TIGHTENING AMERICA'S BORDERS: 
AN INCREASED DRUG INTERDICTION ROLE 
FOR THE U.S. MILITARY 

BY 

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Tightening America's Borders: 
An Increased Drug Interdiction Role for the U.S. Military

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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

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ABSTRACT

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Our National Drug Control Strategy is not effective. At the current rate, the country's drug abuse problem will kill 140,000 Americans and cost our society $700 billion over the next decade. This paper studies elements of the current national drug control strategy and the military roles in implementing that strategy. The paper proposes modifications to the strategy with an increased emphasis on interdiction. These modifications involve an expanded role for United States military forces through the creation of an additional unified commander-in-chief (CINC) charged with drug interdiction at and outside America's borders. The author analyzes the ends, ways, and means associated with the proposed strategy revisions and provides linkage in the strategic, operational, and tactical context.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................. iii

LIST OF TABLES ...................................................... vii

TITLE ................................................................. 1

ENDNOTES ............................................................. 24

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................... 26
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 - Most Important Problem Facing the Country Today........2
Table 2 - Most Effective in Terms of Where Money Should
    Be Spent to Fight the War on Drugs.......................5
Table 3 - Federal-Wide Drug Seizure System - Annual Seizures
    By Fiscal Year...........................................14
Table 4 - Importance of National Concerns in Terms of Where
    Tax Dollars Should be Spent..............................17
Table 5 - Agreement with Statements about Drug Strategies......18
Tightening America’s Borders: 
An Increased Drug Interdiction Role for the U.S. Military

“One other priority - and I strongly urge the president to address it on Tuesday evening (during the State of the Union Address) - . . .is to gear up again for the war against drugs.”

Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Mississippi) in the Republican radio address (response to the President’s radio address), January 24, 1998

Drug trafficking, use, abuse, and the accompanying violence and crime are eroding the very fabric of American society. Our children are being targeted. If the leaders of our nation are not vigilant today, succeeding generations will never have the opportunity to realize the dreams that we and our forefathers envisioned for them. It is in America’s best interest to not only combat but defeat the drug problem. This paper proposes that the root cause of drug proliferation in our country is supply. Our inability to interdict the supply lines is the principal failure of our national drug control strategy. Furthermore, this study recommends that we take the additional step to turn narcotics interdiction over to the United States Military.
**Vital National Interest**

In working our way through the strategy formulation paradigm, the first consideration must be given to national values. Many argue that the status quo with respect to drug use and abuse in our nation today runs counter to our national values (See Table 1).

![Table 1](image)


... the goal of the national security strategy is to ensure the protection of our nation’s fundamental and enduring needs: protect the lives and safety of Americans; maintain the sovereignty of the United States, with its values, institutions and territory intact; and provide for the prosperity of the nation and its people.¹
Defense of the homeland, national economic well-being, and the promotion of values, three of our four categories of national security interest, are affected by the uncontrolled influx of drugs across our borders. Our government must demonstrate the capability to defend its citizens from this undesired criminal activity. Drug use and abuse damage the work environment, blue-collar and white-collar alike, and alter the dynamics of our economy.

Finally, drug use and abuse are counter to the "Great Society", "City on a Hill", "Kinder, Gentler", and "Thousand Points of Light" values-inspired visions that recent presidents have designed. Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on October 29, 1997 argued most convincingly when he predicted that, "...if unchecked, America's drug abuse problem will kill 140,000 Americans and cost our society $700 billion over the coming decade."\(^2\) Is saving 140,000 American lives and $700 billion in our best national interest? The answer must be a resounding yes.

Are our national leaders adhering to the rhetoric they present to the American people? Our leaders publicly state that crime and drug trafficking are heinous, unacceptable activities
that damage the fabric of our society. However, when national policies are documented and, perhaps more importantly, when joint “alliances” are made with partner nations, the tough talk is not being pursued. For example, on May 6, 1997, the presidents of the United States and Mexico reached agreement on a set of 16 “Alliance Points.” The first point, given top priority by the two national leaders, declared: “Reduce the demand for illicit drugs through the intensification of anti-drug information and educational efforts, particularly those directed at young people, and through rehabilitative programs.”

