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Convention Banning Chemical Weapons Hailed
HK0302060193 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
15 Jan 93 p 6

[Article by Qi Linshao [2058 2651 2619]: “Good Beginning, Arduous Tasks” —written on occasion of signing of the UN “Convention of Prohibition of Chemical Weapons”]

[Text] The “Convention Banning the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons” was signed in Paris on 13 January. This is a significant step made by the international community toward the goal of ultimately realizing the total ban and destruction of chemical weapons. If its various provisions are effectively implemented, the convention will play a positive role in eliminating the threat of chemical weapons to mankind.

The international community has long been seeking effective control over chemical weapons, a kind of weapon of mass destruction. As early as in the two “Hague Peace Conferences,” which were held in 1899 and 1907, agreements were unanimously reached on banning the use of artillery shells containing toxins in wars. Nevertheless, these earlier agreements were scrapped in World War I. During the war, chemical weapons were used on a large scale, causing large numbers of injuries and deaths. According to statistics, various belligerent countries used 113,000 tonnes of toxins in all, causing 1.3 million injuries and deaths, of which nearly 100,000 people were killed. Out of the hatred for chemical weapons, in 1925 the international community worked hard and reached the “Agreement on Banning the Use in Wars of the Asphyxiating, Toxic, and Other Gases and Bacteriological Modes of Operations” (that is, the Geneva Agreement, and up to now, 125 countries have signed the agreement). However, suffering from an inherent shortage, the agreement failed to effectively ban the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and as a result, all signatory countries have the right to possess a few chemical weapons, and many belligerent countries have declared preserving the right to use chemical weapons as a retaliation means and use them against non-signatory countries, thus leading to a situation in which chemical weapons cannot be banned despite prohibitions. During World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnamese War, and the Iran-Iraq War in the eighties, there were reports of the use of chemical weapons, and human society suffered colossal calamities therewith. In the arms race during the Cold War, the United States and the former Soviet Union were vying with each other in mass-producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. Hence, they possessed the world’s largest chemical weapons arsenals.

The just signed “Convention Banning Chemical Weapons” underwent a course of difficult negotiations lasting for 24 years. Since the first special disarmament session of the UN Assembly, held in 1978, defined negotiations on a chemical weapons convention as the most urgent task of the multilateral disarmament negotiations, the international community made efforts time and again to conclude the convention at an early date. However, in the then international situation, relevant countries criticized one another, and no one would be willing to commit itself to destroying its chemical weapons. The negotiations on the convention progressed with difficulty and made meager advances. It was until the beginning of the nineties that, as tremendous changes took place in the international situation, the negotiations on the convention took a turn for the better and the convention was signed in the end. Since its official participation in the “Conference on Disarmament Negotiations” in the early eighties, China has always taken an active part in the negotiations on a convention of chemical weapons and made unremitting efforts and positive contributions to the conclusion of the convention.

The current convention banning chemical weapons is the first international arms control treaty even seen by mankind so far banning an entire class of weapons of mass destruction, which has strict verification rules and regulations. The convention defines: Any signatory nation shall not develop, produce, stockpile, and use chemical weapons; any countries possessing chemical weapons must destroy all their chemical weapons stockpiles and their production facilities within 10 years; and signatory countries must be responsible for destroying all chemical weapons they leave in other countries’ territories. The achievement of these purposes of the convention will help safeguard international security and peace and thoroughly eliminate the threat of chemical warfare.

Whether or not all countries can strictly follow and effectively implement the convention is where the key to its success and failure lies. The existing huge chemical weapons arsenals constitute a direct and immediate threat to world peace. Relevant countries must implement the convention’s obligations faithfully and destroy their existing chemical weapons and production facilities as quickly as possible. All countries which leave chemical weapons in other countries’ territories must commit themselves to the convention’s obligations to the letter and undertake the responsibility to destroy as quickly as possible the chemical weapons they leave. The convention’s verification mechanism must be continuously improved in the course of its implementation so as to ensure that the verification rules and regulations are effective, rational, and feasible. Special efforts should be made to guard against the misuse of the right to query and verify to make sure that the signatory countries’ national security and interests which have nothing to do with chemical weapons are not infringed upon. The convention’s provisions on trade and scientific and technological exchange and cooperation in the chemical industrial field for peaceful purposes should be implemented in real earnest to promote economic as well as scientific and technological development of various countries. The conclusion of the convention has not come easily. It remains to be seen if the convention will be implemented in an overall way.
JAPAN

Tokyo To Assist Russia in Strategic Warhead Disposal

OW3101075093 Tokyo KYODO in English 0731 GMT 31 Jan 93

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 31 KYODO—Japan will assist in the disposal of radioactive components from dismantled nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union, but is wary of giving monetary aid for the process, Foreign Ministry sources said Sunday.

The sources said that the government thinks Japan should not be directly involved in the dismantling of the nuclear warheads set by the START II nuclear arms reduction treaty.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin and former U.S. President George Bush signed the treaty January 3, agreeing to cut their nuclear missile stocks to about a third of the current approximately 10,000 in each country by 2003.

Because of a shortage of funds in Russia, the sources said they expect Russia to ask Japan for financial assistance in the dismantling process.

They said one immediate area where the government is likely to offer Japanese expertise is in the safe disposal of nuclear waste material from the warheads and in the monitoring of radioactive contamination.

Because of a bilateral territorial dispute over four islands to Japan's north which the former Soviet Union seized at the end of World War II, the Japanese Government has maintained it is unwilling to offer large amounts of monetary assistance to Russia.

Japan has also taken the view that the disposal of nuclear weapons is basically the responsibility of the country which possesses them.

The matter is likely to be a major topic for discussion at the July summit of leaders of the seven major industrialized nations in Tokyo.
EL SALVADOR

Government Signs Ban on Chemical Weapons
PA2901195493 San Salvador Radio Farabundo Marti
Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 28 Jan 93

[Text] A government source announced officially that El Salvador signed in Paris an agreement that prohibits development, production, storage, and use of chemical weapons.

UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, the UNESCO general director, as well as representatives of more than 140 countries, were present at the signing ceremony that took place in Paris a few days ago. It was reported that Carmen Maria Gallardo de Hernandez, Salvadoran ambassador to UNESCO, signed the document as representative of the Salvadoran Government.

According to official information, El Salvador neither owned nor used chemical weapons during the armed conflict. Nevertheless, on several occasions during the civil war various witnesses, including a U.S. doctor who worked in the war areas in Guazapa, confirmed having seen the Salvadoran Air Force use white phosphorus.
EGYPT

Foreign Minister Addresses Geneva Disarmament Conference

Seeks Regional Ban on Mass Destruction Weapons

NC2801160593 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1354 GMT 28 Jan 93

[Text] Geneva, 28 Jan (MENA)—Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa asserted that the discussion of the issue of removing weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East should not be postponed until after the establishment of peace in the region, noting that the proliferation of these weapons, especially nuclear ones, is unacceptable under any circumstances.

This came in the statement Musa delivered today before the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in which he reviewed Egypt's initiatives and steps toward regional disarmament, particularly weapons of mass destruction. The minister referred in his statement to Egypt's efforts in this respect, starting with its 1974 proposal and ending with President Husni Mubarak's 1990 initiative to make the region free from all weapons of mass destruction, which was adopted by all the Arab countries and enjoyed worldwide support and backing.

Musa said: Despite all the Egyptian and Arab steps and initiatives, Israel has so far not acted to tackle the issue of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and to submit its nuclear facilities for international inspection like other countries in the region.

The foreign minister added that the statement delivered by Israeli Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres at the Paris conference for signing the chemical weapons treaty might be a signal of Israel's willingness to tackle the issue of nuclear weapons. He said that the relevant departments in Egypt are now studying the Israeli foreign minister's statement to decide how to deal with it.

Musa reviewed the recent radical changes that have influenced the nature of international relations. He stressed that these changes present the international community with the real challenge of exploiting the changes to create a new world based on equal rights and supremacy of law. He also asserted that security has several aspects, including economic, social, environmental, and political questions, and not just military ones, and that it is from this premise that Egypt has called for setting up a forum for dialogue between the Mediterranean Sea countries.

Musa called for drawing up a new concept for international security based on the common interests of all countries and not on military power. He underlined the need for this new concept to be drawn up on two bases: achieving security at the lowest possible level of armament and equality of all countries in duties and commitments.

The minister also reviewed the various issues before the Conference on Disarmament. He underlined Egypt's stand on the need to reach a complete ban on nuclear tests and to ensure that all countries join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The Geneva Conference on Disarmament is the only UN forum for negotiations in the disarmament sphere and includes 39 countries with military weight, including Egypt, which will take its chairmanship on 1 July.

Explains Refusal To Sign CW Pact

NC3001130093 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 28 Jan 93 p 1

[Report by Majidah Tantawi in Geneva]

[Text] In an exclusive statement to AL-AKHBAR, Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa, who is in Geneva to address the Conference on Disarmament, has stressed that Egypt's position on the chemical weapons agreement has not changed. Egypt has refused to sign the agreement.

Musa said it is inconceivable to allow one state in the region to possess weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear arsenal, and yet ask the other states to sign an agreement banning chemical weapons.

He said that Egypt's position on the issue comes from a desire for a political and security strategy in the Arab world.

ISRAEL

Talks With U.S. SDIO on RPV Boost-Phase Interceptor Project

93WC0012A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Dec 92 p B3

[Article by Aluf Ben: "Over the Enemy's Head"]

[Text] A Ministry of Defense team has been conducting talks in the United States for about 3 weeks on a new development plan that Israel would carry out within the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI], a study to determine the possibility of intercepting surface-to-surface missiles with nonpiloted vehicles [RPVs] which would attack the missiles during the boost phase.

The new plan is less known than the Arrow missile project, and its budget is only $6 million—in contrast to hundreds of millions for the Arrow. But they are saying in the defense establishment that its importance in the system for defending the country against attacks by surface-to-surface missiles is no less than that of the antimissile missile.

On 3 December, the SDI Organization [SDIO] issued a brief announcement in the Pentagon bulletin of requests for tenders: "It is our intention to develop contacts with
the Israeli Ministry of Defense for the conduct of technical studies on advanced approaches for intercepting ballistic missiles in the boost phase.

"The administration seeks to benefit from unique data in the possession of Israel, which result from its experience in defending against missiles during wartime and in operating RPVs over hostile territory."

Defense experts assert that surface-to-surface missiles are especially vulnerable to interception in their boost phase, among other reasons because the missile takes off relatively slowly. Interception of the missile in the boost phase would prevent damage in Israel, and would also strengthen deterrence: hostile rulers would hesitate to launch a nonconventional missile if they knew that it was liable to explode over their heads.

The development of a remotely piloted vehicle that would attack the ascending missiles deep in enemy territory involves complex technological and operational problems. Considerable experience has been accumulated in Israel in the development of remotely piloted vehicles (in Israel Aircraft Industries) and in infrared-guided missiles (in Rafael). But in the defense establishment, it is believed that fat development contracts are not to be expected after the initial study.

The defense industry in the United States is mired in a severe crisis and in heavy competition between manufacturers, and will do everything in its power to prevent the transfer of work to other countries. The notice in the tender request bulletin was worded also in an apologetic tone: The work must be given to Israeli suppliers because of their unique know-how.

The proposal to develop an RPV to intercept missiles was already presented to the Americans six years ago, when General James Abramson, who then headed the SDIO, visited Israel and asked to review Israel's plans for defense against missiles.

