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- WEST EUROPE............ivory
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NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

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ISLAMIC BROADCASTING OFFICIAL ON ACTIVITIES

JN221200 Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 20 May 87 p 12

[By Muhammad Yunus]

[Excerpts] The Islamic States Broadcasting Services Organization [ISBO] celebrates its 10th anniversary this year. The ISBO Executive Council also held its meeting in Cairo this year after which Egypt resumed its place in the ISBO. On this occasion, we conducted an interview with ISBO Secretary General Ahmad Farraj on the organization's activities.

On the current state of ISBO affairs Ahmad Farraj said that all international organizations are currently experiencing financial crises whose acuteness vary from one organization to the other. He added: Most probably, our financial situation is better than that of any other organization. He said: Frankly speaking ISBO's financial difficulties are caused by the fact that some member states have not fulfilled their financial obligations toward ISBO. We are well aware of the circumstances some of these countries are experiencing, but the continuation of ISBO's activities requires the participation of all members.

On Egypt's contribution to the enhancement of Islamic information through ISBO Farraj said: Egypt has fulfilled all of its financial obligations toward ISBO. He added: During the 12th ISBO Executive Council session in Cairo last March Egypt submitted a draft project for teaching the Arabic language via television. The production of such a project will cost $1.6 million and Egypt expressed its willingness to settle half the cost.

On whether the ISBO has discussed the question of launching an Islamic satellite, Farraj said the ISBO Executive Council has not discussed this issue because it is a very costly operation.

In reply to a question on the Islamic news agency, Farraj said: I was asked 7 months ago to carry out the duties of the director of the Islamic news agency. This agency's state of affairs has been greatly deteriorating. I submitted a lengthy report on the agency's problems and how to solve them to the Islamic summit which formed a 10-member committee including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bangladesh to discuss whether the Islamic news agency can be saved from the current state of affairs it is experiencing.

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CSO: 4500/106
PLO LEADERS ON 'SEPARATION' OF PALESTINIANS

JN151100 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 12 Apr 87 p 15

["Strategic Dialogue" with Khalid al-Hasan, Fatah Central Committee member; Salah Khalaf, identified by his nom de guerre Abu Iyad, Fatah Central Committee member; Muhammad Milhim, PLO Executive Committee member; Nayif Hawat Hawatimah, DFLP secretary general; and George Habash, PFLP secretary general; by Tawfiq Abu Bakr; place, date not given]

[Excerpts] [Abu Bakr] There have been continuous attempts to separate the issues of Palestinians inside [the occupied territory] from the general cause of the Palestinian people. The new tactics of this separation are based, according to some sides, on practical measures such as normalization before peace, and on plans to reactivate the economic situation, and to improve the conditions of the inhabitants [of the occupied territory].

Some sides believe that they will eventually succeed by putting the ordinary citizen before a decisive choice; either the direct requirements of daily life, or the general principles. What do the PLO and the Palestinian factions possess, in terms of tangible material plans, to avoid this tragedy before it occurs—the tragedy of separating the Palestinians inside from those outside the occupied territory, other than issuing revolutionary statements once a tragedy has occurred? Are you seriously considering this issue, and do you have specific ideas in this regard?

Abu Iyad: The enemies of the Palestinian revolution have attempted several times to drive a wedge among the Palestinians and to come up with several interpretations so as to divide the Palestine question. They say there is an occupied territory where people are suffering from occupation and who need a quick solution to their problem away from the Palestine question as a whole, including all its complications. Thus, they say that this necessitates differentiating between the Palestinians inside and the Palestinians outside the occupied territory, as they like to call them. I believe that the Palestinian revolution's most important achievement is its refutation of this theory, those inside and those outside, and its assertion of the links between them. We have actually foiled this theory. If the Palestinians inside the occupied territory suffer from occupation, the Palestinians outside suffer from expulsion and loss of the Palestinians' identity. The Palestinian presence outside is not optional. It was imposed by the circumstances of the first Palestinian
tragedy and the circumstances of the June 1967 setback. The Palestinians and their revolution are not happy with this state of affairs which has been replete with obstacles and danger. The best example of this is that the number of Palestinian victims who were killed by some Arab regimes is several times more than the number of Palestinian victims who were killed directly by the Zionist enemy.

The issue of the Palestinians inside and outside the occupied land is one of the most serious issues facing the Palestinian revolution. This attempt at separation has taken several dimensions. Firstly, the kinfolk inside are suffering and are in need of a quick solution because the occupation is devouring the land, and therefore, we must find a solution before it is too late. We have heard this since the first year of occupation. These statements have been repeated on many occasions. The aim of this is to force us to accept any solution, under the slogan: Which is more important, land or national rights? The most important thing, as this side says, is to regain the land by any means even if it means autonomy rule according to the Camp David Accords, or in accordance with any unilateral agreement with Israel through Jordan or any Arab side which would accept a mandate on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

In 1985, a Jordanian-Palestinian agreement was signed. Thai agreement was a source of dispute in the Fatah Movement and the Palestinian arena. This agreement reached a dead end because the Israeli and U.S. interpretation of this agreement violates the essence of its articles. This dispute was followed by a series of measures seeking an alternative leadership. Of course, this necessitated various plans to gain the support of citizens in the occupied territory. Therefore, development plans were drawn up and bridges and banks were reopened. There was also the policy of temptation and intimidation, just like what had happened with struggler Akram Haniyah and which is what would happen to other strugglers. In order to confront these attempts against our occupied territory we must lay clear bases to avoid the tragedy and to avoid holding ourselves responsible for this tragedy.

The first of these is that there should be Palestinian unity on all levels. The second is that we should follow up bolstering the steadfastness of our kinfolk by contacting states which have not so far fulfilled their commitments. This is to secure the material basis of steadfastness. Until this is achieved we must carry out efforts to meet the people's basic needs. We can do this by using the resources of the PLO and other Palestinian factions to secure the minimum level of our people's steadfastness inside the occupied territory.

We must not rely only on our people's patriotism and their understanding of the external factors behind securing aid because our people need to live within the requirements of the minimum level of an honorable life, especially since our enemy pursues them with taxes and all forms of psychological and material harassment. We must provide them with the minimum level of life's requirements.
Another point is that we should confront the development plans which are approved by Israel by drawing up a scientific plan. We should not reject any aid extended by any side and use this aid to serve our people's interests and higher objectives. National unity is essential. There must be a general PLO effort and not separate efforts by Palestinian factions.

I do not object to returning to the twinning system, the twinning of municipalities: Jerusalem with Riyadh and Jericho with Tunis, etc. By this we will guarantee these municipalities' minimum level of work to serve citizens. There are several ways to do this. I am ready to talk about this at a serious meeting with the experts in this regard and with our kinfolk inside the occupied homeland to prevent any side from exploiting our people's suffering in the interest of political objectives which will eventually lead to the liquidation of the cause.

Dr George Habash: The Palestinian leadership will not deserve its position if it does not give this issue its major concern, efforts, thought, and resources. This is because enemy plans in this regard concentrate on this major issue as I said in my answer to a previous question. What is included in your question is true. The plan of separating the issue of the inside Palestinians from the Palestinian people's general cause is currently being intensified.

This plan is based on [Jordanian-Israeli] sharing of roles, appointments, the creation of an alternative leadership after weakening the PLO, the reactivation of an economic situation to create a social and economic base for this leadership, paving the way for the Israeli-U.S. concept of peace, the policy of open bridges, the exchange of official messages on the pretext of closely watching the kinfolk's conditions and needs, the reopening of banks, and on other several measures which have been taken and which will be taken.

A plan in this regard is being prepared and will be seriously implemented. This plan constitutes a major threat to our people's national cause as a whole and to our people's struggle for liberation. In light of this, the Palestinian leadership must seriously and responsibly think about this plan. The enemies tried to drag the PLO into the quagmire of a U.S. settlement. To achieve this objective, they set conditions to guarantee ending the PLO as a national liberation movement and turning it into an agent and an empty satellite framework. When this plan failed, the enemies began to search for other alternatives and options to complete their liquidatory efforts. They found their long-cherished dream in role-sharing and normalization before signing [any peace treaty] or achieving a "calm peace," instead of the "Clamorous peace," which Al-sadat concluded by signing the Camp David Accords.

This is serious and actually very serious. To confront this plan we must mobilize all the capabilities of our people and revolution, achieve PLO unity on clear bases to guarantee decisive confrontation of this plan, achieve unity in the occupied territory, reactivate the national front and popular and trade unions in the occupied territory, and do our utmost to mobilize our people to wage this battle and to emerge triumphantly from it.
We say this in light of our long experience throughout the long years in which our people proved they were always ready to struggle under the PLO banner and in which they succeeded in foiling many plots against the Palestine question for more than 2 decades.

We say this because we know our people in the occupied territory believe in principles which constitute their present and future. This is because these principles are not abstract or imaginary ones, but are the dream, the hope, the truth, and the only option for safeguarding their rights and interests. As long as the occupation continues the basic needs of the vast majority of our people will never be secure.

It is our national responsibility to explain to our masses that the equation of direct interests or principles is completely wrong because it is based on an ideal interpretation of principles as if these principles were only moral preachings and not tangible and practical plans and programs. Moreover, this equation is based on an erroneous concept. If implemented, the basic economic reactivation will benefit only a very limited group of people and the vast majority of our people will continue to suffer from the yoke of occupation and its hideous exploitation of manpower.

We have not ever heard of any form of colonization which gives more than it takes. In its essence, colonization is also an economic process which is based on profit and loss. Therefore, we believe that the economic reactivation process is only a bribe given to a very small group of people with the objective of gaining support for this plan and that the vast majority of our people will continue to suffer from poverty, coercion, and exploitation. This is if we suppose the economic reactivation plan has achieved its purposes and found financial sources. At any rate, we doubt this plan will be achieved due to the difficulties resulting from the lack of resources.

We are talking about the difficulties facing the implementation of this plan. However, there are many factors which encourage those who are behind this plan to continue the implementation of their plan. The most important factor is the state of Arab weakness and collusion. With the exception of a very few reactions to this plan which were made here and there, some sides are very delighted with this plan as though they have seized an opportunity to be rid of the Palestine question which embarrasses them.

In light of this, serious confrontation of this plan must first begin with the Palestinians through PLO unity and bolstering our people's steadfastness in the occupied homeland.

Second, we must act on a large-scale official and popular Arab level to expose this plan and its objectives, urge Arabs to abide by the Rabat and Baghdad summit resolutions, and to exert pressure to force Arab states to respect their signing of these resolutions.

Third, international action on the level of the socialist bloc, world public opinion, the UN General Assembly, and regional and international organizations
and institutions is very important and necessary to explain this unilateral deal which is being prepared and which violates all the resolutions of the UN General Assembly, international institutions, and regional organizations which believe the international conference is the best framework for settling the Middle East crisis and restoring the Palestinian people's national legitimate rights, foremost being their right to repatriation, self-determination, and establishing an independent state under the PLO, their sole and legitimate representative.

If we succeed on these three levels—the occupied territory, the Arab arena, and the international arena—then the difficulties this plan will face will increase. However, the first major step in this regard is PLO unity on firm national basis,
RELIGIOUS LEADERS, SECULAR SCHOLARS DISCUSS SECTARIANISM

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 20 Apr 87 pp 10-13

[Article: "Religious and Intellectual Figures in Egypt Answer AL-DUSTUR: Why the Factional Strife?"

[Text] When the incidents of religious strife occurred in a number of towns and villages in Egypt's governorates, especially in Upper Egypt, the Egyptian security agencies quickly arrested dozens and some officials quickly denied that foreign participants had been present in these events. However, the religious figures and intellectual leaders were not persuaded by the security measures and presented other views of national unity and a plan for Arab civilization which encompasses all the classes of the Arab nation.

What are these views, or how do the religious and intellectual leaders view the issue of factional strife and the incidents which have occurred? It is a question AL-DUSTUR directed to nine Egyptian leadership figures headed by His Eminence Shaykh Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haqq, the Sheykh of al-Azhar, and His Holiness Pope Shanudah the Third, head of the Egyptian Coptic church, and this inquiry took place.

"I believe that colonialism and the countries which occupied the Islamic Arab East are still pulling some strings and international Zionism is still acting as a front for colonialism and working behind it in order to break the Arab and Islamic world into little principalities so that they will not make the Orient rise up." Thus His Eminence Shaykh Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haqq, the Sheykh of al-Azhar, began his response to AL-DUSTUR's question. He added:

"That is history. Since the clash arose between the East and West, colonialism has been trying to penetrate in order to dominate. The 20th century has witnessed the end of colonial military power, but some influence still exists. The means still exist and are self-renewing and modern means of communication help them.

"The broadcasts directed at us contain much that incites and provokes factions and the cultures which come in the name of religion conceal only the outward appearances of international Zionism. What is being directed at us
in order to revive dissension and inflame the fire of strife by stirring up factional creeds and doctrinal disputes is what harms the unity of the nation the most.

"I would like to stress a fact, that the Egyptians, by their nature, are a devout people and Moslems and Christians are equally so. However, the intensity of devotion which sometimes reaches the point of fanaticism can be a prelude to strife. Therefore we have to return to the spirit of religious and doctrinal tolerance on behalf of the unity of the two elements of the Egyptian people."

His Holiness Pope Shanudah the Third, head of the Egyptian Coptic church, replied to the same question, stating,

"In Egypt factional strife does not have a presence and if some incidents occur here or there, the people who put them in movement are from outside Egypt, because factionalism is not natural to the Egyptian people.

"If some people are uneasy that Egypt will be transformed into another Lebanon, I believe that there are objective causes which prevent that. These are:

"There is more than one army in Lebanon and the armed militias are in reality only armies which the religious factions advance and are stronger in terms of number and materiel than the official army of Lebanon.

"Lebanon is considered a stage of international conflict and international polarization. Egypt, although it is a target, cannot be a stage of international or regional conflict.

"The Lebanese factions have found political expression for themselves through the parties and organizations which have infiltrated into the army.

"In Egypt, though, the army is united and there is no politics and no factionalism in it. There are parties in Egyptian politics belonging to social forces and they are not founded on religious bases. The major countries respect Egypt as one of the strongest Arab countries in the region. Therefore the logic of factional events cannot amount to more than mere incidents which occur among fanatics, and it is possible to curb that by law."

In the context of the assertion of the views of the senior Islamic and Christian religious figures in Egypt, AL-DUSTUR posed a question to His Eminence Shaykh Sayyid Tantawi, the mufti of Egypt, and His Holiness Ghrighur- yus, the bishop for scientific research in the Coptic church.

Shaykh Tantawi said:

"We cannot call and describe some incidents which occur from time to time in some villages or governorates 'dissension,' because Egypt's social fabric guarantees the freedom of the exercise of religious observances.

"The holy Koran and the sayings and doings of the prophet stipulate the right, the total right, of the people of the book to pursue their religious
rituals and the guardians of the Moslems must provide the people of the book with every guarantee to engage in their religious rights. The people of the book must commit themselves to the customary usage which is prevalent in society. Therefore, [with respect to] the factional incidents which some people of weak religion have carried out, regardless of the name or the religion of the people who carried them out, the law is the sole body which can deal with small incidents before they turn into real factional incidents. However, this involves a clear role on the part of the religious figures in enlightening the Moslems and Copts that unity is better than division and that we are in an era which does not need conflict, especially since we in Egypt are trying to rise to a level of science and civilization which requires all efforts without blind fanaticism regarding religion or thought."

His Holiness Ghrighuryus said:

"I believe that the factional incidents which occurred in the month of March are expressive of an Israeli scheme which Ben Gurion set out 30 years ago or more when he said:

"Let us leave Egypt now, because the Moslems and Copts understand one another and have affection for one another, begin with Lebanon and work to have the Maronites demand a Maronite state, the Sunnites demand a Sunnite state, the Shites demand a Shiite state and the Druzes demand a Druze state."

"The clear meaning of Ben Gurion's statement is that there is a factional scheme in Israel's files which it intends to carry out in the Arab nation and it is seizing the opportunity to put it into practice. This scheme meets with a response when we discover that the small group which carries out factional incidents applies what is told it by the proselytizers, especially since Egyptian television, in the program "Symposium of Opinions," sometimes broadcasts expressions in the words of the extremist Islamic groups which attack Christians.

"We ask for alert government media which understand the nature of religious tolerance and work to avoid the Israeli scheme which is aimed at fragmenting Egypt as it previously fragmented Lebanon.

"While the alert Islamic leaders are devoted to mutual toleration, the low-level proselytizers in the mosques and the church must give permanent legitimacy to this climate, because factionalism is not at all in keeping with the nature of the Egyptian people, and history confirms this."

While the abovementioned views of the senior religious leaders have described in a manner which leaves no room for doubt the reality of factional strife and its goals in Egypt, what is the view of intellectual and political figures?

Khalid Muhammad Ahmad, the well known Islamic thinker, was one of the people AL-DUSTUR met. He answered the question, stating:

"I am not in favor of the use of the expression 'factional strife' because I consider it excessive that the stupidities which are committed now in the
name of religion should be crowned, I reject having them be crowned by this
weighty title 'factional strife.' They might be reflections of bigger inci-
dents and we might someday find ourselves in the place where the poet says:

"Immense fire comes from a puny spark.

"However, just as belittling what has happened could do harm, inflating this
incident is more harmful. If we want to define notions, so far as I know
strife, when it exists, represents a rebellion against the basic values of
the society, and therefore almighty glorious God considered it more danger-
ous than killing: 'Strife is more severe than killing.' What is happening
now is an instance of conflict which sweeps up some individuals and in the
worst of cases sweeps up some power centers domestically or abroad in the
form of people who do not want this nation to have peace.

"I prefer to put the term 'national brotherhood' rather than 'national uni-
ty' into general use, because national unity has existed historically since
the Nile existed, and our society lacks the paramount value by which the
other values are surrounded, which is the value of freedom; when that is
lost, all the other values are disrupted like a sun around which the remain-
ing planets revolve, where, if the sun is disrupted, the rest of the solar
system is disrupted. Here I declare and state that the strife in Egypt today
is political, not religious. We want a complete democracy which does not
fall short. I ask the president, why, Mr Husni Mubarak, are we still being
tied down by emergency laws and the laws restrictive of people's freedoms?
We view democracy as a complete institution of life. I am not pessimistic, I
say it is not bad, let what is be and tomorrow the birds will sing."

A Crisis of a Nation

Fahmi Huwaydi, an enlightened religious thinker, writes in the Cairo newspa-
er AL-AHRAM and has a number of remedies which have drawn people's atten-
tion to the dimensions and true nature of factional strife. He said:

"We are dealing with a phenomenon whose real magnitude is not known, whose
true personnel are not defined, where the internal and foreign elements are
not clear and the forms of media treatment in Egypt assumed the form of
brief restrained signals at the beginning then everyone started to talk a-
bout this subject and some people started to compete among themselves to
make people aware that there is a danger threatening this nation and that
Egypt is threatened by what is called a new 'Lebanization.'

"I consider that there are two approaches for dealing with this issue. They
are:

"An approach which deals with it as factional strife or an issue of national
unity.

"Another approach which deals with it as a crisis of a nation.

"I am more inclined to the second approach, which deals with the issue as a
crisis of a nation, because the problem is too big just to constitute
factional strife and too big just to constitute relations between Moslems and Christians.

"Recent years have witnessed a number of Arab phenomena. The Repudiation and Atonement Group appeared, Shaykh al-Dhababi was killed and the attack on the military technical college, the incident of al-Khanikah then al-Zawiya al-Hamra', then the killing of al-Sadat, then the attack on the Asyut security department and the killing of 72 Moslem officers and soldiers, and these few fires you are witnessing now which break out from time to time took place.

"On looking at this angle, we find that it appears to be more than a matter of factional strife and greater than a relationship between Christians and Moslems. I do not claim that we should ignore this, but I claim that we should interpret it in its natural context.

"Let us add to this the matter of the frustration which now exists among the Egyptian people, the anarchy which has come about in politics and the 'repudiation' which emerged in politics before it emerged in religion. The government must revive channels of expression in order to repair the body of the nation and give it new blood. That is the sole guarantee for eliminating this sort of social explosion or factional or political strife which Egypt is witnessing now.

"One consideration to which we must devote attention and give our concern is the Egyptian body's tendency to be penetrated from abroad, in the sense that the immunity of this body and strengthening of the intrinsic immunity in it will guarantee that the gaps are sealed off and the gates are closed to attempts at penetration.

"As for the solutions which we consider appropriate now, that the priests and sheykhs should manifest themselves in a single form, these are palliatives which betray incapacity and do not deal with the real ailment the body of this nation is suffering from."

Let us leave the leaders of religion and enlightened religious thinkers and move over to the secularists.

Dr Louis 'Awad, the well known literary critic, said:

"The explanations which have appeared concerning what is called factional strife in Sawhaj and Kafr al-Shaykh in Egypt include people's statements that this is the mentality of simple-minded anarchists among the masses who become inflamed for some reason. Shakespeare was a master in understanding the human personality and what he tried to depict to us is that the masses have no intelligence, especially the anarchists. I am not content with this, but indeed consider that it is our duty as intellectuals to seek deeper roots for what is going on in our country and look at what is going on around us in the various areas of the Arab world and the Middle East in general. We find that things have come into being here which bring terror upon the human conscience and the conscience of the citizen in this region. We find Palestinians and Palestinians fighting with one another and we find Lebanese and Lebanese fighting with one another. By this criterion, there
has been a missing link in this direction, which is to have the Copts fighting with the Moslems in Egypt. Therefore, I can only feel that there are people who are not innocent manipulating the resources of this country and trying to spread instability. Perhaps their purpose in this is more long-range — to crush the people of the Arab world as a whole. Of course what stands out in this area is the role of colonialism, which always follows a policy of divide and rule and tries to apply it in all the countries where it enjoys special influence. However, there is a third interpretation, which is that we must reflect on the state of extreme frustration many Egyptian people are suffering from, which is embodied in their inability to participate in political life. This has a direct relationship to the state of general anxiety in which some of the people who are playing with fire are engrossed. These are a few people who do not have a legitimate status in the society, and I consider that these few people must be given the freedom to express themselves politically so that they will not resort to techniques of violence and acts which are contrary to reason, such as stirring up strife in the manner we see now.

"Therefore I consider that the intellectuals must try deeply to study and establish the roots of what is going on now. The matter is more complex than we imagine. It is not just a matter of colonialism, which we use as a 'hang-up' on which we can hang up our mistakes, and the matter is not related to democracy alone, nor is the matter related to the mentality of anarchy alone. Rather, the matter is related to these factors in combination, and when they are carefully studied it is possible that we might penetrate to a deeper level in this problem which is appearing on the Egyptian stage now."

Strife and the National Plan

We moved the question over to Dr Milad Hanna, former member of the People's Assembly, who replied:

"The documents which man has set down throughout his history of struggle for the sake of acquiring his human rights stipulate the freedom of belief and the pursuit of religious observances. However, I stress that we in Egypt do not need such documents to form our road to coexistence together, because coexistence between Islam and the Christians has gone on for 14 centuries and a mold of civilization has been created from all that which has a parallel only in Egypt. Christianity in Egypt, in terms of civilization and heritage, aside from religious belief, is Egyptian Christianity in all its pursuit of its rituals and customs, and it has been influenced by the whole tradition of the ancient Egyptians as it has been influenced by Islam."

"Conversely, Islam in Egypt — aside from religious belief, Egyptian Islam has been influenced by all the heritage, history and civilization in Egypt."

"In this regard, I can stress an important fact, which is:

"I prefer to rule out the expression 'the two elements of the nation' which has been repeated in much of the literature of the national movement since the 1919 revolution, in order to challenge the schism colonialism created in order to apply its well known policy 'divide and rule,' because I am certain
that we are indeed a single element with all the notions this expression entails.

"I imagine that the dispute is not one of religion but is rather a civil one. The government succumbs to fraud under the influence of slogans and cannot confront the crisis by imparting a climate of political freedom and through the growth of a real dialogue on the nature of our crisis. All we are pursuing are temporary solutions and the placation of some parties which exert pressure without realizing the interests of the nation.

"There also is the national plan. In the twenties, Egypt had a national plan. In the fifties and sixties Egypt was inflamed with an independent national plan of development for the whole Arab nation, and the people provoking factionalism and strife lost the opportunity. Where is the national plan today which will eliminate the strife? That question is the gist of the matter. We deeply need to come together over our true issues and mobilize all our means to provide enlightenment on them rather than looking under our feet and ignoring the essence of our people's concerns."

