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U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER: GREECE AND TURKEY, A CASE STUDY

BY

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The U.S. security assistance programs have been an indispensable tool of U.S. foreign policy in the post W.W.II period. However, U.S. security assistance to Greece and Turkey, two countries that are allied to the U.S. and are both members of NATO, has presented unique challenges both for U.S. policy and for the preservation of peace, stability, and security in the Eastern Mediterranean. U.S. military assistance to Greece and Turkey is a major factor in the ongoing silent confrontation between the two countries in the Aegean Sea, and the continuing and unresolved crisis that exists on the independent island Republic of Cyprus. U.S. security assistance to Greece and Turkey was intended to further U.S. and NATO goals for collective security and containment of the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War. However, the lack of balanced U.S. foreign policy goals resulted in a lack of proportionality of security assistance deliveries in both quantitative and qualitative terms. This approach has had and continues to have detrimental effects on the maintenance of a regional balance of power between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea and on Cyprus.
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BACKGROUND

THE U.S. POST-WW II RELATIONSHIP WITH GREECE AND TURKEY

The Cold War and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Balkans and the Middle East

On March 3, 1946, the Soviet Union launched its first major post-WW II thrust against the northern tier of Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Its objective was the annexation of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, where a so-called separatist movement had formed. Meanwhile, guerrilla warfare in Greece escalated with an attack on Litokhoron on March 20, 1946. The U.S. Department of State (U.S. DOS) concluded in December 1946 that communist movements from Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria - with at least Soviet acquiescence - were recruiting and training Greek dissidents in an attempt to overthrow the Greek government and separate Macedonia from Greece.

On August 7, 1946, the developing crisis between the Soviet Union and Turkey reached its climax when the Soviet Union demanded that Turkey revise the Montreux Convention to place the Turkish straits under the control of the Black Sea powers and ratify a joint Turkish-Soviet defense of the straits.

On August 23, 1946, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reported that they viewed Soviet actions in the Middle East as "a calculated Soviet policy of expanding Soviet de facto geographical political control" and concluded that Turkey was the
most important geopolitical factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Another report by the JCS stated that "the failure of the West to prevent a communist takeover in Greece would not only put the Russians on particularly dangerous flank for the Turks but strengthen the Soviet Union's ability to cut off allied supplies and assistance in the event of war."1 The rationale for U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey had been established, and in discussions with the United Kingdom (UK) the U.S gave assurances that it was prepared to assume greater responsibility in the region.

The historic transfer was initiated officially on February 24, 1947, when British Ambassador to the U.S. Lord Inverchapel handed to the Secretary of State George Marshall two aide-memoirs; one on Greece, the other on Turkey. In essence the British acknowledged the importance of protecting Greece and Turkey against Soviet influence, predicted the imminent fall of the Greek government in the absence of rapid economic and military aid, and requested the U.S. to assume the major responsibility for providing the assistance that the British economy could no longer support.

**Greek & Turkish National Security Interests and Relations**

The troubled relations of Greece and Turkey in recent decades are the legacy of their historical conflicts dating from the times of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires. Since earlier conflicts always cast a shadow on contemporary relationships,
Greeks and Turks have shown that they are not entirely prisoners of past memories. Following their last armed conflict in 1920-22, Greece and Turkey began a period of détente in the 1930s. Greek-Turkish reconciliation was introduced in 1930 by Eleftherios Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece, and Kemal Atatürk, President of Turkey. Both of these leaders had come to the conclusion that a policy based on confrontation and indefinite enmity would not advance the respective national interests of the two countries. At the same time, both countries viewed the ambitions of neighboring Bulgaria and the more distant Italy as posing more immediate threats to their security interests. The Greek-Turkish détente founded by Venizelos and Atatürk yielded agreements in the political, economic, and security spheres and overcame occasional differences between the two countries.

In the post-WW II era, the prospects for closer relations between the two neighbors were further enhanced when they opted to join the western alliance system and simultaneously became NATO members in 1952.

It was in the midst of this auspicious developments that the island of Cyprus became an arena where Greek and Turkish interests clashed, beginning in the mid-1950s. The struggle for Cypriot independence from British rule increased the tensions between Greece and Turkey. Greece actively supported the concept of self-determination for the majority of the island's
population, while Turkey was drawn into the conflict in order to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriot minority. The attainment of independence by the Cyprus Republic brought about an uneasy détente in the early 1960s which soon collapsed in 1963. The Cyprus crisis of 1963-64 resulted in intercommunal fighting on the island and the threat of a direct confrontation between Greece and Turkey was narrowly averted through the personal efforts of President Lyndon Johnson. Since that time, both Greek and Turkish defense policies for the first time in the post-war period took account of the possibility of outright war between the two countries, while the situation of the Greek minority in Turkey sharply deteriorated. Following the Greek military coup of April 1967, a new crisis erupted in Cyprus. Lacking international political support, the Greek military junta had to withdraw a Greek Army division that had been inserted into Cyprus during the 1963-64 crisis.

The U.S. and the Greek-Turkish Dispute on Cyprus & the Aegean

Since March 1947, when the Truman Doctrine announced a new era in U.S. relations with Greece and Turkey, the U.S. government has shown uncertainty on the respective positions of the two states within the context of the global U.S. foreign policy goals. This uncertainty is founded to a large extent on the inability of the U.S. State Department to adequately monitor and analyze the internal and international politics of the two countries in an institutional fashion. Thus, U.S. foreign policy
was primarily focused on the containment of the Soviet Union and on the Middle East, and there were no significant U.S. State Department institutional mechanisms and resources to pursue long-standing solutions in Greek-Turkish disputes. For example, Greece and Turkey came under the oversight of the U.S. State Department Bureau of European Affairs (EUR), in the summer of 1974, twenty days before the Turkish troops invaded Cyprus. As a result of this U.S. State Department oversight reassignment, responsible individuals were not knowledgeable about their area of responsibility as a major crisis developed. While there were many other reasons for U.S. indecisiveness in the summer of 1974 - not least the paralysis of the presidency induced by the Watergate affair and the imminent resignation of President Richard M. Nixon - it is beyond doubt that EUR, trying to orient itself in unfamiliar terrain, was not capable of recommending bold initiatives.

There were many initiatives that various U.S. administrations did launch to address Greek-Turkish differences over the Aegean and Cyprus. These initiatives included the parallel letters sent by Secretary of State Dulles to the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey in 1955; the mission of Undersecretary of State George W. Ball to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, the development of the Acheson plan, and the transmission of President Johnson’s letter of warning to Turkish prime minister Ismet Inonu, during the Cyprus crisis of 1963-64; the
Vance mission in 1967; the Sisco mission in 1974; the Clifford mission in 1977; and the Cyprus proposals of the U.S. State Department counselor Matthew Nimetz in 1978. All of the initiatives listed above, with the possible exception of the Nimetz proposals, were launched as "firefighting operations" designed primarily to prevent general hostilities between Greece and Turkey or secure other short-term objectives, and only secondarily to resolve underlying differences. These missions represent the U.S. government's reaction to events that had already reached crisis proportions.

