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**East Asia**

**Southeast Asia**

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SPK Carries Statement on Appointment as UN Advisor

[Announcement by Keat Chhon]

[Text] SPK. The program of the UN for development has chosen me to come to work as a consultant to advise on the role of the state in broadening the market economy to enable the state to develop and improve a system to fit the regulations, the institutions, and the infrastructure so that the private sector can grow and expand. In this position, I have been given the post as chief of the Council of Ministers, so I have returned to the country.

Coming back to the country, I have become a witness; I have seen high-level responsible people in the government; I have seen people responsible for economic development; I have seen people in the capitol and people in the countryside searching with all their strength, according to the activity and to the occupation of each one to work to save and rebuild the country.

In the country, I have been a witness and have seen all these people working proudly with all their might to make a living. In my opinion, pride and the difficult struggle are phenomena of revenge, complete revenge against the continuous tragedy which has harried our people over the past two decades.

In the country, I have been a witness to the deep desire of our people, of each one of us, a desire which asks only to live and work in peace with freedom in an independent democratic country with territorial integrity which is respected.

Arriving in the country, I cried copiously like our brothers and sisters when I recalled the very painful, terrifying memories, but the energetic persistence to live caused the tears to cease by themselves. We will wipe away the tears and be happy. We will wipe away the tears and smile when we contemplate the hope for the future.

Compatriots of all generations have been weakened emotionally and many have suffered physical weakness. This is absolutely true. However, our compatriots feel very brave because of an energetic persistence to fight doggedly in order to live; it has entered our very senses. This energetic persistence to struggle has made a strong impression on me.

Therefore, in a situation where our country has not yet savoried a lasting peace and in a situation where the path to this peace has been blocked by the stubbornness of a single faction which is not willing to implement the Paris accords. I see that, in my position as counsel, only to advise in this way is not enough; it does not fit the needs of the situation in the country. For this reason, as a Cambodian, I must join in. This is the logic of patriotism. I believe that I am not slow in taking on my share of the burden to work for the country.

Therefore I have decided to get involved.

I will join in the fight to achieve a joint strategy and a joint plan for the national society not weighing the fact that there are contradictions or that there are many parties provided there is one great national conscience.

In any case, after the elections, the new government must work for peace throughout the country. The situation after the elections will be correct in this way. It is necessary to create peace because if we investigate only the various current events a little then we can see that the pace of the war continues to be active. In order to work for this pacification on the one hand and in order to administer the country on the other, the government which results from the elections must depend on the economic and social infrastructure, on the government, and on the various institutions which the State of Cambodia has built up which have sunk deep roots in the country. This administration must make the choice in this way. Doing it in this way follows reason. Doing it in this way does not involve anything new because there has been this kind of implementation in the past; it is a certainty. That is, it is the only way, unless that government wants to try a strategy like the one used after 17 April 1975.

Therefore, the strategy which is best for all the parties which have a national conscience is to join with the Cambodian People's Party as in the time of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum of Prince Norodom Sihanouk which was a successful historical experiment for the country. This strategy must seize the initiative from now on in order to block the activity of the war, be able to control it after the elections, and finally to extinguish it.

This is the heart of my task from now on.

Soy Keo Pays Respects at PAVN Fete


Speaking on this occasion, Lt. Gen. Soy Keo confirmed the SOC's unwavering position on the Paris Peace Accords and especially that of the Cambodian People's Army. He made that fact clear, in spite of the fact that the Khmer Rouge were still seeking pretexts not to stop in order to destroy the accords.

Lt. Gen. Soy Keo expressed his sorrow that one of the factions would not honor the accords and constantly created obstacles and blamed a neighboring country, Vietnam, which in the past had given its heart and soul for Cambodia to save it from the genocidal regime of Pol Pot.

Colonel Bui Nghi, chief Vietnamese military attache also spoke on that occasion and he made it clear that Vietnam would not do anything at all to interfere in the internal
affairs of Cambodia. He said, “I fully appreciate the new situation in Cambodia,” but he declared that he was very sorry that the Khmer Rouge would not agree to honor the Paris Accords.

On the evening of the same day, a group of military officials of the Foreign Military Liaison Commission of the Ministry of National Defense led by Brigadier Gen. Hing Lang, chief of the Foreign Military Liaison Commission, went to pay its respects at the Cambodia - Vietnam Memorial and also to present its congratulations to the military attack at the Vietnamese Embassy.

Thais Blamed for Deforestation
93SE0125D Phnom Penh PRAKEACHON in Cambodian 3 Jan 93 pp 1, 2, 8

[Text] Thailand has a very bad name in Cambodia. Merchants and middlemen seem to be showing that they can buy anything whatsoever from a war-town country.

Through high level contacts among Thai Government and military official they have begun, directly and indirectly, to destroy the forests of Cambodia.

"Many of them think that it is a very easy task for a group of merchants to go into Cambodia, cut down the forest, and bribe Thai military officials along the border in order to bring wood back into Thailand." These are the words of a member of the UNTAC [United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia] section responsible for rebuilding the country. The official, who wishes to remain anonymous, said that she had been borrowed from a U.N. agency in Bangkok and that she is afraid that because of her statement, the Thai authorities might not give her permission to return to her original post when she has completed her contract with UNTAC.

A report about Cambodia in the UN Conference on Environment and Development ("Earth Summit") in Rio de Janeiro in June reported that Cambodia was special in development as the "Green Lung" of Southeast Asia. A joint written report by officials of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and officials of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) pointed out that 73 percent of the land in Cambodia, equivalent to 18.1 million hectares had been classified as virgin forest in 1965. Approximately 250,000 hectares are cut down every year and at the present time, forest land accounts for about 40 percent of the country although it will have to be verified by satellite.

UNTAC officials responsible for rebuilding say that no one knows the true extent of the deforestation in Cambodia.

The young woman says that whoever works in any area for a few years does not know of the fact that the people whom they authorize to transport wood do not have documents. It is true that the Khmer Rouge and the Thai merchants (along with high level contacts among government and military officials) is the target of the criticism about the deforestation in Cambodia. On 14 January the Thai Government banned entry into the Cambodian forests in a timely and effective manner. There were only certain woods which had permits from the concessions before 14 January and they can be exported into Thailand.

One merchant from a family which has influence in timber brokering in the northern lowlands of Thailand adjacent to the Cambodian border said in Phnom Penh that he could lose an investment from 60 to 70 million baht because of the ban.

He expressed his disappointment that the Thai Government did not inform the people in advance about this ban. "I would think that for anything good to have come out of this, they should have informed them just one day in advance that the ban would become effective on 14 January. The provincial authorities are the ones who do the enforcing and they didn't know anything about the ban. The report of the memorandum on the objective of the export of lumber which was issued by the SNC [Supreme National Council] on 23 November, said that the transportation of wood throughout Cambodia was extremely large with the approval of the Khmer Rouge."

Another Thai merchant said, "We are cutting up lumber like crazy."

The memorandum indicated that 31 December would be the last day for exporting lumber from Cambodia. Beginning on 1 January 1993, only sawed lumber can be exported. (Summarized from the Bangkok Post by A.S.A.)

[Translation of caption to photograph of two trucks loaded with logs on p.1 "The hasty transportation of many logs out of an area controlled by the Khmer Rouge."]

Minister Complains About Opposition Conduct
93SE0125B Phnom Penh PRAKEACHON in Cambodian 22 Dec 92 p4

[Letter From Hor Namhong to Akashi]

[Text] Excellency:

I have the honor to inform you of the following position of the State of Cambodia (SOC) concerning the problem of flying the flag of the Cambodian Supreme National Council (SNC) at political party headquarters along with the flags of all the political parties which are represented on the SNC and which they consider as "the national flag" of each faction.

At this time of great difficulty it is essential to have the maximum law and order so that the voting in the future can proceed in peace and security.

We believe that the flying of the SNC flag at the headquarters of the various political parties will lead to confusion among the people who may believe that all these political parties are directly represented on the SNC. Therefore, the SNC flag could play a propaganda and deceptive role.
For this reason, we request that the SNC flag only be raised at those places where the chairman and members of the SNC reside and flown at the royal residence of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the chief of state, as chairman of the SNC.

As for the flags of the other political parties in the SNC which are used by each part as their own national flags according to the plan agreed to by Prince Norodom Sihanouk and all the Cambodian factions at Pattaya (Thailand) on 22 June 1991 that all these flags can be flown but only in their own areas.

However, we do not mind if the insignias and signs of the different parties are used at their own headquarters.

With the only goal being respect for the accords which have already been signed and to share in the maintenance of public order and the correctness of the elections which we suggest, we request that your excellency give special attention to our point of view.

With my greatest respect.
Murdiono, Rudini on Pancasila Democracy
93SE0145B Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian
5 Feb 93 pp 1, 5

[Text] Jakarta (KOMPAS)—Pancasila [ideology of the Indonesian state] democracy should be permitted to develop stage by stage as the nation develops. If Pancasila democracy is not formulated carefully, it will become a bondage and will be incompatible with new developments faced by the Indonesian nation. Therefore, we must give serious and careful thought to the suggestion before drafting a formulation or guideline for Pancasila democracy.

Minister of State and State Secretary Murdiono said this Thursday, 4 February, in a working meeting with DPR [Parliament] Commission II. He spoke in response to a statement by F-PDI [Indonesian Democratic Party Faction] member Drs. Subagyo, who proposed that study be given to drafting a guideline for the implementation of Pancasila democracy so that the MPR [People's Consultative Council] can embody it in an MPR ruling on the matter.

The action proposed by Subagyo was previously sought by the PDI in the MPR Working Committee in December and January. The PDI submitted a draft ruling on basic guidelines for the implementation of Pancasila democracy, but the draft was withdrawn before the end of the BP [drafting committee] session.

According to Murdiono, democracy is a never-ending process. What we deem good today may need improvement tomorrow. In fact, tomorrow we may consider it completely wrong and abandon it. Democracy, Murdiono said, is closely linked to basic values existing in the community. Among those values are variables that apply during each phase of development as a nation.

As an example of the development of democracy, Murdiono noted that 10 years ago a DPR commission leader would address a cabinet minister as "father minister," but now it has become customary for commission leaders to say "brother minister." "Therefore, we should not put together something that will tie our own hands and feet," Murdiono declared.

Not Too Far

Political observer Dr. Burhan Magenda expressed a similar view. In an interview with KOMPAS this week, Burhan said the political system must be ahead of the people, but not too far. The same is true of democracy. Democratization cannot be forced, seeing that the people are still only moving slowly in the direction of democracy. If disparity should develop between urban elite and the rural masses, radical splinter groups could emerge.

"When we tried to force democracy in the fifties and sixties, there were murders in the villages. That was a lesson to us. If we are too far ahead of the people, there will outbursts that result in 'shock,' a kind of 'ideological shock,'" he said.

"Pancasila democracy means that both the elite and the village masses advance together. At present, the middle class is not yet able to be a bridge between the elite and the villages. Another 20-30 years may be needed to give the middle class time to become large enough to give strong support to a democratic system," he asserted.

Burhan was confident that the people will ultimately accept the voting mechanism. Besides being guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution, the voting principle has been used in a number of places. "We still want the consultation principle, but when there is a dead end, voting will be conducted," he declared. To create a climate that is increasingly democratic, he said, the roles of political and mass organizations and of community self-help groups must be expanded to express the aspirations of the people.

According to Burhan, the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila democracy system accommodate and implement agreed-upon democratic principles. Thus, the Pancasila democracy format achieved through national consensus will be able to express the aspirations and dynamics of the people for the next 25 years.

He also emphasized the constant need for quality of life in every sector, primarily in superstructure and infrastructure. The operating patterns of the state's high-level and supreme institutions are now on "the right track," but they must be able to accommodate the regional issues that have been emerging and that will affect conditions for the next 25 years. In the MPR, for example, a trend is emerging to make decisions by voting in addition to the use of consultation and consensus. Also, the quality of DPR members needs to be improved so that they will be more productive in producing laws, exercising their right to take initiative, handling the budget, etc.

The problem of "dualism" between the Supreme Court and the Department of Justice needs to be resolved. The same is true of the role of regional governments. Is Law No. 5 of 1974, for example, still enough to accommodate current developments? Similarly, improving the quality of DPRD's [regional legislatures] is another pressing matter, so that people will not have to appeal to the Central Government as they have been doing.

He said that the political parties and GOLKAR [Functional Group] are now deemed to be adequate and that no additional parties are needed. More attention needs to be given to infrastructure functions that relate to political communication, political socialization, creation of cadres, dealing with conflict, and political development and participation. The mass media, as a bridge between the government and the people, also need to be encouraged to disseminate balanced information. The press, too, must have a part in taking responsibility to anticipate the negative effects of globalization.

A nationhood perspective on the part of young people and students also needs to be enhanced, and a climate of openness needs to be created through student senates, lecture platform freedom, and academic freedom, which are marks of the New Order.
The role of ABRI [Indonesian Armed Forces] as a stabilizer and provider of dynamics should improve its functioning in defense and security and sociopolitical matters. Increased democratization of LKMD's [village community resilience groups] is needed for development of the village community. Anomalies and divisions in our increasingly diverse urban communities need to be prevented, which means prevention of violence among students and other urban groups. The better quality of elections and the growing neutrality of ABRI need to be maintained and encouraged.

**Improved**

In a recent interview with this paper, Minister of Home Affairs Rudini acknowledged that public political awareness is improving. Because the people are more free to act, they are more visible in expressing their aspirations. Rather than being worried, the government is encouraging public political awareness as well as a public sense of responsibility for complying with regulations in the framework of Pancasila democracy.

He said that Pancasila is an open, dynamic ideology and that its application is adapted to situations and conditions. Rudini feels, as does Murdiono, that Pancasila democracy cannot yet be formalized by law or MPR ruling. The sure guideline for developing Pancasila democracy is that efforts to deal with any issue must be on the basis of consultation and consensus and in the spirit of family and cooperation. In this way, there will not be majority power or tyranny of the minority.

He cited concrete examples from the selection of governors. The appointment of governors can no longer be done by small groups for their own interests. Because the people must now be the ones who decide on governorships, the DPRD's must give time to accommodate the aspirations of the people before making gubernatorial nominations. Through this consultation with the people, the DPRD's will nominate balanced candidates and eliminate fait accompli or inside candidates. "This is the challenge to improving the quality of general election results," he declared.

According to Rudini, general elections have indeed changed, although the results are still not very satisfactory. By improving the general elections, the representatives chosen by the people will know how to do their jobs well. In other words, the delegates must be willing to see the people's aspirations and dare to present them in the legislatures.

He acknowledged that under the present system, DPR members are members of factions, and the factions are extensions of the sociopolitical organizations. This does not mean, however, that aspirations cannot be accommodated. In the development of their cadres, the sociopolitical organizations depend on leaders among the people to be national cadres and DPR members, rather than simply selecting people who have had training.

Rudini said that from the beginning he has stressed to the three sociopolitical organizations that they must give attention to the cadre development system. At first, candidates should be sent to the provinces, and if they perform well they can then be promoted to positions higher on the ladder. The same is true of government officials. After finishing college, a person should be made village chief first. Thus, if later he becomes a subdistrict chief, he will have understood the lives of village people. From there, if he becomes a district head, he will know how to lead the people.