The Constitution Is the Solution

In concluding this survey, we directed the question to Dr Faraj Fudah, the secular thinker, who replied:

"The problem of factional strife is becoming aggravated and we are standing watching it in the total inability to set out radical solutions to it. Although resources for a solution continue to exist, the threat which has flashed on the horizon warns us that things can go beyond a solution.

"The limited strife which flared up in one of the governorates of Upper Egypt was due only to a rumor which held 'a place has been set aside for the construction of a mosque and a church is going to be built on it.' A mere rumor inflamed the situation and anything can be said after that. I consider that is all because we are living in a state of betrayal of civilization and a polluted atmosphere, that is, its causes are embodied in:

"First of all, the increasing talk about the religious state in Egypt and the application of Islamic laws and Islamic law alone to which some people adhere, and what some people are propounding, that Islam is the solution, are the main reason for the inflammation of the strife. They override the real basic problems, without enlightened individual thought to a solution to them, without presentation of the means for that and without our making them commit themselves and declaring in their hearing that the constitution is the constitution and it is our constitution through which we seek rulings with our various religious views, while here they are ruling the constitution and the law out of their consideration. If the constitution and legitimate law impose themselves on everyone collapse, in the context of the absence of the state dissension will be the resultant characteristic of this strange atmosphere.

"Secondly, some people's conception that it is possible to govern by divine writ and the discussion of politics in the mentality of what is permissible
and forbidden and not what is right and wrong are another prelude to factional strife.

"Thirdly, the practice of politicians who vie with one another over religious slogans in response to feelings and the auctioneering among religious figures over political issues in order to draw the approval of people who are devout by disposition and implicitly kindle the flame of dissension.

"Fourth, the official position, where we do not find that punishment is imposed on people who provoke factional strife, although this in my point of view is a major crime which must be dealt with as a form of high treason against society, in addition to the negative position of the Egyptian media which a short time ago were offering Pharaonic serials and suddenly shifted to offering Islamic serials, without presenting a vision which is compatible with the Egyptian social political mixture in which Moslems and Christians are merged together in a stable life. Through their conduct they also kindled the flame of strife and served the elements they provoked.

"The recent election campaign witnessed the bewilderment of a complete generation of Egyptians who had viewed the slogan 'the mutual embrace of the crescent and the cross' with amazement because they were not accustomed to it. Many of the candidates speaking in the name of people raised the slogan 'give me your vote and you will go to paradise.' Have we gone back to the era of indulgences as we are on the threshold of the 21st century?

"I consider that we should move quickly and not be embarrassed. The struggle now is between the proponents of a civil state and the proponents of a religious state, between the law and human rights and the mentality of indulgences. The confrontation will take place not just by insisting on putting the laws into effect but rather through social conduct on the part of the people which is opposed to everyone who stirs up dissension."
SINYURAH ON CONFERENCE, PEACE PROCESS

TA131324 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR (Passover Supplement) in Hebrew 13 Apr 87 pp 14, 15

[Report on interview with AL-FAJR Editor Hanna Sinyurah by Pinhas 'Inbari; date and place not given]

[Text]: Political attention is again being paid to a group of Palestinian notables from the territories, PLO supporters who are today the hope of the "political process." There being no other solution to the present stalemate, these notables "starred" in a series of interesting meetings with Abba Eban, chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, with whom they signed a joint document recognizing the legitimate rights of both nations to self-determination. Later they met for the first time with the leader of the Labor Party, Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres.

The dominant Palestinian figure in these events was undoubtedly AL-FAJR Editor Hanna Sinyurah, who is a PLO supporter. In Israel the activities of the Palestinian group were met with great appreciation, but within Palestinian circles they raised many questions. The Al-shabiba youth movement, the pro-fatah group at Al-najah University, issued an extremely sharp denunciation the day after the meeting with Peres, criticizing the concessions made by Sinyurah and his friends to the Zionist enemy.

Sinyurah himself is unwilling to speak about this issue at length. Regarding the question of whether he received the PLO's blessing for the meetings with Peres and Eban, he says: "The international conference is in danger. We must not let the present opportunity slip between our fingers. On this issue one must first of all consult one's conscience."

The Al-shabiba denunciation links Hanna Sinyurah's meetings with the current policy in the territories, the policy of the iron fist, deportations, and administrative arrests. Sinyurah says: "This policy must be stopped. It does not make things easier for people like us, who want to advance the peace process."

He is being accused of working at his own initiative, without receiving the PLO leadership's blessing. However, recently 'Arafat published a statement authorizing notables from the territories to hold preparatory contacts to an
international conference. It is true that the PLO has already issued several "corrections" to this statement, but the impression of the initial statement is still strong. I asked Sin-urah what he thought to be the significance of Yarid 'Arafat’s statement regarding Palestinian representation.

[Sin-yurah] I would like to use this opportunity to explain how I understood 'Arafat's statement. The present stage is one of getting ready for a preparatory conference to precede an international conference. 'Arafat tried to break the political freeze, especially as concerns the issue of Palestinian representation. Frankly, the PLO will be the body that names the people. As long as it is the PLV that names them, it does not make any difference who they are. Therefore those who are named do not have to be recognized PLO members, I think this is a flexible stand on the part of the Palestinian leadership that is meant to encourage the convening of an international conference. I am convinced that once all the obstacles to a preparatory conference are removed, all the sides of the conflict will come to the international conference, including the PLO.

['Inbari] Before 'Arafat's statement there were reports that the Palestinian representation in the preparatory conference would come from the territories. Was 'Arafat’s statement connected to these reports?

[Sin-yurah] I learned about these reports from 'AL HAMISHMAR when I returned from abroad.... Seriously, the Palestinian representation will represent all the Palestinian people, with all their groups. Part of the Palestinian people is living under occupation, part in exile. It is inconceivable that the Palestinian representation will come only from the occupied lands. I am convinced that an authentic Palestinian representation must take into consideration all parts of the Palestinian people—under occupation and abroad.

['Inbari] So far only 'Arafat has spoken in this spirit concerning the issue of the Palestinian representation, and his comments were received with contradictory statements, even within "Fatah." Can you clarify this issue?

[Sin-yurah] The contradictory statements were made by Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf]. Abu Iyad said that the PLO would be represented in the international conference. This is why I clarified at the beginning of our talk that the PLO would be the one to name the notables for the preparatory conference, not for the international conference itself. The first stage is the preparatory conference, and it is different from the next stage, which is the international conference. It is not required that the people who participate in the preparatory conference also participate in the international conference. The people who are named to participate in the first stage, the preparatory conference, will have to overcome the problem that involves recognition of the right to self-determination. This is one of the problems still hanging over us—how to bring the PLO to recognize UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Another question that will have to be worked out is the role of the international conference. I am sure that all this will be discussed in the preparatory conference. If these problems are overcome it will only be natural for the international conference to convene with all the sides to the conflict, including the PLO, which will be represented by its senior leadership.
['Inbari'] All this is linked to UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Do you see the way as being paved for such a development?

[Sinyurah] The preparatory conference does not depend on preconditions. You will recall that when the Jordanian, Palestinian, and U.S. delegations met in Amman last February, the United States posed three conditions to the PLO: negotiations with Israel, unconditional recognition of 242 and 388, and a denouncement of violence. Had the PLO accepted these conditions in February 1986, the PLO itself would have come to the international conference, and not notables to be named by 'Arafat. Therefore, in order to get the peace process moving the superpowers—that is, the Soviet Union and France—agreed to set up a preparatory conference, and Israel and Egypt embraced this idea in the Alexandria summit between Peres and Mubarak, before Peres handed over the premiership of Shamir. The present efforts are concentrated at breathing life into the preparatory conference. The principle behind the preparatory conference is that it does not have any preconditions. The conditions for a real international conference will be decided in the preparatory conference.

['Inbari'] Do you think the PLO will recognize 242 and 338 soon?

[Sinyurah] I do not think the problem is on the PLO side. First of all it is on the Israeli side. The obstacle of the Palestinian representation has been removed. However, will Israel be able to overcome the entanglement within the national unity government? Prime Minister Shamir is saying that he wants neither an international conference nor a preparatory conference. Foreign Minister Peres, on the other hand, is working both for a preparatory conference and an international conference. How can you overcome this contradiction inside the national unity government? This can be done by replacing Shamir, but I think this is impossible, or by disbanding the government and holding early elections. This might happen next year.

['Inbari'] However, do you not think that an immediate PLO recognition of these resolutions would have helped Peres?

[Sinyurah] A PLO decision regarding these two resolutions is linked to the issue of the right to self-determination. This will be discussed in the preparatory conference. This is what the negotiations will be about if the preparatory conference is convened. However, at this point the problem is the Israeli representation—the Israeli representation is not ensured!! The crisis within the Israeli Government is real. One can hear two voices simultaneously, one in favor and one against—what then is Israel's real voice?! This is the real and cardinal question!!

['Inbari'] Let us talk about the present situation in the West Bank. What do you have to say about the Israeli policy, on the one hand, and the Jordanian policy on the other?

[Sinyurah] This is the condominium policy! I am convinced it will utterly fail. For it to succeed the Palestinian people must accept it. However, the Palestinian people have expressed their opposition unequivocally. Therefore such a policy has no chances of success, and the only way to advance toward
peace is through talks with all the sides to the conflict, and the main side is the PLO. All those who are trying to bypass the PLO are proving they are not interested in real peace.

'Ibari] Has your participation in the Palestinian delegation for negotiations with the United States caused you any difficulties within the West Bank?

'Sinyurah] The truth is that when the names of the members to the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation for negotiations with the United States were published in 1985, there was a real opportunity for movement, and I blame the U.S. Government for missing the opportunity. It was an opportunity to reach an understanding on questions that remain unsolved today. Personal difficulties? No, it did not cause me personal difficulties. However, there was strong propaganda pressure.

'Ibari] By whom?

'Sinyurah] By all sides. Some supported me and others did not. However, there was propaganda pressure. All those who are involved in politics are exposed to such pressure. However, I still do not feel that this has given me personal difficulties.

'Ibari] There was a problem when Vice President George Bush visited, when you came to a meeting with him and explained that as a member of the delegation for negotiations with the United States, it was your role to participate in such meetings. This was not received very well. There was a commercial strike in protest of Bush's visit.

'Sinyurah] I think we should be positive concerning any international figure who is interested in hearing the Palestinians' opinion. We are willing to speak with whomever is interested in hearing the demands and the aspirations of the Palestinian people. I oppose the idea of boycotting such figures. I went to the meeting not as a member of the joint delegation for talks with the United States, but as one of the responsible figures in the occupied territories, I have to clarify with all frankness what is happening and what the Palestinian people want. I am convinced that the other side understood the situation. On the other hand, the Palestinian position vis-a-vis the United States at that time was clear.

'Ibari] You have been quoted as expressing dissatisfaction with the PLO leadership's policy. This was before 'Arafat's latest statements. Are you willing to comment on this?

'Sinyurah] I do not want to say that I am dissatisfied with the policy of the Palestinian leadership. I am convinced that this leadership is acting to end the occupation as soon as possible. 'Arafat's recent statements express the Palestinian leadership's great concern and willingness to make sacrifices in order to advance the peace process. However, it is my personal opinion that if we want to have an independent democratic country based upon freedom, then everyone is entitled to an opinion. There are many who favor and many who are
against the PLO leadership--I support this leadership. At the present time, however, like any Palestinian I have a right to criticize several aspects of this leadership.

['Inbari] What is your criticism of the PLO leadership?

[Sinyurah] I have claimed that the present stalemate has to be broken. I said that all the sides—and I did not talk about the PLO specifically—have not done enough to advance the peace process, and this is harmful to all sides. It has transpired that the Palestinian side is doing more than all the other sides, and it is always the initiating side. I hope that the other sides will also evince the same amount of responsibility.

['Inbari] Based on your experience, what are the causes of the present stalemate?

[Sinyurah] I believe there are two main causes. The Israeli Government is paralyzed because of the national unity government's position, It can't make any significant decisions. The way to find a political solution, therefore, is to disband this government or hold new elections, after which there will be a government that will seek peace. However, even if there are new elections, nobody can guarantee that the Labor Party or the Likud will win. Therefore there is no Israeli politician who is willing to take a real step, and this is the basis of my criticism of Israeli politics. They are not doing enough; they are not showing leadership. They should shape public opinion rather than drag behind events and act according to the public opinion polls. He who wants to be a historic leader must lead! I have not seen this happening in Israel so far. We also have a big problem with the United States. The White House's entire attention is devoted to the weapons deals with Iran. We do not see an end to this affair. We do not see that the United States is interested in the Middle East problem or other regional problems. The administration's only interest is warding off the criticism on the Iran affair. Until the U.S. administration finds time to deal with other things, an understanding must be reached with the Soviet Union. If there is an understanding with the Soviets and the U.S. Administration comes out of its freeze, we will see that regional problems such as that of the Middle East can be handled successfully, and the present stalemate will end.

['Inbari] We have spoken at length about procedural problems. How do you see the solution of the conflict? Suppose we overcome the present obstacles, what are you striving for? How do you see the Middle East following the peace agreements?

[Sinyurah] The solution is to divide Palestine, or greater Israel, between the two nations living on its soil, the Palestinian and Israeli nations. This is the position of most of the Arab states, and it was embraced by the PLO in its 16th and 17th sessions. Israel must withdraw from the territories it occupied in 1967 in order to bring about peace and mutual recognition. I believe that if this is achieved we can reach an understanding. Approximately 100,000 Palestinians work in Israel. When the Palestinians have a state and their problem is solved, there can be cooperation along these lines.
Jerusalem can be a joint and open capital between the two countries. If there is an open and joint capital for the two countries, this will necessitate open borders between them. This will facilitate the passage of workers, and the passage of workers will help the joint economy. I am convinced there can be a common market between the two countries similar to the European market, Jordan will also participate in this market. I am therefore convinced that the nations of the region will benefit from such a solution.

[Sinyurah] The Amman agreement has been frozen since the February crisis a year ago, when the talks broke down. However, I am convinced that there will be close cooperation in the future between the Palestinian and Jordanian sides, when the Palestinian state is established, because Jordan and Palestine share the same fate; they are members of one large family. I do not know whether the cooperation will be based on a confederation, but I am convinced that there will be close economic cooperation between the two sides because they have common interests. To tell the truth, I believe that independence is essential to each of the sides, and I see the cooperation as being similar to that between several European countries, such as Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, the Benelux arrangement. We will also be able to establish such cooperation in this area. The common market I am talking about is not a pie in the sky; it certainly can be implemented, but first political understanding must be reached. When there is political understanding, reality will also require economic understanding.

[Sinyurah] The Palestinians who are "inside" are all members of one people; the Palestinian people. There are several aspects to Palestinian public opinion, but all are working to end the Israeli occupation. The principle of cooperation between all the Arab sides is alive and kicking, because there must be pan-Arab cooperation in the international conference. If a political solution is ever reached there will be two states, not a confederative union. I am convinced that there will be very good relations between the Jordanian and the Palestinian states. There will be common interests and there will be understanding on all levels. Both nations have a common fate, so they must overcome their current differences of opinion. I think the line that began with the resumption of the joint Palestinian-Jordanian committee will be reopened. There will be close cooperation between them in the future.

[Sinyurah] What is currently on the agenda is breathing life into Jordanian-Palestinian cooperation. If the Jordanian and Palestinian leaderships want to renew the Amman agreement, they can do so because the agreement was not cancelled. But if they want to find other ways, they can do that too. In any event, they need cooperation to bring the occupation to an end. Any form of cooperation is better than the negative situation we are in now.
'Inbari] To this day the Palestinians say that Labor and Likud are the same, that both are the same sides of the coin. Now 'Arafat has begun to draw a distinction between them, and he has said that Peres' willingness to come to a confrontation with Shamir is a good sign. Are you prepared to expand on this?

[Sinyurah] The political reality in Israel is clear. There is a contradiction in one government. One side says there will be no concession of 1 inch of land, and it declares its intention of building up greater Eretz Yisra'el. I mean the Likud. It has no intention of achieving understanding in order to arrive at peace. At its side there is the Labor Party, which says there is a possibility of understanding on the basis of a withdrawal from the land conquered in 1967. But one of the obstacles is that the Labor Party does not want to talk with the PLO, which is the representative of the Palestinian people. This is a prime problem that must be solved because if we are talking of mutual recognition, every nation must accept the representative of the other nation. The Palestinian nation has been frank and said that the PLO represents its hopes. Therefore in my view, for the first time in the history of the Labor Party, its leader is recognizing the existence of the Palestinian people, and it must complete the process by recognizing their right to self-determination. If there is an opening in the position of the Israeli people, it will occur as positions develop. Therefore, we will have to pass through several phases before arriving at the international conference. The idea of the preparatory conference, then, is a good one; to break the deadlock, to bring positions closer, and to remove the obstacles to negotiations between the two representatives, the PLO and the Israeli Government. Negotiations with a government headed by the Labor Party have a chance to succeed; but the Labor Party must not only treat the Palestinians as a nation, it must develop its position and also recognize the Palestinians' political rights, including their right to self-determination. It must also come to negotiations with the PLO, which is the representative of the Palestinian people.

/9274
CSO: 4400/218
BRIEFS

DEFENSE INDUSTRIES' DISMISSALS--At least 2,500 additional workers will be fired over the course of the coming year from the defense industries that are controlled by the Ministry of Defense. This was reported yesterday by authorized senior defense sources. In the military industry, approximately 1,500 will be fired; in the air force industry, approximately 300; and in RAPA'EL, approximately 250 workers. In addition to these, workers will also be fired in private industries that deal in products for the defense network. In an effort to prevent widespread unemployment in development towns, Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin has given instructions that preferences be given to enterprises in these towns, as far as awarding defense contracts. Until the end of February, the Ministry of Defense had given 560 people permission to conduct negotiations for the sale of Israeli arms abroad. Of all the requests that were submitted to date, 14 were rejected and permission was denied. Defense sources estimate that the number of people with such licenses will in the end reach approximately 800. It should be noted that this license does not allow the licensee to sign deals. Before closing a deal, the licensee must get further permission from the Ministry of Defense. Israel has not yet received a definitive answer from the United States regarding the possibility of using American aid funds to subsidize the cost of completing the Lavi project. Defense sources refused to discuss the possible damages that Israel or the defense industries will incur following the decision not to sign future defense contracts with South Africa. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Mar 87 p 1] 9811/13046

CSO: 4423/27
MINISTER OF JUSTICE DISCUSSES DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL SYSTEM

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 1 Apr 87 p 7

[Interview With Kuwaiti Minister of Justice Dari al-'Uthman by Jasim Habib as published in KIMYAH magazine; date and place not specified]

[Text] Minister of Justice Dari al-'Uthman pointed out that the Ministry of Justice works to provide Kuwaiti society with justice under a system which safeguards the lives of all people, their freedom and property which protects society's security and social system and insures respect for the law and guarantees its application.

Mr Dari al-'Uthman added that the Kuwaiti constitution was careful to stipulate in Article 2 that Islamic shari'ah was a major resource for legislation because of the distinct position shari'ah occupies among the sources that constitute the foundation of Kuwaiti laws of which a considerable number was derived from shari'ah in order to strengthen ties between law and shari'ah rule and to nurture a spiritual heritage worthy of being preserved and benefited from.

The minister made those remarks during an interview with colleague Jasim Habib, editor of AL-KIMYAH magazine. The full text follows.

[Question] The name Ministry of Justice brings the court system to mind. What is the extent of the ministry's judicial responsibility and competence in the service of society?

[Answer] The Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs works to provide Kuwaiti society with justice under a system where all the people feel secure in their lives, property, and freedom; which safeguards society and the social system; which guarantees respect for the law and its implementation; and which lays a solid foundation for land ownership.

According to 1 July 19 royal decree the ministry is responsible for the following:

1-Providing the means for settling disputes brought before the various courts and dealing with crime according to law.
2-Handling society's public lawsuits, through the attorney general's office, by investigating, acting on, and prosecuting crimes and misdemeanors according to law.

3-Overseeing prisons and other correction institutions.

4-Making technical expertise available to legal departments and other state institutions.

5-Official notarization of legal papers, the execution of judgements and writs of execution, as well as receiving, depositing, and disbursing relevant funds according to law.

6-Real estate registration, certification, notarization, date scheduling and the initialization of commercial books according to law.

7-Cooperation with Arab, Islamic, and foreign countries in legal and judicial matters.

[Question] Would you review for us the organization and development of the legal system in Kuwait since its inception?

[Answer] The legal system was not initially organized as one entity. Courts did not have sole responsibility for the judiciary. Other auxiliary avenues created because of custom or necessitated by the spread of progress and urbanization. There were municipal committees for the settlement of disputes, a public security committee to look into criminal charges and committees of merchants to arbitrate commercial disputes. This was the situation until royal decree 19 in 1959 reorganized the legal system. It charged the courts with deciding all cases unless excepted by law. Courts are organized in two levels--circuit and appeals. There are circuit, appellate, and supreme courts.

A. The supreme court handles cases brought before it according to law. It has circuits to look into cassation cases and others to review appellate judgements.

B. The appellate court looks into matters brought before it according to law. It has circuits according to need and all judgements are passed by one judge except when three judges sit on appealed and other cases according to law (such as housing, administrative, and criminal cases). The circuits of appellate court are:

1-The civil circuit which looks into all civil disputes, transferred real estates funds contracts, etc.
2-The commercial circuit which settles commercial disputes
3-The criminal circuit which handles crimes and misdemeanors
4-The housing circuit which handles rental disputes according to decree No 35 of 1978 dealing with real estate rentals.
5-The administrative circuit which handles all disputes concerning marriage, divorce, estates, wills, gifts, and other family affairs.
6-The appeals circuit generally concerns itself with appeals from district court judgements that exceed 500 dinars and appeals of all judgements by the judge of urgent cases. The criminal appeals circuit handles criminal sentences being appealed according to law.

C-The circuit court passes initial judgements in civil, commercial, and labor disputes whose value does not exceed 1,000 dinars. It has final jurisdiction in matters valued at less than 500 dinars. It may also consider criminal cases. A circuit court judge may sit in the appellate court building to make preliminary decisions without prejudice on writs of execution and in cases where time is of the essence.

The circuit court can be composed of one or more circuits in each of Kuwait's governorates depending on the need. Cases are heard by a single judge.

[Question] What are the procedure for enacting or amending laws and what role does your ministry play in this regard?

[Answer] To enact a new law or amend an existing one, the legislative process begins with a proposal from any government agency which is reviewed in cooperation with the department of legislation and legal opinion. The appropriate minister then puts it before the Council of Ministers which refers it to the ministerial legislative committee chaired by the minister of justice and legal affairs. The committee then makes a thorough study of the proposed legislation and refers it to the Council of Ministers for action. If approved, the legislation would be presented by the council to the Emir for ratification and issuance.

Laws are published in the official gazette within two weeks of issue and go into effect one month from the date of publication. These schedule may be increased or decreased by inclusion of an appropriate article in the legislation.

[Question] From where you stand, how do you regard the Kuwaiti lawyers corps? Do you have a role in organizing and supervising it? Are you happy with it?

[Answer] Law No 42 of 1964, amended by law No 30 of 1968, organized the legal profession and mandated that defense counsels must register with the bar according to terms specified by law. Lawyers are admitted by a committee composed of the chief and deputy chief justices of the supreme court, the attorney general, the undersecretary of justice, the chairman of the appellate court, and four practicing registered attorneys to be named by the bar association. The law has delineated the rights and obligations of attorneys. If a lawyer disregarded any of his obligations or dishonored his profession, he would be subjected to corrective penalties as stipulated in article 35 of the above-mentioned legislation. In such a case, the public prosecutor would automatically call for the action or it could be called for by the minister of justice, the supreme court justice, the appellate court chairman, or the bar association.
The legal profession is therefore one of the free professions organized by law and is not subject to ministry of justice supervision except as specified by law.

[Question] Islam is a major legislative resource. Would you brief us on the subject and discuss its relevance to modern times?

