

JPRS-TAC-89-032  
16 AUGUST 1989



# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Arms Control**

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# Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-89-032

## CONTENTS

16 AUGUST 1989

### CHINA

- China Supports Global Ban on Chemical Weapons at CD [XINHUA 11 Aug] ..... 1  
Critique of Arbatov Article on 'Reasonable Sufficiency' [Z. Hanlong; JIEFANGJUN BAO 3 Jul] ..... 1

### EAST ASIA

#### INDONESIA

- Armed Forces Chief: 'All ASEAN Members' Respect Peace Zone [ANTARA 10 Aug] ..... 3

#### NORTH KOREA

- NODONG SINMUN Article Urges Korean Nuclear-Free Zone [Pyongyang Radio 7 Aug] ..... 3

#### MALAYSIA

- Defense Minister Criticizes Singapore Offer of Bases to U.S. .... 4  
'Jeopardizes' Efforts for Peace Zone [BERNAMA 10 Aug] ..... 4  
ASEAN States Urged To Clarify Stand [Kuala Lumpur TV 10 Aug] ..... 5

#### NEW ZEALAND

- New Prime Minister Reaffirms Antinuclear Policy [Melbourne Radio 8 Aug] ..... 5

#### PHILIPPINES

- Foreign Secretary on Bases, ZOPFAN: 'No Unanimity' [J. Ebro; BUSINESS WORLD 11 Aug] ..... 5

### EAST EUROPE

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Reports of U.S. Reuse of Pershing II Warheads Assailed [CTK 5 Aug] ..... 7

#### ROMANIA

- Belgian Peace Delegation Visits, Holds Talks [AGERPRES 7 Aug] ..... 7

### LATIN AMERICA

#### ARGENTINA

- Charges Filed in Missile Parts Sales to Argentina [A. Cipriani; L'UNITA 30 Jul] ..... 8

### NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

#### PAKISTAN

- Senate Chairman Reports PRC Concern Over Indian Agni Missile [DAWN 26 Jul] ..... 9

#### SYRIA

- PRC Foreign Ministry Denies Report of Missile Sale to Syria [AFP 7 Aug] ..... 9

**SOVIET UNION**

U.S. Blamed for Slow Pace of CW Talks [O. Georgiyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Aug] ..... 10  
Defense Ministry Comments on U.S. Recycling INF Warheads [IZVESTIYA 11 Aug] ..... 10  
Defense Minister Yazov Discusses London Speech on Disarmament  
[D. Yazov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 Aug] ..... 10  
Karpov Interviewed on Verification Problems [V. Karpov; NEW TIMES 25-31 Jul] ..... 12  
Warsaw Pact's Lobov Interviewed on Military Doctrines [V. Lobov; NEW TIMES 18-24 Jul] ..... 15

**WEST EUROPE**

**EUROPEAN AFFAIRS**

NATO's Woerner Says Deterrent Needed Despite Detente  
[M. Woerner; Vienna WOCHENPRESSE 4 Aug] ..... 18

**FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**

SPD Hits Reports of U.S. 'Adapting' INF Warheads to Lance Follow-on  
[East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 3 Aug] ..... 19

**FRANCE**

Reduction of Nuclear Testing Announced [J. P. Casamayou; L'USINE NOUVELLE 8 Jun] ..... 19

### **China Supports Global Ban on Chemical Weapons at CD**

*OW1108062689 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0140 GMT 11 Aug 89*

[Text] Geneva, August 10 (XINHUA)—China supports the early completion of an effective, feasible and equitable global convention on chemical weapons, a Chinese diplomat said here today.

Speaking at the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament, Fan Guoxiang, the Chinese ambassador for disarmament affairs, said the Chinese Government stands for a complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

The threat of chemical weapons, he said, stems from the huge arsenals of sophisticated chemical arms possessed by a few major powers, as well as from a trend of chemical weapons proliferation.

He underscored the urgency of concluding a global convention, saying that "the spectre of chemical warfare is still haunting human society."

The global convention on chemical weapons is now being negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament, the world's principal multilateral disarmament negotiating forum.

Commenting on the conference's work on the convention, the Chinese ambassador said that while there have been more detailed discussions and varying degrees of progress on all the specific issues, the negotiations have failed to produce expected major breakthroughs.

He called for a joint effort of all negotiators to translate the political and moral commitment into the necessary flexibility for compromise.

He also said that challenge inspections, a new concept of verifying compliance with the convention, should not be misused or abused for irrelevant activities because the issue touches upon the sovereignty and security interests of each nation.

In addition, he said, the reasonable concern of private business for confidentiality and the national concern to protect military secrets should be taken into account.

He urged the conference to conduct a more careful study on the challenge inspection issue and make an accommodation of various proposals to achieve a common position.

### **Critique of Arbatov Article on 'Reasonable Sufficiency'**

*HK1570650 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 3  
Jul 89 p 3*

[Article by Zhuang Hanlong: "How Much Is 'Enough'?"—For the text of the Soviet article "How Much Defense Is Sufficient?", see the JPRS Report ARMS CONTROL, JPRS-TAC-89-021, 25 May 89, pp 37-45]

[Text] The Soviet monthly, INTERNATIONAL LIFE, has recently carried a signed article entitled "How Much

Defense Is Sufficient?," and made some supplements and revisions to the Soviet defense strategy of "reasonable sufficiency." The article is worth reading.

The theory of "reasonable sufficiency" is the offspring of Gorbachev's "perestroyka." Essentially, this theory advocates that in developing strength, one should not confine oneself to considering the security of one's own nation, but consider "common security," which is "reasonable." Second, there is a need to convert from "offensive" to "defensive," and the strength needed in "defensive" is the criterion for "sufficiency."

Under the guidance of this theory, the USSR has declared the demobilization of a half a million troops and the cutting back of its military expenditures by 14.2 percent. At the same time, it has decided to pull out and disband six tank divisions from Eastern Europe before 1991, and to cut back 50,000 Soviet troops as well as 5,000 tanks deployed in these countries. Such a practice has beyond a doubt won the world's acclaim while it has aroused people's greater concern about this theory.

The author of "How Much Is Sufficient Defense" believed that to prevent nuclear war and conventional war—the primary task—the focus of Soviet military reform should be shifted from the channel of being extensive to guarantee defense, to the channel of being intensive to gain Soviet security with lower price and consolidation through disarmament talks. However, an idea that runs through the article is "the building of an army with fewer but better troops and stronger combat effectiveness, which is equipped with updated technology that falls in line with the new theory." In a nutshell, quality is to replace quantity. It's no wonder why in commenting on "reasonable sufficiency," Western observers pointed out: Gorbachev's new key is to "pay attention to quality instead of quantity." According to Western statistics, the Warsaw Pact has deployed some 4 million forces in Europe, equaling 113 divisions, while NATO has deployed only 2.6 million men, equaling 90 divisions. The number of Warsaw Pact tanks and cannons in active service in Europe are 52,000 and 37,000 respectively, while that of NATO is 22,000 and 11,000 respectively. So Western Europe spoke out: Did not the USSR say that it is going after "reasonable sufficiency"? Why does it not cut back its conventional forces by a wider margin? It is precisely with such doubts that Western Europe is dissatisfied with Soviet disarmament while expressing their welcome. The British Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher said: Even after the Soviet disarmament, the Warsaw Pact still has a 2:1 advantage over NATO. Therefore, Western Europe hoped that Soviet military strategy will continue to shift from the offensive to the defensive. On the Soviet part, it is readjusting its own strategy out of its own political and economic consideration, while it is making rather great concessions to eliminate Western Europe's doubts.

However, the article carried in INTERNATIONAL LIFE has revealed that the Soviet principle of "reasonable sufficiency" is not as simple as people thought. It

is just some readjustment under the condition that it will not injure basic Soviet strength, namely, working hard to achieve in armaments a low-level balance in quantity and a high-level development in quality. It will not be difficult to see that the USSR is cutting back armaments on the one hand; on the other, it is deploying SS-25 mobile intercontinental missiles in a big way, and it is beginning to build a new-type of aircraft carrier. Also, it is developing long-range cruise missiles, laser weapons, and so on. Of course, the United States is unwilling to lag behind. It has recently declared its deployment of the

MX multiwarhead intercontinental missiles and Midgetman mobile missiles, and it has made substantial progress in its research in the "brilliant pebbles," which is a component part of the strategic defense initiative project. It seems that no "reasonable" and "sufficient" criteria exist in U.S.-Soviet contention.

Facing such a situation, peace-loving people cannot help asking: What will the two superpowers' armaments be "sufficient"? When will their arms race be stopped?

## INDONESIA

### **Armed Forces Chief: 'All ASEAN Members' Respect Peace Zone**

*BK1008101489 Jakarta ANTARA in English  
0950 GMT 10 Aug 89*

[Text] Jakarta, August 10 (OANA/ANTARA)—Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) Gen Try Sutrisno has stated that all ASEAN nations still abide by the principle of ZOPFAN (zone of peace, freedom and neutrality) and respect the agreement on it.

"I just say that all ASEAN members still abide by and respect the agreement on ZOPFAN," Gen Tri Sutrisno said after attending the inauguration ceremony of the new Supreme Court hall here Thursday. The ABRI chief made the statement when asked to comment on Singapore's offer to the U.S. to use its territory for the repairment and maintenance of the latter's military's facilities.

ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) is the non-communist regional grouping of Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

## NORTH KOREA

### **NODONG SINMUN Article Urges Korean Nuclear-Free Zone**

*SK0808085289 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean  
0007 GMT 7 Aug 89*

["Special article" from the Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean of 7 August: "Turning the Korean Peninsula Into a Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone Is Our Invariable Stand"]

[Text] Today, the danger of nuclear war is growing daily on the Korean peninsula. South Korea, which is filled with some 1,000 nuclear weapons, is virtually a huge nuclear powder keg as well as a nuclear forward base, the largest in the Far East.

In recent years, the U.S. imperialists have introduced into South Korea even the neutron bombs rejected elsewhere in the world, and are now accelerating the construction of underground nuclear storage facilities in various places in South Korea, and have been frantically conducting the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, a nuclear test war, according to a nuclear war plan already in place.

The situation is so grave that foreign reports say that if a nuclear war were to break out anywhere in the world, it would be in Korea.

It is the criminal maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists—stubbornly ignoring the consistent peace effort of our party and the Republic's government to convert the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone—who have been frenetically accelerating preparations for nuclear war in South Korea. These preparations have now made the

Korean peninsula the place where the danger of nuclear war is most clearly evident in the world.

In his report to the Sixth Congress of the Workers Party of Korea, the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song said: Our party will make an effort to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone and will positively support the people in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Europe in their struggle to establish a nuclear-free, peace zone.

Yearning for peaceful and stable life in a world free from nuclear weapons is a desire of mankind. Removing nuclear weapons from South Korea and ridding it of the danger of nuclear war is a very pressing issue that arises in rescuing our people and mankind from nuclear threats and in guaranteeing peace and stability in Asia and in the world at large.

In retrospect, since nuclear weapons were introduced into the southern part of the Korean peninsula, our party and the Republic's government have put forward reasonable proposals for their removal and for preventing the danger of nuclear war, and have been making every sincere effort for their realization.

It is known that the U.S. imperialists began accelerating the process of arming themselves with nuclear weapons since they made public for the first time the introduction of nuclear weapons into the units of the U.S. troops occupying South Korea on 29 January 1958.

In its statement released on 7 April 1959, the Republic's government warned against the fact that the U.S. imperialists occupying South Korea had systematically violated and trampled underfoot the Korean Armistice Agreement and had turned South Korea into a base of new atomic weapons by introducing atomic weapons and guided missiles into South Korea. The government put forward a proposal for establishing a peace zone free from nuclear weapons in Asia.

The U.S. imperialists, however, challenging our peace initiative, secretly brought into South Korea a large number of nuclear weapons in the sixties and then at the outset of the seventies. By the mid-seventies, there were some 1,000 nuclear weapons in South Korea.

Even when the Reagan regime in the United States declared the Korean peninsula a test site of confrontation for power in the eighties and was gathering the dark clouds of nuclear war over it, our party and the Republic's government put forth fair proposals one after another for removing the danger of war and for defending peace on the Korean peninsula, and took epochal steps for their realization.

Quite consistently, we stressed the need to convert Northeast Asia into a nuclear-free zone and the Republic's government became a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 12 December 1985.

The effort we made for peace in 1986, the Year of International Peace, is widely known among the people of the world.

On 23 June that year, the Republic's government solemnly declared at home and abroad its intent to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone. Reflected in it were our position to refrain from the testing, production, stockpiling, and introduction of nuclear weapons and not to allow any nuclear weapons to pass through our territory; and at the same time, we urged the United States to not introduce any nuclear weapons into South Korea, to withdraw on a phased basis all nuclear weapons already introduced, and to take measures to call off any plan to use nuclear weapons in Korea.

With its justness and fairness, our concrete proposal to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone enjoyed unanimous support and welcome at home and abroad.

As the world recognizes, we are a completely nonnuclear country, without even one unit of nuclear weapons. Confronting the northern half of the Republic, which has no nuclear weapons, the United States deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea and even threatened a nuclear offensive. Nobody can consider that just.

Nevertheless, the U.S. imperialists did not respond to our just proposal for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea. Even under the circumstances in which we are subject to the threat of nuclear attack of the United States, we put forward a series of epochal proposals not only for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons but also for reducing the overall armed forces in the North and the South for peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula. Thus, we gave fine practical examples.

These examples are: the epochal disarmament proposal we made in July 1987 for a phased reduction of armed forces in the North and the South and for a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea in order to remove tensions and the danger of war on the Korean peninsula; the four principles for ensuring peace and the comprehensive peace proposal, put forth last year at a joint meeting of the DPRK Central People's Committee, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, and the State Administration Council; the step we took to remove about 150,000 soldiers of the People's Army from frontline areas and to send them to sites of socialist construction; and the unilateral cut of 100,000 officers and men.

They are the expression of our consistent peaceloving and patriotic position to remove the danger of a new war—thermonuclear war—from the Korean peninsula, to ensure durable peace and security in our country and in Asia, and to achieve national reunification at an early date.

If the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean authorities showed sincerity for our peace proposals and took affirmative steps corresponding to such proposals, the situation on the Korean peninsula would have undoubtedly been relaxed compared to the present.

However, the U.S. imperialists continuously dragged new types of nuclear weapons and their delivery means into South Korea and are expanding nuclear bases and constructing new ones in many places, thus running amok to perfect war preparations.

Although the U.S. imperialists are paying lip service to peace and the prevention of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula, all of their remarks are lies.

What the U.S. imperialists are seeking is not peace on the Korean peninsula but a northward war of aggression and a nuclear war which will bring about irretrievable calamities to humanity.

All facts show that as long as the U.S. imperialists, who dream of a nuclear war, remain in South Korea, it is unavoidable for the Korean peninsula to turn into the site of nuclear war, and the world, not to mention our nation, cannot escape the anxieties of nuclear war.

Today, when detente and disarmament have become the main trend of the times, the people of the world demand that the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces and nuclear weapons in South Korea that can be the cause of an enormous disaster should be withdrawn at an early date. When the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons are withdrawn from South Korea and the Korean peninsula is turned into a nuclear-free, peace zone, the Asian people, not to mention the Korean people, can be freed from the anxiety of nuclear war. This will also contribute to Korea's reunification and to the cause of peace for humankind.

The U.S. imperialists should discard anachronistic ambition for nuclear war and respond to our peace proposal to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone.

Our people will, in the future, too, actively struggle to force the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces and nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea to withdraw and to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone.

## MALAYSIA

### Defense Minister Criticizes Singapore Offer of Bases to U.S.

#### 'Jeopardizes' Efforts for Peace Zone

*BK1008120589 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English  
1134 GMT 10 Aug 89*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Aug 10 (OANA-BERNAMA)—The use of military facilities in Singapore by the United States could jeopardise ASEAN efforts in realising a zone

of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) in South-east Asia, Defence Minister Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen said Thursday.

Speaking to reporters after a meeting with the visiting commander-in-chief of the United States Command in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, Admiral Huntington Hardisty, he said:

"The position of ASEAN member countries must remain as it is to complement the realisation of the ZOPFAN concept."

Admiral Hardisty who arrived Wednesday is leading a seven-member delegation on a three-day official visit here.

Referring to his meeting with the U.S. commander earlier, Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, who is acting foreign minister, said Admiral Hardisty was told of the aspirations and wishes of the ASEAN member countries on the need to maintain the status quo of the foreign bases in Southeast Asia.

"He (the admiral) appreciates and understands the aspirations of all the people of the ASEAN countries as a whole in that respect," he added.

Admiral Hardisty told the minister "there is no conflicting understanding (over the issue)."

The leases of two huge U.S. military installations in the Philippines—Subic Naval Bay and Clark Air Base—are due to expire soon.

The minister said it was still unclear at the moment on the U.S. decision regarding the use of military facilities in Singapore.

"The fact-finding delegation was only in Singapore to study the facilities there and they had not made it clear what they wanted to do apart from making any decision on it," he said.

Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen said "it was not necessary for them to make decision," adding that U.S. military forces have already been getting some services in the island republic.

#### **ASEAN States Urged To Clarify Stand**

*BK1008130289 Kuala Lumpur RTM Television Network 1  
in Malay 1200 GMT 10 Aug 89*

[Text] Malaysia wants ASEAN member countries to immediately make their respective stands on Singapore's plan to allow the United States to station military equipment in the republic.

Deputy Foreign Minister Datuk Dr Abdullah Fadzil Che Wan said the step is necessary for ASEAN to decide on a common stand on the plan. Malaysia has clearly stated its stand and views on the status of the U.S. military and

their implication in the region. However, Singapore has not yet given any reaction to the Malaysian stand and views.

## **NEW ZEALAND**

**New Prime Minister Reaffirms Antinuclear Policy**  
*BK0808055689 Melbourne Overseas Service in English  
0500 GMT 8 Aug 89*

[Text] New Zealand's new prime minister, Mr Geoffrey Palmer, has immediately dashed American hopes for a change in New Zealand's antinuclear policy. In one of his first acts since being elected early today by the Labor Party caucus to succeed Mr David Lange, Mr Palmer flatly rejected an American suggestion that New Zealand might change its anti-nuclear stance.

Mr Palmer said the policy had not changed and would not change because it was a matter which was now in the hearts and minds of New Zealanders. Mr Palmer also said that there would be little change to New Zealand's economic policies or social policy objectives.

