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THE CASPIAN SEA REGION:

A LOOK AT FUTURE U.S. AND ALLIED MILITARY MISSIONS

by

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
A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

**THE CASPIAN SEA REGION: A LOOK AT FUTURE U.S. AND ALLIED
MILITARY MISSIONS**

The Caspian Sea is rapidly becoming a region of increased attention to both U.S. civilian and military policymakers and planners. The region's large amounts of oil and gas reserves will allow the U.S. and its allies to diversify their sources of oil imports, and therefore, reduce the dependence on Middle Eastern oil. However, the Caspian is an inland sea and the export of the resources to markets is of critical concern. The pipelines required to transport the oil and gas will need to traverse a region complete with internal and external ethnic animosities, border disputes, and regional powers competing with one another for influence and control over the Caspian and its resources.

Entering this so-called "New Great Game" is the United States and the other western nations. The United States has increasingly become more attuned to the Caspian and all the problems and issues connected to it. The U.S. supports its own Caspian pipeline route proposal, has become more involved in solving the regional disputes in Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, and, through the Partnership for Peace program, has increased U.S. and NATO military influence in the region.

Given this background, the U.S. and its allies may have to conduct military operations to secure their investments of capital and influence in the region as well as to resolve or prevent disputes among the Caspian states and the regional powers as the Caspian oil reaches full production in the next 10 to 15 years. The missions of peace operations, humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, and possibly others await U.S. and NATO forces in the twenty-first century.

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
INTRODUCTION

This paper is a think piece for civilian and military planners at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war regarding possible military missions that the United States and its allies may face in the Caspian Sea region in the next century.¹ The Caspian Sea region is rich in petroleum, containing the world's third largest reserves of oil and natural gas.² The region also includes a plethora of ethnic, political, and border disputes along with transnational threats of drug trafficking and theater ballistic missiles. Last but not least, it is also an area prone to seismic disturbances and man-made environmental damage. Not surprisingly, a recent article in *USA Today* listed the Caspian Sea region among its top ten potential world hot spots for 1998.³

Currently, Americans, Europeans, and others are investing or signing deals worth millions of dollars to extract and transport Caspian oil and gas, which will not reach full production until about 2015. The United States Government is actively pursuing this alternative to Persian Gulf petroleum by encouraging and supporting U.S. petroleum companies and other U.S.-based multinationals to invest in the development and transport of Caspian petroleum resources. Given this increasing involvement of U.S. firms and the U.S. Government in the Caspian region, has any thought been given to possible requirements for the U.S. military in the region? Are there possible missions or contingencies that U.S. military forces will likely have to confront in a region rich in oil, but also "rich" in ethnic conflict and political instability?

To fully explore the questions raised in the paragraph above, this paper will set the stage by examining briefly the importance of the region's oil and its current security climate. After a brief synopsis of current U.S. and NATO security thinking and actions toward the

Figure 2



SOURCE: The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia, p.55

Caspian, the bulk of the paper will focus on the potential future missions. Finally, the paper will conclude by providing recommendations of actions that the U.S. and its allies should consider now to prepare for future operations in the region.

CASPIAN OIL AND GAS

The Caspian oil and gas fields are located on the seabed itself or along the shore, while the major Kazak oil fields are located further inland from the Caspian shore. Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan are the primary producers of petroleum and gas from the Caspian and its littoral. Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Iran, and Turkey have, or will have, pipelines that will deliver the oil from the littoral states to the Black and Mediterranean Seas or to the Persian Gulf. The fact that the Caspian is an inland sea and the littoral states do not have access to the open sea makes the issue of pipeline routes critical to the Caspian Sea oil exploitation.⁴ A recent U.S. Government report illustrates the importance of Caspian oil and gas. It stated that the region has potential oil reserves of 200 billion barrels. The U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration estimates that by 2015 the Caspian region will export 2-4 million barrels of oil a day.⁵ However, the Caspian will not, in the next century, surpass the Persian Gulf region as the world's prime petroleum exporter.⁶

While oil-based future wealth explains why the Caspian region will be of increasing interest to the U.S. and others, it is this economic interest, coupled with the area's problems which make it a likely area with which the U.S. needs to concern itself militarily. For a look at the region's ethnic conflicts and competing spheres of influence and how the two relate with the pipeline debate, see Appendix A.

While the area's increasing economic importance will guarantee U.S. business involvement there, it is the political, ethnic, and military complexities which will likely pose the greatest need for U.S. military involvement to protect our increasing level of interest and investment in the region.

U.S. AND NATO'S SECURITY POLICIES VIS-À-VIS THE CASPIAN

The United States and NATO have complimentary security policies toward the Caspian region, especially regarding the Transcaucasus states. The NATO connection is fundamental to U.S. military policy toward the region because it is highly unlikely the U.S. will want to conduct any unilateral military operations in the region. Therefore, in assessing the current state of affairs, it is necessary to examine both U.S. and NATO security policies and arrangements towards the Caspian.

In outlining the basis of U.S. policy, the 1997 National Security Strategy (NSS) states:

A stable and prosperous Caucasus and Central Asia will help promote stability and security from the Mediterranean to China and facilitate rapid development and transport to international markets of the large Caspian oil and gas resources, with substantial U.S. commercial participation.⁷

Obviously, the U.S. will first attempt to use diplomatic and economic means to achieve the stated goal above. Given the built-in ethnic conflicts and competing spheres of influence, however, it would be foolish to ignore the potential military dimension to achieving this NSS goal. The United States signed bilateral military cooperation agreements with both Azerbaijan and Kazakstan in 1997.⁸ Additionally, the United States European Command is engaging these Caspian nations as part of unilateral U.S. military operations or in conjunction with NATO.

