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DGB MEMBERSHIP INCREASES 0.9% IN 1985

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 22 Feb 86 p 5

[Unattributed article: "DGB Reports Membership Increase"]

[Text] Bonn, 21 February (AP)—For the first time in 4 years, membership in the labor unions belonging to the DGB rose again last year. According to a poll conducted by the ASSOCIATED PRESS, membership in the 17 constituent labor organizations totaled 7,727,000 at the end of 1985—which is 67,000 or 0.9% more than the year before. The highest membership figure ever attained by the DGB was 7,957,000 in 1981.

The greatest increase in 1985 was registered by the 2.55-million-strong metal workers union which gained 55,000 new members or 2.2%. The percentage increase was the same for the commerce, banking and insurance workers union. It now has 371,000 members and thereby took over the sixth spot in the DGB family from the railroad workers union. The transport workers and chemical workers union, which held on to their No. 2 and No. 3 positions, both managed to add 11,000 members during the past year.

Whether an individual union gained or lost members during the course of 1985 appears to have depended in the main on employment trends in that particular sector of the economy. Among the unions which lost members were the construction workers, the railroadmen, the textile workers and the miners as well as the teachers and scientists, the wood and plastics workers and the police. The hotel and restaurant employees and the postal workers unions managed to post gains.

Despite a loss of jobs in the shoe and leather industry, membership in the leather workers union rose by 1.5 percent to just under 50,000 which means that more than 50 percent of the labor force in that branch of industry was unionized for the first time ever. The reason given for this development by a union spokesman is said to be heightened awareness among leather workers due to repeated plant shutdowns.

In response to a query, a union spokesman traced the increase in union membership to the increase in the number of jobs during the past year. "Some of us refuse to accept the fact that the loss of jobs was the reason for the drop in our membership," the spokesman said. "So now we cannot really claim that the higher membership figures are all our own doing."
Because of problems in compiling membership figures the railroad workers and fine arts unions were only able to provide estimates, which are said to be reliable, however. By September 1985, the fine arts union was said to have lost almost 10 percent of its membership. According to the union, the reason for this is the fact that some regional unions quit the parent union in connection with the establishment of the media employees union.

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CSO: 3620/593
Bonn—The number of university students in the FRG and West Berlin has risen much more since 1975 than official statistics tend to indicate. This is the result of a poll conducted by the West German Association of University Presidents in Bonn which asked 165 of its member institutions to provide information on their financial status. The survey found that the rise in the number of students between 1975 and 1983 did not amount to 43.6 percent as had previously been assumed but to 61 percent. According to the survey, there are 976,000 students enrolled at universities and another 276,000 at technical schools.

While the number of first-year students increased by 33 percent and that of university students overall rose by 43 percent, the number of faculty members increased by just 10 percent. Government support for the universities increased by 49 percent, the survey found; but in real terms this amounts to a mere 20 percent "when compared to an average annual rise in the cost of living of only three percent."

The figures for the technical schools are even less encouraging where the number of first-year students increased by 60 percent during the same time period while the total student population rose by 90 percent. At the same time, the number of faculty members increased by just 3.5 percent. Once the rise in the cost of living is factored into the additional government support, those payments have registered an increase of just about 10 percent.

The survey findings were announced by Prof. Theodor Berchem, the president of the West German University Presidents Association who deplored the fact that the policy of "drastic economy measures and cuts" at the universities has been going on for a good 10 years now. Temporary hiring freezes which did not show up in the official statistics, he said, have in effect resulted in as much as a four percent drop in the number of faculty members. Slight budget increases gave the appearance of growth but were in fact used up by the rise in costs which is particularly marked in the higher learning field,
he added. Between 1975 and 1983, costs for student and technical support personnel and for research contracts rose between 45 and 55 percent.

The survey also found that the so-called "efficiency reserves" in the higher learning field cited by the Laender finance ministries at regular intervals "have been used up during the long period of underfunded budgets and lowered personnel ceilings." In other words, there is no hope of setting free any such reserves by "programs of heightened efficiency" which are demanded over and over again. Should this policy continue, it would inevitably lead to a further loss of quality in education and research. 113 of the 165 member institutions responded to all the questions on the questionnaire and returned it to the association. According to the survey, Berlin was the only Land not affected by personnel freezes.
The new finance minister, Esko Ollila, has already managed to make a statement about a sensitive question, namely taxation of bank deposits. Inger Jagerhorn comments in today's second editorial.

Our new finance minister since last Saturday, Esko Ollila, has said that he is going to begin carefully. He has, however, already managed to state, among other things, that the banks have too much power, and he has predicted that the subterfuges surrounding the sale of Oulu Oy can be expected to lead to a government crisis. Besides that, he has made a very controversial statement.

Specifically, Ollila raised the question of whether the tax-free status of bank deposits should be abolished. That is an old question which usually sets feelings seething, and the reactions have really been surprisingly feeble.

Savers are of course a patient breed who are accustomed to being stepped on, and they are also a little furtive, if one may say so. The interest which savers have received for their money has for a very long time been lower than inflation.

This has meant that savers have by no means been compensated for giving their money to the banks for further lending. The interest has not even been able to keep the original value of the capital intact, it has been nibbled away at the edges by inflation.

Now as we all know the situation has changed. The low rate of inflation means that for the first time savers can expect that the interest will be a real reward for saving, a real earnings possibility. And now, when the situation is finally brightening, the discussion of taxing is coming up!

The argument for the tax is as follows: a person can save in several different ways, and all should be equal in the eyes of the tax laws. Most people save just to have money in a bank account, some save to buy stocks, quite a few to buy bonds, and some in real estate of different kinds. (The so-called saving
for housing purposes involves simultaneous encumbering with debt, and is not a part of this discussion.)

Therefore one can earn money with money (capital) as one can earn money with labor. Why should one form of earning be tax-free and another not? Bank savings but not wages, bonds but not stock dividends?

And the arguments against the tax? There are mainly two: it is not easy to take an existing benefit away from people, in this case a tax-free benefit. And "people" in this case, furthermore, are a majority of the population. Most have some kind of a bank account, and feel imposed upon, actually threatened, by the proposal to tax. And secondly, taxing bank interest would mean that the taxing authorities would learn what people have in the bank. The previous basic bank secrecy would be violated.

This is what is really behind the reactions of those who say, "then I would rather keep my money in the mattress." Of course it is not just the savings that Ollila wants. If they tax the basic capital itself we are talking about something entirely different. Then we are talking about confiscation of property. But now we are talking about taxing the return of capital, the interest. And naturally not all the interest, just as we do not pay tax on all our wages. The effort is to make all forms of income equal.

To violate bank secrecy and allow sample investigations of accounts is a more difficult question. In the eyes of the common man that comes near to violating the sanctity of private life, nearly trespassing, to pry into people's savings. These attitudes can be very ingrained.

The ideas of the new finance minister are therefore controversial. They should be thoughtfully considered, but then one must begin at the right end: abolish tax-free bonds. This already requires a considerable transition period, as it is a question of long term investments.

Then after that one could begin discussing bank deposits. And in that case it could be conceivable to discuss deposits of considerable size, say over one hundred thousand marks, which can be compared with regular capital investments. The average ordinary bank saver's small account should be left alone. Furthermore it is of course obvious that any eventual tax should only be imposed on interest which is greater than the rate of inflation.

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POLYNESIAN LIBERATION FRONT LEADER ON INDEPENDENCE

Paris ROUGE in French 16-22 Jan 86 p 13

[Interview with Oscar Temaru, leader of the Polynesian Liberation Front and mayor of the municipality of Faaa, by Vincent Kermel: "The Idea of Independence Making Its Way"; date and place not given]

[Text] Oscar Temaru, leader of the FLP and mayor of the municipality of Faaa, passed through Paris last month. He outlined for us the situation in Tahiti and the response of the supporters of independence.

[Question] What is the principal characteristic of French colonial domination in Polynesia?

[Answer] France is a signatory of United Nations Resolution 1514, which includes a clause that condemns the establishment of military bases and even more nuclear testing in the Pacific. The latter is carried out without the agreement of our people. Following the independence of Algeria, the government decided to find another site for its nuclear tests and since 1963 we have seen our way of life disrupted by the arrival of this foreign military force. The economic, political and social systems have been changed. Up to then we had a rather balanced balance of trade. We lived from fishing and agriculture.

Since the arrival of the army, several families have left their native islands and have established themselves primarily in the municipality of Faaa. Those families, which arrived 20 years ago, have rented plots of land and are still living in precarious circumstances.

The municipality of Faaa has experienced a real demographic explosion tied to the massive arrival of the French army in Polynesia. In 1963 we had 3,000 inhabitants. In 1985 there are 23,000 of us, with all the social problems one can imagine.

[Question] In playing the devil's advocate, one may recall that the main argument in colonialist propaganda involves the so-called positive fallout of the French military presence on the Polynesian economy. What is the truth about this?
An artificial economy can never be profitable, neither for the country nor for the people. The Polynesian colonial economy is artificial. There is nothing solid about it, and it does not correspond at all to the needs of the people. We are feeling the consequences of this situation. The army has recruited, and so has the administration. But the recruitment of policemen and teachers cannot go on indefinitely. That is absolutely not productive. And yet, that policy has been conducted in the territory at the expense of the primary sector: fishing and agriculture. That was done on purpose. The French government has done everything in its power to make us dependent on foreign countries. This is true for our food needs and other needs which were created even though they did not represent a necessity.

There are other problems such as the problem of education. After high school there is nothing in Tahiti. Our children have to go to France. And yet, there are opportunities for university studies in the Pacific, in Fiji, in Papua, New Guinea. But a student who earns a degree from those universities will not be able to practice in Tahiti. He needs a French diploma. So that a century after the annexation of Polynesia by France, Tahitian college graduates can be counted on one's fingers. We have only one Tahitian doctor for example.

What is the internal economic structure of Polynesia?

The local commercial economy is in the hands of the Chinese. That immigration is an ancient one. But we are afraid of a new Chinese immigration from Hong-Kong; some people worry about the situation over there with the new statute expected for 1990. Immigration from everywhere, especially from France, is encouraged by the government as it is in New Caledonia. Furthermore, it is always the same political class which governs our country, that is to say the "halves."

What is the situation of the Polynesian independence movement?

Since the establishment of the FLP in 1976 we have taken a major step forward. We were a small group described as a "tiny group." And for 3 years now we have held city hall in Paea. The idea of independence is making its way. It appears in all conversations. Everyone talks about it.

Isn't there a risk that the autonomy status will progressively develop into a form of neo-colonial independence?

While we are in favor of independence, we are also against what could be called neo-colonialism. Because if independence has to be achieved with the capitalists who live here, then we say "no." We want a profound change in our system of life. We reject the consumer society which has been imposed on us. We must base our economy on something much more realistic.

Hence, that danger actually does exist. Gaston Flosse, president of the government Council, used the antinuclear mobilization in March of last year to blackmail the president of the Republic. He aimed to obtain greater authority for the local institutions and more subsidies for his territorial government. It is a permanent institutional blackmail. Consequently, we are afraid that people from the right will use us for their neo-colonialist policy.
[Question] Would it be possible to speak of a Kanak impact on the Polynesian situation?

[Answer] At the time of the Kanaky events, the news had an impact in Polynesia. Many people have family in Kanaky and thus they follow the evolution of the situation over there very closely. Their reaction in this respect is very simple: what happens in Kanaky could also happen here. That helps the independence movement to move things forward in Polynesia.

[Question] There is a sizable Tahitian community in New Caledonia. How is it reacting to the events taking place in that country?

[Answer] I was invited to attend the FLNKS congress in Hienghene a few months ago, and I met several Tahitian families. Some of them have been established over there for more than 20 years and the majority come from the municipality of Faaä. The Tahitians living in the jungle have completely joined the Kanaks, except for a few families. Those living in Noumea are somewhat worried and anxious. I have talked with them and I understand their position. Even though they are in favor of independence, they cannot express themselves openly because they are afraid of the reactions of the people on the right.

"You have to understand us," they told me, "if we openly express our support for the New Caledonians, then we will have trouble with the Kanaks. If we state that we belong to the FLNKS, then it is the people from the right who come and burn down our houses. So that we prefer to wait and see and do nothing. But in our hearts we are with the Kanaks."

[Question] Are there any prospects of unification among the various independence seeking forces in Polynesia?

[Answer] We are going to work at it. That will not be a first attempt. We have already tried to get together, but without success. We hope that next March we will be able to bring everybody together. During our next congress we will ask the militants to establish the new independence Front.

[Question] What do you expect in terms of solidarity from the anti-colonialist militants in France, the labor movement and democrats in general, relative to your struggle?

