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ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET OPPOSITION TO SDI OUTLINED BEFORE SUMMIT

Space Research Institute Director

LD152108 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Nov 85

[Special correspondent Boris Kalyagin video report from Geneva on preparations for the Reagan-Gorbachev summit, including an interview with Roald Zinnurovich Sagdeyev, director of the Institute of Space Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences--from the "Vremya" newscast--recorded]

[Text] Geneva is preparing for the arrival of the high ranking guests. The ancient lakeside city has witnessed many international forums, but perhaps none has evoked such enormous interest as the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting.

The signs of the summit meeting are already visible everywhere on the streets of Geneva. Even the shopkeepers are hurrying to take advantage of the significance of this event. The local authorities are striving to ensure favorable conditions both for the holding of the meeting and for coverage of it by the world press. An international press center has opened in the center of the city. In it, almost 3,000 journalists are receiving their accreditation, a number unprecedented for Geneva. This too is a reflection of the close attention being devoted to the summit by the world community.

Problems of the demilitarization of space and of limitation of nuclear arms were the focus of attention of a meeting of three Soviet scientists, Academicians Velikov, Arbatov, and Sagdeyev with the press.

The public is worried by the question of how ready both sides are to achieve a mutually acceptable accord.

In the press center I met with Academician Sagdeyev, director of the Institute of Space Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Roald Zinnurovich, just before the Geneva meeting U.S. Administration spokesmen are declaring that the United States has no intention of renouncing President Reagan's so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, which has been dubbed the "star wars"
program. For our part we stress that if there is no ban on the militarization of space, neither will there be any possibility of achieving agreement on limiting nuclear arms. I would like to ask you, as one of the major specialists in the area of space research, why we regard the problem of the nonmilitarization of space as the crucial and decisive one for the success of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations?

[Sagdeyev] It seems to me that the position of some U.S. Administration spokesmen is characterized by an inability or perhaps deliberate reluctance to look 10 or 15 years into the future and view more closely the picture sketched fully realistically, in somber colors, in the recent speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to representatives of the congress of Nobel laureates. Indeed, a world filled with a vast number of weapons of destruction, not only land-based, sea-based, and submarine-based weapons, but also thousands of missiles and every possible type of exotic weapon in space, will present a dreadful picture of uncertainty and extreme instability, in which the risk of even the accidental outbreak of war will be unacceptably high. It is precisely an understanding of this stern truth — incidentally, this viewpoint is shared by an overwhelming cross-section of the international scientific public. [as heard] I must say that our scientific colleagues in the United States, major scientists who in their time have done much in the defense field and the military field, understand perfectly the danger of extending the arms race in to space.

Now, the moment of truth has really arrived, when it is necessary to reach precise agreement on the point that the interconnection, the indissoluble interconnection between offensive arms on earth and in space must be broken by a renunciation of the transfer of arms into space.

[Kalyagin] There is very little time left before the summit meeting starts. Today it is difficult to predict whether the day of the opening will be sunny or overcast. In Geneva the weather constantly changes: one moment the sun is out, the next it is raining or even snowing. But one would like the political barometer to read "fair."

Given good will on both sides, the meeting could become the beginning of fruitful Soviet-U.S. dialogue. This is what hundreds of millions of inhabitants of the planet are waiting for and hoping for.
'Political Realities' of SDI

PM151623 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 5

[Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Arbatov article: "'Star Wars' and Political Realities"

[Text] Can one seriously count on constructive results at the Geneva summit meeting and in general on success in the Soviet-U.S. dialogue on nuclear and space arms? It is necessary to have dealings with none other than representatives of the very administration which from year to year makes the greatest possible efforts, extracting billions of dollars from Congress for military space and nuclear programs? So it is not surprising that even many sincere supporters of agreements between the USSR and the United States have recently increasingly frequently put forward pessimistic views on the prospects for Soviet-U.S. accords.

All the same, without minimizing the difficulties in the path of new agreements, it would be incorrect to believe that the prevention of the militarization of space is a hopeless cause.

A whole series of consideration favor this position. And the fact that the history of Soviet-U.S. relations did not begin with the present U.S. Administration and will not end with it is not the most important of those considerations. The next administration's course will be determined to a decisive degree by the military-strategic situation in the world and the political situation outside and inside the United States at the end of the eighties.

The determining factor in the military and political situation in the international arena was and will continue to be the correlation of forces which has emerged in the world and the economic, scientific, and technical might of socialism, on which the Soviet policy of maintaining the global military-strategic equilibrium rests.

The Soviet Union will not permit superiority over itself.

If necessary, countermeasures on the part of the USSR could take place in the sphere of not only offensive, but also defensive weapons systems, including space-based systems. As a recently published extensive study by the U.S. Congress' Office of Technology Assessment admits, in the conditions of the unlimited race for offensive and defensive arms, the prospects for achieving and keeping U.S. superiority are at best "very dim."

At the same time the launching of a new round in the arms race on earth and in space would be too high a price to pay for convincing the militarists once again of the unattainability of military superiority. In view of the dangerous consequences of this wasteful "trial of strength" in the decades to come, it would be better to display farsightedness and good will now, and by joint efforts to prevent the next spiral in the nuclear and space arms race.
In this connection we must not underestimate the fact that, for all the might of the military-industrial complex and the influence of its placemen in the present U.S. Administration, the course of U.S. policy at the talks does not only depend on those circles which are unconditionally committed to new armaments. Among the broad public, in the Congress, and in political circles in the United States and other capitalist countries, there are considerable forces which oppose the “star wars” programs.

On the other hand, the coalition in support of the “Strategic Defense Initiative” is far from monolithic. Given a certain turn of events, it could collapse and lose influence. And the “initiative” itself will continue to be the subject of an acute struggle in political and scientific circles in the United States and the allied states.

For the time being, the supporters of the “star wars” projects are managing to mislead many people with detailed arguments about physical and technical aspects of space lasers and charged particle accelerators, electromagnetic guns, supersensors, supercomputers, and so forth. All this sounds mysterious and impressive to nonspecialists and leads their thoughts away from policy and strategy and into exotic technical matters.

But as time passes, even in Western public circles there will inevitably be a growing awareness of what the majority of specialists (both supporters and opponents of the “initiative”) can already see clearly. Complete invulnerability to nuclear weapons is an impossible fantasy. To be specific: However much money is poured into ABM systems and however many echelons of these systems are heaped up on earth and in space, they will not be able to protect the population and industry in the event of nuclear war; that is to say, they will not be capable of ensuring the attainment of the main goal which is now being used to justify the colossal expenditure associated with the “initiative.” Many of the people who are currently being misled by the administration’s demagoguery will undoubtedly change their attitude toward the SDI when they realize that the promised “technical miracles” cannot eliminate the threat of catastrophic losses in a nuclear war, but instead will make the strategic situation extremely unstable and unpredictable and the arms race completely uncontrollable.

The future of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems is another very important factor in assessing the prospects of the “defense initiative.” It is the chief contractual-legal obstacle to the development [razvitie] of space strike means. In particular, Article V unequivocally prohibits the creation [sozdat'] testing, or deployment of space-based ABM systems or components. The treaty enjoys considerable political support among the public, in the U.S. Congress, and throughout the world. And this does not let the SDI supporters openly discard it.

In order to weaken the popularity of this treaty, an increasingly intensive campaign is being mounted in the West to discredit it. Unsubstantiated accusations against the Soviet Union of imaginary “violations” of particular articles in it are being invented.
The Soviet Union strictly observes all the terms of that treaty, as well as of other agreements which it has signed. The purpose of the fabrications about "violations" is perfectly obvious — to divert public attention and make the public close its eyes to the U.S. measures within the framework of the "defense initiative." These conflict not only in the long term but right now with the provisions of the treaty.

The administration and the Pentagon are practicing the arbitrary interpretation of concepts such as "creation" [sozdatyiye], "ABM component," and "tests for ABM purposes." In this way they are trying to demonstrate that the so-called "research" being conducted in the United States, as well as the "demonstrations" of elements and prototypes of space strike means planned for the late eighties and the early nineties, are supposedly permitted by the ABM Limitation Treaty.

True, even the most zealous advocates of SDI cannot fail to admit that the deployment of ABM space systems is unequivocally prohibited by the treaty. However, adherents of space strike arms reckon that in the next few years their programs will manage to acquire insuperable inertia by virtue of the funds spent by interested organizations and the obligations of political leaders. They also hope that by means of their measures and the campaign about imaginary Soviet "violations," they will succeed in shaking the significance and popularity of the treaty and will get away with its final abandonment without substantial costs.

The continuous buildup and improvement of nuclear arsenals and the seeming inability of the talks to radically stop this process are being actively utilized by SDI supporters to make their plans attractive in the eyes of the broad public. Their plans are passed off as a military-technical "alternative" to the policy of a conscientious search for mutually acceptable agreements.

In fact, however, the appeals by SDI supporters are a recipe for an uncontrolled arms race leading the world to catastrophe. The real alternative to this very dangerous path is contained in the Soviet Union's new peace initiatives. It must be obvious to everyone who understands the essence of the problem, and who judges without prejudice, that the radical reduction and limitation of nuclear arms, if this proves possible in the immediate future, followed by their total liquidation, is preferable to the prospects of the creation [sozdatyiye] of antimissile and other space strike means — prospects full of dangers for decades to come.
The Soviet Union has submitted for the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva specific proposals on the entire package of problems relating to space and nuclear (strategic and medium-range) armaments. These proposals include a total ban on strike space means, a radical 50-percent reduction in the nuclear armaments of the USSR and the United States capable of reaching each other's territory, and the establishment for the delivery vehicles remaining after the reduction of an equal ceiling for both sides' nuclear charges — 6,000 units for each side.

The Soviet Union has demonstrated in practice to the whole world its desire and readiness to proceed along the path of elaborating effective accords aimed at preventing the arms race in space and halting it on earth, limiting and reducing nuclear armaments, and consolidating strategic stability, as envisaged by the 8 January 1985 joint Soviet-U.S. statement on the subject matter and aims of the talks on nuclear and space armaments. The proposals submitted by the USSR are comprehensive in terms of the problems they encompass, are interconnected in essence, are radical in their approach toward the solution of the questions under discussion, and are far from the viewpoint of the principle of parity and identical security. The Soviet Union is displaying flexibility in the choice of ways of achieving the talks' goals. It has expressed the readiness to seek points of contact between the positions of the USSR and the United States.

The Soviet stance on key questions affecting the basis of the strategic balance of forces and strategic stability should be clear to everyone. One such key issue is the question of the relationship between strategic offensive forces and strike space armaments, which Washington shamefacedly calls "defensive" means. This question was examined by both sides during the SALT I negotiations, and its agreed solution was enshrined in 1972 in the ABM Limitation Treaty between the USSR and the United States. The treaty's fundamental articles ban the deployment of ABM defense systems for the country's territory and the creation of the basis for such defense. The creation, testing, and deployment of space-based ABM systems are also banned. By signing this document of unlimited duration, the USSR and the United States acknowledged that the most important conditions for ensuring strategic stability are the sides' voluntary renunciation of the possession of broad-scale ABM systems and the maintenance of approximate parity in strategic offensive armaments. These parameters for the sides' strategic relationship have created preconditions for the limitation and consistent mutual reduction of strategic offensive armaments with a view to reducing the level of nuclear confrontation. And it is not the Soviet Union's fault that the positive process of curbing the arms race initiated in the sixties has not been seen through to the end. As is well known, the thwarting by the United States of the ratifica-
tion of the SALT II treaty, which was the result of the course toward torpedoing it, was an obstacle to this. However, the historical experience of the two countries' collaboration in the arms control field convincingly shows that to make headway in the direction of enhancing strategic stability and limiting and reducing strategic nuclear armaments it is essential to rule out factors which introduce an imbalance to strategic equalization and primarily the most destabilizing factor — the possession of large-scale ABM systems. That was true in 1972 and it remains true to this day. What is the essence of this premise?

