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# **East Europe**

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# East Europe

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### No Need To Reassess 1968 Events

[Editorial Report AU111245] Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 9 Dec 87 p 7 and Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 10 Dec 87 p 4 both carry the 1,600-word "full text" of an article by Boris Kozlov entitled "Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow..." that was published in issue No 49 of the Soviet weekly NOVOE VREMYA. The reprint, which is published under the headline "Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow...; NEW TIMES on the Lessons from the Critical Development in the CSSR in 1968," is preceded by the following introduction: "The Soviet journal NOVOE VREMYA (NEW TIMES) publishes in its issue No 49 an article by Boris Kozlov entitled 'Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow...' in which the author ponders the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and current lessons from them. The article stresses that the principal conclusions made by Czechoslovak Communists were just as undisputed almost 20 years ago as they are undisputed today." The Kozlov article takes issue with the "assertion that the evaluation of the critical events as worked out by Czechoslovak Communists now needs to be corrected." It argues that the past 20 years have confirmed the "correctness" of the "lessons" drawn by Czechoslovak Communists from the critical development in the country in the late 1960s and that there is no need to "reassess views on the substance of the events" of that time.

0847

## HUNGARY

### Stalinist Judicial Model Faulted

25000037b Budapest OTLET in Hungarian  
16 Oct 87 p 14

[Interview with Geza Kilenyi, doctor of law and director of the Governmental Studies Research Department of MTA (Hungarian Academy of Sciences), by Ervin Csizmadia: "Defendant: the State"]

[Text] "Courts of law will have much broader authority in the future than they have now."

Why and how do citizens sue the state, and what is the overall judicial mechanism of Hungary like? We asked Geza Kilanyi, doctor of law, director of the Governmental Studies Research Department of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

[Question] Over the past years there have been much more lawsuits initiated by citizens against the state than previously. Does this mean that the state apparatus and its institutions are doing a poorer job than earlier or rather that the citizens' self-assertion has strengthened and people dare to express their claims against the state?

[Answer] I am convinced that the state's work is not worse now than it was 5 or 10 years ago; conversely, it is operating with better quality. So, what is then behind the higher number of claims? Two tendencies, somewhat independent of each other. One of these is that the provisions of law in our country are gradually broadening the circle of the resolutions by the state administration which are judicially assailable. The broader this circle is the more suits can be filed. The other reason is what you referred to: the hesitation to file a lawsuit, and especially against a state administration organ, that most citizens, mainly the elderly, have shown until recently, is dissolving. So far, experience has shown that people, if they have a grievance, prefer to turn to "the smart cookie," the party committee, the local state administration organ, but are deterred from taking their case to court. This is an ancient abhorrence of litigation. The other reason for this reluctance, particularly at small settlements, is that people living there fear that if they start a suit against some state administration organ, that organ will "come down on them" in some form. However, even with this taken into account, there is a more vigorous civic behavior.

[Question] I think that the reluctance and abhorrence is also fed by the many contradictions our judicial system is full of. It is not by accident that many references are made to the independent courts which operate with substantially less bureaucratic features and more efficiency. Why couldn't socialist development create a freer role for the courts of law?

[Answer] The socialist development of the state and law is, indeed, contradictory in this respect. Probably few in our country know that, according to Lenin's concept of the state, between 1923 and 1933, the Supreme Court in the Soviet Union performed similar functions as the Western constitutional courts of law. However, this did not fit the stalinist concept of the state, therefore, in 1933, when the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office was created, the Supreme Court's system, reminiscent of constitutional jurisdiction, was eliminated. To the best of my knowledge, considerations are again being given in the Soviet Union to restore the former jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with regard to the control of the constitutionality of the provisions of law.

[Question] And obviously, the other socialist countries started applying the stalinist model to their own conditions...

[Answer] Yes. For a long time, they thought in our country, too, that in a socialist country the depository of the people's sovereignty is the National Assembly, so there is no need whatsoever for constitutional courts of law. We know now that this concept is totally without any foundation. I can envision a kind of control which would give constitutional courts of law the authority to repeal provisions of law countering the constitution on a level beneath the National Assembly, while not expanding their rights to repeal laws made by the National

Assembly. The institution of constitutional courts of law exists in Yugoslavia and Poland; in our country, we can regard as a positive development the creation of the Council of Constitutional Law in 1984, even if this organization has not yet occupied its place within the system of the state organs. Since its inception, few cases have been presented to the Council. At the present time, unfortunately, citizens cannot initiate proceedings by the Council of Constitutional Law, but even if they had this possibility, I am not sure that its activity would grow in leaps. To get the full picture, it has to be added that although citizens do not have the right to directly initiate [proceedings by the Council], the chairman of the Council of Constitutional Law receives petitions from citizens. It also happened that the Council of Constitutional Law conducted proceedings on the basis of such a petition.

[Question] So it is due to a lot of things that people have not taken up fighting the state for a long time. In order to litigate with an institution, not only do I have to be aware of my rights, but I also need guarantees; I need to know that I can sue the state on my right as a citizen.

[Answer] Citizens have nothing to fear in this respect. Proceedings by a court of law mean considerably more guarantees than, let's say, a petition of appeal. Proceedings by a court of law assure the significant guarantees that a court of law is subordinated only to the law and the provisions of law. The court of law is not bound by ministerial standpoints. And the independence of the court of law is a serious guarantee for the citizens. The process that has begun is, by all means, healthy, but, in the future, we have to try even more to dissolve the citizens' still existing spasmodic reluctance to file a suit, to litigate with the state as the defendant.

[Question] In order to help this process, it would be very important for the citizens to know exactly when and why they can sue. I think, people often accept sentences only because they are not aware of the rights on the basis of which they could file suit.

[Answer] Indeed, there are many things our legal propaganda should be doing. Let's look at, for instance, the case of compensations for damages. The legal regulation concerning this question has changed a great deal within the Civil Code. Yet, a considerable part of the citizens are still unaware of the fact that the state administration organs are accountable for damages caused in state administration jurisdiction not only if they made an unlawful decision, but also if they committed a negligent act which offends the provisions of law. Let's think of administrative deadlines. The citizens may suffer financial damages because offices sometimes fail to comply with the 30 day deadline for a response. This happens, for instance, if a person submits an application for home construction and, while he waits for a response, a substantial price hike of construction materials takes place. I have hardly met indemnification lawsuits of this type, probably because people do not even think that they

could lawfully sue the state. Therefore, the primary role of legal propaganda could be to help people recognize the elements of the rightful civic behavior and not to sharpen the antagonism between the citizen and the state.

[Question] Would you cite some examples of which those areas are where people are already actively raising a claim against the state?

[Answer] Intensified activity can be noticed in home and tax-related cases. This has a very important feedback influence. In matters where the possibility of judicial assail is open, the quality of administrative work shows perceptible improvement. The chance of filing suit has a great preventive effect. The state administration automatically does a more conscientious job because it knows that the Damocles's sword of judicial supervision hangs over its head. So the requirement to broaden the circle of judicially assailable state administration decisions, that is, to make judicial assailability the main rule, could lead to a situation in which we can really assess people's activity. Courts of law—this is my definite conviction—will receive a much broader jurisdiction than they have now, and it is to be hoped that this will bring favorable experiences for citizens.

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### **Discussion of 'De-Stalinization,' Lenin's Demythification**

*25000049a Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG  
in Hungarian 7 Nov 87 pp 11, 13*

[Article by Moscow correspondent Jozsef Barat: "Atonement. Soviet Historians About the Past"; first paragraph is HETI VILAGGAZDASAG introduction]

[Text] In addition to "perestroyka" and "glasnost," "destalinizatsiya" or de-Stalinization has become another buzzword in recent weeks. This is what emerges from the following report, filed by our Moscow correspondent. He draws this conclusion from recently published writings of Soviet historians, and from interviews with public figures.

According to Professor Yuriy Afanasyev, the director of the Soviet Union's Institute of Historical Archives, the most important task of today's historians is to extricate themselves from their role to date: from having to prove that whatever happens to be the latest party resolution is the best one ever adopted. As Afanasyev points out, historians have been forced to realize that the present structure of the economy and society still bears the imprints of Stalin's model and is therefore reproducing the distorted social relations of his era. Academician Polyakov added at his press conference that it is truly difficult to get rid of this heritage, because the system that society created is producing society itself, the people; in other words, today's Soviet leaders have been trained on experiences that disqualify many of them

from meaningful participation in renewal. Moreover, Afanasyev condemns Stalin's policies also as a continuation of imperial Russia's chauvinistic great-power aspirations.

In the weekly *Moskovskiy Novosti*, Professor Anatoliy Butenko of Lomonosov University has recently expressed a similar standpoint in his analysis of the growth-inhibiting mechanism that has evolved in the economy. Butenko accuses Stalin of Bonapartism, of having expropriated and usurped in practice the class power of the workers and peasants. Stalin had created a bureaucratic structure of administration that prevented objective laws from playing any role whatsoever in the Soviet economy. Several authors have pointed out that only tyranny and a sense of constant threat made the bureaucratic system of administration workable in Stalin's time, but later the underground economy and the black market smuggled the principle of supply and demand back into the less and less effective system of administering a command-directed economy.

In my interview with Vitaliy Korotich, the editor of the very popular periodical *Ogonek*, he characterized the Brezhnev era as essentially an effort to preserve the earlier conditions, without their most blatant crimes. But this—in Gorbachev's words—led to the precrisis situation: plan fulfillment in the course of this became autotelic and had practically nothing in common with the commodities actually produced. Incidentally, Academician Aganbegyan has questioned in *Ogonek* the statistics on economic growth, because he believes that a rapid deterioration of the quality of Soviet goods and a process of latent inflation are at the basis of these statistics.

A natural concomitant of such thinking is the obligation of Soviet politics, public life and historiography to raise anew the issue of new trials for the Soviet leaders who, during the Stalin era, were branded foreign agents, and enemies of the people and socialism. Academician Polyakov—he estimates that the cult of personality claimed at least one million physically annihilated victims—states as an obvious fact that these people were naturally neither spies nor enemies. In his opinion, Trotskiy, Bukharin, Zinovyev, Kamenev and the others were dedicated supporters of socialism but saw the new social order's fundamental interests and future differently than Stalin. But the Academician also points out that these people are similar only in their shared fate; in the course of judging them, it will be necessary to consider anew what errors and mistakes they actually made. Editor Korotich, for example, condemns Trotskiy as a politician who thought along lines very close to those of Stalin's thinking; whereas in the case of Bukharin he emphasizes primarily the latter's merits. According to Korotich, the conclusion to be drawn from the fate of these two people is that political differences must never again be resolved by force or administrative instruments, and no one should suffer physically for his views. The

latter conclusion applies not only to execution and imprisonment, but to the milder forms of administrative reprisal as well. Of course, only democratization can guarantee all this.

In Polyakov's opinion, Soviet historians must also rewrite Lenin's biography. The "frosting," Polyakov said, must be removed from the stories about the infallible genius. The ingenuity and real perspicacity of the Soviet Union's first leader will be more apparent if we do not suppress the decisions that he himself subsequently declared mistaken. Nikolay Petrakov offers an example of this in his extremely interesting and eventful history of the Soviet ruble, which appeared in *Noviy Mir*. On 4 December 1920, Lenin signed a decree that in practice meant the abolition of money and the replacement of its functions with a very bureaucratic apparatus that proved unworkable. There were subsequent attempts to justify this decision by citing the conditions of civil war, but several authors—including the economist Nikolay Smelev—established that the civil war would have been won sooner without this romantic and unfounded measure. The economist added: it truly required Lenin's genius to achieve, in not quite four years, that the Soviet gold ruble was quoted and much in demand on the world's money markets, and no one doubted the reserves backing its value.

Meanwhile there was of course NEP [New Economic Policy], which many people regard as the last truly effective period of economic policy before Stalin, and which is again in the center of attention today. In my interview with Vitaliy Korotich, however, he emphasized the differences. Today we are separated from that period both by what is lacking and what exists. We do not have the mass of experts with entrepreneurial experience we then had, and also the structure of large-scale industry rules out regarding our present renewal as a late but direct continuation of that period.

The polarization of views is natural under the present conditions. While the standpoints of some are becoming more radical, others are advocating caution according to the principle [Russian proverb] "Measure seven times before cutting off once," in the thinly disguised hope that the cutting will be forgotten amidst all the measuring. Thus Smelev, for example, would welcome also in the Soviet Union special economic zones similar to the ones in China, while others are inclined to see the danger of capitalism's restoration even in the Soviet Union's very limited private sector. In these circumstances the political leadership needs all its wisdom to proceed with perestroika at a pace that will restore the people's confidence and enthusiasm, yet will preserve equilibrium, taking into account also this huge country's enormous moment of inertia.

Development has not been entirely rectilinear even since 1985, for the measures adopted in 1986 against nonlabor incomes have often lead once again to abuses of authority over household plots, and in several places the

greenhouses rebuilt with great effort have again been razed. The course of perestroika and de-Stalinization will hardly be an arrow-straight highway. As Korotich commented: "For the first time in my life, I am able to actively participate in a hard struggle that is real and for high stakes. But I certainly am enjoying it."

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**Rethinking of Socialist Ideology Proposed**  
25000028 Budapest TARSADALMI SZEMLE  
in Hungarian No 10, 1987 pp 11-20

[Article by Jozsef Bayer, academic department head at the MSZMP CC Institute of Social Sciences: "Interpretation of Today's Ideological Problems"]

[Text] (Footnote) (This article is based on an expert study prepared as part of an ideological research project guided by the Committee on Agitation and Propaganda. In writing this article I relied on what I learned in the course of internal debates and from earlier studies. Nevertheless, this writing reflects primarily my own conception. The Author.)

Placing ideological issues on the agenda may be viewed as an intermediate step of a process in which the problems of our social development—or for that matter: our social stagnation—and the tasks related to evolution demand to be registered by ideological consciousness. This ideological debate has been going on for quite some time. In it we find reflections not only of possible disagreements and of the always current contradictions between words and deeds and between ideology and objective reality. We also find contradictions in semantics. In other words, the debate conveys ideological positions related to alternatives produced by mature socialist development.

The pragmatic spirit of an earlier period manifested wise restraint in removing issues that could have provided an opportunity for ideological confrontation. Instead it strove for consensus, one that could be accomplished through practical reform measures. In contrast, the ideological issues of our movement today once again appear to gain increased emphasis. In part this is related to changes in perspectives insofar as global socialism is concerned. In part it relates to the manifestations of socialist construction, all of which diminish the credibility of several previously accepted ideological doctrines. The function of ideology has also changed in many respects, and the conditions under which the party performs its ideological functions have substantially changed.

All this appears on the surface as some kind of an ill feeling within socialist ideology, a feeling voiced by all those who produce, convey and listen to that ideology. It will not suffice, however, to merely establish the fact and to document that ill feeling. And one need not even acquiesce into the temporary confusion. We must find a

way for evolution in this area also. This, in turn, requires an analysis of the ideological situation, and a critical and creative evaluation of the party's ideological activities. On the basis of such analysis and evaluation we may draw the outlines of tasks that stem from today's situation in which the function of ideology, and the conditions under which ideological tasks must be pursued, have changed. This we must do for purposes of research, education, and propaganda.

And yet, in order to avoid disproportions, it will be necessary to establish some constraints regarding the tasks related to ideological renewal.

Whenever "disturbances in ideological-consciousness" appear in a society's intellectual life, the source of these disturbances must not be sought in the intellectual sphere, but rather in contradictions within the material life processes of society. These are the processes which, according to Marx, are social existential conflicts, recognized and reconciled by people in ideological forms of consciousness. It then follows that however ambitious an ideological offensive may be, in and of itself it cannot make these contradictions disappear. It also follows that the application of administrative force to coerce these conflict-laden structures of consciousness would amount to political voluntarism. This must not mean, however, that the party, as the leading political force, should not endeavor to resolve these contradictions by resorting to organized ideological activity consistent with the goals of socialism. Equally, it must not mean that in the midst of contradictions the party should assume a posture of authority, thereby attaining a position of hegemony from the viewpoint of ideology. What it means is that the objectives of the party must be accomplished in a manner and through means that are appropriate from the viewpoint of the ideological fiber that has undergone a number of substantial changes. In this respect the party must build on the experience gained from the principles and practice of cultural, scientific, etc. policies that have been developed by the MSZMP, and in particular from the initiatives which gained widespread, popular approval.

On the other hand, the scope of ideology to be conveyed and the extent to which ideological activity is to be pursued must be based on serious consideration, and must remain within the context of changing scope of politics. Excessive emphasis on ideology was appropriate in an overly politicized period, and satisfied the requirements of the earlier total control of political life. In other words, the excessive ideological emphasis of the past was a necessary companion of the total, the virtual "missionary" role of ideology. In the framework of today's self-restrained political practice, one that assumes a more autonomous functioning of societal and economic institutions, politics assumes a coordinative, ideological guidance function, and must change its pattern. Without such change in pattern we cannot expect to have a higher level of intellectual autonomy within society, nor can we expect to see an improved rationale for our social

conditions, both of which are indispensable to the evolution of a stable, yet dynamic developmental process. Stated differently: in the pursuit of ideological work it will not suffice to continue to do the same things we did before, except in a more convincing manner. Something more has to be done. It will not suffice to exchange antiquated doctrines and to partially renew their content, still within the old structure. We must recognize that the renewal of content is possible only within a new ideological structure. Let us call this new ideological structure the "reproductive mechanism of socialist ideological hegemony," whose detailed theoretical design still lays ahead of us. Yet, in practice, the gradual erosion of the old model is already paving the way in the direction of the new model. It is perhaps the failure to understand this phenomenon, the lack of preparedness to recognize this phenomenon that serves as the main reason for the ideological crisis we sense today.

The immediate, primary task before us is the settlement of issues pertaining to the party's own ideological activities. Quite naturally, in the case of a party that fulfills a leadership role, the expressions of that party's strategic goals, its recognized fundamental values and the theoretical framework of its identity as a movement, bear a profound influence on society as a whole. Both the long-range and the short-term objectives and tasks of socialist development, and more fundamentally: the chances of, and criteria for development under socialist conditions are the subjects of lively, nevertheless rather diffused societal debate. In order to face the task of entering into clarifying ideological profile with respect to a number of important issues. This profile today is not adequately defined. Some researchers have demonstrated the fact that with respect to some fundamental ideological issues there is no significant difference between the views of party members and others outside the party. On the other hand, even among party members we discover marked differences in viewpoint regarding fundamental issues. This, of course, is partly a product of the peculiar features of single party systems in which the party reflects, and must reflect the fundamental problems of society. For this reason, these societal problems must be dealt with also within the party all the time, and not only for the sake of producing an outward appearance of unity in action and ideology.

It is not so much the general ideological foundation, the fundamental principles of a Marxist-Leninist outlook that are missing. These have been preserved sort of like a conscious background. They have no direct influence on specific positions to be taken. Today's problems stem from an inability to relate the immediate tasks to some kind of a foreseeable, medium-range strategic guide post. For this reason the uncertainty presents itself relative to ideological issues that are related to specific, acute societal problems. The natural need for unanimity among party members concerning some fundamental issues hardly challenges the idea of freedom of opinion within the party, assuming, of course, that the party indeed has well-founded, details positions that were

subjects of broad political debate and which enjoy widespread acceptance—positions with which party members can honestly and in good conscience identify.

Different interpretations of the concept of ideology itself frequently produce misunderstandings. Suffice it to say that sometimes the term "ideology" is being used as a synonym for Marxism-Leninism, on occasion it is understood to mean the totality of ideological forms of consciousness, of social consciousness or of intellectual life, and yet on other occasions it serves to falsely justify certain partial interests. As a result of variations in the practical and theoretical interpretation of the concept, the meanings of individual ideological doctrines may be judged only in the context of what is being understood by the concept of ideology, what it relates to and what it is being contrasted to. The theory of ideology is one of the richest areas of Marxist intellectual history. It is the science of applied sociology which has grown into an independent branch of the social sciences. Applied sociology examines social consciousness, and the social and existential determinism of the content and form of social consciousness. The reconstruction of the theoretical and historical problematic of ideology constitutes a separate field of research, within that we endeavor to define the concept accurately and to draw historic relationships which are decisively important from our viewpoint.

Ideology may be approached from both an analytical and a historical viewpoint. From an analytical point of view we may generally define the term ideology as a relatively consistent system of ideals which functionally relates to the interests of a social group or a social class. (Some people also apply the terms "ideology" of "developing an ideology" with respect to the justification of the interests of an individual. These applications, however, most often have a pejorative meaning.) The ideological force that convinces people, and motivates people to act stems from the close relationship between theory and practice, between ideals, on the one hand, and (objective, societal) interests on the other. This relationship lends a certain emotional charge, a missionary character to the term "ideology," which, in turn, distinguishes it from necessarily skeptical scientific theories. At the same time, however, an ideology is not necessarily the same as some religious faith whose foundations are transcendental. An ideology may rest on either scientific or non-scientific theories: it is not the truth or falsehood of the ideals that determines whether those ideals are true or false. The fact that ideologies are related to interests does not necessarily lead to distortions. To the contrary: this relationship may enhance the revelation of truth.

Ideologies are always the subjects of dialectics pertaining to both the whole and the part, and to both general interests and special interests. Their character of being perceived as false is frequently related to the fact that in a society composed of many partial interests a special interest purports itself to be the general interest, thereby usually disguising its position of power. It is in this context that Marx viewed the state itself as an ideological

power, which projects the interests of the ruling class as the general interest, then makes those interests prevail while calling them the public interest. Such illusions may hold some historic truth and may have had the right to exist in the developmental course of class struggles. Notwithstanding this fact, no ideology, however progressive—and that includes Marxism—is immune to dialectics between special interests and general interests. Working class interests, general human interests, and the interests of the movement and of its organizations must be conveyed in ideological terms in the same way as those of the allied classes and strata.

In the position of enjoying monopoly over ideological interpretations, there always exists a strong inclination to superficially view these interests as identical. Invariably, this superficial view produces political and ideological crises. This fact makes it apparent that the need for, and the function of ideology goes not cease when the working class gains power. As a matter of fact this need and function only increases, because the leading party must ideologically reflect upon the change in, and stratification of the social structure, which, in turn, changes the relationships between interests. All this has a profound impact upon the party's ideological self-interpretation and the organization of its political base.

It is a historically significant fact that modern ideologies, as comprehensive organic structures of thought, emerged with the evolution of the bourgeois era, and with the gradual retreat of traditional conceptions of social power and of historic religions. These modern ideologies produced an integrated form of mass consciousness which responded to the needs and conditions of the age of science, the communications revolution and of developing openness in society. The durable, productive and progressive ideologies were usually based on rational doctrines. Their missionary character is primarily mundane—it rests on the belief that urgent practical needs do not permit the continuous revision of fundamental convictions.

People need a stable orientation that is in harmony with their fundamental interests, and with which they can identify. The possibility of identification is being enhanced by the institutional organization of ideology, and by the accompanying settlement of relationships of authority, without which there can be no mass impact. It is also for this reason that the original, effective modern laboratories for ideologies were the political movements and parties. This is true also in the reverse: in certain respects the parties were formed along the ideological dividing lines, and may be viewed as forms in which fundamental interest and value orientations materialized. (Today the role of parties vis-a-vis ideologies is different. The more comprehensive the integration they endeavor, the less specific their ideological profile becomes. Ideological eclectics are typical features of so-called populist parties, which endeavor to secure increased numbers of votes, or stated differently: which deal with issues pertaining to overall outlook on life in a pragmatic manner.)

Since the main content of ideologies is the conveyance of the whole and of the part, of interests general and special, and of the relationship between political strategy and political tactics, the dialectic movement of these necessitates a certain degree of openness. Inflexible ideologies, which do not offer an opportunity for reinterpretation, and do not demand rational justifications in plain view of the critical public, sooner or later are bound to become irrational myths, or may turn into "state religions" which justify autocratic rule, or rule by partial interest.

At the outset, Marxism was critical of ideology, because it recognized ideology as a form of religious supplement. Later on, by relying on the theory of ideological forms of consciousness it established the materialistic conception of history. Finally, by exercising scientific criticism over capitalism, Marxism itself became the dominant ideology of specific anti-capitalist workers movements. For this reason the concept of ideology itself has changed in the course of Marxist development. The early critique of the idea that ideology is a false sense of consciousness, a "reversed" outlook on life, always remained a part of Marx's work. First it assumed a specific form in the context of being a "necessarily" false sense of consciousness which stems from the living conditions of defined social groups, but which nevertheless may hold the key to historical truth. Second, the theory of ideology was enriched by a structural-functional dimension, according to which people recognize and struggle with conflicts that stem from the contradictions of their production conditions in the context of ideological forms that are related to the superstructure.

It is this interpretation that prevailed in early workers movements struggling to develop independent class consciousness. Lenin viewed Marxism as the ideology of the proletarian class struggle, as the system of ideals capable of organizing that struggle, of bringing about a sense of class consciousness, and of establishing internal cohesion and strategic direction within the revolutionary party. In Lenin's view Marxism provided a scientific method for analysis, and a guiding light for action. Gramsci's thoughts on hegemony developed along the same lines: the organizational institutionalization of ideology was viewed as an important step by both. At most, one could say that Gramsci provided an increased emphasis on issues pertaining to the cultural struggle.

Ideological functions are diverse with respect to politics. In different periods of the movement's development, different ideological functions gained primary emphasis. At the outset the organizing, identity-creating function of ideology dominated—the function which distinguishes ideology from all other matters. As the movement gained strength, the function of ideology increased in terms of cultural education and outlook on life, cultural hegemony and interest representation, and with respect to preparation for taking power.

The prognosticating, futuristic role of ideology, along with the analysis and interpretation of the present, existed in every stage of development, nevertheless its character changed with the passage of time. Initially it contained a number of utopian features. The sharply defined critical rejection of the present was accompanied by an abstract, albeit an often vividly colored harmonic promise of a shining future. The awareness of weakness frequently produced fatalistic attitudes, and revolutionary activism produced Messianic expectations which represented radical departures from the past. Institutional settlement and integration, on occasion the fact of having achieved positions of power, was accompanied by a critical reevaluation of the entire cultural legacy, a legacy that could have bridged the past and future. Bridging the past and the future is not always successful: opportunists frequently forget about the future for the sake of the present, and voluntarism works in the opposite direction.

The development of social construction in the socialist vein demands that the teleology of conscious planning increasingly prevails. This, in turn, requires a scientific analysis of the possible alternatives of existing practice, an evaluation of the choice from the political perspective and a recognition and clarification of its merits. Ideology does not produce values. It merely synthesizes values into a system, and is capable of continuously reinterpreting the relationships and priorities pursuant to actual needs. In this context the oft-mentioned crisis of values is not so much a crisis of values than it is a crisis of the system of values represented by the ideology. Accordingly, the crisis is primarily an ideological crisis.

In the remainder I will track down those historical functional changes of our own ideology which determine our tasks today.

It should be emphasized, first of all, that a revolutionary ideology finds itself in a rather difficult situation when in an undeveloped country revolution prevails and is sustained, while in the more highly developed regions of the world the revolution fails or does not take place at all. Lenin was still capable of separating the definition of the empirical-political concept of socialism from the definition of the scientific formation theory. Thus, he was able to simultaneously sustain both the critical and the sanctioning functions of Marxism. Subsequently, however, the balance between these two concepts was upset as a result of the urgent practical need for legitimacy, by virtue of the newly emerging relationships of authority, and of the strong concentration of political power. The attribution of general applicability to an ideology that produced a historically justified program in "one socialist nation" made the tensions between actual misery and historic perspectives increasingly vague. These tensions were a real part of Lenin's consciousness. It thus happened that the Soviet model of socialism was declared to be the valid model for socialism, and as one which has general applicability.

In the age of fast-paced socialist industrialization ideology became subordinate to the total mobilization aimed at accomplishing the tasks of extensive industrialization. It was in those days that the theoretical content of Marxist-Leninist ideology was systematized into final form, so that it supports the urgent intellectual endeavors related to the cultural revolution, as well as to political mobilization and education. This included the extensive training of cadres, a program that used every means available in the arsenal of agitation and propaganda. As a result of these endeavors Marxism, with the added modifications provided by Leninist theories, began to represent a rather significant ideological force in a heretofore unanticipated area: revolutionary incitement, and social and economic modernization of undeveloped regions. Under the given circumstances the rationale, the historical perspective, the political realism, and even the enhanced focus of the ideology became functional. The widespread propagation and instillment of this ideology provided assurance in the broadest sense of that term, to the effect that the subjective conscious preconditions for modern industrialization and social development indeed exist.

Our present-day perspective of these events leaves no doubt that the Stalinist voluntarist policies also produced an ideology for elements that retard development, and that it established the intellectual foundations for stagnation. To this day, Marxist ideology remains delinquent in providing a historically accurate analysis of these events. Without going into the details of the substantive elements of this process, we would like to point out the causes of this process, as those exist within the ideological structure.

