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## Glossary

### A

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>antiballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACV</td>
<td>armored combat vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALCM</td>
<td>air-launched cruise missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAT</td>
<td>antisatellite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>antisubmarine warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTU</td>
<td>Atlantic-to-the-Urals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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### B

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BDE</td>
<td>brigade</td>
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### C

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C²</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C³</td>
<td>command, control, and communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C³¹</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRAF</td>
<td>Civil Reserve Air Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>chemical warfare; chemical weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY</td>
<td>calendar year</td>
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### D

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>dual-capable aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (North Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTD</td>
<td>day-to-day</td>
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### E

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECCM</td>
<td>electronic counter-countermeasures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECM</td>
<td>electronic countermeasures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>electronic warfare</td>
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### F

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOFA</td>
<td>follow-on-forces attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic (East Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>generated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I&amp;W</td>
<td>indications and warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>intermediate-range nuclear forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMNA</td>
<td>Joint Military Net Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>km</td>
<td>kilometer(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td>launch control center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>low-intensity conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLRS</td>
<td>multiple launch rocket system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>maritime pre-positioning ship; maritime pre-positioning squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAPCAP</td>
<td>NATO Allied Pre-committed Civil Aviation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nm</td>
<td>nautical mile(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSNF</td>
<td>nonstrategic nuclear forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSWP</td>
<td>non-Soviet Warsaw Pact</td>
</tr>
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### — P —

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POMCUS</td>
<td>pre-positioned organizational materiel configured in unit sets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>Peoples' Republic of China</td>
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### — R —

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>research and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGT</td>
<td>regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO/RO</td>
<td>roll-on/roll-off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP</td>
<td>Rapid Reinforcement Plan</td>
</tr>
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### — S —

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>surface-to-air missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>submarine-launched ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCM</td>
<td>sea-launched cruise missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>sea line of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNF</td>
<td>short-range nuclear forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPETSNAZ</td>
<td>Special Purpose Troops (Soviet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>nuclear-powered submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>Southwest Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYDP</td>
<td>Six-Year Defense Program</td>
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### — T —

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TSO</td>
<td>theater strategic operation (Soviet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVD</td>
<td>theater of military operations (Soviet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TW&amp;AA</td>
<td>tactical warning and attack assessment</td>
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### — W —

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Warsaw Pact</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTVD</td>
<td>Western TVD</td>
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The 1990 Joint Military Net Assessment has been prepared for the Secretary of Defense by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the advice and participation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of the unified and specified commands, and the Intelligence Community. It provides an analysis of current and projected capabilities of US forces, assisted by allies where appropriate, to deter war and, if deterrence fails, to terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. This assessment makes both quantitative and qualitative comparisons of US and allied FY 1990 current forces with those of the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as comparisons of anticipated future forces through FY 1997.

The extraordinary changes in the international security environment present a unique challenge to defense planning and programming. Sweeping global change, coupled with US fiscal pressures, will strongly influence the way US military strategy is implemented and key force investment decisions are made. This assessment reflects conditions as of the end of January 1990 and assumes a defense program with an approximate 2-percent annual real decline in resources.

NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES

The national military objectives serve the national security goal of preserving the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact, while deterring war.
The national military objectives are to:

— deter war across the spectrum of conflict and, should deterrence fail, to terminate conflict on terms most favorable to the United States and its allies and friends;

— encourage political reforms and liberalizations taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe;

— achieve mutually balanced and effectively verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons;

— maintain stable alliance relationships;

— maintain global influence and freedom of action;

— protect free commerce and access to markets;

— stem drug flow into the United States;

— inhibit the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and

— preclude militarily significant technology transfer to potential adversaries.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Since World War II, the Western democracies have prospered economically while executing a grand strategy of containment. The United States has exercised global political, economic, and military presence, including a large commitment of forward-deployed forces. This strategy has been an historic success. The Soviet Union and its allies, economically and politically isolated behind the Iron Curtain, have paid an enormous price in terms of the social and economic well-being of their people. Their leaders now appear determined to pursue fundamentally different paths in an effort to resolve multiple crises that
threaten the very foundations of their society. The resulting domestic and foreign policy reforms are producing profound changes in the Warsaw Pact and associated defense relationships.

Changes of this magnitude present both opportunities and challenges to traditional US alliances. Although prospects are high for successful arms control, simultaneous fiscal pressure to reduce permanent overseas forces and cut spending may create perceptions of reduced US resolve, thus undermining confidence among allies and perhaps provoking tensions between traditional adversaries. In Europe, greater economic integration, more democratic East European political regimes, and the question of German unification will usher in a new era of alliance relationships for both East and West.

The continuing challenge of intractable conflicts in the Third World poses increasingly complex security tasks, especially given the relentless proliferation of advanced weaponry. Ballistic missiles, in particular, have introduced a new era in regional conflict, increasing the potential for escalation and widespread destruction. Traditional regional animosities, exacerbated by the problems of debt, terrorism, insurgencies, and drug trafficking, will continue to command US attention and defense resources.

On the domestic scene, deficit reduction efforts, perceptions of a lessening Soviet threat, and increased Congressional interest in burdensharing will bring demands for decreased defense spending.

However, there is also reason for caution. The United States must recognize that the Soviet Union's restructured military will be formidable and that the Soviet Union will remain the only nation capable of unilaterally inflicting vast nuclear destruction on the United States and its allies through the 1990s. Moreover, despite their current problems, the Soviets are unlikely to weaken significantly their strategic position. Substantial modernization of Soviet strategic systems continues. The United States must remain a source of stability in the event that the positive changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union lead to greater instability.
Striking a prudent balance between optimism born of momentous change and caution driven by great uncertainty will require the most serious dialogue among policymakers in the United States, as well as with friends, allies, and former adversaries.

IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURE

The current dynamic environment, with its reduced prospect for conflict with the Soviet Union, has serious implications for both nuclear and conventional strategies and the forces necessary to support them.

The US nuclear strategy must remain one of deterrence, and parity must be maintained. The deterrent utility of the Triad is still valid. The United States must integrate policies and plans with programs for modernized post-Strategic Arms Reduction Talks force structures, to include appropriate command, control, communications, and intelligence.

The US strategy must continue to support the theater nuclear strategy fundamental to NATO's flexible response. The removal of intermediate-range nuclear forces under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty dictates that the Alliance will place increasing reliance on naval and air forces. The decision on deployment of the Follow-On To LANCE to NATO will be made in 1992 in accordance with NATO's May 1989 Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament. Further, the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by regional powers is of great concern; this may eventually impact on global requirements for US nonstrategic nuclear forces.

In the area of conventional forces, the diminishing Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat and domestic budget reductions both permit and dictate force cuts. The US strategy of forward defense will continue to feature forward presence composed of forward-based forces and deployments. This forward presence will include fewer permanently forward-based forces and more periodic deployments of ground, naval, and air forces for varying durations. Allies must accept greater responsibility for day-to-day deterrence and initial defense while the United States turns toward reinforcement capabilities and the contribution of unique capabilities, such as strategic deterrence (including nuclear deterrence)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

and strategically mobile naval, air, and ground forces for power projection. Likewise, US strategy will provide for rapidly executable contingency operations for responding to unpredictable regional events. This strategy must increasingly rely on allied support. US forces will need to be mobile, flexible, sustainable, technologically advanced, and able to respond rapidly and discriminately to protect and defend the wide range of US interests across the spectrum of contingencies.

ASSESSMENT

General

The most critical tasks remain the maintenance of an effective strategic nuclear deterrent, appropriate provisions for defense of the US homeland, and the strategic projection of power. Given recent events in Eastern Europe and the growing integration of the European Economic Community, Europe will continue to exert fundamental influences on US foreign and national security policies. Also of importance are the continued satisfaction of US commitments to allies and friends and the ability, if needed, to unilaterally deter threats to and defend US interests worldwide.

Strategic Nuclear Forces

The foundation for this strategy of deterrence is US strategic nuclear forces. If forces on both sides are reduced according to the plan envisioned by the United States for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, deterrence and stability can be maintained. Regardless of the outcome of negotiated arms reductions, because of residual Soviet capabilities, the United States must maintain parity and retain a ready, modern, and effective strategic nuclear Triad capable of denying Soviet goals. Investment in a ballistic missile defense system is needed as a minimum to counter the possibility of a Soviet missile attack against the United States and the potential problems caused by the proliferation of advanced missile systems among Third World nations. In any case, the risk of nuclear deterrence failing is assessed to be low and at this moment to be decreasing.
Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces

US nonstrategic nuclear forces constitute a critical element of the military strategy of flexible response. NATO continues to rely on its strategy of flexible response to deter Soviet aggression and to defend against that aggression if deterrence fails. Even in an environment of conventional parity, NATO's nuclear forces will continue to contribute to deterring conventional attack and will serve as a fundamental component of US deterrence of Soviet use of nuclear weapons. Following completion of the destruction of intermediate-range missiles under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union (to a lesser degree) must rely more on dual-capable aircraft. Both have the capability to use cruise missiles to support their strategies and execute war plans. To maintain a credible capability, the United States must continue to modernize its nonstrategic nuclear forces and supporting command, control, communications, and intelligence. The overall nonstrategic nuclear forces balance is assessed to be improved for NATO as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is being implemented, but the Soviets retain a significant advantage both in numbers and range of nonstrategic nuclear forces below the intermediate-range nuclear forces range. The probability that NATO would need to resort to the use of nonstrategic nuclear forces is assessed to decrease with elimination of conventional force asymmetries.

Conventional Forces

Although the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact maintain significant force advantages, unilateral force reductions and political change in Eastern Europe are eroding the Soviets' capability to conduct successful, sustained conventional operations against NATO. Additionally, their confidence in the reliability of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, which had contributed much of the ground forces (albeit a lesser share of combat potential) in the Western Theater of Military Operations, is diminished. This concern is especially valid if the Soviets contemplate aggression against the West. Thus, the Soviets have to consider the prospect that they would have to conduct a theater offensive against NATO primarily on their own. Consequently, their capability to accomplish theater strategic objectives is significantly decreased. This said, the probability of a global conventional war with the Soviets is assessed as low.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the possibility of further unilateral force reductions, force reductions under a conventional forces agreement, and recently postulated reductions beyond initial treaty proposals, and given the increased independence of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations, the Soviet Union will require increasingly lengthy preparation time for force generation for a major theater operation. These conditions allow prudent conventional force reductions by the United States but also call for hedges against reversal through continued modernization and improvements in reinforcement capability and industrial capacity. In the unlikely event that global conventional war were to occur and if the United States reacts in a timely fashion to Soviet attempts to recreate current force asymmetries, the potential for termination of such a conflict on terms favorable to the United States is much improved.

Non-Soviet crises will likely command greater attention of the United States. Third World debt, poverty, fragile democracies, and internecine struggles have created the conditions for continued instability around the globe. In much of the Third World, terrorism, insurgencies, and drug trafficking are becoming more destabilizing and will likewise demand the increasing attention, if not the resources, of the United States. The United States is assessed to be capable of successfully dealing with all likely non-Soviet military contingencies. However, there is an increased probability of threats to US interests as a result of these destabilizing conditions.

Force Generation and Mobilization

In the past, the Warsaw Pact has been judged capable both of generating forces more quickly and of generating more forces over time than NATO, resulting in vast ground force asymmetries. Currently, many of the Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact divisions in the Western Theater of Military Operations are maintained in a ready status, but initial trainees account for a considerable percentage of the conscript soldiers. Under the unilateral reductions already taking place, many ready and not-ready Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact divisions will be eliminated, and remaining units will be restructured in a way that will reduce their armored striking power. However, equipment and personnel from these units are being used to restructure and modernize remaining units. Because of the structure postulated to exist following
unilateral reductions, and certainly under the structure remaining following an agreement on conventional forces in Europe, it will be more difficult for the Soviets to generate forces. Their future capability will be a function of readiness and the disposition of forces and equipment. Upon completion of the announced unilateral reductions, remaining Warsaw Pact motorized rifle divisions will be well suited for defensive operations, but they will be less capable of conducting large-scale attacks or counterattacks in the traditional Soviet manner.