It is well known that approximate parity in armaments and identical security are a key element of strategic stability. With the deployment of ABM weapons, a fundamental change to the existing strategic balance of forces would begin. There is no need to prove that the unilateral or faster [operezhayushcheye] creation [sozdatelnye] of an ABM system secures for the country which has developed this system the opportunity to deliver a first strike against an adversary and to repel a retaliatory strike or limit the harm caused by it. It is clear that under these conditions the other side would be obliged to take the necessary steps in the interests of safeguarding its own security. A new spiral of the arms race would inevitably begin. Military-strategic equilibrium would undoubtedly be restored but at a higher level of armed confrontation. And under those conditions there could be no question of any limitation or reduction of nuclear arsenals or consolidation of strategic stability. Such is the reality. What do the apologists of the "star wars" program and the supporters of the creation of strike space armaments have to say on this subject?

The main "theoretical" thesis of the defenders of wide-scale ABM systems in the United States is that with the sides' parallel creation [sozdatelnye] and deployment of these systems the problem of the arms race allegedly does not arise because both sides will possess ABM systems. Moreover, the deployment of ABM systems will allegedly devalue strategic nuclear armaments and ultimately sweep them onto the trash heap of history. Therefore, it is claimed, a wide-scale ABM system and, equally, the U.S. SDI program, which is geared toward creating [sozdatelnye] such a system, help to strengthen strategic stability and consequently to consolidate peace. The falsity of this "peace-loving" concept becomes obvious if you consider that with the sides' parallel creation [sozdatelnye] and deployment of wide-scale ABM systems, a race is inevitable in the sphere of the quantitative buildup and qualitative improvement of ABM facilities by virtue of the practical impossibility of reliably assessing and comparing the effectiveness of the sides' ABM systems. That is why each side will seek to enhance its strategic potential by every means with the aid of defensive and offensive means. It is clear that the creation [sozdatelnye] and deployment of wide-scale ABM systems, despite the claims of the defenders of SDI, does not and cannot create a basis strengthening strategic stability or further limiting and reducing strategic offensive nuclear armaments.

Does Washington understand this? It cannot fail to. What, then, is it gambling on? There can be only one answer: on an accelerated breaking away from the Soviet Union through new technologies, on their maximum utilization for creating [sozdatelnye]
wide-scale ABM systems with space-based elements, and on the attainment of military superiority on the basis of the faster [perezhashchishche] creation [sozdaniye] of a first-strike potential. That is why the United States categorically rejects the ban on the creation [sozdaniye] and deployment of space strike armaments, and states that it will not stop work on the SDI program. Moreover, it is endeavoring to "involve" in this program the intellectual and material resources of as many countries of the capitalist world as possible, promising them a place under the "ABM umbrella" in return. It is not hard to see behind all this the U.S. desire to assimilate the sphere of armaments hard to control in the qualitative respect that ABM systems built on new physical principles represent in order to build up the effectiveness of ABM means and create opportunities for delivering a first strike.

This U.S. line is closely linked with the its approach toward nuclear arms limitation. The United States has chosen ground-based ICBM's which comprise the basis of the USSR's combat as the most desirable subject for limitations in Soviet strategic armaments. These ICBM's have been declared by Washington to be the "most dangerous" and "destabilizing" armaments. Considering the real fact that the Soviet Union, apart from its strategic nuclear forces, has no other nuclear means reaching U.S. territory, it is not hard to understand the aim of this choice: to limit to the maximum the Soviet Union's ability to respond to a strike against its territory. At the same time the United States is seeking to preserve the offensive potential of its medium-range missiles in West Europe and forward-based means deployed around the Soviet Union. As is well known, this potential is of a strategic nature with respect to our country.

The USSR understands where all this is leading. The United States' long-term orientation toward the creation and deployment of a wide-scale ABM system, presented verbally as a strategy for eliminating nuclear weapons on earth, is in fact a strategy for acquiring military superiority, speculating on people's fear of nuclear war and donning peaceful clothing. Such is the truth.

The U.S. course toward acquiring military superiority is hopeless because the USSR cannot and will not allow a disruption of military-strategic parity. The Soviet Union will give an adequate response to the challenge which is being prepared to it. There will be no U.S. monopoly in space. But in that case it will be a matter of a new round of the arms race.

But what about the automatic disappearance of nuclear missile armaments from the face of the earth which the SDI's supporters promise the world public after the creation [sozdaniye] and deployment of wide-scale ABM systems? This is also part of the Pentagon's "strategic" lie. It is not in order to eliminate nuclear missile weapons on earth or to strengthen strategic stability that the United States is spending billions of dollars, expending enormous intellectual resources, and preparing "star wars." No; the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" is not bringing the world's peoples nuclear disarmament. "Star wars" are still wars and they are prepared by the United States to achieve its imperial claims on earth.
The Soviet Union consistently advocates closing the way into space for weapons and preventing the dissemination of the arms race into outer space. The USSR's proposals are clear and substantiated: in order to minimize the potential for disrupting the strategic balance of forces and to create a firm basis for the consistent reduction of nuclear arms levels, it is essential to impose a total ban on space strike weapons. Without that, deep reductions of nuclear armaments are impossible. The Soviet Union has no intention of helping the United States to acquire a first-strike potential.

Ban Will Solve 'Dilemma'

LD161205 Moscow TASS in English 1144 GMT 16 Nov 85

["Expectations and Hopes"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow November 16 TASS — "A lot of people throughout the world realize today the incompatibility of creating strike space arms and drastically reducing the existing nuclear armaments", PRAVDA's special correspondents write from Geneva today. "Apparently, people will have to solve this dilemma sooner or later. Objectively, it cannot be evaded. The Soviet proposals providing for a ban on outer space militarization is the way out of the impasse. Moreover, our programme for turning outer space into an arena of fruitful international cooperation opens up broad vistas."

"People of good will across the world wish that a way out of the obtained situation be found, that bold and constructive steps be taken towards terminating the arms race and preventing space militarization, in other words, towards a more calm and safer world. These are exactly the expectations which are set for the Geneva meeting."

Reporting about thousands of letters coming in these days to the Soviet mission from various countries, the correspondents underline: "Peoples' warm messages contain wishes of success to the Geneva summit, the expression of support for the vigorous and constructive peace policy of the Soviet Union. There are a lot of postcards expressing gratitude for the announced moratorium on any nuclear explosions."

The dispatch points out that the Soviet Union is going to the Geneva meeting with the comprehensive programme of peace initiatives which can put up a truly insurmountable barrier in the way of outer space militarization and halve the nuclear systems of the USSR and the United States reaching each other's territory. These and other proposals of the USSR open up a real opportunity to improve appreciably the situation in the world, scale down the threat of a nuclear conflict and pave the way for nuclear disarmament. This is exactly what peoples expect from Geneva."
Arbatov Cited

LD220007 London BBC Television Network in English 2315 GMT 21 Nov 85

[Interview with Georgiy Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by correspondent Peter Snow, in the framework of the "Newsnight" program, in Geneva on 21 November--recorded]

[Excerpt] [Question] Now, do you think people back home in Moscow will be disappointed that Mr Gorbachev has gone back there without getting any concessions on "star wars?"

[Answer] You understand the Soviet people. Gorbachev would prefer to have some results but I think that -- well, I am sure about Gorbachev -- I think also that, let's say, political people who are well-informed, they are realistic enough to understand that having a president of the United States so firmly entrenched into this position -- that it has become a forbidden subject even in discussion inside the cabinet -- you cannot really turn around the whole attitude within 2 days. And I am sure that Gorbachev did not put before himself such a task, to convert him here. But I think what was important here, if you remember the President, on the eve of leaving for Geneva, has told to the public that, actually, he will explain to Gorbachev how good and useful, how beautiful SDI is and then everything will be okay. Now, I think, Reagan returns to the United States with full understanding that you cannot have both SDI and arms control. You can have either SDI or arms control. So it is a moment of truth for him. He will have to show what is he actually for, for arms control or he is for arms race.

/8309
CSO: 5200/1168
REPORTS ON KOHL-GENSCHER DISAGREEMENT ON SDI IN FRG

BILD Report

LD101404 Hamburg DPA in German 1210 GMT 10 Nov 85

[Text] Hamburg, 10 Nov (DPA)--Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) and Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), according to reports in BILD, have agreed on the FRG's participation in the U.S. SDI project, thus overcoming the "hitherto most serious coalition crisis."

In today's edition, the paper refers in its Monday edition to information from the chancellery and the Foreign Ministry.

According to BILD, immediately after the Geneva summit meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Defense Minister Manfred Woerner is to declare in a formal letter to U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger the FRG's support for the SDI research program. It was also possible for this letter to be written by the FDP leader and Economics Minister Martin Bangemann.

BILD also reports that the letter will point out that the FRG is to have a share in the technical research findings. However, there should be no doubt whatsoever that these research findings should be used "for civilian and defense purposes only." Mutual secrecy of the research findings would also have to be assured.

Following the latest disagreement between Kohl and Genscher concerning SDI -- voices were said to have been raised during a telephone conversation -- the foreign minister discussed SDI with Kohl twice last week, BILD claims. Whereas Kohl has so far called for a state SDI skeleton agreement with Washington on the German industry's participation, Genscher adopted a more skeptical attitude toward SDI research since he fears a negative effect on East-West relations.

According to BILD, the foreign minister is now in favor of the SDI program since one of his most important demands has been met: the participation of other NATO states in the SDI program. Britain, and Italy are likewise participating in it. Furthermore, Kohl had now accepted that there is to be no SDI skeleton agreement, to be ratified by the Bonn parliament.
Government Spokesman

LD101834 Hamburg DPA in German 1702 GMT 10 Nov 85

[Text] Hamburg, 10 Nov (DPA) -- According to government spokesman Friedhelm Ost, there is complete agreement between Kohl and Genscher on the chronological course of the SDI process. Ost stated in Bonn on Sunday that a final decision on the participation of German firms in the U.S. SDI research project for a space missile defense system will be made by the end of the year. The government spokesman ruled out a state treaty as a framework agreement to safeguard the interests of German firms. An exchange of letters of a "memorandum of understanding" are possible.

According to Ost, the comments requested from individual ministries on the SDI report by the so-called Teitschik Commission of chancellery chief Wolfgang Schaeuble are being evaluated. Afterward, the Federal Security Council will have to deal with the matter once more. Only then can the negotiations with the Americans on the form and content of the agreement begin as well.

DIE WELT Report

DW120954 Bonn DIE WELT in German 12 Nov 85 p 10

[Report by "CO": "SDI: Genscher Sticks to Private Solution"]

[Text] Bonn -- There is no agreement between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on whether and in what form government support should be given to German firms participating in U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research work.

It was learned from informed circles, Genscher will strive for a purely "private" solution, that is agreements by firms without the involvement of the Federal Government. The chancellor and the foreign minister will only outline the time schedule; that is a decision will be made by the end of the year. Therefore, reports on an agreed exchange of letters between Defense Minister Manfred Woerner and Caspar Weinberger to safeguard SDI participation are premature. It was noted in Bonn that in recent statements by government officials the term "framework agreement" was no longer being used.