The home minister said he has recommended that the candidates should know and be known by the people in their voting districts long before candidate lists are drawn up. In this way, each one will know what he must do. It is the implementation that is wrong now. "In fact, I tried to have photographs attached to the announcement of candidate lists, but there was a budget problem. I hope that in 1997, photos can be attached so that the people can vote for the best candidates," he added.

**Legal Aid Society To Appeal to Public for Funds**

93SE0145A Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 5 Feb 93 p 6

[Text] Yogyakarta (KOMPAS)—The Indonesian Legal Aid Society (LBH) plans to seek funds from the public by imitating the collection system used by the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI). This step is to be taken only for the sake of upholding the law, primarily in anticipation of the increased oppression and injustice expected in the future.

This was revealed Thursday night [4 February] at the LBH office in Yogyakarta when the LBH Board of Trustees held a consultation meeting with paralegals, members of the community, and university students. The meeting, led by Nur Ismanto, SH [Master of Laws], was attended by Mochtar Lubis, chairman of the LBH Board of Supervisors; H.C. Princen, secretary of the LBH Board of Supervisors; Mrs. Amartiwi Saleh, SH, member of the LBH Board of Supervisors; a number of paralegals from Yogyakarta, Borobudur, and Wonogiri in Central Java; and students and volunteers.

The second main subject taken up was the LBH's desire to become a people's movement supported by the people, in which the LBH would work with people at the lowest level of society to uphold justice.

The idea of collecting money from the public was originally presented by Amartiwi Saleh, former director of the Bandung LBH, who explained that the LBH must depend on domestic sources of funds to avoid reliance on aid from international organizations. "I once asked some business friends to help, but they were afraid."

She said the LBH is completely open to government aid if the government wants to help. The LBH does not want such help, however, if it comes with conditions indicating a government desire to control the LBH.

"We want the LBH to be a people's movement. Therefore, why not try what the PMI does, using collection cards and appealing to the public for contributions? We would then pin an LBH button on everyone who gives," said Mochtar Lubis, acting as chairman of the LBH Advisory Board.
The cultural expert and novelist, who appeared dressed in a white "barong Tagalog," said the LBH movement must now use the method once employed by the Islamic League (SI) during Dutch colonial days, namely a direct appeal to the public for money.

Mochtar Lubis said the final result of World War II was not the Allied victory over Japan, their principal enemy, but the realization that each country is entitled to independence. As human history moves on, a new wind is blowing, by which all nations understand the importance of basic human rights.

"I feel we are now being helped by a new wind of history in the form of a struggle for basic human rights everywhere. If we are smart, we can attract support from the outside. As champions of law, we must not forget there are many others in the world who have aspirations like ours," Mochtar Lubis said.

Graft Reported on Increase
93SE0150B Jakarta EDITOR in Indonesian
20 Feb 93 p 15

[Text] The BPKP (Finance and Development Oversight Board) has come to a new conclusion. BPKP Chairman Drs. Gandhi says the embezzlement of state money has recently risen drastically. He presented this conclusion in a hearing before DPR [Parliament] Commission IV on Friday, 5 February.

Money embezzled from state funds totals more than 206 billion rupiah, not including the Bank Duta case, in which 870 billion rupiah are calculated to have disappeared. Overall, 5,926 cases have been discovered. What is troubling is that during the first half of 1992-93, 212 more cases occurred than in the previous half year. The BPKP sees this as a great increase.

Graft may be categorized as it relates to the following: obligations for making payments to the government; violations of applicable laws, procedures, and policies; negligence in implementing development, in performing duties of office, and in service to the public; and administrative deficiencies. Such actions of corruption and graft naturally cannot be permitted to continue, and the BPKP has promised to take follow-up action on its findings.

Gandhi admitted, however, that it is not easy to take action. For example, there are managers who protect subordinates suspected of graft. "But do not worry. Everything will be resolved in time. We have only to wait for the right time," Gandhi said. The BPKP does not have authority to take direct action against individuals who have embezzled government money.

The board can only give information to the authorities involved, whether departments, governors, provincial inspectorates, inspectorates general, or ministers. Usually, such actions are then followed by investigations by prosecutors. Action against embezzlers is necessary, of course, but it is much more important to find a way to prevent graft.

MILITARY

Views on Removing Police From ABRI
93SE0144A Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian
4 Feb 93 pp 1, 16

[Text] Jakarta (KOMPAS)—The idea of separating the police from ABRI [Indonesian Armed Forces] needs to be weighed carefully. One aspect that should be noted is the history of the formation of ABRI, Minister of Defense and Security L.B. Murdani said Wednesday, 3 February, in a working meeting with DPR [Parliament] Commission I.

Dr. Yahya Muhaimin, member of the teaching staff of Gadjah Mada University (UGM) in Yogyakarta, expressed a similar thought. He said the concept of separating the police needs further thought, primarily as it relates to the meaning of the dual function of ABRI. It must continue to be emphasized, however, that the fundamental job of the police is to ensure public order, using its basic resource of prestige instead of strength of arms.

Drs. Jusuf Syakir, deputy chairman of the DPR Development Unity Faction (F-PP), did not emphatically state support for separation but said that in principle he supports greater POLRI [Indonesian Police] autonomy, in both the budget and recruitment of experts.

"I agree that there is a need for POLRI autonomy to be expanded, whether through separation from ABRI or otherwise," he said.

The concept of separating the police from ABRI and placing the police directly under the president was expressed to the press Tuesday, 2 February, in Yogyakarta by criminal law expert Prof. Dr. J.E. Sahetapi, SH [Master of Laws], between sessions of the Second International Conference on Urban Crime, which was attended by representatives of many countries.

The minister of defense and security acknowledged that the police in other countries generally are under departments of home affairs, whereas in the United States they are under the governors. In Indonesia, however, the police are combined with an entity called ABRI despite the different job of the police. While the police protect the people, the Army, Navy, and Air Force protect the country.

The combining of the police with the three other services in what was then called the Indonesian Combat Forces (APRI) was prompted only by the bitter experience of the past, the minister of defense and security said. In the past, he said, the people with weapons traditionally had the power. Also, ABRI took part in general elections. Thus, when the parties were in conflict, ABRI unity was shaken.

"That situation was a bitter experience." Ultimately, all those with weapons were combined into one organization, now called ABRI.

Therefore, the idea that the police should be separated from ABRI needs to be studied carefully, lest the bitter experience of the past be repeated in Indonesia, Murdani declared.
Main Resource

Dr. Yahya Muhaimin said the police function needs to be seen in the context of ABRI's dual function, particularly in light of the idea to separate the police from the ABRI structure. “The police work in the field of order, not security,” he said. He stated that under the current structure of ABRI's dual function, both aspects are combined. “Thus, separating them would be a problem, too. If the police should be involved in politics, would that also be included in the ABRI structure?”

The first assistant dean of the UGM Sociology and Political Science Faculty then noted the role of the Military Police (PM) as a bridge. The PM acts as a “catalyst” between the police and ABRI. “In the context of ABRI's dual function, I cannot say that there must be a separation. In elections, for example, should not police have a representative? There are police personnel with potential. This needs to be dealt with. Therefore, seen in the context of ABRI’s dual function, separation needs to be given more careful thought,” he asserted.

Dr. Yahya Muhaimin, who authored the book Development of the Military in Indonesian Politics, 1945-1966, said the main resource of the police is not force of arms but prestige. Everywhere in the world, police are different from the military. “The authority of the military derives largely from the force of its arms; but under ABRI’s dual function, the military's authority stems from its skills as well as from its arms. For the police, however, prestige is the main thing.” He stressed that he is among those who feel that the first thing for the police is honesty and not bazookas.

“The police must be a relatively honest group in society. This is a very cultural thing. It cannot be created suddenly but takes time.” Therefore, he added, public respect for the police must be cultivated early, and the police must work with the public in upholding the law. These things must be done consistently and simultaneously.

Yahya said that because the problem is so complex, arranging the police organization must be drastic but consistent. Without a drastic overhaul, the intended purpose will not be realized; but organizing from the bottom will continue, although it takes time. “There must be political will,” he declared.

Disruption of Public Security and Order

According to Jusuf Syakir, more extensive autonomy needs to be given to POLRI because of the growing sophistication of disruptions to public security and order. The present POLRI budget is worse than distressing. It is to the point of anguish, for there is difficulty in supporting police work at the lowest levels. The budget is so small that police often have to “ask” remuneration from the public, not because of a mental attitude but because they do not have the funds to do their jobs.

Besides having autonomy of budget, Jusuf Syakir said, POLRI should be given full autonomy in fulfilling its responsibility for public security and order. He emphasized that public security and order is the affair of POLRI, not of the Armed Forces, because the country no longer faces problems related to uprisings. “The government should make this clear,” he stated.

If autonomy is not given immediately, he added, there will be an imbalance between POLRI capabilities and the sophistication of disruptions to security and order that occur in the community. Perpetrators of crime now use high-tech equipment, while POLRI's facilities are very outdated.

Commensurate with the growing sophistication of crime, the F-PP member continued, POLRI should also have many experts to support police work. The investigation of banking and computer crimes, for example, can be done only if POLRI has experts in those areas. “If not supported by an adequate number of experts, POLRI will continue to be left behind, and its image will decline,” Jusuf Syakir said.

KASAD Says Academy Prepares Future Leaders

93SE0144B Jakarta ANGKATAN BERSENJATA in Indonesian 3 Feb 93 p 9

[Text] Magelang (ANGKATAN BERSENJATA)—The Military Academy has a very important role in the preparation of future leaders. It not only functions to create second lieutenants but also makes long-term investment for the sake of the TNI-AD [Indonesian Army], ABRI [Indonesian Armed Forces], the nation, and the state. The Military Academy's mission provides military knowledge and skills and, what is more important, imparts soldierly values and character to future Army leaders.

KASAD [Chief of Army Staff] General Edi Sudrajat said this in his speech to Military Academy cadets on Friday, 29 January, at Magelang.

Besides the academy’s having a role as an organization, he said, the success of the academy's efforts to create officers with the qualities mentioned above depends greatly on each cadet's understanding of the responsibility he is to bear and his awareness of the need to develop his potential. Therefore, the traditions of the cadet corps should steadfastly follow the system of values and the conditions that continue to grow and flourish in the TNI-AD.

The KASAD also explained and emphasized military values and traditions that apply to the life of a soldier and that must be heeded and practiced. These things have developed and flourished as the Army has grown, and they represent an integration of military values and traditions that are both universal and unique to the Army. These values and traditions include dedication, responsibility, honesty, loyalty, solidarity and cooperation, recognition of rank, obedience, discipline, and orderliness.

The speech was also heard by assistants to the KASAD and by the PANGKOSTRAD [commander of the Army Strategic Command], PANGDAM IV [commander of Military Region Command IV]/Diponegoro, the governor of the Military Academy, the directors and agency chiefs of the Army BALAKPUS [Central Executive Committee], and the entire Military Academy academic community.
Air Force Implementing Flying Exercises at Night
93SE0151A Jakarta ANGKATAN BERSENJATA
in Indonesian 16 Feb 93 p 9

[Text] As part of the effort to increase the fighting capabilities of the TNI-AU [Indonesian Air Force], in particular Air Squadron 12, to meet a variety of threats and challenges both by day and by night, Air Squadron 12 is preparing to carry out routine exercises during the daytime and is also being asked to increase its operating potential at night. This was among the statements made by Lt. Col. (Pilot) Ganjar Wiranegara, Commander of Air Squadron 12.

Night flight exercises were carried out from 1 to 5 February 1993 at the Pekanbaru Air Force Base and vicinity with the aim of maintaining and increasing the capabilities of A-4 Sky Hawk pilots. This is really necessary because Air Squadron 12, which uses A-4 Sky Hawks, needs its professional pilots to operate both at night and during the day so as to be able to carry out its mission and to be as efficient as possible.

Ten pilots and 41 technicians are taking part in these exercises, which involve four A-4 Skyhawk aircraft supported by one S 58-T Twin Pac Helicopter as an SAR [Search and Rescue] plane, with alternate bases at Dumai and Padang. Other support facilities are navigational aids equipment based at Simpang Tiga and Pekanbaru airports, and consist of Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) equipment, Air Traffic Controllers (ATC), meteorological services as well as other facilities which are always ready to provide support.

ECONOMIC

Rudini Urges Racial Assimilation by Conglomerates
93SE0152A Jakarta SUARA KARYA in Indonesian
17 Feb 93 p 3

[Text] Jakarta (SUARA KARYA)—Minister of Home Affairs Rudini says Indonesia needs conglomerates, primarily those run by people of Chinese descent, to give life to Indonesian business, but the conglomerates must assimilate and adopt a Pancasila [ideology of the Indonesian state] outlook.

"I speak candidly, because who are the ones who have come to the top as a result of economic development? They are the descendants of foreigners, especially Chinese. The president urged them to help small businessmen, but have they done so?" asked Rudini on Tuesday [16 February] immediately after participants in the All-Indonesia Working Conference of Governors, District Chiefs, and Mayors called on President Suharto at the State Palace in Jakarta.

According to the home minister, such a statement about Chinese businessmen is necessary, because the assimilation process is still incomplete, and problems still exist. "Assimilation will be needed indefinitely, since without it a feeling of family and social solidarity is impossible," he said.

To hasten the assimilation process, Rudini said, Chinese must want to assimilate, and native Indonesians must accept assimilation and want to be assimilated. In the provinces, however, the issue of assimilation is still very difficult.

Rudini feels that there are regional governments which discriminate in this matter. "For example, if a person of Chinese descent is in business, nothing is made of any mistake he might make; but if a native Indonesian commits even a small mistake, he is 'stomped on' until he is destroyed," he declared.

He stressed to the regional chiefs that they must develop unity and integrity among the people they lead and must eliminate slums and poverty. If there is no link between the strong and the weak, how can oneness and integrity be built up? "The 'strong' ones are generally people of foreign descent," he asserted.

Nevertheless, said Rudini, this situation has not reached a level so threatening that extraordinary methods of assimilation are needed. "We need to be more firm, however. Assimilation must be put into effect and not remain in the form of appeals alone. Regulations may be introduced if necessary. We must know how to lead them in practicing Pancasila from the aspect of possessing wealth. Some of them must help the weak," he said.

Rudini said that assimilation ideally includes assimilation of regional cultures. "It is my understanding that Chinese in the Tapanuli area speak Batak and that Chinese in Solo generally speak polite Javanese. The Chinese who are reluctant to do this are in Medan, Jakarta, and several other places. They still use the Chinese language, although their younger generation can no longer speak Chinese," he said.

As an example, he noted that in Jakarta itself, native Indonesian contractors are still treated as "stepchildren." A reason for this may be that officials are not ashamed to receive gifts from Chinese but are embarrassed to accept them from fellow Indonesians. He stressed, therefore, that regional chiefs should not hinder the business efforts of affluent native Indonesians.

Official Says Safety Is Top Priority in Nuclear Energy
93SE0146A Jakarta ANGKATAN BERSENJATA
in Indonesian 5 Feb 93 p 21

[Text] Engineer Adiwardoyo, head of the Nuclear Energy Research Center of the National Atomic Energy Board (BATAM), said safety is the top priority in the use of nuclear technology and that danger of radiation can be reduced to the lowest possible levels.

