NATION ASSISTANCE: DOES AN EXERCISE IN GUATEMALA BY RESERVE COMPONENTS SUPPORT UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY?

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

NATION ASSISTANCE:

Does an Exercise in Guatemala by Reserve Components Support United States National Security Strategy?

by

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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

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ABSTRACT

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This strategic research paper critically examines the ends-ways-means formulas of United States national security strategy as it relates to performing a nation assistance exercise in Guatemala. It surveys the relevant documents revealing the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff place less value on nation assistance than the President does.

Guatemala is an emerging democracy that received nation assistance exercises called Fuertes Caminos in 1993, 1994, and 1995. The author was the aviation commander of Fuertes Caminos 95-North.

This paper follows a sequence describing the background of Guatemala and Fuertes Caminos exercises, defining nation assistance policy, then flowing through the United States Army War College (USAWC) strategy formulation guidelines, recommending adjustments and identifying lessons learned.
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NATION ASSISTANCE EXERCISES

President Clinton has three core United States national security strategy objectives:

- To enhance our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win.
- To bolster America's economic prosperity.
- To promote democracy abroad.

The President's objectives are promoted by correctly planned nation assistance exercises, but poor planning has resulted in failures in Latin America during this decade. Also, strategy documents in the levels below the President do not consistently support nation assistance and the ends-ways-means formulas are not all in alignment.

This strategic research paper critically examines United States national security strategy as it relates to performing nation assistance exercises. Guatemala is used as an example of a country that benefited from past exercises called Fuertes Caminos. Two key questions result from this analysis. Is it in the United States' best interest to perform another Fuertes Caminos in Guatemala? If yes, should the U.S. use active duty forces or reserve component forces?
BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The domestic conditions in Guatemala are definitely less than ideal. The illiteracy rate is at 43.6 percent, the second worst in the whole area (Haiti being worse).² "In 1990 the total coverage of health services was (only) 54 percent."³ The official unemployment rate is 5.2 percent, but underemployment is between 40 & 45 percent. The landowners are 2.2 percent of the population and hold 65 percent of the arable land. This is the "most unequal land distribution in Latin America."⁴ Guatemala is one of the poorest countries in the region.

Guatemala is a democracy with a recent past of military presidents, coup attempts, and human rights abuses during 36 years of guerrilla insurgency that finally ended December 29th, 1996. Since January 1997, a United Nations verification mission (named MINUGUA) with 188 authorized observers is in country. The roots of democracy are taking hold in Guatemala. This emerging democracy needs to be strengthened in the eyes of its people, the military, and the free world. Engagement here will lead to further increases in U.S. imports to Guatemala. The imports have been steadily increasing from $664 million in 1990, to $1,199 million in 1993 and $1,512 million in 1996.⁵

In the past decade, the United States sent small teams to assist Guatemala with various nation assistance projects. As a result of a request from the President of Guatemala, the first Fuertes Caminos deployed in FY93 (Joint Task Force Jaguar). This JTF was based in Honduras and performed infrastructure projects (roads, schools, clinics, and wells). They completed projects
throughout the region to include Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Belize, Honduras, and Guatemala.

From January to June 1994, Fuertes Caminos 94-North (JTF Dirigo) worked in north central Guatemala where it built schools, clinics, drilled wells and improved roads. The Maine National Guard was the lead headquarters with the 94th Army Reserve Command supporting.

From January to June 1995, Fuertes Caminos 95-North (JTF Timber Wolf) deployed for training and nation assistance projects similar to Fuertes Caminos 94-North. JTF Timber Wolf worked/trained in southeastern Guatemala. The Joint Task Force built three bridges, six school additions, drilled 16 wells and repaired country roads. They also built two clinics and performed three MEDRETES (Medical Readiness Training Exercise), DENTRETES (Dental), and VETRETES (Veterinarian) to civilians in outlying areas. One of the keys to the MEDRETES was a preventive medicine class each patron attended. The 88th Army Reserve Command was the lead headquarters, with the Minnesota National Guard supporting. The author was on the duration staff in country and was the battalion commander of 2-147 Aviation, Minnesota Army National Guard. They provided helicopter support to the Joint Task Force. Units from eight major commands encompassing 18 states, the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marines were involved in the exercise for a total of over 3,000 U.S. military receiving training in their combat support and combat service support warfighting skills. Guatemalan participants included a military engineer platoon and a few civilian doctors and nurses for the MEDRETES.
DEFINING NATION ASSISTANCE POLICY