Although these nations are not currently within the area of responsibility (AOR) of USEUCOM, USEUCOM is actively engaging all the former republics of the Soviet Union.⁹ These contacts include Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises, military-to-military exchanges, and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. General Joulwan stated in his 1996 USEUCOM Strategy that, "USEUCOM's engagement with the all the newly independent soviet states produces beneficial U.S. influence ... that leads to access which leads to capability." USEUCOM's objectives include promoting stability, democratization, military professionalism, and closer relationships for NATO in the nations of Central Europe and the Newly Independent States (NIS). USEUCOM uses PfP exercises, the George C. Marshall Center of European Security Studies in Germany, and the Joint Contact Team Program to meet the aforementioned Theater objectives.¹⁰

To further illustrate the increasing U.S. interest in the region, in September 1997, the U.S. participated in a multilateral peacekeeping exercise in Kazakstan. The highlight of the exercise, a vivid example of the United States' strategic reach, was an airborne drop by 500 troops from the 82d Airborne Division who flew 19 hours and 7,700 miles nonstop from North Carolina to Kazakstan.¹¹ These bi- and multilateral activities compliment the efforts of the United States' most important alliance, NATO, toward the region.

NATO, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, has become increasingly more concerned with the so-called out-of-area missions. These are missions conducted outside of the territory of the 16 member nations. Bosnia, many will argue, is an example of a successful out-of-area mission. NATO has also become concerned with the volatility of the Caucasus and its impact on Turkey, its most vulnerable member-nation.¹² All the Caspian states (excluding Russia and Iran) are

signatories to the PfP program. PfP exercises with the Caspian nations allows NATO to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for multilateral operations, especially the types of operations that NATO forces would most likely face in the Caspian region: peace operations and humanitarian assistance. NATO conducted the latest such PfP exercise, COOPERATIVE DEMAND 97, from 1 to 5 December 1997 in Istanbul, Turkey which included the U.S., Turkey, and Azerbaijan among others.¹³

Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) is NATO's point man in the volatile southern flank. AFSOUTH has begun its own initiatives to develop closer relations with the Black Sea and Caucasus nations within the NATO sphere of interest. NATO has selected AFSOUTH to be the parent headquarters for a future standing Combined-Joint Task Force (CJTF), recognizing the unstable nature of NATO's flank.¹⁴ In the event of military operations in the Caspian Sea region a possible CJTF headquarters could come from AFSOUTH's Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe (LANDSOUTHEAST) located in Izmir, Turkey, or from Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH) in Italy.¹⁵

The increasing level of U.S. interest and concern regarding the Caspian region has manifested itself in the recent change to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) which formally assigns the Caspian states (and the other ex-soviet republics) to the European and Central Commands.¹⁶ The new UCP will now force the affected combatant commands to consider the possible missions that would require the use of U.S. and allied/coalition forces in the Caspian region.

THE POSSIBLE MISSIONS IN THE CASPIAN REGION

After analyzing the geostrategic context of the Caspian region and current U.S. and NATO activities, it becomes clear U.S., allied, and/or coalition forces are likely in the next 10 to 15 years to become involved in following types of missions in the Caspian region:

- Peace Operations
- Humanitarian Assistance Operations
- Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
- Foreign Internal Defense Operations
- Counterterrorism Operations.

Peace Operations. The Caspian region contains many current and potential disputes between ethnic groups and nation-states that may require peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. The “hook” making U.S. involvement likely is the high potential that such disputes could either disrupt oil production or interfere with the delivery of oil via the pipelines to ports. Once this oil becomes a major factor in the world markets, any interruption in the flow will be a major international problem. Thus, there would be a sense of urgency to solve these problems quickly and any negotiated political settlement may require the introduction of multinational forces to ensure the implementation of the peace agreement(s).

The current disputes in the region include Nagorno-Karabakh and the secessionist conflicts in Georgia. Potential disputes exist in the following areas: along the Turkish-Armenian border, the Azerbaijani-Iranian border (concerning ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran), the Azerbaijani-Dagestani frontier (the border separates the Lezgin ethnic group, which desires

more autonomy from both Russia and Azerbaijan), and perhaps in the Caspian Sea itself if the littoral states get into a dispute over oil fields and territorial waters.

Some of these conflict areas currently have international organizations providing multinational observers. The UN is currently involved in the Abkhaz–Georgian conflict and has 104 observers monitoring the two warring parties and the Russian peacekeepers.¹⁷ The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is currently in South Ossetia with its own observer mission and is supervising the negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh. These organizations could provide the mandate for future peace operations under which U.S. and NATO/coalition forces would operate.

The U.S. has become increasingly involved in both the Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazian conflicts to stabilize the region for future investment and the development of the energy pipelines to Georgia and Turkey. Bradford McGuinn in his article, *From the Caspian to the Gulf: The Assertion of U. S. Power*, reported that the United States has offered to join Russian and French peacekeepers in monitoring the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the context of the OSCE's "Minsk Group" framework.¹⁸

The peace support forces, for political reasons, will almost have to include contingents from non-NATO nations. For this reason, the PfP exercises are a good mechanism to develop the necessary TTPs to integrate these nations. Russia, already nervous over increased western presence in its self-regarded "sphere of influence," will also have to be included to prevent it from vetoing a mandate proposal in the UN or OSCE. Lessons learned from PfP and bilateral US-Russian peacekeeping exercises, as well as experience from IFOR/SFOR, will be critical in integrating Russian units. Additionally, Russian participation will cause uneasiness with Caspian nations given Russia's historical

baggage and a stated agenda toward the Caspian. The U.S. and NATO will have to work hard to mollify these concerns.

Turkey, in this respect, is similar to Russia. Although a member of NATO whose borders touch the Caucasus region, many see Turkey as a regional competitor with its own agenda towards the region. Depending on the situation, Turkey may already be a party to the dispute. Turkish participation, similar to Russian, should be considered for both political and operational reasons (air bases and ports to support the peace support forces). If Turkey participates, the coalition must balance its contribution with those of the other nations.