[Answer] The Kuwaiti constitution was careful to stipulate in article 2 that Islamic shari'ah was a major legislative resource because Islamic jurisprudence occupies a noted position among the sources from which Kuwaiti laws were derived. These laws are based on Islamic shari'ah to a great extent and shari'ah is a general resource to which the judge refers if he found no reference in written legislation or common law. Shari'ah was made a special resource for a considerable category of judgements in order to strengthen the relationship between legislation and shari'ah and to nurture a spiritual legacy worthy or being preserved and benefited from. Rulings derived from the shari'ah are those dealing with extremism, debts, contracts, exclusive possession, rents for religious endowments and many other areas such as the last will and testament of dying man, fraud, gifts, preemption, the principle of no inheritance until after all debts have been paid, and rulings on family affairs. All such laws are based on elements considered quite progressive in modern legislation which shows the advantages of Islamic jurisprudence and its adaptability and suitability for common dealings among people.

12945/12951
CSO: 4404/340
ODD LOT FACILITY OPENED AT STOCK EXCHANGE

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 8 Apr 87 p 14

[Article by Haytham Husayn: "Stocks and Ronds Group Opens Office at Stock Exchange to Trade in Odd Lots at Market Prices"]

[Text] The Kuwait Stock Exchange has decided, in cooperation with the Stocks and Bonds Company brokers, to open a facility at the exchange to trade in odd lots.

The facility will begin operations next Saturday and will trade in odd lots of stocks at market quotes rather than based on supply and demand, a system which was previously used and which tends to depress prices.

The exchange thanked the Stocks and Bonds Group for taking this step despite the losses that will be incurred, in order to help small investors sell their very small holding which are unmarketable because they are below the minimum for trading on the exchange.

The exchange is presently seeking other organizations to join the Stocks and Bonds Group which would help small investors.

The exchange requested brokers yesterday to figure commissions on the basis of the total volume of orders place during a single day. This substantially reduces brokerage fees by eliminatory the previous practice of charging a commission on each segment of an order until it is completed.

Exchange customers had protested what they called exorbitant brokerage fees and requested that the exchange should do something about lowering them.

12945/12951
CSO: 4404/340
ROLE OF COOPERATIVES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 15 Apr 87 p 15


[Excerpts] We find that cooperatives play an important role in economic development. They affect and are affected by domestic and foreign trade, consumer preferences, and the selection process for goods and services. Cooperatives are widespread in almost all areas of Kuwait. Even in regions without cooperatives, cooperative services are supplied by branches of existing or nearby associations. Indicative of their significant role in economic development is that cooperatives represent more than 70 percent of the retail market for basic goods and services for individuals and society. Cooperatives in Kuwait are therefore an economic bulwark since each now owns at least one supermarket and 20 to 40 branches to sell goods and services at the same location. Some branches are managed directly by the cooperative and some are run by others.

The sheer number of such markets and branches—there were 2087 branches by the end of 1986 according to statistics by the Association of Consumer Cooperatives—indicates the impact they must have on commercial activity. The table below names these cooperatives, their distribution centers be they supermarkets or branches managed directly by the cooperatives or by others.

The volume of cooperative sales in 1986, at 190,062,830 Kuwaiti dinars, clearly indicates the role of cooperatives in economic development as well as domestic and foreign trade. The cooperative has also been of help to the state in several economic areas. For instance, when the state wanted to implement ration cards and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry rationed specific goods, only cooperatives could be found to do the job in most parts of Kuwait. The state also had to resort to them as the only available effective channel of distribution for goods of the second tier which are subsidized, price-fixed, and distribution-controlled by the state. This was done because cooperatives have the supervision and control mechanism which allows them to successfully accomplish the public objectives of the state.
And yet the state, represented by the Ministry of Planning, did not give cooperatives their full due in the country's general plan and did not accord them suitable consideration commensurate with their important economic and social impact. That may have been because the ministry depends for its planning data on other ministries and government agencies. This should not prevent us from highlighting the impact of cooperatives on other economic sectors in Kuwait society.

Impact On Domestic Trade

We mentioned that cooperative movement and its supermarkets and branches represent more than 70 percent of the market for consumer necessities of foodstuffs and consumer goods as well as other services available at the branches. Because of this marketing impact on domestic trade, agents and suppliers always do their planning with a view to this movement's value as a marketing force and a superb way to advertise and promote their goods especially in the attractive manner in which goods are displayed on the shelves of supermarkets and other branches throughout the country.

The cooperative movement, by buying in quantity through its association, can secure larger discounts than other supermarkets and therefore gain the advantage of offering lower cooperative prices. Furthermore, the state supports the association by offering it free warehouses which helps keep costs lower than alternative products.

Impact On Foreign Trade

The volume of cooperative-label goods imported by the association directly, added to the volume of imports by individual cooperatives, should have an impact, important though not substantial, on foreign trade considerations.

The objective is to find substitutes for goods with abnormally escalating prices, in order to serve the consumer and members of the cooperative by providing goods at prices lower than market alternatives and by marking up only to the extent necessary to cover expenses. Some might question the substantial profits indicated in the annual statements of the cooperative movement. According to a study we undertook in the seventies at the request of the council of ministers, many cooperatives registered a net loss in their marketing operations; a few had a surplus of 1.5 percent which shows that they adhere to the objective discussed above.

Developing Incomes And Increasing Investment

The cooperative movement employs some 6617 workers according to the association's annual report for 1986. The continuity and maintenance of those workers' wages creates new incomes and assets and intensifies investments in different sectors of society. The use of revenue for transactions and contributes to cooperative membership. Consumer confidence in cooperatives allows them to diversify products. The reasonable cost of goods attract consumers.
Impact On Consumer Wants And Family Budgets

The way goods and services are presented at cooperatives leads one way or another to stimulating latent consumer spending desires of which they were not aware when entering the supermarket. The availability of many brands of the same commodity sometimes promotes buying out of curiosity or to try a new product.

Impact On Banking, Deposits, And Bank Liquidity

Daily and non-daily deposits and other banking activities by cooperatives as a whole have a considerable impact on various banking operations, on the banks' liquidity rate, and also on various deposits. It is to be noted that the location of a cooperative usually has a branch bank, sometimes even more than one, which facilitates public dealings with various banks. It is also understood that deposits by cooperatives had a great deal to do with easing the bank liquidity crisis in the aftermath of the al-Manakh crisis.

Impact On Production And Supply And Demand

The cooperative movement, having been successful in the consumer field, has turned its attention to production as we mentioned before. Cooperatives were formed for production, agriculture, and animal husbandry to produce vegetables, fruits, eggs, poultry as well as meats and dairy products. Even though this trend is in its early stages it, has impacted one way or another on the production of food and on supply and demand. This movement concentrates, among other things, on national industries and gives them preference even if their prices were higher as long as they don't exceed 10 to 15 percent in order to support the state's general objective to protect domestic industry.

Many producers are careful to provide a variety of goods suitable to the tastes of cooperative buyers. They even compete for market share in quality and price.

If cooperatives have so much impact on production then their impact on supply and demand could be no less powerful, especially since Kuwait is a market open to all countries of the world which are highly competitive. Everyone competes to satisfy the consumer.

In impacting supply and demand, cooperatives have an advantage that can be summarized as follows:

1- Cooperatives are important retail outlets for basic goods and services. The areas where they are located are considered critical markets for most consumers in the country.

2- These cooperatives own many diverse branches in almost all parts of Kuwait which makes goods and services easily available to consumers.

3- The cooperatives' displays are attractive. The layout of supermarkets, the arrangement of goods, and the variety of brands help stimulate consumer buying.
We also find that cooperatives can buy at the prices they consider reasonable. When buying collectively for all the cooperatives, their association gains price advantages, payment facilities, and discounts. It can be said, therefore, that cooperative markets are consumer markets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Cooperative</th>
<th>Supermarkets</th>
<th>Branches managed by cooperative</th>
<th>Branches managed by others</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kayfan</td>
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<td>Al-Shamiyah and Al-Shuwaykh</td>
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<td>Al-Sulaybechhat and Al-Doha</td>
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<td>Al-Ramiythiah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-'Adilleyah and Qurtubah</td>
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<td>Al-Rawdah and Hawaiili</td>
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<td>Al-Surrah</td>
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<td><strong>595</strong></td>
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12945/12951
CSO: 4404/345
COMPLICATIONS OF DOMESTIC SITUATION REVIEWED, ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 25 Apr 87 pp 18, 19

[Article by Salim Nassar: "Lebanon, the Most Important of the Impossible Cases in the Middle East"]

[Text] At a session for discussion and forthright talk which included a number of members of the Lebanese community in London, Dr Salim al-Huss said that radical reform in Lebanon may be carried out properly only by guaranteeing man's rights in his country, including justice, equality and the realization of sound democratic practice in the context of a capable, just government, which will require the elimination of political factionalism.

He was asked about the means which might now lead to this difficult goal and replied that the adventure of the democratic struggle must be pursued on the basis of all national reform plans and in his view the loss of the position has deprived the Lebanese of many opportunities and foiled many solutions. The historic opportunity, in his view, will not arise from a void. Rather, it will be a marriage of foreign will with domestic desire. The factional problem may have been given permanent legitimacy in various solutions and it has become difficult for the regime to enlist all citizens in the centralization of government. Thus people have become dispersed and scattered into tribes, factions, creeds and anything that will guarantee them protection from fear.

Dr al-Huss, at this session, criticized the characteristics of the political reform plans in Lebanon. He said that everyone talks about them as temporary deals and not as radical solutions for everyday living. This has meant extending the period of the crisis, alienating it from domestic decisionmaking and making it contingent on foreign will.

The discussion shifted over to the illusions of the Lebanese war and the psychological factors which helped exaggerate the role of the fighting men in the regional and international struggles. Dr al-Huss summarized these political illusions as having helped accelerate the collusion and backsliding. He said that the small had sought to act out the role of the big, and they ended up as the small in the game of the big.

This characterization lent a new dimension to the discussion of the causes of the civil wars in Lebanon, the extent of their connection to foreign
powers and who has been exploiting whom in the game of nations and the com-
petition for centers of influence. The fact is that it is difficult to in-
terpret this question in the light of the ongoing civil wars: is it an in-
ternal struggle by foreign means, or a foreign struggle by foreign means? It
is a dual struggle in which the black and white hairs in the hide of the
zebra are intertwined. It is not a white animal with black stripes, and it
is not a black animal with white stripes. It is a mixture of white and black
hairs.

The constant is that since the outbreak of the "wars of the factions" in
Lebanon in 1840, each faction has resorted to carrying out a policy of seek-
ing support abroad in order to preserve what it considered a legitimate
right, human security or a national solution. The Maronite faction sought
support from France in order to obtain political concessions by which it
resisted the state of fear which dominated its ideas and activities before
and after the birth of the "greater Lebanon." The Sunnite faction sought
support from Nasirism to improve its circumstances and regain its rights in
positions which it considered the Maronites had pre-empted through foreign
forces. According to this rule, the Shiite faction justified its empathy
with Khomeyni's Iran to help it correct its situation, improve its role and
deliver it from what it described as the state of social injustice and politi-
cal deprivation.

This style led to the unleashing of competition aimed at bringing in influ-
ential foreign powers to resolve domestic struggles or impose a new state of
affairs. On this basis, the beneficiary countries made use of this need to
impose subordination and alignment on the Lebanese forces seeking aid and
often turned them into instruments within regional struggles and deprived
them of the freedom of decision in making their future. This view was car-
rried to its extreme in various stages of the history of Lebanon when its
application led to painful choices which were always distinguished by vio-
lence, as the foreign forces used this need to demand the subordination of
the weak seeking the aid. It was natural that this aid would create an en-
during inadequacy which would prevent the development of national unity,
would prevent the breakup of the relationships and would nourish the seeds
of factional strife. It is a vicious circle in which it is difficult to
separate cause from effect and set action apart from reaction.

Lebanon, in the view of observers, is no longer a subordinate force revolv-
ing in the orbit of the dominant powers alone; indeed, its role has evolved
into that of a regional womb, like surrogate motherhood —that is, it has
evolved into a political womb which can be rented out for insemination with
the sperm of the Palestinian cause, the Gulf war, the oil crisis or the Camp
David problem. This is because the fertility of internal currents always
permits such foreign experiments and the surrogate mother often fights the
factors of nursing after birth and forgets that she has been rented out and
that preserving the cause with which she was impregnated is something whose
review is to be referred to a ruling by the judiciary. Therefore, from time
to time we hear talk about partition and division in two as happened with
Mary Whitehead, the most famous of those possessing causes involving a rent-
ed womb.

In Lebanon today there are more than 20 cases of this type, all of which
originated as a result of the agreement to become pregnant on behalf of
"absent spouses." Here is where the demand arises for agreement over a domestic position to create a domestic solution rather than a foreign position for solutions remote from the problems of the country and the concerns of its people. What is desired, therefore, is a balanced solution in which every group will feel that it is the equal of the other group in terms of sacrifices and in gains and bounties, that is, a solution which is able to get the contradicting forces to concur over a goal which will deepen national reconciliation, eliminate alienation and constitute a firm union for formulating participation, because the roots of the real dispute among Lebanese are embodied not in the definition of their relations on Lebanese territory but in the definition of their affiliations with foreign forces.

Lebanon, in the previous period of the generation of the people who forged independence, succeeded to some extent in transcending political shocks and staggered along its way from crisis to crisis without being afflicted with a serious headache. This transitional passage occurred thanks to the concurrence of the people, the army and the politicians about a single goal, which was expulsion of the colonialists. The unfortunate thing is that the officials did not accept or did not realize the importance of developing the political system so that it would become suited to the needs of the age and compatible with the notions of reform and real solutions. When cries rose up demanding that they be removed from positions of influence, they turned themselves into political icons and claimed that a change in their positions within the factions or parties would further disrupt the national balance. This excuse has become a familiar feature of the illusory remedies which are always raised as an argument that the process of government cannot move away from the framework of the people who have exploited and used it. That means that it is a unique regime in the world, capable of guiding itself automatically, that is, without a focal point or basic point of concentration in legitimate authority. Therefore, these methods have been considered a policy of evasion and trickery. The positions of the government on this crisis have also been considered the art of the game of buying time. It is an art that stands on its own, since it turns officials' errors into a general problem whose perpetrators it is hard to take to trial because of their sectarian or political affiliations. Thus reward becomes the lot of the rulers, while the people endure the punishment for the errors others commit. The solution in this regard then becomes connected not to the leaders of the crisis but rather to the new leaders who are able to modernize the governing mechanism of the delapidated political system. The unfortunate thing is that the current leaders consider that they represent all the Lebanese in Lebanon and that every national remedy must take place through them, not through the people. They are the influential armed will which has arrogant the role of the government. They are the comprehensive solution which proceeds from neglect of the role of the government and they are the focal point of the concerns of the advocates of change and development and the advocates of the preservation of the existing situation.

With the conclusion of the 13th year of the ordeal, Lebanon is entering a new year of struggle over government, gains and regional struggles. With the loss of the opportunities for national solutions, the people lack a new upsurge of hope; although they are convinced that the war will not solve the problem, they are compelled to proceed along the road of collective suicide,
preserving their leaders lest events turn them into the victims of their legitimate rights.

With the advent of a new year in the life of the crisis, the issue of the presidency has been raised as if 1988 will bring forth a president with a solution. However, regional and international circumstances do not suggest such an atmosphere and are not imposing the condition that a president be selected who will constitute the basic solution to the quandary of government. Since the laws of the game will not tolerate a vacuum, even in the worst of possibilities, the search is now underway for a president who will have the characteristics of the late Ilyas Sarkis. That is what Mr Walid Jumblatt meant when he talked with [former] Premier Sa'ib Salam recently about a competition for a president with Sarkisian characteristics, that is, one who does not belong to a political, factional or family force — that is, one who is of the crisis-managing arbiter type, not the type of person who will rule on the future of the regime. This sort of role is being presented in the stock exchange of the presidency for the sake of providing tentative plans, not for the sake of rising to the challenges of reform and conciliation. It is a hesitant question which before all else requires a unified national position on interaction with the region's crises and it also requires an international decision which will enable the Lebanese to commit themselves to a line of independent dialogue close to understanding and remote from violence.

The danger, in the view of politicians, is that the subject of the presidency will turn into a quandary which will increase the fragmentation of the Lebanese will with respect to the faltering national dialogue; thus the statement that the crisis of the presidency must not be a cover for the sabotage of reform plans and a justification for threatening the nation with respect to its sovereignty and unity. It is to be noted that this interconnection has started to manifest itself in the extension of the struggle, as if the date for the election of the president will be an entree for the realization of things that have been postponed in the Lebanese, Arab and international contexts. When the presidency becomes political collateral, reform must be transformed into a bargain in which the conditions of stability, security and democracy are not present.

11887
CSO: 4404/333
DOMESTIC ATTITUDES TOWARD PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 25 Apr 87 pp 22, 23

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Lebanon Will Attend the International Conference"]

[Text] The visit to Moscow by the Syrian president, Hafiz al-Asad, in the second half of this month, as officially announced by the Soviet capital, is expected, as reliable Soviet information sources in the Lebanese capital say, to lead to Soviet movement whose focal point will be the international conference for peace in the Middle East.

The information circulating in diplomatic and government gatherings holds that the Soviet leadership is trying, at this stage, to adopt the subject of the international conference as a political entree into the region in a new attempt to normalize Soviet relations with all Arab countries and consequently to try to open new horizons for these relations through the positive impression the Soviet leader Gorbachev is seeking to give various Arab regimes of Moscow's total commitment to defense of legitimate Arab rights, including the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and restoration of their rights, and to present the readiness Moscow is evincing to coordinate with the Arab position on the holding of this international peace conference, the conditions for holding it and the details of the management of the discussions during it.

Western diplomatic sources acknowledge that Moscow at this time finds itself better able to act and carry out direct political contacts with Arab leaders and officials, proceeding from the centralization of Soviet decisionmaking and the liberation of the Soviet leadership from all restrictions -- not to mention that the Soviets have had a priori position of support for Arab rights and that consequently the holding of the international conference for peace in the Middle East has basically been a Soviet proposal since Brezhnev's era. On top of that, the Soviet leader Gorbachev, through the initiatives he is carrying out in domestic and foreign Soviet contexts, is constantly trying to prove that he is the man of peace and liberalization.

While the American administration previously opposed the holding of the international conference and demanded direct negotiations between the Arabs
and Israel in the manner of Camp David, the American position began some time ago to shift in the direction of support for the holding of such a conference on the basis of conditions the leader of the Israeli Labor Party, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, is presenting.

Information from Western sources goes so far as to anticipate that the international conference will not convene before the second year of the term of the next American president, for two basic reasons whose validity American officials in the Reagan administration who have visited the Middle East over the past few months acknowledge.

The first reason is the Reagan administration's feeling that it is at present in a position of weakness where it does not possess full freedom of movement to keep up with the Soviet position and exert the pressures that will be required of it, while President Reagan's priority at present lies in preparing for the presidential elections so that the Republican Party's candidate will not face a major defeat in them, although President Reagan has been striving for a foreign triumph through the strategic arms limitation talks underway with the Soviet Union.

The second reason is that the attainment of a settlement or peaceful solution in this international conference will most likely be out of the question if the two superpowers do not agree that the Soviets should exert pressure on the Arab party, especially on Syria and the Palestinians, in exchange for Washington's exertion of the requisite pressures on Israel for the sake of obtaining concessions from the two parties to the conflict. The latter will become impossible for Washington to carry out as it ventures upon the presidential election campaign, since the Democratic and Republican Parties will be competing to win the affection of Israel and the votes of the Jews in America.

On that basis, the secret word which has been given to some Arab leaders has it that an invitation for the holding of this international conference is not expected before spring 1990 but that this in no way means a freeze on contacts on this subject, because while there is agreement in principle, there are basic details of the magnitude of principle on which a great dispute still exists between the Arabs and Israel and even between Moscow and Washington. This calls for more consultation and the presentation of ideas and solutions in the desire to come up with a final form which will receive the support of the two parties.

This sort of information may perhaps shock a number of people who are optimistic that the international conference will be held soon, but the Lebanese president, Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, is not one of them. He has information and facts which have caused him to assert to a number of figures in parliamentary and political leadership that the holding of this international conference will not take place in the foreseeable future. However, that has not prevented President al-Jumayyil from presenting his view on Lebanon's position concerning this conference, on the occasion of the political debate which began with statements a number of leaders and officials made, the most recent of which was the statement by the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, Mr Hussayn al-Husayni, who declared that he rejected having Lebanon
participate in this conference and said that the matter did not concern Lebanon closely or remotely.

Politicians have conveyed President Amin al-Jumayyil's amazement at this sort of position, which has been common in Lebanon, even regarding attendance at such a conference, and the president has informed the political leaders that Lebanon has a right to and interest in attendance at such an international conference for peace in the Middle East and that the matter concerns it as it does others, if not more than others. Justifying this position of his, President al-Jumayyil has made the statement that "There are numerous problems between us and Israel, including security problems, and on top of those there is the Lebanese territory Israel is occupying now, which is what is called the border strip. There are the problems of water and in addition to all this there are seven well known Lebanese villages which Israel took over after 1948. We refuse to abandon a sliver of them. This land is Lebanese and its inhabitants are Lebanese. Israel previously admitted that and agreed to return them to Lebanon, by virtue of the abrogated 17 May agreement."

In another area, President al-Jumayyil has discussed this matter with these figures and leaders from other important angles. One thing the president has said is that he is a supporter of Lebanon's participation in any regional contacts or meetings linked to the region's conditions, circumstances and future out of the motive of concern over Lebanese rights and consequently the avoidance of any international or regional settlements which will come about at Lebanon's expense. President al-Jumayyil went on to say, "This is categoric, and how so? With respect to a conference like an international one on the Middle East, is it not permissible that we should be remote from it and that we should remain outside it, because our presence at such a conference constitutes a guarantee of our rights and interests and it is not permissible to ignore this if the occurrence of any likelihood of the attainment of settlements which should occur at the expense of Lebanon, with its existence, identity, independence and unity of its territory and people, is to be avoided, especially since our country is in a state that is not at all enviable now that events have made it an easy victim of regional and international settlements in this region at the hands of Israel and others besides Israel, which still insist on establishing an alternative nation for the Palestinians or on settling them outside Palestine."

President al-Jumayyil expressed his amazement at the positions which call for the opposite of this, pointing out that their proponents know all the facts and this data and also know how much the crisis of Lebanon is basically connected to the Middle East crisis.

President al-Jumayyil concluded his conversation with these leaders by stating that it would be premature to await the holding of the international conference at such a point because many considerations are still preventing this — especially since the preparation for such a conference would require a long time. That is if an international decision ultimately is made in favor of holding the conference. However, the priority which must remain the object of Lebanon's attention, as President al-Jumayyil states it, is agreement by the Lebanese to a solution to their problems, because a
reconciliation on this solution will be a guarantee of Lebanon's existence and ability to transcend all difficulties, and reconciliation will be a deterrent barrier to any regional or international body which is thinking of underwriting a settlement to the region's crisis at Lebanon's expense.

11887  
CSO: 4404/333
RELIEF COMMISSIONER ON 'SECRET' SUPPLY NETWORK

JN151123 Khartoum SUNA in English 1745 GMT 14 May 87

[Text] Khartoum, 14 May (SUNA)—Rehabilitation and Relief Commissioner Kamil Shawki told the daily AL-USBU' published here today that a secret air bridge for transporting relief items to the famine-stricken southern Sudan has been made to and from the southern regions.

Shawki who declined to give the number, nationalities and destination of the planes engaged in this air bridge pointed to the worse security situation and the threats of renegade John Garang revealing that the SASCO company Cessna light plane which was shot down last week by the SPLA over Malakal, southern Sudan, was carrying relief supplies and medical equipment within the context of the said airbridge.

About 1,200 tons were transported to the south within the framework of this bridge, the paper quoted the commissioner as saying.

On the other hand, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner Kamil Shawki disclosed that a dangerous conspiracy was being fomented pointing out to several deterrents created to hinder the project for storing relief items near the consumption areas in the south at Rajaj, Babanusa, and Dain besides the freezing of 3.5 million U.S. dollars originally devoted to this purpose.

He also indicated that there were some government elements who have interest in hindering and creating doubts over this project describing as (harmful lies) the repeated allegations on corruption in the project.

The relief and rehabilitation commission is exerting great efforts to make the relief supplies reach the south despite the several difficulties the relief work is facing, the paper quoted the commissioner as saying.

The commissioner pointed to the difficulties that face the transporting of relief supplies through the borders with Kenya and the Kenyan authorities' decision preventing the exportation of dura (sorghum) besides the deteriorated security situation on the Ugandan northern borders.