**Nation assistance** is one type of the sixteen different types of military operations other than war (MOOTW) as they are listed in Joint Publication 3-07. The category type reads “Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency.” The counterinsurgency add-on is performed by both security assistance defined as: “(A) group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services.” And by foreign internal defense (FID): “(T)he total political, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency.” Similarly, the old 1995 National Military Strategy listed the following under the nation assistance subheading: assisting “friendly nations as they combat lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency.” This counterinsurgency part of nation assistance is not the emphasis of Fuertes Caminos exercises and not part of this paper. For an in depth review of United States’ past failures in the counterinsurgency arena see the 1997 United States Army War College (USAWC) Strategy Research Project by LTC Allen D. Cranford. It is entitled: “An Examination of Nation Assistance: Should the U.S. Support Third World Efforts to Combat Internal Lawlessness, Subversion and Insurgency?”

A term used prior to nation assistance was nation building. This term also has a tie to the counterinsurgency type operations. Author Jack A. LeCuyer’s position on not using the term is clear:
My two great efforts while I was assigned to US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) were to advocate that we discard the term 'Nation Building' because of its baggage and instead substitute the phrase 'Nation Development' and to urge acceptance of the notion that joint, combined and interagency Nation Development campaign plans could and should be developed.10

Nation development is a better term. However, in current documents and usage the term nation assistance is the standard.

**Humanitarian assistance** (HA) is another one of the sixteen types of MOOTW operations in Joint Pub 3-07. "HA operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions...Department of Defense provides assistance when the relief need is gravely urgent and when the humanitarian emergency dwarfs the ability of normal relief agencies to effectively respond."11 This type assistance relates to a crisis such as Cyclone Marian in Bangladesh in 1991, or famine in Africa. This crisis type of humanitarian assistance is different than nation assistance exercises as used in this paper. Although, as will be mentioned in the subsequent review of strategic documents, the term humanitarian assistance is sometimes mixed with nation assistance. But, when coupled as **humanitarian and civic assistance** (H&CA), it has a meaning that is under nation assistance.

Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations is listed in section 401, Title 10 of the U.S. Code. In this section the term means any of the following:

1. Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
2. Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
(3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
(4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
(5) Detection and clearance of landmines.\textsuperscript{12}

The first four types of H&CA listed above are what the Fuertes Caminos exercises perform.

**Nation assistance** as defined by Joint Pub 3-07 is:

(C)ivil or military assistance (other than HA) rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. Nation assistance operations support an host nation (HN) by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance, FID, and H&CA. All nation assistance actions are integrated through the US Ambassador’s Country Plan.\textsuperscript{13}

It is important to note the H&CA plans must have an interagency link in two ways. The first is with the State Department through the U.S. ambassador’s country plan. The U.S. ambassador approves the particular exercise sites to receive the assistance. To ensure this link takes place, none of the H&CA funds may be provided “unless the Secretary of State specifically approves the provision of such assistance.”\textsuperscript{14}

The second link is Congress. “The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on National Security and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives ...(an annual report) on activities carried out under this section...“\textsuperscript{15} The Secretary of a military department who uses H&CA funds must determine that the activities will promote: “(A) the security interests of both the United
States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out; and (B) the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities."16

This paper is concerned with nation assistance exercises that utilize the H&CA funds program of Title 10, U.S. Code Section 401. Various documents listed in the analysis below use different meanings for operations or exercises similar to nation assistance. Some use associated terms such as nation building and some documents do not include nation assistance type exercises. They focus on the humanitarian crisis type assistance only.
ANALYSIS

The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) strategy formulation guideline is a tool to assist strategists evaluating policy.\textsuperscript{17} The following analysis follows the guidelines starting with national interests as related to Guatemala and flows through strategic appraisal, national policy, national strategy, military strategy and risk assessment.