The final item under the peace operations regards maritime operations. As stated earlier, there is a dispute among the Caspian Sea littoral states over the definition of the Caspian. Moreover, there already exists a dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over an offshore oil field. According to a Russian press report, the Turkmen Foreign Minister threatened Azerbaijan that the Caspian could become another Nagorno-Karabakh and that Turkmen military aircraft would patrol the disputed area if Azerbaijan begins any work on the disputed Kiapaz oilfield.¹⁹ Therefore, in the future, there may be a requirement for a maritime peace operation in the Caspian Sea, ensuring the peaceful use of its resources.

Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HA). HA operations require intensive interagency coordination, oversight, and planning. There are many varieties of missions under the HA rubric. Assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) is one of the HA missions likely to arise in the Caspian region. Both Georgia and Azerbaijan already have large populations of refugees/internally displaced persons, which are a burden on the existing weak economies. Refugees from a renewed conflict could pose security problems to U.S. and third nation oil workers and the oil infrastructure. Logistics and transportation

would top the list of the type of military assistance required to assist the Caspian nation(s) in need.

It is important to note that the Caspian Sea region lies in a very active seismic zone. The region belongs to the Mediterranean-Asiatic seismic belt in which 15% of all earthquakes worldwide occur.²⁰ The United States already has experience in providing HA to this region under these circumstances after the 1988 earthquake in Armenia. Given the poor quality of the soviet-era infrastructure, these earthquakes can cause tremendous loss of life and could paralyze an entire nation. Additionally, these seismic disturbances could damage the oil facilities and cause severe environmental damage. Oil spills, both on land and in the ecologically sensitive Caspian Sea, would require tremendous amounts of effort and expertise to control and eliminate. U.S. and allied forces may provide some this required expertise and logistics to assist in these efforts. The U.S. Coast Guard has particular expertise in oil spill clean-up efforts at sea.

Finally, there is current experience to assist in HA planning for this region. USEUCOM's OPERATION PROVIDE HOPE currently works in many of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, including the Caspian region. OPERATION PROVIDE HOPE delivers excess U.S. medical supplies to these nations. The operation consists of site surveys, deployment of medical training teams with donated equipment, and return visits to repair and resupply the sites.²¹ Furthermore, many PfP exercises focus on HA scenarios.

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). NEOs may become necessary when the internal stability in one or more of these nations degrade to the point that the U.S. Ambassador has to request a noncombatant evacuation operation. The United States has

already executed a NEO in Central Asia -- Tajikistan in 1994. Azerbaijan has seen several coups and coup attempts since its independence in 1991 where the embassy has drawn down its personnel in preparation for a possible NEO.²² Georgia has seen much internal political violence as well as two assassination attempts on President Shevardnadze and a civil war in 1993. The potential for internal unrest will greatly increase once the Caspian oil fields begin to reach full production unless the Caspian populations begin to see the financial benefits of this oil wealth. Unfortunately, prospects for a widespread sharing of the wealth seem bleak. All the leaders of the Caspian regimes were members of the former soviet *nomenklatura* and view democracy, civil rights, and corruption very differently than do westerners.

In the newly oil-rich Caspian region, a NEO would likely involve a multitude of players. In addition to U.S. diplomatic personnel, there are likely to be a large number of Americans and third country nationals in need of rescue. The oil companies may have workers located in many remote regions or on oil platforms in the Caspian Sea. Extracting these dispersed people will be difficult in a semi-permissive or non-permissive environment. Therefore, the U.S. firms must work with the respective embassy Country Teams in all the Caspian nations to develop Emergency Action Plans that would address the evacuation of U.S. citizens.

Nation Assistance/Foreign Internal Defense. There is a wide range of missions under the nation assistance/foreign internal defense (FID) rubric. Before discussing the particular FID missions likely in the Caspian, it is necessary to understand under what conditions the United States would conduct FID. According to Joint Pub 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, the U.S. normally considers FID requests only if the three following conditions exist: 1) the existing or threatened internal disorder is such

that action by the United States supports U.S. national strategic goals; 2) the threatened nation is capable of effectively using U.S. assistance; and 3) the threatened nation requests U.S. assistance.²³ FID has three major tools: indirect support; direct support (not involving combat troops); and the introduction of U.S. combat forces.

The U.S. Government, under the auspices of a unified combatant commander, would conduct FID operations in any one of the Caspian nations if that nation's internal security were threatened from internal or external forces. The planning and execution requires interagency planning and unity of effort. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are normally the primary forces used in FID. However, there are many areas within FID where the use of conventional forces is appropriate and necessary. Depending on the situation, a CJTF could supervise the execution of a FID mission.

As explained in the geostrategic context appendix, the region is fraught with ethnic, political, and regional antagonisms. A neighboring Caspian state could use any one of these antagonisms to destabilize another Caspian nation in order to achieve an advantage for pipeline placement or rights to Caspian oil fields. The targeted nation would require FID operations to strengthen its internal security and its own organic ability to respond to these threats. As explained above, FID has many different flavors to assist a nation in its internal self-defense.

Indirect support encompasses security assistance, joint and combined exercises and exchange programs. Currently, the U.S. already conducts some elements of indirect support. PFP exercises, military-to-military exchange programs, and IMET programs already exist for nearly all the newly independent Caspian states. For fiscal year 1998, the U.S. Government

expects to train 217 military students from Georgia, Kazakstan, and Turkmenistan at a cost of \$1.23 million.²⁴

Direct support activities (not involving combat operations) is the second set of FID operations. Direct support operations involve the use of U.S. forces providing direct assistance to host nation civilian populous or military. Direct support operations include civil-military operations, intelligence and communications sharing, and logistical support.²⁵ One potential mission for U.S. special operations forces along with interagency elements is counterdrugs. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the narcotics trade has become an increasing problem for the region, Russia, and Europe. Poverty, porous internal and external borders, and civil strife have effectively enlarged the traditional Golden Crescent drug region to include not only Pakistan and Afghanistan, but the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus as well (see figure 3).²⁶

Finally, the last element of FID, introduction of U.S. combat troops will only occur after the National Command Authorities deem this option as meeting the vital national security objectives of the United States. Though this extreme scenario can never be eliminated, currently it is difficult to imagine under what conditions the U.S. would send large number of conventional combat forces to stabilize or secure a Caspian Sea nation.

