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ASYMMETRY FROM THE RIGHT: IMMINENT DANGER FROM EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES?

BY

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United States Air Force

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel O.G. Mannon

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This report examines the issue of extremist groups and their links to serving military members. It explores Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to identify and deter such activities. It also reviews the evolution of extremist groups, their use of technology and informational resources as well as their proclivity for using Weapons of Mass Destruction. The report offers recommendations for strengthening DOD efforts in this arena.
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The discussion in the following pages explores, in many cases, the efforts of the Department of the Army to resolve the issue of extremism. The study focuses on the Army's actions because the available literature is, for the most part, topical to the Army. While the discussion position differs from the Army's study conclusions, the intention is to concentrate on future requirements not on criticism of past actions.

Special thanks to Mr. Peter Probst, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and Mr. Jerry Anderson, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity). Their thoughts, expertise, accessibility, and connectivity to other experts in the field were central to the issue at hand.
ASYMMETRY FROM THE RIGHT: IMMINENT DANGER FROM EXTREMISM ACTIVITIES?

The recently released Report on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified the ways and means through which the Department of Defense (DOD) intends to accomplish the objectives defined by the President's National Security Policy. The QDR emphasized the critical importance of responding to the increasing danger of asymmetrical threats such as terrorism, information warfare, and the use of nuclear, biological or chemical agents by non-state actors. As the United States moves forward toward the new millennium, we face a threat that seeks to exploit the combined use of these asymmetrical actions to achieve its end.

This threat, extremism, seeks to destroy the institution of pluralistic government that makes this country strong. DOD has to be concerned with responses to incidents created by such extremists. However, a greater concern is the existence of hidden relationships between extremist groups and serving military members. Such relationships are a threat to the good order of both the services and the country.

This paper addresses these hidden relationships and offers courses of action to sever them. It also reviews the current policy on extremism in the military, discusses the findings of
the Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities and its implications, explores the use of technology by extremists, and offers a recommendation for strengthening DOD policy concerning extremist activities.
THE THREAT

Extremism is activity at the far ends of the political spectrum. It has been defined as "A position at the end of an ideological spectrum; home of the politically far-out."\(^2\) Congressional hearings indicate the objectives of such behavior are to proscribe the rights of specific groups to participate in society and to impose certain values on the public at the expense of basic freedoms.\(^3\) Extremists seek to achieve these objectives by silencing opposition through fear and violence. They also abuse democratic processes by filing frivolous documents and filing tax liens against local or state governments. Finally, they promote conspiracies in an effort to isolate various citizen groups from belief and trust in the federal government.\(^4\) What means do extremist organizations use to achieve their objectives?\(^5\)

The answers range from promulgating strategies by technology usage to building coalitions. These coalitions include disparate members like the National Rifle Association and Christian Right. All of these groups are brought together by emphasizing ideals bridging the gaps between their causes.\(^6\) Leadership is also a primary contributor.
As Figure One depicts (See Appendix A.), currently recognized extremist group leaders have been involved in radical causes for twenty years. These individuals have moved from organization to organization changing their methods of operation as necessary to attract new members. The recent spate of mistakes like Ruby Ridge and Waco give credence to their long-standing claims of governmental power abuses. Such incidents provide fertile recruiting ground for new members as well as for the forming of loose coalitions with other like-minded activist groups.\(^7\)

Another tactic making extremist practitioners more efficient is adoption of "leaderless resistance" as an operating style.\(^8\) Elements of this tactic include decentralized control, independent actions, and the practice of not claiming responsibility for incidents.\(^9\)

"Leaderless resistance," a "doctrine" articulated since the early 1990s by extremist leaders like Louis Beam, has recently become widespread because of the Internet. Leaderless resistance exhibits many of the characteristics of Communist resistance cells, but lacks the primary element of central control. Individual cell members are expected to act in accordance with their beliefs and conviction. Even though cells are not connected formally, they can be given "blind" instructions
through a loose confederation over Internet sites. Leaderless resistance also provides resilience against intelligence collection and member identification, a factor recognized by federal agencies in recent publications. Beam's idea, like numerous others before it, required technological advances to insure its viability. Technology is also critical as a means to advance other efforts of extremist groups.

Technology brings with it the capability to contact vast numbers of people with little expense, and the ability to espouse inflammatory ideas in relative obscurity. The case of Ernst Zundel is an example of technology's worldwide reach and its effectiveness providing obscurity to those who desire it.

Zundel lives and works in Toronto, has a Web site in Santa Cruz, California, and a San Diego E-mail address. Apparently, he dials into the Santa Cruz site and uses the Internet FTP facility to transfer data from a distant location, presumably Toronto. His Web site, "Zundelsite," focuses on the Holocaust, and reaches an international audience. Zundel reports 82 percent of site visitors are from the U.S., 5 percent from Canada, 3 percent from Germany, and 10 percent from other countries ranging from Argentina to Zaire. Zundel's manner of operations shows the Internet clearly obliterates national borders and restrictions.
It is the force multiplier which bridges the gap between widely dispersed cells and allows them to function under the tenet of leaderless resistance. It is also the engine that drives growth in the movement. The extent of its impact was exemplified in hearings on Capital Hill.

