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Political Affairs

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Development of Multiple Parties, Role of CPSU Examined

91UN0113A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian 17 Oct 90 p 2

[Article by I. Zaramenskiy, deputy chief of CPSU Central Committee Department for Work with Sociopolitical Organizations: "Where are you Taking Us, 'Three-Bird Sleigh'?"]

[Text] *Russia never ceases to amaze the world with the turning points in its social development. For 73 years it would seem it had experienced everything—the pathos of the breakthrough to the future, the fierce battles to the death, NEP, the planned construction of a "bright future," the deliberate destruction of some for the sake of all, purging society from the vestiges of the past by means of "firing squads," and the destruction of faith under the burden of decay and stagnation. It is as if the great classicist M.Ye. Saltykhov-Shchedrin foresaw this our Fatherland's fate, calling it the "theory of rebirth of Russia by means of socialism, guided by the strong hand of the administration."*

In the Face of a Crisis

Today we are experiencing a new turning point in our historic destiny. What will it be like, our new stage? Will it be a period of natural, spontaneous development, shorn of ideological chimera, of the native strength and talent which our multinational country, rich in every sense, is not employing? Or will it become a time of experiments, as society is shaped by the powerful hand of the next "administration" like a lump of moist clay?

It is not just a rhetorical question, for claims to the right to be the new "sculptor" are now being heard. Observing the unfolding of events, and analyzing the apportionment of political forces and the continuing creeping spread of crisis, no one can reliably predict what it will bring. The Party, while being the initiator of perestroika, is in my view more and more losing its significance as the motive force which determines the character and the tempo of the renewal of society. And the new parties and socio-political movements are still trying to find themselves, and are trying to acquire a public personality and base.

In recent times nearly 20 parties at the national level and up to 100 socio-political organizations at the republic and local levels have declared themselves. Their membership is not very large, but that does not reflect their true influence on people. In a number of regions they have managed to place their own deputies in the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the republics and in the local Soviets as well; and they have even managed to make things tight for the CPSU.

Speaking of the role of the CPSU today, one must keep in mind a number of circumstances. First of all, it is consciously withdrawing from the power structures and, handing over the functions of government to the state

organs, is naturally losing the ability to influence the situation, and is narrowing its sphere of activity to the purely political. Solving problems directly, much less by means of power, is already excluded.

Secondly, it is becoming a democratic party, and is itself going through a period of painful restructuring; nor has it yet passed the stage of self-definition and the period of internal struggle. Thirdly, having come to the realization of the necessity of restructuring, the CPSU has wittingly or unwittingly admitted the mistakenness of the model of state-administrative socialism to which it, along with its leaders in the past, had become connected; consequently it bears a burden of political responsibility to the public. Fourth, from hence comes the inevitability of admitting to an ideological and above all theoretical crisis for the party. It signifies that the idea of socialism in the form in which it has in fact prevailed in the official ideology and in the mass consciousness since the time of the Stalin regime has demonstrated that it is not viable. Currently the party is going through a process of critically rethinking both its theory and its policy, all the while inexorably losing a portion of the people's confidence, and its dynamism. It needs new forces and cadres, and time to get established and recognized.

Social development has reached such a state that the CPSU alone is no longer capable of leading the nation out of the crisis; nor, I think, to lead it further, without cooperating with the broad spectrum of socio-political forces. Their tactics and strategy, policy and practical activities will in the near future define social development to no less a degree than the policy of the Communist Party.

Theoretical 'Nitrates'

THIS—IS IN THE FUTURE. But a real position is important today as well, in the face of a socio-economic and political crisis. And it is extremely controversial. The practical activities of the nascent parties and socio-political associations and the statements of their leaders frequently are at odds with their own program documents; they do not always summon the people to consensus, and are sometimes determined by political ambitions rather than objective needs.

Where is the enigma here? Above all in the lack of theoretical definition of the new forces. They take pleasure in exploiting the arguments of the CPSU's critical self-analysis of its own history, and the scientific baggage of the Communists in justifying the main directions of perestroika. The provisions of its conceptions, which were worked out by a group of party leaders headed by M.S. Gorbachev and by scholars, are one way or another utilized in their program documents. The majority of the leaders of our opponents were nurtured, fed and protected on the scientific grounds of that same "Marxism-Leninism" which the party itself is today rejecting; and its theoretical "nitrates" have entered their blood virtually with their mother's milk. Ideologically they are still tied with a thousand threads to the past and present of

the CPSU. Even the slogans on depoliticizing and demopolizing Soviet society and the state structure cannot be considered the theoretical outgrowth of only the new political forces which have entered the public arena—they too were put forth by the Communist Party.

While pointing out the theoretical erosion of the program positions and slogans of the parties, I do not at all wish to stress their low intellectual potential; perhaps on the contrary: it is relatively high. But it is has been too short a period of time, from a historical perspective, for an independent scientific coming-into-being. This will come, and very rapidly, for the social material is being rapidly turned out, polarization of political forces is taking place, their interests are becoming more clear, and their tactical "visors" are opening.

Therein lies the second answer to the enigmatic behavior of the CPSU's opponents, which is connected with the first. To reveal the economic, social and political essence of their programs while it is not clear whether a turn-about of events may take place is today not tactically advantageous. Then there would be competition with the constructive ideas of the Communist Party, for which their own convincing arguments may not suffice. Criticism of the CPSU, its past and present mistakes, and its awkward and firmly-entrenched apparatchiks, works far more reliably.

They Patiently Await Their Chance

The program banners of the dozens of nascent parties, movements, and associations do not contain the optimism of creation and there is little that is constructive; on the other hand, there are many eclectic ideas and demands for "dismantling," "departization," and similar "liquidations," of which we have learned a good deal in our history. In this there is a distinct flavor, proceeding from their political weakness, of a lack of confidence in their own strength, and in their ability to lead the country out of the crisis.

One's attention is attracted to the indistinct, amorphous features of the future society to which the new leaders are calling the people. This, of course, is not a chance occurrence, but an attempt to play on the social realities—the loss of the former attractiveness of the communist ideal, which had been "seized" by a multitude of inept and at times unclean hands. (Even V.I. Lenin warned of this danger.)

Characteristic, for example, is the change of views of our social-democrats. In the program adopted this January—the Declaration on the Principles of Social-Democratic Associations of the USSR—their spiritual foundation was declared to be "the ideas of democratic socialism, the heritage of Russian Social Democracy," and the association itself, "a party of concord and dialogue," in solidarity with all progressive forces, including the "reformers in the CPSU." However, a few months later at the Constituent Assembly of the Social Democratic Party of Russia, the theoretical and purposeful direction toward "democratic socialism" was removed. In

exchange a new one was put forth—achieving a society of "social democracy," the economic and socio-political purport of which was not disclosed. The party also distanced itself from the reforming CPSU. Here the indistinctness of their ideological positions is clearly revealed, dictated apparently by the tactical considerations of the political struggle, in which both the social-democrats and representatives of other parties are engaged.

This sharply-focused aim for power contains the third answer on the sources of the contradictions in their politics: the subjective factor, which is defined more by the positions of their impatient leaders than by the conditions of the real situation. Yet-obscure and miniscule parties, "muddled" programs, unknown leaders, and suddenly—a maximum effort, for power. On what do they base their calculations, if not on chance?

And that is just the point, that with the convergence of many circumstances, a chance may appear. But at what cost to the people and to society will it be achieved? This is a special question, and perhaps even those who are making claims on power are afraid to address it.

Such a chance could come, for example, from further rocking of our multinational boat. Just look at how rapidly and energetically the movements gained strength, taking advantage of the growth of national self-consciousness. Whoever "saddled that horse," is already dictating policy, without even asking his own people for the right to do so. And someone else is calling for assistance from the national-religious factor, the combination of which is capable of giving the social explosives colossal power.

It is possible that putting the question in this manner is taking it to the extreme. But closer to us is the inevitable tension in society with the transition to the market. Such changes cannot be painless, and "payment" for the market is an objective necessity. Although the overwhelming majority of new social organizations support the idea of the market, far from all of them have put their shoulder beneath this unbelievably heavy weight, preferring to criticize the plans that are being made, and waiting for their hour. It is a comfortable position, but is not a promising one.

A Claim for Power?

Finally, the third variant—forming power blocs under populist slogans, paralyzing the activity of state and executive organs under crisis conditions, and winning the favor of the voters at extraordinary elections, and—the "power pie" is ready for dividing. It is rather sketchy, but it is not all that far from the real picture that is taking shape today. The choice of chance depends upon the concrete social and regional situation.

The political statements of certain people's deputies at the head of the nascent parties and movements, the sense of a recent meeting in Moscow which made a serious claim for power show, that the choice has fallen to the

variant of a bloc of "democratic" forces for the purpose of replacing the state structure and pushing the communist party from the political scene altogether. Among the several blocs being formed, "Democratic Russia" represents the most significant power, at the head of which stand USSR People's Deputies A. Murashov, Yu. Afanasyev and other parliamentarians. According to their scheme, "Democratic Russia" must absorb three movements that have taken shape and unite them on both the vertical and horizontal plane with the creation of regional structures: democratic factions of deputies of Soviets at all levels, political parties of a "democratic" orientation, and movements like "Memorial," "April," "Shield," and others.

At a "Democratic Russia" presentation, organization committee chairman A. Murashov declared that the movement "has been called upon to prepare society for holding new elections, which might take place as early as 1991, if the RSFSR Supreme Soviet adopts a resolution on further realization of political reform, and abolishing Soviet power in the form in which it presently exists..."

It was soon after this that we saw and heard the demands of "Democratic Russia" at the 16 September meeting—everything that comprises the power today must go. They crucified it, as they could, at the same time, right down to ridicule, and frightened the people with dictatorship. How many times now have the meetings of the democrats failed to pose questions on democratization of the society toward which we are to forge on and on; but they continue to talk about power.

Judging from their widely proclaimed plans, "Democratic Russia" intends to complete its organizational formation in October, and immediately declare itself through coordinated activities in the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets and on the streets of our cities. Once again they are talking about appeals for political compacts. In this context the motivation for the proposals of G. Popov and A. Sobchak on cancelling the "official" popular manifestations in honor of the 73rd Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution fit in beautifully. It is as if the imperious choice has already been made, and it goes beyond the bounds of constructive opposition and democratic influence on the state structure and the CPSU.

We note immediately all the angry emotions of the righteous ones: the choice was a difficult one, but it was made within the bounds of constitutional and democratic law. One can and indeed must criticize, for it is a sensitive spot, and not the most optimal from the point of view of economic and socio-political consequences, but a very painful one with their shock methods.

Burdens and the Burdens of the Leader

Unfortunately, neither the party committees nor the party press have yet responded to this turn of events. They have not even responded to the blunt declaration by N. Travkin, that the principal aim of his party is—struggle with the Communist Party and its ideology;

struggle, until the "communist monster" and its structure depart from the political scene. It is not a question of responding to brutality in kind, but to show and prove by civilized methods the ideological and constructive emptiness of such a position, and the grievous damage to politics.

But the party must make the principal conclusions for its own sake—that the leading political force today is the one which proposes far-reaching restructuring goals, and genuine, energetic practical steps toward achieving them, which everyone can grasp. The program declaration of the 28th CPSU Congress is entirely capable of becoming the basis for these goals. As far as practical activity is concerned, however, there is no end to vacillation and foot-dragging. This too is reality.

It is hard for the party to part with its ideological and organizational dogma, and with its habits of command. Longing for the past permeated the speeches at the congress, angrily directed toward the Politburo and the Central Committee, "which allowed the democrats to get out of hand." But such attitudes are not the party's problem; its problem is the torpidity of its organizations and committees, of the Communists and functionaries, who have in no way adapted to the new conditions of their life's work. The state of anabiosis is stretching to the danger point. Here matters lie with the cadres, who must recognize that the vanguard role of the party does not derive from the Rules and the Constitution or the Law on Parties, but from its real activity; and from the work of the Communists in the Soviets, in the executive and economic organs, in the social organizations, and in the elections at all levels.

CPSU recommendations to the government on finding the way to the market constantly change; Communist deputies display confusion, and lack a "feeling of comradeship;" and Communist-editors of certain mass information media indulge in demonstration of ideological "independence," forgetting that an "independent" position is also an ideological one. Only, whose?

On the whole, there is a wide selection of internal conflicts in the party, which are rather difficult to endure. This in turn gives birth to the temptation to abandon it and to erect on its ruins a new political superstructure, which is what the leaders of the "Democratic Russia" movement and the leaders of certain other new political parties have determined to do.

While promulgating a program for renewing society, and mechanisms with which to carry it out, the CPSU is proposing cooperation with all social forces in this work. It is not a question of a leading role in a new variant. Cooperation is also possible in conditions of constructive opposition. We have been talking a lot about a multi-party system, but we have not yet matured to that stage. Its essential elements are not found in the tumult of the pre-election struggle or in the exhaustive debates in the parliaments, but in the ability to organize joint activity for the benefit of society, and to find sensible

compromises. What a shame it is for a political power to hear other debates, especially in the "newly-elected" republic parliaments! Shame and doubts about human reason, and in its ability to learn on the level of its own history.

Meanwhile, if one can rise above one's passions and look at problems from the position of the needs of the Fatherland, then nearly all the political forces in the country can find reasons to cooperate. These, incidentally, have been declared in the program documents of the parties.

The tasks for transition to a market economy could become the basis for consensus and unification. The political bitterness with which trenches are dug around tactical questions, which deserves the best use, could be attributed to excess ideologization of problems. Attempts to use emotional political meetings to swing the balance in favor of this or that model, to "500 days," or "701," would be a humorous anecdote, if they would not cause so much malice among people. The peasant and his needs has been forgotten behind the fierce arguments about returning the land to the master (right away, or after first breaking up the kolkhozes), and the rich harvest was allowed to rot. Only the "intellectuals" are arguing among themselves, and the true masters have not been included in the conversation.

And if one were to discard populist phraseology, which is akin to demagogy, and attempt to converge on the problem not with feigned, but with genuine concern for the social security of the workers and the vulnerable sectors of society? But no, the representatives of the "Demparty" and "Demplatform" drive around the towns and villages, to the worker committees and soviets, and day and night call for strikes, for meetings, and demand solutions from the center immediately, for regional and branch, national and geopolitical problems, or for putting multi-billion-ruble projects into operation. And not one single resolution in favor of highly-productive labor—the main source of national well-being!

The standards of the CPSU and many public associations and movements outline fundamental transformations in the political system of our society, which are impossible without broad consensus—affirmation of true democratization, a rule-of-law state, a mature civic society, and the genuine triumph of the individual rights and liberties of man.

This is a direct and objective invitation to dialogue, to working out unified programs for the cooperation of parties and movements. In any case, it would be more natural than confrontation, which sows the seeds of social enmity. The country needs the energy of creation as well.

Without a Superiority Complex

The party must, apparently, tirelessly and publicly propose businesslike cooperation to all progressive social forces, and above all in Soviets of all levels, in dialogues at "round table" meetings, and in the mass information media. The people will heed the call sooner or later. And it is namely the people who will finally put a stop to the long drawn-out arguments. But one should not think that this is a problem of the center and the leading organs of the party, or of the movements and their leaders. Quite on the contrary: in the localities the people live and think in more earthly categories, and worry less about a superiority complex. It is only the capital Soviets who, having failed in the procurement of vegetables and potatoes, can blame the "system" for this and raise the question of deliveries via import. The citizens of, say, working Rybinsk, both the "official" and "unofficial," know full well that they have to work themselves, and demand that their own authorities get a move on in vital matters. Joint work and human contact is established in a natural manner.

For the sake of honesty, one must say that some local party committees do not tolerate dialogue, even with those who think like them, if they hold independent opinions. The tales of certain USSR People's Deputies, Communists—that they have not to this day had businesslike contacts in working with "their own" party committees, since they "were not forgiven" for nominating themselves in the elections—sounded absurd, even wild. Where can they go?

Quite a few "barnacles" from the past remain on the bottom of our flagship—the CPSU Central Committee and its apparat—as well. It holds fast to inertia, to the ropes of forms and methods, and to the traditions which go back to the "legendary" times. But the urgency to forge ahead is strong too. It is no accident that it was precisely a group of thoughtful people at the Central Committee who initiated perestroika. The inconsistency in decisions and deeds proceeds from this genuine contradiction also—first an energetic breakthrough, and then fear: the vanguard is not that much out-of-touch with the masses.

At the 28th Congress the realization prevailed, that the socio-political function of a party is most important for a CPSU which has departed the power structure, and considering the real situation it is crucial for its survival. It should be singled out, and the main efforts concentrated here, to include those of the Central Committee members and the apparat.

* * *

A stormy political fall and winter lies ahead, which will apparently be a crucial point on the plane of our resoluteness—to depart on a further one-way voyage on the seething sea of perestroika, or not to raise the sail at all. The latter would be death, just as if we went to the bottom under the weight of the problems. Then—we can only go ahead, to a future worthy of a great people.

Baltic Republics

Estonia's Kogan on Intermovement TV, Solzhenitsyn Essay

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[Interview with Ye. Kogan, by Vyacheslav Ivanov, SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA special correspondent to the 4th Session of USSR Supreme Soviet: "...As We Forgive Our Debtors"]

[Text] Parliamentary activities obviously do not come easily to Yevgeniy Kogan. Gray hair has already begun to appear in his thick beard, and he is still a long way from 40... Nevertheless, having barely recovered from a recent operation, he is once again in the Kremlin and once again is participating in the work of the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, taking advantage of his deputy mandate that gives him the right, while not a Supreme Soviet member, to be present at its meetings and to make inquiries. It would seem that he is seriously attuned to occupying a permanent place on the parliamentary benches—because soon there will be a partial renewing of the makeup of the Supreme Soviet...

During one of the breaks, our correspondent asked Ye. Kogan to answer a few questions.

[V. Ivanov] Yevgeniy, the Intermovement radio station has begun broadcasting in the republic; we have also heard discussions about the fact that television broadcasts—the so-called "Kogan-TV"—will begin soon. At the same time everyone knows how difficult it is to obtain authorization to broadcast over the air. In order to get this authorization it is necessary to enlist the support of USSR Gostelradio and its reliable partner, Ministry of Communication, both of which are the only organizations that have the right to allocate frequencies for television and radio broadcasting. Could you please tell us how the idea arose that Intermovement should become the owner of its own radio and television transmitters and how that idea is being carried out?

[Ye. Kogan] The idea was suggested to us by American journalists with whom we had a meeting immediately after the election of USSR people's deputies, when Estonian TV (to their shame) invited us to them. At that time the Americans asked, "Does Intermovement [ID] have its own television channel?" The only response we could give was to grin bitterly: the only persons working on existing television were representatives of the People's Front—Yarliik, Sheyn, Undusk... At that time we numbered considerably more. But we were not allowed in any way to get there, so that, in general, there could not be any mention of getting our own channel... But the dream of having that channel became imprinted on our minds.

And now it has already moved into the area of being worked out in a concrete, practical way. Both yesterday

and today I had meetings here that dealt with that question, so things are moving ahead.

The first stage was radio broadcasting. There are those who might criticize us about its content, but we will be having our own transmitters very soon. For the time being, we are operating with those that have been given to us temporarily. At the present time, properly speaking, we do have our own transmitters—the formalization of the documents is coming to an end, and soon we shall begin operating with them.

We have information that we can be heard even in Odessa Oblast and, of course, by our neighbors—in Pskov and Leningrad Oblasts. We have been registered as the radio station in the Northwest Region, so that we are being received on short waves not only in Estonia. But we have not set ourselves the goal of limiting ourselves to the republic territory. True, on medium-length waves there are a few places where, because of the terrain, we cannot be heard. In Kokhtla-Yarve, for example, the mining waste piles hinder reception. But with the introduction of the UKV [ultrashort-wave] transmitter, we shall reliably "cover" all of Estonia, Leningrad and Pskov oblasts, and Latvia.

We also want to implement television according to the same principle: Pskov and Leningrad should be able to receive our broadcasts.

At the present time I cannot reveal details of a technical nature, inasmuch as the forces that are opposing us, obviously, will begin their own "work." The material aspect is also being decided, and I have moved far ahead in that question...

[V. Ivanov] Yevgeniy, we cannot, however, avoid a discussion on that topic, because, sooner or later, people will begin asking us WHO is financing you.

[Ye. Kogan] At present, no one. We do not receive any financing "from the outside." At one time we received considerable amounts of money—during the strikes, when we asked the workers of Leningrad and other regions for their support. So we do have current accounts in the banks, and, for the time being, we are holding onto them. We also received funds from the population and from enterprises. And although in Tallinn our current account has been closed, we have transferred the money to other places and are continuing to work. Of course, it will be necessary to "tighten our belts": we were offered an excellent transmitter for 40,000 rubles, but it proved to be too expensive for us—we had to buy one costing 12,000.

There will also be large financial problems with the television transmitters. But leasing is always possible.

[V. Ivanov] But when, realistically speaking, will your TV broadcasts begin?

[Ye. Kogan] By the end of the year, I think. As for the content: in that tremendous stream of negative information that is currently crashing down on everyone, many

people are beginning to get a permanently negative reaction in general to all the mass media. Many people have stopped reading newspapers, some have been turning off their TV sets... Therefore we intend to reduce to the minimum the policy of broadcasting "in pure form" on our television. We need entertaining programs, artistic movies... Of course, we are not able to wave a magic wand and begin broadcasting many hours a day all at once. At first it will be an hour or two a day. Perhaps at first it will not even be every day. As for later on, time will tell...

[V. Ivanov] Do you mean, then, that the direction taken by your television will be to entertain and educate?

[Ye. Kogan] Not just that. There will be an entertaining direction and an educational one, but there will also be politics—where can we go to get away from politics? Later on, I will be killed, as unilaterally happens today in our history. But I feel that it will be completely reasonable to oppose objective historical information to that stream. We need comparisons and analysis.

But, I repeat, no one would have begun to engage in this job if it did not have political importance.

[V. Ivanov] Yevgeniy, could you not give us the coordinates—the telephone numbers or the address of your radio station? We want to make a report on this for the newspaper.

[Ye. Kogan] For the time being they probably do not have any particular desire to meet anyone, because—certainly you will understand this—in the face of the negative reaction that has currently arisen... A definite reaction to a specific person! But we have had instances when people were "chucked out" of their job. Out of all the co-chairmen of Intermovement, for example, I am the only one who has avoided dismissal, and that is because I am a people's deputy and cannot be dismissed... But the others have been dismissed. Everything was "simply" random, but all of them were dismissed. Perhaps there are also coincidences, but when they constitute 80 percent, it is more than randomness.

[V. Ivanov] You emphasized how difficult it was for you to get air time on Estonian television. But when you get your own television, will you offer the floor to your opponents?

[Ye. Kogan] We have already discussed that question. We had a pleasant discussion, for example, before the television cameras with activists in the Estonian National Independence Party. In preparing our first declaration for "Hope" Radio, we said that we will offer the floor over the air to EVERYONE. Particularly to those who are not given any access to the official mass media.

[V. Ivanov] Yevgeniy, I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to ask your opinion about other questions. First of all: how do you evaluate Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn's article "How We Should Build Up Russia"?

[Ye. Kogan] I have, of course, thought a lot about these problems. Life forces us to think about them. I can agree with Solzhenitsyn when he talks about union republics that intend to secede from the Union—"why use force to hold onto them!" Because he has the idea: anyone who does not want to stay, can leave. I also stand on that position. But I would continue: whoever wants to leave should not force anyone else to do the same thing. Why should I do what you want? On the other hand, why should you do what I want?

[V. Ivanov] That is logical. But it is necessary to find some consensus here, or—to use a Russian word—agreement...

[Ye. Kogan] You know that for a long time our party leaders fed us with slogans asking for consensus. So there are a few people among them who even received the nickname "Consensus" among the ordinary people. But actually what they proposed was not a consensus, but capitulation. On that base, of course, it is impossible to resolve anything. In general, we must resolve our problems without any coercive methods—in this regard I raise both my hands in favor of that! It is better to speak poorly with one another than to fight well with one another...

[V. Ivanov] There is a folk saying that a bad peace is better than a good fight.

[Ye. Kogan] Yes. But, in my view, it is typical of Solzhenitsyn that he closes up everything with the "Slavic root." Let us unite the Slavs around Russia, he says, but we seemingly do not have to worry about the others... But I feel that we are so intertwined that even frank attempts to pull down the country will not be successful! And that is when the executive power in the country behaves, practically speaking, not in the best manner. Here I can agree with Sobchak, who says, "Why give someone additional powers if there is no way that they coincide with the existing ones?"

Solzhenitsyn's article, in my view, is of a somewhat chauvinistic nature. It contains a subtext, one feels, about a great Slavic mission, as well as other factors... But for me it is that the "priority of the Estonian nation" is unacceptable, that it is the "priority of the Russian nation." In general I do not take a very good attitude toward the priorities of nations. I do not understand that.

[V. Ivanov] But heedless internationalism in our country also proved to be insolvent.

[Ye. Kogan] Nevertheless I feel that this is the only, so to speak, current that provides the opportunity to live without conflicts. At the 19th party conference we began

to be "nationally reborn"—and what has that led to! Everything was initiated there, and, strange as it seems, by certain Muscovite circles... It was apparent that a few people had the desire to play on the national question in order to achieve definite goals...

[V. Ivanov] Whom do you have in mind?

[Ye. Kogan] Did you hear Igityan's statement? He said, "In 1987 we came to you with the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh, and you said, 'Take action and we will support you'..." Everyone knows what that led to.

But I, for example, know that in one of the Baltic republics the editors of the mass media were gathered together and were told, "You must create a People's Front!" So I would be a bit cautious about saying that national self-awareness itself began to be reborn—I do not believe in miracles! They wanted to play on that, I am convinced. Incidentally, history will put everything in its proper place. So, in Moscow, a few of the party leaders put their reliance on People's Fronts in the Baltic republics, in order to achieve their goals.

[V. Ivanov] Do you have in mind those who are currently operating?

[Ye. Kogan] Well, let us say, those who have changed over to another "hypostasis."

[V. Ivanov] That is a transparent hint.

[Ye. Kogan] Yes, when they demonstrated their insolvency in one place, they were transferred to another place. I take a poor attitude to such things...

I understand the fact that Solzhenitsyn's soul aches for Russia. But still there is a fine line between nationalism and patriotism, a line that he crosses over. For myself I define that line in this way: when we are talking about benefit for one's nation, that is patriotism. But if that benefit is achieved at the expense of other nations, at the expense of one's neighbor, then that is nationalism...

[V. Ivanov] I agree in principle. But somehow I do not remember that Solzhenitsyn ever called upon people to achieve a benefit for Russia at anyone else's expense... Incidentally, I asked about YOUR opinion.

I have another question: at yesterday's meeting, when there was a discussion of the question of the reunification of Germany, you proposed that concern be shown for the East German Communists, for the servicemen who are being threatened by a "Berufsverboten" as a result of their political convictions...

[Ye. Kogan] I feel that if we want people to take an attitude toward us as being a great power, then we should protect those people whom we "set in place," we should be concerned about them. That is, we bear the responsibility for them. And, certainly, we even are guilty to them for a few things.

After all, when the Americans (albeit after an unjust war) left South Vietnam, they took with them everyone who had helped them, who had collaborated with them, and who obviously could not remain behind—America was concerned about them. And it is proud of that.

But we acted differently. Erich Honecker—who had been a prisoner in fascist concentration camps—spent the night on a bench near the Soviet embassy, and would not even be allowed into the hall. Today I asked a certain comrade from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whether or not that was true. He said that it was true...

[V. Ivanov] Yevgeniy, from purely humane positions I can agree that we bear a definite responsibility to these people. But do you not really think that we bear even a greater responsibility to the Soviet Germans; to the Meskhetian Turks; to those who are living in the tent city near the Rossiya Hotel? That is, God help us, we should resolve our own problems, for which we do not have enough of anything—efforts, time, or funds!... We are not America, which can allow itself this kind of luxury, and which is even ready to help us! I understand that my position is vulnerable: humaneness does not know any boundaries. But if the question arises as to who should be helped first of all—those who are living in a tent that is open to all the winds on the eve of the winter, in destroyed Spitak (where scarcely one-fifth of the city has been restored, although Premier Ryzhkov swore that in two years the Armenian cities that had been destroyed by the natural forces would become more beautiful than they had been), and also near that same Rossiya Hotel; or those whom the German nation swept out of the high state, military, and governmental positions that they had occupied—I would not waver in making my choice. We have our own people who are in desperate conditions—hundreds of thousands of them, millions of them.

[Ye. Kogan] But our own people in desperate conditions appeared for practically the same reason that those in the former socialist countries did. It was the same reason.

[V. Ivanov] Namely?

[Ye. Kogan] It was our slovenliness (I do not want to use harsher words), our shortsightedness. Because I am personally acquainted with almost everyone whom you see on the television screen in the tent city near the Rossiya Hotel. Practically speaking, I did not refuse anything to any of them who turned to me as a deputy. For many of them I wrote several complaints and official requests.

[V. Ivanov] And did you succeed in helping any of them?

[Ye. Kogan] We keep hitting against one and the same wall: formal replies, the lack of desire to do anything, the desire to get away from the problem... And it is the same thing today in Germany—the desire to get away from the problem.

I realize that there are situations when it is impossible to defend an ally, when it is impossible to help him. But if we want, I repeat, to preserve our authority as a power,

then there cannot be a situation when it is possible to sell an ally. The FRG promised us an interest-free loan of a definite amount. I feel that this transaction has an extremely unpleasant odor!... Yesterday the comrades from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not even give an intelligible answer to my question about that.

Incidentally, they also failed to answer a second question of mine: stubborn rumors continue to circulate to the effect that certain people in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are attempting to make certain pledges with regard to the participation of our military contingents in resolving the Kuwait problem. If this is so, then such attempts should be discontinued in the most decisive manner.

[V. Ivanov] God help us if we send our soldiers there! But does the Soviet Union, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, not bear its share of the responsibility for executing the Resolution on the Iraq-Kuwait conflict? I have in mind the technical and financial participation in supporting the blockade of Iraq.

[Ye. Kogan] We censured Iraq's aggression from the rostrum of the United Nations and we should limit ourselves to that. Any participation, I feel, is inadmissible. Properly speaking, for what reason should we get involved there? We do not have any finances for single-use syringes... And you want us to throw in an armada of transport aircraft or combat vessels? In whose name? These are not our problems. The Americans have direct interests there—oil. Excuse me, but we have our own oil. Other people's interests are being settled there, and there is no reason for us to poke our head into this conflict... Our head is already spinning from our own conflicts.

[V. Ivanov] Yevgeniy, for me your position here does not agree with what you said slightly earlier (although, of course, we are not dealing with a direct parallel). Whereas in the former GDR we are supposed to assume definite material and moral obligations, in the situation with Kuwait we are not supposed to... Although the conflict in the Persian Gulf is fraught with a threat to the entire world: if an armed incident breaks out here, the echo can roll over the entire planet.

[Ye. Kogan] By putting our troops on the side of one state that has been drawn into the conflict, we shall only achieve the aggravation of the situation.

[V. Ivanov] We are not talking about a military presence. Why do you consider only this aspect? And it is not taking the side of one of the states, but of annexing ourselves to the sanctions that have been announced BY THE ENTIRE WORLD COMMUNITY. The decision to carry out the blockade was made at a United Nations session, on the recommendation of the Security Council. We are a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and, consequently, a part of that responsibility also lies on us.

[Ye. Kogan] I do not know... In my opinion, we have a large number of other problems that we must engage in. You might recall how we had to work so hard to wring funds for the Pension Law from various departments... And now we would be sending our troops somewhere else. Well, let us compare our vanities and our capabilities.

We have censured the aggressor—and we did so correctly. But getting involved there... Especially since, in my opinion, we do not have any vital or burning interests there.

We must not stint on the funds for the security of our own country, and if that security is not being affected, then let us evaluate the situation correspondingly. Let us feed the country, let us provide shoes, clothing, and medicine to everyone at the proper level. Then we can allow ourselves to be a great power. But until that situation pertains, it is necessary to be what we are—a country with completely disorganized finances and economy...

But if we are forced to do something, then we should do it. In the same GDR people are shooting themselves to death, leaving behind notes containing statements that are appalling to me. Pardon me for saying so, but this is shameful! For our country it is shame and the undermining of its authority. These are vital interests. We do not have any friends today, and tomorrow we will not have any allies.

At one time a certain American president referred in this manner to a certain Latin American dictator: "Of course, he is a son of a bitch, but he is our son of a bitch!"

[V. Ivanov] There is a similar saying in Russian, that sounds somewhat harsher...

[Ye. Kogan] I know, but I do not want to use it.

[V. Ivanov] Thank you for your comments.

Lithuania's Law on Political Parties

91UN0191A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
9 Oct 90 p 4

[Lithuanian Republic Law: "On Political Parties"]

[Text] Diversity of political parties guarantees democracy in the political system of the Lithuanian Republic. Political parties unite the citizens of the Lithuanian Republic for the purpose of achieving common political goals and aid in the formulation and expression of interests and expression of will on the part of Lithuania's citizens.

The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council, striving to guarantee equality of rights among political parties and to ensure that their activities are aimed at strengthening the independent democratic Lithuanian State and fostering social progress, hereby adopts and proclaims the present Law.

* * *

I. General Statements

Article 1: The Right To Form Political Parties

The citizens of the Lithuanian Republic have a right to form political parties and participate in their activities. Only a citizen of the Lithuanian Republic with an active right to vote may become a member of a political party.

Furthermore, a citizen of the Lithuanian Republic may be a member of only one political party.

Article 2: The Basis for the Activities of Political Parties

Political parties operate in accordance with the provisional Basic Law of the Lithuanian Republic and existing and other laws and base their activities on the statute (charter) of each individual party as registered according to established procedure.

Political parties of other states or their subunits and organizations may not be established or function within the territory of the Lithuanian Republic. It is forbidden to establish or operate parties whose programmatic documents advocate or whose practical activities realize ideas of racial, religious, social or class inequality or hatred, methods of authoritarian or totalitarian government, violent seizure of power or propaganda for war and violence, or who commit violations of human rights and liberties or carry out other ideas and actions which are in violation of the constitutional order of the Lithuanian Republic and are incompatible with commonly accepted standards of international law.

The leadership organs of political parties must be located within the territory of the Lithuanian Republic.

II. Establishment of Political Parties, and Suspension or Termination of Their Activities

Article 3: Establishment of Political Parties

In order to establish a political party it is necessary for it to have in Lithuania no fewer than 400 charter members, a statute (charter) approved by a congress or conference, a program and elected organs of leadership.

The program and statute (charter) of the party to be established may not be in violation of the laws of the Lithuanian Republic.

Article 4: Registration of Political Parties

Political parties are registered by the Lithuanian Republic Ministry of Justice.

Political parties are to be registered by the Lithuanian Republic Ministry of Justice not later than one month

after submission of the party statute (charter), its program and the minutes of its founding conference or congress, if they are not in violation of articles 1, 2 and 3 of the present Law.

The name and symbols of the political party to be registered should differ from the names and symbols of already registered political parties.

In the event that a political party is refused registration the founders of the party will be informed of this in writing within a three-day period, with grounds for the refusal stated.

In the event of changes in their statute (charter) or program political parties should report this in writing within 15 days to the Lithuanian Republic Ministry of Justice, including the documents listed in part two of this article.

In the even of a name change a political party must re-register according to the procedures outlined in this Law.

A political party and the organizations listed in its statute (charter) form a legal entity as of the day of their registration.

Article 5: Suspension of Political Parties' Activities

The activities of a political party may be suspended by the Lithuanian Republic Ministry of Justice if the party has violated the provisional Basic Law of the Lithuanian Republic or this present Law.

In the event that a political party violates the law the Ministry of Justice informs the party's organs of leadership of this in writing, indicating which points of law have been violated and establishing a time limit for elimination of those violations. If violations are not eliminated within the allotted time period the party's activities are suspended.

During an electoral campaign the activities of a political party may be suspended by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Court.

In the event that a political party is suspended it is forbidden to use any of the mass media, to conduct agitation and propaganda or to participate in elections.

The activities of a political party may not be suspended for a period of more than six months. In the event that a political party does not eliminate violations following its suspension or commits new violations of Lithuanian Republic laws within one year of the day of its suspension, its activities will be suspended for one year.

When a political party has eliminated its violations it reports this to the Lithuanian Republic Ministry of Justice, which issues permission for the political party to resume its activities within five days of receiving the report.

Article 6: Ending of Political Parties' Activities

The activities of a political party are ended in the event that:

1. the party itself suspends its activities in accordance with the procedures outlined in its statute (charter);

2. the party's activities are terminated by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Court.

Article 7: Termination of Political Parties' Activities

The activities of a political party may be terminated by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Court upon the recommendation of the Lithuanian Republic Ministry of Justice if following a second suspension of a political party's activities that same party within a period of one year again violates the provisional Basic Law of the Lithuanian Republic or this present Law.

Article 8: Procedure for Filing Appeals

Refusal to register a political party or suspension of a party's activities may be appealed to the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Court, which will hear the appeal within three days as a special case.

III. Guarantees Protecting the Activities of Political Parties

Article 9: Freedom of Actions for Political Parties

All political parties within the republic's territory operate freely and independently. State organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations, as well as public organizations and individual officials, are forbidden to interfere in political parties' internal affairs. Individuals who hamper the activities of political parties are liable under the laws of the Lithuanian Republic.

State organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations, public organizations, other political parties and individuals are obligated to compensate for physical and moral damages caused to a political party by their illegal actions.

Article 10: Restrictions on Political Activity

The organizational structure of political parties is to be based solely on geographical divisions. Political party organizations may not be established or function within labor collectives.

Military officers, extended-service military personnel in the country's security system, regular staff members of internal affairs and state security services, judges, procurators and investigators of the Lithuanian Republic may not be members of political parties.

The membership in political parties of individuals drafted according to law into national defense units or individuals appointed by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council or Government to positions in the departments of national defense and state security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the procuracy, as well as officials from the state control system, is suspended for the duration of their entire period of service or work.

An individual whose membership in a political party has been suspended may not vote or be elected to organs of a political party or its organizations, nor may that individual carry out their instructions.

Article 11: Property of Political Parties

Under the right to property political parties may own buildings, equipment, publishing houses, printing plants, vehicles and other items, as well as any other property required to perform the tasks outlined in the parties' statutes (charters).

Political parties' right to property is regulated by the laws of the Lithuanian Republic.

Political parties have a right to use buildings and other property in accordance with agreements regarding loan or lease concluded with state and public organizations, enterprises or private citizens.

Political parties' funds are comprised of membership dues, proceeds from publishing activity, funds donated by individual citizens and public organizations, and other income received in a lawful manner.

Organs of state authority and administration and state enterprises, institutions and organizations do not have the right in any form or by any means to finance political parties, their organizations, or deputies or groups of deputies who represent political parties.

Political parties may not receive funds from or other property allocated by organs of authority or administration, state organizations or other state funds.

Political parties may receive funds and other property from international organizations, non-governmental organizations, foundations and individuals only in accordance with procedures established by Lithuanian Republic legislation.

Illegally acquired funds and property will be turned over to the Lithuanian Republic by court judgment.

A member of a political party does not have the right to the political party's property and does not bear responsibility for the political party's debts.

Article 12: The Right To Receive Funds From the State Budget

Political parties represented in the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council have a right to receive subsidies from the Lithuanian Republic State Budget according to established procedures.

Article 13: Monitoring of Political Parties' Financial Activities

Monitoring of political parties' financial activities is performed by republic financial institutions. On an annual basis, not later than 1 February of the following year, political parties present to financial institutions a declaration of their financial activities for the year, and

make public information regarding their income, its sources, expenditures and ways in which funds were utilized.

Article 14: The Right To Participate in the Administration of Affairs of State

All political parties have equal rights in regard to participation in elections to organs of state authority. During elections candidates for deputy from all political parties are granted equal opportunities to use the mass media free of charge in accordance with procedures established by the Lithuanian Republic Election Law.

Political parties have the right of legislative initiative through their republic organs.

Article 15: The Right To Form Coalitions and Unions of Political Parties

Political parties have the right to form coalitions, unions and election campaign blocs.

Article 16: The Right To Disseminate Information About the Activities of a Political Party

Political parties have the right to disseminate freely in written, oral or other form information about their activities and to promote the ideas, goals and program of their political party.

Political parties have the right to establish mass media, with the exception of radio and television, and also to utilize the state-run press and other state-run mass media according to established procedures.

Article 17: The Right To Conduct Mass Events

Political parties have the right to conduct rallies, demonstrations, meetings and other mass events according to procedures established by Lithuanian Republic legislation.

Article 18: Political Parties' Responsibility

A political party which through its illegal actions causes material or moral harm to the state, its enterprises, institutions and organizations, private citizens, other political parties or public organizations is obligated to compensate for these damages with its own property according to procedures established by Lithuanian Republic legislation.

IV. Concluding Statements

Article 19: Political Parties' International Relations

Political parties have the right to maintain relations with political parties, international organizations and other organizations in other states.

Article 20: Monitoring of Political Parties' Activities

The Lithuanian Republic Ministry of Justice monitors political parties' compliance with Lithuanian Republic legislation.

The Lithuanian Republic General Procurator has the right to demand suspension or termination of a political party's activities. Other political parties may also appeal for suspension or termination of political parties' activities.

A demand or appeal regarding suspension or termination of a political party's activities should be considered within one month of the date it is received.

V. Landsbergis, chairman,
Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council;
Vilnius, 25 September 1990.

* * *

Resolution of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council: On Implementation of the Lithuanian Republic Law on Political Parties

The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council hereby resolves:

1. that political parties registered in accordance with Lithuanian Republic legislation prior to the passage of this Law need not register again.

2. that political parties in the Lithuanian Republic are obligated to bring their statutes (charters) into compliance with the present Law by 1 January 1991 and submit them to the Lithuanian Republic Ministry of Justice.

V. Landsbergis, chairman,
Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council;
Vilnius, 25 September 1990.

Lithuanian Liberal Views Sajudis Decline, Internal Political Tensions

*91UN0069A Riga BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian No 35, 11 Sep 90 p 3*

[Interview with Arvidas Juozaitis by Ilya Kudryavtsev; time, place, and occasion not specified: "Any Power Should Be Limited"]

[Text] "Any Power Should Be Limited"—that is what Arvidas Juozaitis, the public figure and publicist well-known in Lithuania, believes. Two years ago he became one of the spiritual leaders of the Sajudis movement which appeared and then became the republic's most influential political force. Now A. Juozaitis is participating in creating the liberal party (the "Liberal Alliance of Lithuania"). The problems which A. Juozaitis deals with are characteristic of all Baltic countries and their social movements and parliaments.

[Krudryavtsev] You have participated in the work of Sajudis since it was formed.

[Juozaitis] And even before. One and one-half months before the constituent congress I gave a lecture at the Artists' Union on political culture in Lithuania: it was one of the first breakthroughs of truth among the republic's intelligentsia. The ideas expressed then became a reference point for me, and for many others. The lecture

was printed in the Estonian journal RADUGA (No 8, 1988) and then translated into English. At that time, in the initial stage of the formation of Sajudis, it served as the theoretical-political basis for the Movement's united position; documents of the plenums of the creative unions played this role in Estonia and Latvia.

The basic idea of the lecture may be expressed in brief this way: "Sovereignty—rational cultural consciousness—common sense."

For me the question of what Sajudis would become after the elections to Lithuania's parliament was a mystery. It was not clear whether it would continue at all. I wrote the first article on this long before the elections, in November, and the elections were in February. I believe that all my assumptions were confirmed. Sajudis as a movement no longer exists. It remains an administrative system whose authority is constantly diminishing. That is Sajudis after the elections.

[Kudryavtsev] It it related to the transfer of powers from the Movement to the parliament and the government?

[Juozaitis] A serious social movement cannot be destroyed by the simple departure of leaders. The point here is deeper than that. Lithuanian society did not prove to be ready to control the powers it elected. The opposition structures of power had not been readied. Parties did not exist as organic units. Everyone believed that the main thing was to give the authorities their powers and then freedom and independence would follow automatically. We elected our authorities with enormous joy. But a political vacuum was the price of this joy.

Now the authorities are in a strange position. On the one hand, no one can be dissatisfied with them; we certainly elected whom we wanted, but dissatisfaction is growing. A sociological survey conducted a month ago showed that the Lithuanian Communist Party is far ahead of Sajudis in ratings, and that is a negative phenomenon. It speaks of the population's confusion.

[Kudryavtsev] But that concerns the rating of the new Sajudis, of what is left of it.

[Juozaitis] No. The image of Sajudis among the population is still being determined by its past leaders who are now working in parliament and the government. It is there that Sajudis has implemented many very unpopular actions. For example, back on 12 March, the second day of independence, Sajudis through the parliamentary leadership made a crude attempt at a coup, on television—and all Lithuania saw it. Of course, such a thing struck at their reputation: they took power and act like Bolsheviks.

The second congress did not increase the authority of Sajudis: it was held in April 1990. The delegates got too involved in the morass of anticommunism. Sometimes their behavior began to seem like psychosis. This congress was held with the old leadership, those who had

won in the elections, and they did not present their best side either. Thus, the 40-minute "general" speech by Landsbergis brought back memories of the CPSU of stagnation days.