Counterterrorism operations. The Caspian Sea region is not currently a hotbed for international or state-sponsored terrorism. It has, however, seen Chechen separatists conduct raids into the southern Russian provinces and into Dagestan during the 1994-1996 Chechen war. Although the local tensions and ethnic conflicts could engender their own organic terrorist acts, it is the threat of state-sponsored terrorism against U.S. and third nation oil workers and other businessmen in the region that could bring U.S. forces into the region to

conduct counterterrorism missions. A Khobar Towers attack against an U.S. or multinational oil company compound is but one example of the possible terrorist targets. Iran or any other nation in the region, not happy with the U.S. over its political, economic, and military policy in the Caspian or towards one particular nation in the region, could use terrorism to deter American involvement or investment. The multitude of ethnic factions and disaffected political outsiders make for easy recruitment in some cases for terrorist acts. There are ethnic diasporas from the region living in Turkey, Iran, Russia, Europe, and the Middle East that provide fertile ground for terrorist recruits. These wide range of potential suspects make it harder to identify the actual culprits.

The Caspian leaders are obviously aware of the possibility of internal dissention and their internal control regimes keep them well informed on possible threats to their persons and sources of power. The capabilities of some regional powers to conduct terrorist acts with plausible deniability will probably exceed local intelligence collection and surveillance capabilities. These regimes could the turn to U.S. and allied expertise to conduct antiterrorism training and assistance and to protect U.S. citizens living and working in these nations. In case of a hostage situation involving U.S. oil company employees, the U.S. military may be called upon to assist or take part in their rescue.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper makes the following recommendations to prepare for future operations in the Caspian region.

- *UCP*. Recommend that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a further revision to the UCP to assign one unified combatant command to develop plans for the Caspian region as a singular area. The author recommends that the NCA

assign USEUCOM the responsibility for the Caspian region.²⁷ This is logical since USEUCOM has already made contacts in the region, conducted exercises with PfP nations, and it is highly probable that NATO will participate in any contingency that requires military forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) should then update Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to reflect the changes in the UCP.

- ***Form a JOA.*** Should the current UCP revision remain unchanged, then the NCA should plan to designate the Caspian region in its entirety as a Joint Operations Area (JOA), when operations in the region become necessary. Under the revised UCP the Caspian Sea region is split between USEUCOM and USCENTCOM. If the U.S. deploy forces to the region, it should consider the entire Caspian Sea oil region as one integrated area. According to Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, "JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area. JOAs are also appropriate when the operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters."²⁸
- ***Joint Interagency Intelligence Working Group.*** Create a standing Joint Interagency Intelligence Working Group for the Caspian region. Given the already stretched resources of the national intelligence community, this will not be an easy task. However, if the U.S. Government believes this region is vital to economic security of the nation and its allies, it must then allocate resources. This group should integrate intelligence and information from all the departments and agencies of the Federal Government involved in the Caspian region. The Working Group should tap into information from civilian oil and construction firms to provide information on the number and location of American and third

country workers and housing facilities; to provide updated maps, overhead images, and sea charts; location and types of civilian communication facilities, etc. Any upgrades to or new construction of ports, airfields, roads, water plants, and rail lines are also necessary to build the necessary data bases for a future CJTF commander and staff. Medical intelligence from U.S. Government agencies and U.S. firms in the region will assist in planning for all the above contingencies. This working group may also require interaction with the various international, non-governmental and private volunteer organizations already working in the Caspian region. Finally, this working group will need to publish a periodic outlook document to keep unified commands and other agencies updated on the region.

- ***Designate NATO CJTF Headquarters.*** Since this is a very likely area for NATO involvement, NATO should designate one of the AFSOUTH Principal Subordinate Commands as the standing CJTF headquarters with the mission of focusing on Caspian contingencies. They should begin planning for the possible contingencies listed earlier and then conduct Combined-Joint Command Post Exercises to further develop the plan. They should plan to include regional PFP nations and possibly, Russia, in future military operations. The author recommends STRIKFORSOUTH as the CJTF headquarters. Although LANDSOUTHEAST may make logical sense geographically, politically it is too heavily weighted toward Turkey. Additionally, STRIKFORSOUTH will have the air and naval assets necessary for operations in the Black Sea and its littoral and the naval staff to plan maritime operations in the Caspian Sea. Finally, Turkey

will make a good base of operations or intermediate staging base to reduce U.S. or NATO lines of communication, if doing so does not hurt the political legitimacy of the particular mission.

- ***U.S. Coast Guard.*** Include the U.S. Coast Guard in all contingency planning for this region. The USCG already has experience in the Black Sea, counterdrug operations, maritime coastal patrols, and are currently assisting in training the naval units of Kazakstan and Turkmenistan.²⁹
- ***Freedom of Navigation.*** Consider a plan for reflagging and escorting merchant shipping in the event of escalating tensions among the Black Sea littoral states (Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey, and others) over oil related issues. Freedom of navigation rights may become involved in the Black Sea if Russia and Turkey clash over oil tankers in the Turkish Straits. Additionally, mine countermeasures may be required in the both the Black and Caspian Seas if a conflict arises in the region.
- ***Periphery to a Major Theater War.*** Finally, the U.S. must consider the possibility, however remote, that if the United States and our coalition partners become embroiled in a major theater war against Iran in Southwest Asia, the Caspian may become a peripheral area of hostilities. Iran may initiate hostilities directly, through subversive means, use their theater ballistic missile capability, or engage regional proxies (Kurds, Armenians--both in Armenia and those in the Middle East, and Middle Eastern terror organizations) to disrupt oil and gas exploitation and delivery. Caspian oil and gas would become even more critical during a conflict in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the oil facilities as well as U.S.

and European workers could very well be vulnerable to Iranian theater ballistic missiles or terrorist attack from their proxies. An Iranian threat to the Caspian would stress U.S. and coalition forces already decisively engaged in a major theater war.