Mr Palmer succeeds Mr Lange who resigned today after 5 years in power because he believed he had lost the full support of the Labor Party and because of health reasons relating to a heart operation last year and weight-reducing surgery.

The caucus elected Ms Helen Clark deputy prime minister—the first woman to occupy the position in New Zealand's history. Ms Clark defeated former finance minister, Mr Roger Douglas, for the deputy leadership.

Mr Douglas' long-running clashes with Mr Lange over the pace of economic reforms led to Mr Douglas' sacking last December. His reinstatement to cabinet last week by the caucus is seen as a large reason in Mr Lange's decision to step down now.

## **PHILIPPINES**

**Foreign Secretary on Bases, ZOPFAN: 'No Unanimity'**  
*HK1108042789 Manila BUSINESS WORLD in  
English 11 Aug 89 p 12*

[By reporter Jose G. Ebro]

[Excerpt] Singapore's offer to host US facilities "to make it easier for the Philippines to continue to host US bases," was premised on an unofficial statement, Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus indicated yesterday.

"When I made that statement in October 1986 at the Fletcher School (of Diplomacy, Tufts University)... on sharing the political burden of the bases with other countries of the region, I was a private citizen," Mr. Manglapus said.

"The Philippines has never officially asked for that sort of support," Mr. Manglapus claimed.

"The closest we came was a statement during the ASEAN summit in 1987 by (President) Aquino when she spoke of the 'Philippine factor' as instrumental in providing security for the region."

In any case, "Singapore introduces a new reality into the equation which must be taken into consideration," he said.

#### **No ASEAN Unanimity**

Mr. Manglapus said that a recent statement from Kuala Lumpur's foreign ministry, criticizing Singapore's offer to host the bases as contradictory to the aims of ASEAN's achieving a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN), "merely shows there is no unanimity in Southeast Asia with regard to the US forces."

"This Malaysian statement even contradicts a previous statement by their own minister of defense who repeated the same position (as Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew on the strategic role of the US bases in the Philippines)," he pointed out.

To the extent that ASEAN "recognizes ZOPFAN as a long-term goal and foreign bases as temporary...it seems possible to reconcile the two," he said. "That is compatible with our position."

A Thai embassy official the other day told BUSINESS WORLD that as far as his country was concerned, "the bases question is an issue for Singapore, the Philippines and the US to discuss between themselves."

Noting the absence of an explicit ASEAN position on the issue, Mr. Manglapus said that "it is perhaps because ASEAN is not trying to have a position."

"ASEAN has never considered the bases a fitting item for a formal agenda in any meeting. The members feel that such an item would not be constructive in strengthening unity in ASEAN," he said.

A DFA [Department of Foreign Affairs] official believed the true interpretation to Malaysia's recent pronouncement may lie somewhere in between. "They want the bases to stay in the Philippines but, they don't want additional bases in Singapore," he opined.

Asked why Malaysia would adopt such a position, the official said it "is in their strategic interests."

Another speculated that these interests lie in having the bases here continue as a "disruptive political factor" and in Malaysia's bid to "become a military power in the region."

Meanwhile, senior Indonesian officials yesterday gave cautious support to Singapore's offer, as long as it was for maintenance facilities only. [passage omitted]

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### **Reports of U.S. Reuse of Pershing II Warheads Assailed**

*LD0508084789 Prague CTK in English  
0810 GMT 5 Aug 89*

[Text] Bratislava Aug 5 (CTK)—The Slovak daily PRAVDA today pointed out that the United States has never taken disarmament seriously.

“The decision of the U.S. Senate to use the nuclear warheads of Pershing 2 missiles for the modernization of Lance missiles is only a new evidence that the United States has never taken the question of disarmament very seriously, though there are all prerequisites for the signing of a mutually advantageous agreement ensuring peace and security for the whole world”, the daily said.

It pointed out that the ever repeated U.S. “argument” that nuclear deterrence is necessary to prevent military conflict is absurd and loses all logic in view of all the initiatives of the socialist states.

It may be logical only in the reasoning of the military industrial complexes of the USA and other Western countries which do not want to lose profitable orders of the Pentagon and that is why they do not want to

abandon the doctrine of a limited nuclear war in Europe. This fact is proved by obstructions at talks on strategic missiles and the attempts to modernize tactical nuclear weapons, the daily concluded.

## ROMANIA

### **Belgian Peace Delegation Visits, Holds Talks**

*AU0708155289 Bucharest AGERPRES in English  
1233 GMT 7 Aug 89*

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES 7/8/1989—A delegation of the Belgian organization “Rencontres Pour la Paix” led by Jean Verstappen, jurist, former senator, paid a visit to Romania at the invitation of the National Peace Committee over 29 July-5 August.

The guests had talks at social and political institutions and organizations and saw round places of economic and cultural interest in Bucharest and Arges and Brasov Counties.

During the interviews opinions and information were exchanged on better rapprochement, confidence-building and strengthened cooperation among peace movements, on the need to step up efforts for disarmament, security and peace in Europe and throughout the world.

## ARGENTINA

### Charges Filed in Missile Parts Sales to Argentina

PM0708121489 Milan L'UNITA in Italian  
30 Jul 89 p 6

[Antonio Cipriani report: "Italian 'Condors' to Argentina: Missile Trafficking Discovered"]

[Text] Rome—The project was named "Condor 2" and was for the sale of medium-range nuclear missiles to Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq. After 6 years of investigations the Rome judiciary has brought charges against nine people—the heads of a number of military companies formed recently by former employees of the National Industrial Applications Company [SNIA] BPD [Defense Division]. A further 20 Swiss, German, Austrian, and Argentine "front" companies are also implicated. The headquarters of SNIA has been searched.

With the "Condor 2" missile you could launch a weather satellite into space. Or fire a nuclear warhead with a range of 800 km. In other words, whoever possessed it could definitely alter the world strategic balance. And the recipients of these "jewels" of ballistic technology were Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq—all countries situated in "hot spots." The researchers and manufacturers were two major military concerns—one Italian, SNIA BPD, and the other German, Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm. And the vendors? So far nine former employees of SNIA of Colleferro—who recently left the parent company, Fiat to establish a network of military concerns based in Rome and Aprilia, all interconnected and related to 20 foreign companies and financial concerns—have been charged with breaking the laws governing the arms trade. Judge Giorgio Santacroce assumes "international arms trading on a vast scale" connected with a substantial operation for recycling the money earned through a series of front companies—predominantly Swiss—used to make the illegal gains disappear.

The following have been summoned and charged, without being taken into custody: Riccardo Cecchetti, president of Conser of Rome; Eugenio Renzulli, former president of Intes of Rome and director of Conser; Silvano Lustrati, president of Intea of Rome; Sandro Fagioli, president of Intes; Mario del Papa, managing director of Meg and Rata, both of Aprilia; Roberto Coculo, employee of Conser and Intes; Vittorio Baglioni, former technical manager of Rata, now manager of Camma of Aprilia; Alberto Loy, former sole director of Intes; and Pietro Spadetta, managing director of Conser. All except Del Papa were until a few months ago employees of SNIA BPD. During the judiciary's

inquiries the antiterrorist operations division of the carabinieri force searched the various companies' offices and also those of SNIA in Colleferro. In the warehouses of Rata and SNIA the military also seized parts of the missile and components of the mobile nozzle [ugello mobile] with which the missile is equipped. The offices of Microtecnica of Turin and the Ifat Corporation in Zurich were also searched.

CIA agents were the first to realize that the "Condor 2" project could prove dangerous. A number of European companies were selling medium-range strategic missiles to Argentina and Egypt, which were involved in the project financed by Iraq. Then Mossad, worried about the Arabs' acquiring such advanced ballistic technology, began to investigate these "dual use" missiles—officially usable to launch weather satellites, but also potentially usable with nuclear warheads. Then came Britain's MI5, which perceived the threat of an attack on the Falklands with missiles that could reach the islands from the South American Continent. In Italy the first information about individuals and companies supplying missile technology to countries in "hot spots" reached Admiral Fulvio Martini, head of the Intelligence and Military Security Service, in 1985. Then the services set their intelligence inquiries under way in collaboration with the antiterrorist carabinieri.

Internationally, SNIA BPD, Fiat, and Messerschmidt are all accused. The "Condor" project was commissioned from SNIA in 1981 by the Special Aircraft Research Company of Cordoba [Argentina]. Just for weather forecasting? The Americans, British, and Israelis, criticizing the German and Italian governments, on a number of occasions reported the project's violations of Missile Technology Control Regime accords, which include a long list of equipment and technology not to be sold even to "friendly countries."

The case of the weapons sales made by the six Italian companies, in which Fiat, too, is heavily implicated, also features in the half-yearly report on the secret services. "The following referrals to the judicial police emerging from intelligence activities deserve mention: the identification of Italian enterprises and specialists cooperating with foreign industries in connection with missile projects; checks made abroad following the seizure in the port of Savona of a Danish ship carrying weapons; the alleged trading in arms equipment and technology between ports in Northern Europe and South Africa using merchant ships apparently employing Italian crews." The same report also cites figures for arms exports in 1988: 1,097 licenses were issued and military companies earned 2,395 billion lire.

