Journal Editor on Moscow Summit, Disarmament  [V.M. Berezhkov; pp 3-10] .................................................. 1
U.S. Pacific Strategy Examined  [B.N. Zanegin; pp 11-18] .................................................................................. 6
U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa  [Yu.A. Bochkarev; pp 57-61] .............................................................. 16
Role of International Space University  [A.A. Voronkov; pp 61-64] ............................................................ 19
Articles Not Translated from SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 5, May 1988 .......... 29
Publication Data .................................................................................................................. 30
The situation that has taken shape on the threshold of the new Soviet-U.S. summit provides grounds for a certain amount of optimism. Both sides are moving along a path of political dialogue between the top leaders of the USSR and United States which was begun in Geneva and continued at the Reykjavik and Washington talks.

An important milestone on this road was the signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, which reflected the deep and radical changes not only in the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, but also in international life as a whole. Of no less significance is the fact that both sides view what has been achieved as a stepping-stone from which even more significant steps can be made. At their recent meetings, the foreign ministers of both sides were able to note the mutual aspiration for agreements on a wide range of issues. This particularly applies to the preparation of a treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons. Objectively speaking, there is still a chance that the development of a corresponding treaty, with the observance of the ABM Treaty as a condition, will have been concluded by the time of the Moscow summit, which is to be held from 29 May to 2 June.

There are also good prospects in a number of spheres of bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations. Agreements have been signed on economic ties, scientific exchanges, and peaceful cooperation in space. Negotiations are being conducted on drawing up a treaty on transportation, science, and technology, and a number of other areas, and certain prospects have taken shape with regard to trade. Regional problems and human rights are being actively discussed, and each side is frankly expressing its concern, its views, and its concepts.

There has recently been a substantial expansion in cultural exchanges and contacts between different population strata of the Soviet Union and the United States. Soviet and American people have acquired a chance to gain a better knowledge of each other, prejudiced ideas are being eroded, and old cliches are growing dim.

At the same time, in the United States, as indeed in a number of West European countries, all these processes are leading to an exacerbation of confrontation between the forces which M.S. Gorbachev has characterized as the "peace party" and the "war party." Those who are against any agreements with the Soviet Union are offering stubborn resistance to the disarmament process and striving to prevent the normalization of the international situation. They are once again circulating the worn-out cliches of a "Soviet threat," "Soviet expansionism," and the need for the West to improve and build up its weapons, because the USSR supposedly "only understands force." It is only to be regretted that even the official representatives of the Western powers sometimes allow themselves such outbursts, although they swear that they are adhering to a disarmament policy.

American political scientists usually explain such contradictions by the fact that far from everyone in the West has come to believe in the sincerity of the Soviet initiatives. Recently they have even been asking themselves what phenomenon the West is dealing with—is it "restructuring" or a "respite"? Moscow supposedly needs the restructuring process, the USSR's peace initiatives in the world arena, and the new thinking in order to provide a "respite" in the context of worsening domestic problems. Having coped with these problems one way or another, the Soviet country will return to its previous postulates and way of action. For this reason, the West would do better not to rush, but rather to wait a little and see whether there really is any "restructuring" in the USSR, or whether it is simply a "respite."

At various academic symposiums and conferences, Western political scientists are now explaining to their Soviet colleagues that state institutions and academic centers in America and Europe are carefully studying and analyzing what is going on in the Soviet Union, and that some time will pass before conclusions are drawn that will form the basis of the relevant governments' standpoints. Only then, they say, will it be possible to count on radically revised assessments of the Soviet Union, its actions, and its intentions. At the same time, the American experts recognize that the established cliches about the USSR are very convenient for certain Western circles. In the past, references to the "Soviet threat" have always worked and have made it possible to get allocations for new weapon systems and for increased aid to counterrevolutionary forces waging a struggle against governments that are legitimate, but somehow unsuitable for the U.S. Government. Antisocialist rhetoric has helped more than once in election campaigns, too.

However, such tactics have begun to misfire more and more often. In countries allied to Washington, and indeed in the United States itself, people have begun to have an increasingly distrustful attitude toward belligerent speeches. They are tired of confrontation, they are awaiting new approaches and a positive reaction by the West to the Soviet peace initiatives, and they are relying on further successful progress along the road of nuclear arms reduction and elimination.

The opponents of agreements are forced to resort to various tricks. Without directly rejecting the disarmament process, they recommend that it be held in check
and that the strategic arms talks should not be forced ahead. All kinds of doubts are voiced, and it is proposed that there be another thorough analysis of the situation developing in Europe in connection with the signing of the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. They prophesy that, after the elimination of these systems, Western Europe will be defenseless and thrown upon the mercy of the Soviet Union. Demands are being made for the gap which has formed to be “compensated” for by modernizing those nuclear weapon systems that remain on the continent. It continues to be asserted that the USSR has “immense superiority” in Europe in terms of conventional weapons, and therefore must undertake unilateral reductions before a mutual reduction in levels takes place. The Senate debate on the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles has shown what devices have been resorted to by the advocates of the arms race in order to prevent this historic first step from being taken toward a nuclear-free world.

Opponents of the treaty have appeared not only in the United States, but also in Western Europe. One French newspaper christened the Washington accord the “new Yalta.” It states that at the February 1945 Yalta Conference the elderly President Roosevelt “gave away” Eastern Europe to Stalin, and that in Washington another aged president has now “given away” Western Europe to the Soviets. The authors of this version are evidently counting on making an irresistible impression on the uninformed man in the street. The fact is, however, that this version has nothing whatsoever to do with reality. Such assessments of the Yalta Conference merely reflect the disappointment of those who had planned to impose their own systems on East European states after the war and to create a new “cordon sanitaire” as was done after World War I and the October Revolution. Roosevelt understood that this opportunity would not be repeated. Shortly before the Yalta meeting he explained to his immediate entourage that, having freed the East European states from the fascist yoke at the cost of enormous losses, the Soviet Union had every justification for striving to ensure that friendly regimes were set up in the countries that adjoined it.

As far as the attack made by certain French circles on Yalta is concerned, it is all the more strange because the participants in the Yalta meeting reaffirmed France’s status as a great power. After a dinner in the Yusupov Palace—the Soviet delegation’s residence during the Crimean conference—Stalin accompanied Roosevelt to the door. Before leaving, he addressed the President:

“If only as a courtesy.”

“Well then, we will do it as a courtesy,” Stalin summed up.

That was how the question of France becoming one of the four occupying great powers was resolved at Yalta....

The French newspaper’s attack on the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is perhaps an extreme case. More refined attempts to cast aspersions on the disarmament process predominate. For instance, fears are expressed that the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles would eliminate the factor of “nuclear deterrence” and lead to the erosion of the U.S. presence in Western Europe. Once again the thesis of a “Soviet threat” is the starting-point for this.

Although it has long been admitted everywhere that a nuclear conflict is impossible because it would lead to a universal catastrophe, Western figures continue to base their defense policy on a concept that allows for the use of nuclear weapons. Speaking in Brussels in mid-February 1988, Margaret Thatcher declared: “We must maintain the strategy of flexible response, which calls for a convincing combination of weapon systems that is convincing in terms of the readiness to use it. And this includes a nuclear element. If we need a reliable nuclear element then we must carry out an accelerated modernization of NATO’s nuclear weapons, in accordance with the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.”

The doctrine of “nuclear deterrence” was accepted by the NATO countries long ago. However, real life is demonstrating its unsubstantiated and amoral nature in an increasingly clear manner. The Soviet Union has more than once stated that under no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons, just as it is never the first to use military force. The Western powers are stubbornly trying to avoid entering into such an obligation. Moreover, they do everything to stress the “reliability” of the doctrine of “nuclear deterrence,” in other words, the readiness to respond with a nuclear strike to a hypothetical conflict involving conventional weapons.

What is essentially involved is thus the NATO countries’ readiness to unleash a nuclear catastrophe. In an effort to downplay the responsibility assumed by politicians who adhere to this concept, the Western experts refer to the fact that the principle of mutual nuclear deterrence will continue to exist even after a 50-percent cut in strategic nuclear systems. However, first of all this reduction is only one more step toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, which the Soviet Union proposes be achieved by the year 2000. Second, in a reduction of strategic weapons the implication is that “nuclear retaliation” is in response to “nuclear attack.” The NATO concept, however, lays down a nuclear response to a conflict with conventional weapons.
In the same speech in Brussels, M. Thatcher recommended that it be not forgotten that “Soviet foreign policy continues to represent a grave threat.” Where does this threat lie? It turns out that its “main aim” is supposedly to “separate the Europeans from the Americans.”

The thesis that holds that the Soviet Union aspires to “oust” the United States from the European process is very widespread in Western propaganda, and in precisely the context of the conclusion of the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. The interview that former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger gave to the London newspaper SUNDAY TELEGRAPH at the end of January 1988 is typical in this connection. Discussing the changing situation in the world, he expressed the opinion that “many groups in the U.S. leadership have become quasi-isolationist.” Moving on to the European region, Kissinger voiced the idea that: “At an intellectual level, Europe’s relative significance is undoubtedly falling. If, however, the United States consciously gives up Europe, Europe will become isolationist.”

Assessing the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, Kissinger states that there have been many different versions of this treaty, and that “the most useful of these would have established a link between conventional and nuclear disarmament.” In addition, in Kissinger’s opinion a treaty should have been signed not on the complete elimination of intermediate-range missiles, but on only a 50-percent reduction in them. The justification for this standpoint is interesting. Kissinger asserts that the version he proposes “is of immense significance for West Germany.” He declares that the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles “will lead to the collapse of the alliance (NATO) because the first reaction is to allow the British and French forces to replace the U.S. forces to a certain extent. The Germans will then come to the conclusion that it is even less probable that they can count on British and French support than they can on support from the United States, and for this reason will turn their attention to the Russians.”

The former U.S. Secretary of State clearly needed all these arguments in order to lead the reader to the thesis according to which a weakening of U.S. influence will intensify the “Soviet threat” and that it is precisely the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles that is fraught with the danger of the United States being “ousted.”

Attempts to ascribe such a meaning to the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles are absolutely unfounded. Nor does the Soviet Union have the intention of “ousting” America. The United States’ involvement in the European process developed historically as a result of its participation in the war against Hitler’s Germany, and it is confirmed in the Potsdam documents, in the Four-Power Agreement on West Berlin, and in the Helsinki Final Act. This is connected not least with the actual U.S. military presence in Europe. No one is about to dispute this status of the United States. Like Canada, it has been and continues to be an active participant in the European process. “When we point to the importance of Europe’s independent stance,” M.S. Gorbachev explains, “we are frequently accused of a desire to set Western Europe and the United States at loggerheads. We never had, and do not now have, any such intention whatsoever. We are apart from ignoring or belittling the historical ties that exist between Western Europe and the United States. It is preposterous to interpret the Soviet Union’s European line as some expression of ‘anti-Americanism.’ We do not intend to engage in diplomatic juggling and we have no wish to provoke chaos in international relations. That would be incompatible with the prime objective of our foreign policy—promoting a stable and lasting peace built upon mutual trust and cooperation between nations.” (1) One has to suppose that even the authors of the thesis of the United States being “ousted” do not take it seriously. What is involved is rather the use of it to undermine efforts in the disarmament sphere.

Alongside the continuing efforts to slow down the disarmament process, the aspiration of more sober-minded circles to develop a realistic approach to contemporary problems is taking shape more and more clearly. This aspiration is nurtured by an increased interest in the West concerning everything that is happening in the Soviet Union. In the last 2 to 3 years our country’s popularity has grown immeasurably. People want to know what restructuring means and how it is affecting Soviet foreign policy. For the first time in many years the new thinking, which has already led to major shifts, makes it possible for peoples to look into the future with hope. All this is prompting scientific circles in the United States and Western Europe to engage in serious study and analysis of the transformations being conducted in the USSR, and to attempt to develop proposals to modify the Western powers’ standpoint.

In my opinion, the pamphlet entitled “How Should America Respond to Gorbachev’s Challenge? A Report of the Task Force on Soviet New Thinking,” which was published at the end of last year, is worthy of attention. This group was set up on the initiative of the New York Institute for the Study of East-West Security Problems. The group was made up of 38 eminent U.S. experts belonging to the two main political parties. Officials and specialists from Western Europe as well as members of the U.S. Congress were invited to some of its sessions.

When the group was being set up it was specifically stipulated that its results must be based exclusively on the personal judgments of the researchers and cannot reflect the viewpoint of the Institute for the Study of East-West Security Problems or any other institution. It was envisaged that the special group’s work would be only the first stage in a program that is intended to be conducted over a number of years with the aim of systematically studying changing East-West relations.

The introduction to the report reads: “The transformations that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has recently been conducting in the spheres of both domestic and
foreign policy have attracted attention all over the world. On a number of key issues—from domestic economic reform to problems of nuclear arms control and emigration—the Gorbachev leadership has revised long-held Soviet positions and is thus challenging the United States and its allies to rethink many of the concepts on which their policy toward the Soviet Union is based.... There is now an opportunity to review the broad range of relations between the United States and the USSR and between East and West, and to outline the steps both sides could take to ensure international stability.... The wide range of questions that this report touches on represents a response to the need to study all the sources of instability in East-West relations—military, political, economic, and ideological—in order to create more rational and lasting foundations for world development." (2)

The report particularly stresses the significance of its compilers belonging to both parties as a manifestation of unanimity about the need for a revision of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and for negotiations with the Soviet leadership aimed at achieving a prolonged and stable relaxation of tension.” (3) The researchers conduct a thorough examination of the Soviet side’s new approaches which relate to the most important problems of domestic and foreign policy. They believe that all this opens up prospects for practical agreements between the United States and the USSR and between East and West. In order to make this a reality, however, the West should “introduce clarity into its own policy and priorities. The new political thinking in the East calls for new political thinking in the West.” (4)

Proceeding from the view that a conventional arms accord must follow the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the document’s compilers recommend:

—The United States and its allies should intensify their talks with the Warsaw Pact with the aim of reducing conventional weapons and eliminating offensive strike potential, especially that intended for surprise attacks.

—Both sides must speed up progress toward signing an agreement on substantial cuts in strategic nuclear forces. Such cuts would provide a consolidation of strategic stability and eliminate the ability to inflict a crippling first strike. At the same time they should seek ways of strengthening the ABM Treaty and ensure that any research in the sphere of strategic defensive systems is compatible with the upholding of this treaty.