CONCLUSION

This paper has reviewed the possible contingencies that the United States and its allies could face in the Caspian region. As explained earlier, the Caspian region with its oil and the corresponding money the oil will attract, only will require more attention in the future. The region's leaders have very limited views on democracy and the redistribution of expected oil wealth, views likely to conflict with the aspirations and expectations of ordinary citizens in the region. Layered on top of this tension are the regional powers of Iran, Turkey, and Russia. They are seeking to be among the leading beneficiaries of Caspian oil wealth and the regional influence that comes with that wealth. The U.S. Government, along with NATO and other allies, has increasingly become involved in the region because of the oil resources and the desire for regional stability and influence.

The Report of the National Defense Panel summed up the future of U.S. involvement in the Caspian Sea region:

We will continue to be involved in regions that control scarce resources, such as the Middle East and the emerging Caspian Sea areas for oil, as we try to hedge our own and our allies resource dependencies.³⁰

Clearly, this increasing involvement contains many risks. The U.S. and its allies must be prepared in the next 10-15 years to conduct military operations in the Caspian Sea region if they want to benefit from the Caspian's natural resources.

ENDNOTES

¹ This paper will not explore the nuances of U.S. foreign policy toward the region. It will strictly look at potential missions that may require a unified combatant command to develop operational or contingency plans and create a Combined Joint Task Force with allied and coalition partners.

² For the purposes of this paper, the author is defining the Caspian Sea region as the littoral states of Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and the Russian Federation; The author is also including the states in which the oil pipelines may travel through - Georgia, Armenia, and the Northern Caucasian republics of the Russian Federation. Russia and Iran are the major regional players along with Turkey (although oil pipelines may traverse all three nations from the Caspian). The Black Sea has an important role as a commerce route for Caspian oil to travel from the Caucasus through the Turkish Straits or by pipeline to markets in Europe. Therefore, it is an area of interest when analyzing the Caspian region. The first and second largest petroleum producing regions in the world are the Persian Gulf and the Siberian regions of Russia.

³ Tom Squiteri, "Global Peace unlikely prospect in 1998," USA Today, 31 December 1997-1 January 1998, 1A.

⁴ The classification of the Caspian body of water is disputed by the littoral nations. This dispute is one source of the tension between the littoral states. The Russians, Iranians, and recently the Turkmen have classified the Caspian as a lake whereas the Azerbaijanis and Kazaks call the Caspian an inland sea. The classification debate is more than academic. The debate centers on dividing the resources of the Caspian Sea. Those supporting the lake concept say that beyond a limited territorial boundary all littoral states must agree on the use or exploitation of Caspian resources. Those supporting the inland sea view believe that the Caspian Sea should be treated like other enclosed seas, with territorial limits and the resources beyond them open for exploitation. According to the UN organizations, Food and Agriculture Organization and UNESCO, the Caspian, in an oceanographic point of view, is an inland sea. See Sergei Vinogradov, "Transboundary Water Resources in the Former Soviet Union: Between Conflict and Cooperation," River Basins, Part I, Spring 1996, 396.

⁵ In comparison, Saudi Arabia alone produces 8.5 million barrels a day and has reserves of 261.3 billion barrels. See Manouchehr Takin, "U.S. sanctions against oil giants at odds with its Caspian policy," Oil & Gas Journal, 13 August 1997, p. 30 and Bradford R. McGuinn, "From the Caspian to the Gulf: The Assertion of U.S. Power," Middle East Insight, November-December 1997, 11.

⁶ John H. Lichtblau, "U.S. Caspian area foreign policy conflict with resource plans," Oil & Gas Journal, August 11, 1997, 19. Mr. Lichtblau is the Chairman, Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Inc.

⁷ The White House, A National Security Strategy For A New Century. (Washington: May 1997), 23.

⁸ The U.S.-Kazakstan Defense Cooperation Pact signed in November 1997 concerns counterproliferation and transfer of technologies and materials associated with weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, both countries set out plans for enhanced regional security and bilateral military-to-military cooperation to promote regional stability and help develop Kazakstan's military forces. See Robert Lyle, "Kazakhstan: President Signs Economic Partnership." Energy Politics in the Caspian and Russia. 19 November 1997. <<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/11/F.Ru.971119123922.html>> (15 December 1997). On 31 July 1997, the U.S. and Azerbaijan signed a joint statement emphasizing the development of strong U.S. - Azerbaijani defense cooperation. This statement stressed the need for regular consultations and exchanges of Defense Ministers on issue security and military cooperation. Department of Defense, "Secretary Cohen and President Aliyev sign a joint statement." DEFENSELink. August 1997. <<http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/Aug1997/970731-D-29875-110.html>> (6 February 1998).

⁹ Before the Unified Command Plan revision, all the former soviet republics were within USEUCOM's area of interest and the Central Asian republics were in USCENCOM's area of interest. According to a USEUCOM fact sheet, USEUCOM currently has responsibility for some aspects of U.S. military relations and activities

with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. See USEUCOM, "New Independent States." USEUCOM Web Site. Undated. <<http://www.eucom.mil/nis.htm>> (20 December 1997).

¹⁰ General George A. Joulwan, "USEUCOM Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness." USEUCOM Publications. November 1996. <<http://www.eucom.mil/publications/sep/sep03html>> (1 January 1998). The Joint Contact Team Program consists of multi-service military liaison teams of three to five members to demonstrate how a military functions under civilian control in a democracy. USEUCOM depends heavily on Reserve Component officers to man the Joint Contact Team Program.

¹¹ Hugh Pope, "US Plays High-Stakes War Games in Kazakstan," The Wall Street Journal, 16 September 1997, A16. The article quoted General John J. Sheehan (USMC)(retired), then the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Atlantic Command on the U.S. participation in the exercise, "The message, I guess, is that there is no nation on the face of the earth that we cannot get to."

