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ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT: A CHALLENGE IN DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS

BY

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United States Army

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT:
A CHALLENGE IN DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS

by

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Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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Domestic Support Operations (DSO) have never been considered a primary mission for the United States military; however, recent experiences of the past decade indicate that the military role is not only a likely one, but also an expanding one. The purpose of this study is to examine the elements of unity of effort in DSO, how they apply in an interagency environment, and what needs to be done in order to respond to potential civil emergencies of the future. The study includes a review of policy and doctrine and examines several case studies: the Federal response to the L.A. Riots of 1992; a brief excursion to the Hurricane Andrew relief effort also in 1992; and military support to the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. The case studies are examined using the author's delineated components of unity of effort as focal points (criteria) for analysis: coordination, cooperation, consensus, and common focus.

The study concludes that much progress has been made in enhancing interagency unity of effort since the civil emergencies of 1992. However, new asymmetric transnational threats in the form of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), loom on the horizon. Planning for the 1996 Olympics laid the groundwork to address both crisis and consequence management as components of the Federal response to the detonation of a Weapon of Mass Destruction. Much work still remains in order to develop and integrate local, State, and Federal capabilities and ensure a unity of effort that the American people expect of their government and military.
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I. INTRODUCTION

“Where the hell is the cavalry on this one?”

—Kate Hale, Director of Emergency Services, Dade County, FL
Three days after Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida.

Domestic support operations have never been considered a primary mission for the military and have seldom conflicted with principal military missions. However, since 1975 Department of Defense (DOD) has supported over 200 disaster relief operations of varying levels of commitment both domestically and internationally. This is a distinct signal that civilian leadership considers the military to be ideally suited for a swift response as a means of minimizing the suffering and loss of life in crisis situations.¹

The sequence of civil emergencies in 1992, Hurricanes Iniki and Andrew, as well as the civil disturbances following the verdicts in the Rodney King trial, has revealed that the public clearly expects the military, especially the Army, to involve itself in disaster response. There are domestic expectations of a “peace dividend.” As one Florida lawmaker, Senator Bob Graham, stated in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, “In the post-cold war era, this [disaster relief] could be an important new function for the military... not something done after hours, but as an ongoing significant part of the military task.”² But the emergencies of 1992 also served to demonstrate that the nation, both civil authorities and the military, had much to learn in regard to achieving unity of effort in these type of operations.

Senator Graham’s statement has become today’s reality. Often we think of our national security to be the realm of those things affecting our nation from abroad. However, the National Security Strategy of 1997 for the first time emphasizes that “we must be prepared to respond effectively to protect lives and property and ensure the survival of our institutions and national
infrastructure” in the event that an emergency occurs as a result of natural disasters, terrorism, use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), or sabotage of our information systems. Further, it considers national security emergency preparedness a crucial element of national security requiring comprehensive, all-hazard emergency planning by Federal departments and agencies. This serves to reinforce Executive Order 12656 issued 18 November 1988 that discusses responsibilities within the national emergency preparedness system. It defines a national security emergency as “any occurrence including natural disaster, military attack, technological emergency, or other emergency that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United States.” In recent DOD policy statements, there appears to be a corresponding emphasis on military support to the nation. For example, the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recognizes that there are times when it is necessary for the military to intervene “when a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond; or when the need for immediate relief is urgent and the U.S. military has the ability to jump-start the longer term response to the disaster.” The QDR is consistent with the National Security Strategy in that humanitarian relief operations will be of limited duration and designed to give the local authorities the opportunity to “put their house in order” before withdrawing troops.

Recognizing the fact that the military is going to continue to be involved in domestic support operations, the purpose of this study is to examine the elements of unity of effort, how they apply to domestic support operations and how we are postured today to respond to civil emergencies. The study includes a review of policy and doctrine, and examines two case studies: the Federal response to the L.A. Riots of 1992 with a brief excursion to the Hurricane Andrew relief effort; and military support to the Atlanta Olympics which highlighted planning for new
trends in domestic threats. It concludes with recommendations how unity of effort can be further enhanced even with the impressive improvements in the federal response process since the emergencies of 1992.

Since the central theme entails the search for unity of effort, it is necessary to define the term as it applies to this study. Domestic support operations (DSO) are considered in the category of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Joint doctrine considers unity of effort as one of the key principles of MOOTW and defines it as “ensuring all means are directed to a common purpose.” As DOD’s executive agent for DSO, the Army recognizes that in most crisis situations, forces will be in support and under the general direction of civil authorities, and requires coordination and cooperation with other federal agencies toward common objectives. Given these definitions, it is apparent that unity of effort is a function of the following tenets: coordination, cooperation, consensus, and common focus.

Unity of effort is paramount to successful accomplishment of DSO. This is an especially difficult concept for military personnel whose culture espouses unity of command. DOD will most likely be a supporting agency either to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to the Department of Justice (DOJ), or to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the execution of DSO. In the next chapter, we will discuss the distinction between unity of effort and unity of command.
II. LEADERSHIP BY COMMITTEE: 
UNITY OF EFFORT VERSUS UNITY OF COMMAND

It [a committee] leads to weak and faltering decisions - or rather indecisions. Why you may take the most gallant soldier, the most intrepid airman, or the most audacious sailor, put them at a table together - what do you get? The sum of their fears.

- Sir Winston Churchill

Historically, the people of the United States have been reluctant to allow the federal Army of the United States to be overtly and perpetually involved in domestic affairs, especially in a law enforcement capacity. The framers of the Constitution consciously also created a cumbersome political system which insured civilian control of the military and provided protections against the “tyranny of the majority.” As such, they established a process of government that promotes consensus-building as a means of unifying a diverse people. Now, more than ever, consensus-building has become the hallmark of the American way of decision making.

This is in contrast to we in the military who cling to the comfort of the time-tested principle of war—unity of command. This is where one single authority calls the shots usually based on staff recommendations. In other words, all forces are under one responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct their efforts in pursuit of a unified purpose. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people into action. It also entails the responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. Thus, command responsibility extends well beyond decision making and issuing orders.

Unity of effort, on the other hand, requires coordination, cooperation, and consensus among all elements toward a commonly recognized objective, even though they may not be part of the same command structure. Also, inherent in achieving consensus decisions is developing
a level of trust among the participants. Virtually all crisis response situations today will be characterized by interagency operations since responses will rarely fall within the purview of a single agency. Issues will invariably cut across established bureaucratic boundaries. Add to this the layers of overlapping jurisdiction at the federal, state, and local levels, and you have a rather complex task in order to accomplish any mission. To face these challenges, the interagency process must find ways of engaging the full range of each agency's core competencies into one integrated and coordinated plan of action that is mutually agreed to by all. Thus, it is decision by consensus (unity of effort) rather than decision by direct order (unity of command) which characterizes the interagency process in which the military participates while in MSCA status.

Consensus is defined in *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* as "group solidarity in sentiment and belief." This does not suggest, however, that decisions based on consensus necessarily lead to the best solution. In the interagency process there are divergent perspectives and bureaucratic turf battles which place friction in the system. Churchill's point is valid in that consensus decisions often are watered-down versions of a sub-optimal solution that all parties can agree to support. In order to eliminate some of the friction inherent in the process, national policy identifies lead agencies based on the nature of the crisis who head the emergency response effort.

There are several considerations that impact on the lead agency's use of consensus in the negotiation process. First, and foremost, does the lead agency have time to reach consensus? In the case of crisis action responses, the nature of the situation may not allow the decision-maker to consult with other agencies before implementation. It is necessary in crisis situations to have already established working relationships, memorandums of agreement (MOAs), and standing operating procedures (SOPs). Negotiations and consensus occur in the process of MOA and
SOP development. Therefore, during the crisis response, the decision maker only has to decide how to implement a response consistent with MOAs and SOPs and establish the process for coordination and cooperation.