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POLITICIANS ASSESS ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF 1985 UPRISING

Opposition Leaders' Assessment

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 8-14 Apr 87 pp 22-23

[Text] Sudan's uprising will have its second anniversary this week. On 6 April 1985, the Sudanese armed forces declared their support for the popular uprising and put an end to the regime established by Ja'far Numayri. Since then, Sudan has had two kinds of government: a transitional government which lasted 1 year and which was a combined military-civilian government in which the Transitional Military Council, headed by General Siwar-al-Dhahab, shouldered the sovereignty responsibilities while the Council of Ministers, headed by Dr Dafa'allah al-Jazuli, took care of the executive tasks. The transitional government ended with general elections which brought to power the current partisan coalition government, which is headed by al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. This government, the first of its kind in Sudan in 16 years, was expected to crown the democratic movement which erupted in Sudan in April 1985 and to be a fruit of the popular uprising.

Has Sudan's uprising completed its objectives? What are the obstacles that have faced it? Have the causes of the uprising receded? What stage have the economic deterioration, the conflict in the South, and the dream to achieve national unity reached? What form did democratic action take in the past 2 years and what are this action's effects on the government's future?

To get answers to these questions, AL-MAJALLAH explored the opinions of some political figures in the transitional stage and in the current stage in an attempt to assess Sudan's political experience in the past 2 years.

The first to speak about the transitional and parliamentary experience was lawyer Mahmud Hasanayn, leader of the NUP [National Unionist Party], which split from the DUP [Democratic Unionist Party] and whose candidates were not fortunate enough to enter the Constituent Assembly. Thus, this party has remained with the political opposition forces outside the parliament. Hasanayn said: "When the Sudanese fought against and toppled Numayri's regime, the uprising's objective was not to return to an administrative or procedural democracy or to restore the parties as they were prior to May 1969. The Sudanese people's ambition was to establish a democratic system and to free the Sudanese citizen's will so as to achieve the uprising's objectives."
But it seems that the transitional stage's objective was to achieve democracy in form, but not in content. This is proven by the fact that those who took part in the military-civilian council were military men and unionists who had not taken part in fighting Numayri's regime and who did not have the experience of those who had fought this regime for 16 years. This is why it was natural for the Sudanese Parliament to come as a representative of the 'May forces.' It is my opinion that the parliamentary elections were not conducted under a fair democratic system but rather recalled the May image to mind. Currently, there are 72 deputies who were in the Socialist Union's and the May institutions' leadership. There is no democratic explanation for their presence. We asked the transitional government to erase the May traces and to issue a law to bring the corrupt leaders to trial and to account for and regulate party activity. The democratic system that should exist at present is a system founded on quicksands which should have been removed in the transitional stage. But the transitional government kept the quicksands, thus bringing about the current democratic system."

Uprising's Slogans.

"As we see it, the uprising was embodied in freedom." This is how 'Ali 'Uthman Muhammad Taha, leader of the parliamentary opposition National Islamic Front, began his statements. He added: "This freedom has two dimensions: The first is formal and based on the freedom of expression and organization, which is now available to a large degree. The second dimension is embodied in enabling the citizen to live honorably and to find the means of sustenance. In this respect, we find that the uprising's slogans continue to be as they were, far from being achieved. In the transitional stage, the parties became active and increased to more than 40 in number. In its general performance, the transitional government was more like a neutral umpire keeping the game in order but not trying to control or channel it to serve the task with which the government was charged, namely, prepare the country for general elections. Perhaps the one democratic accomplishment the government achieved was its management of the elections with a high degree of success and impartiality." 'Uthman further added: "Democratic action was not bound by restrictions or controls. The government did not prevent the formation of parties or the staging of demonstrations. But during the transitional stage, we did not see any processions, which were banned by the government, except for a procession to welcome the prime minister. The government resorted to official restrictions to the point of clashing with the demonstrators. In the transitional period, the Military Council had a political committee through which it kept sight of the political scene. The committee's task was to contact the political forces and to hear their views on the various issues. Even though the current prime minister calls for holding conferences from time to time, these conferences do not follow the path of real consultation. Rather, they are meetings for the purpose of reading some resolutions and memoranda. This is why we in the National Islamic Front have not been too eager for these meetings, considering that they are superficial actions."

Returning to the uprising's slogans, the opposition leader said: "If the uprising's slogans are what is projected through the left's window, namely,
eliminate the May traces and the September laws, then these objectives foil the meaning of the uprising's slogans. Elimination of the May traces is not supposed to be used as "Uthman's way to settle political accounts or to make narrow partisan gains."

If this is the view of the party and political opposition outside the Constituent Assembly and of the parliamentary opposition, then how do the uprising's leaders assess their transitional stage and how do they defend themselves against the accusations made about them? In this connection, 'Umar 'Abd-al-'Ati, the ex-attorney general who returned to his office to resume his law practice and whose decisions and measures during his ministerial service were controversial, said: "The transitional government achieved numerous accomplishments which were not perhaps up to the level of the Sudanese people's aspirations. The government was facing numerous challenges and difficulties. It contained the starvation which had afflicted many Sudanese villages and formed 85 fact-finding committees to bring politicians and others to trial. The former vice president under Numayri, the members of the 19 May 1969 coup council, and Dr Baha'-al-Din Muhammad Idris were brought to trial. The government also formed numerous courts, amended nearly 300 laws and regulations, and issued several laws, including the press and publication law, the law on the National Radio and Television Authority, and the judicial authority law. The criminal and civil litigation law and the sentencing rules were also amended." He added: "Through the settlements we concluded with the corrupters, a sum of $50 million and of 100 million Sudanese pounds was added to the treasury and all the issued laws were examined, including the new laws and the laws amending or abolishing old laws." The Sudanese ex-attorney general added that the transitional government worked silently and with full understanding and impartiality, that it did not take sides with any of the people's factions, and that its concern was to work for Sudan's interest.

'Abd-al-'Ati added: "A year has passed since the current government was elected and this government is still revolving in a vicious circle. It has lost its prestige now that it has failed to solve the problems and that security has been lost, with the citizen living in fear for his property. I hope that the government will roll up its sleeves, will stop its conferences, and will work to issue decisions to solve the problems of communication, health, education, clothing, housing, and food, which constitute the citizen's simplest rights." On the still ongoing argument concerning the September laws, the ex-attorney general said: "We abolished 90 percent of those laws and we eliminated the unjust points in all the laws, leaving it to the Constituent Assembly to make the decision on God's restrictions." On eliminating the former regime's traces, he said: "All the investigations and all the courts formed to try the former regime's supporters exposed that regime's corrupt ways and abolished many of its laws, including the state security law and the local government law. Promulgation of the transitional constitution means nothing but the elimination of the May traces."

Continued Rising Prices

The second point at which AL-MAJALLAH paused is the economic procession which, to many, takes first place. The spark which ignited popular feelings was the
elimination of the flour subsidy and the increased bread prices in April 1985 within the framework of the former regime's attempts to dress its economic wounds. In this regard, Muhammad Hasanayn, the leader of NUP, said: "All the transitional government did in the economic sphere was to transport the aid and rescue materials received from the Arab and non-Arab countries. That aid played a major role in relieving the predicament of numerous citizens. The transitional government also held a national economic conference in which all the political forces participated. That conference emerged with recommendations which continue to be mere ink on paper. Then the current government came and was able to secure the means for agricultural production. But what both governments are faulted for is their total lack of market control and inability to supply goods. As a result, prices have risen in the parliamentary period beyond their levels in the transitional stage. In the transitional stage, prices rose beyond their levels in the May era."

However, opposition leader 'Ali 'Uthman Taha said: "Tackling economic conditions was not one of the transitional government's tasks because this requires strict austerity measures. But that government was able to supply the daily needs for fuel and food, including bread. The current government's period in office has been characterized by the absence of long lines of people waiting to get their essential needs. The government also succeeded in holding an economic conference which was able to chart and define accurate future options. But the elected government's problem is not just to supply daily needs, which is an elementary duty. Its main duty is to tackle the roots of the Sudanese economy's problems. For example, from my position in the parliament, I cannot but say that the government pledged to the parliament to carry out specific projects for which it could be held accountable after a certain period of time. In one page of the economic program, the government included, for example, in the Ministry of Energy's plan three projects costing more than 1 billion pounds. I don't know how a government inheriting a tumbling economic situation can fulfill such a pledge. The government's economic program is tantamount to amassing a number of projects awaiting completion, with no specific priorities given for their implementation. The government has also failed to attract foreign monies to improve the balance of payments. The gap has led to increased borrowing from the banking sector to finance government spending. This borrowing has affected the inflation rates and the increase in prices. The challenge facing the government is not a major challenge. But the government has wasted a whole year in which it could have begun economic reform."

Security Conditions

On the current security conditions existing 2 years after the uprising, 'Ali 'Uthman Taha commented: "It must be noted that in the transitional stage, the security deterioration began to accelerate because by taking the position of a neutral umpire, the government was unwilling to intervene forcefully to settle whatever problems and clashes occurred. In the wake of the transitional stage, we now find that the conditions which posed a threat to security continue to exist. The government continues to move one step forward and another backward in forming its new security agency. It has not begun to form the local governments and has not defined the alternatives. All the cabinet
statement contained were just slogans which have not been implemented so far, thus helping problems to intensify. There are armed conflicts in Darfur where incidents of armed looting have surfaced and there are the conflicts between Qimr and al-Fallatah, between Nubah and al-Masiriyah, and between al-Masiriyah and the Dinka in South Kordofan where the government has been forced to use the armed forces and police trained in fighting armed looting."

Lawyer Mahmud Hasanayn views the issue from a different angle and deals with security with a different perspective, saying: "We knew for certain that there were political forces carrying and keeping large quantities of arms. We asked the transitional government to take decisive steps to gather the weapons from the political forces, some of whom are partners in the government and who have enough weapons to equip an army. We asked General Siwar-al-Dhahab to issue a law calling for gathering the weapons and setting criminal penalties for the political forces that continue to possess weapons at the end of a grace period. But the government did nothing of the sort. On the contrary, it tried to arm some tribes in West Sudan on the pretext of self-defense in the face of John Garang's rebellion. We warned that such weapons will be used in the future to pose a threat to security and to commit looting and thefts. A short time ago, weapons were discovered in al-Dandar area and the government was unable to determine their source, even though the source is well known and is controlled by one of the parties."

South's Dilemma

Talk about Sudan's security conditions seems deficient if it fails to deal with developments in the South. AL-MAJALLAH asked the opposition leader about his view of the course followed to tackle the southern problem. He said: "We in the National Islamic Front have been warning since the start of the transitional stage and have been saying that the entire South is not under Garang's control and that there are other internal political forces which must be dealt with and must be given enough political say to fill the void and to make Garang feel the need to acknowledge the reality and to deal with it. But the current government has followed the same footsteps. This course is not the right course. Al-Mahdi's meeting with Garang failed and this failure was followed by the downing of the civilian plane. We believe that even though a Peace Ministry has been established, the practical steps to hold a constitutional conference have not taken a definite shape. Moreover, there is the issue concerning the administration of the South. The Southern Council was formed recently despite the reservations expressed by some people. We have been engaged in dialogue with the government through what we have projected in 'Sudan's charter' so that no administrative void may develop the way the security void developed earlier. We hope that the political effort and the military effort being made by the Sudanese armed forces will complement each other."

Hasanayn then projects NUP's view of the course followed to tackle the southern problem, saying: "The position projected by the transitional and parliamentary governments and by the opposition parties does not differ in tendency. All believe in a peaceful democratic solution. However, the transitional government resorted to an approach characterized by idealism.
It wanted the rebel movement to cast away its weapons and enter a dialogue when there are reasons preventing such a step. Garang's movement calls for liquidating the May traces and the transitional government never gave a thought to liquidating May's traces. Moreover, that government's relations with the rebel movement were based on wishes calling for dialogue and for a unilateral cease-fire. This represents the peak of idealism in political and military action. The current government has not employed idealism to deal with Garang's movement but has dealt with it with reaction and anger. The southern problem is not insurmountable. Those who follow what Garang says about the means to solve this problem do not find what he says greatly different from what most Sudanese political forces say. But there is a psychological barrier between the southern and northern political forces and this barrier must be removed. I wish to correct Garang on a point. He says that what took place in Khartoum was not a 'revolution' and we say that what happened was a revolution, but one that has not yet achieved its objectives."

Numayri's Trial

On the interview AL-MAJALLAH had with 'Umar 'Abd-al-'Ati, the attorney general during the transitional stage, on the tasks he wishes to complete if he were given the opportunity to play the general attorney's role in this government, and on the Egyptian Administrative Court's decision not to extradite ex-President Ja'far Numayri, the man said: "If I were asked to accept the post of attorney general in a partisan government I would not agree because I do not possess the partisan makeup that would enable me to abide by the opinions of a certain party whose ideas I do not approve of. But if history's wheel turned backward, I would do the same work I did because I am content with my performance in that period. I may perhaps avoid some mistakes I made. But I do not regret what I did. There are numerous tasks I wish I could complete and there are some issues that preoccupy my mind. For example, there is another committee to investigate prisoner Baha'-al-Din Idris. But this committee has not completed its work yet and I believe that this committee has more serious charges than the charges for which Idris was brought to trial. I was also in the process of forming another committee to investigate the Korean company's activities and a committee to investigate businessman Muhammad 'Abd-rabbuh. As for Numayri's trial, I demanded his trial during the transitional stage on the basis of the crimes he committed against the Sudanese people. We supported the demand with legal charges and proofs. Moreover, I do not agree with the decision issued by the Egyptian court because it is wrong and because it is the court's duty to give an opinion on whether Article 53 applies to the ex-president or not. I believe that there has been no popular support to convince the Egyptian government of the demand and there are no concerted government efforts insisting on the demand." 'Abd-al-'Ati noted that the agreement to exchange criminals is binding on both countries.
Former Prime Minister's Assessment

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 8-14 Apr 87 pp 25-26

[Interview with former Prime Minister al-Jazuli Dafa'allah by Muhammad Ahmad Hisham]

[Text] Khartoum--A leader of the transitional stage who was in power after the uprising had to be interviewed on what has happened during and after the transitional phase. AL-MAJALLAH has chosen Dr al-Jazuli Dafa'allah, who began the interview, saying:

"It is noticed that there is a rush to write the history of Sudan's revolution. There are numerous hasty pens writing about the transitional stage and the April revolution. Often, what is written is not compatible with the reality and does not give the truth. I fear that this revolution will be 'falsified' and that it will be written by pens that do not know the truth and that did not take part in making the revolution. I am not saying that all that has been written about the April revolution is false. But in what has been written, I have noticed a lot that has nothing to do with the real events. My hope is that time will permit the writing of a truer and more comprehensive history of the April revolution because, to my mind, it is a great revolution and what it has created is great in its place and time."

[Question] What is democracy's position in Sudan in the wake of the transitional and parliamentary stages?

[Answer] If we view Sudan before the April revolution, we find that insofar as free press and expression were concerned, there were two newspapers which were tantamount to official publications and each a copy of the other. The television and radio agency was the government's mouthpiece and ultimately became the ruler's mouthpiece. There was no party other than the Socialist Union, which did not represent a base tied to the Sudanese masses. The revolution then established constitutional authorities within a legitimate framework, including the Transitional Military Council and the Council of Ministers. Naturally, nobody expected to be permitted to form a party. But whoever wished did form a party and the government did not at the time object to the formation of parties by virtue of its being a political right as long as the citizen observed the law and democracy. In a country where no parties had existed, more than 40 parties were formed and the transitional authorities accepted those parties, dealt with them, and protected all of them within the framework of freedom and democracy. Then newspapers had to be issued and a large number of papers representing the existing parties and private individuals were published. During the transitional stage, free expression, publication, and political action were guaranteed and the judiciary remained independent and its decisions were respected, even decisions suspending cabinet decrees. As for the parliamentary period, I do not say that political liberties have diminished because the people's awareness of freedom and democracy will not permit anybody to abolish these liberties. But there are manifestations of discontent with and criticism of the broad liberties guaranteed by the transitional constitution. This is why the constitutional
amendments preoccupying public opinion have been made. I see no need to amend the transitional constitution. From the angle of democracy and freedom, the constitutional amendments made are below what is contained in the transitional constitution. Moreover, what we are amending is a provisional constitution with whose amendment we should not have preoccupied ourselves and over which we should not have wasted our time fighting, considering that this constitution was unanimously approved at the outset of the parliamentary period. We should have devoted our efforts to drafting a permanent constitution, which is the real challenge facing the Sudanese government.

[Question] What is your assessment of the economic development taking place in Sudan during the transitional and current periods?

[Answer] It is difficult to talk about economic conditions in Sudan which suffered from economic corruption for 16 years and which has been swept by starvation since 1984. Unlike the political situation, economic conditions cannot change quickly because the economy's nature dictates an uninterrupted process. Therefore, regardless of how great the political change, it is not directly and immediately followed by an economic change. However, political change creates the background to permit an economic upsurge. In the transitional stage, we introduced economic reforms in numerous fields, even though we were facing a large number of difficulties. We tried to eliminate starvation and we produced a surplus in some food supplies by achieving a successful agricultural season. But no noticeable change has occurred under the parliamentary government, even though this government is building on what we started. We were building on the debris of 16 years. The parliamentary government took over a better situation than did the transitional government. Despite this, no noticeable change has occurred in Sudan's economic conditions. The economic damage is extensive and deep-rooted. We must not forget that in the transitional stage, we held an economic conference which emerged with general recommendations that were approved by all the political parties that signed the economic charter emanating from that conference. The economic conference's resolutions became the background on which the current parliamentary government has founded its policies. Therefore, I believe that the transitional stage established the basic principles for an economic renaissance but had no time for anything else.

Old Conflict

[Question] Do you think that the steps taken have helped entrench security in Sudan?

[Answer] I wish to say that the conflict in Sudan is old and is a characteristic of a society like ours. In Sudan, there are parts that continue to live within such a framework. The conflicts themselves can be contained with traditional Sudanese wisdom. But what is new is John Garang's movement, which has been raiding tribes, especially Arab tribes, threatening their security, killing their men, and capturing their women. This has motivated these tribes to look for weapons to protect their honor and their economic resources. I firmly believe that the presence of Garang’s movement in the South and this movement’s attacks on the peaceful tribes have been the main
factor in detonating tribal conflict. These tribes did not get the weapons in their possession from the government, as the rumors say. I wish to stress that the Council of Ministers did not make a single decision to arm any tribe. The allegation that the transitional government armed these tribes is groundless. The tribes acquired their weapons through Sudan's open borders which extend for thousands of miles.

[Question] What is your assessment of the approach you adopted to tackle the conflict in the South?

[Answer] All the Sudanese people are aware that there is no solution other than a political solution founded on dialogue to settle the South Sudan problem. But until this is achieved, should the state abandon its duty and permit the citizens' security to be threatened? This is why whoever rebels against the government and threatens the citizens' security must be deterred. This is a governmental duty. The transitional government tried to create the background that helps solve this problem. First, the transitional authorities acknowledged the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement. Second, they issued a general amnesty for all those who had resorted to arms in the preceding period. Third, the Sudanese armed forces established a unilateral cease-fire. At the outset of the transitional stage, we thought that these three steps would create a certain climate and restore dialogue to Sudan. We then proceeded to talk about the southern conference and said that a conference must be held and that the Sudanese nation must take part in it and must discuss all its problems, led by the southern problem. The southern conference idea then developed into the national constitutional conference idea, considering that the southern problem is one of the problems with which the Sudanese arena abounds. We then issued a political declaration, which established the intellectual background on which the constitutional conference could be founded. In the declaration, we acknowledged the cultural and racial differences and talked of justice in distributing the resources, development of the more backward provinces, decentralization, and the fact that Sudan's problems can be solved by dialogue only. I then sent a message to Garang containing these concepts and noted in that message the movement's patriotic role during Numayri's administration. We sent a copy of the political declaration to Garang and I went to Kenya to meet with President Moi and met with the presidents of Tanzania and Uganda in an attempt to reach an understanding between Sudan and Garang's movement. All this effort has produced no positive result so far. But I say that the background was established and its basic features were made clear. We must develop this background in the parliamentary period.

[Question] What about the Koka Dam agreement?

[Answer] Koka Dam was an endeavor to which the government was not a party. I have my opinion on the Koka Dam plan. Its contents are the same as the contents of John Garang's reply to my message, with some additions. There is nothing new in Koka Dam. The only thing that could perhaps be new is a cease-fire because such a cease-fire will pave the way for true dialogue. The thinking behind Koka Dam on abolishing the September laws and the joint defense agreement with Egypt cannot create the climate for a serious and purposeful dialogue. I cannot see the connection between the joint defense
treaty and the Libyan protocol on the one hand and the southern problems on the other. The joint defense treaty has come as part of the Arab League's joint defense treaties and it contains nothing to undermine Sudan's sovereignty, that is, unless the objective of those who want to abolish the treaty is to deal with Sudan separately. As for developments in the southern issue under the current government, I truly say that we are standing still and that there is nothing new.

Accomplishments

[Question] Many believe that Sudan's uprising has been foiled. In your assessment, which of this uprising's objectives did your government achieve?

[Answer] If we examine the National Grouping charter adopted by the transitional government, we find that it makes no close or remote reference to what has come to be known as the September laws. I do not support the September laws. When the uprising erupted, nobody spoke about these laws. I recall that the first time the September laws were mentioned by name was in a discussion on forming the transitional government. There are more than nine September laws, including the traffic law. Is the disagreement on all these laws or is it concerned with the penal code pertaining to the Islamic restrictions? This entire storm centers fundamentally on the Islamic restrictions but uses the September laws as a slogan. At the beginning of the transitional stage, we asked people to be frank, to discuss the laws in detail, and to steer clear of ambiguities. In the transitional stage, we changed many of the September laws, including the criminal proceedings law and the judicial authority law. We amended a number of the laws and abolished others but stopped short of the Islamic restrictions because we believe that the Islamic restrictions must be tackled in a special way, considering that Muslims form the majority in this nation and that the entire nation approved the Islamic constitution in 1968. This is a historical fact. Therefore, whatever touches Islam may not be treated superficially. We acknowledge that these laws contain excesses unsupported by Islam and remote from freedom. But these laws contain an Islamic essence and this is why we left it up to the people's elected representatives to make the decision. Here I reiterate what Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi said, namely, that the Sudanese option is an Islamic option because the majority coming to the Constituent Assembly advocates Islam, even though its visualization of Islam differs. We now come to May's other traces. In the transitional stage, we dissolved the Socialist Union, the National Assembly, the regional people's councils, and the state security agency. We then brought to trial the major figures involved. Sentences were issued against 'Umar Muhammad al-Tayyib for his role in transplanting the Falasha and against Baha'-al-Din Idris. The courts formed in the transitional stage continue to carry on with their investigations and trials. In 1 year, we eliminated the May traces, issued the transitional constitution and the election law, held the elections which brought about democracy, preserved the judiciary's independence and the parties' freedom, and permitted the publication of party newspapers. So, what is left of the uprising's charter to be achieved? As for the Islamic Shari'a laws, we have left it to the people to decide whatever they wish on them.
Al-Sadiq's New Initiative

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 8-14 Apr 87 p 26

[Text] The Sudanese government has shown an interest in the constitutional appeal presented by two southern opposition parties, namely, the SSPA [South Sudanese Political Association] and the SAC [Sudanese African Congress], against the decree on forming the southern administration. The government has initiated efforts to contain this problem. AL-MAJALLAH has learned that these efforts began with a meeting held at the residence of Dr 'Ali Hasan Taj-al-Din, a member of the Presidential Council. The meeting included representatives of the Ummah Party and the DUP [Democratic Unionist Party] and was attended by Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and representatives of the SSPA and the SAC. Informed sources have told AL-MAJALLAH that al-Sadiq al-Mahdi made it clear to the parties' representatives that he is willing to hear their opinions. But the meeting was delayed to discuss the disputed points and to reach a formula satisfactory to the damaged parties.

Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi said that the SSPA submitted an appeal against the steps taken, adding: "Contrary to some people's allegations, we have not used these steps as a means to divide the southern political forces. Rather, we hoped that what was done would not be the subject of disagreement between these forces but would unite them. What is said about 'divide and rule' reflects backward policies."

