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The peace movements have been mobilizing at even intervals a hodgepodge of well-known personalities who have been signing petitions and advertisements which are to promote efforts for establishment of nuclear-free zones, the campaign against nuclear weapons in Europe, and arms reduction in general. The objective can be to want to show politicians and the people that author X, for example, who commands great respect for his creative writing work, is to be sure also deeply involved in the cause of peace. The manifestations can thereby involve people who hitherto have not been interested in missiles, etc. If the choice of celebrities is sufficiently broad, the cause can also gain greater respect, since it gets to be demonstrated that it is not just a little crowd of radicals who have formed a movement.

But the rallying of people who are known for their ability with words also contains a threat for politicians and media who hitherto have not taken an interest in the token cause. The threat is that if they stick to a line which is against the view of the famous names, popular opposition will grow strongly under the leadership of the articulate. The manifestations can also constitute a source of inspiration for politicians who are sympathetically disposed toward the cause but who hitherto have hesitated with stating bold views because they were reluctant to be massacred in the public debate afterwards. Politicians can have many interesting opinions, but their freedom of expression is limited somewhat by the need for election.

With these considerations in the back of our minds, it is a source of wonder that the peace policy debate here at home does not to an appreciable extent bear the mark of those people who regularly air their commitment with a signature. The Artists for Peace have, to be sure, arranged an exhibition, and in September the cultural elite are arranging a show at Louisiana. But the articulate are amazingly silent when it is a question of contributions to the media regarding specific topics; for example, the deployment of American nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the nuclear buildup's consequences for society in general, and the East-West confrontation's influencing by politics and culture. Did not they not sign the petition because they had studied the issues and wanted to influence the Danish debate? Now the debate
is running chiefly with bulls of excommunication from the media dominated by non-socialist parties, contributions from very few politicians and points of view offered by fairly unknown people who do not have the ability to be recognized that the celebrities have.

The situation has been especially grotesque as far as the Social Democratic Party is concerned. Under the impression of the viewpoints of foreign fraternal parties, the seriousness of the high-political situation and the peace movement's apparent growth, individual leading Social Democrats in the last few years have taken a position more marked than hitherto. The result is that especially Anker Jørgensen and Lasse Budtz have been exposed to rows of attacks which in lack of objectivity often have broken records in a country which otherwise is characterized by a tremendously low level of debate in connection with security policy topics.

In connection with the missile affair, leading people in the party in the course of 1982 developed greater knowledge of the subject, which manifested itself in verbal dissociation from NATO's plans. Late in the fall this scepticism was coined concretely in a proposal which was to discontinue Danish appropriations for missile installations. The debate which broke out was characterized by the non-socialist reaction. Many of the media aimed their guns at the party's alleged veering. And the forces who stuck to the missile project avoided nearly critical questions. The celebrities who had encouraged the development in the party hardly raised their voices.

If some circles in the Social Democratic Party felt frightened after this treatment, it cannot be called incomprehensible. Then followed a motion for a resolution in the Folketing which was so vaguely worded that even Erhard Jakobsen was able to go in for it. Thereby the Social Democratic Party secured support for itself. The broad support of the Danish security policy had been re-established! But it was support which was to make possible the next move in the offensive against the NATO project. "It is very good if we have broad support every other time," a leading party member said. The next move was the sensational resolution of 26 May, where the broad cooperation again disappeared.

Afterwards the party was exposed to an extremely critical campaign which on the private level is in the nature of slander and on the public manifests itself through questioning of the party's entire security policy orientation. Among the assailants are now, more indiscreet than before, Social Democrats such as former Foreign Affairs Minister K.B. Andersen, Folketing Member Robert Pedersen and Economist Steffen Møller. There is allegedly commotion in the Civil Defense Department, where party-loyal Social Democrats feel spited. BERLINGSKE TIDENDE especially has given space to a defense debate whose purpose is obviously to increase the pressure on the party up to the point of talks regarding a new defense compromise. And again people who could defend the party are displaying amazing reticence. The job has been handed over mainly to Knud Damgaard and Lasse Budtz, when he happens to be in the country.
The passivity of the celebrities and even of the many peace activists brings to light a lack of feeling for the situation together with traditional Left-oriented distrust of the largest labor party. After the Social Democratic defeat in Great Britain and West Germany it is no longer obvious that Denmark's Social Democrats can fair well in an election campaign in which the security policy plays a prominent role. Even though the Social Democratic Party's leading people sincerely see the need for new emphases in Danish security policy thinking, they must also look at the voter appeal of these viewpoints. This is an assessment which to a great extent takes place through observation of to what extent one stands alone in the media. It cannot be in the interest of the peace movement and its sympathizers for pragmatic fear to take power in the Social Democratic Party.
MECHTERSHEIMER VIEWS ROLE OF PERSHING II

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 16 Aug 83 p 10

[Article by Alfred Mechtersheimer: "'Whoever Shouts Cholera and Means the Plague Is Not Taken Seriously'--No Dramatization With False Concepts--The Pershing II Is Not a First Strike but a First Use Weapon and Thus Is 'Far More Dangerous'"

[Text] The thesis of Alfred Mechtersheimer that the Pershing II does not amount to a "first strike weapon" has sparked violent debates in the peace movement. In addition some confusion has arisen because--as the author sees it--a mistaken impression was caused by the abridged version given by the news agencies. In what follows, we are publishing the full text of the article "Is the Pershing II a First Strike Weapon or Not?" which appeared in a special edition of the periodical "MEDIATUS--Information on the Work of Peace Policy" (8130 Starnberg, Uhdestr. 2).

"Because the Federal Government is not fulfilling its obligation with respect to information" according to the justification given for issuing this special edition, "the Research Institute for Peace Policy e. V. is publishing all those particulars on the Pershing missile and on nuclear weapons storage sites throughout Germany which in a democracy must be made available to the citizen with respect to a planned armament measure."

With the intensification of the debate on the arms buildup, the question about the nature of the Pershing II has acquired a special weight. In the peace movement, this weapon system is frequently designated as a "first strike weapon" in order to thereby demonstrate the special dangerousness of this so-called rearmament. The Federal Government vigorously disputes that the Pershing II amounts to a first strike weapon. Now, is it a first strike weapon, or is it not?

In order to anticipate the answer: The Federal Government is right. Under the planned stationing conditions, the Pershing II does not amount to a first strike weapon.
The military experts unanimously understand a first strike to mean the elimination by some kind of surprise attack of the enemy's reaction capabilities in a global-strategic nuclear war. If, for example, the Soviet Union were to be able to destroy with its missiles the nuclear capability of the United States in such a way that it could no longer react effectively, then there would be a Soviet first strike capability. The Soviet Union could execute a disarming or annihilating first strike. The technical prerequisite for a first strike capability is the possession of those missiles:

a) Which have a high aiming accuracy and explosive effect, so that the missile silos and the C³ installations can be destroyed.

b) Which have the necessary range.

c) Which have great penetrability against defensive measures (for example, ABM²) [sic], and

d) Which exist in the requisite number (or with the needed number of warheads) such that a multiple covering of the most important targets can be assumed.

If at least one of these prerequisites is not fulfilled, then there is no first strike capability. Measured by the four criteria, with the stationing of the planned 108 Pershing II missiles in the FRG clearly no American first strike capability over the Soviet Union is established. Of the four necessary conditions, two are not fulfilled. With a range of about 1,800 kilometers, at most only 10 percent of the Soviet land-based strategic capability can be reached, aside from the fact that these 108 missiles with one warhead each would not yet be sufficient even to eliminate this ICBM capability.

Now it would be possible to designate as "first strike weapons" those missiles which because of their technical capacities could in principle be used within the framework of a first strike capability. But this is not helpful, because almost every missile developed in accordance with the present technical state of the art qualifies for that designation. But in using the term first strike weapon in a general way for all new missiles, the crucial distinction between an existing first strike capability and one which is not is blurred.

It can be objected to this that the Pershing II as part of a first strike capability by the United States now being developed is not so alone, but rather is so in combination, perhaps, with the new intercontinental MX missile. This is indeed a possibility, but not a very likely one, because such a coupling between the strategic capabilities and the new land-based Eurostrategic capability would prevent the possibility of limiting a nuclear war to Europe—a possibility which is aimed at by the new U.S. strategy. For that reason, it is extremely probable that the Pershing II is not directed at targets whose destruction would force a nuclear conflict to expand and would make impossible a "victory in nuclear war."
Now it is entirely conceivable to view Europe as a closed nuclear system and to transfer the idea (and with it the corresponding terminology) of a first strike to Europe. But even then the 108 Pershing II's would not provide any "European first strike capability," especially not if the SS 20's are included. Because the inability to carry out a first strike, which in fact would have to be an annihilating strike, is not altered due to the fact that the--incidentally relatively invulnerable --SS 20's are stationed in the area of the Soviet city of Perm and thus really lie east of the above-mentioned portion of the Soviet intercontinental capability, in other words far outside the range of the Pershing II's. And in any case their number would be too small, even if one assumes that in a sustained destruction of the structure of command, not all the missiles need to be directly neutralized.

To be sure, it is not impossible that a future European nuclear structure may give rise to the prerequisite for such a "selective first strike capability." A nuclear capability ideally defined in such a way would then be limited above on the Western side by the Pershing II and on the Eastern side by the SS 21, SS 22, and SS 23. However, a necessary condition would be that both sides would have an interest in not going on to the higher escalation stage, an extremely problematic assumption for the Soviet side. It is legitimate and necessary to warn against such a development, which also is inherent in the logic of the nuclear capabilities, especially since the U. S. military had originally called for far more than 572 rearmament systems. But that is not the debate at present in connection with the Pershing II missiles.

It is completely clear that with the 108 Pershing II missiles, no first strike capability is being installed. But the crucial fact is that the so-called arms buildup is not therefore less dangerous. On the contrary, as what are called first use weapons, they are far more dangerous. They are first use weapons in a twofold sense. For one thing, it is a doctrine of NATO to commit nuclear weapons as early as a few days after a conventionally initiated war.

But even if NATO does not want to commit these nuclear weapons, it will be compelled to do so, because the Pershing II as a land-based missile is vulnerable to a high degree, a fact which is not altered by the certain amount of mobility it has.

NATO already has a large number of vulnerable weapon systems in the FRG. Among these are not only the present 180 Pershing Ia's, but above all also the airfields with their nuclear carriers. But the Pershing II represents for the Soviet Union an especially serious threat, which makes it into a top-priority target for missiles from the USSR. If the Soviet Union fears its use--and the political ideology in the U. S. administration is already giving enough reason for this fear--it will have to be intent on eliminating these missiles before they are used, because otherwise there is no defense. On the other hand, for NATO the principle "fire or lose them" prevails. In this diabolical mechanism lies a self-igniting trait which can lead to the annihilation of Europe from out of a crisis or a conventionally initiated war.
In this structural war danger lies the core of the threat to peace which is being provoked with the so-called rearmament. Whoever has perceived this potential automatic character of a war, probably the most extreme form of militarism, can dispense with dramatizations using the false concept of "first strike weapon." Whoever shouts cholera and means the plague may wish for the right thing, but he runs the risk of not being taken seriously. The success of the peace movement stands and falls with its moral power and its argumentative force.

The Pershing II amounts to a further development of the Pershing Ia which has been stationed in Europe since 1964 (these intermediate-range missiles are named after John Joseph Pershing, who with his commissioning to brigadier general in 1917 was given the supreme command over the American troops in Germany, and who in 1921 became the chief of staff of the American army).

In both cases Martin Marietta (Aerospace, Orlando Division, Florida) was chosen as the chief contractor for the systems developed by the U. S. army, which differ from one another essentially in the following points:

The Pershing II has

A new reentry vehicle whose accuracy has been considerably improved with the help of radar correlation terminal guidance (the improved precision—one anticipates deviations from the target on the order of magnitude of only 25 to 40 m—permits a smaller explosive force for the warhead, and thus collateral damage can be reduced).

Two new solid-fuel propulsion stages, which more than double the range (about 1,800 kilometers) compared to the Pershing Ia (about 740 kilometers).

A smaller personnel requirement (with 938 soldiers, the U. S. battalion equipped with Pershing II's will have 31 percent less personnel than the Pershing Ia battalion with 1,368 men). The smaller personnel requirement results largely from a reduction in the vehicle-borne equipment for supporting-role tasks in the firing batteries and in the headquarters and supply batteries, which was achieved through technical improvements in the weapon system. Along with this, the operating costs can also be lowered by about 25 percent.

The Missile

The Pershing II missile consists of two propulsion stages and one reentry vehicle. The entire missile, with rudders, tail section, swiveling-nozzle control, and heat shield, rests on the launching carriage along with the engine hood of the first stage. The three main sections of the reentry vehicle (beginning with the front end of the second stage) are the guidance and control portion (with four air rudders), the warhead portion, and the radar portion.
The first and second propulsion stages consist essentially of a propellant housing with a forward and rear extension and a nozzle jacket. The propellant housing of both stages is manufactured out of Kevlar plastic in order to save on weight, and it forms at the same time the outer shell of the missile. HTPB (hydroxyl terminated polybutadiene) is used as the solid-fuel propellant.

The control and guidance of the first stage is done by way of aerodynamic rudders on the tail and by a swiveling nozzle. Two fixed and two movable triangular fins are mounted on the exterior of the nozzle jacket in the pattern of a cross. The rigidly attached fins stabilize the missile in the longitudinal direction during the propulsive phase, and the two movable rudder surfaces are used to control rolling. Pitch and yaw control is done by the swiveling nozzle made of silicon, which has a graphite nozzle throat and an expansion cone made of carbon-phenolic resin.

The nozzle jacket of the second stage is joined to the forward part of the first stage by means of a V-band containing a cutting charge. After burnout of the first stage, this stage is separated by the cutting charge. The second stage has stabilizing fins at its rear but no rudder surfaces, since pitching and yawing movements are controlled by the aerodynamic rudders of the reentry vehicle. After burnout of the second stage, this likewise is separated from the reentry vehicle by means of a cutting charge; the propulsive phase of the missile is thus completed.

The reentry vehicle consists of three main component assemblies:

The guidance and control system with its four triangular aerodynamic rudders,

the warhead with the nuclear payload, and

the radar system for the final approach phase of the warhead.

The main unit of the guidance and control system is the inertial guidance system, the onboard computer, and the correlator with the stored reference pictures of the target area.

The warhead portion contains either a nuclear payload with air or ground detonation options, or a nuclear payload in a high-strength steel-housing penetrator for underground bursts. The warhead yields of both warheads lie in the lower kiloton range (presumably at most 10-20 kt). For different detonation altitudes, various warhead yields are provided. The underground detonation warhead is designed for an impact pulse of over 600 m/s. In the case of five flight trials of the penetrator at the White Sands/New Mexico testing grounds, the impacting and penetration of the ground did not cause any deformations, but merely scars [Kratzer: possibly typo for Krater—craters]. Both payloads have the same basic construction and are equipped in redundant configurations with the relevant interface device for their locking, priming, and ignition. Both warheads are said to amount to modifications of the type B-61 bomb.
The radar portion of the reentry vehicle has a length of somewhat over 1 meter and a diameter of 66 cm. It is attached to the warhead by means of a quick-release connection and can be completely replaced as a subassembly without affecting other subassemblies. Located below the nose cover are the radar with a stabilizing antenna, the onboard current supply in the form of a battery for the electronics, and the coded firing device for the small explosive charge which blows off the protective cover of the radome and the impact fuze mechanism at the beginning of the terminal flight.

In the terminal phase, the radar echoes of the terrain are compared to the stored reference radar picture of the guidance and control system, in order to detect course deviations. This results in the pulses for the corrective values of the inertial guidance, which in turn gives analog guidance commands to the control fins. With its antenna, the radar activated in the final phase of the trajectory can scan the target area from a height of about 4,600 m over an area of about 22.4 square kilometers. The radar signals are compared with pre-stored digital "mosaics" on 35-mm film, which have been taken from maps or satellite reconnaissance pictures. The use of digitalized target data permits the missiles to be reprogrammed from one target to another. As is known, the radar responds better to natural and man-made details in the terrain such as bridges, buildings, streets, or dominating ranges and lakes, for example.

The radar correlation system of Goodyear Aerospace was first tested on board helicopters and then in manned high-performance airplanes. Here the required precision was demonstrated. Martin Marietta received development contracts for demonstrating that the same high precision can be achieved also with the Pershing. In the flight testing period from November 1977 to May 1978 only five of the planned six missiles were fired, but this showed that the Goodyear system is more accurate by at least an order of magnitude than the guidance of the Pershing Ia. In the last test, the warhead hit only 25 m from the desired point of impact.

The Launch Vehicle

The launch vehicle for the Pershing II is almost identical to that of the Pershing Ia, but it does show certain modifications (not outwardly visible) which are connected above all with the greater launch mass. The transport and launcher vehicle is an 8 x 8 tractor-trailer device of the type MAN XM-1001 with a wheel base of 1.93/2.77/1.50 m. Except for some modifications in the superstructure behind the driver's cab, this is the same tractor which is used in the launcher vehicle for the cruise missile TOMAHAWK and which is transported by C-130 Hercules or larger aircraft.

The semitrailer, equipped with a hydraulic lifting system, carries the missile. At the launcher pad, the trailer frame and missile are leveled by means of supporting screws. Moreover the launcher vehicle carries a transport and mounting pallet for the warhead and radar sections. Added to this are the launcher onboard power supply system with a gas turbine generator and buffer batteries, cooling equipment for the inertial navigation system of the missile during preflight testing, a control panel
for the hydraulic system, and electronics and interface equipment for
the transmission of data to the guidance and control system of the missile
from the fire direction center vehicle. The empty weight of the trailer
is 10,157 kg. Modifications to the launcher-vehicle trailer of the
Pershing Ia were necessary above all because of the greater weight of
the Pershing II. Likewise the power of the hydraulic system for raising
the missiles and the carrying strength of the supporting screws had to
be increased. The missile electronics is energized by a more powerful
200-A power supply.

The Fire Direction Center

The vehicle serving as command post and fire direction center undertakes
the operation of three launcher vehicles. It is equipped with the necessary
communications and control unit for the three launchers as well as equipped
to maintain a line to the battery command post vehicle. The platoon
leader, a noncommissioned officer, and three enlisted men (one each per
launcher to handle the launch preparations, and a radio operator) form
the fire control personnel. Each of the three launching operators sits
in front of a data input and output device which is connected with the
launcher and the missile. By way of a high-speed printer the operator
receives data on the readiness condition of his launcher.

Operational Concept

Nine launcher pads, one for each launcher, are positioned in the firing area
of the shooting battery. The missile is raised after an automatic
operational checkout, and the countdown is initiated. In the case of
preplanned targets, the three platoons receive the appropriate geographic
coordinates, the target height, and the radar reference pictures.

The commitment of the Pershing II takes place following a launching
clearance via a U. S. military communications system as well as via the
communications system of NATO.

The firing orders to prepare for launch come from SACEUR (Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe) via the CENTAG/HQ U. S. Army-Europe to the 56th Field
Artillery Brigade, which is placed directly under USAREUR (U. S. Army
Europe) along with the Pershing battalions and an infantry escort and
security battalion, or they come directly to the battalion command post.
Each Pershing battalion is supplied with four firing batteries for each
nine launchers—that is, with a total of 36 launchers.

At the platoon fire direction center, the cassettes with the reference
picture are inserted into the data input and output device, from where the
picture is automatically "read into" the onboard memory of the missile.
The needed map values are obtained by the Pershing units via reconnaissance
satellites and the American Defense Map Agency (DMA), which has the most
accurate map values from every area on earth. These values are also
needed, for example, for feeding into the TERCOM computer of the cruise
missile. At the same time, manual inputs such as target grid bearing, and
so forth, are also made.
But the DMA itself admits that the maps prepared for adaptation to computers are much too inaccurate to be operationally useful. For the first Pershing II's which are to be stationed in West Germany, the DMA will have to "plot by hand" the comparison charts for the computers. Initially only a limited number of target descriptions will be available "for use against those targets rated as particularly important by SACEUR."

Each missile receives the azimuth reference value from its gyro inertial navigation platform. Then there begins the launch preparation up to the alert status, at which all the data are stored in the onboard computer of the missile. Subsequently the trajectory parameters are calculated. The launching of the missile is done immediately after receipt of the launch clearance. Following the vertical launch, the so-called propulsion phase begins with the ignition of the first stage, which lasts until the separation of the second stage from the reentry vehicle. The subsequent ballistic phase proceeds, at velocities of up to Mach 12, for the most part outside the atmosphere and at heights of around 300 km. At the beginning of this phase, the reentry vehicle is tilted downward in order to orient it for the reentry and to diminish the radar cross-section.

The final phase commences at a previously specified altitude. The first step is a maneuver undertaken with the aid of the inertial guidance for the purpose of reaching the requisite impact speed. In the course of this, the reentry vehicle is brought into an almost horizontal orientation. The radome covering is separated, the reentry vehicle is focused on the target, and the radar correlation system begins to function (at an altitude of about 15,000 m).

This comparing gives position errors which are accurate to scale, and which are passed on to the inertial guidance system via the onboard computer. The correlation process repeatedly occurs at each of four altitude zones, and the inertial guidance is continuously corrected up to the point of impact. If the correlation system fails or if it furnishes deficient data, then the inertial guidance steers the reentry vehicle to the target—although with considerably less accuracy.
POLITICAL ARGUMENTS RAISED ABOUT INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

'Security', 'Intelligence' Are Distinct

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 4 Aug 83 pp 1,9

[Editorial by "D.L."]

[Excerpts] The tragic events that took place at the Turkish embassy in Lisbon on 27 July offer the desired pretext for the government to form a commission charged with studying the creation of a national intelligence service. The response to the reaction aroused by this decision and to the opposition which will arise from this initiative is the feeble argument that we are living with the fearful memory of the "pides" [reference to Salazar's political police].

It is justifiable to fear that once a "national intelligence service" is created, it may slide toward becoming a political intelligence police or a political police for intelligence in the performance of its duties. It would be naive not to admit this could evolve in such a manner. We are not permitted such a naive attitude if we keep in mind the haste with which this pretext was seized upon.

In effect, no one who has a minimum amount of experience and follows similar events in other countries with some attention will believe an "intelligence service" is the absolute weapon against terrorist acts.

"Intelligence services" do not impede acts of that type (either domestic or international) from taking place in such countries as France, England, Italy, Belgium and the FRG. In Portugal's case there are two types of considerations to be added to the ineffectiveness of this type of service in preventing terrorist acts: 1) they are expensive and the nation is going through a very serious economic-financial crisis (furthermore these services involve unverifiable expenditures), 2) terrorism is minimal in Portugal and the terrorist acts we have had were, by and large, anticipated and could have been prevented.

It is clear that the majority of the terrorist acts occurred under circumstances in which a close security detachment could have prevented their occurrence. There were also times when special alertness and preventive
measures should have been adopted. The nation does not lack a special "intelligence service" to anticipate these terrorist acts. What it lacks are security organizations which think about the security of people and property; security forces that are alert to the circumstancial nature which Portugal is visited by foreigners or international events which may cause retaliations against foreign persons, installations or property within our borders.

The specific case of the Turkish embassy cannot be explained by the lack of intelligence because what had happened to the Turkish commercial attache, Mr Erkut Akbay and his wife, the large number of terrorist acts against Turkish diplomats and the terrorist act at Orly Airport were known. Threats as well as movements which had raised the suspicion of diplomats and employees of the Turkish embassy were also known. A lack of intelligence also does not explain the weak security system and the adventurous initiative taken by a policeman which resulted in tragedy.

Intelligence was available. However, there was no operational reaction to the suspicion nor was security reinforced as a result of the available intelligence and the known facts.

This brief review of the situation leads us to believe that an attempt is being made to use the tragic events of 27 July—which were exploited with questionable sensitivity—to find a defensible motive for creating a "national intelligence service". In emergencies of this kind, such a service may gather information but it can never prevent the acts of terrorism. There is no logical relation between the government's decision and the goal of preventing the repetition of political terrorist acts.

However, it is not impossible for the thinking behind the workings of a "national intelligence service", in addition to being a luxury the general state budget cannot support, to possibly become a threat to normal democratic life.

In theory and in practice the "security problem" and the "intelligence problem" are two distinct problems. To us, it does not seem prudent nor proper to confuse the two.

Politicization Feared

Lisbon 0 JORNAL in Portuguese 12 Aug 83 p 7

[Commentary by Augusto Abelaira]

[Text] Here we are on the edge of 1984 which served, arbitrarily of course, as the title to Orwell's famous novel. When it was published, however, it was already more than a pessimistic prediction. It was an allegory of the situation existing in some countries, including Portugal—although Portuguese fascism could not boast of such scientific refinement. Portugal had an archaic 1984, let us say a 1984 B. C. In the 1960's, when Salazar went to Braga by plane for the first time, it was a news event.
In any event, it can be said that things improved in the Portuguese case thanks to the miracle of April. I prefer to speak of the "miracle of April" because it is becoming uncomfortable to name its instigators and it is better to consider April as having been a supernatural phenomenon without instigators. In the event we are positivists, we speak of April not as a supernatural phenomenon but a historical one. Do we know the names of the supporters of the neolithic revolution? Would we know Alvaro Pais' name had it not been for Fernao Lopes? April had no instigators, history makes itself.