—The West must strive for a swift conclusion to the Geneva talks on chemical weapons, including the creation of an international verification regime. Such an agreement would lead to increased confidence in Europe during a period of anxiety about the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles from the continent’s territory.

In the sphere of international economic policy the report states that the Western governments, in conjunction with the private sector, must welcome Soviet efforts to develop legislative foundations for establishing a mutually acceptable system of joint enterprise. The key sectors in this cooperation would include power equipment, machine building, transportation, communications, agricultural technology, and financial services.

It is the opinion of the report’s compilers that although Western governments must not subsidize credits, they should not block the supply of private credits on a commercial basis.

As the Soviet economy is decentralized and glasnost is extended to foreign economic activity, it is proposed that the West examine the question of giving the USSR observer status in GATT and possibly in the IMF.

The report goes on to say that if the Soviet Union demonstrates respect for human rights, the U.S. Government and Congress must bring their policy into line with the position of the United States' allies by revising the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments, which restrict trade with, and the provision of credits for, the USSR. The West should strive for a normalization of the structure of trade with the USSR on the basis of joint and mutual interests.

It is also recommended that the general Soviet-U.S. agreement on scientific-technological cooperation be expanded on a completely mutual basis.

The report contains a number of proposals on regional problems, including settlements in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf region, and the Near East. The compilers of the document recommend that in the question of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the United States and the Soviet Union should work together to further a process of peaceful settlement that would guarantee the territorial inviolability and interests of all states and sides. (5) These considerations might perhaps be taken into account in some form in the course of future negotiations, alongside Soviet initiatives and the well-known proposals made by the Warsaw Pact. The fact that the compilers represent both the main U.S. political parties shows that their recommendations could be used by both a Republican and a Democratic administration.

The discussion around the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles has revealed differences among certain NATO member countries. The British side insists that the nuclear weapons that remain in Europe after the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles has been implemented should be rapidly modernized, and also that negotiations on reducing tactical nuclear weapons should be held back until the negotiations on conventional weapons have been concluded.
In contrast to this, FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl sees no need at present to make a decision on modernizing nuclear weapons in Europe. He also believes that negotiations on cutting tactical nuclear weapons with a range of up to 500 kilometers to commence even before the negotiations on reducing conventional weapons and eliminating chemical weapons are concluded. These same differences in the positions of a number of alliance member countries were revealed at the NATO Council special session at the level of heads of state and government, which was held in Brussels at the beginning of March. Nor was there any shortage of the well-known cliches about the Warsaw Pact’s “superiority” in conventional weapons, the “Soviet threat,” and so on. At the same time, the participants in the session decided to hold off on the modernization of nuclear missiles remaining in Western Europe and expressed the hope that “at the forthcoming meeting in Moscow, Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will be able to consolidate progress” in the disarmament sphere.

The progress made at the Geneva talks on a 50-percent reduction in strategic forces, with the ABM Treaty being observed in the form in which it was signed in 1972, as well as the shifts that are to be observed in certain other areas— in the sphere of eliminating chemical weapons and halting nuclear tests—all these are important parts of the disarmament process that correspond to the interests of all mankind. It is important not to relax efforts, as well as to ensure further forward movement. It is no less necessary to get rid of the old cliches, prejudices, and deliberate distortions. Above all, these include the false picture of the Soviet Union’s so-called superiority in the sphere of both strategic and conventional weapons.

On numerous occasions the Soviet side has explained the true state of affairs—the historically determined asymmetry in strategic weapon systems and the overall balance in conventional weapons, with different levels in various types of weapon and in the correlation of the economic, scientific-technological, and human potentials of the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries. The Western side, however, continues to assert its own version, having unfortunately convinced a considerable proportion of the U.S. and West European public of “Soviet superiority.” It is to be hoped that the article by USSR Defense Minister D.T. Yazov, which was published in PRAVDA on 8 February 1988, has introduced clarity into this issue. The article examines in detail the correlation of potentials of the USSR and United States in the sphere of strategic weapons, and shows the strategic balance that actually exists between the two powers. Specific computations and figures are used to demonstrate that there is approximate parity between the forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Attempts to exaggerate the potential of the Warsaw Pact merely conceal the aspiration for NATO superiority over it. Meanwhile, as D.T. Yazov stresses, “European talks on this problem have every chance of success if they are concerned with a mutual and simultaneous reduction and a mutual elimination of the asymmetry and imbalances.” (6)

D.T. Yazov’s article also contains an important standpoint on the principle of sufficiency for defense. In the West there is a considerable amount of speculation of every kind about this principle, which the Soviet side has put forward within the framework of the new thinking. “For strategic nuclear forces, sufficiency today is determined by the ability to prevent a nuclear strike from being launched with impunity against our country in any situation, even the most unfavorable. As for conventional armaments, sufficiency means the minimum necessary number and high quality of armed forces and armaments capable of reliably ensuring the country’s defense.” (7)

Since the Soviet Union has given a solemn undertaking never to be the first to use nuclear or conventional weapons, the Soviet understanding of the principle of sufficiency is of an entirely defensive nature.

One must assume that the Bern meeting between the defense ministers of the USSR and United States will help to clarify the true situation and finally put an end to attempts to ascribe aspirations to the Soviet Union that it has never had and does not now have.

A great deal of work has recently been done by the foreign ministers of the two powers. In conjunction with experts, they conducted a wide-scale discussion on arms limitation and reduction issues, devoting much attention to the development of a treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons and all the related documents. This proved to be no easy task. The ministers had instructions from the supreme leaders to prepare not simply a new agreement, but a really good treaty that could be reliably verified, that was durable, and that would take each party’s interests into account.

All over the world people are hopefully awaiting the Moscow meeting between the supreme leaders of the USSR and the United States. This is understandable. After all, the definitive significance of such meetings, as well as of the decisions that are made at them, lies in the fact that they raise Soviet-U.S. relations to a new level and thus predetermine the new nature of international relations as a whole.

Footnotes


3. Ibid.


5. Ibid., pp 27-32.
Since the beginning of the 1980s U.S. foreign policy has been influenced by rightwing conservative ideas about international relations. Their supporters in the Reagan Administration see the goal of foreign policy as a move from the principles of passive "containment" to the policy of vigorous struggle against revolutionary forces and, above all, the Soviet Union. In the Asian-Pacific region this goal is embodied in politico-military and military undertakings supplementing Washington's Atlantic strategy.

Because of its geopolitical position, strength, and policies, the United States understandably influences the international situation in this region considerably. Relations between states belonging to different social systems are distinguished here by a relatively high level of confrontation and by weak political and economic ties. To a certain extent this situation is perpetuated by the tendency of the capitalist countries in the region to follow in the wake of American policy and to reject constructive interaction by states belonging to different socioeconomic systems. As for the United States, it is striving to give this historical division the features of politico-military confrontation and essentially rejects (at least in this region) the idea of peaceful coexistence and constructive cooperation.¹

Although anti-Soviet aims might constitute the main aspect of American foreign policy, however, this is not the only aspect. Its neoglobalist content also dictates the primacy of American imperialism's interests in relations with allies and partners and the constant exertion of pressure on them in the interest, and sometimes merely on the pretext, of counteracting the influence of the USSR.

The fact is that in spite of their relative economic and social homogeneity, the capitalist-oriented countries are sometimes distinguished by widely diverging foreign policies. The stepped-up economic growth of some countries, the growth of political awareness under the influence of nationalism, and the revolutionizing effects of socialist ideas on socially unstable societies in the Asian-Pacific region have been accompanied by the establishment of local "power centers" that are trying to pursue a foreign policy motivated primarily by the interests of their ruling classes and far from always coinciding with the coalition interests formulated in Washington.² This is creating more clearly defined patterns of multipolar international relations than in Europe.

All of this has made interrelations between U.S. partners more complex in this region, has weakened the social determinants of their foreign policy behavior, and has consequently given rise to conflicts between the American strategy of bipolar social confrontation and the spontaneously developing political processes in the Asian-Pacific region. One example is the antinuclear position taken by New Zealand, which has put the existence of one of the elements of the "deterrence" system—the ANZUS politico-military bloc—in question.

The years of the Reagan Administration have been marked by the heightened concern of U.S. leaders and the American public about the Pacific region of world politics and by the perceptible intensification of Washington's foreign policy activity in the Pacific basin. There are deep-seated objective reasons for these changes, especially the stepped-up inclusion of this region in the modern world economy and global political interrelations in recent decades. The acceleration of this tendency and the related higher status of Pacific concerns among U.S. foreign policy priorities, however, are due to certain political developments in the American society, particularly the transfer of policymaking functions to the ruling circles of the American establishment; this alone presupposed a greater interest in the Pacific zone, which conservative political tradition has always regarded as a region equal in importance to Europe.

I

The years of the Reagan Administration have been marked by the heightened concern of U.S. leaders and the American public about the Pacific region of world politics and by the perceptible intensification of Washington's foreign policy activity in the Pacific basin. There are deep-seated objective reasons for these changes, especially the stepped-up inclusion of this region in the modern world economy and global political interrelations in recent decades. The acceleration of this tendency and the related higher status of Pacific concerns among U.S. foreign policy priorities, however, are due to certain political developments in the American society, particularly the transfer of policymaking functions to the ruling circles of the American establishment; this alone presupposed a greater interest in the Pacific zone, which conservative political tradition has always regarded as a region equal in importance to Europe.

7. Ibid.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988
8588

U.S. Pacific Strategy Examined
18030009a Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88 (signed to press 16 Apr 88) pp 11-18
[Article by Boris Nikolayevich Zanegin, doctor of historical sciences and senior research associate at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "Pacific Aspect of U.S. Foreign Policy Strategy"]

[Text] The Washington accords embodying the arguments of the new political thinking demonstrated the real possibility of demilitarizing international relations and ridding world politics of military and political confrontations. Although the results of the Washington meeting are of worldwide significance, however, they were based on a mutual understanding primarily on Europe and for Europe (even though there is an Asian aspect to the INF Treaty), where the United States is involved in the process of arms reduction and in the general political (Helsinki) process. As far as the Asian-Pacific region is concerned, here U.S. ruling circles are still not responding, for various reasons, to the numerous peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and other countries. Furthermore, the contradictory dynamics of U.S. policy in Europe and the Pacific are striking (and require explanation): Washington's participation in collective efforts to lower the level of politico-military confrontation in Europe, combined with the perceptible intensification of confrontation and the reinforcement of its military and political base in the Asian-Pacific region.

1

Although anti-Soviet aims might constitute the main aspect of American foreign policy, however, this is not the only aspect. Its neoglobalist content also dictates the primacy of American imperialism's interests in relations with allies and partners and the constant exertion of pressure on them in the interest, and sometimes merely on the pretext, of counteracting the influence of the USSR.

The fact is that in spite of their relative economic and social homogeneity, the capitalist-oriented countries are sometimes distinguished by widely diverging foreign policies. The stepped-up economic growth of some countries, the growth of political awareness under the influence of nationalism, and the revolutionizing effects of socialist ideas on socially unstable societies in the Asian-Pacific region have been accompanied by the establishment of local "power centers" that are trying to pursue a foreign policy motivated primarily by the interests of their ruling classes and far from always coinciding with the coalition interests formulated in Washington.² This is creating more clearly defined patterns of multipolar international relations than in Europe.

All of this has made interrelations between U.S. partners more complex in this region, has weakened the social determinants of their foreign policy behavior, and has consequently given rise to conflicts between the American strategy of bipolar social confrontation and the spontaneously developing political processes in the Asian-Pacific region. One example is the antinuclear position taken by New Zealand, which has put the existence of one of the elements of the "deterrence" system—the ANZUS politico-military bloc—in question.

18030009a Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88 (signed to press 16 Apr 88) pp 11-18
[Article by Boris Nikolayevich Zanegin, doctor of historical sciences and senior research associate at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "Pacific Aspect of U.S. Foreign Policy Strategy"]

[Text] The Washington accords embodying the arguments of the new political thinking demonstrated the real possibility of demilitarizing international relations and ridding world politics of military and political confrontations. Although the results of the Washington meeting are of worldwide significance, however, they were based on a mutual understanding primarily on Europe and for Europe (even though there is an Asian aspect to the INF Treaty), where the United States is involved in the process of arms reduction and in the general political (Helsinki) process. As far as the Asian-Pacific region is concerned, here U.S. ruling circles are still not responding, for various reasons, to the numerous peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and other countries. Furthermore, the contradictory dynamics of U.S. policy in Europe and the Pacific are striking (and require explanation): Washington's participation in collective efforts to lower the level of politico-military confrontation in Europe, combined with the perceptible intensification of confrontation and the reinforcement of its military and political base in the Asian-Pacific region.

1

Although anti-Soviet aims might constitute the main aspect of American foreign policy, however, this is not the only aspect. Its neoglobalist content also dictates the primacy of American imperialism's interests in relations with allies and partners and the constant exertion of pressure on them in the interest, and sometimes merely on the pretext, of counteracting the influence of the USSR.

The fact is that in spite of their relative economic and social homogeneity, the capitalist-oriented countries are sometimes distinguished by widely diverging foreign policies. The stepped-up economic growth of some countries, the growth of political awareness under the influence of nationalism, and the revolutionizing effects of socialist ideas on socially unstable societies in the Asian-Pacific region have been accompanied by the establishment of local "power centers" that are trying to pursue a foreign policy motivated primarily by the interests of their ruling classes and far from always coinciding with the coalition interests formulated in Washington.² This is creating more clearly defined patterns of multipolar international relations than in Europe.

All of this has made interrelations between U.S. partners more complex in this region, has weakened the social determinants of their foreign policy behavior, and has consequently given rise to conflicts between the American strategy of bipolar social confrontation and the spontaneously developing political processes in the Asian-Pacific region. One example is the antinuclear position taken by New Zealand, which has put the existence of one of the elements of the "deterrence" system—the ANZUS politico-military bloc—in question.

