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USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS

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Two February 1985 will be the 100th anniversary of the birth of M.V. Frunze, prominent soviet, party, state and military figure, outstanding military leader and theoretician, and one of the active organizers and founders of the Soviet Armed Forces.*

Prominent soviet, party and state figure and talented military leader, M.V. Frunze was at the same time an outstanding military theoretician. He left an extensive theoretical military legacy in all branches of military science, including military education and upbringing. M.V. Frunze's military-pedagogical views were developed in the course of his revolutionary and military activities under the influence of Marxist-Leninist concepts.

Creatively applying the principles of Marxism, V.I. Lenin and the Communist Party worked out questions pertaining to military education and upbringing, based on the need to establish a regular, well-trained army. V.I. Lenin's demand that "military affairs be taught in a real manner" permeated and guided all aspects of the training of the Armed Forces. From the very beginning of its formation, the Red Army engaged in military operations simultaneously on numerous fronts, carrying out the instructions of its leader, and persistently engaged in combat training. M.V. Frunze was one of the most zealous students (and then one of the teachers) of military affairs. Like all outstanding military leaders, he was at the same time a prominent military teacher; he understood human psychology well and was a real master of military training and indoctrination. Many of his military-pedagogical views on the general principles, the organization, forms and methods of military training and indoctrination are still valid today.

On The Specific Features And The Principles Underlying The Training and Indoctrination Of The Red Army

M.V. Frunze analyzed the experience of the largest wars and arrived at the conclusion that "the strength of any army, including ours, is based on two factors: in the first place, it is based on the political mood, and in the second, on the factors of training and combat preparation."¹ "...Even with a good political mood and in a state of readiness to enter into battle and give our lives, we could find ourselves incapable of gaining a victory if we are poorly trained. Ability... combat training is required in addition to a good political mood."² He indicated that the Red Army must be indoctrinated and trained on the basis of unified concepts and unified views on all matters pertaining to its activities and its tasks.

Mikhail Vasil'yevich also noted that the basic premises stemming from the Communist Party Program, from the nature of the workers' state and from the entire essence of its ideology had to be and in fact were reflected in the principles underlying the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces. Unlike the bourgeois armies, which instill political indifference and lack of principles, and deny their class nature, Frunze said, we build the entire power of our Red Army and its entire might precisely on extensively and thoroughly developed political awareness. He considered the entire process of military training in organic unity with political indoctrination, with political indoctrination having the determining and leading role.

M.V. Frunze attached special importance to the development of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook, to the achievement of a thorough understanding of the policy of the party and the Soviet Government by all the personnel, and to the fulfillment of one's military duty to defend the socialist homeland. He tirelessly explained that the nature of a war which the Red Army should be forced to engage in would be reflected in all aspects of its life and work, would permeate the entire system of our organization and be reflected in the methods used for the training and indoctrination of the army and in a large number of other practical conclusions.³

Proceeding from general party positions on questions of communist indoctrination of the workers, M.V. Frunze considered it necessary to base the training and indoctrination of our Armed Forces on new and absolutely different principles than those applied in the bourgeois armies.

He assigned the determining role to the principle of /communist ideological conviction and party-mindedness/ in the training and indoctrination, which are expected to insure political awareness in all the personnel and their selfless devotion to the cause of the party and the people. He considered the world outlook of the Bolshevik Party to be the foundation of all the political and military indoctrination. The policy of the party and government constitute that vital foundation on which all of our state, cultural, military, educational and indoctrinational work in the army is based. "Profound, unshakeable devotion to it (the party—M.G.) and adherence to its ideals, its discipline and steadfastness are an indispensable condition for the strength of the Red Army and Navy and for their fighting efficiency,"⁴ M.V. Frunze stated.

In accordance with instruction from the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)], he demanded that the barracks be as close as possible to the military school, that it be made a center not only of military training, but of general education and indoctrination.
M.V. Frunze regarded combat and political training as the most important means of implementing the military policy of the party and the state, of actually providing a reliable defense of the socialist homeland. While assigning an important role to the commanders and political workers, he stressed the fact that the combat and political training in the army and navy are not their personal cause, but an extremely important party and state cause, their party and state duty.

In the ideological indoctrination of the personnel and the enhancement of party influence in the army and navy, just as our party demands, M.V. Frunze attached extraordinary importance to party-political work, to stimulating the activity of party and Komsomol organizations and assuring that the communists and Komsomol members had the vanguard role and set an example. A decision coming out of the 8th Party Congress stated that membership in a communist cell did not give the soldier any sort of special rights, but only imposed upon him the duty to be the most selfless and courageous fightingman.5

Frunze stressed the fact that the need for unity of training and indoctrination/, and primarily the close interlinking of the training with the political and military indoctrination, also stems from their ideological conviction and party spirit. Frunze demanded that the commanders and political workers turn their attention to the need to merge two lines—the purely military and the political—in the military-political indoctrination of the Red Army. He considered it "absolutely essential for every practical activity to take place with the watchword of all-round merging of these two areas."6

M.V. Frunze also indicated that military training and indoctrination can only be separated theoretically, that on the practical level they must be inseparable and merged into one. All of the classes should not just provide knowledge and skills, but should constantly indoctrinate the personnel. It is precisely the unity of training and indoctrination, especially political and military, which contributes most to the development in the fightingmen of fearlessness and a preparedness to accomplish the assigned missions in a combat situation at any cost. M.V. Frunze noted that the political awareness of Red Army personnel and their preparedness for self-sacrifice is immeasurably higher than in the army of any bourgeois nation.

Frunze attached great importance to unity of theory and praxis/, which was to be reflected most fully in the teaching of the Armed Forces personnel only that which may be required in a future war. We do not build our military strength in isolation from life, but on the contrary, on the intensification and enlargement of its links with life. M.V. Frunze's demand that a practical focus be given to the entire process of military training and indoctrination stemmed precisely from the principle of teaching the troops what is necessary in a war. He demanded that there be no gap between the peacetime combat training and the action which would be demanded from the troops in a war, and that the focus be shifted to training them in the field, in diverse terrain, in circumstances approaching a combat situation, "because if it became necessary, we would conduct a new war with the least losses and sacrifices, 'with little bloodshed,' as Suvorov, one of the greatest military leaders, said...."7 He believed that the Red Army man or commander cannot be taught military affairs with words alone, even the finest words. It is impossible to acquire the skills essential in a combat situation without active independent work and practical drills. Furthermore, the drills should be systematic, in order to achieve confidence of action in the formation, behind the weapon and on the battlefield.
When he spoke of unity of theory and praxis, M.V. Frunze also had in mind the fact that the political training should not be an abstract thing, but should be closely linked with the combat training tasks and the daily life of the formations and units. "We must organize our educational work," he demanded, "so as to develop both a Red Soviet citizen and a Red fightingman. And I would place special stress on the second part of this formula. The fact is that we sometimes become too involved in the civilian tasks and forget that our duty is primarily to concern ourselves with developing out of the peasant drafted into the army, a well trained and indoctrinated Red fightingman."

Of all the general pedagogical principles, M.V. Frunze attached the greatest importance to the following: /the principle of awareness and activeness on the part of the personnel/ in the training process; the individual approach to every serviceman, while simultaneously relying on the collective; working systematically and according to a plan; intelligibility, permanence and clarity of the training. He pointed out the fact that different methods of training and indoctrination are needed to implement these in the life of the army of the socialist state. Many training methods used in the old army could not be applied in the Red Army. The old army did not so much teach and indoctrinate the soldiers as make fools of them, not so much educate them as dull their minds. The method of regimentation and mechanical memorization of material predominated, and the officer had an active role in the training process, while the bulk of the soldiers remained passive and inert.

M.V. Frunze believed that the individual with his awareness, his feelings and personal characteristics moves to the center of all the military-political work in the Red Army. An important place in the training and indoctrination must be assigned to the awareness, activeness and the personal responsibility of the trainees themselves.

Frunze attached particular importance to /intelligibility of information/ to the ability of commanders and political workers to present the most complex political and military issues to the Red Army men in a clear and intelligible form. He himself set a brilliant example of how this should be with his own talks.

Frunze warned, however, that intelligibility of the training should not be taken to mean simplifying or making things easier. The training process must evoke both mental and physical exertion and strengthen the will and the character of the trainees. He persistently recommended that those in charge of classes with both the Red Army soldiers and command and political staff be able to interest the trainees, to evoke in them a love for military affairs and a desire to constantly perfect their knowledge and practical skills themselves. While attaching great importance to the form in which the material was presented and the method used, he also cautioned against making forms and methods an end in themselves. The ideological content of the training and indoctrination must still be the main thing. When he defined the content of the combat training, M.V. Frunze attached primary importance to training the troops in active offensive operations. He also demanded a skillful combination of various types of combat operations and warned against underestimating the importance of defense.

The /force of example/ is an extremely powerful indoctrinational tool in the new army, as it is in the socialist society in general. If the instructor does not
set a personal example and does not possess prestige, M.V. Frunze stressed, "then we will achieve nothing with the mechanical subordination of the Red Army man, with his regimentation.... This applies to any level of command." He persistently explained that the commander and the political worker must know how to properly approach every serviceman, how to study his individual characteristics, how to affect not only his mind, but also his senses, and to strive to achieve complete mutual understanding between chiefs and subordinates. In order to achieve this, every commander and political worker must be good teachers and psychologists.

While demanding rejection of the old methods of training and indoctrination and the adoption of new methods conforming to the specific features of the Red Army, M.V. Frunze cautioned the commanders and political workers against two errors which are made in this area. In the first place, they should not totally reject all of the old aspects of the training methods merely because they are old. The entire beneficial pedagogical experience needs to be adopted and used skillfully and creatively. In the second place, a creative approach should be taken to both the old and the new methods of training and indoctrination. "In general, every Red commander must firmly grasp the fact that slavery to routine and extreme enthusiasm for some specific plan or some specific method are the most dangerous thing of all for us... for us, nothing can be absolute or solidly fixed; everything flows and changes, and any means, any method might be used in a certain situation."10

On The Training Of Command And Political Personnel

M.V. Frunze noted with great satisfaction that despite the unusually difficult circumstances in which the new army was formed, our party and our state has succeeded in developing their military cadres. He stressed the fact that particularly the class composition of the Red Army and the higher military school demonstrated with adequate eloquence whose interests our command personnel serve. He attributed the successes achieved in the preparation of our military cadres not to the special talents or merits of the military workers, but to the fact that the objective situation had moved military tasks to the fore during the revolution and drawn the attention of the party, the working class and the peasantry to them.

M.V. Frunze constantly pointed out that the postwar situation and the nature of a future war set very great demands for the command and political cadres, that the level of their training was still a long way from measuring up to the new circumstances. In general, the Red Army was experiencing an acute need for highly skilled Red commanders by that time.

With this in mind, M.V. Frunze demonstrated great concern for improving the professional training of the military cadres, regarding this as an important condition for the successful performance of all tasks in the organizational development and preparation of the Armed Forces.

Based on the party Central Committee's instructions on the preparation of cadres, M.V. Frunze set a number of new requirements for the training and indoctrination of Red Army commanders and political workers. While the first officer courses were still being set up in the Yaroslavl Military District, M.V. Frunze required the preparation of a commander/instructor with the following qualities: 1. The instructor should have a passionate and revolutionary spirit and a powerful desire to implement the concepts of communism, and be able to instill that spirit
in the trainees; 2. He should possess a reserve of intellectual ability and be a well developed individual; 3. He should be able to rapidly take in external impressions and figure out developments in life occurring around him; 4. He should possess a body of specific knowledge in his military speciality; 5. He should be able to pass on what he has learned to the trainees--that is, possess pedagogical skills; 6. He should have an understanding of training methods and train his students methodically, moving from the simple to the more complex; 7. He himself should set an example as a soldier in which a trainee could see a model worthy of emulation; 8. The instructor should have irreproachable morals.

With regard to a future war, the requirements set for the training of command and political cadres were made even greater. Taking this into account, Frunze constantly reminded the commanders and political workers that they should keep a constant eye on everything occurring in our armed forces and in the armies of other nations, that determined, /systematic work on their own education/ was essential. "...And this is the duty of all commanders without exception," he stressed. "He who does not do this will find himself unable to keep the distance very early, in which case he should blame no one but himself."11 Frunze stressed the fact that membership in the proletariat or the peasantry alone, or even the most selfless devotion to the interests of the workers is not enough to serve the interests of the workers and the peasants in the best possible manner. Nor is a mastery of the techniques of military art--that which is required of a commander in the bourgeois armies--alone, enough. Considerably more is demanded of the Red commander. In order for a Red Army commander to be at the proper level as a commander in the army of the socialist revolution, he must have a perfect mastery of the Marxist-Leninist method. This, in turn, can only be achieved if all of the work of the higher school and all of the training of command and political personnel in the army and navy is imbued with a spirit of Marxism-Leninism, if all of the military disciplines are illuminated with Marxism-Leninism, if the study of Leninism is raised to a fitting height.

Mikhail Vasil'evich taught us that it is no less important to master the fundamentals of military science and military art. In the article, "On the Academy and Academicians," M.V. Frunze wrote that while welcoming the creativity and the critical rethinking of past experience in every way, it was also necessary to resolutely oppose the nihilism in military affairs and the over confidence of certain young commanders. He did not approve of commanders, including young cadets at the academy, who treated the old specialists with contempt under the guise of the revolutionary breakup of everything old, without having studied either the old or the new experience and without properly understanding any of it. Confidence in one's abilities, confidence in one's self, he taught us, is a fine thing, especially when it is based on a solid foundation of knowledge and experience. Without such a base, however, it holds the danger of turning into arrogance and unjustified self-sufficiency.

M.V. Frunze set an example of demandingness and self-criticism in this respect not just toward others, but toward himself as well. "I will tell you honestly and candidly about myself personally," he said, "that in a number of respects I am constantly aware of my own great backwardness. I am aware of how much work is necessary in order to truly become worthy of those posts at which the Soviet State has placed us."12
Frunze persistently reminded us that "the commander who rests on his laurels, counts only on his old merits and because of this, does not advance in his education or improvement, that commander will not have our support."13

Straight forwardness was one of M.V. Frunze's characteristics. He was frank with people and knew how to focus the main attention on precisely the acute issues, not avoid them. In his address to the academy graduates, for example, M.V. Frunze did not conceal the difficulties which they would encounter in the forces. He told them frankly that they would be returning to a fairly drab atmosphere, an atmosphere of ordinary routine and everyday interests. And that situation would unquestionably place great obstacles on the path to accomplishing the assigned missions. The individual who became despondent and apathetic would be a poor commander, however. The real commander and organizer would be tested precisely in that situation, in that everyday work routine. And only the individual who would be able to cope with that situation, prevent it from getting the best of him, be able to work himself and to carry the others along with him could claim to be a real Red Army commander.