## PAKISTAN

### Senate Chairman Reports PRC Concern Over Indian Agni Missile

*BK1008100189 Karachi DAWN in English  
26 Jul 89 p 3*

[Text] Islamabad, July 25—The Senate Chairman, Mr Wasim Sajjad, has presented to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan the report of his recent visit to China which notes an increased concern of the Chinese authorities over the launching of Indian Agni missile, it was reliably learnt here on Tuesday [25 July].

In his detailed report, Chairman Wasim Sajjad has covered the discussions that his high-powered 10 member delegation had with Chinese leaders who reportedly informed their guests also about the recently held Sino-Soviet summit and the talks the Chinese leaders had with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

The Senate Chairman is believed to have been told by the Chinese authorities that China felt equally concerned over the launching of Indian Agni missile and had recorded their concern in the meeting with the Indian Premier.

The delegation was stated to have been apprised by the Chinese authorities about latter's relations with the Soviet Union and India. They said China would surely like to improve its relations with Moscow and New Delhi, but at the same time wanted them to end their interference in Kampuchea and Tibet respectively.

According to sources the report of the Senate Chairman also contains certain suggestions formulated in the light of the discussion that the delegation had held with Chinese leaders especially on regional issues.

The report presented to the President reportedly suggests that China had received unparalleled support and cooperation from Pakistan when faced with a mini-insurgency about two months ago. Chinese authorities are believed to have highly appreciated the visit of Senate delegation to Beijing at a time when it was confronted with its internal crisis and was wrongly accused by the West of committing recesses on its youth, especially the student community.

The Chinese leaders are said to have told the delegation that the number of killings during the disturbances was highly inflated in reports that appeared in Western Press.

Chinese leaders are said to have offered the Pakistan delegation to expand military and economic cooperation between the two countries. Offer has reportedly been made to further enhance Chinese participation in the bigger industrial projects of Pakistan and expansion of those industries which were established with the active financial and technical support of China.

## SYRIA

### PRC Foreign Ministry Denies Report of Missile Sale to Syria

*HK0708064489 Hong Kong AFP in English  
0629 GMT 7 Aug 89*

[Text] Beijing, Aug 7 (AFP)—China denied Monday a report in a Middle East newspaper that it has sold medium-range missiles to Syria capable of striking Israeli soil.

“The report is groundless,” a Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

AL-ITTIHAD, an Abu Dhabi newspaper, said July 31 that China had signed an agreement with Syria on May 18 to supply an unspecified number of M-9 medium-range missiles.

The deal was made after Syria failed to acquire SS-23 missiles from its chief arms supplier, the Soviet Union, it said.

With a range of 600 kilometers (375 miles), the M-9 could easily strike any target inside Israel if fired from Syria, defence experts said.

Last year the United States expressed “deep concern” about reports that Beijing was preparing to sell M-9's to Syria. Later it accepted a Chinese pledge to act responsibly when selling missiles abroad.

China last year acknowledged selling DF-3 missiles to Saudi Arabia capable of striking Israel with nuclear warheads, but it repeatedly denied selling Silkworm anti-ship missiles to Iran during the Gulf War.

**U.S. Blamed for Slow Pace of CW Talks**

18070741 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Aug 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by O. Georgiyev: "Chemical Weapons: When Will They Be Banned?"]

[Excerpts] Answering this question is still difficult. The international negotiations to work out the text of a convention to ban and eliminate chemical weapons have already been going on in Geneva for nine years. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries considered that the working out of a document acceptable to all could be completed in 1987. [passage omitted]

Two years have gone by, but the convention is still not worked out. Naturally, the question arises: Why have we still not been able to do this? What impedes the work? Were our prognoses too optimistic? [passage omitted]

In my view, this work could and should go forward faster. But what impedes it?

There is one main cause. In the United States, judging by everything, they have still not taken a political decision to eliminate chemical weapons as such. Moreover, these weapons continue to be produced. Enterprises and laboratories are at work, research and development is going on to develop new varieties of binary agents, including those intended for prospective weapons systems.

In 1990 the development and procurement of the components of the Big Eye air bomb will be completed. The development of a chemical warhead for a 227-meter-range rocket for a salvo fire system, which is being widely incorporated into the armed forces of almost all the NATO countries and Japan, is going full steam ahead. Work is also continuing on the development of binary chemical warheads for tactical missiles. This year about 40 million dollars is being spent on this work. Approximately as much is being spent by military agencies on the development of new poisonous binary substances. In the United States about 100 million dollars will be spent this year just for research, production and development of binary chemical weapons.

While carrying out a program of chemical rearmament, the current U.S. military-political leadership continues to conduct negotiations to ban chemical weapons, declaring that these processes do not interfere with each other, but that, on the contrary, they supposedly impel the negotiations in the right direction. It is also asserted that such actions exert pressure on the Soviet Union, making it possible to achieve a ban on chemical weapons more rapidly. Very strange logic.

The USSR considers the complete elimination of chemical weapons one of its main tasks. And as we have seen, unlike the United States, it is taking concrete steps for its realization.

There is no doubt that all the conditions for the conclusion of a convention banning and eliminating the so-called silent death exist today. Delaying here cannot be justified from either the political or moral side.

**Defense Ministry Comments on U.S. Recycling INF Warheads**

52000072 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
11 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Text] In the West German magazine DER SPIEGEL there appeared a report that the United States was intending to use the warheads from the Pershing II and cruise missiles, which are being destroyed under the INF treaty, for a new generation of 500-km-range Lances. They were referring in this connection to a decision of the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee.

The editorial office contacted the USSR Ministry of Defense, where they told us: The information is incorrect. Under the INF treaty the warheads, once their "nuclear stuffing" has been removed, are destroyed. Besides this, it would simply be technically impossible to "unscrew" the warhead from a missile of one class and "screw" it onto a missile of another class. There is another possibility: to use the nuclear charge itself, that is, the fissionable material, for another purpose, either military or peaceful. This is not forbidden by the treaty.

In the opinion of D. (Plesh), a researcher on peace problems and director of the Anglo-American Institute on Security Questions, the use of the charges just mentioned can speed up the development of a new generation of Lance missiles, intended for deployment [razmeshcheniye] in Western Europe. Thus it is not excluded that the old nuclear charges could return to the European Continent in new "plummage."

**Defense Minister Yazov Discusses London Speech on Disarmament**

18010867 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
2 Aug 89 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Interview with Army General Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, USSR minister of defense and candidate member to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, by unidentified TASS correspondent: "From Positions of New Thinking"; date and place of interview not given]

[Excerpts] General of the Army D.T. Yazov, candidate member to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, answers questions from TASS correspondent.

[TASS] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, the other day you concluded your visit to Great Britain. As we know, and as the foreign mass media also emphasized, you became the first Soviet minister of defense in the history of relations between the two countries to set foot on British soil. What is your assessment of this visit?

[Yazov] The fact that I happened to be the first USSR minister of defense to visit Great Britain added a special responsibility. My comrades in the military delegation and I were well aware of this. We were also aware that to a certain extent we had to open a new page in Soviet-British military relations. But in the context of the current international situation, our visit was one of many steps dictated by the logic of new political thinking. It is perfectly obvious that it became possible thanks to the significant improvement in the political climate in Europe and in the world as a whole. And if one has in mind Soviet-British relations, the inclusion of military contacts in them is the result of summit meetings and talks between the leaders of the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

Perhaps the dialogue was the most noteworthy thing in our visit. It turned out to be candid, mutually interesting, and dynamic. We listened attentively to them and, as it appeared to us, they also listened very attentively to us. We made it clear to them that the Soviet Union is striving for a decisive reduction in the level of confrontation, for disarmament, for creating a comprehensive and reliable system of security, and for a nuclear-free, nonviolent world.

The Soviet delegation held meetings and talks with Prime Minister M. Thatcher, the secretary of foreign affairs, the secretary of defense, and other military leaders of Great Britain. Along with the obvious interest, good will, and openness, one still sometimes got the feeling that the burden of old ideas is still great. I hope that our talks will to some degree help the British leaders better understand the words and deeds of the Soviet Union.

We see the main result of our trip to be the fact that, judging from the numerous meetings and talks and from the statements by the British mass media, it helped to move forward in this direction. [passage omitted]

[TASS] In connection with your visit to Great Britain, public attention in the West was drawn to the problems associated with the Soviet Union's position in the area of disarmament. Your address at the London Royal Institute of International Relations, Dmitriy Timofeyevich, evoke a particularly large response. Could you briefly outline the content of this address?

[Yazov] A wide range of problems were touched upon during the meeting at the Royal Institute of International Relations. But in the final analysis, they all focused on disarmament. And this is natural. After all, for centuries how have states carried out the task of ensuring their security? According to this seemingly permanent pattern: Any action in the area of arms was immediately followed by a counteraction. Thus, a vicious, closed circle emerged. To continue to follow this circle in the nuclear age means to move inevitably closer to a catastrophe. In order to break this circle, we must change the direction of movement, turn sharply away from the principle of overarmament to the principle of defense

sufficiency. In other words, we must embark on the path of disarmament. But, you would agree, it is not enough just to embark on this path. We must move along it. It is clear that such movement makes sense if everyone participates in it. But to begin this movement, it is important to overcome inertia, move off dead center, take the first step. Realizing this, the Soviet Union decided to take major steps in the area of disarmament, including unilaterally.