[Kudryavtsev] In the press you gave a negative evaluation of the results of the presidential election in Lithuania.

[Juozaitis] Yes, I characterized the election of President Landsbergis that way in my article "A Historical Mistake." Right after that I distanced myself from Sajudis for good.

I believe that our consciousness is not yet ready for democracy. During the elections, the people voted for Sajudis and for Brazauskas; they were not so very different from one another. Brazauskas's popularity was simply stunning—he garnered about 90 percent of the votes in his own precinct, while only 60 percent of the voters voted for Landsbergis. This result was fully confirmed by public opinion polls; it is no secret to anyone that Brazauskas's popularity was slightly more than three times greater.

By electing Landsbergis president, the parliament above all hurt its own reputation by not paying attention to public opinion. That was a big mistake.

[Kudryavtsev] Tension is growing in relations between the parliament and the government.

[Juozaitis] Gradually all powers, legislative and executive, are being concentrated in the hands of parliament. Departments are being set up which are directly subordinate to parliament. The 50 years of Soviet dominance trained us to merge executive and legislative powers. And this pattern is being repeated again, while the separation of these powers is the basic principle of a law-governed state.

In a parliamentary republic, the prime minister is also a deputy. We have a prime minister and 13 deputies who became ministers and headed departments, have suspended mandates, and are not participating in parliamentary work; they can be there as guests. They are simply deprived of the opportunity to make policy in parliament. That is also a serious violation of the principles of a law-governed state.

Given that we have not even reached the initial, simplest principles of a law-governed state, the separation of powers, and that a constitutional court has not been set up and the institution of an independent court has not been established at all, the introduction of the institution of presidential power may stop the development of democratic processes in Lithuania. Especially if he is elected by parliament rather than the entire population. An enormous concentration of powers would take place. I was absolutely openly against introducing the institution of presidential power in Lithuania. Power must be limited rather than strengthened.

[Kudryavtsev] A center faction has been formed in Lithuania's parliament.

[Juozaitis] I think that the formation of factions should be a serious process. We have already become unique in the democratic world: our parliament has only one faction. In general that is nonsense: if there is only one, then there are none at all.

[Kudryavtsev] But in reality factions already exist.

[Juozaitis] They do, but they have not been formalized. And that is altogether characteristic of Lithuanian politics. There are many informal things in it.

The Kaunas radicals can rally approximately 40 delegates around them; the Lithuanian Communist Party—about 30; and the center faction at first numbered 20 people and now—also about 30. In this way, 100 of the 140 deputies have already broken up into factions. But the matter is delayed by the impotence of the political parties. They have no clear leaders, other than the Lithuanian Communist Party.

[Kudryavtsev] Here one can again speak of a differentiation from the civilized world, where factions in parliament are created by the parties. But for now here in Latvia the situation is very similar in that regard—parliamentary factions have substantially more political weight than any party whatsoever. Most likely this suggests that the creation of the parties was not well thought out and that the values they proclaim, ideological values for example, are not now the definitive ones either in real politics or in polarized society.

On the other hand, that may mean that the present political parties which will have the support of the voters will be created "from parliament" in Lithuania and in Latvia.

In light of that, how do you see the future of Sajudis?

[Juozaitis] It has one chance. Its structures which now exist throughout the entire Republic should be party structures. Recently the 11 March Party (11 March is Lithuanian Independence Day) has been making serious claims to using the Sajudis structures. This party is building its position on the idea of national independence; it has no serious ideology or economic strategy. It may receive the support of the population, the most radical-minded strata of it. Sajudis may simply merge with this party. It has already done well for itself as a simply anticommunist organization—during the second congress, for example, and that is in complete agreement with the political views of the 11 March Party. I think that the leaders of this party are acting with the blessing of Landsbergis; he attended their meeting—it was shown on television.

Another possibility for Sajudis is to leave the political arena altogether. It has already lost political authority. A change to purely economic activity is possible; now, for example, book publishing is being actively developed under the aegis of Sajudis.

[Kudryavtsev] What party do you belong to?

[Juozaitis] I myself am one of the organizers of the Liberal Alliance of Lithuania. We have been in existence since June. We intend to act like all normal European parties—only in elections and in parliament, restarting our work every year. Organizations which support the liberal ideology will be members of the alliance.

From the very start, we announced that in terms of position we would be close to the Republican Party of the United States, that is, maximal freedom for the individual in social and particularly in economic life and minimal taxes.

[Kudryavtsev] Would you perhaps like to add something?

[Juozaitis] Only to wish that our contacts with Latvia will be closer. It has already become a cliché that Lithuania has closer ties with Estonia than with Latvia. I think that is abnormal.

Kaunas Protests Military's Activities

*91UN0255B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
4 Oct 90 p 3*

[Article by M. Filipenkov: "Compromise Is Possible"]

[Text] At the end of July of this year, G. Pukas, Kaunas City Soviet chairman, and V. Adomonis, Kaunas City mayor, sent a letter to the supreme military leadership of the country—Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense; Colonel General F.I. Kuzmin, commander of forces of the Red Banner Baltic Military District; and Major General A.A. Sigutkin, chief of the Kaunas garrison—with a proposal concerning the activity of the servicemen of the Kaunas garrison. It noted that recently there has been a higher frequency of incidents in this city where servicemen of Kaunas garrison are participants in illegal violations and where civilians are the victims. It also indicated specific cases of their use of firearms and mass walks in the center of the city in camouflage military clothing, which made the soldiers an object of intense scrutiny by the local population, and also cases of single and group flights over the city by aircraft and helicopters at low altitudes. The residents of several Kaunas rayons are irritated by the noise that exceeds permissible norms by many times, and they fear possible accidents.

General of the Army Comrade Varennikov, commander in chief of the Ground Forces and deputy minister of the USSR Ministry of Defense, answered:

"The letter of the Kaunas City Soviet concerning the activity of the servicemen of Kaunas garrison was reviewed carefully at your request. The public prosecutor is conducting an investigation into all of the cited cases.

"The rules for wearing everyday camouflage-color field dress by airborne assault servicemen is specified by an

order of the USSR Ministry of Defense; however, considering the desires of the local organs of authority, the appearance of servicemen in public places in this uniform will be restricted.

"As for the flights of military aviation over the city, at the present time, as you know from a letter of the chief of the Kaunas garrison, measures are already being worked on to reduce such flights.

"The military command hopes that fruitful joint work of local organs of authority and the garrison command will produce a positive result in preventing all possible negative manifestations."

Western Republics

State Program on Belorussian Republic Languages

91UN0057A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 25 Sep 90 pp 1-2

["State Program for the Development of the Belorussian Language and Other National Languages in the Belorussian SSR"]

[Text] Today, now that perestroyka processes are under way in the country and the political system is being reformed, the general public and the inhabitants of our republic are facing problems requiring the quickest possible resolution. Above all, the complex problems affecting the hearts and minds of millions of inhabitants of the Belorussian SSR include the issues of state sovereignty, the preservation and development of the national Belorussian culture, the native language, the cultures and languages of other ethnic communities living in the republic, customs, and the way of life, and the restoration of the historical and cultural heritage. People in the republic are growing more and more aware of the fact that language is not only a means of communication. It is the basis and the most important part of a people's culture. Historically and ethnically, the territory of the Belorussian SSR has been the home of the Belorussian nationality. It is here that its culture, language, traditions, and customs came into being and developed.

One of the main considerations in the development of the Belorussian culture is concern for the Belorussian language, which should occupy the place it deserves in the life of the Belorussian people. The dramatic contraction of the Belorussian language's sphere of functioning caused large segments of the population to lose their appreciation for their national cultural heritage and led to deformities in the national identity.

Today the Belorussian language's role in the cultural, sociopolitical, and economic spheres has been unjustifiably diminished, and this disturbs the citizens of the Belorussian SSR.

The State Program for the Development of the Belorussian Language and Other National Languages in the Belorussian SSR was compiled in accordance with the

Law of the Belorussian SSR "On Languages in the Belorussian SSR" and the Declaration of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet "On the State Sovereignty of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic" and with a view to the proposals of ministries and departments, the executive committees of soviets of people's deputies, public organizations, and citizens of the republic.

The implementation of the State Program for the Development of the Belorussian Language and Other National Languages in the Belorussian SSR will promote the restoration and development of the language and culture of the Belorussian people and the free and equitable use of native languages by citizens of other nationalities living within the territory of the republic.

I. Basic Purpose and Priorities of State Program

The basic purpose of the state program is to plan and carry out immediate and long-range measures to secure the extensive and active use of the Belorussian language as the state language in all spheres of cultural, sociopolitical, and economic life in the republic and the free functioning of the Russian language, as the medium of inter-ethnic communication by the peoples of the USSR, and other national languages within the territory of the Belorussian SSR.

The program will be carried out gradually, on the dates stipulated in the Decree of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet of 26 January 1990 "On the Procedure for the Enactment of the Law of the Belorussian SSR 'On Languages in the Belorussian SSR.'" Ministries and departments, the executive committees of soviets of people's deputies, enterprises, organizations, and establishments, artistic unions, and other public organizations will participate directly in carrying out the program. Its implementation will require financial and material resources.

The basic guidelines of the implementation of the state program have been defined as the following:

The creation of the necessary conditions for the free use of Belorussian and other languages by the population of the republic;

The guarantee of the functioning of the Belorussian language and, if necessary, the use of Russian and other languages in state and public establishments, at enterprises, and in organizations in the republic, regardless of their departmental jurisdiction;

The enhancement of the role of the general educational school and all indoctrinational, academic, and cultural-enlightenment establishments in expanding the sphere of use of the Belorussian language and functioning of other languages within the territory of the republic; the preparation and publication of the necessary academic-procedural, terminological, popular-scientific, and reference literature, textbooks, teaching aids, dictionaries, and phrase-books;

The expansion and improvement of the training and advanced training of national personnel and the creation of the necessary conditions for this;

The organizational, scientific, financial, and material-technical reinforcement of the implementation of the law.

II. Provisions To Guarantee Functioning of Belorussian and Other Languages in State Organs, Enterprises, Establishments, and Public Organizations in the Republic

In order to create the necessary conditions for the mastery of the Belorussian language by the personnel of organs of state authority and administration, public organizations, enterprises and establishments and by all citizens of the republic:

1. Ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR and executive committees of soviets of people's deputies will work with public organizations, in line with the provisions of this program, to plan measures to implement the Law of the Belorussian SSR "On Languages in the Belorussian SSR" in order to secure the transition to the use of the Belorussian language in all spheres of governmental and public affairs and in the work of enterprises and establishments, as well as the use of the languages of citizens of other nationalities living within the territory of the republic.

1990

2. The State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Labor and the Social Protection of the Population, the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education, and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Justice will work with interested ministries, departments, and public organizations in the republic in 1990 on the preparation of a list of jobs requiring a knowledge of the Belorussian language, the Russian language, or another language, as well as the related skills required for the performance of these jobs. Ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR, executive committees of soviets of people's deputies, enterprises, organizations, and establishments will determine the need for specialists fluent in the Belorussian language and arrange for courses in Belorussian language studies for various categories of personnel in line with their level of knowledge. The necessary premises and material-technical resources will be allocated for this purpose. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Finance and the State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Labor and the Social Protection of the Population will work with interested organizations in the next three months to determine the procedure for the establishment of these courses and the sources of their financing.

The curricula of institutes and departments of advanced training and the improvement of the skills of administrative personnel and specialists in the national economy will include lectures and classes in the Belorussian language and its use in business correspondence.

The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education will work with the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, the Belorussian SSR Znaniye Society, and the Belorussian Language Society imeni F. Skorina on the compilation of curricula and teaching plans for courses in the Belorussian language before 1991 (with a view to the degree of fluency in the language and the distinctive features of professional duties), and the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee will publish them in the first quarter of 1991 in the necessary quantity at the request of ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR, executive committees of soviets of people's deputies, enterprises, organizations, and establishments; scientific-procedural recommendations will be drawn up for course instructors and administrators, and the appropriate seminars and consultations will be organized for them.

The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education, the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Culture, and other ministries and departments with academic institutions will set up courses, schools, and people's universities on a cost accounting basis to offer classes in the Belorussian language to anyone wishing to learn this language.

Belorussian language and literature teachers and instructors (including retired educators) and upperclassmen in the philology departments of higher academic institutions will be encouraged to teach various types of courses in the Belorussian language.

1990-1995

3. In accordance with the Decree of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet "On the Procedure for the Enactment of the Law of the Belorussian SSR 'On Languages in the Belorussian SSR,'" ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR and executive committees of soviets of people's deputies will begin adopting and publishing the legislative instruments of organs of state authority and administration, conducting business correspondence, and compiling documents in the Belorussian language and, if necessary, also in the national language of the majority of the population of a location within the first three to five years the law is in force.

Within this same time period the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee will act on the requests of ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR, executive committees of soviets of people's deputies, enterprises, establishments, and organizations for seals, stamps, official lists, and official forms printed in the Belorussian language and, if necessary, in Belorussian and Russian or another language.

4. The Main Archives Administration of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers will work with the Belorussian Republic Administration of the State Committee of the USSR for Output Quality Control and Standards on the compilation and approval, with the consent of interested ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR, of procedural and instructive documents on the use of the Belorussian language in business correspondence and the

preparation of a guide to business correspondence in the Belorussian and Russian languages (with parallel texts), and will work with the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee to publish enough copies for all state establishments, public organizations, and enterprises.

1990-1991

5. Executive committees of soviets of people's deputies and ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR will see to the official registration of place names (of populated points, administrative-territorial units, streets, squares, rivers, etc.), the names of establishments, enterprises, and organizations, and the names of publications of an informational and advertising nature in the Belorussian language and, if necessary, in the Belorussian and Russian languages. The Belorussian SSR State Economic and Planning Committee and the State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Material and Technical Supply will allocate the necessary material resources for these purposes.

Beginning in 1990

6. Ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR, enterprises, and organizations will print trademarks, labels, tags, and instructions on the use of goods in Belorussian, and in Belorussian, Russian, or the language of the client in the case of goods to be taken outside the Belorussian SSR.

The Belorussian SSR State Press Committee will reinforce this requirement when placing orders with organizations under its jurisdiction. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Communications and Information Science will arrange for the issuance of stamps, envelopes, postcards, forms and so forth with inscriptions in the Belorussian language.

1990-1993

7. Ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR, enterprises, and establishments are advised to arrange for Belorussian translations of major newspapers and the scripts of the radio programs of enterprises and associations. In conjunction with the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee and the State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Television and Radio Broadcasting, they will arrange for the languages of ethnic groups living within the territory of the republic to be used on certain pages of local newspapers and in radio and television programs.

1990-1993

8. It would be expedient to use Belorussian instead of Russian as the language of publication in rayon and oblast newspapers and the republic papers SELSKAYA GAZETA and FIZKULTURNIK BELORUSSII, the bulletin 7 DNEY, the journal SELSKOYE KHOZYAYSTVO BELORUSSII, and other sectorial publications.

9. Ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR and executive committees of soviets of people's deputies

will oversee the efforts of state notary offices, internal affairs organs, state arbitration bodies, public health establishments, and social security, trade, consumer service, trade, transportation, communications, financial, housing and utilities, and other establishments in constant contact with the public to adhere to official schedules in encouraging their personnel to conduct all affairs in the Belorussian language and guarantee its extensive use in communications with citizens or secure the use of other languages acceptable to the parties concerned.

10. The Minsk Experimental Computer Repair and Maintenance Plant will work with the State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Material and Technical Supply to take the necessary measures to re-equip typewriters with Belorussian printing elements in line with the requisitions of ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR, executive committees of soviets of people's deputies, enterprises, establishments, and organizations.

Ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR, executive committees of soviets of people's deputies, enterprises, establishments, and organizations will determine the additional demand for typewriters with printing elements for the Belorussian alphabet or the characters of other languages, and the Belorussian SSR State Economic and Planning Committee will satisfy this demand in conjunction with the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Trade and the Belorussian SSR Union of Consumers' Societies.

1990-1993

11. Ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR and executive committees of soviets of people's deputies will work with the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education to organize permanent courses for the training and retraining of typists and stenographers for work in the Belorussian language.

The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education and the State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Agriculture and Foodstuffs will arrange for the training of specialists in business correspondence in the Belorussian language in vocational and technical institutes and secondary specialized academic institutions in line with the requisitions of organizations, enterprises, and establishments in the republic.

1990-1993

12. The Belorussian State Committee for Statistics and Analysis will work with the Belorussian SSR State Economic and Planning Committee, the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Finance, the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee, and the republic Soyuzblankizdat Industrial-Production Association to arrange for the printing of the necessary quantities of report and accounting forms, instructions on filling them out, and instructions on keeping republic and union records in the Belorussian language.

1990-1991

III. Use of Belorussian Language and Other National Languages in Work of Educational and Cultural Establishments

1. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education and other ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR with academic institutions will secure the gradual expansion of the use of the Belorussian language in the academic process with a view to its status as the state language. To this end, they will work with executive committees of soviets of people's deputies and the appropriate ministries and departments on the improvement of pre-school establishments, general educational schools, vocational and technical institutes, and secondary specialized and higher academic institutions to arrange for the continuous study of the Belorussian language in them. Belorussian schools and classes will be established and staffed. All educational undertakings to ensure the broader use of the Belorussian language will be conducted jointly with the councils of academic institutions, parents' committees, and the public.

1990-2000

2. Executive committees of soviets of people's deputies will work with the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education to bring the number of textbooks written in the Belorussian or other languages in line with the ethnic composition of the republic population by the year 2000. In locations heavily populated by a particular nationality, the necessary network of schools and classes will be established to teach the language of this nationality; under certain conditions, the academic process will be transferred to the use of these languages, with required courses in Belorussian, Russian, and one foreign language.

Between 1991 and 1995 the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education will arrange for the training of pedagogical personnel for this purpose and will work with the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee on the publication of the necessary quantity of academic procedural literature, textbooks, and teaching aids.

1991-2000

3. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education, other ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR with academic institutions, and executive committees of soviets of people's deputies will strive for the gradual transfer of the academic process to Belorussian and other languages in various types of academic institutions in the republic in line with the Law of the Belorussian SSR "On Languages in the Belorussian SSR" by doing the following:

Before 1 June 1991 they will clarify the curricula and programs of all academic institutions and envisage the necessary number of hours in these programs for the study of Belorussian and other national languages, as

well as foreign languages, so that students in schools and VUZ's will be fluent in them;

They will include a Belorussian language and literature class in the curricula of the preparatory divisions of all republic VUZ's beginning with the 1990/91 academic year;

They will institute Belorussian as the language of instruction in all academic subjects in pedagogical institutes, the pedagogical divisions of universities, higher and secondary specialized academic institutions of the arts and culture, and pedagogical academies by 1996. During the transition period (of two or three years) they will establish Belorussian-language groups (or streams) in these academic institutions; in higher and secondary specialized academic institutions specializing in other fields, they will arrange for Belorussian to be used as the language of instruction in the sociopolitical series of academic subjects;

Special courses in regional studies and schools of Belorussian area studies will be established in general educational schools, vocational and technical institutes, secondary specialized academic institutions, pedagogical institutes, and universities between 1990 and 1995. The history of the Belorussian SSR will be studied in all higher academic institutions;

The list of required entrance examinations for academic institutions in the Belorussian SSR will include an examination in Belorussian language and literature beginning with the 1990/91 academic year, and commencement examinations will depend on the type of institution and its area of academic emphasis;

Young philologists' schools will be established in pedagogical higher academic institutions and universities; the number of secondary schools and classes offering advanced studies in the Belorussian language and literature will be increased to develop the abilities and talents of students in these subjects. Competitions in the Belorussian language and literature, other languages and literatures, and the history and culture of Belorussia will be held regularly among the students of general educational schools, vocational and technical institutes, and secondary specialized and higher academic institutions;

Between 1990 and 1995 at least 40,000 teachers and instructors of vocational and technical institutes and secondary specialized and higher academic institutions, as well as personnel of pre-school and extracurricular establishments, will undergo retraining and advanced training in the Belorussian language each year. The academic process in institutes for the improvement of teaching skills, in advanced training schools and courses, in academic institutions, and other organizations will be conducted in line with this objective;

Belorussian will become the language of upbringing and education in the majority of pre-school establishments in urban and rural locations between 1990 and 1995, and

the necessary measures will be taken to secure linguistic continuity in the work of pre-school establishments and schools;

In locations densely populated by certain nationalities, pre-school establishments or groups where children will be taught in their national language and will take required courses in Belorussian and Russian will be opened when the necessary conditions are established for this.

1990-2000

4. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education will determine the procedure for the study of the Belorussian language and literature by students temporarily residing within the territory of the republic in 1990.

5. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education and ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR with academic institutions will submit proposals to the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers before 1 June 1991 on the specific specialties and professions in which instruction in higher, secondary specialized, and vocational and technical academic institutions will be conducted in Belorussian, Russian, or another language.

6. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education, the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Culture, and executive committees of soviets of people's deputies will work with artists' unions and other public organizations to encourage a deeper knowledge of the Belorussian language and literature and the national culture and history of the Belorussian people;

Groups of amateur performers with a repertoire based on Belorussian literature, music, and folklore, literary studios (or reception rooms), and groups for the study of Belorussian folk art, culture, history, and so forth will be established in academic and extracurricular institutions and cultural centers;

The network of state, public, and school museums of literary history, local history, and ethnology, as well as museums of well-known figures in Belorussian culture and the culture of other nationalities will be enlarged. The students of higher academic institutions and the personnel of republic libraries and cultural centers will be encouraged to assist in the establishment of clubs and museums of regional history and in the collection of oral folk tales and poetry;

Republic television festivals of folk music, competitions by amateur groups and individual performers for the best renditions of Belorussian songs and musical works by Belorussian composers, and festivals of the folklore, folk music, and folk songs of nationalities living within the territory of the republic will be organized.

7. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Culture will work with the Belorussian SSR Union of Theatrical Performers to increase the number of Belorussian-language theaters. Performances of plays, including children's

plays, in Belorussian and the languages of other nationalities living in the Belorussian SSR will be included in the repertoire of Russian-language theaters.

Beginning in 1991

8. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Culture will work with the Belorussian SSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and the Belorussian SSR Union of Cinematographers to organize the making, duplication, and screening of art films and documentary films in the Belorussian language.

Beginning in 1991

9. The Belorussian Republic Council for Tourism and Excursions is advised to plan additional tours of historical sites in the Belorussian SSR conducted in the Belorussian language.

Beginning in 1990

10. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Culture will ensure the use of the Belorussian language in the work of museums, cultural centers, libraries, and other cultural establishments.

1990-1993

11. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Culture, the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education, the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee, and executive committees of soviets of people's deputies will consider the needs of library patrons for literature and periodicals in the Belorussian, Russian, and other languages.

Beginning in 1991

12. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education and the Belorussian State University imeni V.I. Lenin will work with interested ministries and departments and public organizations on the organization of an international Belorussian language and culture summer school each year for researchers, teachers, and instructors of the Belorussian language and literature and activists of Belorussian communities, societies, and associations outside the Belorussian SSR.

1991

13. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Culture, the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education, the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, and executive committees of soviets of people's deputies will work with the Belorussian Language Society imeni F. Skorina, the Znaniye and Rodina societies, the Belorussian republic branch of the Soviet Cultural Foundation, the Belorussian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and artists' unions on the inclusion of the appropriate steps to satisfy the national-cultural interests of people of Belorussian origin living outside

the republic among their measures for the implementation of the Law of the Belorussian SSR "On Languages in the Belorussian SSR."

1990

IV. Publishing

1. The Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education will work with the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee and interested ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR to plan and carry out a program for the publication of a variety of Belorussian, foreign-Belorussian, and Belorussian-foreign dictionaries. Russian-Belorussian and Belorussian-Russian dictionaries, including terminological dictionaries, will be published in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR, enterprises, establishments, and organizations, and inhabitants of the republic wishing to become fluent in Belorussian.

1991-1995

2. The Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education, and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Culture will compile handbooks, phrase-books, and dictionaries for different fields of knowledge and branches of the national economy, guides to the Belorussian language, collections of Belorussian songs, jokes, and proverbs, and so forth, and the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee will publish them in the necessary quantities.

To this end, the possibility of appointing scientific commissions to suggest immediate and long-range publications and their authors or teams of authors will be considered in the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences and universities and pedagogical institutes in 1990.

All of this work will be coordinated by the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education.

1990-1998

3. The Belorussian SSR State Press Committee, the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education, and the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences will arrange for the compilation of new universal textbooks on the Belorussian language on a competitive basis with a set of visual and audio aids for students in Belorussian language classes and for people who are studying the Belorussian language on their own, and they will form temporary teams of writers to prepare the textbooks and teaching aids.

1990-1995

4. The Belorussian SSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting will plan regular broadcasts of educational and popular-science programs on the Belorussian language and the languages of other nationalities living in the republic, on the history of Belorussia,

and on prominent figures in science, culture, and the arts and arrange for broadcasts of programs with the participation of masters of the spoken and written word.

1990-1995

5. The Belorussian SSR State Press Committee is advised to work with the Belorussian Language Society imeni F. Skorina on the investigation and resolution of problems in turning the monthly NASHA SLOVA into a monthly popular-science journal, and to work with the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences on turning the annual BELARUSKAYA LINGVISTYKA into a scientific quarterly journal.

1990-1991

6. The Belorussian SSR State Press Committee and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education will continue working with the appropriate publishing houses on the publication of the following scientific and popular-science series:

On language and literature:

"Skarby movy," "Bibliyateka nastaynika";

"Belaruskaya mova i movaznaystva," "Ruskaya mova: funktsyianirovanne, vyvuchenne, vykladanne";

The "Nashy slavutyya zemlyaki" series.

On a permanent basis

7. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education and the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee will see to the implementation of plans for the preparation and publication of Belorussian-language editions of textbooks and teaching aids up to the year 2000, with a view to the prospect of the use of Belorussian as the language of instruction in all types of educational establishments, and the publication of this kind of literature in other languages that might be used as the languages of instruction and upbringing (Russian, Polish, Lithuanian, and others). By the end of 1990 plans should be drawn up for the preparation and publication of the most important educational and academic-procedural literature and teaching aids, the necessary number of copies of these publications should be determined in advance, and high printing standards should be observed in their publication.

8. The Belorussian SSR State Press Committee and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education will bring the number of textbooks for general educational schools up to 150 in 1995 to completely cover the demand for these works.

The total number of copies of textbooks will be increased from 5.5 million in 1990 to 10 million in 1995. The Belorussian SSR State Economic and Planning Committee will fully cover the need for paper and include the necessary capital investments for the establishment of

additional printing facilities in draft plans for the economic and social development of the republic.

1990-1995

9. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education will complete the preparations for the publication of the necessary number of textbooks in national languages for academic institutions for physically and mentally handicapped children.

The Belorussian SSR State Press Committee will work with the Belorussian SSR State Economic and Planning Committee on the establishment of the appropriate printing base and the allocation of special types of paper for these textbooks.

1990-1995

10. The Belorussian SSR State Press Committee will work with ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR to secure the publication of the necessary popular-science literature in the Belorussian language in various fields of knowledge.

The publication of Belorussian translations of the best procedural aids and educational materials, as well as the popular-science literature published by other publishing houses in the USSR and foreign countries, will be necessary.

Beginning in 1991

11. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Culture, the State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Television and Radio Broadcasting, the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education, and the Belorussian SSR Union of Cinematographers will take the necessary steps to reinforce the educational process in academic institutions with all types of audio-visual aids.

1990-1995

12. The Belorussian Soviet Encyclopedia Publishing House imeni Petrus Brovka will work with the Belorussian SSR Union of Writers, the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education on the preparation and publication of a multi-volume children's encyclopedia in the Belorussian language for children of elementary and secondary-school age.

1990-1995

13. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education and the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee will see to the inclusion of addenda on problems in education and indoctrination in the journal *BELURUSKAYA MOVA I LITARATURA UY SHKOLE*"; arrange for the publication of the Belorussian scientific-procedural journals *DASHKOLNAYE VYKHAVANNE* and

PACHATKOVAYA SHKOLA, original teaching aids for Belorussian-language kindergartens, and libraries for kindergarten educators.

The anthology "Belaruski falklor" and the library "Beloruskiya pismenniki i paety—dzetsyam" will be compiled and published for elementary schoolchildren, and a popular-science series "Belaruskaya mova: ristoryya i suchasnasts," will be published for students of junior and senior high schools; "Narod, mova, kultura," "Mastatstva Belarusi," and other works will be published.

1990-1995

14. The Belorussian SSR State Press Committee will continue publishing Belorussian translations of the classics, contemporary foreign fiction, and the literature of the peoples of the USSR for a gradual transition to the use of the Belorussian language in teaching courses in these literatures in universities and pedagogical institutes.

On a permanent basis

V. Organizational, Personnel, Scientific, and Material-Technical Reinforcement of Program

1. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education will work with the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Culture, the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee, the Znaniye Society, and the Belorussian Language Society imeni F. Skorina on the submission of proposals to the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers on the creation of a republic interdepartmental scientific-procedural council on matters of cultural and linguistic policy, with its main functions including the coordination and supervision of studies of the Belorussian and other languages, the offer of scientific procedural guidance, the analysis of the demand for teaching aids, and the determination of publishing guidelines.

1990

2. A republic terminological commission will be set up in the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences in 1991 to coordinate the work of choosing terms from various fields of knowledge and compiling the necessary dictionaries. The membership of this commission will be approved by the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences.

A terminology department should be opened in the Linguistic Institute imeni Ya. Kolyas of the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, and working terminological groups should be formed in higher academic institutions to compile terminological dictionaries.

The Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences will see to the preparation of the necessary terminological handbooks for practical use and a handbook of personal names and surnames in accordance with national tradition and the rules of the Belorussian language, and the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee will ensure their publication.

1990-1997

3. A republic commission will be set up in the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences to standardize the spelling of Belorussian and foreign place names. It will be in charge of deciding the rules of the transliteration of place names into Belorussian and the scientific bases of the transcription of foreign geographic names; gazetteers will be compiled and published in the next few years.

Maps intended for use in the Belorussian SSR will be prepared and published in the Belorussian language in the established procedure.

Beginning in 1990

4. The Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education will arrange for basic research into the Belorussian native language and the compilation of dialectal dictionaries and atlases, and the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee will see to their publication.

5. Ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR and executive committees of soviets of people's deputies will strive to enhance the quality of documents in the Belorussian language by adding stylistic duties to existing staff rosters. Economically accountable centers should be established when necessary in oblasts, cities, and rayons of the republic to render practical assistance in conducting business correspondence and documentation in the Belorussian language.

Beginning in 1990

6. The Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education will work with the Belorussian Language Society imeni F. Skorina and the Belorussian SSR Union of Writers to organize several scientific conferences on Belorussian orthography. Proposals regarding the clarification of standard spellings will be submitted on the basis of conference recommendations.

Beginning in 1990

7. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Culture will work with oblispolkoms and the Minsk gorispolkom to revise the structure and volume of personnel training to fully satisfy the demand of public education and cultural institutions for national personnel fluent in Belorussian and other national languages before 1996.

1990-1991

8. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education will open Belorussian language and literature departments in the higher academic institutions where these departments do not exist at this time and will staff them between 1990 and 1993, and the staffs of existing departments will be brought in line with present requirements.

The Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education will secure the training of highly skilled specialists with a knowledge of Belorussian and other languages in post-graduate and doctoral programs.

9. The Belorussian SSR State Economic and Planning Committee, the State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Material and Technical Supply, the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Finance, other ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR, and executive committees of soviets of people's deputies will assist in the implementation of the State Program for the Development of the Belorussian Language and Other National Languages in the Belorussian SSR by envisaging allocations of the necessary material and financial resources in the drafts of the corresponding plans for the economic and social development of the national economy and budgets.

On a permanent basis

10. The Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education will work with executive committees of soviets of people's deputies, ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR, and the organizations of the Belorussian SSR State Press Committee to arrange for regular sociological surveys providing an opportunity to assess the state of studies of the Belorussian language and the mastery of this language by various segments of the republic population. Interested ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers will receive regular reports on the survey results.

Beginning in 1990

11. Ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR and executive committees of soviets of people's deputies will periodically examine the progress in carrying out the State Program for the Development of the Belorussian Language and Other National Languages in the Belorussian SSR, take the necessary measures to ensure the timely completion of the program, and suggest ways of clarifying and supplementing it when necessary.

The status of the work on the state program will be discussed annually in the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers.

Beginning in 1991

The State Program for the Development of the Belorussian Language and Other National Languages in the Belorussian SSR was ratified by a decree of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers on 20 September this year. Its appearance was preceded by a great deal of work. A commission of 44 was established back in January 1990, when the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet requested the Council of Ministers to draw up this program. The commission was headed by Deputy Chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers N.N. Mazay.

Prominent academics and Belorussian public spokesmen, jurists, specialists in various branches of the national economy, and representatives of nationalities living within the territory of the republic worked on the

program. They included writer Boris Sachenko; Chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Education, Culture, and the Preservation of the Historical Heritage, Chairman of the Belorussian Language Society and poet Nil Gilevich; scholars Nikolay Birillo and Aleksandr Podluzhnyy from the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences; and Professor Nikolay Yevnevich.

The commission submitted the draft state program to ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR, public organizations, artists' unions, oblispolkoms and the Minsk gorispolkom for their approval twice.

After all proposals and comments had been taken into consideration in the program, it became the product of the collective efforts of all those who care about the future of the Belorussian nationality.

When the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers approved the program, it ordered ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR and executive committees of soviets of people's deputies to work with artists' unions, other public organizations, and the news media in the intensification of the efforts to carry out the program. Each December, beginning this year, the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers will expect reports on the progress in carrying out the program and proposals on specific details of the program.

Belorussian Justice Minister on Constitution Draft

*91UN0057B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 21 Sep 90 p 2*

[Interview with Valeriy Guryevich Tikhinya, Belorussian minister of justice and member of Belorussian SSR Constitutional Commission, by A. Kryzhanovskiy, BELTA correspondent: "The Belorussian Constitution: From the Individual to the State"]

[Text] A BELTA correspondent was told about the work on the draft of the new Constitution of the Belorussian SSR by commission member, Minister of Justice V.G. Tikhinya.

[Correspondent] The entire democratic world commemorated the bicentennial of the Constitution of the United States three years ago. In two centuries this document has been amended only 15 (!) times. We, on the other hand, are already living "happily" under our fourth constitution and are preparing to adopt a fifth in the 73rd year of Soviet rule. We seem to be in the same position as a passenger who is about to miss a train. Will the new constitution allow him to take his seat in the car, and what class ticket will he have?

[Tikhinya] Just five years ago the very idea of a rule-of-law state sounded bourgeois and pseudoscientific to us, with all of the ensuing consequences. No analytical studies were conducted. No monographs were written. We were standing on the platform and watching the train

leave. Finally, the idea of building a rule-of-law democratic state in our country was declared in 1988. We have been building it for two years, but we still have no sound theories. Now we are making a feverish attempt to compose them as we go along.

We know that the rule-of-law state is, above all, a constitutional state. The process of drafting and adopting a new constitution is the most important step in forming a democratic state in our republic.

The new constitution is a micromodel of the society we want, its legal backbone. It is within its framework and on the basis of its principles that the government, the entire machinery of state, will function, the rights and freedoms of citizens will be secured and defended, and many spheres of social development will be defined, particularly the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres. For this reason, in the future constitution it will be important to coordinate the prospect of social development with the affirmation and reinforcement of the universally acknowledged values of democracy, humanism, and justice. The relations between the citizen, the society, and the state should lie at its center, and it should clearly reflect the Belorussian SSR's commitment to common human values and the standards of international law.

The individual is the measure of all social values, and he must be provided with economic and political freedoms, peace and security, a decent living, and genuine guarantees of the exercise of his rights and freedoms.

[Correspondent] In the minds of the inhabitants of our republic, the existing Constitution of the Belorussian SSR, the 1978 version, is associated with the period of stagnation. This Basic Law of the Brezhnev years sentenced us to "universal happiness," and its ideological commentators constantly assured us that it "affirms and reinforces the universally acknowledged values of democracy, humanism, and justice," which were, nevertheless, already being subjected to partial revision in 1988 and 1989.

So, what can we expect this time? Some more minor cosmetic repairs or a major overhaul?

[Tikhinya] It is true that the Belorussian Constitution we have now was largely a political manifesto of what are commonly referred to as the years of stagnation. It was expected to perform important propaganda functions in the worst sense of the term.

Yes, it was revised. In particular, there were changes in the electoral system, new procedures in the election of judges and others. Today, however, we cannot confine ourselves to mere "cosmetic repairs." We need a fundamentally new constitution, and I will tell you why.

Many of the provisions in the old constitution, particularly in the sphere of human rights, are of a purely declarative nature. They were declared and they sound pretty, but they are only an attractive facade: They were

not secured by the necessary guarantees. Let us turn, for example, to Article 56, Part 2, of the Belorussian Constitution of 1978. It says: "Actions taken in violation of the law by officials exceeding their authority and infringing upon the rights of citizens can be appealed in the courts in the manner prescribed by law." In reality, this was not enforceable, and when many citizens began petitioning the courts after this article appeared, their appeals were rejected on legal grounds—there was no manner prescribed by law. It was not until November 1989 that a union law "On the Legal Procedure of Appealing the Unlawful Actions of Government Agencies and Officials Infringing Upon the Rights of Citizens" was passed and extended to our republic. This is what breathed life into Article 56 of the Belorussian Constitution.

[Correspondent] When the declaration of the state sovereignty of Belorussia was adopted, the Basic Law became legally outdated and obsolete, which is, incidentally, confirmed by the example you cited. The Constitution of 1978 stipulates that union laws will take precedence, whereas the declaration says the opposite.

[Tikhinya] There are many other examples as well, relating to the political and economic systems, forms of ownership, etc. One of the main shortcomings of the existing constitution is the lack of any legal basis for the separation of powers. The rule-of-law state we want rests on three pillars: legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

[Correspondent] You mention "three pillars." Does this mean that there will be no "ideological directives" in the new constitution and that it will simply be a document representing the basis of the new legislation of the sovereign Belorussian state?

[Tikhinya] The text of the constitution will be de-ideologized. I think it will declare popular sovereignty as the source of state power, democracy, and the republican form of government and will affirm the policy line of building a democratic rule-of-law state and the establishment of an open civil society. The Basic Law of the Belorussian SSR will stipulate the new status of the soviets, the basic rights and freedoms of republic citizens, and the legal guarantees of the individual.

The main distinctive feature of the new draft constitution should be, in my opinion, a structural progress from the individual to the state, instead of the opposite, as in the existing constitution. After all, the cornerstone of a rule-of-law state is the guarantee of respect for human dignity and the observance of inalienable human rights.

[Correspondent] The Constitutional Commission which was appointed at the first session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet has been working for two months. Two working groups have been formed. One is headed by V.I. Sholodonov and the other is headed by V.I. Gonchar. Five more subcommissions were recently formed to prepare the draft. You are in charge of coordinating their

activities. Is it too early to discuss the first results of the work on the draft constitution?

[Tikhinya] The structure of the draft, its sections and chapters, has been determined, although all of this is still only tentative, of course.

[Correspondent] Nevertheless...

[Tikhinya] The first section, pertaining to the Belorussian Republic, should define and reinforce the basic features of the Belorussian SSR as a sovereign state, in line with the adopted declaration of independence. It should also define the goals and principles of the political system, the economic structure, the social and cultural development, and the foreign policy of our republic. In the political sphere, for example, these are the establishment of a rule-of-law state, political pluralism, a multi-party system, and glasnost; in the economic sphere, they are a variety of forms of ownership, a transition to market relations, equitable taxation, resource conservation, and environmental protection; in the social and cultural sphere, they are the attainment of the principle of social justice, a new level of spiritual and cultural values, and their material guarantees; in the sphere of international relations, they are the constitutional reinforcement of the renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes and a declaration of the primacy of international law.

I feel that the most important section of the constitution will be the second, tentatively entitled "The Individual, Society, and the State." The civil rights and liberties recorded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki accords, and the final document of the Vienna conference, which have been signed by the Soviet Union, and other international acts should lie at its basis. In this connection, in addition to stipulating the rights and freedoms which are already legally secured, the draft should supplement the status of the Belorussian citizens with such rights as the right to life; the right to freedom of opinions and convictions; the right to ideological, religious, and cultural freedom; the right to obtain and disseminate information; the right to seek compensation for moral damages; the right to move freely and to choose a place of residence; the right to enter and leave the republic freely; the right to a healthy ecological environment; the right to an adequate standard of living; and others.

In contrast to the existing constitution, the new draft will include a separate chapter on family matters and thereby underscore the state's concern for the development of the family as the social nucleus, its role in determining the moral and physical health of the younger generation, and the protection of mothers and children.

By recording these important provisions, we will be stating the universally acknowledged standards of international law in the Basic Law of our state and providing a comprehensive definition of the legal status of the citizen of the Belorussian Republic.

The regulation of matters in sections 3, 4, and 5 should be based on the principle of the separation of powers: legislative, executive, and judicial. The constitution will clearly stipulate the authority of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet as the highest legislative body. It will be necessary to attach special importance to parliamentary oversight of the executive branch, with the possibility of issuing a vote of confidence or no confidence in the administration. The possibility of holding public referendums will also be envisaged and regulated.

[Correspondent] Who will be the head of state? A president?

[Tikhinya] In the present structure the head of state is the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, who essentially represents the speaker. The problem now is, on the one hand, that certain functions are displaced and, on the other, that the chairman lacks several of the powers with which a head of state has traditionally been endowed. A president should be elected by a direct and secret ballot by all citizens of the republic who are eligible to vote.

There will be a separate section on the electoral system. In view of its rapid improvement, there is probably no need to regulate these matters in detail in the constitution itself. It should be sufficient to define the principles and procedures of forming government bodies in the appropriate chapters, with the subsequent detailed explanation of all election-related statutes in special legislation.

The section entitled "Local Self-Government" should define the role and place of soviets of people's deputies in the system of local government and their legal status.

Judicial investigation, the procuracy, and arbitration will also be the subject of a separate section. There will be a separate chapter on constitutional review. No final decision has been made yet on whether there will be a constitutional review committee, a constitutional council, or a constitutional court.

[Correspondent] A constitution obviously should not only declare rights and freedoms, but also stipulate a better mechanism than the present one for their exercise and legal protection.

[Tikhinya] It certainly should. In our work on the draft, we have been aware of the fact that updating virtually all areas of legislation will create the real problem of the correspondence of laws and other legislative instruments to the constitution. All laws will have to be brought in line with the Basic Law.

All subordinate legislation, from government resolutions to departmental orders and instructions, will be subject to constitutional oversight because the primacy of the law primarily means that the constitution and laws passed on behalf of the people and in line with their wishes will take precedence over all other legislative instruments. This will entail the categorical stipulation

of the possibility of publishing subordinate legislation only in direct relationship to laws.

[Correspondent] The new constitution—our ticket to board the progress train—was needed, as one of our contemporary satirists put it, "yesterday." How soon can the Basic Law of our life be brought in line with the changes that are so abundant in it, our life, today?

[Tikhinya] In all probability, it will take more than a few months. The preparation of this kind of document usually takes a long time. This is understandable. The law is so important, and the responsibility for its content is so great.

We can assume that the preparation of the text of the new constitution will take at least 6-8 months, by the most conservative estimates and if we work intensively, and in view of the upcoming public discussion (we must be in time to make preparations for a referendum and to determine the procedure of holding it), the Basic Law of our republic, in our opinion, will be adopted at the end of 1991 or the beginning of 1992.

[Correspondent] You said that the constitution will stipulate the right of the citizen of the republic to an adequate standard of living, a healthy environment, and so forth. In our poverty-stricken and ecologically neglected country, how will this "adequate standard" and "healthy environment" be defined? I, for example, feel that the Swedish standard of living is adequate, but what about you?

[Tikhinya] I appreciate your sarcasm, and you have every reason to resort to it. This is why we are relying on international experience in our work. On my desk you can see the texts of the U.S. and Swedish constitutions. We are seeking and investigating everything of value in the world in connection with constitutional reform and everything that is being done in the West in this area today, especially in the countries where the construction of a democratic rule-of-law state has been declared—the previously mentioned Sweden (incidentally, its constitution of 1974 is extremely progressive), Italy, France, Spain, the FRG, Denmark....

The Constitution—the Basic Law—will stipulate your right to an "adequate standard of living" and will guarantee that secondary laws will secure this standard. You, the voter (after all, popular democracy will also be stipulated in the constitution), will decide with your vote whether the constitution your elected representatives—people's deputies—have approved is securing a standard of living you deem adequate.

[Correspondent] As a voter, I do not know, but as a journalist, I certainly will, and I think that the discussion of the new constitution has not ended, but will go on....

After this interview has been published, what if other voters should want to take part in drafting a Basic Law guaranteeing them such civilized rights and freedoms now, without waiting for a referendum?