According to opening statements in Congressional hearings held in the wake of the Oklahoma City Bombing, there were reported to be 224 militias operating in 39 states during 1995. Recent figures from the Southern Poverty Law Center's Klanwatch indicate a rise in the number of identifiable militia groups to 858. Of this total, 380 are armed organizations and all 50 states now harbor extremist groups. In fact, the dramatic rise has agencies as disparate as the Anti-Defamation League and Jane's Intelligence Review keeping close watch on the groups. For instance, a June, 1995, article in Jane's estimated U.S. memberships as exceeding 50,000 individuals. The ability to generate income is another of technology's contributions fueling the growth of extremism.

For instance, one extremist broadcast effort, "For The People," raised over $4 million in 1994 according to IRS documents. Total sales of extremist related materials and equipment through syndicated radio broadcasts, Web sites, and
newsletters exceed $100 million per year.\textsuperscript{17} In fact, the ability to generate large sums of money without audit trails was a focus area for Congressional investigations.\textsuperscript{18} Much like the Japanese Aum Shinryko cult, the loose coalition of U.S. extremist groups methodically build up "war chests" and seek the capacity to achieve their ends through asymmetrical means such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

There are numerous examples of individuals with extremist ties who have attempted to develop and use WMD. Among those are Larry Wayne Harris, recently arrested for possession of anthrax vaccine, but who tried to spread bubonic plague through the New York City subway in 1995.\textsuperscript{19} In another, four Minnesota men affiliated with an extremist group called the "Patriots' Council" were sentenced to prison in 1992 for their plot to kill Federal officials with ricin.\textsuperscript{20} Another case involving ricin had an Arkansan with Neo-nazi ties, Thomas Levy, attempted to smuggle 130 grams of the poison from Canada.\textsuperscript{21} Finally, a Portland, Oregon, chemist and anti-government activist named James Bell was arrested for threatening Federal officials with sarin.\textsuperscript{22}

Thus far we have seen how the non-state actors of extremist groups attempted to influence governmental activities. Their collective pursuit of governance by minority rather than majority
has taken many forms. They have combined the elements of
informational, economic, and political means to sow the seeds of
discontent. Practices like leaderless resistance combined with
the technological advances of the Internet allowed single
individuals within the movement to wield disproportional amounts
of power used to shape and direct the focus of others' activities.\textsuperscript{23}

The leveraging of domestic groups with disparate causes under
the overarching umbrella cause of "government mistrust" resulted
in a loose coalition of supporting partners with one sense of
purpose. Proliferation of informational sources through the
technology explosion resulted in the attraction of many new
members to the cause and proved to be a method of financing
expansion as well. Technology also allowed domestic groups to
establish relationships with international radical groups and to
more easily procure WMD materials.\textsuperscript{24} Development, procurement,
and attempted use of WMD significantly heightened the danger
these groups represent.

The QDR was prescient in its forecast of future asymmetrical
attacks. Unfortunately, it did not foresee the use of all
asymmetrical forms of attack by domestic elements. As
disconcerting as that might be, a more significant issue of
current forecasts is the failure to address relationships between extremist groups and serving military members.

The Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities states there is no relationship. However, a look at the grouping of extremist activities in relation to military posts as depicted in Figure Seven indicates another view. There are rather large concentrations of extremist activities in proximity to the various installations. Is the correlation because of the facilities' geographic locations or is there a more sinister reason for the level of visible extremist activity?

Unfortunately, there appears to be evidence of connections between these two collective organizations. The Task Force Report provides some examples. For instance, 3.5 percent of the soldiers who answered the confidential survey reported having been approached to join an extremist group since enlisting. Twice as many (7 percent) said they knew another soldier whom they believed to be a member of an extremist organization, while 11.6 percent reported that they knew a soldier who held extremist views. Finally, 17.4 percent said they had some contact with racist or extremist material. If these numbers are applied to the 495,000 member Army, the findings mean 17,500 soldiers were solicited for recruitment, while 87,000 had contact with
supremacist publications. If one other percentage is applied to the total force, you find 2881 soldiers possibly involved in extremism. In a related vein, FBI personnel conducting recruit background investigations cite examples of parents with extremist beliefs who have their children join the military for the specialized training it offers. There are other indicators regarding relationships between extremists and military members.

Several former military members are well known as active members of extremism groups. Former Green Beret and retired Lieutenant Colonel James “Bo” Gritz is probably the most well known. Not only is he recognized as a leading organizer of anti-government and racist extremist groups, but he was the 1988 vice presidential candidate on the ticket of white supremacist David Duke. He was also instrumental in resolving the Ruby Ridge, Idaho, standoff by negotiating with Randy Weaver. Weaver subsequently surrendered, and Gritz appeared before the Senate hearing concerning the incident. His subsequent testimony supported Weaver’s self-defense contentions in regard to the shooting of an Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agent. Gritz was also highly critical of the federal agents who attempted to pressure Weaver into the role of an informant for his purported crime of arms possession - a situation later proven false.
Another retired Green Beret with strong ties to extremist groups is former Master Sergeant Glenn Miller. In the late 1970s, Miller founded the North Carolina Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in the vicinity of Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This group later evolved into the White Patriot Party (WPP), becoming the largest and most dangerous Klan group in the country by the mid-1980s. Investigations by the Southern Poverty Law Center revealed a connection between this group and active duty Marines from nearby Camp Lejeune.30

The Marines were training WPP members in the art of warfare at secret locations around the state. In addition, the WWP members had access to stolen military supplies allegedly provided by the Marines.31 More recently, other Camp Lejeune Marines were arrested for stealing arms and providing them to civilian dealers.32

Special Forces troops may be specifically targeted for recruitment into extremist groups. An underground organization of veteran and active duty Special Forces personnel was formed at Fort Bragg in 1992, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center. Called the "Special Forces Underground," it is estimated to have from 35 to 100 members.33 The Task Force Report even notes disturbing trends in this area.
The Report states, "Overall little active recruiting of soldiers by extremist organizations is evident. A possible exception could be Special Operations Forces, which some senior commanders believe are targeted by the militia movement." It states irrefutable proof of this belief was not uncovered, but raises a concern over the lack of minorities in the combat arms. It continues to say,

While the absence of minorities was quite noticeable in all combat units, it is even more pronounced within Special Operations Forces. This representation might lead to adverse human relations consequences in the future by fostering supremacist attitudes among white combat soldiers.