The unilateral reduction of 500,000 troops is a materialization of our radically revised military doctrine, which now, as is known, has been given a particularly defensive nature. Its nucleus, expressing the highest goal of the Soviet state and its armed forces, is the prevention of war. In accordance with this, qualitative changes are taking place along with the quantitative reductions.

This deep restructuring of the armed forces is closely tied to our other peace initiatives.

We are deeply convinced that reliance on force, on deterrence, on nuclear weapons is irrational by its very essence, since it objectively leads to a catastrophe. Unfortunately, up to now the West, recognizing that nuclear war will lead to catastrophe, has still not abandoned attempts to adapt nuclear weapons for carrying out missions on the battlefield and in a theater of war on a global scale. Declaring that there can be no winner in a nuclear war, they still do not wish to outlaw nuclear weapons or at least pledge not to use them first, as we have pledged.

We consider a mutual reduction in naval forces to be one of the most important problems of disarmament. We see expanding confidence building measures to naval activities as an integral part of the all-European process. I suggested to the participants in the meeting at the Royal Institute to picture themselves in the position of a man who finds himself in someone's sights, no matter which way he turns. The Soviet Union has been in roughly the same position for many years, encircled by hundreds of U.S. and NATO military bases with more than a 500,000-strong grouping of armed forces, large air and naval forces, and nuclear weapons stationed on them. Wouldn't it really be logical to include this constantly active factor of destabilization of the international situation in the disarmament process?

Success of the negotiations in Geneva and Vienna are of key importance for further development of the disarmament process. A good beginning has been created in Geneva. A search is now under way for a mutually acceptable solution to the question of the interrelationship of strategic offensive arms and antiballistic-missile defense. Any deep reductions in strategic offensive arms are possible only if the sides reject creating and deploying wide-scale antiballistic-missile defense systems—this is an essential condition for maintaining stability in the process of reducing nuclear potential. We expect from our negotiating partners constructive

approaches to resolving issues associated with air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles.

We consider the goals of the negotiations in Vienna to be quite attainable. The initiatives advanced by M.S. Gorbachev and the quick response to them by U.S. President G. Bush have given these negotiations a new political impetus. Our position is clear: Any attempts to gain military superiority—and this is precisely the essence of the NATO proposals on aviation and the number of troops of the USSR and the US located on the territory of allies, and also the desire to create new imbalances and asymmetries—are unacceptable and impermissible. We need to search for compromises on a mutual basis.

We attach fundamental importance to opening independent talks on tactical nuclear weapons for the purpose of reducing and totally eliminating them. Keeping this type of weapon, which has an enormous destructive potential and are capable of being used in a first strike, will have a destabilizing effect on the situation in Europe. Moreover, this effect will intensify as a result of the planned modernization and buildup of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO.

As far as other disarmament problems are concerned, the USSR's constructive approaches to resolving them are known. We favor the complete elimination of chemical weapons as soon as possible and the destruction for good of the production base for building these weapons. We are ready at any time to halt nuclear testing, if the United States will do the same. We are against building any types of space weapons whatsoever and are in favor of the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of other countries and the simultaneous disbanding of both alliances in Europe and, as a first step, the elimination of their military organizations.

Without question, the problems of disarmament are difficult, complex, and voluminous. Their resolution requires much intense, responsible work. The joint search for a solution, step by step, is strengthening universal security and peace. You will agree, it is worth working for this.

In answering your question on the eve of the visit to Great Britain, I emphasized the need to build up the potential of trust. The visit has strengthened this thought in me even more. I would only add this: In building up the potential of trust, it is important to do everything possible to realize it.

#### **Karpov Interviewed on Verification Problems**

*52000066 Moscow NEW TIMES in English  
No 30, 25-31 Jul 89 pp 5-7*

[Interview with Viktor Karpov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, by Dmitriy Pogorzelskiy: "Disarmament: From Factory Gate to Battleship"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] You recently took part in a non-government Soviet-American experiment on remote verification of the presence of nuclear weapons on warships. Could you tell us about the goals of the experiment?

[Answer] During the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons under the previous U.S. administration, we proposed to limit the number of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) with a range of over 600 kilometres to 400, and of non-nuclear SLCMs, to 600. That proposal is still on the negotiating table. The main American objection, however, is that such an agreement would be unverifiable. This despite the fact that we propose a whole series of verification measures starting from the gates of the factory where cruise missiles are manufactured and ending with their installation on ships or submarines.

The sequence is as follows. At the factory we propose to set up a permanent properly equipped observation post to monitor how many missiles are manufactured, whether their number corresponds to the agreed ceilings. We propose to mark the finished products with fake-proof marks which could be read off by special instruments to prevent the missiles being used for purposes unrelated to the agreement. Whether a missile is being fitted with a nuclear or a conventional warhead can be established in special points en route to the ships. We propose to limit the deployment of SLCMs, under proper inspection, to agreed and strictly circumscribed types of submarines and surface ships.

As for strategic ballistic missiles, they are installed only on submarines and they are covered by a provision which has practically been agreed by the United States and the USSR.

[Question] The stumbling block, then, is the verification of SLCMs with a range of over 600 kilometres.

[Answer] Exactly. They will only be allowed on one or two agreed types of submarines and surface ships. This would facilitate verification and the whole chain, including possible inspection on the ships and submarines would, in our view, make it impossible to avoid or bypass verification.

Americans object that such verification constitutes interference in the manufacturing process and in the outfitting of the missiles. Besides, it means that Soviet inspectors would be allowed on board the submarines and warships—the holy of holies of the U.S. Navy. American seamen cannot have Soviet inspectors there. This prompted the idea of remote contact verification. This method will make it possible to say reliably whether a submarine or a ship carry nuclear weapons on board without searching the ship or submarine. The area verified would be narrowed significantly and the need for close on-the-spot inspection would be reduced.

We propose an intergovernmental experiment. The American Government refused. We then availed ourselves of the useful experience of agreements between our Academy of Sciences and the Natural Resources Defence Council, a private U.S. group.

Thanks are due to the Ministry of Defence, the Black Sea Fleet and its Chief of Staff, Vice-Admiral Selivanov, for

the extensive help in that experiment. The aim of the experiment was to find out whether it is possible, in principle, to determine the presence of nuclear weapons—in this case on surface ships—using the equipment currently available. One launcher on the missile cruiser the Slava was fitted with a nuclear charge, while the others were empty. The instruments registered neutron and gamma radiations. They registered only passive radiation, that is, the objects absorbing radiation, but not emitting it. All the data obtained by the Soviet and American instruments coincided in practically every detail. They registered the presence of a nuclear charge in the launcher and its absence in other launchers.

In principle it was proved that both Soviet and American contact methods could effectively be used to verify the presence of nuclear weapons.

Besides, our instruments on helicopters proved the possibility of reliable remote verification at the distance of 60-70 metres from the ship. Our other experiments show that nuclear weapons can be registered reliably, albeit with some margin of error, from a distance of about 200 metres.

To cut a long story short, the American and Soviet scientists agree that the methods used in the experiments, even at the present technical level, open up a realistic prospect for creating instruments for remote verification of nuclear weapons at sea and eventually also on the ground. Work is only in its initial stage, but it proceeds in the right direction. The instruments can be made more sensitive, the processing of data can be speeded up for greater reliability.

Some sceptics raise this objection: the Slava had no nuclear power plant and, accordingly, there was no background radiation that could have prevented detection; besides, the launcher on the deck was not protected in any way. If it were hidden in the hull and protected by a layer of lead then it could have escaped detection. Our experts are of a different opinion. They believe a sensitive instrument can be developed which will detect the presence of a nuclear charge in any case. It will simply require more sophisticated methods than those existing today. But that is a matter of improved technology.

[Question] You have spoken in detail about the technical aspect, but the political implications seem to be far more important. Why does the U.S. administration refuse to join us in creating a system of remote verification of nuclear weapons?

[Answer] The practice in the U.S. Navy is not to declare whether American ships carry nuclear weapons on board or not. It has provoked public protest in many countries whose ports are visited by U.S. Navy ships. But Washington has no intention of changing this practice. I believe this is one of the factors holding the U.S. administration back from pursuing research of this kind.

There is another possibility which, honestly, I mention with reluctance: perhaps the United States doesn't want

a reliable system of naval armaments verification, including verification of SLCMs. This means that the United States is unprepared to seriously negotiate limitations of these types of weapons. However, as the U.S. administration is well aware, we believe that without solving the question of limiting SLCMs we cannot agree on a 50 per cent cut of strategic offensive weapons across the board, because it is a part of the total arsenal of strategic weapons both in the United States and the Soviet Union, a fact that cannot be ignored.

[Question] The Reagan administration adhered to the policy expressed in the saying "trust but verify." George Bush is reported to have proposed a new conception: "Try before you buy." Does that signal a new approach of the new administration to the verification problem?

[Answer] New accents, but not a new approach. In addition to the experiment of SLCM verification, we have offered the method of preliminary verification as one way to determine the number of cruise nuclear missiles on heavy bombers that are to be counted in that category. It boils down to the following: to have Soviets inspect American heavy bombers and Americans our bombers before the signing of the treaty in order to determine exactly how many cruise missiles this or that type of bomber can carry. For some reason, the Americans rejected that proposal out of hand.