[Answer] At the local level in Tahiti we have perhaps neglected the work of information in the direction of France. As contacts with the Kanaks multiplied, we found out that they were also supported by certain organizations in France. I draw a conclusion from my trip to the FRG: we must have contacts in France. I am very happy to have met Alain Krivine. We need support: financial, political and moral. We need help because in our struggle we are up against more than our match.
Archipelago Under Domination

An archipelago of 4,000 square kilometers of land, consisting of 120 islands spread out over a vast expanse of ocean, representing 2 million square kilometers, Polynesia under French domination includes 170,000 inhabitants. A large number of them are concentrated on Tahiti. The artificial character of the colonial economy is illustrated by the importance of the non-productive sectors. In 1980, the tertiary sector, including the administration, represented 76 percent of the gross domestic product. Agricultural production is weak and mining resources limited, as is the manufacturing industry. On the other hand, tourism, imports-exports and the French military presence are important activities there. The Pacific Experimentation Center [CEP] alone represents 12 percent of the local salaried manpower (or 9,000 civilian and military employees), 55 percent of foreign financial support, and 28 percent of the imports.

The local population, 75 percent of which is Tahitian (Maori) also includes Chinese immigrants (10 percent) who hold the reins of trade. The "halves" or half-breeds who have adopted colonial behavior (15 percent) in turn have gathered political and administrative power for themselves.

Since 1982, Polynesia has been administered within the framework of an internal autonomy status comparable to that which provoked the revolt of the Kanaks in New Caledonia by a team behind Gaston Flosse, president of the local government with ties to the French RPR [Rally for the Republic]. This autonomy status strengthens the power of a local stratum of bourgeoisie which for the moment is not worried by a divided independence movement.

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PCI'S NAPOLITANO ON CONGRESS TASKS, USSR

'Appreciate Gorbachev's Innovations'

PM241153 Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 16 Feb 86 pp 14-16

[Interview with PCI Directorate member Giorgio Napolitano by Giovanni Valentini; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Valentini] What specifically in this legislative term could lie beyond the horizon of the five-party coalition vis-a-vis parliamentary alignments?

[Napolitano] When we talk about a "program government" we are issuing an invitation to all the democratic forces, without any exclusions or preconceptions. The first job should be to draw up a list of problems whose urgency or importance demand very broad cooperation by the political forces; this should be accompanied by an assessment of the chances for agreement on what solutions to apply to these problems, that is, on a very limited program, and on what kind of government should implement it. Maybe nothing would come of it. But the attempt must be made, both because the five-party coalition no longer stands up and because there are some really pressing issues that cannot be resolved without an agreement with the Communist Party.

[Valentini] Is there a little nostalgia for the historical compromise behind this line of reasoning?

[Napolitano] As far as I am concerned, absolutely not. I am convinced that the conditions must be created as soon as possible for a political-cum-institutional dialectic similar to that which exists in all the other Western democratic countries. So we must work to ensure the free and untraumatic rotation of various political alignments in the country's leadership. However, we are in a phase that may demand transitional solutions, more or less emergency solutions more or less characterized by the influence of the institutional problems, though of course they are not the only ones that need to be solved.
[Valentini] Is there or is there not a difference between the "program government" and the "constitution government" proposed by Ingrao at your latest Central Committee session?

[Napolitano] A war of formulas is not what is needed. I hope that the party will not split over formulas at our congresses. What is needed is an endeavor to understand the substance of the issues worth debating—first and foremost the extent and nature of the institutional reforms to be carried out, and, more generally, the policy foundations on which to seek an understanding among various democratic forces for a government that will mark progress beyond the five-way coalition.

[Valentini] Looking at the medium- and long-term prospects, Mr Napolitano, what role could your forthcoming congress play?

[Napolitano] It can thoroughly qualify our party as a force which stands as a candidate for the country's government in a period of deep transformations which must be guided toward really progressive social objectives. This requires that we free ourselves of any residual ideas or attitudes that would move us in the opposite direction.

[Valentini] What attitudes, for instance?

[Napolitano] Attitudes too closely bound to the defense of obsolete positions and demands, whereas it is necessary substantially to reappraise the problems of development, labor, and the welfare state in relation to technological innovations, current international competition, links with the environment, the public finance crisis.... These are problems that must not be dodged by adhering to a stance of merely condemning the admittedly unacceptable policy pursued by the five-party coalition or by yielding to demagogic thrusts, or even by making unrealistic proposals (as in the energy field for instance.) Indeed we must overcome any tendency to remain confined to our old social stock or to pursue minority groups instead of throwing open the door of our party and our policy to new forces of skilled workers, experts, and intellectuals, new professional and entrepreneurial groups. It is on this that the significance of our congress depends—on this and also on our international image....

[Valentini] Yes, Mr Napolitano, foreign policy: You are surely not unaware that this remains the source of the greatest suspicions in your regard.

[Napolitano] We can demonstrate that external vetoes to the PCI's participation in government no longer stand up and that Italian political forces can no longer find any pretexts in our international position or our stances on Italian foreign policy. We consider ourselves an integral part of the European left: We are involved in a joint quest with major socialist and social democratic parties, from which we are not divided by any barriers of the past, especially in the foreign policy field.
[Valentini] But Natta's recent visit to Moscow gave the opposite impression, that is, of a revival of pro-Sovietism within the PCI.

[Napolitano] No, Natta went to Moscow—as Willy Brandt and Neil Kinnock have recently done—to speak on behalf of a major national democratic party and one of the most significant forces of the European left, which is fighting to assert an autonomous role for Europe without challenging the alliance with the United States.

[Valentini] But is there not a danger of nurturing too many hopes with regard to the "new course" introduced by Gorbachev?

[Napolitano] We have appreciated—and are certainly not the only ones to have done so—the innovations that Gorbachev has introduced into the style of Soviet politics and into the USSR's specific stances on the problems of detente and disarmament. There is no question of rooting for the Soviet Union again. However important we consider them, we do not identify even with the USSR's new disarmament proposals. Nor are we venturing an assessment regarding the possible actual developments of the policy of regeneration inaugurated by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. We are watching with interest and objectivity the good and innovative things that are developing, imparting to our relations with the CPSU a new, entirely political, nonideological character and standing firm on our complete autonomy of assessment.

[Valentini] With regard to democracy, another "Cussutta case" seems to have exploded within the PCI, with a tendency to shift internal dissent to the disciplinary plane.

[Napolitano] No, there is no intention to use disciplinary suppression. This is the first time in the PCI's history that leadership members have stood by their amendments to congress theses even after their rejection by the Central Committee. We have broken the taboo whereby disputes originated and were closed within the leadership group. But now we want to prevent the organization of currents and factions—and in the cause of the presentation of Cossutta's book in Milan, it was undoubtedly an organized demonstration.

Napolitano Clarifies Response

PM261553 Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 23 Feb 86 p 177

[Letter from PCI Directorate member Giorgio Napolitano: "Cossutta and the PCI"]

[Text] The wording of my reply to the last question in the interview published in issue No 6 of L'ESPRESSO may have caused a misunderstanding which I would like to dispel. The event organized in Milan to launch Cossutta's book caused us to worry about the introduction into the pre-congress debate—whose complete freedom we all want to fully guarantee—of elements of growing crystallization and opposition likely to encourage the formation of currents and factions.

In other words, I did not intend to define the Milan initiative as an explicit meeting of a current but was identifying in it worrying elements of a tendency which, unless combated, could lead to such outcomes.
PCI, PSI OFFICIALS WEIGH GORBACHEV REPORT

Interview With PSI's Martelli

PM281143 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 27 Feb 86 p 5

[Interview with PSI Deputy Secretary Claudio Martelli by Albert Jacoviello in Moscow; date not given]

[Text] [Jacoviello] This is the first time that representatives of communist and socialist parties have sat down side by side at a congress of the Communist Party of a country directly or indirectly responsible for the split that occurred in the socialist movement 7 decades ago. What impression did this extraordinary and perhaps symbolic fact make on you?

[Martelli] Actually this is not the first time for us Italian Socialists. I cannot now tell you the date but certainly it did happen before, in Nenni's time. However, it certainly has not happened for many years. I should remind you that the Soviets attended our congresses even during the Craxi period and despite the violent and furious controversies launched by PRAVDA under various circumstances and for various reasons, especially at the time of Italy's decision to deploy the missiles on our territory.

[Jacoviello] Why did you agree to come this time?

[Martelli] Our decision has to do with curiosity, a desire to find out about the new things happening here. Perhaps one would have to go back to the Khrushchev era to find a similar situation. So it is natural for us to want to listen to the new CPSU general secretary—who represents an innovative element in the Soviet Union's leadership—to discover how he expresses himself and what he thinks.

[Jacoviello] So now that you have heard him can you give me an initial assessment particularly regarding the part of his report that concerns the state of the world, so to speak?

[Martelli] The general impression is certainly interesting. Gorbachev spoke a new language to some extent. But let us consider in what way. While the part devoted to a kind of sketch of the state of mankind seemed to me marked by a strong ideological stance, in subsequent sections, in connection with both domestic and foreign policy, I believe I perceived some different points from in the past....
[Jacoviello] But many people considered it important that the CPSU general secretary recognized that in the world we are living in no single country or group of countries can aspire to solve the problems on its own. Did this not make the same impression on you?

[Martelli] Yes, this threat runs right through the report and represents not merely a reaffirmation of but an outright new momentum, in grand style, for peaceful coexistence. In this respect I find the political part much more interesting than the ideological part.

[Jacoviello] It seems to me, however, that there is an outright change of viewpoint in the reappraisal of world affairs.

[Martelli] This is true. But with regard to what I said earlier, I want to admit to you that the person I was most reminded of was Pope Wojtyla—great rigorousness in defense of the Catholic religion but at the same time great political flexibility. The same can be said of Gorbachev—on the one hand a great dogmatic rigidity and on the other a great political open-mindedness.

[Jacoviello] You compare Gorbachev to Pope Wojtyla; I once compared him to Dubcek and on another occasion to John Kennedy. What is he really like?

[Martelli] The comparison with John Kennedy seems inappropriate except in the very general sense that Gorbachev too aims to reform the system without changing it. But in that respect one could cite all kinds of people.

[Jacoviello] Do you have any criticisms to make of Gorbachev's report apart from your rejection of its dogmatic aspect?

[Martelli] Well, I must say that one is somewhat shocked to hear that the socialist world is the cradle of humanism when what we are talking about are regimes such as those of Jaruzelski, Husak, or Kadar, or about Afghanistan....

[Jacoviello] So you perceive a number of good things and a number of bad things?

[Martelli] I am certainly not persuaded to alter my verdict on the system. In any case, I ought to point out that there is a surprising total absence of criticism of the foreign policy conducted by the USSR, alongside a number of criticisms of domestic policy. After all the Soviet missiles were deployed when the Carter administration was in power in America and when governments in Europe were not hostile to the USSR.

[Jacoviello] Now Gorbachev says he went to dismantle them....

[Martelli] That is true but it is difficult not to believe that it is due to the show of weaponry made by the West in recent years rather—in the absence of any critical observations—than to a new course in Soviet military policy.
[Jacoviello] There is a widespread impression that the wide representation of socialist parties could mark the beginning of a more general reappraisal of the state of the workers movement, not just of the so-called communist movement. If the Soviets were to do what Giorgio Amendola once proposed when he said that the two wings of the workers movement had each committed 50 percent of the mistakes so it would be preferable to meet each other half-way, how would Italian Socialists respond?

[Martelli] I do not believe there were any such indications in Gorbachev's report. The language adopted was one of a general, albeit kind, appreciation of our role and an appeal for the joint defense of peace.

[Jacoviello] Have you had a chance to exchange ideas with representatives of other socialist parties and to gather their impressions of the congress?

[Martelli] I have not had time. I would like to point out, however, that the highest-ranking delegations are the French and Italian. But perhaps this is the result of the direct contacts that have taken place between Gorbachev on the one hand and Mitterrand and Craxi on the other. Be that as it may, it is our intention to take every opportunity for contacts and dialogue with the new Soviet leaders.

Commentary by PCI's Bufalini

PM281703 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 27 Feb 86 pp 1, 16

[PCI Directorate Member Paolo Bufalini commentary: "That Famous 'Propulsive Thrust'?"]

[Text] The opening of the 27th CPSU Congress, with the sharp swing imparted by Comrade Gorbachev's report, reminds us of the 20th congress, of the great event of 30 years ago. However, there are some profound differences. Of course the new CPSU general secretary is shaking things up, issuing a cogent critique of the 20-year Brezhnev era, and vigorously and resolutely reintroducing the antihetorical and antidogmatic style and climate, the spirit of clarity and truth. The swing imparted by Khrushchev was more dramatic--Gorbachev's is more cautious and calmer but, perhaps precisely because the time is more than ripe and in fact there has been a serious delay, it is more far-reaching.

