

286178

JPRS 84038

3 August 1983

West Europe Report

No. 2183

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release.
Distribution Unlimited

19980603 142

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

7
82
A05

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

3 August 1983

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 2183

CONTENTS

THEATER FORCES

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

FRG, NATO Security Policies Viewed (Hans-Georg Wieck; EUROPÄISCHE WEHRKUNDE, Jun 83)	1
Concept of Area Coverage Defense Viewed (Werner Lange; EUROPÄISCHE WEHRKUNDE, Jun 83)	12
Army Material Needs for Next Decade (Horst Wenner; EUROPÄISCHE WEHRKUNDE, Jun 83)	24

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

Overview of Political Parties' Economic Platforms (TERCUMAN, 19 Jun 83)	34
Ketenci Eyes Flaws in New Labor Legislation (Sikran Ketenci; CUMHURİYET, 26 May 83)	37
Dunya Assessment of FRG Economics Minister's Visit (Editorial; DUNYA, 25 May 83)	39
Mixed Industrialist Reaction To Reduction of Interest Rates (CUMHURİYET, 15 Jun 83)	41
Reduced Interest Rates Impact on Savings Accounts (Meral Tamer; CUMHURİYET, 15 Jun 83)	43

POLITICAL

GREECE

ND Called on To Implement Radical Changes (Stefanos A. Manos; I KATHIMERINI, 16 Jul 83)	45
Agreement With Hungary on Refugees Issues Fails (AKROPOLIS, 13 Jul 83)	47
Albania Accused of Fomenting Trouble in Minorities Issue (Tasos Kondogiannidis; AKROPOLIS, 13 Jul 83)	48
Continued Dissatisfaction in Diplomatic Corps (I KATHIMERINI, 15 Jul 83)	50
PASOK's Responsible Handling of Bases Issue Stressed (EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS, 25 Jun 83)	52
KKE (Int) Policies Vis-A-Vis PASOK Analyzed (EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS, 25 Jun 83)	54
KKE's Anti-PASOK 'Hysteria' Condemned (EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS, 3 Jul 83)	57
PASOK's PLO, Sandinista, Marti Policy Seen Damaging (AKROPOLIS, 1 Jul 83)	58

SPAIN

PCE's Palero on Efforts To Revitalize Party (MUNDO OBRERO, 17-23 Jun 83)	59
---	----

TURKEY

Toker Eyes Two-Party System, Stability of Right (Metin Toker; MILLIYET, 19 Jun 83)	61
Prosecution Presents Arguments in TLP Trial (CUMHURIYET, 22 Jun 83)	64
Ilicak on Need for Barrage, 'Few But Good' Parties (Editorial, Nazli Ilicak; TERCUMAN, 22 Jun 83)	67

MILITARY

SWEDEN

Paper Complains Government Withholding Sub-Incursion Facts (Editorial; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 17 Jun 83)	69
---	----

Air Force Graduates Its First Women Officers (Rolf Akerberg; DAGENS NYHETER, 24 Jun 83)	72
Defense Research Institute Journal on Weapons of Future (SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 20 Jun 83)	74
Briefs	
Automatic Carbines From Belgium	76

FRG, NATO SECURITY POLICIES VIEWED

Munich EUROPÄISCHE WEHRKUNDE in German 06/1983 pp 266-271

[Article by Dr Hans-Georg Wieck, FRG permanent representative on NATO Council: "Basic Security Policy Requirements of Alliance Strategy"]

[Text] Bench Test of Deterrent Strategy

The contemporary strategy debate is marked by the fact that it has permitted certain elements of existing deterrent and defense strategy to assume a life of their own and aims to alter them by reason of their technological-operational shortcomings or for reasons of morality.

Morality and Weapons Systems

Nuclear weapons or specific types of them—like battlefield weapons or neutron warheads—are relegated to a moral category different from other kinds of weapons.

Strategies and technologies are being demanded or developed aimed at attaining security policy or military goals without resorting to the immoral weapons. Shouldn't one also ask how the enemy views his own spectrum of weapons ?

Conventional Deterrents

Future weapons technologies, it is believed, may bring about a major shift in conventional power relationships in Europe and as a result a possible shift in strategy away from nuclear deterrence to deterrence by conventional means. This would be worth considering, if these conventional technologies were capable of posing a decisive threat to the Soviet motherland—in other words, to the strategic base of the Soviet Union itself—in case an attack by the Soviet Union on member states of the alliance had to be repulsed. But that is not the case.

For all that, everyone knows that technological advances tend to lead to an only temporary operational advantage and that they do not permanently or substantially alter geopolitical conditions in most instances because the enemy is apt to make use of similar weapons systems himself. Nuclear

weapons and their delivery systems are a perfect example of this. But even in a parity situation, they serve the West as a peace-keeping deterrent. On the other hand, a structure-related technological-scientific superiority in key areas of modern weapons technology (in submarine and submarine defense technology for example as well as in air defense, C3, ECP and so on) may offset or tone down structure-related weaknesses.

Security in the Absence of the North Atlantic Alliance

When alternative strategies are proposed, they are sometimes accompanied by attempts to overcome unpleasant and risky aspects of one's own geostrategic situation by means of neutralist thinking. Illusions then tend to spread and there may be dire, irreversible consequences, if they are actively pursued. Any attempt to slip out from under Western deterrent strategy will inevitably lead to the removal of the European pillar of the alliance in the final analysis. Aside from Great Britain and France, the two independent, albeit nationally limited nuclear powers, no other European nation would be protected in a deterrent sense from Soviet pressure which would be in a position to rely on a wide-ranging weapons spectrum. As history has taught us, this would lead to a step-by-step inclusion of the non-nuclear nations in the sphere of influence of the present-day European hegemonial power, the Soviet Union--which is both a world power and the competitor of the United States, the leading Western power. In a sense, this would only entail a change of sides but would not reduce the risks inherent in the geostrategic situation, since the differences between the world powers would continue to exist. That may well not be the intent of those who espouse such strategies; but it would be the end result of such a policy, I think, unless the Soviet hegemonial power lost its drive. But that is not to be expected for the time being. Rational policy cannot be based on such suppositions.

Maintenance of Peace and Defense in the Absence of Nuclear Weapons

Those who call for a strategy which restricts the use of nuclear weapons as deterrents (demanding, for example, that first use be excluded) or which uses them only as a deterrent against Soviet nuclear capability tend to exclude nuclear weapons as instruments of escalation. On the other hand, they purposely include area depth as a strategic factor in a possible conventional conflict. These leads one to the following critical considerations. If one looks at the strategic triad consisting of forces, time and area, area and time must, if at all possible, be restricted from the Western and particularly our own point of view in case a conflict should arise. Decisions in a conflict must be made forward (area) and, if need be, by means of premeditated escalation in a timely fashion (time). In that sense, the two elements of area and time as well as the two principles of escalation and forward defense are indissolubly linked.

As a consequence, any alternative strategic or operational concepts are diametrically opposed to Western security interests, if they exclude nuclear weapons in their capacity as an escalation instrument and thereby turn the time factor (60 to 90 days) or area depth (FRG territory) knowingly into strategic elements once again. This is not altered by the fact that such alternatives generally also propose to start "forward." But it is not a question of where to start but of making use of area and time in the decision-making process.

Such concepts also are situated in close proximity of deterrent strategy aimed at maintaining peace and freedom. The intolerable nature of the risks involved in an attack are made exceedingly clear to any would-be aggressor. He cannot harbor any hopes of successfully evading them.

Deadlock and Change in East-West Relations

Thinking in terms of blocs and alliances, tends to make one view the situation in Europe as static. But that is wrong. In spite of the existing East-West split in Europe, political developments in Europe are constantly in motion. Let us now try to see which way they are moving.

They are in motion, among other things, because the power relationship between the world powers has changed and this has an impact on developments in Europe.

They are in motion because of the constantly changing relationship of the United States vis-a-vis Europe and vis-a-vis individual nations of Europe.

They are in motion because of changes within the Warsaw Pact.

Whether and when these changes will lead to new strategies and to changes in confrontation and cooperation relationships, no one is able to say with any degree of certainty.

This exposes a dimension of our own interests to view which at times is overlooked.

International Politics and German Security

Our own security policy position and as a consequence our position within the alliance and in East-West relations is influenced by the following factors:

The Soviet Union and Central Europe

The Soviet Union has become a world power with imperial and ideological ambitions because of its vast geographic area which qualifies it as both a European and Asiatic power; because of the belief in its ideological mission and because it emerged victorious from World War II.

It has assumed the role of a power seeking the hegemonic position in Europe and has taken to viewing this role as its "natural function." Disposing of a far stronger material base, it is continuing the expansionist policies of Czarist Russia and has "integrated" pan-Slavistic and orthodox trends in its ideology of Soviet communism.

Following World War II, the Soviet Union was able to gain a position of hegemony in Eastern, Southern and Central Europe. But at the same time, it took on the burden of the continuing ideological and civilizational differences separating it from the peoples of East and Central Europe it had subdued by power political means. Interventions by force and the threat thereof give proof of the continued existence of these differences.

The Soviet Union was on the verge of extending its hegemonic position in Europe vis-a-vis other nations incapable both of effective resistance to pressure and of self-defense and of signing agreements with still others designed to tie them loosely to the Soviet hegemonic system. The primary goal of these efforts was Germany in the heartland of Europe.

The United States and Central Europe

During and after the war, as is well known, the United States pursued a policy of global maintenance of peace through the United Nations which they also proposed to vest with all nuclear prerogatives. This was accompanied by a rapid build-down of the war machine and a shift to a peacetime economy.

In Germany, only the units needed for occupation purposes remained behind. Similar policies were pursued by the European allies of the United States—the more so since they did not have sufficient funds and were burdened with the job of reconstruction in addition. American credits and economic aid were badly needed. In addition, the problems caused by the dissolution of world empires had an impact on the viability of some European nations (such as Great Britain, France and the Netherlands). Nonetheless, they could not remain indifferent with regard to how and who would step in to fill the power vacuum in Central Europe left by the defeat of Germany.

In view of the worsening international situation brought on by the hegemonic policies pursued by the Soviet Union in Eastern and Central Europe, efforts to achieve closer European cooperation on security began to intensify. This took place in conjunction with U.S. economic aid for Europe and also corresponded to the political goal of European unity. The establishment of the European Union on the basis of the 1947 Brussels treaty marked the first step in transnational cooperation on security issues in the free part of Europe. It represented a first symbol of unity among the European peoples threatened by the hegemonic designs of the Soviet Union.

The West European Nuclear Powers and Central Europe

In contrast to the other European nations, Great Britain and France—still burdened by the weight of substantial overseas holdings and their gradual transformation into independent countries—did continue to maintain rather large national armed forces and armament industries. They also worked on the modernization of their military establishment in that they began to develop nuclear weapons for national reasons and/or continued the efforts along these lines that they had made during the war.

It is important to point this out because it shows that these two nations continued to define the structure, the weaponry and the size of their armed forces on the basis of national goals. Against this background, alliance goals later became a complementary form of safeguarding their independence. Only those national forces and efforts were contributed to the alliance which these nations themselves felt were the proper and necessary ones. They looked upon their nuclear capability as an independent deterrent which is capable of countering a strategic threat emanating from the Soviet Union in a like manner. Both nations possess a nuclear capability sufficient in all probability to inflict unacceptable damage to the USSR—but only once because the capability goes no further than that. However, the two nations cannot endanger the very existence of the USSR with their nuclear potential. Conversely, the Soviet Union could destroy the existence of these two nations several times over, if it were not for the fact that it must also fear the U.S. potential. And so, in the final analysis, the independent, national deterrent of France and Great Britain is tied to U.S. nuclear capability.

In consequence, both of these nuclear arsenals are not suited as escalation potentials and cannot be effectively used as such. If they can be committed at all, then only once and in conjunction with the United States.

Both partners cannot offer a nuclear umbrella—reaching out beyond their own national sanctuary—to other European nations, except in conjunction with the United States.

In fact, both potentials retain their credibility as national deterrents only by virtue of the U.S. umbrella because it alone is capable of endangering the existence of the Soviet Union through retaliation.

But both nations are also aware that any policy of national defense and security vis-a-vis the hegemonic power of the Soviet Union will not suffice because defense cannot simply commence at their own borders and because the threat to their existence as free nations of the West does not commence at their own borders either. The fate of their neighbors has become part of their own fate. All the nations needed to be protected.

However that may be, the European beginnings (as reflected in the 1947 Brussels Treaty) did not offer any guarantee or sufficient protection for Europe in the face of the developing Soviet hegemonic policies. There was not enough strength for that. The Soviet Union not only was the strongest power in Europe; it was also the second world power in ascendancy in its own view. It was also recalled that Europe had won two wars only because of American intervention against the supposed German hegemonic goals in World War I and her actual hegemonic goals in World War II. Without the United States, Europe was threatened by still another war for hegemony.

The Transatlantic Connection

For the first time in history, a transatlantic alliance was established to prevent war by creating a credible power-political counterweight to Soviet hegemonic power. We need merely recall that something similar was agreed upon in connection with the Versailles Treaty in 1919. The project met with failure in the U.S. Senate which refused to ratify such a far-reaching guarantee treaty in peacetime. In 1949, the U.S. Senate did agree to a security and guarantee treaty with far-reaching consequences both for peace and the eventuality of war—an historical event of unusual proportions. The meaning of the North Atlantic Treaty was that the fate of the United States and of Europe was linked as long as the threat of Soviet hegemonic power existed and as long as there was a consensus on both sides of the Atlantic in support of the treaty.

By establishing American treaty guarantees for the European members of the alliance, the Soviet drive for hegemony was effectively stopped on the basis of the superior American economic, scientific as well as military potential.

But the situation remained precarious due to the fact that the Soviet-controlled portion of Germany not only was unprotected but also was in danger of succumbing to the Soviet sphere of influence in connection with Soviet advances. The Soviet Union had wasted no time consolidating its own position in East Germany and even posed a threat to the allies in Berlin (in 1948 and 1949).

A difficult process of reconciling contrasting interests and points of view ensued and ultimately led to German membership in the alliance in 1955.

In view of the lack of operational forces and reinforcements as well as in view of U.S. nuclear superiority, Western defense plans called for massive retaliation in response to a Soviet attack. The plans initially called for establishing a defense line along the Rhine and subsequently along the Weser River—and then for conventional rollback which had proved successful both in Korea and in World Wars I and II.

These Western plans as well as the Soviet and Warsaw Pact units deployed in Central Europe and designed for offensive operations made it clear that as a consequence of World War II and the dissolution of Germany which had functioned as an organizational factor in Central Europe, that very portion of Europe had become operational forward area of the nations taking part in the political organization of Europe--in other words, of the Soviet Union, the United States and of the more or less independent medium-sized powers, Great Britain and France.

The significance of Germany to the other powers was that no power-political shifts should take place in that area which were contrary to their own interests. This then was the geo-strategic and geopolitical starting position for Germany following World War II. The most important task of German security policy was to deal with this by no means favorable situation. What means were there at our disposal to call the proper amount of attention to these interests and the goals deduced from them ?

Constants of German Security Policy

Germany's position was clear. The political weight needed to change this unsatisfactory situation was limited; but it did have a future in terms of the economy and security policy but less so in terms of overcoming the division of the country by political means.

The situation therefore made it incumbent on us to do the following:

1. to prevent a war on German soil which would be a confrontation of the world powers outside their own territory in the Central European area regarded by other nations as a forward area;
2. to contribute to a security and defense policy which would make war seem unacceptable to a potential aggressor as a means of gaining control of Central Europe;
3. to have the alliance issue a guarantee based on Soviet hegemonic aspirations that any attack against Germany by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact or the threat thereof would be viewed as an attack on the entire alliance and that the military response would therefore also be directed against the entire Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in particular. Given the realities of the situation (with regard to strength ratios and technological capabilities) the threat of such a response could only be based on American nuclear weapons. There is no way of endangering the existence of the Soviet Union by conventional means. Nonetheless, any attack on Germany would have to entail the same consequences for the Soviet Union as an attack on the United States, on Great Britain, France or any other member of the alliance. That is the basis of the flexible response doctrine, of forward defense and of deliberate escalation as components of an effective deterrent strategy to preserve peace and our independence.