Here we are, on the eve of 1984 and some clouds are appearing on the horizon. And the darkest cloud of this remarkable summer seems to be the intelligence service which the Armenians fortunately activated. This cloud is all the more concerning because it is certain such a service will inevitably be created. Modern societies, incapable of resolving their problems of social justice, need to defend themselves from the violence these very injustices cause. And it is the societies themselves (look at France) which demand such organizations, ask them to be efficient to the utmost, and accept the loss of part of their freedoms.

As a result, the intelligence service is coming with our consent. Although we know (who does not know it?) that as it grows it will tend to become autonomous, no matter how great the "democratic" oversight is. We also know that the Assembly of the Republic does not provide us any assurances. It tamely submits itself to the governments and these, in principle, have majorities.

It will not be worthwhile to make subtle distinctions such as: this organization is not a police force. We admit that it will not be one initially but it will end up being one and the day will come (although far off?) the microphones, the television cameras and other more sophisticated equipment not yet invented will follow us around if we are not conformists. Then, someone need only raise certain questions—for example, to write that, all things considered, terrorists kill less people than the malnutrition caused by social inequalities (for example, unemployment)—for the author of such a piece to become suspect, perhaps even suspected of inciting the bomb attacks. The intelligence services will fulfill their duty and at least start a file as a precaution. In the name of society's interests, to think differently and to call things what they are will become compromising (as it recently happened in Italy). Without such services, is it not now already compromising and a nuisance to be (or be taken to be) a Eanist or a communist?

It may be said that these are minor nuisances because they do not imply imprisonment but merely professional or economic reprisals. However, is it correct to say "only"?

The intelligence service is unavoidable, no country escapes it. Portugal is one of the rare countries to still have escaped it. Such an organization lies within the tendency to repress individual freedom in the name of other values disguised as social values. It naturally falls upon the individual citizen, who is unable to stop such a service from existing (as a matter of fact, the individual wants it), to attempt to limit its effects. But how, since once it is created it will inevitably tend to become autonomous (I insist) even if it is dependent on governments which are liberal in spirit?
So much so that even the liberally spirited governments, as I believe ours is, tend to forget they are liberal spirited. And this is so because they became the governments.

Is it not true that Mario Soares (a liberal without any shadow of a doubt) sometimes speaks of dissenters as if they were saboteurs? He does this because he is sincerely convinced his policies are the only ones possible (and they may even be). In fact, even faith may be dangerous in politics. A man of faith may potentially become an inquisitor. I say potentially, not necessarily.

For example, no one would attribute repressive intentions to the PS [Socialist Party] in the area of the press. Respect for freedom is among the PS's most profound beliefs.

However, as soon as it took office, it began to show a concerning degree of distrust and a lack of contact with the press as if the latter were pestilent, had to be treated at arms length, was a disease and dangerous. Following this passive attitude, let us say, there was some action. It secured its control over the RTP [Portuguese Radio-Television System], it removed a troublesome voice from the RDP, subjected ANOP [Portuguese News Agency] workers to inadmissible blackmail by threatening not to pay salaries—although, when it was in the opposition it had a diametrically opposite attitude. And a just one.

Why did the PS and its leaders stop being the liberals they had always been? It seems untrue. They are beyond the age in which ideas change. However, the government is a machine which tends to become autonomous and functions independently of the ideas of those who are in government.

If this happens in full view of everyone, then what dangers will the intelligence service (that unavoidable intelligence service which would be formed no matter what party was in power) not prepare for us?

Let us have no doubts, any and all institutions, and, therefore, an intelligence service, always ends up confusing the ends with the means.

Inevitably.

I correct myself: with a high degree of probability.
DOMESTIC OIL FIRMS ACT TO LESSEN INFLUENCE OF ARABS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDEN in Danish 1 Aug 83 Sect II p 4

[Article by Peter Kjelstrup: "Oil Companies Get Ready to Compete with the 'Arabs:' Two Companies Transport Oil in the Same Tank Truck"]

[Text] "The Arabs."

A new concept in the Danish oil world, where the word no longer applies to Middle East oil producers. On the contrary, it applies to an oil company, whose main office is located in Kvasthusgade 3. The oil company, without a name of its own for the time being, will change its appearance 1 October to "Kuwait Petroleum Danmark A/S" but will continue to use Gulf as a marketing label for at least 12 months because "the Arabs" involved in the purchase were given an extended time limit to change the name.

"The Arabs" are also among the better bets on who will bid on the second of the seven sisters, Chevron's European and therefore Danish holdings as well. Like Gulf, which proclaimed that its entire European network was for sale last year, Chevron has plainly called the world's attention to the fact that it wants to get out of Europe, formally by saying it is investigating the possibility of restructuring the European network and, with that, investigating what an eventual sale might bring in. When asked by BERLINGSKE, Director H. J. Hochreuter dismissed the idea that there would be any changes at Chevron by saying: "We are constantly investigating."

However, contact between Chevron and Kuwait Petroleum has been established. The question is whether it will be long term. Sister number two is about to say "good-bye."

"The Arab's have arrived, but have not yet said "hello."

Savings

The Danish world record for savings and the sight of tremendous activity burying natural gas pipes in Danish provinces and towns have, no doubt, turned things upside down in the Danish oil world. But conditions in Denmark have not been the deciding factor in the oil supply pattern in Denmark. In
almost all instances, the changes have come as a result of decisions on the world level, decisions in the United States as to how far the former world-encompassing oil giants should extend themselves in the future. At least two of them have chosen to concentrate on the U.S. market.

And decisions in Kuwait to enter the European market with what in oil language is called "downstream" operations: refining, sale and distribution.

The pattern of the future structure in the Danish oil market is now slowly beginning to emerge since it is given that as of 1 November Texaco and BP will cooperate in the physical area of storing oil and bringing it out to the consumer. But there is still keen competition as to who is going to bill the consumer. There is also the problem of getting customers to distinguish between the two companies, despite the fact that one is a U.S. company and the other British.

The Danish market also expected to see participation of more "semi-state-owned" companies in connection with DONG's [Denmark's Oil and Natural Gas] oil branch, Dansk Olie-Forsyning A/S (Dofas) and the cooperatively owned OK-Danmark, together with the so far less state-controlled BP. The British government is now planning to sell off its shares in BP.

Change of Government

But that was not to be the chain of events. A change of government in Denmark interfered with the ostensible chance to establish some kind of government marketing channel for the oil taken in by Dofas as the state's share of the North Sea production.

Instead, Texaco seized the chance to lessen the distance between customers by joining BP in delivering oil by truck.

A business solution to a distribution problem. An attempt to hold the number of kilometers driven per oil ton to what it was prior to the oil price change forced people to cut consumption to an absolute minimum.

Back in their normal place within the distribution system are two large and a number of somewhat smaller companies with more or less local interests.

Shell and Esso are the two large ones, both profiting from their refineries and hence making money in the depressed market, to which they have been adapting all along. Esso has also assumed much of the leadership in sister companies in Sweden and Finland and, thus, have suddenly had to deal with other problems than the purely local ones. There are strong indications that these companies' dreams that others would leave the market and therefore solve the problems of having a big organization with declining sales are not going to be realized soon.
New Actors

On the contrary, new actors have come upon this market, which has changed more than anything else in the last few years. New actors, who for years sat on their oil fields in the desert sand and who are now well on their way to purchase a fully developed distribution network. First, by taking over Gulf in Benelux. Then, by taking over Gulf in the Nordic countries, including the Stigsnas refinery. And now perhaps by taking over Chevron. The state-owned Kuwait Petroleum has started to invest. However, no one knows how much the company is willing to spend to establish its own marketing channel.

"They are mercantilists and, therefore, we do not fear them." This is the attitude of Danish Shell and that of Esso is somewhat like it. But let there be no doubt about it, the headquarters of these two companies and other companies keep a close eye on the signals emanating from the Gulf building in Kvasthusgade.

Gulf Is Independent

However, signals have already started to come from "the Arabs" behind the scenes in Kvasthusgade. Director D. S. Keep, who delivered a lot of good results in the last few years before Gulf sold out, told BERLINGSKE that the company's good financial situation will be used to strengthen its market position.

"And we are getting extremely good help from the mother company in Kuwait," said the director, "both financially and product-wise, while our strategy is based on local knowledge. We are perhaps more independent here in Denmark today than we have ever been," Keep told BERLINGSKE.

However, the independence has certain natural limits with respect to the purchase of crude oil, no more so than that Kuwait Petroleum Danmark A/S can "optimize the refinery's financial situation" inasmuch as the heavy oil from Kuwait must be mixed with other qualities to give the products the right composition. "The continued sale of products to the Swedish sister company, soon to become Kuwait Petroleum Sverige A/B, will also guarantee continued profitable operation of the refinery," said Keep, who at the moment is employed by Gulf but on loan as the new company's director.

Struggle against DK

While the oil companies are preparing for new and tougher competition when the heating season begins, almost all of the big established companies have enough to do to protect their investments against yet another new phenomenon in the Danish oil market, namely DK-Benzin. Daily bailiff's writs, putting up and taking down signs, sealed tank installations and a long line of lawsuits result when dealer-owned gasoline companies, originating from within the Danish Gasoline Dealers Association, try to take over old gasoline companies' established installations. The small independents against new
variants of the large multinationals, the large companies apparently thinking that the small independent competitors—with Center Democratic Party energy policy spokesman Poul Emmert Andersen as newly elected chairman—should not be given the competitive advantage of not having to invest in tank installations.

In the past year, some 60 independent gasoline dealers have replaced old gasoline signs with their own DK signs, trying to guarantee a larger share of the profits for themselves. Altogether, some 100 gasoline dealers are now stockholders in the company, which means that another 40 will follow as soon as they can get out of previous commitments, and perhaps even a little sooner.

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CSO: 3613/167
BENKOW DISCUSSES PLANS FOR DRILLING IN NORTH

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Aug 83 p 8

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen]

Tromso, 19 August—"The Conservative Party insists that the northern continental shelf be treated the same as the North Sea fields. The old "magic boundary" of the 62nd parallel must be removed!" This was stated by the Conservative Party chairman and parliamentary leader Jo Benkow in a speech in Harstad on Friday evening. Earlier that day Benkow was in Bardufoss and spoke on defense and security policy.

"Only solidarity with our allies can secure peace," the Conservative Party chairman said. He used the occasion to send a strong warning to the "No to Nuclear Weapons" movement.

"This movement now is starting a campaign to elect its supporters to local governments. I would like to warn voters against supporting candidates in local elections on the basis of the methods these candidates advocate for achieving nuclear disarmament," Benkow said. He continued:

"Even though it is significant that they are involved in all aspects of politics, it is not the local governments that will carry on negotiations in Geneva."

The Conservative Party chairman stressed that his party unanimously supported a bilateral reduction to the lowest possible level, with regard to both nuclear and conventional weapons. "But," he pointed out, "we caution against those who would put pressure on the West, alone."

The Greatest Danger

"Unfortunately, all historical experience shows that unilateral disarmament and imbalance are--and have been--the greatest threat to peace."

Naval vessels in the harbor and military helicopters and planes in the air created a realistic frame around Jo Benkow's defense message in northern Norway.
"Few realize more clearly than the people of northern Norway how important our
NATO membership is for Norwegian security and self-determination. The mutual
guarantee and the political solidarity we are achieving through NATO makes
it possible for Norway to withstand political pressure from abroad and to
repel military intervention," he said.

Jo Benkow has a full schedule in the north: Alta, Berlevag, Honningsvag,
Hammerfest, Tromso, Bardufoss, Finnsnes, Evenes, Harstad, Storkmarknes, Leknes,
and Hattfjelldal. All that in 3 days! "It has been fun, interesting, and
diverse," the Conservative Party chairman said. He has every reason to be
satisfied with his campaign journey through northern Norway. He has been
showered with the spontaneity and hospitality of northern Norway.

"These are really fine people," the enthusiastic party chairman told AFTENPOSTEN.

"I will never forget the desperate look on the face of the chauffeur who was
supposed to drive me to the hall in Hammerfest. It was a brand-new car, but
it would not start," said Benkow after the meeting in this far-northern town,
where he was presented with a large bag full of stockfish.

Year-Round Drilling

In Harstad the people were heavily involved in the oil exploration. The
Conservative Party chairman promised that his party's goal was year-round
drilling by 1986, if this were feasible from a safety standpoint. And he
stressed that we should make sure it was safe.

The government received a majority support for full freedom to choose operators
in the north. This means that foreign operators will work alongside Norwegian
operators, just as in the North Sea. Any other arrangement would be meaning-
less and an exaggerated belief in our own capabilities, if we believe that
a small country such as ours could solve the problems in these treacherous
waters, according to Benkow. He received enthusiastic applause when he stated
the following: "The strategy of the Conservative Party is to make oil finds
in the north as rapidly as possible. This means that our activity must not be
spread too thin, but must be concentrated in the regions that show the
greatest promise!"

Demand Better Weather!

But politics is not the only thing on the minds of people in the northernmost
sections of the country. The miserable summer weather is the predominant
theme in conversations. On the flight from Bodo to Tromso this morning we
met member of parliament Jan P. Syse (Conservative Party), who also is
campaigning in the north. At a meeting yesterday he was issued the following
challenge: "Go to your brother in Tromso and demand better weather!" Syse's
brother is head of the weather service in northern Norway.
COUNTRY CHANGING PATTERN OF OIL IMPORTS; MORE FROM USSR

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 27 Jul 83 p 17

[Article by Sophie Petzell: "Sweden Buys More Soviet Oil"]

[Text] During last spring, 64 percent of the Swedish oil import came from the North Sea and all of 15 percent from the Soviet Union. This gives a totally new import picture and is a good illustration of the most acute headache of the OPEC countries.

As late as 1981, 49 percent of the Swedish oil import came from Saudi Arabia. During last spring not one single shipment came from there.

Saudi Arabia is without comparison the largest exporter in the organization of the oil exporting countries, OPEC. The thirteen OPEC countries that earlier totally dominated the world market, have been forced to cut their export during the last years due to decreased oil demand.

Along with the cut in export, the OPEC countries have also lost parts of the market—Norway, Great Britain, Mexico and the Soviet Union all have increased their export and picked up parts of the market.

During the last meeting of the OPEC ministers in Helsinki, increased cooperation with other exporters was frequently discussed. OPEC ministers have also visited oil producers outside the organization.

Algeria's oil minister, for example, has been to Moscow and has been partly assured that the Soviet Union which now exports 1.5 million barrels a day (a barrel is 159 liters) from now on will keep OPEC prizes.

Last year only 4.4 percent of Swedish oil was imported from the Soviet Union, and the year before it was 2.9 percent. Should the Soviet Union really adjust its prizes to those of OPEC, the large Soviet part of the Swedish import may not last—last June it was all of 19 percent.

The import of North Sea oil has increased just as dramatically: from 29 percent in 1981 to 49 percent last year and 64 percent during the first 6 months of this year.
Last January the figure was even 72 percent. The rest of the oil was imported from Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Venezuela, all OPEC countries.

By volume the import of oil has not increased significantly. During the first 6 months of 1982 we imported 10.6 million tons of oil and petroleum products, this year 11 million tons. This means an increase of 3.4 percent.

But although the price of oil dropped during spring, the Swedish import has cost 20 million kronor more during the first 6 months of this year than it did during the same time last year—19.5 billion kronor compared to 16.2 billion kronor. The reason for this is the high exchange rate of the dollar.

Oil is bought and sold in dollars. In spite of this, the oil companies have not raised their prices with more than seven percent, not counting taxes and fees.

Oil is our greatest import item. Counted in value, it has so far this year been responsible for 21 percent of the total import and, during all of last year, for 20 percent—40.3 billion kronor. Petroleum products are also an important export item. Last year petroleum products for more than 8 billion kronor were exported by the Swedish refineries.
[Editorial]

[Text] Finance Minister Henning Christophersen is right when he says that the deficit in the government's operations, construction, and loan budget for 1984 of about 59 billion kroner still is extremely large. On the background of a total budget of 188 billion kroner, this clearly shows that we need additional cuts in state finances. Of course, the size of the budget deficit is not the most important measure of economic developments here at home, but the extremely large and growing budget deficits in recent years have contributed to the imbalance in the country's economy.

For this reason, it is encouraging that the deficit will be lower than in the 1983 budget and in the most recent estimates for this year.

The budget proposal recently presented and the finance minister's comments on it may be seen as a kind of catalog of the government's economic plans. It contains many budget improvements, corresponding to about 10 billion kroner at 1984 wage and price levels. Carrying out these improvements will be of decisive significance for the government. This does not mean that all the individual details have the same priority. The government has staked its continued existence on several proposals, such as the desire to reduce local block grants by 1.35 billion kroner. This question will be taken up at an extraordinary session of parliament on 9 September. On other points, however, the government is willing to negotiate on the details of the budget proposal. Of course, this must occur in such a way that a possible concession by the government would be accompanied by the acceptance of other measures having a corresponding effect. In general, the main principle of the budget proposal (no tax increase from 1983 to 1984) must be respected.

It must be said that the government's budget proposals are extremely reasonable, although they will be the subject of harsh criticism. Instead of improving the position of DSB (Danish State Railways) and P&T (Danish Postal and Telegraph Service) by increasing rates, the same results could be achieved by improving efficiency and making cutbacks within these agencies. It also should
be pointed out that the government's desire to make the wealthiest segment of society pay the full fee for treatment at primary health care facilities and pay a certain amount for hospitalization could give rise to certain administrative problems. Coupled with child care fees that reflect family income, this measure could be interpreted as a confiscation of funds from people whose incomes are rising.

It should be possible to correct such defects in a budget proposal that, on the whole, is a step in the right direction, which will help the government's efforts toward economic reconstruction.

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CSO: 3613/182
[Excerpt] The budget proposal presented by the government yesterday in parliament is a logical continuation of the reconstruction policies that began when the government was formed almost 1 year ago. Under the previous government we witnessed an explosion in the budget deficit, constantly rising interest rates on business loans, declining investments, record trade deficits, rising unemployment, and an endless series of useless measures to reduce unemployment. The four parties that formed the new government on 10 September last year put an end to the previous policies, recognizing that only a drastic change in economic policies could alter the trend that threatened to destroy the nation's welfare. The new government was convinced and continues to believe that a majority of the Danish people are willing to bear the burden that is necessary to repair the Danish economy. No Dane with any respect for himself and his country will stand by and watch Denmark become a second-rate, debt-ridden nation with its prestige declining abroad and its hands tied here at home.

This past year has shown that the new policies were effective. I will not discuss all the positive trends in the economy that have resulted from the government's economic policies. In this article I will merely discuss the budget proposal and the considerations on which it is based.

When the government took over, it inherited a budget proposal for 1983 with a deficit estimated at 74 billion kroner or about 25 billion kroner greater than the previous year. A closer examination of the proposal revealed that, if the previous policies were continued, the deficit would be even greater—nearly 80 billion kroner.

Despite the previous government's efforts to limit the rise in public expenditures, it was only marginally successful. In the budget proposal we inherited, government expenditures increased by 4 percent, even if we ignore wage and price rises. Less than 2 months after the new government took over, it presented a revised budget proposal containing extensive cutbacks. As we know, this proposal was approved by parliament relatively intact. The result was
a 1983 budget with a deficit of 69 billion kroner, which is about 10 billion kroner lower than the deficit that would have resulted from the previous government's proposal, according to a realistic estimate. The rise in expenditures was changed to a 0.5-per cent decrease.

But this effort was merely a first step in the reconstruction of the government's finances. The goal is to reduce the deficit year by year. For 10 years the government deficit has risen each year. For this reason, it was no simple matter when in December 1983 during the third discussion of the 1983 budget proposal in parliament, I promised that the 1984 budget proposal would contain a decreased deficit.

Since the 1983 budget was adopted, it has been estimated that the 1983 budget deficit will be reduced from 69 billion kroner to 63 billion. For this reason, the government sees no reason to alter its goal of reducing the previous year's deficit in the government's first budget proposal of its own, i.e. the budget proposal for 1984, which it has developed from the very beginning.

The budget proposal for 1984, which I am presenting to parliament on behalf of the government, if all the individual proposals contained in it are approved, will mean that state expenditures in 1984 will be reduced by just under 3 percent (compared to this year) if we disregard wage and price increases and if we assume that the present unemployment rate will continue next year. Total state expenditures for operations, construction, and loans will be about 187 billion kroner, while revenues are estimated at 128 billion kroner. Thus, the result is a budget proposal with a deficit of 59 billion kroner, i.e. 4 billion kroner less than this year.

The government believes that the deficit still is too large--no doubt about that. Each year the deficit must be reduced gradually. This is a formidable task, as indicated by the fact that government interest payments alone rose by 15 billion kroner from 1982 to 1983, although interest payments will drop by 6 billion kroner from 1983 to 1984.

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CSO: 3613/182
BUSINESS INSTITUTE SEES FURTHER IN FOREIGN COMPETITIVENESS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 May 83 p 31

[Text] Finland's competitiveness is still declining, the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) warns in its latest cyclical forecast.

While presenting the forecast, the new director of the institute, Pentti Vartia, pointed out that, for instance compared to Sweden, our competitiveness has become weaker year by year. Over the past years, costs have gone up by 25 percent more in Finland than in our Western neighboring country.

According to ETLA, our industrial price competitiveness has decreased by more than 10 percent between 1979 and last October. It is estimated that this year the industrial cost per unit will increase by 6.5 percent, but approximately by 5.5 percent in the countries important to Finnish exports, counted in respective currencies.

It is estimated that the inflation rate, which has been slowing down since 1980, will be temporarily accelerated in the last part of the year, because of the increase in the sales tax. ETLA forecasts that the consumer prices will go up by 8.9 percent this year and by 7 percent next year.

According to ETLA, it is possible to keep up with the clearly slowing inflation development next year. At the end of the year it would be only 5 percent. However, our inflation rate is, despite its decline, higher than in the competing countries.

In order to keep up with a sufficient level of imports and investments, it would be important to maintain competitiveness especially now that growth in public demand has to be limited, it is remarked in ETLA's forecast. At the same time, it is emphasized that, by means of increased competitiveness, the fight against inflation will also improve the employment situation.

In fighting against inflation, we should concentrate on slowing down domestic price and cost development, according to ETLA. ETLA rejects the idea of revaluation. To reduce the industrial competitiveness by revaluation would
not be in harmony with the economic political goals which formed the basis for last fall's economic solutions, according to the institute.

Once again the idea of revaluation came from the Labor Institute for Economic Research (TTT) whose Deputy Director Heikki Oksanen flashed the idea of revaluation at the occasion where the institute's cyclical forecast was released in April. Also a year ago, there was a similar, light discussion about revaluation versus no revaluation.

Western Recovery Affects Finland

The economic recovery on Western markets affects Finland's economy during this year and at first, it can be noticed as increased forestry exports. However, there is plenty of supply on the forestry market, and this keeps the development of export prices moderate.

The surplus in trade with the Soviet Union limits exports to the East which are estimated to decrease slightly in quantity this year and clearly next year. This will especially slow down exports of metal and consumer goods industries. The growth in overall exports of goods will remain low at the early stage of this upswing.

Unemployment at 6.4 Percent

The investment recession will bottom out this year. Next year the investments will pick up especially within the industrial sector, but the increase is expected to remain lower compared to the previous upswings.

The growth in overall production is estimated to pick up during this year and to continue at a rapid pace next year. The GNP is estimated to grow by 2 percent this year and by 4 percent next year. The first one to grow is the production within the forest industry.

Due to the exports to the East, the production within the metal industry will decline, and only a slight recovery can be expected next year.

Unemployment will still increase this year, but next year, as the economic activities will pick up more vigorously, the unemployment level will start to decline slowly. The unemployment level for next year is forecast to be 6.4 percent.

Monetary Policy Tightens Up

During this year the monetary policy will slightly tighten up, as the Bank of Finland is trying to limit growing credits by increasing the commercial banks' reserve obligation.

During the beginning recovery, an increase in the national debt has to be limited primarily by slowing down costs, the research institute recommends. Despite the balancing efforts, the state's economic political decisions should not be in disharmony with the goals to slow down inflation. On the
contrary, they should, for their part, enable a moderate income settlement next spring, ETLA reminds.

In its economic political recommendations ETLA considers as a central goal to slow down inflation. By means of increased competitiveness, the fight against inflation will also improve the employment situation, ETLA points out.

It seems that the worldwide economic recession, which followed the second, big increase in crude oil prices during 1979-80, has now bottomed out. In the United States the turning point occurred at the end of last year.

The overall production within the OECD area will increase only slightly this year, but more vigorously next year. The inflation rate is at its lowest in the OECD countries for the past ten years, and inflation will still slow down.

