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Military Aspect of Common European Home
18070158a Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN
in Russian
No 7, Jul 88 (signed to press 23 Jun 88) pp 81-88

[Article by Sergey Aleksandrovich Karaganov, candidate of historical sciences, department chief in the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Europe: "The Military Aspect of the 'Common European Home'"]

[Text] The debate on the future of Europe is unfolding in all the countries of the continent and across the ocean. It is becoming increasingly obvious that real prerequisites are being created for moving forward to the building in Europe of a new security system that is more humane and more oriented on humankind and that overcomes the military division and is based on cooperation and good-neighborliness among all European states. It is precisely this kind of security system that lies behind the popularity that is being rapidly gained by the concept of the "common European home."

The prerequisites in the military-political field are obvious, but they have still not been the subject of extensive discussion on our country. They are considered in this article.

The late sixties and first half of the seventies were evidently the last period in the development of military-strategic relations between the United States and its allies—a period that was relatively favorable even with all the crisis phenomena. The crisis in NATO originating in the sixties and resulting from recognition of the consequences stemming from the strategic vulnerability of the United States and the advancement of the concept of "flexible response" in its initial American version, had by that time been partially overcome. The NATO version of the concept of "flexible response" was a compromise designed to paper over the existing disagreements.

From the latter half of the sixties and the beginning of the following decade the increase in the quantitative makeup and the greater combat capability of the U.S. nuclear potential in Europe, and the rapid buildup of U.S. strategic forces through deployment of multiple reentry vehicles to some extent halted the declining trust of U.S. allies in the reliability of the U.S. "nuclear guarantees." The development of detente processes in Europe calmed the fears of the West Europeans and made their remaining doubts about the reliability of those "guarantees" less significant, and in general reduced the significance of the military sphere in East-West relations.

The recognition by many American leaders and military strategists in the late sixties that the Warsaw Pact did not possess any kind of substantial advantages in terms of the combat potential of its general purpose armed forces somewhat alleviated the concern that had traditionally existed in West Europe.

This lessening of concern was also helped by the serious complication of Sino-Soviet relations in the sixties and seventies. Most West European leaders thought that this was diverting USSR forces and reducing the possibility of "pressure" on West Europe. In the eyes of many West Europeans the balance of military power had shifted in favor of the West. One of the first to express this thought was Ch. de Gaulle.¹ Thus, West Europe moved on to detente under conditions of a balance of military power that had shifted strategically but apparently also favored the West tactically. Detente processes were not so unambiguously linked to the change in this relationship in favor of socialism, as was widely asserted in those years.

From the mid-Seventies the military-strategic situation started to change. Eliminating the U.S. advantages, the Soviet Union responded by initiating the deployment of MRV's on its own ICBM's and then on its submarine-launched ballistic missiles. As a result, what occurred was, to use the formulation of the eminent Soviet expert on military strategy G.A. Trofimenko, "a real situation of Soviet-U.S. parity: not simply the numerical equality of the sides' strategic launchers but equality in terms of the real combat capabilities of their strategic forces."² This situation took shape at the turn of the Seventies and Eighties but military strategists had understood beforehand that it was inevitable.

From the standpoint of West European experts and the politicians whom they served, it turned out that the USSR had acquired both flexibility and counterforce potential in its strategic forces, that is, as far as the U.S. leadership was concerned, the ability to "respond at the same level" against military targets on American territory. This meant that Washington's readiness to deliver a first, "limited" nuclear strike against targets on Soviet territory was undermined, and this implicated the concept of the U.S. "nuclear guarantees" in the event that NATO should be losing a war in Europe.

As is known, the Soviet Union rejects the concept of "limited nuclear war." But, following American experts, West European strategists do not believe the Soviet statements and ascribe to the USSR plans and intentions similar to their own. And in so doing they fall into the trap of their own logic.

These misgivings were openly expressed by one of West Germany's most influential strategists, U. Nerlich: "Without the invulnerability of U.S. ICBM's, expanded containment is no longer a realistic goal. [...] ...the possibility that [the Soviet Union] will strike U.S. ICBM's in response to a limited strategic attack within

the framework of a European conflict would serve rather to place limits on flexibility right from the very start"³ (that is, there can no longer be any kind of "limited" strike).

In the opinion of the West the USSR has "severed" the last, and for the West European capitals, the most valuable step on the "staircase of escalation," that the United States had until recently been strengthening through the buildup of its own forces and the "Schlesinger doctrine." This change in the situation will evidently be irreversible into the foreseeable future. No buildup by the United States of its counterforce advantages, flexibility or survivability can—in the eyes of Washington and the West European capitals—deprive the USSR of a theoretical capability for a "limited" retaliatory strike against targets in the United States, neutralizing the threat of a U.S. "limited" first strike against Soviet territory.

The concern of military-political circles in the West European NATO countries was deepened even more seriously by the change in the military balance. Before the latter half of the Seventies, in NATO they proceeded from the premise of that bloc's possession of superiority in nuclear forces in the "European theater of military operations." As was noted in a report of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, during the early stages of the SALT-II negotiations (in the mid-seventies) it was considered that "the United States possesses major advantages in the strategic field, while NATO possesses advantages in the field of theater nuclear forces."⁴ In an official report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the highest military organ in the United States—presented to the Congress in 1978 it was asserted that "overall the United States has retained its superiority in theater nuclear forces but should continue to develop and deploy new systems so as to respond to the challenge of Soviet modernization efforts."⁵

This superiority was counted by proceeding both from the larger number of nuclear weapons at NATO's disposal and attached to it, and from the qualitative and quantitative advantages in terms of delivery vehicles. It was thought that Soviet nuclear forces earmarked for a retaliatory strike in Europe were largely vulnerable. The following is a typical example of these kinds of calculations. "Even in the mid-Seventies the nuclear balance in Europe was in NATO's favor," Pentagon and U.S. Congress consultant J. Record wrote. "The alliance possessed a 2:1 superiority in the number of weapons that they could deliver, and major qualitative advantages in terms of delivery vehicles, especially aircraft. The Warsaw Pact had virtually no artillery capable of shooting down nuclear weapons or the aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, such as the F-111 and the F-4. Both at the level of battlefield weapons and the level of nuclear weapons the Warsaw Pact relied on the relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles and high-yield weapons; which

virtually denied them selective, flexibly controlled use. Soviet long-range systems consisted of obsolescent and in many cases obsolete missiles and aircraft."⁶

In the opinion of American strategists, from the mid-seventies the situation was rapidly transformed. According to Western figures, the USSR started to deploy a new generation of tactical and operational-tactical missiles and short-range and medium-range missiles that were more accurate, survivable and mobile. The number of artillery tubes available to the troops and capable of firing nuclear weapons grew rapidly. Deployment of a new generation of aircraft was initiated, capable, so it was considered in the West, of carrying nuclear weapons, including the Backfire (in the Western terminology) medium bomber. Modernization of the air defense system made penetration by NATO bombers and fighter-bombers to their targets more difficult.⁷ As a result by 1979-1980, according to official assessments by the U.S. Department of Defense, the Warsaw Pact had achieved parity with NATO in terms of nuclear forces in Europe.⁸

The SS-20 (RSD-10) missiles were not the only reason for all these shifts, but it was they that mainly become a symbol of them; which explains in part why they (and, it must be admitted, not without success) were nominated as the pretext to justify the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles. As the well-known English expert H. Strachen wrote, "the SS-20 means that NATO no longer possesses the capability of escalation dominance at the level of battlefield nuclear weapons." In the words of the Carter Administration's Secretary of State C. Vance, in the late Seventies Washington was concerned that "deployment of the SS-20 missile might lead to an erosion of the advantages in nuclear forces in the European theater on which NATO has been pinning its hopes since the fifties."⁹

The impression was created that the fact that before the late Seventies (at least as they saw it in the West) the USSR had been lagging seriously in terms of nuclear forces in Europe had passed unnoticed by our science and practical policy.

It is difficult to explain in any other way why when we caught up we announced that parity existed (although this kind of adjusted parity obviously was not a separate category of the nuclear arsenal in Europe, namely intermediate-range forces, needed arbitrarily for negotiation. For, as was also pointed out in the Soviet statements, NATO had a one-and-half-times advantage in the number of weapons that could be delivered by Western intermediate forces in a single launch or sortie).

It is thought that if our position at the negotiations had proceeded from the actual state of affairs, that is, from the fact that the USSR **had been catching up**, it would have been much more convincing for the public in the West. But the NATO propagandists were robbed of the opportunity to undermine trust in us when they pointed

out that in the opinion of the USSR parity in intermediate forces had existed both in 1979 and in 1982, despite the buildup of the total number of intermediate-range weapons.

The Soviet Union did not achieve the nuclear "superiority" of which it was accused as the result of the measures proposed to modernize the nuclear potential in Europe. But in the eyes of an overwhelming majority of experts and politicians in the West what undoubtedly had happened was that the USSR had altered the nuclear balance, and at the turn of the seventies and eighties had eliminated NATO's superiority at the level of the nuclear balance in Europe.

In NATO they saw that in addition to the formation of strategic parity *de facto* that bloc had lost is capability for "escalation dominance" at the lower levels of nuclear conflict that they thought they possessed previously. According to U.S. views, this capability means denying the enemy a rational opportunity to escalate an armed conflict since each new level would mean that he was in an even more unfavorable position than before. "Escalation dominance" was the theoretical foundation of the concept of "nuclear first strike in Europe," and of hopes of "limited" nuclear war and "victory" in it. All these ideas were designed to confirm the reliability of the "nuclear guarantees."

Hopes of realizing these concepts were dashed—the "guarantees" had lost their plausibility. The entire theoretical underpinning of NATO strategy had been torn down.

The fact that the steps taken by the USSR were defensive in nature led precisely to the augmentation of strategic parity by nuclear balance at the European level, and not to "superiority," as the NATO propagandists later began to assert; and in materials not intended for general consumption many U.S. and West European experts in the main acknowledged this to be true. In particular, a leading analyst at the Rand Corporation, B. Lambeth, wrote that as a result of the change in the nuclear balance both at the central and European levels, "the United States has effectively lost the capability of escalation dominance over the USSR thanks to the fact that Moscow has achieved strategic parity and parity at the theater level."¹⁰

This very same conclusion was later confirmed by a very authoritative Rand report dealing with work on a program for the development of NATO: "Changes in the armed forces of the USSR have undermined the capability for escalation dominance that NATO previously possessed, and have enabled the USSR to worry less than previously about the threat of escalation in a conflict."¹¹

J. Record formulated extremely precisely the meaning of the changes that had taken place. He pointed out that it amounted to "a further undermining of the plausibility of the strategy of flexible response proclaimed by NATO.

As it is, the viability of flexible response, now seriously weakened by the loss of superiority in the field of strategic forces and the continuing lagging in conventional forces, has been basically emasculated... Even NATO's loss of strategic superiority could have been tolerated if the alliance had maintained major advantages in nuclear forces in Europe. Superior nuclear forces in the TVD's would have continued to serve as plausible insurance in the event that non-nuclear defense would be overwhelmed, and would have offered significant opportunities for escalation dominance, at least at the lower and middle levels... Unfortunately, all parts of the NATO triad (strategic forces, theater nuclear forces, conventional forces—author) have been undermined. For at least a decade use of NATO nuclear weapons in Europe will for sure be unable to alter the course and result of any conflict but only increase the numbers of casualties among the military and civilian population on both sides."¹²

In the perception of most experts and politicians in the West, these shifts led to qualitative change in the military-political situation in Europe. Obviously this assessment corresponds in general with the actual state of affairs.

Through its measures of a defensive nature the Soviet Union had virtually neutralized the threat of deliberate U.S. and NATO use of nuclear weapons at any level, and emasculated the "nuclear first-strike" concept. Now, in the eyes of Western strategists such a strike at any level would threaten not only escalation to all-out nuclear war but does not even hold out the promise of any kind of nuclear advantages. The idea that the Soviet Union has acquired the capability "of responding at the same level" made first strike essentially unthinkable even from the theoretical standpoint. The structures with which Western strategists tried to substantiate the reliability of the "guarantees," the concept of "expanded containment" and so forth have been destroyed.

In our opinion this meant the following. The efforts by the Soviet people to strengthen the defense capabilities of the USSR led to a major reduction in the threat of attack against the Soviet Union and to a strengthening of the security of our country and its allies. For, as is known, in the eyes of U.S. strategists, the concept of first strike was designed not only to be the basis of the "nuclear guarantees" but also a threat to unleash nuclear war against the USSR and a tool to exert pressure on the socialist countries. Not only the threat of nuclear aggression has been reduced, but also the threat of attack using only conventional weapons. By to some extent "decoupling" nuclear weapons, the USSR has seriously weakened NATO's potential offensive capabilities.

And not only because NATO's sharply reduced capability to use nuclear weapons obviously means also a qualitative weakening of that bloc's offensive potential, of which a key part is nuclear weapons. The undermining of the plausibility of the threat of using them also reduces

the potential effectiveness of using conventional forces within the framework of the "NATO integrated strategy." This strategy assumes that the threat to use nuclear weapons strengthens the potential of conventional forces (by forcing the other side to arrange its defensive procedures giving consideration to the possibility of a nuclear strike). Contrariwise, the threat of a non-nuclear offensive is designed to enhance the effectiveness of the use of nuclear weapons.

The fact that NATO is deprived of a plausible first-strike threat has one other serious consequence. Theoretically, for the Soviet Union there is now no need to compensate for NATO's nuclear superiority through the quantitative and qualitative composition of conventional weapons and armed forces. Obviously the kind of opportunities have appeared for reducing those forces that our country has not had during the entire postwar period. Thus, there is not only an obvious need but also favorable prerequisites that henceforth effective Soviet defense development can be insured, as was noted in the CPSU Central Committee to the 19th All-Union Party Conference, "preferentially through qualitative parameters with regard both to equipment and to personnel."¹³

The phenomena described are superimposed on many political factors: there are no contradictions in Europe for whose resolution the West could risk unleashing war; the improved aspect and enhanced prestige of the USSR are strengthening the positions of peace-loving forces and making it difficult for the militarists to agitate and mobilize the masses on an anti-Soviet platform, even less support military aggression. There are no fascist regimes in the developed capitalist countries. And, as history teaches, an imperialist state functioning in the form of a fascist dictatorship and an imperialist state functioning in the form of a bourgeois democracy are qualitatively different concepts. All this taken together signifies a major reduction in the threat of aggression in Europe and in imperialism's ability to exert military-political pressure on socialism.

But we are still far from the total elimination of the threat of war in Europe. The danger exists of accidental, uncontrollable escalation of some crisis under conditions of the enormous saturation of the armed forces of both sides with nuclear weapons and offensive arms; and that, as previously, NATO will cling to the concept of first-use of nuclear weapons and have appropriate operational plans. Moreover, the threat of war can grow in the event of prolonged destabilization of the arms race for the latest weapons of a clearly offensive nature, for which the Pentagon is calling.

Together with the political processes taking place in Europe and the reluctance of the allies to pay for the implementation of U.S. military plans, the changes in the military balance that we have been discussing are noticeably reducing the opportunities for the United States to use NATO and its allies in the alliance as a tool to exert military-political pressure on the socialist world.

Thanks to this, since the late seventies the trend toward a lesser role for NATO and West Europe in U.S. global strategy has been strengthened.

The value of the Atlantic alliance and its allies as tools in the strategy of "containing communism" has declined. There has been a corresponding decline in Washington's readiness to make concessions to its allies, and the trend toward "going it alone" in decisionmaking, "withdrawing" from Europe and "writing off" the European theater because it holds out no promise on the plane of exerting pressure on socialism has increased, in both policy and military strategy.

The consequences of these changes have been particularly serious for the United States' West European allies.

From the standpoint of most leading circles in the West European countries, the balance of forces in Europe has shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. We are being judged "for what we are," or rather, from what the United States is, which often makes quite high-handed use of its favorable balance of forces in particular regions to exert pressure, and even for aggression (examples for the eighties include Lebanon, Libya, Nicaragua and Grenada). Hence the conclusion that in order to prevent the USSR from behaving in similar fashion it is essential to balance the shift of power in its direction.

The importance of the imbalances in conventional arms has risen sharply, and there is additional impetus for the traditional fear of "impending" Soviet might. In general, the political importance of the sphere of conventional arms and armed forces has grown.

In the opinion of most Western politicians and experts the situation has been complicated still further by the fact, as NATO propagandists assert, that in recent years the USSR has allegedly been building up the quantitative advantages that it possesses in conventional forces and at the same time, by improving the qualitative characteristics of new conventional systems has closed the quality gap that existed in the fifties and sixties.

The practical lack of authoritative data to counteract this kind of propaganda campaign has led to a situation in which most politicians and a significant proportion of the public in the West have believed the thesis on "the relative strength" of Warsaw Pact positions in the conventional field. But the main thing is that the process that started in the fifties, when the United States was deprived of its strategic invulnerability, is now complete. Since the end of the last decade a situation has taken shape in which West European politicians who still think rationally have been unable seriously to count on the United States using nuclear weapons for their "defense." NATO's military conceptual foundation has been emasculated. For eight or nine years now only the "shell" of the old system of nuclear pledges has existed within the NATO framework. The bloc has entered a period of profound structural crisis.

Leading circles in the West European countries sense that they are in a situation in which the foundations of the old security system have been undermined. It is becoming increasingly unreliable for them but they see no solution and no new system has been suggested. The capitals of West Europe now find themselves in the midst of a process of almost feverish search for ways to repair or replace the old security system.

Washington and the forces in the allied NATO countries like it are trying to fill the vacuum that has been formed in West Europe's security system because of the undermining of the plausibility of the American "nuclear guarantees." A buildup of NATO's non-nuclear might is being proposed, defining the bloc's "conventionalization" through the development and deployment of a new generation of conventional weapons and thanks to this, less dependence on nuclear weapons. One variant that is popular in the Pentagon and on the West European right envisages the simultaneous deployment of the latest conventional weapons and a new generation of nuclear weapons. The West European capitals are trying to fill this vacuum by activating a process of military integration. Right before their eyes Washington is altering its initial attitude to them to support this trend.

The "Atlantists" see the main problem in preventing West Europe from solving the NATO crisis by reducing arms and through political detente, and in maintaining the division of Europe into military blocs. Rejection of the variant that reduces conventional forces and equalizes and stabilizes the military balance is also typical of the Washington proponents of the strategy of exhausting the Soviet Union militarily and economically. For, according to Western figures, a large part of the economic burden to maintain the military balance in Europe is being carried by the USSR and the U.S. allies. This means that they rather than the United States are also more likely to gain from a reduction in the military confrontation in Europe.

Obvious attempts can also be seen to repeat the scenarios of 1979-1983: provoke political crisis, increase tension, halt the USSR's peace offensive, and gain time for conventional and nuclear re-arming using the idea of "compensation."

While Washington and forces like it deal with the crisis in NATO and fill the vacuum with the aid of "conventionalization," they will encounter economic limitations. In the United States and most other NATO member countries military spending is not growing, and is sometimes even shrinking. According to authoritative calculations in the United States this may lead to a 25-percent to 30-percent decline in the combat capability of non-nuclear forces by the early nineties.¹⁴ In some of the main West European countries (notably the FRG) a sharp decline has started in the number of individuals of draft age. In the FRG by the late nineties the shortages of these individuals will amount to 200,000 (given a Bundeswehr strength of 495,000).¹⁵

We think that the conclusions from this article are quite obvious. In the military-political field unprecedented opportunities have now been opened up (and they also exist in the purely political sphere) for initiating a process of radical reduction in the level of military confrontation in Europe and of eroding and ultimately eliminating the military division of Europe. A realistic assessment of the threat and of the opportunities and decisive steps based on that assessment can guarantee an historic gain for peace, lead to the dismantling of the USSR's "Western front," and lay the foundation for a new and more stable and humane European order and for the creation of a peaceful "common European home" in which the countries of both West and East Europe would feel equally secure.

Another thing is obvious. The favorable prerequisites will not last forever. Sooner or later the vacuum that has been discussed may be filled. The situation of military confrontation in Europe will be reproduced at a new level. Only the Western part of this equation will change. It will be a greater West European component and a smaller U.S. one, and there will be more destabilizing new-generation conventional weapons.

It is clear that this kind of system of confrontation will threaten only a new increase in mistrust, ruinous for both sides in the arms race. The significance of the military confrontational factor will be maintained or even increased in European affairs. It will continue to disfigure European policy and hamper the expansion of really essential cooperation in all spheres. This, it is understandable, is in the interests neither of the USSR nor the interests of any other European state.

Footnotes

1. Ch. de Gaulle. "Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor." New York 1971, p 201.
2. Cited in "Sovremennaya vneshnyaya politika SShA" [Present-day U.S. Foreign Policy], edited by G.A. Trofimenko, Vol 1, Moscow, 1984, p 313.
3. U. Nerlich. "Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe: Is NATO Running Out of Options?" WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter 1980, pp 110, 116.
4. "Salt II Treaty. Report of the Committee on Foreign relations. U.S. Senate, together with Supplemental and Minority Views." Washington, 1979, p 228.
5. L. Sigal. "Nuclear Forces in Europe." Washington 1984, p 51.
6. J. Record. "NATO's Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Program: The Real Issues." Cambridge, Mass., Washington 1981, p 38. Similar assessments were made in an authoritative report from the Rand Corporation—

the leading analytical center serving the Pentagon. See "NATO: Agenda for the Next Four Years." R-2836-FF, Santa Monica (California), "Rand Corporation," 1982, pp 112-113.