This priority certainly differs with the feelings and concerns of the American people. In a March, 1996 Gallup poll, results revealed that ...

...the majority (64%) of Americans feel that more money should be spent on stopping drugs from coming into the United States from foreign countries. There also seems to be support for the theory that reducing the supply is a more effective means than reducing the desire.

When asked to say which of five major drug strategies they feel would be most effective in terms of where money should be spent to fight the war on drugs, no single strategy is endorsed by a majority of adults. However, government interdiction to reduce the supply of drugs entering the United States is supported by the greatest number (31%) of Americans (See Table 2).
It is time that global leaders in general and the presidents of the United States and Mexico in particular, realize that drug education and demand-reduction are fleeting solutions. They must be viewed as spokes, but the hub of the wheel is interdiction.

Table 2

Most Effective in Terms of Where Money Should be Spent to Fight the War on Drugs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Effective</th>
<th>Most/Second Most Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stopping drugs from coming into the United States</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having more programs to educate both youth and adults about the dangers of drugs</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More efforts, including police action and criminal prosecution, to stop the drug dealers</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putting more drug treatment programs in communities and neighborhoods</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More efforts, including police actions and criminal prosecution, to stop the people who buy drugs</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building more jails and prisons for drug offenders</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


But are drug and narcotics-related violations of our national interest vital? Again, our national security strategy says that our vital interests include "the physical security of our territory..., the safety of our citizens, and our economic well-being." Furthermore, and perhaps most convincingly, "We will do whatever it takes to defend these interests, including - when necessary - using our military might unilaterally and decisively." It is precisely the use of this military might that this paper suggests we expand now.
Legality?

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 is the law that is most frequently invoked by those who argue that it is illegal for the nation's military to be involved in drug interdiction and the arrest of drug traffickers. The act provides:

**USE OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE AS POSSE COMITATUS**

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.8

This key legal precedent, which on more than one occasion has precluded the national command authority (NCA) from using military assets to address domestic issues, was passed in 1878 to deal with "reconstruction era abuses, culminating in the use of federal troops to police polling stations in Southern states (some say to influence the outcome of the presidential election of 1876)."9 The Posse Comitatus Act is an outdated law, established for an outdated purpose and, most convincingly, "no reported case has been found involving criminal prosecution of anyone for violation of the Posse Comitatus Act."10

Because of persuasive arguments such as this, Congress has enacted an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act that authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide equipment and personnel to assist civilian
agencies in the enforcement of drug, immigration, and tariff laws. But the statute expressly forbids "direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search and seizure, an arrest, or other similar activity unless otherwise authorized by law."\textsuperscript{11}

The translation of the Defense Appropriations Act into Public Law 97-86 permitted the following:

...providing information collected during the normal course of military operations; the use of military equipment and facilities; allowing military personnel to operate and maintain that equipment provided; and finally the training and advising of civilian law enforcement. The amended act stopped short of U.S. military personnel participating in search, seizure, and arrest activities. Additionally, it provided two caveats to support: assistance would not interfere with military readiness or preparedness and \textit{there would be no direct participation by military forces in interdiction}.\textsuperscript{12}

It is precisely this direct participation by military forces in interdiction that is missing from our nation’s drug control strategy. We are not using all of the tools available in our kit-bag and we have not put the teeth and the muscle behind our rhetoric.

Even with the more lenient provisions offered in Public Law 97-86, the applicability of the Posse Comitatus Act in dealing with military support of counter-drug operations is no longer relevant. It is not appropriate to invoke the provisions of the act and relate them to drug-related searches and seizures that are made to protect our national borders and American citizens.
The premise for which the act was written still has merit. Obviously, an unacceptable condition arose during the recovery from Hurricane Andrew in Florida when uniformed soldiers were used to erect tents to be used as polling places during a local election. This event recalled the conditions that existed in 1878 when the Posse Comitatus Act was passed. Soldiers cannot be allowed, intentionally or unintentionally by their uniformed presence, to influence the outcome of any election.

