The following is a translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.

Peaceful Coexistence and New Thinking [A.V. Nikiforov; pp 3-10] ................................................. 1
U.S. Professor Interviewed on Joint Ventures [J. Ha interview; pp 67-70] ............................................. 11
Table of Contents for Year 1987 [pp 123-127] ...................................................................................... 17
Articles Not Translated from SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 12, December 1987 .......................................................... 25
Publication Data ................................................................................................................................. 25
USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

Peaceful Coexistence and New Thinking
18030004a Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 18 Nov 87) pp 3-10

[Article by A.V. Nikiforov]

[Text] The main problem in the policy of peaceful coexistence consists in finding and pursuing the kind of line in international relations that will secure peace, disarmament, the all-round convergence of peoples, and the realization of their national and social aspirations. It is probable that all governments would endorse these goals. Differences of opinion arise when specific international problems must be solved with consideration for these goals. This is when the diverging views of states on the essence of these problems and the ways of means of their resolution are fully revealed. The class interests of ruling circles, the personality of the leader, prevailing cultural traditions and philosophical views, the overall level and exact stage of economic development, geographic location, and the balance of power in the region and in the world as a whole—these and many other factors determine the policy of a state. They develop and change, lose their significance and regain it, and are intermingled in various combinations depending on the nature of the foreign policy problems and behavior of other countries. Maximum consideration for this variety of forces and interests, the determination of the spheres in which they coincide, the assessment of the validity of the state's own demands, the consideration of possible concessions, and the prognosis of the possible effects of various decisions—these are the alpha and omega of practical policy, and these, irrespective of all types of rational judgments and calculations, are what raise it to an art. The success of the policy of peaceful coexistence will depend on how we do this now and in the future.

It would be difficult to overestimate the role our social sciences, especially philosophy, history, and political science, must play in the development of the new political thinking and the elaboration of specific recommendations for practical policy on this basis. Much has already been done to elucidate the postures, interests, and goals of the developed capitalist powers in the world arena, to disclose the driving forces and mechanisms involved in their foreign policymaking, and to expose the reactionary essence of this policy. The policy of developing countries is now less predictable and more varied and variable, and their assessments of the prospects for their development and their foreign policy behavior are more realistic. Without relaxing our efforts in these areas, we must pay much more attention to studies of the foreign policy of socialist countries, especially the USSR. Everyone knows the reasons for the obvious stagnation in this field. The level of research (or, more precisely, of publications) on foreign policy could hardly be higher than the level of the social sciences as a whole. Dogmatism, abstract discussions isolated from reality, the concealment of unpleasant facts, and many of the other shortcomings for which the CPSU Central Committee sternly criticized the social sciences are present in abundance in studies of Soviet foreign policy. Superficial commentaries and hymns of praise combined with irate attacks on an adversary lacking the sense to appreciate our proposals—we are all familiar with this format of the typical article and some books.

"Contemporary socialism must first understand itself," A.N. Yakovlev said. "This will not happen if social scientists continue to be intimidated by the fear of discovering problems that do not fit into political decisions yet and if they continue to view the latter only from the standpoint of commentators." Because the majority of works on foreign policy rephrase, explain, and substantiate decisions which have already been made, they cannot be of any practical value and they are failing to keep up with current requirements. This failure is all the more apparent against the background of the USSR's new dynamism and flexibility, which have given strong momentum to all world politics.

In the important and difficult but joyous and cleansing work of our historians, economists, and sociologists, who are reassessing the current problems of socialism, its past, and its future, foreign policy is still an island which has been virtually untouched by the storm of debates. Investigative efforts and journalistic talents are still being wasted mainly on proving that the foreign policy stance of the USSR is the only correct one at this time, and that all of the other side's arguments are completely unacceptable. And no one seems to be embarrassed when our country agrees to a compromise the very next day and puts forth proposals with consideration for these arguments (after all, this is the only way to solve problems). The enthusiasm this evokes in correspondents and commentators, the press, and television is again directed only toward publicizing the new position and criticizing everything contrary to it. The general public is never involved in the search for possible solutions to various problems or even the simple discussion of our country's foreign policy interests and actions. This is in sharp contrast to the glasnost and openness with which our domestic affairs are discussed. "Bold, interesting, and controversial articles have been written about many of the main aspects of all spheres of domestic life, party and state construction, economics, culture, the arts, and science. But there is nothing of the kind in the foreign policy sphere," E.A. Shevardnadze said. "Is it possible that everything is going perfectly here and that there are no alternatives to what is already being done?"

If we want our science and journalism to move toward the kind of open discussion of foreign policy alternatives that would be useful to diplomats, we apparently have at least two problems to solve. First of all, we must have much broader access to information about military and
political issues and we must correct the present abnormal situation in which foreigners know more than we do about our own military affairs and foreign economic and political actions. Second, we must dispel the common assumption among readers, authors, and editors that all publications on these matters should express the official point of view. Our own readers and foreign readers should be better informed of the diverging views and proposals of respected experts and all interested Soviet people. After all, only the open discussion and comparison of alternatives, combined with the intelligence and intuition of the broad masses, can allow us to pursue the policy of peaceful coexistence and educate the citizens of our country and of the world.

There are many factors impeding the active theoretical analysis of Soviet foreign policy issues, but it is probable that a decisive role is also played by the outdated views on basic and fundamental aspects of peaceful coexistence. In particular, there are the outdated ideas about the nature of the conflicts between the two social systems and about whether or not peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle.

Obviously, the thesis that the conflict between socialism and capitalism as world systems is of an antagonistic nature was primarily the product of objective conditions during the first decades in the existence of the country where the proletariat had triumphed. As a result of the October Revolution the Russian working class and its advance guard, the Bolshevik Party, took charge of the government. The party’s objective status effectively changed in an instant: The underground opposition party became the ruling party, but complete victory seemed unthinkable without the assistance of the world proletariat, without revolutions in other, more developed capitalist countries. Later, when it became clear that we would have to build socialism on our own, peaceful coexistence was regarded for a long time as a respite. Constant provocations, boycotts, non-recognition, ultimata, and the spread of fascism—all of this could not fail to create the impression that an armed confrontation with capitalism was inevitable and just as natural as the proletariat’s class battles with the bourgeoisie, as natural as revolution. The Comintern was functioning, and close ties were maintained with the parties of the labor and national liberation movements in many countries. It seemed that the unavoidable battle between the first socialist state and fascism would arouse revolutionary passions in the capitalist countries and complete the proletariat’s liberating mission.

These were also the prevailing views in the leading Western states. Their policy left no doubt that the prospect of the prolonged coexistence of states with different social orders did not enter into the plans of ruling circles in these countries. They regarded the birth of the first socialist state as a “historical mistake” or a social aberration. Even after the attempt to destroy socialism with the aid of German fascism had failed, capitalism did not give up the hope of correcting this mistake. After all, the supposedly defensive doctrine of “containment” was certainly not meant only to halt the revolutionary movements that had grown so much stronger during the war. Viewing them as part of a united communist assault directed from Moscow, American politicians were also counting on the collapse of socialism wherever it had already triumphed. “All we have to do is curb the revolutionary movements,” G. Ball wrote, for example, “while the forces of change and disintegration begin working. Internal corruption and conflicts between local interests and centralism can finish the process later.”

This acute confrontation between the states of the two systems objectively did much to extend class conflicts automatically to intergovernmental relations in our theories. There was the assumption that after the triumph of a socialist revolution in one or several countries, the antagonism between the proletariat and bourgeoisie was simply transferred to a different level without undergoing any significant changes, becoming antagonism between the “state-organized” proletariat and the bourgeois states. The propagandistic emphasis on the “radically opposite nature” of all facets of life in the two societies—from economic laws to moral standards—finished the job in conjunction with the excessively arbitrary use of the term “antagonism.” The interests of the two systems and the states belonging to them and the conflicts between them began to be regarded as irreconcilable and class-antagonistic.

Although life would seem to have forced the adjustment of these oversimplified ideas long ago, they occasionally rise to the surface even today. Just recently a central newspaper remarked that “the era of transition from capitalism to socialism also includes a new form of class antagonism, nuclear confrontation, which poses an equal threat to the two opposing structures and the very existence of the human race.” It would be impossible to disagree with the last words, but could nuclear confrontation really be called a class confrontation, not to mention a class-antagonistic one?

Strictly speaking, the antagonistic conflicts are those between classes, social groups, and other strata with the kind of material relationship that precludes any change for the better in one side’s position without a change for the worse in the other’s. Their interests are mutually exclusive and the struggle between them reaches the point of acute conflict. A well-known example is the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. One class exploits the other and grows rich at the other’s expense. The struggle of the proletariat periodically forces the bourgeoisie to share profits: to raise wages and expand social programs. But then there is little interest in investment, and economic development slows down. Capital which does not earn a profit is self-negating. The bourgeoisie then takes the offensive: wages and social benefits are cut, the laboring public is in a worse position, but profits rise and the economy recovers. This is precisely the kind of phase we are witnessing now in the
United States and other developed capitalist countries. The struggle between labor and capital moves the bourgeois society forward. The antagonism between them is still, just as it was 70 years ago, the main social contradiction of the era of the transition from capitalism to socialism. The autonomous and natural transition to socialism by countries and peoples is only made possible by the resolution of this contradiction.

Obviously, the interrelations between the two socioeconomic structures—capitalism and socialism—and between states with differing social orders can differ perceptibly from those described above. The two structures are perfectly capable of developing without hurting one another. Neither is living at the other’s expense. Capitalism was not suffocated by the contraction of the territorial sphere of its influence, but adapted to the new conditions, and socialism’s prospects are connected less with the transfer to socialism by as many new countries as possible than with the successful creation of socioeconomic structures capable of self-development in the places where socialism already exists.

It is clear that there are conflicts between the states of the two systems, just as there are conflicts between states in general. Furthermore, their nature and severity ultimately depend on the views of ruling classes or, more precisely, of the national segments of these classes in power. The way in which these segments and their leaders interpret national and state interests and their own personal interests constitutes the basis of their foreign policy. The ability to assess these interests accurately depends on the views characteristic of the class, the historical experience of the nation, the level occupied by the elite, and the personal abilities of leaders.