18030009a Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88 (signed to press 16 Apr 88) pp 11-18
[Article by Boris Nikolayevich Zanegin, doctor of historical sciences and senior research associate at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "Pacific Aspect of U.S. Foreign Policy Strategy"]

[Text] The Washington accords embodying the arguments of the new political thinking demonstrated the real possibility of demilitarizing international relations and ridding world politics of military and political confrontations. Although the results of the Washington meeting are of worldwide significance, however, they were based on a mutual understanding primarily on Europe and for Europe (even though there is an Asian aspect to the INF Treaty), where the United States is involved in the process of arms reduction and in the general political (Helsinki) process. As far as the Asian-Pacific region is concerned, here U.S. ruling circles are still not responding, for various reasons, to the numerous peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and other countries. Furthermore, the contradictory dynamics of U.S. policy in Europe and the Pacific are striking (and require explanation): Washington's participation in collective efforts to lower the level of politico-military confrontation in Europe, combined with the perceptible intensification of confrontation and the reinforcement of its military and political base in the Asian-Pacific region.

1

Although anti-Soviet aims might constitute the main aspect of American foreign policy, however, this is not the only aspect. Its neoglobalist content also dictates the primacy of American imperialism's interests in relations with allies and partners and the constant exertion of pressure on them in the interest, and sometimes merely on the pretext, of counteracting the influence of the USSR.

The fact is that in spite of their relative economic and social homogeneity, the capitalist-oriented countries are sometimes distinguished by widely diverging foreign policies. The stepped-up economic growth of some countries, the growth of political awareness under the influence of nationalism, and the revolutionizing effects of socialist ideas on socially unstable societies in the Asian-Pacific region have been accompanied by the establishment of local "power centers" that are trying to pursue a foreign policy motivated primarily by the interests of their ruling classes and far from always coinciding with the coalition interests formulated in Washington.² This is creating more clearly defined patterns of multipolar international relations than in Europe.

All of this has made interrelations between U.S. partners more complex in this region, has weakened the social determinants of their foreign policy behavior, and has consequently given rise to conflicts between the American strategy of bipolar social confrontation and the spontaneously developing political processes in the Asian-Pacific region. One example is the antinuclear position taken by New Zealand, which has put the existence of one of the elements of the "deterrence" system—the ANZUS politico-military bloc—in question.
In this atmosphere of stronger centrifugal tendencies, which are reducing the impact of the U.S. strategy of confrontation, American diplomacy is trying to consolidate local anticommunist forces and find better ways of controlling the situation in the region.

II

American-Japanese relations are the focal point of American policy in the Pacific. In the last 5 or 6 years American diplomacy has been able to expand their anti-Soviet content considerably. There is a higher level of agreement on anti-Soviet actions and ways of influencing the international situation in the region in the directions desired by the American side. American-Japanese relations have been marked by stronger cooperation in the military sphere, which has recently acquired the nature of the coordination of Japanese undertakings with NATO plans within the framework of U.S. global strategy. Tokyo’s several attempts to sound out the possibility of Japan’s inclusion in NATO as an “associate member” are significant. The creation of a mechanism for interaction by the command of the Japanese “self-defense forces” with the NATO military leadership has recently been reported.

The American side has also taken some steps to involve Japan in the search for ways of expanding the coalition structure of American strategy in the region. As the Japanese Government’s “white paper” on defense for 1981 said, Japan and the United States had already agreed by that time to consider methods of interaction in the event of a crisis in the Far East outside Japan’s own borders. Plans for the reinforcement and formalization of the effective U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance have also been reported. Japan is already giving South Korea financial assistance and coordinated with American military shipments. Tokyo has been invited—although only indirectly—to take part in the annual American-South Korean “Team Spirit” exercises. Washington has also invested certain hopes in plans for the broader unification of the countries in this region in a socially homogeneous and politically oriented organization in which the leading position would be occupied by the United States and Japan.

Of course, the coalition aspects are not the only reason for the full range and volume of American and Japanese interests. The economic aspect can be illustrated sufficiently by the following figures: Commodity turnover between these countries totaled 110 billion dollars in 1987, American capital investments in Japan totaled 9.2 billion dollars at the end of 1985, and Japanese capital investments in the United States totaled 19.3 billion dollars. Strong economic interdependence, close cooperation in science and technology, diverse forms of political interaction, common socioeconomic and ideological features, and the Japanese society’s lengthy exposure to the American way of life, public opinion, and mass culture have combined to create a solid objective basis for the long-term existence of the American-Japanese alliance.

American diplomacy has been unable to secure the development of harmonious relations with Japan, however, because of constantly mounting conflicts. Although the United States and Japan act in unison in the economic sphere in many cases, the incompatibility of the interests of monopolist capital is a salient feature of American-Japanese relations; the geographic areas of their economic expansion sometimes coincide (the Asian Pacific, Western Europe, and the Middle East), and they are competing more in trade, including trade in the domestic American market; there is a sharper contrast between Japan’s economic strength and its dependence on the United States and more acute clashes between the pan-Asian attitudes characteristic of Japanese ruling circles and the American claims to a dominant position in the Asian-Pacific region.

Citing the need to strengthen the capitalist camp as the motive for their diplomatic efforts, the two sides, especially the United States, are striving to keep these conflicts from weakening their alliance. The experience in American-Japanese relations, however, has demonstrated the limited potential of diplomacy in the efforts to keep political mutual understanding from being influenced by the economic friction caused by Japanese-American inter-imperialist conflicts. Japan represents a significant threat to the economic influence of the United States on the international level and to its political influence in the Asian-Pacific region. The American deficit in trade with Japan has not only reached a colossal amount (almost 60 billion dollars in 1987) but is also displaying a tendency toward uncontrollable growth. Japan is giving the United States serious competition in foreign markets, especially in the Asian-Pacific region, where 65 percent of Japan’s exports and 80 percent of its direct private investments now go. The United States is now second to Japan in the export of capital. It is still the leader in the absolute amount of aid to foreign states, but even in this sphere Japan is almost matching American indicators, taking second place. Furthermore, more of Japan’s development aid (60 percent) is going to the countries of this region.

American-Japanese economic conflicts have displayed a tendency to turn into political disagreements, and these have been made more acute by the conservative groups in power in both countries—groups with characteristically chauvinistic foreign policy aims. It appears that Japanese ruling circles see the Japanese-American alliance as a convenient framework for the creation of their own forcible means of securing the economic and political penetration of Southeast Asia, reinforcing their position in South Korea, expanding their politico-military influence in the region, and carrying out other wishes of revanchist circles in Japan. Some of the features of the policy of the Liberal Democratic Party, especially Y. Nakasone’s cabinet, testify to the viability of pan-Asian ideas in Japan and of the political embodiment of these ideas, reflected in the theory of the “great sphere of co-prosperity in East Asia.” It is no secret that these views are influencing contemporary political thinking in Japan.
The People's Republic of China plays an important part in U.S. Pacific strategy. The Reagan Administration retained its predecessors' geopolitical idea of U.S. policy in China, namely the belief in the possibility of using the "China factor" in American interests. It also introduced certain changes, however, into the approach to relations with the PRC. The U.S. conservatives' characteristic mistrust of communist China acquired additional momentum under the Reagan Administration and, what is more, Washington has maintained and even strengthened its ideological and political ties with the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan. Under the current administration relations with the PRC essentially have been dependent on the Chinese side's willingness to accept Washington's continuation of certain specific "unofficial" relations with Taipei, including the legally recorded unilateral U.S. obligations to secure the island's defensive potential.

With a view to the PRC's interest in developing relations with the United States, Washington hopes to encourage Beijing to shelve the Taiwan problem and to support the American strategy of confrontation in its entirety or at least to agree to more intensive parallel anti-Soviet actions in regions where their political interests coincide (Afghanistan, Cambodia, the territory claimed by Japan in the USSR, etc.). American diplomacy is also striving to inhibit all PRC foreign policy lines contrary to U.S. interests. Above all, this includes efforts to impede the development of Soviet-Chinese relations because Washington is particularly disturbed by the possibility of their development on a social-class basis. Considerable effort is also being made to stop or at least lessen China's criticism of U.S. hegemonic aims, which could injure American interests in the developing countries.

Washington hopes to take advantage of Beijing's need for constructive cooperation with the United States in economics, science, technology, education, and the military sphere as an effective channel of influence on Chinese government policy and is therefore taking every opportunity to stimulate this need. For example, Z. Brzezinski has proposed the development of the PRC with a framework of common political interests, economic dependence, and politico-military cooperation in order to create the necessary conditions for "interaction in the sphere of regional security" and the manipulation of the "China factor" in world politics.

Current U.S. foreign policy strategy conflicts with the social, political, economic, and strategic interests of the PRC and the basic premises of the foreign policy platform of the 12th CCP Congress, which was reaffirmed in 1987 at the 13th congress of the Chinese Communists. In addition to taking more vigorous politico-military actions in the region, the United States is retaining such anti-Chinese elements of "deterrence" as the offer of military assistance to Taiwan and the military presence in South Korea.

The Reagan Administration has taken a firm stand on the Taiwan issue because it wants to retain control of Taiwan as a strategic base. This is evident from the American shipments of modern weapons to the Taiwanese army. Furthermore, Washington has not displayed any willingness to stop these shipments or to reduce them in line with the joint American-Chinese communiqué of 17 August 1982.

As for South Korea, Washington is taking measures, in the fear of also losing this bridgehead in Asia, to strengthen its position here, establish an operational base for its "rapid deployment force" in this part of the region, and enhance the combat potential of the South Korean armed forces. To this end, the United States rejected the plans for the reduction of its presence in South Korea and began building up its own military potential here, including the additional deployment of the means of nuclear warfare. This has been accompanied by U.S. attempts to engage in diplomatic maneuvers in Korea and to involve Japan and the PRC in these maneuvers for the purpose of impeding the national reunification of Korea, which would eliminate American strategy's support point in the south of the peninsula. In addition, Washington is building up its system of "deterrents" against the Soviet Union, a system functioning in direct proximity to Chinese borders and, consequently, posing a potential threat to the security of the PRC.

The Reagan Administration has been paying more attention to the Southeast Asian subregion. Once again, it is being viewed as an important link in the global strategy of confrontation with socialism. American policy here is spearheaded against the socialist countries of Indochina, which are regarded as serious obstacles to American plans and, in particular, to the possibility of retaining monopoly control of strategic sea lanes from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. The American position also evinces the hope of taking revenge for the military defeat in Vietnam.

The administration's strategy in this subregion has been engineered with a view to the unsatisfactory state of Chinese-Vietnamese relations. Washington believes that this makes the use of the "Reagan Doctrine"—the policy of exporting counterrevolution—possible here. After officially announcing its refusal to accept the Pol Pot group, the American side has been giving the Cambodian "coalition government," which includes Pol Pot's supporters, financial, material, and covert military assistance and interfering with the policy of national reconciliation and the resolution of the Cambodian problem by political means. Washington is taking advantage of the international friction caused by the situation on the Indochinese peninsula to unite the ASEAN countries on an anticommunist platform, to try to suppress the left-wing opposition there, and to secure the necessary conditions for strong U.S. influence in Thailand, which is expected to compensate for the loss of influence after the defeat in Vietnam and which is consequently being assigned greater importance in U.S. foreign policy plans.

Western political scientists frequently express the opinion that Southeast Asia, especially Indochina and adjacent waters, will remain a zone of friction and conflict.
for a long time because there are more clashes here than anywhere else between the interests of the PRC and the other great powers.

The U.S. business community is also interested in developing economic ties with this subregion, which has become almost the main area of American economic expansion in foreign trade and the export of capital. The low cost of labor and natural resources is one of the reasons for this. Access to industrial raw materials and crude energy resources in the countries of the Pacific zone and the seabed in international waters is of particular significance in view of the relative political stability of the region in comparison with, for example, the Middle East or southern Africa. Here, however, the position of the United States is complicated by the pressure of aggressive Japanese capital. Besides this, the distinct outlines of a threat to the political and then the strategic positions of the United States in the region can already be seen on the horizon as a result of the rapid growth of the economic and political influence of the PRC, which has deep roots in the subregion. Finally, both the United States and Japan have had to compete here with the “new industrial states,” which are experiencing rapid economic development—Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and, in the near future, Malaysia. Their modern industry is already competing successfully with American industry and can be expected to steadily reduce the local markets for exports of American and Japanese high technology goods.

Faced by these gloomy prospects, U.S. political thinking turned to the idea of the so-called “Pacific Community”—the plans for the creation of a tightly knit Pacific regional group. American ruling circles hope to use the interest of local states in integration and tempt them with the prospect of access to American and Japanese technology to accomplish the selection of the right members of the “community” on the basis of sociopolitical criteria and to keep socialist countries from taking part in international division of labor and in progressive advances in the economic development of the region. What is more, some of the plans for “Pacific economic cooperation” envisage participation by the PRC along with capitalist countries. Besides this, this kind of closed and privileged group will make it easier to “discipline” its members in the interests of their patron state.

Revolutionary and national-liberation processes, the antinuclear movement in the Pacific countries, and the erosion of the American structure of politico-military alliances have motivated Washington to step up the reinforcement of American control of the islands of Micronesia, where the period of U.S. trusteeship ended in 1981. Particularly important developments in this sphere were the loss of the U.S. military bases in Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay in South Vietnam and the situation in the Philippines, forcing the American administration to seek alternatives to the Clark Field and Subic Bay bases, which have been playing, according to the Pentagon, a key role in “deterring” the Soviet Union. In connection with this and in violation of its UN obligations to prepare trust territories for political independence, the United States took steps to reinforce Micronesia’s colonial dependence for the purpose of militarizing it. Besides this, there is the U.S. interest in exploiting the natural resources discovered here, particularly the oil and ferrous metals, and in using the islands as a base for the exploitation of seabed mineral resources and ocean bioresources.

The militarization of the islands of Micronesia and their economic exploitation have been accompanied by the unprecedented expansion of U.S. military activity throughout the Pacific Ocean. This activity includes the enlargement and qualitative improvement of the Navy, particularly the arming of ships with cruise missiles, the construction of a group of installations on Kwajalein Atoll for SDI experiments in space, the militarization of the eastern Arctic, the enlargement of the U.S. Air Force’s airport on Adak Island (Aleutian Islands), the organization of broad-scale naval exercises involving the United States’ Pacific allies and some NATO members (England and Canada), etc.

