Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL
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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR LINKS SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER EXPLOSION TO SDI

Explosion 'Warning' Against SDI

LD301057 Moscow TASS in English 1047 GMT 30 Jan 86

[Text] Washington January 30 TASS -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports:

In the days when Americans are mourning the deaths of seven astronauts, crew members of the exploded spaceship shuttle Challenger, experts say that the Challenger's explosion is a serious warning to those who are planning to deploy arms systems in space.

The Strategic Defence Initiative of the Reagan administration provides for the deployment of space arms systems monitored and controlled by computers. Investigations recently confirmed by the Pentagon's special consultative commission show the impossibility of developing such a monitoring and control system that would guarantee against error and reacting to false signals.

Suppose, says Robert Bowman, president of the Research Institute for Space and Security Studies, that a spaceship exploded in orbit with arms systems already deployed in space. Who would be able to tell whether such an explosion was the result of faulty functioning of the ship's systems or it was hit by an anti-satellite weapon? Properly speaking, there would be no one to consider the matter because computers monitoring space arms systems would instantaneously react to the explosion. They would issue only one command, the command for these systems to be activated. Such is one of the highly probable chance occurrences that can trigger off a nuclear war.

The seven crew members of the Challenger spaceship have met their tragic deaths not only for the great cause of space exploration but also for preventing the deaths of billions of people because mankind has become more deeply aware of the terrible danger which deployment of arms systems in space represents to our planet. Robert Bowman expressed the hope that the Challenger catastrophe would make the initiators of the "star wars" programme, too, realize this danger and the need for constructive talks with the Soviet Union on nuclear and space arms.
Some Hope SDI Not Affected

PM291819 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jan 86 First Edition

[Own correspondent V. Gan dispatch: "After the Tragedy: America Experiences the Loss of Challenger"]

[Text] Washington, 29 Jan — The U.S. capital plunged into deep mourning virtually from the very moment that time stopped for the crew of the spacecraft Challenger at 1139 hours. U.S. state flags were flown at half-mast and the press conferences, rallies, and seminars which make up a usual Washington weekday were canceled as a token of national grief. On the President's instructions Vice President G. Bush quickly flew to Cape Canaveral, Florida, to gather information and present a report to the White House.

After consulting with his aides, President R. Reagan took the decision to postpone for a week the State of the Union message to the two chambers of the U.S. Congress scheduled for this evening. A White House spokesman reported that the head of the administration considered "the moment unsuitable" for delivering the traditional message; which is also by tradition couched in an optimistic vein.

Instead Reagan made a statement on the national television network in which he honored the memory of the Challenger's crew and stressed U.S. resolve to continue exploring the expanses of outer space.

Special reports transmitted by ABC television throughout the day noted that the Soviet Union was one of the first to express its condolences on the tragedy. Recalling Soviet-American cooperation in outer space in past years and the enormous program of their own research into near-earth space, an announcer noted that "despite the political problems and the disagreements which divide us, what has happened evokes the same feelings and emotions in everyone."

However, among the stream of expressions of grief which inundated the television screens and newspaper pages notes were clearly heard which, given the tragedy, cannot be described as other than monstrous. Literally in the first hours after the Challenger turned into a ball of fire before the eyes of millions of television viewers some legislators rushed to assure people that the catastrophe would not in any circumstances influence work on the very dangerous "star wars" program. And although you would think that the spectacle of people dying, as it were, in public would emphasize the acute need for mankind to pool its creative efforts in the difficult task of peacefully exploring outer space, there were figures in Washington who deemed it possible to champion its very rapid militarization. "Sources in the administration and congress," THE WASHINGTON POST observes in this regard, "have expressed the hope that the Pentagon's part of the program will not suffer seriously as a result of the explosion."

And that "part", as the press reports, is virtually the most significant part of the NASA program, of which the Pentagon, according to ABC, has become "one of the major clients." Using the shuttle, for example, the military department has begun practical research in the sphere of developing [sozdanie] space strike weapons.
America Reconsidering SDI

LD302216 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1745 GMT 30 Jan 86

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Vyacheslav Lavrenteyev]

[Text] The U.S. press continues to publish reports concerning the death of the spaceship Challenger and the seven astronauts onboard it. [sentence as heard]

Many interviews with people who were present at the take-off, with astronauts who have been to space, and with those who are going to fly there are being published. The bourgeois press, trained in sensations, tries to obtain maximum effect from this tragic event.

During the search for debris of the ship, a large number of fragments have been found, including a cone-shaped object sized 4.5 meters. Presumably, that is the nose cone of one of the accelerators. Several guesses concerning the reasons for the crash of the ship have already appeared in the press, although the official investigation, according to NASA representatives, could last several months. The ABC network recommends questioning the Rockwell International corporation, a department of which produced the main thrusters of the Challenger. This company is one of the main contractors of the Pentagon in connection with the work on the "star wars" program.

The fate of the Challenger makes many Americans reconsider their views on the space military plans of their administration. Imagine, what would happen if a spaceship blew up after weapons had been deployed in space within the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative, asks Robert Bowman, director of the Institute for Space and Security studies? Who would be able to tell then if such an explosion was a result of a ship malfunction, or if it was destroyed by antisatellite weapons? Computers would immediately react to the explosion, swinging the whole system into action.

Bowman has expressed hope that the catastrophe will help the administration to become more aware of the danger of the star wars program and push it closer to talks with the Soviet Union on nuclear and space weapons.

FRG Politician Cited

LD302347 Moscow TASS in English 1905 GMT 30 Jan 86

[Text] Bonn, January 30 TASS -- The U.S. space shuttle Challenger tragedy is a reason good enough to revise the attitude to the ominous plans of militarizing outer space, in particular the American "Strategic Defense Initiative", Karsten Volgt, a prominent West German politician and public figure who is a member of the Bundestag and a member of the board of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, said today.

The Challenger tragedy prompts the conclusion in relation to the SDI, he said, that a policy oriented exclusively at technology can represent a threat to world peace.
Japanese Question U.S. Technology

LD302032 Moscow TASS in English 1951 GMT 30 Jan 86

[Text] Tokyo, January 30 TASS -- The disaster with the Challenger shuttle demonstrated the entire danger with which super-sophisticated technology is fraught and its ability to let man down despite all the backup systems, it was stated by the anchorman of the Japanese NHK television station. The tragedy also has another aspect even though it might not yet be appropriate to speak about it, it was stated in the news programme. The sudden explosion of the Challenger, of which no warning came from computers on board the ship and on the ground, might make many people wonder about the reliability of American-made technology.

U.S. Scientist Raps Computers

LD302350 Moscow TASS in English 2220 GMT 30 Jan 86

[Text] New York, January 30 TASS -- The Challenger tragedy has brought us back to reality and shown that it is impossible to create ideally perfect mechanisms, and first of all computers for military and commercial aims, it was stated by John Pike, a representative of the Federation of American Scientists. When the tragedy occurred on Tuesday computers failed to warn either the astronauts or mission control about the impending disaster, he went on. But it is exactly to electronic computers that one of the main roles is given in the "Strategic Defense Initiative" which provides for the development and deployment of an ABM system in space, the scientist said.

PRAVDA Article Assesses 'Tragedy'

PM301918 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jan 86 First Edition p 1, 6

[Article by V. Gubarev: "The Challenger Tragedy"]

[Excerpt] Unfortunately, the U.S. space research program was also involved in the arms race.

An ABC correspondent reported: "The Challenger tragedy has wrecked the plans of the Pentagon, which was to have carried out two secret missions involving reusable spacecraft in the first half of this year. However, the main victim of the catastrophe, a leading specialist of a New York special space research laboratory acknowledges, was Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative program, which relied very much on these vehicles."

Unfortunately the tragedy's main victim was not SDI but the seven astronauts. And, when mourning their deaths, we should learn the lesson of the impermissibility of "star wars." Yes, Challenger is a complex space system but it exploded because of a technical fault. And the SDI system is a complex set of satellites, battle stations, and spacecraft, the "glittering future of the triumph of technology," as its advocates write. But do they ever think that the slightest fault in that technology could cause a world catastrophe? And who can guarantee that such a fault will not happen -- after all, the SDI system can only be tested once -- during a world nuclear war!
"Let us imagine that the spacecraft had exploded in orbit with arms systems deployed in space," R. Bowman, director of the Institute for the Study of Space and Security Problems stated, "who could then have found out whether the explosion was caused by an on-board system failure or whether it had been destroyed by an antisatellite weapon? Strictly speaking, no one could find out since the computers controlling the arms system deployed in space would respond to the explosion instantaneously. They would issue only one command — to send those systems into action. This is one of the most likely ways that a nuclear war could start by accident...Mankind is now even more deeply aware of the terrible danger which the deployment of arms in space threatens the planet."

All the foreign news agencies report that America is deeply shaken by what has happened and that a period of national mourning has been declared. We Soviet people share the pain of loss with the Americans. The scientists, cosmonauts, and specialists who make space flights possible have expressed their condolences to their U.S. colleagues. The Challenger tragedy has shown once again the complexity of modern cosmonautics. But there is no doubt that the dead astronauts' work will be continued by their friends and comrades in the United States and the heroic conquerors of space in other countries. The progress of civilization cannot be halted and, while mourning the loss, it is necessary to continue going forward.

The Challenger tragedy has affected everyone in the world. Some courageous and heroic people have been killed and the best memorial to them would be a pooling of efforts in the face of that mighty and cruel space, which we are committed to use for the good of man, not to harm him.

TRUD Analyzes Explosion

PM311135 Moscow TRUD in Russian 31 Jan 86 p 3

[Excerpts] Washington, 30 Jan--The leadership of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has announced the official start of an investigation into the crash of the space shuttle Challenger and the death of its seven astronauts.

"Quite definite conclusions follow, related, specifically, to the "star wars" programme. An anti-missile defence system with space-based elements would require hundreds of tons more equipment than that carried by the Challenger. As a result, the system would become a hundred times more unpredictable," Gus Hall stressed.

This opinion is shared by many authoritative American experts who believe that the Challenger's crash is a serious warning to those who are planning to deploy weaponry systems in outer space.

Robert Bowman, director of the institute studying space and security problems, said that the administration's Strategic Defence Initiative programme provides for space deployment of armaments that are controlled and directed by computers.

By the way, studies recently confirmed by a special consultative commission of the Pentagon prove the impossibility of devising a control system that would reliably guarantee against malfunctioning and response to false signals. Just imagine, Bowman said, that a spacecraft explodes in orbit when arms systems are deployed in outer space.
Who can find out whether the explosion was caused by faulty equipment on board the craft, or it was destroyed by anti-satellite weapons? Well, no one would have to, since battle-management computers would immediately respond to the explosion. They would issue only one command activating corresponding systems. This is a likely possibility which is fraught with a nuclear catastrophe.

Bowman expressed the hope that the Challenger disaster would impel the architects of the "star wars" programme to realize the threat and would encourage the administration for constructive talks with the Soviet Union on nuclear and space armaments. Weapons should be kept out of space, Bowman stressed.

However, according to reports in the American mass media, the U.S. Defence Department, on the contrary intends to accelerate the implementation of its Strategic Defence Initiative. The CBS television network points out that the construction of a new launch site is nearing completion at the U.S. air base at Vandenberg, California. Using the new facility, the Pentagon and NASA will be able to launch up to 24 reusable spacecraft a year.

The CBS, quoting Pentagon sources, reveals that plans of the Defense Department, drawn up last year, provide for the construction of a new booster rocket in the event of a shuttle crash, which would cost two billion dollars.

THE NEW YORK TIMES reports, quoting Pentagon officials, that U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger issued a secret directive to the Armed Forces giving top priority to President Reagan's SDI programme among other Pentagon schemes. The newspaper stresses that the statement included into the annual secret defense directive attests to the Pentagon's determination to go ahead, come what may, with the "star wars" programme.

Zhokleber Commentary

LD301912 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 30 Jan 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Aleksandr Zhokleber]

[Text] Now let us dwell on the other, as it were, space aspect of the Soviet proposals. In connection with the U.S. "star wars" program which lies behind the mask of the Strategic Defense Initiative, in an editorial article today PRAVDA again points out that it is impossible to create a universal space defense. At best it is an illusion from the technical, economic and political points of view. But any space shield can be very easily turned into a space sword. At the same time it is naive to seek solutions for the security problem by improving one's shield and one's sword. In our times there can be no security for the United States without security for the USSR, no security for NATO countries without security for the states of the Warsaw Pact — without this there can be no universal security. This is now being increasingly frequently admitted in the West, too. London's THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, for example, writes that President Reagan previously asserted that his Strategic Defense Initiative would be a shield against nuclear weapons.
However, now, when the USSR has proposed a total elimination of these weapons, such an argument is no longer valid.

Similar statements can now be heard on the other side of the Atlantic, too, even though, as THE WASHINGTON POST put it, the U.S. Administration continues to be paralyzed by the Moscow statement.

The broad discussion which has begun in the United States, especially in scientific circles, on this problem has taken on a new and dramatic aspect in connection with the disaster which befell the Challenger space shuttle. The reasons for the disaster have not yet elucidated, even though a search group and a multitude of commissions of experts are engaged in this. [Video shows U.S. television clips of NASA officials and search for wreckage]

Some of this recalls that the launch of Challenger and of the other similar vessel Columbia before it had been postponed several times due to all sorts of malfunctions. There was not always enough time to rectify them as the launches were following one after the other.

The CBS Pentagon correspondent has reported that NASA cannot keep up with the demands of its main client, the military, which is continuing research in the sphere of the SDI. The correspondent reported that this might lead to the possibility that the number of flights reserved by the military, which is currently 10 per year, could be doubled.

Even now, after the Challenger disaster, demands are being heard in Washington that the implementation of the military space program must not be halted in any circumstances. However, at present many Americans, and by no means just these horrified students from the college where Christa McAuliffe, one of the members of the Challenger crew, taught, [video shows spectators watching launch disaster] are trying to understand the essence and the scale of what has happened. For example, THE WASHINGTON POST cites one of the scientists working in the Pentagon about the unreliability of the computers which were unable to prevent or to report on the Challenger disaster. What would have happened if this had been a military flight or, even worse, if it had had weapons on board as planned by the authors of all sorts of "star wars" plans? [Video shows shuttle explosion]

And, judging by everything, even now they do not intend to give up their plans. UPI today reported that in a directive from Defense Secretary Weinberger the "star wars" program is presented as of equal importance to the programs for the modernization of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces and even acquires, as he put it, top priority.

Belitskiy Examines Tragedy

LD310152 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 30 Jan 86

[Station science correspondent Boris Belitskiy Commentary]

[Text] First of all, there is something our science correspondent, Boris Belitskiy, would like to say on behalf of all of us here at the studios of Radio Moscow:

The news of the terrible tragedy that overtook the space shuttle Challenger and its crew of seven, including two women, has stunned us all, as it has people here generally. These feelings have been expressed in a message of condolences from the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, to President Reagan.
As a nation that pioneered space exploration and pursues a vigorous, multiprunged space program, we, too, have had space casualties and we, therefore, appreciate how deep is the sense of bereavement on the death of heroes exploring that new and dangerous environment, and we extend our profound condolences to the families, friends, and colleagues of these seven heroic men and women.

But there's also something else that has to be said, if only briefly on this sad occasion. The loss of these seven lives, as profoundly tragic as it is, could be completely overshadowed by casualties on a far, far greater scale. As you've probably heard, computer experts were baffled on Tuesday about why none of the five onboard computers detected anything wrong with Challenger's operation until the instant the craft exploded. Now just think of the endless number of computers it's proposed to involve in the administration's "star wars" program.

What if they detected nothing wrong during the testing or deployment of space strike weapons until it was too late? It would, therefore, be of immeasurable benefit to humanity if, in mourning the loss of these seven heroes of space exploration, more and more people came to realize how vital it is that outer space be kept an arena of peaceful research and applications, that it be kept weapon free. It is with this thought in mind that many people salute Challenger's intrepid crew.

Soviet Press Treatment

PM301441 [Editorial report] All Soviet central daily newspapers for thirty January report the explosion of the U.S. space shuttle "Challenger" prominently on their main foreign news pages, with IZVESTIYA's morning edition, TRUD, and SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA also reproducing a TV shot of the smoke trail in the sky following the disaster. PRAVDA first edition and IZVESTIYA morning edition both front-page General Secretary Gorbachev's brief message of condolence to President Reagan.

In varying degrees of detail the papers report the events surrounding the shuttle crash, the scene at mission control, reactions among those present and among the wider U.S. public, and the already emerging debate on the causes of the "major malfunction" and the dangers of manned spaceflight in general. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's early edition, in the briefest report of all, attributed to TASS, notes without comment President Reagan's pledge that "the U.S. space program will continue." KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, SELSKAYA ZHIZN, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA, INDUSTRIYA, and the government paper IZVESTIYA stick to reporting the facts, with IZVESTIYA notably emphasizing the human stories involved and taking a sympathetic tone in reports from its correspondents L. Koryavin and A. Palladin under the headline "Tragedy That Has Shaken America". Palladin concludes his dispatch: "As the local TV stresses, one of the first condolence messages to the American people came from the USSR Embassy in Washington."

Other papers, in contrast, are not slow to point up the shuttle program's SDI connection and the implications for it of Challenger's loss. Reporting from Washington for the trade union paper TRUD, correspondent A. Burmistenko writes: "As today's WASHINGTON POST writes, the Challenger explosion also affects in the most direct fashion the interests of the Pentagon, which 'uses the shuttle's considerable load-carrying potential for launching large reconnaissance and communications satellites and also for carrying out experiments in the sphere of President Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative," better known under the name "star wars."""
PRAVDA's V. Gan, in his page five dispatch from Washington, waxes indignant: "Although you would think that the spectacle of people dying, as it were, in public would emphasize the acute need for mankind to pool its creative efforts in the difficult task of peacefully exploring outer space, there were figures in Washington who deemed it possible to champion its very rapid militarization. 'Sources in the Administration and Congress,' THE WASHINGTON POST observes in this regard, 'have expressed the hope that the Pentagon's part of the program will not suffer seriously as a result of the explosion.'"

TASS correspondent M. Knyazkov also refers to the "star wars" connection in his page three New York dispatch for the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA first edition: "In the middle of the day President Reagan appeared on TV screens. He said that America was overcome with grief. He also said that the United States would continue its program of space exploration. But the major question underlying many commentaries is: What could the notorious "star wars" program have in store for the world when, according to Pentagon designs, strike arms are to be deployed [prazmeshcheny] in space?"

"Today the conquest of space still entails tremendous risk. But what kind of tragedy could result for mankind from a total 'malfunction' on a space strike station?"

"Undoubtedly Americans will be asking official Washington this question again. And undoubtedly the Cape Canaveral tragedy will not stop mankind making further efforts in the peaceful exploration of outer space. What is important, however, is something else. The Challenger tragedy has clearly shown that space must be an area for peaceful, and only peaceful, cooperation among people."

Earlier in his report, Knyazkhov backs his concern over "malfunction" risks by citing a CNN interview with "American expert (G.) Williams" — also cited in other press reports — to the effect that "NASA 'has not studied the technical aspects of flights by reusable craft carefully enough.'"

The harshest tone in initial Soviet central press comment on the shuttle disaster is adopted by the youth paper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA — one of the latest papers to publish each day — in its thirty January edition. In a Washington dispatch by TASS correspondent A. Lyutyy on page three titled "Tragedy in the Florida Skies" the paper refers to suggestions that "NASA has become too confident of the infallibility, perfection, and reliability of shuttle-type craft and has begun unwisely speeding up the program."

"NASA representatives," the report goes on, "are blaming the Pentagon — they are saying that it is the military department, which has reserved the lion's share of flights for itself, that is urging us on. Will the tragic lesson be heeded? Hardly. As THE WASHINGTON POST writes, 'Administration and congressional spokesmen are expressing the hope that Pentagon participation in the space program will not be seriously harmed.'"

"Once again, for the umpteenth time, plans for the feverish militarization of space are gaining the upper hand over common sense, over concern for people. Another question is being asked here too: How reliable will the President's system of ABM defense in space, as described by the head of the administration, prove to be? Shuttle-type craft constitute an integral part of that system, after all. What if a disaster of this kind happens again? What if carelessness, technical defect, or simple accident pitch the world into an unintended nuclear war?"

"America, numb with grief, awaits an answer from the White House to these 'confounded questions' of the space age."
'Obvious Dangers'

OWO10940 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1145 GMT 31 Jan 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by I. Fesunenko]

[Text] Hello comrades. The tragedy of U.S. spacecraft Challenger and its crew — as a result of which you know seven astronauts perished — will not be removed soon from the pages of newspapers and TV screens. This is understandable. The United States has been shaken. Sympathies and condolences now come to Houston and Washington from the entire world. Mourning continues through the United States. Flags are flying at half mast. Cinemas have closed. The search for remnants of the spacecraft continues. From morning until evening U.S. television carries interviews with agitated, shocked and sad Americans.

I would like to draw your attention to a commentary of THE NEW YORK TIMES which has reported that computer specialists are at a loss over the fact that none of the five computers on board the Challenger manufactured by the U.S. IBM Company — computers which had stopped so many launchings — this time failed to register any malfunction up to the very time of the explosion. As THE NEW YORK TIMES has noted, the computer system on board multi-use spacecraft for a long time has been praised as one of the greatest attainments of U.S. technology. Lately, writes THE NEW YORK TIMES, they have constantly been referred to as proof that the industry has actually mastered the very complicated programming of computers, something that is essential for controlling the system of the anti-missile shield which the Reagan administration has proposed to create.

Whether or not we want to admit it, we must still face one fact. The Challenger tragedy has exposed the complexities of space experiments, and revealed the presence of obvious dangers involved in the hasty and massive onslaught on space which has now been started by Washington in the form of SDI. The assertions of THE NEW YORK TIMES observer (Borfy) consequently appear all the more strange and without foundation when he admits that the tragedy at Cape Canaveral will greatly slow down all the work, including the launch schedule, of the space shuttle program, but and I quote, will not have a great effect on the President's plans for creating an anti-missile shield envisaged on the SDI.

In this connection there may be some truth in the supposition of Thacker, the scientific observer of THE GUARDIAN, who writes that the U.S. Defense Department has imposed stricter demands on its shuttle-type spacecraft missions program to obtain greater returns from the program and reduce times between missions. As a result, writes THE GUARDIAN, the interests of security may have suffered. By the way, a similar view has been expressed by the chief editor of OMNI, a U.S. scientific-technical magazine.

Further on, THE GUARDIAN draws a parallel between the shuttle program and the "star wars" program although he does not name the latter directly.
The world of space technology, writes THE GUARDIAN, remains a world of terrible unpredictability, even though politicians speak about some kind of brilliant future triumph of technology, about the time when a complex set of satellites and lasers will make it possible to open, in the face of a threat amounting to the total extermination of humanity, a gigantic umbrella of security and confidence over the entire continent. They are talking about an undertaking of tremendous scale and complexity. And we saw nothing even remotely similar yesterday, writes THE GUARDIAN, when we watched the tragic search for remnants of the spacecraft off the Florida coast.

Feeling that precisely such a reaction, such an attitude of distrust can now be brought about by Reagan's SDI plan, the director of the organization dealing with the implementation of this program, General Abrahamson, reports THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, met top congressional leaders just a few hours after the disaster and asked them to prevent the disaster from affecting the implementation of the SDI project. Local specialists think that his visit to Capitol Hill was dictated by the anxieties of Pentagon chiefs that the disaster will increase the skepticism of legislators concerning the "star wars" program and lead them to refuse allocating funds to the Pentagon for its implementation.

After that, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, speaking in Detroit, stated unambiguously that his department will strive to get legislators to agree to allocating new funds for the implementation of the "star wars" programs and the creation of offensive space weapons. According to his words, the continuation of work within the framework of the notorious SDI is one of the most essential tasks of the Washington administration.

Disaster Prompts Reagan Remarks

LD311826 Moscow TASS in English 1815 GMT 31 Jan 86

[Excerpts] Washington, 31 Jan (TASS)—Judging by the president's remarks at the Conservative Political Action Conference dinner, the administration intends to leave unchanged the main directions of its foreign and home policy based on starting a new round of the arms race, this including spreading it to outer space, and on pursuing a policy of state terrorism in the international arena.

The explosion of the Challenger prompted many scientists and observers to call for a lesson to be drawn from this tragedy which demonstrated the unreliability of American space technology on which the Pentagon counts so much in the fulfillment of its plans to militarize outer space. They also stress the extreme danger of the very concept of the Strategic Defense Initiative. One of these people, the director of the Institute for Space and Security Problems, Robert Bowman, noted in an interview to an American television company that had a computer-controlled strategic defense system been deployed in space today it would have treated the Challenger explosion as evidence of "enemy attack" and would have put into action the entire huge arsenal of space weapons.

The disaster with the Challenger, the scientist went on, should make the administration aware of the danger and prompt it to conclude an agreement with the USSR on the non-militarization of outer space.