The U.S. \textbf{national interests} relating to nation assistance in Guatemala are the following:

- Peace and stability in the region
- Curtailment of illicit drug trafficking and production
- Nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Respect for law and order
- Democratic government with free market economy
- Environmental cooperation
- Compliance with human rights
- Management of all immigration to the U.S.

The USAWC guidelines identify four categories of national interest: defense of the homeland, economic well being, favorable world order, and promotion of values. A nation assistance exercise in Guatemala applies to all four. When the national interests are placed in the four categories and given a rating of degree of intensity (vital, important or peripheral), they rate at least "important". Considering the geographical location of Guatemala, it is in our best interest for peacetime engagement to promote U.S. interests.

The \textbf{strategic appraisal} of Guatemala reveals the following. Threats include illicit drug trafficking and production,
corruption or international organized crime, environmental and security concerns. The Guatemala climate is excellent for growing opium poppies and other drugs. In 1989 it was ranked 7th to 8th largest supplier of opium in the world. Since then, U.S. drug-crop eradication assistance programs have succeeded in lowering the level of plantings to a negligible amount in 1993.\textsuperscript{18} With over 1,000 private airstrips, coupled with past corruption by officials and the military, it is an ideal refueling and transshipment point for drugs enroute to the United States.\textsuperscript{19}

An analysis of the \textit{national policy} and \textit{national strategy} begins with a policy from 1823, the \textit{Monroe Doctrine}. This doctrine made it clear to the world that the U.S. intends to be the guardian of independence and democracy throughout the hemisphere. In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. He announced the U.S. would unilaterally guarantee order and warned the U.S. would take military action in the face of wrong-doing or impotence.\textsuperscript{20}

In the preface to the 1997 \textit{A National Security Strategy for a New Century (NSS)}, President Clinton emphasized the global economy. He stated, "Now, we must build on that (being the #1 exporter) momentum, especially in Asia and Latin America. If we fail to act now, these emerging economies will find their economic future with other nations--and we will be left behind."\textsuperscript{21} Concerning diplomacy he wrote: "Every dollar we devote to preventing conflicts, promoting democracy, and stopping the spread of disease and starvation brings a sure return in security
and savings." Clearly he has set the course on the value of engaging now.

Throughout the NSS, leadership and engagement are the imperatives to shape the world. Assisting emerging democracies is listed many times. "We must take firm action to help counter attempts to reverse democracy ..." We need to build "on the fact that every nation in the hemisphere except Cuba is democratic and committed to free market economies." Our military serving as role models for emerging democracy militaries is listed several times. It states "(t)he methods for assisting emerging democracies are as varied as the nations involved ... We must take firm action to help counter attempts to reverse democracy, as we have in Haiti, Guatemala, and Paraguay." The humanitarian assistance subheading has nation assistance objectives: "(T)o help establish democratic regimes that respect human rights and to pursue appropriate strategies for economic development." Nation assistance supports the President and the NSS as a matter of national policy and strategy.

The Annual Report to the President and the Congress (April 1997) by Secretary of Defense William Cohen seems to be an exhaustive compilation (300 pages) of armed forces issues and operations. Crisis-type humanitarian operations are listed, but the examples do not include Fuertes Caminos-type exercises. Is this because there were no missions? No. Every year there are exercises in Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). U.S. Army South has an annual augmentation of almost 25,000 U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard troops enabling them to engage regional
counterparts in a wide range of multilateral programs. In Secretary Cohen's Annual Report there is only one acknowledgment of a nation assistance type mission. It is in the Special Operations Forces chapter. In this chapter the Annual Report recommends civil affairs, psychological operations, or special forces personnel be attached for overseas peacetime missions with engineer or medical units.

In an interview with Armed Forces Radio and Television on the day Secretary of Defense Cohen took office (January 24th, 1997), he said that America needs to engage in humanitarian operations "from time to time." He added, "Our force is there to defend American vital interests, and important interests, and not overindulge ourselves in employing them to humanitarian and other types of operations." It appears the Secretary of Defense does not value nation assistance as the President does.

After studying the May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, a Fuertes Caminos type exercise is included in the category under the subtitle "Shaping the International Environment." Specifically, the QDR lists a wide variety of shaping including: "forces deployed temporarily for exercises, ... or military-to-military interactions ..."