/9274
CSO: 5200/2544
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG'S KOHL ON TIMING OF SDI DECISION ANNOUNCEMENT

DW110916 Cologne ARD Television Network in German 2130 GMT 8 Nov 85

[Interview with Chancellor Helmut Kohl by correspondent Ernst Dieter Lueg in Bonn on 8 November; on the "Bericht aus Bonn" program -- recorded]

[Text] [Lueg] What happened, Mr Chancellor, between you and the foreign minister? Do we now have two solid fronts in the cabinet with respect to the assessment of SDI and German participation in it?

[Kohl] Not at all. I can only watch this public discussion in amazement. There is an absolutely clear agreement as to the schedule. It means that we will finalize and adopt our position toward the U.S. offer by the end of the year -- in reality it means before Christmas because we will surely not have a cabinet meeting on 24 December. The preparations have been made. It is likewise obvious that I am endeavoring to introduce a calm phase into this discussion vis-a-vis our interlocutors abroad.

A few days from now General Secretary Gorbachev and the U.S. President will be meeting in Geneva. These negotiations will also be of interest to the entire political environment, meaning also for us. And we will then make our decision. You will find that the decision will be made in a way which will make many people fail to comprehend the excitement of the past few days. Thus, others are in the same shoes as I am.

[Lueg] Let me try again, Mr Chancellor: There was considerable confusion resulting from the demand by FDP politicians for the replacement of your closest foreign policy adviser, Mr Teltchick. Is this the way in which partners in a government deal with each other?

[Kohl] Surely it is an absolutely unnecessary tug of war. I would not even dream of replacing Horst Teltchick. He is an excellent man, as everyone knows, by the way. This is a really unnecessary quarrel. But I think it is history now. This is why I have no intention, Mr Lueg, to pursue this matter any further in this interview.

[Lueg] Can you, with a view to the differences which did exist, observe the time schedule of your SDI decision, Mr Chancellor?

[Kohl] I told you, Mr Lueg, I will observe it, of course. We have the serious intention to decide on quite a few difficult issues this year, for obvious reasons. One of these issues is SDI. We had explicit talks the other day on the occasion of our visit to the UN festivities in New York, we had talks with our partners in Europe, with the Americans. I personally had a long discussion with the Soviet foreign minister. A day after the
Reagan-Gorbachev summit we will meet with Reagan in Brussels for purpose of briefing and clearing up loose ends, if you will. Then I will return home, and by then it will be the end of November. So we will have to discuss the SDI issue and the intensive talks between management and labor which meanwhile have been started on Article 116 of the AFG [Arbeitsfoerderungsgesetz -- employment promotion act]. In my view both decisions will have to be made before Christmas, and taking into account what needs to be done and the course of the negotiations [between labor and the management] the decisions on these matters will be made by the cabinet. This is a clear schedule.

[Lueg] In what form will German participation in this grandiose U.S. research program go on record?

[Kohl] We will decide that in the cabinet meeting I just mentioned and desist from making this publicly beforehand.

[Lueg] Why?

[Kohl] When the time comes -- and this is just a few weeks away -- you will find, Mr Lueg, that it will transpire with much less ado than many people anticipate.

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CSO: 5200/2544
FRG CSU'S STRAUSS DEMANDS POSITIVE ATTITUDE ON SDI

LD041527 Hamburg DPA in German 1459 GMT 4 Nov 85

[Excerpts] Munich, 4 Nov (DPA) -- In the view of CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss the Federal Government must adopt a positive attitude toward the U.S. SDI project. The CSU executive board demanded on Monday in Munich that Bonn follow the example of Great Britain by concluding a framework agreement with the United States on SDI. Strauss emphasized after the executive board meeting that if the Federal Republic were not to participate in SDI research it would be left behind in the area of the "most advanced technology." At his next meeting with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl on 14 November he will also raise the subject of SDI, the CSU leader announced.

Strauss expressed skepticism concerning the outcome of the Geneva summit meeting. The proposal to halve nuclear weapons sounds good but is beset by problems as long as there is no mutual trust. The solution would probably again flounder on the lack of agreement on which types of weapons to take into account.

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CSO: 5200/2544
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG'S SPD DEMANDS BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON SDI ISSUE

DW130903 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 1900 GMT 12 Nov 85

[Text] The SPD demanded today that the Bundestag deal with the issue of potential German participation in the U.S. SDI research plans. In this connection, floor leader Vogel warned the Federal Government against creating faits accomplis before parliament has dealt with the subject. Vogel rejected both a German-U.S. exchange of letters and a formal government agreement on conditions for participation.

U.S. Ambassador Burt thinks that the United States and the Federal Government will soon conclude an agreement on cooperation in the SDI research program. Addressing the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in St. Augustin near Bonn, Burt pointed out that it was German politicians who first brought up the matter of possible SDI participation by the U.S. allies.

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CSO: 5200/2544
TASS REPORTS LATE OCTOBER-EARLY NOVEMBER MEETINGS

Medium-Range Group 17 October

LD171215 Moscow TASS in English 1148 GMT 17 Oct 85

[Text] Geneva October 17 TASS--The group on medium-range nuclear armaments held a session here today within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments.

Space Weapons Group 22 October

LD221323 Moscow TASS in English 1316 GMT 22 Oct 85

[Text] Geneva October 22 TASS--A meeting of the group on space weapons was held here today within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms.

Delegation Meet 23 October

LD231821 Moscow TASS in English 1745 GMT 23 Oct 85

[Text] Geneva, October 23 TASS--The heads of the delegations of the USSR and the USA to the negotiations on nuclear and space armaments held a meeting here today. Questions linked with holding the concluding stage of the current round of negotiations were discussed.

Strategic Arms Group 23 October

LD231416 Moscow TASS in English 1405 GMT 23 Oct 85

[Text] Geneva October 23 TASS--The group on strategic armaments met for a session here today within the framework of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms.

Medium-Range Group 24 October

LD241303 Moscow TASS in English 1300 GMT 24 Oct 85

[Text] Geneva October 24 TASS--The group on medium-range nuclear armaments held a session here today within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments.
Medium-Range Group 5 November

LD051721 Moscow TASS in English 1711 GMT 5 Nov 85

[Text] Geneva, November 5 TASS--A meeting of the group on medium-range nuclear arms took place here today within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms.

Commentary on End of 3rd Round

LD071653 Moscow TASS in English 1636 GMT 7 Nov 85

[Text] Geneva, November 7 TASS--TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Korzhev reports:

The third round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons ended here today. It was started on September 19.

Since it was taking place along with active preparations for the coming summit meeting of the USSR and U.S. leaders due to be held in Geneva which is to focus its attention on problems connected with the curbing of the arms race and the removal of the threat of a nuclear war, the world public attached special significance to that round of the talks.

The world public regards the major Soviet proposals on the banning for both sides of space strike weapons and on the reduction in a truly radical way--by 50 percent--of their respective armaments reaching the territories of each other as the ones that open up real prospects of getting out of the dangerous impasse and advancing towards the practical solution of the problem of preventing the arms race in space and stopping it on earth. The decision of the Soviet Union to institute unilaterally a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, to discontinue a further deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe and other initiatives also met with broad positive response.

Most observers positively assessed those steps as a new and concrete manifestation of the striving of the Soviet Union for a businesslike and constructive dialogue and pointed out that now it was the turn of the U.S. to reciprocate, that the American side should travel its part of the way in order to make it possible to reach corresponding agreements.

Only last week, before the end of the round, the U.S. delegation submitted its proposals in Geneva. Although their content remains confidential, a number of major points which have become known through representatives of the White House and the U.S. press make it clear that the U.S. approach by-passes the prevention of the arms race in outer space which is a problem of priority importance. It is in this way that the U.S. proposals were assessed in the local circles which follow the developments at the Geneva talks.

Repeating the assessment of the U.S. proposals which appeared in many newspapers the world over, TRIBUNE DE GENEVE wrote recently that the answer of President Reagan actually boiled down to the old U.S. proposals in a slightly changed form. According to a commentator of JOURNAL DE GENEVE, they rather
serve the purpose of the ideological struggle and are aimed at lessening the impression made by the Soviet initiatives on world public opinion.

The Republican administration cannot disregard the USSR proposals to reduce by half the nuclear arsenals of the two countries, but it does not accept the conditions put forward by the Soviet side—to give up the SDI program, the newspaper LA SUISSSE pointed out.

It was underlined that the submitting of the U.S. proposals just before the end of the round left no time for their detailed analysis. The plenary meeting of the delegations held today agreed in a preliminary way that the talks would be resumed starting from January 16, 1986.

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CSO: 5200/1143
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: U.S. AIMS TO 'NEUTRALIZE' NOTION OF DISARMAMENT

LD291547 Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 29 Oct 85

[Text] For months U.S. administration officials have said they wanted the Soviet Union to be specific about its arms control initiatives. Now they have a whole package of their desks. One of these initiatives urges a ban on strike space weapons for both sides and a 50 percent cut in the Soviet and American nuclear arms that are capable of reaching each others territory.

The initial reaction from Washington was that like any other offer, the latest Soviet proposal should be carefully studied. In his United Nations speech President Reagan said that within the proposals there are seeds which we should nurture. This is about all there was on the positive side from top administration officials. It was not rejected out of hand like for instance was a Soviet invitation to follow its example and stop any kind of nuclear testing. In other words, officially there has been no response. We are told that there will be one at the proper time.

In the meantime one gets the impression that efforts are being made to neutralize or blunt the Soviet proposal. How is this done? First of all it is a so-called new interpretation of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of 1972. According to this the treaty does not outlaw the development and testing of ABM systems and their components based on new physical principles. Since the thrust of the Soviet proposal is on banning strike space weapons, some people in the U.S. administration have set out to prove the impossible. If they did now know what the ABM treaty was all about they could consult the American negotiators and find out straight from the horse's mouth as they say. Instead they asked a 35-year-old Pentagon lawyer, Philip Kunsberg, who had no previous experience in arms control to study the treaty and its record (s). (Kunsberg's) revelations are said to have become part of administration policy.

We do not know how good Mr. (Kunsberg) was at busting organized crime as a New York City prosecutor, but to place such serious matters as arms control and disarmament in the hands of inexperienced people, and make their half-baked ideas part of government policy is either light-heartedness or a deliberate effort to subvert arms control. Another attempt to distract the public from the Soviet offer on arms control is to shift the attention from disarmament to regional problems. True, they do exist and should be discussed. But, to make them overshadow something that is far more important
for the survival of mankind is to deal arms control a blow. As it is understood here, arms control and reduction mean only one thing, that is to have fewer weapons. But how can we have fewer weapons when we are invited to build more and go all the way into outer space with a whole new class of exotic arms?

What they seek to neutralize or blunt in Washington is the very notion of disarmament meaning cutting and reducing without building new weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1138
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TASS: USSR RESPONSE TO UN ON ARMS HIGHLIGHTS COOPERATION

LD050807 Moscow TASS in English 0755 GMT 5 Nov 85

[Text] New York, November 5 TASS -- TASS correspondent S. Baybakov reports:

The Soviet Union has been doing and will continue to do its utmost for lessening the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, for putting an end to the buildup of nuclear arsenals, for achieving effective agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament. This is the approach that has been displayed by the Soviet side at the talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva started on its initiative. This is stated in an answer of the USSR to the U.N. secretary general who requested U.N. member countries to inform him of the talks on disarmament and arms limitation held outside the U.N. framework.