7. For further argumentation by Western experts on this issue see "NATO: Agenda for the Next Four Years." op. cit. pp 113-115.

8. See "United States Military Posture for FY 1982." Washington, Department of Defense, 1981, p 31.

9. C. Vance. "Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy." New York, 1983, p 64.

10. B. Lambeth. "The Political Potential of Equivalence: The View from Moscow and Europe." Santa Monica (California), 1978, p 22.

11. "NATO: Agenda for the Next Four Years." op. cit., p 117.

12. J. Record. op. cit., pp 47-48.

13. PRAVDA 27 May 1988.

14. "U.S. Conventional Force Structure at a Crossroads." Washington 1985, p 2.

15. J. Dean. "Alternative Defense—Answer to NATO's Post-INF Problems?" Washington, Union of Concerned Scientists, 1987, p 7.

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Political Observer on Toronto Economic Summit
18250063 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Jun 88 p 5

[Article by Aleksandr Bovin under the rubric Opinion of a Political Observer: "The Group of Seven: Spontaneity and Consciousness"]

[Text] The 14th meeting of the heads of state and government from the leading capitalist powers (the Group of Seven), who were accompanied by their foreign-affairs and finance ministers, has ended in Toronto (Canada). IZVESTIYA readers already know that the seven leaders focused on current problems of world politics and world economics.

As always, the meeting was accompanied by discussions and clashes of opinion. As always, the lack of agreement on a number of questions did not prevent the adoption of joint documents, which were, as always, general and sometimes extremely vague.

But what was not as always? Perhaps it was the atmosphere. It was dominated by determined optimism, and a certain euphoria was even noted. Everyone was satisfied, despite some nuances and details, with the results of the U.S. President's visit to Moscow and the gradual improvement of East-West relations. They were all satisfied with the more or less stable situation in the world economy. And although nearly a gentlemen's array of difficulties (the "Third World" debt, which exceeds a trillion dollars, the enormous budget and trade deficits of the USA, the high level of unemployment in Western Europe, the growth of inflationary tendencies plus terrorism, the drug business, AIDS) continues to exist, they did not spoil the somewhat elated mood of celebration. Clearly, it was also influenced by the fact this was the last meeting that R. Reagan would be attending. In a friendly manner they gave him his due, which somehow lifted them above the "trivialities of life" and forced them to forget about them...

Journalists, both in the West and in the East, have usually treated the meetings of the "Group of Seven" with undisguised skepticism and more than once they have declared them a "failure." Such notes, although somewhat muted, were also heard this time. And, moreover, they were louder in the West than in the East. The English SUNDAY TIMES predicted that in Toronto "they will break all records for verbiage." A boring event, a "meeting about nothing," THE OBSERVER claimed. "All talk, no action," said THE NEW YORK TIMES.

And that would seem to be the way it is and was. "Failures" and "verbiage." Nonetheless, the meetings continue. Does this mean that they are necessary? Does it mean that they are of benefit? The attempt to answer these questions forces us to move from "reporting" to analysis.

Let us recall the first meeting. It took place in November 1975 at the initiative of the French president. "The world is unhappy," Giscard D'Estaing suggested then. "It is unhappy because it does not know where it is going. But if it knew it would discover that it is heading for catastrophe." The president was frightened by the economic convulsions which shook capitalism in 1974-1975 and reminded people of the "Great Depression." "In many regards," wrote the well-known American observer G. Harsh in 1974, "conditions reminiscent of the early 30's have developed in the world today. That was a time when nearly everything that could deteriorate had deteriorated." If measures are not taken urgently on the basis of cooperation among countries, H. Kissinger warned, "the world will be threatened by a vicious circle of competition, autarchy, rivalry and economic crises similar to what led to the undermining of the world order in the 30's."

And so. The meeting in Rambouillet was a reaction of self-preservation, an attempt to work together to collectively break through the vicious circle described by

Kissinger. I am far from thinking that the "Group of Six" (Canada was not at the first meeting) saved capitalism. There were other forces and other mechanisms of regulation in operation there. However, the attempt to discuss economic strategy jointly, to coordinate policy was not made in vain. Called to life by the extreme confluence of circumstances, it reflected at the same time profound tendencies in the development, in the "perestroika" of capitalism.

The crisis of the mid-70's was not simply a manifestation of the usual cycle. It signified that in many ways the entire system of the state-monopolistic regulation of the economy had fallen into disrepair and was no longer operating smoothly. New economic decisions were necessary, and in particular, a more fundamental and more effective link between the economic policy being carried out within each of the countries and the actions being taken in the international economic arena.

And it was the 70's which provided a start for the rapid internationalization of economic life. The growing generalization of production at the international level leads to more and more interweaving of the economies of the capitalist countries. All the forms of capital (production, commercial, monetary) go beyond national boundaries and actively incorporate new areas and new methods of functioning. The process of the redistribution of cost and added value is acquiring an increasingly international character.

The multinational corporations (MNC's) and subsequently the multinational banks (MNB's) emerged as the vehicles and the energetic exponents of the new tendencies. In 1971 only four industrial companies from the MNC ranks had an annual trade turnover of more than \$10 billion, while in 1985 the number of such companies was approaching 75. The total foreign transactions of the MNC's grew to \$800 billion by the middle of the decade. The activities of the MNC's and MNB's based on the laws of market anarchy led to the formation of a powerful "second economy." On the one hand, it exerts a growing influence on the economic situation within a given country. And on the other, it is beyond the influence or the reach of the national means for the regulation of economic activity.

The various regimes in which the "first" and "second" economies operate and their differing relationship to the interests of "their" state have given rise to new contradictions and conflicts; they have strengthened the spontaneous elements and consequently the risk of the uncontrolled development of events in the world economy. The well-known American scholar D. Bell described the situation in these words: "In my view, the general problem consists of the following. The national state is becoming too small for the large vital problems... It is too small for the large problems because there are no effective international mechanisms for such things as the flow of capital, commodity imbalance, the loss of jobs, and the various demographic tidal waves which will arise in the next 20 years."

We frequently identify spontaneity with capitalism and consciousness with socialism. Experience has shown the limitations of this dogmatic formulation. Spontaneous, uncontrollable processes also make themselves known under conditions of socialism—after all, no one would set himself the goal of leading the country into a "pre-crisis" state. "It just happened" that way. As for capitalism, its mechanism for adapting to changing conditions, its survival mechanism, increasingly includes data and recommendations provided by science; it is based on their conscious utilization for the purposes of increasing the economic and social efficiency of capitalism.

Let us now return to the "Group of Seven." The regular meetings of the leaders of the capitalist world, as well as their persistent desire to agree upon and coordinate their economic (and political) strategy—regardless of the concrete results which are received each time—are evidence of the growing need—called forth by objective circumstances and subjectively realized—to adjust and to improve the system of state-monopolistic regulation, to extend the boundaries of its application, to reduce the possibility of economic upheavals caused by super-national factors and to contain within an acceptable framework the spontaneity and anarchy of the world economy. In other words, the need to bring the evolution of capitalism under the control of the ruling political elite.

Quite a lot and yet very little has been done in this direction. Quite a lot, if one compares the situation with the way it was, say, in the 20's and 30's. Very little, if one compares it with what is necessary, with what is dictated by the situation. "On economic questions," writes M. Blumenthal, former U.S. treasury secretary, a practicing economist with enormous experience, "we are governing ourselves less successfully than at any time since the Second World War. It seems that sometimes we are confronting factors and forces which we do not fully understand and which we certainly cannot forecast or utilize. Increasingly we find ourselves in a position of unaccustomed economic insecurity both within the country as well as abroad; moreover, at present there is no consensus of opinion on what happened, on what caused it or what to do in the future." The seriousness of the intentions. Of course, the conflicts between capitalist states are inescapable. The delicate fabric of agreement will begin to tear first in one place and then in another. And it will be necessary to act if not blindly, then under conditions of poor visibility. But the search will continue.

In the meantime it is difficult to say which of the possible models for the development of capitalism (conservative-technocratic, liberal-reformist, "mixed") will become predominant in the coming decades. But with any of the alternatives, it seems to me, the policy of strengthening consciously the "planned" interaction of an increasingly wide circle of capitalist powers will continue. It is possible that before our eyes a new stage (level, form, etc.) of state-monopolistic capitalism is developing.

The meeting in Toronto represents one more step along this path.

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[Article by G. Diligenskiy: "Revolutionary Theory and the Present Day"]

[Text] *The article raises certain most complex issues of the development of Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution and emphasizes the need for its creative renewal in accordance with the changed historical conditions. This renewal should, as the author observes, proceed by way of a more specific understanding of the role of various social forces in the revolutionary movement and its goals and methods; it should comprehensively consider both the experience of socialist building and the experience of social development under the conditions of state-monopoly capitalism. The creative development of the theory requires boldness of revolutionary thinking and the abandonment of ideas which have become settled, but which are not being corroborated by current social practice. The author does not consider his findings conclusive and recognizes their debatability—the main purpose of the article is to ascertain the problems in need of further study. The editors intend in coming issues of the journal publishing a number of articles devoted to a more detailed analysis of these problems and initiating wide-ranging scientific discussion in respect of them.*

The need for a fundamentally new comprehension of the paths and prospects of the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism is becoming obvious under current conditions. Appreciable changes in the dynamics and forms of the revolutionary process came to be perceived as of the 1950's approximately and have come to light even more fully in subsequent decades. The pace thereof slowed considerably and the difficulties in its way increased in the 1970's and, particularly, in the 1980's. This was expressed in the serious weakening of revolutionary tendencies in the zone of developed capitalism; in the defeat of the revolution in Chile and the emasculation of the results of the Portuguese revolution; in the contradictions of the development of countries liberated from colonial dependence, including those which had embarked on the path of a socialist orientation. The idea concerning the main content of world social development as the constant narrowing of the positions of capitalism and the dropping out of increasingly new countries from the capitalist system, which is firmly established among Marxists, is proving increasingly less in keeping with the new historical reality. It is becoming increasingly clear that the world has entered a long historical period of the coexistence of the opposite social systems and their peaceful competition and that the latter henceforward becomes the principal form of contradiction between socialism and capitalism. It does not signify the "attenuation" of the class struggle—political and ideological—on the world scene but modifies appreciably the nature and content of this struggle.

The current stage of the revolutionary process cannot be analyzed by relying only on the theoretical propositions formulated earlier by Marxist thought. Partly these propositions are insufficient, partly they are simply out of date.

A new interpretation of the process of the transition from capitalism to socialism does not signify, of course, some nihilistic attitude toward the historic gains of Marxist-Leninist thought and a renunciation of the theoretical and procedural principles of the cognition of social phenomena which it formulated.

However, current social reality and the problems which it engenders differ so profoundly from the historical conditions in which the Marxist-Leninist concept of the revolutionary process was created that far from all its conclusions drawn in the past may serve as the theoretical basis for the activity of revolutionary forces.

There is no reason to be frightened of this affirmation and to see it as something "revisionist." It is well known that the founders of Marxism-Leninism repeatedly revised their views on highly material issues if this was required by changes in the historical situation and the new social and political experience, and revised them very rapidly and radically at times. (It is sufficient to recall, for example, what a profound change throughout the concept of the building of socialism was signified by Lenin's idea of the NEP.)

We have always spoken of the need for the creative development of theory, but this question now has to be posed anew as pungently as can be and the unsatisfactory state of our theoretical thought to be noted. In the past such development frequently amounted to the more or less mechanical combination of new propositions evoked by this urgent requirement or the other and old propositions without any serious attempts to ascertain the impact of the new phenomena and the evaluations thereof on the entire system of our theoretical ideas. As a result the wholeness and logical unity of revolutionary theory were upset, and it did not so much develop as was superficially "adapted" to the sociopolitical marketplace and assumed an eclectic nature. The fear of a critical revision of outdated propositions, the glossing over in silence of the most serious, insufficiently clear problems or their purely declarative, verbal "solution" and, finally, not least, the lack of a self-critical analysis of one's own practice and the influence on theory of apologetic tendencies contributed to this also. Such features are largely characteristic, for example, of the documents of international meetings of communist parties of the 1950's-1960's, which reflected both an aspiration to serious creative renewal of theory and the inconsistency of its realization.

The demand for realism in theory and practice is for the present-day revolutionary movement one of the most pertinent. This applies primarily to the set of problems, which are interrelated and of overriding significance, of

the correlation between interests common to all mankind and class interests and revolutionary struggle and the coexistence of the opposite social systems and paths of social progress.

A consistently scientific analysis of these problems is being hampered by the deeply rooted stereotype of the bipolarity of the modern world and a kind of one-sided absolutization of the actual contrast of the socialist and capitalist systems. The motif of the wholeness of the modern world, the growing interdependence of its various parts and the priority nature of the global interests and requirements of mankind has been heard increasingly distinctly in our ideology recently. However, this realistic idea would not appear as yet to be tied in with theoretical notions concerning the general trends of world development, world social progress and the revolutionary process.

The said bipolarity cliché is manifested in the idea concerning the utterly mutually exclusive, totally opposite nature of the processes of social development in the socialist and capitalist world. In the capitalist countries this development amounts wholly to deepening crisis, in the socialist, to unswerving, nonstop social progress. As far as "third world" countries are concerned, a choice merely between the evolved model of socialism and capitalism is possible, allegedly, for them.

The serious defect of this picture, I believe, is not only the fact that it is an extreme oversimplification of the actual complexity and dialectical and multivariant nature of social development. No less material is the fact that it orients the communists and other revolutionary and progressive forces not so much toward creative search for paths and directions of struggle corresponding to objective possibilities and trends as toward the automatic following of ready models and a kind of fatal predetermination and "given" nature of both the content and the form of revolutionary transformations.

The entire historical experience of recent decades testifies that such predetermination has nothing in common with actual social development. Both the building of socialism in which revolution has triumphed and the activity of revolutionary forces in capitalist and developing countries are constantly encountering situations in which the principles and orientations adopted earlier prove insufficient or inadequate. Thus the socialist transformation of ownership relations in the forms in which it was effected after the revolution was in itself, as has now become clear, incapable either of creating a system of the efficient social control of economic and social development or ensuring the comprehensive development of socialist democracy.

In the capitalist countries the tasks of the revolutionary forces have proven far more complex than, as was formerly imagined, the relatively rapid leading of the masses to slogans of socialist revolution in the course of this crisis exacerbation or the other of the contradictions

of capitalism. The problem of goals and directions of the class struggle which corresponded to the level of these countries' economic, social and cultural development and the social mentality of the masses has become paramount. In other words, the revolutionary process in all its forms and manifestations is inseparably associated with the constant critical analysis and reconsideration of foregoing experience and a quest for the solution of newly emerging problems and is incompatible with the following of outlines formulated in advance.

The principal factor which brought about the radical change in the conditions and course of the world revolutionary process was the discovery and stockpiling of weapons of mass annihilation, which objectively made the survival of mankind the overriding, priority interest of all social forces operating in the world arena. The exacerbation of environmental and other global problems of human civilization and the growing interrelationship of the multilevel engineering-technological, economic, sociopolitical and cultural processes determining the conditions of the current and future existence of all peoples of the world have contributed to the same thing. Peaceful cooperation in the interests of preventing a thermonuclear catastrophe and solving other global problems has become an inexorable imperative of international life.

This is not the sole factor, however. The conditions of the development of the revolutionary process have also been affected by the changes in the nature of the impact of the socialist system on economic and social development in the nonsocialist world. One the one hand it acts as a powerful factor of changes in the economy, social strategy and policy of imperialism. Such phenomena as the rapid development of the S&T revolution and government control of the economy in capitalist countries, the rise in the level of material consumption of the bulk of the working people and a certain broadening of their democratic rights and the progressive social reforms of several postwar decades have been brought about, of course, by the dynamics of the intrinsic contradictions of capitalism and changes in the correlation of class forces. But at the same time they have been to a considerable extent imperialism's response to the existence and development of the socialist system and the new alignment of forces in the world and have been stimulated by an aspiration to a preventive reinforcement of its social "rears." The same factor has also intensified new trends in imperialism's neocolonial strategy and prompted measures capable of firmly tying the developing countries to the capitalist system.

On the other, the course of the competition of the two systems has been affected by the accumulation of difficulties and contradictions in the development of socialism: the stagnation and crisis phenomena in its economy and political system and the intensification of bureaucratism and antidemocratic tendencies. As a result the

magnetic force of socialist example has weakened and the activity of the communist parties of capitalist countries has been made considerably more difficult.

It is essential, of course, in an analysis of the current problems of the revolutionary process to take into consideration the historical experience of the victorious socialist revolutions. Such consideration presupposes an understanding of the entire historical distinctiveness of these revolutions and the specific dialectics of the correlation in them of the general and the particular. And for this it is essential to overcome the mechanical elevation of the specific-historical features of a revolution and the building of socialism to "general normalities." It is no less important to assimilate in depth Lenin's approach to revolution as a living creative process inevitably containing elements of social experimentation and a revision of ideas not corroborated by practice. Ascertainment of regularities of the revolutionary process is by no means an extrapolation of past experience to the present and future and not its idealization. It is primarily an analysis of past experience from the viewpoint, first, of its conditionality by specific-historical circumstances and, second, of its significance (positive and negative) for the achievement of the goals of socialist revolution and realization of the values and principles of socialism.

Let us attempt to apply the said procedural considerations to an analysis of the two most important aspects, "problem nodes" of the current revolutionary process.

These are, first, the problem of the specific prerequisites and driving forces of the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism and the questions of who the social **subject** of revolutionary transformations is, under what conditions and under the influence of what motives and interests this social group or the other may act as the revolutionary force and how it is capable of carrying out the appropriate actions.

Second, the problem of the specific **content** of the revolutionary transformations.

Upon an analysis of the said questions we encounter today the need for a certain reinterpretation of our scientific and political language and our habitual theoretical concepts. After all, even such elementary concepts for Marxist thought as "working class," "class alliances," "power of the working class" and so forth are by no means self-evident and axiomatic in our day. The creative development of Marxist thought is being impeded to a large extent by the fact that such concepts frequently become ideological cliches and are employed merely as theoretical abstractions; it is far from always that we ask to what extent they reflect present-day sociopolitical realities, the actual alignment of social forces and the characteristics of the actual subjects of mass social action.

The traditional notion concerning the immediate causes of the emergence of revolutionary crises and revolutionary situations needs to be rethought also. Basically, such causes amount to a growth of the masses' anger at a deterioration in their situation and the institutions of authority's policy aimed against their interests. Such a notion retains its value to this extent or the other, particularly for countries with a high level of economic and social development and tyrannical and dictatorial regimes. But under the conditions of contemporary highly developed capitalism it is becoming increasingly less appropriate.

The level of S&T and economic development attained by the capitalism of the end of the 20th century, its social strategy and the changes brought about by all this in the structure of the requirements and values of the masses and in the social consciousness are also posing anew to a large extent problems of the prospects of socialist revolution in the capitalist countries and the choice of path for developing countries. The exacerbation of the contradictions of capitalism which occurred in the period of the relative economic "prosperity" even of the 1950's-1960's and which assumed a crisis nature in the 1970's-1980's is leading to a buildup of the potential for social protest, but the direct growth of this protest into socialist revolution is becoming increasingly less likely. Long-term, structural singularities of the socioeconomic, socio-psychological and political situation which exists in the developed capitalist countries are reflected here.

Let us cite some of these singularities.

1. The level of economic development attained by present-day capitalism and the methods of social maneuvering which it has cultivated are enabling it even under the conditions of crisis upheavals of the economy to avoid a sharp deterioration in the material situation of the greater part of the working people and to localize the growth of discontent and protest in relatively limited social groups.
2. The structural reorganization of capitalism based on the latest achievements of the S&T revolution is making the activity of the organized workers movement more difficult. Its revolutionary current, which even earlier was unable in the majority of capitalist countries to win mass influence in the working class, is under these conditions experiencing the danger of a narrowing of its positions even where in the preceding period it had gained the position of influential political force.
3. Considerable changes have occurred in recent decades in the requirements and value orientations of the masses and in the structure of the mass mentality and consciousness under the impact of the economic, social, cultural and ideological evolution of capitalist society. There has been a weakening of the emotional and strengthening of the "rational" motives of mass social behavior and a considerable growth in the need for specific knowledge of the actual consequences of sociopolitical actions and

lines between them intersect, as it were, the boundaries of class and "objective" (that is, distinguishable only per socioeconomic indications) strata.

Among such actually functioning communities pertain, for example, people working in promising sectors of production and professions: the S&T professionals, some workers and also small businessmen of the new type associated with these sectors and professions. They are prone to a kind of "conflict cooperation" with the ruling class in the interests of technical and economic development, are interested in a continued rise in their living standard and social status and are frequently subject to the influence of neoconservative ideas.