NATO’s force generation capabilities will improve relative to those of the Warsaw Pact, given continued unilateral Warsaw Pact reductions. Under the conditions of a conventional forces agreement, NATO’s relative capabilities will be vastly improved if NATO exercises its full treaty rights and continues with force modernization.

Sustainability and Industrial Mobilization

Existing US supplies, pre-positioned war reserves, and secondary war reserve stocks for Central Europe are assessed to be improving. US capabilities are adequate for regional non-Soviet conflicts. The lack of alternative production facilities, the inability to surge rapidly to required wartime rates, and the increasing reliance on overseas supplies introduce a moderate risk under the conditions of a global war. Under the lower force levels envisioned by a conventional forces agreement, with the resultant reduced demand on defense investments, it will be increasingly important to maintain a warm industrial base and mobilization capability as well as a vital research and development base.

Mobility

US capabilities to meet present commitments currently are assessed to be marginal. Improvements will result from programmed pre-positioning and airlift, but sealift hulls and tonnage capability will decline. Currently, strategic lift cannot deliver movement requirements on time and, consequently, the strategic lift shortfall exacerbates the primary risk—the lack of forces—although the capability required to reinforce after a conventional forces agreement has not yet been fully formulated. In a regional conflict, the planned mobility force
would be adequate to support movement of contingency forces worldwide, assuming most combinations of time, distance, and forces. However, mobility shortfalls may occur as a result of short warning, a requirement to rapidly apply overwhelming combat power, or contingencies occurring simultaneously. The future combination of less favorable basing rights, decreased forward-based forces, declining sealift assets, and an aging airlift fleet points toward increasing risk in the future.

Space

Most of the US and Soviet national objectives are adequately supported by current and projected space capabilities. Both nations rely on space systems in some key mission areas. The United States is assessed to retain some advantages in technology and on-orbit capability for military support in peacetime and crisis. The current Soviet warfighting advantage will decrease but remain significant because of the synergistic combination of their antisatellite capabilities and robust space system replacement capabilities. Given the assessment that conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States is increasingly unlikely, the risk to US space systems is considered to be decreasing.

SUMMARY

A dramatically different security environment is emerging that is principally characterized by a diminished Soviet threat, reduced defense resources, and an increasingly complex world. These realities imply a reshaping of US security policy, strategy, force posture, and capabilities. The challenge is to reconcile enduring objectives and tasks with repostured and restructured forces without foreclosing options for hedging against new or renewed threats.
I. PROLOGUE

NOTE:
The purpose of this document is to provide an unclassified version of
the document forwarded to Congress by the Secretary of Defense on
6 March 1990. The effective date for data and assessments contained
in this document is 20 January 1990.

BACKGROUND

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1989 requires the Secretary
of Defense to prepare a comprehensive military net assessment. This Act
amends Title 10, US Code, Section 113(j). Applicable portions are quoted as
follows:

"Each such report shall—

"(A) include a comparison of the defense capabilities and programs of
the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies with the armed
forces of potential adversaries of the United States and allies of the
United States;

"(B) include an examination of the trends experienced in those
capabilities and programs during the five years immediately preceding
the year in which the report is transmitted, and an examination of the
expected trends in those capabilities and programs during the five years
covered by the Five-Year Defense Program submitted to Congress
during that year ... ;

"(C) reflect, in the overall assessment and in the strategic and regional
assessments, the defense capabilities and programs of the Armed Forces
of the United States specified in the budget submitted to Congress ... in
the year in which the report is submitted and in the Five-Year Defense
Program submitted in such year; and
1990 JMNA

“(D) identify the deficiencies in the defense capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States in such budget and such Five-Year Defense Program.

“The Secretary shall transmit to Congress the report required for each year ... at the same time that the President submits the budget to Congress ... in that year. Such report shall be transmitted in both classified and unclassified form.”

PURPOSE

The JMNA was prepared for the Secretary of Defense by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified commands and the participation of the Intelligence Community. The Services and the Intelligence Community provided data based on the FY 1990-1991 President’s Budget through the SYDP, modified for FY 1991 and beyond to the extent possible to parallel the FY 1991 DOD amended budget. The 1990 JMNA presents a net assessment of the capability of US forces, assisted by allies where appropriate, to deter war. It also assesses the capability, if deterrence fails, to terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the United States.

OBJECTIVES

— Determine the potential effectiveness of the FY 1990 US force, assisted by allies where appropriate, against the FY 1990 force of potential adversaries.

— Determine the expected effectiveness of anticipated US future fielded forces through FY 1997, assisted by allies where appropriate, against the anticipated future fielded forces of potential adversaries through FY 1997.

— Examine trends in warfighting capabilities and effectiveness over the 5 years immediately preceding the current FY 1990 force and expected trends through the end of the SYDP.
PROLOGUE

— Identify the deficiencies in the capabilities of the budget and SYDP force.

SCOPE

The JMNA reviews national security objectives and the current strategic environment and assesses the implications for US strategy and forces. It includes assessments of strategic nuclear (offensive and defensive) forces, NSNF, and general purpose conventional forces, as well as a number of specific functional areas. Furthermore, the impact of arms control is considered.

METHODOLOGY

The JMNA has been developed using previous analyses, estimates, expert advice, models, politico-military gaming and seminars, static comparisons, and, most importantly, military judgment. Analytical tools have been applied where appropriate.

The assessment considers the strategic environment against the enduring fiber of national military security objectives, and assesses the risk associated with US global requirements in light of the capability and assessed intent of potential US adversaries.
II. NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES

The basic US national security goal is to preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. In support of this goal, the national military strategy of the United States pursues the following objectives:

— To deter military attack against the United States, its allies, and other important countries, and to defeat such attack should deterrence fail.

— To encourage the political reforms and liberalization taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and to foster associated commensurate changes in their military postures and other resulting improvements in the security environment.

— To reduce US reliance on nuclear weapons and nuclear retaliation by pursuing technologies for strategic defense, by negotiating equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, and by maintaining strong conventional forces.

— To increase US influence around the world, to further an atmosphere conducive to democratic progress, to protect free commerce, and to ensure US access to world markets, associated critical resources, the oceans, and space.

— To maintain stable alliance relationships and to encourage and assist US allies and friends to defend themselves against invasion, armed insurgencies, terrorism, and coercion.

— To stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

— To retard the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

— To preclude the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to the Soviet Union or other potential adversaries.
III. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

OVERVIEW

Since the end of World War II, the grand strategy of the United States has been focused on containment—to restrain and deter the country's most dangerous adversary, the Soviet Union, through a system of alliances, forward-deployed forces, and technologically superior military capability. This strategy responded to Soviet postwar actions, including the retention of numerically superior military forces; the subordination of a number of governments; and, eventually, a Soviet-dominated alliance system encompassing most of Eastern Europe. However, while Western democracies have been secure under a containment strategy, the Soviet Union and its allies have languished behind the Iron Curtain at great cost to the social and economic well-being of their people. The profound changes reshaping the strategic landscape of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are stages of transition leading to a fundamental transformation of the individual members, as well as the institution, of the entire WP. The United States welcomes these changes because, if continued, they represent genuine reductions in the threat to American interests, a substantial shift toward democratization, and the movement of the Soviets and East Europeans toward adoption of political and economic interdependence within the international community of nations.

Although these changes are reasons for optimism, the Soviet Union will still be a competitive Superpower when the transformation is complete. Because the Soviets will retain a strong nuclear and conventional capability, it is necessary to remain both wary and ready.

THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The world is witnessing an historic change in the making. Soviet leaders recognize that past Soviet politico-military strategy is now economically and politically insupportable. Within the Soviet Union, the realities of severe economic hardship, the rise of regional nationalism and ethnic unrest, and the costs of supporting an enormous military structure are causing a transformation of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Although this strategic change is incomplete and may be reversible under some conceivable political and military circumstances, there is broad agreement that the Soviet leadership has decided
to reverse a 20-year pattern of growth in military spending and force posture. Expected benefits from these changes for the Soviet Union are immediate and enduring enhancements in worldwide diplomatic influence, improvements in the Soviet domestic economy in the long run, and the possibility of gaining access to previously restricted technology and international markets. Further impetus for Soviet military restructuring can be found in the Soviet belief that an emerging military-technological revolution could fundamentally alter the nature of warfare. Such a revolution will not only involve the development of new equipment, but it will also require new operational concepts and organizational changes. The Soviets realize that they are ill-prepared economically and technologically for such a revolution. In these times of declining Superpower tensions and reduced arms competition, the Soviets have the opportunity to reduce military expenditures in order to rebuild their economy and improve their technological prowess. The changes sweeping the Soviet Union and East European nations offer significant opportunities for reduced tensions and enhanced global security. However, the United States must not lose sight of the fact that, even under the most optimistic of outcomes, the Soviet Union will retain a formidable military capability and remain the only nation that can destroy the United States and its allies through the 1990s. Moreover, despite their current problems, the Soviets are unlikely to weaken significantly their strategic position. In fact, the modernization of Soviet strategic systems continues.

Many East European countries are also undergoing a fundamental transformation that is shaking the very foundations of Communist rule. Changes that recently were not expected to occur for many years are being announced on an almost daily basis. These events, such as the replacement of all NSWP party and government leaders, the opening of borders, the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, and the Solidarity labor union’s guidance of a fledgling democracy in Poland, are overdue and long-encouraged developments. Largely because the East Europeans are experiencing severe economic and social deprivations, their level of military expenditures can no longer be sustained. These nations’ continued movement toward multiparty democracies and more competitive economies will make them ever more reluctant military partners with the Soviet Union. The United States welcomes and encourages these changes and the opportunities for more open and liberalized societies and the reduced threat they portend.
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

US alliances, upon which US strategy relies heavily, have proven to be robust and long-lived. However, it is recognized that the changing strategic environment and fiscal realities will result in reductions in the size of US overseas force deployments.

West European nations are displaying increasing assertiveness as they turn their focus from military security to economic concerns, particularly with the evolution of the EEC as a single internal European market. Trade and financial issues, already viewed on a par with security considerations, will receive increasing emphasis as the integration of the European economies takes place over the next few years. With the increasing perception of a declining threat, West Europeans will be more inclined to view security questions through an economic prism. Further, calls for German unification increasingly have been heard in both East and West Germany. The variables associated with unification are numerous and the ultimate impact on the strategic landscape is undetermined.

Asia is moving toward increased economic prosperity, resulting in a shift in power, policy, and international relationships. Japan, the PRC, and India are major regional powers. Robust economic growth continues to strengthen nations such as the ROK, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Militarily, the ROK is steadily enhancing its capability to deter attack from the DPRK. The ASEAN nations are experiencing closer unity and economic expansion. It is realistic to assume that a more complicated power game will be played in the future—one in which Superpower rivalries will give way to regional political assertiveness. Asian nations will maintain their interest in a continued US role in the region to provide stability for further growth.

The United States continues to have a range of interests in the Third World, including promoting the growth of freedom and democracy, protecting key strategic resources and LOCs, and nurturing longstanding defense commitments and political relationships. Increasingly, however, actions by a small country can have a significant impact on a large nation’s political fate. Traditional animosities will continue to foment in many regions of the world, and the United States will be confronted with the emergence of more assertive regional powers. The enduring problems of debt, terrorism, insurgencies, and drug
trafficking will continue to command attention and resources as the United States pursues the objective of a more stable world. The proliferation of advanced weaponry has tended to affect the military gap between the Superpowers and the emerging regional powers. In this same vein, the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons—particularly coupled with ballistic missile delivery means—is of great concern. For example, the possibility of DPRK development of nuclear weapons capability would threaten the current stability on the Korean peninsula. In short, US leaders can expect the Third World to command increasing attention, contributing to the need to view the world as increasingly multipolar.

THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

Four domestic themes will have a significant impact on defense planning over the coming decade. First, the fiscal realities of the budget and trade deficits and the perception of unjustifiably high defense budgets will cause severe constraints on the defense budget in the future. Second, the growing perception that the Soviet threat is lessening and that “Communism has failed” will increasingly call into question the relevance of some US force structure and alliance relationships. Third, increased demand for military assistance in domestic disaster response and counternarcotic operations can be expected. Lastly, questions are being asked about defense burdensharing and the validity of US forward deployments. It seems increasingly inevitable that the US Armed Forces must meet future global and domestic commitments more efficiently—with fewer resources, a reduced force structure, and a smaller forward-deployed presence.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE

GENERAL

The strategic environment indicates fundamental changes mandating appropriate US response. The US commitment to containment and deterrence has been successful, due largely to a relatively consistent strategy and policy. Now, as both the strategic landscape and available defense resources undergo rapid change, the United States must adapt to meet emerging requirements. Those requirements include the continued ability to provide an effective deterrent and to be prepared to employ its armed forces effectively in peacetime as required. The United States must be prepared to embrace a wider perspective designed to protect and advance US interests by promoting regional stability and global US influence. Regardless, the strategy and forces of the 1990s must be shaped to provide the United States with the requisite military capability to execute its responsibilities as leader of the Free World.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

The objective of these forces remains to deter nuclear aggression and help to deter other forms of aggression against the United States, its allies, and its interests. US strategic offensive forces will remain the cornerstone of this national deterrent strategy.

The Triad of bombers, SLBMs, and land-based ICBMs has served US deterrent needs well. A modernized nuclear force with redundant, survivable C³I and TW&AA systems continues to be a priority. At the same time, the United States should maximize the constrained strategic force structure options offered by START.

NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

As implementation of the INF Treaty removes and destroys land-based INF from Europe, and after a CFE agreement is negotiated and implementation begun, land-based, short-range missiles with ranges less than 500 km may be up for discussion during negotiations on SNF.
US strategy must continue to support the theater nuclear strategy fundamental to flexible response which has served well the alliance deterrence needs. It will be important to continue to make US NSNF, with its supporting C³I systems, more flexible and modern—both for NATO deterrence and defense and as a hedge against emerging nuclear-capable regional powers.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

The United States must preserve a credible capability to deter conventional attack against the United States, its allies, and other areas in which it has interests. The US strategy of forward defense will be exercised through forward presence, with fewer permanently forward-based forces and more reliance on deployments of ground, air, and naval (ashore and afloat) forces. Allies will be urged to accept greater responsibility for day-to-day deterrence while the United States will seek to concentrate on providing capabilities for which US forces have a comparative advantage and to prudently avoid duplication of effort with and among allies. Likewise, the strategy will require that US and allied forces be able to execute contingency operations rapidly in response to unpredictable events at the regional level—without awaiting conscription or new equipment production. This strategy also must rely increasingly on allied support. Overall, US forces will need to be mobile, flexible, sustainable, technologically advanced, and able to respond rapidly and discriminately to protect and defend the wide range of US interests across the spectrum of contingencies.

Europe

In the near term, Europe will continue to be a dynamic region—economically, politically, and militarily. Although the Soviet Union still possesses a vast conventional capability, European and US leaders are torn between the hopes generated by the vast changes taking place on the European continent and the realities of the continuing need to ensure national integrity and coalition defense. Prudence dictates that the United States should retain a significant commitment to the security and stability of Europe into the foreseeable future. Although the likelihood of war with the Soviet Union has diminished, the United States must ensure that US forces remain capable of
IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE

countering Soviet and East European military capabilities as they currently exist—as well as providing a hedge against a renewed threat.

Pacific

General. The Pacific region, notably Asia, will be in significant transition. While the prospects for conflict involving US forces in this region remain low, growing economic prowess, increasing political assertiveness among allies and friends, and Asia's greater role in international affairs generally will make it a region that will offer challenges and opportunities to US interests. Despite increased political harmony and economic prosperity, US forward presence will continue to remain key to regional stability. With improved allied capabilities and reduced tensions, adjustments to current US regional presence are possible. US planning and force characteristics for the region should emphasize flexibility and become better suited to operating over the vast distances and the relatively sparse base structure of the Pacific region.

Japan. A strong US-Japanese security relationship—and US forces forward-based and forward-deployed in Japan—is important to the security and stability of the Pacific Rim. However, Japan should increase its defense spending to improve the quality and sustainability of its current forces to meet agreed roles and missions.

Republic of Korea. The United States should encourage steady development of ROK defense capabilities and a broadening role for the ROK within the US-ROK defense relationship. As ROK forces grow stronger, a reduction of US forces may be warranted. However, continuous retention of US troops in Korea will be required as long as the US and Korean governments and people want them there.

Republic of the Philippines. The availability of military bases in the Philippines will remain a key factor in regional stability and is important to the support of US forward presence. US access to these military facilities will require special efforts to maintain international cooperation. The United States should continue to aid Filipino efforts to attain economic and political stability while participating in their mutual defense efforts.
Southwest Asia

The maintenance of friendly relations and the region's continued importance require the United States to continue to show its presence and interest in the region and to continue to build solid alliances based on mutual objectives.

Other Regions

As the probability of global war declines and Soviet adventurism abates, other regions will likely receive more US attention and resources. The littoral nations of Southeast Asia are economically and geostrategically significant; however, longstanding rivalries continue. In the Middle East, political and religious differences flare quickly. As nations of the region acquire more capable weapons, there is increased potential for miscalculation and ensuing rapid escalation of crises. In the Western hemisphere, political turmoil and drug problems have been and likely will continue to be at the center of the US focus. The perception of the danger presented by these latter circumstances is magnified by their geographic proximity to the United States.

Third World debt, poverty, fragile democracies, and internecine struggles will have increasing impact on US interests around the globe. Terrorism, insurgencies, regional hostilities, and drug trafficking will continue to command ever-increasing attention and resources. Similarly, the proliferation of high-technology conventional weapons and chemical and nuclear weapons, combined with ballistic missile delivery means, threatens US interests around the world. To address this multitude of challenges, US strategy must give increased attention to well-coordinated interagency planning, adequately funded and appropriately allocated security assistance, and increased participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises with Third World nations. The United States must maintain its influence worldwide through a nation-building process of economic, security, and humanitarian assistance as well as civic action in support of US foreign policy objectives. Security influence can be maintained through deployments and exercises and through a demonstrated capability for credible crisis response across the spectrum of conflict. Toward this end, the United States must maintain a flexible mix of forward-deployed and CONUS-based active forces that are rapidly deployable and sustainable without requiring a major Reserve callup.
V. POSTULATED CAPABILITIES AND FORCES

CAPABILITIES

The previously discussed changes in the international and fiscal environment, and the implications for strategy and forces, both prompt and necessitate adjustments in capabilities and force requirements. These changes cannot be taken simply in proportional fashion; rather they must be made selectively, consistent with a new strategic vision. The challenge is to reconcile enduring objectives and tasks with repostured forces without foreclosing options for hedging against new or renewed threats along the way.

Future force requirements must be based on a range of broadly based capabilities that are critical to the attainment of enduring national security objectives. These capabilities would frame the forces necessary to counter the vast majority of contingencies the United States may encounter over the midterm. This force structure also would provide a measure of stability to defense programs. Simply, the United States should have capabilities to meet its national security objectives under a variety of circumstances.

Peacetime Deterrence and Escalation Control

This category addresses the ability to deploy and execute, both in peacetime and in time of crisis, a variety of flexible response options that enable deterrence and, should deterrence fail, control of escalation and termination of conflict on favorable terms. This capability must span the entire spectrum of challenges from low-intensity conflict to global war.

Global Conventional Conflict

This category addresses the ability to prosecute a war in conjunction with allies in a sustained high-intensity environment with high-technology weapons. Although a global conventional conflict is deemed increasingly less likely, the capabilities required for such a conflict should continue to set the framework for the majority of US forces. Capabilities must exist to meet US objectives both in a conflict evolving from a crisis and in a conflict with deliberate preparation.
Regional Alliance Conflict

This category addresses the ability to prosecute a mid- to high-intensity conflict in an area where the infrastructure would be moderately well developed and where some US facilities would already be in existence. The threat would be sophisticated, primarily consisting of heavy armor and artillery with some late-generation fighter aircraft and a relatively modern navy. The lift requirements would be for extended transport distances from CONUS.

Major Regional Intervention

This category addresses the ability to prosecute a conflict in an area where the local infrastructure would be very limited. The threat would include relatively sophisticated naval and ground forces (primarily armor) and a limited number of fighter aircraft. The lift requirements would be for extended transport distances from CONUS. In this instance, there could be third party hostile force involvement through the furnishing of intelligence data, arms sales, force movements toward sensitive areas, or naval presence.

Medium Regional Crisis Without Mobilization

This category addresses the ability to assist in a low- to mid-intensity conflict caused by an attack against an ally or friendly nation that the United States would feel compelled to assist and in which there would be a very limited infrastructure. The threat would consist primarily of light infantry with limited light armor, air, and naval forces. This conflict could be complicated by a need for concurrent counter-terrorism and antidrug trade activities.

Regional Insurgency

This category addresses the ability to assist a friendly nation that the United States would be committed to support against an insurgency.

FORCES

The general force characteristics listed below could be used to assess future US capabilities given forecasted available defense resources, a transitioning
(if not transformed) Soviet Union and WP, and nuclear and conventional arms controls similar to those envisioned by the administration.

**Strategic Nuclear Forces**

To successfully deter a nuclear attack against the United States, its allies, and other areas important to US interests, the United States must maintain a modern strategic nuclear force.

**Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces**

Maintenance of a credible NSNF relies on the continued modernization of airborne, seaborne, and ground-based weapons, delivery platforms, and launch systems.

**Conventional Forces (Global Deterrence)**

The United States must have the capability to deter a conventional attack against the United States, its allies, and other areas important to US interests. Although the likelihood of a global war has diminished sharply, the United States must retain the capability to generate a highly capable and balanced (ground, air, and naval) conventional force. That force must be appropriate to decreasing global threat capabilities, while still offering a hedge against a renewed threat if Soviet intentions should change. For deterrence and the show of US resolve, the United States will continue to rely on sufficient forward presence to deter in a crisis, while still maintaining regional stability and global influence. Forces must be capable of being employed worldwide without awaiting conscription or new equipment production, yet they must be able to take full advantage of Reserves.

The ground forces requirement will be a mix of heavy divisions and lighter units required for additional contingency missions with adequate NATO prepositioned equipment and sealift and airlift.

The air forces requirement will be a mix of air-to-air, air-to-surface, and multirole aircraft with emphasis on the multirole assets.
Naval forces requirements will be centered around a balanced mix of power projection, sea control, and strategic deterrent forces consisting of carrier and battleship battlegroups, amphibious task forces, Marine expeditionary forces, and area ASW forces.

To support force generation, a warm production base must be retained. The United States must be capable of surging production quickly and producing an increasing output over a longer period of time.

Conventional Forces (Contingency Response)

To protect US allies, access, and interests worldwide against regional hostilities or conflicts, the United States must maintain a contingency force structured and equipped to intervene rapidly and conduct sustained, decisive military action. This force must be highly trained, active duty, rapidly mobile, and modernized; when required, it will be drawn largely from forces in CONUS and deployed forward presence forces.

Ground forces should be centered on a fully supported US Army corps including specialty forces such as civil affairs and military police. There should be a capability to draw this corps from a mix of air assault, airborne, light, and heavy units. This force must be supported by adequate sealift and airlift.