The primary cause of Greek-Turkish disputes during the 1950s and 1960s was the Cyprus question. But in late-1973, following the discovery of oil deposits off the southern shore of the island of Thasos in the northeastern part of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, a number of international sea and air space boundary issues entered the framework of Greek-Turkish relations.  

THE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY

U.S. Security Assistance & U.S. Foreign Policy Actors

Security assistance is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy that consists of a variety of measures. These measures are largely authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), for the transfer of defense equipment, services and training to foreign governments and
international organizations by sale, grant, credit, financing, and lease.

The U.S. government security assistance grant and loan programs are funded along with other foreign affairs budget categories. The U.S. State Department has policy oversight for security assistance, while the U.S. Department of Defense (U.S. DOD) implements the worldwide programs through the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).

The principal components of the military portion of security assistance are the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants and loans, International Military Education and Training (IMET), transfers of Excess Defense Articles (EDA), and presidentially directed drawdowns of defense assets. These programs promote interoperability and self-sufficiency among allies, and support strategic overseas access for U.S. military forces.

Transfers of U.S. defense equipment and training help security partners defend against possible aggression and strengthen their ability to fight alongside U.S. forces in coalition efforts. Adequate military capability among allies, promoted by security assistance, decreases the likelihood that the commitment of U.S. forces will be necessary if conflict arises, and increases the chances that U.S. forces will find coalition partners should a U.S. military response be required.
The U.S. post-WW II military grant aid program, and the involvement of the U.S. in the Vietnam war, motivated Congress to assume a greater role in the decision making process regarding security assistance. Congressional interventions concerning security assistance included the imposition of a partial arms embargo on Turkey, a U.S. ally and a NATO member, as a result of the Turkish 1974 invasion of Cyprus.

The decision of the Congress to play a more important role in the foreign policy of the U.S. in respect to the overseas transfers of military technology, was manifested in the enactment of the AECA in 1976. AECA provides Congress with the ability to control the President's conduct in entering into agreements for the transfer of military equipment and services under the FMS programs and for licensing commercial exports of military technology. Furthermore Congress declared that sales of military equipment and technology should be approved only when they are consistent with the foreign policy interests of the U.S.

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The Evolution of U.S. Security Assistance Programs

Military technology transfers in the modern world have never ceased to impact in a significant manner the overall conduct of international relations. Military technology transfers have presented, and continue to present, a multitude of challenges for the international and domestic, economic, political, and security affairs of nations which are the donors or the recipients of such technology.

The U.S., along with other industrialized powers, has been a traditional supplier of military technology to other nations. The international demand for arms has given the opportunity for the U.S. to pursue its domestic and international goals through its transfers of military technology to various national governments and independent groups.

Military technology transfers are traditional foreign policy instruments which affect both the supplier and the recipient nations. Supplier nations not only provide arms in order to
satisfy the security needs of individual recipient nations and regional alliances, but they also provide arms in order to exert influence on the behavior of the respective national and regional alliance recipients. At the same time, however, military technology transfers have given rise and continue to promote interdependency relationships between suppliers and recipients.

The Cold War national strategy of containment demanded the worldwide presence of a modern, trained U.S. military capability, maintenance of its readiness for combat, and help to friendly allied countries around the globe to develop strong national defenses. The U.S. initially provided a bargain-basement shortcut to military modernization with its WW II and Korean War stocks of inexpensive but reliable arms and a wide range of associated military equipment. Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, which became Security Assistance in the early 1960s, the U.S. provided on a grant basis or sold a wide range of defense articles and services, including professional education and technical training.

Adequate foreign and security assistance resources, can prevent the commitment of U.S. military forces. The assistance resources are foreign policy instruments that can better address threats to U.S. national security in a variety of situations. When American military power must be engaged, security assistance helps to ensure that crucial support of friendly forces is provided - including operational support and backing from capable
military organizations - thus enabling the U.S. military to effectively deter and defeat challenges to U.S. national security.

**DISCUSSION**

**U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AND TURKEY AND THE COLD WAR**

**The Truman Doctrine and the U.S. Policies of Containment**

Shortly after the British formally informed the U.S. government that they could no longer afford the cost of $250 million in economic and military support needed to maintain the non-communist status quo in Greece and Turkey, the U.S. decision-making apparatus responded with the historic proclamation of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947. This doctrine was prompted by U.S. official perceptions that the "communist rebellion" in Greece could prove successful without massive American intervention. The fall of Greece into the Soviet orbit was expected to lead to the isolation, encirclement, and potential loss of Turkey for the West.

The Truman Doctrine was proclaimed, despite considerable skepticism among some members of the U.S. administration and the cautiousness of Republican senators; and it signaled America's determination to proceed on a course of containment of the Soviet Union, initially in the Balkans and the Middle East. Greece and Turkey became the examples of America's determination to confront the rise of communism, equated with Soviet
expansionism, in any part of the globe beyond the immediate
Soviet sphere of influence in the Warsaw Pact.

U.S. Foreign Policy & Security Assistance to Greece & Turkey

U.S. military and economic aid became the primary lever of
U.S. presence and influence in Greece and Turkey. The U.S.
Congress initially authorized $400 million for aid to both
countries. But with the proclamation of the Marshall Fund (June
1947), U.S. aid considerably increased, amounting to well over $6
billion by the end of the 1960s. Greece had received $1.7
billion in economic aid (loans and grants) and $1.3 billion in
military aid, and Turkey received $1.1 billion in economic aid
(loans and grants) and $1.9 billion in military aid.  

The U.S. military presence in Greece and Turkey was
formalized with bilateral base agreements signed in February and
June 1954 that bound the U.S. with Greece and Turkey
respectively. These agreements provided for America’s right to
establish bases; to man equip and resupply these bases; to
overfly Greek and Turkish territories; and to provide generally
for the legal status and local accountability of U.S. forces in
the host countries.  

U.S. Assistance & Domestic Politics in Greece & Turkey

Greece and Turkey faced different circumstances in the
spring of 1947. The Greek government was in the midst of a civil
war; and its major external supporter, Great Britain, was about
to cease essential economic and military aid. For the government in Athens, western support was not a question of choice, but an imperative for the survival of the existing political system. Given this utter dependency, the Greek government was eager to unquestionably agree with U.S. views in order to ensure that the U.S. would replace Britain as the source of external assistance. On the contrary, Turkey - where internal political cohesion and economic conditions were much more normal - was the conscious initiator of efforts to secure a permanent U.S. commitment on Turkish territory that would serve as a deterrent to Soviet threats against Turkey's territorial integrity. The Turks proved to be tougher negotiators than the Greeks, given their condition of lessened dependency vis-à-vis the U.S.

Generalizing about the period 1947-1954, one can assign relatively high magnitudes of U.S. influence in Greece and Turkey. In the case of Greece, however, U.S. influence was stronger and more direct than it was in Turkey. The reason was that conditions in Greece were chaotic after WW II, and the ruling government in Athens, facing a major domestic insurgency, was utterly dependent on external assistance for maintaining itself in power and preserving the domestic political status quo.