Another consideration is whether or not the lead agency, which may or may not be empowered to make decisions, needs the expertise and commitment of others in order to implement the decision. For each type of DSO, the Federal Response Plan (FRP) has predesignated a lead agency to coordinate the supporting efforts of all other agencies. Broken down into Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), the FRP and subsequent joint doctrine, such as Joint Pub 3-07.7, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations*, codify command and control structures from the military perspective. However, *ad hoc* committees are usually formed in the case of federal support to special events, in which the lead agency invites participants based on expertise and function. This does not necessarily mean that it is less complex. The case of an interagency requirement to support a special event such as a Presidential Inauguration or the 1996 Atlanta Olympics dictates a more deliberate planning process in which participants must agree to group goals, procedures, limits, roles, and execution. Events of this nature usually have a long lead time in order to forge the necessary consensus and cooperation among interagency partners. Together, under the direction of a lead agency, they agree and commit to a course of action, milestones, and future techniques for amending the plan.

The final unifying factor in the interagency process for domestic support operations is the common objective. If the objective is well defined by policy makers and the lead agency’s directives are consistent with the objective, interagency friction is kept to a minimum and cooperation is maximized. It is when each agency has a different interpretation of the objective that the operation begins to lack a common focus. Thus, designation of a lead agency, the
development of interagency MOAs and SOPs, and adherence to a clearly defined objective, serve to mitigate much of the potential friction involved in consensus decision making under crisis conditions. Several policy analysts indicate that mastering interagency cooperation is fundamental to success in military operations in support of domestic emergencies. In sum, our commanders must be prepared to deal with a plethora of government and non-governmental agencies (NGOs), understand the policy guidelines, and provide support without the comfort of command relationships which normally frame a military operation.\(^\text{12}\)

Next, we will delve into the policy and doctrine that shapes the military’s role in support to the nation. It is meant to be a primer on doctrinal command and control relationships and provide a background for analysis of the case studies.
III. THE NATURE OF MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE NATION:
A SURVEY OF POLICY AND DOCTRINAL CONCEPTS

Operations in this environment can present a special leadership challenge since the activities of relatively small units can have operational—and even strategic—impact.

—Department of the Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations

National policy reinforces the concept of civilian control of the military. In virtually every domestic support operation, the military is in a supporting role to a lead Federal agency. Contemporary policy on the federal response to domestic emergencies has its seeds in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (Public Law 93-288, as amended in 1993). The Federal Response Plan (FRP) is the federal government’s answer to the Congressional mandate. The FRP is the interagency mechanism, developed under FEMA’s leadership by which the federal government prepares for and responds to the consequences of domestic emergencies. As mentioned previously in Chapter II, federal planning and response are coordinated on a functional group basis, with designated lead and support agencies for each type emergency. Specifically, the purpose of the FRP is to:

facilitate the delivery of all types of Federal response assistance to States to help them deal with the consequences of significant disasters. The Plan outlines the planning assumptions, policies, concept of operations, organizational structures and specific assignments of responsibility to the departments and agencies in providing Federal response assistance to supplement the State and local response efforts.
The twelve Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) which include the designated lead agencies are outlined in the FRP. They are:

- **Transportation**: Department of Transportation
- **Communications**: National Communications System
- **Public Works and Engineering**: Department of Defense (US Army Corps of Engineers)
- **Firefighting**: Department of Agriculture (Forest Service)
- **Information and Planning**: FEMA
- **Mass Care**: American Red Cross
- **Resource Support**: General Services Administration (GSA)
- **Health and Medical Services**: Department of Health and Human Services
- **Urban Search and Rescue**: FEMA
- **Hazardous Materials**: Environmental Protection Agency
- **Food**: Department of Agriculture
- **Energy**: Department of Energy

These ESFs do not account for special events such as Presidential Inaugurations and the Olympics of 1984 and 1996. In these efforts, however, the flavor of the FRP is reflected in the types of response plans to various contingencies, however, the nature of the committees is *ad hoc*. This will be the subject of discussion in Chapter V.

The military finds itself the lead agency in only one of twelve ESFs (Public Works and Engineering), but provides significant support in the remaining eleven. Identified military core competencies are “combat engineering, medical support, logistics, operational planning, reconnaissance and intelligence assessment, command, control, and communications, force projection, and combat operations.” The military’s core competencies and capabilities are greatly valued in the federal response to emergency situations. As one General Accounting Office (GAO) report concluded after the federal response to Hurricane Andrew, “that for large, catastrophic disasters, the military has the capability to respond to the immediate needs of disaster victims in a highly effective manner.” So, while the military is only in a supporting
role, it may find itself the *de facto* lead agency, at least initially, in order to ease the pain and suffering of a population by virtue of its ability to get there “firstest with the mostest.”

The military’s response is codified in DOD Directive 3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)” published in January 1993. It is considered to be the basis for DOD support to civil emergencies. It establishes procedures for DOD components “to plan for, and respond to request from civil government agencies in actual or anticipated emergencies ...” It designates the Secretary of the Army as the DOD Executive Agent for MSCA. The Secretary of the Army executes his duties through the use of the Director of Military Support (DOMS). The DOMS is the primary contact for every Federal department and agency during periods of domestic civil emergencies or disaster response. Per the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the combatant commands are also part of the process. CINC, Atlantic Command (ACOM) serves as the DOD principal planning agent for MSCA for all DOD components within the 48 contiguous states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, while CINC, Pacific Command (PACOM) serves the same function with Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. possessions and territories. Another significant DOD player in MSCA is the Commander, Forces Command, as the Army’s component command to ACOM. He is charged with maintaining liaison with FEMA and other Federal Agencies to facilitate cooperative civil and military planning and training for MSCA.

At the federal level, once an emergency is declared, the President, based on the recommendation of the Director of FEMA, or The Adjutant General as the case may be, appoints a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) who may also be known as the Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General (SCRAG) or the FBI Agent-in-Charge. The FCO is usually the FEMA or DOJ regional director who coordinates all federal agencies supporting state
and local authorities in the assistance effort. He heads the Emergency Response Team (ERT) which assimilates all ESF representatives including the Defense Coordinating Element (DCE). Correspondingly, DOD appoints a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) who heads the DCE and serves as DOD’s on-scene single point of contact for DOD resources. He coordinates and tasks the employment of all DOD resources provided in response to a specific natural disaster or civil emergency. DCOs are predesignated for each state as a key member of the federal response team. Each is usually an active duty Colonel who is multi-hatted as a Training Support Brigade Commander, as an advisor to the State Adjutant General, and as commanding officer of other active duty soldiers committed to the training of the National Guard. At the discretion of the CINC, the DCO may assume control of all federal military units involved in a disaster.

Currently, the Joint Staff is routing Joint Pub 3-07.7, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations* (Preliminary Coordination) through the services and unified commands for review. While it is a preliminary document, many of the procedures it espouses have been used for several years. DSO are divided into two categories: military support to civil authorities (MSCA) and military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA). Examples of MSCA generally include the DOD commitment to the Federal Response Plan and all 12 Emergency Support Functions contained therein. Broadly speaking they are domestic emergencies caused by natural or manmade disasters, environmental hazards, radiological emergencies, mass immigration emergencies, and postal augmentation. MSCLEA missions are more specific and restrictive. Examples include: training civilian law enforcement officials, supporting counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incidents, protecting key assets, and military assistance to quell civil disturbances.
However, the employment of the military in relation to law enforcement functions has
legal implications that may constrain operations. The employment of U.S. soldiers is authorized
by the Constitution, which empowers Congress to “call forth the militia to execute the laws of
the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.”\textsuperscript{22} With Presidential authorization,
Federal law allows the use of the military to enforce the law under two circumstances. First, it
authorizes the use of the military when a sudden unexpected civil disturbance, disaster, or
catastrophe seriously endangers life and property and disrupts normal governmental functions to
such an extent that local authorities cannot control the situation. Second, military forces may be
used to protect federal property and government functions when local authorities are incapable of
providing adequate protection.\textsuperscript{23}

This does not mean that the President or Congress has an entirely free hand at deploying
federal troops to enforce the laws of the land. The actions of the troops are still subject to the
provisions of the \textit{Posse Comitatus} Act of 1878 which prescribes criminal penalties for the use of
the U.S. Army or Air Force to perform civilian law enforcement within the U.S. unless otherwise
authorized by law. The Navy and Marine Corps are also restricted similarly by DOD Directive
5525.5, “DOD Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials.” The origins of the \textit{Posse
Comitatus} Act date back to the Reconstruction era when the presence of Federal soldiers at
voting booths deterred voters in the south. While that seems like a stretch to apply the law’s
context to today’s societal conditions, the Act serves as a symbol of a civilian-controlled military
in a representative democracy, an ideal dating back to the Militia Act of 1792 which prohibited
using the Regular Army to enforce laws.