This mechanism of foreign policymaking is certainly much more complex than the simple extension of class conflicts to intergovernmental relations and frequently makes the experience accumulated in the social struggle counterproductive. On the other hand, this mechanism gives people hope by proving that the political and military confrontations of states are not distinguished by the same kind of inevitability with which socioeconomic structures and classes succeed one another at the helm of government. The decisive role played by the human being, his intellect, and his morality in the main questions of existence today becomes obvious.

This makes the foreign policy situation less definite than it seems when it is approached with the assumption of unavoidable class antagonism between the two systems. After all, people, as we know, not only belong to progressive and reactionary classes, but also can be evil and good, smart and stupid, greedy and noble, dishonest and trustworthy—and, what is more, in different combinations. But only they are capable of rising above the class interests by which they are divided in the social struggle. What the world needs today is the effort of a million people who think of themselves not only as members of a class and a nation but also of the whole human race. The role of any particular class in history depends on its ability to produce people of this caliber.

In spite of all the conflicts, which are sometimes quite acute, between the two structures and the states belonging to them, there is no class antagonism leading unavoidably to confrontation. And if it does not exist in politics, it cannot exist in military confrontation either. The “Ohio” and the “Typhoon,” the SS-18 and the Minuteman, have no class content. They have many more similarities than differences, and the main one is that they pose an equal lethal threat to those who create them in the hope of defending themselves and to the millions of people who do not even suspect that they exist. If there is any antagonism here, it is more likely to be the antagonism between the interests of human survival and the very fact of nuclear confrontation, and this conflict can only be resolved by peaceful means.

Until recently an important element of the system of views on international relations was the thesis that the peaceful coexistence of states with different social orders is a specific form of class struggle. The attentive reader has probably already noticed that this thesis has disappeared from recent official and unofficial publications and that a perhaps not immediately apparent contradictions made its appearance in books and articles in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Of course, their authors made some mention of the programmed interpretation of peaceful coexistence as a specific form of class struggle. As a rule, they said that the policy of peaceful coexistence, which the USSR and other socialist countries had been pursuing consistently since the time of their birth, stemmed from the class nature of their social order. Sometimes they listed the corresponding principles: the renunciation of war, the use of force, and threats of force as means of settling disputes, and the insistence on their resolution through negotiation; non-intervention in one another’s internal affairs and consideration for one another’s legitimate interests; the right of people to decide their own destiny; strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of their borders; cooperation based on complete equality and mutual benefit; the conscientious fulfillment of obligations stemming from universally recognized principles and standards of international law and negotiated international agreements.

Later, however, the authors began insisting that these principles applied only to intergovernmental relations and did not extend to “the relations between the systems,” especially ideological conflicts. Sometimes solidarity with other people’s liberation struggles in line with internationalist duties was added to the list of principles. At the beginning of the 1980s this view was formulated in the theory of the clearly delineated two levels or spheres of political processes in today’s world: intergovernmental relations (where peaceful coexistence is necessary) and the relations between socialism and capitalism, where the class struggle continues as a series
of confrontations between the two systems, mainly in the form of competition and the force of example. It is true that they did point out the fact that the second sphere is broader than the first and that it ultimately determines the nature and specific features of the interaction of states. Nevertheless, they consciously or unconsciously reduced the policy of peaceful coexistence to the defense of several democratic principles in intergovernmental relations, where it seemed that there should be no class struggle whatsoever. It should be fought in another place, in the sphere of “relations between the two systems.”

This theory can be viewed as the first attempt to analyze the experience in Soviet-American relations in the 1970s. It was born during the political confrontation with the West over the exact meaning of detente and the exact spheres of international relations it was to encompass. The West, especially the United States, tried, as we know, to impose the Western definition of detente on us, saying it was a specific set of “rules of play” which regulated not only the bilateral relations of states agreeing to peaceful coexistence but also their relations with other countries and political forces. The socialist states saw this as an attempt to restrict their contacts with national and social liberation movements and thereby preserve the “social status quo” in the world; and they did this with good reason, because the United States itself did not stop supporting pro-Western governments and groups in the Third World, especially in Africa. These differences of opinion, ultimately reflecting differing views on the future social progress of humanity, along with different approaches to human rights, are essentially regarded as the ideological conflicts our theory did not extend to bilateral Soviet-American relations.

In reality, this was not such an easy matter, because this was not simply a conflict of ideas, but also military actions between forces supported by the two countries, huge deliveries of weapons, the movement of naval forces, and the transfer of military advisers and even military contingents over thousands of kilometers. Our diplomats naturally had to consider the effects of the ensuing problems on bilateral Soviet-American relations and on detente in general. They conducted consultations and negotiations with the United States in connection with regional conflicts, the limitation of the international arms trade, and the reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean. But our theory continued to insist that none of this should have any effect on the detente between the USSR and the United States.

Political practices led to the realization that detente demands certain compromises and mutual concessions for the common good—the relaxation of tension, disarmament, and the resolution of regional conflicts. This realization, however, was difficult to reconcile with the dogma regarding the class-antagonistic nature of conflicts between socialism and capitalism: This meant that detente was a form of class peace and was therefore unacceptable to communists. The situation was complicated when many opponents of detente in the United States vigorously used the same dogma to their own advantage: If detente is good for the USSR, they asserted, it cannot be good for the United States, because the interests of these two countries are fundamentally incompatible. This is when the artificial theoretical construct dividing the sphere of intergovernmental relations from relations between the social systems made its appearance. The implication that detente and, consequently, compromises, mutual concessions, and common interests are possible and necessary only in the first of these spheres while the irreconcilable class (or ideological) struggle must continue in the second, saved the thesis of the antagonism between the two systems. But if peaceful coexistence is confined to one sphere and class struggle is confined to the other, then peaceful coexistence cannot be class struggle. This was probably the line of reasoning behind the removal of the accurate, in our opinion, definition of peaceful coexistence as a specific form of class struggle from documents and publications and the inclusion of the warning not to allow the spread of the ideological conflicts between the two systems to the sphere of intergovernmental relations. As a result, our theory was in an odd position: Although in the 1970s it had exposed the invalidity of American ideas about the “end of ideology” (on the basis of which the United States wanted to establish purely pragmatic “rules of play” with us), later, without changing gears, it accused Reagan of “ideologizing” foreign policy, and journalism was quick to follow its example. But is it even possible to separate relations between states from relations between social systems? In theory, as we can see, it is.

In real life it is hardly likely that anyone has ever seen the socioeconomic system as a self-contained entity. It is true that structure and state are two different concepts. These are terms from different sciences studying different aspects of the same phenomenon. Furthermore, the first is a philosophical concept and is therefore broader than the second. In reality, however, structures exist in the familiar form of states, and the class-related foreign policymaking of these has already been discussed.

Of course, international relations are not confined to intergovernmental relations, and, in any case, everything that the term “relations between the systems” implies is conducted and regulated at the governmental level, by the groups and organizations of different states. This is obvious in such spheres of ideological struggle as the exchange of information and propaganda. A brochure containing the text of a speech by one leader can be held up in customs, and a statement by another leader can be modified or simply concealed. And diplomats have to make some sense of all this. Everyone knows what an acute problem the regulation of direct satellite television broadcasts has become, and it is a problem precisely in intergovernmental relations. And even the actions which are commonly called competition between the systems by the force of example are also mediated by foreign policy agencies. After all, the example is not simply a
specific standard of living or way of life, the degree of economic and political human rights or the nature of securing them, or one social system's proposed solutions to domestic and global problems. All of these also represent the practical foreign policy of a state. And it is this that affects the interests of other peoples, who, incidentally, also use this policy to judge the state of internal affairs.

An example must take material form and must be accessible to other people in the literal sense—it must appeal to their senses. Propaganda alone is not enough. People and items of material value (or goods, to put it more simply) must be moved across borders. It is by their appearance and behavior and by the quality of goods that the system is judged by the people for whom the example is intended when they compare these to their own surroundings. Economic, cultural, social, and other contacts are also a sphere of relations between states.

In short, practical policy also has to solve problems engendered by competition between the systems, and it must solve them in combination with the problems categorized as intergovernmental. We must continue to fight for the institution of the progressive standards of peaceful coexistence, but we must also see that they do not cover all of the problems engendered by the conflicting political interests of states. After all, these standards have already been recorded in one form or another in dozens of bilateral and multilateral documents of international law, including Soviet-American agreements. But the number and intensity of political conflicts are not diminishing, because the standards themselves and the correspondence of the behavior of other states to these standards are judged by each country on the basis of the ideological premises of its ruling class.

We can accuse each other of misunderstanding or misinterpreting the principles recorded in treaties or of violating these treaties as much as we want, but this will not bring us a single step closer to the actual resolution of international problems. It is a well-known premise of international law that states cannot be forced to fulfill their treaty obligations. Sovereign states must have an interest in observing them. Consequently, we must seek common interests or spheres of coinciding interests, and not only—if we must use the abovementioned scheme—in the sphere of intergovernmental relations but also in the interaction between socialism and capitalism as socioeconomic systems. This explanation of the policy of peaceful coexistence is recorded in the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nuclear-free and non-violent world, signed by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi. It says that “peaceful coexistence must become the universal standard of international relations...”—international, and not intergovernmental, as our official and unofficial publications stressed just recently.

The policy of peaceful coexistence is not simply a matter of reconciling a set of democratic principles, but of reconciling all of the interests of states, interests which are ultimately class-related but between which there is no fatal antagonism. “Without giving up a single iota of its national dignity and its values and interests,” M.S. Gorbachev said when he addressed the Indian Parliament, “each people and each country must be able today to direct them toward the attainment of the main goal—to save human civilization.”

The best minds in the world and millions of people of goodwill are seeking ways of achieving the mutual understanding of peoples, spheres of coinciding interests, and methods of coordinating and reconciling seemingly irreconcilable positions. Communists have a special responsibility in this work: They head one of the most powerful military and political groups, they are guided by a scientific interpretation of the processes of world development, and their ideas have tremendous influence and prestige. By constantly improving our view of the main trends in world development and international relations, our science and journalism can go further than just contrasting and criticizing the political postures of states—all the way to the materialistic analysis of the actual correlation of their forces and goals in relation to specific problems. The practical recommendations worked out on this basis in an atmosphere of glasnost can aid in translating the new political thinking into the language of diplomatic action and fill the policy of peaceful coexistence with effective content.