[Tikhinya] They can send their suggestions either to the republic Supreme Soviet or to the subcommissions. I will list them: "The Belorussian SSR—A Sovereign State" (tel: 29-68-93); "The Individual, the Society, and the State" (25-30-32); "The Electoral System" and "Constitutional Review" (33-33-11); "Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Powers" and "Local Bodies of Government Authority and Administration" (29-69-04); "Judicial Investigation, the Procuracy, and Arbitration" and "Enforcement of Constitution of the Belorussian SSR and Amendment Procedure" (29-67-71).

[Correspondent] I think you can expect some letters. I wish you, Valeriy Guryevich, and all of those who are working on the new constitution, productive and successful work for the good of the citizens of the sovereign state of Belorussia.

[Tikhinya] Thank you.

Virtual Creation of Moldavian Army Noted

91UN0227A Moscow TRUD in Russian 1 Nov 90 p 1

[Article by P. Rashkov: "Moldavia: A National Army Is Being Created"]

[Text] Chimishliya—With the help of television almost the whole republic witnessed an event that was quite out of the ordinary, especially given the conditions that have now developed in the region.

In the village of Chimishliya (located here at present is the headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and a provisional committee of the Moldova Supreme Soviet that was organized to provide a special form of management for the rayons densely populated by Gagauz), the transfer was made to the "Tiras-Tigina" battalion (this is what the new military subunit that was established here on the basis of a detachment of volunteers is called) of a column of new buses and trucks that were acquired through resources specially collected from the residents of the republic. Opening the ceremony held on this occasion, M. Druk, the prime minister of Moldova, remarked that the presentation of the equipment virtually signified the creation of a national army, and he expressed the hope that, with time, the battalion will grow into a division, and that it will enter into the history of the republic forever.

And the collection of resources for these purposes is continuing. As national television also reported, in a few days more than a quarter of a million rubles was contributed to a special account of the assistance fund for volunteer detachments.

It was quite difficult for representatives of the press, especially for journalists from out-of-town newspapers, to describe the latest events in this region: not only in rayons densely populated by Gagauz, but even in Chimishliya itself—although state of emergency conditions do not apply in this settlement, it was difficult to get there. And so my identification at the entrance to the

settlement was studied long and carefully by a volunteer detail, and afterwards I was escorted by them to the headquarters, guarded by submachine gunners, where the commandant wrote out a pass for travel only in Chimishliya—as before, I was not allowed to go in the direction of Komrat. They promised, of course, to let me do this in the event that the Provisional Committee, which was organized by a decree of the Moldova Supreme Soviet, was relocated there.

And, nevertheless, the work conditions of the journalists are changing—a news conference was held in Chimishliya in which M. Druk, the prime minister of Moldova, took part. It was announced that the Provisional Committee has so far been unable to execute its duties fully, because it is compelled to remain in Chimishliya—it is not permitted to go to Komrat at present.

But intensive negotiations were under way in Komrat between A. Sangeli, chairman of the Provisional Committee, and representatives of the Gagauz Provisional Committee, with the participation of Colonel General Yu. Shatalin. However, no promising results were achieved. Moreover, the vehicle of the Chairman of the Provisional Committee of the Moldova Supreme Soviet—I. Stash, minister of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of the republic, was also in it—was blockaded in Komrat. It took a lot of effort for the participants in the negotiations to be able in the end to drive without hindrance to the helicopter that took them to Komrat. The congress of deputies met on that same day in Komrat until late at night, despite the emergency situation.

In short, although the situation in the republic and the region is under control, it remains complicated and intense.

* * *

While this issue of the newspaper was being made up, our correspondent reported that on 31 October he was issued a pass to the zone where an emergency situation was declared, and he arrived in Komrat. The situation here is calm, and a normal daily routine is being observed, although new mail was not delivered for several days, and medicines and fuel oil have stopped coming in.

Appeal To Implement Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Decree On Army Service

91UN0016B Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 19 Sep 90 p 1

[Appeal by A. Matviyenko, the head of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission of Youth Affairs: "Return the Small Hawks!"]

[Text] A Copy: The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Head of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, Maslov, V. A.

In connection with the fact that numerous citizens have returned, [from military service] the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission of Youth Affairs has examined the course of the execution of the resolution of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet "Regarding the observance of the term of military service of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR and the use of workers in the civil defense organs of the republic beyond its borders."

Information was heard that was given by the members of the commission, the official representatives of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and the Kiev military district. It has been established that specific measures are being taken in order to increase the likelihood that military terms of service for citizens of the Ukrainian SSR will be served on its territory. A number of military service people and workers of the civil defense organs have been called back from the regions of internationality conflicts.

In addition to this, the commission thinks that the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and other state institutions of the republic and the USSR are not making a sufficient enough effort to insure that the resolutions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet are being executed to their full extent. The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers has not established a necessary mechanism to insure its [resolutions] are realized, it has not consulted with the Union administration with the aim of introducing changes to the current jurisprudence, in accordance with which the passage of military service is determined by the legislation of the USSR.

The USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Ministry of Defense have in fact not reacted to the resolution of the higher legislative organ of the republic.

In turn, the commission, which has accepted the aforementioned resolution, thinks that the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet has also not taken into account to a complete extent the real possibilities for its execution in the set period of time for doing so.

All this lessens the authority of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, encourages the growth of civic tension during the call-up period which is now beginning. It is known that the situation has already led to conflicts among the military organs, which have been forced to follow normative acts, which have not lost their judicial authority; and that the local authority in certain regions and some civic associations of the republic, are demanding that action be taken in accordance to the resolution of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Taking into account the aforementioned matters, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission of Youth Affairs has resolved the following:

1. To present the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium with a proposition to periodically analyze the course of the execution of the resolution of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet "Regarding the observance of

the term of military service of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR and the use of workers in the civil defense organs of the republic beyond its borders;" to evaluate the work of the state institutions of the republic and the USSR, and to pass the appropriate resolutions. In case the need arises, to include this issue among those at the top of the agenda of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet 2nd Congress, to specify more exactly the deadline set for executing the resolution, which is provided for in the bill.

2. To propose a mechanism which is to execute resolutions that have been passed;

—to introduce necessary changes to the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR;

—to create in the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet a commission of deputies which is to be responsible for the issue of defense and state security; [to create] in the structure of the Council of Ministers of the republic—a committee that is to be responsible for relations with the USSR Ministry of Defense; to renew the military-mobile divisions in the judicial committees of the local councils;

—to create a centralized-republic military committee;

—to examine the status and the real role of the call-up commissions; to propose to the local organs of authority to take under their special control and to re-orient them [the call-up commissions] so that they defend the citizens' interests;

—to immediately begin consulting the union government with the aim of examining the conditions of the call-up to the ranks of the armed forces of the USSR. Specifically, to determine the minimal necessary percent of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR to be included [in these armed forces of the USSR] that are to serve their military term of duty beyond the borders of the republic on a voluntary basis, at the same time to consider granting [such recruits] relief in the form of shortening their length of service, offering them the right to choose which branch of the armed forces they want to serve in, and to establish contractual type of relations, and so on;

—to create an alternative service in various branches of the republic's economy;

3. To publish the resolutions of the commission in the press.

Rukh Head On Independent Ukrainian Army

*91UN0016A Kiev LITERATURNA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 13 Sept 90 p 4*

[Interview with Ivan Drach, head of Rukh, by a LITERATURNA UKRAYINA correspondent: "Unite What Is Traditional With What Is Modern"]

[Text] [Correspondent] When at the first session of today's Parliament of the Ukraine the issue concerning

the armed forces of the Ukrainian SSR arose, when the discussion began about the clause concerning the armed forces in the Declaration of Sovereignty, what were you thinking about above all else?

[Drach] You know that when the declaration concerning our sovereignty was being discussed, I advanced the idea that the Ukraine in the future should be a permanently neutral nation and that it should adhere to the three nuclear-free principles... Why do I mention this? Because here one immediately sees some kind of contradiction: on the one hand, we are struggling to have armed forces (it thus generally understood that there can be no type of sovereignty when there are no defense forces); and on the other hand, we have proclaimed permanent neutrality, no nuclear power... But, if one is to think realistically and sharply then it becomes understandable that there no contradictions here.

Immediately after our declaration, after two weeks, Belorussia passed a similar document in which the same kind of principles were proclaimed. This is an answer to the claims and fears of many international circles, which are interested in seeing our Soviet Empire being preserved—because they think that only when the hand of Gorbachev is at the atomic control panel, then there is an opportunity to preserve peace; but when these atomic weapons will be scattered in “national quarters” of the sort like Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, the Ukraine, and others—this will, so to speak, complicate the international situation to a great degree, destabilizing it. And that is why when we—Belorussia, the Ukraine, and other republics—offer to reject strategic armaments and give them away, for example, to Yeltsin (in which case, in the hands of only Russia)—then in this manner we may take away the big trump cards from international journalism, various political scientists, and advisors, who fear, for example, that Armenia will want to even the score with Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan with Kirghizia, and so on.

Just this fact should have been thought over, and the main point is that it should be reflected in the Declaration of the Ukraine's sovereignty.

The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet has resolved that the Ukraine's children should serve on its territory. This is the first step in establishing our armed forces. It is understood that slowly, gradually the army will become a Ukrainian Army. Naturally, the issued here also concerns the language to be used in this army, and the control to be exercised by the Association of Soldiers' Mothers of the Ukraine. In general, all the mothers of the Ukraine are to some extent tied to the army; naturally it is much easier for the youths to manage in the environment of the Ukraine itself, instead of filling up the ranks in the Pacific Ocean Fleet, so to speak, with our flesh and blood, to serve somewhere out there in Kamchatka or in the Baltic region. What sense is there for the residents of the Ukraine to fill up the ranks of all of those imperial structures... And that is why the majority of deputies of the Parliament—despite whatever convictions they may hold—nonetheless have agreed on all of this. I remember

well that in the most responsible, painful moment, when during the voting, words were said that our children should serve on the territory of the Ukraine—this was the most critical point during the entire discussion of the declaration. And then 226 individuals voted “yea”. Everyone suffered the most just in these moments...

[Correspondent] Then in Parliament a proposition was proclaimed that the minister of defense of sovereign Ukraine was to be a woman...

[Drach] I do not know whether the minister is to be a woman or a man, but that this must be a civil person, this is incontestable. Even the principle will be confirmed that we are shifting from being a militarized area to a demilitarized one. If this individual is to be a humanitarian—this too would be a good, correct step.

[Correspondent] What kind of historical tradition in the Ukrainian military will the future army model itself on?

[Drach] When one thinks about what kind of army this is to be, what kind of external appearance its military, service people will have, then in this area our master artists of costume design and artists, will have a wide range to work with. They can consider simply the external “uniform” traditional dress of the Zaporozhians [Cossacks] or the Sich Riflemen. But the main thing does not involve this. But it lies in something else. The matter at hand lies at the very essence of the issue. First of all, there should be such an army [a national one]. And sooner or later all of the sovereign republics will get to this point!

[Correspondent] This army, in your view, should it be professional?

[Drach] I guess that it would have to be made up of two sections. Professionals are needed for the real army. And the other part [is to consist of] a certain type of service unit of a parade or decorative character. It would guard the Supreme Soviet in Kiev, the sacred, state historical places in Kharkov and Lvov. For these units one could have service for a set term—at least until we begin to set up our army.

[Correspondent] Will the causes for and the incidents of “hazing” disappear when there is a shift to a republic army?

[Drach] I guess that they must disappear for several reasons. For if we would have our own army, then this would be a national army, and it would bear the tradition of our historical kin and flesh. Service in it would be especially attractive to youths; high moral qualities of the future warriors will be established still in the kindergarten, and then—in children's organizations, whatever they may be called: “boy scouts” or “Cossacks” or... In a word, service will not have the character of exercising such a terrible degree of discrimination against a person, of deforming him, which is what “hazing” is all about, which nothing can be done about now. In addition to this, when the army's scope of activity will be limited (to

the territory of the Ukraine)—there will appear a real possibility for parents to control how their children will serve.

For the Association of Soldiers' Mothers of the Ukraine I see a great future; therefore, the force of the influence of the family on the army—this is in fact the influence of the people of the Ukraine on its army, on how they will live and what they will do with our children. In this manner, the Ukrainian army should become imbued with a humanistic character.

[Correspondent] In other words, you perhaps, are adhering to the idea that the roots of "hazing" are in the structure, in the model of our supra-nation, where the center is in the union republics, in the autonomous republics, the oblasts, where there are younger and older brothers...

[Drach] Yes, the structure of the army reflects the structure of our empire. The situation in the army is an X-ray picture of the situation in which our society is ill with imperialism.

[Correspondent] To what extent is our historical experience to be marked by the army of the Ukraine?

[Drach] Naturally, the old traditions should be preserved. But let us not forget that we live in the present, in a very technological world; thus we will have a very modern army that shall incorporate the traditions of the contemporary American, French, and Japanese armies—whether we want this or not.

The traditions of the Zaporozhians [Cossacks] and of the Sich Riflemen should be united with those of the present, in order to, on the one hand, not have an army of technological worker-soldiers, and on the other hand—in order to not let matters degenerate to merely to having forces dressed in traditional military uniforms...

[Correspondent] But perhaps more "ethnographism" is to be allowed for the national guard? One imagines model divisions, which would take part in ritual meetings with the leaders of other nations and at the airport...

[Drach] There should be a national guard and it should protect the President of the Ukraine (when one will be really chosen by the people, a President chosen [by an election] of multi-parties). Looking at the situation in general terms, the buds of our army will grow from the buds of our statehood, from our sovereignty. We still slowly grow and mature—and slowly our understanding of an army will grow. We aspire, to finally, get away from having the army being a place where our youth is grist for the mill, a place of sapping our young blood, a place where Russification occurs.

Two Opposing Views of Rukh

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[Interviews with Ivan Drach, people's deputy and chairman of Rukh, and Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, by Andriy Derepa]

[Text] **October 25-28 the second All-Ukrainian Congress of the Ukrainian National Movement for Restructuring (Rukh) will be held in Kiev's Palace of Culture 'Ukraina'. The press center of this important movement in community political life of the republic submitted the following interviews with two individuals, who stood at the floodgates of this movement, although they hold opposing viewpoints. We believe our readers will be interested in knowing how their views of the problem have changed in the year since the Founding Congress of Rukh. It has only been a year, but how swiftly time flies!**

The Last Refuge of Freedom

[Depera] You prefaced your speech before the Founding Congress of Rukh with the following: "Swords raged, and horses ran without riders, and the Polovtsi did not recognize each other..." This excerpt from the novel "Vershnyky" clearly emphasized your familiarity with the Ukraine's history of the Soviet period - following the 'hot' World war, the 'cold' war actually never ended. What is your opinion now, one year after the Founding Congress, of the situation in the Ukraine: is this permanent 'cold' civil war continuing, or are we approaching any nearer to the politics of compromise and new thinking?

[Drach] We have not yet reached the stage of normal thinking, and I do not know how soon we will get there. True, in the last year we have come closer to differentiating more clearly the allegiances of the Polovtsi brothers, to return to the famous novel of Yuriy Yanovskyy, as well as the reflection from the swords, which smithy shops forged them, which whetstones were used to sharpen them, and how they work. Understandably, confrontations occur in differing ways in the various regions of the Ukraine, and now we see the situation more clearly. It has become more difficult, and at the same time gives us greater perspective for hope.

[Depera] How do you evaluate the process of meeting the principal goals of the Rukh program, accepted at the Founding Congress?

[Drach] We could say that the activities of Rukh were carried out along two separate paths. The first - the affirmation of national self-identity of the people and the attempt to clarify the position of one or the other segment of the population, making each more socially acceptable - was best exemplified by two events. One - the human chain on the anniversary of the unification of the Ukrainian National Republic and the Western Ukrainian National Republic at the end of January of this year. Two - the celebration of the Days of Cossack

Glory at the beginning of August. As a community-oriented political organization we concentrated on organizing these two events, and they had a significant impact on the reawakening of national self-identity. The second path of our activity, toward creation of a self-governing nation, which to a great extent defined the activities of Rukh, has best been exemplified by the successes of the last elections, in which Rukh delegates were victorious at all levels, and the significance of today's Supreme Soviet and the National Council, the majority of whose members are Rukh delegates. Also worthy of mention is the propaganda significance of the republic's television, whose daily broadcasts of the Supreme Soviet's sessions serves to inform the people of the ideas and positions of Rukh. This is also one of Rukh's achievements, and many other aspects of its work could also be cited. This could include medical aid to the children who suffered after the Chernobyl catastrophe, and our contacts with the diaspora in Poland, Germany, Canada, the U.S.A., etc.

[Depera] In other words, you are saying that Rukh has truly become a political force?

[Drach] I think that only a deaf or mute politician could ignore the activities of Rukh, which presents the greatest opposition to the official party apparatus, whose aim is to bring about change in such a way that actually nothing changes: that the leadership of the society remain in the hands of the Communist Party, and pluralism remains only as an apparent calling card of our society. In actuality, this pluralism exists only to the extent of 0.01 percent. The parties which have been formed to date: the Ukrainian Republican Party, the National Democrats, and the Peasant Democratic, created from the Democratic party, have not been present on the political playing board long enough to create an impact. Individuals within these parties have made themselves known in the system, but in general there is only the Democratic Bloc, and Rukh as a whole.

[Depera] During the Founding Congress of Rukh, its leaders stated their willingness to cooperate with all progressive political elements and parties, even including the CPSU. In my opinion, no such cooperation is evident. How would you explain this?

[Drach] That is not completely accurate; after all, in order to ratify the Declaration of National Sovereignty a degree of consolidation, at least in some positions, must have been achieved. Do you remember when the proposition that our children serve their military duty within the Ukrainian territory was approved by 226 deputies? And that 144 deputies gave their votes to elect Ihor Yukhnivskyy as chairman of the Supreme Soviet - that was the highest vote count for the National Council. This means that these 86 votes had to come from somewhere! I myself believe that these 86 votes represent the chance to steal a few from the agrarian bloc, from the directorate bloc, from the existing party majority. If the Supreme Soviet were visited two or three times not by 10 - 20 thousand Kievans, but 200 - 300 thousand or half a

million, as was the case when the blue and yellow flag was unfurled before the City Council, then these same agrarians, and directors, and party members would view us differently.

[Depera] After the conclusion of the first session, in an appearance before his constituents in Vinnytsia Oblast, Supreme Soviet Chairman Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk confirmed the impossibility of any consolidation between the parliamentary majority - the group favoring a sovereign socialist Ukraine - with the National Council. Do you agree with this opinion, and how then do you see the future of the Supreme Soviet of the republic?

[Drach] I still expect there will be situations when Supreme Soviet members will unite. Although I do not exclude the possibility of very critical situations, which could lead to the recall of part of our delegates. I think that Rukh should already prepare for that eventuality. We should pinpoint the most visible representatives of the reactionary group and do the appropriate work around them with our people.

[Depera] Will the Second Congress of Rukh look into the proposals for a new Congress Union Treaty and if so, what is your position in this matter?

[Drach] I believe that currently the majority stands against a Union Treaty. If only from the aspect that we should finally achieve the realization of the postulates contained in the Ukrainian Declaration of Sovereignty. We ourselves should decide how this independence is to be manifested, and only then can we think of any agreements with others. In this, I believe, we have the support of most of the nation.

[Depera] The Second Session of the Supreme Soviet has scheduled a discussion of several legislative proposals for establishing a free market system within the republic. However, unlike the RSFSR, the Ukraine has no program of its own for such a transition. Would it not be a good idea for Rukh to develop its own proposal for such a program?

[Drach] I think this problem complicates our lives today. If we were not constituents of the Supreme Soviet, for you realize that seven of the permanent committees are chaired by members of the Democratic Bloc, then perhaps Volodymyr Panchuk, or Chernyak, or someone else could create an alternative program in opposition to the one being developed by our government. Perhaps we are approaching the time when we should organize a 'shadow' cabinet. This was discussed at the last meeting of the National Council and one such possibility exists, headed by Volodymyr Chernyak. Then we can develop our own systems, our own models. It is unfortunate that we have no models prepared. I believe that if we had at least two or three potential models of economic reform planned, it would be much simpler to find the optimum variant. But for now this is one of our weaknesses.

[Depera] Do you not think, in this connection, Ivan Fedorovych, that it would be proper in some manner to change, to improve the organizational structure of Rukh?

[Drach] I believe that the leadership of Rukh should be reorganized. We cannot continue to work as we have to date. We, and the Council of Peers, and the Council of Representatives, concern ourselves with one or another concrete situation, a separate problem, without any continuity, persistent, and intractable work being pursued. In this we are all at fault, first of all Council of Representatives Chairman Volodymyr Yavorivskyy, and Council of Peers Chairman Volodymyr Chernyak, and of course myself, as the chairman of Rukh, that these mechanisms operated at far from maximum power.

[Depera] What position do you hold regarding the idea expressed this Spring that Rukh should become a political party?

[Drach] No, Rukh should not become a party. Various parties, organizations, and community associations can be part of Rukh, and it can unite Communists, and republicans, and democrats, and Catholics, and Orthodox - all the people of the Ukraine. This should be a movement of community-minded individuals, personalities. Quite a few people refuse to be associated with any party at all, after years of belonging to one party which usurped everything in the world. I think that for these people Rukh can be a refuge of that freedom, which Oles Honchar described in his novel "Sobor" when he said: "...art is the last refuge of freedom". Rukh can serve those people who do not want to actively belong to any organization, but do want to help occasionally, when they have time. Rukh should continue our good traditions, and the traditions of Mahatma Ghandi, and Martin Luther King, and look to the philosophy of Skovoroda, and the work of the Society of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, on the traditions of the Zaporozhan Cossacks, and on all the good traditions of our nation.

[Depera] Now, Ivan Fedorovych, I would like you to comment on the relationship between Rukh and religion. In newspapers columns and from officials of the Russian Orthodox Church, we have heard accusations that Rukh is participating in interreligious conflicts.

[Drach] I believe that if representatives of Rukh participate in such conflicts, then they are not doing the right thing, because they should support all national religions. In Western Ukraine, for example, there is conflict between Greek Catholics, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian Orthodox Church is diminishing in membership, while the other two are growing. Here Rukh must use extreme tact and reserve and support everything which would deter conflicts reminiscent of the horrors of the Middle Ages, which have often developed in the parishes in Galicia. Regarding Central Ukraine, we should support the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, because this is our national church. It

was essentially destroyed by Stalin in the 1930's, and we must support it with all our might.

[Depera] One last question, under the influence of an article published recently in PRAVDA: "So what kind of Ukraine do they want?" What kind of Ukraine, not according to PRAVDA, but truthfully, do you envision?

[Drach] We hope for a sovereign, independent and democratic Ukraine. We want the Individual within this Ukraine to be free, independent and sovereign. We continually emphasize this. Often, when others speak of an independent Ukraine they forget that its leader could become a dictator similar to Ceaucescu. This is why this must be a free and democratic structure. We support such a structure.

* * *

Political Confrontation Superseded the Desire to Reach Agreement

[Depera] It is widely known, Leonid Makarovych, that you were present at the Founding Congress of Rukh, and maintained an active relationship with the organization. So much so, that many people are firmly convinced that Kravchuk has built a career around confrontation with Rukh. How would you comment on this?

[Kravchuk] You understand very well, that now, as was true a year ago, there was and still is a political battle. If Rukh did not exist, there would be something else. Because as soon as we announced a path toward democracy, for pluralism, for independence, immediately there arose polar, diametrically opposing political platforms and groups of people who supported these platforms. The fact that Rukh with its programs occupies the political proscenium of the republic is nothing unusual. This is a reality, and the fact that there exists the Ukrainian Communist Party with its program is also a reality. And where these two points of view met, it became necessary to explain their positions to the people. The differences were known to us from the start. I knew what Rukh wanted, and Rukh knew what the Communist Party wanted as well. And even now we are aware of our positions. But the Ukrainian people are not so certain even now what it is that Rukh is trying to achieve, and they are not aware of the totality of the programs of the Communists in the republic. Specifically, the people do not all understand why these goals are not being met.

[Depera] A year has gone by since the Founding Congress of Rukh, during which you heard essentially all the speeches and declarations, familiarized yourself with the ratified documents and program of Rukh. How would you evaluate, in general, Rukh's activities in the past year, as constructive or destructive?

[Kravchuk] I would rather comment on something else. The goals which Rukh put forward at the Founding Congress have not been attained. Instead of one Rukh, today we have a large number of parties. Today Rukh,

from my point of view, no longer has an organizational monopoly, it can no longer say that it represents the only democratic front, the only forces, the only positions, and that it works following one program. Bear in mind that in this time Rukh has spawned a whole series of political parties, each with its own program and by-laws. Which brings up an elementary question: what platform will a party that emerged from Rukh support? Its own or that of Rukh? What platform, for example, does the Ukrainian Republican Party follow? Its own! Then where has the program of Rukh disappeared? I am trying to say that Rukh has begun, as they say, to fall apart.

But at the same time Rukh was instrumental in the appearance of progressive ideas. I cannot say that it has and continues to exist as a negative. We must be honest here and admit that the ideals of sovereignty, of economic independence, of privatization, were included in the first platform of Rukh. But I continue to state, for myself and for Rukh, that ideas are ideas, and their implementation is something quite different. I would like to see Rukh not only coming up with ideas, but also carrying them out successfully. It would be proper to ask why the leaders of Rukh, who are people's deputies and commission heads, do not strive to enact their own goals. Especially since there is so much to do. For example, there are shortages everywhere. This may be laying it on too thick, and would be striking too close to home, but so be it: Rukh should take on the problem of trade and investigate what is going on today, explain to the people what the problem is, and then come forth before the government with concrete proposals for improvements. This would be beneficial assistance. Or, for example, look into the problem of speculation, of various illegal cooperatives that exist, to the detriment of the people. The economy today is on the edge of collapse, and each person should look to his own responsibility. This is a fact - an economic catastrophe! Which means that everyone should pick up the harness straps and pull forward. Together! Regardless of the platform one supports. But this is not being done. The political problem of defining who is who is still foremost. The one who espouses the greatest and most radical ideas and plans seems to hold the most favor with the people. Yes, the programs are radical, the ideas are valuable, yet life is terrible. This is the problem. The same problem confronts Rukh. Their valuable ideas and radical stands have not led to any noticeable changes. Yet I would not say this is the fault of any individual. I myself have not stood in the way of any radical programs and have no intention of doing so. It is frightening that some members of Rukh have shown themselves to be organizers of a movement against existing laws, calling for brutality and violence. So what kind of democratic organization is this?

[Depera] In your speech before the Founding Congress of Rukh, you did not dispute the possibility of cooperation between the Ukrainian Communist Party and Rukh, and the leaders of Rukh did not contradict this either. Obviously, these are the two largest and strongest

political forces in the Ukraine today. But in practice, during the last year, no such cooperation was evident. Why, in your opinion?

[Kravchuk] The programs and ideas of Rukh, and the progressive ideas in the programs of the Ukrainian Communist Party, cannot be looked at as insubstantial, as 'Fata Morgana'. They are put forth by real individuals. And it is these very individuals, on one or the other side, who have not been able to meet as political entities, and fuse the progressive ideas which exist on both sides. It seems that political confrontation took precedence over the desire for compromise. Both sides are at fault. But these days the representatives of Rukh in some regions have declared a 'holy war' against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, making threats and intimidation. In these circumstances it is difficult to speak of cooperation.

[Depera] Thank you for answering with such openness and sincerity, Leonid Makarovych. But now I would like to return to your last press conference in the Supreme Soviet of the republic. You stated that the crisis throughout the Soviet Union today can only be resolved if all the republics work together, that it is unlikely the Ukraine could deal with the crisis on its own. But, Leonid Makarovych, how does that explain the success of small countries such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which have declared their independence and national sovereignty? I do not think they are unaware of where they are heading and the results of their actions. Is it possible they have greater resources and economic opportunities to come through the crisis alone, than the Ukraine?

[Kravchuk] The point is that they continue to benefit from imports from Russia and other republics. These are only generalities, when one hears that they are being restricted. Common tactics. But to date no one has cut them off from natural resources - gas, electricity, oil. As I see the problem, it is easier for a small republic to exist and pursue such a course, than it would be for a large one. Our size and scale is too great, we cannot just declare it so, and follow the lead of the Baltic nations. We have our trade agreements to meet, and others have obligations to us. If we were to nullify them completely, all at once, then the question would arise: how are we to live? How will we deal with energy needs, when the Ukraine produces only 7 percent of its own natural gas, importing 93 percent from the other Soviet republics? This is not a matter of agreements. We must decide what we are capable of doing for ourselves, and what we cannot do alone. At present we cannot exist without ties to the other republics, for we do not even have enough goods with which to begin trade with the outside world.

[Depera] The RSFSR has already made independent trade agreements with 7 - 8 Soviet republics regarding mutually beneficial economic trade. What is to stop the Ukraine from making similar agreements with the Russian Federation for mutual trade and free market sale of

the necessary natural resources and strategic materials? Do you not think that our republic is lagging behind in these possibilities?

[Kravchuk] Possibly we are lagging behind in trade agreements. But we are not concerned with making agreements now, we are setting up the protocol for economic treaties. Both regarding governments and national plans. We have already laid the groundwork for this with 12 republics. In addition, we are supporting the signing of contracts between businesses in the various republics. This could be compared to the system in the capitalist world, where each business has its suppliers and buyers, with whom he deals year after year. They do their work without any problems. If the market is flooded with some product, the business will seek out and choose the supplier with the best and highest quality. In turn, his products will be purchased if they are better and cheaper than those of others. Now, whatever is produced is marketed, because all goods are scarce. Do you see what is happening?

[Depera] Currently no serious economist denies the advantages of the free market system of 'producer - supplier - consumer'. As you know, the Russian Republic has already implemented the Program of '500 Days', raising wholesale meat prices to 400 rubles per metric ton. In our republic prices remain at half that level. There is the danger that this price difference will lead to the export of meat from the Ukraine. How can our republic counteract this?

[Kravchuk] We can also raise wholesale prices, or raise retail prices, providing compensation to the buyers in some other way. But this must be done quickly.

[Depera] The Supreme Soviet Presidium of the republic has, with a majority of votes, decided to include in the agenda of the second session of our parliament the question of sending a delegation from the Ukraine to participate in the preparation of a new Union Treaty. The opposition - the National Council - categorically opposes even the idea of such a treaty. Do you not think, Leonid Makarovych, that the question of the Union Treaty could become the 'apple of dissention' within our parliament between the National Council and its majority, thereby creating a parliamentary crisis?

[Kravchuk] No, I do not think this will happen. If the National Council were to concentrate on the essence... The fact of the matter is that I do not see a Union Treaty as anything everlasting. I see it as a necessity now, to get out of a difficult situation, on the road to sovereignty. Once we are able to live and independently act on decisions, then we will no longer need this superstructure. For now, understand, we are limited to living within the bounds of today's meager technology as it exists in our country. To compare our level of technology with that, say, of Japan, would be impossible. Our products are worthless there! How can we compete? So we must live within our existing economic limits for now, until, taking advantage of generally available

potential, we can raise our level. Then we will be able to decide our future. I do not wish to offend anyone, but some of the deputies do not know or understand this. Therefore they make statements such as: if only the republic were to become completely independent - tomorrow there would be plenty of everything. This is an illusion. This is well understood by sociologists outside the country, and Ukrainians as well, who say that we cannot uplift the Ukraine on our own. We need help.

[Depera] You have stated several times that the Ukraine has embarked on the road to sovereignty. How long will we pursue this course?

[Kravchuk] Consider the level we must achieve, how far up we set our goal. In order to become a civilized, technologically and economically up-to-date nation, to modernize the villages, create an infrastructure - most important is the economy - we would need... if we manage to do it all in ten years, that would be laudable.

[Depera] Last of all, Leonid Makarovych, would you have anything against participating in the Second Congress of Rukh?

[Kravchuk] You know, I would like to do so, but... I want the people to understand that the Supreme Soviet chairman can belong to any one or other party, but should concentrate his work primarily within the Supreme Soviet. And I do not have enough time to just sit and listen at the Congress.

Rukh Deputy On Achievements, Prospects of Organization

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22 Sep 90 p 1, 2*

[Interview with Yuriy Hnatkevych, Rukh deputy, by Andriy Derepa: "A Pike in the Pond Keeps the Carp Alert"]

[Text] [Derepa] You were a participant of the founding congress of Rukh, which passed its statute and program of activities. I understand that this program was not created to cover one year, and not even "500 days." Yet, nonetheless, Yuriy Vasylovych, how would you judge Rukh's performance during the last year?

[Hnatkevych] I will immediately say that Rukh to a great extent fulfilled its task. Though, as you recall, at first Rukh planned to create a structure of the type which would assist the Party in the process of perestroika. But very soon it became apparent that the leading structures of the Communist Party were simply not prepared for perestroika. It, in fact, was not needed by them, because the realization of the perestroika plans, especially the economic plan, would make the entire Party and state-bureaucratic apparatus unnecessary. And the powerful instinct of self-preservation forced it [the Party], and forces it still today, to conduct stubborn resistance to any kind of reforms. And the main thing—Rukh's service, in my view, lies precisely in the fact that it explained many

things to the people, how to act, how reforms should take place, what kind of perspectives we have, both political and economic.

Though it is worthwhile to note that our Rukh, for understandable reasons, did not have a significant, general political or economic orientation to its activity; its orientation was more nationalistic in nature. It is a secret to no one that in Eastern Ukraine, in the south of our republic the greater majority of the people in answering the question "what nationality are you?" answer: "Ukrainian" [term written with a Russian pronunciation], because they cannot or do not want to pronounce the word "Ukrainian" [term written with a Ukrainian pronunciation]. And the scheming of the official propaganda directed at Rukh's so-called "nationalism", understandably, only frightened a certain number of people away from us. Precisely because of this Rukh was not able to completely fulfill its mission. And if it was not able, then, obviously, it should continue to live on, finding new paths, with which to appeal to all of the people's reason.

[Derepa] What is your attitude personally to the idea that has already been voiced about the fact that Rukh could be reorganized into a political party?

[Hnatkevych] I am an adherent to the idea that Rukh should not change into any kind of party. It should remain the "umbrella," under which there would be enough room for all the existing parties, because our parties today are still very small and do not have considerable social support. In fact, none of the parties that are in our midst have a sufficient enough degree of support, authority, and popularity among the people in order to become an independent political power. The Communist Party has lost its authority and popularity among the people, and I do not see any hopes for its renewal and rebirth. The republic party—this is a sound party, but it is still small in terms of numbers and in a nascent stage of its development. Other parties... If I, as a people's deputy, who am interested in politics, do not know anything about their activity, about their programs, what can one say about the man in the street.

It seems to me that Rukh should at its present stage think about something of this sort. The newly elected Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has passed a number of laws; it will pass new ones; there will be reforms, against which, I am convinced, the apparatus will continue to show resistance. Only the Supreme Soviet, I have in mind the People's Council, is hardly capable of overcoming this resistance. That is why Rukh should create such structures in areas; perhaps, these will be some kind of civic organizations or self-administered committees, by means of which the initiatives of ordinary people, workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia, would force even the apparatus and the leading circles to put these laws and ideas into practice in life.

[Derepa] Therefore, insofar as I understand, you are advocating a certain type of perestroika within Rukh?

[Hnatkevych] Yes, I think, that the leadership of Rukh should be changed to a considerable degree. There they need people, who would occupy themselves only with Rukh in a professional manner! And who would not be responsible for a lot of other deputy-like or civic affairs. Obviously, one must think through and change the very structure of the organization. I think it would be in conformity to this aim to undertake a rigorous review of all the members of Rukh and to grant membership not only to individuals, but also to civic organizations; [we need to also] think more about the materials, which need to be propagated. And to constantly put before ourselves concrete tasks—both long range and tactical ones. One must follow the example of the former Bolshevik party—the tie with the masses should be with individual people, through the press. And precisely because of the fact that we do not have a press (NARODNA GAZETA, SLOVO—these are drop in the ocean), we lose out a lot.

[Derepa] I do not think that Rukh would want to have and to develop its own press. But as you know well yourself, how difficult this is to do in view of the fact that the CPSU has a monopoly of the entire printing base and television-radio communication...

[Hnatkevych] In my view, in this case the Communist Party, beginning, practically, from 1917, has made and continues to make one of its fatal mistakes. In the civilized world, or, as we say, among the nations with a developed democracy, the ruling parties necessarily even stimulated their opponents, the opposition, to continue existing. For, as the people's deputy of the USSR, the rector of the KPI [Kiev Polytechnic Institute], Petro Talanchuk states: "That is why there is a pike in the pond, so the carp would be alert." So then in our society we need such "pikes," which would not let our leaders fall asleep.

[Derepa] I guess that in the near future the number one issue in the political life of the republic and the nation as a whole will be the new union treaty. It cannot be avoided at the 2nd Congress of Rukh. What is your position on this issue?

[Hnatkevych] In regards to the union treaty, at the moment I can offer three main points of view concerning this issue. The first one is based on the fact that no type of union treaty is needed. The second point of view is also that obviously, nations should immediately renew the union treaty and that the Ukraine should enter into it. And there is a middle position between these points of view, which is based on the fact that it does not contradict the idea itself of a union treaty. But the matter at hand here, is how to conclude it, when, and in what type of conditions? I hold the position, closest to the third position. I think that every nation, like a person, when he or she decides an important question, takes into account two factors. The first—this is historical experience. And the second—one takes into account the situation, which has developed today. And so our history speaks to the fact that we have already twice made treaties with such a great power, like Russia, and—we have already been

deceived twice. And now we cannot allow ourselves to accept decisions, which may at one time, in the future, even when we will no longer be here, lead up to the situation that once again some leading circle of Russia, some new leader, will once again put the Ukraine under his yoke. From the other side, now we cannot neglect the economic ties, which have been established between the Ukraine and with other union republics that were made in the framework of a unitarian nation, which USSR was. And so I stand on the position that on this point I would agree with Leonid Kravchuk, that one need not hurry in settling the union treaty. In this issue we should take into account the point of view of all the republics. At the same time, we see, that the Center—which is made up of hundreds of ministries—will do everything it can in order to completely preserve itself. We should really aspire to our own Ukrainian statehood on the basis of the Declaration of Ukrainian Sovereignty. I think, that now this is what should be done. We should not make a treaty with the Center, but we should make treaties horizontally with the union republics. One can already see in the last few days a published statement has been issued by a number of people's deputies of the Ukraine, of the RSFSR and the USSR "Concerning the principles of the international relations of the Ukraine and the RSFSR based on the Declaration concerning state sovereignty;" and I would support this statement. First of all it is necessary that we immediately pass a number of treaties with the Russian Federation: concerning economic cooperation, concerning mutual defense, mutual strategic forces, taking into account that the Ukraine should have its own army. Besides that we need to already begin to realize the Declaration concerning state sovereignty, especially in regards to the law "Concerning economic independence": concerning the establishment of our own national bank and the establishment of customs boundaries. I personally am not proclaiming myself to be in favor of the union treaty, though I would not go against it, as long as we have not started these processes. That is why we need guarantees. We have already twice, I repeat, had guarantees on paper, but we need real ones. Of the sort which could really calm our people, our deputies, and which would give us the possibility to make a correct choice.

Rukh Chairman on Ukrainian Foreign Relations

*90UN2834A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOE ZNAMYA
in Ukrainian 7 Sep 90 p 4-5*

[Speech given by Ivan Dzyuba at the Congress of the International Association of Ukrainian Scholars: "Ukraine and the World"]

[Text] **The Ukraine and the world. This is a subject as old as the world, and it has been discussed innumerable times. But it continues to acquire new meaning, whenever the Ukraine becomes re-animated and strives to determine its own fate. And in order to join the world community, the Ukraine is seeking support and stimulus.**

Beginning in ancient Kievan times, our ancestors not only associated with many close and distant neighboring people—trading and fighting with them, invading them, defending themselves against attacks from them, teaching and being taught by them—they also reflected on these relations. From the viewpoint of everyday consciousness, the people created stereotypes of an Avar, Polovchianian, Greek, pagan, Turk, Tatar, German, Wallachian, Pole, Muscovite, and so on. From a historiographic viewpoint—in chronicles, our people saw themselves as one group of people among other peoples in the world order. From the poetic viewpoint—in cosmogonic myths, *bilyny*, *dumy*, and historical songs, created by the ethnic group's need to come to self-consciousness among other groups—[our people reflected on] their unequal relations with other groups. Later during the process in which diverging branches of knowledge, of seeing the world and reacting to it developed (in terms of political science, cultural contacts, cultural influences, practical activities) and also as branches of knowledge became integrated, one idea was generalized thus: MY I SVIT; this idea crystallized into a separate, special problem. In certain historical periods (the religious struggles of the 16th-17th centuries, the independence movement in the middle of the 17th century, the nationalist movement at the end of the 19th-the beginning of the 20th century, and the 1920s) this problem became a priority. In the post-war years, interest in it has continually flared up with renewed force.

It is easy to see a simple rule: our people's association with other nationalities in various spheres of economic and cultural life was intensive during the periods of complete or partial statehood, and it declined with the complete loss of statehood. Then the status of the Ukraine changed from being an active participant in international relations to being an observing bystander. Because of this, both the Ukraine and the world lost out considerably.

I will not talk about the fact that the Ukraine's favorable geographical position became a catastrophe for the Ukraine—this is nothing so exceptional, inasmuch as in various times other peoples and lands have ended up in the same situation. The fact that the Ukraine's wealth of natural resources always whetted foreign appetites—this is also a typical situation in world history. Just as the fact that the Ukraine was constantly subject to direct or concealed competition among those nations, which hoped to extend their hegemony in Europe; the Ukraine became their victim. This is also a global phenomena.

A more specific factor in regards to the Ukrainian geo-political situation is that the Ukraine did not have a natural barrier bordering its two greatest usurpers—Poland and Russia; and also the Ukraine did not have a significantly developed ethnographic and linguistic barrier. This situation lent itself to the colonization of the Ukraine and to the establishment of control over its political-strategic, ideological, spiritual-cultural "foundation" and consequently weakened its ability to resist

colonization. Taking advantage of this fact, the colonizing nations did not only identify the colonized Ukraine as a part of themselves, but they were also able to make such an identification acceptable to certain strata of the colonized society, and to convey the notion that non-acceptance of such an identification would be treated as a crime against their nation.

The geo-political situation of Europe was never too beneficial for the Ukraine. The large, western European nations, though they feared the powerful Russian empire, at the same time they needed Russia as a power which would guarantee stability in the east; as a source for raw materials; as a market to have at their disposal; and they needed it for dynastic reasons; and mainly, they needed Russia as a diplomatic and military partner in the struggle they waged with one another for winning hegemony of Europe. And Russian diplomacy cleverly supported a balance of power between its friends and enemies. That is why Ukrainian "separatism" either did not find support (also because of the movement's own weakness) or in some instances, this movement would briefly attract other nation's attention, who hoped to take advantage of the moment to advance their own interests.

In regards to the liberal community, it was in some cases, itself not free of the imperial manner of thinking; in other cases, it knew little about the Ukraine. But there were periods of heightened interest in the Ukraine, as a rule, when there was turmoil there. And then the community, through the voices of humanistic writers, philosophers, scholars, travellers, diplomats, expressed its sympathy to the Ukraine and an understanding of the fact that without a resolution of the Ukrainian question there will be no calm in Europe. K. Havlichek-Borovsky expressed this thought in the most exact terms: "Little Russia-Ukraine is a constant curse, which its oppressors have taken on themselves. In this manner, the oppressed will of the Ukraine avenges itself on them. For as long as the injustice against Ukrainians will not be rectified, a genuine state of international calm and a Slavic understanding is impossible."

However, from the European nations' political perspective this factor was regarded as being so unsubstantial that it did not warrant their attention. And today such a [European] political perspective, as well as that of the USA, does not regard the possibility of an independent Ukraine very favorably, because, as in the past, these powers fear destabilization in the East. This fear is in part supported by the Sovietologists, and also by the Russian intellectual immigrants in the West. One more new and significant fact is that the West desires to support Gorbachev's reforms, the success of which the West regards as the sole hope for pacifying the Soviet monster. It seems to me that "anti-separatist" and specifically anti-Ukrainian tendencies in the politics of the western nations will be stimulated by a united Germany, inasmuch as the fear of a united Germany will increase the interest in seeing great nations existing in the East. The possible axis of Moscow-Bonn(Berlin)-Paris will

also not encourage the development of an independent Ukraine. However, certain perspectives may be revealed by a united Europe that would include all the greater and lesser, newer and older nations.

One can understand the western nations' motives, but they are not in the Ukraine's interests. From the Ukrainian point of view (and not only the Ukrainian one), the very lack of nationhood for the Ukraine has been a source for instability in Eastern Europe. This situation caused international political schemes and intrigues to develop, and this international game going on around the Ukraine has been a constant source of danger, and also in the Ukraine's own domestic life. During the course of three centuries, Moscow and its satraps took advantage of this international factor to blackmail Ukrainian patriots and to justify their anti-Ukrainian politics. This was the main, underlying factor involved in the process of conducting political trials against the Ukrainian intelligentsia—from the trial against the SVU [Association for an Independent Ukraine] to the trials during the '70s.