Congressional committees have also recognized the potential for extremist connections to the military.

The House Armed Services Committee warned, in December 1994, of the potentially explosive racial affairs problem in the U.S. military. The committee's investigators noted, "that white supremacist and skinhead activity is ongoing at several bases, with extremist activity at one unnamed base so intense that it poses a threat to good order." The general council for the Majority Staff, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, Janis Kephart states the Committee continues to focus on extremism activity. Its concern is the amount of unintended support flowing from
installations. Illegal weapons movement, installation usage, and major supply item pilferage were examples of focus areas.  

Some soldiers also offer a differing view regarding extremism and its presence in the Army. While DOD regulations and Army policy define what extremism organizations consist of and prohibit active membership, individual soldiers do not necessarily agree. Nick, a soldier from the 82nd Airborne Division says, "There's room (for racism)." He continues to say he's proud to be a soldier and his prejudices don't conflict with the oath he took to uphold the Constitution. He said, "My personal beliefs are mine. They don't interfere with my professional life." Former skinheads also provide revelations about extremism activity in the military.

For instance, Tom Hayden joined the Marines at 21 years of age after already being a skinhead for 3 years. While in the Marines, he recruited new members for Tom Metzger's "White Aryan Resistance." Finally, after four years in the Marines, he received an "other than honorable discharge" for "alcohol-related" misbehavior. Now a reformed skinhead, he volunteers at the Simon Wiesenthal Center and counsels troubled teenagers on the dangers of such groups.
Specialist Trent Orndorf, an 82nd Airborne Division trooper, was an extremist skinhead for years before joining the Army. He joined the Army at 26 to straighten out his life. Even though he was attempting to reform his life, he still associated with known skinheads. As a result, he was able to provide detailed information concerning Fort Bragg extremist activities to investigators shortly after the Burmeister killings. While initial Army efforts investigating extremism focused in the Fort Bragg area, there are other Army connections to extremism.

For instance, the "Michigan Militia," a white supremacist group, gained access to U.S. military bases in Michigan through the 92-year-old Civilian Marksmanship Program. The program cost the Army $2.5 million in 1995, and provided 40 million rounds of free ammunition to participants plus access to military firing ranges. Are the services addressing these issues? If so, how effective are their actions? As we move to the next section, a review of current efforts will address these questions.
THE COUNTER

Extremism is thriving throughout the U.S. It is affecting how our military recruits, trains, and responds to its mission of national defense. What are the services doing in response to this danger? Does the fight follow a coordinated strategy or is it focused on the issue “de jour”?

Current efforts lack a coherent approach. Actions are driven by external stimuli. Reactive versus proactive is the common thread running through each part of the strategy. For instance, examination of extremist behavior in the services was triggered by the 1995 Burmeister incident.\(^4\) Congress mandated development of military response teams for domestic WMD incidents.\(^4\) Seams dissect the continuity of counter extremism programs as the issue moves between the law enforcement and national security arenas. The extremist is not constrained by such barriers. In fact, their efforts use technology and other means to obviate boundaries and take advantage of such seams. How are we collectively addressing such issues?

Service efforts currently focus on the ends of preventing the occurrence of other violent incidents like the Burmeister assault. The services selected different ways to achieve this
goal. As an example, the Air Force reissued a message reiterating DOD and Air Force policies against participation in supremacist groups shortly after the incident. It also directed a case review of situations involving those activities for the preceding 24 months.\textsuperscript{46} The Army took a more proactive stance and established the previously discussed task force to investigate extremist behavior.\textsuperscript{47} The then Secretary of Defense, Doctor William Perry, also clarified his policy. He issued a policy memorandum dated May 4, 1995 that reiterated the guidance contained in DOD Directive 1325.6. Doctor Perry also strengthened the policy by providing specific directions to commanders concerning their responsibilities in maintaining awareness of such issues.\textsuperscript{48}

Shortly after the findings of the Army's Task Force were released, DOD reissued its Directive 1325.6.\textsuperscript{49} The directive incorporated the revised policy, as well as clarifying active and passive participation in supremacist activities. It also delineated functions of command to include "vigilance about the existence of such activities," and the "active use of investigative authority to include a prompt and fair complaint process."\textsuperscript{50} There are other more recent actions that seek to further focus these efforts.
For instance, the Air Force is currently considering issuing regulatory guidance concerning skin tattoos, many types of which are viewed as indicators of involvement in extremist activities. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has released an “ALMAR” message that establishes a prohibition against contracting new recruits who have tattoos. He cited the Corps’ experience of low first term enlistment completion for Marines whose previous lifestyles included tattooing. He further commented that the tattoos themselves were not the issue, but rather their indication of a particular pattern of behavior subsequently found incompatible with “good order and discipline.” There are other examples like the Army’s “Consideration of Others” program.

