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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Soviet Union**

***SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES  
No 4, July-August 1987***

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# Soviet Union SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 4, July-August 1987

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[The following is a translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

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## SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

### Social Policy in Wage Sphere (Past and Present)

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87 (signed  
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[Article by Leonid Abramovich Gordon, doctor of historical sciences, professor, head of the Social Statistics Laboratory of the International Labor Movement Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, author of monographs "The Individual After Work" (1972, co-authored), "The Social Development of the Working Class in the USSR" (1977, co-authored), and "The Working Class in the USSR: Tendencies and Prospects of Socioeconomic Development" (1985, co-authored), and one of our permanent contributing authors; first paragraph is epigram]

[Text] The 70 years since the Great October Socialist Revolution have been a time of social victories and of agonizing exploration, a time of the triumph of Leninist strategy and of grave errors which put a heavy burden on our people. Policy in the wage sphere, which will be discussed in this article, might appear to be only one of the secondary aspects of the process of socialist reforms in this context. In a certain sense, this is true, but it is in this sphere that the main processes of economic development affect the individual directly. It is through wages that the popular masses feel the results of a particular socioeconomic strategy, and it is in this sphere that the ideals and principles of social justice are realized (or are not). This is why wage policy is not at all a secondary element of social policy as a whole.

The line adopted at the 27th party congress for the revolutionary transformation of our society and for the achievement of a new kind of socialism requires the researcher to provide us not with splendid hymns of praise or triumphal odes, but with an honest and consistent analysis of the historical and economic processes that gave rise to the difficult problems the Soviet people are facing today. The atmosphere of renewal and free scientific inquiry resulting from the implementation of the policy line of the April (1985) plenum and the 27th CPSU Congress is establishing favorable conditions for this kind of inquiry and is making the more thorough analysis of our country's history possible. This atmosphere has created a new vantage point for the investigation—and, in some cases, the reassessment—of some historical acts which are still giving rise to the sluggish behavior impeding our advancement today. Historical research by sociologists can and should be geared to a better future, which is known to be within our reach if we pay close attention to the lessons of the past. In 1921, when the Soviet republic was celebrating the fourth anniversary of the October victory, V.I. Lenin wrote: "The best way of celebrating the anniversary of the great revolution is to focus attention on its unattained objectives. This way of celebrating the revolution is particularly apt and necessary in cases in which fundamental problems have not been solved by the revolution yet, in

cases requiring the assimilation of something new (from the standpoint of what the revolution has accomplished to date) to solve these problems"[1, p 221]. Today, on the eve of the 70th anniversary of October, Lenin's words sound just as relevant as they did 66 years ago.

The basic logical premise of our discussion of changes in wage policy is the conviction that the development of socialism permits—and, what is more, necessarily presupposes—a variable and flexible policy in this sphere. It goes without saying that wage policy in a socialist society is always based on some fundamental principles of socialist distribution. The main one is the idea that most goods should be distributed according to the quantity, quality, and results of labor. This naturally gives rise to a certain degree of inequality: Equal pay for equal work means unequal income and unequal consumption for different workers and their families. Besides this, the socialist society guarantees each member of this society, regardless of how he works, the minimum income required for the reproduction of his human, vital energy. In the same way, socialism guarantees all citizens a certain level of satisfaction of their social and cultural needs, and this is not related directly to their labor either (as we know, this is the most important function of social consumption funds). Within the framework of these general principles, however, wage policy can take extremely diverse forms.

First of all, the exact content of this policy depends on the goals of current socioeconomic strategy: economic growth combined with a high level of daily consumption or the maximum buildup of the production system with no relationship to personal consumption. It is understandable that the level of wages and all other forms of personal consumption will be higher in the first case. On the other hand, the second option can give rise (not always, but under certain conditions) to the possibility of the quicker attainment of objectives on which the future of the society depends, including a subsequent higher level of wages and of prosperity in general. When the emphasis is purely on accumulation, wages are more likely to secure only a minimum level of subsistence. If consumption and accumulation are balanced more equally, on the other hand, the tendency implicit in socialist ideals toward the fuller satisfaction of all reasonable current needs grows stronger (to the extent that this is possible within the framework of socialist distribution).

In addition, wages depend to a considerable extent on priorities in social policy and distributive relations and on the current prevailing ideas about social justice. When priority is assigned to the stimulating function of wages, the difference between remuneration for efficient and inefficient work tends to grow. If, on the other hand, priority is assigned to the reinforcement of social guarantees, social consumption funds acquire more importance and the differences in wages for different types of work decrease. In these cases, the differences in wages and the methods by which they are established are of

great social significance. The natural measurement of labor consists in determining how socially necessary and useful the goods and services produced by some workers are in comparison to the goods and services created by others. These procedures for determining differences in wages and resulting differences in income can be described as **resultant** or posterior assessments (in the sense that labor is assessed primarily after it has been completed).

This method of differentiating wages is only possible, however, to the degree that economic methods of management, cost accounting, and commodity-money relations are practiced widely in the society. Wherever their effects are limited, resultant assessments inevitably seem too arbitrary to employ on a broad scale. In these cases, the primary methods might be called **status-related** ways of assessing labor contribution and wage differences, determined a priori (prior to the achievement of results), depending on the particular sectorial, professional, skill, or occupational category to which the worker belongs.

When resultant assessments of labor predominate, differences in wages span a broader range and are more closely related to the actual labor contribution of individuals and groups. In principle, this kind of wage is more effective in stimulating active labor, but the management of the distribution of wages is much more complicated than in differentiation according to professional status. For this reason, the benefits of result-related differences are seen only when the actual prevalence of economic, non-directive methods of socialist management can be secured.

Various combinations of these approaches provide some idea of the variety of forms wage policy can take in the socialist society. In practice, however, they never exist in pure form. In real life there is always consideration for the needs of daily consumption and accumulation requirements, for the importance of social guarantees and the dangers of wage-leveling, for the current advantages of direct result-related stimuli and the unavoidable use of status-related, normative assessments in some situations. The importance of each of these factors, however, can vary considerably in different situations, and this establishes the conditions for the pursuit of widely differing forms of social policy in the wage sphere.

It goes without saying that specific forms of wage policy are never confined to the arbitrary and automatic choice of one of the abstract conceivable options. In the final analysis, the choice is dictated by the objective socio-economic, sociopolitical, and cultural conditions in the society at a given time, but the realization of objective conditions and social needs and their translation into the language of practical objectives are the responsibility of people, politicians and ideologists. Furthermore, the adoption of a particular option or a particular policy line

depends not only on its correspondence to current conditions but also on the cultural and political development of the masses and on the political will and ability of various officials. The formulation of the principles of remuneration for labor during different stages of socialist construction is the result of conscious policy, and not of spontaneous historical processes, and this is why it is essential to learn lessons from past experience.

The effects of objective economic and political conditions and public opinion on wage policy were clearly revealed during the first years of Soviet rule, although this policy had a direct effect on the wages of only the small part of the population with a direct relationship to the socialist order. Wages in the socialist sector were distinguished by extreme egalitarianism and the complete prevalence of status-related methods of establishing differences wherever they were retained. This wage system reflected the general conditions of the era of "military communism," when the atmosphere of armed struggle dictated the need for the strict centralization of the economy and other spheres of public life, the "direct" distribution of resources controlled by the state, the abrupt and forcible reduction of commodity-money relations, and the widespread use of military methods of management in the economy.

Besides this, the "military-communist" policy on wages was organically related to the prevailing mood in the party and among the active supporters of the Soviet regime, subordinate to the ideal of the "Red Guard attack on capital," and to the desire to accomplish "a direct transition to communist production and distribution" immediately following the seizure of power[2, p 157]. Wage-leveling was regarded by almost the majority of communists as the realization of the social ideal, which was incompatible with the existence of money. This interpretation of the communist ideal reflected not only the natural desire for total and universal equality, "instituted" immediately—here and now!—but was also based largely on a literal interpretation of some statements by K. Marx and F. Engels and by other theorists of socialism—statements implying that socialism would lead immediately to the elimination of commodity-money relations.

One of V.I. Lenin's great services as a scholar and politician was his proposal of a radical reversal—the transition from "military communism" to the New Economic Policy. This constructive Marxist approach, which V.I. Lenin had called "sociological realism" long before, in his youth[3, p 539], represents a model of genuine scientific analysis which does not ignore errors but reveals their causes and indicates ways of moving ahead. "We expected, when we were riding the wave of enthusiasm and were arousing the enthusiasm of the people, first political and then military, we expected this enthusiasm to lead directly to equally great economic feats (as great as our political and military objectives). We expected—or it might be more accurate to say that we presumed, without sufficient cause—to arrange for

the state production and state distribution of goods, on the direct orders of the proletarian state, in the communist manner in a country of petty peasants. Subsequent events showed us our mistake"[4, p 151].

Leninist theory and practice quickly brought the country out of its state of chaos. They restored the economy and stimulated commodity turnover. It goes without saying that the institution of sociopolitical reforms in the country was a contradictory process and required the elimination of long-standing assumptions; the institution of distribution according to labor and the economic mechanism of circulation and exchange was a slow and difficult process.

There is no need to analyze the distributive relations of the transition period in detail in an article on the principles of wages in the socialist society. As far as our topic is concerned, it is enough to note that public affairs in the 1920's corroborated the realistic and practical nature of the theoretical conclusions V.I. Lenin drew from his reassessment of "military-communist" assumptions. The policy of this time led to the successful combination of industrial production growth with an increase in real wages, the development of the socialist order with the extensive use of cost accounting and commodity-money relations, and this, in turn, meant that differences in wages could be based on the results of labor. This is particularly significant because absolutely different principles of social policy in the wage sphere prevailed later, from the 1930's to the 1950's. Many of them are still present in the mechanism of economic management and their modification is therefore an essential condition of today's socioeconomic reforms. In particular, it was in the 1930's that the "remainder principle of resource allocation" became the norm in the social sphere in general and wages in particular, and it was then that the "obvious over-reliance on the technocratic approach"[6, p 44] came into being and the status system for the organization of wages began to prevail. In all of these relations (just as in many others), the situation in the country at the end of the 1920's differed dramatically from the situation of the previous decade.

There is no question that a certain change in wage policy was natural and necessary at the time of socialism's triumph. Social policy in a society in which socialist relations became predominant could not remain the same as it had been during the transition period, when socialist production coexisted and interacted with other economic structures. The difficulty of assessing ongoing changes and, what is most important, of determining their practical and political implications, which are still being felt today, stemmed, however, from the fact that not all of these changes were the result of the move from the economy of the transitional period to the economy with a socialist foundation. The nature of the economic mechanism established in the 1930's (and wage policy as one of its organic elements) was affected not only by the

advancement to socialism but also by the specific historical conditions of this advancement and by the variety of socialist economic and political relations that was established in our country in the 1930's and 1940's.

At that time, and for a long time afterward, this variety of socialist development was accepted as the only possible one under the conditions existing in the country and in the world. It was assumed that only a strictly directive and highly centralized system of economic management, the dramatic reduction of the role of the market and of commodity-money relations, the unconditional priority of production in relation to consumption, the restriction of the standard of living, a style of management based on administrative commands, and the abandonment of the extensive development of democracy and independent activity by the masses—that only these and similar methods of "urging the country forward," as I.V. Stalin described them [7, p 183]—could guarantee the success of socialist construction and socialist industrialization in capitalist surroundings and secure the independence and the very survival of the USSR. Furthermore, many features of socialist reforms in the Soviet society, particularly the intensive development of heavy industry and the rapid organization of nationwide collectivization, were seen by the public as salient features of socialism. Today, when we look back over 70 years of socialist development, and in many countries rather than in just one, we can see that this is a much more complex matter. We can see that socialism, generally speaking, can be built and developed with less directive methods of planning and with the much broader use of commodity-money relations than was the case in the Soviet society. In some situations, rural cooperatives take forms bearing no resemblance to universal collectivization.

In light of past experience, the expediency of "urging forward" economic growth by means of administrative commands does not seem as obvious as it did to the majority of Stalin's contemporaries. This experience, of course, does not refute the existence of the lethal military danger in the 1930's and 1940's and the need to do everything possible to strengthen the country's defensive capabilities, but it does raise questions about the effectiveness of attempts to increase the real economic strength of the state with extra-economic, military and political methods: the arbitrary augmentation of plan assignments (even when these plans were declared law), the voluntaristic alteration of economic proportions, the reduction of public consumption, procurements of agricultural products resembling a surplus appropriation system, the intimidation of the public, and other such methods. The most successful patterns of economic development are the result of optimum, and not maximum, public effort. It is noteworthy, for example, that the arbitrary revision of the assignments of the First Five-Year Plan in the direction of a dramatic increase eventually led to an indicator of total production output at the end of the 5 years that was lower than the original projection: According to initial projections, national

income in 1933 was to be equivalent to 181.6 percent of the 1928 figure, and the augmented assignment set the objective of 203.4 percent, but the actual indicator was 169.6 percent [9, p 56].

In any case, past experience proved that it was senseless, if not criminal, to accelerate national development and consolidate the political order with the aid of mass repression, lawlessness, the use of violence to accomplish collectivization, the fueling of universal hysteria and suspicion, and the use of all of the power of the press and propaganda to spread vulgar and provocative rumors about the constantly mounting class struggle, about acts of sabotage throughout the country, and about spies everywhere. These aspects of sociopolitical reality, which were, unfortunately, so characteristic of the period when I.V. Stalin headed the government of the country, led to irretrievable human, ideological, and moral losses and slowed down the progress of Soviet society instead of accelerating it.

Let us be objective. The shortcomings, the mistakes, and even the crimes connected with this variety of socialist construction in our country do not mean that the acceleration strategy the Soviet society adopted in the 1930's was a historic error or that there was a fundamentally different road to socialism at that time. The circumstances of the choice made at that time—the economic and cultural underdevelopment of the country, the inevitability of war, the lack of democratic experience, and the absence of democratic traditions—attest more to the unavailability of intensive industrialization, rapid collectivization, and the ensuing political practices than to the possibility of more harmonious development. Furthermore, subsequent events, especially the Soviet people's victory over fascism and the postwar reconstruction, testify that the reforms of the 1930's and 1940's met the needs of history in general. It appears that many sacrifices and errors could have been prevented if the subjective circumstances had been different and if more careful attention had been paid to Lenin's warnings about the political implications of I.V. Stalin's personal characteristics, but the accelerated development, which is always connected with colossal difficulties, and the exceptional strain on people's energy were clearly indispensable.

We must admit that there is still an element of uncertainty in the arguments about whether the abrupt move toward intensive industrialization and collectivization in the 1930's and 1940's was unavoidable or whether more harmonious forms of growth might have been secured under those conditions. The past, in contrast to the future, cannot be discussed in the subjunctive mood, and there is always only a single set of facts about the past. For this reason, the actual pattern of development is of decisive significance in an understanding of subsequent events and processes. Whatever the case, socialist construction in our country followed a special pattern, connected with maximum intensification and "urging forward" and with a return to many of the practices of

"military communism." When this pattern was chosen, it was necessary to set much more restrictive limits on economic forms of administration and on commodity-money relations than at the beginning of the New Economic Policy, when V.I. Lenin believed that "the order made up of civilized cooperatives with public ownership of the means of production and with a class victory by the proletariat over the bourgeoisie is the socialist order"[5, p 373].

The fact that the development of our country in the 1930's and 1940's reflected both general trends in the construction of socialism and the unique features of intensive industrialization (complicated further by the cult of personality) is the key to understanding the principles of wage policy at that time.

Because the strategy of intensive industrialization presupposed the maximum development of heavy industry and the defense industry, it was accompanied by the maximum mobilization of resources for these purposes, virtually irrespective of the effects of this mobilization on other facets of the economy, public consumption, and especially wages. The concentration of resources for the needs of industrial construction naturally led to the growth of total accumulations and to the corresponding reduction of the total consumption. Of course, accumulations always represent only a small portion of national income, and in today's society they usually range from 10 percent to 30 percent of the total. Nevertheless, these fluctuations can have a considerable effect on the overall level of wages. It is understandable that the growth of total accumulations during the initial period of industrialization from 10-15 percent of national income to 40-45 percent had a significant impact. Later, total accumulations in comparable prices grew even more: According to the estimates of some economists, they sometimes reached 60 percent of the total or even more [10, p 98; 11, p 90].

It is understandable that the wages paid during the period of intensive industrial reforms were geared primarily to the maintenance of the minimum level of subsistence. Although the nominal wage increased more than 15-fold between 1928 and 1965, during these years it never exceeded the level of minimum financial security.<sup>1</sup>

As for kolkhoz wages, they were far below even this minimum level from the 1930's to the 1950's. This was the reason for the high percentage of income derived from private subsidiary farming: In 1940 it represented around 50 percent of the total income of the average kolkhoz member (including the value of free education, health care, and other such services), and almost 10 percent of the income of industrial workers [13, pp 418-419].

The connection between low wages and the prevalence of free or natural forms of services financed by public consumption funds was recognized to a lesser extent,

although the consideration of this fact is important for an understanding of social policy. The efforts to secure the priority of accumulations at any cost naturally impeded the growth of wages and of public consumption funds. This is why they were confined mainly to the sociocultural services absolutely essential at a time of intensive industrialization, primarily education and health care, because without them it would have been impossible to create a labor force meeting the requirements of the industrial economy. These needs absorbed over 60 percent of the public funds before the war [13, p 412]. Low wages, and not the ideal of socialist equality alone, were the reason that almost exclusively free forms of education and medical treatment were established in the Soviet society. A prevalence of paid forms or even a combination of the socially guaranteed minimum with additional paid services (despite the definite socioeconomic advantages of this kind of combination) would make the growth of the consumption of necessary social and cultural goods and services dependent on the current budgeting priorities of the population. Given the limited nature of monetary income and the underdevelopment of sociocultural needs (they were still taking shape during the period of industrialization), these priorities are unlikely to have secured the required level of education and public health.

In this situation the almost complete exclusion of paid forms of education, culture, and medical treatment created the economic preconditions for the obligatory or even "compulsory" consumption of social and cultural goods and services in the socially necessary quantities. In this sense, the choice in favor of predominantly free sociocultural services during the initial stages of socialist construction reflected the specific socioeconomic conditions of intensive industrialization as much as the tendency of wages to remain at the minimum subsistence level.

The strategy of intensive industrialization was also connected with the particular facets of wage policy that determined the principles of wage differentiation. The need for the rapid construction of an industrial base and the shortage of capital made the stimulation of live labor and its concentration in key areas of economic growth a major political objective. The launching of industrialization was accompanied by the combination of relatively low wages and their substantial differentiation, and this is how the stimulation of labor efforts was secured.

Given the level of wages in those years, a slight rise in wages in the decisive sectors of the economy unavoidably meant their excessive reduction in other spheres. The monetary portion of the wages of kolkhoz members in 1940, for example, did not even reach 5 rubles a month and was approximately only one-sixth or one-seventh as high as the wages of industrial workers. In this case the policy on wages not only stimulated the migration of manpower from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors but also transferred part of the "normal" or customary consumption of some population groups to

the accumulation fund.<sup>2</sup> The lower standard of living of these groups of laborers, especially the peasantry, was an important factor in the development of heavy industry and the defense industry before the war, just as it was in postwar reconstruction. In this sense, the peasants of the 1930's and 1940's can rightfully be called the builders of our country's industrial strength along with industrial workers and specialists.

The conditions of intensive industrialization also dictated the methods of wage differentiation. For the reasons discussed above, the economic development of our country in the prewar, war, and postwar years was accomplished with the aid of a highly centralized economic mechanism and the use of mainly administrative-directive methods of management. Within the framework of this mechanism, status-related methods of establishing the connection between the labor contribution and the relative amount of remuneration prevailed over result-related methods. The differentiation of wages depended mainly on the national economic significance of the sector or enterprise where various groups of workers were employed and on their official positions or professional skills. It is understandable that the size and correlation of the differences calculated according to these methods did not always correspond to the actual quantity and quality of labor. Strictly speaking, this was a measurement not of real differences, but of differences anticipated in orders and directives.

When we note the prevalence of status-related differences during the early stages of socialist industrial reforms, we must admit that they did meet the requirements of that time. Status-related methods, however rough and imperfect they might have been, were completely suitable for the relatively simple economy of the 1930's and 1940's, with the colossal differences in worker skills characteristic of that period. Of course, the absolute amount of remuneration in agriculture and some other spheres of the economy in the 1930's and 1940's objectively cannot be called normal, and even subjectively did not satisfy most of the people employed in these spheres. The tendency of manpower to leave rural areas provides clear evidence of this, but the situation in which virtually all engineers and scientists were paid much more than the workers, and the workers were paid much more than kolkhoz members, and in which the wages paid in defense plants and to army command personnel were higher than the wages in civilian enterprises or in cultural establishments and the service sphere was regarded as the norm. As for the more arbitrary distinctions, resembling privileges, in the distribution sphere, they were confined to an extremely small group in those years and were essentially unknown to the general public.

As we can see, the basic principles of wage policy in the 1930's and 1940's—the assignment of priority to accumulation and the consequent limitation of wages with

considerable status-related differentiation— were the product of intensive industrialization and ultimately contributed to the attainment of its goals.

In the final stage of the industrial transformation of the economy in the 1950's and 1960's, however, the situation changed radically. The policy of subordinating wages to the maximization of accumulations and the status-related differentiation of wages began to lose their ability to stimulate economic growth. The first stages of the technological revolution and the prospect of a new technical reconstruction of the national economy, reorganization of the economic mechanism, and improvement of socialist production relations necessitated the fundamental revision of wage policy.

The era when the development of the national economy depended largely on the successes of some decisive links had come to an end. The balanced and coordinated advancement of all sectors was seen more and more clearly as the main condition of progress. By the same token, the assignment of primary significance to labor in some sectors and of secondary significance to labor in others began to lose its meaning as a factor stimulating wage differentiation. In short, by the end of the 1950's the need to raise the general level of wages considerably and to change the principles of differentiation—to make the transition from primarily status-related methods to result-related ones—was already apparent and grew increasingly evident with the passage of time. This was a situation requiring the radical revision of the general principles of social policy in the wage sphere.

This kind of change, because it is so profound and radical, is inseparable from the transformation of all social relations and can only be accomplished as part of the reorganization of the entire economic mechanism. Unfortunately, for almost a quarter of a century, from the late 1950's to the early 1980's, the immediate need for cardinal economic reforms was not recognized by the leading forces of our society, and these reforms, even when they were announced (as they were, for example, in the middle of the 1960's), were not actually developed. The absence of profound economic reforms naturally caused the revision of the principles of wage policy to acquire contradictory, inconsistent, and indefinite features. On the one hand, the need for the accelerated enhancement of public welfare, including a rise in wages, was acknowledged. The conclusion drawn at the 24th CPSU Congress on the dramatic reversal for the resolution of many different problems connected with public welfare expressed this attitude in general terms. On the other hand, during the distribution of national income priority was still assigned to production needs in the narrow sense of the term, and the funds allocated for wages and public consumption were only whatever was left over after funds had been allocated for the satisfaction of these needs. The retention of this approach was due to the assumption that only the development of production would eventually create opportunities to raise wages. The development of modern production (in

contrast to production in the 1930's and 1940's) is simply impossible, however, on the basis of the earlier level of wages, close to the minimum: This development requires skilled and educated workers. Furthermore, it requires people with a developed sense of their own worth who are humiliated by unsatisfactory work. These people cannot be raised in poverty. Prolonged poverty produces a lumpenproletariat, while a rich and fully developed personality requires, among other things, rich and varied consumption.

The contradictory and inconsistent nature of socioeconomic strategy and wage policy affected wage dynamics from the 1950's to the 1980's. The minimum wage, which had not even secured minimum subsistence in the past, began to rise in the 1950's: from 20-22 rubles at the beginning of the 1950's to 70 rubles at the end of the 1970's [12, pp 151-152]. In the middle of the 1950's measures were taken to raise the wages of kolkhoz members, whose earnings were not even as high as the minimum wage for workers and employees. By the end of this decade the situation in which most of the real income of kolkhoz members came from private farming rather than public began to change. Whereas they had received only 35 percent of their total income from the kolkhoz and 45 percent from private farming at the beginning of the 1960's, the correlation was the opposite in the next decade—the portion of income from the kolkhoz increased to 40-45 percent on the average and the portion from private farming decreased to 25-30 percent. The difference between the wages of kolkhoz members and workers decreased considerably, so that the earnings of the former at the end of the 1960's were not one-sixth or one-seventh as high as the earnings of industrial workers, as they had been in the 1930's, but one-half to three-fourths as high [13, pp 277, 397, 412].

The wages of other categories of laborers also rose, although not as quickly. As a result, the average wage broke away from the minimum subsistence level to which it had effectively been attached in previous decades. In the middle of the 1960's the average wage of workers and employees exceeded 100 rubles. Given the customary ratio of workers to dependants in our country, this wage secured a per capita income exceeding the level of minimum security—50 rubles a month. Now the average monthly wage exceeds 200 rubles and allows for the expenditure of around 100 rubles per person. In fact, around 60 percent of the population now has a per capita income exceeding 100 rubles [13, pp 397, 411].

Nevertheless, in spite of the considerable growth of wages in the 1960's and 1970's, it would be wrong to believe that wages approached the level required for the satisfaction of the needs of an efficient worker or the modern individual in general. Special calculations indicate that although the current wage exceeds the level of minimum financial security, it is still only around half as high as the so-called efficient consumption level.<sup>3</sup> The average wage of workers and employees in the USSR is perceptibly lower than wages in many socialist countries,

where in our prices (according to the exchange rate for non-commercial payments), it is close to 300 rubles a month (CSSR and Hungary) or even higher (GDR) [14, p 432].

Furthermore, real wages were diminished—and this grew more pronounced with time—by the failure of supply to keep up with demand. The nominal increase in wages clearly did not keep up with the rapid rise of the demands aroused, encouraged, and enriched by the economic and social progress of society. As a result, although wages have tripled over the last 30 years, today's wage is more likely to be regarded as inadequate and unsatisfactory than wages in the past. The data of a survey conducted in Taganrog, a typical industrial center, at the end of the 1970's, are extremely indicative in this respect. The overwhelming majority of the respondents—around three-fourths—said their work was interesting and important, the majority—between one-half and two-thirds—said their jobs were important in their own right and responsible, but a high percentage—over half—also said they were dissatisfied with their wages.

The reasons for the inadequate growth of earnings are also the reasons for the inconsistent nature of changes in the second element of social policy in the wage sphere—the differentiation of wages. As we already saw, during the final stages of industrialization and especially during the transition to the scientific-industrial stage of national economic development, there was an urgent need for a more direct and clear connection between earnings and the final results of labor. This kind of connection, however, cannot be established within the framework of a primarily directive economic mechanism in which the decisive role is played by essentially extra-economic forms of management. A prevalence of genuinely economic methods of management, the extensive development of socialist commodity-money relations and complete economic accountability, and the replacement of

plans based on physical measurement with plans taking the laws of the market into account are essential conditions for the widespread use of result-related methods of differentiation.<sup>4</sup>

In reality, until just recently, the earlier economic mechanism was still functioning in our economy. It is understandable that result-related methods of calculating differences in wages based on the overall value of the goods and services created could not be used on an extensive scale. As a result, the differentiation of earnings according to status was still practiced and even grew more pronounced in some respects.

In this kind of situation there is an effort to avoid change wherever and whenever possible and to maintain old patterns (because there is no reliable criterion for determining the validity of changes when wage differences are based on status). Wherever it is absolutely impossible to maintain earlier status-related proportions, on the other hand, changes tend to be onesided and contradictory. Earlier distinctions connected with directives defining the difference between professions, skill categories, and jobs disappear; at the same time, a system of wage differences reflecting the final results of the labor of individuals and collectives does not come into being. The move is incomplete: The reduction of old differences is not supplemented by the appearance of new ones.