The most natural associates we can have today are the other union republics. And it is very unpleasant, to me, that having lived 70 years in one state under the slogans of the friendship among nations and internationalism, we know one another so little, we have formed so few structures for direct relations—political, economic, cultural. The negative factor here is, besides the weakness of horizontal ties, also the psychological prejudices and stereotypes, which are supported, specifically, in part by Ukrainians in their part played in the Russification of other peoples and in the "inter-fronts" that have been created against these peoples.

But to a considerable extent the Ukraine's future depends on regulating relations with Russia. Three new factors are emerging. The first factor is that as a consequence of the global, economic, military, and other changes, the existence of Russia as a large nation, which does not include the Ukraine becomes possible; the Ukraine's resources have almost been exhausted; we are no longer the great power's cornucopia, a fact that lessens the force of arguments to exercise control over us. The second factor is that a significant number of civic and political movements in Russia have shown that they understand that imperial appetite incurs a painful, high price and that the Russian people will not become free, wealthy and preserve their own national features, as long as other peoples do not obtain their freedom. The third factor is the appearance on Russia's political arena of an unusual leader, Yeltsin, who embodies those forces, which want to unite Russia's national interests with the national interests of other nations by means of taking a democratic path of development.

If one takes into account these factors, then one can assume that the movement to gain sovereignty for the Ukraine will find support, and for the first time in three centuries a possibility appears that the two sides can

accept a peaceful separation from one another and a relationship that is based on equal rights.

Yet nonetheless, the situation remains ambiguous and the subject of arguments. Along with the national-democratic movement in Russia there is a strong national-chauvinistic movement, which is locking horns with the party bureaucracy over great nation nationalism and imperialistic ambition. The possibility is not to be excluded that a new self-identification of democratic Russia with Soviet great statehood can occur. The way Yeltsin's own possibilities will unfold is unclear, and some of the measures of his administration constitute an attempt by way of an accomplished fact to gain control of what belongs to all the peoples of the Union, like the gold reserves. And the main thing—in the Ukraine there are no political leaders in authority, who would be able to answer Yeltsin's appeal and find an adequate means of responding to the unprecedented situation in our history, when Russia is itself prepared, at least it has declared be so, to re-examine its leading role.

A great, negative factor in the development of the Union, as well as on the world scale, is the fact that the Ukrainian party bureaucracy was and remains the most reactionary force in the entire Union, with the exception perhaps of some of the Central Asian clans. Such a status was determined by its role as an oblast organization of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] and the CPSU; it was an organ which had a strategic significance in terms of being responsible for a nationally risky region; it undertook titanic efforts to suppress signs of Ukrainian identity; it enlisted and prepared cadres to undertake these actions. Let us read the protocols of the conventions of the KP(b)U [Ukrainian Communist Party (bolshevik)] and the Ukrainian Communist—they all began and ended with collective vows that the Ukrainian Communist Party is the most faithful and the most devoted, fighting guard of Stalin's VKP(b), the Khrushchev-Brezhnev CPSU and so on; it has always given and will continue to deliver a destructive blow to any kind of deviation from the course set by the Moscow leadership, to any kind of opposition, deviation, and revision of the [Party's] dogma. And this [policy] was regarded as being the true one—in any case, after the Shumsky and Skrypnyk were dismissed. And actually the sole opposition, which proudly asserted itself in the Ukrainian Communist Party and with which the Ukrainian Communist Party is coming uneasily to terms with—this opposition is constituted by the party of reactionary opposition to Gorbachev's reforms; its views became clearly apparent during the last convention of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

One can also not avoid taking into account the moral condition of Ukrainian society, which was determined for centuries by anti-nationalistic politics and terror. This is one of the elementary laws of history: a denationalized society becomes the source of servility and political reaction and remains so until it does not return to consciousness. True, revolutionary, explosive forces can be born in such a society, but they have the danger of

assuming an anarchic character. Naturally, the entire Ukrainian society was not denationalized, and today even the denationalized social groups and geographic regions are beginning to awaken, but this process is not taking place successfully throughout the country, and it has not provided any results at all in some places.

Today representatives of many neighboring and non-neighboring nationalities live on the territory of the Ukraine—Russians and ethnic groups co-exist with Ukrainians—this situation is also one which people must live with in the contemporary world; and the character of this co-existence has international ramifications; and it has an impact on the kind of image of the Ukraine projects in the world. And the ethnic picture of the Ukraine is also related to a considerable extent to the question of our national fate and future.

The official propaganda actively exploits the expressions like, "the peoples of the Ukraine," "the Ukraine is a multi-national republic," "100 nationalities live in the Ukraine;" the official jargon of this propaganda is being put into practice in everyday language. The meaning of such formulations is understandable—to question the right of the Ukrainian people to decide the fate of their homeland. But does a "Russian people" of the Ukraine exist? There is a Russian population in the Ukraine, which makes up a part of the Russian people. In a similar way one can observe that there is not a Bulgarian, Hungarian, Byelorussian, or Georgian people of the Ukraine. There is not even a Jewish people of the Ukraine, but there are Jews, who live in the Ukraine and who are a part of the Jewish population, which lives in many nations in the world. At the same time these people of various nationalities and national groups are not just citizens of the Ukraine, but an integral part of the Ukrainian people—but not in an ethnic, but rather in a state sense. If one talks about the peoples of the Ukraine in the ethnic sense, these are the type of people for whom the Ukraine is their sole homeland and indigenous land of residence—that is, besides Ukrainians, one finds in the Ukraine, Crimean Tatars, Karaites, Gagauzy, perhaps, Donetsk Greeks, who are different than the Mediterranean type of people.

Now concerning multi-nationality. Already M. Skrypnyk decisively argued against the view that the Ukraine is a multi-national state, justifiably seeing in this expression a veiled attempt to put into doubt the right of the people to have their own state. Since that time, the national profile of the population has changed considerably; the number of Russians grew from 7 to 21 percent; the influx of people from Belorussia, the Caucasus, Central Asia has increased. And nonetheless Ukrainians makes up three fourths of the entire population of the republic; and this a high figure in the modern world. The Ukraine remains one of the most ethnically stable republics in the Union, a state, in which the indigenous population constitutes an absolute majority. The Ukraine is not multi-national state, like, let us say, Yugoslavia, India, or Indonesia, but rather a state with a multi-national in

character population, as are most of the European nations. And these describe fundamentally different situations.

Such a conclusion must not be made in order to ignore the national minorities on the soil of the Ukraine, but rather to refute anti-Ukrainian schemes made in regards to this issue, the attempts to undermine the sovereignty of the Ukrainian people.

In regards to the national minorities and groups, history has shown, that their fate is closely tied to the fate of the Ukrainian people themselves. Periods of suppression [of Ukrainians] were also periods during which the national minorities were suppressed; and the Ukraine's national rebirth helped the minorities' national rebirth. We see this taking place today.

The reputation of the Ukraine in the world and also its relations to other nations will to a large extent depend on how people of various nationalities will be able to live in the Ukraine, to satisfy their national, cultural, social-economic needs and interests. But a complete guarantee of these interests will be impossible until the Ukraine becomes a master of its own fate.

This applies to the Russian population in the Ukraine as well. Today its actual status is not that of a national minority in the Ukraine, but of a national majority in the [Soviet] Union. Historically among many Russians a conscious feeling in terms of their position of domination in the Ukraine and in other republics has not always developed, and so every step taken to equalize the national and the linguistic-cultural possibilities of other people is regarded by the Russians as a violation of their rights. This criticism is in turn countered with the fact that some Ukrainians react in too excessive a manner in this matter.

With the attainment of actual national and state equality these irregularities will disappear. The Russians will come to understand our right to be ourselves in the world. And we will understand—those, who today are not accepting this—that the Russians are closer to us than anyone else in the world. Together with other Slavs. But in order for this feeling to be purified, we should free ourselves of any form of Russian hegemony.

The issue of the status of some national minorities, in my view, needs, so to speak, to be internationalized. What do I have in mind? The Crimean Tatars should as soon as possible get their own state. But for the Ukraine, which has been abandoned at the crossroads to grieve for Chernobyl, with its empty treasury, it is difficult to bear all the expenses, related to the tragedy of the Crimean Tatars. It is amoral and criminal that the central departments are evading their responsibilities, that Moscow, which could have deported hundreds of thousands of people in one night, cannot manage to send them back for decades.

In regards to the Jewish issue, it is international in its essence. The plague of anti-Semitism is a worldwide

sickness, and it must be cured with cooperative forces. International cooperation is needed in this matter, specifically involving Israel. We need honest information to be given—the world community should know about the efforts, which the conscious Ukrainians are taking to uproot anti-Semitism. Worsening the stereotype of the Ukrainian as an anti-Semite does not benefit the world community.

The Ukraine from the most ancient of times was a significant economic giant in Eurasia and it supported, especially in the Kievan and the Cossack-Hetman times—intensive trade relations with the nations of Central Asia and the Near East, the Caucasus and the area near the Caucasus, Central and Western Europe, and the Baltic and the Balkan nations. The goal-oriented measures of Peter I and Catherine II undermined Ukrainian trade and artisanship. The economy of the Ukraine lost the majority of its ties with neighboring nations, and instead increased its ties to Russia; these ties assumed an increasingly unequal character.

The independent character of foreign trade relations of the Ukraine during the times of Ukrainian statehood (1917-1920) in part was preserved in the '20s. Beginning in the '30s, the Ukraine did not have the opportunity to develop independent foreign trade relations, though its participation in the all-Union economic relations was very significant.

The law about the economic sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR reveals great possibilities also for improving the structure of its economic relations. Above all the matter at hand concerns changing the structure of the economic relations with Russia and other republics, which were not beneficial for the Ukraine. The Ukraine itself can process a considerable portion of its own raw resources, develop instruments and electronics, light industry; it can earn profits from building aviation structures, from the export of motor locomotives and heavy presses, from the export to Russia and other republics of ores, metals, sugar, and bread at world prices, but not at many times less [world prices]—and all this would completely compensate us for the expenses involved in importing of oil, gas, and forestry products; the prospect of paying these expenses is now being used to frighten us. Doing away with the voluntaristic principles of fixing prices, which at times was simply a state form of robbery, will be very significant to us.

Today the opponents of sovereignty of the republic—hidden and outspoken—are strongly exploiting the thesis that we cannot break economic ties with the Union, which have formed for 70 years. Naturally, to sever any kind of ties would be senseless, and of the economical sort impossible, if they are to be truly economic ones determined by an economic sense of design and effectiveness, but not by an imperial political strategy, which attempts to tie everyone and everything up in the empire's reins and to the empire's wagon. It is known that we have experienced large scale economic and demographic manipulations undertaken to meet the

need of a farsighted political strategy of re-settling peoples, the bitter fruits of which we see today in the complications involved in the republics' process of gaining autonomy and the sharpening of the international enmities.

Obviously, the character of the economic relations with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe is changing. Perhaps, now they will be less interested in trading with the Ukraine, and oriented more to the West. But without the Ukrainian ores, coal, metal, and electrical energy they will manage to get along. So in this sense our economic prospects are not hopeless.

Sooner or later the question will arise about the independent, economic relations of the Ukraine with the European Economic Community. But today we can offer it little, except for ores, metals, and some form of natural resources and goods. The illusion about the quick union with the EEC is unfounded so far. Even an initial adaptation to the European market will be a complicated and long process. So thus the matter at hand concerns not only the convertability of money and the quality of production and not only the fact that our economy has still not begun to make a transition to market relations. The matter at hand concerns the profound gap in development: until now we have been working under the most barbaric forms of the industrial era, when the West—is in the post-industrial period, and moreover—at its highest stage—at its technological peak. Therefore there are various historical stages of development...

The Ukrainian diaspora may have, perhaps, a role in decreasing this almost insurmountable gap [in terms of industrial development]. But will effective structures for cooperation be created in the Ukraine to conduct business with Ukrainians in other nations by means of commercial and technological initiatives? The time is at hand to already shift from sporadic assistance and charitable actions (which, naturally, have and preserve their meaning) to stimulating the economic, agricultural activity in the Ukraine itself and to prepare modern economic and administrative cadres.

At various times the Ukraine has ended up in the center of European political life, and at its periphery. Its political thought has also known periods of flowering and degradation. Just as in its forms of civic self-administration, so in its political ideas, the Ukraine often synthesized ideas of western and eastern origin, often engendering profoundly original phenomena, but also becoming an area for testing out imported models, the victim of foreign experiments. The defining factor in characterizing the political history of the civic life of the Ukrainian people is its long standing lack of nationhood, and this remains an open and long and heatedly discussed question of whether this lack of nationhood is the result of an insufficient nation-building will, or, the opposite, that the imposed lack of nationhood led to an atrophy of the state instinct.

This, however, does not mean that Ukrainian history did not have its political parameters. Despite everything, it is one of the most interesting border areas in the history of Europe and the world; and it is not a peripheral supplement to Russian history, as this was presented to us. In the Ukraine social models and values were born, which enriched or could have enriched the world experience of humanity's democratic forms of self-organization. It is enough to recall the activity of the religious-cultural, city brotherhoods in the 16th-17th centuries, the Zaporozhian Sich, even the Hetmanate, which along with all of its faults was nonetheless one of the most democratic self-administering organizations in its time and not only in Eastern Europe; and finally, the short-lived phenomenon of the UNR [Ukrainian National Republic]. One could talk about the democratic traditions of the Ukrainian self-administration and judiciary in the Cossack-Hetman times, about the lawfully equal status of the Ukrainian woman and a number of other particularities, which have not given our people a poor record in the Europe of the time.

Some ideas which were ahead of their time were born in the Ukraine. They can be found in the chronicles and the "History of the Rusiv," in the constitution of Pylyp Orlyk, in [the ideas of] Vasyl Kapnist, and in [the ideas of the] Ukrainian delegates [expressed in] Catherine's "Commission for composing a code." The wide ranging program of the Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood is deeply registered in the history of European ideologies. The anti-monarchical, anti-colonial, and the democratic-independent ideas of T. Shevchenko not only correspond to those of "Young Germany," "Young Italy," but to some extent more developed than the ideas, of let us say, Madzini, Petefi, Hugo—specifically in the sense that Shevchenko tied the liberation of his people with the liberation of all peoples. The democratic-federal conception of M. Drahomanov, the sober non-dogmatic ideas of I. Franko, the programs of the Ukrainian democratic and social movements at the end of the 19th-the beginning of the 20th centuries became original contributions to the fund of European thought. In the context of world political thought, the Borotbists and the Ukapist do not look entirely bad. Finally, in some of the ideas of V. Vynnychenko, and later M. Khyvlov, one can see the prophesying of Euro-communism and national communism (the latter also with Skrypnyk). And when one talks about various conceptions of the united Europe, one can recall that V. Vynnychenko had such ideas; one can recall also the V. Paneyko's book (1922) "The United States of Europe" concerning that modish at the time theme. But our nation was cut off from this heritage and from its own political life.

That is why today's national-political and state rebirth is beginning from almost zero—not only at the level of political structures, but also on the level of political conceptions. If in its first phases Rukh's program could satisfy the democratic community with a wide and qualified exposition of universal democratic principles and demands (though not without eclecticism and epigonism in regards to the programs of the Baltic people's

fronts), then [in contrast] we demand the programs of the new political parties, which are growing like mushrooms, an already profound sense of political concepts. Unfortunately, so far they tend to make declarations, which are not founded on a profound analysis of the historical process, nor provide a concrete answer to the people's urgent questions, nor provide a scientific prognosis. One must give our democratic deputies in the parliament their due for their heroic uneven struggle in the parliament, but one must also honestly state that in some of their speeches there is more rhetoric, rather than argumentation, and often they reveal a lack of political thinking.

Political science will not come freely to us. We have to go towards it—[study] the depths of our national legacy, and the expanses of the world's political experience, and its philosophical and historiographic thought. "Samyvydav" [illegal, underground publications] and similar type of writings despite all their meaning were not the culmination of humanity's wisdom, along with the few recent illegal texts, on which some people are building their entire worldview on.

When we were discussing the prospects of the Ukraine's entry into the family of European democracies, we see a considerable obstacle in today's social-economic dissonances and technological levels of disproportionate development. And no less disproportionate is the ideational-political and intellectual disproportion. This remark does not only refer to the lack of a formal democratic structure and the weakness of the democratic mode of thinking, which has been discussed, but also to the dogmatic, uncritical, mode of thinking, which has apparently settled into our genes. On the waves of emotional patriotism a lowering [of critical thinking occurs] and thus a low level of intellectual discourse and criticism results. In fact, criticism, which has been ravaged for 70 years by Bolshevism, is already ending up being given a sharp moral defense, and in some anti-bolshevik circles, when the matter concerns the national and the patriotic myths. Perhaps, these myths today are as dangerous as the inhuman myths of the official ideology, but an uncritical acceptance of them can create a threat to the new totalitarian political and spiritual life. And we should watch out for the newly born danger and raise an alarm concerning its appearance. Otherwise, with what will we go out into the world. The modern intellectual world does not accept our uncritical method of thinking, our readiness to faithfully accept everything that appears to have an advantage for us. And if the bolshevik-like dogmatism, the intolerance, and the bloodthirstiness will be opposed with a new dogmatism, intolerance, and bloodthirstiness, even under the flags of the liberation and democracy—we will never join the family of democratic humanity.

It is too risky to draw some kind of conclusions from such a superficial discussion of such complicated and vast theme. And yet one cannot avoid making several concluding suggestions.

So, how does the Ukraine appear in the world picture today?

Being capable to achieve a high degree of development with its given resources, it is now at the level of nations of the USSR which have developed to a mediocre level; the USSR as a whole is in the process of falling to the third world nations' level.

And what is our place in one of the most powerful and most characteristic process of modern times—the process of rehabilitating national cultures, renewing the values of national cultures as well as the national individual profile of humanity? In this world process we, in my view, are close to those nations where three factors occur:

- the process of decolonization;
- the long standing preservation of the role of imperial linguistic and cultural domination;
- the presence of various national cultural groupings.

That is, despite our longing for European civilization, we must go through some stages in our path, which other countries have passed through or are still passing through, like India, Algeria, the African continent.

If our movement to independence in peaceful—that is, in the only possible and acceptable today—forms will give the expected result, then the people of the Ukraine, having become the masters of their own fate, will be able in a short time to occupy a respected place in the family of European nations. Respected, but not special.

And can we dream for more?

The Ukraine can be called the land of unrealized hopes.

The prophecy of Herder was not realized in the fact that it would become the new Greece.

The prophecy of the Cyril-Methodian Society members was not realized that the rock, which the builders tossed aside, would become a cornerstone.

Shevchenko's [thought that] "And I shall be a part of the great family..." was not realized.

Franko's [thought that] "You will shake the Caucuses, you will let Beskyd know, you will leave behind the echo of victory..." was not realized.

The dreams of the leaders of the national rebirth at the beginning of the 20th century were not realized in the fact that the Ukraine would become a leader on the world's path to the blue lakes and the communes beyond the hills.

The hopes of those people who saw the historical mission of the Ukraine in bringing accord to the two branches of Christianity have not been realized.

And much more was not realized.

But history is continues...

Ivan Dzyuba's lecture at the first congress of the International Association of Ukrainian scholars will be printed in full in the December issue of the Ukrainian popular academic journal NAUKA I SUSPILSTVO.

Situation of Ukrainians in Crimea

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20 Sep 90 pp 1,2

[Article by Leonid Voloshyn in Yalta: "Who Will Speak for Ukrainians in Crimea?"]

[Text] Towards the end of the 1960's Vasyl Skrypka, a degree candidate in Philological Studies working at the M. T. Rylskyy Institute of Art, Folklore and Ethnography of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences was completing his initial examinations at the Ukrainian section of the University of Simferopol's Philological Department. He was stunned by the lack of knowledge of Ukrainian by the Crimean graduates, and described this lack in an extensive memo to the Republic's Minister of Education, after which he was fired from his job.

Demands to protect the "Russian-speaking population" in the Baltic republics, in Moldavia, and recently in the Russian Orthodox Church in Western Ukraine echo ever more forcefully.

But who will protect the nationality rights of Ukrainians in Moscow, in the far reaches of the RSFSR and even, in our own Crimean Oblast - historically a territory of the Kievan state taken over in the 13th century by the Mongolian Tatars, and in 1783 by Russian colonizers? Ostap Kindrachuk, a sailor of the steamer "Krymchanyyn" has shown that the Crimean Tatars were not related to Genghis Khan's followers [UKRAINA, 1990, No 32]. At the behest of Odessa's Professor Brun, Stepan Rudansky was documenting the renaming of Sudak (old Rus Suroz) - Genovese Okruh place names by the Tatars and Russians. This was mentioned in his letter to V. Kovalov in May-June 1870 (published in the three volume set, 1973.). During an archeological dig on the peninsula, Rudansky was intrigued by the Slavic character of the findings. As expected, Tatar nomads, when they settled, adopted grape growing and agriculture in general from our Ukrainian ancestors in Crimea, who had descended in the south from Scythian farmers. In 1954, renowned Soviet historian Mavrodin wrote about Slavic archeological finds in Crimea in "Russian Sailing on Southern Seas". The three-volume edition "Uniting the Ukraine and Russia" published that year by the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Science and the RSFSR Academy of Sciences contain articles documenting extensive Ukrainian slavery (over 60,000) in the Crimean Khanate. Whenever Cossacks were near, the Tatars would hide the Ukrainian slaves in deep holes covered with boards, so they would not run away.

Potomkin attempted to settle the Crimean steppes with Russian peasants (Zhuya, Petrovka), but they would run

away. Then residents of Poltava, Chernigov, Zhitomir, Kiev, Kharkov and other oblasts were allowed to resettle in Crimea. Tarkhankut in western Crimea is called the Crimean Sahara. No rain falls for half the year. The residents of the town of Olenivka are descendants of the former inhabitants of the town of Vasylivka, now in Zaporizhan Oblast. Settlement of the town of Chornomorske and others occurred in an analogous manner.

The old Rus town of Korsun is located near present-day Sevastopol. Songs of the so-called "Kievan cycle" describe grape growing traditions. In his paper "St. Cyril in Korsun" Ivan Franko states that one of the creators of the "Cyrillic" version of the Slavic alphabet, "Cyril of Korsun" happened upon a Gospel written in the Ukrainian language of that time. During the period of Russification politics, a majority of the population of this area became mostly or completely Russified, maintaining its Ukrainian aspects only in agriculture.

After the downfall of the Russian monarchy, Crimea entered the USSR. Soon Stalin tired of the game of Ukrainian nationalism and annexed the peninsula to Russia. In 1954, on the 300th anniversary of Ukrainian-Russian unification, Crimea was "returned" to the Ukraine. This was so that the Ukraine could support the region economically, while Russia continued to control it. There are no funds for resettling persons from Narodychi, but funds do exist for construction of a high-speed Moscow-Simferopil railroad line. It will extend through our fields of black earth. In the meantime, along many rail lines in the republic, trees have been cut down and orchards uprooted to create space for grain planting.

Officially, there are 700,000 Ukrainians in the Crimean Oblast - one third of the population of the peninsula. If renegades and social misfits, who count themselves as Russians are included in this figure, there would be close to a million. What rights does this "Ukrainian minority" have?

Street signs everywhere are in Russian. Newspapers in the oblast are printed in Russian. Since 1953, for camouflage, a miserly portion of the run of KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA is duplicated in Ukrainian. The following is a quotation from that newspaper. "Is not Crimea closer to Russia in its history and strategic position than Krasnodar?" It would be better to say: "is Kuban not closer to Kiev, than is Arbat?" The Ukraine has irrigated the peninsula with the waters of the Dnepr river - now it can be included in the RSFSR.

The article "In Yalta - Moscow Time" in SOVETSKIY KRYM refers to the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR to create a separate local time zone as akin to sabotage.

Many such examples could be cited.

Turning popular opinion away from insoluble social injustice, destructive elements are forcing the question of so-called "Crimean autonomy", so as to divide the pie before the return of the Crimean Tatars. An attempt is

being made to create another Karabakh-like incident, provoking the Tatar inhabitants to usurp the interior steppes of the peninsula. So they can then take into protective custody both the Tatars - and Crimea.

Voicing warm sympathetic words on the need for equality of nations, Simferopol decreased its Ukrainian-language television programming to two hours per day, filling the airwaves with Russian programming. Crimean radio was not far behind. Ukrainian radio programming is limited to 15 minutes each Thursday, after 18:00 hours, to improve sleep. If the Oblast becomes part of Russia, even these will cease to exist. The claim of V. Burmistrov ("What should be the status of Crimea" in KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA), that "The change in status will be allow for more opportunity to allow for nationality rights" must be looked upon as simple demagoguery.

Georgiy Okolko, construction worker in Yalta and father of two states: "For 700,000 Ukrainians, there is not a single Ukrainian church, school, class, kindergarten, or club."

"Complete freedom of choice", Petrunella Ostapivna Stehniy, a mother of several schoolchildren retorts ironically.

The Ukrainian Language Society in Yalta has not been able (or has not tried) to register as an organization. Therefore it does not legally exist. On that grounds, the local educational authorities refused to inform the Society of the number of available positions for Ukrainian language teachers created by the acceptance by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet "Law pertaining to languages in the Ukrainian SSR."

"So long as we, like a bear with its paw, are satisfied with paper regulations, 'equality' of languages in Crimea will be the same as it was at the time of Stepan Rudansky, and our Russified children will not even be capable of reading his works in the original," said Valentyn Sobol, a bulldozer driver from Masandrov.

Common within the oblast are town names such as Pushkino, Chekhovo, Michurinskoye.

Common street names include Moscow Circle in Simferopol, Moskovskaya in Yalta, and the like.

Doctor Victor Kosteckyy of Miskhora added, that "the naming of hospitals is analogous, and so we have 'Zarya Rossii' (a new settlement near Simeiz), 'Moskva' (in Simeiz), 'Rossiya' (in Yalta), and so on".

The grand Russian fleet anchored in Sevastopol is well-known. Yet the significance of the Zaporizhan Sich for the Black Sea fleet is never mentioned. In the capture of Istanbul, the Zaporizhans were the first to use submarines and rockets. The exhibits make no mention of the sinking of the Black Sea Fleet. The activities of the Ukrainian army committee and the Ukrainian Rada in Sevastopol during the revolutionary years, the raising of the Ukrainian flag over the fleet, are never mentioned.

Due to deficit conditions, the city of Sevastopol strives to maintain its status as a closed city. Closed, that is, to the Ukrainian language, but not to the constant flow of food products from Central Ukraine, which the city absorbs in quantity, like a bottomless barrel.

Architectural landmarks in the oblast, commemorating those who stifled 'foreigners': the palace of Czar Nicholas II in Livadia and the palace of Count Vorontsov in Alushta (Suvorov said in "The Seasonal Housing of Russians in Crimea") are well-maintained. The small structures in Balaklava and Yalta, where lived the singer of "prehistoric fires" have been neglected. In Balaklava the roof fell in, winds blow through the rooms, the memorial plaque is missing.

A small memorial to Lesya Ukrayinka stands on Botkinskaya, a dead-end street in Yalta. The lantern which had cast its light on the monument has been broken with a rock. Alongside the small plaque on the building honoring Rudansky hangs a gigantic sign: "Crab Tavern".

In Yalta, the fashionable hotel for foreigners "Rossiya" bears a large sign to the right of the door with the letters USSR and the emblem of the Sovereign Republic. To the left of the entrance - a marble slab with the names of pre-revolutionary and Soviet cultural dignitaries, who visited this hotel. Unfortunately, nowhere at the hotels of this city will you find any mention of Ukrainian cultural figures who visited: the brothers Tobilevych, Zankovetsky, Hrinchenko, Kostomariv, Olena Pchilka, Ahatanhal Krymsky, Shchohliv, Vasylykivskyy, Trush, Tychyna, Ostap Vyshnya, Dovzhenko...

The building of the Yalta fishing kolhosp "Proletarskiy Luch": using the terminology of classes, the rays emanating from its windows are those of a bourgeoisie, not proletarian, movie theater. The memorial plaque on the building states: "In 1872, the eminent artist-painter Fedor Alexandrovich Vasylyev lived in the building that stood in this location. Yet nowhere is this identified as the yard where stood a hospital, in which Ukrainian poet and democrat Stepan Rudansky worked from 1861 to 1868.

Several steps from here rises the building where blood transfusions are performed. Nowhere is it identified as the former location of the county hospital, where Rudansky worked in 1868-69. There is no memorial plaque.

Alongside the building is a square, with fountains of spring water. The land was donated by the poet. The grateful residents of Yalta appealed to their government to put up a bust of the poet-doctor, honored with the Order of St. Stanislav, in this square. Instead, in this picturesque corner - alongside the blood transfusion station - a public toilet was built.

Public School No.6 now stands where the beautiful villa "Iphogene" once stood. From January 1st to May 1898 Lesya Ukrayinka, poet extraordinaire and revolutionary voice, lived and worked in Iphogene Villa. This is where she wrote her unforgettable "Iphogene in Taurides".

There is no memorial plaque on the building. So what, if anything, do the paid functionaries of Yalta's Ukrainian society for the preservation of historical and cultural monuments do?

The lack of announcements in Ukrainian of departures and arrivals in railroad stations, and at bus depots throughout the Oblast serve to underscore the studied disrespect of the Ukrainian language, to its people and the sovereign Ukrainian nation. That is why sweet words about the creation of a "Nation of Tavryd" are nothing more than a cheap propaganda trick. This is being done so as to 'autonomously' skin the people three times. Most of all the shadowy economy wished for autonomy.

In the stagnant epoch, Russian national chauvinism - and it is its recidivists who are mentioned by Ivan Dzyuba in the first issue of NARODNA HAZETA - extended its monopoly even to the cemetery. Several generations of the region's residents in Yalta lay buried in the Old-Masandriv Cemetery, not far from Stalin's summer home. The souls of the dead are given to the care of the USSR Ministry of Culture. To the left of the entrance a marble tablet with gold lettering bears the inscription: "USSR Ministry of Culture. Polikurovskiy Memorial." In the preamble, to the right of the gate, the ministry refers to the "destruction of the former Masandriv Cemetery during the provisional Fascist occupation". One has the impression that the enemy selectively bombed the graves of the dead of Ukrainian ancestry. There follows a wall covered exclusively with the names of famous Russians buried at the cemetery: "singer, performer of the Bolshoi Theater, teacher of F.N. Shalpin", "Russian chemist, professor of Kharkov and Kiev Universities", and even "Musician, composer of the song 'Bravely, brothers, to your feet.'"

There is no mention whatsoever in this "Memorial" wall, maintained by the "Ukrainian Ministry of Culture" of Stepan Rudanskyy, Ukrainian cultural persona, poet-lyricist, translator, collector of folklore, first county and regional doctor in Yalta, Patron of the study of the climatology of the southern shore of Crimea, a graduate, to go that far, of the Medical-Surgical Academy of St. Petersburg.

No mention is made either of Ambrosiy Metlynsky (1814-1870), professor of Kharkov and Kiev Universities, Ukrainian poet-romanticist, collector of folk traditions, and publisher.

Back in 1968 Ostap Kindrachuk, a staunch supporter of the resettlement of Tatars in Crimea, submitted a proposal to the local government, published in the newspaper, that a ship be named after Rudanskyy. Instead, the seagoing liner "Mykhayl Suslov", docked in Yalta, was renamed "Peter the First".

Not long ago, in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA someone by the name of Bobrov stated his surprise that the author of the article "Republics or States" published on the pages of the Vilnius newspaper VAKARINES NAUJIENOS referred to Estonia and Turkmenia as

countries... The reaction printed in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA and the speedy completion of the Moscow-Simferopol railroad line at a time, when even food for the people is scarce, only emphasize the capital's view of the Crimean Oblast as Moscow's beach. If Crimea should be finally separated from the Ukraine one can expect that the nationality problems of its 700,000 Ukrainians will be solved overnight. Unfortunately, there is no basis to expect a happy outcome.

Even before the unconstitutional regional "referendum" conducted behind the back of the Ukrainian SSR regarding the remapping of boundaries, "the preparatory work was begun to change the national status of Crimea" [KOMMERSANT, 1990, No 26]. This task is being directed by an organizational committee headed by Nikolay Bagrov. "In the opinion of the organizational committee, it is indispensable due to the continuing plundering by the central departments of the natural resources of Crimea" - the "liberators" shed a tear here and immediately provide the following "commercial idea" - "Crimea as an autonomous republic or oblast within... Russia."

Some persons from the "center" and their Crimean marionettes - according to Yalta resident H. Okolko - provoked the Tatars in Uzbekistan to leave their homes and flats, to create unrest in Crimea. They realized that sovereignty of the Ukraine would automatically threaten the existence on the Black Sea coast of the private estate of Union departments. Unification of Crimea with the RSFSR would not create a Tatar paradise. Yet the political brokers will remain at their former posts and summer homes.

Resettlement Problems With Crimean Tatars Described

91UN0075A Moscow TRUD in Russian 13 Oct 90 p 2

[Article by N. Mokrishchev, TRUD correspondent: "Crimea: A Difficult Return"]

[Text] The Crimean Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies session held at the beginning of September termed the situation in the Crimea an emergency. The same conclusion was reached by an expanded plenum of the oblast's Federation of Independent Trade Unions Council. This was prompted by the massive spontaneous influx of Crimean Tatars seeking permanent residence. This year alone approximately 30,000 have arrived on the peninsula. Their total number already exceeds 100,000.

"It is impossible to settle and find work for such a large number of people quickly and conveniently," I was told by Ye. Neklyudov, head of the oblistpolkom's Interethnic Relations Department. "Especially since there are approximately 160,000 residents of the Crimea already on waiting lists for housing. Many have been waiting for improvement in their housing conditions for periods ranging from 11 to 20 years. There are virtually no available jobs. The oblast is experiencing shortages of food, electric power, preschool facilities, hospitals and

clinics. Two or three years ago schools in rural rayons did not operate on a two-shift system. Now children often study in three shifts instead of just two..."

If one adds to this the fantastically inflated prices for houses and building materials and the astoundingly high cost of goods and produce at markets while store shelves stand empty, then one can imagine how bitter and uncomfortable life has become for the local population.

The newly-arrived Crimean Tatars set up tents on the central squares of cities and towns, organize protests rallies and in many cases win out. The first arrivals strove to buy houses. Now many of them are demanding parcels of land so that they can build their own houses. And the parcels in question are located near Simferopol, on the southern coast and in Bakhchisarayskiy and Sudakskiy rayons, where the population density is very great.

With the approach of winter there have been more and more frequent reports of unsanctioned seizure of land. Sometimes these are arable land or parcels which have already been allocated to people living in the Crimea for the purpose of individual construction. As of 1 September over 3,000 parcels with a total area of 647 hectares have been seized. Appeals have been issued calling for civil disobedience and threats have been made against the Russian-speaking population, among which persistent rumors have spread that now apartments and parcels of land will be given only to Crimean Tatars. All this has prompted open dissatisfaction on the part of the local population and has already resulted in some clashes. The situation is heating up.

A conflict could erupt at any moment; during the oblast soviet session, for example, hundreds of Crimean Tatars approached the building where it was being held demanding an immediate return to their ancestral homeland. Demonstrators from nearby villages also appeared, carrying signs reading: "Tatars, your historical homeland is Mongolia." A conflict could have broken out when a 16-year-old Ukrainian boy was killed in a fight with Tatar youths in the village of Plodovoye, Bakhchisarayskiy Rayon. The situation was not far from conflict when, following the latest unsanctioned land seizure, tumultuous meetings were held at the Fiolent Plant, with proposals being made that workers' units be sent out to "deal with the matter"...

And a conflict did break out. The clash occurred on the last Sunday in September and the first days of October. It became so impassioned and involved so much resolve that the resort newspaper SOVETSKIY KRYM called the events virtually "a precursor to civil war."

...When they woke up on Sunday morning the residents of the village of Krasnokamenka, which is part of Greater Yalta, saw a group of Crimean Tatars carrying personal belongings and building materials. They set up camp in a young vineyard, where they intended to build themselves houses without permission. The local residents rushed to where the new arrivals were. At first the

discussion was peaceful, though voices were raised. But then another group of Tatars drove up. Neighbors also arrived from the villages of Gurzuf and Zaprudnoye. They blocked the roads, including the highway from Yalta to Simferopol. Fights broke out, and sticks, clubs and tree branches were used. After the clash bottles containing an inflammable liquid were found on the ground. The militia called for reinforcements from Sevastopol and Alushta. Warning shots were fired...

The next day the epicenter of events shifted to Yalta. In the morning the gorsovet building and the tents standing outside it were approached by people from Krasnokamenka demanding that improper actions be halted, order reestablished and the law complied with. The Crimean Tatars' tent city found itself besieged. Some people broke through a police cordon and began tearing up the tent city. Fortunately no one was injured. In the evening the Tatars were transported to a safe place on military trucks (neither internal troops nor any army units were used to establish order). Later they attempted to rebuild their tent city, but the militia prevented this.

Following all these alarming events the leaders of Yalta convened in emergency session. A decision was made to assign the Crimean Tatars 150 parcels of land for building purposes. That was a large number, for in that area there is virtually no unused land. But what else could be done? Were the Tatars to spend the winter living in tents with their children?

But the events cited above also had another result. Whereas before the local population had not opposed the assignment of land parcels to the Tatars, the two days of "confrontation" in Yalta undid much of that sentiment; now the people of Yalta are expressing their opposition to settlement of Tatars on the Crimean's southern coast. Especially since some of the new arrivals are heard saying more and more frequently that they will outlast all of them in the end anyway... Demands are once again being made that the Crimean Tatars be given back the property which they owned at the time of their deportation, that the next generation be given the right to inherit that property, and that compensation be paid for material and psychological damages.

There is absolutely no justification for the unsanctioned seizure of land. But one can understand the Tatars as they return to their historical homeland, because for a very long time this extremely painful issue remained unresolved. Recall that as early as 1967 the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium restored Crimean Tatars' constitutional rights, and approximately 10,000 of them returned to their homeland. But then the migration was halted. Under various pretenses persons of Crimean Tatar nationality were not permitted to buy houses and were denied residence permits and jobs.

"Therefore people are in a hurry now, thinking that they will let in a few thousand people like they did that time and will then shut the door on the rest," I was told by M. Osmanov and Ya. Kerimov, veterans of the Crimean

Tatar national movement. "Therein also lie the roots of mistrust, which brings with it conflicts and irresolvable problems. Is there a single serious issue today which has been moved along with rallies, protests and ultimatums?"

M. Osmanov and Ya. Kerimov sketched a simple diagram for orderly settlement. There are 993 villages in the Crimea, and in addition to them 517 which have been abandoned as unpromising. Put 15-20 families in each of them and build them up, and the problem of 100,000 people is solved. Then there are the rayon centers, urban-type towns and cities. Members of the Crimean national movement are themselves prepared to meet and help settle their returning kinsmen, establishing a committee under the oblispolkom for this purpose. Their opinion was not heeded in the past, gradually leading to a dense knot of problems which have helped worsen the present economic and political situation.

The USSR Supreme Soviet's political decision regarding restoration of the deported peoples' rights, including those of the Crimean Tatars, has prompted people to undertake a spontaneous return, the rate of which grows with each passing month.

However, that decision was made without preparations and socioeconomic groundwork and is not backed up with appropriate financial and material resources, stated the June appeal of the Crimean Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies to the President of the USSR and our country's parliament.

But at this time everything remains as before, unless one counts the establishment of more and more new commissions, none of which has produced anything except paper yet. Stocks of goods available on the market in 1990 are lower than last year by 12-30 percent. At the same time the oblast is exporting cement and building materials, sand and gravel to other regions of the country. The Crimea is dealing with a very difficult problem all alone. Yet that problem is one which affects the entire state. Even the Ukraine, as stated by A. Statinov, republic Council of Ministers first deputy chairman, is not capable of assuming responsibility for solving this problem. Tremendous outlays which are beyond the republic's ability to make are required. Above all there is a need for additional capital investment in order to expand the building materials industry and establish independent construction subunits.

It is essential to have help from other republics, especially those from which Crimean Tatars are emigrating: the RSFSR, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia. Protocols governing the transfer of a total of 35 million rubles in capital investment funds have been sent there. But no one knows when the transfer will take place. Thus far the people of the Crimea only have a letter from the Krasnodar Krayispolkom refusing to assist in the resettlement of Tatars on account of its own sharply increasing flow of refugees. But it should not be forgotten that the Ukraine, including the Crimea, in

addition to its colossal expenditures to overcome the effects of the Chernobyl disaster, has for quite a while now been giving significant assistance to the Armenian victims and is involved in the development of Tyumen. And the state program for the return of the Crimean Tatars which was adopted on 11 July of this year is also a nationwide program.

But that program could be crushed under an uncontrollable influx of settlers who, like today, could be incited by provocateurs. Expert estimates show that carrying out the whole program as planned and providing both the Crimean Tatars gradually resettling in their homeland and the people already living in the Crimea with essential living conditions and continued normal development will take at least eight years. The Crimean Tatar leaders do not agree with that schedule, and extremely radically inclined young people are impatient and want to resolve everything at one fell swoop. The leaders of the Crimea are calling on people to show understanding and restraint and to renounce violent methods and means of political pressure in order to ensure successful implementation of a program which will ensure an ongoing return of the Crimean Tatars to their homeland, and on a foundation which has been prepared in advance.

A few days ago the local newspapers published a resolution by the oblast soviet of people's deputies regarding basic principles for the settlement of Crimean Tatars in the oblast. I think that it would be beneficial for those who have not yet returned to be familiar with its content. New arrivals are being settled in their former places of residence upon presentation of proof—documents, affidavits or archival materials—attesting to the deportation of themselves or relatives in their immediate line directly from the oblast. An exception has been made for the Crimea's southern coast and for Simferopolskiy, Bakhchisarayskiy and Sudakskiy rayons, where the existing infrastructure and population density do not permit settlement of more people due to ecological and demographic saturation. Those regions could be used for the settlement of veterans and participants in the war as well as specialists required for the upkeep of resorts. Many priorities and benefits will be granted to families which previously lived in the steppe regions and return there. There settlers will immediately receive parcels of land and building loans.

The oblast soviet deputies and trade union officials appealed to republic organs with an urgent request that a decision be made not only to restrict but actually to halt completely the export of building materials, at least for the duration of the all-union return program. The people of the Crimea are insisting on reassessment of their oblast's share in union-republic shipments of agricultural produce, since the Crimea's population is growing and growing...

Ukrainian CP Secretary on Anticommunism
91UN0238A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
26 Oct 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with V. Ye. Ostrozhinskiy, Politburo member and Ukraine CP Central Committee secretary, by PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent Yu. Vasilyeva; place and date not given: "That's 'Democracy' for You"]

[Text] [Vasilyeva] Much is being spoken and written of late concerning the outbreak of anticommunism in our country, and attacks on Communists have become more frequent. What do you, Valentin Yevgenyevich, think of all of this?

[Ostrozhinskiy] Speaking of my own personal perception of homespun anticommunism, I will say frankly that I am exasperated by this political terror. Political forces opposed to the CPSU are attempting to foist on the public a distorted image of the individual with a party card. Shrewd demagogy and a malicious lie and falsification, whose basis is a hostile attitude toward Communists, are directed at forcing the Communist Party from the political arena. All of this is becoming a significant factor in public life.

[Vasilyeva] Will your assessment not appear to be excessively harsh to some?

[Ostrozhinskiy] When it is a question of operating the mechanism of deliberate "denigration" of the party at full power, then it is difficult to use the language of ideological debate, as you yourself, I trust, understand. The past teaches that the cynical lie is a terrible weapon. Humanity has paid with many millions of lives for using lies for the selfish interests of individual rulers and political groups. It would be a crime against the memory of the dead not to take the lessons of the past into account, and not to fight against the system of disinformation and slander and against efforts to transform competitiveness and an honest campaign of opinions into a destructive orgy of anticommunism. Glasnost is by no means a manipulation of people's consciences built on myths and false stereotypes.

[Vasilyeva] But glasnost can also be compared with lunacy: Everyone says what he thinks, but he does not think what he says.

[Ostrozhinskiy] I absolutely do not agree with such a thesis—to say this about everyone is incorrect. Although some, in giving their speeches, at times forget about ethical demands on themselves. I had an opportunity in Kiev quite recently to take part in a city rally on the occasion of the 49th anniversary of the tragedy in Babi Yar. One of the leaders of the Ukrainian Republican Party also spoke there. And even on this sad and mournful occasion, he did not avoid insulting politicking that was suffused with fierce hatred for those who have different political convictions. Such a gesture, and at such a time, shocked many. Is this not sacrilege with

respect to the tormented feelings of those who were assembled at the mournful monument?

[Vasilyeva] It grieves one, and it evokes a feeling of protest. You touched on a "sore point" of contemporary propaganda—the culture of public speaking. But how do you understand facts when judgments are sometimes made in the press that flatly negate the entire post-October development and that present it as a chain of sheer errors, incorrect actions, and abuses?