The Act precludes DOD military personnel form participating in the following law
enforcement activities (without Presidential authority): in arrest; search and seizure; interdiction
of vessels, aircraft, or vehicles; in surveillance or pursuit; or as informants, undercover agents or investigators in civilian legal cases or in any other civilian law enforcement activity. The Act does not apply to: members of a reserve component when not on active duty for training; military personnel when off duty acting solely in a private capacity; enforcing military justice, maintaining law and order on military installations, or protecting classified materials; operations outside the U.S. and its territories; and most significantly, members of the National Guard when in Title 32 and State active duty status.\textsuperscript{24}

The last statement regarding the applicability of the \textit{posse comitatus} to members of the National Guard when in State active duty status requires further embellishment. The 10th Amendment to the Constitution was ratified in response to concerns that the main body of the Constitution did not adequately protect the rights of states. It also reflects the public’s fears of a strong centralized Federal government, unfamiliar with the local needs and problems, employing a large standing Army in law enforcement operations.\textsuperscript{25} The 10th Amendment specifies that “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”\textsuperscript{26} Therefore, the State’s own National Guard remains under the control of the Governor and is not subject to \textit{posse comitatus}. National Guard forces can be activated for Federal service with or without the Governor’s consent. However, within the context of DSO, the State legislature or Governor usually requests Federal assistance in order to enforce Federal law, to protect Federal property, or protect the constitutional rights of citizens within the State. However, before Federal troops are introduced into the area, the President must issue a proclamation calling upon the rioters to cease and subsequently sign a formal proclamation authorizing the deployment of federal troops.\textsuperscript{27}
While *posse comitatus* may serve as a perceived constraint by the military in MSCLEA, it is incumbent upon the senior leaders to understand the implications and develop Rules of Engagement (ROE) consistent with the law’s intent. The federal response to both the Los Angeles riots and Hurricane Andrew were defining events in shaping future policy and doctrine pertaining to civil emergencies. The L.A. riots serve as a case study to illustrate the complexities of achieving unity of effort in domestic support operations such as civil disturbances. And as we shall discover, the federal response team, to include the Joint Task Force (JTF), had difficulty in coming to grips with the concept of *posse comitatus*, among other things.
V. LOS ANGELES RIOTS: A CASE STUDY IN DISUNITY OF EFFORT

"I recoil at the idea of federally controlled Regular Army and Marine personnel, trained to fight a foreign enemy, being deployed on Los Angeles streets."

— Police Chief Daryl Gates
Chief: My Life with the LAPD

The Los Angeles Riots of April-May 1992 provide insights into the unity of effort issues associated with a crisis response to an unanticipated domestic emergency. An operation of this nature has the greatest potential of any of the domestic support missions to harm the image and reputation of the Armed Forces, while at the same time requiring a delicate balance between firmness and discipline in dealing with fellow citizens. In order to appreciate this balance, one only need recall the devastating effect that National Guardsmen firing on unarmed students at Kent State University in the late 1960's had on the American psyche and public support for the military engaged in Vietnam.

In the late afternoon of April 29, 1992, the acquittal of four Los Angeles police officers in the Rodney King police brutality trial set off a firestorm of violent protest in Los Angeles County. In response, the governor called out the 40th Division of the California Army National Guard (CAANG) and requested federal assistance in the form of additional troops. It became apparent over the course of several days that the reaction to the verdict was less outrage against injustice and more excuse for the large criminal element (primarily gangs) in the city to benefit from the civil unrest. Looting, mugging, arson, and drive by shootings were committed on a large scale. By the time authorities brought the situation under control, the city had suffered over 50 killed, 2500 seriously injured, 11,000 fires, and 13,000 arrests. It became the costliest riot in U.S. history.28
Following the riots, two independent investigations were conducted at the request of Governor Pete Wilson. Judge William H. Webster investigated the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) response and LTG (USA, Ret) William H. Harrison investigated the actions of the CAANG and Federal troops. Both reports raised command and control issues associated with the operation. These involved a disjointed approach by the LAPD and Sheriff’s Department; a perceived slow response by the CAANG; the decision to request federal troops and subsequent federalization of the guard; and a lack of communication/coordination by the senior leaders involved in the crisis.¹⁹

When the rioting broke out in the late afternoon, LAPD Police Chief Daryl Gates called in off-duty policemen and activated the department’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC). It was from this center that all actions were initially coordinated. Unfortunately, since the crisis quickly expanded beyond the boundaries of the city of Los Angeles, it was the County Sheriff’s responsibility to coordinate law enforcement efforts within the county. The coordination effort was no easy task since there are 88 cities in LA County. But it wasn’t until the afternoon of April 30th (Day 2) that the Sheriff’s Department EOC was functional and assumed control of all mission taskings. Requests for support of any type were to be sent to the EOC to be prioritized by representatives of the Sheriff’s Department, LAPD, the CAANG, and the Office of Emergency Services. All parties agreed to this concept, Chief Gates reluctantly. However, the EOC quickly became overwhelmed. Designed for up to 40 people, the EOC was soon overflowing with close to 100 people as the never-ending state and later, federal agency representatives poured in. Ad hocism was rampant, as senior agency officials ignored established protocols and circumvented systems that were in place to ensure unity of effort. The Webster report pointed out that senior officials were ill-prepared to deal with the disturbance and unable
to coordinate a cohesive approach to synchronize the efforts of all agencies involved. Moreover, the ongoing situation was a likely contingency to plan, remembering the L.A. Watts Riots of 1965.

At 8:30 p.m. on April 29th (Day 1) Mayor Tom Bradley contacted Governor Wilson requesting 2000 CAANG troops be called-up to duty. The Governor agreed and contacted the State Adjutant General, MG Robert Thrasher, who mobilized the 40th CAANG Division (Mechanized). Soldiers began reporting into armories and the first military police (MP) company was deployed into the city at 3:30 p.m. April 30th; 18 hours and 30 minutes after notification. Unfortunately, the bulk of the 40th Division did not have riot gear, lock plates on their M16 rifles, or small arms ammunition; all of which delayed their deployment. It became newsworthy and even several days into the operation, gang members taunted troops with claims that the soldiers couldn’t touch them because they didn’t have any bullets. Yet as the clamor for CAANG support grew louder and even after units were formed, they remained in armories untasked. Apparently, law enforcement agencies were either unaware the Guardsmen were available or how to task for them through the Sheriff’s EOC. After this was resolved, missions began flowing and the CAANG assisted law enforcement officials in the restoration of law and order. However, the Governor was frustrated by the perceived slow response of his CAANG, which most likely influenced his decision to request Federal troops.