Air forces should be drawn from the global requirement to provide air-to-air, air-to-surface, and multirole assets.

Naval forces should be drawn from the continuing global requirement to provide battlegroup, amphibious, MPS, and naval gunfire support ships for power projection, logistic ships for integral resupply, and SSNs and ASW-capable ships and aircraft for sea control. These forces should include the capability to provide a two-ocean amphibious lift capability.

SOF must have the capability to support the contingency force in addition to maintaining sufficient forces and lift to respond to a separate crisis requirement.
VI. CAPABILITIES AND TRENDS

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

General

The United States and the Soviet Union currently possess the capability to release a massively destructive attack; this capability will be maintained over the period assessed. The United States and the Soviet Union, as a result of continued mutual competition, increasingly capable Third World threats, and indeed, simple mistrust, will find it necessary to retain ready, modern, and effective strategic offensive and defensive forces. Although the scenarios used in this assessment compare weapons arsenals by various measures, numerous intangibles will greatly compound the effects of the direct physical damage.

Scenario Assumptions

Two force posture scenarios were analyzed: DTD alert and GEN alert. The Soviets are assumed to initiate the attack in both scenarios. In the DTD scenario, the United States does not receive sufficient strategic warning to generate its forces. The GEN scenario assumes that both sides fully generate their forces, and it also considers attrition to strategic nuclear forces from conventional warfare preceding the nuclear exchange. For US capability analysis, the results are described for the United States responding to the Soviet attack with a prompt retaliatory launch or a delayed retaliatory launch.

Target Base Assumptions

It is judged that the Soviets attack a postulated US and non-US NATO target base that is much smaller than the number of installations that the United States plans to attack. This asymmetry is a result of differences in doctrine, targeting philosophies, and the relative sizes and characteristics of each side’s forces.

Force Assumptions

Unless otherwise stated, force capabilities are those available based on the FY 1990 DOD budget and projected program and recent National Intelligence Estimates of Soviet forces. A comparison of warhead inventories is shown in Figure 1 on the following page.
Soviet Offensive Force Capabilities (without START)

The Soviets are expected to continue upgrading ICBMs, SSBNs, and bombers throughout the coming decade, making those forces increasingly accurate and thus placing US forces at increasing risk. Although the Soviets currently are modernizing forces along the lines envisioned in the START negotiations, in the absence of a treaty, they could add additional weapons to
CAPABILITIES AND TRENDS

their inventory by FY 1997. This increase would be due primarily to increased numbers of bomber weapons. Concurrently, enhanced reliability and accuracy potentially reduce the number of warheads the Soviets need to achieve their postulated damage goals. As a result, there could be an increase in the lethality and number of Soviet reserves composed of mobile, survivable weapons, making US forces less effective. Currently, the Soviets have deployed a large number of their planned rail-mobile and silo-based SS-24s and road-mobile SS-25s. By the mid- to late 1990s, these delivery vehicles could comprise one-half of the total Soviet ICBM force. Changes in the US target base that add mobile targets (e.g., Rail Garrison PEACEKEEPER and small ICBM) may ultimately complicate Soviet targeting strategy in a GEN scenario. Attrition as a result of allied ASW during an extended conventional conflict before a nuclear exchange would still leave the Soviets with sufficient strategic weapons to meet fully their postulated objectives.

On the other hand, recent trends in the Soviets' strategic nuclear forces suggest that the size of their strategic nuclear weapon arsenal may, in fact, decrease during the next decade by a few thousand weapons. The impetus for this trend appears to come in part from Soviet concerns for resource considerations, as well as the perception that relations between the two Superpowers will remain good and a START treaty will likely be signed in the near term. However, these forces are not expected to be less capable of carrying out Soviet wartime strategic offensive missions. Indeed, through modernization, the Soviets are expected to deploy more effective strategic systems and thereby continue to cover their strategic missions at least as well as they can today. As a case in point, the Soviet emphasis on SLBMs and mobile ICBMs will result in a more survivable force that will continue to threaten US strategic assets.

Soviet nuclear forces are designed, and their personnel are trained, to fulfill their missions under all circumstances. The Intelligence Community has assessed that the Soviets have taken steps over the years to improve their capabilities to accomplish missions for all contingencies. While the Soviets have professed their commitment to no first-use of nuclear weapons, they have developed extensive plans for using nuclear weapons first to preempt any use by other nations. The key to a successful preemptive attack would be effective
coordination of the strike, accurate intelligence on enemy intentions, and reliable C³. In the event the Soviets failed to execute their preemptive option, they would seek to launch while under attack. To deal with this contingency, they have established a complex system of launch detection satellites, over-the-horizon radars, and USSR-based large phased-array radars that will provide the Soviet high command with up to 30 minutes warning of an incoming attack. These systems are able to determine the general direction of the attack and conduct missile tracking. In addition, the Soviets have invested heavily in the survivability of their C³ systems, weapons, and leadership structure.

US Deterrent Force Capabilities (without START)

The United States should have enough weapons to cover fully most targets of interest from a GEN posture, although deficiencies will exist in holding the larger Soviet mobile land-based missile force and deeply buried targets at risk. The number of US weapon systems gradually increases until FY 1993-1994 and then declines because of POSEIDON and B-52G retirements. Comparisons between FY 1990 and later years must be made cautiously because of changes to future target bases. Current estimates indicate that the Soviet target base will become slightly smaller and softer, but significantly more difficult to target, as the Soviets dismantle older silos and LCCs and continue to deploy mobile ICBMs.

Soviet Strategic Defense Capabilities

An indication of the large asymmetry that exists between US and Soviet strategic defenses can be found in Figure 2. Soviet efforts to counter US strategic forces have focused on a wartime management program that stresses four key areas. First, to ensure the survivability of their national command authority, the Soviets have constructed a comprehensive and redundant system of communications facilities and both hardened and mobile command posts. Second, the Soviets have deployed new or modified air defense systems for improved early warning and detection, tracking, C³, and intercept capabilities against bombers and cruise missiles. The Soviets currently are deploying a wide range of air defense weapons and support systems such as SAMs, air defense fighters, AWACS, and radars. The upgraded capability of SAMs has
Air Interceptors decreased the capability of currently deployed US bombers and ALCMs to penetrate Soviet airspace. Third, the Soviets also have continued to expand and modernize their treaty-compliant Moscow ABM system. The upgraded system has two layers: one for exoatmospheric intercept and the other for endoatmospheric intercept. The Soviets shortly will have the only known operational ABM system consisting of 100 missiles. Moreover, the Soviets constructed the PILLBOX battle management radar at Pushkino for full
hemispherical coverage in support of this modernized Moscow ABM system. Lastly, the Soviets continue to improve their TW&AA capabilities, consisting of launch detection satellites, over-the-horizon radars, and a network of peripheral radars.

US Strategic Defense Capabilities

The basic element of today's US strategic defense posture is the ballistic missile TW&AA system. Programmed improvements are designed to maintain a credible and enduring TW&AA capability against the projected threat through the 1990s. To achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating the ballistic missile threat to the United States and its allies, the SDI Organization was established to conduct a comprehensive long-term research and technology development program. The proposed defense would enhance deterrence by presenting the Soviets with uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of attack against the United States and would provide defense against a possible proliferation of ICBMs by other nations. The North American air defense forces are composed of surveillance radars, AWACS aircraft, interceptor aircraft, and an integrated C² system. For the midterm, the United States will maintain an air defense capability against an air attack on North America. Currently, a collection of air defense-related research and technology development programs are being focused on the future needs of North American air defense and oriented on defeating the projected advanced low-observable Soviet threat. Through FY 1997, the United States will continue to have no capability to defend against ballistic missile attack and no operational strategic SAM network in place; the only capability against air attacks will be the existing air interceptor force.

Effects of START

If a START treaty is signed in 1990, it would not be fully implemented by FY 1997, although the process of changing force structure will be well under way during this time frame. As noted above, the Soviets can maintain their current strike capabilities by modernizing as they reduce forces from current strategic levels to START levels. Excursions on US force structures that reflect gradual drawdowns to proposed START-compliant force levels in 1999 indicate the United States can maintain a relative strategic capability as great as today's
CAPABILITIES AND TRENDS

with constrained forces; however, this conclusion is based on previously expected modernization programs and a favorable bomber discount counting rule.

NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

General

NSNF consist of all ground-, sea-, and air-launched nuclear-capable weapons with delivery ranges less than 5,500 km. Nonstrategic nuclear systems have been fielded to hold at risk both fixed and mobile targets on the battlefield and to provide the link between conventional forces and strategic nuclear forces. The linkage to the strategic nuclear forces of the United States adds a substantial degree of uncertainty to plans for aggressive actions directed against the interests of the United States or its allies. This added element of uncertainty and risk reinforces and contributes to the maintenance of deterrence. In the European theater, the close integration of NSNF and conventional forces is central to the NATO Alliance’s strategy of flexible response. US NSNF will continue to be required to maintain this strategy in Europe. The possibility that several emerging powers will develop nuclear capabilities in the coming years underscores the potential need for NSNF in other theaters. Because of the proportionally higher concentration of NSNF and conventional forces in Europe, this assessment focuses on NATO and the WP.

WP Capability

Despite the ongoing implementation of the INF Treaty, the WP maintains the capability to achieve all damage expectancy goals against NATO fixed targets postulated to be consistent with its established warfighting doctrine. This level of defeat is achieved while retaining a significant reserve of uncommitted weapons for use against mobile targets. Because of the large Soviet stockpile, the WP will retain this capability following full implementation of the INF Treaty in June 1991. Modernization of available systems will allow the WP to maintain its capability through 1997.
NATO Capability

With a smaller total number of NSNF systems, NATO's ability to achieve specified damage levels is less than that of the WP. As NATO INF systems are eliminated, NATO will be forced to rely more heavily on DCA and sea-based systems to meet fixed target base requirements. With currently projected modernization programs, however, NATO NSNF capability should increase during the 1990s.

Effects of CFE and START

Any CFE agreement that reduces conventional forces to near parity between NATO and the WP affects the required quantity and mix of nuclear weapons. Depending on the force levels ultimately negotiated, fewer SNF weapons would be required against opposing maneuver forces. A START agreement would significantly reduce strategic stockpiles and would likely produce lower levels of damage. The exact magnitude of the reduction would depend on the actual force structure remaining.

Trends

Soviet Forces. Although they retain significant numbers of non-INF missiles, as a result of the INF Treaty the Soviets are more dependent on DCA for attacking deep nuclear targets. The Soviets are expected to begin fielding several modernized SNF missile systems. Although there is considerable uncertainty on the amount of nuclear artillery in the Soviet inventory, their employment options exceed those of NATO because of a continuing two-to-one advantage in nuclear-capable artillery tubes.

NATO Forces. As INF ground-launched systems are withdrawn, NATO may have to rely more on air- and sea-launched systems to hold at risk targets in the Soviet homeland. By FY 1995, NATO will field new squadrons of DCA aircraft, but politically charged issues will have to be resolved. US cruise missiles may play an important role in providing deep target coverage. NATO will also face critical issues associated with its SNF systems. Despite an extensive service life extension program, LANCE will begin to reach the end of
CAPABILITIES AND TRENDS

its service life in the mid-1990s. Replacement of LANCE will be required to maintain current capabilities without over-reliance on DCA. A decision on deployment of Follow-On To LANCE to NATO will be made in 1992 in accordance with NATO's May 1989 Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament. In addition to replacing LANCE, reductions in older nuclear artillery are dependent on the fielding of modernized systems.

Other Forces. It seems certain that the fundamental changes occurring in Eastern Europe will force a substantial reappraisal of long-established assumptions applicable to a conflict between NATO and the WP. On a global basis, the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by regional powers may likewise impact on global requirements for US NSNF.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

General

This section assesses US conventional force capability to execute US national military strategy. The assessment has been derived from military judgment supported by a variety of studies, estimates, quantitative and qualitative comparisons, wargames, and computer simulations. Conventional capabilities are a function of many factors, but they are largely dependent on people—the quality of the force, its training and equipment, and the competence of its leaders.