**U.S. Assistance & the Regional Balance of Power - the 1960s**

Greece's status as a client state of the U.S. led to the initial underdevelopment of Greece's national defense posture. Although the U.S. supplied Turkey with weapons systems of such
quality and numbers to enable the Turkish armed forces to resist a direct Soviet attack, U.S. military assistance to Greece was initially designed primarily to ensure Greece’s internal security in the post-Civil War period. This policy determination was reached by the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) in March 1949.\footnote{As the U.S.-Soviet détente manifested itself in practice, regional tensions surfaced involving Greek-Turkish relations over Cyprus. As both countries felt that dangers from the Soviet-supported Balkan states and the Soviet Union began to subside, they began to place more emphasis on the “national question” of Cyprus and became considerably more sensitive to foreign interference in their domestic affairs. During the 1963-64 Cyprus crisis, the two ethnic communities in the newly born country of the Cyprus Republic, moved in the direction of increasing separatism rather than integration. The Turkish Cypriot and Turkish rejection of the constitutional reforms that had been proposed by Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus in 1963, led to serious clashes between the two communities. Turkey began preparations for a military invasion in Cyprus. The preparations were leaked to the press, in the hope that the U.S. would intervene. President Johnson, who believed with his advisers that a Turkish landing in Cyprus would have resulted in a NATO-shattering Greek-Turkish war, asked Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu to immediately refrain from...}
landing troops in Cyprus with the aim of *de facto* partition.

Johnson's letter to the Inonu asserted flatly that a Turkish invasion would surely lead to a Turkish-Greek war, which was purely unthinkable. Particularly vexing to the Turks were two provisions in the letter dealing with the contingency of Soviet involvement in the dispute and with the use of U.S. military equipment by Turkish forces in Cyprus. In Johnson's words:

> Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope that you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.¹⁸

On the second issue, Johnson stated categorically, "I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances."

THE GREEK-TURKISH CONFRONTATION AND U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE

The 1974 Cyprus Crisis and Greek-Turkish Relations

Greece's very existence as a modern state arose out of a war of national independence against the Ottoman Turks in 1821-1829, and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. The modern Turkish Republic had its genesis in the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-1922. Just as the Greeks commemorate their liberation from the Turks on March 25, the day that is held to mark the outbreak of the Greek war of independence, so August 30 each year the Turks mark Mustafa Kemal

¹⁸
Ataturk's victory over the Greeks in 1922 during the Turkish war of independence.

Shortly after the 1919-1922 conflict, however, the statesmanship of Greek Prime Minister Venizelos and Turkish President Ataturk brought about, through the Ankara convention of 1930, a dramatic improvement in relations between the two countries, although this rapprochement was achieved through considerable concessions on the Greek side. The emergence of the Cold War, with both countries under threat from the Soviet Union and its satellites, led to close political cooperation between the two countries, the entry of both Greece and Turkey into the NATO alliance in 1952, and the formation of the short-lived Balkan Pact of 1953. But, as the struggle for Cypriot independence was intensified by the Greek Cypriots, this brief honeymoon in Greek-Turkish relations ended abruptly with the anti-Greek riots of 1955 in Istanbul. A short-lived climate of relative détente between the two countries was ushered in by the Zurich and London agreements of 1959, which paved the way for the independence of the Cyprus Republic.

The uneasy détente of the early 1960s soon collapsed in 1963, with the breakdown of the 1960 Cyprus constitution, the outbreak of intercommunal fighting on the island, and U.S. intervention in averting a Greek-Turkish war. Since that time, both Greek and Turkish defense policies for the first time in the post-WW II period took account of the possibility of outright
war. The possibility of such an armed confrontation became close a few months after a military junta seized power in Greece in 1967. This crisis was also resolved following U.S. intervention that obliged the Greek junta to withdraw a Greek Army division that had been inserted into Cyprus during the 1963-64 crisis.

Bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey were to deteriorate sharply in 1973. The world-wide energy crisis and the discovery of oil off the island of Thasos in the Greek territorial waters of the Aegean, prompted the Turkish government in November 1973 to issue licenses to the state-owned Turkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortakligi to conduct exploratory soundings in the vicinity of the Greek islands of Lemnos, Mytilini, and Chios, in international waters but in a region that Greece regarded as being part of its continental shelf.

In February 1974, the Greek government made a formal protest to Ankara stressing that the areas marked out for oil exploration by Turkey formed part of the Greek continental shelf under the terms of the 1958 Law of the Sea Geneva Convention. Turkey replied that the areas in dispute formed part of the natural extension of the Anatolian peninsula and rejected the Greek claim that the Greek islands possessed their own continental shelf. The situation deteriorated further when, on May 29, 1974, the Turkish survey ship Candarli, escorted by Turkish warships, initiated a program of seismological surveys. A few days later, on June 12, Turkey formally declared that any extension of Greek
territorial waters from six miles to the more internationally accepted norm of a 12-mile zone would constitute a *casus belli*.

The growing crisis in the Aegean was soon overshadowed by the Turkish invasion on Cyprus in July-August 1974, which, as both countries mobilized, brought the two countries to the brink of war. It should be noted that the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, before launching the invasion, sought Turkish/UK intervention in Cyprus, since the UK, Greece and Turkey were the guarantor powers under the 1960 Zurich Accords. It is possible that if the UK had agreed to this proposal, the Turkish military invasion and occupation of the island could have been forestalled.

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus proceeded in accordance with operational plans that had been developed in earnest by the Turkish military command structure since the Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964. The Turkish military effort was greatly aided by the disorganization of the island’s defenses following the military coup against the government of Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus, and the unpreparedness of the Greek junta to react to the Turkish military intervention. The 1967 withdrawal of the Greek army division from Cyprus essentially left the island without any modern armor, and significantly degraded the National Guard capabilities in field and air defense artillery and heavy infantry weapons. Thus, on the eve of the Turkish invasion, the
Cypriot National Guard possessed only a few obsolete Soviet-made T-34 tanks and armored vehicles, mainly of WW II vintage.

The 1974 Cyprus crisis also showed the stark reality of the imbalance of military forces between Greece and Turkey. For example, in 1973-74 the Turkish Air Force (Türk Hava Kuvvetleri) was operating approximately 292 combat aircraft with approximately 234 of them, or 80.14%, being supersonic F-104Gs, F-102As, F-5A/Bs, and F-100Ds. In contrast, the Hellenic Air Force (HAF) possessed only 225 combat aircraft, but only approximately 108 of them, or 48%, were of the more modern supersonic types. The Turkish Army possessed approximately 1,400 armored fighting vehicles of all types, while the corresponding figure for the Greek Army was approximately 650.20

The Turkish landing operations in Cyprus were undertaken with the TAF enjoying air supremacy over the island. The HAF did not intervene in the combat operations over the island, but successfully transported a limited number of commando troops to Cyprus during the fighting.21 The Turkish military operations were carried out in two phases. The initial landing and the establishment of a narrow beachhead at Kyreneia was followed by a cease fire mandated by the UN. During this period, the Turkish Army continued to expand its beachhead and landed additional units with significant armor elements, including M-47 and M-48 tanks. In the second phase, Turkish units breached the Cypriot
and Greek defense lines and established the "Attilas Line" which divides the island to the present day.\textsuperscript{22} 

The unpreparedness of the Greek junta to successfully react to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus caused the restoration of democracy in Greece and the formation of a civilian coalition government under Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis. Karamanlis soon made it clear that he did not envisage war as any kind of resolution for the Greek-Turkish impasse. He did, however, withdraw Greece from the military command structure of NATO in August 1974. In Karamanlis words "I had to choose... [e]ither to declare war on Turkey or to leave NATO... [b]etween the two I chose the lesser evil."\textsuperscript{23} The cause of the Greek indignation was NATO's refusal to play any role in resolving the Cyprus crisis. Relations between Greece and Turkey remained in a critical state and, since that time, a number of issues, including Cyprus, have affected the relations between the two countries. The continental shelf dispute predated the July 1974 crisis. To this complicated issue and the problem of Cyprus were added further apples of discord\textsuperscript{24}.