Al-Mahdi noted that the government believes that the powers and authorities of the capital, the provinces, the North, and the South are governed by the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement until a constitutional conference is held and that the government does not plan to make any decision on the South beyond the framework of this agreement. He also said that freedom of choice on the southern council has been left to the southern parties and that he has not intervened in connection with those who have been appointed, rather selected, as a result of consultation between the southern parties.

Al-Mahdi also said that the government is in the process of announcing a new initiative for a peaceful solution and for putting an end to the problem of the failure to reach an understanding with Garang's movement.

AL-MAJALLAH has learned from reliable sources that the new announcement will deal with the position the government will take toward the armed movement and will discuss all the "negatives and "positives" in the contacts that have taken place with the movement. The sources said that the new initiative will take into account the experiences of previous contacts with the movement, especially of the dialogue which was conducted by the National Grouping and which achieved the so-called Koka Dam declaration and of the obstacles which faced the drafting of this declaration, especially the position of some northern political forces and parties, particularly that of the DUP, the only northern political organization which had no direct contacts with Garang's movement.
The movement misunderstood the DUP's position on the southern problem. Endeavors have been made in this connection by some of the grouping's leaders, and Dr Amin Makki Madani and Dr 'Izz-al-Din 'Ali 'Amir have taken part in these endeavors to establish bridges of understanding between the movement and the DUP leadership. The sources added that the new announcement will also cover the experiences of the other contacts made by way of the Islamic-Christian Peace Committee, which was headed by Idris al-Banna, a Presidential Council member. Those contacts reflected signs of willingness on the movement's part to restore the lines of communication and understanding.

The sources added that the new announcement will also consider what has been accomplished at the diplomatic level, especially the contacts made by the Sudanese minister of foreign affairs with the Ethiopian president and the Egyptian mediation efforts. The new initiative will appraise the reverberations of the Drew Wilson Institute's symposium, which was held in Washington on the South and in which elements of the popular movement participated, led by Dr Lam Akol and a number of Sudanese figures and circles from home and abroad. Even though the government declined the invitation to take part in the symposium, it permitted a number of its diplomats in Washinton to attend as observers. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi characterized the symposium as producing positive ideas and said that John Garang displayed goodwill toward dialogue.

By virtue of the contrasting and conflicting considerations in the Sudanese arena, the possibilities of settling the conflict in the South are confined to the following options, which will be reviewed in al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's initiative:

First, continuation of the present situation which is characterized by the lack of security, by the drain on material and human resources, and by deteriorating conditions in the South.

Second, development of a solution by way of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement. Such a solution will be difficult to embrace because of the southerners' differences on a system of government.

Third, the military solution which, all believe, will lead to intensifying the current situation.

Fourth, a peaceful solution. This requires settling intra-South differences first and then national differences which are embodied in broadening the participation in power and settling the issues of religion and government, of identity, and of the constitutional system. A minimal solution can be reached on these issues within the framework of the planned constitutional conference which will discuss the priorities to solve the problem and will prepare the climate for establishing peace and for completing the parliamentary elections in the areas where it has been impossible to hold such elections. It is believed that completing the elections will make it possible for the parliamentary institution to formulate its final concept of the southern administration.

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BRIEFS

SPLA DETAILS ON TRANSPORT PLANE DOWNING--Details are still coming in of the enemy military transport plane Hercules C-130 that was shot down at Wau as it was approaching to land on the 12th May 1987 by the SPLA Air Defense Unit. According to our correspondent in Wau, the plane was carrying more than 50 enemy soldiers, newly graduated from (muqlas) Battalion 242. Pieces of the aircraft recovered by the SPLA forces bear Number 3546083741, serial Number 994769165. Correspondent says that due to the imposition of curfew in Wau, he was not able to gather the information as regards the names of the enemy's military officers involved in the plane crash in time. More details will be brought to you as soon as they are available. [Text] [(Clandestine) Radio of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army in English 1300 GMT 25 May 87 EA] /9274

COMMERCE MINISTER ALLEGES 'ILLEGAL PRACTICES'--Khartoum, 17 May (SUNA)--Commerce, Cooperation and Supply Minister Dr Muhammad Yusuf Abu Harirah said that he has acquainted Premier al-Sadiq al-Mahdi with all the illegal practices carried out by some ministers to spoil the government policy in the economic field. In a statement to the daily AL-AYYAM published here today, Abu Harirah called for the formation of a neutral committee and pledged to present to the said committee the documents which prove the implication of those ministers. Abu Harirah threatened that if the committee is not formed he then would reveal these documents to the public opinion. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 1045 GMT 17 May 87 JN] /9274

CSO: 4500/107
ASSEMBLY, MINISTERS DISCUSS ECONOMIC ISSUES

JN171916 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1515 GMT 17 May 87

[Text] Damascus.—At noon today the People's Assembly held a session under Speaker Mahmud al-Zu'bi in the presence of Dr Salim Yasin, deputy prime minister for economic affairs, and a number of ministers. The assembly discussed during this session a number of supply issues and heard answers by competent ministers to several inquiries and questions related to the supply situation in the country.

At the beginning of the session, written questions by assembly members were read and referred to the concerned authorities. The assembly then heard the Supply Ministry's answers to a number of written questions read in previous sessions. Some assembly members asked a number of questions and inquiries related to the supply situation in the country and also to government plans to secure citizen needs of various consumer commodities, fix prices, provide the requirements of production, promote and improve work at consumer stores, and increase the punishment of those tampering with the people's food.

Afterward, the supply and internal trade minister answered a number of questions related to his ministry, foremost being an emphasis on fulfilling the slogan of increasing production to meet consumption and dispense with imports. He stressed the government works to secure the requirements of production to fulfill this slogan. Social Affairs and Labor Minister Antoine Jubran said that working hours in difficult jobs were determined in the basic law to be between minimum and maximum limits, that a committee has been formed to define the working hours for every job, and that a decision will be issued soon by the Council of Ministers in this regard.

Dr Salim Yasin, deputy prime minister for economic affairs, discussed some of the issues raised, asserting there is a special treatment for every economic issue. He explained the economic situation and the government's tasks to build an economic basis to meet the country's and citizens' needs as well as the requirements of defense and construction.

Economy and Foreign Trade Minister Dr Muhammad al-'Imadi discussed a number of economic issues. He pointed to the important government policy to improve production, rationalize consumption, achieve good balance in the monetary sector, and provide as much hard currency as possible to meet numerous
requirements and needs. He added the markets which give competitive prices for the hard currency have brought in a good income for the country exceeding $100 million in a short period. He said the external corporations belonging to the Economy Ministry signed contracts to secure many necessary materials such as iron, wood, and others and these materials will arrive in the next few months to meet the need for them. The price of tobacco, he added, was raised to an amount equal to its cost plus an appropriate increase in price to encourage peasants to plant this crop. He said what is now raised is only cigarette prices.

At the end, the assembly speaker commented on the topics raised on economy and supply. He appealed to the committee formed previously to study this subject to quickly lay down the appropriate working paper so it will be studied by the assembly to work out suitable solutions. The session adjourned to 1200 tomorrow, Monday.

/9274
CSO: 4400/218
PRO-IRAQI JOURNAL CONDEMNS MILITANT RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 20 Apr 87 pp 28-30

[Article by Slami Hosseini: "AL-DUSTUR Replies to the Question: Is It Possible to Form a 'Fundamentalist' Party in Tunisia?"]

[Text] This question, the title, is not the only one AL-DUSTUR is raising and answering in an attempt to follow what has been going on in Tunisia nowadays and what has prompted Tunisia's adoption of the decision to sever relations with Iran. What is going on now, in Tunisia and in some other Arab countries, raises numerous questions, one being, what are the intentions, ideas and goals of this current, which is cloaked in religion, pursues the platform of violence and pursues everything that is alien to the Islamic religion? Slami Hosseini attempts to seek answers to these and other questions by monitoring and observing practices and roots.

The growth in Tunisia of the "religious current" which later came to be known as the Islamic tendency, or the fundamentalist tendency, goes back to the late seventies. It emerged at the outset with the participation of some political forces (including people who were in the regime) aimed at forming a force to confront the movements of the left which were at the peak of their power at that time. The religious current began with persons who worked in religious societies that had no connection with politics and also with some imams of mosques. However, when these people felt that their activity was yielding a political effect in confronting the movements of the left on the one hand and in investing them with popularity in the ranks of the Tunisian man on the street on the other, the idea took root in them of establishing a political movement which would be distinctive within the Tunisian opposition and indeed shifting to opposition activity when the early signs of "democratic liberalization" appeared in Tunisia at the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties.

This step, that is, the shift from a current whose task was to confront the movements of the left in the university and student setting and to spread religious ideas to an opposition political movement, was adequate for rifts to appear within the religious current. More than one group took form in that current, including the Islamic Tendency, the Islamic Consultation Movement and the Progressive Islamic Movement, in addition to certain figures
who refused to move from a religious current to a political movement, and the Islamic Tendency movement, declaring its establishment at a press conference, established relations with political circles domestically and abroad and raised the slogan of an Islamic party once the Tunisian authorities had given some opposition parties permits for open activity. The Islamic Tendency movement then began to act and move in its capacity as a political party with leaders, rank and file, student and workers' wings and so forth. At that time, the following question presented itself among all political circles and everyone: is it possible to form an Islamic party in Tunisia? Is it possible for the Tunisian authorities to permit an Islamic party to act and consider it a party like the other political parties? Of course, the answer to that question is still lacking, since such an answer would entail many risks, whether it is in the negative or the affirmative.

The fact is that two answers, contradictory and conflicting, have emerged with time. There is a group which says yes, these people have the right to form an Islamic party because that represents a constitutional right and because the statement that it is not logical to form an Islamic party in a society which consists totally of Malekite Sunni Moslems is to be rejected because of the difference in degrees of religious devotion and the application of the teachings of Islamic law among the people; therefore, the Islamic party will be a proponent and a vanguard on behalf of the desired Islamic society in the face of the deterioration of Islamic values in the society. The second group replies that there is no need to form an Islamic party because the whole of Tunisian society consists of Malekite Sunni Moslems and there is no need for an Islamic party in an Islamic society because such a party will ultimately just be an instrument using Islam, which is an element common to the people, for political goals, and no political group has the right to use the religious identity of the people for its own political purposes, especially since all parties and political movements in the country, as well as the country's constitution, state that Islam is the official religion of the country, and therefore the people who want to form an Islamic party must choose between religion and politics and between entering political struggles with the mentality of what is permissible and forbidden and entering them with the mentality of what is right and wrong.

In reality, the two answers view the question in a manner which has been dictated by the current political struggle, not a manner that is related to the actual condition of the society, the institutions in Tunisia and the future of the country, because one can summarize the answers as follows: one group stands in favor of the marriage of politics and religion and another group stands in favor of the divorce between politics and religion, which brings the struggle back to the famous dispute over "Islam and the principles of government." Is this the case in Tunisia today, in this form? Is the matter just related to a dispute over the relationship between politics and religion? Presenting the issue in this manner is an intellectual position that is wrong from the beginning, since if the situation is thus, the proponents of the formation of an Islamic party in Tunisia, whether or not it bears an Islamic name, enter into the struggle, in this case, from the back door, because it would be more worthy for them to say that the scholars of religion (and it is not necessary that scholars of religion in this case assume the form of a political party) have their say in the country's
political life, decrees, laws and so forth, that is, that they be consulted on everything related to the life of the society. This means that the men of religion, if this is their character, cannot perform this task just through an Islamic political party, because forming such a party is not the only adequate condition for performing that task, and if they did indeed have the goal of attention to religion, and were concerned with the proper application of Islamic teachings so that they would have their say regarding political issues, they would have to be above parties and political movements and not be a party to the political struggle, whose goals, in all cases, are factional and class goals and concern intellectual currents which break the society down not on a religious basis but on secular bases. As to the people who oppose the establishment of an Islamic party, they, by presenting the issue as one related to the subject of the relationship of religion to politics, deny religious figures the right to intervene in political affairs, and that is the essence of error because religious figures and scholars of religion in Islamic society have a role to play without of necessity being a religious political party but rather as part of other groups and organizations which complement the constitutional ones. These groups and organizations have existed in Tunisia since independence and play their religious role without ever thinking of entering the political struggle as a political movement.

Fraudulently Claiming Popularity

Since the issue is not related, basically, to the subject of the relationship between religion and politics but to the use of the Islamic religion for political goals, to be precise, these people who raise the slogan of forming an Islamic political party, regardless of whether this party is on the side of the opposition or the government, enter the political struggle against their political adversaries while bearing the banner of religion as one of their weapons in this struggle, and this means that they are acting fraudulently to present an illusory popularity of theirs in the ranks of the people, since the Tunisian people in general are Moslems and they are fighting their adversaries with a weapon common to all, because no party or political movement in Tunisia, including the Communist Party, does not embrace Islam as religion of the state. Everyone considers that the Islamic religion is the sole official religion in Tunisia. Consequently, in Tunisia there is no cause by the name of religion and there are no threats to the Islamic religion. Likewise, the whole issue is purely a political one and it has no connection with Islam or the application of Islamic law. Consequently, it is necessary to discuss this issue and answer the question on a political basis, not a religious one, because the issue is a political one related to a purely political struggle and because the "group" wants to form an Islamic political party not with the objective of religious reform but with the objective of attaining political power, which means that they are using religion in a struggle which has no connection to religion but whose goal is the assumption of power. Consequently, as long as the issue remains thus, a wholly political one, why should there be an Islamic political party? Is it just to exercise a legitimate right to form parties? Here one must return to notions which are commonly raised in a haphazard manner, without careful definition, nowadays in Tunisian political circles. What do a political party, opposition, the regime, the ruling party and the Islamic party mean? The
party is the political and organizational expression of the interests, ambitions and goals of a class or group of social classes which organize themselves within a political party in order to realize these short-term or long-term goals, which will permit them, when they become a political majority, to represent the whole society and, when they become a political minority, to work to obtain concessions which through accretion they will turn into a majority. What interests will this Islamic party represent? Its proponents say that it will represent the Islamic interests of the people in general. That statement of necessity means that they are consciously or unconsciously confusing the task of the political party and the task of groups to enjoin what is good and forbid what is evil. Then they say, "But Islam is not a religion for the afterlife only, it combines the terrestrial world and the hereafter and consequently people's daily life and their spiritual life." Therefore the appeals for religious reform in Islam bring these two parties together yet nonetheless they are not transformed and cannot be transformed from religious appeals to an Islamic political party, because the political party is, by definition, one that chooses, that is, it chooses socially, politically and intellectually among groups, classes, people, goals, aspirations and so forth, while the proponents of the religious appeal can choose only between Moslems and non-Moslems. Without a doubt, there is no justification for this kind of choice between who is a Moslem and who is not a Moslem in Tunisian society, as long as the people are all Moslems. However, if there are criteria and limits which the proponents of the Islamic Tendency set forth to distinguish between Moslems and non-Moslems among the members of the Moslem people, that simply means that they are laying the foundations for a factional war within an Islamic nation, that is, for the division of Moslems into factions and sects and the sowing of dissension in the ranks of the Moslems by levelling the charge at people who are Moslems and are opposed to the political platform of the Islamic Tendency that they are non-Moslems and infidels. That is against Islam from the religious angle and opposed to the interests of the people and the nation from the political angle. However, if the Islamic Tendency imagines that the Tunisian people are not in the majority a Moslem people and that the members of this Islamic Tendency or Islamic party alone are Moslems, that means that they are accusing their people of apostasy and are giving themselves a right to which they are not entitled, which is to monopolize Islam, religious devotion and affiliation with Islam.

Fanaticism and Discrimination

As a result of the insistence by the proponents of this Islamic Party on assigning an Islamic designation to themselves alone and accusing the rest of the people, who are Moslems, of apostasy or alienation from Islam, they find themselves at the peak of religious fanaticism, since they have created a special group of their own for themselves by which to discriminate against the rest of the people: without such a group they would become absorbed within the people as a whole and consequently, to justify their political presence, they must feel the need for fanaticism with the objective of imposing limits and boundaries between themselves and people who differ with them and differ politically with them, that is, the rest of the people. As long as this difference and dispute remains in essence political, not religious, the use of religion for political purposes throws them directly into
the arms of religious fanaticism. For this reason they are compelled to draw up distinctive limits and borders for themselves which often are contrived and pro forma and they try to give them more prominence than is possible — clothes, beards and veils, for instance — in the guise of pursuing the sayings and doings of the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace. However, in reality, they have the goal, in all this, of being distinct from others in external appearance because such an appearance cannot constitute a barrier to the commission of acts of insubordination, and as a result of that they in reality are turned into a faction or religious sect or people of a Sufic order, but in no case can one classify them as a political party, unless they want to establish a party similar to the party of Mussolini's Black Shirts or the special police groups which Hitler formed within the Nazi party, which are organizations that relied on distinctions in external appearances and one cannot say were so much political organizations as fascist bands. Will the adherents of Islam agree to become fascist bands? Will the Tunisian people agree to have a fascist group living in their ranks, whether they bear the banner of religion or any other banner? They, that is, the members of the Islamic Tendency, combine fanaticism in all its manifestations, including fanaticism over appearances and the rejection of democratic modes of dialogue, with exploitation of the faith that is common to the people in general, for their own factional and group objectives. True Moslems refuse to be fascists, zealots and fanatics. Therefore, there are numerous Islamic tendencies today, and the Islamic Tendency is not united in ranks as a result of this fanaticism and fascism. While this phenomenon has increased the fanaticism of the fanatics, because they possess not intellectual arguments but rather the arguments of zealotry, violence, distinction in appearance and introversion, it has made the people who view the role of religion in society in a different manner abandon the condition and platform of fanaticism, which means that when the Islamic Tendency asks for the formation of a political party, and works toward that, it is in reality working for the advent to prominence of a fanatic faction and not an Islamic political party, and the goal of this faction is not to spread the Islamic religion but to make a distinction within the society and consequently spread divisiveness and dissension in the ranks of the Moslems, which is against religion, essentially. On the other hand, one has the right to pose the following question: who gave the leaders of the Islamic Tendency or the religious movements which deal with politics in the name of religion the right to describe one person as a Moslem and another as an apostate who must be fought? The Islamic religion does not believe that there is mediation between the creator and the created, because that means an imitation of the Christian church in the dark European middle ages when the church repudiated a given power and brought it down and endorsed another and enhanced its status. Finally, an Islamic political party will of necessity mean that everyone who is not a member of this party is not a Moslem, and therefore it will legitimize holy war against him, because it is the duty of the Moslem to fight for the sake of spreading Islam. This means that the members of this Islamic political party will declare holy war against the majority of the Tunisian people — unless the leadership of this party imagines that the Tunisian people in general will be members of this party, which is in no way possible, since a whole people cannot become a member of a single party. For this reason, they are advocates of dissension among Moslems and proponents of fanaticism and factionalism, and that is the essence of fascism and the
essence of opposition to the Islamic religion, which condemns the spread of
dissension among Moslems. For this same reason, they also are opposed to
democracy and freedom, because they raise the slogan of "holy war" against
everyone who is not a member of their party, because membership in such an
Islamic political party will be a warrant of absolution and proof of adher-
ence to Islam. Consequently, the members of the other parties are the "apos-
tates" against whom holy war is necessary, whether these other parties are
in the opposition or in the government. The best evidence of this holy war
against others is what is going on in the university and the educational
institutions, where the religious movements engage in violence against the
other political movements for only one reason, which is that these religious
tendencies consider that every student who is not a member of their organi-
zations is not a Moslem but an "outsider," his presence in any other organi-
zation is forbidden and therefore holy war against him is permissible. This
position negates Islam and its teachings in whole and in part and it negates
the most minor principles of democracy, freedom and human rights. This men-
tality, specifically, is what has led Iran to the condition it is in now and
could lead Tunisia to it, if these people (may God not permit it) govern it
— to that of becoming an arena for the execution and imprisonment of people
who do not enlist in this Islamic political party.

Negation of the Nation

However, this Islamic Tendency as an organization, as leadership and as a
movement is not just fanatic, factional, opposed to democracy, fascist and
opposed to the teaching of Islam — rather, it is characterized by another
quality which is no less grave than all these. This quality is apparent in
this Islamic Tendency's answer to the following question: If Tunisia was in
an open war under the current regime against a country like Iran, where
would these people stand on the struggle? The frank, clear answer is as
Mourou wrote in the magazine AL-MUJTAMA', as some leaders of the Islamic
Tendency stated it to me and also as Ghannouchi stressed it in his writings:
this answer is to stand alongside Iran as an Islamic country opposed to
Tunisia as a non-Islamic country, because these people consider affiliation
with the Islamic nation to be above affiliation with the nation and nationa-
ly. They view unity with Afghanistan, if Islam rules it, as a duty before
unity with any Arab country. This platform of thinking is a clear, frank
negation of the nation. Indeed, this belief causes its proponents to have no
connection with nationalism at all. When they are jubilant over Iran's occu-
pation of Arab territories, and Tunisia is an Arab country, whether these
territories are in Kuwait, Iraq or any other Arab country, they are selling
the nation and nationalism to foreigners under the cloak of Islam, while
they differ with Islamic law, as we mentioned above. Consequently, they are
not nationalists and not democrats, and are nothing more than a fanatic,
factional gang which is spreading factionalism among Moslems. In spite of
all that, it is necessary to pose the following question: Are they sincere
in their political opposition to the ruling party in Tunisia? What is meant
by sincerity here is not whether or not they are serious as members of the
opposition but their capacity as members of the opposition or opponents of
the republican system. In their speeches and writings, they do not address
themselves to talking to the government but have the survival of the regime
as their target, exploiting the confusion that exists in Tunisia between the
regime, the government and the ruling party. The Islamic Tendency, by its nature and its political positions and on the basis of the qualities we have mentioned above, does not have the goal of opposing the existing government because it is represented by the Destourian Socialist Party. Consequently, they do not exercise opposition within the organizations, that is, by explicitly recognizing the country's constitution and the republican system. They exercise their political activity in order to change the country's constitution, which they describe as non-Islamic, and the laws of the country, which in their view are not Islamic. In brief, they do not seek change of government through elections and the acquisition of a parliamentary majority but aim at a complete change of the social, political, economic and legislative system.

They have not once declared that they are republicans and do not want to oppose the country's constitution and eliminate the laws. Rather, they talk about changing the regime. Of course, what is meant is not the Bourguibist regime (because the expression Bourguibist regime does not mean a constitutional condition); rather, what is meant is the republican regime. What regime do they want to build after the overthrow of the existing regime: Is it a republican regime? A monarchical regime? A regime of the guardianship of the religious jurist, in the manner of Iran? No one knows, but since the leaders of the Islamic Tendency oppose the constitution of the country, which, in its first section, stipulates that Tunisia is a republic whose religion is Islam, and oppose the institutions and laws of the state, they, apparently, do not want a republican regime and do not want a monarchical regime either. Their firm ties with Iran affirm that they are bedazzled by Khomeyni's Islamic republic with all the blood and chaos it entails. That is the republican model, that is, the guardianship of the religious jurist, which they are spreading about in Tunisia in the name of "the legitimate right to form an Islamic political party."

