BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY LIMITATIONS

BY

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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY LIMITATIONS

by

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Seminar Group 15
14 April 1998

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
The U.S. must critically evaluate our current ballistic missile defense (BMD) strategy. In today’s geostrategic context, is it sound strategy to continue to impose 1972 ABM Treaty restrictions on BMD systems development?

This study considers three alternatives with respect to the ABM Treaty and BMD.

Our current policy (alternative one) is analyzed using the ends, ways and means model. This analysis covers the current state of the ballistic missile threat; the current situation with respect to the ABM Treaty; and technical risks associated with BMD systems.

As a second alternative, the study examines the possibility of mutual accommodation with Russia. This alternative requires the U.S. and Russia to reach mutual accommodation on missile defense; allowing both nations some level of NMD, while maintaining mutual deterrence through “assured destruction.”

The Heritage Foundation’s Team B Study Group proposal provides a third alternative. Team B proposes a sea- and space-
based BMD system and for the U.S. to withdraw from the ABM treaty now so it will no longer arbitrarily restrain U.S. BMD.

This study concludes it is critical to U.S. National Security for America to withdraw from the ABM Treaty now and deploy a BMD system, perhaps based on the Team B proposal.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This author would like to thank Col Skip Brownyard, U.S. Air Force, for his guidance and support. The author would also like to thank Lt Col Robert W. Riegel, USAF, ret; and Lt Robert B. Riegel, USAF, for their comments and insights. Finally, the author thanks Dr Jim Hanlon for his editorial review.
BACKGROUND

Limitations on strategic defense will have to be reconsidered in light of the Gulf War experience; no responsible leader can henceforth leave his civilian population vulnerable.

— Henry Kissinger, April 1991

In the end, you care a lot more about Los Angeles than you do about Taipei.

— Lt Gen Xiong Guangkai, Intelligence Chief of China, 1995

INTRODUCTION: GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT

The largest single American loss of life during Desert Storm occurred on 25 February 1991 when an Iraqi Scud killed 28 Americans. Despite this loss and much political debate in the past seven years, the U.S. still has not significantly improved its ability to defend against theater ballistic missiles. In addition, our nation continues to have no defense at all against Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), despite the fact that 70% of Americans think we do have a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. Given the capability of Russian and Chinese ICBMs to hit America and growing ballistic missile potential of other nations like Iran, Iraq, India and North Korea, the U.S. government must take immediate action to end this vulnerability.

In 1995, Lt Gen Xiong Guangkai, Chinese Intelligence Chief, told an American defense official, “In the end, you care a lot
more about Los Angeles than you do about Taipei." The Wall Street Journal’s editor, Robert Bartley, interpreted this as a threat to America. The Heritage Foundation’s Missile Defense Study Team (known as “Team B”) report likewise characterized Lt Gen Xiong Guangkai’s statement as “a veiled threat by the People’s Republic of China to attack Los Angeles with nuclear weapons if America intervenes in the dispute between China and Taiwan.”

The United States must critically evaluate its current ballistic missile defense (BMD) strategy in the appropriate geostrategic and geopolitical context. Is it sound national security strategy to continue to impose technological restrictions on our development of theater and national BMD systems in order to comply with the 1972 ABM Treaty? Why should we continue to comply with the treaty at all? This study considers U.S. BMD and ABM Treaty options.

To establish the proper geostrategic context for this paper, we should heed the strategic insights of Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to former President Carter. Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, (April 1997), addresses the “formulation of a comprehensive and integrated Eurasian geostrategy.” Brzezinski asserts that America has emerged as the sole superpower and the first truly global power. He then determines that Eurasia is the key “battlefield” for all
geostrategy. He points out the unique U.S. situation as a non- 
Eurasian power, but as the global superpower.\textsuperscript{8}  

Brzezinski judges that America is supreme in “the four 
decisive domains of global power: militarily, economically, 
technologically, and culturally.” This comprehensive dominance 
gives the U.S. unmatched political clout and makes it the only 
“comprehensive global superpower.”\textsuperscript{9}  

Brzezinski differentiates American power from earlier 
empires, which tended to be hierarchical pyramids. “America 
stands at the center of an interlocking universe, one in which 
power is exercised through continuous bargaining, dialogue, 
diffusion, and the quest for formal consensus.” America has 
produced a new international order that replicates and 
“institutionalizes abroad many of the features of the American 
system.”\textsuperscript{10}  

In view of this geostrategic context, this study argues that 
the U.S. should withdraw from the ABM Treaty and pursue an 
aggressive BMD program, leading to an operational BMD system. 
This initiative is critical to U.S. National Security and global 
stability. However, strong bipartisan political leadership is 
needed to achieve these recommendations.\textsuperscript{11}  

This study considers three alternatives with respect to the 
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and Ballistic Missile 
Defense (BMD) systems. The first alternative is a continuation
of current U.S. policy. Alternative two seeks mutual accommodation with the Russians to modify the ABM Treaty. The third generally endorses the Heritage Team B proposal, which makes the case for a sea- and space-based BMD system. It calls upon U.S. leaders to exercise our (ABM Treaty) Article XV right and withdraw from the 1972 Treaty immediately (after the required six month notification) in order not to arbitrarily restrain U.S. BMD systems.