4. Hegemonic powers are in the habit of attempting to attain their goals gradually--isolating their political targets one-by-one. They shrink back in the face of a superior power constellation--one which has the capability of inflicting serious damage on their existence.

When the free portion of Germany tied its independence to the potential nuclear strength of the United States, Germany came under the protection of the nuclear umbrella. But if Germany was no longer to function as a maneuver area for the opposing sides in the East-West conflict, the strategy would also have to include the principle of forward defense and deliberate escalation.

That constituted a political goal of great importance and it was not easy to attain. It called for making a contribution in the form of large defense expenditures and the facilitation of the stationing of allied forces on German soil. Both of these principles tend to offset existing disadvantages of not being able to lay down the conditions of one's own defense due to the lack of one's own capacity to establish defense policy, political policy and security policy and the lack of nuclear weapons of one's own. No European country can do so by itself any longer. But there is a difference. The European nuclear powers still have their own limited nuclear deterrent. And a further difference is that no other country but Germany is as much in danger of becoming a theater of operations.

Risks of German Security Policy

It must be admitted that the two principles on which our continued existence as a nation is based--deterrence and its restoration, if need be, by means of forward defense and escalation--raise some difficult questions and may even be placed in jeopardy through changes in operational plans.

What are the primary dangers we face ?

1. Direct or indirect renunciation of nuclear escalation--including targets in the Soviet Union itself--following a Soviet invasion.
2. The demand for /execution of conventional defense measures in the Soviet approaches/ against all attacking Warsaw Pact forces.

The demand for including the depth of enemy territory in conventional defense but involving the intentional exclusion of the territory of the USSR would permit the Soviet Union--though the aggressor--to function as a sanctuary and the conflict itself to be regionalized.

To be sure, U.S. territory would under such circumstances still not be included in the conflict but it would become apparent to the attacking Soviet Union that the United States was not willing to wage war at the risk of its own existence. This partial commitment would in effect turn the United States into a European power incapable of carrying out a (retaliatory) strike against the aggressor on his own territory.

There might be a lengthy war in Europe in the course of which Great Britain and France might try to protect themselves against becoming involved territorially themselves with the help of their own "strategic" deterrent. In other words, there could be a war which could set Germany back to the time prior to her becoming a member of the alliance—it would become the forward area in which the forces contending for power in Central Europe would confront each other.

That would be the outcome of a policy based on so-called conventional deterrence or one which falsifies the real purpose of nuclear weapons of acting as strategic deterrents by misusing them as battlefield weapons.

3. Improvements in conventional defense and the fear of a nuclear battlefield situation help assign a secondary role to the geostrategic requirement which calls for Germany's dropping her disadvantageous position as an operational forward area by becoming a member of the alliance and thereby becoming an alliance "essential" afforded the same protection as the nuclear powers themselves.

4. So much for a review of our interests. But there are many who would rather not see or would rather overlook the consequences to be drawn from it.

One observer once asked me why Germany does not muster a force of 2 million men to meet the eventuality of war. If she did, any attack by the Soviet Union could be repulsed.

It might be repulsed but it is highly unlikely, since the Soviet Union also has nuclear weapons. If a conventional attack mounted by the Soviet Union did not meet its expectations, it might decide on the use of battlefield nuclear weapons. In that case, the 2 million men would not do any good either.

Such an approach would remove the security policy underpinnings of the alliance. The Soviet Union could take political advantage of that and then the free portion of Germany would forfeit its independence; the West would lose the European heartland and the independence of other European nations would be in greatest jeopardy.

5. The operational political goal of the Soviet Union is to influence the defense capabilities of the European nations not dependent on it in such a manner that they no longer have defense and alliance resources available to them which can inflict damage on the Soviet Union. When that happens, the hegemonic power has in effect established military superiority. It is for this reason that the Soviet Union is raising the demand that the French and British missile systems be equated with the Soviet medium-range systems (SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20) and that there is no justification or need for American systems in Europe. These systems which, as defined by their own governments, are solely designed for the protection of France and Great Britain would expose the non-nuclear areas of Europe to blackmail in the absence of a credible American shield for these parts of Europe. And if

that ever came to pass, the French and British systems could also be outflanked politically. Our French and British friends know that. That is why the alliance as well as the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella protecting the non-nuclear areas of Europe are as important to them as they are to us.

6. Against this background, it runs counter to our interests (because we would indeed be reverting to the "maneuver area" role) to support doctrines renouncing first use of nuclear weapons. And as for the assumption that the existing conventional imbalance and the existing unfavorable geo-strategic situation could be altered decisively and permanently through the development of new conventional weapons, it, too, is fraught with danger, if it is to be employed for the purpose of doing away with the deliberate escalation option.

It is equally counterproductive to establish nuclear-free zones in the areas of direct East-West confrontation because the forces acting upon these areas will surely continue to be nuclear powers.

Common Interests of the Alliance Partners

Although the basic positions of the individual member nations may differ, the alliance has common interests as exemplified below:

1. France has its own nuclear capability to meet any eventuality but it also has a vital interest in not permitting its own approaches—namely Germany—to succumb to Soviet influence or, what is worse, a war to take place on German soil. For this reason, France supports all the nuclear deterrents and all appropriate defense efforts but has no use for the doctrine of independent conventional deterrence because such resources could not be used as a retaliatory response to a Soviet attack which would inflict decisive damage.
2. Like France, Great Britain knows that her own nuclear strength would become ineffective, if the European continent were lost. She therefore supports European-American understandings on nuclear and conventional issues without, however, being able to assume a protective strategic weapons posture which goes beyond safeguarding its own territory.
3. The United States of America, free Europe's nuclear protector not only of the non-nuclear nations of Europe, fears that rapid escalation will ensue in case of war as a consequence of insufficient Western conventional forces and also fears that it might be drawn into a war with its own territory.

The United States is therefore looking hard for alternatives to prevent war which would not have a decoupling effect—which, in other words, might achieve the same goals as nuclear deterrence without U.S. territory being drawn into the conflict at an early stage of the conflict. For this reason, the United States is devoting particular attention to conventional forces which might favorably affect the unsatisfactory power relationships in Europe.

In the interest of preserving peace, these reservations must be gradually overcome. But it will be most important to provide for effective nuclear deterrence in Europe in the years to come--unless there is an arms control agreement which leads to the removal of the Soviet threat posed by the SS-20s, which are a danger to Europe and are aimed at splitting the alliance.

4. Our most important job is to be patient and to try to influence the plans worked out by our joint agencies--all this in the face of subtle but distinct differences which result from the differing interests of the individual members. In my view, NATO Secretary-General Luns said it best. "No one knows when and how escalation will take place in case of conflict and that is just as well," he said. "This uncertainty prevents war--provided that a large enough potential is available for whatever response is selected. In other words, we must have credible options at our disposal."

And finally, let me stress a political point at this juncture which is of colossal importance both for the alliance and its effectiveness. It is the need for consensus in peacetime on decisions affecting all security policy and military planning issues. This means that in each case positions will have to be arrived at which take account of the substantive interests of every individual member state--as perceived by that state itself. It also means that the premier power does not simply walk into the NATO council and announces what is to be done but that a network of consultations is used to develop a position which it thinks can be implemented and that a determined effort is then made to implement that very position. Of course, every other country has the right to act in the same manner with respect to issues it considers important.

9478
CSO: 8120/1606

CONCEPT OF AREA COVERAGE DEFENSE VIEWED

Munich EUROPAEISCHE WEHRKUNDE in German 6/83 pp 281-286

[Article by Major General Werner Lange, commander of 10th armored division: "Alternative Solution or Utopia--Some Thoughts of Loeser's Concept of 'Area Coverage Defense'"]

[Text] Prefatory Remarks

In the debate on alternative defense concepts, which has been going on since the late sixties, Jochen Loeser's proposal occupies a special position.

He begins his analysis by stating that the conventional component underdeveloped ever since the beginnings of the alliance deteriorated even further during the seventies to the detriment of NATO. Loeser's concept for its part is aimed at strengthening that conventional component in order to escape the need of early use of nuclear weapons--or at least to diminish it and to raise the nuclear threshold.

In dealing with Loeser's ideas below, we assume the reader's familiarity both with Loeser's own book as well as the excellent critiques by 1st Lt Dieter Farwick and Brig Gen (ret) Heinz Karst and Baron von Steinaecker's article on the subject of "area defense."¹

The three-part article by Lather and Loquai on "alternative concepts" also has the Loeser proposal for its subject.

This article may therefore dispense with critiquing--necessary as that may be--NATO strategy of flexible response, alliance problems and first use of nuclear weapons. Instead, it will deal with critical issues which have heretofore been dealt with insufficiently or not at all.

Does the Loeser Concept Meet Basic Needs of a Country's Successful Defense ?

The defending forces, arrayed along a largely contiguous front, are initially faced by attacking forces arrayed in a similar manner. The attacker will try to keep the defender from discovering his intentions prematurely. The enemy's main objectives are therefore likely not to become clear until a later stage has been reached. It must therefore be the defender's first

task to discover the enemy's main objective as early as possible and to prevent a breakthrough. All his efforts must be directed toward preserving as much unused combat strength as possible until actual contact with the enemy is made so as to remain victorious when the decisive breakthrough is tried. The main question is how to maintain sufficient combat strength while being subjected to enemy annihilation fire. Strong reserves drawn up close to the front—but out of reach of enemy annihilation fire—are to be readied for immediate commitment while somewhat weaker forces are initially used in the thinly manned approaches in order to keep the enemy guessing with respect to the actual defense posture.

Once the attack takes place, it will be the defending forces' job to prevent an enemy breakthrough—which has always been the defender's job. But what is new is that the attacker is in a position to carry out his intentions sooner than before and with a greater element of surprise. In order to be able to counterattack and bring up reinforcements, the defender will therefore also have to have rapid reaction forces and mobile reserves which can quickly be assembled at a point which is threatened.

The defender can only take advantage of his internal lines with the help of mobile forces which can rapidly be moved from place to place. Another advantage may be gained by committing weaker forces at less threatened points so as to establish a power ratio at some other point which suffices to mount operations of one's own.

It will not be possible to prepare for defense against a breakthrough at all points at once. It will be important to discover the attacker's intentions early on so as to be able to blunt his main thrust with the help of air force units and the artillery.

It has been shown that the defending forces must oppose the attacker with like weapons and means. The defender needs these as much as the attacking forces do. The more mobile the enemy ground and air units are, the better prepared must the defender be to counter this mobility and the element of surprise arising from it. But that does not mean copying the enemy strategic concept.

Intensification of weapon effect will primarily benefit the defending forces. It increases strength and makes it easier for them to fulfill their mission which is to stop and to thwart the enemy attack.

New weapons and resources make it possible to create a more manyfaceted and mobile defense and to lower vulnerability as well.

If the enemy forces are vastly superior, the defenders will first have to try to establish a balance of forces and to follow an attrition strategy designed to weaken the enemy sufficiently to permit them to mount a counter-attack.

But the goal must still be not to stop at this point but to be able to change over to actions of one's own after the enemy attack has collapsed and to strike at the same point or at another to deliver a decisive blow.

In the ninth chapter of the sixth book, Clausewitz writes the following: "Foolishly enough, it has become a basic defense concept to concentrate on defense in battle rather than on annihilation—which is one of the most pernicious of misconceptions which mistakes form for substance."

If one compares this view with Loeser's concept, one finds that this ultimate objective of defense—to bring a war to its successful conclusion and to protect one's own territory—cannot be achieved with the help of the network of area coverage defense.

The network will not stand up under a pinpointed enemy attack. Even if the enemy forces are halted in the depth of the area, they will have occupied large sections of the FRG in the process. But the goal of all our concepts and efforts will continue to be to conduct a defense that is successful enough that very little of our own territory will have to be given up—which after all will have to be regained later.

Does the Loeser Concept Take the Conclusions to Be Drawn from the Most Recent Conflicts into Account or Do the Effects of New Technologies, the Changes in Warsaw Pact Doctrine and the Alterations of Existing Forces Structures of the East Bloc Run Counter to His Proposal ?

On page 155 of his book, Jochen Loeser says that experiences that have been worked through constitute a secure basis for required or even necessary change. In this connection, he cites the false application of the experiences of World War I by Poland and France and can see the danger of arriving at wrong conclusions in an era of fast changing technologies as well.

To see what we can learn from the past, we might draw on the last major defense operation of World War II along the Vistula River in 1944 and 1945.

The exemplary nature of the Soviet Vistula offensive is reflected in the lengthy preparation time lasting from about October 1944 until 11 January 1945 and the thoroughness of the measures taken by both the defenders and the attacking forces in readying themselves for the operations to come. For this reason, we will focus on this operation at this point.

On the basis of experience gained during the rear guard action in Russia, the army general staff developed the large-scale fighting zone system—particularly in the course of the battles which took place in the summer of 1944.

The defense system drawn up by Army Group A in the fall of 1944 provided for a main battle line (HKL); an intermediate line some 2 kilometers in back of it and a large scale fighting HKL another 2 to 4 kilometers in back of that. The artillery emplacements were located still another 4 kilometers behind. In the depth of the large scale fighting zone, a number of additional rear positions were provided for at a distance of some 20 to 30 kilometers—designated as a, b and c positions the purpose of which was to protect the area up to a depth of 200 to 300 kilometers. The purpose of the large scale fighting HKL was to absorb the forces committed to the HKL immediately prior to the start of the enemy offensive and thus to protect them from being destroyed by the bombardment by the enemy artillery.

The problem faced by the German forces which determined all considerations was the adverse ratio which existed between available manpower and the need to hold a front line some 780 kilometers in length in the face of increasing enemy superiority and a lack of sufficient reserves. Along this 780-kilometer front, a total of 31 divisions were committed up front and $5\frac{1}{2}$ fast divisions in the rear to provide reserve strength. Each division had about 24 kilometers of front line to cover.

The Soviets used between 220 and 240 artillery pieces per kilometer of front in the breakthrough salients when they mounted their attack from the Vistula bridgeheads. The artillery ratio stood at 1:10 as did that of armor while the infantry ratio was 1:9. The massed Soviet artillery fire hit the German positions up to a depth of $6\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers and was extremely effective. At the end of 2 hours, the fire was directed into the depth both for the purpose of immobilizing the German artillery positions and destroy the reserves. The attack of the actual combat forces was carried forward under the protection of an artillery bombardment. At the end of 3 hours, the infantry divisions in the breakthrough salients had been completely worn down.

A major portion of the divisions in place—which consisted of infantrymen and thus provided "soft targets"—had been hit and put out of commission by the punishing artillery fire during the first few hours of combat. Anti-tank defense—particularly close-combat weapons such as panzerfausts but anti-tank guns without armor, too, which all are soft targets soon failed. Even at those points where the required 160 infantrymen were available for each kilometer of frontline, they were successful for a limited time only as enemy artillery fire quickly disposed of them.

By this time, the density and accuracy of fire has increased appreciably. Unarmored defense forces, primarily relying on earthworks for protection, will not be able to defend themselves against superior armored forces attacking with massive artillery support however many defense weapons they may have available. Even if they are given an opportunity to change positions rapidly, these infantry or motorized infantry units will sustain far heavier losses than units protected by armor.

Most recent military history--particularly in Lebanon--has shown that it is unrealistic to expect success by using inexpensive and therefore readily available antitank weapons.