Footnotes

5. Ibid., p 69.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo “Nauka”, “SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya”, 1987

8588

Political, Psychological Aspects of U.S. Nuclear Strategy

[Article by I.Ye. Malashenko]

The Soviet Union's historic initiatives have created a real opportunity to take the first big steps toward a nuclear-free world. Nevertheless, there are many supporters of nuclear “deterrence” who are stubbornly arguing that it is “irreplaceable.” It has passionate supporters...
not only among U.S. policymakers but also among their colleagues in other Western countries, such as M. Thatcher, who speaks of nuclear “deterrence” as almost the only way of preventing war. In reality, the apologists for nuclear “deterrence” see it less as a means of preventing war than as an instrument for the attainment of their political goals.

It would seem that the attainment of political goals with the aid of nuclear weapons would be out of the question. Even the Reagan Administration, which began by asserting the possibility of winning a nuclear war and of “prevailing” in one, later had to admit that a nuclear war must never be fought and that there can be no winners in such a war. It appears that not all of the people in the United States are aware of this. Otherwise, how could we explain, for example, Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger’s persistent statements that the American goal in the event of a nuclear conflict would consist in “restoring the peace on terms favorable to the United States.” Ever since R. McNamara’s time, this wording has been used in American declarations as a euphemism for “winning a nuclear war.”

Many U.S. policymakers might realize the impossibility of using nuclear war as an instrument of policy but are nevertheless hoping to attain these goals with the aid of nuclear weapons. On the surface this seems to be an obvious contradiction. In reality, this is a matter of attempts to gain political advantages by using nuclear arms as a means of politico-psychological leverage. The dangerous nature of this aspect of the doctrine of “deterrence” was pointed out by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev, who said that “this is a policy of blackmail and threats and, therefore, a constant source of the arms race and the escalation of tension.”

The apologists for the doctrine of “deterrence” naturally do not admit its real purpose. “The main American defensive strategy throughout the postwar period has been the deterrence of aggression...,” C. Weinberger said. “We are striving not only to deter real aggression but also to prevent the coercion of the United States and its allies and friends with the threat of aggression.” To what “threat of aggression” was he referring? After all, the Soviet Union is not exerting political pressure on the United States or its allies with the aid of nuclear weapons. Assertions of this kind became a common feature of American propaganda long ago, but they obviously cannot serve as a basis for a realistic strategy.

As is often the case, the accusations hurled at the Soviet Union are only a mirror image of the aims of many American strategists. For example, “hawk” theorist C. Gray declared that “it is not enough to define the function of U.S. strategic forces as deterrence... Foreign policy assigns several possible coercive functions to these forces. In other words, there could be situations in which the United States would feel a strong political need to force or coerce the Soviet Union to do something it does not want to do.... This kind of coercion is part of a broader interpretation of deterrence.” In this statement, which is free of the diplomatic conventions a secretary of defense is obligated to observe, everything is spelled out clearly. It is not that the Soviet Union is “coercing” the United States to do something with the “threat of aggression”; this is a matter of forcing the USSR to change its “international behavior” and make concessions. The proponents of such views are not impressed by the fact that the Soviet Union has never given in to blackmail, including nuclear blackmail, and that it has always found ways of responding to pressure by creating an equivalent counterthreat.

Of course, even the American “hawks” realize that many of the threats dating back to the time of the U.S. atomic monopoly or U.S. nuclear superiority have lost their meaning at a time of military-strategic parity. They have not, however, given up the hope of putting the Soviet Union in a position in which it will have to yield to U.S. pressure. As M.S. Gorbachev pointed out, “each behavior pattern has its own inner logic, and when threats are used as policy instruments, there is a natural desire for each such threat to be taken seriously. This, however, necessitates the periodic reinforcement of threats with action.” The most “convincing” reinforcement of these threats could be the actual use of nuclear weapons, which has been urged several times—in different situations—by the American “hawks.” And although common sense has always prevailed in such cases to date, the logic of nuclear “deterrence” will increase the probability of disaster over the long range, and this is the principal danger.

Although nuclear weapons have not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Washington has employed every means at its disposal to intensify its politico-psychological pressure on the Soviet Union. The United States regards its nuclear strategy as the main instrument of this pressure, because it is supposed to make the threats “valid” and “convincing” (or what the Americans describe as “credible”). In a certain sense the constantly modified nuclear strategy should serve as a substitute for the actual use of nuclear weapons, and political goals or changes in the adversary’s behavior should be achieved not through the use of nuclear arms, but with the aid of more subtle methods of manipulating strategic capabilities.

What do American strategists hope to achieve with the aid of these manipulations in the situation known in the United States as “mutual assured destruction,” at the basis of which lies the “balance of terror”? Contrary to all of the public U.S. declarations. American nuclear strategy is specifically intended to create an “imbalance of terror” and a situation in which the Soviet Union’s fears are much greater than the U.S. fear of the Soviet nuclear potential. This is not simply a matter of trying to make the opponent nervous, but of using psychological factors to gain political advantages, to accomplish the “coercion” of the adversary.
The emphasis on the psychological dimension of nuclear "deterrence" is characteristic of works by American political scientists and of official statements of the last few years. The need to consider the psychological aspect as well as the purely military features of the contemporary strategic situation has been underscored, for example, in statements by C. Weinberger. The attainment of objectives in U.S. nuclear strategy, as he has said, "will depend on more than our actual military capabilities. It will also depend on how our opponents perceive these capabilities and other elements of our strategy." This emphasis on the psychological factor is no coincidence. American policymakers believe that perception, or the subjective assessment of the strategic situation, can have a considerable effect on the political decisions made in different countries, on the outcome of conflicts in various parts of the world, and on the international situation as a whole.

Although psychological considerations have been part of the calculations of American strategists ever since the birth of nuclear weapons, they have been paying special attention to this aspect under the conditions of military-strategic parity. The impossibility of using nuclear weapons and the consequent devaluation of this element of military strength have assigned priority to non-military factors, including factors of a politico-psychological nature.

These factors are taken into account during the elaboration of U.S. nuclear strategy and during the work on strategic programs. The importance of the politico-psychological dimension of the strategic balance was once heavily underscored by U.S. Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger.7

In fact, as soon as military-strategic parity became a reality, the U.S. leadership did not want the Soviet and American strategic arsenals to be perceived as equal and made every effort to gain unilateral politico-psychological advantages even in this situation. Obviously, there were and are people in the United States with the aim of tipping the military-strategic balance and acquiring real military superiority. Many members of the U.S. political community had to admit, however, that the Soviet Union would not ever allow the balance to be disrupted and would always take the appropriate countermeasures in response to new U.S. military breakthroughs. But even if real superiority is unattainable, this does not mean, as people in Washington assume, that it is impossible to create at least the illusion of superiority and thereby gain substantial advantages.

What could the basis of this illusion be? The development of today's nuclear arsenals has devalued many traditional approaches to security and politico-military stereotypes that were centuries in the making. But most people still assess the strategic situation with the aid of pre-nuclear considerations. The Washington "psychologists" are trying to take advantage of the discrepancy between these tenacious stereotypes and the realities of the nuclear-space age, to take advantage of how the Soviet-American strategic balance is perceived in the world. According to traditional assumptions, the quantitative superiority of one side in one specific field, its development of a weapons system the opponent does not have, or the elaboration of a better and finer strategy could be regarded as evidence of this side's military supremacy, with all of the ensuing politico-psychological consequences. It is not that important that most such advantages have been devalued by the existence and huge surplus of nuclear missiles—the inertia of the old way of thinking keeps many people from realizing this fact. And it is on this that Washington is relying.

Which aspects of the strategic situation have the greatest, in the opinion of Americans, politico-psychological significance? When the Soviet Union's nuclear potential was still far below the American level, the United States tried to retain its superiority in all quantitative and qualitative parameters. After the establishment of military-strategic parity, Washington had to admit that it could not gain serious advantages in several quantitative areas—a further increase in the number of strategic carriers, for example—although the United States did try to retain its superiority in several other indicators, especially the number of warheads.

After the approximate quantitative balance of USSR and U.S. nuclear arsenals (in spite of asymmetrical aspects) had been recorded in Soviet-American agreements, Washington gambled on creating the impression of the greater dynamism and qualitative superiority of its nuclear potential. The United States believed that constantly developing and dynamic strategic forces would look better and "stronger" than more static potential. For this reason, although Washington agreed to some quantitative limits on the arms race as part of the SALT process, it tried to retain the freedom to develop and perfect three weapons systems which were supposed to secure military advantages as well as substantial politico-psychological advantages. These were to be a product of the deployment of cruise missiles, the constant enhancement of warhead accuracy, and the development of increasingly "exotic" weapons systems. Today, now that the reduction of strategic offensive arms by 50 percent is being considered, Washington is once again assigning special importance to "advances in quality."

During this process, purely military criteria often became secondary, while politico-psychological considerations were assigned special importance. We know, for example, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not feel enthusiastic about the Pershing-II intermediate-range missile, preferring the modernized Pershing-IB operational-tactical missile. For political reasons, however, preference was given to the Pershing-II. Furthermore, when some experts began insisting that the deployment of these missiles would have to be rescheduled because of a series of technical problems, former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs R. Burt (now U.S. ambassador to the FRG) made the following
unequivocal statement: "It is not important if the things work or not. In the final analysis, this does not matter until a war starts. But we do need them to be installed." Similar motives played their role when decisions were being made in Washington on several other systems whose value was dubious at best from the military standpoint. "The bigger, the uglier, the nastier the weapon—the better," was what P. Warnke had to say, for example, about the considerations lying behind the technical parameters of the MX missile.

The reliance on leadership in the creation of new weapons systems and on the acquisition of politico-psychological advantages through their qualitative improvement reflects the desire to act on the "American technological superiority" that people in Washington seemed to take for granted then. If one side develops a weapons system the other side does not have, "common sense" or, more precisely, traditional thinking suggests that it is superior (the fact that the system might be completely unnecessary from the military standpoint was never taken into account). To put an end to this superiority, the potential adversary would have to develop the same kind of weapon, and during this time the United States could work on another breakthrough.