Lukacs's definition of Stalinism is that in the Stalinist view the exceptional methods and conditions applied in times of civil war could be extended to apply also in times of peaceful construction. This definition is relevant also into the ideological realm. Stalin's dogmatism cannot be understood purely on grounds of its theoretical content. Understanding also demands a kind of critical-ideological analysis: an examination of the socio-political conditions which served as fertile soil for the evolution of the ideology. Such analysis indicates that the economic system was based on the distribution of resources and on plan directives in order to be responsive to time-critical developmental and defense needs. And further: the political power structure was strictly hierarchical and authoritarian in character, so that it could deal with conflicts inherited from the original socialist accumulation, and that it could combat resistance. Accordingly, it comes as no surprise, that consistent with this established pattern, also the ideological activities relied upon the distribution of accumulated knowledge. Only top-level, central endorsements were capable of lending credibility and societal validity to these ideological activities.

It happened in those days that the term "ideology" was interpreted to mean a fixed set of "teachings" which may be applied to momentary given situations as seen fit.

This belief manifested itself in a continuous "deductive" theoretical process to prove the validity of practice. The logic of the deductive process was broadly disseminated and propagandized. Further refinements to this interpretation frequently produced new theoretical theses intended to justify some tactical steps, which were difficult to reconcile with the theoretical doctrines of Marxism.

Accordingly, only to a lesser extent was it the essence of ideological work to provide specific analyses of contemporary reality. This void applied to the revelation of contradictions that may be found in contemporary reality, and to informing the conscious public mind in the interest of resolving contradictions. Instead, the main purpose of ideological work was to make contradictions disappear, to quell conflicts and debate, and to discipline and unify diverse interests and motivations. This is the sociological essence of the ideology of that era. It amounted to more than the simplification of Marxist doctrines. It vulgarized those doctrines from an educational and propagandist viewpoint and for purposes of mass consumption. The significance of the outcome of simplification is not debatable either. Quite naturally, the following of a "unified" body of teachings represents an important force of integration. In this instance, however, integration was nurtured not only by personal conviction, but by the internal necessity to adjust to disorganized conditions brought about by the disintegration of the old system of values, and by the psychology of fear from the consequences of deviation.

Within the movement itself there was no room for contradiction or debate. Being excluded from the movement—the method of being stigmatized as the enemy or as a traitor in response to any and all heretic thought—indirectly rendered Marxism and Leninism as the theoretical justification of irrational dimensions of terror, thus inflicting immeasurable harm upon the cause of socialism and upon Marxism and Leninism. The elimination of critique, the severe punishment of any deviation, and suspicion surrounding anything that was new, produced not only a deep sense of conservatism, but also paralyzed the development of the social sciences and of certain important branches of the natural sciences.

Criticism of theoretical dogmatism and of the transformation of Marxist dialectics into an unreal, scholastic theoretical system began virtually simultaneously with the beginnings of that process. The negative aspects of that process were apparent. (Stalin himself spoke out against narrow interpretations of Marxist doctrines and against the evolution of scientific monopolies. The vocabulary of dogmatism always included terms of encouragement regarding theoretical initiatives.) The roots of dogmatic unreality and vulgarity reached deeper than the theoretical mistakes and simplifications made for educational purposes, the ones that could be seen on the surface. Thus the fight against unrealistic and vulgar dogmatism could succeed only through the critique of Stalinist practice, by changing the prevailing socio-political practice.

The philosophical-theoretical critique of dogmatism, and the rehabilitation of the right to pursue sociological research and critical analysis became important elements of socialist intellectual renewal in the aftermath of the 20th Congress. In and of themselves, however, these endeavors did not produce the needed breakthrough. A critical and self-critical reexamination, and an objective evaluation of the path followed by socialist practice thus far would have been needed for the achievement of a breakthrough. Namely, the problems of the ideological structure should have been examined in the context of the entire socio-economic and political system, and with particular attention to peculiar situations produced by the monolithic single-party system. It did not suffice to view ideology as a theoretical formation responsive to the propaganda needs of the political course being followed, one that could be bent at will. A fundamental change in perspective, the acceptance of some indispensable reforms, and new political thought, as those are being manifested in present Soviet reform endeavors, would have been needed for the achievement of a breakthrough. It is no coincidence that following the collapse of post-20th Congress reform endeavors the phenomena of dogmatism, and even of personal cult gained new strength. Subsequently, these phenomena materialized as an "apology for stagnation." The present Soviet leadership's commitment to reform is best evidenced by its harsh criticism of conservative Marxist-Leninist ideological endeavors. These conservative endeavors discourage new thinking relative to the development of social sciences, and in general, impede efforts needed to bring about dynamic social development.

In the midst of multiple global challenges, in the early eighties socialist systems were confronted with a historic choice. In many of these systems the issue presented itself as a choice between renewal and thus the beginning of a new passage characterized by more dynamic development on the one hand, and the threat of being swept aside by the mainstream of historic development, on the other. Regarding the latter choice: having failed to realize the advantages offered by the socialist system, e.g. in the context of the evolving scientific and technological revolution, these systems could not even convincingly demonstrate that socialism was the sole humanitarian and rational alternative for humanity. The possibility that a competitive race in the framework of peaceful coexistence may be lost by a socialist nation became part of the consciousness of an increasing number of committed socialists.

It has become increasingly clear that not all elements of stagnation may be attributed to the initial conditions of backwardness. At the same time, however, it is precisely that Messianic socialist image, the one that grew out of backwardness, which created the paradox according to which we are increasingly falling farther away from fulfilling our proclaimed goals, while we are developing. This paradox is evidence by confused terminology: the way we retreated from a "society that is construction communism" to the concept of "developed socialism,"

and then to a more realistic, inspiring but modest concept of "developing socialism." In reality we are not moving away from socialism. We are moving away from unrealistic goals, toward the critical examination of the theoretical self-portrait of socialism.

The ideological assumption which was subsequently solidified into a dogmatic creed, by which socialism could be established and realized independent from its external milieu proved to be untenable. This assumption holds that the globally structured capitalist system, even though ridden by internal contradictions, presents no challenge to socialism. This "geographic" view of socialist victory is based on the idea that the socialist model established in one country can be applied in many countries. Fortunately, this school of thought is being subjected to increasingly determined criticism in the Soviet Union by way of "new thinking in politics."

Retreat is evident regarding the actual societal functions of socialist construction, as well as with respect to Lenin's distinction concerning the global historical formation theory of socialism. The actual societal functions of socialism are defined by peculiar necessities produced by peculiar situations, and frequently evolve out of national interests. These situations do not always demand socialist solutions—they require appropriate solutions. Lenin's distinction concerning the global historical formation theory of socialism can be interpreted to mean only the global historical movement or process toward the liquidation of capitalism, and cannot be limited to decisively apply only to events that take place in an area comprising only one third of the globe. All this is being underscored by the Soviet Union's newly announced international security conception. It assigns the duty to all communists to accept and to encourage the conscious recognition of the responsibility for human survival in a nuclear age, and further, to recognize the political weight of global problems and to break out of the trap of bipolar antagonism, in the direction of multilateral integration and cooperation.

No less important are the conceptions and endeavors related to the internal reform of socialism. Let us use comrade A. Jakovlev's analysis as an example. According to his analysis, socialism is facing a new passage in practice and theory: "Socialism as a whole must renew itself qualitatively." In other words: not only some aspects, certain features of socialism must be perfected—after all, the essence of socialism itself is undergoing development. "Socialism must primarily recognize itself," and must exercise self-criticism in evaluating its path travelled thus far. In order to accomplish this we must remove the "megatons of dogmatism;" we must develop the social sciences, must free the spirit of creative research, and "must abandon everything that was not confirmed in practice, matters that were based on distorted practice, things that became justifications for stagnation and conservatism."

Among other things, we must rethink the actual and the purely legal forms of social property, the distinction between state property and social property, and we must review the excessive apotheosis of state property. We must reevaluate the role of democracy as "the only feasible path for socialism," which nevertheless has been neglected and underestimated so far, or has been applied in a rather limited sense. Openness and societal control functions play a key role in this respect. We must work out a situation in which "democracy becomes a functional mechanism for the resolution of contradictions at various levels" of society whose interests are stratified, and we must not talk about the harmonized coincidence of diverse interests. The global problems of humanity must be approached from a new vantage point, by analyzing the dialectics of both the class interest and the general human interest, etc.

The idea of a socialist system that produces goods for the market, and even the notion of a mixed economy are advancing. Invoking Marx, it has been said that no form of production may be done away with as long as all opportunities inherent in various forms of production are fully exhausted. The spirit of experimentation picks up and radical economic reform measures are being proclaimed.

Regardless of the speed of transformation, and irrespective of the specific difficulties that are in the way of realizing reform, the urgent need for fundamental change has been expressed. The validity of decades old dogmas are being openly questioned and the revelation of the historic truth concerning little known passages of development will serve only to strengthen expressed needs for change. All this presents a new situation for an ideological viewpoint, for which we must prepare ourselves and to which we will have to react, sooner or later. This is even more so, because although with our reforms in Hungary we are ahead in many respects, accumulating conflicts and tensions created by stagnation and economic difficulties over the past few years have eroded the long-standing national consensus. A certain crisis of confidence is apparent and the unresolved conflicts also emerge as ideological problems.

It is well known that in the aftermath of World War II the Eastern European countries adopted the Stalinist Soviet model and its ideological structure, complete with a strong, centralized regimentation of intellectual life, and with institutional guarantees for the ideological monopoly of Marxism and Leninism. This process of adoption was no less difficult than other mechanical transplantations that disregarded national characteristics.

Not only the difference in intellectual and political traditions made the transfer difficult. Difficulties presented themselves also because those in power tried to replace the previously excluded rich Marxist heritage with a reduced content presented in a schematic form—

one that was highly vulnerable. Despite this fact Marxism gained ground rather rapidly, particularly because of the aforementioned feature of ideology, and because of the close relationship between theory and practice. Great, progressive social transformations confirmed to many that Marxism-Leninism provided an effective, progressive ideology.

Political distortions and sectarian dogmatism inflicted much harm upon the cause of Marxism and socialism. This is so, even though progressive and socialist ideals had a good chance for survival as the sole ideology in Hungary, particularly since events had transcended most of the ideologies espoused during the previous counter-revolutionary era. Political voluntarism that followed the transition from people's democratic development to a distorted version of proletarian dictatorship, managed to gradually narrow its base. By silencing potential allies, moreover, by muzzling a significant segment of the workers movement, the political leadership transformed the earlier political consensus into a monolithic semblance of unity, then transferred this semblance on to the far more complex and qualitatively different ideological sphere, thereby creating and extorting an artificial homogeneity. Ceaseless restrictive and administrative measures disintegrated the foundations of popular and national cooperation. Make-believe "debates" disorganized and scared even the communist intelligentsia, and the crimes and distorted phenomena produced by personal cult alienated the masses.

Social consciousness was dealt with in terms of simplified, politically charged categories, without subjecting the social psyche to in-depth analysis. While party leadership frequently urged that the party overcome its "ideological backwardness," it was unable to extricate itself from the trap of misconceived, politicized ideology. An effort to uphold Marxism and Leninism in an understanding manner in the ideological important fields (i.e. the arts, social sciences and publicism) broke down in the face of sectarian dogmatism. By suppressing debatable views one can easily achieve the semblance of ideological homogeneity, but by doing so the party fools only itself. The inability to deal with ideological problems, the inaptitude to manage conflicts, the resultant intellectual immobility and the moral paralysis felt because of the crimes committed, were the decisive reasons for the bursting of the dam; which, in the end produced the crisis of 1956.

Winning over the creative segment of the intelligentsia—a process which was completed by 1964—was an indispensable part of the post-1956 consolidation process. This process rested in part on the foundations of confidence which was sustained despite severe conflicts, and was reinforced in debates. In part, a full change took place with respect to the direction and orientations of intellectual life. This change was supported by the announcement and gradual implementation of the familiar, still valid principles of artistic and scientific policy.

Opening the door to culture as a whole, and to the entire historic legacy contributed to the accomplishment of this change.

Significantly increased openness, substantially broadened opportunities for travel and information dissemination, and a completely new style in the policy of alliances enriched intellectual life. In spite of debates, it produced a stronger political consensus. Some significant, progressive changes took place with respect to the exercise of self-restrained power, theoretical direction and ideological influence. These changes were not, by far, free of contradictions. The political debates of the consolidation period were reflected in the sphere of intellectual life, along with reform endeavors the spirit of "ideological offensives" laden with illusions to be able to clarify matters continued to haunt for a while.

All told, the 1950's produced substantial changes in the internal and international conditions for ideological activities. From among the internal changes the reorganization of agriculture, the simultaneous, historic transformation of the Hungarian village, followed by the placing of economic reforms on the agenda, represent fundamental changes. The social sciences, which increasingly freed themselves from dogmatic constraints helped the political sphere in finding new answers to questions. An intellectual atmosphere that became more free served as an effervescent in the fields of the arts and publicism. Theoretical policy discussions and an endeavor to reach an agreement with the churches produced a new atmosphere that is more tolerant in outlook.

All this took place under the banner of Marxist-Leninist ideological hegemony, and in recognition of the desired dominance of socialist values. This arrangement has proved itself as a valid conceptual basis for the pursuit of party policies involving ideological issues, surrendering our monopolistic view of the world not only strengthened the national consensus, but in the long run also produced the sole strategy that can be followed. The debates, conflicts and even secessions that took place within the international communist movement have made it apparent that the era of monolithic ideological unity, as perceived earlier, is gone forever. The imperialistic change in strategy, i.e. the change from "liquidation" to "loosening up," also presents some new conditions.

Retreat from the reform movement in the early 1970's caused some ideological damage, had numerous unfavorable ripple effects on the policy of alliances, and within that, upon the established relationship with the creative intelligentsia. True: considering the fact that we stood alone with our reform policies for quite some time, it did not appear as desirable to make theoretical and ideological generalizations on the basis of our reform accomplishments. (Ill feelings and an overly cautious attitude regarding the definition of the "Hungarian model" signaled this concern.)

We failed to deal, or we are delayed in dealing with the new ideological issues and problems that emerged in the 1970's. It seems that the continuity of main policy trends is being stressed more than it is necessary; this, at a time when a change in strategy was needed. This phenomenon produced a kind of complacent orthodoxy, which in turn encouraged the postponement of conflict resolutions, and sidetracked the related debates. On the other hand, this phenomenon also prompted the fact that significant strata of the intelligentsia and part of youth removed itself from Marxist ideology. By the end of the 1970's a course correction became necessary, but at that point the prevailing conditions were far less favorable. The need for course correction was prompted by a slower pace of economic growth, the critical dimension of balance of payment problems, and by overt manifestations of problems in socialist countries (primarily the outbreak of the crisis in Poland).

New reform conceptions emerged in 1984. Some practical measures were implemented and a number of initiatives were made in the direction of a broadening democracy. These actions, however, failed to constitute a comprehensive reform program, and in reality were unable to reverse the unfavorable trends of recent years. We feel, that this is the main reason for our periodic helplessness and haphazard action. Extreme intellectual reactions are almost natural in times like these.

Informative debates are taking place with respect to the political system, the development of socialist democracy, the change in morality and in the value system, and even concerning the crisis. Similarly, the obsolete nature of our socialist image, the Marxist crisis, the national situation, etc. are being debated. Nevertheless it seems that while debates continue, our society is not progressing. We are marking time trying to resolve the dilemmas presented by the need for education that could produce an appropriate outlook on life on the one hand, and educational reform on the other. All this time, however, our youth, whose outlook on life is influenced by a rather complex composite of effects, is less and less interested in any kind of change. On the positive side we find the strengthening role of social sciences in exploring reality. It is positive phenomenon, even though this endeavor is met by ideological suspicion from one direction, and by ideology from the other. On occasion the effort to explore reality is shaded by a degree of suspicion that exceeds the suspicion generally experienced in the course of other professional theoretical endeavors.

We could continue listing the problems. We have incurred a large enough indebtedness to warrant the re-thinking of our ideological process. What are those factors what could serve as starting points for this thought process? Which issues should be brought up and approached from a new direction? By continuing this article we would like to provide some further ideas and analysis. (Footnote) (The second part of this article will be presented in the upcoming issue, No 11 of our periodical.)

12995/06662

### Researcher Discusses Revival of NEP in Soviet Union, Hungary

25000049b Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG  
in Hungarian 7 Nov 87 p 12

[Interview with Janos Matyas Kovacs, staff member of the Economic Sciences Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, by Andras Peto; date and place of interview not given; first paragraph is HETI VILAGGAZDASAG introduction]

[Text] What is the Soviet economy of the 1920's able to tell the Soviet economy of the 1980's? In the following interview, Janos Matyas Kovacs presents his views on this question. At the Economic Sciences Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, he is a staff member studying questions pertaining to the history of economic theory.

HVG: NEP [New Economic Policy], the Soviet economy of the 1920's, is being mentioned more and more frequently these days in the Soviet Union. Why is it that NEP always acquires some new meaning whenever it is mentioned?

JMK: NEP meant very many different things already in the mid-1920's: an economic policy appeasing the peasants; a return to capitalism based on private entrepreneurs, the so-called NEP-men; and even a socialist mixed economy with a strong private sector. The acronym was used mostly in a pejorative sense. With considerable malice, for example, the so-called labor opposition within the party claimed that the acronym actually stood for New Exploitation of the Proletariat. Or take Bukharin, who is customarily regarded as one of the fathers of NEP, which is an exaggeration in my opinion. He was reluctant to refer to NEP even in 1924-1925, when he was appealing to the middle peasants under his "Get Rich" slogan. In the late 1920's, on the other hand, Stalin presented his campaigns respectively to develop heavy industry and to collectivize agriculture, now as the liquidation of NEP and again as its fulfillment, finding suitable 1921-1922 quotes from Lenin to support both claims.

HVG: In school it is being taught that NEP was the economic policy that Lenin sponsored and the 10th Party Congress approved, to end war communism and replace compulsory deliveries with a substantially more liberal tax in kind.

JMK: After March 1921, Lenin truly belonged among those who favored a more liberal economic policy so far as making concessions to the peasants was concerned; or more accurately, he belonged among those who did not wish to unduly obstruct the spontaneous development of such a policy. But Trocki claimed credit for the idea of a tax in kind, and he dated it back to May 1920. His severest opponent on this issue was Lenin, who was

fighting against similar proposals of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries even in the winter of 1920. Only in March 1921, influenced by the Kronstadt sailors' mutiny and the peasant uprisings in the Volga Region, did a majority of the Bolshevik leadership decide in favor of relaxing compulsory deliveries. Attempts to moderate seizures of produce and livestock were made already in late 1918 and early 1919, but were eventually swept away by the civil war.

HVG: These were the events leading to the introduction of NEP. Now let us examine its actual history.

JMK: Perhaps we should first discuss the fact that NEP has always served as a frame of reference: first at the time of Kirov's economic policy, around 1933 and 1934; then during World War II, when it became necessary to provide incentives for the kolkhoz peasants; and even for Stalin before his death, in his pamphlet on the economic problems of socialism; it was often mentioned also at the time of Khrushchev's turnaround and Kosygin's reform, and so on to this day. In Hungary, for example, comparisons with the NEP period were popular after 1945 and 1953, and around 1968. The same thing happened in Vietnam when harassment of Saigon's Chinese merchants stopped, or in Afghanistan when the Popular Front was proclaimed. It is easy to attack this analogy by pointing out that what followed is not quite comparable to NEP. I would turn this argument around and ask: Is NEP itself a suitable yardstick? Did the Soviet Union have in the 1920's some kind of controlled market economy to which the subsequent attempts at reform may truly be compared?

HVG: In the final outcome, what do you have in mind when you speak of NEP? An economic system, an economic policy, or a theory?

JMK: These three approaches intermingle in the reform theories in the East, as well as within the liberal wing of "Sovietology" in the West. Let us begin with NEP as a system. That market socialism had a functioning predecessor in the 1920's is the most tenuous assumption, readily open to doubt. The point is not merely that the NEP period, no matter how we regard it, was very short, but also that the phases of establishing and dismantling a market economy were merged into one. It can be said that a market (permitted peasant farms, private merchants, monetary reform, sale and purchase of farmland, wage labor in the villages, *khozraschet*, etc.) more or less took shape by perhaps 1924 or 1925. In other words, it took the market at least three or four years to evolve, but by then many signs of its decline were also evident. If we take Stalin's industrialization and collectivization drives—they were launched in 1927-1928—as NEP's final hour, then the market's dismantling may be estimated to have begun in 1923-1924, at the time of the crisis caused by the so-called agricultural-industrial price gap. Farm and domestic-trade policies, which most people considered the very essence of NEP, changed about then: the NEP-men were squeezed out of the state sector,

prices were fixed, and exchange between industry and agriculture was directed to state channels and based on barter. In industrial policy, all this began even sooner.

HVG: Yet *khozraschet* or cost-accounting is usually regarded as one of NEP's essential elements.

JMK: That is perhaps an exaggeration. After all, cost-accounting was not an original objective of NEP. Simply stated: domestic trade was necessary to stimulate the peasants and required a stable currency, which in its turn presupposed a balanced budget. In other words, the loss-making large-scale state industry's umbilical cord to the state treasury had to be cut. The principle of profitability was announced only in 1923, but was rescinded in 1926. Meanwhile several things happened that are not entirely unheard of even in our country. The launching of NEP almost coincided with the establishment of GOSPLAN, the Soviet State Planning Commission, and with GOELRO, the first central investment program in the socialist economy's history. The introduction of cost-accounting was preceded by wide-scale mergers of industrial enterprises, followed by extensive programs for the economic rehabilitation of heavy industry, parallel with the ascendancy of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, at the expense of the more pro-market People's Commissariat of Finance. It was typical, for example, that the debate on whether to close the Putilov Works went on for months, but in the end the plant was saved. In other words, Stalin's economic system foreshadowed its coming long before the arrival of formal command planning.

HVG: The socialist reform movements are usually on the offensive when they cite NEP as proof that changeover to a market economy is feasible under socialism.

JMK: In my opinion, it is not very appropriate to cite NEP as an example when speaking of a changeover from the "old mechanism" to the "new mechanism." NEP is a better example of building brakes into reforms, and of the failure of liberalization.

Consider the political sphere. Western historians frequently point out that the 10th Party Congress was also the congress that ended debate in the trade unions and banned factions within the party. Much is being said also about squeezing out the competing parties. But we know less about how local autonomy was curbed under NEP, how the local party machineries developed, how enterprise managers prevented the formation of trade unions, or how functional management was relegated to the background. Thus an institutionalized force was hardly able to develop that could have prevented NEP's subsequent reversal.

Considering the original intentions of its sponsors, NEP was a one-time measure of political realism and meant the introduction of tax in kind. It was supposed to have been followed by a socialist counterattack, but the genie

had escaped from the bottle. In this sense, and only in this sense, NEP as a shift in economic policy may indeed be regarded as one of the basic models of socialist liberalization. So far as theory is concerned, the problem there is that not even Bukharin, who held the most liberal views among the Bolsheviks, was willing to expose the state sector to market forces. In Soviet economic theory of the 1920's, commodity production was mostly synonymous with the private sector, whereas modern reformers venture to include also the state sector in the market. Yet NEP as an analogy should not be rejected, for it can be useful as ideological support when, in the stage of changing over to reforms, Lenin rather than Stalin becomes the authority to be cited.

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### History of Hungarian-Romanian Conciliatory Efforts Examined

25000031 Budapest TARSADALMI SZEMLE  
in Hungarian No 10, 1987 pp 88-96

[Article by Ildiko Lipcsey, academician at the Institute of History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 'The Active Hungarian Youth of the Danube Basin—on the Anniversary of the Marosvasarhely Meeting']

[Text] "...We find conflicts between the great powers on the one hand; nationalistic hatred, territorial disputes and prestige considerations among small nations, on the other..."

A half a century ago, in October 1937 at Marosvasarhely, a first of its kind attempt took place to establish a united anti-fascist front. The proposed front involved various progressive Transylvanian Hungarian youth groups. These groups shared a common belief in equality among nations, and in Romanian-Hungarian brotherhood. All were opposed to war.

There is no better characterization of the European situation under the Versailles peace conditions than the above quoted passage from Gyorgy Ranki. It points to that era's essential feature which resulted from the fact that all cooperative attempts to resolve Central European economic and territorial problems had failed. These included proposals advanced primarily by France, as well as by the affected nations. Hitler's appointment as chancellor of the Third Reich was accompanied by an increase of German aspirations in Central Europe, as well as by a stepped-up policy of revenge. On the other hand, Hitler's appointment also raised hopes that Germany would support the idea of revising the Versailles Treaties. Nevertheless it appeared as certain that a price would have to be paid for such support. As we all know today, that price was indeed paid. Whoever received Hitler's "help" not only paid, but paid substantially more than the "deal" was worth.

Threatening European political phenomena during the second half of the 1930's appeared with increasing frequency. The armament of Germany was well advanced in 1936, and in that year the racial laws of Nurnberg went into effect. A year later, following the devastation of the ancient Basque town of Guernica on 26 April 1937, the days of the Spanish people's front were numbered. In May, Chamberlain formed a new British cabinet. (Chamberlain sympathized with the Italian brand of fascism, and signed the Munich accord on 29 September 1938 in the company of French prime Minister Daladier, Hitler and Mussolini). A month later the French people's front cabinet, headed by Blum, resigned and Portugal's Salazar firmly held the reins of dictatorship.

In early 1937 the Czech, Yugoslav and Romanian ambassadors to Budapest recommended that the four countries enter into a non-aggression pact and understanding of friendship. The Hungarian Daranyi cabinet requested recognition of Hungary's military equality in exchange. Notwithstanding this fact, an approach was made to consummate trade agreements between the Little Entente and Hungary. Related negotiations took place in July, in Bucharest. At that point in time Romania experienced one of its numerous political crises: 1937 marked the end of that country's parliamentary system. The December 1937 elections yielded the 40 percent plurality required for the formation of a cabinet to neither party; on the other hand, the right-wing registered a significant victory. The 473,378 votes cast for the Iron Guard assured that party 66 legislative seats, while the National Christian Defense League mustered only 281,167 votes, which translated into 39 seats.

By the 1930's a new generation of Hungarians matured and organized itself in Central Europe. Notwithstanding differences in outlook, social standing and preparedness, this generation was able to see clearly what the writer Laszlo Nemeth saw, namely that "... in the upheavals of Eastern Europe, Hungary may, on occasion, ride the crest of the waves, on other occasions it may be submerged. Nevertheless, Hungary's final situation will always be the same as that of the neighboring nations." Thus it is not surprising that progressive young Hungarians residing in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Romania mutually influenced one another. Their newspapers, societies and conferences reflect a number of identical or similar program proposals. In earlier days the Czechoslovakian minstrel and Sickle Movements influenced Hungarian populist writers, while the organization called the "Transylvanian Youth" motivated the village exploration movement. Around 1933-1935 the Yugoslavian minstrels made their start; not unlike the phrase coined by the newspaper HITEL [Credit] of Kolozsvár, "facing our villages" became their slogan, too. Beginning in 1932 the periodical KALANGYA [Haystack] chose the Transylvanian Artisans' Guild and Sandor Remenyik's "critical view of the nation" as its examples, and beginning in 1934, HID [Bridge] played the same role as KORUNK [Our Age]: building bridges "between eras, outlooks, nations and people."

At 1936-1937 youth meetings throughout Europe it was easy to recognize the effects of the people's front policy announced at the 7th Komintern Congress. In April 1936 the democratic youth of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania held discussions in Paris. All agreed that there was a "need for these nations to join in a federation." peace conferences were held in August both in Geneva and in Brussels.

A fortunate meeting took place in those days. Members of the Hungarian intelligentsia willing to fight against fascism, and the communist party in its search to resolve national and nationalities problems met face to face. In Ersekujvar, April 1936, and subsequently in December at Komarom, the so-called "spring parliament" held its meetings. Its purpose was to bring about a united cultural front through the establishment of populist unity, as pointed out by a KORUNK reporter. HID also acknowledged that the meeting was patterned after the Czechoslovakian youth parliament. Soon after the "March Front" unfurled its banners, the Active Transylvanian Youth movement came into being following a long period of gestation.

"We are minorities: this fact puts us at a disadvantage similar to the one experienced by wage earners." These were the bitter words of working class writer Istvan Nagy at the Marosvasarhely meeting. They conveyed the general feeling of the 1.5 million people of the Transylvanian Hungarian minority, which was part of some 40 million individuals belonging to nationalities throughout Europe. Nagy personally experienced the effects of minority policies pursued by various Romanian regimes, ranging from pre-election promises and attacks on the Hungarian language and culture, all the way to ultra right-wing threats to the physical existence of the Hungarian minority.

The nationalities policies of the various Romanian regimes had an unfavorable impact on the nationalities themselves, as well as on some well-known Romanian public figures. Romanian historian and politician of international renown Nicolae Jorga pointed out in a 1926 parliamentary remark: "the Hungarian minority in Romania is a historical reality, therefore its cultural institutions must be supported ... everyone in Romania should be able to succeed according to his talent, without being asked what name he received in baptism, what nation he belongs to, and what religion he espouses."