In his turn, columnist James Reston said that Americans belonging to both parties have begun to realize that they are dealing with a weapon that is capable of blowing up the world and which is beyond their control however hard they try.

It appears that the White House, the Pentagon and the other apologists of "star wars" view such sentiments as a mortal danger to their brainchild.
Tragedy Causes Doubts

[Own correspondent G. Vasilyev dispatch: "Thoughts Following the Disaster"]

New York, 31 Jan -- The press continues to seek an answer to the question which perturbs the United States: what happened in the sky above the Kennedy Space Center on 28 January, why did the space shuttle explode 75 seconds after launch?

Here there are more questions than answers now. Deliberating at length about the inevitability of losses in a complex and risky enterprise like space exploration, calling on the nation to "unite in shared sorrow," and declaring that the implementation of space programs will continue come what may, official spokesmen avoid substantial answers and are unwilling to go into details of the specific tasks of Challenger's last flight and the cargo it was carrying on board. Americans have not overlooked the fact that the Coast Guard command is particularly concerned with the search for some kind of "green tin canister" among the space vehicle's debris. "Anyone touching it will be dead within 2 seconds," a command spokesman announced. People here are asking whether this canister could contain some kind of a new explosive which was to be studied in zero-gravity conditions on the Pentagon's orders.

According to THE WASHINGTON POST'S explanation, the U.S. military department is the main force urging on the shuttle flights. "The Pentagon," the newspaper writes, "is using the space vehicle's considerable capacity and load-carrying ability to put into orbit major reconnaissance, communications, and meteorological satellites and to conduct experiments on the presidential Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), in other words the 'star wars' program." The newspaper recalls that in February 1985 President Reagan confirmed an agreement between NASA and the Pentagon, under which the military department is allocated one-third of all shuttle launches.

On the day when the U.S. watched with horror how the space vehicle that had only just been launched into the blue sky turned first into a ball of fire and then into a snow-white cloud, THE NEW YORK TIMES published a document "slipped" to it by the Pentagon — the "defense guidance." In this document, which has been "leaked to the press," military department chief Caspar Weinberger declares that the SDI program "must enjoy the highest priority" and that it will not be affected by a single one of the appropriation cuts planned by Congress.

Now, after the Challenger disaster, many people here have doubts not only as regards the organization of this particular flight, but also about the general direction of U.S. efforts in near-earth space, primarily the plans to deploy space weapons.

The Challenger disaster dealt a blow against one of the main postulates of the champions of the "star wars" program — the technical feasibility of creating [sozdaniye] an "impenetrable ABM defense" which, it is claimed, would render nuclear weapons obsolete and would ensure peace all over the world. If this could have happened to a relatively well-tuned and proven space vehicle, how is it possible, people ask, to expect faultless performance by the multiplicity of ultra-complicated systems designed to control space platforms, nuclear charges, laser guns, and other "exotic" weapons which are to be "suspended" above the globe in accordance with the SDI program? Is this not the way to a universal disaster?
The Challenger explosion, Congressman George Brown declared at a Washington press conference, has shattered any illusions that the absolutely flawless equipment envisaged by the "star wars" plans could guarantee U.S. security in the event of a nuclear war. Charles Hayes, another member of the U.S. House of Representatives, said that space programs must serve not military rivalry, but the peaceful needs of all mankind.

Mourning the dead astronauts, Americans are pondering over events and thinking about the main question of our time, the question of preventing war and safeguarding peace.

Explosion Hurts SDI

LD011607 Moscow World Service in English 1400 GMT 1 Feb 86

[Aleksandr Pogodin commentary]

[Text] There have been further comments in the world media about the explosion in which the American astronauts aboard the space shuttle Challenger were killed. In many comments, the disaster in the sky over Cape Canaveral is viewed in direct connection with various aspects of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, or the "star wars" program to put it simply. More on the subject from our commentator Aleksandr Pogodin. This is what he writes:

It is legitimate to put the issue in this way: The arguments of the supporters of this program are ultimately reduced to the fact that the program as much as guarantees protection against nuclear missiles, and in this way will make nuclear arms useless and redundant. According to reports in the U.S. media, though quite contradictory, the star wars plans provide for filling space with highly complex technical-military devices of various types, the interaction of which must be absolutely reliable. The idea is to develop a sophisticated system, that is devoid even of the slightest malfunction.

But do such guarantees exist? It is a fact that the Challenger's reliability had been tested before each successive flight, to rule out a possible malfunction of any component or unit. And yet a horrible disaster did occur. As for the "star wars" system, if it is developed, it will be several times more complicated than the Challenger system. Specialists believe that the degree of its reliability will be rather low.

Now what does that mean? In the opinion of the director of the Institute for Space and Security Studies, Robert Bowman, an explosion of a space ship in orbit after systems of armaments have been deployed in space would activate computers and only one command would be given to put the systems in action. As the American scientist feels, this is a rather probable accident that could bring about a nuclear war. He underlined that humanity realized even more deeply now the terrible danger to the planet posed by the deployment of arms in space.

It that truth realized at last in Washington? Will the proper conclusions be drawn there?
U.S. Technology Questioned

LD022119 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 2 Feb 86

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by "Novosti" political observer Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Text] Hello comrades! Television provides viewers if not with the illusion of participation in the events shown then at least with the reality of experience with the participants. It is not without reason that at this time in America they remember the assassination of President John Kennedy when television brought to the world the terrible reality of that U.S. tragedy. The death of the U.S. cosmonauts last Wednesday cannot fail to arouse a feeling of grief. Viewers saw them taking up the watch in space, saw them going optimistically to the space ship which the proud name Challenger and they did not know that the television cameras would engrave them on its magnetic memory for the last time. Among them was the teacher Christa McAuliffe, born in 1949, chosen from thousands of candidate teachers to conduct lessons from space by television. These shots went out throughout the world. The United States is in mourning until Monday. Let us give the seven who perished in the impulse for knowledge their due. The ancients used to say that the path to the stars lies across thorns. Icarus tried to fly but he did not take account of all the possible dangers. The creators of Challenger also overlooked something: computers calculated to cope with all conceivable unforeseen situations on this occasion showed complete calm right up to the explosion. They were not ready for what happened. And apart from the tritely comforting thoughts about the inevitability of risk, thoughts and doubts which have significance for the future are now occurring to Americans. They write about excessive haste, as the U.S. space program has a driver — the Pentagon, the Department of Defense, newspapers write, was in a great hurry with this flight. Here is a quote: When a space ship has to be returned to orbit at the demand of the military literally a few monitor minutes this creates the most acute problems for technical monitoring.

And another doubt has arisen, and here I am again repeating what the newspapers say: The doubt consists in whether faith in the perfection of U.S. technology is really so justified. At the same time it is precisely this faith that lies at the foundation of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. Can one entrust the fate of a country and of the world to the computers of a system of antimissile defense? Something, somewhere, in orbit suddenly explodes and automatic space firing starts. And in contrast with what happened to Challenger, there will not be anyone to search for the fragments to explain the causes of the disaster. The well known observer James Reston writes for example: Washington figures have begun to realize that they are dealing with weapons which can blow the world up, and which, even with the most careful attention they will not always be able to control. Such is the grim lesson of the tragedy which occurred in the sky above Florida. This process of realization which Reston writes about has not yet touched the Pentagon. One can see this by the statements that the military part of the space program will not suffer as a result of what has happened. Military business aspires to retain the turnover and profits it has gathered. [Video shows crew of Challenger preparing for the flight, followed by Challenger exploding in the air, interview with Christa McAuliffe, and search for fragments of Challenger]
Charges of 'Callousness' Refuted

LD041258 Moscow TASS in English 1242 GMT 4 Feb 86

[Text] Washington, February 4 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko:

A White House spokesman has expressed feigned surprise and even indignation over the fact that media reports and comments on the disaster of the space shuttle Challenger point to the dangers of the "star wars" programme.

He voiced his anger at the Soviet press comments on the accident accusing the USSR of showing a "very callous approach."

Haven't they in the White House noticed that reports and comments of this kind, based on conclusions by experts, have appeared not only in the Soviet press, but also in the American media, in newspapers and magazines all over the world. The point at issue is that the Challenger disaster, as it is acknowledged by authoritative specialists and scientists, demonstrated the extreme unreliability of computer technology.

It is computers which are to control and direct sophisticated systems of space armaments that are intended for deployment in outer space in line with the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative.

The experts and commentators who thus displeased the White House proceed from the irrefutable fact that if computer-controlled systems are placed in orbit, no one can rule out a possibility of computer breakdown or response to a false signal, which will trigger off the systems trained on targets on Earth with all ensuing disastrous consequences.

In the United States, the warnings were issued by WASHINGTON POST analyst Mary McGrory, Director of the Washington-based Institute for Space and Security Studies Robert Bowman, Director of the Centre for Defence Information Admiral (Retired) Gene LaRocque, and many others. Moreover, the possibility was acknowledged in a report drawn up by the Pentagon-assigned commission of experts and scientists monitoring SDI progress.

DEFENSE NEWS, for instance, which is an American weekly, by the way, points out that such acknowledgements and warnings are not in the least groundless. The weekly published an article on February 3, saying that shuttle missions are directly linked with the implementation of the "star wars" programme. Before the Challenger disaster, the weekly writes, at least two shuttle flights had been planned that were to have carried out experiments wholly devoted to the SDI effort.

The weekly quotes Pentagon officials as indicating that despite the disaster, the U.S. Department of Defence is fully resolved to go ahead with the rapid realization of its programmes on the military use of outer space, including SDI.

Who then shows callousness? The experts and commentators who, while expressing sorrow over the death of seven astronauts, stress the fact that the implementation of the "star wars" programme is fraught with a global catastrophe and, therefore, demand that weapons be kept out of space? Or those who are exploring every opportunity to boost the programme, displaying readiness to continue risking not only the lives of astronauts but also the fate of all of mankind? The latest developments and logic itself irrefutably prove the correctness of the latter assumption.
'Complex Business'

PMO61335 Moscow KRAASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Feb 86 Second Edition p 3

[Excerpt] During the week of mourning, the defense secretary demanded in his usual easygoing manner that "persistence should not be relaxed" in implementing preparations for "star wars."

Needless to say, the Pentagon chief's statements sounded blasphemous to millions of Americans. Robert Bowman, director of the Institute for Space and Security Studies, stressed that the "Strategic Defense Initiative" that is being expedited by the President envisages the deployment in space of hundreds of "platforms," satellites, and other systems crammed with computer-controlled laser, particle beam, and nuclear weapons. This bundle of death is getting out of man's control. And therein lies the chief danger.

Imagine, Bowman said, that Challenger had blown up in orbit at a time when numerous arms systems had been deployed in space. Who would be able to tell if the cause of the explosion had been a "technical accident" or if it had been destroyed by an antisatellite laser cannon? Today many people are expressing this alarm for the fate of peace. In connection with the Challenger disaster there are mounting calls for the need for a more realistic and sober approach to Reagan's so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative."

The tragedy in the skies over Florida has again demonstrated the danger of the course of space adventures. It is clear to all sensible people that ridding the planet of the terrible burden of nuclear arms, as was stated in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is inconceivable without simultaneously removing the danger threatening mankind from space.

Yes, space is tough and still conceals many dangers. Cosmonauts and astronauts themselves admit that their work is difficult and risky and that it requires a high level of professionalism. John Glenn -- the first American to orbit the earth -- stated at this tragic time that "there is no room for the elements of a publicity show in this extremely dangerous business."

There really must be no propaganda trickery. Americans criticized the flamboyant campaign that was the result of the competition sanctioned by the President among more than 11,000 teachers for a "trip into space." There is also a great deal of talk about the 500 people who are vying for the right to be the first journalist in space. A nasty taste is also left in the mouth by such hardly appropriate details as the following: The cost of the program to train the teacher Christa McAuliffe for the flight was $75,000 and before the launch her life was insured for $1 million.

Official circles avoid talking about the cost of servicing and overhauling reusable shuttles. And an increasing veil of secrecy is being drawn over the events of 28 January. However there is a precise figure for the cost of Challenger -- $1.2 billion. "The development and first phase of the use of the space transport system," Professor J. Van Allen of the University of Iowa reported, "has cost the taxpayer $30 billion."

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The fact that space programs require more and more spending is entirely explicable. It is a complex business. And highly difficult too. The question is whether those efforts are channeled into good or evil. The U.S. astronaut Edgar Mitchell expressed the following thought: "We must find a constructive spirit of cooperation in order to exploit powerful space technology exclusively for peaceful purposes. We must be very vigilant and ponder to what end we work in space and to what end we carry out our scientific research."

One can only agree. I must recall that this appeal was voiced by Soviet people in October 1957, the very day that the space age started.

Computer Unreliability Demonstrated

LD041258 Moscow TASS in English 1242 GMT 4 Feb 86

[Text] Washington, February 4 TASS — By TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko:

A White House spokesman has expressed feigned surprise and even indignation over the fact that media reports and comments on the disaster of the space shuttle Challenger point to the dangers of the "star wars" programme. He voiced his anger at the Soviet press comments on the accident, accusing the USSR of showing a "very callous approach."

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Who then shows callousness? The experts and commentators who, while expressing sorrow over the death of seven astronauts, stress the fact that the implementation of the "star wars" programme is fraught with a global catastrophe and, therefore, demand that weapons be kept out of space? Or those who are exploring every opportunity to boost the programme, displaying readiness to continue risking not only the lives of astronauts but also the fate of all of mankind? The latest developments and logic itself irrefutably prove the correctness of the latter assumption.

'Eye-Opener' to SDI Danger

LD031618 Moscow World Service in English 1410 GMT 3 Feb 86

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] The causes for the disaster of the space shuttle Challenger and for the death of its crew are being cleared up. Details from our commentator Yuriy Solton and this is what he writes:

The Challenger tragedy witnessed, thanks to television, by scores of millions of people, have set many people to serious thinking. American space hardware, advertised as the most perfect in the world, has proved to be not so perfect. The triple back-up safety system that operated in the computer-crammed Challenger failed to work. Even greater disaster was barely averted when the solid fuel boosters of the shuttle were falling on populated areas. They were destroyed from the ground just in the nick of time.

Now picture to yourself what might have happened if the space shuttle had carried on board a combat laser unit activated by a nuclear explosion. Yet it's with the help of exactly such spaceships, space shuttles, that Washington plans to test and to put into orbit laser and other weapons under the "star wars" program. The Challenger disaster has served as an eye-opener for many people to the danger of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, which can jeopardize the life of who nations, even of the entire humanity, if its complicated computer systems malfunction.

Now what has been official Washington's reaction to such a warning? The Pentagon has hastened to declassify its new long-term defense directive calling the SDI the highest priority. A deputy United States defense secretary, Richard Perle, did not think the Challenger disaster would have any negative effect on the work under the SDI program. United States Vice President George Bush said his country would never renounce the SDI at the arms control talks with the Soviet Union.

The newspaper LOS ANGELES TIMES has reported that the draft federal budget for the next fiscal year, prepared by the White House, contains over 50 percent higher spending on preparations for the "star wars" to the tune of $4.3 billion. As you can see, Washington refuses to contend with the danger posed by the "star wars" program to all nations.

Pro-SDI Forces Callously Exploit Disaster

LD041258 Moscow TASS in English 1242 GMT 4 Feb 86

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Implications Explored

PHO51611 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 5 Feb 86 p 3

[Own correspondent A. Petruk dispatch under the rubric "We Report Details": "The Challenger Tragedy: Questions Without Answers"]

[Text] New York -- On the same stands near the launching pad at Cape Canaveral where friends and relatives of the departing astronauts sat on the morning of 28 January, 3,000 Kennedy Space Center employees gathered for a ceremony to mourn and honor the memory of the Challenger crew who perished.

Then a helicopter took off into the cloudy skies and headed out to sea where at exactly 1139 hours -- the time of the space shuttle's explosion -- it dropped a wreath containing seven white carnations onto the waves.

A search for wreckage from the shattered Challenger continues day and night in the waters of the Atlantic over an area of several thousand square miles around Cape Canaveral. More than 1.5 tons of twisted metal, control panels, tubing, and electrical equipment have already been recovered from the ocean bed. However, no personal effects or human remains of the astronauts have been found so far.

Until the causes of the disaster are clarified, the three remaining space shuttles -- Columbia, Discovery, and Atlantis -- will be fettered to the earth for an indefinite period. Experts estimate that the investigation could take from 5-12 months.

But will the military agree to wait that long? As THE NEW YORK TIMES noted with reference to the latest Pentagon document entitled "Defense Development Policy," President Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] is of "paramount importance" and cannot be suspended or subjected to any budget cuts. And yet, as recently as 30 October 1984 President Reagan put his signature to Joint Resolution No 236 of both houses of the U.S. Congress which stated that "the extension of the arms race into space is not in the interests of any state."

In his statement in connection with the disaster and the U.S. space program, President Reagan said: "We have no secrets, we do everything openly." Facts tell a different story. At least 3 of the 15 flights of the multiple reentry vehicle planned for this year were secret, having been paid for by the Pentagon. As Congressman George Brown said at a press conference after Challenger's destruction, 70 percent of the experiments under the space program pursue military aims.

Might it not happen that as a result of the catastrophe and the need to make up for the time lost during the investigation, the Pentagon, the White House agreement, will "take over" future space flights and transform NASA into one of its departments?

Following the Challenger catastrophe, U.S. concern over the "star war" program has increased. After all, essentially, SDI will rely on even more complex technology than that used during the space shuttle flights. What if it suddenly fails? Democratic Senator Frank Lautenberg, member of the Senate subcommittee on space, declared that everything that has happened to Challenger raises the question: "are we entitled to believe that the SDI program can go on?"
These misgivings are further corroborated by the preliminary findings of the investigation into the catastrophe.

While the flames engulfed the booster rocket, Challenger's computers were transmitting 3.1 million signals per second in respect of 25,000 parameters to the earth. For the sake of comparison, this information would be sufficient "to write" a 30-volume encyclopedia in... 40 seconds. When the flame which had developed unexpectedly became clearly visible on the screens of the telemeters on earth, the computer VDUs, summarizing the information coming in from Challenger were printing out the words: "Flight successful, all systems operating normally." Only when the explosion rang out, did this information stop coming in.

According to experts, the "star wars" program computers are to be approximately 100-times more reliable than those used currently in the "shuttle" program. They are to operate without the slightest hitch during at least 10 years of tests. Is this realistic? Many scientists say: "No."

"One failure in 25 flights -- this is not a very impressive indicator," a DAILY WORLD editorial notes. "Of course, space flights will never be 100 percent safe. This does not mean that we should halt space research. It only intensifies the need to stop the militarization of space. Just imagine what could have happened had there been nuclear weapons on board when Challenger exploded?"

"Space flights and exploration must continue but not for the sake of "perfecting" monstrous means for the mass destruction of mankind. Space flights must enrich our lives by exploring the unknown."

In this context a long article by the well-known U.S. writer and scientist Carl Sagan, published in the latest edition of the weekly PARADE under the title "Let Us Fly To Mars Together" is deeply symbolic. It describes the history of the Soviet-American joint Soyuz-Apollo mission and argues that joint space research and flights to other planets must become the alternative to the "star wars" plans.

"Many decades ago, Mars attracted the attention of the Soviet scientist and pioneer of space exploration Konstantin Tsiolkovsky and his U.S. colleague Robert Goddard. The rockets which they devised were not designed to destroy life on earth but to convey us to other planets. Are our peoples not obliged to use technology for good rather than evil, bridging the distance to Mars and beyond, for the good of every human being?" — this is how Carl Sagan poses the main question in his article.

"I would like to write a report about how the U.S. "shuttle" docks with the Soviet "Salyut," how a new international crew is working under a new program for the peaceful exploration of space, how a gigantic space station is being built in orbit where an international interplanetary manned spacecraft is assembled and takes off for Mars and how Soviet and American guys make the first footprints in the red sand of Martian deserts," — this is a quote from an article published in our newspaper 14 July last year and reproduced in PARADE.

The Challenger catastrophe and Carl Sagan's appeal: they are separated by a gulf termed "star wars." Will it be possible to bridge this gulf? This is another question which clamors for an answer.
Washington -- The NASA leadership is predicting with increasing certainty that the next shuttle program launch may take place as early as June. Right, so the reason for Challenger's loss has finally been revealed, the faults in the assembly of the craft eliminated, and conclusions drawn?

Wrong on all three counts. Although 15 tons of various objects have been recovered here, some human remains found, and a film showing the Challenger launch from the side where the destructive flames were has come to light, no one is able to state categorically that the picture of the catastrophe is clear. All that can be said with certainty is that NASA overestimated the reliability of the solid-fuel boosters and consequently removed their sensors.

Why then, that some people are rushing to resume the flights of the three remaining NASA shuttles? Or is (J. Li) (a leading space hardware specialist), who has called the loss of Challenger a catastrophe unparalleled in human history and who has advocated the most thorough investigation of its causes, mistaken? And surely NASA itself predicted just the other day that an inquiry might take many months, and even years?

I will begin with the fact that on 3 February NASA...was removed from the investigation.

Instead, by presidential decree, a new commission to investigate the circumstances of the loss of Challenger was set up, a commission headed by former U.S. Secretary of State W. Rogers and ex-astronaut N. Armstrong, the first man to set foot on the moon. They have been instructed to submit within 4 months -- to be precise, by June as earlier mentioned -- their ideas on how to avoid similar accidents in the future. There is no question at all of curtailing or at least suspending the shuttle program. Therefore, in light of this and other factors, you are inevitably drawn to conclude that certain circles here are extremely interested in Challenger flights being resumed as quickly as possible.

It is an open secret just who those people are.

Take NASA, whose leadership has for a year now been literally begging for appropriations for its activity, especially if the work affected its civil program. Hence, the strange -- to an outsider -- "outings" on board the shuttle which NASA started arranging from last year on, including nonprofessionals among the astronauts. There is, however, nothing strange about it: It is a typical publicity stunt designed to persuade people that the as-yet essentially "untried" shuttle craft is fully operational.
Naturally, the Pentagon has its own interest in the flights resuming as quickly as possible. The Challenger accident threatens them, according to THE BOSTON GLOBE, with a glut of military spy satellites.

Nor can the White House wait to hear again the shuttle's call signs for outer space: In the next few years the shuttle craft are to become the main means of putting prototype space weapons into orbit. It is clearly no coincidence that THE WASHINGTON TIMES, reading the administration's mind, has assured people that the Challenger catastrophe will in no way affect "star wars" preparations.

**Exposes SDI Weaknesses**

LD062051 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 6 Feb 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Igor Fesunenko]

[Text] It is difficult not to recall the Challenger disaster: How unreliable and shaky the mirage of a cosmic umbrella over the United States, which Washington is proposing, seems in the light of the tragedy. Indeed, it would appear that the super-fast, super-clever, and the particularly reliable computers on Challenger were not only unable to prevent the 28 January catastrophe of the spacecraft, but they even failed to warn that it would occur. And who can guarantee that, when they are put at the service of this so-called umbrella, such systems will prove to be more rapid and reliable?

That's the first question; the second one is this. Imagine that all is OK with the computers and they won't let you down. Let's suppose that a similar mysterious and completely unexpected and unpredictable disaster should happen to an American craft deployed in outer space and to part of this proposed space umbrella, or with an aerospace aircraft crammed with armsments. One might ask: Where is the guarantee that such a disaster would not be instantly interpreted by computers as an act of aggression, an act of subversion, or an act of sabotage on the part of a supposed enemy?

And who can be entrusted, as a consequence of this, to ensure that a system of retaliatory measures is not put into effect?

Quite a few questions like this are being raised, and they are being raised not only between you and I. The well-known American sociologist (Perrow), author of the book "Normal Disasters in Life in Conditions of High-Technology Risk," wrote recently that President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative would increase 100-fold the danger of an accidental, unpremeditated outbreak of a nuclear war. If a shuttle spacecraft can suffer a disaster, then an immeasurably more complex system is doomed to a failure which could lead to the destruction of mankind, this scientist wrote.

One more very unseemly detail came to light during the investigation into the Challenger disaster. It seems that even up to the very last moment its crew did not suspect the deadly danger hanging over them, since no warning signals appeared on the instrument panel of the spacecraft. This was reported by Lawerence, a NASA spokesman, speaking at the Lyndon Johnson Manned Spacecraft Center. But, Lawrence said, even if the astronauts had found out in time about any defects in the operation of the launching system, they would not, it appears, have had any chance to save themselves. The UPI agency explained that this statement runs counter to NASA's previous claims that the Challenger crew, had they known about the danger in time, could have separated it from the launching system, and (rejected) to the ocean or on to the Cape Canaveral runway. According to Lawrence, the Challenger computers did not enable this to be done since they were not programmed properly.
Yesterday, television companies showed an amateur photograph, released by UPI, on which can clearly be seen a tongue of flame leaping from the body of the right-hand solid rocket booster, just above the nozzle. This supports the view that it was this very defect in the booster which led to the explosion, to the destruction of the spacecraft and the death of the crew. However, NASA, as before, refuses to make any official statements on this subject. Yesterday evening it became known that the special charge destined to liquidate the fuel tank had been raised from the ocean bed. Thus, it has now been eliminated from the list of possible causes of the disaster.