¹² NATO Secretary-General Dr. Javier Solana visited the Caucasus and Central Asia on two separate trips in February and March 1997. During his trip to Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani president, Gaidar Aliev, formally expressed the desire for Azerbaijan to join NATO. See "NATO Secretary General to visit Moldova and Transcaucasus." NATO Press Releases. 6 February 1997. <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-014e.htm>> (31 December 1997), "NATO Secretary General to visit Central Asia." NATO Press Releases. 28 February 1997, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-022e.htm>> (31 December 1997), and McGuinn, 12.

¹³ "Exercise Cooperative Demand 97 News release." Allied Forces South 1997 Press Release Headlines. 17 November 1997. <<http://www.afsouth.nato.int/latest/1997releases.htm#CoopDemand>> (1 January 1998). The press release stated that the purpose of this exercise was to develop a common understanding of peace support operations and enhance interoperability by training Commanders and staffs of NATO and Partner nations in staff procedures. These procedures are required to conduct multinational conflict prevention and humanitarian operations with differently equipped, organized, and doctrinally orientated units. Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Krygyzstan, Turkey, and United States were among the 11 participant nations.

¹⁴ Admiral T. Joseph Lopez, "AFSOUTH-Focus On The Southern Region." NATO'S SIXTEEN NATIONS. No 1, 1997, 58. NATO intends for the CJTF to be a deployable multinational, multi-service formation generated and tailored for specific military operations which could involve not only humanitarian relief, peacekeeping or peace enforcement but also collective defense. See Anthony Cragg, "Internal adaptation: Reshaping NATO for the challenges of tomorrow." NATO Review. July-August 1997, 34.

¹⁵ STRIKFORSOUTH is made up of carrier forces, amphibious forces, and landing forces. The Commander of STRIKFORSOUTH is also the Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in Gaeta, Italy. STRIKFORSOUTH is developing the concept for the Southern Region Combined Amphibious Forces Mediterranean (CAFMED). CAFMED will be a rapid reaction, multi-purpose force supported by many NATO nations. It will contain Special Operations Forces and will be able to respond to a full spectrum of demand from Humanitarian Assistance to full-scale combat operations. See Allied Forces Southern Europe, "Naval Striking And Support Forces Southern Europe-STRIKFORSOUTH." AFSOUTH Fact Sheet. <<http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/StrikeforsouthFactSheet.htm>> (1 January 1998).

LANDSOUTHEAST is commanded by a Turkish General and his staff consists of Turkish, American, British, and Italian personnel. COMLANDSOUTHEAST's mission is to deter all forms of aggression, and if aggression occurs, to preserve or restore the integrity and security of NATO [Turkish] territory. The Fact Sheet further states that Eastern Turkey, which borders the Caspian region and is a projected path for future pipelines, is among NATO's potential hot spots. See Allied Forces Southern Europe, "Allied Land Southeastern Europe-LANDSOUTHEAST." AFSOUTH Fact Sheet. <<http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/LandSouthEastFactSheet.htm>> (1 January 1998).

¹⁶ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "Unified Command Plan Changes Announced." News Release. No. 085-98. 25 February 1998. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb1998/b02251998_bt085-98.html> (8 March 1998). President Clinton approved the revised UCP on 29 January 1998. The Plan assigns the Slavic (excluding Russia) and Caucasus republics to USEUCOM effective 1 October 1998 and the Central

Asian republics to USCENTCOM effective 1 October 1999. Therefore, the Caspian region is now split between the two unified combatant commands.

¹⁷ The United States, since 1994, provides four military officers to serve with the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The author served as the Senior US Military Observer (SUSMO) with UNOMIG from December 1995-June 1996.

¹⁸ McGuinn.

¹⁹ Dzhebrail Khaizov, "Turkmen, pashi," Kommersant. 19 August 1997, 24. The Kiapaz oilfield lies 184km east of Azerbaijan but 104km west of Turkmenistan. Both nations claim this field and this dispute is indicative of the problems inherent in the Caspian Sea until all the littoral states agree on territorial limits and exploration rights.

²⁰ Richard Foster Flint and Brian J. Skinner, Physical Geology, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977), 405.

²¹ COL Russell J. Kilpatrick, "Medical Operations-Humanitarian Assistance" USEUCOM Surgeon Briefing 5 August 1997. <<http://www.eucom.mil/hq/ecmd/briefings/surgeon/sld039.htm>> (20 December 1997).

²² Dr. Elizabeth A. McIntyre, Faculty member at Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, interview by author, 30 January 1998, Spruance Hall, Naval War College, Newport, R.I. Dr. McIntyre was attached to the U.S. Embassy in Azerbaijan in 1993. She stated that in June 1993 when a NEO appeared imminent in Azerbaijan, over 100 U.S. citizens and a number of British and other third country nationals were included in NEO plans. Almost all of the non-embassy people included were connected with oil companies, and this was before any agreements had been reached or any oil operations had begun. Plans were on the drawing board for housing for many hundreds of foreign workers and their families once oil operations begun.

²³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (Joint Pub 3-07.1) (Washington, D.C.: 26 June 1996), viii.

²⁴ Department of Defense, Defense 97 Almanac. (Washington, D.C.: 1997), 39-40. Azerbaijan is prohibited by Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act to receive any U.S. Government assistance. Congress passed this law under immense pressure from the very organized and apparently influential Armenian-American lobby relative to situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the law, the President has to report to Congress that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive use of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (see "Section 907. Restriction on assistance to Azerbaijan" USIS Programs. Undated. <<http://www.usia.gov/abtusia/posts/aj1/wwwhs907.htm>> (24 January 1998). This law restricts U.S. policy towards Azerbaijan and both private industry and the executive branch wants Section 907 repealed. Therefore, the U.S. is taking a more active role in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to mollify Armenian concerns while showing support to Azerbaijan.

²⁵ Joint Pub 3-07.1, viii.

²⁶ Lowell A. Bezanis, "An Enlarged Golden Crescent," Transition. 20 September 1996, 6.