Assessments are first provided of US capabilities to achieve specific regional military objectives within the framework of a postulated global conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies. The scenario for these assessments postulates a global war portraying sequential regional operations. Assessments of the impacts of WP unilateral reductions and a CFE treaty are also provided. Regional assessments in a non-global context are provided to identify unique capabilities that are key to success in lesser contingencies.

The graphs in Tables 1 and 2 on the following page display a static comparison of US versus Soviet and NATO versus WP forces. Force levels are shown for FY 1990 and FY 1993. Forces for the outyears are postulated based on likely outcomes of arms negotiations, budgets, and political actions.
### Table 1. Force Comparisons and Trends
US vs USSR Worldwide

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<tr>
<th>Division</th>
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<th>Medium/Heavy Tanks</th>
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<th>Artillery/Mortars/MLRS</th>
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### Table 2. Force Comparisons and Trends
NATO vs WP in ATTU

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Force structures for FY 1993 are postulated for analysis only, based on current CFE proposals with reductions apportioned equally among NATO and WP countries. POMCUS divisions are not included, but POMCUS equipment is included. Combat aircraft include air forces only. Figures include equipment in units and in storage.
Global Conflict

Currently, if a global conventional conflict were to involve a conflict in Central Europe, NATO would be capable of mounting a strong defense and exacting high attrition, but not without loss of territory. The primary NATO conventional deficiencies continue to be a limited number of ground assets. In most other theaters, allied forces could achieve military objectives with low to moderate risk of failure.

Unilateral force reductions and continued political change in Eastern Europe will further erode the Soviets' confidence in their ability to conduct deep offensive operations in the WTVD. Already the Soviets must question their capability for such operations based on the reliability of NSWP forces. The Soviets will have to consider the prospect that they would have to conduct a theater strategic offensive against NATO primarily on their own. The Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments have reached agreement with Moscow on withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territories. Likewise, the fundamental motivations for an attack against NATO are altered. Nonetheless, Soviet planners have not been forced to discard totally the option to prosecute deep offensive operations against NATO's Central Region. Consequently, this assessment, based on analysis completed at the end of 1989, assumes the viability of such operations and that NSWP forces are intact and politically reliable.

In assessing the warning capabilities of both sides in both FY 1990 and FY 1997, NATO and the WP are judged equal in being able to provide strategic warning if one side commences actual military mobilization for war. However, the political changes ongoing in Eastern Europe and the reduction in WP forces resulting from CFE will have a significant impact on warning times. Given that the Soviets would pursue their traditionally preferred deep theater objectives with associated force levels, the warning times associated with possible WP preparations for war with NATO in Central Europe have likely increased by weeks and will increase further after unilateral and CFE reductions are complete.

Even in the absence of CFE and despite the probability of budget reductions, net improvements in NATO capabilities relative to those of the WP
are projected to occur through FY 1997. Naval forces will be able to protect SLOCs and support the ground war; allied air, ground, and naval forces can defend NATO’s flanks given a full Soviet effort in the Central Region. This situation could change significantly if the Soviets choose to use nuclear weapons at sea. In Central Europe, continued modernization of air and ground forces will further increase NATO’s combat capability. These improvements, however, will be partially offset by WP quantitative advantages and qualitative improvements.

NATO continues to rely on its strategy of flexible response to deter Soviet aggression and to defend against that aggression if deterrence fails. Even in an environment of conventional parity, NATO’s nuclear forces will continue to contribute to deterring conventional attack and will serve as a fundamental component of US deterrence to Soviet use of nuclear weapons. NATO could conduct a stubborn, mobile, conventional defense with the aim of buying time and regrouping to stabilize the front at some point. However, the Soviets still would have to consider that the NATO allies would probably retain the ability to constrain them from obtaining their military objectives, hold the flanks, and engage them in other theaters. With key Western industrial bases intact and protected by a US strategic nuclear umbrella, the Soviet Union and the WP would be faced with the likelihood of prolonged worldwide hostilities.

In SWA, the United States could deploy limited ground, air, and naval forces to the region to signal US commitment, as the situation allows. If Soviet ground forces attack into SWA, the successful protection of Western access to regional oil reserves would depend on the relative prioritization decided by the NCA.

In the Pacific, the postulated Soviet objective would be to conduct limited operations because of the focus on Western Europe. As always, much of the Soviet attention in this region will remain focused on China. As a part of their general force reductions, the Soviets have begun to draw down land and air forces in the Far Eastern and Pacific regions. Additionally, the size of the Pacific Fleet is expected to continue to decline as older ships are retired. Similarly, their fleet out-of-area deployments will decline. However, their naval capabilities are expected to remain about the same because of
modernization. In a conventional conflict, US forces can control SLOCs, prosecute an offensive ASW campaign, and attack LOCs and other targets. On the Korean peninsula, there have been signs of a desire to talk, but nothing has signaled a change in the confrontational relationship. DPRK forces have increased capabilities over the recent years, but given adequate warning and timely reinforcement from US forces, ROK forces can successfully defend or restore the borders in the event of a DPRK attack.

In Central America, the United States can continue to contribute to stability through nation-building forces (such as construction engineers, civil affairs, and medical elements) and SOF. Success also will depend on the careful application of military assistance and forces in conjunction with other aspects of US power, particularly the economic and political elements.

Impacts of Unilateral Soviet and NSWP Reductions

In December 1988, Soviet President Gorbachev announced the beginning of unilateral reductions in Soviet troop strength and selected weapons as well as the restructuring of Soviet divisions. The NSWP nations announced similar reductions prior to the recent political upheavals.

The cuts will reduce overall Soviet troop strength and eliminate tanks, artillery pieces, and combat aircraft from Soviet holdings in Eastern Europe and the western Soviet Union. The net result appears to be that primarily older and less capable equipment is being removed from Soviet forces. Overall, the Soviet unilateral reductions appear approximately 50 percent complete.

Last winter, the Poles, Hungarians, East Germans, Czechoslovaks, and Bulgarians declared their intentions to reduce troop strength and eliminate tanks, artillery pieces, ACVs, and combat aircraft. As of 20 January 1990, assessments conclude that much of this has been accomplished.

The Soviets also have announced that they are restructuring the ground force units that will remain after the unilateral reductions are completed. Soviet divisions that are slated to remain in Eastern Europe are losing tank strength while gaining ACVs and additional air defense and antitank systems,
engineering and minelaying equipment, and artillery. They will remain capable of versatile, maneuver-oriented, combined-arms offensive or defensive operations. These divisions will contain a higher proportion of modern equipment than current Soviet divisions. Nevertheless, the unilateral reductions and restructuring will substantially reduce the WP’s concentrated armor striking power in Central Europe.

The residual capability of the WP vis-a-vis NATO will rest primarily on Soviet forces which could be brought forward from the USSR. Following the fall of Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe, Soviet political and military leaders must now doubt the effectiveness of the WP as an instrument to marshal the participation of the NSWP nations in support of a Soviet military offensive directed against Western Europe. Nevertheless, the WP still may be able to serve Soviet interests. At a minimum, the territory of key NSWP nations provides a security buffer zone, possibly partially manned by Soviet troops.

Although unilateral reductions will render the Soviets less capable than before, considerable conventional force asymmetries will remain. During this process of restructuring, the Soviets have been using some of the equipment they have removed to make other units more capable. Although they have reduced tank production, they continue to outproduce NATO. Production of tactical combat aircraft continues. Production of warships is down in numbers, offset to some degree by the capability and size of some of the ships under construction. The Soviets are producing more sophisticated equipment than in the past, but generally they have failed to keep pace with the United States in the overall technical sophistication of conventional forces being fielded.

Impacts of CFE

It seems likely that the Vienna negotiations will produce a NATO-WP CFE agreement this year. The sides have agreed in principle to reduce tanks, artillery, ACVs, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters, thus eliminating the WP’s pronounced existing superiority.
CAPABILITIES AND TRENDS

Assuming a verifiable treaty based on NATO's current proposal, implementation would significantly alter the balance of forces in Europe. Under the guidelines of CFE, there would be very large and militarily significant reductions in WP forces. In all instances, the WP reductions will be significantly greater than NATO's to reach parity.

The prospective CFE agreement will reduce Soviet forces deployed in Eastern Europe and the western military districts of the Soviet Union, probably causing the reconfiguration of some of their units into machinegun-artillery divisions to man fortified regions along the Soviet border. Additionally, the CFE agreement will require reductions in NSWP forces from current levels.

A major determinant of the post-CFE balance is the NATO commitment to exercise fully its rights under the CFE agreement to maintain levels of modern, combat-ready forces. Regardless of the ultimate level of parity, it is believed that once WP forces are reduced to parity, the Soviets would no longer be confident of achieving offensive (or counteroffensive) theater-depth goals.

Soviet military planning factors would likely indicate to their political leadership that only the possession of substantial military superiority could ensure success to the attacking side. From peacetime parity, the Soviets would have to reestablish major forces, and remilitarize that segment of the industrial base that previously had been converted from military- to civilian-oriented products, in order to generate the capability to attack successfully and sustain the offensive to theater depths. The requirement to reestablish forces capable of large-scale offensive operations to achieve traditional TSOs in Europe would increase preparation times considerably, thus increasing actionable warning time. With the conditions assumed to exist under CFE, any conflict, however unlikely, will probably be prolonged. The foregoing also assumes that the Soviets will not station any forces outside the ATTU zone for the purpose of supporting or reinforcing the European Central Region. To the degree that the Soviets are able to stockpile equipment pursuant to a CFE treaty, or to build up personnel and equipment over time, additional risk would be introduced.

In the unlikely event of conventional conflict following a CFE agreement, the following force characteristics are key: (1) improved, integrated I&W;
(2) continued ability to execute FOFA and apply modernized high-technology systems; (3) force maneuverability and deep fires; (4) improved availability of lift, throughput, and sustainment assets; (5) continued advantages offered by modernized NATO aircraft; and (6) continued maintenance of strong naval forces capable of controlling the seas.

Impacts of Reductions Beyond Initial CFE Levels

East European nations are exerting growing pressure on the Soviet Union to remove or reduce stationed forces. The United States also has examined alternative reductions in forces beyond the initial CFE proposals. This initial assessment considers conventional forces at lower levels of parity and assumes reasonable proportionality in those reductions.

General. Because of geographical asymmetry, the WP enjoys a natural force reinforcement and regeneration advantage over NATO. With a depth of approximately 2,800 km from the inter-German border to the Ural Mountains, coupled with a rail and road network capable of moving units from East of the Urals, the WP might be able to influence the initial outcome in Central Europe at lower force levels prior to arrival of most CONUS reinforcements.

Impacts on the Warsaw Pact. Political objectives and military TSOs are likely to be changed, and NSWP participation would be necessary. Attack options likely would be restricted; even with residual forces in the GDR, quick attack options probably are less feasible. The WP would have significantly reduced artillery to mass in a main attack and reduced follow-on forces to exploit success. The WP could generate additional divisions from east of the Urals, but with high risk in other TVDs; units probably would have to be mobilized coincidentally with mobilization of forces west of the Urals. The Soviets’ continued capability to produce large numbers of major end items, such as tanks and artillery, could lead to increased forces or equipment stockpiles east of the Urals. Depending on the magnitude of continued production, these items of equipment could be potentially destabilizing.