The offensive RPV was perfectly suited to the Israeli defense conception, whose thrust is to take the war into the enemy's territory. Instead of waiting for the hostile missile and intercepting it before it strikes its target, it is possible to destroy it during the boost phase, over the launch area.

Abramson said then that the idea was interesting, but did not suit the defense concept of "Star Wars." An antimissile such as the Arrow, which is launched from friendly territory at the attacking Scud, seemed to suit the American doctrine. The United States agreed to finance the development of the Arrow, but there was no chance of getting a budget for a system that would attack the missiles in enemy territory.

At that time, President Ronald Reagan sat in the White House, and he wanted to develop a system to destroy the nuclear missiles that would be launched by "the evil Soviet empire." Defense against medium-range missiles ("theatre missiles" in American terminology) such as the Scud, held only a minor position in the order of priorities, at the top of which were missile interception sensors and satellites that would hover in space.

The Gulf War marked the change. The Scud and things similar to it then appeared as a real threat to the American forces that were to operate in diverse combat theatres. The SDI underwent a complete change, and the portion of the budget devoted to defense against theatre missiles grew. Along with the Arrow, the Americans began to develop their own antimissile missile, THAAD [theater high-altitude area defense], and to improve the interception capability of the Patriot missiles.

The approaching swearing-in of Bill Clinton heralds an additional change in the American defense conception. Clinton said during his election campaign that he intended to eliminate half the budget of the SDI over the next five years. The president-elect opposes the development plans for the space-based missile interception system, but has not yet clarified which components of the SDI he would retain.

Among the promises scattered by Clinton's campaign headquarters, it was stated that financing for the Arrow would continue. Before the election, the new secretary of defense, Les Aspin, who is also an enthusiastic supporter of strategic cooperation with Israel, declared his support for continued development of the Arrow with American financing.

The signs of change in American policy were discernible even before the presidential elections, in the congressional deliberations on the Pentagon budget for fiscal 1993 that began on 1 October this year. The Senate and the House of Representatives, with Democratic majorities, slashed the budget of the SDIO. From the $5.4 billion that President Bush requested, only $3.8 billion remained in the budget law, $300 million less than in the '92 budget. The cut hit mainly the space defense systems, and not the plans for defense from missile attacks.

In the farewell interview given by Henry Cooper, the outgoing chief of the SDIO, to the weekly DEFENSE NEWS, he said that Congress had sent a clear message. The defense from missile attacks would occupy an important place in the development plans, against the background of the experience in the Gulf War and the growing fear of proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Cooper noted the plans for interception of missiles in their boost phase as among the main goals for his successors.

"Now the Americans are accepting the concepts that we presented to them several years ago, and they understand the danger inherent in missiles such as the Scud," they are saying in the defense establishment. "It is a shame to have lost years of development time."

From what has been published in professional literature abroad, it can be seen that the Israeli RVP plan will compete with similar proposals of American entities. At the top of the list is the "Rafter," an RPV that would be
propelled by solar energy and would fly for an unlimited
time at high altitude (65,000 feet).

The Rafter would be equipped with two long-range
missiles called “Talon,” and would defend a territory
with a radius of 300 km. Scenarios carried out by the
SDIO showed that fourRAFTers would defend the entire
territory of Israel for a range of 600 km. Thirteen RAFTers
would defend Israel and the Gulf states from missiles
launched from any point in Iraq.

The Pentagon requested $43 million this year for an
examination of the technological feasibility of the
RAFTER, and even hired a private company to build an
experimental RPV. The Talon missiles are being devel-
oped in the “Lawrence Livermore” national laboratory,
on the basis of technologies that were developed for the
space defense system, whose budget was cut.

The Congress refused to approve the budget for the
RAFTER until the project was adopted by the branches of
the American army, and it will not be managed by the
SDI Administration, which is an independent office in
the Pentagon.

The U.S. Air Force proposed the development of a
system called [“Fragarin,”] which would launch long-
range interceptor missiles from fighters and bombers at
ascending surface-to-surface missiles. Other proposals
were to install powerful laser weapons on RPVs or on
large passenger aircraft.

Israeli experts say that the booster phase interception
system cannot substitute for the Arrow missiles, but
rather would complement them. It is difficult to main-
tain RPVs permanently over the enemy’s territory in the
expectation of a surprise attack. It is more reasonable
that the RPVs would be launched only after a war had
begun. And, in any event, there is a need for an efficient
defense system in case the attacking Scud gets through
the interceptor RPVs and continues on its flight towards
the target.
SOVIET UNION

GENERAL

Russian-German Pact on Aid in Nuclear, Chemical Arms Elimination
OW2901/144493 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1410 GMT 29 Jan 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian Government has approved the draft agreement with Germany on assistance in the elimination of Russia's nuclear and chemical weapons. Of this document was coordinated with German experts and presented by the Russian Foreign and Defence Ministries, the Ministry for Atomic Energy and the president's Committee for the Conventional Problems of Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons.

According to this document, Germany will give Russia free assistance in the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons in Russia.

In line with the Russian Government's resolution of December 17, following finalization, the agreement will be signed by the Russian minister for atomic energy.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Retired General Criticizes START II Treaty
934P0055A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jan 93
pp 1, 3

[Interview with Nikolay Konstantinovich Beloborodov, retired lieutenant general of aviation, by Vladimir Potapov: "National Security and the President's Ambition"]

[Text] We met with Nikolay Konstantinovich Beloborodov, a retired lieutenant general of aviation, at the editorial offices. The topic of our discussion was the Russian-American START II Treaty signed recently in Moscow. The authoritative domestic specialist in the field of nuclear weapons was not indifferent to what was a hasty move in the view of many people, and particularly to the unprecedented avalanche of enthusiastic appraisals of the treaty in the press. In a word, the veteran decided to share his opinions—which we believe are unbiased and quite competent—with PRAVDA readers.

I served in the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union for over 45 years, the general said. I was concerned with the use of nuclear weapons for three decades: I checked and accepted the latest models of equipment, I commanded a special unit of nuclear technical troops, I took part in the 1962 operation in Cuba, and I worked in the Ministry of Defense.

It does not seem possible to provide a thorough and exhaustive analysis of START II now. We have to carefully study the text of the document and all the attachments. However, we can make a preliminary judgment by relying on what the president has said himself.

The first thing we should point out to understand the problem is that the Soviet Union adhered consistently to a single policy of banning nuclear weapons since the moment they made their appearance in the summer of 1945. History provides many examples of the Soviet initiatives and confirms with facts that the United States has always opposed the limitation and banning of nuclear weapons.

The unlimited power of nuclear weapons, which we specialists have always been aware of, made it impossible to resolve political problems by means of war. It canceled out the nuclear version of Karl von Clausewitz' axiom that war is a continuation of politics by other means.

But certain political circles, chiefly American, considered these weapons to be a convenient means of reaching their geopolitical objectives. H. Truman, together with W. Churchill, began the campaign of "Cold War" and nuclear blackmail and provoked the arms race. In order to put an end to it, we advanced the idea of a nuclear test ban. Clearly, scientific developments and production of the latest types of weapons fade away without them and nuclear systems die off easily by themselves. This is a drastic method of struggling against the nuclear threat. Alas, the present widely acclaimed treaty does not take one step in this direction.

But we had important victories on this path before, after all. In 1983, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Testing in the Atmosphere, in Space, and Underground was signed. But this document would not exist if there had not been a sudden change in consciousness brought about by the Caribbean crisis. The United States realized for the first time that not only someone else's territory can become the arena for nuclear war, theirs can become the arena as well. And all because the USSR not only condemned the possibility of U.S. aggression against Cuba, but it was able to support Cuba by action—concentrating troops and missiles on the island and bringing nuclearmunitions there. As a result, a conflict fraught with a world conflagration was averted without a single shot or human casualty. How this differs from the American "peacemaking" actions which are now being extolled; they bring death to civilians and vast destruction which are more likely to provoke a war.

At that time, in the 1960's, Washington was forced for the first time to refrain from military actions to continue its policy and to take part in negotiations and agreements. The USSR removed missiles from Cuba, and the United States removed them from Turkey. And they left Cuba alone. The viewpoint that a nuclear war was not permissible triumphed. Talks on this subject entered our lives. As landmarks leading to the banning and destruction of nuclear weapons, they indicate a healthy trend in world development. For this reason, the very fact that the START II Treaty was signed only continues the
tradition of Soviet policy. What is new is a different aspect—how it performs this task.

Common sense in the nuclear century suggests that any antinuclear agreement should not infringe upon the national dignity, sovereignty, state interests, or defense capability of either one of the negotiating sides. Otherwise, nothing good can be expected. But if we are speaking from the viewpoint of the latest arrangements, the picture that is taking shape for us is a dismal one.

We know that there is a substantial difference between the American nuclear weapons system and our nuclear weapons system. The basis of the American strategic doctrine is the Navy, the Air Force, and missile forces. And the main emphasis is placed on the Navy and Air Force, and only later on the missile forces. The advantage in the flight time to the target of those missiles which are launched from submarines or aircraft has been taken into account here. Inasmuch as intercontinental nuclear missiles, which make up the main strength of our strategic forces, are in the air for a much longer period of time. The latter increases the chances of antimissile defense by a potential enemy.

With the advent of individually targeted multiple warheads, the reliability of our system as a deterrent factor was increased. However, the START II Treaty now deprives us of this advantage by retaining significant gains for the American side. With its victory in the "Cold War," which the White House has openly declared, the United States, in accordance with all the rules in the art of war, is increasing its successes and establishing stockpiles for the future, so that it can control all processes in the world without hindrances. The Soviet Union has been thrown down and dismembered, its Army has been split apart, and its economy is in decay. But the "heavy missiles" still remain, and the START II Treaty destroys them as well.

But permission to put a strictly stipulated number of other, smaller missiles with a single warhead in the silos creates additional problems for us. We have to develop, build, and deploy new systems and refit the old silos. And waste a lot of money. But the main point is that as a result, we are giving a potential enemy the opportunity to reduce the cost and increase the effectiveness of his own antimissile defense, oriented toward the precise number of our single-warhead missiles; we are giving him confidence that he has a perfect defense, and consequently, that he may act with impunity. This destroys our retaliatory strike doctrine.

All this is perplexing. It makes B. Yeltsin's statements about strengthening our security and the economic benefit for us of his START II Treaty unfounded. I think the Supreme Soviet should look into this when it begins dealing with the question of ratification.

The agreement signed by the president now forces us to reexamine our retaliatory strike doctrine and make it equal to the American doctrine. In order to accomplish its geopolitical objectives, the United States is not ashamed to say that its army should be the most powerful and that it is prepared to make use of nuclear weapons if required by the circumstances. We do not intend to pursue them now. But we cannot allow our capabilities to be restricted and to deliberately put ourselves in an unequal position. In defending the Motherland and its interests, we should and must be guided by essentially the same concepts as other members of the international community that we have to deal with.

Lukin Decrees Politicization of START II
934C0696A Moscow TRUD in Russian 10 Jan 93 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Vladimir Lukin, ambassador of Russia in the United States, by TRUD correspondent Vissarion Sisnev in Washington; date not given: "No One Will Cheat Anyone"]

[Text] Sisnev: The agreement on START II was reached in record time. The "implacable opposition" maintains that this was the case thanks to our concessions. Some press organs have, as you know, christened the treaty a "betrayal of national interests." What can you say about this?