Another large community is formed by the politically and ideologically amorphous mass of workers of average and low skills, people working in services, farmers and office workers experiencing to a relatively slight extent the negative consequences of crisis processes. They are displaying both discontent with this aspect of their position or the other and sociopolitical conformism nurtured by fear of losing this position as a result of technological and structural changes. Simultaneously there is a growth of the stratum of the so-called "unprotected"—the fully or partially unemployed, marginals, the "new poor" and ruined petty proprietors—which is represented most extensively in the youngest groups of the able-bodied population. They are fluctuating between a disposition to irrational rebellion and a fatalistic submission to fate.

Workers of the traditional sectors of industry and occupations being cut back under the influence of technical progress form a special group. They represent, as a rule, the most militant and organized part of the working class, but their capacity for active struggle and performance of the vanguard role in the class confrontation is limited by the threat of unemployment and marginalization weighing down on them.

An increasing role in social and political life is being performed by the part of the professional classes which is not basically connected with material production and which is displaying heightened interest in humanitarian and global problems and humanization of the way of life and reinforcing the ranks of the nontraditional democratic movements. As distinct from in the past, the professionals cannot be regarded today simply as an intermediate stratum fluctuating between opposite classes: the democratic part thereof is an independent social force and is becoming a center of attraction for the representatives of other social groups disposed toward social and political protest.

It is obvious from the adduced—inevitably brief and highly schematic—list how difficult it is today to form a political opposition to the monopoly oligarchy proceeding only from the traditional "class" principle, that is, counting on the leading role in this process of the working class rallying around itself other mass strata.

Under the conditions of the far-advanced social and socio-psychological differentiation of the working class one-sided emphasis on narrowly understood class interests not only does not facilitate the growth of such an opposition but could promote the dangerous trends toward "collective egotism" and corporatism, which are already being manifested. If we proceed not from abstract-theoretical formulas but from actual social reality, it would seem extremely difficult, if possible at all, to find today a system of very close class interests which unites the whole working class and at the same time is fundamentally different from the interests of other mass strata. The class struggle of the working class remains, of course, a most important factor of social progress, but it has to be seen that under today's specific-historical conditions the danger of the substitution therefor of the struggle of narrow-group corporate interests is a real one.

The said considerations show that particular urgency in the development of an antimonopoly opposition and, consequently, the revolutionary process is attached to the organic combination of class and group interests and those common to all mankind.

I believe that we should understand by these latter not only the solution of global problems but also **the interests of the progress of society** in general, which are embodied in social goals and ideals capable of uniting an absolute majority thereof. These are the ideals of peace, man's harmonious relations with nature, economic well-being and social justice, personal freedom and healthy human relationships and lifestyle. It is important that these and similar ideals are shared by broad masses of people, regardless of their socioeconomic situation, political persuasion and ideological beliefs. It is obviously important for the revolutionary forces to seek to coordinate group, including class, interests with these ideals common to all mankind. It may be assumed that primarily the groups and communities which are capable to the greatest extent of championing these ideals in practice might be the subject of the revolutionary process.

It is hardly possible to identify such communities with some particular "objective" social and class groups. Cultural and psychological factors—such as people's cultural development and breadth of social imagination, the independence of their thinking, the level of development of their spiritual requirements and types of value orientations—are playing an increasing part in the alignment of social forces operating in the contemporary capitalist society and in the process of the formation of a democratic opposition together with the objective socioeconomic factors. And depending on the former factors, what is more, various and even opposite trends in consciousness and social behavior spring up in the soil of one and the same objective socioeconomic position. For example, whereas some part of the relatively "privileged" strata of working people is concerned for the defense and strengthening of its privileges, another part is disposed to protest against oligarchical power relationships at work and in society, the antidemocratic policy of

the ruling circles, the situation in the cultural sphere, dehumanization of the way of life and militarism. A most important task of the revolutionary forces is to support and develop such trends in all strata and groups of society.

The humanitarian nature which is now being attached to the goals of revolutionary struggle does not at the same time contradict its class content. It is important merely to see the objectively natural broadening of the immediate and fundamental interests of the working class. Forming in the developed capitalist countries the overwhelming majority of society, the modern working class is capable of uniting only around a program which is geared to the solution of the entire set of problems of social development.

The question of the political organization of the anti-monopoly movement requires special analysis. It would hardly be correct to insist unconditionally on the leading role therein of the communist parties. It is undoubtedly important for the communists to seek to strengthen their role in the opposition movement and enhance the significance of their contribution to its ideological and political platform and the cohesion of the democratic forces. This is not the equivalent, however, of laying claim to political leadership of the movement. Such a claim is unrealistic not only owing to the weakness of the mass influence of the communist parties. Even more important is the fact that the bulk of the working masses of capitalist countries is linked politically with various parties, currents and movements and that in these countries the ideal of political pluralism is by no means a fiction but a deeply rooted value principle of the mass political consciousness. Under these conditions the political organization of a democratic opposition is conceivable only as an alliance of equal participants—communists, socialists, other parties and social organizations of the left and mass democratic movements.

Let us now dwell on the second most important aspect of the revolutionary process—the problem of the **content** of the progressive transformations. A comprehensive consideration of the lessons of the building of socialism in the countries of victorious revolutions is essential upon an analysis thereof. As is known, these revolutions largely inverted the correlation discovered by Marxism between the economic basis and political and ideological superstructure of society. In the period of the building of socialism it was not the basis which engendered a superstructure corresponding thereto but, on the contrary, the party and state superstructure which created a new basis and reorganized at its discretion both the system of production relations and the social structure of society. This path provided under the particular historical conditions for the necessary rapid rate of socialist transformations and eliminated the possibility of capitalist restoration. However, it created at the same time the danger of voluntarism, bureaucratic centralism, conversion of

the socioeconomic system and the economic culture into the fruit of speculative utopian constructions and impedimenta to all economic development.

The social gains of socialism are great and indisputable. They include full employment, a guarantee of the stable position of the working people in production and the democratization of the system of public education, which has created for them hitherto unprecedented opportunities for social and intellectual growth. They include also the working people's new rights in the spheres of social security, health care, recreation and culture. In the historical plane the gains of socialism have marked a qualitatively new stage of world social progress and have exerted, as mentioned earlier, a powerful positive influence on the social situation in the capitalist world. In the economic sphere socialism has been an example of the unprecedentedly rapid and large-scale transformation of a semi-agrarian backward country into a mighty industrial power; this example retains to this day its magnetic force for countries tackling the problem of overcoming economic backwardness.

It has at the same time to be seen that the significance of a number of specific aspects of the positive experience of socialism is changing with the change in the global specific-historical situation. Thus under the conditions of the S&T revolution engendering the intensive type of economic development the extensive path thereof and the economic and sociopolitical structures and the system of economic management associated therewith are losing their advantages. And this applies, what is more, not only to developed but to this extent or the other to a number of developing countries also inasmuch as they too are facing the task of making use of the latest achievements of S&T progress. And in the social sphere also the advantages of socialism appear not as unequivocal as in the 1920's and 1930's; here also capitalism has been forced to compete with socialism in such fields as social security, health care and education. While reproducing unemployment and the material and spiritual poverty of broad strata of the population, it is at the same time, however, pursuing a carefully elaborated and considered social policy objectively limiting the scale of these phenomena. It would be at least naive to maintain that even under conservative governments this policy amounts merely to cuts in social spending and the encouragement of mass dismissals.

The experience of state-monopoly capitalism with its inherent methods of the control of economic and social processes is also highly instructive upon an analysis of the regularities and paths of transition to socialism. As is known, this control has not done away with the anarchy inherent in capitalist relations and has not spared the economy crises. However, it remains a fact that, granted all the economic and social contradictions of state-monopoly capitalism, it is managing to cater for S&T progress, the high efficiency of the economy and, although not stable, quite a perceptible rate of economic

growth. A principal reason for this is the combination of purposive centralized control and the independence of the subjects of economic activity.

The class nature of these subjects—capitalist enterprises (privately- or state-owned)—together with their inherent motives and goals distinguishes them fundamentally from the subjects of economic activity under socialism, but this by no means signifies that the transition from capitalism to socialism must be attended by the rejection in principle of the independence of the economic subject (the socialist enterprise of this type or the other). After all, experience shows that such a rejection sharply weakens the viability and efficiency of the entire economic mechanism. Whence it follows that many components of state-monopoly regulation may, as V.I. Lenin foresaw, be used in the process of socialist transformations.

The demand for the reliance of revolutionary transformations on objective economic and social laws and regularities of human mentality and social behavior is now paramount in the light of historical and contemporary experience. This type of realization of the transition from capitalism to socialism is incompatible with voluntarist-authoritarian methods and in this sense could be called natural-historical. It presupposes, specifically, use of the law of value, the need for market relations between producers and between production and consumption, the multistructure of the economy and the combination of centralized planning and control and the independence of the subjects of economic activity.

It is essential to ponder in depth also the lessons of the revolutionary process which pertain to the **political sphere** and the political organization of the society building socialism. Any revolution is essentially a democratic act and the action of the masses themselves. Just as democratic in terms of the methods of its realization should be the entire process of revolutionary transformations. This means that there should be in the society implementing such transformations not simply a representative democracy but a democracy which presupposes the real participation of the masses in the formulation of political decisions and in administration. As is known, Lenin's ideas on this question have not been sufficiently realized in practice. Yet "participatory democracy" is a most important objective regularity of the development of socialism for without it there can be no feedback from the masses to the system of administration, and without such feedback this system sooner or later ceases to serve the interests of the masses and begins to serve itself.

Particular complexity under current conditions is attached to the question of the defense of revolutionary gains and methods of putting down internal counterrevolution. I believe that the path of its solution most in keeping with the principles of socialism is the abandonment of the absolutization of such methods as a strengthening and toughening of punitive state authorities and

the all-around development of independent mass organizations and movements capable of isolating the counterrevolution and effectively defending socialist goals.

It may as a whole be concluded that under current conditions there is an appreciable change in the very essence and nature of the tasks being tackled by the revolutionary forces. In the past the main problem was leading the masses to the struggle for socialism and the formation of the political army of socialist revolution; the aims of the revolution, on the other hand, and the nature of the socialist transformations appeared to be quite obvious. Under current conditions the problem of the prospects of revolution is shifting to a different plane, and decisive significance is attached to the question of "what kind of socialism?"

An answer to this question may be found only on the paths of the formation of a **specific democratic alternative** to present-day state-monopoly capitalism.

Obviously, it is the search for paths of the progressive transformation of society and alternative types of its economic, social and political arrangement corresponding to the trends of development of the productive forces and requirements of modern man and the need for the solution of global problems of human civilization which objectively becomes henceforward a most urgent task of the revolutionary forces. The main directions of this search are the formation of civilized international relations precluding military conflicts between countries; harmonious economic development capable of subordinating S&T progress to the interests of the working masses and preserving people's natural living conditions on earth; the all-around humanization of the way of life creating conditions for harmonious relations between society and the individual and his material and moral and psychological well-being; the radical democratization of economic, social and political relations; the elimination of the starvation, poverty, barbaric living conditions and economic and social backwardness of peoples of the "third world." In other words, such a search is being carried out in inseparable connection with practical struggle for **social progress**, which under current conditions is becoming the general path of development of the revolutionary process. Obviously, only as a result of the development of this struggle can the conditions necessary for the advancement of directly socialist revolutionary goals and for recognition of the actual content of these goals by both the revolutionary vanguard and the working masses take shape.

If we do not allow a veil of primitive stereotypes to close our eyes, it is not difficult to see that the search for the renewal and restructuring of society has much in common under the conditions of the two opposite systems. It would be insufficient to pose the question such that within the framework of one system it is a question of the improvement of socialism, but within the other, of an entirely different task, of a search for paths toward socialist revolution. In reality both the development of

socialism and the activity of progressive forces in capitalist countries are geared in terms of their intrinsic content toward the solution of particular problems and the realization of particular social requirements, and these problems and requirements are under the conditions of the different systems in some respects profoundly different, but in some others close and homogeneous. Thus the majority of socialist countries today does not have the urgent problem for capitalist society of the fight against unemployment, but problems of the humanitarian use of the results of S&T progress, the humanization of the lifestyle of society and the individual and actual, nonformal democracy are very acute in both (granted all the difference in the specific economic and sociopolitical conditions of the solution of these problems). Of course, bureaucratism under the conditions of state-monopoly capitalism and "socialist" bureaucratism have different social and class bases, but it is highly symptomatic that in both instances it is perceived by the social consciousness as an impediment to the normal functioning and development of society and that in both instances an intensive quest is under way for a democratic alternative to technocratic methods of administration and technocratic ideology.

Such facts, of course, by no means confirm the once-fashionable convergence theory and do not lessen the fundamental differences of the opposite systems. However, they show that the wholeness of the modern world is not confined to the interdependence of various parts thereof and the reality of intensifying global problems of civilization. It consists also of the community of certain technical-economic and social processes unfolding under the conditions of different social systems and the problems born of them.

This conclusion would seem material for the activity of the communist movement and other revolutionary and progressive forces. On the one hand it is in the course of the revolutionary renewal of socialism currently under way that the question of movement toward socialism as the general direction of world social development, specifically, of the practicability of the socialist prospect for the present-day developed capitalist countries, is essentially being decided. The course of the struggle for social progress will depend to a decisive extent on the course of the revolutionary renewal of socialism: as in the preceding historical period the prospect of the socialist rearrangement of society on a world scale was inseparably connected with what was happening in the socialist countries and the progress and results of the creative processes initiated by the Great October Socialist Revolution.

On the other, activity pertaining to the renewal of socialism must comprehensively and critically take into consideration the entire experience of social development under capitalist conditions. I believe that such an approach to the problems of social progress expands considerably the ground for international creative dialogue and cooperation—both within the communist

movement, between Marxists of socialist, capitalist and developing countries, and between communists and all other political forces and currents of social thought sharing progressive, democratic values and ideals.

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National-State Interests in Socialist Countries' Relations

18070118 Moscow NAUCHNYY KOMMUNIZM in Russian No 4, Apr 88 pp 60-68

[Article by Yuriy Stepanovich Novopashin, doctor of philosophical sciences, chief of the sector for theoretical problems of world socialism at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute for the Economy of the World Socialist System: "National and State Interests within the System of International Relations of the Socialist Countries"]

[Text] Steady expansion and deepening of the Soviet Union's collaboration with the socialist countries and the strengthening and progress of the world socialist system are among the main goals and directions of our party's foreign policy. "Of special importance," the CPSU Program stresses, "are coordination of activities with regard to fundamental questions, comradely interest in each other's successes, precise fulfillment of obligations that have been undertaken, and a deep understanding of both national and common, international interests within their organic interrelationship" (Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress, Moscow, 1986, p 173).

International relations of the new type consist of the relationships between socialist countries which retain their own political, economic, historical, cultural and other distinctions from each another. The foreign political activity of these countries for the purpose of realizing their own national and state interests is among the most important natural forces within the functioning and development of their mutual relations.

Such a seemingly elementary concept of the place and role of national and state interests within the world system of socialism did not meet with immediate approval in Soviet scientific and political literature: decades were needed in order to overcome the overly simplified interpretation contained in the idea of the gradual formation of a "single economic organism" within the framework of the world system as a whole. It is understandable that those scholars and practical workers who ascribed to such ideas perceived, at the basis of the new type of international relations, only general, international interests, connected with solution of the allegedly already urgent problem of developing a unified plan and of creating a unified planning organ, etc.

Attempts to surge ahead, to shortcut the extremely complicated and lengthy path of developing a world system of socialism, were subjected to criticism as early as in the 1960's. However, it was only in the 1970's, at least in Soviet social science, that the category of "the national and state interests of the socialist countries" became a subject of systematic scientific examination. And, indeed, even now it cannot be said that the fundamental importance of these interests is entirely clear to everyone and that everyone appreciates the increased role foreign political activity is playing at the present time with regard to their satisfaction within the overall system of multilateral mutual collaboration. The matter here is much more complex, and ultra-internationalist positions, related to an undervaluation of the role of national and state interests within the system of the new type of international relations, are by no means a rare fossil from the past.

Indeed, to this day, an approach is sometimes manifested in theory and practice, the essence of which is that it is better to "carry over," in part, justifications of the decisive role of general, international interests within the system of the new type of international relations, than to insist on the recognition of a similar role also for national and state interests, because this, they say, can only be regarded as a nationalistic deviation, which is a far more terrible thing in the eyes of the "orthodox" than an ultra-internationalist deviation.

The history of the world socialist system, in particular the 1956 events in Hungary, shows that either of these deviations, when actualized in the activities of a country's leadership, is capable of causing enormous harm to the business of building socialism and to the development of a new type of international relations. Take, let us say, the positions of the Rakosi leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party which, as the Hungarian party press has noted, "was characterized by dogmatism in its inherent one-sided absolutization of the general theses of the doctrine of socialist revolution, in its disregard of specific national conditions and in its extreme emphasis on universal natural laws" (Ez tortent. Cikksorozat az 1956-os ellenforradalomol, Budapest, 1961, 2o old.). Such ultra-internationalist positions were one of the main reasons for the dissatisfaction of the population within the country. Right opportunist elements within the party, and later openly anti-socialist counterrevolutionary forces as well, were able to use this for their own purposes.

It stands to reason that there are fundamental differences between defending national and state interests in the international relations of the socialist countries and absolutization of the role of these interests, between foreign political activity that is aimed at achieving national and state interests, which are the most important determinants of how the new type of international relations function and develop, and nationally egoistic

positions. History testifies that the party of the working class, when in power, cannot disregard the national feelings and interests of its own and other peoples.

During the last two decades, there has been a considerable increase in the activities of the socialist countries aimed at guaranteeing their own national and state interests within the world arena. There are specific historical grounds for this. The period of time when the world system of socialism took form falls during the first postwar years. This was a time or "cold war" unleashed by imperialism, of military conflict in Korea, of a deepening polarization in international politics. Under these conditions, the socialist states considered their main task to be to ensure their own security and to strengthen their political-military relations, first of all their mutual ties with their allies. The obvious necessity and the priority of solving this problem, a vitally important one for preservation of their revolutionary accomplishments, preordained that the initial form of international relations between the countries comprising the world socialist system would be their political and military alliance. Its rapid development testified not only to the objective commonality of the basic class interests of the socialist countries in their struggle with imperialism and internal reaction, but also to a conscious putting aside of problems connected with combining the not entirely identical national and state interests of these countries, particularly foreign trade interests, and with resolving contradictions which existed between them on the grounds of this dissimilarity.

During the two decades that followed the war (1945-1965), the socialist countries fundamentally strengthened their domestic and foreign positions, which led to the rise of a new situation within the world of socialism, one which meant increased possibilities for taking fuller account, within the mutual collaboration of the fraternal countries, of one another's national and state interests, for more effective resolution of the contradictions conditioned by the partial dissimilarity of these interests, etc. The path of intensifying collaboration turned out to be by no means a simple one, and it had its costs, but, on the whole, it was precisely this that led to the consolidation and development of mutual ties during the period from the second half of the 1960's through the first half of the 1980's.

During the past two decades, a need has developed within the world socialist system, within the commonwealth of fraternal countries, for a changeover to an intensive path of development. Every socialist country is now concentrating its efforts on a search for reserves for intensification, for overcoming the inertia from extensive reproduction of economic and of all social life. And it is natural that discussion primarily concerns the realization of reserves for internal development, such ones as more rational and economical expenditure of energy resources and of natural resources and materials, increasing the returns from existing potential, activating the human factor, further democratization of social life,

etc. These reserves are enormous. Calculations show that, as applied to the Soviet economy, with fixed capital valued at 2.3 trillion rubles, an increase of only one percent in fixed capital yield is equal to an additional product output of almost 8 billion rubles, and that inefficient utilization of machine-tool equipment, transportation facilities, and energy resources, increased capital construction costs, etc. brought the country a shortfall of approximately 112 billion rubles in output during 1981-1984 (calculations based on: M.S. Gorbachev "Selected Speeches and Articles", vol. 2, Moscow 1987, p 11; "The USSR National Economy in 1985: A Statistical Yearbook", Moscow 1986, p 57).

To overcome this unfavorable tendency means to respond by deed to the historical challenge of capitalism. Herein lies the most important national and state interest of the Soviet Union, as of the other socialist countries. The development of a complex of interconnected radical measures, aimed at ensuring highly dynamic scientific and technical, economic, and social progress, will facilitate realization of this interest. "The necessity of such dynamism," it was stated at the 27th CPSU Congress, "is dictated by a concern for the well-being of our peoples. But it is also necessary to the socialist world from the viewpoint of countering the threat of war. Finally, in this there is a demonstration of the possibilities of the socialist way of life" (Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress, pp 70-71).