Gorbachev's approach is split between two interconnected levels--the need for a domestic "radical reform" and the development of a bold and consistent international initiative for arms reduction accords and peaceful coexistence.

On the domestic plane--and first and foremost on the socioeconomic plane but also, albeit less directly and more vaguely, on the cultural and even the political plane--Gorbachev's report reveals new elements and pointers of which there was no trace in the 20th congress. At that time, in that unforgettable congress of 1956, the dominant issue was the "violations of socialist legality," "Stalin's personality cult," the Stalinist leadership's "noncollegial" or "despotic methods." There was a dramatically urgent need to release
the victims of a huge and tragic repression from the hard labor camps and prisons and also to rehabilitate the dead, to deal fairly with their memory.

Khrushchev also issued an extraordinarily vigorous indictment of the dominant inefficiencies and dogmatism. But he was unable to go beyond that. The repercussions ensued, and then the long gloomy and stagnant Brezhnev period.

Market Reassessed

Gorbachev, however, is not only talking about "reform"—and "radical" reform—for the first time in the CPSU but is also issuing important pointers. In planning, the role of a central leadership is to define only the major general guidelines, overall proportions and balances; but it must not interfere at lower levels of the economy. For the rest the sights are being set on the initiative and autonomous responsibility of grassroots and provincial enterprises and bodies. It is clearly asserted that all earnings—for each individual worker, each enterprise or cooperative—must be proportional to the qualitative and quantitative yield of the work done.

There is a reassessment of the market's function as a yardstick of efficiency and productivity. There is the assertion of the need for self-management and democratic supervision in the heart of the production organization and in social life. There is unqualified criticism of "the pedantry, dogmatism, and formalism that have caused, and are still causing, a stagnation of thinking." There is condemnation of persisting instances of conservative resistance within the party, which must be overcome to bridge the gap between the party and the country's great energies.

All these pointers are aimed at encouraging the citizens' initiative, interest, and broadest participation in the production process and in the process of economic and social deliberation, decision-making, and supervision. Of course when we talk about (political) democracy and socialism we mean something broader and different but we do not presume to dictate our own model to others. Nevertheless we believe that the major issue of the political rights and civil liberties that must be guaranteed in a socialist system remains unresolved.

The Reply to PRAVDA

May I now be permitted to point out, however, that when we Italian communists spoke, following the grave Polish crisis, of the "exhaustion of the propulsive thrust of the models which emerged from the October Revolution" we clarified the significance of this in a lengthy document published by L'UNITA on 27 January 1983 ("reply to PRAVDA"). It contains the following passages, among others: "...in the most varied forms—on the basis of the conditions that have come about during the course of history in each country—democracy and socialist must be united: both democracy within the production process and at the same time political democracy. The major innovations of the 20th CPSU Congress demanded reforms that would proceed in this direction.... But no progress has been made along this path: in fact there has been a standstill and, we believe, even a regression. We are convinced that if the Communist Party in these countries succeeds in leading a properly directed process of
reform, crises will be averted and it is our desire to help, through our
criticisms and sincere deliberations, encourage this task of regeneration...."
Now Gorbachev's sharp condemnation of the long stagnation accompanied by
degenerative processes confirms the correctness of the stance we adopted at
that time.

Of course the "reform" advocated by Gorbachev is encountering and will continue
to encounter major resistance and obstacles. We do not naively delude our-
selves. However, it should be borne in mind that after such a delay the
"reform" presents itself to the Soviet Union as a necessity that cannot be
avoided or put off. Gorbachev's argument derives truth and intrinsic strength
from this. We want to emphasize its great worth.

The political initiative that the Soviet Union is developing internationally
with the aim of shifting the quest for security (for all) from the military to
the political field is of supreme importance. At the same time as Gorbachev
issues a searing indictment of the Reagan administration's and the imperialist
forces' responsibilities in the pursuit of new objectives of rearmament
(particularly "star wars") and of the material and political influence of the
U.S. military industrial bloc, he is again proposing to everyone--first and
foremost to the United States and Reagan--a strategy of disarmament and peace-
ful coexistence based on solid and clear points. Mankind has reached a cross-
roads: either it takes the path of accords for arms reduction leading to the
elimination of nuclear weapons (based on parity at lower and lower levels) or
it proceeds further along a path on which not even parity of nuclear deter-
rents can ensure peace and free mankind from the threat and nightmare of
catastrophe. Nobody can believe in winning a nuclear war just as nobody can
believe in winning the arms race. The path of accords on arms reduction and
peaceful coexistence is also in the interests of the American nation and of
all mankind. Reagan's counterproposals, Gorbachev says, tend to create new
obstacles; they will nevertheless be carefully examined by the Soviet Union,
which keeps the dialogue open and which, though aware of the serious difficult-
ies, set its sights on negotiation and on the possibility of finding major
points of agreement. At the same time Gorbachev emphasizes the role of Europe,
of the five major powers of the UN Security Council, and of all the peace
forces and initiatives. He sets all this within the context of a universal
humanist view of the use of scientific and technical gains and of resources.
Partly because of this crucial aspect we want to stress that Soviet policy is
now oriented toward the necessity and possibility of negotiated solutions and
accords--and, of course, in order to safeguard peace, accords with the ad-
versary. Specific proposals and stances remain to be discussed, but one cannot
deny that in this direction the USSR is not conducting propaganda but setting
itself and everyone objectives which it considers difficult, but necessary and
feasible.

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CSO: 3528/98
PCP ASSESSES PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

PM101402 Lisbon AVANTE! in Portuguese 27 Feb 86 pp 2-5

[PCP Central Committee 20 February resolution: "Immediate Tasks Following the Presidential Election"]

[Text] 1--The PCP Central Committee met in plenary session on 20 February to examine the results of the presidential election and the political situation resulting from them.

2--The Central Committee deemed it necessary to examine further the evolution of the economic, social, cultural, and political situation over the past few years, the changes that have occurred in various aspects of national life, and the consequent changes in the immediate and medium-term struggle aims.

3--The Central Committee also deemed it necessary to intensify soon the analysis of the existing economic, social, and political situation.

4--In the meantime, the Central Committee considered the urgent need right now—4 days after the second round of the presidential election—to draw immediately the conclusions from its results and its impact on the political situation, and to define the party's course and the corresponding tasks.

1. Defeat for Reaction, Victory for Democracy

With Freitas do Amaral's defeat in the presidential election, a grave and imminent danger looming over the democratic system has been dispelled.

The defeat for Freitas do Amaral in the presidential election was not just a defeat for the candidate and for the Social Democratic Center Party [CDS]—his party.

It was a defeat for Cavaco Silva, his government, and the Social Democratic Party [PSD], who committed themselves totally to his candidacy and to the subversive political plan of which it formed part.

It was a defeat for the forces of the fascist past and the most reactionary social and political sectors—specifically, fascist and fascist-type revanchism.
As in 1980, with Soares Carneiro's candidacy, Freitas' and Cavaco's plan was clear and avowed: By gaining the presidency of the republic, controlling the government, preparing elections which would give the resurrected "Democratic Alliance" the majority of deputies, and being able to designate and appoint the military leaders as they pleased, the reactionary forces were planning to launch a general, comprehensive, and violent offensive against the workers, citizens' freedoms and rights, and the gains of April [1974].

It was not a matter of a political program to be implemented within the framework of democratic legality. It was an unconstitutional, illegal, and subversive plan for the elimination of the economic and political system enshrined in the constitution and the complete destruction of the democratic system.

The failure of this plan, in which reaction staked all its forces and invested very considerable resources, and which it sought to implement through the most contemptible methods, represents a severe blow to counterrevolution.

The reactionary forces have not abandoned their aims of eliminating the democratic system enshrined in the constitution, but the dynamic of fascist and fascist-type revanchism has been curbed and broken. Defeated in the presidential election, the forces of reaction will now be forced to review, reformulate and start again new subversive plans.

Thus the fact that reaction and the fascist-type dynamic did not succeed in the presidential election means a great victory for democracy, which, by dispelling the danger, opens up new prospects for the defense of the democratic system enshrined in the constitution.

As many facts and specific reports indicated, a victory for Freitas would have immediately triggered an explosion of illegalities and reactionary outrages, spreading hatred, acts of revenge, fear, and intolerance.

The extraordinary and spontaneous demonstrations of popular joy on election night itself proved that the majority of the Portuguese people were aware of the fascist and fascist-type danger and therefore enthusiastically acclaimed the victory of freedom, democracy, and 25 April.

2. PCP's Decisive Contribution

The elimination of the two democratic candidates in the first round of the election having been ascertained, the PCP's decision to intervene in the second round and make it its aim to defeat Freitas do Amaral and the fascist and fascist-type threat—therefore urging voting against Freitas do Amaral by voting for Mario Soares—caused the turnabout in the situation and played a decisive role in the election's outcome.

Nobody denies that, without this decision, Freitas do Amaral, who won 46 percent in the first round, as against just 25 percent for Mario Soares, would have been elected president of the republic.

When victory for reaction seemed inevitable, it was the PCP's decision and action which totally reversed the prospects in the presidential election.
The decision and the PCP's elucidation campaign in the second round were, in the existing situation, the decisive factor for the defeat for Freitas do Amaral and reaction and for the great victory for democracy.

Both the overall national result and comparative analysis of the regional results bear out this assertion, without a shadow of doubt.

In the national total, the fact that Mario Soares had just 154,000 votes more than Freitas do Amaral demonstrated the imminence of the danger in which the democratic system stood and the decisive value of the convergence of votes.

In the regional results, it was precisely in the regions with majority PCP and United People Alliance [APU] influence, in which Mario Soares achieved lower polls in the first round, that he achieved the highest percentages in the second round.

In Beja, Mario Soares won just 18 percent of the votes in the first round; in the second round he won 76 percent. In Evora he won 14 percent and 69 percent, respectively; in Setubal, 17 percent and 71 percent; in Portalegre, 25 percent and 65 percent; in Lisbon, 23 percent and 57 percent.

In these five districts alone, Mario Soares won 820,000 more votes in the second round than in the first.

Bearing in mind that the votes of the PCP and APU electorate were decisive, not because of support for Mario Soares' candidacy, his program, and his activity, but because of the conviction of the imperative need to defeat Freitas do Amaral for the defense of democracy, the extremely high political awareness of the PCP and APU members and supporters is made even clearer.

The PCP Central Committee, highly appreciating the contribution made by all the democratic forces and sectors to the defeat of the reactionary forces and plans, greets and congratulates them all.

However, it is a historical fact, and it is therefore just to emphasize it, that the PCP's contribution to the outcome of the 1986 presidential election was decisive.

This is new proof of the PCP's high sense of responsibility in national life and of its role in the defense of freedoms and democracy.

It is new proof that the PCP is a crucially important bastion of the Portuguese democratic system—an essential force for successfully resisting reaction and for a democratic solution to the nation's problems.

3. The Danger of Reaction Persists; the Struggle Must be Continued

While emphasizing the great defeat for reaction and its plan to subvert the democratic institutions, the PCP stresses at the same time that the high poll of 48.7 percent achieved by Freitas do Amaral in fact represents broad and worrying electoral and social support. It is clear that the vast majority
of the 2,800,000 voters who voted for Freitas do Amaral do not lie politically on the fascist-type extreme right, but were deceived and did not realize that Freitas do Amaral's candidacy in fact represented the danger of fascism.

The Central Committee believes that the high poll for F. do Amaral and the mass support which the poll reflects stem from five main groups of factors.

In the first place, the dominant positions of the PSD, the CDS, and other forces of reaction in political power, the state apparatus, and economic power, which enabled them for electioneering purposes to misuse functions, decisions, services, funds, and other material and technical resources, including the powerful state-owned news media, in a massive and systematic operation of ideological diversion, disinformation, and deception. The sustained operation by many powerful news and cultural media controlled or directly influenced by the right, imperialism, and opportunism constituted considerable support for the reactionary political and electoral operation.

Second, the capitalization by reaction on part of the discontent which its own policy over the past 10 years has caused; a capitalization which became possible because of several basic factors:

(a) The decisive role of the Socialist Party [PSP] and Mario Soares in the right-wing governments over the past 10 years, thus accepting the most direct responsibility for the right-wing policy's disastrous consequences;
(b) The mistaken and false identification of that policy with 25 April;
(c) The PSD's and CDS' strategem of disclaiming responsibility;
(d) The demagogic campaign by reaction--specifically by the new PSD leadership and by Cavaco Silva's PSD government;
(e) The concealment from broad masses of the electorate of the real aims of Freitas do Amaral's candidacy. The "hour of change," which for the fascists and quasi-fascists meant (as their adopted aim) the elimination of 25 April, appeared in the eyes of less politicized sectors as a real hope of solution to the people's and the country's problems.