M.V. Frunze warned the commanders that military science and military affairs were moving ahead rapidly. Thought would become feeble and fruitless if it did not strengthen itself, if it did not keep up with all the achievements in military affairs. The conclusion: "Only those of you who will experience a sense of constant dissatisfaction with yourselves, dissatisfaction and the inadequacy of the scientific preparation you have taken from the academy, those who will strive to expand your perspective, to enlarge your theoretical and practical knowledge—only those who do not fall behind in military affairs, will move ahead and perhaps take dozens or hundreds of other people with you."14

In view of the shortage of trained cadres, he strove to see that the graduates of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] Military Academy were sent primarily to work on staffs at the operational and strategic level. "We must not be so provident," he said, "as to hold up our Red Academicians for long periods in line positions, especially when they already have a certain amount of line experience from the past."15

M.V. Frunze never looked down on commanders who had not had the opportunity to acquire the necessary theoretical training. Mikhail Vasil'yevich spared neither time nor effort to work painstakingly with them and to direct their self-education into the proper channel. He was extremely intolerant, however, and sharply critical of dilettantism manifested not simply in inadequate knowledge, but also in the fact that a person not only did not know something, but did not even want to know it, when, without understanding the matter and being content with only a superficial knowledge, such an individual took it upon himself to self-confidently and categorically assess specific problems of theory or praxis. He considered it indispensable for the commanders and political workers to study the most important issues from original sources as one of the conditions for their serious and substantive training. Mikhail Vasil'yevich was convinced that no proper understanding of anything could be gained from substitute spiritual nourishment. Convictions are honed and profound thinking generated only with direct study and research of facts, documents and works, as he did when he summarized the experience of the war in Morocco, for example.
M.V. Frunze hated all manifestations of mental vegetation or intellectual laziness. When he was working on the article, "On the Reorganization of the French Army," in 1921, he advised one of the staff workers in charge to read a book on military organizational development abroad. The next time they met, Mikhail Vasil'yevich understood that the comrade had not read the book himself but had assigned it to a subordinate to read, he did not conceal his dissatisfaction, but simply broke off the discussion. This attitude toward books seemed to him as unnatural as it would be for a human being to assign the vital functions of his organism to another. While physical emaciation from systematic undernourishment makes itself felt fairly rapidly and is immediately apparent, however, spiritual starvation, unfortunately, is a more latent process. This is why it is particularly dangerous.

During those years such demanding attitudes toward self-education, the development of one's perspective and competence, and the ability to get to the bottom of things, to the depths of any matter oneself, were frequently regarded as extreme and not corresponding to the existing level of the cadres' training. The main thing for him was not the fact of a commander's knowledge or lack of knowledge of a specific matter (this could always be rectified), but his basic attitude toward his own self-education. Frunze considered military-theoretical backwardness on the part of a senior leader, when the latter's lack of competence not only prevented him from thoroughly handling his assigned job, seeing all of its aspects and skillfully directing his subordinates, but also prevented him from understanding what they were reporting to him, to be the greatest evil for the military service. Life subsequently confirmed how profoundly correct he had been in making such great demands of the training of military cadres.

All of this is reminiscent of the modern demands. Speaking at the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, described concisely but extensively the qualities which the Soviet military leader must possess. "They include competence, an acute feeling for new things, the ability to assume responsibility for the execution of difficult missions, to promptly detect and support initiative, to mobilize the will and the energy of the personnel... the ability to think and function in a situation with an extremely rigid time limitation, enormous moral-psychological and physical stress."15a

M.V. Frunze is rightly considered to be the founder of officer training in the Soviet Armed Forces. It was his appointment to the post of chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR which laid the unified foundation for organizing the training and indoctrination of command and political personnel at military educational institutions and within the officer training system in the army and navy forces.

M.V. Frunze proceeded from the premise that the officer training programs should assure the systematic mastery of all the basic achievements of military science and military art. At the same time, he resolutely opposed overloading the officer training programs in the forces and the training programs at VUZ's. "If we do not make some thoroughgoing changes in this area," he said, "there is the threat of great danger, primarily in the sense that all of our enormous and fine programs will remain on paper and get no further, because it is practically impossible for us to implement them. They will simply be a formality and will by
no means be mastered. On the other hand, this sort of overloading increases apathy and indifference among the command and political personnel. I therefore consider it to be our greatest and largest task to immediately set about further studying this matter to make it possible for us immediately to set up the programs so as to make them viable.... We need to approach the matter in a practical manner. It will be far better for us to curtail our programs than to have extensive programs but cover them in such a way that there can be no hope of mastering them."

The more time has gone by since those words were spoken, the more up-to-date they have sounded. This is because with the development of the equipment and the increasing complexity of military affairs, the volume of knowledge and skills needed by the officers has grown, and the attempt to include the large number of subjects in the programs has resulted in overloading and overdistention of the training process and negatively affected training effectiveness. Arriving at the optimal scope of programs which take into account the level of development of military affairs, on the one hand, and realistic possibilities for mastering them well, on the other, therefore has been one of the most important problems involved in organizing officer training and the training process at military educational institutions, and is still one today. Along with perfecting the training process as a whole, Frunze regarded independent work by the commanders and political workers as one way out of this situation.

M.V. Frunze was also absolutely cognizant of the fact that this demand can only be implemented if proper conditions are arranged for the self-education of command and political personnel by restructuring and regulating the entire system of military service. He raised the issue of the workday of the commander and political worker, which lasted 12 to 14 hours, for the first time in this connection. He spoke of this in detail at a conference of commanders and chiefs held in Tiflis in 1925.

When he set the task of regulating the workday, he was considering more than just general concern for the commander and political worker. He was most disturbed by the fact that the problem of self-education for the command and political staff would get nowhere under those conditions.

Mikhail Vasil'yevich understood that this task could not be accomplished with general orders and appeals. Unlike certain other leaders, he considered its complexity and did not make light promises to the command staff. He even warned them as the equipment and military affairs in general became more complex, the demands and the scope of questions on which the command personnel would decide, would increase. He was convinced that in order to regulate the workday of the commanders, it would be necessary to thoroughly review the entire system of work performed by command and political personnel, from top to bottom, and to begin at the center.

In order to resolve this matter, in Frunze's opinion, it would be necessary first to plan the work of the central apparatus and then that of the districts, fleets, formations and units, precisely--by the calendar, as he put it. The planning could not be a mere formality, however, but must be thoroughly conceived and realistic, and would have to be adhered to by all those in charge. Any deviation from the plan at the center would cause a chain reaction of disturbances in the planning work at all levels. In the second place, it would be necessary to precisely define the questions which would be determined at the center, in the districts (fleets) and in the formations. It would be necessary to reject the
practice whereby instructions were issued from the top on questions which did not have to be decided at the center. M.V. Frunze said that too much time was being devoted to matters which could be resolved far more rapidly and simply, that they only needed to set themselves the task of seeing to it that the commander accomplished everything which could be accomplished through his individual arrangements. In the third place, regulation of the workday at all levels would depend upon both the superiors and the subordinates of commanders. If the subordinates performed well and completely fulfilled their duties, it would be necessary less frequently for superior chiefs to intervene in their affairs and fewer additional steps would have to be taken to provide assistance and perform various kinds of inspections and checks. Since the problem of the officer's workday will always exist to one degree or another, it would be a good thing for us to give some thought to M.V. Frunze's advice today.

Speaking of the content of the officer training and the methods used, M.V. Frunze stated that the command personnel, which had acquired good practical schooling in the civil war, lacked theoretical training and general high standards most of all. At the same time, he pointed out the need to closely link the theoretical training with the practical work in the forces and warned that the young commander who did not demonstrate confidence in the performance of practical tasks would find himself in a difficult situation in the forces. Mikhail Vasil'evich therefore directed attention to the main shortcoming in the training process at the Military Academy of the RKKA and at other military educational institutions, a shortcoming which stemmed from its separation from the practical work. The discourse of many instructors and students at the military educational institutions was abstract and not specific. Some of them were unable to pick out the main element and to apply their theoretical knowledge in general in the performance of practical tasks. He stated that discussions and literary exercises on general subjects were not of greatest importance at that time, but vigorous, diligent and painstaking work with respect both to their own preparation and mastery of the job assigned to each.

Frunze called upon the professors and instructors to avoid formalism in the training and indoctrinational work, to assess the degree to which the students were grasping the training material not just from their answers, but also on the basis of how well they could apply their knowledge on the practical level, to develop in the students the ability to formulate their decisions precisely and clearly, to set tasks for their subordinates and make the practical arrangements for their execution. While developing general work standards and rules mandatory for all in the trainees, they were not to permit the trainees' individuality and originality to be worn down or suppressed. Mikhail Vasil'evich recommended that greater concern be shown for developing the character of a firm commander and other organizational and volitional qualities. He demanded that the main attention be devoted to the tactical training of the commanders in the training process at VUZ's and in the officer training in the forces. Frunze considered "the elimination of tactical feebleness" to be the main task of the Military Academy of the RKKA.

Frunze was particularly demanding with respect to the training process at the military educational institutions, including the matter of increasing the sense of personal responsibility in the students and cadets, and was extremely disapproving of the padding of grades by certain instructors. He stated frankly that it is the duty of every student to justify the state's large outlays for his training.
"All 100 percent of the time spent... within the walls of the Military Academy of the RKKA... should be used to prepare oneself in the best possible manner for the responsible work ahead. The training and mastery of the subject should be at the fore."17

And so, M.V. Frunze saw three main directions for improving the system of training for command and political personnel: first of all, the development of optimal training programs of realistic scope to conform with the level of development of military science and military art; secondly, the development of training forms and methods which took into account the new demands set for preparation of the army and navy, and in the third place, the thorough increasing of personal responsibility in the trainees, the prestige of a knowledgeable commander or political worker, vitalization of the training process, and intensification of its practical orientation.

On Improving the Combat Training of the Troops

The Red Army engaged in constant combat training, even during the civil war. It became the main mission of the Armed Forces in peacetime, however, and the entire training system had to be better planned and made more systematic and uniform.

M.V. Frunze devoted a great deal of attention to the organization of the combat training. As commander of the Ukraine and the Crimea, he issued detailed organizational instructions on 30 May 1921, "On the Conducting of Summer Exercises Upon the Completion of Basic Drill Instruction and Improving the Combat Training of the Troops," in which he demanded that thorough preparations be made for those first summer assemblies following the civil war.18 He also issued orders on the results of the combat training for that year. An order with an attachment, "List of Instructions /on the Field Training of the Troops/" (my emphasis—M.G.) was issued on the combat training for 1923.19 He was thus the first to single out the concept of field training for the troops in the overall system of combat training.

Frunze continued the work of better organizing the training of the troops (forces) with even greater scope when he assumed the position of deputy chairman and then, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. It was a result of the military reform practically alone which created the conditions for developing planned and goal-oriented combat training for the troops and naval forces. He considered that a unified system of combat training for the troops should be a very important part of military doctrine.

The organization and orientation of the combat training were discussed at a plenum of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR at the end of 1924. In accordance with plenum decisions, beginning in 1925, a unified combat training plan was introduced for the entire Red Army, which covered the Red Army man's entire period of service in the ranks of both regular and territorial units. The practice of setting annual missions for the combat training of the troops (forces) and summing up the results in an order issued by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. The number of the largest exercises, the areas to be covered in them and the schedules for the exercises were planned for the year by the Directorate of the RKKA and were reported to the military districts in good time.

In accordance with the approved programs, the training of the troops in their specialty was mainly effected during the winter training period. Coordination of
the subunits was continued, and unit and formation exercises, and large-scale maneuvers were conducted during the summer period. Two-sided maneuvers, in which the troops of several military districts participated, were conducted in the southwestern part of the Ukraine under M.V. Frunze's supervision as early as September 1921.

The commanders, staffs and troops prepared thoroughly and in good time for the final exercises and maneuvers. Additional classes were held for the command and political personnel on the training areas they were to cover in the exercises, command-staff exercises were conducted with the staffs, and tactical drill, special tactical and tactical classes were conducted with the subunits and units of all the branches of troops. The reorganization of the formations and units in the reform gave the exercises a combined-arms essence. Artillery, engineer sub-units and other reinforcements were used in the battalion, regimental and division exercises. Aircraft began to be used more frequently in the large exercises. As new branches of troops came into being, special exercises were conducted with formations and units of the aviation, antiaircraft artillery and other branches of troops, along with the combined-arms exercises.

In his report, "The International Status of the USSR and Our Military Missions," M.V. Frunze directed the attention of command and political personnel to the fact that it was becoming especially important to develop combat training methods which took into account the new requirements being made of the troop training. He pointed out that it was this aspect of the matter which lagged the most and cautioned against the danger of a future gap developing between the improvement of the political and cultural level of the Red Army men and the methodological skill of command and political personnel.

Striving for strictly systematic and consistent training, M.V. Frunze pointed out that this principle was being taken into fullest account not just in the classes, but also and primarily in the combat training plans and the programs of the military educational institutions, in order to assure gradual growth and solid reinforcement of the knowledge and skills of the trainees. His idea of unifying the disciplines studied and the tasks during the development of programs and plans with the common objective of combat and political training for the army and navy, taking into account the nature of future operations and combat actions, is very important.

M.V. Frunze demanded that greater initiative and independence be given the commanders and staffs undergoing training in all the exercises and military games. The development of a smoothly coordinated system for the organization of the intermediate apparatus, which continued to be perfected in subsequent years, was begun in 1924 and 1925.

M.V. Frunze pointed out that the issuing of orders and the development of programs is only the beginning of the job of overseeing the combat training. Organizational work in the forces, the monitoring of plan fulfillment and personal participation in the training of subordinates were the main thing for the personnel in charge. In 1924 and 1925 he visited many units of the Moscow, Leningrad, Tula, Voronezh, Rostov, Baku, Tiflis and other military garrisons. In the summer of 1925, he took part in a large foreign cruise by ships of the Baltic Fleet. The cruise, which lasted from 20 to 27 June was replete with various exercises and drills. Chief of
Naval Forces V.I. Zof, Baltic Fleet Commander A.K. Bekman and Deputy Commander of the Leningrad Military District B.M. Shaposhnikov were on the flagship with Frunze during the cruise. He practiced the most important aspects of interaction between district troops and fleet forces with them. Throughout the entire cruise, M.V. Frunze also studied navy service extremely thoroughly. He was not embarrassed by his lack of knowledge of specific matters, but carefully listened to the explanations of the specialists and asked detailed questions about various parts of the ship's structure and the weapons, and about the techniques of conducting combat operations at sea. Once again, he set an example of how one should not only teach, but should also constantly learn.

In the course of his work in the forces and in the fleet, M.V. Frunze noted with satisfaction that despite numerous hardships with respect to facilities and living conditions, political enthusiasm reigned throughout, and the personnel were in a fighting spirit. He was gratified by the fact that the commanders and the Red Army men were drawn to the political and military training. He also noticed the lagging of the troops, however, and primarily the command personnel, in the technical and rifle training.

M.V. Frunze considered movement and fire to be the main elements of combat. He therefore devoted a great deal of attention to developing endurance in the troops, to their march training, and to the rapid deployment of the infantry, the cavalry, and artillery for engaging in combat in the most unexpected situations, and he always cited the Suvorov troops as an example.

M.V. Frunze pointed that the thorough study and skillful handling of the weapons and equipment assure the complete employment of their combat capabilities for defeating the enemy, on the one hand, and develop confidence in their capabilities, on the other. The extent of the psychological effect, especially that of a new weapon, can be considerably more powerful than material damage. This is why he demanded that in the exercises, the troops be placed in a situation in which they could acquaint themselves with all the new weapons. The entire army should be familiar with them, and its moods and feelings should be developed in such a way that the employment of new weapons would not be unexpected and would not produce panic in the personnel.

Considering tactical exercises and maneuvers to be the main form of combat training for the troops and of the combat coordination of the formations and units, M.V. Frunze was extremely demanding with respect to their preparation and their instructiveness. He was most strictly demanding of the command and political personnel, striving to see that they creatively applied the instructions contained in the manuals, taking the specific circumstances into account, and employed bold maneuvering on the battlefield, boldness and determination in accordance with the demands of Soviet military doctrine. He was most critical of the unthinking, routine application of instructions contained in the manuals and of the theoretical principles in isolation from reality, in general. When he critiqued the unsuccessful actions of commanders, staffs and troops, he convincingly demonstrated that in order to exhibit a high level of military art, it is not enough simply to apply military theory to praxis. Each specific combat situation is original and unique. The decisions of the commanders and the actions of the troops must be the same, or else they will not conform to the existing situation and consequently, cannot be successful. "The summer and fall exercises," he said, "demonstrated that the command personnel have a proper knowledge of the manual, but they frequently do not know how to apply that knowledge."
M.V. Frunze persistently recommended that the commanders thoroughly and carefully study likely enemies, the organization and capabilities of their formations and units, and the techniques they use for conducting combat operations. He set a splendid example, keeping close watch over the organizational development and training of the capitalist armies.