This strategic analysis of current policy (alternative one) is the "Ends-Ways-Means" model developed at the Army War College. This model states, "Strategy equals Ends (objectives towards which one strives) plus Ways (courses of action) plus Means (instruments by which some end can be achieved)."12

This study concludes that to continue to adhere to the 1972 Treaty poses a serious risk to U.S. national security and represents a leadership failure within the U.S. Government. Finally, this study recommends the third alternative: Withdraw from the ABM Treaty immediately and accelerate a restructured BMD program.

CURRENT POLICY (ALTERNATIVE ONE)

Current U.S. policy, stated by the President in the May 1997 National Security Strategy (NSS), places the ABM Treaty in the broad category of "Shaping the International Environment ... through Arms Control."13 U.S. policy is to continue our
commitment to the ABM Treaty and the need to reach “agreement on demarcation between systems to counter strategic and theater ballistic missiles.” The NSS also declares that the ABM Treaty is the “cornerstone of strategic stability” but must be adapted to “meet the threat posed by shorter-range [theater] missiles.”

This policy conforms with the following NSS threat assessment: “Although the intelligence community does not believe it likely that any hostile state will develop an intercontinental-range missile capability that could threaten our nation in the foreseeable future, we are developing missile defense programs that position the U.S. to deploy a credible national missile defense system should a threat materialize.”

The phrase “any hostile state” refers only to third world nations, but not to Russia and China. This policy seems to ignore potential changes in the current state of affairs between the U.S., Russia and China. What if the Communists return to power in Russia? What if the Russian “Mafia” gains control of some ICBM sites and launch codes? What if the Chinese make good on their threats to nuke LA?

Current Administration policy does not enjoy unqualified support from many members of Congress. Congressional Republicans have pushed for years to get the Administration to adopt a plan to immediately make the deployment decision for an NMD system. Only last year Congress worked on legislation that would require NMD deployment by 2003.
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT ABM AND BMD POLICY

POLICY OBJECTIVES (ENDS)

The objective of our current ABM Treaty policy is to shape the international environment in order to maintain strategic stability with Russia and China and to avoid a strategic offensive and defensive arms race. The objective of our “ABM Treaty compliant” BMD systems are “to protect our country, deployed U.S. forces and our friends and allies against ballistic missiles armed with conventional weapons and WMD.”

CONCEPTS AND METHODS (WAYS)

Current concepts and methods (the ways) to achieve the stated objectives (ends) are described in some detail in the April 1997 Annual Report to the President and the Congress. A summary of our “Treaty constrained” BMD program follows:

The U.S. ballistic missile defense program places the highest priority on Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) programs to meet the threat that is here now. The second priority is the development of a National Missile Defense (NMD) program that positions the United States to field the most effective defense system possible at a time in the future when the threat warrants deployment. The third priority is the continued development of a technology base that improves the capability of both TBMD and NMD systems to respond to emerging threats.

The TBMD (or TMD) concept for achieving our objectives is based upon the following threat assessment and on compliance with the ABM Treaty:

With the proliferation of theater ballistic missiles among third world nations, the United States plans to develop and deploy highly capable TMD [Theater Missile Defense] systems.
Although the ABM Treaty does not address TMD systems per se, it does require that non-ABM missiles, launchers and radars not be given capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles and not be tested in an ABM mode. The Administration believes that clarification of the distinction between ABM systems, which are limited by the ABM treaty, and non-ABM systems, which are not so limited, is necessary. The United States is seeking that clarification within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission.\textsuperscript{24}

For NMD, our strategic concept is based on the following Intelligence Community interpretation of the threat to America:

For NMD, our strategic concept is based on the following Intelligence Community interpretation of the threat to America:

No country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states. Only a North Korean missile in development, the Taepo Dong 2, could conceivably have sufficient range to strike portions of Alaska or the far-western Hawaiian Islands, but the likelihood of it being operational within five years is very low.\textsuperscript{25}

The Annual Report also states that "the threat from an accidental or unauthorized launch from the former Soviet Union or China is remote."\textsuperscript{26}

A decision to deploy an NMD system has not been made.\textsuperscript{27}

With respect to NMD, the Annual Report states that,

The NMD Deployment Readiness Program will be conducted in compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Depending on its configuration, a deployed NMD system could either be compliant with the ABM Treaty as written, or might require amendment of the Treaty's provisions. The NMD system currently under consideration would have the purpose of defending against rogue and accidental/unauthorized threats. It would not be capable of defending against a heavy deliberate attack. Decisions about the treaty compliance of potential NMD systems would be made by DoD on advice of the Compliance Review Group.\textsuperscript{28}

Another key part of the ABM policy with respect to NMD relates to and rationalizes the ends-ways-means aspects of
current U.S. strategy. Given current interpretation of the threat and current level of defense funding, it is prudent from a means point of view to continue a "deployment readiness" approach to NMD.\textsuperscript{29} This approach ensures that we do not deploy an NMD system too soon, only to discover we have wasted funding (means) on a system that does not meet a newly emerging threat.\textsuperscript{30}

The final source of current policy with respect to ways is detailed in the May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR recommended a substantial increase in funding for NMD testing over the next three years. This initiative will improve U.S. ability to make an NMD deployment decision “as early as FY2000, if the threat warrants.”\textsuperscript{31}