Progress at the Geneva talks depends, in the first place, on whether both sides observe unswervingly the reached agreement on their subject and objectives, the answer points out. As for the Soviet Union, it is doing all that depends on it for putting the agreement into effect. The Soviet Union put forward at the talks a whole program of measures whose characteristic feature is strict adherence to the principle of equality and equal security which excludes the acquiring of military advantages by any of the sides. In the striving to ensure proper conditions for working out constructive solutions, the USSR proposed the institution of a moratorium on nuclear and space weapons for the whole period of the Geneva talks.

The answer stresses that the Soviet side is insistently pressing for the beginning of a practical discussion at the talks of measures to be taken concerning the key problem -- the prevention of an arms race in space. It is obvious that the militarization of outer space will speed up the arms race in all the spheres, first and foremost the race in nuclear arms, as well as further improvement of these armaments, and lead to an aggravation of the threat of nuclear war. An arms race in space also means the diverting of enormous resources from resolving urgent problems facing mankind -- the combatting of famine, diseases and economic backwardness. The Soviet Union is convinced that if both sides display good will in the political sphere it is possible to prevent an arms race in space and to work out a verifiable agreement to this effect.

Unfortunately, however, the U.S. continues to display obvious unwillingness to search for ways to reaching agreement in Geneva, the answer points out. U.S. actions outside the talks are also aimed at unleashing an arms race in space. Within the framework of the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" the U.S. is actively developing nuclear space weapons, a large-scale ARM system with space-based elements and anti-satellite systems and is aiming at undermining the ARM Treaty of 1972. The
implementation of this program would inevitably lead to a new, ever more dangerous round of the arms race in all the directions, would make it uncontrollable and would wreck altogether Soviet-American agreements in the sphere of maintaining strategic stability, the USSR answer underlines.

The USSR has always displayed a sense of responsibility with regard to its participation in the arms limitation and disarmament talks, including outside the U.N. framework. It will continue to consistently work for achieving radical changes for the better on the way to curbing the arms race and will display political will and readiness to cooperate constructively with all those who also strive for finding effective solutions, the document stresses in conclusion.

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CSO: 5200/1138
FRG'S EHMKKE EXPECTS NO 'SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS' AT GENEVA

LD021303 Hamburg DPA in German 1130 GMT 2 Nov 85

[Excerpt] Bonn, 2 Nov (DPA) -- The SPD group chairman deputy, Horst Ehmke, does not expect the Geneva summit between U.S. President Reagan and the Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev to lead to "real, substantial progress," particularly in the disarmament sphere, because the preparations were "not good enough." On the other hand, the two sides were also interested in preventing the (?failure) of the summit, Ehmke said on Saturday on Saarland Radio.

The SPD politician believes there will (?probably) be a statement at the end of the summit on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, on regional conflicts in the world, and a formula for continuing the Geneva disarmament talks. "We don't think Geneva can produce results in the sense that the Soviets are prepared to make real cuts in (?nuclear) offensive weapons and missiles, if the Americans do not include their SDI program in the talks," Ehmke said. If the (?SDI program) were included, the Soviet Union would however have to be subject to the same restrictions, he said.

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CSO: 5200/2544
FRG'S BRANDT OFFERS NEW PLAN FOR ARMS CONTROL

LD131144 Hamburg DPA in German 1100 GMT 13 Nov 85

[Excerpt] Washington, 13 Nov (DPA) -- Willy Brandt, SPD chairman and former federal chancellor, has called on leading representatives of the two superpowers 6 days before the start of the Geneva summit to give a sign of their joint desire to make a third world war impossible. Receiving the International Peace Prize of the Albert Einstein Peace Prize Foundation, which is worth $50,000, Brandt said in the U.S. capital today that the world is waiting "with hope and fear" for rapprochement between Moscow and Washington. He named four elements which could ease the process toward a detailed arms control agreement:

Both sides should recognize their joint responsibility to preserve peace, to constantly cooperate with each other, and to agree on annual meetings; should agree to a 50-percent reduction in their nuclear weapons arsenals and agree in principle that together with the dismantling of strategic weapons there will be a reduction of the potential which threatens the respective allies; should agree in principle on a ban on space weapons; and should agree on immediate resumption of negotiations between the United States, the USSR, and Great Britain on a complete test ban.

Brandt added that for the time necessary for the conclusion of negotiations, Washington and Moscow should conclude a deployment ban and should freeze weapons production which could be overseen with means already available. He again expressed insistent opposition to space weapons and cast doubt on the sense of them: "I cannot see what a reduction of the arsenal of offensive weapons is supposed to achieve if both sides begin with so-called strategic defense." They would merely exacerbate the arms race.

Rather, the superpowers should seek new fields of cooperation, Brandt said. He urged that the United States and the USSR should support the projects begun by scientists from all over the world to overcome hunger and drought in Africa and should make them the symbol of a new aim: aid for the underdeveloped regions of the earth.

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CSO: 5200/2544
POLISH REACTION TO REAGAN'S RESPONSE TO USSR INITIATIVE

Proposals Lack New Approach

LD031413 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1105 GMT 4 Nov 85

[Program presented by Boniecka and Dziemidowicz]

[Text] [Boniecka] From hour to hour agencies supply further details of Ronald Reagan's proposal, as well as issues connected with the preparations for the summit. In principle the entire text of Reagan's interview will be published today, simultaneously with the publication of the text by the Soviet press. But, we already know the details of Reagan's proposal.

First, let me make a general remark: Perhaps we all agree, and this has been written about by the most serious U.S. commentators, that the President of the United States found himself in a defensive position in respect to his approach to the Geneva disarmament talks. This is true because proposals put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in Paris, which have been widely commented on, have put the United States in the position of a power that in essence has proposed nothing new.

I also presume that United States allies at the United Nations General Assembly session in New York clearly pressured Reagan: They expect problems of armaments control and disarmament to be essential. The administration had to propose some approach.

[Dziemidowicz] So it proposed; but this approach, as you said yourself, is nothing new, and it was assessed as such in Moscow.

[Boniecka] Reagan has reverted to the old idea of seeing any reduction of nuclear forces as applying to missiles fired from the ground; thus applying to arsenals which are largest in the Soviet Union due to the fact that it is a continental power. His general statement, declaring he proposes a very substantial reduction of nuclear forces, is of such a general nature that it clearly suggests that it concerns the reduction of missiles fired from the ground. At the same time, in the same breath, Reagan immediately announced that the United States will not give up the development of the so-called space defense program: Thus, at the same time it looks as if he rejected Gorbachev's proposal of a 50 percent reduction in long-range missiles on the condition that all research on the militarization of space be given up.

[Dziemidowicz] Let us recall that the Soviet Union maintains that if a reduction is to be made -- and according to Moscow it is a necessary step -- then it has to be made in all fields, starting with space armaments, long-range missiles, and Eurorockets, in other words in those fields being discussed in Geneva.
[Boniecka] Yes, undoubtedly, Soviet proposals were very concise, and offered an exit that states that if there are no attempts at the militarization of space then one can discuss the 50 percent reduction in strategic arms. Whereas the United States, by rejecting any discussion on the "star wars" program and demanding that the Soviet side make a very substantial reduction in its basic nuclear forces which constitute the largest forces of the Soviet Union, simply made proposals which aim at a reduction to the detriment of the Soviet Union.

Let us recall that the United States spoke frequently, in general terms, about the so-called zero option, which is a complete reduction of nuclear forces, at the same time assuming that this reduction would apply to arsenals in which the United States is relatively weak, and the Soviet Union best developed.

[Dziemidowicz] On reading the U.S. proposals, and considering Washington's approach to disarmament issues, one is under the impression that Washington does not quite know how to prepare an answer to Soviet initiatives, to the simple peace offensive made by Mikhail Gorbachev. Its tone, and scope seemed to surprise the White House and took the wind from its sails.

[Bontecka] This is being pointed out by all commentators; when one reads U.S. proposals they find, in fact, they do not propose any new approach to the issue. They state: We will continue to conduct research into the Strategic Defense Initiative, and we expect the Soviet side to accept our conditions for an arms reduction. Obviously this proposal has been calculated mainly to calm down their West European allies, and in part, their own public opinion. You will agree that recently the West European press and various statements made by politicians, mainly from opposition parties, indicate that their allies are very deeply concerned that the United States does not reply to the Soviet Union's initiative, which has been assessed as a radical proposal for arms reduction and the prevention of the militarization of space.

Soviet proposals have been described as radical and new, and the first reaction of Western agencies to the American proposal said that unfortunately the President of the United States proposed nothing new. This, in essence, is a defense for the benefit of public opinion, to show that Americans have some cards in their hands. In fact they hold few cards.

TASS Response Cited

LD011946 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1830 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] Journalists from the TASS Agency, the APN press agency and the newspapers PRAVDA and TVZVESTIYA have conducted an interview with President Ronald Reagan in the White House.

Commenting on President Reagan's disarmament proposals, the TASS agency states that, in assessing their essential aspects, the majority of Western observers are coming to the conclusion that they are based on the same old American principles that have not only not brought about any progress so far in the Geneva negotiations, but have taken them down a dead end street.

Attention is drawn, among other things, to the fact that Ronald Reagan's proposals are, in effect, old American proposals -- just somewhat modified and presented in a new package, comments the TASS agency.

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CSO: 5200/3009
POLISH WIRE SERVICE ON REAGAN IZVESTIYA INTERVIEW

LD102146 Warsaw PAP in English 2100 GMT 10 Nov 85

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 10 -- The U.S. President's interview for Soviet journalists carried many formulations which he had not often used during his five years of presidency and which should be appreciated. He stated, for example, that there can be no winners in a nuclear war, that both superpowers aim at reducing nuclear arsenals, that these arsenals are too large, and that one should overcome distrust in relations between both superpowers.

Unfortunately, the interview carries a number of understatements, even contradictions. The president speaks about his proposal to completely eliminate medium range nuclear weapons from Europe, which signifies a return to the "zero option" promoted by his administration some time ago, but fails to clarify that the "zero option", if applied, would affect only the Soviet Union, while the U.S. would continue to use aircraft-borne nuclear weapons and submarine-borne nuclear missiles.

Moreover, nuclear weapons of Britain and France would remain intact.

Likewise, the President's proposal for the bilateral reduction of ballistic missiles warheads to 5,000 at each side is merely an appearance in ensuring equal security. The Americans are not going to reduce their long-range cruise missile warheads. Neither do they intend to cover them by the negotiations. This position of the U.S. in practice amounts to an attempt to ensure nuclear superiority to itself.

Another contradiction in President Reagan's interview concerns the question of 2,400 nuclear warheads, which the U.S. are going to withdraw from Europe. The process of removing these warheads is indeed taking place. But the types of weapons involved are outdated, and are being replaced with new ones.

Also, the President's promise not to use the "spaceshield" unless the offensive weapons are reduced and that he is eager to share the know-how for it with the whole world does not seem convincing.

The President who speaks so much about ensuring the military might to the United States and who does not hide his eagerness to equip it with strategic superiority, cannot sound credible, when he makes such "magnanimous" offers.

Also, his statements aiming to provide justification for the U.S. interventions in Grenada and in Vietnam cannot fail to raise reservations.

It should be hoped that in the course of the Geneva summit the American side will not resort to understatements and evasions, and will start materializing its declarations on the way to reducing the nuclear arsenals.
POLES RATE REAGAN PRE-SUMMIT RADIO SPEECH

LD102333 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 2300 GMT 10 Nov 85

[Text] The issues of the approaching Geneva talks between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States were the subject of the latest radio address by President Ronald Reagan to the American nation and also to the nations of the Soviet Union.