The Israeli army has shown how a strong and modern antitank defense equipped with guided missiles can be knocked out before any attacking armor can be committed to combat.

Any weapon that cannot be given armored protection must be used from fortified positions or shelters to afford protection to those manning it. Any soldier who fires off an antitank missile is not only supposed to hit the target but also to survive. Of necessity, this type of defense is rigid and does not permit movement--particularly involving rapid reaction to a main effort or a shift of main effort by the enemy. A modern artillery battery equipped with the 70 model field howitzer will need 30 hours of hard work after all to dig in and thereby get a certain amount of protection.

It was a bitter lesson of the Yom Kippur War for the Israelis that combat tanks can no longer be committed singly and that success may be expected only in those situations where tanks are closely integrated into combined arms combat. They have come up with a tactical concept where enemy antitank defenses were knocked out with the help of newly developed long-range artillery which covered the target area almost completely and took out those operators which did not have armored protection. Only then did the mechanized assault forces begin their attack.

It is worth noting in this connection that the Soviets are once again reacting quickly to these new findings. Following the Yom Kippur War, they correctly concluded that the best way to counter a great number of antitank weapons is to provide artillery superiority.

Taking the Soviet Forces in Germany as an example, one can see how rigorously these conclusions have already been implemented. In motorized infantry regiments, the artillery component was raised from battery strength to battalion strength or from 6 to 18 antitank howitzers. At the division level, the rocket launcher systems were increased two and one-half times and at the army level, the artillery component was raised from regimental to brigade strength or from 52 to 72 pieces. Aside from the increase in actual numbers, the important thing is the improvement in quality. Towed artillery was replaced by self-propelled artillery down to the regimental level. Now that tests are completed, it may be expected that the heavy 203-mm self-propelled howitzer will get the nod. Frontline artillery divisions are being equipped with the BM 27 heavy rocket launcher which fires 240-mm rockets and at the division level, the modern BM 21 medium rocket launcher is being used which now has 40 barrels per launcher instead the former 16. The light 122 field howitzer has been replaced by the 152-mm self-propelled howitzer at the artillery division level and of late, frontline artillery brigades have also been getting the 152-mm self-propelled howitzer. Another frontline artillery brigade was found to be equipped with the BM 21 rocket launcher.

Articles in Soviet publications confirm the assumption that the Soviets are trying to base their firepower relating to Europe on conventional weapons with the help of which NATO forward defenses could be breached to raise the possibility of a rapid and concentrated offensive which would take them all the way to the Atlantic without having to resort to nuclear weapons.

It appears that the tool to be used to breach the defensive wall of anti-tank weapons, in the Soviet view, is area-covering, rapidly shifting, steamroller-like and above all continuing annihilation fire laid down by superior, long-range, highly mobile escort artillery units.

The efforts made to provide each and every motorized infantryman with armored protection indicate that the Soviets consider an unprotected infantryman a "soft target" with no chance of survival.

What we have said thus far raises the need for an alternative defense concept and for equipping our units in such a fashion that they can withstand an attack by divisions of the Warsaw Pact and are protected against inordinately high casualties.

With his concept, Loeser does not provide an answer to the question of what real measures can be taken to counter the classic steamroller fire of the Soviets which has increased both in effectiveness and mobility and what can be done to counter the battle tanks and the motorized infantry on their APC's supported by helicopter gunships. In view of what we have already said, infantry units hardly seem suited for defense against this kind of enemy employing this type of tactics because successful defense under such conditions appears almost hopeless.

Does Loeser's Proposal Correspond to Available Resources, i.e. Can the Manpower and Weaponry Called for by Loeser—Including the New Technologies—Be Made Available and Can They Be Paid for ?

In his book, Loeser submits a defense concept based on forces which are staggered in depth. It is hard to figure out the totals of the ground forces component in Loeser's "real Bundeswehr." He does provide actual numbers in speaking of the sword forces—72 brigades made up of 24 Bundeswehr and 48 allied brigades—on page 259; but he does not go into specifics with regard to the shield forces. Their numbers can only be deduced from reading the text.

Loeser calls for positioning 4 to 7 brigades one behind the other (on page 260) and for 5 to 7 brigades on page 185. Since he proposes to hold the allied brigades in readiness in depth as the sword forces, "border area defense" duties will have to be assumed by the infantry brigades alone. If one assumes a frontline of 1,000 kilometers and if "defense sectors" about 30 kilometers in length are assigned, then one would need some 33 brigades to man the far forward sectors. Behind these, in following the Loeser concept, at least 3 or 4 more brigades would have to be positioned. This would call for an additional 130 brigades, giving us a total of about 160.

According to Loeser, the brigades located in the border area are to be one-third staffed while those in depth are to be two-thirds staffed (cf p 187 and p 261). But even that would call for available manpower in the neighborhood of 65 brigades. The 28 home guard brigades are left out in this instance because they are supposed to be fully staffed (cf p 260).

When asked about the large number of operational units and the total number of brigades in the course of a 11 September 1982 panel discussion held at Lueneburg, Loeser said he was thinking of this type of staggered-in-depth defense by 5 to 7 brigades only at the point of the enemy's main effort. But this response does not jibe with some basic precepts of his in other sections of the book. For that matter, it would not jibe either with the concept of area covering defense as outlined by him. In Loeser's view, the units within the network are operational at all times (p 187) because they can be readied for defense purposes within 12 hours or in 24 hours (p 187) or in 36 hours (p 262) in depth. This would mean that the units in question would have to have their home bases in the deployment and/or stationing site. Small depots would have to be available to secure area supply.

All of this would point to the need of covering major portions of the FRG with such a network because it is at least open to doubt that the attacker will really select the very point in the line to launch his main effort where the defender has massed all of his forces and his infrastructure. It would seem more likely that the siting of the small depots and the deployment of the infantry units in depth would give away the defender's intentions prematurely.

Now if the Loeser concept really claims to be area-covering, the area would have to be covered more or less equally both in front and in depth.

As we mentioned before, this would call for operational units numbering some 65 brigades of 3,000 men each or about 200,000 men in all comprising the shield forces and another 24 brigades numbering 72,000 men comprising the sword forces. But these figures do not include any support units. Who, for example, is it that provides maintenance for the brigades' helicopter gunships (referred to on page 263)? Who brings up the vast quantities of ammunition Loeser needs to wage his battles (p 185)? Where will engineer, artillery, anti-aircraft and reconnaissance units come from in sufficient numbers to strengthen the organically integrated technological units of the motorized infantry battalions at the point of main enemy effort? Where are the medics and their field hospitals? And who makes up the supply chain?

Even if Loeser proposes to reduce the combat unit to supply unit ratio from 1:9 to 1:1 (as he says on page 116), he would be exceeding the personnel strength of the entire Bundeswehr by asking for as much manpower as he does. In view of the lesser number of conscripts to be available in the years ahead, an army of this size could no longer be mustered.

What we have already said about the forces and their equipment shows quite clearly that cost savings can certainly not be expected. In fact, chances are that costs would be substantially higher.

Loeser, too, appears to be aware of this. On pages 146 and 177, he calls for saving money on the air force and the navy in favor of the army. In addition, he calls for discontinuing logistic services, staffs and administrative units (p 192) and shifting resources and priorities (p 146).

In fact, he expects the improvement of army combat strength to cost more money (p 146) and calls for "additional budgetary funds" (p 192).

We should not neglect to mention at this point that any reduction in air force funds would merely serve to increase the threat posed by enemy air units and/or helicopter gunships. This could be particularly dangerous for our fighter aircraft, since these could be attacked by aircraft out of the range of the anti-aircraft weaponry with which Loeser proposes to equip his units.

Any major renunciation of the capability to interdict through air action the introduction of enemy forces from the depth of the area or at least to make it more difficult would also greatly reduce the chances for "border area defense." Destroying or slowing down the second operational echelon before it can be committed to battle, however, through air action represents one of the most effective ways of truly raising the nuclear threshold by means of enhanced conventional striking power.

From a security policy point of view, any cuts in the navy budget would have a major impact on the operational freedom of ground forces in Central Europe as well as on the alliance policy of deterring war. This "one-dimensional" aspect of the Loeser concept represents one of the major problems with the book.

Taking a look at the consequences new weapons and new technologies will have on the combat units, one finds that changes in the relationship between fire and mobility are taking place.

It seems as if firepower has sparked a new stage in the race between firepower and mobility. In World War I, firepower stopped mobility dead in its tracks. In World War II, mobility made a comeback in the form of the tank. The emergence of simple, accurate and inexpensive anti-tank weapons in large quantity seemed to have had an initially detrimental effect on the mobility of armored units. By coming up with the "bold thrust" concept, the Soviets tried both to solve the problem and to find ways of returning to greater mobility. As firepower became ever more effective and more accurate and as modern types of area-covering ammunition were developed, ways seem now to have been found to overcome the factors which limit mobility, at least for the time being, and to restore mobility to the mechanized units. But it should not be overlooked that the new types of ammunition could also pose a threat to mobile armored units, if ways cannot be found to neutralize the artillery delivery systems.

New technologies such as multi-purpose ammunition, mine systems, sensors, combat platforms, rocket launchers and particularly precision guided munitions to be used against tanks, aircraft and naval ships may make it necessary to devise new tactical measures sometime soon. As to exactly when these new weapons technologies can be made available to the armed forces not only depends on their further development but also on the cost involved.

In his book, Jochen Loeser refers to long-term development (p 264). It will have to be watched closely in order that the appropriate further steps may be taken in time.

But given present fire effectiveness and the emerging Soviet tactics, Loeser's ideas cannot be realized, it should be pointed out. The thing is that Loeser is planning on an army most of which would be comprised of so-called shield forces. In other words, most of it would be comprised of non-motorized infantry units. His concept calls for largely unarmored forces in order thereby to save money for the proposed enlargement in manpower (p 192). There are several points in the book where he calls for cutting down on mechanization (p 177); for doing away with armor on some systems (p 115); for introducing inexpensive, unarmored weapons (p 119 and 188) and vehicles (p 129).

Such an army, to be sure, would have the required infantry strength available but these forces, as we mentioned earlier, would become "soft targets" who would be exposed without protection to enemy annihilation fire and thus soon be neutralized. Such an army would not be a credible deterrent but would, if anything, increase the threat of war because it would appear to be winnable to the Soviets.

On this decisive issue, Loeser in fact contradicts himself by on the one hand calling for cutting down on mechanization and by turning the motorized rifleman into an infantryman not engaging in combat from mechanized vehicles and on the other hand by making light armor on vehicles and combat platforms an almost foregone conclusion elsewhere in the book (cf pp 262-263).

How Do FRG Realities Jibe with Loeser's Ideas and Expectations Regarding a Possible Activation of the Will to Fight on the Part of the Population ?

In his book, Loeser devotes a good deal of attention to the motivation to fight and engage in combat. He is quite right in perceiving the need to have major segments of the population agree on defense (p 20). He also takes a realistic view of the effect of the questions asked by soldiers regarding the meaningfulness of their serving in the armed forces on fighting morale as a whole (pp 84-85).

But it is very doubtful whether investment in overall defense will improve matters and whether preparations for a national defense emergency will both foster solidarity and lower unemployment (cf p 89). In any event,

there is no reason to assume that Loeser's dreams will come true that the defense network he proposes will activate the citizenry's will to fight.

Staying with Loeser's concept, one has to assume that about half of the FRG would be turned into a combat zone in case of an armed conflict. One-third of the population lives in the 100-kilometer strip along the border. The problems posed by the lack of depth of the FRG are evidenced by the mere 50-kilometer distance between the inner-German border and Hamburg; by the 100 kilometers from the Dannenberg tip to the North Sea and the 120 kilometers from the Thuringian bulge to the Frankfurt area. Any concept that calls for a defense perimeter that reaches into the outskirts of Frankfurt will certainly do little to motivate the population.

For another thing, the deeper defense operations penetrate into our own territory and the more destruction is to be countenanced, the less credibility and effect will a deterrent strategy have that only relies on a conventional defense capability. After all, conventional forces that cannot solve the problems posed by forward defense extend an invitation to aggressors to take advantage of the opportunities with which they are presented.

Summary

According to Loeser, there is no need for additional funds, if conventional defense is to be improved to such an extent that the FRG can be defended successfully without resorting to nuclear weapons. All it takes is a change of structure, equipment and operational plans.

Another fundamental idea of his is that a conventionally inferior defender must not take over the tactical and operational principles of the attacker, if he hopes to be successful. New ways will have to be found.

But there is no convincing proof for the fact that the alternative concept of area-covering defense proposed by Loeser represents a realizable and more effective solution.

The probable manpower costs as well as the increasing cost of modern technologies will exceed the limits of the possible. It must be doubted that Loeser has provided an even approximately correct estimate of the funds needed to implement his ideas. The initial steps outlined in his concept which point to an enhancement of defense capability would call for numbers that could not be met from available resources. Just in passing, we should call attention to the fact that it will be difficult enough to meet manpower requirements by the end of the eighties in view of the low birth rate age groups then reaching draft age.

Loeser draws one-sided and excessively doctrinaire conclusions (on pp 126-127) based on military history as well as technological development both of which he evaluates solely from his own point of view. He does recognize the revived importance of firepower--but solely from the defender's point of view and not that of the attacker. A similar misconception led to the construction of the Maginot Line.

Superior firepower can only be countered by means of a mobile and protected center-of-gravity shift—in other words, by means of movement. As always, a defender can only succeed on the interior line, if he manages to establish local and temporary superiority of his own. The relationship between firepower and movement can therefore not be perceived in a dogmatic fashion.

Loeser does not realize that an unprotected individual has no virtually no chance in view of the vastly increased effectiveness of firepower. It is wrong to try to offset a vast number of inexpensive weapons by means of an equally vast number of unprotected individuals because this neutralizes the weapons operator even before he has had a chance to fire his weapon.

On page 128, Loeser refers to man as an "invaluable object." If that is so, logic would require him to do something to protect this valuable tool called soldier.

No doubt, there is no 100 percent protection for a soldier but one can substantially reduce losses by hardening "soft target" man. This goes all the way from issuing armored vests to individual fighting men to light armor for vehicles, heavier armor for combat vehicles and ultimately to mechanized units. The 30 to 40 percent increase in APC's in the Soviet Forces in Germany over the past few years shows that the Soviets have learned this particular lesson.

Coupled with the increase in firepower by adding to and improving their artillery by 40 to 50 percent, we can see a trend in Soviet tactical-operational thinking which calls on the defender to take measures which are the very opposite of what Loeser proposes.

Nonetheless, the lively debate sparked by Loeser's book is to be welcomed. To a degree, it has led to suggestions and considerations which definitely merit further thought.

But, as Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker writes in his essay entitled "Living with the Bomb" contained in his book "The Threat to Peace," "he who says he is sure of how catastrophe can be avoided thereby gives proof of his lack of credibility—in the same manner as that other person who is just as sure that catastrophe is unavoidable."