**RESOURCES AND FUNDING (MEANS)**

The BMD budget for FY97 was $3.7B. The FY98 budget is $3.84B and the President’s proposed FY99 budget is $4.0B.\textsuperscript{32} The FY98 budget includes about $2.2B for all TMD systems, $941.1 million for NMD and about $699 million for support technologies.\textsuperscript{33} The QDR expressed strong support for BMD, recommending an additional $2B for the overall NMD program, including an additional $474 million for FY98.\textsuperscript{34}

For FY98 Congress took a number of actions on the BMD budget.\textsuperscript{35} Within the “support technologies” category, Congress added $99 million to the Space Based Laser (SBL) program, to bring SBL total funding for FY98 to $127 million.\textsuperscript{36} For major TMD programs, Congress appropriated the following funds for FY98 (information on President’s Budget [Pres. Bud.] also shown):\textsuperscript{37}
($ millions) | Change from FY98 | FY99 | Date of Initial Deploymt
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<tr>
<td>Navy Upper Tier (theater-wide)</td>
<td>$419M</td>
<td>+$215M</td>
<td>$190M</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy Lower Tier (area defense)</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>+22</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army THAAD$^{40}$</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>-150</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Patriot PAC-3</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army MEADS$^{41}$</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force Airborne Laser (ABL)</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>2006</td>
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Just to put the BMD funding in perspective, the Air Force F-22 budget for FY98 is $2.15B, the Army Abrams Tank Upgrade Program is $655 million, and the Navy’s New Attack Submarine (NSSN) funding is $2.99B.$^{43}$

**ANALYSIS OF ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS; BALANCE AND RISK**

U.S. ends, ways and means are not balanced for our current BMD strategy -- we can not achieve our stated ends with current ways and means. The Cold War is over; America won. The USSR has dwindled to a weakened Russia. China is an emerging economic and military power. Not everyone agrees with the Clinton Administration’s position that there will not be a ballistic missile threat to America in the next 15 years.$^{44}$ WMDs and ballistic missile delivery capability is proliferating around the world; the threat is more immediate and more real than official U.S. policy acknowledges. The ABM Treaty is a relic of the Cold War which now prevents America from adequately defending our forces, allies, and homeland. It should be abandoned immediately. Additionally, there are technical risks associated with all boost-phase intercept BMD systems.
The Threat

A key risk area is the intelligence assessment of potential ballistic missile threats. A great deal of controversy surrounds the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that underpins our current policy. For example, the NIE’s definition of the “U.S.” does not include Alaska and Hawaii. Additionally, recent reports indicate the North Korean No Dong missile (est. 2000 km range) may have been deployed in recent months after only one test. Other sources indicate that North Korea could potentially deploy its ICBM-class NoDong-X with an initial range of 6000 km (which could strike most of Alaska and the western most third of Hawaii) as early as 1998. The threat from Iran has also increased. “Secret Israeli intelligence data” indicates that Russia is assisting Iran with a ballistic missile program to develop four different systems with ranges from 1300 km to 10,000 km. “The 10,000 km range missile would allow Tehran to hit targets in the eastern United States, according to the Israeli data.”

President Clinton’s former Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, has stated that, “The administration is not giving this growing problem [adversaries potential to use ballistic missiles for blackmail and terror] the weight it deserves.” Woolsey cites five points that are being ignored in public NMD debates:
1. China and Iraq are examples that “it is not necessary to deploy NBC [nuclear, biological or chemical] warheads to use ballistic missiles as weapons of terror and blackmail.”

2. “We are in a period of revolutionary improvements in missile guidance” which might, for example, “make it feasible within a few years for Saddam to threaten to destroy the Knesset.”

3. “Even relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles may be given awesome power if equipped with any WMD.”

4. “It is not necessary for an adversary to be able to conduct an effective counterforce strike against” ICBM silos in the [CONUS] in order to use ballistic missiles for blackmail against the U.S.” North Korea may soon be able to threaten Alaska. China can already hit Los Angeles.

5. “We should not assume a benign post-Cold War world in which Russia is a democracy and China is a free enterprise economy that is steadily developing democracy.”

Woolsey states that the NIE, upon which current U.S. policy is based, was over-constrained and has been misused. He states that threats against Alaska and Hawaii from North Korea “will likely be present in well under 15 years.” Woolsey also says that, “Even with the best intelligence it is impossible to forecast 15 years in advance such events as the Iranian
revolution of the late 1970s, which turned a friendly state into a hostile one.”

The Administration’s position has been articulated by Robert Bell, National Security Council special assistant to President Clinton for National Security Affairs. Bell primarily tries to justify the analysis of the threat “from regional outlaw states” around the Administration’s perceived need to comply with the ABM Treaty. This is very dangerous logic, given James Woolsey’s assessment of the NIE.

Given the uncertainty of the threat and the long lead times required to develop ballistic missile defense systems, current ways and means must be questioned. We should certainly consider alternatives to current policy. The U.S. Government cannot ignore the possibility that James Woolsey, along with other experts, are right about the nature of the threat to America and to our allies. As COLONEL Harry Summers charges, “To not defend ourselves and our allies from nuclear blackmail and attack when we have the means to do so verges on criminal malfeasance.”