Besides, in exercising the INF treaty we are in effect trying out the methods which may come in useful for the strategic offensive weapons treaty. They included the permanent monitoring of the non-manufacture of SS-20 missiles in Votkinsk, USSR, and U.S. Pershings in Magna, U.S. In general, preliminary testing of verification methods is not a bad idea if this work is pursued without hindering the drafting of an agreement on a 50 per cent cut of strategic offensive weapons. This is the stand of the American side at the Geneva negotiations: not to make preliminary assessments of the effectiveness of verification systems a condition for advance in negotiating other provisions of the treaty. If this is so then it is quite possible to follow along two tracks: to draft the treaty and simultaneously test the verification system. Provided, of course, the testing information on the armaments of the other side. Such a tendency exists. Washington, for example, wants to verify the manufacture of our SS-24 missiles, and does not want us to verify an analogous U.S. missile. But why verify only one of our missiles? Because the Americans are already present in Votkinsk where the SS-25 missile is manufactured. Now they want to see where and how our other mobile missile is manufactured. Alright, we could, on an equal basis verify—also by way of an experiment—the manufacture, say of the MX, or the development of the Midgetman missiles. But why, then, do Americans talk only of mobile ground-launched missiles and not of cruise missiles? Why not verify the manufacture of heavy bombers? Or of submarine-launched missiles?

So, if experiments are to provide the basis for an effective system of verifying a future treaty, they should

involve all the components of that future treaty. They include, among other things, compliance with the ABM treaty.

The question suggests itself: why not stage joint experiments with a view to elaborating verification measures that would strengthen confidence that both sides are scrupulously observing the ABM treaty? That neither side is exceeding the restrictions imposed by the treaty in its experiments, say, in outer space. I think this would be very useful. Inside the United States, too, opinions vary as to what can and what cannot be done in outer space under the ABM treaty. We have made specific proposals of this kind and have suggested considering the parameters of corresponding instruments. So far the United States has not been forthcoming. This prompted the following idea: why not take advantage of the fact that the Bush administration has evinced interest in cooperation in creating an effective verification system. So far, these are just my thoughts.

[Question] We have talked about nuclear weapons verification. How difficult is it to verify cuts of conventional armaments which, hopefully, will come in the wake of the Vienna accords? The area is huge, and the quantities of armaments are enormous. I know that the West is sceptical about the possibilities of verification in that area.

[Answer] It is not just sceptical, it says that only armaments should be controlled and troop strength should not be touched. Let every side reduce troops if it feels necessary to do so, the reductions of armaments would inevitably force troop reductions, which should not be verified because it is too difficult. I believe this has something to do with the thinking of those who would like to impede the restructuring of European security along new lines. Why? It is true that verifying troop strength is no simple matter. But let us remember that formerly when negotiations on Central Europe were held, the West invariably took a tough stand: it is necessary to cut not armaments, but personnel because it can be precisely verified. This would offer a guarantee that armaments will not be increased because they cannot be fired, driven or flown without the personnel.

The NATO has now made an about-face. Why? Because the West seeks first of all a reduction of tanks and artillery weapons of which the Warsaw Treaty Organization has more than NATO and it does not want to reduce, let alone change, the structure of its own armed forces. President Bush's proposal covers the limitation of Soviet and American troops situated in Europe on foreign territories.

Our view is that as tanks are reduced, the units from which these tanks are removed should be disbanded. That is to say, the structure of the armed forces must change to guarantee the remaining personnel will not be used to sharply increase the number of, say, tanks in these units. This applies even more to aviation, because it takes much longer to train an airman than a tankman.

We cannot yield to the arguments of those who think that troops should not be cut because of the difficulties of verification. Personnel reductions are verifiable.

This would be aided by dividing Europe into corresponding zones as we have proposed. We have offered NATO a choice of two variants of such zones which may facilitate the verification problem. Verification in these zones could be a stepping stone to the whole picture of the balance in the zones and between them. We believe the system of selective verification and verification on suspicion could be adopted here. It is not necessary to have inspectors from the other alliance in every unit and every battalion. It is enough to have checkpoints in hubs such as airfields, intersections of major roads and railways. There aren't all that many such hubs. In addition, we could create a system of inspection groups which could set out for a suspected place at a few hours' notice. Incidentally, the experience of the INF treaty proves the validity of such an approach.

[Question] You have dealt with disarmament problems as a diplomat for many years. You often meet military men and representatives of the military-industrial complex. Talking about verification, I can't imagine that they would be overjoyed and willing to receive inspectors of "potential enemies" on board their ships and on their bases, not to speak of arms reductions.

[Answer] We have perestroika in the army too. I know this from my colleagues in the Defence Ministry. Though, of course, a person entrusted with defending his country and costly hardware into which great effort and energy have gone, would naturally like to preserve this hardware and not to let it be just destroyed. That is why they try before they buy. We are, however, reassessing our needs. The new military doctrine must be matched by corresponding organization. This is a complicated process. Considering the huge machine that we have, it is necessary to find an optimal solution. This cannot be done at one stroke. Some people may feel unhappy about the rate at which we are changing over to defensive structures. But I think this should be treated with understanding. Security is a delicate matter. So, if we argue with our colleagues, disagree and sometimes come up with different proposals, this does not mean that our Defence Ministry colleagues don't want to do anything. More likely than not, they are giving another hard look to their arguments in the course of discussions with other government departments. We are trying to submit such proposals to our government which would be valid in terms of security, in terms of industrial backup and in terms of our foreign policy interests. Everything should be taken into account.

I hope the discussion of these problems in the committees of the Supreme Soviet, notably in the Committee on Defence and State Security, will give an impetus to perestroika in the security area, to creating a defence potential and counting our money at the same time.

[Question] Thank you for the interview.

### Warsaw Pact's Lobov Interviewed on Military Doctrines

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No 29, 18-24 Jul 89 pp 8-10

[Interview with General Vladimir Lobov by Vladimir Nazarenko—date and place not given]

[Text] The Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization member countries, General Vladimir Lobov, answers questions from our magazine.

NEW TIMES: You took part in the Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Treaty's Political Consultative Committee. Would you comment on its results?

Vladimir Lobov: A similar meeting took place in Warsaw a year ago. The allied socialist states advanced then concrete proposals for improving the military and political climate, especially in Europe. The Bucharest meeting had naturally to discuss progress in carrying out these proposals and to work out new proposals and approaches.

It can be noted with satisfaction that a certain positive shift has been brought about in world affairs. Tension has reduced and trust has increased. The political dialogue is developing, and inter-state conflicts at various levels have become more active. Initial steps have also been taken in the field of disarmament.

At the same time, the world situation remains complicated and contradictory. The buildup and modernization of armaments are going on, as are nuclear tests. The cold-war concepts of confrontation and reliance on force are being overcome with difficulty. These are but some of the problems that are still outstanding.

That is why the participants in the Bucharest meeting declared their intention to do their utmost for ensuring comprehensive and equal security. In particular, they expressed their desire to direct the Warsaw Treaty-NATO relations into a non-confrontation channel, to establish a constructive dialogue between the two alliances in the political and military fields, and make it a factor of security and cooperation in the continent. The Warsaw Treaty states have reaffirmed their principled stand on the need to rid Europe of military blocs, simultaneously to disband both alliances, and to abolish their military organizations as the initial step.

The Political Consultative Committee mapped out further steps for the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons and for a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments. It also discussed questions of a further promotion of cooperation between allied states in the context of new realities now shaping in Europe and in the world as a whole.

NEW TIMES: The Warsaw Treaty Organization marks its 35th anniversary in under a year. NATO was 40 years old earlier this year. It is an open secret that throughout

almost the whole postwar period relations between the two blocs have been based on confrontation. Do you think an alternative variant to confrontation—an open and equal dialogue—is feasible at present?

Vladimir Lobov: Unfortunately, you are right: the last four decades following the end of WWII have indeed passed, but for a few brief periods, in tense military-political confrontation as far as relations between East and West and between the WTO and NATO are concerned. In fact, the bulk of the responsibility for that rests with the North Atlantic alliance, which should accept it. Just a reminder: NATO emerged six years prior to the WTO, the creation of the latter being a forced move on the part of the socialist countries, which needed their security strengthened.

However, it should also be admitted that the WTO failed fully to take changes in Europe and the world at large into account when shaping its policy and determining its actions. Because of that our steps did not always meet with the proper understanding in the West, which led to a straining of relations.

It became apparent that both the socialist and capitalist states can exist under confrontation as well. But who stood to gain from this? And what benefit could ensue from it? The answer is: no one and nothing. Yet, at the same time global issues gained poignancy, and the threat of war in particular reached a high level. This circumstance urgently required that the existing differences be resolved and the efforts of all states pooled.

The breakthrough in the former pattern of relations between the WTO and NATO became feasible because both sides had realized the impossibility of the continuation of this state of affairs. A new political mentality representing an important achievement gained by restructuring in the USSR and other WTO member countries has opened up vast possibilities for conducting a modern civilized policy. The obvious and indisputable truth that at present international security is feasible only if it involves each and every country is gaining more and more supporters. Accordingly, security between the WTO and NATO can only be mutual. The provision of national security is increasingly shifting from the military to the political sphere.

If this tendency continues, if NATO follows the example of the WTO and proves its preparedness to promote detente by taking practical steps, then the result may be the emergence of new principles in relations between East and West.