[Ostrozhinskiy] The question is quite serious. We will begin with the fact that it is profoundly immoral to repudiate both one's parents and one's historical past. It is necessary to observe the ethics of treating the past. The one who sees the pages of Soviet history only in black does not know and does not want to know the kind of life that it was. The older generation has every reason to assert that the history is woven not only from dark fibers, but also from light and brilliant ones. The main thing is that which always has determined the development of Soviet society—the will and moral steadfastness of the people who were able to carry out the first socialist revolution in the world, and to go through severe trials and survive. No one has the right to render its work and inspiration null and void and to castigate millions of honorable workers with contempt. Our grandfathers, fathers, and mothers were building a new life with their hands, they saw the results of their labor, and they were proud and are proud of them. By the way, I convinced myself of this once more while talking to gray-haired old comrades on 6 October, when the republic's meeting of veterans of war and labor was held in the capital's Palace of Culture "Ukraine." I wanted to go up to each one and ask: What roads of life did he travel, and what did he succeed in doing? Journalists, sit down more often next to veterans in a sincere conversation; they can tell you a lot about their own generation, and about their own fate.

[Vasilyeva] Indeed, it probably behooves the members of the press to do this more often. However, let us continue our conversation. Valentin Yevgenyevich, what do you see as the ways to restore the political honor of the party, which was trampled on during the cult of personality and stagnation, and to renew its character?

[Ostrozhinskiy] To really restore its prestige requires much effort and time. Totalitarianism did great damage to the party. Our party was the ruling party for a long time and, with all of its errors and miscalculations, it did a lot that was good. People remember this. They also see something else: The party itself, which became the inspirer of perestroika, is now undergoing a difficult but ascending process of renewal and self-cleansing. What disturbs me in this connection is this aspect of the problem: Finding in itself the strength and courage, the party itself honestly told the people about the distortions and errors of the past in the plan of principles of the party. Is this not so? Does this not really show a sincere and critical attitude toward its own history and activity?

[Vasilyeva] Excuse me, I will interrupt you. All of this is so. However, the "clamor and fury" of anticommunism is increasing...

[Ostrozhinskiy] As I have already said, they are directing all of their efforts to slander and smear us. It is becoming more and more difficult for the political forces that are in opposition to our party to hide behind the banner of the general democratic process. A specific target has taken shape against which they are aiming all of their firepower. This is the idea of a socialist choice and the CPSU as its standard bearer. And our people must realize this clearly.

[Vasilyeva] Recently I had occasion to hear how one of the speakers at a street rally was trying to convince those assembled that the people are no longer supporting the Communists. What do you think of this opinion?

[Ostrozhinskiy] Before answering, I would like to note the following... Shouting in the streets is not always an adequate reflection of the people's opinion. Observations show that the most energetic part of the population, of the working class, of the collective farm peasantry, and of the intelligentsia goes to ecstatic rallies less, but it does more. They speak openly among themselves in collectives, they raise pressing questions, and they resolve them. That is why public opinion is not always reflected through political rally actions.

Now, on the substance of the question—about support of the Communists. Is not the majority among the deputies in the Ukraine Communist, excluding some western oblasts of the republic? It is not possible to forget that the election campaign took place under conditions of a wide choice and democratism, and quite a few were nominated people's deputy candidates who today are in other political parties. But someone urgently wants to present the Communist Party as being rejected by the people. These processes have to be followed and analyzed.

[Vasilyeva] Today, virtually the most dangerous thing for our society is the deliberate stirring up of passions, which we see in contemporary places like Hyde Park. In a new story by Anatoliy Kurchatkin, published in the journal ZNAMYA (No. 1, 1990), the author puts in the mouth of his hero a poeticization of the crowd that these days looks characteristic and authentic. Here it is: "Who does not know this delightful and splendid unity with a crowd of thousands, a complete merger, to the last atom of your flesh, with the many hands and many heads of its body, when you yourself cease to exist as a separate personality, actually becoming the crowd, its strength, its desires, its will..." And, you know, people are beginning to be afraid of unpredictable actions by those assembling on squares, at rallies.

[Ostrozhinskiy] I think that these are natural feelings. The insolent antisocial behavior of different rally demonstrators compels the population to think about this seriously. As you have just quoted from an artistic work, I would like in this connection to refer to real events that took place during a rally in Lvov, which was held on the

eve of the dismantling there of a monument to V.I. Lenin. I viewed several times a videotape that was made in the city square that day. And I will tell you frankly: The impassive video camera captured in detail the process of supercharging unhealthy passions and the psychological atmosphere of aggressive intolerance and of extreme agitation. Someone needed to hold the people in a state of tension and bitterness. And did not something similar really happen at the end of October in Kiev? All of this evokes just indignation among the population, which is corroborated in meetings with workers and in the numerous letters that are coming to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party and to newspaper editorial offices.

While thoroughly analyzing all of the zigzags and turns of specific events, it may be time for us to see what is democracy and "democracy." Against a complicated background of popular will, there has begun to operate, I would put it this way, a parasitizing false democracy. The political fish is more easily caught in troubled waters. That is where such a powerful attack on the CPSU comes from. On socialism. On Lenin. That is what is standing in the way of antisocialist forces to power.

[Vasilyeva] Speaking of a psychological attack, you and I are coming to an understanding of the problem of mass pathos, which of late has been manifesting itself frequently in rally actions. Apparently, it also has to be taken into account in practical work. What do you think?

[Ostrozhinskiy] We are now studying this problem closely. There are a lot of questions here that require consideration.

[Vasilyeva] Can you go into a little more detail?

[Ostrozhinskiy] Well, it cannot be done in just a few words. Since Hegel's time, by pathos is meant an idea that becomes a passion. Depending on the content of the idea, pathos, as is known, can take on a creative, as well as a destructive turn with respect both to the personality that it moves and to all social life. This kind of destructive potential is inherent, in my opinion, in the idea of civil disobedience in calls for a strike, which, as is known, are more and more frequently proclaimed by certain representatives of the so-called "democratic bloc" of people's deputies. Was it from their mouths that you heard appeals to help in the harvesting of crops, to strengthen work discipline, and to aggressively join the fight against crime? No, this did not occur. The very logic of such destructive actions, I emphasize this particularly, leads to chaos and to an outright betrayal of the interests of the people of the Ukraine. That is why the neutralization of this kind of destabilizing actions becomes one of the most important tasks of party committees and organizations, of labor collectives, and of all healthy forces.

Every sober-minded person should understand that calls for strikes and civil disobedience—all of this is the path to economic destabilization, to social decay, and not to

harmony. It would be socially dangerous to allow the microbe of dissension to affect our state of mind and to create a discordant subconscious and automatic feelings of dissension in us. Our history, including the most recent history, knows quite a few examples when people, deceived by political adventurers, took out their exasperation in pogroms and violent uproars. But such a path has never yet led to a good end. And the one who used evil for his own purpose became a victim himself. It is up to each of us not to permit such a development of events.

[Vasilyeva] Well, novices in politics frequently become victims of their own illusions, because at first they orient themselves primarily on those who applaud them most and cleverly play up to them. And, nonetheless, what can we expect from the diverse destructive forces?

[Ostrozhinskiy] This is not an unimportant question—it involves problems of people's security. Take a look at the photo, please, that was taken on 2 October at the building of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. The photograph shows a gas-filled tank truck from Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast that broke through a cordon around the republic's parliament, terrorists threatening to throw lighted matches in the cistern hatch and blow up everything around, and two Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] people's deputies urging them not to do this. Fortunately, persuasion was successful this time. But imagine what would have happened in the event that the threat was carried out...

So that, to be realistic, almost anything can happen in the development of events. In any case, this question must not be oversimplified. And, still, one cannot help but be pleased that many people in our republic have begun to realize the danger of the plans and appeals of strategists to destabilize socialism. I account for this by the fact that the adventurist undertaking, advertised by representatives of strike committees, the Ukrainian Republican Party, and the Association of Democratic Soviets, to conduct a republicwide political strike on the opening day of the Ukraine SSR Supreme Soviet did not, in fact, receive wide support. The press wrote a lot about how the workers of the Ukraine responded to appeals to their work honor and to the Appeal of the September Plenum of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee not to submit to provocation. And I would like especially to note here the active explanatory work that efficient managers and rank and file Communists conducted in the work collectives of party committees and organizations and to mention the important neutralizing role of our party press in interrupting this improper action.

[Vasilyeva] Apparently, the reaction of the work collectives to the policy of adventurism reflects the objective process of a mass sobering up of the public conscience. Although, of course, time is needed so that people realize the perniciousness of the actions of those forces that, for the sake of achieving their own selfish aims, are attempting to support social tensions in society.

[Ostrozhinskiy] There is this English saying: The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Thus, to become convinced of the intentions of the new social formations to do something, it is necessary to take a look at how they will do this and what they will aspire to—to creation or to destruction. That is the whole point. And it is good that people are supporting what is reasonable and that they do not submit blindly to those who profess the tactic of "the worse—the better."

[Vasilyeva] I would like to digress here. Our readers complain in letters that party workers and Communists still rarely enter into an argument with their opponents. The need for such actions, especially at rallies, is obvious. But it, this objective necessity, must be expressed subjectively, that is, to someone's face, and in specific instances, is that not so?

[Ostrozhinskiy] This is really an important task. It is necessary to reject a naive belief in the strength of decisions that are being made. But it would be extremely unfair to accuse all party workers and Communists of weak-willed contemplation of events. Indeed, there is nothing here to argue about: Recently, mass rallies were held in many cities of the republic in defense of V.I. Lenin's memory and deeds, in which quite a few of our party comrades took an active part. Incidentally, the mass media reported on this in detail. Although the existing opportunities in political work are far from being exhausted by us. I do not think there can be any argument here.

As for the meetings that are being organized by our opponents, when you begin to examine this phenomenon dispassionately, you always come to the conclusion: Perhaps, the strangest thing in the practice of the pluralism that is being affirmed is the harsh ostracism to which everyone is subjected who attempts to express his own viewpoint that runs counter to the anticommunist phrase. Here, the very concept of "tolerance" is deprived of any kind of sense whatever. The attempt to ponder a situation calmly, as a rule, runs into an openly threatening reaction of those present, accompanied by exclamations that are well-known to us. But if there is fear of entering into debate—this means slipping into a position of compromise. There is need of a timely, well-reasoned, and convincing rebuff to those who deliberately incite a worsening of the situation. I want to be understood correctly—this in no way means that it is necessary to suppress another opinion.

[Vasilyeva] That is, you want to say that you must not shoot from the hip...

[Ostrozhinskiy] In answering your questions, I tried to emphasize that one should not be guided by emotions in political matters. Restraint, reason, and a recognition of all consequences are needed here. Under conditions of the emergence of many parties, all social forces, I am convinced of this, need a social charity and consensus that we, unfortunately, are not taught in our society. Is

that not the reason why compromise and mutual concessions are attained with such difficulty? Our society is filled with negative emotions, and it is still not clear what spiritual impoverishment the situation harbors. For our children see and observe all of this. They, as was shown long ago by pedagogy, cannot develop normally without a positive thrust. Frankly speaking, when you try to present such an "example" of adults, now and then it makes you shiver. To be anxious over the fate of the children and not to see how badly the atmosphere of antipathy affects them, means to parade the imperfection of our own social vision.

[Vasilyeva] Can the error that will hang like a great sin on the generation of children be corrected? Is not too much significance being given now to political battles, and is not a lot of energy and time being devoted to them?

[Ostrozhinskiy] I am far from underestimating the significance of debates, discussions, and the civilized forms in which they are conducted. And still today it is impossible not to notice among the people a weariness from the noisy street actions and a longing for healthy stability. And I understand these feelings. Because the people know well that the main events occur in life itself, in fields and in plants, in the depths of the people—that is where the fate of perestroika is being decided now. That is what should not be lost sight of now when our society will make the difficult transition to a market, and when the Ukraine must acquire not a declared, but a genuine sovereignty.

I will return again to the children, in order to tell you an interesting fact. I could not read without emotion newspaper material about a competition in school compositions under the motto "How To Reconcile Adults?" recently organized in one of the republics. Unfortunately, it is not possible to explain what the students are writing. But it is apparent even from the excerpts quoted from the weekly SYN OTECHSTVA that the children understand much of what is happening better than the adults. I think that it would be sensible to listen to their sincere word and to their humane arguments and advice.

[Vasilyeva] That which you talked about is indeed interesting. Since you, Valentin Yevgenyevich, have touched here on the educational aspect, then allow me in this connection to ask you the following question. Some ideologists now do not very much like to use the word "education." What do you think in this respect? The problem of education disturbs many now.

[Ostrozhinskiy] To use one or another term is a personal matter for everyone. I suppose it is more important to think about what we put into the concept of "education," and what its social reference points are. A person in any society cannot do without education. We all continuously have to educate one another: by word, gesture, a look... Is that not so?

[Vasilyeva] I agree.

[Ostrozhinskiy] The education of someone dear is the oldest of human obligations, and it is as old as mankind itself. In ancient times, it was considered the most difficult of undertakings, the first of the arts. It remains such to this day. However, we must carefully analyze the accumulated experience, to draw lessons from mistakes, and to reject obsolete approaches. It is extremely important to get rid of the averaging mannerism to see in each only something effaced, unified, and homogeneous, and we must fundamentally accept the fact that we are all very different.

How do you strengthen higher moral and spiritual principles in a person, and how do you cultivate independent, industrious, good, and honest people? Those who live on earth are called upon to think about this continuously, if they want to live peacefully, prosperously, and happily. In consonance with the new conditions of the democratization of the life of society, it is necessary to change the social directions in the educational process that have embedded themselves in the conscience of many party workers, and not to reduce it to only a philological influence. The main thing now in party work, in my opinion, is education through human interaction, education through cooperation, education through coauthorship, and education through good creativeness. This is not a slogan, and it is not a phrase—this is really those factors that will insure the success of our transformations. And I want to hope that the dialogue and the cooperation of Communists with other constructive social forces—and I believe in the intellect and the common sense of the people—will give a mighty thrust to these vital processes.

[Vasilyeva] Thank you for the interview.

Kiev City Council Adopts Nationalist Flag, Anthem

*90UN2859A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
8 Sep 90 pp 1,2*

[Article by Volodymyr Serhiychuk, deputy head of the history department, Kiev State University imeni T.H. Shevchenko: "How the Blue and Yellow Flag Was Raised Over Kiev"]

[Text] On September 4, 1990 the Presidium of the Kiev City Council approved the final decision on Ukrainian national symbols in Kiev, sanctioning the official use of the blue and yellow flag, the Ukraine's coat-of-arms - the "tryzub" [trident], and the anthem "The Ukraine Has Not Perished." This decision was preceded by tense, and at times dramatic, debates. The following account is provided by one of the witnesses and active participants.

After the Ukrainian national blue and yellow flag was raised over Kiev (which went down in history as a yellow and blue flag), comments are often heard about the illegality of this action, and O.M. Mosiyuk, deputy head of the Kiev City Council is frequently accused of acting arbitrarily. In my view, the main reason for this is that

the press did not give the event sufficient coverage and, of course, not everyone understood its immense historical significance.

Since there was no stenographic record of the City Council Presidium's meeting, I will try to recall at least some of the highlights of that day in greater detail. In fact, I first became convinced that the blue and yellow flag would fly over our Republic's capital back on June 21 of this year, when I was returning from Zhitomir (the national symbols were approved there already), where I had been lecturing on the historical tradition of Ukrainian national symbolism.

And then several months later, the dean of the economic department of our university, V.P. Nesterenko, informed me that the City Council Presidium approved an initial proposal that day (July 20) on the use of Ukrainian national symbolism. Vasyl Pavlovych, who heads the permanent commission of the Kiev Council, briefed me about that document and requested that I be ready to attend the meeting of the Kiev City Council Presidium on July 24, at which time the final decision would be made. V.P. Nesterenko explained that my presence would be justified because some of the people's deputies might need explanations on the use of the national symbols, particularly in Kiev.

It should be pointed out that very few Kiev residents knew about this event. But on the morning of July 24, tens of thousands people found out about it after reading the newspaper PRAPOR KOMUNIZMU, which published the declaration of the city party bureau of the Ukrainian Communist Party, representing the communists in Kiev, on its position against this action. When V.P. Nesterenko and I arrived at the City Council around ten o'clock in the morning, a large crowd carrying banners had already gathered outside of the building.

The presidium hall was filled almost to capacity. A discussion on the strike of trolley-bus drivers and trams was in progress. A proposal was made that all members of the presidium go to the strikers' collectives and that the meeting be postponed. But a part of the presidium was against this, stating that this might be an attempt on the part of certain factions to undermine the discussion on national symbols. Finally, it was decided that a group of people's deputies from the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet deal with the strikers and the meeting of the presidium would proceed as planned.

After ending the discussion on the strike, the agenda for the day continued. A proposal was made that the issue of symbols be examined first because it had not yet been completed. But the majority voted against this and the presidium began a discussion on the question of separate departments within its future structure. This issue was discussed in detail at considerable length. It was already lunch break when the summaries were made. I gathered from conversations among the heads of commissions around me, that the issue of national symbols would be

raised after the break, because at the proposal of V.I. Konfederatenko, all of his colleagues had decided to withdraw their questions from the discussion.

However, after lunch, a new situation developed when representatives of the strike committees arrived and presented their demands to the city council and to the trolley-tram administration. Incidentally, they were questioned about the attitude of the workers' collectives toward the blue and yellow flag. In reply, they stated that, for them, this flag was a sacred national shrine.

At last, the discussion on the symbols issue was on the agenda. However, when an attendance count of city council members was taken, the quorum which had been present before lunch was no longer there. The tension in the building began to mount. The crowd outside the city council building grew, and buses with zmopivci [special police squads?] arrived in the square. When questioned by People's Deputy V.I. Konfederatenko, the president of the Kiev Rada, A.H. Nazarchuk, explained that he had a firm agreement from the heads of the Administration of Interior Affairs that no skirmishes would be permitted among the people that had gathered on Khreshchatyk [Street] outside the city council building.

Since there was no quorum, it was decided that there would be a recess, to find those deputies that had vanished.

Meanwhile, on Khreshchatyk, there was a moving sea of people, and an impromptu meeting was being held, demanding that a rapid decision be made approving the use of symbols. Alarmed by the rapid rate at which the crowd outside the city council was growing, I approached the deputy head of the Kiev City Council, O.M. Mosiyuk, and expressed my fears that if a discussion on the symbolism issue did not begin immediately, there might be unforeseeable consequences. Oleksander Mykolayovych agreed with me and assured me that the discussion would take place.

The recess finally ended; it turned out to be very long because the head of the Kiev Rada, A.H. Nazarchuk became ill (obviously, from the tension). As a result, his deputy, O.M. Mosiyuk began to conduct the meeting. As it turned out, for some reason, one of the people's deputies expressed his doubt that A.H. Nazarenko had commissioned Mosiyuk to conduct the meeting. This surprised many of those present because it is accepted practice that in the absence of the head, the deputy head always replaces him. But O.M. Mosiyuk once again patiently explained the procedures to the people's deputy and then began what had turned out to be an evening session - it was 5 pm. I was to provide the opening remarks.

I first explained that I am a historian specializing in the Ukrainian Cossacks, and actually began to do serious research on national symbolism at the bidding of the Ukrainian CP Kiev City Committee. I caught the astonished reaction of the first secretary of the city committee, Anatoliy Ivanovych Kornienko to my words. But I was

not making anything up, because indeed I had been given such an assignment by L.M. Novokhatko, head of the ideological section of the committee. This occurred on May 22, 1989 near the T.H. Shevchenko monument in Kiev when the blue and yellow flags were raised there for the first time. That is where I was asked to provide an explanation of national symbols to the readers of VECHIRNIY KYIV. I agreed, because at the suggestion of the deputy secretary of the Party Committee of Kiev State University I.V. Burakivskiy, I was already preparing similar materials for the newspaper KYIVSKYY UNIVERSYTET.

The following morning, the necessary materials were printed and delivered to the city party committee. A second copy was delivered to the university distributors.

Two days later, it was explained to me by the city party committee that my article could not be published because it did not call attention to the fact that the yellow and blue flag was soiled with blood. When I asked a counter-question about the amount of innocent blood there was on the red flag when Stalin held it in his hands, no reply was given.

Two weeks later, my work was not allowed to appear on the pages of KYIVSKYY UNIVERSYTET either. It was only through the insistence of the partcom secretary, V.I. Polokal, that it was finally published. Following this, I began to do in-depth studies on the history of Ukrainian national symbols, and after several months of searching in the libraries of Kiev, Lvov and Leningrad, I prepared a special booklet "The Fate of Ukrainian National Symbols", published at the beginning of this year by the Ukrainian Association "Znannya."

I provided concrete historical facts on the traditional use of the yellow and blue symbols in Kiev to everyone present at the City Council Presidium meeting; these symbols were used on the frescoes of the St. Sophia Cathedral (there were also similar ones in the St. Nicholas Mykolaiv Golden-Domed Monastery, which was destroyed in the 1930s); they were used in the flags of the Kiev Cossack regiments during the Khmelnytsky period; in the ancestral coat-of-arms of Kiev Colonel V.F. Dvoretzky (1659-1669), and in Kiev emblems at the end of the 18th century as well as in the coat-of-arms of the Kiev province in the second half of the 19th century. It was with this very yellow and blue flag that the students of Kiev's university marched on March 9, 1914 during the commemoration dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the birth of T.H. Shevchenko; and it was under this banner that Ukrainian volunteers marched from Kiev to the Russian-Austrian-German front and were blessed by General Bruslov, for battle in defense of "eternal and inseparable Russia" and united in a mass brotherhood under that very yellow and blue flag...

After relating the historical facts, I added my own comments that this flag is recorded in Kiev by history itself and so there is no need to pose the question about its registration. In fact, the flag could simply be raised by

the crowd gathered on Khreshchatyk, all the more, since there was no specific legislation on the use of national symbols. And everything that is not forbidden, is allowed.

They listened to me attentively. Apparently, many were hearing this for the first time. Someone even called out: "Can the Academy of Sciences attest to this?"

When I stepped down from the podium, I had a better chance to observe what was happening in the auditorium. It was completely packed and people stood in the aisles and corridor. In addition to P.S. Kysly and I.R. Yukhnovsky, whose reaction I managed to catch, I also saw many other people's deputies from the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet, including S.P. Holovaty, V.P. Ivasiuk, I.O. Zayets...

V.P. Nesterenko, who was head of the coordinating commission, stepped up to the podium after me. After providing the deputies with an explanation of editorial corrections in the initial proposal, he said something like this: "You have just listened to a scholar. No one has objected to his arguments and so I propose that we accept the decision in its entirety."

V.P. Nesterenko was immediately besieged with questions: who sought the opinions of Kiev's residents, and why not wait until the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet examined this issue, and what is the opinion of the rayon council, and so on.

O.M. Kulyk, who did a special sociological study on this, provided an explanation about Kiev's residents, and V.P. Nesterenko explained why, in his opinion, this decision should be accepted. Vasyl Pavlovych called attention to the accelerated politization of society, and to the processes of spiritual rebirth which have been increasingly pronounced after the Ukraine proclaimed its Declaration of Sovereignty. When asked to be specific about this, he suggested that everyone go outside and look what is happening there. At that very moment, voices of the thousands outside were heard throughout the auditorium, chanting: "Symbolism", "Blue and yellow flags! Blue and yellow flags!"

"And this is the opinion of the people!" someone in the auditorium called out.

The deputy head of the UVS [Administration of Internal Affairs] of Kiev, Comrade Shaposhnyk, walked up to the chairman and informed him that a procession carrying a blue and yellow flag which had been blessed by the clergy was now heading from the St. Sophia Cathedral to the city council building, and was approaching Khreshchatyk. The militia representative asked for directives on what action should be taken. O.M. Mosiyuk ordered that traffic be stopped on Kreshchatyk.

After this, the tension in the auditorium became even greater. The deputies began to demand a guarantee that no militia force would be used. Comrade Shpshnyk assured everyone that unless they [the militia] get a

direct order from him to do otherwise, the special forces units would remain stationary. He then turned to the people's deputies and said: "You do not have the right to leave the militia face to face with the masses."

In the street, the chanting which demanded the national flag became louder and louder.

At that point, Deputy M.F. Hrabar stood and suggested that even though there was no quorum, since the initial decision had already been passed by a majority of the members of the presidium, it should therefore be approved on record.

This proposal aroused an emotional response. Representatives of party organs objected categorically. The moment had arrived when a decision had to be made. The choice was that either the members of the presidium be dismissed because there was no quorum, or else someone would take the responsibility upon himself and make the decision, at this moment when the situation was reaching a breaking point both inside and outside.

And then O.M. Mosiyuk declared: "I take the responsibility upon myself and ask the deputies to raise the flag."

It should be said that immediately there were several threatening voices in the auditorium: "What have you done? You will be sorry yet!"

But no one paid attention anymore. Everyone rushed for the exit.

The sight outside was unforgettable. Although it had begun to rain, the crowds did not leave. They filled the entire central municipal area, from the Central Department Store [univermah] to the Khreshchatyk metro station. Thousands and thousands of youths waved blue and yellow flags, standing atop trolleybuses...

There was a rally called adjacent to the city council building at which speeches were given by people's deputies from the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: D.V. Pavlychko, M.M.Horyn, I. O. Zayets, S. P. Holovaty and deputies of the City Council.

Then Oleksander Mykolayovych Mosiyuk raised the blue and yellow flag.

And here is how the document on that subject read: "Considering that the initial decision has already been made (15- ayes, 6- abstained), and since none of the members of the presidium objected, and considering that the deciding commission which represented all political blocs came to a consensus, those who were present in the auditorium take upon themselves the responsibility of carrying out pt.4 of the decision of the Kiev City Council, that which deals with the use of the Ukrainian national flag, namely, 'To raise the blue and yellow Ukrainian national flag over the Kiev City Council Building on July 24, 1990 at 7 p.m.'

"Deputy Head of the Council, O. Mosiyuk"

And that is the way this historical event happened.

URP Rally in Poltava Criticized

90UN2834B Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 7 Sep 90 p 1

[Article by H. Hryn issued from Poltava: "They Talked and Chatted..."]

[Text] Notices posted in the city announced that Rukh is conducting a meeting concerned with providing Poltava residents with food, varied items, and also the Ukraine's sovereignty. Instead, at the meeting something of this sort resounded: "It is time, Cossacks, to take up arms...Beat the red hangmen..."

These statements were made by the representative of the URP [Ukrainian Republican Party] V. Maly, and though they did not become the leitmotif of the next meeting near the stadium "Kolos," they added fuel to the fire.

And so there appears another, no less fiery speaker, who throws mud at and curses the "commies" for all they are worth, and also specific oblast leaders. Just like that, for no reason, without any kind of evidence, he calls them criminals, blood suckers, and other far from polite names. And one observes that such statements have provoked some people's laughter and other people's indignation, but the judiciary organs' reaction is completely incomprehensible; they, it seems, give the impression that they have not heard such anti-constitutional appeals.

Though on the whole such statements were educational to me. With indignation and pain, the speakers talked about both the lack of essential, indispensable goods and the people's lack concern. The speakers presented quite a few facts concerning disorder, bureaucratic red tape, and indifference.

There were enough rumors being talked about: the mythical special stores only for the "upper crust," and at the meeting the participants even got to chat about the fact that it seems that somewhere someone personally saw near the homestead of Kozelka the "party apparatchiks" burn a train with goods and cigars in it. In short, they talked and chatted...

It is an unfortunate fact that at the meeting there were no concrete proposals made concerned with easing the tension about the availability of consumer goods in the oblast cities and villages. After all, will the volume of goods increase after one more commission is established to control goods, which is what is being done at bases and storehouses? And this was the demand that was voiced most often by the speakers.

Perhaps the members of that commission do enrich themselves with something for the dinner table, because people are really spreading gossip that in order to live well nowadays—you need neither titles nor money, but just to become a "controller."

The 33 year old builder, I. Mosiyenko, summed up everything that was to be heard at the meeting aptly: "I go to each meeting, discussions about urgent issues draw me to them, but absolutely nothing happens afterwards; it seems as if these were conversations taking place in the kitchen..."

Well what can you say, there is no denying what he said.

Caucasus

Armenian CP 29th Congress Opens 25 September

Information Report

91US0049A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
26 Sep p 1

[Unattributed report: "On the 29th Armenian CP Congress"]

[Text] On 25 September 1990 the 29th Armenian CP Congress set to work in Yerevan in the Armenian CP Central Committee Meeting Hall. The republic's party organizations are represented at the congress by 479 delegates. Also invited to attend were Armenian CP Central Committee members and candidate members and Armenian CP Auditing Commission members who are not congress delegates, officials from state and public organizations and republic organs, and representatives of the mass media.

At the invitation of the Armenian CP Central Committee the first session of the congress was attended by L. A. Ter-Petrosyan, Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet chairman, and G. G. Arutyunyan, his deputy. The congress was also attended by O. S. Shenin, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary.

The congress was opened by V. M. Movsisyan, Armenian CP Central Committee first secretary and CPSU Central Committee Politburo member.

Those attending the congress stood in a moment of silence to honor the victims of pogroms in Sumgait and other cities and towns in Azerbaijan, as well as G. Pogosyan, Idzhevskiy Party Raykom secretary, who passed away just prior to the forum.

The congress' leading organs were elected: presidium, secretariat, editorial commission and credentials commission.

An agenda approved by a session of the council of delegate representatives was submitted to the congress; following discussion this agenda was accepted in full. Its points:

- political report from the Armenian CP Central Committee to the 29th Armenian CP Congress;
- on the budget and property of the Armenian Communist Party;

—on a draft of basic points in the Armenian CP Program;

—on the Draft Armenian CP Charter;

—elections of Armenian CP leading organs;

—resolutions, statements and appeals to the 29th Armenian CP Congress.

Taking into consideration the opinion of many primary party organizations as well as the Central Committee Commission for Congress Preparations the council of delegate representatives proposed that the congress be conducted in two stages. During the first stage there would be simultaneous discussion of the five points on the agenda, but resolutions on the Armenian CP Program and Charter would be passed only after the referendum which has already been announced in regard to the party's status and name.

At delegates' request a tricolor flag, symbol of the Armenian Republic as an independent state, was brought into the hall following the recess.

The chairman, Armenian CP Central Committee second secretary O. I. Lobov, gave the floor to V. M. Movsisyan, Armenian CP Central Committee first secretary, who presented the Armenian CP Central Committee Political Report to the 29th Armenian CP Congress.

Then Dzh. A. Dzhanoyan, Armenian CP Auditing Commission chairman, presented the Auditing Commission's report.

V. Dzh. Yegiazaryan, Armenian CP Central Committee administrator of affairs, presented a report on the next point on the agenda, the Armenian CP budget and property.

The congress remains in session.

First Secretary Movsisyan Address

91US0049B Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
26 Sep 90 pp 1-3

[Unattributed report: "Armenian CP Central Committee Political Report to the 29th Armenian CP Congress: Report by V. M. Movsisyan, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member and Armenian CP Central Committee First Secretary, 25 September 1990"]

[Text] Comrades!

As an Armenian CP Central Committee first secretary who has served in that post for only a few months I am faced with a very difficult and weighty task. In this political report I must give a thorough assessment of the complex, contradictory and ambiguous events which have occurred in the years which have passed since the 28th Armenian CP Congress, express the Central Committee's view on a number of vital issues which pertain to the basic problems of how our republic will emerge

from this crisis situation and to renewal of the communist party, and propose for your consideration fundamentally new strategic orientations in democratization of the party and efforts to alleviate the crisis in our society in the political, economic, social and spiritual realms.

The Armenian Communist Party comes to this congress bearing a heavy burden of problems. The party's critical situation faces us with a difficult choice. The emergence of various platforms within the party and various forms of political power struggle are shaking the party's foundations and are leading to a weakening of its ideological and political stance.

These phenomena prompts serious concern and alarm over the future of the party and the people. Events in our republic are unfolding with remarkable speed. Only by striving forward together with all the democratic forces of our republic can we hope to see the party reborn and once again in its proper place in modern society.

That is why this 29th Armenian CP Congress has been convened ahead of schedule.

Our congress' task is to analyze the sociopolitical and socioeconomic situation in our republic and set a strategic course for the Armenian CP.

What is at stake is the present and the future of our party. In consideration of the opinion of party members and a majority of party organizations we deem it appropriate to conduct this congress in two stages. During the first stage we will hear the Central Committee's political report, discuss the draft Armenian CP Program and Charter, pass a number of important resolutions, call a recess, conduct a partywide referendum, and based on the outcome of that referendum complete this congress, after defining the party's status and the principles governing its operations and electing leading organs.

Comrades!

Today this is the most urgent question: will the communist party find within itself the strength for radical renewal and real service to the highest interests of the Armenian people, or will it continue to follow the same path as heretofore and remain in the sidelines of history?

This serious crisis in the communist party results not only from the complex and tense situation which exists in our republic. It is rooted above all in the serious systemic crisis which is becoming ever more pervasive throughout our country. Of late many words of praise have been directed at perestroika and frank, open analysis of the mistakes of the distant and not-so-distant past; there have been abundant promises for the future. But it is time we assessed the mistakes that have been made in the perestroika period. And of these there have been many.

When the CPSU initiated perestroika it proved unable to develop an in-depth and principled strategy for it. Renewal of society began in the realm of glasnost, not

encompassing from the very start many levels of the economic, social, cultural and ideological realms. Policy for the transition period was not thought through completely. The nationalities question, such an important issue for our state, was ignored altogether. All this has resulted in a crisis of power today.

The CPSU has avoided solutions to specific problems, and the soviets have not yet adequately mastered the art of government. In society there is growing disrespect for laws, chaos and anarchy. There have emerged a number of new and in times past unknown processes, such as economic blockades of entire regions, closing of key natural gas pipelines and highways, and interethnic conflicts.

The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that democratization within the party is still lagging sharply behind corresponding processes occurring in society. Even the 28th CPSU Congress—let us be frank—for all its significance was not able to bring about a decisive turning point in this process, so crucial to a political party. The people doubt whether the CPSU can become a democratic force which can make a serious contribution toward preventing disintegration of the economy and degradation of political and spiritual culture and which really can lead our country out of its present "time of troubles."

The situation, as you can see, is very serious. Here in our republic it is exacerbated by the fact that perestroika processes are occurring in an even more complex and contradictory manner. The breakdown of the old political and economic structures, growing ethnic self-awareness, affirmation of democracy and glasnost and dismantling of relationships which are hindering our movement along the path of progress are all taking place against a backdrop of marked destabilization of our entire sociopolitical and socioeconomic life and a profound and protracted crisis in society.

The lack of a tested, precise political strategy on the part of the Armenian Communist Party, inconsistency in decisions and actions, and the inability to foresee the consequences of the steps that have been taken and to consolidate communists' strength have given rise to serious difficulties and problems in regard to realization of the tasks and ideas of perestroika. Unjustified procrastination in regard to a solution to the Karabakh problem, lack of political and legal condemnation of cases of genocide against the Armenian population in Azerbaijan and failure to recognize the status of the thousands of deported Armenians have provoked a negative attitude toward the central authorities and as a result toward the communist party; among certain segments of the population anti-Russian sentiments have become common.

The effects of our disastrous earthquake are being overcome too slowly; tens of thousands of refugees remain

homeless. Crime and inflation are on the rise. Speculation, corruption and the shadow economy have become widespread. The ecological situation has not taken a radical turn for the better.

We have a situation in which a sense of ethnic vulnerability and socio-psychological stress give rise to political chimeras among certain groups of people, prompting them to undertake adventurist actions.

The communists and a majority of the working people of our republic expect from this congress a sober and honest analysis of events, a thorough assessment of the mistakes which have been made, definition of their causes and an outline of ways to lead our party and society out of their profound crisis, the roots of which extend back into the past.

Today as never before we need clear-cut criteria and guidelines. We cannot agree with those who suppose that the socialist idea was wrong from the very start or contrary to the best interests of the Armenian people. We cannot erase our history, which contains many shining as well as tragic pages. Only nihilists could deny the results of our people's labor. It is precisely on this foundation that today's Armenian Republic is being erected. This is an objective truth, and it cannot be denied.

The Armenian Communist Party, which has been the ruling party for decades, was undoubtedly involved in all the great and small achievements of Soviet Armenia, achievements which made Armenia one of the developed union republics. But our party is also responsible for the crimes and essentially inhuman acts which took place during the years of totalitarianism and stagnation. It was in that period that the gravest crimes were committed not only against the people, but against the party itself.

The label of nationalist was applied to any leader who dared to undertake independent steps aimed at strengthening economic potential, ensuring national sovereignty, expanding ties with our countrymen abroad or correctly illuminating our people's historical past.

Between 1921 and 1937 seven Armenian CP Central Committee first secretaries and six secretaries were shot and 11 Armenian Komsomol Central Committee first secretaries fell victim to repression, as did chairmen of the Armenian Soviet of People's Commissars and Central Executive Committee and dozens of people's commissars. In the years 1936 and 1937 the Armenian CP and Armenia's soviet organs were twice decapitated, and the entire membership of two convocations of the Armenian CP Central Committee was arrested. In those same two years approximately 6,000 communists fell victim to repression. Of the 59 Armenian delegates to the 17th All-Union CP (Bolshevik) Congress elected from various regions and organizations around the country only two or three survived.

In the past three years alone the Armenian CP Central Committee has authorized the political rehabilitation of 105 persons.

The Armenian Communist Party acknowledges that it as an integral part of the CPSU bears moral and political responsibility for all the illegal acts committed against the people, the party and the individual and resolutely condemns those acts.

However, we deem it essential to limit the extent of guilt on the part of party leaders and the thousands of communists who honestly and selflessly labored for the benefit of our people and for the sake of today's Armenian Republic. We also resolutely reject unjustified attacks on the present generation of communists, the majority of whom support radical democratic transformations in our republic.

But the present crisis in the Armenian Communist Party is due to mistakes and crimes not only in the distant past.

The republic leadership and the leaders of the Armenian CP Central Committee and Buro proved incapable of comprehending all the depth and scale of the perestroika processes which began in 1985 or of the changes in our society. The decisions of the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum were regarded in our republic as the beginning of just another political campaign, and the word "perestroika" itself as a name change concealing the same old party line. Both politically and organizationally they were unprepared to begin perestroika of all areas of our republic's life in a decisive manner; at the crucial moment they lost the initiative and leadership in the process of democratization.

The Armenian CP Central Committee has been unable to renounce bureaucratic centralism in party leadership, reveal communists' initiative and creativity, dismantle production relationships which are a source of alienation between workers and property and the results of their labor, or to affirm true people's power in our society.

One could add to this distortions in cadre policy, lack of efforts to combat negative phenomena—bribery, corruption, embezzlement and window dressing in the ideological realm—or also the fact that the party apparatus proved unable to comprehend that democratization and glasnost have awakened the masses' political activism; the masses no longer wanted to or could keep silent and spoke plainly of the festering diseases which are consuming society.

The Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, for decades subjected to ethnic, political, economic and spiritual discrimination, has once again raised the issue of practical implementation of a nation's constitutional right to self-determination. On this basis the popular Karabakh movement arose and began to grow strong. The republic began to be convulsed by rallies attended by thousands, demonstrations and strikes, all in support of the justified demands of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast that

their autonomous oblast be allowed to leave the Azerbaijan SSR and be united with the motherland.

However, the center could not understand the nature of the processes that were occurring or assess them properly: stereotypical conservative thinking hastily pinned the label of "extremism" on the popular movement. In this difficult situation the Armenian leadership simply could not find its bearings, voluntarily renounced its leading role in the movement and by force of habit complied with instructions from the center. However, in a situation of relative political stability in the republic and still-prevalent confidence in organs of authority an independent and constructive approach to the resolution of pressing ethnic problems, including the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, would have resulted in greater respect for the Armenian Communist Party. However, this chance was squandered.

It seemed that when new blood assumed the leadership of the republic communist party in May 1988 the Central Committee and party committees and organizations could finally take charge of the political situation and have an influence on it. At the September 1988 Central Committee Plenum an attempt was made to assess the causes of this profound crisis and put forward a program of national consolidation, renewal and revival, but these efforts were not backed up the necessary organizational, political or practical work.

After this the Armenian Communist Party began to lose its leading role in society and to yield its positions one by one. The lack of principles on the part of the party Central Committee Buro and its Secretariat, the clearly evident discrepancy between words and actions, the imperfect nature of efforts to stabilize the situation, and serious mistakes made in cadre policy intensified public dissatisfaction. The center's resistance and inability to resolve the problem of the Armenian people's self-determination by constitutional means led to genocide in Sumgait, interethnic conflicts and armed clashes.

The January pogroms in Baku, the driving out of the population of the Armenian villages of Kamo and Azat by Azerbaijani fighters, the elimination of Soviet government in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, bandit attacks on border villages in Armenia and destruction of the Soviet-Iranian border caused the Armenian people to rise up to protect themselves and form self-defense units. Yet unfortunately weapons also fell into the hands of criminal elements. The key issue was not resolved in a timely manner, i.e. to legalize the units which had been created to defend the border, and to take decisive measures to break up criminal gangs.

By the time a new Armenian Communist Party leadership was elected these processes had worsened in the extreme and a new upward spiral of tensions was unfolding. Anarchy and chaos prevailed in society. Events were unfolding faster than we could react to them, guide them or fundamentally change the situation.

Every day and every hour it was necessary to put out brushfires of events occurring in various places.

It is not in order to justify ourselves that we are saying this. This was simply the reality, and we must realize that.

The center favored the imposition of martial law throughout the entire republic and disarming of all armed groups without exception as the sole solution to the problem. Taking into consideration the opinion of broad segments of the public and at the cost of tremendous effort we succeeded in avoiding this. First of all, the basic reasons which prompted the people to arm themselves in self-defense had not been eliminated, and on the other hand this could have resulted in much bloodshed, more victims, and clashes between the Armenian population and the Soviet Army or Internal Troops. We proposed that we normalize the situation through our own efforts, within the framework of legal mechanisms, and that we legalize the militia and disarm criminal elements, and we repeatedly submitted this plan to the people.

We succeeded in recovering a portion of the stolen weapons and ammunition. Our indecisiveness, as well as inaction and demoralization on the part of law enforcement organs made it impossible to stabilize the situation.

As you can see, in recent months the party has been operating under dramatic circumstances. In spite of that we succeeded with great effort in lifting the rail blockade following a heated and thorough discussion at the CPSU Central Committee in May attended by the Azerbaijani leadership. Thanks to the efforts of the Union government a special resolution was adopted creating a free enterprise zone in Armenia. Special structures were created to invigorate construction policy in the disaster area.

Practical steps have been taken to organize and convene a World Armenian Congress.

A resolution by an Armenian CP Central Committee plenum marked the beginning of the process of drafting a new party program and charter. However, the Armenian CP Central Committee, its Buro and myself personally were unable to make substantive changes in the party's operations or bring about a turnaround in the present crisis. Though we presented our program for stabilizing the situation, overcoming the economic crisis, consolidating the healthy, democratic forces in our nation and solving the problems of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and the refugees during the Supreme Soviet election campaign, we still suffered a political defeat.

What were the principal reasons for this? Above all I must emphasize the grave mistakes made over a period of decades in all areas of society, the atmosphere of dissatisfaction and mistrust among the masses of the people as a result of changing perceptions of socialism, a lack of confidence in perestroika and disillusionment

with the possibility of its success, which left a decisive imprint on the outcome of the election both in Armenia and in many other union republics. Another reason was the slowness of the central authorities in finding a solution to the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh, something which prompted the people's justified anger and outrage. Let us note self-critically that the Armenian Communist Party did not do the best it could have at this serious political moment and was unable to set political guidelines. We found ourselves faced with a *fait accompli* due to a passive, contemplative stance, inertia, lack of consistency and partylike adherence to principles, and in some cases timidity, on the part of the Armenian CP Central Committee, its Buro, the appropriate departments, Yerevan Party Gorkom and other party gorkoms and raykoms and their leaders.

Comrades! The acute crisis being experienced by the Armenian Communist Party is to a large extent the result of the fact that the Armenian Communist Party, which for decades was one of the CPSU's many regional organizations on a par with an oblast party organization and was guided in its operations by strict guidelines set down by the CPSU Central Committee, was virtually completely deprived of the qualities and characteristics typical of a political party which is capable of bold and independent decisions and actions.

The work of the Armenian Communist Party, just like that of the CPSU, was suited for service to the totalitarian and authoritarian-bureaucratic system, which in the end led to serious deformations of intraparty relations, cadre policy and the formation of party ranks and virtually no participation by rank-and-file communists in decision making.

Today it is extremely important to rid ourselves as quickly as possible of the hierarchical party command structure of administration and give up our monopoly in politics, the economy, culture, science and information.

There was perhaps no other area of party work which was so ruinously affected by the command-administrative system as was implementation of cadre policy. One of the main reasons for our failures and people's justified dissatisfaction was incorrect cadre policy. In this regard other primary causes are subjectivism and arbitrariness, narrow local interests and protectionism, and an absence of clearly defined mechanisms. We were not able to take decisive steps toward all-encompassing decentralization of cadre work or toward overcoming widespread negative phenomena and tendencies and creating the conditions necessary for development of the processes involved in democratic selection and promotion of leadership cadres. Not enough thought was given to ways of abolishing the immense official nomenklatura of party committees, including the party's Central Committee.

Today the party is going through processes which mark a new quality of self-purification. In view of that there is

no point in dramatizing the fact that some party members are quitting the party; perhaps those individuals have gone astray in the murkiness of political life or have been disappointed in their personal aspirations.