In the years following the assimilation policies of the liberal regimes, and the benevolent, but failed initiatives of the Peasant party and of the Iorga cabinet; beginning in 1933, Romanian nationality policies were dominated by ultra right-wing Hungarian revisionism and responsive anti-revisionism. The July 1934 introduction of a Romanian national labor protection law resulted in the mass layoff of Hungarian workers and employees. This evoked outrage even among Romanians. Gheorghe C. Costa-Foru, leader of the Romanian Human Rights

Defense League publicly declared his opposition to the anti-Jewish and anti-Hungarian actions of the Romanian regime, as well as of the Iron Guard.

Parliamentary representation of the Hungarian minority in Romania was provided by the National Hungarian party [OMP] at the time. The OMP, however, supported the Romanian grievance policy of discouraging the active participation of Hungarian masses. To offset the OMP's activities, Karoly Kos in 1927 revived the Hungarian people's party, and in 1933, some forces, proclaiming themselves as the National pro-Hungarian Opposition, severed their relations with the OMP. In August 1934, at the Marosvasarhely Congress, the mushrooming number of groups joined forces under the umbrella of a newly created Hungarian Workers Federation [MADOSZ]. MADOSZ espoused the idea of Romanian-Hungarian cooperation in the struggle against fascism and war, and of a fight for democracy and equality for people and nationalities. From the outset, the Romanian communist party observed with interest and understanding the organizational establishment and daily struggles of MADOSZ, and was instrumental in making that organization a factor in Romanian national affairs.

Since its establishment, the Romanian Party of Communists advocated the realization of leninist nationalities policies. The Party pointed out that the ruling class of Romania equally exploited workers of both Romanian and of ethnic origins, and that overtly and covertly, the ruling class pursued policies adverse to nationalities. Resolutions produced at party congresses between 1924 and 1931 openly advocated the nationalities' right to self-determination.

At its 5th Congress in December 1931, the Romanian Communist Party recognized and defined the significance of the huge force represented by the peasant and nationalities movements, and decided to lend its full support to the Romanian National Peasant party, and to the left-wing opposition to the OMP. The Communist Party advocated the unobstructed use of ethnic languages (including Hungarian) in official proceedings and adjudications; the cause of state-sponsored nationalities schools, including Hungarian schools and universities; the allocation of a proportionate state budgetary share to support Hungarian educational institutions; and the award of land to peasants of Hungarian nationality. Between 1932 and 1933 the Communist Party helped the opposition forces with the publication of several left-wing Hungarian newspapers. It was then that the party established relations with Petru Groza in the interest of bringing about a radical Transylvanian peasant party to be named the "Plowmen's Front." Between 1933 and 1935, within the secretariats of the party's Transylvanian and Banat region chapters, Romanian, Hungarian and Jewish communists (Gabriel Birtas, Bela Jozsa, and Hillel Kohn respectively) worked hard at establishing the anti-fascist front of Romania.

It was symbolic of the situation that the 24 September 1935 agreement reached in the Hunyad County village of Bacs by the Plowmen's Front, on the one hand, and MADOSZ, on the other, established foundations for the entire Romanian people's front movement with the support of Romanians and Hungarians. Popovic's socialist party joined in this effort in November at Deva, and so did the Romanian Democratic Bloc and the Democratic Students Front. The Romanian and Hungarian left wing expressed some commonly shared feelings: fascism and the preparation for war must end, democratic rights to freedom must be reestablished, the system based on exploitation must cease, and every form of discrimination based on nationality must be eliminated.

Based on this minimum program, between 1935 and 1937 both MADOSZ and the Plowmen's Front made several attempts to reach agreement with the OMP and with Maniu's National Peasant party. OMP officials were not willing to cooperate with MADOSZ. MADOSZ' plight, however, was favorably received by a certain stratum of the Transylvanian Hungarian intelligentsia. That stratum espoused social development as its goal, in addition to national liberation. It sought to accomplish its objectives by aligning with the left. Within the broad ranks of the working class and of the peasantry, in addition to the representatives of the social democratic and the trade union movements, MADOSZ found support in certain youth groups and organizations, which, by virtue of their commitments, or perhaps their hopeless situations, had come close to accepting the ideals of scientific socialism.

Thus the opportunity for a major meeting was established. It involved the heliconists, the Transylvanian Youth organization, HITEL, KORUNK, MADOSZ, the communist and the social democratic parties, as well as representatives of Catholic, Unitarian and Jewish youth. All were imbued with a sense of responsibility for the future of nationalities and of the people within the region. That meeting took place at Marosvasarhely, in October 1937.

Edgar Balogh began his activities in the framework of the Sickle Movement, then returned from Czechoslovakia in 1935, following an extended period of absence. Persuaded by Transylvanian Hungarian communists, and in particular by Bela Jozsa, he addressed a circular to the above-mentioned representatives of Transylvanian Hungarians. The circular was issued on behalf of radical writers who gathered in the Endre Ady Society. Jozsa suggested that these organizations convene a discussion forum. A number of individuals had reservations concerning Jozsa's suggestion, nevertheless the first serious sign of support came from the highly respected writer Aron Tamasi in April 1936. As an aside we should mention that an article written by Tamasi, published in BRASSOI LAPOK [The Pages of Brassó] envisioned a number of possibilities. These were based on Tamasi's views of the young generation of Transylvanian Hungarians who grew up in the aftermath of the Trianon peace

treaty. One of the possible trends was that followed by the "Group of Eleven," which, in 1923 professed that it was the function of the intelligentsia to build a bridge and to enhance the possibility of an approach between the Hungarian and the Romanian people. Even though the Group of Eleven dissolved at an early date, its members continued to work as spiritual leaders of the Hungarian minority. A number of these persons worked for the group called "Erdelyi Helicon" [Transylvanian Helicon] and within the Transylvanian Youth movement. All members of the Transylvanian Helicon espoused the fundamental principle that self-revision and openness with respect to universal values are, by necessity, products of minority existence.

This was the fountain source of "transylvanism," which may be viewed as a literary school of thought (e.g. the novels of Aron Tamasi, Sandor Makkai, and Karoly Kos, and the poetry of Jenő Dsida and Sandor Remenyik), a political conception (a movement urging the independence of Transylvania), and an ideology for minorities. Transylvanism came to life by virtue of a conception, according to which identical historic circumstances produced a peculiar brand of intellectuality within the three nations residing in Transylvania. At the same time, however, the common path also represented separate paths, which should consciously prevail in the future.

Tamasi also wrote about the path followed by the Transylvanian Youth movement. Between 1930 and 1940 this movement endeavored to organize youth, irrespective of religious and social class differences. This trend aimed not only for the re-evaluation of political and public thought, but also for the scientific analysis of society. Several supporters of the movement professed that the peasantry should serve as the foundation for a new society; that "transylvanism" should be the common ground for peace between the East and the West; and that cultural approaches and the joint discussion of problems would pave the road to conciliation between Romanians and Hungarians. The more distant future was embodied in the image of a Danube confederation.

Tamasi believed that it was HITEL's approach that best suited a self-conscious search for the homeland. In response, HITEL abandoned its focus on literature and stressed the need for a scientific assessments of social conditions. The paper provided space to express the concerns of contemporary Hungarian society, for discussion of the infant death rate, of unhealthy nutrition, the emigration of the Szekely people, backwardness in industrialization, the problems experienced by tradesmen and the merchant stratum of Kolozsvár, and even for the preservation of historic landmarks. The Transylvanian Youth movement chose Endre Ady, Zsigmond Moricz and Dezső Szabó as its spiritual leaders. HITEL's inspiration came from Istvan Szechenyi. Individuals aligned more closely with the left found their focal point in KORUNK, a periodical which provided fertile soil for the ideals of progress and socialism. Claiming to be the

voice of an intellectual people's front, KORUNK presented the writings of Peter Veres and Gyula Hay, and opened its doors to world literature and to Romanian cultural products. Gabor Gaal, the editor of KORUNK, professed that a minority can survive only if it faithfully preserves its values, but at the same time is capable of renewing itself by being receptive to other values each and every day. By accepting the given historic situation, KORUNK went one step beyond focusing on Transylvania and claimed that the Hungarians of Transylvania live in Romania, and therefore Hungarian writers and social researchers in Transylvania must consider the Romanian reality as the basis of their work.

Tamasi's open stand supportive of the idea of joining forces dissolved the mutual lack of confidence. A number of tasks were to be accomplished, and the Hungarians of Slovakia and of the voivode region were filled with expectations: what will be Transylvania's response to the historic challenge?

In the interest of bringing into motion and shaking up public opinion, it was once again the left that initiated and directed the actions. Their targets included those who were waiting for the call, in whom the will to act was still latent. Laszlo Banyai used UJ SZO, the communist paper of Marosvasarhely, to motivate readers to act. He invoked the examples set by MADOSZ and the Plowmen's Front. Also on the pages of UJ SZO, Bela Jozsa planted the seeds of a new Hungarian national party into the public consciousness, a party that would be based on the unity of the Hungarian masses. Jozsa was concerned about the fact that right-wing Romanian organizations were being formed for the introduction of the numerus clausus and the numerus nullus. In one of his articles printed in BRASSOI LAPOK (where most of his articles appeared), Sandor Kacso reminded his readers that the Hungarian party abandoned and betrayed the people.

During the spring of 1937 FUGGETLEN UJSAG [The Independent Newspaper] presented its view that a meeting of representatives of various trends, and the consequent development of principles and of a workplan for a unified anti-fascist movement was indispensable. The fact that there were common objectives became instantly apparent, nevertheless almost everyone expected different results from the meeting. Several individuals joined forces with social democrat Lajos Jordaky who spoke for the workers. Lajos Csogor made recommendations on behalf of small tradesmen, and literary historian Elemer Jancso and poet Jenő Dsida spoke about devising a self-defense mechanism for minorities. Jozsef Venczel envisioned the fulfillment of the intellectual mission in defining economic and cultural tasks in more specific terms, and in the intelligentsia's "responsible service supported by populist forces." Venczel spoke on behalf of Catholic academicians. Writer Laszlo Szabedi called attention to the necessary sense of responsibility toward the Hungarian people and used the phrase "Hungarian

progress, Hungarian survival" as his theme. Jozsef Kovacs counted on the participation of Jews having a Hungarian cultural background.

The comments were well thought-out. In spite of nuance differences, or perhaps precisely in spite of some substantial differences, everyone agreed on one point. Dezső Albrecht put it this way: "we must leave behind everything that divides us, and must search for factors that unite us!"

Participants at the "parliamentary meeting of the intellectual grouping of Transylvanian Hungarians" met between 2 and 4 October 1937 in the Apollo room of Marosvasarhely. The 187 members of the "youth in action" included Andras Arato, Sandor Asztalos, Edgar Balogh, Laszlo Banyai, Lajos Csogor, Jenő Dsida, Elemer Jancso, Bela Jozsa, Sandor Kacso, Jozsef Meliusz, Imre Nagy, Istvan Nagy, Aron Tamasi, Ferenc Szemler and other notables. The nine reports presented at the meeting dealt with issues pertaining to Transylvanian Hungarians:

- [1] The social structure and the ethics of the Transylvanian Hungarian society—ways and means for transformation;
- [2] The Transylvanian Hungarian national minority situation in the context of public law and international law;
- [3] Conditions and ways for the constructive coexistence of Transylvanian Hungarians and the Romanian people;
- [4] Formal education, educational reform, education outside of schools;
- [5] Science, literature, the theater, music, the arts;
- [6] post-World War I functioning of the Transylvanian Hungarian daily and periodical press; its present condition and future role;
- [7] The education and the role of masses of small tradesmen and blue collar workers;
- [8] Economic policy; and
- [9] Agricultural policy.

Following these presentations one question triggered another, views clashed and recommendations were made: how many of the tasks could be accomplished on their own, what should the state provide, how much of the forefather's heritage had become obsolete, which demands were overly radical or premature.

The Transylvanian Hungarian minority expected the Romanian state to establish Hungarian classes with Hungarian teachers in state-supported schools, and to provide support to parochial schools. The general expectation was that the state would ensure the autonomy of

schools, of various religious denominations and of cultural life. The political and cultural education of the masses was viewed as the task of the minority. The assurance of economic opportunities and the freedom of labor were viewed in Marosvasarhely as the most fundamental human rights. These issues were always part of the agenda also in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The meeting participants registered their protest with the Romanian government concerning the mass dismissal of Hungarian workers, and demanded an expansion of democratic civil rights, political amnesty and the introduction of a system of unemployment compensation. They recommended the establishment of a Hungarian economic council, and dealt intensively with agricultural issues. They deemed the expansion of the network of farmers' circles, and the industrialization of Szekely country as necessary. (It was Sandor Kacso in BRASSOI LAPOK, and Gyorgy Bozodi in his monograph entitled "To the Detriment of the Szekely People," who revealed the sinful disregard manifested by the Hungarian aristocracy toward the situation of the Szekely people. As a result the emigration of the Szekelys to the Regat region and to America took frightening proportions. Bozodi viewed as outrageous the fact that while banks controlled by Saxons annually contributed 10 percent of the needed support to Saxon schools and cultural institutions, Hungarian banks voted to provide only 2 percent of the needed support.)

From among all the presentations Sandor Kacso's "The Conditions and Ways for the Constructive Coexistence of Transylvanian Hungarians and the Romanian People" evoked the greatest response, spanning from Paris to Moscow. Kacso established the fact that the Romanian state was not able to discover nationalistic organization or conspiracy among Hungarians. He stopped short of dealing with issues concerning disputed territories on grounds that those disputes were to be resolved by the governments of Hungary and Romania. Under the circumstances he assumed the existing territorial limits as given factors, within which the Transylvanian Hungarians must carve out a living, nevertheless in a manner so as to assure their survival, and all aspects of the development of their national existence. Kacso felt that the fulfillment of this desire was the function of the state. Romanian-Hungarian conciliation was just as much a historical necessity as was closer international cooperation in the Danube region—the latter requisite being dictated by the interdependence of those nations.

The meeting adopted a "Profession of Faith," drafted during the meeting. In it, all the concerns and sober expectations of the progressive Transylvanian Hungarian youth were expressed:

"Imbued by the spirit of openness that befits a freedom-loving nation, the youth gathered at Marosvasarhely appeals to the Romanian people and its leaders whose national dreams have come true, and who were able to reach the high spiritual plateau manifested at Gyulafehervar. The Hungarian youth prays that Hungarians

endangered in the exercise of their existential and human rights find a way to achieve spiritual conciliation and an honest understanding, so as to establish an opportunity for free, brotherly coexistence.

"This desire is reinforced by our belief that a higher level mission lies ahead for both the Romanian and the Hungarian people within the Danube basin."

Hungarian communists residing in the Soviet Union provided this summary of the Marosvasarhely meeting's significance: the meeting expressed a willingness of the intelligentsia to cooperate with the working class, with Romanian democratic forces and with the nations of the region. At the same time, the meeting attested to the unity of Hungarian culture, despite national borders and divisions. The French working class paper SZABAD SZO [Free Word] properly recognized the situation from the European vantage point: the same democratic spirit which through the works of Gyula Illyes, Geza Feja and Peter Veres elevated Hungarian literature to universal standards, was at work in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania also. The Hungarian literary journal SZABAD SZELLELEM [Free Spirit] published in Prague presented Laszlo Hantos' solemn statement: "The Profession of Faith framed in Marosvasarhely may be accepted by all of us for what it is called." HID voiced the opinion that it was the obligation of Hungarians to be the flagbearers of brotherhood, irrespective of the political setting in which they live.

We could not venture to say that in Marosvasarhely a dialog between Hungarians and Romanians evolved, nevertheless both the Bucharest newspapers and the Romanian press of Kolozsvar observed the events. Kacso's presentation was cited in most publications, including in the TARA DE MIINE, the NATIUNEA ROMANA and the LUMEA ROMANESCA. The latter presented an article by Constantin Clonaru, who felt that the Transylvanian Hungarian democracy was intent on developing a lasting friendship between Hungary and Romania. "In this respect we support the Hungarian youth."

Virtually all articles quoted a certain part of Kacso's presentation: "We are not irredentists. ... We must pursue our livelihood under the present historical and political conditions, and it is here that we must survive as somewhat more than a nationality. We also must continue to develop our culture." TARA DE MIINE's report picked up on this thought and viewed the statement as a starting point for settling the relationship between the two nations. Also NATIUNEA ROMANA perceived the situation appropriately when it viewed the Marosvasarhely meeting as the proper response to the Sepszentgyorgy congress sponsored by the OMP. At the OMP congress the noted international lawyer and editor of the periodical MAGYAR KISEBBSÉG [Hungarian Minority] Elemer Jakabffy and others were unable to persuade the OMP membership to accept any conceptual program modification that would have been adaptable to

the situation presented by that era. The editors of NATIUNEA ROMANA hailed the Hungarian youth which stepped out of its passive role of being observers only, and which made an effort to become the fermenting yeast for Hungarian society as a whole.

NATIUNEA ROMANA appeared to have accepted the "peace terms" for Romanian-Hungarian conciliation, as proposed in Marosvasarhely. It summarized these terms by saying that Hungarians of Romania were an organic part of the Central European Hungarian linguistic and cultural community; the Romanian state must change not only its recent policies that endanger the national existence of nationalities, including Hungarians, but must also guarantee both the individual and collective rights of those nationalities. In closing, the article paid tribute to the Hungarian peoples' "sincere desire to pursue brotherly coexistence, which stems from mutual interests and from the meritorious mission to be pursued by the two nations of the Danube basin."

Virgil Nistor's three-part article in NATIUNEA ROMANA of Kolozsvár presented three views of the Marosvasarhely meeting from three different perspectives. Nistor also posed the question of whether on the way home from the meeting the willingness to act would fade. Will indeed the desired populist-national unity come about? Will the people understand the ideas propounded in the Profession of Faith? Will it be possible to democratize political thought despite the OMP? "One thing is certain: our brothers in the Hungarian minority are busy preparing something that is beneficial. It is conceivable that crystal clear wine will fill the cups placed on the table of reconciliation and understanding—unless the fermentation process is choked off;" went the answer.

Zaharia Stancu's paper LUMEA ROMANESCA saw it this way: the Hungarians have made an unequivocally democratic statement; in Marosvasarhely we heard the voice of brotherhood.

The March Front which unfurled its banners in the spring of 1937 issued the so-called Proclamation of Mako, in which it defined the need for "the populist forces of all Danube basin nations to take power." It was in this spirit that the March Front debated the tasks. Following the Marosvasarhely example, they began to organize a meeting in Kecskemet to be opened on 15 March 1938, with the intent to establish a united national front. During October and November 1937 the Transylvanian youth discussed the problems, and in Brassó MADOSZ organized a national conference. By year's end several OMP youth chapters from the countryside proclaimed allegiance to the principles of the Marosvasarhely resolution. On 4 April 1938, at a literary evening held at the Kolozsvár Ironworkers Home, all guest writers (Aron Tamasi, Jenő Kiss, László Szébedi, Erno Salamon) came from the ranks of participants at the Marosvasarhely meeting.

A year later planning for the second meeting began in Brassó. Geza Feja noted that "the willingness to act was not as readily apparent as it was a year ago." Aside from differences in viewpoint, the changed historic situation also served to dampen spirits.

"Only one avenue that leads out of war is open to Hungarians. That avenue is an anti-fascist fight for freedom fought jointly with the Romanian people." The royal dictatorship on 10 February 1938 outlawed all parties and organizations, including the OMP and MADOSZ. The Hungarian left of Transylvania was forced to keep alive the ideals of Marosvasarhely under far more polarized circumstances. Following consummation of the Munich accord on 14 November 1938, MADOSZ sent memoranda from exile to the cabinet head. In these memoranda MADOSZ expressed concern because "the ongoing machinations in the Danube basin endangered world peace and the independence of the people." MADOSZ expressed its conviction that "the only defensive shield the two nations have is brotherhood." At that point in time the most reliable outposts for MADOSZ were the Transylvanian Encyclopedic Publishers, the Workers Atheneum and the Working Group of Revolutionary Writers. It is to the great credit of MADOSZ that ERDELYI MAGYAR SZÓ [Transylvanian Hungarian Word] appeared after 18 June 1939, thanks to the benevolent support of Radu Paraschivescu and Raul Sorban. The paper managed to organize the Petofi festivities of 1939, which yielded an opportunity for Bela Jozsa to propagate the idea of international friendship. He did so by invoking the legacy of the 1848 revolution. In response Romanian poets Mihai Beniuc and Tudor Bugnariu paid their respects on the pages of the Romanian press; through them the Transylvanian Romanian intelligentsia also joined the celebrations.

ERDELYI MAGYAR SZÓ accepted the task of organizing the 30-31 December 1939 so-called populist meeting of Kolozsvár. Representatives of the Romanian left participated and the purpose of the meeting was to demonstrate the continuity of the Marosvasarhely meeting. A closing memorandum was published in 12,000 copies. It dealt with issues affecting Hungarians, but it also included more general demands for the state support of ordinary people, and even the need for an agreement for mutual aid among neighboring countries. The meeting was repeated on 4 February 1940 in Brassó: Székely employees, small tradesmen and workers protested the war and proclaimed friendship among nations. It was in this vein that the importance of establishing a universal democratic front of Hungarians residing in Romania was demonstrated.

A universal democratic front actually came into being during the summer of 1943. In Southern Transylvania the Székely people joined the National Anti-Hitler Front which was conceived by Romanian left-wingers. In Northern Romania MADOSZ, the communist party, the Smallholders Party and the social democratic party discussed similar matters.

Within this endeavour, just like with respect to the preparation of the Marosvasarhely meeting, the tireless work of Bela Jozsa deserves mention. At his recommendation, in January 1941 there came about a "Permanent March 15 Committee" aimed at moderating the effects of incitement that produced mutual hatred among the nations of Transylvania. In Kolozsvar, unionized Hungarian workers protested the dismissal of Romanian workers, and in Arad, Romanian workers protested the dismissal of Hungarian workers. During spring, 1941, the periodical TERMES [Harvest] which attracted populist writers, organized a lecture forum concerning the nations of the Danube region. Romanians Teofil Vescan and Victor Eftimiu praised this Hungarian initiative. The summer 1943 invasion of Europe by the Allied Forces further stimulated attempts for an international approach. In Romania MADOSZ reached an agreement with the Plowmen's Front and the Federation of Patriots, thus joining the Anti-Hitler Front. In Hungary Bela Jozsa began organizing a new meeting at Marosvasarhely. He wrote to left-wing representatives of the Transylvanian Helicon and the Transylvanian Party, and Aron Tamasi convinced Lajos Jordaky of the meeting's importance. In the course of their travels in Transylvania Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky and Zoltan Tildy also approved of the organization of Transylvanians. Close relationships were established between the Peace Party and the Northern Transylvania secretariat of the communist party, as well as with the Smallholder Party, the social democrats and Northern Transylvania MADOSZ supporters.

All signs indicated that a significant popular front had evolved in both parts of Transylvania, with the participation of Romanians, Hungarians and members of other nationalities, irrespective of political party affiliations.

It was the writer Gyorgy Kovacs who called for the organization of a new meeting at Marosvasarhely. The call was published in the 29 August 1943 issue of SZABAD SZO.

The October 1943 arrests ordered by the Hungarian Gendarmerie struck the democratic circles of the two nations. A significant part of the Transylvanian left, including Bela Jozsa, was arrested. A similar wave of arrests decimated the Southern Transylvanian workers movement also. Under these circumstances the new meeting at Marosvasarhely planned for October 1943 was cancelled.

The Marosvasarhely meeting was not immune to the effects of World War II. But as MADOSZ reminded its followers in late September 1944: The organization "served as a faithful comrade-in-arms to the democratic forces of the Romanian people for more than 10 years."

The events also exemplified the fact that common causes are capable of forging a truly creative community composed of people with different outlooks and convictions, on the basis of mutual respect for humanist values, progress and interests.

Concerning our days, the legacy of the Marosvasarhely meeting is being cherished not only by Hungarians residing in Romania, but also by their Romanian peers. They view it as the most significant Hungarian democratic movement between the two world wars. On the 30th anniversary of the meeting Tudor Bugnariu noted in CONTEMPORANUL that during the days of the anti-fascist struggle "it was the common legacy of Romanians and Hungarians that enabled" the establishment of a joint anti-fascist movement. Following 23 August 1944 the democratic and anti-fascist spirit of the meeting inspired both the Romanian and the Hungarian progressive forces in their struggle against nationalism and chauvinism, and in the endeavour for friendship between the two nations. Bugnariu acknowledged the fact that democratic representatives of Hungary joined the Romanian left and participated in disintegrating the remnants of the old system, as well as in bringing about the people's democratic change and in implementing the socialist revolution.

The meeting served as an example to show that disputed issues can be resolved around a table, and that conflicts cannot stamp out mutual recognition and assurance of human and national rights in the hearts of nations which have suffered and have been tried for so long.

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#### **Critique of Uncontested National Slate of Candidates Published**

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[Article by Marta Dezso, academic associate, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of State and Jurisprudence: "Thoughts on the Role of the Electoral Slate"]

[Text] Barely a decade ago, establishing a slate of National Assembly at large candidates was among the most controversial ideas. In contrast to past concerns over some institutional feature that could destroy the "unified" electoral system, the new concern was nurtured by more than just "reflexes protective of the structure." Additional factors included prejudiced as well as professional views on elections in which people vote for an entire slates of candidates rather than for individuals, and the uncertainties of anticipated foreign and domestic reaction.

The largely favorable results produced by the 1983 implementation of the idea, as well as interest expressed by socialist countries and their search for similar solutions failed to justify these concerns. On the other hand, extreme expectations were not proven correct either. (Footnote 1) (In Poland the election law of 19 May 1985 institutionalized the system of a national slate of candidates, similar to the one introduced in Hungary. In the Soviet Union experimental districts are testing the adaptability of the concept. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are preparing for an electoral reform.) In

its present form the slate fulfilled its political objectives only in part. Nevertheless it still may be worthwhile to give further thought to the future function and possible benefits of electoral slates.

### The Character and Present Function of the National Slate

In the course of professional preparatory debates for the new election law, several alternative representative structures were conceived to ameliorate tensions stemming from the one-sidedness of representation based on the principle of residence. (Footnote 2) (The Political Committee's 29 June 1979 resolution already provided an outline of alternatives that were discussed later, e.g. cooptation by the National Assembly, ex officio memberships, workplace-based direct representation, and the possibility of introducing a national slate of at large candidates). From among the several alternatives the idea of slate voting appeared as the most viable solution, and as the one best adaptable to our electoral system. Beyond doubt, a slate of candidates for which every registered voter could cast his vote is far more responsive to democratic expectations, than are indirect elections or ex officio memberships in the National Assembly. At the same time, however, voting for a slate of candidates is no panacea either, because parliamentary seats allotted to a slate of candidates are backed by a limited expression of the popular will. The substantive choice made in voting for a slate is limited to the fact of the election: a vote merely affirms or rejects a political decision which served as the basis for selecting candidates. The popular will and the will of advisory societal organizations conveying interests does not prevail directly in the nominating process. The future parliamentary conduct of the elected slate of candidates is immune to popular influence: the processes of authority delegation, control, accountability and recall cannot be exercised. In other words, the mandate of representatives elected by virtue of their being listed on the national slate of candidates pertains primarily to issues of a national scope. (Footnote 3) (For further detail on this subject see: Marta Dezso: "Whose Representative? The Character of the Representative Mandate" JOGTUDOMANYI KOZLONY No 7, 1978.)

The character and the numerical proportions of the existing national slate significantly deviates from the one proposed earlier. The earlier proposal envisioned a larger number of candidates and reinforced the principle of interest representation. The existing national slate does not include candidates from societal organizations and interest groups. The will of such groups and organizations may prevail only indirectly, through the nominating process. In reality it is the central political decisionmaking body that selects individuals to be included in the slate of candidates. For this reason, in its present form, the institution of a national slate of candidates does not convey the joint expression of all the individual voting districts and interest groups. We must admit

nevertheless, that however faintly, certain issues conveyed by interest groups did emerge in the process. Although not in any systematic form, on occasion the nominating process and the process of filling vacancies appeared to be responsive to influence exerted by interest groups. In some instances it became apparent that choices were tied to certain interests.

For this reason the function of the national slate of candidates may be viewed from a number of vantage points. In comparing advance expectations with the existing institution we find that the new institution was unable to fulfill many of the expectations. Examples include the expectations that the slate would provide a concentrated expression of views represented by the political sphere, obviate the fact that socialist construction is a national program, convey the unified character of society and of the party's policy of alliances, strengthen interest representation while at the same time provide recognition to social stratification, offset disproportions in voting districts where disadvantaged women, young people and physical workers run for office, etc. These expectations were fulfilled only in part, because the primary purpose of the slate turned out to be the expressions of social and political unity. Accordingly, from the voters' viewpoint, a vote for the slate demonstrates primarily an agreement with the political sphere. Election propaganda also underscored the opportunity and the requirement that votes cast for the slate support the political sphere, and disregarded conceptual guidance provided by the election law concerning the conduct of elections. The election law enables voters to individually judge candidates running for policy making and representative offices.