The 1972 ABM Treaty

U.S. policy objectives (ends) to “maintain strategic stability” are not best served by limiting our BMD systems to the constraints imposed by the 1972 ABM Treaty. Additionally, we will not meet our objective (and constitutional obligation) “to protect our country, deployed U.S. forces and our friends and
allies against ballistic missiles armed with conventional weapons
and WMDs" if we design and deploy our BMD systems to be "ABM
Treaty compliant."\(^5\)

It is time to "think outside the box" -- to challenge the
perceived need to comply with the ABM Treaty. The conditions
that led America to sign the 1972 ABM Treaty no longer exist.

Former President Richard Nixon said it best:

> We should not bog ourselves down in a legalistic argument
> about the kind of research, testing, and development the ABM
> Treaty of 1972 permits. **I signed the treaty because it
> served American security interests in the strategic setting
> of the early 1970s.** ...The treaty specifically provides
> that either side can opt out on six months' notice if ...,
> events have "jeopardized its supreme interests." ...If [we
> require] a limited strategic defense [to assure our
> security]; [and] ...If that requires the renegotiation of
> provisions of the ABM Treaty, [and] Moscow refuses to
> negotiate, we should then invoke our rights under the treaty
> to suspend its provisions...\(^5\) [emphasis added]

Russia will not be able to militarily challenge America if
we withdraw from the ABM Treaty. The USSR did not have the
financial resources to match U.S. BMD programs.\(^5\) Russia
certainly does not either. Recent estimates put the Russian
defense budget at $20 billion (U.S. dollars) per year.\(^6\) This is
less than 10% of U.S. defense spending, and about a third of the
British defense budget.

The Russian Duma is currently holding up ratification of the
START II Treaty pending U.S. Senate agreement on a series of ABM
Treaty modifications negotiated by the Clinton Administration.\(^6\)
The Duma’s treaty strategy will soon face budget realities when
Russia contends with the prospects of having to pay to perform service life extension programs (SLEPs) on their older START I forces. They will find this a difficult project to fund.\textsuperscript{62} In perspective, America does not want to have to pay the estimated $10B to SLEP our START I forces.\textsuperscript{63} In fact, the National Defense Panel (NDP) has recommended not spending any funds to maintain START I force levels and instead use the money to increase funding for NMD.\textsuperscript{64}

Russia will not be able to maintain funding for START I force levels, and START II will be defacto ratified. USAF General Eugene Habinger, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, stated that he believed Russia’s nuclear forces are wearing out: “They’re going to be at START II force levels by the year 2005 whether they want to or not.”\textsuperscript{65} Those who fear that Russia will not adopt START II unless we continue to adhere to the ABM Treaty are misinformed about the hard-core realities of the total strategic force situation. START II negotiations should not be linked in any way to our BMD and ABM Treaty decisions.

Certainly some Americans and others around the world will protest a U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The recent debate about U.S. involvement in the Anti-Landmine Treaty serves as a good example of how to handle negative public opinion. The Clinton Administration deserves very high marks for not signing the Anti-Landmine Treaty, because it runs counter to U.S. national security interests. If the U.S. government (DoD,
President and Congress) makes a strong case that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is in U.S. national security interests, we can infer, from the landmine debate that President Clinton can "take the heat" of U.S. and world public opinion.

We must also be concerned with Russian internal political stability. Will a U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty destabilize Russia politically? If so, what sort of Russia could emerge? These questions have to be addressed in the context of Russia’s overall geopolitical situation. Brzezinski addresses Russia’s situation in a very comprehensive manner. He sees U.S.-Russian ABM Treaty discussions as a small part of Russia’s overall geostrategic situation. In his complex analysis, Brzezinski states that Russia’s only real geostrategic option is to join the transatlantic Europe of the enlarging EU (European Union) and NATO, which will likely remain closely linked to America. In this context, a robust U.S. BMD system is no more a threat to Russia than it is to Germany. In fact, a space-based BMD system could be in position to defend a "Super-NATO" (including Ukraine and Russia) from attacks from Iran, Iraq, India, China and North Korea.

Nonetheless, the Clinton Administration remains committed to the current ABM Treaty policy. Mr Bell, from the NSC staff, makes a plausible argument for maintaining deterrence. Indeed, the U.S. still needs a nuclear deterrent against Russia, China and others.
Mr Bell specifically defends the ABM Treaty:

...I would argue that the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty matters...
...We must include, as part of our calculation of the sufficiency of deterrence, the threat we will face on the other side in terms of defenses. Without the ABM Treaty, we would require more RVs (Re-entry Vehicles) than the 3,500 level set in START II. So the ABM Treaty is key to our ability to ask the United States Senate to ratify this Treaty...

Furthermore, within the limits of the Treaty itself ... what are the defenses that STRATCOM would have to confront and penetrate if we ever had to retaliate; not just the 100 authorized ABMs, but the thousands of SAMs that could be upgraded and, increasingly, the whole new possibility of dedicated Russian Theater Missile Defenses (TMDs).