The 1974 Cyprus Crisis and the U.S. Assistance Programs

The Cyprus crisis of 1974 proved as erroneous one of the fundamental premises of U.S. foreign policy that had been formulated by Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. This premise was based on the theory that crises
in international affairs could be successfully managed through bilateral arrangements of the superpowers. The then relatively recent historical experience of the October 1973 Middle East war and Dr. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy had reinforced that premise. However, the Cyprus crisis of 1974 found a U.S. Administration caught in the paralysis of the Watergate scandal, and totally unprepared, if not outright unwilling, to actively dissuade Turkish military action as had happened before in 1963-64 and 1967.

The Cyprus crisis of 1974 caused a fundamental shift in Greek-U.S. relations. Greece withdrew from the military wing of NATO in August 1974, demonstrating the point that the U.S. and the alliance were incapable or unwilling to prevent a "fellow ally" from becoming an aggressor. In addition, the U.S. Congress, having assumed a more forceful role in U.S. foreign policy making following the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Vietnam, was motivated in part by the Greek-American community in the U.S. to impose an arms embargo on Turkey during the 1975-1978 period. Although the arms embargo did not seriously undermine the war fighting capabilities of the Turkish armed forces (Turkey continued to receive military assistance from western European NATO members), it partially redressed the imbalance in quantitative and qualitative aspects in military equipment that existed between Greece and Turkey. In addition Greece assumed a more demanding stance in subsequent negotiations in its bilateral
defense relationship with the U.S. In particular, Greece became more watchful of the corresponding Turkish-U.S. negotiations of bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreements (DECAs), that governed the operation of U.S. military bases in Greece and Turkey in exchange for military and economic assistance.

NEW INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE U.S., GREECE AND TURKEY

U.S. Security Assistance to and the "7/10" Ratio

The apportionment of U.S. security assistance to Greece and Turkey has become a bone of contention. Over the course of fifty years, from 1947 through 1997, U.S. security assistance to Greece has totaled over $5.7 billion and to Turkey over $9.8 billion. The annual security assistance proposals by the executive branch and the hearings that accompany the Congressional authorization and appropriation process have become almost as familiar to the Greek and Turkish governments as they are to the Defense and State Departments. This has been especially true since the Cyprus crisis of 1974, when Turkish armed forces invaded (and continue to occupy) almost 40 percent of the island. An estimated 30,000-35,000 Turkish troops remain on the divided island, and U.S. and international efforts to achieve a Turkish withdrawal as part of an overall resolution have failed to date.

A major part of the U.S. policy in the Cyprus conflict was the Congressional action in 1974 and 1975 in placing an embargo on military aid to Turkey. Against strong Ford Administration objections, Congress voted for the embargo, which went into
effect in February 1975. The embargo was partially lifted later that year to permit FMS sales of $125 million. The Carter Administration lifted this embargo entirely in September 1978. There was never a clear consensus within the U.S. Congress or between the Congress and the executive branch regarding the effectiveness of the embargo as leverage on Turkey to remove its troops from Cyprus. It is widely believed that unconstrained U.S. military assistance to Turkey does not provide U.S. policy makers with the necessary leverage in order to achieve a resolution of the Cyprus problem.

Since 1980, Congress has developed informally the practice of granting military aid to Greece and Turkey on the basis of a "7:10" ratio. This approach is a compromise that has been forged from competing domestic and foreign policy concerns. It reflects a long-standing difference in Congressional and executive perspectives on the two nations, their bilateral disputes, and on the intended link between U.S. security assistance and U.S. policy in general. This ratio, as part of the annual review of military aid to Turkey, has emerged essentially as Congress' way of expressing to the executive its concerns and interest in the situation in the eastern Mediterranean. The first public milestone in the evolution of this ratio was the legislative language that was adopted when the arms embargo against Turkey was lifted:

The Congress declares that the achievement of a just and lasting Cyprus settlement is and will remain a
The central objective of U.S. foreign policy... U.S. policy regarding Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey shall be directed toward the restoration of a stable and peaceful atmosphere in the eastern Mediterranean region and shall therefore be governed by the following principles: ...(4) the U.S. will furnish security assistance for Greece and Turkey only when furnishing that assistance is intended solely for defensive purposes... and shall be designed to ensure that the present balance of military strength among countries of the region, including Greece and Turkey, is preserved. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit the transfer of defense articles to Greece or Turkey for legitimate self-defense or to enable Greece or Turkey to fulfill their NATO obligations. Sec.620C of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, emphasis added. 26

The figures that may have provided the basis for determining what might constitute a fair balance between the two countries come from the two defense and cooperation agreements discussed between the U.S. and Greece and Turkey in 1976 but never implemented. On March 26, 1976, the U.S. and Turkey signed an agreement which called for defense support consisting of grants, credits and loan guarantees of $1.0 billion during the first four years of the agreement's duration. The Greek government of Prime Minister Karamanlis was negotiating its own DECA agreement with the U.S. at that time. However, the U.S. proposals concerned much lower levels of aid than what was contained in the U.S.-Turkish DECA. The Greek Foreign Ministry researched the levels of U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey since 1947 and concluded that this aid had a 7:10 proportional allocation between the two countries. On that basis, the Karamanlis government demanded a $700 million aid package during the pending U.S.-Greek DECA
negotiations. On April 15, 1976, the U.S. State Department released principles to guide future U.S.-Greek defense cooperation, which made reference to a four-year commitment to Greece of military assistance totaling $0.7 billion, a part of which would have been grant aid. Thus, the “7:10” ratio was established by the Greek government as the guiding principle for the distribution of U.S. military aid to Greece and Turkey, and for the maintenance of regional balance of power.

Since 1983, the debate between the Congressional and executive branches of the U.S. government has also broadened to include new factors as conditions for improvements in the military assistance programs to both countries:

- The quality of the respective aid programs has come under scrutiny, as Greece has sought concessional treatment similar to the aid concessions that have been or are made to Turkey.
- The calculation of the 7:10 ratio on the basis of military aid alone has been questioned and the inclusion of economic aid should be considered (Greece is not a recipient of U.S. economic assistance while Turkey still receives U.S. economic aid).
- Turkey’s transition to a real democracy, Turkey’s domestic human rights situation, and progress in talks designed to resolve the Cyprus problem.

In order to increase security assistance to Turkey, U.S. Administrations have generally presented strategic arguments, despite a clear Congressional mandate to focus U.S. policy on a
settlement of the Cyprus problem and on achieving a withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the island.