At a meeting with the team for the institutionalization of Nuclear Power Electric Generators (PLTN) and with officials of the West Java provincial government held in the DPRD [Provincial Parliament] Building in Bandung on Wednesday [3 February], he said that PLTNs do not need combustion through smokestacks and will not throw dust into the environment.
He said that radioactive waste is intercepted and stored, taking advantage of its volume, and then it is stored for scores of years in the PLTN region itself, because it has a relatively small volume.

"With a PLTN we can gradually limit and decrease the release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, which is the main cause of global warming of the earth’s atmosphere. We must anticipate this starting now," he said.

He also stated that the construction of a PLTN would have a positive effect on the socioeconomics of the local population. On the average, household income would double during the construction phase. When the PLTN is in operation, income would rise more than 80 percent.

He estimated that a PLTN would indirectly decrease the number of people migrating out of the province by 28,000 for seven years after the PLTN is in operation. At the same time, he said, new employment opportunities would be available for 13,500 people.

He said that there is no doubt that with the development of changes and innovations in nuclear safety technology, nuclear technology is the way to go in the coming era of energy diversification.

Production of 1.5 Million Barrels of Oil per Day Expected

93SE0146B Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 5 Feb 93 p 3

[Text] Indonesia continues to be optimistic that it can produce 1.5 million barrels of oil per day up to the year 2000. Given that figure, in the effort to attract more foreign investors in the exploration field, PERTAMINA [National Oil and Mining Company] is planning to publish an open file on Indonesia’s geological situation.

Nayoan, PERTAMINA’s director of Exploration and Production, made this statement to the press in Jakarta on Monday, 1 February.

He said that PERTAMINA bases its optimism on the fact that Indonesia now has 60 sedimentary basins. Up to now, exploration has been limited to tertiary basins, i.e. those with a geologic age of 60 million years or less.

Pretertiary basins, which are mostly found in the eastern part of Indonesia and are about 400 million years old, have not been touched. “We haven’t gotten to them yet, and that’s why I’m optimistic,” he said.

Large amounts of capital are needed for exploring and exploiting pretertiary basins because the technology needed is very difficult and because the risks are high. However, by offering incentives it is hoped that there will be more and more investors who can be pushed in that direction. One of the ways that PERTAMINA is trying is the publication of Indonesian geological documents.

Nayoan, accompanied by Zuhdy Pane, Head of the Board for Fostering and Administering Foreign Investors (BPPKA) said that these documents contain data for the last five years or more and are intended to provide clearer information about the oil and natural gas potential for all of Indonesia.

At the present time, said Nayoan, PERTAMINA is studying and looking into these plans. “We must be selective and careful, considering that not everything about Indonesia’s geological situation should be public knowledge,” he said. Up to now, special permission was needed from PERTAMINA or from the government to look at these facts.

Sixteen Contracts

In talking about the problem of production sharing contracts Nayoan said that PERTAMINA is now carrying out negotiations for three production sharing contracts in West Kalimantan, in South Sumatra, and in Jambi and for one JOB (Joint Operation Body)—a type of contract in which operations are funded jointly by the foreign contractor and by PERTAMINA, but PERTAMINA manages the operation—in South Kalimantan. The three contracts already approved by PERTAMINA, one each in Irian Jaya, South Kalimantan and the southern part of Sumatra, will be signed in the near future.

Nayoan also stated that this year PERTAMINA would open up bidding on new contracts in 20 regions. A number of foreign investors have expressed their interest and will enter the negotiating phase for about six EOR (Enhanced Oil Recovery) contracts.

“If we succeed, about 16 new contracts will be signed this year,” he said.

This figure of 16 contracts for 1993 is larger than 1992’s 11 contracts, but fewer than 1991’s 22 contracts. That is also true of the actual exploration commitments. In 1992, for example, the actual amount was only $700 million out of every $1,000 million estimated.

The low yield of the 1992 program, Nayoan said, was because the plans were made in 1991. There was a worldwide tightening in 1992, in part because there was about a 32 percent drop in the revenues of large oil companies, such as Mobil Oil, Shell, and others compared to 1990.

This decline in revenues meant a decline in funds for 1992 operations. In addition, in 1992 the United States Clean Air Act had the effect of diverting a large part of the funds put aside for upstream activities, such as exploration, to downstream activities, such as investments in refineries or refining.

In Indonesia itself, there was a tightening of bank credit in 1992 because banks were required to meet the CAR (Capital Adequacy Ratio) regulations. Another reason was the appearance of more choices—Indonesia’s competitors—for new exploration, for example Russia, Vietnam, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and others.

However, Pane said, Indonesia is still competitive in attracting investments. He mentioned the fact that at the present time no other country can rival Indonesia’s archipelagic situation, in that no matter where one drills, it will be relatively close to the coast.

In addition, in applying its production sharing contracts, Indonesia has a system, which has continued to improve, which has been in place since 1967.
"So, our only remaining problem is the geological prospectus which I mentioned earlier. The problem has been answered for the western part of Indonesia, but incentives are still needed for the eastern part of Indonesia since 95 percent of our oil still comes from the east coast of Sumatra, the north coast of Java and the east coast of Kalimantan. We are still trying to find out if there is a second golden belt. If oil is found in the Timor Gap, maybe it can also be found in Aru and in Irian Jaya," he said.

**Improvement Urged in Management of Cooperatives**

93SE0152B Jakarta ANGKATAN BERSENJATA in Indonesian 10 Feb 93 p 4

[Unsigned editorial: "Make Cooperatives a Bulwark for the National Economy"]

[Text] Cooperatives in Indonesia are moving ahead, but we must not be quickly satisfied. The realization of our desire that cooperatives be strong and dependable pillars of Indonesian economic life still needs time and serious effort, Vice President Sudharmono said when he inaugurated the First Cooperatives Week and the 1993 Working Conference of the Department of Cooperatives and again after the Bina Karya Cooperative completed its housing complex in Bandung last Monday [8 February].

Therefore, the government and the cooperatives community must take strategic and "conceptual" action to develop the world of cooperatives. The issuance of the Cooperatives Law is expected to spur this development.

To achieve this, the vice president asked the Working Conference of the Department of Cooperatives to produce concepts for improving the future role of cooperatives through new regulations.

The 1993 Cooperatives Week is an effort to show the results of the development of cooperatives during PJPT [Long-Term Development Phase] I. This week can be a vehicle for promoting the products of cooperatives/KUD's [village unit cooperatives] and a means for building cooperation and expanding the business networks of cooperatives through other economic activities, the vice president said.

Cooperatives existed in this country from colonial times, but they did not develop; and some died because managers lacked knowledge and experience and were corrupt. Members of cooperatives were the ones who were hurt, and the image of cooperatives declined.

The planned and purposeful development of cooperatives was undertaken in the New Order era on the basis of Law No. 12 of 1967 on Basic Provisions on Cooperatives. That law bore considerable fruit during 25 years of promotion of cooperatives. During that period, the number of cooperatives rose from 13,523 to 37,560, and the number of members rose from 2.5 million to 19.2 million.

Nevertheless, changes in the economy in this era of globalization made the 1967 law inadequate for the protection of cooperatives, and it was replaced with Law No. 25 of 1992 on Cooperatives, which went into effect on 21 October 1992.

According to the director general for supervision of cooperatives, Subiakto Tjakrawerdaya, four government regulations implementing the new law will be issued in March 1993. These regulations will cover forming and disbanding cooperatives, capital investment, saving and lending operations, and government protections.

The new law gives more room to cooperatives to operate without government interference.

Under the law, both central and regional governments will create and promote a climate conducive to the growth of cooperatives and public participation in them. The government will also provide guidance, facilities, and protection to cooperatives. The government is permitted to decide economic activities that may be conducted only by cooperatives. The government may also decide that certain regions successfully worked by cooperatives are to be closed to other businesses. These things will be done with an eye on the national economy and the even distribution of business opportunity.

The law also gives opportunities to cooperatives to strengthen their capital through investments by both members and nonmembers. Thus, cooperatives are free to gather funds to develop their enterprises. The law also encourages the development of professional management.

Furthermore, the law also clarifies and stresses the identity, objective, status, role, management, business operations, and capitalization of cooperatives, in addition to their supervision by the government. In this way, life oriented to cooperatives will be better guaranteed, as mandated in Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution.

Cooperatives can progress as a public economic movement based on a spirit of family only if managed efficiently and proficiently under modern business law by experienced managers. Professional managers must also be supported by better operations personnel who are oriented to excellence and who are not merely perfunctory in their work.

The main point is that because of the growing complexity of problems to be faced in the midst of increasingly stiff competition, the development of cooperatives during PJPT II demands better human resources at each level.
MILITARY

Military Budget Figures Published

93SE0154A Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai
22-29 Jan 93 pp 12, 13

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The details of the budget for the 1993 budget year were released to five affiliated units: the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, the Supreme Command Headquarters, the Royal Thai Army [RTA], the Royal Thai Navy [RTN], and the Royal Thai Air Force [RTAF]. The changes from last year could be summarized as follows:

The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense received an increase for military research and development of 16 million baht over last year. This year the budget was 87,222,700 million baht. But there was a reduction in defense planning for the Kingdom from 768,936,000 million baht to 181,145,300 million baht. As for secret operations or the secret budget as it is called, it increased from 12 million baht to 17 million baht.

As for the Supreme Command Headquarters, in 1992 it received 6,131,653,100 baht. This was increased to 7,453 million baht. There was a great increase in the construction budget from 188,424,600 million baht to 377,060,000 million baht. This included the construction budget for the headquarters building of the Supreme Military Command which had had such problems that it was eliminated.

As for the Royal Thai Air Force, in 1992 it received 33,481,628,800 baht in 1992. This year it received 37,963,297,100 baht. What was interesting was that the budget for secret operations, or the secret budget, decreased from 517,861,000 baht to 397,868,000 baht. In other areas there were small increases with the exception of health services which increased from 126,635,900 baht to 334,995,800 baht.

The Royal Thai Navy received 14,015,357 in 1992. This year it received 16,122,587,400 baht. There had been requests for increases especially for the special projects, meaning projects assigned by the government. This had been 8,128,000 baht last year, and it was requested to be 45,636,000 baht [this year]. Medical services were increased from 55,500,000 baht to 108,500,000.

The Royal Thai Air Force received 13,691,044,100 baht in 1992. This year it requested 15,703,185,000 baht. Of particular note was the budget for the defense of the Kingdom. This referred to the carrying out of plans to build up combat forces and the committed budget. This increased from 4,991,091,600 baht to 5,816,641,700 baht. Another large increase was for health services which increased from 45,872,000 million baht to 66,552,500 million baht.

If one were interested in the secret budget, the uses of which the average person is not able to learn but which affects the security of the nation greatly and which the military is suspected of bargaining over, it has been learned from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense that its budget in this area went from 12 million to 17 million. The Supreme Military Command requested the same as before: 75,200,000 baht. The RTA budget decreased from 517,868,000 baht to 397,868,000 baht. The RTN budget remained at 86 million baht, and the RTAF budget remained at 25 million baht.

From these summarized details it can be seen that the military has been reserved in its budget requests in this area, especially the RTA. Its secret budget requests went from 317,868,000 million baht in 1991 to 517,868,000 baht in 1992. Although it appears that this year the political situation would require more of a budget for the gathering of intelligence inasmuch as events were occurring continuously on the border and the situation there was much hotter than in previous years, nevertheless the RTA was willing to request a smaller budget in this area.
POLITICAL

New Year Interview With Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet

93SE0109A Hanoi SUNDAY VIETNAM NEWS in English
3 Jan 93 p 1

[Text] Q: In your recent report to the second session of the 9th National Assembly, you already spoke of the new socio-economic situation in our country. Could you again elaborate on this?

A: In 1992, we achieved a relatively comprehensive success on the economic front. For the first time, as I reported, we were able to fulfill and even overfulfill the main targets set for the year. This was the result of a combination of many factors year after year, with strenuous efforts exerted by the entire people. All our achievements originated from our party line and policies of renovation, from our sustained efforts towards better management and investment in laying the material and technical foundations, and from our open-door foreign policy as well. These factors, in fact, have raised the whole society to a high degree of unanimity in the process of Doi Moi, stimulating the masses to work with renewed enthusiasm and all branches, services and localities to bring into full play their initiative and creativeness. At the same time, they have won sympathy and support from our trends outside the country. Obviously we are now in a better position to develop than a year or two ago even though our material strength is still limited.

With a new situation opening up in all areas of social life. Yet, we do not intend to make light of our difficulties, let alone our numerous shortcomings. We are not only analysing but also striving to overcome them with the hope that we could seize new opportunities to ride through the present crisis and eventually tackle our problems to create new, favourable conditions for development. Failing to seize new opportunities would only make our problems ever more difficult and complex. This is a law of development.

We know for sure that every area, every locality in our country is potentially strong enough for exploitation and development in one way or another, that no locality is incapable of developing at all. During my latest fact-finding tour of a number of provinces, districts and villages including villages beset with difficulties in Tra Vinh and Soc Trang, I saw great scope for exploitation. These things are of vital importance to radically transforming state administrative apparatus; strengthening order and discipline, prevention and eradication of corruption and smuggling. All these programmes were reported in the National Assembly and made public through mass media.

Now I want to say more about priority in economic construction. In both nature and economy, unequal development is a universal phenomenon, if not a law. For years, economic development in the whole country as well as in each locality used to be spread evenly. That was why investment could not be concentrated main targets of decisive significance to the whole economy, leading to waste of money on certain projects. So, it is very important to define key projects for the whole country and for each branch, each province, each city, each district or precinct.

From 1993, we will mobilise capital from all Sources at home and abroad to speed up construction of key projects, to expand or upgrade existing facilities and, at the same time, to concentrate on building new major infrastructure projects, in particular roads and ports, in support of socio-economic development in the coming years. We also begin to build economic zones with great potentials, thereby accelerating socio economic development in the whole country. Three such zones have been defined for the national construction strategy from now to the year 2000. They are Hanoi-Hai-Phong-Quang Ninh, HCM City-Bien Hoa-Vung Tau, and the Western Highlands and the Central Coast.

Of course, while concentrating on key projects, we will also invest in other branches and localities to a certain extent, with emphasis on our most urgent needs.

Q: Could you elaborate on administrative reforms?

A: In my recent report to the National Assembly I already pointed out the tasks of reforming the state administrative apparatus in all aspects its function, duties, working relations and style, personnel, training, etc.

These things are of vital importance to radically transforming state administrative bodies moving them away from the authoritative bureaucratic mode of socio-economic management to one of the rule of law. So reforms an effective management apparatus worthy of the trust of the people.

In this connection, I must again stress responsibility of the executive power as a whole and the heads of various administrative offices at all levels. They must provide better guidance in the settlement of local affairs. The chairmen of grassroots People's Committees, from district or precinct levels downwards, must change their working style by keeping closely in touch with the people in order that satisfactory solutions may be brought to such local problems as support for needy families in production and
daily life, fighting corruption, smuggling, prostitution, drug addiction, gambling and other social evils, fostering a civilised mode of life, and ensuring a safe peaceful life for all members of society.

Principles of Building Model of Socialism Discussed
932E0047A Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Nov 92 pp 1, 4

[Article by Professor Tran Nham: "On the Model of Socialism in Our Country"]

[Text] The party's platform adopted by the seventh party congress traced out the main features of the concept of socialism and the path to socialism in our country.