The 1995 version of the National Military Strategy (NMS) has a subheading entitled "Nation Assistance." It mentions bilateral and multilateral exercises, and civil-military operations. The 1995 version also covers combating lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency (as mentioned above in definitions).
The September 1997 NMS, by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, does not specify nation assistance. It does state that "Peacetime Military Engagement encompasses all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime."\textsuperscript{33} The 1997 NMS stresses the "imperative of engagement," to shape the international environment. "(Our) military capabilities form the foundation...that encourages peace, economic growth, and democratization."\textsuperscript{34} "Engagement serves to demonstrate our commitment; improve interoperability; reassure allies; ...convey democratic ideals; deter aggression; and help relieve sources of instability before they can become military crises."\textsuperscript{35} With the emphasis on engagement and shaping, why was the term nation assistance dropped in the 1997 version? It appears the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not value nation assistance as the President does.

Analyzing the ends-ways-means of the 1997 NMS, they are written in far too general terms, but are not inclusive of all the types of operations the military performs. The phrase "Promote Peace and Stability" is one of two objectives/ends. The other one is "Defeat Adversaries." Therefore, all of the peacetime ends need to be encompassed in "Promote Peace and Stability." The narrative though, leaves out a host of peacetime ends because it only focuses on creating and sustaining security conditions. "Promoting peace and stability means creating and sustaining security conditions globally, and in key regions, that allow the peaceful pursuit of our interests and the just
resolution of international problems through political means.”

The NMS has focused on the “Armed Forces core competence: we fight” to the detriment of all of the other peacetime operations typically performed.

The net result of the ends-ways-means as it applies to nation assistance in the 1997 NMS/Joint Chiefs of Staff level, is the following:

ENDS- Promote stability
WAYS- Elements of strategy
MEANS- Full spectrum force
Today's total force
Funding

The NMS lists shape, respond, and prepare as the elements of strategy. These elements of strategy should actually be the objectives. With shape as the ends and peacetime military engagement (such as nation assistance) as the ways, then the NMS level would be general and inclusive, yet specific. It would also be well balanced at this level and congruent up and down the levels.

Recommended Ends-Ways-Means for the NMS:

ENDS- Shape (Prepare and Respond)
WAYS- Peacetime military engagement activities
MEANS- Full spectrum force
Today's total force
Funding

In Army Vision 2010 under the heading of MOOTW is a statement about operations which are mostly humanitarian crisis but include nation assistance (nation building):

Primary among these contributions is the role land forces play in support of preventive defense. Through peacetime engagement, land forces are active and dominant players in
preventative defense activities ranging from nation building to military-to-military contacts. Through their presence, they provide a unique capability to impart American/democratic values as they interact with nations' armies and peoples to favorably shape the world environment and help keep potential dangers to our security from becoming full-blown threats.  

Further on it categorizes missions into seven general areas of which humanitarian is one. The subsets are disaster relief, population evacuation, refugee protection, then cooperation, exchanges, and training. The document Army Vision 2010 includes Fuertes Caminos type exercises.

Turning now to the Commander in Chief, Southern Command (CINCSOUTH) level, the theater strategic objectives are to:

* Strengthen democratic institutions;
* Assist host nations in eliminating threats to their security;
* Support continued economic and social progress;
* Assist host nations and U.S. agencies in attacking drug production and agencies;
* With the government of Panama ensure open and neutral Panama Canal; and
* Enhance military professionalism.

They are well written, general and inclusive, yet specific enough to apply throughout the area of responsibility (AOR).

In the ARMY Green Book, Commander, U.S. Army South's (USARSO) three primary goals for fiscal year 1998 are listed as:

* Continue with the implementation of the 1977 Torrijos-Carter treaties.
* Execute the theater engagement strategy of the CINC.
* Maintain force readiness through regional engagement exercises.