The ABC television company has reported the start of work by a special presidential commission to investigate the circumstances of the Challenger disaster. Here we can see a representative of this commission. The television company noted that so far its members have no idea of where to begin this work.

At the same time NASA management has begun a propaganda campaign aimed at obtaining additional funds for the construction of a spaceship to replace Challenger. This will cost approximately $2 billion.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

IZVESTIYA PUBLISHES SEMEYKO ARTICLES CRITICIZING U.S. SDI PLANS

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[29 Jan 86 p 5]

[First part of L. Semeyko article under the rubric "SDI -- What Is It?": "Attack Plus Buildup" -- First paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] In the White House this program is called nothing less than the "Strategic Defense Initiative," SDI. And it is asserted that the program's objectives are "exclusively defensive," aimed "only at the elimination of nuclear weapons," and moreover that it is only a question of "harmless research." Is that so? "Yes!" Washington insists. The implementation of the "star wars" program, as it has rightly been christened in the United States itself, continues. So we will evidently have to keep on coming back both to the content of this program and to the "arguments" invented on the banks of the Potomac to justify SDI.


Mankind could and should greet the year 2000 with no nuclear weapons on earth. Under a peaceful sky and cosmos, without the fear of annihilation. Only then will people have firm confidence in their own survival and the continuation of their species. Of course, it is not easy to achieve this. But real opportunities exist. Routes, signposts, schedules for each stage, and a machinery for comprehensive disarmament are defined on a large scale and comprehensively in the Statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The elimination of nuclear weapons is indissolubly linked with the prevention of the creation [sozdaniye] and deployment of space strike arms. The former is inconceivable without the latter. It is important for everyone to understand that after all, this question is now in the forefront of the political struggle. We are up against the thinking and policy of those who would like to put the resolution of the problems of space under lock and key, doing this supposedly in the interests of peace. Some people in the West are inclined not only to support, but actively to inflate the U.S. Administration's groundless thesis that the implementation of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) will strengthen peace and security. It will strengthen them, they say, because it will make it possible to eliminate nuclear weapons, since a nuclear attack will become pointless with the creation of an antimissile shield. Thereafter it would, perhaps for centuries, fulfill its defensive functions against those "fanatical madmen," as Reagan puts it, who might decide to use nuclear weapons for blackmail.
The formula publicized by the advocates of "star wars" -- SDI -- is: defense against nuclear weapons, plus their subsequent elimination. Another -- sober and objective -- formula can be set against this: SDI is not defense, but attack plus the buildup of nuclear arsenals. That is the assessment shared by thousands of military-political experts in dozens of countries, the majority of western politicians and public figures, and millions of those who assess at its worth the true nature of honey-tongued space defense demagoguery. What is the basis for this assessment? There are a whole series of arguments here.

First. Defense of any kind has the most meaning when it is capable of effectively resolving the tasks facing it. But the whole point is that an antimissile defense will not be able to fulfill the function of defense against nuclear weapons. Even supposing that "defensive" space strike arms incorporate military-technical achievements based on new physical principles. Supposing that this defense is on a large scale -- in terms of the area of territory covered, the density of arms and combat hardware, and the all-embracing nature of various backup measures. Supposing, lastly, that not $1 trillion, as is now being suggested in the United States, but $2 trillion or even more go to the creation of an ABM system with space defense echelons. The result will be the same: the system will not have 100-percent reliability. Whatever breaks through its echelons will inevitably lead to catastrophic destruction. After all, we are talking about nuclear weapons, not the tanks or planes of the last war.

Second. The supporters of SDI would like to avoid catastrophe, reducing U.S. losses to an entirely "acceptable" level. How?

By all appearances the United States sees two answers to this -- the politico-diplomatic and the military. The politico-diplomatic answer (and Washington is proposing this at the Geneva talks for fruitless theoretical discussions) is to carry out a reduction in nuclear arsenals together with the deployment of an ABM system with space-based elements. It is stated that agreement must be reached on principle about this at once. But the Soviet Union rejects this path.

As M.S. Gorbachev has stated, people must not count on our helping the United States, with our own hands, to weaken our strategic potential. The opposite will happen: In order to restore equilibrium the USSR will be forced to improve the effectiveness, accuracy, and might of its arms.

The military answer, which is given by the hotheads in Washington and which is by no means of a theoretical nature, consists of something different: It is, they say, possible to radically reduce the number of missiles and warheads breaking through the American ABM defense system and thereby reduce their own losses only by means of a preliminary first (disarming) strike against the other side's nuclear missile bases.

The strength of the Soviet retaliatory strike will then be reduced, so to speak, twice over. First by mighty offensive strikes against missile bases, then by defensive strikes in space against the surviving means. The U.S. physicist Frank Von Hippel expresses this "logic" thus: Since the ABM system cannot in itself serve as a reliable shield, "there is far more sense in using it as a supplement to a first-strike capability than as a shield against a first strike" (let us mention in passing that the USSR has no intention of making such a strike).
But this approach to the purpose of the large-scale ABM system displays, in the last analysis, a clearly offensive nature, not a defensive nature. It is a question of disarming the USSR. It makes no difference where this disarming action is carried out (on land, in space, or in the atmosphere) or how. And that means that the declared defensive purpose of the ABM system which Washington plans to deploy is in fact fictitious. In reality it is a question of a gamble not on defense, but on attack on an unprecedentedly large strategic scale. In the more remote future this gamble will be further strengthened, when, according to the Pentagon's calculations, the potential arises for making a strike from space against strategic targets on land and at sea.

Third. People in the United States now are becoming increasingly aware of the idea that reliable ABM cover for the country's entire territory is unattainable even with the use of lasers and beam weapons in space. That is why the administration is to all appearances already inclining toward the idea that "for the time being" it is necessary to seek to create a "roof" not over all U.S. territory but only over nuclear missile bases. In the Senate recently, Lieutenant General J Abrahamson, the leader of work under the SDI program, called for the need to "retain the possibility of deploying a limited ABM potential in the very near future." And (J. Yonas), a leading scientist in the field of the "star wars" program, claims that this will secure the best "deterrence" opportunities for the United States. Let's put it more precisely -- the best opportunities to "intimidate" the Soviet Union with the possibility that the U.S. will deliver not only the first but also all subsequent strikes. And once more these are by no means defense calculations. Nuclear means of attack covered by a space "shield," and sophisticated means at that, will become even more dangerous.

Statements about "defense" are just as unfounded as promises to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons by shifting to the "defense." The real gamble is on preserving nuclear weapons. More, on building them up. Otherwise why speak today of cover for regions of the future deployment of the sophisticated MX missiles, each of which has three times more warheads than the present Minuteman-3 missile? Would they not like to cover the MX with a space shield because these missiles are a typical first-strike weapon?

Fourth. It is difficult not to call talk of the "subsequent" (after the implementation of SDI) elimination of nuclear weapons demagogic if you also consider an aspect that is not often given coverage -- U.S. policy in the field of the production of fissionable materials (fuel for nuclear ammunition). In the first 20 years after the war the United States stockpiled so much nuclear material that in 1964 it was able to suspend the production of highly enriched uranium.

New nuclear charges were produced at that time using obsolete ammunition and existing stockpiles. But now the production of fissionable nuclear materials is being resumed. Work on the creation of nuclear weapons, of the "third generation" this time, is underway under 22 (!) programs, according to U.S. press reports. Why? "We need new warheads with new characteristics even if we succeed in ensuring arms control for at least the next few decades," R. Wagner, the defense secretary's assistant for atomic energy, replies. This aim directly contradicts the widely billed official purpose of the proclamation of SDI -- "freeing the world from nuclear weapons." It runs counter to the Soviet position: In 1982 the USSR suggested halting the production of fissionable materials for producing nuclear weapons. Now it also runs counter to the USSR's specific plan for nuclear disarmament for the next 15 years.
Fifth. The questions of "eliminating" nuclear weapons with the implementation of the SDI also remains hanging for one further reason. SDI is aimed at destroying missiles with their warheads. But what about the bombers which deliver the nuclear weapons, what about the cruise missiles, nuclear artillery, and as they are called in the West, "suitcase bombs" -- nuclear, of course? After all, they remain outside the space shield's laser or any other impact! Of course, they could be eliminated under an accord and irrespective of any particular potential of SDI. But the question arises: If these nuclear means could be destroyed sometime later, why can we not embark on the destruction of all -- and that means all -- nuclear armaments right now? Why create a shield costing many billions or even trillions only "later" to destroy nuclear arsenals? Would it not be simpler to act directly and not via an expensive and dangerous ABM detour? Figuratively speaking, it is hardly sensible to travel Vladivostok to get to Leningrad from Moscow.

Sixth. Finally, regarding the thesis of the "nuclear madmen" who, Reagan asserts, could blackmail the world in the future. Of course, the question of "third" countries possessing nuclear weapons in the future is a serious one. The danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is obvious. But must it be prevented by creating an ABM shield? Of course not. In any event connected with the arms race -- on the bilateral and multilateral plane -- action inevitably causes reaction. The creation of a shield could in fact encourage not only the creation but also the buildup of nuclear swords in "third" countries. Another path is needed -- the consolidation of the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the attainment of a universal agreement that nuclear weapons will never be resurrected after being eliminated.

But it is a shield expedient against accidental, unsanctioned nuclear missile launches (this argument is frequently cited in the West)? The answer would seem to be yes. But at best a shield would be a superfluous luxury. Far less technically complex measures could be used against such launches. Political measures are also important. As is well known, the USSR has already undertaken to renounce first of all nuclear weapons. In accordance with this undertaking an even stricter framework is set up in organizing stringent control ensuring that the unsanctioned launch of nuclear weapon is ruled out. The United States and its nuclear allies could take the same path.

From the viewpoint of political and strategic logic, the United States' "Strategic Defense Initiative" thus cannot be called defensive. It is a case not of a defensive shield but of a political screen behind which an attempt is being made to forge one more keen sword for unarming [mech obezoruzhivaniya]. And that is what intensifies concern for the destiny of the strategic stability which exists at present and for the destiny of international security.

[30 Jan 86 p 5]

[Part two of article by L. Semeyko: "A Course Aimed at Destabilization" under rubric "What is SDI?"]

[Text] What effect would realization of the "Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) have on strategic stability? This is essentially the central question. Preserving strategic stability is an essential condition for preserving peace in the nuclear age. And that is why it must be strengthened in every way possible. Any shaking of its foundations will make peace far more fragile.
The U.S. Administration tries to convince everyone that the concept of "star wars" is a "great blessing" in the matter of ensuring strategic stability. An antimissile shield in space will remove forever, they say, the desire to launch nuclear missiles. Peace will no longer rest on the threat of nuclear destruction and will consequently become more reliable and secure.

Well, it would be fine if everything went precisely like this. But in actual fact the situation appears far more complex. The celestial mirage of "still firmer" strategic stability evaporates on close examination of this issue. It is no accident, we must suppose, that the authors of the rather voluminous Pentagon report to Congress on SDI (1985) preferred to avoid analysis of the question of mutual connections between SDI and stability. But the nature of these mutual connections is such that it is arousing growing alarm everywhere.

First. Perhaps it would be possible to begin with a pronouncement made by U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger: A Soviet antimissile defense, if it is created, "will create the necessity to increase our (U.S.-L.S.) offensive forces and improve their capacity to overcome Soviet defense systems." In other words, the chief of the Pentagon directly admits an objective fact (this, incidentally, rarely happens with him): The creation of defense weapons will cause a buildup of offensive weapons in response. We also recognize this fact. We not only recognize it, but sound the alarm in advance: A qualitatively new arms race will be extremely dangerous in its consequences. It will inevitably destabilize the situation and increase the threat of the outbreak of war.

However, the leaders in Washington have a different approach. Simplified, it could be formulated as follows: If an ABM system is developed above the United States, the Soviet Union would do well to initiate a radical reduction in its strategic offensive potential, but if an ABM umbrella system is developed above the Soviet Union, the Americans should immediately increase their offensive arsenal. This, at least, is how Weinberger puts it. A very strange approach, to put it mildly, if one regards it from the standpoint of equality and justice, which U.S. leaders themselves urge. If one takes the official U.S. approach as a whole, it is based on the fact that a certain combination of reduced offensive weapons plus newly created strategic defense weapons and the "balance" between them must strengthen strategic stability.

But what kind of "balance" regulated in the U.S. way can be discussed if the measures taken by one side will inevitably lead to countermeasures by the other, followed by counter-countermeasures? There is an obvious lack of logic in the U.S. position. It is not accidental: The realization of SDI is a conscious course aimed at an uncontrolled increase, rather than a coordinated curbing of the arms race. The latter, as is well known, has never led to anything good. It is precisely the arms race that is capable of destabilizing the strategic situation to the greatest extent by introducing to it more and more new elements of tension, right up to the appearance of a most acute situation.

Second. SDI also runs counter to the idea of maintaining the existing strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. The mechanism of this balance is complex and delicate. It not only directly concerns the sides' security interests, but also includes an account of a multitude of different indicators. For 15 years now, this balance has looked like an approximate equilibrium of strategic offensive potentials, even if the structure of these potentials and the potentials of the various offensive weapons are not at all identical. It is important that the military and technical problems of this balance have long since been "pigeonholed" and repeatedly analyzed by each side; now the difficult task is to substantially lower the level of this balance without upsetting it.
But realization of SDI would overturn all existing ideas on the balance of forces and even on the possibilities of reducing nuclear arms. The strategic balance would truly become strategic chaos. It would be extremely difficult to determine whether the balance was being maintained or not, because not only the offensive components of the balance would have to be taken into account, but also the defensive components -- no longer deployed on a limited scale, but on the broadest scale possible -- and, what is more, in their interaction with one another. An extremely unclear situation would arise. It is difficult to imagine all the dangerous consequences if one of the sides were ever to gain a vital edge in something. The Soviet Union has never aspired and will not aspire to this. The situation is more complex with the United States. On the one hand, it was stated at the Geneva meeting -- and this is a positive step -- that the U.S. side will also not aspire to gain military superiority. On the other hand, however, there are no signs of even a deceleration of the flywheel of Washington's gigantic military programs. In these conditions, with the realization of SDI not only even greater asymmetry in the makeup of the sides' strategic forces could arise -- which would make analysis of the correlation of forces extremely difficult -- but the threat of the strategic balance being violated as a whole would also become obvious. Such a violation -- real or even mistakenly taken as real (chaos is chaos) -- would automatically signify the undermining of strategic stability. And the undermining of stability is the undermining of general security.

Third. Assessment of the strategic situation would also become extremely vague. U.S. research, in particular, cites possible scenarios of the very process of obtaining these assessments. Side A, for example, could consider itself "better" covered by a space-based ABM umbrella and consequently, in a crisis situation, would not hesitate to press the nuclear button. Side B, on the other hand, fearing a first strike against its territory and knowing it has "worse" cover, would be given the incentive to carry out a preemptive strike. Side A, foreseeing such a course of strategic analysis by side B, would try to hasten its own first nuclear strike. It is clear that in this "race into nonexistence" precisely nothing remains of strategic stability. Nothing, U.S. analysts point out, would also remain of it if each side were to believe that it is covered "better" (or "worse").

Of course, this is an abstract military and political analysis with all its inevitable shortcomings. But even it may be used by the hotheads in Washington: The logic of "side A" would clearly be to their liking if one takes into account the slogan of military and technical superiority which has by no means been withdrawn in the United States and confirmation, even since Geneva, of the necessity to have only "strong positions."

Fourth. Realization of the "star wars" program engenders and would engender in the future destabilization at every stage of its implementation. Indeed, even now, at the so-called "research and development" stage, the problem of nuclear disarmament is being called into question. In order to unblock this problem, the door through which weapons could penetrate space must be tightly shut. Shut at the very earliest stage. This would make it possible to keep the ABM Treaty in force, which prohibits (in Article V) the creation, testing, and deployment of sea-, air-, space-, or mobile land-based ABM systems or components.

This is a treaty of fundamental significance for the entire process of limiting and reducing strategic offensive weapons. Coordinated limitations on ABM systems are an inalienable part of Soviet-U.S. relations and negotiations as a whole. Washington's attempts to undermine the ABM Treaty with "harmless research" even today are having a negative effect on Soviet-U.S. relations and on the course of the Geneva talks. These attempts are laying the foundations for undermining strategic stability.
If we fail to place barriers in the way of the creation and testing of space-based strike weapons, the destabilization curve would suddenly shoot upwards at the next stage — with the deployment of space-based strike weapons. In addition to the aforementioned factors, others would also have an effect. They include the appearance of the possibility of suddenly knocking out satellites providing early warning of a nuclear attack. Even, accidentally knocking out these (particularly these) or other satellites could be regarded as an act of war undertaken by the other side. There is more. The militarization of space using the latest scientific and technical achievements would lead to still greater automation of the process of adopting strategic decisions in a crisis situation. The question "to be or not to be" would ultimately be decided not by man, but by electronic machinery — with all the extremely dangerous consequences of possible malfunctions in the functioning of extremely complex computer systems (it is calculated that just one control system for space-based ABM would have to process from 10 to 100 million units of information). From this standpoint we also cannot fail to perceive the main thing: SDI is really the prologue to the undermining of strategic stability.

Fifth. When examining the problem of strategic stability it is important not to forget that it must not be approached on a narrowly technical level, that is, from the standpoint of the effect upon it of various specific arms. It is not a matter of this or that missile or space-based strike weapon. The point is that Washington is beginning a qualitatively new round of the arms race, in both nuclear and space arms. It is beginning it in an attempt to level the close interconnection between them. This approach by the U.S. side is potentially dangerous for strategic stability. It is therefore all the more important to observe in practice the obligation reinforced in Geneva by the signature of the U.S. President, the obligation regarding the necessity of carrying out the tasks set out in the joint Soviet-U.S. statement of 8 January 1985. These tasks also include strengthening strategic stability. Achieving this is both possible and necessary. This depends to a decisive extent on whether we will succeed in preventing an arms race in space and halting the one on earth. This, in turn, depends on Washington's political will.

Strategic stability is a vital necessity. Essentially, it is a question of the decisive condition of maintaining security in the nuclear age — both national and general. In the situation taking shape, concern over preserving and strengthening strategic stability must not be the domain of only two great powers — the Soviet Union and the United States. It is a question of universal concern and universal responsibility. As indicated in the statement by M.S.Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee: "when it is a question of preserving peace and ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war, there can be no bystanders and nonparticipants. This is a matter for each and every one. Here the contribution of each state — large or small, socialist or capitalist — is important. Here the contribution of every responsible political party, every social organization, and every individual is important."

[31 Jan 86 p 5]

[Final article of three under the rubric "What is SDI?" by L. Semeyko: "Undermining Security"]

[Text] The U.S. refusal to give material form by means of concrete decisions and deeds to the task of preventing the arms race in space places the fate of international security under a serious threat. The time factor is especially important now, particularly in the context of the Soviet proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons on earth
within 15 years. The deeper the Pentagon falls into the chasm of militarizing space, the harder it will be to stop and even harder yet, to reverse the wheel of the space arms race and the interrelated nuclear arms race. And the more important it becomes to find a constructive solution — at the present stage — to the problems of security, which are the determining factor in Soviet-U.S. relations and international relations as a whole.

The U.S. leadership continues to claim that SDI will somehow strengthen security. The latter will no longer be based on the "balance of fear" of mutual nuclear destruction, but rather on the impossibility of achieving that destruction because of the existence of an untestable "nuclear umbrella." This is presented as virtually an innovative approach to strengthening security. But in the nuclear age this is the greatest deception.

First. An innovative approach to safeguarding security under modern conditions cannot be based on the priorities of the arms race or the buildup of strength. Everything has its limit. All reasonable limits to the buildup of the arsenals of war were passed long ago. It has become senseless to raise those limits in view of the ability we now have to destroy each other many times over. But it is even more senseless to try to get rid of the threat of that manifold destruction by a further stockpiling of the mountains of weapons. The saying "to fight fire with fire" is inapplicable to the security sphere. The sparks which that would inevitably produce may well kindle a world conflagration.

A truly innovative approach would be to reject the Stone Age thinking transferred to the nuclear age which envisages holding a heavier nuclear rock in one hand and a thicker space shield in the other. For the sake of preserving peace it is necessary to overcome the spontaneous elements of the nuclear race and rise above national egoism, tactical considerations, disputes, and discord in a readiness to halt nuclear confrontation by the end of the 20th century, in a readiness to really abandon the ambitious dreams of military superiority and be guided by the principle of having enough arms for defense purposes, and in accepting the idea of rejecting the first use of nuclear weapons, while it still exists.

Second. The solution of security problems in the nuclear age is inconceivable if its aim is to satisfy just one set of national interests, for all their undoubted importance. What is new in the present-day military-political situation is that it is no longer possible, as it once was, to strengthen "one's own" security at the expense of the "other side's." The opposite will happen: security — "one's own," the "other side's," and thus, world security — will be reduced. There will be inevitable countermeasures of a military character and an increase in tension with the threat of its developing not just into war, such as there has been around 15,000 times in mankind's history, but into a war leading to universal annihilation. Thus, one should not pin one's hopes on strengthening "one's own" security by creating an antimissile shield in space. From this viewpoint, too, as M.S. Gorbachev stated at the Geneva meeting, if the United States had less security than the Soviet Union this would not be of benefit to us since it would lead to distrust and would engender instability. It is quite clear that an analogous approach from the United States to the USSR's security is also needed here.
But that is what Washington does not realize. There is more than enough evidence of that based on many factors and facts. One claim — a comment by C. Weinberger in the Senate in 1984 — is an absolute classic. He said: "If we could acquire a system which would be effective and could render their (the Soviet Union's — L.S. note) armaments ineffective, we could get back to the situation we used to have, that is, when we were the only country with nuclear weapons."

So there you have it, security American-style. It is anything but identical for the two sides. This is in no way a form of security which precludes nuclear war. It could only be interpreted as security "achieved" by the United States after (1) a nuclear war during which the USSR's nuclear might would be nullified by laser beam strikes in space. If you try, albeit with great difficulty, to see a more "acceptable" implication in that comment it would be about security based on absolute U.S. military superiority.

But dreams of a modern monopoly along the lines of the U.S. nuclear monopoly now permanently consigned to the past (and that 40 years ago) are definitely not evidence of a new way of thinking in Washington regarding the approach to safeguarding security. The only difference is that whereas the former U.S. nuclear monopoly was based on its leadership in the creation of nuclear weapons, the monopoly now planned, according to the Pentagon's scheme, is to result from leadership in the creation of space-based AMB defense. A highly relative difference; it is true. The arms race is still a race.

Third. Security under an "AMB space umbrella," is a fictitious security also because this "umbrella," figuratively speaking, cannot fail to leak. A retaliatory strike, albeit reduced by several layers of ABM defense, would be destructive for the aggressor. It is not just a question of the well-known medical and biological consequences of nuclear explosions for all life, but also of the recently discovered and quite probably climatic consequences even with comparatively few explosions. Under these conditions it is truly blasphemous to talk about the security of the Americans, who would be condemned not only to incineration or contamination by radiation but also, as it now turns out, to be frozen in the intense cold of a "nuclear winter." And that despite the "salvation" of ABM protection!

Fourth. The implementation of SDI will not strengthen security at all since the self-deception that it is possible to "survive" can only prompt the United States to try to disarm the Soviet Union while it deems the time ripe. "The Strategic Air Command simply does not plan to act in a 'retaliatory mode,' that is, to deliver a nuclear strike only in response," U.S. researcher D. Ford writes. "In a real situation we will not think about whether to strike first or second," the former Pentagon employee stated. "We will think about whether to strike first or not to make nuclear strikes at all."

It is hard to say what the Pentagon's staffers will "think" about in a critical situation, but it is now generally recognized — and this is no exaggeration — that with the existence of an antimissile shield there will be more voices in favor of delivering a strike, the first strike, furthermore, among circles in the United States who will make the fatal decision. That is a warning signal for the whole planet. That undermines security.

Fifth: Inevitably this will also undermine European security — whatever the quality of the space ABM shield above the United States. The existence of "holes" in it, as already noted, may accelerate the fatal decision — which will also be catastrophic for the European countries. Nor can European allies of the United States feel secure in the other — unlikely — event that the "umbrella" proves reliable. Then the United States, pinning its hopes on "security," could decide on a nuclear strike with
even greater boldness. Once again the allies would be the losers. "The prospect of the deployment of an ABM system will bring Western Europe not security, but uncertainty and, by all accounts, even more danger," — that is the conclusion of well-known U.S. specialist S. Drell and his colleagues in recent research of theirs. Nor would the U.S. allies gain anything if Soviet countermeasures are taken into account.