However, Bell’s case for abiding by the ABM Treaty has its weaknesses. First, how can Russia afford to pay for an upgraded BMD system and maintain the service life of their ICBM force with a defense budget that is one tenth of the U.S. budget? Second, this is a “fight” America won when then-President Reagan out-negotiated General Secretary Gorbachev in 1986-1988. Reagan maintained a steadfast position that “We won’t stand by and let you [USSR and Gorbachev] maintain weapon superiority over us. We can agree to reduce arms, or we can continue the arms race, which I think you know you can’t win.” Margaret Thatcher cites this as the turning point of the Cold War; she believes that Gorbachev finally realized he could not win an arms race with America. So why does Bell and the Clinton Administration think we have to “fight that battle” again?
A U.S. NMD system would not be intended to negate the Russian ICBM force. Rather it would be deployed to protect Americans from limited or accidental ICBM attack from rogue states or elements within states. As Henry Kissinger observed, “Limitations on strategic defense will have to be reconsidered in light of the Gulf War experience; no responsible leader can henceforth leave his civilian population vulnerable.”

**Technical Risks**

Finally, our current policy fails to adequately account for possible enemy countermeasures. All surface-based BMD systems intercept ballistic missile warheads during the terminal phase of flight. A September 1997 technical report by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) details numerous countermeasures our currently planned surface-based BMD systems will possibly face. Included are countermeasures such as maneuvering warheads, decoys, chaff, submunitions, infrared and radar stealth by shrouding, and use of lofted trajectories. These technical challenges are compounded by the current U.S. policy to design all our BMD systems to be ABM Treaty compliant. This situation has led some groups outside the Administration to propose space-based solutions to TMD and NMD. A space-based BMD system which would intercept ballistic missiles during the boost phase and mid-course phase of flight, avoiding these terminal phase countermeasures.
In view of this revised threat assessment, an “outside the box” look at the ABM Treaty, and technical problems and risks presented by possible countermeasures, what are some alternatives to the current policy?

**ALTERNATIVES TO CURRENT POLICY**

**ALTERNATIVE TWO: SEEK MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION WITH RUSSIA**

A joint U.S.-Russian study sponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace proposes an alternative of “mutual accommodation” for BMD. Essentially, this proposal calls for America and Russia to reach mutual accommodation on missile defense, based on U.S.-Russian “engagement on a broader set of cooperative technical, financial and strategic endeavors.” The goal is for both nations to be allowed some level of NMD, while also maintaining mutual deterrence through “assured destruction.” The problem with this study, and therefore this alternative, is that it is not clear that Russia has given up its desire to have a “counterforce first-strike option.” In fact, recent press reports confirm that Russia’s nuclear forces continue to be their most important military capability.

The other problem with this alternative is its relatively “small and short term” geopolitical utility. In the context of Brzezinski’s recent analysis, this alternative is just a “speed bump” on the road to the inevitable expansion of the European
Union (EU) and NATO. The sooner Russia comes to grips with such geopolitical realities, the sooner "the West" (Transatlantic-Europe) can get on with the business of furthering overall global geostrategic stability. A robust (non-ABM Treaty constrained) U.S. BMD system will contribute to this global stability. Russia does not have the financial resources to develop a comparable system, nor does it need to develop its own system if it becomes part of (or allied with) a "Super-NATO."

The joint U.S.-Russian study report is filled with Russian "concerns" about the potential implications of a U.S. NMD system, linked to their concern that America might withdraw from the ABM Treaty. A paradigm shift is needed in U.S.-Russia relations to get us beyond this phase of Russian insecurity. Brzezinski says this will be a potentially long and difficult process and "will require an enormous act of political will." Russians must realize that "Russia's national redefinition is not an act of capitulation but one of liberation."

This alternative of mutual accommodation addresses other interesting ideas that could fit in nicely with the concept of a "Super-NATO." For example, it discusses the possibility of a Global Protection System and a Global Nonproliferation and Early Warning Center. These stabilizing instruments all make more sense in the geopolitical context of a world where another alternative allows the U.S. to develop a robust, global BMD
system that could protect all the members of "Super-NATO" (including Ukraine and Russia).

ALTERNATIVE THREE: WITHDRAW FROM ABM TREATY, ACCELERATE BMD

The third alternative is drawn largely from the Heritage Foundation's Missile Defense Study Team (also known as "Team B"). Members of Team B included Ambassador Henry Cooper (former Director of SDIO), and Lt Gen (ret) James Abrahamson (former Dir SDIO). The Team B study recommends the following actions:

- "Congress, and the U.S. Senate in particular, should seek ways to remove the obstacles to effective missile defenses posed by the ABM Treaty, including possible withdrawal," as permitted by Article XV. Team B and many other defense experts believe America should not be arbitrarily constrained by the outdated ABM Treaty. The current treaty does not permit the sea-and space-based BMD systems which Team B recommends as the most cost-effective approaches. In the current geopolitical context, adherence to a treaty signed with a "nation" that no longer exists (the USSR) is not a responsible national security strategy. The ABM Treaty is not, contrary to the NSS position, a "cornerstone of strategic stability." It is a "speedbump" in the way of a rational, global geostrategy that potentially includes the Ukraine and Russia in an expanded "Super-NATO".
- "Congress should forego development of ground-based systems for NMD and accelerate development of sea-based wide area defenses." Congress and DoD should fully fund sea-based wide area defenses without ABM Treaty restrictions and plan to use these sea-based defenses for both TMD and NMD. This proposal specifically refers to the Navy Upper Tier (theater-wide) system, or to proposed Navy upgrades to that system.\textsuperscript{85} Such a strategy is potentially more cost effective than the current plan to develop new ground-based BMD systems. Team B estimates that, given the almost $50 billion already invested in the Navy's Aegis missile system, for an additional "$2-3 billion, 650 defensive interceptors on 22 Aegis cruisers could be at sea by 2001."\textsuperscript{86} However, the Navy estimates that a sea-based NMD system could cost as much as $10 billion.\textsuperscript{87} For this sea-based system to be capable of NMD it must not be constrained by the ABM Treaty.