In the final analysis, election results manifest widespread agreement with the national slate of candidates. (Footnote 4) (Regarding election results and the composition of the slate see Istvan Kukorelli: "Casting Votes or Choosing Candidates? Thoughts on Electoral Reform and on the History of the 1985 General Elections." Budapest, Manuscript, 1986 pp 58-66) Quite obviously there remain some questions. To what extent did the large number of supportive votes reflect agreement with the political sphere and how much of that vote may be attributed to propaganda, reflexes, or perhaps to lack of knowledge? As in every election, it is difficult to answer these questions. It is a fact, nevertheless, that the national average for votes opposed to individual candidates was between one and two percent. The overwhelming election results did not provide sufficient guidance even for the charting of the previously suggested "political map."

Critical remarks concerning the role and composition of the slate therefore are based on different approaches. One's view of the emergence of elements of interest representation as a "functional disturbance," or, alternatively as the beginning of an important function is subjective and relative, depending on one's perception of the purpose of the slate.

"Halfway" solutions provided by the slate warrant most criticism, because the slate is the embodiment of a mixture of various purposes of representation. More accurately: the various objectives of representation are not being provided obvious institutional forms of expression. Absent clarification of this matter, the slate cannot continue to be functional.

Despite these missing features, however, the slate did produce some positive results, particularly from the viewpoint of the election process. The election of the 35 leaders and public figures on the slate unburdened the individual voting districts. It substantially reduced the number of dual nominations, which, from the outset, amounted to formality. This is so in spite of the fact that within the individual voting districts the number of "centrally designated" candidates was more or less the same as the number of candidates included on the slate.

Another positive feature is the fact that the transfer of certain individual representatives previously elected from the individual voting districts to the slate, brought an end to potential tension. Previously, these representatives were tied to their respective voting districts. (These are candidates of national stature who either neglected to deal with the problems of their districts, or were overly preoccupied with the affairs of their districts.) And finally, the national slate proved to be advantageous in terms of conveying the policy of alliances.

#### **Possible Direction for the Further Development of the Slate**

As a starting point, let us consider the purpose of the slate. The purpose of the slate is to ameliorate problems stemming from exclusively residence-based representation and from conflicting local and national interests. We find that by conveying a unified view of proposed policies, the slate indeed performed a certain balancing function. But a further analysis of problems stemming from residence-based representation also reveals that local interests which are not integrated into the residence-based representation design will clash with central conceptions. This problem stems from the fact that interests and viewpoints not integrated into the residence-based system triggered pronouncedly disproportionate representation, permitting excessive residence-based special interests to prevail. (Footnote 5) (The transformation of interests into political will, alternatively the amorphous mechanism by which interests can be conveyed is the neuralgic aspect of our representation system. See, e.g. Kalman Kulcsar, Mihaly Bihari studies in "Politics and Political Science." Godolat Publishers 1982 pp 10-11 and 545-612) We may search for solutions in two mutually non-exclusive directions. Either the concept of residence-based representation must be modified so as to include considerations for natural socio-economic units, or the system of the national slate of candidates must include an institutional feature which permits the expression of significantly interests excluded

by virtue of residence-based apportionment. This is not a new requirement. The fact is, however, that so far the slate has not performed this offsetting and balancing function.

Assuming that the purposes of representation have been clarified, the functions of the slate may be developed in one of three directions:

—political representation, exclusively;

—dual function: in addition to political representation some separate institutional guarantees would enable the fulfillment of certain interest representation functions; and

—interest representation, exclusively.

(Footnote 6) (Real activities in the field of interest representation and the establishment of appropriate forms of organization may transform the representative structure in the latter direction. As of today, however, I view the dual function as the realistic alternative.)

#### **The Political Representation Function**

One possible way of formulating the slate would be to openly recognize that the candidates listed on the slate represent nothing but the country's political leadership. Accordingly, it could be made clear that although it is the PPF National Council that accepts nominations, it is the upper level of political leadership that decides upon the candidates. These decisions are being reached in due consideration of societal needs. It is the upper level of political leadership that decides how it wants to express political unity, as well as the extent of alliance for stratum policies deemed appropriate by the leadership. Considering the present stage of development of our representative system, describing the function of the slate in these terms would constitute a backward step as compared to advances already made in the direction of interest representation.

But even if this kind of statement were to be made, the election law should define the number of candidates that may be included in the slate. Irrespective to what form the slate takes, it would be useful to increase the number of individual candidates in each district from the present 10 percent to 15 percent, i.e. a minimum of 50 individuals. In this way we could discontinue the category of "centrally designated candidates" in each voting district, and nominations to the slate would become more consistent (e.g. the CC secretary and the deputy prime minister would not run within individual voting districts). On the other hand, if the inclusion of national leaders on the slate becomes the primary objective, the representative purpose of the slate will be distorted in yet another direction. The slate's role as a societal balancing factor would be reduced, and it would support those who complain about the "closed" and "protected" nature of the slate.

Since the slate of candidates is not tied to defined quotas allotted to organizations, there exists also in this construction a theoretical possibility for multiple nominations. At first, this solution seems more democratic, moreover, in the case of several candidates people could elect alternate candidates, and there would be no need for cooptation by the National Assembly in filling vacancies.

The election law could require that a number of candidates larger than the number of parliamentary seats available be included in the slate. Further, the law could provide that those, who by virtue of the number of votes cast failed to be elected, nevertheless acquired at least 25 percent of the votes cast, will become alternate representatives. Under this scenario the possibility of making the alliance and stratum policies prevail may become questionable. It then follows, that the more candidates run for office, the less the chance for achieving the desired and needed ratio that ensures continuation of the policy of alliances.

There are two possible alternatives with respect to increasing the number of candidates. Under one alternative the law would fix both the minimum and the maximum number of possible candidates to be included in the slate. For example, the law could state that the slate of candidates must be no smaller than 20 percent, and no larger than 50 percent of the representative seats available to individual voting districts. Such requirement would guarantee multiple nominations. In terms of a slate of 50 candidates, at least 10 more candidates should be running for office, this, however, would enable the possibility of changing the pre-established ratios. Under such conditions virtually all candidates nominated by nationalities federations would be eliminated. On a national scale the probability of a situation like this is small, nevertheless the theoretical possibility exists, because in order to make the slate valid one would have to select from among several candidates.

Alternatively, the law could prescribe that the slate be composed of more candidates, the total number of candidates, however, should not exceed by more than 50 percent the number of the available parliamentary seats. At first glance there is hardly a difference between the two approaches. In reality, however, there is a substantial difference. If only the maximum number of candidates is established, multiple nominations could become symbolic, depending on the inclinations of the nominating organizations. The symbolic character would emerge for instance by nominating only two or three additional candidates. True, in this way the original conceptions would not be endangered, but the solution would be no more than a semblance, one that could not convince the public that multiple nominations indeed constituted a "new democratic achievement."

In my judgment, there is no need for such a solution. It would be futile to overestimate the activity or role of individual voters in assembling the slate of candidates.

The process would be alien to the individual votes. They could not be expected to cast votes while keeping in mind, e.g., the importance of providing representation for each religion or for each nationality, and at the same time, to consider national requirements. If in the context of the Parliament's representative composition one objective of representation is the expression of the policy of alliances, it would be more democratic if the leadership enforced this stance in the appropriate fashion rather than choosing a seemingly more democratic solution.

The problem of elected alternate representatives presents the same problem. For example: who would fill a seat vacated by one of the religious groups, if among the alternative representatives there were no more members from the churches, or, if there were, those members belonged to a different church? It would be futile to elect alternate representatives belonging to a number of different interests, the matter of who should occupy the vacated seat would still remain questionable. This then suggests that consistent with existing practice, cooptation would solve the problem. Of, could there be another solution? Multiple nominations to the slate would force the composition of the slate in this direction: one could take the viewpoint that given seats are not attached to given groups, and that accordingly, any alternate representative may acquire that seat, with the choice of alternate representatives depending on the ratio of votes cast. This solution, however, would be in conflict with the political objectives of the slate.

In the same manner multiple nominations would conflict with the original political objectives if the slate were to be corrected according to ratios corresponding to various strata. (For example, if there was a larger number of young, female or non-party member candidates.) (Footnote 7) (Gyorgy Wiener finds it necessary to influence the ratio between the various strata. See: "The Social Composition of Representative Bodies." Manuscript, Budapest 1987 pp 11-12.) Multiple nominations could acquire a meaningful role only in the judging of representatives who acquire a meaningful role only in the judging of representatives who perform national political leadership roles. The opportunity for this does exist in the form of an open slate in the course of an election. Rather than introducing a system of multiple nominations, the emphasis should be placed on creating awareness in this respect.

In summary: one could support the exclusive political function of the slate only, if as a result of differences in perception regarding theories of representation within individual voting districts there would emerge a graduated system of integration that encompasses the various levels and types of interests. Without this, pure political representation serves only to cover up, not to replace the representative expression of differences that are based on the societal division of labor.

### Political and Interest Representation: The Dual Function of the Slate

In addition to preserving or even strengthening the political function of the slate, and in the interest of providing more realistic representation for societal interests, the slate should include representatives of large societal organizations and interest groups in their capacity as representatives of interests. (Footnote 8) (Concerning the relationship between societal organizations and representation see Peter Schmidt: "Socialism and Statehood." Kossuth Publishers 1984 pp 317-319.) The desirability of such representation, as previously defined, now emerges as a political necessity. The slate could continue with this dual function without substantial structural change.

The number of societal organizations eligible to acquire parliamentary seats should be kept within reasonable limits, and in due consideration of today's socio-political requirements. In any event, it would be a justified and defensible position to state that along with the PPF which is authorized already to nominate candidates, also some other organizations may obtain the right to directly submit nominations to the slate. These could include trade unions which comprehensively embrace and represent the needs of wage-earners, salaried workers, employees and members of the intelligentsia (e.g. the National Council of Trade Unions) [SZOT], the interest representatives of producer cooperatives (e.g. the National Council of Producer Cooperatives) [TOT], and organizations which accept the responsibility to present the problems of, and to represent the national interests of youth, (e.g. the Hungarian Communist Youth League) [KISZ]. (Footnote 9) (Within the same conceptual framework this thought emerged in the course of preparing the election law. See Jozsef Halasz: "On the Developmental Problems of the Hungarian Election System." Manuscript, Budapest 1987 pp 12-14.)

In principle the circle of participating organizations could be expanded. In the end the right to nominate candidates could be discussed with all interest groups and federations. (In particular: e.g. the National Federation of Cooperatives [SZOVOSZ], the National Federation of Artisan Cooperatives [OKISZ], the National Organization of Artisans [KIOSZ], and the Chamber of Commerce.) Granting representation rights to any one of these organizations would, quite naturally, trigger a rightful demand for representation by all the other organizations. It would be difficult to find an objective basis upon which choices or preferences could be made among these organizations. Beyond a certain point, expanding the number of organizations eligible to be allotted parliamentary seats would cause a structural change in the representative system. If partial interests were to be delineated excessively, the focus should be on the most comprehensive political and societal organizations which are structural parts of our political institutional system. This is my judgment, as of today.

The already developed practice of nominating to the slate could be supplemented by authorizing a limited number of nominations to be submitted by societal organizations. Such authorization should take the form of a legal provision. The PPF National Council which is responsible for assembling the national slate, should continue to discharge this responsibility, but in a dual capacity. First, the PPF should pursue this matter in its own right, i.e., following political agreements and decisions it should nominate candidates consistent with past practice. On the other hand the PPF could also accommodate the nominating processes of the societal organizations. The PPF could refuse to register societal organizations only if the nominations submitted by authorized societal organizations are contrary to law.

The method of nominations within societal organizations should not be governed by law. On the other hand, a political requisite should be made obvious, namely that the societal organizations must pursue their nominating processes in the open, and that nominations would have to emanate from the grassroots. Legal provisions should go only so far as to state which organizations are obligated to announce their candidates. It should be apparent to these organizations that their respective leaderships (e.g. the presidiums of SZOT and TOT, and the CC of KISZ) could not usurp the right to make nominations.

The distribution of parliamentary seats among various organizations could take place in a number of ways. Based on the number of parliamentary seats available on the national slate, (a number that should be increased by all means,) quotas should be allotted to societal organizations in varying ratios. We believe that no political or other danger would inure, if 15 percent of the total number of representatives (this is far less than the 20-25 percent suggested earlier) would be elected by way of the national slate. Moreover, the political purpose of the national slate, the need to provide a kind of representation that is more appropriate to the social structure, and the anticipated degree of public identification with functional interest representation that would appear on the slate would warrant the inclusion of at least 50 candidates on the national slate.

Considering the possibilities and a slate with 50 names, a realistic number of seats assigned to societal organizations could be between 20 and 25. The specific division should be specified by law. According to the possibilities this could go as follows:

—The number of seats would be evenly distributed among the various organizations. TOT, SZOT and KISZ would each enter with eight or seven nominees. This division is a mechanical function, and would not provide preferential treatment to any one of the organizations.

—According to the size, character and activity of the various societal organizations and interest groups the distribution of seats could take place in a more differentiated manner. Correspondingly, for instance, SZOT

would receive more seats than TOT or KISZ. The specific decision would be based on political evaluation and judgment. One must recognize, however, that differentiation must not determine the ability of various organizations to obtain representation. Instead, the difference of two or three seats should be the norm reflecting the political intent.

In addition to the societal organizations' right to directly nominate candidates, certain seats should be consistently allotted to religious and nationalities groups. It would be justified to amend the list of such organizations by providing representation to the ethnic group of Gypsies. In a manner similar to other ethnic groups, the National Council of Gypsies would have the right to nominate candidates, and their candidate could become part of the slate accepted by the PPF.

More than half of the total parliamentary seats tied to the national slate had been distributed thus far. They can be defined easily, linking them to specific organizations and interest groups. Supportive of the general political will, these seats would convey the specific purpose of representation, and these purposes would become the guiding principle for the assembly of the national slate.

Additional seats on the national slate would permit a more free movement for nominations. In addition to the election of political leaders, who in their persons already represent national policies, some timely political considerations could influence the assembly of the slate of candidates. (At present we could count into this category former coalition partners, who, with the passage of time, would necessarily lose their function.) Political consideration should be given for instance to artists and scientists, whose interests are important to society as a whole. They should not run on the national slate, instead, they should run in a multi-seat voting districts, where the natural fiber for their nomination is present in the peculiar features of large cities or in certain districts of Budapest. For example, a university city or a county seat having four or five parliamentary seats could nominate some well-known scientists who are active in public affairs, without much formality and without "forcing" them to run for office. Nomination of such individuals would be consistent with the city's profile. Representatives of the various arts could be nominated in a similar manner, and would accede to office with roots reaching back to their respective voting districts. (We find many examples for this in the areas of theatrical and motion picture arts.)

#### Arguments Supportive of the Dual Function

—By providing an opportunity for representation to organizations which encompass the fundamental strata of society, the national slate would provide an opportunity to express differentiation that stems from the societal division of labor. Heretofore this feature was missing from our representative system.

—SZOT's, TOT's, KISZ's and the PPF's right to directly nominate candidates would not create structural changes in the representative system, but would enable the institutional emergence of interests that are different from the interests that emerge through residence-based apportionment. Such interests become visible in a different cross-section of society.

—The purpose of representation would be clarified, the parliamentary seats would be tied to delegations made by the nominating organizations, and the appropriate societal organizations and interest groups would have the right to initiate recall.

—The increased number of seats favoring interest representation would resolve the problem presented by the slate's "closed" or "protected" character.

#### Counterarguments

—The unified system of nominations would come to an end and the PPF's definitive role in nominations would be reduced.

These concerns, however, are nurtured only by those who disapprove of interest and stratum representation as those would appear on the slate. Namely, the system of nominations was not unified heretofore either, moreover, by permitting nationalities candidates to be included on the slate, practice has already sanctioned the right to make direct nominations.

The PPF's public law function (which gained the strength in the last election), would not change. The PPF would continue the same nominating practice, and its tasks would be supplemented by the registration of candidates nominated by various organizations. The PPF character of elections would not be diminished by the fact that next to the candidates' name on the slate, the constituent societal organizations's name would also appear.

#### Additional Counterarguments

—There can be no real interest- or stratum-representation, because the number of slot or parliamentary seats on the slate is too low. (For instance, what would SZOT do with seven or eight seats?) We must note here that it is not the individual branches of the economy that need representation. The representation of salaried persons and wage earners is important.

—The group of organizations that acquire the right to directly submit nominations is extremely small—other organizations should also be represented. (E.g. KIOSZ, SZOVOSZ, OKISZ, etc.)

Unlike the previous counterarguments, these two counterarguments do not object to the appearance of interest groups on the slate. Instead they view the number of interest groups appearing on the slate as too low.

Undoubtedly, the change proposed in this study must not be viewed as the final solution to problems of interest representation in the National Assembly. Nevertheless, granting a right to societal and political organizations to directly nominate candidates is the first important political step in the direction of interest representation. Any further increase of the number of groups represented would affect the structural issues of our representation system, and changing the structure would require a new, comprehensive scientific and political evaluation.

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### Improvements in Candidate Selection for National Assembly Urged

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[Article by Peter Schmidt, university professor, department head at the ELTE Faculty of State and Jurisprudence: "Mandated Multi-Candidate—As Reflected by the 1985 National Assembly Representative Elections"]

[Text] In the course of the 1985 elections in Hungary we made the first steps in the direction of a more democratic representation, more reflective of the differences in the views and interests of the society. This was the first—sometimes uncertain—step since 1974 to have a public contest for mandates. It has to be added: this contest could hardly evolve at some places, and it frequently did not find adequate forms. The organizing entities sometimes—with or without reason—made exaggerated efforts to secure the expected result, while a significant part of the citizens did not understand or did not believe in the possibility of a contest.

There are debates in the Hungarian public life about whether the present multi-candidate election system is adequate for a system regarded as politically uniform.

According to one viewpoint which can be considered conservative, the mandatory multi-candidate nomination is not well-thought out and laden with internal tensions, since the one-party political system automatically rules out a scenario of contesting candidates. This view holds that in order to eliminate the contradiction it is necessary to step back and to put an end to the multi-candidate nomination, the representatives have to think in the framework of the national unity, which must not be disrupted by the public expression of the contradictions.

Another, not less extreme opinion also holds that the reform of voting rights is not adequate for the political system of socialism. It maintains that the steps taken in 1985 do not reflect an authentic effort to carry out democratization, but only serve the system's propagandistic protection.

These extreme opinions could carry some grain of truth only if we really interpreted the party's leading role as its unwillingness to recognize other than one public approach to the problems of society. According to this interpretation, the party rules out a confrontation of different views and makes the election a platform for choosing from among persons and securing local interests instead of making it a platform for confronting interests and opinions.

However, the whole unfolding of the 1985 elections shows that some worries are not totally without justification. In approximately 60 percent of the election districts voters accepted without any modification the dual nomination of the Patriotic People's Front, that is, voting citizens did not show any desire for a contest; therefore, the election was narrowed down to a voting for one out of two persons. This was also demonstrated by the close election results.

In the rural election districts, the alternatives mostly took the form of competing among settlements or of promises to "better" represent local interests.

In Budapest and in some rural election districts, however, certain differences in social and political views appeared, too. The apparatuses showed a perceptible aversion to and disagreement with these. Occasionally, they used administrative measures to prevent representatives of these political differences from becoming candidates, and not only when these views were anti-socialist.

The party's leading role interpreted as excluding other views is best suited by a referendum-style election. It was by no accident that such election systems developed in all countries of people's democracy in the 1950's. It is beyond doubt, that this type of election also carried some features of control by the society since it made explicit and formally institutionalized the dependence of representation on the society. However, the feature of power control could prevail only to a small extent because the internal, centralized selective mechanism of the people's front-type election, operated primarily by the apparatus level, practically always came up with a predetermined result: the personality and political profile of the preselected candidate of a certain election district fused into the current political course, and the act of election did not focus on the individual, the public person representing a personal political profile and specific interests, but on the current political constellation. The citizens took this election system for what it was, there was no possibility for voting down [the candidate], and, naturally, the usual hundred percent results were not the proof of real political support. Therefore, in the present stage of development, it has become obvious that this former form of election has grown hollow and formal by losing its social value.

The making of multi-candidate nomination mandatory combined with the possibility of nomination by the citizens brings a radically new element into the election system. It poses a challenge toward the methods of administrative preparations and renders the controlling function of society more efficient. In an indirect way, it also lays the foundation for the power controlling feature of the election by making it possible that persons performing political functions—if they wish to run—be judged and elected on the basis of their public and political performance, individual qualities, and political values. The chance of this possibility becoming reality depends primarily on the public political life, and the 1985 elections definitely brought this controlling function to surface. Although the results were influenced by many local circumstances, independent of the political assessment of the candidates (such as the expression of discontent due to certain local conflicts, the negative opinion of the movement in the case of trade unions, the spontaneous support thrown behind the candidate having less chance, the intensified appearance of local interests, etc.), it became clear that conservative-type leaders who tend to permanently create conflicts with their environment and political personalities who have not found the adequate means of making local politics have difficulties in standing the test of publicity.

The working of the controlling function is indicated primarily by the big differences in the number of votes, in spite of the fact that results may be influenced by subjective factors, like the public opinion's proneness to generalization, its unreasonable emotional motivations and its inclination to be manipulated, the unsatisfactory level of publicity, and others. Thus, an election system built more consistently on the principle of electing political values, necessarily presupposes greater political publicity and programs offering visible political alternatives. At the same time, a competitive electoral system can also lead to a scenario in which those performing political functions do not undertake "being weighed" by the multi-candidate nomination; consequently, the representation system will have a larger proportion of laymen and less political influence.

As it can be seen, the electoral rights and the election of representatives are a very important part of the reformative revival of the political system. Their well-thought out further development may mean a new step in the direction of the altogether desirable increase of the political weight of the people's representation, even if we can see that the electoral reform measures—apart from playing a positive role—bring to surface undoubtedly significant contradictions. Therefore, the experiences of the 1985 elections have to be taken into consideration partly in the further development of the whole political system, and partly in the formation of the elections and electoral rights.

The present article's main proposition is the analysis of the latter, raising those possible legal and regulatory

solutions which can enhance the democratism of nomination and through that, the significance of social publicity and civic participation. The rethinking of the nomination system and the problems of the national list—in spite of the seemingly overwhelming majority of the suggestions concerning regulation techniques—can help form a new composition of the representation and develop a richer and more colorful, institutionalized expression of the relationships of the interests of society.

The electoral system was reformed in Hungary in 1970 and 1983. These reforms were aimed to enhance the voting possibilities of electors and to step beyond the "referendum-like" style of the elections, which could be historically justified, but had lost its function.

The referendum-type election—as we have referred to it—developed in 1949-1950, when voting for parties ceased and the only political organization to enter the election was the Patriotic People's Front. The elector citizen could vote for or against the People's Front and had no other alternative. In this respect, the switch from fixed lists [of candidates] to individual election districts (in the case of the election of council members in 1954, of National Assembly representatives in 1966) had no significance at all, since the single-candidate nomination offered no alternative in either case.

This situation was hardly changed by a modification, according to which, in 1953, the People's Front's nomination right was complemented with the right of citizens' groups to make recommendations and to agree. Until the elections in 1971, the meaning of elections was the demonstration for or against the political system, while in the meantime, with the foundation of socialism, the appearance of the internal contradictions grown on the ground of socialism, and the restoration of capitalist social system becoming impossible this meaning had gradually become hollow and lost its function. Besides the role of the political referendum, the role of National Assembly representatives strengthened—with all the negative and positive effects—in lobbying for local interests, but it did not give any possibility to choose from among candidates.

These were the precedents of the acceptance of the first electoral reform law, law III of 1970, which enacted three provisions bringing about significant changes.

With the maintenance (but without the exclusivity) of the Patriotic People's Front right of recommendation, so-called nomination conventions of citizens were charged to nominate candidates (to determine who can be given valid votes). This measure—as it will be explained later—further strengthened the representatives' bonding with regional interests and voting citizens.

The law ordered that the members of county councils be elected indirectly, by local councils. The aim of this measure was the expression and coordination of local interests on the county level. The cause of why this

remained only an intent, I believe, has to be looked for not in the method of the election, but in the scarce role representative organizations play in decisionmaking.

With the law coming in force, a political position was taken to increase the number of election districts with two or more candidates. In fact, the decision was not implemented, as in 1970 there were only 49, in 1975 there were 34 and in 1980 there were 15 multi-candidate election districts out of the total of 352 election districts.

Therefore, the 1983 law III took further reform measures, two of which had especially determinant importance: it made the multi-candidate nomination list mandatory in every district and created the so-called national list.

The following analysis examines the reform measures of the two electoral provisions of law primarily in connection with the nomination. This time, the effect of these provisions was measured only on representatives\*; special research concerning the election of members of councils (for example, the election of presidents of council, need for county lists, etc.) was not conducted.

(Footnote) (The basis of my conclusions of the experiences of the mandatory multi-candidate nomination was the national survey conducted about the election of representatives by the Institution of Social Sciences of the MSZMP KB [Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party].)

#### **Preliminary Thoughts About the Effect of Representation of Regional Interests on Elections**

The place of residence is only the scene but not the basis of the representation system based on parties in bourgeois societies. The interests of residential areas at the most only add shades to the interests and opinions expressed by the parties, but do not determine those. Thus, when elections in Hungary were built on the residential principle and there was no more party representation behind the elections, a new situation was created. In this situation, the representative elected by residential areas can bring the interests of those areas to the surface and can confront those with the interests of other residential areas.

This is sensed clearly not only by the regional social organizations and by citizens, but also by representatives, when they see their primary task in today's Hungary as the lobbying for regional interests.

The 1985 elections of National Assembly representatives also prove that citizens continue to expect their representative to fight for local interests. The contradictions and endeavors born around the nomination clearly indicate this fact. Both the local apparatus managing the

elections and the citizens look for a candidate who carries weight and influence in public life, so his interference can be expected to help solve the problems of the residential area.

Experiences show that electors regard as success the nomination of a public figure of great influence. They especially welcome such a representative if he has a connection with the region; either he was born there or has already proven his willingness to help in some way. It is no accident that since 1970, simultaneously with the strengthening of local interests, central measures have been applied to restrict the nomination of ministers and other officers of the central power, because the growth of their number—and there is such a tendency—is not favorable from the point of view of the representative organizations.

This is the reason why the so-called spontaneous candidates, that is, those not nominated by the People's Front, were considered mostly where the candidates of the People's Front were workers or employees without official influence. In these cases citizens nearly always suggested even new candidates, and quite often, even the local social organizations searched for persons of greater prestige and capacity for more effective "influence-peddling."

Election experiences show that this is the point where the "statistical" approach clashes with local endeavors. The central and county organs try to protect the composition of the National Assembly against the spontaneous nomination of party and state officials, even at the expense of the withdrawal from elections of candidates from the apparatus.

This kind of fight for regional interests took place particularly in the rural election districts consisting of several settlements. Frequently, when no common denominator was found with a candidate enjoying central influence and, therefore, a leader or resident of one of the settlements was recommended, the rest of the settlements tried to nominate their own candidates. Arguments like "our cooperative president will make just as good a representative as the neighboring village's cooperative president" could often be heard. Some settlements chose not to nominate another candidate for tactical reasons, because it would have divided the votes of the settlement and thus strengthen the position of the other settlement's candidate.

This open manifestation of local regional interests is the motivation behind the steady growth of the number of party member representatives in the National Assembly, in spite of the fact that the central party organs made it public also in 1985 that their intents were different and, with the help of the county organs, tried to protect—unsuccessfully—their intents, at some places even with administrative means.

The tendency is shown by the statistical data which compare the data of candidates nominated by the People's Front and by the citizens. This makes clear that the candidates spontaneously nominated by citizens are older, the number of women and young people is lower, that of party members and persons with a doctor's title is higher. For example, 20 percent of the candidates nominated by the People's Front are doctors, their percentage on the voting papers is already 21 percent, and 31 percent of the representatives have the title of doctor.

The segmentation of regional interests keeps the individual profile of a representative who thinks on a national scale from materializing. This individual tone has been made superfluous by the People's Front's policy of emphasizing the national unity. Elector citizens still do not want to hear the different opinions of the election district from their representative, but they expect him to loyally "lobby" for the local interests.

The difference of approaches is also reflected by the representatives' thinking in quantities and specific investments. However, without a knowledge of the conditions, this often takes the form of irresponsible promises and fails to express differing aspirations and opinions. Thinking on a level of comprehensive social endeavors, or in other words, taking an individual approach, was difficult in 1985 also because neither the goals of the country's next 5-year plan, nor the plans of regional development had been elaborated by the time of the elections. Candidates mostly could not demonstrate their specific stance toward the plans.

The close results of the elections clearly reflect the content of regional representation. More than half of the mandated representatives got 50 to 55 percent of the votes, while only 5 elected representatives acquired over 80 percent of the votes.

### Preselection of Representatives

The nomination of candidates for National Assembly representatives was practically put down into the hands of the county-level political organizations, the county party officials played a decisive role in these. According to the number of the population, the number of the election districts had been at around 15 to 20 in each county for years. In making their selection, the counties adjusted to the central expectations, while on the other hand they made it possible for the organizations (first of all, party organizations, at some places larger factories) of towns and central villages of election districts to form their own opinions; these, however, could not gain significant positions.