NEW TIMES: Speaking of the WTO's confirmation of its preparedness to ensure international and national security, do you have in mind unilateral cuts in the armed forces of the socialist states?

Vladimir Lobov: Certainly. In the next two years the Soviet armed forces are to be cut by 500,000 men, or by 12 per cent, with 240,000 in the European part, 200,000 in the eastern part, and 60,000 in the southern part of the

USSR. As many as 50,000 troops and 5,300 tanks are to be withdrawn in this connection from the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Defence expenditure is to be slashed by 14.2 per cent and the manufacture of armaments and military equipment, by 19.5 per cent.

This step is very important for the cause of peace in Europe. However, the proclamation of the military doctrine of the WTO member countries was perhaps even more beneficial for the military-political climate in Europe. This doctrine reflects the new mentality in the political as well as the military sphere.

In the broad sense, the issue of military doctrines is effectively that of mutual trust and understanding, without which any beneficial development of relations between states, especially those belonging to different social systems, is unthinkable. This is the premise proceeded from by the WTO member countries.

Speaking of NATO, the situation is somewhat different. It is common knowledge that the alliance has officially adopted a doctrine of "flexible response," though the word "doctrine" has almost never been used in this connection. The words "strategy" and "concept" are used instead. Quite a few important notions are formulated differently and cannot be equated.

This circumstance hinders discussion of NATO's military doctrine in practical terms as well as any comparison of it with the doctrine of the WTO member countries. Yet such a comparison is necessary equally for an analysis of the nature of the doctrines and a joint discussion of their further evolution. The result could be the removal of the mutual suspicion and mistrust that have been accumulating for years, the gaining of a better understanding of each other's intentions and the guarantees of principles of defence as the basis for the military conceptions and doctrines of blocs and the individual states incorporated in them. However, the assimilation of such approaches doesn't proceed as easily as might be desired and as the present situation in Europe and the world demands.

The West still maintains that the WTO's doctrine remains basically offensive, which is utterly wrong.

NEW TIMES: Each military doctrine is a combination of political and military-technological aspects.

Vladimir Lobov: We proceed from the assumption that the political aspect plays the leading role. The military doctrine of the WTO member countries rules out any kind of war as a means for the continuation of policy, aims at making it inadmissible and gives priority to political means where solutions to controversial international issues are concerned.

All that determines the strictly defensive essence of our military doctrine. It was obviously defensive in the past too, though it also contained some offensive elements. For instance, it was believed before the Great Patriotic

War that aggression can be repulsed and victory won only by powerful retaliatory blows at the enemy and by large-scale offensive operations with a view to completely routing the enemy armed forces on "foreign territory."

The overall goal being to prevent war, the present-day Soviet military doctrine envisages defence as the principal type of combat operations in repulsing aggression. The purpose is to check the enemy offensive, enfeeble the enemy forces, prevent the loss of a considerable part of territory, and provide conditions for a complete defeat of the enemy troops. This is impossible to achieve by defensive tactics only. That is why, having repelled the enemy attack, the Soviet troops must be ready to launch a decisive counteroffensive.

Now, our military doctrine is strictly defensive in both its aspects. The Warsaw Treaty member countries pledge never to start hostilities against any other country under any circumstances, unless they themselves become the objective of an attack. They pledge never to be the first to use their nuclear means. They do not claim any territories in any state in or outside Europe and treat no nation or state as an enemy. Under the remaining military threat, these fraternal countries deem it necessary to maintain the level and structure of their military forces, which do not exceed the limits for defence sufficiency while guaranteeing the repulsion of any possible aggression.

The military doctrine of the WTO member states repudiates the arms race and confrontation. Socialist countries are in favour of international problems being resolved jointly with other countries in an honest and open manner and with the lawful interests of each other taken into account.

The leaders of the North Atlantic alliance admit the possibility of conducting war against the WTO member countries and of being the first to use nuclear weapons. The aspiration of certain NATO countries to have the alliance's military might increased also does not square with NATO's proclaimed wish to have peace in Europe preserved. It is natural therefore that the convergence of viewpoints is proceeding only slowly, given the polarity of outlook.

NEW TIMES: All that reflects the essence of the political aspect of the doctrine. What can you say about its present-day military-technological aspect?

Vladimir Lobov: The military-technological aspect of the doctrine of the WTO member states clarifies a whole range of important issues. The first one deals with the assessment of the military threat for our fraternal countries. This threat remains, though it has somewhat dwindled in scale. The threat emanates from the United States and NATO, which consider actions "from a position of strength" admissible. Simultaneously the possibility of unintentionally starting a war by accident cannot be excluded.

The doctrine adopted by the WTO lays bare and substantiates key principles of the building of the armed forces and defines which type of armed forces we need. It also takes into consideration the fact that it is necessary to maintain military-strategic parity with the United States and NATO and observe the principle of defence sufficiency, according to which the military potential of the allied countries must be on a par with the level of the military threat and the character and intensity of military preparations of the opposite side and is determined by the requirements of security for the Warsaw Treaty member countries and their ability to repulse an aggression from land, air, sea or ocean, or outer space.

The building of the armed forces of the allied states is being carried out in strict accordance with the above-mentioned principles. Their structure and stationing pattern are undergoing changes, as well as opinions on their use when repulsing an aggression and the tendency in training the forces. Fundamental documents are being recast. For example, large-scale war games have been cut in number, routine activity by the armed forces is getting more restrained, and the number of defence-simulating war games has increased.

Let's consider the military-technological aspect of NATO's doctrine of the "flexible response." The "prevention" of war is planned to continue on the basis of the strategy of deterrence, which proceeds from the admissibility of being the first to use nuclear weapons—therefore the presence of U.S. nuclear and conventional forces in Europe is deemed necessary. Offensive actions feature prominently in the training of troops, and this is confirmed by the concept of "fighting against second echelons." It is designed to make the WTO incapable of repulsing the aggression. It is tailored for a surprise attack, which necessarily presupposes the formation of the potential for a first strike, to be delivered mainly with nuclear weapons.

Importantly, the scope of the military activity included in training, the amount of forces actually involved in the exercises and the scale of military exercises carried out by NATO have grown to exceed considerably the forces' reasonable need for routine training. Thus, last year's war games were, in fact, vast military rehearsals, while the strategic deployment of forces carried out within the framework of the exercises was vast enough to get the bloc's military machine into a condition enabling it to launch hostilities at almost a moment's notice and without any preliminary preparations.

NEW TIMES: Therefore the issue of the implication of the concept of reasonable defence sufficiency and how it can be achieved is now high on the international agenda.

The issue is extremely important as far as strengthening international security and ensuring its stability are concerned.

Vladimir Lobov: Indeed, reasonable defence sufficiency has now become an extensively discussed subject, evolving a very broad range of opinions. I think that those who interpret the concept as such a level and pattern of military potential of a country or coalition of countries that can guarantee their own security but cannot pose a threat to other countries are the closest of all to understanding the crux of the matter.

The implementation of this demand involves, among other things, the lowering of the level of the armed forces and armaments, rendering them non-offensive in point of structure, the introduction of certain changes in the armed forces groupings and in their deployment in order to suit their primarily defensive character, as well as the scaling down of production by the military industry.

However, the principle of reasonable defence sufficiency is not realizable unilaterally. It can only be implemented if the opposite side, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, also agrees to scrap its nuclear weapons and bring its armed forces and armaments to lower levels.

The scaling down of military activity, the adoption of the principle of reasonable defence sufficiency in building the armed forces and levelling up the balances are without doubt of significant importance in achieving stable security as well. Alongside military stability, there should be stability in all other spheres of international relations.

NEW TIMES: The last question is: what is your assessment of the chances of extending contacts between the WTO and NATO in future?

Vladimir Lobov: I believe that such contacts should be developed. The prevalence of theorizing during the majority of meetings and seminars mustn't be seen as a cause for concern. Theoretical deliberations are bound to lead to practical steps sooner or later. After all, everything positive in contemporary Europe originated from theorizing, before being implemented in real life through the efforts of politicians, diplomats, scholars, the military and people of Europe.

I believe that it is important that we continue to learn more about each other and overcome hackneyed enemy images. The better we are informed about each other's intentions and each other's reactions to possible changes in the situation, the higher will be the effect of the security-building measures we really need. The result will be a more stable peace on our planet.

## EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

### NATO's Woerner Says Deterrent Needed Despite Detente

AU0408163289 Vienna WOCHENPRESSE in German  
4 Aug 89 pp 38-39

[Unattributed interview with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner: "Gorbachev May Fail"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] WOCHENPRESSE: East-West relations have fundamentally changed over the last year because of perestroika. Does NATO also have to change its strategy?

Woerner: First of all, the change in East-West relations is the result of our strategy. Without NATO's policy—its compactness, firmness, and also its readiness for dialogue—the change in the Soviet Union would not have been possible. The basic guidelines of our policy continue to be credible defense and the will for the dialogue of detente. As I said, this policy has shown results. Our strategy will certainly change if East-West relations undergo a fundamental change in the military field as well.

WOCHENPRESSE: NATO's commander-in-chief, General John Galvin, told me 1 year ago that perestroika had not brought about any changes in the military field. Is this still true today?