Over the past two-and-a-half years 1,502 persons have left the 198,855-strong Armenian Communist Party, while during the same period 10,324 joined its ranks.

In these difficult times the people who are quitting the party are primarily those who had used their party membership for selfish ends, and are now leaving the party for those same ends. Our task is to fight for every honest communist and help him orient himself in the present difficult situation.

We have at our disposal a large army of honest, bold and principled communists, people who joined the party with hope and conviction, who have selflessly defended their homeland and the honor and dignity of the Armenian people, who have demonstrated lofty human qualities in labor and in public service. It is on the support of these people that we are counting.

Comrades!

The main question which our congress must answer is how to transform the programmatic guidelines and organizational principles of the Armenian Communist Party and give the party a new, democratic face, how to breathe new life into it so that it will truly serve the interests of the working people and of all the people.

Drafts of the basic points in the Party Program and the Armenian CP Charter have been submitted for your consideration. As you are aware, as these documents were being prepared a number of party committees drew up alternative versions. The drafts which have been distributed to the delegates take into consideration many of the points contained in the latter, as well as comments and suggestions received by the Central Committee.

The most heated discussions have revolved around the party's status and its name. Decisions on these key issues will be of fundamental importance to the party and the people. Precisely for that reason they should be made by the congress based on the results of a partywide referendum. This is the first time in the history of the CPSU that decisions are being made by the whole party on the basis of a referendum. We submit that this delegation of responsibility for the fate of their political organization to all communists without exception will help them become more deeply involved in today's complex problems and in finding ways to solve them.

As we work to determine the fate of the Armenian Communist Party we must show wisdom and restraint, take the lessons of the historical past into account and proceed with a view not only toward the present difficult situation but also the status of our republic and the Union Treaty which is under discussion and which our republic will sign, and we must be able to look into the future. At this fateful hour for the Armenian Communist

Party it is important that we set aside special interests, subjective biases and personal ambitions and be guided by the most important thing: our interest in preserving the party and our efforts to place it in the service of the people and in no event to permit a split in its ranks. We do possess certain prerequisites for achievement of intraparty accord. Above all we need to define our position on the following issues: the party's place and role in our republic's political life; its programmatic goals; the ideological basis and fundamental principles for basic reforms in intraparty relations and democratization of intraparty affairs.

There have been various opinions and suggestions offered in this regard. However, an overwhelming majority of communists favor further democratic renewal of society and restructuring within the party based on profound democratization of intraparty affairs. In the opinion of an overwhelming majority of communists the Armenian Communist Party should become genuinely democratic and popular and should be imbued with the highest national interests. In the party's programmatic goals common national and common human values have priority over pseudo-internationalist and class-based values.

As we work to create a fully empowered, independent party we must restructure our relations with the CPSU, moving from all-encompassing, strict centralization and absolutely unquestioning subordination to free cooperation on principles of autonomy, equality and mutual agreement. The Armenian Communist Party deems unacceptable all resolutions by CPSU leadership organs which are directed against the national interests of the Armenian people. In the realm of interparty relations the renewed Armenian Communist Party will build partnership relations with union republic communist parties and political parties and organizations in various countries and states in regard to matters of mutual interest. As the Armenian Communist Party renews itself one of its important tasks is dialogue and cooperation with political parties and schools of thought for the sake of protecting common national interests, resolving the Armenian question and establishing close ties between our homeland and the diaspora.

Under these new conditions the Armenian Communist Party is entering into dialogue and cooperation with all forces, movements and organizations whose goal is to strengthen the might and progress of the Armenian Republic and bring about national consolidation and cohesion among the Armenian people. Within the framework of the Armenian Constitution and current laws the communist party will strive to be an active participant in political processes and have a constructive influence on them.

We must examine thoroughly our theoretical heritage from the past and rid ourselves of any and all ideological myths, above all of the Stalin-Suslov concept of "Marxism-Leninism."

For decades party ideology was forced into the constraints of ossified dogmas, while the party and party interests were placed not only above common human values, but also above the interests of our own people.

In actuality rejecting its national functions and championing internationalism, ideology was essentially wholly at the service of a policy aimed at assimilating our country's ethnic minorities.

By elevating the category of class origin to an extreme, an absolute and an absurdity party ideology played a destructive and obstructing role in the development of the social sciences, the arts, literature and ethnic cultures.

By declaring Marxism-Leninism the only scientific theory, official ideology not only attempted to justify the glaring failures in socialist building but also essentially cut off Soviets from world civilization and the achievements of international social thought, categorizing all of that as somehow unscientific. Party ideology lowered an iron curtain between nations, cut off our peoples from the world community and created an atmosphere of universal anxiousness which to a great extent helped maintain the atmosphere of misunderstanding between peoples.

Through the use of all these means official ideology could and did in fact become the indispensable buttress of the Stalinist-Brezhnevist totalitarian state.

We must dissociate ourselves from everything which has not stood the test of time and is not in accordance with modern scientific views. In this regard the key issue is our attitude toward "the communist perspective." We must also reconsider our perception of socialism as something opposed to a civil society and based on the arbitrarily administrative and forcible socialization of private property.

We must deal thoroughly with these and many other fundamental issues as soon as possible and do some major theoretical work.

Comrades! Today it is extremely important that party policy include a clear-cut stance on the ethnic question. In recent years our country has witnessed an unprecedented worsening of interethnic relations. The words like friendship, brotherhood and internationalism which have been repeated for decades have been transformed into meaningless symbols; the groundlessness of declarations proclaiming the successes and achievements of the CPSU's wise Leninist nationalities policy has been exposed. In fact, that policy was often not Leninist, much less wise. Today everyone is aware of the tragic results of that policy.

The significance of the ethnic question was not grasped by the CPSU and Central Committee Politburo leadership. Though a special plenum was devoted to this issue and a CPSU platform adopted in regard to it, our

political arsenal still does not include appropriate structures and mechanisms for defining the question and resolving it; there is no legal basis for regulation of interethnic relations. In speeches at the 28th CPSU Congress we assessed the Central Committee's work in this area as unsatisfactory. The actions taken by the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to protect their free self-determination, honor and national dignity clearly demonstrated the unfounded nature of the nationalities policy pursued by the CPSU and the Soviet State.

The bloody events in Sumgait, Kodzhalu, Kirovabad and Baku and the forceful deportation of over 350,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan; the blockade of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast; tendentious materials issues by the all-union media, disinformative in content and anti-Armenian in tone; numerous punitive actions by Internal Troops and Soviet Army units against the peaceful population of Artsakh; forceful liquidation of organs of Soviet government as well as the oblast party committee and a number of rayon party committees in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in violation of the Soviet Constitution and the CPSU Charter; flagrant and unconcealed efforts by the chauvinistic leadership of Azerbaijan to eliminate the autonomous region and forcefully resettle the oblast's Armenian population; disdainful disregard by the country's leaders for numerous statements and resolutions by Armenia's official authorities, conclusions by authoritative commissions and appeals and resolutions by the general public, including the foreign public, in regard to a just political solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast problem—these have all impressed upon our minds the idea that these and many other crimes against the Armenian people committed over the past two years or more have been carried out with the unspoken complicity of the center and assistance from the corresponding union ministries and agencies.

Analysis of the ill-conceived resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast adopted by Union organs, including the infamous CPSU Central Committee Politburo resolution of 21 February 1988—which, incidentally, should have been revised long ago—and the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution of 28 November 1989, as well as endless cynical experiments, starting with the establishment of a Special Administrative Committee and a union monitoring and observation committee in the oblast in place of its constitutional organs of government, and concluding with the so-called republic organizational committees and various other organizational bureaus, convincingly attest to the fact that the fate of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast is of no concern whatsoever to the leaders of the perestroika period.

Today, at a time when the republic is showing signs of stabilization in its situation, we are witnessing intentional efforts to escalate tensions. Certain interested parties are attempting through violent coercive methods to bring the freedom-loving and courageous people of

Artsakh to their knees. Even after a political hunger strike by prominent sons of the Armenian people—academician Viktor Ambartsumyan, writer and journalist Zoriy Balayan, actor Sos Sarkisyan, people's deputies from Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as a number of other prominent individuals who have joined them—the authorities and the mass media which meekly do their bidding continue to pursue their immoral course of indifference.

The communists of our republic resolutely condemn the position taken by the central authorities in regard to solving urgent ethnic problems, specifically in regard to self-determination for Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, as well as the apartheid policy pursued by Azerbaijan's leaders with regard to its Armenian population.

We have demanded in the past and continue to insist on immediate restoration of the oblast soviet of people's deputies and party structures in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, elevation of the oblast's status, lifting of the economic, political, transportation and information blockade, guarantees for the safety of the Armenian population and unswerving compliance with their constitutional rights.

The cornerstone of the Armenian Communist Party's ethnic policy has been and remains the right of nations and peoples to free self-determination. We assume and always have assumed that healthy interethnic relations must be built and developed on a basis of profound respect for the honor, dignity, ethnic traditions and culture of each people. There should be guaranteed equal rights and opportunities for unhindered development in all areas of life for all the nations and peoples living in our republic.

Comrades!

An important part of the draft Program is devoted to development of national culture and science, Armenian cultural studies and objective presentation of the history of the Armenian people's national liberation struggle and the history of Armenian social and political parties and schools of thought.

Our republic communist party regards it as its duty to aid in the implementation of a program of national consolidation. It favors broad development of political, commercial and cultural ties with the domestic and foreign Armenian diaspora. One of its main goals is to achieve international recognition and condemnation of the genocide which occurred in 1915.

The Armenian Communist Party should in no way stand apart from the indoctrination of citizens in a new and genuinely democratic society. We will do everything possible to aid in the formation and development of ethnic schools and the improvement of training for young specialists. We hope that the entire Armenian creative and scientific intelligentsia will work harder to help find solutions to the moral and cultural problems which face our society and our people.

Qualitatively new changes in our republic's political life as well as the existence of new tasks facing the communist party insistently demand active work by us and legislative initiative by communist deputies in parliament, which has now become truly a forum of all the people. Without well-organized, well-planned parliamentary activity and mastery of the skills of working in the republic parliament and in local soviets it will be difficult for the party to achieve its stated goals.

Today our party's task should be to struggle to unite all the people's forces for the purpose of successfully realizing a common national revitalization program.

The political foundations of this program are contained in the basic documents which are to be discussed and approved by this congress. The draft of the basic points in the Party Program will serve as the foundation of the party's ideological work. Its fundamental ideological, theoretical and political principles are firmly interwoven with national principles. Its fundamental and most important goal is to ensure people abundance and civil and democratic liberties.

As we develop perestroika of our ideological work we must above all be imbued with an awareness of the inevitability and undisputed nature of democratic transformations. Renewed ideology should mold new thinking, change people's way of thinking and help them rid themselves of primitive and distorted perceptions of socialist society.

By rejecting outdated dogmas the Armenian Communist Party should become a modern, renewed party, with experienced, staunch communist reformers at its helm. All levels of the party organization should be updated in a fundamental way by the introduction of new leading cadres. We need to find new people who are capable of boldly and in a principled manner implementing a program of party renewal.

As we work to carry out political and ideological work based on national interests we must also adopt international experience and make skillful use of the policy of socialist and social-democratic countries which have succeeded in providing a high level of material and spiritual life for the peoples of their countries. Unless we do this our ideological work will not be full adequate and up-to-date.

It is very important for us to reconsider our attitude toward the party press with a view toward present-day realities and the mistakes of years past.

During the reporting period there was no radical perestroika of the work forms and methods of our party newspapers and magazines. The Central Committee, Yerevan Party Gorkom and a number of party raykoms have abdicated their involvement in principled, purposeful work by the party press.

Under the harsh conditions imposed by competition it is essential that we develop our own line and strive to

convince the readers of its correctness in a consistent manner and with a high degree of professionalism. Communist journalists should have their own voice. The time has come for objective interpretation of reality and development of a clear-cut position.

The political, commercial and administrative activities of our party publishing house should also be fundamentally transformed and substantially intensified.

Real life has led to a clear understanding of the fact that the communist party is now at an ideological and organizational dead end and that the way out of this situation lies in a decisive break with totalitarianism and the one-party system, in consistent embodiment of the principles of a multi-party system, social justice, humanism and progress.

Democratization of public life is possible only if there exists an all-encompassing system for protection of human rights, one indispensable condition for and guarantee of which is the creation of a law-governed state of all the people and a self-governing democratic society.

A law-governed state should provide protection for the national interests of the Armenian people and their material and spiritual needs, security for life and property, social protection, a guaranteed right to work, protection for the rights of ethnic groups and human rights, freedom of conviction and conscience, and development of science, education and culture.

Our republic parliament has adopted a highly important and historic document: the Declaration of Armenian Independence, which marks the beginning of the process of restoring our republic's independence.

The proclamation of the Armenian Republic, revelation of the people's creative capabilities and all fundamental issues pertaining to democratization and radical renewal of society should be reflected in the republic's Basic Law. Therefore the Armenian Communist Party favors the swiftest possible drafting and adoption of a new Armenian Republic Constitution and can participate actively in that process.

The Armenian Communist Party expresses the hope that the establishment of true people's power will become a fundamental issue in the work of our republic parliament and is prepared to do everything in its power to aid in the successful realization of this key political task.

Today the task of strengthening law and order is a top priority. The Armenian CP Central Committee and the republic government have not been successful in establishing order in this important sector. Society has grown tired of instability. People are presenting organs of authority with categorical demands: halt the growth of crime and antisocial manifestations and move resolutely to strengthen law and order. The direct link between the state of law and order and the level of political and social stability is quite clear. It was toward reinforcement of

law and order that the republic parliament's first measures were directed. The Armenian Communist Party will do everything possible to assist in all steps undertaken by the supreme organ of authority to reduce tension, stabilize the situation and lead society out of its present crisis.

Of fundamental importance to the party is its relationship with mass public organizations, including trade unions. It is clear that the trade unions' former role as the party's "reins," something like the administration's vassals at enterprises, is unacceptable under conditions of profound democratization of society. Relationships between the party and trade unions and with other workers' organizations should be based on partnership. We will do all we can to cooperate with trade unions and lend support to their just demands in regard to social protection for working people.

A special word should be said about our republic Komsomol, which presently finds itself in the process of perestroika and renewal. While respecting the Komsomol's independence and supporting it in every way, the party should renounce its habit of regarding the Komsomol as the sole representative of all young people.

Our party's highest goal is to serve devotedly the national interests of the Armenian people. Consequently we have no right to isolate ourselves and we will continue to fight to attain our goal.

Only through specific, beneficial and purposeful actions aimed at qualitative renewal of the content and direction of its work can the Armenian Communist Party win respect as a serious and solid political organization, participate effectively in our republic's public life, exert an active influence on political processes and achieve radical renewal of society.

Comrades!

In the draft Party Charter which has been submitted for the consideration of this congress provision is made for statutes intended to expand the role of primary party organizations. Regulation of their activities is being eliminated and independence in the way they organize their internal affairs established. Primary party organizations may resolve independently issues pertaining to their structure and define the forms of their work. Their decisions, if not in violation of the Armenian CP's Program and Charter, are not subject to repeal by higher-level organizations. Admission to the Armenian Communist Party is being transferred to primary party organization jurisdiction. They are being granted the right to give a definitive assessment of the activities of any communist on their party rolls.

Today it is essential that we implement fundamental reforms of intraparty relations on the basis of all-round democratization of party organization affairs. Only thus can the Armenian Communist Party consolidate broad segments of society around common national issues.

Democratization of intraparty affairs should above all pursue the goal of all-round affirmation of the authority of the party masses based on substantial expansion of the organizational and financial rights of primary party organizations, recognition of their definitive role and creation of a new mechanism for the making of political decisions. We must strive toward guarantees that communists can freely express their will through direct, secret elections from among multiple candidates at all levels of the party's leadership structure. Intraparty relations should be based on comradeship and respect for the minority opinion.

In the course of pre-congress discussion various viewpoints were expressed regarding the principle of democratic centralism. Some people favored excluding this principle from the Party Charter, justifying this by the fact that democratic centralism led to deformation of intraparty affairs. Others favored keeping this principle, stating that if this is not done the party will be transformed into a formless, unmanageable organization.

We are of the opinion that the very principle of democratic centralism was at some point in the past replaced by the principle of bureaucratic centralism. And those who favor elimination of bureaucratic centralism are absolutely correct. Equally correct are those who are afraid that repealing the principle of democratic centralism in its original form could transform the party into a debating society. We favor democratization of party affairs, self-administration, combination of the interests of the party with those of individual communists and greater conscious discipline.

Our congress faces the task of defining its position on the problem of factions within the party as well. Recent discussion in party organizations and committees and articles in the press indicate that the principle of glasnost and free expression of various viewpoints and positions, often diametrically opposed, is becoming increasingly prevalent within the party. We discuss any and all proposals by dissidents and resolutely favor development of intraparty democracy. In view of this, in our opinion, it is correct to ask: is it necessary in a multiparty system to create factions within the party, with their own separate discipline? Yet at the same time we feel that a minority which has formed its own opinions on various issues, separate from the majority view, may openly discuss and promote its views. This does not mean that the party is opposed to pluralism or the struggle between various viewpoints and theories. On the contrary, while continuing to take principled stances communists should affirm a spirit of comradeship and tolerance of other opinions and concepts within the party; therein lies the guarantee that party unity will be preserved.

Which organizational principle should a renewed Armenian Communist Party follow: geographical or production-based? This issue should be resolved by communists themselves; to them we delegate the right to determine the forms of their organization.

Comrades!

The profound events which are deforming the present social and political situation are to a large extent the result of the economic crisis and the decline in the people's standard of living. The scale of our crises and the danger from the effects of current trends are such that without realistic interpretation of their causes we will simply be unable to avert economic ruin. And the causes are many. A number of them are rooted in the current perestroyka years.

In the Armenian economy problems are interwoven which are fairly typical for the whole country. These are instability in our country's political situation, monopolism in administration and the contradictory nature of the transition period, imperfect decisions in regard to implementation of economic reforms and a marked decline in state and labor discipline.

Negative consequences have resulted from mistakes during the transfer of enterprises and sectors to full cost accounting and self-financing, in the struggle against non-labor income and in the conducting of the anti-alcohol campaign and from excesses in the organization of the cooperative movement.

One concentrated expression of crisis has been the disintegration of our country's consumer market and uncontrollable inflation, things which are having not only social but also political effects and are undermining the masses' confidence in perestroyka.

It is only natural that every one of the aforementioned negative "external" problems has also been more or less evident in our republic as well. However, their effect on Armenia's social and economic life has been exceptionally severe, for they have been augmented by and intertwined with the factors of a destructive earthquake, the blockade against our republic, the refugees and, a very significant point, numerous mistakes and failures and ill-conceived, quick palliative economic actions by the Central Committee and the government.

The direct and indirect damage caused to our republic's economy alone is roughly five billion rubles, which is equal to 68 percent of our national income. Compensating for losses from this unprecedented action will require much more time.

The main conclusions which can be drawn from economic results over the past two-and-a-half years is that in essence our republic has been unable to create a more or less functional mechanism for management of the economy under crisis conditions or to halt processes which are deforming the entire public production system. Tactics for action under present conditions have proven clearly inadequate to the tasks which face our republic and our people.

I do not wish to burden you with all the figures; I will merely state the gist of them. In our republic production

volume and labor productivity are declining and the structure of production continues to be of an archaic and cannibalistic nature.

Today this crisis has spread to all areas of the economy. During the first six months of this year there was a worsening of virtually all basic socioeconomic development indices: national income growth rates fell, industrial and agricultural production declined, and labor productivity declined and profits shrank.

Also seriously alarming is the situation which exists in the disaster area. It should be noted that most of the blame for this falls on the Armenian Communist Party and the republic government, which from the very start failed to mobilize their own capabilities, relying instead on "others." As a result they did not create the kind of moral and psychological atmosphere which would help speed up the completion of a whole complex of construction and recovery efforts or encourage efficient utilization of the aid given by concerned organizations, foreign states and private firms.

The people today are seriously unhappy with the fact that almost two years after this great tragedy there has not yet been any successful effort made to reactivate the paralyzed branches of administration in the affected zone or to develop and gradually implement a special program which would be aimed at putting the republic's entire economic potential to work resurrecting destroyed cities and villages.

Virtually none of the plans which were made were carried out. Over the past year and eight months only 28.7 percent of planned construction and installation work was completed. Yet the plan goals, as you are aware, were intended to restore the entire ruined economy and the entire material provision sector within two years.

In order to speed up efforts to revitalize the disaster area the Armenian Communist Party feels that above all we must ensure maximum mobilization of all our republic's resources and means, relying on our own efforts, and then work to ensure that the republic government is given funding and capital investment set aside for these purposes for republics and for organizations which have left the disaster area. We deem it appropriate to conduct negotiations with the union government on ways of continuing the aid which is presently being given after we have created all the necessary working conditions.

As part of the search for ways of ending the crisis and developing a strategy and tactics for socioeconomic transformations it is being persistently proposed that we renounce state regulation of the economy and existing interregional economic ties and "drag" our republic economy out of our country's unified economic realm. Just try to ask the proponents of those ideas how and at whose expense modernization of Armenia's economy should be carried out, or how industrial sectors and the production infrastructure are to be reprofiled and renovated? What will our republic use to pay for imports?

The idea of the Armenian people achieving an autonomous, independent state entity has now become a reality. The question is merely by what paths and means and within what time period this process will take place. How can we convert a devastated economy to the market-oriented model when we do not have adequate raw materials, finished goods to trade or capital, when we have no communications and infrastructure network? Unfortunately no one has been able to give a specific, clear and unambiguous answer to this question yet.

It should be borne in mind that the products of Armenia's leading industrial sector—machine building—are not needed by the Common Market today, and that a majority of our consumer goods are not competitive, and that our reserves of copper, gold, molybdenum and building materials will not support us for long.

Those who in a fit of excessive vanity think that Armenia's resource potential is adequate for us to find independent solutions to the problem of prosperity should remember this: fuel and energy resources, grain, meat, butter and sugar will cost us over two billion U.S. dollars annually, a figure which when calculated in real terms is larger than our entire national income by a factor of 1.7. It would be good for everyone to know that so that they will be more sober when pondering the future of our people.

We are obliged to face the reality that in recent years there has been a sharp increase in the surplus of our imports over exports. According to some estimates this imbalance is already 1.8 billion rubles. Furthermore, out of the 105 most important types of goods our republic has a negative balance in regard to 75 of them, i.e. imports more of them than it exports. All this should make us cautious as we choose our path of economic development, especially when one stops to consider that due to the transition to market prices the problem of equivalent compensation for goods will increase greatly.

Comrades!

The Armenian Communist Party's economic policy envisions implementation of both comprehensive emergency anti-crisis measures and a long-range economic development program.

The Armenian Communist Party regards as the cornerstone of all our actions to build an economic model completely new to our republic and to make the transition to market relationships the impermissibility of breaking the republic out of the unified union market and its closely integrated economic ties with other regions of the country at this time.

The Armenian Communist Party should work to ensure that the introduction of market relationships is definitely accompanied by the creation of a sort of social "armor": a guaranteed right to work.

Comprehensive solutions to problems connected with primary assistance and support for refugees and other

social groups—the handicapped, orphans, the elderly, single mothers, large families, young families and war and labor veterans—should be the subject of special attention.

The Armenian Communist Party will work to achieve this goal by political methods and by the conscious, coordinated efforts of communists, including those working in soviets and other state organs and public organizations, taking advantage of our constitutional right to take legislative initiative and attempt to win the confidence of the masses.

Among the socioeconomic problems which the Armenian Communist Party regards as urgent and primary the food supply problem is undoubtedly one of the most important.

In spite of some progress in this area the situation in our republic's agrarian sector remains tense; this is primarily the result of deformations in agrarian policy.

Authoritarian policies and a directive economy have thoroughly distorted many historical traditions and methods of land management. Peasants have been unjustly deprived of the experience of generations and our country has been virtually left without tillers of the soil. Alienated from their own land and from the distribution of what they produced, they have been transformed from masters of the land into executors of orders, into hired hands. The masterless land has begun to lose its fertility in a catastrophic way.

The present state of our republic's agroindustrial complex will require non-standard approaches and radical changes in our agrarian policy.

The party feels that the first thing which we must do is return the land to the peasants, and in order to do this we must speed up land reform and the passage of laws on property and peasant farms.

We are following the principle that during the first stage of land reform all forms of management and property should continue to exist: economically powerful kolkhozes and sovkhozes, individual and collective peasant farms, land cooperatives, and private property managed in various ways.

The Armenian Communist Party's agrarian policy gives special attention to ways of radically improving the social realm in rural areas and improving rural workers' working and living conditions. Stabilization of villages is a top priority, as well as revitalization of dying or abandoned villages in the republic's foothills and mountain zones; this will at the same time help lift the population burden from major cities.

Comrades! One of our most important tasks is the development and implementation of a fundamentally new ecological policy, the key issues in which should be completion of measures aimed at ensuring rational utilization of Lake Sevan and natural resources, substantial improvement in the condition of our air, water and

agricultural land, particularly in the Ararat Valley, as well as ways of instilling ecological culture in the public.

The granting of economic freedom to citizens and enterprises should be a priority goal of the communist party's socioeconomic policy. This will encourage further development of productive forces, entrepreneurial activity and incentives.

This will be possible if there is renewal of investment resources, transfer of certain state enterprises to private ownership or ownership by stock companies, leasing or sale of enterprises, stores and other facilities in the service sector, and inclusion of apartments, stocks and a certain portion of the means of production and scientific advances in the trading market.

We must create commodities and financial markets and commercialize the republic's system of specialized banks, reform the tax system, and create proper conditions for equality among all forms of property and for free enterprise.

The present situation urgently dictates the need to ensure stable operation of the fuel and energy complex and full utilization of both internal and external energy sources, including small rivers and nontraditional energy sources.

In view of the specific geopolitical situation of our republic, the Armenian Communist Party deems it important to build new mainline railways, airports and highways and to implement qualitatively new interstate and interregional measures to ensure that those lines of communication function smoothly.

Other important measures to protect our republic's economic sovereignty should be its inclusion in the system of world economic relations, establishment of a system which will create favorable conditions in order to attract foreign investment, pursuit of an open-door policy, and accelerated development of joint ventures, cross-border trade and our entire foreign economic complex.

In order to direct practical realization of this economic reform program the republic will need new skilled cadres at all levels. The Armenian CP Central Committee believes that training of future specialists both here and abroad is an important task for all levels of administration.

The Armenian Communist Party rejects its former administrative-command approaches of interference in the economy, but socioeconomic policy must be the key to all our practical work. Without that, without active participation in efforts to achieve specific goals which affect people's lives, our party cannot exist.

Comrades!

This report does not cover all the details of our present complex and difficult situation. We hope that the delegates will fill out the areas which I have missed with their own practical speeches, comments and suggestions. This

will be encouraged by the distribution for the congress' consideration of resolutions on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, refugee problems, the disaster area, genocide against Armenians and a number of other issues.

The Armenian Communist Party is heading for a party-wide referendum. The issue has been formulated clearly: what do the party masses think about the Armenian Communist Party's future status? We are creating an independent party with full rights and with its own program and charter, a party which should base its relations with the CPSU on new principles and free itself from dictates and coercive subordination, working to establish equal cooperation based on mutual agreement. We regard the future CPSU as a union of independent parties in sovereign states.

Today the Armenian Communist Party stands at the crossroads. The question now is where do we go from here? The answer to that question will depend entirely on the extent of Armenian Communist Party participation in the performance of the tasks which face our people at the beginning of this historic era. Will we be a party whose credo is liberty and progress for the Armenian people and their social, cultural and spiritual flourishing, a force whose efforts will be aimed at protecting common national values and interests, consolidating all the people's strength and affirming and upholding democracy?

Will we be a political force which will consistently further the idea of sovereignty for and mutual understanding between nations and peoples, to whom nationalism and conceit will be unacceptable, which will fight for the rights of both people and nations?

Will we be a party which will direct all its efforts toward consolidation of all its countrymen scattered around the world, which will uphold the foundations of our ethnic culture and serve as a proponent of a solution to the Armenian question?

Finally, will we be a power worthy of the Armenian people's confidence?

The answers to all these questions must be given by the communists of Armenia themselves, both in the referendum and before the second stage of this congress in a broad exchange of opinions on the published drafts of the basic points in our Program and our Charter.

Second Secretary Lobov Views Armenian CP Program

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[Article by Armenian CP Central Committee Second Secretary Oleg Lobov: "One Hundred Questions—One Answer"]

[Text] The 29th Congress of the Armenian Communist Party will begin its proceedings on 25 September.

The drafts of the "Basic Principles of the Armenian Communist Party Program," the Charter and the "Statute on the Control Commission" have been published in the press.

These documents are currently under discussion in the primary party organizations. Both nonmembers and representatives of other parties and public movements are interested in their content, because what the party is to be—renewed, democratic, humanitarian—depends in many ways on these documents; they will determine whether it adheres to the ideas of communism and socialism, and define its relationship to slogans to which we have become accustomed—ones for example like "From each according to his ability, to each according to his labor," or "according to his needs," and so on.

Congressional candidates were nominated in the primary party organizations. For the first time in many decades of an authoritarian administrative system, communists were able to express their trust in their emissaries to the congress by secret ballot in the districts or at conferences, plenums and city and rayon party committees, and to voice their wishes, their doubts, and urgent questions they wanted answers from the congress for.

I made tried to imagine to how the congress would go, and what its atmosphere will be, and to isolate the main and secondary issues that would become centers of debate. Will communists attending the congress be able to create an atmosphere of glasnost and pluralism, inherent to a democratic party and society, in their discussion of acute issues and in their search for novel solutions? By the end of the conference, will they be able to arrive at a weighted, wise decision capable of bringing communists together into a unified, workable party possessing new ideas attractive to the people of Armenia, who could be an aid in leading both the party and all of our society out of the crisis? Will they be able to receive the one answer to all of the questions troubling us today—what the renewed party is to be in the new conditions of perestroyka?

I would not care to express my opinions on all issues in this article. My goal is only to identify those issues which are important in my opinion and which I believe will be discussed at the congress.

Perhaps the most important issues being raised today in individual party organizations, and especially in the city of Yerevan, are creation of an independent Armenian Communist Party, withdrawal from the CPSU, and renaming of the Communist Party. It is perhaps around these issues that the most acute debate will unfold. My hope is that truth will issue forth from the debate. I think that factors such as our history, the republic's position and our future union and foreign relations and prospects will be accounted for in this case. All of this of course will also be intertwined with questions as to the suitability of retaining the slogan "Proletariat of all countries, unite"

and the party's anthem, the "International." Are they acceptable in today's realities?

The alternative program of the independent party and its charter were published in the party press. Much is in keeping with documents of the 28th CPSU Congress. But I can also sense the bitterness of insults and a certain ambitiousness, a claim on originality, and a longing for the strong arm and power of the party. The authors proclaim complete rejection of democratic centralism while simultaneously resurrecting it essentially in other clauses.

Nor will communists be able to avoid condemnation for the gross errors and crimes of the past. There will be talk of depoliticizing state bodies, schools and scientific institutions. I think that there will be opposition from both sides in this matter.

The question as to party organizations in production and their status will come up, of course.

And what do we say to rank-and-file communists in regard to the attempts to prohibit establishment of party organizations where they wish, rather than where they are ordered to establish them? How does this fit in with the proclaimed democratization and with human rights?

Deideologization, departization and depoliticization have entered our lexicon together with the concept of a multiparty system. But what is actually happening? There used to be one party, and it had its groups, cells, party bureaus and party committees everywhere. The majority said that one party was bad, that we needed several, that only under such conditions would there be opposition, pluralism and democracy. There is logic to that. Truth issues forth from debate. But it seems as if there are some who have no interest in debate, in searching for the truth, or in dissent. Who are they? Perhaps those who dream of a strong hand, those who find all public organizations a hindrance. Or those who dream of once again dismantling everything down to the foundations, and then living according to the principle of doing whatever one wishes.

But it would be better for us not to forget history, and to refer more often at least to the old constitution in lieu of a new one: It states that people are entitled to themselves determine the suitability of creating public political organizations with program and charter not in conflict with the constitution and with existing law. Were we to expel party cells on whatever grounds, wouldn't we force them underground, together with all the negative consequences of this, would we not violate human rights, and would democracy and humanitarianism not be offended? In the end, all of us would be the losers. The idea that the methods and style of work of the party must be different in the new conditions is another matter. This is obviously something that must be discussed at the congress.

Communists are also troubled by the work of party organizations at places of residence. It is clear today that

the party is dissatisfied by the level of work being done in the principal social environment—among residents. The proposal in the draft charter to establish party departments at places of residence will apparently elicit debate at the congress in this aspect as well. What is such a department, who will work in it, and what matters will it deal with? It seems to me that by reducing the staff of rayon and city committees and the party Central Committee we could create groups of professionals who could involve themselves not in collecting membership dues, issuing reprimands and keeping records on communists, but in the thick of human affairs, in all events occurring in the microdistricts, on the streets and in the squares, and in work with the people on the basis of purely party methods. This would be one of the ways of democratizing the party. Playing sleight of hand does not become us: It is not that easy for a party which over a period of decades has become accustomed to one-man command utilizing a brutal machine of suppression to switch to a democratic footing. This will not happen painlessly.

And how are we to maintain the party apparatus? By dues, or by other sources? This is not a simple question. The party budget is already receiving four to five times less in dues than in the past. The draft charter foresees leaving 40 percent of the dues at the disposal of primary party organizations. How is this money to be spent, for what purposes—to help party veterans or to train young communists? This of course is a matter for the party organization, but lively exchange of opinions on this matter will doubtlessly be useful to everyone.

The main documents that will be the focus of discussion will be the Program and Charter of the Communist Party of Armenia. And it would of course be boring at the congress if there were no alternatives. My hope is that new proposals will yet appear prior to the congress, and this would be good.

I would like to turn attention to two questions of some importance from my point of view, addressed in the Charter of the Armenian Communist Party. First, if we wish to discuss the power of the party masses—and we should not just declare this principle but reinforce it with specific decisions—then it seems to me that the following statement contained in the charter would be very important: “The Charter of the Communist Party of Armenia is written and approved only by a congress of the Armenian Communist Party, and it becomes conclusively effective after approval by a majority of the republic’s communists by way of a referendum. No one has the right to amend the charter without a partywide referendum.” On the other hand it may seem that by introducing this statement we will cause the party to become bureaucratic and the charter to become dogmatic. Proponents of this opinion would cite the CPSU Charter, which allows amendments of itself not only at a congress but even at a conference. But wouldn’t there be truth in what is said by those who feel that frequent changes in fundamental documents under the benevolent excuse of “not falling behind the times” often do colossal damage by their hasty nature, which often leads

to destabilization—something we observe in life and in other spheres of human activity?

Second. Let me turn your attention to Clause 6 of the draft charter, which defines the range of persons sympathetic to the party. These are persons who approve of the party program and charter, thus acquiring the right to participate in the party’s affairs with the right of deliberative vote. This could perhaps be replaced, and possibly very effectively, by the former institution of party candidates. This institution is concurrently a living relationship with the people, a source of new party members. Questions of a smaller scale but no less acute are not excluded either—about the privileges of party organ executives, and about renaming party newspapers and changing their status.

The memory of television broadcasts from the 28th CPSU Congress and from the constituent congress of the RSFSR Communist Party, and of the demands voiced at them concerning accountability reports by Politburo members and assessment of the activities of former executives, is still fresh in the minds of many. Abolition of the institution of Central Committee candidates, general reduction of the size of the Central Committee, renewal of the bureau of the Central Committee, and in general, introducing younger leaders into party executive organs will also probably be discussed. Communists are awaiting the advent of new leaders and new ideas. But this does not mean that we can reject experienced candidates, all the more so because many of them acquired their work experience in the complex conditions of the last two years. And as we know, experience adds value. In a word, although personnel remains, as always before, a cornerstone issue in the party, it cannot be hidden in a corner. It must always be kept visible. And I have no doubt that there will be new proposals to democratize work with personnel. Among the accomplishments that have already been attained in this direction are elections offering more than one candidate, consideration of the opinion of primary party organizations and direct secret ballot. Adding to this list, we will propose new ways and means of improving personnel work.

Nihilism, a defeatist attitude and abandonment of the political fight have recently been observed among a certain faction of the republic’s communists. As in the other republics, career-seekers and opportunistic people in the party are abandoning the party of the communists in these difficult days. No one is about to feel sorry for them, but honest people needed by the party often leave as well. When it comes to them, it would be no sin to fight to keep them.

Some explain their departure by an unwillingness to be in the same party with the odious figures of the past, with leaders who hold no sympathy among rank-and-file communists. But would this make the party any purer? The overwhelming majority of the multimillion army of communists, after all, are local laborers who we believe

will still have their say. Scoundrels and unsuccessful leaders come and go, but the party remains.

The following is not an idle question: What is to become of the party apparatus, which has become an object of brutal criticism in recent times? Today the party apparatus has been relieved of direct leadership of party work to a significant degree. The future "apparatchik" must be a specialist of a broad profile, and he must possess deep knowledge in the areas of party political development, political science, economics, sociology, jurisprudence, culture and art. He must be recommended for the apparatus from below, he must be free, and he must be socially protected by labor law.

Nor can we avoid the questions concerning international relations, the 5 July 1921 decision of the Kavbyuro [not further identified] and the legal and historical assessment of the Moscow Treaty dated 16 March 1921.

Talk on the continuing crisis in resolving the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] issue will perhaps be the most heated at the congress. Communists are in favor of settling this problem by parliamentary, constitutional means. They propose sitting down at the negotiating table, they express displeasure with the actions of the center, with the slow progress and with the prejudiciousness of the approaches, and they are making their own proposals, including creating a special United Nations commission on the NKAO.

These issues are intertwined with the problems of self-defense, with actions of armed groups and with guarantees of the security of the Armenian population both in the republic and beyond its borders. All of these issues require their resolution, without which there will be no stabilization in either politics or economics.

Communists feel that the meeting period of perestroika is finished, and that we need to begin work in all units of the national economy, tighten discipline, law and order, and consolidate healthy forces. And here as never before we need a law on parties, a law on the work of communists in the parliament and government. We need to work out the status of primary party organizations at work and at home, and draw up regulations governing their work.

Questions are arising associated with the work of communists in the earthquake zone, with refugees, with achieving Armenia's economic independence, with development of trade relations with foreign countries, with signing a Union agreement and agreements with each republic, with the struggle against corruption, bribery and protectionism, with our attitude toward private ownership and a regulated market, and with the party's agrarian policy.

As we know, economics are inseparable from politics. Having declared noninterference in economic affairs, and having rejected dictatorial ways, the party cannot disappear into the background and watch from the sidelines as the economic situation in the marketplace

worsens, as the welfare of the laborers declines and as poorly protected strata of the population find their position worsening. The fact that new approaches are needed in party work aimed at solving economic problems is another matter. Obviously, we need to make sensible use of the intellectual potential of communists. Patience and tolerance of one another are absolute necessities today. The value of the competent specialist will grow with growth of our conscientiousness irrespective of his party membership.

What is our view of the housing problem and the ways of solving it? What is our opinion of conversion of defense sectors of industry and privatization of the economy? These issues affect all of the republic's population. They are complex and supremely important. The party Central Committee was clear about the housing problem: The potential for self-recovery and the talent of the creator and builder are embodied within the Armenian people. When we lift the restrictions on the size of private homes and the dimensions of greenhouses, we will see truly explosive growth of private construction. In contrast to the standard, regimented, neat structures which give off an appearance that suppresses individuality and creativity, we envision fabulous examples of homes and homesteads. My only hope is that some part of the population would not become envious. We must remember that everything that will be built and created will remain for people on earth.

The word "privatization" is also new to everyone. And as with everything new, it "inflames" and excites the mind. Some are ready to immediately mount this "unbroken charger" while on the other hand others flee from it, like the devil from incense. But to take one's leave of this issue is the same as taking one's leave of life. Yes, things are hard for the communist today: After waging an implacable war against private ownership for dozens of years, in an instant he must make peace with his sworn enemy. This is where we need courage, so as to work everything out without panicking. Is private ownership really all that bad? Wouldn't it be better to find reasonable limits for it in each stage of historical development? Are there really many communists today who oppose possessing a car, a home, a garden plot, which just recently was labeled as the trappings of the petty bourgeoisie? Why, then, should we deny a person, including a communist, possession of shares in an enterprise in which the labor of more than one generation of his ancestors and his own labor might be invested?

Questions, questions, questions. There needs to be debate and disagreements in regard to them. For otherwise we will not see the truth.

The party takes far from a secondary position in the matters of development of science, art and culture, creation of unified administrative systems and the fight against monopolies.

What are we to do about gas supply, fuel and energy problems, and the work of transportation? How do we

begin the work of creating a zone of free entrepreneurship? How do we solve the problem of employment of the population and large collectives, and the destiny of Nairit and ecology? Here as well we need clear answers, and collective wisdom must lead us to the correct and promising solutions.

All of these questions are very important, and it would hardly be possible to reveal all of their essence and map out the strategy and tactics communists would use to solve them in a single document, even one as highly important as the party Program. This is why the preparatory commission worked with active party members and congressional delegates to prepare an entire package of resolutions, decrees and other documents on the most important issues that are of the greatest interest to communists and to the republic's whole population.

Entering into debate on any issue, we must remember our responsibility not only to ourselves but also to those who will come after us. Our job is not simply to say what is good and what is bad, but to answer one other very important and urgent question—what will we do as communists in order to make goods of higher quality appear more quickly on the store shelves in sufficient quantities, in order that every peasant would truly become the master of his land, in order that each person would feel himself to be socially protected, and in order that each person would know that there is a party in Armenia which is concerned primarily for the common citizen? Only in this way can we hope to restore its authority.

Unification of all forces, including the Armenian diaspora in the USSR and abroad, in order to rehabilitate Armenia's national economy and hasten its development can produce a large, concrete payoff. But we must all work toward this actively, we must make our way into the new joint ventures, associations, companies and so on. We must create an atmosphere of benevolence toward all who will come to our assistance, who will introduce new production procedures, and who will invest their capital in our republic's development.

Special attention must be devoted to compatriots returning to the motherland. Communists must express their attitude toward the recently adopted declaration on the independence of Armenia, on Armenian citizenship and on the forms and methods of protecting Armenians residing outside of Armenia.

There will also doubtlessly be discussion on the significance of developing Armenian as the state language, and creating a well organized system that would increase its status and widen the sphere of its application. I am certain that the delegates will also not forget to say something about the significance of Russian and other languages, and of ethnic minorities residing in the republic.

The party and the church. This was a prohibited subject until recently. But now, broadcasts from houses of worship and television appearances by clergy have become

commonplace for us. Armenia also doubtlessly faces problems involving the church and religion—problems which communists need to consider.

The future of any party lies in the young generation. Without it, the Communist Party of Armenia cannot have a future either. The young generation will be a topic of discussion, there will be debate on the subject, and I think that a document on the party's youth policy will be adopted. What its content will be, the congress will decide.

There will be debates on democratic centralism between its proponents and opponents. What are we to do with it? Are we to impart new meaning and content to it, rejecting the old hierarchical subordination from top down, or are we to replace it with a more up-to-date organizational principle? I think that the debate on this issue will be one of the most acute. But my hope is that we will find the correct solution, one which would allow us to strengthen party ranks and tighten discipline, while concurrently amplifying democratic principles in the party and creating a comradely atmosphere in the party environment.

Concluding this article, my mind keeps coming back to the question of independence, the party's name, and mutual relations with communist parties of the union republics. At a recent plenum of the Leninskiy Rayon Party Committee (Yerevan), where I was elected a congressional delegate, I was asked the following question: What side would I take if 10 percent of the delegates were to vote in favor of maintaining the party's status as part of the CPSU and 90 percent voted to withdraw? I decided to answer the question without offering a lot of justifications, and what I said was approximately this: "This might distress you, but I would have to go along with the 10 percent." The audience obviously expected nothing else from the second secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee. But I gave this answer not due to my position but out of conscience. It is not at all that I am a conservative. On the contrary, many feel that I am a democrat, as you know. And in this case I support preservation of party unity as a democrat. However, the party I favor is a renewed one, having nothing in common with one which conspired in its time with the state machine.

With formation of the RSFSR Communist Party, with sharp reduction of the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, and with greater representation of republic communist parties in the executive bodies of the CPSU, the party has for practical purposes become a union of equal, independent republic communist parties with their own programs that account for national interests.

Independence is becoming a perceptible reality. But would it be reasonable in this case to break all ties completely, at a time when the republic has not declared withdrawal from the Soviet Union even in the face of its radically predisposed Supreme Soviet, and is taking steps to sign agreements with republics and enter a

common market? Is this a process that communists should be against? Would that be reasonable? Would rank-and-file communists understand us? I have no wish to impose my own opinion. The final word belongs to the Armenian Communist Party, but still, I cannot remain silent.

I think that rank-and-file communists and residents of Armenia will display a lively interest in the work of the congress, since they know that it is too early to write the communists off into the archives, or to try to use their past against them. Letters and telegrams to the congress from communists, labor collectives, party organizations and simply common citizens will make it possible for congressional delegates to maintain their tie with the people, to feel their pulse, and to draw up a program that would keep us alive—a complex, contradictory program, but one with hope for a better future.