Our legislators should act now to amend the Posse Comitatus Act. This action is required to allow our active and reserve military forces to conduct searches and seizures, outside our nation's physical borders (in international airspace and waters as well as within our own territorial airspace and waters), and to facilitate more active participation in the war on drugs. Such an amendment could be designed on the premise that the Posse Comitatus Act was never intended to be applied to actions that take place outside our national borders. At our boundaries and inside those boundaries, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the U.S. Customs Service, and various police organizations can operate within the parameters of their regulatory search and seizure requirements. Quite simply, it is time to give our military more authority to
assist federal and local law enforcement agencies in securing our borders from illegal entry and narco-trafficking.

Having argued why the limiting Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 is outdated and irrelevant, now is the time to more thoroughly revise/replace that law.

**Military Involvement - Rules of Engagement**

Perhaps the solution to the dilemma posed by the continued presence of the Posse Comitatus Act resides in the creation of a set of dynamic Rules of Engagement (ROE) for military forces assigned counter-drug responsibilities. The ability to search and seize is inextricably tied to the use of deadly force, particularly when it comes to the role of the military.

In the worst-case ROE example, a U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft pulls beside a civilian or commercial aircraft of a type frequently used to transport narcotics. In this scenario, the civilian aircraft's radio is inoperative, the fighter is unable to hail or communicate with the civilian, the civilian aircraft appears to make an attempt to evade the fighter, and the military pilot shoots the civilian aircraft down.

The establishment of the following ROE - applying to civilian as well as military aircraft - could avoid this unfortunate situation. A civilian pilot departing from an
airfield outside the United States, with a destination inside our borders, would be required to file an acceptable flight plan. U.S. military aircraft employed in the drug interdiction role would follow an escalating use-of-force protocol upon encountering civilian aircraft approaching U.S. airspace that had not filed a flight plan or had deviated from their submitted plan. U.S. military naval vessels would follow similar procedures upon encountering civilian or commercial craft of unknown origin or which had followed a suspicious course.

The establishment and communication of Rules of Engagement is a complicated issue. However, if our military forces are to possess the latitude necessary to accomplish their mission and protect our borders by employing the threat or measured use of force, we must provide them with detailed, appropriate, and acceptable rules to follow.

Current Operations

Our current national drug control strategy has five strategic goals, each with a set of supporting objectives. They are as follows:

Goal 1: Educate and enable America’s youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.
Goal 2: Increase the safety of America’s citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.
Goal 3: Reduce health and social costs to the public
of illegal drug use.

Goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply. 13

The focus of this analysis is on Goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat. In support of this goal, our Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) outlines the following objectives, or ends:

Objective 1: Conduct flexible operations to detect, disrupt, deter, and seize illegal drugs in transit to the United States and at U.S. Borders.

Objective 2: Improve the coordination and effectiveness of U.S. drug law enforcement programs with particular emphasis on the southwest border, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Objective 3: Improve bilateral and regional cooperation with Mexico as well as other cocaine and heroin transit zone countries in order to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

Objective 4: Support and highlight research and technology - including the development of scientific information and data - to detect, disrupt, deter, and seize illegal drugs in transit to the United States and at U.S. borders. 14

To accomplish these objectives, the ONDCP has reorganized its interdiction efforts and created three geographically-oriented counterdrug Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs). These JIATFs employ U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Coast Guard, and Department of Defense operational assets in the conduct of interdiction operations in the Gulf of Mexico, Pacific, and South America. 15
JIATF East (formerly JTF-4) is a subordinate joint command of U.S. Atlantic Command located in Key West, Florida. Its principal mission is to help Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEA) reduce the flow of drugs and other contraband from Latin America. JIATF West (formerly JTF-5), at March AFB, California, is a subordinate joint command of U.S. Pacific Command. JIATF West’s mission is to detect and monitor maritime and air drug trafficking in the Eastern Pacific. Likewise, JIATF South, in Panama, detects and monitors drug trafficking in South America.16