These features have determined the general strategic orientation for resolving the contradiction between the need to attain the goal of making the people prosperous and the country powerful along the socialist line on one side and the state of economic underdevelopment and the forces obstructing fulfillment of that requirement on the other side. This orientation is directly aimed at stabilizing the socioeconomic situation, extricating the country from the current crisis, and creating the basis for development and gradual advance to modernization. It asserts the principles of socialism in the political, economic, social, cultural, national defense and security domains in our country; at the same time, it gives expression to our party's principled stance on the most important issues relating to the fate and prospects of socialism and the success or failure of the renovation undertaking. At present, these issues have become a bone of contention in the struggle about stance, viewpoint, and ideology between socialism and capitalism and among different trends in the workers movement.

It could be said that the goals and orientation set forth by the party's platform are a general outline of the model of socialism that our people will be building.

What could we say here about our perception of the question of the model of socialism?

Over the past several decades, a prevalent orthodox view in various socialist countries was that there was a sole, mandatory common model for all countries in transition to socialism. Whoever contradicted that view was accused of revisionism and betrayal of Marxism-Leninism. In such a situation, the majority of socialist countries were willy-nilly forced to slavishly copy the model of socialism of the Soviet Union.

Since transition to socialism is effected within the framework of different countries, which proceed from different starting points, historical characteristics, and national traditions, and from different economic, cultural, and social levels, how could similar forms and methods of transition be applied to every country? What is right for and applicable to one country may not be right for and applicable to others. The more countries participating in the socialist-oriented historical current of development, the more accentuated and colorful the picture will become because each country bears the specific imprint of its particular national development.

Therefore, instead of a single common model of transition to socialism, there can be many different models. But whichever model one may choose, one is required to know how to correctly combine the general with the particular in applying the objective laws. The more varied and diversified models of socialism, the more important the combination of the general and the particular.

Whichever model one chooses, it must be aimed at developing a socioeconomic form superior to the capitalist socioeconomic form; this is a necessary rung on the evolutionary ladder that every nation and all mankind are bound to attain. As the Marxist-Leninist theory of socioeconomic forms has clearly pointed out, a specific society developing in a particular historical period is a complete structure constantly on the move under the effects of the dialectical interaction between production relations and productive forces and between the infrastructure and the superstructure.

A firm grasp of this theory would provide us with an objective criterion for judging each model of transition to socialism, for distinguishing one specific model from another, and would enable us to find out the common features in the history of development of various countries and peoples, and at the same time to discover the particular characteristics of each model in the specific development of each country. On this basis, we would compare the social systems of different countries and clearly determine the stages of development each country must go through.

Thus, the structure of a socioeconomic form is an ever-changing living mechanism constantly affected by the law of compatibility between production relations and the character and standard of productive forces and between the infrastructure and superstructure. If we do not proceed from this methodology in developing a model of socialism, we will inevitably be susceptible to subjectivism and voluntarism, thus seriously violating the objective laws.

In the process of leading the building of socialism, our party itself has not been able to avoid mistakes, shortcomings, subjectivism, voluntarism, and violations of the objective laws, especially the law of compatibility between production relations and the character and standard of production and between the infrastructure and superstructure.

To overcome the shortcomings and mistakes already committed, especially to settle various contradictions in order to promote compatibility between production relations and productive forces and between the infrastructure and superstructure, we must speed up the liberation, renovation, and development undertaking. Only by liberating all forces and latent potential will we have the necessary strength to speed up renovation and development. By the same token, speedy development is a condition for more profound liberation and renovation.

Renovation, therefore, is the revolutionary undertaking of our entire nation aimed at extricating the country from the socioeconomic crisis, overcoming the state of poverty and
backwardness, and implementing the socialist-oriented socioeconomic and cultural development program for the people's happiness.

Renovation is aimed at achieving stability and development. This is a healthy and positive stability built on production development, economic growth, improved and heightened living standards of all laborers, and on the building of healthy social relations through the broadening of democracy and the strengthening of social law and discipline. Such a healthy and positive stability must be a result and achievement of renovation; brought about by renovation, it will also serve as the basis for developing society in a creative, dynamic, and modern direction. This is the driving force of the shaping of a model of socialism for our country.

Building a model of socialism for our country is a process of endless efforts to overcome the contradictions that crop up in daily life. According to the basic viewpoint of our party's platform, the underpinning principles serving as the methodological viewpoint to be followed in building that model are the following:

1. We must attach great importance to the role and essence of the socialist state and pay special attention to the need to build the socialist state in the transitional period. Our party does not stray from the Marxist-Leninist principles of the state of proletarian dictatorship; but, at the same time, it also introduces a substantive understanding of that state—a state of the people, by the people, and for the people. This is precisely the most profound characteristic of the system of people's power, a characteristic that is in conformity with the nature of socialist democracy. Only with such a state—where the people's genuine power is asserted and implemented with the might of the law in an open, equitable, democratic, and progressive manner—will we be able to counter the rampage of bureaucratism and corruption, the toxins that vitiate the state and corrupt its nature. The concept of state is closely linked with that of strengthening the role of law, and the concept of the essence of democracy is bound up with those of law, the legal system, and the management of society by law. This is precisely the crux of political democracy in our society.

2. We must carry out a comprehensive and far-reaching socialist revolution in all the three domains of productive forces, production relations, and superstructure. Of these domains, we must make every effort to develop productive forces. This is the central, foremost task aimed at laying strong economic groundwork for the gradual emergence of the socialist mode of production. It is also the most basic task that our people must carry out in the period of transition, the task of highest priority and of decisive significance to the victory of socialism.

Socialism can exist and develop in a strong, stable, and harmonious manner only on the basis of modern productive forces and new productive capabilities, which we must create. We must quickly release and exploit all capabilities of the productive forces, develop the diversified and varied commodity-based multisector economy, and create large amounts of products and ever greater sources of capital accumulation. The building of production relations and superstructure must all proceed from the requirement that productive forces be set free and always has the effect of promoting the development of productive forces. Only in this way can we ensure victory over the intrinsic anarchic spontaneity of scattered small production and over forces hostile to socialism. This is a correct way to give expression to the theme of class struggle.

3. We must achieve compatibility with the development of productive forces: establish socialist production relations step by step, from the low level to a higher one, with diversified forms of ownership; and develop the commodity-based economy according to the state-managed market mechanism. The system of public ownership will gradually become the underpinnings of socialism; this system cannot be created by administrative measures or coercion but must be a natural result of the real socialization process. Each kind of ownership cannot exist in a formalistic fashion but must have real economic contents and effects. Social ownership must be one that has owners or individuals who assume responsibility. The state of ownerless ownership that has existed for a long time should be ended. We should not completely identify social ownership with state ownership because this would result in the state of extreme centralization, cause social ownership to be separated from its subject, and give rise to bureaucratism and monopoly in production and business. We must closely combine various forms of social ownership with other forms of ownership.

4. We must carry out the socialist revolution in the ideological and cultural fields, thereby enabling the Marxist-Leninist world outlook and Ho Chi Minh thought to hold a fundamental position in the spiritual life of society. We must overcome the pernicious effects of feudalism, petty bourgeois mentality, colonial culture, and bourgeois ideology. We must bring into play the human factor to build a civilized society sustained by ideals, aspirations, ethics, culture, and respect for law and order. We must liberate individuals to liberate society and combine the strength of individuals with that of the community, which constitutes an important driving force of socialism and of the process of liberating and developing productive forces.

A new feature here is that we have begun to approach socialism as a product, a valuable crystallization of the achievements of mankind's civilization and culture, thus overcoming our past rigid perception which hindered the selective reception of the quintessence of human culture in the life of socialism.

The aforementioned principles and methodology are a synthesis of the basic viewpoints aimed at building a model of socialism for our country. In this model, productive forces, production relations, and the superstructure are the component parts of a socioeconomic form which is to be built simultaneously, but development of productive forces must be regarded as the foremost and central task that would decide the final victory of socialism.

The model of socialism in our country needs to be built uniformly and with balance among its various components. Economic renovation is impossible if it is not
accompanied by simultaneous and appropriate changes in the political system and in the social and spiritual domains. This model is not confined solely to the development of productive forces and to production relations; instead, it requires a simultaneous transformation even of the superstructure, the political system, social relations, and people's psychology.

Thus, we can draw the following conclusion: To build socialism in our country is to build a society where the system of exploitation of man by man, social oppression, poverty and hunger, and unemployment will be abolished and the laboring people will be masters of the country. Such a society will create great capability for strongly developing productive forces, promoting scientific and technological advances, ensuring employment, and ceaselessly improving and raising the people's living standard. It will be a society where all forces and talents will be liberated and developed; where human rights, personal qualities, and the laboring people's dignity will be brought into full play; and where favorable conditions will be created for the comprehensive development of man. It will be a democratic and humane society where the free development of each man will be the condition for the free development of all men. This is for the sake of man's happiness and the country's prosperity.

This is the model of socialism that our people are building in the future.

MILITARY

General Stresses Need for National Defense-Security Unity

932E0051A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Oct 92 pp 3-7, 31


[Text] “Closely linking the national defense task with the security task” [Footnote 1] [Resolution of the Third Plenum of the Seventh Party Central Committee] is an objective requirement, a guiding viewpoint and concept that thoroughly permeates our national defense task at this juncture.

To oppose and undermine our country's revolution in the past as well as at present, hostile forces have usually resorted to the tricks of sabotage, causing political, economic, and social instability from within in conjunction with attacks launched from without.

At present, in the process of feverishly implementing the "peaceful evolution" scheme to foment rebellion and subversion, these forces attach special importance to taking advantage of the bad influence of the political and social changes in a string of East European countries and the (former) Soviet Union to distort facts, to incite public opinion, and to breed skepticism among our people toward the socialist path. They have capitalized on the loopholes, mistakes, and shortcomings in the socioeconomic positions and policies of our party and state to attract the masses, to demand "political pluralism and a plurality of opposition parties," and to sow division within our party, our state, our Army, our public security service, and among our people in an attempt to cause sociopolitical disorder. For decades now, they have implemented a policy of economic embargo to push us deeper into the economic crisis in order to eventually cause a sociopolitical crisis, overthrow the socialist system, and put our country into the orbit of capitalism. On the other hand, hostile forces in and outside the country have feverishly rallied, built up, and developed forces, and have coordinated their sabotage activities, waiting for an opportunity to cause rebellion and overthrow the regime. They have combined these maneuvers with the application of military deterrence and stand ready to intervene by force whenever conditions permit. There is no boundary between "peaceful evolution" and rebellion to overthrow the regime from within and military intervention from the outside: they intertwine, closely coordinate with each other, and guide and transform each other according to the development of the situation.

This reality presents us with extremely heavy strategic tasks, namely we must concentrate on national construction while struggling against and frustrating all enemy schemes and tricks, be they "peaceful evolution" aimed at fomenting rebellion and subversion, or encirclement, blockade, armed raids, and war of aggression of varying intensity conducted by the enemy. Now more than ever before, these heavy tasks require that the national defense and security sectors should be closely linked with each other to effectively cope with and readily smash all enemy schemes and acts of combining opposition and sabotage from within with military attacks from without.

If we succeed in firmly maintaining political stability, achieving socioeconomic development, gradually improving the people's material and spiritual life, and building a strong national defense and security system, all this will provide us with a firm basis for neutralizing and smashing the enemy "peaceful evolution" scheme and military deterrence. The fundamental issue here is that, to safeguard national security and the durability of the regime, we must mobilize the aggregate strength of construction and struggle in the political, ideological, cultural, economic, diplomatic, national defense, security... and other fields, of which national defense and security are the closely linked principal domains.

The close combination of national defense and security must be reflected in many aspects. In connection with this matter, a number of concrete tasks stand out as follows:

1. The unity and combination of national defense and security must be reflected first of all in the determination of common goals and tasks and in the organization of implementation.

The Platform for National Construction in the Period of Transition to Socialism asserted: "We must firmly defend the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the fatherland; safeguard the socialist regime, political stability, social order and safety, and the people's right to
mastery; and frustrate all schemes and acts of imperialist and reactionary forces aimed at sabotaging our people's revolutionary cause." Obviously, it is difficult to discern any clear distinction between the national defense and security tasks; in fact, these tasks have become the two united sides of the current task of defending the socialist fatherland. (Naturally, there still must be a division of particular functions and responsibilities between the national defense and security forces). There must be close coordination between national defense and security in monitoring and evaluating situations; in formulating national defense and security strategies and strategic plans; and in guiding implementation in each locality and throughout the country. In our plans, we must fully anticipate all possible contingencies and suggest corrective measures and suitable, highly effective policies to cope with each contingency.

"The stability and development of all aspects of social life constitute the foundation of national defense and security. Socioeconomic development must go along with the strengthening of national defense and security potential. We must closely combine economy with national defense and security and vice versa in socioeconomic development plans." [Footnote 2] [From "The Platform for National Construction in the Period of Transition to Socialism"]. Imbued with this spirit, we must ceaselessly consolidate and cultivate our political, spiritual, economic, military, security, and other potentials... to resolutely foil all enemy schemes and tricks; firmly hold to the banners of national independence, socialism, and national reunification; and safeguard our territorial integrity.

At present, we are implementing an open-door policy and broadening our economic, scientific, technological, cultural, and other relations with all countries. This is realistic and an objective demand. The national defense and security sectors must have a correct perception of this policy and effectively contribute to it in order to ensure socioeconomic development while firmly maintaining and boosting our country's national defense and security potentialities.

In recent years, progress has been made in combining national defense and security with other sectors in general and national defense with security in particular. This progress is most clearly reflected in the tasks of promoting production, consolidating national defense, and maintaining order and security at installations throughout the country, especially in important areas, at the border, on offshore islands... and in the building of provinces (or cities) and districts (or towns) into strong defense zones.

2. The unity and combination of national defense and security must be reflected in the building of a strong all-people national defense disposition, which must be closely combined with the people's security disposition in the new conditions.

Our strength in national defense and security is the strength of our entire people and country. To what extent that strength would be developed depends primarily on whether or not the national defense disposition and security disposition are satisfactorily built and combined. Essentially, the building of the all-people national defense disposition and the people's security disposition consists of the development and deployment of the political, spiritual, socioeconomic, military, security, and other potentialities of the entire country and each locality and establishment. This is a task originating from our party's viewpoint of "considering the people as the roots." On the other hand, the building of the national defense and security dispositions also involves organizing the transformation of these potentialities into concrete strength (or capability) for the defense of the fatherland and socialism.

The national defense and security dispositions must be built and planned in conformity with the socioeconomic development strategy and with economic zoning work and population redistribution by the party and state. At the same time, this building must be based on scientific forecasts of enemy schemes and tricks. Along with the common national defense and security dispositions of the nation, there must be dispositions for each direction, each strategic region, each locality, and each area. Although their purposes and basic requirements are similar, the national defense and security dispositions in mountain regions must be different from those in the towns and cities and certainly cannot resemble those in the sea areas and on offshore islands. Whenever the situation changes, these dispositions must be essentially readjusted. This must be said to prevent mechanical imitation and the lack of a sense of constant consolidation and improvement.