There can only be one conclusion: The nuclear-space age inevitably dictates the needs for new political and military thinking. The resolution of the security problem exists primarily in the political sphere. Security can only be ensured on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, not under conditions of uncontrollable military rivalry.

Orienting oneself toward a security based on the feasibility of delivering a first strike with impunity can only lead to disastrous results for the United States itself. Such an orientation is impermissible.

A car racing fan would probably not give up racing if he was told that with each lap his chances of catastrophe increase by one in a million. But a country's leadership cannot decide to run "laps" in the arms race which increase even by one in a million the chances of the threat of destruction for its people and for all mankind. Furthermore, the implementation, as we can see, is by no means "one chance in a million." For that very reason the abandonment of the "star wars" program would be in the interests of both national and international security.

Today a radical review of the "star wars" concept and its replacement by the "star peace" concept would provide that foundation on which the productiveness of the next summit meeting would be based. The U.S. side has every reason to reassess SDI's illusory "merits." "It is our profound conviction that we should not enter the 3d millennium with the 'star wars' program, but with large-scale projects for the peaceful exploration of space using all mankind's forces," the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, says. "We propose engaging in practical work to develop and implement such projects. This is one of the most important ways of ensuring progress throughout our planet and of establishing a reliable security system for all." This needs political will, a love of peace which is not ostentatious, but real and the practical implementation of what was outlined in Geneva.
IZVESTIYA INTERVIEWS U.S. SCIENTIST ON SDI

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jul 85 p 5

[Interview with Carol Rosen by V. Kuznetsov in Geneva: "Carol Rosen: Stop the Fly-Wheel of the Nuclear [Arms] Race"]

"I came to Geneva in order to inform the participants in the Soviet-American negotiations of the point of view of those Americans who believe that space must remain peaceful, and kept free of nuclear weapons," stated Carol Rosen, president of the American Institute for Security and Cooperation in Space, in a conversation with this correspondent.

"The people await a clear answer: Will the push of militaristic trends into the space surrounding the earth be stopped? If the go-ahead will be given to the arms race at this stage, then militarization of space becomes irreversible, C. Rosen stressed. At the present time on our planet are accumulated more than 50,000 nuclear warheads which are capable of fully destroying civilization and all life on earth. And at this time the "Strategic Arms Initiative" promulgated by President Reagan proposes to increase and create a new generation of deadly weapons.

"We already have witnessed how major corporations are beginning work and conducting research within the framework of Reagan's program," continued Rosen. "Last year 16 major corporations received 1.4 billion dollars from the government for the military conquest of space. Hundreds of scholars, engineers and representatives of industry were polled by the Pentagon concerning their possible participation in the implementation of the "Star Wars" program. At the present time, the Pentagon has concluded 800 contracts with various organizations to develop space weapons. About half of the contracts in President Reagan's proposed program were granted to firms from "his state" -- California. And there is an additional bit of "exotic" information: the major firms and companies which were interested in receiving orders from the program for the development [sozdaniye] of space weapons, last year gave more than $900,000 to senatorial candidates during the elections.

"All this naturally causes alarm and anxiety. This is why thinking Americans and scholars are expressing a growing concern with the dangerous new turn in the nuclear weapons race and the attempt to achieve an illusory unilateral advantage with the help of the "Star Wars" program," says Rosen. "We still have time to reconsider, to stop the fly-wheel of the arms race, and not to allow it to spread into space."
"As a first step, we propose to the Reagan administration to immediately stop the financing of research in the area of the militarization of space, and introduce a moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite weapons, and to get as a way to achieve the quickest possible results in negotiations aimed at prevention of the arms race in space." "It is incomprehensible to us," stated Rosen, "why the American government does not respond to the proposals of the Soviet Union, agreeing that in the event of achieving an agreement prohibiting the militarization of space, a reduction of one-quarter or more on the installation of strategic offensive weapons could be proposed. It is incomprehensible to us why Washington rejects this initiative outright and labels as 'propagandistic' the proposals to maintain a reciprocal and all-around moratorium on the creation, testing and development of space weapons, and to freeze on strategic offensive weapons during the entire negotiation period.

"At the present time there is still the issue to improve the treaty base on arms limitation and to get new agreements between the Soviet Union and United States is based upon parity and equal security. This would be an important contribution to the reduction of military stockpiles. Our institute developed the proposals for the resumption of cooperation between the United States and the USSR on the question of the peaceful use of space. As we know, the 10th anniversary of the joint Soyuz-Apollo project will be in July. In our opinion, the joint flight of Soviet cosmonauts and American astronauts laid the basis of peaceful cooperation in space, which should continue to be developed even in the present conditions. The peaceful development of space will create new jobs and allow to redirect military industrial capacity toward civilian goals. It is not a simple road, there is no other alternative, no other way out for mankind, if we do not wish to burn in the fire of a space war," Rosen stressed.

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FRG GROUP SEES 'LIMITED' SPIN-OFFS FROM SDI TO CIVIL SECTOR

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 3 Sep 85 p 4

[Text] On "Anti-War Day" the SPD and the DGB have again called on the federal government not to participate with the U.S.A. in the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Economic and Social Science Institute (WSI) of the DGB attempts to demonstrate in a study that "space weapons" will not bring any spin-off technologies for the civil sector.

First the German government wants to wait to see what results the 30-man delegation led by Horst Teltschik, the Chancellor's foreign policy advisor, brings back from the U.S.A. on 13 Sep. The group travels to Washington this Wednesday (4 Sep). As the government spokesman Mr. Ost explained, the group is to sound out ideas in the United States about arrangements concerning industrial cooperation, particularly the property and usage rights and questions about industrial espionage security. Only after all questions have been satisfactorily answered will the German government consider "the form and contents of an eventual official government participation" in the SDI.

The CDU Defense Working Group came out in favor of entering into an independent European Defense Initiative (EVI). Its chairman, Willi Wimmer, announced to journalists that in conference over the defense budget in the parliament, the Union (CDU-CSU) would push for research and development funding for defense against short-range missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range weapons.

In any case, there must be an end to "simply just accepting whatever has already been planned out in Paris or Washington", and to the "lamenting over what the U.S.A. plans to do," stated Wimmer after his return from talks with American defense politicians in the U.S., where the American "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) was also discussed.

The Economic and Social Science Institute states in the justification for its thesis that "space weapons" will bring no advances for civilian industries, such as:

- The aerospace industry - with less than 100,000 employed, a very small branch of the air industry, and which has up to 60% of its sales to the
armed forces - has received the lion's share of public research and development monies (between 21 and 52% in the period from 1967 to 1979). Sensible projects of practical application in the civilian sector are as good as non-existent. The civilian showpiece of the German aerospace industry, the Airbus, which has received so much praise because of its technology, is an enormous loss leader in an economic sense. Up until now, not even half of the sales have been made which are necessary to cover the production costs.

The often-cited spin-offs from military development for civilian products is actually rather low, or signifies a nearly grotesque round-about way towards the development of economically useful products: technology developed for military purposes is far too expensive for civilian products, which are produced on a cost/benefit basis, because the "baroque pieces of armaments" are highly complex and technically overdeveloped.

Finally, a comparison between western industrial countries, including Japan, shows a negative correlation between military expenditures and economic growth: the countries with the highest military expenses had on the average lower growth rates in the productivity of manufacturing industries. A further comparison between the U.S.A. (where currently half of all public funds for research and development is going to military purposes, and this is increasing) and Japan (where only 2% of the public R&D funds are going to military research) clearly indicates that international competitiveness is not positively affected by increased efforts in the armaments field.

The WSI draws the following conclusion from its investigation: it is more sensible to set the priority in favor of civilian technology instead of the hope for civil trickle-down products from the military sector.
MEETING REVEALS SOME SUPPORT FOR EUREKA LINK TO MILITARY

Duesseldorf VDI NACHRICHTEN in German 18 Oct 85 p 10


[Text] The American President's defense initiative, which has become commonly known as SDI, is up front about serving military goals. The Europeans are trying to meet the technological challenge posed by SDI with the Eureka project, which is at the present oriented primarily toward civilian goals. At a discussion on SDI and Eureka sponsored at the end of September by the Academy for Political Education and Future Form, reg. Asso., in Tutzing, it became clear, however, that the French at least are not pursuing exclusively civilian goals with the Eureka Project.

The American Strategic Defense Initiative is an attempt to employ as yet to be developed technologies to destroy enemy intercontinental ballistic missiles on approach--to destroy so many of them so early that perhaps, according to the vision of the American president, it would be possible to catch them all.

Since both military blocks are faced off against each other in Europe and of necessity hold each other in check with weapons systems other than intercontinental rockets, the military, the politicians, and the arms industry also all agree that a new arms technology is needed for protection from this kind of threat. Consequently, the military and the arms industry are pressing for cooperation between the European allies as well as with the USA. In their opinion, the Eureka research and engineering program can be seen in close connection with a European defense initiative.

The two super powers began already 30 years ago to look for possible ways to shoot down nuclear-armed rockets before they would reach their own territories. Hence President Reagan didn't invent "Star Wars"; he only brought it up to date and emotionalized it by propagating it as the "solution" to atomic annihilation.

Reagan has asked for 26 billion dollars for the period from 1985-1989 to finance SDI. So far Congress has approved 4 billion dollars for 1985-1986, including 1 billion alone just for research into new laser systems. For Europeans these are nearly astronomical figures.

It would be easy to answer the question whether Western Europe should take part in the Americans SDI research—if the advocates' argument were the only
consideration: SDI is not just supposed to increase military security, it is even supposed to result in the elimination of all nuclear ballistics missiles in the long run. And finally—this is an extra carrot dangled in front of the Europeans—participation in the space defense system is also supposed to induce a quantum leap for science and technology in the old continent.

Gerd Schmueckle, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, spoke out in Tutzing for European participation within the framework of Eureka. In his opinion, the Americans will only accept the Europeans as equal partners if they supply funding for Eureka at least equal to what the Americans intend for SDI, and in addition if they would speak with one mind with the Americans. However, Schmueckle is correct in doubting that this can be achieved. Hence he is pleading more for a kind of European supplemental program with a supposed goal of increasing the proportion of purely defensive weapons in the Nato alliance in comparison to the number of offensive weapons. Defensive weapons are not only cheaper; a high proportion dedicated to a defense concept would have a confidence building effect. In the past no one has been able to achieve this kind of concept in the Nato Alliance because resistance from the armaments industry, which wants primarily to sell expensive and highly complicated weapons systems, is too great.

It is interesting in this context that Schmueckle also noted, "that the Soviet Union possesses a higher ratio of defensive than offensive weapons," in addition to the comment that "Nato is a frightfully awkward allied structure, which is also extremely awkward to reorient to a new defense concept."

Then a representative of the armaments industry illustrated how the weapons system cited by Schmueckle should be developed within a European framework. Starting with smart mines, which lurk behind hedges waiting for tanks, to tanks with high-performance laser cannon and remote-controlled drones, to satellite-controlled interceptor rockets, all the "good and expensive" stuff was well represented. The overall scenario posed the question as to what role remains for humans to play with such weapons systems. It looks like the war of the future will only take place on the video screens in the command bunkers.

Monique Garnier-Lancon, Vice President of the European Institute for Security in Paris and political security advisor to Jacques Chirac, presented the French view on Eureka. In France they see Eureka as a European defense initiative counterpart to the SDI project. Thus the French position is a clear contrast to that of the Federal Republic where Eureka is seen as a purely civilian research and engineering project. Interestingly enough, one main research point in the Eureka concept presented by Madame Garnier-Lancon involves "the psychology of the masses and of the individual." Monique Garier-Lancon's comment: "if the Communists don't conquer us militarily, they will to it psychologically," leads one to believe that this research emphasis is supposed to break down enemy images and hence encourage "moral fitness."

Reflecting on the meeting, it is apparent how closely and almost unassailably scientists, engineers and military people work together, but above all, how strongly the armaments industry is capable of promoting its own interests in this frame of reference. It was also obvious how uncritical primarily the
technical specialists attending the conference were in accepting the strategic military concepts—certainly with the ulterior motive that military research and development is the motive force behind the technical progress which should guarantee jobs and income. They think too seldom of an increasing weakness which affects all highly complex technical systems: The functions of a multi-layered defense system based on the most modern technology must be carefully and reliably attuned to one another. Human decisions are no longer capable of controlling the use of weapons systems like those included in SDI and possibly in Eureka. Humans have to surrender control to the computer; politicians have to delegate the power of decision to machines, and mankind becomes the handmaiden of the technical apparatus, which alone has the power of decision.

Is this what the much-acclaimed technical progress looks like? Instead of contemplating ever-more complicated weapons systems which degrade human beings to objects, should we not rather think about the content and background of something Research Minister Riesenhuber said, "Technology after all is not an end in itself, but rather an instrument to improve human living conditions"?
PRESUMMIT POLISH REPORTING ON SDI ISSUES

Administration Dissensions Over SDI

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 19-20 Oct 85 p 7

Article by Marian Podkowinski

A month before the Geneva summit there are serious disagreements in Washington between the White House and its opponents over the present arms policy of President Reagan and his Pentagon advisors. Between those who refuse to renounce further research and testing of missile weapons in space, and those who assert that the present policy represented by Weinberger may undo all the work done in reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union.

While State Department circles still believe in the possibility of reaching an agreement which would provide an opportunity to continue the Geneva talks within the framework established by the Gromyko-Schultz agreement, which Reagan himself sponsored and in that spirit talked with Minister Shevardnadze in Washington, circles close to national security advisor Robert McFarlane believe that nothing must be rejected, but that nothing should be conceded as far as the SDI program is concerned.

President Reagan supported this view in his latest radio speech, interpreting the ABM treaty of 1972 in a so-called broader context. In his opinion, the SDI program is not contrary to the ABM treaty, and for that reason will be continued. However, the legal interpretation of that treaty and the words of warning from the European NATO countries have put the Reagan Administration in an ambiguous situation.

A result of the uncertainty prevailing especially among jurists is Schultz's speech at a parliamentary forum of the Atlantic countries, which took place in San Francisco. Schultz tried to downplay the president's radio statement, saying that he did not intend to question the legality of the SDI program or McFarlane's interpretation, but tried to assure listeners that the ABM treaty would not be distorted or misused.

The controversy which has arisen on this issue has also provoked reactions in Congress, since the Democrats are planning to hold hearings on the legality of the SDI program under the treaty which Nixon concluded with the Soviet
Union. Referring to certain articles of that treaty, the Democrats assert that the testing, development and deployment of these weapons in space, on land and at sea is banned. The Russians knew what they had signed, say the Democrats. The present interpretation of the ABM treaty by advocates of the SDI is onesided and legally indefensible. This is admitted even by some of the President's advisors.

Translation of Soviet Work on SDI

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 19-20 Oct 85 p 10

/Article by Lech Kantoch/

/Text/ "Space for peace or for war? That question confronts mankind with the greatest urgency. And the fact that it has arisen is not the fault of the Soviet Union. The White House has put it on the agenda by beginning to develop space weapon systems for offensive purposes." Thus reads an excerpt of a publication of the Soviet publishing house "Progress" made available to the Polish reader by the MON publishing house.

This book discusses one of the most crucial questions of our time. It shows two political-military policies. One represented by the USSR, a state which has consistently wanted to use space for peaceful purposes, and the other one, pushed through by the United States, aimed at making space an arena for the arms race. This approach of the United States is especially dangerous for the whole world, especially if one considers that the plans to militarize outer space are not the only military program.

Previous experience has shown that the arms race has not strengthened the security of the United States or its NATO allies at all. Plans to win a nuclear war lose all meaning due to the inevitable nuclear retaliation. Thus it would be logical to ban further buildup of nuclear arsenals and work toward an agreement on their reduction and eventual elimination altogether.

The essence of the policy of both superpowers should thus be to not only maintain military parity at the lowest possible level, but also to take measures to build confidence between each other, thereby reducing tensions in the world. Meanwhile, American military circles do not intend to renounce their attempts to achieve superiority over the Soviet Union. The creation of offensive space weapons is aimed at "reducing the value" of the Soviet defense potential.

Calling the program to militarize outer space the "strategic defense initiative" is an obvious attempt to deceive people. The dangers which emerge from such a presentation serve to hide the real nature of the "Star Wars" program, and are intended to create an opportunity to satisfy the ambitions of American militarist circles. The United States not only does not intend to renounce the development of an ever more "powerful strategic triad," as Caspar Weinberger calls various types of offensive nuclear forces, but also wants space weapons which can serve as a "sword" as well as a "shield."
The essence of the threat posed by the American "Star Wars" plans lies in the fact that it would not, as some in the United States try to assure us from time to time, be exclusively a war in space, but, as we read in the publication, "an element of U.S. strategy aimed at preparing the way to unleash a nuclear war or to carry out a nuclear attack with impunity, and ensure itself the ability to exercise permanent blackmail against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the world."

The American administration is attempting to camouflage its plans, and is trying to convince world opinion that so far the project is only in the research phase. But the mere announcement of such a program entails serious consequences for the world situation, and especially for American-Soviet agreements. The announcement of major research in this area was already against the 1972 treaty, while present "research" has gone far beyond the theoretical stage, space weapon prototypes are now being tested in laboratories and testing ranges.

These "bricks of the final system" as Keyworth, a presidential advisor on science put it, costing around 60 billion dollars (the amount the United States intends to allocate to "research" to 1993) can be put into mass production, especially as the military-industrial complex has a stake in that. Hence the assurances from the White House that once the research is concluded the United States will renounce deployment of ABM weapons in space, are unconvincing.

In short, this publication concisely and accessibly presents one of the key international problems. Its value is increased not only by its tremendous topicality, but also by the clear and precise argumentation, many illustrations, tables and diagrams, which show, as Mikhail Gorbachev put it, that the struggle is over whether in the future mankind will have a "star peace" or whether it will be threatened by "star wars."

FRG Government Circles Oppose SDI

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 15 Oct 85 p 4

Article by Zbigniew Ramotowski

The American "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SD), also known as "Star Wars," has not only become a source of concern among the FRG public and the object of protests from the parliamentary opposition, but also a bone of contention in the Bonn Government camp. Recent days have brought to light substantial differences of opinion among leading representatives of the governing parties, and also confusion and anger in the cabinet itself.

An eloquent illustration of this situation was Monday's press conference at which the government spokesman, Friedhelm Ost, was bombarded with questions about the alleged "new promise" given to Bonn by the Washington administration. Chancellor Kohl gave an interview to the Welt am Sonntag, from which it emerged that the Americans allegedly would be ready to "renounce" the realization of the "Star Wars" program, since placing new systems in space would lead to a "drastic increase in the other side's offensive weapons."
That interview with the chancellor, which was clearly aimed at reassuring public opinion and preparing it for postponing to the end of the year the decision of the Bonn Government on the FRG’s possible official participation in SDI research, provoked unusually sharp reactions, not only from West German political observers. As American correspondents accredited here pointed out about the source of that "promise," neither the U.S. President, nor any of his secretaries or advisors has so far indicated Washington’s readiness at any time to renounce the space weapon program now being pushed forward.

The Bonn Government spokesman was unable to dispell the new confusion and disorientation. He limited himself to very general remarks on possible interviews with Washington envoys and to quoting the not very convincing document published by the U.S. Embassy here a few months ago. The helplessness of the journalists was confronted by the helplessness of their informant. Many factors indicate that the Bonn decisionmakers are also helpless and uninformed about certain questions relating to the SDI.

Their real concern has to do with another matter, which, as has been officially announced, is to be the subject of today’s (Tuesday’s) session of the NATO Council of Ministers in Brussels. Waiting for the American Secretary of State Schultz will be questions from Bonn on the recent statement by U.S. presidential advisor on security Robert MacFarlane, which has aroused much anger, to the effect that the Soviet-American ABM treaty of 1972 allows not only research on, but also the testing and production of, space based ABM weapons. That statement was a slap in the face to the Bonn Government, which based its initial support for SDI research and the admissibility of such research on earlier, different explanations and assurances of the U.S. Administration.

Especially Foreign Minister Genscher (FDP), clearly cautious about the "Star Wars" concept, urges Washington to take a clear and firm stand. The Federal Republic, as was stated by FDP Vicechairman Baum, must not cause the interruption of the disarmament talks.

The determined opposition of the SPD and the "Greens," the caution of Genscher and the FDP, and the positive but wait-and-see attitude of Kohl, are not the only view held on the Rhine regarding "Star Wars." In the view of some local politicians, especially the Christian Democrats, FRG participation in the SDI program is doomed from the start regardless of the immediate and strategic goals of Washington and the political costs of the enterprise in the international arena.
THE CPSU PROCEEDS FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT, HOWEVER GREAT THE THREAT POSED BY
THE AGGRESSIVE CIRCLES OF IMPERIALISM TO PEACE, WORLD WAR IS NOT FATALY INEVITABLE.
IT IS POSSIBLE TO AVOID WAR AND TO SAVE MANKIND FROM CATASTROPHE. THIS IS THE HISTORIC
MISSION OF SOCIALISM, OF ALL THE PROGRESSIVE AND PEACE-LOVING FORCES OF THE WORLD.
[Uppercase passage published in italics] (Draft new edition of the CPSU Program)

Fifteen years are now left before the next change of the millennia. Before we cross
this boundary of time, another 2 billion new inhabitants of the earth will be born and
yet another generation will have matured. What kind of relay race will that generation
receive from those who are shaping the present image of the planet? What awaits the
states, the peoples, and mankind in the foreseeable and the distant future? With what
will the irrepressible creative genius of man enrich them and of what will it deprive
them?

Contending among themselves, the fantasists come to resemble political oracles and the
politicians and sociologists come to resemble fantasists. The "great" bourgeois press is
filled with predictions for every taste. Television screens flicker at their multi-
million audience day after day. Contests for a world exhibition timed to be held in
2000 have been announced. The British are getting set to hold this exhibition. Per-
haps to prove that, contrary to popular belief, the children of Albion are not
pessimists.

The world of the 21st century is undoubtedly the major topic of all negotiations
conducted today by leaders of states and the background of all international confer-
ences regardless of their formal mandates. What will this world be like? What joys
will it enjoy and with what sorrows will it burn? When will man, penetrating the
hidden secrets of matter ever more deeply, comprehend the elementary composition of
parts in the whole?

It is merely an appearance that it is not difficult to compose a mosaic from individual
stones, the colorful map of the world from individual national colors. And the time
comes when one's own interests must be joined with the interests of others and the
simplest equalization turns into a nearly insolvable task. Here is an example. It is
impossible to count how many times oil has been a direct or indirect cause of armed
conflict. And now, too, it is at the top of the American list of "casus belli". But
it is enough to master the technology of nuclear synthesis, of conversion of hydrogen
into helium and the thirst for energy will be quenched forever.
And the abundance of energy will resolve many of the problems that hold back the
development of productive forces and the growth of prosperity of all peoples without
exception. If the states joined their scientific and technological potentials, as the
Soviet Union proposes, the road to the creation of a constellation of man-made suns,
mild of manner and responsive of heart, would be shortened by years, by decades.

And why have things stopped? It turns out that, before the Soviet tritium and the
American deuterium can be combined, it will be necessary to combine possibility with
reality. This is accompanied by no smaller difficulties because Washington's attitudes
are changeable to the point of uncontrollability.

The coming of the "golden age" had been promised to people as early as on the eve of
the present century. Then, too, exhibitions were held and fireworks were set off. But
instead of a "golden age" the peoples have been given two world wars and a multitude of
local and regional wars in which tens of millions of people have perished.

Who is guilty of this "fraud?"

Imperialism came on the scene. It appeared not to discuss human freedoms and rights
but to plunder, rob, and rape. Jargon and labels were different but the main character-
istics were greed and unscrupulousness in the choice of means -- U.S. imperialism was
in dispute with British, German, or any other imperialism and staked the claims to
"economic domination of the world, to control over peoples" ... with the sanction of
the "supreme."

Control, domination, hegemony also means subordination of others similar to oneself
and claims to the most lucrative and warm places. But if they showed no mercy toward
their own half-brothers, could they have welcomed the appearance of the world's first
socialist state? When they had not yet had time to let the oligarchy go on the
rampage to its heart's content and were already asked to make room? No, they are not
of those socially aware ones who would voluntarily yield the road to the progressive
and invest the concept of justice with the highest social meaning.

They welcomed us with bayonets. The answer to Lenin's Peace Decree were "crusades,
"blockades," "sanitary cordons." If the Land of the Soviets held out and protected its
national and class choice, it was not because anyone might have perhaps spared us.
They did not spare the Soviet Union in World War II or in the "cold" war that was in
its way also a world war. But socialism's base is too broad for anyone to be able to
 crush it and reject it. Of course, the fact that we know how to protect ourselves and
possess the necessary defense force has helped and continues to help us in this task.