This speech was to convince listeners, both at home and abroad, of the goodwill of the United States President, and of his striving for an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and for a reduction in arms.

Ronald Reagan pointed to the expansion of space weapons which, according to him are a barrier against any kind of nuclear attack, as a means of avoiding nuclear war and a nuclear catastrophe.

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CSO: 5200/3009
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

BEIJING RADIO VIEWS U.S.-SOVIET GENEVA ARMS TALKS

OWL40130 Beijing Domestic Service in Mandarin 1150 GMT 12 Nov 85

[From the "International Current Events" program: "International Background Information on U.S.-Soviet Disarmament Talks in Geneva"]

[Excerpts] The third round of U.S.-Soviet arms control talks ended in Geneva on 7 November without reaching any specific agreement. The next round will occur in mid-January. The U.S.-Soviet Geneva disarmament talks package, including space weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, began in mid-March of this year. Compared with past disarmament talks, the present ones exhibit some new characteristics which merit our attention. First, they are held at a time when both the United States and the Soviet Union want to ease their strained relations and establish dialogue.

At the beginning of this year, the U.S. secretary of state and the Soviet foreign minister met and reached an agreement on resuming talks on nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union no longer insisted that the United States halt deployment of intermediate-range guided missiles in West Europe as a prerequisite for restoring talks. It even accepted the U.S. suggestion that both offensive and defensive weapons be included on the agenda. The United States also made some concessions. It agreed to include the star wars plan on the agenda.

The second characteristic of the present Geneva talks is that they cover an extensive array of subjects, and the questions involved are quite complex. Therefore, it is unlikely that any substantive agreement will be reached within a short time. Because the talks cover space weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, and intermediate-range nuclear weapons at the same time, the large number of issues involved is unprecedented. New questions give rise to disputes while some old questions still remain to be resolved. As new questions mingle with old ones, the talks become all the more difficult.

At the end of September the Soviet Union first made a specific proposal on comprehensive arms limitation and publicized it widely throughout the world. At the end of October the United States also made a disarmament proposal at the talks, but did not make public the details. However, according to information from various sources, while the two proposals at first glance have something in common, they are fundamentally opposed if analyzed carefully.

Both U.S. and Soviet proposals agree to curtail their respective strategic weapons by 50 percent.
However, with regard to which weapons to curtail, how to calculate the number of existing nuclear weapons, and other essential questions, each country has its own different plan.

The third characteristic of the Geneva talks is that along with the escalation of the nuclear arms race, the focal point of the talks has shifted to space weapons. During the past few years, both the United States and the Soviet Union have been making great efforts to study and develop various antisatellite and antimissile space weapons. The difference is that the United States openly claims it will carry out the star wars plan and moves ahead vigorously; while the Soviet Union, holding the banner of seeking peace in space, quietly carries out its plan. At the very beginning of the talks, the Soviet Union regarded scrapping or at least postponing the U.S. star wars plan as its primary goal. According to its disarmament proposal, scrapping the star wars plan is the prerequisite for cutting down Soviet nuclear weapons by 50 percent. The United States spares no effort to treat space weapons and other nuclear weapons differently, stressing that its star wars plan is of a defensive nature, and has repeatedly stated that its stand on studying and developing space weapons is unchangeable. One of the principles upon which the U.S. disarmament proposal is based is to permit research into Strategic Defense Initiative.

The U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks in Geneva have continued for some 8 months. Though both sides have relaxed their strained relations a little, the talks still face one obstacle after another. If the two nuclear powers fail to fundamentally change their policy of nuclear arms expansion, it will be difficult for them to reach any significant agreement. Of course, it is always better to have talks. At the current UN General Assembly session, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian pointed out: People hope the United States and the Soviet Union can, through serious talks, reach an agreement which is feasible and does not harm the interests of other countries. However, it is unrealistic to pin all hopes on the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union.

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CSO: 5200/4008
COMMENTARIES ON RESULTS OF GENEVA SUMMIT

FOLHA DE SAO PAULO Editorial

PY250035 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 22 Nov 85 p 2

[Editorial: "The Results of Geneva"]

[Text] The summit between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, held on 19-20 November in Geneva, has once again frustrated world expectations—small from the very beginning—that the two countries would agree on concrete measures to curb the arms race.

As is shown by the communiqué issued after the meeting, no significant agreement was reached during the private talks the two leaders held on numerous agenda items like the future of the U.S. star wars plan, which seeks to deploy a very sophisticated space shield against nuclear missiles, the SALT-II treaty, the antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty, regional conflicts like those of Nicaragua and Afghanistan, and the human rights issue. Cultural, sports, and scientific programs were agreed upon. However, "serious disagreements have been noted in many critical issues." Once again, the two leaders' most noticeable efforts centered around public relations, and no outstanding results were achieved.

The only important result has been the reestablishment of more relaxed and cordial relations between the leaders of the two superpowers. Disregarding protocol, Reagan and Gorbachev dedicated considerable time to personal conversations without their advisers, except for their interpreters. The days of "detente," of peaceful coexistence, revived. At least, it was agreed that new summits will be held and that the two leaders will exchange visits to Moscow and Washington, on dates that have not been established yet. This result, to be regarded with as much disappointment as irony, is small, but not meaningless.

Therefore, the results of the Geneva meeting are not that encouraging. No progress was made toward the urgent need to put an end to the nuclear arms buildup. Only the willingness to engage in a dialogue has been strengthened. Nothing can be more ephemeral concerning the arsenals that can destroy the earth more than 100 times over.
O GLOBO Editorial

PY251645 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 22 Nov 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Green Light in Geneva"]

[Text] It was not, after all, simple theatrics of cordiality, adorned with embraces and smiles, that President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev offered to the world when they made their public appearances during the Geneva Summit. Something positive, important, substantial, and constructive really happened, both for the almost blackened East-West relations and for the fate of the planet.

It might be exaggerated to proclaim that the end of the Cold War was the best fruit from the talks between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, two leaders, by the way, whose positions are consolidated and who, therefore, have authoritative positions of internal power. But, at least, a new and more operational and promising era can now be envisioned in the context of the nuclearized world crisis after this successful effort to reopen communication channels, an effort mankind kept its eyes on anxiously and hopefully.

The Reagan-Gorbachev joint communiqué, synthesizing the intentional and practical results of the meeting, nowhere uses or hints at any tone of threat. On the contrary, the document abounds in terms of consensus that refer to "greater understanding on reciprocal points of view," to the need for a "continuous dialogue," revealing the strong aspirations of two superpowers to "seek joint understanding on existing problems," and to the need to "improve U.S.-Soviet relations and the international situation as a whole," and so on.

The list of general agreements between Reagan and Gorbachev begins by admitting that a nuclear war should never be unleashed, because none of the parties in conflict will be in a position to emerge as winner from the ashes of the hecatomb. Even a war waged with conventional weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union must be discarded, and so, the two countries must give up their dispute over military superiority.

The principle of reducing Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons by 50 percent emerges in the communiqué as a matter of consensus, and there is a request for a quick development of the advance proposal with which Gorbachev had the advantage of appearing at the summit conference.

The two parties have also expressed support "for a general and complete prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, and the destruction of all existing arsenals."

Whenever the document mentions the coming negotiation of the agreements outlined or proposed at the Geneva talks, it also refers to the "imperative
need to establish reciprocal means of controlling the fulfillment of
the assumed commitments." And this is the fundamental and decisive
point: the real possibility of the two parties of verifying what has
been agreed upon, and the appropriate procedures.

Although the two leaders have considered the meetings "frank and useful,"
they have also admitted that "serious disagreements on several critical
questions" remain.

The number one question—the arms race in space, including the U.S.
Star Wars program—must have come out of Geneva just as it was introduced,
that is, accompanied by Reagan's intransigence and Gorbachev's veto. Yet,
it did not prevent the holding of the summit conference, and it did not
prevent other important issues from being thoroughly discussed. It did
not create disheartening conditions restricting the development of the
meeting, the second round of which is officially under study.

The final balance of the Geneva summit will require a reasonable period
of meditation. In general terms, however, it would not be too much
to convey some optimistic ideas in advance, knowing how to distinguish
between what has really been achieved and what remains in the field of
rhetoric. A green light has been turned on in Geneva in the midst of
threatening shadows of a nuclear tragedy.

/12858
C50: 5200/2007
SOVIET STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES POLITICAL CHIEF INTERVIEWED

LD191559 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 19 Nov 85

[Studio interview with Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel General Petr Andreyevich Gorshakov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Strategic Rocket Forces, by (Aleksandr Abramov)—live]

[Excerpt] [Gorshakov] It is a joy to us veterans of the front to know that the victory of the Soviet Armed Forces during the war years serves as an example and inspiration for loyal service to the fatherland by a new generation of defenders of the motherland. It is symbolic that the day of 19 November, singed by the fire of the Stalingrad battle has for more than 40 years now been marked as a festival of the wartime glory of our people and the firepower and might of its armed forces. The fact that it is now the festive day not just of artillery troops but also of rocket forces bears witness to the relentlessly growing might of our defense.

[Abramov] You have just returned from an official mission. May we know what your trip was about?

[Gorshakov] This time my trip to the forces was connected with my part in the work on elucidating and propagandizing the drafts of the new edition of the Party Program, the CPSU Statutes, and the Basic Guidelines for the economic and social development of our motherland; and also with summing up the results of combat and political training during the year.

What can be said about these issues? Communists and all the personnel are taking a great interest in studying and discussing the precongress documents. Rocket Forces servicemen wholly approve the party's domestic and foreign policy and the course it has taken towards accelerating the country's social and economic development.

They have a profound understanding of the acuteness and complexity of the international situation, and their personal responsibility for the security of our motherland and for the defense of the achievements of socialism and the ensuring of stable peace.

In this training year the combat readiness of many missile units and subunits has been significantly enhanced, and the level of field training has been raised. The absolute majority of training missile firings has been carried out with excellent marks. One in three missile troopers has been awarded excellent marks in combat and political training. It is Communists who set the one at an intensive pace in military labor: They are in the vanguard of the competition to greet the 27th CPSU Congress.
[ Abramov] We have already spoken about the continuity of the generations. Is it possible to talk of a unique degree of reliability of those who every year enter the Strategic Missile Forces? For young folk are entrusted with such complex technology, and they bear supreme responsibility.

[Gorshakov] I can say with conviction that the degree of reliability of Rocket Forces servicemen is high. The sons and grandsons of the hero veterans of the front are honorably carrying on the glorious traditions of their fathers. Service in the Rocket Forces has no few specific characteristics: the main ones are constant readiness and the incomparable responsibility for the defense of the motherland. For the Rocket Forces serviceman the order to go over to operational readiness is the boundary beyond which begins service subordinated to the laws of fulfilling the combat task. From that minute all thoughts, will and skill are subject to one thing -- the irreproachable fulfillment of combat duty. This demands a high level of vigilance, of military skill, the utmost mobilization and strong discipline, great exertion of moral and physical strength. Also vital is irreproachable knowledge of the most complex technology absorbing the latest achievements of scientific and technical progress. It is not difficult to understand what knowledge and skill people to whom these terrible weapons are entrusted must have.

All Rocket Forces love their chosen profession and have the utmost devotion to it. They are highly qualified specialists who have a profound mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory and wide-ranging knowledge in the sphere of automation, telemechanics, electronics, nuclear physics, mathematics and chemistry.