In a phone conversation with President Bush and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, GEN Powell, early on the morning of May 1st (Day 3), Governor Wilson and Mayor Bradley (with some prompting by the National Command Authorities (NCA)) asked for the introduction of Federal troops. This was against the advice of the State Adjutant General, County Sheriff, LAPD Chief Gates, California Director of Emergency Services and other state
advisors but strongly recommended by Warren Christopher, then an attorney living in L.A.\textsuperscript{33} DOMS planners in the Pentagon, no doubt tuned into CNN, had already begun contingency planning. The Presidential Executive Order issued on May 1st directed the military to “restore law and order in and about the City of Los Angeles, and other districts of California.”\textsuperscript{34} The President authorized the deployment of Federal troops, Federal law enforcement officers, and Federal agencies. These together with the California agencies combined to accomplish the common political objective.\textsuperscript{35} Joint Task Force Los Angeles (JTF-LA); consisting of the 2d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (7ID), and elements of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) from Camp Pendleton, CA, was formed under the command of MG Covault, Commanding General, 7ID. CAANG forces were federalized and placed under command of JTF-LA. The main body of JTF-LA deployed to the city on May 2d (Day 4). By policy, the Department of Justice (Attorney General) is the lead federal agency responsible for coordinating law enforcement operations. The Attorney General appointed a SCRAG who was responsible for coordinating federal civil disturbance operations and assisting state civil authorities.\textsuperscript{36}

Chief Gates was apparently taken by surprise by the governor’s decision to bring in Regular Army and Marine personnel, federalize the National Guard, and to dispatch one thousand Federal law enforcement officers. He believed they had the situation under control. He held the traditional disdain for Federal forces in a law enforcement role and believed the federalization of the operation was purely politically motivated: “Theirs [the Governor and Mayor] was a political gesture that had no other effect, and I resented it.”\textsuperscript{37} Chief Gates also pointed out that federal law enforcement officers really did not have any value added,
The federal officers became a problem. DEA agents, immigration people, and others showed up wearing funny uniforms, or no uniforms, and because they are not trained in riot control, it was hard to know how to employ them.\textsuperscript{38}

Federalization of troops brought with it its own baggage, the most pronounced being the concept of \textit{posse comitatus}—whereby it is illegal to use military forces to perform civilian law enforcement within the U.S. However, Federal law does allow “the use of the military to enforce the law in the case of a sudden and unexpected civil disturbance which may seriously endanger life and property and disrupt normal government functions to the extent that local authorities cannot control the situation.”\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Posse comitatus}, therefore, did not apply until the situation was stabilized and the mission reverted from \textit{restore} to \textit{preserve} law and order. When the mission changed to preserve law and order, the federalized military would be restricted from participating in law enforcement activities. Yet, as the JTF assumed control, it adhered to the spirit of \textit{posse comitatus} and caused confusion, especially among the CAANG units. Soon after federalization, the LAPD and Sheriff’s Department stated they didn’t want federal troops claiming that the JTF often refused missions that the CAANG, prior to federalization, aggressively pursued. This caused a great deal of frustration as only twenty percent of the requested mission taskings were approved by the JTF liaison team at the EOC.\textsuperscript{40} Had the CAANG not been federalized, it could have continued to provide support to law enforcement agencies since it is not subject to \textit{posse comitatus} when it is in Title 32 and in state active duty status. In response to some of the friction encountered in supporting law enforcement agencies, CAANG officials developed a civil disturbance agreement designed to assist interagency officials in determining what missions were appropriate for the military based on Federal or State status.

With the transfer of control over to JTF-LA the ROE were changed to give troops a much less threatening appearance due to a perceived declining threat. Prior to federalization, the
arming orders allowed soldiers to routinely keep a loaded magazine in their weapon so they could rapidly respond to an unexpected threat. The JTF imposed the lowest arming order requiring the rifle at sling arms, magazine in the ammunition pouch, and chamber empty. 41 Unfortunately, this only prodded gang members to continue taunting and flashing weapons. Drive-by shootings increased and they also appeared to be bolder in their efforts to benefit from the unrest. 42 Though ordered to the lower arming status, most soldiers on the street, as well as policemen remained at a higher arming level. A majority of deployed National Guard soldiers kept a magazine in their weapon. National Guard leaders delegated arming authority to their leaders on the ground. 43

Personality conflicts among senior officials led to a lack of coordination and trust early in the crisis. For example, Mayor Bradley and Chief Gates had not spoken to one another for over one year and their relationship was hardly one of mutual respect. Likewise, Governor Wilson did not have high regard for his Adjutant General and did not foster a close working relationship between his office and the National Guard. Having never visited the State National Guard HQ in Sacramento or soldiers in the field, CAANG senior leaders had the impression that their commander-in-chief was indifferent toward them. Additionally, the state officials often excluded the SCRAG and FBI Special Agent-in-Charge from their policy meetings. 44 It was apparent that this really was a state-run operation and perhaps should have remained that way.

Apparently, the SCRAG did not feel an obligation to take charge of the federal response. According to the Department of the Army After Action Report (AAR), there was a disconnect between the DOD Civil Disturbance Plan, GARDEN PLOT, and the role of the SCRAG. The plan envisioned the SCRAG as the coordination authority for the Federal response, as well as the commitment of Federal military forces in support of specific civil disturbance missions. DOJ, on
the other hand, viewed the SCRAG’s role as one of oversight rather than a leadership capacity. Additionally, “Political sensitivities [unspecified] and DOJ staffing limitations impacted on the SCRAG’s ability to coordinate a Federal response...” The hesitancy of the SCRAG to take charge probably caused the JTF-LA Commander to become the *de facto* leader of the Federal response.

Throughout the operation, MG Covault appeared to be somewhat uncomfortable with the civil disturbance role he had been given, especially since there had not been any rioting since the JTF’s arrival. Based on his assessment, “the military had been drawn into law enforcement work and that’s not the military’s job.” This may also explain the reluctance to accept taskings from the Sheriff/LAPD. However, his assessment seems to conflict with the Presidential Executive Order entitled “Providing for the Restoration of Law and Order in the City and County of Los Angeles, and other Districts of California.” Within four days of deployment, he was pushing hard for release from the mission. Reflecting the attitude of the troops as he appealed to the Commander of the Army’s Forces Command, “We have done our job, so why are we still here?” On May 9th, defederalization was authorized, tasks were haphazardly turned over to CAANG forces and the LAPD, and JTF-LA was disestablished, only nine days after it had deployed.

Yet, in spite of problems in coordination, cooperation, and achieving consensus, the operation was ultimately successful because all agencies remained focused on the common objective and worked through points of friction. In the case of the LA Riots, the political objectives spelled out by the local and Federal leadership were sufficient. An obvious conclusion to draw is that all agencies at the action officer level remained focused on the common objective.
Several procedures were not followed which would have aided cooperation and coordination. First, before requesting federal assistance, state officials should exhaust all emergency resources available to them. The state of California has a viable Mutual Aid system whereby neighboring law enforcement jurisdictions are called in to assist imperiled jurisdictions when situations escalate beyond local capabilities. "Experienced officers within the California Office of Emergency Services tried to implement the system early, but were unable to energize the senior management." In fact, the Webster report states in its findings that "National Guard Troops were requested by the Mayor and committed by the Governor before a law enforcement mutual aid request occurred." The Mutual Aid system is considerably more responsive than mobilizing the National Guard since it consists of on and off-duty policemen from neighboring jurisdictions who are readily able to deploy to the troubled area. Chief Gates acknowledged the effectiveness of the system, "Far more helpful [than federal law enforcement officers] were the police officers sent from small cities as far north as Fresno and as far south as Orange and San Diego counties."

Second, the decisions to deploy federal troops and federalize National Guard units are major steps. Federalization creates numerous administrative burdens unrelated to the law enforcement mission, such as the requirement for immunizations and medical screening prior to federalization and again before defederalization. In this case, federalization appears as if it was more of a political expedient than a practical solution. In the opinion of most senior California officials, by the time federal troops arrived, law enforcement and CAANG forces had the crisis under control. JTF-LA was overkill. However, the confusion over the role of the military in restoring law and order vis a vis posse comitatus must be eliminated in advance of deploying troops into a volatile situation. This goes further than giving each soldier an ROE card. Leaders
from JTF Commander through squad leader must know the limits of their authority so they can
take charge of situations, thereby maintaining positive control and credibility. It is my
recommendation that civil disturbances, as a general rule, be left in the hands of the state, with
the exception of an emergency occurring in the District of Columbia. An option to federalization
could be to send experienced Federal agency experts to the scene to advise state officials and
prepare/recommend the need for federal response. If a crisis need be federalized in order to
provide added capability, it is recommended that only that portion of the force providing MSCA
be federalized, while forces providing MSCLEA, such as MPs, remain in State status, and
therefore can perform law enforcement functions as directed without violating *posse comitatus*.
Federal troops could also be sent to a troubled area but held as an operational reserve for
deterrent value, and introduced in the event the crisis truly got out of hand.