Today the United States is using declared and actual nuclear strategy, including plans for aiming nuclear arms, as an instrument of politico-psychological pressure. During congressional hearings on nuclear strategy in September 1980, Secretary of Defense H. Brown stressed that "if we want to deter the Russians, we must convince them that we have the strength and the will to retaliate. For this reason, although the operational details of our nuclear forces and plans should be kept secret, their existence and part of the important information about them should be publicized and explained for the purpose of deterrence." The content of actual U.S. military plans is brought to the attention of the Soviet side with the aid of sanctioned "leaks" to the press, carefully edited proceedings of confidential congressional hearings, etc. Obviously, sometimes the United States uses these methods simply to misinform the other side of its real intentions. The "leakage" of a certain amount of credible information, however, also serves a much more important purpose: It informs the "target" of threats which are contrary to the content of declared strategy but which correspond more to the interests of U.S. ruling circles.

Since the beginning of the 1960s nuclear strategy has been intended primarily to demonstrate the certainty of American strategists that nuclear war can be fought "rationally" and can be effectively "limited," although it is doubtful that many of them actually do believe this. In effect, they are saying that nuclear war, however destructive it might be, can nevertheless be confined within specific boundaries and that the damages caused by the use of nuclear weapons can be limited to a politically acceptable level. It is only on this condition that even the idea of using nuclear war for the attainment of political goals can be expressed and, what is most important, the effectiveness of nuclear strategy as a means of blackmail can be enhanced. In fact, if the Soviet Union refuses to accept the possibility of limiting nuclear war, the United States will be unable to "intimidate" it with the aid of the finest nuclear strategy to any greater extent than the United States itself is intimidated by the prospect of global nuclear catastrophe.

To this end, the United States is making every effort to influence the Soviet posture by stressing its determination to limit nuclear war. As Schlesinger said when he was U.S. secretary of defense, for example, "if we stay in contact with the Russian leaders during a war and can provide precise and scrupulous proof of the limited nature of our actions," this will force the other side to "observe caution." The Reagan Administration's initial comments about the possibility of "limited nuclear war" were dictated by the same desire to portray dreams as realities. This administration has still not given up these ideas. As Weinberger declared, "if deterrence does not work, the United States will be able to limit the losses of the United States and its allies as much as possible and strive for the quickest possible cessation of hostilities on terms corresponding most closely to the interests of the United States and its allies.

It is easy to see that Weinberger connects the idea of limiting nuclear war (and war-related losses) directly with the expectation of winning it. The absurdity of the hope of winning a full-scale nuclear war is apparent, as the saying goes, to the naked eye. American policymakers have never, however, given up the hope that the United States will be able to work out the kind of strategy that will guarantee victory at a lower level of nuclear conflict. This possibility is supposed to be secured for the United States by "escalation dominance" or the strategic potential to destroy the enemy at all levels of conflict, with the exception of the highest level—i.e., the level of a full-scale exchange of nuclear strikes against cities. In the event that the United States acquires the potential for escalation dominance (if the Soviet Union acknowledges the need to limit nuclear war), this will create a situation in which it could theoretically expect to win in any sequence of events. In this way, Washington hopes to tip the "balance of terror" in its own favor and to "intimidate" the USSR with the prospect of American victory, which should strengthen the American position in all international conflicts and force the USSR to retreat under unremitting politico-psychological pressure from the United States.

In reality, of course, even the potential for escalation dominance would not allow the United States to anticipate a victory in the real sense of the term because of the excessive size of today's nuclear arsenals. According to the calculations of American strategists, however, the United States could at least create the impression that it believes in the possibility of winning and is actually striving to do so (it is no coincidence that the statements of Reagan administration spokesmen about "victory" in
a nuclear war sometimes sounded like magic incantations intended to demonstrate the firmness of their belief in this possibility). Therefore, here again the United States is trying to use the gap between contemporary realities and traditional politico-psychological stereotypes to take advantage of the popular and tenacious idea that winning a nuclear war is possible in some sense and to create the impression that Washington knows the recipe for victory.

How is the Soviet Union reacting to this policy? In contrast to Washington, it is not trying to use nuclear weapons to force the United States into political concessions. By the same token, the USSR does not intend to accept U.S. pressure tactics. In its elaboration of ways of counteracting U.S. provocative moves, it is striving to surmount traditional politico-military stereotypes and has resolved to work out a new way of thinking and to use it in practice.

The simplest—and seemingly most natural—response to attempted nuclear blackmail is a repetition of the opponent’s actions: a copy of the other side’s strategic forces and an imitation of its strategy. There is something suspicious, however, about the fact that ever since parity was established the United States has made every effort to encourage the restructuring of Soviet strategic forces to make them resemble American forces as closely as possible, and demands of this kind did much to impede the conclusion of agreements within the SALT framework for many years. Washington also spared no effort to influence the development of Soviet strategy, encouraging the Soviet Union to adopt American strategic principles.

If Soviet strategic forces were to turn into a “mirror image” of the American forces, this would, in Washington’s opinion, give the United States the hope of gaining military advantages and of creating the illusion of superiority by virtue of its leading position in the arms race. If the Soviet Union should adopt American strategic postulates, the United States would finally have a completely “predictable” opponent, which is essential from the standpoint of the “rational” strategy emphasizing the need to “limit” nuclear war.

The Soviet Union has consistently refused to accept the key premise of American nuclear strategy, according to which a nuclear conflict can be limited in some way and prevented from growing into a full-scale nuclear war. This has always aroused the anger of American strategists and is regarded by them as the main obstacle to the enhancement of the politico-psychological effectiveness of U.S. nuclear strategy. Given this asymmetry of strategic approaches, they cannot hope to tip the “balance of terror” in their own favor and effectively blackmail the Soviet Union with their “superiority” in the sphere of nuclear strategy.

For many years, however, the USSR had symmetrical responses to the creation of new U.S. weapons systems—i.e., it developed and deployed similar weapons. By achieving military-strategic parity, the USSR was able to effectively neutralize the U.S. attempts at nuclear blackmail and to stabilize the situation. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Soviet leadership, this situation is far from the ideal, and the Soviet side is proposing the renunciation of nuclear “deterrence” as a basis for guaranteed security. At the 27th CPSU Congress M.S. Gorbachev stressed, “security cannot be built forever on the fear of retaliation—i.e., on the doctrines of ‘deterrence’ or ‘intimidation.’ In addition to creating the absurd and immoral situation which has made the entire world a nuclear hostage, these doctrines are stimulating an arms race which could go out of control at any time.”

The Soviet program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 was given concrete form in the USSR’s peace initiatives. Revising old approaches, it advances the principle of reasonable sufficiency and acknowledges the need not to give in to provocative U.S. actions or to build up armaments beyond the necessary level. In particular, the Soviet Union has continued to observe SALT treaty limits and has announced that it will not try to duplicate the American “Star Wars” program but will have an asymmetrical response to it. For a year and a half the USSR did not conduct any nuclear tests, in spite of the ostentatious U.S. refusal to join the Soviet moratorium and the acceleration of the American program of nuclear tests.

Could this restraint on the part of the USSR threaten heavy losses at a time when the old political thinking is still so tenacious in the world and when most people on the planet measure the strategic balance with old yardsticks? Could the United States take advantage of the disparity between the realities of the nuclear-space age and traditional thinking to successfully create the illusion of military superiority and thereby gain certain politico-psychological advantages?

Of course, this danger does exist. Many people are fully convinced that the quantitative advantages of one side or its creation of a new “superweapon” provide evidence of its “superiority.” This is why some people might still believe that the United States’ deployment of a new system of offensive weapons and its preparations for breakthroughs in space weapons mean that it is in the lead and is superior. This is another indication of the tenacity of old assumptions. But after all, the traditional stereotypes demanding the imitation of all of the adversary’s actions and the prevention of even symbolic superiority are rooted not only in the inertia of thinking itself. It is equally important that the arms race itself seemed to confirm the accuracy of these views until recently.

The Soviet Union is looking for more than just some kind of palliatives to lower the level of confrontation within the confines of traditional military rivalry. Its
refusal to adhere to the "common" logic of confrontation is intended to undermine this logic and to provide an escape from the vicious circle of the arms race. It is demonstrating the possibility of surmounting old stereotypes.

How could the Soviet Union's proposed solution to the problem of intermediate-range and operational-tactical missiles in Europe be described if not as the breakdown of firmly entrenched stereotypes? After all, the USSR agreed to scrap more warheads (and, in the case of the operational-tactical missiles, more missiles) than the United States must dismantle. From the standpoint of traditional logic, this is a major concession and a voluntary renunciation of an important politico-psychological advantage. But this is the very crux of the matter: The USSR does not intend to use its nuclear arms as a means of pressure, but is striving to deliver mankind from the nuclear danger.

Today Washington is making every effort to draw the Soviet Union into a new round of military and politico-psychological competition with the aid of the "Star Wars" program. In essence, the SDI program represents an attempt to find a way out of the strategic impasse the United States created by inventing more and more new threats within the framework of the doctrine of "deterrence" to put pressure on the USSR. As Weinberger admitted, all of its key ideas date back to the 1950's and the situation of American nuclear superiority, but "this era is gone forever." This would seem to be the right time to admit that the doctrine of "deterrence" should be discarded.

Weinberger and his colleagues, however, are striving only to strengthen "deterrence" and to "update" it with the aid of the "Star Wars" program. "The SDI program is not a renunciation of deterrence but is dictated by a desire to reinforce it," he stressed.14

With the aid of the "Strategic Defense Initiative," Washington is trying to restore the effectiveness of long-discredited means of exerting politico-psychological pressure on the USSR. To a considerable extent, the SDI is supposed to serve as new evidence of the U.S. intention to achieve limited nuclear war, and on a unilateral basis, in spite of the Soviet Union's refusal to accept the "rational" scenarios composed by American strategists. The term "limited losses" is once again being mentioned in American statements on the SDI, and we must assume that this means "acceptable" losses, in view of the otherwise obviously senseless nature of the project. This is an obvious attempt, therefore, to reinforce the terms and stereotypes with which the United States tried to tip the "balance of terror" in its own favor for many years.