Impacts on NATO. In general, NATO would be far more capable of defending than today. This finding would be altered if the Soviets were able to
reestablish asymmetric force levels in the ATTU zone. As force levels decrease, NATO defensive concepts rely more on mobility and maneuver. Likewise, supporting units would have to be appropriately mobile. As force levels decrease, NATO's dependence on air power will increase. NATO will require air superiority over friendly territory for its ground forces to have the freedom of action to operate, given the increased reliance on mobility and maneuver. In addition, air power provides the most rapid means of concentrating combat power on enemy penetrations to delay enemy advances while NATO maneuver forces are brought to bear. Closure of US reinforcements from CONUS is increasingly important at reduced force levels and places a higher premium on POMCUS (peacetime fill, wartime removal rate, and protection) and strategic lift. FOFA-related systems will remain important to attack the second echelon (follow-on) forces and to provide a means to bring combat power to bear rapidly on penetrations where maneuver forces are thin. The importance of interoperability is increased because of the increased likelihood of units being employed outside traditional sectors. In this regard, the integration of Territorial Forces and civilian auxiliaries becomes more important.

Regional Conflicts

US involvement in a regional conflict would begin by aggressive action of a threat force against an ally or friendly nation that the United States is committed or compelled to assist. The US response would be to apply economic and political pressure, provide military assistance, and deploy appropriate military units. The US objective would be to terminate hostilities quickly on favorable terms, creating a situation that would deter future aggression and preserve US interests in the region.

The postulated threat in regional conflicts ranges from unsophisticated insurgent groups armed with light infantry weapons to a heavily armed, modern, sophisticated military force. Some regional powers have, or are developing, intermediate-range mass-destruction weapons.

US military presence and host-nation infrastructure vary by region, ranging from a relatively large number of forces and modern facilities, seaports, and air bases to no forces and a very limited infrastructure.
The United States has the capability to prosecute satisfactorily any regional conflict, provided it has the political will to act promptly and decisively and the national will to endure the conflict. Although it must be recognized that conflicts of this nature are heavily influenced by political factors, the duration of a conflict can be significantly influenced by rapid reinforcement or deployment of ground, air, and naval forces followed by continuous sustainment.

FUNCTIONAL AREA CAPABILITIES AND TRENDS

Force Generation and Mobilization

Neither NATO nor the WP maintains its forces in a fully ready status. WP ready divisions are maintained at a high state of training, manning, and equipment levels. During peacetime, the most ready WP divisions are the Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe. However, some of this manpower consists of trainees with less than 6 months in the Army. Manning levels in the support forces are substantially lower.

Forces within the Soviet Union are maintained at much lower readiness than Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. Ready Soviet divisions in the western military districts make up a small portion of the Soviet forces available to reinforce Eastern Europe. Not-ready Soviet divisions in the western military districts make up the majority of the reinforcing units. Some of the not-ready divisions currently are demobilizing and most likely will become mobilization base divisions. Substantial post-mobilization training would be required before they would be ready for offensive operations. On the other hand, restructuring provides the opportunity to produce forces that are more efficient, better organized, and modernized.

NATO ground forces are generally more ready than WP ground forces. European Reservists train with their units, although on a limited basis, and many are assigned to the same units with which they served on active duty. US forces coming from CONUS in the early days of a mobilization are far more ready than WP not-ready divisions. Selected US units exercise their mobilization and reinforcement capabilities every year, while the WP countries seldom exercise their mobilization and deployment systems.
The location of Reservists and reserve units is also a factor required in mobilization time; with the exception of the United States and Canada, generally this factor serves in NATO's favor. Reservists reinforcing Soviet forces in Eastern Europe must come from the Soviet Union, while Reservists reinforcing non-US NATO forces have a much shorter distance to travel. This advantage will help NATO Reservists become combat ready more quickly.

After the first week of mobilization, NATO unit reinforcements come primarily from the United States. The major difference between NATO and the WP in the latter stages of a mobilization is the advantage the WP has in the total number and location of organized and equipped ground forces that continue to become available.

Soviet and NSWP unilateral reductions, and the potential impact of force reductions under a CFE treaty, will have a very significant impact on the ability to generate forces. While a defensive posture might be attainable in a matter of days, the time required to prepare forces for sustained offensive operations probably will be significantly longer than before. Specific times would depend on several unknown factors—including the readiness at which post-CFE forces were maintained, disposition of withdrawn equipment, limits on forces east of the Urals, state of defense industries, production of additional equipment, and Soviet willingness to risk shifting forces from other regions.

**Sustainability and Industrial Mobilization**

Sustainability. In the stressful environment of a high-intensity conflict in Central Europe, the United States is constrained by limited supplies. The non-US NATO allies have perhaps half the supplies of US forces, particularly munitions. Recent improvements gained in munitions sustainability will be slowed and in some cases reversed by FY 1997. In the WTVD (pre-CFE), the WP has adequate material in most categories of supply calculated at high-intensity consumption rates to meet or exceed requirements for initial offensive combat operations. Additional nonallocated supplies reside in the Soviet Union's strategic reserve.
Globally, although the United States will show modest improvements in some areas of sustainability through FY 1997, shortfalls will persist. Significant improvements in munitions sustainability, particularly in modern high-technology munitions, have been made; however, funding peaked in FY 1985 and has been significantly reduced since then. Again, improvements made have been slowed and in some cases will be reversed by FY 1997. Shortfalls also exist in secondary end items. Although recent trends show some improvement, available stocks continue to be far below worldwide requirements. Bulk fuel war reserve materiel shortfalls will continue to exist.

Industrial Mobilization. The US industrial capability to surge or expand production remains inadequate. This situation will worsen over the period of this assessment as more defense industries are consolidated. The tendency toward small, sporadic production runs of weapons, munitions, and equipment exacerbates this trend. In comparison, the Soviet Union has a larger military industrial base and in many areas is operating at only partial capacity. The effects of converting military production to civilian goods may degrade the Soviet capacity over time.

Effects of CFE. Although the direct implications remain uncertain, negotiated reductions on combat aircraft, equipment, and personnel should enhance sustainability. In a short-term analysis, NATO sustainability would improve because fewer weapons and ammunition would be needed to counter the reduced quantities of enemy forces on the battlefield; additionally, there would be fewer US forces to support. A major hindrance to NATO logistic planning now and in the foreseeable future is the continued reluctance to meet conventional sustainability requirements. Many nations are not willing to meet stockage level goals in munitions.

Mobility

General. Mobility is divided customarily into intratheater (within CONUS or a theater) and intertheater (between CONUS and a theater) movement. The United States, as a maritime nation, and its NATO allies place the principal emphasis on the trans-Atlantic surface and air movement of reinforcements and sustainment. Since both the United States and NATO have well-developed
theater transportation networks, this assessment will focus on the intertheater movement of forces. The United States depends on airlift, sealift, and prepositioning to execute any overseas deployment. Because of the distances and times involved in closing forces by sea, airlift fulfills a vital role in allowing the airlifted troops to rapidly fall in on their in-place pre-positioned equipment. However, in a protracted conflict, a predominance of movement requirements must be transported by sea. Consequently, the strategic lift triad—sealift, airlift, and pre-positioning—must adjust to changing factors in the strategic mobility equation.

WP Mobility Capabilities. As a continental power on the Eurasian landmass, the Soviet Union relies on internal LOCs rather than external air or sea LOCs to deploy and sustain military forces. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have large and redundant transportation networks that integrate rail, highway, inland waterway, sea, and air facilities and routes.

The Soviets have airlift divisions and independent airlift regiments to support the deployment and combat operations of the Soviet Airborne divisions. Aeroflot, the Soviet civil airline, is the Military Transport Aviation reserve.

The Soviet Union has the world's second largest merchant fleet in number of ships. This fleet ranks sixth worldwide in deadweight tonnage capacity. In the future, the Soviet merchant fleet capacity probably will remain about the same, but numbers of ships may decline slightly as older ships are replaced by larger ships constructed with features that support military roles. There probably will continue to be enhancements to Soviet strategic mobility assets such as An-124 CONDORS, new RO/RO and barge carrier-type ships, and continued improvements to the road and rail network.

US Mobility Capabilities. Historically, the United States has depended on merchant marine augmentation of strategic sealift with breakbulk ships and small tankers to support major military operations. International economic conditions favoring intermodal container trade are forcing the merchant marine toward fewer and larger non-self-sustaining container ships with reduced manning, eliminating less profitable but militarily useful breakbulk and RO/RO ships. The continued decrease in the total number and military utility of the
ships available in the US-flag fleet is of major concern. See Figures 3 and 4 below. The policy of procuring ships on the open market as they become available to add to the Ready Reserve Force is a stopgap measure that does nothing to redress the increasing shortage of US-citizen merchant marine crews and the erosion of the domestic shipbuilding industrial base.

FIGURE 3. STRATEGIC SEALIFT FORCE STRUCTURE

Numbers of Ships

FIGURE 4. MILITARILY USEFUL DRY CARGO CAPABILITY

Millions of Deadweight Tons
With the completion of the C-5B and KC-10 acquisitions, strategic airlift capability continued an upward trend. The CRAF program continues to be a major contributor to US capability and accounts for approximately one-third of the current lift capability. The capability of US airlift forces improves significantly in the future, as shown in Figure 5 below. With more than half of the planned C-17 fleet delivered, the added airlift capability more than offsets the programmed partial retirement of the C-141. As one of only two funded acquisition programs that will provide additional strategic lift assets in the near term, the C-17 provides strategic and tactical mobility vital to execution of both regional and global war plans. The CRAF program, both cargo and passenger, is expected to contribute an increased capability, depending on projected market trends in the domestic air carrier industry.

**FIGURE 5. STRATEGIC AIRLIFT FORCE STRUCTURE**

Pre-positioning is a significant contributor to the strategic mobility triad. The United States has made steady progress in positioning and filling requirements worldwide, with stocks in SWA, Europe, afloat pre-positioning worldwide, and war reserves in Thailand and the ROK.

The US Navy and US Marine Corps maintain three MPS squadrons based in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. These carry the heavy unit equipment for three MEBs. These 13 ships, in conjunction with the airlift to move
personnel, can deploy up to 3 MEBs and their supplies to any littoral(s) within 14 days. Additionally, the US Marine Corps maintains selected equipment and supplies for a MEB pre-positioned in Norway to support NATO defense requirements.

The changes in the strategic environment may cause a reevaluation of mobility requirements. Notional global mobility requirements, shown in Figure 6 below, depict the relative balance between pre-positioning, airlift, and sealift requirements. The effects of CFE and other arms negotiations on the mobility requirement cannot be determined until the impact of specific force reductions and changes in warning are addressed and the resultant required lift capability defined.

FIGURE 6. COMPONENTS OF MOBILITY

Non-US NATO Mobility Capabilities. Non-US NATO members represent, in general, a highly developed bloc that possesses an efficient transport system capable of supporting and sustaining movement of military forces. The land systems are superior to those in neighboring Eastern Europe. The NAPCAP provides a framework to share civil airlift capability with reinforcing nations that require help in airlift to meet their national commitment of forces. NATO currently provides passenger and cargo aircraft in support of the RRP. Non-US NATO nations are also obligated to provide a pool of over 400 general dry cargo ships to ensure the availability on short notice of
sufficient NATO ships to implement the RRP. In the future, movement in the Central Region is likely to be further enhanced by the continued development of the European high speed rail system as well as the proposed completion of the Channel Rail Tunnel linking the United Kingdom and France. The NATO shipping deficit will likely continue as a problem in the short term. Estimates on allied capability for contributing to NAPCAP for the long term remain positive. In a post-CFE environment, non-US NATO transport assets may be strained in reintroducing large numbers of troops and equipment to the European Theater.

Command, Control, and Communications

General. WP forces pose significant physical and electronic threats to US and allied C³ through signals intelligence collection, jamming, atmospheric effects of nuclear weapons, conventional attack or sabotage, and disruption of US satellites. The EW threat posed by non-WP countries is less sophisticated and on a reduced scale.