FOOTNOTES

* Jochen Loeser, "Neither Red, Nor Dead," Munich 1982

Dieter Farwick, "Neither Red, Nor Dead ?—A Critique of Jochen Loeser's Book," *EUROPAEISCHE WEHRKUNDE*, 05/1982, pp 210-214

Heinz Karst, "Area Coverage Defense," *ALTE KAMERADEN*, 02/1982, pp 7-10

Baron Heinz-Eberhard von Steinaecker, "Area Defense," WEHRWISSENSCHAFTLICHE RUNDSCHAU," 01/1982

Karl-Heinz Lather and Heinz Loquai, "Alternative Defense Concepts," TRUPPENPRAXIS, 09, 10, 11/1982

9478

CSO: 8120/1606

ARMY MATERIAL NEEDS FOR NEXT DECADE

Munich EUROPAEISCHE WEHRKUNDE in German 06/1983 pp 271-277

[Article by Lt Gen (ret) Horst Wenner, former head of general army office, Cologne: "Army Weapons and Equipment Needs to Strengthen Conventional Combat Effectiveness in the Nineties"]

[Text] Let me start by listing the following army needs to increase conventional combat effectiveness in the nineties:

1. The West is not in need of a new strategy; we must merely reassess our operational plans.
2. The conventional component represents the weakest link in our flexible response triad. It must be strengthened but by no means for the purpose of building a /solely conventional/ deterrent and defense capability.
3. The potential of modern technology makes it appear realistic to call for increasing conventional combat effectiveness.
4. These are some of the initial steps to be taken immediately in order to assure gradual attainment of this goal:

--extension of the battlefield into the depth of the enemy area

--neutralization of enemy air force

--preventing the second wave of armies and fronts from closing up to the attacking forces

--attacking these second wave units in their assembly areas and as they move forward

Forward defense is part of the strategic concept and calls for engaging in battle in far forward areas for political and military reasons. Too often, it has been taken literally and dragged down to the operational level and was viewed by many primarily as a defense battle to oppose the first attacking units of a strong adversary. But to conduct a successful defense operation in Central Europe, equal weight must be assigned to combating the second echelons of the enemy armies.

Let me add a few general prefatory remarks which I will not deal with in detail as I enumerate the army's needs for weapons and equipment for the purpose of increasing conventional combat effectiveness in the upcoming decade but which are of special significance nonetheless.

1. All demands and desires must take the enemy potential into account and at the same time do justice to alliance obligations. They must make a realistic assessment of the battlefield of the future and take account both of our own capabilities and those of our allies.

This last listing is of particular importance for the German army because we are—thank God—supported both on the right and the left by allied corps.

We should start on the assumption that there will be border-crossing operations into the battle zones occupied by major allied formations under a unified command. For this reason, weapons systems and equipment particularly in the area of guidance systems both for the artillery and the anti-aircraft units should be made compatible well ahead of time in terms of software and hardware.

This will thus call for international cooperation in any number of instances, even though it will frequently be necessary to take account of our own economic interests—so that compromises will become unavoidable.

2. Research institutes on both sides of the Atlantic have found that no revolutionary developments are to be expected in the area of technology. But we may hope for and indeed expect evolutionary improvements in various areas of military equipment.

3. The rate of modernization will be strongly affected by declining resources available to the European allies—in short, it is bound to decline. We will still have to be in a position to pay for the military equipment we need in the near future of the nineties. We know that current procurement plans are taking up almost all our funds until 1987 and a good part of them even further on. Complete freedom of planning will not exist until the early nineties, it may be assumed. The demands of all the services, including the army, will have to be guided by this fact.

4. There now is a shift of emphasis from delivery systems to sensors, weapons and ammunition to achieve greater effect on target. Particularly in the weapons and ammunition field, the ground forces are looking to our world-famous armament engineers to provide improvements in the near future.

5. The limits to the use of the most advanced technologies must be factored in ahead of time even by the most seriously committed researchers.

Our conscripts—whom we will have to integrate into the nucleus of our armed forces for national, political reasons—will have to be viewed as the primary user and operator.

Having a long-term serviceman act as operator, raises peripheral costs substantially indeed.

The Marder APC and the Leopard 2 tank represent such technological borderline cases.

The conclusion to be drawn can only be that even simpler solutions for users and operators will have to be devised both in the control of the equipment and in applied technology.

6. In the 1981-1983 time period, financial needs of the army will have to be lowered by drawing projects out; by cutting down on unit quantities and by eliminating programs in order to adjust medium-term and long-term procurement plans to the budget. This calls for establishing clear priorities so that both the field and the territorial army may receive the equipment they need to meet the threat and do justice to their assigned task.

The needs of the army service branches will have to be guided by overall army plans and available budget.

Army Needs to Increase Conventional Combat Effectiveness

We will now attempt to take a look into the future at the futuristic battlefield in Central Europe and at conceivable combat operations in order to determine army equipment needs while keeping in mind the four possible, gradual steps to be taken which make use of modern technology and which we already referred to in our introduction.

The nineties are not likely to bring any major changes in the defense area of this region which has already been broken up due to urbanization and a widespread network of highways and roads but which also contains a number of discontinuous as well as continuous wooded areas. It is in this region that the combat operations against the first echelons of the Warsaw Pact forces will be taking place and it will be of advantage to both the attacker and defender to make use of the great mobility of motorized and mechanized units here.

Let me mention one conclusion to be drawn from these terrain-related factors before going any further: many of the line-of-sight distances and visual contacts measurement of which is required by future weapons systems and anti-tank systems in particular frequently turn out to be shorter than originally assumed.

In order not to be hit by the full force of the second wave of Warsaw Pact armies too soon--particularly when a power ratio unfavorable to us exists--combating these units is a decisive operational goal.

We must get away from the antiquated idea that conventional combat decisions on our battlefield must be brought about with strong forces in far forward areas without making use of the depth of our own area or that of the enemy. The conclusion to be drawn from this, however, must not be to substitute far forward defense for forward defense but

- the utilization of our own mobility--particularly of our mechanized units in order to hold our defense positions;

- the employment of long-range weapons systems using modern technology to combat as well as wear down the enemy second echelons in the depth of the battlefield.

An important condition for this is the neutralization of enemy air units as mentioned in the introduction.

Against this backdrop or rather on this basis, conventional battles will be fought under the threat of nuclear weapons in the upcoming decade.

The army will fight its battles as "battles of combined arms" as the actions of the various branches are coordinated.

In view of our appreciable technological advantage in army weapons systems and equipment in the eighties, the elements of land battles have increased both in number and effectiveness. Based on actual tests of weapons shortly to be commissioned for use, further improvement may be expected during the next few years and full use is expected in the early nineties.

Armored and unarmored combat troops are now and will continue to be the main elements in combined arms combat. As a rule, they will be supported by elements of the combat support units (artillery, engineers and anti-aircraft units); by command units such as communications, EW and military police; by army air force units, operational support units such as maintenance and supply as well as by medical corps units.

Today, more than ever, it is necessary to assess and analyze the various instruments participating in the grand concert of combined arms combat both in terms of operational command and the possible use of new technologies.

Future combined arms combat will primarily involve forces whose structure provides them with a share of diverse branches of service or which are drawn together through tactical grouping in a battle formation

In view of the Warsaw Pact option to effect a quick strike using massed mechanized combat units with strong air and artillery support, our own combat units will have to fulfill their forward defense tasks on the basis of superior firepower and accuracy as well as high mobility—above all of their battle tanks, APCs, antitank gun carriers and antitank missile carriers and armored reconnaissance vehicles. Repeated attempts will have to be made to force the enemy into action by quickly massing our own forces; to achieve local superiority in firepower and manpower and so defeat at least some of his units through quick maneuvering.

At this point, let me turn to the question of how important armored and unarmored combat units will be in this decade and in the next. There are a number of factors which make it necessary for us to call for improvement and greater efficiency of our armored combat and combat support units. These include enemy strategic, operational and tactical intentions and capabilities; his superiority in the numbers of mechanized armored units and artillery of every caliber and our own terrain structure.

In the future, the effect of fire will have an even greater impact on the course of fighting. The Warsaw Pact forces responded to the huge enhancement of antitank capability in terms of tube artillery and missile systems particularly on the part of the Germany army by a drastic increase in their own artillery so as to be able to neutralize these new weapons systems with the aid of burst and zone fire and achieve a quick breakthrough into the depth of the area with their mechanized major formations. For this reason, any combat unit based on light infantry and wheeled launch vehicles will not constitute an alternative to the battle tanks and APCs of the future. But light infantry will continue to exercise an indispensable supplementary function.

Even after the turn of the century, mobile armored high-performance guns will continue to be operated by draftees. In other words, battle tanks will continue to be required as the army's main weapons systems. As a consequence, these mechanized battle tanks will have to be supplemented by armored infantrymen.

Unarmored infantrymen will continue to be needed primarily for defense operations in covered and difficult terrain.

These remarks on the future tasks to be assigned to armored and unarmored combat units in combined arms combat are intended as a response to incomplete analyses and proposals for radical changes in operational guidelines and lighter equipment.

In keeping with the orchestra concept, we should now turn to the remaining individual instruments or in other words to the additional weapons systems and carriers that are needed and to the equipment of all the service branches. But that will be done elsewhere.

There is only one more instrument that ought to be tuned. It is the one to be used in combating enemy helicopter gunships. The question to be put is whether such combat should be engaged in by another helicopter or by a ground vehicle. If anti-aircraft units are to be relied on, then we must turn to a piece of aerial combat equipment. If we choose to rely on a weapon or vehicle on the ground, we will have to decide whether to give the job to an existing weapons system (such as the 20mm, 25mm or 30mm BMK) or whether to turn to an entirely new weapons carrier. The advantages and disadvantages are obvious in either case. In view of rising costs, the first version (helicopter gunship) seems the more promising one.

Army Equipment Needs in the Nineties

Let me now give just a few examples of the army's major conventional equipment needs to engage the first and second echelons of the Warsaw Pact forces in combat.

Reconnaissance

The army command must know as soon as possible where the first and second enemy echelons will launch their concentrated attack and what units and weapons will be used. It is the job of reconnaissance to find these things out. As far as the first enemy echelon is concerned, drones, radar, infrared photography, artillery location devices and EW will not be sufficient to do the job. There remains a gap ranging from 15 to 60 kilometers and there is no piece of allied equipment yet available that is capable of closing it.

If the operational concept is to be satisfied and if combat against these first echelons of the enemy forces is to meet with success, such a reconnaissance device—a remotely piloted vehicle, in other words—will have to be developed over the short term. It will have a dual job. It will have to transmit as fast as possible both data on enemy units and their movements to corps, division and brigade headquarters and on our own tube artillery and missile positions to artillery command centers as well as directly to the operational units so that they can return the fire immediately.

If such reconnaissance devices can be made available by the end of this decade, conventional combat effectiveness of the German army will be substantially enhanced because it will then be possible for our own units to react quickly in combined arms combat and to counter enemy artillery effectively.

Reconnaissance as well as the engagement in battle of the second echelon will prove more difficult. In the main, we will continue to rely on the reconnaissance devices necessary to make out and counter the accumulation or movement of major enemy reserves. It will be necessary to develop a safe and accurate reconnaissance device--alongside the air force--which can cover the 100 to 200-kilometer area and which can transmit high-resolution data and images to the recipient--in this case, to an army group.

Active and Passive Protection

Active protection of our crews--particularly in the combat and combat support services--will have to be improved in the nineties. After all, we may also expect the enemy to enhance effectiveness through the introduction of so-called intelligent or terminally guided ammunition on indirect laying weapons systems and to make advances in ammunition against armored combat vehicles to be hit directly.

It will be particularly important for the armored combat units engaged in forward area combat which will be the main carriers of the battle against the first enemy echelons to be protected ballistically against machineguns, antitank small arms and artillery ammunition and thereby to be afforded long-time survival capability.

In this field, too, technology has made progress. Some of it was tested in the Lebanon war. Both these protective measures and interference measures directed against the sensors of terminally guided ammunition are acquiring increasing importance

To provide survival capability to crews and weapons carriers, we also have to have passive protection. This includes, among others

- mobility
- warning equipment (such as radar, lasers, helicopters)
- artificially generated smoke
- camouflage paint
- suppression of heat radiation
- noise reduction
- silhouette reduction

There is a special technological challenge to be met in this field in particular.

Indentification or Identification Friend-Foe

In view of the speed and high mobility of modern weapons systems, the defender has relatively little time to react and identify a reconnoitered or intercepted object as belonging to friend or foe.

Present IFF systems such as the Mark I, II and III all have major operational shortcomings. We therefore need a new system and priority must be given to one that is compatible for both army and air force as well as among the various NATO member countries. This question-and-answer identification system will have to be designed for ground-to-ground; ground-to-air; air-to-ground and air-to-air operation within NATO for the use of combat units, anti-aircraft units and army air force units.

To achieve our own operational objectives in combined arms combat against the first enemy echelons, it will be important to attack enemy air targets in order to assure our own fire effectiveness and movements on the battlefield—during the day as well. Reaction time of our own weapons systems such as the Gepard, the Roland among others is to be achieved through autonomous and immediate IFF in order that range, superior firepower and accuracy of these weapons systems can be taken advantage of at maximum range even in fog, under a dense cloud cover or at night. High demands will be made on the reliability of this IFF system.

The success of the antitank helicopter system and the third generation antitank rocket systems of the infantry will also largely depend on such an IFF system.

Thus, it is the army that has a particular interest in a solution soon which makes use of state-of-the-art technology.

Periphery of Weapons Systems and Equipment

A major portion of the weapons systems and the equipment presently available and still being delivered will still constitute the basic equipment of the army in the nineties.

But as a result of decreasing funds—especially on the personnel and fiscal side—equipment life will probably have to last longer than originally planned. Full efficiency of each individual piece of equipment can only be attained, if full account is taken of the periphery all the way from the training stage to the supply stage to its value as a command resource and to sufficient ammunition supply.

With regard to the Gepard weapon system, we have had success as far as the training stage is concerned; with regard to many other systems we have been nowhere near as fortunate.

The training equipment example shows just how important peripheral development of equipment is. For every modern weapon system there must be modern training equipment so that the soldiers can learn how to operate the system properly. The training process can be helped along by simulating combat conditions through the use of a particular piece of equipment or some part of it. All such simulators have saved a lot of time and money—such as the tracked vehicle simulator. The army would like to see a seasoned tank firing simulator to train battle tank crews. This type of simulator would save a lot of money on training ammunition.

If battle tanks are to continue figuring as the centerpiece of the equipment available to our combat units, such a simulator is a needed as soon as possible as a supplement.

Closing Remarks

These closing remarks contain three critical observations of my own which are designed, however, to provide background for the substantive discussion of the problems of equipping our ground forces.

1. If we look at our capability to defend the alliance, the army will always play an important part—particularly in Central Europe. If the defense line on the ground between the North Sea and the Baltic and the Alps does not hold, all the efforts of our air and naval forces will be of no avail.
2. If the Western technological advantage is to continue offsetting the qualitative superiority of the potential enemy, R & D—especially in Germany—must receive far more psychological and financial support in spite of all resistance to this course. We must make especial use of the great intellectual capabilities of our technical experts. If we spend less on research, this will, in the final analysis, lead to a withering away of intellect.
3. New ways must be found to inform our economy of the planning goals of NATO, of the Bundeswehr and its military services, service branches and ultimate users. All concerned must talk to each other more and in greater depth so that intellectual capabilities and financial resources are not directed toward useless development projects. The arms industry as well as the responsible officials both inside and outside the defense ministry including end users must talk to each other and exchange views. Fear of contact both of a formal nature and based on conflicting responsibilities should be overcome once and for all. And all those concerned with the military establishment should make greater use of the engineering know-how coupled with practical experience which are both available in the army.

Let me quote a very apt remark of Napoleon's. "Lost time," he said, "cannot be made good during a war." And that still applies today to the speed with which modern battles can be expected to take place. Army equipment needs must take account of that.

9478

CSO: 8120/1606

OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL PARTIES' ECONOMIC PLATFORMS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 19 Jun 83 p 5

Text As 6 November elections grow nearer, the economic views of the parties established or to be established will obviously be an increasingly important factor in determining how citizens vote.

The differences in the economic views expressed in the platforms of the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP), the Motherland Party (MP) and the Social Democracy Party (SDP) are hardly distinct enough to be termed "model differences." However, the three parties do have varying opinions as to whether the focus should be upon the private sector with minimum interference by the state in the market economy, or upon state enterprises and a planned economy.