The price of crude oil has clearly dropped during the first part of the year and will probably stay at its present level next year. However, it is still uncertain if the general economic upswing will continue, ETLA warns.

Latest Economic Forecasts

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<td>GNP</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<td>Consumer Prices</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment level, %</td>
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<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
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12190
CSO: 3617/125
TRADE EXPERTS DISCUSS ROLE OF OIL IN PURCHASES FROM USSR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 May 83 p 2

[Article by Johnny Liebkind and Martin Relander: "The Oil Will Dominate Our Imports from the Soviet Union Also During the Years to Come"]

[Text] Mr Martin Relander, MBA, is the Finnish secretary general of the Fenno-Soviet commission for economic cooperation. Mr Johnny Liebkind, MBA, has been export manager of the trading department for oil within Neste Oy.

As for Western countries, Finland is the Soviet Union's second most important trading partner after the Federal Republic of Germany. Last year the value of trade was approximately 33 billion marks which is more than 4 percent of the Soviet Union's overall foreign trade. The Soviet Union's share of Finland's foreign trade was around 25 percent. Over the past ten years the value of trade has become over ten-fold.

How is it possible that Finland has succeeded so well in its trade with the East, while in the West it has not been by far as successful? Briefly we can answer that good political relations have created conditions for a rapid development in trade and economic cooperation between the two countries.

Network of Agreements

In practice this means that we have created a uniquely vast and multidimensional network of trade political agreements between Finland and the Soviet Union. Unlike other Western countries, Finland's trade with the Soviet Union is bilateral which is characterized by the fact that imports and exports must balance in the longer term.

Another important and unique feature is the far-reaching planning for the future. Among the most important agreements regulating this trade are the 5-year barter and payment agreements as well as the annual barter records. In these documents the general trade principles are defined and also the quantity and value quotas for goods to be delivered by both parties are agreed.
The most far-reaching into the future is the long-term program between the two countries in which the major guidelines for trade and the economic cooperation are defined until 1995.

Naturally, the agreements are materialized in practice on company level. Finnish companies and Soviet foreign trade companies mutually agree on quantities and prices of goods, following the current price level on the world market. So far the experiences show that the agreements have been carried out well, and, in general, the countries have been able to exceed them abundantly.

Structure of Imports Getting Simpler

The processing level of Finnish exports to the Soviet Union is very high. Approximately half of the exports consists of metal industry products and almost one quarter of woodprocessing products. Among the most important groups are also products of chemical, textile and agricultural industries as well as project exports. Despite the strong growth, the structure of exports has not changed essentially.

Although Finland is the biggest purchaser of Soviet machines and appliances in the West, their share of our total imports from the Soviet Union is only a few percent. Energy products and raw materials are totally dominating on the import side. The share of energy alone is almost 90 percent.

Over the years the structure of imports has clearly become simpler. Certain product groups, like sugar and grain, have totally dropped out, but that is not the real reason why the structure is getting simpler since other products have replaced them. The main reason is that the price development has increased the import value of oil and oil products.

Oil Dominates

The 1950's and 1960's were in Finland as well as in other industrial countries a period of fast economic growth, in which one very important factor was cheap energy. In the 1970's the first oil crisis proved that the solutions built upon cheap energy were not lasting.

The prices doubled between 1979 and 1981. Finally it was understood that it is not possible to build production processes upon abundant use of energy. Throughout the world people had to be satisfied with lower growth percentages of the national economy than normally.

In the 1970's crude oil and oil products formed a product group which then has become dominating in trade between Finland and the Soviet Union. Their share of the overall imports from the Soviet Union was approximately 78 percent in 1982.

The requirement for balancing included in the clearing system of bilateral trade as well as Finland's remarkable oil imports have signified that Finland
has overcome better than many other countries the periods of soaring oil
prices on the world market, also known as oil crisis. In the 1970's there
were two of them.

As the oil prices went up on the world market, unlike other countries, Finland
did not have to purchase its oil imports on credit, although the oil from the
Soviet Union is priced according to the world market prices. According to the
clearing system, Finland paid for its oil imports from the Soviet Union by
increasing its deliveries to the Soviet Union.

As Finland's total oil consumption started to decline, the Soviet Union's
share of Finland's oil imports has increased, especially last year, so that
it might exceed Finland's own consumption. It is hardly possible to increase
the present level of oil imports, unless Finland starts to develop re-
exportation of crude oil or oil products.

The balancing problems over the past few years are partly due to the trend
sensitivity of oil. The rapidly fluctuating world market prices of crude
oil have, therefore, their reflecting effect on the structural development
of the Finnish industry.

Soviet Union as Oil Exporter

The Soviet Union is, in general, presumed to freeze its oil exports to the
East European countries to the level of 1980, in other words to 80 million
tons.

According to the present 5-year plan, the reduction of oil exports will be
compensated by increasing exports of gas and electricity. This is also
indicated in the CEMA's long-term energy program, in which it is forecast
that there will be a steep decline in energy autarky in East European
countries.

The East European countries are now importing around 35 percent of their
energy need. It is presumed in the program that energy imports might reach
50 percent by 1990. Soviet fuel deliveries, which between 1976 and 1980
increased by 8 percent per year, are now growing by 4 percent per year.

According to IEA's estimate, the Soviet net export of oil to the Western
countries was 70-75 million tons in 1982. This means an increase of as much
as 20 million tons (+40 percent) compared to the year before. This indicates
that the Soviet Union is now exporting more oil than ever to the Western
countries, instead of the CEMA countries.

The Soviet Union applies an active marketing policy to Finland and other
Western countries. The market-oriented policy has made the Soviet Union
the first country to lower its prices. Crude oil is mostly exported to Italy,
Finland and France.
Need for Change

When examining our trade with the Soviet Union in the long run, we have to keep in mind that the development of trade cannot be based solely on oil.

Finland's energy political goals require an increase in the activities to save energy as well as in the share of domestic energy. This structural change probably means a decline in the consumption of oil products in Finland in the 1980's.

The decline in oil prices, which started last year, has caused some balancing disturbances in our trade with the Soviet Union. We have been able to compensate our oil imports, which have reduced in value, only partially by means of other imports. Since everything has been based on the fact that the present level of exports should be retained, the surplus in trade has become alarmingly big. Therefore, it looks difficult, in the short term, to regain balance without reducing exports.

In order to be able to expand further our exports to the Soviet Union, we have to diversify the structure of imports. It is a difficult task which requires lots of efforts from both parties. To diversify and expand exports is the key issue in the preparation of the barter agreement for 1986-90.

Increasing Imports

It seems that the 1980's is becoming the decade for a breakthrough within the production cooperation. The cooperation, which mainly means joint planning, manufacturing and marketing of products, is expected to create new possibilities of increasing machinery and appliance imports from the Soviet Union.

As for energy, increasing imports of natural gas and extending the pipeline in Finland's territory are under investigation. The construction of one 1000-megawatt or two 500-megawatt nuclear power plants in Finland is also under investigation within the cooperation project. Also district heating plants might offer some possibilities for cooperation in the future.

In the future the Soviet Union will be able to offer more and more various semimanufactures and processed products, which Finland should take into consideration, when making industry political plans and investment decisions.

For instance the possibilities of increasing imports of chemical products can be considered promising. Finland's chemical industry is very dependent on foreign raw materials, and the supply of the fast developing Soviet chemical industry is constantly growing.

The nature of the above objectives to increase imports is such that they cannot be materialized in the near future. They require, especially on the Soviet side, long-term preparations on the different levels of the planning hierarchy of the national economy. Regardless of how successful that is going to be, oil will have a key position in our imports from the Soviet Union in the 1980's.
Key:
1. Other imports
2. Coal, electricity, nuclear power
3. Oil products
4. Natural gas
5. Crude oil
6. Finnish imports from the Soviet Union

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12190
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ECONOMIC

FINLAND

STATE OIL FIRM READY TO INCREASE OIL IMPORTS FROM USSR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 May 83 p 27

[Text] Neste is negotiating about increasing heavily crude oil imports from the USSR or from third countries via it. According to Finnish industrial sources, Neste would be ready to import as much as three million tons of extra oil. The matter will be discussed at the session of the Economic Council of Finland and the USSR in Moscow next week.

Kai Hietarinta, vice president of Neste, admits that Neste has announced its readiness for additional imports, but considers the amount of three million tons as "a new piece of information to Neste."

"The amount seems very high. Last year we imported one million tons of extra oil, but it is true that we have made it clear that we are ready for even bigger amounts," says Mr Hietarinta.

According to Mr Hietarinta, the final amount of tons depends, however, completely on the terms of trade. Neste requires that the additional imports can be scheduled commercially evenly and conveniently. Furthermore, the price has to be such that the oil will be competitive on the trading market.

So far Neste has agreed to import eight million tons of oil from the USSR this year. It will be used for domestic consumption. The extra oil would be resold, as is or partially refined in Finland, to third countries.

Mr Hietarinta thinks that, before the negotiations, there is no point in guessing where the extra oil batches would originally come from. The extra million tons imported last year were Libyan oil which were never shipped via Finland. It was, however, documented as a sale by the USSR and a purchase by Finland.

Neste resold the oil mainly to West European customers on the international oil markets. Mr Hietarinta believes that it is possible to trade two or three million tons of oil despite the oversupply of oil and oil products.
"It is true that the task is difficult but possible, provided that the oil in question is competitive," says Mr Hietarinta.

Last year Neste established a trading company in London to take care of its oil trading activities. In 1982 Neste traded a total of approximately two million tons of crude oil and oil products world-wide. The trading value exceeded two billion Finnish marks.

Neste and the Soviets will also discuss the actual level of crude oil prices in Moscow next week. The USSR has earlier announced that it will raise the price of crude oil by half a dollar per barrel, in other words, up to $28.50.

Mr Hietarinta admits that the price level has become somewhat stable on the free market and the price will be checked according to that.

Besides the USSR, Neste is negotiating about oil with the GDR, too. Neste would like to refine approximately 200,000 tons of crude oil for East Germany also during the next quarter, as it did during the last quarter. This year Neste is refining smaller batches of crude oil also for Sweden and West Germany.

Forest Industry Wants Extra Timber

The forest industry is seriously hoping that it could, for its part, balance trade with the Soviet Union. The balancing would be made possible by increasing imports of raw timber from the Soviet Union.

"There would be demand especially for conifer," says director Yrjo Hassi from the Central Association of Finnish Forest Industries. At present the share of Soviet timber is approximately ten percent of the total amount of timber used by the forest industry.

"Even if the timber imports were increased from the East, it would not, however, solve our domestic timber shortage," emphasized Mr Hassi.

Department manager Jorma Inki from the Commercial Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs estimates that the industry could easily use approximately one million cubic meters more of raw timber imported from the East than what it does now.

12190
CSO: 3617/125
TRADE FROM DOLLARS TO MARKKA—A transition will be made from the present dollar base to the Finnish markka in the payments of transactions between Finland and the German Democratic Republic. The change will go into effect in the beginning of September. The statute regarding this matter was presented to the president on Friday. In the Foreign Ministry the change is being justified by the fact that the rate of exchange for the dollar has fluctuated significantly in recent months while, on the other hand, the markka is one of the more stable currencies. It is believed that this change will help to promote trade between Finland and the GDR. The change is based on the wishes of Finnish industry and commerce and also the GDR, states the Foreign Ministry. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Aug 83 p 24] 10576
CNPF, GOVERNMENT CLASH OVER BUSINESS EXPENSE FIGURES

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 14 Jul 83 pp 23-24

[Article by Alain Barbanel]

[Text] How much has the reduction of the work week cost businesses? Over 30 billion francs in 1983 according to the CNPF [National Council of French Employers], and barely over 8 billion, according to the government. There is also disagreement over the impact of the solidarity contracts on total wages and the consequences of increases in the SMIC [minimum interprofessional growth wage]. Thus the report of the commission to evaluate businesses' new costs has not squelched the controversy. But the report exists, and the CNPF intends to make good use of it....

At a televised meeting pitting Yvon Gattaz, CNPF president, against Laurent Fabius, in charge of the budget at the time, the government and business executives agreed to set up a joint commission to evaluate the new costs incurred by firms since May 1981. This commission has just published the results of its work. There was agreement with the government on one point: the financial position of firms has deteriorated alarmingly since the first oil crisis in 1973. Using data from the national accounts, the administration noted that the profit margin of firms declined by 5 points between 1974 and 1981, before stabilizing in 1982. Another black mark pointed out by the experts is related to the low rate of savings, which has reached a danger point: it decreased from 12.3 percent in 1979 to 7.8 percent in 1982.

The net savings of corporations has become negative and is no longer enough to cover capital replacement. Even more serious, this collapse has engendered a decline in the self-financing rate, which dropped 10 points in 2 years (51.2 percent in 1982 as compared to 62.5 percent in 1980).

Overall, the CNPF and the government concur on estimates for increases in costs of 4.7 billion francs in 1981, 19.9 billion in 1982 and 24 billion in 1983. The points of agreement end there.

Employers add to the above amount 24.7 billion for 1982, as a result of the reduced work week, and 38.39 billion for 1983 (work week, SMIC and the Auroux laws). For its part, the administration only acknowledges an increase of 1.5 billion in 1982 and 3.7 billion in 1983.
The first difference of opinion is over the cost of the reduced work week. The administration only counts the financing of new jobs or jobs maintained (70,000) and considers that the cost of the reduced working time (3.265 billion francs in 1982, or 0.27 percent of firms' total wages, and 8.3 billion in 1983) has been offset by higher gains in productivity. The CNPF, however, includes in its computations the cost of creating new jobs and says that productivity gains should be offset against efforts at increasing competitiveness and at restoring their margins. The resulting cost is 24.5 billion francs in 1982 and 30.9 billion in 1983.

The second point of disagreement is the impact of solidarity contracts on total wages. In the administration's view, they allowed firms to save 1.7 billion francs in 1982 and 5.9 billion in 1983, i.e., 50,000 francs for each employee taking early retirement. These computations are incorrect, replies the Employers' Council, since although they do in some cases lower costs, they also involve additional costs at the same time, including retirement allowances and expenses incurred in staff reorganization.

Increase in the SMIC: A Full Slate for the CNPF Experts

Finally, the third point of disagreement is the impact of SMIC increases in 1981 and 1982. According to government experts, the effects cannot be counted after 1982, as the previous hikes were supposedly absorbed by a slower increase in middle-level and higher wages.

The CNPF does not agree, as it feels that these costs are even greater in 1983 because firms no longer receive any reduction in social security fees. For 1983, it advances a figure of 5 billion francs. To this already full slate must be added the cost of the price freeze, estimated by INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies] at 6 billion francs, the increase in interest rates (23.7 billion francs), and the cost of raising the social security ceiling on 1 July (2.9 billion). The commission omitted all these factors in its research.

Overall, nearly 15 billion francs in additional costs were "forgotten." However, on Avenue Pierre I de Serbie, it is acknowledged that "this report represents a working tool which will have a substantial impact on the negotiations." Moreover, the commission has spurred the idea of creating a permanent body which, in the pattern of the commission on agricultural accounts, would follow developments in the financial position of firms.
New Costs of Non-Financial Firms
(in millions of current francs, year after year)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CHARGES NOUVELLES DES ENTREPRISES NON FINANCIERES</th>
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<td>(en millions de francs courants, année après année)</td>
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A) Ayant fait l'objet d'un accord entre le CNPF et l'Administration

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<tr>
<td>C) Charges fiscales</td>
<td>3 283</td>
<td>9 130</td>
<td>10 424</td>
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<tr>
<td>D) Exercice comptable</td>
<td>(997)</td>
<td>(6 690)</td>
<td>(10 745)</td>
<td>(4 170)</td>
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<td>E) (exercice budgétaire)</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>6 820</td>
<td>6 600</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>F) Sécurité sociale (1)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 100</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G) UNEDIC</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>2 867</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>H) SMIC</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I) Total comptable</td>
<td>4 731</td>
<td>19 917</td>
<td>24 024</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J) (budgétaire)</td>
<td>(2 445)</td>
<td>(19 685)</td>
<td>(25 345)</td>
<td>(4 170)</td>
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K) Ayant fait l'objet de divergences d'appréciation (2)

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<tr>
<th>L) POSITION CNPF</th>
<th>M) POSITION ADMINISTRATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A) Charges fiscales</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td>B) SMIC</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C) Contraits de solidarité</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D) Lois Auroux (3)</td>
<td>1 115</td>
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<tr>
<td>E) Réduction temps</td>
<td>24 500</td>
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<tr>
<td>F) de travail</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>G) Transports collectifs</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>H) urbains</td>
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<tr>
<td>I) Total</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U) Totaux respectifs (4)</th>
<th>CNPF</th>
<th>ADMINISTRATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 731</td>
<td>44 694</td>
<td>62 420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 731</td>
<td>21 450</td>
<td>27 761</td>
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1 - Pour l'année 1983, cette évaluation ne comprend aucun chiffrage au titre du relevement du plafond de la Sécurité sociale au 1er janvier, ni d'éventuelles charges liées aux élections aux conseils d'administration des caisses de Sécurité sociale.

2 - Le blocage des prix n'est pas pris en compte dans ce récapitulatif.

3 - Les textes d'application n'étant pas tous parus, la commission n'a pas mesuré l'incidence des lois Auroux au-delà de l'année 1983.


Key:
A) Agreed by the CNPF and the Administration
B) Type
C) Tax burden
D) Fiscal year
E) (budget year)
F) Social security
G) UNEDIC
H) SMIC
I) Accounting total
J) Budget Total
K) Items not agreed

(key continued on next page)
(key continued)

L) CNPF's position
M) Administration's position
N) Tax burden
O) SMIC
P) Solidarity contracts
Q) Auroux laws
R) Reduced work week
S) Mass urban transportation
T) Total
U) Separate totals

1) For 1983, these figures do not reflect the rise in the social security ceiling on 1 January or any costs related to the elections to boards of directors of the Social Security Funds.

2) The price freeze is not reflected in this table.

3) Since the implementing tests had not all been published, the commission did not measure the impact of the Auroux laws beyond 1983.

4) Except for the figures on the SMIC, the evaluation procedures agreed on reflect the impact in 1982 and 1983 of measures adopted in 1981 and 1982 and not reported. This explains the cumulative aspect of the figures presented.

9805
CSO: 3519/590
There is a reason to be reminded that on August 1 30 years had passed since Iceland signed a trade and payment agreement with the Soviet Union. This agreement is still in effect but has greatly changed, however. With this agreement, a new and large market opened up for Icelandic products. This was invaluable for the whole national economy which at that time suffered great difficulties. The British had imposed a landing ban on Icelandic fish because of the extension of the fishery limit from 3 to 4 nautical miles. As a result, supplies of frozen fish accumulated for which there was no satisfactory market. In addition, there were difficulties in selling the salted herring that was possible to produce. This was the beginning of continuing trade which has lasted for 3 decades, with some changes, however, as will be further discussed later in the article.

Older Trade

The first formal trade relations between Iceland and the Soviet Union was a most favored nation agreement on trade and shipping, which secured both nations the best mutual rights, and was signed by the Danish minister-counselor to Moscow on 25 May 1927. This agreement seems, however, not to have had any value and the trade between the countries during the years before the Second World War was minimal. After the end of the Second World War, the government took the initiative of starting direct trade with the Soviet Union with the help of Ambassador Petur Benediktsson and Minister-Counselor Petur Thorsteinsson of the embassy in Moscow. In May 1946, an agreement was made with Soviet state firms for the sale of frozen fish fillets, salted herring and cod liver oil, and instead we bought timber, coal and cement. The following year, the same type of agreement was made, but then the trade stopped and was next to nothing during the next 5 years. Repeated requests by the government for continuing trade received no response. There is no doubt that it weakened our position that the trade in 1946-47 was not based on the general trade agreement between the governments.
of the countries, as it has been since 1953, but on a commodity agreement between the trading partners.

Motivation for the 1953 Trade Agreement

Early in 1953, some change was reportedly felt in the position of Soviet authorities on trading with Western countries and in this connection there was talk of a "thaw in the Cold War." The Swedish professor Gunnar Myrdal was then the executive director of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in Geneva, which is operated on behalf of the United Nations. Myrdal reacted quickly to this change of heart and called for a meeting on behalf of ECE in Geneva in April 1953 to discuss the possibilities of strengthening trade between the East and the West. The government decided to accept this invitation and Foreign Minister Bjarni Benediktsson and Minister of Commerce Bjorn Olafsson asked me to represent Iceland at the meeting.

The Geneva meeting was arranged in such a way that aside from general discussions about East-West trade, bilateral talks were planned between all West European countries on the one hand and all East European countries on the other. I therefore had special meetings with the representatives from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Our trade with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary was normal at the time, but the Geneva talks later led to a trade agreement with Romania in 1954. But our main purpose for participating in the Geneva meeting was to try to reopen our trade with the Soviet Union. On the advice of Prime minister Benediktsson, I called on Soviet Minister-Counselor Syssoev before I went to Geneva to explain our participation and ask him to prepare the Soviet representatives for the discussions.

At the meeting with the Soviet representatives in Geneva, I presented a list of the Icelandic products we wanted to sell and another list of the commodities we wished to purchase from the Soviet Union. The response of the Soviet representatives was very positive and it was promised that the matter would be studied in Moscow and a formal response sent to Reykjavik. On 14 May 1953, the Soviet minister-counselor told me that in continuation of the Geneva talks, Soviet authorities had decided to invite an Icelandic negotiating committee to Moscow for trade talks.

This message was joyously received by the government. It was decided to send a negotiating committee to Moscow with representatives from the main trading associations under the leadership of Petur Thorsteinsson, who had been minister-counselor in Moscow and spoke Russian. After long and strenuous negotiating talks, a general trade and payment agreement was reached and signed 1 August 1953 by Petur Thorsteinsson and V. Spandarian, who was at the time the chief of the Western Department of the Foreign Trade Ministry.

The 1953 Trade Agreement

The trade agreement deals, on the one hand, with the agreed barter trade between Iceland and the Soviet Union and, on the other hand, with the payment arrangement. In Article 1 of the agreement it states that trade will take
place according to lists of Soviet and Icelandic commodities which will be negotiated on an annual basis. It is assumed that a balance will be maintained in the barter trade, or so-called clearing, and therefore free foreign currency payment does not occur unless the debt of either party exceeds the agreed right to overdraw. In fact, such free foreign currency payment was never made while the clearing provisions were in effect to the end of 1975, although the debt on the clearing account was often more than the amount agreed on for overdrawning.

Due to Soviet trade policy, there were no possibilities of selling large quantities of frozen fish and herring to the Soviet Union unless important goods were bought from them. This was successful when the Soviets offered us oil products which earlier had only been imported in exchange for free currency payments. By purchasing the majority of what we needed of gas oil, heavy fuel oil and gasoline, we were successful in selling 21,000 tons of frozen fish fillets, 180,000 barrels of salted herring and 3,000 tons of frozen herring. The oil trade was thus the basis for this extensive trade with the Soviet Union and has been ever since.

In addition to the oil products, the purchase of wheat bran, rye meal, cement and hardware was negotiated. Since then, the variety of the Soviet products has increased with the purchase of timber, cars, machines and other goods. Also, canned goods, woolens, paint and other commodities have been added to the Icelandic list of products. Nonetheless, the trade during these 30 years has been more or less unchanged and has been based mostly, on the one hand, on the sale of frozen fish and salted herring and, on the other hand, on purchase of oil and gasoline.

There was no dispute about this agreement but rather general pleasure. On the occasion of the agreement, Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson gave an address on the radio and said, among other things:

"These are great and good tidings, as no nation is as dependent on foreign trade for its survival as we Icelanders. With this agreement that we have now reached, one-third of the country's frozen fish production and a similar quantity of next year's expected production have been sold. In addition, one-third of estimated salted herring production from the northern and eastern parts of the country this summer, at least half of expected salted herring production from the southwest part of the country this summer and fall and a considerable quantity of frozen herring from there have been sold. In exchange for these products we receive necessities such as fuel oils, gasoline, grain, cement and hardware. This can be considered a favorable exchange."

A few months later, Minister of Commerce Ingolfur Jonsson mentioned the agreement in a speech in the Althing and said, among other things:

"The agreement with the Soviet Union has, of course, helped the sale tremendously. It is pleasant that trade has started anew with this large country. Hopefully, this trade can continue for the benefit of both nations."
Even though there is a difference of opinion about regimes between nations, it should not prevent trade on the basis of friendly relations between states."

Implementation of the Agreement

On behalf of Icelandic authorities and importers, much work was put into implementing the agreement. With regard to export, this was a relatively simple matter as the Icelandic Freezing Plants Corporation and the Federation of Icelandic Cooperatives handled the sale of the frozen fish and the Icelandic Herring Board handled the sale of salted herring. There were, however, many importers of the products that were to be imported from the Soviet Union and it was therefore important to reach good cooperation with them about the implementation of the agreement. Without exception, the importers showed great understanding of the necessity of strengthening this trade from the national economic point of view, and at the request of the government, they united in purchasing and transporting merchandise with regard to the trade agreement. In some cases, the Ministry of Commerce had to act as the formal negotiating party but that no longer applies except in the purchasing of oil products. When a decision was made to import Soviet cars, representatives from all car agencies were called to a meeting and they were encouraged to unite for the car import. Most of the car agencies participated in these imports and founded a company, Automobiles and Farming Equipment, to handle this business. In order to promote this trade, import licenses were granted for cars from the Soviet Union but import from other countries was quite limited during these years. One example of how far Iceland went to accommodate trade with the Soviet Union during the first years is that wheat was bought from the Soviet Union and then a Dutch company was paid to grind and package it and ship it to Iceland. At that time, the Soviets had a surplus of wheat but were unable to sell wheat meal.