The national defense and security dispositions of any locality must be built and consolidated chiefly by the party committee echelon, the administration, and the people of that particular locality. The principal question is that we must know how to rely on the people and initiate a mass movement to maintain security and consolidate national defense. Realities in many localities and establishments have showed that, to remove all obstacles in carrying our national defense and security tasks, with the exception of those secrets that must be kept, we should "let the people know, discuss, do, and control" everything else, especially those matters directly relating to their duties and interests.

An important factor deciding the success of the task of building and combining the all-people national defense disposition with the people's security disposition is that we must develop comprehensively strong grass-roots units and build districts, towns, and provinces (or cities) into impregnable defense zones. We must closely combine this task with the consolidation of people's security positions, attaching great importance to vital areas. These are component parts of the current national defense and security dispositions throughout the country. In these defense zones, in addition to the political, socioeconomic development plans..., there must also be combat plans, defense plans, and plans to counter "peaceful evolution," rebellion, and subversion. In these plans, measures should be set forth to effect close coordination between the national defense and security forces in order to bring into play the strength of each force in mass motivation work and in the struggle and fighting against the enemy.
3. The unity and combination of national defense and security must be reflected in the organization and building of the people’s Armed Forces.

In this fierce and complex struggle, we must “concentrate our efforts on improving the overall quality and fighting strength” [Footnote 3] [Resolution of the Third Plenum of the Seventh Party Central Committee] of the people’s Armed Forces (comprising the three categories of troops and people’s public security agents), thus making them worthy of being the party’s and state’s reliable forces and strong enough to serve as the core and assault forces of the entire people in the defense of the independence, security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the socialist fatherland. Along with readjusting forces, consolidating organizations, and building the Army and Public Security Service into well-trained and gradually modernized revolutionary regular forces, we must pay special attention to strengthening the party leadership over the people’s Armed Forces. To build strong party organizations in the Armed Forces is to ensure the strengthening of the party leadership in each unit in particular and in all the Armed Forces in general. This is a decisive factor enabling the Armed Forces to acquire a solid political character, great unity of will, and the capability to satisfactorily fulfill their tasks in the new stage. These tasks are inscribed in Article 45 of the 1992 SRV Constitution as follows: “The people’s Armed Forces shall be absolutely loyal to the fatherland and the people; be dutybound to stand ready to fight in defense of the independence, sovereignty, unification, and territorial integrity of the fatherland, national security, and public order and safety, and in defense of the socialist regime and revolutionary gains; and join the entire people in national construction.”

The Armed Forces must always remember that their responsibility is to serve as the core and assault forces in the task of national defense and security. Acting alone or in close coordination with other forces, they must struggle against reactionary, revisionist, opportunist, and right-wing deviationist viewpoints and ideologies, and against corruption, smuggling, and crime, which are jeopardizing sociopolitical security and directly sapping our national defense and security strength. They must safeguard the party leadership and the state management, protect the laboring people’s right to mastery, and take the socialist renovation undertaking to complete victory.

To give the Armed Forces sufficient strength to fulfill their tasks, it is necessary to attach much importance to improving the quality of the formal and on-the-job training of cadres, and improving the quality of training of forces according to their practical tasks. We must take every effective measure we can to intensify the provision of equipment and techniques to meet the demands posed by the tasks of each force. We must amend, promulgate, and scrupulously and wholeheartedly implement necessary policies toward the Armed Forces and their families. There must be adequate national defense and security budgets to meet the demands raised by our tasks in the new situation.

4. We must build and eventually perfect a leadership and management coordination mechanism to ensure close combination of the national defense tasks and the security task at all levels.

The party committee echelons’ absolute, direct, all-sided leadership over national defense and security work is the most important, most basic, and absolutely inviolable guiding principle. Party resolutions and directives must be institutionalized by the state, which must promptly promulgate various mechanisms and decisions—to ensure that the needs of the national defense and security sectors are satisfied—and necessary procedures and policies.

Concerning the state, under the direction of the National Defense and Security Council headed by the president of the state, and under the management of the government, it “shall exercise unified managerial control over the implementation of political, economic, cultural, social, national defense, security, and diplomatic tasks of the state” (The 1992 SRV Constitution).

To exercise timely leadership and tackle national defense and security tasks, between the party committees and military organs on one side and the party committees and public security organs on the other side at all levels, there should be regular and periodic coordination in monitoring situations, using forces, and determining operational orientation, themes, and measures.

At present, all national defense activities from the provincial level on down to the grass roots are governed by the mechanism “the party leads, the administration manages, and the military organ serves as an advisory body.” What should be added here is that we must build a mechanism for combat cooperation and coordination between the People’s Public Security Service on one side and the People’s Army and militia and self-defense forces on the other side to satisfactorily serve as an advisory body to the party and administration in carrying out national defense and security tasks, especially in important areas such as the borders, the seas, major cities....

The application of the new mechanism of party leadership over national defense and the mechanism of leading and managing the task of combining national defense with security over the past years has yielded great results and provided us with definite experience. To regularly and effectively manage and promptly carry out national defense and security tasks, many provinces have set up unified commands or interservice commands composed of public security and military forces, the tax and court services, people’s organs of control, propaganda and educational services... and headed by provincial people’s committee chairmen. Numerous establishments have organized national defense and security party chapters to strengthen the party leadership over national defense and security tasks. There is a great need to review, assert, and place these models under unified guidance. However, in practical activities, there still are manifest weaknesses and confusion, especially in localities and grass-roots units. Most evident is the fact that many localities have not yet correctly determined the position of the public security
service in the mechanism of leadership over security work. In many exercises in the maintenance of security in various localities, the military organs themselves undertook to organize and direct exercises, while the public security service should have been the one who presided over the implementation of this task. In dealing with various "hot spots" and suppressing armed reactionary forces, there still has been confusion in the coordination of action between the army and the public security service and other forces.

Under the light of the Resolution of the Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee on national defense and security, many issues will surely be studied and developed into programs of action to promote greater unity between national defense and security.

General Looks at Experience in Defense-Security Work

932E0050A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Oct 92 pp 46-50

[Article by Lieutenant General Phan Hoan, commander of the 5th Military Region: "Firmly Maintaining Security and Consolidating National Defense in the 5th Military Region"]

[Text] The 5th Military Region, like several other military regions, has suffered from the adverse effects of the collapse of the East European socialist countries and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Reactionaries of all stripes in and outside the country have colluded with opportunist and disaffected elements to rally forces and intensify their sabotage activities against the socialist renovation of our people in many fields—political, economic, national defense, cultural, educational—in all localities. The FULRO [United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Peoples] reactionaries, who disguised themselves as ethnic minorities and who have served as a tool for several generations of colonialists and imperialists to sow division among different nationalities, have striven to restore and reestablish "sanctuaries" and carried out activities sabotaging the party's and state's policy toward the ethnic minorities in various villages and hamlets in the Central Highlands. They have even resorted to armed activities in confronting the authorities, and have plundered property, killed people, and destroyed production establishments and resettlement centers of various ethnic minorities in an attempt to kindle the "nationalities issue," to cause political instability.... Many members of the former puppet administration and army who refused to be reformed and who are aided and directed by external reactionary forces, are taking advantage of our weaknesses to arouse public opinion about the issues of democracy and living standards in an attempt to drive a wedge between our party and the people, to cause the people to lose confidence in the future, to plant the seeds of rebellion and subversion.... Reactionary elements disguising themselves as followers of major religions such as Catholicism, Buddhism, Caodaism... have distorted our party's and state's policy of freedom of faith, have taken advantage of missionary work to carry out propaganda against socialism, promote a superstitious life-style, kindle among the believers and peasants the problems of farmland, religion.... The coast of the 5th Military Region, which extends for more than 1,100 km and comprises systems of close-to-shore or offshore islands and archipelagoes such as Hoang Sa [Paracels] and Truong Sa [Spratly], and more than 200,000 square km of continental shelf, used to be the landing site of various invading foreign expeditionary corps. This coastal area is currently facing difficulty in marine resources management and exploitation, in infiltration suppression, and in the defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity; it also harbors the danger of armed conflict. Along the 732-km Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia common border, which is being developed into a border of peace and friendship, there have appeared abnormal phenomena caused by exiles and reactionary forces in an attempt to incite illegal cultivation and resettlement in other people's land, disputes, infiltrations... thereby sowing disunity among Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The enemy's maneuvers are very sophisticated, permitting no distinction between political, psychological, social, ideological, violent and nonviolent... activities. This makes it very difficult for us to determine where is the danger of rebellion, subversion, and insecurity, where is the threat of armed conflict or aggression....

For this reason, we can neither separate national defense from security nor oppose them to each other. Instead, we must consider both of these areas of work as a unified process of motion of the task of opposing "peaceful evolution" and the "soft" war of aggression, which must be closely linked to the task of standing ready to counter the "hard" war of aggression. The dialectical unity between national defense and security, and vice versa, is a new law governing the development of the task of building and defending the socialist regime and safeguarding the socialist fatherland.

Nowadays, in the area of the 5th Military Region, unlike what they did in wartime, the people and armed forces are carrying out the two tasks of building and defending the fatherland in peacetime. The hostile and reactionary forces in and outside the country are scheming to abolish socialism and liquidate our national independence and territorial sovereignty by implementing the "peaceful evolution strategy," applying deterrent military pressure, and threatening aggression. The internal enemies and external aggressors are in caboats. The "victory without war" strategy and the strategy of starting wars of aggression in all forms pursued by various reactionary forces are being closely combined to sabotage and annex our country. The aim of abolishing socialism and aim of aggression of imperialism against our country are inseparable. Therefore, the process of their implementation of the "peaceful evolution strategy" is aimed not only at weakening us and depriving us of political security in order to advance toward overthrowing our regime but also at making preparations for war of aggression when an opportunity presents itself. Thus, this process harbors the danger of war of aggression. Their constant application of military pressure from without is aimed not only at increasing the danger of aggression but also at giving rise to and developing factors
that cause political insecurity and incites rebellion and subversion. The people's armed forces should realize that they must oppose aggression and acts of aggression by the enemy even when war has not yet broken out, and that they must oppose the schemes of aggression and annexation of imperialists and reactionaries right in the process of opposing peaceful evolution, rebellion, and subversion. This is also the process in which the people's armed forces must join the people's public security forces and the entire people in firmly maintaining security, consolidating national defense, and preventing armed conflict and war of aggression.

To fulfill this duty, it is necessary to further improve the quality of the core force of the entire people in the task of firmly maintaining political security and consolidating national defense. This force comprises the People's Army (including the local forces), the People's Public Security Forces (including border defense troops), and militia and self-defense forces. What is of paramount importance is to improve the political quality of this core force. We must see that many are the causes of the decline in some aspects of the sense of national defense among the people of various ethnic minority groups, of the youth's still poor sense of responsibility for discharging their military duty, of the slow-improving discipline in army units, and of the still unsatisfactory combat readiness of a number of units.... Therefore, the armed forces' political quality cannot be raised by means of political education and motivation alone.

Basing ourselves on the realities in the 5th Military Region, we think that we must closely combine education in patriotism and the heightening of socialist consciousness and the sense of responsibility for defending the regime and the fatherland with satisfactory implementation of the social welfare policy toward soldiers and their families, thereby inextricably linking the discharge of each soldier's lofty duty with the guarantee of his practical interests. Proceeding in this direction, the 5th Military Region has actively applied new educational themes concerning patriotism and has linked the people's love of their native land with their responsibility for defending the regime and the fatherland. Political motivation and education measures have been applied on a large scale from families, schools, mass organizations, and localities to Army units to heighten the sense of responsibility of cadres and combatants in the struggle against “peaceful evolution,” to overcome weak aspects, to actively build Army units.... At the same time, the military region has striven to create proper conditions for Army units to improve soldiers' diet, to increase the monthly and quarterly incomes of officers in both organs and units, and to balance their own budgets to save money for providing cadres with additional uniforms. The military region has also tried to save money to help officers take leave to visit their faraway birthplaces. Aided by various localities, the military region has gradually found employment for cadres' families, has assisted cadres in building household economy in appropriate ways, and has allocated houses and land to cadres so that they may “live in peace and be content with their occupations.” Many provinces and cities such as Khanh Hoa, Phu Yen, Quang Nam-Danang, and Dac Lac... have paid for transportation expenses or provided transportation and have supplied more rice and money to military cadres going to school. A number of localities have opened passbook savings accounts for draftees. In 1991, the military region spent more than 1 billion dong to care for the families of servicemen on active duty and to implement the welfare policies for war invalids, families of fallen soldiers.... However, this work must be done more thoroughly, on a long-term basis, and in a steadier fashion on the state plane to help further improve the political quality of troops in the military region.

The tasks of firmly maintaining political security and consolidating national defense call for studies to be conducted to improve the organization of forces of the three categories of troops to make it more rational, and to closely combine these forces with the security forces. The main forces and local forces in both the western border area and on the eastern islands, archipelagoes, and coastal area must be consolidated and improved as far as troop strength, organization, and equipment are concerned. Those units designated to defend the western border defense line and important positions, cities, towns, and bases in the Central Highlands must be units really capable of fighting and maintaining combat readiness as required by their tasks. Units charged with defending the coast and the islands and archipelagoes must be the ones that are selected for their quality, that have a compact and light organizational structure, and that are equipped in a relatively uniform fashion as required by their combat duties on the sea and islands. In both the western border and eastern coastal areas, strong mobile units must be organized so that they can take up combat duties anytime. The experience of Dac Lac has showed that, with limited troop strength we can still create a model of local force organization that is compact, light, and combat-worthy. These mobile units must be provided with means of transportation suitable for sea and mountain travel, including “civil” means such as motorcycles, horses, bicycles, fishing boats, motorboats, and tourist boats. In the current highly restrictive conditions, the 5th Military Region is striving to make the fullest use of the capability of various localities in the field of information and telecommunications, as well as the means of transportation, marine fishing, marine economic and communications building, and timber exploitation and transportation of the state and joint ventures to serve national defense and security along the line of combining economic building with national defense.

The building of militia and self-defense forces are posing new requirements. The task of defending villages and hamlets and safeguarding political security for the settlement of ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands, for the development of forest and marine economy, and on main communications axes such as Route 1, railroads, Routes 14 and 26... must be assumed by local militia and self-defense forces. These forces, which must simultaneously perform military duties and participate in carrying out security tasks, are organized in villages and hamlets, state organs, and enterprises, including privately-owned enterprises and production establishments... in conformity with
the established principle and specific situation in the localities concerned. What matters is that the political quality of these forces and the unified and centralized leadership of grass-roots party and administrative organizations over them must be ensured.

Another task that should be satisfactorily carried out is to reinforce and gradually perfect the security and national defense dispositions and to combine the people's security disposition with the people's war disposition. The people and people's armed forces have finished building all the nine provinces and 108 districts, towns, and cities into strong defense zones and have held exercises according to the new mechanism. A number of important cities and towns have organized exercises in countering "peaceful evolution," rebellion, and subversion. These are great efforts on the part of the armed forces and people in the 5th Military Region. What still needs to be done to reinforce and perfect provincial and district defense zones is to unite security zones with defense zones and to closely combine the people's security disposition with the people's war disposition in each district, province, and city. Such unification and combination require that we make additional studies to clearly determine various objects of struggle (internal enemy and external aggressors), that we study and determine methods of operation and fighting ranging from countering "peaceful evolution," countering rebellion and subversion, and countering air and amphibious assaults to countering war of aggression. We must study the combination of security and national defense in a rational deployment of security forces and military forces composed of three categories of troops according to a plan for close cooperation and under unified leadership and command.