The NDP viewpoint is described as one of "moderate liberalism." The MP, chaired by Turgut Ozal who implemented the 24 January stability program, claims to favor "a free sort of liberalism that sees the state as the helper, not the competitor of citizens in economic affairs." The SDP, on the other hand, will be confronting the people with its concept of a mixed economy which "calls for state interference in certain areas and introduces restrictions aimed at eliminating some of the drawbacks created by a market economy."

The NDP's Economic Policy

The NDP says that its stability program will bring great relief to the country's economy and successfully curtail inflation. It does add, however, that "this model will need to be modified as time goes by." In fact, NDP Chairman Turgut Sunalp had mentioned that "the 24 January model would be modified" when he made a speech some time ago.

The NDP economic concept centers mainly on the following points:

- State enterprise must not compete with free enterprise. The state should not have a hand in everything, and the idea of unproductive etatism must likewise be avoided.
- The state must lead the way in those areas where free enterprise falls short within the economic system.
- The economy must operate on the basis of the rules of a free market economy with free competition.
- To finance progress, inflationary pressures must be eliminated, personal savings increased, and national income distributed more evenly to the extent possible.

The MP Model

The MP believes in achieving economic progress based on natural economic laws. This means reducing state interference and restrictions to the minimum required for the country's interests and implementing a free market economy where competition prevails.

The main lines of the MP economic model are:

- Savings will be encouraged.
- Investments, production and jobs will be increased.
- A stable, lasting solution will be found for the balance of payments abroad.
- Exports will be increased, as will the share they have in the national economy.
- Services that bring in foreign currency (e.g. contract work, shipping, tourism) will be encouraged.
- Inflation will be checked and price stability achieved for this purpose.
- Agreement will be reached regarding economic, financial and credit policies.

MP Chairman Turgut Ozal summarizes his economic views by saying: "The state must not get involved with details. Its function of organizing and guiding economic policy must be kept at a general level. The state is not the citizens' competitor; it is a helper that serves the citizens and facilitates economic development."

The SDP View

In calling for a mixed economy, the SDP would like to see the producer functions of the state complement private enterprise. Headed by Erdal Inonu, the SDP favors direct intervention by the state in such areas as:

- Achieving a sound social and economic substructure...
- Producing goods and services that fail to attract private enterprise for various reasons...
- Eliminating regional imbalances...
- Preventing monopolistic tendencies...
- Producing goods and services of a strategic nature and exploiting natural resources...

The SDP does not see the state's function as being limited to direct and indirect intervention in the economic field. It goes on to say that "the speculative efforts of private enterprise have no positive contribution to progress, and the state should therefore guide these efforts toward industrialization with planned goals."

Maintaining that the market mechanism raises problems such as inequitable growth, regional differentiation, differences in domestic and foreign trade prices that tend to hurt certain sectors, economic slumps and uneven distribution of income, the SDP emphasizes, "Strong national planning is necessary to escape from these problems."

12279

CSO: 3554/344

KETENCI EYES FLAWS IN NEW LABOR LEGISLATION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 26 May 83 p 9

[Article by Sikran Ketenci in the column "From the Workers World": "What Should Change?"]

[Text] First reports from work places in the aftermath of new laws are not very heartening regarding the establishment of peace between employees and employers.

Under the trade union law No 2821 and collective agreement, strikes and lock-out law No 2822, a considerable number of unions are to be dissolved. Trade unionists appear to be unwilling to start work in situations where mergers, separations, changes of rules under the new laws and surprises introduced at general meetings to be held under these rules are not known yet. Even union officials who believe in keeping their posts lack enthusiasm. They say that under the conditions created by the new laws, trade union positions have ceased to be attractive and the functions of unions are eliminated.

Despite the fact that under the new laws considerable work has to be done within a short period and there are formalities to be carried out within a specified period, waiting for the publication of regulations concerning union locals becomes, at least, a good reason for such a lack of enthusiasm. According to rough estimates by Turk-Is [Confederation of Turkish Labor], unions have to gain status, according to the new laws, by holding more than several hundred [as published] congresses. Being a confederation, Turk-Is, too, is plagued with the inflation in the number of unions. If these unions cannot rely on their majority or are unwilling to join with others, then they have to dissolve themselves and join other trade unions, or they have to become independent. The majority of independent unions, which number a few hundred, being small and weak, will either join others, merge through bargaining or disappear, in accordance with the law, from the trade union scene without feeling the need to hold general meetings. Unions belonging to DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions] had a sufficient number of locals and a structure required by the law. However, under the temporary provisions of the law, the legitimate existence of these unions is suspended, for some, for the duration of the first phase of the court action brought against them, and for others, until the conclusion of court action that has not yet been taken. For these unions, undergoing constitutional changes as provided

by the law or holding general meetings are out of the question. In accordance with new constitutions to be drafted as provided by the new law, the number of open trade unions will drop from 800 to 100, and then branches will elect their delegates and through branch general meetings, delegations to the trade union congress will be elected. This will be followed by trade union congresses. In addition to several formalities to be carried out under the new laws, regarding the eligibility of members, thousands of general meetings have to be held by January 1984.

There is a restlessness within the employers front at a time when the trade union leaders seem to be aware that--despite the pile of work facing them--just one single unpleasant step could mean the loss of everything; so for the time being they limit themselves to bargaining to survive with minimum loss or gain (by snatching members from unions to be closed or suspended from activity).

As is known, our employers have already publicized their satisfaction with the new laws. As a result of their pleasure and zeal stemming from this satisfaction, they appear to be eager to plug the gap caused by the passive stand of the trade unions in the early days of the new law.

To be more specific, it looks as if their old disease has surfaced again. In other words, they decide on behalf of the workers which union they should belong to, and to achieve this they exert pressure, contrary to the laws, on the workers without having any right to do so. Some of our big factories have already told their workers, who are organized within DISK, that they have to resign from their unions in 30 days. They even began obtaining letters of "resignation" from workers taking their annual vacations to preempt any imposition of deadlines. Naturally, it goes without saying that the laws have no such provision: the workers have three options--to wait for the result of court decisions to establish new unions or to join existing unions--and are not bound by any time limit in making this decision, and in making these decisions, important for them, they can consult and discuss matters among themselves as long as they want to and it is their most natural right to reach a collective and healthy decision. Some of our employers, on the other hand, moved before the workers did and set their own men to work for the formation of unions. However, for these two trades [as published], regulations concerning union locals may bring about important changes.

Complaints from workers in other fields of employment as well as efforts to ascertain the legality of declarations made by employers painfully indicate that there is not much change in old attitudes. How can peace in labor relations be established, regardless of the laws, unless these attitudes change?

9558
CSO: 3554/309

DUNYA ASSESSMENT OF FRG ECONOMICS MINISTER'S VISIT

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 25 May 83 p 1

[Editorial: "Lambsdorff's Visit and Issues"]

[Text] Otto Lambsdorff is the second FRG minister of economics to visit Turkey. Lambsdorff had quite a busy schedule during his visit, which began with a short meeting with Sermet Pasin, minister of state in charge of foreign economic relations at the Foreign Ministry, in the presence of technical advisers.

In addition to his audience with President Kenan Evren and Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu, Lambsdorff also called on Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen; Minister of Finance Adnan Baser Kafaoglu; Minister of Industry and Technology Mehmet Turgut; Minister of Public Works Tahsin Onalp; Central Bank Chairman Osman Siklar and Undersecretary in the State Planning Organization Yildirim Akturk. At a luncheon yesterday, Lambsdorff had the opportunity to meet the president of the Union of Chambers, Mehmet Yazar. This was followed by a press conference.

Undoubtedly, the fitting of such a busy schedule into two working days has special significance. The aim is the removal of all hitches in Turkish-German relations, which can already be described as "good." It seems that to achieve this, both sides have opted for direct consultations among the parties involved in these relations.

Within this framework, the subject raised by Mehmet Turgut for discussion is an easy one to resolve. The FRG would have no difficulty in launching a training program for "managers and administrators" from Turkey through scholarships. On the other hand, financial support requested by Tahsin Onalp for important public works projects, including the construction of a second Bosphorus bridge, has been (classified) as technical assistance.

It looks as if the meeting held between Yildirim Akturk and Lambsdorff touched on nothing concrete beyond a reiteration of the success of the 24 January decisions concerning the running of the Turkish economy.

Although not of direct interest to the FRG, two important facts were underlined by the minister of state, Sermet Pasin, during his meeting with lambsdorff. One was the forthcoming sharp increase in Turkey's foreign debt in

the years 1985 and 1986. The rescheduling of debts to OECD countries and the start of the repayment schedule for principal amounts borrowed under the emergency assistance programs established under debt rescheduling would tighten the repayment of foreign debts, which might otherwise be done without hardship. Sermet Pasin considers it expedient to raise this matter during discussions from now.

Examined in the light of a speech delivered by the chairman of the Central Bank, Osman Siklar, in which he referred to the assistance given by the FRG when Turkey was facing difficulties in making foreign payments, the issue can be described as a call to the FRG to be ready for the years 1985 and 1986.

The second thing underlined by Pasin was the textile problems between Turkey and the EEC. It is important for Turkey that an early common ground with regard to bottlenecks, which turned into de facto restrictions, be found. Along with escalating tension in Cyprus, Greece's assumption of the EEC Council presidency in July may turn the existing bottlenecks into a deadlock.

What will the FRG do about these issues? At every opportunity, Lambsdorff points out that Turkey's economic performance is successful and that the FRG will continue to support Turkey's economy. He also says that the FRG sees Turkey as a strong partner and within this framework will include the financing of certain megaprojects in the Hermes Export Insurance scheme. Such an approach is vital for the implementation of joint investment projects related to the return of Turkish workers to the FRG. What is behind the FRG's interest in joint projects is to create employment for returning Turkish workers at complexes related to them under the joint ventures. To raise the capacity of these establishments as a means of providing employment for a reasonable number of Turkish workers depends on Turkey's active contribution....

9558

CSO: 3554/309

MIXED INDUSTRIALIST REACTION TO REDUCTION OF INTEREST RATES

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 15 Jun 83 pp 1, 11

[Text] Ankara Chamber of Commerce Chairman Yener: It won't do the economy any good.

Murtaza Celikel: Banks will recover half their losses.

Halit Soydan: It won't give the banking system any relief or breathing space.

Sakip Sabanci: The industrialist needs cheap credit.

Professor Asaf Savas Akat: It is an extremely dangerous decision.

Turgut Ozal: This decision will put a great strain on the economy in the future.

News Center -- It is being argued that the 5-point reduction in interest paid by the banks on time deposits will not do the economy any good, but on the contrary will raise bank profits. While the reduction in credit interest accompanying that on time deposits is welcomed by industrialists, some bankers contend that reducing both deposit and credit interest rates will not solve any of our banking system's current problems.

Gungor Yener, board chairman of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce [ACC], said reducing interest rates would not do the economy any good at present, according to reports by our Ankara bureau. Noting that the best indicator for determining interest rates was the inflation figure, Yener said, "In view of the fact that the primary feature of the economic policy being pursued is to cut consumption and increase savings, it would have seemed that deposits, which have currently stabilized, ought not to be reactivated. If interest rates are brought down below inflation, it will aggravate deposit activity and start a shift to gold and real estate."

Murtaza Celikel, deputy board chairman of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry, took a stance close to the ACC chairman's in a statement to the ANKARA AGENCY in which he said, "The reason for reducing credit interest 5 points is to enable the banks to recover half their losses this year. This decision will increase the banks' profits and it will be paid for out of the pockets of depositors."

Guarantee Bank General Director Halit Soydan, viewing the matter through banker's eyes, said, "Reducing both deposit and credit interest rates together will not give the banking system any relief or breathing space."

In a TURKISH NEWS AGENCY interview, Sakip Sabanci, chairman of the board of Sabanci Holding, took an industrialist's view, saying he welcomed the reduction of interest rates because the industrialist needs credit at cheap interest interest and on long terms.

Sait Koseoglu, general director of the Pipe Industry Corporation, argued that the reduction of credit interest would not reflect on the marketplace. "As long as money is tight in the marketplace, credit interest rates will not fall. Moreover, reducing deposit interest will hold down deposit increases and the current money shortage will be even further aggravated by lower deposits," he said.

Meanwhile Professor Asaf Savas Akat summarized his views on the matter under three points: "(1) The drop in deposit interest rates will cause a real decline. Since this will increase the banks' real activities, it will deepen the crisis in the banking sector. (2) Since shrinkage in the real deposit volume will also bring shrinkage in the real credit volume, the banks will raise their withholding rates, that is, real credit costs will rise. (3) Under these circumstances, marketplace (lending) interest limits may also rise. The conclusion is that an extremely dangerous decision has been adopted."

Ozal's Comments

Turgut Ozal, general chairman of the Fatherland Party, also issued a statement to the TURKISH NEWS AGENCY in which he said, "Reducing interest rates is to distance ourselves from the 24 January decisions. This will put a great strain on the economy in the future."

Ozal went on to say: "Interest rates must not be adjusted by state intervention. Credit interest, like deposit interest, is being declared officially. Credit interest ought to be determined by supply and demand. If demand is very high, interest goes up; there is no other way to explain it. Reducing interest rates is neither adequate nor valid. They do not really come down."

8349

CSO: 3554/335

REDUCED INTEREST RATES IMPACT ON SAVINGS ACCOUNTS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 15 Jun 83 p 9

[Article by Meral Tamer: "Bank Interest, Bonds, Gold?"]

[Text] The decision to reduce bank interest rates by an average 5 points looks as though it will also do a pretty good job of reducing the attraction for the saver of keeping his money in the bank. The new interest rates to become effective on 1 July provide the saver a net interest income of less than 30 percent for all options except 1-year -- registered -- [certificates] payable at maturity. Yet it is not thought that this year's inflation rate, being publicized officially as 20 percent, will fall below 30 percent. The maximum interest income obtainable at the banks is 32 percent annual net interest on the 1-year registered option payable at maturity, and it becomes debatable under these circumstances just how attractive that will be for the saver.

The increasing trend towards recovery since the first of the year in real estate, automobiles and durable consumer goods shows how the saver no longer trusts interest income very much and would rather invest his savings in possessions.

Thus many are anxiously waiting to see what the banks will do now to attract time deposits as they have two competitors paying higher interest and a risky gold market offering uncertain returns on any given date.

--The banks' most serious rival for time savings is undoubtedly the state. Though the latest bonds it has put on the market are for 3 years, they guarantee 33 percent net interest annually for the 3 years. Moreover, the state pays interest semiannually. For those who have become accustomed to the additional income from savings for the past 2 years and cannot afford to give it up, the guarantee of 33 percent net interest income for 3 years in a climate in which bank interest is reduced every 6 months is an option not to be ignored. The state is also a serious contender against the banks for demand savings accounts. State demand bonds, put on the market by the Agricultural Bank, bring 20 percent net annual income and may be cashed in whenever one wishes, and they pay 4 points higher interest than the banks can pay on their demand accounts because the bonds do not have the 20 percent withholding.

Brokerages

--Interest rates on the brokerage market, meanwhile, are much higher. Brokerages pay interest at 10 to 12 points higher than the banks. On top of that, these establishments serve only as a "go-between" under the Capital Market Council's latest revisions, they only market bonds and, by offering bond discounts, raise the saver's interest income. Thus all one has to do is take a good look at the business whose bonds are being offered. That is, if the company putting the bond on the market is sound, the saver need not worry too much. Even if the "go-between" is liquidated or closes down for some other reason, it is possible to collect both the interest and the principal from the firm offering the bond. Here, too, the Capital Market Council has changed the rules for offering bonds. It is no longer possible to offer the old 7-year bonds. New bonds offered may be cashed in after 2 years, or 3 at most. In any case, complaints by active "go-betweens" that they cannot find anything to sell show that this market has been rediscovered to an extent by the saver.