M.V. Frunze attached great importance to the coordination and training of the staffs. Analyzing the maneuvers conducted, he noted that the work of the formation commanders and staffs frequently lacked proper coordination and interaction. He pointed out that there were still instances of failure to understand the role of chiefs of staff as responsible assistants in working out the operational tasks. This accounted for the fact that they were treated as messengers designated for merely the mechanical conveyance of the commander's instructions. The capabilities of the staffs were not being utilized as a result, the chief of staff was an unnecessary appendage, as it were, and the work suffered because of this. He saw this as a remnant of partisan warfare and demanded that it be eliminated immediately.

Following exercises, tactical drills or firing practice, M.V. Frunze conducted critiques in the immediate area where the combat operations were practiced. He also employed the method of having the commanders of the sides involved analyze and justify their actions at the beginning of the critique. Frunze recommended that those in charge of the exercises not make hasty conclusions on specific decisions or actions of the commanders and the troops, but skillfully point out their weak and strong points and do everything possible to encourage them to make bold decisions and demonstrate initiative. In his opinion, only inaction, passivity and indecisiveness on the part of the trainees deserved severe condemnation.

M.V. Frunze altered the methods used for inspecting and checking the combat and political training of the troops. He demanded that the inspectors combine objectivity and demandingness with a vital interest in improving the situation in the formations and units being inspected. He advised those working in the forces not merely to reveal shortcomings, but also, and primarily, to spot positive examples to be used for indoctrinating the men. He recommended that the commanders be taught at the site how to organize the service, to train and indoctrinate the personnel, and to announce the inspection results in orders and issue specific instructions for eliminating the shortcomings detected.

M.V. Frunze strove to see that the inspections and checks determine the viability and effectiveness of programs, plans and orders produced at the center, in order to use this for improving the work style and methods at higher levels of leadership in the forces. He considered the use of competition between formations and units, with the most outstanding units rewarded in various ways, to be extremely useful for stimulating and vitalizing the combat training.

M.V. Frunze rated the combat training level as the most important element in the combat readiness of the forces as a whole. He considered supervision of the combat and political training to be the main duty of command and political personnel, and every leader's attitude toward the combat training to be the main indication of his maturity. He considered and decided on questions pertaining to the combat training of the troops, from the planning and the individual training of the Red Army men to the development of methods for conducting exercises
and directing the troops, in close linkage one with another, and directed all activities and efforts toward the single goal of enhancing the combat training of the troops and their preparedness to begin executing combat missions at any time.

FOOTNOTES

4. Ibid., p 68.
5. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Central Committee Congresses, Conferences and Plenums], Moscow, Part I, Gosudarstvennoye izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1954, p 436.
7. Ibid., Vol III, p 199.
8. Ibid., Vol II, 1926, p 146.
9. Ibid., Vol III, p 120.
10. Ibid., Vol I, p 403.
11. Ibid., Vol II, p 172.
12. Ibid., p 37.
13. Ibid., p 171.
15. Ibid., p 18.
18. TsGA VMF [Central State Naval Archives of the USSR], M.V. Frunze's orders for 1921, Order No. 712 of 30 May 1921.
19. Ibid., M.V. Frunze's orders for 1923, Order No. 1525 of 14 November 1923.

On 14 May 1985 the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, the men of the Combined Armed Forces, and the peoples of the fraternal socialist countries are ceremoniously marking the 30th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact Organization. This defensive military-political alliance of socialist countries serves as a reliable shield in the struggle to prevent nuclear war and to frustrate the attempts of imperialism's most reactionary circles to organize a crusade against socialism.

The conclusion of the Warsaw Pact was a forced and necessary responsive measure to that threat to the socialist countries which emerged on the part of the imperialist states after World War II. The smoke and ashes of the villages and cities burned by the fascist aggressors had not yet succeeded in dissipating when the reactionary circles of the imperialist states and, primarily of the United States and Great Britain, in striving to revise the results of the war and restore the positions lost by capitalism, began to conduct a policy "from a position of strength" and whip up international tension, and they initiated the "cold war."

In trying to prevent recognition of the superiority of the socialist social and state system over capitalism abroad which was demonstrated objectively in the course and outcome of World War II and to impede the growth of socialism's influence in the world, imperialism's apologists directed turbid streams of slander and provocations against the socialist countries, undertook nuclear blackmail, and began to exploit temporary postwar economic difficulties in an ill-intentioned manner. Simultaneously, the U.S. imperialists began to seize most important military-strategic positions in the most diverse regions of the world and to encircle the USSR and the young European socialist countries with numerous military bases.

In April 1949 the most reactionary leaders of imperialism put together the North Atlantic bloc (NATO)—the powerful strike force of international reaction headed by the United States. It began intensively to equip the armies of its members with the latest means of armed conflict and to game strategic plans for a crusade against the East on big exercises. Bourgeois diplomats and
politicians were engaged in forecasting possible times for the start of World War III.

In 1949, a plan for the preparation and conduct of a war against the Soviet Union under the code name of "Dropshot" was worked out in the United States. On its first stage, implementation of which was planned from 1 January 1957, it was planned to drop 300 nuclear bombs and 250,000 tons of conventional bombs on the USSR. On the second and third stages, continuing air strikes, it was planned to initiate a land attack with the forces of 164 NATO divisions. The total number of invasion troops was determined at 20 million men. On the fourth stage of the war it was planned to accomplish the occupation of the USSR and other socialist countries.

It seemed to the imperialists that it still was not too late, using the American monopoly of the nuclear bomb, to at least throw back significantly the forces of socialism by armed means if not destroy them and thereby inhibit and weaken the development of the world revolutionary process. The creators of the bloc strategy across the ocean also pursued the goal of holding Western Europe in a state of dependence, not permitting in this most important region of the world any other coalitions capable of opposing the United States and conducting a policy independent of it. West Germany was to play an important role in this. Therefore, in May 1955 the Paris Accord which was signed by the NATO countries went into effect and opened the door of the North Atlantic Alliance to the German Federated Republic. The process of this country's postwar militarization began.

The situation which developed required of the socialist countries the urgent organization of their reliable shield against imperialism's aggressive aspirations: on 14 May 1955, in Warsaw, a multilateral Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration, and Mutual Assistance was concluded and went down in history as the Warsaw Pact. Now its members are the Bulgarian People's Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Romanian Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The Warsaw Pact became not only the most effective factor of collective security, but also the logical continuation of the entire preceding combat collaboration of the proletariat and of all workers which was born in the course of numerous class battles with the common enemy for the great cause of socialism and communism. The pact was also a new social and historic phenomenon in the mutual relations of the peoples and armies of fraternal states and the most important stage of socialist internationalism in the military sphere.

In contrast with the military blocs of the imperialist states which are pursuing aggressive goals, the Warsaw Pact is a voluntary defensive military-political alliance of sovereign states based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, imbued with the spirit of friendship and collaboration, mutual confidence, and comradely mutual assistance, and having a common economic, political, and ideological basis and common goal—the preservation of peace and the defense of the building of a socialist and communist society. In this regard, the fraternal countries threaten no one, do not claim foreign territories, and do not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. They are firmly following the Leninist course of peaceful coexistence of states with different political systems.
The Warsaw Pact mechanism is characterized by the combination of organs of political leadership which are engaged in evaluating the international situation and working out joint foreign-policy decisions with special military organs which conduct the working out of recommendations and proposals for strengthening the defensive capability of the allied states and accomplish the training and use of the Combined Armed Forces in the interests of their collective defense. Its political organs are the Political Consultative Committee (PKK) and the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Combined Secretariat which function as its organs. The military organs include the Committee of the Ministers of Defense, Headquarters, Technical Committee, and other organs of the Combined Armed Forces.

The Combined Armed Forces were created for the armed defense of the Warsaw Pact countries. The legal basis of their creation, just as of the organs for their control, was provided by Article 5 of the Pact. Specific contingents of troops and fleets which were allocated by each country of the alliance became part of the Combined Armed Forces. Now the Combined Armed Forces include Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, Air Forces, and Navies.

The history of the Warsaw Pact is the history of a persistent struggle for the preservation of peace on Earth and the defense of socialism.

The military-political events which have occurred in the world during the past 30 years permit estimating highly and at its true worth the activity of the fraternal countries. One sees with his own eyes how necessary, exceptionally timely, and effective a measure for the defense of peace and socialism their signing of the Warsaw Pact was. Many times it cooled the hot aggressive ardor of many Western rulers and military strategists who encroached on those countries which selected the socialist path of development. This is shown, for example, by events of 1956 when the allied countries rendered fraternal assistance to the Hungarian people in eliminating a counterrevolutionary insurrection unleashed by internal reaction with the active assistance of the imperialist powers. This is also confirmed by the decisive support, by the Warsaw Pact member states, of the defensive measures of the German Democratic Republic on the border with West Berlin which defeated an imperialist provocation in August 1961.

Loyal to the principles of socialist internationalism, the allied countries did not remain indifferent when, in 1968, a threat hung over the socialist system in Czechoslovakia. By the joint efforts of five socialist states, the fraternal people of Czechoslovakia were rendered effective assistance in the defense of socialist achievements and the attempt of the imperialists and their accomplices to wrest this country from the world socialist system was staved off. The assistance of the allied countries to the Polish People's Republic frustrated the treacherous attacks of foreign and internal counterrevolution against the socialist achievements in this country which were coordinated by Washington.

The Warsaw Pact member states also undertook decisive measures in the defense of the socialist revolution in Cuba which had been subjected to aggression and blackmail on the part of American imperialism. They rendered comprehensive assistance to the Vietnamese people, as a result of which the biggest attempt of reactionary circles of the United States to make short work of them by means of arms since World War II failed.
At the same time, the chief historic service crowning the entire past activity of the Warsaw Pact is the steady and consistent implementation of the peace-loving Leninist policy which has effectively restrained the unleashing of a new world war and is reliably ensuring the defense of the achievements by the peoples of the socialist countries. The main role here belongs to the Political Consultative Committee—the highest organ of the Warsaw Pact. At its conferences, which are conducted in turn in the capitals of the fraternal countries, the leaders of the ruling parties and the heads of states regularly examine the most important problems which touch on the common interests of the preservation of peace and the defense of socialism and they adopt measures which reflect common positions and views which have been strictly coordinated by the allied countries.

Among the main problems which are constantly in the sphere of competency of the Political Consultative Committee over the past 30 years are the struggle to prevent a new world war, measures to ensure collective security in Europe, defense of socialism's achievements, strengthening the unity and solidarity of the countries, and support of peoples which are struggling for freedom and independence.

An important tool in increasing the stability of the relations and coordinated actions of the fraternal countries in the sphere of foreign policy is the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (created by the decision of the 1976 Bucharest conference of the PKK). Questions connected with implementing the proposals and initiatives put forth by the Political Consultative Committee were examined at its sessions.

Recently, in persistently conducting a struggle to preserve and strengthen peace, relax tension, curb the arms race, and expand and deepen collaboration between states, the Warsaw Pact countries came forth with a series of new big constructive initiatives and proposals directed toward improving the international situation. However, reactionary imperialist circles and, first of all, the United States of America, do not heed the voice of reason. They are forcing military preparations against the socialist countries, are trying to achieve military superiority over the USSR and its allies, are whipping up the arms race without restraint, now also shifting it to outer space, and are trying to dictate their will to sovereign states from a position of strength.

In the summer of 1984 the Council of the West European Alliance lifted the last restrictions on the production of heavy offensive weapons by West Germany. Such a decision opens the path to the West German militarists for the production of all types of conventional weapons including guided missiles, long range missiles, and strategic bombers. It is the imperialists' next step toward a new world war.

The emplacement of the American Pershing-2 first-strike nuclear missiles and cruise missiles in a number of European countries presents a special danger to the cause of peace and the fraternal countries.

In this connection, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries were forced to adopt responsive measures. They include: the Soviet Union's repeal of a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium range missiles in the European part of the country, the emplacement of Soviet operational-tactical missiles having increased range by agreement with representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on the territory of these
countries, and an increase in the number of submarines with nuclear missiles on board near the shores of the United States.

These measures should be considered as a necessity dictated by the security interests of the Warsaw Pact countries and their striving not to permit a break in the balance of military forces but maintain the military balance as an objective basis for peace on our planet.

In implementing the instructions of V. I. Lenin that our steps toward peace should be accompanied by the straining of all our military preparedness, the Communist and Workers Parties, the governments of the fraternal countries, and the Combined and national commands are displaying special concern for the Combined Armed Forces—the reliable tool for the defense of the socialist achievements of the fraternal peoples. So that they are in constant readiness to repel successfully any armed attack by the aggressors, a large complex of measures is being conducted on improving the organizational structure of large units and units, equipping them with contemporary equipment and weapons, and raising the level of the combat training of the troops and fleets.

These measures include joint command-post, special, and troop (fleet) exercises of the troops under the direction of the ministers of defense, the commander-in-chief, and chief of the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces which are conducted in accordance with plans of the national and Combined commands. They are the exercises "Soyuz" [Alliance], "Shchit" [Shield], "Bratstvo po oruzhiyu" [Brotherhood in Arms], "Druzhba" [Friendship], and others.

The collaboration of the allied armies is becoming stronger and expanding in the area of military science, which permits command personnel constantly to be abreast of the latest achievements in military science and military art. Collaboration in the training of military personnel has acquired a multiplan nature. Great attention is being devoted to mutual enrichment through the experience of indoctrinating the personnel of the fraternal armies in a spirit of patriotism and socialist internationalism.

Considering the difficult and contradictory nature of the international situation the men of the allied armies and the Combined Armed Forces consider it their sacred duty to maintain high vigilance and strengthen the defensive might of the Warsaw PactOrganization whose entire 30-year history of activity shows that it is an insurmountable obstacle in the path of imperialism's aggressive aspirations and a reliable guardsman of the fraternal countries' socialist achievements.

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AKHROMEYEV ON 'LESSONS OF HISTORY', WEST, COMMAND PRIORITIES

Moscow NOVYY MIR in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 4 Apr 85) pp 3-20

[Article by MSU S. Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, first deputy soviet minister of defense: "The Great Victory and the Lessons of History"]

[Text] On 9 May 1945 the Soviet people, our friends abroad, and all progressive mankind mark an important holiday. History has already counted off 40 years since the battles and engagements of the Great Patriotic War subsided and over the prostrate enemy the banner of our victory was raised in the capital of fascist Germany, Berlin, a victory having worldwide and historic significance and a victory which was so great that even now, 40 years later, the peoples of the world sense its results in full measure.

Mankind remembers many wars, large and small. But history had not yet known such a destructive and annihilating war as was brought down on our land on 22 June 1941 by the Hitlerite Wehrmacht. The Great Patriotic War, being the main component part of World War II was, as is noted in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the 40th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War, the battle of the Soviet people which was unprecedented in history for its scales and cruelty against the most reactionary strike force of imperialism--Hitlerite fascism, which posed as its goal the destruction of the first socialist state in the world and the winning of world supremacy.

The further the years of the past war depart into the depths of the ages, the more completely and brilliantly the greatness of our victory appears. And although more than half the people of the planet were born and grew up after the war, its memory lived, lives, and will live eternally.