Third, the high poll was influenced by the very conduct of the campaign, promoted with very considerable material and financial resources (payments, donations, distribution of articles, parades), which made it possible to impart to it a spectacular mass mobilization and dynamic, combining real intimidation with a festive prospect of victory and with broad participation by young people.

Fourth, the right's high poll is due to antidemocratic aspects existing in the national situation--broad geographical areas and many enterprises subjugated by the most diverse forms of pressure, coercion, and intimidation by the local bosses, including the manipulation of religious feelings, creating situations in which the exercise of democratic freedoms is virtually forbidden and in which the greatest abuses and frauds in the electoral process and election become possible.
Fifth, the poll for Freitas do Amaral, supported by the right-wing parties' bloc, is also influenced by the democrats' splits in the presidential election and the fact that Mario Soares was not a democratic unity candidate, had the real and direct support (in the first round) of only about 25 percent of the votes, and had in the second round not real support but reluctant and constrained votes, which were, however, essential in order to make his victory possible.

All these factors indicate that although reaction, having the PSD and the CDS as its main instruments, sustained a major defeat in the presidential elections, it still has considerable strength, means, resources, and influence, and is therefore still a factor of destruction and a real threat to democracy.

To forget or play down the danger in which the country stood and still stands and to treat Freitas do Amaral and Cavaco as democrats and the PSD and the CDS as democratic would be to allow the reactionary forces to continue their offensives and to prepare freely new plans for subversion without taking into account the defeat they have suffered.

The terrorist actions which have occurred over the past few weeks (and which the PCP firmly condemns) indicate provocative methods which would provide a pretext for the restriction of freedoms, the approval of antidemocratic security laws, and a repressive policy.

The Central Committee emphasizes the imperative need to continue in the immediate future the struggle against reaction and its policy, and, to this end, to confirm in practical action at the most diverse levels and in the most diverse fields of activity the democratic convergence ascertained in the presidential election.

The Central Committee emphasizes the need to intensify elucidation and to attract to the democratic forces' camp the hundreds and hundreds of thousands of voters deceived and deluded by right-wing propaganda.

4. Combating the PSD Government and Struggle for a Democratic Government

Freitas do Amaral's defeat in the presidential election also represents a grave defeat for Cavaco Silva's PSD government. Cavaco Silva staked everything on the restoration of the "Democratic Alliance" and its majority in the 6 October legislative elections and on Freitas do Amaral's election. Both aims failed.

If the PSD/Cavaco Silva minority government did not have sufficient strength to carry out a violent and comprehensive attack on the people's rights and the democratic gains before the presidential election, the PSD/Cavaco Silva government is left even more insecure, weak, and dependent following the defeat in the presidential election.

The Central Committee points out that the parties defeated in the presidential election (the CDS and the PSD) are in a minority in the Assembly of the Republic, and the parties which converged in the vote to defeat
Freitas do Amaral (the PCP, the PSP, the Democratic Renewal Party [PRD], the Portuguese Democratic Movement [MDP], and "The Greens") have a comfortable majority of deputies.

This situation means that the parties which converged to defeat Freitas do Amaral in the presidential election are in an institutional position, provided that they converge in action, not only to prevent the government from adopting measures contrary to the people's and the country's interests, but also possibly to form the parliamentary base of support for the formation of another government.

The Central Committee warns of the existence of new dangers to democracy if, following the great democratic victory in the presidential election, democratic forces made it possible to continue the PSD/Cavaco Silva government's right-wing policy with impunity, preparing the conditions for launching a new plan for the elimination of the democratic system and its gains.

The PCP still believes that the continuation of the PSD/Cavaco Silva government's policy and plans will not only not resolve but will exacerbate the nation's problems.

The government's policy, set out in its program and in the major options and budget bills for 1986, aims explicitly at rebuilding the monopolies and the big estates:

--by stifling, dismantling, and destroying or handing over to private capital the public and nationalized enterprises;

--by reserving for the state and public funds the mere role of builders of economic infrastructures serving big capital;

--by promoting through credit and tax incentives and benefits and through other forms of support the accumulation and centralization of capital, artificially assigning to big capital the role of driving force of the national economy;

--by relaunching the offensives against the agrarian reform, aiming at its total destruction.

In order to strengthen its weak political and social position, the government has found itself forced to adopt some measures which meet demands made long ago by the PCP and other democratic forces, such as, for instance, lowering interest rates. But the government increased the prices of essential products in November, and despite considerable falls in international prices, has not yet reduced the price of fuels.

The bulk of the government's measures--particularly those adopted in the presidential campaign period--are of a markedly demagogic nature:

--the 50 percent reduction in the telephone rental for retired people on terms which virtually cover only a very small number;
--the announcement of exemptions from the capital levy for retired people's deposits, provided that they do not exceed the sum of 1 million escudos;
--the announcement of the change in home purchase terms for young people;
--the announcement of the reduction of compulsory military service;
--the announcement of the reduction of taxes after increasing the tax burden through the value-added tax;
--the creation of temporary jobs for unemployed young people within the framework of the OTL [expansion unknown].

The government's policy, benefiting from highly favorable external factors (specifically, the fall of the dollar and the fall of the price of oil), could temporarily alleviate in some respects the deterioration of the economic and social situation, but it will not only not resolve any of the major national problems, but will exacerbate the economic situation of a huge production sector—particularly, agriculture and fisheries and nationalized enterprises—unemployment increased by dismissals without just cause, and social conflicts, encouraging repression by employers and dependence on imperialism, especially through the process of integration into the EEC.

The experience of 10 consecutive years of right-wing government (with or without the PSP) has already demonstrated that a policy subject to the strategic aims of destroying the democratic gains of the April revolution and of restoring the monopolies (associated with imperialism) and the big estates is the direct cause of social and political instability, the dangers to the democratic system, the disaster of the economy, the sharp deterioration in the people's living conditions, the foreign debt, and the subordination to other countries.

It is the democratic and patriotic forces' task, not only to prevent Cavaco Silva's government from continuing its antipeople and antidemocratic policy, preparing the subversion of the system, but to create conditions for the formation of a democratic government with a democratic policy, capable of resolving the grave national problems created by 10 years of successive governments' right-wing policy.

5. Outlines of a National Policy

Faithful to the interests and rights of the workers, the people, and the country, the April revolution and its gains, and the democratic system enshrined in the constitution, the PCP will resolutely continue the struggle for a democratic alternative, a democratic government, and a democratic policy.

Contrary to the reactionary forces' policy and program, which constitute, in conformity with their own counterrevolutionary aims, violent factors of economic, social, and political instability, the policy which the PCP proposes is a policy of stabilization and stability.
An essential presupposition of a democratic policy capable of resolving the nation's problems is an immediate end to the veritable war unleashed against the workers and other working sectors and the constitutional offensives against workers' rights, the nationalized enterprises and sectors, the collective production units and cooperatives of the agrarian reform, democratic freedoms, and democratic local government.

A democratic policy capable of extricating the country from the crisis and resolving the disastrous national problems caused by 10 years of right-wing policy will necessarily have to have four basic aims:

First—Respect for the constitution, democratic legality, the guaranteeing of freedoms, and the institutions' stability—which implies firm opposition to any attempts at an antidemocratic revision of the constitution and the defense of the workers' rights, citizens' freedoms and rights, impartiality and independence in the state-owned news media, democratic local government, and the electoral system which has proportionality as a basic principle.

Second—An economic policy of recovery and development in order to surmount the crisis, an integral part of which will necessarily have to be support without discrimination for all existing economic structures and the mobilization of the nation's resources, energies, abilities, and potential for an increase in production, financial reorganization, and the improvement of the Portuguese people's well-being. Development in keeping with national interests requires a firm and patriotic attitude toward foreign imperialism—specifically in the EEC—not accepting terms of subordination and the sacrificing of Portuguese interests in international relations.

Third—The improvement of the people's material and cultural living conditions, which is not only compatible with but complementary to a policy of economic development, and requires emergency measures to resolve the gravest problems, such as wages in arrears, dismissals, unemployment—with particular attention to youth unemployment—the rise in the cost of living, the wretched level of pensions, the intolerable costs of housing and health, and the deterioration of education and social assistance for education.

Fourth—A foreign policy of independence, peace, and cooperation, which implies the development of diversified relations with all states, a refusal to turn Portugal into a base for plans for aggression and war, and a stance in favor of detente and opposed to the arms race (specifically, nuclear weapons and "star wars"), which is causing the threat of the total destruction of the planet to loom over mankind.

6. The PCP and the State Bodies

The defeat for Freitas do Amaral and for the PSD/CDS plan for subversion of the system and of the democratic institutions, whose core was the presidential election, places on the agenda the defense and observance of the constitution and of democratic legality and the institutions' consolidation and regular functioning.
Now that reaction's plan to take over all the state bodies has been thwarted and conditions have been created for constitutional normality to be ensured, it is opportune to define the PCP's stance toward the president of the republic, the government, the Assembly of the Republic, the courts, and local government.

With respect to the president of the republic, the PCP believes--irrespective of its opinion on the program put forward, the policy advocated by the new president-elect, and the stances he may adopt during his term--that, in institutional terms, relations between the PCP and the presidency of the republic, as a state body, should be conducted normally, as happened under the outgoing president, in the manner envisaged in the constitution.

A similar stance will be adopted in the Council of State--a consultative body of the president of the republic--by the PCP secretary general, who is a member of it.

With respect to the government, the PCP, while combating the policy of Cavaco Silva and the PSD and struggling for an end to the disastrous right-wing policy and for the formation of a democratic government with a democratic policy capable of resolving the grave national problems, remains prepared to hold meetings with the government in accordance with the rules governing the opposition.

The PCP maintains exactly the same stance with respect to the regional governments of Madeira and the Azores.

With respect to the Assembly of the Republic, the PCP, through its parliamentary group, talking and seeking cooperation with the other democratic parties and deputies, will work for the exercise of the Assembly of the Republic's legislative and monitoring powers (specifically as regards combating corruption and the illegalities of government action against the agrarian reform), submit bills aimed at resolving the problems and satisfying the people's interests and aspirations, oppose the approval of reactionary legislation, and unmask the government's antipeople and antidemocratic policy.

The PCP parliamentary group firmly opposes and will do its utmost to ensure the rejection of the law on dismissals and other laws of the so-called labor package, the law on the theft of wasteland, and the law on the handing over of television channels to private enterprise (currently under debate in the Assembly of the Republic), as well as other bills which the government is preparing with a view to dismantling public and nationalized enterprises and the collective production units and cooperatives, the restriction of freedoms and rights under the pretext of internal security, and the antidemocratic revision of electoral legislation.

At the same time, the PCP parliamentary group will struggle steadfastly for the approval of the PCP's bills concerning wages in arrears, an increase in allowances, benefits, and pensions, annulment of the law on an increase in rents, control over the price of medicines, the protection of the nationalized sector, the agrarian reform, and democratic local government, the independence of the news media, the alleviation of the disastrous consequences of entry into the EEC, and the cancellation of the scandalous increases in government members' and deputies' salaries and stipends.
With respect to the courts, the PCP continues to champion resolutely the judiciary's independence and impartiality. To this effect it will continue to demand compliance with the legal rulings which annulled or suspended government actions—specifically, compliance with the Administrative Supreme Court's 300 rulings in favor of the agrarian reform workers' appeals against decisions to extort land from the collective production units and cooperatives.

With respect to local government, the PCP resolutely champions its democratic nature, character, functions, and functioning against any attempts at governmentalization, and will continue, through its elected officials, to work honestly and competently for the resolution of the population's problems.

In the municipalities administered by the APU, the Communists will continue their noteworthy work; a fact whose recognition by the population was demonstrated again in the 15 December local elections.

The Central Committee emphasizes the particular importance assumed in the current situation and for taking advantage of the opportunities for unity and contact with the population by the strengthening of the councils' collegiate functioning, enhancement of the role of the municipal and parish assemblies, increased decentralization for parishes, the setting up or galvanization of municipal councils, and a stronger link with residents' committees, associations, and the representative organizations of the workers, young people, and other strata in sectors of the population.

Concerning the state bodies and the state apparatus, the Central Committee also deems it opportune to confirm the PCP's stance with respect to the Armed Forces—uncompromising advocacy of the constitutional principles, according to which the Armed Forces serve the Portuguese people and are strictly nonpartisan.