--As for gold, the traditional savings medium of our people, it does not seem to be any serious competition for the banks in the short term, at least through the summer. Republic gold which was going for 21,400 liras at the first of the year is now around 24,000 liras. That is, it has paid a premium of around 12.6 percent in approximately 5.5 months. However, it would undoubtedly be a mistake to count on the premium and ignore the risks. For example, in early February when the price of gold spurted in our country as elsewhere around the world, or even more so, there were buyers who paid 28,000 liras for Republic gold on 4-5 February. Those who bought gold on those days are sorry now, we would imagine, or eagerly awaiting the annual fall revival of the gold market. These unknowns in gold, therefore, do not seem to offer sufficient attraction for the saver who, "once burned" a while ago, is now "twice cautious."

Who Pays What For Your Money (annual net interest-percentage)

Terms	Banks	State Bonds	Brokerages
Demand	16	20	28.32
6 months, paid monthly	24	--	--
6 months, paid at maturity	28	--	--
1 year, paid monthly	27.2	--	--
1 year, paid at maturity (registered)	32	--	45
1 year, paid at maturity (to bearer)	28	--	40
3 years, interest paid as shown	--	33	39.7
		(semiannually)	(quarterly)

8349

CSO: 3554/336

ND CALLED ON TO IMPLEMENT RADICAL CHANGES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 16 Jul 83 p 4

/Commentary by Stefanos A. Manos/

/Text/ As we come to the end of the second year of socialist "change" there are two main questions that are being asked: First of all, where are we going under our socialist government? Secondly, and more important, where should we be going with a genuinely liberal government? I shall attempt to provide answers to these two questions in this article.

The answer to the question "where are we going" is simple: worse and worse. Each person from his own viewpoint is coming to the same conclusion. Complete disorder prevails in every aspect of both public and social life. In health, education, economy, administration, mass information, everything has become disorganized and nothing operates properly. Besides, in foreign policy too the government's acrobatics has succeeded only in making Greece an untrustworthy partner and interlocutor. Turkey is thus directly and indirectly being strengthened, balance is upset, balance that the post-dictatorship New Democracy governments succeeded in with so much labor, while the dangers of a national adventure are increasing. The vulgarization of political life, the cultivated atmosphere of division and the phenomena of violence and terrorism are inevitably leading to the weakening of democratic institutions.

I am afraid that if the present trend of the government continues, at this time next year we will have a bigger drop in the purchasing power of income, much higher unemployment than today, insurmountable monetary problems, drop in production, bankruptcies and many other things. However, together with all of these tribulations we will also lose quite a few of the freedoms that we take for granted today.

During the 1981 pre-election period I attempted to explain how the PASOK program was leading to the restriction of our individual freedoms. This is not something that we either have or do not have. Freedom is a sum total of many small freedoms, each of which is nothing other than the possibility of choice. Each time that we lose one of these small freedoms we become a little less free. A small freedom is to be able to choose your deputy with a preference check. That has been lost. A small freedom is for a few people to get together in a

public organization and decide to strike for some demand or other. That has been lost. A small freedom is for you to select your own medicine. That too has almost been lost. With the health bill, we will not be able to choose our doctors. It was a freedom of the farmer to be able to sell the product of his labor to whomever he wanted. He has lost this freedom since he is obliged to sell exclusively to the local cooperative. With all that is being prepared with regard to the press, newspapers will become all the more uniform. The model evidently is ERT [Greek Radio and Television]-1 and ERT-2 where there too, of course, we have no choice. Or perhaps what does constitute an expression of democracy and freedom are all that has occurred in the trade union sector, or what has occurred with the workers in the public sector who live in constant fear of unfavorable transfers, or whatever has occurred in private companies all of which are in danger of going bankrupt. Everywhere the freedom of expression, the freedom of action and the freedom of choice is being restricted.

Renovation and Dynamic Vision

We have spoken enough about PASOK. It is unfortunate that many of the opponents of socialism are almost exclusively engaging in criticism of the "change" by the movement instead of proposing alternative solutions, in other words their own form of change for the better.

We need a new government to get out of the impasse. A genuinely liberal government that New Democracy is called upon to provide. Only the prospect of such a government will contribute to winning back the confidence of the Greek people that was lost in 1981. For New Democracy to become a government, however, it needs the broad "positive" vote of the Greek people that will be given in support of their ideas and not the restricted "negative" that will come about from PASOK's losses. However, how can this positive vote be won? Two conditions are needed: a bold renovation of New Democracy with a dynamic ideological vision of a liberal society.

Within ND, it is above all indispensable that there be a renovation of men and mentality. We need men who seek change, who search, meditate and accept the new. At the same time, we will cultivate and instill a corresponding mentality on both followers and friends. A mentality of change and acceptance of the new, a mentality of progress, a mentality of effective action, a vanguard mentality. In this way will the party become alive again, while new ideas circulate within it bringing to it new faces which, in turn, will bring in even newer ideas.

Besides this, however, we need a radical vision that will attract these men who will give us a new fresh picture that will move the people. It must, above all, be made clear that we are radicals. We seek progress and the happiness of our people, a change of our society on the basis of liberalism. The liberalism that, contrary to socialism of every hue, safeguards free choice by free and responsible citizens. It must also be made clear that we have been freed from the old government models that led us to believe that the state and government knows better than the individual what is good for him. We must finally show that we have abandoned our old static "realism" "to do whatever was of interest to us each time" and to promote dynamic and concrete positions which we will subsequently implement.

5671

CSO: 3521/381

AGREEMENT WITH HUNGARY ON REFUGEES ISSUES FAILS

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 13 Jul 83 p 5

/Text/ Deputy Minister of Social Insurance R. Kaklamanaki-Rigou's mission to Hungary to sign an agreement for the transfer of insurance rights of repatriated Greek political refugees in Hungary has failed.

Hungary did not agree to Greek proposals but made a counterproposal for the payment of a one-time appropriation, while at the same time giving our country various allowances in money and in kind.

The agreement, however, was not initialed because the Hungarian Government refused to determine the amount of the sum and allowances.

It was finally decided that special representatives of the two countries would once again meet until next October in Athens to try to settle the issue.

Speaking yesterday to reporters about her trip to Hungary, Mrs Kaklamanaki attributed the failure of the signing of the agreement to the "differences in the social insurance systems of the two countries."

It is being pointed out that of the Greek political refugees living in Hungary, 1,387 have requested Hungarian citizenship, 912 will obtain Greek citizenship but will remain in Hungary, 393 requested Greek citizenship and will be repatriated, while 520 have already returned to Greece.

5671

CSO: 3521/381

ALBANIA ACCUSED OF FOMENTING TROUBLE IN MINORITIES ISSUE

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 13 Jul 83 p 3

Article by Tasos Kondogiannidis

Text "The Greek Government is aware of the provocations and is taking its measures. We must not, however, talk about a minority issue because that would be admitting to its existence."

The above was the answer given to reporters' questions by Minister of Justice Gennimatas as to whether he knew that an institute in Florence, Italy, had sent mayors and heads of local councils of the Mesogeion, Attiki, region a document asking them for information about how many "Albanians" were living in their municipality or community and how many spoke the Albanian dialect.

According to reliable information, similar documents have been sent to municipalities and communities of other regions of the country, evidently by propaganda circles of Enver Hoxha's Albania.

At any rate, no municipality or community has answered this provocative document whose purposes are underhanded and are turned against our national conscience so as to create problems with unknown consequences. For this reason too the government must dynamically confront this deceitful propaganda.

Their Goals

As it has been discovered, behind the network of these anti-Greek activities is the Tirana embassy in Athens, while the primary goals of its agents, who act in a provocative fashion, are the following:

- To terrorize northern Epirus residents and Albanian political refugees living in Greece, as well as their close relatives, for the purpose of stopping their revelations about acts of torture and persecutions taking place in Albania and also to force them to suspend activities they are promoting in our country.

- Their second and more important goal is to succeed in laying the foundations for and proving that there is an Albanian minority in Greece! They hope to do so through obtaining statements from Greeks called "Arvanites" who speak an Albanian dialect and who live mainly in eastern and western Attiki and in areas of Voiotia.

However, the wrath of the propaganda of the Albanian agents does not stop at these two goals but goes even further:

-Maps are being circulated that show Ioannina and Preveza inside Albanian territory. Books too are being circulated that say that at some time these lands will be liberated and will be made part of Albania. They even say that there are 200,000 Albanians in Greece!

In the wrath of their propaganda they interpose the so-called "Macedonian" problem, falsifying history for the benefit of their sought after goals.

5671

CSO: 3521/381

CONTINUED DISSATISFACTION IN DIPLOMATIC CORPS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 15 Jul 83 p 1

[Excerpt] Renewed commotion has been noted in the diplomatic service, indeed at an untimely period when the country should benefit to the utmost from the possibilities offered it through its assumption of the EEC presidency. The new troubles are caused by the following:

- a) The determination by Mr N. Karandreas, our ambassador to Washington, to resign.
- b) The politically-motivated transfers of diplomats --as interpreted by diplomatic circles --on orders from Mr. I. Kapsis.
- c) The recent circular by Mr I. Kapsis, without the knowledge of Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Kharalambopoulos, the ministerial office, as well as the diplomatic offices of the other two deputy ministers, by which diplomats who serve in these various offices are replaced.

Karandreas Affair

Specifically, despite an appeal by the prime minister, indeed made just recently, to Mr Karandreas to withdraw his resignation and remain as ambassador to Washington, the Greek diplomat has refused sticking to his decision for reasons of principle. This decision is not the consequence of superficial thoughts or bitterness of the moment but a result of a series of events that make his task difficult --with the forbearance of the government-- or at least diminish his authority.

As is known, Mr Karandreas submitted his latest resignation on 10 June. According to I KATHIMERINI's reportage of 14 June, the reasons for the resignation "are the constant intervention by party men in the work of the embassy and the assumption by them of initiatives without previously informing the ambassador."

One of the most important reasons is the interference by the embassy economic counselor in ambassadorial affairs whose actions --as estimated by diplomatic circles-- do not contribute to the promotion of Greek positions.

Role of Mrs Papandreou

Moreover, not to be excluded from the reasons for the Karandreas resignation are the efforts being made by the Greek Government to discuss with the American Government, through the prime minister's wife Margaret Papandreou, the issue of a possible joint Greek-American mediation effort on the Palestinian question and the Lebanon issue that had been requested by Yasir Arafat himself so as to avoid a mediation effort by Mubarak and Hussein.

The Greek Government had at the time attempted, through the prime minister's wife, to bring about a political understanding with American Undersecretary of State Eagleberger. The latter, however, did not accept Mrs Papandreou as a political representative and did not move forward in understandings with her.

This fact, about which Mr Karandreas appears to have informed the prime minister's wife beforehand, constituted Mrs Papandreou's point of contention with the Greek ambassador who, very properly, despite his esteem of her person, did not consider her politically his boss with jurisdiction to give him orders.

According to information --and given the fact that a replacement for Mr Karandreas must be found by fall-- the government is turning once again to the use of a person outside the diplomatic corps as it has done in other important embassies (London, Paris and Brussels).

This fact, besides the fact that it will strike another blow to the diplomatic corps, may also have unfavorable repercussions on the relations of the government and Greeks living abroad whom the government has already tried to make partisan.

5671

CSO: 3521/381

PASOK'S RESPONSIBLE HANDLING OF BASES ISSUE STRESSED

Athens EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 25 Jun 83 p 32

[Text] In a front-page commentary the other day, RIZOSPASTIS referred to a passage from the statements which Premier Andreas Papandreou made at his return from Stuttgart, which had to do with the negotiations on the American bases in our country. He had said that if they do not result in an agreement we will be forced to act unilaterally, and "we can do it." Therefore since--it says--"we can do it," what are we waiting for?

This ostensibly innocent question is nothing but a deliberate oversimplification of a very complex problem, a question aimed at uninformed readers who--as we would like to believe--are not the typical readers of the RIZOSPASTIS. Because it tries to depict the PASOK government as being able to immediately dismantle the American bases and is not doing this, and therefore--in consequence--it must want these bases.

The RIZOSPASTIS thinks that it has driven the PASOK government toward a trap in which it has fallen of its own accord. However, we all know that the Greek people have demonstrated in the course of their history that they have been able to give proofs of their heroism and self-sacrifice in the struggles for their national independence, and consequently they will give these proofs again if necessary. The problem for us is to avoid resorting to the supreme sacrifice, if we can devise solutions which do not lead to this.

As the premier said, we have to do with a superpower which has--of course--many and various ways it can react to a unilateral action. Certainly our mainstay is the people themselves. But that is not enough. Because in the past as well the people were led into misadventures because supporters were lacking or because the international correlation of forces or the international situation was not understood. Consequently the PASOK government is waging a battle to ensure our national independence, while simultaneously taking into consideration the needs of our national defense and the safeguarding of order. It is a question here of very delicate balances, and precisely for this reason what we have is a very difficult and tough job.

Consequently, such oversimplifications lead to the popular saying that "outsiders always know best," because it is easy to play an uncompromising role when it costs nothing. The premier said correctly that "we can do it." This little phrase embraces the entire history of the struggles of the Greek

people. For this reason, before we arrive at the "we can do" the government is exhausting all its negotiating possibilities.

And the hope of everybody, the hope of every responsible citizen, is that it will succeed in this difficult effort, so that the foreign bases can be withdrawn without misadventures, and so that for whatever--fixed--period they remain there can still be a safeguarding of our country's interests, as these have been laid out at the negotiating table.

12114

CSO: 3521/370

KKE (INT) POLICIES VIS-A-VIS PASOK ANALYZED

Athens EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 25 Jun 83 p 3

[Text] The new tactics which were approved at the last session of the Central Committee of the KKE (Interior) were inaugurated with the meeting which it organized in Omonoia Square and at which the speaker was the secretary of the Central Committee, Giannis Banias.

It is expected that this meeting will be followed by others in smaller cities, at which the speakers will be the public spokesman for the KKE (Int), Leonidas Kyrkos, and other officers of the party. The objective of these meetings is to distinguish the presence of the KKE (Int) in the country's political life and to broaden its influence, which--as I AVGI says--"is very small."

Nevertheless we should point out that what emerges from the contents of the speech which was delivered at Omonoia by Giannis Banias is a noteworthy and correct analysis of the international situation which presents frankly and boldly--for a party which chooses to take a position in the opposition--the international correlations and which is accompanied by positions on national issues which coincide with the views of the government.

Also sincere is its ascertainment of the needs of the Greek economy, although it takes care to distinguish the position of the KKE (Int) from the economic policy of the government.

But let us look briefly at what the positions of the KKE (Int) are on the current problems of the country, as these were presented by Banias.

- The downward course of the economy is continuing, no upturn in industry has been noted, investments have declined, and the threat of intervention by the International Monetary Fund is looming on the horizon.
- Democratization remains one of the most fundamental problems.
- The democratization of the armed forces has been postponed.
- The governmental machinery remains centralized.

- The mass news media are being used in a biased manner.
- In the international arena, American imperialism is on the offensive, and international relations are characterized by bipolarity.
- The relations between Greece and Turkey remain strained.
- On the Cyprus question, new intimidations are being attempted.
- On the matter of the bases, it calls for a public denunciation of the adventurous treatment and petty-politics exploitation of this issue by the KKE (Exterior), and it stresses that the negotiations must have the following as their objectives:

A timetable for withdrawal,
control over their operation, and
a guarantee of a balance of forces in the Aegean.

In connection with economic policy, it is stressed that:

- the public sector must be made sound, and
- the private sector of the economy must be activated.

The KKE (Int) focuses its criticism primarily on the democratization of the government and the institutions. Choosing this issue gives it the opportunity to disassociate itself from the government, to address itself to the problems in terms of a leftist phraseology, and to project the image of an innovative party which is struggling for "socialism with freedom and democracy," with this party figuring that it has a monopoly position in the camp of the communist Left.