Within the context of the problems we are examining, an extremely urgent one is the question of the content of the international interests of the socialist countries, which not only do not contradict the fundamental national and state interests of these countries but, to the contrary, include these as a deep, fundamental component part. An international, a common interest arises from the objective requirements of the socialist countries for collaboration and interaction in all spheres of social life. The mutual dependence of the states which are building a new society, the mutual influences of successes and of failures in each of them on all the rest, stimulate creative searches by the fraternal countries, aimed at more complete utilization of internal material and intellectual resources and increased effectiveness of internal, primarily economic, relationships. The vital interests of all these states, for example, are met by utilizing the advantages of the international socialist division of labor, by support of new forms of this that would signify a more decisive transition than heretofore from the stage of primarily commodity exchange to rapidly growing processes of inter-sectoral and, particularly, intra-sectoral production specialization and cooperation, to deep-going integrational shifts. The objective necessity for this was once again noted at the concluded 43rd (unscheduled) session of CEMA, which stressed the necessity "to gradually shift the center of balance in our collaboration with the fraternal countries from the sphere of simple trade to the sphere of science and production" (PRAVDA, 14 Oct 87). The urgency of satisfying this

requirement has also been pointed out at other international fora and in joint documents, for example, in the Complex Program for the Scientific and Technical Progress of the CEMA Member Countries to the Year 2000.

The development of the world socialist system during the past two decades has seen a strengthening of an objective tendency toward an increase in the role played by common interest, as more and more new elements of the national economies have become a part of our collaborative effort and as this has become deeper and more complex, and also in connection with the increased importance of collective efforts aimed at neutralizing the actions of imperialism, at joint defense of the victories of the new system, and at countering the threat of nuclear war.

The establishment of an increased role for joint interests in the modern development of world socialism does not, of course, have anything in common with the assertions that are sometimes encountered regarding a supremacy of international interests over national ones and, in this connection, about the rise within the socialist commonwealth of a new historical community of people which allegedly is already functioning side by side with the community of "the Soviet people" (see: L.F. Lavrova, "The Collaboration of the Socialist Countries and Development of the Intellectual Culture of Socialist Society," Kiev, 1984, p 153). The authors of such assertions make use of references to the process of internationalization which, they say, leads to a situation where, already at the present stage, economic and political life in the countries of the socialist commonwealth is deprived "of any sort of noticeable national peculiarities" (V.M. Yeremina, "The Natural Laws of the Development of a World Socialist System as an Expression of a Unity of the National and the International," Moscow, 1981, p 77).

Real life, however, does not provide a basis for conclusions of this kind. Under the conditions of socialism, internationalization does not depreciate the significance of national and state interests but, to the contrary, ensures a true flourishing of nations and nationalities, the social and economic uniformity of which in no way equates to an identity in their appearance. Consequently, integrational processes within the socialist commonwealth also are inconceivable without a multiplication of elements of differentiation and an increase in national self-consciousness and self-respect, as broad masses of the working people are mobilized in international production and cultural activity, as the direct, increasingly less formal ties and personal contacts of the populations of the fraternal countries increase, and as international relations of the new type which, at the beginning of their development and to a large extent up until the present time, have taken the form of inter-state relations, are transformed in fact into relationships between the peoples themselves.

Thus, under conditions of their mutual collaboration and as they draw closer together, the content of the international interests of the socialist countries is specifically manifested primarily by the reproduction of all that is best which these countries have achieved, and this determines the progress of each of them as well as of regional and other associations of these countries.

In this connection, an examination of the question of how national and state are combined with international interests seems expedient. The founders of scientific communism, in revealing the dialectic of the national and the international, did not permit either their mechanical mixture or their artificial separation. The sarcastic attitude taken by K. Marx toward those who interpreted his views in the spirit of the historical-philosophical theory "concerning a universal path which all peoples are condemned by fate to take, no matter what historical circumstances they find themselves in," is well known... (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Collected Works", vol. 19, p 120). No less noteworthy is Lenin's idea that in socialist reconstruction "unity basically, fundamentally, essentially, is not violated, but rather is ensured by a *diversity* in details, in local peculiarities, in *methods of approach* to a matter, in the *means* of exercising control, in *ways* of eliminating and rendering parasites harmless..." (V.I. Lenin, "Compete Collected Works", vol. 35, p 203).

The little more than four decades of the existence of a world socialist system, of the development of a socialist commonwealth, have corroborated the vitality of these ideas through the establishment of a new system of economic management based on strengthening and perfecting public ownership of the means of production and by the determining place and role of this property in the socialist division of labor. They have corroborated this through the blossoming, the wealth, and the distinctive character of national cultures, whose international interaction and mutual influence by no means depreciates the originality and uniqueness of each of them (the Bulgarian, the Polish, the Hungarian, etc.). They have corroborated this by an increase in the initiative and activities of each socialist country and of the entire commonwealth in solving the international, including the global, problems of mankind. They have corroborated this, finally, by the establishment of a socialist way of life and by its distinctive national and international features. The dialectical approach to the question under examination excludes both absolutization of national goals and undervaluation of international ones, as well as national nihilism and cosmopolitan indifference to the destinies of the socialist nations.

It follows from what has been said that there is a need for further, more thorough development of the question of the relationship between national and international interests. It is obvious that, in the course of mutual collaboration, the basic national and state interests of the socialist countries, as interests which repeat each other and which objectively coincide, produce a common, an

international interest. Integration of the interests of the fraternal countries is conditioned not simply by the concurrence of their individual national and state interests (such concurrence is also possible for countries that have different social systems)—it is determined by the identical social and political nature of the socialist countries, with their collective economies, their single ideological and theoretical foundation—Marxism-Leninism—etc. The social and economic and the ideological and political kinship of socialist national and state interests incorporates within itself an objective possibility for harmonizing these interests on an international scale. The general, international interest of the socialist countries, of course, is not simply a mechanical sum of their coinciding national and economic interests.

Various points of view are expressed regarding the question of the dependence and correlation between national and state interests and the international interests of the socialist countries. Sometimes, this correlation is viewed from the viewpoint of subordination, when general, international interests are declared to be the higher, the determining ones, and national interests are considered a subordinate basis. A characteristic of the authors of such interpretations is their insufficiently precise reflection of the specific characteristics of the mechanism of the correlation of interests in such an area of socialist relations as the international one. The socialist countries are, to the same degree, sovereign and equal in their rights and the relationships of subordination that are characteristic of a system of management by internal processes, built on the basis of democratic centralism, cannot exist between them. Therefore, judgments that, for example, within the community of Warsaw Pact members, "the correct combination of international and national interests consists of a subordination of national interests to international interests, of a readiness to make national sacrifices in the name of solving common, international problems" appear questionable (V.F. Samoylenko, "The International Character of Defending the Achievements of Socialism," NAUCHNYY KOMMUNIZM, 1985, No.3, p 95).

To talk about a subordination of national interests to international ones, about a readiness to sacrifice the former in the name of the latter, as being a "correct combination" of the one and the other, i.e. as the *norm* for the interactions of the socialist states and not as a deviation from this norm, one that is justified only in certain, exceptional cases, means not to see or to ignore processes which are taking place within the new type of international relations, which demand a *harmonious* (and not a subordinating or hierarchial) combination of national and international aspects in the development of the socialist countries and, what is more, in their mutual relations.

Politically, the thesis that a subordination of national interests to international ones is their "correct combination" within the system of international relations of the new type seems confusing, because it is also possible to

interpret this in such a way that the common interests of the commonwealth of socialist states naturally limit their sovereign rights with regard to realizing their own interests, and this contradicts the principle of respect for these sovereign rights, which is one of the fundamental principles of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and other documents of international law.¹

The socialist commonwealth is the common property of the socialist countries: within it, in a joint account, so to say, are all the achievements of these countries. In the world socialist system, there are no supra-national organs which prescribe the observance of common interests. Administrative constraint is missing from relations between the socialist peoples; they cannot be forced to act against their own interests. Only by finding ways and means of satisfying national and state interests in the course of a collaboration which is based on equal rights and mutual responsibility is it possible to ensure the international interest, to realize collective goals.

The proponents of a "hierarchical" correlation of interests within the system of international relations of the new type are striving to consolidate their positions by making references to V.I. Lenin's thesis that "the interests of world socialism are higher than national interests, higher than the interests of the state" (V.I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," vol 36, p 342), that the interests of the world revolution "are higher than all national sacrifices, no matter how heavy they may be" (V.I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," vol 38, p 133). Referring to these statements, some authors do not hesitate to point to "the mistakes of those who limit themselves only to recognition of the necessity of combining the international and the national and who forget the necessity of subordinating the national to the international" (Ts. A. Stepanyan, "The Dialectic of Establishing a Communist Formation. Theoretical and Methodological Problems," Moscow, 1985, p 174). But, at the same time, those who like to take upon themselves the function of natural protectors and defenders of our revolutionary doctrine do not, for some reason, make any sort of adjustment for the specific historical context of Lenin's statements, when national interests were understood to mean the interests of the capitalist state and when the day's agenda contained the question of international revolution in the name of which the proletariat was called upon "to sacrifice" the interests of their own bourgeois states, their bourgeois homelands. But, since then, the situation has basically changed. Today, the bearers of national and state interests are sovereign socialist nations and states, whose qualitatively different social nature and international direction of development presupposes also a fundamentally new correlation between national and international interests.

The question, consequently, is not one of proving the "legitimacy" of a hierarchical relationship of interests within the system of new-type international relations, i.e. of a vertical relationship, and in this way specifically, that this relationship, as it is understood, conforms to

the theoretical legacy of Marxism-Leninism, although such a relationship is not excluded from the practice of relations of this type. The whole question lies in the fact that, characteristically, what is emerging is certainly not a subordination of interests, but rather their harmonization, i.e. a horizontal relationship. And the priority of interests as viewed from the social and historical perspective of world socialism, of the process of internationalization, does not mean that these interests stand above national and state ones, that they exist outside of and independently of them. International interests do not exist outside of the interests of specific nations and states. Common interests are nothing other than the result of a coordination of national and state interests, inasmuch as international ones arise, develop, and are reproduced on the basis of national ones. Consequently, the argument about a "hierarchy" of interests, about which of them is the more important—the international or the national—is in itself a scholastic one. The cause of world socialism is advanced not by subordination but, mainly, by coordination of the interests and efforts of our peoples and states. Such a point of view more fully agrees with the real processes of collaboration among the countries of the world socialist system, of the strengthening of their unity and international influence. Proponents of the first point of view evidently have not considered that "the specific historical paths of the rise and development of socialism do not lie in everything, as the founders of our revolutionary theory supposed" (Yu. A. Andropov, "Selected Speeches and Articles," Moscow, 1984, p 421). Although this conclusion was drawn with regard to the development of socialism as a social system, it can be applied as well on a broader plane. Indeed, the specific paths of the mutual international activities of the socialist nations and countries also have not laid in everything, as was initially supposed.

On the basic level, as is known, V.I. Lenin pictured the main direction of the international collaboration and the drawing together of the socialist nations and countries as a movement toward a single world cooperative, where the economy would be managed in accordance with a unified plan. As a similar main direction on the superstructure level, he saw a federative association of the socialist nations and countries (see V.I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," vol 35, p 288; vol 37, p 347; vol 41, p 164). Concrete expression was given to these ideas of Lenin in the documents of the Comintern. It was emphasized in them that "friendly collaboration of all the national parts of mankind is realizable only through the medium of a federation of Soviet republics," which "in the final analysis, is formed by a union of the soviet socialist republics of the world" ("The Communist International in Documents, 1919-1932," Moscow, 1933, pp 18, 51). And it is understandable that the principle of subordination or hierarchy as applied to the relationship of national and international factors was written in its entirety into the framework of this concept, inasmuch as, from an economic standpoint, talk was about a single economy of the socialist nations and countries, regulated by a single plan, and, from the political standpoint, was

about a federative association of these nations and countries, also with its own central organs of administration, with whose help generally significant interests, ones of paramount importance to all, would be realized.

On a broad international plane, the interaction of free nations did take the direction of forming a federative union, but followed the path of developing a community of independent socialist states—a world system of socialism, the idea of which is missing from V.I. Lenin.

During the formative period of the world socialist system, the peoples of the socialist countries and their communist and workers' parties were confronted by a whole series of new questions which neither the revolutionary movement nor Marxist-Leninist theory had run up against earlier. Among these were the questions of how to combine the national peculiarities of independent and sovereign states, and the interests connected with them, with the international interests of their international community, and how to coordinate, in particular, the economic development requirements of individual socialist countries, which were distinguished from each other by the development levels of their productive forces and production relations and by other macroeconomic parameters and which in no way comprised a single economy. There were, as well, also questions concerning the meaning of the new type of international relations, including their essential characteristics, the natural laws regulating them, and their prospects for development during the period under historical review. And it has to be said directly that correct solutions to such questions, ones that stand up to the judgement of time, were not immediately found, that we did not come immediately to recognize a fact that is now obvious, specifically that, because the national conditions and the material and intellectual resources of each socialist state, taken individually, certainly do coincide in all ways, this gives rise to a great diversity of approaches, methods, and means of solving common problems and is the reason why the process of the actual establishment of an historical type of new order, one that is unified in terms of its essence, does not proceed the same everywhere and, therefore, naturally takes on various forms.

Modern times demand that fuller consideration be given in our internationalist policy to the fact that there are sometimes extremely substantial differences and contradictions between the socialist countries in connection with their unequal social and economic levels, their unique conditions of building socialism, and the varied historical experience of their national and state and their cultural life. This necessity is dictated, first of all, by the fact that the development of a new society is following the path of a contradictory interaction of increasingly influential tendencies toward the internationalization of production and of all social life, on one hand, and of a tendency toward a strengthening of the sovereign socialist states, toward the all-round flourishing of nations and nationalities under socialism, on the other.

Consequently, for the present and for the period observable from today's perspective, it is characteristic that the socialist countries will preserve the state political form of national (and multi-national) existence, evidently, for a prolonged period of time, at least during the lifetimes of a number of generations of builders of socialism and communism. And it follows from this that constant attention is demanded to those forms of collaboration among the socialist states which have become established as the dominating ones in the mutual relations of these states and for which the rule is not a hierarchy but a harmonious combination of national interests among themselves and with general, international interests, both on the part of Marxist social scientists and by practical workers in our countries. For national and state diversity, if it is not confused with nationalistic vagaries, can and should serve within the socialist commonwealth as a factor for mutual cognition, for the creative enrichment of the sovereign countries, as a source for the internationalization of experience, and as a necessary prerequisite of equal rights and friendship of peoples. Within our socialist family, we learn to value equally both the common things that unite us and the specific and special ones that distinguish us, while ensuring that these national differences do not serve to separate people, but to draw them closer together.

The level of comradesly trust and of the solidarity of the Marxist-Leninist parties and the peoples of the fraternal countries, the effectiveness of their foreign policy, including the success of combining the national and state interests of these countries with each other and with general, international interests is directly dependent upon an understanding of the dialectic of the common and the particular, of the "uniting" and the "divisive" elements within our commonwealth, within the world system of socialism as a whole. "The world of socialism," M.S. Gorbachev noted in an address devoted to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, "appears before us today in all its naand social diversity. And this is good and useful. We have become convinced that unity by no means signifies sameness, uniformity. We have also become convinced that socialism does not and cannot have any kind of 'model' to which everything is equated.

"The criterion of its development at each stage and in each country is the aggregate and quality of existing successes in restructuring society in the interests of the laboring people" (M.S. Gorbachev, "October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues," Moscow, 1987, p 58).

Footnote

1. The well-known grounds for precisely such interpretations by our ideological opponents were once given in an article by S.M. Kovalyev, "Sovereignty and the Inter-

national Obligations of the Socialist Countries," PRAVDA, 26 Sep 68, which said, in particular, that "nobody interferes in specific measures aimed at perfecting the socialist order within the various countries of socialism. But the matter changes fundamentally when a danger develops to socialism itself in one or another country." This, of course, is an extremely unfortunate

interpretation of the position, shared by all communists, that the defense of socialism is an international duty.

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New Political Thinking: Perestroika in Relations with Asia-Pacific Region

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[Article by Candidate of Juridical Sciences A. Kovalev under the rubric "We Discuss the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee": "A Course of Peace and Collaboration"]

[Text] *Among the major ideas that have been put before the world by the new political thinking in the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union Party Conference is the idea of restructuring relations in the Asian-Pacific Region. The development of peaceful and mutually advantageous relations among the countries of this part of the planet has no small significance in order for the world situation to take on greater stability and predictability.*

The Soviet National Committee for Asian-Pacific Collaboration has recently been created. It includes representatives of business, trade, economic, scientific and research organizations, as well as the Soviet leadership of the eastern regions of our country. The task of the committee is the further expansion of trade, economic, scientific and technical ties of the USSR with the countries of the Asian-Pacific region.

The Asian-Pacific region (APR), where the majority of the world's population resides, encompasses about half of the world's dry land. Major reserves of minerals—petroleum, uranium and tin—have been discovered and are being exploited there. With enormous human resources and mighty industrial, scientific and technical potential at its disposal, the APR has become one of the most dynamic regions of the world in recent decades.

A new center of the world economy is taking shape here which already has about 60 percent of world industrial production and over a third of world trade.

According to the forecasts of economists, production growth in the states of the Pacific region will be an average of 4 percent a year in the upcoming decade. The total gross national product will exceed 9 trillion dollars by the year 2000. By way of comparison, the average annual economic growth rate of the countries in the European Economic Community is forecast at 2.5 percent, and the GNP at about 4.6 trillion dollars. A sharp jump in industrial development has occurred in recent years in the so-called newly industrialized countries of the APR (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore). The ASEAN states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Brunei) and South Korea have joined the zone of rapid economic progress and accelerated industrialization. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the countries of Latin America are being drawn more and more into the system of the Pacific economic community.

The dynamism of the economic ties among the states of the region was facilitated to no small extent by the creation of the Conference for Economic Collaboration of the Pacific Basin Countries (PECC) with 15 members in 1980. This organization, as was stated in the concluding report of its 5th session in November of 1986, has been opened up to the entry of the other countries of the Pacific basin. Participation in its activity could bring much benefit to our country as well.

Five socialist, five developed capitalist and over 30 developing states co-exist and interact in the Asian-Pacific region. Notwithstanding the differences in political systems, ideologies and world views, the peoples of Asia and the Pacific, as, by the way, the peoples of the whole world, are linked by a commonality of interests in survival in the face of the threat of nuclear annihilation. The ecological danger is common to all as well. All of this helps us to understand the necessity of international collaboration, which has enormous significance for the peoples of the APR as well.

As was noted in the materials of the 27th CPSU Congress, there are many tangled knots of contradictions in the Asian-Pacific region, and the political situation is unstable in certain places. They must seek their own solutions, their own paths there without delay. They must begin with coordination, and then a unification of efforts in the interests of a political settlement to painful problems so that the acuity of military confrontation in various regions of Asia could be removed simultaneously and the situation stabilized there.

The broad-scale, considered and constructive initiatives advanced by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev in Vladivostok in July 1986 have been called upon to realize in practice the concept of an all-encompassing system of international security and implement in practice the principles of peaceful co-existence, good-neighbor relations and mutually advantageous collaboration. The Vladivostok program formulates a fundamentally new approach by the Soviet Union to ensuring reliable peace and security in the APR.

In developing and making concrete the Vladivostok program, the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to agree to reducing the activeness of the naval fleets of the USSR and the United States in the Pacific Ocean, creating international guarantees for the security of navigation in the Indian Ocean and the seas, straits and gulfs that are part of it and holding a Pacific conference with the participation of all of the countries adjoining the ocean on the nature of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Collaboration in Europe.

The creation of an atmosphere of trust and good-neighborliness in the APR would be facilitated by the arrangement of equal, mutually advantageous and stable trade and economic ties of the Soviet Union and its Far East

with all of the countries of the region on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis with the aim of its organic inclusion in the system of the international division of labor.

Essential to this is a strengthening of the export thrust of the development of productive forces in this region. Aside from raising the efficiency of traditional directions of foreign-economic ties of the Far East with the countries of the APR, it is also obviously necessary to assimilate such new and progressive forms of collaboration with these countries as production and scientific and technical cooperation, the creation of joint enterprises in the production and services spheres, coastal, border and cooperative trade and the exchange of scientifically sophisticated services.

The current level of trade and economic interaction with the countries of the APR does not meet the needs of the times. The high degree of dependence of our imports and exports on the Japanese market (about 40 percent of the trade turnover of the USSR with the countries of the APR is with that country) and the imbalance of trading operations with Japan dictate the necessity of expanding mutually advantageous economic ties with the widest possible circle of countries in the region in the near future. Specific forms of them must be selected proceeding from the goals and tasks of each stage of the development of the foreign economic potential of our Far East. At this stage we can obviously make use of such an organizational form of business collaboration as joint entrepreneurship, which makes it possible to rely to a considerable extent on foreign investment sources and provide for the creation of industrial, social and cultural facilities and enterprises with scientifically sophisticated types of production, as well as the development of the production and social infrastructures, in the Far East in compact time periods.