This program is one of the means that the Army uses to shape soldiers’ attitudes. It addresses several areas of civility. Included among those are prejudice, harassment, verbal abuse, and offensive behavior. The program’s main aspects are enforcement, education, and ownership. Enforcement seeks to establish Commander’s Intent, guarantee training time, and actively investigate incidents. The education aspect seeks to inculcate consideration of others as a value starting at initial force entry. When the combination of actions taken through the
enforcement and education processes result in the internalization of consideration of others as a value, ownership is realized.\textsuperscript{52} Another means undertaken to identify and isolate occurrences is the Defense Incident-Based Reporting System. This system standardizes how services report a range of incidents and provides a DOD-wide data base.\textsuperscript{53} The DOD's Equal Opportunity Office provides another means for monitoring and tracking extremism activities.

A senior equal opportunity manager spends approximately one-third of his time researching extremism, defining patterns that might affect the military, and providing information to field agencies. Since initiating this effort in December 1995, he has compiled over 135 six-inch binders of material on specific groups.\textsuperscript{54} This resource is used to educate commanders on extremist indicators such as clothing styles, popular extremist bands and their song titles, specialty book titles, and tattoo types.\textsuperscript{55} Recently established dual purpose programs provide other avenues of attack supporting the overall objective of combating extremism.

Recent executive and legislative actions recognized the overlapping regimes of extremism and terrorism. Presidential Decision Directive 39 defines terrorism as both a law enforcement
and National Security threat, especially in situations involving WMD. It clearly mandates DOD provide rapid response capabilities, assigns consequence management to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and law enforcement responsibilities to the Department of Justice (DOJ). DOJ, with the FBI as executive agent, is responsible for domestic threat warnings of terrorist activities.56

The Clinton administration, in support of this directive, supplemented funding for the FBI’s counter-terrorism (CT) programs by almost 40 percent. The FBI created a CT branch that acts as the center for information collection, analysis and dissemination to improve CT efforts at home.57 Congress also provided additional funding and guidance in the Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Authorization Act.

Known as the “Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996,” this legislation addresses domestic preparedness. It states the U.S. “lacks adequate planning and countermeasures to address the threat of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical terrorism.” It also notes exercises have shown “serious deficiencies in preparedness and severe coordination problems.” The Act directs DOD to establish and carry out a program to provide civilian personnel of Federal, State, and local agencies
with training and expert advice on emergency responses to WMD. DOD must also develop and maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid response team capable of reacting to chemical and biological incidents. Finally, it directs the Federal Emergency Management Agency to maintain an inventory and database of personnel and responses to WMD situations for access by local, State and Federal officials.58

The interagency community has made great strides forward correcting these deficiencies in the short amount of time since the signing of the aforementioned directives. For example, a "Local Terrorism Planning Model" is available on the Internet. This site provides recommendations for local community preparations in response to an incident. Included is a description of the counter-terrorism roles each federal agency plays. The site also provides such information as: tactical guidelines for the terrorist scene; how to conduct investigations; descriptions of various types of terrorist actions as well as likely targets; profiles of significant terrorist groups; and finally, in-service specialized training and how to conduct it.59

It's obvious through these examples that our "raison d'etat," extremist linkages to the military, are being attacked through a
variety of means. From improved identification of recruits with extremist connections to specialized training for leadership. The recognition of national security issues concerning domestic use of WMD has resulted in the fielding of additional resources that provide indirect benefits to this end. The game plan forming the ways of the attack includes consideration of others, the creation of respect for human dignity, and establishing responsibility for individual actions. Bearing these efforts in mind, are there any weaknesses in this program, and if so, how can they be corrected? Recommendations to address these questions are the focus of the next section.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The previous discussion has shown more than a casual linkage between extremist groups and military members. There are some efforts aimed at breaking this connection. However, most of the support for this issue is a peripheral benefit precipitating out of tangential programs. Bearing that in mind, what actions can be taken to refocus efforts with the specific end of severing this relationship?

First, we must recognize the level of danger extremists represent to both civilian and military interests. The components of this threat include not only recruitment of military members but the asymmetrical use of both the information network and WMD. Secondly, we must consolidate our widespread efforts and establish a focused campaign guided by a single office having both primary responsibility for the strategy and authority to enforce its execution. Lastly, we must insure the long term efficacy of the program in spite of more recent competing crises like sexual harassment, same gender basic training or fissures between active and reserve components.

Specific recommendations include the following:

• Establish a joint, interagency Task Force as lead proponent for tracking extremist activities and organizations. Responsible for development and
execution of centralized guidance in pursuit of national policies.

- Develop protocols for information sharing between national, international agencies, and local law enforcement. Establish standardized, computer-indexed reporting of domestic terrorism, international terrorism, hate crimes, and extremist activities. Include punitive actions for failures to report incidents. Complete current DOD effort and link to proposed national system.

- Petition Congress for relaxation of prohibitions on invasive investigative practices under specified conditions that do not meet criteria as on-going criminal activities.

- Expand current FBI efforts hosting regional information exchanges concerning terrorism and extremism. Increase frequency of occurrence and push down to lower levels. Insure information is captured and promulgated through integrated computer databases.

- Increase funding to allow more complete background investigations on potential enlistees. Establish DOD-wide guidelines on indicators of extremist activity. Also, provide contractual quick release authority for new members who are subsequently found to have extremist ties which were not uncovered during pre-enlisting processing.

- Complete studies similar to the Task Force’s efforts on the remainder of the force and publish results.