Now, since these people constitute a fanatic, factional, fascist band, oppose democracy, work to spread dissension among Moslems, oppose the republican regime and offer the people the Iranian model as the one that is desired, they are not nationalists and do not believe in the legacy and values of the Tunisian people. Do they have the right to form an Islamic political party to realize such goals, which would throw Tunisia back centuries? The laws and constitution of the country without a doubt permit any group of Tunisian citizens to establish a political party in the framework of the laws in effect, but what government, what political movement, what cultural society and what aware citizen would bear the responsibility of defending the possibility of forming an Islamic political party? Who indeed would be content to have such a group work in his country like any other party, while it has the objectives, mentality, ideas and intentions it has? Doesn't the Moslem in Tunisia have the right do declare in a loud voice that he is strictly opposed to the use of Islam, the religion of the people in general, as a pretext for spreading dissension and fanaticism? Isn't it the duty of the government, if it is indeed vigilantly watching the higher interests of the country, not to run after the brilliant slogan in the name of democracy which calls for the formation of an Islamic political party? It would be more worthwhile for these people who are demanding the formation of such a party, if they are indeed concerned over the teachings of Islamic law and
are indeed working for the sake of Islam, to devote themselves full time to religious work to the exclusion of other activity, and to guide people to what is commendable and enjoin them from what is repugnant, and they will find supporters and partisans. However, if they want to get into political struggles, let them leave Islam to the scholars of religion and let them enter the political struggle through its front doors. This confusion and cover will bring strife upon Tunisia, prepare it for a civil war which it can do without and lead it into an era of dissension, dark ages and divisions among Moslems. At that point, any citizen will have the right to ask about the extent of these peoples' enmity to the nation of their birth, Tunisia, and the extent of their interest in the nation to which they are subject, be it Iran or something else. That involves a crime neither God nor his worshippers will forgive.
LATEST CHANGES IN TOP POSITIONS REVIEWED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 25 Apr-1 May 87 p 14

[Article by Rashid Khashanah: "Bourguiba Surprises the Tunisians with New Changes; Dismissal of Conciliation Figures from the Party Administration; The New Director Faces the Difficult Stage"]

[Text] Observers in Tunisia concur that the changes which President Bourguiba (84 years old) has recently decreed affect the apparatus of the ruling Destourian Party more than they affect the government. One should bear in mind that Bourguiba occupies the presidency in conjunction with the chairmanship of the party. The most important of these changes has been the appointment of Abdelaziz Ben Dhia, minister of social affairs, as director of the party apparatus in the place of Hedi Baccouche, who succeeded Ben Dhia in his ministry. Baccouche's dismissal from the administration of the party was something that had been expected for a time, because the information which political circles had been bruiting about had indicated that for weeks. However, they considered it likely that the lawyer Bechir Khantouche, who was appointed member of the political bureau a short time ago, would be the director of the party.

Abdelaziz Ben Dhia is to be considered the third director of the Destourian Party since 1970. Mohamed Sayah (current minister of administrative reform) was in charge of this task from 1970 to 1980. The period of his administration witnessed intensive struggles with members of the opposition and with the federation of unions and marked support for the party apparatus' dominance of political life through the spread of its presence in all sectors and the establishment of cells in factories and economic organizations. This period ended with the declaration of the policy of liberalization at the start of the eighties, led by Mohamed Mzali, the former prime minister, and that was accompanied by the removal of Sayah from administration of the party and his replacement by Monji Kaali, currently Tunisia's ambassador to Prague, who left the government in 1977 in protest against the escalation of the struggle with the unions. This period witnessed the holding of an exceptional party conference in 1981 in which it was decided to recognize the opposition organizations and pave the way for the proliferation of parties. However, the incompetence of the party apparatus in the face of the extensive demonstrations during what came to be known as the "bread incidents" in
1984 prompted the Destourian leadership to consider this a sign of the weakness of the apparatus and its inability to assimilate the changes which had occurred in society, especially in the ranks of the young people, and it was decided to replace Kaali by Hedi Baccouche, who had been ambassador to Algeria. The new director brought the assertion that the party had become stripped of its best personnel and that the old combatants had become alienated from it. He determined upon a policy of conciliation among the Destourian generations, and some people who had been removed from the party in Kaali's term returned to it.

Although the party's policy during the second half of the eighties continued to be founded on respect for the independence of the unions, the commitment to the removal of the Destourian youth organization from the institutes and the tendency to grant of permission to opposition currents in the university to hold an exceptional general youth federation conference, the direction of the wind changed in the period of the crisis with the federation of workers in 1985 and the party apparatus then demanded the restoration of its political power over the unions, the university and the institutes. That occurred at the beginning of the current year with the election of Abdelaziz Bouraoui as secretary general of the federation of unions in succession to Habib Anchour, against whom a sentence of 4 years in prison had been handed down.

What, however, is the fate of Baccouche, following this change, since he lasted only 3 years in the party administration? Observers believe that the change amounts to a demotion as far as he is concerned, in spite of the importance of the role of the department of social services in managing the relationship with the unions. However, the assignment of a ministerial portfolio to him indicates a restoration of confidence in him after his adversities had worked to remove him for good and replace him with Bechir Khatouche. A question exists, which is, will the period of Ben Dhia's administration of the party apparatus be different from all his predecessors, or will it be similar to a specific period in the past?

The obvious thing one can discern from the new director's statement is that he derives his power from his loyalty to president Bourguiba and he does not want to be a supporter of one wing and opponent of another one. That may be the main reason which explains that President Bourguiba chose him to the exclusion of others for this delicate task, since he had not been a party to old party struggles, embarked on central committee membership only in the late seventies and only last year advanced to membership in the political bureau. Observers believe that his aloofness from the struggles that shook the party leadership in the seventies and eighties is what explains that he stayed on in the government while the prime minister was changed twice. He assumed the position of minister of higher education in Hedi Nouira's term from 1979 to 1980 and kept this position until the last days of Mzali's cabinet. Last summer he was appointed minister of social affairs and remained in this position after the appointment of Rachid Sfar as premier.

However, the stage he will face will unquestionably be difficult and its most important features will include the open struggle with the religious current, most of whose personnel have been arrested and will be brought to state security trial next June, the trial of the leadership of the socialist
grouping, a left wing party operating in the open, which has been set at 28 April, and the state of cold relations with the other three recognized parties, which are the Movement of Socialist Democrats, the Communist Party and the Popular Unity Party.

These challenges which the Destourian Party is facing in the current stage explain the latest changes not only in the party apparatus but also in its higher command as well, that is, in the political bureau, which four new members have entered. A high-ranking diplomatic figure told AL-TADAMUN that the economic crisis the country is passing through and the need to provide job opportunities and stimulate exports dictate the creation of a suitable social climate far removed from disturbances and fluctuations, which is what prompted President Bourguiba to appoint the heads of people’s organizations and the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies as members of the party’s political bureau. The new members are Mahmoud Massadi, 76, chairman of parliament, Abdelaziz Bouraoui, 64, secretary general of the Federation of Workers’ Unions, Toufiq Said, 52, chairman of the federation of farmers, and Fatma Douek, 49, chairman of the women’s federation.

The four people who left the political bureau are former foreign minister Beji Kaid Essebsi, former transportation minister Mohamed Karim, the former secretary general of the federation of unions Ismail Lejri, who succeeded Achour before Bouraoui returned to the leadership, and the lawyer Bechir Khantouche. While the removal of Essebsi and Lejri could be explained by their appointment to diplomatic missions which are not compatible with their continued membership in the political bureau, Khantouche and Karim lost their political cards after their removal from the party leadership.

Where will the Destourian boat proceed after these changes?

Observers unanimously agree that coping with the difficult economic circumstances and feeling the threat of the religious currents are two main worries of the senior people in the regime in the current stage, and that makes the slogan "national unity" which the government is raising a feature of all the political changes in this period.

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CGO: 4504/205
OIL INDUSTRY SERVICE SKILLS SAVING FOREIGN EXCHANGE

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 13 Apr 87 pp 40,41

[Article by Fethi Ben Farhat: "Oil Industry: Role of the Operators and Auxiliary Services"]

[Text] When people talk about oil in general, they often mention only the aspects of discovery and production. They forget to mention certain aspects that relate to this wealth, that is: the petroleum services, in other words, the oil industry that takes the oil from its "crude" or natural form to our use of it. Tunisian operators are working to master the various sectors of petroleum services, thereby gaining considerable amounts of foreign exchange for the national economy.

While the first oil drilling was carried out in Tunisia in 1932, oil exploration did not get underway until 1948, with the discovery of the gas deposit of Sidi Abderrahmen. After that, the exploration work intensified, mainly after 1964, following discovery of the El-Borma oil deposit.

Paralleling this latter discovery, a flourishing oil industry emerged: drilling, maintenance of the wells, off-shore resupply, pipeline transport, reprocessing of used oil, etc. As well as auxiliary oil services, for the most part provided by foreign companies.

The oil environment of the beginning of the 1970's prompted the Tunisian Government to think about the management of this national treasure.

In that period, Tunisia made discoveries at very frequent intervals, including the deposits of Asthart and Isis in the Gulf of Gabes, and Sidi Litayem in the Sfax area. It was in this context that the Tunisian Petroleum Activities Enterprise (ETAP) was established on 10 March 1972, by Law No 72-22.

According to the company's establishment law, ETAP's responsibility is all the activities relating to oil products from studies to involvement in oil operations.

Currently, this national enterprise has little reason to envy the foreign companies.
Previously, this was in the nature of a dream. Thousands of jobs (direct and indirect) were created with the emergence of a new generation of Tunisians trained on the job in Tunisia, or in specialized training schools abroad, particularly in France and the United States.

On the economic level, the general public was only aware, in regard to this field of oil products, of what it produced in foreign exchange.

While the management of some petroleum industry services by Tunisians has avoided for our country a hemorrhage of foreign exchange, which we can then proudly add to the exports invoice. In a market open to both Tunisian and non-Tunisian companies, these operators have been able to assert themselves with a seriousness and perserverance worthy of technologically advanced companies. Moreover, some of these companies are trying to project themselves beyond Tunisia, in the markets of the countries of the Gulf, in Africa and elsewhere.

Also, the development of these auxiliary petroleum activities has given the national economy a new impetus, and has given the national industry a new branch that supports the oil products field.

The role of these operators is to resupply the offshore production operations by boat, maintain pipeline transportation (transport of the refined products to the La Goulette storage area, and transport of Algerian gas to Italy), and reprocessing of used oil, which involves collecting used engine oil and refining for reuse. In addition, construction by Tunisians of a steel fixed platform at the Ashtart oil deposit was a first in Africa. This platform, used to put deposits into production, required 2 years of work at a shipyard on the Pont de Ghanouche. The construction work involved a number of stages, required by the multispecialty nature of the construction.

Indeed, several specialty groups were involved: structural, piping, electricity, instrumentation and painting. The welding work required hiring no less than 500 workmen, all Tunisians.

Despite the rarity of offshore deposits in our country, the company that initiated the construction of this platform was able to acquire unprecedented experience in the offshore sector. The company trained specialists in several fields such as welding, erecting, electricity, and instrumentation. These examples show the high degree of integration achieved by the oil industry, even though our country is only a small oil producer.

Tunisians today have the expertise and technology necessary to carry out petroleum studies and projects, and are mastering the technical methods needed for exploration, which remains the private preserve of the foreign companies.

If Tunisia one day lacks oil, it will not lack ideas. The post-oil era is being prepared. Oil replacement projects are planned: geothermal energy, the project to produce energy from biomass, and alcohol production using rejected dates and agricultural waste. In the meanwhile, the Tunisian operators are continuing to master the various fields of petroleum services, the auxiliary ones, earning considerable foreign exchange amounts for our national economy.

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CSO: 4519/106
BRIEFS

KLIBI RECEIVES ROMANIA'S OANCEA—TAP, Tunis—Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi received on Monday at the league headquarters Constantin Oancea the Romanian deputy foreign affairs minister. The Romanian official said at the end of the meeting that he had exchanged views with Mr Klibi on the latest developments in the Arab world and stated that Romania continues top remote friendly relations with the Arab states and league [as received] [Text] [Tunis TAP in French 1300 GMT 28 Apr 87 LD]

MILITARY OFFICIALS APPOINTED—Tunis, 16 May TAP—On behalf of President Habib Bourguiba, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, National Defense Minister Slaheddine Baly yesterday appointed Major General Mustapha Bouaziz as attorney general and director of the military judiciary, Bechir Mouaddeb as president of the Permanent Military Tribunal in Tunis; Mahmoud Ben Hamouda, as president of the Permanent Military Tribunal in Sfax; Colonel Mohamed Kazkaz as public attorney to the Tunis Court; Colonel Mohamed Ben 'Abdallah as public attorney to the court in Sfax, and a number of officers judges. [Excerpt] [Tunis TAP in Arabic 1130 GMT 16 May 87 LD]

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CSO: 4500/96
MINISTER OF LABOR AND CIVIL SERVICE DISCUSSES SOCIAL SECURITY

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 22 Apr 87 p 12

[Interview of 'Uthman 'Abd-al-Jabbar, minister of labor and civil service, by Fadiyah al-Zu'bi: "We Have Developed the Social Security Law So That It Includes Yemenis Working in the Gulf Countries"]

[Text] Minister of Labor and Civil Services of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 'Uthman 'Abd-al-Jabbar announced that Yemeni citizens working in the Arab Gulf countries would be able to benefit from the social security law.

He said that the method of counting the years of service of those concerned was still under study and that the amount of the contributions to this security would be determined in accordance with the structure of wages in effect in South Yemen and not according to what expatriates receive abroad.

The minister indicated in an interview with AL-WATAN that the government of PDRY had arranged MANY opportunities for investment in Yemen for both resident and expatriate Yemenis.

The following is the text of the interview:

Decrease in Remittances

[Question] Why have expatriates begun to receive your attention only recently. Why weren't they an object of concern in previous years?

[Answer] We noticed that the amount of the remittances of Yemeni expatriates to South Yemen has dropped recently by 40 percent of what it was 4 years ago. This is a result of the economic recession in foreign countries which has led to the spread of unemployment to a certain extent among the expatriates, in addition to a reduction of their wages. We have also noticed through our contacts with them that Yemeni workers are beginning to feel anxious about their futures. This fact was the most important motive behind hastening to give them this special attention. Despite the fact that the social security law was issued in 1980, the regulations for applying it to expatriates were only determined recently.

Complete Social Insurance

[Question] What are the most important advantages of the social security law for workers?
Several articles distinguish this law from the laws that were in effect before independence. The most important of these articles is that the previous laws terminated the pension of a worker at the time of his death, that is, they guaranteed a retirement pension during his old age only, whereas the new law guarantees a retirement pension for his family also, until the youngest son of the worker reaches the age when he works or finishes his university studies, if he is a student. Likewise, the new law requires business owners to offer group insurance to their employees. This insurance includes health insurance and guarantees that the relatives of a worker will receive 1,000 Yemeni dinars when he dies or 1,500 dinars, if he dies while he is at work. This law also ensures that a retirement pension is paid to a worker who undergoes an injury at work that disables him or if he is afflicted with a disability as a result of his job. In this connection, the law provides that the minimum retirement pension be 50 percent of his salary or the minimum salary in effect in South Yemen. Likewise, the social security law gives the worker the right to work again after his retirement, if he wishes, but in this situation the consent of the minister of labor is required. The worker may combine his retirement pension and the salary of the new job and all the provisions of the law with respect to calculating length of service and the amounts of the social security entitlement which apply to this service.

Thirty-five Years of Service

[Question] How is the retirement pension of the worker calculated?

[Answer] The retirement pension is calculated by dividing the years of service of the years that the worker has worked by 35 and multiplying this by his last salary.

For example, if a worker has contributed to social security for 20 years and the last salary he received was 150 dinars, then the computation would be as follows: 20/35 x 150 = 86 dinars

If the worker has not worked enough years to qualify him to receive a retirement pension and he wants to receive what he is entitled to, he is paid 8 percent of the total amount of salary that he received during the years he worked based on the last salary he received, the "average of the last year." However, if the business owner terminated the services of the worker, the latter receives 12.5 percent of the average salary of the last year.

Qualifying for a Pension

[Question] When does the worker qualify to receive a retirement pension?

[Answer] The worker qualifies for social security payments to workers in one of the following cases of retirement:

1. If the worker seeks to retire after completing 30 years of actual service (for men), and 25 years of actual service (for women), whatever the worker's age.
2. If the worker seeks retirement, after 25 years of actual service if he is at least 50 for a man or, for a woman, after 20 years of actual service if she is at least 46.

3. If the worker seeks retirement after having completed 15 years of actual service if he is at least 60 for a man or, for a woman, after having completed 10 years of actual service, if she is at least 55 years old.

4. If the worker becomes unfit as a result of a job injury that completely disables him, whatever his length of service.

5. If the worker becomes unfit, as determined by the appropriate medical authorities, whatever his length of service.

6. If the worker dies for any reason, whatever his length of service.

Regulations for Expatriates

[Question] What is new in the regulations that you have made for expatriates so that they can benefit from the new law?

[Answer] In our treatment of the Yemeni worker inside Yemen, there are specific cases, such as partial job injuries that do not lead to the complete disability of the worker and for which a series of procedures are carried out and which are announced, along with the determination of the injury and the amount of compensation, at the proper time. It is difficult to apply such rules to workers outside the country. Therefore, matters that are not related to retirement pensions and the rights related to the termination of service will be treated separately in the framework of a special set of regulations that is being prepared to include expatriates in the social security law.

[Question] What is the size of the contribution that Yemeni expatriates must pay to the Social Security Fund?

[Answer] The amount of the contribution to social security is 20 percent of the wage structure in effect in South Yemen and not a percentage of the salaries of the expatriates in the countries of emigration. As you know, wages in our country are very low compared to the wages that expatriates receive abroad. This means that the contribution represents only a small part of the salary of the expatriate worker.

[Question] Will their years of service in PDRY be added to the new years during which they will begin to contribute to social security?

[Answer] Yes. The years of service of Yemeni workers who were working in the country and who have payments previously deposited at the Social Security Agency will be added to their new years of service. This includes workers who worked in other countries before and after independence and who have not received the payments that are due to them.

[Question] And those who were not contributors to social security before they left the country?
Those workers who did not formerly contribute to the Social Security Fund, that is, who were not working in the governmental sectors, institutions or private companies that contributed to the Social Security Fund are considered by law to be new contributors and the years of their service are counted from the time when they began to contribute to social security when they were abroad.

People with Limited Incomes

[Question] Can't the years of service of a Yemeni expatriate worker be counted on the basis of the fact that he contributed to serving his country through his remittances?

[Answer] In principle, years of service are counted from the time he begins to contribute to social security. However, the idea of counting his years of service abroad will be studied later. Nevertheless, the new system that we are discussing will work to send a team to meet with Yemeni workers abroad and, in particular, in the Gulf countries, to talk with them and to work on carrying out everything that will aid the Yemeni worker.

[Question] There is a category of Yemeni expatriates who work in commerce or are self-employed. How can this category take advantage of the social security law?

[Answer] If people with limited incomes who are self-employed and who are not employees of a company, however small, show a desire to participate in social security, we will study their wishes and try to help them. However, as I mentioned, our primary concern is the worker. It does not matter if he is a worker in a factory or somewhere else; what is meant by worker is an employee who receives a wage for work, whatever this work may be. Our interest in the worker's participation in social security is a result of the fact that this participation is necessary to the worker and to the security of his future.

Workers in the North

[Question] Are the years of service of people who work in North Yemen counted?

[Answer] With respect to the Yemenis who came from the North and are now located in South Yemen, their years of service in the North are counted. Likewise, the contributions of Yemeni workers from North Yemen now abroad will be accepted and their years of service in the North will be added, irrespective of their nationality, for the sake of offering the same social security benefits to workers in the two parts of Yemen. Qualification of North Yemenis is not conditional upon their being of South Yemeni origin or having been born there.

[Question] What about the Yemenis who left the country just before and after the events of 13 January. Can they take advantage of the social security law and can their length of service be counted?
The council of ministers issued a decree concerning those who left the country to work abroad either legally or illegally. The decree considered those Yemeni expatriates until 31 December 1985 and every specialized agency in the country and our embassies abroad were required to treat them on this basis.

And those who left during the events of 13 January?

A general pardon law was issued by which everyone who had left the country had the right to return to the homeland. The state guarantees a person's return to his job and to his home, the return of his property and compensation for the property he lost. For example, if a citizen returned and found his house occupied, the new resident must leave so the person returning can live there. If his possessions have been stolen, the government will compensate him for the value of the stolen goods. A number of those who fled have returned to Yemen and they are working at their jobs as before.

Opportunities for Investment

What are the opportunities for investment in which the expatriate can participate?

We have a law that was issued specifically to encourage investment in South Yemen. This law was issued in 1979 and some expatriates have taken advantage of it in a limited way. The most important articles of this law are the permission to establish projects that are based on the country's 5-year plan of the projects it. Permission for these projects is conditional upon obtaining confirmation from the Supreme Committee for the Encouragement of Investment. This committee gives priority to and is interested in industrial projects.

There are currently two projects open for the participation of expatriates. They are a cement project that has a capacity of 350,000 tons annually and a project for the production of soap and industrial cleaners. The Social Security Agency has bought 51 percent of the shares of this project and expatriates have the right to buy the rest of the shares. The ministries have directed that studies of productive projects be carried out, that their economic feasibility be ascertained, and that these studies and proposals be presented to the Supreme Committee for the Encouragement of Investment so that it may study the possibility of letting expatriates participate in them.

In addition, a general administration for expatriates that takes care of the interests of expatriates and acquaints government agencies with their concerns and the difficulties that they face has been created for the sake of taking care of any difficulty that these expatriates face.

A large number of expatriates are currently participating in some indigenous social projects, such as water projects and projects related to health and social services in rural areas.
U.S. SENATOR REPORTEDLY ASKS MEDIATION IN AFGHAN WAR

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 15 Apr 87 pp 1, 9

[Text] NEW DELHI, April 14.—A senior U.S. Senator, Mr. Gordon Humphrey, who stopped here for a few hours today on his way from Kabul to Islamabad, has suggested to the Indian Government that it mediate with the Soviet Union to stop its air attacks on Pakistan. There would then be no need to sell early warning systems to Pakistan, the Senator said.

The Republican Senator, who is chairman of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan and a member of the Armed Services Committee, was in the capital in the course of a tour of countries in the periphery of Afghanistan. His previous stopovers were Moscow and Kabul. Mr. Humphrey told reporters shortly before leaving for Islamabad that he intended to go to Beijing before returning home.

Mr. Humphrey met the Foreign Secretary, Mr. K. P. S. Menon, and the scientific adviser in the Ministry of Science and Technology, Mr. K. Arunachalam. The Senator told the Foreign Secretary that there was a “strategic vicious circle involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union”. While Congressmen were sympathetic to Pakistan's request for weapons to fight aerial attacks from Afghanistan they were also concerned over the tension growing between India and Pakistan.

Mr. Humphrey said that several Congressmen including himself, wanted to strengthen the hands of the Mujahideen. There was evidence to suggest that aerial attacks from Afghanistan had troubled since last year and the general feeling in the Congress was that Pakistan should be helped to face such attacks. It is in this context that Mr. Humphrey said he had told the Indian Foreign Secretary that because of its special relationship with the Soviet Union, India could persuade that country to cease aerial attacks on Pakistan which would obviate the need to sell AWACS to Pakistan.

In Moscow, Mr. Humphrey said, he had met senior officials of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. They had made “incredible statements” about the number of Afghan refugees returning from Pakistan, guerrilla leaders coming over to Kabul, and expressed “an amazing confidence” in the process of reconciliation. He dismissed these postures as attempts at self-delusion and meant for propaganda.

He had told the Soviet officials that there was no point in the Geneva talks without the presence there of the real representatives of the Afghan people, the Mujahideen; a suggestion rejected out of hand by the Soviets.

In Kabul he did not meet any officials since he considered the regime there illegitimate. But the Senator saw at the airport in Kabul Soviet aircraft fitted with flares to avoid the attention of Stinger missiles. That, he told a questioner, was an indication of how effective the Stinger had been.
NEWSMEN BRIEVED ON CPI NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 12 Apr 87 p 1

[Text] The CPI will not accept the replacement of the Congress Government at the Centre by another "bourgeois" government since such a government was bound to follow the "same disastrous policies".

Briefing newsmen in New Delhi on Saturday on the party's two day National Council meeting, CPI general secretary C Rajeswar Rao said that though an alternative to the Congress rule was necessary, it could not come from political forces who were wedded to the capitalist path of development.

Mr Rao's rejection of a "bourgeois" alternative to the Congress assumes significance in light of the CPI-M's call for a "democratic, secular alternative" to the ruling party. While the Marxist appear to have a coalition of non-BJP parties in mind as a coalition, such an arrangement is not acceptable to the CPI.

When Mr Rao's attention was drawn to the recent statements of West Bengal Chief Minister and CPI-M politician Jyoti Basu, he said that he still did not have a clear idea as to what Mr Basu meant. Since the West Bengal Assembly election, the leaders of the two parties have not yet met and discussed this issue.

Mr Rao said that talk of a political alternative to Rajiv Gandhi has begun since his popularity has taken a beating in recent months, specially in the light of his electoral debacles. He, however, dismissed the suggestion of an alternative political force with Karnataka Chief Minister Ramakrishna Hegde as its leader as of "no consequence".

As far as the CPI was concerned, the only alternative it saw to the Rajiv Government was one formed by Left and secular forces. Anti-imperialist orientation and foreign policy would be crucial to such a government. He added that Mr Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy was "right".

The victories of the Left and democratic front in Kerala and Left Front in West Bengal could be utilised as a "focal point" for building up a left and democratic unity for which a special responsibility devolved on the CPI and the CPI-M.