Concerning the many comments on the presidential election, the PCP does not believe that the fact that a civilian and not a military man has been elected president of the republic has any institutional or democratic significance. The military consists of full citizens, and nothing in the constitution prevents military personnel holding the highest posts in the state apparatus.

7.  Situation Requires That Democratic Convergence Continue

The Central Committee closely examined the many aspects of democratic convergence in the presidential election. Although its immediate practical manifestation was the vote that made possible Freitas do Amaral's defeat, the democratic convergence had many other manifestations and positive aspects.

The process of the presidential election—specifically, the efforts to achieve consensus among the democratic forces on the candidate of democracy in the first round, and the final convergence of democratic votes in the second round in order to defeat Freitas do Amaral—confirms a long-standing experience: Just as discord among the democratic forces is one of the main factors in the right's advance, convergence in the democrats' activity is the best guarantee of victory for democracy.
The process of the presidential election made it possible once more to ascertain the depth of the Portuguese people's democratic and antifascist feelings and the vast potential for unity among the workers and unity among democrats.

The Central Committee registers as a new and promising phenomenon the countless attestations of deep unitary feelings expressed both at the level of the masses and at the level of members of all democratic parties and sectors.

A situation favorable to rapprochement, understanding, and unity among democrats has been created. In order to continue to withstand reaction successfully and to defend the democratic system successfully, it is in the Portuguese people's vital interest that the feelings and attitudes conducive to unity among democrats be maintained, consolidated, and substantiated.

In the process of the presidential election it was made clear once more that the PCP is an essential force for containing and defeating reaction and for consensus and unity in the democratic camp.

Success for the struggle against reaction and the defense of democracy make essential the disappearance from the democratic camp of anticommunist prejudices and the fear of reactionary blackmail over so-called "links" with the PCP, which only help reaction.

An irrefutable conclusion emerges from the analysis of the facts and the situation: The struggle against reaction and the defense of the democratic system in the immediate future require a serious effort by all democratic forces and sectors in the direction of convergence and unity.

The Central Committee expresses the PCP's readiness in the immediate future to undertake or take part in joint or convergent initiatives concerning specific problems in the Assembly of the Republic, the local authorities, trade union activity, the workers' committees, enterprises, schools, cultural activity, and struggles in support of demands in general.

With respect to interparty relations, taking into account the situation arising out of the political process and the outcome of the presidential election, and the importance currently assumed by dialogue among all the political forces that converged for reaction's defeat, the Central Committee has decided to propose meetings with PCP delegations to the following parties: The PSP, the PRD, the MDP, "The Greens," The Popular Democratic Union, the Revolutionary Socialist Party, and the Union of the Left for Socialist Democracy.

The Central Committee Secretariat will carry out these proposals in the immediate future.

The Central Committee took cognizance of the fact that the PSP has just announced an initiative with respect to meetings among parties which, as far as the PCP is concerned, converges with the above-mentioned Central Committee proposal.

At the same time as taking these initiatives and taking into account the rapprochement, contacts, and in many instances, relations of understanding and
cooperation that have been established between PCP organizations and members and democrats in other parties and sectors, the Central Committee gives all party organizations and members the general instruction not only to maintain but to intensify these contacts and relations, seeking whenever possible their substantiation in convergent joint initiatives and actions.

The PCPR Central Committee is certain that these decisions are in keeping with the vital interests of defense of democracy and the deepest feelings of the Portuguese people and democrats.

8. Unity and Unitary Organizations and Mass Struggle

Political action at the level of the institutions (in the state bodies and in the relationship with them) is not the only way to take part in political life and to influence its evolution.

Mass struggle remains an essential form of participation and action, and the development of mass struggle makes work in the unitary organizations a prime activity.

The struggle for convergence and unity is not confined to the effort at rapprochement, dialogue, and understanding among the democratic parties and their members. The struggle for convergence and unity assumes particular importance at the level of the unitary organizations and movements of the various classes and social strata, as well as of the most diverse mass organizations, in the sphere of their specific activities.

The Central Committee emphasizes the importance in the current situation of strengthening the unity, organizations, and dynamism of the mass struggle waged by the powerful unitary trade union movement organized around the National Confederation of Portuguese Workers—National Intersindical.

While emphasizing that the struggle for workers' unity—specifically, trade union unity—is a task for Communists in all trade unions and trade union organizations, the Central Committee at the same time regards as essential steadfastness in the struggle against trade union splitism and against connivance by General Workers Union leaders and organizations with the government and with the employers, to the detriment of the workers' interests.

The Central Committee believes that both the political and social situation and the prospects for evolution in the situation also require the strengthening of the workers' committees, the residents' committees, and all forms of unitary organizations of the workers, farmers, intellectuals and skilled personnel, young people, women, small and medium traders and manufacturers, pensioners, the handicapped, and all social sectors in defense of their specific interests.

It is particularly important that rapprochement, convergence, and unity be established, consolidated, and developed around specific problems—specifically, in struggles in support of demands with specific aims, whose intensification the economic and social situation imperatively requires.
In the current situation, particular prominence as negative factors has been gained, on the one hand, by manifestations of sectarianism (manifested specifically in overestimation of one's own strength, disregard for other democratic sectors, and incapacity for openness and dialogue), and, on the other hand, by manifestations of opportunism (manifested specifically in concessions of an ideological nature, deadening of critical spirit, and subservience toward other political sectors' stances.)

The Central Committee emphasizes, as an essential factor for the development of unity and mass struggle, resolute struggle against both sectarianism and opportunism (right-wing or leftist).

9. Essential Force of Democracy

The intense political struggle marked over the past 5 months by three general elections (for the Assembly of the Republic, the local authorities, and the presidency of the republic) has put to the test the PCP's strength, capacity for organization and achievement, internal unity, mass influence, and influence on national politics.

The 11th (special) PCP Congress, decided on, organized, and held within the space of under a week, and marking the culmination of preparatory debates at over 800 plenary meetings, attended by over 30,000 party members, is extraordinary proof, not only of the party's prompt and effective participation in national life but also of its organization, militancy, internal democracy, and unity.

This whole period of struggle has confirmed the role of the PAP—the party of the working class and all workers—as the great necessary, essential, and irreplaceable political force for the defense of the people's interests and rights, freedoms, and the other great gains of the April revolution, the democratic system, and national independence.

However, the intense political struggle in the course of 1985 and the election campaigns and battles have prevented the party from devoting the necessary attention and efforts to various fronts of its work.

There are conditions in the near future for doing so.

The Central Committee sets as the immediate task the strengthening of the party in all aspects of its activity.

To this effect the Central Committee points out four major aspects:

First—The strengthening of the party's organization, boosting and improving work in all cells and organizations, with particular attention to the enterprise cells, regularizing the bodies' organization and functioning, increasing the regular turnout at meetings, normalizing the payment of dues, and promoting regular recruitment again.
Second—The strengthening of party unity, whose main factors are the dynamic of political action in the performance of tasks, collective work, the internal democratic life which gives all party members the right in their respective organizations to take part in debate and in decisions, and the voluntary and conscious discipline which obliges all party members to act in accordance with the policy defined and decided on.

Third—The strengthening of political and ideological work in the party's ranks and among the masses, improving information and propaganda resources, adopting effective measures for the widest possible distribution of AVANTE! and other party organs, promoting the assimilation and dissemination of the party's aims and policy and the study of Marxism-Leninism, combating the ideological influence on the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, and combating disinformation, ideological diversion, and anticommunism, and all their manifestations aimed at reducing the role and strength of the workers' movement and the PCP, and of the ideals and achievements of socialism in the world.

Fourth—The strengthening of the party's tie with the masses through activity in the unitary movements and organizations and in the mass associations, the fight against sectarianism and opportunism, and the constant promotion of the struggle of the workers, farmers, intellectuals and skilled personnel, women, young people, small and medium traders and manufacturers, pensioners, the handicapped, and the population at large in defense of their interests and rights.

In line with the conclusion of the 11th (special) congress, the Central Committee sets as a task for this year the thorough examination of a set of problems deemed to be of prime importance:

— the problems of young people, their aspirations, and their involvement in social and political life;

— the problems of women and the struggle for their emancipation;

— the problems of the workers movement, its organization, and its unity;

— the problems concerning the ideological battle, the cultural front, and the news media;

— the problems concerning the party's functioning, its organization, and its dynamic.

The Political Commission and Central Committee Secretariat will lay down the work schedules for the performance of these tasks, so that their implementation can be begun as soon as possible.

The Central Committee sets as great days of struggle, whose preparation should begin immediately, the 25 April commemorations and May Day, whose centenary is commemorated this year.
The commemorations of the 65th anniversary of the party's founding at the beginning of March could give rise to initiatives falling within the purview of this work schedule.

The Central Committee has set 5 through 7 September as the dates for the 1986 AVANTE! festival.

The Central Committee expresses its full confidence that the workers and democrats will be able to strengthen their unity and continue with determination the struggle in defense of the Portugal of April.

20 February 1986

The PCP Central Committee

/12712
CSO: 3542/70
USE OF SARA BY AIR FORCE DESCRIBED

Paris AFP SCIENCES, in French 21 Nov 1985 pp 28-29

[Article: "The SARA System of Aerial Location of Enemy Tanks"]

[Text] Strasbourg—While the Army is using RITA's [expansion unknown] ears for its communications, the Air Force now can rely on SARA [Air-Transportable Station for Aerial Reconnaissance] to spot, locate and identify enemy tanks or concentrations in less than a quarter of an hour, i.e. a time sufficiently short to definitely destroy these objectives.

SARA is neither a secret weapon nor an experimental project. The 33rd Reconnaissance Wing, one of the major units of the Tactical Air Force (FATAC), has been using it since 1984.

Developed for the Air Force by MATRA [Mechanics, Aviation and Traction Co.], the station consists of eight cabins equipped with data-processing hardware, which can be carried together with their generator by a C-160 "Transall." The system can therefore be transported immediately to the zone of engagement of the FATAC, in Central Europe or overseas.

Like any computerized system, SARA is not spectacular per se and, for those who are not familiar with it, the real-time transmission of intelligence requires an effort of imagination. Yet, it is an important progress in a field in which the transmission and interpretation of an aerial photograph used to require at least one hour.

For example: two Mirage F1-CR fly at very low altitude over the runway of the Strasbourg air base. Less than 3 minutes later, the laser printer in the SARA transmission cabin starts restituting the panoramic photograph taken by one of the two aircraft. The picture of the runway is clear and contrasted: even a non-specialist can identify the hangars and grounded aircraft.

Data printed at the edge of the picture by the Mirage F1 equipment show the time when the picture was taken, the position and inclination of the aircraft as well as the geographic coordinates of the photograph.

Thanks to these data, a rapid-interpretation expert working from the adjacent cabin can read and identify the photo on a pair of screens: the left-hand
screen shows an enlargement of the photo around a given point of interest; the right-hand screen shows the captioned map contained in the computer memory, on which the exact location photographed can be pinpointed.

Still electronically, the interpreter captions the photograph: "tanks," "missiles," "PC [expansion unknown] trucks," and the caption is printed on the final negative which is thus fully digitized: from the time the photograph was taken, it takes exactly one quarter of an hour to produce a precise document showing potential objectives.

SARA and the Mirage F1-CR actually form an indissociable pair. The F1-CR, which was used to equip a first squadron in 1983, is truly a flying computer, the first digitized weapons system: all data are integrated into the inertial SNAR (Navigation, Attack and Reconnaissance System).

In the previous system, with the Mirage III, the process is much slower. After the order to reconnoiter an objective has been received, it takes 15 minutes to plan the mission, 1 hour for the pilot to prepare it, and a flight of 15 minutes on the average until the photograph is taken.

Therefore, the response time for the three-stage "mission + collection + interpretation" is 2-1/2 hours, time enough for a mobile objective to go away. With SARA, the information is not "older" than 15 minutes and the response time of the system does not exceed 50 minutes. The aircraft does not even have to come back; all it has to do is get away and rise higher in order to transmit.

9294
CSO: 3519/75
HERNU INITIATES MILITARY STUDY GROUP

Paris LE FIGARO in French 10 Dec 85 p 8

[Article by Pierre Darcourt: "Hernu Inaugurates the GERMES"]

[Text] Yesterday, the former minister of defense launched his Group for Military and Strategic Studies and Reflection bringing together men of all political leanings.

A dark street in a working-class neighborhood of the 14th arrondissement, two CRS [Republican Security Companies (State Mobile Police)] agents in black slickers, a 505 Peugeot unaccompanied by a motorcycle policeman and parked in front of a repointed and repainted building, a polished-wood door on the fifth floor, opening on four rooms with flower arrangements, a buffet and two waiters in tuxedos. Here, yesterday evening, before 50 reporters or so, Charles Hernu, former minister of defense, inaugurated the headquarters of the Group for Military and Strategic Studies and Reflection (GERMES) of which he is the chairman. "The GERMES," the former minister stated, "is not a fan-club. It started with the 20,000 letters that I received after I resigned. Created 2 months ago, the group has already nearly 2,000 members."

