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CONTENTS

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NEAR EAST

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

- Expatriate Press Censorship in Arab World Examined [*Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI' 14 May*] 1
Future Water Shortages Threaten Region [*Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST 25 May*] 2

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

- Intifadah Coverage by Palestinian Press Reviewed
[*Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH 13 May*] 4
Settler Attacks Against AL-FAJR Staff Reported [*Jerusalem AL-FAJR 17 May*] 4

ALGERIA

- UGTA Official Discusses Relations With Government [*REVOLUTION AFRICAINE 3-9 May*] ... 5

EGYPT

- Official Says Civil Service Raises 525 Million Pounds [*AL-AKHBAR 13 May*] 6
Officials See 1.25 Billion in Loans for Fiscal Year [*AL-AKHBAR 9 May*] 7
Narrowing Arab Labor Market Seen Verging on 'Crisis' [*ROSE AL-YUSUF 30 Apr*] 7
Sources Expect 5 Billion Pounds in Tax Revenue [*AL-AKHBAR 8 May*] 9
Seminar Reports 16 Million Unemployed [*AL-AKHBAR 8 May*] 9

IRAQ

- Exporters Exempted From Converting Hard Currency [*London AL-HAWADITH 11 May*] 9

ISRAEL

- Most Soviet Jews Choose To Live in Central Region [*THE JERUSALEM POST 21 May*] 9
Nerve Gas Antidote Shelf Life Extended [*THE JERUSALEM POST 24 May*] 10
Rehabilitation of Informants Described [*THE JERUSALEM POST 21 May*] 10
Ashdod Coast Oil-Drilling Activity Discussed [*MA'ARIV 18 May*] 12
Netzarim Settlement in Gaza Profiled [*'Ofra NEQUDA Mar, Apr*] 13

JORDAN

- Closer Relations With Baghdad Examined [*THE JERUSALEM POST 25 May*] 16

KUWAIT

- Banker Calls Upon Arab Banks To Form Economic Bloc
[*London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 18 May*] 17

LEBANON

- Hizballah Kills Israelis in Operation Code-Named Ya Ruhallah
[*JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI 7 Jun*] 19

MOROCCO

- Statistics Show Trade Deficit Doubled in 1989 [*LA VIE ECONOMIQUE 13 Apr*] 19

SUDAN

Government Under Fire at Home, Abroad	20
Public Strikes, More Arrests [London AL-DUSTUR 28 May]	20
Public Killings Reported [London AL-DUSTUR 28 May]	21
NIF Isolation Growing [Cairo AL-AHALI 9 May]	22
Egypt Reviewing Policy [Cairo AL-AHALI 9 May]	22

SYRIA

Muslim Brotherhood Leader Criticizes Political Changes [Cairo LIWA' AL-ISLAM 26 Apr]	22
Agricultural Statistics Projected for 1990 [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 19 May]	25

SOUTH ASIA

AFGHANISTAN

AL-HURRIYAH Correspondent Reports on Political Situation	27
Kabul Residents, Officials Interviewed [Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH 22 Apr]	27
Communist Party Secretary Interviewed [Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH 22 Apr]	31
Communist Party Problems [Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH 29 Apr]	33
Interview With Party Officials [Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH 29 Apr]	35

INDIA

Kashmir: Special Constitutional Status Questioned [NAVBHARAT TIMES 22, 23 May]	42
Commentary: To Counter Terror We Need Courage [NAVBHARAT TIMES 5 Jun]	44

IRAN

Twenty-Five Thousand Tehran-Based Troops March [ETTELA'AT 31 May]	45
One Thousand Projects Planned for Current Year [JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI 20 May]	45
Economic Benefits of Tourist Industry Detailed [ETTELA'AT 12 May]	46

PAKISTAN

Qazi Terms Bhutto's Islamic Countries Tour 'Failure' [THE MUSLIM 22 May]	49
Gujral Accuses Pakistan of Nuclear Buildup [THE MUSLIM 24 May]	50
Senate Passes Shariat Bill [DAWN 14 May]	50
Resistance to Shariat Bill at Seminar Discussed [DAWN 27 May]	50
TNFJ Chief Criticizes Shariah Bill [THE MUSLIM 20 May]	51
Opposition Levels Charges of Corruption Against Punjab Government [DAWN 27 May]	52
Nawaz Accuses Center of 'Sabotaging Reconciliation' [THE MUSLIM 20 May]	52
Federal Anti-corruption Committee Issues Orders Against Officials [THE MUSLIM 20 May]	53
Karachi Conference Explores Oceanographic Development [DAWN 27 May]	54
Paper Voices Support for Iranian Offers [THE MUSLIM 20 May]	54
Economic Council Approves Projects [THE MUSLIM 24 May]	54
Good Politics Cited as Prerequisite for Good Budget [DAWN 12-18 May]	55
Syed Iftikhar Sworn in as Auditor General [THE MUSLIM 20 May]	56
'Cost and Profits of Farming' Discussed [DAWN 12-18 May]	56
Better Tax Collection Urged [DAWN 24 May]	59
Budget-Making Options Discussed [DAWN 27 May]	61
New Formula To Collect Ushr Being Proposed [THE MUSLIM 20 May]	64
PPP-IJI Tussle Shifts to Azad Kashmir [THE MUSLIM 20 May]	64
Editorial Views Corruption [DAWN 27 May]	65
Commentary Terms Karachi 'Pakistan's Beirut' [THE MUSLIM 22 May]	65
Editorial Discusses Sindh Situation [DAWN 26 May]	67
Commentary Views 'Excitement', Confusion Over Shariah Bill [THE MUSLIM 25 May]	67
Energy: Commentaries View Needs, Strategy	69
Editorial on Conserving Energy [THE PAKISTAN TIMES 23 May]	69
Article Analyzes Increased Power Generation [THE PAKISTAN TIMES 23 May]	69

Commentary: English in Pakistan	71
English in Pakistan [DAWN 14 May]	71
English, a 'Pakistani Language' [DAWN 25 May]	72
Letter: 'English in Pakistan' [DAWN 23 May]	74
Article Reports on Human Rights Improvement [DAWN 23 May]	74

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Expatriate Press Censorship in Arab World Examined

90AE0051A Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI'
in Arabic 14 May 90 p 5

[Commentary by Bilal al-Hasan: "The Missing Arab Law"]

[Text] On 14 May, AL-YAWM AL-SABI' completes its sixth year and begins its seventh year. What do six years of our own experience in the Arab expatriate press represent?

I would first like to point to a special characteristic of AL-YAWM AL-SABI' that is not shared by other magazines. AL-YAWM AL-SABI' is the only Arab magazine without a homeland. Other Arab magazines and newspapers can be categorized as Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi, Saudi, Kuwaiti, or Libyan. In this sense, they can, if they wish, decide to return to their countries of origin, whereas AL-YAWM AL-SABI' cannot.

Arab newspapers and magazines are published in the Arab diaspora for reasons related to security, ambition, or opposition. All such publications have their own reasons that are subject to change. However, AL-YAWM AL-SABI' must remain in the Arab diaspora.

Lebanese magazines are published in the Arab diaspora because of the civil war, in spite of which, some of them have returned to Beirut.

Other Arab magazines are published in the Arab diaspora because of their ambition to publish an idea in which they believe, or control the Arab press market, or because they feel constrained by the smallness of their countries and aspire to an international scope. If these magazines find that their goal is being achieved, they continue publishing. If they find that their goal has changed, they can pack their bags, end their experiment or adventure, and return. AL-YAWM AL-SABI' alone does not have this luxury of "returning." AL-YAWM AL-SABI' was born in the Arab diaspora and has no choice but to remain there. The only range of hope open to it to be affiliated to a country is one over which the wills of peoples, small states, and major states struggle, one which is crowded with strategies, weapons, armies, missiles, and even nuclear bombs.

This is the reality of AL-YAWM AL-SABI'. We note it, neither boasting nor sighing.

But this reality poses a bitter, agonizing question to us: As long as immigration has been imposed on us, why immigration to the West and not to an Arab country?

This question seems innocent, normal, and simple, but the answer is cruel and harsh. The gist of the answer is that it is impossible for any Arab citizen to publish a newspaper or magazine in any other Arab country. Not a single Arab law permits any Arab citizen or any Arab

party to publish a newspaper in its country. Moreover, Arab laws clearly stipulate a prohibition against such a possibility.

If Lebanese, Iraqis, and Libyans can speak in their respective countries, Palestinians cannot speak in any Arab country through a magazine or newspaper unless they are nationals of that country, part of its regime, or a branch of its party machinery.

The Arab governments approve the establishment of a training camp, but they cannot approve the publication of a magazine.

The Arab governments agree to help you by negotiating with the major states, but they cannot help you regarding the publication of a magazine.

The Arab governments can collect contributions for you and give you money, but they cannot grant you the right to publish a newspaper.

It is a bitter, harsh, cruel reality when you are an Arab, and every Arab is willing to defend and speak in behalf of your cause, but no Arab government or state is willing to allow you a podium from which you yourself can speak about your cause.

What has made establishing a training camp easier than publishing a newspaper?

This question can be directed to Arab leaders. However, at the same time, it can be directed to Arab legislators, legal experts, and lawyers unions; to the lawyers union in every Arab country. Has it ever occurred to one of them that there is an Arab law which is lacking, which is none other than a law that permits an Arab citizen to publish a magazine in another Arab country?

Why are France, London, Nicosia, Athens, and Brussels magnanimous about the publication of Arab magazines and newspapers, whereas not one Arab capital is generous enough to allow the publication of a single Arab "guest" magazine?

The magazines of the Arab diaspora, regardless of our view or position on them, are the only Arab magazines that are distributed in all Arab countries. They are the last "rostrum" that provides politics, culture, thought, and information read by Arabs everywhere. They are the last dais from which an Arab writer from any country can address an Arab reader in any country. When these Arab magazines are fought with a variety laws, notices, or distribution restrictions, the result is a strike against, and the elimination of, a basic means of Arab survival. This means of survival helps to create a single Arab mentality. It is familiar with Arab problems and the views on these problems. It thus knows how to think, how to engage in dialogue, how to differ, and how to agree.

The elimination of the expatriate press would put an end to the last rostrum that exists for the sake of Arab continuity, and it would open wide the door to mutual

regional estrangement. The Egyptian would become distant from the Sudanese, the Sudanese would become a foreigner to the Iraqi, the Tunisian would feel alienation from the Lebanese. Factors conducive to fragmentation would thus be allowed to develop in a world that is moving toward cohesion, union, and coming together.

We do not make these remarks in defense of the expatriate press, but in defense of Arab continuity and the importance of its survival and growth.

Our intention is to register disapproval of the logic of the "regional" press that is developing and becoming consolidated in each Arab capital. This regional press is providing peace of mind to Arab rulers at the expense of depth, breadth, and scope.

Every Arab magazine or newspaper remains able to solve its problems when they become critical. Whereas AL-YAWM AL-SABI' is ending its sixth year in the Arab diaspora, not possessing the luxury of thinking about its own problem, and suffering from the enormous proportions of the combination of its particular problem with the problem of the homeland.

Future Water Shortages Threaten Region

4400278 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 25 May 90 p 8

[Article by Douglas Davis]

[Text] Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir has been the recipient of little good news in recent months, and the message he received from a delegation of 16 senior hydrologists last week gave him no fresh cause for comfort.

Israel, they told him, is using up its water reserves 15 percent faster than they can be replenished each year. The years of over-pumping ground water are leading to a deterioration of both the quantity and quality of Israel's supply.

There is an urgent need to adopt drastic, emergency measures, the scientists warned Shamir, even if this involves such politically sensitive decisions as cutting back agricultural production. The bottom line: Unless such measures are implemented, Israel will face a "catastrophe" within five years.

Israel is not alone among Middle East states in facing a water crisis. Warnings are growing steadily louder, both inside and outside the region, that the next major Middle East conflagration will draw its inspiration not from the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian problem, Islamic fundamentalism, or any of the other myriad rivalries, jealousies and suspicions that characterize relationships within the region. The next war, say politicians and scientists, will be over water.

A sign of the times appeared earlier this year when Turkey, the emerging water "superpower" of the region, unilaterally turned off the flow of the Euphrates. The

purpose was to fill its new Ataturk Dam, the center-piece of an ambitious \$21 billion project which will eventually involve the creation of 21 new dams, 17 hydroelectric plants, and irrigation works to transform some 120,000 semi-arid square kilometers of ancient Mesopotamia into fertile agriculture land.

The Turkish action drew a response that was as swift as it was unexpected: a short-lived alliance between traditional arch-rivals Syria and Iraq, both of which draw water from the Euphrates and both of which suffered acute shortages, electrical disruptions and crop failures when the flow was halted.

Within weeks, the strained relations approached breaking point, with headlines appearing in both Syrian and Iraqi newspapers warning of war unless water supplies were resumed immediately. Just one month after they stopped the flow, the authorities in Ankara turned the tap on again.

Nevertheless, the harsh facts of life are that Turkey's far-sighted and ambitious water projects could ultimately cost Syria a devastating 40 percent of its Euphrates water, while Iraq could lose up to 90 percent.

Concern about the region's diminishing water supplies in the face of rapidly rising demand—which is fuelled by an exploding population and the increased needs of agriculture and industry—has been given dramatic expression in the United States.

A 1987 State Department report noted grimly that "there will be insufficient water to sustain Egypt's population by the year 2,000 unless dramatic conservation and management improvements are put into place in the next few years."

More recently—and in more apocalyptic terms—the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies warned that the Middle East was standing on the edge of another major resource crisis.

"Before the 21st century," noted a widely quoted research paper, "the struggle over limited and threatened water resources could sunder already fragile ties among regional states and lead to unprecedented upheaval within the area."

Despite the warnings, however, little has been done to conserve existing supplies; to apply those supplies more efficiently and economically; to establish fresh sources that could avert the predicted catastrophe.

The Syrian capital of Damascus, which is without water most nights, is estimated to be continuing to lose as much as 30 percent of its water supply as a result of old, leaking pipes.

In Egypt, up to two-thirds of the water supply allocated to cities and towns is lost through inefficient use, while farmers in the fertile Nile Delta are estimated to be using twice as much water as necessary because of primitive irrigation techniques.

Saudi Arabia uses 90 percent of its non-replenishable deep-well fresh water supplies for agricultural produce that could be imported at one-tenth of the cost, while Israel uses 70 percent of its water for agriculture and some 17 percent of its energy resources simply to pump water around the country.

A complicating political factor in Israel's calculations, and a cause for sober consideration by those advocating a return of the administered territories, is that no less than 40 percent of Israel's fresh water is derived from aquifers beneath the West Bank and Gaza Strip, representing 95 percent of the known underground water supply in the administered territories.

The Jordan River, which is shared by Israel and the Hashemite kingdom, is now so overused that its increasingly saline water can irrigate only some of the most salt-resistant crops.

Even so, the subject of water allocation from the river is a matter of constant haggling between Israeli and Jordanian officials. According to sources in London, the flow is so meticulously monitored and the supplies so carefully allocated that the debate between the two sides overheated when Israel reportedly removed a large boulder in the river that slightly increased its share of the water flow.

Indeed, so critical is this natural resource as a factor in Middle East politics these days that Jordan's King Hussein has reportedly told visitors recently that water is the only factor that would induce him to go to war against Israel again.

Relief may come if Israel can strike a deal with Lebanon over water from the Litani River and with Jordan over the largely untapped Yarmuk River, where Hussein had planned to build a \$350 million "unity dam" that would essentially supply water to Jordan and Syria.

Observers are in no doubt that Israel, which claims a share of the Yarmuk, would take drastic action if it were excluded from a strictly Jordanian-Syrian division of the water. Indeed, plans to construct the dam broke down over what the Jordanians consider to be excessive Israeli demands for its share of the Yarmuk waters.

Israeli experts are now predicting a water shortfall of up to 30 percent by the end of the decade; Syria and Iraq are expected to suffer shortfalls of up to 60 percent, while Jordanian experts predict that within 20 years they will require about twice as much water as they currently consume.

Both Saudi Arabia and Libya have embarked on hideously expensive water-development projects, both of which bear the hallmarks of desperation rather than cool long-term strategic planning.

Riyadh has already spent at least \$20 billion on a seawater desalinization plant which supplies less than 3 percent of its water, while Libya's Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi has embarked on a characteristically bizarre

scheme: a \$24 billion project which he had dubbed "the Eighth Wonder of the World."

The Libyan plan involves the construction of massive concrete pipes to carry water to the coastal plain from non-replenishable underground lakes deep below Libya's southern desert.

The lakes are expected to dry up shortly after the project is completed within about 10 years.

A more realistic prospect for Israel is contained in a recent agreement with Turkey to purchase up to 250 million cubic meters of water a year equivalent to almost the annual quantity carried by the National Water Carrier-at a cost of up to 35 cents per cubic meter.

It is envisaged that the Turkish water will be shipped to Israel in huge plastic barges. Infrastructure work alone, including the construction of special terminals and additional pipelines, is expected to cost around \$200 million.

The agreement evoked a howl of outrage from Jordan last week when the Turkish ambassador to Amman was summoned to the Foreign Ministry for a severe rebuke: The people of Jordan, he was told, were displeased that the Turkish government had struck a deal to supply Israel with water.

While agreeing to relay the Jordanian protest to Ankara, the Turkish envoy responded firmly that his government was committed to supplying the water needs of all countries in the region.

In fact, however, there is no legal international obligation to share natural water resources, and "downstream" countries will increasingly be at the mercy of "headwater" states, prompting fears that, as demand increases, water may become a more powerful lever in regional affairs than oil ever was.

Turkey's President Turgut Ozal has repeatedly promised that he will "never use the control of water to coerce or threaten," but the Syrians and Iraqis believe that much of the damage has already been done.

Syria relies on the Euphrates for 90 percent of its surface water, and Shakir Bazu'ah, director-general of Syria's own al-Thawrah Dam on Lake Assad, which is fed by the Euphrates, has been quoted as saying that the new Turkish dam will cut the flow of the river by two-thirds, reducing it to a salty, inconsequential stream. "There is no longer a river," he said recently. "The Euphrates is dead. The Turks are telling people who live along this river to emigrate or die."

Similar anxieties have been reflected in Cairo, where a symposium was recently held to discuss the shortage of Nile water and the desperate measures that will have to be taken in the coming decade to avoid a full-blown crisis.

The main reason for Cairo's headache is the projection that Egypt's population, which depends almost exclusively on the Nile, will increase from 54 million to 70 million souls within the next 10 years. For the moment, however, Egypt's concern is focused on the activities of Israeli technicians who are reported to be investigating the possibility of constructing three dams on the Blue Nile, which rises in Ethiopia, to provide irrigation for an ambitious Ethiopian agricultural development programme.

Such a project, Egypt fears, could radically reduce the flow of Blue Nile water into its Delta region, cutting supplies by up to 20 percent. Cairo has reportedly despatched a blunt warning to Addis Ababa that it will not tolerate any attempt to interfere with the flow of the Nile.

"Egypt," said one Western official, echoing dire warnings emanating from Washington in recent years, "will go to war to protect its Nile waters. There is absolutely no doubt about that."

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Intifadah Coverage by Palestinian Press Reviewed

90AE0067A Nicosia *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH*
in Arabic 13 May 90 p 44

[Article: "The Palestinian Press and the Intifadah"]

[Text] A monograph about the united media in the PLO (45 pages average size) by 'Ali al-Khalili, entitled "The Palestinian Press and the Intifadah," was published in Tunisia. In this study the author lists Palestinian newspapers and magazines which are published in East Jerusalem and which may be viewed and studied as "a daily journal" of the Palestinian intifadah [uprising] since its inception on 9 December 1987.

Among al-Khalili's first observations is that "alarming shock" which confronts an observer because "most of the facts and incidents are astonishingly missing from these journals." The observer becomes confused as he faces a lengthy series of redundant expressions and terms which continue to "obfuscate and neutralize the term, intifadah, itself." Al-Khalili adds, "The shock is driven home once again when that researcher discovers that more coverage of the intifadah and more accurate reporting on it can be found in any other press, including the Israeli press, than in the Palestinian press. Even the term, intifadah, as well as all the media and political terms and expressions which are derived from it, are mentioned more frequently in non-Palestinian newspapers and publications than they are mentioned in Palestinian ones. The observer then discovers that he can do without all newspapers and publications from East Jerusalem.

This is because Palestinian newspapers, which are published under the guns of the occupation, do not reflect the daily history of the intifadah as much as they expose

the occupation itself. Palestinian newspapers expose the occupation in its worst form as an oppressive force that stifles free speech. "Is there any other reasonable cause why the national Palestinian press would voluntarily to this day keep the term, intifadah, out of all official periodical publications? Is there any reason why the national Palestinian press would do that at a time when the Arabic term, intifadah, (dare we say it is a Palestinian term?), has been incorporated into all the languages of the earth, including Hebrew, the language of the Israeli occupation itself?"

'Ali al-Khalili deals with the conditions of the Palestinian press in the occupied territory and with the relationship between that press and the intifadah. He addresses what he called the "accelerated adjustment" achieved by that press. Despite very severe blows, on the one hand, the Palestinian press remained steadfast. On the other hand, it continued to develop and formulate an independent, Palestinian national character.

Al-Khalili's study is divided into five "progressive chapters." The first one, entitled "The Narrow Margin," monitors Israel's military censorship under which all local newspapers and magazines have been published since 5 June 1967.

The second chapter, entitled "A Balance of Contradictions," closely monitors press activity and the expertise gained by members of that press in their media and national activities. This expertise is incompatible with that amassed by the occupation authority "in dealing" with members of that press and in suppressing them as well.

The third chapter is "The Crisis" for both parties. Al-Khalili says, "Our press, on the one hand, and the occupation on the other are confronting this 'balance'."

The fourth chapter, "The Natural," has to do with the intifadah which has turned everything upside down.

For his fifth chapter al-Khalili chose the title, "The Temporary Adjustment of the Press." In it he lists the possibilities and the likelihood that the Palestinian press, which has been suppressed and stifled, will survive in the future as the intifadah continues and a stream of future political changes are forced on Israel.

Settler Attacks Against AL-FAJR Staff Reported

90AE0067B Jerusalem *AL-FAJR*
in Arabic 17 May 90 pp 1, 11

[Article: "Solidarity Campaign With AL-FAJR Continues"]

[Text] The solidarity campaign with AL-FAJR and its employees against a series of attacks on the newspaper carried out by settlers resumed yesterday. The settlers carried out their most recent attack on the newspaper two days ago when they attacked a vehicle owned by AL-FAJR. Five newspaper employees were wounded in that attack.

Delegations from various areas in the West Bank and Gaza, representing popular and national institutions and organizations, converged upon AL-FAJR yesterday. They denounced the murderous attack against the newspaper's employees, and they declared their solidarity with AL-FAJR. The delegations called upon international institutions and human rights organizations to intervene so that attacks by the settlers can be brought to an end.

AL-FAJR also received telegrams from inside the country and abroad. Those who sent the telegrams strongly denounced the attack and declared their solidarity with AL-FAJR. They expressed their wishes for the speedy recovery of those employees who were wounded.

Salim Jibrán, editor-in-chief of AL-ITTIHAD newspaper, which is published in Haifa, sent a telegram to AL-FAJR expressing the solidarity of AL-ITTIHAD and its employees and the solidarity of Israel's Communist Party as well with AL-FAJR and its employees. He expressed his wishes for the speedy recovery of the colleagues who were wounded.

Citizens in the occupied territories made scores of telephone calls to AL-FAJR to express their solidarity with that newspaper and condemn the attacks by the settlers.

The League of Arab Journalists in the occupied territory issued a statement yesterday condemning the attack which it considered one episode in a series of episodes accelerating the settlement process.

In its statement the league demanded an end to these barbaric actions, and it called upon international institutions and organizations to intervene to stop the settlers' attacks against Palestinian citizens and their property.

A group of young people in the old town of Nablus denounced the incident. They used loudspeakers to condemn the incident and to express their solidarity with AL-FAJR and its employees.

ALGERIA

UGTA Official Discusses Relations With Government

90AA0131A Algiers *REVOLUTION AFRICAINE*
in French 3-9 May 90 pp 14-15

[Interview with UGTA secretary general Tayeb Belakhdar by Abdelhak Bouattoura: "UGTA Secretary General Tayeb Belakhdar: 'Still Ready To Pursue Dialogue'", date and place not given]

[Text]

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] After the ultimatum for a general strike, a communique saying that the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] will continue to

confer with the government. Why? On what bases? Have you received guarantees from the government?

[Belakhdar] First of all, it must be made clear that the final statement made during the proceedings of the last National Council meeting do not constitute an ultimatum. It is only a faithful manifestation of the latter and at the same time it expresses workers' concerns and impatience with the deterioration of their living and working conditions, on the one hand, and, on the other, with the delays in receiving their pay, and the slight interest evinced by the administration at all levels in endowing the notions of dialogue and negotiations with the responsible content they should have in connection with its commitments. In addition to a response to the workers' legitimate expectations on the eve of the month of Ramadan and during the entire period preceding it. A whole series of deflagrations in those relations that were supposed to constitute a rallying point for the development objectives of the public sector enterprises, on the one hand, and a constant deterioration of workers' purchasing power, on the other, have been noted in the labor sector. This is what led this meeting of the National Council to specifically decide on the principle of a general strike in view of the fact that the union and its members had found themselves in a blind alley which, if the situation were to persist, could have jeopardized the entire credibility of their organized labor struggle struggles.

It must, in any case, be made clear that the National Council's decision was in no way aimed at breaking off the dialogue and negotiations with the government and certain administrations. Quite the contrary, it is the latter's lack of interest and their ostracism that led the National Council to take this step.

Moreover, it must be noted that the government's latest communique meddles in the affair and introduces confusion by linking the legitimate rights recognized as belonging to the labor union with certain partisan procedures through provisions of the Constitution. The UGTA reiterated its demands, which are exclusively social in nature, out of concern for the clarification of its rights and stated that it was still ready to pursue the dialogue and negotiate to come up with a positive solution to workers' socioprofessional problems, thus taking it upon itself to contribute to the restoration of confidence in the labor sector in order to increase social stability and improve production.

It is no accident that we suggest that this willingness to engage in dialogues is represented by the scheduling of a working session between the UGTA and the government within the next few days. We hope that this meeting will result in the realization and continuous pursuit of the efforts that have preceded it.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] You reject the laws governing union rights and labor relations. Aside from the fact that you say that you were not consulted—the

government claims the contrary—where do you find fault with the laws in question?

[Belakhdar] As a social partner, the UGTA should be consulted beforehand on all laws concerning the labor sector. It has always demanded this and will continue to do so in such a way that the government is impressed with the need for this. As far as the two above-mentioned bills are concerned and due to the fact that they were not turned over to us within the time frame allotted [by law] to permit the labor union and workers to examine them and to participate in a democratic way, the UGTA asked the government for time to consider the matter in order to assure a democratic and responsible process that might have endowed these laws with credible support for their application. As for the labor relations bill, which we think constitutes an extremely important document because of the implications it has for the worker's career and the retention of his job, for the ways workers can organize and participate in the process,...this was not the case. The National Council took note of this state of affairs and made it a point to inform workers regarding this anomaly.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] Let us go back to the ultimatum. What if you gain nothing or not enough? People say that your threat is linked to your next congress. They also say that the rate of [member] participation at the National Council meeting on 9 April 1990 was not high enough to permit you to make such a decision.

[Belakhdar] First, I think I've clarified the situation as concerns the term "ultimatum," since the UGTA, a labor organization that represents Algerian workers, has the specific prerogatives of protecting the moral and material interests of the latter, and I insist on the term "moral" because we feel that workers' dignity has been subjected to intolerable outrages due to the slight interest shown in the position they occupy as a fundamental element in the development of the nation, on the one hand, and due to the constant and continuous attacks on these material interests through the deterioration of their purchasing power and through speculative operations, the failure to control prices, an absence of controls, *trabendo*, and other social plagues, on the other hand.

I must say that, in terms of its rules and programs, the missions the UGTA undertakes have nothing to do with economic situations, which permits us to maintain that UGTA decisions should not be construed as actions, as some people want to present them, and even less so as our wanting to link them to the next UGTA congress. I've already said that the UGTA's essential mission is and will continue to be the defense and preservation of workers' rights and interests and will be so as a corollary to the defense and strengthening of the public sector, the guarantor of the preservation and perpetuation of our economic and political independence.

Furthermore, I insist on giving the lie to the kind of argumentation that speculates on the quorum. The participation rate at the 9 April 1990 National Council meeting was one of the highest. The quorum was filled. The decisions were made in a context of respect for union rules.

On just this subject, it is with amazement and consternation that we learned of the statements issued by a high official of the Ministry of Social Affairs who chose to violate the obligation to exercise restraint and to behave properly that is imposed on him to indulge in defamation and slander in an interview he had granted an evening daily.

In conclusion, I take advantage of this occasion to wish all workers a pleasant holiday in the hope that they keep their hopes up in this free land of Algeria. True, the times are hard, but the determination of each of us can contribute to straightening out the situation and coming out of the crisis victorious once again. Happy holiday and best wishes!

EGYPT

Official Says Civil Service Raises 525 Million Pounds

90AA0157D Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic
13 May 90 p 1

[Article by Fu'ad Fawwaz: "New Group Pay Raise in July To Cost 525 Million Pounds"]

[Text] AL-AKHBAR has learned that the group pay raise that government workers will get with their July salaries will be paid as a percentage of salary according to the same rules as previous group raises. This was stated by a responsible source in the Finance Ministry.

The source said that the group pay raise will be exempt from the wages and salaries tax, but will count as income subject to insurance and pensions under the rules of variable salaries. The pay raise will be announced shortly with the new budget.

The source stated that a total of 520 million pounds have been allocated for the new pay raise. The raise is being paid to workers in the private sector under an agreement with the Chamber of Commerce, the Union of Industries, and the Workers' Union. It will be paid at the same rate to those on pension and those entitled to pensions this July.

In a related matter, AL-AKHBAR has learned that a total of 3.225 billion pounds will be allocated in the new budget for educational, research, and youth services. Total allocations for health, social, and religious services will amount to about 900 million pounds.

Officials See 1.25 Billion in Loans for Fiscal Year

90AA0157C Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic
9 May 90 p 1

[Article by 'Isam al-Siba'i: "1.25 Billion Pounds in Loans During Coming Fiscal Year—Loans for Housing, Land Reclamation, and Food Security"]

[Text] A responsible source stated that in the coming fiscal year the government will work to provide the liquidity needed to issue low-interest loans for low-cost housing projects, land reclamation and cultivation, cooperatives, and food security. A total of about 1.25 billion pounds in loans have been allocated by the National Investment Bank, in addition to a 15 million pound reserve. This is the same sum that was allocated during the current fiscal year. The source added that these loans will be at easy interest rates.

The source indicated that housing absorbs the greatest share of loans, with 1.1 billion pounds allocated to it; 505 million pounds of this to be funded by the Investment Bank, compared with 555 [million] during the current year. He said that 5 million pounds had been allocated for governorate projects, companies, and emergency shelter; 335 [million] to the Building Bank [Bank al-Ta'mir]; 100 million to the Arab Real Estate Bank; and 60 million to the Arab Real Estate Bank [as published]. In addition, 100 million pounds were a reserve for housing project loans.

Seventy million pounds will be provided for land reclamation projects—50 million for the public sector, and 20 [million] to the Agricultural Development and Credit Bank for allocation to the private sector. Twenty million pounds will be provided for food security—10 [million] to the Credit Bank, and 10 [million] to public sector banks. Also, 15 million pounds will be provided for cooperatives—5 [million] for consumer cooperative projects from the Agricultural Development and Credit Bank, and 10 [million] for the Industrial Development Bank.

Narrowing Arab Labor Market Seen Verging on 'Crisis'

90AA0151A Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF
in Arabic 30 Apr 90 pp 20-21

[Editorial by Fatimah Ihsan and Amin Taha Mursi: "Five Million Arab Workers in Poverty"]

[Text] We are walking on an unforgiving minefield that permits no one to walk there. We—the Arabs from the ocean to the gulf—are currently dancing over it! Yes, Arab labor. The labor market throughout the Arab world is changing, and the entire map is changing. In Egypt, all the crises are embodied in the square on three million citizens' identity cards marked "unemployed."

Bakr Muhammad, envoy of the chairman of the Arab Labor Organization, was quite unequivocal in a recent meeting of the organization when he stressed that an

Arab employment strategy cannot exist in the absence of a pan-Arab development plan.

Because neither a strategy nor a plan exists at the present, it has become necessary to raise the issue of the labor market crisis forcefully. Perhaps if we disturb officials on this issue they will become disturbed about it themselves!

Many papers and studies have been put on conference tables explaining and analyzing, but no one listens. The facts in these papers are increasingly alarming. The Arab world is exporting and importing labor!

The Arab labor situation began as follows:

Labor emigrated to western Europe, primarily to Germany and France and then to Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

Where did they come from?

They came from the Arab Maghreb countries, and their numbers grew until they reached 3 million.

And all were threatened with expulsion!

The reasons were quite well founded. Certain European countries suffer unemployment rates as high as 11 percent, a serious level which affects increasing inflation, particularly since the European countries have unemployment insurance, which is paid to all unemployed workers!

Other European countries, such as Spain and Portugal, had reached disastrous levels of unemployment. Spain, for example had 21 percent unemployment, with approximately 3 million out of work. What could these countries do?

Simply put, their workers left for neighboring countries with the same European blood.

From Spain, 3.5 million left to make a living and for more money, with at least 1.4 million spread over western Europe. Although Portugal has a population of only 10 million, 4 million workers have left for other countries in Europe fleeing an epidemic of unemployment.

Clearly they represent competition for Arab labor in Europe, particularly with European unity at hand. Jobs in Europe must stay in the European "family!"

The crisis of Arabs in Europe might not have become so severe and alarming if the Europeans had allowed the Arabs to leave gradually and by choice, but because of their noted lack of unity, the Arabs did not realize that they could pressure Europe on trade, which naturally would tilt the scale of Arab imports from Europe (42.5 percent of all imports), or what the Arab world exports to Europe (\$32.4 billion). For this reason, Europe resorted to immediate, collective expulsion and blind fanaticism and aggression against Arabs in a racial war that ranged

from breaking the bones of Arabs in the street to prohibiting the wearing of scarves in schools.

All of this may anger the reader, but what could drive him, and us crazy is the other side of the coin from the shores of the gulf.

The status of foreign labor in the Gulf countries has prompted western research and reports to characterize what is happening in the Arab region as unprecedented throughout the world!

Why is one fact sufficient to sum up all the papers in the file and throw them in the face of the future? The percentage of Asian labor has grown to frightening numbers, exceeding not only the national labor force in certain Arab countries, but actually exceeding the population itself! Although certain countries are turning toward Arabization of the labor force, this may actually turn into "Saudization" or "Kuwaitization," etc. A systematic dispensing with Arab labor, before any other, and replacing it with local labor is occurring. In four countries this has clearly happened: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates [UAE]!

While there are no accurate statistics on the volume of Arab labor going to the Arab countries, estimates, which are the only figures available, indicate that it numbers between 3.5 and 5.5 million. From 1975 to 1980, Arab expatriates remitted \$50 billion to five labor-exporting countries: Egypt, Syria, North and South Yemen, and Jordan. During the same period, Pakistan and India alone received \$20 billion in remittances from workers in the Arab countries!

What should we understand from this?

The Arab manpower chart, which is nearing 64.5 million, and expected in the next 10 years to reach 99 million, will not include Arab countries that can absorb this force.

Nor are there foreign countries that will accept them.

Their native countries will not need them.

The existing picture does not call for despair. Every country must change its way of dealing with the crisis so that it will be on firm ground. But where will Egypt stand?

In the middle of tons of papers and files inside a small vault is stored information on labor in Egypt, Major General 'Abd-al-Muhsin Hindawi, director of the Work Permit Administration, spoke with us.

"Unfortunately, there is not at present an accurate, comprehensive inventory of the work force in the various production and service sectors by profession, scientific specialization, and administrative level in any government agency.

"I cannot undertake this role on behalf of the government agencies concerned!"

Maj. Gen. Hindawi does not know the size or specifics of the work force in Egypt, just as all of us do not know precisely how many unemployed there are in Egypt.

Among the many conferences on unemployment held by Egyptian government and popular organizations, the figures of the National Democratic Party [NDP] conference differ from those of the Faculty of Economics, but in general they range between 666,000 in 1986-87 to 1.1 million. Other conferences put the number of unemployed in 1990 at 2 million or more.

It has reached the point that an undersecretary in the Ministry of Manpower stood before one of these conferences and stated clearly that neither he, nor anyone else, has precise information on unemployment and labor in Egypt.

Experts attribute increased unemployment in Egypt to several factors, including population policy. When the population growth rate rises, the age structure of the population changes, with the percentage of those in the 15 to 64-year-old age bracket increasing from 54 percent in 1960 to 75 percent in 1988.

Educational policy takes second place as a causative factor in worsening the unemployment problem. One-half (or more) of Egypt's population are illiterate, and 96 percent are dropouts from elementary school.

An NDP (note!) study accused those who make education policy (who are also from the NDP) of not coordinating the preparation of graduates and specialties with the jobs available.

There are many other causes, including the method of allocation of domestic investment among the various sectors since the mid-1970's and waning agricultural investment.

If the Arab market is about to be closed, and the Egyptian market is already closed, where will workers go?

Can we keep them from leaving?

A decree on the desk of Prime Minister Dr. 'Atif Sidqi awaiting his signature proposes that all those leaving be required to have tourist visas and to pay a deposit that is refundable if the citizen returns within three months or submits proof that he has obtained an authentic employment contract. It was also decided that the worker would not be eligible for a refund of the deposit if he returns after the end of the stipulated time period without an employment contract.

This means that travel would be restricted and controlled so that many of those seeking a livelihood would not be able to travel hastily, leading to problems reminiscent of the Egyptian labor crisis in Iraq a few months ago.

Minister of Manpower 'Asim 'Abd-al-Haqq said:

"With these rules, we are applying the articles of the constitution without infringing upon the right of Egyptian citizens to travel and relocate." At the same time, the minister did not deny that the Egyptian labor market cannot absorb all graduates and for this reason, one of the cabinet's goals is to develop the market for Egyptian labor abroad!

How can this be done, Mr. Minister?

The statistics prepared by the Ministry of Manpower the ministry's providing 18,500 job opportunities abroad through labor representation offices and 1472 job opportunities through employment agencies!

Again (for the tenth time), do these figures meet the needs of the workers?

Hope is the only guarantee. These opportunities are a drop in the (stormy) sea!

One thing before we conclude:

In June 1990, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will deport foreign workers who do not have job contracts.

Minister Asim 'Abd-al-Haqq stresses that this will not affect Egyptian workers in Jordan, perhaps because of the loss of sufficient figures and information. Contrary to what the minister thinks, we believe that the Jordanian decision, followed by decisions of other countries, will push the crisis toward an explosion which we hope can be defused before it is too late.

Sources Expect 5 Billion Pounds in Tax Revenue

90AA0157A Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 8 May 90 p 1

[Article by Fu'ad Fawwaz: "5 Billion Pounds Expected Tax Yield This Year"]

[Text] A responsible source at the Tax Department stated to AL-AKHBAR that the department is expected to realize a yield of 5 billion pounds this year, an increase of 800 million pounds over last year. This yield represents approximately 38 percent of total government revenues.