While the verdict delivered in the Rodney King trial may not have been justice’s finest
hour, neither was the state and federal response to the verdict’s aftermath. The Army’s AAR
even states that this event was unique in many ways, and probably not the model for future civil
disturbance operations. Since this incident, however, the state of California, Los Angeles
County, the city of Los Angeles, and the California National Guard have done extensive planning
to effectively respond to emergencies of this kind. Similarly, the Army and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have been active in gathering lessons learned and developing a joint doctrine for domestic
support operations. It will take further concerted effort by all agencies to get to know the
capabilities, limitations, and personalities in advance in order to ensure unity of effort in the
emergencies of the future.

As an addendum to this case study, it is interesting to note that within two weeks of
forwarding its AAR on JTF-LA, DOD was faced with another significant civil emergency. On
August 24, 1992, Hurricane Andrew hit Florida south of Miami near Homestead Air Force Base leaving an estimated 250,000 without shelter, power, and drinking water, causing an estimated $15 billion in damages. After a sluggish initial response due to state/federal confusion, the “cavalry” arrived in force. In fact, the military’s response to Hurricane Andrew was massive. In all, more than 17,000 active component soldiers and nearly 7,000 U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers deployed to the region; over 1,000 support sorties were flown; 900,000 meals were served; 67,000 patients received medical treatment; and over 1,000 tents were erected.\(^3\)

This is not to say that everything was peachy. As mentioned previously, the Federal response was initially sluggish. President Bush personally visited the disaster area, declared it a national emergency, and promised the affected people in Florida and Louisiana that they could expect to receive all the nation had to offer. However, four days after the hurricane touched down, no federal assistance had arrived. The problem apparently was due to a technicality in bureaucratic procedures whereby Governor Lawton Chiles had to formally request assistance and specify aid requirements. Governor Chiles thought that he had addressed these issues with the President. Additionally, Federal regulations require contracts to be let for re-establishment of basic services instead of allowing Federal agencies, specifically the military, to employ their capabilities.

Command and control relationships violated established policy as the Secretary of the Treasury was appointed as overall person in charge, instead of the FEMA Federal Control Officer. This showed a lack of confidence in FEMA, who had been criticised for perceived poor handling of similar disaster such as Hurricane Hugo of 1989. The military chain of command was convoluted at best. The Chief of Staff of the Army (as DOD’s executive agent for domestic
support) exercised control through the FORSCOM Commander. He, in turn, formed Joint Task Force Andrew under the command of a Lieutenant General (LTG), and designated component commands, one of which was the Army Forces (ARFOR) under LTG Luck, Commander of XVIII Airborne Corps. This top heavy command structure often resulted in delayed decisions which could have been delegated to a lower echelon for resolution.\textsuperscript{54}

Finally, politics played a role in the Federal response. This occurred during an election year and it was campaign season. President Bush had faced much criticism in 1989 (Hurricane Hugo) when he did not visit Charleston until one week after the hurricane had struck. \textit{The New York Times} reported, “At a time when Mr. Bush is sagging in the polls in his campaign for re-election, the hurricane provides an ideal opportunity to put forward an image of Presidential leadership.”\textsuperscript{55} Unfortunately, the Federal response did not live up to the nation’s expectations, fueling greater criticism concerning President Bush’s indifference toward domestic affairs. However, as in the case of the L.A. riots, inefficiency in unity of effort was overcome by focus on a common objective and the operation was a success from a military perspective.

Since the events of 1992, the nation and the military has endeavored to improve cooperation and coordination through the development of Interagency Working Groups, improved MOAs and SOPs, interagency training programs, Federal Response exercises, and the development of joint doctrine. We will next explore how that doctrine was employed in a deliberate interagency planning process to support the 1996 Atlanta Olympics.
V. DOD SUPPORT TO THE ATLANTA OLYMPICS: 
THE TEMPLATE FOR FUTURE MSCA?

- SFC Smith, GEMA [Georgia Emergency Management Agency] Center, called and reported 10 shots had been fired at National Guard Post Number seven (Fulton County), and that suspicious packages had been found at the Fulton County stadium, Georgia Dome and Olympic Stadium. He added that EOD teams had been deployed ‘all over the place’ in response to these threats. Other bomb threats had been received as well in relation to the House of Blues, a bar in Marietta.

— Entry in Duty Officer’s Journal at the Crisis Response Transition Team (CRTT) hours after a bomb exploded in Centennial Park, 5:45 a.m., July 27, 1996

Since the events of 1992, great strides have been made in enhancing the interagency process regarding the Federal response between DOD and the various agencies. However, in the period between 1992 to 1996, a new domestic threat moved from a possible to a likely emergency: terrorism and the implements of its trade, explosives and chemical and/or biological agents. In 1995, the multinational organization, Aum Shinrikyo exploded sarin gas canisters in seven locations in the Tokyo subway systems killing a dozen people and injuring 5,500. Closer to home in 1993, Islamic religious extremists bombed the World Trade Center killing six and injuring 5,000. The 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building in the nation’s heartland, killed 167, injured 467 and was accomplished using components available on the open market. These events demonstrated that the nation faced new security threats that must be accounted for as a part of Federal Response Planning. Assessing the need to be a priority, Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar II Domestic Preparedness legislation: The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act of 1996. This Act required the Secretary of Defense to develop a program which enhances Federal, state, and local agency capabilities to respond to WMD incidents.
This chapter will focus on the development of plans to address the crisis and consequence management in response to WMD or Special Improvised Explosive Device (SIED) relative to the security planning for the Centennial Olympic Games held in Atlanta July through August 1996. Crisis management is defined as the measures to resolve a hostile situation and subsequently investigate and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under Federal law. This includes a response to an incident involving a WMD, SIED, or a hostage crisis situation beyond the capability of the lead Federal agency. The Department of Justice (DOJ) is designated as the lead Federal agency for crisis management. It exercises its authority through the FBI. Consequence management involves the immediate response to chemical, biological, or radiological contamination, in order to contain and mitigate the effects, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses, and individuals. FEMA has the lead in consequence management. Both crisis and consequence management can occur simultaneously in the wake of an incident involving the detonation of a WMD or SIED.

The requirements for crisis and consequence management posed several new issues for the Federal response. First, it required new lines of authority and defining roles and responsibilities for both law enforcement and disaster responders. Second, it placed additional demands for techniques of information management to link law enforcement and disaster officials at all levels of government. Third, depending on the type of incident, there were also requirements to provide for the health and safety for disaster workers at the scene over and above life support issues. Finally, it is noted that there are insufficient Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) capability to respond to massive or simultaneous incidents. Therefore, new interagency relationships in cooperation and coordination had to be developed, as well as, consensus achieved in order to determine roles, responsibilities, and procedures for the response.
Two special events, the Centennial Olympic Games held in Atlanta in July-August 1996 and the Presidential Inauguration in January 1997, provided the common focus of effort as the interagency process developed response plans to possible MSCA and MSCLEA scenarios. This included establishment of command and control relationships for responding to requests for routine military support as well as response to potential contingencies. In both cases Joint Task Forces were established, JTF-Olympic (JTF-O) and JTF Armed Forces Inaugural Committee (JTF-AFIC) to respond to routine requests for military support. Both events also provided an opportunity to develop interagency plans to conduct crisis or consequence management. By far, the more complex of these events was the military support to the Olympic Games.