At Charles Hernu's side, suntanned and smiling, the vice-chairman, General de Benouville, companion of the Liberation and RPR [Rally for the Republic] representative, and General Glavany: was this an indication of a desire to cohabitate?

The GERMES is not a militant political structure. It will not publish any study or proposal before April 1986, so as not to interfere with the election campaign. "But," he explained, "men motivated by the security of France, of Europe, in the international context, may work together. No one has a monopoly on patriotism."

Answering a barrage of questions from reporters, Charles Hernu remains calm and at times elliptic: "When I was minister, I would administer; now, I am reflecting... I am not here to criticize, but to support..."

"For 25 years, I ploughed a furrow for defense in the opposition... dissuasion, preserving the draft... coherence of the armies."
He does not intend to start a polemic with his successor who is responsible for a weighty and important department. "It would be awkward and unsound."

No useless confidence either. "Are there socialist ministers in the GERMES? The question is indiscreet."

Asked about his increasing popularity in public opinion, Charles Hernu retorts with detached assurance: "You are telling me that I am increasingly popular? It does not bother me, but I am not going to get too big for my boots!"

The group does not lack work or matter for reflection: the U.S. strategic defense initiative, the Reagan-Gorbatchov negotiations, the North-South dialogue.

Two contrasting images are superimposed over each other in the reporter's minds. Paul Quiles, a Polytechnic School graduate, tall, thin and cold, the new minister of defense, and Charles Hernu, the old one, a self-taught and good-natured republican. Why is Hernu popular? "First, because he has saved us from the worst," a general in civilian clothes, officer of the Legion of Honor, murmurs, "and because he has tried to safeguard the essential."

Charles Hernu, at any rate, made a point of indicating what his intentions were: "I was minister of defense and very proud of it. But I am not a veteran from that ministry. I am not going to dwell on the past with nostalgia. What counts is the future and the support which we all owe to the country's security."
BRIEFS

ELECTRONIC TANK CONTROL--The Directorate of Land Weapons just awarded to CGA-Alcatel, of the CGE [General Electricity Company] group, a contract to study an electronic servo-system designed to equip a tank turret powered by an electric motor. The goal of the study is to achieve fine stabilization of the tank weapon so that it can be fired during motion and so that the interference resulting from the movement of the machine will not affect hit accuracy. The techniques implemented in this study include the use of an ESD [Serge-Dassault Electronics] UT-2084 data-processing unit derived from the Mirage-2000 computer. [Text] [Paris AFP SCIENCES in French 21 Nov 85 p 34] 9294

AIRCRAFT-CARRIER TRANSMISSION SYSTEM--As part of the evaluation studies of the internal transmission system of the future French nuclear aircraft-carrier, the Directorate of Marine Engineering of the Ministry of Defense awarded the construction of a prototype to CGA-Alcatel. The system contemplated will be used to service several thousands of user stations within the ship, and it is based on the use of a redundant wideband fiber-optic network. It represents a new generation of transmission networks on board ships. Through its technology, its capacity, its throughput rate, its reliability and its ability to withstand any aggressions that might result from a traditional or nuclear conflict, this system appears to be the only system capable of meeting the future requirements of the French Navy's nuclear aircraft-carrier. [Text] [Paris AFP SCIENCES in French 21 Nov 85 p 34] 9294

CSO: 3519/75
Bardufoss—The Norwegian soldier digs in and holds on tenaciously. But although his weapon is pointed toward the east, he has not dug his foxhole at the border with the Soviet Union.

The defense of North Norway is largely concentrated here in Troms, more than 300 kilometers from the supposed enemy to the east.

"When Norway is confronted with a superpower such as the Soviet Union, it is natural that we must give up a little terrain before we offer opposition," explained Lieutenant General Ulf Berg, commander of the forces in North Norway.

The Norwegian defenses are dug in in the boundless mountain expanse of Troms. Between the mountain tops of Istinden, 1,490 meters over sea level, and Storala, 1,238 meters over sea level, the hospital company belonging to the brigade in North Norway set up an ambulance point when DAGENS NYHETER in company with a group of Nordic journalists were shown around the area.

Similar to most Norwegian soldiers, those in the hospital company spend nine months of their year of conscript service up here in the north, 1,600 kilometers from their homes in the south. Norway offers its 21,000 conscripts five trips home per year and 41 kroner per day in pay.

"We are treated well up here, but it is questionable what this year has been worth," said Corporal Kjell Oxnas, who had 53 days remaining until his departure.

Winter Training

He has, as have 12,500 of his conscript comrades, received basic winter training. The Norwegian defense forces heavily emphasize ski training, even
though both the British and the Americans have tried to replace skis with snowshoes. "NATO planks," which are called "white lightning" in the Swedish forces, are used diligently in North Norway.

Norway's permanent military strength consists of 37,000 men. That is small in NATO terms. Only Denmark and Luxemburg have smaller forces. Exactly one-third of the defense forces are stationed in the northern counties, Nordland, Troms and Finnmark. They are there to defend a 200-kilometer-long border with the Soviet Union, 700 kilometers with Finland and 700 kilometers with Sweden.

The brigade in North Norway comprises the first buffer against a surprise attack from the east. It has two main missions—to defend North Norway against any attack and to prepare for the inputs of national and allied reinforcements.

Norway's and NATO's contributions in North Norway are defensive in nature. No storming attacks against Soviet military bases on the Kola Peninsula, the world's strongest fortress, are planned. But at the same time the Norwegians also see the Soviet Union's strategic interest in North Norway primarily from a Soviet defensive perspective.

According to Lieutenant General Ulf Berg the Soviet Union has three main interests in the Norwegian portion of the Scandinavian arctic:

- to improve the protection for their own nuclear weapons in the Northern Fleet.
- to protect their weapon-carriers at sea.
- to destroy allied transports on the North Atlantic.

"The Russians will conduct a forward defense in a crisis situation, with preventive intent," said Ulf Berg.

The great geographic distances and the inaccessible terrain of the Scandinavian arctic are the Norwegians' best guarantee that such a Soviet advance would not come as a total surprise.

Finnmark, nearest the border with the Soviet Union, comprises a "thinning-out" zone to the east. An attack against the garrisons in Finnmark, which have little military value, will ring the alarm clocks in Troms.

In the Norwegian defense debate they do not exclude the possibility that an attack against North Norway can come through Sweden.

"I cannot claim that we have the flank toward Sweden secured. Perhaps Sweden must also give up terrain in the north and concentrate on the defense of southern Sweden. That would make the situation difficult for Norway," said Ulf Berg.
Aided by infantry troops on Swedish-made tracked vehicles, field artillery, tanks, antiaircraft and well-developed antitank forces the Norwegian troops will meet every attack across the mountains and tundra of the Scandinavian arctic.

Despite the threat which the Norwegians feel from the east, most professional military personnel in the north are eager to point out that military activities in the area remain at a constant low level. The Russians are mainly training at their own bases. Similar to the submarine threat in Sweden, the threat from Kola is very abstract, a threat which everyone senses but nobody sees.

From time to time, however, the Soviet threat comes to the surface in North Norway. The flames from Soviet rocket firings in the Barents and Norwegian Seas are clear as stars on the winter evenings to the coastal inhabitants, and are a threatening complement to the northern lights.

Once a year the Northern Fleet comes together for a major exercise in the Norwegian Sea.

"Statistically the Soviet presence in the Norwegian Sea is minimal, but since very many ships participate in the annual maneuvers, their military activity is still statistically high," said Rear Admiral Thorolf Rein, commander of the Allied Naval Forces in North Norway.

Low Tension

"Low tension is the same as before," also emphasized Lieutenant Colonel Bjorn Fredriksen of the Troms ground defense forces.

"There is no confrontation up here, but the threat has grown. If one considers the balance of forces it is obvious that it has developed to our disadvantage."

Military personnel in North Norway want better air defense, longer range artillery, more powerful armament on warships and more advanced defense technology to utilize western capabilities which the Russians lack.

"What good is it if my son uses advanced computers which I myself do not understand, when the defense forces cannot afford to purchase computers," said Ulf Berg.

"We in the defense try to be realistic and tell our politicians what threat we are confronting. But I must say that I continue to sleep well at night."

Pilot Shortage Weakens Posture

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Mar 86 p 16

[Article by Erik Magnusson: "Norway's Defense in the North--Outflow From the
Bodo—With a deafening roar the jet aircraft rose from the ground. With the strong headwind the takeoff run was less than 300 meters. The heat from the afterburner flames left the wet runway steaming.

When the F-16 returned to land it did so with the aid of a braking chute. It came in with a thud on the short runway.

This time it was a demonstration and drill. But in a war situation it is expected that the Norwegian Air Force will be able to operate its modern F-16's on short and often slippery airfields across all of North Norway. The air force has a key role in Western readiness in northern Europe.

Today there are 68 F-16's in the Norwegian Air Force, each one of them worth 75-100 million kroner. Of these, 34 are stationed at Bodo and earmarked for employment in the north. The F-16 squadrons have been in full readiness for two years in the Bodo Air Flotilla.

The F-16A Fighting Falcon is the most advanced combat aircraft in the Nordic countries today. It is small and heavy—but powerful. Top speed is twice the speed of sound--2,300 kilometers per hour.

Electronically the F-16 is very advanced, and is one generation ahead of the Swedish Viggen. It will be the "king" of Nordic airspace until 1992, when the Swedish Air Force enters the electronic age with JAS-39 Gripen.

The F-16 is a very powerful weapon platform, of great importance to NATO readiness in the Scandinavian arctic. And when Norway next year completes its plan for the computer-guided air-to-surface missile Penguin the F-16 will not only be an effective fighter plane, but also a fearsome attack plane capable of attacking warships.

The Soviet MIG pilots from the Kola base, whom the Norwegians encounter daily off the Norwegian coast, will be able to detect how the F-16's are modernized, one by one, during 1987.

Pilot Shortage

But despite firepower and impressive technical capability the F-16 is still today a fairly hollow weapon for Norwegian defense. The shortage of pilots has hit Norway harder than both Sweden and Denmark because several private aviation companies are fighting for the fighter pilots' services with wages as weapons.

"Roughly calculated, we have only two-thirds of the pilots we need," said Colonel Per I. Utgard of Bodo Air Flotilla.

"That means that our operational capacity is limited in both endurance and training. We are lacking both junior officers and instructors."
At the headquarters of the North Norway Command at Reitan, a couple of kilometers outside of Bodo, senior officers are taking the pilot shortage very seriously. The outflow from the Norwegian Air Force is, according to several military observers, the most difficult problem within the Norwegian defense forces.

The nightmare would be that in a real domino game the pilot shortage could lead to NATO losing its northern flank. Control of the North Atlantic requires control of the air. If NATO loses control of the air the Norwegian sea could become the province of the Warsaw Pact. NATO's supply lines across the ocean could then be lost.

Three Roles

The F-16 squadrons have a triple role. They must patrol the western approaches over the Norwegian Sea. They must defend north Norway against enemy, meaning Soviet, attack. Third, they must delay an invasion from the sea by attacking enemy sea targets. The ability to accomplish these tasks is not as credible when the flying hours for each aircraft are limited.

The Defense Department in Oslo hopes that a new bonus system will provide a solution to the problem and enable combat pilots to remain in the Air Force.

The politicians are working with both the carrot and the stick. The stick consists of forcing new SAS pilots to take turns between civil and military service. The carrot is a bonus of 1.2 million kroner to the pilots who remain in the Air Force for 15 years. Older pilots get 600,000 kroner after 8 years.

Technicians

If the bonus system is successful, however, half of the problem remains. There is also a burning shortage of maintenance and technical personnel.

"So far, thanks to the pilot shortage, we have been able to carry out our mission," said Major Age Stole, who is responsible for maintenance of both of Bodo's F-16 squadrons.

"If the Air Force gets the pilots we need, then we will have a problem on the service side," he said, and pointed toward a hangar where five F-16's were emptied of their contents. Five or six aircraft technicians were working on each aircraft shell.

After 100 hours flying time every F-16 is grounded for complete maintenance. That means an average of two overhauls per year. But when nearly 35 percent of the technical personnel are missing it is difficult to meet the goal of having 7 of 10 F-16's ready to go.

9287
CS0:3650/146
NAVAL COMMANDER: SUB INTRUSIONS PERHAPS SPETSNAZ OPERATION

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 17 Feb 86 p 8

[Article by Emily von Sydow]

[Text] "Spetsnaz sabotage units have 4,000 men for use in an attack on Sweden. It may be for the purpose of training those young units that Soviet submarines intrude into Swedish waters so often and for such long periods."