[Abramov] The training year that has just ended was special for us, as for all the Armed Forces. It was the year of the 40th anniversary of the great victory, and of preparations for the 27th Congress of our mother party. The tasks of the year have been fulfilled. Combat readiness of the troops has been raised to a higher level, the level of organization and discipline is being enhanced. The units and subunits in which the following officers serve greeted their festive day with high results: Byakov, Molozhayev, Nayakov, Anisov, Kursanov, Proskurin, Vrachev, Kirillov and others. True to their duty, they are doing everything necessary to meet the CPSU's requirements of the armed defenders of the socialist motherland.

In conclusion, dear comrades, permit me to congratulate heartily the Rocket Forces, our veterans, workers in the defense industry on the traditional holiday, Rocket Forces and Artillery day. Allow me to wish you robust health and fresh labor successes for the well-being of our beloved socialist motherland.

/8309
CSO: 5200/1165
TASS CITES REAGAN INTERVIEW WITH JAPANESE JOURNALISTS

'Very Distant From Reality'

LD161231 Moscow TASS in English 1201 GMT 16 Nov 85

[Text] Washington, November 16 TASS -- President Reagan has given an interview to Japanese journalists. In the interview he again sought to present the Soviet Union's policy in the Asian-Pacific region in a distorted light.

The head of the U.S. Administration was asked, in particular, this question: Is the U.S. planning to try to include Soviet SS-20 missiles, which have been deployed in the Asian part of the USSR, in the Geneva arms control talks? Reagan answered that "these missiles are included in the Geneva talks." He also maintained that the SS-20 ostensibly "greatly increases the threat to Asia as well as to Europe."

Then the U.S. President, posing as a peacemaker, stated that "nuclear weapons that threaten our allies and friends anywhere in the world are, of course, of deep concern to us. We could not therefore, accept any Soviet proposal in Geneva which would endeavour to address European security by increasing the threat to our friends and allies in Asia.

In an obvious attempt at laying the blame at somebody else's door, the U.S. President again asserted publicly that "actions by the Soviet Union in Asia have been a major cause of tension in our relations over the last decade."

The pronouncements by the head of the U.S. Administration are very distant from reality, to put it mildly. It is a matter of common knowledge that it is the United States, and not the Soviet Union, that has lately intensified its military preparations in the Asian-Pacific region. It is precisely the United States that encourages militarist and revanchist trends in the policy of Japan's ruling circles and speed up the formation of a Washington-Tokyo-Seoul aggressive alliance. Neither is it a secret that the United States seeks to convert that region into yet another arena of military-political confrontation with the USSR and other socialist states. As the present Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger has admitted plainly, the goal of U.S. policy in the region is to oppose the Soviet Union "from the Persian Gulf to the Aleutian Islands."

It is none other than Washington that intends to make East Asia and the adjacent Pacific and Indian Oceans the same kind of line for the deployment of forward-based nuclear systems as Western Europe and the adjacent Atlantic have already become. This is the real hidden motive of the present U.S. Administration's increased attention to the Asian-Pacific region.
As for unfair hints at the Soviet Union's certain "plans" to redeploy to Asia the SS-20 missiles which were additionally deployed in the European zone and which have now been removed from stand-by alert, and exhaustive answer was given to those inventions. "In Asia we have as many missiles as is needed to counter-balance the respective U.S. potential which is available in the region -- neither more nor less than that. If the USA does not build it up, we shall not build it up either. If the situation changes for the better, we shall react adequately," Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, emphasized at the joint press conference with President Francois Mitterrand of France in Paris on October 4, this year.

It is time the Washington strategists realized: Peace and security both in Asia and elsewhere in the world cannot be ensured by a confrontation-oriented policy.

Remarks on Asia 'Unfair'

LD161844 Moscow TASS in English 1822 GMT 16 Nov 85

[Text] Moscow, November 16 TASS -- TASS Political News Analyst Vladimir Matyash writes:

On the eve of the Geneva summit meeting between the leaders of the USSR and USA the White House propaganda machinery has sharply stepped up the hostile campaign in order to present in a distorted light the Soviet Union's policy in various regions of the world and thus mislead international public. Among such gimmicks is President Reagan's interview with Japanese journalists, in which he loudly claimed that the Soviet "SS-20 greatly increases the threat to Asia as well as to Europe". The President dropped hints that since these are mobile missiles they can, as he claimed, be readily sent from the European zone to Asia.

These are unfair hints, since if the Soviet Union reaches agreement on a subject it does that seriously.

It is known that the Soviet Union agrees to freeze the number of missiles in the Soviet Union's Asian part. Certainly, on conditions that the USA does not take actions leading to a change in the strategic situation in the region. The Soviet Union would not be against discussing that problem with the states of Asia and the Pacific having similar weapons with the aim of their limitation and subsequent reduction, certainly, on the basis of reciprocity.

As Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev stressed at a joint press conference with French President Mitterrand in Paris on October 4 this year, we have exactly as many missiles in Asia as are necessary to balance the corresponding U.S. potential in that region -- not less, but not more. If the USA does not build it up, we will not build it up either. If the situation changes for the better we will react adequately, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out.
Such is the Soviet Union's principled stand on the question of ensuring security in Asia. It is precisely the USA, and not the Soviet Union, which has recently noticeably stepped up its military preparations in the Asian-Pacific region. It encourages the militaristic trends in the policy of Japan's ruling circles. Washington makes Tokyo increase its military aid to Seoul. In continuing the occupation of South Korea, the U.S. militarists are perpetuating that country's partitioning. This is in conflict not only with the aspirations of the Korean people, but also threatens peace in the Far East. Thus the U.S. ruling circles are out to turn that region into another arena of military-political confrontation with the USSR, the other socialist states and the forces of national liberation.

The Soviet Union proposes a diametrically opposite approach -- to look jointly for ways to strengthening security in Asia and the Pacific -- the largest and most populous part of the world. In the Soviet Union's opinion, the formula of general Asian security could include such steps and measures as renunciation by all the nuclear powers of first use of nuclear weapons in Asia and the world as a whole, non-use of nuclear weapons against the countries and regions of that part of the world observing the non-nuclear status, the scrapping of foreign military bases on the territories of Asian countries, in the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins. The adoption of all of these measures will undoubtedly contribute to a deepening of mutual understanding between the states of the region, ensuring genuine security rather than the emergence of a dangerous confrontation.

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CSO: 5200/1163
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: UK DEMONSTRATORS PROTEST U.S. MISSILE MOVEMENTS

LD251541 Moscow TASS in English 1526 GMT 25 Nov 85

[Text] London, November 25 TASS -- TASS correspondent Sergey Terekhov reports: Hundreds of British anti-war campaigners have taken part in a protest demonstration in Wiltshire County against military maneuvers staged there to practice the movement and operational deployment of American cruise missiles.

During such war games which are regularly held by the American command with the ready assistance of the British Defense Department Tomahawk missile systems are moved from the U.S. Air Force base at Greenham Common to other areas in Britain to be put in simulated full combat readiness there.

The latest maneuvers caused particularly strong anger among the country's anti-nuclear organizations because they coincided in time with the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva which centered on the issues of containing the nuclear arms race, including the race in medium-range nuclear-missile systems.

Conspicuously, the maneuvers also followed almost immediately after the arrival of another batch of American cruise missiles at Greenham Common. Against that background the latest exercise involving Tomahawk launchers was seen here as a premeditated provocation with obviously political aims.

Representatives of Britain's biggest anti-war organization, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, conveyed a protest petition to the American Embassy in London, saying that the supply of another consignment of Tomahawks to Greenham Common and their immediate testing at the time of a most important meeting in Geneva had been, mildly speaking, a manifestation of political flippancy and, in effect, a flagrant provocation. The peace campaigners demanded respect, in fact rather than words, for the aspiration of the European nations for an end to the arms race and a favorable climate at the Geneva talks.

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CSO: 5200/1163
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S BOVIN ON NETHERLANDS DEPLOYMENT DECISION

PM221444 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 19 Nov 85 p 3

[ANP report: "Relations With the Soviet Union No Worse After 1 November Decision"]

[Text] Amsterdam, 19 Nov -- Relations between the Netherlands and the Soviet Union have not been negatively affected by the Lubbers cabinet's 1 November decision, although Moscow naturally hopes that the Netherlands will not finally proceed to the deployment of cruise missiles.

"The missiles are not deployed yet," IZVESTIYA political commentator Aleksandr Bovin, CPSU Central Committee member, said. Bovin arrived in the Netherlands yesterday morning for a 10-day visit during which, according to the Soviet embassy, he will give interviews and hold talks with Second Chamber Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Ter Beek (Labor Party).

Despite earlier negative comments on the future of Soviet-Netherlands relations Bovin does not think that relations between the Hague and Moscow have been seriously disturbed. "If the Netherlands feels better with U.S. cruise missiles, and if this increases the feeling of security, then the Netherlands must simply deploy," he said. The comment prior to the 1 November decision by United States and Canada Institute director Georgiy Arbatov that after 1 November the Netherlands "would only be able to export herring to the Soviet Union" was dismissed by the IZVESTIYA commentator. "Mr Arbatov should not have said that; he is after all an intelligent man."

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CS0: 5200/1163
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS:  U.S., UK, FRANCE OPPOSE UN ON NUCLEAR TESTS

LD240045 Moscow TASS in English 1316 GMT 22 Nov 85

[Text] Moscow, November 22 TASS -- TASS news analyst Vasilyi Kharkov writes:

On Thursday the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly adopted a draft resolution on immediate termination and prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The document is a new important contribution to the world community's efforts to secure an end to the nuclear arms race. The initiative in such a topical matter has been taken by the USSR and other socialist countries which sponsored the above-mentioned draft resolution, which an overwhelming majority of states voted for. Only the United States, Britain, and France voted against it.

The world community has highly appreciated the Soviet Union's unilateral termination of all nuclear explosions from August 6. The appraisal has found its reflection in the document adopted by the First Committee. The document welcomes this step by the Soviet Union as a vivid illustration of its good will and of readiness to resume talks on a total ban on nuclear tests.

The joint message, which the heads of state and government of six countries sent on the eve of the Geneva summit meeting to the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, contained a proposal that all nuclear tests be suspended for one year. The message had it that this term could be extended or tests could be terminated for ever.

The proposal has met with a positive response in the Soviet Union. The document which has been endorsed by the First Committee and which fully supports the proposal indicates that it expresses the strivings of an overwhelming majority of the world community members.

The fact that the United States, Britain and France voted against the draft resolution, shows once again that they intend, contrary to the clearly expressed will of an overwhelming majority of the world community members, to go ahead with the work to develop new types of weapons of mass destruction. THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper reports that hearings on the subject "arms control and national defence" were held in the U.S. Congress recently. Speakers at the hearings did not conceal that requirements connected with a build-up of U.S. own nuclear arsenal. And by no means the far-fetched problems as to verification difficulties, are the main obstacle to U.S. participation in the elaboration of a treaty on a total ban of nuclear tests.

As far as verification is concerned, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev again emphasised at the press conference in Geneva that if the U.S. side ceases any tests of nuclear weapons and if an agreement to this effect is concluded, there will be no problems of control, including international one, on the Soviet side.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

TASS NOTES MARSHALL ISLANDERS PROTEST--Tokyo, November 22 (TASS)--According to Japanese press reports, a group of residents of the Pacific Kwajalein Atoll--a part of the Marshall Islands archipelago--infiltrated tight security cordons set up by the U.S. military police and made its way to the small island of Mick which the Pentagon plans to use as a launching pad for target missiles needed in space weapons testing. The group demanded an end to the militarization of the Pacific Ocean by the Pentagon. Their protest action demonstrates that the people of Micronesia aren't going to put up with the role of nuclear hostages--the role which the U.S. military assigned to them. Protest demonstrations held by the population of that region in the Pacific become increasingly determined. The demonstrators demand the right to independent and peaceful development and the dismantling of U.S. military test ranges. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0736 GMT 22 Nov 85] /8309

CSO: 5200/1161
RELATED ISSUES

USSR: U.S. OPPOSES DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON ARMS CURBS

PH201802 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 1

[IZVESTIYA-TASS report: "For Real Disarmament"]

[Text] The Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly has begun discussing one of the most important items on the agenda -- international cooperation in the use of space for peaceful purposes.