Much gain is promised by an expansion of the collaboration of the Soviet Far East with the contiguous states of the Pacific basin in the realm of the economic assimilation of the Pacific Ocean, whose colossal reserves of natural resources and large power and chemical potential

could be utilized successfully to satisfy the food, raw-materials and power needs of the states of Asia and the Pacific Ocean. The discussion could concern, in particular, the creation of modern technologies to extract and process semi-metallic iron-manganese concretions from the ocean floor and the construction of joint metallurgical enterprises for the production of high-alloy steels from these concretions, needed by practically every country of the region. The legal basis for expanding this collaboration could and should be the UN Convention on Maritime Law of 1982, in the development of which over 160 states took part, including the overwhelming majority of the states in the APR.

The formation of the Soviet National Committee on Asian-Pacific Collaboration is another concrete affirmation of our desire to develop and reinforce trade and economic ties with all of the countries of the region and with regional economic organizations.

Soon after its creation, the Soviet National Committee received a message from India from the International Institute for the Study of the Problems of the Asian-Pacific Region. It stated that the problems of peace, security and development of the countries of Asia and the Pacific were important for the process of liberating the planet from nuclear weapons and building a non-violent world. The institute expressed its readiness to interact with the corresponding Soviet organizations. This and other responses from the countries of the APR testifies to the vital interest of the states of Asia and the Pacific in closer economic ties with our country.

The Theses of the CPSU Central Committee note that thanks to a rise of trust in our country, the international position of the Soviet Union has improved appreciably. This was facilitated by the active foreign-policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet government as expressed in the Soviet-American treaty on medium-range missiles, the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan, the principles of the Delhi Declaration and other actions aimed at ensuring peace on the planet. The projected restructuring of relations in the Asian-Pacific region that the Soviet Union is bringing forth will make its own contribution to the development of mutual understanding, trust and collaboration among countries and peoples.

12821

Foreign Policy Aspects of Lenin's NEP

18250070 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 23, 4-10 Jun 88 p 5

[Article by V. Sirotkin, doctor of historical sciences, professor at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Academy, under the rubric "Viewpoint": "NEP: Foreign Policy Aspects"]

[Text] *The following outline is a part of all school textbooks: The basis of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) was the replacement of food surplus requisitioning by a tax in kind. This was precisely the first step towards NEP. Today, we often talk and write about NEP's importance for our economy in the 1920's and about using the ideas of NEP as they apply to today's economy. The foreign policy aspects of NEP are less often at the center of attention.*

In order to understand them, we should reestablish the historical truth about the original orientation of the founders of the USSR on a world proletarian revolution and about the subsequent fundamental shift in 1921-1922 to a policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

Course for World Revolution

Looking back at the path covered by the bolsheviks, in his report at the Third Comintern Congress on 5 July 1921, V.I. Lenin noted that "back before the revolution and even after it, we thought: Either right now or at least very soon the revolution will come to the remaining, more capitalistically developed countries, otherwise we are bound to perish."

Based on this initial theoretical guideline, the Second Comintern Congress adopted the "Manifesto," which stated: "The international proletariat will not sheathe the swords until Soviet Russia is included as a part of a federation of Soviet republics of the entire world." This congress was held in July-August 1920, during the Red Army's advance on Warsaw (in the war with landowner Poland), and young Army Commander M. Tukhachevskiy, based on the Manifesto, signed the famous order: "... We will bring on our bayonets happiness and peace to the working mankind. Forward! To Warsaw, to Berlin!"

That same Manifesto also contained these lines: "A Soviet Germany united with Soviet Russia would immediately prove to be stronger than all the capitalist states together!" The authors of the Manifesto placed hopes on uniting the revolution in Russia and in Germany by means of the Red Army.

As we know, however, this did not happen. The Red Army was rolled back 600 km eastward from the suburbs of Warsaw. A peace treaty between landowner Poland and Soviet Russia in Riga, according to which the

Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia went to Poland. This treaty, sometimes called the "Second Brest Peace," existed almost 19 years until September 1939.

There are a number of reasons for our failures at that time. I will name one, possibly the most important.

The following political cartoon appeared in a French bourgeois newspaper in 1920. It was a picture of the globe with two loops drawn on it. Then U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was pulling on one (under him was the caption "Nationalism"), and V.I. Lenin was pulling on the other (under him was the caption "Internationalism").

With all the ludicrousness of this image, it captured the main idea correctly. Frightened of a world proletarian revolution, Wilson and the leaders of the Entente counterposed nationalism of the small nations of Europe to the bolsheviks and Comintern. The Versailles Peace Conference sanctioned the dissolution of Austro-Hungary and the creation of small nation-states in its place. Together with Finland, Poland and the Baltic republics, which left tsarist Russia after the October Revolution, and supported by the League of Nations and the Entente, they formed a nationalist "sanitary cordon" around our country. This strategy played its role in 1920: The Polish bourgeoisie was able to counterpose peasant patriotism of the Poles oppressed by tsarism to proletarian internationalism.

A New Stage

A new stage in the revolution came following the Riga peace. It was characterized by the bolsheviks' sudden shift from an orientation on "immediate world revolution" and "war communism" to a new economic policy—both inside the country and in the international arena.

The Theses of the Report on Tactics of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), prepared by V.I. Lenin for the Third Comintern Congress in the summer of 1921, stated that the proletarian revolution in Europe had not yet matured and that world capital was standing firm, but was not yet in a position to crush by force of arms the world's first state of workers and peasants and, consequently, "the result is, although extremely tenuous, nevertheless, a balance," and the "socialist republic can exist, not for a long time of course, in capitalist surroundings."

At that time, in the summer of 1921, Lenin and his comrades in arms believed that the balance of capitalism and socialism could be temporary, a kind of respite. However, Lenin's careful elaboration of the principles of peaceful coexistence, and also such practical steps as expanding our country's foreign trade, the introduction of a hard (convertible) currency in 1922-1924, and the

significant reduction of the Army (which Lenin also insisted on) proved that the "foreign policy NEP" was being introduced "in earnest and for a long time."

Lenin's thorough analysis of the new realities of the international situation was of great importance to the fundamental shift in the bolsheviks' foreign and domestic policy. Based on data presented by specialists in international affairs Professor N. Kondratyev, future academician Ye. Varga and others and also by Soviet plenipotentiaries abroad, he was able to conclude: Capitalist Europe was not in a position, either in 1922 or in the next few years, to attack us—it had a crisis, unemployment and inflation, and inter-imperialist contradictions were aggravated. In the minds of Western politicians, after the Riga peace Russia was thrown back far to the east (almost to the borders it had before Peter I) and was reliably surrounded by the nationalist "sanitary cordon." In the West, the Riga peace was understood as the actual recognition by the diplomacy of Soviet Russia of the new borders in Europe established at the Versailles Conference, and NEP was perceived simply as the beginning of the restoration of capitalism.

Lenin was also able to observe a new trend for capitalism, what he called "Lloyd-Georgism"—named after British Prime Minister D. Lloyd George. The essence of this trend was forced concessions to the working people, made under the influence of the Great October Revolution (8-hour workday, expansion of voting rights, introduction of social security, and so forth). By Lenin's definition, these were "concessions of the unimportant and preservation of the important," concessions which created "a likeness of the 'social world'."

Practically speaking, for the leaders of the West this was an attempt to introduce "their own" NEP. It was most graphically demonstrated in the 1930's in F.D. Roosevelt's "New Deal" in the United States and the policy of the Popular Front in France; however, this phenomenon did not take on its finished forms until after World War II.

Attack "From the Left"

At that same time, L. Trotsky and his supporters in the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and Comintern in the 1920's also continued to believe the departure from the concept of world revolution to be temporary and tactical, since it was inseparably linked, in their opinion, to the plan for building socialism in Russia: The European proletariat would gain power and "take in tow" backward Russia, helping it "to achieve a truly socialist economy."

In 1921, Trotsky still believed the world revolution to be a question of several years. In 1922, G. Zinoviev even named a specific date for the start of the world revolution and the end of the NEP—1927. Also in 1922, Trotsky stated simply: The NEP will lead to capitalism if we drag it out.

It turned out that later, in 1928, I. Stalin adopted this same program, the part concerning an "early" end to NEP and a return to the basic principles of the policy of "war communism." At the same time, Stalin clearly exaggerated the threat of a capitalist invasion in 1928-1932.

The balance of capitalism and socialism was gradually upset with fascism coming to power in Germany and the preparations for war. The return to the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence came much later, under new historical conditions.

Note: This article on the foreign policy aspects of NEP will be published in its entirety in the collection "Inogo ne davno" [It Was Different Not Long Ago], edited by Professor Yu.N. Afanasyev at the "Progress" Publishing House.

12567

International Joint Ventures Seminar in Moscow 18250065 MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jun 88 p 2

[Article by Ye. Minin: "Joint Ventures: Common Problems"]

[Text] *The first international seminar "Joint Ventures: The Year 1988" was held recently in the Central House of Tourists and assembled leading specialists in this realm of economic ties, new to Soviet business managers, from around the world.*

In our country, which was the organizer of the forum, joint ventures began to be created quite recently. It was thus all the more gratifying that representatives of the ministries and departments on whose activities the normal operations of the joint ventures largely depends took active part in the seminar along with the scholars, specialists, economists and legal and financial workers. It is no secret that just a year ago many did not yet understand the necessity of such forms of international cooperation and division of labor. The situation has changed for the better today.

American specialist J. Morton, with the participation of whom many joint ventures have been organized in various countries, noted in speaking at the Moscow seminar that joint ventures, as opposed to concerns, trusts and syndicates, provide for much closer ties among companies. It is namely in this form of economic activity that the commercial, legal, financial and other interests of the parties are merged completely. Soviet and foreign legislation on joint ventures is largely similar. There also exist distinctions in them, however—for example, on establishing the predominant share of capital in a set fund or the regulation of the choice of general director—that unfortunately make the process of creating joint ventures in the USSR more difficult.

A domestic anthology of decrees on the activity of joint ventures does not regulate such important issues as, for example, the possibility of dissolving the agreement. And after all, these enterprises are not created for a century. In the opinion of Doctor of Legal Sciences and Professor N.N. Voznesenskaya of the Institute of the State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, many conflicts could arise in the future due to the lack of legal preparedness for dissolving agreements. It has yet to be determined how to divide the capital, plant and equipment where necessary or how to settle up with former employees and the like. It is namely on such issues that well-defined regulation that is not subject to different readings is especially needed.

The seminar showed that the realm of joint entrepreneurship is an uncharted area for legal science. N.N. Voznesenskaya emphasized in particular the necessity of creating stockholder legislation in the Soviet Union. It would make it possible to attract capital from the personal savings of the citizenry to the formation of joint ventures. The experience of the American intermediary firms makes it clear that this proposal is a timely one.

The intermediary firms—experts on the market conditions in a given country and the world overall—accelerate the dissemination of joint ventures. But for that they should possess information on the creditworthiness of the clients, the availability of raw materials and labor resources and the political situation. One of the best known in the world of intermediary firms, and which allotted funds for holding the seminar, is Ernst and Whinney from Great Britain. This lawyers' office was first engaged only in the affairs of private individuals, but today 80 of its representatives scattered across the world seek partners for the creation of joint ventures.

It has also found clients in our country. Up until now the Kishinev firm of Offerta, which creates specialized videotexts and teaching programs, and a Moscow NPO [scientific production association] developing medicines from a unique biological raw material, have been unable to "come to an understanding" with anyone. Their applications were accepted by the joint Soviet-French-Italian enterprise Interquattro and the firm of Ernst and Whinney. They guarantee that there will be partners.

The seminar itself also played the role of a sort of intermediary. It brought together business people who could meet only here in the meeting halls and lobbies. The Moscow City Collegium of Lawyers offered its services to supply information essential to the joint ventures being formed along with advertisements for their activities.

The business relations that were joined at the seminar will continue after it as well. A climate exceedingly favorable for this has now taken shape in the Soviet

Union. State policies are facilitating a flourishing of joint ventures and guaranteeing their productive activity. There are businesslike and competent Soviet businessmen in the country as well.

"Where do you see the guarantee of our success?" they asked J. Howell, a representative of Ernst and Whinney.

"In the name of the firm," he answered simply. "The first broken deal for us would be the last. And by the way, when I discuss participating in joint ventures on Soviet territory with my Western colleagues, any one of them will ask: what is the pledge that they are not miscalculating, that we are dealing with honest and competent partners—such, for instance, as the colleagues of the first joint venture in the country, Interquattro?"

This pledge is the new approach toward the creation of joint ventures and the expanding democratization of all aspects of the life of society. Was it so long ago that the managers of many ministries and departments were troubled by no more than the issue of wages in the economic efficiency of joint ventures? What limitations they tried to invent for them! Several days after the seminar the chairman of USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems], I.I. Gladkiy, stated in conversation with the chief directors of several joint ventures that risk, initiative and high productivity should be better compensated and that it is essential to give people the opportunity of receiving increased compensation for intensive and highly efficient labor. A material reconsideration of wage legislation for joint ventures is essential for this.

This statement makes it possible to hope that the ice will soon be broken in this delicate matter as well.

At the seminar it was decided to institute regular courses in London for the Soviet directors of joint ventures. The practices of English enterprises in commercial, financial and technical departments are also envisaged in addition to classes in theory.

12821

Exporters' Association Formed at Moscow Trade Center

18250060a Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Jun 88 p 2

[Article by G. Alimov: "Exporters' Association Formed"]

[Text] The formation of an Exporters' Association was officially announced after an organizational meeting at the Moscow International Trade Center.

Soviet enterprises and organizations seeking a place in global markets are joining together. It would appear that their coordinated policy is indicative of their readiness to challenge foreign competitors.

For certain ministries, enterprises, and associations, the barrier to direct entry to the global marketplace was lifted two years ago. But as subsequent events showed, it has been a difficult passage. We have learned that commercial ventures may easily end up on the rocks.

Regardless, there is no going back. We are obviously going to end up with a few more lumps before we gain the experience, business acumen, and entrepreneurship to make our competitors take note and make way. There is no alternative in today's international marketplace. At the meeting, I. Ivanov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission on International Economics, stated: "We are going to have to operate in a saturated market where no one is going to wait around for us. Plus, we will be dealing with skilled competitors. So dividing up the market is not the issue; it is going to have to be redivided."

We all understand that we cannot accomplish this with a few flourishes and bold moves. Our exporters do not have enough experience in the commercial and operational sides of foreign markets. They need to learn more about export marketing and have to assimilate basic information about the marketplace. Our first face to face encounters with the competition showed a certain confusion on the part of Soviet exporters. On the other hand, veterans of international markets are starting to feel the pressure of Soviet business in some cases, perceiving it as a threat to their interests. They are already seeking ways to respond, and have not been afraid to resort to such measures as discrediting Soviet goods.

According to our experts, all the above supports the conclusion that forming an Exporters' Association for our enterprises was a step in the right direction. The first things the Association will have to do seem simple. The members have to learn to sell competitive goods, to start with. That in itself is an art. And they have to encourage exports using new techniques, including export leasing, so-called holding operations, and special economic zones.

More than 100 enterprises and organizations have indicated they wish to join the Association. Among them are 40 industrial enterprises and 10 diversified scientific and technological complexes, all of which have obtained permission to enter foreign markets; and 15 foreign trade associations, 16 industrial associations, five joint enterprises, and 10 industrial enterprises, none of which currently have permission. Soviet banking institutions have also shown interest in working with the Association. They include the Vneshekonombank, Agroprombank, Promstroybank, and even the International Investment Bank. Economists and management experts are also ready to contribute to the work of the Association.

The Exporters' Association was formed under the aegis of the USSR Trade and Industry Office. A. Samsonov,

general director of the "Clock Plant Number One" Industrial Association, was elected chairman.

13189

Official on Tajik Foreign Economic Relations
18250060b Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 29 May 88 p 2

[Article by R. Nuritdinova, deputy chairperson of the Tajik SSR Trade and Industrial Office: "Dependable Barrier"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The Tajik SSR Trade and Industrial Office is involved in foreign economic relations through its work checking export and import goods against the documentation of Soviet and foreign organizations, determining whether the goods meet the needs of the non-domestic market, and verifying completeness, quantity, and quality.

A certain portion of the population is deeply convinced that any product which makes it abroad is automatically better and free of defects. But this is not always the case, and experts at the Trade and Industrial Office are working to identify these defects in time. Last year, for example, Dushanbe shoe manufacturers received 105,000 rubles worth of defective polyurethane shoe soles from Italian companies. And 2,300 pairs of Rumanian shoes, worth almost 100,000 rubles, were also defective.

Verifying the quantity of goods delivered is also the job of the inspectors. In the last year, incomplete shipments accounted for over 400,000 rubles. At the same time, shipments containing excess quantities of products were responsible for 99,000 rubles. Of course, foreign companies compensate short shipments or inadequate quality, but only if our Office notifies them officially.

There is considerable interest in expanding imported equipment inspections. Last year, 16 million rubles worth of such equipment was inspected. In the 12th Five-Year Plan, the percentage of equipment to be inspected will rise from 5 to 10 percent. At the same time, completeness and quality of machinery, lathes, production lines, tools, and instruments will receive special attention.

The Office has established close working ties with the Tajik Gosplan, which is the agent of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and with ministries and departments, which provide the information about equipment imports the Office needs for planning its inspection program. An effort is also underway to improve quality and ensure the service sector meets its deadlines.

With the support of Party, Soviet, and economic organizations, the Office and its personnel have helped expand trade and economic ties with foreign countries. The Office currently employs 102 persons, many of whom

have been inspectors for more than 20 years. They are experienced experts in the economy and highly skilled appraisers. Unfortunately, no institution of higher learning in our country has a program dedicated to this specialty. On the job training is the rule. It is a noble task undertaken by, among others, T. Barentseva, G. Ktsoyeva, Z. Krymskaya, M. Shamsutdinova, and A. Umarova.

This year, the Trade and Industrial Office will go on the full khozraschet, self-financing, and samookupayemost [self-compensation] system. Personnel are preparing for this new system by trying to upgrade ties with their partners. They have a lot of hard work ahead of them, but the experienced personnel of the Office can certainly handle it.

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AMERIKA No 3, March 1988**

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**WPC, Bolivian CC CP Member Interviewed on
Peace Movement**

*18070096 Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in
Russian No 3, Mar 88 pp 113-115*

[N. Kuchin interviews Carlos Carvajal, member of the
central committee of the Bolivian Communist Party and
the World Peace Council: "The Campaign for Peace:
The Duty of Everybody"]

[Text] [Question] **What made 1987 significant for Latin
Americans working for peace?** [Answer] As our experi-
ence has shown, most people in our countries have never
taken an active part in the campaign for peace because
they ignored the very possibility of a nuclear war on a
continent that was so distant geographically from the
main sources of conflict in the world. They were affected
by neither the first or second world wars. This led to the
conviction that any nuclear conflict would leave our
countries untouched.

But, all this was before the events in the Malvinas
(during which several British nuclear submarines were
deployed), the appearance of new Pentagon bases and
facilities in Latin America, and the sharp increase in US
interference in the internal affairs of our countries.
Subsequently, the people of our continent have stepped
up their anti-war campaign, come to an awareness that
the problems of the modern world will not disappear by
themselves, and become conscious of the reality of a
nuclear apocalypse that includes Latin America. Repre-
sentatives of Latin American and Caribbean basin anti-
war movements met at a continent-level conference in
Ecuador in 1987 and noted that: "All movements, orga-
nizations, and people who are aware of this reality must

unite and undertake specific actions to stop the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and eliminate all weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000."

It is important to stress that regional conferences and meetings are now common and regular occurrences and have become an arena for discussing and coordinating joint anti-war activities and sharing experience gained from the work of Latin American peace councils. Another major initiative of the continent's peace movement was the International Conference in Buenos Aires (1987), which was devoted to the issue of making the South Atlantic a nuclear free zone of peace and cooperation. Among the participants in the conference were: representatives of anti-war movements and organizations and government figures from Uruguay, Brazil, Peru, and Mexico, as well as from Greece, India, Tanzania, Angola, the Congo, Namibia (SWAPO), and the Republic of South Africa (ANC); and representatives of the World Peace Council.

The University of the Andes (Venezuela) is organizing a "Peace, Disarmament, and Life" international conference for April 1988, while the Nicaraguan Peace Committee will be conducting its "Future of the Earth" meeting at the same time, with representatives from all continents attending. [Question] **What other tasks do the Latin American peace movements see for themselves in the future?** [Answer] We feel that every citizen of our countries is a potential participant in the campaign for peace. Starting in childhood and proceeding through the process of education, physical and cultural growth, and ideological, political, and philosophical development, every person becomes involved individually or collectively in the battle for the civil and political freedoms and rights that are the foundation of a decent life for the individual. They are thus involved in the battle for the right to life itself as well. But it is not possible to unite all adherents of peace into a single organization. A much more realistic and effective approach is to have every individual take an active part in the effort to secure overall security by working directly within their public, political, or professional organizations on the job. Each of these organizations, regardless of its orientation, incorporates anti-war activities into its agenda and thereby become a direct contributor to the struggle for peace, democratic rights and freedoms, and social justice.