The source affirmed that the big increase in tax revenues resulted from applying a philosophy of treating taxpayers well and solving their problems on the spot through district branches, without turning to appeals committees or tax suits.

Seminar Reports 16 Million Unemployed

90AA0157B Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic
8 May 90 p 4

[Article by Hisham Mubarak: "16 Million Unemployed Devour Fruits of Development, Customs Exemptions Should Be Canceled To Eliminate Budget Deficit"]

[Text] A Management Club seminar yesterday stated that 16 million unemployed exist in Egypt because of the tremendous population increase that is devouring all the fruits of development. The seminar called for establishing radical solutions for the problem of population growth. It stressed the importance of narrowing the gap between imports and exports and working to attract the savings of overseas Egyptians into the banking sector.

Dr. Farid al-Najjar, head of the Department of Business Administration at al-Zaqaziq University, spoke before the seminar and stressed the seriousness of the unemployment problem, which has reached 4 million directly unemployed, and 12 million hidden unemployed. He said that the big increase in births—1.5 million a year—is devouring all attempts at development and leading to great economic problems.

Dr. al-Najjar called for canceling \$6 billion in customs exemptions to eliminate the government's budget deficit. He stressed the importance of tying wages to productivity and of incentives to increase production. He asked the banking sector to play a larger role in attracting Egyptian savings from overseas.

IRAQ

Exporters Exempted From Converting Hard Currency

90P40067A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
11 May 90 p 38

[Text] An important decision regarding the Iraqi economy was made by the Council of Ministers to exempt private sector exporters from converting any part of the value of materials exported from Iraq for a three-year period.

This decision gives Iraqi exporters the opportunity to keep the hard currency received for the materials that they export in a private capacity, and to invest it or use it as they want in commercial activities or for importing materials into the country.

ISRAEL

Most Soviet Jews Choose To Live in Central Region

44000279 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 21 May 90 p 2

[Article by Herb Keinon]

[Text] Well over half the Soviet immigrants who have arrived since the beginning of the year have settled between Hadera and Gedera, according to an Absorption Ministry study.

The study indicates that 55 percent of the immigrants have gone to live in the center of the country, 31 percent to the north, 10 percent in Jerusalem, and four percent in

the south. No figures on the number of Soviet immigrants settling in the territories were provided, but the Jewish Agency recently put this figure at less than one percent.

The number of immigrants settling in Jerusalem is well under the 30 percent goal set by government planners at the onset of the aliya wave.

Vladimir Glozman, executive director of the Soviet Jewish Zionist Forum, said that many immigrants are bypassing the capital because of rumors that there are no jobs. These rumors, Glozman said, are rife even in the Soviet Union.

In addition, he said that a family of three has an easier time finding housing in the center of the country on their rental subsidy than in Jerusalem, even though the subsidy in Jerusalem is NIS 95 higher.

Glozman added that the current wave of immigrants is not an ideological or necessarily Zionist one, and that the immigrants do not have a natural preference for Jerusalem, something that characterized the 160,000 Soviet Jews who came in the 1970s. At that time, 25 to 30 percent of the immigrants made Jerusalem their home.

Most of the immigrants are concentrated in large cities, with only a few choosing development towns. Glozman said that this situation could change if better roads were built from the country's periphery to the main population centers. "That way they would not feel stuck in the development towns and would feel linked to the main job centers," he said.

Nerve Gas Antidote Shelf Life Extended

44000277 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 24 May 90 p 2

[Article by Judy Siegel]

[Text] The country's emergency supply of syringes containing nerve-gas antidote will no longer have to be replaced every five years, now that Rafa Laboratories and the Shal'on company in Qiryat Gat have developed a system for replacing only the ampoule when it reaches its expiration date.

The Israeli innovation, expected to save the government a considerable amount of money, was made public for the first time yesterday, on the occasion of the renovation of the exterior of Rafa's Jerusalem headquarters. In addition to Rafa's money-saving innovation regarding the atropine syringes, the pharmaceutical company manufactures pyridostigmine pills to increase protection against nerve-gas attack days before the attack actually begins.

The drug, originally designed to treat the neurological disorder myasthenia gravis, increases the activity of the nerves. It is being stockpiled for the civilian population. In the event of an expected nerve-gas attack, citizens will

be told to take the pill for a few days in advance of the attack. The pill blocks the enzyme cholinesterase and bolsters the protective effect of the atropine injection, according to Rafa sources who were allowed to reveal this information for the first time.

Rafa's director, Shmaryahu Levin—a grandson of the famed Zionist leader of the same name—said at the company's Jerusalem Day ceremony that when the building was first occupied, "Romema seemed to be at the end of the world, close to the Jordanian border," but that now Rafa is located on a humming thoroughfare in a busy part of town.

Rehabilitation of Informants Described

44000289 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 21 May 90 p 5

[Article by Joshua Brilliant]

[Text] The General Security Service feels an obligation to help rehabilitate persons from the administered areas who supplied information of value to Israel's safety.

X., interview in his tidy living room, didn't seem the type who would rummage through Carmel Market garbage looking for meat and vegetables. But the man, a former informer for the General Security Service [GSS], said he had been abandoned and he, his wife, and three children were hungry.

X. is one of 280 Arabs from the territories who have supplied information to the authorities and have been pulled out during the intifadah because their lives were in danger.

He was the only informer THE JERUSALEM POST could reach last weekend, possibly because others were too scared to answer a stranger's call. The lights in one home were on and a Yiddish-speaking neighbor insisted her mysterious neighbor was home, but he did not answer. A second informer's car was parked in front of his apartment, but he, too, did not open the door. A third did not call back.

X. unlocked a metal door only after his wife opened a small kitchen window and scrutinized me as I stood behind an iron-grilled door.

His contacts with the authorities began some 20 years ago when he was a part-time teacher with no previous relationship with the government. He recalled strangers knocking at his door at night, identifying themselves as Fatah or Popular Front emissaries and threatening to shoot if he opened. Then they would curse him, and warn that he would be "doomed" unless he fell into line.

Once he started informing, however, X. soon found that shop owners refused to serve him, taxis would not stop for him, and people cursed him. X.'s son was injured in the back when someone threw a fire bomb at him.

But he stayed on the job, like hundreds of others whose links with Israel were no secret.

These "helpers" were among the intifadah's first victims. They were hated for being traitors and sometimes for behaving haughtily. The more casualties the Palestinians sustained in clashes with the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], the more they hated the informers and sought revenge, a senior security source said in an interview.

Since the intifadah began, Palestinians have killed more than 230 "collaborators." More than 500 were wounded in its first two years.

Very few were deep cover agents, the source said; only a small percentage really cooperated with the authorities or were perceived to be doing so. Others were criminals, or people who failed to obey intifadah orders and were therefore accused of weakening the "Palestinian cause." Some were victims of internal settling-of-accounts, the officer added.

Victims were sometimes killed with axes. A pregnant woman was killed and her baby was pulled out of her womb and stabbed. One man's life was spared—but his ears were chopped off.

The crowd which gathered near X.'s home was in frenzy. Loud-speakers proclaimed he was about to die and that his body would be burned.

The authorities pulled him out in a hurry. "I left with only one cigarette," he recalled.

X. and other agents exposed during the intifadah were resettled in Israel proper. But three months ago the GSS decided that only in rare cases would Arab informers be settled in Israel proper. Some of them, having been relocated, had joined the local underworld, so that granting them the rights of citizens appeared to be unwise.

Twenty-six other former informers were resettled abroad, but most of them were being "rehabilitated" in the territories, the source said.

Rehabilitation proved to be a difficult task. Some were drug addicts; some had mental problems. Their exposure and ostracism worsened matters. Some, like X.'s wife, had been through traumatic experiences. Palestinians kidnapped, blindfolded and interrogated her for three days before the GSS succeeded in freeing her. She required psychological treatment after her release and "sometimes wakes up in the middle of the night, holds me and hugs the children," X said.

The fatalism of many informers, as well as the belief on the part of others that the intifadah would soon end, made it difficult to persuade them they needed to make a fresh start, the GSS officer noted.

Housing was hard to provide as the resettled informers were competing with Jewish immigrants for scarce resources, the officer said. The GSS would approach the

Housing Ministry, or other government and municipal housing officials, to ask for an apartment and would be told: "We have a limited number of flats left. You decide whom we should give them to—your Arabs or new immigrants."

X. received a four-room apartment in Jaffa and NIS [new Israeli shekel] 2,800 towards buying furniture. Neighbors and a former colleague donated used so far and mattresses. He had two double and two single beds, closets, a TV set and a washing machine. Several flower pots were there, one for each child, "so that they won't feel something had changed in their lives," he said.

But he deeply missed his gun. Most agents resettled in Israel proper were stripped of their weapons because some had misused them, and because they didn't need them. None of the reformers resettled here was attacked, the source argued.

Tens of thousands of shekels were spent to provide each exposed agent with a home, but the problem was finding them jobs.

Some former agents did not want to work. One reportedly opened the palm of his hand and told a GSS officer: "I'll go to work when hair grows here. I never worked—and neither did my father."

The source said he had no difficulty convincing top managers to hire burned agents, but the problem arose at the shop-floor level. Israeli Arabs boycotted them because they were "traitors" and the Jews wanted nothing to do with them because they were Arabs. The GSS helped one former agent open a tire repair shop, but when clients learned of his background they boycotted him.

X. did not say what he did immediately after his rescue, but the GSS said it had invested NIS 15,000 in establishing a business for him. It collapsed.

Resettled Informers are entitled to NIS 855 a month, which is the minimum wage, and to the child allowance given Israelis. But the NIS 855 payment is reduced, or cancelled, once they work.

Payments to X. were apparently stopped when he opened the business and now he gets nothing.

"I looked for a work as a teacher, a garbage collector, anything," he said. He and his wife worked as cleaners but he had to be cautious. Arab workers once identified him and planned an attack, he said. Someone who passed by and heard them motioned him to get away as fast as he could.

Several times X. dialled the GSS for help but hung up in a hurry. He was embarrassed. "I began collecting food from the floor. It's more honorable than asking favors from someone with whom I shared a cigarette, or a cup of coffee, in a hideout."

He opened the kitchen cupboards to reveal a few potatoes, rice, cereal and a jar with a murky greenish substance. The jar contained rotting cucumbers which he said could be eaten once they were cooked.

A thumb-sized piece of salami, a plate of soup and few tomatoes, lemons and onions were all that was to be seen in the refrigerator. Kind neighbors sometimes fed his children and wife.

X. said 10 other families were in the same predicament. Three or four went through the garbage near a meat store in Tel Aviv's Carmel market and took whatever they considered edible. "Now all of us have diarrhea and my son has worms and is bleeding," he said.

"I am to blame," he said. "I didn't know that after being told to leave home and come here as a guest of the state, I would have to pull worms out of my son's behind.... Let them give me what a jailed terrorist gets."

He bitterly recalled his last meeting with a GSS officer. X. asked for NIS 10, but didn't get it. While driving, the officer remarked that he had forgotten to buy food for his dog.

X. had the officer stop the car immediately and got out. "The shame of it," he exclaimed. "The dog will be angry at him, but my children won't say a word."

The source interviewed last week was not aware of how badly off X. was. The service will have to help him, he said. It is a practical, not only a moral consideration.

He quoted the GSS "Concepts for Rehabilitation," which states that informers must be rehabilitated so as not to impair the service's ability to recruit new agents, and to prevent fired or "frozen" people from becoming security risks. They could switch sides, he confirmed.

Ashdod Coast Oil-Drilling Activity Discussed

*90AE0053B Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
18 May 90 p 1c*

[Article by Yohay Raza'eli]

[Text] Israel is a Mediterranean island cursed by a lack of oil, they used to say in the past. These days it is possible that will prove untrue. Everything depends on a drill hole at a depth of about five and a half km in the sea, under an oil rig floating on the sea opposite the coast of Ashdod. The rig is busy with Sea Drill-2, and the goal is to get the black gold. Everyone is asking what the prospects are, and the answer is: for the moment, not bad.

Recently there has been a radio blackout concerning the drilling. Apparently because of the rules of the American stock exchange, the drillers are refraining from giving any kind of information about what is going on with the extraction tests now being conducted, and it is those tests that will determine if there is oil in commercial quantities or not.

The little bit of information that leaked out last week set the stock exchange gates abuzz on Wall Street and in Tel Aviv (see box). Oil drillings in Israel have always been considered on a par with a national casino. They said that money is to be made on the stock exchange and not from oil, which was never found. Maybe this time will be an exception. That is to say, maybe this time they will find oil. So that you don't misunderstand—this time, too, there have been those who made money on the stock exchange. If the extraction tests are successful and it turns out that there is oil here that can be extracted and it is economically worthwhile to do so, an official announcement to that effect will be sent to the exchange. Those who already bought stock will sell to those who waited for the official announcement.

The thing is that even if you find oil, there could always be frustration if it turns out that it is trapped in a kind of soil that makes its extraction economically unfeasible. Then, in a nutshell, it is as if you didn't find anything. In the Middle East there are several oil fields in which the oil is stored in the ground in an almost ideal way—actually released oil. That makes its extraction cheap and, mainly, quick. We should only be so lucky.

The Sea-2 drilling continues a previous unfortunate attempt two years ago: Sea-1. The location then was similar, but a mishap midway caused an unwanted blowout of gas and the sealing of the drilling with a cap.

The two drillings, Sea-1 and Sea-2, are part of an expanded program called Negev-2 being carried out by the group of the Jewish billionaire Armand Hammer, owner of the giant oil firm Occidental Petroleum.

The implementation of the Negev-2 program began with two dry-land drillings in which nothing was found. They continued with Sea-1 which had great potential but a bitter end, and now we are at Sea-2, behind which are exhaustive geological surveys leading to the conclusion that there, opposite the coast of Ashdod, perhaps lies the greatest hope of finding oil in the State of Israel.

Others would say precisely that about the Dead Sea area where they will begin drilling in the summer.

Oil drillings cost a fortune. A drilling like Sea-1 or Sea-2 requires about \$20 million, a lot of money, all the more so considering Israel's dry past. But Armand Hammer is a very old fox who figured out at the 11th hour how to get on the government train for oil-drilling stipends. That train is no longer running; he was the last passenger. If he finds oil, the government will get royalties totaling 12.5 percent. That is a smaller profit margin than it would get if the drilling permit were issued today according to the conditions now prevailing, but it is still something.

Hammer decided to go for oil drilling in Israel in the wake of an accidental meeting with the master American driller Jerry Williams, who once worked for him. Williams, who also dealt in drilling in Israel, got Hammer excited. The latter, who was then, in any

case—it was in the early 80's—in the stages of discovering his Jewish roots, got into the business in earnest.

That seriousness can also be seen in the very successful deal, from his point of view, that he struck with the government. Hammer's people continue to say that their business is "drilling dry holes," and that they are not upset about a string of failures. Despite that, everyone will admit that it is better to find a trace of oil since otherwise the future of oil drilling in Israel will be in danger. Those that do exist have been declining since it peaked in 1983.

Hammer's involvement in drilling has lent an air of seriousness to the matter and brought it to a professional level heretofore unknown in oil drilling in Israel. The drilling is actually being carried out by the Isramco Corporation belonging to the businessman Joe Almaliah, but the oil rig and the two supply boats were obtained by dint of Hammer's connections and through the good name of Occidental.

The goal, from the beginning, was a depth of about 5.5 km and for that purpose an expensive giant infrastructure was prepared. Knowing the prospects for a blowout at 3.4 km as happened in the previous drilling, they took extra precautions, and for the entire time of the drilling, occasional breaks were taken to strengthen the delicate hole. More than once these interruptions led to rumors about problems, as it were, with the drilling. But who remembers that today? And who remembers the rumor a month ago that the drilling turned out to be dry?

There were those who joked about the drilling. They said the rig was full of Philippine drillers, and on top sat the Jews directing the operation. But those who said that didn't know what they were talking about. The oil rig is a city in miniature that is self-supporting. You can, in fact, see a clear majority of Asians on board, but there are also other nationalities, Americans and Europeans, who are responsible for the more complicated facets of extraction. What we are talking about is several groups operated by separate subcontractors. Each is responsible for part of the story: drilling, computerization, diving, geology, etc.

The drilling work has been carried out continuously in two 12-hour shifts. Each month the rig's crew is replaced by a fresh crew. At the port of Ashdod, storage areas were leased for kilometers of drill pipe and the necessary chemicals. Supply boats constantly ply the route between the port and the oil rig. It is certainly no simple matter.

A little about the drilling partners: Armand Hammer holds 61 percent. In partnership with him are YOAL [not further expanded] (8 percent), Fuel Oil Explorations (8 percent), Gold Oil Explorations (6 percent), Naphtha (3.75 percent), American investors (2.25 percent), Isramco United States (1 percent) and the public partner with 10 percent.

YOAL and Isramco belong to the Jewish-American businessman Joe 'Almali'ah. Isramco (Israel) is responsible for operating the drilling. Nor should we forget Isramco-Partnership, which issued partnership certificates on the Tel Aviv exchange to raise public capital. All of the partners are very excited lately by the prospects that have been raised. They don't talk about it a lot—they are simply waiting nervously. Not just they.

Finding oil in the State of Israel would greatly change the pictures—political, economic, security, and who knows what else? And with Israel's luck, we would not be surprised if after one successful drilling, all of them started to be successful. As one of those involved said this week: "Such a flood of drilling would begin that even if the oil went into hiding, they would find it." But it is still early for optimistic forecasts; a few more days, weeks at the most, and we will know everything.

Netzarim Settlement in Gaza Profiled

90AE0053A 'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew
Mar, Apr 90 pp 18-21

[Article by Shmu'el Lerman]

[Text] Kibbutz Netzarim was founded in 1984 by a handful of idealists. It is an isolated settlement, geographically and socially, in the northern central part of the Gaza Strip. The "Kibbutz route" is not satisfying and produces statements that cause absorption problems. The members are firm in their view that Netzarim, despite everything, will make it and survive.

The view from "Hook Hill," local slang for a high sand dune within the confines of Kibbutz Netzarim, includes young mango plants in the west, beyond which is an agricultural area of five hundred dunams that serves mainly for raising yams and potatoes and a row of tamarisk trees that defines the worked area and serves as a windbreak. Close by are the tomato hothouses and further south, the new kibbutz homes with their red roofs, alongside which are the old houses that served the members until recently and which now house the Nahal people, members of other kibbutzim doing their in-service year with volunteers. Ruling over it all are the golden sands that embrace the installations, the hothouses, and the agricultural areas. The cultured plant life is still thin, but the acacias, sycamores, and eucalyptus trees scattered all around are increasing the amount of greenery. The sea on the west strengthens the dreamy feeling—a young kibbutz amidst the golden sands. The connotations of this are trite but, nonetheless, painfully true: an outpost that is really hanging on by its fingernails—a handful of idealists, frequent crises, true Zionism.

It is made up of eight young families, seven small children, nine bachelors and nine from the national service—with only some of them in the permanent nucleus. But even before dealing with the regular, prosaic things, you are struck by a feeling of slight drunkenness from the Jewish scenery, the crisp air, this pure outpost

of youngsters. Moshe Grolman, the kibbutz secretary, says: "There is a feeling that things are happening here. The challenge exists for someone who cares about settling Israel." It is so simple.

Kibbutz Netzarim was founded in 1984, on the eve of the elections, on a spot that had, in fact, been settled since 1972. It is located about six km south of Gaza and two km from the sea; to the south, some kilometers away, is the Nusarat refugee camp. The element of loneliness is very salient geographically—it is a question of a lonely settlement in the northern central part of the Strip. During its brief history the kibbutz has undergone crises, which have mainly involved waves of emigration. Just recently five families left, including two from among the kibbutz founders. Conversations with the members immediately revealed that the security situation was not the decisive factor, nor even a peripheral one in the decision to leave. Mainly there were social problems stemming from a feeling of isolation. Yosi Schwartz, the senior member, puts it more explicitly: "In every small place there are problems because of the pressure applied to get people to work. You have to contribute more hours than usual, to invest more. Young married couples who want to be at home more find it particularly hard, first with the wife and later with the kids. This clearly creates social problems." The "kibbutz route" is also disruptive and leaves the members feeling uncomfortable. Throughout the religious kibbutzim you hear comments like: "Well, when are they going to evacuate you?" That results in army graduates, who are hoping to volunteer for their service year in a young kibbutz, being less than enthusiastic about going there. That doesn't mean that those who come don't, in the final analysis, enjoy their service there. In the flyer put out by Kibbutz Yavne under the headline "I Was in Netzarim," Li'at Ne'eman tells about her service year there. "Spontaneity rules in a young kibbutz which facilitates and contributes to a social and cultural life. You want to go to the beach at a particular hour of the day? No problem: You take a vehicle or a tractor with a wagon (and a pistol, of course) and go...the same is true for hikes and group singing. I can conclude by saying that I enjoyed it a great deal from a personal perspective as well."

What about the feeling of detachment and isolation? At first glance it seems the problem is serious. The connection with Gush Qatif is rather weak, and there are about 10 km of intifadah separating them. That is excluding ties with the local council. The stronger connection is with the religious kibbutzim 'Alumim and Sa'ad who are neighbors across the Green Line. It takes a quarter of an hour to reach them. This situation prods the members into broader social activity that would not embarrass an older kibbutz. In recent weeks they have held lectures on Soviet Jews, on the Jewish history of Gaza, a lecture by Hulda Qofmanino of Kibbutz Yavne, an evening with the songs of Natan Yehonatan and various other evening socials.

Shlumit, a volunteer in her year of service who works in the tomato hothouse, supports the following impressions: "Precisely here there is a young, much more cohesive population than in the old kibbutzim where the young members are off studying or into other things and the people in the young age range are more thinned out. The cultural committee here does what it is supposed to, and there is no problem at all with regard to that issue." She decided to finally get off this subject with Platina's comments: "The social life here is so full that at times you feel you would like an evening to stay home with your husband and kids." Platina works in the laundry, and her husband 'Eldad is in charge of the chicken coop. They came to the kibbutz a year and a half ago from Petah Tiqva, pure city folk, and what bothers them here is their children's trip to the kindergarten in 'Alumim. "It's clear that it's good for the kids," says Platina, "the operator is certified, and they are with kids their own age. The problem is the road. Not because it goes through the Arab sections, but the traffic is what scares me. But, then, what does my husband say? Look, you can get hurt even on the way to the chicken coop, or you can fall in the bathtub."

Despite all the difficulties, life goes on, even with a smile, according to Moshe Grolman, who adds that from an economic point of view the kibbutz stands on its own two feet. The kibbutz is based mainly on agriculture. There are five hundred dunams of land devoted to raising yams and potatoes. The yams, a relatively new line in Israel, are grown mainly for export, and Netzarim has done quite well in raising them. A 500-ton annual harvest puts the kibbutz in the number two spot in Israel in this area. The kibbutz also grows four dunams of tomatoes in hothouses, and the mango grove should produce its first fruit three years hence. Experimental organic gardening has already yielded its first modest crops, and the intent is to expand that sector which right now produces only onions, carrots and a portion of the yams. The kibbutz is also trying to grow grapes with the guidance and advice of the people of Abu-Madin, a Bedouin clan that maintains good-neighbor relations with the people of the kibbutz. By the way, the decision was to grow organic grapes which is not true of the Bedouins who use fertilizer as they deem necessary. Other sectors are the chicken coop which also represents an important source of income (in three months, about 15,000 chicks are fattened), a quarry, that supplies sea sand for construction to the Arabs of the area, as well as to various contractors throughout Israel and Jewish labor, a relatively new sector that is a source of pride to the members.

Lunch in the dining room. Modest furniture, green formica tables and colorful decorations left hanging from a wedding held there. A large poster proclaiming the upcoming Purim festival reads: "Just like every other year the holiday is again approaching and we have no choice, we have to get through this, too." It reminds the members that "legally it is okay to become a little boisterous." Later, over the water tower, the sun begins

to set slowly and patiently on the sea. On the lawn a young girl runs away from a barking dog shrieking with laughter. Moshe Grolman, optimistic, quiet, perhaps a bit naive, indicates plans with a light wave of the hand: "I hope we will add other sectors and take in more families. At the moment we are establishing contact with two families from the Religious Kibbutz movement and another family where the father is a certified rabbi. If he comes then we will even have a rabbi on location but these are still just the initial contacts." Afterward he expresses the feeling that today the issue has been made more solid, and there is a sense of stability. And, you hope along with him that this stability will bring about a firm foundation and the prosperity that will constitute a road mark highlighting the fact that Zionism is still a word people can write, at least in Netzarim, without quotation marks.

[Box, p 19] A Large Israel, But Without Struggle

When you take Netzarim as your focal point and look toward the kibbutz periphery—the establishment types, old line kibbutznikim—you share a feeling of being "comrades in arms," of being one big family. In the case of Netzarim, a kibbutz that was set up and had to struggle for its existence, even if there is criticism, no one is happy to state it explicitly. It's like you don't turn your back on your own flesh and blood, and at times you think "why should I put myself at risk?" One thing is clear: Within the broad confines of the religious kibbutz movement, there are those who are uncomfortable about settling in that place and holding on to it. And the arguments generally go in two general directions. One concerns the objective difficulty of developing such a place, where startup conditions are harsh economically, socially and in terms of security. The other is a left of center political view that views the Gaza Strip as a demographic nuisance not worth fighting over.

Hayim Ya'aqobi, a member of Tirat Tzvi, was one of the lonely few who agreed to say their peace explicitly: "I think our strength is not up to all the tasks facing us. If you ask me what I would want, I would answer 'a very big Israel.' And I have no pangs of guilt over this. The question is, what are we able to do? In my opinion we feel tired about all of this, tired of the constant wars. And there are other problems: In the Galilee we don't have a majority, and the Galilee is at risk. So why do we hunker down in the hardest places to struggle with a crowded, problematic population? Instead of being so adventurous, we should take a more clever approach and settle where we can handle the difficulties."

As we noted, that "family feeling," the feeling of responsibility toward Netzarim, is verbalized in conversations with people of the religious kibbutzim who are connected with Netzarim. We can say with absolute certainty that they provide full backing to the kibbutz, highly appreciate the members, believe in a better future and never consider any other possibility with regard to holding out there. In practice the religious kibbutz movement is connected through two advisors on loan from

Kibbutz 'Alumim: Beni Maler, the economic advisor, and Yehudit Gutman, who deals with social issues. Micah Rozentler, the coordinator of the social department for the religious kibbutz movement, argues that the recent wave of immigration had no particular connection with the problems of the place, "even though it is clear that departures of this sort do not have a positive effect on those who remain." He cites three basic hardships for Netzarim: its location, even though from an economic point of view the kibbutz has developed nicely and is self-supporting. Yehudit Gutman thinks the same way. We asked those directly concerned about: the Avishar family, now in kibbutz 'Ayn Hanatziv, and the Landau family, now in the 'Otni'el settlement.

Yehuda Avishar: "The recent wave of departures was a combination of things. It was not a domino effect. Everyone left for his own reasons. We, for example, after a certain time in a young kibbutz, decided to try an older kibbutz. Clearly that was a result of dissatisfaction with a number of things, mainly that we missed the tradition and orderliness of an older kibbutz. Here, in Netzarim, you really start from scratch every day. It's a kind of daily war. We wanted to see how we would fit in a framework that we hadn't built ourselves."

Yaska Landau: "What was decisive for us was the question of education for the kids. They had no group to call their own. They had to travel each day to the kindergarten in 'Alumim, and we just couldn't see that. Likewise from our own personal point of view, we felt we were reaching a stage in life when we had to decide if we really wanted a kibbutz or should try something else. We decided to try something else."

Yehudit Gutman, the social advisor, gets straight to the point: "To come here means telling yourself 'I am a pioneer,' and one of the things I want is to feel that I did something for the people and the country. What there is to offer here is 'hard-core pioneering.' It's a kibbutz, it's isolated, it's young, it is both looking for sources of support and trying to define itself. Those who come will forge its character, and as long as it is still being built, it's hard work. Brick by brick. That is exactly what I tell interested families—make sure you understand that you will have to do without."

Arye Qarol, the secretary of the religious kibbutz movement, is decisive and dogmatic: "There is a resolution by the expanded secretariat that we will continue to build Netzarim and give it every preference in manpower and in the year of service, and there is no argument about that. No one would consider anything else, and the active secretariat is giving practical backing to the resolution."

[Box, p 20] The Dune That Was Shaved

In 1972 the decision was made to erect another Jewish spot in the Gaza Strip, and the general of the Central Command at the time, Rehav'am Ze'evi (Gandhi), chose a high dune that met the needs of the army—a lookout point opposite the intersection between Sag'ia (later, Netzarim) and the Gaza-Rafiah highway. He also chose

the name Netzarim alluding to the name of the neighboring Nusarat refugee camp. The instruction given to the bulldozer operators were misunderstood, and instead of leaving the dune and grading the land around it, the dune was carefully shaved and the area properly graded. Then a two-story house was built (which today is used for the settlement's secretariat and other services), and it was again possible to look out over the entire area.

Since then the spot has undergone several incarnations; as a Nahal outpost manned by nuclei from Herut, as the United Kibbutz, as the National Kibbutz, as the Religious Kibbutz manned by people from the Gan-Or moshav (today in the Qatif group), until, finally, the day before the 1984 elections, on 22 July, Netzarim was settled by the Religious Kibbutz movement. Since then, despite the departures, the changing settlement nuclei and the volunteers who stay for a short time, the place has held firm and is supported by the Religious Kibbutz movement's institutions. There is still a religious kibbutz adjacent to its two kibbutzim across the Green Line, 'Alumim and Sa'ad, with the goal of creating a Religious Kibbutz bloc.

[Box, p 21] Mazmor, Not Song

As we said, remarks concerning the "the kibbutz route" which express the feelings of various members about the temporary nature of the place, as well as the quiet undertones in the Religious Kibbutz movement not specifically identified with the traditional moderate right-wing line, disturb the members. At the plenum of the expanded secretariat (Mazmor) of the Religious Kibbutz movement, one of the female members of Netzarim said the following:

"A feeling of lack of confidence is projected by the kibbutzim of the Religious Kibbutz movement through statements like 'we heard that you are dismantling' and similar things. That message causes acceptance problems and a sense that backbone is lacking. We did get support from the people of Gush Qatif, and among them were those who offered themselves to come and help strengthen the place. If the impression should be created that the kibbutzim don't care about us then we will start getting people who have no kibbutz motivation. Netzarim will continue to exist, but it will change." The expanded secretariat report related that after a survey of the economic and social situation in Netzarim ("and a detailed report will be distributed to the members' homes"), it was decided that the expanded secretariat would offer full assistance for increasing the population of Netzarim. The following were the resolutions of the expanded secretariat:

1. Netzarim will have the highest priority for boys and girls doing their year of service.
2. The expanded secretariat takes a positive stand on drafting suitable families from established kibbutzim to help Netzarim, and tasks the active secretariat with including this position in the framework of its public activity.

JORDAN

Closer Relations With Baghdad Examined

44000276 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 25 May 90 p 5

[Text] The ominous assessments leaked to the press weekend that King Husayn's throne was in imminent danger, and that a civil war could break out in neighboring Jordan at any time, were obscured by the massacre of Palestinian laborers in Ri'shon Lezion and the ensuing riots in the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and among Israel Arabs.

The immediate background to these assessments was the growing power of the Muslim fundamentalists and of the PLO who had only recently been permitted by King Husayn himself to exhibit and flaunt their power in the Hashemite kingdom.

But the unnamed Israeli assessors of the king's political health and chances of survival were also pointing to long-term trends. They noted that the loyalty to the king of the Beduin tribes, who constitute the mainstay of his army, was gradually eroding. Another change that could constitute an even greater danger to the king lay in his apparent abandonment of the long-standing de facto symbiotic relationship with Israel in favor of a flirtation with Iraq, and a possible attempt to establish a united eastern front or an Amman-Baghdad-Cairo axis against Israel.

Dan Shu'eftan, a research fellow at the Hebrew University's Truman Institute, provided an evaluation of the validity and urgency of these estimates. Shu'eftan is the author of *A Jordanian Option—The Yishuv and the State of Israel vis-a-vis the Hashemite Kingdom and the Palestinian National Movement*. Two points from this book are in order as background:

- The Zionist-Israeli nexus with Jordan is of the longest standing in Middle East politics, going back about 70 years to the birth of the Hashemite emirate and kingdom and to the emergence of Zionist politics in the Yishuv.

Despite their resentment of Britain's arbitrary decision in 1922 to sunder the Transjordan from the area the League of Nations Mandate allotted for the establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, the Zionist leaders of the '20s, '30s and '40s clearly preferred a working relationship with Husayn's grandfather, the Emir Abdullah, to the outright hostility of the Palestinian nationalists under the Mufti of Jerusalem.

In the War of Independence, David Ben-Gurion concluded a tacit agreement with Abdullah for his Arab Legion not to fight actively against the establishment of a sovereign Jewish Israel, but to restrict itself to the retention of the areas allotted to the Arabs and to their inclusion in the Jordanian kingdom. Following that war, Israel was well on its way to the conclusion of a peace

treaty with 'Abdallah, when he was assassinated on the steps of al-Aasa Mosque in Jerusalem by a Palestinian.

- In 1970, Israel reciprocated to save 'Abdallah's grandson, King Husayn, by warning Syria that if it carried out its threatened invasion of Jordan, it would have to risk a counterinvasion of its own territory by Israel. After a few hours, the Syrians withdrew their tank column which had penetrated into Jordan and was heading for Amman.

King Husayn has successfully foiled or evaded more assassination attempts than any other ruler in the Arab world. After more than three-and-a-half decades on the throne he is the longest-established head of state in that world. He owes part of his political longevity to Israel's consistent support, but an even larger part to his own political sagacity.

Shu'eftan says that Husayn is a master of the tactic of "if you can't beat'em, pretend to join'em," which has worked time and again against the threats of Nasserist pan-Arabism, PLO Palestinian nationalism and Moslem fundamentalism.

But now, Shu'eftan said this week, "the king is in a lot of trouble, more than at any time since 1974 when the Arab League vested representation of his Palestinian subjects in the PLO rather than in him." The problem, Shu'eftan explained, was that Husayn, adept at administering the medicines that had saved him in the past had now, in giving free rein to the political activity of the PLO and the Muslim fundamentalists, increased their dosage to poisonous levels that could prove fatal.

While Shu'eftan said he did not see any signs of developments that could actually topple the king in the next few weeks, he acknowledged that the democratization that Husayn had initiated was working against him. Another problem confronting him and that was driving him into the hands of his various radical enemies and into the flirtation with Iraq, was that he was taking the loose talk in Israel of "Palestine is Jordan" very seriously as representing a broad consensus among Israeli policy-makers. "The worrisome thing about Husayn's perception, in this regard, is that it constitutes an example of the breakdown in communications with the Israel leadership," Shu'eftan said.

"There are two political forces in Israel endangering Jordan, Husayn and the Hashemite dynasty—the far Right and the far Left. The threat from Arik Sharon and his thesis that Israel should be interested in supplanting Husayn with a PLO that would take over Jordan, thus diverting its attention from the conflict over the territories, is clear.

"But the Israeli far Left, which sees Arafat and the PLO as Israel's only partners to an agreement over the territories, is just as dangerous to Husayn. For in the end, that approach will lead to Arafat's taking over in Amman and the East Bank too."

Husayn's best allies in Israel, he said, are to be found in that part of the political spectrum between Yitzhaq Rabin in Labor and Dan Meridor in the Likud. They view Jordan under Husayn and his regime as the best of all the real alternatives for Israel. Shu'eftan believes that Husayn is courting fatal danger by alienating that large stratum in Israel politics, and undermining its resolve to continue to protect him and his dynasty, by entertaining the introduction of an Iraqi military presence in Jordan.

The growing middle class in Jordan, which includes many people of Palestinian origin who have a vested interest in a moderate, sensible Jordan, is very pro-Western in its world-view. It has made its peace with the existence of an Israel alongside Jordan. The main thing in the eyes of these people, who rule Husayn's Jordan, is not to radicalize Jordan, not to play for high stakes, not to promise too much, but to fulfill the promises made and, "as opposed to Syria and Iraq, to be thankful for small mercies."

Shu'eftan believes that the frequent portrayal of the incessant horrors of Beirut, Gaza and the other occupied territories on Jordan TV, is an intentional message by this establishment to the viewers as to the importance of those small mercies.

They may not sound very dramatic or heroic, but Shu'eftan believes that this group has a reasonably good chance of continuing to run Jordan even after Husayn. The main problem today is that it is the members of this middle class who have been suffering most from the serious economic recession plaguing Jordan for the last few years.

"That is why I tell my American friends that from an American point of view the best value their aid dollars to the Middle East can buy, after supporting Israel, is in shoring up Husayn and the Jordanian economy on whose well-being his supporters depend."

On Wednesday, Foreign Minister Moshe Arens went out of his way to declare that Israel had no intention of intervening in events in Jordan and in its internal affairs. The pointed leak of intelligence assessments of potential threats to Husayn could be interpreted to mean that important elements in the defence establishment have become very concerned over developments in Jordan that may require such Israel's intervention.

KUWAIT

Banker Calls Upon Arab Banks To Form Economic Bloc

*90AE0046A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT
in Arabic 18 May 90 p 11*

[Interview with 'Abd-al-Salam 'Abdallah al-'Awadi, chairman and CEO of the National Bank of Kuwait, by 'Abd-al-Karim Kazim in Kuwait: "Vice Chairman of

National Bank of Kuwait Says Arab Financial Institutions Will Have Wider Future Role in Foreign Markets"; first paragraph is AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT introduction; date not given]

[Text] 'Abd-al-Salam 'Abdallah al-'Awadi, chairman and CEO [Chief Executive Officer] of the National Bank of Kuwait, advocates that Arab banks solidify activity in a world driven by economic blocs. In dealing with the integrated Europe of 1992, he called in an interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT for collective action by the entire Arab banking system. Following is the text of the interview.

[Kazim] Your bank aside, do you believe that Arab banks have comprehended fully the legal and empirical significance of the transformation of the European market over the next few years into an integrated and open banking market?

[al-'Awadi] Upcoming world economic developments, led by the European common market of 1992, will undoubtedly have a substantial impact on world economic relations.

I believe that all financial organizations, and not only Arab institutions, have prepared for dealing with the new situation. As for Arab banks, I believe that they have prepared for that eventuality and are indeed ready for it.

[Kazim] What specific action have you taken to monitor current developments and prepare for them? For instance, have you made a detailed study of the subject, either directly or through research organizations?

[al-'Awadi] We have conducted comprehensive studies of Europe's economic integration in 1992 and are cognizant of all foreseen consequences. Scenarios for our relations with European countries have been prepared on the basis of projections as well as available facts and figures. It is to be pointed out that our studies and research have resulted in several projections and recommendations that must be heeded since it will be necessary to accommodate those economic developments and changes.

[Kazim] What are your conclusions? What procedures will your bank adopt in face of that development?