The relative earnings in different sectors are the clearest indication of the disparities resulting from the absence or inadequacy of changes (see Table 1). The prevalence of extra-economic methods of management led to a situation in which these correlations—in spite of several administrative directives—have not undergone any fundamental changes in decades.

Table 1. Average Monthly Earnings of Workers and Employees and Wages of Kolkhoz Members

National economic sectors	1940		1960		1970		1980		1985	
	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II
Industry	34.1	100	91.6	100	133.3	100	185.4-	100	210.6	100
Breakdown										
Machine building	...	...	92.8	101	134.4	101	187.5	101-	208.2*	102*
Light industry	...	...	65.6	72	103.3	77	149.9	81-	162.6*	79*
Agriculture										
Breakdown										
State enterprises	23.3	68	55.2	60	101.0	76	149.2	80-	182.1	86
Kolkhozes	...	...	28.0	31	74.9	56	118.5	64-	153.4	73
Transportation	34.8	102	87.0	94	136.7	102-	199.9	109	220.3	105
Construction	36.3	106	93.0	101	149.9	112-	202.3	110	236.6	112
Trade and public catering	25.0	73	58.9	64	95.1	71	138.2	75-	149.2	71
Public health	25.5	75	58.9	64	92.0	69	126.8	68-	132.8	63
Public education	33.1	97	72.3	79	108.1	81	135.9	73-	150.0	71
Culture	22.3	65	49.2	53	84.8	64	111.3	60-	117.3	56

Table 1. Average Monthly Earnings of Workers and Employees and Wages of Kolkhoz Members

National economic sectors	1940		1960		1970		1980		1985	
	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II
Science and scientific services	47.1	138	110.7	121	139.5	105	179.5	97-	202.4	96
Administrative agencies	39.0	114	86.4	94	123.2	92	156.4	84-	166.2	79

Calculated according to data in [13, pp 277, 397; 16]. I—absolute amount in rubles; II—percentage of earnings in industry.  
\* Workers in industry.

There is no question that in some cases attempts were made to correct the situation and some of these moves were successful. For example, the total invalidity of the huge differences in the payment for industrial and agricultural labor became completely obvious in the 1960's. The quicker growth of earnings in agriculture in the last 20 years led to a situation in which they now are only 15-25 percent below the figure in industry on the average. Nevertheless, the difference is still much greater than in other economically developed socialist countries, where the corresponding difference is around 5 percent and where earnings in agriculture are sometimes higher than in industry. A positive trend, however, is evident. At the same time, virtually no changes have been made in many other sectors. In particular, wages in trade, housing and municipal services, and health care today represent only two-thirds of the earnings in industry, just as they did at the beginning of the 1950's, and wages in culture are equivalent to just over half of the industrial wage. In public education, in spite of the wage increases every 10 or 15 years, the relationship to wages in industry is worse than before: Whereas the average wage was approximately equal in both cases in the 1940's and 1950's, in the middle of the 1980's educational personnel were earning from 30 to 40 percent less. And this has occurred in spite of the fact that people with a secondary specialized or higher education constitute the majority

of the people employed in the educational sphere and only one-fourth of the people working in industry. In general, the scales of intersectorial differences in wages in the Soviet society in the middle of the 1980's differed little from those of the prewar and postwar five-year plans.

The retention of intersectorial differences on the earlier basis of status does not meet the requirements of economic development today. In modern production the differences in the quality and significance of labor in different sectors are not as great as they were at the height of industrialization. A substantial difference of 50-100 percent in the wages paid for fundamentally identical labor in different spheres of the economy (and sometimes literally identical labor, in the case of related professions) does not serve any economic or social purpose. In the past there was some justification for the concentration of the best workers in heavy industry and the removal of them from light industry or agriculture, which contributed to these differences; today this would only inhibit economic growth, not to mention its incompatibility with even the most elementary sense of social justice. It is noteworthy that the level of intersectorial differentiation in other economically developed socialist countries is generally lower than in our country (see Table 2).

Table 2. Correlation of Average Wage of Workers and Employees in Different Sectors of the National Economy in the USSR and Some Other Socialist Countries in 1985 (percentage of average wage in industry)

National economic sectors	USSR	Bulgaria	Hungary	GDR	Poland	Romania	CSSR
Industry	100	100	100	190	100	100	100
Construction	112	110	105	101	98	116	106
Agriculture	86	83	97	94	89	97	97
Transportation	105	107	101	108	86	104	108
Trade	71	81	86	89	73	86	78
Housing and municipal services and consumer services	70	84	91	...	82	94	71
Science	96	112	97*	...	96	108	108
Education, culture, art	69	87	93	...	74	99	83

Table 2. Correlation of Average Wage of Workers and Employees in Different Sectors of the National Economy in the USSR and Some Other Socialist Countries in 1985 (percentage of average wage in industry)

National economic sectors	USSR	Bulgaria	Hungary	GDR	Poland	Romania	CSSR
Public health, social security, physical culture	63	87	91	...	70	95	87

Calculated according to data in [17, pp 383-386].  
\*1981.

Whereas intersectorial proportions reflect the difficulties engendered by inadequate change, the dynamics of intra-sectorial correlations in the 1960's and 1980's testify that changes cannot lead to success either if the status-related basis for the differentiation of wages is retained. Although status methods alone create no more opportunity to secure the correct correspondence of wages to labor expenditures within sectors than between sectors, for several reasons the departure from the earlier intra-sectorial wage structure has been practiced more widely than the modification of intersectorial proportions. One reason was the urgent need to raise the minimum wage as quickly as possible. Given the slower rise in the general level of wages (unavoidable until the economic mechanism has been reorganized), the quick rise of the minimum wage led naturally to changes in the entire system of wage differentiation, and especially to the reduction of distinctions between low-, average-, and high-paid workers within each sector. In the middle of the 1950's the average wage was 3.6 times as high as the minimum wage, but by the end of the next decade it was only twice as high. In the 1970's and 1980's the difference increased again [14, pp 238-239], but the average wage has never exceeded the minimum wage by as much as it did in the 1950's (in 1985, for example, it was 2.7 times as high). The relative shortage of workers for semiskilled and non-prestigious jobs and the need to offer wage differentials in these cases also gave rise to changes in wage patterns within sectors.

In short, whereas the absence of objective criteria due to the prevalence of extra-economic methods resulted in attempts to maintain earlier proportions and priorities on the intersectorial level, within sectors the maintenance of the proportions of the 1930's and 1940's turned out to be absolutely impossible, and especially in the less complex jobs requiring fewer skills. In some cases wages were raised according to plan, and in others the spontaneous pressure of economic and social circumstances necessitated the elimination of various status-related restrictions. This pressure became stronger as low wages failed to be compensated for by interesting and prestigious work, relatively simple production conditions, and so forth. This situation usually arose in occupations requiring physical and semiskilled labor. For this reason, changes in intra-sectorial status distinctions, although they could have, in the abstract, either diminished or increased differentiation during the last quarter of a century, usually reduced differences.

There would have been no problem if the elimination of old status-related restrictions had been accompanied by the establishment of a closer connection between wages and the final results of labor, but this connection was not, and could not be, established within the framework of the economic mechanism of the 1960's and 1970's. Even the advances that were made did not signify a transition to wages based on results. It was simply that the status basis of wage differentiation seemed to be disintegrating and becoming more fragile, indefinite, and ambiguous. The perceptible tendency toward wage-leveling, toward the excessive reduction of intra-sectorial differences in wages, was a natural result of these partial changes.

In addition to the previously mentioned convergence of minimum and average wages, another obvious result of this tendency was the dramatic reduction of differences in the wages of workers and specialists in the main branches of physical production. In 1940 the average wage of engineers and technicians in industry and construction and of agronomists, veterinarians, and machine operators in agriculture was from 2.2 to 2.4 times as high as the average earnings of workers in these branches, but in 1960 it was only 1.5-2.2 times as high. Since that time the difference has decreased each year and it had virtually disappeared by the middle of the 1980's. Even in agriculture, where the greatest difference was maintained, the wages of specialists in 1985 were only 35 percent higher on the average than the wages of workers. In industry engineering and technical personnel earned 10 percent more than workers, and in construction they even earned 2 percent less [13, pp 397, 398].

It appears that these excessively egalitarian tendencies were also responsible for many other changes in the wage structure in the last quarter of a century, including the relative wages of the best, most highly skilled workers and the least capable ones. In any case, the data of several surveys and follow-up studies in industrial centers indicated that the difference between the earnings of the most and least qualified workers decreased substantially throughout the 1960's and 1970's. For example, in Taganrog, a typical industrial center, at the end of the 1960's workers of the fifth and sixth skill categories were earning more than twice as much as workers in the first and second categories, but at the end of the 1970's they were earning only 1.4 times as much [18, pp 70-72].

In general, the changes that have taken place in recent decades created a situation in which intrasectorial wage differences—both in the case of the wages of workers and specialists and the wages of workers in higher and lower skill categories—are obviously inconsistent with actual differences in the results of labor. The wages of the top 10 percent in the 1970's and early 1980's were three times as high as the wages of the bottom 10 percent of workers and employees [19, p 21]. Within each sector this coefficient was even lower. There is hardly any doubt that the actual value of the goods and services produced by the best workers is far more than two or three times as great as the value of the labor results of the least developed part of the labor force.

The reduction of intrasectorial differences in wages in the last 25 or 30 years had social consequences just as negative as the maintenance of excessive intersectorial differences. Intersectorial differences, which turned out to be too great, maintained the previous patterns of manpower migration after they had lost their national economic value. The inordinate reduction of intrasectorial differences naturally and constantly weakened the stimulating function of wages. Wages gradually turned into something like a guaranteed source of income, guaranteed by the person's inclusion in a particular labor collective (or his official "registration" as a laborer) but actually depending little on the results of his work. Differences between wages and pensions, stipends, and other such monetary payments gradually ceased to be appreciable. Whatever the subjective intentions of the engineers of wage policy might have been, social guarantees gradually gained priority over work incentives.

It seems that the reduction of intrasectorial wage differences also had far-reaching sociopsychological consequences. The prevalence of status-related methods not only gave rise to excessively egalitarian tendencies but also created an atmosphere in which wage-leveling began to be regarded as a fair practice, consistent with assumptions about the social ideal. The continued prevalence of status-related difference after they had ceased to reflect real differences in the labor contribution naturally diminished the appeal of equal pay for equal work and unavoidably enhanced the relative importance of literal equality. When daily experience suggests that existing methods of establishing differences in wages cannot draw a clear and precise connection between these differences and labor, a connection obvious to each worker, then literal or mechanical equality appears to be a more valid and fair principles of remuneration.

In the broader sense, in combination with the mounting sense of the general inadequacy of wages, the widespread egalitarian attitudes in the mass consciousness deformed the labor ethic. Conscientious, ingenious, and intense labor began to lose its meaning as the primary ethical standard. There was a simultaneous loss of genuine respect for honest earned wages, and this gave way in some cases to the servile and unscrupulous worship of

"big money" and in other cases to spiteful and envious condemnations of any perceptible increase in prosperity and the slavish idealization of banal equality and the banal hierarchy.

Throughout the last quarter of a century, despite the radical changes in conditions, the economic mechanism which took shape during the early stages of socialist construction continued to operate. The resulting contradiction affected the content of the radical socioeconomic reforms that were supposed to have been carried out in the Soviet society and were supposed to have included changes in wage policy. The wage policy based on the unconditional priority of the needs of production and on status-related differentiation should be replaced with a policy assigning equal priority to production and consumption, a policy capable of surmounting excessive egalitarianism and making the transition from status-related to result-related distribution.

The political possibilities for this kind of reorganization were established by the April policy line of 1985 and the decisions of the 27th party congress and the January and June (1987) CPSU Central Committee plenums. These decisions paved the way for sweeping economic reforms, more efficient planning based on economic methods of management, broader autonomy for enterprises, cost accounting on a broader scale, a more important role for commodity-money relations, and the beginnings of economic self-management and production democracy.

All of this also dictates the basic principles of a wage policy intended for the economically and socially renewed Soviet society.

In conclusion, we will attempt to list the major changes that should take place in the wage sphere as part of the extensive socioeconomic reforms stipulated in CPSU resolutions.

The rejection of the "remainder" approach, in which the resources allocated for wages and the satisfaction of social needs are only those remaining after the short- and long-range needs of production have been met. The rise of wages in conjunction with the growth of production, and not in the distant future.

The establishment of a style of management in which the satisfaction of the vital material, social, and spiritual needs of the laboring public is regarded as a condition of effective planning and management, a condition as essential as a balanced supply of physical resources in production. The creation of democratic and social mechanisms to keep people from making decisions that do not secure the necessary growth of wages.

A transition from primarily status-related forms of wage differentiation and of distribution in general to primarily result-related forms. The fullest possible—within the confines of a planned economy—use of commodity-money relations, market factors, and market prices to

calculate the objective correspondence of socially acknowledged results of labor to the remuneration paid to collectives and individuals.

The elimination of the traditional limits on the earnings of outstanding workers. The elimination of the automatic wage "ceiling." The establishment of a procedure for the payment of wages in strict accordance with the results of labor, regardless of the average wage.

The expansion of production democracy in the distribution of wages within collectives.

The creation of a system of social assistance for insufficiently skilled workers under the conditions of more pronounced differences in wages.

The use of new guidelines for labor indoctrination, the publication of individual achievements, and a struggle against excessively egalitarian attitudes and attempts to restore status-bureaucratic "fairness."

The standardization of legal protection for the economic interests of enterprises, the labor collective, and the individual worker.

It goes without saying that each of these ways of improving wages requires separate and detailed analysis, but this is a topic for another article, in which the focus will be on processes taking us "from the present into the future."

#### Footnotes

1. According to estimates of the early 1960's, this level was reached when wages allowed the worker and his dependants to spend at least 50 rubles a month on each family member. At that time there was approximately one dependant for each worker, and the minimum level of financial security was therefore reached only in families where the worker earned at least 100 rubles a month. The average wage did not approach this level until the middle of the 1960's: In the 1950's and in the 1930's (not to mention the war and postwar years), it was much lower and the number of dependants was higher. Of course, the demands of workers and employees had also risen perceptibly by the 1960's, but the average wage in 1940 (33 rubles a month) and in 1950 (76 rubles) corresponds only to minimum security. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship of nominal and real wages to minimum financial security, see [12, pp 143-146, 280].

2. We should recall that at the end of the 1920's I.V. Stalin openly discussed the "contributions" or "extra taxes" the state should collect from the peasants for the needs of industrialization (see [8, p 49]).

3. It requires a monthly per capita income of over 200 rubles[14, p 433].

4. The term "plans taking the laws of the market into account" is used by J. Kadar[15, p 4]. Although it is not used widely in Soviet economic literature yet, it seems to be a good description of the specific nature of economic methods of management in the socialist society, connected with the use of commodity-money relations and market mechanisms and the assignment of priority to planning.

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### Students' Attitudes Toward Social Sciences

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[Text] When M.S. Gorbachev addressed the All-Union Conference of Social Science Department Heads, he said that "the ability to get one's bearings in today's complex and contradictory but interdependent world is not a natural gift. Nor is it a by-product of study in special fields. Future specialists must be taught this ability"[1]. How is the higher academic institution coping with this extremely important matter? Instruction in the social sciences in VUZes is not very effective. The scholastic approach, isolation from the events of real life, and didactic teaching methods are quite common in classes in scientific communism, philosophy, political economy, and the history of the CPSU. All of this naturally affects the student's assimilation of academic material and his attitude toward the social sciences. Of course, we have talented educators. Many genuine professionals are

working in our VUZes. The present situation, however, displays all of the symptoms of a state of stagnation. The system of instruction in the social sciences needs radical reorganization. This was the general consensus in a sample survey of 1,657 students in the day divisions of non-liberal arts VUZes in Moscow, Alma-Ata, Arkhangelsk, Vladivostok, Irkutsk, Riga, Sverdlovsk, Frunze, and Kharkov in September 1986.

We will discuss the results of the study in detail.

**Academic Performance.** According to the study, 80 percent of the students surveyed received excellent and good grades in the social sciences in the last (summer) session—a 4.0 average. Do these figures attest to the good or excellent assimilation of material and the thorough understanding of social problems? There is reason to believe that examination grades are more likely to reflect the ideas of department heads and rectors about report indicators than the knowledge and convictions of students. If we compare the percentage of students displaying good academic performance with the percentage of students regularly taking part in discussions in seminars (around 25 percent of the respondents), participating in student competitions in the social sciences (31 percent), and requesting additional reading assignments (21 percent), we can conclude that the student who wishes to make reports and pass tests in the social sciences does not necessarily have to take a serious interest in sociopolitical matters, read supplementary literature, or participate in seminar discussions. Many of the respondents assigned priority to the formal "registering" of instructional material.

It would be naive to assume that students are to blame for this. Unfortunately, passive or obviously negative attitudes toward the study of social sciences in VUZes are a result of the style of instruction and the content of academic material. Why did 23 percent of the respondents not believe that a good knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory is important to the specialist with a higher education? Why did 34 percent of the students underestimate the role of social science courses in the development of philosophical views? Their negative attitude is largely due to the shortcomings of the extensive stage of our society's development, during which "many aspects of real life," as T.I. Zaslavskaya says, "were contrary to socialist principles. Frequent encounters with various forms of social injustice and the futility of attempts at individual struggle became one of the main reasons for the alienation of part of the laboring public from society's goals and values"[2].

Let us look, however, at the results of our study. We will employ four general categories of student attitudes toward academic subjects, determined with the aid of the "logical square": Each takes shape where value judgments and behavioral indicators cross—or, more precisely, where positive and negative values cross (see Table 1). The following empirical indicators were used in constructing the typological model: "How important is it

for a specialist to have a good knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory?"—"Important" and "Unimportant" (the value judgment component); "How actively do you participate in seminar discussions of the social sciences?"—"Actively" and "Passively" (behavioral component).

We derived the following categories: I—genuinely positive attitude toward lectures and seminars; II—declarative, verbally expressed positive attitude, in which a high assessment of the importance of knowing the social sciences is combined with passive participation or a lack of interest in basic forms of academic instruction; III—formal-positive attitude, combining participation in the study of the social sciences "for points" with a profound understanding of the significance of the social sciences; IV—negative attitude, combining passive participation in the academic process with a low evaluation of the place and role of the social sciences in the development of the young specialist's scientific outlook.

**Table 1. Typological Model of Student Attitudes Toward Social Sciences**

Value judgment component	Behavioral component	
	+	-
+	I	II
-	III	IV

Less than 26 percent of the respondents revealed a creative and interested attitude toward the social sciences (Table 2). They actively discuss sociopolitical issues in seminars and in their free time, enter their projects in social science competitions, and have a good understanding of the importance of learning the humanities.

**Table 2. VUZ Student Attitudes Toward Study of Social Sciences, percentages**

Type of attitude	Forms of instruction		
	Lectures	Seminars	Student science projects
I. Genuinely positive	10	20	26
II. Declarative-positive	67	57	50
III. Formal-positive	1	4	5
IV. Negative	22	19	19

A declarative-positive attitude toward the social sciences was expressed by 50-67 percent of the respondents. These students generally lack the skill of backing up their views with logical arguments and do not have any firm opinions of their own on fundamentally important social issues.

The third group of respondents was small, possibly because of its intermediate position. In terms of outlook, these students are close to the "skeptics" making up the fourth group (19-22 percent). The latter express a consistently negative attitude toward the study of the social sciences.

These were our general findings. In addition, there were significant differences in attitudes toward social sciences within each group depending on the field of professional training (Table 3).

**Table 3. VUZ Student Attitudes Toward Social Science Lectures Depending on Type of VUZ, percentages**

Type of VUZ	Types of attitudes toward lectures			
	I	II	III	IV
Engineering and technical	6	61	1	32
Agricultural	7	83	0	10
University	10	74	1	15
Medical	10	63	1	26
Pedagogical	13	77	1	9
Creative (arts)	10	46	4	40

It is striking that only 6 percent of the students of engineering and technical VUZes and art VUZes displayed an interest in the social sciences. In the minds of the other students these subjects apparently have a weak connection with their future career.

It is indicative that the attitude of students toward the social sciences stays approximately the same throughout their years of study. The basic attitude toward the social sciences apparently takes shape during the first year at the VUZ or even before enrollment and displays almost no changes later. This clearly indicates the low effectiveness of the academic process.

**Reading sociopolitical literature.** By the end of their years of study, students should not only have taken classes in the social sciences but should also have developed the ability to interpret and solve social problems independently and creatively. This cannot be accomplished without a thorough familiarization with sociopolitical literature. According to our study, around 80 percent of the students read the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, party and state documents, and other sociopolitical literature in the last semester of the 1985/86 academic year. The other 20 percent did not read sociopolitical literature even immediately before and during the 27th party congress. Around 43 percent underestimated the role of philosophical and sociopolitical literature in the development of the specialist's outlook.

The distribution of respondents among the four categories depending on their attitude toward sociopolitical literature was the following: 51 percent in the first group, 7 percent in the second, 33 percent in the third, and 9

percent in the fourth. The third group, including students who were quite active in working mainly with primary sources, textbooks, and so forth, is surprisingly large.

The amount of reading characteristic of the first group testifies indisputably to a conscientious attitude toward sociopolitical studies. At the same time, high priority was assigned to "performance" in this group. The underdeveloped reading interests of half of the students could lead after graduation to the considerable reduction of the group of readers and the loss of skills in working with literature independently.

The second group is the most difficult to interpret. On the one hand, a declarative attitude toward the reading of sociopolitical literature prevails here, but on the other, an independent and creative reliance on this method of acquiring knowledge in the social sciences cannot be excluded either. This apparent contradiction stems from the desire to transcend the bounds of the curriculum. Erudite students with independent opinions generally make higher demands on the content of lectures, are more critical of the professional and personal qualities of instructors, and discuss current social issues more frequently. These students can play a leading role in the development of attitudes toward the social sciences and can actively assist competent instructors.

The reading of sociopolitical literature differs considerably in various fields of professional training (Table 4).

Table 4. VUZ Student Attitudes Toward Reading of Sociopolitical Literature Depending on Type of VUZ, percentages

Type of VUZ	Type of attitude			
	I	II	III	IV
Engineering and technical	40	5	43	12
Agricultural	46	10	32	12
University	60	7	28	5
Medical	27	22	29	22
Pedagogical	69	5	22	4
Creative (arts)	51	4	37	8

There is a stable correlation between the attitude toward the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, party and state documents, sociopolitical journals and so forth and the attitude toward the social sciences. The students of pedagogical institutes and universities rank highest here, just as they did in the previous case. Medical students rarely read works of this kind. It is indicative that 43 percent of the future engineers have a low opinion of the significance of sociopolitical literature in the training of specialists.

The results of the studies conducted in recent decades testify to the declining interest in sociopolitical literature. Whereas literature of a humanitarian nature

became more popular than books and articles about science and technology in the middle of the 1960's, by the end of the 1970's fiction, poetry, and journalism ranked highest among the reading preferences of students. The standardization of reading habits has caused students to lose their previous leading role as the group setting the standard for the young reading public.

The effectiveness of training in the social sciences is ultimately measured by the ability to put the knowledge acquired to practical use. In verbal terms, everything seems fine: Around 80 percent of the respondents noted the importance of a scientific outlook for the successful performance of professional duties. In the hierarchy of factors listed by students as determinants of the quality of specialist training, however, philosophical factors ranked 9th and 10th among the 15 factors evaluated. Professional and research skills turned out to rank highest, for completely understandable reasons. It is also significant that instructors in the social sciences do not have much prestige among students. Their personal and professional qualities were given much lower assessments than the qualities of instructors in specialized fields.

In spite of the high percentage of respondents attaching importance to the practical use of knowledge in the social sciences, many respondents also assigned it an extremely modest role (around 20 percent). In the minds of students, the social sciences have only a weak connection with the demands they make on themselves as future specialists. They put virtually no emphasis on the ability to use this knowledge. Many VUZ students regard the social sciences as abstract theoretical subjects with little practical value.

In light of these facts, it is completely understandable that students are poorly prepared to take an active part in the perestroika. According to our survey data, only 37 percent of the students were ready to begin work on the perestroika. These figures point up the need for the serious consideration of radical changes in the system of VUZ education and indoctrination.

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### Responses to Editors' Questions

18060001c Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87 (signed  
to press 10 Jul 87) pp 24-27

[Responses to editors' questions by Yu.V. Sogomonov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and head of the Vladimir Polytechnical Institute Department of Scientific Communism; S.F. Frolov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and head of the Department of Scientific Communism of the Moscow Institute of the Petrochemical and Gas Industry imeni Academician I.M. Gubkin; I.M. Popova, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and head of the Odessa State University Department of Philosophy; and A.S. Grechin, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and head of the Department of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy and Political Economy of the Moscow Civil Aviation Engineering Institute; first paragraph is SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA introduction]

[Text] An empirical study recorded the difficulties VUZ students encounter in studying the social sciences. What is the reason for the trouble they have and how can it be prevented? The editors asked the heads of VUZ social science departments to answer these questions.

### "Teaching-Dialogue" vs. "Compulsory Learning"— Yu.V. Sogomonov

I would like to stress that teaching is always a dialogue between two equal partners and that the social sciences are no exception to this rule. But if teaching is not merely a "cognitive" process, but a form of spiritual communication, it can develop successfully only in the form of tutorship. This presupposes a special type of dialogue—flexible, meaningful, and private. After all, this is not simply a matter of taking in knowledge, but also of developing moral qualities. This kind of dialogue can be tricky; the student runs the risk of submitting to the teacher's will. Another type of dialogue, frequently called Socratic, excludes the possibility of the automatic transfer of beliefs. The student must set out on the road to enlightenment independently and perform all of the necessary heuristic operations himself. It is only on this basis that the "theory" takes shape, or, in other words, that career goals are defined and moral choices are made. Dialogue stimulates the student's creativity and creates the necessary atmosphere for an objective search for the truth. We still have to disclose and legalize the high level of equality between student and educator in the academic process. We can only strengthen the cooperative nature of their relationship (with consideration for their differing degrees of responsibility) by surmounting "compulsory learning," with its disdain for the student's past experience.

In addition, the democratization of instruction in the social sciences will require the kind of socio-pedagogical measures that will turn the standards of free dialogue into the rules and procedures of scholastic debate.

### "Assembly-Line Rejects"—S.F. Frolov

What was the instructor of scientific communism in a technical VUZ required to do in the past? To relate the contents of the textbook accurately. Digressions were not encouraged, and, in fact, they were punished. He was required to provide "scientific substantiation" for successes and to comment on them. A bureaucratic interpretation of socialism was characteristic of many fields of the social sciences. The student was thought to be too young to deal with serious problems. But the young people saw them, probably agonized over them more than their teachers, who had grown wiser with experience, but abided by the common practice of learning just enough to pass the state examination. Furthermore, they knew that unsatisfactory grades sometimes cost the instructor more than the student. The situation itself motivated the average specialist to avoid making waves and to advance quickly.

I think that the decision of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education to allow only people with university degrees in specific fields to teach the social sciences is inconsistent with objective requirements. What can we say about the contemporary graduate? In most cases, he was outstanding in school, was active in his VUZ, and is now an erudite specialist. But this is not enough to teach in a VUZ. The experience yesterday's graduate lacks is just as important in scientific communism. An assembly line is being constructed for the production of rejects: a schoolchild with insufficient training in the basic subjects, a VUZ student with little academic success, a mediocre specialist. The final result is an engineer who cannot become a full-fledged specialist or take charge of a collective. Production has to bring this graduate "up to par," and this takes extra time and resources.