It is not unnatural that some difficulties are caused when trade between countries with different economic systems starts. Foreign trade is in the hands of the government in the Soviet Union. A few large trade institutions handle trade according to annual plans. It was therefore necessary to negotiate the purchase of goods for 1 year at a time instead of a few months as importers were used to. The importers showed good will and intentions to adapt to these changed business arrangements and the trade therefore went generally quite smoothly. It made the implementation easier that during the first years the agreement was in effect, most merchandise was subject to import license. The authorities were therefore able to direct the purchase of goods to the Soviet Union and other countries with clearing agreements and thereby facilitated the sale of their products. Of the merchandise now imported from the Soviet Union, only oil and gasoline are subject to import license.

Development of Trade

If the trade between the countries during the first years of the agreement was in effect is compared with the trade in recent years, it comes forth that
the value has multiplied. The imports from the Soviet Union during the first 3 years amounted on the average to 11.2 million dollars annually and the exports to the Soviet Union to 10.0 million dollars, but the imports from the Soviet Union during 1980-82 was annually on the average 88.3 million dollars and exports to the Soviet Union 52.2 million dollars. To a great extent, this represents price increases and not quantity increases. The proportion of Soviet trade in Iceland's total trade has, however, decreased greatly, because the increase in the country's export production has been greater for other markets than the Soviet Union. The proportion of the trade was by far the greatest during 1954-1960, but then the import ratio was on the average 15.7 percent and the export ratio 17.8 percent. During the last 3 years, the import from the Soviet Union has been on the average 8.9 percent of the total imports and the exports to the Soviet Union has been 6.4 percent of the total exports. During this whole period, the Soviet Union has always been among our primary trading partners, and in 1982 it was the third with respect to import and the fourth with respect to export.

This type of proportional figures is not an absolute yardstick on the value of trade with various countries. It is no less dependent on which goods are sold and purchased. It is obviously of greater importance to be able to sell products that have limited marketing capability than products that are easily marketable. It has sometimes been difficult to sell the quantity available and the quantity feasible to produce of frozen carp fillets and salted herring, and the Soviet market has proven invaluable as the largest purchaser of these products. Last year, 60 percent of exported frozen carp fillets and 82 percent of exported salted herring were sold to the Soviet Union. Obviously it would be desirable to distribute the sale of these products to more markets but that has not been considered possible or favorable.

More than 90 percent of the import exchange from the Soviet Union is oil products, but the ratio increased considerably because of the great oil price increases on the international market in 1974 and again in 1978. The pricing of Soviet oil products has been mostly favorable and comparable with the price of those products available on the international market. When the great oil shortage occurred in the Western countries in 1974 because of the oil embargo of the Arab states, we did not suffer at all. In 1982, 66 percent of our oil imports came from the Soviet Union. Great reduction has occurred in the purchase of gas oil because of decreasing import needs and increased purchases from other countries. It has been of great economic interest for us to get heavy fuel oil from the Soviet Union which, because of its particular quality, is used by the majority of the trawler fleet instead of much more expensive gas oil. The oil imports are now, as before, definitely the prerequisite for the extensive trade.

Trade Protocol

Originally, the 1953 trade agreement was only in effect for 2 years but has since been extended, first for 2 more years and then a few times for 3-4 years, but since 1975 the time of validity has been extended by 5 years at a time. Simultaneous with extending the agreement, new lists of
commodities, with quotas that are in effect for the next term of the agreement, have been negotiated. It is in fact such an agreement, the so-called Trade Protocol, that the trade is based on.

The old trade agreement has been changed considerably. In 1975 it was agreed to abolish clearing, so that since 1 January 1976 the trade has been transacted with free currency, usually in U.S. dollars. It therefore became necessary to pay the debt which had accumulated on the clearing account, especially after the oil price increased in 1973. The change in the payment arrangement was done according to a definite request by the Soviets which caused some fear that it might hamper the sale of Icelandic products to the Soviet Union. In order to reduce this danger, there was an agreement to continue to negotiate about lists of commodities with quotas which would be an indication of annual purchase of goods during the period of agreement. Experience has shown that the change in the payment arrangement has not led to a reduction in the trade. At the last trade agreement for 1981-1985, a considerable increase in the sale of Icelandic products was anticipated. During the last 3 years, the sale of frozen fish fillets has been twice as much in quantity as it was in the years before, and the sale of salted herring 3 times as much. It is of great importance to increase the sale of these products and others still more to the Soviet Union. The trade discussions that will take place in Moscow at the end of August will to a great degree be about these matters.

Conclusion

In this summary, an effort has been made to describe the trade with the Soviet Union during the last 30 years and its importance for economic life. In general, there has been unity among the people about the position on this trade. It should not be a matter of disagreement that we must sell our products to markets that are the most favorable at any given time, without any respect to regimes and economic systems in the trading countries. This has been the policy of all governments.

At the 50th anniversary of the Russian Revolution, Dr Oddur Gudjonsson, former ambassador, who is extremely knowledgeable about trade with the Soviet Union, wrote an article in MORGUNBLADID about trade between Iceland and the Soviet Union and said, among other things:

"It has come to light that this trade is the proof that nations with different regimes and economic systems can easily have relations in the field of trade and cultural affairs for the benefit and advantage of both parties."

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MOZAMBIQUE—FINLAND CREDITS—A new 25-million markka development credit agreement is being concluded between Finland and Mozambique. The matter will be negotiated between the countries in Helsinki at the end of August. In this same connection the intent is to reach an agreement by which the credit funds will be used primarily for the future construction of the Nacala container terminal in Mozambique. The container terminal project involves the cooperation of nine south African countries, which Finland has promised to support particularly in the transport sector. The use of the development credit will begin in 1985. The term of the development credit loan is 25 years, of which the first 7 years will be amortization free. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Aug 83 p 25] 10576
There is a heavy summer heat over Kongens Nytorv. Det Konglige Theater, diagonally across the square, easily brings the thoughts to Ludvig Holberg, both Norwegian and Danish. By the way, the Folketing at Christiansborg, not far away, can also do that. I am not then thinking of Holberg's "Den Politiske Kandestober" [the tinker turned politician]. Instead, it is two conservative politicians, the Danish Prime Minister Poul Schluter and the Norwegian Minister of Culture Lars Roar Langsett, who in spite of the heat bring about thought associations.

Langsett has in a very brilliant essay in the publication honoring John Lang's 70th brithday taken up Billeskov Hanssen's question: "Was Holbert conservative or a man of the future?" When Poul Schluter returns to the Bergen-born Dane, it is maybe typically in a more popular connection: "Jeppe on the Mountain."

When Schluter was greeted with applause by the national committee of the Conservative Party in 1973, he thought he had awakened, like Jeppe, in a four-poster bed. In spite of the party crisis, warmth flowed toward Schluter. Still, he found it best to remember how badly things turned out for Jeppe. And the future for the Conservatives looked darker and darker. In 1975 they experienced their largest defeat since the party's institution in 1915, when the inheritance from Estrup and the Bredgade society was settled. In 1980 it even looked disastrous: the party was drifting toward the limit for the Folketing.

Today, three years later, Schluter can again on a Sunday in July believe he is waking up in the Holbergian four-poster bed and again ask himself:

"What is then this? Am I dreaming or am I awake? Have I gone to heaven? I think yes, but I also think no...."

Ideological Foundation Exists

Gallup has today given the Conservatives new top figures in BERLINGSKE TIDENOE. They are, if not next to, still close by the Social Democrats. Only about 10
mandates would separate the two at a Folketing election. The difference between them in 1980 was almost 30 percent—now it is less than 10. Some may take comfort in this sign that parties, as long as the ideological foundation remains, are not easily exterminated.

For those who do not closely follow Danish politics, it should be noted that not until now did the Conservatives appear as the indisputable majority non-Socialist party. It thus deserves its party name even more—the term "Conservative" is more emphasized than during the 60's and "People's Party" is a realistic term. Denmark has a Conservative prime minister and he leads the most popular government since the Second World War, if one may believe the opinion polls. But all is, however, not perfect: the three other parties in the "four-clover" government, the Radical Liberal Party, the Democratic Center, and the Christian People's Party, have had to pay for the success of the Conservatives.

After the exclusion of Mogens Glistrup—what a show!—the men in the Folketing left Christiansborg. But in both the political and the theatrical world the play behind the scenes is priceless. However the roles are cast, Poul Schluter has finally made up his mind: The Folketing will be called back for 9 September, and the government will then put its economics policy to a vote of confidence.

Nine September is a symbolic day. At that time the government, which when it was formed was not expected to last more than a couple of weeks, will be a year old. It does not want to be an episode, but rather an epoch. And it is in the economics policy that it feels strong enough to have a vote. The bizarre security policy situation will be a different story, to use the words of H. C. Andersen.

Instead, it could be interesting to place the Schluter cabinet against the non-Socialist Swedish government. Although the latter, when there were three parties in the Government Offices, had their own majority, it is obvious that the Schluter ministry, in spite of being in minority, feels stronger before the opposition and among the people. Undoubtedly, it is a psychological fact that explains much of what is called "the Schluter success."

The prime minister himself should be granted the principal credit for this psychological effect. No political journalist outside of Denmark probably knows Schluter better than I do; 30 years ago we were writing Nordic Young Conservative programs—when Norway's Kare Willoch did not do it himself! Also I would never have dared attack the Radical Party leader, Niels Helvi Petersen's—once called Denmark's Per Ahlmark—furlough slip, when he, before his Folketing group motivated Queen Margaratha's recommendation of Schluter as head of government, when Anker Jorgensen simply and without asking the people in election said:

"Schluter will be sensationaly good. His qualities will be more than right in the situation...."
Support of the Radicals

Paradoxically enough, the government works well even if the Radicals, Denmark's people's party, is outside. With margin, Schluter can count on their support for the economic policy. The Radicals are, however, not heirs to Viggo Horup, the foremost man in the policy of giving in; the man who, when it came to defense, made the famous statement:

"What is the point?"

Consequently, the Radicals support the Social Democrats and the extreme Left when it comes to the attacks on NATO's dual track decision on the European rocket issue—but, as mentioned before, that is another story to return to.

Behind the psychological effect is also the real "spirit" of the government, far from the anxious watching of others and the continuous supervising and watching, that was part of the non-socialist Swedish government's life. To take office with the death certificate practically signed strengthened, of course, the demand for unity in the Schluter government and produced something or the old musketeer spirit: All for one, and one for all!

Bitter Disappointment

For the Liberal Party it was, of course, a difficult disappointment to lose the prime minister position. The group leader and Minister of Finance Henning Christophersen must thus, because of his way of handling this defeat, be attributed great importance for the government's success. In the center of power it is, of course, easier to survive the opinion poll judgments on the sympathies of the politicians. The foot soldiers in the Liberal Party probably have a more difficult time swallowing the bitter pill. What good does the explanation do that Christophersen is the backbone of the government, when it is still Schluter's face people look at!

The—in spite of everything—exceptionally good relationship between Schluter and Christophersen gives the government strength. Ideologically, the tensions within the government are small—the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party could be the Danish synthesis of the Swedish Moderates. Those two parties are also large enough to put their stamp on the government policy; the Democratic Center (old gray Socialists with villas and row houses) and the Christian People's Party are somehow interest groupings. All this has made it easy to produce an "inner cabinet," this term obviously hated by Swedish politicians. It eliminates, of course, equality among the representatives—when one can still pretend that it exists!

To the success belongs also the absence of control mentality. A government that is working to survive has, by the way, not time to worry about what party would benefit the most from a measure, maybe also because most measures affect all in the Danish society. Neither does one at all times have to make a statement, and the Danish system of government eliminates what the non-Socialist governments suffered from and what the Palme ministry seems to be attracting; hordes of under-secretaries, experts, knowledgeable coordinators and information chiefs who are always playing junior cabinet ministers.
Denmark's Conservatives fall back on a mixture of ideological and pragmatic policy. Poul Schluter once expressed it this way:

"Occasionally someone calls the Conservative Party a pragmatic party. It may be true that we are not plagued by dogmas and political patent formulas. It is also true that we wish to liberate people from the spiritual yoke of the ideologies. But otherwise the Conservative Party is filled with ideas and poise."

The balance between ideas and pragmatism can be difficult. In the non-Socialist Braunsgaard government, the Minister of Justice Knud Tehstrup through liberalizing made way for the Stroget being turned into a street with mostly pornographic stores.

The Augia stable has not been cleaned out. It was one of the elements in the policy that threw out the Conservatives in a difficult crisis.

At the same time, Poul Schluter's pragmatic disposition is, of course, an advantage when it comes to the economic reorganization: the economic instruments are certainly handled the best when not given party political labels!

Confidential Conversations

Poul Schluter's known good relationship with the Social Democrat Anker Jørgensen is also an advantage. That the prime minister and the leader of the opposition can confidentially talk to each other and even come to terms is, of course, important in a Folketing with an utterly complicated party political composition. But even here the spirit is different. Prominent advocates for Metal speak openly of cooperation between Conservatives and Social Democrats.

There certainly is a different feeling of political culture in the Folketing and its "snaps-ting" than in the more and more puritanical Swedish group of people. And one certainly sometimes wishes for an exchange of words characterized by such culture between Swedish Moderates and Social Democrats.

(By the way, when did someone last use the epithet "Honored Representative" about an adversary in the Riksdag?)

Answer in the Fall

Well, all is not idyllic in Denmark. The unemployment figures are rising, although Schluter's Denmark like Palme's Sweden are taking advantage of better economic situations. How hard that polish is we will see in the fall when there probably will be an election in Denmark.

Will the Conservatives double their mandates? Will the government last longer?

The answer will come at the show, with which we in Sweden cannot compete: The great election vigil at Christiansborg. The Aalborg is quickly finished in the "snaps-ting." Crates of beer are brought in. The wine flows. Thus one meets the election figures.

One thing is also certain: the Conservatives are serving chateau wines. For one must be able to win or lose with style.
The defections from the Progressive Party that became apparent on Tuesday are exactly what Mogens Glistrup wants. This was stated by a former member of the Progressive Party, director Jörgen Junior, who now lives in Switzerland.

"Mogens Glistrup wants the party to stand and fall with him, so that in a few years, when he is released, he will appear as the party's savior. For this reason, the party's actual self-destruction is in his own interest," Jörgen Junior told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

"Anker Tang Sorensen and Erling Askjaer Jorgensen, like myself, could not stand Glistrup's behavior. This has been true for most of the members of the parliamentary group who have left the party during the past 10 years."

This is the seventh time that members have chosen to break with the Progressive Party since the party entered parliament 10 years ago. There have been a total of nine members who have chosen either to become independent or create a new party. The party has been damaged by Mogens Glistrup's lack of leadership capabilities, according to Jörgen Junior. A leader must be able to work with others and Glistrup is incapable of that, he stressed.
[Excerpt] "The necessary budget" is what Finance Minister Henning Christoffersen calls the budget that the government has proposed for 1984. It is the necessary budget from an economic standpoint, but is it also the necessary budget in a political sense? And is it a sufficient budget?

These questions were raised after Tuesday's events within the Progressive Party. Is the budget proposal, as it stands now, an expression of political necessity? And is it a sufficient expression of this necessity?

It is impossible to answer these questions. No one knows what is politically necessary. And with 10 years of experience observing politics, I must add that even if we know what is politically necessary today, things may change before any decisions are made. The truth is that no one can predict whether the situation will change completely 1 day or 1 hour from now. This is the political necessity with which the government must work today.

What will happen, for example, when Mogens Glistrup begins serving his sentence? Will the (now expanded) parliamentary group now decide that it can meet only on weekends when Glistrup could perhaps get out of prison on leave? Or will the meetings take place in Horserod? Anything is possible. It is not true, as the most recent defectors from the party have told the press, that the group meetings have degenerated into a kindergarten. The group meetings never have been anything but a kindergarten. But now even the kindergarten is falling apart. Some Progressive Party politicians have speculated as to what effect this or that event would have. Glistrup's conviction was seen by many as an event that would put an end to the most tumultuous behavior. But what has happened? It has only become worse. Now it is reported that as soon as the prison door is closed the party will get down to business. But just wait and see!
The protest against armament is taking new forms. Since Hiroshima-Day, the pacifists have been active in Bonn. Thousands are taking part in nonviolent resistance. A tiny minority is thinking of sabotage and making bombs.

Josef Leinen has said the magic word: "We will make this country ungovernable!" Modestly, the spokesman of the peace movement adds that by this he means nothing more than did the conservative political thinker, Wilhelm Hennis, who suggested the ominous statement to him: that the times have passed in which politics was the lonely occupation of an elected elite. Today the many anonymous laymen intervene constantly and stubbornly; they feel a need to be sand in the machinery.

Leinen's statement has become a motto and has awakened resentment. But more important to its originator, it has destroyed nothing: the peace movement continues to grow in spite of all the reminders by the government about law and order. The prophets agree that in September and October more than a million, perhaps even three million people throughout the Federal Republic will demonstrate against the deployment of the new American nuclear missiles; in the cities and in the country, before military bases and munition depots. The peace movement hopes that just as Ernst Albrecht years ago had to admit his impotence at the Gorleben hearing, Helmut Kohl will have to say the liberating words: The cruise missiles and the Pershings — unfortunately they cannot be deployed here; it is not politically possible to carry out the NATO dual decision.

Josef Leinen, the lawyer and Social Democrat, also cherishes this hope. Since he is eloquent and well-received, he is sent out whenever it is important to explain the motives and aims of the pacifists. His style of arguing is faintly reminiscent of Rudi Dutschke. He is more courteous, but he too always wants to know what the politicians are really up to, and he likes to unmask them as hypocrits: "What is all this talk about a tumultuous fall? We don't want that. It would only help the government. This is nothing more than the attempt to divert people away from the subject of weapons of mass destruction. The less
the tumult, the better for us!"

Of course, Leinen has had too much experience in extra-parliamentary opposition to want to put credulous trust in the power of large numbers alone. "The government can take a lot without changing anything. Or it allows itself to be corrected to its own advantage." This is the way it was when the ecology movement stormed from Wyhl to Brokdorf. It was not able to prevent the nuclear power plants; it did see to it that there were not too many of them and that they became safer. Many a politician was secretly grateful for this.

Isn't the same thing happening in the armament debate? "Naturally it is partially because of the peace movement that Genscher and Kohl have become more careful," Leinen said. Are the pacifists therefore serving the conservative government as useful idiots? Leinen does not give the government that much credit for subtlety. "They are seeking confrontation. We have to watch out and not run into their trap."

The many groups that compose the peace movement are agreed on their goal -- to prevent the deployment of the 108 Pershings and the 96 cruise missiles -- but not on the means. There is the "traditional" wing of the peace movement, which is no longer growing, but which still has the majority: the Greens, the unionists; the old sectarianists from the very small Maoist parties in which the student revolts languished away; the hangers-on from the DKP; the leftists, some of who have turned to the SPD, and some who remain independent. They would like most of all to march against the missiles as they were accustomed to march in Frankfurt, Bonn, and Brokdorf; the more, the better; the higher the spirits, the greater the effect; and the brawls along the way cannot hurt the totality of the movement.

Here the political reasoning of the student movement still agrees. In fact, the argument goes, power comes from the state. Whoever defends himself against it does not necessarily make himself guilty. To be sure, the illusions that were accepted in the sixties have evaporated. Today no one believes anymore that the institutions are so shaky that a well-aimed boot will topple them. Therefore feelings about the fall are ambivalent. Most feel it is obvious they must resist, but only a very few believe that the missiles will not be deployed.

Josef Leinen is skeptical about the traditional members. "It is wrong for everyone to demonstrate at one place. The time for this is past. And then the extremists ruin everything by giving the police a private war." For a long time the peace movement did not want to divide itself into violent and nonviolent groups. But after the excesses during the visit of the American vice-president, Bush, things had gone too far. Leinen and ex-General Bastian drew the line: "We have nothing to do with them."

Geographical borders play a role. In the north, the traditional wing, with its appendage, the militants, has the upper hand. The "Autonomous Group" -- perhaps about two thousand -- finds support above all in Hamburg and Goettingen. In a discussion paper published in the TAGESZEITUNG, they attacked the pacifists with rage and resentment: "It is fear of the governmental truncheon, perhaps
more than the fear of the Pershing missile, that causes the nonviolent peace movement to play dead." The "Autonomous Group'' sticks to the city guerrilla concept of the Baader Meinhof group: "The missile inferno forces an unconditional subordination under the U.S.-directed joint community. The theme is not a question of abstract power, but of concrete anti-imperialism that must begin simultaneously with a tricontinental and metropolitan attack, and that takes its existential point of departure in the proletariat that is separate from the industrial process."

But how? "Our tactics are blockades and sabotage actions by which we will isolate missile sites and cut off supply lines." The motto is "Observe, greet, blockade." The "Autonomous Group'' is said to have set up an information net in and around Bremerhaven, which is frequented by American supply ships. In the past months, according to the Constitutional Protection Office, railway points have been blockaded, cables thrown over overhead electric systems, and Molotov cocktails put on railroad tracks.

The peace movement fears that it will be discredited by such tiny, ignorant groups. "They can cause a lot of trouble," Josef Leinen admits. But the peace spokesman is less worried about the most recent rumors -- that in other places bombs are being made, perhaps in "revolutionary cells," possibly in the "Red Army Faction," possibly by the neonazis, in whose ranks the "anti-imperialist struggle" finds sympathy. To this the strategist says, "As long as the bombs don't fly out of a peaceful demonstration, they cannot harm the peace movement."

But what will happen if all the demonstrations and protests do not prevent the deployment of the new weapons? Those in high spirits do not tend toward self-criticism. "If the peace movement starts thinking about failure now, it will lose the enthusiasm it needs for success," the Stuttgart peace theorist Wolfgang Sternstein said to ward off anxious questions.

In the southern part of the Federal Republic, the "independent" wing of the peace movement dominates. It is made up of the very many individuals who torture the two churches by asking them what they think of armament. They are believers and laymen who are full of the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount and of Ghandi. They have never been suspected of being financed by Moscow or of being led by a party. Not even the groups that they are associated with -- "Live Without Armament," "Atonement Sign Action," "Pax Christi," "German Peace Society/United Opponents of Military Service," and the "Protestant Student Community," among others -- claim to have scared up these people.

Their discontent comes from a long way off.

It is a discontent with Western culture, whose riches do not guarantee any spiritual contentment; a criticism of civilization with its destruction of nature and its love of weapons; the uncertain feeling that a fundamental change in basic human values in necessary, and that each individual must begin with this himself. The social psychologist Erich Fromm put his trust in the
explosive force of this minority, which ignores the borders between politics and morality. Erhard Eppler has taken his ideas from Fromm's works: "It would not be the first time in history that a minority pointed the way a historic development would take."

But how can so much exuberence be translated effectively into politics?

These summer days about 15,000 young people are meeting in peace camps throughout the whole Federal Republic. The meetings are colorful and pleasant. The memory of the youth movement at the beginning of this century with its opposition to and escape from the establishment into the freedom of nature is not far away. The idyll nestles close to the apocalypse.

The peace camps have purposely been set up where the new fear-inspiring nuclear weapons are soon to be deployed. A hike in the forest to the depots must be possible, as well as a blockade here and there as a test for large demonstrations and blockades. Cautiously and seriously the nonviolent groups are preparing themselves.

Wolfgang Sternstein has waited twenty years for this moment. For it he has accepted humiliations and given up comforts. The political scientist with a Ph.D. is a peace researcher by conviction. He has not made a civic profession of it. He holds himself above water with occasional lectures and articles on "nonviolent resistance" and "civil disobedience." For many years, he found no listeners. Now the times have finally recognized his insights, and the 44 year old Sternstein has risen to be the acknowledged theorist of the peace movement. Now he travels continually and prepares in the peace camps, in seminars, and in strategy discussions, what he wrote about so long in the darkness.

If military bases and depots are soon besieged in the south, where almost all the Pershings are to be deployed, the new spirit he is preaching will prevail. The police on the opposing side can no longer be denounced as blindly raging cops, as obliging state jailers; the demonstrators are to treat them as confused, like-minded people who have not yet reached understanding.

The peace movement is practising in the peace camps. It has divided itself into "Reference Groups" of ten to twenty people each. They get to know each other and their peculiarities so that when they are beaten or dragged away they will not react incorrectly. Others are preparing to protect themselves against militants who want to throw stones and Molotov cocktails. "We must not allow ourselves to be provoked either by the Autonomous Group or by the police," Sternstein warns his listeners.