- "Congress should accelerate the deployment of space-based sensors to enhance both TMD and NMD," specifically the Brilliant Eyes Sensor System. "This system would enhance the capability of all wide-area defense interceptor systems, wherever based."\textsuperscript{88}

- "Congress should direct the Air Force to develop follow-on space-based defenses, both kinetic energy interceptors and space-based lasers, to begin deployment early in the next decade." Congress and DoD should fully fund space-based defenses (unconstrained by ABM Treaty restrictions) and plan to use these
space-based defenses for both TMD and NMD. This proposal specifically refers to the Air Force Space Based Laser (SBL) and Space Based Interceptor (SBI) programs.

The DoD should adopt these Team B recommendations and develop a plan to gain Congressional approval. The approach presented in the Team B report represents a much better balance of the ends, ways and means for U.S. BMD policy in the current geopolitical environment. Our allies will support this more robust, sea- and space-based BMD system, which can provide them much better protection. A more global, space-based BMD system is also more in line with the geopolitical realities described by Brzezinski. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

In conclusion, current ABM policy and its limits on BMD represents an inflexible, “in-the-box” continuation of outmoded strategic thinking. Its primary function is to placate the Russians and BMD critics in America. However, it fails to address fundamental changes in the world since the end of the Cold War, perhaps best analyzed by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his recent book on global geostrategy. And, in the very near-term, this policy leaves America, especially “portions of Alaska or the far-western Hawaiian Islands,” open to attack by ballistic missiles containing NBC warheads.
This study concludes continued adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty poses a gravely serious risk to U.S. national security and represents a leadership failure. This conclusion is consistent with the Heritage Foundation’s Team B report, which concluded: “There is a clear, present, and growing threat of ballistic missiles of all ranges armed with weapons of mass destruction -- a threat that demands an urgent response to protect Americans at home and American interests abroad.”

As we witnessed during the Gulf War, ballistic missile attacks can have powerful political impacts. America went to great lengths to keep the Coalition together by keeping Israel out of the war, even though the Israelis were continually provoked by Iraqi Scud missile attacks. As Rick Atkinson points out regarding the 25 February 1991 Scud attack that killed 28 Americans, “Had the missile struck Israel with comparable devastation, it is unlikely that any amount of pleading from Bush and Cheney could have stayed the Israeli sword.”

This study considered two alternatives to current U.S. policy. It strongly recommends the U.S. Government make every effort to adopt the alternative to exercise our Article XV (of the ABM Treaty) right and withdraw from the 1972 Treaty immediately (after the required six month notification). Bottom line: America should withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty now and accelerate a restructured BMD program which puts primary emphasis on the Navy Upper Tier (theater-wide) system, and the Air Force
Space Based Laser (SBL), Space Based Interceptor and Brilliant Eyes Sensor System.  

In view of the 1997 NSS, the President probably will not quickly embrace this proposal if put forward from the Secretary of Defense. After all, we have not had a “defining event” for BMD as the 1980 Desert One disaster was for the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.  But, why do we have to wait for a BMD “Pearl Harbor” or “Desert One”? Perhaps the most compelling argument is to appeal to the President’s sense of his place in history. As then-Senator William Cohen said in August 1995, “We cannot face our constituents in good conscience and say: ‘Sorry we failed to take any measures to protect.’”  Perhaps the Heritage report summed it up best: “Someday soon, it is a near certainty that U.S. forces abroad, and possibly even the U.S. homeland, will come under ballistic missile attack ... with NBC warheads. If that day comes, the American people will hold responsible all those in positions of public trust who failed to carry out their constitutional and moral duty.”
ENDNOTES

1Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 420. This is the Iraqi Scud attack on the Al Khobar barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia which wounded 98 others. This was G+1/D+39 of the war.


3Howell Estes, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) 1997 Posture, Posture Statement presented to Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, March 11 and 12, 1997. Gen Estes, CINCSPACE, said in Congressional Testimony, “The American people think we are more capable than we are--approximately 70 percent believe we already have a national missile defense system in place, and almost 100 percent believe we have total protection against air attack. Neither are true, so we have some work to do.” This 70 percent perception is also effected by all the media hype around the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) begun by President Reagan in 1983 (Reference The Heritage Foundation, Defending America: Ending America’s Vulnerability to Ballistic Missiles (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1996).


5Ibid. Mr Bartley said, “surely this is a warning to step up work on missile defense at home.”


8Ibid., xiii.

9Ibid., 24. Brzezinski states that the U.S. is supreme in “the four decisive domains of global power:” militarily - U.S. has unmatched global reach; economically - it remains the main “locomotive” of global growth; technologically - U.S. retains the
lead in cutting-edge areas of innovation; and culturally -
"despite some crassness," the U.S. "enjoys an appeal that is
unrivalled, especially among the world's youth." All this
combines to give the U.S. unmatched political clout and the four
in combination makes the U.S. the only "comprehensive global
superpower."