III

Against the general background of the increasing aggressiveness of American imperialism, the situation in the Pacific zone seems relatively calm, despite the fact that even events in this region have given the Reagan Administration several pretexts for the use of force. There appear to be several reasons for the United States’ “restraint” in the Asian-Pacific region. The effects of the “Vietnam syndrome” are at the top of the list. Even the current right wing conservative administration cannot ignore this experience. Besides this, the United States does not have any satellites in the Asian-Pacific region strong enough, reliable enough, or prepared enough for military ventures to launch “proxy” aggressive actions on Washington’s behalf with American financial and military assistance. Other important reasons are the deterring influence of the USSR and its armed forces on Far Eastern borders and the uncertainty about the position other states in the region would take. The governments of some countries are now being influenced by the growth of the antinuclear movement, which is creating an unfavorable political atmosphere for unconcealed displays of military adventurism.

People in the Soviet Union realize that the Pacific states are not as militarized as the European ones. They also know, however, that the Helsinki process of dialogue, negotiations, and agreements is going on in Europe and is introducing some stability into the situation and reducing the probability of armed conflict; the Pacific countries, on the other hand, have not been able yet to reach a mutual understanding on the need to create a similar mechanism, which they could use to put an end
to the militarization of the region, improve the atmosphere, and make its development more predictable. The Soviet Union's proposals offer friendship and cooperation as alternatives to the confrontational line of the United States and its allies.

The Soviet Union is also aware of the increasing significance of the Asian-Pacific region in world economics and international relations. But in contrast to the United States, which has subordinated foreign policy strategy in this region to the reinforcement of its own dominant position at the expense of other states, and especially by isolating the socialist countries, the Soviet side proceeds from an awareness of the interdependence of today's world, the recognition of the economic, political, and strategic interests of all Pacific states, including the United States, and the general goal of lowering the level of American-Soviet military confrontation in all parts of the world.

To this end, several Soviet documents, particularly M.S. Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok on 28 July 1986 and his responses to the questions of the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA on 21 July 1987, propose a sweeping program of constructive and peaceful interaction in the Asian-Pacific region, including the development of mutually beneficial bilateral relations with all of the countries of this region, regardless of their socioeconomic nature, and a vigorous search for ways of organizing regional cooperation and future Pacific conferences of the Helsinki type with the participation of all interested states.

The proposals the Soviet side has elaborated and has submitted to the court of world public opinion concern the achievement of international security by employing political methods of settling regional conflicts and taking measures to exclude the possibility of the proliferation or buildup of nuclear weapons in the region. The USSR's proposals envisage talks on the reduction of naval activity in the Pacific and Indian oceans, the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Asia, non-aggression, and the institution of confidence-building measures. The Soviet side has demonstrated its willingness to contribute to the improvement of the atmosphere with such actions as the reduction of Soviet troop strength in the Mongolian People's Republic, the recall of six regiments from Afghanistan to their permanent bases in the Soviet Union and, of course, M.S. Gorbachev's announcement of 8 February 1988 on Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union's proposals offer friendship and cooperation as alternatives to the confrontational policy of the United States and its allies. The historic results of the Soviet-American meeting in Washington have urged the world community to consider the need to develop this success in general and to extend it to the Asian-Pacific region in particular, a region where the pulse of world politics is beating so strongly today.

Footnotes


2. V.P. Lukin, "'Tsentry sily'-kontseptsi i realnost' ['Power Centers'-Ideas and Reality], Moscow, 1983.

3. JAPAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Fall/Winter 1987, p 132.

4. GEKKAN NIRI, 1985, No 4, pp 56-61.


10. In a TASS statement of 13 November 1986 and a note from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the State Department in January 1987, the USSR described these U.S. actions as arbitrary and unlawful (PRAVDA, 23 January 1987).


COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

8588
Space—The “Commanding Height”

The implementation of the SDI program would be the first step in seizing the “global commanding height.” This idea is not one of the inventions of the current American administration and its nourishing “think tanks.” The first theoretical investigations of the strategic advantages of supremacy in outer space appeared in the United States before the beginning of the space age. At that time they were regarded as “bold” scientific hypotheses with no chance of rapid application. One of the first works on this topic, written by American astronomer R. Richardson, was printed in a science fiction magazine in April 1943. Just a few years later the U.S. Air Force began working on the NABS program (Nuclear Armed Bombardment Satellites) and made the first attempt to implement these theories. The attempt failed, but later, in the middle of the 1960s, another “promising” project for the establishment of a military base on the moon was seriously considered in an American naval research center, the Rand Corporation.4

The combination of scientific achievements in such key areas as laser, optical, and computer engineering stimulated support for the idea of the militarization of space in the United States in the 1970s. At that time Rockwell International, an aerospace firm, issued a brochure with the catchy title “Outer Space—American Frontier for Growth, Leadership, and Liberty,” in which the program for the emplacement of orbital stations armed with laser weapons in space was discussed in practical terms. According to the authors of the brochure, these stations would guarantee “direct, immediate, and reliable domination and control of all powers on earth.”5

It was in this atmosphere that the SDI program came into being in the United States at the beginning of the 1980s. When we analyze its roots today, we can clearly see that although the establishment of the necessary material and technical conditions for the emplacement of weapons in space played an important role here, it appears that military-strategic and political considerations were still the deciding factors. In the 1970s and early 1980s the stability of the strategic balance between the USSR and the United States became more obvious than ever before, and this demonstrated the futility of attempts to win the arms race in its traditional spheres.

This objective fact stimulated more vigorous efforts by militaristic groups in the United States to put the idea of the sweeping militarization of space on a practical level. The establishment of specialized space commands for the different military departments was followed by the creation of a combined space command responsible for the overall management of the Pentagon’s expanded activity in space.

In 1982 the U.S. Department of Defense adopted a document entitled “Defense Directive for Fiscal Years 1984-1988,” stressing the need for more thorough preparations for warfare in space and from outer space and expressing a negative attitude toward any international agreements and accords impeding the development of space weapons.6

The logical conclusion of these preparations was President Reagan’s speech in March 1983 and the subsequent presidential directive of 6 January 1984, setting forth the SDI program. In April 1984 another specialized agency was created, the SDI Organization, under the command of Air Force Lt Gen J. Abrahamson. This provided the idea of the militarization of space with a strong administrative basis and made it one of the top priorities of U.S. military policy.
The administration's actions were accompanied by the theoretical validation of the need to fight for a dominant position in space. American specialist G. Stein quite candidly defined this objective: "Mankind is facing the prospect of new types of warfare. Whether we like it or not, outer space is a theater of war and it should be subjected to the most serious and thorough investigation in this capacity."

The current ideas of supremacy in space are closely related to one of the most ancient laws of military tactics, prescribing the need to seize the commanding height over the battlefield. The development of military equipment and the martial arts at the beginning of this century raised this axiom to a qualitatively new strategic level. The doctrine of "air power" made its appearance, and its author, Italian General D. Due, advanced the thesis that supremacy in the air was the decisive condition for the defeat of enemy ground forces and, consequently, for total victory in a war. In accordance with Due's recipes, war would include two separate but closely related objectives. The first would be supremacy in the air. This would then aid in attaining the main objective of war— the defeat of the enemy army and navy with strikes from the air and the achievement of final victory. During this decisive stage of military operations, aviation, according to Due's doctrine, would play the leading role.

It is noteworthy that the clearly offensive and aggressive essence of Due's doctrine and the emphasis on a surprise preventive attack were salient features of the doctrine. Due defined future warfare as a battle "consisting solely of attacks, without any kind of defense," and believed that each side would strive to make maximum use of the advantages of surprise attacks "for the quickest possible infliction of maximum damage on the enemy."

With the appearance of the new superweapon—the atomic bomb with its unprecedented destructive power—Due's doctrine was made the cornerstone of U.S. strategy. The changes introduced into the nature of world war by the appearance of nuclear weapons and strategic means of their delivery necessitated, in the opinion of American strategists, a struggle for a new, now global "commanding height"—space.

Outlines of Space Doctrine

The direct analogy between the postulates of Due's doctrine and the ideas of today's American supporters of "space power" stems from the fact that the military uses of the atmosphere and the stratosphere essentially reflect the same process of transferring military operations from "plane" (or surface) movements to something three-dimensional. From this standpoint the spread of military operations to outer space could be regarded as "quantitative" growth leading to qualitative changes in the parameters of warfare and a significant change in the nature and consequences of war. The supporters of the idea of "space power" in the Pentagon underscore two main objectives in their space doctrine: supremacy in outer space and the use of space weapons to crush the adversary.

When Due's ideas are translated into the new "language of space," the deployment of space strike weapons by both sides will mean that supremacy in space will necessitate, first, destroying the enemy's space systems and, second, preventing the launching of new enemy systems into orbit. In view of the colossal difficulties involved in deploying combat-ready space strike weapons in space (if only because of their size and weight) and the speed of modern warfare, we can assume with some certainty that the destruction of enemy battle stations in space will essentially complete the main task of the first phase of war.

If space weapons are deployed by only one side, the objectives of the first phase of war will remain virtually the same. In this case the targets would be other military satellite systems, such as missile early warning systems, communication, command, and control systems, etc. There is also an important difference, however, between this situation and the previous one. Whereas in the first case the space phase of war will remain relatively separate in spatial and functional terms, in the second case it is more likely to be an overture to a subsequent ground stage. In view of the tremendous role space satellite systems play in modern warfare, we could say that a coordinated and effective strike against these systems, intended to "blind" and disorient the enemy, would be the primary objective.

Its attainment is assigned an important place in American theories of "limited" nuclear war, because, in the opinion of their supporters, the side which loses its space communication and navigation systems cannot conduct effective military operations with nuclear weapons. For this reason, whether or not the enemy has space strike weapons, the initial, space stage of war has remained the most important phase in the plans of Due's American successors. They completely ignore the fact that the Soviet Union has categorically refuted the possibility of "limited" nuclear war and, in this kind of situation, an appropriate response to nuclear aggression can be secured even if space weapons have been destroyed by using systems for the automation of a retaliatory nuclear missile strike.

As for the second phase of war, the defeat of enemy ground forces with the aid of space weapons, this would entail two relatively separate actions: first, the destruction of enemy strategic intercontinental systems, ICBM's and SLBM's in flight (the ABM function) and, second, the use of space weapons to deliver strikes against surface and airborne military targets. Even if the broadscale space ABM system is not used for the destruction of targets on the ground and in the air, the combination of
this system and offensive nuclear weapons could introduce fundamental changes into the nature of offensive operations and the combat efficiency of "traditional" offensive systems.

SDI—Instrument of Space Doctrine

The establishment of effective ballistic missile defense is the only one of the main objectives of U.S. space doctrine discussed above to also be an official goal of the SDI program. The authors of most specialized works agree almost without reservation, however, that the space strike systems developed within the SDI framework will not only serve as highly effective antisatellite weapons but might also be used quite extensively for the destruction of targets in the atmosphere and on the surface of the earth.

According to military expert R. Bowman, for example, any space system designed to perform ABM functions, even the least effective of these, will also be an extraordinarily effective antisatellite weapon. During hearings in the American Senate it was pointed out that the development of an effective antisatellite system would be a much simpler matter than the development of an ABM system operating beyond the atmosphere. The reason is that the targets of an antisatellite system are much fewer in number, much more vulnerable as a whole, and much easier to detect than the targets of an ABM system. Furthermore, the trajectory and exact location of the targets of antisatellite weapons are much easier to predict, and these targets also have vulnerable lines of communication with the earth.

It must be said, however, that the development of space strike weapons will not be enough to guarantee their owner's military supremacy in outer space. Even in the case of the unilateral deployment of such weapons, the other side will still have the ability to counteract them, particularly with antisatellite systems on the ground. The space weapons of the broad-scale ABM system will be just as vulnerable as any satellite. The protection of space vehicles from antisatellite weapons will be an extremely difficult and costly task, and no sufficiently effective solutions to the problem have been found to date. The antisatellite systems deployed on earth and designed to counteract the space tiers of the antimissile system will apparently also serve as an effective means of destroying the enemy's other orbiting systems. As a result, we could conclude that the equal potential of the antisatellite weapons on both sides could be secured even with asymmetrical development. Obviously, this would lead to an arms race in the new, antisatellite sphere and to the further destabilization of the strategic situation, and all of the responsibility for this would have to be assumed by the side deploying the space strike systems.

Fairly definite conclusions can also be drawn with regard to the use of the kill elements of the space antimissile system for strikes against targets in the air and on the ground. The possible emplacement of the strike weapons included in this system directly over enemy territory and the use of sources of high energy transmitted over unlimited distances will create unique opportunities for attacks from space.

We should recall that the SDI program envisages the following means of destruction: kinetic weapons (from metallic fragments conveyed at high speeds to small homing missiles), electromagnetic weapons, particle beam weapons, and laser weapons. The ability to surmount the earth's atmosphere will be the decisive factor in their use against targets in the air and on the ground. On this basis, the particle beam weapon can be excluded because even the thin layers of the atmosphere are an insurmountable obstacle for this kind of weapon.

In principle, kinetic weapons can surmount the earth's atmosphere, but in a "space-to-air" attack their speed of entry could be much higher than that of the ICBM warhead and could be around 11-12 km per second (orbital speed plus momentum). Because braking speed is proportional to the cubic velocity of the charge, temperatures during flight through the atmosphere would be extremely hot. Space shrapnel (or a cloud of metallic fragments) would burn, and the difficulties of using the infrared sensors constituting the basis of modern homing systems would be compounded. For this reason, within the near future it is unlikely that kinetic weapons could serve as an effective means of destroying targets in the atmosphere and on the surface of the earth from space.

The destructive effects of electromagnetic weapons consist in causing electronic equipment to malfunction and putting it out of commission. They would be particularly effective in a first strike for blinding command centers and disabling enemy communication systems. A concentrated electromagnetic charge would be technically possible during an attack from space against targets on earth and in the atmosphere.

Laser weapons mainly destroy targets by burning or piercing a thin outer shell. In addition to ballistic missiles, other targets of lasers might be, for example, airplanes and helicopters, oil and gas storage tanks, etc. Finally, a powerful laser beam could burn a forest, wooden structures, plastic surfaces, etc. These targets will not require the kind of high speeds needed for the destruction of targets in outer space in line with SDI objectives. This also lowers the energy requirements of power sources. As a result, the use of laser weapons in offensive operations could be technically much simpler than their use in a broad-scale ABM system with space tiers.