But already fears are being expressed that this choice will not prove to be an effective one. And this is because it is precisely in this area where PASOK has to its credit the greatest number and the most important measures involving a democratic and socialist content and objectives.

And we must state that the criticism which it levels at the government in the area of democratization is being done from PASOK positions! With the measures which it has taken, PASOK has given an example in writing of the "socialism with democracy, freedom, and self-management" which it envisions and is materializing.

Thus--stress political commentators--even though it is declared that the KKE (Int) has as its objective a more energetic presence on its part in political life, its true objective seems to be to fortify its position in the camp of the communist Left.

With its new tactics, the KKE (Int) is aspiring:

- to emerge from the sidelines of political life,
- to rally around it unaffiliated forces of the communist Left which the KKE (Ext) is unable to speak for,

- to intensify its organizational work,
- to draw up a complex of positions for every sector, so as to cease being engaged only in general policy.

The next steps which we should expect are the appearance of front movements which will be directed by the KKE (Int) toward the mass news media, where it is demanding prominence on an equal basis with the parliamentary parties, and perhaps movements in favor of the establishment of simple proportional representation, so as to not be outdone by the KKE (Ext), which has already become involved in this demand.

Of course, we are not in a position to predict whether in making this effort to intensify its anti-government propaganda it will reach the point of distorting and turning inside out the positions of the government--something which in recent times has been very dear to oppositionist circles.

12114

CSO: 3521/370

KKE'S ANTI-PASOK 'HYSTERIA' CONDEMNED

Athens EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 3 Jul 83 p 32

[Text] After passing through all the stages of an offensive against the government, from "constructive criticism" to open attack, the KKE's party organ and its ordained scribes have now reached the stage of a vulgar anti-PASOK hysteria. What other than this are the things written by a named officer of the KKE in the RIZOSPASTIS last Sunday, which of course is simply the tip of the iceberg?

He writes, for example: "Now the PASOK government is the one which is sending the thugs against the popular mobilizations, in order to protect by means of violence the interests of the industrialists, the shipowners, and the large-scale merchants."

We find it difficult to respond with similar vulgarities. It is obvious that what is alluded to is the intervention of the organs of the State for the purpose of protecting the general public from the directed tyrannical acts of a minority of workers on the public means of transportation, whether on land or at sea, and in other cases...[text garbled]...contrived provoking of incidents, which are done deliberately in order to bring about the inevitable response from the government.

But later on the article writer becomes more clear in speaking about the "wrath of the EXORMISI with respect to hundreds of thousands of workers who were mobilized against the anti-strike monster created by the government, the notorious Article 4; it did not hesitate to label this struggle of the working people as mobilizations contrived by KKE-led groups." Our answer--which we stick to today as well--is given by the journalist himself while quoting a passage from our commentary, which reads: "...the leading dervishes of the KKE are in a frenzy of rage against the government, because they were offended that a small group made up of professional self-styled leaders of the working class from the KKE is no longer able to lead by the nose the great majority of the workers."

Next the familiar chestnut is repeated about our compromising with the monopolies, about organs of imperialism, and other such ridiculous nonsense.

And now we ourselves find something to be perplexing: Why do you want to cooperate at the governmental level with such traitors and instruments of the capitalists, of the multinational corporations and of imperialism? Since we are worse than the Right--because you say this also--why do you not strive to cooperate openly with it?

PASOK'S PLO, SANDINISTA, MARTI POLICY SEEN DAMAGING

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 1 Jul 83 p 2

[Text] While Arafat is foundering and is losing his supporters one by one, our national television undauntedly continues to sing its same old tune. It features him in all the news bulletins, with the fanaticism of the fan of a football team. Is there nobody in the two ERT's [Greek Radio and Television sections] or in the administrative governmental echelons able to understand that this ridiculous affair must come to some sort of end? We realize, of course, that the government has compromised itself by embracing Yassir Arafat so closely, and it does not want to face up to its recent blunder. But let it reflect a little on the interests of the country and let it stop engaging in an "ideological" policy which without any good reason embroils the country in conflicts from which we could and should remain aloof. Major interests link us with Syria. Consequently we ourselves cannot continue to support a person who is undesirable to it and whom it opposes. And let us wise up also in certain other cases where we are following the same thoughtless policy. As a state, we can have relations with other states. We can have relations with Nicaragua, with El Salvador, with the whole world. But we cannot have relations with the Sandinistas, with (Faramboundo) Marti, or with any other movement or regime. This is unrealistic and inexpedient.

12114

CSO: 3521/370

PCE'S PALERO ON EFFORTS TO REVITALIZE PARTY

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 17-23 Jun 83 pp 40-41

/Text/ In this year's Celebration, the PCE /Spanish Communist Party/ is going to set up a very special stand: it will be dedicated to the militant recovery effort the party has been making since its most recent National Meeting. In the stand there will be a constant presence of party leaders, particularly from the organizational area, who will explain to those who may wish to achieve a reconciliation with it, the nature of the "open door policy" aimed at winning over new militants and at re-entry of those who left our ranks.

This subject, that of the return to the party of former communists, is just now in a complete state of flux because of 2 cases which have captured public attention: CASA, in Getafe, where 180 former members have sustained talks with the leadership of the PCE concerning their return, and Salamanca, where something similar is occurring, with 50 persons who had dropped their membership.

Francisco Palero, organizational secretary of the PCE, has been a direct and active participant in these talks along with Gerardo Iglesias and it stands to reason that he is primarily responsible for this campaign, whose balance-sheet, since the National Meeting held in January, has been about 7,000 members, 40 percent of whom are re-entries.

/Question/ What, Francisco, are the determining factors that have brought this about?

/Answer/ We must distinguish between causes of two kinds. The first are of an internal kind and spring from the process of self-criticism initiated at the National Meeting. There, errors we had made in the life of the party were recognized and began to be corrected: remoteness from the masses, the "placing" of labels and an etcetera which is already known. This self-critical message began to be carried from the same leadership, on the state level, and began spreading to all levels of the party, with its resulting positive, revitalizing effects. The best proof right now of the putting into practice of concrete measures in all groups is the attitude adopted by the CASA groups themselves, or the Salamanca Provincial Committee, an attitude without which it would not have been possible to seek the answers we are now finding.

her internal causes are the overcoming of acrimonies, of personal attitudes or stances, in favor of more objective positions and the adoption of a more tactful view over differences of opinion, though the latter, as is natural, may remain. The fact that the Organization Secretariat has put the recovery policy on the desk of all the organizations as a priority issue also counted.

As to the reasons of an external kind I referred to previously, it must be emphasized that after the great expectations raised in the country by the victory at the polls of the PSOE and its coming to power, many people have had time for new reflections. They have realized, especially in analyzing problems like that of peace, integration into NATO or the economic running of their own that there needs to be a different Left force, a Marxist, revolutionary force.

Question How is the recovery policy being carried out? Isn't there the risk that old conflicts and confrontations will revive?

Answer The fact is that the self-criticism process has been twofold, has developed, as I explained to you, in the party since the meeting, and likewise has been lived by many of those comrades who left us or were expelled. Under these circumstances there is an absolute receptivity and problems are not created for return. Of course we assume that there will be arguments, but our offer is generous and those who return do so fully accepting the party's politics. Let us not forget either the proximity of the Convention, which implies the discussion of a new policy in the near future.

Question The discussions being held or the contacts materializing at CASA or in Still, the integration of collective groups into the party has to follow fixed procedures according to the rules, like being approved by the Central Committee.

Answer In these cases it is not a matter of groups organized along ideological lines; they are not homogeneous, so you can't speak of organized groups; there are individuals who left the party during the various crises for various reasons. Furthermore, these entries are being carried out on a personal basis in their respective groups.

Question What is happening to other collectives like that of the artists or professionals of culture?

Answer We are likewise taking important steps in this field. As has been reported, several meetings have taken place with the leadership of the party and collectives of professionals and artists. As a matter of fact, the Cultural Commission has been revitalized and personal incorporations into the political work are occurring which, though they do not always go in hand with the granting of Communist Party membership, are undoubtedly an improvement with regard to the previous situation. All these data, plus the work started in all the groups in the State, observing the agreements of the National Meeting and of the most recent Central Committees, lead us to affirm that the organic recovery of the party has begun.

12448
CSO: 3548/455

TOKER EYES TWO-PARTY SYSTEM, STABILITY OF RIGHT

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 19 Jun 83 p 6

[Article by Metin Toker: "Problem On The Right"]

[Text] If Turkey is to have a parliamentary democracy in the Western sense, it would hardly be disastrous for a strong left or a strong right to come to power on 6 November. What would be disastrous is if we were unable to enter the 6 November elections with either a strong left or a strong right. If this were to happen, we would be seeing a parliament that could not stand on its own two feet and a nest of corruption being formed outside that weakling parliament. Democracy like that would not last for long. This would mean new intervention, which is the last thing in the world that the current administration wants. Still, if wrong choices are made, the undesirable sometimes becomes the inevitable.

Until a few months ago, there did not appear to be much chance of having a strong left on the new political chessboard. There seemed to be nothing for this dynamic wing of society to rally around as a strong left. Ismet Inonu's moderate left had lost its true color owing to the 'loud minority' comprised of leftist radicals and extremists. The 'silent majority' who maintained Ismet Inonu's views watched attentively as a number of groups moved into action. Their attention stemmed more from anxiety than from confidence, however. Another leftist faction wanted to keep the Turkish left out of parliament, figuring that it would later be easier to quell any internal movements in a parliament with a leftist label but no representational capability.

Erdal Inonu and the ideological platform of the Social Democracy Party (SDP) have solved the left's problem. And now, this leftist party, its young leader and the masses who have taken their place on the moderate left must never forget these lines which appeared in an editorial in LE MONDE examining the recent defeat of the British Workers' Party:

"In a two-party system, a big party can never turn radical without risking collapse. Big parties should heed the painfully clear lesson just taught to the leaders of the Workers' Party and the big radical unionists who were responsible for slowly but surely leading the party astray over the years."

Here is another lesson from LE MONDE that needs to be committed to memory by the SDP's young leader and its administrators: "This deviation in policy was forced upon the Workers' Party by a handful of activists who mixed communist sympathizers, Trotskyites and pacifists into the party like alphabet soup. This group, which united for the purpose of taking over the party, used two age-old methods to achieve its goal: First, it toyed with decision mechanisms and procedures within the party. Secondly, it made the decision level extremely intolerant, thereby eliminating officials and candidates on the local level who seemed too soft."

Apparently, the takeover methods of leftist parties are neither Turkish nor British. They are international.

The moderate left wing had earlier saved itself from our two-party democracy which was to turn out to consist of a foolhardy right and a brilliant radical left, and we can hardly begrudge the SDP its aspirations and motives for taking over the task of our democracy now. Yet, common sense tells us that anyone who really wants democracy would like to see a strong right wing.

It is hard to believe that there is a party in collusion on the right, since collusion takes at least two people. One of these people would have to be Cankaya, but Cankaya doesn't deserve such suspicion. Still, it cannot be denied that his party gives the impression of being 'the most protected party.' Maybe this impression is right; maybe it's wrong. But regardless of whether it's right or wrong, the fact is that it has burdened the party with an irreparable handicap. At the same time, it has put the party in check on the political chessboard. If it didn't present this image, it would go nowhere; when it does present it, the masses who would otherwise be its followers give it the cold shoulder.

In cases like this, the sensible thing to do is 'take the bitter with the sweet,' sincerely accept that there is no collusion, and cooperate in building the future. This must be done by the administration, by the press, by those who might take up this issue, by those who could be innocent victims of it if sacrifices need to be made, and especially by the moderate right itself... A former Prime Minister's man who had passed the test very well could certainly become the 'Erdal' of the right.

At any rate, it is up to the right to act. Still, any well-meaning person who would like to see a healthy, well-balanced parliament that is stronger outside and respected within after 6 November should be hoping to see this achieved swiftly and prudently by the Right.

12279

CSO: 3554/347

PROSECUTION PRESENTS ARGUMENTS IN TLP TRIAL

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 22 Jun 83 pp 1, 7

[Text] ISTANBUL NEWS SERVICE -- The Military Prosecutor, in stating the basic opinion in the Turkish Labor Party [TLP] trial, requested the acquittal of 5 of the 144 defendants, penitentiary imprisonment for 8-15 years for the 17 members of the Central Executive Board and penitentiary sentences varying between 5 and 12 years for the other 118 defendants. The military prosecutor also asked that four cases be removed from the file.

The basic opinion read on 20 June at the TLP trial, continuing at the Istanbul Martial Law Command's Second Military Court, was a 74-page document read by Military Prosecutor Cayhan Ulgen.

The military prosecutor asserted that the TLP was first organized on 13 February 1961, elected 15 national deputies in 1965 and was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1971. Then, he said, taking advantage of the 1974 amnesty, the TLP was re-established on 30 April 1975, advocating, according to Marxist terminology, human, social and state liberty, the working class, working-class consciousness, democratic centralization, the social state and socialist government.

In reference to the TLP's program and bylaws, Prosecutor Ulgen said, "There is a question of great similarity between the TLP program and the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. There is full complicity between the views of the TLP and Marxist-Leninist theory."

Asserting that the TLP maintained relations with the organizations and entities named the Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions, the Turkish Teachers Unity and Solidarity Association, the Peace Association, the Youth Vanguard, the Progressive Youth Association, the Progressive Women's Association, the Comprehensive Civil Service Unity and Solidarity Association, the Union of Revolutionary Lycee Students and the Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation, the military prosecutor said:

"As the result of efforts based on Marxist-Leninist philosophy launched in the guise of a party following its founding, these efforts began to bear fruit, work was begun in the districts along the lines of directives sent down from central headquarters, teams were formed to conduct educational efforts whereby the training was begun of a local corps of militants and sympathizers attached to the party."

Stating that the defendants maintained that this trial was a case for the Constitutional Court, the prosecutor claimed that this was not a trial for the banning of a party, but that the persons who were members of the party constituted a society whose purpose, under the guise of a party, was to establish the dominion of one social class over other social classes, saying:

"A party has a legal personality. Existing statutes in force give the party this legal personality. Individuals are the agents of the party's personality. And the party conducts its endeavors through these individuals. Thus it is impossible to separate these endeavors of individuals from the legal personality of the party. The activities in question are illegal activities of individuals who were members of the party. Thus the proceedings are not proceedings to ban the party, but the prosecution of crimes consisting of the actions of individuals."

Acquittals

The military prosecutor argued that the defendants intended to establish the dominion of the working and proletarian class over other social classes and bring about a working class dictatorship, that to achieve this goal they intended to overthrow the fundamental, established economic and social order of the country.

The military prosecutor requested the acquittal for insufficient evidence of TLP activities of former Diyarbakir Mayor Mehdi Zana, Dervis Sabir, Ali Kemal Kabacaoglu, Irfan Bayram and Mahmut Altun Cevahir.

The prosecution also requested removal from the trial of defendants Tarik Ziya Ekinci, Hanifi Vatansever, Omer Yalcin Cerit and Zeki Kilic, who have been unable to present their defense to date.

The members of the Central Executive Board whose imprisonment for 8-15 years the prosecution requested under article 141/1 of the TPC [Turkish Penal Code] are:

Alp Selek, Dincer Dogu, Nurdan Orpeu, Musfik Eren, Bekir Yenigun, Mustafa Aktulgali, Vedat Baranoglu, Cetin Gozacti, Ozcan Kesgec, Ibrahim Sonmez, Gunduz Mutluay, Husamettin Bakan, Vedat Peker, Yavuz Unal, Saban Erik, Turgut Gokdere and Nermin Aksin.