It seems to me that there are two parallel ways of improving instruction in the social sciences. First of all, students should not be admitted simply because they are "better than nothing." Classes in some technical VUZ's seem to be filled with people who were driven in with whips. What can we expect from a student who knows that the instructor needs him more than he needs the instructor? The student knows that the instructor's future depends on grades (he suffers unless he gives all of his students passing grades) and on the drop-out rate (the reduction of the student body is followed by staff reductions). In the second place, many instructors do not meet today's requirements. They are hired because of their degrees and not because of their professional qualifications. Of course, there is a connection between the two, but it is not always a direct connection: An excellent scholar could turn out to be a bad teacher, and vice versa. Finally, it is time to start teaching sociology in VUZ's, and especially in technical VUZ's. It should be made part of the social sciences, even if it has to be combined with scientific communism at first. This will settle the matter of teaching and conducting scientific

research, which is now organized haphazardly, without any supervision from the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education.

**"Selection of Scientific Wheeler-Dealers"—I.M. Popova**

There is no question that student interest in the social sciences has declined considerably. This is attested to by the subjective data of student polls and by objective data. The social science department offices, where, as I plainly recall, there was not even enough room for an apple to fall in the 1950's and 1960's, are now empty. Students gain only a poor and superficial acquaintance with the information they hear in seminars and lecture courses. Graduates cannot answer the simplest questions in state exams (for example, what are idealism and materialism, or what makes the Marxist interpretation of practice unique). I remember when an outstanding graduate of the school of history was unable to explain the methodology of populism or define the subjective method in sociology. If more serious demands were to be made on students, grades in the social sciences would be much lower, and "excellents" and "goods" would be quite rare.

Sociological research indicates that only the information of practical interest to people, of practical value in their future careers, is thoroughly digested. The main reason for the "alienated" (so to speak) attitude toward the social sciences is that the very interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory by "experts in the social sciences" is transformed in some strange way into something resembling dogmatic and lifeless phrases. In this way, the theory lost its revolutionary nature and its ability to reveal current problems. We have concentrated more on recording "advantages" and on justifying and praising whatever already exists.

The lack of connection between the social sciences and the daily worries of young people, who are particularly sensitive to insincerity and all types of evasive statements, is primarily a flaw in analytical thinking itself, because the important thing is how we theorize and how honest we are in our theorizing. Maxwell's statement that there is nothing more practical than a good theory cannot be interpreted as an attempt to temporarily adapt the latter to relevant subjects that are reflected in the titles of newspaper articles rather than in real action.

The declining prestige of the social sciences among VUZ youth is due to the unique system for the selection of instructors. Few of them are thinking people with thoroughly developed intellectual sophistication and the necessary moral instincts. But let us consider this: Who will be more successful—a wheeler-dealer in the sciences who is skillful at maneuvering his way through the maze of opinions or a morally sound individual who regards the search for the scientific truth as his civic duty? Highly professional qualities are still defenseless against group pressure and caste solidarity.

**"Equality Before the Truth"—A.S. Grechin**

Instruction in the social sciences in higher academic institutions is now experiencing its far from best period. Today it is clear that cosmetic techniques and improvements in the recommended procedures for seminars and lectures are not enough to correct the situation.

The reorganization of instruction in the social sciences must be viewed in the broader context, as a process of surmounting stagnant thinking and reinterpreting outdated ideas and stereotypes. It is no secret that there can be no bosses or subordinates in science: All are equal before the scientific truth. In spite of this, however, unique differences in scientific personnel have been evident in recent decades. Setting priorities in the social sciences has become the prerogative of a limited group of people. This inhibits criticism and constructive assessments in advance. Ever since the 1950's less attention has been paid to theory, and its development has been the prerogative of an elite more bureaucratic than scientific. All other social scientists have been assigned the role of commentators and interpreters.

The self-congratulatory style which became firmly entrenched in government and then moved to the sphere of theory has injured the social sciences considerably. We can recall how each decision and each article in the press was called a tremendous contribution to science and something just short of a revolution in Marxist-Leninist theory. All of these "contributions," however, turned out to be largely illusory, and the party's line of acceleration was impeded by a shortage of completed analytical projects.

We still encounter cases in which scientific ingenuity is confined to clever terminology and a game with concepts, as in the case of the theory of "popular self-government within the socialist state framework." When we discuss the theoretical content of ideas, we must not fall prey to euphoria. Students are tired of all of the talk about the tremendous achievements of Marxist-Leninist theory and are prone to listen to it with a certain degree of skepticism.

Today educators must worry about what they are saying, and not about how they say it and how they can decorate their speech with the "flowers" of the oratorical art. The perestroika will make great demands on instructors in the social sciences, but not all of them are ready for this.

How can they be helped? First of all, departmental and social duties must be redistributed. Second, research must be encouraged. In particular, the Soviet Sociological Association could organize the contracting of applied research projects by agreement with enterprises. Besides this, research institute personnel should be encouraged to teach (part-time), and vice versa. Faculty renewal is still being restricted by artificial limitations: The VUZ cannot solicit the services of a young specialist who is not

a party member. The January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum made an unequivocal statement on this matter. The time has come to move from words to action.

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### **Soviet Believers**

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[Digest of book "Soviet Believers" by William Fletcher, doctor of philosophy, head of the University of Kansas Department of Soviet and Eastern European Studies, and author of several works on the sociology of religion, published in 1981 by University Press of Kansas, translated by N.A. Yegorova; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] It will soon be a thousand years since Christianity was adopted in Rus. This has aroused the interest of the international public. Some groups in the West are trying to use the anniversary as an excuse to bring up the issue of violations of human rights in the USSR again and to portray Soviet believers as outsiders or outcasts of the "totalitarian" system. This view of the religious situation has traditionally been held by Western Sovietologists, who have kept a close watch on sociological research in our country. Believers, both the laity and the clergy, are not subjected to official discrimination in any sphere of public life in the USSR.

Today, guided by the principles of the new way of political thinking, we are learning to acknowledge the exceptional importance of humanitarian ideals for the survival of life on earth. When Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus Pimen addressed the international forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Mankind" (in February 1987), he spoke of the need for unity in major matters of general human significance. The editors hope that a constructive dialogue by spokesmen for different points of view will strengthen the new way of political thinking in the Soviet social sciences. They also believe that it will be useful for Soviet specialists in the sociology of religion to meet their extremely experienced American opponent "face to face."

In the last 15 years Soviet scholars have achieved definite results in the sociological study of religion, and public surveys and various experiments have produced a rich store of empirical information. Nevertheless, the picture based on the generalization of the data collected by the Soviet sociology of religion cannot be called complete or detailed. Research tools are not free of

defects and conclusions are not always supported by logical arguments. In any case, however, sociological information about the state of religion in the USSR is always useful.

Unfortunately, Soviet research is not fully appreciated in the West. This is all the more regrettable in view of Sovietologists' constant complaints about the lack of reliable empirical information about the religious sector in the USSR. Obviously, when the study of religion is based on speculations, the probability of error and of arbitrary interpretations is compounded. In essence, experts still do not have a reliable factological base. A lack of objectivity and biased descriptions of reality, as well as the ensuing conscious or unconscious distortions and all sorts of misinterpretations, are encountered at every turn. Of course, the sociology of religion in the USSR is still an immature field of research in many respects, but if the data collected in this field can help specialists study serious aspects of religion, there is no question that it deserves every consideration, especially when there are problems to be solved.

The sociological study of religion in the USSR is a young field of knowledge, and the difficulties encountered in this field are quite substantial. These include not only the lack of firmly established research traditions in the field, the incomplete methodology, and the virtual inaccessibility of units of observation. The researcher also encounters many obstacles in the religious sector itself. The strained relations between church and state and the difficulties engendered by official policy on religion put the sociologist in an extremely difficult position.

This is apparently the reason for the limited number of sources of information for the sociologist. The researcher of religion must resort to the speculative reconstruction of events even when he is working with specific data. It goes without saying that value judgments cannot reflect the actual state of affairs. Furthermore, the data, which are rarely distinguished by absolute clarity, can be interpreted in different ways. To a certain extent the resolution of this problem depends on the researcher himself, and if he has a combination of good taste and astuteness based on a knowledge of other approaches to the study of religion in the USSR, he can arrive at conclusions representing a fairly accurate reflection of reality. But can they be the final word?

Soviet sociology still has not answered the central question about the number of believers in the country. One fundamental problem consists in deciding who should be categorized as a believer. Until a decision has been made on this matter, investigations of religion will be of dubious scientific value.

For example, there is some basis for the statement that religion is most popular among the elderly (around half of all the people between 50 and 70 are religious), but it would be wrong to absolutize these data and not to see other, less visible tendencies behind them, such as the

level of religiosity in the younger generation of Soviet citizens. It is true that it is not always possible to determine the exact number of religious young people. Many are not inclined to act on their beliefs or to reveal them to strangers. It is understandable that representative data cannot be obtained in this case. What can be said with a high degree of certainty is that some young people are religious or, at least, are distinguished by an absence of active disbelief. The "observable" believers, on the other hand, are, I repeat, older than the average.

The data of Soviet research prove conclusively that most believers are women. It is highly possible that there are three or four times as many religious women as religious men.

The educational level of the believers is lower than the average, although not much lower. Many believers were not given a chance to obtain a higher education, and this naturally affected their overall educational level. It is possible that deeply religious people place less emphasis on a higher education.

As for occupations, from 30 to 40 percent of the believers are living on pensions, are housewives, or are dependent on others for their support. Believers in the production sphere usually perform unskilled or semiskilled work. Labor discrimination is rife: People with a relatively high status wisely say nothing about their religious convictions in the fear of sanctions. Therefore, statistical data on the occupational skills of believers in the USSR are heavily concentrated on the lowest levels.

The rural community is still the stronghold of religion in the country. Urbanites, however, are usually more consistent and active in religious affairs. Their views are less subject to vacillation, and religion is a more important part of their life. One reason is that churches are more accessible to the population in cities than in rural communities. The anonymity of the urban way of life also plays a part in augmenting religious activity. In the rural community the religious behavior of an individual is more likely to arouse attention than in a populous city. Finally, urban believers, with their higher level of education and rich social experience, know much more about worldly matters than their rural counterparts.

Virtually no differences have been observed in the housing conditions and standard of living of believers and nonbelievers, although more of the former are unskilled workers and consequently have low-paying jobs. Besides this, many believers are single (widowed, divorced, or never married) or live in multigenerational and less prosperous families.

The structure and content of leisure activity is also different for believers. As a rule, they read fewer newspapers and magazines than other groups and rarely attend movie theaters. Nevertheless, the press and the radio are important to them as sources of information.

There are many indications that religious people are alienated from society, and although few believers are inclined to minimize their contacts with nonbelievers, many religious people do not trust atheists because they doubt their ability to adhere to moral standards. It has been established that most believers support progress, but their degree of participation in public affairs is far below the average. Of course, it is not clear whether this alienation is due to latent hostility toward officially declared values or to a different set of goals and standards.

The overwhelming majority of believers have been religious since childhood. In other words, the people who regularly take part in the activities of various denominations usually come from the religious rather than the atheistic sector. This conclusion, however, requires clarification. If people who were religious as children but then lost their faith for some reason later returned to the church at a mature age, they must be recorded as members of the atheistic sector, or at least the non-religious sector to which they belonged prior to their latest conversion. Furthermore, the religious consciousness is usually transmitted by the older generation: Religious beliefs are handed down to children by their grandparents, bypassing the middle generation. To some extent, this is promoted by the widespread practice of leaving children in the care of grandparents while the parents are at work.

Wherever institutionalized religion was abolished at one time, there is a clear tendency toward syncretism with pagan folk beliefs. Various types of superstitions (fortune telling, the belief in the evil eye, etc.) are quite common among believers with no access to a church. It is also a fact, however, that these superstitions are just as characteristic of nonbelievers.

The empirical data obtained by Soviet researchers do not make an integral sociological description of the philosophical views of believers. Many conclusions are inconsistent with traditional assumptions. In particular, in spite of the common view of science and religion as opposites, the majority of believers do not regard the two as incompatible value systems. It is true that they have only superficial contact with scientific achievements. The believer's ideas about God are probably the most difficult problem in the Soviet sociology of religion. Attempts to categorize these ideas have been unsatisfactory, partly because the complexity of the phenomenon itself has not been taken into account. Believers usually hold several beliefs simultaneously. There is some indication that they do not all believe in the immortal soul. The connection between religion and morality is corroborated by all religious people. The responses of the majority of believers surveyed by Soviet researchers to questions about the meaning of life are usually not worded in religious terms. They are more likely to mention material, moral, or family matters. And of course, not all believers define happiness in religious terms.

More precise data can be obtained from studies of the practice of religion. Icons are exceptionally popular in traditionally Orthodox regions. They are frequently found in homes whether the inhabitants are believers or not. If there is a church nearby, many believers attend regularly, and some attend occasionally. When there are few churches in a district, denominational boundaries are crossed. It is true that many people cite non-religious motives among their reasons for attending church (for example, the need for an aesthetic experience or adherence to tradition).

Even nonbelievers take part in religious rituals. The same is true of religious holidays. For example, some atheists (or nominal believers) have their children baptized. Weddings, on the other hand, are being replaced by civil ceremonies. The strict observance of Lent is more likely to be an exception to the rule. Church funerals are still the most tenacious custom.

This is the picture painted by sociological studies of religion in the USSR.

In spite of constant pressure and discrimination, the Soviet believer does not seem demoralized or confused. Sociological data are more likely to attest to the firmness and conviction of believers.

Soviet sociological studies of religion contain information of a confidential nature: responses to intimate and highly personal questions. The sociologist in the USSR has a unique opportunity: In no other sphere but sociology do spokesmen for scientific atheism come into such direct contact with believers. For this reason, the individualized portraits of Soviet believers compiled here are exceptionally reliable and complete. This material is simply indispensable in analyses of the current state of religion in the USSR.

Returning to the question of the number of believers in the country, we should note that Soviet researchers have not arrived at any unanimous conclusions regarding the people who should be described as believers. Attempts to obtain "behavioral" criteria have been inconclusive. Most specialists use the intuitive approach in deciding whether an individual accepts or denies the existence of the supernatural. Obviously, this approach tends to oversimplify matters: Soviet scholars admit that many of the people regarded as believers are not. At the same time, the system of classification does not include a large group of individuals who are deeply religious but do not share the traditional religious beliefs.

Efforts to obtain a more precise method increase difficulties. In particular, the question of intermediate types of religiosity arises. The group of "vacillators" is a category made up of many transitional types, depending on the degree to which the initial characteristic is displayed and on the goals of the research project. It is often defined as the group "vacillating between belief and

disbelief." If specialists regard the "vacillators" as "vacillating believers," however, all of the members of this group should be included in the believer group. Unfortunately, this is often overlooked, and the summary of the data obtained by the researcher will contain only the percentage values for "believers" and "confirmed believers."

The "indifferent" category creates just as many difficulties, and most researchers do not even take this group into account. It is possible that this group should be completely excluded from the believer group. It is clear that the use of the terms "vacillating" and "indifferent" can change the estimate of the total number of believers in the USSR considerably. In any case, when the relative numbers of religious and non-religious people are being calculated, the former should be increased.

The majority of Soviet sociologists cite extremely conservative estimates of the number of believers in the country—from 15 to 20 percent. How valid are they? It is completely obvious that the minimum figure of 10 percent should be discarded because of its invalidity. In addition, the maximum number of believers (50 percent in regions with a Russian population) seems highly improbable. Figures ranging from 25 to 35 percent seem more credible.

This estimate might seem too high at first, but a careful analysis provides conclusive evidence that the lowest figure was obtained when the large group of people described as "vacillators" and "vacillating believers" was excluded. Furthermore, regional differences must also be taken into account (comparatively low figures for cities and high figures for rural areas). Several large-scale studies cite figures above 25 percent and sometimes even above 35 percent. In Penza Oblast, for example, where more than 30,000 people were surveyed, believers constituted 28.4 percent of the population, and in Voronezh Oblast believers represented 22.4 percent (another 27.8 percent were "vacillators"). Therefore, the figure of 30 percent does not seem too high.

But this applies only to regions with a predominantly Russian population. There is more differentiation in the country as a whole. "The distribution of religiosity is not uniform throughout the country. The level is much higher in the western Ukraine and Belorussia as well as in the Baltic republics and in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and other places where earlier inhabitants were under the influence of Muslims. In the Russian Federation the practice of religion is most common in Moscow, Vladimir, and Yaroslavl..., less common in the Urals and west Siberia, and even less common on the Altay peninsula and in the Far East"[1, p 23].

Russians now constitute around half of the population of the USSR. The opinion that 60 percent of the people of other nationalities are religious seems quite credible. It goes without saying that it would be impossible to obtain absolutely accurate records. This figure might seem high

for the Ukrainians and Belorussians, together making up one-fifth of the population of the USSR. Common ethnic roots and cultural similarities have made the distribution of religiosity in these regions approximately the same as the Russian model. The indicator of religiosity could be even higher, however, because part of the territory of these republics did not become part of the USSR until World War II.<sup>1</sup> Besides this, many existing churches are concentrated in the Ukraine, and this also presupposes a higher level of religiosity than in Russia.

In other regions, however, 60 percent might seem unrealistically low. For example, among the Muslims who make up almost 15 percent of the population, religion and culture are so closely related that it would be naive to assume that a certain part of the population is consciously non-religious. Religion influences the majority of the population in these regions. Soviet sociology has done too little in these regions to assess the prevalence of religiosity there. There are data, however, on the national languages: 98.9 percent of the Turkmens, 98.8 percent of the Kirghiz, 98.6 percent of the Uzbeks, 98.5 percent of the Tajiks, 98.2 percent of the Azerbaijanis, 98 percent of the Kazakhs, and 89.2 percent of the Tatars call their national language their native tongue. The knowledge of conversational Russian in these regions ranges from 62.5 percent (Tatars) to 14.5 percent (Uzbeks) [2, p 211]. On the one hand, religion is closely connected with the nationality of Muslims [3] and, on the other, their insufficient knowledge of the Russian language actually excludes the people from the influence of atheism [2, pp 211- 212]. Consequently, the figure of 60 percent is completely valid for the believers in these regions.

As for the Armenians and Georgians (together making up around 3 percent of the population), their religion and culture are so closely connected that this figure might even seem too low. The same is true of Jews, for 15 percent of whom Hebrew or Yiddish is their native language. Little is known about the prevalence of religiosity among the natives of Siberia. The fact is that there is much sociologists do not understand about the details of shaman rituals. Studies conducted among the Mari and Chechen-Ingush peoples testify that they are more religious than the Russians. Almost nothing is known about the practice of Buddhism in the small ethnic groups in the Asian part of the USSR because the institutionalized forms of this religion were effectively abolished in the 1930's.

For the Baltic republics, the figure of 60 percent is only an approximation. It is too high for Latvia and Estonia but certainly too low for Lithuania.

Therefore, the figure of 60 percent for the non-Russian part of the population does not seem unjustifiably high upon closer examination.

If we combine the two estimates—30 percent for Russians and 60 percent for the rest of the population—we obtain an average number (45 percent) of believers in the USSR. This figure might seem high, but it will not come as a surprise to all Soviet sociologists. For example, V.D. Kobetskiy (whose estimates range from 15 to 20 percent) remarks: "During the period of Soviet rule the level of religiosity has been reduced by around 50 percent" [4, p 90]. He does not elaborate on this statement. If we assume, however, that 90 percent of the population of the Russian Empire was religious (he quotes A. Lunacharskiy's statement that 80 percent of the Soviet citizens were religious at the end of the 1920's, a decade after the official declaration of atheism [ibid., p 21]), Kobetskiy's final estimate would be around 45 percent.

If the absolute number of believers is substituted for the percentage, the results seem even more astounding. Soviet scholars have always disputed the Western estimates of around 100 million believers in the country: "This figure is several times in excess of the real number of believers in the USSR, which is attested to by the results of sociological research" [2, p 6]. If 45 percent of the population is religious, however, then there must be around 115 million believers in the USSR.

This amazingly high estimate is much higher than those derived from Western sources (64 million). The natural conclusion is that religion still exists in spite of energetic atheistic propaganda. Furthermore, the number of believers is rising.

After the extremely incomplete population census of 1937, which included a question about religion, Ye. Yaroslavskiy calculated that one-third of the urban population and two-thirds of the rural population were still religious. American sociologist N.S. Timasheff concluded from data on the degree of urbanization in those years that 56 percent of the population was religious [5]. If the population at that time was 170 million (although this figure is obviously too high), we obtain a total number of 95 million believers. Yaroslavskiy asserted, however, that there were 80 million believers and that all references to a higher indicator were just rumors. The figure of 90 million would seem to be a completely reasonable compromise.

The criteria used in the 1937 census to measure the religiosity of the individual coincide with those used by Soviet sociologists today. The question then was: "Are you a believer or not?" Because the same criteria are used in the majority of surveys today, the results obtained in 1937 and in recent years are comparable. The percentage of religious people in the population apparently has decreased from 56 percent in 1937 to 45 percent at the present time, while the absolute number of believers in the USSR has actually risen from 90 million to 115 million.

The Soviet sociology of religion represents an imperfect instrument with many methodological flaws. Although accidental errors could affect calculations, it is more probable that the researchers are inclined to underestimate the number of believers and the level of their religious activity.

There are many indications that religion is still an important factor in the spiritual life of the Soviet society. It is apparently more important than researchers believe, but the assumption that its influence will grow radically and that it will become a dominant factor in Soviet life transcends the bounds of what is known about this topic today.

Here is an interesting parallel. Observers in the United States were surprised and even astounded by the rebirth of evangelical Protestantism in the 1970's. Many commentators believed that it had disappeared at the time of the "monkey trial." On closer examination, however, it becomes clear that the conservative form of Christianity is not dead at all. For two generations it managed to keep its American followers in spite of the rapid development of the industrial and then the post-industrial society. In 1970, when conditions became more favorable, Protestantism began to spread throughout the country and to have a colossal effect on American social life and politics. Today many Americans say that they were "born again" as a result of this.

Although Soviet sociologists believe that religion is a thing of the past, that it has been growing weaker since the time of the October Revolution, and that it is becoming extinct, there is considerable evidence to the contrary. It has had steadfast followers in four generations in spite of all obstacles. And whenever conditions became favorable (in the war years or during the "thaw" of the 1950's), it developed rapidly. Contemporary sociological studies prove that religion has not disappeared, that there are believers in the USSR, and that they will constitute a significant part of the population in the near future.

#### Footnotes

1. This is what the author writes, but the Soviet Union was drawn into World War II long after the territories Fletcher has in mind became part of the USSR—Ed.

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**Current Status of Russian Orthodox Church**  
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[Article by Sergey Nikolayevich Pavlov (Hieromonk Innokentiy), candidate of theology and instructor at the Leningrad Theological Seminary]

[Text] This article was supposed to be a response to "Soviet Believers," a book by renowned American Sovietologist and expert on religion William Fletcher (1981). After I had read this work and the works on religion by the Soviet sociologists on whose findings the American author based his study, I had to broaden the limits of my original topic. My reasons were the following. The studies by Soviet scholars of religion and, by the same token, Fletcher's book do not examine some important aspects of institutionalized religion in the USSR, which are especially significant in any discussion of the largest religious community in our country, the Russian Orthodox Church (hereafter called the ROC). Besides this, the American researcher bases his discussion of religious practices in the USSR today on Soviet literature published mainly in the 1960's and 1970's. The situation, however, has changed since that time. For this reason, it would be best to cite the findings of Soviet authors whose works were unavailable to Fletcher and to share my own observations with the reader. The geographic boundaries of my personal observations are somewhat broader than those in the works the American researcher used as a source of information.

Because the opinions expressed in this article are the response of a person observing the social phenomenon from within while Fletcher is an outside observer, our historical and sociological discussion will cover only the current status of the ROC, and not the status of religion in the USSR in general.

Prior to the revolution, for nine centuries, Christianity in the tradition of Byzantine Orthodoxy was the predominant religion in Russia. It is unlikely that anyone today would try to deny its significance in the formation of

Russian culture and, what is equally important, in the axiological outlook of the people. This easily explains why the ROC is still the largest religious community in the USSR, uniting most of the religious population (the nationalities in which the religious members have traditionally belonged to the ROC represent around 74 percent of the population of the USSR).

In the preceding excerpt from W. Fletcher's book, religiosity in the USSR is analyzed with a view to the following indicators: 1) the sex and age composition of believers; 2) their education and social status; 3) a comparison of urban and rural levels of religiosity; 4) the believers and their immediate environment; 5) ways of acquiring faith; 6) the practice of religion; 7) statistics on religiosity in the USSR.

We will begin by using the same framework to trace the evolution of the ROC in the last two and a half decades (the author's personal observations cover this period).

Fletcher says, for example, that at least half of the believers—or, in any case, of those participating in religious undertakings—are elderly people in their 50's or even in their 60's or older. Furthermore, the majority of these are women (in a ratio of approximately 3:1). Sociological studies conducted in Kaluga Oblast at the beginning of the 1970's[1], however, paint a slightly different picture, but the results of these studies were not known to the American author. For example, in the urban population the level of religiosity was the following: 19 percent of the people between the ages of 51 and 60, 38 percent for those between 61 and 70, and 62 percent for those 71 or older. The respective figures for the rural population were 37, 49, and 68 percent[1, p 43]. The author of this article has been to several churches in the Kaluga Diocese and has seen that these age groups already represent not "at least half" of the churchgoers, but the overwhelming majority (at least four-fifths). As for their division according to gender, the ratio of women to men I observed was around 5:1 (according to A.A. Lebedev's data, the percentage of religious men in Kaluga Oblast is 5 percent in the cities and 6 percent in rural communities, with respective figures of 14 and 24 percent for women[1, p 42]). The picture was slightly different in the churches of Kaluga, Kozelsk, and the rural community of Pryski in 1981. There was no appreciable decline in the number of people attending holiday and regular services in comparison to the number in 1973, but there were more middle-aged people and young adults, and men and women were present in approximately equal numbers in the last group. Although this did not change the existing sex and age balance of the congregation dramatically, it did reveal trends characteristic of the ROC today.

Before we examine these trends, I should make two observations. The prevalence of elderly people, mainly women, attending regular services is more or less characteristic of any Christian congregation in today's secularized world. The ROC is no exception to this rule. At

the same time, there are regional differences in some external indicators. For example, the relative numbers of men and women, children and young adults, middle-aged people and the elderly attending services in Lvov Oblast would be different from the numbers in Kaluga Oblast. We will discuss the reasons for this later, but now we will just note the increase of men, primarily members of the middle generation (31-40 and 41-50) in the church congregations in the last 10 or 15 years, as well as the increase in the number of people of these age groups and the group of people between the ages of 51 and 60 in the total group of believers. It is true that this tendency is more apparent in some regions. In the Far East and in east and central Siberia, for example, it is more perceptible than in west Siberia and the Urals. The tendency is stronger in the cities of the central and northern RSFSR, in the eastern oblasts of the Ukraine, and in the Baltic republics than in rural locations.

I can remember services during Easter Lent (and they are the most indicative in revealing the religious activity of Orthodox believers) in Moscow churches in the early and middle 1960's. There was a sea of black scarves. Most of the churchgoers were elderly women (from 50 to 70 and older). There were not many men. There were few people of middle age. A young man or woman was an uncommon sight. There were a few children, brought by their grandmothers or, less frequently, by their mothers. My colleagues tell me that the congregation in the Leningrad churches in those years was the same.

What do I see today in Orthodox churches in Moscow and Leningrad, which I visit more frequently than other places in our country?