Lukin: I would like to emphasize at once that I do not care for it at all when most important foreign policy issues, disarmament issues especially, are used as bait in domestic political struggle. This is not typical of really democratic countries. Whereas domestic policy is a normal reason for heated debate, the main, fundamental aspects of foreign policy are usually of a national, general nature. This is extremely important because a democratic country is divided within into groups, it is pluralistic. And whatever is directed outside it should be above group interests. I myself never forget this—my personal sympathies and antipathies are one thing, but when, as in this case, it is a question of national interests, it is another. And I would greatly urge my esteemed deputy corps colleagues, regardless of the extent to which we agree or disagree at home, to be, for all that, patriots not in word but in deed. And this means making of paramount importance fundamental issues: how we appear to the world, how to seek the optimum of stability and our security. I am profoundly convinced that the vast majority of people's deputies proceed from just such considerations. Although there is a handful of people, very small, in my opinion, for whom, were there to be a further five Chernobyl's even, the opponent is automatically wrong, even if he has not yet begun to speak.

Now to the point. As U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara once said, overkill times overkill is nothing but overkill. What both sides cranked up all these years was a nonsense, and we are now turning the insane process back. The Americans are going back to the 1963 level approximately, we, to the 1975 level. And it is not true that we will be left with 3,000 warheads, the United States, with 3,500. Only those who have not taken the trouble to read the text of the treaty could say this. Clause 3 says clearly
that by 1 January 2003 the total numbers of each side will not exceed a value between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads. Where is the “betrayal of national interests” here? I would like to call attention to one further point: Quantitative equality has been reached between us and the United States for the first time in the entire disarmament process. Earlier the Americans always had the advantage in terms of numbers of weapons. Although I personally do not consider the quantitative indicator what is most important here, since we are talking about this I would like to emphasize that the Pentagon will be destroying more warheads than us. The “implacablenes” do not have to take me on trust, this assertion can easily be checked by figures which are generally accessible.

Sisner: This is undoubtedly a serious concession on the part of the Americans, although there are some who altogether fail to discern such on their part. Could you point to anything else of this kind?

Lukin: I would like first of all to point out that they have their “implacables” also. In the well-known and popular WASHINGTON TIMES newspaper the commentator Frank Gaffney, who also, evidently, has not familiarized himself with the treaty, castigates President Bush for having been in a hurry for the sake of his own prestige to sit down at the negotiating table and make entirely unwarranted concessions to the Russians. Hence the only possible answer is the facts. What, for example, might the local “implacables” interpret as “unwarranted concessions to the Russians”? We are for the first time making a precise count of the nuclear weapons deployed on American nuclear bombers, previously it was very imprecise and allowed the possibility of there being considerably more of these weapons than those given out on account. Now a strict system of the monitoring of the United States’ nuclear aircraft at their base facilities is established. The latest B-2 bomber, the so-called Stealth, is now subject to monitoring, to which the Americans had previously strenuously objected.

And is it a small matter that we will preserve 90 launch silos after the multipurpose intercontinental missiles have been destroyed? We argued about this for a long time, and at the last moment the Americans consented to this version. Scientists have calculated that this will reduce our missile-dismantling costs 40 percent, plus the entire costly infrastructure of the silos in the areas surrounding them, which will themselves be converted for missiles of a smaller caliber, will be preserved. And, finally, let us take the missiles deployed on surface ships and underwater. Not even disarmament specialists but simply people who read the newspapers know that for many years Washington did not even want to hear about including the naval nuclear arsenal in the overall numbers to be cut. Its navy was simply some sacred cow—do not touch, and let’s hear no more about it. Yet START II means a reduction in the United States’ naval MIRV’s by half. Voices demagogically taking advantage of the eternal dilemma: a glass half-empty or half-full, are already being heard. Professional skeptics prefer to see it half-full, but realistic people realize how serious this American concession is.

Sisner: Have you discussed all these problems with President-elect Bill Clinton?

Lukin: I have met Clinton just once as yet—when he was introduced to Boris Nikolayevich at the time of last year’s top-level meeting in Washington. But he and Yeltsin recently spoke by telephone, and prior to this Clinton had received a message from our president on the issue of START II. He fully supported the treaty, as we all know, and did so on the basis of sound knowledgability.

Sisner: What is meant by U.S. assistance in the physical destruction of Russian nuclear systems?

Lukin: The treaty does not specify this directly but I believe that there is mutual understanding in this connection. It should be remembered that the principal essence of the treaty is that it appreciably lowers the nuclear threshold. It is clear, after all, that our SS-18 missiles are first-strike weapons, and the Americans cannot fail to be interested in the elimination of such a possibility as quickly as possible. The mere possession of such monsters could give rise to temptation in some heads. We currently have partner relations with America, but military professionals are required to proceed from the fact that anything could happen. It is a realistic expectation, therefore, that our partners will help us tackle the difficult and costly task of the dismantling, destruction, or warehousing of the missile components, and agreement in earnest on this is planned with us. I would note in passing that updating the SS-18’s, which are constantly “aging,” would simply be beyond our means. The two principal plants manufacturing them are now not on Russian territory but on land which has become foreign. What should we do—reconstitute these giants of the military-industrial complex from scratch? With what money, I would permit myself to ask the gentlemen “implacables”?

Sisner: Since the signing of the treaty you have socialized with local political and public figures, with my colleagues....

Lukin: I know what you are getting it. As far as your colleagues are concerned, Gaffney’s article which I mentioned is undoubtedly a rare exception. And, generally, the basic reaction is formulated approximately thus: It is a great historical step forward. But there remain also misgivings connected with the fact that the realization of START II is possible only given ratification of START I. And serious delays connected primarily with the uncertain position of our neighbor and friend Ukraine have arisen here. Not only with it but primarily. A Ukrainian delegation, to which the Americans made it quite sternly understood that they expect unconditional compliance with the Lisbon agreements, according to which Ukraine undertook on its own volition to switch to nuclear-free status within seven years, has just left Washington.
Sisnev: The uniqueness of your personal position is, in addition, the fact that you remain a people's deputy, that is, you are informed as to the prevailing mood in this, as the Seventh Congress showed, far from homogeneous mass. The "implacables" have already announced that they will try to bury the treaty. Yeltsin, on the other hand, is giving the assurance that they will not succeed. How do the prospects of ratification of START II appear to you?

Lukin: I believe that the treaty will be ratified in both Washington and Moscow. I proceed from what I myself feel: The country's security is not a pretext for settling momentary political scores. I am convinced that, with a few exceptions, the majority of members of the Supreme Soviet proceed from this also. If, meanwhile, some people feel hurt by the fact that the United States will be left with more naval warheads, the treaty by no means prohibits us, should we so desire and given the resources, from matching it. No one will cheat anyone inasmuch as mutual monitoring will be exceptionally strict—more than ever. I suggest to my deputy colleagues: Let us examine the treaty in its totality, not pulling out individual parts on which a petty but effective game beneficial to one's faction could be played. We have no need to rush the ratification, and this would be pointless until others ratify and realize START I. Let us hold several hearings on the treaty as a whole, as is done in the U.S. Congress. We will hear the top specialists—ours, American, and neutral. The deputy or the Congressman is not in himself a specialist but he has an opportunity to familiarize himself with authoritative expert opinion. Perhaps deputies should come and take a look at how this is taking place in Congress—not everything is going smoothly here either. As far as I know, the START II bill will be presented for congressional approval quite soon. We, on the other hand, thanks to our unhurrying neighbors, have time. All deputies, therefore, have a chance to study the treaty objectively and in depth. Given this condition, they will adopt it for, I repeat, I do not believe that the majority of deputies are concerned for some personal foibles but for the interests and well-being of the Russian state. Let us not in words but in deeds give thought to our national interests and the interests of world stability. Let us decide from the standpoint of the fatherland, not from the standpoint of personal ambition.

General Staff Reaction to START II
93WC0013A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 11 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer under "Disarmament" rubric: "Russian Army General Staff Supports START II: But a Specific Plan for the Implementation of the Treaty Has Not Yet Been Worked Out"]

[Text] "The START II Treaty is the result of the joint efforts of two ministries—the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense. Never before have two departments worked so closely together and in such an amicable working atmosphere," declared Col. Gen. Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army, during a meeting with a group of journalists on 6 January (on the morning of that same day, General Kolesnikov presented an analysis of the principal positions of the START II Treaty to an audience at the General Staff Academy).

In the opinion of the General Staff, the START II Treaty is advantageous to Russia and the radical reduction of the existing strategic arms does not in any way threaten the national security. By the year 2003, when the main conditions of START II must be carried out, there will no longer be any technical military reasons for strategic instability in the world, for neither the United States or Russia will have the potential for a "first" ("disarming") strike, each having 3,000 to 3,500 "first-line" warheads.

In accordance with START II, highly accurate (capable of delivering a "disarming" first strike) land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with independently targeted multiple reentry vehicles (ICBM's with MIRV's), which actually allowed the United States and USSR to successfully "by-pass" the SALT I and SALT II treaties, will be eliminated. It was precisely after the signing of SALT I by Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon in Moscow in 1972 (it was then called "detente") that the United States and USSR began a truly large-scale proliferation of their nuclear potentials. In the 1970's and 1980's, the military-industrial complex here and abroad produced more than 60,000 nuclear weapons of different kinds—P.F."

The elimination of the ICBM's with MIRV's turns back the nuclear arms race, as it were, simultaneously preserving the existing global strategic parity. In addition, START II may help Russia substantially in the resolution of its own technical military problems: the service life of the current liquid-fuel ICBM's with MIRV's ends within the next 10 to 15 years. "We would in any case have to destroy them unilaterally and the production base for the construction of new and the possible modernization of old missiles would largely remain in Ukraine," stated General Kolesnikov. Now, in the scope of START II, those same reductions will be "linked" with corresponding reductions of the American nuclear potential. Moreover, the United States obligated itself to provide direct financial assistance to Russia in the development and implementation of ecologically clean programs for the elimination of nuclear missiles.

At the same time, Russia does not intend to renounce land-based ICBM's entirely. "Instead of heavy missiles each with 10 warheads, they will have systems with 1 warhead. And in rather tough talks in the last stages of the agreement of the START II Treaty, the Russian side was able to achieve the consent of the American side to the conversion of 90 launch silos for heavy SS-18 missiles for single-warhead solid-fuel ICBM's. In addition, the number of weapons on the 105 SS-19 ICBM's already deployed will be reduced to 1 warhead, which
will substantially reduce expenditures for the implementation of START II (by 2 billion rubles in 1992 prices)."

The United States agreed in the scope of START II to reduce the number of sea-based nuclear weapons, including the most up-to-date "Trident-2" missiles, by two-thirds in comparison with the current level (and to one-half the level of START I). There will likewise be a real reduction of the possibilities of American strategic bombers, for START II, in contrast to the START I Treaty already ratified by Russia and the United States, provides for the calculation not of the arbitrary (10 weapons each) but actual load of American aircraft, thereby with mandatory "on-site" monitoring. The START II Treaty also provides for the full observance of the 1972 SALT I Treaty.

"The realization of START II will require substantial expenditures but the planned reductions will cost a fraction as much as the maintenance of nuclear systems at their present level until the end of their guaranteed service life," think experts of the Russian General Staff (What is meant is all branches of the Russian strategic triad rather than just the land-based strategic missile forces—P.F.). By the way, "it is still too early to say that we have prepared a program to dismantle a certain number of warheads at a certain plant by a particular date." The appropriate studies are being carried out in interested departments.