Participating in the work of the congress, every communist will one way or another return to the issue of the rights and responsibilities of a party member. What is he to do, what position is he to take, so that later on, at the end of his journey, he would not find it shameful to look into the eyes of his friends, his children, so that he could say that in a difficult situation he remained true to his ideals and aspirations, and was able to work together with everyone else to find the only correct answer to the question as to what our life is to be in the future?

Draft Program of Independent Armenian Communist Party

*91US0033A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
11 Sep 90 p 3*

[Unattributed article: "A Free Dialogue: Draft Program of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent)"]

[Text] **The changes in the actual socio-legal status of the CPSU and the crisis-type situation in the Armenian Communist Party have evoked a feeling of concern among communists for the future of their organization and for the party's fate. This concern has impelled a number of party organizations (in the YerNIIMM [Yerevan Scientific Research Institute for Mathematics and Mechanical Engineering], the State University, the Ani Association, the Polytechnical Institute, the Yerevan City Soviet, the Sirius and Jewelry Plants, and the Railroad Department) to join together in a Coordinating Council for Creating an Armenian Communist Party (Independent).**

What kind of party is this, and why is it necessary to create it anew? Here below is how the Coordinating Council has replied to that question.

The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) is being created on the foundation of the Communist Party (Independent).

The creation of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) will allow us to utilize for the benefit and well-being of the Armenian people those healthy forces

which exist in the party today. The use of such forces has been hampered by the totalitarian nature of the CPSU. The principal differences between the new party and the Armenian Communist Party consist in a rejection of the Utopian idea of building communism in Armenia and, from an organizational point of view, a rejection of the principle of democratic centralism. This new party is a party with a social-democratic bent.

The ideology of the CPSU, by which our country has been guided since 1917, has led to millions of human victims, to innumerable evil deeds and heinous crimes, to moral decline, political degradation, and an acute economic crisis.

As members of the Communist Party, we bear full responsibility for everything which has been done up to now in our name and which has had grave consequences for our people.

As the constantly obedient and submissive executor of the CPSU's wishes, the Armenian Communist Party has continued to conduct a policy of neglecting the interests of our nation. It ceased to have any authority long ago. Even today its leaders do not intend to abandon their power and privileges.

The 28th CPSU Congress once again demonstrated the powerful opposition of the conservative forces to democratic changes. The delegates of the Armenian Communist Party took an unprincipled position, and with regard to solving our national problems they proved to be incapable of taking effective actions.

As a party with a social-democratic bent, the new Armenian party will establish ties with other parties, taking into consideration herein primarily the national interests and the general values common to all mankind.

The new party's name will be determined at its Constituent Congress. But today, by way of a subject for discussion called "A Free Dialogue," we are presenting here below the Draft Program of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent). It has been written by an editorial commission, consisting of the following persons: A.V. Akopyan, A.T. Kuchukyan, N.Ya. Zarobyan, R.G. Grigoryan, A.M. Simonyan, A.Kh. Martirosyan, S.A. Kaplanyan, G.S. Pirumyan, A.R. Abadzhyan, S.N. Ovanesyan, and R.V. Oganyan.

Draft Program of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent)

The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) is an organization of ideological-political likeminded persons having a unified Program and Charter. It is a constituent part of Armenia's political system. As the goal of its activity, the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) has set the building of a humane, democratic society, one in which the material and spiritual demands of the citizens and the entire Armenian people will be satisfied in fact; there will be guarantees for the security of their lives and property, as well as social protection, human

rights, and national interests. In order to achieve these goals, we must secure our republic's independence within the framework of a confederative union within the Soviet Union's nations and peoples. We must free up the party's healthy forces and place them at the service of the Armenian people's vital interests.

This goal will be served by the present Program, which, being based on the values of the social-democratic movement, takes into consideration national, historical, ethnic, cultural, socioeconomic, and geographical features.

The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) is building its political and ideological activities on the foundation of the ideals of peace and humanism, the statutes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the values of all mankind.

The dictatorship of the proletariat, as established by the October Revolution in 1917, was transformed into the dictatorship of the party, which, in turn, "spilled over" into all power being vested in the party apparatus. This has led the society and the Communist Party to a general crisis.

As the sole holders and wielders of power, the party-state bureaucracy possessed public property and disposed of it as it saw fit, inasmuch as its egotistic interests as a new class required this.

In order to retain its own power and privileges, the state apparatus created and actively utilized powerful punitive organs and mechanisms for the purpose of suppressing any differences of thought or opinion; it ruthlessly exploited the socialist idea, relying therein on an enormous propaganda apparatus.

The natural historical development was disrupted and violated; culture was forcibly driven within the framework of artificial, antihumane schematic systems.

Such a situation, which prevailed for decades, led to tens of millions of victims of the terror, to the forcible resettlement of entire peoples, to hunger and starvation brought about by collectivization, and to a severe disruption of the ecological balance as a result of thoughtless industrialization.

The party's prevailing, oversimplified, and false ideas about the very imminent world revolution, rapid erosion of national differences, and accelerated building of socialism and communism led to incorrect and criminally negligent decisions. Based on such ideas as these, and in order to accommodate concepts of business conditions, without taking into account the consequences of the decisions being undertaken, without the participation by those very peoples whom these decisions would affect, they foolishly decided matters of national-territorial importance, border problems, and other issues of vital importance for our fate.

As a consequence of the criminally negligent policy on the nationality issue, Karss, Ardagan, and Surmalin

oblasts were conceded to Turkey, and Nakhichevan Oblast was handed over to Azerbaijan in accordance with the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of 16 March 1921. This treaty was signed without the participation of the Armenian people's representatives and against its will. Moreover, the statutes and paragraphs of this treaty, which logically contradicted the basic interests of the Armenian people, were reinforced anew by the Karss Treaty, which was signed on 13 October of that same year. And previously, on 5 July 1921, in accordance with a decision by the Caucasian Bureau of the RCP (b), Nagorno-Karabakh was illegally handed over to Azerbaijan. This was done without taking into account the manifested wishes of the Armenian people who constitute 90 percent of its population; it was also done without a referendum.

This criminally negligent policy, directed against the national interests of the Armenian people—a policy which, in new forms and justifications, is being continued to this very day in the matter of Artsakh—constitutes one of the reasons causing a portion of the most right-thinking, democratically inclined communists, those defending the Armenian nation's interests, to quit the CPSU.

Critically evaluating the errors committed in the past by the CPSU, the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) can no longer remain within the CPSU, and, in leaving it, is creating an Armenian Communist Party with its own national Program and Charter. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) is prepared to follow, together with its own people, the creative path of renewing our society.

I. Political Goals and Principles of the Activity of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent)

1. The principal goal of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) is building in Armenia a democratic, diversified, multi-structured society, based on the values common to all mankind, with guarantees of the actual securing of human rights and the freedom of the individual.

This goal can be implemented only within the framework of a sovereign Armenia, relying on the consolidated efforts of its citizens, on the thousand-year-old traditions of the Armenian people, and on the experience of the world community.

2. The Armenian Republic shall independently decide all its own political, economic, social, and cultural matters, including the range of issues to be delegated to the confederative authorities. Apart from these powers, the decisions, laws, and normative acts adopted by the confederation's authorities shall have the force of law in Armenia only after they have been approved and ratified by the Armenian parliament.

3. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers the confederation to be a voluntary union or league of national-territorial formations, based on the

self-determination of nations. As equal members of the confederation, union and autonomous republics, as well as autonomous okrugs and oblasts shall conclude a new union-type treaty.

4. All members of the confederation must have the right to freely secede from it. This right is to be implemented by means of a referendum.

5. Representatives of nations and nationalities living beyond the borders of their own nation-state entities or who do not have such entities must have the right to national-cultural autonomy.

6. One of the goals of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) is to create a state based on the rule of law, a state in which the rights of citizens and the activities of the state and public organizations and institutions shall be regulated by the Constitution and the laws to be passed by the republic's parliament.

7. Armenia must become a parliamentary republic with a unicameral parliament, to be elected by direct, equal, and secret balloting on the basis of a multiparty system.

8. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers that a sovereign Armenia ought to have a nonparty-influenced or nonpolitical army, with defense assignments whose activity should be limited by the functions delegated to the confederative armed forces; there should also be nonparty-influenced internal forces and security services, to be monitored by the republic's parliament.

9. The approval, consolidation, and reinforcement of national sovereignty and self-government require the development of trade, economic, and political ties and relations (diplomatic and trade representations, exchange of consulates, opening up of permanent correspondents' stations and cultural centers) with those foreign states where Armenians have settled.

10. Reciprocal or mutual relations with confederation members must be regulated by a treaty and be based upon the principles of equitable partnership.

11. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers that only a multiparty system can guarantee a dialogue and a healthy rivalry or competition among all public and political forces, as well as their juridical equal rights and an equal responsibility before the law and the people; this must be reflected in the Constitution.

The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) will struggle for its place in the republic's political life by means of its own ideas, striving to implement them as much as possible, by being prepared to determinedly serve the Armenian people's interests, to utilize its capability and know-how for rallying people to purposeful, targeted activities, as well as by means of its own moral authority.

Belonging to the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) does not grant nor presuppose any privileges whatsoever for its members.

12. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) rejects any dogmatic treatment of socialism and the practice of building a society in accordance with preconceived schemes. It does not recognize the priority of any class or social group whatsoever.

13. The values common to all mankind, the interests and goals of the Armenian people are predominant for the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) over other interests; it considers it illogical and incorrect to set up an opposition between human rights and freedoms on the one hand and the rights and freedoms of nations on the other hand, inasmuch as that nation is not free which oppresses another nation or which dominates it.

14. In order to humanize all the spheres of public life, the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) advocates the depoliticization of science, culture, and education; nor does it lay claim to any monopoly on the truth. It defends freedom of speech, as well as the right of citizens to express themselves spiritually and creatively. With regard to all nationwide issues—economic, political, social, and military—citizens should express their wishes by means of a referendum. They should employ democratic means to elect their own representatives to the organs of power and also make use of the right to recall them. Political power is to be achieved by means of democratic elections. Having achieved the status of a ruling party by parliamentary means, the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) would implement its Program by means of the parliament and the government formed by it as the executive organ of authority and power.

15. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers it as one of its most immediate tasks to wage a determined struggle against corruption, bribery, protectionism, and the other negative phenomena which discredit the moral features of society.

16. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) advocates the objective study of Armenia's history and its truthful exposition; it defends the interests of the Armenian people and advocates protecting the rights of national and ethnic minorities living in this republic.

17. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) guarantees all citizens of Armenia equal political, socio-economic, and cultural rights, regardless of national origin, sex, convictions, or religious beliefs.

18. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers that implementation of the national ideals and attainment of the goal which has been set can be achieved only by joint efforts, only by rallying the forces of all political parties, public organizations, and trends or movements around such nationwide tasks as Ay Dat and, as a component of it—the Artsakh issue, preserving

the Armenian nation, and eliminating the consequences of natural disasters (earthquakes), self-defense, and ecology.

The Socioeconomic Policy of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent)

The principal goal of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent)'s economic policy is ensuring this republic's economic independence, as well as providing a normal standard of living and social protection for its population.

The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers that in order to implement these goals, the following factors are necessary:

1. A diversified economic structure, based on various forms of property ownership (state, cooperative, shareholding, private, and others) under the conditions of market-type relations to be regulated by the state.

2. A combination of economic efficiency and high labor productivity with the principle of social protection. To bring this about we need to do the following:

- along with differentiation in the wage structure, we need to provide measures for the social protection of all groups of the population, including the unemployed;
- high labor productivity must be combined with maximum employment of the able-bodied population;
- coordinate the market-formed prices with the socially targeted state policy on prices;
- ensure a balance among all sectors as a guarantee of the stability of socioeconomic development.

3. Mutual interaction among political, social, and economic mechanisms, thus providing, under the conditions of competition, for the development of various forms of property ownership and labor organization.

4. Development of Armenia's national economy with a view to providing the population with food products of prime necessity, consumer goods, and housing.

5. In order to achieve Armenia's economic independence, we must develop an autonomous system to formulate finances, credit, and the budget, as well as a policy of price formation and taxes.

6. We must make the transition to market relations gradually, step by step, denationalizing specific sectors of the economy, eliminating monopolies, and working out an anti-inflationary policy.

7. We must gradually reorganize the economic structures in order to ensure Armenia's economic protection.

With this goal in mind, it is necessary to carry out the following actions:

- transform Armenia into a free-enterprise zone;
- develop the economic infrastructure to the maximum and improve it;

- develop an science-intensive, energy-conserving, and resource-conserving technology;
- strive to make this republic self-sufficient in energy and develop nontraditional sources for obtaining it;
- provide equal economic opportunities for kolkhozes, state farms, shareholding societies, cooperatives, individual, peasant-type farms, and farmstead-type establishments.

8. In parts of Armenia which have little land or which are not fertile the local authorities should decide to turn land over to be owned by those persons who cultivate it. This should be done without charging them money or imposing installment payments. The new owners would have the right to pass such land on to their heirs but could not sell it or give it away.

9. We must distribute water reserves economically, levying a specific fee for its utilization. Underground-water reserves should be used for the needs of production, the general economy, and for irrigational purposes.

10. Economic relations at all levels must be built on the principles of mutual advantage and profitability.

11. We must consolidate and unite the efforts of the entire Armenian nation in order to speed up the development of Armenia's national economy.

12. We must implement a policy of social guarantees in cases of misfortune, illness, disability, or unemployment.

13. We must conduct a policy of social justice and social protection for those families which are poor and which have many children.

14. In order to solve the housing problem as soon as possible, we must adopt all measures to facilitate the development of cooperative and individual housing construction.

15. We must accelerate restoration and renovation work in the disaster zone. We need to seek out additional possibilities, including the involvement of foreign firms.

16. We must regard the problem of refugees as a serious, sociopolitical problem, one which requires a legislative-type solution in accordance with the norms of international law.

17. We must render moral and material assistance to our fellow-countrymen who have returned to the Homeland.

18. We must create favorable conditions for working women and mothers; and we must help to expand the network of domestic-type services.

19. We must work out a republic-level, all-encompassing ecological program, one which takes into consideration the fact that this is vitally important for a country with a small territory, minimal water resources, and an insignificant forest cover. We must develop a

program for restructuring those enterprises whose production lines have harmful side effects, and we must specify the optimal time periods for carrying out such restructuring. We must set up permanent or constant monitoring controls on the state of the environment and organize the production of biologically pure food products.

20. Solving the ecological problem of Sevan, which is vitally important for the Armenian people, must be considered a top-priority task, one to be solved without delay or postponement.

21. Taking into account the consequences of the destructive earthquake of 1988, in order to ensure the survival of our nation, we must develop and implement as soon as possible a comprehensive program for studying buildings and increasing their earthquake-resistance; we must create a system for predicting earthquakes, work out a plan of actions, and measures to be taken in cases of such a natural disaster.

22. We must expand and improve the system of medical services to the population, including making the transition to medical services to be covered by insurance.

III. The Nationality Policy of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent)

1. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent)'s nationality policy is conceptually based on the following positions:

- recognition of the right to self-determination for each nation;
- condemnation of racism, chauvinism, and nationalism in all their manifestations;
- recognition for each nation of the right to freely develop its national culture and language, to retain and preserve its national features, uniqueness, and traditions;
- respect for the rights of national minorities;
- friendly and good-neighborly relations with other nations, based on mutual respect for national and state interests;
- recognition for each nation of the right to choose the form of its state sovereignty or statehood and the voluntary principle of joining in the confederation.

2. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) argues in defense of the justifiable territorial demands of the Armenian people; it will struggle with all its strength for the return to this thousand-year-old Homeland of its indigenous lands taken away by force from the Armenian people. And it will base its actions on values common to all mankind, on international conventions and declarations relating to human and national rights according to the norms of international law. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers that certain degrees and treaties adopted during the 1920's should be declared null and void. On the basis of these decrees and treaties, Karss, Ardagan, and Surmalin oblasts were

handed over to Turkey, whereas Nakhichevan and Artskh oblasts were given to Azerbaijan. By way of meeting the demands of Ay Dat, the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers the annexation of Artsakh by Armenia as its most immediate task.

3. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers that problems between peoples and nations should be resolved solely by peaceful means, by political methods. It condemns violence and the highest form of its manifestation—genocide—and demands that worldwide recognition be given to the fact that genocide has been practiced against Armenians.

4. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) demands that a just political evaluation be given to the genocidal acts against the Armenians in Sumgait, Gandzak, and Baku; those Armenians who suffered and were deported should be awarded monetary compensation, and a law should be passed concerning the status of refugees in accordance with the requirements of international law.

5. In case of necessity, the Armenian Republic must act to protect the interests of members of the Armenian nation, regardless of where they are living.

6. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers that we need to pass a law on citizenship which would make it possible for every Armenian to become a citizen of Armenia if he so desires.

IV. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) and Young Persons

The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) notes that the sociopolitical changes taking place in Armenia, its present and future depend essentially upon the young persons' point of view.

1. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers that a component of its parliamentary activity should be devoted to providing the conditions for a multifaceted development of the younger generation, for implementing programs which are vitally important for them, including the involvement of young persons in political and socioeconomic activities.

In order to carry out these tasks, the following steps must be taken:

- work out a nationwide program for educating the younger generation, providing for its spiritual, creative, and physical development, protection of children's rights, studies for young persons and preparing them for the world of work, rehabilitating young invalids, expanding the production of consumer goods for children and young persons, helping young families and youths to engage in business enterprises;
- under the conditions of making the transition to a market-type economy, we must create legal guarantees to protect young persons.

2. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers that an open dialogue with young persons is a vital necessity. It cooperates with all those young persons' organizations whose activities are channeled into unifying the nation and benefiting Armenia.

3. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) involves the intellectual portion of the younger generation into working out and implementing its own programs; it considers it necessary to make all state and public organs of this republic "younger."

4. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) will render assistance to the creation of a Youth League; such a League would have its own program and charter; it would adhere to the party's ideological and political guidelines and would, in effect be an "ally" of our party.

V. Policy of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) in the Fields of Culture, Science, and Education

1. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers that the principal condition for the further development of the Armenian people's culture is the development and widespread use of the Armenian language in all fields of human activity. At the same time, the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) recognizes the importance of Russian and other foreign languages as a means of communication between peoples.

2. Because it recognizes the principle of creative freedom, the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) advocates a diversity of creative methods and trends, i.e., "school," unless they propagandize ideas which run counter to the national interests of the Armenian people or antihuman or immoral ideas.

3. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) advocates free, politically unconditioned, international cooperation in the field of culture. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) accords particular attention to close, reciprocal ties and cultural contacts between Armenia and its diaspora; it also advocates more widespread familiarization of the world's peoples with the achievements of Armenian culture.

4. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) advocates a broad-based program of preserving and restoring landmarks of Armenia's culture and architecture, whether they be on the republic's territory or beyond its borders. It supports the Armenian people's demands for condemnation and punishment of those persons who have organized and carried out barbarous acts of vandalizing and destroying Armenian cultural landmarks located outside this republic's borders.

5. Freedom of speech and the press, as well as glasnost, must be ensured by creating state periodical publications, as well as public, cooperative, and shareholding ones; we must also set up free radio stations and television channels.

6. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) ascribes great importance to the free development of the national minority cultures, to further development of their national languages, education, literature, and art, along with preserving their national unique features and traditions. This is an important factor in strengthening genuine friendship among all the nations living in our republic.

7. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) supports freedom of religious belief and recognizes the positive role played by religion and the church in the cause of preserving the nation, as well as the moral upbringing and consolidation of the Armenian people.

8. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) advocates the development of the pure and applied sciences, of advanced equipment and technology, and it supports by all measures the state's efforts in the cause of advancing science and technology.

9. Our party condemns the persecution of certain scientific trends and scientists which have taken place in the country's history. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers that scientific truth should be confirmed by life itself, rather than by administrative decisions.

10. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) advocates broad-based ties with the world's scholars; it favors training Armenian specialists and students in the laboratories, firms, and educational institutions of various countries in the world.

11. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers that the most important conditions for developing this republic are the development of national schools, a network of educational institutions and VUZ's, outfitting them with up-to-date equipment and educational-methodological textbooks. The multifaceted development of culture, science, and education must assist in bringing up an independently and critically thinking, well-educated person.

12. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) considers it necessary to expand the publication in the Armenian language of scientific and technical periodicals and literature for schoolchildren and students.

13. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) advocates a radical modernization of the system of scientific structures and administrative mechanisms in order to ensure integration of scientific activity and to create an integrated, standardized system of scientific research institutions.

14. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) is in favor of a reform directed at reviving national education and its high-priority development, at forming a new generation of the national intelligentsia. The ways of implementing this are as follows:

- an autonomous system for administering and financing education;

- a standardized, general-education school with Armenian instruction and measuring up to the appropriate international standards;
- a sharp rise in the status of schoolteachers;
- a state program for discovering, supporting, and sending talented students to study abroad;
- imparting national-type contents to higher specialized education;
- ensuring self-government for higher educational institutions.

* * *

The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) has keyed its own, new, democratic structures on effectively solving tasks aimed at achieving the program goals.

Guided by the Program published above, the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) will apply all its efforts and strengths so that, along with the people, it can transform Armenia into a free, independent, democratic, economically strong, and flourishing republic.

Draft Charter of Independent Armenian Communist Party

*91US0033B Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
14 Sep 90 p 3*

[Unattributed article: "A Free Dialogue: Draft Charter of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent)"]

[Text] In "Discussion Page No 6" (GOLOS ARMENII, 11 Sep 90) we published the Draft Program of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent), which had been worked out by the Coordinating Council of several primary party organizations. This same Coordinating Council's Editorial Commission has also prepared a Draft Charter for the Armenian Communist Party (Independent), and it is presented herewith under the rubric "A Free Dialogue" for the judgement of this republic's communists.

I. Status of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent)

The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) is an independent political organization having its own Program and Charter. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) is a component of Armenia's political system; on a voluntary basis it unites those citizens of the republic who share the party's aims. The Armenian Communist Party (Independent) operates within the framework of this republic's Constitution.

II. Party Members

1. Membership in the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) may be granted to any citizen of Armenia who has reached the age of 18, recognizes this party's Program and Charter, participates in the activities of a primary organization, and pays membership dues.

2. Armenian Communist Party (Independent) members shall have equal rights. Their religious beliefs and

general convictions must not run counter to the aims of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent).

3. A person desiring to join the party shall submit an application to a primary party organization at his place of employment, residence, creative or other activity, and he shall become a member if he is voted for by $\frac{2}{3}$ of the organization's members attending a general meeting.

4. A Armenian Communist Party (Independent) member cannot be a member of any other political party.

5. Armenian Communist Party (Independent) members shall be issued party cards in a standardized format. The registration procedure shall be established in accordance with the instructions of the party's republic-level committee.

6. Inhabitants of this republic who approve of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent)'s Program and Charter may become followers or supporters of the party by so informing one of the primary organizations. After this, they may participate in the party's activities with the right of a consultative voice.

7. A party member shall have the right to perform the following actions:

7.1. To elect, and to participate in the activity of a primary organization, having received the latter's consent.

7.2. To discuss at party meetings, as well as in party forums and in the party press, issues concerning the Armenian Communist Party (Independent)'s policy and practical activity, and to criticize any organ of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent).

7.3. To associate and join in with other members of this party in ideological trends, associations, platforms, or factions, provided that the party's organizational unity is maintained.

7.4. To address a proposal or an initiative to any party organization or to its leadership organ with regard to any issue, and to receive a specific reply.

7.5. To nominate candidates to all electoral organs of this party, as well as to elect or be elected to such organs.

7.6. To attend the session of any party organ if his own activity is to be discussed thereat.

7.7. To be under the party's protect in case his honor or dignity are unjustifiably violated.

8. A party member shall be obligated to perform the following actions:

8.1. To carry out the Program of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) and observe all the requirements of its Charter.

8.2. To execute the decisions of the party organs. In case a decision is unacceptable to a party member, he may refrain from carrying it out on condition that he sets forth his own position on the matter in question and defends it.

8.3. To perform all obligations and duties vis-a-vis the party organization and its organs.

8.4. To be tolerant and conciliatory with regard to other party members, to respect their opinions and rights.

8.5. To adhere to the principles of ethics, morality, and common-human norms of conduct.

8.6. To pay membership dues.

9. A party member who, for objective reasons (a lengthy trip on official business, a serious illness, advanced age, etc.), cannot participate in the party's activities may remain in the party with the consent of a party organization meeting.

10. A party member may quit the party, having submitted a written declaration concerning his decision to the primary organization. A return to the ranks of the party shall be deemed a new joining.

11. If a party member does not carry out the Program of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent), or if he violates the Charter, the primary organization by a majority of its members' votes can issue him a warning or expel him from membership in the Armenian Communist Party (Independent).

11.1. In case of a disagreement with a decision regarding expulsion from the party, an appeal may be submitted within 30 days to the party's territorial or republic-level appeals commission. Appeals shall be subject to examination and consideration within 60 days.

11.2. A person who has been expelled from the party shall have the right to join the ranks of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) again only after at least two years have elapsed.

III. The Party's Organizational Structure

A. The Primary Party Organization

12. The foundation of the party is its primary organization.

13. Creating a primary organization

13.1. A primary organization may be created at a place of employment, residence, creative or other activity. It shall be founded by at least five members who have declared their wish to do so at a general meeting.

Primary organizations shall be created upon the initiative of party members, as well as at the proposal of committees belonging to the party's territorial organizations.

13.2. A primary organization shall inform the territorial party organ regarding its decision within 15 days; it shall be registered on the basis of the minutes of the meeting and the list of party members involved.

13.3. A primary organization shall be independent in deciding its own organizational structure.

14. A primary organization shall carry out the following actions:

14.1. Implement the Program of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent), being guided by the present Charter.

14.2. Independently adopt and carry out decrees connected with its own activities. It shall express its own point of view and introduce its own proposals regarding matters of party and public life. The organization's decisions shall be binding on the party members and elected officials who have voted for these decisions.

14.3. Execute the decisions of higher-ranking organs. In case $\frac{2}{3}$ of a primary organization's members do not agree with a decision by a higher-ranking organ, the primary organization may refrain from executing it, having stated its reasons and motivation for acting in this manner. It shall also attempt to revise this decision.

14.4. Accept party members into the ranks, handle and disburse the organization's funds, introduce the dues which have been set, provide incentives for and level fines on its own members.

14.5. Nominate candidates to party and other electoral organs, as well as public organizations, and assist in their election.

14.6. Can function as a person in the eyes of the law.

15. The highest organ of a primary organization is the general meeting of its members; such a meeting shall be called whenever necessary.

A meeting must also be convoked in case this is demanded by $\frac{1}{5}$ of the organization's members. A meeting shall be empowered to act if it is attended by more than half of all its members.

A decree shall be adopted by a majority of the organization's members attending the meeting, with the exception of cases provided for in the articles of the Charter.

16. A meeting shall elect an organizational committee, its secretary, deputy secretaries, and treasurer. In organizations having only a few members (less than 15 persons) a secretary and a deputy secretary-treasurer shall be elected.

16.1. A primary organization shall determine the composition of its own electoral organ and the number of staff associates. Financing the staff associates shall be carried out from the organization's funds.

16.2. The activities of the secretary, his deputy, and the treasurer may be fiscally encouraged or supported by the organization's funds provided that this decision has been voted for by $\frac{2}{3}$ of the primary organization's members.

B. Party Territorial Organizations

17. The primary organizations for an administrative-territorial division of the republic shall be united into party territorial organizations.

18. The highest organ of a territorial organization is the conference, which is convoked when necessary, but at least once a year.

A conference may also be convoked if this is demanded by $\frac{1}{5}$ of the party members or by $\frac{1}{3}$ of the primary party organizations.

A conference is empowered to act if $\frac{2}{3}$ of the delegates participate in it.

19. The delegates shall be elected in the primary organizations. The norms of representation shall be set by the territorial organization.

20. A conference's decrees shall be adopted by a majority of the delegates' votes.

21. A Conference of the territorial organization shall perform the following tasks:

21.1. Independently take decisions pertaining to the organization's political and internal activities.

21.2. Form an organizational committee, elect a secretary and his deputies.

21.3. Elect appeals and finance committees, as well as their representatives.

21.4. If necessary, approve a publishing plant for the territorial press organ and approve its editor.

21.5. Discuss and approve the organization's budget.

21.6. Form the body of composition of the territorial appeals and finance commissions, specify the number of staff units, being guided in this by the principle of feasibility, and proceeding from the funds which it has at its disposal.

22. Committee members of territorial organizations shall be elected directly at the conference.

23. A territorial organization committee

23.1. Register primary organizations, coordinate their activities, conduct the accounts of party members, and issue party cards to Armenian Communist Party (Independent) members.

23.2. Coordinate the pre-election campaign for nominating candidates for government, state, and public organs.

23.3. Eliminate primary organizations if their activities run counter to the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) Program and Charter.

24. The executive functions of territorial party organizations shall be performed by a secretariat, which, in case of necessity, shall convoked expanded, plenary sessions.

25. Members of a territorial organization's party committee cannot serve as members of the appeals or finance commissions.

26. The appeals commissions of territorial party organizations shall be guided by the party's Charter and by the normative-methodological documentation pertaining to the appeals commission.

27. The finance commissions of territorial party organizations shall be guided by the party's Charter and by the normative-methodological documentation pertaining to the finance commission.

C. Republic-Level Party Organs

28. The highest organ shall be the Congress.

It shall be convoked by the republic-level committee of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) at least every three years.

The date for holding the Congress and its agenda shall be announced not later than three months prior to the beginning of the Congress. An Extraordinary Congress shall be convoked upon the initiative of the republic-level committee of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent), or when this is demanded by more than $\frac{1}{5}$ of the party members, or by $\frac{1}{3}$ of the primary organizations, or by $\frac{1}{3}$ of the territorial organizations. In case the republic-level committee of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) refuses to convoked an Extraordinary Congress, the organizations demanding this shall have the right to set up an organizational committee. Such a committee shall enjoy the right of the republic-level committee with regard to convoking an Extraordinary Congress of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent).

The data and agenda of an Extraordinary Congress shall be announced not later than two months prior to the beginning of the Congress. A Congress shall be deemed legitimate if it is attended by more than $\frac{2}{3}$ of the delegates.

28.1 The delegates to a Congress shall be elected in the primary organizations according to the norms of representation established by the republic-level committee of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent). Those primary organizations the number of whose members is lower than the necessary number according to the norms of representation shall be combined at the behest of the territorial organization and shall elect delegates jointly.

28.2. A Congress's decrees shall be passed by a majority of votes cast by the participating delegates with the exception of Article 29.1.

29. A Congress shall perform the following tasks:

29.1. Approve and change the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) Program and Charter by $\frac{2}{3}$ of the votes cast by the participating delegates.

29.2. Specify the strategy and tactics for implementing the Program.

29.3. Specify the ways to cooperate with other parties, public organizations, and trends.

29.4. Elect the republic-level committee of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent).

Elect the committee's Presidium, the party's chairman, and his deputies.

29.5. Elect the republic-level appeals and finance commissions of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) along with their chairmen, specify their functions and rights.

29.6. Specify the composition of the republic-level committee, the Presidium, the appeals and finance commissions, and the number of staff units, proceeding from the principle of feasibility and the funds available.

29.7. Approve the republic-level, party publishing plants and appoint their editors.

29.8. Discuss and approve the party budget.

30. The republic-level committee of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) shall perform the following tasks:

30.1. Establish the status of the territorial party organizations and coordinate their activities.

30.2. Coordinate the election campaign for nominating candidates from the party organizations to state, economic, and public organs at the republic level.

30.3. The executive functions of the republic-level party organ shall be performed by the Presidium, which, in cases of necessity, shall convoke plenary sessions of the republic-level committee at least once a year.

31. Members of the republic-level committee and secretariat of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) cannot serve on the republic-level appeals and finance commissions.

32. The republic-level appeals commission shall perform the following tasks:

32.1. Be guided by the Party's Charter and normative documentation pertaining to the appeals commission.

32.2. Examine and consider the appeals made by party members and party organizations, explain the mechanism of applying and amending the norms of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) Charter.

32.3. Coordinate the activities of the appeals commissions of the territorial party organizations.

33. The republic-level finance commissions shall perform the following tasks:

33.1. Be guided by the party's Charter and the normative-methodological documentation pertaining to the finance commission.

33.2. Monitor the financial and economic activities of the republic-level committee, party organizations, and enterprises.

33.3. Coordinate the activities of the finance commissions of the territorial party organizations.

IV. The Party's Organizational Principles

34. The elections of delegates to party conferences and congresses from party organizations, as well as the elections to leadership organs and commissions, shall be conducted by secret balloting on an alternative basis.

35. The term of office with regard to electoral party organs shall be three years. Party members may be elected to the same electoral organ for no more than three terms.

36. Those members of electoral organs who, for valid reasons, cannot perform their duties and obligations shall be relieved of them upon the decision of the organ concerned. Members of an electoral organ who have been elected at a meeting, conference, or congress, and who do not carry out their duties in these organs, or who have lost the trust of the members may be expelled from office by a secret ballot amounting to $\frac{2}{3}$ of the votes by the members of these organs. Other persons shall be elected to replace them by following an established procedure.

The electoral organs cannot be supplemented or added to by means of co-optation.

37. Party discussion shall be announced on extremely important matters of party activity upon the initiative of the republic-level committee, or upon the demands of $\frac{1}{3}$ of the primary organizations and $\frac{1}{5}$ of the party members.

38. The electoral party organs shall be obligated to state their own point of view within the period of one month if $\frac{1}{5}$ of their organization's members have come out with a political initiative.

39. Matters pertaining to the labor activity of the staff members of executive party organizations shall be regulated by Armenia's labor legislation.

40. The principal document which regulates intra-party life shall be the party's Charter.

In their activities the party organs shall be guided by the appropriate normative-methodological documents (supplements or addenda).

V. Party Funds

41. The monetary funds of the party and its organizations shall consist of party dues, revenues from publishing or economic-production activities, voluntary contributions from party followers and supporters, and other revenues which do not run counter to the law.

42. Membership dues shall be as follows:

42.1. When a person joins the party, an initial amount of entrance dues shall levied; it shall amount to 2 percent of the new member's monthly wages or salary.

42.2. The monthly membership dues shall be determined on the basis of the member's monthly earnings. It shall have the following range: up to 100 rubles of monthly earnings—the dues shall be 20 kopecks; above 100 rubles of monthly earnings—1 percent of such earnings.

NOTE: By a decision of the primary organization, membership dues may be withheld once every three months. Primary organizations may relieve the following categories of persons from membership dues: unemployed pensioners, invalids, as well as women with children up to the age of three years.

43. Primary organizations shall retain 60 percent of the membership dues for the needs of their own organization, send 20 percent to the territorial organs, and 20 percent—to the republic-level committee.

Supplement or Addendum

Based on the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) Charter, the following normative-methodological documents are being worked out:

1. On elections to the Armenian Communist Party (Independent) and the procedure for recalling persons from the electoral organs;
2. On the accounts of Armenian Communist Party (Independent) members and party statistics;
3. On the office work of party organs and committees;
4. On the accounts of party dues and the financial-economic activities of party organizations;
5. On conducting a referendum and discussions within the party;
6. On appeals commissions;
7. On finance commissions.

Independent Armenian Communist Party Platform Elaborated

91US0038A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
29 Sep 90 pp 1-2

[Report by the Coordinating Council Member A.V. Akopyan: "On the Platform of the Armenian Communist Party (Independent)"]

[Text] Respected delegates! The Coordinating Council which represents more than 200 major primary organizations in giving this report aims at backing up its main demand of the withdrawal of the Armenian Communist Party from the CPSU and the establishing of an independent party with its own Program and Bylaws, and a new name corresponding to its tasks and goals.

The platform of the Coordinating Council has been generalized in the drafts of the Program and Bylaws of the Armenian Communist (Independent) Party as published on 22 August 1990 in the newspaper KHORUR-DANI AYASTEN and then in GOLOS ARMENII, as alternative documents to the draft Program and Bylaws of the Armenian CP Central Committee as published at the beginning of September in the same newspapers. Let us emphasize that the Coordinating Council began to work out its platform as early as in January of 1990 independently of the position of the Armenian CP Central Committee which, in our view, against the background of the processes occurring in the republic, conducted a passive, wait-and-see, indecisive and vacillating policy related to a traditional fear of the center. The leadership of the Armenian CP Central Committee was thus unable to completely shake off this fear, even under the conditions of the severest suffering of our people over the last two and one-half years and which due to the grace of the center are still continuing and deepening.

We have seen how such a passive, wait-and-see, indecisive stance by the Armenian Communist Party and its policy of temporizing has reflected lamentably on the authority of the Armenian Communist Party.

The sincere desire of the masses of people to see the leading role of the republic Communist Party in their national liberation struggle has remained unheeded.

Individual promising but, as it was soon apparent, deceptive gestures by the party apparatus and leadership in this area, the inglorious end of certain leaders of the first magnitude and the desertion of others from the political arena have inevitably distanced the people from the party. We have felt that all of this is fraught with fatal consequences for the position, authority and influence of the Armenian Communist Party.

This is why the Coordinating Council has decided that there must be an abrupt change to bring the Armenian Communist Party out of the profound crisis; it is essential to gain independence from the CPSU, let me emphasize, an independence but not as far as full sovereignty.

It is essential to work out a new status for the party, promote new ideas, tasks and goals which in essence would be profoundly national, and we need a program of fundamental changes in the socioeconomic and political spheres and which would take into account the particular features of the entire nation, including its domestic and overseas diaspora; it is also essential to rename the party in accord with its tasks and goals.

These decisions adopted long before the 28th CPSU Congress have served as the point of departure for creating the draft Program and Bylaws of the Armenian CP (Independent), the third version of which we are submitting to the judgment of the communists as well as a platform for the 29th Armenian CP Congress.

The Independent Armenian Communist Party is to be established on the basis of the Armenian Communist Party. The establishing of this party will provide an opportunity to use for the good of the Armenian people all the healthy forces which exist at present and the employment of which is obstructed at present by the totalitarian nature of the Communist Party.

The new party proposes to abandon the Utopian ideas of building communism and from the viewpoint of organizational work to abandon the principle of democratic centralism.

This is to be a party of the social democratic type.

Undoubtedly, it must be admitted (this hint could be found in the subtext of the Political Report of the Armenian CP Central Committee) that whatever intelligent decisions are taken now, they all the same will be too late, because we have lagged behind the stormy processes occurring in our society. This should be the lesson drawn from our own defeat.

In any event, neither by this criticism nor by the alternative platform do we set out to turn the congress into an arena of internal party confrontation and bring things to a split in the Armenian Communist Party. On the contrary, we sincerely desire a consolidation of the party and want to save it from accidental death or the prospects of self-disbandment. However, we are profoundly convinced that it is possible to carry out this primary task in the existing situation only under the condition that the Armenian Communist Party withdraws from the CPSU, as this will make it possible for the party to be fully independent, have its own nationality program, its own bylaws and, consequently, unlimited opportunities for serving the national interests of the Armenian people.

We propose naming the new party the People's Democratic Party of Armenia.

What has forced us to draw such conclusions?

1. We are abandoning the communist ideology. At the same time that the leadership of the CPSU has lost its ideological orientation and until the 28th Congress did not provide an answer to the question of what a party which considers itself to be communist is to inherit from

Marxism-Leninism and what it is to deny. In acting in favor of democratic socialism which is propounded by social democracy and already carrying out its principles, the CPSU leadership has continued to speak in the name of Leninism which declares social democracy and its ideology to be an avowed enemy. Moreover, in the third stage of the revolution, the so-called stage of world revolution, the main blow was directed against social democracy.

Such an ambiguous, contradictory situation in the realm of ideology is either the result of confusion or of temporizing. This is a very dangerous reality which jeopardizes the future of the present changes, since what happened with the NEP [New Economic Policy] can happen again, when in the name of Leninism the New Economic Policy was defeated by Stalin in a single sweep on behalf of the same Leninism. We are the supporters of a social democratic ideology.

2. The gap between word and deed of the CPSU leadership as a result of which the Armenian people most of all have suffered and continue to suffer. One has merely to recall how on each issue the party leadership which declared the right of nations to self-determination, in being swept up by illusions of world revolution, under the leadership of the chairman of the RSFSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars], having violated the elementary standards of morality and international law as well as the Moscow and Kars Treaties of 1921 and the decision of the Kavburo [Caucasus Buro] of the same year put up for auction the territories belonging to Armenia, an independent state, having ceded to Turkey Kars, Ardagan and Surmalu and having given to Azerbaijan Nakhichevan and Artsakh. The government of Soviet Russia in fact dealt with independent Armenia as if it had been a borderland of the former Tsarist Empire, although it was refused the right of the heir of the empire in the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia" published a week after the October Revolution.

The same policy vis-a-vis our people is being continued now. This confirms the validity of our demand for the withdrawal of the Armenian Communist Party from membership in the CPSU.

3. The CPSU has been and remains a party of the apparatus, and the 28th CPSU Congress reaffirmed that, being one of the primary causes of the party crisis, this failing continues and will continue to eat away at the ailing organism of the party. As is known for curing such an illness, two preliminary conditions are required: a correct diagnosis and the correct choice of the methods and means. The 28th CPSU Congress was unable to meet either the first or the second condition. In the program statement adopted by the Congress "For a Humane, Democratic Socialism," the entire party as a whole is blamed for the errors and crimes of the past: "The Congress points out that the CPSU, as the ruling party, bears political and moral responsibility for the situation created in the nation."

We unconditionally reject the organizational structure of the CPSU and its totalitarian nature. Of course, we all have a share of the blame, some as functionaries, some as proponents and some as obedient voters who "unanimously approve" the decisions of the apparatus. And if many of us, in contrast to others in the aim of being elected to parliament or out of other considerations, have not abandoned the ranks of the communist party, this is for the reason that we joined it unselfishly, with a sincere desire to contribute to peace, humanity, the progress of our own people, believing in the progressiveness of the slogans and promises which were in no short supply in the programs, decisions and resolutions of the CPSU.

We consider it amoral to abandon the party at its moment of crisis, not wishing to avoid the share of our responsibility for its past and present. However, it should be admitted that the history of political currents and movements has never known another party which to such a degree has been deprived of its political appearance, its rights and competence which has so totally been usurped by the apparatus and leaders as has the CPSU. For this reason, we consider it absolutely inadmissible to heap the blame for the past and the times of perestroika on all the party. Unfortunately, this trend has occurred in the draft of the Basic Provisions of the Armenian CP Program.

We decisively reject this accusation leveled against the 200,000 communists of Armenia and insist that for emerging from the crisis the party should cease being an apparatus and become a political organization of the broadest party masses. The Armenian Communist Party cannot meet the challenge of this vitally important task which cannot tolerate delay without withdrawing from the CPSU.

4. The leadership of the CPSU has been unable, once and for all, to break its ties with the past and at present is not doing so. Even now, it has not been brave enough to say that what was built in the Soviet Union was in no way socialism but rather a society of paradoxes which could not be fitted in the context of any logical system, but continues to characterize it as "barracks socialism," "administrative-command socialism," "deformed socialism" and so forth. By so doing, the CPSU leadership nevertheless has endeavored to assume an intermediate position between the truth and fiction, not to abandon certain values of the past, and under the pretext of combating nihilism to glorify individual socialist victories. Thus, M. Gorbachev has repeatedly stated that the question of the social protection of the workers in the USSR has been settled better than in the West. The apparatus and the leadership have been unable to orient the party under the new conditions.

The CPSU which has been far removed from a true political struggle and has never felt the need to acquire the skills of such a struggle due to the monopoly of the

apparatus and leadership, has suddenly ended up lost and powerless in a sociopolitical environment which is strange to it.

The CPSU leadership could have prevented all of this if just once it had come forward with a frank and complete criticism and decisive condemnation of Stalinism and Brezhnevism. At the same time, it has limited its condemnation of the past to general declarative words, only after a great delay and after long hesitation has abandoned certain names and personalities. How can one explain the fact that even now Geydar Aliyev has not departed from the political scene and it was he who before the entire world presented Leonid Brezhnev with a dagger and a ring set with diamonds? In our view, after all of this, the Armenian Communist Party cannot remain within the CPSU since it is not indifferent to the moral appearance of the policy itself. We cannot escape from the reality that the CPSU leadership has been unable to rise to the level of open relations with the party and people, regardless of the numerous declarations. Glasnost has not been developed to the greatest extent and in many cases, in particular for our people, it has been excluded.

5. The CPSU leadership has democratized the party predominantly in words and not in deed, although the steps taken in this direction are indisputable. However, it has not done the main thing, it has not abandoned the principles of democratic centralism. Nor did the 28th CPSU Congress decide on this. We unconditionally defend the viewpoint that the principle of democratic centralism cannot be democratized and that this principle deprives the party, its primary organizations and its members of a political face. This is why the Coordinating Council favors the unconditional elimination of democratic centralism.

Democratic centralism in principle has not been repudiated in the draft of the Basic Provisions of the Armenian CP Program where it states "the Armenian Communist Party decisively rejects the bureaucratic regulated form (clearly what is meant is the hierarchical form—A.A.) and which was formed and established in the structure and activities of the party."