Generally it can be concluded that in 1985, the nomination of candidates was decentralized in the sense that it was handed down by the central organs to county level. The central party and People's Front organs made recommendations only in the case of some candidates

working in national organizations. In some smaller counties there was no such nomination at all, but even in other counties there were no more than a maximum of two or three such cases. The number of the centrally nominated candidates was approximately 30 to 40 in the whole country. Conflicts between the central and local organs originated by such nominations were not significant also because the local organs themselves often looked for candidates working in central organizations. The introduction of the national list helped in reducing the number of the central nominations by relieving individual election districts from certain candidates who were nationally public figures. However, the central coordination was maintained in the nomination of the most important party, mass organization and state leaders.

All this meant that the county organs—with the influence of the organs of the election districts—made their selection of candidates enjoying considerable independence.

First they usually assessed how content the local initiating organs and citizens had been with the former representatives. Approximately one third of the former representatives were reelected. Two hundred thirteen of the former representatives ran for office again, 143 of them acquired mandate, but 70 of them were not elected in spite of their entering the race.

In the view of the counties, the exaggerated centralization was strengthened by the statistical ideas concerning the composition of the National Assembly. As it has already been mentioned, a peculiar contradiction was generated in this area.

We have to take it as natural that the political leading organizations wish to adjust the composition of the representative organizations to the real structure of society. Therefore, they try to ensure that the different social classes and strata gain proportionate representation in the representative body. Accordingly, it is natural that the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party] had previously formed its own idea about the composition of Parliament. In the given situation, the leading organs of the party took the position that it was justified to increase the number of women, young, manual workers and non-party representatives. The implementation of this idea, however, confronted with the goals of the individual election districts created in residential areas and, sometimes, with the aspirations of citizens. The social organs of the individual election districts and the citizens—as we have earlier mentioned—usually looked for representatives in an important position and having great influence. This aspiration did not necessarily converge with the ideas of the county or central offices dictated by statistical composition. The citizens of certain election districts could not understand why exactly their election district had to choose from women or manual worker candidates.

Apart from few cases, the selection of candidates was the responsibility of the counties' party apparatuses with the inclusion of the village and town organs. There had to be formed a circle suitable for the county's social structure, which strengthened county centralization against the chances of the election districts to select their candidates. The independence of the election districts in most cases was restricted to look for their candidate within the parameters determined by the county (man-woman, manual-intellectual worker, young-older, party member-non-party member). This often pitted the election districts' ideas against the counties' aspirations, since if the party and social organs of the election districts made concessions under the pressure of the county, they had to confront the electors' ideas; we will return to this at the analysis of the nomination conventions.

Contradictions of this type were strengthened by the old reflexes of the apparatus. Over decades, the party apparatus selecting the candidates had become used to make its selection alone, and most of them are not used to have political arguments about the nomination. Similar conflicts have never before arisen between the organization selecting candidates and the citizens. The county party organs could satisfy the statistical requirements and the mandatory dual nomination only if they had woman compete against woman, young against young, non-party member against non-party member, and manual worker against manual worker. This was carried out in 40 percent of the election districts. The original "parallel suggestion" was more than that, and the proportion declined because the so-called spontaneous nominations made by citizens did not take this into consideration. Moreover, the election district organs and the voting citizens often regarded the statistical aspiration as bureaucratic and unwarranted interference. Eventually, the preplanned composition of the National Assembly representatives could not be achieved. Instead of growing, the proportion of women, young, manual worker, and non-party representatives decreased.

One of the causes of the above mentioned contradiction probably was that the preparation of the nominations remained mostly on the level of the apparatus with the electors hardly included at all in the process. The majority of the electors learnt only at the nomination conventions who had been recommended as the candidate of the People's Front; neither had party members been informed about the selection process, the reasons for the decisions made and the party's views about and goals of the nomination. It also happened frequently that the elected organs of the People's Front only formally confirmed the plans made this way.

That's why the desire to make the nomination system more public is realistic. Besides the names of the candidates, electors have also to be informed about the reasons based on which the candidates had been recommended. It is also a justified aspiration that candidates be selected from a larger pool of people, since the maximum number of people considered by election

district so far has not exceeded four or five. There were counties with higher numbers, but there were some where only two persons' names were mentioned.

A typically contemporary feature of nominations is the thinking in terms of cities. This is due not only to the central role cities play in the majority of the election districts, but also to the fact that only one and a half years had passed since the elimination of districts until the elections, and cities still do not see their problems in an organic relationship with neighboring settlements. This was often expressed in the antagonism of a city and its rural surroundings, and in the increase in the number of the spontaneously nominated rural candidates.

Greater publicity may relieve the above described contradictions, but it cannot completely eliminate the differences between the viewpoints of the statistical approach and the individual election districts. For that, still other solutions have to be found.

This purpose could be well served by the expansion of the national list with names of representatives of social strata which would be at a disadvantage in the individual election districts of residential areas.

In every city where more than one representative is elected—including Budapest—it is worthwhile thinking about the introduction of a uniform city list. The essence of this idea is that cities electing more representatives should not be divided into election districts any more, but forming only one election district they would receive mandates, i.e., seats for representatives for every 30,000 inhabitants of the city. For example, in Budapest the districts would be the election districts. It would be possible to nominate more candidates than there are mandates, but, of course, citizens would elect only as many representatives as many mandates the city has got. Having such a so-called free list, the elector may be more easily convinced that, besides the multi-candidate nomination, the social composition of the city has to be reflected, too.

The free list election of representatives may also have the advantage in larger cities that, while maintaining competition (since those acquiring the highest number of votes receive the mandate) it does not set candidates against each other in twos.

However, the disadvantages of this solution must not be kept secret, either. For example, one is that the individual profile of the candidates may fade compared to the election district method, the candidates may lose their characteristics in the uniform list of the People's Front, which can lead to results contrary to the above described intents.

Therefore, in the case of the acceptance of the recommendation, the nomination procedure should be reregulated, since the possibility for citizens to be able to nominate their own candidates besides the uniform list of the People's Front has to be ensured.

### The Nomination Conventions

In the light of the 1985 election of National Assembly representatives, it is worthy examining the role nomination conventions played in 1985.

The People's Front committees usually convened two nomination conventions in each election district. There were altogether 762 nomination conventions, that is, there were 58 more conventions than the mandatory two per election district. Three, or even more conventions were organized where the number of settlements made this inevitably necessary.

After the preparation of the nominations the organs of the People's Front recommended 714 candidates to the nomination conventions. This means that the People's Front tried to nominate two and not more candidates in every election district. There were only seven election districts where the People's Front nominated three candidates. The apparatus handling the elections were motivated to nominate only two candidates by the law requiring an absolute majority to get the mandate. In the case of three candidates there is a larger possibility that no candidate acquires the mandate in the first round and thus the voting has to be repeated; they wanted to avoid this. This is proven true by the election statistics which shows that there were triple nominations in 54 election districts, and more than in half of these, in 31 election districts the voting had to be repeated. There were four districts with four candidates, and by-elections had to be held in each of them.

This contradiction could be solved in two ways. Either the law should be modified to accept relative majority as satisfactory in the first round or to rule that only the two candidates who have received the most votes should enter the second round. The complete repetition of the nomination before the second round does not seem to be justified.

The citizens who appeared at the nomination conventions voted nonconfidence for 19 of the 714 persons recommended by the People's Front, that is, 19 did not get the confidence of even one third of those present, and consequently, they did not become candidates. This means that 97 percent of the recommendations was accepted by the citizens. On the one hand, this shows that the preparation was good, on the other hand, it may hide some conformity and disinterest, too.

It is well-known that at the conventions the citizens submitted further recommendations, so-called spontaneous nominations. The exact number of these is very hard to estimate, since there were nomination conventions

where the recommended persons did not accept the nomination, and there were recommendations which received only a minimum of votes. These were left out of even the county summaries. Central statistics registered 176 candidates who were recommended by citizens at the nomination conventions, but their number is probably higher. However, only 74, that is, 39 percent of them became candidate, only this many got the necessary one third of the votes.

In summary, 66 percent of the election districts accepted the candidates of the People's Front without offering new recommendations.

The following experiences of the nomination conventions can be considered general.

The two nomination conventions held in each election district proved to be too few, and caused dissatisfaction in two typical situations.

First, where the election district consisted of several settlements, and not even in each of the larger ones had conventions. A general need was expressed to have nomination conventions at every major settlement of the election districts.

Secondly, disputes took place where also the citizens recommended "spontaneous" candidates, that is, they were not satisfied with the submitted recommendations of the People's Front, or wished to support other aspirations. In such cases there was an intensified interests in a second nomination convention, since that decided whether the so-called spontaneous candidate received the necessary votes. Sometimes it happened that the electors could not get into the room where the nomination convention took place. Several things indicate that in these cases either the supporters of a candidate occupied the rooms, or the organizing body felt it necessary to push out some groups supporting certain "spontaneous" candidates. Usually, the repetition of the nomination convention was demanded in such cases.

It has to be stressed that the word spontaneous is a little misleading, since there were usually groups behind the citizens who made the recommendation, and in the majority of the cases, generally respected public figures, mostly party members were recommended. The groups supporting spontaneous candidates were formed for different reasons and in different ways. Sometimes, the organizers themselves agreed with the new nomination; it also happened that someone made a recommendation on behalf of a working collective (especially on behalf of agricultural cooperatives); often friends made recommendations, and there were self-nominations, too, not only in the form of someone recommending himself, but suggesting a friend or acquaintance of his. In Budapest, in certain election districts, it was proven that dissidents made organized efforts to run or to support their candidates.

The non-public handling of the People's Front's recommendations was a source of problems, that is, citizens were informed about these practically only at the nomination conventions. The general experience is that citizens expect the preparation of nominations to be more public and to offer reasons for the selections made. There is also a desire for social organizations other than the People's Front, first of all, the party, to publicly form their opinions about the candidates.

Not only the electors, but professional groups also advocated the further development of the provisions of law concerning nomination. While only one People's Front candidate could be voted for, it was sufficient to put some basic rules into legal form; today, however, there is a basic need for the further development of legal guarantees. Without offering a comprehensive elaboration of the development, we have in mind the following.

—The preliminary preparational process ought to be made more public. Within the framework of the National People's Front, a so-called nomination board should be established in each parliamentary election district. In addition to the party and People's Front organizations, the representation of the larger settlements and factories in the boards ought to be ensured. Partly, this would mean the legalization—with a higher number of members—of the already existing operative election committee. The election board would be elected by the People's Front committee of the election district's center, inviting the opinion of the People's Front committees of the election district. The responsibilities of the election board could be determined as follows.

—It would be the board's task to convene and, through its representative, to conduct the nomination conventions.

—The election board would determine who received the necessary one-third of the votes to become candidates.

—After the conclusion of the nomination, the board would convert into an election committee whose major responsibility would be to determine the results of the election. This session could be open for the press, the candidates or their proxies; because the information of the public means guarantees at the determination of the election results.

In addition to the establishment of election boards, the process of the nomination conventions should be regulated more exactly. Today it is left open by the legal formulas, and this was the main cause of confrontations and disputes in every election district where the nomination conventions wanted to nominate new candidates, too.

The attendance of nomination conventions ought to be regulated. The principle to start from could be that only residents of the area belonging to the election district

should attend. In the countryside, the nomination conventions for National Assembly representatives are usually held in a certain settlement, so this rule is easy to enforce there. The principle is more difficult to implement in the cities.

The number of nomination conventions ought to be increased so that there would be nomination conventions for National Assembly representatives in every major settlement. The number of conventions in the cities should be adjusted to the local needs, but, in all events, more than the current two should be organized. In the case of council members of rural districts, the one nomination convention per election district can be maintained, but the possibility has to be given to convene more than one conventions.

The number, place and date of the conventions would be determined and announced in advance by the parliamentary election board or, in the case of council members, the election board of the settlement concerned.

Practice has proved that the public voting and the requirement of gaining one third of the votes to become a candidate provides sufficient protection against self-nominated candidates. Neither the increase, nor the decrease of this proportion is justified. The screening of self-nominated candidates could be strengthened by the public announcement of the People's Front's recommendations in advance, or by laying the foundation for the nomination of new candidates with gathering signatures and seeking the support of working collectives before the nomination convention. Consideration could be given to the suggestion that someone supported by a number of signatures determined by the law could become candidate without voting at the nomination convention. For example, a person recommended by one-third of those present at the nomination conventions or recommended in writing by a determined number of the voters (e.g., 3 or 5 percent) could become a candidate. Of course, written nominations would have significance primarily in the case of National Assembly representatives.

There is a significant number of opponents to nomination conventions in factories. Especially in big cities and in factories drawing their labor force from several settlements, nomination conventions could be attended by a large number of people who have no voting rights in the given election district. Nomination conventions held in factories also offer more possibility for abuses. That's why it is to be considered to allow the organization of election conventions, but not of nomination conventions in factories.

The nomination function of nomination conventions could be strengthened. The main responsibility of nomination conventions is to acquaint people with the nominees' programs, to conduct the discussions of the programs and to determine who the candidates are going to be. It is undesirable that speakers be sent there to give general political speeches.

Voting should remain open, but the method of counting the votes has to be determined in the provisions of electoral law.

It is reasonable to continue the practice that votes valid in an election district can be given only for candidates whose names are on the voting paper. As it is well-known, the present procedure is that voters have to strike out the name or names of those whom they are not voting for. This negative voting ought to be changed in a way that the voters should mark the name of the person they are voting for (positive attitude).

In order to increase the publicity and to strengthen the legal guarantees of elections, more frequent use should be made of the possibility to have an organization independent of the organization managing the election process decide in election-related complaints. Thus, in several cases, the decision-making could be left to the courts of law, like in the case of preparing the elector's list. Such a case can also be, for instance, the ruling in debates about the lawful organization of nomination conventions.

In summary, the introduction of the mandatory multi-candidate nomination can be regarded as an important step, though one which will provoke attacks. The further analysis of the experiences of the elections of National Assembly representatives, and the taking of a political stance in the questions raised, can substantially contribute to the reformative renewal of our political system.

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## POLAND

**Jerzy Urban's Press Conference of 12 Jan 88**  
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[Transcript of Jerzy Urban's press conference with foreign and domestic journalists in Warsaw on 12 January]

[Text] Jerzy Urban's press conference on 12 January was dominated by issues connected with the visit to Poland by FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Here is the transcript of this conference:

Urban: Minister Genscher's visit has reached the half-way mark, and at this moment the third round of his talks with Minister Orzechowski is taking place. Talks with Jozef Czyrek and Mieczyslaw Rakowski will be held today, and with Wojciech Jaruzelski tomorrow. We feel that this visit goes beyond bilateral relations because Polish-FRG relations have a Europe-wide significance. International issues, especially disarmament, control over armaments, and bilateral political, economic, and cultural relations, have been discussed. Each side has demonstrated obvious political resolve to search for progress in mutual relations. That is why I am somewhat optimistic about the visit's outcome.

Yesterday the Polish authorities asked Jan Amberg, second secretary of the Swedish Embassy, to leave Poland because of activities that are incompatible with his diplomatic status.

At my previous conference I promised to provide data on our oil stocks, which are now an urgent economic problem. Our difficulties in supplying engine oil have been caused primarily by the fact that demand has outstripped supply. In 1987 the refining of oil was 11 percent lower than in 1980, but the number of motor vehicles increased 70 percent within this period. The 11-percent drop in oil products and the 70-percent increase in motor vehicles are reason enough for the present difficulties. These difficulties continue to be reduced by the rationing of gasoline, but diesel oil is not rationed. In addition to automobiles and tractors, the number of combines, farm and construction machines, and other types of equipment using gasoline or diesel oil has also increased. Because of payment difficulties, our oil purchases in free currency markets have decreased, but deliveries of Soviet oil continue reach us in line with the long-term accord. Last year our Soviet partner delivered us not only the contracted oil, but also an additional 50,000 tonnes of crude oil from the supplies contracted for this year, which means that our 1988 oil resources will be lower.

Although last year the amount of oil products was larger than in 1986, we had supply difficulties because bad weather and severe frost were chiefly responsible for increases in oil consumption. Because oil supplies were irregular, people began to buy up oil and hoard it. Expected price hikes accelerated this hoarding and, as a result, our oil stocks went down drastically. To avoid a breakdown in supplies, a number of measures were taken, including the appropriation of reserve convertible currency to import an additional 60,000 tonnes of oil. This was why oil supplies in the fourth quarter of 1987 were 7 percent higher than in the last quarter of 1986. This increase included a 46-percent increase in oil for private consumers, which was a very high increase. The tight supply situation was thus alleviated, but we were unable to rebuild our oil stocks and to balance the market. This year's oil supplies will be as in 1987, and this means that much greater economies will have to be made.

This situation has produced many misunderstandings, some of which were publicized in the West. Our television has explained the issue of trains, but the Western mass media reported that enormous numbers of trains had to be withdrawn because of an oil shortage. This was not true. Of course, railroad oil stocks went down, but they have been partially built up again. Compared with all the trains we run, only a small number of trains were withdrawn. An oil shortage was only one reason for this, as each winter we withdraw a number of trains because of reduced numbers of passengers. Timetables always announced this in advance. Transportation economies

and oil savings were also responsible for withdrawing some trains. But there was nothing dramatic and drastic in this measure, as the media have reported.

The laying off of river boats was also caused by factors other than an oil shortage, although the press asserted that the stoppage of navigation on the Odra river was caused by the shortage of oil. Inland navigation is seasonal. Freight boats are moored in winter or undergo overhauls. But this winter is such that, unexpectedly, river navigation is possible and some boats have resumed plying their routes. I am supplying you with such great details in order to rectify the incorrect reports in the press. River navigation is slowly getting into its stride, but it may die out if the weather changes.

But let us return to the poll that was discussed by the BBC and THE WASHINGTON POST. In it, over 73 percent of the respondents expressed their confidence in General Jaruzelski or, to be more exact, answered yes to the question: Does Wojciech Jaruzelski's activity serve society well and coincide with state interests? This figure cannot confirm, as THE WASHINGTON POST says it does, the stance of "Solidarity" whereby Jaruzelski does not have enough social support to effectively carry out changes to the PPR economy.

Finally, an assessment of the government. Another question asked whether the activity of the government and Premier Messner serves society well and coincides with state interests. In the opinion of AP, French radio, the Voice of America, and the British GUARDIAN, 80 percent said no, in other words they said that this activity does not serve society well and does not coincide with its interests. That is what these mass media reported. But in fact, 63.1 percent said yes to this question, in other words that this activity does serve society well and does coincide with society's interests. This figure includes those who said "definitely yes" and those who said "yes, rather."

Views are quite simply different, but it is dishonest to describe them as unanimously and overwhelmingly unfavorable.

Finally, French radio, commenting on this poll, said: "The poll reveals that the average Pole thinks Z44,000 a month is a respectable salary." This implies that anything less than Z44,000 is not respectable. In fact, people said that about Z44,000 per person permits a comfortable life without problems, so this is a completely different category of thinking. French radio said that average wages are only Z18,000 per month. But I tell you that the average wage in Poland is around Z30,000. What French radio quoted is the average monthly income divided among everyone in a family, including children.

Following this conduct on the part of Western mass media, people in Poland now doubt whether it is a good idea to publish the results of opinion polls if they are used in a biased way to color the convictions of Poles.

This is also an attempt to influence moods in Poland, because people tend to associate themselves with the majority. My reply to this is that, for us, openness is such a strong principle that I would sooner bore you with long polemics on how the results of polls are manipulated in order to show how everything in Poland is collapsing, than have Poland discontinue the publication of opinion polls. So you can continue to "steal" from undercover party officials the results that have been distributed to editors.

Peter Johnsson, GOETEBORGS POSTEN: Could you present some specific accusations against Mr Amberg, second secretary in the Swedish Embassy, that have resulted in yesterday's decision to expel him?

Urban: I can only say generally that his activity harmed Poland's security interests. It is not the custom to present details in public. Sweden does not do so either.

Irena Czekierska, REUTER: Poland's decision to expel the Swedish diplomat is bound to be seen as revenge for the similar decision by Sweden to expel a Polish diplomat last December. Could you comment?

Urban: I cannot confirm this.

John Daniszewski, AP: Several weeks ago you promised to give us news about Konrad Morawiecki, as it happens. We have still not had any, so I would like you to confirm what we are receiving from opposition sources, namely that Mr Morawiecki has been refused the right to receive parcels from his family.

Urban: All I can say is that investigations are drawing to a close and it will be possible to announce their results shortly. But you would have to ask the administration at his place of detention whether or not he is receiving parcels. A government spokesman does not have such detailed knowledge.

Herbert Straeten, NEUE RUHR ZEITUNG: You have expressed optimism as far as Mr Genscher's talks in Warsaw are concerned. I would like to know what this optimism is based on. Is it based on the economic talks, or on political aspects, or on the general assessment of the climate?

Urban: At the present stage of the visit, the optimism is based on the general assessment of the climate and on the frankness of the talks, not on any concrete results.

Gulio Gelibert, ANSA: Could you comment on the Italian press interview with Aleksander Dubcek about the situation in 1968, especially about the Warsaw Pact attack in which Poland also took part?

Urban: I have no reason to comment on an interview given by a Czechoslovak citizen to the Italian press. I object to the term "attack."

Gemma Aizpitartheheriz, EFE "Flash Press": I want to know what are the feelings and possibilities of action of a government in which, according to the ODRÓDZENIE [REBIRTH] journal, 63.8 percent of the Polish population has no confidence.

Urban: The government's feelings are, of course, proportional to the degree of confidence and lack of confidence in it, but feelings alone are not the most important matter. The government attitude toward this constantly changing information about what the public thinks about it is generally as follows: We are trying to increase confidence in us, and will continue to do so. This confidence is necessary, even essential, in order to have increased support for the radical reforms that are very important for Poland's future and which the government initiated and whose second stage it has begun to implement.

Christopher Bobinski, FINANCIAL TIMES: One should expect the OPZZ to reject the government's prices and incomes proposal soon. What government reaction should one expect?

Urban: When the OPZZ issues its opinion, the government will examine it very carefully and then work out its stance toward it. You are forestalling events by far. You are foreseeing the OPZZ stance and asking for the government's reaction to a hypothetical OPZZ stance. I do not think any other government spokesman, including your British spokesman, would give you a better answer to a question like that.

Gulio Gelibert: Seeing that you do not want to comment about the interview by Mr Dubcek, I would like to ask about the Polish authorities' present stance 20 years after the attack on Czechoslovakia. How do the Polish authorities view this matter right now?

Urban: I repeat, I object to the word "attack." This also partly expresses our stance. However, the entire problem refers to matters that are distant in the past, and I see no reason to adopt a more concrete stance on events that belong to history.

Stanislaw Shtukatorov, APN: I would like to ask you a more general question, but one that I think is more pertinent today. In 3 days' time, 2 years will have elapsed since Mikhail Gorbachev, the CPSU Central Committee general secretary, addressed a declaration to all the world's states and governments in which he set out a program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Do you think that over the last 2 years hopes have increased that this initiative will be realized, and how do you see Poland's role in this process in the new year?

Urban: We welcomed the plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons 2 years ago, and our satisfaction was accompanied by the hope that it would mark a new beginning in disarmament efforts. In addition, this hope

was based on the belief that the goals contained in the plan accord with the wishes of the international community and, of course, those of Poles. But, first and foremost, we believed and we still believe that the plan provides an opportunity to improve security on our continent and to improve Poland's security, and that it can create a more favorable external environment for our economic, social, and political plans, because their successful implementation depends on detente.

Over the last 2 years the idea contained in Gorbachev's plan has retained its vitality and has exercised a favorable and, moreover, concrete influence on disarmament dialogue. Three factors or events enhanced the plan's importance. First, the Reykjavik summit led to the acceptance of the very idea of the elimination of nuclear weapons as a point of reference and as the goal of various stages in Soviet-American disarmament moves. Second, there is the Washington treaty on the elimination of medium- and short-range missiles. This was the first concrete step toward the realization of the program outlined 2 years ago. Third, the program has won many supporters in both East and West, and among the non-aligned states. It has also inspired many new proposals that accord with the concept of the program and enhance its content. We were always realists in our assessment of the possibility that Mikhail Gorbachev's idea would be realized. We are aware that the overcoming, so to speak, of further stages in disarmament plans is connected with the overcoming of mistrust, suspicion, and, psychologically, the idea of impossibility. In addition, the resistance provided by the subject matter itself, in the form of the complex technical problems that have to be solved, must be overcome. However, we believe in the irreversibility of the disarmament process that was initiated by the Washington treaty. In the West there is no lack of forces who openly advocate maintenance of the nuclear deterrent—this is one of the obstacles that has to be overcome. We believe that a stronger feeling of security ought to stem from effective negotiations, and not from the acquisition of more weapons. We associate the development of the disarmament process with a 50-percent reduction in the size of the strategic arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States; keeping within the limits set by the ABM treaty; a ban on nuclear tests; the elimination of chemical tests; and a reduction in conventional capacity and the number of tactical nuclear weapons.

Poland does not intend to play the role of a passive observer with respect to these events. Our national security interests and rich traditions in the field of disarmament efforts are the reasons for our active involvement in this process. We support Gorbachev's ideas and the efforts of the Soviet Union. Besides, together with the other states that belong to our alliance, we are conducting coordinated political and diplomatic actions. We are making our contribution to this process; the Jaruzelski Plan, which is growing in importance in the international debate, is but one example. It is arousing more and more interest, and we are doing everything

possible to make its content an integral part of the creation of a new set of military realities in Europe, including the freeing of our continent from nuclear weapons. Poland is actively involved in the Vienna negotiations, in which 23 states are participants, aimed at producing a mandate designed to reduce armed forces and achieve equilibrium in Europe with regard to conventional forces. Our voice is important in this respect, because our armed forces, in the conventional sense, are the second largest in the Warsaw Pact. We are taking part in the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Poland is actively involved in the formulation of a joint concept concerning disarmament for the Warsaw Pact. We are also conducting an active bilateral dialogue with various states on disarmament and security questions. An example of this are our current talks with the FRG Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Gunter Brozio, SAABRUCKER ZEITUNG: Why have the talks with Mr Genscher dealt solely with the climate surrounding relations so far and not with concrete matters?

Urban: Very concrete matters are being discussed during the talks. However, as the talks are still in progress, this is not the time to describe their actual content. Thus, I am talking about the atmosphere attending the talks, because that is the one element of the talks that I can inform you about at the present time. You would have to ask some more detailed questions before I could say whether I can satisfy your curiosity.

Gunter Brozio: To be more specific, I would like to know about economic issues, the debt question, the preservation of investment projects, as well as the expulsions, and the question of place names.

Urban: Economic issues are under discussion. The Polish side has expressed a desire to expand economic relations and normalize the principles on which they are based. The West German side has not avoided such issues. However, so far there have been no detailed talks on, for example, an agreement concerning investment, that is, conditions for investment. The talks were not that detailed. I do not know what you meant by expulsions. I do not know what this means in your political vocabulary. I think you must mean those FRG citizens who at one time lived on what is now Polish soil and left during the war, or were resettled immediately after it. This subject was not discussed during the talks, and there is no reason why it should be. The question of place names: It arises in connection with various issues during the course of detailed negotiations concerning the provisions of certain agreements. Currently, four agreements between Poland and the FRG are being discussed. The agreements concern: investment in Poland, the protection of the environment, consular representations in Krakow and in Hamburg, and matters relating to scientific and technical cooperation. The actual provisions of these agreements are not being discussed at the ministerial level, at least not at this stage.

Richard Kiessler, DER SPIEGEL: Mr Minister, how do you view the fact that today, for the first time, a West German politician has laid a wreath on the graves of German soldiers who were killed during World War I?

Urban: It is true that this ceremony was not part of the official program, but our attitude toward the wreath-laying ceremony is one of respect and understanding.

Wolfgang Storz, BADISCHE ZEITUNG: Mr Minister, what is your assessment of the state of negotiations concerning the four agreements that you mentioned: Have they reached the final stage or will it be a long time before they are actually signed?

Urban: I do not know how I should answer this question, because the negotiations are at various stages. Perhaps toward the end of Mr Genscher's visit we will get some idea of the rate at which progress is being made or when these matters will be finalized, or perhaps some declaration will be issued. At any rate, I am pleased that I have somehow managed to encourage my FRG colleagues to ask questions.

Hans Fullbrunn, WESTFALISCHE RUNDSCHAU: Mr Minister, how do you view the second occasion on which Foreign Minister Genscher laid a wreath, that is, on the grave of the murdered priest Father Popieluszko?

Urban: That was part of the private program. However, it is something of a ritual that has been adopted by all the countries that belong to NATO. We get the impression that is the duty of every NATO politician to make gestures of this kind; it seems to have become obligatory. This does not concern us, because it is a private matter. How should one describe the matter? It is the grave of a priest who was a murder victim. Thus, the visits paid by Western politicians to his grave can be interpreted in various ways, depending on the significance that they attach to such visits, whether it is of humanitarian or of political significance.

#### **Long-Term Political Change Based on Role of Individual**

*26000036a Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY  
in Polish No 42, 18 Oct 87 p 3*

[Article by Marcin Krol: "Short-Term, Long-Term"]

[Text] I believe that a substantial proportion of the political differences in Poland derive from the variety of categories in which we think about the present and the future.