Commander Hans von Hofsten was urging members of the Freedom in Sweden association on Sunday to be alert to the threat from the East.

He told his already convinced audience: "We know that the East is mapping military housing and studying our communications network very carefully."

Cosmetic Improvement

The improved relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union that have come about over the past year are only cosmetic and are not altering the Soviet Union's overall objective, according to von Hofsten.

That objective is communist world dominion, said von Hofsten, and he presented maps showing how the Soviet Union has expanded since World War II.

"The occupation of Afghanistan is one sign of that escalation. The USSR used to rely on supporting internal forces, but there it sent in its own troops."

Strategic Bridge

Sweden is very important strategically as a bridge to the NATO bases on Norway's west coast, explained von Hofsten, who said that if Sweden joined NATO, the danger of our being drawn into a war would be reduced, but there would also be major disadvantages:

"We would be unable to decide on the shape of our defense forces for ourselves, things would grow more tense in the Baltic, and Finland would be wedged tightly between the blocs," said von Hofsten.

11798
CSO: 3650/151
BILDT HITS SOCIAL DEMOCRATS FOR 'CONTINUED WEAKENING OF DEFENSE'

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 17 Feb 86 p 3

[Op Ed article by Carl Bildt, Conservative member of Parliament; first paragraph is SVENSKA DAGBLADET introduction]


It fell to Anders Thunborg, with some support from Mats Hellstrom, to respond to my articles on Swedish foreign and defense policy as we approach the coming year. And his response—when he frees himself of the role of party propagandist that he is occasionally forced to assume—contains a few things of interest as far as the continuing debate is concerned.

Judging from his article, Anders Thunborg has now forgotten that we ever had a minister of foreign affairs named Lennart Bodstrom and that the prime minister went on a rampage the moment anyone criticized the handling of foreign policy. He writes that it is "depressing" to talk about what happened during the period from 1982 to 1985. I fully understand why he feels that way.

A Matter of Nuances

All the same, it is historiography more than future prospects which holds his attention. And it is certainly of interest to explain what happened. Today's policy for meeting tomorrow's challenges is based on yesterday's experiences.

Anders Thunborg attempts to portray the Social Democratic policy during the 1970's and early 1980's as being less unsuccessful than I claimed it was. But as the attentive reader will notice, it is all a matter of nuances.

We agree that "at the end of the 1960's, security policy rested on solid ground." We both see that as a result of Unden's foreign policy line in combination with Andersson's defense policy. There was broad unity concerning that policy. And it was from that policy that the Social Democrats departed.
It was then that the time of aberrations began for the Social Democrats. It is true that we all hoped that detente would lead to lasting results, but the Social Democrats were alone in quickly and thoughtlessly converting those hopes into reduced defense ambitions.

Helped by Communists

The Social Democrats believed that the 1970's and 1980's would bring reduced demands on our defenses and altered policy accordingly. But the demands increased instead, and it was a long time before the Social Democrats even began to realize that fact. As a matter of fact, the process is not over yet.

The 1972 defense decision was pushed through by the Social Democrats with the help of the Communists. A fact often forgotten is that Anders Thunborg was one of the architects of that decision.

When the nonsocialist government took office in the fall of 1976, preparations for the 1977 defense decision had progressed so far that only minor revisions were possible. The 300-million-krona increase in the defense budget that was it was possible to put through was met with loud cries of "shame" from a united Social Democratic Party, which said it constituted an "arms buildup" (!) that might have negative effects on the international climate.

But by that time, Anders Thunborg had already moved on to wider horizons on the other side of the Atlantic.

Knows Better

The farsighted warning in 1979 by Under Secretary of State Leif Leifland concerning the effects on security policy of a continued weakening of our defenses was directed at everyone. A curious impression is produced when Anders Thunborg tries to suggest that it was not directed at the Social Democrats and their policy. He knows better.

Unfortunately, aberrations continued to characterize Social Democratic policy well into the 1980's.

At the party congress in 1981, where the broad outlines of policy after the 1982 election were laid down, the decision was made to "reduce spending on total defense" and also, within that overall reduction in the budget, to proceed with "some degree of rebalancing" that would include "lower appropriations for military defense."

It was on that basis—a weakened defense policy and a partially naïve foreign policy—that the Social Democrats were supposed to conduct security policy after the change of government in 1982. And that was what happened.

Shares Responsibility

Nor does Anders Thunborg escape responsibility. His first act was to submit a bill to Parliament to tear up the 1982 defense decision. He proposed the
immediate shutdown of one fighter squadron, a substantial cutback in the expansion of air bases, a halt to plans for new offensive weapons for the Viggen aircraft, cutbacks in the JAS fighter program, a study of the possibility of putting the fifth Norrland brigade on hold, and a halt to the construction of new minehunters for the Navy.

That program of cutbacks was twice as large as the one the Social Democrats had proposed less than a year before. And Anders Thunborg justified the cutbacks by citing the need for "popular support" (!).

Internal Crisis

Then came the inevitable confrontation with reality. There was the Submarine Commission's gravely important report in April 1983. Then the great crisis in defense finances in 1983-1984. The necessity of seeking nonsocialist support. And the internal and external consequences of irresponsibility in foreign policy.

This was primarily an internal crisis for the Social Democrats. Anders Thunborg writes that the Social Democratic Party Congress in 1984 had the effect of weeding out "ambiguities and uncertainties" in the party's and the government's security policy. That is a judgment on policy up to that point which I have no reason to object to.

That is obviously what Anders Thunborg has in mind when he talks about "a beneficial tightening up of Swedish security and defense policy from 1982 to 1985." It is true that Social Democratic policy was gradually tightened up during that period—the result would have been disaster otherwise. But for those of us who refuse to place an equal sign between Sweden and the Social Democratic Party, it remains true that the Social Democratic aberrations had too great an influence on our national policy during those years.

Negative Sum

It is typical for Anders Thunborg to write that "all the twists and turns concerning a new Swedish fighter plane to replace the Viggen ended in the spring of 1983." But the only thing that ended was the Social Democratic Party's twists and turns. The JAS program had been ratified by Parliament in the spring of 1982.

It remains a fact that we had a stronger defense policy when Anders Thunborg took office than we had when he left.

During the period since 1982, the Social Democratic majority in Parliament has made decisions to weaken defense finances by about 1.7 billion kronor. All those decisions were proposed by Anders Thunborg.

Also part of the picture, of course, is the increase of about 2.1 billion kronor which resulted from the four-party agreement in 1984 and for which the nonsocialist parties can take most of the credit. But that money was intended
to cover the big losses caused by developments in foreign exchange, among other things. It was not enough to allow anything else.

That the result should be a negative sum is quite obvious.

Words not Enough

Over the past year or so, there have been gratifying signs of a return to the traditional security policy that we both recommend.

The Defense Committee's report on security policy constitutes the basis for this new realism in our debate on security policy. But words are not enough, no matter how true they may be.

It is admirable that Anders Thunborg agrees with my demand for "the primacy of security issues in foreign policy." It is obvious that this also lays a solid foundation for our activities in general—for example, the contributions we must make to bridging conflicts and rifts in various parts of the world. And that "decibels are not a good unit of measurement in foreign policy" is something that we both know—that pointer is aimed at someone else.

Going to Chicago

But the picture of our defense that is presented by Anders Thunborg is too polished. He writes that we can mobilize 850,000 men—but fails to mention that fewer and fewer of them have modern weapons and that not all of them have been been trained satisfactorily.

He talks about our Air Force—but forgets that it has been reduced in size at the same time that the threat from the air has been increasing dramatically.

He talks about antisubmarine defense and hides behind the erroneous myth that no one has ever succeeded in forcing a foreign submarine to the surface—when the opportunity arises, he should go to Chicago and inspect the one that the United States forced to the surface more than four decades ago. He does seem to be headed in that direction.

A defense policy for the future must be based on better knowledge than that which Anders Thunborg chooses to display in his article. And it is a cheap shot when, with a sneer, he dismisses OB [Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces] Lennart Ljung's words of warning about the weakening of defense as an expression of "masochism."

Important Question

The big question for the coming year is whether the Social Democrats are prepared to return to the kind of annual real increase in defense spending that existed during the decades when there was unity between Social Democrats and Conservatives concerning defense policy. Doing so is a precondition if we are not to continue to grow weaker in relation to the world around us. We Conservatives and the Center Party have both made proposals in that direction.
I asked that important question in my article. Anders Thunborg leaves it without a hint of an answer. He obviously is not authorized to get into a constructive discussion of future policy. It is a pity, for that is exactly what we need.

The primacy of security issues in our foreign policy must not displace other important issues, an example being the development of our European identity.

EC an Important Component

Cooperation with the EC is an increasingly important component of such development. But Mats Hellstrom will please excuse me for pointing out that something much larger than our trade relations is involved. The trade departments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do an admittedly good job as far as trade relations are concerned. No shadow is to fall over them.

But what I am looking for is that dimension which can only be provided through a unified and explicit European ambition in our foreign policy—one that is visible to the rest of the world. That dimension is lacking.

It is not good for cabinet ministers to talk about our European policy chiefly when that policy can be used as a weapon in domestic politics. When we Conservatives reiterated in a parliamentary bill something that had long been a part of our party program concerning the EC—and when, for once, it was reported by the TT [PRESS WIRE SERVICE, INC.]—the immediate result was condemnation by both Mats Hellstrom and Roine Carlsson. The latter revealed how much he knew by even being wrong about the decade in which the question of our membership in the EC was considered.

Looking Ahead

That will not do as a European policy. We must endeavor at every possible level to expand our European contacts, and the focus must be that West Europe of which we are a part in every respect except as regards security policy. Otherwise, there is a great danger in the long term that Sweden will be "crowded out" of the increasingly tight network of European contacts that is now taking shape. That must not happen.

Foreign and defense policy must look ahead. We must free ourselves of the aberrations of the 1970's and, on the basis of the new realism of the 1980's, shape a policy that will also be valid for the 1990's.

It is true that such a requirement places demands on all the parties. But it involves even greater demands for an adjustment by the Social Democrats.
The Army is short 230 million kronor in this year's budget, and that money must be provided if basic and refresher training is to be possible. The procurement of new antiaircraft missiles and helicopters will be postponed.

Brigadier General Lars-Olof Strandberg told SVENSKA DAGBLADET: "It is embarrassing to have to admit that one reason is that in the current 1985-1986 fiscal year, the Army is providing basic training for at least 2,000 more conscripts than are called for by the government and the OB [supreme commander of the Armed Forces]." There are several reasons for that excessive training. The regimental commanders have been too eager to fill up their units, the area recruiting offices have called up too many soldiers, resignations before and during training have continued to decline, and computer foul-ups at the Armed Forces Enrollment Administration in Karlstad have continued."

"It is even more embarrassing to have to admit that at the moment, we on the Army Staff do not know how many conscripts are in training around the country. Instead of the 38,000 we should have, there may very well be 40,500. Things obviously cannot continue like this. The least we can expect is to be able to check up on the induction situation in each regiment from day to day throughout the year by looking at a video display."

The Army has various proposals for solving its financial problems, which will be even worse in the coming fiscal year, when extra financial efforts will also be required in the field of training and personnel. Recruitment and efforts to discourage career officers from leaving will receive priority. The estimated cost over 5 years is 120 million kronor.
Compensation for Training

Army Commander in Chief Erik G. Bengtsson is now asking that the money spent on excessive training be replaced by redistributing the inflation money that will be paid out in May and June as a price control measure. He is also being forced to delay procurement of important materiel until future fiscal years. This means that urgent projects such as transport helicopters and new antiaircraft battalions with Hawk-77 missiles will be further delayed.

Of the current 230-million-krona shortfall, 50 million kronor will be recouped this year through cutbacks in official travel, study courses, and major exercises.

Refresher Training Continued

The remaining shortfall of 180 million kronor represents refresher training for 30,000 conscripts. With approval by the army commander in chief, a unanimous Defense Committee has decided that no refresher training is to be canceled. On the contrary, there is to be more training than in previous years, preferably to include brief surprise exercises aimed at strengthening preparedness and increasing motivation among officers and conscripts.