Both at SOUTHCOM and USARSO levels nation assistance exercises are an integral component of theater strategy. The following list is the ends-ways-means for SOUTHCOM.
ENDS- Strengthen democratic institutions
  Assist host nations in eliminating threats to their security
  Support continued economic and social progress
  Assist host nations and U.S. agencies in attacking drug production and agencies
  Enhance military professionalism

WAYS- Theater engagement strategy
  Humanitarian and civic assistance nation assistance exercises
  Military to military contacts

MEANS- State Department and country teams
  Joint task force
  Funds: example (Fuertes Caminos 95-N) $18 mil including State Dept. H&CA $682,000 and exercise related construction $500,000

An analysis of the SOUTHCOM ends-ways-means reveals a good balance. They also fully support the President’s policies and national security strategy.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States objectives/ends for Guatemala can be achieved by the following ways of reducing the threats to our interests. Foundationally, the threats can be thwarted if the people are healthy, educated, employed, economically stable, and have trust and confidence in their government and military so they follow the rules of law and order. People with good stable jobs, who acquire a few possessions, with hope in the future, are more likely to be responsible law-abiding citizens. They begin to trust the system and become a part of it. They believe it is in their best interest to vote, and obey law and order. Coupled with good morals and family values, positive spirituality and discipline, they care for their environment rather than dumping trash on the side of the road, for example. These people also become consumers of products such as those imported from the United States.

To gain the people’s trust and confidence the democratic government and military must be professional, free from corruption, just, properly trained and responsible. The U.S. military’s piece in this shaping task is, above all, being role models/ambassadors in uniform to military and civilians alike. U.S. soldiers stand out in their culture. Every move is scrutinized. A professional relationship with the host country displays appropriate behavior and leadership styles. Contact made during nation assistance exercises must be performed purposely and professionally to capitalize on this opportunity.
All of the nation assistance H&CA funded activities listed in Title 10, U.S. Code are appropriate ways to meet our ends/objectives in Guatemala. The U.S. military MEDRETES, DENTRETES, and VETRETES along with preventive medicine classes provided free of charge to rural patients are one component. Others are improvement to rudimentary roads and bridges, well drilling and basic sanitation facilities. Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities like schools and clinics should also be performed.

The ways/concepts above need resources or means to complete the tasks. The first resource is the U.S. ambassador and country team. They are an integral part of the planning process and execution and they continue in country to reap the benefits or correct any problems. Their strategic concept or country plan is the basis for identifying project sites that will bring the most benefit toward U.S. objectives. This planning is performed months in advance of an exercise.

The second resource/means is the Joint Task Force. When selecting U.S. forces to perform an exercise, the training value toward the unit’s wartime Mission Essential Task List (METL) should be the first concern. For example, engineer units performing horizontal and vertical construction are forces that will directly benefit from using their skills in nation assistance. An added benefit is the morale boost to the U.S. unit, knowing completed projects will remain for years of use. By contrast, many of the engineer projects performed at local training areas must be disassembled or filled in at the end of an exercise.
In addition to engineers, individuals and units with many branch skills within the Army combat support and combat service support units are needed. Typical branches with wartime METL's aligning with exercise needs are: military police, signal, military intelligence, adjutant general, finance, transportation, quartermaster, judge advocate general, chaplains, and the medical branches. Aviation utility helicopter units, special operations forces, civil affairs, psychological operations, and linguists can be used to further their skills in country. Any individuals of the services (Navy, Air Force, Marines) with skills common to those listed above would benefit by participation. Some special skills of particular services are also needed such as strategic transport and weather detachments. Wartime METL items from mobilize, deploy, perform operations, and re-deploy are all provided in an overseas nation assistance exercise to Guatemala.

Is this another mission that should be added to the active duty military? The active duty forces could perform and benefit from nation assistance exercises, especially special operations forces. However, combat engineers, as an example, need to train with their wartime brigades and divisions to maintain a higher readiness posture. Secretary of Defense Cohen does not want to overindulge in humanitarian and other types of operations. With the high operational tempo, reduced strength, and asymmetrical threats of today's world, it is recommended this mission be assigned to the reserve components.

The National Guard and Reserves are capable of performing these missions. Almost all of the necessary military
occupational skills (MOS) required for nation assistance exercises are in reserve component units.