[al-'Awadi] We have reached the general conclusion that the world of the nineties will be a collection of economic blocs and that we, as Arab banks, must solidify resources and coordinate actions in order to strengthen our position in dealing with those blocs. Recent developments in East Germany are proof of the surge in such blocs and their proliferation. All nations realize that there is strength in unity and solidarity. It behooves us likewise to integrate on the basis of the elements available to us in order to confront any changes mandated by the new world order that will take shape over the next few years. This is why I call for solidarity of action by all Arab banks without exception in order that we may be able to

deal with anticipated developments in world economic relations from a position of more strength.

[Kazim] Do you believe that professional associations, such as the Federation of Arab Banks or associations of Arab banks abroad, are playing notable roles in this respect?

[al-'Awadi] I believe that Arab financial institutions, led by the Federation of Arab Banks and the Arab Bankers Association among others, have played and are still playing a notable role in foreign investment markets and as a liaison between those markets and Arab banks. I imagine that this role will grow in the near future.

[Kazim] Do you believe that it would be appropriate for Arab banks to help finance a study on this subject?

[al-'Awadi] It may be appropriate, in view of expected developments, to integrate the ideas, outlooks, and deductions of all financial institutions. But it may be better to dedicate all those conclusions to a collective effort by the entire Arab banking system in order to draw a unified scenario for the near future and identify whatever joint action should be taken.

[Kazim] The Arab banking presence abroad—was it a successful experiment or a failure? Do you believe that some banks are better off shutting down their nonproductive branches?

[al-'Awadi] The experiment of Arab banking presence abroad has been successful on several levels, and especially as liaison between Arab banks and foreign markets. We, for instance, have representative offices in London and in Peking. Both were effectual in identifying investment opportunities in those two financial centers. The efforts of those offices have reaped fine results.

It is to be pointed out that advance studies must support a bank's decision to have a presence abroad. Unless success is assured, it would be better not to get involved in such a venture, than have to close branches and offices because of failure.

[Kazim] What is your bank's policy in that regard?

[al-'Awadi] Our policy is a better long-range strategy that recognizes the need for expansion abroad and defines it on the basis of accurate data and realistic hypotheses.

[Kazim] Do you have a specific plan vis-a-vis the European common market?

[al-'Awadi] We have already arrived at conclusions, recommendations, and scenarios relating to the European common market. However, we prefer not to rush into execution and the adoption of procedures until there is coordinated action towards a uniform strategy for dealing with the new order. I wish to point out here that we are currently having discussions and consultations with Arab banks in this regard.

LEBANON

Hizballah Kills Israelis in Operation Code-Named Ya Ruhallah

90AS0136A Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI
in Persian 7 Jun 90 p 12

[Text] In commemoration of the anniversary of Imam Khomeyni's death and in line with his will and testament for struggle against the Zionist regime, Islamic resistance forces conducted a military operation code-named "Ya Ruhallah" on Wednesday evening.

According to reports from the Central News Unit from Beirut, in this operation, which was conducted in the Talah al-Radar region, a number of Zionist officers were killed or wounded.

The Islamic resistance communique which was issued on Wednesday night indicated that, in line with the Imam's will and testament regarding the destruction of the regime occupying Jerusalem, successful operations were conducted by the combatants of the Islamic resistance. This operation was concluded without inflection of any casualties on the combatants and they returned to their base in "Jabal Sa'fi."

In the conclusion of this communique, the need to continue the Imam's line and respect for the rule of jurisprudence and the leadership of Ayatollah Khamene'i has been stressed.

Following this attack, the artillery of the Zionist regime bombarded for six hours the areas of concentration of Islamic resistance forces in al-Jobur, al-Sarirah, and Meydan in western al-Biqā'. This may be attributed to

the anger of the Zionist regime and the high number of casualties inflicted on them.

MOROCCO

Statistics Show Trade Deficit Doubled in 1989

90AA0130C Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE
in French 13 Apr 90 p 12

[Text] The final figures on the trade balance for 1989 are now available. They are roughly in keeping with what the initial estimates led us to fear: a near doubling of the deficit. The coverage rate of exports over imports dropped from 76.0 percent in 1988 to 60.7 percent in 1989.

Actually, the trade balance showed a slight recovery in November and December with the resumption of sales of phosphoric acid to India. The litigation that pitted the OCP [Moroccan Phosphates Office] against India during the past year had a damaging effect on exports, but it alone is far from being able to explain the deterioration of the trade balance. While its real impact (for the drop in sulphur imports must also be taken into account) will probably not, according to our estimates, exceed 1.5 or 1.6 billion dirhams of deficit to be made up, the total deficit increased by nearly 9 billion dirhams.

While exports dropped by five percent, imports rose by 19 percent. All product categories were affected by this increase with the exception of raw materials of mineral origin (because of the drop in sulphur purchases).

The increase in energy and wheat purchases should be noted as well as the big increase in purchases of capital goods and semifinished products.

Item	Imports	
	1988	1989
Food, beverages, and tobacco	4,175.4	4,992.0
Wheat	1,414.6	1,817.9
Sugar	558.3	672.6
Energy and lubricants	5,155.7	7,156.8
Crude oil and kerosene	4,379.8	6,093.8
Raw materials of animal and vegetable origin	2,997.7	3,461.7
Semifinished products	10,323.0	12,131.4
Farm Equipment	408.8	461.9
Industrial equipment	8,342.7	11,498.2
Consumer goods	4319.3	5,018.1
Industrial gold	-	3.9
Total	39,132.5	46,594.4

Exports		
Item	1988	1989
Food, beverages, and tobacco	7,527.8	7,260.6
Citrus fruits	1,609.7	1,168.3
Crustaceans, molluscs, and shellfish	1,612.2	1,563.1
Fresh, salted, dried, or smoked fish	881.8	1,018.0
Energy and lubricants	612.8	732.7
Raw materials of animal and vegetable origin	1,229.8	1,323.1
Raw materials of mineral origin	5,135.7	5,254.4
Phosphates	4,154.1	4,148.0
Semifinished products	8,642.1	5,940.4
Fertilizers	2,637.5	2,653.2
Phosphoric acid	4,672.2	1,454.0
Capital goods	359.0	986.1
Consumer goods	6,342.9	6,775.4
Total	29,750.5	28,270.6

	1988	1989	Rate of Change
Imports	39,132.5	46,594.4	+19.1%
Exports	29,750.5	28,270.6	-5.0%
Balance	9,382	18,323.8	+95.3%
Coverage rate	76.0%	60.7%	-

(Source: Foreign Exchange Office)

SUDAN

Government Under Fire at Home, Abroad

Public Strikes, More Arrests

90AA0168A London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 28 May 90 p 6

[Article: "Repression and Resistance Continue"]

[Excerpts] The Sudanese capital, Khartoum, has been transformed into a military barracks. A large number of Soviet-made T-52 tanks and tracked vehicles have concentrated conspicuously around bridges and important positions, as well as around the home of Lieutenant General 'Umar al-Bashir, chairman of the ruling military council. They are also concentrated around the homes of the other council members, whose movements have become extremely secretive, following the April 24 massacre to which a number of officers of the Sudanese army fell victim. Describing these precautionary measures, an Arab diplomat in Khartoum said that 'Umar al-Bashir does not sleep in the same bed each night. The council members and chairman have forgone any public appearance that might indicate their location. They have given up using official limousines for their movements, and their families have moved to locations known only to their closest associates.

Observers ascribe the situation to the fact that the Khartoum regime, despite its having liquidated many of its enemies and dismissed and imprisoned a large number of army officers—numbering in the hundreds—and arrested a large number of politicians and trade unionists, is in an unstable situation and isolated from the people. These measures are being confronted by continuing popular resistance. Railroad workers, the largest labor grouping in the country, have announced a strike, after authorities arrested five of their leaders and alleged that they were linked to the movement of the army officers liquidated this April. In solidarity with the railroad workers, port workers have also announced a strike and have disregarded threats against them by government officials, who have said that if they did not return to their jobs by the morning of May 21, severe measures would be taken against them.

This strike, which still continues, has paralyzed parts of the Sudan. Trains have stopped running. The government has made use of numbers of soldiers to operate a limited number of trains.

Reports circulating mention that some Sudanese army units have expressed rejection of National Islamic Front [NIF] attempts to gain control of the army's resources and to implement its schemes in the army's name. Some military units, including the garrison of the city of Kusti, have disobeyed orders to move to the south of the Sudan. For this reason, the chairman of the ruling military council in his remarks to officers and soldiers emphatically denied that the government had any relation to any political party. He said, "We proclaim today, as we proclaimed yesterday, that we are not a front and are ready to cooperate with every sincere citizen." Certainly, Lt. Gen. 'Umar al-Bashir's emphatic denial of this relationship to the front, although hardly anyone disputes that 'Umar al-Bashir's government is in essence and

appearance a government of the NIF, means that dissatisfaction, particularly in the army, has reached a high level. The ruling military council has had no choice but to embark on a maze of blatant falsifications that largely arouse ridicule and at the same time reveal the inability of Lt. Gen. 'Umar al-Bashir and his military council to confront the dissatisfaction otherwise than with this kind of falsification, without daring to make an unequivocal confession.

For their part, the authorities of the ruling military council have removed a number of senior officers and retired them because they presented a memorandum to the army command protesting the liquidation of the "martyrs of Ramadan" and the fact that their trials violated the procedures of military law as well as minimum principles of fairness. Military council authorities have announced the names of only 13 officers, including five major generals from the army leadership.

A report broadcast by Radio Monte Carlo on the 9th of this month indicated that "urged by military council and NIF member Major Ibrahim Shams-al-Din, Lt. Gen. 'Umar al-Bashir wanted to bring these commanders to trial. However, the other members of the council thought that the time was not suitable now to try these commanders." The station mentioned that "a military committee recently formed from members of the military council, joined by officers from the main branches of the armed forces, will soon examine a new list of officers to be removed from service, purportedly for being secularists." [passage omitted]

Arrests Continue

Lt. Gen. 'Umar al-Bashir has announced that his military council is now attempting to hand over authority to the people by building a political organization in which both modern and traditional forces participate. Observers explain this proposal as merely an attempt to create a new facade behind which the NIF can hide and as aimed at counterfeiting a mass movement and its organizations. The attempt began with a prohibition on trade union activity and with the appointment of operating committees for the unions. The most recent of these attempts was the issuance of a decision establishing a preliminary organization for "the General Federation of Sudanese Women," composed of 60 members headed by Fatimah Talib and Khadijah Karrar, who are considered to be NIF cadres.

It should be mentioned that Sudanese authorities arrested 16 women on the charge of planning and preparing a women's demonstration in the capital. Among those arrested were the women's secretary of the Democratic Unionist Party [DUP], Sumayyah Ahmad 'Abd-al-Hadi, and Salma al-Shawiyyah. A number of members of this group of women had been arrested previously, when they participated in a demonstration by the families of the martyrs of Ramadan.

On the other hand, political parties and organizations interested in human rights and many federations continued their solidarity with the Sudanese people in its tribulation. On the 12th of this month, four Yemeni political parties, including the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, the Septembrist Democratic Organization, the Nasirite People's Unity Organization, and the Yemeni Popular Unity Party, sent a telegram to Lt. Gen. 'Umar al-Bashir, containing the following message:

"We are grieved by the savage actions your regime has undertaken against many innocent members of the fraternal Sudanese people and its armed forces. We see the dictatorial path you have set in alliance with the militias of the National Islamic Front as a repulsive action incompatible with Islam, the customs and traditions of the Sudanese people, and Islamic and human values. This action constitutes a blatant violation of human rights and places your regime at the lowest level of the deposed Imam Ja'far Numayri. We therefore condemn the terrorist actions that your regime has and is carrying out against the Sudan. We ask you immediately to halt acts of terrorism and repression, end inflammatory measures, and restore the democracy that will guarantee the Sudan's stability and security and under which the Sudan will be able to solve its problems and safeguard its path to progress and prosperity."

The same Yemeni parties also sent a telegram to the leaders of the National Democratic Grouping in the Sudan, saying:

"In the name of the masses of the Yemeni people and their national democratic movement, we express to you our complete solidarity and support for the fraternal Sudanese people in their present tribulation due to the tyrannical, terrorist actions of the military regime led by 'Umar al-Bashir in alliance with the dark forces of National Islamic Front gangs. We affirm to you that the savage terrorism and barbaric repression underway in the Sudan rise to the level of heinous crimes repugnant to human morality and rejected by Arab and Islamic values. As we condemn the military regime ruling in the Sudan for these futile actions, we ask the Arab people to increase their solidarity with the Sudanese people and their national democratic movement to eradicate terrorism and enforce human rights. At the same time, we are confident that the people and their beneficent forces are able to confront the fascist regime and triumph for democracy, peace, and progress." [passage omitted]

Public Killings Reported

90AA0168B London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
28 May 90 p 4

[Article: "Rejection!"]

[Text] Sudanese authorities are concealing the death of a former NIF [National Islamic Front] member of parliament from the city of Kutum on the Sudan-Chad border at the hands of citizens from the area. Authorities allege

that armed Chadian elements infiltrated the city to settle accounts with Chadian refugees in the Sudan.

AL-DUSTUR has also learned from trustworthy sources that at least seven NIF supporters were killed and others wounded in the city of Port Sudan at the hands of citizens of the city who opposed the NIF supporters when they tried to organize a march in support of the liquidations carried out by the Khartoum authorities against a number of senior Sudanese army officers this April. AL-DUSTUR has also learned that two NIF supporters were killed in the city of Kassala for the same reason.

NIF Isolation Growing

90AA0168C Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 9 May 90 p 2

[Article by Muhammad Fadl 'Ali: "Sudanese Officials Conceal Military Disobedience in Regional and Capital Units"]

[Text] In an attempt to contain dissatisfaction in armed forces circles following the execution of 28 Sudanese officers, Lt. Gen. 'Umar al-Bashir has issued a directive to military council members to review military units. Meanwhile, informed sources say that reports about military public opinion prepared by central military intelligence warn that the situation could explode at any moment, especially since individuals of the armed forces feel anger at the NIF's arrogation to itself of a national character and its pushing through of its isolated and rejected programs in the name of the armed forces. The source also affirmed that arrests in the ranks of the military were continuing in the regional garrisons, some of which have been transferred to unknown locations which some observers believe may be prison camps belonging to NIF militias.

In a related development, health conditions in the Sudan have declined dangerously. Fevers have taken the lives of large numbers of citizens. Life-saving medicines are unavailable. Meanwhile there are reports that physicians have decided to submit group resignations, now that the authorities have ignored their demands to contain the deteriorating situation.

Thousands of citizens living in refugee camps, victims of the civil war, face danger of death, especially now that al-Bashir's forces have expelled many medical and humanitarian organizations from the Sudan.

In another development, an informed source in the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement [SPLM] stated that al-Bashir's regime had practically fallen, given the accumulation of its crimes against the Sudanese people. He added, "We predict that the NIF will try to bring the roof down on everyone's head. We therefore urge all patriotic and democratic forces to maintain vigilance and alertness." Commenting on the al-Bashir government's charge that the SPLM had supported the recent coup and had attempted to land forces at Khartoum Airport, he said, "We will not take the trouble to respond

to the allegations. However, we feel bitter about the continual lies and contempt for the intelligence of our people on the part of the front's government." The source affirmed that the SPLM had continually rejected military coups and was committed to working alongside the Sudanese people's organizations and political parties to overthrow the regime.

It is to be noted that the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, has been transformed these days into a military barracks, following the regime's mobilization of all its civilian cadres with weapons training. These cadres receive weapons training in White Nile Province under the People's Defense Law promoted by the NIF during the rule of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. At that time, parliament defeated the law by an overwhelming majority, but it was recently approved by the military council.

Egypt Reviewing Policy

90AA0168D Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 9 May 90 p 1

[Article: "Egypt Reviews Position on al-Bashir Government"]

[Text] AL-AHALI has learned that top-level official political circles in Cairo are reviewing policy toward the military government headed by Lt. Gen. 'Umar Hasan al-Bashir, following the execution of 30 Sudanese officers without any real trial.

A group of senior experts and specialists in Egyptian-Sudanese relations are engaged in a thorough evaluation of the military regime in the Sudan and the extent of its connection to the NIF [National Islamic Front], which is headed by Dr. Hasan al-Turabi.

Even before the execution of the generals, several recent actions indicated that al-Bashir's government was merely a facade for the NIF. An attempt to exploit a telephone conversation between President Husni Mubarak and Lt. Gen. al-Bashir has angered Egyptian officials. Before the report of the execution of the officers, President Mubarak spoke with al-Bashir to reassure himself about conditions in the Sudan, and the execution was not brought up.

Al-Bashir informed him that the situation was completely stable and that "we have settled the problem." A few hours after the conversation, Cairo was suddenly confronted with the news of the execution of the group of officers without any real justification for the death penalty.

SYRIA

Muslim Brotherhood Leader Criticizes Political Changes

90AE0048A Cairo LIWA' AL-ISLAM
in Arabic 26 Apr 90 pp 17-19

[Interview with Dr. 'Ali Sadr-al-Din al-Bayanuni, deputy supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood Society in

Syria, by Husayn Fathallah: "Cosmetic Attempts by the Syrian Regime Only Measures to Best Critical Situation;" first four paragraphs are LIWA' AL-ISLAM introduction; date and place not given]

[Text] The changes that have occurred in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are casting dark shadows on events in countries that are governed by authoritarian regimes. This is prompting those regimes to take up slogans of freedom, multiplicity, and liberalism. This is solely cosmetic, which they imagine will cloak them in legitimacy.

One of those regimes is the regime that weighs heavily on the Muslim people in Syria, a regime that is now leaking information through close associates about its multiplicity, economic liberalism, and political freedom.

What is the truth about these matters, and what is that regime's future in light of these changes? Is there any intention of forming an Islamic party, as is being rumored, and what are the facts about that?

These and other questions are the subject of our interview with Dr. 'Ali Sadr-al-Din al-Bayanuni, deputy supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood Society in Syria.

[Fathallah] Some sources talk about new changes that will appear on the Syrian political scene. What is your information in this regard? How do you evaluate any development in this direction?

[Al-Bayanuni] Information available about the measures that the regime will be taking toward political multiplicity and economic liberalism is information that the regime itself is leaking. It is merely a cosmetic attempt to make this regime look good. Through this means, the regime is trying to consolidate its rule against the winds of change, especially since the fall of the Romanian tyrant, Nicolae Ceausescu, has shaken the foundations of power in Syria, because of the many similarities between the two regimes.

We would like the Syrian regime to ponder these international changes and the fate that befell the tyrant Ceausescu's regime, and respond to the demands of the people, who have suffered many long years of oppression, repression, persecution, poverty and hunger, and to undertake a process of true liberalism, restoring to the Syrian people their freedom and honor, and eradicating the nightmare of terror weighing on their hearts.

We should emphasize that any liberalism occurring in Syria would have a share, in one form or another, of arriving at true liberalism, and would serve the issue of freedom. The regime would be unable to use it for its own interests, or to strengthen the supports of its collapsing power, because Arab citizens in general, and Syrian citizens in particular, are well aware of the truth about the extraordinary situation in Syria and the nature of its ruling regime.

What is needed in Syria is a comprehensive, radical change in the nature, composition and course of the regime, a change that would restore to the people their purloined freedom, and to Syria its basic Arab, Islamic directions. However, the present regime is incapable of effecting these changes, because it is mired in oppression and tyranny, and is afraid of freedom.

[Fathallah] Sources close to the Syrian regime have leaked information about the creation of a political party called the Party of Islamic Progress. How do you view the establishment of this party under the Islamic label? What is the regime's objective?

[Al-Bayanuni] Undoubtedly, the Syrian regime senses the bottomless abyss that separates it from the people and from their Islamic orientations. For some time—to no avail—the regime has tried to fill that gap, and get closer to the people through certain Islamic manifestations, making use of certain esteemed persons—although falsely esteemed—of the Islamic movement. The regime is fully aware of the extent of the people's devotion to the Muslim Brotherhood Society, their trust in it, their rallying around it. All means of tyranny, terror and barbaric butchery, including the Law of Dishonor (49) of 1980, which stipulates execution of anyone affiliated with this society, or who cooperates with it, all of this has not enabled the regime to isolate the society and its leaders from the masses. Therefore, it is attempting, through creating an Islamic party, to carry out its scheme of creating an Islamic alternative for the people, in order to hide the truth of its position with regard to Islam and its *da'wah* [the call to Islam].

We believe that Islam is indivisible, that its creed and principles are one in every time and place. We do not claim that we are (the Muslim Brotherhood Society), or rather, we are a society of Muslims. It would please us for the beliefs and principles of Islam to be borne by any individual, party or regime...

We have cooperated—and still do—with all sincere workers on the Islamic scene, including the most distinguished Islamic ulema, groups, and persons, irrespective of their schools of thought or beliefs. All of them have been affected by the oppressiveness and terrorism of this regime, as has our society, because the regime is at war against Islam, making no distinction between one group or another. Those who work with our people have made huge sacrifices, both in martyrs and prisoners. They have paid dearly to defend the people's faith, freedom, and honor.

If this Islamic party is really established, and is committed to the beliefs and principles of Islam, we will meet with it and it will meet with us, we will cooperate with it and it will cooperate with us. But if the regime intends—as is expected—for that party to have a misleading image, for the purpose of serving the regime's best interests, our Muslim people will, in their awareness and belief, understand the truth of this treachery.

Islam—by its nature—cannot come together with the existing regime in Syria, and an Islamic party cannot join the regime's so-called National Front, because Islam is the religion of freedom, justice and equality, and cannot join with enemies of freedom, nor with oppressors, nor follow the sectarian path that this regime follows.

[Fathallah] Can you confirm the reports of human rights organizations that there are thousands of political prisoners in Syria, and the recent rumors that the regime has released a few of them? Is the regime's detaining them because of the wish to make them a bargaining chip when needed?

[Al-Bayanuni] The jails in Syria are filled with political prisoners, including old men, women and youths of various classes, professions and ages. They include those who are described—internationally—as “thought prisoners.” Thousands are being detained without trial, and thousands more have done the time for which they were sentenced, but have not been released. Another small number are hostages and have affiliations.

Inside the prisons, thousands of prisoners have been executed in collective massacres, such as the Palmyra massacre in 1980, or as a result of mock field trials, which are periodically held inside these jails. These prisoners receive the worst treatment, and the most repugnant forms of torture and humiliation are practised against them. Fatal diseases spread among them, as a result of these vile conditions imposed upon them. One can refer to the annual reports of Amnesty International, and other organizations working in this field, to learn the extent of the barbarism with which the political prisoners in Syria are treated.

During the past few years, the regime has only released a few score men and women. There are still thousands of detainees filling up the jails. The regime has in fact tried to use these political prisoners as a means of putting pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood Society for bargaining purposes, in two rounds of negotiations in 1984 and 1987, but the society, which is conscious of its responsibilities toward these prisoners, and its duty to save them, cannot accept bargaining over the rights of people with regard to a free and decent life.

[Fathallah] We have noted that the armed struggle that represents your current path, with regard to the confrontation, is encountering a kind of cooling off. Was there a specific decision made to concentrate on political action at the present time? Where have you got to in your Arab and international political relations?

[Al-Bayanuni] The Muslim Brotherhood Society still takes the stand that it is necessary to overthrow that oppressive regime by all available legitimate means. For each way, the society has a plan, and legal and specialized programs. Our political relations are excellent and in an advanced state. They are based on an understanding of the facts of the extraordinary conditions in Syria, and of our people's suffering from oppression,

repression and tyranny. They are also based on cooperation to rescue the people and alleviate their suffering.

Sectarianism, a Slogan and Pathway for the Regime

[Fathallah] What is the actual stance of the 'Alawi sect with regard to the Syrian regime, and are there some forces inside the sect that have changed their position, or not?

[Al-Bayanuni] We have described the Syrian regime as sectarian, but that does not mean that all individuals of the 'Alawi sect support it. On the contrary, there are those in the 'Alawi sect who oppose and resist this regime. However, the regime's pathway is sectarian, and it deals with the people in accordance with the policy of sectarian discrimination in all areas. The regime is indelibly marked by this.

[Fathallah] Observers think that Hafiz al-Asad's defiant wish to restore relations with Egypt, conduct a dialogue with the PLO and flirt with Iraq, reflects the state of Arab isolation from which the regime suffers. To what extent do you agree with this analysis?

[Al-Bayanuni] Without a doubt, the Syrian regime suffers—because of its positions—from Arab isolation, in addition to popular and international isolation. It constantly tries to break the circle of isolation around it, and these actions that were referred to—in my view—will not break this impasse.

[Fathallah] What are your thoughts and expectations about the future in Syria with regard to all aspects, and most especially, the possibility of radical change in the regime?

[Al-Bayanuni] I do not think that the regime—despite the severely critical position into which the international and Arab developments have put it—will voluntarily undertake a true metamorphosis or a radical change in its policies. However, at the same time, I feel optimistic about the future, because the extraordinary conditions in Syria cannot endure for long against popular ferment and the powerful winds of change. Any attempt at cosmetic change or partial relaxation will not change the truth one iota, and will not deceive anyone.

[Fathallah] The formation of the Syrian National Salvation Front was announced recently. How does this front differ from the alliance announced in 1982?

[Al-Bayanuni] The National Front for the Salvation of Syria, in which the Muslim Brotherhood Society has participated, as announced in February 1990, and before it, the National Alliance for the Liberation of Syria, is a living expression of the firm unity of our people—of various classes and orientations—to confront the oppression that has befallen them, because of this regime. The charter of this new national front, and before it the national alliance's charter, clearly states the goal of the alliance of these national parties and forces,

which is, to work for the overthrow of the Syrian regime and save our people from its talons.

As for the difference between the alliance and the front, the front's charter transcends certain detailed issues pertaining to Syria's future, and avoids getting into trivialities or details that all parties cannot agree to. This is in preparation for the participation of the largest possible number of opposition forces. The front's political office began its work, after the announcement of the front's establishment, by means of an established plan and program of action.

[Fathallah] One notes that the Muslim Brotherhood Society in Syria, despite the dangerous and provocative opposition, still has strong connections with the major issues.

[Al-Bayanuni] Muslims—under any circumstance—cannot abandon brothers and their issues. The Muslim is the brother of a Muslim; he neither oppresses nor forsakes him. He protects him. Like a building, one Muslim shores up another. What is happening in Syria and Afghanistan, in Palestine and other Muslim countries, concerns all Muslims. Our preoccupation with our issues in Syria must not prevent our concern for the Muslims' issues elsewhere. Those who have no concern for Muslim affairs are not with them.

[Fathallah] We have heard that efforts are being made to mend the rift and restore unity to the Muslim Brotherhood Society in Syria. What is your assessment of these efforts, and have you any good news in this regard?

[Al-Bayanuni] The society's institutions—on both the local and world levels—have been hard at work to eliminate any obstacle to unity. The door has been opened wide, and the brothers will be welcomed back to their society without restriction or condition, because unity is strength and division is weakness. With many of our other brethren, we have sensed agreement and a desire to end the division, and a conviction that there is no good reason to continue it. We hope for cooperation and coordination, a step along the path, while preparing the circumstances for all brethren to return to the society soon, God willing.

[Fathallah] What final word would you like to say?

[Al-Bayanuni] On my behalf, and on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood Society in Syria, which is led by Syria's learned and senior shaykh, Shaykh 'Abd-al-Fattah Abu-Ghudah, I would like to say a final word to every Muslim and to every citizen in our beloved country, Syria. Unity, meeting of hearts, cooperation for piety and courage, effort and sacrifice, that is the way to save our people from their ordeal. "Say, Work; so God will see your work and so will His Messenger and the believers. And you will be brought back to the Knower of the unseen and the seen, then He will inform you of what you did."

Agricultural Statistics Projected for 1990

90AE0047A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT
in Arabic 19 May 90 p 8

[Dispatch from Damascus: "Syria Implements Extensive Production Plan; Plant and Animal Production To Grow in 1990"]

[Text] The Syrian government began implementation of an ambitious production plan for this year's crop growing season and adopted a series of exacting scientific formulas that give priority to soil fertility, irrigated land, and strategic production regions, as well as to agribusinesses that feed on such crops as cotton, cereals, vegetables, and fruits.

Plan figures indicate that the cultivated area in 1990 covered 5.563 million hectares of which 690,000 are irrigated and 4.873 million are rain dependent. Field surveys, however, show that last year only 655,000 hectares were actually irrigated.

Consequently, 35,000 irrigated hectares were cultivated this current growing season thanks to land reclamation and irrigation processes. Newly irrigated are: 2,100 hectares in al-Sahil basin, 7,500 hectares in Upper Yarmuk in the south of Syria, 3,500 hectares in Maskanah Gharb to the east, 2,000 hectares in Homs governorate in central Syria, 220 hectares in al-Ghariyah al-Sharqiyah to the northeast, and 1,200 hectares in Saday 'Udwan and Ghadir al-Bustan to the north. Also cultivated were 4,591 more hectares of irrigated land in al-Hur in the upper Euphrates basin.

Other irrigated land also cultivated this current winter season under the same plan are 7,000 hectares in Maskanah to the west and 7,760 hectares in the River Baligh basin to the north.

The Syrian plan emphasizes strategic crops. Irrigated land is 46.9 percent planted with wheat, 30.1 percent with cotton, 5.3 percent with sugar beets, 3.2 percent with soya beans, 2.6 percent with tomatoes, and 2 percent with potatoes.

Grazing land accounted for 572,000 irrigated hectares and 4.265 million rain-watered hectares of which 2.537 million hectares were planted with barley, 1.238 million hectares with wheat, 150,000 hectares with lentils, 84,000 hectares with chick peas, and 16,000 hectares with sesame.

The plan called for an overall farming density of 34.2 percent whereby 65,000 hectares were planted with corn, 13,000 hectares with autumn potatoes, 7,000 hectares with autumn tomatoes, and 6,000 hectares with peas.

The plan predicted record harvests on the basis of precise calculations. Crops of superior wheat were calculated at 3,800 kilograms per irrigated hectare and 2,000 kgs per rain-watered hectare; regular wheat at 2,500 kgs for irrigated land and 1,250 kgs for rain-watered land;

irrigated corn at 3,000 kgs; irrigated cotton at 334 kgs; irrigated tomatoes at 32,000 kgs; and irrigated potatoes at 20,000 kgs.

Of rain-watered crops, one hectare is calculated to produce 900 kgs of barley, 855 kgs of chick peas, 950 kgs of lentils, 17.5 kgs of olives, 9.1 kgs of grapes, and 35.3 kgs of apples.

Harvest forecasts under the plan call for 2.877 million tons of wheat, 2.268 million tons of barley, 528,000 tons of cotton, 487,000 tons of olives, 344,000 tons of citrus fruits, 204,000 tons of corn, 143,000 tons of lentils, and 47,000 tons of soya beans. Forecasts also call for 143,000 tons of red meat, 98,000 tons of fish, 1.362 million tons of milk, and 1,737 million eggs.

The plan also outlined Syria's current animal wealth by number, production, and composition. Official figures reveal that cattle herds grew from 730,000 heads in 1989 to 787,000 heads in 1990. Cow milk production increased from 589,000 tons last year to 704,000 tons in 1990.

The number of sheep increased from 13.5 million heads in 1989 to 14.7 million heads in 1990. Sheep milk production increased to 575,000 tons from 526,000 tons last year. Meat production also increased from 98,000 tons to 103,000 tons in 1990.

The plan indicated that poultry production increased slightly from 1989. The number of egg layers grew from 13.5 million in 1989 to 13.8 million in 1990. Egg production increased from 17.5 million eggs in 1989 to 1,737 million this year.

Meat production under the plan declined from 105,000 tons in 1989 to 98,000 tons this year as a result of fodder shortages and high prices. The output of a domestic cow increased from 770 kgs in 1989 to 1,800 kgs this season and 2,500 kgs in the second generation season.

The plan also showed that fish production increased from 6,300 tons in 1989 to 11,800 tons in 1990.

Seeds required for the implementation of the ambitious Syrian plan amounted to 180,000 tons for wheat, 24,000 tons for cotton, 2,250 tons for corn, 2,000 tons for soya beans, 40,000 tons for potatoes, and 65,000 tons for barley. The plan also required 300,000 tons of nitrogen fertilizers, 220,000 tons of phosphates, and 22,500 tons of potassium—both imported and domestic.

Pesticides needed for the current growing season are estimated to cost some \$55.3 million of which chemicals valued at \$13.4 million are earmarked for the winter season alone. Required pharmaceutical imports were valued at about \$7 million.

The Syrian government, by adopting the plan, hopes to boost farm crops and animal husbandry—the two components of agricultural production—in order to be able at the end of the current 1990 season to substantially increase exports, supply domestic market demand for various food commodities, and feed agribusinesses at a new rate that would keep them producing fully 360 days of the year.

Projections indicate that several of the plan's objectives will be realized, especially since this year's rainfall has proven them to be realistic. This makes it necessary to strike some sort of balance between production requirements and ways of calculating returns.

AFGHANISTAN

AL-HURRIYAH Correspondent Reports on Political Situation

Kabul Residents, Officials Interviewed

90AS0055A Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 22 Apr 90 pp 36-39

[Article by Jum'ah al-Halfi: "Freedom in Kabul: Half the Budget, Half the Bread, Half the Textiles Go to the Army; Afghan Mujahidin... Drug Trafficking and Establishing an Islamic Republic; Soviet Losses in Afghanistan: 15,000 Dead, 30,000 Wounded"]

[Text] Kabul turns into a ghost town as soon as darkness falls on the city. Stores close their doors hours before the daily curfew, which starts at ten, and people rush to return early to their homes. A little after ten o'clock the dimly-lit streets become deserted. Only soldiers carrying machine guns and B-7 launchers patrol the streets, and every now and then, whenever they think they see something stirring in the darkness, they shatter the silence of the night on the deserted streets with their gruff demand for the password. The atmosphere in Kabul in the wake of the coup, which was carried out by Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanai, has been extremely tense.

We had been taking photographs of what had happened to some political party buildings and government buildings down town as a result of the shelling. On our way back from that assignment, my Palestinian host said, "Before the coup, traveling on the streets of Kabul, even after the curfew, was possible. Sometimes, all you had to do was joke with the patrol soldiers or tell them you were a Palestinian student and they would let you go through. These days, however, everybody is extremely tense. Can you imagine that what is being feared now is that Pakistan might help Shahnawaz Tanai return to Kabul? After all, most of those who fled with Tanai were pilots, and it is estimated that about 20 pilots fled with him."

2300 Hours

I asked an official in Afghanistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs if there was anything to support the charge that was being made against the former minister of defense, who was being accused of having a relationship with Pakistan's military intelligence and with Gulbuddin Hikmatyar's group. The official answered, "Let me give you this piece of information. At 2300 hours on Tuesday, 6 March, that is, a few hours after the coup, Benazir Bhutto, the prime minister of Pakistan, was holding a security meeting with Aslam Beg, Pakistan's assistant minister of defense, and with Shamsur Rahman Kalloe, a military intelligence officer. Immediately after it was announced that the coup had failed, Aslam Beg and Shamsur Rahman left for Peshawar, which is located on the borders with our country. There, in the area of Lashkarkun, they met with Shahnawaz Tanai, who had

arrived there fleeing from Kabul. The meeting took place in the presence of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar."

Because I wanted to hear more, I told the Afghan official, "But this may not be the proper, absolute proof that there were previous relations between Tanai and these people." So the official said, "How then would you like us to explain the matter?" I asked, "Where is he now? I mean, where is Shahnawaz now?" The official said, "His main residence is in Peshawar. He entered Afghan territory; then he went back to Peshawar." "Were there troops with him?" I asked. The official said, "Only escorts from Gulbuddin's group accompanied him." Then I asked the official if Shahnawaz's return to Kabul was something that was being feared, and the Afghan official laughed and said, "You must remember that Shahnawaz was minister of defense and that he failed despite the fact that he controlled all the capabilities. What [do you think] he can do now with no military decorations?"

Farid Mazdak, who is a member of the Political Office of the People's Party and secretary of the National Front, answered similar questions in an interview. He said, "We were not far from the truth when we declared that Pakistan did have something to do with the recent events. Individuals in the group which carried out the coup were paid off some time ago by Pakistani and American intelligence. The CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and Pakistani military intelligence had counted on the fact that Khalq and Parcham, the two factions in our party, would fight each other when the coup succeeds and that the regime would then collapse. Things turned out differently, however, and these criminal hopes were frustrated. The united action of the People's Party affirmed that the party had no followers from the Khalq faction and no followers from the Parcham faction. No one stood with Shahnawaz Tanai except those persons who escorted him to Pakistan."

Two days after the interview with Farid Mazdak, it was announced that 24 leading members of the party, accused of betraying the people and the party, had been ousted from the party. All these people were individuals who were considered, as the record showed, to be members of the Khalq faction. On the other hand, two members of the same faction were elected to the Political Office, and they joined General Muhammad Aslam Watanjar in the Political Office. General Watanjar, who was appointed minister of defense after the coup to succeed Shahnawaz Tanai in that position, is one of the leaders of the Khalq faction.

President Najibullah and many party leaders as well consider Shahnawaz's coup to have its many pros and cons. The coup was tantamount to a quick surgical procedure which rid the party of a dangerous virus that was not easy to get rid of.

This is what President Najibullah told representatives of the Pashtun tribes in one of the meetings he used to hold to explain conditions in the country after the coup.

When I interviewed him, the president of Afghanistan said, "Shahnawaz Tanai was a major obstacle to the national reconciliation policy. We have now managed to remove this obstacle." Da'ud Razmyar, member of the Central Committee and secretary of the Partisan Kabul Committee, talked about Shahnawaz and his group and described them as a ticking time bomb within the party which was defused when the coup failed.

In the final analysis such statements shed light on the fact that Shahnawaz Tanai's action was not merely a rash action spurred by extremism, but that it rather epitomized a political conflict which was settled militarily.

How All This Got Started

In the course of explaining the causes and implications of the recent coup, an Arab diplomat, who is an expert on Afghan affairs, told me, "Much can be said about Shahnawaz's qualities and extremism, or rather, his contacts and relations. However, there is no way that his recent action can be separated from the traditional conflict within the party, specifically, the conflict between the Khalq and Parcham blocs. I believe," added the Arab diplomat, "that no scientific analysis of recent events can be accurate if it does not take into account that conflict in the party's leadership which is both old and new."

I told him, "But how can what you are suggesting explain matters when leaders of the Khalq bloc, to which Shahnawaz belongs, are still holding important positions in the party and in the state?" The Arab diplomat said, "Be patient. I'll explain it to you." Then he added, "It is known that the conflict between the Khalq and Parcham blocs is a historic conflict which antedates the establishment of the party in 1965. But I will start from a specific point. Ever since the victory of the 1978 April Revolution, which was led by the People's Party after the two blocs merged, the struggle for power between the two blocs became highly competitive and in some cases turned bloody. Although the party did manage to maintain its organizational unity to a large extent, the conflict and the growing difficulties which have been plaguing the country would resurface from time to time and some settlement of that conflict would somehow be reached. The milestones of that conflict are well known, and the first leader of the revolution, Nur Muhammad Taraki, lost his life in that conflict. A few months after the revolution's victory he was physically eliminated by Hafizullah Amin."