In general, there are fewer people in church. In any case, it is easy to enter a cathedral on a holy day. And during regular Sunday services the cathedrals are only about three-fourths full on the average. At the same time, the composition of the congregation has changed perceptibly. Although elderly women are still the predominant group, there are many more men, most of them middle aged or young adults. The members of these age groups now constitute a much higher percentage of the total congregation, and young adults (from 18 to 30) could even be described as a noticeable group. The number of children attending services has risen significantly.

This examination of the first characteristic in Fletcher's description of religiosity in the USSR has shown us only the external features of the phenomenon. The second characteristic will allow us to look inside related social processes.

Basing his statements on Soviet works written in the 1960's and early 1970's, Fletcher asserts that the educational level of the believers is slightly lower than the average and then adds an observation of his own—"although not much lower." The American researcher then goes on to provide his own explanation for the

Soviet findings: "Many believers were not given a chance to obtain a higher education, and this naturally affected their overall educational level."

The reason for mistaken conclusions of this kind is the tendency to substitute ideologizing for an objective examination of the facts. The Soviet atheistic scholar of religion frequently tries to portray the religious feelings of part of the population of the USSR as a result of undereducation. This corresponds well to the thesis of the gradual disappearance of religion in the socialist society. The American Sovietologist, in turn, takes the onesided picture revealed to him in Soviet literature and uses it as the basis for a conclusion conforming to his ideological position: As a result of discrimination, believers have a lower educational level than the rest of the population.

What is the truth?

In the case of those who are now at least 60 years old, the composition of believers in the educational sense (with consideration for regional factors) may have covered the full range in the last 20 years but was apparently lower than the national average. For example, in the older generations we might have encountered an academician or a world renowned figure in the arts among the believers of those years. A specialist with a higher or secondary education was not an uncommon sight either, but the previously mentioned prevalence of elderly women among believers, women who spent most of their lives performing unskilled or semiskilled labor, produced the statistic that was often deliberately misinterpreted later. If, on the other hand, we look at other age groups (18-30, 31-40, 41-50, and 51-60), we find an average educational level that corresponds to the union-wide indicators for these age groups.

Now let us take a look at the internal developments lying at the basis of the facts cited above. As far as the older generations are concerned, their acceptance of the faith was a result of family upbringing. The polarity in the social groups of this category of believers is not surprising. On the one hand, there are highly educated people who came from a long line of intellectuals and whose origins ensured a conscious acceptance of faith as a result of the more or less systematic catechization they received at home; on the other hand, there are people with little education whose acceptance of religion was secured by the customs and traditions existing prior to the sociocultural changes of the 1920's and 1930's. The prevalence of women in this group is no coincidence.

Our examination of the third point in Fletcher's analysis of religiosity in the USSR reveals the invalidity of his conclusion regarding discrimination against believers in education.

In his comparison of urban and rural levels of religiosity, the American researcher says that the rural community is still something like a religious stronghold. It is true that

the regional studies of Penza and Voronezh oblasts on which Fletcher bases his remarks provided some grounds for these conclusions. The same was true of Kaluga Oblast in the early 1970's, judging by the results of A.A. Lebedev's study. As for the current situation, it is slightly different. I can cite some extremely interesting facts. The first is the much higher number of urban churches in several eastern and northern dioceses of the ROC. Here is an example: Of the 13 churches in the Omsk-Tyumen Diocese (Omsk Oblast and southern Tyumen Oblast), not one is in a rural location. The second fact is the growth of the urban population as a result of the addition of former inhabitants of rural communities. This has changed the ratio of urban to rural believers in favor of the former most perceptibly in the central and northwestern RSFSR. Finally, the third fact is that there are objective reasons for the acceptance of faith and the reproduction of religiosity. If we exclude the western regions of the USSR, we can agree with Fletcher's conclusion that "churches are more accessible to the population in cities than in rural communities." Fletcher also makes the accurate observation that the higher educational level of urban believers is one of the factors augmenting their religious activity. This is also promoted, in Fletcher's words, by the anonymity of the urban way of life.

This requires clarification. It is true that in Moscow and Leningrad—i.e., in the giant cities with a relatively high number of churches in different neighborhoods—anonymity can be a contributing factor in the religious activity of young and middle-aged believers. In other cities, however, the situation is different. For instance, the existence of one small church in Sverdlovsk and two in Kaluga deprives the young believer of anonymity. If, in addition to this, historical inertia allows flagrant authoritarianism to be a part of atheistic work in local academic institutions and establishments, the churchgoing student or employee will try to conduct his institutionalized religious activity out of sight of his superiors. For example, I know of young adults in Kaluga who do not attend the two local churches but are members of the congregation of a rural church or even a Moscow church.

Here is another response to Fletcher's comments. There is no legally secured discrimination against believers in education in our country, but we must admit that when the religiosity of a schoolchild or VUZ student becomes noticeable, this could affect his treatment by the administration of the academic institution.

Let us move on to Fletcher's discussion of another aspect of religiosity in the USSR—the relationship between believers and their secularized surroundings. Religious people, the American researcher writes, "as a rule, read fewer newspapers and magazines than other groups and rarely attend movie theaters." Studies conducted in the 1960's apparently provided the grounds for these conclusions, but religion was not the reason for this. The high percentage of elderly and undereducated women among believers was enough to produce this state of

affairs in those years. Today it would hardly be valid to compare and contrast believers and non-believers in their use of the news media and cultural achievements in general. Fletcher goes on to say that "there are many indications that religious people are alienated from society." Then he cites the main cause of this alienation—"many religious people do not trust atheists because they doubt their ability to adhere to moral standards."

Before proving the invalidity of the American researcher's statements, we must say that they reflect not only the mental stereotypes of many Americans ("Only a religious person can be moral"), but also the ideological aims of the Soviet literature on which he based his conclusions. In essence, they imply, as we know, that religion is "harmful" because it supposedly discourages the believer from taking part in social activity. This opinion is easily refuted by past and present facts.

Fletcher is wrong in assuming that believers in the USSR are alienated from the rest of society. Above all, his explanation of this "alienation" is inaccurate. The moral precepts with a Christian basis that influenced believers for centuries still have a strong effect today, in spite of the secularization of the contemporary mass consciousness. In any case, we will not encounter any Orthodox believer who mistrusts a non-believer for purely religious reasons. Something else, however, does happen. The non-believer is sometimes inclined to put special trust in the believer because of his strict morality.

Fletcher's assessment of the process by which religious affiliations are formed also requires significant additions.

The religious training of children has retained its importance as a source of subsequent religiosity almost exclusively in the western regions of the country. Fletcher's comment that even "the people who regularly take part in the activities of various denominations usually come from the religious rather than the atheistic sector" is completely true of the native population of these regions. The reference here is to the conversion of some Orthodox believers to the Baptist religion or other non-traditional denominations in the western Ukraine or Belorussia. As for the rest of the country, neophytism is also a factor in the reproduction of religiosity here. It is true that this is characteristic primarily of cities. The percentage of new converts in the total group of Orthodox churchgoers can vary in different cities. In any case, the percentage in Moscow and Leningrad is quite high. I think that at least a third of all of the people who regularly attend Orthodox services here converted to the faith when they reached maturity, irrespective of, or even contrary to, their family upbringing. Furthermore, this group includes elderly people as well as young adults and people of middle age.

Using the empirical findings of studies of religiosity as a basis, Fletcher presented a generally objective description, but it requires some additions and clarifications.

For example, he says that weddings are not very popular in Orthodox parishes. Apparently, the data gathered in Voronezh and Penza oblasts more than 15 years ago, and these constituted the American researcher's informational base [2; 3], allowed him to draw these conclusions, but we should add that the overwhelming majority of couples in the western USSR have church weddings. Studies in Lvov Oblast, for example, indicate that up to 80 percent of the newlyweds here had a religious ceremony. In other regions of our country, several circumstances have to be taken into account. Sometimes one partner is religious and the other is not and does not want a church wedding. Sometimes when church elders write reports, they try to please the Soviet agencies for which the records are kept by deliberately listing a lower number of church ceremonies. This "padding in reverse" distorts statistics, and Soviet religious scholars and Sovietologists later make use of this to their own advantage. In any case, although few weddings are now performed in Moscow and Leningrad churches, they have been more common in recent years than they were 10 or 15 years ago. This attests to an increase in the number of young believers.

There is one more thing. There are still quite a few people who occasionally attend an Orthodox church but who do not know enough about dogma and who have a more secular than religious frame of mind in general. For example, they feel the need to teach their children to cross themselves, but when it comes to the religious sacrament of marriage, many refuse to have a church ceremony because of the liberal attitudes in their secularized surroundings toward the marital union itself, the inviolability of which is stated in the Gospels. The "vacillators," a term used by religious scholars, can probably also be put in this category of occasional churchgoers.

Now let us look at Fletcher's statistical computations. In his opinion, by 1980 believers represented 30 percent of the Russian population and 60 percent of the other nationalities constituting the other half of citizens of the USSR. As for the ROC, its members apparently represent from 12 to 20 percent of the total population now.<sup>1</sup> Depending on the region, the indicator can fall below the union average or rise sharply. For example, whereas believers (and vacillators) represented 11.5 percent of the population of Kaluga at the beginning of the 1970's (and 23.9 percent in rural areas [1, p 41]), in eastern Belorussia the rural indicator was 25.8 percent. In rural regions of western Belorussia, it reached as high as 60.6 percent [5, p 96].

How can the dynamics of the religiosity of ROC members in the past two decades be described?

There was a clear change of generations in the late 1960's and early 1970's. There were fewer believers who had become religious before the revolution and had continued practicing their faith later. This led to a slight decrease in the total number of Orthodox believers,

mainly in the central and eastern regions of the country. To understand the dynamics of the decline of religiosity in the USSR in the prewar years and then in the 1960's, however, we must examine underlying objective causes. In literature we often read that the decline of religiosity was a result of the cultural progress of society and the higher educational level of the masses. Unfortunately, the reasons were much simpler. The 1930's were marked by battles primarily against institutionalized religion, and by 1939 there were whole oblasts in our country with only one or two Orthodox churches or none at all. In Leningrad, for example, there were only five churches at that time, three of which belonged to the ROC, while two were "reformed" churches. It is true that the restoration of church services during the Great Patriotic War and the postwar years revived the practice of institutionalized religion among Orthodox believers and stabilized the religious situation in the country to some extent. In any case, the objective conditions for religious upbringing in the home improved, and there were some new converts. There was a dramatic change for the worse in the situation at the beginning of the 1960's, however, when the ROC lost almost half of its churches as a result of the voluntaristic methods then used in ideological work. The eastern Ukraine and Belorussia lost the greatest number. In Poltava Oblast, for example, there were 340 Orthodox places of worship in 1960 and only 52 in 1965.

Therefore, two factors led to the decline of religiosity in the last two decades. The first was the perceptible change for the worse in conditions for institutionalized religious practices. The second was the following: A woman (and, as we already saw, it was precisely the women who were most influential in this area) who had acquired her religious beliefs along with the rest of her family's customs was not always able to give her children and grandchildren even the most elementary summarization of religious principles. She believed with all her heart but rarely thought about her faith in intellectual terms, and she was never taught to do so. Furthermore, the opinions of her children were purposefully molded without her participation. In short, children are taught to think mostly in secular terms and they are sometimes merely irritated by the seemingly overconservative and ridiculous beliefs of an old woman.

We have mentioned the qualitatively different religious situation in the western USSR several times. Soviet scholars of religion have also pointed this out [6, p 139]. There is a simple explanation. The social reforms of the postwar period in those regions did not include efforts to eradicate institutionalized religion. Besides this, the antireligious campaign of the early 1960's did not cause as much damage there as in some other places. Suffice it to say that the Lvov-Ternopol Diocese is now the largest in the ROC, with more than a thousand churches. Besides this, the older generation of believers in the western regions did once receive sufficient catechization. These factors create more favorable conditions than in other parts of our country for religious training.

At the same time, there have been more new converts among the members of educated and intellectually developed social groups. It is possible that this could become a significant factor in the stabilization of the religious situation. In any case, the recent predictions by atheists, that religion would disappear as socioeconomic and cultural progress continued [6, p 181], can be termed naive with complete confidence today. Even the theorists of atheism have begun admitting this in recent years [7].

In his work Fletcher did not discuss an important facet of the religious situation in the USSR—the administrative structures of religious communities. Data on the ROC clergy, however, can contribute much to its historical and sociological analysis.

First of all, we should note that there were few members of the prerevolutionary clergy among the postwar bishops, priests, and monks. Therefore, the ROC clergy consisted mainly of representatives of various groups of believers. Besides this, there was a clear change of generations in the ROC clergy and secular personnel in the 1970's. Now there is a high percentage of people under the age of 40. In addition, the number of students in theological schools has risen noticeably in the last 10 years (there are now more than a thousand in three seminaries and two academies). On the average, there are 2.2-2.5 applicants for each place in the seminary.

Who are these students?

Of the 157 incoming freshmen at the Leningrad Theological Seminary in 1985 (their average age was around 23), 57.9 percent were Ukrainian (primarily from the western Ukraine), 34.5 percent were Russian, 3.2 percent were Moldavian, 2.6 percent were Belorussian, and 1.8 percent were other nationalities. These data agree in most respects with our general description of religiosity among the members of the ROC. Most of the students in Leningrad theological schools (the seminary and the academy) come from religious families. Only 11 percent of the seminary students and 25 percent of the academy students, however, are the children of clergymen. It is interesting that in both schools there is approximately the same percentage of people from non-religious families who became religious without receiving any religious education in the home. As for the faculty of the Leningrad theological schools, more than one-fourth come from non-religious families.

When we speak of the motives for enrolling in the specialized academic institutions of the ROC, we should first list the faith of these young people and their desire to serve the church. The common opinion among non-religious people is that theological schools can only attract young people today by offering them large student grants and promising them fabulous salaries when they become parish priests. In fact, the theological academy student with free room and board receives a stipend

of only 18 rubles a month. Our discussion of the financial status of the Orthodox clergy will be based on the evaluative criteria employed in the article by V.D. Sitnikova and A.A. Michurin [8]. Only an extremely small segment of the clergy can be included in category "E" ("There is virtually nothing we cannot afford"). It is true that the percentage belonging to category "D" ("The purchase of durable goods does not present any difficulties, but a motor vehicle is still beyond our means") would be quite high, but we would also encounter people in category "C" ("We have enough money in general, but we would have difficulty buying durable goods"). This happens if the clergyman has many children or if his parish is located in a place with few Orthodox believers—for example, in Latvia.

As we can see, the ROC clergy do not belong to the needy strata of our population. At the same time, if, for example, a clergyman in a rural area of the western Ukraine has an automobile, this does not distinguish him from his rural neighbors. Whatever the circumstances, a person striving for quick financial enrichment is not likely to choose the difficult road of the clergyman, which often requires a great deal of spiritual and physical effort and energy.

In summation, we should note that the ROC still has potential for growth, although the total number of its members might vary. This is realized not only by church officials: Quite recent articles in the Soviet press have suggested the need for the fundamental reorganization of the system of atheistic propaganda. It has been called hopelessly outdated [9]. The author of one of these articles discusses the spiritual life of a large rural community in the Moscow suburbs, a sovkhos center, and says that the local church has more influence than the club [ibid.]. Although some people feel that one of the reasons for conversion is that "an undereducated person overwhelmed by personal problems can and does turn to religion" [10], experience tells us that life's difficulties are far from the only factor motivating people to do this. I think that neither the substitution of cultural studies for the old clichés of atheistic propaganda, nor the better organization of leisure time, nor the stronger emphasis on humanitarian principles in social relations can convince the religious person to give up the path representing truth and life to him. The contemporary believer will go to the club to hear an interesting lecture and to the conservatory for a concert, but the joys of going to church will still be of the highest value to him.

And there is something else I want to say. The spiritual curiosity which is expressed in an interest in Christian doctrine, church history, and the practice of religion is now a noticeable phenomenon in the USSR. This, however, frequently entails encounters with the ignorance of well-educated people in matters which are obviously connected with important aspects of our country's centuries-old culture.

I hope that my attempt at a historical and sociological analysis of the current status of the ROC will give the reader a better understanding of its place in the life and activity of the Soviet people.

#### Footnotes

1. The most objective Western information about religion can probably be found in the 1984 annual world report of the United Bible Societies, which puts the number of Orthodox Christians at 19.5 percent of the population of the USSR [4].

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### Where Does Religiosity End and Atheism begin?

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[Article by Vladislav Nikolayevich Sherdakov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor at the Institute of Scientific Atheism of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of the Social Sciences, and author of the books "Sotsialno-psikhologicheskii analiz khristianskoy morali" [Sociopsychological Analysis of Christian Morality] (1976), "Illyuziya dobra" [Illusion of Good] (1983), and "Dobro, Istina, Krasota" [Goodness, Truth, and Beauty] (1984). This is his first article for our journal]

[Text] The articles by the American theologian and the representative of the Russian Orthodox Church on the state of religiosity in our country are interesting for several reasons. Both authors comment on the results of the sociological research of Soviet atheistic scholars of religion, and the readers can therefore compare the opinions and assessments of these different sides. Another good reason for reading these articles is the recent noticeable increase in attempts to review our past history, including attempts at a more thorough explanation of the place and role of religion in the spiritual life of the people and in the national culture. These attempts are all the more valid because a onesided approach to this subject matter and somewhat tendentious explanations are still—we must admit—characteristic of our atheistic literature. Sometimes all of this arouses suspicions, and these can extend even to objective information. From this standpoint, it is completely justifiable that space in the journal was offered to religious ideologists. Finally, the articles will provide a reason for discussing current problems in atheistic propaganda and the impermissibility of vulgar atheism.

We will discuss these matters later, but first we should take a look at the disagreement of the sides with regard to the number of believers in the Soviet Union. Whereas our sociologists, it seems to me, make every effort not to overstate the figure, Fletcher is obviously overestimating the number. The greatest paradox is that he uses the data of Soviet researchers but then arrives at a truly astronomical figure with the aid of some simple calculations, asserting that there are 115 million believers in the USSR—i.e., 45 percent of the population. The implausibility of this figure is obvious to the specialist and to any person living in the Soviet Union. Of course, Fletcher's excuse could be the occasional understatements (what Father Innokentiy calls "padding in reverse") of the number of believers and the shortage of glasnost, which always creates a favorable atmosphere for lies and exaggeration (incidentally, most of the corrections of Fletcher's computations by his opponent seem correct, primarily because Father Innokentiy bases his figures on his own observations and sees many processes from within). It seems to me, however, that something else is the main thing. Although Fletcher asserts that "Soviet

sociology still has not answered the central question about the number of believers in the country" and blames this on the unreliability of the empirical materials used by the Soviet scholars of religion, on their flawed research tools, on the lack of strong investigative traditions, and on the immaturity of the field, he cannot fail to acknowledge all of the complexity of the term "believer." This has been the subject of many works (in particular, the extremely interesting article by F.N. Ilyasov in the last issue of SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, where the author substantiates his position with methodical precision and with a thorough knowledge of his subject [4]), but there is no unanimous opinion on the matter, not even in American literature.

Of course, the genuinely religious person in any country, regardless of his religion, is unlikely to call himself a non-believer. But the opposite is completely possible, and people can have the most diverse motives for calling themselves believers. This possibility is not excluded even in our society, where atheists constitute the majority. Some young adults, for example, call themselves religious out of a desire for non-conformity and a wish to set themselves apart and to challenge the majority. Sometimes a person calls himself a believer because of an injustice committed by an official or by his social group. Another motive might be the crudity of atheistic propaganda, which frequently does not achieve its goals and even arouses sympathy for religion and the desire to dissociate oneself from primitive atheism. We will return to this matter later. Here we will simply note that our atheistic propaganda literature is usually inferior to religious philosophical literature. The latter is often much more meaningful and interesting and is even less dogmatic.

Sympathy, of course, is not enough to qualify as religiosity. If the wish to believe stays on the "surface" on the consciousness and makes essentially no changes in the person, it is not enough to qualify as faith. Furthermore, religiosity cannot be confined to the mere acknowledgment of a supreme being. It also entails the performance of certain rituals. On the other hand, participation in these rituals in itself is not enough to qualify the person as a believer. For example, Soviet researchers have noted that the predominance of Islam in Central Asia for centuries made many religious rites so common that they became confused with customs in the public mind. They are still part of the traditional lifestyle and are observed even by many non-believers [5]. And would it be possible for Fletcher, in the United States, to calculate how many of those in our country who call themselves believers and regularly attend church (or the mosque, the synagogue, etc.) actually perform their religious obligations mechanically and formally, because of tradition or habit and because it is the right and expected thing to do?

Besides this, Fletcher includes the people with doubts, the vacillators, among the believers in the USSR. In line with this, he should also include people who are superstitious or believe in omens. It is also wrong to say that

people are religious if they do not share the belief in the immortal soul. The decline of this belief unavoidably destroys the main pillar of religion and leads directly to atheism. In short, if the American theologian had taken all of these circumstances into account, he would have had to revise his calculations of the number of believers in the USSR, calculations he made from so far away, and probably would also have to radically reduce the group of those who can be described unconditionally as true believers in the United States.

Of course, it is just as difficult to calculate the number of non-believers, and the Western authors who deliberately misrepresent the current level of religiosity in our country make extensive use of this difficulty.

The phenomenon of mass atheism is often ascribed to the authoritarian methods of struggle against institutionalized religion and the militant, pervasive, and overpowering atheistic propaganda. Is this a satisfactory explanation?

The history of many nationalities testifies that administrative penalties, persecution, and religious restrictions usually do not produce the anticipated results. And the reason is not just the fact that there are always people who are willing to suffer for their faith. It is the nature of the human being to sympathize with the persecuted and harassed. The Orthodox Church was unable to suppress the Old Believers' cult or Protestant sects, in spite of concerted administrative and ideological pressure. Bismarck also lost his fight with the church. What happened in our country? One of the main reasons for the transfer of broad segments of the population to the atheistic position was the revolutionary ideology. The old faith, which had been severely discredited, and mainly through the fault of the church hierarchy itself, was supplanted by a new faith, new hopes, new ideals, and new values. Atheistic propaganda met with a warm response precisely because the soil had been prepared for it—after all, the most powerful ideological machine can malfunction if the ideas it is spreading do not correspond to public attitudes.

I do not wish to deny, much less excuse, the incidents of repression and unjustifiable, unconstitutional administrative pressure or the use of crude forms of atheistic propaganda designed to insult believers. I would merely like to stress that these excesses were committed in an atmosphere of fierce class struggle and the subsequent "dizziness with success" and ideological fanaticism which, incidentally, has been common throughout the history of religion.

Religious intolerance—and the history of our country is no exception here either—sometimes took the form of hatred for believers, and especially for the clergy. Now the situation has changed radically. There has been a shift toward more rational judgments in the public mind. People are more likely to agree with the need for a historical approach to religion and to its role in the

development of the Russian government and culture. There is no question that this is a healthy process in general, corresponding to the ideological, moral, and legal standards of our society.

Obviously, recent changes provide no grounds for the discussion of a religious boom in the USSR. In contrast to Western sociologists, Father Innokentiy, who is able in general to view the situation objectively and who has first-hand knowledge of these matters, is not nurturing any such illusions. I cannot deny that it is difficult for an outsider to understand the complex and sometimes contradictory processes occurring in the spiritual life of our society today, but I must say quite frankly that a tendentious approach to religious issues and to the definition of religion's role and place in today's world is still characteristic of bourgeois Sovietologists. How many times, for example, have they announced the revival of religion, but where is it? New religious movements and groups usually do not last long, and the traditional churches are slowly but surely losing their strength.

One of the most important concerns of our public is the preservation of the cultural heritage. The development of our past culture and of many art forms—painting, architecture, and music—was influenced by religious ideals, values, and beliefs. When a person rejects the mystical aspects of religion, he cannot and should not deny this spiritual heritage. Seeing an icon only as a picture of a saint or a church only as a place of religious worship is just as wrong as it is harmful. We have already paid a high price for this attitude. Our losses, including moral ones, have been huge and have hurt many people. And it is precisely the fact that the church never rejected the values of our traditional national culture that now arouses some sympathy for religion. I repeat, sympathy, but not religiosity! For the Armenian people, for example, religion and the church served for centuries as one way of preserving their national uniqueness. The Armenians' respect for Echmiadzin, it seems to me, reflects an acknowledgement of this fact more than religiosity (Fletcher clearly does not make this distinction in his discussion of the matter). The Russian non-believers have a strong sense of "love for their fathers' graves," the reverence of which has always been taught by the church. There were many angry responses to an article once published in one of the central newspapers, telling of the intolerable neglect of a national shrine—the graves of monks Peresvet and Osl'yabya, heroes of the Battle of Kulikovo.

The present sympathy for religion also reflects an awareness of the shortage of spirituality, which, as we know, is not the same as education. Although religion frequently played a purely negative role in our history, it served not only as a justification for an unjust order but also as a universally acceptable form of spiritual life for centuries, representing, in K. Marx' words, "the heart of a heartless world, ...the soul of soulless orders"[1].

Although we agree with Father Innokentiy's statement that the Russian culture and the axiological views of the people were influenced by the Orthodox religion, we should add that the essence of this culture was not determined solely by Byzantine Orthodoxy, because, in the final analysis, religion is a derivative of public life, and not vice versa. A distinctive religious consciousness was taking shape in the masses for centuries in Rus, before and after the adoption of Christianity, and it manifested itself in the choice of certain religious doctrines. The people knew almost nothing about the gospels (and I do not mean just the Russian people), did not understand all of the subtleties of theology, and therefore had their own interpretation of "God's word." It would be difficult to deny the effects of religious ideals on the moral standards of believers, but this does not mean that only the religious person has high spiritual and moral qualities. It is true that we do hear the statement today that a believer will never act against his conscience. I think that Father Innokentiy would agree with me that this belief stems less from experience than from a lack of experience and from the substitution of some kind of ideal image of the believer for this experience. It would be just as wrong to think that our believers are prejudiced against atheists, against those who do not share their beliefs, as Fletcher asserts. This attitude is encountered only in fanatical members of Protestant sects. Father Innokentiy makes the accurate observation that Fletcher's assertions are rooted in the mental stereotypes typical of many Americans ("Only the believer can be moral"). Even L.N. Tolstoy was already admitting in "The Confession" that "wisdom, integrity, honesty, kindness, and morality were more likely to be found in acknowledged non-believers" [6]. But sometimes the abandonment of religion leads to a preoccupation with hedonistic pleasures, conspicuous consumption, and a disregard for the highest values in life. This variety of non-belief, which is common in the West, has little in common with Marxist atheism.

The current changes in the attitude toward religion do not mean that the struggle between the ideologies of religion and of dialectical materialism is over, but that the excesses and extremes of this struggle in the past—and, unfortunately, even in the present at times—have been surmounted. The position of atheism was only weakened by, in particular, the article "Flirting with God" in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA last July by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences I.A. Kryvelev. Reproaching outstanding Soviet writers V. Bykov, V. Astafyev, and Ch. Aytmatov for seeking truth in religion, the author was not fastidious in his choice of words, which were, to put it mildly, crude and tactless. The philosophical and ethical content of the article could not stand up to criticism either. I can testify that most experts on religion disagree vehemently with Kryvelev. As far as the religious themes in the works of modern artists are concerned, I would not reject them outright. It is true that the moral quests that are quite understandable in this difficult time in our history sometimes lead

to the acceptance of religious ideals. It would be completely wrong, however, to judge these quests in the same terms used by V.I. Lenin to describe the deviations from Marxist philosophy by Bazarov, Bogdanov, and Lunacharskiy after the failure of the first Russian revolution. These judgments, which referred to specific ideals under specific circumstances ("inexpressible loathesomeness," "ideological necrophilia," etc.), were mechanically applied to a completely different historical situation by Kryvelev. When V.I. Lenin's words (from a letter to A.M. Gorkiy), "I *cannot* and will not talk to people who allow themselves to preach the unification of scientific socialism with religion" [2, p 343], are held up as a general principle, this is nothing other than a distortion and misrepresentation of Lenin's ideas. After all, a few lines later he writes that he is willing to discuss general matters—party matters—with the same people (Bogdanov, Bazarov, and Lunacharskiy). Because Lenin was mainly concerned in those years with keeping philosophical disputes from hurting party work, he tried to separate "this fight from the faction" [3, p 338] (he was referring to the Bolshevik faction).