Even today all progressive mankind pays the tribute of profound respect and gratitude to the unparalleled exploit of the Soviet people who, at the price of the incredible straining of strength and with the blood and lives of their sons and daughters, won the great victory over fascism and brought to the peoples of Europe deliverance from Hitlerite tyranny and the boundless joy of peace, freedom, and progress.

But mankind's memory is not only recollections of the past and not simply knowledge of the events of the war years. The memory of history is first of all
an analysis of the worldwide tragedy which has been experienced and which gave
many lessons and conclusions having permanent significance for today's as well
as future generations.

The Soviet Union's path to victory was painful and long. It was almost four
years of ceaseless bloody battles and engagements of the valiant Soviet Armed
Forces, the heroic struggle of the partisans in the enemy's rear, and the im-
mortal exploit of the Soviet people on the labor front.

In the first period of the war, the military situation developed extremely
unfavorably for the Soviet Union. As a result of the surprise and treacherous
attack by fascist Germany and because of already known objective and subject-
tive reasons the German-fascist troops succeeded in advancing deep into our
country (800-1,200 kilometers) and capturing considerable territory with the
most developed industrial base and large human resources (where up to 40 per-
cent of the population resided). The loss of vitally important regions in com-
bination with large losses in personnel and combat equipment in the army re-
quired the adoption of decisive measures. In order to stop the enemy, bleed
his shock groupings, and then launch a decisive offensive the incredible
straining of forces and the steadfastness and will of the Communist Party and
of the entire Soviet people and their Armed Forces were required. And only
because these qualities were displayed in full measure did the Soviet Union
hold out and win despite any difficulties and privations.

Large enemy forces were ground up in fierce defensive battles, especially at
Smolensk and at the walls of the hero-cities of Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, and
Sevastopol. Constantly wearing down the enemy shock forces, the Soviet Armed
Forces were able to delay and, on individual directions, even stop their ad-
vance. The country received a respite and precious time to rebuild the nation-
al economy on a military basis, for the creation and training of new, big re-
serves, and for the final frustration of the enemy's military-strategic plans.

The Battle of Moscow, where the enemy still had a superiority in personnel and
weapons, became the decisive event of the first period. The myth of the in-
vincibility of the fascist Wehrmacht was finally dissipated on the fields of
Moscow and the plan of a "blitzkrieg" was buried. Soviet military art re-
ceived experience in the conduct of strategic defensive operations against
superior enemy forces and in the preparation and conduct of a counteroffensive
with the forces of several fronts. The victory of the Soviet Army at Moscow
marked the beginning of the turning point in the war. The successes of the
Soviet troops inspired the entire Soviet people, strengthened their belief in
victory, and multiplied the strength for resistance and the courage and hero-
ism of Soviet people at the front and in the rear.

In the autumn of 1941 the Soviet troops stopped the offensive of the German-
fascist armies in fierce defensive battles in the area of Stalingrad and the
foothills of the Caucasus, created and trained huge reserves under the most
difficult conditions, and launched a counteroffensive, as a result of which
they inflicted a crushing defeat on the Hitlerite troops. In this period,
Soviet military art was raised to a new, higher stage. If in the counteroffen-
sive and the subsequent winter offensive at Moscow the fascist troops were
thrown back up to 400 kilometers from the capital of our motherland, in the
winter of 1942-43 with an overall equal correlation of forces. Soviet troops succeeded in attaining a decisive superiority in men and materiel on the directions of the main efforts and in advancing up to 600-700 kilometers on a number of directions and, at Stalingrad, encircling and destroying a 330,000-man force of enemy troops. Never prior to Stalingrad had the Hitlerite Wehrmacht suffered such a defeat. The strategic initiative was finally seized by the Soviet Army. This outstanding victory marked the turning point in the war.

The Battle of Kursk occupies a special place among the battles of the Great Patriotic War. The launching of the counteroffensive in this operation was accomplished after the conduct of a deliberate defensive operation. In the course of fierce battles at Kursk 30 crack divisions of the German-fascist army were smashed, its tank troops were knocked out, and fascist aviation suffered irreplaceable losses from which it could not recover prior to the end of the war.

The grandiose battles on the Kursk Bulge and the reaching of the Dneiper by the Soviet troops completed the fundamental change not only in the course of the Great Patriotic War, but also in the entire World War II. The offensive strategy of the German Wehrmacht suffered the most complete collapse. The Soviet Armed Forces seized the strategic initiative finally and irrevocably.

The year 1944, which went down in the history of the Great Patriotic War as the year of decisive victories, became the most important stage on the path to the attainment of victory over German fascism.

On the basis of a profound and comprehensive analysis of the military and political situation which had developed by the end of 1943 and the actual correlation of forces and weapons, the political and military leadership of the Soviet Union planned to conduct 10 big consecutive offensive operations in 1944. For the first time in the course of the war, the attack of the troops was envisaged on the entire strategic front—from the Barents to the Black Seas. It was accomplished by the conduct of two campaigns.

In accordance with the concept of the Headquarters, Supreme High Command [Hq, SHC], three strategic offensive operations were conducted in the winter-spring campaign of 1944: on the northwest direction at Leningrad, in the Right-Bank Ukraine, and in the Crimea. The main effort was launched in the Right-Bank Ukraine against the most powerful enemy force to smash Army Groups "South" and "A."

From the end of December 1943 to the middle of April 1944 it was namely here, on the vast expanses from the Poles'ye to the Black Sea and from the Dneiper to the Carpathians—on a front of 1,400 kilometers—that one of the biggest battles of World War II unfolded. Participating in it simultaneously on both sides were about 4 million men, 45,500 guns and mortars, 4,200 tanks and self-propelled guns, and more than 4,000 airplanes. The strategic operation for the liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine was conducted with the forces of four Ukrainian fronts. Six tank armies participated in it simultaneously.
While the troops of the Ukrainian fronts were already conducting fierce battles in the Right-Bank Ukraine and engrossed the attention of the German-fascist command and the large forces of his troops, the offensive of three fronts on the northwest strategic direction was begun in the first half of January 1944, and in April-May 1944 Kiev was liberated by Soviet troops.

The successful conduct of these operations in the Right-Bank Ukraine, at Lenigrad and Novgorod, and in the Crimea was also furthered to a considerable degree by operations of the 1st Baltic, Western, and Belorussian Fronts on the western strategic direction, in the course of which a portion of Belorussia was liberated.

Not only were important military results attained in the winter and spring of 1944 by the strategic offensive, but also exceptionally important military-political goals. One of the most important results of this offensive was the fact that the Soviet troops, which had advanced 300-500 kilometers, liberated the tremendous territory of the Right-Bank Ukraine and liberated millions of Soviet people from Hitlerite bondage.

The reaching of the state boundary by Soviet troops and the shifting of combat operations to the territory of Romania had important international significance. For the Soviet people and their friends, this marked the approach of victory over fascist Germany, and for our enemies—inevitable defeat.

The routing of the German-fascist troops on the northwestern strategic direction also had political significance.

The complete elimination of the enemy's blockade of Leningrad—the cradle of the Great October—and the liberation of Leningrad and Novgorod Oblasts permitted the party and the government to initiate widely work on the restoration of this biggest industrial region of the country.

An important strategic and economic region was also returned to the country by the liberation of the Crimea.

As a result, conditions were created for the further development of the Soviet troops' offensive in the Balkans and the liberation of the peoples and countries of the Balkan Peninsula from fascist enslavement.

On the whole, the winter-spring campaign of 1944 was crowned by big victories of the Soviet Army, and in the course of it 30 enemy divisions and 6 brigades were destroyed while 142 divisions lost from one half to three quarters of their personnel. The Wehrmacht was deprived of more than a million soldiers and officers, 20,000 guns and mortars, 8,400 tanks and assault guns, and about 5,000 airplanes. The losses were so great that the industry of fascist Germany just could not make up the losses suffered by the Reich in this period. For the first time, the front line on a 400-kilometer section began to pass through the land of the states which fought against us. The ruling circles of fascist Germany's satellite countries began to look for ways to get out of the Hitlerite coalition and out of the war. The antifascist liberation struggle of Europe's peoples was made more active.
The high level of combat ability and the increased might of the Soviet Armed Forces were demonstrated with new force in the operations of the winter-spring campaign of 1944. Their successes in the operations of this period were attained under extremely difficult conditions. Slushy roads, broken roads, and a great number of overflowing rivers slowed the advance of the troops and hampered their maneuver. But even under these conditions the superiority of Soviet military art over the military art of the German Wehrmacht was actually proven once again and the high combat skill and heroism of the Soviet servicemen as well as the command talent of the Soviet military commanders were shown. Our enemies were also forced to acknowledge this. Hitler relieved group commanders General-Field Marshals Manstein and Kleist of their commands.

On the basis of a single concept a number of simultaneous and successive front operations were conducted, each of which being a part of the general strategic offensive which was conducted on almost the entire Soviet-German front. The Hq, SHC ensured the clear and close coordination of the fronts and skillfully exploited the success on each of the directions for the attainment of the general goal of the strategic offensive.

The offensive operations of the Soviet Army in the summer-fall campaign of 1944 were even more impressive for scales, scope, results, and military-political outcome.

The missions formulated in the May Day order of the Supreme Commander formed the basis of the planning of the offensive for the second half of 1944. Their essence was to clear the country's entire territory of the fascist aggressors "and restore the state borders of the Soviet Union along the entire line," pursue the wounded fascist beast closely and finish him off in his own lair, and liberate our brother Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and other peoples of Europe allied with us from Hitlerite slavery. Here it was envisaged that the main effort would be launched in the center of the Soviet-German front--on the Western strategic direction. And this is not by chance. From the military-political point of view, it was the shortest route to Germany, and from the military--a successful offensive here created conditions for breaking up, isolating, and smashing the two most powerful army groups--"Center" and "Northern Ukraine."

The basic feature of the overall concept of combat operations for the summer and fall of 1944 consisted of conducting a series of simultaneous and successive offensive operations on the entire Soviet-German front. The enemy was deceived concerning the very scales of our offensive as well as regarding the main effort. It was correctly considered that the launching of an offensive by the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts in the north inevitably would force the enemy to shift a portion of his forces and weapons here from the central sector and, at the same time, would lead to Finland's withdrawal from the war. The crushing blow of four fronts in Belorussia was to follow after this without any delay. And while the enemy collects himself and understands that the main events are developing precisely here and unwittingly shifts his reserves from the south, a blow would also be launched on this direction. Subsequently it was planned to initiate active operations in the Balkans, in the Baltic, and in the North.

As further events showed, the calculations, forecasts, and plans of the Hq, SHC were completely justified. The Belorussian offensive operation, known by the
name "Bagration," was one of the biggest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War and World War II. During the last third of June 1944 fierce battles were initiated on land and in the air on all three Belorussian and the 1st Baltic Fronts. Breaking through the deeply echeloned enemy defense on an almost 500-kilometer front and advancing in a zone of 1,100 kilometers, the troops of these four fronts encircled up to 11 enemy divisions in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk and, in the area of Minsk—the main forces of Army Group "Center" with a total strength of 105,000 men, destroyed them, and by the end of August had advanced up to 500–600 kilometers to the west. The Belorussian SSR, a part of the Lithuanian and Latvian SSR's, and the eastern regions of Poland were liberated. The troops of the fronts reached the borders of East Prussia and arrived at the Visla on a broad front, seizing bridgeheads on its western bank. In this operation, the men of the Polish Army also fought courageously side by side with the troops of the Soviet Army.

All the other operations of the summer-fall strategic offensive of 1944 were also conducted brilliantly. Large units and units of the Czech Army fought under the direction of General L. Svoboda as part of the 1st Ukrainian Front for the liberation of the Western Ukraine and Czechoslovakia. The defeat of the fascist bloc's army in this period had far-reaching military-political and military consequences and the second half of the year was characterized by important changes in the military, political, and economic status of the opposing countries (coalitions).

Despite the opening of a second front in Europe in June 1944, the Soviet-German front continued to remain the main front of World War II. It was namely here that Hitlerite Germany employed the main mass of its most combat-effective troops (181.5 divisions and 58 satellite divisions) which exceeded 2.5-3-fold the forces operating against the Anglo-American troops (80 divisions). It was namely in this period of the summer-fall campaign of 1944 that all the operating army groups of the Wehrmacht—"North," "Center," "Northern Ukraine," and "Southern Ukraine"—suffered serious defeat or were subjected to destruction on the Soviet-German front. Here 96 divisions and 24 brigades were destroyed and taken prisoner. The Wehrmacht lost 1,600,000 soldiers and officers. According to German data, irreplaceable losses alone from June through December 1944 were 860,000 men.

As a result of the victories which were won, the Soviet Armed Forces accomplished one of the primary military-political missions assigned to them for the summer and fall of 1944—they liberated Soviet land from the fascist aggressors, restored the state boundary, and carried combat operations beyond the limits of the Soviet Union.

During this time, the enemy was cleared from a territory with a total area of 600,000 square kilometers on which about 20 million people had lived before the war. One of the most important military-political results of the historic victories of the Soviet Union and the entire anti-Hitler coalition as well as of the anti-fascist liberation struggle of the peoples of Europe was the disintegration of the fascist bloc in Europe. By the end of 1944, Japan remained Germany's only ally, and such countries as Finland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria had declared war on her while all the other states actually stopped the delivery of strategic raw materials to Germany and some of them broke diplomatic relations with her.
A characteristic feature of the Soviet Armed Forces' liberation mission in Europe was the fact that they entered the territory of foreign countries on the basis of intergovernmental or international agreements and operated hand in hand with the armies of these states. Fighting against the common enemy together with the Soviet Army for the liberation of their countries and peoples and the smashing of the Hitlerite occupiers were the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, the Polish Army, the 1st Czech Army Corps, and the Roumanian and Bulgarian armies and, at the concluding stage of the war, units of the new Hungarian Army. The merging of the Soviet people's struggle and that of their Armed Forces with the struggle of the peoples and armies of Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary against Hitlerite tyranny was one of the most important military-political results of the Soviet Armed Forces' victories in that period.

The decisiveness and depth of the concepts and the tremendous scale and military-political consequences of the operations conducted in 1944 testified to the high skill of the Headquarters, Supreme High Command in developing strategic plans and their implementation, the command maturity and operational state of training of commanders and staffs of fronts and armies, and the combat skill and heroism of all command-political and soldier personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The outstanding achievement of Soviet military art were the successive strategic operations of front groups which were characterized by the variety in forms of maneuver and high rates of attack with the participation of large masses of troops in them. The most important distinguishing feature of such operations in the summer-fall campaign of 1944 was the fact that, as a rule, they were completed with the smashing of big enemy groupings and the capture of important political and economic regions and centers with the withdrawal of individual allied countries from the war.

The forms of the strategic operations were the most varied and not subjected to stereotype. Most effective was the offensive from converging directions which concluded with the encirclement and destruction of big enemy groupings (the Yassko-Kishinev and Budapest operations). In a number of cases the encirclement and destruction of groupings of enemy troops were initially attained by the breakthrough of his defense on several directions and the launching of powerful frontal splitting blows with the subsequent envelopment of big enemy groupings in his operational depth (Belorussian operation). When the configuration of the front did not favor the launching of flanking strikes, the Soviet troops broke up the enemy's defense by a series of splitting strikes and defeated him in detail (Baltic operation).