Obviously, there are some problems here and they must be taken into account. The passage of the beam of a ground-based laser through the atmosphere is a major problem of the SDI, and attempts to solve it have
entailed the use of methods of adaptive optics or distortion-reducing wave patterns. It is still not clear how losses can be reduced when the laser beam moves in the opposite direction—from space to the earth's surface. It appears, however, that this problem is not a major one and that the proper adjustment of the laser beam will be made with acceptable energy losses.

A dense cloud cover or various kinds of smoke and aerosols could seriously impede the use of laser weapons against targets on earth. For this reason, their use in the destruction of high-altitude airborne systems in flight seems more probable. This will be all the simpler in view of the fact that both classes of targets—ballistic missiles and airborne systems—have virtually identical tensile parameters, but airplanes are distinguished by much lower speeds. Strategic bombers on combat patrol missions or responding to missile attack warnings and airborne command centers could be targets. The main problem in destroying this class of targets consists in their reliable identification and tracking. The Defense Department is now making an active effort to solve this problem. For example, the U.S. Air Force is developing an updated satellite for the detection of airborne systems as part of the Teal Ruby program. These satellites, equipped with infrared high-resolution detectors, should be capable of the detection and reliable identification of planes.

The unique features of the basing of space platforms, which put virtually any spot on enemy territory within the range of means of destruction, have created another danger. The side deploying a system of carrier platforms in space might want to situate missiles with nuclear warheads on them for attacks on ground targets.

American works frequently discuss the hypothetical scenario in which both sides have space ABM systems. In this case, the emplacement of nuclear weapons on platforms in space could be justified by the consideration that when strikes are launched against targets on earth the means of nuclear delivery will not be subject to the effects of several (and highly effective) layers of defense. Of course, the emplacement of nuclear weapons on space platforms for the destruction of targets on the earth’s surface would be a violation of the 1967 treaty on the principles of the activities of states in the study and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. The first step in this direction, however, has already been noted in connection with the development of a nuclear-powered X-ray laser in the United States for the space ABM system. Although the nuclear charge will not destroy targets directly in this case, this obviously does not change the essence of the problem.

The light weight and small size of missiles situated on space platforms would make it possible to launch them into orbit in substantial quantities at a relatively low cost, and this means that they could replace some of the interceptor missiles intended for the destruction of ICBM's. This means of emplacing nuclear weapons in outer space would be extremely difficult to monitor with national technical means. If, however, the method of interception with the aid of nuclear weapons, a method which is the subject of intense discussion today, is used in the ABM system, all of the talk about verification will be meaningless and, consequently, the possibility of agreements to ban offensive systems of the “space-to-earth” class will be virtually excluded.

Of course, the use of missiles situated on space platforms for the destruction of targets on earth will entail certain difficulties. The precision targeting of a missile on a space platform and its removal from the platform orbit will be technically much more complex than the launching of a land-based ICBM. The emplacement of nuclear weapons on a space platform and their subsequent launching at targets on the ground will apparently be much more costly than an attack on the same targets using ICBM's or SLBM's. Therefore, the technical and economic expediency of using space platforms for the emplacement of nuclear missiles intended to destroy targets on the ground might seem dubious.

This is a valid assumption if both sides have enough land- and sea-based strategic offensive nuclear systems, but it is a different matter if we assume that an agreement will be reached on the substantial reduction and subsequent elimination of strategic nuclear weapons. In this case, the technical and economic problems of deploying nuclear weapons in space will be secondary, while the possibility of the unverifiable retention of some quantity of nuclear systems capable of destroying targets on earth will become much more significant.

Of course, this prospect would be an extremely weighty obstacle in the reduction of offensive strategic arms. It is unlikely that either side would agree to radical reductions of strategic nuclear systems if the other side retained the ability to keep part of its offensive nuclear potential in space in forms complicating verification by national technical means.

This offers further sound evidence that the implementation of the SDI program, even in its “simplified and stepped-up” form, is incompatible with the plans for the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms.

Therefore, we can say that the appearance of new and unprecedented opportunities for the destruction of enemy airborne command and communication systems and certain important types of targets on the ground will be a direct result of the deployment of the broad-scale ABM system with space-based elements. This kind of system, supposedly aimed against ballistic missiles, will lead to the further escalation of the arms race and make it virtually unpredictable, and this will lower the level of strategic stability dramatically even under the conditions of approximately equal overall military potential on both sides.
Obviously, this would only happen in the distant future. According to the majority of American experts, it is unlikely that any space system of military value will be developed before the end of this century. Nevertheless, the SDI program can be viewed as the first step toward the attainment of full-scale military-space potential.

The work on this program, which is now being presented to American and world public opinion in its attractive “defensive packaging,” will provide the important initial momentum for a space arms race and will make the still largely hypothetical ideas of “space power” and of struggle for the military domination of space and the consequent domination of the world virtual realities. Analysis indicates that the offensive and auxiliary weapons being developed within the SDI framework, even regardless of the intentions of their developers, could be used in the attainment of key objectives of “space doctrine.” The effectiveness of systems of this kind and the effects of a new space round of the arms race on the overall military balance are still unknown.

If we continue the comparison with Due’s doctrine, however, we can already assume that the space doctrine the Pentagon is now elaborating will not give the United States the ability to achieve military supremacy on earth or in space.

The validity of Due’s doctrine, as we mentioned above, was not confirmed in the battles of World War II. The much more extensive and intensive air operations of that time played an important but essentially subordinate role, while the battles deciding the outcome of the war were fought on the ground.

The augmentation of the dimensions and role of air operations, however, stimulated the stepped-up development and improvement of air defense systems, and this resulted in a dynamic balance between the capabilities of aircraft and antiaircraft weapons. Later, in spite of the continuous improvement of both types of systems, the balance was maintained and it still exists today.

It is probable that the development of space weapons will lead to a similar situation. In response to their deployment by the United States, the USSR might institute a group of active and passive countermeasures. This would allow it to, first of all, retain its potential for a retaliatory strike by enhancing, for example, the capability of ICBM’s and SLBM’s to penetrate enemy defenses and, second, put the space weapons themselves in jeopardy by deploying effective antisatellite systems. For this reason, the unannounced but clear intentions of certain groups in Washington to win significant military-strategic and political advantages over the USSR and its allies by developing and deploying space strike weapons seem groundless.

Many American experts also realize the futility of a new round of the arms race, including some with real influence in the administration and Congress. In addition to criticizing the technological flaws of the SDI program, more and more prominent American scholars in the U.S. political community are admitting that an arms race in space would not benefit either side. In the United States today there is a fairly complex network of diverging opinions and interests in connection with the SDI program, and these differences will probably become increasingly pronounced as the process of real disarmament, begun by the signing of the INF treaty, develops. At this time the struggle is entering a decisive phase, and the main issue is the future of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

The genuine interests of the equal and common security of the USSR, the United States, and the entire international community demand the preservation of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems which has now become an obstacle in the path of the SDI and the space arms race in general. This confirms the need to heighten the stability of the military-strategic balance and reduce the probability of nuclear war. The unconditional retention of strict limitations on ABM systems is an essential condition for the reduction and gradual elimination of nuclear weapons.

In connection with this, it is particularly significant that the leaders of the two countries, as the joint Soviet-American statement signed during M.S. Gorbachev’s trip to Washington stresses, have instructed their delegations in Geneva to “hammer out an agreement which would obligate the sides to observe the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972...and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period.”12

The signing of the INF treaty and the prospect of an agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent have created a real opportunity to prevent military competition in a new, dangerous, and destabilizing sphere—an arms race in outer space.

The new political thinking demands the acknowledgement that only the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons can serve as the most reliable defense against the nuclear menace.

Footnotes
1. PRAVDA, 12 December 1987.
3. For more about the NABS program and other projects of this kind, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1986, No 11, p 62.


COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo “Nauka”, SSShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

8588

U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa
18030009c Moscow SSShA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88 (signed to press 16 Apr 88) pp 57-61

[Article by Yu.A. Bochkarev]

[Text] The American press has never been happy with Reagan Administration policy in southern Africa. The results of the attempts to apply the “Reagan doctrine” to this region have been, in the opinion of observers, contrary to expectations. “The Reagan doctrine is not working in southern Africa,” THE WASHINGTON POST remarked on 25 May 1986. In its opinion, the doctrine’s emphasis on aid to “freedom fighters”—i.e., antigovernment groups operating in the “front-line states”—has made these states suspicious of U.S. policy. The newspaper quoted a Zimbabwe official as saying: “It seems to us that South Africa and the United States have common goals in this subregion.” These states have been particularly disturbed by the U.S. administration’s decision to supply weapons, including Stinger missiles, to the Angolan counterrevolutionary UNITA organization, which wants to overthrow the government of the MPLA-Labor Party, and by reports of Pentagon plans to take over the Zairian air force base in Kamina. They are afraid that this military base could be used to exert pressure on Angola and other countries in southern Africa with regimes not meeting White House approval.

There is some basis for these fears. On 21 February 1987 the same WASHINGTON POST reported Pentagon plans to turn the dilapidated air base in the southern Zairian province of Shaba into a “major American base of operations in central and southern Africa.” The ways in which the United States will use the base in Kamina for “operations” in central Africa are still unknown, but the ways in which it is using it in the south of the continent are no longer a secret. The base in Kamina has become a transfer point for the shipment of American weapons to UNITA gangs. This was first reported last February by NEW YORK TIMES correspondent James Brooke. On 27 July he wrote another article and quoted Western diplomats in Zaire as saying that weapons were still being delivered to UNITA through the Kamina base. He also mentioned two secret memoranda which he said the Zairian special services had compiled for President S. Mobutu of Zaire. They contained information about the transfer of American weapons through the base in Kamina and said that the group of Americans in charge of the operation was headed by CIA Major C. George.

The chief aim of American strategy in the region was and is the preservation of the existing regime in South Africa, which is regarded, as General Secretary of the South African Communist Party Joe Slovo put it, as an “important acquisition” in the economic and military-strategic system of capitalism. This “acquisition” is all the more precious to the West because it includes the extremely valuable “bonus” of Namibia with its incalculable mineral resources. Furthermore, South Africa itself is rich in various minerals. Besides this, South Africa plays an important role in the West’s military strategy because it is located on the sea lane from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. In particular, it is being used for the transfer of the naval ships of the United States and its NATO allies to the Persian Gulf. Finally, the South African regime is an ally of the United States in the struggle against the national liberation movement. The collapse of apartheid would strengthen democratic regimes in this region, and this would be unacceptable to the White House.

The West, headed by the United States, is making every effort to help P. Botha halt the decay of the racist regime. This is why the United States, with England’s support, is stubbornly resisting all of the international community’s attempts to impose effective economic sanctions on South Africa.

The liberation struggle of the people of South Africa and Namibia under the leadership of the ANC and SWAPO is the main force eroding the economic and political bases of apartheid. The “front-line states” are giving liberation forces moral and political support. The elimination of the racist regime in South Africa would be in their interest, because as long as this regime exists, their security and internal stability are in constant danger. Among South Africa’s neighbors, there is not a single state that has not been invaded by South African troops or commandos.
The White House regards the support the “front-line states” give the ANC and SWAPO as a challenge and exerts inexorable pressure on them. In May 1987 the American Senate passed a resolution requesting the administration to cut off financial aid to states in the region unless they refuse to support the ANC and SWAPO. Earlier, in 1986, the White House announced it was cutting off financial aid to Zimbabwe. This pressure, however, produced the opposite result. The Zambian foreign minister described the Senate resolution as blackmail designed to force the countries of the region to abandon their principles in exchange for Washington’s aid. “We,” the minister declared, “will not stop helping the liberation movements of the people of South Africa and Namibia.”

By pressuring the “front-line states,” Washington is giving its relations with them a confrontational nature. In spite of this, the leaders of these states have not refused to discuss the problems of South Africa with the United States. In September 1986 President K. Kaunda of the Republic of Zambia invited R. Reagan to visit the region to learn more about what is happening there. Kaunda also said that the leaders of the “front-line states” would be willing to come to Washington. Reagan, however, rejected both proposals, saying that he was too busy and promising to send the secretary of state to Lusaka the next month. The President did not keep his promise. In January 1987 G. Shultz had time to tour several African countries but he bypassed the south of the continent.

It is easy to understand why the U.S. leaders have avoided meetings with the presidents of the “front-line states.” People in the White House know that besides having to discuss matters of policy toward South Africa, they will probably be asked why the United States is encouraging South Africa to sabotage UN Security Council Resolution No 435 on the decolonization of Namibia. This would be a legitimate question because in 1978 the draft of this resolution was submitted by five Western powers, including the United States, which expressed its wish that the resolution be submitted to undated elections. The U.S. position on the resolution, however, has been unproductive. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs C. Crocker, who represents the American side in these talks, has invariably insisted on the withdrawal of the Cuban contingent as a preliminary condition for the fulfillment of the resolution on Namibia, but the government of the People’s Republic of Angola could not agree to this. The Angolan side has insisted that the withdrawal of the Cuban contingent be discussed in connection with the guarantee of its security, which would require South Africa to remove its troops from Angolan territory and require South Africa and the United States to stop supporting UNITA gangs and begin carrying out Resolution 435, envisaging the recall of South African troops from the Namibian territories from which they were launching attacks on vast regions in southern and southeastern Angola. The Angolan representatives reaffirmed their principled position at a meeting with Crocker in Luanda on January 28-29, 1988. Luanda regards the U.S. demand for the withdrawal of the Cuban military contingent from Angola without any consideration for its security needs as an infringement of Angola’s sovereign rights and defensive capabilities.

A review of the history of this issue might be useful. The Cuban internationalists arrived in Angola at the request of its government in 1975, when Pretoria conspired with the United States to launch an armed attack on the young republic for the purpose of overthrowing its government. It declared its socialist orientation. Angolan troops repulsed the South African intervention forces and drove them out of Angola with the support of the Cuban soldiers. The “Clark Amendment” the U.S. Congress passed in 1978 prohibited U.S. support of counterrevolutionary forces in Angola, but the amendment was repealed in 1985 under pressure from President Reagan, and the U.S. interference in Angolan internal affairs was resumed. The United States began supplying UNITA gangs with weapons and thereby confirmed Reagan’s intention to overthrow the government of the MPLA-Labor Party, an intention he had repeatedly declared.