We should concentrate on reinforcing and perfecting the security and national defense dispositions in important areas such as the Central Highlands and major coastal cities and towns first. There, we must do a good job of building political bases, developing the masses' political forces, really cultivating the bloc of unity of the people of various nationalities, consolidating party organizations, and raising their leadership capability and militancy. Along with this work, we must focus on further improving the material and spiritual life of the ethnic minorities and laboring people. According to the experience of many provinces, the local forces and militia and self-defense forces must actively participate in this task. Only in this way can we establish steady, sensitive, and alert political bases among the population, in various economic, cultural, ideological sectors... to promptly discover the peaceful evolution schemes and tricks of the enemy and to launch timely attacks against him. At the same time, we must increase the material bases and means of these directions and areas. We must concentrate our resources on equipping the forces defending security and sovereignty on the sea with relatively modern means of communications, patrolling, and pursuit, and with means of communications, firepower, and means of transportation suitable for mountainous terrain....

Satisfactorily applying the mechanism of coordinating national defense with security, and vice versa, in the military region is vital to a satisfactory fulfillment of the task of national defense there, especially in each province, city, and district. Proceeding from the principle that the party exerts absolute and direct leadership over all aspects of the task of firmly maintaining security and consolidating national defense, we should concretize the mechanism of coordinating the security forces and the military forces composed of three categories of troops according to the tasks, targets, areas, and operational methods, especially in important areas, and should concentrate the material and spiritual strength of these forces to attack the enemy at decisive moments and in vitally important areas. Depending on the concrete situation and plans to attack the enemy in important areas, we can prepare in advance a provisional unified security-national defense leadership and command organization, with the standing committee of the military region's party committee, the standing committees of city, provincial, precinct, and district party committees... serving as its nucleus, and with authoritative organs serving as an advisory body. The mechanism of coordinating national defense with security in major cities and important towns, at predictable "hot points"... must be prepared right now and must be put to effect in the process of implementing the plan of firmly maintaining political security and consolidating national defense. We cannot wait until incidents occur before we determine a unified command and management mechanism and organization, because such an approach would substantially reduce leadership and command effectiveness. Nor should we set up too many leadership and command organizations, because this would lead to overlapping of duties and encroachment on one another's responsibilities, and to no one actually doing any work despite a large staff.

We must boldly further increase the supply of modern means of communications and command to leadership and command organizations, and administer unified management of national defense and security work (including national defense and security communications, storage of national defense and security situation data, selection of plans of national defense and security communications between two forces, command communications, placing troops on alert)... in order to ensure a highly reliable decision-making process, to speedily and efficiently handle large amounts of information, and to launch timely attacks on the enemy.

Models of Rudimentary Weapons Production Organizations Suggested
932E0052A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Oct 92 pp 42-45, 84

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Do Bang Doan: "Production of Rudimentary Weapons for Provincial and City Defense Zones"]

[Text] Nowadays, with the very fast development of the computer, high-tech weapons, and many other technical branches, a discussion of rudimentary weapons may be dismissed by not a few as an exercise better left to historians. The issue is not that simple, however. In fact, like so many other "ancient national traditions," rudimentary weapons still have an extremely important role to play...
in the modern people's war for national defense, especially with regard to localities and in defense zones and combat villages and subwards.

In peacetime, rudimentary weapons (spikes, mines, booby traps) are principal means of preventing the enemy from infiltrating into our territory by crossing the border or landing on the seashore (in those places where such means are needed). They are also necessary means to suppress and check rebellion. In wartime, rudimentary weapons are important means of fighting (in many cases, they also are the basic, principal means) of militia and self-defense forces and an essential component of the combat facilities of the local troops and even main-force troops.

Rudimentary weapons are a kind of arms with a relatively simple structure and made of easy-to-find materials. Requiring not-so-complicated technological processes in manufacturing, they can be produced locally and widely (in each hamlet and village) in large quantities to quickly make up for arms shortages in general, to promptly strengthen the morale and fighting capability of combatants on the battlefields.

Who, then, are the ones producing rudimentary weapons to ensure their supplies to provincial and city defense zones, and what are the methods of organizing these processes?

First of all, we should agree among ourselves that rudimentary weapons are chiefly necessary for actual combat activities. This fact, coupled with the structural characteristics of rudimentary weapons and our current manufacturing technological capability, requires that rudimentary weapons should be produced immediately before and during hostilities. In peacetime, they should be turned out only in sufficient quantities to meet the demands of training and maintaining combat reserves.

Four forces may be involved in producing rudimentary weapons for provincial and city defense zones: defense factories of the Ministry of National Defense, defense enterprises of the military regions, rudimentary-weapons production establishments jointly set up by two or three provinces, and production establishments of the provinces.

If the military regions are responsible for rudimentary weapons production and supply, they would, on the one hand, face significant difficulties in their task of ensuring timely shipment of large amounts of these weapons to the provinces (over distances of hundreds of kilometers in some areas); on the other hand, the provinces' local potential would not be brought into play in ensuring rudimentary weapons supplies for combat in their defense zones in the conditions of a divided battlefield. In modern warfare, severance of communications and division of battlefield are always one of the enemy's primary targets. Concerning those military regions where there are inaccessible mountain and forest areas and numerous rivers, difficulty in transporting and supplying rudimentary weapons is well worth considering carefully. Besides, the building of a military region-run workshop (or enterprise) for concentrated rudimentary weapons production as well as the production of rudimentary weapons in large quantities sufficient for an entire military region requires considerable amounts of materials, equipment, factory floor, manpower, capital.... Thus, the military regions would encounter significant difficulty regarding construction and production capital; in wartime, the protection of workshops would also become a complicated problem. However, we must also see the advantages of the concentrated rudimentary weapons production in military regions: production cost would be lower than that of arms produced by lower-level units; production planning and management would be more centralized, thereby reducing the waste of manpower; lower-level units would be spared additional burdens. These advantages would not mean much when hostilities break out, however. Therefore, if we look at this matter from all angles, we can see that production of rudimentary weapons by military regions for provincial and city defense zones would be unlikely to meet the demands of combat activities.

By the same token, we can also see immediately that the defense factories of the Ministry of National Defense themselves should not organize rudimentary weapons production for provincial and city defense zones.

What about the third case, where two or three provinces team up to organize a few rudimentary-weapons production workshops? This scheme would help overcome part of the difficulty regarding rudimentary weapons transportation, eliminate workshop overcapacity, prevent a glut of workshops in a military region.... However, it would not be able to completely surmount the difficulty in meeting the demands of combat operations, in construction, and in production. Yet, this scheme could still be applied in reality if we know how to rationally organize each cluster of provinces into an association for rudimentary weapons production.

And last but not least is the scheme under which each province and city would produce rudimentary weapons to meet the demands of combat in their own defense zones. The greatest advantage of this scheme is that it would enable provinces to ensure timely supplies of weapons for combat activities, to resolve financial difficulties (thanks to the direct participation of provinces and cities in the rudimentary-weapons production process), and to overcome in a relatively comprehensive fashion the shortcomings of the other schemes. Depending on the requirements of combat activities, provinces and cities can set up large- or small-scale workshops as they deem appropriate; or they can entrust to districts, precincts, or villages the complete production of a certain kind of rudimentary weapon. Provinces and cities can even dispense with organizing production workshops and apply the methods of exchanging and trading in rudimentary weapons within their localities or with other provinces and cities or cooperating with them in the production of such weapons. According to this organizational method, rudimentary weapons workshops would be placed under the guidance and management of provincial people's committees, and directly under the industrial service, the planning committee, the military command, and other responsible
organs of provinces, cities, districts, precincts.... In this way, there would be more favorable conditions for the existence and operations of these workshops. In terms of capability, we can see right away that the industrial sector of a province or city, with its current contingent of technical cadres and workers, its technological equipment, and its advanced techniques... is fully capable of producing sufficient rudimentary weapons to meet the demands of defense. What the provinces and cities may need is probably some assistance in procuring a number of highly special components—or components about which secrecy should be maintained—for bombs, mines, grenades....

We can conclude that each provincial or city defense zone should produce rudimentary weapons for its own use and for other forces fighting in its localities.

To enable each provincial or city defense zone to produce rudimentary weapons, the cadre leaders of provinces and cities, especially the secretaries of provincial and city party committees and the chairmen of provincial and city people's committees, must really consider such production as absolutely essential and as a responsibility of the party, administration, and people of the entire province, and must institutionalize it by issuing concrete procedures and regulations. If the local administration regards rudimentary weapons production as an exclusive task of the Army, a war-related undertaking, then under the current mechanism of economic activities, the provincial military command would not be able to produce rudimentary weapons even if it wanted to. Besides, as each provincial or city defense zone is an integral part of the national defense disposition of the entire country, the various organs of the Ministry of National Defense (directly represented by the General Department of National Defense Industry and Economy and the General Technical Department) are also partly responsible for the rudimentary weapons production by each province and city. The relations between the specialized organs of the Ministry of National Defense and the provincial and city people's committees in rudimentary weapons production must also be institutionalized to prevent the practice of doing things according to a gentleman's agreement and ill-defined responsibilities....

The industrial service and military command of a province or city, together with the technical branch of a military region, play a directly decisive role in the organization of rudimentary weapons production. It is necessary to consolidate the technical organization of the provincial and city military commands once again to enable it not only to serve as an advisory body to the technical branch but also to organize rudimentary-weapons production forces. An effort should be made to return to their original functions those weapons-repairing means and military technical equipment already switched to other uses. The provincial industrial service itself should have its own organizations and forces to take charge of this task.

Once the aforementioned conditions have been created, the military command of a province or city, together with the provincial or city industrial service and planning committee, must make a technical study of the building of a rudimentary-weapons production system for the provincial people's committee chairman to approve. The common points of such a study are the determination of capacity, organizational structure, operational mechanism, and funding for the building of a rudimentary-weapons production system and the maintenance of its operations.

The capacity of a rudimentary-weapons production system must be determined according to the demands for rudimentary weapons of the Armed Forces that would fight in the provincial or city defense zones concerned. When determining its need for rudimentary weapons, a provincial military command must base itself on combat activity forecasts, on the concrete situation in its locality, and on the expected use of the combat forces of a military region and of the Ministry of National Defense in its locality. Proceeding from that need and other factors, the provincial military command will determine the capacity of the rudimentary-weapons production system to ensure reliable supplies for combat activities and, at the same time, to prevent waste in production and building.

The organizational structure and scale of a rudimentary-weapons production system must be capable of ensuring the capacity needed, suitable for both peacetime and wartime, capable of bringing into play the strength of various levels, sectors, and economic components of localities, and ready to switch from the peacetime status to the wartime status. To satisfy these requirements, first of all there should be a division of responsibilities in rudimentary weapons production. Provinces can produce complex weapons such as mines, grenades... while districts and villages can make simpler ones such as spikes, knives, booby traps.... Each echelon is a small system which contains even smaller production systems for different kinds of weapons. In districts and villages, each kind of simple weapon can be completely produced in a single establishment (team or station). The number of establishments and their scales depend on the demand for a system's capacity. As for more complex weapons, their components should be produced separately at different economic production establishments for assembly and completion later at a defense establishment (workshop) subordinate to the military command or industrial service of a province or city. For example: In the production of grenades, their cast-iron casings could be cast at some engineering plant; their detonators could be obtained from the General Department of National Defense Industry and Economy; and the packing of explosive, plastic pressing, assembly, and completion could be done at a grenade and mine workshop of the provincial technical office. If conditions and the preservation of secrecy permit, the organization of a rudimentary-weapons production workshop subordinate to the military command of a province may be dispensed with in favor of organizing complete production at an economic production establishment by calling for tender or providing financial support according to the task performed by a mobilized industry. Under this scheme, utmost attention must be paid to ensuring sufficient supplies of military materials and adopting rational mechanisms and adequate policies to enable the rudimentary-weapons production line to remain in sound condition...
in peacetime. The scale of establishments producing rudimentary weapons for national defense subordinate to provinces or cities, the number of factories and enterprises subordinate to the economic sector of a province or city involved in rudimentary-weapons production, and the extent of this involvement must also be decided by the capacity of the rudimentary-weapons production system.

The operational mechanism of the rudimentary-weapons production system must be flexible, can change in accordance with the actual situation, and always stands ready to switch to the combat status. In peacetime, each component (or the whole system) must operate at an adequate pace to ensure sufficient supplies of rudimentary weapons to meet the demands of defense and training of the Armed Forces. Aside from the time devoted to this purpose, all components must perform their economic duties in such a way as to ensure their own existence while maintaining the rudimentary-weapons production technological capability of their workshop and standing ready to take up production according to their predetermined functions. At the beginning and throughout the duration of hostilities, all components must work at full or part of capacity depending on actual demand. To maintain the rudimentary-weapons production capability of the entire system, we must maintain not only the training of cadres and workers belonging to the rudimentary-weapons production line but also the training of an adequate number of cadres and workers belonging to other production lines of the factories and enterprises to be mobilized. Such training should be closely combined with production activities.

Operational funds for and a clear determination of financial responsibilities in building a rudimentary-weapons production system and in producing rudimentary weapons are always a complicated matter. All organs and units concerned should consider this issue in accordance with the concept of reconciling the interests of the part with those of the whole, and the interests of economy with those of national defense. Proceeding from the actual situation and from the functions and tasks of the organs concerned, we can make the following preliminary assertions: Expenses will be defrayed chiefly by localities; the General Department of National Defense Industry and Economy, the General Technical Department, and the military region commands are responsible for giving assistance. The extent of assistance provided by the Ministry of National Defense is based on the percentage of the national defense budget earmarked by the state for this task and on the design output of the rudimentary-weapons production system.

**ECONOMIC**

CIS Still Has Need of Country's Market

For many decades, the economic and commercial relations between Vietnam and the (former) Soviet Union were very tight. Vietnam considered that country to be a big and stable market which played a very important role in her export-import activities. At that time, exports to the Soviet market accounted for 80% of the total export value of Vietnam. The (former) Soviet Union was the main supplier of items of strategic importance for Vietnam's economy: petroleum, iron and steel, fertilizers, chemicals and others. It was also the main outlet for Vietnamese exports, especially with regard to items that could not yet find their way into capitalist countries: handicraft and fine art articles, raw materials, etc. (see table below).

Two years ago, due to a serious political and economic crisis and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) came into existence. For this reason, the commercial relations and other economic transactions between Vietnam and the countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States have dwindled. This is due to the fact that the CIS line of national construction is not the same as before and shows a trend to privatization; the former organizational structure of foreign trade has ceased to exist. On the other hand, the economy of each CIS country has undergone new trials and difficulties. As a result, Vietnam's commodities could not be exported to those countries; inversely, some exports of the CIS did not reach Vietnam directly but through the agency of foreign companies. Although the economic and commercial relations between Vietnam and the Commonwealth of Independent States still meet with many obstacles, but viewed from the angle of long-term trading relations, the market of the Commonwealth of Independent States bears as always a big significance for Vietnam's export-import activities.

