade and Moscow in 1955-1956. They were confirmed and developed with reference to current conditions in bilateral documents adopted on the results of the meetings and conversations of Soviet and Yugoslav leaders in the period 1972-1983. In particular, permanent significance is attached to the agreement to sweep away the accretion of the past, not to "stir it up" and to do everything possible to ensure that its load not burden bilateral relations and not impede their development.

Yu. Girenko's book is imbued with the firm conviction that Soviet-Yugoslav relations, which are based on the principles of equality and absolute non-interference in each other's internal affairs, have sound prospects. The author fittingly repudiates a variety of inventions to the effect that Soviet-Yugoslav relations have no future for the alleged reason that the ways of tackling specific tasks of socialist and communist building in the USSR and Yugoslavia are dissimilar in a number of aspects and that there are certain differences in the approaches to certain international problems.

As the book emphasizes, the Soviet Union is convinced that the existing differences in the forms of the political and economic organization of society in the USSR and Yugoslavia should not be reason for any estrangement or mistrust between the two countries. The Soviet Union imposes on no one any outlines and "models" of state organization which ignore the singularities of this country or the other. It is emphatically against the counterposing of the practice of socialist building in different countries (p 175). Each fraternal party operates under its own specific conditions. For this reason they are all to a certain extent pioneers on the way to socialism, making their original contribution to the general treasure house of world revolutionary experience. The CPSU and the Soviet Government are doing
all within their power, in accordance with the high-minded line of the 26th CPSU Congress, to ensure that Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation develop steadily and assuredly and in the proven channel of friendship. Yu. Girenko's book, the first comprehensive study of Soviet-Yugoslav relations in our country, collating the wealth of experience of cooperation, comprehensively shows the consistent policy of our party and state aimed at ensuring that vistas of friendship corresponding to the fundamental interests of the peoples of the USSR and Yugoslavia be always bright and clear. The monograph will undoubt-ly be of interest not only to specialists but also to a broad range of read-ers.


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IMEKO BOOK ON CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 21 Feb 84) pp 153-155

[V. Kudrov review: "Key Factor of Economic Efficiency"]

[Text] The monograph,* which was prepared by a group of research assistants of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), (Yu.V. Kurenkov, executive editor), has a number of special features. First, the authors' approach to an understanding of the very subject of the study, which is examined by them as productivity of both live and embodied labor. Second, the specific analysis (both at the level of the sphere of material production of the main capitalist countries and individual sectors united in the corresponding production complexes) of the main factors which influence a change in labor productivity. And third, and finally, the forecast of its growth rate in the United States, Japan, the FRG, France, Britain and Italy.

The book examines first the factors and trends of a change in live labor productivity as an individual indicator of production efficiency and then the sum (integral) productivity of live and past labor which, according to the authors' concept, is adequate to social production efficiency. According to the calculations of the IMEMO research workers, labor productivity in the material production sphere in 1977 constituted 64 percent of the U.S. level in France, 57 percent in the FRG, 43 percent in Japan, 41 percent in Britain and 36 percent in Italy, in industry correspondingly 80 percent, 59 percent, 50 percent, 38 percent and 42 percent and in agriculture 30 percent, 30 percent, 18 percent, 51 percent and 24 percent (p 26).

As a whole throughout the 1970's the United States lagged behind the competition countries in terms of overall labor productivity growth rate, and there was a relative deterioration in its position. If it is accepted that

the average annual rate of its increase throughout the 1980's will constitute 1.5 percent in the United States, 3.8 percent in France, 4 percent in the FRG and 6.3 percent in Japan, in the authors' estimate, these competitors will overtake the United States in this respect in 1986, 1987 and 1988 respectively (p 15).

As distinct from works published in the last two decades in the West, the authors of the monograph in question do not evaluate the degree of influence of various factors on the labor productivity growth rate on a quantitative basis. They adduce "aggregate productivity index" calculations only for the United States and without an indication of the proportions of individual factors in the level of the latter that has been achieved (p 65). According to these calculations, its average annual rate of increase in the country in the period 1948-1966 constituted 2.9 percent and in the period 1967-1977 1.4 percent. The influence of extensive factors increased in the U.S. economy in the 1970's as a whole (p 63).

The main attention in the book is paid to factors of the growth of the productivity of live labor. Among these the IMEMO specialists put scientific-technical progress; the quality of labor; new forms of organization of the use of labor resources; forms of the social organization of production; subjects of labor; the natural factor; sectorial structural changes. The place and significance of labor's capital-worker ratio remain unclear in this classification. The growth of its productivity in the industrially developed capitalist countries has, in the authors' estimate, been secured 50-70 percent by scientific-technical progress, which via investments and other expenditure is embodied in new equipment and higher-quality manpower (pp 27-28).

The dependence of the dynamics of labor productivity on the general educational and skills level of the work force and the solution of problems and questions of organization of the labor process is growing. In all the countries studied in the monograph there is increased expenditure on the education and improvement of personnel and a growth in the proportion of more educated and qualified manpower in the overall numbers of those employed. The authors note the new principles of the organization of labor embodied in such forms thereof as work rotation, broadening of labor assignments and the framework of independence in the production process and the creation of semi-autonomous groups engaged not only in the production of corresponding products but also control of their quality, consumption of raw material and production costs. Unfortunately, the question of the material and moral stimulation of labor productivity growth remained beyond the confines of the analysis.

Speaking of forms of the social organization of production as a factor of a rise in labor productivity, the researchers concentrate attention on the growth of the process of production concentration (it is for some reason called the "concentration process"). Their processing of processing industry census showed that in the postwar period the relative significance of the large-scale enterprises in the overall value of industrial production increased markedly (p 41). At the same time it cannot be unconditionally claimed that "the advantages of large-scale enterprises over small ones in the sphere of labor productivity have increased" (p 42). This proposition
is fair enough if we take the postwar period as a whole. Otherwise it transpires that the superiority of the large-scale enterprises to the small-scale ones in terms of labor productivity growth rate showed itself only in the 1950's and in the first half of the 1960's (p 41).