Neither does he avoid talking about the risk. "Each person must be aware that he will perhaps be beaten and brought to court." But at the same time, he asks whether the interior ministers can afford to drag away and lock up thousands. Sternstein cannot imagine it, but in his opinion the nonviolent resistance movement would have its greatest effect if it did: if the police leadership had to bring thousands who were blockading entrances and violating the law into
gymnasiums and "protective custody areas." "The silent majority on which the government depends would not stand for this -- so much idealism, so much personal effort toward a goal that is important for everyone!"

Sternstein thinks that the power of the powerless will force the state into a loyalty crisis. The signs seem favorable to him. According to the polls, more and more people consider the new missiles to be a danger. They don't want to go into the streets for this reason. But can they not be convinced of the honesty of the peace movement? Sternstein believes that it will take a long time to get this far. But he does not consider it impossible. "This fall is only the beginning. Then comes 12 December, the anniversary of the NATO dual decision. Of course, there doesn't have to be a general strike. But there is a good possibility that tens of thousands will take a day's leave or simply not go to work. Then comes Christmas -- the peace movement needs reflective phases, too. And not until spring do the decisive days come when the Pershings are really there."

With this long forward look, the concept changes. Up to now it has had a catchwordlike heading: nonviolent resistance. In the future, Sternstein speculates, the peace movement will call for a tax boycott, or one day it will put on the emergency brakes in all the trains.

Sternstein also knows what he himself will do if all this does not help. With friends he will try to storm a munitions depot and destroy nuclear warheads. "I think they are so bad that I would go to prison for a long time to do this."

Whenever a mass movement is underway, the loners and the martyrs show up. The peace movement has suffered the harbingers of fall with embarrassment. The squirting of blood by the Hessian Green Frank Schwalba-Hoth at an American general: perhaps tasteless, politically foolish. The hunger strike to the death of nine loners in Paris, San Francisco, and Bonn imposed upon themselves: No good comes of this; it certainly won't make the superpowers turn away from the fateful road toward nuclear war. Now there are uneasy feelings that the teacher, Hartmut Gruendler, might have successors. He burned himself up in 1977 before St. Peters Church in Hamburg in despair at Bonn's nuclear reactor policy.

These beginnings are unpleasant for Klaus Vack. He is a prudent man, calm and experienced. Every extra-parliamentary opposition needs its secretary. Vack has always been ready to accept such posts. He administered the Easter marches from 1960 to 1969; then he took over the Socialistic Office, in which the ideas of the students lived on; now the 48 year old Vack is the soul of the "Committee for Democracy and Basic Rights," a busy, serious organization that steps up everywhere where injustice seems to rule. Still more: Vack has almost without any action on his part become the trusted person of the rival peace groups. And he has had that inspiration, the success of which the peace movement hopes will one day be recorded in history books as the inspiration that began the successful resistance of the peace movement against the weapons of mass destruction in the Federal Republic.
The theater will be the Swabian Mutlangen. There, according to the NATO deployment plan, the first Pershings will be located. Before this -- on 1 September, 44 years after the outbreak of the Second World War -- dozens of world famous Germans will sit down before the gates of the American air base: among them, Heinrich Albertz and Helmut Gollwitzer, the angry old men of the church; the ailing Nobel laureate Heinrich Boell, and Guenter Grass, who fifteen years ago unconditionally defended the republic against the immoderate student revolutionaries, and who now sees fascism prevailing in Washington; the 88 year old William Born, together with Erhard Eppler and Oscar Lafontaine and Walter Dirks. The old men do not want "to be among the silents ones again."

Klaus Vack is completely absorbed with the image: "It will bring the government into difficulties. I cannot imagine that it will risk such scenes: weak old men, completely beyond suspicion, being dragged away by young policemen. Boell in jail? This can only have a devastating echo abroad. The Minister of the Interior from Baden-Wuerttemberg cannot decide this alone. He must get support from Bonn. But if the government does not give the O.K. then all the talk about anarchists who are hurling Germany into chaos is over."

The prominent people intend to stay for three days on styrofoam and pillows in front of the gate to the military base. They intend to read to the young people from their books, to sing with them ("Constant Water breaks the Stone"), and to chat. For this, too, is imaginable: the Minister of the Interior from Baden-Wuerttemberg may allow them to sit, no matter what the law is. Roman Herzog is already clearing his desk. On 7 September he wants to get himself elected to the Supreme Court -- can one imagine that he would create such a wild departure for himself? "He is not free to act as he chooses," Klaus Vack commented, however. "If the Americans want it, he cannot do anything else than drag Boell and the others away."

Among the horror scenarios there is, to be sure, this one: A German pacifist is shot in the excitement by an American soldier. What then? Vack does not let such frightful images get him down. "We can be optimistic. We must soften up the government. If we stay peaceful, we can do it. We must create fear in the politicians with our fear."
At the Justice Ministry they have been drafting a revision of the government statute this summer. The fall will probably bring results and a government proposal. The key issue is the way in which the president is to be elected. The justice minister has promised prompt action and believes that it will have broad support.

A national desire for democracy has indeed forced Finland's political parties to reach rare unanimity on precisely the question of how the president is to be elected. Behind this is the desire for change attested to in very much the same direction among the constituencies of all the parties. The administrative machine of no parliamentary party has dared to oppose this reform, even though it might deviate from the party's usual position.

With the so-called Koivisto phenomenon, it became abundantly clear that people wanted to elect the nation's president to the greatest extent possible through voters' direct power of decision. People did not, for example, want to run the risk that electors, that is, in practice the parties, might, having already reached agreement among themselves in trial heats, come up with some outvoted dark horse, the choice of whom would then be justified with the usual quite mumbo jumbo arguments.

Actually, they might just as well have been talking about the Kekkonen phenomenon. Those, who having supported Kekkonen as citizens had guilty consciences because of the fact that Finland in presidential matters had for so long lived through a time of ostensible elections and had even had to stand for a special statute, backed Koivisto in large numbers.

One typical impetus to consolidation of the Koivisto coalition was provided by the Industrial Confederation's unfortunate public statement, which anyone could translate into plain language: Worried about their trade with the East, industrial leaders hinted at the difficulties with the Soviets Finland's national economy would experience unless Karjalainen were elected president. Voters realized that the talk of a dark horse was absolutely true, reflecting the intentions of influential forces.
During those periods and under those circumstances most Finns lost faith in the way we elect a president. It is a carefully thought out system, but it would require a more firmly established and more mature democracy to continue to function: Voters should be in a position to unhesitatingly believe that their will and their views are somehow reflected in the final outcome of an election.

This lack of faith then led to the so-called Hallberg Committee report, in which a more desirable way of electing the nation's top man is outlined. The chance of electing a dark horse is eliminated when the president has to be elected from among candidates nominated from the start and voters simultaneously vote for a candidate and an elector. If one of the candidates gets more votes than all of the others combined right from the start, he is chosen and there is no need for electors — and the result is a national referendum. Not even the Koivisto coalition really obtained an absolute majority of the votes during the recent electoral elections; so that kind of direct democracy situation will probably be a quite theoretical one in our multiparty country.

The committee did not, however, end up proposing a true national referendum, in two stages if necessary, along the lines of the French model which has already been to a certain extent publicized here. In the committee's opinion, in Finland a system like that might occasionally lead to decisive results dependent on chance factors. Perhaps so — their hesitation is to a certain extent understandable: A government statute must be handled carefully lest it break. The committee's proposal is at any rate better than the present way of doing things.

The committee also outlined a bunch of additional powers for the government as changes in the rules governing a fixed parliamentary minority, changes that have been long debated. The Sorsa government now wants to offer these changes as a deal contingent on revision of the way in which a president is elected: both or nothing. Aside from the manner in which the president is elected, however, another serious matter, the question of the number of presidential terms in office, was not included in the committee's assignment. It might have been publicly discussed during the interregnum that followed Kekkonen's resignation, but since Koivisto's election victory it has again been conjured into nonexistence.

Only a year ago, in the summer of 1982, Justice Minister Taxell tried to propose limitation of presidential terms in office as one of the partial revisions of the government statute. The party secretaries of the government parties, whose opinions were canvassed, felt it was wiser to forget the whole thing. The position paper on the need for revising the government statute that had already been prepared by the party secretaries dated from the preceding summer, from Kekkonen's term, which is, of course, why they were carefully silent on it or the number of presidential terms.

And now the justice minister says, in a slightly conciliatory and slightly explanatory fashion, that the government statute revision should not be allowed to grow into too big a package since such packages tend to remain on the shelf unopened. True, of course, but the question of limiting the number of...
presidential terms should have been packaged together with the question of how the president is elected as an almost obvious natural pair since it would have been much more appropriate in that package than the fixed minority issues, even though they too are government statute matters.

Let us all now wonder together in what dark corner the limitation of presidential terms has been hidden and why. But first, a bit of background:

The classic example is from the United States. After the man in power, Franklin D. Roosevelt's fourth 4-year term — which was incomplete — the Constitution was amended: Let no one successively be elected president more often than twice, that is, for no more than 8 years at a time.

Allergic to their leaders' use of power, the Americans learned that there neither is nor will be a president who is so remarkable and ideal that one man's inordinately long term in office would not lead to authoritarian manifestations in a democratic state as well, that just the continued renewal over decades of even a constitutional presidency in itself contains an undemocratic element.

We have also reached the same conclusion in Finland, although the elements involved are on the other side of the scale: a small country's relatively limited presidential resources and its values in terms of benefiting from experience and protecting continuity. On the other hand, in those lie exactly the same reasons Svinhufvud and Paasikivi together appealed to in their attempt to turn Finland into a kingdom.

As for Stahlberg, the real master mind of our government statute, he did not even approve of a second term in succession as president for himself. If we were to at this time limit the number of presidential terms to two in succession, to 12 years, we would presumably be properly half way between Stahlberg's system and a kingdom.

Such views began to be more widespread during Kekkonen's third and fourth terms and became stronger at the latest during his fifth term. They did not really surface publicly since fear of the lord was the better part of wisdom. A couple of exceptions were the HELSINGIN SANOMAT (HS) Gallup polls of 1978 and 1981. On both occasions it was unhesitatingly demonstrated that a clear majority of Finns old enough to vote were in favor of limiting presidential terms to two in succession at the most. A majority of both Conservative Party and SDP [Social Democratic Party] voters held that opinion in 1981. (The form of the questions and the breakdown of the replies for both years are given below.)

Political Finland and news media Finland's reactions at the time to the Gallup poll and the opinions measured through it are essential to understanding the matter. The nation looked toward Tamminiemi [Kekkonen's residence] and deemed it best to remain silent. While the country's large and medium-sized news media had evidently reported on the other questions in the same HS Gallup poll and on the answers to them that were obtained, this one single issue got fouled up somewhere in that journalistic world that claims to acknowledge the
realities of life. For many of them it became a nonexistent issue which no one had ever even raised.

But now it would be important to properly discuss the issue before the same thing happens with it. If we also want to make Finland's government statute more democratic in this respect, there will not be a more propitious moment to do so. Every additional year with Koivisto will demand more courage of the reformers, of the president himself, for reasons quite independent of this.

At present the issue is still to be pursued as a matter of government statute principles, without any calculations with regard to personalities - or is that the case? At least it ought to be that way. Mauno Koivisto was elected only a year and a half ago with reassuringly broad support and there are no signs of his popularity crumbling. His term in office has so far run smoothly. It is 4 and a half years to the next presidential election and 10 and a half to the one after that.

Popular support for this change in the government statute was measured the year before last. Last year the support of the political majority was predicted for it. Whatever has happened to the whole debate and why?

Is there the beginning of a new fear of the lord? The president is the president, no matter what you call him - is it after all safest for him not to be branded a limiter of his terms in office?

Has it been shown that it no longer pays for the big parties to strive for unanimity? Did the SDP lose its desire for reform with Koivisto's election victory?

I do not know. All the question marks above are genuine, not rhetorical.

Number of Presidential Terms: HS 1978 and 1981 Gallup Polls

"According to current laws, the number of presidential terms in office is not limited in Finland. There are such limitations in some countries. It has been proposed that in future the number of presidential terms in Finland be limited to two in succession so that in future no one could be president for more than 12 years at one stretch. What is your opinion: Is there a need for such a limitation or is the current practice better?"

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CSO: 3617/166
SOVIET JOURNALIST: FINLAND NO LONGER HAS PATRIARCH

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 12 Aug 83 p 40

[Article: "Finland Lacking a Leader"]

[Text] There is no patriarch in Finland. This statement was made by Soviet editor and researcher Rudolph Sykiainen, who has been a member of General Secretary Yuriy Andropov's circle of friends since the war years.

"Finland is now lacking a leader. In a strained world situation this kind of a flimsy democracy will bring problems," stated Sykiainen in an article published in KALEVA.

According to Sykiainen, previous practice will be restored in Finland as well as in the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union a return to the Stalin era, but "only in the respect that a strict internal order will be restored".

"Also Finland too will yet return to the Kekkonen era," he predicted.

Sykiainen accuses the Finns of indifference. Someone in his opinion should "put in order the unfounded" articles about the position of the Russian language in Estonia.

According to the KALEVA article, Sykiainen did not deal with individual points of Finnish foreign policy. In the opinion of the Soviet researcher, no new names are being written after the names of J. K. Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen in characterizing Finland's foreign policy line.
STALINIST-CP ORGAN COMMENTS ON UNION 'PURGE', NEUTRALITY

Building Workers' Union Rids Stalinist Leaders

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 17 May 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Aitamurto and the Purge"]

[Text] In the 15th executive meeting of the Building Workers' Union, which ended on Sunday, the top leaders of the union dismissed the minority wing from the leadership of the union. This communist faction did not get a single one of the union's key positions.

Within the Communist Party, action has taken place to expand, deepen and steepen the process at the other end of which there is the dissolution of the party. The purging action has been carried out in several district organizations. At the same time, this procedure has gradually reached more and more into such organizations in which the Communists are involved and where they have significant influence. What happened in the executive meeting of the Building Workers' Union is the latest proof of that.

It was said that the reason for that was exceeding "the irritation threshold." Other people's opinions were no longer tolerated. To be more precise, it is a question of the fact that certain comrades' ideological and political opinions became unbearable. Consequently, "the irritation threshold" means that the expression of discordant ideas is prohibited, and if the prohibition does not work, the next step is dismissal.

How evident and clearly noticeable the ideological and political differences are appears from the fact that, over many years, different viewpoints have been presented with regard to the government issue. Some of the Communist leaders have supported, without any conditions, the participation in the government, some of them have opposed that. The issues under discussion have not only been tactical but deeply dissentient and strategic matters. Among these fundamental issues, of which the entire government issue ultimately consists, are public transportation, opposition to monopoly power, supporting the interests of the working class at every phase and creation of a strong, democratic front which now, because of the governmental experiments of the Left and the Center, has lost its reputation, if this kind of governmental experiment has ever had one.
It is a well-known fact the Communists act everywhere, both in their own organizations and also in other mass organizations, according to the principles and decisions defined by the party. It has never occurred that these decisions would have slowed down the activities of the Communists in the slightest or reduced their possibilities of entering into alliances with other progressive circles. Since it is a fact that the decisions made by the party do not and cannot form "an irritation threshold," then apparently it is a question of a relatively small clique's "irritation threshold" and, at the same time, a provocation against the SKP. In all probability this clique consists of Chairman Aitamurto and a couple of others. The ordinary members of the organization do get well along with one another.

Therefore, this kind of extreme discrimination is even more unfortunate. The Building Workers' Union has to be consolidated not destroyed.

The consolidation of the Building Workers' Union requires a halt to the discrimination. It is impossible to have members who are granted two kinds of rights in the union. Some get their representation, others do not. Some are just entitled to pay their membership dues without any rights, one of which is being part of the leadership.

NEW YORK TIMES Article Criticized

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 17 May 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Towards an Active, Peaceful Policy"]

[Text] When Finland's foreign policy is discussed abroad, something important is happening in this field in Finland. This old rule is still valid.

The chief editor of foreign affairs in THE NEW YORK TIMES has written about Finland's foreign policy in his newspaper. Although the article relates to president Koivisto's behavior and profile, of course, it is a question of the Finnish president's forthcoming visit to Moscow, which is also mentioned in the article.

According to the article, Mr Koivisto is irritated because he is being compared to Mr Kekkonen. It is understandable that Mr Koivisto wants to create his own career, following the established lines of Finland's foreign policy and, at the same time, to leave his own imprint and characteristics on the foreign policy. It has been told that Mr Koivisto has said, referring to his role in the foreign policy, that the house is now ready and his task is to keep it in good shape.

However, the foreign policy is never completed, and it cannot be a question of passive maintenance only. If a low profile in the foreign policy equals sitting down to table and burping of pleasure, that is, of course, wrong. One is hardly on the right track.

The adjective "active" has always been attached to the definitions of Finland's foreign policy. Briefly, this, in turn, means that Finland always has to be a
pioneer one way or the other in a positive sense. An active, peaceful policy is the expression used to describe this situation. An active, neutral policy in turn, is a cross breed of concepts since neutrality itself wants to stay away from everything that is happening. Furthermore, neutrality is a concept that does not fit the foreign policy in accordance with our state treaties.

The article in the American newspaper has to be considered as a reminder of the fact that, prior to an official visit like this one, the Finnish president should remember the West's wishes and the U.S. leaders' main guidelines in diplomacy and foreign policy--anti-Sovietism. Hopefully, our president does not remember this.
SKDL WANTS STAND ON NICARAGUA—The SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] is demanding a stand on the Nicaraguan situation from the Finnish Government. Finland should in the opinion of the SKDL support all initiatives and measures which are aimed at guaranteeing the right of Nicaraguan self-determination and an end to foreign intervention in Central America. The demand was presented on Wednesday to Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen by a delegation of the SKDL, which was headed by Chairman Kalevi Kivisto. The SKDL proposed to Vayrynen that the Foreign Ministry conduct an immediate study on what prerequisites the neutral and nonaligned countries of Europe have for acting on the Nicaraguan issue. In demanding a stand from the government the SKDL's representatives referred to the proposal for negotiations made by the so-called Contadora group, which has floundered on the negative stand taken by the United States and its Central American allies. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINKIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 Aug 83 p 7] 10576

VAYRYNEN BACKS CANCUN DECLARATION—In a review for Finland's ambassadors, Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen stated that the government is following developments in Central America with concern. According to Vayrynen the government approves of the efforts of the different governments to find a peaceful solution, and especially favors the efforts of the Contadora Group. Vayrynen explained that the Government of Finland supports the so-called Cancun Declaration which the heads of state of the Contadora Group have approved. [Text] [Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 18 Aug 83 p 7] 9287
About 50 Leftist militants, signatories of the appeal "For union in the struggles" of December 1979, have expressed in a joint statement their concern over the evolution of the political situation. They have declared themselves in favor of a policy of "firmness" in the face of "economic pressures" and of nonalignment on the international level and have proposed the creation of "alternative Leftist circles" to defend these choices.

Among the signatories of this statement are found the constituents of the "For union in the struggles" appeal, which received the support of 140,000 people in 1980. One of these constituents is missing, however; as a matter of fact, no socialist has signed this new appeal, in order that it may not be considered an attempt to interfere with the preparatory debate for the Bourg-en-Bresse congress.

This initiative is therefore being sponsored by "critical" Communist intellectuals such as Guy Bois, Raymond Jean and Robert Lamblin; by former leaders of the General Confederation of Labor such as Rene Buhl; by leaders of the French Democratic Confederation of Labor such as Gilbert Declercq and Leon Dion; and by minority activists of the Unified Socialist Party such as Victor Leduc.

The complete text of this appeal follows:

"The vision of 10 May is now 2 years old. It signified building on the basis of new social and working relationships; correction of inequalities and expansion of freedoms; priority attention to employment, education and training; raising the living standard, especially for the most deprived; improvement of working conditions and reduction of working hours; and decentralization of government at all levels.

"It was fostered by the general objectives of defending peace, disarmament and solidarity with peoples struggling for their economic and political liberation, which called for our steadfast action on the international scene.

"We remain deeply devoted to this vision."
"However, despite undeniable successes—nationalizations, freedoms, social measures—hope has given way to doubt and concern. It is not that we ignore the extent of the obstacles to government action, but one cannot help but be alarmed by the rise of the following three phenomena:

"1. Pressure by international capitalism has not ceased to grow; it cannot tolerate the emergence of new responses to the crises, and its speculative blasts have propelled the national economy into a downward spiral (devaluation aggravating the external deficit, debts being contracted and the way being prepared for the next devaluation); it does everything possible to impose total alignment with solutions a la Reagan or a la Thatcher.

"2. The social and political bases of the regime are shrinking dangerously. The workers, whose intervention was hampered from the beginning by the state of crisis and by political and trade union divisions, feel doubts about the path that is being followed by seem to be impotent in face of the deteriorating situation, even though they are potentially strong enough to be capable of intervening effectively.

"3. The reactionary forces, encouraged by the government's ineptitude and weaknesses, are mobilizing one by one in the hope of bringing it down and installing in power an aggressive Right, composed of Chirac's cohorts and strong by virtue of its implantation in the government apparatus at multiple points.

"Is this evolution inevitable? Is it the expression of a relationship among forces hostile to the Left that is irreversible? We think not. The central problem is the outlook offered to workers, the issue on which their active support depends. If it should become even cloudier, then all is lost; if, however, it is ultimately defined clearly and courageously, then everything is possible.

"The building of a new society involves a break with the existing one and requires a policy of firmness in the face of external and internal economic pressures; that is to say, if it is necessary, and with all due regard for international cooperation, one must not hesitate to take the measures required to protect and transform the country's industrial and agricultural potential and to resist the hegemony of the dollar.

"This implies the mobilization and intervention of workers in the decision-making and control processes and a profound fiscal reform that does not put the burden of the effort called for on wage-earners alone.

"Finally, it entails a foreign policy disengaged from Atlanticism and leading to convergence of the forces of peace and opposition to the reasoning of the two military blocs.

"We who have made this analysis and hope for rectification of the situation while there is still time are numerous, very numerous, and found in all the components and tendencies of the Left. Let us bring back the alternative Leftist circles—the creation of which we propose in every locality—to the places where debate, confrontation and reflection take place; they cannot be
substituted for action by the parties and trade unions but should avoid interfering with these organizations and work toward the maximum mobilization of popular forces and the emergence of a popular, unified and determined movement. The moment has come to fight to secure the victory of a true Leftist alternative."

This statement was signed by:


12336
CSO: 3519/577
DEVELOPMENTS, PLANS OF PEACE MOVEMENT VIEWED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 12 Aug 83 p 9

[Article by Hermann Bleich: "The Courageous Signal Suddenly Turns Into a Negative Symbol"]

[Text] In the Netherlands the peace movement is on everyone's lips. The question of stationing cruise missiles is the subject of lively discussion in the media, the churches, the schools, the trade unions and political parties. It has been shown again and again in public opinion polls that a considerable majority of the population is opposed to the continuation of nuclear armaments. The recent announcement by the government of the Woensdrecht air force base as the site for the 48 U.S. cruise missiles in the event that the NATO resolution of December 1979 to modernize should become a reality, has provided new fuel for the debate about the rockets.

Taking account of the mood in the country, Minister of Defense De Ruiter was quick to give assurances in a letter to parliament that no preliminary decision about actually stationing rockets was being made with the announcement of the possible site. Nevertheless, thousands of demonstrators from the entire country quickly gathered in the small village of Woensdrecht to protest against the stance of the center-right government in The Hague under the leadership of the Christian Democrat Lubbers. The Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), which plays a particularly active role in the Dutch peace movement, had called for the mass demonstration. Even before that, the village council of Woensdrecht had voiced its opinion in a decision opposing the stationing of nuclear weapons on the community's territory and announced that it would resist such a plan with all legal means available.

In the course of a special debate in the Dutch parliament it became evident that misgivings continue to exist within the ruling Christian Democratic party (CDA), even though attempts at appeasement were made. The CDA spokesman had to admit that "complete agreement" about the question of deployment did not exist in his fraction. Critical CDA delegates demanded clarification as to why the deployment site had to be determined now, if the Lubbers cabinet was not expecting to make a final decision about deployment until next year. On the other side, the fraction of the right-wing-liberal partner in the coalition (VVD) gave its unconditional support to the cabinet decision. The VVD regards the naming of the Woensdrecht base as "a courageous political signal to the allies."
When NATO passed the arms buildup resolution in 1979, the Netherlands were the only allied nation to make the provision that The Hague was not yet ready to enter into the obligation of stationing medium-range nuclear weapons on its soil. The Netherlands at first occupied the "waiting room," in the hope that there would be satisfactory results from the negotiations in Geneva. Two years later, in November 1981, the largest peace demonstration ever took place in Amsterdam. No less than 40,000 people took to the streets to protest against nuclear arms and the stationing of rockets.