The Commonwealth of Independent States constitutes a big market with nearly 300 million consumers who are badly in need of many kinds of commodities, especially food and foodstuffs, consumer goods and raw materials. Vietnam is quite capable of providing many necessaries of life for the inhabitants of the CIS, namely: rice, meat, vegetables and fruits, rubber, tea, coffee, handicraft and fine art products, which have won a high appreciation from the consumers in those countries.

As a matter of fact, the Commonwealth of Independent States needs to have economic transactions with Vietnam because it is a big producer of petroleum, iron and steel, fertilizers, chemicals, cotton and others, which could find a much easier market in Vietnam than in other countries. In addition, a number of cooperative projects conducted formerly between Vietnam and the (former) Soviet Union which are now in full operation need accessories, spare parts, raw materials and equipment from the CIS for a smooth running.

All the above-mentioned facts show that the re-establishment and development of commercial relations between Vietnam and the Commonwealth of Independent States is a matter of utmost necessity and urgency. The CIS market constitutes an area of activity most propitious for Vietnam's export-import activities. However, many difficulties are lying ahead on the road to a complete normalization of commercial relations with the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States as a result of the...
political, economic and even military crisis prevailing among those countries. The latter's economies are seriously endangered and rapidly deteriorating which hinder Vietnam from exporting consumer goods and necessaries which are badly in need of them for meeting home consumption. Their economic cooperation and trading relations were broken up due to the shift to a commerce based on world prices with the accounts to be settled in convertible currencies. They are now in a state of soaring inflation because the rise in prices and the system of finance and credit seem to be uncontrollable. The per capita income of a worker in the national economy is rather low. From that situation, the fact has arisen that any imports of goods from foreign countries, Vietnam included, is a matter of extreme difficulty for these countries. Mention should be made of the new mechanism which was called upon to replace the old one. Even this institution is not fully fledged and necessarily empowered to establish the trading procedures and settle the questions arising from country-to-country transactions. Many a time the export-import firms of Vietnam have striven their best to contact their counterparts in the Commonwealth of Independent States for renewing their ties, signing exchange contracts and negotiating trading transactions but they did not know how and where to make their contacts because many export-import companies which operated in the (former) Soviet Union no longer exist or has been transferred to private ownership.

Consequently, the settling of accounts in terms of exports and imports between the two parties has become a complex problem. Recently, the Commonwealth of Independent States has required Vietnam to export to its members many kinds of goods but the payments for them shall be deducted from the money that Vietnam still owed to the (former) Soviet Union and this would create a no small difficulty to Vietnamese export-import firms. Many bilateral contracts have been signed between the companies of the two countries but they could not be implemented as a result of non-availability of running accounts. As for the contracts to be settled in convertible currencies, there has not yet been any one signed between the two parties. In order to pave the way for reopening economic transactions between Vietnam and the Commonwealth of Independent States, a delegation of the Vietnamese Government visited the Federal Republic of Russia and several other countries in the CIS for discussing how to settle the matter with its counterparts in those countries, and so did a delegation of the Federal Republic of Russia to Vietnam for exchange on views and for signing a protocol on goods exchanges between the two countries. Under this protocol the bilateral trade turnover in 1992 is to reach 800 million US dollars (400 million US dollars for Vietnam and 400 million for the Federal Republic of Russia). Vietnam is to export to Russia rice, meat, fruits, vegetables, crude oil, garments, woollen carpets while Russia delivers in exchange for Vietnam's meat, fruits, vegetables, crude oil, garments, woollen carpets, for the Russian organizations involved in construction works in Vietnam. The two sides discussed programmes of cooperation in growing and processing rubber, tea, coffee, fruits and vegetables and also cooperation in light industry according to the spirit of the Law on Foreign Investment of their respective countries. The Federal Republic of Russia expressed readiness to cooperate with Vietnam in building 8 works with its provision of complete equipment; the two parties have agreed to settle accounts in convertible currencies and partly with agricultural produce and other materials. The two parties have agreed to expand direct relations between production and business establishments and between different localities in the two countries.

Besides, Vietnam and other countries in the CIS are making contacts at different levels. The economic, business and production establishments in those countries are doing their utmost to pave the way for better, mutually beneficial relations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value of Export Turnover</th>
<th>Value of Import Turnover</th>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>282.5 million roubles</td>
<td>1.43 billion roubles</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>335.0—</td>
<td>1.72—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>397.4—</td>
<td>1.79—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>548.6—</td>
<td>1.53—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>890.0—</td>
<td>960 million roubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>215.0 million roubles/</td>
<td>160—</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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National Assembly Wary Over Investment Law Changes
93SE0141A Hanoi VIETNAM INVESTMENT REVIEW in English 21-27 Dec 92 pp 1, 10
[Article by Nguyen Tri Dung: “National Assembly Wary Over Changes”]

[Text] Vietnamese legislators have balked at two of the government's 10 amendments to the country's foreign investment law proposed in an attempt to make Vietnam more attractive to investors.

Also during last week's National Assembly sitting sessions, deputies accused the administration of lethargic responses to chronic smuggling and corruption.

National Assembly Law Commission chairman Ha Manh Tri said the commission "fully agrees" that amendments are necessary "to make our country's investment environment more attractive."

In a written report on the government's proposal to ask the legislators to approve "urgent amendments to the Investment Law," the National Assembly chief lawyer expressed his commission's full support for eight of the 10 amendments and additions proposed in the government report presented by SCCI Chairman Dau Ngoc Xuan at the opening session of the National Assembly.
But regarding widening tax incentives currently enjoyed only by joint ventures to all forms of foreign investment, Tri urged deputies to consider carefully before deciding.

"If tax incentive is given to the 100 percent investment projects as is granted to all joint ventures, then the distinction for the different investment forms will be practically nonsense," Tri said.

He added that the commission will submit a clause limiting the government's ability to offer such tax incentives for 100 percent foreign-owned investment projects. They should be offered only in cases where the investment is considered worth the encouragement, the report stated.

Concerning the government proposal to implement the BOT (build-operate-transfer) form for infrastructure investment, Tri said that some members of his commission still feel uneasy on two counts.

Firstly, there must be a clear distinction between non-refundable BOT and the BOT as stipulated by the law because, they argue, by committing to the BOT form, foreign investors essentially had already planned a non-refundable transfer to the Vietnamese side.

Secondly, by giving the investors tax incentives, such as exemptions or reductions, the Vietnamese side has effectively begun to repay the investors' capital. But at the moment of transfer, the lawyers say, it is very difficult to calculate the value of the whole project in concrete and precise terms—before even considering whether or not the project has met technology requirements at the transfer stage.

"Because of these reasons, the Law Commission is of the view that this issue should be considered more carefully and thoroughly in order to ensure the national interest," Ha Manh Tri urged the legislators.

During last week's debates, the deputies were also informed by several government ministers about different aspects of the country's socio-economic situation, among them the continued corruption and smuggling.

"2966 cases of corruption involving VND92.366 billion (US$8.5 million) have been discovered this year. Legal proceedings have been instituted against 1,914 persons while many others have been tried," Nguyen Ky Cam, General State Inspector, told the Assembly.

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"Because of these reasons, the Law Commission is of the view that this issue should be considered more carefully and thoroughly in order to ensure the national interest," Ha Manh Tri urged the legislators.

According to Cam, more than 50,000 cases of smuggling had been dealt with and the amount of goods seized was roughly estimated at VND120 billion (US$11.1 million).

"Investigations made in 27 (out of 54) provinces and cities throughout the country show that a total of VND512.8 billion and US$1.8 million earmarked for the State had not been delivered while some VND257.8 billion in revenue had not been declared," Cam said.

Corruption was rampant in the economic sector and is spreading to other areas of the society, involving top officials and smugglers organised in rings and operating not only in the country, but across borders. The gangs used bribery and often resorted to violence to resist arrest.

The General State Inspector's report stirred up heated debates among deputies. The Law Commission said the report "has not informed the legislators fully and thoroughly on the real situation of corruption and smuggling."

The deputies insisted that government statistics are "far below reality" and that "the slowness in responding to the situation by the administrative organs at different levels" was one of the main reasons making the fight against corruption and smuggling a stalemate.

According to the government report, during the first nine months of this year, smuggled goods circulating in the domestic market were valued roughly at VND3000 billion (US$280 million) while the value of re-exporting smuggled goods stood at VND9000 billion (US$834 million).

Studies Underway on Four Big Steel Joint Ventures

The Vietnam Steel Corporation (VSC) is presently completing feasibility studies for four foreign investment projects in steel production.

VSC, now the sole national contract in the field, "has joined with experts from South Korea, Singapore and Japan in compiling feasibility studies and other documents submitted for approval to the State Committee for Cooperation and Investment (SCCI)," a VSC official said.

"The projects aim at building four new steel plants and opening an iron ore mine in Hai Phong, Thai Nguyen and Dong Nai," he added.

South Korean giant Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO), the only foreign company operating in steel production in Vietnam, has already finalised contracts for the implementation of two more projects in Hai Phong.

The first is the construction of a foundry equipped with arc electric furnaces capable of producing 200,000 tonnes of steel a year.

The other is for the production of steel pipes with a designated capacity of 30,000 tonnes a year.

The first joint venture POSCO engaged in with the Southern Steel Union (SSU) is a US$3.9 million plant to make flat and corrugated roofing on a 50-50 basis. Since opening in Ho Chi Minh City's suburbs last April, the plant has turned out more than 10,000 tonnes of roofing materials and preparations are being made to raise the plant's capacity to 50,000 tonnes a year.

Natsteel of Singapore, meanwhile, is coordinating with the Chinese built Steel Complex in Thai Nguyen to prepare feasibility studies for a jointly funded foundry and rolling mill to be established.

Another larger foundry and rolling mill is expected to be established in Bien Hoa, near Ho Chi Minh City.

It will be a joint venture between Kyoei Steel Company Ltd of Japan and VSC.
Feasibility studies are being accelerated and submitted for SCCI approval for the mill which will be capable of producing up to 200,000 tonnes of steel a year, more than three times the output of the Natsteel-Thai Nguyen plan in the north.

**Hanoi Promises Big Benefits for Investors in Development Plan**

93SE0141B Hanoi VIETNAM INVESTMENT REVIEW in English 21-27 Dec 92 p 20

[Article by Hoang Uong: “Hanoi Promises Big Benefits for Investors in US$1.5b Plan”]

[Text] At least US$1.5 billion in investment is called for under a city development plan to 2000 adopted by the Hanoi People's Council.

Around US$600 million is required from now to 1995, to realise the programme comprised of industry, service, tourism and agricultural sectors.

With regard to the question of attracting foreign investments, the city has drawn up a list of priorities to invite foreign investment in a variety of forms. These include:

- *borrowing to purchase new equipment and technologies, to be repaid later by export;*
- *concentrated investment by the city in infrastructure construction on land destined for foreign investors' use;*
- *incentive policies for organisations and individuals who act as brokers or agents for foreign investment in socio-economic development projects within the city limits.*

According to Dinh Hanh, vice chairman of the Hanoi People’s Committee, domestic funding sources would include land rents, “contributions” from enterprises to infrastructure construction, fees from land use right assignments and profits from housing rental.

The city's land will be used more economically and effectively. Areas currently occupied by unprofitable factories or enterprises will be recovered and sold to other businesses, to raise cash for investment in profit-making concerns.

Families living in government-allocated villas or high class buildings will be persuaded to relinquish all or part of their residential space and move to smaller houses, freeing the buildings up for more profitable uses.

The city will set up a financial company and expand insurance operations in order to provide security for investors in production development projects.

The Vietnamese government has issued preferential policies for foreign investors in Hanoi, such as lower land rent compared to Ho Chi Minh City, lower tax rates than those defined in the investment law, and electricity and water supply charges on a par with those for similar Vietnamese enterprises.

The vice chairman of Hanoi city said more than VND1,125 billion (US$105 million) has so far been spent on Hanoi’s development, of which 734 billion came from the central budget and 381 billion from the local budget.

Hanoi has also received US$81 million and 3.2 million roubles in foreign aid of various forms. Mr. Hanh said though these were not small sums they still fall far short of the development needs of the capital city.

**Businessmen Unimpressed by Trade Surplus Estimate**

93SE0139B Hanoi VIETNAM INVESTMENT REVIEW in English 28 Dec 92-3 Jan 93 p 5

[Article by Cam Nhung: “Businessmen Unimpressed Over 92 Trade Estimates”]


They say the figures are misleading because part of the exports totted up were debt repayments to former CMEA countries.

The official trade volume also does not take into account cross-border trade and massive smuggling, estimated to be worth half of the total official trade.

They also point out that the structure of export goods has not improved. Breakdowns show that the export base remains narrow with unprocessed agricultural products and raw materials still accounting for a large percentage of the total.

The smooth shift from non-convertible currency trade to other markets has been realised in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City only. Traditional handcraft and garment industries in central provinces are still suffering from the loss of their former markets. Many local trading companies and their manufacturing bases are unoperational as they cannot meet stringent market requirements for transportation, quality and supply.

However, Trade Minister Le Van Triet recently said that the trading activities of a country are not necessarily present in all localities. He said the collapse of export-oriented enterprises in some provinces is not worrisome, emphasising that trading must be concentrated in certain regions of the country.

Vietnamese economists say if a comeback to these markets is successfully staged, trading volume could reach US$1.2-1.5 billion in the first year.

The trade surplus for the year was rooted in the recent import ban on 17 items of goods taking hold in December. But as domestic manufacturers proved unable to meet demand, the government has had to permit imports of seven commodities—motorcycles, electronic components, electric fans, radio cassette recorders, television sets, and canned beer.

This means the surplus trend will be reversed in the early months of 1993.

Another worrying trend in Vietnam's trade is the depreciation of the US dollar against the dong. Except for rice and...
crude oil, other export items are suffering losses because of the lower rate of foreign exchange.

Because most export contracts were signed when the exchange rate was higher, exporters are finding it hard to fulfil the order without losses, especially when they have to buy products in dong. The irony is that many factories are standing idle as traders cannot sign long-term contracts while they do not have resources to supply goods in large quantities.

Profits in US dollars for the garment and fishery industries might remain the same as last year, but income in dong has fallen by 20 per cent.

With production costs, including electricity bills, and competition expected to rise further, few traders can seriously expect big profits in 1993.

**Investment in Dong Nai Increases**

93SE0139C Hanoi VIETNAM INVESTMENT REVIEW in English 28 Dec 92-3 Jan 93 p 16

[Article by Tran Du: “Investment in Dong Nai Increasing Rapidly”]

[Text] There are presently 24 licensed foreign-invested projects in Dong Nai province worth a total of US$302 million.

Countries which have invested in projects here are Taiwan (8 projects), Hong Kong (9), France (2), South Korea (2), Britain (1), Canada (1) and Malaysia (1).

Of the investments, 13 projects are joint ventures, three are business cooperation contracts, and eight are 100 per cent foreign owned. They operate in textiles, garments, agricultural product processing, wood processing and transportation services.

The companies are concentrated in Bien Hoa industrial area and neighbouring districts.

Taiwan ranks first with a total of US$253.6 million invested, followed by Hong Kong with US$39.3 million.

The largest establishment is VEDAN, a Vietnamese company involved in food processing and producing monosodium glutamate. VEDAN is based in Long Thanh with a capital of US$183.9 million.

According to Dang Van Tiep, vice-president of the Dong Nai People's committee, of 24 licensed projects there are only 11 units in operation. There have been four failures and production is under way on two. The remaining projects are now being set up.