Another essential element of our national counterdrug interdiction effort includes the Department of Defense’s Joint Task Force Six, which coordinates military support of federal, state, and local counterdrug efforts along the U.S.- Mexican border. This task force recently received national attention regarding its involvement in the death of a Mexican youth. The young man was shot by a U.S. Marine member of Joint Task Force Six, once again calling into question the legality and utility of military involvement in the counter-drug effort.

Shifting the Emphasis - Military Involvement

Although the crime and drug use rates are down marginally across the entire nation, they are still at unacceptable levels. Congress has given the ONDCP a $16 billion budget to further
combat this national epidemic. Thirty-five percent ($5.5 billion) of that budget has been ear-marked "for programs that increase the safety of America’s citizens by reducing drug-related crime and violence." On the other hand, the ONDCP has allocated only 10% ($1.6 billion) to Goal 4, Stopping the Flow of Drugs at our Borders.

In 1989, then-Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney issued guidance for the implementation of the President’s national drug control strategy. In that guidance he stated:

Success of the attack on drugs in transit will require sustained deployment of appropriately trained and equipped members of the U.S. armed forces and substantially improved cooperation between the armed forces and U.S. law enforcement agencies. The substantial increase in military participation in the attack on drugs in transit is intended to be in addition to, rather than in place of, Federal law enforcement agencies’ efforts.  

Secretary Cheney followed up this DOD guidance with a letter to each of the specified and unified commanders-in-chief (CINCs). This letter directed them to "elevate the priority of the counternarcotics mission within your command. Keep me informed through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the progress of your command in carrying out this mission within your area of responsibility."

Table 3 reflects that Federal-wide annual drug seizures, notably cocaine, increased (with the exception of 1993) in the
five years following President Bush and Secretary Cheney’s commitment to military support for drug control and interdiction. However, it is also apparent that seizures declined considerably, returning to 1990 levels, in 1995 and 1996.

Table 3

Federal-Wide Drug Seizure System
Annual Seizures, By Fiscal Year

![Graph of Cocaine Seizures by Fiscal Year]

Source: DEA's FDSS Report (4/22/97)
Office of National Drug Control Policy, Reducing Drug Abuse in America

On November 6, 1997, Barry McCaffrey, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, pursuant to the National Narcotics Leadership Act, refused to certify the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Fiscal Year 1999 budget. In a letter from McCaffrey to Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, the ONDCP Director stated that DOD “had requested $809 million for FY99 drug control programs, approximately the same level as FY98.” McCaffrey went on to require the Defense Department to amend its FY99 budget “to include an additional $141 million in drug control
initiatives...which will enhance operations...along our borders." The current defense secretary has not maintained DOD's 1989 level of momentum in the war on drugs.

**Recommendations**

On 3 August 1997, Ed Koch, former mayor of New York City, spoke to the U.S. Army War College Class of 1998. He expressed his belief that the war on drugs "should be turned over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (military)." Mayor Koch stated that he was convinced that the military possesses the culture and necessary resources to plan a successful campaign to win the drug war. This paper expands on Mayor Koch's proposal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) should not only plan the campaign but DOD should assume full responsibility for securing U.S. borders from illegal drug traffic.

How far-fetched and out-of-the-box is this line of thinking? Frankly, not that far. At the end of the Cold War, "the Pentagon jumped to the forefront of the drug fight in a burst of enthusiasm sparked by concern that its traditional war-fighting mission was evaporating with the sudden decline of the Soviet threat." With recent publication of National Defense Panel (NDP) findings and their challenge to the military's two near-
simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTW) scenario, the Pentagon must respond to yet another aftershock following the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. An enhanced role in the counter-narcotics war could serve to bolster defense funding in the face of more ambiguous threats.