It is also wrong—from the standpoint of the scientific and Marxist-Leninist indoctrination of the masses—to present such onesided and categorical ideological analyses of the debates of our day on matters of history and culture as Ye. Losoto does in the article "Into Oblivion" (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 22 May 1987). Frankly, the misinterpretations in this article cannot do anything to strengthen our ideological position. The assertion, for example, that the concept of two cultures is contrary to the concept of a national culture oversimplifies and eviscerates the Marxist-Leninist teachings about the dialectical relationship between class and general human values and between international and national features, ignores the principled position V.I. Lenin took in his fight with the "Proletarian Culture" organization, and denies the existence of a people's culture, because people always have a nationality.

Apparently, we can safely assume that criticism of this kind does not strengthen atheistic convictions as much as it stimulates an interest in religion at a time when it is already a thing of the past for many people. It is interesting that those who talk about the positive role of religion frequently reveal almost complete ignorance in matters of dogma and church history. Even those who talk about the "Ten Commandments" can rarely name more than three or four. The ten commandments of Moses are often thought to be evangelical or Christian principles recorded in the New Testament.

Indicators are not the only important consideration in the study of the state of religiosity. Sometimes an extremely significant trend can be discerned from seemingly unimpressive data. Father Innokentiy says that more middle-aged people and young adults have attended church services in recent years. This important fact is corroborated by other evidence. We could even agree with the Orthodox theologian that the acceptance

of faith today is not connected directly with the level of education. This is more likely to be the result of the ideological and moral unrest of some young adults, their rejection of the experience of older generations, and their dissatisfaction with themselves and their lives. Obviously, the further reinforcement and development of atheism will depend primarily not on the methods of atheistic indoctrination (although they are also important), but on the progress in the reorganization of all spheres of life in our society. Atheism will win a complete victory only when relations between people have been improved and when the majority of non-believers are distinguished by a high level of spirituality and morality.

We cannot and should not strive to surmount religious feelings by force, not to mention "eradicate" them, as the matter is frequently described in the West. Communists have always viewed the problem of religion within the context of their main goal of building a new society. We cannot agree with the Enlightenment thinkers, the proponents of rationalism, or, for instance, English 20th-century philosopher B. Russell, who describe religion as the main enemy of social and moral progress. Marxists point to deeper causes impeding human progress. It does not make any sense to make ideological and political enemies of the leading religious organizations supporting social reforms and expressing agreement with the main goals of our domestic and foreign policy. On the contrary, believers and non-believers should be united in a common cause—the revolutionary reorganization of life in our country. It is our opponents, both the true believers and those who take shelter under the banner of religion, that are counting on alienation and enmity for religious reasons.

In conclusion, I would like to stress once again that the diverging views of the two Christian theologians—American and Orthodox—is important and far from meaningless to Marxists. These diverging views stem from their different sociopolitical outlooks, and not only from their methods of calculating and describing the level of religiosity in our country.

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#### Management Presupposes Education

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[Article by Galina Georgiyevna Sillaste, candidate of philosophical sciences, secretary of the Section for Sociological Research and Public Opinion Analysis of the CPES Central Committee Ideological Commission, and author of the book "Mysli i dela molodezhi" [Thoughts and Actions of Youth] and of the article in our journal "Reinforcing the Connection Between Party and Sociological Work" (1985, No 3)]

[Text] The decree of the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum "On the Perestroika and Personnel Policy" says: "Administrative personnel, the party aktiv, and all communists should perform indoctrinational work daily" [1]. The observance of this general requirement presupposes, in our opinion, the accomplishment of several specific tasks. This is suggested by the results of public opinion polls conducted in republic labor collectives in 1985 and 1986 (according to a program drawn up by M. Titma and G. Sillaste). At this time, 289 people from seven rayons in Estonia were surveyed. Around 43.7 percent of the respondents were party committee secretaries and the heads of ministries and departments; 16.8 percent were party committee officials; 39.5 percent were the directors of industrial, transport, and communications enterprises and chairmen of kolkhozes and sovkhozes; 45.7 percent were under the age of 30. Most of the respondents (51 percent) had occupied their last administrative position for 1-5 years, and 38 percent had occupied it for 10 years or more.

The purpose of the survey was to determine the exact impact of the measures envisaged in the CPSU Central Committee decree of 30 July 1984 "On the Participation of Administrative Personnel in the Estonian SSR in Political Indoctrinational Work with the Laboring Public" [2]; to decide whether the attitudes of administrative personnel toward political indoctrination work had changed and whether these changes had helped to broaden forms of communication with low-level collectives; to analyze the potential of the news media to mold competent public opinion on economic and sociopolitical issues of vital importance.

Judging by the results, the communication of administrators with low-level collectives had been expanded perceptibly, channels of political work with the masses grew more diverse, and the news and propaganda media were used on a broader scale. The most effective measures, in the opinion of the majority of respondents (82 percent), were those intended to improve the ideological and theoretical training of administrators and their knowledge of current sociopolitical affairs and to guarantee that more attention would be paid to the complaints and requests of laborers. In this context, it is significant that when administrative personnel were interviewed in 1984, they made several critical remarks about the slow and inefficient work of party organizations to disclose current problems. Now the situation has improved considerably.

Around 68 percent of the respondents spoke of positive changes in the struggle against abuses of professional status for personal gain and in the hiring and placement of personnel. As for the development of criticism and self-criticism, the encouragement of vigilance and counterpropaganda in labor collectives, work with youth, the reinforcement of discipline in production, and the struggle against alcohol abuse, there has been no perceptible change for the better yet in these spheres of administrative activity. The elimination of shortcomings in these fields today, now that the renewal of social life and the reorganization of party work and personnel policy are picking up speed, seems even more fundamental and essential. The development of criticism and self-criticism warrants special attention. This field of work is directly connected with the attitude toward the complaints and observations of laborers, the improvement of hiring and placement practices, the struggle against the abuses of professional status, and the encouragement of political vigilance.

Several of the proposals made at the time of the survey have already been implemented. Judging by our data, for example, the Estonian television program "Forum" is quite popular with the public and the administrators themselves. The speakers include officials from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, the republic Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet Presidium, representatives of state committees and ministries, and prominent experts.

Another innovation based on the suggestions made in past surveys is the appearance of the permanent rubrics "Questions Asked on Political Day," "We Answer Questions on Political Day," "We Answer Your Questions," and others in city and rayon newspapers.

At the time of the last survey (1986) we tried to learn the views of the administrators of industrial enterprises on the proper degree of participation in ideological and political-indoctrinational work. Most of the respondents (60 percent) associated it with "a personal example, worthy of emulation, of concern for people's problems," 50 percent associated it with meetings, speeches, talks on

political subjects, and the constant supervision of the progress in completing plan assignments, and 40 percent associated it with propaganda and lectures. Nevertheless, many still underestimate the role of the administrator in the improvement of socialist competition and the establishment of the best possible conditions for the rest and recreation of enterprise personnel.

As for the immediate political duties of administrators, here communication with workers and with labor collectives was expanded perceptibly. As the data in Table 1 testify, administrative personnel are taking a more active part in political days and open letter days and are issuing more statements to the press than before. It is interesting that speakers were persuaded to reorient themselves from large (official, so to speak) audiences to small ones. In 1986 there was an increase of more than 13 percent in the number of administrators who said that meetings with brigade, shop, and section collectives had become an essential element of their work. This reorientation is particularly important because 42 percent of the primary party organizations in the republic are small.

**Table 1. The Use of New and Traditional Forms of Communication with Workers by Administrators, percentages**

Forms of communication	Used only last year	Used long enough to become a tradition
Regular conferences	7.4	78.9
Private appointments	5.4	83.6
Appointments with deputies	12.4	37.2
Meetings and talks in the workplace	10.1	81.5
Attendance of party meetings	7.0	87.6
Participation in political day	14.1	77.2
Participation in open letter day	11.4	18.4
Statements in the press	16.8	35.9
Statements on radio	7.0	15.8
Appearances on television	6.7	12.1

There are more frequent meetings with youth—upper-classmen, VUZ students, and members of student construction teams and school squads working on kolkhozes and sovkhoses in the summer. In 1985 there were just over 400 such meetings, and the next year there were already around 800. Public opinion polls conducted at 17 enterprises in Narva and in Kalininskiy and Morskoy rayons in Tallin (1,119 people were surveyed, with workers representing 81 percent, engineering and technical personnel representing 16 percent, and employees

representing 3 percent. The sample group was formed with the aid of quotas) showed that workers appreciated the participation of administrative personnel in political undertakings such as republic political days. Around 50 percent of the respondents working for industrial enterprises in Narva and around 35 percent of the respondents in Kalininskiy Rayon in Tallin believed that the speeches made by administrators on political day are an important channel of current and relevant information. The number of administrators participating regularly in political days (in virtually all of them) increased by 14 percent over a single year. Furthermore, the speakers now represent a much more diverse group. Since 1986 the propaganda and agitation department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia has had an informational propaganda group consisting of ministers and their deputies, department and administration chiefs, and senior specialists. Their participation in political explanatory work, including the political days, is the responsibility of the party organizations of ministries and departments.

Although this mass political measure is quite popular, some disturbing tendencies cannot be ignored. The acknowledgement of the high effectiveness of political days (by 68 percent) has been accompanied by the more frequent expression of other opinions: "Political days as they are conducted in our collective are not completely worthwhile," "They were useful once, but now they are not," etc. Specific shortcomings are cited: "People who read their speeches without taking their eyes off their notes" (33 percent); "The fear of frank discussion and bold answers to the questions of the collective" (32 percent); "The inability to speak plainly and comprehensibly" (23 percent). One out of every four respondents mentioned the "speaker's lack of personal conviction with regard to what he is promoting and to what he is advising"; "the inability to speak to large groups or hold people's interest"; "the speaker who repeats well-known cliches without giving them his own interpretation."

The validity of these statements is corroborated by the administrators themselves, who said that the main difficulties they encounter in their political work with personnel are their lack of experience and skill in public speaking and inadequate knowledge of the interests and distinctive features of various population groups (34 percent). Many complained of a lack of time. On the average, 50 percent of the administrators spend up to 3 hours a week on their immediate political duties (speeches, meetings with personnel, participation in elected bodies, and propaganda and lectures), and the rest spend more than 3 hours, including 10 percent who spend from 7 to 10 hours (around 5 percent devoted no time at all to this work). Of course, these are extremely relative figures: No one carries a "chronometer of political activity" in his pocket, but the party instructions on the daily participation of administrators in indoctrinational work suggest that they must schedule their time carefully to avoid breaches of their regular communication with others.

As the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Perestroika and on Party Personnel Policy" says, in several fields "changes are entailing great difficulties. The mechanism inhibiting socioeconomic development was built up over many years and is taking a long time to dismantle. Conservatism, inertia, and obsolete thinking have not lost their strength and influence yet" [1].

Our studies (in 1986) confirmed that the collectives in which perestroika is in full swing are still few in number. In the opinion of most workers, the perestroika has already had perceptible results, however negligible they might be. In some collectives, however, "everything is settled in the old way" and people "are waiting for recommendations 'from above' before embarking on the perestroika themselves" (see Table 2). It is indicative that the opinions of workers coincide to a considerable extent with the assessments of administrators.

Table 2. Assessments of Progress in Perestroika in Labor Collectives, percentage of respondents

Assessments	Narva; N=322	Kalininskiy Rayon; N=456	Volta Plant; N=90	Baltic Textile Production Association; N=90	Avtotrans Production Association; N=231	Narva (enterprise managers); N=60
Perestroika has produced substantial results	11	10	2	14	11	13
Perestroika has produced insignificant results	30	66	59	64	52	51
Virtually no changes yet, all decisions made in old way	31	19	37	19	21	18
Work on perestroika will begin as soon as recommendations have been issued "from above"	20	5	2	3	16	15

There is no question that the presence of advanced and underdeveloped enterprises in the sample group must be taken into account. The range of opinions reflects the inner contradictions and the difficulties of the struggle between old and new. At the same time, this provides important information about the necessary activity of enterprise managers and party and social organizations. The perestroika and renewal presuppose an indissoluble connection between economic management and indoctrinational work in the collective. After all, what is the most obvious sign of the weak influence of ideological indoctrinational work in production today? According to these surveys, 68 percent of the managers encounter a lack of initiative in people and a lack of desire to work as hard as possible; 50 percent encounter indifference or the refusal to "agonize" over common causes; 34 percent encounter a wish to continue living in the old way, without any changes, and the fear of making independent decisions. Some respondents (18 percent) spoke of the declining prestige of the manager among subordinates, and some mentioned the inability of party organizations and the administration to educate people properly. All of these are among the factors impeding the perestroika.

Party organizations and communists have been instructed "to take additional measures to expand glasnost, develop criticism and self-criticism, particularly criticism from below, and use this tried and tested weapon to instill personnel with a sense of intolerance for shortcomings and healthy dissatisfaction with past achievements" [1]. Unfortunately, the results of this study indicated that one out of every three workers has seen no changes yet in the attitude toward criticism in his collective. People are still being harassed for criticism, and some managers, especially those who frequently exceed their authority, still have trouble accepting criticism.

In the opinion of most workers, the main ways of improving collective work consist in the augmentation of personal responsibility, the development of heightened concern for others, and the reinforcement of personal discipline (see Table 3). It is interesting that managers and workers are unanimous in their assessment of concern for people and the observance of technological regulations. There was some disagreement, however. Administrators placed more emphasis on the reorganization of their style of work and on personal responsibility and discipline. Managers were more likely than the rank and file to mention such factors as the conservation of resources and materials, the elimination of negative work habits, and the improvement of the moral and psychological climate in the collective.

Table 3. Percentage Distribution of Respondents' Opinions on Main Ways of Improving Work in Collectives

Methods	Kalininskiy Rayon (N=456)	Volta Plant (N=90)	Baltic Textile Production Association (N=90)	Narva workers (N=322)	Narva enterprise managers (N=60)
Stronger personal responsibility	78	88	66	58	90
More concern for people	58	55	56	49	48
Unconditional observance of rules	48	45	49	38	48
Fewer interruptions in work	39	64	29	37	43
Better use of equipment	34	43	24	26	55
Conservation of resources and materials	29	44	28	25	28
Strict observance of technological regulations	29	46	27	19	30
Active struggle against negative behavior	27	26	29	21	45
Better moral and psychological climate in collective	25	19	33	34	50

The remarks about managers' attitudes toward people's needs were striking. Almost 70 percent of the workers believed that the most typical situation was one in which managers "might listen to the complaints of workers but usually take no action," and the rest said that many managers "worry about the plan but rarely think about people's needs" and "pay no attention at all to the complaints and suggestions of the workers in the collective."

Here it would be helpful to cite the data of another study we conducted at the end of 1986 in the Tallinavtotrans Production Association (we surveyed 231 people, and 80 percent of them were workers, 9 percent were engineering and technical personnel, 9 percent were subdivision managers, and 2 percent were employees; the survey

topic was glasnost in the labor collective). In particular, we learned that although 75 percent of the respondents admit that their managers usually grant workers private appointments and listen to their complaints, this is frequently all that they do about them. Besides this, the working conditions and, in particular, the personal and leisure conditions at industrial enterprises in the republic leave much to be desired. Only 33 percent of the respondents called them good, 20 percent called them bad, and the rest described them as satisfactory. Unfortunately, this is more likely to be the rule than the exception. This is why we must make an earnest effort to implement the decisions of the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which say that "the ability to solve social problems correctly, to create favorable conditions for the highly productive labor of people and for their living and personal comfort, and to establish a

creative atmosphere of inquiry in collectives are essential criteria of the political and business maturity of any manager" [1].

In conclusion I would like to mention another important matter discussed in the public opinion polls—the election of managerial personnel. The current situation is a contradictory one. On the one hand, workers are not kept informed of transfers, dismissals, and appointments of managers (particularly mid-level management or higher) at their own enterprise or association and usually learn about them after the fact. The opinion of the collective is rarely considered when a manager is appointed (more than 70 percent of the workers said that this was not done at their enterprise). On the other hand, the idea of electing managers on all levels (from the link or brigade leader to the director of the enterprise or association) has not won complete support. It is indicative that most workers believe it is necessary for them to elect a brigade leader or foreman and to discuss their candidacy in the collective, but in the case of shop chiefs the votes "for" and "against" election were equal in number. As for the highest administrative link of the enterprise, two-thirds of the respondents said that these appointments should be made "from above."

Obviously, we do not wish to absolutize our findings, but our study did prove that regular public opinion surveys can be of great practical value in monitoring the progress of the reorganization of ideological work on the local level. They help to extend the sociological approach to the ideological indoctrination work of party organizations, provide an accurate picture of the real situation, and allow for the timely adjustment of the ideological process.

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#### More Rational Consumption: Typological Approach

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[Article by Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Ovsyannikov, candidate of economic sciences, department head at the Automation and Electromechanics Scientific Research Institute of the Tomsk Automated Control Systems and Radioelectronics Institute, and author of the articles in our journal "Differences in Consumer Behavior" (1982, No 3) and "Interrelationship of Labor and Consumption: Experiment in Typological Analysis" (1984, No 1)]

[Text] The accepted concept of planning practices based on the determination of consumption standards presupposes the achievement of these standards by producing

goods at higher speed and in larger quantities. The flaws of this concept are obvious, because the aims of actual consumer behavior differ from those recorded in the standards [1, 2]. Another sign of the alienation of normative theory from the conditions of the exchange of goods and money and the distribution of goods and services is the tendency of the normative approach to view the society as a homogeneous group of individuals.

Existing differences in the needs of laborers and their families, however, lead to differences in consumption. For this reason, plans should be based on forecasts of consumer behavior and the standards of truly rational or reasonable consumption. Furthermore, these standards should not be handed down "from above," but should represent consumer priorities under certain conditions of distribution and exchange. The construction of the mechanism to regulate consumer behavior necessitates: 1) the definition of types of consumers; 2) the assessment of the rationality of consumption patterns; 3) the assessment of methods of influencing the consumer.

We will discuss each of these points in detail with the aid of the information accumulated during a 1983 study of the standard of living in Tomsk.<sup>1</sup>

The use of the method described in [2, 3] aided in distinguishing between nine types (or groups) of consumers, whose social characteristics are presented in Table 1. The families of the *first type* are mainly the families of trade workers. A distinctive feature of this group is relatively low income and an extremely high level of physical property ownership. The *second type* includes the families of employees and engineering and technical personnel in industry, construction, and transportation. They have a low income level and an average amount of property. The *third group* consists of young families headed by workers of average and low skill categories with little property but a relatively high income. The *fourth type* is distinguished by high income and considerable physical property; these are primarily the families of highly skilled workers. The *fifth type* consists of the families of engineering and technical personnel and employees occupying managerial positions. The amount of property they own is slightly higher than the average but their income is relatively low. The *sixth type* consists of the families of students and retired individuals. Indicators of income and property are low in this group. The *seventh group* includes the families of workers of low and average skills with an average income and an average amount of property. The *eighth group* consists of the families of members of the intelligentsia with a high level of material comfort and income. Finally, the *ninth type* of consumers are also the families of intellectuals, but of young ones, with a low income and level of material comfort.

Table 1. Main Indicators of Types of Consumers

Type of consumer	Monthly per capita income, in rubles	Amount of property, in thousands of rubles per family	Skilled workers	Social categories, percentages				Sectors of national economy, percentages				Percentage of people with secondary specialized or higher education
				Workers of low and average skills	Students	Retired individuals	Production managers and organizers	Industry, construction, transportation	Trade	Education, culture, science, health	Administration	
I	115.6	13.9	27.2	72.8	4.9	8.5	17.4	42.0-	31.3	18.6	1.0	19.0
II	96.3	3.8	32.8	67.2	1.7	0.5	17.9	41.4-	21.4	30.2	4.6	55.8
III	131.5	0.9	13.3	86.7	2.3	1.7	4.8	85.9-	1.2	12.0	0.0	20.2
IV	133.5	11.0	44.1	55.9	6.7	6.4	7.5	78.4-	11.8	7.4	0.7	25.8
V	98.3	5.0	34.5	66.5	8.3	13.5	30.7	47.5-	10.3	38.4	1.4	59.7
VI	74.3	0.5	0.0	0.0	68.7	17.8	4.7	18.1-	9.0	9.0	0.0	13.1
VII	108.9	2.3	28.9	71.1	3.9	7.0	6.7	69.7-	11.3	2.4	0.9	20.9
VIII	130.6	11.6	39.9	60.1	6.2	12.5	39.8-	26.9	7.6	60.3	0.0	67.6
IX	92.7	1.9	12.3	87.7	7.6	5.1	20.3	20.9-	22.9	52.8	2.6	59.9
Sample group as a whole	108.0	4.9	27.9	66.0	10.3	7.3	15.1	57.8-	14.6	22.6	1.7	38.5

A typological analysis of the sample group revealed its division into five types of behavior (see Table 2).

Table 2. Annual Family Expenditure Patterns Depending on Type of Consumption, percentages

Expenditure items	Total sample group	Type of consumption				
		A	B	C	D	E
Non-commodity expenditures	20.5	39.2	20.1	17.0	14.7	23.3
Food	36.4	30.2	34.2	36.6	51.4	38.8
Alcoholic beverages	16.6	12.6	3.7	26.1	16.1	8.8
Clothing and footwear	12.7	8.5	17.0	10.5	9.0	13.5
Durable consumer goods	1.6	1.7	3.2	0.7	0.9	1.8
Furniture	3.4	3.7	11.6	2.4	1.9	2.3
Jewelry	3.4	2.1	5.0	2.9	3.1	4.3
Transportation	3.6	0.0	3.6	0.5	1.7	5.8
Other	1.8	2.0	1.6	3.3	1.2	1.4

The typological model of consumption [2, 3] presented in Table 3 suggests the following. The most common expenditure patterns are characteristic of types D and E (respectively, 56 percent and 31 percent of the consumers). These patterns include high expenditures on food, relatively low expenditures on alcohol, and a low level of non-commodity spending—i.e., expenditures on services, recreation, and travel. The expenditure patterns of type B could be regarded as a model of future consumption, now characteristic of only 5 percent of the families, mainly belonging to the fourth and eighth consumer categories (18 percent and 17 percent respectively). The appearance of type C, in our opinion, is a form of a disappearing form of behavior: It is distinguished by

an extremely low level of spending but substantial expenditures on food and alcoholic beverages. The families of workers of low skill categories (13 percent) and families of the first type (15 percent) base their behavior on these expenditure patterns.

Furthermore, the differences between consumer families and the equalization of expenditure patterns attest to a weak connection between demand and consumption: The population is still being given little chance to satisfy its demands. The lack of correspondence between supply and demand leads to uniformity in consumption. There is also another side of the matter: The significant differences between families as consumers, on the one hand,

and the negligible differences in their behavior, on the other, serve as an indirect yardstick of the correspondence of degrees of labor and consumption. The distinctive features of types of consumers due to the

nature and content of their labor and the demographic characteristics of families presuppose differences in consumption, but experiments did not reveal any such differences.

**Table 3. Typological Model of Consumption (Line Distribution)**

Type of consumer	Type of consumption					Percentage of families
	A	B	C	D	E	
I	0.03	0.07	0.15	0.47	0.28	6.5
II	0.0	0.03	0.02	0.49	0.45	18.1
III	0.0	0.02	0.01	0.91	0.06	9.8
IV	0.02	0.18	0.04	0.21	0.56	16.3
V	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.46	0.43	16.5
VI	0.0	0.0	0.01	0.98	0.01	6.7
VII	0.0	0.03	0.13	0.61	0.23	15.6
VIII	0.0	0.17	0.08	0.42	0.33	0.9
IX	0.0	0.02	0.04	0.83	0.11	9.7
Percentage of families	3.0	5.0	5.0	56.0	31.0	100

The evaluation of the rationality of consumption patterns presupposes their comparison to some kind of "model." We used the actual consumption patterns of families (in each consumer category) which did not

change with a rise in income as this model. The "normative" income levels and normative expenditure patterns are presented in Table 4.

**Table 4. Normative Expenditure Patterns for Each Consumer Category per Family per Year, percentages**

Expenditure items	Type of consumer									Total sample group
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	
Non-commodity	30.4	23.3	19.2	25.3	30.6	18.4	23.8-	24.5	35.9	26.7
Food	31.0	34.9	50.1	35.0	39.8	51.8	37.2-	31.0	35.7	35.3
Alcoholic beverages	3.3	3.6	7.2	2.3	2.9	7.1	6.1	2.1-	2.5	3.3
Clothing and footwear	18.1	20.0	16.0	14.5	11.5	15.7	16.9-	13.2	15.8	15.1
Durable goods	1.2	2.0	0.6	6.5	7.0	2.4	2.2	8.0	4.1-	7.2
Furniture	8.2	3.8	2.6	6.5	5.3	0.0	1.8	5.0-	2.6	4.5
Jewelry	2.0	1.7	1.8	1.4	0.0	1.0	1.2	3.0-	0.7	1.1
Transportation	3.2	8.0	0.0	5.7	0.0	0.0	9.0-	10.0	0.0	4.2
Other	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.8	2.9	3.6	1.8	3.2-	2.7	2.7
"Normative" income level (rubles per person per month)*	180.0	150.0	200.0	200.0	170.0	150.0	180.0-	220.0	190.0	190.0

\* The "normative" levels were determined by categorizing the families in terms of income within each consumer category and comparing the expenditure patterns of income groups. Our assessments are close to those of N.M. Rimashevskaya, who believed that a monthly income of 200 rubles per person was the minimum permitting a relatively free choice of goods and services [4, p 231].

The central task of rationalizing consumption consists in determining methods of socioeconomic influence and the consequences of this influence from the standpoint of changes in consumption patterns. We can cite some data on changing expenditures (coefficients of elasticity) in response to changes in retail prices and income. The

coefficients were calculated with a regressive model showing the dependence of expenditures on income and prices.

The coefficient of elasticity indicates the change in expenditures (in percentage values) in response to a change of 1 percent in prices (Table 5) and income (Table 6).

**Table 5. Coefficients of Price Elasticity of Expenditures**

Type of family	Expenditure items						
	Food	Alcoholic beverages	Clothing and footwear	Durable goods	Jewelry	Transportation	Furniture
Total sample group	1.08	-0.64	0.86	-1.75	1.91	-2.91	2.84
Families of employees and engineering and technical personnel (I, II)	1.03	0.27	0.45	-4.46	2.93	2.11	2.85
Young families (III, IX)	0.80	-0.41	0.46	-2.54	0.80	-1.01	-1.02
Families of intelligentsia (VIII)	1.02	1.19	0.48	-0.51	1.91	2.02	2.78
Families of managerial employees (V)	1.10	0.70	1.11	0.19	2.01	2.22	2.71
Families of workers (IV, VII)	1.15	-1.01	0.80	-3.33	2.11	3.01	2.19
Families of retired individuals and students (VI)	0.68	0.42	0.41	-0.01	0.12	-0.08	0.01

The consumption patterns of retired individuals are stable and depend little on changes in prices or income. The most sensitive in this respect are young families and the families of workers. The behavior of

consumers planning expenditures on jewelry and durable goods is "non-classic" (with respect to the observance of Engels' laws): Expenditures on these rise when prices rise.