We can distinguish the shortterm, a month, three months, a year, at most three years and the longterm, let's say 20 years and the utopian, revolutionary term, not measurable in terms of historical time, because it is designated by the eventual achievement of the utopia, a realization that usually recedes systematically into the future.

Recently there has been a decisive retreat from utopian, revolutionary categories; thus, it is not worth criticizing them, although we must remain aware of the presence of their intellectual and practical consequences. The most important of them is the fact that thinking which has lost its utopian base usually succumbs to an extreme pragmatism, submits to the pressures of immediate problems, and wholly limits itself to the short-term. This observation applies not only to post-marxist utopias but also to some versions of liberal utopias and to the civilization-national utopias of the post-colonial countries, which are hard to name.

This is most visible in political thinking and actions, although it is also visible in economic decisions and education. All those who think that something in this world can be resolved, settled with one decision, one change in the legal system, one wave of arrests, one coup, or one reform are thinking and acting in categories of the short-term, and in my belief condemn themselves to failure.

Edmund Osmanczyk commented correctly on long-term thinking (for example, 20 years) in TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY (No 37/38). In his article, 20 years was a concrete political proposal. Since the general thesis of this proposal is dear to me, I would like to pursue the reflections on its political, philosophical setting somewhat further. One can live within long-term categories only under certain circumstances. Conditions for both public and private life must be met. Thinking in long-term categories derives from the conservative, liberal tradition in politics and from the Christian tradition in morality. However, the subject of such thought, the only real thing is the individual.

Thinking in long-term categories begins with private life, from the simplest things, from the reactions to our customs, from what we are accustomed to, from what we value not because understanding commands us to but because we have inherited it or have systematically learned spiritual responses directly associated with reliable values. Tocqueville noted that the law and custom are guarantees of freedom. I will return to the law in a moment, but customs belong to a sphere which is much less subject to decisions and management from above, or rather positive management, for destruction is easy, as examples from the occupation show.

The sphere of customs (I am thinking of the European cultures) today is subject to erosion (mass society, secularization, excessive consumption, etc.) in spite of the fact that western societies have not experienced so many attacks on the elementary spiritual and moral reactions of the individual as our society has. In brief, Stalinism and the egalitarian, utopian vision; Gomulka's period, the little stabilization and flashes of nationalism; Gierek, simulated modernization, corruption, and the revelation of vain attitudes; the August era and martial law, the awakening of civic attitudes and their transfer to the symbolic realm.

Finally, inevitably and naturally, the recent past has brought the dominance of apathy and passivity over any forms of personal commitment. There remains one motivation, to be sure, not the worst, although surely an insufficient one, money. It is not worth debating the negative effects of these changes and particular trends in customs. Instead we should emphasize strongly that the very quantity of these breaks had to produce a twilight in the realm of customs. All of us, if we do not hold a particularly privileged place in society, are subject to at least some degree to the process of adaptation to our encompassing reality. A person can change his views once, a very costly process, but after four or five breaks, he becomes an apathetic being who will no longer believe anything or trust anyone. The few fortunate ones thanks to their upbringing, strength of will or luck of circumstances surrounded by their close ones and the same objects found themselves on the periphery and maintained their elementary spiritual reactions, or they did not feel the effects of the social and economic changes of the last 40 years.

The others, the decided majority of Polish society, however, regardless of their general views, whether they were pro-government or in opposition had to a greater or lesser degree to lose out under the pressure of the successive breaks and successive efforts to adapt. Probably the priests know this the best, although faith is the only stable, unidirectional factor in the internal life of the individual in Poland. Thus, the rebuilding of thinking in long-term categories in Poland must begin with guaranteeing continuity and a sense of security, of a conviction that no break will force successive changes in orientation in customs. Such guarantees must apply to property and upbringing, civic freedoms and individual freedoms, relative financial stability and, what is probably most important, people must be free from successive forms of pressure requiring adaptation to further changes in the system.

These guarantees, then as else where, must be legal ones but also political ones, which is obviously much more difficult. Not because, or not just because the politicians in Poland are burdened by the successive waves of loss of confidence in those governing us in the postwar period, but because the short-term categories seem to dominate in their thinking, which causes the realm of customs, which in my opinion is crucial, to elude their vision or they think that much can be done in this realm through decisions and essentially illusory codifications (the pupils' code, the teachers' charter, the builders' charter, or the family code) or through equally ineffective committees, councils, etc.

These are dangerous illusions, for the realm of custom does not tolerate intervention well. It is much better to give a guarantee of peace and to leave it in peace. But this requires the courage to think in long-term categories. Instituting laws and the function of the law are simpler problems inasmuch as they operate in the realm of the rational and not just in that of tradition. I realize that I

am not entirely right since there is the problem of natural versus positive law and that the weight of tradition is not void of significance even in the realm of law, but let us recognize for the purposes of these remarks that it primarily a question of rationality. Then the law in Poland is always set in terms of the shortterm.

First, either legal regulations are created to deal with immediate problems (speculation, increased juvenile delinquency, social parasites, etc), or, second, the law is so general that in social life not the law but the current interpretative regulations and the political commentaries are significant (passports, associations, etc.). It is good that recently there has been a observable liberalization, but the law is just the same, in other words it practically does not exist. A state that observes the law is undoubtedly essential, but what does this phrase mean when the law is the result of current, at times real, immediate social problems? I am afraid that not much, for there is no transfer of the deduced regulations into the realm of custom. The absolute record in this respect belongs to areas like tax and customs policy. Everyone knows how damaging the effects of the constant, incompressible changes are; in this area it is easiest to measure these effects, but what good is this since stabilization is no where to be seen? We are living in an era of crisis and inflation, thus of constant changes, and regulations adapting to these changes must aggravate the crisis.

The only hope is a radical change of perspective which, however, requires an equally radical change of attitude, a legislative practice that always takes into account the long-term. This seems impossible without a division in principle and in fact of the executive from the legislative authorities. The more critical the economic situation is, the more intensely the executive searches for immediate solutions and the greater the danger to independent, long-term action by the legislative authorities. Is this possible in the Poland of today? Edmund Osmanczyk says it is. I do not know whether it is possible, but I do know that it is necessary, for the domination of policy limited to the short-term categories can lead to nothing good. Why is it so hard to think in long-term categories in Poland since both the governing and the governed, as well as the great powers, believe the situation is stable? The charge of thinking in short-term categories also applies to those in the civic opposition (Osmanczyk's phrase), but in this case the charge is inaccurate inasmuch as the opposition is condemned to reacting to the authorities actions and cannot undertake, promote independent initiatives, which would have even the most minor chance of implementation.

Whoever then in Poland participates in politics is condemned to shortterm categories. The exception of the church is genuinely an exception for the church in the sense of execution does not participate in politics. The question then which one must ask, if one wants to participate in public life intelligently, is: How to prevent having short-term categories imposed on oneself?

To this question there is not one good answer, for in political life in general, there are no ready answers that are always correct. There are, however, a few conditions, which if met, would facilitate holding firmly to the long-term approach. The first is the organic representation of existing communities. This can be a small group but one that actually exists. Whoever appears in public life alone is automatically condemned to depending only on himself and, regardless of wisdom or honesty, to depending on categories of an individual life, thus in short-term categories. Representation of abstractions like youth, the nation, or the working class are not helpful in the least.

The second is the rejection of all Enlightenment, marxist utopias. I know that today even the official exegesis of marxism pushes the utopia of the communist society aside (withering of the state, money, etc.) and thus I mention the Enlightenment utopias or, simplifying, the belief that rational regulations and decrees can quickly bring radical advancement in the quality of social life. This postulate is addressed primarily to the governing but also to many of us governed who also believe that social and economic life can be decreed that some reform can produce rapid results, that one can "overtake" organic changes, dream up, solve, take care of something—definitively.

The third is acceptance by the governing and the opposition of the relative permanence of the existing social relationships. Nothing lasts forever, but conscious or unconscious, open or hidden hope by the governing that the opposition either will come over to their side or collapse is an illusion and it has fatal consequences for it forces them to regard the opposition as a temporary, transient phenomenon and not as a participant in public life. In turn the opposition in such a situation thinks about the current state as transitory and rarely seems to view the high probability of the permanence of the current state.

The fourth condition is the most important in the sense that if it is not met it is difficult to implement the preceding conditions. The individuals participating in public life must have certain guarantees (there cannot be absolute ones) that negative judgments of the results of this participation by the governing will not have any influence on the public situation of the group which the individual represents. In other words public life cannot be organized around punishments and rewards. Meeting the above conditions will permit thinking in public life in longterm categories; this is meeting the postulates of democratization. We always rejoice with each liberalization (who would not rejoice), but liberalization is something other, please forgive the banality, than democratization.

Democratization is not so much openly interpreted principles and regulations of the existing, unchanged system as it is an improvement of that system that causes the participants in public life to know that they can move

within a framework of stable, open regulations. I think that in spite of the non-existence of full democracy, that a system of incomplete democracy based on stable rules of play can bring much good. For as we well know after periods of liberalization there are opposed periods, and as long as we do not have a sense of stable rules of play, we all, governing and governed, will be condemned to thinking in short-term categories, to a feeling of living in a transition period, constantly passing, a sense inimical to intellectual, social, and economic life.

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### **Journalist Association on Media Role in Pushing Reform**

26000040c Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
5 Oct 87 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Journalists in the Stream of Progressive Changes"]

[Text] On Saturday, 3 October 1987, the newly elected board of the Association of Journalists of the Polish People's Republic met with Polish and foreign journalists at the Interpress Press Center.

Briefly summarizing the Second Congress of the Association which ended a day earlier, Artur Howzan, the president of the Executive Board, announced the results of the elections for the Association's new officers. This aspect of the congress aroused the journalists' particular interest, for later they asked about the course of the voting, the distribution of the votes, the number of candidates for the presidency of the Executive Board. In answering, A. Howzan emphasized that he was not the only candidate. The opposing candidate, editor Wojciech Krasucki of PERSPEKTYWY who participated in the press conference, was later elected deputy president.

In answering a question from the reporter for RZECZPOSPOLITA about the conditions that must be met for the press, radio, and television to become the avant-garde in social, economic, and political change in Poland and about the role the Association has to play in this process, the president of the Executive Board said, among other things: "Polish journalists are facing a fairly difficult period. It will be a period of effort directed toward raising the quality of their work. We must and we should take on the burden of everything that is most difficult in actualizing progressive changes. We must even at times proceed ahead of the orchestra, fight with conservatism. The times demand more rapid advancement and progressive Polish journalists should keep pace with it." For Polish journalists to actually perform this role, A. Howzan continued, "they should have behind them a significantly stronger organization than heretofore. This means it must have definite rights. In particular, we want for the Association to be an organization that defends the interests of the entire community, of the individual editorial offices and individual journalists.

We would also want for the Association to have influence on the creation of new journals, the liquidation of existing ones, for it at least to have influence on filling the position of editor-in-chief. We would want for the Association to find its proper place in the overall system setting information policy in Poland. I think, that during the coming term in office the Association's officers should observe the following slogan: "nothing about us without us."

Further questions touched, among other things, on the question of socialist pluralism (Renate Marsch, DPA) in relation to the journalistic community, and specifically: why can second journalist organization not be formed? In answering this question, president A. Howzan emphasized that the largest organization of Polish journalists in history, which the present Association is (8,500 members and candidates), was not formed in a vacuum nor on barren soil. It is the inheritor of all the traditions of Polish journalism, leftist and liberal. The decided majority of the current Association and the previous Association of Polish Journalists consists of the same journalists. It is their organization. And no one has the right to assert personal rights to it. The Association of Journalists of the Polish People's Republic does not have the right to decide whether to form another journalist organization.

Marian Podkowinski, the honorary president of the Association, added: that there is a place in the Association for every journalist. But never in the history of Polish journalism have all of the active members of the profession belonged to the journalist organization. Not all belonged to the Association of Polish Journalists, and then no one paid attention to this. It is more important who writes and how they write, how they will write. The last question: will the president of the Executive Board remain the editor-in-chief of PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY? (Krzysztof Bobinski, FINANCIAL TIMES) "Yes," answered A. Howzan, adding that he would be very sad to leave the editorial office, which he loves.

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### **PZPR Voivodship Plenums Held, Reported**

#### **Olsztyn Focus on Housing**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
14 Sep 87 p 2

[Article by (wodz): "Above All, Build; Plenary Session of the Olsztyn Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Excerpts] For this year, on the initiative of the Executive Board of the Olsztyn Voivodship PZPR Committee, the voivodship plan stipulates the target of releasing for occupancy 3,709 dwellings in multifamily construction as well as 1,000 single-family houses.

To explore the feasibility of these tasks, the party investigated construction sites. Its investigation warranted stating that the plan for socialized housing construction will be fulfilled.

Those present responded with especially great applause to the speech by Engineer Czeslaw Rosinski of the Olsztyn Rural Construction Design Office. He discussed the formidable barriers to the application of his cement-conserving ideas. Only the resolute support of the party and the economic authorities demolished the official barriers and made it possible to build houses according to his method. Even now 40 such projects are under construction — projects saving 31 percent of concrete and 28.5 percent of steel. On the average, cement consumption per dwelling will be reduced by 500 kg.

Such instances of efficient operation are many here.

In his summation of the discussion First Secretary of the Olsztyn Voivodship PZPR Committee Tadeusz Jelski declared, "These definite accomplishments do not satisfy the party and the population, because the waiting period for apartments is still too long. That is why we must act more aggressively in our party organizations so as to influence the volume and quality of construction.

#### **POP Role Critically Assessed; Civic Volunteer Efforts Noted**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
18 Sep 87 p 2

[Articles by Ewa Jasinska and Tadeusz Wiacek: "Plenary Sessions of the Voivodship PZPR Committees: Plock—The Party's Authority Derives from the POP's; Kielce — Together, Meaning Efficiently"]

[Excerpts] Plock. "We all know what we want to achieve, but we don't always know how," declared First Secretary of the Plock Voivodship PZPR Committee Adam Bartosiak, on opening the plenary deliberations of the Voivodship Committee at its field session at the PETROCHEMIA Plant. The main topic of the session, which was attended by, among others, Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Baryla, was the tasks and role of the POP's [basic party organizations] in the life of the party and their communities.

The plenary discussion was highly specific. This time there were few declarations of the "should" kind made. From the plenary podium fell the names of specific organizations and comrades, both those who understand well and implement party policy and those who have so far accomplished little.

"The POP must be not only the forward but the strongest frontline of the party," declared PZPR Voivodship Committee Secretary Wieslaw Paszkiewicz. "The place at which rationales have to be hammered out is the party meeting, and this is the case at 80 percent of the basic party organizations. For example, the initiatives offered

by the POP's at Leg, Cieszew, and Drobin Gmina succeeded in stimulating the entire local rural communities and have produced tangible effects in the form of the expansion of schools and of the house of the teacher, and construction of roads."

Considerable attention was devoted in the plenary deliberations to winning over young people to the party. Although 130 ZSMP [Union of Socialist Polish Youth] clubs have the power of recommending their members for membership in the PZPR, only a few avail themselves of this privilege. And characteristically it is the same people who do it, over and over, in general. Among others the party echelons at Kutno, Sierpiec, and Piatek Gmina can be proud of their good work with youth.

Zdzislaw Palczynski, a farmer from Piatek, described the cooperation between his POP and the local ZSMP club, which has borne fruit in, for example, the joint construction of the OSP [Volunteer Fire Brigade] firehouse and the admission to the party of five persons recommended by the ZSMP club.

Wojciech Kuzminski, first secretary of the plant party committee at PETROCHEMIA, discussed the opportunities ensuing to basic and branch party organizations from their power to grant recommendations for particular posts. Not all these organizations as yet avail themselves of this privilege, but slowly it is becoming a practice, one of the ways of gaining in authority.

During the discussion it was declared that we would not gain in authority by closing our eyes to abuses and waiting until the NIK [Supreme Chamber of Control] or the IRCh [Worker-Peasant Inspection Teams] relieve us of them.

The voivodship party organization resolved to relieve basic party organizations of superfluous paperwork in reporting. The flow of information is to occur via people and not via paperwork.

Replying to many of the comments, toward the end of the session, Jozef Baryla stressed that it is precisely the plenary session that is an element of renewal. At no previous plenary session have so many details been specified and names named.

In Kielce deliberated the joint plenary session of the PZPR and ZSL [United Peasant Party] voivodship committees. Both these voivodship echelons considered this time problems relating to the development of initiative and community projects.

In this respect the Kielce region has a rich tradition. The voivodship ranks third in Poland in the number of community projects accomplished. During the 1984-1986 period alone construction worth 6.4 billion zlotys was carried out by releasing for use, among other things,

9 schools, 7 houses of culture, 22 firehouses, 38 rural watersupply systems, more than 170 km of hard-surfaced roads, and 17 health centers.

It is expected that this year the worth of community projects in Kielec Voivodship will reach nearly 3.2 billion zlotys. Among other projects, the construction of 11 gas pipelines, 41 schools, 6 health centers, and 33 water supply systems, is being continued.

In the discussion, attention was drawn to the vast differences in the extent of community projects in discrete cities and gminas. It was therefore recommended that PZPR organizations and ZSL clubs, while stimulating public initiative, pay greater attention to the coordination of efforts, so that the combination of the state's investment resources with community enthusiasm would be optimally utilized.

During the session the directions of development of community projects for the 1988-1990 period were considered.

The discussants pointed to the substantial rise in the cost of investments in community projects during the last few years. Moreover, only 30 percent of these projects are linked to clean-up or repair operations, proper maintenance of roads, passageways, public areas, parks, and greenery. It was pointed out that sometimes experts from enterprises are recruited for simple construction operations which could be done more cheaply otherwise.

The joint plenary session stipulated tasks for the members of both parties and their echelons in implementing the socioeconomic targets for the period until 1990.

Participating in the deliberations of the plenary session were Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee Zbigniew Michalek and Chairman of the Main Audit Commission under the ZSL Supreme Committee Mieczyslaw Grabek. The session was chaired by Secretary of the PZPR Voivodship Committee Jan Maciejewski and Chairman of the ZSL Voivodship Committee Stefan Gut.

#### **Comments on POP Passivity**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
21 Sep 87 p 3

[Article by Jerzy Nogiec: "Plenary Session of the Voivodship PZPR Committee in Gorzow Wielkopolski"]

[Text] Gorzow Wielkopolski. The secretary of the rural party organization of Lubiszyn, Mikolaj Byk, declared during the discussion that the image of the party is the image of its basic elements. On the other hand, less attention is being paid to the fact that many party organizations, especially the smaller ones, lack what is

termed "breakthrough power" and complain that their recommendations and advice are not being followed. This discourages party members and causes POP's to be passive.

Other comrades too made comments of a similar nature during the session, on pointing to, among other things, the "frequent absenteeism" of plant managers at meetings of plant party organizations and the leaving of smaller and weaker party organizations to their fate.

It was also observed that party resolutions are not being implemented in certain sectors of the economy. This especially concerns construction, where the annual plan was fulfilled only 38 percent during the first 8 months of the year.

In his report and comments First Secretary of the Voivodship PZPR Committee Wiktor Kinecki also touched upon an issue that has for some time been agitating public opinion, namely, the controversy about the possibilities for the storage of the weakly radioactive wastes of nuclear power plants in the old bunkers of the so-called Miedzyrzec Fortified Region and the replacement of apartments for persons holding important posts in Gorzow, an issue raised by POLITYKA.

As for the storage of these wastes, it was deemed necessary to conduct throughout the voivodship party organization a broad explanatory campaign, because the attendant controversy ensues from deficient information and misconceptions. As regards the replacement of apartments, it ensues from the comments by Comrade Kinecki that no aspect of this matter infringes upon legal norms in force. Currently this question is being investigated by another commission on behalf of the Central Union of Housing Construction Cooperatives and definite conclusions can be inferred only after its findings are known.

#### **Poor Membership Numbers Noted**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
21 Sep 87 p 3

[Article by Jerzy Koziol: "An Activist Organization Attracts Members; Plenary Session of the Tarbno Brzeg Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Text] Tarnobrzeg. Improvements in the activity of basic party organizations and strengthening their role and authority in the social life of factory workforces and the urban and rural population were the topics of discussion of the plenary field session of the PZPR Voivodship Committee in Nowa Deba.

The deliberations were chaired by First Secretary of the Voivodship Committee Janusz Basiak. The working part of the session was preceded by the ceremony of awarding party cards to 20 PZPR candidate members from Nowa Deba and surrounding villages.

In Tarnobrzeg Voivodship the current membership of the PZPR is about 30,500, or 17 percent of the workforce in the socialized sector of the voivodship. For several years the number of candidate members has been rising; in 1986, 1,052 were admitted, while this year so far nearly 800 were admitted by the end of August. This is incontrovertible proof of the fairly effective work of the basic party elements, although unfortunately not all the 1,714 basic and branch party organizations active in this voivodship can boast of an increase in their membership.

Hence also party committees should thoroughly analyze the performance of the basic party organizations which in the last 2 years have not admitted even one new member, it was resolved at the plenary session.

Open party meetings already are a tried and tested form of popularizing the party's policy and winning working people over to it.

But while party organizations at enterprises have won some authority for themselves, rural party organizations, which generally are numerically smaller, continue to operate under difficult conditions.

"The incompetence or unreliability of agricultural service organizations undermines the trust of the rural population in the party," declared First Secretary of the Baranow Sandomierski City-Gmina PZPR Committee Jan Reczer.

The changes occurring in the operating system of enterprises have also entailed considerable changes in the forms and methods of work of their party organizations. A distinctive quadrangle of plant democracy has evolved: the management-the trade union-worker self-government-party organization. Within this system the POP should operate as the inspirer and coordinator.

Concluding its deliberations, the plenary session adopted a plan for implementing the tasks ensuing from the resolution of the Fourth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee.

#### **Consultations, Brigades Discussed**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
22 Sep 87 p 3

[Article by Czeslaw Kubasik: "The Reform Offers Opportunities—How To Exploit Them; Plenum of the Wroclaw Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Text] Wroclaw. Current tasks of party work were the topic of a plenary session of the Wroclaw Voivodship PZPR Committee on 21 September. We asked representatives of the city-gmina and worker community their views on the activities of their party echelons and organizations with respect to the tasks formulated for the voivodship party echelon.

First Secretary of the Oborniki City-Gmina PZPR Committee Wieslaw Rucinski commented:

"In view of the developing self-government at enterprises and in the countryside we try to act so as to be always present among party and nonparty members and disseminate among them our objectives and specific tasks. We give no orders to basic party organizations without prior talks and discussions. For example, we have recently had problems at an agricultural circles' cooperative which performed poorly and was threatened by bankruptcy. Following talks with the party members active on the council and governing board of that cooperative, we have been jointly drawing up a program for its economic recovery. This is no simple matter, because of the particular interests of farmers who desire no changes in the amount of fees charged for the services rendered by that cooperative."

Krzysztof Lubanski, a representative of the workforce of the Wroclaw Heat and Power Station and a member of the executive board of the Voivodship PZPR Committee, raised the housing issue.

"It is time to put an end to the bureaucratic approach of officials with respect to plants and factories desiring to expand construction on "sealed" [war-devastated] sites. At present it takes years to be assigned construction sites, and thereupon there arise many other obstacles. Young people, and not only those, would also like to engage in private home building, and they should not be hindered by formalist obstacles which most often are strewn on their path by officials who are either ignorant of their competences or do not desire to know them."

Discussing the tasks for the voivodship party echelon, its first secretary Zdzislaw Balicki declared that, among other things, positive changes in the structure of the voivodship's industry are occurring; in the first 8 months of this year its output increased by 6 percent compared with a like period last year. The voivodship party echelon shall continue to promote the growth of the enterprises producing modern means of technology, those operating profitably, and those producing popular consumer goods, and also those producing for the needs of agriculture.

"Partner brigades are being formed too slowly at enterprises. There are few organizational and management changes. There still are too many deputy directors and supervisors and deputy supervisors," stated Z. Balicki.

#### **Reform Efforts, Membership Noted**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
23 Sep 87 p 2

[Article by Jan Kraszewski: "No Waiting for the Ready and the Matured; Plenum of the Sieradz Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Excerpts]. Sieradz. In the Sieradz Voivodship operate 1,171 basic party organizations with a combined total of more than 25,000 members and candidate members.

Nearly 70 percent of these organizations operate in the countryside, with farmers accounting for 36.7 percent of the membership. The smallest numbers of party members are in the health services, education, communal economy, and construction.

Such in brief are characteristics of the voivodship's party organization whose committee held on 22 September a plenary session to discuss the tasks of basic party organizations (POP's) in implementing the principal socio-political objectives within their communities. The performance of the POP's was evaluated in an extensive report of the executive board presented by Voivodship Committee Secretary Klemens Jozefowicz.

"We must eliminate the make-believe actions and conservative attitudes of some party members," Jan Matusiak of SIRA Plant declared. "The success of the second stage of the economic reform hinges on our common commitment. But I believe that this alone is not enough, because not all of us are properly prepared for this task. We must first become thoroughly familiar with the principles of the reform in order to lead in its implementation. The system of party training should be adapted to this goal."

"It is often said that we should admit to the party the best workers, individuals with an irreproachable attitude. This is a great oversimplification," said Ryszard Kmiecik, first secretary of the plant party committee at the ZWOLTEX Plant. "We are forgetting the party's educational function; there is nothing simpler than handing a party card to a mature and formed person, whereas it is much more difficult to educate a person and help him in his personal growth."

The plenum, chaired by First Secretary of the Sieradz Voivodship PZPR Committee Janusz Urbaniak, adopted a resolution defining the tasks of the voivodship party organization and containing recommendations addressed to central institutions.

#### **Personal Initiatives Hailed**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
25 Sep 87 p 4

[Article by Czeslaw Kubasik: "No More Passivity and Waiting for Ready-Made Prescriptions; Plenum of the Legnica Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Text] Legnica. With the participation of Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Baryla and Vice Chairman of the CKKR [Central Party Control and Audit Commission] Jerzy Wilk, the voivodship party echelon in Legnica discussed on 24 September the tasks ensuing from the resolutions of the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum. Its deliberations were chaired by First Secretary of the Legnica Voivodship PZPR Committee Henryk Nowak.

The siting of the plenum in a mining community, at the RUDNA Mining Plants, the broader participation of aktiv, and the specific nature of the formulations contained in the report of the executive board and in the discussion, all demonstrate an understanding of the intents contained precisely in the resolution of the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum. The language of communication with party members is changing and the problems posed are specific and relate to particular individuals and communities. This may best be demonstrated in the following passages from the report by Secretary of the Legnica Voivodship PZPR Committee Piotr Czaja:

"Let me ask the Director of the Voivodship Road Engineering Operations Enterprise Comrade Trychubowski: when will you complete the access road in the direction of Lubin? Was it necessary for the executive board of the party city committee to remind you that the deadline for completing the viaduct on Waszkiewicz Street on Legnica had elapsed on 30 August? If you cannot manage on your own, cooperate with the party organization, which demands it urgently."

"We attempt to promote party initiatives without waiting for guidelines from the central bodies or the voivodship. We realize that ways of strengthening the party's position differ in different communities, and we try to act so as to reach both party and nonparty members. We are consistently resolving issues important to the local workforces by, among other things, codeciding on the staffing of executive posts, caring for a good organization and improved discipline of labor, and also caring for just wages and improved housing and social conditions. As the need arises we prod the laggards and bestow deserved praise on the leaders. I was told this by the first secretaries of PZPR committees from the Legnica Machinery and Tractor Station and the Kunice State Farm, comrades Henryk Kujawa and Tadeusz Ocieblowski."

"I believe that 80 percent of the success of an enterprise hinges on the proper work and activities of the broad plant aktiv. For the implementation of the second stage of the economic reform requires integrating all the social forces. We railroaders are hampered by centralism, which does not permit a proper structuring of wages. This also complicates pursuing a proper personnel policy—capable and ambitious individuals belonging to our personnel pool increasingly often refuse to accept managerial posts." This was confided by First Secretary of the PZPR Plant Committee at the Legnica-Milkowice PKP [Polish State Railroads] Hub Herzy Garbolinski.

"During the intermission I asked Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Henryk Baryla to share his reflections on this plenum. He said that this is yet another plenary voivodship party committee meeting at which the tasks following the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum are being discussed in a specific and critical manner. It is precisely such a perception of the aspects of our life that is consonant with the spirit of

renewal. In mobilizing the society to undertake new tasks the party is not alone—one proof is that the plenum today is being attended not only by the chairperson of the voivodship PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth] but also by representatives of the leadership of the ZSL [United Peasant Party] and the ZSD. It is also pleasing that young people are taking the floor in this specifics-oriented discussion—people who, as can be seen from their critical comments, are proactive within their communities. The progress and future of Poland will depend on them.