Today, one argument against a greater role for the military holds that the Persian Gulf War “made some military officers scornful of mere anti-drug operations.” Others also claim the Pentagon is wary “about becoming too closely identified with the failure to make inroads against a potentially intractable problem.” Complete commitment on the part of our national command authority and military leadership would go a long way toward removing this “failure to make inroads” from the equation.

But what is the most important consideration when choosing a course for American policy? Our leaders must consult the American people and be responsive to their desires. The ONDCP commissioned The Gallup Organization to study the American public’s views and perceptions of our drug problem and actions they would support. Gallup found Americans “are most concerned with the crime and violence the country is experiencing, and regard drugs...as a serious problem.” (Table 1, page 2) More than eight of every ten Americans responded that reducing illegal
drug use among children and adolescents is an extremely important area demanding tax dollars. (Table 4)²⁶

Table 4

Importance of National Concerns in Terms of Where Tax Dollars Should be Spent

Reducing violent crime.................................84%
Reducing illegal drug use among children/adolescents...............................82%
Educational opportunities for children........................................82%
Health insurance or low cost health care..........................66%
Reducing drunk driving........................................63%
Reducing illegal drug use among adults.............57%
Reducing unemployment.................................55%
Gun Control.................................................36%


Campaign Planning and Execution

In implementing this proposed strategy and making the change to a greater role for the military in drug interdiction, our national command authority must allow the JCS to plan in an unconstrained environment. Military planners must be able to consider all available resources and assets and then have the final plan reviewed and approved by the NCA.

The second leg of the recommended strategy - border security and military responsibility for drug interdiction - correctly prioritizes and resources our drug war efforts. For too long our
policies have been passive and reactive - spending 35% of the
ONDCP budget on the reduction of drug-related crime and violence.
We need new initiatives and proactive efforts to stop the flow of
drugs at and outside of our borders (Table 5).

Table 5
Agreement with Statements
About Drug Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>% Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More money should be spent on stopping drugs from coming into the U.S. from foreign countries</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should have more drug treatment available to reduce drug use</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the money spent on building prisons for drug users were spent on prevention and rehabilitation, there would be significantly less crime</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harsh criminal penalties for using illegal drugs are an effective means of drug prevention</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should have more severe penalties for drug users than for people who sell drugs</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a person gets addicted to drugs, treatment and rehabilitation programs usually do not work</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tellingly, the ONDCP’s National Drug Control Strategy declares, "unless we shield our borders from the flow of illegal drugs, the United States will never stem the tide of drug abuse. Interdiction is the key to stopping drugs from crossing our borders and reaching our neighborhoods."^27

To implement this strategy, this author proposes the creation of an additional unified combatant command. The new CINC would receive guidance from the NCA and JCS, develop his own campaign plan, and employ the resources to defeat the threat.
With the end of the Cold War, elements of our military establishment are now free to address some of the complex issues surrounding the breakdown of the fabric of our society. As our armed forces have downsized and historical threats have changed, we can redirect our spending, resources, and efforts to the creation of this command and defeat of our nation's drug problem.

This new Drug Interdiction CINC must have the freedom to plan using all sources - intelligence, weaponry, personnel, etc.- currently available within the military establishment. We must also invest force modernization dollars in the development of new equipment to provide the CINC with comprehensive coverage and capabilities. He must monitor and secure all of our borders. Although current efforts are focused on the southwest border, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, The National Drug Control Strategy states:

Our ability to interdict illegal drugs is challenged by the volume of drug traffic and the ease with which traffickers have switched modes and routes. Efforts to interrupt the flow of drugs must be supported by timely and predictive intelligence that is well-coordinated and responsive to changing trafficking patterns.38

For this reason, the CINC must be charged with securing all of our borders, thereby defeating the traffickers' ability to change modes and routes.
Assessing the Benefits

The amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act found in Public Law 97-86 mandates that military support to counter-drug operations will not interfere with military readiness or preparedness. On the contrary, there are tangible benefits from the military's participation in the drug war. Leif Rosenberger, in his book, America's Drug War Debacle, states, "Counterdrug operations offer some training... it allows the U.S. military access to host nations and establishes relationships and support infrastructures within a particular nation. Such support is often critical during regional crisis." The Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) require commanders-in-chief to design Theater Engagement Plans (TEP) for their areas of responsibility (AOR). The training and presence benefits available in an expanded drug interdiction role for the U.S. military will fit nicely into these TEPs.