The job of the national-level peace councils is to coordinate these joint efforts and activities, encourage specific solidarity-enhancing measures, and aid in creating new anti-war social movements. To be specific, the Latin American peace councils are planning to devote their 1988-89 program of action to the 40th anniversary of the creation of the World Peace Council.

US-Soviet talks on a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons have been tremendously helpful to our effort. If the talks conclude successfully—and our work is

one of the factors that will determine this—there will be untold new opportunities for stepping up our efforts to secure peace in Central America and establish demilitarized zones in the region.

The future, as we can see, is encouraging. But there is still hard work to be done in the campaign to create a nuclear-free and prosperous world.

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Zaytsev Book on LA, NIEO Reviewed

18070096 Moscow *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA*
in Russian No 3, Mar 88 p 141

[V.M. Gavrilov reviews N.G. Zaytsev's "Latin America in the Campaign to Reorganize International Economic Relations" Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya," 1987, 272 pp]

[Text] It would be difficult to say that we have suffered from a shortage of material written in the USSR on the problems of the NIEO [New International Economic Order] over the last few years. It would be equally wrong to maintain that the part played by Latin America in international economic relations has not been given enough attention. Nonetheless, Zaytsev's book is a work of singular interest, largely because of the author's effort to comprehend the fundamental changes in the international economic relations of the mid-80's and encapsulate what the countries of Latin America have learned in the course of the difficult intellectual journey that has been part of the effort to create the NIEO. Also of interest is the way Zaytsev sees the nature of the contribution the countries of the region have made to solving a global problem: making the world economic order democratic. Many other general and specific issues addressed in the book are also of interest.

There is no question but that this book was published at an appropriate time, especially since its purpose is to comprehend both future trends in an interrelated world whose development is often contradictory and the future of Latin America in this world. This is the overall impression Zaytsev's book gives you. At the same time I would not want to deprive the reader of the opportunity to extract the main ideas of each section of the book and draw the logical links that exist between them, and at the same time see both the strong and weak points of the book. The reader will have to judge the originality of the book on its own merits, assess the difficulties the author encountered in discussing this multi-dimensional issue, and decide for himself what constitutes solid scholarly achievement and what is closer to the realm of analytical guesswork.

Nonetheless, I would like to share a few thoughts that the careful reader of this book will undoubtedly have. It seems to me that the author is protecting his audience from certain basic conclusions for some reason. Yet at

the same time, his knowledge of the issue and ability to organize the empirical material logically compel the reader to become involved in discussions of theoretical arguments which could have served as the foundation of the international economic relations model that is so badly needed today. Of course, it is obvious that we have to look at the NIEO as one of Latin America's most important resources for resolving its crisis and overcoming its backwardness. But the theories should keep in mind that the new economic order will become the old economic order if its purpose does not extend to solving the global problems that the region can no longer afford to see as an abstraction.

In any case, we now have a new book, a thorough and, most importantly, compelling book that forces us to think about and reconsider the meaning of established scientific criteria and seek new ways to solve the problems associated with building a world community.

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**Leonardo Boff Book on Liberation Theology
Reviewed**

18070096 Moscow *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA* in
Russian No 3, Mar 88 p 143

[Review of Leonardo Boff's "And the Church Becomes the People. The Genesis of the Church: The Church is Born From the Faith of the People" Sao Paolo, 1986, 226 pp]

[Text] In the last few years, liberation theology has had a major impact on the religious population of Latin America, frequently challenging the doctrinal despotism of the Vatican. The Brazilian priest Leonardo Boff is one of this movement's leading ideologues. His works, which are well known outside Latin America, include numerous articles and 32 books, many of them in translation.

In May of 1985, the Vatican Congregation on Issues of Faith, which was headed by Cardinal Ratzinger, censured Boff's 1981 book "The Church: Charisma and Power," declaring it heretical and instructing its author to cease public appearances. In the subsequent years of compulsory silence, the Brazilian theologian published another three books: "The Trinity, Society, and Liberation;" "Choose to the Benefit of the Poor;" and "And the Church Becomes the People." The last of these is the most interesting, since it summarizes ideas articulated in Boff's earlier works.

In his book, Boff studies the emergence and growth of christian communities among the masses and attempts to prove that as they become more aware of their place in the liberation process, they begin to create a people's church. Among the characteristics of this church are broad democracy and the tendency to incorporate elements of popular culture. The author compares the new church, which "grows out of the people," with the

traditional church, which he feels is gradually losing its influence over the masses. "In place of the church society with its strict, centralized, hierarchical, and featureless system of power, we are seeing the emergence of a church community that is more equitable in the way it allocates priestly power." (p 53)

In comparing the traditional and popular churches, Boff notes that the former primarily embodied the culture of the ruling classes, the historical manifestation of which was the bourgeoisie. In Latin America, the popular church is an embodiment of a differently manifested class: the poorest laborers.

In light of the rising tide of democracy in many of the continent's countries, the author's thoughts on democracy seem most timely. "Democracy," he writes, "is more than a form of government. It is a spirit which must permeate all forms of authority. After all, the goal of democracy is to have all or a majority of people equal and actively participating in society." (p 145)

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USA Struggle for Panama Canal

18070119 Moscow *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA* in Russian No 5, May 88 pp 33-45

[Round Table Discussion conducted by V. M. Gavrilov of the *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA* editorial staff, with the participation of A. D. Bekarevich, I. N. Klekovkin, I. M. Vershinina, and M. L. Chumakova, identified collectively as collaborators from the Cuba and Caribbean Countries Sector of the USSR Academy of Sciences Latin America Institute and TASS; first three paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] Today the world is witnessing how one more Central American country—Panama—has turned out to be a target for the United States' policy of economic and political dictation. "I took the canal, now let Congress decide what to do with it," Theodore Roosevelt said at one time. A great deal has changed since then, it would appear. More and more frequently, Washington has to give up the idea that "Congress decides" the vital national issues of Central American countries. However, relapses into the imperial approaches of the past are breaking through anyway.

The current unprecedented pressure on the Panamanian Government, the grip of the financial blockade, and the open blackmail and intimidation are more than enough to confirm that.

The journal's readers are showing considerable interest in the Panamanian situation. The editorial staff has conducted a "round table" centering on the causes and possible consequences of the crisis in Panama-U.S. relations. Collaborators from the Cuba and Caribbean Countries Sector of the ILA AN SSR [Latin America Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences] and TASS took part in the discussion.

V. M. Gavrilov (editorial staff): Against a background of the trends toward peace in Central America which have shown strength recently, the anti-Panama campaign in the United States has been steadily gaining momentum. It would seem that there are no important grounds for stepping up tension in Panama-U. S. relations. It is still a long time until the year 2000, when Panama will regain sovereignty over the canal, which the United States has been accustomed to considering its own private domain. Then what is the underlying reason for Washington's

sudden pressure on the Panamanian Government on such a large scale and the attempts to discredit the army and the Panamanian political model?

A. D. Bekarevich: The crisis in Panama-U. S. relations did not arise spontaneously; it has its past history and its deep-seated causes. And in order to acquire a more realistic view of how it developed, we must dwell at length on Torrijos' legacy first of all. Unless this basic question in Panama's life is cleared up, it seems to me, it will be difficult to properly assess both the country's present complex internal political situation as well as the strained relations between Panama and the United States.

Now then, the fate of Torrijism, which under Torrijos became a kind of national liberation doctrine. After the general's death, two trends took shape: on the one hand, emasculation of the social significance of Torrijos' ideas, and on the other hand, the policy set by Torrijos continued to prevail in domestic policy, largely because of the "Torrijist potential" of the military. This was expressed in the struggle to ban revision of the canal treaties, to expand Panama's foreign economic and political ties, and to actively support the Contadora process.

These two trends also tell us about the policy of Manuel Antonio Noriega, the commander in chief of the National Defense Forces, who lays claim to the role of Torrijos' successor.

I. N. Klekovkin: Before we respond to the question of successors, we must define more specifically what Torrijism embodied initially. Essentially it comes down to two basic concepts: defending the national sovereignty, returning the Panama Canal to the people, and eliminating all colonial enclaves; and carrying out socioeconomic reforms aimed at protecting the interests of the national bourgeoisie and improving the living conditions of the lowest strata of the population.

These same concepts have also been incorporated in the Panamanian Armed Forces' strategic doctrine, which has gradually crystallized over the years of military rule and been consolidated by the General Staff. From this viewpoint, the army is unquestionably the heir to Torrijism. The young officers who now hold the ranks of captain and major are especially active in their defense of Torrijos' ideas. They began their service under Torrijos, and their nationalist convictions were shaped at the same time. It is no coincidence that Major King, one of the popular and acknowledged leaders of the "Young Officers Movement" who was speaking on behalf of the National Defense Forces on 10 February 1988, demanded that the U. S. Southern Command be removed from Panamanian territory.

Panama's Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), which was established by Omar Torrijos in 1978 with the aim of involving the broad popular masses in the process of progressive socioeconomic reforms, is the political "heir" to Torrijos and Torrijism.

As far as the government is concerned, it cannot be considered the "heir" to Torrijism, strictly speaking. Under pressure from pro-American forces, the PRD leadership proceeded to set up a bloc with right-wing bourgeois parties in 1984.

I would like to draw your attention to what in my view is another very interesting point. If we analyze U. S. policy with respect to Central America and with respect to Latin America as a whole, we see a distinction between the Republican administration's approaches and the Democrats' position. The Panamanian question is practically the only one on which a community of views exists between the administration and both groups in the Congress. It is precisely this that makes us wonder: what lies under the layer of propaganda of Washington's "Panama problem?" We must bear in mind that the Democrats supported ratification of the treaties and supported the canal's transfer to Panama. So this involves not only the treaties. In my view, this is the question that comes to the forefront: the role of the Panamanian Army and its example for the military in the Latin American region.

If we recall, progressive military men came to power in a number of the continent's countries at the same time in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Subsequently, the United States and local right-wing forces managed to isolate and separate them from the masses and in the final analysis, to bury the plans for progressive reforms, which made it possible to advance the notion that there was absolutely no prospect of progressive military men coming to power.

But the Panamanian military are demonstrating that when more flexible measures which are in accord with the people's interests and the goals of sovereign development are selected, they can play an important role in protecting national interests. On this plane, the Panamanian military have been turned into ideological opponents of the United States. And the fact that they have become a symbol of rebelliousness and an independent nationalist path of development irritates both the Republican and Democratic Parties in the United States.

At the same time, it would be incorrect to classify the positions of the Panamanian military as left-wing. Moreover, the Panamanian military men who propagandize the Torrijos policy are not an anti-American force. They continue to stress that they are a reliable strategic ally of the United States.

V. M. Gavrilov: An extremely "flexible" position. There is no anti-Americanism and there are no sympathies for the left wing. A convenient platform for dialogue with the United States. So why doesn't it suit Washington?

I. N. Klekovkin: The nationalist policy of the military has come into objective conflict with the U. S. interests in the region. And where the Americans infringe upon the interests of the Panamanian nation, the command of the

National Defense Forces is standing up for its country's interests by seeking to eliminate the colonial enclaves. This is the root of the problems which exist between the United States and Panama. The United States' main objective is to bar the military from taking part in political activity. The cutting edge of American dictation has now been aimed against the commander of the Panamanian Army, General Noriega, for precisely this reason.

We cannot overlook one more fact. Even before the Republican administration came to power, the so-called "Santa Fe Document" pointed to the need to remove the Panamanian military from power and to change the independent policy of this country, that is, the basic directions of the anti-Panama campaign which we are witnessing today had been programmed even then.

V. M. Gavrilov: It is a small country—a population of 2 million and an army of about 15,000. Such insignificant forces, but they have thrown down the gauntlet. This is purely a psychological irritant...

I. N. Klekovkin: I think it is more than psychological. The fact that one of the United States' largest embassies is in little Panama attests to the high priority which the American administration attaches to this country. The number of diplomatic personnel in Panama, as an example, significantly exceeds the number at American embassies in many NATO countries, as well as the largest states in the region, such as Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia.

A. D. Bekarevich: I would like to stress in this connection that Torrijism has not reached the limits of its resources as a current of political thought and as a doctrine of national liberation, despite the contentions of some analysts, inasmuch as those problems politically and ideologically "reflected" in this doctrine have not been resolved yet. Torrijism has become the banner of all the truly democratic and patriotic forces in Panama. And this is very important.

I. M. Vershinina: In my view—although it may be too subjective—the military men have not had a clear conception of the country's socioeconomic development. Their views in this area are too general and "strategic" in nature. I agree that Torrijos contributed to a revival of the Panamanian people's national consciousness. And this was expressed primarily in the struggle for return of the canal. But on the domestic "front," the many progressive measures that were proclaimed have not been realized. This process was marked by compromises, and Torrijos was forced to make concessions to the oligarchy and the upper bourgeoisie. This was not his fault, but rather bad luck. He clearly understood all the extraordinary complexity of carrying out progressive socioeconomic reforms and struggling at the same time for return of the canal, and its "inclusion" in plans for the country's economic development.

A. D. Bekarevich: Torrijos had to single out the problems of top priority that were facing him. What is more important: uniting the nation to resolve the canal problem or concentrating first on domestic problems. After all, he realized that it was not feasible to resolve both problems at the same time.

I. M. Vershinina: Yes, Torrijos succeeded in uniting the nation in the struggle for the canal. This cannot be denied. But it was as if realization of the democratic reforms within the country that had been proclaimed and promised were pushed into the background in this struggle.

A. D. Bekarevich: The point is that the doctrine of Torrijism is not the fruit of "abstract" creative work. It was worked out gradually and basically in the course of practical actions.

I. M. Vershinina: But wasn't it also because the deviation from Torrijos' socioeconomic policy within the country took place so easily that the many reforms remained in the form of ideas and were not put into practice?

M. L. Chumakova: First of all, it seems to me, we must separate the layer of ideology and specific policy. One matter is the Torrijist military men's plans during the 1970s, the doctrine of national liberation (I agree with Bekarevich on this), the return of a sense of national dignity, and sovereignty over the Canal Zone—all this is a positive, and no one will deny this. It was precisely this that made the name of Torrijos a Latin American symbol of the struggle for sovereignty. But there is still a specific policy which is linked with the complex social processes—in the midst of Panamanian society—and with the role of the Army in politics and with those processes which are taking place in the Panamanian Armed Forces.

I want to support Vershinina. The original socioeconomic and political plans remained unfulfilled after Torrijos' death. I refer primarily to the democratic element which he brought with him. In the 1980's this democratic element gradually began to dwindle to nothing in the policy of the military men and the government under their control. And this, it seems to me, is one of the key reasons for the crisis situation. We must cast a critical glance at the social work of the military men after Torrijos' death. I am concentrating my attention on the 1980's, because in 1982 there was a turn from Torrijism to the model which more closely corresponds to the traditional military regimes which profess nationalism.

What has Noriega succeeded in doing? He modernized the defense forces in accordance with a five-year plan, created three new battalions, reinforced the elite "Dobermans" units, and opened the country's first military academy, that is, he strengthened the professionalism of the Armed Forces. But this is one side of the matter.

The military acquired a great number of purely material privileges after practically establishing control over trade. These changes, which took place in the 1980's, are affecting both the conduct of the military men and their social orientations. Representatives of the military high command have made political deals with the oligarchic circles and have issued orders on the suppression of public demonstrations.

In addition, in the 1979-1982 period, the Panamanian Army took part in 20 joint military maneuvers with the United States and participated in the early 1980's in reactivating the Central American Defense Council and other military preparations of an anti-Nicaraguan orientation. To sum up, since the early 1980's the 15,000-member Panamanian Army has gradually lost those traditions of a progressive nature which were characteristic of it in the 1970's. This evolution has had an effect on the character itself from dictatorships and promoting the accession to power of civilian governments, and it is attempting to shift from a "Big Stick" policy to a strategy of "controlling changes," which will ultimately lead to the establishment of a regime under Noriega's personal control unless it intervenes, in the American administration's opinion. True, until recently there have been substantial differences in the position held by the State Department and the administration on one hand and the Pentagon itself from dictatorships and promoting the accession to power of civilian governments, and it is attempting to shift from a "Big Stick" policy to a strategy of "controlling changes," which will ultimately lead to the establishment of a regime under Noriega's personal control unless it intervenes, in the American administration's opinion. True, until recently there have been substantial differences in the position held by the State Department and the administration on one hand and the Pentagon on the other hand. Noriega has been closely linked with the Pentagon for many years. (According to American estimates, Noriega received up to 100,000 dollars every year when he was the head of intelligence for the National Defense Forces.) The Americans are now reexamining Panama's place, not only in their regional strategy, but their global strategy as well, taking a new factor into account: when the Carter-Torrijos agreement was reached, there was no Sandinist Nicaragua. The situation in the region was different. Now the administration, the State Department, the Congress and the Pentagon evidently agree on the basic objective: the United States does not have a stake in a leader who is nationalistically inclined remaining in power in Panama. For this reason, the main emphasis in statements by administration functionaries and congressmen is being put on the involvement of representatives of the military leadership in the drug trade as the basis for conducting an investigation of real and imaginary abuses and removing the military from the political scene. Reports that Panama is a transshipment point for the entire Latin American drug trade are widely known.

Naturally, the United States is not so much guided by concerns for the fate of Panamanian democracy as it is interested in the accession to power of a government

with which talks on revision of the 1977 treaty are possible, or at least one with which agreement can be reached on retaining American bases in Panamanian territory.

I. N. Klekovkin: It should be noted that at present, all the announcements on the Panamanian military's participation in the drug trade and the statements by Washington officials on this subject are being made for effect. The absence of facts is replaced by emotions. The Americans are threatening to make public the available information they allegedly have. As we know, a grand jury was convened in Miami. The decision was made to submit the case to the court for consideration. However, even in this case there were no specific proofs or cases of Noriega's personal involvement in the drug trade.

V. M. Gavrilov: If Noriega were a person of this sort, it would be simpler for the Americans to find a way to reach him. The campaign organized by the United States in connection with the military's involvement in the drug trade and the new "twist" in the confrontation with Panama have been called upon to put an end to Torrijism. He has really evolved to a certain extent in the current situation, but he continues to live and function, nevertheless. There are both Torrijists and anti-Torrijists in the society. The traditions are strong all the same. But in order to remove him and achieve the basic objective—revision of the canal treaties—the Americans are now exaggerating precisely the cases related to the drug trade. And this is not coincidental.

I. N. Klekovkin: In addition, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between some Panamanian citizen's personal participation in drug smuggling and the use of Panamanian territory by the criminal drug rings. These are entirely different things. After all, it is not simply for pleasure that the Americans have shifted the burden of the struggle against drugs to the territory of the producing countries in their attempt to get at the sources. The reason is that they are incapable of controlling their own borders and preventing drugs from being imported into U. S. territory. Just think of this: the United States, which has the most advanced means of monitoring its airspace, waters and land at its disposal, cannot cope with the smugglers' tricks.

There is one more "delicate" aspect which the Americans prefer to pass over in silence. Panamanian military men, General Noriega in particular, are now being accused of permitting Panamanian territory to be used to move drugs through to the United States 7 years ago, using private aircraft in the process as well. The truth is that 7 years ago control of the airspace and the air traffic control service were the responsibility of the U. S. Armed Forces. It was only the year before last that they transferred the center controlling the airspace and the air traffic control service to Panama in accordance with the treaties. At the same time, the U. S. Air Force has the

most advanced early warning radar, as well as navigation and monitoring systems, at its disposal. Taking this into account, the American accusations appear hypocritical, at least.

We cannot help but touch upon one more important question—the charge that the Panamanian military are involved in arms smuggling. And it is necessary to see the heart of the problem behind the propaganda smoke-screen here. This refers to the deliveries of weapons to the Sandinists during the struggle against Somoza.

A. D. Bekarevich: The question arises: if the United States really supports truly democratic governments and authoritarian regimes are no longer convenient for them, why, for example, have they supported the Namphy regime, which has blocked democratic elections? And this is not an isolated case. How do we explain such “flexibility” as this by Washington?

M. L. Chumakova: The Americans are not omnipotent. There are irregularities in “implanting democracy”: the United States cannot bring armies that have been infected with rightist-authoritarian anti-Americanism under its control. Nevertheless, we should take into account that strategically the administration is now pursuing a policy of support for a shift to civilian rule. This line has been clearly observed with respect to the Philippines, Haiti and El Salvador.

A. D. Bekarevich: I hold the opposite opinion. The United States controls and coordinates its policy with repressive and anti-insurgent forces in the subregion. As far as the anti-Americanism of these forces is concerned, it is more for show and minor in nature, at least. If the Panamanian Defense Forces were to pursue a pro-American policy, such active steps by the United States “in defense” of representative democracy in Panama would be highly questionable and I doubt whether they would be possible in general.

M. L. Chumakova: But we must take into account that the American policy is being shaped under conditions in which the positions taken by the Democrats and Republicans in Congress on matters of Latin American policy are sharply opposed to each other at times. And the Democrats have insisted for quite a long time that the United States’ principal long-term allies in Latin America would be the representative governments, and this is in accord with the American values.