The initiators of the SDI might realize that even this "superprogram" cannot rescind the realities of the nuclear-space age or bring them in line with outdated politico-military stereotypes. They are making every effort, however, to force the Soviet Union to act in accordance with the old way of thinking and are drawing it into a contest entailing the development of broad-scale ABM systems.

By diverging from familiar cliches, the USSR has already shaken the logic of traditional thinking perceptibly and has proved that blind adherence to it is not at all necessary. American policymakers and their colleagues in the West are still far from an acknowledgement of the imperatives of the new way of thinking. On the contrary, they are making every effort to take advantage of the disparity between traditional politico-military stereotypes and the realities of the nuclear-space age for their own selfish purposes and to perpetuate this disparity. They do have to admit, however, that the political dividends of their attempts to create the illusion of superiority are diminishing as more and more people surmount the inertia of the old way of thinking.

Of course, this does not happen automatically. The new initiatives of the Soviet Union, which has taken concrete steps to undermine the insidious logic of confrontation, have provided the momentum for this difficult process. Obviously, the United States' acknowledgement of the futility of its attempts to tip the balance of terror in its own favor and the impossibility of winning not only a nuclear war but also the arms race would speed up the process appreciably. Then mankind would have a chance to renounce nuclear deterrence as a shaky basis for national security and begin creating a system of common security in a nuclear-free world.

Footnotes

buttons, thread, etc.—were not up to world standards. How, in your opinion, should we build up relations with foreign firms in order to participate in international trade?

**Answer:** Joint ventures are a wonderful idea! If I am not mistaken, 21 of your ministries and 70 of your enterprises were recently granted the right to establish direct commercial contacts with foreign partners. By establishing joint enterprises and entering the world market, you can improve the quality of manufactured goods and get hard currency at the same time. I hope you will allow me to give you some advice in this connection.

Above all, the choice of the correct sites for the construction of these enterprises is crucial. If the products are intended for export, it would be best to locate them near seaports. This would get the goods to customers more quickly and reduce shipping costs.

The second important factor is the choice of partners. This should not be confined only to the companies suggesting cooperation themselves. You should seek out partners actively and establish contacts with many firms, especially multisectorial transnational corporations. The TNC's are distinguished by flexibility and have solid contacts of long standing in many countries and an efficient sales mechanism.

Your goods will not be easy to sell in the United States, because the Soviet Union does not have most-favored-nation status in trade there. I remember a few years ago when I was a member of a regional development commission and we were considering the purchase of a Soviet turbine for a hydroelectric power station in Washington State. Another turbine of this kind had been installed in a plant in Canada, and I concluded that it would be the most suitable for our purposes too. Because of the higher tariffs on Soviet goods, however, the price of the turbine rose 5 percent, and this was not a small amount in view of the cost of several million dollars. In Canada, however, where your country has been granted most-favored-nation status, Soviet turbines and other types of equipment are completely competitive. I think you should try to establish commercial relations with as many American companies as possible, on the condition that the products of joint ventures would be sold on the American market. After all, if it turns out that there is a demand for your goods, your American partners will urge Congress to grant the Soviet Union most-favored-nation status.

Incidentally, these do not necessarily have to be corporations on the east coast of the United States. You should look for partners in a variety of states. Then the congressmen representing the interests of these states in Washington will be more likely to support the expansion of economic cooperation with your country.
When you establish joint enterprises, you will naturally want to obtain the latest technology and to update it continuously. It is true that many people in the Soviet Union are not inclined to regard Nike as a high-technology firm. I do not agree with them. We invest 40 million dollars a year in product development. This year, with the aid of computers, we developed a new line of high-quality athletic footwear with a foam rubber sole. The demand now exceeds the supply. Later, however, market requirements could change, and their satisfaction will necessitate new research and new investments.

**Question:** It appears that the construction of a joint enterprise in the Estonian SSR with the Nike firm is being planned. What will it take, in your opinion, for its products to be equal in quality to those manufactured in the United States, so that they can be sold on the world market and earn profits? How can we interest Nike in supplying us with the latest technology?

**Answer:** The Nike company should be signing an agreement with the USSR Tennis Federation soon. By the terms of this agreement, it will finance the participation of Soviet athletes in international competitions. In exchange, they will advertise the firm's products by wearing its footwear. There is also a plan for a joint venture. Our company has offered to supply the necessary equipment and technology and to take care of production control. The Soviet side will build the factory and supply the manpower. Gradually, as the necessary skills are mastered, the Soviet side will perform a broader range of functions. The products will be sold in the USSR and abroad.

**Question:** How will the income be distributed?

**Answer:** In line with the amount of capital invested by each side and its share of the stock. By the terms of the agreement, the Soviet side will have 51 percent of the stock and we will have 49 percent. Later it might turn out that the value of the equipment we have supplied is greater than the value of the work performed by the Soviet side, but we intend to keep the ratio at 51:49.

Quality control is an important matter. For example, our firm produces 65 percent of its footwear in South Korea, where the reject level is below 5 percent. We produce less than 1 percent in China, where defective output can reach 50 percent because of poor quality control.

**Question:** Do you plan to train Soviet workers?

**Answer:** Yes, we must have well-trained personnel, but quality control is the main thing. It is too liberal in the USSR.

**Question:** Who will be responsible for this control?

**Answer:** I think it will be best if this is done by Americans at first. They can simultaneously teach you the methods of control.

**Question:** Who will supply the raw materials?

**Answer:** The United States will supply it in the beginning, until suitable materials have been developed in the Soviet Union. But if Soviet raw materials turn out to be more competitive because of their proximity to processing enterprises, this will be all the better. At this time, as you know, the footwear produced in the USSR by agreement with the Adidas firm is inferior in quality to the West German product, and athletes prefer the latter because it is lighter and better. I think the whole problem is that your producers have no competition. This is why they are not motivated to improve product quality.

**Question:** What can we do about the problem of most-favored-nation status? After all, part of the products should be sold in the United States.

**Answer:** Yes, this problem does exist, but it could be surmounted by exporting products first to our subdivisions in the FRG, the Netherlands, or England, and then to the United States. Direct exports to the United States from the USSR are not possible at this time, but they are possible from our English branch.

**Question:** We are not satisfied with the quality of our passenger vehicles. The products of the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant, built by the Fiat firm, in our country are inferior to the cars produced now in Italy. In addition, of course, the Volga is an outdated model. You probably know that the Gorkiy Motor Vehicle Plant was built by Ford, but today this company is building much more advanced models than our Volga. What do you think we can do to avoid lags of this kind?

**Answer:** You need joint automobile production enterprises. They have been established all over the world. Of course, the automotive industry has made great advances in recent years, but this does not mean that you cannot master Western technology.

Take a look at the IBM corporation, the world's largest producer of computers. One of the reasons for its leading position is the high number of joint ventures in many different countries. Small companies are responsible for up to 50 percent of all technical innovations today. Experts from IBM consider all of the technical proposals and, if necessary, conclude agreements on deliveries of various components, but only on the condition that the item will also be produced by companies other than the one submitting the proposal. This is done to keep IBM from becoming dependent on a small company and to lower prices and guarantee high product quality. I see this as one of the reasons for the success of IBM and other companies.

It is certainly not necessary for one firm to produce everything by itself. In the future you could order identical components for one main producer from many
small enterprises so that they will be competing with one another. This will force them to improve the quality of items. This applies to joint ventures and to purely Soviet enterprises.

**Question:** Therefore, you feel it would be expedient to ask several suppliers to manufacture components for a large enterprise and then use the best. Under these conditions, however, one enterprise will flourish while another is ruined. It will have to fire its workers, but we cannot allow unemployment. In addition, we now hope to have only profitable enterprises manufacturing high-quality items. What do you have to say about this?

**Answer:** I understand. This is one of the strengths and one of the weaknesses of the socialist system. On the positive side, everyone is guaranteed a job. Without a job a person cannot maintain his self-esteem. This is more important than money. The weakness of your system, however, is that if a person is not afraid of losing his job, he could get lazy. I think that if a small enterprise cannot make a profit, it should be converted for the production of something else.

I see another solution in the sharp reduction of wages at enterprises where performance is unsatisfactory until they improve product quality. The income of enterprises producing unsatisfactory goods declines, and wages should decline along with it.

**Question:** You already have some experience in cooperation with our country and you are working on the plans for the establishment of a joint firm, but what if our common hopes turn out to be futile, as they have several times in the past?

**Answer:** I am a very optimistic person. I believe that commercial cooperation between the USSR and the United States has a great future. And we must not dwell on past offenses. For example, I tried to establish commercial contacts with your country for many years, but I was unable to do so until now. In the past, your official representatives would ask me to submit samples, ostensibly so that they could examine our firm's products more closely. After spending our time and money on these samples, we would contact them again, but there would be no response—not even a letter or a telegram. But today I immediately received a proposal for a joint venture.

There is no question that the situation in your country is changing and that the attitudes of members of the business community and of your leaders are changing. These processes seem genuinely revolutionary to me. Your economy is being geared more and more to the international market. If Western businessmen want to establish commercial contacts with you, they should start right now.

When commercial contacts are maintained only by a few businessmen, it is easy for politicians to pressure them. But if joint enterprises are established on a mass scale, the Washington administration will be unable to refuse to issue licenses for trade with the USSR. Just ask any American businessman: We are against the policy of protectionism. This policy is wrong, and we do not need it.

**Question:** What do you think will appeal to foreign businessmen most—the Soviet market, as in the case of the Nike company, or manpower, which might be cheaper, or cheaper energy? What will attract them to the Soviet Union?

**Answer:** A great deal. Above all, any businessman who starts out on a new venture thinks about profits. He can earn profits in the USSR because you have a large consumer market. The Nike company, for example, could establish a trade firm. The Soviet rubles it earns could be invested in other sectors, such as the service sphere. For this reason, it would be most convenient to establish multisectoral joint companies, providing broader opportunities. You have many outstanding scientists who make remarkable discoveries.

**Question:** This is true. Unfortunately, the journey from the discovery to the concrete product is regrettably often too long. In some cases we have sold licenses abroad and have then had to pay through the nose for the products because of some new innovation there.