"Hundreds of leaders and cadres also lost their lives as a result of Hafizullah Amin's domination and extremism. He too was killed when Babrak Karmal came to power. Ever since then, that is, ever since Karmal came to power, some leaders of the Khalq faction have been complaining of what they call discrimination and domination by members of the Parcham faction. Both Karmal and his successor, Najibullah, are from the Parcham faction of the party. However, the subject of

the conflict which has been going on since Najibullah came to power differs from the traditional subjects of the conflict."

I asked, "How is it different?" He replied, "It differs in substance." Then he added, "Unlike the conflict in the past, the new conflict has nothing to do with the struggle for leadership. Instead, this struggle is about crucial issues, specifically the question of national reconciliation and that of the party itself. Some Khalq leaders oppose what they call the looseness of the national reconciliation policy. They think that the peace proposals which were announced by Najibullah are unlimited concessions. In this regard, they also hold the Soviets responsible for this policy."

"Were they opposed to the departure of Soviet troops?" I asked. He replied, "The idea they are setting forth in this regard seems logical. They are saying that if the Soviets made a mistake by coming to Afghanistan, they should not repeat the mistake by leaving Afghanistan before somehow ending the problem. In other words, they think that the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan and the decision to get them out were both wrong decisions."

"And what about the dispute about the question of the party?" I asked. The Arab diplomat said, "The conflict over this issue coincided with President Najibullah's proposals to abandon the real class and ideological nature of the People's Party. The conflict was also about proposals which were on the table to change the party's name as well as its program and bylaws. Some leaders of the Khalq faction think that the aim of these proposals is to destroy the party and bring it to an end, and that is why they have been calling for a conference for some time."

"Are members of the Khalq faction the only ones opposing these proposals?" I asked. The Arab diplomat said, "No, they're not. Also, not all of them oppose these proposals. Herein lies the answer to your question, and that also covers the attitude toward national reconciliation. President Najibullah managed to gain support for his policy among different and various circles within and outside the party. This includes the party's leaders and general members: those who are members of the Khalq faction as well as those who are not."

"How did the conflict get to be so bloody?" I asked. The Arab diplomat said, "The atmosphere became cloudy and murky after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. It was obvious, even to President Najibullah, that the post-Soviet period would be a complicated one. A few months before the Soviet troops' withdrawal, a number of members of the Political Office and the Central Committee, including Muhammad Saleh Ziri and Sayyed Muhammad Gulabzoy, were pushed aside. The two men were among those who were accused of taking part in Shahnawaz Tanai's recent coup. They had served as ambassadors to Aden and Moscow, respectively. In addition, most of the others who were also pushed aside

were thought to be members of the Khalq faction. In October of last year it was announced that a group of army leaders had been arrested and that several generals, who were also members of the Khalq faction, were among them. A number of civilians, who were accused of contacting the rebels, specifically the Islamic Party, which is led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, were also arrested. At that time, Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanai thought that the arrest of the seven generals was a blow to weaken the Khalq faction and undermine his personal influence. At that time Tanai protested publicly. He sent his tanks to the streets, and he tightened his control over the Ministry of Defense and other ministries. But although the Soviets interfered to calm the situation, the situation remained tense until the coup on 6 March. That, as it is being said, was the date set for the trial of the seven generals."

Brezhnev Market

In the Brezhnev Market, which is the popular name of one of the markets in Kabul where Soviet experts and soldiers used to shop before their withdrawal from Afghanistan, my Palestinian host was exchanging pleasantries with a salesman who was selling an Afghan fur coat. He told him something to that effect: "How can you sell us these coats at such high prices? Do you think we are Soviets?" The salesman, whose facial expression changed to one of surprise, remonstrated, "God forbid! Please forgive me. I meant no harm." After leaving the salesman, without buying anything, of course, my host said, "The Soviets offered Afghanistan a great deal, but they got nothing in return." An Afghan friend told me, "It is estimated that the number of Soviets who died in Afghanistan is approximately 15,000. Approximately 30,000 were wounded, and large numbers of Afghans were taken prisoner. The Soviets' material losses are in the tens of billions of dollars. During the years of the war," added the Afghan friend, "hundreds of Soviet soldiers either lost their minds or became addicted to drugs. They used to be transported directly from Kabul to hospitals in their country. In the past people, especially on the official level, used to talk with pride about the heroism of Soviet soldiers because the image which people had of Soviet soldiers was a negative one. That image is still negative. In some battles the ratio of Soviet troops to Afghan troops was 70 percent to 30 percent. In other battles their sacrifices were incredible. Now, however, the picture has been tarnished even on the official level. Can you believe," added the Afghan friend, "that even the people in Babrak Karmal's group are talking today about the need to condemn Soviet intervention? And Babrak Karmal is the one who citizens and officials think is responsible for inviting Soviet troops into Afghanistan. And yet, Babrak Karmal's group did submit a memorandum to a meeting of the Central Committee of the People's Party which was held late last year, asking the committee to condemn the intervention publicly and to ask for damages. But the party refused to do so, and its reason was both simple and sound: the flow of Soviet military, economic, and even food aid did not

stop after the Soviets' withdrawal. And that is why you see," said the Afghan friend, "heavy airplane traffic in Kabul Airport. Ninety percent of the airplanes which land daily in the airport are Aeroflot airplanes carrying this aid."

At Afghanistan's Ministry of the Economy, I obtained a report stating that the Soviet Union provided 85 percent of all the foreign assistance which was offered to Afghanistan. More than 100 national economy projects in the country have been built with Moscow's support, not to mention the 171 projects which are under construction. Foremost among these projects are the government sector's production establishments, which produce more than 75 percent of all industrial products. For the first time in its history the Soviet Union is offering loans to the private sector and to many Afghan merchants to help them set up small production projects. There has been no precedent for that. As I re-read the answer which Afghanistan's minister of foreign affairs had given to one of my questions, I remembered a popular Iraqi proverb which describes a person who has poor luck with his friends and compares him to a fish dish, which is eaten but never praised. At that time the minister had said something to the effect that the Soviet Union should not have sent its troops to Afghanistan to avoid condemnation of such a step. The Soviets are like that friend: everyone ate at their table, but no one expressed any gratitude.

Half the Fabrics and Half the Bread

Afghanistan was one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world before the revolution. Its GNP [gross national product] was under \$1 billion, and its per capita income was no more than \$160. A UN report published in 1976 mentioned these figures. What might these figures be approximately 15 years after the UN report was published? To say that there has been no change in this gloomy picture may not be enough. Afghanistan, which is primarily an agricultural country, still has the lowest volume of principal agricultural crops, and millions of Afghans still suffer from hunger and deprivation because of a shortage of agricultural crops. With the exception of goods which are smuggled into the country and then sold on the black market, imports meet only a moderate range of the bread, sugar, vegetable oil, and remaining other essential needs of the population.

I asked an official in an Afghan political party about the economic reality in the country. He replied sorrowfully, "The economic circumstances which Afghanistan is experiencing are extremely miserable. Most of the centers of production were destroyed during the years of the war, and those that are left are not operating. For example, during the years of the war the plants and factories which are being used in the conversion industries were operating at no more than 50 percent of their capacity, and they contributed no more than 5 percent of the GNP. Consequently, the country has to import almost everything, and that includes matches, tobacco, nails, and soap. Making raw materials available became

extremely difficult also. But agriculture, which the country relies upon in a principal way, was seriously damaged during the years of the war, and agricultural production declined significantly, and was not meeting the needs of the population. While there are many reasons for that, the most important one is that the peasants who cultivate the land turned into fighters 11 years ago. The peasants are fighting either on the government's front or on the opposition's. To put it briefly," added the Afghan official, "our economy today depends upon aid, grants, and foreign loans. Without them we would literally have no economy."

I asked an Afghan civil servant what his monthly income was, and he told me that it was about 6,000 Afghanis, which is the local currency. That is about \$12 only. I asked, "Can you live on such an income?" "Of course not," he said. "How do you manage then?" I asked. "I am not the only one working in the family," said the civil servant. "It is the rule that in most families more than one person has to work. Otherwise, life would be extremely difficult. My salary," added the Afghan civil servant, "will not buy five kilograms of meat. Sometimes one kilogram of meat costs more than 1,000 Afghanis. A loaf of bread costs about 28 Afghanis, and prices for sugar and tea are also very high."

I asked the civil servant, "Are these the official prices for these substances?" "When there is only one place where you can shop," said the civil servant, "there are no official prices and no nonofficial prices. Government establishments use coupons to sell some products at reasonable prices, and they distribute flour at no charge to civil servants. However, not everyone can get what he needs from the state's establishments."

I put some of these questions to an Afghan official, and he told me, "The fact that half the state's budget, half the imported textiles, and half the bread which is produced go to the front to defend this country says enough. In light of that fact you can appreciate the magnitude of the difficulties which Afghanistan is experiencing. The damage which has been inflicted on economic life in our country as a result of the war," added the official, "exceeds \$1 billion annually."

Afghanistan's President Najibullah says, "Solving the many complicated problems which have been piling up in Afghanistan over centuries in a short period of time was not possible. Furthermore, the Afghan Revolution did not evolve in an old, customary manner. Besides the fact that the problems which we inherited from the past created heavy burdens, many grave mistakes were made. We fell into the trap of having great expectations, personal illusions, and premature concepts. The party's mistakes and internal disputes," adds President Najibullah, "as well as the fact that party leaders overestimated the ability of broad social circles to accept a new mode of life without any restrictions or conditions created a split between the revolutionary vanguard and the masses. All this, of course, culminated in the civil war which has

been a drain on the country's human, economic, and material resources for 10 years."

Thus, Afghan leaders are discovering, a decade or so after the revolution, that they are paying a high price for the mistakes which were made. Afghan leaders are also discovering that, as is the case with several experiments, they did not take into account the religious, tribal, and national factors which affected people's consciousness. How are these factors being taken into account today?

Persian New Year's Eve

On new year's eve, night in Kabul turned into day. It was a festival of lights, stars, and gunshots during which Afghans forgot about their civil war and about the Scar cluster bombs which fall on their markets, their homes, and their streets at noon every day. At first, the festival started with light signals which are launched by military units in times of war. Then the fireworks started, lighting up the sky as yellow, blue, and grey lines of light shot their way up into the sky, traveling like shooting stars and then opening up like flowers in the darkness of the night. When one light waned and faded, another was launched into the sky. Thus, the sky over Kabul appeared to be full of colored stars. Afterwards, gun shots were fired. This is, after all, the eastern way of expressing joy, victory, and sorrow. When people of high social standing die, gun shots are fired from one location to another. Then the entire city of Kabul started shaking as shots were fired from various weapons: from hand guns, machine guns, and dushkas.

I asked my Palestinian host, "Do you expect Scud missiles will be fired on this occasion?" My host laughed and invited me to step into the room because, according to him, standing on balconies at such times was risky.

That night President Najibullah was on television, speaking at a religious ceremony that was being held in Mazar-e Sharif, where Imam 'Ali's final resting place is located. The ceremony was being held to celebrate the Persian New Year. As he addressed the crowd that had gathered around him, the Afghan president said, "I had a daunting dream last night. I dreamt that a man dressed in white and riding a white horse approached me and told me, 'Tomorrow, no matter how busy you are, Najib, you are to go to Mazar-e Sharif where you will have to do two things. First, you have to order the repair of some parts of the dome. Second, you are to pray there and ask God for peace in Afghanistan.'" President Najibullah added, "And here I am now responding to the appeal. I brought with me enough money for the repair work, and as far as praying is concerned, join me and let's pray together and ask God for peace in our country."

The following day my Palestinian host and I were going back in a taxicab. After some light-hearted conversation, we asked the driver of the cab what he thought about conditions in the country and whether he expected conditions to improve. The driver said that things were getting worse, and then he went on to explain the difficulties which citizens face. I asked him, "Who in

your opinion can stop all that and save the country?" Without hesitation he said, "King Zahir Shah." At first, I was taken by surprise, but I soon remembered what President Najibullah himself had told me when I interviewed him. Najibullah told me, "His Majesty King Zahir Shah can play a part in bringing peace to Afghanistan."

Political Parties and Drugs

Protracted civil wars produce not only destruction, devastation, and misery, but they also produce political parties. To put it more precisely, tribal, sectarian, and denominational political parties are "hatched" in civil wars. Some of these parties are created by events, and others are manufactured abroad. Parties are created for selling weapons; others for purchasing them; and still others for using them. This is the case in Afghanistan whose civil war is now in its 11th year. During the past 10 years political parties have been mushrooming in Afghanistan and in neighboring countries. They are even appearing in remote regions where Afghan immigrants and expatriates can be found.

I asked an official in an Afghan political party how many political parties and organizations were in Afghanistan. His reply, which sounded like a whistle, indicated that he could not count them. Then he said, "In Pakistan alone, approximately 50 organizations which oppose the regime have been set up." I did not believe my ears at first, so I asked him again to verify the figure, and he said, "Yes, there are 50 organizations. The largest of them is made up of two associations. The first one is the Islamic Association for the Freedom Fighters of Afghanistan. This group, which is called the Association of Seven, was established in September 1981, and among its most prominent organizations are the Islamic Party, which is led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; the Islamic Society, which is led by Burhanuddin Rabbani; the Islamic Party of Fighters for the Faith, which is led by Yunis Khalis; and the Islamic Alliance, which is led by 'Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. In addition, the association has smaller organizations. The other association," added the Afghan official, "has three organizations and a number of small factions.

"In Iran there is an alliance of nine parties, and it includes the nine principal Shi'ite parties which are supported by Iran. Outside Pakistan and Iran there are no less than 15 political parties and organizations operating in Europe and the United States where communities of Afghan expatriates can be found. But in Afghanistan, there are nine principal, legitimate parties: four of them are left-wing organizations, and the other four are religious and traditional."

I told the Afghan official, "Can we make heads or tails of this Afghan mosaic?" He said, "Have you heard of the American charge against the Association of Seven in Pakistan?" I replied, "No, I have not." The Afghan official said, "A few days ago, Malone Levitsky, the assistant U.S. secretary of state for drug affairs, stated

that the United States could not accept a situation in which it would be offering assistance to the Afghan mujahidin who then turn around and encourage the production of drugs. From such a charge," said the Afghan official, "you can find out about this mosaic, which is called the Afghan opposition. The seven political parties which are being accused by the Americans and supported by Washington itself are the ones which are calling for the establishment of an Islamic republic in Afghanistan. To this day these political parties have not come up with any concrete concept of the republic they are hoping to establish. And yet, they are, of course, capable of inflicting pain on innocent people in Kabul with the missiles they fire every day. But the parties of the other association are mostly pro-royal parties advocating the return of King Zahir Shah. Between these parties and the others, there are those political parties in Iran, which, thanks to the present Iranian policy, are starting to understand the reconciliation policy which is being proposed by President Najibullah."

I asked the Afghan official, "What about the disputes which are breaking out between the Afghan mujahidin?" He replied, "Forgive me, but this is another matter which we have to talk about another time."

Communist Party Secretary Interviewed

90AS0055B Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic
22 Apr 90 p 40

[Interview with Da'ud Razmyar: "Secretary of the Party's Organization in Kabul Talks About the Time When the Coup Was Underway; 'We Realized That Shahnawaz Was Planning Something"; first two paragraphs are AL-HURRIYAH introduction; in Kabul; date not specified]

[Text] Among the many political party and government buildings which were bombed by airplanes on the day Afghanistan's minister of defense carried out his coup, the building in Kabul which houses the party organization was hit by a number of missiles, each one weighing 500 kilograms. The process of repairing that part of the building which had been destroyed had not been completed when I had the opportunity to visit the place and meet Mr. Da'ud Razmyar, the secretary of the organization and member of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. We went into his office which is located in the basement under the building. He spoke first and said, "This is not my office. My office is located in that part of the building which was bombed by the airplanes of Shahnawaz Tanai on the day of the coup."

After he welcomed us, I told Mr. Razmyar, "Since you brought it up and started talking about the coup, please talk to us about it. Where were you and what did you do during those hours?"

The First Missile

[Razmyar] I can tell you frankly that these were difficult days. I am saying days because we realized before the coup that Shahnawaz Tanai was planning something. Therefore, we were making preparations to deal with any emergency. We had taken all the necessary measures in the Kabul Defense Council to confront something like that. Thus, days before the coup, members of the party who were in the city were well positioned and ready. That is why when the first missile hit our building at noon on the day of the coup, we issued orders to move to more secure locations. Then we started implementing other measures, such as arming our colleagues in the organization and protecting important places such as banks and ministries. In the evening on the day of the coup, it was feared that Gulbuddin Hikmatyar's group would take some action to support the perpetrators of the coup. That is why we set up a security zone around Kabul, and we transported heavy weapons to the upper plateaus and to important areas. Besides, we took part in rescue operations, and we carried the wounded and the victims to hospitals. As you know, Shahnawaz's airplanes bombed many civilian, residential areas and even markets and mosques. Besides all that, we had to ensure the essential needs of the city's residents, such as water, electricity, bread, and other such things.

Shahnawaz Does Not Represent a Faction in the Party

[AL-HURRIYAH] Some people are saying that Shahnawaz Tanai's coup has something to do with the conflicts within the party, specifically the conflict between the Khalq and Parcham factions. What would you say about that?

[Razmyar] To me, your question implies that some people want to make Tanai's coup an issue within the party. Let me tell you that there is no doubt that Shahnawaz and his group represented a problem within the party, but that after Shahnawaz carried out his attempted coup, which failed and was brought to an end in 24 hours only, thanks to the effective role played by all members of the party, it turned out that this problem was not a major problem. Shahnawaz Tanai does not represent any faction within the party, and what he did was a conspiracy against our party and our country. Shahnawaz Tanai worked with Pakistani military intelligence and with Gulbuddin Hikmatyar to carry out that conspiracy.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Do you think the things which are being said are rumors?

[Razmyar] Yes, they are, and the evidence for that is that all members of the party, members of the Khalq and Parcham factions, defended their party and their country when the coup occurred. Also, the party's Central Committee held a meeting yesterday, and committee members made several political and organizational decisions about which there were no differences.

[AL-HURRIYAH] How many people took part in the coup, and how many of them were in leadership positions?

[Razmyar] The military men and civilians who had main parts to play in this coup were no more than 50. They were the people who actually planned the coup. Seventeen of them hold leadership positions in the party and the state. Those individuals were fired yesterday at the meeting of the Central Committee. Of course there is no doubt that someone had misled those people who are not many and who are still being questioned so that the facts about their role in the coup can be determined.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Have those who participated in the coup been arrested?

[Razmyar] Some have been arrested, but others fled with Shahnawaz Tanai to Pakistan. Others were killed during the clashes.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Will public trials be held for those who took part in the coup?

[Razmyar] Of course we will put those people on trial. They will be tried in front of the people in accordance with the penal code and Islamic principles. However, we will not react emotionally because we realize that some people played an active and a scheming role in the coup, others played a secondary role, and still others were misled.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Will the coup have consequences that will affect party circles and have an impact on them?

[Razmyar] We are certain that when the true identity of the conspirators becomes known, that knowledge will be a factor that will strengthen our party. A meeting of the Central Committee was held yesterday, and the decisions that were made were not opposed by any different points of view. What Shahnawaz Tanai did is indefensible. He carried out a military coup, and he bombed the presidential palace and several buildings which house party as well as state offices. Each one of these bombs weighed 500 kilograms. Hundreds of innocent civilians and military personnel lost their lives because of this. Will a person who does all this find anyone to defend him? Shahnawaz Tanai fled, and he sought refuge among corrupt people who are enemies of the revolution. They are the people who killed thousands of our people. In other words, Tanai is now embraced by those against whom members of the party have been fighting.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Do you believe that the Tanai coup will have an effect on the national reconciliation policy?

[Razmyar] On the contrary. The effects it will have will be positive because Shahnawaz Tanai and his group and all those who took part with him in the coup had been impeding the national reconciliation policy. With the failure of their coup, that obstacle has been removed. The effects of the coup will provide an incentive for taking more action to achieve the national reconciliation policy.

Communist Party Problems

90AS0055C Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic
29 Apr 90 pp 33-35

[Article by Jum'ah al-Halfi: "Freedom in Kabul: U.S. Intelligence Operations in Afghanistan More Extensive Than U.S. Operations in Vietnam"]

[Text] A person can choose his neighbors, but countries cannot choose theirs. Although God did enjoin people to be good to their neighbors, even distant ones, He did not enjoin countries to be good to theirs. It is Afghanistan's misfortune that it has not gained the friendship of most of its neighbors. The Soviet Union, Afghanistan's big neighbor to the north, is the only country which has had friendly relations with this small and impoverished country since the socialist October Revolution. Pakistan and Iran, Afghanistan's neighbors to the south and southwest and to the west have been hostile to Afghanistan for decades. In the last decade, that is, the decade during which the civil war broke out, the number of foreigners adding fuel to the fire of these deadly wars has grown. Afghanistan's neighbors were not the only ones who worried about Afghanistan and interfered in its affairs, but also countries that are thousands of miles away from Afghanistan's borders. They too worried about Afghanistan and interfered in its affairs.

Afghan officials are right in thinking that foreign intervention in the Afghan question has been and still is the principal factor that is inflaming the civil war and allowing it to continue. Foreign intervention has also been a factor that has kept the Afghans from achieving peace.

When I interviewed him in Kabul, Mr. 'Abdul Wakil, Afghanistan's minister of foreign affairs, told me, "The United States of America, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are the ones forcing the people of Afghanistan to fight. They are the ones who are choosing a military solution to the Afghan question. *Al-kitab al-abyad*, [The White Book] which was published by Afghanistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, affirms historical facts. It affirms that the hostility felt by ruling circles in Pakistan to Afghanistan goes back to 1947, that is, to the time when the state of Pakistan emerged on the ruins of the British Empire. In the mid fifties, when the United States' alliance with Pakistan, with the deposed Shah of Iran, and with reactionary Arab regimes was dedicated, the hostility of Pakistani military circles to the state of Afghanistan grew. At that time the undeclared objective of the alliance between the four reactionary countries was to attempt to sway Afghanistan away from its independent policy of positive neutrality, which it pursued in its foreign relations, and to drag it into the military, hostile CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] and SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] alliances. This reactionary alliance wanted to induce Afghanistan to pursue a hostile approach to socialist countries and to national liberation movements in the area.

"Because Afghanistan lacks an outlet to the sea, it finds itself compelled to transport its exports and imports across the territories of neighboring countries. Pakistan has always used that factor to apply economic pressure to Afghanistan, just as the Shah had used the water of the Helmand River, on the borders with Iran. The distribution of the river waters between the two countries did from time to time threaten to bring conditions between the two countries to a head, and it did complicate relations further. Then when reactionary, right-wing political organizations were publicly established in Afghanistan and in its neighboring countries in the early seventies with the consent of Islamabad and the unlimited support of the United States of America and Saudi Arabia, these organizations came to be the nucleus of the opposition, which today is called the Afghan mujahidin."

Poverty and the Party's Mistakes

An official in Afghanistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me, "You undoubtedly know that the Afghan Revolution started in one of the most backward and poorest spots on earth. Illiteracy in our country was almost universal, and the majority of the people were poor. In addition, the country had no cultural traditions and laws; ruling circles were despotic; people were being subjected to the worst kinds of exploitation by feudalists and speculators; and the ruling bureaucracy was negligent and corrupt. Afghan society was characterized by sharp class, ethnic, sectarian, and religious discrimination, and possibilities for social expression were nonexistent. The revolution was born," added the Afghan official, "under these extremely backward conditions, and it had to contend with complicated problems which included the enactment of an agrarian reform law to guarantee the interests of poor peasants. The revolution had to draft a law declaring all peoples and tribes equal; it had to take measures to develop education and health; and it had to start the war against illiteracy. In a poorly developed country of multiethnic groups and many languages and customs, a clash between the new powers and their measures on the one hand and those who were being affected by these measures, on the other, was, of course, something to be expected. Thus, radical elements of all kinds rose against the new life and the economic and social reforms. Soon the people's authority was inundated with propaganda, falsehoods, and terror campaigns. That was an indication that representatives of deposed feudalists, of the bureaucratic military cabal, and of a few reactionary clergymen had formed an antirevolutionary core unit which received immediate backing and support from abroad."

"All of this, however," I said to the Afghan official, "was one aspect of the predicament which is manifesting itself to us today in the civil war." "Yes," he said. "There is no doubt that another aspect of the predicament manifests itself in the party's mistakes and in the fact that the party did not appreciate the country's circumstances, traditions, customs, and standard of social consciousness. Thus, antirevolutionary forces found that to be a golden

opportunity for getting large numbers of peasants and poor people on their side in the name of religion and tribal traditions. Although it is true that the party did confuse facts with ideological wishes, it was not the mistakes of the party that led to the existing situation in Afghanistan. The principal and fundamental cause of the difficulties which our people and our revolution confronted head on lies in the fact that the strategic goals of the foreign powers who oppose our national interests agreed and coincided with the interests of Afghan reactionaries in Afghanistan. How else can one explain this hodge podge of Afghan mujahidin from different sectarian and political groups coming together to join Pakistan, the United States of America, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran to declare war on Afghanistan?"

Only \$2 Billion

The Afghan government has in its possession innumerable facts and pieces of evidence which prove that successive U.S. administrations have been blatantly involved in the declared war against Afghanistan. It would be enough to mention in this regard the suffering of innocent Afghans who, for more than two years, have been the targets of SCAR missiles which Washington provides to the Afghan mujahidin who fire them on Kabul and other Afghan cities. An article entitled "CIA Schemes Facing Failure" appeared in the British newspaper, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, last December 30. In that article the British newspaper affirmed that over the past 10 years the American agency had become involved in events in Afghanistan on a large scale and that its covert operations in that country had become the most extensive and the most expensive after its operations in Vietnam. THE FINANCIAL TIMES revealed that these operations had "cost the CIA over \$2 billion. And yet, the American agency is still making mistakes." The newspaper then discussed the agency's mistakes in estimating the mujahidin's power and the capabilities they had to overthrow the Kabul regime. In its *al-kitab al-abyad* [The White Book] and in other official documents as well the Afghan government presents unimpeachable evidence about Saudi Arabia's involvement in the war against Afghanistan. From time to time the Afghan government shows many Saudis on television who were captured in clashes with the mujahidin. The Afghan government also shows the kinds of weapons that were seized, and these carry Egyptian insignia.

Of course, Pakistan's enormous involvement in the war in Afghanistan requires no proof. An official in an Afghan political party told me, "Given the complicated picture that you see, you have to realize that a solution to the Afghan problem no longer lies in the hands of the principal contenders in the battlefield. That is, neither the Kabul government nor the Peshawar government (the government of the Afghan mujahidin) has a solution. The question now is in the hands of the regional and international parties which are backing both sides." The Afghan official added, "I can give you an example of that. Since 1978 President Najibullah's policy has been

to reach out to the opposition so that national reconciliation can be achieved in Afghanistan. However, his outreach efforts have not been reciprocated, nor has there been any response to the policy of moderation among the leaders of the Association of Seven, which is made up of the mujahidin's parties in Pakistan. At first, these parties' excuse was that there would be no reconciliation while Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan. But things remained unchanged after the Soviets withdrew. Then their excuse was that the ruling People's Party was a party of nonbelievers and that it was a willing tool for the Soviets. Today, the party is declaring that it is neither a communist nor a Marxist party. Nevertheless, the mujahidin continue to reject reconciliation and to choose war. How can one explain that?" The Afghan official answered his own question by saying, "The only explanation is that the mujahidin did not make that decision but that it was made for them by those who support them and offer them money and weapons. Let me give you another example," said the Afghan official. "When Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat met with Gulbuddin Hikmatyar in Pakistan, Abu 'Ammar tried to persuade the mujahidin to accept the national reconciliation policy. He asked Gulbuddin to reply to the overtures which had been made in that regard, but the latter asked that he be given some time before giving him an answer. When Abu 'Ammar pressed him for an answer, Gulbuddin, once again, asked for more time. Finally, Abu 'Ammar told Gulbuddin, 'I want your answer, not that of the United States'."

Optimism, but...

Afghan officials are talking optimistically about the national reconciliation policy, which they proposed approximately three years ago, and also about possibilities for establishing peace in Afghanistan. Their optimism, however, is mixed with a great deal of skepticism. Political and military facts on the ground as well as factors which have to do with the balance of powers inside the country and abroad allow nothing but a glimmer of hope, and that hope depends basically on international commitments, especially those between the two major guarantors of the Geneva documents which were signed to provide a solution to the Afghan question. These two guarantors are the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Afghanistan's President Najibullah says, "I am very optimistic about the possibility of applying the national reconciliation policy in Afghanistan." In his interview with AL-HURRIYAH the president adds, "Those who were involved in the coup were one of the principal obstacles to reconciliation. With the failure of the coup, that obstacle was removed." If, however, the Afghan president's optimism here were based on the idea that Shahnawaz Tanai, the former minister of defense, was an obstacle to reconciliation and that the failure of his coup removed the obstacle, then another coup on the front of the Afghan mujahidin in Peshawar will be required to set matters straight, since there are extremists there too who are an obstacle to

national reconciliation. The differences among the mujahidin which President Najibullah is counting on have not yet reached the point of causing such a coup.

It is precisely from [this angle] that one can look seriously at the expectations (or the desires) of western experts and analysts with regard to the development of the situation in Afghanistan during these weeks. According to these experts and analysts, Afghanistan will be experiencing rounds of combat from now until the U.S.-Soviet summit is held. This means that George Bush and Michael Gorbachev will have an opportunity to discuss the Afghan question in the light of a new map of the conflict and in accordance with an amended balance of powers. A western expert on Afghan affairs says, "From now on every day is important for the Afghan government and for the mujahidin as well." This western expert adds, "The government in Kabul wants to put greater emphasis on the fact that there is no alternative to the national reconciliation policy and that it will stay in power until this policy is achieved. The mujahidin, however, are trying to place a stranglehold on regional centers. They are trying to cut lines of communication and to obstruct the routes through which the regime and the government forces in Kabul receive their supplies and their weapons, ammunition, and staples. In the course of preparing for these rounds of combat, the two parties are continuing their political preparations. In Peshawar the mujahidin are engaged in a dialogue (in which they sometimes use weapons) to reshape and oust their interim government after the expiration of its legal term. In Kabul the government of President Najibullah prepared a plan for the Peace Front which it hopes will be set up to shore up the national reconciliation policy. This front includes political parties and organizations in Afghanistan which support the peace proposals.

Who Will End the War?

Everything will be all right when the war ends. What the war destroyed will be rebuilt. Land will be cultivated; illiteracy will be wiped out; and new schools, hospitals, health facilities, and homes will be built. The rattle of factories and refineries will resound once again. Children will be cared for, and security will be provided for families. The most beautiful songs will be written, and we will sing in the streets and from the mountain tops; we will sing day and night and at dawn. We will restore appreciation for colors, for flowers, and for the rain and snow. Everything will be all right when the war ends, but who will end the war?

It was more like a dream. There was nothing but snow, and everything was white: the sky was white; the mountains were white; the valleys were white; and the wind was bright and white. We were still flying over Kabul, a city carved out of the mountains. When one looks at Kabul from the window of an airplane, one would not believe that there, below, underneath this mysterious whiteness, one can find land and people. After approximately 30 minutes of flying we crossed the Afghan borders. We are now flying over India, but the song is

still ringing in my ears: "Everything will be all right when the war ends, but who will end the war?"

Interview With Party Officials

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[Article by Jum'ah al-Halfi: "Leaders of Afghanistan's Political Parties and Organizations Speak to AL-HURRIYAH"; first three paragraphs are AL-HURRIYAH introduction; date and place not given]

[Text] The recent coup which was carried out by Shahnawaz Tanai, Afghanistan's former minister of defense, raised many questions on the political scene in Afghanistan. The government of President Najibullah and the ruling People's Democratic Party are no longer the only parties that are concerned about answering such questions. Answering such questions has rather become the main responsibility of broad sectors of the Afghan people and their political forces and parties, especially those which support the declared reconciliation and peace policy.

Can the factors which are exacerbating the Afghan crisis be checked? If they can be checked, how can that be done? Will the reconciliation policy achieve its objectives? When will that happen? What are the obstacles which are hindering the reconciliation policy? Can the ruling People's Democratic Party unilaterally accomplish these major tasks? What does the experience of the last decade say about one-party rule? What are the prospects for the future? What are the prospects for war, and what are those for peace? What about the political unity plan which is now being proposed? What is the difference between the peace front, whose establishment is being hoped for, and the existing national front?

These are essentially the questions which are being asked in the wake of Shahnawaz Tanai's coup. We addressed these questions to the leaders of Afghanistan's political parties and organizations, including the ruling People's Democratic Party.

An Important Experience

Farid Fardak, mem' of the Political Office of the People's Party and secretary of the National Front, says, "The recent events in the country, that is Shahnawaz Tanai's coup, proved to be an important experience for us. They made us re-evaluate conditions within our party and on the political scene. At the recent meeting of the Central Committee in mid-March, it was decided that two approaches be taken to apply the national reconciliation policy. The aim of the first approach, which has to do with the party's actions, is to achieve the reconciliation policy promptly, to strengthen the alliance between the party's political and military circles, and to intensify political awareness within the party's ranks and in the armed forces.

"During the meeting it was affirmed that if the party did not evolve and respond to present tasks, it will not be

able to succeed in implementing its policy. That is why the party will start using new methods in carrying out its actions: it will adopt a new structure, new ideas, and a new organization.

"The aim of the second approach is to pull together all the political energies and forces and to round them up so that the national reconciliation policy can be carried out. In pursuing this approach we have been working for some time on developing this policy. In the course of this process we conducted a series of talks with opposition forces, especially those that are in the country, and we did that to establish a peace front. So far, nine parties have responded and indicated their willingness to participate in this front, which is open to all pro-peace political forces."

[AL-HURRIYAH] What about the Peace Front's program, and what is the difference between the Peace Front and the National Front?

[Fardak] The front's proposed program has many principles and goals. It focuses on solving the country's problems, especially the war, and it includes the people's economic, social, and educational demands. The program is being made the subject of discussion so that its shortcomings can be corrected and new elements can be added to it. With regard to the National Front, let me speak candidly and say that it did not include all the forces. Left wing parties, for example, believed the front to be a false front for the People's Party. Actually, they were somewhat justified in believing that. That is why the National Front was politically ineffective. The Peace Front, however, is a front which we hope and wish will become a front for all forces which believe in peace. We have actually turned to these forces, and even to Afghan forces in other countries and in Europe, and we invited them to join the front.

We Are Ready for Any Change

[AL-HURRIYAH] Did you invite the forces in Pakistan and Iran to join the front?

[Fardak] Recent events in our country led to a new classification of these forces, which we hope will make more opposition forces rally around the national reconciliation policy. There are now major, new differences over the position on the reconciliation policy between the association of seven parties in Pakistan and that of nine parties in Iran. Differences also exist within the association of seven parties itself. These differences grew out of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar's intransigence and extremism, especially after the establishment of his new alliance with Shahnawaz Tanai. What matters is that all these differences were factors which boosted the reconciliation policy among opposition leaders. The talks and discussions which took place recently proved that there is no alternative to reconciliation and peace and to the establishment of an alliance that brings together all groups of the Afghan people.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Will the front actually take part in leading the state?

[Fardak] The front will not replace the government, but it will have the power to apply pressure and to affect the government's policy. It will have an effect on the country's future. In the past the party was the body which formed the government and monopolized power. Since the reconciliation policy was announced, however, the party has been acting like a political power, not a governmental power. With the establishment of the front, the Peace Front, we will work to establish pluralism, and we will work to establish a parliament and a free court system. In all these matters the party will not play the part which it played in the past, and the front, as a political force, will play an active part to organize the work of the next government.

[AL-HURRIYAH] It is being said that the changes which are to be made will include changes in the party's name and program. Is that true?

[Fardak] Neither the party's name nor the front's name is important. What is important and crucial to us is the establishment of peace. To establish peace the party is willing to bring about any change, and that includes giving up any positions in government or any positions in power. The front which we hope will be established soon will gain the support of the people because of its persistent and daily effort to achieve the people's goals.

[AL-HURRIYAH] When will the establishment of the front be announced?

[Fardak] It will be announced after a maximum of four months. The parties and the political, religious, and social figures who will join the front will be announced then.

The Peace Process Is Facing Problems

Regarding prospects for the national reconciliation policy and the obstacles that are standing in its way, Mahbub Allah Kushani, secretary general of the Revolutionary Organization for the Toilers of Afghanistan and deputy prime minister for planning affairs said, "It is known that the national reconciliation policy which was proclaimed by the Afghan government about three years ago, was proclaimed because the political, economic, and social crisis in the country was getting worse. Before that, there was the protracted war and internecine fighting. The national reconciliation policy was proclaimed in the wake of local and international changes. Specifically, it was proclaimed after changes were made in the Soviet leadership and after the restructuring and political liberalization between the East and West which ensued. It also followed a quest for solutions to regional problems and the impact which that quest had on the policy of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. It was expected from the outset that reactions to the declaration of this policy would be varied and incompatible, whether they came from those in power, from

people in the People's Party itself, or from society and society's political expressions.

"As far as the war is concerned, there were forces which may be described as extremist forces, and these forces were rejecting the reconciliation policy and they were even boasting of their hostility to it. It was that which aroused doubts and suspicions about the party's and the government's belief in the reconciliation policy. On the other hand, there were radical, right-wing forces whose interests basically lay in having the war go on. These forces gained their reputation and made their fortunes during the years of the war at the expense of the Afghan people's lives. That is why it is normal for them to reject peace and reconciliation. Let me tell you briefly that the reconciliation policy faced major problems and obstacles in the past. These were either the product of internal contradictions within the ruling People's Party, or they were the product of the rejection of radical right-wing forces."

The Front Is the Product of Joint Efforts

[AL-HURRIYAH] How would you evaluate the prospects of this policy now, that is, after the coup of the minister of defense?

[Kushani] The coup gave expression to the contradictions which have been plaguing the party, and it clearly revealed the differences within the ranks of the party about the national reconciliation policy. And even now, opposition to this policy can still be heard, just as discrepancies between people's words and deeds can still be seen. In other words, the old methods are still being practiced: power is being monopolized and held on to exclusively despite the fact that at the present time international conditions would help solve the Afghan problem if energies inside the country are mobilized to achieve the reconciliation policy and establish the broadest national coalition of pro-peace political forces.

[AL-HURRIYAH] And what about the Peace Front whose establishment is forthcoming?

[Kushani] We support and welcome the establishment of this front. That was a principal demand made by the forces and parties operating in the country. It is fortunate that the ruling People's Party has finally become convinced that the establishment of such a front is necessary. The front which existed in the past was an organization that was subordinate to the People's Party did nothing that was politically effective or influential, and that is why we were not supporting it. It seems, however, that political facts have forced the party to reconsider this front. The Peace Front was undoubtedly the product of efforts made by various Afghan political forces.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Do you expect this front to play a leading role in the country's affairs?