- Insure compliance with current guidelines throughout the force including the Reserve Component. Particularly emphasizing annual training for all members.

- Identify critical information nodes, consolidate efforts between military and civilian agencies to increase security and develop the ability to gradually shed system components. The ability to
shed components isolates targeted nodes avoiding the paralyzing cascading effect normally resulting from center of gravity attacks.62

Adoption of these recommendations will correct deficiencies such as those currently inherent in the Defense Incident-Based Reporting System. Deficiencies include the lack of assigned responsibility for correlating data and identifying trends. Also, the lack of a hate crimes category and voluntary reporting guidelines results in only 44 percent of events being reported.63 In addition, the weakness resulting from the lack of centralized control would be resolved.

Centralized control would consolidate efforts currently spread among the independent service investigative branches.64 It would resolve the stovepipe nature of the current system and increase efficiency at the policy level as well. For example, it would connect the numerous Pentagon offices who have pieces of the extremism puzzle by providing oversight guidance.65 It would also provide a defined span of control ensuring centralized focus and accountability for actions. Both elements are of critical importance when addressing the propensity for WMD use by extremists.

The attempted use of WMD by extremists, whether individually or as a member of a group, represents a grave concern for the
nation. The recently released QDR emphasized the critical importance of responding to the increasing danger of asymmetrical threats such as terrorism, information warfare, and the use of nuclear, biological or chemical agents by non-state actors. As exemplified previously, extremists in this country not only have the ability to manufacture or procure such weapons, but also have the desire to use them.

Efforts combating extremism must emphasize this aspect to the next QDR. They must also recognize the increasingly blurred line separating foreign and domestic policies as well as the ever-enlarging role of global economics in international affairs. In keeping with the national priorities of the President, the efforts must recognize the transnational nature of the threat that may require unilateral solutions. They must, in accordance with the National Security Strategy, be designed to prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist (extremist) operations before they occur. The tension between ends, and the available ways or means to achieve those ends will always be present. However, the penalty for failure to address the unsymmetrical conditions continuing to develop in these arenas is immense. To put the risk in perspective, you only have to consider the damage caused by an estimated two to three thousand members of the IRA over two
decades to what damage that could be wrought by the estimated
tens of thousands of extremists in America.69
APPENDIX A

The modern history of U.S. extremist groups dates back to the civil rights movement and de-segregation efforts of the mid-1960s. During this period organizations like the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (KKKK) came to be violent forces affecting the civil liberties of many. Federal and state governments expended significant resources to blunt the efforts of such groups. Subsequently, the groups' abilities to spread poisonous rhetoric and actions were crippled. During this tumultuous time, individuals like David Duke, Louis Beam, and Don Black were beginning their long-term associations with extremist groups.

Duke was first arrested in 1970 for protesting at a Tulane University anti-war speech. At the time of his arrest, he was nineteen years old and attired in a full Nazi dress uniform. Beam, the former head of the Texas KKKK, was indicted on federal sedition charges in 1987 and placed on the Federal Bureau Of Investigation's Ten Most Wanted List. Later, he was found not guilty of the charge and continues his anti-government rhetoric.

Black, an associate of Duke, served three years in federal prison for conspiring with a white supremacist group to overthrow the government of the Caribbean island of Dominica. He also ran
for one of Alabama's U.S. senate seats, receiving strong support from anti-Semitic and racist Neo-nazi groups. One other individual has played prominently in the recent growth of extremism.

William Pierce Smith, a former instructor at Oregon State University, has a doctorate in physics. Commonly held to be the most articulate strategist of the extremist movement, Smith heads a West Virginia-based racist group known as the National Alliance. He claims an audience of 100,000 listeners for his radio show, "American Dissident Voices," and publishes a racist journal called the "National Vanguard." He is probably best known throughout the movement as author (under the pen name Andrew MacDonald) of The Turner Diaries.

Individuals with serious extremist convictions consider the book, which chronicles the violent overthrow of the federal government by white revolutionaries, a seminal work. It describes a bombing using Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO) as a weapon. The improvised explosive device used at the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was very similar in construction to bomb described in Pierce's fictitious account. When questioned by Mike Wallace of CBS television about the striking parallels between his book and the Oklahoma bombing, he
dismissed the action. He unabashedly stated, "The U.S. is not in a revolutionary state yet - people have more learning to do before they are ready for a revolution." 75

Figure One highlights an important point for understanding the current state of affairs. There are obvious connections between the numerous groups illustrated. One only needs to color code individuals' names as they appear in different organizations. The resulting colorful web clearly links many of the radical white supremacists of twenty years ago to current movements. These individuals learned their lessons from past battles, toned down their rhetoric and enlisted the support of "strange bedfellows." The bedfellows include the Christian Right, abortion rights activists, Second Amendment rights groups, and activists against government abuse. 76
EVOUUTION OF RACISM TO EXTREMISM

1930
Ku Klux Klan
Founded 1866
Various Klans

1940
Wesley Swift

1950
John Birch Society
Robert Welch
United Klans of America
Robert Shelton

1960
Tom Metzer
Gordon Kahl
John Walker

1970
Gordon Kahl
John Walker

1980
NC Knights
Glenn Miller
White Patriot Party

1990

Adapted from 29 May 97 briefing to DoD Senior Advisory Group for Equal Opportunity