²⁷ The author recommends that USEUCOM include Kazakstan and Turkmenistan along with the Transcaucasus states in its new AOR. USCENTCOM new AOR should include the remaining Central Asia states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kirghizia. This proposal places the Caspian basin under one combatant commander.

²⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-0) (Washington, D.C.: 1 February 1995), II-17.

²⁹ Karen Chaisson, Kchaisson@comdt.uscg.mil "RE: Request For Information." 21 January 1998. Personal e-mail. (21 January 1998). Miss Chaisson is the U.S. Coast Guard's EUCOM regional training manager. She states that the USCG is training and has trained members of the naval forces of Kazakstan and Turkmenistan. This training includes IMET programs in the U.S. as well as mobile training teams to these nations.

³⁰ Phillip A. Odeen and others. Report of the National Defense Panel. (Washington. D.C.: December 1997), 6.

APPENDIX A

THE GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT

The Caspian nations require intensive outside investment, technology, and know-how to extract and deliver the oil to ports. Both Azerbaijan and Kazakstan have consortiums to assist in these tasks. Major U.S. oil companies such as Pennzoil, Amoco, Unocal, and McDermott are involved in Azerbaijan.ⁱ In Kazakstan, Texaco, Inc. and Mobil Corporation are partners in the two consortiums working the Kazak oil fields.ⁱⁱ All of these U.S. firms along with their European, Turkish, Saudi, and other partners have signed deals with the Caspian littoral states worth tens of millions of dollars for rights to exploit the Caspian oil riches.

OIL PIPELINE DEBATE

Extracting the oil and gas is relatively simple. The difficulty lies with the pipelines as local, regional, and international powers grapple for control and influence. There are currently several pipeline proposals to move Caspian oil to markets (see figure 2).ⁱⁱⁱ These proposals are linked to the interests of the regional powers, Russia, Iran, and Turkey and to those of the United States and other non-regional states. The United States does not want

ⁱ M.E. Ahrari, The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia, McNair Paper, no. 47, (Washington, D.C., Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University), 57.

ⁱⁱ Steve LeVine, "Kazakh Chief, in U.S., to Back Oil Deals," New York Times, November 18, 1997, D6.

ⁱⁱⁱ There are other proposals for transporting Caspian oil and gas to ports and/or markets. The Chinese are considering a pipeline from the Kazak oilfields to the population centers in eastern China. There is also a proposal to build a pipeline from Uzbekistan through Afghanistan to Pakistani ports on the Indian Ocean. Russia with Greece and Bulgaria has considered a pipeline from the Bulgarian Black Sea Coast to the Greek Mediterranean ports to by-pass the Turkish Straits. The Iranians have offered their own proposals to link Caspian oil and gas to the Persian Gulf or with Turkey. The Iranians were successful in opening a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran on 29 December 1997. The U.S. government is pressuring its allies and local Caspian leaders to avoid any business deals with Iran. U.S. law prohibits U.S. firms from conducting business with Iran. In the author's opinion, the isolation of Iran from the potentially lucrative Caspian oil may have been a (or the) deciding factor in Iran's recent overtures to the United States.

any pipeline connecting the Caspian region with Iran, although geography shows that it is the most direct route to the open sea. The U.S. and Turkey prefer a more costly pipeline that carries oil from Baku, Azerbaijan across Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. The Russians want the oil from both Kazakstan and Azerbaijan to use existing (but upgraded) soviet-era pipeline routes to the Black Sea and then use tankers to ship the oil to the Mediterranean. Turkey opposes this proposal because they do not want the already busy Turkish Straits clogged with tankers and the accompanying risk of environmental accidents. Currently, Caspian "early" oil is flowing through Soviet-era pipelines to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisk and will also travel to the Black Sea Georgian port of Batumi once Georgia repairs its Soviet-era pipelines.

ETHNIC CONFLICTS

The Caspian Sea region is not only well endowed with natural resources but with ethnic and minority conflicts as well. The pipeline routes cut across or abut regions that have seen or are still experiencing military and political conflict. These include the Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the unresolved secessionist conflicts in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and the unstable eastern North Caucasus republics of Russia (Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and Dagestan). Kazakstan, along its northern border with Russia, has a large Russian (including Cossack) population that is of concern to the Kazak government. There is also the ongoing Kurdish problem in eastern Turkey as well as in northern Iraq and Iran. Additionally, there are minority issues with Azerbaijanis in northern Iran and Turkmen in eastern Iran and pockets of ethnic Russians scattered throughout the Caspian region (See figures 4,5, and 6).

REGIONAL POWERS AND COMPETING SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

To further complicate this jigsaw puzzle of oil, pipelines, ethnic disputes, and minorities, there are the three regional powers and their own political, security, and historical interests. Iran, Russia, and Turkey have been competitors over the Caspian region for nearly three hundred years. The renewed competition for influence and markets was only made possible by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Turkey, with U.S. support, believed it had the advantage as a secular Muslim nation that is ethnically related to the Azerbaijanis, Kazaks, and Turkmen. However, Turkey is short on capital and geographically separated from the Caspian littoral by Christian Georgia and Armenia, complicating its efforts to expand its influence. Turkey's two regional neighbors, Iran and Russia, are restraining factors on Turkish influence and any pan-turkic aspirations Turkey may have.

Iran borders Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and shares the Shi'ia version of Islam with Azerbaijan. Although Iran has more capital to invest than Turkey, it is hindered by its pariah status. The newly independent Caspian states do not want to run afoul of Washington and thus are careful in their contacts with Iran. Besides not wishing to displease the U.S., other factors make these nations feel uncomfortable towards Iran. Iran shares Russia's position over the legal definition of the Caspian Sea. Moreover, the theocratic nature of Iran's government and its overt desire to export Islamic fundamentalism are worrisome to the region's post-soviet autocratic (and secular) leaders. Furthermore, the Iranians have appeared to support *Christian* Armenia in its struggle with *Muslim* Azerbaijan.^{iv} Finally,

^{iv} Mohiaddin Mesbahi, "Russia and the Geopolitics of the Muslim South," *Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamics*, ed. Mohiaddin Mesbahi (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1994), 301. According to Mesbahi, Iran's alleged support for Armenia-or put it more accurately, Iran's unwillingness to abandon its neutrality in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict - has been an important source

Iran's theater ballistic missile capabilities and research threaten the entire Caspian Basin as well as Turkey and the Persian Gulf. The last item is of particular concern to U.S.