During the course of the two month period, DOD employed 1,277 active duty soldiers and 13,376 National Guard soldiers from 47 states and territories in support of the Olympic and Paralympic Games. There was no lack of volunteers as this was perceived as 'good duty' providing access to venues, as well as being a part of a significant international event. DOD provided over 300,000 items of equipment and supplies to over 60 Federal, state, and local organizing committees and law enforcement agencies. Soldiers supported security operations at over 96 venues spread in 10 locations over four states (Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and Tennessee) and the District of Columbia. Not only did the geographic dispersal of venues present significant security and logistical challenges, so did the sheer volume of humanity infused into the Olympic area. In all, there were 10,003 athletes from 197 countries; 15,000 accredited media; 40,000 Olympic volunteers; 300,000 - 600,000 Atlanta daily commuters; and over 2,000,000 visitors. This posed quite a challenge, but more, quite a responsibility for organizers and law enforcement personnel to provide a safe and secure environment. This was
an especially significant task given that during this period, DOD Bomb disposal personnel responded to 490 calls about suspicious items.\textsuperscript{61}

With the Munich Olympics of 1972 and current terrorist capabilities in mind, it was certainly in the nation’s interest to provide a secure environment for the athletes, officials and venue workers, and spectators. Therefore, organizers were determined either to preclude an incident or to be able to respond efficiently should an incident occur. Therefore, a great priority was placed on planning for crisis and consequence management across the Federal Response spectrum. The Secretary of Defense directed on August 2, 1995 that FORSCOM provide DOD non-emergency Olympics support and develop appropriate emergency contingency plans to support civil authorities.\textsuperscript{62} In a letter dated April 11, 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) outlined the procedures for emergency DOD support during the 1996 Olympic Games. Specifically, they included: Disaster Relief, Civil Disturbance, and Crisis or Consequence Management in response to a SIED or a WMD.\textsuperscript{63} The supported CINC, CINCACOM, authorized through the ACOM Execute Order the appointment of the Commander, FORSCOM to serve as the lead operating authority. The FORSCOM mission statement was as follows:

When directed, COMFORSCOM will deploy military contingency response task forces to 1996 Olympic and Paralympic area of operations to support the federal response to a major disaster or terrorist incident involving WMD in Alabama, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, or Tennessee from 5 Jul to 25 Aug 96 and transition support to other state or federal agencies and redeploy.\textsuperscript{64}

FORSCOM expected to provide the following immediate response requirements for which they coordinated with the lead federal agencies: Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams (EOD), Technical Escort Unit, Urban Search and Rescue support, Medical Support, Engineering, Transportation, Chemical/Biological Support, Mortuary Affairs/Graves Registration,
Communications, and linguists. For example, in response to the Oklahoma City bombing, DOD provided a DCO and staff, linguists, graves registration, MEDEVAC ambulance and helicopter support, US&R teams, power generation and lighting, shower facility and water trailers, buses and drivers. Thus, the Centennial Olympics provided the catalyst for the development of support plans for incidents requiring crisis or consequence management. Per Federal directives, FORSCOM coordinated with the lead federal agencies to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for coordination and cooperation. A DCO was appointed for each state and the District of Columbia to provide direct interface and liaison for the routine support. As a means of developing clear lines of command and control, in addition to JTF-O, the FORSCOM Commander directed the designation of several Response Task Forces to be prepared to deploy in the event of various incidents. Each RTF was given the authority to liaison directly (DIRLAUTH) with the lead federal agency (either FBI or FEMA) in order to solidify deployment plans and integrate capabilities.

FORSCOM designated a standing Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) and the establishment of a Crisis Response Task Force (CRTF) to assist with both crisis and consequence management, respectively as a means of supporting the Federal response to a terrorist crisis. Additionally, FORSCOM established a Civil Disturbance Task Force (CDTF) and Disaster Response Task Force (DRTF) to fulfill DOD Federal response requirements in the event of a civil disturbance or natural disaster. Additionally, during a terrorist crisis, the Director of the FBI, may request that U.S. military assets deploy with the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST), a composite team of DOD, Department of Energy (DOE), and FEMA personnel to
provide expert advice and guidance to the FBI On-Scene Commander to assess requirements and coordinate follow-on response assets.\textsuperscript{67}

Per DOD policy, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) personally oversees DOD support of the Federal response when DOD responds to acts of terrorism. Following approval of the President and the appropriate Executive Order, the SECDEF authorizes the deployment of the JSOTF, approve courses of action for planning, and direct its operations, through the CJCS. CINCACOM through COMFORSCOM, controls and directs consequence management support provided by the CRTF and coordinates their activities with those of the JSOTF and other military forces operating within the area. Additionally, advance elements of the JSOTF were prepositioned with the FBI operations center in the Atlanta area as well as the FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C.\textsuperscript{68} Contingency operations envisioned for the use of JSOTF were terrorist incidents involving the taking of hostages or use of WMD. JSOTF forces were provided by CINC, U.S. Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC).

While the JSOTF was the primary DOD responder for crisis management, the CRTF was to provide the assets to minimize the effects of the chemical, biological, or radiological hazard on the conduct of the criminal investigation. However, the introduction of the CRTF is contingent upon the request from the state Governor's office for Federal assistance, as well as a declaration by the President that a major disaster exists. For the Olympics, the CRTF remained under the operational control of COMFORSCOM, but placed under command of a U.S. Army Major General, MG Malcor of the First U.S. Army. The CRTF consisted of units forward deployed and on alert. Forward deployed elements included the CRTF Advance element, consisting of MG Malcor and a staff of 32 soldiers which provided liaison to both the FBI and FEMA; 315 Marines which comprised the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) from Marine Forces
Atlantic Command (MARFORLANT); 26 EOD Teams; three Technical Escort Units (TEU) which provided a Chemical Biological response capability; two MEDEVAC helicopters; three AN-MPQ4 radar teams (52 soldiers from 1-3 Air Defense Battalion, 3d Infantry Division) for air defense early warning (working closely with the FAA); and eight UH-60 helicopters to assist in transporting FEMA personnel rapidly to a disaster site.  

The CDTF, under the command of MG Crocker, Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division, that would support the Department of Justice in the event of a wide-spread civil disturbance, consisted of 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division (approximately 1250 soldiers) from Ft. Bragg, N.C., and other elements of the division. Prior to the Olympics, soldiers received refresher training at home station in Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS). The unit sent liaison teams down to Atlanta to establish coordination in various agency operations centers, however, the force remained at Fort Bragg on alert status. The DRTF, on the other hand, would be employed under the functional areas and provisions of the Federal Response Plan. Five Defense Coordinating Officers were appointed for each of the host states, and along with their staffs (a total of 207 people), collocated with the various State Emergency Operations Centers.  

JTF-O had primary responsibility for coordinating all routine, non-emergency administrative and logistics support, including security, vehicle inspection, law enforcement agency support, and transportation. Security functions included fixed site, perimeter, roving pedestrian sentry, and vehicle sentry. DOD orchestrated day-to-day military support for non-emergency Olympics activities through JTF-O. JTF-O assets were to be diverted to contingency operations only in situations requiring immediate response—those situations where the local military commander commits resources in order to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. However, the JTF-O
Commander, MG Hicks, wanted to ensure soldiers clearly understood their role in performing security functions in coordination with law enforcement agencies in accordance with the limitations of *posse comitatus*. To ensure compliance with this policy, the JTF published Change 1 to its Olympics Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) on 13 June 96 which specified, “It is Department of Defense policy to limit direct military involvement in civilian law enforcement, except where Congress has specifically authorized such involvement. The tasks of AC [Active Component] personnel will not involve law enforcement functions.” Annex C to the CONPLAN specified the rules for the use of force. The rules prohibited soldiers from carrying weapons of any kind for base camp security, venue security, route security, and bus driver duties. Of course, soldiers were authorized to use deadly force only when they reasonably believed that such force was necessary to prevent death or grievous bodily harm to themselves or another. However, their special instructions informed them that their primary security duties were to act as observers, and to contact civilian law enforcement or Atlanta Civilian Olympics Security personnel for assistance. They were to avoid direct confrontation with civilians. In this manner, JTF-O sought to avoid any violations of the *Posse Comitatus Act*.

Continuous interagency coordination was conducted primarily from three operations centers. A Joint Coordination Center (JCC) for emergency support operations was established at City Hall-East. The JCC and State Olympic Law Enforcement Center (SOLEC) were responsible for coordinating routine support and law enforcement support to the games. JTF-O established its primary liaison here. The FBI Operations Center was located in the Atlanta Office of the FBI. FBI activities in support of crisis management were coordinated from that location. The JSOTF provided a liaison team to support the FBI On-Scene Commander. The third operations center was the State Emergency Operations Center established by Georgia Emergency
Management Agency (GEMA) responsible for coordinating consequence management operations. FEMA’s FCO collocated with this operations center to facilitate the Federal response to state requests for possible consequence management support. The DCO in turn collocated with the FCO to provide liaison with the CRTF, and FORSCOM to coordinate the execution of DOD’s potential support.