A. D. Bekarevich: I do not think that one needs to be a prophet to discern Washington’s real objectives behind all the discussions about democracy, the struggle against drugs, and the infringement of human rights in Panama: the desire to maintain their presence in the Canal Zone and to prevent the dismantling of American military bases.

I. M. Vershinina: I agree that the future of the military bases is the principle thing that worries the United States and it is precisely this that determines their present policy with respect to Panama.

At the same time, I would also like to understand the conflicts which exist among the military and in the country. It will be interesting to find out what the opinion of Panamanian communists is in this connection. In September 1987, R. Dario Sousa, the general secretary of the PdP [People’s Party] Central Committee, noted in analyzing the causes of the country’s crisis that “the current ethics of the military is one of the reasons for their deviation from the Torrijist policy... and the inclination toward bourgeois values has been turned into a trend in the Defense Forces to such an extent that when one speaks of improvement, one thinks of enrichment at the same time.”

I. N. Klekovkin: There is no question that a number of the high officers have large fortunes, but this does not constitute grounds for enrichment at all. The Panamanian officer corps, unlike the armies of other countries on the continent, has been formed mainly with persons from the middle and lower strata of society.

The thought expressed by Chumakova regarding the Army’s control of drug operations is more than questionable. Wholesale trade, particularly in the free zone, is controlled by representatives of American capital. Representatives of the traditional oligarchic clans—Maduro, Mendez, (Betesh), and (Eismann)—hold retail trade firmly in their hands. They all represent Jewish capital and are closely associated with the right-wing opposition. At the same time, it should be remembered that among the simple people the prestige of the soldiers is high, as if none of them had been accused of corruption or other abuses; for the ordinary rain forest dwellers, the peasants in the mountains, and the Indians on islands in the Atlantic and Pacific, the soldiers are the only help and support which helps them to survive in the struggle with nature. Because there are no roads or telephones and there is no electricity or medical service; and help can come only from the Army. The doctor wears a military uniform. An Army helicopter brings in provisions in the event of a calamity. But the representatives of the bourgeois parties visit them once every 4 years during elections, when they come to buy votes.

The question of the modernization of the National Defense Forces (FDN) requires some clarification. As already pointed out, the FDN command is pursuing a policy toward the establishment of practical control over the canal. Modernization pursues the objective of transforming the former National Guard from police forces into modern armed forces consisting of infantry, a navy and an air force. Creation of the new modern units is aimed at depriving the Americans of the opportunity to accuse the Panamanian military of being incapable of providing security for the canal. The work to reinforce the Army is being carried out against a background of an

antination campaign by the opposition parties, which are striving to demonstrate that Panama is incapable in principle of providing security for the link between the oceans. So they are attempting to substantiate the need for the continued presence of American troops in Panama.

M. L. Chumakova: Yes. The Panamanian Defense Forces are already sufficiently prepared to provide security for the canal. And it is exactly the current crisis and the destabilization campaign which is being conducted by the United States which have been aimed at undermining the "autonomous status" of the Panamanian Army and undermining its political positions. We should turn our attention to the Panamanian political system. There is a legislative assembly, a ruling coalition, and a representative government with a civilian president. But in addition there is Panama's National Security Council, where the crucial positions belong to Noriega and his colleagues in Panamanian intelligence. The important political decisions are made precisely by the National Security Council.

I. N. Klekovkin: One personal note, or rather a correction. As far as I know, a National Security Council also exists in the United States. On its behalf, in circumvention of the Congress and the Senate, arms were delivered to Iran and the Contras—which subsequently became well-known as "Irangate." A National Security Council does not exist in Panama. Under the Constitution, a State Council was established and is functioning; it is headed by the President of the Republic. The council is made up of certain ministers and leaders of the political parties in the ruling coalition. The only military representative in the council is the commander of the National Defense Forces.

M. L. Chumakova: I wanted to emphasize that the geopolitical factor was not of transient significance in shaping American policy with respect to Panama. The United States' priority objective continues to be to retain the bases. But the methods of achieving this objective are being changed in the context of new shifts in world politics and an awareness that the processes which are taking place on the continent and global processes are interdependent.

Now, judging by the talks being held between the United States and individual representatives of the Panamanian Government, variations of the Jos Blandon plan, which provide for Noriega's "retirement with dignity" and the formation of a provisional government, are being worked out. The Blandon plan includes the requirement that 12 of the 18 high-ranking officers that make up Panama's military command be retired. Perhaps rejuvenation of the officer corps' leaders is one of the possible methods for the United States to influence the military circles. Perhaps the young Torrijist officers which Klekovkin mentioned will play a role here. In my view, the prospects that Noriega will remain at the head of the

Army are limited on the one hand by intensified economic and political pressure from the United States, and on the other hand by the development and unification of the right-wing and centrist opposition forces.

Finally, I would like to mention one more factor. Panama's ties with certain socialist states and regimes in developing countries which are objectionable to the United States are a source of concern to the American administration.

A. D. Bekarevich: At the same time, we cannot underestimate the U. S. resources to apply pressure to Panama. Panama is one of the largest financial centers. About 130 international banks and other financial institutions are in its territory, and on the whole they are all controlled by the United States. A tremendous amount of goods flow through Panama's free trade zone to Central America. This "canal" is also controlled by the United States. For example, under U. S. pressure, a number of Central American countries blocked the transit of commodities from Panama through their territory last year.

Hence it inevitably follows that the United States will make use of every opportunity to apply financial, trade and economic pressure against Panama.

There is increased awareness among all the patriotic forces of the scope of the danger threatening Panama under the crisis conditions. I believe that certain support—even more than that, important support—will be given to the National Defense Forces to the extent that they offer resistance to pressure from the United States.

I. M. Vershinina: I support the thesis that it is precisely the economic sanctions which will become the basic lever for pressure against Panama. This is confirmed by the fact that this is the first time in the history of bilateral relations that a campaign for commercial and economic destabilization of Panama has reached such a level.

At the same time, we cannot lose sight of the problem of modernizing the existing canal. Now, with reference to the operations near Culebra, the United States is opposing deductions from the canal operation income for these needs, on the one hand, and is dragging out the work in every way possible, on the other hand, trying to show that the work should be conducted by Panama itself. It is clear that Panama is not in a position to perform this task alone. At the same time, the current economic problems, particularly the foreign debt, with payments which comprise about 55 percent of budget expenditures, have to be taken into account.

V. M. Gavrillov: Perhaps Panama has the right to count on help from Japan, which is displaying interest in strengthening its positions on the isthmus?

M. L. Chumakova: Yes, but we should not overlook the military and strategic alliance between the United States and Japan and their plans for joint development of a Pacific community.

A. D. Bekarevich: I do not think that Japan will support the United States' policy toward Panama unconditionally because of apprehension that its plans in the Pacific region would be prejudiced.

M. L. Chumakova: It's possible, but I believe that Japan would coordinate its policy with the United States to begin with.

Most likely, Panama will resort to extension of its international contacts if the U. S. dictation is intensified, and they will appeal to the Latin American community of states, especially the "Group of Eight" to which it belongs.

A. D. Bekarevich: Of course. After all, the concluding document of the Acapulco Conference ("The Acapulco Commitment in the Interests of Peace, Development and Democracy") expressed full support for the Panamanian Government in the struggle for strict implementation of the Panama Canal treaties. This is a very important fact which must be taken into account in considering the consequences of the crisis.

And one more point. As you know, the OAS adopted a resolution on 1 July 1987, at Panama's request, to censure the United States' policy toward Panama. This attests to the fact that the crisis problem now affects all of Latin America in the most direct way.

Let us summarize to a certain extent. The outcome of the crisis will depend on many factors. Will the forces which oppose the United States' dictation find a "common language?"

To the extent that the Army maintains its unity, taking into account that the United States is not only exerting pressure on it from the outside, but is looking for opportunities to split it from the inside. Thus far the Army has maintained unity by virtue of the patriotic, Torrijist mood of the officer corps, and primarily the young officers.

By taking into account Panama's situation and its role in international financial, economic and political life, the international community also is able to play a role in protecting this country's sovereignty.

Finally, and this is the most important point, the masses have not spoken their piece yet. The experience in concluding a just agreement on the canal demonstrated that the Panamanian people possess a high level of national consciousness, self-discipline and political will. The future will show the outcome of the opposition between the patriotic forces and the proimperialist forces.

I. N. Klekovkin: There is no question that the military are unable to withstand U. S. pressure alone. However, they will be able to resist political and economic pressure with the support of the broad masses. We have to expect intensification of the domestic political struggle and aggravation of Panama-U. S. relations in the short-term future. The United States will do everything possible to turn the Panamanian military away from the nationalist path, to compel them to change their policy in the international arena, and to force Noriega into retirement.

In the long term, the Americans will be compelled to turn the canal over to Panama all the same. At the same time, they will do everything possible to find some compromise solution to retain the military bases.

If we analyze American military policy in recent years with respect to Latin America, and particularly the tremendous efforts they are making to establish a new Latin American-Pacific military community, we also will see a strategic policy of reinforcing and extending military presence in the region. For this reason, the United States is by no means prepared, either morally, theoretically, or psychologically, to leave the Panamanian isthmus. The question of the bases' fate will continue to be critical, one which is sensitive for the United States, and naturally for the Panamanian nation.

After 4 years of relative calm in Panama-U. S. relations, a crisis has broken out once again. The question of defending national interests has again advanced to the foreground, which will inevitably radicalize the national sentiments of the masses. We cannot help but take this into account in assessing the prospects for development of the situation and the probable intensification of the struggle between the two countries.

V. M. Gavrilov: A considerable number of rrijos' legacy, judging by the views expressed. But it has not been developed. Unfortunately, we did not manage to devote more attention to this question: what role is the United States, which is "taking care of" the fate of democracy in Panama, playing in this?

One more important problem was raised—the foreign military bases. It is important because the number of large economic projects, which play an essential role in the development of the entire international community, will evidently rrijos' legacy, judging by the views expressed. But it has not been developed. Unfortunately, we did not manage to devote more attention to this question: what role is the United States, which is "taking care of" the fate of democracy in Panama, playing in this?

One more important problem was raised—the foreign military bases. It is important because the number of large economic projects, which play an essential role in the development of the entire international community, will evidently be increased. As explained, the current

conflict between the United States and Panama shows that the United States, under the guise of "democratizing" Panama, is striving to retain the archaic model of former times for control over these types of projects—"construction" with elements of a military presence. But this naturally causes general apprehension because of the possibility of blackmail of the world community. After all, the fact is that no one is threatening the safety of shipping in the Panama Canal. Unless it is international terrorism. So new models are necessary for operating projects which serve the interests of all mankind. And this presupposes that they are demilitarized. Otherwise, instead of "disarmament for the sake of development" and the development of an integrated world, the planet may be covered by a web of new military bases by the year 2000. In such a context, the struggle of Panama's patriotic forces, as well as the international—including Latin American—solidarity with them, acquires an altogether different accent.

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Remembering General Torrijos

18070119 Moscow *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA* in
Russian No 5, May 88 pp 72-74

[Introduction by N. Leonov to translation of book "Mi General Torrijos" [My General Torrijos] by Jos de Jesus Martinez; translation into Russian by D. Grushko]

[Text] When they suggested that I write an introduction to the translation of Jos de Jesus Martinez' book "Mi General Torrijos," I recalled the words of Graham Greene referring both to the author and the hero of this book: "Tossing in bed (in a Panamanian hotel during one of his trips to see General Torrijos—N. Leonov), I considered a sketch for a future Panamanian coin. Wouldn't it really be unfair to stamp one side with the likeness of the general and the other with that of Chuchu, two romantics who trusted each other more than any politician, intellectual or woman?"¹

Chuchu is also Jos de Jesus Martinez. In Latin America, anyone who has "Jesus" as part of his name is called either Chucho or Chuchu by friends and relations. This is not familiarity, but the highest sign of trust and almost the attachment of a relation. For this reason, I take the liberty of using this short name because I had occasion to know Chuchu personally, to fly in his old plane, to trust in his flying skill and exceptional political insight, to listen to his interminable humorous stories, and to be glad that there are such lovers of life and optimists on earth.

Greene's words about the inseparability of the likenesses of Torrijos and Chuchu are very possibly the best illustration of the unique value of the book presented to readers by the journal *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA*. Anyone who has had occasion to read Greene's book dedicated to Torrijos finds it difficult to determine who

attracted the English author more—the general himself, the leader of the Panamanian revolutionary process, or his strange protector Chuchu, the former professor of philosophy and mathematics, a poet at heart, a special envoy for delicate political matters, a skilled diplomat, and a person with all the Bohemian virtues and vices.² During his visit to the Vatican, Chuchu was presented to the pope as "the minister of defense," although there is no such ministry in Panama, and the commander of the National Guard was Torrijos himself. Peruvian General Leonidas Rodriguez Figueroa called Chuchu "a general honoris causa." In reality, they were inseparable. This was not the classic duo—Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, but two Don Quixotes, so strong was the spirit of romanticism in both of them. For this reason, you believe the author wholeheartedly when he mournfully writes: "When a loved one dies, half of you dies." Perhaps Chuchu lost even more than half his life. After all, he became part of Torrijos' inner circle at age 45 and carried out missions for him for just 6 years (1975-1984), but these years became the heart of his life. Nothing that came before and after can be compared with this brief but dazzling scintillation.

Chuchu's book indicated that he remained very devoted to his true friend Torrijos and that he had found the courage to write a book about a person whose name they now try to forget and whose ideas they seek to send to the storeroom of history. These days, 7 years after Torrijos' death in the air crash—Chuchu convincingly labels it an assassination—the emboldened Panamanian oligarchy and upper bourgeoisie, with obvious support from Washington, are persistently attempting to turn Panama back to pre-Torrijos times and to obliterate any memory of an outstanding fighter for the Panamanian people's rights. Some of those who stood beside the general in those glorious days turned out to be at a much lower altitude than Torrijos' flight, many followed the well-beaten path of time-servers, and civil courage was simply denied to others, those who prefer to sit on the fence passively when there is essentially a struggle centering on General Torrijos' political legacy. Chuchu and his book are a brilliant example of allegiance to the precepts of his friend and leader.

The Soviet reader is familiar with the story of Torrijos' struggle for the return of the canal to the Panamanian people. This has been written about in our press most of all. Chuchu speaks of this least of all, as if he assumes that the reader needs new, little-known facts about the life and activity of Omar Torrijos. The pages of Chuchu's book project an image not simply of a Panamanian patriot, but a fighter for the rights of the working people who maintained that "the truth of a soldier is much closer to the social truth of his people than the social truth of those who govern them." The author writes with passion and sorrow that Torrijos spent essentially his entire life not in power but in opposition to the real bourgeois-landowner masters of Panama whom he did not have enough time to fight. Very likely for this reason, Torrijos lived for a long time in the small fishing village

of Farallon, more than a hundred kilometers from the capital, and his other favorite place was the poor settlement of Coclecito, lost in the mountains; Torrijos maintained bonds of cordial and unostentatious friendship with its residents for many years. The general built a small house for himself in this village and every time that circumstances would permit, he would go there to visit with the peasants privately. Torrijos was killed on 31 June 1981 on his way to Coclecito, where the first livestock-raising cooperative in Panama, which he established, was in operation. It will be a revelation for many Latin Americans to learn that in the 1970's up to 20 percent of Panama's VVP [GNP] was produced by enterprises belonging to the state sector of the economy. Now many of them have been given back to private businessmen again.

Chuchu reveals features of Torrijos' personality that the public at large is completely unaware of, down to the asceticism of an unassuming, kind, and witty person, an innately pessimistic person who often spoke of death and the impossibility of achieving ultimate goals.

Torrijos asked that a soldier who had slept on guard duty be sent breakfast in bed, and sometimes he would even bring it himself with a newspaper. This had a stronger effect than any punishment. His orderly was Corporal Omar, whom the general had released from prison, where he had been confined for 13 years for stealing food. He was convinced that the hungry child was not the one that was guilty, but those who had doomed him to chronic undernourishment. His cook was a simple peasant woman who once had asked Torrijos to send her to the jail where her only son was confined for stealing, for she did not have the means of subsistence. (Many diplomats and officials complained about the simplicity and modesty of meals in the general's home, which were "inadequate" for their position.)

Once when he learned that children who had begun to gnaw on their own hands from hunger were put in the hospital, Torrijos ordered that all noncommissioned officers in the National Guard see this tragic manifestation of a social evil with their own eyes.

Torrijos tried to help persons who were suffering and persecuted in every way. For example, he helped obtain the release of Germ n (Pom rez), a prominent figure in the Sandinist Front who died not long before the victory of the revolution, from a Honduran prison. He gave money to work out and implement a plan for the release of Maria Estela de Peron, the president of Argentina, who had been overthrown by the military and put in confinement. I had occasion to witness how he managed to alleviate the suffering of Laura, sister of the late President Salvador Allende, and bring about permission for her return to Chile. There are many such examples.

Considerable assistance and support were provided to the Nicaraguan patriots during the years of their struggle against the Somoza dictatorship. At that time Panama

became the place from which weapons and ammunition for the Sandinists were sent, and the wounded fighters and commanders were treated and recuperated here. A huge map of Nicaragua, which Torrijos used to follow the course of events in that country, hung on the wall in his home throughout the war. After the Sandinists' victory this map was replaced by one of El Salvador. Chuchu—an indirect participant himself in many operations—tells readers about this activity of General Torrijos, which was strictly secret then, for the first time.

Not everything in Chuchu's book, as in Torrijos' personality and views, can be shared without reservation by Soviet readers. For example, the general thought that before the social structure of society can be changed, man himself must be changed. With a typical aphorism, he said: "It makes no difference if one's underwear is changed if he hasn't taken a bath." We cannot agree with this, of course. Nothing changes a person so rapidly and profoundly as a social revolution which completely changes a person's place in society and provides him with access to education, enables him to take part in political life, and so forth. The general, and Chuchu as well, "do not worship" the class struggle (as they say). They accept it, but do not acknowledge the importance of the engine of social development behind it. And again they state their position in the form of a pun: "I do not believe in witches, but it's true that they exist."

But the main point about the book is that the reader learns a great deal that is new and unexpected about General Omar Torrijos from one who took part firsthand in the events described. Torrijos was one of the most brilliant social and political figures in Latin America. He said of himself: "I do not want to go down in history, I want to go into the Canal Zone"; but he has now become an integral part, and perhaps the most glorious part, of his people's history.

Footnotes

1. G. Greene, "Getting to Know the General," New York, 1984, p 89. 2. G. Greene, "Znakomstvo s generalom, ili Kak chuzhaya bol stala moyey" [Remembering the General, or How Someone Else's Pain Became My Own], LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Nos 10-12, 1985 and Nos 1-2, 1986.

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Haitian CP General Secretary Interviewed
18070119 Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 88 pp 108-110

[Interview with Ren Thodore, general secretary of the United Party of Haitian Communists, written by A. A. Sukhostat: "There Is a Way Out!"]

[Text] A broad popular movement for democratization in which practically all the people are taking part is under way in two island states—Haiti and the Dominican Republic. However, the forces are unequal—crack punitive units have been hurled against the peaceful

demonstrators. But the tension of the demonstrations and their duration and persistence attest to the fact that Haitians do not intend to retreat and are firmly and adamantly determined to obtain their essential rights. It is no wonder that the topic of Haiti remains on the pages of the world press.

Your journal covers the basic events and trends in the development of the current domestic political situation in Haiti effectively and comprehensively, although simplifications are not always avoided.

It appeared to me that the role of the United States in the development of events in my country was somewhat exaggerated in a recent discussion.¹ Their resources are great, of course, but they can pick only the "fruit" which has "ripened"—even with their assistance, but on national soil. They have seen perfectly well in Washington that not only the workers, but many bourgeois circles as well, practically all the Army, and even some of the Duvalierists have been dissatisfied—each of them for their own reasons—with the situation that has taken shape. Only the "mulatto" sector of the bourgeoisie, which is closely linked with American monopolies, has remained loyal to the regime. For this reason, it has been sufficient for the master of the White House to move his finger a little and point to an airplane for the dictator, so that the latter, after being stubborn for the sake of propriety, goes back where he came from.

Have Duvalier's closest associates understood where the development of events has been leading? Unquestionably. But the country has continued to go downstream on a current that has become increasingly swift, and all those who were "traveling" with the ruling regime yesterday have begun to jump out of this boat.

To be sure, many Duvalierists supported the overthrow of the dictator (or at least maintained neutrality), not at all because of aspirations for changes, but simply because they were moved to the rear for the official feeding trough and deprived of opportunities to fill their pockets as in the good old days of "Papa Doc." For this reason, they turned their back on his "Baby," hoping to come to an agreement with the military.