**Answer:** This is another point in favor of joint ventures. With their help, you will be able to incorporate innovations and enter the foreign market with them more quickly.

I must add that the terms of the organization of joint production are important to us, such as the complete exemption from taxes for the first 3 years. Besides this, we will not have to buy land in the USSR. After all, in Tokyo a piece of land the size of a writing desk costs millions of dollars. And if we want to sell the products of joint ventures in third countries, your proximity to the European markets will be an important consideration.

**Question:** Some people might suspect that you are trying to “colonize” the Soviet Union.

**Answer:** How can you say that! In the United States, for example, joint ventures are quite common, but no one is saying that the United States is a Japanese colony or that West Germany is a colony of South Korea. This is the pattern of economic development all over the world today. Joint ventures have been actively encouraged in my native state of Oregon in the last few years—with Japan, South Korea, and West Germany. Because of this, Oregon now produces 50 percent of all the microchips in the United States.
In conclusion, I would like to repeat that Gorbachev's new policy has made it much easier to develop contacts with you.

Editors: We thank you, Professor Ha. We hope that your experience will serve as an example to other businessmen.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo “Nauka”, “SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya”, 1987

8588

U.S. Nuclear Power Problems, Solutions
18030004f Moscow SSRA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 18 Nov 87) pp 88-94

[Article by A.L. Korovina]

[Text] In 1986 nuclear power plants in the United States produced 405 billion kilowatt-hours of electric power—more than in any other country. This was 5 percent above the previous year's figure, which had broken all records. These plants accounted for around 16 percent of all the electrical power generated in the country. Another 20 plants are in the construction stage, and by the beginning of the 1990s, when they have been completed, nuclear energy's share of the total will rise to 20 percent.

These figures were cited in “The United States Atomic Industry in 1986,” a bulletin published by the Atomic Industrial Forum, an organization uniting representatives of the country's largest power engineering companies, research centers, and labor unions. The organization's experts are concerned, however, about the future of nuclear energy in the United States if no new nuclear plants are ordered.

“Since 1978, a year before the Three Mile Island accident,” TIME magazine commented, “no commercial nuclear reactors have been ordered in the United States. And now the prospects for nuclear energy have become even bleaker.”

The debates on the problems of nuclear energy recently heated up again. This was connected with the accident in Chernobyl, with incidents in several other countries, including the United States, and with economic problems—changing conditions in the energy market and the decline of world oil prices, which diminished the commercial appeal of alternative sources of energy, including nuclear power plants. And the reliability and safety of nuclear plants are still the focus of these debates.

Nuclear Power Plants: Is There an Alternative?
The range of opinions and views is quite broad: from demands for the gradual abandonment of this source of energy to suggestions that the construction of new plants be halted and even that existing ones be shut down.

These extreme views were already being expressed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but the proposed renunciation of nuclear energy did not win public support. Even when skeptical feelings were at their highest (in spring and summer 1986), the “gradual shutdown of existing nuclear plants” was still supported only by a minority (in a poll conducted by THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper and the ABC television news service). Most experts acknowledge the importance of nuclear energy as an integral part of national power engineering.

Many American experts would agree with the point of view expressed in NEW REPUBLIC by Director T. Johnson of a research laboratory in West Point: “Some critics of nuclear power say that any risk is indefensible: We simply must use other ways to produce the electrical power we need. There is no question, however, that one day there will be no more oil. The main renewable sources of energy (solar and thermonuclear) are still dreams for some indefinite time in the distant future. We will be very lucky if safe and renewable sources of energy turn out to be practical and profitable, but pinning our hopes for the future on this would be unrealistic. Only two reliable sources are left: coal and nuclear fission reaction. Burning coal on a massive scale, however, poisons the atmosphere and our water. Over the long range, the consequences could be catastrophic for our entire planet.”

Without denying all of the serious problems connected with the development of nuclear energy, the scientist expresses the following opinion: “When we deal with technological processes entailing a definite risk, a responsible and critical approach is crucial. But it would be irrational to argue that nuclear energy is unacceptable in principle.... And taking advantage of the public's fears and lack of awareness to substantiate one's own position is irresponsible. The reasonable solution is to increase the safety of reactors...while we are still conducting research and experimental design projects with renewable sources of energy.”

Safety: Standards and Profitability

Along with the acknowledgement of the importance of using nuclear energy, there is the widespread conviction in the United States that the current level of the safety and reliability of existing nuclear plants is not high enough.

Although several measures were taken to enhance the reliability of nuclear reactors after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 (new methods of control and stricter demands on personnel), the new practices still have not reached all of the reactors with operating licenses. The fire prevention regulations instituted more than 10 years ago as a result of the serious fire in the Browns Ferry reactor in Alabama are not being observed fully either. “This inability to enforce regulations is largely due to the dispersed nature of nuclear power engineering. Each of the dozens of reactors scattered around the country has its own design, and this complicates the institution of a common set of rules considerably.”
Experts believe that the absence of a common design and common standards in nuclear power engineering in the United States is also having an adverse effect on its economic indicators. At the end of the 1960s it took less than 5 years to build a nuclear power plant, but now it can take more than 10; the interest rates on the loans commonly used for construction projects of this kind rose dramatically during this period, and this has increased costs by 40-50 percent. According to T. Johnson, the fact that American reactors and safety measures do not have to meet a single set of standards is one of the reasons why “they are working at only 55 percent of projected capacity on the average. This is almost the lowest figure in the world.... The absence of standardization complicates the issuance of licenses and raises the cost of the technical engineering services (which now account for two-thirds of construction costs) involved in the construction of each nuclear power plant.”

There is also the fear that measures to enhance the reliability of the plants could also be affected adversely by the Reagan Administration’s policy of “deregulation” and the emphasis on commercial considerations. In October 1985 the so-called “retooling rule” went into effect in the United States, envisaging feasibility studies of expenditures to increase the operational safety of nuclear plants. In the opinion of several experts, this rule puts too much emphasis on the cost of modification and not enough on the possible consequences of accidents. “This is a real attempt to take an oversimplified approach to the problem of nuclear safety,” said E. Weiss, the chief legal counsel of the Union of Concerned Scientists. As J. Esselstein, a member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), remarked, there is a “disturbing tendency to reject regulations incompatible with past operating practices.” Quoting his words, the WALL STREET JOURNAL commented that “in any case, the concern for safety has been diminishing in the government and in the nuclear industry itself.” The newspaper also cited an NRC report which was made public by Congressman E. Markey, chairman of a subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce, in which the three most serious accidents and nine other incidents in American nuclear plants between 1984 and 1986 were analyzed. “Although the facts tell us we need stronger measures to guarantee safety,” Markey stressed, “the nuclear industry and the Reagan Administration are pressuring the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the cancellation of nuclear energy regulations and the relaxation of equipment safety standards.”

Is a “Safe” Reactor Possible?

Many experts agree that the future development of nuclear power engineering will depend largely on the success in enhancing its safety and in surmounting the prejudice against this source of energy.

There are two fundamental approaches to this problem. One is connected with the development of a new type of commercial reactor which is safe in principle and which cannot, even theoretically, have any accidents serious enough to melt the core or to release radioactive substances. The other would entail the improvement and standardization of existing water-moderated reactors. The supporters of this approach are skeptical about the idea of developing a new reactor, assuming that this will entail the repetition of the entire lengthy process of designing the system and applying for licenses. Furthermore, this kind of reactor would most probably be of limited capacity. In their opinion, although the improvement of existing equipment is a less “sensational” plan, it is more realistic. They maintain that if the appropriate program is drawn up without delay, it could be carried out within 5 years and at a lower cost than the replacement of the space shuttle “Challenger.” This would have to be a national program, however, and would have to be financed by the federal government.

Nevertheless, THE NEW YORK TIMES reported, citing the opinion of Professor R. Lester, MIT nuclear engineer, more attention is being focused on “the new concept emphasizing the safety elements inherent in the very system, which ideally should exclude the possibility of accidents, than on the addition of complicated mechanisms to the reactor to guard against disaster after something goes wrong.... In other words, the main elements insuring safety would be part of the design of the reactor and would not require any kind of human intervention.” Not only have the theoretical bases of this concept been elaborated (this was the subject of, for example, an NRC report published in July 1986), but some practical steps have also been taken.

In particular, an integral fast reactor was tested last year in Idaho. This experimental 20-megawatt reactor is cooled not with water, but with molten sodium, which can absorb far more heat. Reactors of this kind are to be submerged in a pool of molten sodium. Besides this, the reactor does not use the conventional uranium oxide, but an alloy—75 percent uranium, 15 percent plutonium, and 10 percent zirconium. One of the important properties of this fuel is its ability to stop the release of energy when the unit overheats. This concept also presupposes a new method of fuel processing based on electrical precipitation instead of chemical extraction. This requires less cumbersome equipment and reduces the quantity of radioactive waste. The simpler processing system could be situated within the reactor complex, and this would reduce the danger of the theft of nuclear fuel and prevent accidents during transport. The new reactor is being developed by Argonne National Laboratory specialists in conjunction with the General Electric and Rockwell International companies, which are spending a total of around 70 million dollars a year on the project.

This concept, however, is still arousing considerable controversy, and experts believe it requires more thorough investigation. According to most American experts, the most successful research into “safe” reactors is now being conducted in Sweden and the FRG. The American
press is giving this research extensive coverage. In particular, Sweden is developing the PIUS (process inherent ultimately safe) system—a conventional reactor immersed in a giant pool of water. If the primary cooling system fails, the water in the pool floods the reactor core. In addition, it contains a substance to absorb the neutrons and stop the chain reaction.

One of the advantages of the modular high-temperature gas reactor developed in the FRG is that if anything should go wrong, the reactor would simply cool down without releasing any radiation. Another advantage is that its principal components could be mass-produced: The reactor itself generates only 80 megawatts of power, but several such 80-megawatt modules could be combined to make up a large plant. A model of the reactor has been tested in the FRG; similar research is being conducted by GA Technologies, an American company. According to experts, with a concentrated effort the production of the modular reactors could start in 1996. This concept, the American press commented, received "support from an unexpected source"—the Union of Concerned Scientists. R. Pollard, a nuclear engineer and union spokesman who has urged the shutdown of all U.S. nuclear plants, said that this kind of reactor "is a much better idea than current reactors."