We ask ourselves: What would our planet be like at the end of the century if, in their
time, the Western powers displayed less arrogance and a greater amount of good sense
and if they responded to the appeals from Moscow? We will not wink at the fact that
at the Genoa conference the representatives of imperialism overlooked the significance
of the program of international economic cooperation and general reduction of armaments
proposed by the Soviet delegation. Or, more precisely, they mistrusted the Bolsheviks
to such an extent that they did not find it necessary to try to grasp the essence of
our initiatives. However, the respectable "democracies," not to mention the repressive
military regimes, also did not spoil with attention the proposals of the "immature"
United States.
In 1933, F. Roosevelt, considering the arms race to be one of the causes of the "great depression," appealed to the participants of the Geneva conference on the reduction and limitation of arms to reach an accord on a significant reduction of military potential. The Soviet Union supported the United States. France expressed its objections. The United States repeated its appeal in 1934. The USSR again responded positively. This time Britain opposed the reduction of arms. In the situation that had developed it was important to break the trend by awaking the collective good will in the face of the gathering storm. However, in the summer of 1934 Washington, too, together with London, rejected the idea of general security and turned down the Soviet proposal (supported by France and a number of other states) to transform the Geneva disarmament conference into a permanently acting organ.

The war confirmed Roosevelt in his view that the arms race is incompatible with good neighborliness. Later he was to return to this idea more than once in negotiations with the Soviet leaders. Just before his death the president wrote the lines about the urgent need to learn to "live together and to work together on this one and same planet under conditions of peace." These are the words of his legacy which his successors condemned to desecration. The down fall of Fascism and militarism represented a sentence for all aggressions and all those who reach for world domination and for the policy of violence as such. For the second time after the October Revolution the international community was accorded a real opportunity to humanize the climate on earth. Having shouldered the main burden of the war, the Soviet Union needed peace as it needed air. The American intelligence service of various departmental subordination agreed that the USSR neither intended nor was able to threaten the United States. The same conclusions were reached -- independently from the Americans -- by the joint intelligence subcommittee of the British Committee of the Chiefs of Staffs. It only remained for others, too, to share our aspiration to peace.

But these others first and foremost, the United States concluded that the earth's globe, molten and heated to incandescence by the flames of the war, could easily be reforged into a mold that would suit imperialism. H. Truman and his administration set forth the concepts not of general peace but of "peace the American way," not of freedoms as they are naturally understood but of freedoms in Washington's narrow interpretation, and not of a stable world without military confrontations but of a world bristling with arms and torn asunder along the boundaries of the blocs. "It was due to the set strategy and not to any necessity," H. Gregg writes in his examination of Washington's postwar policy, "that the atomic bomb was assigned the main role in the United States' military planning in the summer of 1946. The bomb's growing importance in planning extended beyond the framework of military thinking."

What is true is true. The "strategy set by imperialism" dictated the course of the United States and all of its fellow travelers. The plans for employing the weapons that "extend beyond the framework of military thinking" predetermined Washington's position on any aspects of arms control and disarmament. "Our theory on determination of labor organization by means of production," K. Marx noted in his letter to F. Engels, "has not been confirmed anywhere more strikingly than in the man-killing industry." H. Gregg sees the "set strategy" as a "culmination of a new and hard logic that led to the terrorist bombing in World War II which had been initiated by the Axis powers but then advanced to the level of science by the (Western -- V.F.) allies." A "science" that, like General Vandenberg, proclaimed atomic blitzkrieg as being "moral" if it saves American lives. A "science" calculating, for instance, that all major USSR cities must be destroyed and 60 to 70 million Soviet people killed in the first half hour of the war in order to "crush the Soviet will for resistance."
Militarism does not represent a reaction to the socialist revolution because it had appeared in the world long before the latter. It is a product of the internal combustion of the capitalist system at the highest stage of its development. Just as the military-industrial complex in the United States is not a new formation introduced from outside but a specific variety of dictatorship of the monopolistic capital. If cancer is to be considered a form of anti-life, then militarism must be marked as an asocial excrescence that is hostile to any healthy society, a phenomenon that gives birth to such perversities as the "single integrated operating plans" that take more than 40,000 targets in the territory of the USSR and other states in the United States' nuclear sights, or as the effective field manual of the American Army (FM-100 S) that is oriented to striking the probable enemy with the "entire complex of nuclear, chemical, and conventional means."

In the mid-sixties the United States was hit by the first crisis of overproduction... of weapons. The conveyors of death were delivering weapons in such quantities that their storage itself became immensely dangerous. Life could not be squeezed into the "set strategy." Procrustes' bed was splitting at the seams. The policy of force, devised by Washington, reached a deadlock. Creating threats to other countries, the United States jeopardized its own future. It was necessary to think it over seriously, not for any altruism and not because of anyone else, but for purely utilitarian motives: Would it not be better to shift the emphasis to cooperation?

The fact that the Americans joined the efforts of the states that had already embarked on the course of detente made it possible -- without lingering on the periphery of problems -- to move to the core of problems, to the erection of the supporting structures of peaceful coexistence and joint security and to the assertion in international relations of the norms of equality and respect of mutual interests. The SALT I treaty, the ABM Treaty, and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War represented major landmarks on this road and a part of that necessary long process which is expected to make peace more than a mere utopia.

When and why did the process of relaxation of tension begin to slip and then stop and become finally reversed? Several explanations can be offered for what has happened. They have set their teeth on edge to such an extent that they are resorting to rehashing anti-Soviet statements more out of inertia than anything else. But if it suits those in Washington to seriously render account to themselves, they do not consider it necessary to hide the fact that detente was not considered a long-term policy line. It was only seen as a tribute payment to the current situation and demand, as a halt, and as a maneuver to gain time, but by no means as a renunciation of pretensions to exclusiveness and to "leadership" -- as H. Truman put it -- "in moving the world along the road on which it must be led."

For instance, it is now being stated that the United States consented to the conclusion of the ABM Treaty of unlimited duration because in 1972 it lacked a reliable and -- as far as costs are concerned -- acceptable technology of the struggle against ballistic missiles. At that time it was more advantageous to have the treaty. However, as a result of the appearance of new scientific facts and technological achievements, the rulers of the United States began to see the treaty as superfluous and even harmful.

Opportunism has once again been elevated to the level of principle. A utilitarian, consumerist view of international law and of one's obligations as a member of the community of nations is cultivated. Former Secretary of State A. Haig proclaims: "We have placed new limitations on the use of force by the Soviet Union and have widened the horizons of security for the free peoples and the peoples fighting for their freedom."
This is how they would have wanted it: They "widened the horizons of security" for
themselves and for that purpose they introduced Pershing-2 and cruise missiles to
Europe, set up dozens of new military bases in the immediate proximity of the socialist
countries, and set in motion the production of even more lethal systems of strike
weapons. This for themselves and for their own. As for the others, they are not
averse to lowering and narrowing down the very same "horizons" for them and they try to
palm off to them the security "of their own tailoring."

One would think that you cannot go any further. But the "society of unlimited
opportunities" knows no limits, and C. Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defense, is fight-
ing to make arbitrariness a rule. No agreements that in any way limit the freedom of
action of the Americans, no balance of interests because that presupposes consideration
of the interests of someone else, and no equal security and parity because that places
the United States and the USSR on the same level. To act according to circumstances,
"depending on specific cases," the secretary assures us that this is possible if
American policy is made completely unpredictable, a policy that throws everyone off the
track and causes disarray in the defense of all. By constantly changing its mind, the
United States will have the "initiative" and it is not so important that this initiative
will be basically counterproductive.

Briefly, the rising tide of the "set strategy" is once again observed, the strategy
pursuing the unattainable goal of adapting the world to the whims of Washington. And
beginning all over again and lacking real arguments, they draw on the "moral super-
iority" of the United States. From this "moral" position they proceed to claiming the
right to simultaneously act as procurators, judges, and court executors in relation
to the "less perfect" states and regimes.

American leaders are systematically suggesting to their audience that the arms on the
Western and the Eastern sides should be calculated differently and measured by a
different "moral" scale. For, even when Washington fraternizes with the devil, it does
so in the name of what is "good." Splitting the policy is an ailment that has been
diagnosed and described in detail long ago. Its name is the great power mania or
hegemonism.

Yes, the problem of problems of American policy is its unwillingness to recognize the
equal status of other countries and peoples. Can it be that Washington is tormented by
the ghosts left behind by the colonial empires that have sunk into oblivion? Equality,
that is, equality not confined to mere nods in its direction but a practiced quality,
is a serious matter. The Americans account for less than 7 percent of the earth's
population but consume 30 to 40 percent of its overall volume of natural resources.
"And since the world's resources are declining," H. Schiller has written in LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, "the all-planet system [vseplanetnaya sistema] is beginning to look like
a new frontier for exploitation by the Americans" the frontier where the task is to
come to an even more perfect "equality," an equality that has asserted itself in the
United States, the country that is famous for the fact that two percent of free
inhabitants of this "ultrademocratic" country own nine tenths of its resources.

It is certainly no accident that the toughening of the U.S. foreign and military
policies in the seventies coincided with the "oil crisis" and the terror that seized
the capitalist world -- and the paper equality suddenly grew flesh. It turned out that
the economic counterforces alone could not withstand the pressure. The reactionaries
of all colors launched a frontal offensive against liberals, pacifists, and other
"appeasers," demanding the restoration of America's "former might," the former correla-
tion of forces, and indisputable superiority.
"Their innate inclination to simplification" which, the eminent political scientist C. Hoffman notes, drives the United States' rulers to chronic errors, also manifested itself in this connection. It did not work out on earth. It turned out — just as it turned out for other hunters — that mankind could not be controlled by a bridle like a horse. Oh well, it is possible to throw the lasso from outer space especially if the preparations for "star wars" are combined with the development of a planetary race in offensive missile and nuclear arms.

The last remnants of differences between the United States' foreign and military policies are being obliterated. "In the sphere of foreign policy," Washington has declared, "we have initiated the restoration of our military potential." According to G. Shultz, diplomacy has become an instrument of force and a "limited war," as C. Weinberger states, "is essentially a means of diplomacy, an instrument of bargaining with the opponent." Militarism is penetrating the American way of life more and more deeply and — what is no better — it is more and more strongly gripping the way of American thinking. All in all, this is not surprising in view of the fact that for 4 decades the country has been made to expect the fatal strike from hour to hour, and assured that the only solution is to increase its muscles. "Peace based on force is not a mere slogan. It is a fact." This is what is persistently drummed into the heads of Americans. This "peace" in the American way is not violated by any "short-term invasions" (such as that in Grenada) that have happened and which, it has to be assumed, will not be prohibited in future either, depending on circumstances.

The "question of risk" has been the "key question of defense planning" for some time. "The critically important question is," the head of the Pentagon said recently, "what level of the threat of a catastrophic war can be considered acceptable." We add as a footnote to this that the "defense" deliberations of all past aggressors started precisely with this "key" and "critical" question. And in this connection U.S. military circles are making debatable the problems to which life has provided mono-semantic answers long ago not under the impact of any kind of external events but "as a result," we quote the secretary of defense, "of a wide overestimation... of our foreign policy and our policy in the sphere of defense."

The "wide" in this context means arbitrary. And so zealous that international treaties are turned inside out and prohibitions are used to derive the "permissions" for Washington to do whatever it takes into its head. The Americans lay claim not only to being masters of their own words but also of the words that belong to other countries and which form a part of the international law and order in order to turn upside down the meaning of the most elementary concepts, the most mono-semantic categories, and the most irreproachable axioms.

R. Reagan has spoken about an ideologization of international relations to the level of "psychological war" and about a "bold re-formulation of the principled moral difference between democracy and communism." To characterize the activities of the present administration Weinberger has used the term "revolution" meaning, judging by all available evidence, overturn [perevorot] or overthrow [nisproverzheniye]. One really has to be afflicted by a willful aberration of view to be able to recognize the arms race as a method of achieving "genuine disarmament," the United States' military superiority as a "stimulus" to bring others to the point of "voluntary concessions," and the militarization of outer space as a fire extinguisher against fires on earth. The "strategic prospect" for the survival of the human race "one a more solid basis than the prospect of mutual deterrence" has been revealed to the self-appointed leaders of mankind alone.
The President and his secretaries have turned the Strategic Defense Initiative into the cornerstone of their military-political doctrines. "We do not know yet," the SDI's apologists admit, "whether it is possible to develop [sozdat] an effective defense system." Therefore "prudence demands" that the offensive forces must be increased. This was stated by the head of the Pentagon in October 1985, sounding a disagreement with the optimistic expatiations of other members of the administration. In November the secretary added: "It is vitally important to ensure that we will be the first to develop [razrabotat] such a system (space-based ABM system — V.F.). For, if the Russians develop [razrabotat] it first, the result will be an extremely dangerous situation in the world. In that event the United States', Britain's, and France's nuclear means of deterrence would be reduced to zero and there would be nothing to prevent the Russians from making a successful first strike." SDI is the point through which they break all the existing security systems on earth and all the systems of international agreements that at present keep security afloat, be it effectively or poorly. It is unclear whether anything will come of it. It is possible that natural laws will stand the ground against madness and nothing will come of it. But they nevertheless continue to break. They not only try to impose new military technologies that will deprive mankind of peaceful outer space, too, but also to rehabilitate the philosophy of permissibility of everything and of disregard for all eternal values, principles, and norms.

At the November (1985) Senate hearings B. Scowcroft, one of the most widely read authors on military affairs in the United States, said: President Reagan's SDI has led to a situation where "in a certain sense we now have confusion in the sphere of strategy." His assessment is shared by J. Schlesinger, former secretary of defense. Answering the senators' question on what is the situation in "military strategy," he pointed out: "At present we do not have a military strategy." There are loads of weapons but only confusion in strategy: one can only expect harm from such a thundering mixture. They got themselves into this mess and they themselves are getting lost in the enigmas of its consequences. They only know that a "long transition period" will begin at the end of which there will be nuclear weapons and antimissile weapons and all other kinds of weapons. The only thing lacking will be security.

They further define it more precisely that the "transition period" will be the most restless and unstable period that will be fraught with all kinds of possible surprises and complications. This is understandable. The United States has started the SDI adventure in the belief that, being the first to venture into the militarization of outer space and throwing unlimited resources for this purpose, it would be precisely it, the United States, having risen above all others, that will decide who should be rewarded with greater security and who should be punished with lesser security. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, Washington intends to reduce the USSR's defense potential to zero and to simultaneously adjust its own first-strike system against which there would be no counterweight.

The intention, of which no analogy can be found in contemporary history, to bring the entire U.S. military machine to the level of permanent number-one combat readiness is the core of the SDI program and of the "modernization" program of that entire machine. This is a real war in peacetime. The intention now is to push this war to the utmost limits, the war initiated by the U.S. Administration in the 1946-47 period with the purpose of "increasing to an enormous degree the burden that would make the implementation of the Soviet policy and the functioning of the Soviet system more difficult."
According to Washington's plans, the "transition period" to peace, in which the United States will be the only holder of the sword and the shield and the state with a totally mobilized military-industrial base, will coincide with the transition of mankind to the new millennium. In that period the peoples will have the company of the Airland Battle-2000 doctrine, the FOFA doctrine (of carrying out follow-on strikes through the entire depth of enemy defense), the doctrine of "decapitation" of the opposite side in the initial stage of the conflict, and, finally, the "star wars" doctrine, for the time being only roughly sketched but threatening to turn — to borrow the image sketched by L. Leonov — into an "eyeless monster of hundred arms," each of them seeking its own booty.

A majority of people want the future to be better than the past. But as far as Washington is concerned, the main thing is neither a worse nor a better future but a future that will be more American. Both in the literal and applied sense. Explaining in his letter to TIMES [as published] his "Vision of America of 2000," R. Reagan expresses the hope to preserve a mighty and determined bloc of the United States and other Western countries and the capability of the United States to continue to rely on a "deterrence potential," having mastered the most highly refined technologies. . . . The President assures us that he is ready to shift to competition for the good of mankind if the Soviet Union accepts the American demands concerning... the arms race in outer space and on earth. And if the Soviet Union does not accept them? Then the "optimism and hopes, justified as never before," will not be realized.

It is an extremely difficult task to make the Americans admit that a world not divided into the blocs that are at loggerheads with each other, an earth not ringed with strike systems like Saturn with its rings, and the human genius programmed for purely peaceful tasks promise more cheerful prospects for all, including the Americans themselves. It will not be possible to solve this task as long as those on the other side of the ocean do not learn to accept white as white and black as black. So long as Washington does not acquire the art of correlating enormous power to constructive political and human goals and as long as it continues to seek its own advantage to the disadvantage of others.

It is the common duty and joint concern of governments and parliaments and of responsible figures of all world outlooks and religions to pass the planet to the coming millennium in a better shape that the shape in which we have received it. And it really is not much that is needed for this purpose: to adopt toward your near and distant neighbors the same attitude which you want them to adopt toward you; to learn that the best security for today and the future is to threaten no one; and to understand and admit that each newly added missile or ammunition charge does not add to peace but shatters peace and does not make mankind richer but poorer.

The Soviet Union has not proposed and does not propose anything else. Peace among people has been our choice since 1917. And a world without weapons, a world of honest cooperation has been our ideal.

There are no issues in international relations which could not be solved through negotiations if respect for one another and patience and tolerance are displayed and if ultimatums, ambitions, and arrogance are left outside the doors of the negotiating halls.

The USSR leadership concentrates its attention on constructive directions, on the search for a better and more peaceful world. This is so because what is involved under the present conditions is not only a matter of confrontation between two social systems but also a matter of choosing between survival and mutual annihilation.
The questions of war and peace and of disarmament control were at the core of the Soviet-U.S. meeting at the highest level in Geneva. For the present the American side did not show itself ready for major solutions that would equally consider the security interests of both powers and strengthen the strategic stability in the world. This is disappointing but it does not obviate the need for new efforts to stop militarism, halt the arms competition, and arrange joint actions for the good of the world. "The Soviet Union," M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in his speech at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "is a resolute champion of the development of international life in this direction."

The history of the forties should not be allowed to repeat itself, the forties when the matters on hand were given an inch and they took a whole mile. The volume of total expenditures of states for war and the arms race in this century is measured in trillions of dollars. If all these resources were thrown to Moloch to provide tangible proof that no systems or types of weapons can build the bridge to mutual understanding either along or across the gap dividing the peoples, then the lesson may be to advantage even though the learning was expensive. For, it is not obligatorily necessary to wait for pitch darkness to realize the value of light and it is not obligatorily necessary to bring on oneself the "nuclear winter" to value the delight or warmth.

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The international development in our period is passing through a difficult stage that is fraught with danger unequalled by any in past history. In a situation of tension and confrontation, the continuation of the accumulation of already colossal stockpiles of weapons of monstrous destructive power threatens a catastrophe of truly global dimensions. Mankind faces the choice: Either survival under the conditions of stable peace and general security, or destruction in the flames of a nuclear war.

A sharp turn from hostile confrontation to constructive cooperation is vitally needed. The interests of the preservation of world civilization and of life itself on our planet demand the adoption of effective measures to eliminate the threat that is hanging over the world, to radically reduce weapons, and to advance toward real disarmament.

"There are no weapons," the draft new edition of the CPSU Program points out, "that the Soviet Union would not be prepared to limit or ban on a reciprocal basis and with the application of effective verification."

The meeting of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, with U.S. President R. Reagan in Geneva from 19 to 21 November 1985 represented an important step on the road toward solving the problem of averting a nuclear catastrophe. The joint statement of the leaders of both powers that a nuclear war must never be unleashed and that there can be no victor in such a war represents a most important result of the meeting. The recognition by both sides of the importance on preventing any war -- nuclear or conventional -- between the USSR and the United States and their mutual pledge not to strive for achieving military superiority are also of principled importance.

Solutions for a number of concrete questions on which the stopping of the arms race depends could not be found at the meeting. Major differences on principled problems continue to exist between the Soviet Union and the United States. However, the results of the talks at the highest level in Geneva provide the basis for the transition from dangerous confrontation to normalization in Soviet-U.S. relations and to improvement of the international situation as a whole. The foundation has been laid for a dialogue aimed at eliminating the threat of nuclear war and for ensuring reliable international security as a whole. Further prospects have opened up for searching for mutually acceptable solutions concerning the deep reduction in nuclear arsenals and simultaneous prohibition of siting nuclear means in outer space. For the first time in this decade a real opportunity has opened up for a practical start in curbing the arms race.
The special topicality of the problem of limitation and reduction of arms is obvious. Such large quantities of lethal weapons have already been accumulated in the world, that any further competition in increasing the military potential has become not only irrational and onerous but also increasingly dangerous both for the sides participating in it and for all mankind. Under the conditions of the existing military-strategic equilibrium, it is impossible to achieve decisive unilateral superiority and the attempts to achieve this goal can only whip up the arms race. In the final analysis, the equilibrium would be established at a higher level with greater expenditures but with lesser stability and security for both sides. Even if the arms race could develop "evenly" by maintaining parity, it would nevertheless continue along an ascending line and the result would inevitably be greater and not lesser mutual vulnerability and danger of nuclear catastrophe.

In real life it is difficult to ensure mutual equilibrium between the opposing forces when the development of military technology advances at an accelerating rate and on an expanding scale, when new systems and types of weapons are being developed, and when the arms race is not only spiralling further on earth but also threatens to spread to outer space. The siting of weapons in outer space would cause the gravest damage to strategic stability which represents the basis for the preservation of peace in the nuclear age. Military rivalry would assume qualitatively new dimensions and the probability of any conflict would increase manyfold, a conflict of unforeseeable consequences.

To break the dangerous trend that has developed, it is necessary to stop, to look back, to think again, and to lead matters toward strengthening the achieved equilibrium, strengthening this equilibrium not at the present high level and even less at any higher levels at that. In the existing situation the objective requirements of mutual security and strategic sufficiency determine the necessity of a substantial reduction of nuclear weapons while at the same time, not permitting the creation [sozdaniye] of space-based strike means. Under the conditions of stable parity, a considerably lower level of strategic balance than what now exists would not only be sufficient for maintaining equilibrium but would ensure a much higher degree of security for both sides.

Curtailing military rivalry is the imperative of the time. And it is necessary to act without delay. It is already difficult today to bring the contemporary weapons under control and tomorrow it will be even more difficult. The process of increasing military potentials threatens to emasculate the process of negotiations.

Being profoundly conscious of the responsibility for the fate of the world, the Soviet leadership has put the task of curbing the arms race at among the highest priorities of its foreign policy. The April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum called for all possible actions to restrain the forces of militarism and aggression and to find ways of reducing international tension, of nuclear disarmament, of overcoming military confrontation and developing normal and correct relations between states, and of expanding and deepening mutually advantageous economic relations.

The Soviet Union has activated its interaction with other states in the interest of achieving these vitally important goals. It has developed and continues to develop its entire international activity on the basis of understanding the obvious reality of our time, the reality that dictates the necessity of joint efforts of all countries, small and large.
The significant deepening of political and economic ties among the Warsaw Pact and CEMA member-states has represented an important contribution to the consolidation of general peace. The meetings of leaders of the fraternal countries in Moscow, Warsaw, Sofia, and Prague during 1985 have further advanced the cohesion of the socialist community. The relations between the socialist countries on the whole have continued to develop and grow stronger.

The Soviet Union has deepened its cooperation with the states that have liberated themselves from colonial oppression and, first and foremost, with members of the Nonaligned Movement. Significant steps have been made to develop relations with many of these countries in the interests of strengthening peace, halting the arms race, and defending the freedom and independence of peoples.

The USSR has made considerable efforts to improve its relations with the capitalist states on a multi-level basis. The Soviet-French meeting in Paris in October 1985 was especially important. It gave a fresh impetus to the further development of cooperation between the two states in the cause of strengthening European and international security. Steps have been taken in the same direction to expand the ties with other Western European countries and with the states of the entire capitalist world. At the same time, the relations between the USSR and the United States, the two powers that possess the greatest military, economic, and scientific-technological potential and have great international political influence, are obviously of exceptional importance in the nuclear age. It is precisely these two powers that are primarily responsible for the preservation of general peace. The political and psychological climate in the entire world, the level and intensity of military confrontation, and the process of limitation and reduction of arms depend in many respects on the state of Soviet-U.S. relations.

Proceeding from a sober assessment of this reality of the contemporary world, the CPSU and the Soviet State have unflinchingly followed their principled policy aimed at improving relations with the United States, at jointly searching for solutions for the problems of bilateral and international security, and at restraining the arms race.

However, enormous difficulties had to be overcome on the road to this goal. Especially at the beginning of the eighties the Soviet Union confronted not only a negative but also an openly hostile position of the U.S. Administration. The course of confrontation, the stake on achieving military superiority which was reinforced by a massive "counterarmament" ["sverkhvooruzhenye"] and, later, by preparations for "star wars," the blocking of the process of negotiations on the limitation of arms, the destruction of the positive that had been achieved with joint efforts during the years of detente, and, finally, the inflaming of "psychological war," and the undermining of mutual trust — this is what the United States' leading circles opposed to the Soviet call to open a serious and honest dialogue, the need for which is dictated by the special responsibility of both powers for the nature and the course of international development.