10 Ibid., 28.

11 Joseph Cirincione, "Why the Right Lost the Missile Defense
Debate," Foreign Policy, Spring 1997, 39-51. In the opinion of
the author of this paper, this should not be a partisan political
issue. The Republicans tried to use NMD as a campaign issue in
1996 and failed. BMD must be a bipartisan issue with support from
both major political parties. This is not an appropriate issue
to have political fights about; the stakes are too high.

12 Arthur F. Lykke, Jr, "Toward an Understanding of Military
Strategy," Military Strategy: Theory and Application, 12 March
1993, 3. The Ends-Ways-Means model was developed by COL Arthur
Lykke, U.S. Army (retired), at the U.S. Army War College.

13 U.S. President, A National Security Strategy for a New

14 Ibid., 7.

15 Ibid., 14.

16 Ibid., 14. The phrase "any hostile state" refers only to
third world nations and not to Russia and China. Reference
statements by Mr Robert Bell, a special assistant to President
Clinton for National Security Affairs at the White House National
Security Council quoted in "Viewpoint: Build Missile Defenses But
Maintain Stability," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 December
1995, 110.

17 Gary L. Guertner and Donald M. Snow, The Last Frontier: An
Analysis of the Strategic Defense Initiative (Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books, 1986), 50. America has maintained a policy of
compliance with the ABM Treaty since it was signed in 1972. In
fact, President Reagan planned to "maintain compliance" with the
ABM Treaty within the bounds of his Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) program. According to his Secretary of Defense, Casper
Weinberger, Reagan planned to have the U.S. properly withdraw
from the ABM Treaty if and when SDI progress warranted such
action. (Reference: Casper W. Weinberger, "It Is Time For True


21 Ibid., 14.


23 The Apr 97 Annual Report uses the terms “TBMD” and “TMD” interchangeably; they mean the same thing.

24 Ibid., 58.

25 Ibid., 216-217.

26 Ibid., 217.

27 Ibid., 216.

28 Ibid., 217.

29 Deployment Readiness means that the NMD program is “designed to develop and maintain the option to deploy an NMD system. It will reduce the leadtime required to deploy an NMD system as a hedge against an uncertain threat.” (from BMDO Fact Sheet 96-005, Aug 96)

30 Ibid., 217.


35 Paul Mann, “Hill Ups NMD, Caves in on B-2s,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 6 October 1997, 25-28. They provided a total
of $3.77B for FY98. This is about $800 million above the President’s request. Congress appropriated a total of $978 million for NMD.


40 THAAD is Theater High Altitude Area Defense.

41 MEADS is Medium Extended Air Defense System.


43 Association of the U.S. Army, Army Budget, FY98, 17. Funds incl. RDT&E and procurement.


50 Woolsey, “Missile Blackmail Exists Today.”
1. "It is not necessary to deploy NBC warheads to use ballistic missiles as weapons of terror and blackmail," and gives China and Iraq as examples.

2. "We are in a period of revolutionary improvements in missile guidance." For example, the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) may "make it feasible within a few years for Saddam or the Chinese rulers to threaten to destroy, say, the Knesset, or cause a Chernobyl-like disaster at a Taiwanese nuclear power plant."

3. "Even relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles may be given awesome power if equipped with any WMD. ... It is even easier for rogue states to acquire the wherewithal to produce chemical or biological warheads [versus nuclear]."

4. "It is not necessary for an adversary to be able to conduct an effective counterforce strike against ICBM silos, bomber bases ... in the [CONUS] in order to use ballistic missiles for terror and blackmail against the U.S." North Korea may soon be able to threaten Alaska and China can already hit Los Angeles.

5. "We should not assume a benign post-Cold War world in which Russia is a democracy ... and China is a free enterprise economy that is steadily developing democracy." Russia may well be "increasingly autocratic and imperialistic," and China more like what we have already seen at Tiananmen Square and in the Taiwan Straits.


56 The Heritage Foundation, Defending America, 41.
research, testing, and development the ABM Treaty of 1972 permits. I signed the treaty because it served American security interests in the strategic setting of the early 1970s. It was an important achievement and has lasted longer than any other major arms control pact. To engage in a debate over whether the treaty should be broadly or narrowly interpreted is neither useful nor necessary. When the United States enters into a treaty, we should abide by its terms and not try to squirm out of them by legalistic maneuvering. The treaty specifically provides that either side can opt out on six months' notice if it finds that events have "jeopardized its supreme interests." We should determine what we need to do to assure our security. If that requires a limited strategic defense, we should find out what kind of defense is feasible and then take the steps to deploy it. If that requires the renegotiation of provisions of the ABM Treaty, we should put our demands on the superpower agenda. If Moscow refuses to negotiate, we should then invoke our rights under the treaty to suspend its provisions after a six-month notice."


63 QDR Briefing on NMD given to the QDR Integration Group, 7 Mar 97, p. 6. (Total briefing classified SECRET, page 6 UNCLASSIFIED.)

64 Letter from Mr Phillip A. Odeen, NDP Chairman to SecDef Cohen, 15 May 97, 6.


Why? ... We're working very hard ... in many areas, ... arms control, denuclearization and the Nunn-Lugar initiatives, to make sure that we continue to strengthen strategic stability and assist Russia in its democratic and economic reforms.

But, a strategic partnership with Russia is not a "for sure" conclusion yet. Thus, it is fundamental to this Administration's strategy that we are hedging against the requirement to reconstitute strategic deterrence in full form.