The United States must have highly capable, survivable, integrated TW&AA and C³ systems to support its deterrent strategy and global power projection requirements. Threats are countered by employing survivable, secure, and jam-resistant systems and by hardening facilities. NATO C³ also emphasizes flexibility, mobility, and decentralization at the tactical and theater level, but interoperability remains a concern. Outside NATO, allied country C³ primarily focuses on the tactical and national levels.

Soviet C³ is based on a hierarchical structure with centrally directed control and rigid adherence to operational plans. Soviet and WP C³ systems are inflexible but highly survivable. This is reflected in a comprehensive, redundant system of hardened command posts and communications facilities.

Soviet and WP C³ Assessment

Crisis Through Brink of War. Soviet C³ can support all missions. Current limitations involving integration and management of C³ systems, communications systems capacity, and lack of automation are being addressed.
Regional Conflicts. Soviet C³ can adequately support all projected regional conflicts if they are on the periphery of the Soviet landmass, since the established national and regional infrastructure will provide the base for theater C³ support. The limitations noted above apply.

Global Conventional Conflict. Current limitations in the Soviet national C³ structure will impact their ability to conduct simultaneous global operations.

Theater and General Nuclear War. Soviet C³ to support a theater nuclear war is assessed as adequate assuming that damage to the C³ systems supporting theater nuclear forces is not extensive. The Soviet C³ capability in a strategic nuclear war is assessed as adequate, due in large part to the multiplicity and redundancy of hardened command posts and communications systems.

US and Allied C³ Assessment

Crisis Through Brink of War. Current US C³ can adequately support any major crisis. As the crisis escalates, C³ support will continue to be adequate, but limitations may be experienced within certain areas as escalation continues.

Regional Conflicts. Current C³ capabilities to support regional conflicts in most areas are assessed as adequate. C³ support for LIC in general is also assessed as adequate. Difficulties may be experienced with limited regional infrastructures, the vulnerability of existing facilities, and communications interoperability.

Global Conventional Conflict. Current C³ capabilities will improve with the fielding of several new systems. Current limitations exist in secure, jam-resistant communications means, capacity of certain systems, and vulnerability of non-hardened communications facilities to conventional attack and sabotage. Current NATO capabilities also are hindered for many of the same reasons. Additionally, limited NATO interoperability and automated capabilities remain areas of concern. A number of programs are under way to improve these areas. Outside of NATO, allied C³ capabilities vary widely.
Theater and General Nuclear War. Limitations in current C³ support for NSNF exist because supporting C³ systems are not all sufficiently jam-resistant or survivable. C³ capabilities for a general nuclear war are adequate due to the recent modernization of integrated TW&AA and strategic C³ systems. Current programmed improvements should rectify remaining limitations.

Trends

United States. The United States is now at a critical point in modernizing its C³ capabilities. Many of the planned systems that address critical deficiencies are just now completing development or have just begun initial fielding.

Soviet Union. The Soviet Union continues with its program of expanding and hardening its system of command posts and supporting communications nodes. It is enhancing the capabilities of its C³ network through the introduction of more capable equipment.

Effects of CFE and START. Reductions in US and NATO force levels will increase the demand for strategic and tactical warning information, requiring faster assessment and classification. Planned automated fusion and display systems should enhance C³ capabilities in this area. Emphasis on interoperability with allies must continue.

Electronic Warfare

General. The threat includes a variety of adversary electronic systems. Electronic systems targeted by US EW include adversary communications, radar systems, and weapon control devices. EW is also employed to negate adversary electronic countermeasures against US weapons systems and communications.

Assessment. The United States has a fair overall capability to counter the Soviet electromagnetic threat. US EW capability against most Soviet radio communications, ECCM against most currently fielded Soviet EW, and destructive EW against most Soviet radar systems are assessed as good. However, the Soviets continue to modify old, and field new, electronic
systems—both radar and communications—with advanced electronics against which currently fielded US EW systems have limited capability.

EW improvements are needed in the following areas: EW used to counter Soviet-style integrated air defense systems; self-protection ECM against some Soviet weapon fire control systems (especially for transport aircraft); ECM against lower high frequency and advanced, low-probability-of-intercept systems; ECCM against antiradiation missiles; and joint(combined EW interoperability.

The United States has good overall capability to counter the older-generation electronic threats present in most potential regional conflicts not involving the Soviets. It should be noted, however, that the proliferation and accessibility of modern Western technology will increase the challenge to US EW capabilities from a non-Soviet threat.

Ongoing EW plans address virtually all US EW improvements against developing and fielded adversary electromagnetic systems with planned R&D and/or production extending into the mid-1990s. EW interoperability issues are being addressed by both NATO and the US Joint Task Force on Electromagnetic Interference.

Because EW developments are in response to an observed adversary threat, US EW capabilities always will lag behind a continually improving adversary electronic threat, thus limiting today's overall US EW capability. A fiscally constrained environment will reduce the EW industrial base and increase the lag time between threat observation and countermeasure development, further degrading the already limited capability.

Space

The United States and the Soviet Union use space programs to enhance force effectiveness and support worldwide military operations. The Soviet program is thoroughly integrated into operational forces. The US program is peacetime oriented toward communications, environmental monitoring, treaty compliance monitoring, and early warning. The Soviets—even in this era of economic
change—will probably continue to make major investments in space-related R&D, production, launch, and operations for military and economic benefit, albeit at a modified rate.

Most of the US and Soviet national objectives are adequately supported by existing and programmed capabilities. Both nations rely on space systems in some key mission areas. US space warfighting support capabilities provide distinct surveillance, navigation, and C3 advantages. The Soviets, however, have the world’s largest and most responsive space launch infrastructure, including extensive booster and spacecraft production pipelines, which is optimized to support military operations. At the same time, their ASAT capabilities allow them to deny or inhibit an enemy’s use of vulnerable satellite systems. With an ASAT capability and those survivability enhancements planned for US systems through FY 1997, the United States should be equipped to meet essential warfighting needs and a rough parity of capabilities should exist.

The United States is assessed to retain some advantages in technology and on-orbit capability for military support in peacetime and crisis. The current Soviet warfighting advantage will decrease but remain significant because of the synergistic combination of their ASAT capabilities and robust space system replacement capabilities. The United States must continue to address the deployment of an operational space control capability, the development of a robust launch capability to space, improvement of the survivability of US space-based systems and ground-based space support facilities, and improvement of the monitoring and treaty verification capabilities of satellites.

Chemical Warfare

The United States has assumed the initiative in concluding a global CW convention that bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of CW. To this end, the United States is committed to very substantial reductions in its CW stockpile within 8 years after completion of a CW convention. The United States will commit itself to the total elimination of its CW stockpile provided all CW-capable states have become parties to the convention. In the interim, the United States will reduce its CW stockpile significantly if the Soviets agree to reduce their CW stockpile to the same level.
While the Soviets have engaged in meaningful CW arms control discussions, their CW capability is assessed as the best in the world and must be viewed as such. The Soviet's sophisticated offensive and defensive CW capability is backed by a large R&D program. Additionally, militarily significant CW programs that cannot be ignored have emerged in Third World nations.

The United States has a modest CW defensive program. Most US and NATO forces are marginally capable of operating in a CW environment. Likewise, the US and NATO capability to retaliate with chemical weapons is limited; therefore, through modernizing binary weapons and improving CW defensive capabilities, is essential.

The United States is relying on the cooperation of the Soviet Union and other CW-capable states to achieve a verifiable CW ban. Currently, the US ability to monitor and verify a CW treaty is limited. Improved technology is required to ensure confidence in the implementation of a CW treaty.

The United States, NATO, and other US allies would fight at a disadvantage in the event of a conflict that includes CW. Assuming that a bilateral agreement with the Soviets is reached to draw down CW stockpiles to agreed levels, the United States has the opportunity to achieve a sufficient deterrent posture. However, the conclusion of a worldwide CW ban will not be easy. Until a verifiable, global CW ban is reached, the United States must maintain a modernized but modest retaliatory capability and a robust CW defensive program to deter CW use by potential adversaries.

Special Operations Forces Capabilities

US SOF are best employed in high-risk, high-payoff operations in support of conventional forces or in the conduct of independent operations supporting national objectives. US SOF perform unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counterterrorism missions. SOF may conduct special activities in accordance with Executive Order 12333. The establishment of the US Special Operations Command focuses the continuing revitalization of SOF. US Army, US Navy, and US Air Force SOF are capable of performing primary special operations missions, but full mission accomplishment is hindered by lack of specialized equipment.
The US Marine Corps has no units with special operations as their primary mission. However, the Fleet Marine Forces are specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a broad spectrum of maritime special operations that complement the capabilities of dedicated SOF.

Many NATO nations are assessed as having a SOF capability that could complement US SOF. The current overall capability of non-US NATO SOF is substantial but somewhat limited by shortfalls in specialized support.

Adversary SOF will continue to maintain the force structure, skill, equipment, and training programs required to maintain basic mission proficiency. Soviet SPETSNAZ troops and other WP SOF are assessed as mission capable. However, they suffer periodic degradation of unit readiness due to a high conscript turnover rate.

In summary, US and non-US NATO SOF will substantially improve their capabilities across all levels of conflict by FY 1997 because of expanded SOF force structure and mobility.

Leadership, Morale, and Training

Currently, NATO possesses a warfighting advantage because of its flexible and decentralized leadership, the high quality and morale of its service members, and its realistic training programs. However, if not managed carefully, this advantage could erode due to budget reductions.

Soviet armed forces have traditionally placed more emphasis on indoctrination than on service member morale. Soviet leadership is inflexible by Western standards because commanders lack initiative and obey their superior's orders without deviation. Soviet training is simple; conscripts learn only one job, but they learn it well. The Soviet armed forces are composed of members from numerous and diverse ethnic backgrounds that have inherent problems of compatibility. The NSWP armed forces are very similar to Soviet armed forces, but they are less hampered by ethnic and language problems.

Leadership in the US armed forces is characterized at all levels by initiative, sound military judgment, and flexibility—qualities that will be essential in the
future battlefield. US forces are manned under the all-volunteer concept which, though costly to maintain, has produced a highly capable and motivated force. US training emphasizes realism and flexibility and is supported by an established system of military education and training exercises. The non-US NATO forces are considered to possess good to excellent leadership, morale, and training.

For the WP, a likely result of conventional arms negotiations will be continued reorganization and equipment modernization of residual forces. A greater emphasis on training soldiers in multiple skills may occur, and NCOs will be better educated with perhaps less indoctrination. Officer training will probably concentrate on developing initiative, since officers will have to do more with less.

In the United States and NATO, the continued perception of a decreasing threat and reduced military budgets may affect morale and training proficiency. Restricted defense budgets will pose serious challenges to the leadership to maintain a competent peacetime military force and modernization programs.

Regardless of these potential changes, the United States and NATO should maintain an advantage in the areas of leadership, morale, and training through FY 1997. The significance of this advantage will depend on NATO's ability to maintain adequate capabilities under reduced budgets.

Alliances

The United States and the Soviet Union rely on alliances, especially in Europe, to enhance their security. Beyond Europe, both countries seek to strengthen their positions through security alliances and treaties that provide varying degrees of additional military forces, political support, and access to facilities and logistic infrastructures.

The WP is under severe pressure. This predominantly military alliance is being weakened by continued political and economic unrest in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
NATO, including the United States, will continue to provide the mainstay of deterrence and stability in Europe. NATO's military strength is reinforced by political and economic strength that far exceeds that of the WP. NATO cohesion will be instrumental in managing the changing relationships between East and West in Europe. This cohesion will rest on the ability of the United States and its NATO partners to develop a coherent approach to deterrence and arms control, while managing intra-Western economic competition and political differences in other forums.

Beyond Europe, the network of US treaties and alliances offsets the Soviets' advantages of strategic continental position, large armed forces, and alliances. The forward presence of US forces is a valuable contribution to regional stability and economic progress.

In a comparison of alliances, the United States is clearly favored. The political and economic strength of NATO and other alliances enhances the military strength of those alliances and provides the foundation for increasing their overall strength.