Coordinating its actions with South Africa, the United States is striving to destabilize the republic and plunge it into a state of economic chaos. The UNITA gangs are inflicting colossal injuries on the Angolan economy. They commit acts of sabotage in economic centers, burn harvests, and kidnap foreign specialists. The Angolan army would have crushed the antigovernment groups long ago if Pretoria had not come to their assistance. Each time UNITA was in danger, South African troops
invaded Angolan territory and fought on the side of their protege. This was the case, for example, in fall 1987, when government troops had launched a successful attack on Mavinga, the last stronghold on the road to UNITA headquarters in Huambo. The city would have fallen if South African troops had not intervened. In the past Pretoria denied any involvement by its army in battles on UNITA's side, but this time Minister of Defense M. Malan admitted that an UNITA defeat would not be in South Africa's interest.

Realizing that UNITA was incapable of overthrowing the Angolan Government, the United States encouraged and supported UNITA leader J. Savimbi's demand for negotiations with the MPLA-Labor Party with the aim of establishing a coalition government. Luanda categorically refused to negotiate with the puppets of South Africa and the United States. This is why the talks are being conducted by Crocker. The last round of the talks, which was discussed above, ended with the submission of "new ideas" and a decision to continue the contacts. Judging by reports in Havana's GRANMA, Angola added something new to the question of the withdrawal of the Cuban contingent. In the past it insisted on retaining part of these troops even after the Namibian issue had been resolved, but this time it declared its willingness to remove the troops "down to the last man," as GRANMA reported. Now the matter will depend completely on the U.S. Government.

The United States' policy in relations with the People's Republic of Mozambique is slightly different in its methods but exactly the same in its purpose. Two-faced behavior is a salient feature of this policy. The Reagan Administration has not resorted to overtly hostile actions against the PRM. What is more, the White House has pretended to approve of the FRELIMO government and has tried to seem willing to help it solve its economic difficulties. The late president of Mozambique, Samora Machel, was even invited to Washington and was received by R. Reagan. The United States gives Mozambique some economic and military assistance. This is how the official relations between the two countries look, but they also have another side.

Gangs of the so-called "Mozambican National Resistance" (MNR) are operating in Mozambique. They exist only on the strength of all-round assistance from South Africa and commit terrorist and subversive acts. Washington is not assisting antigovernment forces in Mozambique, but their representatives operate freely in the United States, maintaining contact with the State Department, and an influential group in the Senate is demanding assistance for the MNR from the administration.

Washington and Pretoria would like to see another government in Maputu. Following the same script as in Angola, South Africa is encouraging the MNR to destabilize the situation in Mozambique for the purpose of overthrowing the government or at least forcing it to agree to talks with the MNR leaders, who, reading from the same script, have announced their willingness to cease all hostilities when FRELIMO agrees to the talks. The United States is pressuring FRELIMO and hinting to its leaders that the aid to their country will be increased substantially if they make a deal with the MNR. FRELIMO, however, has categorically refused to have anything to do with South Africa's hirelings.

To gain additional leverage, the United States is also taking advantage of the "front-line" states' dependence on South African railways: Zambia and Zimbabwe are landlocked. Around 70 percent of their foreign trade freight is now carried by South African railroads. If Pretoria denies Zambian and Zimbabwean freight access to its sea ports, their economies could be in a catastrophic state. This is part of the reason why the "front-line states" have refused so far to institute economic sanctions against South Africa.

Under these conditions, the 400-mile railroad in Mozambique could be of vital importance to Zimbabwe and Zambia. It runs to the port of Beira (the so-called "Beira corridor"), but this road is in serious disrepair and requires modernization. Besides this, the subversive activities of MNR gangs make it difficult to use the road. Zimbabwe sent its troops to Mozambique to help it in its fight against the MNR gangs, especially in its efforts to stop their acts of sabotage on railways. There are fewer disturbances along the "Beira corridor," but it still has to be modernized.

The leaders of the "front-line states" asked the United States to help them in this undertaking. The White House's response was essentially a mockery: It would be ridiculous for the United States, it said, to invest millions of dollars in "modernizing the Beira corridor," when a better railway network exists within the territory of South Africa. Washington is quite happy with the "railroad dependence" of the "front-line states" on South Africa, if only because it makes them less eager to demand sanctions. The main reason for the U.S. refusal to pay for the remodeling, however, is political rather than financial, explained THE WASHINGTON TIMES, a newspaper with close ties to the White House.

Therefore, although Reagan promised to promote peace in Africa when he entered the White House, not one of the region's problems has been solved. What is more, some of them have been compounded (for example, the complication of the Namibian problem). As a result, South Africa is just as much a seat of international tension today as it was then.

Meanwhile, the desire to resolve conflicts by means of peaceful settlements has been growing stronger in the world, but this will require non-standard approaches and a new way of thinking. For example, it will be necessary to renounce the standard approach known as the "Reagan doctrine," to stop interfering with the "front-line" states' choice of their own patterns of development,
Role of International Space University

The initiators of the ISU plan want to organize joint learning and research by the most promising young people from various countries in order to "expand international cooperation in future undertakings in space." The curriculum of the new university is expected to include training in major scientific, technical, and political aspects of the study and use of space. The most gifted students will have an opportunity to conduct joint research and develop specific projects to the stage of industrial incorporation, thereby acquiring the important skills necessary for their professional growth. The university's organizers expect this work to lead to the establishment of long-term contacts between the future leaders of industry, science, and government in various countries and believe that this will promote broader international cooperation in space projects.

Three young people have been given credit for the idea of the ISU—Peter Diamandis, a graduate student from MIT and Harvard Medical School, Todd Hawley, a student at George Washington University, and Canadian Robert Richards, an active member of such student organizations as Young Astronauts of Canada and Students for the Study and Exploration of Space. Their proposals were actively supported by the American Space Heritage Foundation, uniting the advocates of international cooperation in the study of outer space.

The idea was also supported by the International Space Flight Association, established in 1985 on the initiative of Soviet cosmonauts and American astronauts to publicize the idea of the peaceful exploration of space in the interest of all humanity. It is active in the publishing field, holds regular meetings for members of space flights from different countries, and organizes lecture tours by cosmonauts and astronauts. For example, in April 1987 Soviet cosmonaut V.A. Dzhanibekov presented a lecture to students in seven American cities on "The Next Generation in Space." In a reciprocal tour, American astronaut E. Mitchell spoke at academic institutions and research institutes in Moscow, Leningrad, Tallin, and Tbilisi. The association agrees completely with the ideas lying at the basis of the ISU plan, regarding it as an effective instrument for the education of future conquerors of space in the spirit of international friendship and cooperation. It is precisely the "space generation"—this is the name that is sometimes given to the young people who were born after the Soviet Union sent up the first artificial satellite in 1957—that will, in the words of renowned American scholar and writer of science fiction Arthur Clarke, be the "architects of the first human civilization in space."

What do the organizers of the ISU think about its future work? According to plans, for the next 5 years the most promising undergraduate and graduate students from countries engaged in space research (especially the USSR, the United States, the PRC, India, Japan, Canada, and members of the European Space Agency) will be chosen each year to attend a summer session. Each successive summer session will be held in a leading university or research institute in a participating country. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has already expressed a desire to house the first session, scheduled for June 1988. According to reports in the Canadian press, McGill University (in Canada) will supply the lecture halls for ISU classes in 1989. Some members of the academic community, however, believe that the ISU summer session of 1989 should be held on another continent to underscore the international nature of the university from the very beginning. At the end of the 5-year "trial" period in 1992 (when the world public will celebrate the International Year of Space), the year-round functioning of the university will be organized.

The interdisciplinary approach has been chosen as the main principle of ISU work: Classes will be taught by experts in law and medicine, engineers, designers, journalists, and others in addition to specialists in astronautics. Some of the proposed courses are "Engineering and Astronautics," "International Space Law," "Flights to..."
the traditional shortcomings of narrow specialization on the one hand, to broaden the outlook of those whose future will be connected with astronautics by eliminating the traditional shortcomings of narrow specialization and, on the other, to give tomorrow's leaders (regardless of the field in which they will be working) an understanding of space, of its problems, and of its role in the modern world.

Undergraduates and graduate students will be expected to take classes and to conduct independent research and development projects. Besides this, one major research project is to be conducted each year, with all students participating, regardless of their area of specialization. For example, they could design a fundamentally new research and transport module that could be used in combination with the Soviet Mir station or with the American orbital station now being developed.

Around 100 undergraduates and graduate students from many countries will attend the first summer session of the ISU; 10 places are reserved for the PRC and 14 are reserved for the members of the European Space Agency. Most of the students in 1988 are expected to come from North America. Many experts believe with good reason, however, that the university should operate on the basis of equal participation by all space powers. Its organizers also agree with this point of view. We repeat, the students will be the best undergraduates and graduates, combining success in their professional field with leadership qualities. In other words, they will be people who might be heading the space programs in their countries in the future.

How will applicants be chosen? This matter was also discussed extensively in Boston. The procedure agreed upon is one in which candidates will be chosen by the countries and organizations participating in the ISU project, but the final decision will be made by an international admissions committee. This procedure should guarantee the equitable representation of all countries in the university and the necessary balance between fields of specialization. Although English will be the main working language, preference will be given to applicants fluent in several languages.

According to the initiators of the project, the first 18 months of the university's operations will cost only 1.3 million dollars. Because classrooms and other necessary material resources will be supplied by the host country, this sum will be used mainly for student grants and for the salaries of a highly qualified faculty.

It is still not clear whether or not the government and business community in the United States and other Western countries will participate directly in ISU funding. All statements to date have been unofficial. For example, J. Prike, the director of the Washington bureau of the European Space Agency, said: "We have not decided yet exactly how we will be participating, but we know that we will do our part." In any case, we can assume that government agencies and large aerospace firms in the leading capitalist countries will not remain uninvolved and will allocate the funds needed for the functioning of the university. Some of the project's features with the greatest appeal to Western leaders are the general public's interest in the very idea of cooperation in space exploration (this means that participation in the ISU project would create political advantages), the benefits of international cooperation, and the possibility of establishing additional channels for the exchange of information in astronautics. There is no question that some groups hope that this will facilitate the "brain drain" (the most talented young people from many countries will gather in a single place) and will create opportunities to influence "future leaders."

Many American politicians are in favor of the establishment of the ISU. Messages of greetings were sent to the organizational conference by NASA Director J. Fletcher, Secretary of Transportation E. Dole, Senators J. Glenn, J. Garn, E. Hollings, and D. Riegel, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications B. Nelson, and others.

The interest with which government officials and the business and scientific communities in different countries are keeping an eye on the new university's first steps is also attested to by the people who attended the conference. The United States, in particular, was represented by high-level officials from government agencies—the State Department, NASA, and the Department of Commerce—and by professors from leading universities (Harvard, Stanford, and Berkeley), company executives (Starinet, Hughes Aircraft, C.S. Draper Laboratory, and others), and astronauts; Canada was represented by the national space program consultant, executives of aerospace corporations, and the director of the University of Toronto Aerospace Research Institute; the European Space Agency was represented by the director of its Washington bureau, astronauts, and professors from many universities. The PRC representatives at the conference were officials from the Ministry of Astronautics, Science and Technology Commission, and higher academic institutions; the representative from India was a Space Affairs Ministry official, and so forth.

The importance of the ISU project to all mankind is indisputable. Arthur Clarke expressed it best when he said: "Whereas the first universities helped man make the move from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, the International Space University could be an important milestone on the road to the 21st century in space and on earth."

The organizers of the ISU invited the USSR to attend the conference and to hold a summer session at a Soviet university or a research institute in a related field. "We
are willing to cooperate at any level," Soviet cosmonaut V.A. Dzhanibekov announced on behalf of the delegation from the USSR Academy of Sciences at the Boston Space Festival. "Our door is open to any country."

The possible participation by the Soviet Union in ISU activity would be completely in line with our country's proposed "Star Peace" program. Projects of this kind on a non-governmental basis could supplement the agreements signed by the governments of the USSR and the United States in 1972, 1977, and 1987 on cooperation in the study and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

8588

U.S.-EEC Agricultural Production, Trade
18030009e Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88 (signed to press 16 Apr 88) pp 65-70

[Article by Viktor Fedorovich Lishchenko, doctor of economic sciences and department head at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, and Aleksandr Nikolayevich Mikheyev, candidate of economic sciences and researcher at the institute]

[Text] The United States was the first capitalist country to establish a strong agroindustrial complex through the industrialization and use of advanced technology. It was also able to win a dominant position in the world food market and to retain this position for almost the entire postwar period. At the end of the 1970s, however, the balance of power began changing, and largely as a result of the stronger position of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the sphere of agricultural production.

The Food Situation in the 1980s

The exacerbation of the world food crisis in the 1960s and 1970s allowed for U.S. expansion on an unprecedented scale in the world food market. American exports of grain, including fodder grain and oilseeds, displayed the highest rate of increase in the 1970s as a result of the higher demand for it in a number of developed capitalist countries (primarily for the needs of animal husbandry) and in developing states. Between 1971 and 1980 American deliveries of wheat, fodder grain, and cereals to the world market increased from 2.5-fold to 3-fold: to 41.2 million, 70.7 million, and 113.7 million tons respectively, while the U.S. share of world exports amounted to 43.8 percent, 65.5 percent, and 52.6 percent respectively by 1980 (see Table 1); exports of soybeans exceeded 20 million tons (or more than 80 percent of world exports) by the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980s. The proportion of the national agricultural product sold on foreign markets reached 30 percent (in terms of cost). By the end of the 1970s one out of every four farmers in the United States was effectively working for the export market, and the agrarian economy began to depend largely on the world market.

In the 1980s, however, the food situation in the world underwent significant changes. The rising prices of the main agricultural products on the world market\(^1\) and the cumulative effect of the so-called "green revolution" (that is, the widespread use of advanced plant selection techniques, agricultural machinery and chemicals, and intensive technology) in the developing countries since the early 1960s contributed to the growth of food production outside the United States.

As a result, first of all, even countries which had been major importers in the past, such as the PRC and India, are now almost self-sufficient. By 1985 the total output of grain in these countries was 18.4 percent and 19.1 percent, respectively, above the average annual level from 1979 to 1981 and amounted to 339.4 million and 164.6 million tons. What is more, in some years China, for example, even exported grain.

Second, the higher grain yield in many developing countries and the reduction of their purchasing power for various reasons lowered the demand for grain on the world market as a whole.