The "7:10" ratio, as time passes, takes a more institutional meaning:

- Preserves a **consistent balance** in U.S. aid levels to Greece and Turkey, and prevents either country from viewing the U.S. as compromising its objectivity on their bilateral disputes.
- Promotes a degree of stability and predictability for U.S. policy and calms regional concerns about sudden shifts in U.S. foreign policy aims.
- Provides a political symbol in Greece of U.S. concerns for Greek positions, despite the U.S. inability to achieve a Turkish withdrawal from Cyprus.
- Offers a device to constrain large increases in military aid to Turkey by obligating increases for Greece as well.
- Gives the U.S. Congress a way to monitor and serve notice to the executive branch that it is not satisfied with U.S. diplomatic efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem.

The 7:10 ratio is a high profile political issue for Greece in its relations with the U.S. This ratio is the minimum quantitative term Greece wishes to accept in its defense relationship with the U.S. Greece has increasingly placed its focus on the quality of U.S. military aid. This focus has been triggered by the increased quality of U.S. weapons systems that are transferred to Turkey, where such weapons systems clearly enhance the offensive capabilities of the Turkish Armed Forces in both the Aegean and on Cyprus. For example, the U.S. approved
the delivery of 72 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) units to Turkey in November 1995, with an additional transfer option of 48 units, and with deliveries commencing in April 1998. Although Greece had sought to receive the ATACMS system since 1994, the U.S. did not approve the transfer of ATACMS systems until well after the Greek-Turkish Imia crisis in the Aegean in January-February 1996. The Greek ATACMS order involves 40 missiles. ATACMS missiles can be launched from the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) vehicles of the Turkish Army, and their range and submunitions carrying capability pose a serious threat to the defenses of the Greek islands in the Aegean, as well as the defenses of the Cyprus Republic. Similarly, the U.S. has significantly increased the offensive capabilities of the THK through the transfer of seven Boeing KC-135R aerial refueling aircraft in the 1997-1999 time frame, while two KC-135As were leased by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) for TAF since July 1995. The THK aerial refueling capability has essentially enabled Turkish F-16s to operate in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus from bases in Turkey that cannot be easily reached by HAF offensive counter-air strikes. Greece is currently seeking to obtain its own aerial refueling capability within the context of its own long-term military modernization program.

Since the 1974 Cyprus crisis, both Greece and Turkey have escalated their respective military procurement programs. This has resulted in heavy defense expenditures for both countries.
Greek defense expenditures amounted to an average annual figure of 5.2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the 1985-1989 period in constant prices, and 4.5% during the 1990-1994 period. The corresponding figures for Turkey were 3.2% during 1985-1989, and 3.6% in 1990-1994. In contrast, the same figures for the European NATO nations (inclusive of Greece and Turkey) were 3.2% during the 1985-1989 period, and 2.7% in 1990-1994. Greek and Turkish defense expenditures were expected to reach 4.6% and 3.9% of the respective national GDPs in 1995.  

In the 1980s, Greece became increasingly concerned for its balance of payments deficits, and called for more concessional terms in U.S. military aid. Greece also asked to be qualified for Economic Support Fund monies. The U.S. so far has not granted this request. The continuous tension between Greece and Turkey in the 1990s did not produce a "peace dividend" for the governments in Athens. To the contrary, in 1996 Greece announced a 10-year major rearmament and military modernization program of $16 billion. Thus, although Greece is striving to achieve the monetary convergence targets of the European Union in the context of the Maastricht Treaty, it has to sustain the continuous burden of heavy defense expenditures. Thus, the role of U.S. military assistance and the 7:10 ratio continue to occupy a prominent position in Greek national security policies.
The U.S., Greece, Turkey and the DECA Agreements

The primary formal bilateral instruments of U.S. defense cooperation with Greece and Turkey after the 1974 Cyprus crisis were the periodic Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreements (DECA). The DECA agreements have largely governed not only the flow of U.S. military technology to the two nations, but it has also provided the institutional and legal framework for the operation of U.S. military bases in the two countries. Furthermore, the DECA agreements have functioned in the development of the domestic defense industries in both Greece and Turkey.

The negotiation and execution of the distinct bilateral DECA agreements since the late-1970s, has been premised on the preservation of the 7:10 ratio. Greece, during its negotiations of individual DECA agreements, has unsuccessfully sought to obtain a bilateral security guarantee from the U.S. As previously mentioned, the U.S. legal framework that governs military aid to Greece and Turkey references the need to preserve the military balance between the two countries. However, the 1990 DECA between Greece and Turkey contained the following reference in its Preamble:

The United States and Greece declare their dedication to the maintenance of peace and their commitment to respect the principle of refraining from actions threatening to peace; reiterate their firm determination mutually to safeguard and protect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of their respective countries against actions threatening to peace, including armed attack or
threat thereof; and confirm their resolve to oppose actively and unequivocally any such attempt or action and their commitment to make appropriate major efforts to prevent such a course of action[.]


Following the Cyprus crisis of 1974, and the U.S. 1974-1978 arms embargo on Turkey, both Greece and Turkey sought to obtain more preferential terms in their respective DECA agreements with the U.S. and to develop their respective indigenous defense industries. For example, the U.S.-Turkish DECA agreement of 1980 postulated the conversion of existing Turkish M-48 battle tank inventories to the M-48A3 and/or M-48A5 standard. 33 In implementing this program, the U.S. transferred the appropriate heavy industrial equipment and conversion kits to Turkey during the 1982-1990 period, and the last upgraded M-48A5T1 was delivered to the Turkish Army in 1993. 34

The most significant U.S.-Turkish industrial defense cooperation project has been the coproduction arrangement for the Lockheed Martin (formerly General Dynamics) F-16 "Fighting Falcon" fighter aircraft. Under the Peace Onyx programs, it is expected that the TÜSAS Aerospace Industries airframe production facility at the Mürted Air Base near Ankara, will be delivering a total of 240 F-16C/Ds to the THK by the late-1990s. The whole program cost is projected at $4.2 billion. 35 TÜSAS Aerospace has
also exported 46 F-16C/Ds to the Egyptian Air Force since March 1994.36

Although Greece has not developed an indigenous aircraft production capability, Lockheed Martin had assisted with the development of the Hellenic Aerospace Industry (HAI) in the mid-1970s. HAI is a major aircraft maintenance and overhaul facility in Tanagra near Athens, and engages in the production of subassemblies for both civilian and military aircraft. HAI also produces telecommunications equipment and military electronics. Although HAI's main function is the support of the HAF, its customers include the United States Air Force in Europe (USAFE), the UK Royal Air Force (RAF), France, Portugal and various Arab states.37 In the context of the U.S. transfers of Lockheed Martin F-16C/D fighter aircraft to the HAF under the Peace Xenia programs, HAI manufactures F-16 rear fuselages and intakes as part of the offset benefits.38

The U.S. transfers of military technology to Greece and Turkey in the context of the respective DECA agreements, have long-term implications for the 7:10 ratio and for the defense production capabilities of the two countries. The significance of the 7:10 ratio will erode over time if the transfer of "know how" and industrial production technologies for defense items continues unabated from the U.S. to Turkey. Although the defense industries of both Greece and Turkey are not self-sustaining in economic terms, it appears that Turkey is much more willing to
support its defense industrial base at a high economic cost for its domestic economy.