The Soviet Union has not deviated from its projected path and has resolutely acted to prevent confrontation from becoming the dominant trend in international life. Its invariable position in favor of normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations has not been based only on an understanding of the profound community of interests in averting mutual destruction in a nuclear war, but also on comprehensively analyzing the interaction of international and internal factors that influence the practical implementation of the United States' policy of "force." This analysis has shown that this imperial policy cannot conform to the realities of our period and that it would inevitably come up against increasing obstacles in the United States itself, obstacles
both on the part of its allies and, of course, on the part of many states of the world and powerful political and social forces.

At the same time, drawing the proper conclusions from a scientific interpretation of the laws of contemporary world development, the Soviet leadership has by no means adopted a position of passively waiting for the moment when the U.S. Administration would begin to seriously reexamine its unrealistic goals in the face of existing difficulties. Firmly rebuffing Washington's policy aimed at breaking up the military-strategic equilibrium, the Soviet Union has at the same time consistently and persistently continued to take bold large-scale initiatives, demonstrating responsibility and a constructive approach toward the central issues of ensuring international security and curbing the arms race.

The Warsaw Pact member-states have again resolutely acted to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and to ensure a turn for the better in European and world affairs. Confirming that the socialist states do not strive for military superiority but that, at the same time, they would not allow any military superiority over themselves, their highest leaders have set forth a complex of constructive proposals to improve the alarming situation that has developed. The actions of the USSR and its allies have won the support of the world public and have been highly appraised by the governments of many countries.

When the first signs began to appear in Washington indicating a desire to improve the atmosphere in Soviet-U.S. relations and to "soften" to some extent the United States' international behavior, the road to the summit meeting was open. Adopting the decision to hold such a meeting in Geneva, the Soviet leadership proceeded from the fact that the central place at the meeting should be accorded to the issues that represent the core of Soviet-American relations and determine the entire world situation, that is, the problems of strengthening of security and reduction of arms. The views of the USSR's allies and friends and the positions of the governments and public circles of many countries that had placed great hopes on the summit meeting were taken into consideration in this connection.

The Soviet Union did everything in its power to create the most favorable conditions for productive negotiations at the highest level. As early as at the remote approaches to the Geneva meeting it took concrete steps: It unilaterally stopped all nuclear explosions and expressed its readiness to immediately resume the negotiations on completely halting nuclear tests; it confirmed its unilateral moratorium on the tests of antisatellite weapons; and it proposed to develop the broadest international cooperation in the peaceful conquest of outer space under the conditions of its nonmilitarization.

As is known, in January 1985 the USSR minister of foreign affairs and the U.S. secretary of state agreed that the Soviet-U.S. talks should deal with the entire complex of space-based and nuclear weapons and aim at preventing an arms race in outer space and at halting it on earth. To develop the achieved accords, the Soviet side put forward a whole series of new constructive proposals on the eve of the meeting. These bold and far-reaching initiatives, worked out in strict conformity with the principle of parity and equal security, were designed to open up the scope for productive negotiations on nuclear and space-based weapons.

First, the Soviet Union addressed itself to the U.S. Administration with the proposal to reach an agreement on completely banning space-based strike weapons for both sides and to really radically reduce by half the nuclear weapons that are capable of reaching each other's territory. The overall numbers of carriers of nuclear weapons capable of reaching each other's territory would be 1,250 for the USSR and 1,680 for the United States, that is, there would be a certain preponderance to the advantage of the latter. The Soviet Union demonstrated its readiness to agree to this,
taking into account the fact that, as a result of the 50-percent reduction of carriers, the sides would have an equal number of nuclear warheads, that is, 6,000 units each. The preservation of the approximate strategic equilibrium, but an equilibrium at a radically lower level, would thereby be ensured.

This is an honest and fair approach. It equally affects the strategic forces of both sides according to a single criterion that determines the nuclear means subject to reduction and, precisely, the sides' capabilities to strike at the targets in each other's territory, regardless of the means by which or the location from which such strikes can be carried out, that is, either by means of missiles or aircraft and either from their own territories or from the territories of their allies. The Soviet proposal takes account of differences in the composition of the opposing strategic forces and does not seek any radical restructuring of these forces. The sides can determine for themselves which of the components of their armaments they will reduce and what the volume of their reduction will be within the agreed framework. At the time, those components of the strategic "triads" of each of the sides which represent their main strike forces must be subject to substantial reductions. These forces are the Soviet Union's intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and the United States' submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). And this is fair because the strike capabilities of land- and sea-based strategic offensive means are similar. The reduction of these means must be carried out in a complex way to ensure that none of the sides could gain any advantage as a result of reductions. Following the reductions, it is proposed to install not more than 60 percent of the overall number of warheads on each of the components of both "triads," that is, either the Soviet ICBM's or the American SLBM's.

In proposing to reduce the nuclear weapons of both sides by half, the Soviet Union declares that it is ready to go even further on the road of nuclear development, that is, up to and including a complete liquidation of all mass destruction weapons, naturally, under the condition that other nuclear states, too, will join this process at appropriate stages.

Second, the USSR proposed to reduce the medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. To facilitate an accord in this connection, it expressed its readiness to consent to the conclusion of a preliminary agreement, separately from and without directly linking it with the problem of space-based and strategic weapons. Regarding the nuclear potentials of France and Britain, the Soviet Union, considering their place in the overall balance of forces, proposed to open a direct dialogue with these countries, taking into consideration their security interests.

Third, the USSR proclaimed a moratorium on the siting of its own medium-range missiles in the European zone and announced that the number of SS-20 missiles which it now has on combat-ready duty is 243 units, that is, it is at the level of June 1984 when the additional deployment of Soviet missiles began in response to the installation of American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe. Thus, the SS-20 additionally deployed in this connection have been removed from combat-ready duty and the fixed installations for their siting have been dismantled.

The Soviet Union invariably acts in favor of completely ridding Europe of medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. But so long as the United States and its NATO partners do not consent to this, it is proposed to start with a substantial lowering of nuclear confrontation in that region and to subsequently advance to further reductions.

The Soviet initiative aimed at curtailing the arms race has not been left unanswered by the American side which in itself is something positive. However, the basic substance of American counterproposals differs little from what has continued to create
obstacles on the road to working out mutually acceptable solutions over a number of years. It is a matter of the same biased, one-sided, unfair, and therefore, unrealistic approach. It is a matter of the same unrealizable desire to use the negotiations to gain advantage for oneself at the expense of the interests of the other side. Hence, the unacceptable starting positions that deliberately ignore the differences in the structure of the opposing forces and which are aimed at substantially reducing the main component of the Soviet strategic power (ICBM) while reducing to a lesser extent the main strike means of the American "triad" (SLBM and heavy bombers, including those carrying cruise missiles).

However, the U.S. Administration's refusal to reach an accord on banning the space-based strike weapons and its "obsession" with the "star wars" plans represent the main barrier on the way to mutually acceptable solutions.

II.

Stubbornly insisting on the implementation of the "Strategic Defense Initiative," its inspirers, authors, and promoters try to prove that the strategic stability could be strengthened in this way, and that, in the final analysis, it would even be possible to be rid of nuclear weapons altogether. A "concept of transition" from offensive nuclear weapons — through their combination with non-nuclear space-based "defensive" weapons — to the "reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons" has been worked out. The period allotted for this "transition" which would last a few decades has been also predicted. It is further proposed in the future to "share" the space-based means with the Soviet Union and to "open to each other" the doors of the laboratories engaged in the development [razrabotka] of these means.

This is a strange logic! It turns out that for the purpose of nuclear disarmament it is necessary to plunge the world into an arms race the scale and intensity of which it is hard to imagine. It would not simply be a matter of adding space-based weapons to nuclear weapons, which in itself would significantly increase the dimensions of military preparations. The introduction of the new space-based weapons into the strategic balance would bring the greatest acceleration to the interconnected offensive and defensive arms race. The process of gigantic accumulation of weapons would continue over dozens of years, involving a colossal expenditure of material and other resources. Under this scenario it is inconceivable to seriously consider any kind of reduction and, even less, about the elimination of nuclear weapons. This is not a scenario of halting the arms race but a scenario of endless prolongation and of heating up of this race.

It is perfectly understandable that a sharp increase of the already enormous stockpiles of weapons would have a most pernicious effect on the strategic stability and, consequently, on mutual security on the sides and the world situation as a whole. However, this is not all. It is not only in their quantitative parameters that the actual dimensions of damage to strategic stability would have to be appraised. The very dynamics of the arms race and its qualitative characteristics would sharply change. What would take place would certainly not be a balanced and synchronized quantitative increase on both sides but a noticeable intensification of the tendency to overtake on the part of the American side that would be engaged in an accelerated creation [sozdaniye] and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of nuclear and space-based weapons in order to disrupt the existing military-strategic equilibrium to its own advantage. This precisely represents the main threat to the stability of the existing situation.

Widely advertised as "defensive," the concept of creating [sozdaniye] the space-based strike means cannot be considered separately from all other military preparations of the United States which, in the final analysis, are aimed at achieving the capability
to inflict the first disarming strike. The "Strategic Defense Initiative" has been integrated into the all-embracing complex of large-scale programs of increasing American military power. The plans for the creation [sozdaniy] of an "antimissile defense" by no means replaces but only supplements and intensifies the planned "strategic program" of the U.S. Administration which is being implemented. Under this program five new types of strategic carriers -- two types of ICBM, and one type of SLBM, and two types of strategic bombers -- are being created and, at the same time, long-range cruise missiles for various modes of basing and other systems of nuclear weapons are being deployed.

The development [razrabotka] and deployment [razvertyvanie] of antimissile defense means with space-based elements are designed to provide under the cover of this defense the possibility of attacking the Soviet Union with impunity by employing the entire range of offensive nuclear weapons. And the space-based means themselves are also weapons, and a qualitatively new type of weapon at that, which are not only capable of hitting missiles at various points of their flight trajectories but also targets on earth.

The undermining of strategic stability in the event of the realization of the "star wars" plans would be further deepened by the fact that those circles would strengthen their position in the American military-political leadership which entertain the illusions that the first strike can allegedly be made under cover of the space "shield" and that the opposing side can be either completely deprived of possibilities for a retaliatory strike, or the strike can be substantially weakened. Calculations of this kind are as hopeless as they are dangerous. Of course, even in the face of the most perfidious American scenarios of unleashing a nuclear conflict, the Soviet side possesses the necessary means and methods that can guarantee crushing retribution which no potential aggressor can escape. This is the decisive means for neutralizing the adventurist plans for achieving "victory" in a nuclear war. But the fact that under these circumstances the element of "mutual deterrence" would inevitably be intensified in the sphere of strategic planning would represent yet another serious factor in weakening the stability of the existing equilibrium and further charging the explosive tension.

But this is not all. What kind of strengthening of strategic stability could be imagined at all if the spreading of the arms race to outer space were allowed? The present nuclear confrontation is already extraordinarily dangerous because of the high degree of its programming for the event of outbreak of a critical situation. And if space-based weapons are not prohibited, an even more dangerous situation will be created. The combination of nuclear offensive and antimissile means would further reduce the time -- already counted in minutes now -- for decisions on which the very existence of mankind will depend. These decisions, irreversible in their catastrophic consequences, would be made by electronic machines, that is, essentially without the participation of the human mind and political will, and without taking account of any moral and ethical criteria. And in this connection it might not even be any real or imagined intentions of the other side but an error, a miscalculation, or some technical faults of the highly complicated computer systems which would provide the first impulse for the fatal development of events.

A new wave of the arms race -- this time, of the nuclear-space race -- threatens to roll over mankind. And the growing threat of a general catastrophe which this wave carries with it cannot be warded off by any other means than a total mutual prohibition of space-based strike means. If the nuclear and space-based weapons are joined together into a single super-system enveloping our planet from all sides, assurances of anyone's peace-loving intentions, promises to share technological achievements in the sphere of antimissile means, or proposals to open up laboratories to observe their development [razrabotka] could hardly be of any help.
The U.S. Administration's preparations for the creation (sozdaniye) of space-based strike weapons run counter to the strategic, political, and other realities of our period. It seems as if an approximate parity of military forces did not exist. As if it would be possible, under the conditions of comparable potentials and resources of both sides, to count on gaining the upper hand in the nuclear-space rivalry! As if the United States had all possibilities at its disposal and the USSR were not in a position to create (sozdavat) an adequate counterweight!

But this is not the reality. At the meeting in Geneva, M.S. Gorbachev put the following direct question to President Ronald Reagan: "Does the American leadership really seriously think that, under conditions of the creation (sozdaniye) of American space-based weapons, we will continue to reduce our own strategic potential and with our own hands help the United States to weaken it? This should not be counted upon. Precisely the opposite will happen: To restore the equilibrium the Soviet Union will be forced to increase the effectiveness, accuracy, and power of its weapons in order to neutralize — should it become necessary — the electronic space-based 'star wars' machine created (sozdavat) by the Americans."

The Soviet side has declared in all responsibility that the United States can have no ground for hoping to achieve a monopoly in outer space and pass the USSR in the arms race unleashed there. As has happened more than once in the past, the Soviet Union will find the proper answer to this challenge, too, and the answer will be effective, sufficiently quick, and less costly. The American side must weigh all this in the most responsible way and then draw the conclusions that will correspond to the interests of the security of both powers and the security of all mankind.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, its choice is firm and immutable, and that is not to allow an arms race in outer space. If this key question is positively solved, the high road to achieving the broadest accords in the sphere of reduction of nuclear weapons will be open.

III.

The Geneva summit meeting has convincingly confirmed the acute necessity and topicality of the recent initiatives and actions undertaken by the CPSU and the Soviet State for the purpose of solving the central question of preservation and consolidation of peace, the question of averting the threat of war, improving the international situation, and curbing the arms race. The meeting has once again demonstrated that the determining sphere in Soviet-U.S. relations is the sphere of security at the core of which are the problem of banning the space-based strike means and the problem of reducing nuclear weapons in their organic linkage.

In realistically assessing the results of the Geneva meeting, it has to be noted that it did not succeed in solving these problems. The unwillingness of the United States' leadership to renounce the "star wars" program made it impossible to work out concrete accords on nuclear and space-based weapons. Following the meeting, the quantity of accumulated weapons has not been reduced and the arms race has continued. But at the same time the general positive significance of the meeting should not be underestimated. The meeting was a major political event in the international arena and has had a favorable effect on the political and psychological climate in the world. Without the direct contact established between the USSR and U.S. leaders in Geneva and without the achieved accords in principle it would be impossible to overcome the deadlock and begin a serious joint search for a way out of the impasse in which the disarmament problem had found itself as a result of the far-advanced confrontation and the unrestrained arms race.
The negotiations at the highest level were necessary and useful for a clear comparison of the positions of the two sides and for restoring trust between them. What was most definitely revealed was the urgent need for new approaches, for a fresh view of realities of the contemporary world, and for a sharp turn for the better in Soviet-U.S. relations, something that depends in many respects on the political will of the leaderships of both states. The Soviet side emphasized that the USSR respects the American people, has no hatred toward the United States, and does not build its policy on any aspirations to infringe upon its national interests. Moreover, the Soviet Union does not wish to change the strategic balance to its advantage because such a situation would intensify the suspicions on the part of the other side, whip up the arms race, and undermine the foundations of mutual and international security.

The USSR's constructive and consistent line decisively contributed to the positive development of the Geneva dialogue. At the same time, certain elements of realism manifested themselves in the position of the American side at the meeting, something which led to agreements on a number of questions. The general understanding, jointly asserted at the highest level, that nuclear war must never be unleashed, that there can be no victor in such a war, and that the USSR and the United States pledge to build their relations precisely on the basis of this incontrovertible truth and will not strive for military superiority, is undoubtedly of very essential importance in this sphere.

The imperatives of the nuclear age dictate: It is necessary to become accustomed to strategic parity as the natural condition that provides the greatest security. There is no other reasonable way except the joint determination of such a level of nuclear weapons which would be sufficient both from the viewpoint of national security of each of the sides and, simultaneously, also from the viewpoint of their mutual security. And the level of this sufficiency, as it was revealed during the Geneva negotiations, is much lower than the level now held by the USSR and the United States. It follows from this that deep cuts in the existing nuclear arsenals on a reciprocal basis are realistically possible. Such a reduction will not weaken but, on the contrary, noticeably strengthen the security of the Soviet Union and the United States and will make the entire strategic situation in the world more stable.

As a result of their examination of the state of affairs at the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space-based weapons, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President agreed that the work at these negotiations would be speeded up with a view to accomplishing the tasks set forth in the joint Soviet-U.S. statement of 8 January 1985, that is, namely, the tasks of preventing the arms race in outer space and halting it on earth, of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons, and of strengthening the strategic stability. Taking into account the proposals that had already been introduced during the negotiations, they declared themselves in favor of achieving progress as quickly as possible particularly in the spheres where there are meeting points, including the appropriate implementation of the principle of a 50-percent reduction of both sides' nuclear weapons and the idea of a preliminary agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe. Effective measures of verification [kontrol] of the fulfillment of assumed obligations will be coordinated in connection with the drafting of accords.

The foundation has been laid for the process leading to a curtailment of the arms race. Now joint efforts are needed to advance this process along the path of working out concrete mutually acceptable solutions. Possibilities for that exist. The Soviet and American proposals on the reduction of nuclear weapons still differ in many respects. However, if we proceed from mutual interests in achieving accord, the differences can be completely overcome through a mutual search for compromises. It is also possible to reach accord on reliably verifying the process of real arms reduction.
However, to solve the aforementioned problems the door through which weapons could penetrate into outer space must be tightly shut. No fundamental reduction of nuclear weapons is possible without this. The U.S. side's stubborn striving to create [sozdaj] and deploy [razvernut] space-based weapons can only lead to a situation where the efforts to halt the arms race will be blocked, and it goes without saying that such a situation would be profoundly disappointing for the peoples of the entire world, including the American people.

The Soviet leadership is convinced that a real chance exists for sharply reducing the threat of nuclear war and for beginning to reduce the arsenals of means of mass destruction, and it would be unforgivable to miss this chance. Therefore, it hopes that what was said in Geneva concerning the "Strategic Defense Initiative" is not the United States' last word.

Reporting on the results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting at the highest level in Geneva at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 27 November 1985, M.S. Gorbachev stated: "President Reagan and I made an arrangement to instruct our delegations at the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space-based weapons to speed up the negotiations and to conduct them on the basis of the January accord between the two countries. Thus, it has been confirmed by both sides at the highest level: An arms race in outer space must be prevented by tackling this question in conjunction with the reduction of nuclear weapons. This is precisely what the Soviet Union will be striving for. This is precisely what we are urging the United States to emulate. By fulfilling in practice the commitments we have jointly undertaken, we will justify the hopes of the peoples of the entire world."

To help achieve future accords, the Soviet Union considers it necessary for both sides, first and foremost, to refrain from any acts that would undermine what has been achieved in Geneva, and from actions that would block the negotiations and erode the restrictions on the arms race which are now in effect. The agreements now in effect in the sphere of arms limitation must be strictly and conscientiously observed. This applies, first and foremost, to the ABM Treaty of unlimited duration which represents the basis of the strategic stability and of the entire process of limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. The further mutual observance by the sides of the appropriate provisions of the SALT-II Treaty also represents important support for this process.

The question of halting nuclear tests is also acutely relevant. As long as this problem is not solved, the development of new nuclear weapons systems and the perfecting of the existing ones will continue. In proclaiming a moratorium on all types of nuclear tests, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to prolong it if the United States reciprocated. A joint moratorium would have a favorable effect on the strategic situation and would strengthen mutual trust. The USSR is also ready to immediately start negotiations on the conclusion of an international treaty on complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests.

Although the question of halting these tests was placed before the U.S. President in Geneva, no answer to the question followed. Refusing to consider this problem, the United States has advanced no serious arguments to substantiate its position in this respect. And there can be no such arguments. At times the United States tries to present the question of verification as the stumbling block in this connection. However, the possibility for carrying out reliable verification with national means has been demonstrated more than once. If, however, international control is necessary, the Soviet Union is willing to consider this possibility, too, bearing in mind, in particular, the considerations expressed in their joint appeal by the six states that proposed to set up in their territories special stations to observe the fulfillment of the accord on halting nuclear tests.
At the Geneva meeting the USSR and the United States confirmed their obligation to help improve in every way possible the effectiveness of the system of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and they came to an agreement on joint practical steps in this area, including the continuation of regular Soviet-U.S. consultation. This is of considerable importance for maintaining stability in the world and diminishing the probability of a nuclear conflict.

The leaders of the two states declared themselves in favor of general and complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. They made arrangements to activate the efforts to conclude an effective international convention on this problem, a convention that would be amenable to control, and they agreed to open discussions on the question of preventing a proliferation of chemical weapons.

The sides stressed the importance they attach to the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe and they expressed their readiness to lead matters toward achieving positive results at these negotiations.

The great importance of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe was also noted. The sides stated their intention to contribute to its early successful conclusion together with other participant states of the conference. They confirmed the need for the adoption of a document that would incorporate both the mutually acceptable measures on confidence building measures and security and a concrete definition of the principle of nonuse of force, making this principle more effective.

The accord achieved in Geneva to study at the level of experts the question about centers for reducing the threat of nuclear war, taking into account the development of the negotiations on nuclear and space-based weapons, will also help strengthen mutual trust.

On the whole, the Geneva meeting at the highest level has provided a powerful positive impulse to a serious dialogue that opens up the prospects for the adoption of effective measures on the limitation and reduction of arms. What is needed are further unremitting reciprocal efforts and the implementation of the agreed principles in practical actions. The accord achieved in Geneva on the continuation of political contacts between the USSR and the United States, including new summit meetings, is expected to be helpful in this respect.

The Soviet Union intends to strive for concrete agreements with all resoluteness and in the spirit of honest cooperation with the United States. If the United States adopts the same approach, the important and necessary work accomplished in Geneva will yield more tangible and longer-term results.

The CPSU and the Soviet State firmly and purposefully follow the Leninist course in the conduct of its peace-loving policy at the core of which is the struggle to release mankind from the threat of annihilation and from the burden of armaments. This policy is wholeheartedly supported by all Soviet people, now advancing toward a historical event in the country's life, the 27th CPSU Congress. They are filled with determination to conquer with their intensive work new frontiers in communist construction, in strengthening the fatherland's economic and defense might, and in the social and spiritual development of the society. This is the reliable basis of the Soviet foreign policy that combines in itself counteractions against the forces of militarism with a constructive devotion to peace.

In implementing its consistent policy of peace and disarmament, the USSR closely cooperates with its Warsaw Pact allies, with all countries of the socialist community.
This policy enjoys the support of the broadest public circles and of other peace-loving countries, the understanding on the part of many governments and responsible statesmen and political figures, and the approval of millions of people.

The Geneva meeting has engendered great hopes. The ice that had frozen the relations between the two powers for such a long time has been broken. A difficult but reliable road toward the adoption of solutions for which all peoples are waiting has been opened. The favorable opportunities must not be missed. The conscience and reason of mankind demand a continued advance to peace, a peace without lethal weapons and without the threat of annihilation.
Our country goes to the 27th CPSU Congress as the standard bearer of peace on the entire planet. The Leninist foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State, which is aimed at eliminating the nuclear threat hanging over mankind, has been precisely and clearly formulated among other places also in the new draft edition of the party program and has been welcomed by all soberminded people as the program of struggle for curbing the arms race and for peace and social progress.

Halting the arms race and first and foremost, the nuclear arms race, and preventing its spreading to outer space represents the main aspect of solving the principal task of all mankind in our period, the task of averting the danger of war. The Soviet Union works actively and purposefully in the struggle against the threat of war. It is setting an example of high responsibility for the fate of the world. What is needed at the present critical stage in international relations when mankind faces the choice between survival and the threat of annihilation are responsible actions and bold practical solutions primarily on the part of those countries whose international weight is significant and whose influence on the state of affairs of the world is beyond doubt. What is needed are a new approach to international affairs and a new way of thinking which take into account the realities of the world development. At present it is more important than ever before for all states, regardless of their size or economic potential, to broaden their contribution to the common cause of halting the arms race and improving the international situation.

As is known, working at full capacity, the powerful propaganda machine of the United States and other NATO countries is implanting in the conscience of people the false notions about the causes of the present tense and explosive situation in the world. The anti-Soviet stereotypes about the "Soviet military threat," the USSR's "unrestrained" increase of its military power, some kind of USSR "responsibility" for "regional conflicts" the preservation of which hinders the achievement of accords on halting the arms race, and so forth, are being repeated in all manner day and night. All these propaganda tricks are aimed at justifying in the eyes of peoples the increase of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons, the militarization of outer space, and the policy of material preparations for war carried out by the governments of the United States and other leading NATO countries. What in reality is the true reason for the fact that the world has reached an extremely dangerous point? Why it is that the question
arises in all of its magnitude: Will there or will there not be a nuclear catastrophe, will it be possible to preserve civilization and life itself on the planet or has their destruction in the flames of a nuclear fire been prepared for them?