Economic, Technical Problems in START II Implementation Seen
93WC0013B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer under "Disarmament" rubric: "START II: The Music Is Ordered by the One Paying the Money: Talks Are Continuing on American Financial Aid"]

[Text] For more than 40 years now, the equilibrium of mutual nuclear deterrence has been restraining the start of a new and third world war. In the confrontation of the "cold" war, however, the "reasonable" level of nuclear arms was exceeded many times over, in the opinion of military experts as well as ordinary citizens. The necessity and inevitability of a radical joint American-Soviet (Russian) nuclear disarmament has long since become quite obvious. The START II Treaty (if it is ratified) may serve as the legal basis for making the existing nuclear arsenals correspond somewhat with the new military and political situation in the world.

In the general opinion of responsible military specialists (Russian as well as American), the START II Treaty is a very balanced document that permits a substantial reduction of the level of nuclear confrontation while preserving the overall global strategic balance.

But the accelerated conclusion of talks and signing of START II on 3 January 1993 did not by any means resolve the well-justified doubts of specialists and politicians (including some members of the current Russian Government) about whether Russia can actually fulfill this treaty and especially by 2003.

For START II to go into effect, START I and the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear arms must first be ratified by all three "seminuclear" republics of the former Union. By the way, Belarus and Kazakhstan do not have any serious nuclear ambitions and some inconsistent pronuclear statements by Ukrainian leaders were never taken seriously by specialists on nuclear missiles. Ukraine is not in a position independently either to use or to maintain in a technically adequate state those strategic arms that are now in its territory. And the current lamentable state of the economy in all the former Soviet republics will hardly allow any of them to begin and successfully carry out their own "Manhattan Project" in the near future or to establish within the next few decades their own nuclear industry comparable to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (formerly the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building). Now, after the signing of START II, the "seminuclear" republics will obviously be subjected to a double Russian-American pressure and it is likely that they will soon be forced to renounce any rights to nuclear arms.

But the main threat of the transformation of the START II Treaty from a symbol of American-Russian agreement into a new and supplemental reason for discord between the main nuclear powers in the world is not outside but within them.

The START II Treaty in its present form may fail to get through the Russian Supreme Soviet. And there are quite objective reasons for this: the economic and technical details in the execution of the START II Treaty were worked out incomparably worse than its military and political aspects (and, in some cases, apparently were not worked out at all).

There is still no specific and technically well-founded plan of measures for either the dismantling of the nuclear weapons or for the destruction of delivery systems. In some cases, they have not yet even determined practically feasible scientific-technical principles for the elimination of ecologically dangerous components of the nuclear triad (thus, for example, they have not yet resolved in principle the problem of the recovery of the toxic and dangerous liquid rocket fuel heptyl).

It is now necessary to begin the appropriate scientific investigations and then to develop and test technological lines. Only then will it be possible to begin the construction of facilities (plants) where the START II Treaty will actually be accomplished. Of course no one can really know today how many years it will take just to prepare START II for implementation. Just, by the way, as no one knows what kind of funding will be needed.

Right now, after the signing of the START II Treaty, Russian-American talks are continuing on the amount of
the American financial aid and also on scientific-technical cooperation in the development of technologies for the destruction of arms. As responsible representatives of the Russian and American governments told the correspondent of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, the talks are about specific amounts (multiple billions) of aid for the elimination of the former Soviet nuclear potential. It is obvious that the corresponding agreement will be “tacked on” to the treaty through a separate protocol so that it can get through the American Congress simultaneously with ratification. The publication of the probable amount of American aid in the open press should be expected close to the time of the discussion of START II in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation—the amount will be rather impressive (at least in terms of rubles at the current exchange rate) and obviously may influence the attitude of the deputies.

Now, however, when no one yet knows exactly how much START II will cost or the actual number of years necessary for the implementation of the bold political initiative of Yeltsin and Bush (10 years, 15 years, 20 years...?), any American appropriations will inevitably have the nature of the usual Russian (Soviet) figures “plucked from the air.” But the American Congress (in contrast to the Russian Parliament and Russian Government) is accustomed to examining rather closely the expediency of “assimilating” the money of taxpayers. The usual Russian requests for supplemental financing, when the initial appropriations will suddenly turn out to be quite inadequate, may be met even more coolly than analogous claims expressed in the course of last year to the German Government with respect to the financing of the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from the former GDR.

And, as practice as shown, the American Congress can unexpectedly “freeze” financial aid when it considers this necessary and the motives for this may arise not within a year or two, when the program for strategic disarmament inevitably begins to “skid,” but possibly sooner than that for reasons that are quite unexpected from the Russian point of view. After all, American congressmen, congresswomen, and senators are indeed rather unpredictable, whereas the Russian Government has neither the funds nor the custom of maintaining a serious lobbying office in Washington in the manner of the Americans to put continuous pressure on Congress. The embassy of Mr. Lukin is not able to do anything and it is hardly reasonable to expect the Pentagon, the White House, or the State Department to do our work for us. The indicated departments often receive from Capitol Hill “half of what they ask for.” And you can “get out” especially little if you really do not want very much to receive anything.

As far as one can judge, for example, the Russian Ministry of Defense is planning to replace “heavy” strategic missiles with a “new” single-warhead solid-fuel system based in silos. This does not contradict the terms of the START II Treaty. But “one high-ranking American representative” declared to the correspondent of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA that “such a step will cause a sharp negative reaction of the American Government, even to the point of financial and economic sanctions. We do not intend to finance indirectly the completion and purchase of a new Russian strategic system that, generally speaking, is aimed at us.”

One must admit that this approach is rather fair. The Americans themselves, it is true, are also continuing to develop and deploy new arms systems, including strategic systems. They have to replace the “Minutemen-3” ICBM’s, the B-52 bombers, and other arms. But the American Army arms and disarm exclusively at the expense of their own taxpayers and, accordingly, reports only to its own Congress.

Despite all of the obvious shortcomings and trickiness of the START II Treaty not yet apparent to the eyes of ordinary citizens, however, there is one very serious argument in its favor, which, by the way, is stressed by American and Russian military experts: if there is no treaty, then it will be even worse for Russia than with the treaty. This opinion, however, also requires a serious and detailed economic justification which, it may be hoped, will soon be presented to the Russian parliament and public by interested parties.

Editorial: START Implementation Will Cost Russia Most
PM1801153193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Jan 93 p 8

[“Editorial Viewpoint” article: “Three Semi-Nuclear Cinderellas”]

[Text] The Soviet Union left behind it in its ruins one full nuclear power and three semi-nuclear powers. For the one full nuclear power the full nuclear missile legacy serve as the last reason for great pride, but that is the only perceptible one, unfortunately. The three seminuclear powers secretly suffer from an inferiority complex although they are afraid of criticisms which might anger the wicked stepmother, who acquiesced in the unhappy division of the escheat.

The stepmother, of course, is America. Or to be more specific, the Bush administration.

There is no secret here: The United States was pretty successful in ensuring that the documents on the USSR’s nuclear legacy were made out in favor of Russia. When the leaders of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus visited Washington last fall they saw for themselves that the White House was categorically opposed to the multiplication of the members of the nuclear club by gerrymandering.

Meanwhile, Bush’s efforts related to the legalization of the inheritance, not to the actual possession of it. The reality is the missiles of the entire former superpower can be launched from Moscow but not from Kiev (Alma-Ata, Minsk). Furthermore, the process of their destruction
Russian Supreme Soviet Takes Up START-II Ratification

Outlook for Hearings

93P0062B Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 13 Jan 93 p 11

[Article by Natalya Kalashnikova: “Hearings on the Treaty Will Last Several Months”]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of Russia began hearings yesterday on the treaty to limit strategic offensive weapons (see: “X” for January 12th), signed by the Presidents of Russia and the U.S.A. Statements made by leaders of a number of parliamentary factions and by Ruslan Khasbulatov himself, who is chairman of the Supreme Soviet, give reason to believe that START-II will not have an easy time of it inside the walls of the Russian Parliament.

No one is optimistic about a quick and conflict-free ratification of START-II. Aleksandr Piskunov, deputy chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security Issues, noted that hearings lasting many months will be necessary in order to clarify all questions relevant to this document. In addition to experts from the Russian Ministry of Defense and scientists, he does not exclude the possibility that U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who is retiring on January 20th, as is Bush, and Mr. McCaffrey, representative of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, will also appear before the parliamentarians, and that they have already “expressed their readiness to do so.”

Efforts by representatives of the opposition (especially the Front for National Salvation and the “Russian Unity” bloc) on the eve of the hearings to convince the public that this is a secret treaty, were halted and changed over by the same groups to a guarded watchfulness over the speed with which this treaty is being concluded. Sergey Baburin, one of the leaders of the “Russian Unity,” stated that the issue of ratifying START-II should not be included on the daily agenda of Supreme Soviet sessions until the concept of Russian foreign policy and defense doctrine is formulated. He emphasized that according to the opposition, Andrey Kozyrev, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who “forced the signing of this treaty,” is occupying his ministerial position illegally. Deputy Mikhail Astafyev went even further in his judgement, blaming not only the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also President Yeltsin, for being subservient to the Americans. George Bush was also attacked. According to Astafyev, he has a short-sighted policy. The deputy noted that “while they are all still in power,” the hurry to ratify this treaty creates the impression that “instant success is more important for the United States than long-term relations with Russia.” Another argument of the opposition is with regard to Russian deficiencies in defense as a result of the START-II ratification. Commenting on this, Grigory Berdennikov, Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that “even after the year 2020, we shall have sufficient nuclear missile potential to destroy the world ten times over.”

The hearings promise to be long and, according to observers, will take up most of the Supreme Soviet session, which will end only on June 25th.

Otchizna Deputies’ Group Cited

93P0065B Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 27 Jan 93 p 10

[Article by Georgiy Bovt and Aleksandr Pisarev under the rubric “Parliament Discusses START-II”; “Treaty Opponents Advancing New Arguments All the Time”]

[Text] Yesterday at a session of the parliamentary faction Otchizna, which belongs to the Russian Unity bloc, hearings were conducted on the START-II Treaty. General Boris Tarasov, faction coordinator, stated that the goal of the hearings was “to deepen understanding of the treaty” and turn out “analytical material for ratification.” Observers at the hearings noted that nonacceptance of the START-II Treaty by “patriots” was sometimes brought about not so much by its content as by blunt opposition to the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its head.

Speaking at the hearings, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigory Berdennikov once again dwelled on the main parameters of the treaty. In his words, START-II, which depends directly on the implementation of START-I, establishes for Russia and the United States identical limits in numbers of strategic arms. All intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles (ICBMs with MRVs) will be destroyed. To this end it is intended to dismantle two of the three warheads on the American Minuteman ICBM, and three of the four, and five of the six, on the Russian SS-17 and 105 SS-19 ICBM’s, respectively. According to the START-I treaty, the American Peacekeeper ICBM’s and Russian ICBM’s carrying 10 warheads—the liquid-fuel SS-18 and SS-24—are subject to destruction, as are all SS-19 missiles above the 105-missile limit. Berdennikov made special
note of the fact that the United States will be deprived of its newest mobile solid-fuel MX missile, and stressed that even after the implementation of START-II, Russia will surpass the remaining nuclear powers in terms of numbers of warheads (3000): France—with 434, China—with 217, and England—with 384 warheads.