Nevertheless, in spite of existing or anticipated technological breakthroughs, the opinion that technology alone cannot guarantee the necessary level of nuclear plant safety and reliability is being expressed more and more frequently. "The two most serious accidents occurred in the United States and the Soviet Union—the two countries with the strongest technical base," F. Graham, vice president of the Atomic Industrial Forum, stressed in this connection. The development and reinforcement of international cooperation in nuclear power engineering, including cooperation through the IAEA mechanism set up for this purpose, should become an important factor in the reliable functioning of nuclear plants, and this opinion is winning increasing support.

Nuclear Power Engineering and Nuclear Weapons

The debates on the prospects for the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes in the United States stimulated a discussion of the dangers connected with the production and testing of nuclear weapons. THE NEW YORK TIMES recalled, for example, that 11 atomic tests were conducted in the United States in 1953: "All of these tests were conducted aboveground, and each was accompanied by radioactive fallout far in excess of the radiation released in Chernobyl."

The reactor, the SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER remarked, "is the prototype of much larger systems with atomic power plants.... The reactor project is a significant part of the space defense system because it will require so much electrical power that experts believe only a nuclear reactor can satisfy these needs."

Reactors used for military purposes and not subject to civilian regulations are arousing increasing anxiety in the United States. According to the MERCURY NEWS, there are 22 nuclear reactors in the San Francisco Bay Area, and the greatest potential threat is posed by the 19 installed on aircraft carriers, naval ships, and submarines with local ports of registry. Navy spokesmen, the newspaper asserted, regularly conceal information about incidents involving military atomic reactors. Just recently it was learned that an accident in 1975 on the cruiser "California," stationed on the naval base in Alameda, had caused radioactive leak to leak out of the reactor cooling system. A similar accident occurred 2 years later when the ship was docked in Norfolk for repairs. In 1985 incidents took place in eight reactors on the aircraft carrier "Enterprise" in San Francisco Bay.

The atomic reactors of the Department of Energy, which are used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, constitute a more serious problem, according to the American press. "Because they are under federal authority," THE LOS ANGELES TIMES remarked, "the reactors of the Energy Department, more than 50 nuclear installations in 11 states, are not under the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and are not subject to the commission's commercial reactor regulations."

Articles in the press clearly point up the conflict between the development of nuclear arms and the safety requirements in the nuclear military industry. "The Reagan Administration," THE WASHINGTON POST reported, "is hoping to use a series of obsolete nuclear reactors as the basis for the most massive strategic arms buildup of the last 20 years.... All of these reactors have caused environmental problems."

The Pentagon's plans to use nuclear reactors as an important component of the "Star Wars" program have also been one of the topics discussed recently in connection with the use of the energy of the atom for military purposes. A branch of the General Electric company in Silicon Valley is now building an experimental model of a reactor with the equivalent of 300 kilowatts of electrical power for satellite-launching into orbit. "This reactor," the SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER remarked, "is the prototype of much larger systems with atomic power plants.... The reactor project is a significant part of the space defense system because it will require so much electrical power that experts believe only a nuclear reactor can satisfy these needs." According to J. Johnson, director of the SDI Organization office of advanced science and technology, the power requirements of the elements of the "Star Wars" system will be
equivalent to "much of the energy generated by the eastern network of electric power plants in the United States." Expenditures on research into the development of atomic sources of energy for the space ABM system could total almost 4.5 billion dollars by 1991.

All of this, the critics of the SDI have noted, is inconsistent with President Reagan's statements about the nature of the "strategic initiative." "The military establishment promised that the Star Wars program would not be nuclear and that its systems would not be in our backyard. The reactors orbiting the earth at an altitude of 100 miles, however, will be closer to us than the nuclear plant in Diablo Canyon," stressed D. Hirsch, director of the Stevenson College Nuclear Policy Research Program at the University of California in Santa Cruz. There is also the fear that an accident during the launching of atomic power plants into space could result in the radioactive pollution of the territory within a radius of several miles around the launch site. There is also some concern about what will happen when the service life of these reactors comes to an end (in 7 years). Not all experts agree with General Electric consultant N. Brown's opinion that the reactors will be at such a high altitude that they will not return to earth until the decay of radioactive waste has reached a safe level, or with the statements of Pentagon spokesmen that the satellite will stay in a "nuclear-safe" orbit for 300 years. These experts have pointed out the possibility that the satellite might gradually leave its orbit, approaching the earth, as Skylab did, for example, in 1979. Besides this, as engineer S. Aftergood warned in an article in the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (October 1986), after 7 years in orbit this 300-kilowatt reactor could leave longer-lived radioactive waste in space than the radioactive pollution from 300 bombs like the one dropped on Hiroshima. Furthermore, the reactor which is to be used as part of the SDI system will have 10 times the power of the experimental model.

Of course, the discussion of problems connected with nuclear disarmament should not be regarded simply as a "derivative" of the current arguments in the United States over the safety of nuclear sources of energy used for commercial purposes. "The public concern about nuclear arms increased even before the Chernobyl accident, in connection with President Reagan's decision to continue underground nuclear tests in spite of the moratorium announced by the Russians," 13 In addition to all of this, stressed J. Grunebaum, executive director of the national nuclear freeze campaign, the incidents in civilian atomic installations confirm the "impossibility of relying on technology in the nuclear age and prove that security will depend ultimately on mutual political understanding."

Footnotes

1. TIME, 21 July 1986, p 60.
4. Ibid.
5. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 6 May 1986.
8. NEW REPUBLIC, 14 July 1986, p 32.
10. Ibid.
11. TIME, 21 July 1986, p 60.
13. THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 8 June 1986.
15. MERCURY NEWS, 6 May 1986.
17. THE WASHINGTON POST, 6 May 1986.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo “Nauka”, “SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya”, 1987

8588

Table of Contents for Year 1987

1803004g Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIY in Russian No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 18 Nov 87) pp 123-127

[Text]

Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution

Berezhkov, V.M., "October, America, and the Myth of the 'Soviet Threat,'" No 9


Henry, Ernst, "Lenin and America," No 11

Gilenson, B.A., "He Witnessed the Birth of a New World," No 10
Izakov, B.R., "Seventy Years," No 11
Petrov, P.S., "Solidarity with Soviet Russia," No 11
Yakushevskiy, A.S., "Intervention Against Soviet Russia," No 11

For Students in Party Educational System
Belov, A.M., "U.S. Transnational Banks in the 1980's," No 1
Berezhkov, V.M., "Two Concepts of Security," No 4
Davydov, V.F., "The Rarotonga Treaty and Washington," No 1
Korniyenko, G.M., "New Phase of Anti-Nuclear Struggle," No 10
Nikiforov, A.V., "United States in World Oil Market," No 6
Nikiforov, A.V., "Peaceful Coexistence and New Thinking," No 12

Articles
Alekhin, B.I., "Canada and Free Trade," No 6
Belov, A.M., "U.S. Transnational Banks in the 1980's," No 1
Berezhkov, V.M., "Two Concepts of Security," No 4
Berezhkov, V.M., "October, America, and the Myth of the 'Soviet Threat,'" No 9
Vasilyev, A.A., Gerasiev, M.I., and Kokoshin, A.A., "Asymmetrical Response (Possible Countermeasures to SDI)," No 2
Vlasikin, V.A. and Chervonnaya, S.A., "Rightwing Extremist Terrorism Under the Cover of 'Democracy,'" No 4
Henry, Ernst, "Lenin and America," No 11
Gilenson, B.A., "He Witnessed the Birth of a New World," No 10
Gladkov, P.V., "In Search of 'Alternative Values,'" No 7
Davydov, V.F., "The Rarotonga Treaty and Washington," No 1
Zaychenko, A.S., "Income and Consumption. The American Middle-Income Family," No 12
Zubok, V.M. and Karaganova, I.O., "The Democrats After the Elections," No 1
Izakov, B.R., "Seventy Years," No 11
Izymov, A.I., "Democratization of Ownership in American Corporations," No 7

Anichkina, V.S., "On the Road to the White House," No 7

Beglova, N.S., "Crisis in the Persian Gulf," No 12

Belova, T.Ye., "The 'Baby-Boom' Generation in Politics," No 9

Berezhnykh, O.A., "First Armored Turret Ship," No 9

Voyna, V.A., "How To Save the Future," No 5


Galkin, I.V. and Yazkov, Ye.F., "The Moscow State University Laboratory of American Studies," No 8

Gorbunov, S.V., "The Declining Exchange Rate of the Dollar: Causes and Consequences," No 4

Guseva, V.S., "Battle for the Future," No 6

Guseva, V.S., "Television Evangelists and Their Flock," No 12

Kalugin, V.I., "Washington and Greece," No 8

Kozin, V.P., "United Nations and Naval Limitations," No 10

Kunitsyn, A.V., "The Lifting of Sanctions Against Poland," No 6


Litavrin, P.G., "The United States and Political Changes in Latin America," No 4

"Fiftieth Anniversary of First Flight from USSR to United States," No 7

Sitnikov, B.P., "Narcotics and Politics," No 3

Sitnikov, B.P., "Mulroney's 'New Beginning,'" No 2


Todorova, L., "The Latest Technology and the Export of American Culture," No 2

Turkatenko, N.D., "The Iran Affair and Its Consequences," No 1

Chernov, V.L., "From the 'Truman Doctrine' to Reagan's 'Neoglobalism,'" No 3

Economic Surveys

Gluskin, E.A. and Tuchapskiy, K.O., "United States in International Shipping," No 2


Kondratyev, V.B., "Regional Peculiarities of U.S. Industrial Development," No 8

Kuteynikov, A.A. and Supyan, V.B., "Economic and Social Aspects of Data Processing," No 3