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ARMY COLONEL WARNS AGAINST CONTINUED 'ISOLATED' DISARMAMENT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 27 Feb 86 p 5

[Op Ed article by Colonel Einar Lyth, commanding officer of 1-3 in Orebro]

[Intex] In my article (DAGENS NYHETER, 31 January), I discussed three aspects of our security policy's credibility: its credibility abroad, with our own population, and with the officer corps. Everything I said was so unoriginal that it could have been taken from any civilian lecture on security policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Defense. My conclusion—which was also elementary—was that if our unintentionally isolated disarmament, which began in 1972, was allowed to continue, it might lead to a credibility crisis as regards the workability of our security policy, and that in turn, that could lead to a crisis in our security policy. By way of precaution, I refrained from making the equally obvious statement that continued zero growth—or what amounts to zero growth—in a world that is continuing to arm by an additional 3 percent per year could, from a very long time perspective, result in our being drawn into the sphere of interest of one or the other of the power blocs.

Reaction to the article was violent in tone and unreasonable in content. No one bothered to refute my simple theses or my description of reality. On the other hand, there was a great deal of putting words in my mouth that I never uttered, examples being statements that "the defense forces are not good for anything," "war is on our doorstep," and "the officer corps is losing its confidence in the government." I was also accused of having intentions that I do not have ("to frighten") and ambitions that I lack (to be a "ringleader"). It was even intimated that officers should not express themselves on security policy matters.

The prize is taken by Carl Tham, who sees officer participation in debates as a fashionable manifestation inspired by American pornography of violence. Carl Tham is also interesting in other respects. He devoted a large part of his article in DAGENS NYHETER (8 February) to a panorama of security policy that was not needed, since to my knowledge, everyone involved in the debate agrees on the overall view presented in the Defense Committee's report on security policy. The debate is concerned with how strong our future defense needs to be so that, against that background, we can "have a peacekeeping
effect and make a substantial contribution to calm, stability, and limited superpower presence in the Nordic region in peacetime and during international crises. Carl Tham has nothing to say about that, except that he wants to reallocate defense funds. In so doing, he joins the large crowd of daydreamers who think they can have stronger defense at a lower price.

If we continue our isolated and gradual disarmament, that will not be a contribution to calm, stability, and limited superpower presence. On that last point, of course, our security policy has failed in one respect—a minor one, to be sure—in that we have brought extensive submarine intrusions down upon ourselves. Filling that and other gaps which are less visible than the shortcomings in antisubmarine defense is therefore a security requirement—not, as Tham says, an "overexcited nationalistic need for strength."

The question of isolated attacks is quickly disposed of by Carl Tham. Since isolated attacks or attempts at such attacks are the rule rather than the exception in history, the burden of proof rests with those trying to claim that such attacks can be ignored in Swedish defense planning. Carl Tham seems to believe that attacks of that kind have been left out because defense against them is impossible. The real reason is that our territory has been regarded as lacking intrinsic strategic value and that the chief opponent of an attacker would presumably be willing and able and have time to intervene. Those conditions, which date from the 1950's, have changed considerably. It is beginning to be time for a reevaluation. Carl Tham's assumption that we would not be able to cope with attacks of that kind is too hasty. In most cases, the one contemplating an isolated attack on us will have to carry out a surprise attack and bring it to a very rapid conclusion. Even a defense force operating within today's economic framework can probably have a peacekeeping effect under such conditions.

For safety's sake, I want to say in passing that by no means do Swedish officers find it hard to imagine an attack by NATO. The lesson from 1939-1940 has not been forgotten. And if the relative weakness of our defense forces continues, both sides will have to arrange themselves better in their starting holes for a possible preliminary race for our territory.

In conclusion, I want to say, on the subject of Carl Tham's article, that it is both surprising and disturbing that a person who has occupied a fairly central spot in Swedish domestic policy for so long is so nonchalant about security policy issues. This underscores the need for people who are outside domestic political circles and who are well informed on security policy matters to express themselves in the debate.
WEAKNESS IN COMMAND STRUCTURE FOUND IN WAR EXERCISES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Mar 86 p 2

[Commentary by Olof Santesson: "Inexperienced Commanders in the Field a Tough Military Headache"]

[Text] "Everything for the wartime organization units"—a Swedish watchword these days—should not be an empty slogan.

Our security policy is certainly based on many things other than military preparedness and capability. International efforts, contributions by experts on the world scene, demonstrations of solidarity, and constant endeavors to create respect for international law—all those things play the greatest role as far as the world's perception of our freedom from alliances, aimed at neutrality in war, is concerned.

But when it is said, by the prime minister and others, that there should be neither expectations nor fears that Swedish policy is going to change, one cannot ignore the fact that the rest of the world must also believe that our country has and will maintain a reasonably functioning defense force.

For that reason, politicians and the military should never be content with the idea that to the extent possible, Sweden will try to keep up with expensive technical developments by spending x billion kronor on materiel procurement, thus providing a great asset that capable instructors and technically gifted conscripts are expected to make the most of.

The reason is that producing effective troop units—real wartime organization units—is probably difficult and probably requires more effort than is generally put into it.

Reference has already been made in an editorial to the critical—and to some extent, also self-critical—review of operations during the West Border-1985 military exercise that Brigadier General Curt Sjöo published the other day in the KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR.

The very fact that the first part of that exercise took place in severe winter conditions ought to impress both the Swedish people and the rest of the world.
The ability of the staffs to plan the operation gets good marks from the general. The equipment is described as acceptable.

But that just about sums up the positive aspects.

As has happened so many times before, the instructors were unable to help keep the units in training during quiet periods. That is bad because it helps create the feeling that the operation is only a waste of time.

Completely startling is the general's harsh comment that the exercise was not carried out by wartime organization units but by units that were pieced together temporarily—that is how long the delays in mobilization were! Even the minister of defense is obviously worried.

And that, of course, is a completely ridiculous situation.

The exercise was one of the Army's largest during the entire postwar period (over 20,000 soldiers), and one of its purposes was to test the capability of a 6,000-man Norrland brigade!

Gen Sjoo points out that the communications service caused much concern and worry. There were deficiencies in the ability of the staffs to follow up on their instructions and see that they had been obeyed—quite simply, to ensure that the decisions reached were carried out.

What this means in plain language is that the top command organization was unable to direct two brigades in a desirable manner and that, correspondingly, it was impossible for the brigade commanders and staffs to lead their battalions in a coordinated brigade operation. And so on.

Delays in mobilization certainly contribute to insecurity. The brigades were pieced together, in fact, with battalions from various places. There remains the impression that there was clumsiness and sluggishness in many places when it came to activating units in the intended manner, despite the fact that fortunately, their capability was being tested only during an exercise.

Few countries, if any, have experienced peace as long as Sweden has. That circumstance is bound to leave its mark. Least of all do we have reason to deplore our lack of experience in war.

But if our wartime organization units are to live up to their name reasonably well, it appears that the ability of commanders and staffs to command needs to be tested and exercised much more intensively and severely than is now the case.

A great many things could improve if a sufficient number of decisionmakers took an interest in how Sweden's conscript army is used in the field.

In combat situations, it is possible that Swedish units, having less firepower and weaker backing, would find it difficult to match the best forces—those available to the superpowers, for example. But we are considered good at
using our own terrain. There is no reason to believe that Swedish conscripts will ever be in danger of winding up in battles against real supermen.

When the Americans invaded Grenada—in what was a police operation against a weak opponent—a great many things went wrong.

And the Soviet Union is having its problems in Afghanistan.

A military correspondent in the Armed Forces newspaper RED STAR presents a picture of military clumsiness reminiscent of the one depicted by Gen Sjöö in connection with the West Border exercise: helicopters providing meaningless fire support from far too high an altitude, and the artillery—the famous Russian artillery—failing to live up to expectations (something for which the Afghan guerrillas must be thankful).

The military correspondent—also a general—directs his criticism at the training in Soviet military schools. He wants helicopter pilots daring enough to land on mountain tops, officers directing fire who can climb up to good observation points, medical orderlies who can carry the wounded over rough terrain, and so on. What is that if not a command problem?

Things are doubtless the same all over the world.

Failures in the art of war may—hopefully!—make conflicts in our day less devastating than they would be if armies were perfect fighting machines.

But if Swedish politicians and military men are serious about doing "everything for the wartime organization units," a lot remains to be done.

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REPORTER CRITICIZES EFFORTS TO REDUCE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Feb 86 p 13

[Editorial by Klaus Peter Krause: "Subsidies for Doing Nothing"/ Agricultural Policy on a New Wrong Track]

[Text] Until now, farmers are paid subsidies if they produce. In the near future, they are to receive subsidies so that they won't produce. Compared to the amount of agricultural products that can be sold, the production capacities of European farmers are much too large. For this reason, agricultural production can be left to the farmers' free disposition only if government price support is abandoned. If, however, one continues to hold fast to price support—which is still considered appropriate by Minister for Agriculture Kiechle and the German farmers' associations—, then production limitations set forth by the government become inevitable. As a logical consequence, Kiechle and the farmers' associations advocate such limitations, and they are aiming in particular at a production cutback for pay.

At first glance, the proposal is attractive: the "closed down" areas no longer contribute to surplus production; the non-produced amounts eliminate the costs for government support purchases, storage, and surplus disposal; the closure premium paid in its place goes to the respective farmer directly and in the full amount (different from now); the land remains in the farmers' hands, farms are preserved, rural areas stay populated, and landscapes remain well-cared for. Unfortunately, everything else is not at all attractive.

Even the starting point is wrong economically: in Europe, it is not that too large an agricultural area is being cultivated, it is rather that too many farmers continue to want to live off this land. The project starts at the wrong production factor, it is "not a solution from one's own economic strength" (A. Henze). An artificial shortage of land is brought about; land prices rise; production costs go up; farmers intensify production on the land not "shut down" in order to maintain their income; and the desired drop in production does not occur because the production stop on the fallow fields is compensated for by production expansion on the cultivated land. So, surplus costs will continue to accrue, and the additional closure payments come on top of that.
But it gets even worse. Kiechle wants to induce European farmers above the age of 55 to give up any agricultural production on their land for at least 10 years. As compensation, they are to receive an adequate amount per hectare of land during that time as a kind of pre-retirement payment. The goal is to rid the market of surplus. What to think of this plan?

1. "Closing down" is offered primarily to farms in woefully low production areas (marginal yield regions), but hardly to productive farms on rich soils. But they are the very ones who contribute most strongly to surplus production. Therefore, only a relatively weak market relief can be expected.

2. Farmers accepting the offer to let land lie fallow can only apply the cultivation waiver to their own land, not to leased tracts. In the FRG, farms operate with an average of 30 percent leased land. Thus the effect of relieving the market is additionally lowered to that extent. In other EC countries, the proportion of leased land is as high as 70 percent. There, one can just about forget the effect of relieving the market.

3. Among the farmers willing not to cultivate their land will be many, perhaps too many, who are more or less in great debt. In order to pay back overly high debts at the time of closing down, they will have to be allowed to sell partial areas. This again diminishes the effect of market relief.

4. Tracts encumbered by the production waiver drop in value. This also diminishes their value as security for bank loans received. It may cause banks to demand higher securities, or to terminate loans. This, also, may force farmers to sell part of their land.

5. Leased land set free, and the owned land sold by farmers willing to close down, will end up in the hands of more efficient farmers who in turn will produce higher per hectare yields than the former owners. This production increase again lowers the effect of market relief.

6. The German agriculture ministry estimates that, after 5 years, about 10 million tons less grain will be produced in the EC because of closure. At the same time, however, technical progress will lead to further yield increases. In the case of grain, for example, an annual increase of at least 2 percent must be expected. After 5 years of the time of application have passed, EC grain production will thus have risen by 10 percent, or about 14 million tons. Government-subsidized closures must therefore be continued in order to cushion this effect. The consequences of the government-induced shortage of arable land for farms that continue to produce will be aggravated (see above); those farmers will intensify production even more.

7. Farmers with leaseholds must expect higher lease prices. The lessors will reason: why should I be satisfied with DM 300 or DM 400 per hectare, when the government pays DM 1200 to DM 1500 for letting it lie fallow? Then farmers with leaseholds will either have to give up because of exorbitant operating costs, or else flee into even higher production intensi-
The first consequence contradicts the goal always reiterated by Kiechle that farmers not be forced to give up. The second consequence defeats the desired market relief.

8. Since primarily farmers in the marginal yield regions will accept the closure offer (point 1), this closure action means that in these underprivileged regions two government actions work against each other, because at the same time, these farmers receive the so-called equalizing supplement so that they cultivate their land, i.e., not give up production.

9. After 10 years, the obligation to waive production is to be ended. Then this land will again be free for cultivation. The farmers can lease it out. Then production will again soar. If this is still undesirable, the government must again offer subsidized closure—with the same effects as described in points 1-7.

All these tricky effects show that the subsidized production waiver is the wrong way to go. Farmers must be given greater freedoms, not have them taken away. The government must keep options open for them, not block them. But this is not possible without gradual abandonment of price support.