As alluded to earlier, there were 490 reports of suspicious activities to which bomb disposal units reacted. Yet, despite the numerous criticisms of visitors that security was too tight, one incident marred the relative calm. At 1:08 a.m. on July 27th, a bomb threat was made via the Atlanta 911 line stating that a device was located in Centennial park and that detonation would occur within the next 30 minutes. Centennial Park was located near the Olympic village and was the site of much revelry, with a local band was holding a concert. A Special Operations Law Enforcement Center team (SOLEC) was dispatched to the scene and discovered an unattended bag on the ground. Officers inspected the device and began evacuating the area. A DOD EOD team was enroute from the Bomb Management Center at Dobbins AFB by helicopter when the bomb exploded. The device detonated at 1:25 a.m., killing two and injuring 113. Per the crisis management plan, the FBI assumed control of what was considered to be an investigation into terrorism with DOD support providing helicopter (transportation) and EOD dog teams to the FBI. The local response was sufficient to respond and all victims were being treated at hospitals within 45 minutes. The CRTT approved the relocation of UH-60s to the Cobb County Fairgrounds for Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT), but the DMAT teams were not needed. The CBIRF had boarded buses at their location and were ready to roll, however, samples taken at the scene did not indicate the presence of any chemical or biological agent. Later the next day the CRTT denied requests from local authorities for the CBIRF to
clean up the medical waste at the site on the grounds that was a local function.\textsuperscript{73} MG Hill, FORSCOM G3, working through the FORSCOM CRTT, directed the upgrade of all venue security and to be on the alert for suspicious looking packages. Additionally, he tasked for four more EOD dog teams from Fort Bragg, N.C. and Fort Carson, CO to deploy to the region.\textsuperscript{74} During the rest of the night and the next day, EOD teams were “all over the place” responding to the increased vigilance.

After action reports conducted by members of the FORSCOM CRTT concluded that the interagency learned a lot and worked extremely well together. They were confident that planning had been adequate to respond to the potential contingencies. Several other recommendations included: beginning the interagency and DOD planning process two years out to allow development of local capability and preclude \textit{ad hoc} solutions; combine JTF-O and Contingency Operations Centers (CRTT) as a one stop focus for all coordination and to enhance information flow; develop and fund a 3-5 year contingency exercise program; clarify authorities for deploying federal assets prior to an emergency; and finally, standardize and document Federal responsibilities and procedures for crisis and consequence management using the Olympic model.\textsuperscript{75} In-depth, hard-nose planning had addressed the full spectrum of DOD support to include crisis management, consequence management, and technical assistance, establishing a solid template for interagency coordination and cooperation for the future.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

I applaud the efforts of the work done to date. I expect the same thoroughness and cooperation in completing this very important undertaking for DOD and the many outside agencies we support. Our goal is to streamline our procedures and ensure accountability, without degrading our responsiveness to the needs of the nation.


As the study notes, much progress has been made in both the Federal and Military preparation to conduct a successful response to domestic emergencies. However, crisis and consequence management remain fertile ground for further improvement. In its recent report, DOD Responses to Transnational Threats, the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force identifies several problem areas in dealing with the looming threat of WMD as the weapon of choice by transnational actors. The report recognizes that transnational actors can have ready access to weapons of mass destruction; they cannot be easily deterred since they have no homeland; and they respect no political, organizational, legal, or moral boundaries. Therefore, detection is difficult, warning may be short if at all, and attributing the attack to a particular group may be slow or ambiguous. The Board was concerned about the erosion of DOD’s capabilities to deter and defend against these threats. For example, the Marine Corps’ CBIRF now employs about 60% of the nuclear, biological, and chemical specialists of the Corps. This leaves few specialists for the operational fleet Marine Force. Perhaps this mission is better accomplished by the Army, which possesses a more robust capability and infrastructure to work the issues on a national basis.

The report makes several very strong recommendations for strengthening DOD’s response capabilities. First, the SECDEF should treat transnational threats as a major DOD
Placing great emphasis on civil protection, the Army and National Guard Bureau should establish a national consequence management capability to support state and local agency responses to domestic chemical and biological incidents, as well as support training and exercises for first responders. It even goes as far as to recommend the establishment of “An integrated state and regional National Guard capability consisting of both state rapid assessment teams and regional chemical-biological incident response units (on the Marine CBIRF model). Together, these teams would require 4,000 National Guard personnel, only about one percent of the National Guard structure.”

Second, to facilitate unity of effort, the DSB proposes that the SECDEF must clarify and assign, to a single policy office, responsibilities for counterterrorism, counterproliferation, transnational threats, and infrastructure protection. For coordination, they recommend the development of a new global, shared interactive information system termed the Secure, Transnational, Threat Information Infrastructure (STII) to allow two-way information sharing of critical information between local, state, national, and international partners. Finally, the DSB recommended that DOD reemphasize force protection as a major responsibility for forces at home or abroad. An enhanced force protection program requires expanded vulnerability analysis, filling the gaps caused by diverse responsibilities, focusing intelligence programs and capabilities, and exploiting promising technologies. They advocated the creation of a Force Protection Test-Bed.

DOD has begun its internal study to assess and build a response capability consistent with the DSB report. A recent study entitled, Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction, was conducted by the Director of Military Support in January, 1998. The DOMS report recognizes that the
operational environment is characterized by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rapidly changing technologies, and a smaller military with severely constrained resources. Therefore, the nation’s response capability cannot consist of active forces alone. “The complementary skills of the Reserve Component create a more robust capability that must be integrated into a comprehensive WMD consequence management response.”

The proposed operational concept envisions the development of a Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Element as the initial response element to confirm the nature of a WMD attack. Additionally, there is a significant training component required to integrate WMD training for DCOs, state Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs), one consequence management RTF each for First and Fifth U.S. Army, and military response elements which interface with local, state, and Federal response assets. The response elements would remain under State control, unless the attack is beyond the capability of local authorities and the State. The study advocates a five-year plan for training, implementation of concepts, and procurement and fielding of equipment. The plan strongly recommends interagency exercises and training to ensure elements can operate together as military units and with corresponding civilian responders.

It is clear the DOD’s participation in DSO is a growing mission. As previously mentioned, DSO has never been the primary mission for the military, however, military support to the numerous emergencies in the 1990’s has been met with the popular approval of civic-minded citizens. It is evident that the public clearly expects the military to involve itself in disaster response as a part of a “peace dividend.” In fact the citizens of both south central Los Angeles and Dade County, Florida, were reluctant to see the military leave their areas. Residents exclaimed that they never felt safer than with the military presence, especially in gang-infested or
looted areas. Phone calls were placed to political leaders pleading for assurances that the Guardsmen would remain in place until the streets returned to normal.  

Futurists such as Ralph Peters and Martin van Creveld postulate that the future primary role of the Armed Forces is peace operations, “the U.S. military would abandon its conventional warfighting mission and focus instead on internal order, counterterrorism, nation assistance, peace support operations, and humanitarian relief. The Army, therefore could be dominated by Special Forces with small flexible units.” This is not a role that senior military officers have enthusiastically embraced as this mission siphons off precious resources such as time and dollars from an already over-committed force. Obviously, a balance will have to be struck between being trained and organized to fight and win the nations wars versus being prepared to respond to domestic emergencies.

At the same time, the military may be undergoing an identity crisis, struggling to maintain relevance in the absence of a peer competitor. As one study on civil-military relations states, “What is of concern is the degree to which the armed forces are growing more separate from American society.” For the first time in history, a majority of the members of Congress have had no military experience. Furthermore, the Clinton Administration has appointed far fewer military veterans than any preceding administration. Therefore, it may be out of political necessity that federal forces are committed to domestic support operations as a means of enhancing their relevance and credibility with the American people. As they grow more isolated, the services must make a concerted effort to reach out to society, else they become little more than mercenary forces, citizens detached from society and sent into harm’s way without the will, or worse, the concern of the people. Involvement in domestic support operations increases force
visibility with the public and reduces the view that the Armed Forces are global policemen or mercenaries. 86

For domestic support operations it is important for the military to develop working relationships with the Federal agencies it may be called upon to support. The National Guard Bureau and CONUSAs have done much in this regard. The CONUSAs have already identified individuals to serve as Defense Coordinating Officers and their support elements to conduct advance planning with FEMA and DOJ, both lead agencies for MSCA and MSCLA. As the immediate response force for the state, National Guardsmen are much more prepared to respond to domestic support emergencies. After all, they have a vested interest—it’s often the livelihood of friends and neighbors at stake.