**Table 6. Coefficients of Income Elasticity of Expenditures**

Type of family	Expenditure items						
	Food	Alcoholic beverages	Clothing and footwear	Durable goods	Jewelry	Transportation	Furniture
Total sample group	-0.23	1.34	1.01	1.19	1.15	1.13	1.04
Families of employees and engineering and technical personnel (I, II)	-0.14	0.71	2.03	1.23	1.04	0.52	1.03
Young families (III)	0.03	1.42	2.05	1.44	0.05	0.48	1.95
Families of intelligentsia (VIII)	-1.10	1.02	1.81	1.14	2.11	2.56	2.02
Families of managerial employees (V)	0.08	0.60	1.06	0.91	1.73	1.70	1.68
Families of workers (IV, VII)	-0.20	1.77	1.12	2.11	1.80	2.91	2.01
Families of retired individuals and students (VI)	0.02	-0.06	0.04	0.32	-0.02	0.17	-0.06

Alcohol consumption increases as income rises: In the families of workers an increase of 1 percent in monetary income increases these expenditures by 1.77 percent (by 1.34 percent for the sample group as a whole). At the same time, calculations indicate that a rise of 1 percent in the prices of alcoholic beverages reduces expenditures on them by 0.64 percent for the population at large and by 1.01 percent for families of workers.

The low-income families of workers in the low skill categories, the families of employees, and young families needing goods for cultural and personal use have not saved enough money to buy them. Calculations indicate, however, that the reduction of the prices of durable goods by 1 percent increases the demand for them by 1.75 percent in the population at large, by 3.33 percent in the families of workers, and by 4.46 percent in the low-income families of employees and the intelligentsia. In this connection, it would be expedient to offer loans to young families for the acquisition of property and the construction of dwellings. Consumer credit opportunities should be broadened. In particular, it is time to stop restricting credit sales. The system of consumer prices should be revised. Projects of this kind are being considered (see, for example, [5]). The rationalization of national consumption is a social objective of special importance in connection with the work "to cultivate reasonable demands in the Soviet people and teach them the socialist culture of family life and leisure"[6]. Studies corroborate the realistic nature of this objective.

#### Footnotes

1. In this study 1,500 families were surveyed. The sample group consisted of three levels (the sector, the enterprise, and the occupational category, including students and retired individuals) and was based on quotas. Probable error did not exceed 10 percent for the majority of sample group characteristics.

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**Clients of Alcohol Abuse Treatment Center**  
*1806000i Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87 (signed to press 10 Jul 87) pp 79-81*

[Article by Valeriy Ivanovich Litvinov, candidate of juridical sciences, docent in Department of Criminal Procedure of Academy of USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, militia colonel, and author of the articles in our journal "Motivational Patterns of Group Juvenile Delinquency" (1983, No 2) and "Some Features of Mercenary Crime" (1987, No 1), and by Valeriy Petrovich Revin, candidate of juridical sciences, docent in Department of Crime Policy of the same academy, and militia lieutenant-colonel. This is his first article for our journal]

[Text] Although we are disgusted by the sight of militia officials trying to seat a citizen in a special medical service vehicle, we also find it comical. But there is nothing funny about it. A person is not taken to the alcohol abuse treatment center unless he is literally wallowing in drunkenness and unless it has become the norm in his life. Of course, not all of those who frequently have too much to drink end up in the alcohol abuse treatment center, but its clients provide some idea of the people making up the main bastion of alcohol abuse. This group is the object of close scrutiny today, now that alcohol abuse has gone underground and the symptoms of the illness are less noticeable.

Our study, conducted by the Academy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1983 and 1984, focused on people who were taken to the alcohol abuse treatment centers in Chernovtsy and Lvov oblasts (830 people in all). The majority (58.2 percent) were young people under the age of 30 (see Table 1). The following figures testify that young people are less able to handle liquor and are more likely to have a more flippant attitude toward drinking: One out of every five teenagers with a record for juvenile delinquency abuses alcohol. Three-fourths of these teenagers had their first and subsequent drinks in the parental home. There is no question that the absence of control on the part of the family increases the probability of deviant behavior. Judge for yourselves: Almost half of the people in the alcohol abuse treatment center either have no family (43.5 percent) or have lost contact with their families (6.5 percent).

The severity of the problem is compounded by the fact that the majority of those without families live in communal dwellings. As a rule, the strict rules and regulations of these institutions are rarely combined with equally strict adherence to moral standards. When the residents of several communal dwellings in Moscow, Lipetsk, and Chernovtsy oblasts were surveyed, from 25 to 30 percent of the young people regarded the daily consumption of alcoholic beverages as a necessary element of their free time. The people around them are just as indulgent, and many of them said that a bottle is a natural and essential part of leisure and communication, a means of relieving the boredom of everyday life and of lifting the spirits. Labor collectives also refuse to intervene. Around 56.2 percent of the respondents said that

their drunkenness had never been discussed at meetings, and even when it was discussed (in 39.6 percent of the cases), the reaction was purely formal.

From the socioprofessional standpoint, the citizens who are taken to the alcohol abuse treatment center present a quite diverse picture. Two groups are predominant: workers represent one group and retired and unemployed individuals represent the other (see Table 1). Most of the people in the latter category have completely gone to seed and require administrative rather than preventive measures. Some of the retired individuals also fit this description. Some of these were always reluctant to let go of the bottle, and now that they have "earned" a rest and are not bothered or threatened by anyone, they can finally drink to their heart's content.

Table 1. Sociodemographic Characteristics of Respondents

Social Status	Percentage	Age group	Percentage
Workers	54.7	14-17	3.6
Agricultural laborers	7.2	18-24	30.2
Engineering and technical personnel	5.7	25-30	23.4
Students in VUZ's and vocational and technical institutes	6.7	31-40	19.0
Retired and dependent individuals	10.0	41-50	14.9
People not engaged in socially useful labor	15.7	51 and over	8.9

Now for a few words about the workers. The high percentage of workers was due primarily to the fact that workers represent over 60 percent of the able-bodied population in the oblasts where the study was conducted. The ones in the alcohol abuse treatment centers were mainly (85 percent) unskilled and semiskilled laborers. Incidentally, almost half of the experts (district inspectors and personnel of alcohol abuse treatment centers) listed a low educational and cultural level as one of the main causes of alcohol abuse.

What we call labor-hardening also has the most direct impact. The majority of the people brought to the attention of the special medical services had been working less than 3 years—that is, these were people who, on the one hand, were experiencing the "stress" of adapting to production and the collective and, on the other, still did not have any firm career plans, a strong sense of social responsibility, or self-discipline. If the difficulties of socioprofessional adaptation are surmounted successfully, the danger of becoming a drunk decreases dramatically. For example, among the workers in the alcohol abuse treatment centers, 10.1 percent had been working from 3 to 5 years, 7.1 percent had been working from 5 to 10 years, and 4.1 percent had been working for more than 10 years.

The study revealed another extremely disturbing fact. There were few chronic alcoholics among the clients of the alcohol abuse treatment centers (see Table 2). One reason is that these people are sent for compulsory treatment. The majority of the individuals apprehended by the special medical services were drinking only for "relaxation" or to "christen" their bonus or salary.

Furthermore, most of the detainees (85.3 percent) were apprehended within a relatively short time period—between 6:00 p.m. and midnight. In other words, it was a short journey from the first drink to the "collapse." Another disturbing finding was that respondents experienced no difficulty in obtaining the alcohol or the money to pay for it. They simply paid for their drinks out of their wages or bonuses. When the liquor ran out, one out of every ten was able to obtain more under the counter in a store or restaurant. Most of the people in the alcohol abuse treatment center had been drinking vodka or cheap port (see Table 2). For this reason, the reduction of their production and sales will certainly help to eliminate the extreme and most dangerous forms of alcohol consumption.

Table 2. Some Characteristics of Alcoholic Beverage Consumption by Respondents

Motives and consequences of alcohol consumption	Percentages
Reasons	
"Christening" wages, bonuses, etc.	26.2
Birthday or family celebration	12.4
Holiday	8.8
Family problems	5.1
No special reason	47.5
Number of times in alcohol abuse treatment center	
First time	56.0
Second time	22.4

**Table 2. Some Characteristics of Alcoholic Beverage Consumption by Respondents**

Motives and consequences of alcohol consumption	Percentages
<b>Reasons</b>	
Third or fourth time	11.8
Repeated apprehensions as chronic alcoholic	9.8
<b>Methods of payment for alcohol and types of alcohol consumed</b>	
<b>Method of payment</b>	
Wages	57.5
Bonus	11.6
Borrowed money	8.6
Refunds on bottle deposits	1.4
Treated to drinks by others	20.9
<b>Type of alcohol consumed</b>	
Vodka	54.0
Wine	35.5
Brandy	6.0
Raw alcohol	1.5
Medicinal compounds	1.0
Home-brew	2.0

Many of the clients of the alcohol abuse treatment centers had a criminal record. Administrative action had been taken against 19.8 percent for petty hooliganism, many had been prosecuted (mainly for hooliganism, bodily assault, and theft), and 18.4 percent had committed infractions of the law at home. Incidentally, most of the latter are caused by alcohol abuse in the family—by one or both spouses. Experts were unanimous in this opinion. The close connection between alcohol abuse and crime was discovered long ago. Our study testifies that repeat offenders who abuse alcohol constitute a specific group of drunks. Preventive measures alone are unlikely to solve this problem. Finally, another fact warrants discussion. The sight of a citizen weaving his way down the street attracts the attention of other people than special medical personnel. The intoxicated person frequently becomes the victim of crime and facilitates the commission of criminal acts. According to our data, from 50 to 70 percent of all homicide, assault, and rape victims were in a state of intoxication. Thieves and muggers are also more likely to choose drunks as their targets: These were men in 45.8 percent of all cases, women in 25.6 percent, and juveniles in 10.6 percent.

Our study revealed one important fact. The respondents were aware of the social dangers of alcohol abuse. What is more, they believed that effective measures must be taken against those who abuse alcohol: They should be fined (this was the opinion of 34.2 percent of the respondents), their employers should be notified (21.1 percent), they should lose their extra month's salary or

bonus or have to take their vacation in winter (19.4 percent), they should be given an official warning (15.8 percent), or their names should be listed on bulletin boards and announced over loudspeakers at work (9.5 percent). As we can see, the possibility of severe penalties, including penalties against themselves, does not deter the most ardent fans of alcohol. We can draw two conclusions from this. First, that the measures taken should be different for different groups (depending on their social image, level of alcohol consumption, etc.). Second, that the social authority of moral and administrative-legal sanctions must be enhanced. This is particularly important today, now that the scales of the most abnormal forms of alcohol abuse have been reduced dramatically.

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#### **Marital Discord**

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[Article by Sergey Tikhonovich Agarkov, candidate of medical sciences, sex therapist, head of the neurosis division of the Central Moscow Oblast Clinical Psychiatric Hospital, and author of the monographs "Personal Sexual Pathology" (1983), "General Medical Issues of Therapeutic Practices" (1983), and "Neuroses and Sexual Disorders" (1985). This is his first article for our journal]

[Text] The negative social consequences of family crises are serious and multifaceted. They include divorces, difficulties in bringing up children, juvenile delinquency, an increase in alcoholism, an increase in borderline neuropsychological disorders, sexual dysfunction, psychosomatic illnesses (stomach ulcers, bronchial asthma, high blood pressure, neurodermatitis, and others), and even suicide attempts in some cases.

We must realize that the conflict-free existence of partners is not the ideal, much less the norm, in marriage. There is always some conflict in marriage. Some people feel that the only accurate yardstick of marital harmony is the subjective assessments of the partners, because people are the best judges of their own problems. We can agree with this point of view only with major reservations. We know of many cases in which irreconcilable enemies have formed a strong and quite happy union after a divorce. By the same token, the opposite situation is not uncommon either, in which a happy husband or wife discovers that his or her partner has been unfaithful for years and suddenly becomes aware of the gulf of misunderstandings and lies separating them.

Therefore, the diagnosis of marital discord, not to mention the correction of these situations, can be extremely difficult and complicated. There are two fundamental ways of shedding light on the secret of a happy marriage. The first consists in a lengthy study of the evolution of the relationship of a specific married couple, revealing the initial symptoms of subsequent crises, the embryonic phase of "family upheavals," and the causes of conflicts of different types and scales. Information of this kind is of indisputable interest for several reasons, but this approach is virtually impossible under the conditions of mass sociological research. Besides this, this kind of interference, however accurately it might be conducted, has a definite effect on the couple's relationship and changes its structure.

The other approach consists in comparative studies of happy and unhappy (i.e., conflict-, crisis-, or problem-ridden) families, with the necessary consideration of the interaction of social, psychological, physiological, and other factors. Isolated and onesided studies of individual characteristics of marriage (for example, the age or education of the partners, the number of children, the frequency of sexual relations, or the amount of housework done by the husband) produce information that is not only limited but is also fundamentally incorrect and distorted as far as the elements of marital happiness or discord are concerned.

The formalization of information about these elements is always a major problem. After all, marital harmony cannot be measured by the number of kisses within a specific time period, and common interests cannot be measured by the number of bound volumes in the family library. One of the researchers who used this method and divided harmony into five components—material, cultural, physical, sexual, and psychological[1]—had to admit that there was a sixth factor "A," standing for mutual attraction—i.e., the love neutralizing disparities in other areas. Here the omnipotent factor "A" is a symbol of the integrity of the individual and the constancy of his feelings. In another recent study [2], marital harmony was dissected into social, psychological, sociopsychological, sexual-behavioral, psychophysiological, and physiological components. Furthermore, the social component was divided into socioideological and sociocultural elements, and the sexual-behavioral component was divided into psychosexual behavior, sexual eroticism, and informational and judgmental elements. The achievement of marital harmony involved the minor task of bringing all of these components and elements into alignment. Without denying the analytical value of the dissection of marriage into a multitude of elements on various levels, we must realize that this approach replaces the question "why" with the question "where" (i.e., in which sphere). Besides, the union of two people with their good and bad points, ambitions and disappointments, mutual recognition and experience in communication, represents a unique and inimitable entity, whose extreme forms are commonly defined as marital harmony or discord.

As specialists have pointed out, "although material and economic factors are of indisputable importance in family living, they influence the partners only through psychological factors"[3]. Dysadaptation—the violation of the standards of cohabitation to the point of destructive behavior in the relationship, the severance of sexual bonds, and unhealthy reactions (neuroses, excessive alcohol consumption, suicidal actions, etc.)—is an indisputable sign of discord. As a rule, this situation cannot be corrected by the couple themselves, and they must seek professional help (unfortunately, this is not always the case). The accurate and complete information derived during the process of medical and psychological counseling can tell us much more, in our opinion, about the nature of family crises than work with couples seeking a divorce, in which the partners are concerned mainly with proving that they cannot live together and not with understanding the reasons for the failure of their marriage.

Let us look at the results of a survey of 300 couples who sought counseling in connection with family crises that had caused at least one partner to suffer neurotic disorders and ruined their sexual relations. The survey was conducted in the neurosis division of the Kharkov Scientific Research Institute of Neurology and Psychiatry imeni V.P. Protopopov (1979-1983) and in a similar division of the Central Moscow Oblast Clinical Psychiatric Hospital and the "Family and Marriage" counseling center of the Moscow soviet ispolkom (1983-1986). For the majority of the couples (88.8 percent), this was their first marriage, and the couples had lived together for 7.6 years on the average—enough time for them to gain a more or less good knowledge of their partners' character traits, habits, and peculiarities, but also enough time for the relationship to have undergone certain changes. The average age of the men was 32.6 years, and the average age of the women was 30.3 years—i.e., they had reached the age of social maturity. There were no significant differences (of more than 5 years) in the ages of the partners. All of the subjects lived in large industrial centers. In terms of education, the breakdown for the men was 19.2 percent with a partial secondary education, 57.2 percent with a secondary or secondary specialized education, and 23.6 percent with a higher education. The respective figures for the women were 10.1 percent, 36.3 percent, and 53.6 percent. The percentage of workers among the men was 44.2 percent, while 56.8 percent were employees or specialists, primarily engineering and technical personnel; the respective figures for the women were 18.2 percent and 81.8 percent. Do these figures mean that the marriages in which the wife has a higher level of education and occupies a higher social position are less likely to last than the rest from the very beginning? Obviously, it would be difficult to answer this question without analyzing other characteristics of the married couple. There is no need to prove, however, that the statistically established prevalence of members of specific groups among those seeking counseling does not mean that they are particularly prone to certain types of family crises,

but that they are more willing to discuss personal problems with experts and are better informed about the possibility of obtaining this kind of help.

An analysis of the conditions in which the partners were raised and the conditions of their childhood socialization is much more informative in explaining the main aspects of family crises. The survey revealed that many of the men (55 percent) and women (43.8 percent) were raised by a single parent or a grandmother (in connection with frequent conflicts between parents or the remarriage of the mother) from an early age. The majority of male clients were elder siblings and the majority of the women were the youngest children in their families. During their childhood, they received, in their words, a great deal of attention and care. The most common breaches of interpersonal relations between the parents of the men and the women were the following: Situations in which a strong and emotionally cold mother constantly insulted a timid and dependent father or in which an emotionally unstable mother was constantly creating scenes with a reserved, punctilious, and easily wounded father. All of the couples surveyed had accepted their sexual identity at the proper time, by the time they were 5, 6, or 7 years old. No transsexual (identification with the opposite sex) or intersexual (gender confusion) tendencies were observed.

Significant deviations from familiar patterns of development were observed during the next phase of psychosexual development (before the ages of 11-13). The adoption of the male or female behavioral stereotype characteristic of this phase was repressed by the immediate environment—by the school, encouraging a standard asexual type of behavior in the schoolchild on the one hand, and by the family, wary of anything that might arouse a preoccupation with sexual matters on the other. As a result, the boys acquired certain "feminine" traits: sensitivity, the inclination to daydream, and an idyllic view of relations between the sexes, while the girls developed certain "masculine" personality features: determination, courage, independent thinking, career ambitions, etc. The erotic interrelations characteristic of this age group—or, more precisely, the games simulating erotic contact—and necessary for the successful assimilation of the rules of sexual behavior, were usually rejected as something vulgar and bestial.

During the final phase of psychosexual development (from the ages of 13 to 18), the couples surveyed also displayed retardation in the choice of psychosexual orientations—i.e., the image of the ideal partner. The reason was the lack of experience in interpersonal communication and everyday life. For example, for 40.2 percent of the men and 70.8 percent of the women, their experience in elementary erotic contact was confined to occasional dances, with a complete ban on actions with erotic implications. During the period when the stereotype of behavior with people of the opposite sex was developed, the prohibition of erotic contact often led to dissociative inclinations. Men with feelings of loving

adoration for their wives nevertheless preferred to have relations with more experienced women. As far as the women clients were concerned, they felt the pressure of sexual prohibitions at this age and usually had to "put the finishing touches" on the image of their ideal partner with information from foreign movies. It is not surprising that later, when the unavoidable difficulties of family life and, in particular, of interpersonal relations arose, the men felt the need to commit adultery and the women were convinced that their husbands were a far cry from the romantic hero of their dreams. It is indicative that as the partners grew more experienced in dealing with other people, each began to be irritated by the insufficient masculinity or femininity of the other partner.

An analysis of the motives for marriage revealed that three groups of motives prevailed for the men: 30.1 percent were guided by a sense of duty growing out of a lengthy friendship or intimate relationship, while the rest (to differing degrees) acted on the woman's initiative or were motivated by the fear of losing their future wives because of competition, an impending separation, etc. The motives of the women were much more diverse and subtle. The main motive for half of them was a strong feeling of attachment to their partners, and the rest decided to marry for conformist reasons, giving in to the persistent requests of their fiances and the persuasive arguments of their parents and girlfriends. In many cases, the reasons for future destructive behavior were apparent from the very beginning. They include the bride's desire to marry in order to escape unpleasant situations in her parents' home, to legitimize a pregnancy, to cure an inferiority complex, or to avoid becoming an old maid. The most dangerous motives were sublimating and compensating ones: an overemphasis on the functional aspects of marriage (material goods and living comforts) or an attempt to overcome the pain of betrayal by a lover, to take revenge against him, and to assert her own right to be liked and loved.

These remarks about the origins of family crises concern only the short initial stage of the problems, but even they provide conclusive evidence of the invalidity of reducing the causes of marital discord to a series of social clichés ("he drinks," "he beats her," "he cheats on her," etc.). The "husband's drinking" frequently concealed not his thoughtlessness or neglect of the family, but a form of panic-stricken escape from it. Another negative combination recorded in several psychiatric studies of the "battered wife syndrome" always includes the provocation of the husband by the wife and her attempts to arouse his aggressive behavior, followed by feelings of deep guilt on the part of the husband. The third traditional accusation—"he cheats on her"—frequently masks an inferiority complex and the desire of the husband who is unappreciated at home to prove his own worth to himself. By the same token, the problem of no help with the housework signifies not a shortage of actual help, but a failure to share emotional concerns about the family. After all, no one falls in love with the vacuum cleaner because it "helps" with the cleaning, or with the washing machine because it "helps" with the laundry.

A marital crisis is a grave and frequently fatal illness and is difficult to diagnose, because the visible "symptoms" are more likely to conceal than to reveal the real causes. Besides this, the illness is difficult to treat, requiring a special approach in each individual case, time, patience, and skill on the part of the person administering the treatment. The relatively young science of sexual pathology can make a substantial contribution to the study of marital discord. It would be futile, however, to look for it on a list of medical specialties. The agencies in charge are in no hurry to register the new-born science. It also lacks a solid scientific base. But the main thing is the lack of a school where specialists working with couples with "diseased" marriages could and should be trained, even though the establishment of this kind of school proved to be necessary and was ordered in a published decree of the USSR Ministry of Health 13 years ago. Today, now that the reinforcement of the family is one of the most important social objectives of our society, questions about the methods of reinforcing it and the people responsible for doing this must be answered. Marital discord is an extremely heavy burden for the entire society. The time has come to acknowledge this fact and to take the necessary action.

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#### Signs of Criminal Tendencies in Youth

18060001k Moscow SOTSILOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87 (signed  
to press 10 Jul 87) pp 85-87

[Article by Vladimir Semenovich Ovchinskiy, candidate of juridical sciences, department deputy chief at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, militia major, and author of articles on the prevention of parasitism (1983, No 3) and on juvenile delinquency (1984, No 2) and of a review (1985, No 1) in our journal]

[Text] Criminologists have been working on a comprehensive program for the prevention of juvenile crime since 1986. The following tendencies attest to the severity of the problem: the higher percentage of mercenary

acts of violence (thefts and burglaries) among juvenile crimes and the higher percentage of "professional criminals" among antisocial youths.

This is not simply a matter of stopping violations of the law and instituting stricter criminal liability. It is a matter of eliminating the specific causes of the not yet unlawful but already deviant behavior of adolescents. Obviously, deviant behavior can be interpreted in different ways. If we take a didactic position and set up certain "standards" of good behavior, the "deviant" group will consist of the majority of young people, even those whose hairstyle looks like "an explosion in a pasta factory." Today we are learning to judge people by something other than their hairstyles and to accept the subcultural distinctions of the young lifestyle. We cannot ignore the fact, however, that the process of democratization under the conditions of inadequate knowledge of the law creates situations in which seemingly subcultural deviations to turn into actions punishable by law. Yu.P. Shchekochikhin was right when he said "we must anticipate the dangers inherent in groups of teenagers united by various symbols and put an end to all signs of hooliganism from the very beginning. We must anticipate them; in other words, we must watch, investigate, and ask questions so that we can tell one from the other"[1, p 93].

We know that most juvenile crimes are group actions and that some informal associations of young people are a source of criminal danger. Furthermore, the range of violations can be quite broad: from petty theft to group disturbances of the peace.

Articles in the press about informal associations of young people are usually referring to juveniles. They represent 90.5 percent of the members of these groups. One out of every six groups, however, is headed by people between the ages of 18 and 25, or fairly mature people. These data were derived from a sample survey of 1,230 members of youth groups distinguished by antisocial behavior.<sup>1</sup>

Obviously, not all associations of young people are formed for the purpose of unlawful activity, but studies have shown that many of the leaders of these groups have a criminal record: Almost half have spent time in corrective labor institutions (see table). There is every reason to assume that the rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents in isolation from society is not very effective. The opposite is more likely: The institution often turns into something like a "school" where the inmates learn the "rules of the game" from criminals and develop the personality features needed for the leadership of antisocial groups.

To a considerable extent, juvenile crime is connected with the spread of drug addiction and substance abuse. Some people feel that the press is overdramatizing the problem. This is absolutely untrue. The fact that drug addiction is primarily a young people's problem is also

attested to by the data cited by USSR Minister of Internal Affairs A.V. Vlasov: Of the 46,000 people diagnosed as "drug addicts" in medical records, 80 percent are under the age of 30 [2]. For this reason, the inertia of complacency and inaction must be resolutely surmounted.

#### Effect of Criminal Experience on Leadership in Antisocial Groups

Criminal experience of members of antisocial groups	Leadership in antisocial groups, percentages
No previous crimes	53.8
Time spent in corrective labor institution for crimes	46.2
Total	386 groups

Unfortunately, little attention is paid in our society to the prevention of juvenile vandalism—i.e., the willful destruction of property. Today we cannot explain why new schools and vocational and technical institutes are turned into ramshackle barns within a week, why the walls of buildings are covered with obscene graffiti the day after they have been repainted, why elevators and mailboxes are burned, or why equipment on subway trains is broken. What are the origins of this show of contempt for human labor? There have been virtually no studies of the pathological brutality of adolescents. This is the reason for heinous crimes against private citizens and for the sly tricks played on other teenagers to humiliate them. This feature of the "subculture" is also quite common, especially in non-traditional informal groups of young people with antisocial tendencies.

The emphasis young people put on self-expression, non-conformity, the latest styles, and Western models of mass culture is nothing new. In past decades there were the notorious "teddy boys" and "hippies." A wave of fanaticism was characteristic of sports fans in big cities in the middle of the 1970's. By the beginning of the 1980's we had our own "punks" and groups seeking truth in religion. Today broad segments of the younger generation are obsessed with "heavy metal" rock music. The formation of non-traditional, informal associations of young people does not constitute a social danger in itself, but the tendency to ignore them and the lack of knowledge about their aims and composition frequently lead to social pathology.

In my opinion, it is also time to give some serious thought to nationalist tendencies in informal associations of young people. An analysis of the events of December 1986 in Alma-Ata revealed that many of the VUZ students involved in the riots had united in informal nationalist groups a few years before when they were upperclassmen in secondary schools, had assaulted people, mocking and insulting their victims, and had never been rebuked for these actions by law enforcement agencies or Komsomol organizations [3].

The events in Alma-Ata underscored the need for the thorough study of the behavior of young people. I agree completely with K.G. Myalo: It is time to give up the excessive enthusiasm for the young subculture and all forms of activity by youth, which portrays the younger generation as an idyllically homogeneous and supremely innocent group with the status of "eternal adolescents" [4, p 184]. These attitudes are the result of an inaccurate assessment of the situation. An example of this can be seen in V. Yumashev's article about the new trends in the young subculture in YUNOST magazine. The author underscores his respect for break dancers, heavy metal musicians, rock fans, and sports fans and praises their independence, their innovative fashions, and their standards of behavior [5, p 102]. The author sees all adolescents as an undifferentiated group and easily sidesteps the unpleasant problems of the antisocial behavior of some. Of course, the social realities giving rise to the phenomenon of the subculture of juvenile vandalism in the West cannot be equated with the realities of our society, but we have also witnessed certain processes alienating young people from the mainstream of social life and contributing to nihilistic attitudes in the young. We must admit that sociologists, criminologists, and psychologists have not revealed all of the symptoms of social pathology among youth, even though serious studies of these problems were already being published in the 1970's [6]. Preventive measures were not planned in time either.