For a long time the government vacillated indecisively and tried to keep its powder dry. It was forced into this position because of the split within the political parties and the government coalitions. The faithful NATO supporters on the one hand and the nuclear opponents on the other hand were both basically exercising a kind of veto right against every positive or negative form of resolution with respect to the stationing of rockets. The first concrete step in the direction of the modernization resolution has been taken with the present designation of Woensdrecht as a possible site.

With Woensdrecht a new symbol for the peace movement was created at the same time. The decisive confrontation between the government and the peace movement has now begun and will probably reach its peak in the fall. A mass demonstration against nuclear arms and the deployment of rockets is planned for 29 October in The Hague which will possibly surpass the protest action carried out in Amsterdam 2 years ago in its extent and vehemence.

As a relatively moderate formation, the Interchurch Peace Council enjoys support from various currents and forces. At the same time the IKV forms the nerve-center in a loosely structured collection of organizations and groups, which extends from orthodox Christian circles through left-wing oriented groups to the Stalinists from the Communist party and its cover organizations.

The central position of the IKV brings nothing but advantages for the peace movement. Since the left-wing parties for the most part have always steered a pacifist course anyway, and the right-wing groups are of less interest to the peace movement, the struggle in the Netherlands is concentrated in the great political middle ground. The religious part of the population, which can be convinced most quickly when it is addressed by people of the same confession, is to be found in this center ground. By its very nature the IKV is well suited to this task.

This situation is also of advantage to the churches. In the past they have had the experience that theological and dogmatic positions do not impress modern churchgoers much any more. The peace movement is opening up a new point of departure. In an official document, the Catholic bishops of the Netherlands recently opposed the stationing of new nuclear weapons, after the synods of the Protestant Church had earlier taken a position opposing nuclear armaments. Moral-ethical points of view are prominent in both. The Church positions represent support for the IKV and related groups, which have succeeded in past years in building up a grass roots organization that regularly organizes demonstrations and makes life difficult for the political parties.
In the mid-1970s, the continuing arms race led to disappointment and discontentment in a large part of the Dutch public. Their displeasure was expressed concretely in various actions when there was some thought of introducing the neutron bomb in 1977 and, a little later, the modernization of the nuclear arsenal and the deployment of new medium-range missiles came up for discussion. The peace movement coordinated the protests and it succeeded in putting pressure on the major political parties.

The climate in the political center changed to such an extent that it was no longer the opponents of the new nuclear weapons systems who had to advance convincing arguments, but their supporters had to prove that the weapons were indispensable. The consequence of the protest actions of the peace movement was that the problem of nuclear weapons played a major role in the Dutch elections in 1981 and 1982. The peace movement developed into an important political factor, which the parties have to take into account quite seriously.

The naming of Woensdrecht as a possible site for cruise missiles has abruptly raised the temperature of the political dispute in the Netherlands considerably, and reactions from abroad were not slow in coming. The Soviet press agency NOVOSTI, in a commentary from Moscow, warned that negative consequences for relationships between the Soviet Union and the Netherlands would result. The Dutch Minister of Defense, it was reported, had revealed the site after German Chancellor Kohl had exerted pressure on Prime Minister Lubbers.

There were harsh words also from neighboring Belgium. The village of Woensdrecht, with a population numbering 8,500, in the south west of the Netherlands, lies only 5 kms from the Belgian border and 20 kms from the port city of Antwerp. The socialist party of Antwerp has indignantly rejected as unacceptable the possible deployment of offensive weapons within range of the international port of Antwerp. At the same time, increased protest actions were announce in the region. In the Netherlands, the peace movement is preparing for the decisive test of strength: The fall will truly be hot.
DEFECITION IS OCCASION FOR EXAMINING USSR SVALBARD ACTIVITIES

Soviet Views on Norwegian Sovereignty

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Aug 83 p 4
[Article by Per Egil Hegge]

[Text] This month a Soviet archeologist working on Svalbard left his colleagues and flew to Longyearbyen in the district governor's helicopter. There he announced that he wished to remain in the West. How do the Russians view Svalbard?

A good many Norwegian eyebrows were raised in September 1978 when the Soviet party organ PRAVDA presented a lengthy report on Svalbard, without mentioning that the island group was under Norwegian sovereignty. Otherwise, the article was totally apolitical. It was written by a geologist who described living conditions for researchers, workers, and other employees in the Soviet mining community of Barentsburg. It was particularly interesting because it appeared in precisely that newspaper, while Norway and the Soviet Union were in conflict concerning the wreckage of a Soviet fighter that had crashed on Hopen.

In this article the Soviet writer stressed the close contact between Barentsburg and the "materik," a Russian word meaning "mainland," which also could be interpreted as meaning "motherland." He also praised the fine telephone connections and said it was possible to call almost any city "in the country." And the "country" in this case was the Soviet Union.

Whether the omission in PRAVDA was deliberate or without ulterior motives, the Soviets always have been careful to point out that Svalbard is Norwegian territory and that Norwegian sovereignty is undisputed. (The discussions we have had from time to time with the Russians always have dealt with a difficult aspect of this fact: the practical application of principles in a concrete case.)

The most recent addition of the large Soviet encyclopedia states laconically that Svalbard (or Spitsbergen as it is called in Russian) is Norwegian territory. A review of the main points in the Svalbard treaty states that it confirmed (zakrepil) Norway's sovereignty over the island group.
Nine months after the PRAVDA article, in June 1979, the Moscow paper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA wrote that the region was under Norwegian sovereignty. The same point is made clear in the beautiful book Spitsbergen, a collection of photographs published in English by the Planeta Publishing House in Moscow that same year.

It is always pointed out in such texts that the treaty obligates Norway to prevent the island group from being used for military purposes—a concept that Norway has nothing against.

It would not necessarily occur to a Soviet miner coming to Barentsburg that he was not in the Soviet Union. He is greeted by an enormous red sign reading CCCP, familiar pictures of Lenin, appeals to work harder, and slogans such as "Communism is Our Goal." It is so much like home that it is easy to understand the Soviet miner who looked perplexed when Hans Wilhelm Steinfeldt, now Moscow correspondent for NRK (Norwegian Broadcasting Company), asked him how he liked it here in Norway. "Norway?" the Russian said. "Isn't this Spitsbergen?"

Nevertheless, there have been two defections during the past year—a miner who managed to reach Longyearbyen and now an archeologist.

Soviet researchers need not be particularly insightful to discover that they are on Norwegian territory. All research stations are inspected regularly by the governor, who often is in uniform. It also would be surprising if Soviet citizens staying outside Barentsburg or Pyramiden (with 1,200 and 900 inhabitants, respectively) were not briefed and warned just as thoroughly as all other Soviet citizens traveling abroad.

Soviet research on Svalbard is extensive. About 150 researchers from the Soviet Union are spending 1983 on the island group. They include zoologist, botanists, geologists, and especially archeologists. The latter are significant, inasmuch as archeology, in some cases, is a science with political overtones. This is true, for example, in the Middle East, where both Jews and Arabs have conducted excavations for the expressed purpose of determining "who came first." Obviously, the purpose is to use the results as a basis for current politics.

Soviet writings on Svalbard (which was called Grumant in Old Russian) stressed that Russian hunters and fishermen visited the island group as early as the 11th century. Thus, the primary work of Soviet archeologists is to find the burial sites of these people. The most famous Russian inhabitant of Svalbard was the hunter and fisherman Ivan Starostin, who died in his hunting cabin in 1826 after spending 39 winters on the islands. There was lively interest in Svalbard during the 1760's, when the great Renaissance man Mikhail Lomonosov organized several expeditions that led his researchers (he did not participate himself) as far west as the eastern coast of Greenland, but the researchers were stopped by the ice at about 80 degrees north.

Defections are never popular on either side, but the Soviets especially have ways of preventing them. And there is reason to believe that the researchers
on Svalbard—and especially those seeking permission to travel to the islands—will be investigated more thoroughly before they set foot on the plane to Murmansk and eventually arrive at the Longyearbyen airport.

More Details on Defector

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Aug 83 p 4

[Article by Odd Bergfald]

[Text] The 30 year old Russian archeologist and historian who defected from a Soviet research team on Svalbard on Friday, 12 August, and asked Governor Carl A. Wendt for political asylum in Norway remains in the vicinity of Oslo. He has not been incarcerated, but is staying at a secret location. As previously reported, the day after the Russian defected he was transferred from Svalbard to Oslo. Inspector Jostein Erstad told AFTENPOSTEN that the Russian had not yet decided whether or not to seek asylum in another Western country.

AFTENPOSTEN learned that the Russian had been trained in both archeology and history at the university. He would like to continue his studies. It is reported that he was married at one time, but now is divorced. He has no children, but his parents are still living in his homeland. The Russian is being questioned so that the police can learn about his background and determine why he chose to defect from Svalbard.

The Russian defected on Friday afternoon 1 week ago in Trygghavna in the Isfjorden. A total of 88 Soviet researchers have been involved in various expeditions to Svalbard this summer. This is the first time a Russian researcher has defected in this manner during a stay on Svalbard. He knew that officials from the governor's office were on a routine inspection trip to the group of Russian researchers who are examining old Russian settlements in Trygghavna. The 30 year old suddenly left the group of researchers and approached the Norwegian helicopter, which had just landed for the inspection. His colleagues must have seen the 30 year old approach the helicopter and may have known about his intentions, but as far as the Norwegians who observed the defection could see, none of the other researchers made any attempt to stop their young colleague.

The Russian is being questioned in Oslo in the Russian language, but it is known that the archeologist and historian speaks some English. It was reported that he is from southern Russia and that he was trained at a university in that section of the Soviet Union.
PUJOL RESPONDS TO COURT ON LOAPA

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 16 Aug 83 p 11

[Text] Jordi Pujol, president of the autonomous regional government, has told a newspaper in Barcelona: "As I see things on the subject of LOAPA (Harmonizing Organic Law for the Autonomous Provinces), there are neither winners nor losers among Catalans, because Catalonia is the winner and, consequently, so are all Catalans, and centralism is the loser."

"I believe," added Pujol, "that we Catalans will all know how to use the decision of 10 August as a point of departure for working together in the service of real, not merely apparent, Catalan autonomy."

The Catalan president expressed the hope that the government would consider carefully the point of view expressed by Tomas de la Quadra, minister of territorial administration, following the LOAPA decision.

"I hope," he emphasized, "that the central government will consider the decision carefully and give it the weight it merits, as well as the autonomous regional government's offer of collaboration and dialogue."

Pujol commented on his recently announced initiative, convoking all the Catalan parties to analyze the situation created by the LOAPA decision.

"When the president of the autonomous regional government addresses himself to all the political forces in the Catalan parliament, he does so for two reasons: because he believes that all of them must have felt it necessary to take advantage of the situation created by the decision in order to consolidate Catalan autonomy, and because he thinks that they can all make positive contributions toward this end," he added.

He specified that the Socialists were "obviously" included in this initiative, "and I am confident that they will know how to take advantage of the opportunity they now have," he added. On the other hand, Santiago Marraco Solana, the Socialist president of the regional parliament of Aragon, feels "absolutely indifferent" on the subject of LOAPA, since he sees no basic problem.
"In any case, this affair could have an effect on the state and autonomous regions in future," and he understands that "all the nationalist parties are taking advantage of the consequences, presenting the decision as a defeat for the central government, because they are already in an electoral campaign, but we are not in any campaign here and LOAPA does not seem so important to me."

Regarding Aragonese sentiment about autonomy, he indicated that "it is not so deep here as in the Basque Country or Catalonia, nor at such a low level as in other places."

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CSO: 3548/485
As a result of last Sunday afternoon's confrontations between the Basque Autonomous Police and National Police and groups of Herri Batasuna (HB) demonstrators, after the latter had burned the national flag, provoked street disturbances, cheered for the ETA-military terrorist organization and insulted and attacked the Forces of Public Order (FOP), a total of 69 people had to be treated for wounds of varying seriousness at various hospital centers in San Sebastian.

At the end of the day, the city remained submerged in silent tension, presenting the appearance of a place where a pitched battle had just been fought: barricades placed across the streets, objects scattered about, bloodstains. While the violent events—which occurred only a few meters from the place where the autonomous authorities were performing the ceremonies preceding the inauguration of Semana Grande (a pre-harvest festival)—were taking place, members of the Autonomous Police were rebuking members of the FOP, which led to an isolated physical confrontation between the two police forces.

The incidents began at the end of the afternoon, shortly before Carlos Garaiocechea, president of the Basque government, and his wife, accompanied by various local and autonomous government authorities (including Mario Fernandez, vice president of the regional cabinet; the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) regional parliamentarian Javier Ardanza; Pedro Luis Uriarte, counselor for economic affairs and finance; and Ramon Labayen, mayor of San Sebastian, the latter with all members of the City Council, except those belonging to Herri Batasuna), attended the traditional Salve Regina in the Church of Santa Maria, on the eve of the beginning of the feast of Semana Grande. Just after 7:00 pm, a group of about 1,000 people forming part of a chain of relatives and friends of ETA members organized by those promoting an amnesty, as well as of a separatist demonstration called by HB under the slogan "Basque, yes; Spanish, no," burned the national flag (the actual act was carried out by two hooded individuals, in the midst of heated shouting by the crowd surrounding them), stopped traffic on the boulevard, shouted slogans in favor of amnesty and the ETA-military and attacked the police, who charged the demonstrators. This initial charge caused the rioters to rebuke and insult members of the Autonomous Police, who were forming a protective cordon around City Hall, from the balcony of which no flag was flying and within which the autonomous
government and local authorities remained. The separatists reproached the Autonomous Police for not impeding the FOP charge. A member of the Autonomous Police, dressed in Basque costume, confronted the National Police, reproaching them for their attitude, for which—according to the newspaper EL PAIS—he was beaten.

When the procession of authorities, protected by successive cordons of Autonomous Police and municipal police, began to walk from City Hall toward the Church of Santa Maria, the demonstrators blocked their way through Mayor Street, installing barricades of chairs and tables with a placard reading (in the Basque language), "The refugees want to live in the Basque Country." The Autonomous Police charged briefly, after which the National Police intervened again, disturbances manifesting themselves at various places. Once the path was disencumbered, the procession continued on its way to church under a shower of stones, shoes, bottles and jars. Among those suffering bruises were the city's mayor, Ramon Labayen, who was hit on the point of the chin, and the chief of the Autonomous Police. The authorities arrived at church at 8:30, half-an-hour later than anticipated.

The confrontations continued as long as the Salve Regina inside the church lasted; several members of the Autonomous Police were beaten, and a youth with Latin American features was freed by the crowd after he had already been handcuffed and arrested. The separatists insulted the FOP and threatened them with death. When the authorities came out of the church, the confrontations recurred once more, making a new Autonomous Police intervention necessary. Later, the National Police took up positions in the area and were sporadically attacked with stones until late at night.

On coming out of church, Carlos Garaicoechea told reporters: "There is an alternative to this: transform the feast into a slaughterhouse. The Autonomous Police could have cleared away the demonstration in 10 minutes, but it was a question of seeking an equilibrium vis-a-vis this gang of aggressors. I think that the equilibrating measures were married to firmness and calmness. It is best to avoid an excessive solution. Let this band of radicals be aware," he concluded, "that the people are patient but their patience has its limits. If they think their patience is unlimited, they are mistaken. So, I am happy that this situation could be set to rights, even though they would have liked to turn it into a massacre." For his part, Ramon Labayen, mayor of the city, told the news media yesterday that he had the impression someone had made a considerable effort to ruin "a feast in this country". At the end of the high mass at the Basilica of Santa Maria del Coro, attended by the City Council, Labayen said it was possible that a motivation for the incidents had been the LOAPA decision, "which confirmed", he said, "the validity of the path of agreement and invalidated the path of eternal negation. Moreover," he added, "having recourse to paving stones and rocks, that is to say, to potentially dangerous missiles shows that these radical groups have limited ability to turn out a crowd and are obliged to act in this way to make themselves noticed."

Furthermore, yesterday, in mid-morning, the national, Basque and local flags were raised and flown at San Sebastian's City Hall, as is traditional during the feast of the Assumption, the culminating day in the city's Semana Grande. The three flags flew all day and were lowered at night.
DEFENSE MINISTER ENGELL ENTERS DEBATE ON FORCES' STRENGTH

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 30 Jul 83 p 7

[Text] This is Defense Minister Hans Engell's contribution to the debate in BERLINGSKE about defense in the eighties. He shares many of the doubts expressed in this debate. On the other hand, it is his impression that our defense is better than often suggested. "That opinion is also shared by military experts among our allies," writes the minister.

Col C. F. Hagen deserves our thanks for initiating this debate because most of the contributions have had an obviously positive influence. There is reason to be happy about that. Defense is normally only debated in depth in the media in connection with political compromise negotiations. This debate has clearly been of value if Colonel Hagen's statements together with the many other points of view have brought about a more positive attitude and established a basis for continuing our defense plans at a level that will guarantee their credibility and effectiveness.

As is usually the case in such debates, however, things have been carried to extremes—from the very beginning. That does not matter either because it helps stimulate opinions. But we need to realize that this is often tantamount to, if not erroneous, at least very subjective remarks.

Colonel Hagen had the opportunity to conclude the debate in this newspaper 23 July. The article ended with some questions for politicians who favor defense and, as defense minister, I would like to submit my contribution.

One contribution carried the headline "The Military Must Lower Its Ambitions." I quite disagree. The military's ambitions are those of the people and the politicians. The soldier's ambition is to create the best possible defense within the established limits. One basic factor that determines the size and the composition of Denmark's military defense is the amount budgeted for defense by the people through Parliament. As was cited by Colonel Hagen, it is true that the defense budget constitutes a declining share of the national budget. But is that a relevant criterion for the credibility of our defense?
Public spending, including state expenditures, is dependent upon so many factors that it is not entirely reasonable to consider the relationship between defense spending and total government spending as an expression of our defensive position. But we can use other comparisons. The important question is, what kind of defense do we get for the money appropriated? Can it solve the problems? Is it effective and credible? Considering our needs and problems, I have no doubt that the answer is positive. I share many of the doubts expressed by Colonel Hagen. On the other hand, it is also my impression that our defense is better than often suggested in this debate and that our evaluations are perhaps often too pessimistic. This opinion is also shared by military experts among our allies.

The present defense budget is based on a broad political consensus. It was established after a thorough military and political evaluation of all the aspects, including our security, of course. Some critical voices on behalf of the military, among others, were also taken into consideration during the debate. The criticism led to the addition of some "bricks" with respect to the original proposal for a "zero solution"—not least benefitting Zealand's defense.

Many—politicians included—would have liked to spend more money on defense, and still do. I will personally work for it. But you have to be realistic.

One of Colonel Hagen's primary concerns is the army's "peace orientation." It is correct that we have an 8 to 4 peace army in many areas. I also find it particularly relevant and useful to discuss today's preparedness. The views expressed by Colonel Hagen, among others, regarding this issue are not new to me, of course. Today, the military disburses more than 250,000,000 kroner in general payment for overtime work, on-call duty and inconveniences. In my opinion, were we to imagine that the military could draw without limit on an individual's ability to work, a budget of 12 to 13,000,000,000 kroner would not be adequate. Even if the budget were increased and based on the military's priorities up to this point, I doubt that military experts would suggest using the money to strengthen our military preparedness outside the regular working hours.

I have no doubt that should security call for it, we will be able to adjust to the situation, be it between 8 and 4 or 4 and 8. In this connection, we should not overlook the fact that a so-called surprise attack will be preceded by some kind of warning, which will effect quick preparatory measures. The army's preparedness system is so flexibly designed that the defense minister can call in troops to supplement the standing army ahead of an actual mobilization and a general mobilization can be completed in about 48 hours. Likewise, we should not overlook our surveillance and warning, which are the responsibility of the Military Intelligence Service in cooperation with the navy and the air force. In his contribution, Col G. K. Kristensen said that I use the threat of evaluation as an argument for reducing defense personnel. Nothing could be more erroneous. That development is always dictated by the funds granted. Materiel and training have been given high priority in the last few years because, without reasonably meeting these needs, even the best possible preparedness in terms of personnel is of no value.
The fact that of late I have advocated that we should have more conscripts and that we will investigate and discuss that matter in connection with future defense plans beyond 1984 must be viewed in the light of military preparedness in general. I did not raise the subject with a view to reduce personnel within other groups or to abolish the police arrangement, as some have claimed. My view was primarily to improve the mobilization force and to maintain the link between the military and the public, in other words, to strengthen and promote the defensive spirit. I also find it appropriate that defense in the nineties should combine the basic military personnel, which will form the nucleus in units dealing with complicated materiel, with conscripts the basis of our military strength.

Colonel Hagen alleges that laws and decisions which influence education, discipline and morale are not designed with war requirements in mind. Of course, education and preparedness could be even better, were it not for rules concerning working hours, education and vacation in the military. No doubt about it. But I believe most people understand that would be utopia. Hence, the goal must be to guarantee decent working conditions for military defense personnel, while constantly keeping in mind the one basic stipulation, that the military be able to fight. A difficult balancing act—I admit that. I have already commended the high morale among our military defense personnel. The fact that this opinion is also held in NATO circles was attested to by the then NATO chief of the North Region, Gen Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, who in the army's annual publication a couple of years ago wrote: "I meet soldiers from many nations, month after month, as I travel throughout the allied North-European Region. Whether it be regular personnel or conscripts, the attitude and the talent are regularly of high quality. Nowhere more so than in Denmark. I appreciate the Danish army's contribution to the alliance: its traditions and the standard it attempts to achieve are among the best. I am fully convinced that these values will be preserved regardless of the army's immediate problems."

It is my understanding that the effectiveness of our nation's defense is not alone dependent upon the armed forces, but also upon the attitude which people in general have toward the nation's defense and its military defense efforts. Many policemen pass through our ranks every year. We must not underestimate the importance of this group's attitude toward the military. The policemen have chosen to spend a few years in training for the military before making a decision about the rest of their lives. Therefore, the military should also retire these policemen in a dignified manner.

Colonel Hagen is right when he says that 9 months' training for conscripts is too short. There may be a lack of skills—at least among combat troops. Since 1973, the purpose of calling up conscripts has primarily been to give them goal-oriented training for the purpose of entering mobilization and supplementary units. The training is supposed to be supplemented by reviews. I must admit that the fund situation over the last couple of years has limited the review activity. We are fully aware of the deficiency and are moving upward again in this respect. As a bright spot in this connection, I would like to mention that we have extended the service for army reserve officers from 18 to 21 months, beginning 1 October this year. Besides
training, this should also provide a higher standard among our mobilization forces.

In my contribution of 14 June, I discussed materiel standards in the military. There is no need to repeat that. We know our strengths and weaknesses in this area and are seriously working to improve the situation. In that connection, our top priority the last 3 years has been equipment for the individual soldier and the overall situation at the end of this year can be termed satisfactory.

In his contribution to the debate, Col G. K. Kristensen asked some questions relative to the defense budget. They need an answer.

I do not understand his criticism regarding the use of military defense appropriations for 1982. The reason for the delay in submitting documents to the Finance Committee at the end of 1982 was that I wanted to initiate some projects included in the 11-man committee's discussions on defense budget cuts for 1983 and 1984. Appropriations announced for fiscal 1982, in the amount of about 1,850,000,000 kroner for materiel purchases and construction, were used with the exception of 30,000,000 kroner, which due to delay in deliveries could not be used by the Defense Command before the end of the accounting period. According to standing rules, the roughly 30,000,000 kroner were carried over for use in 1983. I know nothing about the 10,000,000 kroner which the colonel insists were not used as planned for materiel purchases and construction in 1982 because the government allegedly did not get the applications on time.

The Defense Command's operating budget—individually administered by the command—showed a surplus of about 60,000,000 kroner at the end of 1982, due in part to lower price and wage increases than expected when the Supplementary Grant Act was drawn up and in part—according to the Defense Command's explanations—to disposition problems because of uncertainty about delivery dates, for example.

For the sake of thoroughness, I also want to say that a surplus of about 25,000,000 kroner had already been demonstrated in the civilian construction budget connected with Fishing Inspection Service funds when the Supplementary Grant Act was drawn up. Again, the necessary funds had been appropriated, but as a result of late deliveries it was impossible for the Defense Command to use all of the appropriated funds before the end of the fiscal year. With respect to Col G. K. Kristensen's remarks about taking care of the Home Guard (HV), I can inform you that the Defense Ministry has been fully aware of the difficult economic situation there, which was the reason for transferring about 6,000,000 kroner to HV through the 1982 Supplementary Grant Act because of surpluses in other areas.

Henceforth, it has been documented that Col G. K. Kristensen is, mildly speaking, using the wrong address when he attacks me by saying I am guilty of not using all the appropriated funds in 1982. As defense chief of staff, he cannot be unaquainted with the fact that there was a surplus with respect to the Defense Command's administrative appropriations, which—like other appropriations—go "back to the state treasury," according to practice.
With respect to regulating the defense budget for price and wage increases, I can say that during the debate on the finance bill for 1984 the Ministry of Finance reported that no change had been made respecting the regulating principles in the established budgetary limits for 1984.