The book rightly emphasizes, however, that at times production concentration may reach "a level where it becomes a certain impediment to further labor productivity growth, bringing about a whole number of negative consequences and additional difficulties" (p 43). As distinct from the large-scale enterprises, the small ones have a lower level of proportional capital expenditure and its quick recoverability and can reorganize production more flexibly in connection with changing demand, are more precisely specialized and are better managed. And their provision with equipment is in no way inferior.

In the study of the influence of the subjects of labor on its productivity the authors highlight two points: the increased quality of the raw material and technical level of its processing; the increasing preferential reduction in proportional labor expenditure in the production of the raw material compared with the dynamics of this expenditure in the sectors consuming the raw material. They adduce convincing examples and make their own calculations of the declining material-intensiveness of production, particularly on the basis of its chemicalization. At the same time, however, there has been a rapid growth in the main capitalist states in the power-worker ratio, the marked growth in which "in all countries has been the basis of a rise in output per employed person" (p 50). The monograph does not, however, specially illustrate this important question.

Speaking of the influence of the natural factor on labor productivity, the authors consider it the least significant for the reason that the proportion of the primary sectors in the material production of the main capitalist countries is small (p 56). This conclusion appears insufficiently substantiated. We have evidently not yet learned to correctly "measure" the significance of this factor. It is clear that Japan, which practically has none of its own raw material, suffers considerably from this, and it is as yet not known what the labor productivity in this country would be if it had as much raw material as the United States, for example. That the deteriorating conditions of the recovery of minerals is leading to a reduction in the role of the natural factor in labor productivity growth is another matter.

The evaluation of the influence of structural changes on labor productivity in the period 1950-1980 in the industry of the United States, Japan and the FRG is made in the work only in the profile of a highly consolidated sectorial grouping (the processing and extractive sectors and power engineering). As a result it turned out that in the United States and Japan this factor had a lowering impact on the labor productivity level and in the FRG an increasing impact. In the United States and the FRG its quantitative impact was relatively slight, in Japan more pronounced.

As of the mid-1960's and throughout the 1970's the average annual rate of increase in labor productivity slowed in all the main capitalist countries, and particularly significantly in the United States, furthermore. The IMEMO
specialists dwell in detail on the causes of this trend. The main one, they believe, is the deformation of the investment process and the sharp slowing of the growth rate of the capital-availability of labor (p 293).

The United States has the lowest norm of accumulation among the industrially developed capitalist countries. A certain sluggishness of the investment process was revealed as of the mid-1960's: although "flashes" of crisis and postcrisis falls and upturns occurred therein, a stable trend toward the increased modernization and rebuilding of fixed capital in place of its expansion was manifested as a whole. Such factors as the decline in the rate of the capital-availability of labor and spending on R&D, negative changes in the structure of manpower and increased state intervention in the economy are also adduced in the book.

As the authors believe, in the future the labor productivity growth rate in the United States will grow compared with the period of the 1970's, but will be lower than the so-called "historical" rate (p 298). They forecast local investment booms, primarily in the group of science-intensive industries, but believe their development into a general intensive investment boom unlikely. An uneventful type of process based on the predominance therein of elements of compensation for departed obsolete means of labor within the framework of general cyclical development is more plausible (p 297). We have to agree with the authors' general conclusion that in the course of the 1980's the United States will in all probability take serious steps for a new spurt in the sphere of an increase in labor productivity and production efficiency in order to once again increase the distance from competitors, which have drawn "dangerously" close to it in the past two decades.

A considerable part of the work—eight of the 10 chapters—is devoted to an analysis of the factors of labor productivity growth in the base functional-production complexes of the material production of the developed capitalist countries, which is undoubtedly of definite interest to Soviet economists.

The conclusion concerning the intensive nature of reproduction of the U.S. machine-tool pool is extraordinarily important: the increase in the proportion therein of new and the latest high-quality equipment and a reduction in the proportion of traditional, less productive machine tools. As a result, for example, in the period 1950-1968 the U.S. machine-tool pool increased quantitatively 29 percent, but in terms of value 90 percent, and in 1968-1978 the value of the pool increased 34 percent, whereas its numbers declined almost 10 percent, while output per unit of equipment increased by a factor of approximately 1.5 (p 81). The increased expenditure on production automation serves as a most important factor of these qualitative changes. Its relative significance in total capital investments in U.S. engineering grew from 7 percent in 1955 to 47 percent in 1980 (p 85). The development of the automation of engineering production has led to the creation of flexible readjustable, multipurpose systems of processing a vast list of products manufacturable in small batches. This area of technical progress is opening fundamentally new possibilities in the sphere of the comprehensive automation of engineering.
In concluding the review we would point out that besides the said individual omissions a number of other points of significance may be highlighted. Thus in a book which studies a broad range of topical problems in the main capitalist countries the summary analysis of the dynamics of the level and factors of labor productivity growth by sector within the framework of the entire sphere of material production is inadequate. Further, the books' authors practically do not examine the forms and methods of state and intrafirm stimulation of labor productivity, although particular significance is attached to this question today in connection with the new practice of regulation proclaimed by the R. Reagan administration. Finally, one is struck by the certain varying approach of the sectorial chapters.

However, despite the individual criticisms, the work will, I believe, attract the reader's considerable attention and will be greeted by him with great interest as the first major comprehensive study on the problem of labor productivity in the main functional-production complexes of the capitalist economy.