[Kushani] Not only do we expect the front to play a leading role, we think it should play a leading role. The

previous period affirmed that no party, not even the People's Party, can unilaterally solve the problems which are plaguing the country. Nor can one party lead society and gain the support of all groups of people. After all, diversity and the lack of social homogeneity in a country require multiple parties. Similarly, the country's circumstances require the country to have a broad front to lead society.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Do you believe that the front will contribute to the process of establishing peace?

[Kushani] If matters proceed on a proper course, the efforts that are being made will undoubtedly be fruitful. Based on that assumption we support the establishment of the front, and we are cooperating with the People's Party. We firmly believe that the unity of political forces inside the country can play an important role to ensure peace and reconciliation.

[AL-HURRIYAH] But what about the attitude of opposition forces in Pakistan and in Iran?

[Kushani] There is support for peace within the ranks of these forces. It is known that opposition organizations in both Pakistan and Iran had first taken shape as a result of political circumstances in the country. These circumstances include the erroneous and extremist policy of previous governments. Afterwards, these organizations were dominated by Salafi and reactionary elements until the political content of their goals was altered. We believe, however, that it will be the toiling masses in Afghanistan who will ultimately decide and settle the matter. Among these toiling masses are the bases of support for these organizations themselves. That is why we make a distinction between the leaders of these organizations, who are extremist and who think only of their own interests, and their bases of support, some of whom are not radical but rather truly patriotic individuals, aspiring to deliver the country from the nightmare of war. These people can join the Peace Front, and they can help establish peace.

A Change in the Balance of Powers Is Required

Zaman Kaldahati, first secretary of the Afghan Vanguard Toilers Organization, answered a question about the prospects for a solution to the Afghan question by saying, "The fighting in Afghanistan differs from the fighting that goes on between one country and another. In Afghanistan the people are fighting each other, and they are receiving help from foreigners. Herein lies the difficulty of finding a possible solution to the Afghan question. Another difficulty lies in the fact that if the forces which are being backed by the United States to fight the government were to succeed, achieve victory, and take over power, they will not have American support. To put it more clearly, the establishment of an Islamic power in Kabul is not, in the final analysis, what Washington would prefer. And that is why Washington is backing these forces as long as they remain in the opposition and as long as they fight the government in Kabul."

[AL-HURRIYAH] In your opinion, is Washington counting on other forces out there?

[Kaldahati] Efforts are being made to find a third-party force to rule in Afghanistan. This force, which has not yet been formed, is one whose formation will require a rather considerable period of time. A considerable period of time will be required before this force can replace the opposition forces or the leaders of those opposition forces which are being backed by Washington.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Is it possible to find out what the characteristics and tendencies of this third-party force are?

[Kaldahati] This third-party force is specifically made up of groups of former technocrats and statesmen who have western European tendencies. What matters is that in addition to these difficulties or obstacles, there is the dilemma which has been plaguing the state and the ruling People's Party. An example of this lies in the fact that the national reconciliation policy, which was proposed about three years ago, does not have the support of all party circles. There are those within the party who think that this policy is tactically and strategically a sell out of the principles of the revolution. The recent coup which was carried out by Shahnawaz Tanai, the minister of defense, relied theoretically on that premise. All these obstacles, and most recently Tanai's coup, are impeding the possibility of a political solution to the Afghan question.

[AL-HURRIYAH] This means that you are extremely pessimistic, doesn't it?

[Kaldahati] I am not completely ruling out a political solution, but I think it is unlikely in the near future because all the surrounding factors indicate, especially after the recent coup, that a solution is not imminent. I also believe that a solution to the Afghan problem cannot come about without upsetting or changing the balance of popular power in favor of one of the two feuding parties. That is why all the peace-loving forces in Afghanistan ought to unite to shape public opinion so that the public can apply pressure to change the balance of power.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Do you expect this alliance to be formed in the Peace Front whose establishment is forthcoming?

[Kaldahati] I regret to say that so far no real unity exists among Afghan progressive forces. In view of the situation which Afghanistan is going through at the present time, such a unity has become an urgent necessity. Experience has shown that no one party can unilaterally lead the country. Experience has also shown that none of the feuding forces can achieve a decisive military victory. That is why our organization thinks that there is no alternative to the unity of progressive forces and no alternative to peace in Afghanistan. In this regard efforts are being made to establish the Peace Front which, it is hoped, will include all the forces of peace in Afghanistan.

[AL-HURRIYAH] What about the role of the front in leading the country?

[Kaldahati] There are still differences about the nature of the front and the role it will eventually play. President Najibullah supports the establishment of an active front that will have a role to play. Some People's Party circles, however, are trying to hold on to the party's monopoly of power. Meanwhile the other parties are demanding the establishment of an active front from which a government command council can be formed. That council would consist of representatives of the participating parties.

[AL-HURRIYAH] And what are you proposing in that regard?

[Kaldahati] I do not support the parties' proposal because it would not be right to replace the People's Party, which is monopolizing power, with a group of political parties who would also monopolize power. There are other parties, which support peace and reconciliation, but which may not have joined the front. Why should they be denied the right to participate in case the aforementioned council is established? That is why we support the notion of the front participating in free elections as a political bloc. If it gains support, it will have the right to form a government.

[AL-HURRIYAH] And how do you differ with the People's Party and with its policy?

[Kaldahati] Our differences start with the action program for the People's Party. Documents which were approved by the party itself provide the right to political pluralism and provide freedom for political parties to operate publicly. This right, however, was not actually exercised since all the capabilities and opportunities are available exclusively to the People's Party. We also differ with the party about the question of its monopoly of power and about the problems which are plaguing various state institutions.

No Future for Those Who Buy and Sell Islam

'Abdul Ghaffar al-Sharifi, secretary general of the Young Workers' Organization of Afghanistan, had this to say about the Peace Front. "What is being achieved now by forming a coalition and an association of pro-peace Afghan parties and organizations is a historic, unprecedented happening. During the past years our organization had struggled to establish such an association. What happened has alarmed and scared the ranks of radical forces as well as the countries which support them. That is why Pakistani military intelligence used two radical elements, namely Shahnawaz Tanai and Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who carried out the recent coup, to prevent the establishment of such a national association. But in addition to the fact that it was promptly foiled, that treacherous coup was condemned by all classes and social groups as well as by pro-peace and pro-reconciliation political parties."

[AL-HURRIYAH] Do you entertain any hopes that this front will play a part in solving the problems of the country and establishing peace?

[al-Sharifi] It is our point of view that the Peace Front is the only solution for getting Afghanistan out of the current crisis. Experience has shown and the People's Party itself has realized that no party can unilaterally solve the country's problems. That is why the unity of propeace forces and the establishment of multiple parties and political pluralism are the only way by means of which peace can be achieved.

[AL-HURRIYAH] What about the attitude of opposition parties in Pakistan?

[al-Sharifi] The people of Afghanistan have learned many, profound lessons during this war which lasted 12 years. They also realize that the radical elements who suggest that Islam in Afghanistan is in danger are the ones who are adding fuel to the fire of war. The Afghan people realize that these radical elements do not wish Afghanistan well. Instead, they want to tear the country apart. That is why we believe that these people who are buying and selling Islam and trading in people's lives have no future.

[AL-HURRIYAH] What is your assessment of conditions in the country in the wake of the coup which was carried out by the minister of defense?

[al-Sharifi] Present conditions in our country are undoubtedly extremely complicated. But as I said, the only way out of these conditions is to set up the Peace Front, which must be open to all those who want national reconciliation. This includes the former king as well as opposition leaders in the field. The front must articulate the interests of all social classes and groups.

The Coup Opened the Door to Reconciliation

Mr. 'Abdul Hakim Tawana, president of the Party for Agricultural Justice in Afghanistan, spoke about his assessment of the implications of the recent coup and its effects on the national reconciliation policy. He said, "First of all, we oppose any kind of military operation to settle differences and conflicts. Based on that principle, our party has condemned the recent coup. We believe that the coup had no negative effects on the national reconciliation policy. On the contrary, the coup had positive effects because those who carried it out did not believe in the reconciliation policy, and the aim of their action was to interfere with that policy. Evidence for this lies in the fact that Shah Nawaz Tanai received support from radical forces and from Pakistan. In addition, it may be said that the recent coup laid the groundwork for an alliance among moderate forces, and it opened the door to the reconciliation policy and to peace."

[AL-HURRIYAH] What do you think about the position of opposition parties which reject the reconciliation policy?

[Tawana] There are opposition parties in Pakistan as well as in Iran which support the peace policy. At the same time there are radical parties which look favorably upon letting the conflict and the war continue. In light of that fact we are trying to find ways for working with moderate parties which support the peace proposals so we can make them join the Peace Front and the joint struggle against the war. We are also trying to develop relations with the parties and forces in Europe, and these include groups of intellectuals, technocrats, and individuals who had participated in previous governments in the country. After all, a majority of these forces support the national reconciliation policy. Briefly put, our attitude toward opposition forces is determined in light of these forces' attitudes toward the peace process and national reconciliation. But we reject the positions of radical forces and we call upon them to respond to the reconciliation policy.

[AL-HURRIYAH] What about the Peace Front? Do you believe that it will be active in political life?

[Tawana] Our party played a distinguished role in preparing for the establishment of this front. We believe that this front must be a political front in the full sense of the term. In other words, it must play its part with all its implications, and it must be at the top of the pyramid of political power in the country. Otherwise, its fate will be similar to that of previous fronts. In fact, our party will not join the front if it turns out to be like previous fronts.

[AL-HURRIYAH] What exactly do you want from the Peace Front?

[Tawana] We want the front to form a broad-based coalition government, and we want it to include all the propeace forces in that government. We want the front to end the monopoly which the People's Party has over power. Because Afghanistan is made up of different social groups and classes, having multiple parties in the country and political pluralism is a natural phenomenon which is necessary to lead the country to peace. We believe that these proposals are acceptable to President Najibullah.

Reconciliation Is a Lawful Mandate

Shaykh Safar Muhammad, president of the Association of Ansar Allah [the Followers of God], answered many questions in a lengthy interview.

[AL-HURRIYAH] What do you think about the national reconciliation policy, and how would you assess it from an Islamic point of view?

[Muhammad] First of all, I would like to make it clear that the Association of Ansar Allah is an association of clergymen; it is a spiritual association operating in our country, Afghanistan, within the framework of the prophetic tradition. That is why we consider national reconciliation to be a lawful mandate. This is not something which is being said and heard today, but it is an approach which has existed since the days of the

prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation. The prophet made peace with idolators who were fighting a war against him, and he accepted reconciliation. God also rules in favor of reconciliation because when matters can be settled by means of reconciliation, there is no excuse for continuing to fight. God affirms that war causes hatred and hostility in our midst, and that is why He encouraged peace and negotiations. With that in mind, we support the national reconciliation approach, and we go along with it. Also, the national reconciliation policy, especially under present circumstances and under the present policy which is being pursued by the government, is a policy that can be applied. It is a policy that will win because today there is no other road to take to find a solution to the Afghan puzzle but the road to peace. Peace comes first, and Islam comes with peace.

[AL-HURRIYAH] But how can the national reconciliation policy be applied when opposition forces are rejecting it?

[Muhammad] Last night, as you heard, a delegation representing the United Nations came to assist with the repatriation of Afghan refugees. The delegation's mission is based on the proposals which were made by Mr. Najibullah, the president of Afghanistan. These proposals are known to the whole world. Our fellow Afghans in the opposition were told, "Come, let us forget about the war, and let us establish a coalition government. Let us establish an advisory council. Let us establish a Loya Jirgah (the General Assembly for Tribal, Sectarian, and Popular Groups' Representatives)." If our counterparts accept these proposals, we will proceed with the application of the national reconciliation approach. The arrival of a UN representative in Afghanistan was good. Such a UN initiative is something we look upon favorably. In light of the government's suggestions, some areas and provinces have been designated peace areas to facilitate the refugees' repatriation and settlement. These areas are actually ready to receive the refugees. These people can participate in the assembly; they can send their representatives to the Supreme Assembly (the Loya); and they can also participate in government and share power. Let them come, if they agree to talk. We can assure them that the government will meet their demands. The national reconciliation approach can be realized by means of national reconciliation.

Freedom Fighters Accused Me of Being a Nonbeliever because I Support Peace

[AL-HURRIYAH] What do you think about the position of the mujahidin's parties and their present policy?

[Muhammad] Let me tell you that Islam is a tolerant and broad-minded religion. According to the Koran and the prophetic tradition, we cannot call anyone who does not pray or does not fast a non-believer. Nor can we call a murderer or a thief a nonbeliever. In one case only can we call a person a nonbeliever, and that is if he makes a public declaration that he believes in other gods besides

the One God. The mujahidin, who are fighting today against the government, describe their activities as "jihad" or holy war. The word, "jihad," which comes from the Koran, refers to a concept that we believe in absolutely. What is regrettable, however, is the fact that the mujahidin do not act in accordance with the concept of "jihad." This is because they make categorical judgments against the Afghan people, and they issue legal opinions which accuse people of being nonbelievers and atheists. Can you imagine, for example, that a death sentence was issued against me, as the official responsible for the Ansar Allah organization, because they consider me a nonbeliever? They think that killing me is a duty that must be carried out. Why do they issue death sentences against us? Because we did not support their misguided policy from the outset. We cannot use the term, "jihad," to describe the mujahidin's actions, because "jihad," or the actions taken to promote the cause of God, is governed by rules.

And what is the government's policy today on the mujahidin? The government says that it is willing to meet all their demands. But what was the mujahidin's reply? They are saying that all officials are to leave the country "so that we can then take over power." Being in power, however, and receiving dollars do not constitute "jihad," the actions which are taken to promote the cause of God. Yielding to the embrace of the United States of America, receiving funds from Saudi Arabia, and supporting Pakistan's anti-Afghan policy are not actions taken to promote the cause of God. Such actions are nothing but satanic and hostile actions, and because they are, we do not welcome the mujahidin's policy. The only policy we respect is one which is compatible with the canonical laws of Islam, with the country, and with the country's independence. Unlike them, however, we do not address the mujahidin as nonbelievers; nor do we consider them nonbelievers. They carry out actions which are contrary to Islam, and we do not support their policy. We have opposed their policy from the very beginning.

[AL-HURRIYAH] What is your assessment of the Saudi support which is being offered to the mujahidin in the name of Islam?

[Muhammad] As you know, Saudi Arabia, which is subject to the principles of the Wahhabi denomination, has been trying to promote that school of thought for several years in Islamic countries. While Wahhabism did become somewhat widespread in Pakistan many years ago, it did not become widespread among Muslims in Afghanistan. Years ago, circumstances which are known to everyone caused a large number of Afghans to seek refuge in Pakistan. Saudi Arabia took advantage of those conditions which resulted from the war, and it tried to promote Wahhabism among Afghan expatriates. Thus, when Saudi Arabia offers assistance and aid, it does not do so to glorify Islam or [to alleviate] human suffering in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia's only goal is to promote and spread Wahhabism in Afghanistan. And we categorically reject Wahhabism. Even in the seven organizations in

Pakistan there are people who reject Saudi Arabia's proposals and do not accept them. For example, Gulbuddin rejects the Saudi proposals; Rabani too does not accept them; and Muhammad Bani and Muhammadi do not accept them either. The only person who accepts Saudi Arabia's proposals is Shaykh Sayyaf. He is the one who committed himself to promoting Wahhabism. If the Saudis were concerned about Islam and Muslims, why is it that they don't fight with our fellow Palestinians against the Zionists? Aren't Jews and Zionists greater nonbelievers?

[AL-HURRIYAH] What about the interim government which was formed by the mujahidin? What do you think about it from an Islamic point of view?

[Muhammad] As I told you before, in general, we do not support the mujahidin's policy. The interim government is something that was created by Pakistani military men, and that is why we cannot say that it is a government. This interim government is not a government, and it cannot possibly be one. The Afghan Constitution stipulated unequivocally that the head of the Afghan government must be in the capital, Kabul. He must be an Afghan citizen, and he must live on his country's soil. But these mujahidin formed a government, which they called the interim government of Afghanistan. They formed that government in the name of Afghanistan, on Pakistani territory: in Rawalpindi, to be specific. We are not the only ones who find this unacceptable. The mujahidin themselves must not accept it either.

What does Islam have to say about this matter? Islam says we should try to serve the interests of our country's independence and the interests of its national soil. A government like this interim government does us no good. If the mujahidin really want to form a government and to carry out reforms, the Afghan government has a policy that is moving in that direction. The president of the republic had called upon them and invited them "to form your governmental institutions here in Kundab, in Kabul, and in Jalalabad. Form your councils. Form supreme assemblies, and form the Loya Jirgah, which has the authority to ratify laws." No law can be enacted without its approval, and no government can be formed without its approval either. The Loya Jirgah must be formed so that we can determine the validity of the law. The Loya Jirgah has the right to appoint one man president and to reject another. What we are saying, however, is that such a council must be formed in Afghanistan by the Afghans themselves. Such a council should not be formed by destructive elements or by foreign countries, such as the United States, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia. These countries are to remove their guardianship over the Afghan people. They must stay away from the Afghan people and give them an opportunity to determine their own destiny.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Will you participate in the Peace Front? What is your attitude toward this Peace Front?

[Muhammad] We are working now with all the political parties on Afghan territory to form the Peace Front, which can steer the country's policy. The establishment of a coalition of all political forces would open the door to meeting all the demands of the Afghan people. We ask God that this front be formed in the near future. This proposed front can bring the monopoly of power to an end because it will not be formed in the name of the People's Party of Afghanistan. We are not the only ones who are demanding this; our brothers in other parties also want that.

[AL-HURRIYAH] How would you assess the Iranian position vis a vis the Afghan question?

[Muhammad] Iran is an Islamic country, and it is also a neighboring country. Iran, which has its own political point of view on Afghanistan, is striving now for the success of national reconciliation. We accept the initiative of any Islamic country whose intention is not to interfere in our domestic affairs but to help the country become independent and to support its national sovereignty. On that basis, Iran's policy toward Afghanistan at the present time is a good policy. We want relations with Iran to be restored to what they used to be. We want relations with Iran to be based on good neighborliness and friendship.

We Did Not Support Soviet Intervention

[AL-HURRIYAH] What did you think about the Soviet Union's position before the Soviet withdrawal, and how would you assess that position at the present time?

[Muhammad] The Soviet Union is our neighbor. We established cordial and friendly relations with the Soviet Union 60 years ago. The Soviet Union supports Afghanistan and backs it up in various areas. However, when political circumstances made the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan necessary, Soviet intervention affected all Afghans because they were opposed to the intervention of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. That is why the first paragraph of the Geneva accords stipulated that Soviet troops were to be withdrawn from Afghanistan. This is consistent with the general opinions held by the Afghan people, especially since it was western countries who were reporting that Soviet troops had occupied Afghanistan. And now, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the whole world and the Afghans themselves have proof of the fact that Afghans are courageously defending the unity of their land as well as their independence. We did not support this intervention from the outset. When Soviet troops withdrew, we expressed our relief because this step had been taken, and we supported the withdrawal. The Soviet Union acted the way a friend should act.

INDIA

Kashmir: Special Constitutional Status Questioned

90AS0112A *Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES*
in Hindi 22, 23 May 90 p 6

[Two-part Article by K. K. Wadhwa: "Jammu-Kashmir Constitution"]

[22 May p 6]

[Text] Jammu-Kashmir was an Indian state during the British rule and was locally governed by Hindu Dogra Maharaja Hari Singh. Hari Singh's grandfather, Raja Gulab Singh, originally ruled only Jammu. He bought Kashmir valley from the East India Company for 7.5 million rupees as per the Amritsar Pact of 1948 [sic]. After this, the rulers of this area were known as the "Maharajas of Jammu and Kashmir". This area became a part of India when India got its independence. However, due to some circumstances, this state was given a special status. This is the only state in India with a special Constitution. This Constitution was written by a special constitutional committee.

The Indian government had announced at the time of Kashmir's joining India, on 27 October 1947, that a special constitutional committee elected by the people of Kashmir would write a new Constitution and also decide on Kashmir's future relations with India. The crown prince of Jammu and Kashmir issued a statement on 30 April 1951 which established a constitutional committee election by citizens of the state. This was followed by elections during September and October of 1951. This committee had 75 representatives—45 from Kashmir and Laddakh and 30 from the Jammu area. Forty-three of these representatives were elected unopposed as the nomination forms of the Paraja Parishad party were declared illegal. The constitutional committee started its work on 31 October, and an interim Constitution was approved on 20 November 1951. This was finally approved in its final version on 20 November 1956. This Constitution was promulgated on 26 January 1957.

This constitution committee approved Jammu-Kashmir's joining India in its February 1954 meeting. The Constitution was amended unanimously defining the state's relations with India. This section became a very important part of the Constitution later. Jammu and Kashmir became an integral part of India (Section Two, Clause Three). Thus, the Indian government fulfilled its promised duty to the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Constitution of the state is a written document consisting of 158 Articles divided into 13 Clauses. It also has six sub-lists. The introductory part of the Constitution approves Jammu and Kashmir's joining the Indian Union.

Section 370 of the Indian Constitution provides a special state status to Jammu and Kashmir. Administration of

other Indian states is included in the Sixth Section of the Indian Constitution. However, Jammu-Kashmir has its own Constitution. Jammu-Kashmir does not come under the definition of a state given in Section 152. Section 370, which provides special status for Jammu-Kashmir was added on 7 October 1949 by the special constitution committee. This was a temporary and emergency proviso and the word "special" was added in the Thirteenth Constitutional Amendment in 1962. At present it is known as a "temporary", "emergency", or "special" provision.

The Indian government considers the states and territories as part of the Indian Union that had joined India before the 26 November 1949 Constitutional Amendment. The Constitution of the state [Kashmir] recognizes all counties that belonged to it on 15 August 1947 as part of the state. This includes most of the area currently occupied by Pakistan.

The Indian Parliament, according to Section Three of its Constitution, has the right to change state boundaries, create new states, and change state names. However, it cannot change the boundaries or the name of Jammu-Kashmir without the permission of the state legislative assembly. Similarly, any treaty made with another country involving this state under Section 256 must be approved by the state legislature. Jammu-Kashmir government is the final authority on decisions over its borders.

The state Constitution provides dual citizenship to its residents. According to Section 10 of the state Constitution, the residents of Jammu-Kashmir have all the privileges given an Indian citizen. They have some additional privileges also. As a permanent resident of the state, they have special rights such as government jobs, ownership of real property, and scholarships to universities. Civil administrative positions are filled by Public Service Commission and only Jammu-Kashmir residents can be appointed to these positions. People from other states are not eligible to these positions. A Jammu-Kashmir resident can run for any state or regional election in the country, but residents of other states in India are not allowed to run for public office in Jammu-Kashmir. Thus, the people here are Indian citizens and "permanent residents of Jammu-Kashmir". However, Indian citizens cannot be permanent residents of this state (Section Eight).

This is the only Muslim majority state in India. The Muslims make up two-thirds of the total population of the state. The writers of the Constitution still have made this a secular state. Article Five, Section Four of (Kashmir's) Constitution clarifies this secularism. It calls for the government to encourage brotherhood among all residents of Jammu-Kashmir regardless of their religious affiliations. The state Constitution is more liberal in this area than the Indian Constitution. The term "secular" was added to the Indian Constitution in 1976 in the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, and only in the introductory part. Whether this introductory section is a part

of the Constitution is still a matter of contention. The Supreme Court ruled in the Berubadi case (SCR [Supreme Court Reports] 1960) that it is not a part of the Constitution. However, in the Keshwanand Bharti case (AIR [All India Reporter] 1973), it overturned its earlier ruling and declared it a part of the Indian Constitution.

The state Constitution does not discuss the constitutional rights of the permanent residents in the state. The rights included in the Indian Constitution (Section Three) are given to the residents of Jammu-Kashmir with slight modification (Article 10). For example, some provisions about freedom were suspended on 14 May 1954 for 20 years. Similarly, unlike other states in India, the right of "protection against arrest and imprisonment" included in Section 22 of the Indian Constitution is interpreted here by the state legislature. The state does not have to get permission from the president for passing any laws related to property annexation (Section 31A). The word "estate" used in this Article has wide interpretation. The Supreme Court has been given the right to issue writs to help protect constitutional rights. This does not apply to Jammu-Kashmir.

There is no section on basic citizen duties in the Jammu-Kashmir Constitution. It was missing from our country's Constitution in the beginning. This was included in the 42nd Amendment. The permanent residents of this state are free from these duties.

Article 11 through 25 in Section Four describe basic principles necessary for administration of the state. These principles are not much different from the principles for formulating policy included in the Indian Constitution, however, there are some principles that are very "obvious". It mentions the establishment of a "socialist order" for the welfare of the state's residents and "social order" as in the Indian Constitution. The state is also supposed to try to provide free college education to all its residents.

Our country's Constitution only provides [free education] until the age of 19. The rights of women and children are also described in detail. There are some important provisions in this section—organization of gram panchayats (village councils), the right to work, and special rights for backward classes.

[23 May 90 p 4]

[Text] The "Sadar-i Riyasat" [state head] title was used for the governor of Jammu-Kashmir and the qualification required for this position included in the state Constitution called for a "person of state's high ranking citizen." He should be elected by the state legislative assembly. The title of the position and election method were changed after the Sixth Amendment (April 1965). The head of the state is called a governor now and is appointed by the president of India. He must have the qualifications required in the Indian Constitution. This plays two roles—protection of the state's Constitution and those sections of the Indian Constitution that apply to the state.

The writers of the Constitution have copied the Indian legislative model. Section 35 of the state Constitution calls for a formation of a cabinet under the state's chief minister to help the governor. It should be noted that the chief minister of the state was called a prime minister until the Sixth Amendment (1965). Except for the appointment of ministers and deputy ministers, the governor is to make decisions based on the advice of the cabinet. The cabinet is responsible to the legislative assembly. The length of the cabinet's appointment will depend on the governor.

The legislature has two houses—the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council. The Legislative Assembly has 100 members who are elected directly by the people. The governor appoints two female legislators to the Legislative Assembly if he believes that females are not represented appropriately. Twenty-five of the 100 constituencies are located in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. However, there is no provision for this in the Indian Constitution. Scheduled castes have reserved seats in the Legislative Assembly. The Jammu-Kashmir Legislative Assembly was elected for five years just like other state assemblies. The 42nd Amendment to the Indian Constitution extended this period to six years. The state Constitution of Jammu-Kashmir was also amended to make this period six years. When the Janata government amended the Indian Constitution and reduced the term to five years, the state decided to stay with six years. Thus, while other states have five-year legislative terms, Jammu-Kashmir has six years.

Jammu-Kashmir has more autonomy than other states in passing laws. The right for the Parliament to make laws is included in the list of union territories. Items eight, nine, and 34 in this list do not apply to Jammu-Kashmir. The "adjacent state" policy does not apply here at all. Even now, the Parliament can make laws only in 17 out of 47 listed areas. The remaining areas are covered by the state assembly. The Parliament has special rights over other states, while Jammu-Kashmir is autonomous.

Clause Seven of the state Constitution describes establishing high court and Jurisdiction over it. Article 13 mentions a high court whose chief justice and two or more justices would be appointed by the Indian president with input from the chief justice of the Supreme Court and the governor of the state. The chief justice of the High Court is to be consulted in the appointment of justices to other courts. Even though the Indian Constitution calls for federal administration, legal administration is established through chain of courts headed by the Supreme Court. This applied to Jammu-Kashmir also.

The state Constitution also has provisions for emergency, however, it is limited to "the failure of constitutional machinery". If a state governor feels that a situation has arisen which limits him in the discharge of his duties, he can take over some or all state powers after consultation with the president. However, in Jammu-Kashmir, governors rule is declared in emergency situations. States

under the presidential rule have their budgets controlled by the Parliament. The Parliament does not pass a budget for Jammu-Kashmir during the governor's rule.

This state is effected by the president's declaration of emergency in case of foreign attack or internal revolt. (The president had declared a national emergency on 25 June 1975. This was effective in this state from 29 June, after it was approved by the state.) The declaration of any economic emergency does not affect this state at all. The greatest difference is that the Indian government cannot suspend this Constitution even when this state ignores all instructions from the central government.

According to Article 147 of the Constitution, the process for constitutional amendment must start in the Legislative Assembly. Both houses must approve an amendment by at least a two-thirds votes. Article 147, which describes the amendment procedure, cannot be amended. Articles Three and Five, which respectively define and describe the state's relationship with the Center and its executive and legislative branches, also cannot be amended. In other words, none of the provisions in the Indian Constitution that are related to Jammu-Kashmir can be amended. Section 368 includes procedures for amending the Indian Constitution, however, it has an exception related to Jammu-Kashmir. According to it, no amendments that effect Jammu-Kashmir under Section 270 can be made without the permission of the president.

There are other provisions in Volume 11 of the Constitution. The state Constitution made Urdu the official language as per Article 145, even though Urdu is not used anywhere in the state. There is also a provision to use English as the official language. This will continue until a new provision calls for stopping [the use of] English. Regional languages are also listed. India's national language—Hindi—is not listed among these. However, a provision calls for its development.

Article 144 includes another provision for the state. Its flag is to be rectangular and red, with three white lines on the side. The picture of a plow is to be in the center.

A review of the Constitution clearly shows that Jammu-Kashmir has more power than other states in the context of center-state relationship. It is in a class by itself. This state occupies a very special place in the Indian Union and is the cause of jealousy for other states. (The writer is a professor of politics in Delhi University.)

Commentary: To Counter Terror We Need Courage

*90P40066A Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES in Hindi
5 Jun 90 p 6*

[Text] Once some young men were travelling. It was summertime. The way was sandy. One of them felt great thirst. He said, "I am dying of thirst. I am unable to walk. It would be nice if I could get a little bit of water." No water was in sight anywhere. His friends comforted him.

After a little while, they sighted an oasis. They thought that there must be some water there, and went towards that place with enthusiasm. Upon getting there they could see a well and on it was a pot tied to a rope. They felt as if they got a new lease on life. They lowered the vessel into the well and pulled it up with the hope of getting water, but what is this?! Not a drop of water was to be seen in it. There was a hole in the bottom of that pot and no one got even a gulp of water. They remained thirsty.

Our lot today is very similar to this. Our households have the faults of lust, anger, greed, illusion, arrogance, and jealousy. The water is lost because of these holes and we remain thirsting. The crisis face by the nation today is the result of our degeneration. At the root of all the corruption, inflation, murders, antipathy to tradition, black marketing, smuggling is the selfish desire for predominance, greed, and illusion of our minds. These enemies are turning the wheels in depleting life-values from all around in such a manner that the entire nation is in a state of quandary.

Our politics today has become lawless. The man is not able to rise up to his office anymore. Personal and party self-centeredness have blindfolded members of the ruling party as well as the opposition. Everyone has created his own limited circle. Sticking to those limited circles, we have dragged the vehicle of politics into the mire. Just as something stuck in quicksand slowly sinks to the bottom, today the wheels of the political vehicle are sinking deeper and deeper in the mud.

It is not possible for the ruling party to pull this vehicle out now. It is utterly impossible for the opposition. We have had differences of opinion all along. After all, it is said that people possess different minds, but become serious when this finds expression as disagreements. Present day politics is full of disagreements. Everyone wants peace in Punjab, Kashmir, Assam, etc., but our disagreements are making it impossible to take a united step towards this peace. Our parliament, the body most powerful in the nation, the representatives of the 85 crore citizens, is becoming the arena for wrestling matches. For hours on end, members do not allow its work to proceed. The Lok Sabha and the Rajyasabha have lost their grace. The Lok Sabha and the ruling party are busy saving their seats and the opposition is bent upon pulling them down. The bad treatment of the speaker of the Rajyasabha in the past few days has ruined the parliament's dignity completely. We have had the opportunity to observe the proceedings of the parliaments of many countries. We have seen the congresses of America and Canada in action. There are tensions between the ruling parties and oppositions there also, but the dignity of the speaker and the parliamentary body are always maintained. At the slightest hint from the speaker, all the members of the ruling party and opposition bow in deference to the supremacy of that institution. In our country, however, even the speaker's tears of frustration prove to be a cry in the wilderness.

Politics has become violent today. It is raging like an uncontrollable fire. The future consequences of this are clear for all to see. Democracy has been injured. Bounds of decency do not exist among the masses any more. Common-ethics have become meaningless and people-power is dwindling. Innocent and faultless people are being murdered right and left. The ruling party and the opposition are satisfied with just shedding a few tears on mass murders.

Have we forgotten that as long as farming was being done in administrative files and offices, there was a shortage of grain in the land, but as soon as the harvest was grown out in the fields, the nation became self-sufficient? In the same way, if thoughtful politicians visit the areas affected by terrorism in person, and show their prowess there, then it won't be too long before a solution to this problem is found. Thinking indulged in comfortable surroundings of big houses, anger and frustration experienced while lying supine under a blanket, and issuing stern warnings, not followed by stern action, all these are meaningless.

The field is open. Now there is the need for such courageous people who would enter it armed with the infallible weapons of love rather than under the protection of guns and prove with their life that valor is not in killing but in dying, not in taking lives but in making an offering of one's own life.

IRAN

Twenty-Five Thousand Tehran-Based Troops March

90AS0136B Tehran ETTALA'AT
in Persian 31 May 90 p 2

[Text] Tehran—Islamic Republic News Agency: On the occasion of the first anniversary of the death of His Holiness Imam Khomeyni, the grand protector of the glorious school of Islam, 25 thousand guards-men from the quad forces stationed in Tehran and the General Headquarters of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps will gather in Tehran University. Later, in the form of a mourning procession, they will conduct a march and proceed to the Imam Khomeyni prayer house to meet with the exalted leader of the revolution.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Araqi, the acting representative of the supreme jurisconsult in the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, in a contact with the Islamic Republic News Agency stated: This group from the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps will march to the Jamaran prayer house on Sunday, 13 Khordad [3 Jun], to pay a visit to the beloved son and memory of the founder of the Islamic republic.

He also thanked the Industrial Forces of the guard corps which participated in the operations to complete the sacred shrine of His Holiness Imam Khomeyni.

One Thousand Projects Planned for Current Year

90AS0136C Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI
in Persian 20 May 90 p 3

[Text] The joint seminar of the center for expansion and the National Coordination Council was inaugurated yesterday morning with a speech by Mr. Fuad Karimi, the fully authorized representative of the interior minister in the affairs of Centers for Expansion of Manufacturing and Reconstruction Services, in the gendarmerie club.

In this gathering, which will last two days, the results of last year's activities, problems, and executive policies, Note Three of the 1369 [21 March 1990-20 March 1991] budget law, and the programs and policies of the centers for expansion will be the subject of discussions and exchanges of views.

Mr. Fuad Karimi, the representative of the interior minister in the affairs of Centers for Expansion of Manufacturing and Reconstruction Services, in his opening statements emphasized the cooperative sector's expansion policies and employment of [war veterans] as principal policies of the Centers for Expansion.

He said: With preparation and planning for the employment of combatants, our goal is to transform the front line crusaders into successful people in the area of national economy.

Mr. Karimi added: The final approval by the Council of Guardians of the legal plan for creation of facilities for devotees [combatants] of the Islamic revolution will be a substantial boost for the achievement of this goal.

He added: The investigation of the issue of credit allocation—the subject of Note Three of the 1369 [1990-91] budget law—its executive guidelines, and also suggestions of the Centers for implementation of its reconstruction plans across the country is scheduled for the next week.

He reminded: According to Note Three of the 69 [1990-91] national budget law, for creation of productive employment within the framework of the Five-Year Plan for economic, social, and cultural expansion and considering the priorities of the deprived regions of the country, the exalted families of martyrs, combatants, and self-sacrificing devotees, up to 50 billion rials have been allocated for plans in the manufacturing sectors for self-employment, technical services, rural services, and cultural and educational research.

Continuing his speech, Mr. Karimi said: The level of required credits during the current year for implementation of 1,022 projects in agricultural, industrial, construction, scientific, and cultural projects amounts to 190 billion rials. We are prepared to implement these projects based on the funds which the government may make available to us.

The representative of the interior minister in the affairs of Expansion Centers also said: We have the capability to construct 35,000 housing units across the country during the Five-Year Plan for economic and social expansion. If the government can allocate to us an annual credit of three billion rials we will be able to implement this project by compensating the remaining 80 percent from domestic banks.

Concluding his speech, Mr. Karimi said: So far we have registered 40,000 combatants for employment. We hope that with the aid of the Plan and Budget Organization and the Cabinet facilities for employment of these people can be created during the Five-Year Plan for economic and social expansion.

According to reports by the Islamic Republic News Agency, during this seminar the problems and various issues of Expansion Centers will be put forward for discussion by the three commissions for Planning and Investigation, Financial and Credit Statistics, and Legal [matters].

Economic Benefits of Tourist Industry Detailed

*90AS0090A Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 12 May 90 p 6*

[Excerpts] Foreign tourism is among the economic sectors whose share in creating jobs and income for our fellow compatriots have so far been undermined. While the trend for attracting tourists and the foreign exchange income ensuing therefrom is on the rise in the tourist-oriented countries of the world, unfortunately after the revolution that trend has constantly been declining in our country, and from a high of approximately 500,000 tourists in 1357 [21 March 1978-20 March 1979]—who availed our country of approximately \$22 million, and that they did with the purchasing power of the dollar of 12 years ago—has now dropped to approximately 65,000 tourists who are mostly pilgrims from the region. The foreign exchange income generated from incoming tourists has currently dropped to less than \$25 million annually and is reduced to 11 percent of its figure 12 years ago. The slump of foreign exchange income, compared to the potential income which can and should be generated by the abundant tourist attractions of our country is very low.

Regretfully the government has not yet officially declared its general policy regarding the tourism industry and the manner in which the needed facilities should be procured and offered, and it has also failed to present a comprehensive, versatile, and encouraging program along these lines—and this at a time when with a slight consideration of this sector our country will be able to absorb a good share of the \$150 billion—and growing—demand in global tourism, decrease joblessness among the nation's educated youths, and to avail our people of relatively suitable revenue with current and future investments in tourism.

Relative Significance

[Passage omitted] Our country too by being blessed with a diverse climate and hundreds of archaeological curiosities and places of interest and thousands of mosques, churches, fire temples, minarets, towers, forts, citadels, caravanserays, public baths, cisterns, seminaries, tombs, dervish monasteries, palaces, historic museums, etc, should be able to claim a significant share of global tourism, except that tourism is not dependent only upon the existence of historical monuments and requires a radical revision of the government's approach to its various aspects. The entry, accommodation, and excursion of tourism in our country should be resolved initially and the needed facilities require to be procured. The side issues related to foreign tourism should not deprive our people from planning and preparing for a better life.

Better Than Petroleum

The earning of foreign exchange from incoming tourists may boost the economy of our country better than the petroleum industry for a number of reasons: First, the petroleum industry requires the annual expenditure for hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign exchange for the exploration, production, use, transportation, and distribution of petroleum by degradable oil tankers worth hundreds of millions of dollars, or by leased tankers and the payment of demurrage. This is not the case in the tourism industry. The tourist attractions of our country are all amortized, and even though they require better repairs and maintenance, they do not need heavy expenditures in foreign exchange. Second, the petroleum industry constantly erodes our national subterranean oil resources which belong to our future generations, whereas the tourism industry does not take anything away from our historical relics, but helps to spread and to better make known our heritage through visitors. Third, income generated by tourism is distributed more meaningfully among the populace than that generated by the petroleum industry—the oil revenue initially goes into government coffers before being expended on imported goods and on other preplanned purposes. Income generated by tourism is distributed straight to a wide spectrum of the populace employed in hotels, restaurants, shops, travel agencies, and air travel establishments, and vendors of domestic handicrafts in lieu of goods and services rendered. The sources of handicrafts—the most significant of which around the world being Iranian rugs, short-napped coarse carpets, and small rugs—are scattered throughout the country.