Big strategic reserves were needed to conduct offensive operations of such a scale as they were in 1944, to build up the force of the strikes in time on the directions which showed success, and skillfully execute the maneuver of forces and weapons. And this mission was accomplished. By 1 June 1944, that is, by the start of the summer-fall campaign, the reserve of the Hq, SHC contained the commands of the 4th Ukrainian Front, 2 combined-arms and one tank and air armies, and 9 tank, 7 mechanized, and 11 air corps. These formations included 30-rifle, airborne, and cavalry divisions and 36 air divisions and numbered 645,000 men, 9,500 guns and mortars, 1,800 tanks and self-propelled mounts, and 2,900 combat airplanes. Having such big reserves, the Headquarters could react to the
situation operationally, reinforcing fronts on the decisive directions and especially where success appeared.

Typical of the further development of the Armed Forces and military art in the summer and fall of 1944 were a further increase in firepower and technical equipping and the improvement of the organizational structure of the troops and control organs on the basis of a profound study and generalization of combat experience. Qualitative changes in the Ground Forces occurred here. In particular, the number of rifle troops was reduced but the numbers of the artillery, armored, engineer, and signal troops increased. Thus, for example, by the end of 1944 the armored troops included 6 tank armies, 20 separate tank and mechanized corps, 2 tank divisions, and 68 tank and mechanized and 10 self-propelled artillery brigades. The weight of the Air Forces and Air Defense Troops continued to increase. By the end of 1944 the Air Forces had 16 air armies. The Air Defense Troops included three fronts, three zones, and four armies. The Navy also underwent substantial changes.

In the course of the 1944 offensive operations Soviet military art was raised to an even higher stage. Such of its characteristic features as activity, purposefulness, and flexibility in the selection of the forms and methods for the conduct of combat operations which meet the changing conditions and situation were displayed with new force. The Soviet Armed Forces launched powerful successive strikes on the entire Soviet-German front which were concluded with the encirclement and routing of the biggest enemy groupings. Instructive in this regard were such operations as the Belorussian, L'vov-Sandomir, Yassko-Kishinev, and Baltic operations. The victories which were won confirmed once again with all convincingness the indisputable advantages of Soviet military art over the military theory and practice of fascist Germany.

An important feature of the armed struggle during this period was the opening of a second front in Europe by the United States and Britain. Unquestionably, the landing of allied troops in Normandy and the inflicting of defeat on the Hitlerite army in France contributed to the acceleration of the final crushing defeat of Germany. The blows against the bloc of fascist states which were inflicted from the east for three years now merged with the blows from the west. At this same time the United States and Britain even then also pursued other, far-reaching class-egoistic goals: they tried to acquire positions in the post-war period which were advantageous for themselves.

Thus, the military successes of the countries of the antifascist coalition and, first of all, of the Soviet Union, which were attained in the second half of 1944 created all necessary conditions for decisive strikes against the enemy and the approach of the hour of victory. By the end of 1944, Germany had completely lost the occupied territories in southeastern Europe, was deprived of all its European allies, and was squeezed in a vise between two fronts from which, as subsequent events showed, it was no longer able to extricate itself.

In 1945, considering the strategic situation, the country's economic capabilities, and the combat capability of its Armed Forces, the Headquarters, SHC planned to execute a number of no longer sequential, but simultaneous big offensive operations on all strategic directions of the Soviet-German front with their subsequent development into the depth.
In accordance with the concept, on the first stage of military operations which was worked out in the greatest detail the Soviet Armed Forces were to smash the enemy with simultaneous crushing strikes in East Prussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Austria and reach the line of the Visla River, Poznan, Breslau, and Vienna. On the second stage it was envisaged that Berlin would be occupied, Prague would be liberated, link-up with the allies would take place, and the war would be ended victoriously in Europe. On this stage, it was intended to assign specific missions to the fronts depending on the situation.

In examining the operations of the war's concluding period, even today one is struck by the profound consideration of all the special features of the military-political and operational-strategic situation with which strategic operations were prepared and executed by the Soviet Union's Headquarters, Supreme High Command. And how with utmost clarity the military-political and strategic goals of the Great Patriotic War's concluding campaign which were connected with the completion of the utter destruction of fascist Germany and its satellites were determined. In accordance with the military-political goals and the necessity to complete the utter destruction of the enemy in the shortest time, the direction of the main effort was selected—the Berlin direction, the groupings of forces and weapons for the conduct of the operations on all the most important strategic directions were determined, and the efforts of the various fronts which were directed toward the accomplishment of this primary mission were well coordinated. In particular, the rolling-up of the enemy's defense to the north and northeast by the forces of the 2d Belorussian Front and to the south and southwest by forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front created favorable conditions for operations of the 1st Belorussian Front on the Warsaw-Poznan direction. The creation of sufficient reserves was envisaged by the start of the operation as was their restoration in the course of the operation's development so as to increase in good time the force of the strike and eliminate the threat which hung over the flanks of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Conducting the winter-spring operations brilliantly and accomplishing a great international mission, the Soviet Armed Forces completed the liberation of Poland, Hungary, and a considerable portion of Czechoslovakia by the middle of April 1945, completed the elimination of the enemy in East Prussia, captured Eastern Pomerania and Silesia, and reached the southern regions of Germany.

The finale of the Soviet Army's victories was the Berlin operation. Its goal was to smash the main forces of Army Groups "Visla" and "Center" in the shortest time, capture Berlin and, reaching the Elbe, link up with the troops of the Western allies. This was to deprive fascist Germany of opportunities for further organized resistance and force her to unconditional surrender. The main efforts of three fronts (1st and 2d Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian) were directed first of all toward smashing the enemy defense along the Oder and the Neisse and then toward the encirclement and splitting of the Hitlerite main forces which were defending on the Berlin direction. This mission was also accomplished successfully. The Berlin and Prague operations were the concluding operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in Europe. Being prepared and conducted in short times and in a difficult military-political and strategic situation, they serve as a striking illustration of the high skill of command personnel at all echelons and an example of flexible and mobile control of troops, the close coordination of fronts, and highly-maneuverable combat operations with employment.
of active and the most decisive forms and methods for the conduct of the armed struggle. The enemy capitulated.

In commemoration of the total and final victory over fascist Germany, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet declared 9 May a day of national celebration —the Victory Holiday.

To eliminate the Far Eastern hotbed of war and ensure the security of the Soviet Union in this region and in honestly accomplishing its alliance obligations in the anti-Hitler coalition, the Soviet Armed Forces prepared the Manchurian operation in a short time and secretly and, in August-September 1945, they utterly defeated the Japanese million-man Kwangtung Army.

World War II, the lessons and conclusions of which have permanent significance even today, ended.

The historic victory won by the Soviet Union in the most difficult fight with the product of imperialism—fascism—was proper. It was the result of the practical realization of the Lenin teaching on the defense of the socialist fatherland and proved convincingly the great vitality and invincibility of the first socialist state in the world and its basic advantages over capitalism in the political, economic, ideological, and other fields.

And how profoundly correct was V. I. Lenin in saying that "that people will never be defeated in which the majority of the workers and peasants recognized, felt, and saw that they are defending their own, Soviet power...."* The birth and development of socialism is a historically irreversible process and it is no longer subject to being stopped and cannot be stopped by any forces.

The victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War—the smashing of German fascism and Japanese militarism—became a truly historic line in the fates of mankind and exerted the most profound influence on the course of world development. It strengthened the authority and international positions of the USSR and opened new, favorable opportunities for a growth in the forces of socialism, national liberation, and democracy. As a result of the victories won by the Soviet Armed Forces and the active struggle of the working masses for their social liberation the chain of imperialism proved to be broken, now no longer in one place as was the case in Russia in 1917, but in a number of countries of the West and the East, which led to the formation of the world socialist system. The sphere of capitalism's supremacy and its influence on international processes in the world was narrowed significantly. Imperialism ceased to be a monopolistically ruling system which dictates its conditions and the ruler of mankind's destinies.

World War II showed once again that the source of wars was and remains international imperialism. Of course, basic responsibility for the unleashing of the last war lies primarily on Hitlerite Germany as well as on fascist Italy and militaristic Japan. However, now it is known who prepared the attack on the USSR and how. This crime was the deed of international imperialism as a

*V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 38, p 315.
whole. The imperialist circles of the United States, Britain, and France, which supported the rebirth of German militarism and the creation of its war machine precisely for an attack on the USSR, participated directly or indirectly in preparation of the war against the Soviet Union. Imperialism was united by one aspiration—the destruction of the first socialist state in the world.

The imperialists have not abandoned these attempts even now. The main obstacles for the aggressive policy of the United States and the other countries of the NATO bloc are the defensive might of the Soviet Union, the member states of the Warsaw Pact as a whole, and the struggle of progressive world public opinion for peace and against war.

The conclusions and lessons which were drawn by the peoples from World War II are obstacles and a great hindrance for the aggressor.

The latter-day pretenders to world domination do not find the postwar organization of peace convenient. It is for this very reason that in Washington, Bonn, and several other capitals of capitalist countries today they furiously come out against the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences which determined the postwar boundaries of states and against the obligations of the great powers of the anti-Hitler coalition for the strengthening of peace. Today, these decisions are interfering in the imperialists' conduct of an aggressive policy against the socialist states. The striving of the United States, the FRG, and other countries of the NATO bloc for their falsification and even abolition springs namely from this. Imperialist propaganda is trying in every possible way to belittle the role of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces in World War II and in the attainment of victory over fascism and militarism.

The victory over German fascism and Japanese militarism was won by the joint efforts of all the states of the anti-Hitler coalition and their armed forces. The peoples of these states also made their contribution to the armed struggle. The heroic armed struggle of the partisans, members of the antifascist underground, and the Resistance Movement in the European countries against Hitlerite oppression is generally known and generally acknowledged. The victory over fascist Germany was a matter of all states and peoples who united against Hitlerite aggression.

However, the main role in the destruction of fascist Germany and its allies belongs to the Soviet Union. This is indisputable. For it was the Soviet people and their Armed Forces who first stood as an insurmountable obstacle in the path of German fascism toward world domination, bore on their shoulders the main burden in fighting the fascist aggressors, and then made the decisive contribution to the smashing of the enemy.

Events of the last period of the war, which led to the final destruction of fascist Germany, have recently attracted especially great attention of the investigators of history. And this is proper. For as a result of the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition and the destruction of imperialism's shock detachment--Hitlerite Germany--the international situation and the relationship between the forces of war and peace changed radically. And if the events of that time are objectively analyzed and evaluated in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to please mercenary interests bourgeois reactionary historians try
to present them in a distorted light. The role of the opening of a second front in Europe in June 1944 is exaggerated and the significance of the grandiose battles on the Soviet-German front in the last period of the war is belittled. The combat operations of the American troops in Europe which allegedly actually alone brought peace and freedom to the countries of Europe are dealt with especially tendentiously.

The bourgeois falsifiers are trying to distort history and belittle the contribution of the Soviet Armed Forces to the defeat of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan. The highest-ranking political and military figures of the United States and a number of other NATO states are participating in this campaign. The West's mass media are trying to impress on world public opinion that the victory over fascism was ensured across the ocean allegedly thanks to the broad economic and military assistance to the Soviet Union during the war years on the part of the United States and Britain and that the defeat inflicted on the Wehrmacht on the western front in 1944-1945 became almost decisive for the attainment of victory in the war. Many other idle falsehoods about the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over the Hitlerite coalition are also presented today by imperialist propaganda.

When, in a coalition war, the contribution of one or another country to the attainment of victory is assessed, there are certain criteria and objective and reliable historical facts. The fact that the Soviet-German front was the main and decisive front during the entire war is confirmed by such indices as the scope and duration of the campaigns, battles, and engagements, the quantity of troops, forces, and weapons of the sides which participated in them, and the number of enemy troops destroyed and captured.

For three years, from June 1941 through June 1944, the Soviet Armed Forces actually in single combat repelled the onslaught and then, in the course of offensive operations and battles, smashed the crack German horde on a tremendous front of from 3,000 to 6,200 kilometers. In this period the American and British troops conducted combat operations in Italy and North Africa on a front with a total length of only up to 300 kilometers. Here, the combat operations had a local character and were conducted far from the vitally important centers of the fascist bloc. In 1942-1943 they exerted no substantial influence on the course of World War II.

Prior to the beginning of 1944 from 153 to 201 German fascist divisions operated on the Soviet-German front and, in addition, there were several dozen divisions of Hitler's satellites. At this time, the American and British troops were opposed by only up to 20 divisions. The opening of the second front in Europe, of course, led to an increase in the Wehrmacht's armed forces on the western front and helped the Soviet troops. But this in no way changed the significance of the Soviet-German front as the main one in the war. In the second half of 1944 and at the concluding stage of the war in 1945 at least 180 German divisions operated against the Soviet Army while from 80 to 107 divisions opposed the American and British troops.

The decisive significance of the Soviet-German front is determined not only by the fact that it tied down the main forces of fascist Germany. Consideration should be given to on which fronts the enemy armed forces were destroyed.
During the war the Soviet Armed Forces destroyed (routed and took prisoner) 507 German divisions. In addition, 100 Hitler-satellite divisions were subjected to destruction. The allies in the anti-Hitler coalition smashed 176 divisions in Western Europe, North Africa, and Italy. Up to 75 percent of the enemy's tanks, artillery, assault guns, and aviation, that is, the main part of his military equipment, were destroyed on the Soviet-German front. These indices are objective, and they expose those who are trying to diminish the role of the Soviet Armed Forces in the smashing of fascist Germany.

Propaganda in the West tries to assert that the main significance in the material ensuring of the Soviet Union's victory in the war was had by the allies' deliveries. Actually, the United States and Britain delivered weapons, ammunition, fuel, transportation equipment, non-ferrous metals, and food to the Soviet Union in accordance with lend-lease. There was such assistance, and we are grateful for it. But the main thing in the war economy of the Soviet Union was not the allies' help. It is generally known that the deliveries of the United States and Britain during the war years comprised no more than four percent of the total quantity of weapons employed on the Soviet-German front and of the consumption of material resources for their production. The main and decisive arsenal of victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War was their own socialist economy.

Even today, 40 years later, we are proud of and carried away by the truly unparalleled exploit of the Soviet people who, under the most difficult conditions of the war, ensured the evacuation to the eastern regions of the country of many hundred big industrial enterprises, more than 10 million people, hundreds of thousands of tons of raw materials, and other material valuables. In essence, in an unprecedented short time an entire industrial country was moved thousands of kilometers, again put into operation, and provided the multimillion-man Armed Forces with everything necessary for the war with the enemy. This was an exploit of the Soviet people, a working people, and their contribution to the victory over Hitler. This cannot be forgotten.

During the war years the industry of the Soviet Union produced almost 103,000 tanks and self-propelled mounts, more than 830,000 guns and mortars, and more than 112,000 airplanes. At the same time fascist Germany, for whom the industry of enslaved Europe worked, produced 43,300 tanks and assault guns, 384,500 guns and mortars, and about 81,000 airplanes. For production of the basic types of armaments the USSR surpassed Germany more than 2.5-fold. The Soviet Union met its basic requirements for weapons, military equipment, and ammunition through its own production.

Various types of fabrications are presented in the West concerning the decisive influence of the allies' opening of a second front and the military operations on the territory of France on the course of the war. But for the sake of fairness let us say directly that our allies opened the second front in Europe not in 1941, when the enemy stood at the walls of Moscow, and not in 1942 and 1943, as was called for by alliance obligations, but only in the middle of 1944 when the fate of Hitler's Reich was, in essence, already predetermined and when it had become clear that our country had not only held out, but was also capable of completing the rout of the aggressor with its own forces and liberating the
peoples of Europe from Hitler's enslavement. In addition, by the start of the landings of the allied troops the Soviet-German front as formerly pinned down the main forces of the fascist bloc—240 divisions. There were only about 58 German divisions in France, Belgium, and Holland, and of them 18 were in the formation stage. Just where was the main and decisive front?