"In general, the implementation of capital contribution is still slow and inadequate.

"Presently, six projects have around 60 per cent of capital contributed, with the remaining projects having only 20 to 50 per cent of prescribed capital," Tiep stated.

DONACO Electronic Company, Bochang Dona International, which produces towels and other textile goods, and VIKO-Moolsan Company which produces mattresses are all sustaining successful operation.

Though the businesses are at an initial stage of development, they are providing essential consumer goods. Additionally, they have provided employment for 1,600 workers and the province has contributed VND6 billion to the State.

Dong Nai is a province of 5,864.47 square kilometres and 1.7 million people. It has good conditions for economic development, particularly in the processing industry.

Land and climate conditions are suitable for short and long term industries such as rubber, coffee, cashew nuts, soya beans, cigarette production, cotton, banana and maize.

Communication systems and infrastructure in Dong Nai are favourable. A 100,000 - 500,000 cubic metre water plant has been constructed to meet the needs of tourists and residents in the province.

Efforts are not being made towards investment of existing companies by developing and processing rubber, paper, coffee and cashew nuts.

Dong Nai has also begun exploiting marble and producing refractory bricks.

**Business Patterns Show Big Difference in South**

93SE0139A Hanoi VIETNAM INVESTMENT REVIEW in English 28 Dec 92-3 Jan 93 p 3

[Text] Patterns of private business differ sharply between Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, with enterprises in the former southern capital tending to be newer, larger and more likely to use credit, a survey has shown.

The tale of two cities with diverging business habits emerged in a survey of private enterprises conducted by Vietnam's Central Institute of Economic management, the Saigon Giai Phong daily said in a report last week.

Sixty-three per cent of the businesses surveyed in Ho Chi Minh City had been created in the past three years, compared to 17 per cent in Hanoi.

Vietnam began cautiously legalizing private enterprise in 1988 as part of a package of economic reform, then enshrined the right to own and operate a business in its 1992 constitution.

But most businesses in Hanoi appear to be small family-owned ventures, with the survey finding that 70 per cent were opened on the owner's own property compared to 53 per cent in HCMC. The average size of a factory in Hanoi is only 386 square meters, one-fourth that in HCMC, while average investment is around US$40,000, one third of that in the southern city.

Vietnamese authorities have been very worried by disparities in economic growth between the north and the south.

Businessmen in former Saigon appeared from the survey to be more unruly than their northern counterparts, with only six per cent saying they paid taxes to visiting collectors compared to 28 per cent in Hanoi.
while said they felt the government was subjecting them to strict control, compared to 16 per cent in Hanoi.

Bright Prospect for Oil, Gas Industry
93SE0132B Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English Dec 92 p 12

[Article by Le Tien Hoan]
[Text] The oil and gas industry has now become a key economic branch of Vietnam. Right in the first months of 1992, the tenth, eleventh, then twelfth million tonne of crude oil were pumped up from oil wells. Enormous strides have thus been made in oil exploitation. Foreign currency earnings due to oil exports account for a big proportion of the annual export value and make notable contributions to the State budget.

Nearly 30 Years of Intensive Preparations
Since 1959, though Vietnam had not yet discovered any oilfield, the State has already paid attention to the training of scientific cadres and qualified workers presumably to be used in the prospective oil and gas industry. Although the country was still at war, great funds were allocated by the State for the exploration of oil and gas in Northern Vietnam. With the assistance of the former Soviet Union, elaborate geophysical investigations were conducted and exploratory drilling operations of over 40 wells at depths from some hundred to over four thousand meters had been made which helped discover deposits of natural gas in Thai Binh province with a not big reserve. Thus 1981 marked the putting into exploitation of the first gas deposit. For more than ten years now, hundreds of millions of cubic metres of natural gas have been exploited for electric generators and local industries (ceramics, porcelain, glass making and others).

In September 1975 when the country was reunified, the General Oil and Natural Gas Department was founded. It has become now the Vietnam National Oil and Gas Company operating under the international appellation of PETROVIETNAM. This general oil and gas department was then assigned the duty to conduct oil and gas explorations not only on the mainland but also on Vietnam's continental shelf.

Mention should be made here of Vietnam's continental shelf whose area is about 1.3 million square kilometres, nearly three times bigger than the country's area. It has been divided into 171 lots. The average area of each lot is about 8,000 sq km.

Prior to 1975, many foreign companies had conducted geophysical surveys and carried out exploratory drilling operations on Vietnam's continental shelf through which oil deposits were already found in two wells. When the Saigon puppet administration collapsed in 1975, these companies had to abandon their work. In the late 70's, a joint exploration was made by three Italian, German and Canadian oil companies together with their Vietnamese counterpart in five lots on Vietnam's continental shelf. But due to different reasons, these companies gave up their schemes in 1979. In November 1981, the Governments of Vietnam and the former Soviet Union signed an agreement under which the VIETSOVPETRO Oil and Gas Joint Enterprise was founded with a view to making oil and gas exploration in a number of lots on the southern continental shelf of Vietnam. By the end of the 1980's. The VIETSOVPETRO Oil and Gas Joint Enterprise made a number of elaborate geophysical investigations on a large area covering one hundred thousand square kilometres and drilled tens of wells there. In 1984, oil and natural gas were found at the Bach Ho oilfield 120 km from Vung Tau coastal area. Afterwards, exploratory drillings gave signs that oil and gas also exist in the Rong oilfield near the Bach Ho oilfield, especially in the Dai Hung oilfield with a fairly big reserve, over 300 km from the shore and at a depth of 110 metres, double that of Bach Ho oilfield.

Five Years: A Leap Forward
In 1986, with the putting into operation of two oil rigs, VIETSOVPETRO started to exploit the Bach Ho oilfield. June 26, 1986 went down in the history of Vietnam's oil and gas industry as a memorable date marking the exploitation of the first tonnes of crude oil from Vietnam's sea-bed. It was also in 1986 that the first shipments of oil were exported. Now VIETSOVPETRO boasts dozens of oil rigs which have drawn daily from the oil wells beneath the sea tens of thousands of tonnes of crude oil. The volume of crude oil exported from the wells under the sea have been pumped into two tankers each with a capacity of 250,000 cubic metres. On an average every week 1 or 2 tankers have come for oil. Together with tens of thousands of tonnes of crude oil exported daily from the sea-bed, it should be said that there would be still some 2 million cubic metres of accompanying natural gas coming out which are to be eliminated by burnt-out procedures as we don't have the means to convey them to the mainland for use. The Vietnam General Oil and Gas Company is now planning to bring this natural gas to the mainland for processing it into liquefied gas for industrial use.

Up to now, over 12 million tonnes of crude oil have been obtained from various oilfields under the management of VIETSOVPETRO and the output of oil exploited annually has gradually increased in volume (see tables and figures in the years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991). Annual oil outputs (in million tonnes) have been respectively 0.041; 0.280; 0.680; 1.510; 2.721; 3.950. Most of the volume of oil exploited has been exported through the Vietnam National Petroleum Import-Export Corporation (PETECHIM). Vietnam is ranking fourth among crude-oil exporters in Southeast Asia after Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. The foreign-exchange earnings from sales of crude oil have amounted to over 1.5 billion US dollars. The main petroleum purchasing countries at present are the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Japan, Singapore, and China. Japan is the biggest consumer of petroleum from Vietnam with increasing values (from 35 million US dollars in 1987 to over 400 million US dollars in 1991).

The total value of petroleum bought by Japan from Vietnam has exceeded the one billion US dollars mark. It should be said that until now Vietnam has entirely

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exported petroleum in the form of crude oil. If oil was to be duly refined in Vietnam, it would yield a surplus value of 10% and with the setting up of the petrochemical industry, Vietnam will gain 20% more over the value of crude oil sales but as a matter of fact, Vietnam is not yet in a position to set up oil refineries or petrochemical facilities. Since May 1988, Vietnam has signed 19 contracts. During the first nine months of 1992 alone, she signed 6 contracts for exploration and exploitation of oil and gas on Vietnam's continental shelf with 15 foreign oil companies among them figure major ones in the world, namely: ONGC (India), SHELL (Holland), BP (United Kingdom), TOTAL (France) and many others from the above-mentioned countries and also from Canada, Australia, Belgium, Malaysia, South Korea and Japan. Most contracts provide for the sharing of products when oil is exploited. Besides, Vietnam has cooperated with the Norwegian company NOPEC for jointly conducting non-monopolistic geophysical investigations in sea areas at a depth of over 200 m to obtain necessary materials to be used for signing further contracts in terms of oil exploration and exploitation.

PETROVIETNAM is now making due preparations for putting forth the work of exploitation of the Dai Hung oilfield for international oil corporations to bid for a contract as well as for carrying on the exploration for oil and gas in the Red River and the Mekong River deltas. With the cooperation and capital investment of foreign countries, Vietnam is planning to build during the years 1993-1995 an oil refining and petro-chemical factory with a capacity of 500,000-600,000 tonnes/year, a pipeline with a capacity of 1 billion cubic metres/year and a liquefied gas manufacture with a capacity of from 800 million to 1 billion cubic metres/year.

It is expected that by 1995 Vietnam's oil and gas industry will have obtained annually an output of 10 million tonnes of crude oil and 1.5 billion cubic metres of natural gas. In a not too far future, Vietnam will be an official member of the World Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

**BIOGRAPHIC**

Information on Personalities

**Le Quy An** [LEE QUYS AN]

*Vice minister of science, technology, and environment; on 2 December he signed an agreement on scientific and technological cooperation with China. (Ho Chi Minh City TUOI TRE 3 Dec 92 p 1)

**Pham Tien Ba** [PHAM TIEENS BA], M.A.

Chief of the Science and Technology Department at the Ministry of Energy; associate editor in chief of the monthly journal NANG LUONG; his name was listed on the masthead of the cited source. (NANG LUONG Sep 92 p 32)

**Nguyen Thi Bung** [NGUYEENX THOWIS BÜWNG], Major General

His article on security and national defense was published in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN Oct 92 p 3)

**Huynh Van Can** [HUYNHF VAWN CAANF]

Member of the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] Central Committee; secretary of the CPV Committee, Dak Lak Province; his article on mass mobilization work in his province was published in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN Oct 92 p 51)

**Nguyen Thanh Chau** [NGUYEENX THANHF CHAAU]

*SRV ambassador to Australia; he was mentioned in an article on Vietnam - Australia economic cooperation, which was published in the cited source. (QUAN HE QUOC TE No. 37 Nov 92 p 9)

**Nguyen Van Chieu** [NGUYEENX VAWN CHIEEU]

Secretary of the CPV Committee, Long An Province; he was recently interviewed by NHA BAO & CONG LUAN, a monthly journal. (NHA BAO & CONG LUAN special issue Dec 92 p 1)

**Truong Duc Duy** [TRUOWNG DUCS ZUY]

*Vice chairman of the People's Committee, Can Tho City; he recently talked about negotiations with investors from Hong Kong and Singapore on an export processing zone in his city. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 17 Oct 92 p 5)

**Nguyen Van Dang** [NGUYEENX VAWN DANGS]

Secretary of the CPV Committee, Minh Hai Province; he was recently interviewed by NHA BAO & CONG LUAN, a monthly journal. (NHA BAO & CONG LUAN special issue Dec 92 p 2)

**Nguyen Van Haan** [NGUYEENX VAWN HUAANS]

Vice chairman of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee; he recently gave a speech at a city conference on local goods protection. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 14 Sep 92 p 2)

**Ly Tai Luan** [LYS TAIF LUAANJ]

*Vice minister of finance; on 7 October he spoke at a National Assembly meeting. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 8 Oct 92 p 1)
Tran Nham [TRAANF NHAAM], Professor
Vice president of the Marx-Lenin, Ho Chi Minh Thoughts Research Institute; his article on building democratic regulations in party theory work was published in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN Oct 92 p 20)

Phan Hoan [PHAN HOAN], Lieutenant General
Commander of the 5th MR; his article on maintaining security and strengthening national security in his region was published in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN Oct 92 p 46)

Trang A Pao [TRANGS A PAO]
Secretary of the CPV Committee, Lao Cai Province; he was recently interviewed by NHA BAO & CONG LUAN, a monthly journal. (NHA BAO & CONG LUAN special issue Dec 92 p 1)

Nguyen Duc Phan [NGUYEENX DUWCS PHAN]
Minister of energy; editor in chief of the monthly journal NANG LUONG; his name was listed on the masthead of the cited source. (Hanoi NANG LUONG Sep 92 p 32)

Chau Phong [CHAAU PHONG]
SRV ambassador to the United Kingdom; on 22 September he attended a meeting in London held by the International Agricultural Organization (CABI) to welcome the SRV to the organization. (HANOI MOI 26 Sep 92 p 4)

Bui Hong Phuc [BUIF HOONGF PHUCS]
SRV ambassador to the FRG; on 8 September he gave a presentation on Vietnam's economic policy and the transition to a market economy. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 10 Sep 92 p 4)

Mai Van Phuc [MAI VAWN PHUCS], *Major General
*Deputy commander of the 7th MR; he recently accompanied Ho Chi Minh City leaders to bid farewell to Thai Prince Vajiralongkorn at Tan Son Nhat airport. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 21 Nov 92 p 7)

Nguyen Dinh So [NUGYEENX DINHF SOWR]
Secretary of the CPV Committee, Ha Tay Province; he was recently interviewed by NHA BAO & CONG LUAN, a monthly journal. (NHA BAO CONG & CONG LUAN special issue Dec 92 p 1)

Vo Viet Thanh [VOX VIEETS THANH]
*Vice chairman of the Ho Chi Minh City People’s Committee; on 12 September he welcomed a U.K. delegation which was visiting his city. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 13 Sep 92 p 1)

Nguyen Dinh Thanh [NGUYEENX DINHF THANHF]
Director of the Public Security Service in Hanoi; his article on public security in Hanoi was published in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN Oct 92 p 13)

Mach Quang Thang [MACHJ QUANG THAWNGS], M.A., associate professor
Vice president of the Party Building Institute of the Marx-Lenin, Ho Chi Minh Thoughts Institute; his article on party renovation and ramification was published in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN Oct 92 p 27)

Pham Van Tho [PHAMJ VAWN THOJ]
Member of the CPV Central Committee; secretary of the CPV Committee, Hai Hung Province; his article on experience in solving conflicts in rural areas was published in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN Oct 92 p 8)

Phan Van Trang [PHAN VAWN TRANG]
*Secretary of the CPV Committee in Dong Nai Province; on 23 November he attended the Dong Nai Province Farmers Congress in Bien Hoa City. (NONG DAN VIETNAM 5 Dec 92 p 1)

Le Van Toan [LEE VAWN TOANS]
*Ambassador; *SRV permanent representative to UNESCO in Paris; on 29 September he presented his credentials to the general director of UNESCO. (NHAN DAN 5 Oct 92 p 4)

Nguyen Phu Trong [NGUYEENX PHUS TRONGJ]
*Editor in chief of TAP CHI CONG SAN; he visited China 27 September - 8 October. (NHAN DAN 12 Oct 92 p 4)

Nguyen Thanh Tuan [NGUYEENX THANH TUAANS], Major
*Political deputy commander of the Da Nang City Military Command; his article on the city’s military branch at the ward level was published in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN Oct 92 p 60)