However, it was regrettable that the CPI-M had joined hands with the Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh during elections for Zila Parishad and Mandal panchayats despite a serious effort made by the CPI in this regard to bring about a leftward shift. He stressed the rift between the two Communist parties in Andhra Pradesh to be healed.

Mr Rao described "most undemocratic act" the attempt by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to block debate in Parliament over the controversy involving him with President Zail Singh and also on the Fairfax issue.

He said the party's apex forum had criticised "the style of functioning of the Prime Minister" and maintained while the "forces of destabilisations were raising there heads, the unsavoury controversy between the Prime Minister and the President was highly deplorable".

Mr Rao strongly denied that the CPI was under pressure from the Soviet Union to come to the aid of Mr Gandhi and the Congress government inside and outside Parliament during the burgeoning political crisis. The report to this effect published in some papers was not true; he maintained.
SINGH RESIGNS FROM GOVERNMENT, PANT GETS DEFENSE

Details of Resignation

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 13 Apr 87 pp 1, 9

[Text]

NEW DELHI, April 12—Mr Vishwanath Pratap Singh has resigned from the Government in the aftermath of the controversies that had rocked the ruling party recently. The inquiry that he as Defence Minister had ordered last week into a multi-crore defence deal, and the Fairfax affair, of which he had been one of the key figures when Finance Minister, had made him the target of severe criticism within the Congress(I).

Announcing his resignation here today, he said that he would not hold any office in Government in future to prove that he had not been over-ambitious. Nor would he exercise his right to make a statement in Parliament. Mr K. C. Pant, who was tonight appointed Defence Minister in place of Mr Singh, will now be the leader of the House, reconvening tomorrow. Stressing that his loyalty to the Prime Minister remains unchanged, he felt that his resignation would silence his detractors in the party.

The Ministry of Steel and Mines, which Mr K. C. Pant will head now, will be looked after by the Minister for Energy, Mr Vasant Salve. This is reportedly a temporary arrangement.

The Prime Minister had received a letter from Mr V. P. Singh late last night, expressing his intention to resign. They met for about 30 minutes this morning and then Mr Singh sent a formal letter of resignation. After consulting senior members of his Cabinet and party leaders, the Prime Minister forwarded the resignation letter to the President for acceptance.

According to UNI, the Prime Minister today apprised his Cabinet colleagues of the development leading to the resignation of Mr V. P. Singh. The Cabinet meeting lasted an hour.

The Cabinet met only to discuss the crisis within the party and the Government arising out of the Fairfax affair and Mr Singh’s ordering a probe into the defence deal.

(The meeting is understood to have considered the steps required to save the Government and the party from further embarrassment.)

In a brief statement issued today, the former Defence Minister said: “Yesterday night, in a letter to the Prime Minister, I had tendered my resignation. It has been accepted by the Prime Minister today.

“The original letter, being a personal one, I do not want to disclose its contents, nor will I exercise my option of a statement on the floor of the House.

“To nail the lie of those who
I shall not hold any office in Government in future. To be a member of the Congress(I) family and to work for its leader is honour enough.

The past few weeks have found Mr V. P. Singh in the centre of a political controversy that arose out of his decision, when he was the Finance Minister, to utilize the services of an American private detective agency to probe certain economic offences.

While one aspect of that investigation concerned some activity of a Gujarat-based textile firm, it was also said to be part of a move to uncover assets held in foreign banks by Indian nationals.

The Opposition parties had demanded a parliamentary probe into the affair and a section of the Congress(I), of which Mr. Dinesh Singh was the most vocal, had been critical of the decision to engage an American agency. The security of the nation had been risked, was one of the argument. Mr V. P. Singh had rejected the charge of security being compromised.

INQUIRY

A commission of inquiry comprising two sitting justices of the Supreme Court was appointed by the Government, which seemed to have assuaged some feelings—though several Opposition leaders have insisted that the matter was side-tracked. The real issue was not the hiring of the U.S. detective agency, but the money held by Indians in foreign banks, they said.

Even before the dust had begun to settle on that matter, Mr V. P. Singh found himself creating another stir when last week he ordered an inquiry, within the Defence Ministry, into a deal in which an agent of a foreign company is said to have made Rs 30 crores by way of a 7.5% commission. A second inquiry, to be conducted by the Defence Secretary, was ordered into the working of agents of suppliers of defence stores, and to find ways of keeping them at bay. Since 1953 the Government has decided to avoid using agents in defence matters.

Strong exception was taken to those inquiries being made public through the Press and without consultations at the Cabinet and party level. When Mr V. P. Singh volunteered a statement in the Lok Sabha on the matter, among those who were upset was the Home Minister.

There has been no official confirmation about the specific deal into which Mr V. P. Singh had ordered inquiry, nor was there any official explanation on the telex message received from an Indian diplomatic mission abroad about the Rs 30-crore commission which the agent has received.

SUBMARINES

There has been much speculation over the particular deal. The one being mentioned most frequently is the order of four SSX submarines (submarine search and kill) from HDW of West Germany. The selection of that particular submarine had aroused some controversy. It was maintained in some circles that the Swedish submarine offered at the time for about the same cost, had better capabilities.

Last week there was a news agency report from Germany that India was likely to buy another two submarines of the same class from HDW—on which there was no official denial or confirmation.

The decision to order an inquiry—not the deal itself—was interpreted by Mr V. P. Singh's critics as an act of defiance of the party leadership aimed at embarrassing the Prime Minister. Mr Singh has, however, repeatedly maintained that his loyalty to the Prime Minister is absolute.

Several members of the Congress(I) had met the Prime Minister in the past few days and demanded that he dismiss the Defence Minister. This pressure must have mounted steadily, even when the Prime Minister was away from Delhi for the better part of Saturday.

Yesterday morning the Prime Minister had been non-committal on the defence investigation issue during a brief talk with the Press. He did not have the details of the deal in question, and he suggested that the reporters ask the Defence Minister about it. Mr Gandhi had said it "is a matter between us", when asked if he had been consulted about the inquiry.
Q: Why did you resign suddenly?
V.P. Singh: Last night in a personal letter I tendered my resignation to the Prime Minister. I had taken the letter myself but as the PM had gone for a dinner from which he came late I could not deliver it personally. So I left the letter at his house. About 12 in the night a message came that I should come over to the PM’s house; round about 11 O’clock in the day and then it was shifted to 12. I met PM for half-an-hour. It was a heart-to-heart talk with some very touching moments. I am grateful to PM that he has accepted my resignation. As the contents of my letter yesterday were personal, I will not disclose them. So today I wrote a formal letter of resignation of two sentences. I gave it today.

Then, I have also decided that I will not exercise my option of making a statement on the floor of the House. Of late there has been a rumour campaign that I am overambitious. To nail this lie, I hereby declare that I will not hold office in government in future. Being a member of the Congress family and working for its leader is honour enough. I am a member of Parliament and will do my work as an MP and then do my work as a member of the party. Office alone was not the issue. I was thinking of it, rolling it over (about the resignation) since day before yesterday.

Q: What qualitative change took place ever since you shifted to defence from the finance ministry, after which you said you had never thought of resigning, and in the past two or three days? A: Because at that time people were projecting in the sense that I will create a crisis in the party (by resigning) and all sorts of wild stories about a party split, and the President would do something. So all sorts of stories were being floated. To kill those stories I made it clear that if you are thinking on those lines, I am not resigning on those lines. But this (today’s action) is a watershed in my life. It is not an ordinary resignation. It is changing the course of my life because only such action could meet the allegations being made by some people within the party.

Q: Now that you have resigned, will the hostile elements in the party cool down?
A: No. But I met their argument in public with my resignation. Now the people are to judge. Am I overambitious? It is for the people to decide. Only such an action could blow up the argument.

Q: As Mr Dinesh Singh had asked, what has loyalty to do with the issues involved?
A: I have given a word to my leader that I will not be making a press statement in this (Mr Dinesh Singh’s) regard. I will abide by it.

Q: What was the PM’s response during your talk today?
A: It is between us. More so, not as a PM and a minister or ex-minister. It was between Rajiv and Vishwanath and he said so. It was so nice and sweet of him. There could not be any more sincere gesture on his part. That is a relationship which I value much more than anything else. And being associated with Mrs Indira Gandhi and the family, at a personal level, it could not be a more heart-to-heart talk.

Q: For half-an-hour?
A: Yes. But nobody was looking at the watch.

Q: Were those criticising you from within the party acting on their own or were they being prompted by somebody?
A: I know only what has been appearing in the press. Nobody has told me anything. But I think anybody speaking would do so on his own volition and not because of anybody.

Q: But you are also an elected representative of the people. Do you not feel responsible to the nation to explain a little bit?
A: I do. The nation comes above everything. And within the nation are the government, and the
party and our individual existence. That is why I have said that my obligations are to the people to whatever small area it may belong. We will continue through public work and public life.

Q: You have sacrificed your career, but that does not explain exactly or clear the air of misunderstanding.
A: But so far as my obligation to the country is concerned, what service I can do by public life will continue. In that sense, the convictions I have I will continue to pursue.

Q: There is a view that instead of a departmental committee the defence deal matter should have been inquired into by a commission.
A: I am not in favour of a commission because while we may inquire, and we should, a commission of inquiry in defence supplies can hurt many other sensitivities and not only the commercial relationship of an agent with the supplier. For instance, what is the nature of the technologies we are acquiring, what is the equipment we are acquiring. That will be open to our adversaries. So, an open inquiry will damage a much bigger course than this (departmental committee).

I do not agree with those in the party who say that any inquiry about an agent will be an embarrassment to the party or the government. I do not subscribe to this view. I am very clear that the more action we take against such people, the more our credibility will go up. There is an honest difference of opinion on this.

Q: Why did you resign then? What was the compulsion?
A: Precisely because some people were saying that this person (V.P. Singh) has started scheming and is becoming overambitious. I have no problems with the Prime Minister. But I have a relationship with the members of my own party also. Some people had started making such allegations. PM has fully supported me, given his confidence and trust. But at the same time I have also to address myself to members of the party. If they raise issues, I have given the final test I can give. To them any amount of argument would not have stopped this (kind of) talk. Now taking a radical change in my life, I can hold my ground before the people's court. So far as the leader is concerned, I have no problem to this moment, to this day. He has expressed, given his trust. This resignation is not addressed to any leader. A challenge was put to my loyalty and I have proved it. I wanted to give a final and the last proof.

Q: Did you decide on the inquiry as soon as you got the telex (about an Indian agent's involvement) or had the telex been received earlier?
A: As soon as we got the telex, we ordered it. Now I should not be talking about it. I am no longer a minister. I should not preempt, or abuse any information that I may have. I have taken an oath of secrecy, I cannot disclose. Today I am on the theme of my resignation. When the occasion will come, everything will become crystal clear.

Q: It is also said that since you were instrumental in getting a number of dishonest people arrested when you were finance minister, you were shifted to the defence ministry, under their pressure.
A: I do not think so. The PM in his placing of his ministers is not subject to these pressures.

Q: The Opposition has said your exit means there is no place for an honest man in the government. How would you react to it?
A: They are totally mistaken.

Q: What was the hurry to shift you before the Budget?
A: He needed me in defence.

Q: You seem to have always played the politics of emotion. Earlier, you did so in Uttar Pradesh. This is the second time. Do you think it would not have served the cause of the country better had you remained in the government?
A: One thing, I feel emotions also have a value. I do not believe that emotions do not have a value. And if there were no emotions, we would be inhuman. In any judgment it is thinking and emotions and I am not apologetic about it. Why should one be apologetic? Is a human being made of stone? The point is that emotions has a positive value in life. You would not do a thing if
you did not have emotions. The soldier who lays down his life at the border does not do it by mathematical calculations. Emotion has a positive value even in major political changes. If you see the independence movement. And on being in government, I have no airs. One individual does not matter in the maladministration of a country, my being there or not being there is not going to make a change. Please make a note of that. I have no illusions about myself. Our country is rich in talent.

Q: When you talk of emotions, don't you think you were shifted from finance to defence because Mr Gandhi had this confidence in you. By this resignation, have you not betrayed his confidence?
A: How?
Q: He obviously wanted you in defence because of his trust. He wanted you to help.
A: Cannot I help now? Do you think only ministers can do some things. Outside the government there is also need to work. There are lakhs of Congress workers, those who march with the party flag. Don't underestimate their contribution. If I mingle with those workers, I am contributing to the country as much. There is no dearth of work, if you want to work.

Q: Your concept of politics appears to be quite different.
A: Emotions for me mean that you want to do certain things. It is this that I call emotion. Not the sentimentalism, like that of children. The whole crux of human behaviour is that almost everybody knows what is good. But having known it, to do it needs an emotional link.

Q: Did you have no motivation left for working in the government?
A: Motivation is of work. That has not lessened. It is not of work in any specific area. An MP has no small role to play.

Q: Your decision not to accept any official position now, does it include the party positions also?
A: I have not mentioned anything about the party.

Singh 'Highly Irresponsible'

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 12 Apr 87 p 1

[Editorial by R.K. Mishra: "Highly Irresponsible"]

[Text]

Mr Vishwanath Pratap Singh has, over the years, carved for himself the image of a noble, simple, person. The worst that could be said about him is that he tends to be impulsive. A strong streak of populist gimmickry was discernible in his personal style when V P Singh resigned the Chief Ministership of Uttar Pradesh ostensibly because he failed to eliminate dacoity by the declared date. The propensity to play to the gallery appeared to have been a major factor in shaping several of his actions as Union Finance Minister. Some of these actions were undoubtedly vindictive. In some cases, he was patently partisan. Victims of his actions were naturally disturbed and often angry. But people, by and large, regarded these actions as yet another example of idiosyncrasies of men and women in authority. Often his off-the-cuff announcements and steps caused worry; sometimes anxiety because of the adverse impact they were having on the economy. That a Finance Minister responsible for the highest ever deficit was not criticised for mismanagement of the economy and, instead, rewarded with the stewardship of the Ministry of Defence is a measure of the generosity with which he was treated.

But Defence Minister V P Singh's announcement of an enquiry into an alleged offer of commission to an Indian agent in an arms purchase transaction has come as a shock and surprise.

Purchase of hardware for the military is an extremely sensitive matter. Leadership of the armed forces at different levels is involved in such decisions. In almost all cases, more particularly in this case, the negotiations
are carried on between the Governments. Before such decisions, involving heavy financial commitment and national security are taken, information has to be collected from different sources, often confidentially, in order to get the best terms covering costs, supply schedule, training, transfer of technology and suitability of the purchases from the strategic viewpoint. These decisions are taken in the context of the threat perception, and the dependability of the source of supply. Suppliers of military hardware have their own sensitivities and a relationship of trust has to be established before these transactions can be concluded in the best interest of the country. Every step affecting such transactions must be taken with great circumspection in a manner which would not adversely affect the credibility or the country, the Government of the civil and military decision-makers. Not to take these factors into account is an act of grave irresponsibility. In this particular case, Mr Vishwanath Pratap Singh has not shown the responsibility expected of him. The fact that even the Defence Secretary was unaware of the press note that had been put out in this connection is a shocking evidence of the irresponsible impulsiveness so characteristic of Mr Singh.

It is necessary to put the issue in proper perspective. Agents are often employed by manufacturers and suppliers for vending their goods and all purchasers know that this is so within the country and in international commerce. Sales of arms — which involve large amounts — are no exception. The Government of India has decided not to deal with middlemen and is within its rights to do so.

It is in its interest as a buyer to know the element of commission for such middlemen built into the price quoted for a transaction and then negotiate the best price from the supplier. If an Indian embassy was able to obtain information about the commission which the suppliers had built into their quotation for this particular sale and informed the Government about it, the information could be used to secure a better deal. What aspect of the transaction does Mr V P Singh want to inquire? Can he impose his own norms on those from whom the Government wants to buy military hardware? To try to do so is, to say the least, ridiculous. The Government should be concerned if sub-standard equipment is supplied, if the transaction is otherwise dubious; or if any one in the Government has taken money. If these charges have not been made, the relationship between a supplier and his agent hardly offers any ground for enquiry. If there is suspicion of a malafide in such a sensitive area, every single step has to be taken with great circumspection. Mr V P Singh has not shown ordinary prudence expected of a person holding high office. He has acted as an individualist who is unconcerned with the consequences of his actions for the country and the Government in a sensitive area.

By referring to the source of information — telex from Indian embassy — Mr V P Singh has seriously undermined the source of information which our country must have developed with considerable effort. This disclosure would now make it difficult for India's representatives abroad to cultivate such sources. The telex was coded — a fact which made it incumbent upon the Minister not to refer to it.

The information about the element of commission was received in February when Mr Rajiv Gandhi held the portfolio of Defence. By rushing to the press about this matter without a detailed discussion with the Prime Minister, the military authorities, the CCPA and the Cabinet, Mr V P Singh has violated the norms of collective responsibility and administrative propriety.

For Mr Vishwanath Pratap Singh I always had a soft corner. But over the months I have witnessed, with deep regret, how he has allowed himself to be manipulated by coterie which played upon his irresponsible ambition to project an image of an honest Minister engaged in a fight to eliminate corrupt practices. Witlessly or unwittingly, he has allowed this ambition to be exploited by commercial houses to promote their interest at the cost not only of their rivals but also of the nation. They were working from the very outset to use him as a puppet in their designs to divide the Congress party. For the last few weeks, they were desperately wishing that his position in this Government should become untenable so that they may use him in pursuit of their vendetta against the Prime Minister. In this sinister game, these dubious elements had no concern for national interest. Mr V P Singh has fallen in their trap.
The choices before Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi are limited. It must be said with regret that political management during the last several months has been marked with shocking ineptitude. This is not the place to discuss where he has erred and why. Though the crisis into which the country is being pushed makes it necessary to discuss this aspect threadbare. In the present context, we will like to underline that the Prime Minister of India cannot afford to give the impression that he is afraid of taking firm action because of fear — political or personal.

Mr V P Singh has created an impression that this is a country of corrupt people, corrupt businessmen and corrupt politicians. He has chosen to give good conduct certificates to officers whose actions have been referred for enquiry by Supreme Court judges. He has chosen to give an impression that his Cabinet colleague is a liar and head of a foreign detective agency is speaking the truth. And now he has chosen to cast shadow on the integrity of decision-makers in the military field and in a Ministry which was under the charge of the Prime Minister himself. This, to say the least, is highly irresponsible.

/13046
CSO: 4600/1642
NEW DELHI, April 12.—The German submarine has struck again, confirming what armed agents call its ability to cause disasters for leaders and countries who rely on it.

The list of casualties is a long one: Adolf Hitler, who thought the world was his U-boats, lost the war; the Shah of Iran, who ordered the submarines, was deposed; the Argentines, who had bought many, were beaten in the Falklands war; and now, even as it threatened to sink the Government, it has served as the catalyst for Mr. V. P. Singh's resignation.

But what was it about the inquiry ordered into its purchase and the payment of commission that so upset the Prime Minister and his close associates?

A reconstruction of events shows that the submarine was first considered for the Indian Navy in 1980. Represented by a non-resident Indian family, the Hindujas, who have offices in Geneva and London, the Germans first came on the scene while the late Sanjay Gandhi was still calling the shots.

But it was in the second half of 1981 that the Government of India signed the deal with the German manufacturer, HDW. While the proposal had been for the purchase of eight submarines, the Government then placed orders for only four.

Two submarines were to be delivered after sea trials while two more were to be assembled in India. Included in the purchase price were 110 torpedoes, manufactured by another German firm, AEG, and assorted spares. The bill came to Rs. 433 crores and the Hindujas were reportedly paid a commission of Rs. 39 crores, which works out to seven percent.

It is reliably learnt that the assembly of two submarines in India was delayed badly and, in late 1985, the Government decided to purchase two more submarines from Germany.

Negotiations went on all through last year. Representatives of the manufacturer visited India. Local officials, including the Defence Secretary, Mr. S. K. Bhattacharjya, in turn, visited Germany.

In November last year, the German manufacturer found itself embroiled in a seemingly following disclosures of an alleged sale of the submarine's technology to South Africa. It is learnt that a director and an official of the company had to return after the uproar.

It was in February this year that a high-power German team, made up of representatives of the manufacturer and a senior official of the Government, came here. The team had two-pronged objectives: to reassure India about the South African fiasco and, more important, settle the terms for the purchase.

It is learnt that the Germans asked for a price which was almost twice what they had charged in 1981. But persuasion by Government officials got the Germans to agree to a 29% price reduction. They reportedly offered a 16% discount outright and said the balance would be made possible by eliminating the commission due to their agent, the Hindujas.

But after returning to Bonn, the manufacturers informed the Indian Embassy there that the reduction in price would not be possible. And it was this declaration, made last month, that set the events of the past few days rolling.
The submarine, in any case, is causing the Navy a lot of belly-aches because it seems the torpedo is malfunctioning. The problem, it is learnt, is with the batteries. What happens is that the torpedo either detonates before it is supposed to or refuses to leave the tube. Sailors serving on the submarine are terrified about the prospects of such malfunctioning occurring simultaneously.

Several questions arise from this series of events:

1. Did the contract specified in 1981 not commit the Germans to a price for future purchases? Is that how the manufacturer led the Government with a demand for almost twice the original price?

2. Why was it that the Germans, who had agreed to a 20% price reduction as recently as February, change their minds so quickly? And send a formal communication to the Indian Embassy? Had they been assured that the Government of India would accept their terms? If so, by whom?

And, finally, is it that the German could insist on commission for their agent when it is now the established policy of the Government not to recognize middlemen?

With Mr V. P. Singh out of the scene, answers to these questions may never become public.

Defense Minister's Statement

NEW DELHI, April 15.

The Department of Defence has not appointed any agent authorized to act on behalf of any defence contract, the Minister of State for Defence, Mr. Arun Singh told the Lok Sabha today.

In a statement, which was greeted by cheers by the ruling party members Mr. Arun Singh said, "I would also like to assure the House that the most stringent procedures have been laid down to ensure quality and technical parameters of equipment procured by the Department of Defence."

No equipment was purchased without technical certification of acceptability from the concerned service headquarters, he said.

Mr. Arun Singh said the Prime Minister, on assuming office, reiterated the existing instructions that the Defence Department should not deal with any non-governmental agent of a foreign supplier in respect of any commercial negotiations. The Prime Minister also directed that foreign governments and suppliers be told unequivocally about the decision.

"This policy directive has been enforced rigorously by the Department of Defence with satisfactory results."

Following is the full text of Mr. Arun Singh's statement:

With your permission I would like to place before the House information regarding the inquiry ordered by the former Defence Minister into a defence contract in which an Indian agent was said to have had an arrangement for receiving payment of 7 per cent commission from the supplier.

On February 25, 1987, the Government received a secret telegram in cipher from one of our embassies stating that an Indian agent is involved in a defence contract in which the agent has an arrangement for receiving payment of 7 per cent commission from the supplier. The identity of the agent or the amount of money said to have been received by him was not stated.

This information was furnished by a foreign Government. Keeping in view sensitivities pertaining to international relations, I do not propose to divulge any information on the subject matter of the defence contract or the source of supply.

The papers on the subject were put up to the then Defence Minister on March 3, 1987. On March 11, 1987, the then Defence Minister ordered that the matter should be referred to the Directorate of Enforcement for investigation of violations of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and to the Central Board of Direct Taxes for possible violations of the Income Tax Act. He further desired that the Economic Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of Finance should be requested to carry out a systematic study of the modus operandi of all agents, Indian and foreign, so that firm action could be taken against them, as necessary.

On March 25, 1987, a draft letter from the Defence Secretary to the Finance Secretary was put up to the then Defence Minister for approval in pursuance of his order of March 11, 1987. On April 9, 1987, the then Defence Minister approved the draft letter and authorised its issue. He further directed that a committee under the chairmanship of the Defence Secretary should report on the modus operandi of foreign and Indian agents in defence deals and to suggest steps necessary to eliminate them from defence transactions.

The members are aware that the Directorate of Enforcement, the Central Board of Direct Taxes and the Economic Intelligence Bureau conduct inquiries in a confidential manner so that relevant evidence is not destroyed.

Speculations: However, on April 9, 1987, the then Defence Minister directed the issue of a press note stating the substance of information received from an Indian Embassy and further stating that an inquiry into the matter had been ordered. The press note also announced the establishment of a committee under the Defence Secretary.