Church of Jesus Christ Christian
Wesley Swift

Silver Shirts
William Pulley
Henry Beach
Gerald L.K. Smith
Richard Butler

American Nazi Party
George Lincoln Rockwell

Minutemen
Robert DePugh
Butler Lynch Gale

National Alliance
William Pierce

Liberty Lobby
William Pierce

Aryan Nations
Bob Mathews

Posse Comitatus
Richard Butler
Connie Lynch
William Gale

Richard Butler
Robert Miles
Bob Mathews
Louis Beam
Bruce Pierce

LA Knights
AL Knights
TX Knights
CA Knights

Invisible Empire
NAAW
P
DAVE DUKE

Knights of the KKK
Louis Beam
Thomas Metzer
White Aryan Resistance
Tom Metzer

American Front

Skinheads

Aryan Nations

The Order
Bob Mathews
Bruce Pierce

Bob Mathews

Populist Party
Willie Carso
Robert Weems
David Duke
APPENDIX B

Explaining a base case involving anthrax and its consequences provides a rather graphic example of the need to quell such proliferation. Figures Two through Six display situations resulting from various degrees of exposure to anthrax. Each case plots secondary exposures considering variable contact rates, infection rates and treatment intervention. A review of Figures Two, Three, and Five provides best and worst case scenarios.

Figure Two shows the result of an initial group of ten infected people who have secondary contact with five individuals each. The infection rate of the secondary exposures is thirty percent, a conservative estimate. In thirty days, the achieved mortality rate is only ten percent. Generally, it would take about seven days for medical facilities to isolate the illness type and provide appropriate treatment. In this situation, even with that delay, the number of casualties will not overwhelm available facilities. However, if the infection rate is increased to a realistic fifty percent as shown in Figure Three, the number of deaths becomes staggering.

The death of more than 200,000 people in 30 days will significantly affect the U.S. population. Genetically altered anthrax could possibly spread through the air. As a consequence,
family members, friends, coworkers, and health care professionals would be exposed to the threat before steps could be taken to minimize transmission. As in the case of other airborne viruses like smallpox, the public-health and health-care-delivery system would be overwhelmed. Are we able to successfully quarantine entire communities to contain the disease, an action we haven’t accomplished in almost a century? Are there enough antibiotics available nationwide to treat those affected? If the answers to those rhetorical questions were available, they would probably not provide a measure of comfort to anyone. Let’s take the discussion one step further and look a “worst case” scenario.

Figure Five provides a situation so immense it is almost unfathomable. The original patients still have secondary contact with only five others. But in this case, the infection rate is seventy percent (based on the assumption that the anthrax is transmittable by airborne means). Within thirty days, the numbers of dead would approach eight hundred million souls! Is such a scenario possible? Given the correct conditions, such a situation is quite possible. If the initial exposure were to occur in a high volume pedestrian traffic area like an international airport, the initial victims would spread the exposure nationwide. Such wide spread distribution would limit
case load numbers in specific locations thus decreasing the
likelihood of early detection. The projection for infection then
follows the logarithmic progression as depicted. Failure of the
U.S. infrastructure nationwide will be the end result of such an
event. In any case, the obvious conclusion from this rather
simplistic discussion is the overwhelming national need to avoid
such a situation at all cost.
Medical Cases from Single Anthrax Exposure of 10 People

- Number of contacts = 5
- Incubation Period = 2 days
- Infection rate = 30%
- Hospitalization = 50%
- Mortality = 10%

Projections provided by Dr. Glenn Mitchell
(Col, USA MC) 15 Feb 98
Medical Cases from Single Anthrax Exposure of 10 People

- Number of contacts = 5
- Incubation Period = 2 days
- Infection rate = 50%
- Hospitalization = 50%
- Mortality = 10%

Projections provided by Dr. Glenn Mitchell
(Col, USA MC) 15 Feb 98

Figure 3
Medical Cases from Single Anthrax Exposure of 10 People

Number of contacts = 5
Incubation Period = 2 days
Infection rate = 50%
Hospitalization = 80%
Mortality = 25%

Projections provided by Dr. Glenn Mitchell
(Col, USA MC) 15 Feb 98
Medical Cases from Single Anthrax Exposure of 10 People

Number of contacts = 5
Incubation Period = 2 days
Infection rate = 70%
Hospitalization = 80%
Mortality = 25%

Projections provided by Dr. Glenn Mitchell
(Col, USA MC) 15 Feb 98

Figure 5
Medical Cases from Single Anthrax Exposure of 10 People

Number of contacts = 10
Incubation Period = 2 days
Infection rate = 30%
Hospitalization = 50%
Mortality = 10%

Projections provided by Dr. Glenn Mitchell
(Col, USA MC) 15 Feb 98
Figure 7

- Skinhead
- Militia Group
- Neo-Nazi
- Klan
ENDNOTES


4 Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information 12.

5 Refer to Appendix A for a more complete discussion of the evolution of racism into extremism. Figure One in Appendix A provides a clear illustration of how “white supremacists” from twenty years ago are leading various extremist groups espousing causes across the full spectrum of ideology.


8 Leaderless resistance, a “doctrine” articulated since the early 1990s by extremist leaders like Louis Beam, recently became widespread because of the Internet. Leaderless resistance exhibits many of the characteristics of Communist resistance cells, but lacks the primary element of central control. Individual cell members are expected to act in accordance with their beliefs and conviction. Even through cells are not connected formally, they can be given “blind” instructions through a loose confederation over Internet sites. Leaderless resistance also provides resilience against intelligence collection and member identification, a factor recognized by federal agencies in recent publications. Beam’s idea, like numerous others before it, required technological advances to insure its viability.