Practically the entire Army (not an individual group in it) opposed Duvalier. It was no secret to the United States what was taking place among the military. They also knew about the Army leaders' extreme dissatisfaction with the fact that the traditional bourgeoisie was given more rights and resources (they were particularly indignant about the honors that the dictator showered on his father-in-law, E. Bennett). Washington also knew about the persistent ferment in the officer corps, which was intensified after the Army was sent to suppress the demonstrations against the dictator in November 1980 for the first time in 20 years; and they knew about the miserably desperate plight of the rank and file which often forced them to earn a living by robbery and smuggling. Washington has decided to play this no-risk

card, it would seem. On the whole, we can say that the calculation was justified by 100 percent, if we mean the current situation, without looking into the future. But it is knocking at the door more and more insistently. The removal of zealous Duvalierists from the National Council of Government, the dissociation of part of the Army from the repressions, and the display of pronounced anti-American sentiment in its ranks attest to this. The Army is not monolithic, and the struggle under way in it is not always apparent but no less intensive because of this. Especially as the pro-American forces are doing everything possible to slander or remove those who do not share their views.

In this connection, the commander of the "Dessalines" garrison, Colonel Jean-Claude Paul, attracts our attention. In discussion, he appears to support restoration of an authoritarian system, that is, Duvalierism. As far as I know, the United States has not wanted him to be assigned to this important post from the very beginning. But this took place on the eve of Duvalier's flight, that is, with his knowledge and consent. The question arises: why? The answer to this can be drawn from a recent article in one government newspaper. It states in particular that Paul enjoys the respect of the Army rank and file, and that he lives with the soldiers and shares all their burdens. Thanks to his efforts they opened a new secondary school at the barracks (one must live in Haiti to evaluate this properly). He did not attend a military academy in the United States and his views and sentiments are far from pro-American. The newspaper with the article on the colonel came out on 3 March and they closed it down the following day. Suppression of demonstrations and killings are often attributed to the Paul battalion. The Americans frankly say that this is the handiwork of his people. But the "Dessalines" soldiers deny taking part in repressions and say that when demonstrations begin, persons dressed in their green uniform appear unexpectedly and engage in a massacre. Colonel Paul is also accused of drug trafficking and many other sins. Extreme pressure has been put on Namphy to remove the objectionable colonel, but the latter remains in his position at present.

And finally, we should not forget that many of those in bourgeois circles fell victim to Duvalierist repressions and were forced to emigrate. Many of them have taken an active part in the political struggle after returning to their homeland. The lessons of this were not in vain. They will long remember the "bloody Saturday" of 26 April 1986, when the new dictatorship shot into the crowd of people at the Fort Dimanche prison who came to honor the memory of members of the opposition who had perished behind its walls. This was the first "cold shower," and others followed later. The government which had seemed to be theirs sobered the unsuspecting and hastened the division in these circles.

The clash at Fort Dimanche, in turn, showed the military that they cannot retain power without repressions.

We cannot help but mention the role of the Catholic Church as well. J.-B. (Aristide) has become one of the most popular persons in Haiti, and perhaps in the entire Caribbean. I would like to add only that the Catholic hierarchy which organized the persecution of its "prodigal son" is not as united as it seems at times. Its conduct today is like that of a weather vane—always looking back at the military. But where will the wind be blowing tomorrow? Believers were stirred up against the "voodoo" priests not long ago, but this has been replaced lately by a flirtation with them, for this is now the military's policy.

What can we expect in the near future? I think that what is being experienced is a "wait-and-see" policy for some, and a "buildup of forces" for others. Our only fitting response to the dictatorship is to do everything possible to ensure the unity of democratic forces. After the dictator's flight a people's movement which is capable of covering the entire country came into being. It did not have enough offensive capability and organization and there was too much spontaneity and improvisation. An effort is now under way not only to comprehend what has happened, the entire experience, but also to search for a new approach, and in the final analysis, to establish a united front of all opposition forces. The main objective now is the unification, organizational if not ideological, of all the people's committees, many of which came into being before Duvalier's departure and include practically the entire spectrum of forces capable of functioning. These committees were very active during the election campaign on 29 November, but they became passive somehow later on. It is important to reinvigorate their activity and to get rid of the anticommunism being cultivated intensively in their midst. It is common knowledge that the first congress of all the progressive political and social organizations was held early last year with the participation of the Catholic hierarchy. It adopted the decision to establish a national committee of democratic movements. We are faced with putting this decision into effect. We have developed good, business-like relationships with a number of political parties, primarily the United Democratic Committee. Contacts are being organized with other influential groups such as the Union of Patriotic and Democratic Forces and the Haitian Workers Party. To the extent that election passions have faded, other associations and parties have actually disappeared from the political arena. Some of them, the Social Christian Party for example, have stated publicly that they are supported by the majority of the population. It turned out that its leaders were simply bluffing, passing what is desired for what is real. For this reason, it seems to me, what are important now are not declarations, but specific steps, even if they are little noticed but no less practical, on the path toward the unity of democratic forces. Only in this way can Haiti

find a way out of the impasse and bring about genuine democratic reforms. In a word, there is a way out!

Footnotes

1. "The Tragedy of Haiti—Is There A Way Out?," *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA* No 3, 1983.

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Mexico Becomes Acquainted with USSR Perestroyka

18070119 Moscow *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA* in
Russian No 5, May 99 p 132

[Report by A. Borovkov from Mexico City: "Mexico Becomes Acquainted with Perestroyka"]

[Text] The process of perestroyka in the Soviet Union is arousing increasing interest among the Mexican public. All the mass media carry broadcasts about it and they discuss it at conferences and in private conversations.

Mexicans recently had the opportunity to acquaint themselves with perestroyka firsthand, as they say, thanks to the publication by the "Diana" publishing house, one of Mexico's largest, of M. S. Gorbachev's book "Perestroyka i novoye myshleniye dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira" [Restructuring and New Thinking for Our Country and the Entire World].

A book presentation was held at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on 14 December 1987. The executive president of the "Diana" publishing group, Jos Luis Ramirez; the chairman of the National Book Chamber, (Trillas Mercader); and USSR Ambassador to Mexico R. Sergeev addressed the gathering. In the process it was noted that the publication of M. S. Gorbachev's book is an important event in Mexico's spiritual life. It was emphasized that Argentina and Brazil had acquired the right to publish it.

After thanking all those who took part in preparing the excellent publication of the book, R. Sergeev noted that along with the democratization of all aspects of Soviet society and a thorough economic reform, perestroyka means a new approach by the Soviet Union toward international affairs. He expressed confidence that the publication of M. S. Gorbachev's book in the Spanish language will serve to further strengthen ties between the Soviet and Mexican peoples.

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Political Observers on Near East Conflict
18070149 Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian
No 11, 1988 pp 44-45

[Discussion under the "Studiya 'SV'" [SOVETSKIY VOIN Studio] rubric with Sergey Andreyevich Losev, director general of TASS; Oleg Gerasimovich Peresypkin, rector of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Academy; and political correspondents Konstantin Yervandovich Geyvandov, Igor Petrovich Belyayev and Farid Mustafeyevich Seyful-Mulyukov: "The Middle East: Mines of Conflict"]

[Text] F. SEYFUL-MULYUKOV: Our discussion today is devoted to the Middle East, one of the "hottest" spots on the planet. But first, several considerations on how pernicious and dangerous the so-called "local" conflicts are. They are like the sources of forest fires that have not been put out. They flare up suddenly in one place, then another. It is estimated that up to 200 regional conflicts have broken out at different times in the world since World War II, taking the lives of about 30 million people.

As Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev noted in his speech in Belgrade, "The settlement of existing conflicts and, to the extent possible, prevention of new ones is one of the world's most urgent problems."

S. LOSEV: The first world conference on the Middle East was held in late December 1973. And now, 15 years later, the idea of convening the conference again has acquired considerable magnetic force. It is no coincidence that USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze and U. S. Secretary of State George Shultz are devoting a great deal of attention to this problem in the course of their bilateral meetings.

It is common knowledge that Shultz has made trips to this region recently. What brought them about? In January this year, the United States vetoed a Security Council resolution recommending that the UN secretary general convene an international conference on the Middle East. Convening the conference has now appeared as the first point in the plan proposed by Shultz in the course of his talks in Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Israel. It would appear that real shifts in the U. S. position are at hand, but only at first glance, unfortunately. Because an international conference, according to the American concept, should not be authoritarian, as they say. That is, the participants will come together, and then right after the meeting, they are to hold separate talks. Between Israel and Jordan first of all. In other words, an international conference should serve as a screen for separate negotiations, in the American view.

Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union has consistently insisted on a conference that is up to strength, with the participation of all sides concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization. Under the American plan, the Palestinian delegation would be part of a joint

delegation with Jordan. But the main drawback of Washington's plan is that the U. S. Administration substitutes limited autonomy for the Palestinians for the concept of creating an independent Palestinian state. At the same time, the autonomy in the first stage would be semiautonomous, to use the American expression, continuing for no less than 3 years. The Israelis, in turn, are insisting on a Tel Aviv protectorate over the occupied territories under the conditions of autonomy as well.

F. SEYFUL-MULYUKOV: I would like to point out that the problems in the Middle East are inseparable from the problems of maintaining peace and security in the entire Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Sea washes not only the shores of Middle Eastern countries, but of many European and African countries as well. And it is no coincidence that the attention of the entire world public was riveted on Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia.

O. PERESYPKIN: True. The desire of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to strengthen their relations and broaden the scope of their cooperation was conclusively demonstrated during the visit. At the same time, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev touched on the questions of demilitarizing the Mediterranean and there has been a widespread response in the world to the proposals which he advanced in this connection.

The reason for such intense interest in the new Soviet initiatives is clear. The Mediterranean Sea is the cradle of many civilizations. And in the second place, too many weapons have been concentrated here today. About 200 American military bases and installations have been deployed in the Mediterranean, according to specialists' information.

The U. S. military presence in this region is intensified because the American 6th Fleet is permanently stationed here. From my experience in working in Libya and other countries in the Middle East, I know that the American 6th Fleet, which keeps about 20 warships in the Mediterranean on a permanent basis, is the United States' most active naval unit. It is looked upon as sinister in the Middle East. It is sufficient to recall that the battleship New Jersey shelled the coast of Lebanon and the Palestinian camps in Beirut, and ships of the 6th Fleet guided the American aircraft that bombed Libya to the target...

F. SEYFUL-MULYUKOV: As I recall, you were the ambassador to the Libyan Jamahiriya at that time.

O. PERESYPKIN: Yes, I was there then, and I can say that those were not easy times for the staff members of Soviet missions in Libya. Indeed, the Americans have turned the Mediterranean into a very uneasy region in general. If you recall, the uninvited visit to the Crimean coast by two American ships began here, from the Mediterranean, after all.

The Soviet Union is sincerely interested in establishing lasting peace and stability in this region. The only route linking our Black Sea basin with the world ocean passes through here. Many of our commercial ships use the Mediterranean Sea. Important foreign trading partners of the USSR are located in this region. So the struggle for peace in the Middle East is vital and a broad field of activity for Soviet diplomacy, as well as the diplomacy of the socialist countries and all those who really want peace.

F. SEYFUL-MULYUKOV: Let us return to the Middle East conflict. In particular, to the uprising by the Arabs of Palestine in the territories occupied by Israel. Igor Petrovich, I think you will agree this uprising is an extraordinary event?

I. BELYAYEV: Unquestionably. The uprising has been going on for quite a few months. It is characteristic that both juveniles and young people, that is, those that represent the generation that has grown up during the occupation, have been taking part in it. They have not resigned themselves to deprivation of their rights and they do not want to live under the Israeli yoke. The principal demand of the insurgents is that their home, an Arab Palestinian state, be built on their land.

Stones are their main weapon. We cannot help but recall from our own history that cobblestones were the weapon of the proletariat. However, the Israeli Army is helpless in the face of the insurgents. They are helpless because the means of neutralizing the resistance has not yielded the desired results.

F. SEYFUL-MULYUKOV: Pardon me, let me "cut in" briefly on the means of neutralization. The Israeli leaders have not limited themselves to repressions in the occupied lands; they also organized the attempt against the deputy commander of the Palestinian Armed Forces, Abu Jihad (his real name is Khalil (Vazir)). Incidentally, the assassination of Jihad on the territory of Tunisia, whose sovereignty was not taken into consideration by the organizers of the truly gangsterlike action, made the entire civilized world shudder.

So the Israelis have not been shy about choosing their means of pressure. And it is not their "fault" that the effect was far from what was desired. Please continue, Igor Petrovich.

I. BELYAYEV: In past years the Israeli Administration in the occupied territories and the military authorities have contended that the Palestine Liberation Organization has neither authority nor force, so to speak, in Palestinian lands and occupied Arab territories. The uprising has demonstrated that the PLO enjoys a tremendous amount of authority and influence.

K. GEYVANDOV: A few words about the leadership of the uprising in the occupied territories. I returned comparatively recently from Jordan, where I met with

(Muhammed Milkhem), a member of the PLO Executive Committee. He told me in considerable detail how the PLO was guiding the uprising and how they are keeping their fingers on the pulse of this uprising all the time. And he spoke further about the position maintained by the Israeli prime minister, Shamir, who heads the Likud Party. I recall this sentence in particular: "Conducting negotiations with the Likud is just like trying to milk a bull."

F. SEYFUL-MULYUKOV: From time to time, reports appear in the foreign press concerning Soviet-Israeli relations. Most often these are fabrications by the appropriate services in the West. But in itself, the question is of interest to many persons: is there progress in Soviet-Israeli relations? Sergey Andreyevich, perhaps you will reply? You were a TASS correspondent in Israel in the 1950s, I recall.

S. LOSEV: I was. The absence of diplomatic relations today is not normal, of course. But I would like to point out that the Soviet Union severed diplomatic relations with Israel because of its aggression against the Arab countries. This was the fundamental reason. And what led to the severance of relations must be eliminated. The obstacles cannot be removed on the basis of a policy of annexation, continuation and reinforcement of occupation, and violation of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. The USSR recognized Israel in 1948, but at that time Israel in turn recognized the right of the Arab people of Palestine to establish their own independent state. It is common knowledge that a great deal has changed in Tel Aviv since that time. As far as the future is concerned, as far as I understand, normalization of our relations is possible in the course of a Middle East settlement. And of course, the first sign of a real intention to bring about normalization of our bilateral relations would be a change in Israel's attitude toward the idea of an international conference on the Middle East.

F. SEYFUL-MULYUKOV: And toward a Middle East settlement.

S. LOSEV: Of course, and a Middle East settlement as a whole.

F. SEYFUL-MULYUKOV: Another "hot spot" in the Middle East—perhaps the "hottest" spot—is the Persian Gulf region. Oleg Gerasimovich, please shed some light on this problem.

O. PERSEYPKIN: Indeed, the Iran-Iraq conflict has been continuing for about 8 years now, and it has taken 1.2 million lives, according to estimates by specialists who have been closely following these events. In the scope of destruction, only the Second World War was more disastrous.

F. SEYFUL-MULYUKOV: Many readers are asking: "Is any progress being made toward peaceful settlement of the conflict?"

O. PERESYPKIN: Most specialists believe that a military victory is practically impossible, and this war is particularly senseless for that reason. Moreover, it is poisoning the situation in the entire world, especially as it is in the Middle East. Both Iraq and Iran are being damaged economically. Suffice it to say that both Iraq and Iran, as oil-producing countries, were quite wealthy states, all in all. Now they have been turned from financial donors into debtors.

Naturally, the Soviet Union is speaking out in favor of an end to this absurd war and the beginning of negotiations. I would like to emphasize that our interest in this problem is explained not only by the fact that we support peace and oppose war as a means of resolving political disputes in general, but by a number of other considerations as well. Iran is our neighbor, and we are obliged to think about maintaining normal relations with this country. We are linked with Iraq by a friendship and cooperation treaty, and we have a number of mutually beneficial agreements. In our contacts with Teheran, we continue to call upon the Iranians to sit down at the negotiating table and begin talks with the Iraqis.

The Soviet Union supports the role of the United Nations in every way possible in resolving regional conflicts. And when Resolution No 598 was adopted unanimously by the Security Council last year, it was the Iran-Iraq war that gave us occasion to assess the United Nations' capabilities in a positive sense. It is common knowledge that Iraq accepted this resolution. Iran actually rejected it. It appears that this resolution has not worked out its potential yet, and it is important that not only we, but those who represent many states, acknowledge this.

I. BELYAYEV: I would single out one more important aspect. Those who instigated the unleashing of this war from both sides were the most active supporters of the "divide and conquer" policy which has not been forgotten in the West. Now, on the Arabs' positions. The Arab world is extensive—over 20 countries. And their attitude toward the Iran-Iraq war is very contradictory. Indeed, Iran is at war with an Arab country. And states such as Syria and Libya are on Iran's side. Moreover, certain other Arab countries—I mean the United Arab Emirates in particular—do not want to take an active position in everything related to the adoption of sanctions against Iran, considering that country's proximity.

S. LOSEV: It is also necessary to dwell on the policy of the United States as well. They have taken advantage of the Iran-Iraq war, now in its eighth year, to sharply increase their military presence in the Persian Gulf. As if they have been seeking thereby to compensate for the loss of positions in Iran. I will note that what they lost there were only the modern weapons valued at 16 billion dollars that were delivered for the Shah's Army at one time. But today this involves not only an increased naval presence, but attempts to obtain permanent military land bases in the Persian Gulf region as well.

There is a certain dichotomy here. On one hand, the official American position appears to call for adoption of the Security Council's second resolution and introduction of an embargo on arms deliveries to Iran. A peace-making role, it would seem. But at the same time, everything is being done behind the scenes to stir up and kindle the flames of war. After all, this is not something that has been made up; these are hard facts, and they have been published in the U. S. press—the Americans have been sending the sides information from their space reconnaissance to pinpoint the targets for air bombings. And the "Irangate" scandal! This is not simply a matter of circumventing Congress. This involves the deception of the United States' closest allies. While demanding that Britain, France, and other NATO allies strictly adhere to the ban on arms shipments to Iran and calling Iran the principal conduit, so to speak, of international terrorism, the United States was delivering arms secretly to Iran for several years at the same time. They actually promoted the Iran-Iraq war. This did not involve "minor things," but thousands of antitank missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and spare parts for fighter-bombers, without which Iranian aircraft would essentially be grounded. This is something to think about.

F. SEYFUL-MULYUKOV: Another "hot spot" on the planet is long-suffering Lebanon. Konstantin Yervandovich, you have worked in Lebanon for many years. Please characterize the Lebanese situation.

K. GEYVANDOV: To put it briefly, the situation has unfortunately not changed for the better since 1975, when the civil war began. Practically, the problem turns on two matters. The first one is abolition of the confessional system of running the state. The second one is equitable sharing of power between the Christians and Muslims who live in the country. The criminal action by Israel, whose troops, supported by aircraft, tanks, and artillery, invaded Lebanon's territory in May this year, has complicated the situation considerably. The pretext, as usual, is the standard one: to search for and annihilate the PLO guerrillas. Now the next election for president of the republic, whose term expires in September this year, will be held. A fierce struggle among the different sides has begun. And apparently the situation in Lebanon may become aggravated again with the approaching election.

F. SEYFUL-MULYUKOV: Our discussion has come to an end. Naturally, we have not been able to shed light on all the region's complex problems, and we did not set such a task. The situation here remains dangerously explosive, as attested by the reports coming from different Arab capitals. In the interests of both East and West and all of mankind, and finally, in the interests of the Middle Eastern countries themselves, we must untie this tight knot of regional conflicts as quickly as possible and open the way toward peace, security, and cooperation at this crossroads of ancient civilizations. This, in fact, is also our country's principled position.

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Indian Peace, Solidarity Delegation Visits USSR

18070187 [Editorial Report] Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian on 20 July 1988 carries a brief RATAU article on page 3 reporting the visit of a delegation from the Indian Organization of Peace and Solidarity to the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet

Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries. During a 4-day stay in Kiev, the delegation had talks in the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and became acquainted with the antiwar activities carried out in the Ukrainian republic under the sponsorship of the UkSSR Peace Committee.

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Zimbabwean Official On Bilateral Ties

18070189 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 3 August 1988 carries on page 5 a 1500-word article by Igor Tarutin noting Zimbabwe's many successes. He states that Zimbabwe's economy as a whole stands solidly on its own feet. Tarutin quotes N. Shumuyarira, Zimbabwean minister of foreign affairs, Politburo member and secretary of the Central Committee of the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF): "We have good relations with socialist countries, including the USSR. Zimbabwe-Soviet ties are broadening along state and party lines. Unfortunately, trade-economic cooperation lags behind significantly. We are attentively following the processes of perestroika in the Soviet Union. The idea of new political thinking is making a great impression on us. We especially support the struggle for peace and disarmament."

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Search For Soviet Captives In Mozambique Continues

18070177 [Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian on 6 July 1988 carries on page 5 an 1100-word article by B. Pilyatskiy noting that the search continues for two Soviet geologists, Yu. F. Gavrilov and V. A. Istomin, who were captured by an "MNR band" in the Mozambican bush in August 1983. Pilyatskiy acknowledges the continuous assistance which the International Red Cross has been providing. "This year meetings between Soviet and Red Cross representatives have continued, including in Moscow, Geneva and Maputo where they have discussed directions for further searches, including the elucidation of possible burial places, if they died in captivity. No more should be said today because, as experience shows, confidentiality, patience and a delicate approach are required at certain stages in order not to damage the case."

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