Millions of people in all corners of the planet every day more and more distinctly realize that the reasons for the growing tension and danger of war and for the increasingly acute socioeconomic and ecological problems on a regional and a global scale are to be found in the policy of Washington and some of its closest allies who have placed their stake in achieving military superiority, considering the position of military domination of the world as some kind of a springboard for carrying out a social revanche and imposing their will and the systems that suit them on other states and peoples.

This is the essence of the course that Washington proclaimed in its most complete form and began to forcefully carry out at the beginning of the eighties. This course is based on an unprecedented increase of military power and on striving to undermine the established nuclear parity that represents the most important oasis of security and stability in the world. The program of "nuclear rearming" which provides for a sharp increase of the U.S. strategic potential has continued to be implemented since October 1981.

Washington's aspiration to try to achieve military superiority by making a "technological jump" by means of creating [sozdaniye] an essential new type of weapons, the space-based strike weapons, adds an extraordinary danger to the present situation. This precisely is the meaning of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" [SDI], proclaimed by the U.S. President in March 1983, which has been named the "star wars" program.

Work is being carried out at an accelerated pace under this program to create [sozdaniye] a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements. Briefly, simultaneously with a powerful nuclear sword, Washington also aspires to acquire a "space shield" so that, by covering itself with it, it would be possible for it to blackmail the USSR and, should it become necessary, to also carry out a nuclear attack with impunity and without fear of retribution. Thus, a new and extremely destabilizing element of the U.S. offensive forces is being created [sozdavatsya]. These essentially new means, capable of virtually lightening-fast global action, can also be effective as offensive weapons.

The appearance of these weapons in the United States would lead to a disruption of the military-strategic parity that was established between the USSR and the United States at the beginning of the seventies and it would create a serious threat to the security of the USSR and other socialist countries. It is understandable that the USSR cannot allow this. As has been pointed out more than once by the Soviet leadership, the Soviet Union will be forced to take countermeasures both in the sphere of offensive as well as in the sphere of defensive weapons, not excluding in this connection also space-based defensive weapons. There will be no United States' monopoly in outer space. The strategic equilibrium will be rectified but it will be rectified at a higher level of military confrontation. It is obvious what this would involve in practice. The "star wars" program will provoke an uncontrolled arms race in all areas, and the spending of enormous moral and material resources of truly astronomic proportions.

Something else is also obvious. The appearance of space strike weapons in outer space, including the antisatellite and antimissile weapons with their qualitatively new technological characteristics and methods of combat use, will inevitably weaken the
stability of the strategic situation in the world and will result in an increased risk of outbreak of a nuclear war. Washington is pushing mankind to the abyss of nuclear catastrophe with its actions aimed at implementing the "star wars" program.

The sinister nature of the "star wars" program lies also in the fact that the 1972 unlimited-duration Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems between the USSR and the United States which, as is widely recognized in the West, represents a cornerstone of the entire process of limitation of the strategic offensive and defensive weapons, has already become the first target of this program. The creation [sozdaniye] by the United States of an all-embracing space ABM system is incompatible with this treaty and it will signify its liquidation: First, because work is being carried out in violation of Article No. 1 of the treaty to create [sozdaniye] the ABM system to cover the entire territory of the United States and its allies; and, second, because the creation [sozdaniye] of a space-based ABM system signifies a violation of Article No. 5 of that treaty.

Obsessed with the idea of military superiority, the U.S. Administration is unwilling to take account of the essential — not only political but also objective military-technological — reality that was considered by the sides and confirmed in the ABM treaty. What is involved is the recognition of the indissoluble link between offensive and defensive weapons. THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES AGREED AND STIPULATED IN THE ABM TREATY THAT ONLY MUTUAL RESTRAINT IN THE SPHERE OF ABM SYSTEMS CAN REDUCE THE ARMS RACE AND PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR MAKING PROGRESS ON THE PATH OF LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. The significance of this objective interconnection has not diminished at all as a result of the appearance of the conditions for the creation [sozdaniye] of an ABM system on the basis of the latest technological achievements. More likely to the contrary. The increased combat potential of space-based ABM systems only accentuates the lasting significance of this interconnection.

Disregarding this in the hope for some kind of a monopoly in the sphere of space-based ABM systems, the U.S. Administration is opening sluices to an uncontrolled increase of strategic forces and of other nuclear weapons. The assertions by the latter-day sword-bearers of "star wars" about the defensive nature of the SDI program whose implementation can allegedly lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons and to creation of a "non-nuclear deterrence potential" that will not be based on the threat of mutual nuclear destruction but on non-nuclear defense, are nothing more than a propaganda ploy. Their real aim is to justify the most aggressive military doctrine, the military doctrine of the greatest danger for peoples, that has ever originated in Washington.

Striving to break the dangerous course of events, stop the arms race, and prevent its spreading to outer space, the USSR has brought forward and is implementing a broad constructive program of measures whose implementation would lead to an improvement of the international situation and a sharp reduction of the threat of nuclear war.

New Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons have been conducted in Geneva since March 1985 at the USSR's initiative. The entire future of international affairs depends on the solution of these questions. Either the involvement of outer space in the sphere of military rivalry and consequently, a new spiral in the arms race will be successfully prevented and the further increase of nuclear arsenal will be stopped or mankind will move intolerably close to the fatal borderline of an all-destructive nuclear war — this is how the question stands now.

In January 1985 in Geneva the leaders of the USSR and U.S. foreign policy departments coordinated their principled positions on the subjects and goals of the talks and on
the method of resolving the questions discussed in these talks. In conformity with
this accord, effective agreements are to be worked out in the talks which will be aimed
at preventing the arms race in outer space and halting it on earth, at limiting and
reducing nuclear weapons, and at strengthening the strategic stability. All questions
in the negotiations must be considered and solved in their complexity, their inter-
connection.

The USSR joined the Geneva negotiations with the firm intention of achieving an honest
mutually acceptable accord [dogovorennost]. The Soviet side is not merely declaring
its readiness for agreement but has also put forward at that forum from the very begin-
ning concrete proposals concerning all three areas of negotiations.

Regarding the key issue of the negotiations, the prevention of the arms race in outer
space, the USSR has proposed a prohibition on all classes of space-based strike weapons
and to reach an agreement according to which the creation [sozdaniye] of these weapons,
beginning already with the stage of scientific research work and their testing and
deployment, would be ruled out and the existing weapons of this type, that is, anti-
satellite means would be destroyed.

In interconnection with the prevention of militarization of outer space, the USSR has
proposed to come to an agreement on a significant reduction of strategic weapons both
in carriers and in the overall number of warheads on them. At the same time it has
been proposed to renounce the creation [sozdaniye] and deployment of new kinds and
types of weapons or to strictly limit such programs.

The USSR has also proposed far-reaching measures in the sphere of medium-range weapons
in Europe. The USSR has confirmed its readiness to also reach accords on such a
radical step as a complete deliverance of Europe from all medium-range and tactical
nuclear weapons.

At the same time, during the Geneva negotiations the USSR continued to take serious
steps to contribute to the success of the negotiations and to create a favorable
atmosphere for them. With the opening of the Geneva dialogue the Soviet side proposed
to proclaim a moratorium on nuclear and space-based weapons for the entire duration of
negotiations. Furthermore, the USSR also advocated the proclamation of a moratorium
on the deployment of medium-range missiles and, correspondingly, on the measures taken
in response to the siting of new American missiles in Europe. The USSR supported
these proposals with unilateral goodwill actions by halting, beginning in April 1985,
the deployment of its own medium-range missiles and the increase in the implementation
of other countermeasures in Europe.

These Soviet proposals created a good basis for productive work in Geneva. Why then
has there been no progress after already three rounds of talks? The obstacle is the
United States' position.

Despite the Soviet-U.S. accord on the subjects and goals of negotiations, Washington
avoids discussions about the questions concerning the space-based strike weapons.
It prefers to only talk about the benefits that would result from the acquisition of
a "space shield" by the United States. Refusing to reach accords on preventing the
arms race in outer space, the U.S. representatives argued in favor of efforts to search
for some kind of a "framework of a more stable combination of offensive and defensive
forces," that is, in other words, some kind of rules in the sphere of the space-based
arms race. Washington has also made no new proposals at the negotiations concerning
the other two questions under discussion: the strategic and medium-range weapons.
The United States merely repeated its old and deliberately unacceptable position which
it had already set forth at the previous negotiations that it itself broke off.
It is not difficult to understand why this is happening. The United States does not want to create an obstacle to the realization of its "star wars" program and its other programs of intensified increase of nuclear weapons.

To overcome the impasse in the Geneva negotiations the USSR has introduced new concrete proposals on the entire complex of problems concerning the space-based and the strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons.

The basic substance of these proposals was set forth by M.S. Gorbachev during his visit in Paris from 2 to 5 October 1985. The Soviet Union proposed to reach an accord on completely banning the space-based strike weapons for both sides and on really radically reducing — by 50 percent — those nuclear weapons of both sides which can reach the other's territory. In order to facilitate an accord on the earliest possible mutual reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons, the USSR proposed to conclude the corresponding agreement separately without directly linking it with the problem of space-based and strategic weapons. In this connection, the idea was set forth for a direct dialogue with France and Britain on the European balance of nuclear forces. It was proposed to work out accords on a complex of intermediate forces that would be designed to contribute to a quick and sound conclusion of the Geneva negotiations.

In combination with the USSR's earlier initiatives, these proposals represent an entire program of constructive and realistic measures whose implementation would lead to a complete turn in the development of international relations and to a strengthening of strategic stability and confidence in the world. Thus, the USSR has demonstrated once again in practice its striving to reach just and honest agreements in Geneva as quickly as possible. These large-scale Soviet actions have won the approval and support of many states and of broad political and social circles in the United States and Western European countries. It is recognized everywhere that the realization of these actions will help lead the world from the blind alley of the arms race on earth and prevent it from spreading to outer space.

How did Washington official circles react to the USSR's proposals? The scale and attractiveness of the Soviet proposals are so great that they could not but take account of them.

At the beginning certain statements appeared in Washington about the presence of "reasonable seedlings" in the Soviet proposals and that these proposals deserve "further consideration" and can provide a "starting point in the negotiations." However, this maneuvering was followed by a massive "offensive" against the Soviet peaceful initiatives. High officials of the U.S. Administration were engaged in falsification of and in efforts to discredit the Soviet initiatives, trying to distort their essence, present them in a false light, and diminish their significance. They even resorted to such impermissible methods in interstate discussions as direct deceptions and juggling of facts concerning the USSR's strategic nuclear weapons and the medium-range weapons in Europe.

Thus, despite the objective facts that were verified by both sides and confirmed by the SALT II Treaty in 1979 (there have been no changes in the numerical strength of the USSR strategic forces since then), a superiority, and a considerable one at that, in these weapons is attributed to the USSR. By juggling the figures, by counting in the types of weapons which are unrelated to the matter at hand, by also ignoring such "trifles" as the nuclear weapons of Britain and France, and by means of other artless methods, they try to prove that the USSR has a multiple superiority in the medium-range weapons in Europe both in carriers and warheads. As a result, it is concluded that the United States has "slipped behind" the USSR in the military-strategic position and that it must first increase its nuclear potential and only then begin to disarm.
Therefore, the USSR's proposals on really deep reductions of strategic offensive weapons and medium-range means of both sides were proclaimed as unbalanced and as proposals that "fail to take account of security interests of the United States."

The apologists of the "star wars" program try especially zealously to substantiate the legitimacy of the United States' actions to create [sozdaniye] a space-based ABM system, the space-based strike weapons. Taking account of the general feelings of its NATO allies and of some quite influential circles in the United States itself in favor of preserving the ABM Treaty, Washington came up with some "new" or "renovated" stereotypes simultaneously with the already well-known ones. True, for the time being the U.S. Administration has decided to adhere to a more "moderate" interpretation of the treaty, an interpretation according to which the United States intends to engage in research, testing, and development [razrabotka] of the ABM system within the SDI program, leaving the solution of the question of whether or not to deploy such a system for a later time. The purpose of these false arguments is to prepare some kind of "juridical" basis for carrying out all the stages of practical work within the SDI program.

Of course, Washington does take account of the fact that, by pursuing the policy of undermining the ABM Treaty and of creating [sozdaniye] the space-based strike weapons, the United States is thereby liquidating at the Geneva talks the very basis for a possible accord on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons. The deployment of antimissile weapons in outer space would initiate a fundamental change in the strategic balance of forces. Therefore it is impossible to come to any decisive reductions in strategic offensive weapons without an accord on renouncing the space-based strike means. Consequently, the U.S. Administration is assuming the entire responsibility for lack of all progress at the Geneva negotiations on these organically interconnected issues.

Distorting the position of the Soviet Union, Washington propagandists try to present the matter in such a way as to show that the USSR allegedly demands more or less the prohibition of all space research. But in reality, as M.S. Gorbachev explained in his interview given to the American TIME magazine, our country is arguing in favor of a prohibition of space-based strike weapons which would include all stages of the conception [zrozhdeniye] of this new class of weapons. This, however, does not deny the rights and possibilities of states to carry out only the fundamental research in the sphere of outer space.

As regards the really peaceful space research projects, the USSR, being the pioneer in this field, has consistently acted in favor of expanding in every way possible the scientific knowledge of outer space and of utilizing the latest technological means connected with astronautics in the interest of resolving various problems on earth and improving the welfare of peoples. The USSR considers outer space as an exceptionally promising arena of international cooperation.

Judging by the materials published in the Western press, there have been no signs of any turn by the United States toward a constructive approach at the Geneva negotiations or in the "counterproposals" submitted by the United States in October 1985 in reply to the large-scale Soviet initiatives on the eve of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva. The unwillingness to conduct negotiations on preventing the arms race in outer space is the main shortcoming of the "new" American "counter-proposals."

The accords achieved at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting on the need to accelerate the work at the Geneva negotiations on the basis of the January agreement on the goals and subjects of these negotiations create real possibilities for progress at that
The USSR has done and continues to do everything possible to find mutually acceptable solutions in Geneva. Although the Soviet and U.S. proposals on the reduction of nuclear weapons differ in many ways, the Soviet side is ready to begin with compromise solutions [nachat kompromissnyye razvyazki], naturally, under the condition of a complete prohibition of space-based strike weapons. Keeping outer space free from weapons is of decisive importance for achieving agreements on radical reductions of nuclear weapons. Naturally, time and mutual constructive efforts are needed for this. What is also needed is a corresponding political-psychological atmosphere at the negotiations themselves and around them. Demonstrating its aspiration to reach an accord in Geneva, the USSR has taken a number of important unilateral actions as early as prior to the summit meeting which were aimed at making the negotiations more productive and at setting them in motion.

In addition to the moratorium proclaimed by the USSR earlier on the deployment of medium-range missiles, the number of Soviet SS-20 missiles on combat-ready duty in the European zone was reduced to 243 units, that is, to the level corresponding to the level in June 1984 when the additional siting of Soviet missiles began in response to the installation of American medium-range missiles in Europe. The SS-20 missiles that had been additionally deployed in this connection were removed from combat-ready duty and the fixed installations for the siting of these missiles were dismantled within a short time. It must be added in this connection that the Soviet Union has completely removed the old very powerful SS-5 missiles and continues to remove the SS-4 missiles from its armaments. This means that, on the whole, the number of medium-range carrier-missiles in the USSR's European zone is now considerably lower than 10 or even 15 years ago. However, ignoring this manifestation of goodwill on the part of the USSR, the United States continues to increase its nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

Under the conditions of an increasingly acute nuclear confrontation and an ever growing level of mistrust in the relations between the USSR and the United States, it would be hard to overestimate the significance of the USSR's unilateral pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons which has been in effect since 1982. To this day, the United States has not followed this good example of the USSR.

The moratorium on introducing antisatellite weapons in outer space, proclaimed by the Soviet Union in 1983, has been highly appraised in the entire world. However, the United States has not followed this Soviet example either. On the contrary, it answered it by testing the new ASAT antisatellite against a real space target in August 1985. Thus yet another chance has been missed to make a useful step for the cause of preventing the introduction of weapons in outer space.

To contribute to success in Geneva, the USSR has proposed more than once to carry out some preliminary measures that could be arranged even prior to the elaboration of an agreement on the entire complex of issues concerning the space-based and nuclear weapons.

An accord between the USSR and the United States to stop all work on creating [sozdaniye], testing, and deploying space-based strike weapons, including the antisatellite means, would be of particular significance. The importance of such a measure is obvious, considering the central role of the problem of prevention of militarization of outer space for reaching accord on the entire complex of interconnected issues concerning the space-based and nuclear weapons.
The USSR has proposed more than once to simultaneously freeze the already existing nuclear weapons at their present qualitative level while imposing a maximum limitation on their modernization and a simultaneous halt of the development, testing, and deployment of new kinds and types of these weapons. In relation to the European Continent it was proposed to make such an immediate step by halting the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe.

Halting the nuclear weapons tests is one of the important preliminary measures which the Soviet Union has resolutely advocated. The USSR's unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests which is in effect until 1 January 1986 has provided a good basis for a coordinated and quick implementation of such a measure. If the United States joined the moratorium on nuclear explosions, the road would be open to conclude a treaty (dogovor) on complete and general banning of all nuclear weapons tests. The USSR confirms its readiness to agree without delay (nezamedlitelnimoi pohri) to a treaty of unlimited duration banning all nuclear weapons tests.

The decisions of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member-states held in Sofia on 22 and 23 October 1985 represented an important event in the struggle of peace-loving forces of the world for halting the arms race and for disarmament. In the statement adopted at their meeting entitled "For Eliminating the Nuclear Threat and for a Turn for the Better in Europe and World Affairs" the leaders of the allied socialist states stressed that they consider the halt of the arms race and the transition to disarmament as being a cardinal task of our time.

Advocating a lowering of the level of military confrontation in Europe and the strengthening of European security, the participants of the Sofia meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee resolutely declared themselves in favor of stopping any further siting of nuclear weapons on the continent and engaging in efforts to reduce these weapons. They confirmed their determination to strive to completely rid Europe of medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. The allied states expressed their complete support for creating nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe as well as for the efforts of the GDR and CSSR Governments for establishing a zone free from chemical weapons in central Europe. They pointed out that their proposal to NATO countries for direct negotiations continue to be fully valid, that is, the proposals for direct negotiations to conclude a treaty (dogovor) on mutual nonuse of military force and maintaining the relations of peace between the Warsaw Pact and NATO member-states, a treaty that would also be open to all other European and other interested countries, on non-increasing and reducing military expenditures, and on ridding Europe of chemical weapons.

The Warsaw Pact member-states declared themselves in favor of reaching an accord as quickly as possible at the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe and they proposed to start with a reduction of the Soviet and American forces. They also declared themselves in favor of working out substantial mutually complementing political and military measures on confidence building and security in Europe at the Stockholm conference in the immediate future.

The participants of the Sofia meeting also called on the USSR and the United States to adopt on a bilateral basis a number of immediate measures to set a good example for other states. In their opinion, it would be in accord with the interests of the cause of halting the nuclear arms race if the USSR and the United States mutually pledged to refrain from siting any nuclear weapons in the territories of the states where there are no such weapons now, from increasing their stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and from replacing these weapons with new ones in the countries where they already have been sited.
The participants of the Sofia meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee further called on the USSR and the United States to also set an example for others in the matter of restraining the non-nuclear arms race. They proposed that both big powers assume the obligation to refrain from developing and producing new types of conventional weapons that are comparable in their destructive potential to the weapons of mass destruction; and that they freeze the numerical strength of their armed forces, including those stationed beyond the borders of their national territories, at the level existing on 1 January 1986. In the opinion of the participants of the meeting, an effective measure of limiting the armaments in all of their aspects would be if the USSR and the United States mutually refrained from increasing their military budgets beginning with the next financial year.

The decisions adopted in Sofia are a graphic confirmation of the fact that the allied socialist states represent a powerful and dynamic factor acting in favor of solving the fundamental question of the contemporary period, the question of halting the arms race and of disarmament. Putting forth their specific proposals aimed at limiting the arms race and at disarmament, the Soviet Union and other socialist states are convinced that it is possible to lower the level of military confrontation and achieve reliable security and lasting peace.

An overwhelming majority of peace-loving states also advocates the halting of the arms race together with the socialist states. Despite the efforts of the official bourgeois propaganda of the United States and other Western countries to justify in every way possible militarist preparations, the powerful forces of the antiwar movement, broad sectors of the public, mass political parties and organizations, realistically-minded political and public figures, and influential specialists in the field of military affairs and contemporary military-political strategy are also making resolute demands for freezing the nuclear arsenals, halting the arms race, and not allowing the entry of weapons into outer space.

The growing criticism of Washington's policy of militarization of outer space, the statements by prominent American scientists protesting the implementation of this militarist program, and the refusal of many scientists in Britain, the FRG, and other Western European countries to participate in the projects connected with the creation [sozdanie] of space-based weapons under this program attest to the frame of mind of broad strata of public in the United States and other Western countries which demand that the arms race be stopped and the preparations for "star wars" be prevented.

The demands of an overwhelming majority of UN member-states to solve without delay the most acute problem of the contemporary period, that is, the problem of curbing the arms race and preventing it from spreading to outer space, were made more emphatically and firmly than ever before at the 40th session of the UN General Assembly. The demands to limit the arms race and to implement practical disarmament measures were the central topics of statements by delegates at the Assembly session. These demands were expressed in nearly 70 resolutions adopted at the session on the basis of the drafts prepared by the socialist and nonaligned states on various specific aspects of this problem. These decisions propose the implementation of such measures as those aimed at preventing the arms race in outer space, at complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, at freezing the nuclear arsenals, at implementing a program of gradual nuclear disarmament, at making all states assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, at preventing the development of new types of mass destruction weapons, at prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons, at preventing their proliferation on the planet, and the like.

Under the conditions of the growing danger of the arms race spreading to outer space, the USSR's proposal "On International Cooperation in the Peaceful Conquest of Outer Space Under the Condition of Its Non-Militarization" won broad support at the UN
General Assembly session. According to the statements by many delegates, as a counterweight to the militarist "star wars" program, the Soviet initiative shows the prospects for peaceful cooperation in outer space for the benefit and in the interest of all peoples.

Both the statements by an overwhelming majority of delegates and the resolutions adopted at the session of the UN General Assembly graphically express the feelings of the entire world community which demands immediate practical actions and tangible material measures that can ensure a turn toward limiting the armaments, toward disarmament, and toward ensuring a peaceful outer space.

As the draft new edition of the CPSU Program notes, the USSR "proceeds from the assumption that however great the threat posed by the aggressive circles of imperialism to peace, WORLD WAR IS NOT FATALY INEVITABLE. IT IS POSSIBLE TO AVOID WAR AND TO SAVE MANKIND FROM CATASTROPHE. THIS IS THE HISTORIC MISSION OF SOCIALISM, OF ALL PROGRESSIVE AND PEACE-LOVING FORCES OF OUR PLANET." The CPSU and the Soviet state wage a consistent and tireless struggle in the international arena for this most humane and most important goal. The important concrete practical steps taken by the Soviet Union in the recent period and resolutely supported by other socialist states and all peace-loving forces of our world attest to this struggle.

The Soviet-U.S. summit meeting held in Geneva from 19 to 21 November 1985 at which primary attention was devoted to the problem of limiting the arms race and preventing the entry of weapons into outer space also attests to this. Although the sides did not succeed at this meeting in finding solutions for the most important questions concerning the task of halting the arms race and consolidating peace, they nevertheless managed to determine their agreement in a number of principled positions that are directly related to the implementation of this task.

Thus, the Geneva summit meeting created the possibility for progress. As the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting points out, the Soviet Union will do everything in its power to convert the accords achieved at the meeting into practical deeds and it expresses hope that the United States will adopt an equally responsible approach. Just as in the past, much will depend on the extent to which the United States shows itself ready to follow the USSR's example and to traverse its own half of the road.

Political results of the Geneva summit meeting are also in the fact that they have even more increased the interest of the international public in eliminating as quickly as possible the danger of a continuing nuclear and conventional arms race. It has become even more obvious to everyone that what is needed at the present stage of international relations, which is characterized by great mutual interconnection and mutual interdependence of states, is a new way of political thinking and a new realistic policy.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET PAPER HOPES FOR CONTINUATION OF 'SPIRIT OF GENEVA'

PM241147 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Jan 86 First Edition p 1

[Gennadiy Shishkin "International Review": "Fidelity to the Spirit of Geneva"]

[Excerpts]

Two months have elapsed since the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva, which was rightly regarded by the peoples as a very major political event in international life. It is hard to find a country where people have not spoken with hope of the "spirit of Geneva." They see in it prospects for reducing tension and restoring the policy of detente in relations among states. People of the most varied political convictions and social position are demanding at the top of their voices that the "spirit of Geneva" be expressed in actual deeds as rapidly as possible. The detailed plan of purposeful actions to remove the most serious threat of all -- nuclear war -- contained in the statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev is directed precisely at achieving that goal. "This task must be carried out by people of our generation without shifting it on to its descendants' shoulders," the statement stresses. "Such is the command of the times, the burden of historical responsibility, if you wish, for our decisions and actions in the period remaining before the beginning of the 3d millennium."