Woerner: I do not doubt that Gorbachev will keep his word and implement the disarmament measures that he announced. However, these unilateral reductions involve only 10 percent of the Soviet overbalance in the armament sector. Even if the USSR were to implement all its plans, it would retain a great superiority in the conventional sphere. This is why General Galvin is right: For the time being there is no reason to change our military strategy, let alone our political strategy, which remains valid anyway. If the Vienna talks (on conventional disarmament) are successful, we will certainly make the corresponding changes in our defense strategy.

WOCHENPRESSE: Some people speak of "considerable progress" at the Vienna talks. Is this realistic, or only a result of the current atmosphere?

Woerner: It is certainly more than the atmosphere. In most issues the positions are no longer very far from one another.

WOCHENPRESSE: Does Gorbachev's policy make it more difficult for the West to raise the budgetary means for defense?

Woerner: Gorbachev is certainly not making it easier for us. Nevertheless, I believe that the cuts that have been made in some place or other—or the insufficient rate of increase—have rather been caused by budgetary and economic problems, and are not an anticipation of results that we hope to achieve some time in the future.

There are, of course, people who think that the threat has decreased or even disappeared. This is not correct, considering that our defense efforts are not determined by the intentions of our opponent, but by his potential. Intentions may change. People may be replaced. One cannot base one's own security on the good or bad intentions of the respective Soviet leadership. One must make one's own efforts and be able to rely on them.

WOCHENPRESSE: In other words, you include the possible downfall of Gorbachev in your strategy?

Woerner: There can be no doubt that we hope for Gorbachev's success, as long as he continues to open up the USSR, improves human rights, eases border restrictions, and cuts the USSR's immense arms potential. Yet we are not the masters of his fate. We cannot make ourselves dependent on the ups and downs of Soviet power and domestic policy. As I said before: No one would like to see him overthrown. However, no one can exclude his failure one day, and his replacement by someone else.

WOCHENPRESSE: The Soviets are withdrawing troops from Hungary and the GDR. Is it possible that the Americans will partly withdraw before a formal agreement on troop reductions is concluded?

Woerner: I do not really expect a substantial withdrawal of the Americans independent of the current talks. Of course, there is considerable pressure in this direction in the U.S. Congress, but I hope we can avoid a substantial troop withdrawal.

WOCHENPRESSE: Is the Warsaw Pact loosening up?

Woerner: Of course it is. One must not forget that in the postwar era the USSR created conditions in East Europe that had little or nothing to do with what the people wanted. Under the banner of perestroika and glasnost the natural desire for independence has awakened in these countries. This has become noticeable since Gorbachev has now been loosening the reins. Astonishing things are taking place there. Let us hope that they will continue to grow and bring about a development that fulfills the peoples' desire for human rights and self-determination.

WOCHENPRESSE: Is it still too early to discuss the idea of simultaneous elimination of the military blocks?

Woerner: This would destabilize Europe. This proposal is an obvious maneuver by the East and is out of the question for us. NATO has become a factor of global stability, and global stability would be unthinkable without it. NATO does not aim to maintain the status quo, but to overcome the status quo. It does not obstruct a new political order for Europe.

WOCHENPRESSE: The EC countries, most of which are NATO members, aim at political union. Would NATO then be replaced by a "double alliance": The European alliance partners on the one side, and the American (United States and Canada) on the other?

Woerner: Our aim for the future is an alliance on two equal pillars. That Europe is growing closer together politically is certainly in the spirit of the Atlantic Alliance. The Europeans will then have more right to have a say, but will also have to be prepared to assume more responsibility. The process of European unification poses no danger for NATO, but is taking place within the framework of the alliance.

WOCHENPRESSE: Would this change in any way if Austria were to join the EC?

Woerner: This is a question that the responsible people within the EC have to ask themselves. It is not NATO but the EC and Austria that decide on this. Anyway, one cannot do anything without asking the Austrians. One will have to watch how the EC develops in the future: Is it an instrument for political union, or does it content itself with economic unity and a joint will. Yet this question does not concern NATO.

WOCHENPRESSE: What is the role of the neutral countries in NATO's strategic plans?

Woerner: Our plans are exclusively based on our own efforts and potentials. However, we expect that neutral states will not neglect the task of defending their neutrality. As long as they fulfill this duty I regard them as factors of stability in the overall system of the balance of powers.

WOCHENPRESSE: In other words, it depends on the neutral countries to make sure that they do not become a military vacuum.

Woerner: Yes, that is correct. A neutral country without an army that is unable and unprepared to protect itself, is worth very little.

WOCHENPRESSE: Are Austrian "Armed Forces light" [bundesheer light] conceivable to you?

Woerner: I know better than to interfere in Austrian defense. The Austrians themselves must decide how they want to defend themselves.

WOCHENPRESSE: Does purely military defense still make sense today?

Woerner: I think that it is no less important today than during the period of the cold war. Not that I impute the intention to start a war to Soviet politicians, but one must see one thing very clearly today: In times of change there are always phases of instability and insecurity. In such times one needs even more security. One does not throw away one's insurance policy because one has not had an accident for years, or one's fire insurance policy because there has been no fire for a long time. What is important is that credible defense does not at all obstruct detente and profound change. On the contrary: Promising dialogue is only possible when one knows about one's security.

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

### SPD Hits Reports of U.S. 'Adapting' INF Warheads to Lance Follow-on

AU0608132789 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND  
in German 3 Aug 89 p 5

[ADN report: "SPD Official Warns Against Returning Pershing II Warheads"]

[Text] Bonn—SPD disarmament expert Katrin Fuchs warned against returning to the FRG, within the framework of the so-called modernization of the follow-on system to the Lance missile, nuclear warheads from U.S. intermediate-range missiles being withdrawn from the FRG in line with the INF Treaty. This project, which was adopted by the U.S. Senate's Armed Services Committee on 19 July, is a political scandal, the politician noted via her party's news service. It would lead to the "absolute perversion" of the first disarmament treaty, and thus destroy the people's hopes for the complete elimination of categories of weapons, she stated.

Katrin Fuchs pointed out that the Senate Committee had already demanded that the corresponding financial means be made available for the 1990 budget law, so that the warheads of Pershing II and cruise missiles can be adapted to the Lance substitute, even though NATO officially said it would not decide on the deployment before 1992.

## FRANCE

### Reduction of Nuclear Testing Announced

51002443 Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French  
8 Jun 89 p 22

[Article by Jean-Pierre Casamayou]

[Text] The military activities of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) will not escape budget austerity. Untouchable until now, the Directorate of Military Applications (DAM) is going to experience the first austerity measures mentioned by Yves Sillard. The general delegate for armament has announced before the National Assembly's Committee for National Defense that the number of nuclear tests will be reduced and that they will be concentrated in single salvos instead of two. Expected savings: 1 billion francs.

That decision constitutes the first breach in the fortress built up by the DAM over the years. Taking advantage of the absolute priority assigned to development of the strike force, the DAM has turned itself into a real industrial empire: four research centers (it devotes 60 percent of its credits to research) and two production centers employing 7,000 people and having an annual budget of over 8 billion francs.

### DAM's Facilities and Main Activities

Location	Activity
Vaujours	Theoretical study and research
Limeil-Valenton	Theoretical study of nuclear fusion
Bruyeres-le-Chatel	Metallurgy, production of prototypes
Valduc	Fabrication and assembly of nuclear components
Ripault	Fabrication and assembly of nonnuclear components
Cesta	Industrialization, environmental tests
Mururoa	Pacific Test Center

In addition to its complete impenetrability on the grounds of "defense secrets," the DAM has managed to maintain a powerful lobby within the Ministry of Defense. With Andre Giraud—the former general administrator of the AEC—as minister of defense and Jacques Chevallier—the former director of the DAM—as general delegate for armament, meddling with credits for the military atom was out of the question.

Today, however, the lack of transparence no longer pays off. Although the DAM gives assurances that it has always respected the cost forecasts presented to the government, the military is wondering if those costs are still really justified. So much so, in fact, that they are considering reducing their subsidies to the AEC by as much as 30 percent.

There are several reasons for doing so. First of all, the bulk of the research and development effort in connection with new nuclear weapon systems is behind us. The TN-71 weapons for the M-4 strategic missile and the TN-81's for the ASMP [medium-range air-to-surface] missile are in mass production. And studies related to nuclear warheads for future weapon systems (TN-75's for the submarine-borne M-5 missile and TN-35's for the S-4's on the Albion Plateau) are almost complete, whereas the deployment of those missiles will be delayed beyond the year 2000. Moreover, the U.S.-Soviet talks on nuclear arms reductions provide no incentive to continue the same effort as before. In short, everything points in the direction of a reduction in credits.

That reduction will be fraught with consequences as far as the AEC is concerned. It receives about 10 billion francs—about half of its funds—from the Armed Forces every year. Of that amount, 6 billion francs go directly to the DAM, while the rest goes to the AEC's "civilian" sector. The latter is responsible (through its subsidiary Technicatome [Atomic Energy Technical Company]) for the nuclear boilers used in submarines and on the future aircraft carrier Charles-de-Gaulle and for supplying the nuclear fuels and materials for armament (uranium, plutonium, and tritium) that are produced by Cogema [General Nuclear Materials Company] and at the Pierrelatte plant. In all, 10,000 people work on the military atom, but there is talk of a cutback in personnel. Roger Baleras, the DAM's director, has announced the setting up of a plan aimed at reducing the number of personnel to 6,400 over a 2-year period.