Attention is centered on the USSR's proposals, published as an official document, on the main directions and principles of international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of space under conditions of its nonmilitarization.

On the initiative of a large group of socialist and nonaligned states, including the Soviet Union and the Belorussian and Ukrainian SSR's the First Committee of the UN General Assembly (political and security questions, including disarmament) has adopted a draft resolution prohibiting the development [razrabotka] and production of new types of mass-destruction weapons and new systems of such weapons.

These aims are also pursued by other draft resolutions approved in the first committee by an overwhelming majority of delegations, whose coauthors are socialist and nonaligned states. These documents point, in particular, to the grave economic and social consequences of the arms race.

Only the American delegation voted against these draft resolutions.

The UN General Assembly's first committee also called for measures to be taken to curb the arms race on the seas and oceans. In a draft resolution approved by an overwhelming majority of votes the committee pointed to the pressing need to begin talks with the participation of the major sea powers and, primarily, the states which possess nuclear weapons.

The U.S. delegation voted against this document too.

On the initiative of Cameroon, Poland, Romania, and the Ukrainian SSR a draft resolution was adopted which calls for measures to be taken with a view to preventing the spread of the arms race to the sea bed and beneath it. [egonedra]

By a majority of votes the First Committee resolutely condemned the nuclear preparations of Israel and the Republic of South Africa.

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CSO: 5200/1169
RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S GENERAL YASYUKOV ON CPSU MILITARY POLICY

AU200601 Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 85 (signed to press 3 Oct 85) pp 14-21

[Article by Major General M. Yasyukov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "CPSU's Military Policy: Essence, Content"—Article recommended for use within the system of Marxist-Leninist training of officers in the study of the theme of "the CPSU's Military Policy in Conditions of the Worsened International Situation"]

[Excerpt]

The CPSU Program, the USSR Constitution, and the decisions of the 26th party congress and of subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums defined the basic task in the sphere of military policy which derived naturally from its essence. This task is to maintain the state's defense might and the Armed Forces' combat readiness at a level which guarantees the country's security. Maintaining the military-strategic balance between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO has become the main line of the military policy of the Soviet Union and the fraternal countries of socialism. The achievement of this balance was one of the most important results of recent decades. This parity must be preserved by all possible means, for the sake of peace. It reliably restrains the aggressive aspirations of imperialism. Soviet military policy's principled line of approximate parity of weapons was confirmed once again at the March and April (1985) CPSU Central Committee plenums. In his report at the Central Committee conference on questions of accelerating scientific-technical progress, M.S. Gorbachev stressed that "The Soviet Union will continue to apply maximum efforts to halting the arms race, but in the face of the aggressive policy and threats of imperialism we cannot permit military superiority over ourselves. That is the will of the Soviet people."

In contemporary conditions the party's military policy contains a principled evaluation of such facts as the White House's aspiration not to take account of the Soviet-U.S. SALT-II treaty (which remains unratified through the fault of the United States), their military budget's attainment of growth-rates of up to 12 to 14 percent per annum in peacetime conditions, and the deployment [razmeshchenie] of medium-range Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles in Western Europe. Account is taken of the United States' dangerous course of deploying [razvertyvanie] strike systems in space and creating [sozdanie] a wide-scale antimissile defense with space-based elements, and of its accelerated development [sozdanie] and introduction of high-precision weapons and intelligence and attack complex [razvedyvatelno-udarnyy kompleks]. CPSU military
policy takes account of the increased threat to our motherland created by the United States in the sea and ocean areas. After all, more than 15 very large aircraft carriers, the nuclear submarine fleet, and the powerful amphibious forces are intended to inflict blows not so much on naval targets as on land targets. The mighty Soviet ocean-going nuclear-missile fleet, which was created in good time by the party’s will, is successfully withstandings the naval forces of the imperialist powers, and primarily the United States.

The aggravated international situation has demanded that the CPSU make theoretical developments of ways of further increasing the combat readiness of the Army and Navy and their ability to inflict a crushing defeat on an aggressor.

Under the leadership of the CPSU and the fraternal communist parties, countermeasures have been outlined and are being implemented in various spheres, and primarily in the sphere of the buildup and development of the armed forces of the states of the socialist community. They reduce to nothing the attempts by imperialist circles to gain unilateral advantages in the military sphere.

The meeting of top party and state figures of the Warsaw Pact member-countries, which was held in April this year in Warsaw, once again stressed the unity of the military-political course of the socialist states, which consider that as long as the aggressive NATO bloc exists and a real threat to European and universal peace remains, it will be necessary for them to maintain by all possible means a proper level of defense. This explains the fact that the Soviet Union, once again due to the development, production, and introduction into combat strength of new U.S. strategic weapons, is having to move toward deployment [razvertyvan’ye] of corresponding strategic systems. Thus, in response to the threat to the USSR created as a result of the siting of U.S. Pershings and land-based cruise missiles in Western Europe, we were forced to take additional measures to ensure strategic parity in this region.

All these measures by the USSR and its allies do not go beyond the framework of ensuring their own security. Moreover, as a sign of goodwill and in order to ease the search for agreement at the Soviet-U.S. negotiations in Geneva, the third round of which began in September 1985, our country took an important unilateral step. Its essence consists in the fact that the USSR Government introduced a moratorium from 7 April 1985 on the deployment of its medium-range missiles, as well as halting the implementation of other countermeasures in Europe. All over the world this decision was evaluated as an important and constructive one which contributed to reducing tension and strengthening confidence between West and East. Striving to promote the halting of the dangerous competition in the nuclear arsenal buildup and wishing to set a good example for the United States, the Soviet Union also took a decision to unilaterally halt all nuclear explosions from the 6 August this year to 1 January 1986. This moratorium will continue to operate if the United States for its part also starts to refrain from conducting nuclear explosions.

And these are not the only steps of their kind. It should be recalled that since 1982 there has been in operation a unilateral obligation by the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Since 1983 there has been a unilateral moratorium on being the first to put antisatellite weapons in space. All these initiatives once again graphically confirm the consistent nature of CPSU military policy, which organically includes both ensuring the USSR’s security and the aspiration to preserve peace on earth.

Unfortunately, the U.S. Administration has not replied to these initiatives, with a single gesture of goodwill, but is merely exacerbating the international situation. In these conditions, the CPSU is orienting the personnel of the USSR Armed Forces toward an increase in vigilance and combat readiness, especially in the performance of combat readiness duty, and toward the further perfecting of field, air, and naval training.

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CSO: 5200/1169

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SOVIET GEN VOLKOGONOVA ON WAR, PEACE IN NUCLEAR AGE

PM301600 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 85 First Edition pp 3, 4

[Article by Lieutenant General Professor D. Volkogonov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, under the rubric "Questions of Theory": "War and Peace in the Nuclear Age"]

[Text] It was 70 years ago, in August 1915 when the trenches of World War I formed a bloody belt around many states, that Marxists' attitude toward the problems of war, peace, and mankind's future was accurately expressed by V.I. Lenin in his work "Socialism and War." This book, like many of his other works, reflected the communists' principled stance on the questions of preserving peace. The decades through which the planet has lived since then have confirmed the profound vitality of Lenin's teaching on war and peace, which has been further developed in our party's resolutions in the "nuclear age."

It was most resolutely declared once again at the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) plenum that the Soviet Union will firmly follow the Leninist course of peace and peaceful coexistence, a course which is determined by our social system, our morality, and our world philosophy. It must, however, be absolutely clear that when imperialism gives up the attempts to resolve the historical dispute between the two social systems by military means will it become possible to set international relations on the tracks of normal cooperation.

The "nuclear age" inevitably dictates a new political thinking which expands the traditional ideas of war and peace. At the same time the objectives proclaimed by Lenin's teaching remain unaltered: "an end to wars, peace among peoples, termination of plunder and violence--this is our ideal..." (V.I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, Vol 26 p 304).

1. Under the conditions of antagonistic formations, the fundamental questions of social dynamics were resolved by means of weapons and military strength. Historical memory has recorded 7-year, 30-year, and even 100-year wars. The two world wars in the 20th century, which cost 60 million human lives and destroyed material and cultural riches valued at astronomical figures, have left indelible dents in the pyramid of historical progress. But this is not enough for the moloch of war, who has now set up his headquarters on the
other side of the ocean. For several decades now the planet has been haunted
by the specter of a third world war, which can call mankind's very existence
into question. But although this most terrifying event has hitherto not
occurred, the sinister torches of local wars flare up now and again in
different corners of the globe. There have been over 100 of them since
World War II alone. These statistics are literally bloody.

This fateful chain of wars provides many bourgeois theoreticians and
politicians with grounds to speak of their ineradicable and primeval nature.
The bourgeois apologists of war explain the occurrence of modern wars in terms
of psychological and biological factors ("people's inherent aggressiveness"),
and, of course, reasons which are allegedly "generated by communism."
The scientific inconsistency and socially reactionary nature of these views
are unquestionable.

In the very first place, there is no such thing as the primeval, eternal,
or ineradicable nature of wars. They were unknown to mankind over a period of
many hundreds of thousands of years. It was only when private property and
classes emerged that the resulting state found it no longer possible to manage
without violence. Violence became its essence. There appeared armies--
instruments of war which, in F. Engels' words, became the "permanent trade"

As for the genesis of wars and their deep-seated source, it is rooted in the
exploiter system itself. Imperialist policy, which is the expression and
culmination of the bourgeoisie's economic and class interests, causes domestic
and international crises, conflicts, and wars. It is not difficult to
perceive this when the sources and causes of any war in the "distant past"
or in our age are analyzed. This is why the claims by even subjectively
honest people that the threat of a nuclear war today is rooted in the
contradictions, competition, and confrontation between the two systems and
the world's two mightiest states on the planet are untrue. This concept
substantiates the thesis of the "equal responsibility" of socialism and
capitalism, while it is obvious that imperialism alone is the permanent source
of war.

War is not absolutely inevitable. This conclusion has been repeatedly
substantiated, developed, and enriched in documents of the CPSU and other
communist parties. Over the last few years it has been based on a number of
new arguments which emphasize even more strongly the interconnection of war
and politics, confirming that Lenin's definition of war as the continuation
of policy by violent means is still valid today. "...War," V.I. Lenin noted,
"is a reflection of the domestic policy followed by a given country before
the war" (Vol 39, p 319). Indeed, the almost 300 billion dollars of the
U.S. military budget which have been fed into the fire-box of the engine of
war confirm yet again that the country's rulers, stubbornly pursuing military
superiority, still consider war and the threat of unleashing it as an
instrument for the attainment of political objectives. It is obviously
unnecessary to even speak of how dangerous this is for the fate of
civilization.
On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly obvious that a nuclear war can no longer be used by the aggressor as a means for resolving political tasks. This thesis was formulated with utmost precision by the 26th CPSU Congress. It noted that counting on victory in a nuclear war is dangerous madness. This conclusion also defines the precise address of the political cradle of this "madness"—the aggressive wing of contemporary imperialism.