Finally, the new CINC will be charged with the responsibility to lead an interagency process - with the State, Defense, and Justice Departments, DEA, and FBI, for example. This process will ensure guidance is being translated into acceptable and appropriate action.
Will implementation of this recommendation amount to the closure of our borders and our society? No, but if we are serious about interdicting the supply before it penetrates our borders, we have to make the requisite investments and sacrifices (potential trade/transit slowdowns, delays in immigration processing, moderately heightened military presence, etc.) necessary to be effective.

Analyzing the Ends, Ways, and Means

It is beneficial to next assess how suitable, feasible, and acceptable this recommended course of action is measured against ends-ways-means in the strategic-operational-tactical context. The end our nation pursues is the total elimination of the drug element from our society. Current presidential and ONDCP goals are mis-placed and will never achieve this desired end state.

This paper argues the only way our nation will reach this end state is to generate and maintain a commitment to the ways and means of a massive drug interdiction campaign. National-level (NCA/JCS) planning accompanied by CINC-level planning and execution, securing our borders, and the international waters and airspace surrounding them, provide the only truly effective ways to accomplish the stated strategy. Finally, the American people and their leaders must commit the resources (means) to accomplish
the desired objectives. These resources include tax dollars, personnel, equipment, time, and sustained commitment. We have finally balanced the federal budget and expect a surplus in the next few years. If we commit these resources, this strategy will be effective.

Strategically, we are very close to the mark. Our ONDCP has clearly articulated five sound goals. In the strategic arena, the change we must make deals with mind-set and priorities. Education is not enough. We must elevate "Goal 4: Shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat" to the Number 1 priority.

Operationally, the creation of an additional area of responsibility for an additional unified commander-in-chief will encompass United States territorial waters and airspace as well as the international waters and airspace through which illegal narcotics transit to reach our sovereign soil. Adequately resourced, the Drug Interdiction CINC can design and execute an aggressive campaign plan.

On the tactical battlefield in the CINC’s AOR, he will have the force package, composed of elements of all of the services, required to defeat the threat and accomplish the mission. U.S. Armed Forces, equipped with all of the capabilities necessary, employing a measured set of Rules of Engagement, can acquire,
target, and, if necessary, destroy inbound narcotics, traffickers, and their means of transportation.

Does this proposal, then, meet the requirements for strategy formulation? We have defined the ends, settled on the ways, and set aside the means necessary to stay the course. Furthermore, we have redesigned the goals at the strategic level, created a headquarters to oversee campaign planning and execution at the operational level, and made available the forces and ROE necessary for success at the tactical level. This strategy is most certainly suitable, feasible, and acceptable.

In conclusion, our current interdiction strategy has proven to be ineffective. Less than 35% of available, in-transit drugs are being seized. We are losing the war on drugs. To win, we must turn interdiction over to the military and create a new unified command charged with this responsibility. We must tighten our borders and stop the flow of narcotics to our citizens and our children...it is a vital national interest.
ENDNOTES

1 A National Security Strategy for a New Century (The White House), 5.
3 "Declaration of the Mexican/U.S. Alliance Against Drugs" (Mexico City, May 6, 1997), 2.
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7 Ibid., 9.
9 Ibid., 427.
10 Ibid., 428.
11 Ibid., 430.
14 Ibid., 31.
15 Ibid., 57.
16 William W. Mendel and Murl D. Munger, Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), 31, 53.
19 Ibid., 93.
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23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 8.
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Control, on U.S.-Mexico Counter-Narcotics Efforts, October 29, 1997."