U.S. Aid and the Defense Postures of Greece and Turkey

The U.S. military assistance patterns to Greece and Turkey have largely reflected the U.S. foreign policies towards the two countries. These military assistance patterns were initially governed by the U.S. principles of containment during the Cold War, and the sharing of borders between the Soviet Union and Turkey. As previously stated, however, Turkey was able to negotiate its defense relationship with the U.S. as a sovereign state since the late-1940s. On the other hand, Greece was obliged to accept the status of a dependent state upon its liberation after WW II, and during its struggle of the Civil War that followed in 1946-1949. Thus, although Turkey was able to absorb U.S. military assistance for the gradual development of its national defense infrastructure during the 1940s and 1950s, Greece had expended most of the U.S. military aid under the Truman Doctrine in fighting the Civil War. For example, the U.S. undertook a massive modernization program of the THK that commenced in 1947 and involved virtually all aspects of THK's combat operations, command, control and communications, training, technical support of the aircraft inventories, and air base construction. Furthermore, this U.S. effort involved the transfer of numerous U.S. combat, training and transport aircraft of WW II vintage to the THK, and the preparation of adequate
infrastructure for the delivery of the first North American F-84 jet fighters to the THK in 1952.\textsuperscript{39}

Turkey’s borders with the Soviet Union also led the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to adopt different positions on the long-term strategic defense relationships between the U.S. and the two countries. In turn, these positions had a direct effect for the respective U.S. military assistance programs. In 1957, a U.S. JCS and the NSC study had concluded that the Greek Armed Forces should be capable of maintaining internal security against a \textit{domestic} “communist threat.” In sharp contrast, the same study concluded that the Turkish Armed Forces should be able to resist direct Soviet aggression for a sufficient period of time until U.S. and NATO reinforcements arrived to assist with the defense and preservation of Turkey’s sovereign territory. However, although the same JCS study had concluded that the Greek Armed Forces had a limited ability to resist a direct aggression from Warsaw Pact forces, it did not espouse any significant improvement for the national defense capabilities of Greece. Consequently, the U.S. military aid to the two countries was tailored to fit the respective roles that were “assigned” to the military establishments of Greece and Turkey.\textsuperscript{40}

The U.S. bases in Turkey had a strategic intelligence role and were designed to participate in a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. These installations were able to monitor activities deep within the Soviet Union, and could accommodate
nuclear bombers of the then U.S. Strategic Air Command. The installation of the Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with nuclear warheads in Turkey was also one of the factors that gave rise to the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The Kennedy Administration withdrew these IRBMs to the consternation of the Turks, following the Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba.

These U.S. military assistance patterns resulted in the introduction of more numerous and more advanced weapons systems into the inventories of the Turkish Armed Forces. For example, the THK was equipped with North American F-100D Super Sabre jet fighters in the 1957-58 time frame. However, the HAF did not benefit from any corresponding F-100 deliveries.

The highly disproportionate quantitative and qualitative imbalance of U.S. military aid to Greece and Turkey during the 1950s and 1960s were first manifested itself during the Cyprus crisis of 1963-64. Greece quickly realized that it could not provide air support to the defenses of the Cyprus Republic. Furthermore, the numerical inequality between the Air Forces of Greece and Turkey was even utilized by the Johnson Administration in politically pressuring Greece to accept settlement proposals that were unacceptable to the Greek government of Prime Minister George Papandreou and the Cyprus government of Archbishop Makarios. During the 1963-64 Cyprus crisis and in the 1964-65 time frame, the HAF operated approximately 180 combat aircraft,
with only 50 of them, or 27.8%, being the supersonic F-104Gs and F-5A/Bs. In comparison, Turkey operated approximately 288 combat aircraft, with 126 (or 43.8%), being the F-100D, F-104G and F-5A/B supersonic types. Thus, the THK enjoyed a 1.6:1 overall numerical superiority in combat aircraft, and a 2.5:1 superiority in supersonic aircraft. When the 1967 Cyprus crisis ensued, the THK enjoyed a numerical superiority of 2.1:1 and a 3:1 superiority in supersonic aircraft.

Since the late-1960s, both Greece and Turkey had started to diversify their arms procurement policies. The Greek junta, faced with a limited U.S. arms embargo in the 1967-68 time frame, proceeded to order a number of AMX-30 medium battle tanks (MBTs), and missile-guided fast attack craft from France, while in 1967 an agreement was signed for the procurement of four HDW Glavkos class Type 209/1100 submarines from West Germany which were delivered to the Hellenic Navy in 1971-72.

The 1974 Cyprus crisis not only demonstrated Turkey’s air superiority over the embattled island, but it also provided concrete proof of Turkey’s long-term development of its amphibious warfare capabilities. Indeed, Turkey had redressed its lack of landing craft that had existed in the 1963-65 time frame through indigenous shipbuilding efforts. Similarly, the Turkish Armed Forces deployed both paratroop and heliborne forces during their invasion of Cyprus. The subsequent creation of the Turkish “Aegean Army” in July 1975, with headquarters in Izmir,
encompassed a concrete threat of seaborne and airborne operations against the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean Sea.\textsuperscript{45}

The active intervention of the U.S. Congress in matters of U.S. military assistance to Greece and Turkey, especially through the 1974-78 arms embargo on Turkey, assisted in reestablishing a proportional regional balance of power between the two countries in the late-1970s and for most of the 1980s. Furthermore, Greece intensified its efforts to diversify its sources of weapons supplies from other countries besides the U.S. During that time frame Greece achieved a proportional quantitative parity with Turkey in terms of air and sea power, while the HAF combat aircraft inventory enjoyed a slight qualitative edge over the THK in the Aegean Sea. Indeed, the deliveries of 40 Dassault Mirage F1-CG aircraft from France, and the FMS deliveries of F/RF-4E and A-7E aircraft to the HAF, permitted the Greek Armed Forces to deploy adequate amounts of deterrent force during the Aegean crises during the summer of 1976 and in May 1987. For example, the THK numerical superiority in combat aircraft had reached 1.6:1 in the 1975-76 time frame; however, the HAF possessed 76 modern fighters and fighter-bombers (F4-Es, A-7Es and F1-CGs), as compared to the 40 F-4Es of the THK.\textsuperscript{46}

The development of new U.S. "containment" policies in the Middle East and in the Balkans during the 1990s, is resulting in massive amounts of U.S. military aid to Turkey. This development threatens the tenuous proportional balance of power that exists
in the Aegean, and reinforces Turkish military capabilities on
Cyprus. Turkey is engaged in an ambitious and massive long-term
rearmament program that is largely based on U.S. military aid, on
a relatively new defense cooperation with Israel, and on the
development of its indigenous defense industries. Turkey's
dependence on U.S. military technology transfers is becoming more
pronounced in view of the European Union's (EU's) rejection of
Turkey's candidacy for full membership in the EU.