This is one of the main differences between the drafts of the Bylaws submitted by the Coordinating Council and by the Armenian CP Central Committee. In our view, the provision of the Central Committee draft that a party member may not carry out the decisions of the superior bodies, if these are unacceptable for him, does not eliminate this fundamental difference, since in contrast to the platform of the Armenian CP Central Committee, we grant this right also to the party organizations and this, in my opinion, is more important.

I would like to point out that democratic centralism has dealt severe blows to our people. Here is just one example. In 1921, when a decree of the Kavburo of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] was adopted on transferring the Artsakh to Azerbaijan,

Armenia was an independent republic. And regardless of this, its government was forced to obey this decision, since the ruling Communist Party was not independent but was, so to speak, a "fighting detachment" of the RKP(b) and in accord with the demand of democratic centralism was obliged to carry out the decision of the superior body.

6. Having proclaimed perestroika, the CPSU leadership has not been up to the slogans and tasks posed by it. Having shown shortsightedness and even incompetence, the leadership has been incapable of foreseeing where the processes of carrying out these tasks are to lead.

Thus, having advanced the tasks of economic perestroika, it never imagined that things would go so far as to revise the monopoly of so-called socialist ownership. Economic perestroika must start with the question of ownership and in the meanwhile this question was discussed only in the 5th year of perestroika, after the halfhearted decision was adopted. This is why in the 6th year of perestroika we have ended up in a much worse situation than before it. Having advanced the task of creating a government under the law, the CPSU leadership never thought that this would be impossible without a true political pluralism, that is, the establishing of a multiparty system. And this is impossible without abandoning the monopoly of the communist party apparatus. The leadership has also not admitted that its power, the elimination of which is an indispensable condition of democratization, this power is extraconstitutional and hence illegal. The fact is that from the very beginning of establishing representative states in all the democratic systems, just three forms of power are known—legislative, executive and judicial and the boundaries of activity and principles of relationships between these have been defined by constitutions. Over a period of 70 years in the USSR, there has been a fourth form of power and this was placed above the three remaining forms, it issued orders to them, it regulated and predetermined their activities but, in contrast to the forms of power subordinate to it, it did not bear either material, financial, political or moral responsibility for its deeds. This was the power of the Politburo.

We must say farewell to the CPSU and establish a loyal and moral party, if we do not wish to be deprived of the last vestiges of the trust of the people.

7. In terms of the nationality question, the "fathers of perestroika" have already shown absolute blindness. Neither the materials of the April (1985) Plenum, the documents of the 27th CPSU Congress nor in the new version of the Program will you find concern about the nationality question or about the difficult problems existing in the nation. Quite on the contrary, everything is put in a good light.

Being completely unprepared to solve the profound problems of the nationality question, the CPSU leadership from the very outset has carried out a policy of repression and suppressing the nationality movements.

As is known, the Armenian people became the first victim. After the anticonstitutional Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 21 February 1988, there followed the crimes in Sumgait which still have not been given an objective political and legal assessment by the CPSU leadership. Since that time, the CPSU leadership has conducted an overtly anti-Armenian policy, using Azerbaijan as a tool, and it has resorted to genocide and a blockade in order to seal off Armenia from the outside world, to doom its people to hunger, to force them to their knees and make them abandon their just demands. The CPSU leadership has flaunted and continues to flaunt the national dignity of the Armenian people.

The labels of extremists and nationalists found in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 21 February 1988 untied the hands of the Azerbaijani thugs and republic leadership which proclaimed repressive actions against the Armenians and gave them carte blanche in Sumgait, for from the history of the nation it was well known that the carriers of such tags must pay for this with their lives. Our people cannot forget the repeated warnings by M. Gorbachev that the Armenians must give some thought to the 200,000 compatriots living in Baku. The very same idea in the general context crept into the Decree of the September (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee "On Party Nationality Policy Under Modern Conditions" where it stated that questions like the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh should be settled considering, among other circumstances, "possible consequences for the life of people." I do not feel that in so doing the leadership of the ruling party was emphasizing its impotence in preventing pogroms based on nationality. It was merely washing its hands, giving freedom of action to murderers. It is also absurd to assume that the leadership and President of the nation who are making an effort to recolonize the Artsakh are powerless to protect the right to the extraterritoriality of their railroad mainlines, highways, gas lines and other general state communications.

Our people cannot forget the statement which M. Gorbachev made at the Komsomol Congress on the Karabakh question that if we now begin to redraw frontiers, a civil war will start in which no one will be saved. Finally, fresh in the memory of all of us is his statement at the 28th CPSU Congress that the patience of the Azerbaijani people is not infinite and that there was a direct challenge to the Azeris to punish the Armenians with force.

Our people have not forgotten and do not forget such behavior by a leader of the CPSU. And if we endeavor to forget this at our congress, the people will forsake us.

The CPSU leadership consciously did not intervene into the "armenocide" which went on for 7 January days in 1990. At present, with its approval, with the intervention of the army and the Interior Troops, the Artsakh is being recolonized, the bodies of Soviet power are being eliminated and replaced by the bodies of the colonial power.

The Armenian population is being deported from Getashen, Shaumyan and Artsakh. Their demographic makeup is being changed.

Not one of the republic parties making up the CPSU for now has supported us or expressed regret or sympathy over our victims and losses. The CPSU leadership and President Gorbachev have been indifferent to the fate of the deputies of the national parliament who have announced an unlimited hunger strike including the CPSU members Zoriya Balayan, Viktor Ambartsumyan, Sosa Sarkisyan, Vachagan Grigoryan and Semen Babayan. The central party press and the television program *Vremya* [Time] have kept silent. After this, how can we remain within the CPSU?

In remaining within the CPSU, the Armenian Communist Party would distance itself from the Armenian people and lose their trust. It has already suffered a severe defeat in the elections to the Supreme Soviet where it did not operate as a political force, although it was the only organization having the status of a political party and still held the levers of power in its hands. The problem was that the apparatus and leadership were demoralized. And if there is no apparatus, there is no party.

During the elections the communist candidates were thrown to the vicissitudes of fate and they had to fight one another, without an election platform and to the benefit of the nonparty candidates.

Comrades! The platform of the Armenian CP Central Committee leaves the final solution to the question of withdrawing from the CPSU and the renaming of the party to a referendum of the communists and this is to be conducted between the two stages of the congress, although for all of us it is clear that in the current crisis state it would be impossible to conduct a normal, legal referendum, if it is not accompanied by reregistration.

The Coordinating Council unanimously and independently of the results of the referendum proposes that the Armenian Communist Party withdraw from membership in the CPSU. We have been told that in remaining within the CPSU we will be able to be independent, make independent decisions stemming from the interests of the Armenian people. We feel that this is self-deception. No one yet has been independent without full independence. It has been proposed to us that we remain within the CPSU in the hope of turning the CPSU into a union of autonomous republic communist parties, into a unique association. In the first place, no one has given any guarantees for such a future. And then this is possible in keeping the principle of democratic centralism. Finally, and most importantly, it is impossible to remain in a single union with the Azerbaijani Communist Party which has organized the genocide of the Armenian people and which is headed by the butcher Mutalibov. This is incompatible with our national dignity and will not be accepted by the people. Tortured by

these two years, our people and the rank-and-file communists will not accept a decision to remain further under the Gorbachev leadership which overseas favors the reunification of divided nations, including Germany, while within the nation, in the single state, in the same society, it acts against the just demand of the reunification of the two parts of Armenia and the Armenian people, defending, on the contrary, an internal colonial regime.

Some people feel that the withdrawal from the CPSU would be tantamount to the withdrawal of the Armenian republic from the USSR. However, in the first place, it is not up to the Armenian Communist Party to settle such a question, as it is no longer the ruling party in Armenia. Consequently, its withdrawal from the CPSU which, incidentally, is losing its status as the ruling party on a national scale, means nothing on this level, that is, whether Armenia is to remain with the USSR or not.

Furthermore, as I have already said, before the formation of the USSR, the republics were independent but their ruling parties were taken over by one party, the RKP(b). Consequently, why can the reverse not happen, when the parties split apart, but the republics are united in a single union, particularly as it is a question of regular, parliamentary parties?

Incidentally, the Coordinating Council in its platform is proposing that the USSR be turned not into a "union of sovereign states," that is, a renewal of the federative structure, as has been proposed in the platform of the Armenian CP Central Committee, but rather into a confederation, and in such a form where the equal principals of the new treaty of union are not only the current Union republics but also all autonomous formations, regardless of their territory, population size and economic potential. In this instance, they will gain equal rights, and the current four-tiered system of the different rights of nations and peoples will disappear. In this instance, all the autonomous formations, from the autonomous republics to the autonomous oblasts and okrugs, will emerge from under the power of the Union republics and obtain the status of general confederative subordination. In our view, this is the only way to resolve the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh and its reannexation with Armenia.

On this question we are actually proposing a definite mechanism. Generally in the draft submitted by the Coordinating Council, the questions are posed more clearly, leaving no room for ambiguity and doubt. We have endeavored not only to make progress on the tasks, accompanying them with the words "it is essential," "we must" and "it is necessary," but also to outline the ways and means of realizing them. In our platform the question of Artsakh is viewed as a component part of the Armenian question as a whole and not only from the viewpoint of the right to self-determination but also the right of the territorial claims of the Armenian people.

We feel that the Armenian Communist Party cannot restrict itself to the role of an opposition party and by constitutional means should fight to become the ruling party, as is stated in Article 14 of Chapter 1 of the Alternative Program. At the same time, the platform of the Central Committee restricts itself to the forming of an opposition under certain conditions and this opposition should struggle actively for the interests of the people and for carrying out a policy which would influence the work of the bodies of power.

Both platforms have many common provisions and ideas, particularly on the questions of socioeconomic policy, although here the draft of the Coordinating Council has been compiled more clearly and definitely. We are in favor of following more democratic principles in the economic changes and in converting to a market economy. Thus, we want privatization not to become a means for legalizing the shadow economy and illegally acquired funds. The party which the Coordinating Council is proposing to be set up on the basis of the Armenian Communist Party, in our understanding should defend the rights of the workers, the working peasantry, the intelligentsia and the middle strata who are growing rapidly and will grow under the conditions of the new economic situation. Consequently, we demand that in converting to a market economy maximum provision be made for the social protection and interests of the working class, the peasantry and the middle strata.

The Coordinating Council feels that the nonfundamental differences between the two platforms can easily be overcome and for the sake of the unity of the Armenian Communist Party is ready to discuss them with the noble desire to reach a common denominator. However, it cannot concede on the most important and crucial questions, that is, withdrawal from the CPSU and democratic centralism. This is our obligatory condition for collaboration. And the Armenian CP Central Committee in essence does not deny the variation of withdrawing from the CPSU and changing the name of the party and for this reason the proposed referendum can provide an affirmative answer to both this and other questions particularly as after changing the name it would be impossible to remain in the CPSU even if the referendum decided otherwise.

The question arises of where has the concern gone over a possible disaster?

In conclusion, on behalf of the Coordinating Council, I would like to urge the delegates to the 29th Armenian CP Congress to very attentively consider the drafts of the Alternative Program and Bylaws and accept our proposal for the withdrawal of the Armenian Communist Party from the CPSU which we have endeavored to justify here, for, in our view, this is the only way to bring the Armenian Communist Party out of its crisis and make the party truly popular and able to fight for the sake of national interests.

Central Asia

Kazakh Commission on 1986 Alma-Ata Events

91US0073A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 28 Sep 90 p 2

[Text] Conclusions and Proposals of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Commission for Final Appraisal of the Circumstances Linked to the Events in the City of Alma-Ata on 17 and 18 December 1986

The actions of Kazakh young people in December 1986 in Alma-Ata and several oblasts in Kazakhstan were not nationalist. They were a first attempt to exercise the right freely to express a civic and political position, a right guaranteed by the Constitution and proclaimed by perestrojka.

The underlying reasons for the discontent of the young people were rooted in the low standard of living, social injustice and the command and administrative system.

The action of the young people was prompted directly by the secretive and insulting way in which G.V. Kolbin was appointed as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan CP. This appointment was seen as crude diktat by the center in resolving issues concerning the vital interests of the population of the republic. The evident contradiction between the traditional command style actions of the center and the proclaimed democratic principles of perestrojka gave rise to particular indignation.

The initial protest against the decision of the Central Committee plenum came from a small group of young workers and students in the city of Alma-Ata. They held a peaceful political demonstration which did not call for the overthrow of the state order or attack other peoples. The young people who gathered outside the republic's Communist Party Central Committee were not breaking the law or breaching public order. They were merely demanding an explanation of the plenum's decision and expressing their disagreement with it.

From the outset the republic's leadership did not wish to enter an equal dialogue with the young people or listen to their opinion. Interpreting the political protest as a threat to the basis of its authority, the republic's leadership reacted to it by putting the Alma-Ata garrison on alert and surrounding the square with forces outnumbering the demonstrators many times over. A distorted and panicky report about the demonstration was sent to the center—to the CPSU Central Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR KGB. The use of regular army units to crush the demonstration was even considered.

The decision to bring special units of Ministry of Internal Affairs internal troops into Alma-Ata from various parts of the country, a decision taken by A.V. Vlasov, USSR Minister of Internal Affairs at the urgent request of the republican leadership, was completely

unnecessary as well as illegal. According to the USSR Constitution only the Presidium or a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet was competent to take such a decision on condition that the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet had declared a state of emergency in the city of Alma-Ata. This decision was taken behind the back of the supreme body of power and the republic's government by a small group of people.

The escalation of a small, peaceful protest demonstration into mass disorder was caused by the political impotence of the republic's leaders and their inability and unwillingness to find a peaceful way out of an acute crisis as well as by their reliance on force rather than on good sense and good will.

The behavior of some of the demonstrators was frequently outside the law. In attempting to achieve a dialogue with the republic's leaders the demonstrators displayed their lack of political skill as well as impatience and intolerable disrespect toward them, going as far as outright insults and hooliganism. In disobeying the forces of order they insulted them, skirmished and fought with them, stoned them and caused them bodily harm. There were irresponsible and provocative calls for illegal actions. Cars were set alight and buildings damaged.

In suppressing the disturbances the forces of order perpetrated repeated and flagrant breaches of the law: they beat detainees, took them out of town half naked in the middle of winter, and without the authorization of the prosecutor they put them in solitary confinement cells for questioning and left them in temporary solitary confinement cells for days at a time, often without food or medical assistance.

In breaking the demonstration up they used sticks, sappers' small shovels and dogs.

The tragic consequence of the clashes was that some demonstrators as well as some of those responsible for maintaining public order lost their lives and many people suffered bodily harm, some of them grievous bodily harm.

The actions of party and local soviet officials who ordered civilian units made up of industrial and office workers to be set up and armed, thus setting a mass of people against each other along national lines and giving the events the characteristics of interethnic clashes, deserve to be condemned unreservedly. This political blindness and muddled thinking led to the kindling of interethnic differences.

Official figures for the consequences of the events were contradictory and inaccurate. The Ministry of Internal Affairs gave the number of arrests as 2,336, the KGB gave the figure as 2,212 while the prosecutor's office said that 2,401 people were detained. It has been established that counting those who were taken to temporary solitary confinement cells, special reception centers and interrogation cells as well as those who were taken out of town

the number detained was around 8,500 people. Different figures, ranging from 763 to 1,137, were given for numbers of injured. The Commission estimates that over 1,700 people sustained bodily harm.

Until recently the heads of the law and order bodies and the prosecutor's office denied that sappers' small shovels and dogs were used.

There were also crude breaches of the law during the legal and investigation process surrounding the criminal proceedings against those involved in the events. The investigation of their cases was carried out with great haste, in a superficial manner and with a clear bias in favour of the prosecution. In this respect the case of K. Ryskulbekov is typical. He was sentenced to death, but in the Commission's view, without sufficient evidence. Judges at various stages, including in the republic's Supreme Court, examined many cases in haste and did not go through the necessary legal procedure. In effect they simply rubber stamped the unconvincing conclusions of the investigation. A deliberate lack of principle on the part of investigators and judges at all levels was characteristic of the work of the legal and investigative apparatus in cases concerning those involved in the events. They worked under un concealed pressure from the leadership of the court and prosecutor's office, as well as from the political authorities who compelled them to reach hasty and illegal guilty verdicts and conclusions. To date, of 99 people convicted, 46 have been rehabilitated. Many of those convicted who had their sentences reduced also deserve to be rehabilitated.

Such crude and shameless breaches of the law on the part of the forces of order, law and order bodies, investigation and legal bodies and the prosecutor's office were possible because the rigidly centralized command and administrative system which had come into being in the country coupled with the party apparatus' indisputable monopoly on power, an apparatus which in the final analysis boiled down to a small group of people in the political leadership, operated to the full.

The prestige of party bodies was not enhanced by the position which they adopted in assessing the December events and their consequences. This position has only shifted once in all the time since the events: the accusation of Kazakh nationalism contained in the CPSU Central Committee decision has been recognized as mistaken. However, whereas at the time these accusations resounded aloud all over the country and in all the mass media their retraction was quiet, unnoticed and silent. The relevant decision by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee was only published in the small circulation "News of the CPSU Central Committee." In effect this decision does not contain so much as a hint that the authorities even partially admit their guilt. It repeats that there were demonstrations by young people provoked by extremist and nationalist elements. Thus the accusation is repeated, albeit in a more veiled and sanctimonious form.

In deeming the main culprit in the December drama to have been the command and administrative system, one must not overlook its actual representatives, individuals who had the power to give instructions and influence the course of events and who abused that power or failed to see where their duty lay.

Taking the above circumstances into consideration the commission considers it necessary publicly to name firstly party and state leaders whose instructions and orders led to the use of force to suppress a peaceful political demonstration by young people and a campaign of repressions against those involved in the events; secondly officials who, in carrying out these instructions, gave orders for the use of illegal methods of suppression and repressions; thirdly those who mindlessly carried out the illegal orders and instructions; fourthly officials of the law and order and legal apparatus who failed to ensure that the law was observed and who failed in their duty and finally those behind the setting up and arming of civilian units:

- Kolbin, G.V.—former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan CP and current Chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee, a USSR People's Deputy for Kazakhstan and a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet;
- Solomentsev, M.S.—former member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee;
- Chebrikov, V.M.—former member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR KGB;
- Razumov, Ye.Z.—former first deputy chief of the Department for Organizational Party Work at the CPSU Central Committee;
- Vlasov, A.V.—former USSR Minister of Internal Affairs and currently chief of a department at the CPSU Central Committee;
- Mishchenko, N.F.—former chief of the Kazakhstan sector at the Department for Organizational Party Work at the CPSU Central Committee;
- Miroshkin, O.S.—former Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan CP and current USSR Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Zambia;
- Kamalidenov, Z.K.—former secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan CP;
- Yefimov, V.I.—former head of the Department for administrative organs at the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan CP and currently working for a doctorate at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee;
- Ustinov, A.A.—former head of the Department for propaganda and agitation at the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan CP;
- Yelisov, B.K.—former first deputy USSR Minister of Internal Affairs;
- Soroka, O.V.—former first deputy USSR Prosecutor General and currently deputy chief of the investigation directorate at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs;
- Bobkov, F.D.—first deputy chairman of the USSR KGB;
- Strelnikov, V.K.—former assistant to the USSR Prosecutor General and currently deputy chief of the USSR Prosecutor's Office directorate for supervising investigations and inquiries in Ministry of Internal Affairs bodies;
- Andreyev, V.I.—former chief of the USSR Prosecutor's Office department for supervising investigations in the organs of state security, currently deputy USSR Prosecutor General;
- Knyazev, G.N.—former Kazakh SSR Minister of Internal Affairs and currently in charge of USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs higher courses in Sverdlovsk;
- Miroshnik, V.M.—former chairman of the Kazakh SSR KGB and currently deputy chief of a USSR KGB directorate and USSR People's Deputy for Kazakhstan;
- Basarov, E.O.—Kazakh SSR first deputy Minister of Internal Affairs;
- Paridukha, A.M.—former chief of the directorate for internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs for Central Asia and Kazakhstan;
- Dubinyak, V.S.—deputy chief of the Main Directorate for internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs;
- Komissarov, V.S.—former deputy chief of the directorate for criminal investigations at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs;
- Serikov, S.D.—Kazakh SSR deputy Minister of Internal Affairs;
- Koryakovtsev, B.A.—former Kazakh SSR deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and currently chief of the main directorate of the State Highway Inspectorate at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs;
- Musin, K.T.—former deputy chief of the internal affairs directorate of Alma-Ata city executive committee;
- Karpov, I.G.—former head of Alma-Ata higher command frontier academy of the USSR KGB and currently head of the Moscow higher command frontier academy of the USSR KGB;
- Kosolapov, Yu.A.—chief of staff at the directorate for internal troops at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs for Central Asia and Kazakhstan;
- Isabayev, S.M.—formerly chief of the Directorate for Internal Affairs at Alma-Ata oblast executive committee and currently chief of the Internal Affairs Directorate at Alma-Ata town executive committee;
- Kulikov, N.T.—former deputy chief and now chief of the Eastern directorate for internal transport troops;
- Abdulmanov, M.A.—chief of the fire prevention directorate at the Alma-Ata city executive committee Directorate for Internal Affairs;
- Rekun, V.A.—former deputy chief of the Directorate for Internal Affairs of Alma-Ata city executive committee;
- Yelemisov, G.B.—Kazakh SSR Prosecutor;
- Aytmukhambetov, T.K.—Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court;

- Dospolov, D.—former Kazakh SSR Justice Minister and currently a senior official in the apparatus of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers;
- Myznikov, A.D.—former Kazakh SSR Deputy Prosecutor and currently Alma-Ata transport prosecutor;
- Voltunov, V.S.—former head of the investigations section of the Kazakh SSR Prosecutor's Office and currently deputy prosecutor for the city of Alma-Ata;
- Murzalin, S.D.—deputy chief of the investigations department of the Kazakh SSR KGB;
- Teterkin, I.A.—former Kazakh SSR First Deputy Minister of Justice and currently Kazakh SSR Chief State Arbiter;
- Mendybayev, M.S.—former First Secretary of Alma-Ata obkom of the Kazakhstan CP, member of the buro of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan CP and currently head of a section at the department of heavy industry at the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers and a USSR People's Deputy for the CPSU;
- Shuliko, G.V.—former First Secretary of Alma-Ata city committee of the Kazakhstan CP;
- Khmyzov, A.V.—former head of a department at Alma-Ata city committee of the Kazakhstan CP and currently head of the department for labour and social issues at Alma-Ata oblast executive committee;
- Yezhkov, Yu.A.—former First Secretary of Moskovskiy party raykom in Alma-Ata city and currently deputy chairman of Alma-Ata city executive committee;
- Meshcheryakov, Yu.A.—former First Secretary of Oktyabrskiy party raykom in Alma-Ata city and currently First Secretary of Pavlodar obkom of the Kazakhstan CP and a USSR People's Deputy;
- Romanov, V.I.—former First Secretary of Alma-Ata city committee of the Kazakhstan CP and currently chief of a section at the Department of Party Construction and Cadre Work at the CPSU Central Committee;
- Dolzhenkov, V.A.—former Chairman of Frunzenskiy rayon executive committee in Alma-Ata city and currently second secretary of Alma-Ata obkom of the Kazakhstan CP.

M.S. Solomentsev, B.K. Yelisov, F.D. Bobkov, O.V. Soroka, A.M. Paridukha, V.S. Dubinyak, Ye.Z. Razumov, N.F. Mishchenko and G.V. Kolbin personally as representatives of the center were directly in charge of the suppression of the demonstration and the repressions which followed. Of all the republic's leaders only O.S. Miroshkhin, G.N. Knyazyev and V.M. Miroshnik were allowed to be part of "HQ." At the same time, in the interests of objectivity it must be recognized that the entire Buro of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan CP should take an equal share of the moral responsibility for its passive and consenting attitude and for dodging influencing key decisions, the course of events and the campaign of repressions which followed.

Like all citizens of the republic the Commission, which is made up of people of various nationalities, cherishes peace, tranquillity, good neighborliness and mutual

respect between peoples. The members of the Commission are convinced that openly telling the bitter truth will remove many painful issues and that this will promote the consolidation of political stability on which the republic's economic transformation primarily depends. At the same time we share the bitter feelings of people whose lives have been ruined by the December events.

Those responsible for the unlawful actions which in some cases led to fraternal peoples confronting each other must bear the responsibility.

In view of the above the Commission proposes:

1. To condemn the actions of the former membership of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee for diktat in appointing the top political leader of Kazakhstan without taking into consideration the opinion of the communists and people of the republic; for approving the unconstitutional decision to bring special units of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs into Alma-Ata, a decision which led to grave consequences, including loss of life; for the politically irresponsible and insulting accusation of nationalism against the Kazakh people, an accusation which did serious damage to traditionally friendly relations between the peoples of Kazakhstan.

2. To condemn the appeal of 18 December 1986 to the population of Alma-Ata from the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan CP and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR which was adopted without their knowledge by a small group of people and which distorted events.

3. That the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet should petition the USSR Supreme Soviet and the President of the USSR:

- to review the decision to appoint Kolbin, G.V. to the post of Chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee;
- to recall O.S. Miroshkhin from his post as USSR Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Zambia;
- to examine the issue of the intolerable nature of employing F.D. Bobkov and V.M. Miroshkin in top posts in the KGB system and O.V. Soroka and G.N. Knyazyev in top posts in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs system.

4. That the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet should ask the appropriate authorities to examine the question of recognizing the impossible nature of the following people remaining in senior posts:

- Yelemisov, G.B.—Kazakh SSR Prosecutor; Ayt-mukhambetov, T.K.—Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court; Teterkin, I.A.—Kazakh SR Chief State Arbiter; Dospolov, D.—a senior official in the apparatus of the Kazakh SR Council of Ministers; Basarov, E.O. and Serikov, S.D.—Kazakh SSR First Deputy and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs;

Myznikov, A.D.—Alma-Ata transport prosecutor; Voltunov, V.S.—deputy prosecutor of the city of Alma-Ata; Yefimov, V.I. who is currently studying for a doctorate at the Academy of Social Sciences at the CPSU Central Committee.

5. That in appointing judges and especially in approving the membership of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet should take into consideration whether or not they observed the law in examining criminal cases connected with the December events.

6. To start criminal proceedings in cases involving:

- the use of sappers' shovels, dogs and fire engines against the demonstrators and the arming of volunteer militiamen with metal bars, lengths of cable and sticks;
- illegal arrests and imprisonment without the authorization of the prosecutor or the appropriate court decision;
- the conviction of people known to be innocent;
- the death of Ye.M. Spatayev, a student at Alma-Ata Institute of Power Engineering;
- the causing of grievous and actual bodily harm;
- the brutal treatment of detainees, including women and minors.

7. To restart previously dropped criminal proceedings aimed at finding out who was truly responsible for the following deaths:

- that of A. Savitskiy, an engineer at the republic's television center;
- that of K. Ryskulbekov, a student at Alma-Ata Institute of Architecture and Construction;
- that of S. Mukhamedzhanova, a student at Ust-Kamenogorsk Pedagogical Institute;
- that of L. Asanova, a student at Alma-Ata Academy of Music.

8. That the Kazakh SSR Prosecutor's Office and the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court should reexamine the basis and legality of sentences in all cases involving the criminal and administrative punishment of those involved in the December events.

9. To inform the republic's voters and the CPSU Central Committee of the role in and actions during the December 1986 events of USSR People's Deputies G.V. Kolbin, V.M. Miroshnik, M.S. Mendybayev, and Yu.A. Meshcheryakov and invite them to reconsider the confidence which they have placed in them.

10. To revoke the decision of the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet conferring Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet certificates and certificates of honor and USSR orders and medals on individuals for their active involvement in suppressing the political demonstration by young people in December 1986.

11. That in order to achieve the political and social rehabilitation of innocent people who have suffered for their involvement in the December events, the Ministries of Public Education, Health and Social Security as well as Soviets of People's Deputies and political and public organizations should adopt measures to restore their violated civil and social rights to work, to housing, to study in educational establishments, to medical care, to social security and to membership in public organizations.

12. That in formulating a draft new Kazakh SSR Constitution and the basis for a Union Treaty as well as the republic's Declaration of Sovereignty a mechanism should be envisaged which would rule out the concentration of power in the hands of a small group of people, opportunity for abuse of power, a lack of proper control by the Supreme Soviet and interference and diktat by representatives of the central organs of power and the party apparatus in resolving issues which are of vital importance to the population of the republic and to the protection of the rights, honor and dignity of the people and the individual.

13. To declare 17 December Remembrance Day or Democratic Renewal Day in memory of the tragic events of December 1986 and as a sign that such a thing must never happen again in Kazakhstan.

14. To publish these conclusions and proposals by the Commission in the mass media.

The events of December 1986 were a bitter lesson for the peoples of the republic. The Commission considers that it has accomplished its mission and hopes that the results of its work will serve to overcome alienation and promote the consolidation of the republic's multinational people.

Commission Co-Chairmen:

Shakhanov, M.—USSR People's Deputy, Member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Secretary of the Board of the Union of Writers of Kazakhstan and chief editor of ZHALYN magazine

Murzaliyev, K.G.—Kazakh SSR People's Deputy, poet

Commission Secretary:

Burabayev, T.—advocate at Alma-Ata city board of advocates

Commission Members:

Fokin, N.K.—senior lecturer at Alma-Ata Institute of Architecture and Construction, Co-chairman of Kazakhstan's Public Committee for Human Rights

Tasmagambetov, I.N.—Candidate Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan CP, First Secretary of the Central Committee of Kazakhstan's Komsomol

Kirinitsianov, Yu.I.—RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent

Abdrakhmanov, S.A.—Kazakh SSR People's Deputy, Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee of Alma-Ata City Soviet of People's Deputies

Duberman, Yu.Ye.—reader at the department of sociology at the Institute for the Further Training of Teachers of Social Sciences at Kazakhstan S.M. Kirov State University, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences

Dzhaksymbetov, S.—senior lecturer at the department of Soviet criminal law at the law faculty of Kazakhstan S.M. Kirov State University

Zadorozhnyy, N.V.—Kazakh SSR People's Deputy, mill operator at the Agroremmash scientific-production association experimental works

Ignatov, F.F.—editor of KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA

Izmukhambetov, T.A.—senior official in the apparatus of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers

Kasimov, S.A.—adviser to the Kazakh SSR Presidential Council

Kim, V.A.—head of a department at the law faculty of the Kazakhstan S.M. Kirov State University, Doctor of Legal Sciences, Professor

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Kirghiz Enterprises Hurt by Mass Departure of Russians

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[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA staff correspondent for Kirghizia A. Ivanov under the rubric "The Sovereign Republic and the Fate of Man": "Good Ridance?"]

[Text] The fate of the enterprises of Kirghizia is hanging by a thread because of the mass departure of Russians.

Quite recently I would be asked, is such a thing possible here? The naivete of those inquiring surprised me. Of course not.

But it did not pass us by. And it came in such a way that everything under the sun recognized it. Osh was on the tip of everyone's tongue for so many months. The waves

of alarm are rolling and rolling about the republic itself, there is no end to them. The Russian-speaking population was affected and flowed in rivulets first from the places closest to Osh. And then the circles spread further, encompassing all cities and villages. Wherever I went, it was all people talked about.

Approximately 40,000 "aliens" abandoned the limits of Kirghizia during the first half of this year. The outward flow intensified even more after the tragic events of July. For the time being, the people leaving are those who can start life in other places without particular trouble. Intelligent specialists, highly qualified workers, rural machine operators. Their age, as a rule, ranges from 40-45.

It would seem that the figures are not high.

"But sometimes quantity is much more important than quality," persuaded A.S. Morozov, general director of the "Kirghizelektromash" association. "Our major production has lost 50 workers. A drop in the bucket. But the concern has staggered. Among those who have left are electrical equipment repairmen. While previously repairmen worked round the clock and the equipment never stopped, now there are disruptions all the time. And throughout the production chain. Every time you turn around there's a new gap. We are not delivering enough production. But for now, this is just the beginning..."

In such a situation, a look into the future is timid and uncertain. They almost tried to transfer the association's work to a shareholding basis, but that broke down. Perceiving the lack of long-term prospects of their daily life here, many workers refused this. Each step is like walking a tightrope.

"I wish to resign in light of my departure from the republic..." This phrase from the applications, now a cliché, makes enterprise managers shudder, keeps them turning at night. Within a short period of time, over 100 people, one-third of them engineers and designers, left the Dzhahalabad detachable socket plant. The shadow of those leaving was also cast on the instrumentation shop, where fittings for the main production line are made. And the plant was already reminiscent of a wounded bird rapidly losing altitude.

The same woes are also present at the Frunze appliance assembly plant. I was shown a list of those who had gone. Each had the highest qualifications. Once-strong construction organizations are falling apart in Osh Oblast. Whether you want to or not, just wait for a decline in housing construction. K.B. Khuriyev, chief of the board of "Naryngidroenergostroy," holds his head in his hands. For years he gathered bit by bit, cultivated specialists, and they put one GES [hydroelectric power station] after another in Naryn. Now the friendly multinational collective is falling to pieces.

But at the same time, the opinion exists in certain circles of the republic that nothing in particular is happening.

Well, people are leaving, so what? Good riddance. We can get along without them. A demand will appear, and a supply will appear. Our own unemployed have nowhere to go.

Well, everyone has his own reasons. A.M. Novak, director of an electric vacuum machine building plant, feels that about 15 years will be needed for training specialists as highly qualified as those who are resigning and leaving. And it is precisely those who should have been doing the teaching that are leaving.

But all the same, it occurred to me, is the situation worth dramatizing? A production to production discrepancy. The benefit from other production isn't enormous, but scads of people are employed. Isn't that the case here?

Alas, it is not. A monopoly has penetrated here, too. "Kirghizelektromash" produces alternating current electric motors for a certain type of washing machine and other domestic equipment. Even now you have to pay double, triple the price to get that item. Meaning we are faced with the prospect of unwashed laundry and spoiled food. But we go on. Eight types of medical equipment, including centrifuges, are produced only by the Frunze appliance assembly plant. For the time being, it is producing them. Why be unhappy? The electric vacuum machine building plant, famous for its automatic assembly lines for lamp plants, is also the only one in the country. Without these lines, not only will electric lamps disappear, but the country will sink into darkness. Perhaps enough sad possibilities enumerated?

Frankly, I supposed that stoppage at a number of the republic's enterprises still looms ahead. But the directors with whom I met unanimously said only one thing: With such an exodus, calculations are to be made month by month.

The attitude in the republics toward enterprises of union subordination is well-known: A few crumbs from them fall to the local budget. Such a practice is destructive; it should be reconsidered. Yet there is another aspect: As soon as the products of the "all-unionists" cease getting to other regions of the country, there comes from them a wave of sanctions. God forbid they block delivery to Kirghizia of the types of products and raw materials that the republic urgently needs. What will happen then?

The republic leadership long pretended that it did not notice this. Having recollected, it suddenly manifested its concern. Absamat Masaliyev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and Kirghiz CP first secretary, called upon city and rayon authorities from the tribune: "Consider this issue especially, study the causes, establish what is troubling people. And make it so that no one leaves." Good wishes. As if it were not clear that the main reasons are the interethnic instability, the distortions existing here. Cardinal decisions must be made first on all on the republic level. Yet it seems that our leaders are wasting more effort on the struggle against opponents, on striving to shield their retainers guilty in

the Osh tragedy rather than seriously and conscientiously building bridges between the nations living in Kirghizia.

National self-recognition is gaining strength everywhere. It is greatly to be desired that people win, rather than lose while it is gaining.

Informal Organizations Blamed for Osh Disorder

90US1280B Tashkent SOVET OZBEKISTONI
in Uzbek 14 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by F. Salimov: "Is It Politics Or Is It Playing With Fire?"]

[Text] The blood of innocent people flowed again in our Central Asian land. The events in Osh made the entire country shudder. Mothers, widows, and children were weeping bitterly.

One hundred thirty-nine people killed, 486 people wounded, and hundreds of homes set on fire—this is the result of an essentially internationally incident. This is the result of a madness that is playing with the lives of completely innocent people.

But this raises the question of who began this insane hostility, who is fanning it, and whether it can start again. What is the primary cause of the incident? Is it really about "a bucket of strawberries," young troublemakers, a plot of land, or disputed water? Or is the real cause the ever increasing inflation, economic disorder, and the bare shelves of stores? There is no doubt that such conditions are responsible for the dangerous events of the present day. Such conditions are bringing to the surface a terrible hidden force—the power of the people's anger which can inflict a shattering blow.

But is this force ever set in motion on its own? Either voluntarily or involuntarily, either consciously or unconsciously, certain people are setting it in motion.

Internal affairs organs will respond to the question about exactly who they are. Internal affairs organs now have begun to concentrate on this task. More than 150 experienced and qualified investigators from the Center are involved in investigating the conditions which have appeared. We believe that they will determine the cause of this tragedy and identify by name those who stirred up the two peaceful peoples who have been kinsmen over the course of centuries.

We await the truth from judicial organs. This time we hope that they will find the evidence that will enable them to determine the cause of the bloody events that took place in Osh, in Buka, in Parkent, and in Fergana.

But for now one thing is clear: today there are people who are trying to seize power openly, directly, and without fear. Who are the ones openly attacking the CPSU, the party organs, and the soviets? The majority are hidden within the informal movements familiar to the people. The majority pretend to be the guardians of

the national spirit. The majority regard themselves as leaders of the young. The majority call themselves the defenders of the people.

When we speak about the tragedy in Osh, in Kirghizstan, on the surface there seems to be a single cause of the incident—the distribution of land sections between the two peoples. In reality, the tragedy brought to the surface something else: the political aspirations of two informal movements, the Adolat [Justice] movement of the Uzbeks and the Aymak [Country] movement to the Kirghiz. They incited this struggle for power in order to increase their own influence. They aroused the people's anger.

Chingiz Aytmatov also has the same interpretation of the causes and results of the events in Osh. We have faith in his intelligence and common sense.

To those who are trying to seize political power, seeking to gain political prestige easily, and playing with politics in a situation that is difficult for the country and the republic today, we must respond as follows. If you are serious political figures, then do you not understand the consequences of your heedless and careless actions? Do you not understand the suffering and grief which your publication of names has brought to the refugees, to the people whose homes were burned, and to those who were crippled!?

We say, "Turn away from this path. Preserve your self-esteem. Do not forget the people!" We say, "Time will reveal who is who."

'Erk' Party Goals, Membership Discussed

90US1280C Tashkent OZBEKISTON ADABIYOTI VA SANATI in Uzbek 25 May 90 p 2

[Interview with Ahmad Azam, writer, by Kamol Matyoqubov, correspondent]

[Text] On 30 April in Tashkent, the first congress of the newly formed "Erk" Democratic Party was held at the republic House of Sciences. At the congress the manifesto and program of the EDP were adopted and the leadership was elected. A new party appeared on the political map of our republic. Our correspondent Kamol Matyoqubov addressed several questions to the writer Ahmad Azam, one of the founders of this party, and a member of the EDP's managing board:

[Correspondent] Our subscribers are very interested in what the appearance of the "Erk" Democratic Party will hold for the future of our people and the fate of our republic. Would you comment on whether the new party arose due to some sort of social necessity?

[Azam] "Erk" is a necessity. It arose from the need to struggle for the political and economic independence of our republic. Moreover, it concerns not only "Erk." Because it emerges from the reality of the aspirations for

independence, for true independence of a certain nationality and of a state that has been dependent for a long time and it will turn into a historical necessity, an inevitable destiny. The facts that they have begun to think about whether independence is necessary or not and that this idea has become an important problem on the moral agenda shows that this process is gaining strength. Only some power, some secret misfortune that is not from outside, but from within can halt the tumult of the multitude for a time, or hinder the development of progressive ideas and enlightenment. When a situation is ripe, the multitude which itself does not fully understand its own political destiny can suddenly explode and create obstacles to its own future, then strike at those obstacles, but strike in vain. At such times the basic activities of a party consist of transforming the blind social discontent and reactionary anger into a political critique and analysis of the future, as well as transforming the broad masses into a national force, and uniting all the social strata around a single goal.

With this objective the "Erk" Democratic Party has begun to work with the intention of putting an end to the political and economic dependence which has been the source of all the tragic events that have befallen our people and our republic and, ultimately, to work with the intention of transforming the republic into a state with international rights that will express the wishes and desires of the people, in line with all similar states.

We stared as history was stained and forgot that for better or worse we once had an independent state, and the rights of an independent nation state along with commercial traditions and ties, and diplomatic relations. With respect to the feudal period of the time of the Khorezm or the Timurid states, we should not speak of extremely developed systems of statehood in comparison to the political institutions of Europe in that period. But even though the Kokand, Bukhara, and Khorezm khanates still carries the seal of backwardness, they were independent states in their time, and had relations with foreign states just as any state would. In the end, a system of independent statehood along with a language determine a nationality's identity.

Supposedly today, since the artificial national delimitation in 1924, as promised in the current constitution, we live in a state and in a republic which cannot be compared to the feudal khanates. We have a constitution, a flag, a seal, and a hymn. But if we exclude the differences between nationalities, the rights of our republic as a state subordinate to the center are no greater than the rights of a socialist regime to a socialist oblast.

Today we see the fate that has befallen our people in an ecological, economic, cultural, and administrative light, but these tragic events grow from a single stem—from a political foundation. The cotton monopoly comes from a political monopoly. Our having been turned into a single raw material base comes from our political dependence. The death of the Aral Sea; the export of gas, gold, and

other precious metals; the republic's lack of possession of its own earth, water, and wealth; and so on—these come from the fact that its political will exist only in the pages of the Constitution.

[Correspondent] Does "Erk" mean only these things by the word "independence"?

[Azam] Let us take a broader look at the problem. Although a group of men may hold very progressive ideas, they may be powerless to carry out those ideas. If the boldest 5 or 10 politicians were somewhere else, they could change the government. But this system is a hopeless knot, and it is impossible to change the old bureaucratic methods of this government. I mean that passage from dependence to independence and from a colony to independence will not be realized just through the efforts of a social organization of 10 to 20 progressive minded intellectuals or even hundreds of people, but will be realized as a set of historical circumstances, a process that has evolved in the reality of socioeconomic conditions, and as the social outlook and daily political and moral readiness of the people, the nationality, and the general public.

With this situation in mind—that is, the fact that independence is historically obtained in both a political-economic respect and in the disposition of the masses, we have established the "Erk" Democratic Party, a political movement to unite the awakening forces and to express their goals and aspirations.

[Correspondent] Why exactly is the party described as "democratic"? The objective of the party is apparently to struggle for independence, so is not the name "Erk" [Independence] sufficient?

[Azam] True, the name "Erk" explains the objective of the party. But the term "democratic" reflects both its nature and its goal as well as its means for achieving its goal. "Democracy" conveys the ideas of "people's government" and "people's sovereignty." "Erk's" style of work really is democratic, which means, in the first place, that it proceeds in the interests of the people, and also wages the struggle to bring into existence a legal state—a true people's government.

[Correspondent] It is well-known that the activities of any kind of party or social organization leads to an ultimate struggle for power. Will the "Erk" Democratic Party also take this course? What is the EDP's potential in this area in the present day, especially in a time when the Communist Party has a monopoly on power?

[Azam] First of all, one must not simplify the quest for power into an attempt to wield power. The management of power requires a very profound political culture both from a new party and from the masses. Because in the future it is inevitable that neither the old nor the new party will be able to hold power on its own accord. Rather the people will bestow power on whomever they regard as the best. The "Erk" Democratic Party is not keeping its plans in this area secret. In this way, it strives above all to gain the trust of the people and to become the people's party. As for the question of opposition, it goes much farther than you said. First of all, the ruling party will never resign on its own accord. Moreover, the old party will not give up its position in the government and in political life. But a nationality that is thinking in democratic terms doubtlessly would elect a new occupant for this position. It is a question of what kind of work we do among the people and to what degree we become its party. In this sense we worry 10 times more about the dormant common people who are devoid of political thinking than about the ruling party and its apparatus.

[Correspondent] All of my final questions are interrelated: How can someone be accepted into "Erk" and what kind of person can become a member? How much does membership cost? And, where should those who want to join and those interested in the new party inquire?

[Azam] Anyone who accepts its manifesto and program, who is 18 years old, and who does not belong to another political party can become a member of the "Erk" Democratic Party. In this, it is natural to pay attention to a candidate's political readiness and to the purity of his personal history. A member of "Erk" without doubt must possess some degree of political readiness. It is well-known from bitter experience that accepting someone on a casual basis will cause serious damage to the party's work in the future. The duties and responsibilities of an EDP member are explained in the party's program. The payment of dues is determined by one's salary, starting from 5 kopecks of the 30 ruble stipend for students, and up to 5 rubles of the 500 ruble monthly salary of a worker. The "Erk" Democratic Party has its own publication. The ERK newspaper is being published. The manifesto and program were also recently published. The temporary center of the party is in the building of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union, Pushkin Street, House 1.

Interested parties can inquire there, familiarize themselves with the manifesto and the program, and obtain its publication of which four issues have appeared so far.