Academician V.N. Kudryavtsev proposed an all-union comprehensive program of crime prevention up to the year 2000 [7]. This is an extremely timely proposal, but it should not diminish our efforts to attain immediate objectives in the eradication of crime.

#### Footnotes

1. The survey was conducted jointly with Candidate of Juridical Sciences A.Ya. Vilks in Latvia and in Moscow and Omsk oblasts from 1981 to 1986.

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### Anonymous Letter Phenomenon

180600011 Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87 (signed  
to press 10 Jul 87) pp 95-102

[Article by Olga Georgiyevna Chaykovskaya, candidate of historical sciences, member of the USSR Writers Union, author of the books "Protiv neba na zemle" [Against Heaven on Earth] (1966), "Bolotnyye ogni" [Swamp Fires] (1967), "Zakon i chelovecheskoye serdtse" [The Law and the Human Heart] (1969), and "Nebo Austerlitsa" [The Austerlitz Sky] (1976), and our permanent contributing author. First paragraph is SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA introduction]

[Text] When the issue containing this article is published, the literary and sociological community will be celebrating O.G. Chaykovskaya's anniversary. On behalf of the readers, the editors congratulate one of the journal's most active contributors on this memorable date and wish Olga Georgiyevna new artistic triumphs.

The process of the reorganization of social life is facing sociologists, journalists, and jurists with new problems that were considered to be of secondary importance just yesterday. The anonymous letters sent to party and state organs and the mass media represent one of these problems. Many of the letters written by the laboring public are anonymous. Some of them are quite transparent: The very nature of the accusations they contain proves that the anonymous author is making nothing other than slanderous and defamatory statements. Others contain concrete facts attesting to abuses of power. It would seem that these letters call for thorough investigations to stop this kind of evil. We can understand why a person would not take the risk of signing his real name. He could be afraid of reprisals (from outright criminals or from mafioso-type bosses who take revenge even for criticism, not to mention exposure, which is not so uncommon). Should his cry for help also land in the waste basket? What about the letters that tell nothing but the truth?

We are bewildered by contradictions that seem almost insoluble, and it is unlikely that we will ever resolve them if we continue to consider one side of the matter and then the other, as if the sides were equal. The fact is that they are not the same, and we are in a situation (a situation familiar to the legislator drafting a law and to the statesman making an important decision) in which we must choose the lesser of two evils.

Anonymous denunciations are both an evil in themselves and a product of evil (an evil mind or an evil situation). But if we start throwing them out without reading them, the result could be even more evil—we could refuse to answer a cry for help. Unfortunately, it is just as impossible for us not to read anonymous letters as it is for the militia not to answer a call even if it might be a false alarm. This is all the more regrettable because it forces many people to perform a dirty and unsavory job. But this is the only solution—every effort must be made to eliminate the sources of this dirt.

The reason for reading anonymous letters is important. The job is a simple one: All of the anonymous letters must be read to weed out just the genuine requests for help. They are easily distinguished from the rest and do not constitute a high percentage of the total. As a rule, however, anonymous letters are read with a different aim, with the hope of catching a socially useful fish in the muddy stream, or, to use another metaphor, of finding a pearl of truth in a stinking pile of manure. Perhaps a useful little fish can be caught here, but what does it weigh in comparison to the troubles caused by the process of verification? The problem of anonymous letters is a tragedy primarily for those who are struck down by the anonymous denunciation as if by a speeding train. Much has been written about this, but the time has come to also consider those required to do the verifying, the militia or procuracy personnel or the members of the countless commissions set up in establishments.

A young man who worked in the Department for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation told me that the huge pile of anonymous letters (a pile which was crippling and smothering him) he was investigating included one about a professor at the conservatory. The letter contained extraordinarily dirty and vulgar accusations and, as usual, a lack of proof. They sat facing each other, the young militia official and the elderly conservatory professor, with the anonymous letter lying on the table between them. The militia official could not throw it in the trash because he was obligated to conduct an investigation; in the absence of evidence and a known author, his only recourse was to interrogate the professor.

This is a classic example of the "investigation" of an anonymous denunciation—with the difference, incidentally, that the officials responsible for "investigations" of this kind eventually stop blushing, and some of them, sad to say, even acquire a taste for the work and, if they have a craving for power, take pleasure in the embarrassment, humiliation, and helplessness of the person who has to prove that he is not a thief or has not corrupted a minor. This is a state of complete helplessness because the situation is clearly hopeless: It is impossible to prove that something did not happen.

It is incredible that anonymous denunciations are rife in our society as if we had no law based on the principle of the presumption of innocence and prohibiting the investigator from putting the "burden of proof" on the

suspect. The jurist (just as any citizen with a knowledge of the laws) cannot deny that this kind of investigation of anonymous denunciations is an outrageous miscarriage of justice. Could this fail to injure his professional consciousness? But there is also another side of the matter: Instead of working professionally—i.e., discovering crimes with the aid of the methods and means of modern criminology—the jurist spends whole days digging in a pile of trash in the hope of finding—on the off-chance—something of use to him. This boring job causes him to grow dull and lose his skills, and if, God forbid, he acquires a taste for it, it can corrupt his morals (we know of cases in which investigators have used anonymous denunciations to get ahead, pretending that they have uncovered a scandal of major proportions).

Are pearls of truth found in this trash? Perhaps they could be, especially in view of the fact that the experienced writer of anonymous denunciations (and there are some extremely experienced ones today) takes a real mistake, false move, or omission and envelops it with his own lies. There are even some trustworthy and business-like letters citing evidence from documents or, for instance, bookkeeping accounts, and these could arouse the interest of an investigator and could be verified (without bothering, it goes without saying, the people who have been accused). Most of the anonymous letters, and all of the ones saying "Marya Ivanovna is living beyond her means," however, should be thrown directly into the garbage, unless, of course, there is some chance of exposing the anonymous writers. This is the only way of depriving them of their destructive force. Directly into the garbage! If a few pearls of truth float away in this muddy stream, let them go! This loss, we repeat, will be negligible in comparison to the colossal waste of social resources, both emotional and material. And let the jurists seek the truth, as they are empowered to do by law, and let them improve their skills and perfect their professional techniques.

The incredible suffering (to the point of death) of the victims, the work of investigators, which is corrupting as well as senseless, and the colossal waste of social effort and energy are not all. If the "anonymous disease" is allowed to spread, it eats its way into the heart and erodes the spirit. An example from real life will provide conclusive proof of this.

Olga Sergeevna suffered a terrible tragedy: After a brief but terrible period of illness, her young husband died, leaving her alone with a daughter and inconsolable. This extremely attractive, gentle, and intelligent woman had several opportunities to remarry but did not. Finally an extremely strong-willed man fell in love with her. He was willing to carry out her slightest wish, whatever the cost, called her 20 times a day to see if there was anything she wanted, and showered her with fresh flowers in winter. He was head over heels in love with her. And how did she feel? She was past 40, she began to feel the pressure of daily concerns and wanted someone to take responsibility for at least some of them, she wanted a good strong

arm to lean on, and suddenly one was offered to her. The wedding was a happy occasion, Olga Sergeevna moved into her husband's home, and her daughter remained in the old apartment alone.

Everything was fine. Things were also going well at the institute where she worked and where she was respected, valued, and surrounded by nice people. One day when she arrived at the institute, however, she felt that something was wrong. No one said a word, but there was danger in the air. She asked some people what the matter was and they finally told her that they had not wanted to worry or upset her but that anonymous denunciations had been made and a commission was already investigating the matter. Because of the nature of her work and her extremely responsible position, Olga Sergeevna had to deal with all sorts of people outside the institute. Her anonymous accuser alleged that her dealings with these people were criminal and that she was speculating and taking bribes. This anonymous accuser (he printed all of the letters and usually signed them "The Phantom") was obviously someone from the institute. What gave him away was his knowledge of all the details of her meetings with these people—their names, the dates, and the reasons for the meetings. Her colleagues did not believe the slanderous statements and sympathized with Olga Sergeevna, but the commission still interrogated her, and she ceased to think of the institute as a second home.

Then she ran into a new and perhaps more upsetting problem: Her daughter also began receiving anonymous letters (she was planning to get married, and the letters slandered her fiance) and, what is most important, began receiving obscene phone calls and telephone threats (of murder and mayhem) at night in her apartment where she lived alone. Olga Sergeevna could no longer leave her daughter alone. At work and at home her life was made a sheer hell by, it goes without saying, the selfsame "Phantom." Who was this enemy of hers? Was it a rejected suitor? None of them seemed likely to do this kind of thing. Was it someone who envied her?

Besides this, the institute was already receiving anonymous phone calls from a man who gruffly demanded to know why no action had been taken on the letters and why the bribe-taker and speculator had not been fired.

One day "The Phantom" finally got too bold and careless (or lazy) and wrote one sentence in his own handwriting. Olga Sergeevna studied the handwriting and.... No, she tried to submerge her impossible suspicions, she could not understand it or believe it, but finally she asked some handwriting experts she knew to compare this handwriting to another. Yes, they replied, there is no question that your suspicions are well founded....

"It was you," she said to her husband, looking him in the eye.

After lengthy and vehement denials, he suddenly said:

"Yes, I wrote the letters. I did it! I wanted you to be fired so you could stay at home."

He did not blush when he said this and he was not the slightest bit embarrassed. What for? He had the most noble intentions, he was trying to strengthen the family and build a happy marriage. Olga Sergeyevna realized that domestic comforts were not what he wanted (she had enough strength and energy to make him comfortable). He had such a strong craving for power that he wanted her to be financially dependent on him and, consequently, completely within his power. But why did he have to call his stepdaughter at night? He wanted to frighten her so that she would move into his home, vacating a beautiful apartment he needed for his ex-wife. This woman, from whom he had been divorced for a long time, was pressuring him for the division of their property, but he loved his marvelous apartment and did not want to move. This was also his reason for slandering the fiance. If his stepdaughter got married, he—"The Phantom"—would not get the apartment.

This kind of villain has existed throughout history, but this virtuoso mastery of anonymous denunciations is, you will agree, a new phenomenon. And what is wrong with them? If there is nothing disgraceful about them and if they are officially acknowledged as sources of information, why should a person not make use of them to put his family affairs in order? You can see how far the disease has spread.

And this is a disease, an infectious disease.

Here is another account of a family and a comparatively late marriage, but in this case the anonymous letters were interspersed with signed letters, and this broadens our discussion to cover the topic of denunciations and slander in general.

Lidiya Petrovna, a doctor of sciences and historian, was a remarkable woman of extraordinarily good character. As they tell the story at the institute, when she was quite young and arrived in their city—with an infant daughter but without money, a place to live, or friends—to enroll in graduate school, she was told that admissions were closed for her specialty and that there was one vacancy left in another history department but it required a knowledge of obscure languages. After listening to all of this, she (as the legend goes) uttered a single word: "When?"—i.e., when was the test to be given—and then took the test on the scheduled date, revealing not only a knowledge of the subject but also of the languages. She had tremendous ability and phenomenal energy. She defended her candidate's dissertation at a cost known only to her. She lived with her daughter in a rented room, and her expenses grew as her daughter grew. Lidiya Petrovna took any job that came her way: She worked as a mail carrier and as a gardener. She soon had many friends. People liked her because she did not put on airs and was attractive and bright. She was cheerful, she got along well with other people, and she could sit up all

night arguing or telling jokes. She was a good and loyal friend and was always the first to offer help to anyone who needed it. Her vitality was overwhelming, and it would have been impossible not to admire all of these qualities. She defended her doctoral dissertation (she was the youngest doctor in the institute) and paid off her share in a cooperative apartment. In short, she handled everything well and triumphed.

Her second marriage, however, was a mistake. Nikolay turned out to be an alcoholic, and a violent drunk at that. Lidiya Petrovna did not give up on him either: She made her husband seek treatment and then tried to prevent a relapse by buying an automobile—people do not drink, as we all know, when they are behind the wheel of a car. This time, however, she did not triumph. Her husband continued drinking and grew more and more violent. It became impossible to live with him, and he did not object to a divorce either—on the sole condition that he keep the car. He petitioned for the division of all of Lidiya Petrovna's belongings (they did not acquire any community property in their year of marriage), but he essentially demanded only the car and, before the settlement had been reached, he drove the car away and parked it in his father's garage. This is where the main character of our story comes in—Nikolay's father, Ivan Sidorovich Kozlov, the former rector of a large academic institution, a war veteran now living on a private pension. At the height of the divorce proceedings, he sent a letter to the institute where Lidiya Petrovna worked. He asked for an investigation of "the behavior of Orlik, L.P., whose low morals degrade the honor of academe. She lies, cheats, buys goods and resells them at a higher price, hoards gold, etc. Orlik, L.P., has an innate ability to manipulate people. She stays out of work for weeks on end, makes fun of the institute, and writes long letters to her lovers and husbands instead of scientific works. Could this be part of her job?" Sarcastic remarks of this kind are common, but this one had a political thrust: "If senior researcher Orlik, L.P., had the proper political background, she would not calculate how much cheaper it is to hang wallpaper with wheat flour than with synthetic paste, forgetting that we have to pay Canada in gold for the wheat." The letter unequivocally suggested that this kind of pseudo-scholar should be driven out of the institute. The author included an earnest request for a personal report on the actions taken.

A similar letter was sent to the court. It was here, in court, that Lidiya Petrovna read that she was a pseudo-scholar, a shirker, an idler, and a morally depraved woman. She was shocked. "That scum!" she sobbed. "That dirty old man!" There were witnesses, and Ivan Sidorovich, who seemed quite pleased, immediately took down all of their names and started a new lawsuit, this time in criminal court, accusing Lidiya Petrovna of assaulting his honor and dignity. At this time the militia received an anonymous tip that Orlik, L.P., had registered in the city illegally. During this difficult period for Lidiya Petrovna, she received a proposal from an old friend (her current husband, with whom she is now living

happily). He had just been offered a job in an institute, but an anonymous letter was sent there too, calling him a parasite who lived off his wife, a morally corrupt woman now on trial. The job offer was withdrawn, and since the man had already left his previous job, he had to seek another.

Then Ivan Sidorovich went to the institute where Orlik was working and went straight to the director's office. He sat down sedately, this gray-haired man with rows of medals on his chest, he clutched his walking-stick, rested his chin on his hands, and casually asked whether the director had received his letter and what his reaction had been. Had Orlik been dismissed?

The director realized that he had to be very careful. He replied that Orlik had not been dismissed but that an institute commission was investigating the statements made in Ivan Sidorovich's letter. Ivan Sidorovich then walked through the institute, visited the secretary of the party organization and the local committee chairman, started conversations with researchers, telling them the facts about his daughter-in-law's moral character, and vowed that she would be sent to prison soon. After this he came to the institute regularly, as if to his job. By nine o'clock he was already sitting in the director's office. He would talk for a couple of hours and the director did not dare ask him to leave.

"You know, Ivan Sidorovich," he would say politely, "I have so many things to do."

"The only thing I can see," the experienced—extremely experienced!— Ivan Sidorovich would reply in a firm tone, "is that you do not want to listen to me."

"No, no," the director would quickly reply, fully aware of the implications of these words. "I am willing to listen to whatever you have to say."

"No, you are not," Ivan Sidorovich would reply, also knowing full well what all of this could mean, and would set off to wander around the institute. He was in no hurry and walked slowly through the institute, fully aware of his power. He would drop into the local committee office and the people's control office and would look into all of the rooms to make sure that the researchers (especially Lidiya Petrovna) were where they were supposed to be. He was told that some researchers were on out-of-town assignments or were working in the archives, but his answer to these explanations was that he, thank God, was a man of integrity, that his students occupied high positions, and that he did not plan to let the matter rest. And he was telling the truth. Anonymous letters were sent to various high-level agencies to inform them that discipline was almost non-existent in the institute, that the researchers were being paid for doing nothing, and that this was why they were protecting the pseudo-scholar Orlik, L.P., who was wallowing in moral corruption instead of working.

The institute was in a frantic state. The director, the secretary of the party organization, and the local committee chairman constantly had to explain their actions to various agencies and wrote countless replies to countless inquiries—from the Academy of Sciences, from party organs, and from newspaper editors. The institute commission was working overtime. And the measured gait of Ivan Sidorovich could be heard in the hallways.

Lidiya Petrovna dashed from place to place and cried, and then she took the offensive. Yes, she began writing letters of her own. We should recall that she was divorcing her husband because he was a violent drunk, but now she cited another reason: the moral character of her father-in-law and his family. These bribe-takers, hoarders, and usurers had vacation homes, cars, garages, and gold and crystal everywhere—almost a million rubles' worth. She had seen all of this when she had been married to their son. It turned out that her father-in-law had told her confidentially that he had been a marauder during the war, had bartered with people dying of starvation, giving them bread in exchange for gold and diamonds, had taken bribes when he was a rector, and had speculated in motor vehicles later. Her husband, it turned out, had also confided in her, telling her many secrets—how he had beaten up people on the street with brass-knuckles, how he had lost secret documents while he was drunk.... The attacks were more resolute and furious than any Ivan Sidorovich might have seen in a nightmare. She sent letters wherever she could—to the courts (from the people's court to the supreme court), to the procuracy (from the rayon office to the procurator general of the USSR), and to soviet and party organs, all the way to the top. "What are you doing!" her friends exclaimed. "The person who started all of this is to blame," she retorted. "But what about the person who is continuing it? Is she exempt from moral laws?" She shrugged her shoulders: "She has the right to respond on the same level." "You put yourself on the same level as Ivan Sidorovich?" She would not listen to reason. Another brilliant idea came to her: All of this hostility did not start because of the divorce and the division of property, but because of something else, something quite vile. The Kozlovs had tried to involve her in their crimes but she refused when they stole an extremely expensive instrument. She threatened to report them to the authorities—and she did! This is when they began persecuting her. She wrote her letters without worrying about details in some that contradicted what she had said in others. Who would compare them? She piled up accusations, each more serious than the one before (never before had she done anything like this—all of her friends and colleagues are unanimous in this belief!). "We children of the war did not suffer hunger and cold," she feverishly wrote, "to be repaid 40 years later for the childhood the war robbed us of with humiliating attacks by the Kozlovs, the underground millionaires who got rich when all of us were starving."

"But how can you prove that the Kozlovs were marauders and that they are secret millionaires?" people asked her.

"Why should I have to prove it?" she replied. "I do not plan to even try."

"But is this right?"

"My ideas of right and wrong have undergone major changes recently."

"They could sue you for slander."

"They cannot!" she yelled in a transport of rage and delight. "This is precisely what they cannot do! The law—bless it!—has given me a loophole, and I am making use of it!"

She did not notice that she was losing her friends and that people were not treating her as warmly at the institute. She did not have time to worry about this. She had no time because she was getting ready for the trial, and even for two trials, because Ivan Sidorovich was taking her to court for assaulting his dignity, and she was taking him to court for slander.

She read the criminal code and learned that verbal assault is a verbal attack on a person's honor and dignity, expressed in indecent terms, and immediately found the weak spot in the wording of the law—the phrase "indecent terms." What were they? The law did not include a list of indecent words or any instructions on the difference between decent and indecent words. And if the word "unprintable" were to be substituted for "indecent," then she was guilty of nothing: "Dirty," "old man," and "scum" are all printable. To support her position, she (after all, she was a doctor of sciences) began a study of the use of the word "scum" in classic works of literature. The word was used by Nekrasov ("scum from a foul trough...") and it was also used by Korolenko, Gertsen, and Dostoyevskiy. "Scum," she concluded, "is a literary term."

"But what do you think?" people asked her. "Is 'scum' an insult or not?"

"I do not make any judgments of my own anymore," she snapped. "Whatever the criminal code says is good enough for me."

Ivan Sidorovich responded by also theorizing, as well as he could. "Orlik, L.P., has forgotten that our philosophy, in contrast to metaphysics, views form and content in their unity, and not in isolation, as Orlik, L.P., is doing. In the unity of form and content a specific role is assigned to content, but Orlik, L.P., is doing the opposite." The judges did not want to go into the details of philosophy and settled the case in connection with an amnesty covering both defendant-plaintiffs.

But while all of these strange battles were going on, a more serious event took place. For a long time Lidiya Petrovna had had a bad relationship with the daughter for whose sake she had worked like an ox for so many

years. Friends watched with horror as the girl grew up and became more and more insolent. Now she was learning to be shrewd and was acquiring remarkable experience in getting along in life. After she got married, she told her mother and her new husband, Sergey Pavlovich, to get out of the apartment (the same cooperative apartment that had been paid for by so much work). She refused to move to Sergey Pavlovich's apartment because she did not like the floor it was on. We do not have the energy or the room to describe this battle and we will only note that Sergey Pavlovich wrote a letter to the employer of Lyusya's new husband (this was, incidentally, already her second marriage and was not legal, because he was not registered), and he had to leave the city. Lyusya then joined forces with the Kozlovs and wrote to Lidiya Petrovna's employers. They replied: "Dear Lyudmila Igorevna, The directors and officials of the institute have read your letter of 13 October 1984. This is to inform you that senior researcher, Doctor of Historical Sciences Orlik, L.P., has been working in our institute since January 1964 (the latest news, so to speak— O.Ch.). During this time she has defended her candidate's and doctoral dissertations, has written seven monographs, three of which have been published, and 75 scientific articles, and has been a speaker at several science symposiums and conferences. Orlik, L.P., completes her assignments on time and on the proper scientific-theoretical level. She is active in social work." This is what the institute administration told the daughter about her mother. And what was the alternative? What should be done when a daughter does not act like a daughter, when brains are addled, when feelings are perverted, and when humans are inhuman? When the rivers run backward and the sun sets in the east? It is the end of the world as we know it!

But after all, Lidiya Petrovna had been a cheerful person and a loyal friend and had written what have been described as extremely competent scientific works instead of denunciations. We are faced by more than just the question of whether a decent person who is fighting with an unscrupulous person can use unscrupulous methods and hope to remain decent. Obviously, the answer is no. This story shows how infectious the disease of anonymous denunciations has become and how deeply it has penetrated our society, all the way to the foundation of its basic link—the family.

How can the flood of anonymous letters be stopped? It is not enough, after all, to throw them into the waste basket without verifying them. The time has come for us to take the offensive.

It is difficult to expose the writer of an anonymous letter, but sometimes it is not all that difficult. For instance, if anyone had wanted to establish Ivan Sidorovich's authorship, it could have been done quite easily, but no one wanted to do this. Are the energy and resources for this lacking? But if all of the energy and resources of those who now have to investigate the denunciations could be redirected for a struggle against slander, it could be dealt a severe blow!

Today's slanderer is not afraid to take off his mask and is more brazen than ever before (I once had to write an article about a grandmother who was arrested for an awful anonymous denunciation and who asked, with youthful enthusiasm: "And what if I did write it? It is my duty to sound the alarm"); if he has to, the slanderer can sign his letter with his real name without fear. Why?

Law enforcement personnel are often accused of being reluctant to take on cases involving slander and verbal assault. I do not think that the reluctance of jurists is the issue here. The slanderer is not afraid to take off his mask and speak openly, because he can easily circumvent the law and escape punishment. Frequently, no legal action is taken, and this is inconsistent with Article 57 of the Constitution of the USSR, which declares the right of citizens to legal protection from attacks on their honor and dignity. It is no wonder that Lidiya Petrovna spoke so joyfully about the blessed loophole that allowed her to accuse her father-in-law of heinous crimes without fear. This loophole does exist, and it consists in the single word "wittingly." False evidence defaming a person is not punishable by law unless it is false evidence given wittingly. The insulted person seeking legal protection must first prove that the slanderer knew that he was lying. Trials of this kind—and jurists are well aware of this—are generally confined to the tedious and usually counterproductive attempt to elicit the facts: Was the slanderer committing slander consciously or unconsciously? Did he know or did he "make an honest mistake"? And how often can anyone prove that he knew or did not know? Only rarely, and with great difficulty. And what does it matter in the final analysis to the person (and to the society) if he has been slandered consciously or unconsciously? After all, he has only one good name and only one life, and it is this one that is ruined and throttled.

**No, there must be no loopholes! No one should even consider saying something bad about a person without taking the trouble to find out if it is true.** The citizens of our country should feel completely safe from any kind of slander, and the slanderer and informer should know that they will go to prison unless they can prove every single word of their accusations in court. Here the law must show no mercy.

To fight against the disease of anonymous letters effectively, we must overcome the fear of slanderers and erase the common stereotype from the public mind. People have grown accustomed to regarding the anonymous letter as something like a divine curse. They believe that nothing can be done about it. Some people will have to begin the shameful work of verifying the accusations, others will have to flounder helplessly in their attempts to vindicate themselves, and everyone around them will have to view all of this with indifference. In certain departments, incidentally, the exact brand of this indifference has been defined: "Never do anything to make yourself the target of a denunciation." This is easy to say! One director arrogantly told a subordinate who was the

target of an anonymous denunciation: "For some reason, I, for example, have never been mentioned in a letter of this kind!" It was not until letters were written about him soon afterward that he knew how hot things could get.

Of course, the time has come to get rid of these firmly ensconced beliefs, to get rid of them with all of the means at our disposal and every type of propaganda, just as this has now been done with the problem of alcohol abuse, by replacing the resigned and indulgent attitude toward drunkenness (the common opinion was that the Russians had always been hearty drinkers) with strong public indignation. This should also be done in the case of slander, anonymous or not.

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#### **Men and Women Assess Labor Conditions: Agreement or Differences?**

*18060001m Moscow SOTSILOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87 (signed to press 10 Jul 87) pp 111-114*

[Article by Nikolay Ivanovich Dryakhlov, doctor of philosophical sciences and professor in the Applied Sociology Department of the School of Philosophy, Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov; Irina Vladimirovna Litvinova, research associate in the same department; and Valentina Vladimirovna Pavlova, candidate of philosophical sciences and lecturer in the Scientific Communism Department of the Moscow State University School of Humanities]

[Text] The current process of renewal in the country is facing sociologists with new problems that were recently indistinguishable behind the veil of apparent well-being. One such problem is connected with the professional labor of women. The inclusion of women in industrial production on a mass scale, the high level of their education and culture, and their active participation in public affairs would seem to have brought us closer to the realization of the enlightened dream of sexual equality. But can we not see, at least in the form in which this dream is being realized, the ephemeral reflection of feminism, with its tremendous, even if not always articulated, potential for self-destruction? Does today's technocratic and urbanized stereotype lifestyle hold up the model of the emancipated, independent, "self-made woman" [in English] as one of the criteria of progress? These questions are much broader and more encompassing than those we will discuss in this article. Here we will only say that the indisputable success in the inclusion of women in national production should not obscure the fact that the situation is deteriorating as far as the "production of people" is concerned. The inadequate development of the social infrastructure and delays in organizing social assistance for families and in stimulating the birthrate have exacerbated the contradictions

between the roles women play in the home and in production, the kind of exacerbation sociologists warned us about back in the early 1970's [1].

In our study we planned to compare evaluations of the labor situation in primarily "female" and primarily "male" types of production. The differences turned out to be quite significant, even though women displayed greater conformity in their evaluations than men. In particular, dissatisfaction with the system of financial incentives was expressed by 35 percent of the men and 29 percent of the women, although wages at "female" enterprises are much lower. The system of norms and

rates is essentially identical at all industrial enterprises—it is regulated by instructions from the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems. Women, however, rarely displayed a critical or negative attitude toward work norms. It is possible that this was a flaw in procedure, because it is no secret that the actual working conditions of women (particularly in bakeries and printing companies) are far from optimal. Furthermore, other data testify to considerable delays in the mechanization of women's labor, a lack of correspondence between the nature of work and the level of education, skills, and professional experience, and poor sociopersonal conditions in production (Table 1).