Third, the stronger position of the United States' main rivals in the grain trade—Canada, Argentina, and Australia—also helped to reduce American exports of wheat and fodder grain.

Fourth, the EEC countries, which once represented the main importer of grain, turned into a net exporter of wheat and fodder grain. In 1986 net exports of grain from the EEC countries amounted to 19.5 million tons, including 15.2 million tons of wheat.

The lower demand for grain and the stronger competition from the EEC, Canada, Argentina, and Australia led to the dramatic reduction of the U.S. share of world exports (see Table 1).
In the same way, the United States lost its strong position as a producer and exporter of today's most important oil-bearing crop—soybeans. Stronger competition, primarily from Brazil, has been reducing the U.S. share of world soybean exports for more than 10 years now—from 93.5 percent in 1971 to 65.5 percent in 1985. Its share of exports of soybean meal—an important fodder protein—decreased from 61.2 percent in 1971 to 20.3 percent in 1985. Now Brazil is the leader in the export of this product, and its share of world exports is over 35 percent.\(^2\)

The situation in the world food market by the middle of the 1980s was aptly described by prominent American expert W. Meyers: "It is obvious that in the 1980s the United States began to depend more on foreign markets as a source of demand, but the world market no longer depends so much on the United States as a supplier."\(^3\)

**Development of Agriculture in EEC Countries**

One of the main aspects of the agrarian policy of the EEC countries\(^4\) was and is the objective of maximum self-sufficiency in the main agricultural products for the purpose of reducing food imports and expanding exports to other countries. Many countries in Western Europe traditionally imported agricultural products in the past—grain, meat, some dairy products, sugar, and others. At the turn of the decade, however, agriculture in the EEC countries rose to a qualitatively new level in the production of the main food products. Between 1973 and 1983 the level of self-sufficiency (the relationship between national production and consumption) rose from 91 percent to 109 percent for grain (including a rise from 104 percent to 124 percent for wheat), from 96 to 102 percent for meat (including a rise from 96 to 105 percent for beef and veal, from 100 to 102 percent for pork, and from 102 to 111 percent for poultry meat), from 98 to 147 percent for butter, from 100 to 103 percent for chicken eggs, from 90 to 141 percent for sugar, and from 95 to 99 percent for fresh vegetables.\(^5\)

The per capita consumption of all types of meat increased from 75 to 88 kilograms a year, and corresponding increases for other products were from 97 to 102 kg for fresh dairy products, from 11 to 13 kg for cheese, and from 100 to 107 kg for vegetables.\(^6\)

These achievements were made possible by the stepped-up development of farming in the Common Market countries, especially grain cultivation. For example, between 1961-65 and 1985 the output of grain of all types in the 10 countries belonging to the community increased, according to FAO data, from 82.3 million to 139.1 million tons, or by 69 percent, exclusively as a result of a higher yield, because sown area decreased by 3 percent during the same period. Particularly good results were achieved in increasing the yield of wheat, which is now twice as great as in the United States, and even three times as great as in the United States in Denmark, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Ireland. In 1984 the respective indicators for these countries were 73.2, 78, 77.1, and 84.5 quintals per hectare.\(^7\)

There is no question that these high indicators were partly a result of the favorable climate for the cultivation of cereal crops in most of the West European countries: sufficient precipitation and a mild climate with no dramatic fluctuations in temperature. In the United States wheat is grown in dryer areas because the region with the best soil and climate, the "corn belt" (Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, and some other states), specializes in corn, a more productive crop than wheat.

Another important reason is the higher level of intensive farming in the countries of the community than in the United States, which is largely due to the limited amount of suitable land. The level of intensification in grain production in the EEC countries in comparison to the United States can be judged, for example, by the quantities of mineral fertilizer applied, which is the main factor in increasing the yield of agricultural crops. According to FAO data for 1984, the amount of mineral fertilizers of all types (nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium) applied per hectare of farmland was 161 kg in Greece, 168 kg in Italy, 421 kg in the FRG, and 788 kg in the Netherlands, while the figure in the United States was only 104 kg.\(^8\)

---

**Table 1. Changing U.S. Share of World Exports of Main Agricultural Products, 1971-1986, percentages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>All grain</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Fodder grain</th>
<th>Soybeans</th>
<th>Soybean meal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Preliminary data.

Agriculture in the EEC countries is distinguished by higher energy requirements than in the United States. The amount of energy used (in its oil equivalent), including the energy used in the production of fertilizers and pesticides and in the operation of irrigation systems and agricultural equipment, increased from 535 kg per hectare in 1971-73 to 715 kg per hectare in 1981-83 in Western Europe, while the average figure in the United States and Canada decreased from 293 to 279 kg per hectare.

Another important aspect of the augmentation of the amount of energy used (in its oil equivalent), including the energy requirements than in the United States. The agriculture in the EEC countries is distinguished by higher growth without lodging.

As a result, wheat production costs in Great Britain and France—the main producers and exporters of grain in Western Europe—are the same as in the United States or even lower. A higher yield compensates for the higher capital investments in grain farming in the EEC countries (per unit of product). For example, the average production costs of a ton of wheat, excluding the cost of land, were 7.3 dollars in Great Britain and 11.8 dollars in the United States in 1984; the respective figures including the cost of land were 7.9 and 15.1 dollars. Conditions are similar in the cultivation of another important fodder crop in the EEC countries—barley.

It was precisely the intensification of production that turned the EEC countries into the United States' chief competitor in the world wheat market and, in the middle of the 1980s, into a net exporter of grain, including fodder grain (see Table 2). The fodder grain imported by the Common Market countries decreased by 41.1 percent in the current decade—from 30.4 million to 17.9 million tons—with a simultaneous increase of 43.1 percent in exports (from 14.4 million to 20.6 million tons). Besides this, they were able to strengthen their own fodder base in animal husbandry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Grain Supply in EEC Countries,* 1981-1988</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years (Commercial)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fodder grain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 12 countries.

According to FAO data, the output of all types of meat in the EEC (10 countries) increased by 78.4 percent between 1961-65 and 1985—from 13.4 million to 23.9 million tons. Furthermore, the average annual rate of increase was around 3 percent, while in the United States it was around 1.6 percent and the output of meat increased by 40.5 percent during the same period—from 18.5 million to 26 million tons.

It must be said that pork and poultry have accounted for most of the increase in meat production in the EEC countries while beef has accounted for only a slight percentage. Nevertheless, the output of beef increased by 300,000 tons between 1980 and 1985 with only a relatively small number of cattle (78-79 million head, including dairy cows). During the same period the pork output increased by 1 million tons and the poultry meat output increased by 800,000 tons.

The output of milk also increased more dramatically in the EEC than in the United States. Between 1961-65 and
1985 it increased by 31.7 percent in Western Europe—from 86.7 million to 114.2 million tons—while in the United States it increased by 14 percent (from 57 million to 65 million tons). In the Common Market countries, however, the increase was due more to the growth of the dairy herd (constituting almost 26 million head at this time) than to an increase in yield and led to large surpluses, forcing the EEC leadership to limit the size of the dairy herd in March 1984. On the average, the milk yield per cow in the United States is 1.4-1.5 times as high as in the EEC. In 1985, for example, the indicators were 3,284 kg in France, 4,710 in the FRG, 5,307 in the Netherlands, and 5,346 in Denmark, but in the United States the figure was 5,844 kg. The difference is largely due to the less effective feeding of livestock in Western Europe.

The EEC's efforts to solve the problem of protein supplements in livestock feeds are of interest. The countries of the community do not have sufficient resources within their own territory for the cultivation of legume and oil-bearing crops and must import products with a high protein content, mainly soybeans and soybean meal. On the basis of soybean imports, the Common Market has established its own powerful oilseed processing industry, securing the “absorption” of the value added by processing. Furthermore, the EEC now ranks third in soybean meal production after the United States and Brazil and has a meal output of around 7.5-8 million tons a year.10

The EEC countries want to be self-sufficient in oilseeds, especially sunflower and rape, and oilseed products. Between 1970-74 and 1986 the area sown to all types of oil-bearing crops increased 3.5-fold, reaching 2.4 million hectares (in 10 countries), and the output of all types of oilseeds increased 4.8-fold, reaching 6 million tons.

A larger output of agricultural crops with a high protein content, such as peas, fodder beans, and lupine, is also high on the list of EEC priorities. They could replace around 65 percent of the soy protein used in hog and poultry feeds without any drop in productivity or the quality of meat. The current level of their production in the EEC countries is still low, primarily because the West European farmers are still inexperienced in this field and because their production is not subsidized. It is extremely indicative, however, that after the community took measures in 1976 to encourage farmers to grow peas, the output increased from 2,700 tons to 363,400 tons by 1982.

**Tendencies in Foreign Trade**

In the 1980s the positive balance in U.S. trade in agricultural and food products decreased dramatically: from 26.6 billion dollars in 1981 to 5 billion in 1986. The Common Market members, on the other hand, were able to improve their foreign trade balance in agricultural products and foodstuffs with third countries in the 1980s, although it is still negative. Between 1978-80 and 1984 their imports from third countries decreased by 13.1 percent—from 47.4 billion dollars to 41.2 billion—while their exports increased by 7.1 percent—from 22.4 billion to 24.6 billion. As a result, the deficit in the balance of trade decreased from 25 billion dollars to 16.6 billion.

Using agricultural subsidies as the main instrument of agrarian foreign trade policy, the EEC countries accumulated large reserves of grain (more than 50 percent in the case of wheat). Between 1981-82 and 1986-87 the carryover reserves in the EEC countries, counting the new members of the community, increased 1.5-fold—from 21 million to 30.9 million tons. The majority are so-called “intervention” reserves, designed to support prices on the domestic market and subsidize exports.11

One of the reasons for the erosion of the United States' position in foreign trade was the reduction of the EEC share of American agricultural exports and the increase in its share of U.S. imports. For example, between 1970 and 1985 the first indicator fell from 37 to 21.4 percent and the second rose from 12.5 to 19 percent. The trade balance between the United States and the EEC countries, which had increased from 1.8 billion dollars in 1970 to 7.2 billion in 1980 in the United States' favor, has been decreasing constantly throughout the 1980s at the same level of trade between the two sides. In 1986 it amounted to only 2.3 billion dollars. Important changes also took place in the structure of bilateral agricultural trade. Between 1980 and 1986 the EEC countries' imports of American fodder grain decreased by more than two-thirds (from 9.4 million tons to 3.1 million), their imports of American wheat decreased by 14 percent (from 1.5 million tons to 1.3 million), and their imports of oilseed cake and meal decreased by 32.7 percent (from 4.1 million tons to 2.7 million).

During the same period the proportion accounted for by these items in the value of American agricultural exports to the EEC countries decreased respectively from 13.8 to 5.1 percent, from 3.2 to 2.7 percent, and from 10.2 to 8.4 percent. This was accompanied by increased exports of non-grain fodder, primarily corn gluten and other feeds based on corn—from 2.5 million tons to 4.7 million—while their share of total exports rose from 4.8 to 14.2 percent.

The proportion accounted for by meat and meat products (especially pork), grain and grain products, dried and canned fruits and vegetables, and juices in EEC exports to the United States has grown. An analysis of the current structure of the bilateral trade in agricultural products and foodstuffs between the United States and the EEC countries indicates that European commodities are distinguished by a much higher level of industrial processing than American goods. Most U.S. exports are agricultural raw materials (grain and oilseeds), while 80 percent of EEC exports (even without including alcoholic beverages) are products of the food industry. This gives the countries of the community higher profits per
unit of exported product and, in view of the declining significance of several types of agricultural raw materials in world trade in the last few years, could give the Common Market an advantage in bilateral trade with the United States and in competition with it in the markets of third countries.\(^\text{12}\)

The weaker foreign trade positions of the United States and the stronger positions of the Common Market countries in the 1980s have considerably intensified the competition between them for agricultural markets, even in the case of relatively small export volumes. One recent conflict arose when Spain and Portugal became members of the EEC in January 1986. The U.S. administration announced that the new tariffs on Spanish imports of American corn would cost American farmers 430 million dollars and threatened to retaliate by charging a 200-percent duty on cheese and on white wine and other types of liquor exported by the EEC to the United States. After tense negotiations the Common Market had to make some concessions by allowing Spain to import from 2 million to 2.5 million tons of corn from countries not belonging to the EEC and by setting the U.S. quota at 1.8 million tons.\(^\text{13}\)

The changes in the world food market in the 1970s and 1980s proved that the European Economic Community is able to compete with the strongest capitalist power in agriculture, a sphere monopolized by the United States for a long time. Although the EEC countries made use of some of the experience the United States had accumulated in the agrarian sphere, they charted their own course, with an emphasis on the intensification of production processes and the efficient use of land. Using government methods of stimulating the production of the main agricultural products, they resolved to make maximum use of their own resources for the development of farming and animal husbandry and the eradication of their dependence on agricultural imports. This dealt a perceptible blow to the United States' position as a world exporter of food.

Footnotes

1. The United States' speculative price hikes played an important role in this. Whereas a ton of American wheat cost from 70 to 74 dollars and a ton of corn cost from 57 to 70 dollars on the world market before 1972, these prices were already two or three times as high in the middle of the 1970s—around 200 dollars and 145 dollars respectively.


4. Agricultural production is high on the list of priorities in EEC areas of activity. The common agricultural policy (CAP) of the EEC countries covers around 90 percent of their combined agricultural output and absorbs from 70 to 80 percent of the supranational budget of the community countries.


11. The subsidization of grain production and exports in the Common Market countries has been the target of angry criticism in other states. The obvious protectionism of the CAP will certainly injure the United States' competitive potential in the world market. Everyone knows, however, that the system of government regulation in U.S. agriculture is also designed to give farmers income support and subsidize the production and export of grain and other agricultural products.

12. Also see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1986, No 5, pp 81-86—Ed.


COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo “Nauka”, “SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya”, 1988

8588

Review of Book on SDI


[Text] This book is a collection of analytical articles on technical, economic, and politico-military aspects of the SDI. It was compiled by experts from the Institute of
U.S. and Canadian Studies and the Space Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences under the auspices of the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat. The work describes the current state of research and experimental design projects in all of the main areas of the U.S. space-based ABM system and analyzes the views of the SDI program's supporters and opponents on such issues as its effect on strategic stability, the future of the arms race, and the prospects for nuclear arms limitation and reduction.