Speaking afterwards, Ananii Golitsyn, director of the Center for Military-Strategic Studies, emphasized that there was no divergence of opinion in assessing the treaty between the General Staff and Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to studies conducted by the center, the 3,000-3,500 warhead level envisaged by START-II does not take away the capability of the sides to inflict "the required damage." In this regard, the economic effectiveness as compared with the START-I level will be decreased here by 8 billion rubles. The opponents of START-II were represented by director and political scientist Sergey Kurginsky, who avoided specific figures and analysis. He is not suited with the prospect of destruction of the "pearl" of the Russian nuclear triad—heavy ICBMs. In addition, in Kurginsky's opinion, START-II will "enhance the effectiveness of SDF" and the two programs must be examined as they relate to each other. He compared the treaty itself to "dancing on ice without skates." The hearings have shown that treaty adherents still face a struggle to achieve its ratification, for opponents are resorting to entirely new arguments all the time, though not always competent ones.

Moscow Talk Show Discusses START II Treaty


The program begins with brief excerpts from the Chertkov interview. Shots of Shaposhnikov speaking at a meeting saying that further mutual reduction is necessary, and an unidentified speaker saying: "We are being denied the opportunity of giving retribution to a potential aggressor," and that the belief that "new thinking" has saved Russia "is very premature."

Chertkov, considers the two-fold reduction in nuclear arms a great victory. He says, "The victory achieved by this treaty is two-fold—there is a political prize as well—there is a political prize for both sides. Their world prestige has increased. It is clearly a step forward, and this treaty should be ratified." He does not share the viewpoint of individual specialists that this treaty is detrimental to the country.

Beketov's attitude towards the treaty is negative. He rejects the idea that the treaty provides for deep cuts in nuclear weapons. He says, "In fact, there are few reductions as such, particularly if we take the U.S. viewpoint." He proceeds to quote figures from the text of the treaty document saying: "The U.S. is reducing only 50 new MX ballistic missiles—500 warheads. The rest of its arms remain outside the scope of reduction." Using the Trident II missile as a specific example, he argues that, "The U.S. side will not eliminate a single submarine or missile. The treaty does not even demand the remaking and the rearming of these missiles." He says the U.S. potential remains fully preserved, and to activate it would take only hours, and at most, days.

Yesin says that in his evaluation: "The START II Treaty undoubtedly meets the security interests of Russia, and of the whole of the CIS. It lowers the strategic nuclear confrontation threshold of the United States and Russia. By its realization date in the year 2003, the complement of strategic offensive weapons of each side will be 3,000-3,500 nuclear warheads. Evaluations by various research organizations show that this level is quite sufficient to ensure an effective nuclear deterrent."

Chertkov says that any disarmament treaty must satisfy a state's military and political doctrines, and he says Russia has no new military doctrine yet. He agrees with the interviewer that at present, politics prevails over military defense.

Next the narrator speaks about the arms race. He says that some people harbor concerns over the START Treaty, loss of parity, wanting to remain a superpower, and the disintegration of industry in all of which, the narrator says, there is a modicum of truth, however, any reduction is a benefit to humanity.

Surikov, questioned about the cost of dismantling missiles, says the cost will be great, and proceeds to speak about the need to maintain parity.

Beketov is of the opinion that the treaty is unprofitable to Russia in the economic sense, and the whole issue requires "expert, attentive, thorough, and detailed expert evaluation, and not just announcements by higher officials who occupy certain posts, but by independent specialists who should accurately calculate and evaluate the treaty."

Chertkov says "that insufficient effort was expended to attract industry to the issue of preparation of this treaty is an absolute fact. As you can understand yourself, a force [gruppirovka] is not created by the military, but by industry, and all the strategic complexes are built by industry. That is why consideration of industry's capabilities—and in these economic times it is a very complicated issue—should have been weighed carefully, and it seems to me; worked through out them." He is sure that industry is capable of fulfilling the task in accordance with the treaty.
Yesin says missile forces will be restructured as will the rest of the military. However, "Thanks to the sensible 10-year treaty fulfillment timeframe, we will be taking missile complexes out of service only after the expiration of their service life, and not a single long-range missile will be taken out of effective combat strength until the expiration of its service life." On the reduction of missile forces, Yesin says that about 10,000 officers and warrant officers will no longer be needed, however, the lengthy time needed to realize the START II Treaty allows this reduction to take place through natural attrition, and no one will be dismissed.

**Russian-Ukrainian Talks on START Adherence, Implementation**

**Disagreement on Status of Forces**

93400062A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 13 Jan 93 p 12

[Article by Aleksandr Stukalin: "Russian-Ukrainian Differences Call in Question the Reduction of Nuclear Weapons." Article is under the rubric "Meeting of the CIS Ministers of Defense"]

[Text] A meeting of the Defense Ministers of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, scheduled for yesterday, which was to have discussed problems of state ownership of nuclear weapons located outside of Russia, did not take place. The Supreme Command [Glavkomat] of the CIS Unified Armed Forces intends to hold this meeting on the eve of the conference of the CIS presidents in Minsk on January 21st. Independent experts have stated that the most probable reasons for the postponement were disagreements that have arisen in recent days between Ukraine and Russia in connection with the interpretation and ratification of the START-2 treaty.

On the eve of the postponed meeting, the Russian Ministry of Defense sent the Ukrainian military department a draft of the agreement on the status of nuclear forces located on Ukrainian territory. According to Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, the Russian first deputy Minister of Defense and chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the document emphasizes that nuclear weapons should state precisely to which government they belong. Kolesnikov noted that Ukraine today does not have the capability to ensure that nuclear weapons will be maintained and serviced "to a high degree of reliability and nuclear safety, because the republic does not have the necessary services and specialists." Kolesnikov said that he completely shares the worry of the world community about the aging of "Ukrainian" nuclear weapons that are becoming more and more dangerous.

The official Kiev assessment of the proposed draft was that it did not take into consideration the national security of the republic and, consequently, it could not be seriously considered. Ivan Bizhan, deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, stated that even though Ukraine is not developing its own codes for the missiles located on its territory and does not aspire to control strategic nuclear forces, the Ukrainian leadership is not inclined to refuse "administrative control over nuclear weapons located on its territory."

Commenting on the Russian-Ukrainian dispute, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, Supreme Commander of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, said that a precise determination is needed for a problem as important as the nuclear status. "Ukraine should either declare itself a nuclear power or take concrete steps to become truly non-nuclear." Otherwise, according to the Marshal, serious problems may arise during the ratification of the START-2 treaty by the parliaments of the republics. "X" will report on the January 22nd meeting of the ministers of defense.

**Bilateral Talks Open; Ukraine Sets Conditions**

MX2901070193 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 27 Jan 93 p 2

[Report by Viktoria Kulakova and Vladimir Makar-sev: "Mechanisms for the Withdrawal of Nuclear Arms From Ukraine Discussed"]

[Text] The first round of talks between Russia and Ukraine to determine the mechanisms for implementing the START I treaty (the withdrawal and nonproliferation of nuclear arms) began in the Kiev suburb of Ppren yesterday. The Russian delegation to the talks is led by Yuriy Dubinin, chairman of the state commission for talks with Ukraine, while the Ukrainian delegation is headed by Yuriy Kos-tenko, minister for environmental protection. The meeting is taking place behind closed doors.

According to observers, the meeting is to discuss a range of problems related to the storage of missiles and warheads before they are finally withdrawn from Ukraine in 1997, and to draw up a document confirming Boris Yeltsin's oral statement about Russia's nuclear security guarantees for Ukraine.

The meeting was preceded by talks in Kiev on 12 January between delegations of the Russian and Ukrainian Foreign Ministries. The Russian diplomats gave the Ukrainian side additional information that was intended to make it easier for the Ukrainian parliament to ratify START I. By that time, Kiev had already received clarifications regarding the details of the signing by Russia and the United States of START II in the context of Russo-Ukrainian relations and national security guarantees. The present meeting therefore can be viewed as a continuation of the previous one.

It is thought that Ukraine will continue to insist, as a condition for its ratifying START I, on an increase in U.S. aid from $750 million to $1.5 billion in addition to a share of Russia's profits from its sales of the dismantled nuclear warheads whose contents, after processing, can be used as fuel for nuclear power plants. More
accurate figures may be given at the meeting because at the beginning of the year, the parliamentary foreign affairs commission of the Ukrainian Supreme Council had requested experts of the defense industry, security service, and the Institute for Strategic Studies to provide calculations of the political and economic consequences of nuclear disarmament.

The current talks are being held in a difficult atmosphere with various political forces trying to put pressure on the Ukrainian and Russian parliamentarians. Observers believe that the success of the talks will depend largely on the alignment of forces in the legislatures of the two countries.

Because it is a closed meeting, there is no telling when it may end. KOMMERSANT-DAILY will return to the subject of the Russo-Ukrainian talks on 30 January.

[Article includes the following boxed text]

The three conditions put forward by Ukraine to expedite its process of nuclear disarmament:

1. The nuclear powers should provide security guarantees.
2. Russia and the United States should subsidize the process of dismantling missiles.
3. Financial compensation should be paid for the storage of warheads that will be moved to Russia for destruction.]

Positions Clarified
PMO20205793 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 2 Feb 93 p 3

[Anatoliy Polyakov report: “Russia and Ukraine Clarify Positions on Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Now Things Depend on Quest for Compromise Solutions”]

First Round of Talks Completed
LD0302117393 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in English 0100 GMT 3 Feb 93

[Text] Completed was the first round of Russian-Ukrainian talks on regulating the issue linked with the realization of the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol. On the agenda of these talks was the issue pertaining to the security of nuclear weapons situated in the territory of Ukraine.

As stated by the head of the Russian delegation, Yuriy Dubinin, progress has been achieved in preparing the text of the agreement on the observation of the (exploitation) of missile components of strategic armed forces and the search for ways and discussion of different (variants) of dismantling, transportation, and destruction of nuclear warheads and elements of nuclear components, including their processing.

Ukrainian Officials Seek Compensation for START Implementation
OW0102175793 Moscow Interfax in English 1734 GMT 1 Feb 93

[Report by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grischchenko; from the “Presidential Bulletin” feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk who is taking part in the Davos world economic forum, drew attention of the western public to the problem concerning liquidation of the strategic nuclear forces in Ukraine. According to mass media, the head of state once again repeated the thought about the necessity to compensate the material damage related to nuclear disarmament process in his public addresses.

Premier Leonid Kuchma formulated government’s attitude with respect to this issue in his recent TV interview. “We should decide problems concerning destruction of nuclear weapons with Russia,” he believes. In Kuchma’s words, $175 million proposed by the United States as a
compensation for the destruction of strategic missiles are clearly not enough. “If U.S. President had put a question to his experts they would have told him about this,” declared Kuchma.

INTERFAX Note: Mentioning a telephone talk between Kravchuk and Bill Clinton on January 26, presidential press secretary Vladimir Shlyaposhnikov drew attention to the fact that Clinton spoke “minimum about $175 million.” Meanwhile, Vyacheslav Chornovil, the leader of Ukraine’s opposition Popular Rukh [Ukraine People’s Movement for Perestroyka] (the major opposition force in the republic), believes, along with Kuchma, that the sum proposed by the Americans does not correspond to real requirements of the republic. Presenting calculations of experts, Chornovil said that Ukraine’s expenditures to reduce nuclear weapons will constitute $1.5-2 billion. Rukh’s leader thinks that until there is an uncertainty in this issue the parliament should not be in a hurry to ratify START-1 Treaty.