Publications in the West (they are especially zealous in this regard in the FRG) try to prove that for the Ardennes Hitler allegedly brought up his last strategic reserves, including almost all those from the eastern front and, thanks to this, favorable preconditions arose for the successful outcome of the Visla-Oder operation which was conducted by the Soviet Army. In fact, it was far from this. On 16 December 1944 the Hitlerites began their offensive in the Ardennes against the American troops whose command did not surmise the possibility of the conduct of offensive operations in the mountains by the fascist troops. The Americans proved to be unprepared to repel this attack. In this regard, the Hitlerite command did not transfer one fascist division to the Ardennes from the eastern front. The crisis situation on the western front forced the governments of the countries allied with us and, in particular, W. Churchill, to appeal directly to J. V. Stalin with a request for help, in connection with which the Hq, SHC of the Soviet Union shifted the start of the Visla-Oder operation from 20 to 12 January 1945. Realizing the entire seriousness of the situation which had developed for fascist Germany, in connection with the blows of the Soviet troops on the evening of 14 January the Wehrmacht command issued the order to halt the offensive in the Ardennes and concentrate all efforts on the eastern front. And German troops again began to be transferred from the west to the east.

The historic truth is that the more energetic actions of the allies in the west became possible in considerable measure only as a result of the launching of the offensive by the Soviet troops. The commander of the American 3d Army, General G. Patton, who repelled the blows of the German troops in the Ardennes, noted that the morale of the soldiers and officers changed with the launching of the offensive by the Soviet troops. If formerly they doubted the possibility of stopping the German offensive, they now felt confident that they would do it.

Evaluating highly the offensive of the Soviet Army in 1945 and the effect of this factor on the change in the situation on the western front, W. Churchill stressed that "the enemy needs troops not only to support the attack in the west, but even more to fill the terrible gaps...created on the eastern front as a result of the magnificent onslaught of the main forces of the Russian army along the entire front--from the Baltic to Budapest."

Such are some of the facts which show the role and place of the Soviet Armed Forces in the smashing of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht. But it can be clearly seen from them who made what contribution for the attainment of victory over German fascism in the concluding period of the war.

With the conclusion of World War II the peoples of the world, naturally, hoped that the tremendous sacrifices made in the name of the destruction of fascism and militarism, incalculable suffering, and the severe lessons of the war would be properly considered by political parties and state figures and war would be
eliminated from the life of mankind. However, aggressive circles of imperialism and, primarily, of the United States, in the race for world domination, buried in oblivion everything positive which had been accumulated in the mutual relationships of peoples and states of the anti-Hitler coalition in their joint struggle with fascism and set foot on the path of aggravating the international situation and the arms race. First in secret, and then more and more openly they began to develop plans directed against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

Reviving the Hitlerite myth of a "Soviet military threat," under its cover they plunged the peoples of the world into the "cold war" and began the active development of variations for the unleashing of nuclear war against the USSR—their recent ally in the anti-Hitler coalition. For this purpose, the United States began to put together aggressive military blocs and ring the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist commonwealth with a network of military bases, and they initiated a broad-scale program for the buildup of nuclear and other weapons.

Today, through the fault of imperialism's aggressive forces the international situation remains difficult. The military danger is increasing and the ominous threat of nuclear war remains real.

The United States and the other NATO countries try to justify their militaristic policy by the fact that allegedly in the 1970's the relaxation of tension was advantageous to the Soviet Union which, they say, significantly surpassed the United States in military might, and primarily in nuclear weapons. This is a deliberate lie. The true reason for the intensification of imperialism's aggressiveness, and primarily of American, is not at all hidden in the far-fetched military advantage of the Soviet Union over the United States. There is a different reason. Capitalist society is in a deep chronic crisis. It is unable to compete with socialism in the creation of a better future for the people under peaceful conditions and thus is trying to solve the controversy between socialism and capitalism by force. American imperialism is trying to stop at any price and even turn back the progressive changes in the world. In the area of the Caribbean basin and in Central America, in South Africa and in the area of the Horn of Africa, in the Near East and in Southeast Asia—United States imperialism is suppressing by force the struggle of the peoples for a better future. The imperialists lie when they explain the struggle of the peoples against U.S. aggression, against social injustice, and for their national liberation by the mythical interference of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of other countries. The United States is trying to create a military potential which would provide it with the capability to solve any international problems in its own, American way from a position of superiority and strength and be master of the world.

At one time, Nazi Germany justified its criminal expansion by some requirement for "living space." Today the American military-political leadership has armed itself with the thesis of the so-called defense of the United States' vital interests. Using the principle of coarse power pressure, it has reached the point that it has openly declared a "crusade" against the USSR and the countries of the socialist commonwealth.
To attain superiority over the USSR, the Reagan administration is implementing large-scale military preparations, laying main stress on the development of strategic offensive forces and land-, air-, sea-, and recently also space-based nuclear weapons.

The nuclear threat is great today. There is no hiding from it. It should be fought actively and purposefully. The entire complex of peaceful initiatives put forth by the Soviet Union in recent years—from assuming the obligation not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons to averting the militarization of outer space—has been aimed precisely at this.

The Reagan administration is not acting like this. Creating so-called strategic defensive forces in space, it is trying to prove the unprovable and make black appear white. The leaders of the White House assert that the deployment of these forces in the future allegedly meets the interests of a reduction in nuclear weapons and even, they say, is useful not only for the United States and its allies but also for the Soviet Union and other peoples of the world. The goal is clear—to mislead their people and world public opinion and thereby, relying on this deceit, continue the arms race and achieve military superiority over the USSR so as to dictate their conditions to the world and, if this does not succeed, to accomplish their hegemonistic intentions by military means. At the same time, some figures across the ocean would like to see the territory of the United States invulnerable. Hence their categorical refusal to assume the obligation not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons. This can be answered: the plans of the American administration to create a so-called space shield above the United States and, with its help, remain unpunished in case of a military conflict are illusory.

Refusal to accept the constructive peace-loving proposals of the USSR and open declarations that the United States "has things somewhat more important than peace" lead not to the strengthening of peace, but to a further supercharging of the international situation. Therefore now, under conditions of American imperialism's aggressiveness, special timeliness is acquired by the main lesson of the last war which, as is noted in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the 40th anniversary of victory, "is that we should struggle against war before it begins." And war can be averted only by the collective efforts of all countries and peoples. The situation now is not the one which existed at the end of the 1930's and beginning of the 1940's. It has changed radically. The CPSU believes that today war not only should, but also can be prevented. Today mankind has the necessary forces and capabilities to restrain the new pretenders to world domination. The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist commonwealth step forth in a common front for the relaxation of international tension and for disarmament and peace. The collaboration of states with different social systems in the matter of preventing nuclear war is possible and objectively necessary.

The situation has developed so that the fates of peoples depend on such collaboration. The fact is that such a quantity of nuclear weapons has been accumulated by the opposing sides that their employment can lead to catastrophic consequences. Nuclear war, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing it, will bring incalculable sacrifices and suffering for mankind. It will assume a global scale,
encompass our entire planet, and will have a destructive nature (big cities may be subjected to destruction and annihilation in a short time as will many objects of the economy, and population losses will have a mass nature).

But the aggressor should be under no illusions. He no longer has the capability to launch a disarming strike with impunity. Nothing will save him if he unleashes war. No one should have any doubts on this question. It is obvious that a further nuclear arms race, whatever the arms may be—offensive or defensive—does not guarantee the security of the potential aggressor but, on the contrary, increases this danger. Retribution is inevitable under any conditions and will follow without delay.

The attempt of the United States to create a so-called comprehensive missile defense system will not remain without a response on the part of the Soviet Union. But then, through the fault of Washington the situation may develop so that limitations and reductions of strategic offensive weapons will become impossible. Moreover, they will be improved and deployed by both sides. Such is reality.

The situation which has developed should be soberly weighed and evaluated by the military and political leadership of the United States; only then will the attainment of an agreement on limitation and reduction and then the complete banning of nuclear weapons become possible. This is in the interests not only of the Soviet and American peoples, but of all mankind.

However, this is not occurring for the present. The aggressiveness of American imperialism is increasing. The danger of its unleashing of a new world war is also increasing. Therefore our party and the Soviet government, in conducting a Leninist peace-loving foreign-policy course and persistently struggling to restrain the forces of war, are devoting unremitting attention to the comprehensive strengthening of the country's defensive capability. The lessons of history also teach this to us, and as long as the danger exists for the unleashing of war against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth on the part of the United States and the NATO states, we should keep our powder dry and be on the alert to prevent imperialism's military superiority.

The Soviet Union and its allies are maintaining their defensive potential at the level necessary for the defense of the Warsaw Pact's member states. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government consider it their sacred duty to the Soviet people constantly to maintain the country's defensive capability and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces at such a level as to reliably ensure their peaceful labor and the security of the peoples of the socialist commonwealth's states. And the more serious the threat to the security of our socialist motherland, the higher does its defensive capability rise.

Maintenance of the defensive capability of the Soviet motherland and the combat readiness of its Armed Forces at a level which ensures not only a proper rebuff for the aggressor but also an immediate crushing responsive strike if he is the first to unleash nuclear war is one of the most important lessons which the Soviet Union and the CPSU drew from the history of the struggle with imperialism, including with German fascism, in the years of World War II.
Accordingly, attention is also being devoted to the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. During the postwar years, they have been transformed on the basis of our state's high economic potential. Today the Army and the Navy are equipped with contemporary weapons systems and military equipment and the combat capabilities of all the services of the Armed Forces have increased.

Military-theoretical views are constantly developing and being refined. Soviet military science and the theory and practice of Soviet military art, as two interconnected aspects of military affairs, are making creative use of the combat experience of the last war, making a profound analysis and considering the actual capabilities of new weapons systems and the contemporary military and political situation, and disclosing and substantiating prospects for the development of military affairs. In this way the corresponding contribution is being made to the raising of the Armed Forces' readiness and the strengthening of our motherland's defensive capability.

In what directions is work being conducted today in increasing the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces?

First. The main task on the accomplishment of which command and political personnel are working is a further rise in the combat readiness of formations, large units, units, and ships to prevent possible enemy aggression. Combat readiness serves as the basic indicator which characterizes the degree of conformance of the technical equipping, organizational structure, and level of training of the Armed Forces to today's requirements. The tremendous efforts and material expenditures of the people for equipping the Armed Forces, the combat training and discipline of the Soviet servicemen, and the skill of command personnel in controlling the troops are concentrated in it as in focus. In the end, it is the peak of combat skill of the troops and naval forces in peacetime and the guarantee of victory in war. This is why it is constantly at the center of attention of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government and of the practical activity of our military personnel, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations.

The officer personnel are directing all their strength, energy, intellect, and creativity toward the training of the troops and naval forces, in so doing displaying persistence, inflexibility, and will. Constant readiness to repel possible aggression at any time, every day and hour, and under any conditions is the basis of military labor of generals and admirals, officers and warrant officers [praporshchik and michman], sergeants and petty officers, and soldiers and seamen. But if the enemy unleashes aggression, a crushing responsive blow will be launched against him. For this, the troops and naval forces are persistently mastering contemporary weapons and combat equipment and large units and units are being trained and tempered so that they operate smoothly and in an organized manner under the most difficult conditions of a combat situation.

Considering the experience of the Great Patriotic War, command personnel are trying to check in practice contemporary military-theoretical views and trying to master and introduce them in the course of operational, combat, and political training. As a result of the intense work the degree and status of combat readiness of the Army and Navy are constantly maintained at the level necessary to prevent aggression.
Of course, one of the primary conditions for ensuring the security of the socialist commonwealth's states is the maintenance of the approximate military balance between the USSR and the United States and the Warsaw Pact organization and the NATO bloc in the future, too. Thanks to the concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government we have everything necessary for this today. Our workers, engineers, and scientists and, together with them, the personnel of the Armed Forces are working intensively on preventing military superiority over us and ensuring approximate military equality with the probable enemy in the future and providing the Armed Forces with weapons and equipment which would completely meet the nature of contemporary armed conflict.

Second. One of the important problems on which the command personnel and staffs of the Soviet Armed Forces are working is the correct foresight of the development of the military situation and the methods for the conduct of a possible future war if imperialism decides on it. Scientific research institutions, military academies, and our military scientists are working on the solution of this problem. In recent years the probable enemy, realizing the inevitability of our responsive blow and its catastrophic consequences if he unleashes aggression, is devoting special attention to the development of conventional weapons systems and improving their combat capabilities, bringing them to such characteristics that they become close to nuclear weapons in power, range, and accuracy. At the same time, methods for unleashing military operations with the employment of conventional means of destruction and, first of all, new types of high-precision weapons which are guided in the automated mode are being perfected in the armies of the United States and the other NATO countries.

The Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov, requires that command and political personnel constantly consider all this in practical work. "Under contemporary conditions," he stresses, "when the imperialist states are intensifying military preparations, our military theory and practice, in accordance with the lines of the Communist Party, the Soviet government, and our military doctrine, should look farther ahead and develop methods for the preparation and conduct of armed conflict and the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces with great foresight. All this, along with the study of the war's experience, will contribute to a further increase in the combat might and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces."

Third. Under contemporary conditions even higher demands than formerly are imposed on the training of the Armed Forces and directly on military training and the indoctrination of the personnel. The requirement to teach the troops what is necessary in war is not new, it is generally known. The experience of the Great Patriotic War confirms that in order to accomplish their duty to the motherland the Armed Forces should constantly learn to defeat the enemy and should learn persistently, day and night, with the high and even maximum training of physical and spiritual strength, considering what is new and, at the same time, relying on past experience.

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War our army basically stood on the correct path in this regard. But the Great Patriotic War also disclosed many weak places in its training which were already eliminated in the course of the conduct of bloody battles and engagements. We are considering this lesson. In contemporary war there will be considerably fewer opportunities for relearning and perfecting one's knowledge. Therefore, military science and military art constantly and
purposefully look for the most improved forms and methods for military training and indoctrination of the personnel and their moral-political and psychological training and physical tempering.

Fourth. Especially high requirements are being imposed today on the training of officers, generals, and admirals. Today the level of their education is incomparably higher than formerly. Now 70 percent of the officer personnel have a higher military and special education. Our officer corps has grown noticeably younger. The sons and grandsons of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War received high theoretical training in the schools and academies but they have not gone through the severe tests which befell the lot of their fathers and grandfathers. Under the direction of the senior commanders and political officers, the knowledge which has been obtained is consolidated in practice and high organizational abilities, will, and practical skills in troop control under conditions which approximate those of combat are being worked out. The severe experience of the last war also teaches us the necessity for such an approach to the training of officers. It is completely obvious that only on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the interconnection of events of the past and the present can we establish dialectical continuity in military affairs and, on this basis, improve it creatively and raise it to a new, higher quality stage. Therefore, the combination of profound theoretical knowledge with firm practical skills, a keen sense of what is new, and the striving to accomplish the assigned mission in good time with the least expenditure of men and equipment are a necessary principle for the training of command personnel of the Armed Forces and one of the conditions for raising their combat readiness even today.

As formerly, a mighty weapon in the training of the Armed Forces remains party-political work which is called upon to indoctrinate Soviet servicemen in a spirit of devotion to the Communist Party and the Soviet government, high moral substance, organization, and discipline and a readiness to perform their military duty under the most difficult conditions and situation.

The Communist Party considers this mission one of the most important. The efforts of the highest command personnel who have the rich combat experience of the war and life's tempering are directed toward its accomplishment. We are paying special attention to bringing up the military youth in a spirit of boundless devotion to the socialist motherland, hatred for its enemies, high political and class vigilance, and constant readiness for the accomplishment of their military duty.

The combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces whose personnel, in greeting the 27th CPSU Congress, are constantly ready to accomplish their civic duty to the motherland, is constantly growing with consideration of contemporary conditions and the richest experience of the Great Patriotic War and its lessons.

The Soviet people can be confident that the defensive might of our country is being maintained at the level necessary to ensure their creative labor. "The Soviet Union always responds to good will with good will, and to confidence—with confidence," declared the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M. S. Gorbachev. "But everyone should know that we will never forego the interests of our motherland and its allies." No one should have any doubts about this.
We won the victory over fascist Germany at the cost of tremendous efforts and sacrifices. Eternal memory to the heroes who gave their lives for the freedom and independence of our motherland!

Years, decades, and centuries will pass, but the exploit of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces who saved mankind from fascist enslavement will never be effaced from the memory of the people. Today's situation in the world requires that we remember the lessons of the great victory as never before and guard its fruits as the apple of our eye.

BENEFITS FOR FAMILIES OF SERVICE PERSONNEL

Tashkent SEL'SKOYE KHOZYAYSTVO UZBEKISTANA in Russian No 2, Feb 85 p 62

[Interview with Safura Muratovna Mirzaakhmedova, first of the Administration of Pensions and Assistance of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Social Security, by R. Gabdulkhakov: "Benefits for Servicemen's Families"]

[Text] Letters asking that we tell about the benefits for the members of families of those who were killed in the Great Patriotic War, in defense of the motherland, have been arriving in the editorial office. At the request of R. Gabdulkhakov, our correspondent, Safura Muratovna Mirzaakhmedova, Chief of the Administration for Pensions and Assistance of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Social Security, answers numerous questions of readers.

[Question] Tell us about the housing and domestic-services benefits for such families.

[Answer] Families of servicemen who were killed in defense of the motherland or in the performance of other armed services obligations have a number of important benefits and privileges. They are specified by "The Statute on Benefits for the Disabled of the Patriotic War and the Families of Servicemen Who Were Killed."

In accordance with Article No 20 of the Code for Housing Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics and with paragraph No 15 of the indicated Statute, families of soldiers killed who need better housing conditions are provided with living space in a priority procedure (both as to place of work and as to place of residence).

Living space within the existing norms that are occupied by families who obtain a pension for a killed serviceman is paid for in the amount of 50 percent of the apartment payment, computed according to the rates established for blue-collar and white-collar workers, and excess living space (up to 15 m²) at a single rate. Such families, moreover, are granted a deduction in the amount of 50 percent from the established payment for the use of heating, water lines, gas and electricity.

The councils of ministers of Union and autonomous republics, ministries and agencies, and the ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies are required to extend assistance to families of killed servicemen in every possible way in the construction of private housing. Local building materials for private
homes and overhaul of housing will be supplied these families on first priority. They are also provided with fuel in the same procedure.

The families of servicemen who were killed in defense of the USSR cannot be evicted in a judicial procedure from housing occupied by them without another living space being granted.

[Question] How are pensions granted to members of families of servicemen killed?

[Answer] Incapacitated members of families of those who were killed or of deceased Heroes of the Soviet Union and Knights of the Order of Glory, Third Degree, have the right to the personal pensions established for them. A pension in the case of loss of the provider has been specified since 1 May 1975 for incapacitated parents whose children were killed at the front, regardless of whether the parents were dependent on the killed serviceman.

Incapacitated wives of servicemen killed at the front are given pensions in the case of loss of the serviceman providers, regardless of the time they became aged, and also regardless of whether they were dependent upon the serviceman killed. For those living in a rural locality, a pension is granted in the full amounts—without the 15-percent reduction stipulated for pensioners who live permanently in a rural locality—on the occasion of the death of the serviceman providers.

[Question] Just what benefits have been established for the families of servicemen who are living in a rural locality?

[Answer] The USSR law, "The Agricultural Tax," and the corresponding directive of the USSR Ministry of Finance established that the farms of families of servicemen killed on Great Patriotic War fronts are granted the following benefits in regard to the agricultural tax:

—for farms which have from one to three children less than 16 years of age, where there is one able-bodied member of the family—a deduction from the total tax in the amount of 25 percent; and

—for farms which have more than three children less than 16 years of age, where there is one able-bodied member in the family—a deduction from the total tax in the amount of 50 percent.

Benefits in regard to the agricultural tax are granted to the farm which included the killed serviceman. A person who receives a pension for the loss of a serviceman provider is released from paying tax on income that does not exceed 300 rubles per year.

Men and women who have children killed at the front are released from paying the tax on bachelors and on USSR citizens who are single or members of small families.

[Question] Who is included among those who have the right to benefits established for the families of killed servicemen?
The benefits enumerated are granted to families of servicemen, partisans, command and rank-and-file personnel of USSR MVD and USSR KGB organs, soldiers and command personnel of interceptor battalions, and platoons and detachments for the people's defense who were killed or died as a result of wounds, concussion or serious injury which were inflicted during defense of the USSR or during the performance of other responsibilities of the military service (or service obligations), and also as a result of illness connected with the stay at the front. The families of servicemen who were missing in action during military operations are equated to the families of those who were killed at the front.

The following are recognized as family members of servicemen, partisans and the other indicated categories of civilians who were killed (or died): the dependents of those who were killed or were missing in action to whom a pension is paid in connection with this; parents or a wife who did not marry again, regardless of whether a pension has been awarded; and children who do not have their family or even if they do have them but were disabled prior to their reaching majority.

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SELECTION OF OFFICER CADETS: NEW STANDARDS, PROBLEMS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Apr 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The Deserving to Military Academies"]

[Text] Work continues these days in the Ministry of Defense's military-training institutions, in chasti [units], on ships and in military commissariats on the selection of military and civilian youth for study in military academies and institutes. This matter is of great state importance. It concerns not just the filling of the ranks of military vuzes. Youth who are being trained today to become cadets should be worthy tomorrow of filling the ranks of our officer corps. The importance and responsibility of this work flows from the high demands that the party places on personnel which were heard with new force at March's extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

Youth are being selected this year for study in accordance with the new Rules for Admission, which make increased demands on cadet candidates. Those who are sent to study at military academies and institutes pass through a vocational selection, which includes an evaluation of their social and political activity and moral qualities, their state of health, taking psychological data into account, and their physical and general-education preparation. In so doing, how sincere the youth are in their decision to dedicate their lives to service in the Armed Forces is also considered.

The selection of candidates who meet fully the requirements of the new Rules for Admission is a task in which a large number of officials participate. A leading role in it is assigned to the chiefs of the military-training institutions, who are given direct responsibility for selecting good-quality cadets and for filling the ranks of military academies and institutes in timely fashion with them. Experience indicates that the greatest successes are won in those cases where the selection is performed in close collaboration with commanders, political and personnel organs of the Army and Navy, military commissariats, local party and soviet organs, Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations and the directors and military supervisors of regular schools and vocational and technical schools. This will enable the profession of the Soviet officer to be widely popularized, a well-rounded study to be made locally of candidates, and assistance to be extended to them in choosing a specific military specialty.

Selection work is proceeding purposefully at the Pacific Ocean Higher Navy Academy imeni S. O. Makarov. Here open-door days are held regularly, and
Sports and propaganda campaigns are organized throughout the kray's districts, during which cadets speak before youth with talks about naval service, the branch school and their lives and training. The cadets act as patrons for many regular schools and PTU's [vocational and technical schools] where various discussion groups and basic military training exercises are conducted. Vuz representatives are frequent guests at military units and ships, military commissariats, enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and educational institutions. A military-patriotic club for youths, which bring together students of the 8th to 10th grades who dream of becoming officers has been operating at the school for several years.

Many such examples can be cited. But there are vuzes that rely upon the results of selection by units and military commissariats and do not assist commanders and political organs and local military commissariats. In some cases much is left to be desired in regard to the ties of the vuzes with kolkhozes and sovkhozes, local schools and PTU's. Not everything is being done to fill the academies' ranks through worker youth of enterprises and construction projects and servicemen who, having completed their military obligation, have been transferred to the reserve.

Commanders, political organs and staffs of soyedineniye [large units] and other units are called upon to make a major contribution to filling the ranks of the schools with the new augmentation of cadets. Work on selecting candidates is being performed well at the Kiev, Siberian and Odessa Military Districts. Unfortunately, there are cases which are persuasive that not everywhere does this important matter receive proper attention. Certain units of the Transbaykal, Turkestan and Transcaucasion Military Districts are not meeting plan goals for selection for training. In some units selection is not engaged in earnestly even by the deputy commanders who have been charged with staff responsibility for this matter. Under various pretexts some commanders hinder the sending of their best servicemen from among the ranks of the "excellent," rated specialists and Komsomol activists to study and they send subordinates to academies other than those which they want to attend. Senior chiefs, political organs and party organizations should make a strict, fundamental evaluation of all this, based upon adherence to principles.

One of the urgent tasks now is good quality conduct of monthly sessions for servicemen who are cadet candidates that have been organized for the purpose of comprehensive training for their arrival at the vuz. The time devoted to the meetings must be used with maximum effectiveness. For this purpose, concern must be given to creating good conditions for exercises of servicemen, providing them with the necessary educational aids and enlisting the services of experienced teachers for consultations. Annoying cases have occurred in the past in which officials responsible for organizing the sessions sent the candidates off to work in the economy and did not help them in preparing properly for the entrance examinations.

This year the military commissariats are working more actively on the selection of youths for study in military schools. Singled out as the better ones are the Uzbek Republic Military Commissariat, the Tula, Omsk and Nikolayev Oblast Military Commissariats, and the Moscow City Military Commissariat. The selection work is being conducted here purposefully, thoughtfully and with specificity. At the same time, not everywhere are the negligent preparation
of papers and the formalistic and, at times, soulless attitude toward candidates completely eliminated. In some military commissariats not enough attention has been paid to selection and to a comprehensive assessment of the candidates' personality.

The role of the acceptance commission of servicemen's institutions and of the traveling acceptance commissions, which make the vocational selection at the concluding stage of bring the complement of military schools up to strength, is exceptionally great. They should include the better-trained, more-experienced commanders, political workers, teachers and specialists in vocational selection. Members of this commission are obligated to show maximum objectivity and devotion to party principles, and to insure observance of the rules for admission.

Concern about good quality in the complement of vuzes is concern about the future of our officer corps. And this work must be done in such a way that the best representatives of Soviet youth who can successfully endure the vuz training and then bear worthily the high title of Soviet officer will be found among the cadets.
CONFERENCE: PLACEMENT OF FORMER SERVICEMEN--A meeting held at the Central Home of the Soviet Army imeni M. V. Frunze considered the question of improving the placement of servicemen who have been transferred to the reserve for employment at the economy's enterprises and construction projects, in light of the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers. Member of the Military Council and Chief of the Political Administration of the Ground Forces Col-Gen M. Popkov made a report. Deputy Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy Lt-Gen V. Nechayev and Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee I. Ordzhonikidze spoke at the meeting. Responsible workers of USSR Gosplan, the USSR State Committee on Labor and Social Questions, the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and the main staffs and political administrations of the Armed Forces branches took part in the meeting. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Apr 85 p 1] 11409
LESSONS FROM WW II ON AIR COMBAT

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 9 Apr 85 p 2

[Article by I. Selifonov, Retired Colonel and Hero of the Soviet Union: "Coordination in the Air"]

[Text] I will start with an interesting and instructive episode from the front. In the summer of 1943 the Fascists were spreading rumors about the unusual combat qualities of their new Focke-Wulf 190. And now the commander of the 106th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment Guards Lt Col M. Kuznetsov had assigned us the task of destroying the Fascist innovation!

Guards Lt P. Semeyko led a flight of four Yakovlevs on a mission. Not far from Kupyansk a pair of Focke-Wulf 190's was observed. The first thing Semeyko did was to organize precise cooperation of the interceptors in the air. The commands were brief—we close with the enemy. The leadman opened fire and knocked off a Focke-Wulf. We got the other in a "vise" with our aircraft. The Fascist turned between our interceptors and answered with fire—all without success.

Semeyko's two-plane element, after disengaging from the victorious attack, returned in time. He "pressed" the enemy from above, and the Focke-Wulf landed within our troop dispositions. The captured "air prisoner" turned out to be a test pilot from an aircraft plant. The Focke-Wulf 190 was sent to Moscow for a display of captured equipment.

In air battle with flight elements one cannot do without precise tactical and firing coordination. We would like to recall our experience at the front also because the organization of coordination relates and will relate to the most complicated questions.

It is very important here to study carefully the tactical and technical capabilities of the opponent's aircraft and his methods of waging combat. As in chess, doing so will enable one to arrange his aircraft pieces on the field of battle in a way that will constrain an enemy's maneuvers, deprive him of initiative, and then allow his destruction.

I recall that Squadron Commander Guards Sr-Lt F. Chervotkin, who led a four-aircraft flight of Yak-1's, attacked several dozen Junkers that were under a cover of Messerschmidt's. It became clear to the lead man: the Fascists had used their favorite method—a closed circle of aircraft. Based upon this,
Chervotkin organized mutual action in the air. The interceptors attacked in pairs from below and from behind and emerged from the attack with a vertical maneuver. Then a flight of four led by Guards Lt V. Popkov (later Twice Hero of the Soviet Union) appeared. These pilots did not have to explain the complicated situation. The Fascists themselves, by their tactical maneuver, told them how to interact with us. We destroyed eight Junkers without losses.

Experience in air battle indicates that the organization of coordination is a creative matter. But this in no way permits reliance only upon shrewdness at the height of the events. The complexity and rapidity of battle presupposes the most thorough working out of coordination in the air prior to the flight.

Thus, for example, Guards Capt P. Gerashchenko and Guards Lt N. Khimushin (a street in Moscow has been named after this Hero of the Soviet Union) came to serve in the same regiment with me during the war years. They trained strenuously on the ground for battle, and they examined joint tactical measures for various situations. The pilots were trained in mutual warning and in the precise execution of commands. I saw the result of this exciting work, among other things, with my own eyes.

On a short day in February 1943 the air-raid warning sounded. An armada of Fascist bombers had flown to Krasnyy Liman. And we had, unfortunately, not one aircraft completely ready for flight.

Here Gerashchenko and Khimushin rushed to planes not completely repaired. They took off in a combat formation, attacking en route, then completing a precipitate vertical maneuver. The enemy's formation was broken up, and one Junkers was destroyed.

I shall tell also about this very instructive case. An eight-plane formation of Yak-1's, led by Guards Capt V. Bobkov, attacked 20 Junkers in the Krivoy Rog area. Suddenly we saw that Bobkov's aircraft had been disabled. But the commander did not desert the combat formation. Extinguishing the flame in a dive, he fought on a par with everyone. Back on the ground we found out that the commander had been seriously wounded, but the laws of our frontline fraternalism and the striving to support coordination in battle, no matter what happened, was for him above everything else.

Yes, in organizing coordination, one must consider not only tactical but also firing skill. The leader and the led, the element and the squadron, and the regiment—these are the military collective, welded together into one family both on the ground and in the blazing sky. It happened so many times in battle that one pilot or other got into a critical situation, and his comrades hurried to his aid, often risking their own lives. I recall when Guards Jr-Lt Sokolov jumped with a parachute from a burning plane. A Fascist began to attack him. At that same instant, without having a reserve of speed and altitude and at great danger to himself, Chervotkin protected the parachutist from the enemy.