The Web of Hate: Extremists Exploit the Internet (New York: William and Naomi Gorowitz Institute on Terrorism and Extremism, Anti-Defamation League, 1996), 46.

"The Web of Hate..." 47.

Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information, 1.

Holstein and Tharp 26.


Holstein and Tharp, 26. Also see Roy 17-19, and 36-37.

Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government, 16, 19-21, 45, 79-80.

Todd S. Purdum, "Two Charged With Possessing Toxin Thought to Be Anthrax," New York Times, 20 February 1998, sec. 1, p. 2. Also, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Developments of Interest to Security Manager (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, August, 1997), 9, and Jeffery Smith, "Iraq's Drive for a Biological Arsenal," The Washington Post, 21 November 1997, 1. The American Type Culture Collection in Rockville, Maryland, where Harris obtained the sample, was also the source for seed materials in Iraq's biological weapons program. This information was indicated by the Smith article cited above and in Bradley Graham's "U.S. Gearing Up Against Germ War Threat," The Washington Post, 14 December 1997, 1.

Roy 25. In this case, enough ricin was manufactured to kill 100 people. Ricin is an odorless, tasteless toxin occurring naturally in castor beans. Minute amounts are all that is
necessary to cause massive internal bleeding shortly after exposure. The toxin is readily absorbed through the skin.

21 Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Developments of Interest to Security Manager, 10. In this case, the toxin would have killed thousands of citizens if properly delivered.

22 David E. Kaplan "Terrorism's Next Wave," U.S. News and World Report, 17 November 1997, 26-27. During searches of Bell’s home, officials found large amounts of chemicals but did not find the secret stockpile of sarin and other deadly chemical weapons they believed he possessed.

23 Bradley Graham, "11 U.S. Military Computer Systems Breached by Hackers This Month," The Washington Post, 26 February 1998, sec. 1, p. 2. For instance, eleven different military systems were breached in February 1998. The verdict is still out regarding the perpetrators’ identities. However, it could have easily been an organized effort on the part of extremists. The disconcerting element of this action was the attackers' efforts not to vandalize the systems nor flaunt their intrusions. Whether the attacks were successful in leaving behind "trapdoors" remains to be seen.

24 Stephen H. Leader, The Rise of Terrorism (Arlington, Virginia: Eagle Research Corporation, 1997), 4. While it is relatively easy to find instructions for manufacturing such items as sarin on the Internet, nuclear weaponry requires increased levels of effort. The apparent ease of securing nuclear materials from the European continent makes it unnecessary to expend the funds necessary to create it yourself. The 1995 use of a radioactive substance by Chechen terrorists in Moscow, and the theft of 4.5 kilograms of partially enriched U-235 from a Russian naval yard are just two examples. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, there were 254 incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear material from January 1990 to February 1996. Sixty-six percent involved former Soviet Union states.


27 Dennis J. Reimer and Togo D. West, Jr. "A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1998," Testimony to the Senate and House of Representatives Committees and
Subcommittees February, 1997: 16. The percentage of active duty soldiers with extremist tendencies as identified in data collected by the Task Force and interpolated by the Army’s EO office was .582 of a percentage (or less than half a soldier per 100) as stated in an interview with Mr. Jerry Anderson, EO Manager, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity), Washington, D.C., 5 December 1997. Also cited in Tod Ensing’s *A Real Threat to National Security: Racism in the Ranks*; available from <http://www.worldmedia.com/caq/articles/army_racism.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 August 1996.

28 Derek F. Beyss, Andrea L. Cruz, and John C. Perkerson, FBI Office of Domestic Terrorism, Analysis Unit, interview by author, 12 December 1997, Washington, D.C.


30 Anderson interview and Roy, 44.

31 Roy, 44.


33 Roy, 44.

34 *The Secretary of the Army’s Task Force on Extremist Activities: Defending American Values*, Final Report, 8.

35 *The Secretary of the Army’s Task Force on Extremist Activities: Defending American Values*, Final Report, 15.

36 Ensing, 2.

37 Janis Kephart, General Counsel, Majority Staff, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, telephone interview, 4 November 1997.

38 *The Secretary of the Army’s Task Force on Extremist Activities: Defending American Values*, Final Report, 6. Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, defines extremism organizations as “…organizations that espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, gender, religion, or national origin; or advocate the use of force or violence and otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights.”


Ensign 2-5. Also noted in Militia-U.S. Military Links; available at <http://MediaFilter.org/MFF/CAQ/caq53.mmc.html; Internet; accessed 21 July 1996. It should be noted that threats outlined thus far are not limited just to the active force. There are some sources that argue National Guard and Reserve forces are even more susceptible to influence from extremist members. There may be validity to the argument if consideration is made for long-term service in the same location where friendships extend, in some cases, for decades. However, the breadth of this issue carries it beyond the scope of this paper.

The Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities: Defending American Values, Final Report, 1.


The Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities: Defending American Values, Final Report.