Yuri Kostenko, Ukrainian Ecology Protection Minister, called the problem to liquidate strategic missiles stationed on Ukraine’s territory an extremely complex one in ecological, political, and economic aspects. According to him, the main problems concern further utilization of missile fuel.

Kostenko believes that the first round of the Ukrainian-Russian negotiations held near Kiev last week helped to find ways to speed up ratification of START-1 Treaty by the Ukrainian parliament. The Minister who headed the Ukrainian delegation at the negotiations reported that the Russian party promised to present proposals concerning liquidation or utilization of components of nuclear weapons stationed on the Ukrainian territory within a month.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Reports on Belarusian CFE Implementation

Borisov Plant Begins Dismantling Tanks
PM0202144793 Moscow Teleradionompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 0600 GMT 1 Feb 93

[By Aleksey Zhuk; from the “Novosti” newscast]

[Text] [Zhuk] The Borisov armored equipment repair plant, which is now well known, and not just to the military, has entered the next phase in the elimination of conventional weapons. Under the European treaty and other international agreements which the Republic of Belarus has signed, the task in hand is to dismantle over 1,500 battle tanks. Heads of diplomatic missions were invited to the launch of the operation.

After a tank has been cut up, it is no longer a unit of combat equipment. Designers have already drawn up designs for the use of former tanks for civilian purposes as tow trucks, chassis for various cranes, and machinery for use in the countryside.

[Deputy Defense Minister V.G. Yakshev] All this is being monitored by the countries which are parties to the Vienna agreements, just as we monitor the same processes in other countries. We believe that our task will certainly be carried out, and indeed within the 40-month deadline that has been laid down under the treaty.

Baranovichi Missile Dismantlement Center
WS0202133193 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by NARODNAYA GAZETA Correspondent Ales Sivyi: “Number Three Is Asking for Permission To Land....”]

[Text] In accordance with the concluded international agreements, at the end of January 1993, Baranovichi will become the third Belarusian center for the dismantlement of military fighting equipment.

The first two centers—in Borisov and Stankovo—specialize in the dismantlement of armory, artillery and missile equipment. As we were told in the Belarusian Defense Ministry, the center in Baranovichi will serve for the dismantlement of missile equipment. The procedure will be carried out under the surveillance of international inspection.

To Destroy Military Aircraft
LD0202230093 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1300 GMT 31 Jan 93

[Text] The Lesnaya base for the liquidation of intermediate-range missiles in Baranovichi Rayon has resumed work after the destruction of the deadly weapons and after some lull. Instead of missiles, aircraft are now arriving there in accordance with the treaty on the reduction of weapons in Europe. Workers and specialists at the Baranovichi aviation repairs enterprise are dismantling the military machinery. The destruction of the fuselage and other body parts will be carried out in the presence of international experts.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Further Polemics on Mirzayanov-Fedorov on CW Secrecy Case

Authors Dispute Secrecy Claim
934P0057A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 50, 13 Dec 92 p 8

[Article by Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov, doctors of chemical sciences: “Death License”]

[Text] The Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation continues its investigation of the case of the so-called
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"divulgence of a state secret" by Doctor of Chemical Sciences V. Mirzayanov in the article "Poison Policy" (MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI No 38, 1992). More and more "witnesses" are being called in to the Lubyanka offices, including MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI journalists. All this is taking place against a background of critical statements from the Russian press and protests from the world community, which the Ministry of Security of Russia, it seems, wants nothing to do with. Certain other events are also taking place, and these are discussed today by the authors of the article "Poison Policy."

We wish to draw attention to a fact we are aware of: In the military-chemical "underground" they are hastily burning archives related to the development of chemical agents. One might wonder why these secrets are not being guarded by such a powerful organization as the Ministry of Security of Russia, and when the former underground men are becoming legal... (August Ishkov, the institute's former deputy director who works on preparing for an immunological war) are becoming environmental protection chiefs, protectors of the environment. They are probably aware that if the Ministry of Security of Russia were suddenly to take up real matters pertaining to state security instead of trumped-up ones, these archives would serve certain persons poorly.

But they are still a long way from that. In September, after the publication of our article in MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA published an official article. Actually, it was a "presidential edict approving a certain list. A list of chemical substances, so-called precursors, which serve as a basis for the production of chemical agents. The substances included on the list are banned for export without a special license. But God forbid that the strictest control should be established over these exports. But on the list one can clearly see the "signature" of A. Kuntsevich, a general of the chemical warfare service with whom we are already familiar. There is a ban on exports of precursors of binary weapons, only not ours but American ones! There are no components of the Russian "binary" there. So there will be no problems with deliveries of them to Iraq or Libya...

And another thing. According to the program for chemical disarmament currently being discussed in the Supreme Soviet, in the next 10-15 years it is planned to ship by rail carloads of small shells and missiles containing no more than eight liters of phosphorous chemical agents. And nothing is being said about the other ammunitions, for example, the large aviation bombs and powerful missiles, the ones that are loaded with large quantities of chemical agents.

And yet the Russian "binary" exists, it has been developed and approved. So is this weapon just waiting for its time to come?

Moscow Institute Said Harmless
934P0054A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jan 93 p 4

[Article by Vitaliy Karyn: "Top Secret. We Shall Delay the Destruction of Moscow for Now: Reportage From the Top Secret Institute in Which Until Recently Chemical Weapons and Chemical Agents Were Developed"]

[Text] The USSR stopped producing this terrible weapon in 1987, after which enterprises working with chemical agents began to be retooled as facilities for studying and producing various kinds of national economic products. The State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (GSNIIOKhT) is no exception on this list.

As one of the institute's former associates wrote recently in a capital newspaper, within its walls shells filled with sarin are being sawed up almost like metal being sawed with a hacksaw, and the contents, that is, the chemical agent, are poured out in buckets into the toilet or they are carried in baskets to the grounds of the institute and buried, barely covered by dirt.

And now after a careful inspection of the institute's activity and its grounds by authorized services, the GSNIIOKhT administration for the first time in the 70 years of its existence has decided to invite representatives of the press to visit.

...An ordinary entry way without ultramodern security. I was met by the institute's director—Professor and Doctor of Chemical Sciences Viktor Petrunin.

"Where shall we go?" he offered me my choice of a route.

I took advantage of the opportunity and pointed to one of the attractive new buildings—as it turned out, it was Building 7. On the way to it we passed an unprepossessing separate two-story building.

"And that building is the former jail for scientists," Viktor Alekseyevich said, noticing my curious glance. "Researchers who were under suspicion were kept here during the war."

"During that same war," said V. Petrunin, "our institute filled bottles with a combustible mixture."

"And now, during peacetime, you fill shells with chemical agents?"

"I officially state: The GSNIIOKhT today does not work on problems having anything to do with the production of chemical weapons. Moreover, our institute is participating actively in the preparation of the convention banning them. If everything goes according to plan, as early as January the document will be signed in Paris."

The director and I went into Building 7. I was introduced to Professor Vyacheslav Dobryansky. He is working on an experiment right out of the horror movies. In his laboratory crucified on an iron device was a...rabbit.
"You are in a large pharmaceutical complex," explains Vyacheslav Stanislavovich. "And you came at a good time. We have discovered a new preparation—a muscle relaxant which is needed for any surgical operation. But in order to begin series production of it the preparation has to go through comprehensive tests. That is why the rabbit is here."

...Before my "visit" to the institute I made detailed preparations for my meeting with the scientists. The "information leak" turned out to be a riddle to me: In room number 425 of the institute lies the "very most" mysterious thing. Because once I was inside the walls of GSNIIOKhT I asked the person in charge to show me room 425.

"You are drawn to the forbidden fruit," was the answer that followed.

But still I saw it. After chemical weapons are destroyed there remains a residue or a physiologically active substance. It is necessary to check to see how dangerous it is for the environment. This is what they are working on in room 425.

"Please show me the military chemical agents, if it is not too dangerous," I asked the scientists.

In response I got a friendly laugh from the director and the laboratory assistants. I was taken to a sealed iron box. There were glass windows in it. Two rubber gloves were sticking out from the box. On the rear wall was a tiny metal safe secured with a padlock. They pointed it out to me.

"Here is where THEY are kept."

Such a small safe and such a lot to-do over its contents...

The laboratory assistant stuck her hands into the rubber gloves, took the key from a little shelf inside the box, and opened the lock. Inside the safe was a hermetically sealed shiny cylindrical container.

"It contains a glass test tube in activated carbon," explained Viktor Alekseyevich, "and the military chemical agents are stored in it. It is practically impossible for the substances kept in there to come into contact with the surrounding air."

"You are working with chemical agents so you must be continuing your research in the area of chemical weapons."

"The first and main area of the activity of our scientific research institute is the study and creation of medicines. The organization of their production in our experimental plant includes only 14 kinds of vitally important medical preparations.

"Second—for this year we have planned such areas of work as the creation of effective means and methods and technology for salvaging harmful substances and wastes, above all the destruction of chemical weapons. The institute has developed technologies for destroying chemical agents, whose high level of ecological and technical sophistication has been confirmed in seminars conducted in New York and Geneva under the aegis of the United Nations; and also in conferences in Moscow, including under the aegis of the Russian Academy of Sciences," explains V. Petrunin. "Our institute has created a mobile installation for the destruction of the so-called unsafe chemical weapons. It can go to the site of an accident, prepare for performing its tasks in only four hours, and carry them out.

"We," he continued, "demonstrated it to representatives of Western countries in 1986 when we used the installation to dismantle an unsafe shell containing the nerve gas sarin."

"Viktor Alekseyevich," I could not keep myself from asking the next question, "if, God forbid, chemical agents were to leak out of the laboratory of your scientific research institute into the air of Moscow, all residents of the capital would be in mortal danger. Is this not what Vil Mirzayanov, a former institute worker, was talking about?"

"In the first place, I officially declare that the institute and its experimental plant are not polluting either the air or the soil or the waste waters with any highly toxic substances. This was the conclusion arrived at by the inspection organs of the Ministry of Health and Protection of Nature. In the second place, Vil Mirzayanov did more than just perform the functions of a scientific associate when he worked here. Until recently he was in charge of the department for counteracting foreign technical reconnaissance. His duties included protecting information, the leakage of which was linked to the work of computers, and also protection of so-called verbal information. For the sake of discretion it would be better not to comment on what was covered by these phrases. In addition to all of this, V. Mirzayanov performed the functions of analyzing samples of the air, soil, and ventilation discharges. In MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI he warns Muscovites of an impending danger. But in 1986, in his own report, he wrote the following: '...A control analysis of air samples on the grounds of the enterprise and also ventilation discharges from the laboratory buildings and waste waters showed the absence of any special products in the samples of either the air or water. A total of 1,351 samples were taken and analyzed.'

"Similar data under V. Mirzayanov's signature were cited in reports for 1987, 1988, and 1989.

"Another interesting fact: In the article entitled 'Poison Politics' he writes: 'the artesian waters here have been poisoned,' 'an analysis of running water from building No. 7 which comes from an artesian well on the grounds of the institute showed the presence of a whole array of sulfur and chlorine compounds...' But what is the point of this cleverness when there is no artesian water at all in the institute?"

"What, in your view, is the reason for such statements?"
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His personal indignation," answered the director. "Recently the department for countering foreign technical reconnaissance was restructured because it was no longer needed, and its leader came under the axe..."