**Table 1. Evaluations of Labor Conditions by Women and Men, Percentage Indicating Two Lowest Positions on a 5-Point Scale**

Labor conditions	Women	Men
Level of mechanization and automation	54.9	43.6
System of financial incentives	29.2	35.8
Work norms	18.0	33.8
Safety equipment	20.1	20.1
Moral and psychological climate in collective	18.8	4.4
State of machine tools and equipment	34.0	29.9
Organization of workplace	58.4	53.9
Personal conditions	70.8	56.3
Catering services	48.0	26.0
Medical services	50.7	19.0
Housing opportunities	66.0	60.2
Child care facilities	29.2	20.6
Organization of grocery sales and deliveries	86.8	76.0

There were particularly significant differences in assessments of the sociopsychological climate in the collective (interpersonal relations between women are known to involve more friction and a higher risk of conflict) and of medical services.

Although the average assessments provide interesting material for practical recommendations, they do not indicate the particular factors of the labor situation of greatest importance to workers. To this end, the respondents were asked to name the main factor influencing their choice of a place of employment (Table 2).

**Table 2. Comparative Significance of Elements of Labor Situation, Percentage Indicating Two Highest Positions on a 5-Point Scale (categorized in terms of age and gender)**

If you had to choose a place of employment today, what would play the deciding role?	Women			Men		
	Under 30	31-50	51 and over	Under 30	31-50	51 and over
Opportunities for professional advancement and improvement of skills	39.5	37.8	43.4	67.2	59.6	44.2
High wages	57.9	50.0	21.7	76.9	65.1	72.1
Comfortable working conditions	42.1	40.3	47.8	71.2	56.8	67.4
Interrelations in collective	71.1	70.7	69.6	82.7	81.6	81.4
Housing opportunities	47.4	36.5	50.2	73.1	57.8	55.8
Child care facilities	60.5	45.1	56.5	76.9	75.2	48.9
Ecological state of production	47.4	46.3	47.8	61.5	56.0	44.2

It is interesting that the opinions of women of different ages differed more than men's opinions, with the probable exception of the factor of child care facilities. The number of men satisfied with this factor declines sharply after the age of 50. This probably means that problems in the upbringing of grandchildren "are at work." In general, however, respondents feel that relations within the collective are the main factor, and although the second most important factor for women is the opportunity for professional advancement and the improvement of skills, after 30 years the significance of this factor is declining dramatically and concern about children is taking the place of professional ambitions. The bimodal dependence of the professional activity of women on their fertile years is another determining factor [2].

The desire for high wages is the dominant factor for men, but this does not mean that their motives are more pragmatic and mercenary than the motives of working women. This is more likely to be a result of the difference in social roles, especially during the period of the stabilization of family relations and social status.

The interested reader can interpret the tables for himself and delve into the details of the matter. We will conclude by repeating that much has been said in our society about the equality of men and women and, behind all of this talk, we have discerned the deterioration of conditions for women in the field of professional labor. Of what value are our achievements if women make up the overwhelming majority of workers in the first through third categories (70 percent) and only 1.3 percent of the high sixth category in, for instance, machine building and metal processing [3]? Furthermore, according to data presented at the all-union women's conference on 30 January 1987, "in the last 5 years the number of working women throughout the country moving up to a higher skill category declined by 1.5 percent"[*ibid.*]. Today around 40 percent of the women working in the national economy are performing unskilled or semi-skilled, primarily manual, and physically arduous labor requiring no professional training [4, p 61]. According to surveys, the wages of working women in industry were equivalent to 70 percent of men's wages at the end of the 1970's [*ibid.*, p 65]. Moreover, the quality of the work of public health, child care, and consumer service establishments is still far below public demands and is making adjustments to the detriment of women in social equality. Obviously, under these conditions existing stereotypes must be reviewed and we must realize that "the most important job for a woman from the standpoint of the future of the country and of socialism is the job of a mother"[5, p 33].

#### Footnotes

1. In 1986, 354 people, around half of them women, were surveyed at six industrial enterprises in Maloyaroslavets in Kaluga Oblast. The sample group included enterprises with a prevalence of women in the labor force. For this

reason, there is some basis for the discussion of a specific type of "female" production. For example, bakeries, printing companies, and garment factories are enterprises of this kind.

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#### Letters to Editor

18060001n Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87 (signed to press 10 Jul 87) pp 120-125

[Text]

#### Unrealistic Plans—Letter from Doctor of Economic Sciences and Professor A.M. Solomonov, Dushanbe

A lengthy article by D.I. Zyuzin entitled "Patterns of Socioeconomic Development in Central Asia" was printed in your journal (No 4, 1986). The problem of the efficient use of Central Asian labor resources was mentioned in the article. The severity of this problem in Tajikistan, for example, is due largely to the highest birthrate in the country, surpassing the increase in jobs by far. During the years of the 11th Five-Year Plan republic labor resources increased by 16.9 percent while employment in national production increased by only 13.7 percent. D.I. Zyuzin tries to present a method of using the unemployed part of the population efficiently. He recommends the "resettlement of at least 7 million people of working age outside Central Asia" within the current 5 years (p 21). Further on in the article he proposes "the resettlement of more than 80 percent of the increase in labor resources, or 450,000 people a

year." If this recommendation were to be taken seriously, the entire population of Tajikistan and Kirghizia would have to move. The author of the article is therefore proposing the grand-scale migration of the Central Asians!

The author says that the resettlement should not be planned as a "permanent" move (although this possibility is not excluded), but should envisage the possibility of returning to the republic after 3-5 years (p 23). Just imagine moving 7 million people, 450,000 a year, from one place to another!

Are these recommendations of any great economic or social value?

The real situation is the following: The more efficient use of labor resources began to be discussed extensively in the republic press in 1986 and 1987, and on 17 January of this year measures for the radical improvement of the use of labor resources in the republic in light of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress were discussed by a plenum of the Tajikistan Central Committee. A mass survey had revealed that 234,000 people of working age were not employed in national production and 161,000 expressed a desire to work, 93 percent of them women. The survey also indicated that more than 15,000 men and 219,000 women, two-thirds of them mothers of large families, were engaged in housework or private subsidiary farming. Researchers from the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences Council for the Study of Productive Forces calculated that if unemployed women were to be included in the public production sector, pre-school establishments for 350,000 children would have to be built and more than 40,000 people would have to be hired to work in these establishments. This would require around 5 or 6 billion rubles in capital investments. Incidentally, the republic state budget for 1987 was approved at a total of just over 1.9 billion rubles.

In view of the complex and multifaceted nature of the problem of labor resources, it should be approached with care and consideration for each facet. The term "population with a labor surplus," used by Comrade Zyuzin in his article, is not completely acceptable. We should be concerned about the fuller employment of the population not included in the public production sphere at this time, the improvement of planning, and the creation of new jobs.

Comrade Zyuzin's unrealistic plans to resettle people could put directive and planning agencies in a state of confusion. For this reason, I would like to register my vehement objections to this article and an unconditional protest against the author's point of view as a fundamentally mistaken opinion which does not take local conditions into account and is not based on a thorough analysis of the demographic situation.

**"And I Ask Myself Agonizing Questions"—Letter from CPSU veteran A.V. Rusakov, Moscow**

What motivated me, a man who is already advanced in age and who witnessed the revolutionary events of 1917, to take up my pen and write to the editors? Obviously, it was not the desire to teach the young something or to share my memories, although this would be more appropriate today than ever before.

What worries me most is the fate of social reforms in our society. I might feel the need for them more keenly than my younger contemporaries. Of course, the struggle against bureaucratism and behavior contrary to socialist morality and the efforts to accelerate economic development are long overdue. But after all, the party attached great importance to them even in the past. Is it possible that the new ideas are not simply forgotten old plans but a different interpretation and more thorough understanding of our needs?

I remember how we boys marched down the suburban street of a provincial town in February 1917, singing a song we had heard our fathers sing: "Take up your cudgels and beat your masters." Reining in his horse, an officer with a waxed mustache gruffly told us to stop and made us sing something completely different—"Take up your shovels and dig a vegetable garden." It cost many lives for all of us to be able to think freely and to do whatever we can do.

I also remember a tax official who had the most sincere respect for my worker father for his openly professed antireligious views but could not greet him publicly and had to confine himself to a slight nod of the head when they met. The rules of etiquette did not allow the members of different social classes to exchange signs of recognition, especially in public.

But please tell me what is keeping the managers of some enterprises from entering a shop and having polite conversations with the workers today? Is this a matter of social barriers or of bureaucratic arrogance? This is why I believe in the kind of perestroika that would wash away all of the barriers to human mutual understanding like a spring flood. I am against the kind of progress that presents old ideas which have been discarded by history to us in a new disguise. The alienation of people and of hired laborers and the antagonism between social groups are not supposed to exist in our society, but why are there so many problems with the perestroika, which has the aim of restoring the ideals and achievements of October 1917?

I ask myself agonizing questions and I do not always find an answer. Perhaps scientists armed with the achievements of contemporary thinking could give me some help.

**The Grooms in Our Rayon—Letter from Ye.U. Kurachev**

Dear Editors! You often publish articles about the various problems of the contemporary family—the declining birthrate, the rising divorce rate, and difficulties in bringing up children. As a rule, however, the articles deal with the urban family, and the reader might have the impression that rural families have no problems of this kind. Unfortunately, this is far from the truth. I have lived and worked all my life in the rural community of Abramtsevo in Dmitrovskiy Rayon in Moscow Oblast and I would like to express my thoughts about the rural family, based on my personal observations and on available statistics. First I would like to say something about the population of our rayon and the size of the families here. According to the data Professor Tokmakov cited in the book "Istoriko-topograficheskoye opisaniye Dmitrovskogo uyezda" [History and Topography of Dmitrovskiy District], at the end of the last century there were 3,567 people living in the 18 rural communities located on the territory of what is now the Bunyatinskiy Sovkhoz of the Bolshe-Rogachevskiy rural soviet in Dmitrovskiy Rayon, and the average family consisted of 7.6 members. According to the 1970 census, the same location had a population of 1,322 and the average family consisted of 2.3 members. The respective figures for 1987 were 626 and 1.7. The reasons are the continuous migration of the rural population, especially the young, to the cities and the declining birthrate. The inhabitants of some communities literally can be counted on the fingers of one hand. For example, there are five people left in Golyadi, three in Ashcherino, and two apiece in Yurkino and Teleshovo. There is one person left in Cherny! Of the 626 inhabitants of the 18 rural communities in our rayon, 40 between the ages of 40 and 65 have never been married and have no children. This is one out of every seven in this age group. The young are in no hurry to have children either and usually limit themselves to one child, or two at most. The qualitative side of the matter is also disturbing. I am referring to the rising number of children who are slow to develop mentally or are just plain retarded. Whereas 30 years ago there was only one school in the whole rayon for these children, now there are three. The main cause is the drunkenness of their fathers and, what is most terrible, of their mothers. There are 14 women registered as substance abusers, and who knows how many women do not call themselves drunks but use any excuse to drink or do not even need an excuse to get drunk! The old moral standards characteristic of the peasant family for centuries are disintegrating. Here is a telling example: Before the war 25 orphans were adopted and raised, but now it is not uncommon for the elderly with living sons and daughters to live out the rest of their days in homes for the aged.

I am also disturbed by the declining prestige of the father and husband in the family. Of course, I am not saying that the master of the house and breadwinner should have unlimited power. Today's woman is economically

independent and equal to the man. Frequently, however, people seem to go too far in the other direction—the role of the father and husband is being reduced to nothing and the man has no say in household matters or in the upbringing of children. This usually happens in the families of men who move into the homes of their wives' parents (in the last 10 years 90 percent of the young grooms in our rayon have moved in with their in-laws after the wedding). It would seem that there are some advantages to this: They do not have to start from scratch and set up their own household, there is a grandmother to care for the children, and so forth, but there was apparently a good reason for the traditional separation of the young from their parents. Obviously, living separately involves difficulties, but it is by surmounting these difficulties that the family grows strong and the husband and wife achieve complete equality.

The contemporary rural family has just as many problems as the urban family, and I hope that my letter will bring at least some of them to the attention of specialists.

**To Cross Out Or To Underline!—Letter from V.B. Olshanskiy, Moscow**

The results of the elections to the administrative bodies of the Soviet Sociological Association made me wonder. What happened was that some people I know to be qualified and ingenious scientists, who have done much and are doing much for the development of our science, were blackballed without any kind of public criticism, while some of those who were elected are unknown to me and have done little in the field of sociology.

People might object and say that I have no right to impose my personal opinions on others, that it is stupid to argue about matters of taste, and that it is the whole point of a democracy to abide by the opinion of the majority rather than individual preferences. But I would be more likely to ascribe this to the whims of our new-born democracy. It is still unable to stand on its own feet and is just beginning to crawl. We are delighted when we hear the news that administrators are being elected here and there instead of being appointed from above in the customary manner. But we are already disturbed by cases in which the people elected at enterprises or in establishments turn out to be individuals who do not get excited about things but just remain relaxed and undemanding.

To avoid compromising the great cause of renewal, we must thoroughly analyze and perfect the election mechanism. Group egotism and the ailments of excessive pride can only be countered by the personal interest of each individual in the final results of group activity. It is no coincidence that the institution of the brigade contract and gradual economic accountability was the first step in the reorganization and that democratic reforms only came second. Many interesting ideas have been expressed in newspaper articles about the conditions

guaranteeing the truly democratic election of administrators in the public interest. This is no longer a matter of general principles, but of the improvement of the electoral mechanism. Sociologists and social psychologists will certainly look into this matter.

I would like to suggest that the editors of SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA take the first step by conducting a little experiment. Using the common principles of sociological measurement regarding the ways in which the wording of a questionnaire influences the answers of respondents and staying within the confines of the procedure by which the individual works with the election bulletin, I am hypothesizing that a certain degree of inertia in the thinking of the people who receive a voting bulletin causes them not to elect the most worthy, but merely to cross out the names of those considered unsuitable. I am proposing an anonymous postal survey of the participants in the last conference, the distribution of the same election bulletins to them again, with the addition of two questions preceding the list of candidates: 1) Do you agree with the objectives set at the conference and with the methods chosen to attain them? 2) Which of the people on the following list (underline the name or mark it with a check) is more capable than the others of working toward the attainment of these goals? Obviously, this kind of survey should not change the decisions that were already made, but if my hypothesis is correct and the proposed instructions change the attitudes of respondents, this will provide a basis for the issuance of recommendations to organizations preparing for elections, that they ask the voters not to cross out the names of candidates arousing suspicion but to *underline* those inspiring the greatest trust. This wording also seems less painful for the minority group.

**A Democratic "Infrastructure" Is Needed—Letter from Soviet Sociological Association member P.P. Petukhov**

Dear Comrades! The dry report on the Sixth All-Union Soviet Sociological Association Conference in the third issue of your journal and the comments by Yevgeniya Albats in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI (27 April 1987) are the reason for this letter. The journalist rebuked the sociologists who were dissatisfied with the results of the voting at the conference, said they should be ashamed of themselves, and advised them to "learn something about democracy." In her opinion, this means they must learn to accept any collective opinion just because it is collective.

I will dare to object to this seemingly democratic statement. As a witness, I can testify that the voting was extremely dramatic. The results did not reflect the opinion of the sociological community or even the opinion of conference delegates. This is attested to by the post facto attempt to change the conditions of election as soon as the votes had been counted. But I will relate these events in order.

A list of 128 candidates for the association board was approved in the morning of election day. According to the Soviet Sociological Association charter, there were to be 90 new people on the board. Each delegate received a copy of the list. The voters were asked to choose the most suitable candidates by crossing out the names of the unsuitable ones. I will say right away that the very conditions of the vote encouraged arbitrary and subjective choices: Almost none of the delegates knew all of the candidates on the list. I would even dare to say that no one knew all of them. I asked five of my colleagues from Moscow and other cities about this and learned that they "knew" (i.e., could express a valid opinion) from 30 to 60 candidates and "had heard of" another 25 or 30. In other words, they knew from one-third to one-half of those they were supposed to entrust with the control of our field of science. Under these conditions, it is stupid to appeal for responsible and principled choices, because the very conditions of voting encouraged subjectivism and personal ambition. Besides this, criteria other than scientific prestige, organizational abilities, and so forth were used.

I can illustrate the results of the vote in a graph [not reproduced]. We can see a clear preference for out-of-towners, and not because they know each other, but because each person knows the Muscovites and, as it turned out, is inclined to judge them quite harshly. On the average, the Muscovites won approximately 160 votes and the out-of-towners won approximately 180 (I am writing "approximately" because I do not have any official information and must rely on my own notes).

The announcement of the results was like a clap of thunder on a sunny day. At least 20 scientists of national and world renown, the authors of respected monographs and textbooks, organizers and administrators of sociology, were not elected to the Soviet Sociological Association board. The voters preferred the "unknown soldiers" of science. And we cannot complain, because a democracy is a democracy. This is where the floor should be turned over to the journalist from MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI so that she could quote, as she did in her newspaper article, association President T.I. Zaslavskaya's advice to us to learn to accept the results of democratic expressions of will, however disappointing they might be.

In spite of her personal convictions, the association president proposed a change in election procedure, suggesting that the new board members could be all the people who won two-thirds of the vote rather than the 90 people who won the highest number of votes (as stipulated in the association charter adopted the day before). The proposal was put to a vote and was then adopted over the protests of some. Of the 128 candidates on the list, 118 became members of the board. "That does it! I am going to burn my membership card!"—my neighbor slapped the back of his chair in a rage over our democracy's "suicide."

What is the moral of this story? Yes, we must learn something about democracy, but it is less important to learn to accept the results of democratic expressions of will (although even this has turned out to be difficult) than to learn to express our own wishes in a democratic atmosphere. First of all, we must realize the crucial and fundamental importance of our own choice and, second, we must be able to plan and conduct democratic procedures. The latter is particularly important.

I would like to ask the organizers of the conference several questions. Why was a different, stricter voting procedure not instituted? Why were no quotas (for different branches of the association) observed in the nomination of candidates for the board? Why were these nominations not discussed or made at regional conferences? And the main question is this: Why are some of the new members of the board unknown in sociology while many renowned and respected scientists have been "thrown overboard"?

I think it is no coincidence that only a few more than half of the newly elected board members (72 out of 118) were present when the vice presidents were elected the next day. This certainly provides no evidence of their interest in scientific affairs.

The elections to the SSA board proved that the sociologists who should be paving the way for democracy were not ready to do this. They displayed a lack of professional competence and civic responsibility. It is too bad that the first pancake turned out to be lumpy. But this should serve as a lesson for the future. The planning and organization of a democratic "infrastructure" will require a highly responsible approach: The nomination procedure, representation quotas, forms and methods of publicizing campaign "platforms," and appropriate voting procedures must be defined and recorded in the charter. We need reliable rules of democracy rather than ad hoc regulations, and, of course, once we have adopted these rules, we must observe them.

Democracy, Aristotle once said, has two enemies: tyranny and mob rule. Mob rule easily turns into tyranny. The democratic "edifice" must be built on a strong and reliable foundation to avoid these dangers.

**An Honest Young Man with a Thick Wallet—Letter from Doctor of Philosophical Sciences B.Z. Doktorov, Leningrad**

Dear Editors! I feel the need to make a few remarks about distributive relations in our society (No 3, 1987).

Wage-leveling has become an objective tendency (a short-lived one, I hope), a propaganda cliché, and a common occurrence. G.S. Batygin is correct in saying that a high standard of living and non-labor income are equated in the public mind. He is also correct in calling the obsession with prohibitions a "social ailment." The author is carrying on the ideas expressed so clearly in

works by V. Ovechkin, A. Agranovskiy, A. Strelyanyy, and G. Lisichkin. I also agree completely with these views, but I was nevertheless dissatisfied with the article. The sociological study of the issue of fairness should be more thorough, and the causes of the "malicious virtue" of public thinking should be defined more boldly and more precisely. Batygin first records it and then discusses it, but he should also disclose (even if only halfway) the historical roots of this state of public consciousness. Then we will acquire a realistic and more sweeping view of today's stereotypes in distributive relations. There is no question that there is some "genetic" hostility between the rich and the poor, but this is also present in the illiterate person's relationship to the scholar, the customer's relationship to the salesclerk, etc. The roots or causes of these "reflexes" are lost in history.

The 1960's and 1970's led to the association of the "good life" with "easy money." People must realize that they rarely see a rich inventor, or even a rich professor, but they always run into bribe-takers in stores, thieving kolkhoz chairmen, and officials who live on graft. The public consciousness registers all of this. Can it accept the image of an honest young man with a thick wallet? G.S. Batygin does not answer this question.

Another "subject" that might shed new light on this discussion, in my opinion, is all of the "speculation" about the consequences of individual labor activity. The statements by its "opponents" are emotional and "rational." Sometimes this "rationalism" frightens me: It is true that we cannot exclude the possibility of serious negative consequences of individual labor activity in an atmosphere of low legal and economic standards. Perhaps a sociological analysis of the work ethic and the rational work paradigm would be useful.

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**What Is Impeding Perestroyka (New Studies by Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences)**

*18060001o Moscow SOTSILOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87 (signed to press 10 Jul 87) pp 126-127*

[Report by A.I. Michurin on joint session of Academic Council of Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, and editors of SOTSILOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in April 1987]

[Text] It is unlikely that anyone today would expect the reorganization of the socioeconomic sphere to be a smooth and unimpeded process, but it is important to know the actual dimensions of current developments, to record the exact parameters of acceleration, and to determine the decelerating force, structure, and mechanism of deterring factors.

Sociological studies of the renewal process and their results were discussed at a joint session of the Academic Council of the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, and the editors of *SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA* (in April 1987). Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V.N. Ivanov, institute director, analyzed the materials of empirical studies conducted by the research team in 1986 and 1987 in a number of our country's industrial regions. Some of the results have been reported in newspapers [1]).

The new method of operational research—sociological observations of the perestroika—consists of conducting a series of exploratory public opinion polls and an analysis of publications to disclose the social features of reforms and the problems and contradictions in this important historic process. Public attitudes toward economic-organizational changes in the USSR are the focus of attention.

Each field of scientific inquiry, the speaker said, is the responsibility of a particular subdivision of the Institute of Sociological Research, which periodically (once or twice a year) collects information on its assigned subject with the aid of a unionwide sample group. This kind of "sociological monitoring" is productive because it provides administrative bodies with situational information and serves as a basis for short- and long-range forecasts of changes (already apparent or still latent) in the socioeconomic sphere.

What have the first results revealed? A public opinion poll conducted in eight scientific-production associations and five intersectorial scientific-technical complexes—and these, V.N. Ivanov remarked, represent only a fraction of the basic network of enterprises (more than 120 in all) serving as the organizational base of this large-scale project—revealed general attitudes toward the success of the perestroika. In particular, only 16 percent of all scientific personnel and 5.2 percent of all engineering and technical personnel called it an unqualified success. Many respondents believe, on the contrary, that the perestroika is still being carried out too slowly and with great difficulty (31.4 percent and 46.9 percent respectively) or that it has made no difference whatsoever (32.3 percent and 47.9 percent).

In spite of the obvious organizational interruptions and bureaucratic delays in the reforms, the absolute majority (from 84 percent to 94 percent) of young workers and members of the scientific and technical intelligentsia surveyed in Orsk (in a group of 400) in March 1987 still believed in the perestroika and regarded it as a necessary and objectively long-overdue process. But will their enthusiasm and their genuine interest in social renewal last for long if they encounter indifference and irresponsibility at every turn? The actual potential of "antiperestroika" attitudes is still just as strong: 76 percent of all engineering and technical personnel said that the material and technical base is inadequate for the acceleration of scientific and technical progress, 60 percent said that

planning and management standards are too low, 50 percent cited the colossal and completely unjustified losses of work time in research institutes, and last but not least, 45 percent said that personal relationships and friendship are still the prevailing factors in managerial appointments. What kind of turning point could it be if 90 percent of all scientific personnel and engineers are still being assigned to work in warehouses and on construction sites and *kolkhozes*?

We know that the special reliance on youth is not simply the current fashion but an integral element of the party's innovative strategy. Up to 50 percent of the young respondents, however, said that the country's problems should be solved by the older generation and not by people of their age. Apparently, many have grown used to the idea that bureaucratism, the misuse of authority, low standards of labor, conservative stereotypes in thinking, and authoritarianism are age-related, and not social, ailments. But after all, does this not lead to a consumer mentality and infantile behavior? It is interesting that when young workers and employees were asked the direct question—"Is perestroika necessary to you personally?"—from 30 to 40 percent of them either avoided answering the question or said it was not.

It is probable that the situation in which the number of people wanting to participate in the management of production and of public affairs is many times as high as the number of people actually involved in it, which was recorded by sociologists long ago, still exists. In any case, more than half of the 254 rank-and-file laborers (engineering and technical personnel, employees, and workers) surveyed in Moscow expressed complete dissatisfaction with existing opportunities to influence the progress of the perestroika in their labor collective.

It turned out that the range of glasnost is broadest in discussions of violations of discipline and the results of socialist competition, but when it comes to the distribution of housing and bonuses and the resolution of personnel problems, the personal opinion of 52 percent of the respondents is rarely or never solicited, although these are the precise issues related directly to people's vital needs. Apparently, regulated initiative still prevails over unsanctioned glasnost and opportunities for self-management. This is why something else is not surprising: Elected administrators are usually on the lowest level of management (foremen and brigade leaders) and are enterprise directors in only 15 percent of all cases. Furthermore, the system of competition for jobs and of performance evaluations has not been raised to a qualitatively new and higher level yet. The speaker did note, however, that the number of cases of protectionism in job placement has decreased by 15 percent.

Here is an interesting detail: More than half of the rank-and-file engineering and technical personnel believe that the perestroika is being impeded largely by the labor collective itself and by the social passivity and psychological inertia of people. Around 50 percent of the

administrators (directors, chief specialists, and heads of subdivisions), however, mentioned the bureaucratism of superior authorities and inaccuracies in plans "handed down from above."

Furthermore, 40 percent of the administrators were certain that their subordinates were ready for the perestroika but did not know how to work according to new methods, and 23 percent simply do not want the perestroika to restrict their interests.

In general, however, the latent opponents of the perestroika appear to fall into two main categories: semi-skilled workers and incompetent managers. The results of the polls resembled something like a social scale, with highly skilled workers and engineering and technical personnel energetically supporting the renewal and democratization of production at one end of the scale and with administrative personnel at the other. For example, 60 percent of all specialists believe that there has been no real change for the better in the performance of ministerial personnel. They play no part whatsoever in the scientific substantiation of plan assignments, the struggle against bureaucratism, the dissemination of advanced experience and scientific achievements, the transfer to complete cost accounting, and the resolution of social problems. All of this is taking place spontaneously and outside the ministerial offices.

It was also learned that there are definite "leaders" of the anti-perestroika movement—i.e., departments competing with one another in the publication of totally unnecessary sets of instructions and circulars, the organization of useless meetings and, finally, the effective strangulation of glasnost. The main ones are the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry (92.4 percent of the respondents) and the USSR Ministry of Finance (85.7 percent).

Therefore, the speaker stressed, the social features of the current perestroika in our country are extremely ambiguous and contradictory. Obviously, the current social picture cannot be portrayed only in black and white tones because shades of gray now appear to be dominant. This apparently testifies to the complexity of the process itself, the diversity of the social base of the perestroika, and the differing attitudes of different groups of people toward it. Sociologists must keep track of the "barometer" of public opinion more carefully and efficiently.

Comments on the report were made by N.A. Alekseyev, I.V. Bestuzhev-Lada, G.L. Bondarevskiy, Z.T. Galenkova, and others.

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