Government as well. Late last year, U.S. press reports stated that on December 15, 1997, Iran tested engines for a new generation of ballistic missiles, each capable of carrying a 2,200-lb warhead more than 800 miles.^v Despite the natural Iranian interest in the region, Iran will always subordinate its moves in the Caspian region to those of Russia. Tehran will do nothing in the region to alienate Russia as a potential ally.^{vi}

Russia is particularly touchy about the issues relating to the Caspian region. The nations of the Caspian littoral have only recently achieved their independence from Moscow's rule. Therefore, Moscow remains sensitive about events along their southern flank and especially to any attempts from regional or extra-regional powers to displace Russian influence. Russian policy toward the region includes the following points:

- Prevent other states from achieving regional hegemony.
- Protect and expand its own economic interests.
- Protect ethnic Russians living in the region.
- Stop the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.

of Azerbaijani irritation. the Azerbaijanis rhetorically ask, "How could a neighboring Muslim country with more than 15 million of its own Azerbaijanis not support Azerbaijan against aggressive Christian Armenia?"

^v Barton Gellman, "Shift by Iran Fuels Debate Over Sanctions: While Urging U.S. Dialogue, Tehran Pursues New Arms," *Washington Post*, 31 December 1997, A01. This article further states that Iran was only capable in developing these missiles with assistance from Russia. See also Yossef Bodansky, "Iran's New Ballistic Missiles," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, May-June 1997, 6. Bodansky writes that Iran is developing a missile that will have an estimated range of 5,500 kilometers; that is covering all of Europe, Russia, Central Asia, Pakistan and India. Furthermore, the Iranians are considering another missile with a 10,000km range--capable of reaching the East Coast of the United States.

^{vi} Dianne L. Smith, *Central Asia: The New Great Game*. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College 1996) 10. LTC Smith further stated that Iran still considers Iraq as enemy number one. Regarding Russia, it is a major arms supplier to Iran and has suppressed Azerbaijan's interest in reuniting with Iran's Azerbaijani population in return for a nonaggressive Iranian policy in Central Asia.

- Maintain military ties with the region through the Commonwealth of Independent States and the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty.
- Acquire a greater degree of profit from developing energy deals.^{vii}

Post-communist Russia has seen much turmoil on its southern flank with the ethnic conflicts in the Russian North Caucasus and in the Transcaucasus.^{viii} Russia has employed its troops in peace operations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia) and in North Ossetia (Russian Federation); fought a war against Chechen separatists; and is propping up the government of Tajikistan against a determined opposition operating from Afghanistan. Russia has signed a number of bilateral military agreements with all the nations of the Caspian region and has established basing rights in Georgia, Armenia, and Turkmenistan to name a few. Finally, Russian border troops patrol the Turkish and Iranian frontiers of the Caspian former soviet republics.

Russia has used overt and covert military intervention in the above-mentioned conflicts to ensure that these nations remain within its sphere of influence. One writer has described Russian peacekeeping activities by paraphrasing Clausewitz, saying that peacekeeping is the continuation of politics with other means. The employment of Russian peacekeeping troops precludes involvement by other regional powers wishing to extend their influence. It also limits Western policy options and marginalizes the role of the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) peacekeeping overtures.^{ix}

^{vii} Ibid., ix.

^{viii} The North Caucasus republics of the Russian Federation are Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Adygeia. The Transcaucasus consists of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

^{ix} Smith, 20.

Clearly, Russia wants to limit any foreign inroads into the Caspian oil/gas development and wishes to see itself as the *only* transit route for Caspian oil and gas.

APPENDIX B

MAPS

Figure 4 - - Ethnolinguistic Groups in the Caucasus

Figure 5 - - Major Ethnic Groups in Central Asia

Figure 6 - - Peoples of Iran







Figure 4
Ethnolinguistic Groups in the Caucasus Region



SOURCE: CIA

(http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/map_collection/commonwealth/ethnocaucasus.jpg)

Figure 5
Major Ethnic Groups in Central Asia




2/2/93 © CIA

SOURCE: CIA

(http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/map_collection/middle_east_and_asia/Casia_Ethnic_93.jpg)

Figure 6
Peoples of Iran



Ethnolinguistic Groups

Groups in Iran

- ALTAIC FAMILY**
- Turkic
 - Turkoman/Turkmen
 - Ossetian
 - Arabs
 - Other (significant groups identified on map)

INDO-EUROPEAN FAMILY

- Iranian**
- Talysh
 - Lur
 - Hazara
 - Baluch/Beluch
 - Kurd
 - Pashlur/Pashlun
 - Bakhtiari
 - Tajik
 - Chahar Amak (Chahar, Amak)
 - Daghlam (Tali)
 - Persian

Other (significant groups identified on map)

Armenian


HAMITO-SEMITIC FAMILY

- Semitic
- Arabs
- Assyrian

Groups Only in Surrounding Countries

- ALTAIC FAMILY**
- Turkic
 - Uzbek (Soviet Union, Afghanistan)
 - Turk (Turkey)
- INDO-EUROPEAN FAMILY**
- Slavic
 - Russian (Soviet Union)
 - Iranian
 - Chahar Amak (Hazara Amak) (Afghanistan)
- CAUCASIAN FAMILY**
- Adigey Abkhaz (Iraq)

Sparsely populated or uninhabited areas are shown in white



SOURCE: CIA

(http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCI/map_collection/middle_east_asia/iran_peoples_82.jpg)

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