Fedorov: USSR CW Elimination Pledges Dishonest
934P0059A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Jan 93 p 6

[Article by Lev Fedorov, doctor of chemical sciences: "Long Farewells: Not Everyone Is Ready To Part with Chemical Weapons"]

[Text]

Opinion

Last week's signing of the convention on chemical disarmament cannot help but prompt us to cast our eyes one more time toward the path along which the military chemical generals continue to lead Russia. This retrospective does not evoke anything optimistic.

From the beginning there was deception concerning the total amount of toxic agents (OV). Western experts, based on real production capabilities, supposed that our chemical weapons stockpiles were at the level of 200,000-300,000 tonnes. This error is quite excusable—after all, they did not know what and how much of what was produced we managed to bury and submerge. In 1987, when M. Gorbachev declared a freeze on the production of toxic agents, we had about 60-70,000 tonnes of this junk. Meanwhile, international agreements did not allow more than 50,000 tonnes. The generals coped with this difficulty in an offhand way—they reduced the stockpile figure to 40,000 tonnes. And they buried and submerged the "excess" toxic agents. Incidentally, the shooting of chemical munitions is going on at the military-chemical test range in Shikhany up to the present time.

Afterwards, they deceived the West (or themselves) with the toxic agent nomenclature. In October 1987 in Shikhany correspondents from various countries were shown 19 types of chemical munitions, including six with yperite (rocket and barrel artillery shells and bombs) and one with CS gas (grenades). Well, the chemical disarmament program that is now going through the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation does not include any of this (incidentally, not even one page, without which it is difficult to understand the structure of expected expenditures). It did at one time, but not now. As for the grenades with CS gas, everything here is simple: The army was at fault for employing it in Tbilisi in April 1989, so they buried it so that no one would remember. But, after all, we had many thousands of tonnes of yperite packed in munitions, but now it would seem that there is not even a single such munition. Incidentally, the entire available adamsite stockpile was also buried, of which we were able to produce thousands of tonnes before the war. It was buried not very long ago, at the end of last summer.

But the main deception is still to come. Our military-chemical generals have already prepared for chemical warfare under the conditions of its ban, as at one time they performed a similar trick regarding biological warfare. They renamed the directorate in the general staff that was engaged in chemical warfare planning, the... ecological directorate. They conducted training exercises at bases, institutions, and plants in the event of a foray by international controllers. They prepared for the kind of organization of industry so that a nomenclature of substances was always in use that could be transformed easily into the production of highly toxic agents. Finally, the generals prepared for war with the help of binary weapons. When in 1987 M. Gorbachev proclaimed a halt to the production of toxic agents, the final stage of production of V-gas, it appears, was actually stopped at Khimprom in Novocheboksarsk (Chuvashia). However, the general secretary did not even mention a halt to the production of substances that were the forerunners of toxic agents (the so-called precursors). It was possible to produce them in massive amounts right up to September 1992 and to store them quietly. Why did the generals need this trickery? For the preparation for war with binary chemical weapons. After all, the final stage of the process—the synthesis of the toxic agent itself—can be moved from the industrial area and put directly into a shell or missile during flight in the direction of the probable enemy. And they, our expensive generals, were successfully preparing for exactly this kind of war: They conducted all the full-scale tests and developed the pertinent munitions. In spring 1991 a secret Lenin Prize was awarded to three specialists—A. Kuntsevich, V. Petrunin, and S. Golubkov.

On 24 October 1992 General A. Kuntsevich wrote in a letter to President Yeltsin: "Work on the draft convention on banning chemical weapons has been completed. The draft has been submitted for review by the UN General Assembly. According to information of the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of Russia, 138 states declared their readiness to join the draft resolution of the General Assembly on chemical weapons as coauthors. Russia has not yet made such a declaration, it finds itself isolated, and it is losing politically. The indicated delay is associated with the absence of decisions concerning approval of the program for the phased destruction of chemical weapons in Russia and its special purpose financing... The draft of such a program...developed by the committee on conventional problems of chemical and biological weapons jointly with the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Industry, and other departments was presented on 15 October 1992 to the government and the Committees of the Supreme Soviet for Industry and Ecology, and is
there for examination. In the situation that has developed, it seems advisable—to declare your approval in principle of the program for the phased destruction of chemical weapons of Russia—to instruct the government to provide...a special purpose line item in budget appropriations for conventional problems of chemical and biological weapons under the responsibility of the committee for conventional problems of chemical and biological weapons for the purposeful use of these resources—to charge the MFA in coordination with interested departments to give instructions to the representative of Russia at the UN to issue a statement of support for the resolution on chemical weapons... I ask for your concurrence.”

“I concur,” wrote the president, not looking, inasmuch as there was no place to look: The program was not attached to the letter. To what did Boris Yeltsin agree so easily? Here are several random points.

To the large-scale transportation of toxic agents over our utterly dilapidated railroads. The Americans have destroyed and will destroy chemical agents only at the place where they are stored. But we do not learn from anyone else’s experience, and we propose to transport toxic agents just as we have been. Until the first accident?

To the quarrel with Chuvasia. Yes, in the years 1972-1987 thousands of tonnes of the most toxic combat toxic agents in the armaments inventory were produced in Novocheboksarsk—V-gas. But later the military took them away for storage—there are no depots in Chuvasia. Thus, the general program does not say a word either about restoration of the health of the afflicted population of Chuvasia or about the inspection and decontamination of the contaminated land. That is, about that very same parting with chemical warfare that it was necessary to plan in the first place and without any conditions—simply as consideration of the past. Incidentally, there is also no consideration in this program of the “dirty” chemical past of Chapayevsk, Dzerzhinsk, Kineshma, Volgograd, and many other cities that were scorched by the preparations for chemical warfare. On the other hand, there is something else there: The return transport to Chuvasia of the most toxic phosphoric toxic agents (both our own V-gas and the foreign sarin and soman) from all of Russia and their destruction right in the middle of Novocheboksarsk. It is just that the general did not disturb the president with the fact that the laws of sovereign Chuvasia prohibit this delivery. Can we expect a quarrel?

The president also agreed to something that is very strange—the clear designation of the strategic enemy of our chemical weapons. General Kuntsevich proposes 10-15 years to destroy only tactical weapons—small shells and rockets with phosphoric toxic agents with a volume of not more than eight liters. But, kindly tell me, where are the rest of the munitions, for example, the large aviation bombs with a load of 45 and 49 kilograms of sarin and soman and the powerful rockets with loads of 216 and 555 kilograms of V-gas? Those that are capable of ending up not simply far but very far, on the other side of the Earth. These strategic munitions are not mentioned in the chemical weapons disarmament program. Are they really waiting for an order of the supreme commander in chief?

1982 CW Experiment on Human Subject Detailed
934P0064A Moscow TRUD in Russian 29 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Igor Tsarev: “Behind the Solid Curtain of Secrecy—Poison”]

[Text] A universal agreement on chemical disarmament has been signed once again. Will deaths in laboratories that prepare poisonous combat substances be stopped now? Up until the present time, not one convention has become an impediment to this.

“The most barbaric means of mass destruction”—this is precisely what chemical weapons [CW] were called by the Hague Convention, which was signed by 44 countries as far back as 1907. Germany also left its “signature” on this document. However, literally within seven years, during World War I, the Germans easily disregarded both their commitments and international norms, and Russia became a testing ground on which the achievements of German chemists were tested. According to front line reports of those years, Russian troops lost about 40,000 persons from gas attacks....

World public opinion was indignant. According to the Versailles Treaty, Germany was categorically forbidden henceforth to develop and have chemical weapons. Its commanders, it would seem, resigned themselves to this, but they soon found like-minded persons for themselves in...Russia, which was already Soviet by that time. A special military chemical directorate was established in the Red Army, located in Moscow, on Lyubytanka Square. And the chain of lies got longer....

The year 1923. The armaments directorate of the Reichswehr concluded a secret treaty with the well-known chemist Hugo Shtolzenberg, and he established the mysterious Society for the Promotion of Business Undertakings (GEFU), with affiliates in Moscow and Berlin. The true aim of this organization was the secret financing and coordination of the work of the German military industry in the USSR. The Soviet defense enterprise Metakhim actively collaborated with the GEFU. With 24 million reichsmarks that were issued by the Germans, three factories were built for the production of phosgene, yperite, and mustard gas—two in Germany and one in the little Russian settlement of Ivashchenkovo, near Samara. The Soviet plant, which was given the name Borsel, could produce several tonnes of toxic agents in one day....

The year 1925. Germany signed the Geneva protocol on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons.
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The year 1927. The leadership of the USSR appended its signature to this document. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union and Germany reached an agreement (now in secrecy from everyone) on the joint conduct of tests with combat toxic gases “somewhere in a remote area of Russia.” The little town of Shikhany was chosen, not far from Saratov. The facility received the code name “Tomka”.

The top-secret testing ground in Shikhany exists to this day. It is an enormous territory of 400 square kilometers adjoining the Volga, and, as previously, it is a restricted and closed area.

Sergey Mikhaylov, our stringer from Saratov, reports:

There are a lot of rumors about the Shikhany “zone.” It is said that a huge number of barrels with toxic agents are buried there that gradually are seeping into the Volga. Tests of chemical weapons are being conducted there allegedly directly on people.... Despite the solid curtain of secrecy, some of the facts can be verified. Thus, for example, I recently became acquainted with Vladimir Petrenko, who worked at the “facility” for a long time and who took part in a rather strange experiment....

In the summer of 1982, young Lieutenant Petrenko was summoned by the chief of the department of special work. The conversation began in a roundabout way: You see, he said, the West is preparing for war, and we also have to step up the development of modern types of weapons. And then he informed the lieutenant that he was being assigned to take part in the execution of an especially important operational task. The chief said that a week would be spent on this, and that top-secret work would be conducted right here in Shikhany, but that Petrenko should tell the people at home that he was going on an assignment to another city....

Which is what Vladimir did—on the appointed day, he packed his suitcase, said good-bye to his wife, and left. He was assigned a separate room with a bed in the laboratory building. In order not to jeopardize the regime of secrecy, he was not permitted to go out on the street, and food was brought to him from the officers mess. However, nothing in particular happened in the first four days. Petrenko was made to “race” on an exercise bicycle, and he was forced to shoot at a target from an electronic pistol mockup.... At that time, doctors measured his pulse and pressure, and they took samples. Then he was met by the deputy chief of the medical service institute, and he proposed (but in the Army, as is well known, the proposal of an officer who is senior in rank is equivalent to an order) to test the action of a toxic agent. At the same time, the lieutenant was given assurances that the dose of toxic agent would be small, and that the effect would be absolutely harmless.

Right then he was asked to sign an insurance policy in the name of his mother and wife, he was made to shave his moustache, either more for safety or for better effect.... The tests took place in a small room in which there was a transparent chamber. Vladimir’s head was tied up with a triangular head scarf in such a way that only his nose and mouth were clear, then a toxic agent was released into the chamber, and the lieutenant, who had shoved his head into it, began to breathe....

“This lasted for about a minute,” he recalls today, “I got a tickling under the nose, and my breath was taken away. And afterwards, the doctors once again got me to race on the exercise bicycle, and they had me do all kinds of exercises. It is curious that the results of the shooting were better....”