However, for the active component, there is very little training focused on the Federal Response, except at the Major Command staff level. Soldiers in the field are no less in need of education and training in the challenges of interagency cooperation. Major disasters cannot be handled without adequate preparation. There is not enough time to reorganize and conduct training at the site of the emergency. This is unacceptable given that the likelihood of a unit deploying in support of a domestic emergency is as great or greater than a combat deployment. The first time MSCA training is inserted into the Army’s institutional educational system is at the Senior Service College level which trains only ten percent of the Army’s future leaders, few of whom will return to Army units. I recommend that training be inserted into Officer Advance Courses, Command and General Staff College, and senior Non-Commissioned Officer’s courses. Units likely to be called upon to perform MSCA should devote some training time with their soldiers explaining the nuances of the mission. Leaders and soldiers need to be able to distinguish between Federal and Non-Governmental Agencies, recognize their capabilities and
limitations, develop mutually supporting relationships to ensure all civilian and military efforts are as complementary as possible. Many of the MSCA tasks are directly transferable to skills required to perform peace operations abroad, or in the case of WMD, respond to protect the force. So this is not wasted training time. Since the nature of DSO is both interagency and joint, MSCA training must be added to DOD's Joint Professional Military Education program. Effective response requires a commitment of time and resources by Army leaders before a disaster occurs.

But education works both ways and both policy makers and field level civilians need to learn about the military's organization, priorities, request procedures, capabilities, and specific personnel with whom to coordinate. Along these lines, the Army staff and agencies, as DOD's executive agent for DSO, must make a concerted effort to identify and maintain contact with counterparts in key agencies. The Army should also initiate the development of interagency task-based working groups, exercises, and training. The Nunn-Lugar Defense Preparedness Act certainly implies that DOD should take the lead at least in the planning and coordination effort. The outcome for all of this should be a detailed interagency doctrine that codifies agency responsibilities, relationships, and procedures.

Much work remains to be done in terms of civil preparedness and consequence management by civil authorities as well as in order to limit the effects of a domestic WMD attack. The challenge is not to unduly alarm the population while conducting training for first responders. This is to preclude a situation similar to the “Red Scare” of the 1950’s where school children conducted “duck and cover” drills; or the Israeli model where every man, woman, and child is trained and issued a protective chemical mask. The real effort needs to be focused on counter-terrorism to detect or deter WMD activities before they can be brought to bear on
American soil. Failing that, capabilities and technologies must be developed to mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack on population centers. The issue is not if, but when, a WMD attempt is made.

The bottom line, however, is that the decision to employ Federal resources is ultimately a political one, albeit for humanitarian reasons. Domestic support operations are an essential aspect of our National Security Strategy as they directly contribute to the well-being, safety, and security of American citizens. Federal response agencies must be given a clearly defined objective which serves as a focal point for interagency consensus, coordination, and cooperation. Regardless of the cynicism leveled at the Federal or State government, the American people expect governmental agencies at all levels to act with efficiency, compassion, and unity when disaster strikes. Our nation not only expects, but demands the response be integrated at all levels in order to protect national security and the American way of life.

Word Count: 12,094


8 These tenets are adapted from a discussion on unity of effort found in Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, June 1993), 2-5. The tenets are also reflected in joint doctrine and the Federal Response Plan, but are otherwise the subjective criteria of the author.


10 FM 100-5, 2-5.


12 Ibid, 7.


14 Ibid, 14.

15 Miller, 6.

16 Ibid, 34.
17 Quote is attributable to Civil War General Nathan Bedford Forrest.


19 This information is compiled from DOD Directive 3025.1, .12 and Department of Defense Manual for Civil Emergencies, DOD 3025.1-M, June 1994, 1-6 to 1-7.

20 DOD Manual 3025.1-M, 1-5, 4-1 through 4-3.

21 The information regarding MSCA and MSCLEA is taken from Joint Pub 3-07.7, II-11 and III-1.


23 Joint Pub 3-07.7, III-1.


27 3-07.7, III-2.

28 James D. Delk, *Fires and Furies: The L.A. Riots of 1992* (Palm Springs, CA: ETC Publications, 1995), 222. MG (CAANG) Delk served as the overall commander of CAANG forces who responded to the crisis. He was involved first hand in working strategy and policy issues with the key agencies involved and was present during the meetings of primary decision makers. He is very candid about his observations.

29 Ibid, Chapter 14.

30 Ibid, 59-60. It wasn’t until after the riots were calmed that Mayor Bradley hired Peter Ueberroth, Chairman of 1984 LA Olympics, to chair a program entitled “Rebuild LA” to coordinate the relief and recovery efforts by all state and federal agencies.

31 Ibid, 57-58, 76. According to Delk, federal regulations required lock plates to be installed on all M16s during conduct of civil disturbance operations to keep them from firing on automatic. The military leadership did not want to exacerbate the situation with a repeat of the Guard’s performance in the Watts riots or Kent State, where troops fired indiscriminately in self-defense killing innocent civilians.

32 Ibid, 100.
33 Ibid, 98. Warren Christopher was a former deputy Attorney General of the United States and a former deputy Secretary of State. He had chaired the citizen’s commission that investigated the LAPD following the Rodney King beating prior to the trial. He had previously called Mayor Bradley the afternoon of 30 Apr urging federal troops be brought in. He asserted that federal troops were more effective than national guard for civil disturbances. Mayor Bradley granted him permission to contact federal officials in Washington.

34 Ibid, 320.

35 Ibid, 172. Over 1700 law federal law enforcement officials were ultimately deployed to the area.


38 Ibid, 438.


40 Ibid, 250.


42 Delk, 136-137.

43 Schnaubelt, 105.

44 Delk, 154.


46 Delk, 227.


48 Ibid, 296.

49 Ibid, 297.

50 Gates, 438.

51 Shannon, 4.

52 Ibid, 6.


57 This discussion on crisis and consequence management is taken from an unclassified Memorandum, “Emergency DOD Support During the 1996 Olympic Games,” dated 11 Apr 96, signed by John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Hereafter cited as Shalikashvili.


59 Grange, 112.

60 These figures were taken from an unclassified FORSCOM briefing given by LTC Jay Steinmetz, “1996 Olympic and Paralympic Games Contingency Operations,” presented at the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course 97-01, 1 Nov 97. Hereafter cited as Steinmetz, FORSCOM Briefing to DOD Preparedness Course.

61 Grange, 114.

62 The SECDEF directives are contained in Steinmetz, FORSCOM Briefing to DOD Emergency Preparedness Course.

63 Shalikashvili, 1-3.


65 Steinmetz, WMD Briefing.

66 DOD Pamphlet, “DoD Support for the 1996 Olympics,” undated. This pamphlet was developed by DOD to describe to other agencies “the capabilities available within DOD to assist in resolving or mitigating the consequences of a terrorist incident, the procedures by which that support may be obtained, and the manner in which military forces and assets will be controlled
once they are committed.” What follows is a summary from this document and an amalgamation of the Steinmetz WMD and FORSCOM Briefings.

67 Ibid, 14.

68 Ibid, 3-4.

69 Steinmetz, FORSCOM Briefing to DOD Preparedness Course.

70 Ibid.


72 Ibid, C-31 to C-35.

73 Jay Steinmetz <steinmej@forscom.army.mil>, “CRTF,” electronic mail message to author, 3 Feb 98.

74 Steinmetz, FORSCOM Briefing to DOD Preparedness Course.

75 Ibid.

76 Defense Science Board, Chairman’s Executive Summary.

77 Ibid, 7.

78 Ibid, 29.


80 Director of Military Support, Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction (Department of the Army, Director of Military Support: 6 Jan 98), 1.

81 Ibid, 6, 19.

82 Delk, 260.

83 Steven Metz, Strategic Horizons: The Military Implications of Alternative Futures (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), 289-290.


88 Shrader, xi.
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