Lack of Balance

For years a balance between our incoming and outgoing tourism has been absent. While the incoming tourism to our country is on the decline and has dropped to approximately 65,000 tourists per year, the number of outgoing tourists from our country in recent years has been soaring and has currently reached to 830,000 persons per

year. This figure is 13-fold the number of incoming tourists and as can be seen there is no balance between them.

If the per capita expenditure of each outgoing tourist is assumed to be \$400 per year (In 1357 [21 March 1978-20 March 1979] this figure was \$440 per each incoming tourist and has now dropped to \$385) our fellow compatriots will be spending about \$330 million every year on their overseas—and no doubt necessary—travels, and if they also spend an identical figure on shopping and on gifts, the bill of our outgoing tourists shall amount to \$660 million. This figure is 26-fold of our revenue from incoming tourism and is almost equivalent to the income generated by our non-petroleum exports.

To create a better equilibrium between the scales of our national tourism, and generally to attract more tourists into the country and lastly, to upgrade the employment and income situation, adopting the following measures seem to be necessary:

Facilitating Entry

Iranian consulates in foreign countries often issue visas to applicants free of charge, obtusely, and on the basis of face to face interviews. And their final decisions are affected by retaliatory or quid pro quo measures. In my opinion a change in our visa issuance policy would be opportune and it would have to evolve from the current red tape situation and be based on fulfilling our foreign currency needs as well as on the nonimposition of the Foreign Affairs Ministry on our national budget. The employment and administration of personnel in any foreign country involves very heavy expenditure in foreign exchange for our government. Part of these expenditures may be provided for through the sales of more visas to applicants seeking entry into the country.

The sales of visas has a justifiable economic basis, because in this way the expense for rendering the service is received directly from the applicant without it being imposed on the national budget. Presently some countries receive considerable amounts of money from tourists and visa applicants, such as Saudi Arabia—which charges applicants \$200 for a first entry, and England—44 pounds, and the United Arab Emirates [UAE] which charges 50 to 100 darhams. Interstate mutual cancellation of visa requirements is an exception to the rule since it guarantees full entry privileges.

The government may even consider a role for the people on issuing visas. That is, while transferring part of the expenditures to the people, the government may declare the handling of tourist entry applications by travel agencies, by production, industrial, and commercial companies, and by qualified individuals to be worthy of consideration—as it is currently practiced in the UAE. In that case the task of issuing visas shall be relegated to citizens within the country, and there will be no need any longer for the heavy expenditures of the present time.

Meanwhile, each incoming tourist will thus be supervised by a responsible establishment which will oversee the conduct, behaviour, and the timely exit of the tourist from the country.

Assuming that such an arrangement is adopted, and assuming that for instance an \$80 fee for handling and visa issuance is received from each applicant, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will earn eight million dollars from each hundred thousand incoming tourists. This sum may be expended on improving facilities and rendering better and prompter services.

Implementing the retaliatory policy for the issuance of visas by the Foreign Affairs Ministry has cost the nation's economy many hundred millions of dollars—at least—in foreign currency every year. In the meantime, the cost of running only one of our embassy's, the one in Tokyo, is estimated to amount to \$450 million—the revenue of this figure being approximately \$40 million annually. This policy should at any rate be revised and any substituting policy should have more consideration for the economic welfare of our citizenry.

Conversion of Foreign Exchange

In some socialistic countries where there is a multiple foreign exchange rates system, and where people are paid subsidies by the government, and where the prices are controlled by the government, incoming tourists are required to convert a certain amount of dollars into the internal denomination at official rates. For instance, Bulgaria has fixed the figure at \$15 per day. But in some other countries foreign visitors are required to carry with themselves minimum amounts of money in bank or money order. Our country, like socialistic countries, has both a multiple foreign exchange rate system and a policy of controlling prices, and in this way people are paid consumer subsidies, and it should necessarily follow a similar but regular policy, because presently some foreign visitors are required to convert up to \$300 into rials for once at official rates, while some others who come from relatively affluent European and Arabian countries are exempt from such conversion.

Until the multiple foreign exchange rate system prevails and until prices are kept below market levels through government control excluding competitive prices even in hotel room rates, each incoming tourist should be required to convert at least \$100 per day into rials at official rates. Assuming each tourist stays 10 days in the country, the Central Bank of Iran will avail itself of approximately \$100 million in foreign exchange. The precise amount of the foreign exchange that will be converted in the free market cannot be foreseen, but if we assume it to be one-third of the \$312 spent daily by Japanese tourists in Hong Kong during a 10-day stay, some additional \$104 million will be earned annually by our people—which of course will necessitate the creation of more customs facilities.

Group Tourism

In global tourism, group excursions are by far less expensive and more economical than individual travels. This mode of excursion has become popular in recent years due to savings in major expenditures including commutation, food, and accommodation. It is beneficial both to the tourist and to the host country. Presently a good number of thrifty English tourists take advantage of group excursions. For instance, they pay only \$700 for a two-week stay in Majorca, Spain, or in Florida, United States. Or by paying a total sum of \$1,000 they travel to Thailand and stay at a deluxe hotel for two weeks, while the cost for the stay of only one person at the Bangkok Oriental Hotel in Thailand is between \$230 to \$330 per day. European tourists visiting our country may possibly be able to spend higher amounts of money in Iran. But one should not assume their budgets to be unlimited. Attracting tourists through the expansion of group excursions saliently cuts back travel expenses and may therefore help increase the number of applicants. The entry of 51 million tourists to Spain last year is no trivial matter. The majority of these 51 million persons entered Spain in tourist caravans and group excursions. We should at any rate be able to compete with other tourism oriented countries price-wise too. Fixing a \$700 fee for a 10-day stay of members of group excursions in the five-star hotels of the nation by an active foundation in tourism seems to be an opportune and fair measure.

Learning the (traveling) habits and tourism preferences of each nation is normally carried out by those responsible for tourism of the host country. For instance it wouldn't harm us to know that Belgian tourists more often eat at restaurants and seldom buy food from stores, while the French do otherwise and are more interested in visiting archaeological monuments; or that the Dutch like mountaineering and gravitate more to nature, whereas the Swedes and the British are more inclined to lie down on the hot sands of the beach.

Constraints

Limitations in passenger transportation capacity, both in internal and external flights, together with the poor reception capability of our national airports represent our basic constraints in developing our tourism industry. During the imposed war [with Iraq] we lost six airplanes, and despite the few airbuses that were acquired recently, the five million passenger capacity of the state run air travel company that has a monopoly over the Iranian market has become even more limited compared to a few years ago. For this reason the lack of seats and departure delays have become an ongoing routine, and the reservation of passenger seats are only possible with many months of delay.

The relatively cheap rial sales of seats at a 40 percent discount rate to public servants through the creation of a false demand plays a significant role in the scarcity of passenger seats. The flight price per passenger per kilometer in Iran is presently less than one-tenth that of the

other countries of the world. Thanks to this, the flight from Tehran say to Kerman—at a distance of approximately 900 kilometers—costs less than the price of 12 kilograms of potatoes. Therefore, it should not surprise us that while most international airlines, such as Lufthansa or even [Cathay] Pacific, have earned high and unprecedented incomes in recent years, the National Iranian Airlines have constantly sustained losses, and its accrued losses presently amount to many million dollars.

The losses suffered by the Iranian Airlines finds source in the belief held by some of our statesmen in a free lunch concept—which of course does not exist anywhere and at any time. Eventually someone should pay the price for these cheap flights, and that someone is no other than the government budget—while every applying passenger should be able to pay up the real price of the service received. Anyway, the current air-ticket rates are unrealistic and uneconomical, and they in turn find source in the Iranian Central Bank's erroneous ratings of official foreign exchanges as well as in our ties with IATA [International Air Transport Association?] International as a member country. Both of these require to be revised promptly.

In the meantime thanks to an increase in global demand for any type of new aircraft orders to renown manufacturers, such as the American Boeing and the Airbus Industries of France, entail a four to five year wait before delivery. Chartering aircraft, a practice that has become more feasible lately, may offer an immediate solution, but unfortunately in view of the current official rates of exchange, this is also impractical and uneconomical. And finally the purchase of aircraft from the Soviet Union that are costlier and heavier than those manufactured by other competitors—and nobody knows anything about their casualty and crash rates—may not be justified by any sort of reasoning.

Findings

Of the approximately 400 million global tourists who spend \$150 billion annually, only about 65,000 tourists who spend approximately \$25 million become our lot. Any calculation will show that our country's share from global tourism is very minimal and that it should be improved to create jobs and a new source of income as well as more foreign exchange for our fellow compatriots. [passage omitted]

According to existing figures, we have 330 hotels, 15,000 rooms, and 30,000 beds, and we can easily accommodate 100,000 foreign tourists. But due to entry bottlenecks, the sloth in issuing visas, and the lack of coordination among various responsible ministries, even this negligible capability remains idle and unused. By expanding our accommodation and reception units, we can easily render manifold our receiving capacity. The only thing is that attracting more tourists requires a better coordination among the Foreign Affairs and Islamic Guidance Ministries, the Customs Department, the National Iranian Airlines, the Railways, hotel establishments, and

our national tourism agencies. Making the private sector more active in building hotels and in hotel management and tourism requires encouragement by the government. The government encouragement in this regard may be carried out through dedicating plots of suitable land for the construction of hotels at reasonable prices, allowing construction credits at encouraging interest rates, the elimination of price controls, and the allowance of tax breaks for activities in this field. If we permit people to make their buildings available to tourist groups—as has been the case in Spain for many years—under reasonable criteria, the capability of our national accommodation units shall increase considerably. Likewise, prompt measures have to be taken to augment the transportation capacity for air passengers.

Sole contendership in this regard by any government agency is unpardonable, because it may affect our country adversely in the long run, even if the sole contender be the inheritor of 70 percent of the nation's accommodation and recreation units plus many of its best hotels. Private sector competitors should also be allowed some leeway to operate. While group excursions cost less for incoming tourists, they are capable of being better managed by those responsible and should be encouraged more.

Anyway, the key to solving the tourist industry's puzzle and the creation of any new facilities in this area is in the hands of the government, and it is the government that should promptly launch extensive encouraging and facilitating measures using decisive managerial skills.

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PAKISTAN

Qazi Terms Bhutto's Islamic Countries Tour 'Failure'

46000118C Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
22 May 90 p 6

[Text] Lahore, 21 May (PPI)—Senator Qazi Hussain Ahmed, Amir Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan, has declared Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's tour of Islamic countries to muster support for her government's stand on Kashmir issue a failure and said the delayed meeting of Islamic countries was ample proof of that fact.

He maintained that the diplomatic activities of the government were non-serious and had produced no positive result for the Kashmir dispute and its solution in accordance with the wishes of the people of Pakistan.

Addressing a news conference here Monday, the Jamaat Chief claimed the Prime Minister had not succeeded in getting support of even a single country. He said Turkey had already announced her support to Pakistan's stand and it was on record.

He asserted that Prime Minister's tour of Islamic countries had failed as she was not able to win sympathies of Syrian Government for Pakistan's stand on Kashmir dispute.

How could the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Government stalwarts claim the tour successful? He questioned.

APP adds: Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Chief of Jamaat-I-Islami, Pakistan, Monday said that brutalities of Indian Government in occupies Kashmir were the manifestation of its total failure to suppress the freedom spirit of the Kashmiri Muslims.

He said the Indian troops were involved in cases of moral turpitude like rape, violence on innocent people and depriving the Muslim families of their food during house search.

He said that whenever there was relaxation in curfew, even for half an hour, the Kashmiri Muslims came out of their houses and demonstrated for their right of self determination.

He said that top leaders of the Kashmiri Muslims had either been put behind bars or gone underground. He described the murder of Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq as an attempt to deprive the Kashmiri Muslims of their bold leadership.

He called upon the Pakistan Government to forcefully raise the Kashmir issue at all international forums and give a call for a special session of the OIC [Organization of Islamic Conference] Foreign Ministers Conference.

He said that there were reports that the annual OIC Foreign Ministers Conference was being postponed on the request of some member countries. The conference, he demanded, should not be postponed at any cost.

The Jamaat Chief felt that the electronic media in Pakistan was not giving proper coverage to the uprising in the held-Kashmir. He asked the government to take note of it and ensure that the important issue got proper coverage.

Regarding the adoption of "Shariah Bill" by the Senate, he said that it had been passed with the consent of Senators representing all schools of thought. He said though it took five years to adopt the Bill, it had united the people belonging to all schools of thought. He said that Bill in no way affected the sovereignty of the parliament or the superior courts.

Gujral Accuses Pakistan of Nuclear Buildup

46000122C Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 24 May 90 p 1

[Text] Monitoring report, May 23: Indian Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral said Wednesday that India still believes Pakistan was working on the acquisition of a nuclear military capability, Radio Network reported.

A broadcast said the Indian Foreign Minister told the Lok Sabha, that India was unaware of what progress Pakistan has made in the direction of producing a nuclear bomb. He said, however, that India would review its nuclear policies after Pakistan explodes its first nuclear device.

The Foreign Minister said India was not alone in suspecting Pakistan of trying to produce nuclear weapons. American intelligence reports also substantiated reports that Pakistan was very near its objective of building the first nuclear warhead, the broadcast quoted Mr Gujral as saying.

The Indian Foreign Minister also criticized the United States for supplying Pakistan with sophisticated warplanes which would be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Mr Gujral was quoted as saying that the American action was inexplicable in the light of the fact that Pakistan had no one except India against which it could use the planes.

Senate Passes Shariat Bill

46000115B Karachi DAWN in English 14 May 90 p 10

[Article by Anis Mirza]

[Text] Islamabad, 13 May—A crescendo of applause burst across the Senate hall. The enforcement of Shariat Bill 1990 locked in controversy for 5 years in several house committees, glided smoothly through the second reading without any major obstacle. The clause by clause consideration and the final passage barely took 60 minutes. Ironically lapses surfaced from the People's Party ministerial benches. Federal Law Minister Iftikhar Gilani was not in the Senate to move his crucial amendment, establishing the powers and authority of the chosen representatives of the people. Gilani had gone off to China. According to Deputy Chairman Fazal Agha, Iftikhar had not even informed the Senate that he was going abroad.

The theocrats of the Senate, Kazi Hussain Ahmad, Prof Khurshid Ahmed, Kazi Abdul Latif and Maulana Samiul Haq had reasons to rejoice over the passage of the enforcement of the Shariat Bill. Prof Khurshid Ahmed of the Jamaat-i-Islami called the bill's passage "a historic event."

Said one objective viewer of the parliamentary scene: "Iftikhar Gilani's amendment was an important one. It said 'and whereas the objectives resolution, inter alia, provides that the State shall exercise its powers and

authority through the chosen representatives of the people.' This amendment connotes that democracy not theocracy is paramount. Of course, the Shariat Bill will meet with obstacles in the National Assembly. If it ever goes on the statute book in its present form, questions can be raised later whether or not a woman can head an Islamic state."

Prior to the passage of the Shariat Bill, Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs and Interior Minister Aitzaz Ahsan wanted to move Iftikhar Gilani's amendment. But, Deputy Chairman, Fazal Agha refused to use his discretionary powers. Said Agha: "This Bill has been pending for 5 years. The Law Minister could have delayed his trip to China by a day. The Treasury Benches have shown little interest." "The Senators clapped their desks." [Quotes as published]

For 5 years, disagreement on interpretation of Shariat stalled the movement of this private members bill. The movers of bill wanted that the sources of Shariat be identified as the Quran, the Sunnah, Ijma and Kiyas. This point of view was not acceptable to all schools of Islamic thought. Mohammad Khan Junejo held the bill in abeyance, and one of the reasons given by Gen Zia-ul-Haq for the sacking of the Junejo cabinet was that it had failed to enforce the Shariat Bill.

On 10 May 1990, a Senate committee met in the parliament building and arrived at a broad consensus. Jacobabad's Senator Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani later said in the cafeteria that an amended version—non-controversial and acceptable to all schools was thrashed out. Bijarani's amendment said that while interpreting the Shariat, the recognised principles of interpretation and explanation of the Quran and Sunnah shall be adhered to and guidance would be sought from the opinions of recognised Islamic jurists as envisaged in clause 1 of Article 227 of the Constitution. Bijarani added: "It has been finally made acceptable to all schools of Islamic jurisprudence."

In contrast to the Shariat Bill's passage, was the fiery protest of Senator Ejaz Jatoi. When the session started, Ejaz Jatoi charged that on the night of 12 May, a Charade car came and opened fire on his house in Dadu. He said his servants retaliated and for 2 hours the intruders opened fire from a public school in front of his house. Later, Senator Ejaz Jatoi held a Press conference.

Jatoi said the Sindh situation was moving towards a civil war. He charged that conditions were being deliberately created to bring back army rule. Jatoi said people were armed with 30,000 kalashnikovs and often it was difficult to distinguish the police from the dacoits. Said Senator Ejaz Jatoi: "Corruption is rampant from the Inspector General of Police downwards."

Resistance to Shariat Bill at Seminar Discussed

46000116D Karachi DAWN in English 27 May 90 p 9

[Text] Lahore, 26 May—In the first vociferous reaction against the Shariah Bill, speakers at a seminar here on

Saturday expressed their determination to resist its passage in the National Assembly by mobilising all the sections of society against "the Draconian Law."

In case the bill became law, they said, it would undermine the sovereignty of the Constitution and the legislature. Law-making would shift to the superior courts, infringing thereby on the right of Parliament. This would divide society in the name of Shariat, deepen sectarian prejudices, curtail the rights of minorities and women, and establish the hegemony of "fundamentalist forces," they added.

A resolution adopted on the occasion called on the National Assembly to reject the bill and vote against it without any reservation. It said that the Quaid-i-Azam was opposed to the rule of the "Mullah" which was now being forced on the people. The masses were fully aware of the "negative" role of the "fundamentalist forces" in the Pakistan Movement. The resolution endorsed the supremacy of the Constitution and said that all attempts to formulate laws which are against the spirit of the constitution, would be resisted.

The resolution was critical of the President of Pakistan who, it said, had favoured a bill which could erode the independence of the judiciary, take away the powers of legislation from Parliament and mutilate the Constitution. It said the bill was a political manoeuvre to end the democratic process and as such a conspiracy against the rights of the citizens.

The seminar was represented by people from all walks of life, including teachers, lawyers, journalists, human rights activists, working women, housewives and political leaders. The seminar was jointly sponsored by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and the Women Action Forum [WAF]. The Karachi Hall of the Lahore High Court Bar, where it was held, was packed to capacity.

Speaking at the seminar, Dr Mubashir Hasan said that giving the powers to interpret any law to the "Mullah" was an infringement of the right of the elected representatives. The "Mullah" had always served the vested interests, Dr Mubashir Hasan said adding that if the bill was enacted it would open a new chapter of sectarian hatred. The attempt to impose one "Fiqh" on the entire society would further divide society and would be unacceptable to majority of the people. "Nothing will divide Muslims more than the Shariat Bill," he claimed, and added that never in the history of Pakistan had the people voted in favour of "fundamentalists." As such, it was a conspiracy against the popular will and the present democratic process. He called on the Prime Minister to take action against the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Senators who voted in favour of the bill.

Ms Asma Jehangir maintained that the bill was an attempt of the "fundamentalist forces" to come into power through the back-door, after having been rejected by the people on several occasions. In the past, she said the bill aimed at undermining the independence of the

judiciary. She was critical of the President of Pakistan for supporting the bill and pleaded for a joint struggle against it by all sections of society to check the domination of the "fundamentalist forces."

The Vice-President of the Punjab PPP, Mr Arif Iqbal Bhatti, said that the bill was an attempt of reactionary forces to sabotage democracy. He said the Senate had been engaged in plans against the PPP Government and the bill, too, was a step in that direction.

Sister Angela of the Catholic Church criticised the bill on the plea that it would take away all the rights of the minorities.

Ms Samina Rehman of the WAF pleaded that the bill would hit the women and minorities the most by taking away the rights conferred on them in the 1961 laws.

Begum Nasim Shamim Malik criticised the Senate members who had opposed the bill when it was first presented during the Junejo administration.

TNFJ Chief Criticizes Shariah Bill

46000108C Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 20 May 90 p 8

[Article by Ejaz Malik]

[Text] Islamabad, Mar 19: The Chief of Tehrik-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-Jafria (TNFJ) has severely criticized the passage of Shariah Bill in the Senate and termed it as ambiguous, defective and imperfect.

Allama Sajid Ali Naqvi, TNFJ Chief, who was addressing a Press conference, here Saturday said the approval of the Bill would give upper hand to a particular school of thought over others. He recalled that the TNFJ team had conveyed its views regarding the Bill to the Senate committee on June 19, 1989. The Shia point of view was however, not accommodated in the Bill, he deplored. He reiterated that TNFJ was in favor of the Shariah rule but was not ready to accept any document or bill based on prejudices, narrow-mindedness and sectarianism.

The TNFJ Chief said that those sectarian elements, who could not achieve power through election, were trying to get in the government in the name of Shariah. He said there was nothing new in the bill which could bring about basic changes in political, economic military and administrative set-up of the country. The TNFJ wanted to again inform the members of the Parliament about its point of view so that the Shariah Bill may be acceptable to all, he said.

Talking about the murder case of Allama Arif Al-Hussaini, the TNFJ Chief accused the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] government of trying to close the case. He said the NWFP government had reached a secret agreement with Gen (Retd) Fazle Haq, and Siraj, the approver in this case, was being pressed to deviate from his previous statement.

Allama Sajid said that Gen Fazle Haq was acting as a PP [Public Prosecutor] agent in NWFP. The TNFJ chief warned both the provincial and Federal governments that bargain over the blood of martyr Hussaini would be very costly for them.

Allama Sajid Ali Naqvi announced that the TNFJ has decided to take out a rally of Ulema in front of NWFP Chief Minister's House in Peshawar on June 12. The purpose of the rally was to convey to Chief Minister sentiments of the Shia community as well as to remind the provincial government of its responsibilities. He also announced that if the government continued creating hindrances in the way of law and justice, the Shias would take out a protest rally in Islamabad on July 15.

While commenting on the law and order situation in the country, particularly in Sindh and Punjab, the TNFJ Chief expressed deep concern over the killings and looting of public properties. He said killing of the innocent people in Karachi and Hyderabad has become a daily business.

He also referred to the sectarian riots recently occurred in Jhang, Multan, Bahawalpur Kabirwala and Bhera. Dozens of people were killed and personal properties worth millions of rupees besides the holy places, mosques and imambargahs were reduced to ashes. The government had care little about the situation, he said.

Opposition Levels Charges of Corruption Against Punjab Government

46000116E Karachi DAWN in English 27 May 90 p 12

[Text] Lahore, 26 May—The Leader of the Opposition in the Punjab Assembly, Rana Shaukat Mahmood, has levelled serious charges of corruption and nepotism against the Punjab Government and some leaders of the COP [Combined Opposition Parties] and called for an inquiry by a judge of the High Court.

Speaking at a news conference here on Saturday, he maintained that the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad], when it was in power during the Zia regime, had crossed all limits of corruption, particularly in the real estate business. "Only the Lahore Development Authority [LDA] affairs will prove to be the biggest scandal in the world," he added and charged the Punjab Chief Minister with involvement in the scandal.

Rana Shaukat said that people had not yet forgotten why Mian Zahid Sarfraz was removed by Gen Zia-ul-Haq from the Federal Cabinet. He challenged that it was the scandal of the import of reconditioned cars, which caused his removal. Similarly, the PPP had given documentary evidence in the past about the misappropriation of LDA lands and was prepared to provide proof once again.

The PPP leader said that even Gen Zia had accused the present IJI of corruption on the basis of which he dissolved the National Assembly in 1988. "Perhaps they

(the IJI) have conveniently forgotten that they had sown the seeds of corruption, misuse of power, rapine of the national wealth and exploitation of various agencies for political benefit," he alleged.

Criticising the COP for its charges against the PPP Government, Rana Shaukat said: "They are baseless and mala fide" with the sole intention of doing away with the democratic process. He said that had there been any substance in the COP's allegations, it would have gone to a court of law to prove it.

The leader of Opposition in the Punjab Assembly deplored the COP for levelling the charges at a time when unity and cooperation was needed more than ever in view of the internal and external situation, as such, it was not an attitude which was in the national interest, he said.

The attitude was also an attempt to sabotage the conciliatory efforts initiated by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto who had set up a two-member committee to resolve differences with the Punjab Government and evolve a working relationship at a time when parleys were only two days away, Rana Shaukat said.

Nawaz Accuses Center of 'Sabotaging Reconciliation'

46000107A Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 20 May 90 p 2

[Text] Islamabad, May 19—Mian Nawaz Sharif, Chief Minister Punjab, has said he wanted to have "cordial working relations" with the Centre. He said this was despite antagonistic posture adopted by the Senior Federal Minister and victimisation of 20 IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] MNA [Member of National Assembly]s whose accounts had been recently frozen.

Talking to newsmen here Saturday, the Chief Minister claimed that some elements in the federal government were trying to sabotage the "reconciliation efforts" being made to create a working relationship between the centre and the Punjab.

He said the committees appointed by the federal government and the Punjab would soon meet to chalk out a formula acceptable to both the parties. "We have been completely responsive to the call of the Centre in the interest of the country and we are also ready to cooperate with the federal government so that there can be progress and prosperity. We can extend full cooperation in view of the prevailing conditions on the borders."

However, he regretted that the Senior Federal Minister, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, while addressing a public rally in AJK [Azad Jammu and Kashmir], had issued a statement which negated the claims of PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government about "reconciliation."

The Chief Minister deplored the failure of Federal agencies, including ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence], IB

[Intelligence Bureau] and others, in providing with advance information about bomb blasts in the Punjab.

Her asked, "Why bombs have been exploded only in the Punjab, particularly in Lahore, over the last two months."

He claimed that a deep conspiracy had been hatched to disturb peace in the biggest province of the country. He, however, maintained that his government would never allow anybody to destroy peace in the province.

To a question, Nawaz Sharif said, that the whole Nation knew about what he called the "character assassination campaign against his family by the media at the behest of the federal government."

The Chief Minister also criticised the role of electronic media which completely blacked out news about opposition leaders. "The electronic media is only projecting PPP and its friends while news about IJI, COP [Combined Opposition Parties] and the Punjab Government are ignored."

Federal Anti-corruption Committee Issues Orders Against Officials

46000107B Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 20 May 90 pp 1, 8

[Text] Islamabad, May 19—Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has approved the recommendations of the Federal Anti-corruption Committee and ordered immediate action against some top former and serving officials of the Civil Aviation Authority, Trading Corporation of Pakistan and the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan.

The Committee headed by Malik Mohammad Qasim had recommended varying action ranging from suspension, departmental inquiry, probe by FIA [Federal Investigative Agency] to recovery of the losses suffered by the state.

The officials against whom orders have been issued include ex-chairman of the Trading Corporation of Pakistan (TCP) Habib Hussain, Ziauddin Malik, former Director Finance of Civil Aviation Authority and currently member of the Prime Minister's inspection team, a former Director General of the authority and some of its directors, Zahid Ahmed, the Senior Chief Manager of the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP), Lahore.

Malik Qasim told APP that the Prime Minister has accepted all the recommendations made by the Committee regarding these officials and ordered that these be carried out immediately. He was now sending the relevant operative parts of the recommendation to the Ministry of Finance, the Establishment Division and the Federal Investigation Agency for necessary action.

The Committee found gross irregularities in cases involving import of sugar, construction of Lahore

Runway, maintenance of accounts of Civil Aviation Authority and extension of credit by IDBP by officials mentioned above. These irregularities resulted in huge losses of millions of rupees to the state.

Habib Hussain, who has since been retired, has been indicted in case of import of 100,000 tons sugar in 1987. He was retired as chairman TCP. The committee recommended that a case be registered against Mr. Habib and the FIA directed to proceed with further investigations. Incidentally, the Prime Minister's inspection commission under former Premier Mohammad Khan Junejo gave similar findings against Mr. Habib but no action was taken.

Ziauddin Malik has been indicted for gross dereliction of duty in the maintenance of balance sheets of the Civil Aviation Authority and failing [to] get these audited by the Auditor General of Pakistan. The committee recommended that Mr. Ziauddin be suspended and dealt with departmentally.

Mr. Ziauddin has denied charges and written to the committee that he reserved the right of defending himself at other forums and also claim damages.

The authority is required to maintain accounts and get them audited regularly every year by the representative of the Auditor General of Pakistan who, in turn, has to submit his report to the government by September each year so that the same could be placed before the National Assembly.

The 1986-87 accounts of the authority were completed in 1988 and passed by the Board of the authority in July that year. The accounts for the year 1987-88 were completed in April 1990 while those of 1988-89 have yet to be completed. After the approval of the accounts by the Board, these were to be sent to the Auditor General which has not been done.

The Committee also detected instances where appointments of non-professional were made on posts exclusively requiring professional hands.

In case of Lahore runway, which was approved by the EC-NEC in 1984, was to cost Rs.174.2 million. The authority completed it by spending 322 million rupees without referring it back to EC-NEC under the rules.

There are also serious reservations expressed by foreign and Pakistani experts about the quality of work. The runway, they say, is so uneven that it would cost another rupees 70 million to improve it.

The committee found senior Chief Manager of IDBP regional office Lahore, gross negligence of duty and utter failure to guard Bank's interests by colluding with the sunshine just mills and causing a loss of rupees 14.25 million to the IDBP. They recommended that he be immediately relieved of his duties, placed under suspension and proceeded against departmentally.—APP

Karachi Conference Explores Oceanographic Development

46000116C Karachi DAWN in English 27 May 90 p 7

[Text] The vast marine wealth lying unexplored in the coastal waters of Sindh and Balochistan was underscored at the just-concluded, two-day Karachi conference on the development of oceanic resources for economic progress. Pakistan's Exclusive Economic Zone, stretching a thousand kilometres from the Indian border in the east to the Iranian border in the west, encompasses some 250,000 square kilometres. Coupled with another 50,000 sq km comprising the continental shelf, the maritime zone measures up to almost a third of the country's total land mass. Characteristic features and distinctive oceanic phenomena make the zone one of the most productive maritime areas in the world. The extensive network of tidal creeks that form part of the Indus delta is an excellent breeding ground for a large variety of commercially exploitable fish and shellfish. The geology of the coast of Balochistan is ideally suited for deposition of minerals. The large waves generated by the south-westerly monsoons and the strong tidal currents witnessed in the deltaic region could be harnessed to produce energy on a fairly large scale. Close proximity and topographical similarity to the oil-bearing Gulf region are indicative of substantial hydrocarbon accumulation which could be exploited to yield oil and gas.

Sadly, this vast gold mine of biological, chemical and mineral wealth has not been accorded the attention it merits. Apart from fishing, which nets the equivalent of over 2.5 billion rupees annually in foreign exchange through exports of shrimp and other varieties of fish, and some offshore drilling, the area, for all practical purposes, has been left untapped. What is all the more disturbing is the fact that, paying scant regard to the need for maintaining environmental balance, we have callously permitted indiscriminate dumping of industrial, chemical and other pollutants into the sea, rendering vast tracts inhospitable for a large number of biological species. If the large storehouse of economic wealth that lies in the Exclusive Economic Zone is to be preserved for commercial exploitation, the neglect of the past four decades will have to be reversed. Harnessing of oceanic and maritime resources is far more complicated than that of ordinary land resources. First and foremost, it requires a precise understanding of the topography of the area and its geological characteristics. Also necessary is a census of the biological species present, a close observation of their interaction with the geography and ecology of the locale and a thorough study of their living and breeding habits. Without judicious coastal zone management, with a keen awareness of the need for protecting the marine environmental and ecological balance, appropriate citing of coastal industries and proper handling of ocean engineering problems, efficient utilisation of the zone's potential will remain an uncertain prospect.

The National Institute of Oceanography [NIO] is already seized of these issues. During the 10 years that it has

been in existence, the NIO has conducted quite a few oceanographic surveys and researches in relation to several important aspects of the maritime zone. Because of paucity of funds, however, the impact of its efforts has been minimal. The need is to substantially augment the funds available to the NIO to enlarge the scope of its activities. Simultaneously, steps must also be taken to start commercial and economic exploitation in areas where the NIO has made some headway and laid the groundwork. It will not be out of place to draw private sector participation in the activities of the NIO for it is the private sector that will eventually benefit the most from the commercial and economic exploitation of the marine resources.

Paper Voices Support for Iranian Offers

46000107D Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
20 May 90 p 4

[Text] Iran's offer for supplying gas to Pakistan through a jointly-built pipeline deserves earnest consideration because of its varied advantages for both. Iran has surplus gas close to the border which it can supply at competitive prices and Pakistan needs it particularly for power production. If cheap gas could be available, Pakistan could use it for power production and reduce the import of oil for its thermal plants. Besides, gas can also be used for production of power for remote areas of Balochistan and a part of that supplied to Iran to electrify its border villages and supply more power to border areas. With cheap gas available from Iran, Pakistan's gas reserves can be preserved and put to more productive use instead of being used for domestic consumption. Cement plants and other industries in Pakistan which prefer gas, can also return to the use of gas profitably.

Iran has also, following the visit of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to Tehran, offered to buy a cement plant and five sugar manufacturing plants from Pakistan. Pakistan's Heavy Engineering Complex needs such orders and the facilities in the heavy Mechanical Complex, Karachi Shipyard, etc., can be used for such purposes. Pakistan's heavy engineering facilities need such a boost and more manufacturing orders. Of course, the gas pipeline will cost a great deal of money, but that money has to be found for a joint enterprise by both the neighbours. The kind of offers which have come to Pakistan give a significant role to Pakistan in the reconstruction of Iran after the recent war. And if such opportunities are seized quickly, Pakistan's labour, engineers and other technical personnel can find employment in Iran.

Economic Council Approves Projects

46000122B Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 24 May 90 pp 1, 8

[Text] Islamabad, May 23: The Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC), which met here today under the chairmanship of Prime Minister's

Adviser on Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning and Development, approved development projects involving an estimated capital cost of about Rs 21 billion, located in all parts of the country.

Projects approved in the agriculture sector envisaged increase in milk production in Punjab and development of 168,000 hectares of culturable wasteland and establishment of agricultural college in Sindh.

Schemes approved in the education sector aimed at expansion of primary education facilities in NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] and Balochistan.

In the energy sector, schemes cleared by the ECNEC envisaged increase in the existing capacity of PARCO's Karachi-Multan pipeline system for transportation of petroleum products from 2.9 million tons per annum to 4.5 million tons per annum, drilling of wells for oil exploration in Sindh, expansion of gas distribution network in Balochistan and installation of two hydro electric turbines and generating units with installed capacity of 16 mw.

Projects approved in water sector aimed at equipping Hub and Khanpur dams for efficient operation, maintenance and monitoring and controlling waterlogging and salinity, establishing a snow and ice monitoring system in the upper Indus Basin to get reliable streamflow forecasts for the whole year covering both Rabi and Kharif periods and developing command area in Balochistan.

Various schemes approved in transport and communications sector envisaged procurement of 270 and rehabilitation of 650 traction motors for diesel electric/electric locomotives of Pakistan Railways during seventh Five-Year Plan, construction of roads in federally administered tribal areas, procurement of earthmoving and construction machinery by Frontier Works Organization, installation of high capacity microwave link between Karachi-Bela-Quetta-D G Khan-D.I. Khan-Bannu-Peshawar, expansion of existing digital transit exchanges and creation of new primary trunk dialing centers and strengthening and widening of old flexible runway for airbus operation at Faisalabad airport.—APP

Good Politics Cited as Prerequisite for Good Budget

*46000114A Karachi DAWN (Supplement)
in English 12-18 May 90 pp 1, 5*

[Article by Dr Mubashir Hasan]

[Text] The budget of a country is not merely a document of national economic programme and policy, it is, simultaneously, an eloquent expression of the economic and political interests of its ruling elite or elites. Rulers, ruling groups or coalitions will rarely present, or will be

in a position to legislate, a budget that does not preserve, indeed aims at enhancing, their economic and political power.

In the case of making a budget for Pakistan, the problem of its rulers is somewhat more complicated. Our rulers have chosen to govern Pakistan as a client state of the Western industrial powers, under the leadership of the United States. The decisions on some of the crucial questions such as economy and defence, hence on foreign policy, are, therefore, not completely in the hands of our governments. It is because of this dependent status of Pakistan that the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the USAID [United States Agency for International Development] have come to acquire a decisive role in the preparation of Pakistan's budget.

In Pakistan, as elsewhere, strong governments present budgets that express clear-cut policies, having a minimum of internal contradictions on questions of government priorities on savings and investments, resource mobilisation and spending, defence and development, austerity and consumerism, trade and commerce, borrowings and credit allocations, industry and agriculture, etc.

Weak governments in Pakistan, in their effort to survive under pressure from the governing elites—defence establishment, civil bureaucracy, feudals, graft-bestowing industrialists, newly-rich smugglers, speculators, heroin distributors, mullahs, and last but not the least the international financial institutions—can only produce budgets which have glaring contradictions, and which signify a policy that represents, so to say, more of the same. Their budget for a new financial year differs not much from the budget of the previous year.

Budgetary Pressures

In specific terms, what is the nature of pressures that the present Government of Pakistan is under in its task of presenting the budget for the financial year 1990-91?

Our feudals want cheaper prices for seeds, fertiliser, pesticide, tractors, petroleum products, electrical energy, and irrigation water. They want higher prices of agricultural produce and higher credit allocations for the agriculture sector. They would not hear of any tax on income from agriculture.

Our industrialists want scaling down of the expenditure on defence and administration. They want lower taxation, less oppressive tax laws and tax collecting machinery, deregulation of the investment process, lower custom duties on raw materials, cheap electricity, no load-shedding, better transportation system, right to hire and fire labour, diminishing the power of the labour unions, control over banks, and tariff protections for Pakistani products, etc.

Our defence establishment wants more sophisticated weapons, more generous purchases of spare parts, more money for ammunition and other supplies of war and for

a better maintenance of the defence machine and better pay scales and perquisites for officers and men.

Less Welfare

Our civil bureaucracy wants expansion of civil services, better pay-scales and perquisites, and of course more power, under laws and rules, to control the economic life of the nation.

The international financial institutions want Pakistan to change over to an unfettered market economy. They want elimination of government subsidies to any sector of the economy, reduced defence and administration expenditure, cutting down the expenditure of the "welfare" aspect of the state (such as on health and education services) export-led growth, continued ability of Pakistan to service its debts and to borrow more, wide open doors for imports from abroad, no foreign exchange control, strict fiscal and monetary discipline, land reforms, tax on agricultural income etc. Although some of these measures, such as land reforms, are eminently suitable, the totality of the guidance provided by our foreign friends amounts to an attempt to make Pakistan's backward Third World economy serve the interests of the economies of the industrialised countries.