If you don't think maintaining a deterrent hedge matters; if you think it's "over, over there;" that Russia could never again constitute a nuclear threat to the United States, and all we have to deal with are missile threats from regional outlaw regimes, then you can take a different approach and you can save a lot of money.

But that's not what the Clinton Administration thinks.”

Ibid. Mr Bell says, “In this context, I would argue that the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty matters as well.

Why is that? Well, it is axiomatic that we must include, as part of our calculation of the sufficiency of deterrence, the threat we will face on the other side in terms of defenses. Without the ABM Treaty, we would require more RVs (Re-entry Vehicles) than the 3,500 level set in START II. So the ABM Treaty is key to our ability to ask the United States Senate to ratify this Treaty.

And if you believe we should go below 3,500, and we're continuing to discuss that question within the Administration now, then the ABM Treaty matters even more.

Furthermore, within the limits of the Treaty itself you have to ask yourself what are the defenses that STRATCOM would have to confront and penetrate if we ever had to retaliate; not just the 100 authorized ABMs, but the thousands of SAMs that could be upgraded and, increasingly, the whole new possibility of dedicated Russian Theater Missile Defenses (TMDs).

So does that mean, then, that what we want to do is expand the ABM Treaty and transform it through some sort of aggressive outreach effort into a "TMD Treaty," to capture and eliminate any strategic defensive threats from Russia below the level of their authorized ABMs?

Of course not. The ABM Treaty is not a "TMD treaty." Does that mean "anything goes," though? Does that mean that you can just take any interceptor missile and hang a sign on it that
reads "TMD," and as long as we say it's a TMD, it's a TMD, period, end of case?

Does it mean that if we see something on the Russian side that "looks like, walks like, talks like" an ABM, we have no recourse to say, "Wait a minute," if they say that's a TMD? No. And there's a good reason for this."


Ibid, 40.

Ibid, 40.


The Heritage Foundation, Defending America, 35-40.


Ibid.

Specter, "Yeltsin's Plan to Cut Military."

Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, 120.

Ibid.

The Heritage Foundation, Defending America.

Other members included: Frank Gaffney, Gen (ret) Charles Horner (former CINCSpace), Gen (ret) Bernard Schriever, Former Senator Malcolm Wallop (Wyoming), and Former Congressman Vin Weber (Minnesota).

Ibid., 3-4. The report also says that, "Congress should ensure the BMDO develops an integrated but open architecture for battle management, command, control, and communications to support" BMD systems."

In other words, a global, sea- and space-based BMD system could defend “Super-NATO” (including Ukraine and Russia) against ballistic missile threats from Iran, Iraq, India, China and North Korea and promote global stability.

Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard.

The Heritage Foundation, Defending America, 47.


Atkinson, Crusade, 420.

As an initial proposal for a plan to get us on the road to implementing alternative three, the following “mission statement” and “situation analysis” are proposed as a starting point:

1. **Mission:** Defend/Secure U.S. (all 50 states) from ballistic missile attack as soon as possible (Initial Operational Capability (IOC) NLT 2003 (TBD)) at lowest possible cost. Any “system(s)” developed for this purpose should have maximum potential to be expanded both as the threat grows and to potentially defend U.S. Allies (to potentially include Ukraine and Russia) from ballistic missile attack. This is not intended to protect the U.S. from a “massive” Russian nuclear attack. Target is ability to defend against up to a 200 (TBD) warhead (20 boosters (TBD)) barrage attack on the U.S.

2. **Situation and Courses of Action:**
   a. **Situation:** U.S. is currently not capable of defending the 50 states from ANY ballistic missile attack. Numerous nations already have or are developing the capability to hit targets in the 50 states. Current efforts to develop a National Missile Defense (NMD) system are subject to restrictions of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

   The NMD program has **faltered due to lack of bipartisan political support** from Congress and the Executive branch. Senator Robert Dole and the Republicans tried and failed to make this a deciding political issue in the 1996 Presidential
This paper has already shown the current NMD program to have numerous risks.

The Threat: Russia (Mafia), China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, India and potentially others.

A "Five-Ring" Analysis: The key geopolitical "COG" (Center of Gravity): The lack of national will to field NMD, the lack of bipartisan political leadership (a la Goldwater, Nunn, and Nichols with respect to GNA), and the lack of a defining event (a la Desert One with respect to Goldwater-Nichols). Why do we have to wait for a BMD Pearl Harbor or Desert One?

The NMD program has faltered due to lack of bipartisan political support from Congress and the Executive branch. Senator Dole and the Republicans tried and failed to make NMD a deciding political issue in the 1996 Presidential elections. A center of gravity (COG) analysis would have to consider the possibility that the key geopolitical COG for NMD deployment is the lack of national will to field NMD. Another factor is the lack of bipartisan political leadership (as Senators Goldwater, and Nunn, and Representative Nichols provided with respect to the Goldwater-Nichols Act). An additional factor is the lack of a "defining event" (like Desert One with respect to Goldwater-Nichols). Why do we have to wait for a BMD "Pearl Harbor" or "Desert One"?

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97 The Heritage Foundation, Defending America, 41.
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QDR Briefing on NMD given to the QDR Integration Group, 7 Mar 97, p. 6. (Total briefing classified SECRET, page 6 UNCLASSIFIED.)