I have said that we can learn from history. That is important. Unfortunately, reluctance to spend what is necessary on defense is not unfamiliar today either. Those who oppose defense argue frequently and loudly in favor of cuts. In order to maintain the present level of defense—or a higher level, which I would prefer—it is necessary that those who favor defense also argue frequently and loudly and, I would add, objectively. Otherwise, naivete and idealism devoid of objectivity could cost us dearly in the end. In that respect, I agree with many of the contributors to this debate.
In the future, young Danish males will be subjected to a psychological test when they appear before the Armed Forces Medical Board prior to military service. Along with the traditional intelligence test, those who appear before the Armed Forces Medical Board will answer 27 questions, which are supposed to reveal whether they are psychologically unsuited for military service—and whether they have hidden leg and back pains.

Questions like "Are you almost always in a bad mood? Are you very shy or sensitive? Do you have difficulty making friends? Do little things get on your nerves?" will be asked in writing by Armed Forces Medical Boards throughout the country. This will be done to avoid all too many having to be rejected later—sent home after they have been called into the military.

The proposal for a so-called P-test by Armed Forces Medical Boards came in a report entitled "Late Rejection of Conscripts," issued by two working groups under the Defense Ministry. These groups were established in the spring of 1981 because up to 10 percent of all conscripts fell away and had to be sent home due to psychological and physical injuries.

"A P-test would cut in half the number of late rejections," said Lt Col F. H. Jessen with the Defense Command. Jessen was the leader of one of the working groups. The number of rejections is declining, however, since the figure for 1981 was 6.8 percent, compared with 1980 when 1,033 out of 8,681 conscripts were rejected—equivalent to 9.6 percent.

"I think it is very important that we find ways to reduce the number of late rejections. First of all, we need to consider the conscripts—for whom late rejection can be a heavy burden—personally, economically and work-wise," said Defense Minister Hans Engell.

As far as the military is concerned, a large number of rejections means an enormous waste of resources. The late rejection of 1,033 men in 1980 cost the military about 21,000,000 kroner, for example.
MILITARY

DENMARK/GREENLAND

ICELAND NEWSPAPER SUMMARIZES ACCOUNTS OF SUBMARINE SEARCH

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 5 Aug 83 pp 24-25

[Article by Agas: "Mysterious Submarine Traffic off Greenland: Soviet Submarine Looking for Hiding Places"]

[Text] Based on reports in Danish newspapers. The search by Danish reconnaissance ships and a coast guard plane for a submarine seen by scores of Greenlanders in various places off the west coast of the country during the middle of July did not bring any results and was soon called off. Many questions have been raised as to whom the submarine belonged and what it was doing there, and all indications are that it was the same submarine that was sighted in all incidents.

If, on the other hand, all reports about submarines prove to be true, it would seem that a whole fleet of submarines visited Greenland. The first to see the submarine were fishermen on small boats at the mouth of the Taserimut fiord by Nanortalik at the southern tip of Greenland where they were fishing on July 11. They saw a periscope emerge, passing along the surface of the sea right by them. However, the authorities did not receive this information until a few days later.

The same day the crew of the shrimp trawler Elias Kleist saw a black submarine sailing at full speed towards land about 50 nautical miles off Holsteinsborg. When the submarine was closest to Elias Kleist, there were 700 meters between them, and the crew took turns viewing the submarine in binoculars for 45 minutes. The crew did not see any identification signs on the submarine that could establish its nationality.

When the crew on Elias Kleist saw the submarine, it was half way between Nanortalik and Egedesminde in the mouth of Disco Bay. Then the submarine disappeared and most likely it submerged as it approached land. A short distance from Holsteinsborg is a DYE-1 radar and telecommunications station, which is a part of NATO's warning system in the North Atlantic, and the American base in Sonder Stromfjord.
It is considered doubtless that a submarine cruised back and forth in Disco Bay, even for days, as it was sighted by scores of people from various points in the bay. Fishermen in Aknaaq, where 200 people live, first thought this was a whale looking for food. Aknaaq is an isolated place on a small island where people live from day to day. There is only one telephone there located in the building of the Royal Danish Greenland Trade.

But Bertel Sandgreen, sheriff of the area, was in no doubt about what it was, as he was sailing his small boat on the bay near Aknaaq.

"The submarine surfaced and most of the tower surfaced only about 25 meters away. And when I was closest to it, there were only 25 meters between us. But they must have seen me because they dove immediately," said Sandgreen.

When Sandgren reported the submarine, Danish reconnaissance ships started to look for it and a Gulfstream jet from the Danish coast guard was sent to search, but little result was expected from the search as the ships are not equipped for submarine search. Both Ingolf and Vaedderen are equipped with depth charges and other smaller charges to force a submarine to surface when discovered within Greenlandic jurisdiction without any authorization. The Gulfstream jet is not equipped with electronic devices for submarine search and would only have been able to find the submarine if it had been partially surfaced, but bad weather interfered with the search and considerably reduced the capabilities of the jet.

According to people who are in charge of the defense of Greenland, it never came up to get aircraft from the Iceland Defense Force at Keflavik to assist, but Danish newspapers maintain that they would probably have discovered the submarine or submarines immediately.

The search was therefore called off soon, as Ingolf had to be used to sail Prime Minister Poul Schuter who visited Greenland about the middle of July, and Vaedderen was on an annual cruise with eight Danish parliamentarians to Greenlandic towns.

What Nationality?

Representatives from the Danish army say that it can be ruled out that this was a NATO submarine and that everything indicates that this was a Soviet submarine.

The possibilities are that this was a coastal submarine of the Tango-class or a nuclear powered submarine of the Victor II class or Charlie class. The Victor-class submarines are huge, 6,000 tons, equipped with torpedoes and nuclear missiles and two nuclear powered, 30,000-horsepower engines that drive the boat at 30 nautical miles per hour. The submarine is also fitted with electronic devices to listen to communications and it is considered conceivable that it was on such a mission off Greenland. The submarine has a 90-member crew and is able to dive to 400 meters and remain on the bottom of the ocean for many weeks. The Charlie-class submarines are slightly smaller.
What Mission?

The question is first and foremost what was the mission of a Soviet submarine or submarines off Greenland? Actually, these are not the first reports of alien submarines in Greenlandic fiords, as it is known that more than once exercise landings have taken place from submarines, most likely Soviet, in Greenlandic fiords in the last decade, as people have been seen and undisputable evidence has been found that people were there.

Various theories have been put forth about the presence of the submarines at this time. One is that the Soviets are looking for hiding places along the coast of Greenland from where they could operate in time of conflict in the Atlantic Ocean. They would be well situated there with respect to the sea routes that would connect Europe and North America in time of war. From there they would be able to attack without any danger of being noticed in time.

The Soviets would be uncomfortably close to the United States and could easily conduct missile attacks on the country from Greenlandic fiords. The submarines' nuclear missiles have targets anywhere in the United States, Canada or Europe easily within their range. The objective of the Danish defense is not to conduct searches or fight submarines off Greenland.

Easy To Hide

Informed sources say that it is easy for Soviet submarines to hide off the coasts of Greenland, as there are no charts available of the depths there nor of the numerous fiords. It is, however, a good question why the submarine did not try to be less obvious. According to the evidence of witnesses, it can almost be assumed that the captain actually intended to have the fishermen notice the periscope and at times it sailed with its tower above the surface of the sea, for example, in the vicinity of the shrimp boat Elias Kleist, and it is assumed that they were making it known that they were leaving Disco Bay.

One theory is that the Soviets intended for the submarine to be noticed and that they were showing the Western states its strength and that it will not be easy to keep them back. The Soviets are proud of how far they can get in their submarines. Numerous incidents within Norwegian and Swedish jurisdictions have proved to them that it is far more difficult to locate submarines and destroy them than it was in general thought to be, even under conditions where the field of activity for the submarines is minimal.
(1) Þannig hugsar teiknari sír atvikið þegar kafláturinn skaut upp turninum í øðins 25 metra færi frá syslumanninum í Akúnaaq á vesturströnd Grænlands.

(2) Hér kom kafláturinn upp, øðins örfáa metra frá kønu syslumannsins í Akúnaaq.

KEY: 1. This is how the artist imagines the incident when the submarine tower surfaced only 25 meters away from the sheriff from Akunaaq on the west coast of Greenland.
2. This is where the submarine surfaced only a few meters away from the sheriff's boat.
3. Another submarine?
4. The inspection ship Ingolf
5. Drawing by Erling Nederland

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MORE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE, YOUNG RECRUITS FOR BUNDESWEHR

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 8 Aug 83 pp 38-39

[Text] Bundeswehr draws a record crowd; more than 70,000 young men want to be soldiers.

Earlier, whenever recruiting officer Friedrich-Franz Sodenkamp appeared at schools in northern Germany as a representative of the FRG armed forces, he met with contempt and ridicule. He was once even drenched with a bucket of water.

Nowadays, however, the discussions have become more "objective," says Sodenkamp, and a high-school student recently even "ventured to say that Communism poses a threat."

Adds recruiting officer Michael Behrendt, who works with Sodenkamp: "Ninty-five percent of the young people are curious, approachable and even hungry for information." Reflecting on the new situation, Behrendt observes that they are "surprisingly relaxed in their attitude towards the armed forces."

For years the army recruiters were out of favor among young people. The armed forces found it difficult to meet their quotas for officers. The military personnel offices were complaining of a chronic shortage of soldiers and NCOs signing up for longer enlistment periods.

A "welcome development" put an end to this situation, reports the military magazine BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL [Today's Armed Forces]. The West German armed forces are experiencing a rush of volunteers as never before in their 27-year history. For 1983 the applications already number 73,500.

The numbers are so large that the officers are able to apply strict standards of selection. Only 1 out of 6 makes the team; more than 45,000 volunteers are being rejected this year.

A good 60,000 applicants have signed up for 25,000 positions in the training program for troops and NCOs. There are 13,100 people--74 percent of whom have the abitur [high school graduate] diploma--competing for the 2,200 openings for officer candidates. And the great majority of them want to wear the uniform for at least 4 years. "Even recognized conscientious objectors are signing up again," rejoices Colonel Hans-Ulrich Schneider-Vorfalt, director of the
Nord volunteer center in Hannover. His region, which includes Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg and Bremen, has so far registered an increase of applicants 30 percent over that of last year.

At the very time when peace demonstrations are popular as never before, the number of conscientious objectors is sinking for the first time since 1979. In the first quarter of this year, there were only 20,488 applications made, 8.3 percent fewer than in the same quarter of last year. The arms debate, observes Schneider-Vorfalt, has mobilized not only opponents of military defense, but advocates as well.

Ingo Schaubt, a sociologist doing military duty in the Defense Ministry's department of opinion and motivation research, thinks that serving in the armed forces has acquired a "better image." One can, claims Schaubt, detect a clear and firm resolution favoring military defense.

That may well be true. But if the military authorities label this strong turnout as a kind of peace movement of patriotic Germans, it is only half the story. The other half has nothing to do with convictions on defense policy, but with unemployment among the young.

For many recruits the thought of serving in the military is simply more appealing than the prospect of joining the ranks of unemployed youth between 18 and 21. Twenty percent of the candidates that signed up in Hannover, for instance, were unemployed.

Schaubt does not see any sign of a "close correlation between unemployment and attitude towards the armed forces." According to a "youth study" conducted last year by the Bonn Institute for Applied Social Sciences (Infas), the armed services enjoy a far better reputation among young Germans than might be suggested by, for example, the fuss about swearing allegiance:

--Seventy-five percent of the young men between the ages of 16 and 18 think that the armed forces are "important" or "very important"; eighty percent believe that they make peace more certain.

--Seventy-five percent of those asked are willing to comply with compulsory military training or to serve voluntarily.

--Seventy-nine percent of those surveyed think that quite a few young people are "benefited by military service." Fifty-eight percent share the opinion that "strict discipline such as exists in the military" could well be applied in other areas of social life.

On the other hand, the study also shows that many of the young are looking for assistance from the service in personally coping with the economic crisis.

Only 22 percent of the volunteers, says Infas, are eager for "military service per se." But 86 percent expect some "training for an occupation" from their stay in the barracks. Seventy-eight percent expect "further education for a civilian occupation."
The military has also certainly improved its technique of recruiting the young to its cause now. Fritz Boller, a senior official in the Defense Ministry, says that the years-long "persistent work of education and persuasion" is now paying off.

In district recruiting offices and volunteer centers, the military now maintains a staff of about 150 service counselors working on the front lines of persuasion. Along with these, there are 65 full-time and 600 part-time recruiting officers who, for instance, invite school classes to demonstrations of military hardware in order to promote enthusiasm for modern weapons technology and, consequently, the wish to serve in the military. In 1981, they provided 624 courses of instruction to altogether 20,711 teachers and made a pitch for the military in 16,724 classes.

The "Youth Recruitment Committee" each quarter sends out an information mailing called "Infopost" (150,000 issues), consisting of posters and colorful brochures that depict military service as something fascinating. With these, the young people can either witness an "aerial submarine chase" or learn that the status of conscientious objector is actually a "special dispensation."

The 80,000 youths who, according to military estimates, will throng into the barracks next year will be a welcome sight for the personnel planners. Manpower planning calls for the 495,000-man armed forces to consist of 65 percent career and enlisted soldiers and 35 percent draftees. But the proportion of the professional soldiers stands at only 55 percent, and even the short-term soldiers will become fewer and fewer, according to Defense figures.

A "Commission for Long-Term Military Planning" has forecast a total shortage of 80,000 enlistees by the end of this decade, due to the fact that from now on those reaching drafting age will represent periods of low birth rates. Personnel planners were even considering calling up women and drastically prolonging the term of compulsory service (now 15 months) in order to fulfill the personnel quota.

Defense Minister Manfred Worner last month responded to the rush of volunteers and sounded the all-clear for both worried military managers and those not included in the rush to the service. The personnel situation makes it possible "that no one has to serve longer than 18 months," reported the minister.
A boat loaded with heavy vehicles and equipment for air bases for American prestockage in Trondelag was unloaded in Andalsnes on Wednesday. The next shipment of American military materiel is expected to arrive in December, the head of the district command in Trondelag, Major General Thorbjorn Bergersen, told AFTENPOSTEN.

The shipment that arrived this week consists of 70 to 80 heavy trucks similar to the models used by our military. The trucks were taken to Setnesmoen. From there they will be driven by Norwegian drivers to Sor-Trondelag and Nord-Trondelag. The air-base equipment will be sent to the Vaernes and Orland air bases. This is ordinary equipment that is necessary for maintaining fighter planes.

Major General Bergersen said there were several reasons why Andalsnes was chosen as the port of entry. The main reason was that the ship's size and draft required a special harbor, which did not leave many possibilities. The military also had enough room at Andalsnes to park all the vehicles, so that they could be driven at a time at the final destinations. It was not stated, however, that the port was chosen because dock workers' unions in Trondheim had stated previously that they would not unload American military materiel for prestockage in this section of the country.

What type of materiel will arrive in December will depend on the shipping possibilities available at that moment, AFTENPOSTEN was told.
POLITICAL PARTIES 'STRANGELY SILENT' ON MILITARY'S PROBLEMS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 24 Jul 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Defense of the Defense Forces"]

[Text] The recent political silence concerning defense policy has become embarrassing.

In the public's view of things, the Armed Forces have naturally assumed a central place following the submarine intrusions. As was evident from the debate on SVENSKA DAGBLADET's "Focus" page, the country's security experts have also been paying the utmost attention to military defense. But the political parties and their spokesmen have remained silent. After the 250 million kronor were appropriated for antisubmarine defense, the military's problems were forgotten.

At the same time, however, the Armed Forces really have problems. The cutbacks already decided on—and they vastly exceed the extra money appropriated for antisubmarine defense—have been causing serious cash problems for the military. Despite that, the Armed Forces are facing even stiffer cutbacks.

Those problems were brought up by Member of Parliament Carl Bildt in a speech on Saturday. And it was really about time that one of the country's defense politicians spoke up.

According to Bildt, the 1982 defense decision itself reflected a lower level of aspiration than the 1977 decision. Since then, the Social Democrats have reduced appropriations even further, and added to that are the effects of the higher value-added tax, devaluation, and the rise in the value of the dollar.

The combined effect is that the Armed Forces are being faced with the need to reduce their consumption of resources by 1 billion kronor per year in terms of the defense decision that was once made.

Furthermore, the Armed Forces will probably not receive price compensation for the fact that inflation will exceed 4 percent. So another 300 million kronor will disappear.

It should be clear to everyone that the reduction in defense appropriations has in effect torn up the defense decision.
Member of Parliament Bildt said in his speech that further cutbacks will have to result in the immediate appointment of a new defense committee, since such reductions would make it impossible even technically to carry out the defense decision.

The need for a defense committee exists even without further cutbacks, because the question facing us is not how the 1982 defense decision can be carried out. The question, instead, is how we will work out a defense policy with a higher level of aspiration. That is the conclusion we must draw from the submarine intrusions, and it has been made so evident as to leave no room for doubt through the contributions to the debate that SVENSKA DAGBLADET has published over the past few months in the wake of the Submarine Committee’s report.

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Carl Bildt (Conservative Party) complained last weekend that from the economic standpoint, reality for the Swedish Armed Forces is obviously going to be grim in the late 1980's--unless more consistent and balanced measures are adopted.

Evidently--judging from his rather meager statement--Bildt's main thought was that the defense committee that will prepare the 1987 defense decision ought to be appointed by the government earlier than usual.

That is naturally a solution which might help to create the realization that if we want to maintain the credibility of our defense forces, we cannot continue to postpone important orders for materiel, cut back on refresher training, and, by adopting further rationalization measures affecting Armed Forces personnel, thin down the number of instructors so much that talk about "universal military service" becomes all but meaningless.

There is an even stronger need, however, for the government to realize that all the talk about our firm will to defend ourselves must be accompanied by the allocation to the Armed Forces of the funds they need so that they can do their most important job, which is to keep Sweden out of all international conflicts.

If that realization exists within the government--and SVENSKA DAGBLADET believes that it does--the question then becomes that of whether the government possesses the political courage to make the necessary decisions.
MILITARY FORCES STEPPING UP PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE EFFORT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 24 Jul 83 p 7

[Article by Erik Liden]

[Text] Skalderviken--Sweden's psychological defense program is to be stepped up. A large number of training courses and exercises are already being conducted this year for journalists and military who would be assigned in wartime to information departments under the government, the supreme commander of the Armed Forces, and the military district staffs in various underground facilities.

Lt Col Jan-Ake Berg, head of the Defense Staff's Information Department, which shares responsibility with the Psychological Defense Planning Committee for peacetime preparations for psychological defense, says: "For many years, psychological defense has been left uncultivated."

About 20 journalists who are liable for military service are already being called up this September to manage information activities during the Armed Forces "East Coast" exercise in east central Sweden. That exercise will include 25,000 officers and enlisted men, and nearly 200 airplanes and 150 ships will also participate. This exercise will follow the same pattern as exercises "Northern Lights" and "Southern Front," which were held in 1982.

Jan-Ake Berg says: "I really hope that big exercises will not disappear again as a result of tight military finances. They are our only chance to train effectively and under realistic conditions."

The Journalists Union and the Publicists Club are opposed to the use of journalists by the military.

Osten Johansson, chairman of the Swedish Journalists Union, says: "As long as the Armed Forces do not distinguish between propaganda and genuine enlightenment, or information, we will not participate in war preparations for psychological defense. We reached a decision on that point at our congress in 1980, one result of which is that the union is not represented on the planning committee.

"Now I believe that the government is prepared to reorganize psychological defense so that our demands will be met. In that case, naturally, we will help
out again, because it is important to have functioning public information in wartime, and it is preferable that it be provided by journalists."

Volunteers Taking Part

The Defense Staff is not immediately concerned by the Journalists Union's boycott, but it is disturbed by the fact that representatives of the journalists on the government information committee lack knowledge of the wartime organization.

"But it looks as though the journalists that we have here for 7 days of training (all of them on a totally voluntary basis and receiving only 20 kronor per day in compensation) do not care about the union's views. On the contrary, they are happy to receive training in preparation for refresher courses and so on."

Kjell Gustafsson, who in civilian life is managing editor at Radio Karlstad, says: "It is obvious that we must train reporters, too, I hope that politicians and the defense command also realize that."

Those participating in Skalderviken included Col Costa Norrbom of the air force, Lt Col Folke Sonesson of the South Military Region, Per-Eric Nordqvist from the radio station in Karlstad, and Police Chief Sven Smedjegarden from Arlanda.

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Six American test pilots were in Sweden recently to practice flying Swedish training aircraft: the Viggen SK37, the Draken SK35, and the SK60. In some quarters [including in the Communist press], this has been presented as a sensational "news item" and a "revelation." But it is neither of those things.

Similar exchanges take place every year: Swedish pilots visit other countries, just as we welcome pilots from other nations for that type of exercise.

The background is this: all such pilots have one thing in common—they receive advanced test pilot training either at the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School or at its counterpart in Great Britain. As a consequence, Swedish pilots are also sent to those places for training.

What they receive on those annual study visits is advanced flying training, and this is more a stage in their further training than any kind of sensational combat flying duty now being brought to light. The training can be summed up as being concerned with aerodynamics and maneuverability—not with tactics or attack operations.

All the planes used are so-called training versions from which every kind of computer or other combat equipment has been removed. What the foreign pilots are not allowed to see or test are the AJ37 attack Viggen, the JA37 interceptor Viggen, and our reconnaissance Viggens.

Besides, these exchanges of test pilots go back 30 years. Just over 200 of those pilots held their annual meeting in Linkoping last year. The press was invited. So much for that "news item."
APN SCIENCE REPORTER DISCUSSES SOVIET-SWEDISH COOPERATION

Lulea NORRSKENSFLAMMAN in Swedish 27 Jul 83 p 11

[Text] Even if no special agreement about cooperation in space exists between Sweden and the Soviet Union, it is still developing successfully, writes Mikhail Chernitsov APN's science contributor and expert in space questions.

In July 1976 the Intercosmos-16 satellite was launched. On the cosmo drome—the launching pad—the Swedish flag could be seen for the first time. That meant that there was Swedish apparatus onboard the satellite.

The Swedish-Soviet cooperation dates from October 1969 when two Swedish academicians turned to the scientific academy of the Soviet Union with the suggestion of expanding the already existing cooperation in the scientific and technical field by adding joint space experiments. The science academy of the Soviet Union said yes to the Swedish suggestion.

Research About the Sun

The physics of the sun became the first area for the Swedish-Soviet cooperation. The Swedish researchers suggested, for example, that a Swedish made apparatus for measuring the ultraviolet spectrum of the sun's eruptions be placed on a Soviet satellite. The Soviet leader for the project was Andrey Severnyy, the Swedish leader was Doctor Jan Stenflo of Lund University. Doctor Stenflo was also present at the launching of Intercosmos-16 and studied the send up together with a group of other foreign researchers.

The purpose of the experiment was to study the so-called area of transition that exists between the atmosphere and the corona of the sun, where the temperature rises from some tens of thousands of degrees Kelvin to hundreds of thousands of degrees. The results of these joint projects have been published in international scientific journals.

A decision was made to conduct subsequent experiments on the Soviet Prognoz satellites. They are nothing else but specially constructed research stations, intended for the study of the sun's activity. They travel in very elongated elliptical courses with its apogee (highest point) of 200,000 km in the direction of the sun. This makes it possible to take measurements within the magnetosphere of the earth as well as outside its limits.
A Number of Discoveries

The first experiment, named Promiks-1, was conducted in 1978 on the satellite Prognoz-7. In February 1980 Swedish and Soviet researchers summarized and assessed the work so far. It was emphasized that the experiment made it possible to discover a number of phenomena until then unknown to research, for example, that oxygen ions were found in the magnetosphere of the earth. At the end of the same year, a similar experiment was conducted. It was called Promiks-2 and was done with the help of the satellite Prognoz-8. The results of these experiments will be the basis for further investigations.

During the years 1976-78, a broad international project called MIM (International Studies of the Magnetosphere) was done, in which around ten countries took part. The different "layers" of the magnetosphere were investigated. The top layer was investigated by satellites, among other things two intercosmos sputniks. The middle layer, at about 40 km, was studied with the help of hot air balloons, launched from the Swedish research station in Kiruna. Researchers from Sweden, the Soviet Union, Austria and France cooperated on this project. These countries also conducted a number of joint experiments within the framework of the so-called Sambo project, the intent of which is the study of the electrical field in the atmosphere, as well as the so-called continuous x-ray radiation. The characteristics of the aurora borealis were also studied.

Results are Published

The measurements are made from French balloons, launched from the experimental base of Esrange. At the same time, high altitude rockets were sent up from the island of Heiss in the Soviet Union to make vertical investigations of the different atmospheric layers.

The joint experiments are conducted free, without any mutual cost estimations. The results of the experiments are then to be published for the benefit of all researchers.

The Soviets really appreciate the work done at the Geophysical Institute in Kiruna, at the Universities of Uppsala and Lund, at the Royal Technical Institute and at the Uppsala Ionosphere Observatory.
BODSTROM CRITICIZED FOR ARGUMENTS RAISED IN KATTEGAT ISSUE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 26 Jul 83 p 2

[Editorial: "All Islands not the Same?"]