### Rural Self-Management Advocated

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
26-27 Sep 87 p 3

[Articles by Czeslaw Kubasik, Alicja Zagorska, and Ryszard Wolak: "Plenary Deliberations of PZPR Voivodship Committees: Walbrzych—Self-Government is Most-and Best-Suited; Suwalki—Proactivism Should Not Be Sought in Resolutions Alone; Zamosc—So That the Reform Be Applied More Rapidly"]

[Excerpts] Rural Self-Management Advocated

Walbrzych. The joint plenary session of the PZPR and ZSL [United Peasant Party] voivodship echelons in Walbrzych on 25 September discussed the tasks of the members of the two allied parties in people's councils, trade unions, and rural self-governments, as well as in the further spurring of proactivism throughout the Walbrzych Voivodship countryside.

Stanislaw Grzesiak, a member of the presidium of the ZSL Voivodship Committee and chairman of the ZSL Main Committee, commented that there exist possibilities for spurring the proactivism of farmers in production and in sociopolitical life. One prerequisite is participation in all forms of self-government and focusing on young and ambitious persons who have taken over parental farms and are attaining good results. As for industry, it must provide the countryside with more farming machinery. Further, the problems in acquiring fertilizers and building materials should be resolved.

"This is the third plenary session in a row to be held within a relatively brief period of time jointly with the Voivodship ZSL Committee. Twice before we had jointly identified economic tasks. Now we are extending this scope to the entire domain of self-government, which is decisive to further progress in agriculture. By acting jointly and, let me add, on the basis of the experience so far, we can successfully resolve such issues of the countryside of the Walbrzych region as the growth of livestock output, storage and warehousing facilities, a more consistent implementation of the so-called montane resolution, and the promotion of cultural literacy and culture," declared Secretary of the Walbrzych Voivodship PZPR Committee Jerzy Krzywda.

The plenum, which was attended by Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Zbigniew Michalek and Secretary of the ZSL Supreme Committee Kazimierz Kozub, was chaired by Secretary of the Walbrzych Voivodship PZPR Committee Jozef Nowak.

### POP Rural Achievements Noted

Suwalki. Wladyslaw Baranowski, POP secretary at Gruszki Village, Plaska Gmina, who had participated in the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum, illustrated the question of whether the party organization is propagating the resolutions of that plenum within its community by citing examples of measures initiated by his local POP: road repair, the construction of a [bus?] stop, and a reading lounge — that is, improvements in rural living conditions without looking to the authorities.

"This," he declared, "unites the community best and effectively builds the authority of the party in the countryside. But that authority is not gained once and for all; it has to be continually strengthened in response to the negative occurrences of quotidian life."

Barriers to the proactivism of rural POP's were discussed by Piotr Tymofiejski, director of the Wegorzewo Regional Center for Party Work. The party in the countryside is not shielded by the desks of officialdom. The members of the rural POP's are the first to suffer the blows of quotidian life. It is precisely the rural POP's that should attract the special attention of party echelons. Such positive experiences are not difficult to identify in Suwalki Voivodship.

Providing a good example is a better starting point, it was stated at the plenum, than posing questions of what should be done. This is one of the most effective ways of overcoming formalism and lack of initiative.

Much room in the discussion was devoted to the substantive and organizational quality of party meetings. They should become a broad platform for explanatory work and for uniting people and winning their trust. A party meeting which omits discussion of the implementation of resolutions and recommendations and focuses exclusively on the presentation of reports is not very useful.

The participants in the plenum did not draft a prescription for making party organizations more proactive, because no such prescription exists. One thing, however, is certain: wherever the party organizations are close to people and their quotidian affairs and do not merely make declarations about them, there answering the question of how to act more effectively and efficiently is easy.

The plenary deliberations were chaired by Waldemar Bertyga, first secretary of the Suwalki Voivodship PZPR Committee.

### Reform Implementation Needed

Zamosc. The Zamosc Voivodship PZPR Committee held a plenary session at the Zamosc Furniture Factories — the largest industrial enterprise of the voivodship — on 25 September with the object of assessing the quantitative changes and improvements in efficiency in the voivodship's economy in the light of the implementation of the resolution of the Third Central Committee Plenum. The deliberations were chaired by First Secretary of the Zamosc Voivodship PZPR Committee Marian Wysocki.

“Think Wisely and Act Efficiently — This is the Essence of the Second Stage of the Economic Reform.” This slogan, inscribed in large letters and posted in the conference room, was the guiding thought of the several hours of discussion during the plenum. It was stressed that, although many positive changes have occurred in the economy during the initial period of the reform, it was not possible to achieve a sufficient economic equilibrium and there still continue major shortages of goods on the retail market as well as shortages of producer goods. The progress in streamlining management is unsatisfactory.

However, a number of positive changes has been recorded in the economy of Zamosc Voivodship, this being largely due to the consistent implementation of the resolutions of the Third Central Committee Plenum by the voivodship party organization, the plant party committee, and the basic party elements.

It was stressed in the discussion that this year's harvest was efficiently completed despite the difficult attendant conditions of the simultaneous harvesting of many kinds of grain and rape. By 10 September the procurements reached 165,000 metric tons of grain and about 20,000 metric tons of rape. The decline in the area under sugar beets was halted. A greater area was sown with intensive kinds of grain, and new farming technologies are increasingly often applied.

Most of the discussants did not confine themselves to reporting on the performance of their enterprises but also tried to identify the causes of unfavorable occurrences and, above all, answer the question of what should be done in order to accelerate the application of the reform so that it would affect positively the living conditions of working people.

### Poor Productivity Assailed

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
29 Sep 87 p 4

[Article by Wladyslaw Bielski: “By Name and Surname: Joint Plenum of the Biala Podlaska Voivodship PZPR Committee and the Voivodship PZPR Control and Audit Commission”]

[Text] “This has never before happened.... Names and surnames are mentioned.” Such was a comment heard in the conference room with regard to a report presented at

the plenary session of the Biala Podlaska Voivodship PZPR Committee and Voivodship PZPR Control and Audit Commission (held on 28 September).

The plenary session was also attended by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Baryla, Vice Chairman of the CKKR [Central Party Control and Audit Commission] Jerzy Wilk, and Director of the Letters and Inspections Office under the PZPR Central Committee Marian Kot.

The discussion focused on subjective causes of difficulties in the region's economic and social development. That is, it touched upon what depends specifically on individuals, with precisely names and surnames being mentioned.

For while during the first 8 months of this year only 39 percent of the planned amount of housing construction (one-third less than in the last year) in Biala Podlaska Voivodship was released for occupancy, at the same time paid idle time on construction sites increased by a factor of as much as 14 compared with the previous year owing to stoppages while wages in construction increased by 18.5 percent. “What did the directors of construction enterprises say to it?”—and here the names and surnames of five persons were mentioned.

Another example: at the Debrowa Wola SKR [Agricultural Circles' Cooperative] each tractor operated 1,226 hours, at the Zalesie SKR each tractor operated only 524 hours, for example. The question must be raised: who is responsible for the poor organization of labor at Zalesie?

This also applies to bakeries. Why is it that for example, in Miedzyrzec Podlaski the bakeries of the PSS [General Consumers' Cooperative] operate at 177-percent capacity while the bakeries of the GS [Gmina Cooperative] in the same town utilize only 61 percent of their capacity?

A large number of such questions, concerning the causes of disproportions, has been asked at the plenary session. They were linked to the complaints from urban and rural inhabitants to the voivodship's party echelons, as well as to the results of intensified inspections. The party—this time the voivodship party echelon—has assumed the duty of inspiring activities promoting the elimination of abuses. This is a hugely difficult task, because first a distinction has to be made between objective and subjective causes. For example, why is it that at the Jablon RSP (Agricultural Producer Cooperative) the grain harvest amounted to 41 quintals per hectare while at the Wagnanka RSP it amounted to 21 quintals per hectare? Is that due to poorer soil at Wagnanka, or is the principal reason the fact that the soil in Wagnanka had not been limed for 2 years?

Agriculture is dominant in the economy of Biala Podlaska Province. The progress in production is reflected in that, among other things, procurements of agricultural products in this voivodship have been growing at a faster

rate than in the country as a whole; in the years 1980-1986 this voivodship has advanced from the 37th to the 31st place in its overall indicator of living conditions and living standards of the population.

This makes all the more crucial the question of exploiting every potential to accelerate changes to the better. "The party cannot be indifferent to the performance of individuals, especially those holding executive offices," said Kazimierz Doroszek of Sosnowka. "Pressure must be exerted on poor producers" (Stanislaw Rapa, Biala Podlaska Voivode). "The requirements toward executive personnel should be tightened and the importance of internal control enhanced" (Stanislaw Domanski).

In the discussion reference was made to the second stage of the reform when, upon a thorough restructuring of the economy, the initiative, qualifications, and resourcefulness of individuals will be the decisive factor. This topic was mentioned by Jozef Baryla when pointing to the growing role of the party, and especially of basic party elements, in the application of the reform. That application should consist in a more resolute inference of party consequences [penalties] with regard to manifestations of poor organization or make-believe work.

The fact that the party is calling a spade a spade—Jozef Baryla stressed—that it names names and identifies those responsible for particular matters, is nothing other than an obligation to infer constructive recommendations from criticism, with the object of improving what hinges on the human element.

### **Members, Aktiv Tasks Increased**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
1 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Henryk Keller: "The Distinction Between Aktiv and Members Reflects an Incomplete Utilization of the Party's Forces: Plenary Session of the Poznan Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Excerpts] "A total of 1,192 plant party organizations operate at the enterprises of Poznan Voivodship. They associate more than one-half of the voivodship's total PZPR membership and candidate membership; the core of these basic party organizations consists of blue-collar workers. This is a tremendous human potential that is only partially tapped as regards effectively influencing the processes in the economy."

This statement, contained in the report of the Executive Board of the Voivodship PZPR Committee to the plenary session of 28 September in Poznan, sums up most tersely the nature of the party discussions both during the stage of preparations for that plenum at 16 consultation meetings in boroughs, large plants, and gminas, and in the course of hours-long deliberations which were also attended by a 100-member group of secretaries of the voivodship's plant and basic party organizations.

Also participating in the plenary session, which was chaired by First Secretary of the Poznan Voivodship PZPR Committee Edward Lukasik, were Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Baryla, Candidate Member of the Politburo Gabriela Rembisz, and Prof Adam Lopatka, chairman of the Supreme Court and delegate of the Poznan party organization to the 10th PZPR Congress.

The plenary session evaluated party work and defined the role of tasks of basic PZPR organizations following the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum.

The broad range of problems discussed during both plenary deliberations and the sessions of seven taskforces reflected the discussion currently ongoing throughout the party and at the same time it confirmed the rising and responsible tasks of all PZPR members. Much attention was devoted to the tasks of strengthening the party's forces and its qualitative and quantitative growth. Against this background, the implementation by the basic party organizations of their statutory powers and control obligations was critically assessed.

Among the problems whose solution by the activists of basic party organization is important to enhancing the party's authority at enterprises, mention was made of the problem of personnel policy and of the monitoring functions of basic party organizations in that respect.

Following the presentation of reports on discussions within taskforces, the floor was taken by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Baryla.

In his address, Jozef Baryla stressed that both the preparations for the plenary deliberations and their course as well as the discussions within taskforces confirm the political maturity of the Poznan aktiv rallied round the voivodship PZPR echelon. In addition, they demonstrate the greatness and responsibility of the tasks facing the entire party organization of Poznan Voivodship and all its members.

Although there was a tangible increase in party membership during the first half of 1987 and, this being especially gratifying, it is precisely young people who account for a large proportion of new members, too small a percentage of these had been recommended by youth organizations.

Discussing the problem of personnel policy, J. Baryla stressed the need for a more consistent utilization by the basic party organizations of their statutory powers in that respect. This is also linked to the proper treatment of the personnel pool at enterprises.

Sensitivity to any and every individual problem and action to rally honest and conscientious individuals, civic-minded nonparty members, PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth] activists, and mass organizations round the tasks of the party concern not

just magnifying the effects of social action but, what is more important, winning over to the party new allies in coping with the so greatly difficult tasks for the present and for the future.

#### **Construction Plans Not Fulfilled**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
2 Oct 87 p 3

[Article by Edward Filipczyk: "How to Overcome the Barriers to Construction; Plenary Session of the Opole Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Text] Opole. "The point is not to gab and gripe but, above all, that we jointly define more precisely the ways of maximally fulfilling the plans for housing construction," declared First Secretary of the Opole Voivodship PZPR Committee Eugeniusz Mroz in his prefatory address to the plenary session of the Committee in Opole. This time the session is devoted to one of the most difficult and socially extremely sensitive problem: the fulfillment of the voivodship plan for housing construction and for the social and technical infrastructure.

The plenary session was preceded by thorough preparations. Fifty experts and activists in the construction sector were asked for opinions and recommendations. Voivodship PZPR Committee members also toured many construction sites in Opole region and talked on the spot with investors and builders.

On the whole, however, the fulfillment of the Committee's 1983 resolution on the social and economic conditions for the development of housing construction in the region during the 1983-1990 period was critically assessed at the plenary session. For example, the drafting of detailed plans for the build-up of cities and gminas is too slow, land for construction sites is not used and developed on schedule, construction blueprints are incomplete, and the coordination of investment processes is inadequate. It was found that labor productivity is declining and the discipline and organization of labor are deteriorating at some enterprises.

The reminder was offered that planned construction targets for 1986 were underfulfilled, and the fulfillment of this year's and 5-year voivodship plans in this important domain is imperiled.

#### **Party Interventions, Results Noted**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
6 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Ryszard Wolak: "Effective Interventions Needed; Plenary Session of the Lublin Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Text] The manner in which party members take part in resolving the problems contained in letters, grievances, and signals from working people was the main topic of the plenary session of the Lublin Voivodship PZPR

Committee which was held under the chairmanship of First Secretary of the PZPR Committee Andrzej Szpringer on 5 October. Participating in the deliberations was Marian Kot, director of the Letters and Inspections Office of the PZPR Central Committee.

Reference was made to the 1984 resolution of the Lublin Voivodship PZPR Committee, and the course of the deliberations confirmed that, although definite progress has been made in the efficient and thorough resolution of the grievances of citizens, not all the points of that resolution are being fully implemented.

The problems contained in the letters and complaints addressed to party organizations and echelons point to domains of socioeconomic life to which special attention should be devoted. They include: housing construction, which only minimally meets the growing needs; renovation of housing, which also does not keep step with the demand; and the provision of producer goods, including building materials and coal, to agriculture.

The "Position" taken by the Voivodship Committee toward the end of the deliberations stresses that even more importance should be attached to resolving the grievances of citizens by, among other things, expanding the practice of receiving petitioners at their workplaces and homes by members of the leadership of the voivodship party echelon and the Voivodship Office.

#### **Agricultural Modernization Needed**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
6 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Zbigniew Wrobel: "We Need a Productive and Modern Agriculture; Plenary Session of the Elblag Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Text] The production potential of the agriculture of Elblag Voivodship is high and ranks it in the fifth place in Poland with respect to, e.g., soil quality. Its considerable food-industry potential and human and land resources make this region a major food producer for the nation, as was stated during discussion at the plenary session of the Elblag Voivodship PZPR Committee on 6 October. The session was chaired by First Secretary of the Elblag Voivodship PZPR Committee Boleslaw Smagala.

The assessment of the development of agriculture and of the tasks yet to be accomplished in implementing the resolutions of the 10th PZPR Congress and the Sixth Voivodship Reports-Elections Conference were preceded at the session by a quarterly report on the status of the voivodship's agriculture in all of its sectors and fields, prepared by members of the voivodship party echelon following their study of 16 gminas.

It was stressed during the deliberations that Elblag agriculture has progressed markedly in the production of grain, rape, pork, and marketable output. Positive trends

in the development and growth of the hog and sheep population became consolidated. However, the overall increase is not quite satisfactory: the positive trends continue to be accompanied by negative ones, such as the uncontrolled decline in the cattle population and the marked decrease in the area planted with sugar beets.

Many state and private farms harvest as much as 6 tons of grain or 60 tons of sugar beets per hectare, but others, operating under identical conditions, harvest only half as much or even less.

Our actions should thus be intended to attain desirable cohesiveness and reduce the span of variations in the yield of Elblag farms, it was stated.

The recommendations offered during the discussion with respect to modernizing and streamlining the output of Elblag agriculture were contained in the resolution adopted at the end of the deliberations.

#### **'Belchatow' Plant Problems Noted**

26000044 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
8 Oct 87 p 2

["In Piotrkow Trybunalski"—PAP report]

[Text] In 1988 as many as 12 turbine-boiler units should be operating at the BELCHATOW Mining and Power Generating Plant. The construction of this project, commenced in 1975, involves many complex problems. These and the prospects of the BELCHATOW Project were discussed by the Executive Board of the voivodship PZPR committee in Piotrkow Trybunalski in the presence of Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Planning Commission under the Council of Ministers Manfred Gorywoda.

#### **Gdansk Shipyards Host Plenum**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
8 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Zbigniew Wrobel: "Plenary Session of the Gdansk Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Text] We are aware that the conditions of public life require exploring new forms of work of the basic party elements, because action has to be different in the presence of the radical reforming of the economy.

Production relations nowadays are different, and the possibilities for the participation of working people in governing processes and in democratized political life are richer, as stated during the discussion by members of the plenum of the Gdansk Voivodship PZPR Committee which deliberated on 7 October with the participation of Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Baryla and under the chairmanship of Candidate Member of the Politburo and First Secretary of the Gdansk Voivodship PZPR Committee Stanislaw Bejger.

During its field session in the Conference Room of the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk the voivodship PZPR committee resolved to discuss in detail the actual and desirable role of basic party organizations in plants, factories, and urban and rural communities, in connection with the resolutions of the Fourth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee.

Stagnation and routine are our adversaries and lead to apathy, bureaucracy, and, ultimately, inconsistency of action. We cannot afford this. Perceiving the problems sharply, party members do not tolerate lackadaisicalness and stagnant situations and want positive changes, the participants in the discussion declared.

Not everyone favors us in our work with deeds or views, but everyone expects of the basic party elements in factories that they attend to the affairs most important to the enterprise and courageously confront difficult problems and initiate their solution, declared Wlodzimierz Kamrowski, first secretary of the basic party organization at TRANSROL in Pruszcz Gdanski.

The development of the Gdansk voivodship party organization, which at present has a membership of more than 70,000, largely depends on the style of work with candidate members and recent members. The main principle of that work is shaping the ideological attitudes of candidate members and the accomplishment of individual party tasks, emphasized Alfred Raclawski, first secretary of the basic party organization in Milobadz.

Taking the floor, Jozef Baryla stressed, "The country and party face great events—the application of the second stage of the economic reform, the reorganization of the central state and economic agencies, refinements of organizational structures, and nationwide job certification." J. Baryla further stated, "These are great and truly revolutionary changes initiated in this country and we desire to accomplish most of them within the present year. This is a great opportunity to us. For these changes will affect substantially further stabilization of life in this country and civilizational progress. In order to attain the designated goals, the party must be ready to tackle these matters and to rally round itself its natural allies, non-party members, and the broadest circles of the society."

Jozef Baryla continued, "In directing the process of these transformations the party is transforming itself. Great tasks require a great mobilization of the party's efforts and resources. These problems lay in the focus of attention of the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum. That also is why we are taking so many comprehensive and longterm measures to strengthen the importance and position of basic party organizations. It is symbolic that the deliberations of the Gdansk voivodship party committee on this topic are taking place at the Lenin Shipyard, a great industrial plant whose successful development is largely dependent on the proactivism of the basic party organizations operating in it."

### Reform 'From Top' Inconsequential

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
12 Oct 87 p 5

[Articles by Zbigniew Kopec and Henryk Keller: "Plenary Sessions of [Chelm and Leszno] Voivodship PZPR Committees"]

[Excerpts]

#### The Burden of Party Work Rests on Basic Party Organizations

Chelm. As the democratization of political life and the reforming of the economy continue, the burden of party work shifts downward to the basic party elements. It is they that create the first and broadest front of the party's activity, as stated on 10 October at the plenary session of the Chelm Voivodship PZPR Committee dealing with the place and role of basic party organizations in the party and in the community in the light of resolutions of the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum. The session was attended by more than 100 first secretaries of basic party organizations and representatives of youth organizations.

Polls and an evaluation of the status of the voivodship party organization conducted before that plenary session revealed that the Chelm party organization made progress in many domains of political and economic activity. At many basic party organizations, however, the possibilities for influencing the community were assessed critically. This pointed to a growing discrepancy between possibilities and the tasks stipulated in the resolutions. The multiplicity of these tasks and the deficient skills for implementing them under local conditions in accordance with needs and possibilities, prompt a feeling of impotence instead of spurring proactivism.

Zdzislaw Popek of the Chelm Cement Plant declared, "We did not accomplish much last year other than making declarations. Only now the concrete shape of implementation of the second stage of the economic reform is being outlined. We all are impressed by the decisions taken at the Fifth PZPR Central Committee Plenum. They should be now calmly analyzed. The changes at the central level will not of themselves automatically result in improvements locally here. We must all join in these measures and enlist the participation of nonparty members."

The plenary session adopted a resolution defining more precisely the tasks of propagating greater proactivism among basic party organizations, strengthening their primacy and autonomy, and overcoming the still persisting moods of apathy and passivity among certain party members.

#### No Defense for Construction Delays

Leszno. Is a successful finale to housing construction in Leszno Voivodship possible? We asked this question in a TRYBUNA LUDU article (23 Septempter) when comparing the implementation of housing construction plans with the actual situation on Leszno construction sites. And at the time we did not have an affirmative answer.

At present, already in the second decade of October, the plenary session of the Leszno Voivodship PZPR Committee on 10 October devoted to housing construction has not either answered unambiguously this question, although major experts within the voivodship—investors, construction enterprise directors, and heads of design offices—were invited to the session.

They could not give a satisfactory answer to the question whether the 1987 tasks will be accomplished by the builders.

The heads of the voivodship party organization in Leszno expressed, in the report presented to the plenary session, which was chaired by First Secretary of the Leszno Voivodship PZPR Committee Stanislaw Sawicki, the apprehensions of the public concerning the fulfillment of both this year's plan and the voivodship-wide program for housing construction throughout the period until 1990. The 5-Year Plan as a whole envisages building 10,950 dwellings in the voivodship, which means a 16-percent increase compared with the preceding 5-year period.

Those taking the floor—chiefly PZPR activists, farmers and workers, tried to explore the causes of the poor situation in housing construction and the ways of overcoming this, to put it mildly, construction "impasse" in Leszno Voivodship.

Zenon Nowak, a warehouseman from the Dlugie Szare State Farm in Strzyzewice, drew attention in his speech to the threat of disintegration of old housing stock.

He declared, "We have 19th-century buildings, and the current curtailment of renovation funds is likely to cause further deterioration in the housing situation. The 'old' buildings are disintegrating, and there are no new ones. At present a 12-apartment building costs about 100 million zlotys to erect; for the same amount 24 homes could be built through private home construction, that being probably a more economical and feasible orientation."

At the same time, plants nad factories recently reduced their housing construction programs by more than 620 dwellings, especially the Western DOKP [District Directorate of State Railroads] and the Voivodship Association of Producer Cooperatives. Yet it is precisely the housing problems of railroaders and cooperative farmers that are particularly important to the public in the region.

Franciszek Halec said, "For the first 9 months of this year the 1987 plan for housing construction has been fulfilled barely 54 percent. The long duration of construction is due chiefly to dilatory resolution of complex formal-legal issues and the absence of material incentives."

"The youth patronage approach is underestimated in this voivodship," said the Chairman of the Voivodship Board of the ZSMP [Union of Polish Socialist Youth] Zdzislaw Ellert, who criticized sharply the absence in Leszno Voivodship of land for the construction of "patronage" homes; there exist large numbers of willing young people who would perceive this form of construction as an opportunity for building their own homes.

Z. Ellert offered the reminder, "In Ciechanow Voivodship, for example, at present 275 'youth patronage' dwellings are under construction; in Krakow Voivodship, 440; and in Slupsk Voivodship, 725, whereas in our voivodship only 12 'youth patronage' homes are being built."

Klemens Durka, a representative of the PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth] Voivodship Council, represented public opinion on housing construction and stressed in particular the need for greater attention to the still existing possibilities for utilizing developed land in cities—the so-called sealed areas [remnants of World War II devastation].

The plenary session adopted a resolution which, allowing for the assessments contained in the report of the Executive Board of the Voivodship PZPR Committee and the proposals made during the discussion, defined more precisely the directions of action of the party echelon, the state administration, and investors with respect to implementing housing construction in Leszno Voivodship until 1990.

#### Market Needs Evaluated

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
12 Oct 87 p 2

[Articles by Stanislaw Pigula and Jerzy Dabrowa: "Plenary Deliberations of [Konin and Koszalin] Voivodship PZPR Committees"]

[Text] Konin. The plenary session of the Konin Voivodship PZPR Committee evaluated the implementation of the resolutions of the 10th PZPR Congress and the Sixth Voivodship Reports-Elections Conference concerning the intensification of production for the consumer and export markets.

An improved supply of consumer goods is one of the most important social goals of this 5-year period, and a major lever for intensification of the economy is strengthening its pro-export orientation, it was emphasized repeatedly during the Konin deliberations. Only about 15 percent of industrial output in the voivodship

is for the consumer goods market and exports. This situation is due to the domination of the fuel-energy complex in the voivocship (brown coal mines, power plant), which however is no reason for failing to develop production of consumer and export goods. In this field the party's role should be decisive. Unfortunately, a large group of organizations did not prove capable of critically assessing the management of enterprises and initiating specific solutions.

Owing to the existing system of economic incentives, enterprises in Konin Voivodship are more interested in exporting than in the production of consumer goods, even though the share of exported goods in the totality of output is still minimal. The principal foreign customer for the production of Konin factories is the GDR, but the Czechoslovak SSR, the FRG, and recently also the USSR also are on the list of regular clients.

The resolution adopted by the plenary session in Konin acknowledges that the party's actions in promoting production of consumer and export goods in Konin Voivodship must be intensified.

#### Different Views on POP Role

Koszalin. The role of the basic party organization (POP) in the sociopolitical and economic life of the voivodship was the topic of the plenary session of the Koszalin Voivodship PZPR Committee on October 9.

The changes taking place in the party's activity correspond to the economic transformations occurring in this country, it was declared. Every party member and the party organizations at all plants and in the countryside should provide strong social support for these transformations. Unless there are resolute and fully aware supporters of this cause, the effectiveness of the transformations is hardly conceivable. It was pointed out that in Koszalin Voivodship many POP's are weak and their members remain passive, often owing to poor awareness of the nature of the changes taking place and of the methods used by the party to implement the objectives ensuing from the resolutions of the 10th PZPR Congress and the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum.

Marian Jankowski, first secretary of the PZPR Plant Committee at the Voivodship Center for Agricultural Progress in Grzmiaca, declared, "At meetings of all POP's we agreed upon a plan for discussing party resolutions. Many nonparty members are coming to us. We have no secrets, and we are winning trust. There are open monthly meetings at which economic information is transmitted and we discuss our activities."

First Secretary of the POP at the Karniszewice Gardening Combine Jan Godlewski declared, "At our combine we established a worker aktiv school. Both party and nonparty members attend the meetings; five of the latter joined the PZPR this year."

Many critical comments were uttered concerning echelons at all levels which are too bureaucratic to pay attention to the nature of the political work and liaison which they should maintain with POP's at plants and institutions.

The comments and recommendations made were recorded in the resolution of the plenary session.

### **Discipline Stressed, Members Attacked**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
19 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Andrzej Kalinowski: "Wloclawek: Without the Cover-Up of Objective Difficulties"]

[Text] "Comrade Wilkoszewski, we do not accept any justification that you might offer for disregarding the assurances and promises given to the concerned individuals and the Voivodship Committee. Let this be confirmed by the letter from a female tenant from Swierczewski Street, which states, among other things:

"...I am a category-2 pensioner. I live together with my husband, my daughter and her two little children, and my 86-year-old mother in a dilapidated dwelling. For 4 years I have been petitioning the Local Association of Real Estate Owners to renovate my dwelling. I received a notice to the effect that my dwelling would be renovated before the end of last year. Subsequently this was postponed to the first quarter of 1987. But even now the renovation has not been completed, although the Voivodship Committee was assured that it would be completed by the end of September. We also meet with similar practices at the Housing Management Enterprise."

Yes, exactly, the report of the Executive Board of the Voivodship Committee, presented at the plenary session of the voivodship party echelon on 17 October, named the comrades responsible for the quality and state of services to the population of Wloclawek, and for the effectiveness of the handling of complaints and suggestions made to the Wloclawek Voivodship PZPR Committee.

During the discussion, in which 19 comrades took the floor, the causes and sources of the complaints as well as the possibilities for improving consumer services were evaluated. That these possibilities are real, despite the existing shortages and difficulties, was demonstrated by the example provided by the management of the fuel warehouse which, aware of criticism at the plenum, decided on the plenum's eve to improve its performance. Because, as the discussants stated, only part of the problems is due to shortages.

It was stated that we still encounter apathy and indifference, lack of a proactive approach to the problems of difficult daily life. Mistakes and fear of risktaking reveal

themselves. The old disease of lack of discipline and responsibility among part of worker collectives and their management makes itself felt.