The statement has generated broad support from the world public and met with considerable interest in political circles and among statesmen in various countries. Washington has also responded. President R. Reagan noted that the Soviet proposals are a further useful step in the process of reducing nuclear arms.

However, the White House boss as well as other highly placed U.S. Administration figures carefully sidestep the question of the interrelationship of the whole range of space and nuclear armaments. But after all, if space strike weapons are developed [sozdaniye], the hopes for reducing nuclear armaments on earth will be quashed. However, reports from across the Atlantic indicate that the most reactionary circles of U.S. imperialism, the military-industrial complex and its stooges in the Pentagon administration, have not downed arms. On the contrary, they are going all out to try to thwart dialogue and torpedo completion of the task set at Geneva: Namely, preventing an arms race in outer space, stopping it on earth, limiting and reducing nuclear armaments, and strengthening strategic stability.

The story about the "leak" of the notorious letter written by U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger which occurred on the eve of the Geneva meeting and in which he entreated Reagan not to give way on a single point on the talks agenda, was, as time has shown,
no accident or isolated episode. Weinberger and those forces backing him are now doing their utmost to prevent the comprehensive Soviet disarmament program from being realized. At a Washington press conference the U.S. military department chief reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the plans to militarize outer space. Commenting on the new Soviet proposals, Weinberger stated that "the priority that the United States accords the Strategic Defense Initiative is well known and remains entirely in force."

The stance adopted by the United States on such an important question as stopping nuclear tests, a question which worries all mankind, is also highly instructive. The Soviet Union has extended the moratorium on nuclear explosions, declared by our country on 6 August, by a further 3 months. Stopping these explosions amounts, in its way to removing the motor which pushes the nuclear arms race forward. However, Weinberger and a number of other figures in the U.S. Administration tirelessly advocate the continuation of nuclear tests by the United States with maniacal tenacity. The reason for Washington's course is a desire to achieve superiority over the Soviet Union at any cost by developing new kinds of nuclear armaments.

During the last nuclear test in Nevada, on 28 December, the Pentagon tried out, among other things, a so-called nuclear-triggered X-ray laser. The laser, which is powered by the energy of a nuclear explosion, is being developed as part of the "star wars" program.

The latest testing of a new antimissile system carried out recently as part of the "star wars" program is also indicative of a deviation from the "spirit of Geneva." And, after all; the U.S. side was told clearly and precisely at the summit meeting that each new step toward implementing the program will create additional hurdles to compromise solutions at talks on nuclear and space arms.

Nowadays there is no lack of words about commitment to peace. But there is a noticeable shortage of actual deeds to consolidate its foundations. Moreover, speeches are being made from lofty rostrums aimed essentially at ensuring the disappearance of the 'spirit of Geneva,' that new factor which is having a beneficial effect upon international relations today", M.S. Gorbachev stresses. "The matter is not restricted to statements. Actions patently calculated to inflame enmity and distrust and generate the exact opposite of detente, a situation of conflict, are being carried out. U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger, for example, recently sent the President a special secret report proposing a number of steps be taken to undermine agreements previously concluded with the Soviet Union in the disarmament sphere which are in operation today. In particular, by manipulating groundless and unsubstantiated charges against the USSR regarding alleged breaches of international commitments he is insisting that the United States should not dismantle nuclear submarines carrying Poseidon missiles after the new "Ohio"-type missile-carrying submarines are commissioned. And this, as qualified specialists observe, would result in a breach of the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Moreover, Weinberger is advising the President to replace certain single-warhead Minuteman-2 missiles with Minuteman-3 nuclear missiles equipped with three nuclear warheads. This measure is aimed at ensuring that the United States exceeds the limit placed on nuclear warheads by the SALT II Treaty.

The U.S. Administration is capable of realizing that you cannot endlessly indulge those circles in the United States which want to direct it toward sabotaging the process begun at the Geneva meeting. In this regard people in the U.S. capital are recalling that Weinberger's previous attempt to derail the SALT II Treaty were fore-
stalled by the White House. There are grounds for hoping that the administration still has not said its last word on "star wars" either.

In any event, the opponents of this adventurist enterprise both in the United States itself and abroad are seeking with increasing energy to implement the understanding achieved in Geneva on the need to prevent a nuclear arms race in outer space and to stop it on earth.

The process initiated in Geneva is in accord with all the peoples' interests. They want a switch to constructive, mutually useful cooperation among states in all spheres.

Public opinion polls in the United States show that most Americans want subsequent meetings between the leaders of our two countries to lead to specific accords promoting a reduction in nuclear confrontation and a lowering of the danger of nuclear war. It is essential now to do everything possible to ensure that 1986 is not just a year of peace but helps the 20th century to end under the sign of peace and nuclear disarmament.
PHILIPPINE COLUMNIST FAVORS GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 18 Jan 86 p 6

[Commentary by Benedicto David: "Nuclear Bomb Free?"]

[Soviet Premier Mikhail S. Gorbachev presented a proposal the other day that would allow a nuclear-free world to emerge by the Year 2000.

The proposal is, of course, under serious consideration by the United States and indeed by the entire planet... for it is something that could spell the difference between the annihilation of mankind or the survival and prosperity of the entire human race.

Details of the proposal are to be negotiated between the US and the USSR... the two states which have more than enough nuclear bombs to blast all life from this planet in a matter of hours.

The rest of the world will have to wait for the two sides to reach a definite agreement before being able to breathe easier.

Obviously, the biggest stumbling block to the agreement is the great distrust now prevailing between Moscow and Washington. Neither side really believes the other... and the credibility of each is suspect because of past history.

If a new era of peace can finally unfold, it would be quite fantastic because then, the technological and manpower resources of the two countries and most other states on this planet could then be devoted to such necessities as food, clothing and shelter, not to mention medical attention and education.

If such an agreement can be reached, then in the next millennium, we could have a world that could possibly be free of poverty since almost half of the world's total resources are now devoted, spent and actually wasted on weaponry and defense systems... not to mention small wars waged by proxy by the superpowers.

The sine qua non of such an agreement would obviously be a mutual check on each other's activities... something which is now being done through the intelligence services of the other instead of an open check by entities appointed to do so with the consent of each side.

This reminds us of an impasse a few years ago regarding negotiations between the same two sides. Neither side gave the correct number of nuclear warheads and missiles that it had and neither would admit to a different figure.

The impasse was resolved, we were told, when a bright negotiator suggested that the Soviets tell the Americans what the American figure was and vice-versa. The figures supplied by each about the other proved startlingly accurate... and the negotiations then began in earnest.

We cannot really blame either side for not trusting the other... after so much deception, ill-feeling and hostility.

But now that a man in his 50s has made the proposal, perhaps the world should stand up and take notice... and consider his proposal with the utmost seriousness. It could be a chance for peace that might not arise again in a long, long time.

If indeed Mr. Gorbachev is sincere, then he would agree to an open system of checks by the other side or by a neutral body. And if he agrees, we doubt if Mr. Reagan could do less.

The rest of the world can only hope and pray that an agreement is reached and that by the next millenium, we will have a planet whose resources are dedicated to the welfare of mankind instead of its destruction.
FRENCH PRESIDENT JUSTIFIES NUCLEAR ARSENAL

LD081943 Paris Domestic Service in French 1800 GMT 8 Feb 86

[Text] Francois Mitterrand was the guest of a symposium on defense organized by the Here and Now Movement comprised of several left-wing clubs this morning. The head of state justified the existence of the French nuclear arsenal which aims, he underlined, at deterring the Soviets. Here is an excerpt from Mitterrand's speech.

[Begin recording] The Soviet Union has some 10,000 nuclear warheads, and so does the United States. France currently has 150. That is enough for us. That is enough not only from the point of view of defense because we would be in a position to attack, to destroy territories larger than France, but mainly, we force the others, in this case the Soviet Union, which is a nuclear (power) comes to mind. [sentence as heard] However, I do not believe in the Soviet Union's bellicose intentions toward us, but we must think logically, they [as heard] are well-known data. We happened to have enemies on the continent which has caused us many difficulties. We are in a position to cause so much damage, and the other side would cause us so much damage that a conquest would be pointless. The stake...the risk is greater than the stake. The psychological conditions, good sense, the balance of power are created so that France will not make war, should not have to make it. [end recording]

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IZVESTIYA HITS FRG LACK OF RESPONSE FOR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jul 85 p 4

[Article by correspondent E. Bovkun under the rubric "Topics of the Day": "An Urgent Necessity: Broadening Support for a Zone Free of Chemical Weapons on the European Continent"

[Text] Bonn—A conference is under way of working groups, including representatives of the SPD (FRG) and the SED (GDR), on chemical weapons disarmament.

At a press conference in Bonn a month ago, the public was informed of "a proposed agreement to create in Europe a zone that is free from chemical weapons." It is envisioned that such a zone would comprise a minimum of three countries of Central Europe: the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and the FRG. Eventually, it could be extended to include the territories of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Poland.

In accordance with the proposal, states bound by the agreement must eliminate existing stocks of chemical weapons and refrain in future from deploying them on their territories. They must refrain, moreover, from production and acquisition of such weapons, and they must not allow other countries to deploy them on their territories.

The Bonn government has promised to "carefully study" this initiative. How are things going today? With this question I turned to the chairman of the Working Group, a member of the SPD and a deputy of the Bundestag, Karsten Fogta, about the question of chemical weapons disarmament.

The federal government, Karsten Fogta told me, until now has not found time to conduct a detailed study of the proposal, or to outline its position in regard to it. "At least the government has not communicated anything about this officially to the participants of the Working Group. Meanwhile, the idea of the creation on the continent of a zone free from chemical weapons, ratified by a treaty between the governments of Central Europe, is meeting with great popularity among the general public. It has strong support in the professional
unions and the numerous organizations of the anti-war movement. It has found a positive response also in the parties of the Socialist International. In September this initiative will be discussed at a joint session of the Social Democratic parties of the European Economic Community.

"If before autumn the cabinet of Helmut Kohl has not spoken out on the proposal, then the Social Democrats will propose this question for discussion in the Bundestag. We will see that the resolution concerning the creation of a chemical weapons free zone remains a subject of general public discussion until either the present federal government approves it or a government comes to power under the leadership of the Social Democrats."

12897/12859
CSO: 5200/1342
Ottawa—Canada's major defence pact with the United States—the North American Aerospace Defence agreement—should be renewed for another full term of five years without further ado, a parliamentary committee report says.

The all-party committee also suggests that Canada's defence spending be nearly doubled to 3.8 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (a measure of the nation's economic activity), from about 2.1 per cent. The defence budget for 1985-86 is about $9.7 billion.

Several sources close to the all-party committee confirm that the recommendations form part of a 130-page draft report.

The proposal to renew the agreement comes despite opposition worries about Canada becoming involved, via NORAD in President Ronald Reagan's Star Wars defence scheme, formally known as the Strategic Defence Initiative.

Some critics have been pressing for a far shorter renewal period, to give Canada more flexibility in assessing the impact of Star Wars research on our own defence policy.

Previous renewals have been for periods of one to 10 years.

In September, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney declared that the government would not participate in research on the space-based Star Wars defence plan. However, private firms can participate.
While the recommendations by the committee on external affairs and national defence could be changed before the report is released next month, sources close to the group said such changes are unlikely.

Controversial Clause

In other controversial recommendations, the draft report:

— Concludes that the renewal agreement, to be signed in May, needn't include a clause stipulating that renewal would not "involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in active ballistic missile defence." The clause was in four previous NORAD agreements but dropped in the 1981 renewal;

— Urges more Canadian-American naval cooperation in patrolling the Arctic Ocean and enhancing our sovereignty there. One proposal includes a plan that would limit Canada's responsibility for anti-submarine surveillance to the Arctic archipelago itself, while leaving the Americans responsible for surveillance on the periphery of the Arctic Ocean;

— Suggests that Canada undertake a military space program involving satellite technology designed to meet our own defence needs while at the same time complementing missions that the newly unified U.S. Space Command will undertake on NORAD's behalf. The Space Command could become the organization responsible for any future operation of Star Wars-style defences.

Also proposed is the creation of a Canadian space agency modelled on the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration to coordinate civilian and military ventures in space;

— The report proposes that Canada purchase sophisticated Airborne Warning and Command aircraft to patrol that area of our domestic airspace between the U.S. border and the new North Warning System — an area that currently constitutes a gap in NORAD defences.

Opposition critics have argued for reintroducing the clause regarding this country's role in ballistic missile defence.

Undermine treaty

They say such a move would be a sign of Canada's formal determination to abide by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty between the Soviets and Americans. Critics of Star Wars believe the research program will eventually undermine the ABM treaty and other arms-control agreements.

The report does, however, want to see a joint Canada-U.S. declaration signalling support for the arms control process, the ABM treaty and the Outer Space Treaty accompanying any NORAD renewal. If the Americans balk, the report suggests that Ottawa make a unilateral declaration to this effect.

The report also contained other significant proposals.

It says Canada should accept a U.S. invitation to participate in Strategic Defence Architecture 2000, Phase 2. The scheme involves U.S. contingency planning for ballistic missile defences.

This would be through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, an agency which in theory at least has been responsible for organizing continental defence sharing for decades. This would distance the federal government from direct participation in any aspect of Star Wars planning.

Share costs

On the costly issue of building a Class 8 Arctic icebreaker to help establish Canada's claim to the

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North the report merely says that the defence department should not have to bear the entire expense.

Rather, costs should be split with other agencies like the coast guard and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which would use the services of such a ship.

Finally, the report urges a renewed commitment to close defence co-operation with the U.S.; greater efforts to persuade the Americans to purchase more military goods and services from Canada to ease our $1.35 billion deficit in defence sharing; more;

authority for the Permanent Joint Board on Defence; beefed-up land defences in Canada's North and beefed-up reserve forces generally; better integration of Maritime Command with NORAD to enhance aerospace early warning systems; and a greater say for northern communities in regional defence planning.

The national defence committee held a meeting last night to consider the recommendations, and will meet again today and twice next week. The report on NORAD renewal is due before Feb. 28.

Peace Groups’ Reaction

Ottawa THE CITIZEN in English 23 Jan 86 p A3

[Text]

Peace groups were up in arms Wednesday over a recommendation in a Commons committee draft report that Canada renew an air defence agreement with the United States for another five years.

A spokesman for the Toronto Disarmament Network said the report has triggered plans to launch a letter and telephone campaign aimed at forcing the government to shorten the length of the new agreement, and to re-insert a controversial clause dealing with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the superpowers.

The report recommends against reinstating the clause, dropped in 1981 from the current agreement, that said participation in NORAD did not commit Canada to take part in ballistic missile defence systems.

Among other recommendations: a virtual doubling of Canada’s defence spending, increased co-operation between the two countries on Arctic surveillance and initiation of a military space program for Canada to improve its surveillance capabilities.

The draft was drawn up by committee researchers and Conservative chairman William Winegard and now is being debated by other members of the Tory-heavy committee.

Opposition MPs on the committee stressed Wednesday that the report is only a draft and that they want to see, at most, a short-term or two-year renewal period.

The committee is just beginning its study of possible recommendations and has come to no conclusions, said NDP external affairs critic Pauline Jewett in an interview.

Liberals and New Democrats have also argued in the Commons committee hearings that the ABM clause should be reinstated because they fear future links between NORAD and U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s controversial Star Wars spaced-based missile defence shield.

Liberal spokesman Lloyd Axworthy said in an interview that inclusion of the clause in the new agreement is “very essential.”

Robert Penner, speaking for the disarmament network, said the recommendations came as a surprise “because the views of the Canadian people have been made pretty clear on a lot of these questions.”

John Lamb, director for the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, said the report was “alarming” and could undermine public support for any government moves to shape a more effective arms control policy.

Penner said the Toronto-based coalition will call on 40,000 supporters to telephone Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s Ottawa office and other MPs to urge the government to shorten the renewal period and reinsert the ABM clause.
Test Result

LD232101 Montreal International Service in English 2000 GMT 23 Jan 86

[Text] Yesterday's test of the U.S. cruise missile over northern Canada did not go as well as originally reported. The missile crashed at the end of the flight. The U.S. military argues that that is not really a failure, saying the missile performed more or less as it should during the flight. However, the missile did not land properly, as the test required. Reporter Dick Gordon was at the Canadian forces' base at Cold Lake, Alberta, where the military first announced a successful conclusion. He says the whole exercise raises questions about how the public gets information about these controversial tests:

No journalists are allowed to see either the missile or any part of the test maneuvers. Once the test is under way, reporters and photographers are sequestered in a restricted area on the base. In that room we have to rely on whatever information the military decides to release. Captain Rose Hicks was one of the officers who originally told reporters the missile was safely on the ground.

[Begin Hicks recording] The word that we got from the Americans was that the test had been concluded and that it was a success at that point, and then it was after the test was concluded that something went wrong. [end recording]

Something went very wrong. In order to land safely, the cruise missile was supposed to fly straight up in the air. First it burns off left over fuel, then it is supposed to turn off its own engine, spit out a parachute and float to the ground. We were told that's what happened.

[Begin Hicks recording] It wasn't until quite a bit later that we found out that the missile had had an accident and that they were out looking for it. It took them quite a long time to get out and look for it because it had disappeared, presumably in the clouds. [end recording]

Captain Hicks says the missile's still out in the bush. The Canadian forces' retrieval team knows where it is, but ran out of daylight in its effort to recover the cruise or find out how serious the damage is. The recovery operation is still under way and this has caused a similar flight schedule for tomorrow to be postponed. U.S. Air Force officials don't say when the tests will resume.
Canada will continue to allow cruise missile flight tests in this country because it is important to show solidarity with the United States, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said yesterday.

With arms control negotiations under way between the United States and the Soviet Union, it is important that Canada "not breach the solidarity of the West," Mr. Clark said during a brief exchange with reporters.

One of the unarmed missiles fell short of its target and crashed during a test at Cold Lake, Alta., on Wednesday.

That test was described yesterday as a success by Associate Defence Minister Harvie Andre.

The missile "completed its mission perfectly," Mr. Andre said.

Mr. Clark was asked about Canada's support for U.S. Air Force cruise missile tests as he left the House of Commons, where he had just delivered a policy statement on arms control.

Ottawa welcomes the newest Soviet arms control proposals as a sign that the Soviet Union is serious about nuclear disarmament, Mr. Clark told a nearly empty Commons chamber.

He reiterated Canada's concerns about U.S. Star Wars research.

The research for Star Wars, known formally as the strategic defence initiative, must "conform strictly" with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed by Moscow and Washington, Mr. Clark said.

The ABM treaty would prevent Star Wars research from proceeding to development and testing of anti-ballistic missile weapons.

Though Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Defence Minister Erik Nielsen were present for the daily Question Period, they left the Commons before Mr. Clark's statement. There were fewer than 80 MPs in the 282-seat chamber to hear the speech. Some Government strategists have suggested to Mr. Mulroney that he should make peace and disarmament issues a theme during 1986 to help the Conservatives recover lost public support.

The arms control proposals presented 10 days ago by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev indicate that Moscow is moving closer to a 1981 U.S. proposal for limiting intermediate-range nuclear missile arsenals in Europe, Mr. Clark said. In addition, he said it is gratifying to see that the Soviets acknowledge the importance of verification of arms control agreements.

The Gorbachev proposals contain some "intriguing new elements alongside well-worn positions and some disturbing preconditions that could hamper negotiation," he said.

Mr. Clark's statement on the relationship between the SDI and the ABM treaty is encouraging, said Ronald Purver, the research director of the independent Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament.

In some ways it can be interpreted as a diplomatic way of telling Washington that Canada will support SDI only if the research complies strictly with the ABM Treaty, Mr. Purver said.

Liberal foreign affairs critic Jean Chretien said Canada should urge Washington to set aside or slow down plans for the $26-billion (U.S.) SDI research program which, in his view, is the major stumbling block to progress at the Geneva arms talks.

Mr. Chretien, who was a member of the Liberal cabinet that gave approval for cruise missile testing in July, 1983, suggested that Ottawa should reconsider its position on such testing.

In 1983, it was important to show solidarity but the situation has changed now, he said.

When pressed later to elaborate, Mr. Chretien said the Liberals have not formally changed their policy on cruise tests, but the party is re-evaluating its position.

Pauline Jewett, the New Democratic Party's foreign affairs critic, said Mr. Clark's statement should have been stronger by insisting that the North American Aerospace Defence Command — a joint Canada-U.S. command — is not to become part of a Star Wars strategy.

She also called for the Government to end cruise missile testing.
Protesters at Cold Lake Base

Ottawa THE WEEKEND CITIZEN in English 25 Jan 86 p B5

[Article by Peter Bakogeorge]

[A large net dubbed the "Cruise catcher" was put away, as was the plan to use electronic jamming equipment to halt a test of the cruise missile.]

Instead, a small handful of protesters who travelled to the Canadian Forces Base at Cold Lake, Alta. Wednesday quietly marched and spoke against the cruise missile tests.

Though four members of the high-profile Greenpeace organization were arrested for blocking a road and obstructing police, the demonstration was much smaller and much quieter than those that have characterized the anti-cruise movement.

Since the Canadian government decided to allow the low-flying missiles to practise navigation over Canadian soil, "the cruise" has been the rallying call for anti-nuclear and anti-arms race groups.

Now, say organizers, the focus is shifting to more public education, lobbying against the arms race, and protesting the United States "Star Wars" program.

Kevin McKeown was in north-central Alberta Wednesday, representing Greenpeace in its opposition to the fifth test of the missile, which cruises 300 to 1,000 metres above the ground on its 2,400-km test flight across mostly unpopulated areas.

But while he was part of the group that tried to blockade the entrances to the military base, it was a far cry from the size and nature of protest last year, during the second and third test flights.

Then, a coalition of protest groups promised hundreds of protesters, and serious attempts to interfere with the test.

Though only about 40 people showed up, they managed to catch the attention of the military, and capture the imagination of many others when they unveiled the "cruise catcher."

The 30-metre net was floated into the air using heavy-duty meteorological balloons. They claimed the net and the balloons interfered with the data gathering during the flight, but military officials disagreed.

There were other, more symbolic protests.

A group assembled on a hilltop beneath the flight path, and when the missile passed over them they shot an arrow and hurled stones from slingshots into the air.

There were attempts to tie up the telephone lines to the Prime Minister's Office by calling in anti-cruise sentiments, and some protesters occupied a Canadian Forces recruiting office.

The cruise and the protests against it became a major issue. But by this week, that appeared to have changed.

McKeown, who drove from Vancouver with other Greenpeace members for the Wednesday protest, says only about 14 members of his group were on hand for the latest test.

He says that doesn't mean the anti-cruise movement has fizzled. And Greenpeace spokesman Dan McDermott says there weren't as many people on hand this week simply because the nature of the protest has changed.

Greenpeace abandoned as too dangerous its plan to use electronic jamming equipment to interfere with the flight of the missile. McDermott, speaking Wednesday from Toronto, says they therefore needed fewer people on the site to register their protest.

But he also says that many who protested at the missile base before are now fighting the nuclear buildup in other ways. "Many members of the peace movement have altered their focus. They're doing other things."

"But that doesn't mean they're any less opposed to the cruise."

John Wilkinson, executive director of Operation Dismantle, also says the fact that his organization wasn't at the Wednesday test isn't a sign it is waver ing in its opposition to the cruise tests.

"Our commitment is evolving and changing," Wilkinson said Wednesday from Ottawa.

"We have certainly not forgotten about the cruise... but the cruise is part of a larger Canadian problem we're facing."

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It was Operation Dismantle, a coalition of several anti-testch led much of the protest against the tests.

While Canadians in several cities marched for peace and against the cruise, and a small group established a peace camp on Parliament Hill, Operation Dismantle tried a legal battle.

It failed in a bid to have missile testing challenged in the courts, and failed to win an injunction that would have stopped the tests.

Now, says Wilkinson, "we're doing lobbying and engaging in public education. "We're asking the government to make this the last of the cruise tests, and some of our people are working on the NORAD agreement.

"But just because we didn't have large numbers out (at Wednesday's test) it doesn't mean our commitment to the anti-cruise movement is any less."

Toronto Protest Marchers

Toronto THE SUNDAY STAR in English 26 Jan 86 p A3

[Text]

About 200 peace activists marched amid snow flurries and chilling winds in downtown Toronto yesterday to protest last week's cruise missile test over Western Canada.

"We only get 48 hours notice (of cruise tests) and we do the best we can (to organize protest)," said Gareth Lind of Against Cruise Testing (ACT), after the march ended at the peace garden in Nathan Phillips Square.

"It is very important to be visible and vocal. The government has to know that we haven't given up and there is still opposition against cruise tests," he said.