The authors have assessed the politico-military purpose of the "Star Wars" program correctly by demonstrated that it is geared to the creation of not some single ABM weapon, but an entire new family of highly effective weapons.

The first chapter discusses the potential candidates for use in the American ABM system—directed energy and kinetic energy weapons (lasers, accelerators, microwave weapons, homing devices, and electrodynamic mass accelerators). The authors thoroughly analyze the problems facing developers and demonstrate the colossal discrepancy between the current characteristics of some weapons and the requirements of ABM systems. For example, energy and axial intensity will have to be increased by a factor of $10^6 - 10^7$ in hydrogen fluoride lasers, of $10^6 - 10^4$ in excimer lasers, and of $10^3$ in neutral particle accelerators.

Economic-organizational aspects of the SDI program, the structure of R&D, and financing procedures are examined in the second chapter. An analysis illustrates the monopolization of this program by a few large military-industrial corporations, most of which are among the Pentagon's 20 top contractors. In comparison with SDI orders for fiscal year 1983, 1986 orders were 70 times as great for Gencorp, 33 times as great for General Motors, almost 25 times as great for Flow General, and 8.5 times as great for Lockheed (p. 205). This rate of increase in allocations to strategic arms producers in just 3 years of R&D seems unprecedented. The leading position of a limited number of states in the SDI program, including California, Alabama, Washington, Texas, and Massachusetts, is pointed out in the work. It is also indicative that contracts are concentrated in just a few electoral districts. The SDI contracts have been awarded mainly to the states and districts whose representatives in Congress are prominent members of two major committees—on appropriations and the armed services.

Politico-military aspects of the SDI program are analyzed in the third chapter. The evolution of the SDI's official supporters' views on the scheduling and effectiveness of the broad-scale ABM system is accurately described. At this time Washington officials no longer use the term "absolute defense." In spite of the assurances of the SDI program's supporters with regard to the possibility of the "quick" completion of the work involved in developing experimental models and the subsequent deployment of the broad-scale ABM system, many now prefer to say nothing about the exact dates of various projects and are more likely to mention the 21st century.

The groundless allegations of SDI supporters, that it will stimulate the reduction of nuclear potential, are analyzed in the book. The authors demonstrate how the deployment of the ABM system will be regarded by the other side as an extremely hostile action and an indication of plans to achieve the potential for a first "preemptive" strike.

The Soviet scholars conduct a detailed examination of the thesis that the deployment of the broad-scale ABM system is supposedly necessary for protection from accidental or unauthorized nuclear strikes, the hypothetical use of nuclear weapons by a "third" side, and acts of terrorism. As far as the Soviet Armed Forces are concerned, their strategic missile complexes include all of the necessary technology to preclude the unauthorized use of ICBM's or SLBM's. The prospect of the use of nuclear weapons by a "third" side will depend on the number of states possessing nuclear weapons. France and Great Britain are allies of the United States, and the PRC maintains normal relations with Washington. For this reason, the authors make the accurate statement that protection from strikes by "third" sides will necessitate not the development of an ABM system by the United States, but more vigorous and purposeful efforts to stop the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons.

The authors analyze 14 areas of R&D in the SDI program that represent flagrant violations of the ABM Treaty. They include the testing and demonstration of space-based ABM weapons. Projects of this kind are prohibited in Article V of the ABM Treaty. Confirming the close connection between strategic defensive and offensive arms, the treaty is immutable and objective regardless of the level of ABM technology. One of the fundamental provisions of the treaty is the pledge of the sides not to deploy ABM systems covering the territory of their country and not to establish the basis for this kind of defense. This makes the document a specific link in the organic connection between defensive and offensive arms, a link which cannot be broken without causing an unpredictable nuclear and space arms race. Washington's possible renunciation of certain provisions of the ABM Treaty would put the reliability of the United States as a negotiating partner in question.

The introduction of another new strategic component into the structure of the strategic forces of one or both sides, such as a broad-scale ABM system with space-based elements, would complicate the entire system for estimating the balance of offensive and defensive strategic weapons and create additional difficulties in calculating the balance of power on both sides. It is most likely that the development of advanced weapons in the two leading nuclear powers will continue, and this will
heighten disparities in the strategic forces of the sides and make them difficult to compare. These imbalances could be quite substantial in view of the real possibility that one side might develop anti-ABM weapons. The main purpose of countermeasures of this kind would be the guarantee of an unacceptable retaliatory strike. Some of the possible countermeasures against the American broad-scale ABM system are discussed in the work.

The book contains many illustrations, diagrams, and tables. It is written primarily for experts on military technology and policy, but it will be of indisputable interest to the general reading public as well. Published in a limited edition, the book is most likely to be republished soon, and in this event it would be best to discuss the potential danger of the use of SDI technology in the development of weapons of the "space-to-space" and "space-to-earth" classes and other "exotic" weapons systems.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

8588

Chronicle of Soviet-U.S. Relations (January-March 1988)
18030009g Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88 (signed to press 16 Apr 88) pp 125-127

[Text]

January

1—New Year’s messages from M.S. Gorbachev to the American people and from R. Reagan to the Soviet people were broadcast on Soviet central television and the American national TV networks.

6—Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium A.A. Gromyko received a large group of representatives of the American Council of Young Political Leaders, visiting the USSR as guests of the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR, in the Kremlin.

14—The latest round of Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms began in Geneva.

14-17—A group of U.S. congressmen headed by T. Lantos were in Moscow as the guests of the USSR Parliamentary Group.

15—The USSR delegation submitted a draft “Protocol to the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction and Limitation” at a plenary session in Geneva at the Soviet- American talks on nuclear and space arms.

A.A. Gromyko received U.S. Senator J. Biden, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who was in Moscow as the guest of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

17—Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee A.F. Dobrynin received well-known U.S. businessman and public spokesman A. Hammer.

18—A.F. Dobrynin received President A. Schneier of the American Appeal to Conscience Foundation at his request.

20—A protocol to the program of scientific contacts in the social sciences and humanities between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the American Council of Learned Societies was signed in Princeton (United States).

22—The Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed on 8 December 1987, was delivered to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium for ratification.

The American delegation at a meeting of the space group in the latest round of Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms submitted a draft treaty between the United States and USSR on some measures to promote the development of future strategic defense against ballistic missiles on a cooperative basis.

25—The U.S. administration submitted the INF Treaty to the Senate for discussion.

25-30—Twenty Soviet experts, headed by I. Palenykh, the head of the USSR delegation at the Geneva full-scale talks on nuclear tests, visited the test range in Nevada in response to a similar visit by an American delegation to the Soviet testing center near Semipalatinsk.

26—A Soviet delegation headed by USSR Minister of Culture V.G. Zakharov arrived in the United States to attend a seminar on Soviet- American relations.

27—Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock in Moscow at his request.
February

1—A delegation from the USSR Parliamentary Group headed by Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet A.E. Voss returned to Moscow from a trip to the United States where they were the guests of the American Congress.

1-5—A conference of representatives of the Soviet and American public was held in the Washington suburb of Alexandria to discuss “The New Thinking in the Nuclear Age” and was organized by the Center for American-Soviet Dialogue, which invited around 100 Soviet citizens and more than 400 American citizens to attend. The “Alexandria Appeal”—an open letter to General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev, President R. Reagan, and the next president of the United States—won unanimous approval.

2—The 11th session of the joint Soviet-American commission for cooperation in environmental protection began in Moscow.

12—The U.S. delegation submitted a draft protocol on inspections at a meeting of the strategic arms group at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva.

13—The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a vehement protest to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with the provocative and obviously deliberate action of the American Navy when its ships, the destroyer “Carron” and the cruiser “Yorktown,” violated the USSR state border near the southern Crimean coast on 12 February.

15—The Soviet-American full-scale talks on the limitation and eventual cessation of nuclear tests were resumed in Geneva.

Another underground nuclear test was conducted on the test range in Nevada. This was the first officially announced nuclear explosion this year.

A protest rally against U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of the Lithuanian SSR was held in Vilnius.

16—E.A. Shevardnadze received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock at his request.

19—A published report by the U.S. Ministry of Defense refuted the rumors being spread in the United States to imply that the USSR has 160 more SS-20 missiles than the Soviet side claimed in the memorandum of understanding in connection with the INF Treaty.

A preparatory commission—a working body of the USSR Supreme Soviet foreign affairs commissions—met in the Kremlin to discuss matters connected with the ratification of the INF Treaty.

21-23—American Secretary of State G. Shultz visited Moscow, accompanied by the President’s National Security Adviser C. Powell. All aspects of Soviet-American relations, including preparations for the new summit meeting, were discussed in detail. The sides also discussed human rights and humanitarian issues and all of the remaining unresolved problems connected with the talks on nuclear and space arms, nuclear tests, armed forces and conventional arms, and chemical weapons, and conducted a broad and frank exchange of opinions on regional issues. A joint statement on the results of the talks was issued. The USSR minister of foreign affairs and the U.S. secretary of state exchanged personal notes constituting a new agreement on continued cooperation in fishing.

21—A.F. Dobrynin spoke with C. Powell.

22—Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers M.I. Ryzhkov received G. Shultz. They discussed important aspects of Soviet-American political relations, world economic problems and the two countries’ ideas about their resolution, and the state of trade and economic relations between the USSR and the United States and the prospects for the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in this area.

M.S. Gorbachev spoke with G. Shultz in the Kremlin. They discussed the progress in implementing the agreements reached in December 1987 and the preparations for President Reagan’s upcoming visit to the USSR. M.S. Gorbachev put forth several new ideas about specific aspects of the reduction of various types of strategic nuclear weapons. Regional conflicts were discussed in detail.

E.A. Shevardnadze held a press conference in the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A press conference with G. Shultz on the results of his visit in Moscow was held in the same place.

More than 250 works by three Soviet artists—Boris Ugarov, Tair Salakhov, and Dmitriy Bisti—were exhibited in the Brandywine Museum in Chadds Ford (Pennsylvania).

25—A published statement by the Soviet Government said that the USSR had decided to withdraw the Soviet OTR-22 (SS-12) missiles and the launchers and other auxiliary equipment for them from the territory of the GDR and CSSR, in the nature of a goodwill gesture and with the agreement of the governments of these states, even before the INF Treaty goes into force.

29—The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a vehement protest to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with the dramatic increase in subversive broadcasts to the Soviet Union by Voice of America, the American government radio station.
March

1—The USSR delegation at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons submitted new proposals for the quickest possible drafting of a treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons.

8-26—The eighth round of Soviet-American consultations on the prohibition of chemical weapons was held in Geneva.

9—Members of the foreign affairs commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet met in Moscow with a group of American senators and scholars visiting the USSR as the guests of a committee of the USSR Parliamentary Group.


11—M.S. Gorbachev received the American senators and scholars in the Kremlin. The main topics of discussion were security issues, arms reduction, international stability, confidence-building measures, and the perestroika in the USSR and its international implications.

E.A. Shevardnadze received Assistant Secretary of State R. Murphy, who was in Moscow as a personal representative of G. Shultz. They discussed matters connected with the settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.


15—A.F. Dobrynin received prominent American public spokesman and former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara at his request.

16—While M.S. Gorbachev was in Yugoslavia he spoke at a meeting of the Federal Assembly and set forth additional proposals regarding the reduction of military potential in the Mediterranean zone; a freeze on the number of ships and on the potential of the Soviet and U.S. naval forces here on 1 July of this year was proposed as the first step.

E.A. Shevardnadze received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock at his request. The main topic of discussion was the settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan.


16-17—Candidate for membership in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Secretary of Defense D.T. Yazov met in Bern with U.S. Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci. They discussed matters connected with the nature of the military doctrines of the two states and arms reduction and limitation.

21-23—The second of a series of meetings between USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz took place in Washington. They discussed Soviet-American relations and the preparations for the meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev and President R. Reagan of the United States in Moscow from 29 May to 2 June 1988. E.A. Shevardnadze was received by R. Reagan.

E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz attended an experimental test of communications between the Washington and Moscow nuclear risk reduction centers established in accordance with the agreement of 15 September 1987.

The minister and the secretary agreed to meet again in Moscow from 21 to 25 April and again in the middle of May.

29—The Senate Armed Services Committee recommended the approval of the Soviet-American INF Treaty by the U.S. Senate.

Prominent oncologists communicated with one another over a Moscow-Washington spacebridge.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo “Nauka”, “SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya”, 1988

8588

Articles Not Translated from SSHA:

EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 5, May 1988

E1030009h Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88 (signed to press 16 Apr 88) pp 1-2

Canadian Working and Middle Classes (V.S. Azhayeva and S.Yu. Danilov) ............... pp 28-35

Labor Solidarity in Action (P.S. Petrov) ............... pp 36-44

Language of Cultural Communication (V.I. Borisyuk) ........................................... pp 45-51

Halfway Through the Presidential Campaign (V.S. Anichkina) ................................... pp 52-56

Weak Dollar: The View from the FRG (M.Ye. Stukanov) ........................................ pp 71-74

Inventing Reality. The Politics of the Mass Media (Michael Parenti) .......................... pp 75-85
Medico-Biological Research in the 1980s
(A.Ya. Bulovinova) ........................................ pp 86-93


Review of “United States and Western Europe” by Longin Pastusiak (W. Kostecki, Warsaw) ........................................ pp 99-101

Review of “Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia” by R. Scalapino (A.A. Nagornyy) ........................................ pp 101-103

Report on “U.S. Foreign Policy in American Political Science” by Ye.I. Popova (D.B. Petrov) ........................................ p 105

Professional Training of Diplomats (M.M. Lebedeva and S.I. Lobanov) .............. pp 106-109

Indiana (V.N. Orlov) ........................................ pp 110-115

U.S. Position in International Investment Sphere (Ye.M. Kotlyarova) ........................................ pp 116-121

Canadian Orders and Medals
(A.I. Cherkasov) ........................................ pp 122-124

8588

Publication Data
18030009j Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88 (signed to press 16 Apr 88)

English title: USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

Russian title: SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA

Editor: V.M. Berezhkov

Publishing house: Izdatelstvo Nauka

Place of publication: Moscow

Date of publication: May 1988

Signed to press: 16 April 1988

Copies: 28,500

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo “Nauka”, “SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya”, 1988

8588