Mikheyev, A.N., "The 200-Mile Fishing Zone," No 4

Parkanskiy, A.B., "U.S. Foreign Trade in the Middle of the 1980's," No 6

Skvortsov, B.V., "Energy Problems in Civil Aviation," No 9

Starostenkova, Ye.Ye., "Canada: Economic Conditions in the 1980's," No 1

Starostenkova, Ye.Ye., "Tax Reform in Canada," No 12

Tikhonov, O.V., "Reagan Administration Tax Policy," No 11

Interviews

"Women Speak Out," No 10

"Canadian Professor on Current Issues," No 6

"PRAVDA Sold on American Newsstands," No 8

"Professor Joseph Ha on Joint Ventures," No 12

Toffler, Alvin, "This Is a Special Moment in Your History," No 1

On Capitol Hill

Vasilkov, V.Yu., "Congress and Sanctions Against South Africa," No 2

Veremyeva, Ye.M., "Congress and the White House," No 10

Ivanov, Yu.A., "Difficult Problems Facing Congress," No 4

Turkatenko, N.D., "An Inquiry into Scientific and Technical Cooperation," No 6
Culture and Life

Ivanov, V.A., “Discussions of Canadian Film,” No 5
Kartseva, Ye.N., “American Film in the 1980’s: Strokes for a Portrait,” No 6
Mulyarchik, A.S., “A Tour of Literary America,” No 3

Scanning the Press

Spandaryan, V.B., “Bilateral Dependence,” No 9

Translators and Digests

Bellah, R., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W., Swidler, A. and Tipton, S., “Habits of the Heart” (digest), Nos 8-12
“Tower Commission Report,” No 7

Melman, Seymour, “An Economic Alternative to the Arms Race,” Nos 4, 5 (concluding remarks by V.P. Konobeyev, No 5)

Naisbitt, J. and Aburdene, P., “Re-Inventing the Corporation” (continuation), Nos 1-3

Science and Technology

Belyayeva, T.T., “The Role of the Electronics Industry in the Arms Race,” No 1

Lebedeva, Ye.A., “The ‘Brain Transfer’ to the United States,” No 3
Savinov, A.I., “Development of Electronics,” No 11
Sokolov, V.I., “Water Conservation and Diversion in the United States,” No 8

Khorkov, V.T., “Prospects for Astronautics, American Model,” No 10

Management


Agriculture

Mikheyev, A.N. and Shcheglov, I.A., “Crop Production Machinery,” No 12
Sotnikov, S.V., “Biotechnology in Agriculture,” No 11

Bibliography

Izakov, B.R., “Dangerous Blunders,” No 4
Usachev, I.G., “Roots of U.S. Expansionism,” No 11
Shaskolskiy, A.I., “A Depressing and Ruinous Venture,” No 9

Book Reviews

“Amerikanskiye vnutrenniye prioritety. Ekonomicheskaya otsenka” [American Domestic Priorities. An Economic Appraisal] (Sokolov, V.I.), No 5

Ashin, G.K., “Sovremennyye teorii elity: kriticheskiy ocherk” [Contemporary Theories of the Elite: Critical Survey] (Zubok, V.M.), No 2

Brown, N. and Farrar-Hockley, A., “Nuclear First Use” (Davydov, V.F.), No 5


Broad, William J., “Star Warriors” (Gladkov, P.V.), No 5

Wiarda, H., “Ethnocentrism in Foreign Policy: Can We Understand the Third World?” (Kolobov, O.A. and Sergunin, A.A.), No 1
“Panorama of Diversion, or the Image of Poland in ‘Voice of America’ Propaganda in 1982-1984” (Bolshakov, S.I.), No 2

“Shared Destiny: Fifty Years of Soviet-American Relations” (Bursov, A.V.), No 2

Pinchot, Gifford, III, “Intrapreneuring” (Ivanov, M.M.), No 7

“Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War. A Book of Readings” (Churmanteyev, A.V.), No 3

Roche, Douglas, “Canada and the Pursuit of Peace” (Israelyan, Ye.V.), No 6


De Sa Rego, Carlos and Tornello, Fabrizio, “La guerre des etoiles” (Kireyev, V.P.), No 8

“The Soviet Union in the Third World, 1980-85” (Pyadyshcheva, Ye.B.), No 7

“USA—Aussenpolitik in der Gegenwart,” by Claus Montag et al (Puzanov, S.Ye.), No 9

Ferguson, T. and Rogers, J., “Right Turn. The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics” (Razmustov, V.B.), No 8

Formanek, Miloslav, “Ideologie a politika neokonservatismu” (Zadorozhnyuk, I.Ye.), No 10


Hammer, Armand and Lyndon, Neil, “Hammer. Witness to History” (Sidoruk, A.F.), No 11

Herken, Gregg, “Counsels of War” (Kobrinskaya, I.Ya.), No 3

“Shirokomasshtabnaya protivoraketnaya sistema i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost” [The Broad-Scale Anti-missile System and International Security] (Glebovich, V.G.), No 1


“Canadian Industry in Transition” and “Industrial Policy” (Alekhin, B.I. and Shapyrina, O.A.), No 9

“The Economy in Deficit,” edited by Philip Cagan (Gorbunov, S.V. and Deykin, A.I.), No 6

“U.S. Economic Expansion: Western Europe,” “U.S. Economic Expansion: Latin America,” and “U.S. Economic Expansion: Asia and Africa” (Shifrin, I.A.), No 3

Epstein, J.M., “The 1987 Defense Budget” (Travkina, N.M.), No 7


Books in Brief

Alekhin, B.I. and Komkova, Ye.G., “Kanada v mirovoy torgovle” [Canada in World Trade] (Biryukova, Ye.A.), No 8

“Antimarksistskiye ideyno-politicheskiye techeniya i problemy obschestvennogo razvitiya” [Anti-Marxist Politico-Ideological Currents and Problems in Social Development] (Deyev, V.A.), No 7

Bogina, Sh.A., “Ethnokulturnyye protsessy v SSSR” [Ethnocultural Processes in the United States (Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries)] (Yevtukh, V.B.), No 10


Lisitsyn, Ye.N., “Ekologicheskiye politika SSSR. Gosudarstvenno-pravovoye regulirovanie okhrany okruzhayushchey sredy” [U.S. Ecological Policy. Governmental Regulation of Environmental Protection] (Sokolov, V.I.), No 8


Punin, Ye.I., “Tsenoobrazovaniye v mezhdunarodnoy torgovle. Teoriya i praktika formirovaniya tsen v usloviyakh NTR” [Prices in International Trade. Theory and Practice of Pricing at a Time of Technological Revolution] (Bobrakov, Yu.I.), No 8
Savelyev, V., “SShA: krizis zakonodatelnoy vlasti” [Crisis of U.S. Legislative Branch] (Zyablyuk, N.G.), No 10


Shomina, Ye.S., “Kontrasty amerikanskogo goroda (sotsialno-geograficheskiye aspekty urbanizatsii)” [Contrasts of the American City (Sociogeographic Aspects of Urbanization)] (German, G.N.), No 9

Politics and People


“William Webster—New Director of the CIA,” No 6

“Frank C. Carlucci—New Assistant to the U.S. President for National Security Affairs,” No 2

Background Material


Litvinova, M.A. and Orlov, V.N., “Congressional Information and Analysis Services,” No 4

Makarevskiy, V.I., “Conventional Weapons,” No 11


Orlov, V.N., “Presidential Papers,” No 8

Fedorov, B.G., “U.S. Futures,” No 12

“Conference of Young Scholars of American Affairs,” No 6

Essays on American States

Introduction, No 2; Vermont and New Hampshire, No 4; Connecticut, No 6; Massachusetts, No 5; Maine, No 3; New England, No 2; New Jersey, No 9; New York, No 10; Pennsylvania, No 12; Rhode Island, No 7; Middle Atlantic States, No 9

Canadian Affairs

Alekhin, B.I., “Canada and Free Trade,” No 6

Alekhin, B.I., “Canada-PRC: Broadening the Horizons of Cooperation,” No 8

Danilov, S.Yu. and Cherkasov, A.I., “Canadian National Emblem, Flag, and Anthem.” No 5

Ivanov, V.A., “Discussions of Canadian Film,” No 5

“Canadian Professor on Current Issues,” No 6


“Northwest Territories,” No 1


Starostenkova, Ye.Ye., “Canada: Economic Conditions in the 1980’s,” No 1


Filatov, S.B., “Catholicism in Canadian Sociopolitical Affairs,” No 3

Cherkasov, A.I., “The Maple Leaf—Symbol of Canada,” No 3

“Yukon,” No 1

Answers to Readers’ Questions


Gasanov, R.M., “Industrial Espionage,” No 1

Danilov, S.Yu. and Cherkasov, A.I., “Canadian National Emblem, Flag, and Anthem.” No 5


Cherkasov, A.I., “The Maple Leaf—Symbol of Canada,” No 3

Chronology of Soviet-American Relations

Nos 1, 4, 7, 10

Letters to Editor

Nos 4, 7, 8, 9

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo “Nauka”, “SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya”, 1987

8588
Articles Not Translated from SSHA:
EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No
12, December 1987
18030004h Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA,
IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 87 (signed to
press 18 Nov 87) pp 1-2

Income and Consumption: American Middle-Income
Family (A.S. Zaychenko) ...................... pp 31-41

Crisis in Persian Gulf (N.S. Beglova) ........... pp 52-58

Television Evangelists and Their Flock (V.S. Guseva).. pp 58-61

Tax Reform in Canada (Ye.Ye. Starostenkova) ...... pp 62-66

Bicentennial of American Constitution (I.Ye. Korzheva)
................................................ pp 71-73

Habits of the Heart (Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen,
William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, Steven M. Tipton) .. pp 74-87

Crop Production Machinery (A.N. Mikheyev, I.A.
Shcheglov) ........................................ pp 95-102

Review of "American Capitalism in 1980's. Natural

Review of "Faces of the Enemy. Reflections of the
Hostile Imagination" by Sam Keen (A.V. Churmante-
yev) ............................................. pp 106-108

U.S. Futures (B.G. Fedorov) ....................... pp 109-114
Pennsylvania (M.S. Kalashnikova) ............... pp 115-122

Publication Data
18030004i Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA,
IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 87 (signed to
press 18 Nov 87)

English title: USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEO-
LOGY

Russian title: SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA,
IDEOLOGIYA

Editor: V.M. Berezhkov

Publishing house: Izdatelstvo Nauka

Place of publication: Moscow

Date of publication: December 1987

Signed to press: 18 November 1987

Copies: 31,000

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekono-
mika, politika, ideologiya", 1987

8588