[Text] There are many unresolved maritime boundary issues in Scandinavia's sphere of interest. Norway has not settled the delimitation of its border with the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea, and it has long been quarreling with Denmark over fishing rights around Jan Mayen Island. Norway has introduced a zone extending for 200 nautical miles around the island—but that encroaches on the Danish zone (also 200 nautical miles) as measured from Greenland. Norway's delimitation also ran afoul of Iceland, but in that case Norway has yielded.

Sweden's boundary dispute with the Soviet Union in the Baltic Sea is not its only unresolved boundary issue. Also in dispute is the division of the Kattegat, where islands such as Anholt, Laes, and tiny Hessel enter the picture. Hessel Island in particular has come to the forefront because of the test drilling for petroleum currently underway there. Should the median line—a principle on which the two countries agree—be measured on the Danish side from Hessel Island or not? If not, the expected petroleum deposits will be on the Swedish side.

It is bad enough that Scandinavian arguments have gone awry even inside our countries. And none of it has been improved by a sloppy statement made by Minister of Foreign Affairs Lennart Bodstrom.

In rather rough outline, the confused Scandinavian situation can be described as follows: Denmark does not accept the Norwegian boundary delimitation around Jan Mayen Island because Norway maintains only a meteorological station on that island. Denmark is actually thinking of taking the case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. When it comes to the conflict with Sweden, on the other hand, the Danes want to include Hessel Island because a few people live there.

As far as the Baltic Sea is concerned, Sweden is demanding that the median line be measured from Gotland. In this case, it is adopting the same position of principle as that upheld by the Danes in the case of Hessel Island.

Our minister of foreign affairs now says that not all islands are the same. Gotland is a separate county, while Hessel Island has only a small population.
One should be very wary of that argument. It is not difficult to recall potentates who have grabbed areas precisely on the grounds that not many people were involved. Compared to the Soviet Union's population, Gotland's inhabitants can be regarded as indeed few in number.

It is always dangerous when an issue of law becomes a question of whether the number of people involved is large or small. But that is where Bodstrom is headed through the blunder in his statement.

Fortunately, there is also a way out: the Scandinavians should make their position easier by working their way toward common starting points.
ENVIRONMENT MINISTER DISCUSSES PROBLEMS WITH GDR OFFICIALS

Environment Minister Christian Christensen (Christian People's Party) returned on Saturday after a 3-day visit to the GDR and reported on arrival home that before long bilateral discussions will begin on an official plan regarding nuclear safety. The GDR has a nuclear power plant about 100 km south of Falster.

"The East German government proved to be surprisingly obliging regarding our wishes regarding increased public reaction in connection with the East German nuclear power plant near the country's Baltic coast—a plant which especially alarms the inhabitants on Lolland and Falster," Christian Christensen says, and adds that he explained the viewpoints of the Danes to the East Germans as he previously had done to the Swedes in connection with Barsebäck.

In addition to the nuclear safety problem, Christian Christensen and officials from the Environment Ministry touched on water and air pollution in the Baltic Sea area.

As far as air pollution is concerned, according to Christian Christensen, it went harder with respect to East German obligingness, but the East German authorities have tried to put a stop to agriculture's nitrate pollution of the water by reducing the nitrogen content of fertilizers.

Christian Christensen does not want to make a statement regarding to what extent he has gotten a good idea here, but says that he received especially interesting information which will be included in his considerations when a group of experts has developed a report on Danish nitrate pollution.

In connection with the East German – Danish discussions of water pollution, Christian Christensen was successful in gaining ready-established contacts between Danish water decontamination establishments and the East German authorities.

The East Germans displayed great interest in investigating in greater detail Danish progress in the field of water decontamination. This means that East German experts before long will travel to Denmark in order to take a closer look at Danish products in the field.
EXPERT URGES 'TOTAL REVISION' OF WASTE-TREATMENT LAW

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 19 Aug 83 p 7

[Article by Lars-Olof Streng: "Waste-Treatment Law Must Be Totally Revised"]

[Text] A significantly greater environmental problem than PCB exists in the other substances like chlorinated phenols which are used in pressure-impregnated wood, and mainly in older types of wood preservatives. These substances can be found everywhere, and with combustion they give off the same super poisons as PCB, such as dioxin. That is a poison which is estimated to be 10,000 times stronger than potassium cyanide, according to Professor J. Johan Lindberg at Helsinki University Institute for Plastic and Wood Chemistry.

The waste-treatment law states how PCB waste will be treated. But it says nothing about how to deal with wood which has been treated with substances which contain chlorinated phenols, although these substances are just as dangerous as PCB in its most sensitive chloride compounds.

Our entire waste-treatment law will soon need a total revision, believes Professor Lindberg. It is derived partly from the 1800's, and even from the 1700's.

It is PCB which has today become known as the really large environmental villain among the general public. That is because of the great publicity in our media about the dumping of PCB waste in the Abo archipelago last year, and the discharge from the Nokia condenser factory in Tammerfors.

In addition there have been several large international accidents such as the one in Seveso, and another accident in Japan, and a third on Taiwan in which PCB has been involved.

Popular Substance

According to Professor Lindberg, PCB has been used in different compounds in Finland for nearly 50 years. The substance is used in transformers and
condensers, among other things. It gained quick popularity, since it is not flammable, does not freeze and does not cause corrosion.

As such, PCB is not dangerous. It first becomes an environmental poison in certain chloride compounds, and when it reaches temperatures of between 300 and 800 degrees, according to Professor Lindberg.

The most dangerous PCB compounds are contained in transformer oil. That is PCB together with chlorinated benzenes, which at temperatures of 300-1,000 degrees create super poisonous dioxin. In our country there are also about 250 transformers which each contain an average of 1 ton of transformer oil containing PCB. They are now very well protected.

It is rather difficult to express exactly how poisonous a substance is. Professor Lindberg gives an example:

Deadly Poison

A fatal dose of potassium cyanide for a human is 1-100 mg, depending upon body weight and whether the substance is taken intravenously or orally. Dioxin is 10,000 times more poisonous!

That means that 10 grams of dioxin in Helsinki's drinking water would poison the entire population of the city!

In Japan and Taiwan there have been two major accidents, with over 1,000 dioxin-poisoned people per accident. In Japan the incident was as follows:

In connection with the cooking of rice oil a little PCB compound leaked into the rice oil from a heat exchanger. Then the oil cooked so long that it created dibenzene furan in the PCB compounds.

The result was that 1,000-1,500 people were injured. They received nerve and liver damage, miscarriages and chloracne. Many became 100 percent invalids with clearly shortened life spans.

According to calculations which were made, the injured persons had received 4 mg per person of dibenzene furan over a period of 6 months, said the professor.

In the accident on Taiwan, 2,000 people were injured.

Use Discontinued

In Finland a prohibition was issued as early as 1970 against the use of PCB in open systems, he said. Within 10 years the use of PCB will be entirely terminated, so that the greatest risks of accident will disappear within 1 year and in other important areas within 3 years. All this is expected to cost 300-500 million marks.
PCB oils can be replaced with harmless silicon oils, which according to Professor Lindberg are best. But silicon is an expensive substance. Also there can be a return to the old mineral oils and diethyl phthalate.

Nokia has figured in both the PCB scandals, because Nokia is the only firm which manufactures condensers in Finland, said Professor Lindberg. Now Nokia is accused of not following the regulations.

According to him the firm has simply neglected to control the contents of the waste which is burned in the ovens at the condenser factory. So now they have confirmed the presence of small amounts of PCB reaction products in the factory smokestack.

The interesting thing is that the source of the pollution in the smokestack is not always the PCB which Nokia uses, according to Johan Lindberg. That indicates that they burned waste which contained other substances, possibly chlorinated phenols.

Super Poison in Wood Preservative

Now we are entering a gloomy aspect which is less known among the public, said the professor. The largest source of dibenzene furans and dioxins after eliminating condensers and transformers is not PCB.

It is the aromatic compounds, especially the phenols which are part of the lignins of wood, which together with natrimum chloride or potassium chloride on combustion produce dibenzene furans and dioxins in small amounts. Plus chlorinated phenols, which are used in certain types of pressure-impregnated wood and in older types of wood preservatives. Furthermore, forest fires must create a constant, natural emission.

Sawmills also use chlorinated phenols in significant amounts when working with wood, to protect against discoloration. This creates a noteworthy risk of possible fire. The problem is that these substances are difficult to replace with others.

Another problem arises with fire. The equipment of rural fire departments for fighting sawmill fires, where super poisons can be present, is entirely inadequate, Professor Lindberg pointed out.

What should be done? Most important is to get the information about these problems to the public. For that we must have money for setting up preparedness and for continuation of needed research in the area.

The latter task can be accomplished for about 100,000 marks per year, said the professor. The problem is that no ministry seems to be able to give us the needed funds...
He also affirms that PCB as well as wood treated with chlorinated phenols can be destroyed in a positive manner. This requires temperatures of over 1,200 degrees. These temperatures will be attained in a waste-processing plant under construction in Riihimaki. They can also be attained in a number of ovens located here in this country, for example cement ovens.

The key position, however, is occupied by the decision makers at Arkadiabacken. It is there that the necessary total revision of the waste-treatment law will take place.
HAZARDOUS WASTE FIRM STARTS GATHERING UP PCB

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 22 Aug 83 p 9

[Article: "Hazardous Waste Company Has Begun Collecting PCB Waste"]

[Text] Riihimaki--Suomen Ongelmajate Oy [Finnish Hazardous Waste Company] has begun the transporting of industrial waste containing PCB from industrial plants to a temporary storage facility in the port of Naantali. The company has concluded a transport contract with a shipping firm in Naantali, which will begin to transport the waste to England most likely in September.

At this time there is approximately 10 tons of scrap condensers and transformers containing PCB in Naantali. They will be shipped to England when half again as much is collected in the storage facility, stated Technical Director Matti Vattulainen of the Finnish Hazardous Waste Company.

The Finnish Hazardous Waste Company has concluded contracts for the treatment of PCB waste with several firms already, and many others have asked for bids from the company for the treatment of scrap containing PCB.

The treatment of waste at the Riihimaki Hazardous Waste Plant will begin next spring according to the company. At that time it will also be possible to begin the destruction of liquid PCB waste and small amounts of PCB scrap. The destruction of larger amounts of scrap will, however, require a pretreatment facility, for which funds have not yet been granted.

It will still be necessary to ship the waste abroad, stated the Hazardous Waste Company.

It is estimated that there is approximately 5,000 tons of industrial scrap containing PCB, which is awaiting treatment in our country.
Interview with Huseyin Yildirim, Kurdish lawyer, by Brigitte Heinrich: "Make the Struggle Against Torture Your Own Business"; date and place not specified; words within slantlines in italics in original

There was life pruned away,
The creepers with their bloody, coiled vines
Intertwined with death
Converged on the mountains
And now,
All roads lead to Diyarbakir.

Two years ago--on 13 April 1981--the trial against 760 Kurdish opposition members began in the military prison of Diyarbakir. The trial is still pending. The number of defendants has been decimated by torture-induced death. One of the defense attorneys, the Kurdish lawyer Huseyin Yildirim, was arrested on 11 October 1981, while the trial was going on, and during his 10-month confinement was almost tortured to death. The 6-hour interview with him, which we publish in excerpts, is but another testimony that political show trials, torture and murder, are still firmly established oppressive practices in the NATO country Turkey. But while the military junta is being actively supported by the FRG with military and economic aid, German judges declare torture in Turkey to be a "common phenomenon" thus justifying deportation orders and denials of petitions for political asylum./

Question: You are now living in exile in Sweden. Was it difficult to be granted asylum?

Answer: No. The proceedings went on for about a month. Since I had been confined because of my work as defense attorney, my "case" was known.

Question: This would have probably been different in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]. Her central asylum agency, the Federal Office for the Admission of Foreign Fugitives, has flatly rejected the petition of your colleague Serafettin Kaya; in their words he tends to "play down the problem of Kurdish terrorism." In another case, judges at the West German Administrative Court have denied a petition for asylum with almost fascist logic: There has always been torture in Turkey. Therefore the existence of torture does not entail the existence of political persecution. How do you feel, when you hear something like that?
I have talked to my colleague Kaya. According to international treaties, which are binding also for the FRG, the suit for political asylum, which he filed in the meantime with the Administrative Court, has got to be successful. That I was granted asylum so fast was not because the Swedish Government wanted to do me a favour, but because Sweden, too, honors international law. When petitions for asylum by persecuted Turks and Kurds are being denied in the FRG, then this has nothing to do with the law, but rather with the particular relations between the FRG and the military junta in Ankara. Although the federal government knows very well about the existence of torture in Turkey and Kurdistan, they don't change their policies towards the junta. Thus they strengthen and support the torture regime.

You were defending political prisoners in Turkey. How did the court proceedings go?

Since 1978 I was counsel for the defense in trials conducted under martial law, which in several provinces was issued already before the military coup. What I experienced in the military prison in Diyarbakir, starting on 13 April 1981, had a new quality. The court receives orders from the military commander. Only declared enemies of the Kurdish National Liberation Organization or the Kurdish people are being appointed military attorneys and military judges. Even the defense attorneys were expected to subject themselves to military discipline. I didn't follow these instructions, but many attorneys were marching like soldiers, when they went to court.

And how did it go in the courtroom?

The 760 defendants were represented by 52 defense attorneys. The ones in confinement were brought into the courtroom early in the morning. When the defense attorneys arrived, the prisoners were already sitting there, or they were lying on the floor because they were no longer able to sit on a chair because of the torture. Even in the courtroom the prisoners were guarded by soldiers, each one equipped with a club and a rifle. There was one soldier for every prisoner. Those prisoners, who were no longer able to walk, were dragged to the stand by the soldiers.

And the court?

Since it was so obvious that the prisoners had been tortured, there was no possibility for the court to be adjourned, to have the torturers arrested, and to order a medical examination for all inmates. Instead, the court questioned those tortured, as if nothing had happened. Some refused to testify on the grounds that they had been tortured. After that, the chair of the court, Enrunnah Kaya, gave orders to take them away. They were dragged out of the courtroom by soldiers, and tortured outside. Their cries could be heard in the courtroom.

And the defense counsels? Couldn't they intervene?

On the third day of the trial I insisted on a joint statement of protest by all the attorneys. They thought that if we did that we would be arrested too. I myself then protested against the illegal court proceedings.
I declared that it was a party, the PKK, that was on trial. They were accused of fighting for the independence of Kurdistan. There was never a trial in the history of mankind, I said, in which the victims had to appear in court as defendants. I protested against the refusal of the court to let me talk to my clients, even though I had to defend 400 of the 760 defendants. I insisted that the prisoners should not have to spend 14 hours without food in the courtroom when the court was in session. I presented 17 demands, all of them based on existing law. I said that if need be, I would tear up my robe in the courtroom, and brand the injustice, that had occurred here, elsewhere before the eyes of the world public.

[Question] What did the defendants do?

[Answer] After I had made my motions, the imprisoned members of the Central Committee of the PKK were heard: Mehmet Hayri Durmus, Camal Pir and Mazlam Dogan. They had to be carried to the stand because they could no longer walk on their own. This caused a considerable turmoil in the courtroom, in which Turkish attorneys joined in with Kurdish attorneys. Mehmet Hayri Durmus was hardly able to speak, he could be heard only very faintly. He said: "We, who fight for freedom and independence of Kurdistan and the Kurdish people, have founded a party. We don't deny our responsibility. But you don't have the right to pass judgment on us. We are responsible to our people alone, and we accept their judgment only. The only reason we speak here is because we feel a responsibility towards history. We don't fear the death sentence you will pass on us.... I am defending here the legitimacy of our struggle. I concur with all the demands of my defense attorney. Give us the possibility to defend ourselves!"

[Question] How did the court react to this offensive defense?

[Answer] It adjourned its decision about the motions presented. When I left the court room, the officers who were present, beat me and threatened to never let me into the courtroom again. I assumed that they would drag me away and kill be. But nothing happened. The next day the court announced a decision, according to which fourteen of the seventeen motions were granted. The motion to have the prisoners examined by a doctor was denied. The question of the torture of the prisoners was of no interest. But the demands, that had been accepted, were not met by the court. The situation of the defendants became even worse.

[Question] But there were 50 defense attorneys present in this trial. Didn't they dare to do their job?

[Answer] The torture against the prisoners was so cruel that no defense attorney had the courage to truly defend his clients. This meant to take the risk of being arrested and tortured yourself. Therefore the defense attorneys restricted themselves to focusing in on the evidence for the case, and demanded the release of their clients for lack of evidence.

[Question] How did your arrest come about?
At first there was an increase of harassments during my job as defense counsel. Visits with imprisoned clients became increasingly difficult. I was beaten up by the police. On 11 October 1981 I was finally arrested while I was visiting the military prison in Diyarbakir together with family members of my clients. The prison director, Oktay Yildran, ordered the soldiers to surround the family members until I was taken away by police. They took me to the nearest police department. There I was kept for 4 days in protective custody without being allowed to talk to anyone. The searches of my office, my apartment, and myself yielded no results. Then they took me to the barracks and handed me over to the military. Some soldiers blindfolded me and handed me over to the torture specialists of the police. They laid me down on the back seat of a car and sat on me. After about a twenty minute ride we came to a place where I heard landing and taking off, as well as the noise of coming and going police cars. My guess was that we had reached the headquarters of the commander of martial law. My guess was right.

18 Months in the Military Torture Center

Yildirim: After they had dragged me out of the car—I was still blindfolded—they beat me with a hard club over the shoulder, the back and the pelvis. I was led into a room and in there to a wall. Everything was very quiet, so that I had the impression that I was secretly brought before some people. I thought they would kill me now. My hands were free, and in order to see what was going on around me, I ripped the blindfold off my eyes. I saw three high ranking officers, slightly below the rank of general. At once I was beaten over the head and all over my body. My eyes were blindfolded again. I was taken to the room next door and hit again all over my body. The torturers didn't ask questions. They bound a rope around my shoulders and pulled me up on it. Then I received electric shocks on the mouth, ear, abdomen and genitals. The jolts of current and my screaming made me loose consciousness. When I came to, they had water poured on me, and they were still pouring. Then I received the Bastonade. I was also hit on the hands. How many times I was hit on the hand and on the soles of my feet I don't know, only that I lost consciousness again. This torture lasted 7 days.... There were many prisoners besides me. I couldn't see them, however, and they couldn't see me, because our eyes were blindfolded. Day and night prisoners were dragged to the torture chambers—sometimes individually, sometimes in groups. Day and night, without interruption, you could hear the screams of the ones who were tortured. When our torturers came in, we noticed the smell of booze on them. Some prisoners I knew from the military prison in Diyarbakir cried when they saw what had become of me. Medical officers advised that I been taken to a military hospital, but the military leadership refused permission. So I stayed in the torture center until the 18th day. I couldn't keep myself upright anymore, and I hardly could walk.

One day I was brought into a room. In it stood a guy with thick and dark glasses. He only asked: "Is that him?" And some people pointed at me and said: "Yes, that's him."

In one of the following days I was transferred to another prison.
...I was taken into a room where I was questioned. They had taken the blindfold off my eyes. They only wrote down what I said. They didn't try to put any words into my mouth. After all, there were four witnesses who had testified wrongly that in the region of the Kurdish city Urchpah I was the PKK official in charge of the Organization of the resistance.

In the Military Prison of Diyarbakir

When a month later I was transferred to the military prison of Diyarbakir, I was taken to the office of the prison director, East Oktay Yildran. The first blow I received was from him, and he hit me very hard. About 50 soldiers with clubs in their hands stood around me. Upon the orders of the prison director: "Well, my soldiers, show what you can do now," they took me to a cell two corridors down from where we were. The corridors are 100 meters long and 10 meters wide....

Throw-in-the-Fire

The soldiers were polite; they said: "Please take off your clothes." Except for my pants, underpants and shirt, all other clothes, including my blanket, were cut to pieces with scissors, then piled up to a heap. I can't tell what they poured on that heap, but suddenly I saw it was burning. They wrapped my head and then threw me into the burning clothes. I tried to get out of the fire, but everytime I did, they threw me back in, while hitting me with their clubs.

Dragging-through-the-Sewer

After that the soldiers grabbed my legs and pulled me through the corridor, from one side to the other one. Through the corridor ran a sewer which was filled with feces and urine. I don't know how often they were dragging me back and forth. While they kept beating me, they said only thing: "Why do you defend the PKK?" and "Do you still want to go on defending them?". Finally I lost consciousness. When I woke up, I saw that my legs and my arms were swollen. My face was bleeding, my head was bleeding, there was blood running out of my nose and my mouth.

The Coil

While I was tortured I screamed. You can't help that. Often I was screaming so loud, and without interruption, that the prisoners in their cells started to protest. Then the torturers started to take the protesting prisoners out of their cells to beat them up. Once my torturers took me to a circular device, a coil, that was hanging on the wall. There was a rope hanging from that coil. They tied my genitals to the loose end and started to pull me up with that rope. I screamed, and tried to hold on to the rope with my hands.

Push-the-Head-through-a-Hole

After the experiment with the coil they dragged me through the corridor. They pushed my head through a narrow hole so that I couldn't pull it out by myself. Then they started to hit me on the shoulder, back and pelvis. This went on for a long time. Finally they hit me with a hard object against my left kidney so that I became unconscious. When I came to, my whole body was swollen. My
mouth was totally dry. I was very thirsty. My body was aching everywhere. When I felt my back with my hand, I noticed an open wound. They dressed me and pulled me by the legs down into a cell on the lower floor. They pushed me into that part of the cell that was covered with feces and urine all over.

Bastonade

It was very dark in that cell. After a few minutes I began to tremble with pain. Midnight came. The guard in front of the door first looked around. Then he helped me to the dry part of the cell, where there were no feces. I stayed there, lying on the concrete floor, until morning; then I heard voices. Now the guard pulled me back to the part that was covered with feces and urine. Through the iron cell door I saw 10 soldiers with clubs, standing there. Some of them took be by the feet and pulled my legs through the iron bars up to my knees. A well built, stock soldier pressed my feet down, so I couldn't pull them back. The soldiers hit the sole of my feet, one after another, all 10 taking turns whenever one of them got tired. Blood spurted with every blow. When the first group of soldiers was gone, another one arrived. They took my hands and pulled them through the iron bars. They held my arms and hit my fingers, my fingertips, with full force. To this day, two fingers of my left hand can't be used.

Don't Torture Him Before Our Eyes

The next day I was introduced to the martial law commander. I protested against the torture. After they had taken me back to my cell, they continued torturing me for 12 days. Then they gave me a mirror and commanded: "Look at yourself in that mirror!" I saw the skin coming off my eyes. I couldn't walk anymore. My whole body was swollen. Five days later two prison guards carried me over to the wing in which the PKK cadres were kept. I knew these prisoners because I had defended them. They were asked if they recognized me. I was so disfigured that none of them recognized me.

Then, 2 hours later, they locked me into a cell on death row, where members of the Central Committee of the PKK were kept as well. I had been arrested later than them. They wanted to know what the public was doing for them. Three to four times a day, the torturers dragged me out of my cell, through the corridor, and past the death cells. While this was going on, I was tortured, and the party officials were supposed to watch. The Central Committee members shouted: "don't torture him before our eyes, take him away!" After that they were taken out of their cells themselves, and beaten, and brought back bleeding.

The constant screaming of the ones who were tortured got to me most. It came to the point where I thought I was going mad, I completely lost my marbles. Esat Oktay Yildran, the prison director and head torturer, came to us again and again and explained: "It mustn't go fast and all at once; you will die slowly."

[Question] You got away from these sadistic torturers. What brought about your release?
After 32 days of torture in the military prison of Diyarbakir I came to the 38th cell district, where the Kurdish members of Parliament, Awad Turk and Alif Yilmaz, were kept too. A short time after that I was visited by my brother who is also an attorney. Two prison guards had to support me, because I wasn't able to walk to the visitor's cell on my own. The military prosecutor and the military judge in the PKK trial saw what terrible shape I was in. Later, during my own trial, the four witnesses for the prosecution declared that they had given false testimony against me because of police pressure and police promises. They were disappointed that, in spite of all that, they had received a death sentence. So I was acquitted and released on 15 July 1982. I was excluded from the bar by orders of the Bar Association and the Department of Justice.

What is the best thing one can do abroad against the brutal torture regime of the NATO generals?

A factually accurate account must be given of the methods of torture employed. They must be publicly denounced, branded and investigated. The European governments must be forced to publicly explain what role they are playing. The progressive people have to make the struggle against the junta and torture their own business. An effective public campaign must be started, so that the junta will shy away from torture and murder. When I was arrested, I received 300 letters from Europe. Thus the torture regime couldn't kill me without inviting problems. My clients, Mehmet Hayri Durmus, Camal Pir, Mazlam Dogan and many other political prisoners in Kurdistan, who were tortured to death in prison, might still be alive, if the critical public had stood up for them as they did for me.