William J. Perry "Secretary of Defense Memorandum on Dissident and Protest Activity," 4 May 1995, 1. Commanders were charged with insuring that publications that originated from other than official outlets (post exchanges and military libraries) were not a danger to loyalty, discipline, or morale of military personnel. Distribution of any publications determined to be a danger in any of these areas shall be prohibited. Writing for publication in "Underground Newspapers" may not be pursued during duty hours, or be accomplished by use of Government or non-appropriated fund property on- or off-duty. Military personnel must reject participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, or national origin; advocate the use of force or violence; or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. Active participation, such as publicly demonstrating or rallying, fund raising, recruiting and training members, organizing or leading such organizations, or otherwise engaging
in activities in relation to such organizations or in furtherance of the objectives of such organizations that are viewed by command to be detrimental to the good order, discipline, or mission accomplishment of the unit, is incompatible with Military Service, and is, therefore, prohibited. Commanders have authority to employ the full range of administrative procedures, including separation or appropriate disciplinary action, against military personnel who actively participate in such groups. Functions of command include vigilance about the existence of such activities; active use of investigative authority to include a prompt and fair complaint process; and use of administrative powers, such as counseling, reprimands, orders, and performance evaluations to deter such activities. It is Defense Department Policy that a Service member’s right of expression be preserved to the maximum extent possible, consistent with good order and discipline and national security. However, no commander should be indifferent to conduct that, if allowed to proceed unchecked, would destroy the effectiveness of his or her unit.

50 Department of Defense Directive 1325.3.
52 Robert F. Foley, "U.S. Military District of Washington Consideration of Others Program," 30 October 1996, presentation briefing, 1-8. Also, Department of the Army Inspector General, "Special Inspection of Initial Entry Training Equal Opportunity/Sexual Harassment Policies and Procedures," 22 July 1997, ii, 1-5. The program was the result of the Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. The focus of this panel was on the human relations environment in which soldiers live and work. The findings focused on four main areas: the Army equal opportunity (EO) program, the extent of sexual harassment in the Army, leadership, and Initial Entry Training (IET). The panel's report stated, "The Army lacked institutional commitment to the EO program and soldiers distrusted the EO complaint system. Army leaders are the critical factor in creating, maintaining, and enforcing an environment of respect and dignity in the Army, too many leaders have failed to gain the trust of their soldiers. Finally, the majority of drill sergeants and instructors perform competently and well, but respect as a Army core value is not well institutionalized in IET
process." Recommendations for improvement included: 1) Assigning one Department of the Army (DA) staff agency the primary responsibility for leadership, leadership development, and human relations in the Army. 2) Conducting a critical review of staffing and organization of DA elements responsible for human relations problems/issues and of the resourcing of those agencies responsible for assisting commanders in implementing and executing human relations policy. 3) Publishing Army Regulation (AR) 600-20, Army Command Policy, immediately. 4) Increasing the length of IET to allow for more intense, rigorous soldierization and the inculcation of Army values; designing new training to inculcate Army values, appropriate behavior, and team building. 5) Improving IET cadre and recruiter training to include tools and techniques for addressing inappropriate behaviors in units; incorporating ethics and human relations training in recruiting and IET cadre courses, to include professionally facilitated sensitivity training.


54 Anderson interview.

55 The Secretary of the Army’s Task Force on Extremist Activities: Defending American Values. Final Report, 127. The Civilian Marksmanship Program was rescinded by Congress thus breaking at least one questionable militia to Army connection.


60 Examples of such activities include the Aberdeen Proving Ground incidents, prosecution of Command Sergeant Major McKinney, the Sara Lister affair, and actions by various factions to establish a four-star Reserve Component seat on the Joint Chiefs.
Obviously, a more comprehensive, unified effort is necessary concerning screening of recruits. Long term it is much cheaper to identify extremist leanings in tentative recruits than it is to attempt to investigate and out-process soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines after they are on active duty. In addition, a more aggressive stance is required for identification of individuals in the National Guard and Reserve who have extremist connections. As noted earlier, the long-term association with specific locations and the limited contact inherent in this type service provide a less constrained environment ripe for extremist recruitment and involvement in related activities.

There are several recent examples of "information warfare" type attacks that demonstrate not only the need for this ability but the intent by extremist factions to use such attacks. For example, the recent attack on eleven different DOD computer systems sought to maintain an unobtrusive presence in the systems. There is also the 1996 extremist attack on a CIA home page that filled the site with obscenities, swastikas, and a picture of Adolf Hitler. In addition, all the text was rewritten to express racist statements. See Wayne B. Drash and Jim B. Morris "Hackers Vandalize CIA Home Page;" available at <http://cnn.com/tech/9609/19/cia.hacker/index.html>; Internet; accessed 4 March 1998.

Anderson interview.

Department of Defense, "Combating Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Domestic Preparedness and Interagency CT Intelligence Coordination," briefing. The Army uses it's Criminal Investigations Division, the Navy its Criminal Investigations Service, and the Air Force its Office of Special Investigations.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OSD/SOLIC) is connected to the issue through counter-terrorism concerns and possible impacts on special operations forces. The Equal Opportunity Office is involved because of possible civil rights violations. The Air Force Judge Advocate General is involved because of legal issues concerning enforcement of DOD regulations. Other offices such as the Intelligence Directorate of the Joint Staff, and the DOD
Inspector General also have direct or indirect involvement in the problem.


70 Roy, 1.

71 The Web of Hate: Extremists Exploit the Internet, 8.

72 Roy, 36.

73 The Web of Hate: Extremists Exploit the Internet, 8.

74 Roy, 37.

75 Mike Wallace, "Interview with a Revolutionary," 60 Minutes segment, CBS, 7-8 p.m., 19 May 1996.


78 Mitchell, 2.


80 Mitchell interview, 4.

81 While there are other factors that affect the natural infection and progression rates of the disease, according to Dr. Mitchell, they are beyond the scope of this paper.
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