The inter-se clash of interests among the ruling elites of Pakistan is wide and deep, their practical unity against the silent, suffering majority of the population of Pakistan notwithstanding. On questions of reducing defence and administration expenditure, on who should be taxed and how much, on governmental assistance in the sectors of industry, agriculture, trade, on questions of deregulation and ownership of industry by the state, on allocation of credit and interest rates, on price control, besides other important aspects, the make-hay-while-the-sun-shine elites of Pakistan remain dagger drawn at each other. The government of such elites is only in a position to present budget proposals that aim to please all but succeed in pleasing none except perhaps the wheeler-dealers, the palm-greasers and those willing to charge the people of Pakistan for their signatures and their influence.

That budget will have to wait which aims at reducing government expenditure, increasing exports, reducing imports, strengthening economic infrastructure, concentrating on development of human resources, facilitating labour-intensive production, doing away with the iron grip of the bureaucracy on the economy, introducing a just taxation system, taxing the rich of the landed and real-estate aristocracy and those indulging in ostentatious consumption, making the rich less rich and the poor less poor.

Good budgets can only come out of good politics and the present is certainly not the time of good politics.

Syed Iftikhar Sworn in as Auditor General

46000107C Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
20 May 90 p 3

[Text] Rawalpindi, May 19—The newly sworn in Auditor General of Pakistan, Syed Iftikhar Shabbir, has said that the main function of the Auditor General was to submit his reports about any sort of irregularity in the government accounts to the Public Accounts Committee [PAC], which ultimately presents such reports before the National Assembly.

Replying to newsmen's questions after being sworn in as Auditor General of Pakistan, here at the Supreme Court premises, he vowed to continue pointing out the discrepancies in the government accounts to the PAC and the parliament which was ultimately responsible for elimination of corruption from the country.

To another question, he said it depended upon the Public Accounts Committee and the parliament as regards the strength and effectiveness of the concerned institutions for taking necessary steps towards the elimination of corruption.

"Corruption is a national issue," If the PAC and the parliament were strong enough they could deal with cases of corruption effectively, he opined.

He also pointed out that when cases of corruption or irregularities in the government accounts were brought before the parliament by the PAC, it was the responsibility of the national press to highlight such cases so that it had an impact on the people. National press could thus play a vital role in that regard, he added.

Earlier while taking oath of his office, the Auditor General pledged to perform his functions honestly, faithfully and to the best of his knowledge and ability without any fear. His personal interests will not interfere in his official functions. He also prayed to Allah Almighty to help and guide him in that regard.

The oath was administered by the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Mr Justice Mohammad Afzal Zullah. Judges of the Supreme Court, senior officials, lawyers of the Supreme and High Courts and officials of the Audit Department, witnessed the occasion.

The proceedings began with the recitation from the Holy Quran by Qari Obedur Rehman.—PPI

'Cost and Profits of Farming' Discussed

46000114C Karachi *DAWN* (Supplement)
in English 12-18 May 90 p 3

[Article by Dr Mohammad Uzair]

[Text] Budget time is not very far away. Discussions have started taking place. Proposals have been submitted to the Government regarding the next budget. One

problem of our budgets has been that direct taxation has been very limited while major reliance is placed on indirect taxes.

Indirect taxes are hidden and become part of the price of the commodity concerned. The consumers or users who buy the taxed commodities and services have to bear the burden of these taxes, irrespective of the fact whether they are rich or poor. Most of the time a payer of an indirect tax may not even know whether he is paying a tax concealed in the price, and as to how much tax he is paying in this manner. All that he knows is that the prices of the concerned commodities or services have risen.

We have had a few favourite items for adjustment in the taxes and their prices. In fact prices of a few such items have been raised on 26 March 1990. Some people have described it as "mini budget." The problem with indirect taxes is that rise in certain prices leads to a "sympathy" rise in prices of many other items, and even the price level as a whole. Indirect taxes are always passed on to others, ultimately the consumers. Direct taxes on the other hand are levied on the persons or companies to be paid out of their income. These cannot be passed on to others. There are certain advantages of a direct tax over an indirect tax.

Merits of Direct Taxes

Firstly, the tax-payer pays the tax knowingly and consciously rather than paying it as a concealed part of a price. Secondly, a payer of direct tax realises that he is contributing something to the national exchequer. Thus, he becomes a more responsible and more patriotic citizen in as much as he is conscious that he has a stake in the nation and the country. Thirdly, he is likely to take a more active interest in the welfare of the country, and he realises that the Government is being run with the help of the money provided by the tax-payers. This adds to accountability and answerability of a Government to the tax-payers as well as the common man. This is good for socio-economic and socio-political health of the country and the government.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood at Rs 686 billion for the financial year 1988-89. Contribution of agricultural sector was Rs 183.7 billion. Of the total agricultural sector, Rs 111.4 billion was obtained from crop farming, while Rs 65.7 billion was contributed by livestock sub-sector of agriculture. The rest of it was from minor sub-sectors such as fishing and forestry. The contribution of manufacturing sector was Rs 112 billion of which Rs 79 billion was contributed by large scale manufacturing units, and Rs 33 billion by small scale manufacturing industries.

In Pakistan, the term agriculture is usually spoken and understood as crop farming which contributed Rs 111 billion. Total number of farms under crops in the country is 10 million, spread over an area of 47.8 million acres of the total farm land in the country. A little over nine million of them constituting 91 percent of the total

farms, are small farms of up to 10 acres each. The total area of these small farms is 27.7 million acres, i.e. 59 percent of total acreage. According to experts, 10 acres is supposed to be a "subsistence level," i.e., a farmer cultivating about 10 acres can earn enough income to survive and live with bare minimum. The number of agricultural farms above this subsistence level of 10 acres number about 0.9 million farms, constituting nine percent of total farms, covering 19.29 million acres, i.e., 41 percent of total acreage. These would include farms of even more 150 acres which should not legally exist after land reforms.

It has been estimated that a farmer who owns his land and grows wheat and cotton generally gets a net income or profit of about Rs 990 per acre from one crop of about 5-6 months, or about Rs 1,980 per annum per acre. We are ignoring in this context the landless peasants. However, it is well known that people who own land, do not have to buy most of their food items. In this way, the "real income" from the agricultural sector is higher than what is indicated by the figures we have calculated. Moreover, certain wages are paid in kind. We have tried to compute money value of these wages in kind in our costing which follows a little later. Thus, we have ignored the income in kind, but have considered the cost in kind. The figures are based on an assumption that land owner himself does not work, but all labour is hired. If he does some work himself, some cost will be saved, and income would be higher. The farms above 10 acres (19.9 m. acres) would produce an income of Rs 39,402 million per annum. If they are taxed at an average rate of 10 percent, (ranging between 5-20 percent), the tax yield would be Rs 3.94 billion. If, however, we choose to consider for taxation, only such farm income which is produced by farms of 20 acres and above, their number would be 0.27 million, i.e., three percent of total farms covering 10.9 million acres or 23 percent of total acreage. The total profit or net income from farms above 20 acres, (total 10.9 m. acres) would come to Rs 21,580 mn. As mentioned earlier, we have presumed that the owner himself does not work, and that all labour is hired. If, however, he himself also works, as would be typically the case, actual income would be higher. If a tax is levied at an average rate of 20 percent (ranging between 10-30 percent) tax yield would come to Rs 4.3 billion per annum.

The present revenue from direct taxes is Rs 18 billion [figure blurred, could be 13]. By taxing the agricultural income from farms of 20 acres and above, we can get an additional income from direct taxes, of about 40 percent.

It may be mentioned that we have estimated the agricultural income per acre after taking into consideration all the inputs including Water Rates or "Abiana" which is Rs 50 per acre per crop, which means half of a year, or Rs 100 per annum. We have also taken into consideration Ushr at the rate of 5 percent, which is seldom paid. According to an estimate by a former Finance Minister, the total Ushr collection constitutes 0.001 percent of total agricultural income. Anyway, Ushr is a divine obligation and should not be confused with taxes. It

would be desirable to examine at this stage in some detail the cost and income from agricultural activities. This is especially necessary because much fuss is made about administrative difficulties in imposition of agricultural income tax, and that agriculturists or farmers do not and can not maintain proper accounts. If we can determine a per acre profit or net income for different crops, a flat rate of tax per acre can be easily evolved and implemented.

A costing of agriculture shows that cost of inputs like seeds, fertilizer and pesticides comes to Rs 619 per acre per crop. Water rate charge comes to Rs 50 per crop, and land revenue (rs two per acre per crop); that comes to Rs 52. Assuming that all the labour is hired for farming, total labour cost would come to about Rs 932 per acre per crop. The total cost thus comes to (Rs 609 + 52 + 932) Rs 1,593. Gross Income in case of wheat after

excluding Ushr at the rate of five percent of produce (1000 minus 50 kilograms) comes to (1950 kilogram x Rs 2.4) comes to Rs 2,580 per acre. Net income or profit comes to (rs 2,580 minus Rs 1,593) about Rs 990 per crop or Rs 1,980 per annum per acre. A detailed costing of wheat farming, the most important crop is given in table below.

It would be noticed, we have assumed that Ushr is actually paid, which is not the case in real life. Similarly, we have assumed such inputs of fertilizers and pesticides which are technically required. Again in practical life many farmers do deviate from the same. At the risk of repetition, it may be mentioned that much publicised water rate or "Abiana" is Rs 50 per acre per crop in case of wheat, rice and cotton, and Rs 100 in case of sugar cane. For sugar cane it would be higher, but so would be the income.

Costing of Wheat Farming Per Acre/Per Crop

I.		COST		
	A.	<u>Material Cost</u>		
		Seeds 40 kgs	Rs 96	
			Fertilizer	313
		Pesticides	200	
		Water Rate (Abyana)	50	
		Land Revenue	2	Rs 661
	B.	<u>Labour Cost</u>		
		Ploughing 6 mandays	Rs 180	
		Ploughing 2 mandays	30	
		Sowing 1 manday	20	
		Sowing 1 bullock day	20	
		Interculture lump sum	100	
		Application of fertilizer and pesticide	100	
		Irrigation cost	50	
		Harvesting cost in kind	192	
		Winnowing & Threshing in kind (240 kg)		Rs 932
	C	<u>TOTAL COST</u>		Rs 1,593
II.		Yield 1000 kgs		
		Less USHR @5% = 950 kgs.		
III.		INCOME		
	A.	From farming (less Ushr) (950 kgs x Rs 2.4)		Rs 2280
	B.	Sale income from straw (25 mds x Rs 12)		300
	C.	Total income		Rs 2,580
IV.		NET INCOME OR PROFIT (Rs 2,580 - 1,593) = Rs 987 per acre		Rs 987

The question of agricultural income tax which is a socio-economic issue has been mixed up with political considerations of the rulers from time to time. It is rightly understood that a democratically elected government can take revolutionary and bold decisions which a Martial Law government can not possibly afford. A political government needs to take a bold step to earn acclamation nationally and internationally. It would also constitute an important first step in the direction of clipping the clout of feudal class.

It may be recalled that when Americans were conducting the struggle for their independence from the British, one of the slogans that was raised by the Americans was "No Taxation Without Representation." Common sense would suggest that the reverse should also be equally applicable, namely, "No Representation Without Taxation." The people who are not even the tax payer in the sense of the direct taxes have no right to represent their constituents and voters in the National Assembly or Provincial Assembly. It is unfair that elected representatives and many voters in the urban areas pay direct taxes, while the voters and even the representatives from the rural areas, or agricultural sector, do not pay direct taxes. Most of the members of the cabinet and members of the legislature, who are feudal lords, do not pay any tax whatsoever. In fact, many of them allegedly do not pay regularly their electricity and telephone bills. Yet their election is assured the day they file their nomination papers. The illiterate tenants and peasants are taken for granted as far as their voters through a "rubber stamp" are concerned. The voters themselves some times need not take the trouble of even putting the rubber stamp. Anybody can do it for them. This is how certain seats are "property" of a feudal lord and his family. A feudal lord who "owns" his seat can put up his son or brother, or daughter, and some times any friend from some other area altogether. This is why certain sets are offered as a "gift" to anybody whom the feudal lord wishes to oblige. This is neither cricket nor democracy. Under the present socio-economic system, democracy is a farce as far as feudal lords supposedly elected from rural areas are concerned. This is a very sorry state of affairs. It seems logical that the members of legislature elected from the rural areas belonging to the feudal class should be required that:

(a) They should be direct tax-payers; and

(b) They should have made a contribution to develop education in their electoral constituency, and that at least 60 percent of their voters should be literate.

If they have made no contribution for the betterment of their constituents, their representative character becomes dubious, especially if the electorate is illiterate in spite of the elected leaders. At the top of it, they are not even the direct tax-payers, which in the case of urban areas is true not only of the elected representative but even majority of voters. There are a great many legislators and political leaders who themselves have had excellent education from Europe and the United States,

and have abundant resources to afford living abroad for years. However, they have not educated in 3R's even 100 electorates in their constituency. Some allege that they deliberately want their electorate illiterate like deaf and dumb driven cattle so that their "ancestral seats" in legislature remain ensured and guaranteed. Most of the feudal lords have enough resources to open schools and colleges in their constituency in the interest of their prospective voters. In a way it is also a duty of the Government that they should set up at least a given number of primary and even secondary schools in each village in the rural areas, so that a true democracy can work in the country, and social conditions can improve. Adult literacy and adult franchise should go together. At the top of it, there should be direct income tax for the landlord to eliminate discrimination between rural and urban areas of the country.

In Pakistan, direct taxes constitute only about 11 percent of the total revenue budget, and about 13 percent of the total tax revenue. This needs to be corrected. If there are more direct taxes recovered from those who can afford to pay taxes the ratio of direct taxes to the total taxes will improve. To that extent, reliance on indirect taxes can be eliminated. Somehow, we have left untaxed the income from agricultural tax.

There is no reason why agriculturists should be treated as a "sacred cow" or "stud bull." This is not to say that there is no room for additional direct taxes in the urban areas. Because of inertia and inefficiency, there are good many people in the trading sector, and self-employed people providing services who are not fully covered in the tax net. This is not due to any policy of the Government but a mere inadequacy and the inefficiency of the tax collecting machinery. However, agricultural income tax has remained outside the tax net because of the deliberate Government policy.

In 1977 the then Prime Minister had enforced a legislative measure to impose agricultural income tax.

However, shortly thereafter there was a political change and the Martial Law Government annulled that legal measure. Now that we have again a high educated and enlightened Prime Minister, we may hope that this negative measure of the Martial Law period is rectified like certain other shortcomings or wrong doings of the Martial Law regime. National Taxation Reforms Commission, headed by Mr Qamrul Islam had suggested introduction of agricultural income tax. But the rulers ignored it. We hope that the [concluding sentence missing].

Better Tax Collection Urged

46000115D Karachi DAWN in English 24 May 90 p 7

[Article by Sultan Ahmed]

[Text] The key final figure will be known only after the Federal Cabinet, following the session of the National Economic Council, comprising Federal and provincial

Ministers meets and presents the Budget, but the official estimate is that the Budget deficit in the next financial year on the basis of existing taxation and projected larger expenditure will be around Rs 21 billion after the projected borrowing.

The very vexing question is: how to fill it largely through raising taxation and the rates for various official services, and by cutting down expenditure wherever possible? The Prime Minister was consulting her key colleagues before she left on her Middle Eastern tour whether to fill this very large gap at one go or in stages next year, which is usually dubbed by critics as mini-budgets. Opinions varied with some ministers arguing in favour of one approach, and others for the other.

Filling the deficit of Rs 21 billion through taxation and raising the rates can be hazardous. Mr A.G.N. Kazi tried to do that three years ago by introducing three kinds of defence taxes, and following a country-wide uproar Mr Mohammad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister had to intervene and slash the final taxation to less than one fourth of the figure he had originally proposed unthinkingly.

The additional taxation levied by the new Government in India is less than Rs 20 billion, and that has been done along with large concessions to the rural class to reduce the massive rural poverty and after giving a strong rural bias to the Budget.

But the IMF which is monitoring the Budget formulation very closely would neither let the Government borrow beyond an agreed sum nor permit printing of notes beyond modest limits so as to check the rise in inflation. Deficit financing this year is to be Rs 4.5 billion, which is far above the negative deficit of Rs 2.5 billion achieved last year, but is lower than the Budget deficit of Rs 14 billion in 1987-88 and the record of Rs 18.74 billion in 1984-85. If the Government wants to reduce inflation, as it is committed to the IMF to do, it has to resort to less printing of notes or bank borrowing and not more.

But the additional resources which will be raised next year need not necessarily be through additional taxation. It could be through increase in power rates following the 15.8 percent rise in POL [Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants] prices, and rise in gas prices. It may opt for raising the telephone call fee from 90 paise to a rupee, although the net profits of the Telephone Department this year are Rs 7 billion. The Government may also reduce the subsidies, which now cost the Government Rs 7.6 billion, as the IMF insists.

But when it raises the gas surcharges it can be running into trouble with Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, Chief Minister of Balochistan, who insists that he should be paid Rs 4 billion out of Rs 4.9 billion to be collected this year as gas surcharge. If his demand is accepted he may lay a claim to the arrears as well. Hence the Federal Government may be very wary of raising gas surcharge. The government may also spend less as debt servicing cost

because of the reduction in interest rates on Khas certificates, and further cuts in other borrowing instruments to follow.

While next year's outlay on the Annual Development Plan is currently at Rs 63.8 billion (subject to revision by the NEC [National Economic Council]) compared to Rs 55.4 billion this year and the defence expenditure is bound to rise sharply, a large additional expenditure will be the increase in the emoluments of the Government employees. The only concession given last year was a pay increase of 5 percent for employees up to Grade 16. This year's pay rise has to be substantial in view of real inflation and strikes in various parts of the country by Government employees.

It was earlier said by the officials that the revenues of the Government this year rose by 17 percent; but that is over last year's collection, and not over the budget estimates. Revenue collection this year may be just about the same as projected by the Budget.

Official figures show that largescale manufacturing increased this year by 7.7 percent compared to a dismal 2.4 percent last year, and the projection of an increase of 7 percent for this year. That should have meant a substantial increase in revenues compared to last year, but that does not appear to have taken place despite the fact that the manufacturing sector is the largest single revenue paying sector.

A senior Finance Ministry official estimates that it is safe to levy additional taxes upto Rs 7.50 billion. The increased taxation levied, after tax reliefs of Rs 1.08 this year to Rs 6.75 billion. But long before the new Budget, through a single measure of raising POL price by 15.8 percent, announced in March, the Government would get next year Rs 7.5 billion, and Rs 300 million more by raising the prices of phosphate fertilisers. But that increase in revenue is not to be taken into account when calculating the deficit for next year. It is to be treated as part of the existing fiscal measure. Some say the revenues from the increase in POL prices next year would be Rs 10 billion, and not Rs 7.5 billion. If that is how it will be, the total revenue mobilisation next year may be around Rs 30 billion, which is a staggering sum.

We may deduct from that the amount to be earned by selling the shares of the public sector industries to be privatised next year. We are told that the momentum of privatisation would be really high next year compared to the lone attempt with PIA shares this year for over Rs 100 million as against the Rs 1.5 billion which was to be mobilised through privatisation this year.

The volume of revenues to be mobilised and taxes to be levied would also depend on the extent of Budget deficit which the IMF would permit next year. The report that the deficit would be reduced to 5.3 percent next year appears too good to believe. Originally the deficit was to be reduced to 5.5 percent this year; but later the IMF scaled that up to 6 percent. Some months ago we were told the deficit would be about 6.3 percent, and now,

following the tension on the border fuelled by the Kashmir crisis, Mr V.A. Jafarey, Prime Minister's Adviser on Finance, told a pre-Budget seminar in Peshawar that the current year's deficit would be just below last year's deficit of 7.3 percent of the GDP [gross domestic product]. If that is to be the level of deficit this year, can that be scaled down to 5.3 percent next year if the Kashmir crisis does not abate quickly, which is extremely unlikely? Even otherwise the three-year agreement with the IMF has been extended to four years ending 1991-92, and the deficit in the final year was to be reduced to 4.8 percent. Hence if the Government can reduce the deficit to 5.3 percent of the GDP from over 7 percent this year, that would be a near economic miracle.

What matters is not only heavier taxation but also better tax collection. Year after year Finance Ministers assure the nation that more revenues would be mobilised through better tax collection; but evidently that is usually small or no headway is made at all. Mr Ghulam Yazdani, Chairman of the Central Board of Revenue [CBR], told a pre-Budget seminar in Lahore that the whole of the large Liberty Market in Lahore paid a total income tax of only Rs five lakhs and Bohri Bazar only Rs eight lakhs. The Liberty Market leaders have denied that figure; but if the CBR is faring that badly in Lahore and Karachi Markets, is it any better closer home in Islamabad? He surprised his listeners by saying that the whole of the sprawling Jinnah Super Market Complex in Islamabad paid a total income tax of only Rs 85,000 despite the giddy prices of shops and land.

By and large Islamabad has been a tax haven not only for shopkeepers but also for the landlords, who are senior officials or more often their Begums, who did not pay earlier any tax on their vast rental incomes from one or more bungalows, and pay too little now.

Of course, the landlords of Islamabad may argue that if the Zamindars, who own vast tracts of lands in the rural areas and rule the country on that basis, do not pay any tax, why should they pay taxes on their urban assets? The fact is that when the rulers and the lawmakers or members of the legislatures do not pay taxes on their principal incomes—from agriculture—how can they force the people to pay taxes in full?

In the name of Islamisation Gen Zia did away with Land Revenue in favour of Ushr. But Ushr payments are more of a joke now as after the Rabi crop of 1987-88 and Kharif crop of 1988 the total Ushr payments came to Rs 73.18 billion only, while the low assessments were Rs 177 million. But now, it has been said, that Ushr payments are to be made real. The landlords, who have been ruling this country for decades, have, however, always defeated any scheme to make them share their vast incomes even very modestly with the country.

This then is a pathetic picture. If the rulers and lawmakers do not want to pay tax on their large incomes even to the provinces, as agricultural income tax falls in the provincial sphere, the taxation machinery is not able

to collect much by way of taxes despite heavy taxation, how can tax revenues really increase?

The new remedy is to be General Sales Tax [GST]; but now it has been said that the revenue from this source too, is not to be very large, compared to the collection of Rs 19 billion to be made this year from the Sales Tax. The GST too is likely to hurt the low-income groups and make their cost of living higher than that of those with large surplus incomes.

Budget-Making Options Discussed

46000116B Karachi DAWN in English 27 May 90 p 7

[Article by Shahid Kardar]

[Text] The economic travails of the country and the fiscal difficulties of the present Government, reflected in the yawning budget deficit, are by now well known and do not require further elaboration. What options does the Government have in rejuvenating its dry financial arteries? What kind of constraints will it encounter in bringing sanity to its financial structure? In this period of gloom what can it offer to the less privileged segments of society that will reflect its commitment to the improvement of their lot?

Although this article will only attempt to examine the policy measures that the Government is likely to employ in the short term, it will highlight the implications that will flow from their institution.

The Government is under severe pressure to bring its financial house in order. There is the IMF to contend with, there is the tension on the borders, and then there are the political difficulties of taxing some holy cows and of raising taxes beyond a certain point. How can these different demands be balanced, the foundation laid for a more stable revenue-generating institutional structure, the budget deficit further pruned—largely through bridging the gap between revenues and annual recurring expenditures for the functioning of the State, and still have enough left over for creating the physical and social infrastructure and the related assets necessary for at least maintaining, if not pushing up, the growth rate?

What measures the government finally adopts in the 1990-91 Budget will be dictated more by the political constraints it faces and less by what is required for improving the discipline in economic and financial management. Its political constraints are essentially of three types:

i) Those that are beyond its sphere of control, at least in the short term. These relate primarily to the political and structural realities of today resulting in the Government's inability to cut:

a) its debt-servicing obligations immediately—in the long term these can be brought down through a reduced dependence on loans; and

b) the expenditure on defence in view of the current situation on the borders.

ii) Those resulting from its lack of will and reluctance to tax the farming lobby, for fear of them switching political loyalties.

iii) Those that are of its own making. The continued kidnappings and dacoities, particularly in Sindh, the allegations of rampant corruption amongst its leadership, and the privileged treatment of the feudals make it increasingly difficult (both morally and politically) to raise the tax payment of other sections of society, even of those with the capacity to pay.

In the view of this writer the biggest problem that the Government is confronted with is not merely how to balance its books but how to sustain growth as well as arrange a fairer and more equitable sharing of its benefits. The Government is currently conveying the impression that resources are simply not available to finance development and new investment in infrastructure and that it is keen to shed its development responsibilities and seek private capital. If, therefore, the entire purpose of the effort is just to ensure that there are adequate revenues for financing the non-development recurring expenditure comprising mainly of the components of defence, debt-servicing commitments and administration (where, considering the present conditions, there is limited room for manoeuvrability and radical reductions and restructuring), then there is little point in going through the motions of what is being portrayed as a major surgical operation and a major budgetary exercise. The objective could be achieved by partially raising taxes—through a 12.5 percent sales tax, by partially cutting expenditure on social services and economic subsidies and by further reducing, in real terms, expenditure on development-oriented programmes. This is the 'softest' option and the most appealing in political terms.

The major implications of this route needs to be elaborated. If the asset-creation role of the Government becomes less important, then, with the deceleration in the rate of creation of new assets—particularly in view of the high, and growing, rate of corruption and leakages from the funds expended on various projects—the ability of the installed infrastructure and other assets to generate revenues in the future will be seriously impaired. Therefore, the narrowing of the budgetary deficit by cutting expenditure will create a much more serious problem in the future, this time from the revenue side; the asset base will be inadequate for meeting expenditure obligations in the future. The problem will then become more acute and more difficult to resolve, as more and more will have to be extracted and appropriated, to finance the rising expenditure requirements, from the insufficient volume and depth of infrastructure.

Moreover, this option will be deflationary in nature. The 12.5 percent sales tax will curb consumption, and, indirectly, savings. The slackening in development expenditure will bring about a future reduction in the demand

for goods and services produced by the private sector. The combined effect of these two factors could have disastrous consequences for the investment climate and for the job market. The option will also be anti-poor in nature. The poor will be doubly hit—first, by the regressive nature of higher indirect taxation (the sales tax) and, secondly, by the worsening scenario for desperately needed employment opportunities, as a result of marked slow-down in investment.

As is obvious, the Government hardly has any options in respect of debt-servicing obligations, demands for defence—particularly in the light of the happenings in Kashmir, the requirements for running the administration, and tackling the internal law and order situation. As it is, just these four items consume 84.3 percent of the combined federal and provincial government revenues. The demand on revenues of defence and law and order needs have risen rapidly in recent months. Hence, if the pitfalls of a narrowing asset base referred to earlier are to be avoided, measures aimed at reducing the gap between expenditure obligations and revenues for financing these requirements will have to be more revenue generating in nature.

The more sensible and equitable route in this regard would be to curb the consumption of the richer segments of the population. Then, what other options does the Government have, and can exercise, if the political will exists (this is the real stumbling block) to bridge the gap between expenditure and revenues while maintaining, if not raising, real levels of expenditure on development and welfare-oriented programmes. A discussion of these follows:

Starting with the income tax proposals first, the Federal Government should try and convince the provincial governments to also demonstrate their sincerity in meeting the shortfall by mobilising resources internally. They should be asked to reintroduce taxation of capital gains, raise irrigation water charge—given that only 40-45 percent of the operations and maintenance expenditure of the irrigation systems is recovered from the beneficiaries, and substantially increase the road tax paid by owners of motor vehicles. And, of course, there is the long-standing demand of various groups for the taxation of higher agricultural incomes, and the withdrawal of the special fiscal dispensation enjoyed by the large farmers.

Even if it is conceded that taxation of agricultural incomes is a provincial subject under the Constitution, the PPP Government can do either of the following two things:

i) It can set an example by introducing such a tax in the provinces of Sindh and the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] in which it is in power.

ii) It can make estimates on what can potentially be realised from taxing agricultural incomes (and to it could be added the realizable from the revision of *abiana* charges and the reintroduction of the Capital Gains Tax)

and adjust the non-obligatory and discretionary grants to the provinces by these amounts.

Second, income of retail outlets should be taxed on the basis of imputed sales and incomes. Their turnover should be estimated on the basis of the location of the shop, its size and the nature of the business. The information contained in the property tax registers of the Excise and Taxation Department can provide the starting point for conducting a survey for supplementing existing information on location of shop and its covered area by data on the type of business. This measure is proposed on grounds of simplicity (to minimise taxpayers' contact with the tax department) and to avoid what prevails today in terms of low tax yields from prime commercial centres.

Third, the benefit of furnished accommodation provided by companies to its employees should be disallowed for tax purposes and all such perquisites should be taxable at the beneficiary's end.

Fourth, for individuals provided with employer-maintained cars, with engine size exceeding 800 cc, the amount to be added to the taxable income of the individual should be raised to Rs 10,000, from Rs 3,600 currently being added back in the assessee's income.

Fifth, to discourage luxury consumption, leasing charges paid by companies on cars exceeding 1300 cc should not be allowed as admissible expenditure for tax purposes.

Sixth, a number of businesses are not paying the interest due on various loans taken by them. It is proposed that interest charges should be allowed as an expense only on actual payment basis and not on accruals basis.

Seventh, the income tax exemptions granted to all foundations, including the Fauji Foundation, should be withdrawn.

Eighth, from the point of view of the honest assessee, the Government should also be seen to be fair and equitable in its treatment of different tax-payers. The Government charges a penalty rate of 2 percent per month on the difference between the tax demand raised by the Income Tax Department and the tax under-deposited by the assessee. Then, in all fairness, the applicable interest rate on any refund determined in an appeal should be the market rate rather than the 6 percent per annum rate allowed currently. This measure will also put pressure on the Income Tax Department to exercise greater caution in its assessments.

So much for income tax related proposals. Given below are proposals in respect of wealth tax:

Wealth tax payments are allowed as a deductible expense against incomes liable to taxation. This treatment should be discontinued. Wealth tax dues should not be allowed as an expense while estimating taxable income.

Whereas agricultural land is valued at its market price when offered as collateral against a loan, it is valued at its

much lower produce index unit for wealth tax purposes. This anomaly should be removed and the same valuation, the market price, should be used for both purposes.

For determining wealth tax the assets owned by all the members of a family—the husband and wife and their dependent children—should be clubbed. The family should be treated as one unit for tax purposes. The tax exemption limit for the family's wealth should be what is currently applicable to an individual.

In respect of revisions of user charges for certain services, it is proposed that tuition fee for higher education, which is very low, should be raised. Students in degree colleges and universities are currently paying less, as monthly tuition fees, than what they spend in a single day in the college canteen. Therefore, fees for higher education, graduation and above, should be enhanced.

Similarly, charges for private rooms in government-owned hospitals should be increased so that there is full recovery of the costs entailed in providing these facilities.

On the expenditure side most of the changes and restraint in expenditure can only be introduced over a longer time horizon, through a curtailment of expenditure on defence and debt servicing, the latter through a reduced reliance on borrowings. As a step in this direction, therefore, expenditure on defence should be discussed at length by the elected representatives. A serious debate on this matter can, however, only begin provided defence is no longer shown as a one line item in the Federal Budget.

As is evident, austerity should be the order of the day, if the fiscal imbalance is to be corrected. The important consideration in this regard should be the equitable sharing of the related burden. Austerity, therefore, will have to be mixed with programmes of social import to moderate the adverse impact of the austerity measures on the poor. We have to concede that the thin upper stratum is getting richer while the poor have been pushed out of the ambit of development and exposed to further exploitation.

To help the poor, therefore, the poverty alleviation programmes would have to include a mix of:

(a) development projects that provide employment opportunities; (b) better access to potable water and critical infrastructure like farm-to-market roads and electricity; and (c) greater emphasis on development of human capital through improvements in health facilities and education—a slow but powerful tool for improving their productivity and chances for gainful employment.

In respect of (c) above it is proposed that the Government should seek the support of the Opposition in making a national commitment, by suitably amending the Constitution if necessary, that, irrespective of who is in power, the minimum annual allocation for education shall be 5 percent of the GNP [gross national product] of

the previous year. In this way the Government can furnish home evidence of its commitment to development in general and to the improvement in the quality of life of the poor in particular.

New Formula To Collect Ushr Being Proposed

*46000108D Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 20 May 90 p 8*

[Article by Ashraf Hashmi]

[Text] Islamabad, May 19: The collection of Ushr from agriculture sector would register an eight time increase if the new formula being proposed for collection and assessment of Ushr approved and implemented during the forthcoming fiscal year.

This was stated by Feroz Qaiser, the Chairman of the Prime Minister's Consultative Committee on Economic Affairs.

Talking to THE MUSLIM here Saturday, Feroz Qaiser was of the view that with the introduction of the proposed system the government would be able to collect at least Rs 1.5 billion from the agriculture sector as Ushr. "Had there been a tax on agriculture income this would have been the exact recoverable amount" he remarked.

He said at present Ushr collection from the agriculture sector is restricted to only Rs 20 crores. The Prime Minister, he said, has issued special instructions for revamping the collection and assessment of Ushr. He said under the present system the local Zakat Committees were responsible for collecting Ushr in rural areas. The assessment, he said, is made on the basis of lowest yield of crops and their lowest prices with the result that only Rs 20 crores were being collected as Ushr.

Under the new proposed system the assessment, he said, would be made on the basis of average yield and average prices of the crops during the year. Similarly the collection would be the responsibility of revenue officials instead of local Zakat committees. The amount collected from the specific area would be diverted to the development of that area which would be helpful for the provincial governments in their development efforts.

Feroz Qaiser strongly pleaded that all exemptions from the payment of taxes should immediately be done away with in every sector including the agriculture sector. He clarified that he had never opposed the imposition of tax on agriculture. What he said while addressing the recent pre-budget seminar at Quetta was that the Federal Government has been constitutionally debarred from levying tax on agriculture.

He said, however, the provincial governments were free to tax the agriculture income and he would be happy if they really exercise their authority.

In view of the constitutional impediment and in accordance with its desire that the landed aristocracy should

also share the rising economic burden the Federal Government was planning to reshape the system of Ushr.

A proposal in this respect has already been submitted to the Cabinet which would soon finally take a decision on it, he added.

PPP-IJI Tussle Shifts to Azad Kashmir

*46000108A Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 20 May 90 p 6*

[Article by Mir Abdul Aziz]

[Text] "I will break the head of anybody who imports Pakistan's politics into Azad Kashmir [AK]" said Ch. Muhammad Ali, when he was prime minister of Pakistan, to a deputation of Kashmiris including Sardar Ibrahim Khan, the the president of the parallel All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. The writer of these lines who was then general secretary of the Muslim Conference and late Rajah Muhammad Haider Khan of Muzaffarabad. Ch. Mohammad Ali had convened an All Parties Conference on Kashmir, which we also attended and on its conclusion we called on the prime minister of Pakistan at Karachi. He told us that, as was decided by All Parties Kashmir Conference, elections would be held in Azad Kashmir but he would not allow anyone to import Pakistan's party politics into Azad Kashmir. He had suspicions that our party was hobnobbing with late Mr H.S. Suhrawardy, the then leader of the Opposition, who wanted to form a branch of his party in Azad Kashmir.

Later on, Chaudhry himself exported his party into Azad Kashmir by making Sardar Ibrahim, the convenor of his Nizami Islam Party.

Pakistan's politics have been very much there in Azad Kashmir. The Muslim Conference leaders had been saying that Pakistan's politics should not be allowed in Azad Kashmir. It is interesting to note that Sardar Qayyum himself is a member of the All Pakistan Muslim League. He used to attend meetings of the Pagara League frequently and the MSF [Muslim Student Federation] used to receive large amounts of money from the Pagara League. The Muslim Conference of Sardar Qayyum was also the 9th star of the PNA [Pakistan National Alliance], and Sardar Sikandar, the present Prime Minister of AK used to be the general secretary of the PNA.

And whenever the Muslim League is in power anywhere in Pakistan, the Muslim Conference leaders proudly say that despite a little difference in nomenclature, the Muslim League and the Muslim Conference are one. Both the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] and the Muslim Conference claim to be the recipients of inspiration from the late Gen Ziaul Haq. In fact Gen Zia used to call himself a "mureed" of Sardar Abdul Qayyum, who was his "murshid" (a spiritual guide).

Sardar Qayyum raised full throated slogans in favor of the late Z.A. Bhutto when the latter visited Azad

Kashmir in 1973. One of the slogans which the Sardar raised at Rawalakot was: "Pakistan ki azmat ka nishaan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto" which meant that ZAB was the symbol of the greatness of Pakistan.

It is also to be noted that when Mr Bhutto was in difficulty in 1977, he got released Sardar Qayyum from Pullandri jail and sent him as his emissary to contact leaders of the opposition. Sardar Qayyum did this job well. During the present situation also, he aspired to become the go-between to bring about a compromise between the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and the IJI, but it seems that the present PPP regime did not oblige him. He therefore, started disputing the right of the PPP to form a branch in Azad Kashmir. It is interesting to note that his Muslim Conference has branches all over Pakistan.

The election campaign in Azad Kashmir and for the 12 refugee seats in Pakistan is in full swing. Barring a few constituencies, it seems to be a straight fight between the IJI and PPP. The Prime Minister of Pakistan has left on a foreign tour, with the aim of seeking assistance of the Muslim countries for Kashmir, and the IJI chief is also touring Azad Kashmir, seeking the support of the electorate for the candidates of the ruling Muslim Conference. Sardar Qayyum urged a gathering at Kotli to call Mian Nawaz Sharif the Prime Minister of Pakistan and not Chief Minister of Punjab. And he himself raised slogans of "Pakistan kay charon soobon ki awaz Mian Nawaz" at Mirpur. Sardar Sahib seems to be an expert in coining slogans.

Federal Ministers of PPP are also helping their partymen in Azad Kashmir and on the 12 seats based in Pakistan. There is nothing wrong in this campaign. Let us hope that the elections will pass off peacefully and a democratically elected government will replace the present one. It is too risky to make a prediction about the results. Let us hope for the best.

Editorial Views Corruption

46000116A Karachi DAWN in English 27 May 90 p 7

[Text] After recent conciliatory moves between the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and the provincial governments opposed to it, the political temperature in the country seemed to be going down. But it has shot up again after the accusations of corruption that have flowed thick and fast between the Federal Government and the Combined Opposition Parties [COP]. The latter, indeed, held a convention in Rawalpindi to highlight what it considered were the Government's misdemeanours in this field. Some PPP spokesmen have tried to refute these charges. Others have made charges of their own against the Punjab provincial government, accusing it of embezzling huge amounts of public money. As a result of all this talk of corruption in high places, the atmosphere in the country has become a bit murky and public confidence in their leaders, already pretty low, has fallen still further. It should be obvious to everyone that if these exchanges continue, the political process itself

will receive a setback and democracy will earn a bad name. This situation would be bad at any time, but when faced with Indian threats and the Kashmiri uprising, there was a greater need than ever before for Pakistan to put its own house in order, it becomes infinitely worse. So what should be done to put an end to it?