For Greek foreign policy makers, Turkey is pursuing an
unambiguous agenda of territorial revisionism. Turkey's
continuous provocations in the Aegean that resulted in the Imia
crisis of 1996, Turkish intransigence over the Cyprus problem,
and Turkish attempts to exert political influence in the Balkans
and in former republics of the Soviet Union, are viewed by Athens
as the manifestation of a long-term threat to the national
security of Greece and that of the unoccupied portion of the
island Republic of Cyprus. Thus, Greece views with growing
apprehension the U.S. military assistance to Turkey and the
development of the U.S.-Israel-Turkey defense cooperation
arrangements.

At the same time, successive U.S. administrations have not
seriously questioned the motives of Turkish foreign policy in the
Aegean and Cyprus, nor have they questioned the Turkish military
posture and clearly hostile actions in these regions.
Furthermore, the U.S. has stayed largely silent on the
independent role that the command structure of the Turkish Armed Forces plays in the domestic politics of Turkey. Indeed, the U.S. largely condoned the actions of the Turkish military in “safeguarding” Turkey’s secular political system that resulted in the resignation of the elected islamist Prime Minister Nemsantin Erbakan in June 1997. Furthermore, U.S. administration reactions to human rights violations in Turkey, the treatment of the Kurdish ethnic minority in Turkey, and the unending campaigns of the Turkish Armed and Internal Security Forces against the Kurdish guerillas of the PKK, have been tepid at best.

It appears that U.S. military technology transfers to Turkey and the development of the indigenous Turkish defense industrial base will irrevocably change the balance of regional forces in the Aegean and Cyprus in the next century. For example, the Peace Onyx F-16C/D coproduction arrangement in Turkey will result in the delivery of 220 “third generation” combat aircraft to the THK by mid-1999. In comparison, the HAF will possess only 114 comparable F-16C/D and Mirage 2000EG/BG fighters in the same time frame. Furthermore, Turkey’s program for modernizing 56 of its F-4E Phantom aircraft under a $632 million contract with the Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI), has triggered a corresponding program for the upgrade of 39 HAF F-4E Phantoms by the German firm of Deutsche Aerospace AG (DASA), at an estimated cost of $315 million.
The developing imbalance of power in the Aegean has resulted in the continuous challenges of Greek national security and sovereignty by the Turkish Armed Forces. For example, the THK exploiting its current numerical advantage in combat aircraft of 1.2:1 over the HAF, and its advantage in F-16C/D "third generation" aircraft of 2:1, routinely engages in massive violations of Greek air space. Since 1994, these violations often result in mock dogfights between armed aircraft of the two opposing Air Forces. Although no shots have been fired in anger, accidents in the course of these engagements have claimed aircraft and crews on both sides. It is obvious that these air space violations are not simply a part of Turkey's unending "war of nerves" in the context of its non-recognition of Greek air space boundaries. Rather, they constitute a coordinated plan for testing Greek air defense capabilities and tactics in the region. In addition, THK aircraft conduct both photo reconnaissance and electronic intelligence (ELINT) missions over the Greek islands of the Aegean and Cyprus during such confrontations.

In response to Turkish provocations, Greece and Cyprus structured the Unified Defense Doctrine (Eniaio Amyntiko Dogma) in 1994, that is designed to provide for the common defense of the Republic of Cyprus against renewed Turkish aggression. The implementation of the Unified Defense Doctrine has involved the development of the necessary infrastructure in Cyprus that would facilitate the deployment of Greek reinforcements, combined
exercises with the participation of Greek air and naval forces, combined operational planning, and joint weapons procurement. The U.S. has adopted an ambivalent position towards the Unified Defense Doctrine initiative of Greece and Cyprus. The U.S. has been critical of Cyprus' military equipment purchases and efforts at modernizing the island's defenses, while this criticism omits any reference to the modernization and firepower enhancement of the Turkish occupation forces. Furthermore, although Greece and Cyprus have adopted a purely defensive posture, the U.S. and other NATO countries perenni ally have denied the extension of any military aid to Cyprus.

Thus, the Cyprus government has recently made substantial purchases of military equipment from the Russian Federation (Russia) and France. Purchases from Russia have included 41 T-80U MBTs and 41 BMP-3 armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs), while purchases from France have included 155 mm towed artillery and mobile coastal defense batteries with MM40 Exocet missiles. The most controversial purchase of military equipment was the January 1997 contract, between Cyprus and Russia for the transfer of 8-12 S-300PMU-1 air defense mobile missile batteries at an approximate cost of $426-$660 million. The U.S. criticism of the Cypriot decision emboldened Turkey to declare that it would not hesitate to use force if necessary in order to stop these Russian missile systems from ever reaching Cyprus! Although the U.S. undertook certain diplomatic measures to avert a possible crisis,
Turkey has not retracted its formal position to stop the installation of these missiles on the island of Cyprus.

It is obvious that the combination of a more forceful U.S. diplomacy with a selective policy of arms transfers, could have succeeded in breaking the stalemate of the Cyprus problem. For example, the U.S. could have decided to transfer military technology of a purely defensive nature directly or indirectly to the Republic of Cyprus, where such technology could have neutralized in part the overwhelming superiority of the Turkish forces in the area. For example, the U.S. could have transferred the Raytheon MIM-104A Patriot air defense missile system either directly to Cyprus or to Greek forces stationed on the island, with a simultaneous and numerically proportional transfer of the same military technology to Turkey. Thus, the U.S. could have provided a concrete signal of its commitment to the national independence and integrity of Cyprus, and demonstrated its willingness to structure a long-term and viable solution to the Cyprus problem. It should be noted, however, that although Greece is actively seeking to procure a long-range air defense missile system, the U.S. has maintained an unofficial embargo on the sale of Patriot batteries to both Greece and Turkey. Consequently, Greece has placed the Russian S-300PMU-1 system "under consideration" for a possible purchase.51
U.S. Military Aid and Domestic Politics in Greece & Turkey

U.S. foreign policy and the associated security assistance programs have been inextricably linked with domestic politics in both Greece and Turkey. These linkages have largely reflected the influence that U.S. policies and assistance patterns have had over time on the independent decision making capabilities of the respective national governments in Greece and Turkey on matters of national security. It can be said that these linkages have undergone a process of maturity from the “dependence” patterns of the Cold War, to “partnership” patterns in the post-Cold War era. It should be noted that the internal debates within Greece and Turkey regarding the respective defense relationships and arrangements with the U.S., have assumed more realistic tones. National governments and the majority of the political parties in both countries recognize that their respective armed forces are largely dependent on the transfers of U.S. military technology. Furthermore, U.S. policies do not seek to directly affect domestic political choices in Greece and Turkey as they did in the past during the Cold War era.

However, the shaping of national security policies in Greece and Turkey, and the consequent use of the security assistance supplied by the U.S., differs dramatically in the two countries. In Greece, a democratically elected civilian government exercises complete control over the military command structure, the development and implementation of national security policy, and
associated weapons procurement decisions. In sharp contrast, the Turkish military enjoys an independent role in shaping national security policies, and safeguarding the secular identity of the Turkish political system, that has been embodied in the 1982 Constitution of the Turkish Republic. In this respect, the Turkish military views itself as the guardians of a secularist Turkish Republic under the principles that were first established by Kemal Atatürk. The primary device for the exercise of such an independent role is the Turkish National Security Council, where the Turkish military and internal security leadership are heavily represented.\textsuperscript{52} It should be noted that the chief of the Turkish General Staff holds ultimate decision making power over the allocation of the defense budget among the service branches of the Turkish Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{53} Similarly, the Turkish National Defense Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, or SSM, has its own direct funding support from tax revenues that are independent from the national Turkish defense budget. Although the SSM is not under the direct control of the Turkish military, SSM’s defense production programs are strongly influenced, if not outright decided, by the Turkish military command structure.\textsuperscript{54} Undoubtedly, the Greek military does not enjoy the same degree of decision making power.