In addition to MOS, another criteria concerns the planning or mobilization time required for reserve components. The Fuertes Caminos exercises are planned many months in advance. This planning time allows reserve component units to fit an exercise into their Annual Training requirements, preparatory training plans and pre-mobilization needs. By activating a Joint Task Force planning cell about a year in advance of the exercise all of the coordination, construction plans, bill of materials, and pre-deployment training tasks can be completed. The planning cell becomes the nucleus of a duration staff who provides continuity as each two-week Annual Training rotation deploys. The airplane deploying each rotation also provides logistic supplies from their home station. This ensures parts and special tools needed for sustainability are at the most, two weeks away.

Another benefit of rotations is the increased number of soldiers and leaders who receive the benefit of the training. This broadens the base of personal involvement in the plight of the host nation. During JTF Timber Wolf, hometown communities collected eyeglasses, shoes, and school supplies. The items were brought with the soldiers and distributed to the needy.

One of the CINCSOUTH theater objectives is to enhance military professionalism. The military to military and the military to civilian contacts made by reserve component citizen-soldiers can be positive role models of a civilian controlled military in a democracy.
In a survey of hundreds of reserve component soldiers and leaders who deployed on Fuertes Caminos exercises, the overwhelming majority had a positive training experience. Their enthusiasm affected their attitude toward Guatemala as a democratic ally, toward U.S. interests in the region and their military service. Recruiting and retention among the individuals and units was positively affected. Therefore, in light of all of the above, reserve component forces are excellent choices as a means/resource to conduct nation assistance exercises.

What about the funding means for these exercises? The Clinton administration pledged $40 million for peace and reconstruction of Guatemala since the end of the guerrilla insurgency civil war. This reconstruction money might flow from the State Department directly to Guatemala. However, the national security strategy would be enhanced by including the military in this flow. By allocating the money to Fuertes Caminos exercises in Guatemala, U.S. dollars spent also provide training benefits to our limited resource military. As an example, the budget for JTF Timber Wolf in 1995 was 18 million dollars.

In addition to U.S. resources, nation assistance exercises should include host nation military and civilian personnel. Working with our allies for combined benefits is an important aspect to capitalize on. In addition to military to military role modeling, incorporating local people gives them a vested interest in the successful completion and maintenance of the project. If the locals do not have all of the skills necessary
they can receive on the job training to enhance their skills. As the saying goes, teach a man how to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.

Despite all the positives coming from nation assistance exercises, there are past strategic and operational failures in Latin America and potential risks. The U.S. built roads that do not lead to the community’s transportation needs (roads to nowhere) and roads that allow illegal drug runners to use large trucks instead of pack animals. There are roads washed out each year with no maintenance plans. Some MEDRETES/VETRETES have temporarily cured symptoms such as dysentery in people or worms in animals, but have not addressed the causes. Dental and medical clinics have been built with no staffing. Water wells were drilled and electric pumps installed with local promises of electrical hookups that have not materialized. At a school site, the U.S. built a toilet facility that they later found out was on sacred ground. They had to tear it down. Toilets were also built with inadequate plumbing or with no plumbing and no maintenance plan. Some buildings are not engineered to endure the local environment.

In these examples a unit performed the training with good intentions, but what went wrong? The ends-ways-means and risk assessment with attention to detail did not align. This recommended alignment check must occur at each level extending down to the local community for input and back up to the strategic levels. The alignment must also be checked laterally
Joint Task Force Timber Wolf ensured the ends-ways-means were aligned. Local input was solicited and host nation army and civilians were integrated with the work force. Projects were completed in areas with military zone commanders who deserved the recognition. The three MEDRETES/DENTRETES/VETRETES included preventative medicine classes, their animals that carry diseases were treated, and thirteen fresh water wells were drilled. Each of the wells without electricity on site before the JTF left country, received a temporary hand pump even if electrical service was supposed to come. Also, equipment was locally purchased to ensure repair parts availability.
CONCLUSION

Does a nation assistance exercise in Guatemala by reserve components support our national security strategy? Yes. The United States has a window of opportunity in Guatemala to help shape their emerging democracy. A nation assistance exercise would be a positive influence for the civilian and military leaders and the general population. The United States reserve component engineer, combat support, and combat service support units would receive invaluable training on wartime METL skills with low risk. Also, with an enhanced U.S. image, our exports to Guatemala should continue to rise. These conclusions support the President's policies, strategic objectives and are in the United States' best interest.
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