The “harmless” dose of the unknown toxic agent made itself known within several months. Petrenko acquired a whole bunch of ailments—large pigmented spots appeared on the skin. This was written on his medical card: vitiligo, chronic gastritis, chronic laryngitis, allergic conjunctivitis, and also some kind of hypo-rosis [gipotirozz], and bowel obstruction [obstruktivit]—all told, 10 names.

For the performance of a secret task of the motherland, Petrenko received a reward of 300 rubles. And, judging by everything, he was not the only one on whom tests were conducted. When he received the money and was signing his name, he noticed that there were no less than 40 names there.

I do not know how Russian law looks upon this, but from the standpoint of morality and ethics, tests like this on people cannot be called anything other than inhumane. And, therefore, I certainly want to say that in that year when the unknown toxic agent was tested on Lieutenant Petrenko, the institute in Shikhany was directed by Anatoliy Kuntsevich, the same person who in 1991 received the secret Lenin Prize for creating the nation’s binary chemical weapon, and who today heads the Committee on Chemical and Biological Weapons Problems under the president of Russia.

One other story is associated with the name of this general. Our newspaper has already written that Doctor of Chemical Sciences Vil Mirzayanov, who talked about Kuntsevich and the binary weapon in one of his articles, was arrested on charges of publicizing a state secret. It would seem that, today, when Russia has signed another international convention calling for the destruction of chemical weapons, that the matter should be closed. But, alas, the research is going on. And this automatically evokes doubts about the sincere desire of our military once and for all to get rid of this barbaric weapon, toxic agents of mass destruction. Especially since experience shows historically that the creation and testing of combat toxic agents have always been hidden behind a solid curtain of secrecy. But where can deception hide? Vil Mirzayanov has this to say:

“Our military-chemical generals prepared themselves long ago for chemical warfare under conditions of its international ban, changing the name of the directorate of the General Staff that engages in planning chemical warfare to the ecological directorate. Exercises were conducted at bases, institutes, and plants in the event of
an unexpected visit of international controllers. The organization of the kind of an industry was prepared so that substances were always being widely used that could be easily transformed into highly toxic toxic agents. You will agree that if we develop, produce, and test new types of toxic agents, but at the same time do not include them in lists subject to international control, this is by no means done from good motives. Rather, this is an attempt to circumvent the convention, and this, unquestionably, contradicts the interests of Russia and of its citizens. After all, in such a case, it is assumed that the other convention members can also behave in the same way. But then this is not any kind of a convention at all, but a conspiracy in behalf of interests that are not comprehensible to the ordinary person."

"The investigator has not told you that he plans to close your case?"

"On the contrary. I am summoned regularly to Lefortovo prison for interrogations. After all, the investigation is supposed to be concluded and the documents transferred to the court by 19 February. The other day, I wrote a statement that I categorically refuse to give any kind of testimony, and that I do not want to participate in this farce to assist those who want to "send me off" to a lockup...."

Can the "Mirzayanov case" serve as a "litmus paper" and a unique test of the sincerity of the intentions of the Russian military? I think so. Unquestionably. And the decision of the court will say a lot. If a scientist who talks about the secret production and testing of binary weapons will receive freedom, this means our state has really entered onto the path of peace.
GERMANY

Bundeswehr Allegedly To Be Reduced to 320,000 Men

Cuts Said Driven by Budget Woes

[Report by Michael J. Inacker: "Further Reduction of Bundeswehr; Military Service Soon 6-8 Months?"]

[Text] Bonn—Because of Bonn's major financial problems, for the first time in Germany's compulsory military service system, high-ranking officials in the Defense Ministry are considering not calling up any recruits for a period of 3 months.

Even in the so-called G-1 meeting of the officers responsible for personnel and internal management in the four corps of the Bundeswehr on 25 November 1992, the development of personnel in the Armed Forces was painted in gloomy colors: In the long term, the desired size of the Bundeswehr—370,000 men—and the 12-months' compulsory military service might have to be questioned.

Although in an internal crisis meeting on the budget decisions last week Inspector General Klaus Naumann stated that "despite all considerations in connection with the austerity plan, cuts in personnel should be the very last option." The Armed Forces planners do not see any possibilities for making cuts, neither in equipment nor in operating costs. Significant savings are only possible by reducing personnel.

To gain short-term room for maneuvering, Armed Forces planners have suggested not calling up recruits either in the last quarter of 1993 or the first quarter of 1994. This step might save between 500 and 750 million German marks.

Defense Minister Ruehe has ordered experts to examine this week a reduction of the size of the Bundeswehr from 370,000 to maybe 320,000-340,000 men. In the long term, this also challenges the 12-months' duration of military service.

To maintain compulsory military service, initial considerations suggest reducing the duration of the military service to six to eight months, accepting the possible consequences for the future structure of the Bundeswehr; increasing the proportion of professional soldiers and long-term servicemen in the combat-ready force, and in addition having elements of a militia army, from which the necessary young men can be recruited in the future, too.

Kohl Reportedly To Announce Cuts

[Text] Hamburg (DDP)—Federal Chancellor Kohl (CDU) will announce, according to the HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT a reduction in the Bundeswehr at the Defense Studies meeting in Munich. The Chancellor will make it clear over the weekend that the planned size of 370,000 men was no longer tenable in view of the drastic cuts in the defense budget, the paper writes in tomorrow's edition. However, both Kohl and Defense Minister Volker Ruehe (CDU) intend to keep conscription.

The paper adds that the defense ministry is already investigating how and to what extent the armed forces can be reduced. This follows talks by Kohl with Ruehe.

Ruehe previously announced to the CDU/CSU Bundestag group that a Bundeswehr of 370,000 men could no longer be sustained after 1994 in view of massive, additional cuts in the defense budget. HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT writes that defense ministry experts were noting with concern that the minimum needed for general conscription was 350,000 men. Equity in conscription could not be guaranteed below that level.

Reports on Russian Troop Withdrawal From Germany

Supplement Granted Housing

LD0102145593 Hamburg DPA in German 1219 GMT 1 Feb 93

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The German Government wants to introduce an inflation-related supplement of 550 million German marks [DM] in order to boost the construction of housing for troops returning home to Russia and at the same time accelerate the withdrawal schedule. The transitional agreement of the Russian-German Good-Neighborliness Treaty in 1990 earmarked DM7.8 billion to finance the withdrawal of the then Soviet forces from the former GDR. Details of the acceleration plan, which had been agreed in December 1992 by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, were finalized last week by the negotiators, Ambassador (C.J. Duisberg) and General M.P. Burlakov.

By 31 December 1992, 329,500 persons—including 211,356 military personnel—had withdrawn from eastern Germany, equivalent to 60 percent of the total sum of personnel and material. Diplomatic sources added in Bonn today that the withdrawal quotient should reach 90 percent by the end of 1993, leaving just 10 percent to return home by the time the treaty lapses on 31 August 1994.

Complaints by General Burlakov, head of the so-called Western Group, regarding delays in the promised construction of dwellings, were rejected by diplomats. Issuing of contracts was the sole responsibility of the Russian Defense Ministry. The withdrawal figure
achieved thus far should be seen as a great organizational achievement given the difficult relocation of garrisons created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the loss of former bases in Belarus and Ukraine.

The number of Russian deserters is put at between 100 and 200. Both sides have placed a blanket of strict confidentiality on the precise number as well as the police handling of the problem. Deserters are evidently safe on western German soil as the withdrawal treaty applies only to the territory of the former GDR.

According to diplomats, DM2.4 billion has to date been channelled into housing construction. German firms, particularly from eastern Germany, have been awarded 58 percent of the construction work involved. Other contracts have been awarded to companies from Turkey, Austria, Finland, as well as one Russian firm.

Withdrawal Said on Schedule
AU0202173993 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Feb 93 p 4

[Report by “fy.”: “Withdrawal of Russian Troops To Be Completed By September 1994”]

[Text] Bonn, 1 February—The withdrawal of the Russian troops from the new laender is taking place as scheduled. It is not delayed by the fact that the construction of housing in Russia for the officers of the units that are to be withdrawn from Germany lags behind. That is the result of the seventh meeting of the German-Soviet Commission that was set up to settle problems resulting from the withdrawal of the former Soviet troops. The Commission meets under the chairmanship of General Burlakov, commander of the Russian Forces’ Western Group, and German Ambassador Duisberg, who is commissioner in charge of the German-Soviet treaty on the residence and withdrawal of the troops.

By 31 December 1992, Russia had withdrawn 60 percent of its forces in Germany. Out of the originally 546,200 persons of the Western Group, 216,700 were still in the new laender at the turn of the year. By the end of this year, no more than 55,000 persons will be left. The rest of the Western Group will return to Russia before 31 August 1994. This is the result of supplementary agreements on the withdrawal that were concluded between Federal Chancellor Kohl and Russian President Yeltsin when Kohl visited Moscow in December last year. Both sides then agreed that the troop withdrawal should be completed before the end of August 1994, and not as late as by the end of 1994. In return, Germany declared its readiness to pay Russia an additional sum of 550 million German marks. Regarding the withdrawal, both sides also agreed not to make any additional mutual financial demands.

The German side rejects the reproach made by Western Group Commander General Burlakov recently that Germany is delaying the promised construction of the 36,000 apartments for Russian officers by failing to make the money swiftly available. Bonn politicians have said that the Russian Defense Ministry does not share this criticism. Deputy Russian Defense Minister General Gromov, who is in charge of the Russian forces’ withdrawal, rather confirmed that the reproach that the Federal Republic was delaying the process, was unfounded. It was true that there were delays, but Germany was not responsible for them, said Gromov. They were rather created in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Originally, the Soviet Army planned to have most of the houses built in Ukraine and Belarus because the troops to be withdrawn from Germany were to be transferred there. After the end of the Soviet Union, the plans had to be revised, and that took some time. Out of the 36,000 apartments that Germany had bound itself to build, no more than 8,500 had therefore been completed so far, including 2,300 in Russia, said Gromov. Diplomatic sources said that Russia hoped that housing construction would largely be completed by the end of 1994. As the building owner, the Russian Defense Ministry was having “problems” with planning the houses. As agreed, Germany was paying in accordance with the progress of the construction works, the sources said.

Russian General Burlakov Cited
LD0202161493 Hamburg DPA in German 1416 GMT 2 Feb 93

[Text] Grimma/Berlin (DPA)—The Russian troops stationed in Germany will leave the Federal Republic of Germany by August 1994 as planned. Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Russian armed forces, promised this in Berlin today. By the end of 1992, 60 percent of the total reserves of troops and stocks of material had already been withdrawn, and another 30 percent is to follow by the end of 1993, he said.

Today the 20th Motorized Rifle Guards Division, the last Russian combat unit in Saxony, left the Grimma site. The division took up quarters there in July 1945, and will return to Volgograd.

The troops remaining in eastern Germany for the time being will no longer carry out low-level flights under 600 meters or hold large-scale maneuvers, according to Burlakov. Tank firing using live ammunition will also cease.

According to the Russians, they have thus far handed over to the German side 468 properties from a total of 777, with 11,700 buildings, and have cleaned up more than 103,000 hectares of polluted disused wasteland. According to the general, accommodation problems and the difficult reintegration of soldiers are making the move more difficult.

Burlakov also spoke about accusations that the Army is involved in the machinations of the so-called “Russian mafia.” It is not true, but criminal elements from Russia are literally laying siege to the barracks, he said. They tried to get into the army area to bribe soldiers. In 1992 alone, more than 1,000 such “mafiosi” were detained and handed over to the German authorities.
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