As previously stated, the U.S. has stayed silent on the issue of civilian control of the Turkish military. To the
contrary, the U.S. views the Turkish military as the guarantor of a secular political system in a country that shares common borders with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unfortunately, as the Iranian Revolution of 1978 demonstrated, U.S. acquiescence to the domestic political role of the Turkish military may sacrifice long-term goals of political stability and democratization in Turkey, in favor of short-term gains in "containing" the perceived dangers of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East.

The relevant independence of the Turkish military from civilian control in matters of national security, does not guarantee that U.S. military aid to Turkey will be used in accordance with the overall foreign policy objectives of the U.S. Indeed, it cannot be argued that continuous Turkish military provocations in the Aegean Sea and the Turkish occupation of Cyprus are consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals of peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

U.S. security assistance to Greece and Turkey has played and continues to play an important role in the international relations of the Eastern Mediterranean. The transfer of U.S. military technology to Greece and Turkey not only served the "containment" goals of U.S. policies during the Cold War, but it shaped the respective defense relationships between the U.S. and the two countries. The heavy dependence of Greece and Turkey on
military equipment of U.S. origin, greatly affects the formulation of their respective national security policies.

The renewed U.S. emphasis on new "containment" policies in the Balkans and the Middle East is in danger of transforming the instrument of U.S. security assistance to a destabilizing factor in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is beyond doubt that Turkish foreign and national security policy goals, as those are often defined by the Turkish military and not by the civilian elected governments, contemplate the use of military force as a plausible alternative despite repeated declarations to the contrary. Indeed, the Turkish rearmament and military modernization programs can hardly be justified in view of the external threats that Turkey faces today and is likely to face in the near future, neither can they be justified in view of the counter insurgency campaign that is fought against the PKK guerillas. It should be noted that the most technologically advanced Turkish defense assets of U.S. origin are oriented towards the Greek-Turkish frontier in Thrace, the Eastern Aegean and in Cyprus. For example, the F-16C/Ds fighters of the Peace Onyx programs are routinely utilized in Greek and Cypriot air space violations. Similarly, the orientation of the Turkish forces of the 4th "Aegean Army" and those on Cyprus, are not defensive in nature and are supported by the majority of the Turkish Navy combat and amphibious warfare assets.
Thus, it is imperative that U.S. military assistance to Greece and Turkey must continue to be apportioned in such a manner that will maintain a proportional balance of military power between the two countries. Furthermore, the U.S. should selectively utilize the instrument of security assistance in effectuating a long-term and viable solution of the Cyprus problem in coordination with the corresponding efforts of the UN and the EU. The selective use of U.S. military assistance in order to attain such a foreign policy goal does not need to infringe on Turkey's legitimate and realistic national security needs and alienate Turkey as a U.S. ally. For example, there is no realistic need for Turkey to obtain its own airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) when its air defense needs can adequately be served by ground radar stations and by NATO-operated AWACS aircraft. If the possibility of transferring such technology to Turkey were eliminated by the U.S. in coordination with its NATO Western European allies, then the corresponding requirement for AWACS procurement by Greece will cease to exist. Instead, in the context of U.S. security assistance, weapons systems such as the Patriot air defense missile system could be proportionately transferred to both countries. Thus, an immediate step could be taken to slow down the arms race that exists between the two countries, especially in offensive weapons systems.
The U.S., as a weapons systems supplier, always faces the dilemma of how to use military technology transfers as an effective tool of foreign policy, when competing with other nations for lucrative military procurement contracts. It is obvious that although Greece and Turkey are attractive markets for U.S. weaponry, the potential economic benefits of unrestrained quantitative and qualitative transfer of U.S. military technology to both countries are clearly outweighed by the potential risks of conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean and the heavy burdens of excessive defense expenditures for Greece and Turkey.
ENDNOTES


2 From the population of 90,000 in 1955, the Greek community in Istanbul—together with Imbroz and Tenedos—declined to approximately 3,000 in 1989. Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek minority in Turkey, 1918-1956 and Greco-Turkish Relations*, Athens, 1983.


4 It should be noted that these sea and air space issues were brought forward because of Turkish foreign policy aims in the region.


Military cooperation and base agreements between the U.S. and Greece at that time contemplated the protection of U.S. servicemen under the concept of "extraterritorial jurisdiction," e.g., U.S. servicemen committing criminal offenses under Greek law were turned over to U.S. military authorities.


19 The Cyprus crisis of 1974 was precipitated by the attempt of the Greek junta to oust Archbishop Makarios who was the elected President of the Cyprus Republic. Cypriot National Guard troops under the guidance of Greek officers carried out a coup against Makarios' government on July 15, 1974. Archbishop Makarios survived the attack against the Presidential Palace and escaped from the island with the assistance of the British forces.

The HAF had allocated only a limited number of subsonic F-84Fs in support of the Cypriot National Guard. These aircraft did not have an adequate operational radius, and the HAF did not fly any combat support missions during the crisis.

Cypriot and Greek units resisted the attacking forces. However, the Turkish units possessed overwhelming numerical and firepower superiority. Both Turkey and Greece suffered from serious faults in command, control and communications. The THK accidentally sank one of the Turkish Navy destroyers, and Cypriot air defenses mistakenly brought down two HAF Noratlas transport aircraft that flew Greek commando units to the island.


Sterns, pp. 40-50.

Section 620C was enacted in the fall of 1978, and has remained in effect. CRS Report for Congress, Ellen Laipson, *The Seven-Ten Ratio in Military Aid to Greece And Turkey: A Congressional Tradition*, April 10, 1985.

Stearns, pp. 41-42.


Ibid, Amyntiki Vivlos 1997-98, p. 113; Ptisi, p. 133.

NATO Review, January 1996, Table 5, p. 33.

See, n. 22, supra.

Stearns, Appendix D, p. 163.


Ibid., pp. 128-129. The North American F-100D was capable of a top speed of 864 m.p.h. and a maximum range of 1,500 miles. The most capable jet fighter of the HAF at the time, the Republic F-84F Thunderflash, initially delivered in 1958, had a maximum speed of 695 m.p.h. and a range of 810 miles. William Green and Gordon Swanborough, The Observer’s Basic Military Aircraft Directory, Frederick Warne & Co., Ltd., London, UK, pp. 34, 37.

By 1967, the THK had an inventory of 414-450 combat aircraft, with 216 of them being the supersonic F-100Ds, F/TF-104Gs and F-5A/BS. The corresponding figures for the HAF were 198-250 and 72 respectively. The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1967-1968, London, UK, pp. 23, 27.


Greece: A Country Study, 1995, p. 287. This infrastructure will permit the "prepositioning" of Greek military equipment on Cyprus in the future.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