The Prime Minister says that if the Opposition has any proof of wrongdoing on the part of members of the Federal Government or members of her own family, it should move the courts. This, however, is easier said than done. What if the Opposition does not take her advice and sticks to its present tactics? The Government will suffer not the Opposition, for when allegations of corruption begin to be talked about in drawing rooms and bazars, the moral authority of a government is eroded. And once that happens, its ability to govern effectively is crippled. The onus, therefore, is on the Prime Minister to take the initiative in this matter, instead of taking refuge behind protestations that it is the target of a malicious smear campaign. She can do this by appointing an independent and impartial commission or tribunal to investigate all the charges that have been made, whether against the Federal Government or the Punjab Government. True, the Prime Minister has asked Malik Qasim, who is head of the Federal Anti-Corruption Committee, to investigate Opposition charges. But a man closely identified with the Government is unlikely to be acceptable to the Opposition. In order to be credible, the tribunal in question must be independent. A time limit could be set for such a body to complete its task. Once its findings are known, strict action should be taken against anyone found guilty of nepotism, corruption and the misuse of authority.

In this connection, it might not be out of place to say that had the Prime Minister taken some action against her Minister of State for Finance, whose conduct was severely criticised by the Rawalpindi Bench of the Lahore High Court, she could not only have spared herself much of the distress she is now encountering but she could also have occupied the moral high ground. But far from doing anything of the sort, she has chosen to defend Mr Ehsanul Haq Piracha which, to say the least, has not been a wise move on her part. At times the lancing of a malignant growth can save the rest of the body from sickness and disease. But this is not a point that she seems much to appreciate. At any rate, corruption is turning into the Achilles heel of the PPP Government. Unless it seeks to cover its exposed tendons, it will continue attracting sharp darts from a hostile Opposition. This is a decisive test of the Prime Minister's leadership. A lot will depend upon how she comes out of it.

Commentary Terms Karachi 'Pakistan's Beirut'

*46000118B Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 22 May 90 pp 4, 11*

[Commentary by Nusrat Nasarullah]

[Text] Not having written last week would normally make it somewhat more difficult to begin this time. There would be that much more to say. And so the problem would be how to begin? While that does appear to be the case, there is also my weary feeling that there is nothing new to report, except of the same. Karachi remains tense and trouble-ridden, and with Hyderabad worse off, someone may read relief in this scenario. The Senate of course is discussing Sindh, and the Prime Minister is off to the Middle East with the Kashmir issue as the principal item on her agenda.

I am not suggesting that Karachi has nothing to write about. But I would like to make a slight departure from the capital of Sindh and tell you about the heavenly contrast that a Karachite gets when he goes off for five days to Copenhagen, even if it is to attend an International Media Seminar on population issues, organised by the untiring United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). This time the UNFPA has come out with a world report on the population theme with special emphasis on the last decade of the 20th century. A central theme being that this is the last decade that offers to the world, a chance to do something about the exploding population scenario.

It was a fine seminar, brief, yet stimulating and of course I am not sure whether many of the participants from the developed world truly grasped the extent to which population matters in developing societies. It is very simple. Living in the prosperity and the isolation of the developed world, it is natural and necessary as well, to just about forget that there is a poor population on the world's map. Population turns into a cold media theme, a subject for classy rhetoric and a point that needs to be thrown into the face of the developing societies each time they turn to the affluent and powerful nations in the world, seeking help, in fact forever seeking help.

I said at the summing up session of the seminar and in brief I intend to reproduce it here as well. That the Karachi problem is in a sense an explosive population theme. A population story that is not being told. It is not a family planning kind of a story—but one which reflects the tension that comes from migration and unemployment, and illegal immigrants. Isn't it amazing that even a city like Karachi, and a country like Pakistan has the problem of illegal immigrants—and of course refugees as well.

Look at the unhappiness and the bloodshed that has resulted in this city ever since April 1985, when that college girl Bushra Zaidi died in Nazimabad. A transport problem, an environmental problem turned into an ethnic riot. Thereafter the citizens of this city have battled with each other, and the loss of life and property is a weather-beaten tale now. The central question still remains: what shall the province of Sindh do with the population of this city? How soon, if at all, can enough and respectable infrastructure be provided to all? Is the World Bank the answer. Is the UNFPA the answer? Is there an answer anywhere in sight at this stage? Has it to

get worse before it gets better? I can only give you questions. Please don't respond with tears.

The five days that I was away brought more incidents of killing, ransom kidnapping, car snatching and protest and anger—but it also brought a further hardening of people's attitude's not indifference. But the kind of attitude that is reflected in a remark like this. After all we have to get on with life. It is with hesitation that people, and even families move out of their homes, for work, and recreation. A common thing to hear in Karachi these days is the disclosure that "I don't go out of the house unless it is very necessary." There are people who don't go out after they have returned to their homes after work. They watch video or Pakistan TV or aggravate the population scenario, says a cynical friend of mine.

It might be somewhat relevant to mention here the large crowds that were outdoors on Friday evening, and until late at night, despite what everyone says is a terrifying scenario. I can cite the evidence that comes from the unconventional print media advertisement that have appeared recently, originating from the All Pakistan Textile Millowners Association, the SICORLO and other groups. Some of these were appeals to the President of Pakistan and the Chief Minister of Sindh to act and intervene and save the people.

Now what were these crowds of people doing? Eating out is popular in this city and it often makes some of us comment that eating at home is becoming an outdated lifestyle, unless of course it is very necessary. There are numerous sociological interpretations on this theme. As always on Friday night there were large crowds having their Burgers, and Kababs, and Tikkas, and Chinese meals as if all was well in Karachi. But then what else can we do, argue the citizens who even refer to people in places like Beirut. After all life hasn't stopped there.

Now while law and order appears to be one theme, there are political parties like the Jamaat-E-Islami raising issues like that of Pakistan Television, obscene video films and other forms of entertainment. The argument is traditional. These media are all corrupting the moral values of the Muslims of Pakistan. That in a nutshell is the case, and so on Friday evening there came to an end a week of protest at the way private and public entertainment is influencing Pakistani society. A TV set was stoned to destruction in the spirit of "SANGSAAR," on Friday evening at the Civic Centre Roundabout in Gulshan-E-Iqbal, and three people died in other places there, for various other reasons. When the news of Lahore's blast at Bhatti Gate came at 9 pm in which 10 people had died, the Karachite felt (perhaps) that life was becoming Hell elsewhere as well.

When I got down to writing this column on Saturday the sweeper told me in a matter of fact manner, that one of the two cars of a neighbour had been snatched at the petrol pump by two armed boys at 7:30 am and that was all. I had just finished reading the newspapers which carried some details of how within a week there is to be

swift and just action against criminals. So here is a week that promises to bring relief and hope.

What the Federal Budget is going to bring net month one doesn't know. I only know that there has never been so much of public relationing for the Budget in the past. What I cannot understand is that while transport fares have risen substantially in the city, there has been no harsh reaction. A citizen commented, "there is the uncertainty of life and death. Fares don't matter anymore." Not a bad angle, I dare say.

Editorial Discusses Sindh Situation

46000115E Karachi DAWN in English 26 May 90 p 7

[Text] As one whose office requires him to take a detached view of the changing political scene and the day-to-day functioning of the governmental machinery, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan is ideally placed to offer disinterested advice to the political leaders as well as the Executive in the larger interest of the political system and the country. This is what he attempted to do during his recent two-day visit to Karachi. By ruling out either Martial Law or Governor's rule in Sindh, the President reaffirmed his faith in democracy and constitutional government and hoped that the measures being taken by the provincial administration would produce results. At the same time, the Head of State once again called for an all-party conference to discuss Sindh's deteriorating law and order situation and to come up with concrete suggestions that could stem the slide into the abyss. Nobody would disagree with the President's forthright rejection of Martial Law as a possible answer to the anarchic situation that prevails in the southern province. We experimented with Martial Law thrice, but it never succeeded in solving any of the problems for whose intended solution it dislodged civilian governments. It tried to treat or suppress the symptoms but it never got down to treating the malady. What is more, the suspension of the political process under military rule invariably led to exacerbation, so that at the end of the day the country experienced a resurgence of the old malady in a more virulent form. Under the present circumstances, there is little that a Martial Law administration or the Governor's rule can achieve.

One might ask why some people have gone to the extent of asking for an unelected government and even a patently extraconstitutional arrangement, in spite of our experience of the futility and harmfulness of such departures. Barring the small minority which has been traditionally allergic to a democratic system, the advocacy of such nostrums in most cases proceeds from utter desperation. The elected governments have been managing their business badly, and a process of disillusionment with the democratic order has been set in motion. It is no use denying this fact. Talking specifically of Sindh, ever since the democratic government assumed office in December 1988, we have been treated to one promise after another in an unending succession, but the situation on the ground has gone from bad to worse. The

change in the stewardship of the Sindh administration in February had aroused some hope of an improvement in the situation. Even those with a sceptical bent of mind were inclined to wait and see. They are still waiting. The law-and-order situation is going from bad to worse. Things are no better so far as the region of politically motivated violence is concerned. The argument that the entire fault lies with the opponents of the Government is self-serving and will not bear scrutiny. Democracy's strong point is that it accommodates dissent and provides avenues of consultation, negotiation and conflict-resolution. One does not find these avenues being explored. Reverting to the issue of increase in crime, there is a noticeable lack of will on the part of the Government to fulfil its duty to protect the life, honour and property of the citizens. When the Government shows that it has the will to act, the law enforcement agencies will respond in spite of their known weaknesses.

It is widely known that dacoits and kidnappers enjoy the backing of influential people, and there are reasons to believe that the Government knows who they are. There have been cases where victims have been rescued from the clutches of the kidnappers after negotiations involving the amount of ransom. This is a most extraordinary situation which calls for strength of will and ruthless efficiency in waging a war against the violators of the law regardless of their status and influence. Unless the Government proves by deeds that it is capable of cracking down hard on the perpetrators of crime, the present process of the rapid erosion of its credibility is bound to be speeded up.

President Ishaq's suggestion for an all-party conference needs to be considered carefully. It is intentions that matter and not procedures and modalities of talks or conferences. An all-party moot will serve little purpose if the participants turn it into a forum for party propaganda and mud-slinging. Posturing is hardly the kind of response the people of Sindh expect from their leaders at this critical moment when blood is flowing in the streets. If the conference fails to achieve a consensus and does not come up with concrete suggestions for reversing the frightening trend towards violence and anarchy, the state of demoralisation will get worse. It would be much better if the conference is preceded by careful spadework and behind-the-scenes negotiations. If the parties are able to evolve a consensus at these parleys, the conference could then formally meet to adopt an agreed programme for peace in Sindh. Without honesty of purpose on the part of both the administration and the politicians, one cannot hope for what every citizen in Sindh has been anxiously hoping and praying for—peace.

Commentary Views 'Excitement', Confusion Over Shariah Bill

46000121A Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 25 May 90 pp 4, 9

[Article by Mir Jamil-ur-Rehman]

[Text] President Ghulam Ishaq Khan has hailed the adoption of the Shariah Bill by the Senate as an historic event for the ummah. He has urged the National Assembly to follow suit and thus demonstrate its love for Islam.

The president's excitement over the Shariah Bill is rather premature. His excitement would have been more appropriate at the time of its enactment as the law of the land. It cannot become the law of the land unless he gives it his assent. And a bill cannot be presented to him for his assent unless it is passed by the National Assembly untouched by amendments. What happens if the National Assembly rejects the Shariah Bill and does not pass it within ninety days after receiving it, or passes it with amendments? One of two things may then happen. Either the bill will elapse or if the Senate was still interested in its passage then it may request the President to summon the Parliament (joint sitting of the two Houses) to consider the bill. The Parliament would then decide the fate of the bill by the votes of the majority of its total membership. It may reject it or pass it with or without amendments. In the latter case it will be presented to the President for his assent. Only after the President has given his assent will the bill become an act of Parliament and thus could be enacted as the law of the land.

The fact is that the Shariah Bill might not reach the President for his assent. The Government in power has made it abundantly clear that it does not accept the bill in its present shape. The indications are that the Government may go to the court pleading that the Senate has exceeded its legislative powers. The court may declare it ultra vires or send it back to the Senate to bring it within the constitutional parameters.

It is doubtful that any government worth its salt would ever allow an important piece of legislation which has been sponsored by the opposition to become an act of Parliament. The President may care to recall that this Shariah Bill was introduced in the Senate on 13 July 1985 as a private member's bill jointly by two opposition Senators. He himself then was the chairman of the Senate.

Opposition

The makeshift Muslim League under Prime Minister Junejo had opposed the bill tooth and nail. Junejo's Law Minister, Senator Wasim Sajjad, now the chairman of the Senate, had most eloquently and with great logic stated the reasons for opposing the bill. In his view the bill lacked consensus and did not meet the aspirations of the majority of the people. The Junejo Government had undertaken to first establish consensus among the various schools of thought, redraft the bill accordingly and then introduce it from the treasury benches. Junejo and his Government came under great pressure on this issue but he remained firm in his resolve. The same Senators who mostly belong to the Muslim League have now taken a somersault. It is anybody's guess whether their

conversion is due to their newborn love for Shariah or their inborn hostility towards the PPP.

The President's advice that the National Assembly should demonstrate its love for Islam by adopting the Shariah Bill is incompatible with the character of his exalted office. The President is well aware of the feelings of the ruling party about this bill and the controversy it had engendered when it was first introduced in Junejo's time. He has unfairly implied that the failure of the national Assembly to adopt this bill would be tantamount to its lack of love for Islam. The implication is quite serious. If the National Assembly were to reject this bill, it would be branded as anti-islamic by the sponsors of the bill. Secondly, the President by implying thus has in fact preempted the legislative authority of the National Assembly. It is the constitutional right of the national Assembly to legislate freely and without fear for the general good of the people. Any suggestion which implies conditions to its law-making prerogative is undemocratic and would be tantamount to clipping the sovereignty of the National Assembly.

There is no way that the Government of Benazir, and for that matter any other Government, could either be persuaded or pressurized in giving a free passage in the national Assembly to a private member's bill. The Shariah Bill is a major piece of legislation. Its enactment would effect some basic and far reaching changes in our economic and judicial system. A private member is not equipped with the means to foresee all the consequence which his proposed law could unleash in the country. It is only the Government in power which possesses the information, resources and professional manpower to unearth every eventuality, a proposed law could cause before embarking upon legislation.

The Shariah Bill as passed by the Senate is full of explosives. If enacted in its present shape it will blast the nation into unending and deadly sectarian controversies and an all-out economic, legislative and judicial confusion. In fact the Senate is asking the public representatives to withdraw their legislative authority in favor of the courts. Instead of the Parliament it would be up to the judges to determine and define Shariah. Instead of interpreting the law, the judges will be making the law. If that is the intention, then the Parliament better pack up and go home.

Confusion

Think of the confusion that would follow. The Lahore High Court may judge that the National Savings Schemes of the Government of Pakistan which distribute fixed profits are repugnant to Shariah. The Sindh High Court on the other hand may declare otherwise basing its decision on a well-presented case supported by viable testimony. A smuggler of Russian silk and air conditioners may convince the Peshawar High Court that he was engaged in legitimate trade activity and not smuggling. Any act or order of the Government can be challenged in the court as repugnant to Shariah. Thus the

business of the federal and provincial governments could be brought to a virtual standstill.

There is no dispute in the country on the question of enforcement of Shariah. Our constitution contains enough safeguards making certain that no law could be enacted which is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy-Quran and Sunnah. This council of Islamic Ideology has been in existence since 1974. This council is the constitutional sentinel which ensures that legislation remains within the confines of the tenets of Islam. Then there exists the Federal Shariat Court. any citizen can petition the Court to examine and decide the question whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.

The Constitution has guaranteed the enforcement of Shariah through the elected representatives of the people. The Parliament will be shirking from its constitutional duty if it were to pass on the enforcement of Shariah to the courts.

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people. The Parliament will be shirking from its constitutional duty if it were to pass on the enforcement of Shariah to the courts.

Energy: Commentaries View Needs, Strategy

Editorial on Conserving Energy

46000111 Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES
in English 23 May 90 p 6

[Editorial]

[Text] The National Energy Conservation Centre (ENERCON) established in 1985 to encourage energy conservation had so far been content with giving out National Energy Management Award to organisations contributing to energy conservation in the country. It has now taken a step further and decided to create within the private sector high quality energy conservation services through training and subsequently hiring local engineering firms to conduct detailed energy audits. Later it will develop into an autonomous energy conservation agency meant to ensure optimum utilisation of the scarce resource.

Its first task should be a mass education programme. People are still not sufficiently conscious of the energy crisis we are facing. There is still a lot of wastage, particularly in domestic use. For a chronically energy deficit country this is unpardonable. Even more so when the challenge worsens with rapidly increasing demand and the traditional means of power generation, oil and gas development, and imports are not able to meet the requirements. Wherever in other countries the energy supply has deteriorated and there was little prospect of augmenting the supply quickly, conservation has been seen as a compelling need. In Pakistan, too, it should be the first of the imperatives. Conservation has the additional advantage of protecting the environment and contributing to efficiency and competitiveness.

Article Analyzes Increased Power Generation

46000111 Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES
in English 23 May 90 pp 6, 7

[Article by Masoud Mehdi Janjua]

[Text] Every Pakistani is worried about the unbearable national loss due to loadshedding. With increasing needs for village electrification and setting up of new industrial units, the gap between generation and demand will only be going to increase. A balance looks impossible unless we can introduce a radical change in the conventional methods to generate electricity and in the parastructure that now exists for it.

The solution to the problem lies in round-the-clock generation at full capacity and in installing new electric power stations. But as we do not have sufficient water in the ponds or catchment areas round the year, and because of the need to close the canals for annual repairs, what to say of keeping pace with increasing demand, we

cannot even achieve a goal of full capacity generation of electricity round the year even if the demand remains static.

Apart from solar energy we have three ways to generate electricity: thermal power stations; nuclear reactors; and hydro-electric power stations.

Undoubtedly we can have only a very limited number of thermal power stations and a very few nuclear reactors. Add to it the lack of heavy initial cost and international political and geopolitical strains. This is a vicious circle which is hard, but not impossible, to break. For hydro-power, the simplest question is, can we provide sufficient water round the clock indefinitely to keep the generators moving at full speed and producing electricity at full capacity? Fortunately, the answer to it is a big "yes."

Before going into the details of the proposal by which we can arrange the supply of water to the generators without jeopardising the other systems, it is pertinent to look at the problem of the Kalabagh Dam. The main objections to the construction of this dam are:

(i) The flow of water in the Indus will be lessened and thus the speed and quantum of water in the delta will so decrease that the seawater will begin to flow in the river which phenomenon will result in:

(a) increasing the salinity on the one hand, both in sea and to large area upstream the delta, while on the other hand the heading-up of water will cause waterlogging—a situation which will cause the fertile land to change into barren land;

(b) great increase in salinity in the sea which in its turn will decrease the propagation of sea life—a special victim of which will be the fish, source for foreign exchange.

(ii) In pond area, the underground water level will rise and the fertile land around it will be subjected to waterlogging and thus on the one hand such land will be ruined, while on the other the danger and havoc due to floods will increase manifold: new areas will come under floods.

We need not go into the validity of these apprehensions. We must think about other means that will go in our favour without causing any loss or damage.

To generate electricity we are to rotate the main shaft of the generator at a specified speed. This is done, in case of hydro-electricity, by forcing the water to flow through a tube-channel at the end of which there is a propeller connected with the main shaft of the generator. Now-a-days we head-up water by constructing dams and regulate the flow of water. The fears listed above are not altogether incorrect. However, it will be seen that if we exclude and get rid of the pond area created by heading-up of water, all these apprehensions will automatically lose ground. Can we do that? The answer is again "yes."

At present we construct dams and cause the headed-up water to flow through a slanting tunnel having upper end much bigger than the lower end where the main shaft of the turbine has been placed and pivoted in such a way that the blades fixed to it rotate under the force of the water. Such movement of the blades causes rotation of the shaft, at the other end of which is the generator. And thus electricity is generated. Apart from many other things, the generation of electricity is directly proportional to the speed of the rotation of the main shaft while the speed of rotation of the main shaft is directly proportional to the mass and the speed of the flow of the water. By adding up these two versions we come to the conclusion that the quantum and speed of the water falling on the blades of main shaft are directly proportional to the generation of electricity.

By the foregoing we can simply say that we can calculate the quantum and speed of the water required to generate electricity at full capacity of any generator. The speed of the water is calculated in terms of a certain volume per second. Now we certainly know that how much water flows through the tunnel per second for any generator working at full capacity at the present.

The device by which the water is lifted up is called tubewell. The water being lifted up has also a speed per second. If we divide the quantum of water required by the turbine per second by the quantum of the water being lifted up by the tubewell per second, we can exactly know the number of tubewells required to keep the turbine and the generator rotating at full speed. This is theory. But because we have not taken the losses which always occur for one reason or the other, for practical purposes we will have to increase the required input for the generator by 20 percent and will also have to decrease the output of the tubewell by 20 percent. The fractions will be disregarded and the fractions in case of required number of the tubewells will be rounded off to the next higher whole number. For example:

(a) Speed of water required to rotate the shaft.
= 1000 C.Ft./Sec.

(b) 20% of the speed at (a)
= 200 C.Ft./Sec.

(c) Total (a + b)
= 1200 C.Ft./Sec.

(d) Speed of water pumped out by the tubewell.
= 10 C.Ft./Sec.

(e) 20% of the speed at (d)
= 2 C.Ft./Sec.

(f) Subtracting (e) from (d)
= 8 C.Ft./Sec.

(g) Number of tubewells required (c divided by f the fractions rounded off to next whole number).
= 1200 divided by 8
= 150 Nos.

Instead of 150 tubewells we will install 450 tubewells so as to allow 16 hours rest after each 8 hours' continuous working.

We have hypothetically discussed as to what number of tubewells are required to equal one turbine in terms of use of water. The idea behind it is that if we pump up the water coming out of the tunnel, after rotating the turbine, back to the main pond, there will be no loss of water and all the generators will produce the electricity at full capacity. The consumption of the electricity by these tubewells will be a small fraction of the electricity being generated by that generator. To start with, we can install tubewells at all the hydro-electric-power-stations now in operation.

At present we are pumping out the water from the waterlogged areas into the canals. This process in itself is very dangerous to life, both botanically and zoologically. The havoc created by such a scheme in the area irrigated by Keerthar Canal in Nasirabad Division in Balochistan, cannot be ignored. Same is the condition at the tail of every canal, distributory, minor and rajbah of the canals into which water from waterlogged areas is pumped. In this way we are nourishing the monster of salinity and waterlogging—which in its turn is adversely affecting the flora and fauna. The health of human beings, animals and vegetation is deteriorating. We cannot allow such a situation to persist, even for a short time.

Fortunately now we are in a position to combat the monster of salinity and waterlogging by pumping up the water into the overhead tank and after utilising it, as explained above, by allowing the same to flow into the river or *same nallah*. This process will not only give us electricity but also enable us to resecure the fertile land.

Coming to the Kalabagh Dam in nutshell if we generate electricity without heading up the water, all objections will die away. Keeping this in view, if we lift up water from a point just upstream of the bridge between Mari Indus and Kalabagh and after using it for the generation of electricity in three stages let the water flow back into the river just upstream of the Jinnah Barrage, there will be neither loss of water in the river nor will there be any heading up of water since there will be no pond area.

On the Mari Indus side we can install 18 generators each of the capacity of the one installed at Tarbela or Mangla or at any other place whichever is the biggest. These generators may be installed in three sets, each set having six generators. To avoid any mishap we may also construct three tanks each of the capacity to cater to the needs of six generators for one day, i.e. 24 hours. The difference of height between the tank and the generators should be the same as is at Mangla; and the tank may be 60 ft deep. Similarly, the height difference between the last outlet and the highest flood level of the river will be 10 feet.

The provision for the overflow of tanks will also be there in such a way that the overflow of the highest tank will flow into the middle tank; that from the middle tank will

flow into the last tank and that of the last tank will flow into the river along with the water from the outlet of the third set of generators. The diagramatic sketch [omitted] of the proposed Kalabagh hydro electric power station will explain the position.

Basic Data

- (1) Water required for one turbine.
= 1,000 cusic
- (2) Water required for one set of 6 turbines.
= 6,000 cusic
- (3) Volume of water required per second.
= 6,000 c.ft.
- (4) Volume of water required per 24 hours (volume of the tank).
6000x3600x24
- (5) Depth of tank.
= 60 ft.
- (6) Area of tank.
= 51,84,00,000 divided by 60
= 86,40,000 c.ft.
- (7) One side of the tank.
= 86,40,000
= 2,949 ft. approx.
= 4.5 furlong, approx.

Commentary: English in Pakistan

English in Pakistan

46000109A Karachi DAWN in English 14 May 90 p 7

[Article: "English in Pakistan"]

[Text] An extraordinary phenomenon clouds the future of English in Pakistan: its ubiquity is hardly a measure of its quality. The English language Press may thrive, English movies may be a craze, and a foreigner may be bewildered by the number and variety of street ads and neosigns he sees in English. But all said and done, these are but a superficial manifestation of the hold and prevalence of English in a few major urban areas. But the standards of the once imperial language is shockingly low in a country where it is still the language of the bureaucracy and business. Yet a perusal of official correspondence will show that most of it is clothes in a hackneyed jargon which has changed little since the colonial days: "Reference your letter No... dated... the undersigned is pleased to inform you that your water supply will be disconnected unless...". Letters issuing from government and private offices are badly written and full of mistakes of idiom and grammar, to which the typist often adds his own. Tender notices and job advertisements are couched in an idiom copied from files, and betray a poor grasp of the language.

One reason for the fall in the quality of English is, of course, the decline in the standards of education in

general—a story in itself. Even in English-medium schools, barring some exceptions, the standard of English is no better. Sometimes, teachers themselves do not know the language well, to say nothing of nuances of expression and the finer points of usage and composition, while pronunciation and accent are no longer supposed to be a teacher's concern. School has become 'sukool', there is little difference between 'support' and 'sport', while 'aal' politicians make 'taal' promises and do nothing but 'taak'. TV announcers invariably trip over the name of the English film to be shown, restaurants greet their patrons with a 'wellcome' or 'wellcomme', while truckers warn that the fluid they are carrying could be anything between 'enflame-able' and 'inflammatory'. There are not many inter-school and inter-college English debates, while TV offers no quiz show in English. In the newspapers, howlers are common, so also are cliched and florid expressions, while brevity and precision are at a discount. Editors of English language journals sometimes wonder what it would be like when the present generation of journalists is phased out.

But the picture is not without its bright aspects. We also have novelists like Prof Ahmed Ali and Bapsi Sidhwa and poets like Daud Kamal and Mehdi Ali Seljuk and several others, while a sizable section of the educated middle class is still proficient in English. It would like its young ones to do the same—and that perhaps holds out some hope for English in Pakistan. In the meantime, one must welcome the symposium organised jointly by the National Book Council and the Karachi University's English Department. English cannot serve as the mass medium either now or in the future, though it has certain limited uses in the area of inter-communication at the elite level. Again, English cannot take the place of our languages as the principal vehicle of literary and poetic expressions, mass education or political communication. Yet English is indispensable as our link with the outside world. It is no more the language of the imperialist power. It is now the language of international diplomacy, world business and science and technology. Countries that do not have a historical relationship with English—China, Japan and the Middle Eastern States—are now spending millions to learn English. It would be a pity if Pakistanis, in their dealings with the outside world, were to lose an advantage that is theirs to benefit from.

English, a 'Pakistani Language'

46000109B Karachi DAWN (Magazine)
in English 25 May 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by Muneeza Shamsie: "English is a Pakistani Language"]

[Text] Professor Alamgir Hashmi is an eminent poet, scholar and critic. He has taught English at universities in America, Switzerland and Pakistan; contributed poems, critical articles and reviews to anthologies and journals all over the world.

He is also the winner of the 1985 Patras Bokhari Award for his book of poems "My Second in Kentucky". He is

the founder of the Jane Townsend Poetry Prize in Pakistan and this year, both he and Indian novelist Nayantara Sehgal, will be among the regional judges for Eurasia, for the 1990 Commonwealth Writers Prize. The main categories will be 10,000 pounds sterling for the Best Book, 1,000 pounds sterling for the Best First Published book.

The awards were initiated in 1987 to encourage the new upsurge of Commonwealth writing in English and is directly linked to the concept that English literature today is not the "literature of England" but a world English literature which transcends national and geographic boundaries.

Alamgir Hashmi has elaborated on this theme in his book *The Commonwealth, Comparative Literature and the World*. More recently, he has discussed the status of English and English creative writing in Pakistan at the International Conference on English in South Asia and at the symposium on Pakistani Literature in English held in Karachi, this month.

"With its 3 percent relatively privileged anglophone population Pakistan is an English speaking country just as it is an Urdu or Arabic or Persian speaking area..." he stated in his paper *Prologomena to the Study of Pakistani English and Pakistani Literature in English* "Not only has English been the language of education, law and government—or more recently, of trade, science and technology—for over a century. What is perhaps equally important is the fact that the language has been used ordinarily in South Asia for almost two centuries and its uses have not been limited to the practical or pragmatic spheres only; it has also been the literary vehicle for some of the best that has been written in these parts. The literature in English is the youngest of the major literatures and oratures of Pakistan, but its achievement is a vital part of our literary heritage.

"In fact it was an Indian Muslim, Sake Deen Mohammed, who wrote the very first book to be published in English by an Indian. His *Travels* which appeared before the end of the eighteenth century, in 1794, established India and Pakistan as one of the first regions outside the United Kingdom and the United States of America to have used English for literary purposes."

Dr Hashmi attributes the beginnings of present day Pakistani poetry to the "modern and witty, if austere, compositions of Shahid Suhrawardy". He describes contemporary English poetry in Pakistan as both modern and relevant and says that some of the best English poetry today is being written in Pakistan. The distinctive voice that contemporary Pakistani poets in English have forged "carries both the responsibility and authority of an ancient civilization recomposed part by part in its newer settings". While the small, but growing body of English fiction written by authors of Pakistani origin, whether they live in Pakistan or abroad, have added new dimensions to post-colonial writing.

An extremely articulate man who can talk at length about poetry and literature but is very reticent about himself, Dr Alamgir Hashmi spoke to me for a while of the isolation that English writing in Pakistan continues to suffer. It is still regarded as "alien", excluded from the mainstream and seldom mentioned in any discussion on "Pakistani" writers, writings or literary trends although its subject matter is drawn from the same political matrix and the same society as creative work in any other language in this country.

"Pakistani writers," Alamgir Hashmi said "including poets and playwrights have always been subject in the eyes of the Establishment, unless they are the Establishment belonging to the army, bureaucracy and so on. At best their work is considered a freakish activity. It is only because a small minority, the enlightened Establishment, has looked upon it positively, that it could sustain itself.

"The periods of benign indifference or hostility have altered over the decades. Sometimes this hostility has been fairly active to the extent that it was considered nonpatriotic to write in English. So Pakistani writers in English, especially poets, have not been officially recognised. It is only during the last decade that a flexibility of official attitudes became visible, when The Pakistan Academy of Letters instituted the Patras Bokhari Award for the Best Books in English."

Son of a lawyer, Alamgir Hashmi grew up in Lahore and started to write poetry as a child in both English and Urdu. Both languages were spoken at home, together with Punjabi. His parents also had some access to Sanskrit, Arabic and Persian, as was quite common in those days. In fact, Alamgir Hashmi is filled with regret that he, like most of his generation, has lost touch with classical oriental languages.

"In my home," he said "reading was a part of life. I started writing at eight or nine, because I liked words and, basically more than words, I liked images and sounds. It is these that still stay with me and haunt me and I try to find their verbal equivalent. That is why I have to work a lot at each poem.

"English gradually became my dominant language because it was the medium of instruction at school and I used it more. It has meant that I am no longer as fluent in Urdu as I once was, but I retain a great admiration for Urdu and Punjabi writers. I am familiar with classical Punjabi works. I still read Urdu fiction and verse and have done several translations.

"My English certainly has specific Urdu and Punjabi elements. I am not writing a characterless international English but an English that has a recognisable idiom, imagery and figures of speech that belong to this country. These would not have come into my language or my perception had it not been for my trilingual background. It has given me simultaneity, a way of invoking images and a process of recall where I can snatch, select or use words which are culturally associated."

The Chairman of the Standing Committee for the International Conference on English in South Asia, Dr Alamgir Hashmi was at Punjab University before going on to do his masters and doctorate at Louisville and San Francisco respectively. He spent 15 years abroad, writing and teaching, mostly in the United States and Switzerland. It was an experience which was to have a profound effect on him as a poet.

His first collection of poems "The Oath and Amen" appeared in Philadelphia in 1976 and he has written 5 books of poetry since.

Much of his work is the poetry of exile and reflects the nostalgia and cross cultural influences that became an integral part of his life. Memory, the sounds and smells of other countries, other places are central to much of his work. He uses contrast very effectively to give his verse texture and richness and his imagery, more often than not, is both delicate and elegant.

In his new book *Inland and Other Poems* the title poem "Inland" links up an experience of America, Pakistan and Switzerland and there are many others in this collection which contain references to more than one country or culture. Several poems, including "Captain Kirk in Karachi" are touched with irony and humour. Whereas "Kashmir 1987" evokes both the sound and spaces of Kashmir's fairy-tale valleys and include the lines:

The Neelam goes through the city, humming an old tune that time can crack as fresh walnut, while the valley's fruit collects in wicker baskets and the cease fire holds.

Particularly moving is a brief but beautiful tribute to Faiz, which ends with:

for he was a man who taught the Muse new manners, a meaning of grace, and filled Urdu's mid-century rift with ore.

In 1986, Dr Alamgir Hashmi founded the Jane Townsend poetry prize, to encourage poetry in English by students in Pakistan. He has participated in a Voice of America's World net programme on poetry and has given a series of lectures on English and Comparative Literature for Radio Islamabad. He now lives in Islamabad and works as course director at the Foreign Service Training Institute and has taught at Quaid-e-Azam University, Government College Lahore, and the University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. His latest book *The Commonwealth, Comparative Literature and the World* addresses itself not only to literature in English but to the literature of the world. In his dissertation *Muslim Literary Imagination and the Shape of the Contemporary World* he forcefully argues for the need of a more meaningful dialogue between nations of the North and South by the study of each other's literature which, in the Muslim context includes the poetry of Iqbal, Faiz, Mahmud Darwish and the prose of Ahmed Ali, Zulfikhar Ghose, Naguib Mahfouz, Forugh Forrokhzad, among others.

Letter: 'English in Pakistan'

46000109C Karachi DAWN in English 23 May 90 p 6

[Article by Prof. K. M. Larik, University of Sindh, Jamshoro: "English in Pakistan"]

[Text] I fully share the concern expressed in your editorial, "English in Pakistan" (DAWN 14.5.90). English has, in fact, been bruised and mutilated!

Our students fail to compose a meaningful and grammatically correct 10-line passage in English even after studying the language for 14 years or more. This is all due to lack of proper teaching methodology for English.

Those, who plead for Direct Method, often complain that our students are stuffed with grammatical rules and intricacies. But the fact is that we have, since long, ceased to teach through Grammar-Translation Method, and the Direct Method or the Structural Method, as it is often termed is inefficacious in the context of the situation in our country.

The Direct Method plunges the student too soon into expressing in a foreign language in a relatively unstructured situation with the result that he tends to develop glib but inaccurate fluency, clothing native language structures in foreign vocabulary. The problems are created because students are not sufficiently exposed to a situation where English is frequently spoken, read and written around him. So they forget all about it when they leave the classroom where the student hears and practises little or no English.

When you take a non-native speaker in England (not Bradford of course!) to learn English, the Direct Method will work wonders. But it is very hard to teach English to a pupil particularly in non-English medium schools through Direct Method, particularly a student who attends classes for a brief period of 40 minutes and is interrupted by pep-rallies, scout drills, non-participation of the teacher in the matter—a pupil who is not in touch with English outside the class, a pupil who hardly listens to a correctly uttered sentence in or outside the English class.

To sum up, it is the pupil who has minimal exposure to listening, writing, reading and speaking English. In a situation like this, although it may appear to be blasphemous to suggest, an emphasis on Grammar-Translation Method might do pretty well as it has been doing for the past few decades in Pakistan.

There is no harm in reverting to Grammar-Translation Method, particularly in non-English medium schools without any inhibition or reservation in order to obtain the desired results.

A discreet use of other methods along with Grammar-Translation Method is, of course, not forbidden to a teacher who is, in fact, a method unto himself.

Article Reports on Human Rights Improvement

46000115C Karachi DAWN in English 23 May 90 p 6

[Text] London—Pakistan's human rights record has improved since the change of government in 1988 but further safeguards are needed to eliminate continuing abuses, Amnesty International said in its latest report released here on Tuesday.

When Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto came to power in December 1988, 2029 death sentences were commuted and thousands of prisoners were released in an amnesty, including many political prisoners convicted by special military courts. The government has also announced compensation for torture victims and set up a board to review remaining martial law convictions.

However, Amnesty International (AI) said further steps must be taken to redress human rights violations which took place under previous governments and which continue today.

In its report compiled after a delegation visited Pakistan in last July/August, the organisation said torture, including rape, still frequently occurs in police stations; whipping remains as punishment for certain crimes; fetters are used in prisons; imprisonment on religious grounds continues; and special courts which do not conform to international standards for fair trials can impose the death penalty and try certain political offences.

Scores of people were reportedly tortured in police stations last year, including at least eight women who were allegedly raped. Torture in prisons has decreased but is still likely to recur as those responsible have not been brought to trial.

"The government has taken some steps to monitor police abuses by setting up a body to monitor police atrocities but further safeguards are clearly needed," the AI said. These include strict limits on incommunicado detention; prompt and regular access to lawyers, doctors and relatives; prompt referrals to magistrates; independent investigations into reports of torture; and special provisions to protect women and children in custody.

Whipping, amputation and stoning to death remain in Pakistan's statute books and two public whippings occurred last year. Fetters are still used on prisoners, including children. Executions have ceased in Pakistan since December 1988 but the death penalty remains in law and there is no ban on executing minors. The AI is calling for the abolition of all these punishments.

Sectarian imprisonment and attacks continue in Pakistan, where Ahmadis can be imprisoned for up to three years for claiming to be Muslims. The authorities have failed to investigate fully an attack on Ahmadis in July 1989 which resulted in several deaths.

Special courts set up under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act are increasingly used in Sind Province and

fail to fulfil international standards for fair trial by presuming the guilt of the defendant in certain circumstances. Amnesty International is urging that this legislation be reviewed.

The organisation welcomed the release of thousands of prisoners in December 1988, including many political prisoners convicted by special military courts. These courts had restricted defence rights and reportedly accepted evidence extracted under torture. However,

several hundred martial law convicts remain imprisoned, including possible political prisoners. Amnesty International is urging that their cases be reviewed fairly "to ensure no prisoner remains wrongly jailed on convictions from politically-motivated charges secured in unfair trials."

The AI is also calling for a review of administrative detention provisions which currently allow authorities to detain people without charge or trial for up to eight or 12 months, depending on the grounds for detention.