Coordinating in the air and organizing it with precision were important during the large-scale use of aviation—the regiment and the division—by attack interceptor, bomber, reconnaissance and other types of aviation. But also during these large-scale affairs, success depended primarily upon teamwork and
the tactical unity of the pair of aircraft, the element, and the squadron. I
know from experience how important it is to take off without the slightest de-
lay, take up one's position (or altitude), and assemble in combat formation.

Thus, in June 1943 we were given the mission of covering an attack-aviation
regiment which was to strike a blow on an enemy airfield between Slavyansk
and Lozovaya. There was not enough time on the ground for organizing coordi-
nation (this happened often). But still, along with the attackers, we quickly
defined the initial point of the run—the point where we would meet an IL-2,
and we specified more precisely who should follow which group in the combat
formation. Warning signals and communications procedures were established.

Strictly at the designated time our interceptor aviation regiment lifted off
into the air. I at once perceived that the winged formation's discipline was
beyond reproach: we had to come out with maximum precision on the initial
point of the run at the designated time. Ahead on the course we saw the
IL-2—aviation attack regiment commander Maj Makarov.

We had flown to the front line, when the unexpected happened. Along the Se-
verskiy Donets river black thunder clouds faced our formation over a wide
front. The leader commanded: "Hold course and altitude strictly!" In
this threatening vicinity the desire to descend slightly or to climb slight-
ly was great, for often it is dangerous to send aircraft directly into a
storm cloud. But it was impossible to maneuver in any way— one could col-
lide with another aircraft, and, the main thing—break up our combat forma-
tion. Then it became clear to me that coordination in the air is not only a
concept of the military art and tactics. It is a manifestation of courage
and skill—to subordinate one's interest to the common affair, to vic-
tory, no matter what happened.

Thanks to the crew's bravery and high state of discipline, we went through
the storm front without mishap. The enemy airfield came into view. Enemy
interceptors on alert took off to meet us. We quickly engaged them in bat-
tle, and the attack aircraft dashed toward the targets. However, enemy
antiaircraft guns opened up with very heavy fire. And here I could not help
but admire the coordination of the attacking group. Some attacked the anti-
aircraft battery, others rained down rockets and bombs on parked aircraft
and warehouses.

Maj Makarov's aircraft was hit in a duel with a Fascist antiaircraft gun.
We saw his IL-2 turn toward parked Junkers—in seconds a powerful explosion
shook the air there....

Such was coordination in the blazing sky. Thus we see even today that, in
considering experience at the front, it is basic, based upon strict disci-
pline, courage, tactical sharpness, and fraternal mutual support in the
winged formation.

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LITERATURNAYA GAZETA INTERVIEW WITH FLEET ADM SU GORSHKOV

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[Interview with Fleet Adm SU S.G. Gorshkov, commander in chief of the Navy and deputy minister of defense of the USSR, twice Hero of the Soviet Union conducted by N. Mara, special correspondent of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Sergey Georgiyevich, we are at the threshold of the 40th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. This war had an ending and a beginning. And between them four long years--battles, tests.... If you can recall, what was the beginning for you personally? Where and how did you greet the war?

[Answer] The war found me in the Black Sea Fleet, in the post of commander of a brigade of cruisers of the Black Sea Squadron. On the eve of the war's beginning, on Saturday, 21 June, after completion of joint maneuvers of the fleet and troops of the Odessa Military District the ships of the squadron returned to Sevastopol' and the ships' crews were given rest with shore leave.

And at 0200 hours a general emergency call was declared for the personnel of all the fleet's ships and units. Blasts of the ships and the Navy Yard served as the signal for "all hands parade." The city was submerged in darkness. I soon climbed up on the deck of the cruiser "Chervona Ukraina" the commander of which, Captain 1st Rank Basisty, reported to me that combat readiness "number one" had been declared throughout the fleet. The personnel were at their battle stations and ammunition had been brought up to the antiaircraft guns.

At approximately 0310 hours the roar of motors approaching from the direction of the sea was heard. The black sky was cut by the beams of searchlights. The signalmen on the ships noted some objects descending on parachutes. As was learned later, these were influence bottom mines with which the Hitlerites intended to block up the ships of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol'. Several minutes later two powerful explosions were heard in the city: mines which had fallen on the shore were actuated.

I ordered opening fire on the airplanes. The rounds of the antiaircraft guns began to thunder. Other ships of the squadron began to fire right after the "Chervona Ukraina."
The raid of the fascist airplanes had ended by dawn. Everything fell silent. The fleet headquarters announced officially: war had begun! For the entire day of 22 June I was engaged in preparing the ships for combat operations. Minesweepers and hunter-killer ships set out on patrols. On 23 June the brigade of cruisers was ordered to emplace minefields toward Sevastopol' from the direction of the sea. Then I repeatedly had to go with the ships of the brigade to Odessa for fire support of the ground troops and to neutralize the enemy weapon emplacements on the approaches to the city. The prolonged and stubborn resistance to the enemy by the troops of the Odessa defensive area which was encircled from the land and which found itself in the rear of the German-fascist troops which had broken through to the east was possible only thanks to the constant support from the sea by the fleet's combat ships.

That is how the war began for me.

[Question] And which events of the concluding period are most memorable for you and where did you greet Victory Day, 9 May 1945?

[Answer] The spring of 1945 found me in the post of squadron commander of the Black Sea Fleet. By this time the Black Sea and the coastal regions adjacent to it had already been liberated from the German-fascist aggressors.

The beginning of the liberation of the Danube countries was the successful conduct of one of the biggest offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War—the Yassko-Kishinev offensive operation. The 2d and 3d Ukrainian Fronts, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Danube Flotilla which I commanded at that time took part in it.

The Danube Flotilla helped the troops of the front in the assault crossing of the Dnester liman, landed assaults on the Romanian coast, destroyed enemy ships, and supported with gunfire the troops attacking along the Black Sea coast and the Danube. The seamen transported hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers, much combat equipment, and thousands of tons of military property.

During combat operations on the Danube the ships of the flotilla travelled more than 2,000 kilometers with fighting and took an active part in the routing of the German-fascist hordes in Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria.

I should note that the participation of Soviet servicemen in combat operations on the territory of Southeast Europe in the last months of the war had not only local significance. In joint operations of the Red Army and the troop units of Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia and the rivermen of the Soviet Danube Flotilla the fraternal union of the peoples and armies of the socialist states began to be formed.

[Question] Sergey Georgiyevich, you devoted many decades to naval service. How would you characterize the contemporary situation on the world ocean and, in particular, the strategy of the present American administration which is building up the combat power of its naval fleets in an intensified manner?
The military leadership of the United States is allotting a special role to naval forces in its global militaristic policy. The Secretary of Defense, C. Weinberger, believes that these forces should "possess supremacy at sea right up to the next century." With this goal, a program for the building of combat ships has been undertaken in the United States on unprecedented scales.... This program, according to a statement of the American command, "is called upon to ensure the superiority of the United States and its allies in key regions of the world ocean...."

With this goal, the mass rearming of underwater ships and nuclear submarines and the arming of airplanes with the Harpoon antiship missiles and long-range Tomahawk strategic cruise missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads is being conducted on broad scales. The naval air fleet is being updated through contemporary AY-8B Harrier and F-14A Tomcat aircraft. As part of the Rapid Deployment Force it is planned to build by 1987 13 depot-ships on which the heavy armaments and supplies of material and technical equipment will be placed for the conduct of combat operations by three Marine expeditionary brigades.

By building up naval armaments the ruling circles of the United States are trying to transform the world ocean into a springboard for aggression against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and to ensure undivided control over the riches of the seas and oceans and over the resources of developing countries.

Naturally, such a frank militaristic course of the present American administration and other NATO countries forces us to adopt the proper measures to strengthen the defensive capability of the USSR and the countries of the socialist commonwealth which are united by the defensive Warsaw Pact. We are for detente and for the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems but we will never waive the interests of our country and its security, and no one should have any illusions about this. Thanks to the constant concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the defensive might of the USSR is reliable and strong. The guarantee of this is also the ocean-going nuclear missile fleet. Together with the other services of the Armed Forces, it is worthily countering the military threats of aggressively attuned powers. The Soviet Navy is standing loftily the important peace watch on the seas and oceans.
The roar of helicopter engines was heard unexpectedly in the predawn mist. Then Sr-Lt Med Serv Aleksandr Makarevich understood the resounding, ringing noise: a rotary-wing aircraft was hovering. Getting dressed quickly, he slipped out of the officers' tent. Since the helicopter was landing at such an ungodly hour and close to the separate medical battalion, that meant that he, a military surgeon, was needed for emergency assistance.

The young officer was not mistaken. On-duty medical orderlies quickly brought a wounded man from the cabin.

...Later, when the danger had passed, I got acquainted with this man. Sr-Lt Sergey Rusinko, commander of a sapper platoon. He was young, smiling and an excellent conversationalist. A graduate of the Higher Engineering Command School at Kamenets-Podolsk, he has served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan more than 1½ years. One of his platoon's tasks is to help the Afghan people in clearing mines from roads, bridges and footpaths. The officer has walked, ridden and climbed over many mountain roads with his brave soldiers. He has given much help to the ordinary, peaceful people of a friendly country. But this happened for the first time.

"The dushmany mined all the approaches to a remote settlement. They resolved to cut it off from the outside world, to starve the people and to bring them to their knees. Only one old man found his way out of the minefield, he was brought to the staff of our chast [unit] and he asked for help.... We had now finished the work, and we removed almost all the mass-destroying deathdealing 'stuffings,' with which the dushmany had liberally larded the approaches to the settlement. And suddenly, from behind distant cover, a grenade launcher was fired. My armed seemed to have been burned by something...."

...In the receiving section of the medical battalion, everything was now prepared for examining the wounded man. All the specialists from the operating sections were present: surgeon's assistant Maj Mikhail Shklyaruk, anesthesiologist Capt Ivan Golousikov, senior operating nurse Glafira
Masyuk and others. These are experienced people, accustomed to working under any conditions. They are self-assured, bold and solicitous.

Glafrira Masyuk, graduate of the Pinsk Medical School, has now spent two years in Afghanistan. Our many nice lads who during their service got into various predicaments while escorting goods, protecting important facilities, or extending help to the Afghan people recall her heartfelt concern and attention.

Senior operating nurse G. Masyuk has been awarded many acknowledgements and commemorative gifts by the command for her work and faithfulness to duty.

Yes, the specialists and the whole staff of this battalion have much concern. I am conversing with the medical battalion's Deputy Commander for Political Affairs, officer Vyacheslav Kararushkin. He says:

"When, on a mission assigned by the command, our motorized riflemen, tankmen, communicators, and sappers go into the mountains on exercises or to defend a facility, a military doctor and a medical NCO-in-charge must accompany the soldiers. During the march, especially in those localities where dushmany ambushes, mine fields and poisoned wells are not rare, anything can happen. The military medical men are always on the alert! They also often have to help the local residents, heal their wounds and injuries and deal with infectious diseases. Sometimes we even send a whole operating group—a surgeon, therapist and nurse—to help the communities.

"We are also doing much to prevent disease, so that the soldiers will not be subjected to any misfortune or unpleasantness. You know yourself what the climate and customs are here. In the summer the heat gets up to 50 degrees and there's no rain for half the year...."

Many medical men with whom I had managed to talk in Afghanistan said much about this. Including those who are responsible for medical support for our military contingent in the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]. The soldier here must be protected not only from the bandit's bullets but also from any kind of sickness.

The rich experience of Soviet military medicine is at the service here of the soldier's health. Therefore, we see among the medical men of the Limited Contingent of the Soviet Forces such excellent specialists as Doctor of Medical Sciences Col Ivan Danilovich Kosachev, Doctor of Medical Sciences Lt-Col Lyashenko, Yuriy Ivanovich, Candidate of Medical Sciences Lt-Col Sakurdayev, Viktor Vasil'yevich, and others.

These are people who are anxious and enthusiastic about their job, they are decisive and persistent. They are modest, honorable people, men of principle. Their word is law for all medical personnel, because the opinions of these specialists are based upon vast living and military experience and sound theoretical knowledge.

Here is just one example from the extensive practice of Col Med Serv Kosachev, who is in charge of the whole local surgical service. Once a person with an open vein was brought in. The case, it would seem, was hopeless. Surgeon Kosachev, arriving for the operation, said to his assistant,
"Be calm....Clamp the wound carefully...," and he joined the vein almost instantaneously.

The operation occurred in a military hospital. This medical institution is supplied with the latest in domestic science and technology. In the office of the hospital chief, Lt-Col Med-Serv V. P. Matveyev, graduate of the Military Medical Academy imeni S. M. Kirov, I saw the layout and diagram of the siting of his main services and sections. Some hours were required to complete the trip about the hospital. Vladimir Pavlovich Matveyev is a strict, smart and dashing officer, the son of a participant in the Battle of Stalingrad, and he says with pride:

"For us, everything begins—like everywhere, incidentally—with the spacious and well-equipped receiving section. Here the initial examination of the ailing, the first analyses, and the first assignments take place. Depending upon the nature of the illness, injury or other cause, the patient is sent to one of the treatment sections.

"The most modern diagnostic methods are used in the hospital. All the main types of specialized medical help—traumatology, neurosurgery, stomatology, ophthalmology, and others—are represented here. The work of the anesthesiology and intensive-care sections, where the most gravely ailing are treated (with infusion therapy, hyperbaric oxygenation, hemosorption, enterosorption and other of the newest treatment methods), has been well arranged. In comprehensive therapy of the sick, LFK [therapeutic physical fitness], physiotherapy and diet therapy are used widely. Our task is to put the man on his feet and to return him in good condition...."

Everyone who works in the hospital—from the aid man and paramedic to the section chiefs, five of whom are candidates of medical sciences—are genuine enthusiasts about their jobs, putting themselves at risk at times and selflessly carrying out their military duties. It is not without reason that many of them have combat orders and medals on their chests.

Let us get acquainted with some specialists. The second surgical section is under Maj Med Serv Aleksandr Yerokhov. He is 38 years old and has served at garrisons near and far in the Soviet Union, he is now carrying out his international duty, and he is a candidate of sciences. So many people are grateful for operations that saved their lives, which were excellently conducted by Maj Yerokhov!

Or Col Mikhail Mikhailovich Kornev, the hospital's leading surgeon and chief of the first surgical section. He was recently awarded the order, "For Service to the Country in the USSR Armed Forces, Third Degree." A thoughtful and deeply learned man who has introduced medical innovations into practice.

And here is hospital mechanical engineer Aleksandr Kalyuzhen. A white-collar worker of the Soviet Army, a river transport worker from Astrakhan. Once he and a driver, Pvt Mikhail Chepik, drove to the city by truck, to a fuel storage. It was early in the morning. There was fog. Unexpectedly a terrible explosion was heard: an Italian-made thermite-vacuum mine, which had been laid secretly at night by bandits, was triggered. The vehicle was turned over. But, fortunately, the people were unhurt. Aleksandr Kalyuzhen is a Knight of the Medal, "For Combat Services," and right now is carrying out his obligations, which the hospital needs so much, with honor.
A beautiful monument in honor of Afghan-Soviet friendship stands on the hospital grounds. It was raised by the hands of the specialists themselves and their Afghan friends. Lt Col Matveyev told me how so many lives of simple Afghans, children and women had been saved by Soviet military surgeons.

When I left the hospital, I saw a group of soldiers waiting for a bus. They were cheerful lads, bubbling with life, who were returning to their own subunits after being healed. Deputy Chief of the Hospital for Political Affairs Lt-Col Aleksey Tel'nov bade them farewell heartily. The soldiers answered:

"Thanks for the help and the care. Thanks, dear military doctors!..."