Finally, it is impossible not to see that the qualitative level of the modern development of military technology and weapons is influencing the fate of war itself in a new way. At a certain stage (and mankind has obviously reached it) a point, a limit, a borderline is reached beyond which it is no longer a question of victory or defeat, but rather of destruction or existence. The road of peace leads to coexistence and the path of war to destruction.

Of course, our sympathies have always been and will be on the side of the peoples waging a just struggle for their social and national liberation and against imperialist domination and aggression. Abstract condemnation of all wars lacks a precise political direction and is therefore ineffective. It is important to condemn not war in general but its nature, its culprits, the deep-seated sources and causes giving rise to it, and the forces which are preparing and able to involve mankind in a nuclear catastrophe.

2. Specialists have calculated that there have been only 227 years of peace on earth in the last several millennia. Peace has not been a frequent visitor to the planet. K. Marx was profoundly right when he noted that "war has reached developed forms earlier than peace..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol 12, p 735). The "developed nature" of war and its stable domination of human society's life are indicated primarily by the extent of its economic, sociopolitical, genetic, ecological, demographic, and other consequences for the life of peoples. It is therefore no accident that, even centuries ago, the most eminent humanists attempted to "discover" and indicate the way to "eternal peace."

It was only the classics of Marxism-Leninism that substantiated the idea of peace as the communism program principle. It is profoundly noteworthy that Lenin saw the great October socialist revolution as the first victory in the cause of destroying wars. All the subsequent activity of the communist party and the Soviet state has proved communism's commitment to this noble objective.

Struggling to attain this objective, the CPSU takes into account a number of objective factors which render the task of preventing a new war realistic and feasible. Our party believes—and this has been repeatedly and loudly proclaimed from the most authoritative rostrums—that it is within the world community's power to create a reliable "antinuclear" machinery for blocking the causes of war based on honest recognition of and respect for the principle of equal security. But this requires an unambiguous rejection (not in words but in actions) of the pursuit of military superiority in which the United States and its allies have been engaged unsuccessfully for many years.
It must also be born in mind that a qualitative change has now occurred in the means for waging war. A third world war threatens unprecedented devastation. If a nuclear hurricane sweeps across the planet it is hardly likely that even oases of life will be left behind. Arms buildup beyond a certain limit ceases to play a decisive military role. Indeed, life on earth can only be destroyed once, not twice or three times over. V.I. Lenin foresaw the possible coming of a stage in social development when the application of the achievements of scientific and technical progress in the sphere of military work could pose a direct threat to the very existence of human civilization. Way back in 1918, almost 3 decades before the explosion of the first atom bomb, he noted that the militarization of science and technology is the way to "mass extermination of millions of human lives. This could cause "regression into savagery, starvation, and total collapse of all productive forces" and also undermine "the very conditions of human society's existence" (see Vol 36, p 396). The sagacity of this forecast is striking.

The struggle waged by the CPSU and the other fraternal parties against militarism and the threat of a new war is based on energetic actions to establish a just peace. The point is that both war and peace can be either unjust or just. Peace "from positions of strength" is fraught with war. For example, the policy which the United States is trying to impose on peoples in Central America, the Near East, Southern Africa, and several other regions of our planet is essentially nothing but diktat, a demonstration of might, and military pressure, in other words the threat of direct use of force. At times one gets the impression that people in Washington perceive foreign policy only as a state of affairs in which one side inevitably wins and the other side loses. And yet, in the face of the common threat, everything must be done to ensure that the gain is common—a real and just peace.

Now there is no sensible alternative to peaceful coexistence. The idea of the vital necessity and possibility of peaceful coexistence is not just a theoretical concept. It has been presented totally specifically in many exceptionally significant initiatives of the USSR: the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the freeze on nuclear arsenals, and the announcement of a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles and the buildup of other countermeasures in Europe and also on all nuclear explosions. If we were to ponder the substance of these and other peace-loving and constructive proposals, their essence becomes utterly clear and simple: the immediate task is to reduce the threat of a nuclear war; the longer-term task is to diminish even further the possibility of such a war arising; and the subsequent and ultimate task is to exclude war from the human community's life.

3. V.I. Lenin linked the task of preventing wars primarily with the existence of socialism. It was no accident that the decree on peace was the first foreign policy act by the young socialist state. At that time, however, the relative weight of the land of the Soviets in world affairs was not decisive, and its influence on the fate of peace and war was, to a certain extent, limited.

Matters are different now.
The effect of the law of the inevitability of a world war, which manifested itself with such terrible consequences in the first half of our century, ceased with the formation of the world socialist system and the shift in the correlation of forces to the advantage of peace. Back in the fifties the CPSU drew the conclusion that henceforth there was no fatal inevitability of war. Although the reasons causing world wars, which are rooted in the nature of imperialism, remained in existence, objective factors had emerged which made it possible to limit their manifestation and practical effect, and the potential of peace had become stronger. These factors include primarily the economic and defense might of real socialism and the energetic actions of democratic and progressive forces merging with the broad international antiwar movement. They include, finally, the political will and determination of the leaders of many countries committed to the idea of the necessity and possibility of preserving peace.

Of course, the imperialist forces are able to and, as events of the last few years show, actually can create conditions when a world war rears its head as a potential terrible reality. Today, under these circumstances, there is but one objective material basis for holding back war: socialism's ability to maintain strategic parity in nuclear means.

An externally paradoxical situation has developed: imperialism's military potential is growing, while its ability to use it to attain political objective is not increasing. And it is the currently prevailing approximate parity of strategic nuclear forces that deprives imperialist politicians and strategists of any real hope to achieve victory. Essentially, this dialectical interconnection between the balance of strategic forces and the guaranteeing of international security emerges as one of the laws governing the preservation of peace. The prevailing military-strategic equilibrium objectively serves the preservation of peace on our planet.

Today the potential enemy must know that he can try to destroy his enemy with the aid of nuclear weapons (Washington's new so-called "strategic defense initiative" is indeed evidence that the pursuit of the ephemeral but dangerous specter of decisive superiority is continuing), but he will not avoid a crushing counterstrike. People in the Pentagon's bunkers are totally unwilling to accept the imperative demand of the "nuclear age": real security now lies not in the search for ways to achieve victory in war but in the ability to prevent a nuclear cataclysm.

Socialism's ability and readiness to defend its security represent the most important factor for the preservation of peace. Particular importance for the implementation of this possibility attaches to Lenin's conclusion that socialism has exerted and continues to exert the main influence on world development by means of its economic policy, its successes, and its real achievements. Today, it is important to strengthen in people's minds the understanding that the Soviet policy of peace and peaceful coexistence is based on the creative labor of each person, on his lofty political awareness, and on his readiness to do everything to strengthen the USSR's economic and defense might.
The dialectics of the class and the panhuman aspects of the fundamental issues of our time reflect the objective fusion of the innermost interests of the overwhelming majority of the population of the planet and the socialist world. The conclusion drawn by V.I. Lenin back in March 1920--"Our peaceful policy is approved by the vast majority of the earth's population" (Vol 40, p 177)--still remains fully applicable. For millions of people the struggle for freedom, social justice, and equality today takes primarily the form of the struggle for the right to life.

The functions of the Soviet Armed Forces have been noticeably enriched in line with the change in the role of economic and defense potentials in solving the problems of war and peace. While still remaining the guarantor and guardian of the security of socialism, they have also become a reliable instrument for peace and the containment of aggression. This conclusion goes to confirm the original dialectic of the social role of armed forces. Having been for years on end an instrument of violence and war (and remaining such an instrument under capitalism), they have turned into a tool of peace and international security under the conditions of socialism.

In the "nuclear age" the problems of war and peace are facing mankind with merciless urgency and terrifying determination. It can be said that today there are three alternative ways of solving them: peaceful coexistence, brinkmanship, or nuclear apocalypse. Of course, the choice of alternative does not depend only on those who are looking at mankind through gunsights. Ultimately, the fate of war and peace depends on the forces who are against nuclear war and for peace and peoples' security.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL WARFARE SUB-UNIT EXERCISE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jul 85 p 1

[Article by Captain V. Mamayev: "Before Missile Launch"]

[Text] The predawn haze had still not lifted when the signal to assemble sounded in Guards Major V. Pashkov's bivouaced engineer sub-unit. The "enemy" had used a nuclear weapon during combat operations. Although the explosion's epicenter was off to the side of rocket troops' position, it had received serious damage. They had to execute their engineering duties quickly.

Vital minutes passed during the march preparation. After a short briefing, the crews rushed to their vehicles, which were lined up in a column.

"Forward!"

The column moved at a high rate of speed. For executing his planned exercises, Major Pashkov chose old, neglected dirt roads with terrible bumps and pits, and overgrown, marsh-ridden logging-paths. Sweating profusely, the column cleared the roads.

Once, on one such training exercise the soldiers cleared a rock slide along a road to a village after a storm.

"What kind of special training area is this?..." wondered someone.

"Unknown terrain is at times more difficult than a training area," Pashkov answered skeptics. "Moreover, our work serves two purposes: we learn and the repairing of the roads is a useful service to the economy."

The road turned sharply into the forest. Towards dusk, a greyish-white shroud was added to the thick fir-grove, and one caught the smell of burning. Then the chemical reconnaissance patrol confirmed the conjectures, the instruments registered "contamination." "Gas!" The soldiers' further movement continued by protected means.

And this was their workplace: a conglomeration of concrete slabs, which were the destroyed portions of roads... Guards Major Pashkov stopped the column. Having assessed the situation, he quickly gave his subordinates their
assignments. Shortly afterward, the rocket troops' heavy tracked vehicles crawled into combat positions.

A group headed by Guards Lieutenant Polyakov was operating in one of the difficult areas. In two years of service, the young officer had won great respect among his subordinates. Now he was working confidently with two young specialists, Privates V. Tapinsky and E. Nosevich.

When Polyakov's men together with the fire fighting crew had contained the "fire's" hotspots, soldiers commanded by Guards Lieutenant A. Kreindyasov's joined them. Now the group faced very likely the hardest part of the mission, clearing the obstructions and examining of the damaged road-bed.

Everyone worked confidently, as if there was no long and fatiguing march. Everyone understood that to allow negligence was to let down the rocket troops who had to occupy their combat positions on time and inflict an accurate strike on the "enemy".

Pashkov reported to the senior leader, that the mission had been completed. Now military and technical equipment was moving over the cleared path into their firing positions. Vital minutes remained before launch.

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TASS: UK REJECTS 'CONSTRUCTIVE' ARMS REDUCTION APPROACH

LD201806 Moscow TASS in English 1551 GMT 20 Nov 85

[Text] London, November 20 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vasily Borodin reports: Britain's Conservative Government is not going to take a constructive approach to issues of nuclear arms reductions. Further evidence of this has been furnished by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's statement in the British Parliament. Answering questions from members of the House of Commons, she flatly rejected the possibility of change in London's policy in this field or its consent for Britain's so-called independent deterrent force to be counted at arms reduction talks.

The Conservative government's policy which is not instrumental in decreasing the threat of war and bridging the nuclear arms race has caused the just indignation of opposition political parties. Liberal Party Leader David Steel pointed out in his statement in the House of Commons that 72 percent of the electorate, including 62 percent of Conservative voters, made it clear they wanted a freeze on nuclear arsenals.

MP James Callaghan, former leader of the Labour Party, stressed the need to step up and broaden dialogue between East and West. Speaking here at the Ernest Bevin Memorial Center, he said, in particular, that Britain had to determine the further changes in its policy and traditional objectives that would enable it to build its relations with the Soviet Union in a consistent and constructive spirit.

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