Roman Chesiak of AZOTY Plant declared, "We are expert at proving that things are bad. At party meetings we trace the causes to poor orders and decisions from the 'top' instead of pondering how to implement them." Other speakers also pointed out that certain basic party organizations clearly avoid handling difficult and sensitive matters and their meetings do not culminate in specific recommendations and proposals. And even if some people identify shortcomings, there is no lack of others who try to gloss everything over and cover it up with the excuse of objective difficulties. If party echelons and organizations do not react to this, they forfeit their authority. This also is influenced by the disregard of the opinion of basic party organizations by the management of plants and institutions.

Grazyna Maliszewska said, "It is high time to identify the responsible individuals and cease to protect those who mishandle matters, drunkards and loafers. The comrade from CELLULOZA Plant bewailed the problems of the housing cooperative. Another example: the barrier on the tracks near AZOTY is an obligatory topic of discussion at each meeting. The persons responsible should be identified."

During the Voivodship Committee plenum the functioning of nearly every aspect of the city's life was tentatively assessed with the object of, as stated by Henryk Czyzewski, chairman of the Wloclawek Municipal People's Council, finding comprehensive solutions to problems instead of merely improving the performance of particular institutions.

"It is high time," the TRYBUNA LUDU correspondent was told by Zygmunt Arkuszewski, a member of the taskforce for recommendations, "for consolidating the awareness, in the light of this plenum as well, that, following the 10th Congress, and in face of the second stage of the economic reform, we must work differently and energetically tackle completely unjustified difficulties. The tasks in the field of consumer services are known and have been spelled out in the voivodship party and people's council programs. Now the implementation discipline has to be strengthened. This precisely is the purpose of the plenary session."

The deliberations, chaired by Krystian Luczak, first secretary of the Voivodship Committee, were attended by Gabriela Rembisz, candidate member of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee, and Marian Kot, director of the Letters and Inspections Office under the Central Committee.

### **Interest in Youth Assures Party Goals**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
19 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Alicja Zagorska: "Plenary Deliberations of the Bialystok Voivodship PZPR Committee: Factory Life is Not Only Production"]

[Excerpts] Can party organizations at enterprises overlook the basic nature of the socialist work establishment, namely, its upbringing function?

Such was the topic of the plenary session in Bialystok last Saturday, which discussed strengthening the social-educational function of the workplace in the light of the resolutions of the 10th PZPR Congress. This topic demonstrates that the voivodship party organization supports the unity of economic and ideological tasks.

The discussants repeatedly pointed to the well-known saying that the work community is a major vehicle for shaping the social attitude, awareness, and character of the individual. At the voivodship's enterprises there operate some party organizations which can cope with the obligation of shaping committed and pro-innovation attitudes.

This can be done, however, only by the organizations with authority. And authority is something that cannot be decreed or won for nothing. Only activist basic party organizations can gain authority for themselves.

Activist basic party organizations will thus find it easier, now that the era of radical changes is beginning, to cope with imbuing socialist systemic principles with a new quality.

Marek Raczyllo, chairman of the ZSMP [Union of Polish Socialist Youth] branch at the Bialystok Instruments and Clamps Factory, pointed out to those present that a plant's approach to care for young employees influences their subsequent proactivism. Plants operate programs for socio-occupational adaptation, and the persons directing them should be made personally accountable.

The recommendations and proposals ensuing from the discussion were included in the resolution, with not only the basic party organizations but also the party echelons being obligated to implement that resolution.

During the second part of its deliberations the plenum, which was chaired by Wlodzimierz Kolodziejczuk, first secretary of the Bialystok Voivodship PZPR Committee, elected Lucjan Niewiarowski as agricultural secretary of the Committee.

### **Varying Statistics on Party Growth**

26000044 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
17-18 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Roman Bajerlajn: "Eliminate Differences and Deficiencies: Plenum of the Czestochowa Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Text] Moskorzew Gmina is located at the very end of the voivodship and is not among the well-off gminas. It lacks any substantial resources, and the local aktiv contains few people with academic credentials. And yet, the

gmina party organization was ranked highly in the recent evaluation of party performance in Czestochowa region. In this gmina there is a basic party organization in every village.

The proactivism of the local basic party organization means a higher authority of the party among the inhabitants. This was mentioned by First Secretary of the Moskorzew Gmina PZPR Committee Zbigniew Krzysiek at the plenum of the Czestochowa Voivodship PZPR Committee, held on 16 October.

Moskorzew's example is only one pole. At the other pole there are the occurrences and facts demonstrating that party activities are not as highly regarded everywhere in the voivodship, and hence also the effectiveness of party work is still insufficient.

On the basis of recent assessments of party work in the voivodship, it was pointed out in the discussion that there also exist gminas in which no basic party organizations operate at one-half of the plants and factories. In gminas of the Lubliniecki and Solecki rayons there are no basic party organizations at one-half of the villages. The preparations for party meetings also are not uniform.

How then to eliminate the differences in the activism of discrete party elements and surmounts the passivity existing in certain of these elements? These questions were considered in the discussion, which was inaugurated with a report on the experience of party organizations in Moskorzew Gmina, at the B. Bierut Iron and Steel Plant, and at the Higher Teacher Training School.

In the discussion the floor was also taken by Politburo Member Zofia Stepien, who attended the plenum. She pointed out to the primary importance of a consistent implementation of the resolution of the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum.

The plenum, whose deliberations were chaired by First Secretary of the Czestochowa Voivodship PZPR Committee Jerzy Sypek, adopted a position outlining the conditions for implementing the resolutions of the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum, inclusive of the elimination of differences and deficiencies that still occur in the work of party elements in the voivodship.

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### **'Green Lungs' Campaign, Motives Described**

26000074a Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY in Polish No 42, 18 Oct 87 p 8

[Interview with Prof. Stefan Kozlowski, member, presidium of Social Ecological Movement, by Marek Sarjusz-Wolski: "A Fresh Breeze"]

[Text] [Question] Is the idea of "Poland's Green Lungs" related to the Wigry Green Carta?

[Answer] The Wigry Carta, which was proclaimed a year ago, on the occasion of the 10th meeting organized by the ASP [Cleaning and Sanitation Drive] and the Suwalki Voivode, declares, "Our society needs a region, a part of the country, in which Poles could recover their strength, relax, and savor the beauty of nature. The idea of 'Poland's Green Lungs,' conceived in the Bialystok region, envisages specific future measures in five voivodships: Suwalki, Bialystok, Olsztyn, Lomza, and Ostroleka. For there exists an opportunity for maintaining nature in its pure, pristine form in northeastern Poland." Thus, this idea was conceived among the social activists of Bialystok. It may in a sense be a consequence of the Wigry climate; at any rate, scientists, artists, and public activists who meet there each year support this idea ardently.

[Question] This is limited to five voivodships only. Is not this kind of minimalist?

[Answer] It is simply that such is our tragic situation. Only the area of these five voivodships has an opportunity for avoiding until the year 2000 sulfur pollution, which devastates forests. This may also apply to Western Pomerania and the region of Bieszczady, but it is the northeastern region that will be of decisive importance.

[Question] "Green Lungs" resembles a glittering generalization.

[Answer] This motto should be regarded as the beginning of a new thinking on the macroscale. A year ago we had thought that its translation into reality was distant and hardly realistic. But in the meantime something has been done about it. Owing to the interest shown by the Social Ecological Movement, a small committee was appointed and it prepared a draft text for agreements that could be concluded between the five voivodships.

[Question] Does not this sound a bit surrealist? After all, voivodships are not autonomous principalities negotiating into mutual agreements.

[Answer] Are local self-governments, which nowadays have many powers, to be condemned because they want to reach an agreement about saving nature, to which artificial administrative boundaries are detrimental? We desire a joint program for the management of the Narew River Basin. Fragmentary measures taken by discrete ministries would not produce substantial effects.

[Question] What else does the draft agreement say?

[Answer] That agriculture in that region should not employ technologies that lead to environmental pollution. This concerns, e.g., using granulated fertilizers instead of their powdery counterparts which immediately penetrate lakes and cause them to become eutrophic. Similarly, the aim of land reclamation should be irrigation rather than diversion of water. This also concerns the necessity of augmenting forested land and

improving the state of forests, as well as the need to create a large system of protected areas. On valuable unspoiled land no new centers should be built and part of the existing centers should be demolished.

Another problem is the need to consider the possibilities for developing spa facilities in that region. We should bear in mind that in the very near future we will lose many sanitariums. The Lower Silesian spas with their poisoned air and deteriorating water will discontinue operation. The draft agreement also touches upon the problem of protecting cultural resources. This part of Poland has exceptionally rich ethnic-cultural traditions and the point is that they should be preserved in their entirety.

[Question] So far nothing is said about industry.

[Answer] The last part of the draft agreement concerns subordinating industrial development to the principles of natural conservation. It is probably for the first time in Poland that this issue was so strongly formulated. To put it plainly, environmentally hazardous industries should not arise in that region. Agricultural processing industries as well as modern industries based on biotechnology and electronics should instead be developed. These industries need pure air and water. This is a great opportunity for the region. It could leap from the stage of 19th-century industry to the stage of latest technologies which are so vigorously springing up throughout the world.

[Question] You are speaking of desiderata, and I thought this concerned deeds.

[Answer] One very important deed was the meeting which took place in Wielbark, Olsztyn Voivodship. It was attended by chairmen of people's councils from the five voivodships, along with deputy voivodes, certain first secretaries [of voivodship PZPR committees], and the entire presidium of the Social Ecological Movement, headed by Professor Kostrzewski. A draft declaration was discussed, on realizing that the acceptance of the "Poland's Green Lungs" concept must entail concrete changes in the management of that region. Even before this year is over, the concerned voivodship people's councils are to accept this understanding by passing their own resolutions. The resolutions should be followed by the appointment of taskforces which would work out jointly outlined objectives on their merits. On this basis, it will be possible to prepare a master plan for the entire macroregion and thus to provide the premises for developing territorial plans for the discrete voivodships during the next 5-year plan period.

[Question] I don't believe it. How could this happen without any controversy? This is not at all like Poland.

[Answer] Controversies will certainly arise. The lag in the region's water treatment facilities alone is so considerable that the voivodships lack the resources for remedying it on their own. Water treatment plants will require a huge capital investment. But I fear that it is public awareness that will present an even greater problem. The voivodship representatives declared explicitly that so long as they have to be accountable for crop productivity per hectare rather than for the quantity of pure water, the whole idea will remain a castle in the air. It must be plainly stated that the central authorities should take a new look at the region. The matter is not so simple, because it requires an extensive redefining of the objectives of the so-called socioeconomic development of this country. That development should be markedly differentiated. It may be that the idea of "Poland's Green Lungs" will facilitate such a reorientation in the thinking of the central authorities.

[Question] Are voivodship authorities more aware of the peril [to nature] than the central authorities?

[Answer] Examples answering your question in the affirmative could be cited. As we know, nature parks are being established by voivodship people's councils. Thirty-four such parks have already been established, and each year several new ones are added. But as for the establishment of new national parks, that is within the purview of the Council of Ministers. The situation is such that since 1981 not one new national park has been established. And yet, every preparation has been made for opening the Wigry National Park. The central buildings, the research station, and the personnel are already there, and beautiful color maps of the future park have already been printed.

[Question] What else is needed then?

[Answer] A suitable resolution [by the Council of Ministers].

[Question] Is this apathy or precisely lack of awareness?

[Answer] Both, I think. Tackling seriously the biggest villains, namely, big industry and large-scale farming, indeed requires awareness on the part of both the authorities and the society.

[Question] Are we deficient in this awareness, or perhaps are we too stupid?

[Answer] An exonerating factor is that until the end of the 1970's little had been said about these matters. We had been fascinated by industrial growth, which was to solve all social problems. The information barrier resulted in that, aside from a small group of environmentalists, few people had realized the scale of the pollution peril.

[Question] But now we do realize it. This realization, however, makes us feel only more frustrated.

[Answer] I don't agree. Public awareness is needed in order to exert social pressure, without which the central authorities will not decide to abandon many economically ineffective and at the same time environmentally hazardous technologies. Little can be done without a fundamental change in the approach to the environmentally most hazardous big smokestack industries. At the same time, a prerequisite for commencing any new investment project should be an assessment study of its future influence on the environment, the so-called OWS [Assessment of Influence on Environment]. This concerns not only new factories but also new transportation routes, land reclamation projects, high-voltage lines, etc. So far such assessment studies have not been obligatory in Poland, and this renders impossible the adoption of proper siting decisions. It seems to be high time for abandoning approaches for which we have even now to pay dearly.

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## YUGOSLAVIA

### Sardonic Commentary on Declining Living Standard

28000054 Belgrade *POLITIKA* in Serbo-Croatian  
6 Dec 87 p 9

[Commentary by Vasko Ivanovic: "The Art of Starving"]

[Text] The television schedule the other day announced a forthcoming documentary from the Sarajevo studio: "Sarajevo TV's documentary evening program consists of items under the heading 'Fragments from Life'."

In the "Human Factor" series, a piece of reportage entitled "The Art of Starving" was prepared by Mladen Vuksanovic and Vuk Janjic.

The item answers the question as to what Vlado Puskas of Konavli near Dubrovnik is aiming at. He voluntarily renounces food and practices and little-known athletic discipline called "starving."

The following bits of news illustrate the relevance of the "athletic discipline called "starving."

A report from the Economic Chamber: "The last 9 months have been extremely unfavorable. Overall losses have more than quadrupled in comparison to the same months last year."

News item from the Trade-Union Federation of Yugoslavia: "More than 50 percent of families in Yugoslavia are on the borderline of the minimum for existence, and many families are below the minimum."

News item from the Titograd opstina trade-union council: "More than 10,000 blue-collar workers fail to receive personal incomes regularly. Personal incomes for more

than 5,000 blue-collar workers, or rather minimal personal incomes, are paid out of solidarity contributions from workers receiving full personal incomes. Workers set aside these contributions to help their fellows even though they barely make ends meet with their full pay."

News item from Bosnia and Hercegovina: "Unless urgent aid measures are undertaken, demonstrations are possible in Cazin, Bihac, and Velika Kladusa, where since the 'Agrokomerc' scandal there is no money for bare existence and where people are already beginning to starve."

News item from Subotica: "At border crossings with Hungary, our citizens have been observed importing bread. They say that they lose less time that way than by jostling in line at dawn in front of our stores for 'people's bread.' And bread is cheaper in Hungary."

News item from the Vracar opstina social-welfare center: "As the socioeconomic crisis has deepened, applicants for aid include increasing numbers of employed blue-collar workers and retirees with the lowest pensions. Formerly, employed workers and retirees were not among the socially threatened groups.... Unusual customers have been appearing in some self-service stores in town. These persons lack money to pay, usually for food. Instead of paying, they leave their identity cards."

These bits of news not only confirm the relevance of Sarajevo TV's 'Art of Starving' but also are capable of strengthening morale and improving the mood of those numerous persons, some of whom we have listed above, who have a minimum for existence or less than any minimum.

In what way can this reportage strengthen morale and improve the mood among the threatened?

A tour could be arranged for Vlado Puskas of Konavli near Dubrovnik, who practices the "little-known athletic discipline called 'starving'."

Vlado Puskas would visit the most threatened localities in the country, of which we have mentioned a few. He would explain what starving is to those who have already begun to starve or who soon will be. In other words, he would explain to people that starving is an athletic discipline, if little known. That is why starving is regarded as a disagreeable and undesirable phenomenon.

The responsible authorities could organize athletic games in which starving would take its place as a new discipline.

This suggestion might seem cynical to some people. Not so. Or, at least, it is less cynical than leaving certain responsible authorities—in areas in which hunger threatens—in authority.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Flood Threat to Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project

AU291349 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Dec 87 p 2

[CTK report in the "Brief Information" column]

[Text] Stage one of flood emergency activity has been declared for the Czechoslovak sector of the Danube in Gabcikovo. Frontal disturbances over Austrian and Czechoslovak territory, which have led to intensive rain, have raised the river level to more than 600 cm. On Sunday [20 December—FBIS] evening the Danube level in Bratislava, the capital of the Slovak SR, was 616 cm; yesterday [21 December—FBIS] morning the figure was 585 cm. In the next few days the Danube level is expected to rise. Because of the higher river level, measures have been taken to protect the construction of the "Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Hydro-Project System."

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## HUNGARY

### Legal Implications of Information Technology Assessed

25000068 Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian  
10 Dec 87 p 1

[Article by Gitta Takacs]

[Text] Some 18 countries already have laws concerning the protection of data bases. These laws protect private citizens as well as legal persons against damages resulting from the abuse of new technology and data banks. In Hungary too the preparation of laws pertaining to information technology is in progress.

Item. Why do students attending bilingual high schools have to report on a form how many rooms their parents have in their house and whether they own a VCR? Why did one of our enterprises express curiosity in early October concerning the time period in which the worker's spouse or common-law partner has participated in union work or in the workers' movement? Space is provided to answer these questions on forms which gather data from employees for purposes of calculating aggregate(!) wages.

Item. Not too long ago a few hundred (a few thousand?) of the female members of Hungarian society received gift parcels through the mail. Each contained a sample of a new kind of tampon. The mailing list was rather accurate. I have not heard of a single six-years old girl or an eighty-year-old grandmother who would have received that parcel. Just how did market researchers obtain such accurate information?

Item. Not too long ago the company "Quelle" wrote to all holders of a foreign exchange bank account promising a ballpoint pen with a quartz watch if they reported at

one of Quelle's shops. Most certainly, the addresses came from the bank that manages foreign exchange accounts. In other respects: the State Insurance Company receives the addresses of new parents from the hospitals. The agent for the private sector photographer asks for and receives the same list from the nurse, while offering some extra pay.... By invoking the provisions of the Civil Code of Laws any parent or any of the addressees could seek court protection of his or her personal privacy. We are not aware of any lawsuits....

Yet another item. Competent computer specialist are curious these days just how well-protected the computerized tax records and tax computation systems will be? For the sake of argument, let's say that a burglar could obtain some very bright ideas by having access to the contents of some declarations of assets....

### Shall We Continue?

COMPUTERWORLD recently presented a series of articles which detailed the practice of laws in developed countries pertaining to the protection of data and information. To quote the "motto" of the series:

"My name has been entered into many a Book.' Kosztolanyi already sensed that feeling of dependence which stems from the inequality of the person vis-a-vis the bureaucracy—the inequality which inspired 20th Century artists to acquire Kafka's visions. This is so, even though those people knew nothing about the secrets of computerized databanks, and about the proneness of electronically stored information to be tampered with. It is no coincidence that during the past decade developed countries enacted information laws, and that debates were sparked about obligations to provide data, the extent to which data obtained may be utilized, the protection of the private sphere, data protection—in other words about general personal rights, which in the final analysis boil down to democracy."

The world's first law designed expressly to protect data was enacted in 1970 in the Hessen territory of the FGR. A comprehensive, national law whose function it is to protect data has been in force since 1977 in the FGR. It was of extreme significance that in 1983 the federal constitutional court declared the census law unconstitutional. It was so declared on grounds that the law did not provide adequate protection for persons subject to the census from the viewpoint of possible further dissemination of the data gathered. The actual census-taking took place only in 1987, following the incorporation of corrective legal provisions....

A detailed Swedish law of 1973 obliged everyone to protect data. Any data bank containing personal information may be organized and operated only with the permission of a separate authority called the Data Superintendency. Only the cabinet and the parliament are exempt from under these requirements. The Data Superintendency grants permission for the use of data only if

it is reasonably assured that personal data contained in a data bank will not be abused, and only as long as the privacy of persons is assured. 'Sensitive' data receives increased protection. This includes information concerning health conditions, medication, social service assistance received, political views and religious belonging. It has become part of the Swedish consciousness that e.g. confidential information conveyed by a physician may be detrimental to a person if it reaches a life insurance agency. Through computers all data tied to the ten-digit personal identification number may be retrieved....

In Great Britain the Queen enacted a law protective of data on 12 July 1984 with the concurrence of religious and lay orders and representatives. Registration is the central theme of the British law: all data users—be they private persons, government offices or the police—must apply for separate registrations regarding each and every data collection effort. Registration may be denied only if the stated purpose of data collection is contrary to law. Once registered, the registration is valid for a limited period of time, not exceeding three years, at which time the renewal of registration is subject to a new decision by the authorities. The entire system is under the jurisdiction of an independent, national office held by one person. That person holds the title of the Registrar, Data Protection Registry. A three-year registration fee amounts to 22 pounds.

A French law "concerning informatics, registration and civil rights" went into effect on 1 January 1980—six years after a parliamentary committee reported that "Informatics is not neutral. It serves primarily those who possess power." A separate, independent institution called the "National Committee for Informatics and Civil Rights" was established to oversee the enforcement of the law. Any intent by public or private organizations to gather personal data must be declared to the Committee. Not everyone can gather all kinds of data. Those authorized to collect data pertaining to race, political views, general outlook, religious belief, and to union or political party membership are limited to certain government agencies and to the press. The first court case dates back to 1985 when a company required job applicants to provide data concerning their moral conduct as well as their political and organizational belonging. Since 1985 there were some more incidents: an enterprise manager mislead his employees in order to obtain personal data related to the employees, and in Nantes the list of voters was sold for commercial purposes.

And in Hungary?

The Hungarian information law, or, as it is officially referred to: "the regulation of information" is being prepared in a working group headed by the appropriate deputy chairman of the Central Statistical Office [KSH]. The group includes among others representatives from the Ministry of Justice, the National Technical Development Committee, the Ministry of Health, the Hungarian

Chamber of Commerce, the Hungarian National Bank and other experts from different ministries. (Years ago, academician Tibor Vamos, honorary chairman of the Janos Neuman Computer Science Society was the first to propose the drafting of a law that deals with informatics comprehensively.) The work is coordinated by the KSH's applied computer technology division.

It would be difficult to say how soon the proposed information law will reach the National Assembly. Actually, it is a bit too early to discuss this law. At this point one can be sure of one thing only: the information regulation conception will advocate the need for related legislation. (This is the subject of our article on page 4: "To Unlock the Imprisoned Personality.")

12995

**CEMA Reform From the Hungarian Perspective**  
*25000055 Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian*  
*No 49, 3 Dec 87 p 10*

[Text] The 43rd (extraordinary) session of CEMA produced important guidelines for the development of socialist economic integration. Lajos Osvath, Mihaly Patai and Ivan Szegvari describe and evaluate CEMA reform from the Hungarian viewpoint. This is the first in a series of articles dealing with the subject.

Heretofore CEMA cooperation aimed for fundamental extensive economic growth. Its essential model remained unchanged for decades. By now, this situation has produced an unresolvable conflict between the old model on the one hand, and the developmental goals of member nations and of the socialist community as a whole, on the other.

At the international level, the cooperative system was based on the concept of in-kind delivery and receiving obligations within bilateral structures. This system provided a more or less adequate framework for the mutual trade of raw materials and of unsophisticated processing industry mass products. The system was obviously inadequate to accommodate modern integrated processes, however. It separated the producer from the consumer, placed a host of administrative obstacles between cooperating partners, produced distorted interest relationships and was unresponsive to user needs. It also produced some detrimental effects which hindered the qualitative development of several domestic and external economic factors, such as efficiency, scientific and technological development, and the state of the art, choice and competitiveness of goods exchanged or sold.

These deficiencies have been recognized for a long time. Using different vantage points, the content and form of intra-CEMA cooperation in terms of the real economy has been criticized strongly from the outset. The need for a new system which responds to intensive developmental needs, is highly efficient, and is based on the concept of socialist international division of labor was recognized

by the economic and political leaderships of CEMA countries beginning in the early 1960's. Since then, related endeavors were distilled a number of times into documents propounding "integrated" conceptions and programs—to use the terminology that has evolved. (At the same time it should be noted that the term "integration" has gained acceptance in professional and official terminology only later.) In the context of cooperative goals aiming for a change in both quality and efficiency there appeared the "Fundamental Principles of Socialist International Division of Labor" (1962), the 1971 "Complex Program" for socialist economic integration, the long-range target programs of the mid-1970's, the high level economic resolutions of 1984, and a year later the "Complex Program for CEMA Technological and Scientific Progress Until the Year 2000." Despite continually renewed program commitments, the unquestionable evolution of the integration concept, and changes in the cooperative mechanism—all of which supported endeavors for modern integration—the fundamental extensive model for cooperation continues to survive.

How can all this be explained? It can be explained first and foremost by the fact that the national economic policies and the national economic management of member nations did not produce favorable conditions for the development of a qualitatively different system of integrated relationships. The actual logical and rational foundations for relationships and economic weapons are the existing [1] national economic policies which are quantitatively oriented and have short-term perspectives, in the framework of which the concept of shortage-management prevails, and [2] economic command mechanisms which are based on natural balances, on centralized material supply and technical know-how, and on plan directives. The latter applies to a majority of the member nations. Only in this light can we understand the high level resistance manifested by the above-described model vis-a-vis endeavors to change and to develop.

Meanwhile some epochal changes took place and continue to take place in the global economy. World market prices have undergone fundamental changes, exchange rate ratios of leading currencies have changed greatly and a number of times, and new forms, directions and problems with respect to the international flow of money and capital have evolved. Structural changes in production, consumption and in external relationships have accelerated to an extraordinary degree. Scientific and technological development, flexible adaptation to market conditions, efficiency, and global competitiveness drive this structural change and serve as the primary criteria for success. The changed global economic environment substantially altered the developmental conditions for all countries and regions, irrespective of the sizes, developmental levels and socio-political systems of those countries and regions.

CEMA countries manifested inconsistency and a passive attitude in terms of an in-depth restructuring of the

conditions for both internal and external economic development. It is mainly for this reason that significant structural and trade balance problems accumulated both in the domestic and the external economic relationships of these countries. In several member nations convertible currency indebtedness has reached critical levels. Corresponding with these a strong disintegrationist trend in CEMA cooperation evolved.

The growth of CEMA member nation economies has shown a continuously decreasing rate for two decades. There is a marked and increasing conflict between the quantitative, and primarily the qualitative indicators of CEMA countries relating to production potentials and participation in the international division of labor. While CEMA produces 25 percent of the world's combined national income, its participation in global trade is less than 10 percent, and this rate shows a decreasing trend. In terms of trade involving modern machinery and installations CEMA's share in world trade is even less, and in terms of scientific and technological accomplishments the ratio stands at a low 1 percent. It is particularly unfavorable that our backwardness is most pronounced in areas that serve as definitive components in progressive global economic processes. These areas include innovative processes, the development of the service sector and of the infrastructure, specialization in parts and components, and material and energy conservation.

This situation made it clear to a majority of CEMA nations that a fundamental reform of the cooperative system was needed if they want to accomplish their socio-economic goals, have a developed system of integration within the CEMA community, and forestall further losses in world market positions. It is this recognition and need that was defined at the November 1986 conference of communist and workers party leaders of CEMA countries. Following that conference preparatory work to institute reform began on the basis of a Soviet initiative. The initial results of that work were summarized at the 43rd (extraordinary) session of CEMA.

The resultant document provides a critical and realistic analysis of the achievements and the present state of cooperation thus far. It recognized a number of trends in perspective, related to the goals and means of integration, all of which were conceived in the framework of the new conception. These include the establishment of a unified market for CEMA countries and the free flow of goods, services and production factors, the establishment of conditions for currency convertibility, and the development of micro-integration and of mechanisms that serve micro-integration. The document also establishes the need for a phased reform program to be implemented gradually. It did not take positions with respect to details however; it designated the development of a specific reform program as a task for the near future.

From the Hungarian viewpoint reform efforts so far have produced progress that is less than what was expected. At the same time, however, these reform efforts clearly revealed the kinds of peculiar contradictions and interest relationships that confront reform processes, as well as the starting conditions which must be taken into consideration in the context of a realistic reform conception. One of the significant starting conditions is that in particular from the viewpoint of the internal economic management systems, and of rather large differences in the developmental levels of various member nations, their relations to reform vary. The GDR, Romania and Cuba view the perfection of the present cooperative system as appropriate. With respect to several issues, there are differences even among those member nations which advocate the need for radical reform. In this respect it is particularly important that for the time being the specific approaches to be applied within the internal Soviet system, which have a definitive impact on the cooperative system, have not emerged in an entirely clear fashion. Serious contradictions may be discovered between the short-range and long-term interests of the various member countries. Economic sciences must also demonstrate some significant, but overdue performance in developing a realistic and detailed reform program.

In spite of these unquestionable limitations and difficulties, the substantive reform of CEMA cooperation has a better chance now than ever before. Also the pressure

exerted by both external and domestic conditions is stronger and more objective than ever. The decisive factor in this respect appears to be the fact that the restructuring of the cooperative model is evolving parallel with, and under the mutual influence of radical reform processes that are taking place in a majority of the member nations, including the Soviet Union. This fact should be contrasted to earlier attempts for reform.

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#### **New Banks in Provinces**

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9 Jan 88 p 5*

[Excerpts] Three new commercial bank branches began operation in Komarom County at the beginning of last year. The Hungarian Credit Bank opened branches in Tatabanya and Esztergom, and the National Commercial and Credit Bank opened a branch in Komarom. The greatest turnover is at the Tatabanya branch of the Hungarian Credit Bank, which handles the accounts of almost 100 enterprises and cooperatives.

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