TLP provincial administrators from Eskisehir, Bursa and Giresun and district administrators from Bandirma, Fatih, Beyoglu, Kartal, Eyup, Beykoz, Gaziosmanpasa, Uskudar, Gebze, Adalar, Ispir, Sisli, Sariyer and Eminonu, whose imprisonment for 5-12 years the prosecution requested under article 141/5 of the TPC are:

Ahmet Mahir Nalbantoglu
Ersen Sensal
Ilhan Akalin
Fikret Akman
Necati Yazicioglu
Ibrahim Poyraz
Mehmet Ali Altay
Saffet Kayalar
Muzaffer Sakir

Nurten Arican
Huseyin Ozyilmaz
Feridun Takaoglu
Riza Erdogan
Muhittin Bakirsan
Dursun Capraz
Sezai Babakus
Mahmut Dilek
Necdet Ceylan

Zeki Tezel
Dursun Celik
Kadir Ermen
Huseyin Gokova
Erdogan Helimoglu
Ahmet Ak
Belkis Atacan
Atilla Atabay
Ismet Demir

Izzet Yavuz
Erdogan Deniz
Nuri Hatipoglu
Mesut Yurtman
Suheyyla Gunescakar
Metin Parmaksiz
Abdullah Bas
Halil Ozcan
Canan Canbeyli
Sinasi Sahin
Necla Okumus
Mehmet Ali Yildirim
Mehmet Demirci
Sedat Gulersoy
Halil Savas
Umit Hurcan
Ertugrul Sevimbike
Ismet Ozsoy
Nihat Tanriseven
Memduh Harmen
Mehmet Basar
Ibrahim Selcuk
Ahmet Kamil Ciftci
Ahmet Ozsoy
Ender Kamil Boyaci
Aslan Aslan
Yildirim Sevimbike
Ertugrul Bulut
Erol Karabaizoglu
Dogan Epe
Hasan Dundar

Rahmi Dundar
Ahmet Nusret Gunal
Ergun Cavuldak
Hasan Yildiz
Kamil Hasmeden
Ali Temel Bilginer
Mustafa Ozkan
Ismail Ozkan
Ismail Yildiz
Vedat Demirkol
Ugur Ozdemir
Selahattin Ozpalabiyiklar
Serafettin Akkaya
Selim Cuhaci
Husnu Cerkez
Cumhur Camlibel
Serafettin Oktay
Sezai Sogutlulu
Ali Bektas
Guran Ilkel
Ali Gokce
Halis Celebi
Erkan Seper
Sukru Celik
Rafet Garip
Ali Murat Gezgin
Ibrahim Yazganoglu
Fatma Ertanyilmaz
Mustafa User
Hasan Ozdil

Mualla Guner
Ismail Semercioglu
Zeynel Simsek
Musa Dogru
Cengiz Aksakal
Yasar Bilgin
Cemal Turan
Metin Unal
Ismail Koyun
Mustafa Bal
Erdogan Yamac
Hudayet Kandaz
Murat Yamac
Gulden Sevgili
Gulsum Tosun
Hulusi Omur
Mahmut Duvarci
Ismail Cakir
Sebahattin Piravadili
Mehmet Sayan
Hanefi Ucler
Riza Haluk Ortac
Sansal Dikmen
Mustafa Isik
Mustafa Oksan
Nevzat Ozdemir
Mehmet Akar
Faruk Mandal
Seyfi Aydin

8349

CSO: 3554/353

ILICAK ON NEED FOR BARRAGE, 'FEW BUT GOOD' PARTIES

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 22 Jun 83 pp 1, 10

[Editorial by Nazli Ilicak: "Few But Good"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Mr Evren, in his addresses to the public, is talking about the hazards of forming too many parties. In fact, past coalition governments have dragged the country to the brink of instability and created an authority vacuum. We have all had a close look at the damage this does. After 12 September, the quest for stability became one of the most important goals. It was for this reason that the Electoral Law instituted a 10-percent barrier, higher than anywhere else in the world except in state elections in West Germany. It was hoped in this way to reduce the number of parties. The fact of the matter is that a two-party system /can be brought about only by instituting it as a system/, not by restrictions and prohibitions. If the electoral system permits, parties will multiply. Thus we began with four parties in 1961 (JP, RPP, NTP [New Turkey Party], RPNP [Republican Peasants Nation Party]), we raised it to six by 1965 (JP, RPP, NTP, RPNP, TLP [Turkish Labor Party], NP [Nation Party]), we had eight parties in 1969 (JP, RPP, NTP, NAP [Nationalist Action Party], RP [Reliance Party], TLP, NP, UP [Unity Party]), and in 1973 and 1977, the parties had changed shape and name, but the number stayed at eight.

The proportional representation system, because it was practiced without barriers, was wide open to party proliferation, and parties drawing few votes gained representation in parliament. Despite the public search for stability by shifting in the main to two parties, somewhere between 5 percent and 10 percent of the voters put into parliament a cadre of 40 to 50 people outside these two parties. The new Electoral Law has barred this route with the 10-percent barrier.

10-Percent Barrier Against Instability

If the 10-percent barrier had been used in conjunction with the proportional representation system, only one other party besides the big two would have been allowed representation in parliament since 1960, despite the proliferation of parties, and on only one occasion -- in 1973.

Owing to the indecision of the electorate in 1961, we would still have started out with four parties (JP-34 percent, RPP-37 percent, NTP-14 percent, RPNP-13 percent). The latter two would not have survived the 10-percent barrier in

1965 and 1969, and the number of parties would have dropped to two. In 1973, only the NSP [National Salvation Party] with 11 percent would have been able to pass the barrier besides the big two. Moreover, since a barrier as high as 10 percent would have been a deterrent anyway, the likelihood of party proliferation would have been pretty weak. But even if a number of parties had arisen, they would not have been a shock to stability and one party would have been able to gain a comfortable majority in parliament.

Now that we have as strong a weapon as the 10-percent barrier, we need not fear the establishment of multiple parties. Only genuine parties with a sound base will be able to make the grade. Five other parties submitted founding applications to the Ministry of the Interior the same day the Justice Party was founded in 1961. They were the Native Land Party, the Occupational Reform Party, the Work Party, the Moderate Liberal Party and the Turkish Labor and Agricultural Party. There is a long list of parties formed just for the sake of forming a party. There are imposing party skeletons, hollow on the inside, artificial parties. Their numbers seem to be legion, but whether they exist or not is all one and the same to the citizen.

Good By All Means

Mr Evren says /few/ but /good/. Indeed, /good/ is very important.

If they are few but not /good/, we arrive at a point opposite the basic goal of 12 September, the "search for stability." If votes are cast indiscriminately without conviction in the elections, the search will not be over when the elections are concluded. It is necessary to fill the vacuum starting today. Let them be few, but let them be /good/; yes, by all means, let them be good.

8349

CSO: 3554/353

PAPER COMPLAINS GOVERNMENT WITHHOLDING SUB-INCURSION FACTS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 17 Jun 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Will the Opposition Be Silenced?"]

[Text] One main responsibility of a country's political leadership is to give its own people clear and reliable information about the country's security situation. That responsibility becomes especially important when things happen that do not fit the picture of reality on which security policy and defense policy have been based.

Following the report by the submarine defense committee, uncertainty arose among the country's citizens, especially since the report was followed very closely by another serious violation off Sundsvall. People agreed completely with the strengthening of antisubmarine defenses and with the sharp protest delivered to the Soviet Union by the prime minister. The uncertainty was based on the fact that nothing was done after that. The questions as to what the violation meant in a larger context of security policy were not answered--they were not even discussed. Nor were any conclusions drawn as far as defense policy was concerned.

Instead of providing information on central issues, the country's prime minister set in motion a personal and political campaign--on a scale seldom seen--against Carl Bildt, the opposition's foremost spokesman on foreign policy matters. The prime minister took that campaign further in his interview on yesterday evening's "Report" program, but this time he attacked the Conservatives as a party.

The gist of the prime minister's statements was that it is impossible to be neutral if one has definite views as to what reality looks like. If by chance one were to make an assessment of the Soviet Union that came close to the U.S. or French assessment, one would obviously be announcing one's withdrawal from Swedish solidarity on the security policy issue.

The prime minister is creating a restriction on opinion concerning neutrality policy that limits the open and constructive debate on security and defense policy issues that we were once proud to be able to engage in.

That restriction limits our opportunities for shaping our own security policy after free and open debate. The government--or at least the prime minister--

is in practice claiming the right to determine the limits of that discussion. The reason seems to be that neutrality requires a kind of deference in the matter of opinion.

That attitude is objectively absurd, politically incomprehensible, and democratically unacceptable. It can only be understood as an emanation of the single-minded policy of confrontation that Olof Palme has been pursuing toward the Conservatives for a long time. It seems to be a goal in itself to isolate the Conservatives regardless of cost.

In a situation in which one of the most important tasks of the government and the prime minister is to establish the country's policy authoritatively and energetically, they are failing in their responsibility. Uncertainty in Swedish society is spreading.

The work of the submarine defense committee shows clearly and unequivocally that it is possible to achieve unity among the four democratic parties concerning security policy assessments and the defense policy conclusions that should be drawn from those assessments. Against the background of that experience, the obvious next step should have been for the government to seek ways of discussing security policy and further defense measures trustingly and constructively even after the submarine defense committee's work was done. The experience with the submarine defense committee's work clearly indicates that such discussions could have created unity and resulted in finely shaded conclusions as regards both the assessment of the security policy situation and further defense measures beyond those concerned strictly with antisubmarine measures.

But the government has not tried to go any further on the path indicated by the appointment of the submarine defense committee and the latter's work. The government is choosing instead--obviously quite deliberately--to create confrontation on foreign policy and security policy issues.

Through its deliberate choice of confrontation over understanding, the government is causing its policy to lose credibility. The policy being pursued by the government is not in the interest of the entire country. Narrow and obscure partisan political interests are being given first place.

It will be a serious matter and a great loss for the country if the conditions for basic alignment as regards our foreign, security, and defense policies are eliminated as a result. Thanks to the doings of the government and especially the prime minister, we are very near the point at which that will happen. The responsibility for seeing that we do not reach that point rests inescapably and primarily on the government. It is the government that is provoking confrontation.

Only the government can give shape to the contacts and discussions between the parties that would cause constructive discussion to replace a steadily escalating quarrel.

The credibility of Sweden's neutrality policy as well as of its defense policy and defense capability is being harmed by the government's policy of confrontation.

It is made no less serious when that confrontation appears aimed ultimately at silencing the objectively sharp criticism being encountered by the foreign policy that bears Olof Palme's own personal seal.

11798

CSO: 3650/229

AIR FORCE GRADUATES ITS FIRST WOMEN OFFICERS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 24 Jun 83 p 36

[Article by Rolf Akerberg]

[Text] Halmstad, Thursday--The air wings are now going to be joined by girls who will have an equal chance with the guys when it comes to competing for posts as colonels and generals. And at least theoretically, they will also have a chance to become commander in chief.

Thursday was graduation day at the Air Force Officers Academy in Halmstad under the new command system, and 21 girls were commissioned as second lieutenants in the air force.

Tina Djarf of Trollhattan says: "You have to have a mind of your own to be a good woman officer." She will report for duty on Monday morning at the air wing in Satenas in Vastergotland to begin her career as an officer.

She also says that one has to be independent while simultaneously showing that one can work with others.

What did the girls learn during their officer training?

"Well," answers Helena Manhammar of Goteborg, "we learned to be leaders and to teach."

A couple of hundred girls applied to be among the first women trained as career officers in the air force. Thirty were accepted, and of those, 19 made it as far as the final examinations, says Monica Eriksson of Jakobsberg. Those who dropped out were attracted to other kinds of training or had to leave for medical reasons.

The women air force officers will do the same work as their male colleagues, be included in incident preparedness, and train conscripts in combat information duties. There is one exception, however: the women will not fly.

Helena Manhammar explains: "You can't make a girl sign a contract promising not to get pregnant. Pregnancy leave would interrupt flight training for too long--and those are expensive interruptions that it would be difficult to make up later."

Air Force Chief of Staff Sven-Olof Olson, who handed the new officers their diplomas, said this about not allowing women to fly:

"Labor market physiological studies--made not by us but by the Labor Market Institute--show that there is such a marked difference in physical strength between men and women that we don't know what the consequences would be."

Understanding

Sven-Olof Olson says: "In the flying service, there are situations in which physical strength is of crucial importance. The women cadets have said that they fully understand this and that they realize that the reasons are objective."

The air force chief of staff also says that the defense command considers it entirely natural that women should now be entering the armed forces.

"This was not something that was forced on us, and we have not felt that it was part of the women's movement.

"The air force kept up with the times and took the initiative in admitting women several years ago. It is not a victory for anyone, but something that developed naturally. We are utilizing a resource."

11798

CSO: 3650/229

DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE JOURNAL ON WEAPONS OF FUTURE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 20 Jun 83 p 9

[Text] Soporifics, blinding light, and plastic foam are future weapons being discussed by military experts. Tanks with extra roofs or explosives in their armor to counteract modern projectiles are another development being predicted by researchers.

Or what would you say to tanks painted in "chameleon colors" that change their shade and pattern as the terrain changes its appearance?

Those are a few examples of how the FOA (Defense Research Institute) believes that tanks and antitank weapons may develop over the next 10 years or so.


It is a future war between the development of better and better tanks and the simultaneous development of new weapons with which to destroy them that is described in an upcoming special issue of the FOA-TIDNINGEN on future armor and armored units.

Composite Armor

The tank of the future will have increasingly better protection against attacking weapons. Armor will no longer be made of steel: it will be composite armor--a blend of steel and other materials.

Extra protection will be added by covering the outside of the tank's armor with boxes containing explosives. The dynamite explodes when hit by an armor-piercing shaped-charge projectile. The effect of the projectile is thus neutralized.

Along the sides of the "Fantasy Model" tank will be movable plates lined with explosives known as "active armor" for protecting wheels and tracks. In the very front will be two minesweepers to trigger mines and protect the tracks. A mine plow will clear away mines that threaten to blow up the "Fantasy" tank from underneath. Above the gun turret, there will be an extra roof for protection against projectiles from above.



The FOA predicts how the "Fantasy" tank may look. On the top are smoke shells, in the front is mine clearance equipment, and on the sides is protection for the tank's tracks.

Extra Roof

Sitting on the extra roof is a battery of smoke shells that are launched to provide cover while the tank is advancing over open terrain. The main weapon is a high-pressure gun with a smooth-bore barrel. The dart-shaped projectiles have a high muzzle velocity of 2,000 meters per second and have either a shaped charge or an armor-piercing effect. The projectiles are made of the remarkable metals tungsten or uranium. The uranium is depleted and less radioactive than in its natural state. Uranium has remarkable armor-piercing qualities and produces a powerful effect.

11798

CSO: 3650/229

BRIEFS

AUTOMATIC CARBINES FROM BELGIUM--The Swedish Armed Forces are going to buy about 80,000 ultramodern automatic carbines, including ammunition, for just over 300 million kronor. The government made that decision on Wednesday. The new carbine, known as the AK-5, will be used in the army's infantry and armored units and in the navy's coast artillery units. The AK-5 is a Belgian weapon, and it will be manufactured under license in Sweden by the National Industries Corporation. The carbines will be delivered beginning with the 1985-1986 fiscal year by the Small Arms Manufacturing Company in Eskilstuna, whereas the ammunition will be supplied by the Vanas Works in Karlsborg. The AK-5 is a high-speed weapon with a caliber of 5.56 mm. The Delegation for the Inspection of Weapons Under International Law has approved the weapon. Acquisition of the AK-5 will mean that older weapons in use by local defense units and the Home Guard can be scrapped. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 23 Jun 83 p 6] 11798

CSO: 3650/229

END