Arms Control

Although significant portions of US and allied military forces are on the negotiating table—a process that can produce a range of consequences—an assessment based on probable conditions has been discussed in previous sections.

The primary US arms control goals are to increase stability worldwide and improve the security of the United States and its allies at reduced levels of nuclear, chemical, and conventional arms. Arms control negotiations and treaties serve as rational adjuncts to national strategy and policy, not as substitutes for coherent objectives. Treaties define military relationships with allies as well as adversaries, normalize the strategic environment, and enhance stability. An added benefit is that arms control treaties help to channel development and deployment of military capabilities along predictable lines.
The United States and NATO continue to face a capable adversary in Europe. Even if the Soviet unilateral force withdrawals continue, significant asymmetries will remain in the WP's favor. Thus, it is in the best interests of the United States and NATO to continue to negotiate toward a CFE treaty that would redress the imbalance of forces in Europe. In this regard, it also can serve to meet the real demands of a declining defense budget. Assuming NATO-proposed force levels are accepted, post-CFE WP ground forces would be less than half their current size and WP air forces would be reduced significantly, forcing a reassessment of WP strategy. Should such a treaty be concluded, however, it must contain effective verification measures so that significant violations are detected readily. Lastly, a reduction in the WP's favorable balance of forces must not induce US and NATO planners to defer ongoing modernization and improvements of remaining forces.

The United States has rejected calls for any form of naval arms control, whether it be reductions or constraints on independent naval activities. NATO's dependence on the LOCs will remain, even in a post-CFE Europe. Any form of arms control that would limit or restrict the US ability to maintain LOCs with overseas allies, or operate unilaterally when required, is not in the national interest.

Arms control can weigh in favor of the United States and its allies, since arms reductions can redress the great quantitative advantages of the WP. It is important that the aggregate effect of INF, START, CFE, and other related treaty efforts ensures deterrent capabilities at every level of flexible response.
RISK ASSESSMENT

GENERAL

The main question arising from this assessment is: What is the level of risk to the national security of the United States given the capabilities available with expected fiscal resources and the current capability and motivation of potential US adversaries? Critical to the assessment is a reconciliation of the reality of the present with the optimism about the future. In this regard, the United States must construct a defense program that establishes a bridge between current and future US capabilities—given the current threat, a future threat that is predicted to be diminished, new and challenging regional threats to US interests, and the prospects of fewer resources.

While past assessments have enjoyed moderate stability in either the threat, the budget, or both, the current assessment presents a greater challenge. In this regard, the current capability of the Soviet Union and the NSWP nations is relatively well known; military force capabilities can be somewhat accurately predicted given reasonable levels of unilateral reductions and those levels postulated under a conventional forces agreement. Predicting the prevailing, and certainly the future, national interests and motivations of those countries currently undergoing wrenching transformation is more difficult.

A major component of US capability lies in the perception of the United States as a leader of the free world and as a Superpower capable of protecting global interests, access to resources, technological superiority, and world economic stability.

The United States' most critical tasks remain the maintenance of an effective strategic nuclear deterrent and appropriate provisions for defense of the US homeland. Of only somewhat less importance is the continued satisfaction of US commitments to its allies and friends and the ability, if needed, to unilaterally protect US interests worldwide.

DETERRENCE

The fundamental objective of the United States is deterrence of war. The United States, acting through coalition arrangements as well as unilaterally,
attempts to deter aggression against itself, its friends, and its allies across the spectrum of conflict.

The US ability to deter is a complex relationship involving the options, capabilities, and motivations of potential adversaries contrasted with the real and perceived will and capabilities of the United States. A fundamental and enduring characteristic of US deterrence has been a credible and capable force that could be employed by the national leadership as an element of national power.

As a backdrop, it is important to distinguish between the capability of potential adversaries to act and the probability that they will act. This is particularly germane concerning the Soviet Union and the NSWP nations. While Soviet and NSWP military capability remains substantial, current conditions suggest that the likelihood of hostile behavior is low. Likewise, if the hope for an even more favorable future outcome is realized, the likelihood of conflict involving those parties will remain low.

STRAATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

The foundation for the US strategy of deterrence and for global military balance is strategic nuclear forces. The United States and the Soviet Union recognize that both have the capability to inflict unacceptable destruction upon one another. Regardless of the outcome of force reductions and the balances brought about by negotiated arms reductions, the United States and the Soviet Union will find it necessary to retain ready, modern, and effective strategic nuclear deterrent forces. Given the continued maintenance of the Triad and continued development of capabilities against ballistic missiles, the probability of deterrence failing is low.

NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

The overall nonstrategic nuclear forces balance is assessed to be improved for NATO as the INF Treaty is being implemented, but the Soviets retain a significant advantage both in numbers and range of NSNF below INF range. However, for NATO, as INF weapons are removed, the burden of holding deep
targets at risk increasingly will rest with DCA and sea-based systems. In contrast, the WP will retain significant quantities of SCUD missiles capable of ranges to 300 km. As conventional unilateral reductions continue, and particularly under the conditions of force parity offered by a CFE agreement, the weapon-to-mobile target asymmetry will be reduced. At these new conventional force levels, there is a lower probability that NATO would need to resort to the use of NSNF. Thus, as conventional forces approach parity at lower levels, the risk of conflict involving NSNF continues to decline.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES (GLOBAL CONFLICT)

US conventional forces have provided the United States with a credible, effective, and flexible global deterrent. The Soviets have instituted unilateral conventional force reductions in part as a direct result of this US commitment.

The only plausible global war scenario would postulate the Soviet Union as the adversary. Unilateral force reductions and political change in Eastern Europe will continue to erode both the confidence and the capability of the Soviets to conduct deep offensive operations into the WTVD. They certainly must question the reliability of NSWP forces, which have contributed a significant portion of the ground forces in this region, as well as the vulnerability of vital internal LOCs and infrastructure.

In view of the instability in Eastern Europe, uncertainty about the reliability of their allies, and unilateral force reductions, the assessed probability of a global conventional war involving the Soviet Union is low.

In the unlikely event that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union (and between NATO and the WP) were to deteriorate and result in a global conventional war, the US objective would be to terminate the conflict quickly on favorable terms. US military forces would establish a cohesive defense as far forward as possible based on priorities and sequencing determined by the NCA.

Even if it is assumed that the Soviets can rely on NSWP military forces for the present, FY 1990 US and allied forces are sufficient in a conventional
conflict to prosecute all elements of the national military strategy, except the successful forward defense of Central Europe. NATO forces could mount a strong defense and exact high attrition, but not without loss of territory—primarily because WP forces continue to maintain a numerical superiority.

However, the overall WP combat capability has been affected by Soviet and NSWP unilateral force reductions implemented to date. These reductions probably would impair sustainability in protracted operations, and the force restructuring caused by these reductions makes WP breakthroughs less likely. The overall effect is to increase the WP’s need to generate and draw on forces from the western Soviet Union.

Within the context of the current state of affairs in Eastern Europe, the scenario described above is highly unlikely. NSWP nations are not likely to mobilize for war, even if ordered by the Soviet Union, unless there was an as yet unidentified set of crisis circumstances.

Beyond FY 1990, given the projected increased independence of NSWP nations, and under the effects of further unilateral force reductions, and certainly under conditions of negotiated force reductions, the Soviet Union will require lengthy preparation time to generate the forces necessary for a deep and sustained attack into NATO territory.

Thus, in the unlikely event that global war did occur, the potential for termination of such a conflict on terms favorable to the United States is improving. Under the conditions of CFE currently envisioned, conditions will be greatly improved.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES (REGIONAL CRISIS)

In much of the Third World, traditional animosities and the enduring problems of debt, terrorism, insurgencies, and drug trafficking will continue to command attention and resources as the United States pursues the objective of a more stable world. Similarly, the proliferation of high-technology conventional weapons, as well as chemical and nuclear weapons, combined with ballistic missile delivery means, threatens areas of US interest around the globe.
Thus, during the period considered by this assessment, non-Soviet threats are likely to command increased attention from the United States. The Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and Africa will continue to be areas of instability. The tools of terrorism will become more lethal and sophisticated, and regional instability increasingly will threaten US citizens and interests. Thus, there is an increased probability of threat to US interests.

If the United States were to become involved in a conflict within the range of contingencies described above, sufficient US capabilities are available, and are forecast to remain available, to successfully prosecute the national strategy, although these tasks would be more difficult if more than one such conflict occurred at a time.

SELECTED FUNCTIONAL AREAS

Sustainability and Industrial Mobilization

Staying power of US conventional forces in either a global war or regional conflict is primarily determined by existing US capabilities in sustaining supplies, pre-positioned war reserve, and secondary war reserve materials. This capacity must be reinforced with an industrial capability to surge production of critical warfighting material and supplies.

The lack of alternative production facilities, the inability to rapidly surge to required wartime rates, and the increasing reliance on overseas supplies introduce risk under the conditions of a global war. The declining defense budget will exacerbate this problem.

The risk associated with sustainability in a conflict in Central Europe is assessed to be moderate and improving. Risk in regional conflicts is low.

The risk associated with industrial capability is assessed to be moderate. Although changing conditions in Europe mean that the United States and NATO are better able to manage a postulated conflict, industrial capacity is declining.
Mobility

Given the geographic relationship between the United States and its allies, strategic mobility is essential to the successful prosecution of US national strategy. In the unlikely event of a conflict in Central Europe, the US mobility assets would be sorely taxed to meet force closure requirements.

If the United States becomes involved in a Third World or limited regional conflict not involving the engagement of Soviet forces, the planned mobility force would be adequate to support movement of contingency forces worldwide, assuming most combinations of time, distance, and forces. However, mobility capabilities may be stressed by short warning, a requirement to rapidly apply overwhelming combat power, or contingencies occurring simultaneously. Further, future sealift and airlift operations may be hampered by less favorable basing rights agreements and decreasing prospects for airlift and sealift modernization.

Space

Most of the US and Soviet national objectives are supported adequately by their respective space systems. Both nations rely on space systems in some key mission areas. US space warfighting capabilities provide distinct surveillance, navigation, and C³ advantages. The Soviets, however, have the world's largest and most responsive space launch infrastructure, including extensive booster and spacecraft production pipelines, which is optimized to support military operations. At the same time, their ASAT capabilities allow the Soviets to deny or inhibit an enemy's use of vulnerable satellite systems. With an ASAT capability and those survivability enhancements planned for US systems through FY 1997, the United States should be equipped to meet essential warfighting needs and a rough parity of capabilities would exist.

Given the assessment that conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States is increasingly unlikely, the risk to US space systems is considered to be decreasing.
CONCLUSIONS

Because of changes taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, there are many reasons to believe that the United States and its allies, friends, and global interests are more secure today than in many past years. If hopes for the future are fulfilled, there is further cause for optimism. It would seem fundamental now to say that the ideals, institutions, and commitments of the United States and its allies have played a major role in leading the Soviet Union and the nations of the Eastern Bloc to recognize that their processes have failed. Despite that favorable prospect, this assessment also concludes that in many regions of the world, situations exist that can threaten regional stability and US global interests.

Overall, it is assessed that the United States is, and will remain, capable of attaining its national security objectives, if the forces and programs requested are provided. This is assessed to be true under current conditions as well as under the conditions postulated for START, CFE, and other arms control regimes.

Although the United States can succeed in meeting its national security objectives, it is critical to the full understanding of this assessment to appreciate the factors that determine the cost of this success. Protecting the lives of American service members is directly related to readiness, the ability to act quickly and decisively, the ability to be mobile and lethal, and the ability to sustain battle. Thus, while the United States pursues its required goals and objectives, any calculation of risk must include an assessment of the cost. In this regard, if the United States fails to provide the elements essential to the effective and efficient prosecution of battle, the nation will pay an even higher cost at the time of execution.