The concerned file was despatched to the Prime Minister's office for information of the Prime Minister.
on the evening of April 9, 1987. However, before the file could be put up to the Prime Minister on April 10, 1987, the newspapers had already carried the press note, giving rise to speculations. I would like to draw the attention of the members to the following specific points:

9) In regard to the specific case of the defence contract in which an Indian agent was reported to be involved, the inquiry ordered by the then Defence Minister was to be conducted by the Directorate of Enforcement and the Central Board of Direct Taxes of the Ministry of Finance.

10) The Economic Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of Finance were also desired by the then Defence Minister to carry out a systematic study of the modus operandi of the agents, Indian and Foreign.

The Defence Secretary has written to the Finance Secretary in pursuance of these directions as per the draft letter approved by the then Defence Minister.

89) The committee under the defence secretary to study the modus operandi of agents has also been constituted and has begun its work.

I wish to categorically state before the House that the Department of Defence has not appointed any agent authorised to act on its behalf in respect of any defence contract.

I would also like to assure the House that the most stringent procedures have been laid down to ensure quality and technical parameters of equipment procured by the Department of Defence. No equipment is purchased without technical certification of acceptability from the concerned service headquarters.

On assuming office, the Prime Minister reiterated the existing instructions that the Department of Defence should not deal with any non-governmental agent of a foreign supplier in respect of any commercial negotiations. The Prime Minister also directed that foreign Governments and suppliers should be told unequivocally about the decision. This policy directive has been enforced rigorously by the Department of Defence with satisfactory results.—UNI

Analyst's Review

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 15 Apr 87 pp 1, 9

[A STATESMAN INSIGHT Report]

[Text]

Did the former Defence Minister, Mr V. P. Singh, really wake up a six-year-old defence deal to settle scores with the Prime Minister? On the contrary, the announcement of the inquiry appears to have been made only to ward off high-level pressure to buy two more submarines from West Germany at grossly inflated prices and with a controversial clause, to pay commission to a non-resident Indian agent. In fact, the shoddy manner in which the first agreement was signed in 1981 is real- lized only now after the first German submarine reached India in February 1987.

The Patriot carried a Press Trust of India report from London which quoted reliable sources to say that the negotiations were at an advanced stage. This report, however, said that the submarines were estimated to cost Rs 220 crores ($200 million).

The report in the Hindustan Times spoke of the fact that the Indian Navy had bought four Type-1500 submarines from the company in 1981 for $375 million. The PTI report said that the negotiations were on for purchase of two more Type 1500 submarines but claimed that the "new" series would have the capability of staying under water for 50 days and that the endurance of the craft, had also been increased.

Details of the manner in which one deal was signed in 1981 and how another was sought to be signed early this year are now available and show a curious series of developments.

The purchase of submarines for the Navy was first considered in
1980, soon after the Congress I returned to power, five countries—West Germany, Sweden, France, the United Kingdom and Italy—were in the running. Initially, Defense Ministry short-listed the Germans and the Swedes for consideration.

The Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs had met on June 30, 1980, a week after the death of Rajiv Gandhi, and decided that the Germans be chosen. But the contract was signed only on December 11, 1981, nearly 19 months later. The matter was delayed, INSIGHT learns, because of lengthy price negotiations and because the then Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral R. L. Periera, was reportedly not in favour of the German submarine.

There were significant differences between the two offers. The Swedish company, Kockums, which is Government owned, offered a submarine fitted with a Sterling engine that was claimed to be good enough to keep the craft under water for long periods continuously.

Also, the Swedish Government, on its part, signed and sent a memorandum of understanding to the Defense Ministry where it guaranteed quality, training and spares.

The Germans, on the other hand, were unwilling to give a memorandum of understanding and only agreed to an exchange of unsignaled minutes—confidential kept by either side—of a meeting where assurances were given. It is learnt that the Swedish offer cost about Rs 40 crores more than the German. The difference arose mainly because of the vast difference in the cost of spares quoted by the two companies.

The Germans had then asked for 25 million DM for spares. But soon after the deal was signed in 1981, they wrote to the Government that, following a reciprocal payment of 50 million DM, the German Government would be willing to reduce the cost of spares to 25 million DM.

Following this massive increase in the cost of spares the Defense Ministry decided that only one of the submarines, which were to be assembled in the Mazagon docks, Bombay, would now be put together and that components for the other would be used as spares. This was reportedly done because the components had originally been purchased for Rs 40 crores but, labelled as spares, they would cost nearly twice as much in 1985.

Thus, in effect, for the cost of four submarines (and spares transfer of technology and training), the Navy got only three. In 1984, the contract with HDW was scaled down to Rs 43.6 crores.

In January 1985, the Defense Ministry tried to contact the Swedish company, Kockums, through the Indian Embassy in Stockholm, but the Swedes were said to be reluctant to come and negotiate afresh for the two extra submarines that were now to be purchased. A message was then sent through the Swedish Ministry of Industry and, in March, 1986, a team from Kockums visited India for discussions with the Defense Secretary, S. K. Bhatnagar.

Kockums officials are reported to have told Mr Bhatnagar that the preparation of a bid was a time-consuming and expensive process and they wanted to be assured that the Government of India was not merely going through the motions in order to compete prices. They were then reportedly told to state what Kockums would charge for preparing and filling a bid. And there the matter ended.

The first German submarine was to have been delivered in January 1988 but was actually handed over to Indian Navy officers at Kiel in October 1986. Following trials and training, the submarine came to Vishakhapatnam in February 1987. The second submarine reached Bombay early this month.

Meanwhile, the first of the submarines to be assembled at Mazagon docks was to have been delivered later this year. But it is now learnt that the delivery may be delayed by as much as five years.

The Navy has reported faults in the torpedoes of the new submarines and fresh firing trials, which were slated to have been held this week, have been put off till the end of the month.

More than any fault, disquieting news from Bonn in December 1986 that HDW may have sold blueprints of the two Indian submarines—Shishumar and Shankush—to South Africa for a sum of £3.5 million has come as a shock.

A news agency report from Bonn on December 21 said that an inquiry into the matter had been ordered by the West German Parliament. Later, a director and another official of HDW were disqualified from service for alleged involvement in the affair.

But the allegations in the German Parliament that HDW had been "directly involved" in selling submarine blueprints, nuclear films and even highly sensitive military secrets were, according to the report, part of a continuing controversy over German arms sales to South Africa.
These details were available with the Defence Ministry when a German team visited New Delhi on February 26, 1967. The high-level team was led by Mr. H. Moller, a senior official of the West German Government, and the negotiations floundered, contrary to reports in two Delhi newspapers in April. The Germans reportedly asked for a price of Rs. 150 crores for each submarine, against the approximate price of Rs. 68 crores they had charged in 1963. Following discussions, they agreed to consider a 20% reduction in price, half this reduction being the commission payable to the agent which would now not be paid.

HDW was given until March 15 to state formally that the reduction would be given. But in the first week of March itself, they informed the Indian Embassy in Bonn that no price reduction was possible.

Meanwhile, HDW's reported denial of kick-backs to anyone in India on Monday, only says that "it paid no commission to any person or firm in India in connection with the submarine contract". The German company has never, however, said anything about commissions abroad since it was known to the Defence Ministry that payment had been made overseas to a family firm of non-resident Indians, the Hinduja.

Following HDW's refusal to give a reduction in price, the Defence Ministry had not initiated any fresh action to either renegotiate with the Germans or seek fresh offers from any other company. It was because of this that the reports in two Delhi newspapers about the strong likelihood of the Germans getting the contract assumed significance.

But how could anyone be categorical enough to say on April 7 that the negotiations were at an advanced stage and the deal nearing completion when the Government of India had not reacted officially to the tales from the Embassy in Bonn a month earlier which said that a price reduction was not possible?

The news reports were extolled Kiel and London respectively, and suggested that the information had been given by either the manufacturers, who are based in Kiel, or the agents, who are based in London.

Had anyone high up in the Government assured the Germans that they were getting the contract? If so, why? And why?
COUNTRY’S COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES WITH U.S. REPORTED

London KEYHAN in Persian 14 May 87 p 8

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] Although the volume of commercial exchanges between Iran and the United States has dropped significantly since the advent of the Islamic republic, in view of the fact that current American law does not prevent this country’s merchants from exporting non-military goods to Iran, commercial activity between the two countries continues.

The American newspaper the NEW YORK TIMES reports that the Islamic republic officially regards America as the last country from which it could buy merchandise. Despite this, in 1986 the Islamic republic bought merchandise and materials valued at 32 million dollars from the United States of America. The goods purchased include small industrial machinery, paper, agricultural goods, and consumer goods. In exchange for importing 32 million dollars in goods from America, last year the Islamic republic exported about 611 million dollars in goods (mostly crude oil) to the United States of America.

In addition to oil, Iran’s exports to America last year include quantities of caviar, carpets, antiques, dried fruits and other similar items.

The market for Iranian pistachios in America, which was very prosperous in the past, has gradually declined of late, and this gourmet nut has lost its customers because of its high price. In April of last year, American pistachio growers, who have recently succeeded in growing large numbers of pistachios in California and other states, put pressure on the American government to protect their crop in order to take over the market and drive out the competition. For this reason last year American commerce officials raised tariffs on pistachios imported from Iran more than 300 percent. The result was that Iranian pistachios, which are much more desirable in terms of quality than those produced in America, are more expensive to consumers, and domestic customers for this product have preferred to buy cheap domestically-produced pistachios.

The NEW YORK TIMES, in part of its article pertaining to Iran’s commercial policies, writes: American producers vigorously protect those who seek a market for their products in Iran. An American commerce department official said: We are constantly asking merchants who still have contacts in the Islamic republic about exporting to that country.

He added: These merchants want to know if they can export dried coconut or European cosmetics, for example, or other similar goods to Iran. The official stated: Trade is one of several links that can still connect America to the Islamic republic.

89
More than 90 Percent of Iran’s Exports Oil-Related

The NEW YORK TIMES writes: Some time ago Hasan ‘Abedi Ja’fari, minister of commerce for the Islamic republic, told reporters at a press conference: The Islamic republic has successfully expanded its commercial ties with Islamic and developing nations. He claimed that the result of this policy has been that the Islamic republic has continually distanced itself from the West with respect to commercial ties, and has drawn nearer to the nations of the Third World.

One correspondent, asking a question that disturbed the minister of commerce of the Islamic republic, stated that Iranian statisticians regard Turkey, which is considered a Western nation, as a developing country.

Continuing the article, the NEW YORK TIMES adds: Iranian commerce officials have followed three important principles in setting their commercial policy: reducing dependence on oil as much as possible, reducing imports from Western countries, and expanding commercial ties with Third World nations. The regime of the Islamic republic has been able to increase the value of its transactions with the third world nations, but 90 percent of the value of this country’s exports is still crude oil, and, contrary to the claims of this nation’s minister of commerce, Western industrial nations are still the Iran’s largest commercial partners.

Western Industrial Nations Iran’s Largest Trading Partners

Based on statistics published by the International monetary fund, in 1985 about 64 percent of goods exported to Iran were products from Western nations.

Eight percent of these exports were products from Eastern bloc countries and around 28 percent were products from developing nations.

The NEW YORK TIMES writes: The export to Iran of electronic devices and computers valued at 90,000 dollars, the news of which was published last month, shows clearly that the Islamic republic no longer observes the principle of “Islamic purchases” where the country’s special needs are concerned, but turns to the Western industrialized nations. The export of computers to Iran is seen as America’s first step towards opening the doors to commerce with that country since the “Irangate” episode.

The export of these computers to Iran also shows that the Islamic republic is prepared to overlook its declared principles on commercial policy, and it will turn to the West in any situation where its foreign exchange can be increased through the sale of oil.

Shaul Bakhash, professor of history at George Mason University in America, believes that the Islamic republic does a lot of sloganeering about trade with Islamic nations, but where the country’s welfare in terms of foreign exchange is concerned, it turns to the West.

In its article, the NEW YORK TIMES adds: When in need, the Islamic republic is even willing to deal with other countries besides those of the West. In order to obtain needed refined petroleum products, Iran has been willing to import fuels from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. More than half of the exports of Dubay, which has taken the Iraqi side in the war, go to Iran.
The Islamic republic, due to limited foreign exchange, has signed barter trade agreements with a number of countries. Malaysia provides Iran with various goods and receives oil in exchange. Sri Lanka gives Iran tea and gets oil. The same kind of agreements have been signed to exchange rice for oil with Thailand and to exchange mutton for oil with New Zealand. Receiving wheat from Argentina in exchange for oil and finally exporting oil in exchange for various imported industrial goods from Turkey are some of Iran's other bartering activities with other countries.

The flourishing black market for foreign goods in the Islamic republic has caused a great many items to be imported into Iran through various means. Figures on these imports are not shown in official reports on Iran's foreign trade.

The rationing of goods in Iran is seen as an important factor in the spread of unauthorized imports and the smuggling of foreign luxury consumer goods into this country. Winston cigarettes are abundant throughout Tehran. Moreover, there is a hot market in Iran for various other goods imported from the Persian Gulf, especially Dubay, as well as opium from Pakistan and Afghanistan. On the other hand, goods such as caviar and carpets are smuggled out of Iran.

9310
CSO: 4640/131
REGIME'S ECONOMIC, POLITICAL POLICIES CRITICIZED

Economic Attitudes

London KEYHAN in Persian 14 May 87 p 6

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] The banking and economic officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have claimed that through a miracle they have been able to preserve the balance of their payments under the present conditions. Undoubtedly, the foundation of this economic miracle has been formed through their lies and false promises to and deception of the people. The special tricks used by the Islamic banks, devised by minds with no ties to their people, include the pre-sale of freedom coins, the registration for Hajj pilgrimages for the next five years, and the collection of money for promised trucks and buses.

The story of the freedom coins is one of such a trick. A year and a half ago, the banks of the Islamic Republic announced that anyone wanting any number of spring of freedom coins may deposit the money for the coins and receive them when his turn comes up.

Many lined up at the banks. Because of their unemployment, many thought that after receiving the coins they could sell them on the open market and live on the profit for a few more days. Some, because they distrusted the savings accounts of the Islamic banks, preferred to change their cash into gold coins. In the meantime, a number of people were only able to buy the coins by selling their necessities or by saving money. More than a year and a half has now passed. It is said that millions of freedom coins have been pre-sold at more than 40,000 rials, but there is still no sign of the promises made by the banks of the Islamic regime.

KEYHAN in Tehran, as a result of the pressure by the people and the volume of telephone calls to that newspaper every day in regards to this coin, referred in an economic editorial to the long time that the distribution of coins has taken and strongly criticized it. This newspaper has also published the people's complaints several times, because of the telephone calls in the KEYHAN and You column. Meanwhile, the Majlis responded to the criticism of the economic commentator of the newspaper.
'Abbas Musavi, the representative of the Majlis, strongly criticized this newspaper and claimed that the newspaper is controlled from elsewhere. In the open session of the Majlis, he said: "Despite the emphasis of the imam, we are still slaves to certain desires." Suddenly and without any instigation, we question the banks and speak about the so-called failure to distribute the people's coins. This, unfortunately, is what KEYHAN has done, totally disregarding the problems and without making any reference to such items as the increase in deposits.

The Majlis representative added: These dear people know themselves that control comes from somewhere else and this issue is tied to other issues. The representative of the Majlis, in fact, referred implicitly to the empty treasury of the government and the tricks that the economic experts of the Islamic Republic employ to fill it with the small savings of the people.

The Islamic Republic has already now collected money from some people for next year's Hajj pilgrimage, has registered them and received 260,000 rials each as a deposit. Money has been collected from applicants for such vehicles as cars, buses, trucks and even motorcycles and bicycles, which are to be delivered to them later. A few weeks ago, a group of people who have deposited more than one million rials each to purchase Khavar trucks but have not even seen a picture of their trucks assembled in front of the manufacturing factory for a sit-in. Later, the committee officials dispersed them, and only the people's voice of protest was reflected in the newspaper.

On 10 Ordibehesht [30 April], quoting the numerous telephone callers, KEYHAN wrote: "About a year and a half ago, a large number of people gave money to banks in order to receive coins, but the Central Bank is unable to meet its commitments. It should announce to the people that they will get their money back."

But no response has yet been given by the officials of the Central Bank. For this reason, and because of the strong mistrust of the banks of the Islamic Republic on the part of the people, most of the people who have had deposits such as savings accounts have withdrawn their deposits and the officials of the Central Bank, in order to attract deposits, have announced that next year the banks will grant more than 20 million rials in prizes to interest-free loan accounts. The economic miracle consists of giving false promises to the people and collecting their money through various excuses. In our opinion, the economic and banking officials of the Islamic regime are the greatest miracle workers in history.

Political Policies

London KEYHAN in Persian 14 May 87 p 6

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] The course of events in the Middle East in recent weeks has once again bought to the attention of the people of the world the issue of the Iran-Iraq
war world as one of the most important impediments to achieving peace in the region.

The secret meeting of Saddam Husayn and Hafiz Assad last week, which was arranged by the mediation of King Hoseyn and Saudi Prince 'Abdallah complicates this problem and the role of the governments of the region even more.

In other words, this reconciliation once again between the two Arab political leaders in the Middle East and the united voice of the Arab countries to end the Iran-Iraq war turns the balance of power in the region against Iran and in favor of the Arab governments.

The Iranian nation has the right to be informed, as one of the two sides in this conflict, in this bloody war, during these sensitive and decisive moments concerning the secret deals and decisions which today an "enemy" and a "friend" are making, in order to avenge itself and its due national and patriotic rights under all circumstances against the instigators and perpetrators of this historical crime.

But, the Iranian nation is not setting its hopes on the leaders of the Islamic Republic to retrieve its rights. If the dictatorial and anti-national regime of the Islamic Republic had paid any attention to the wishes and demands of the great Iranian nation, on the same day that the Iranian brave men and patriots drove the last soldiers of the Iraqi aggressor out of Khorramshahr, by making use of international rights and superior military power, they could have forced Saddam and his supporters into an honorable peace, which was guaranteed by the self-sacrificing nation that had cleansed the soil of its homeland of foreign aggression and was protecting every inch of it.

In the course of the past five years, by sending thousands of the children of the laborers of the Iranian society and the patriotic soldiers to the deadly fronts, not only has Mr Khomeyni's Islamic Republic placed no importance at all on the opinion and decision of millions of mourning Iranian families as to whether to continue or stop this war, but it has also placed the entire burden of this historical calamity on the shoulders of the brave nation that prefers a temporary reconciliation with the domestic enemy to the dishonor of submitting to defeat at the hands of the foreign enemy.

The anti-national regime of Mr Khomeyni has consistently tried to cowardly escalate the fire of this war by mixing the two elements of the powerful national culture of our people, that is, patriotism, and our religious sentiments in order to cover up its incompetence and inability to operate a modern society under the pretext of the war, and also to justify its archaic violence in suppressing a people who must even breathe in accordance with the wishes and models of the regime, as well as to maintain the high pitch of the bloody Islamic revolution among the Hezbollah members and rebellious extremist youth under the pretext of exporting the revolution and making it universal.
Obviously, such an anti-national and treacherous policy in today's world, with all its political complexities, cannot have a happy future. Its foundations will crumble with the agreement between the major political poles involved in the issue, and the result will only be the increase in the damages in terms of loss of life and finances of the innocent people of Iran.

It now seems that all the forces and countries involved in the start and the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war, including the USSR, Syria, the United States and Saudi Arabia, have come to the conclusion that this war must end. Naturally, under such circumstances, the isolated regime of the Islamic Republic, under foreign pressure, will only submit to dishonorable compromises that will increase the infamous survival of the regimes and will by no means intend or be able to defend the national interests of Iran, even superficially.

Differences with and fighting against the anti-national and suppressive regime of the Islamic Republic must not result in patriotic Iranians remaining silent in the face of circumstances that will result in surrendering the national interests and just rights of the Iranian nation.

The sense of individual responsibility of every Iranian nationalist requires discussion of the conditions and demands of the Iranian nation, and not Khomeyni's regime, in order to secure its national interests and prevent the treacherous compromise of the regime of the Islamic Republic in this event.

Previously, too, every time the regime of the Islamic Republic has felt the sharpness of the blade of events on its throat, it has determined that compensation from the Iraqi regime for the destruction of human and financial capital of the Iranian society should take such forms as "Saddam leaving" or "the Ba'athists leaving." The interests of the Iranian nation will not be secured by the departure of Saddam and the Ba'athist party. The conditions that secure the interests and just rights of the Iranian nation must be raised by those who do not see the true interests of the Iranian nation as different from their own and not by those whose interests contradict the interests of the Iranian nation.
SHAH’S SON TALKS ABOUT CREATION OF ‘APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATION’

London KEYHAN in Persian 23 Apr 87 p 5

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Interview with Reza Pahlavi, son of the late shah; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Seven years ago, announcing your acceptance of the position conferred upon you by the Constitution, you undertook your heavy responsibility. During the same period, groups and organizations of Iranians abroad, based on the precepts of the same Constitution, formed forces known as the monarchist opposition against the governing regime in the country. Now that this period of seven years has passed, what are your true feelings concerning what has been accomplished during this period, and to what extent do you agree with the disappointment of many Iranians in this regard? Do you not think that in these few years many opportunities have been lost?

[Answer] I sense the disappointment, and perhaps we might say the anxiety, of many of my compatriots because progress in the struggle against the usurping regime is not tangible.

The situation and conditions in Iran today are worse and more unpleasant than ever during all these eight years since the tragedy occurred. The long list of problems, threats and disorders increases daily. The problem is not only the war and the waste of the lives of Iranian youth and the remainder of the capital of the nation. It is not only the increasing unemployment and backbreaking inflation. It is not only the strangulation, terrorism, injustice and tyranny, which are unprecedented in Iranian history. It is not only the widespread, blatant corruption and bribery among the leaders of the usurping regime. All of these, and many of them together, have created such a horrible situation. I do not think any other country in the world can be named that is entangled with so many problems and dangers like our nation is today.

Under such circumstances and conditions, many compatriots, both in Iran and abroad, are naturally worried and unhappy about the slowness of the struggle, about disunity among the forces, and about lack of coordination and cooperation among their political leaders.
Six years ago, when I accepted the responsibility of the monarchy, I hoped that the national personalities and struggling organizations would succeed as soon as possible in mobilizing the immortal forces of my compatriots, in expanding the arena of the struggle with each other's help, and in bringing the Iranian nation, stage by stage and step by step, closer to ultimate victory.

I had hoped that as the usurping regime became more helpless, national political organizations would become more organized and would carry out their mission of leadership in the arena of struggle more significantly and fruitfully. For this reason, all these years, I have devoted myself completely to this goal, and I have not stopped for a moment in my efforts to help create a front that includes all the combative, patriotic forces, organizations and personalities. Despite all the obstacles, I have not stopped for a moment.

But the balance of the tasks, on the one hand, and the experiences I have gained in the course of these years, on the other, have led me to believe that my efforts by themselves are not enough. The situation and conditions of Iran today are too critical and sensitive to continue watching the waste of the ability, energy and particularly the hope and enthusiasm of the Iranians, who have never accepted the domination of the enemy of the country.

For this reason, I am determined to take more effective measures in carrying out my duty, which I have always tried to do. I intend, from now on, to inform my compatriots more directly of the increasing crisis in Iran, and particularly of my own efforts. I am determined to invite my compatriots, wherever in the world they are, to take unceasing steps in the struggle and to ask them not to hesitate, along with me, to use all their capabilities and abilities to liberate Iran and not to easily relinquish the opportunity that history has provided for all of us.

[Question] On various occasions, differing and sometimes contradictory views have been expressed concerning what is considered as your role in the national struggle. Some of these views are decisive and some are merely legal. Often, they seem not to follow one line of thought. Could you explain this?

[Answer] What I can tell you most assuredly is that I have never had any doubts about the role I see for myself in the arena of the struggle to liberate Iran, and I do not see any contradiction in my statements and actions. The contradictions that you have seen may be due to other people's interpretations of my role and duty.

I recognize two essential but completely harmonious and complementary duties for myself. My first duty is that of every patriotic, struggling Iranian, which is the duty to continually try to liberate and free Iran, the duty to make use of every means to advance the struggle and expedite the ultimate victory of the nation. Naturally, because of the responsibility I have accepted and the duty to which I have committed myself, upon the request of the great majority of my compatriots, to return and enforce the Constitution,
I have an undeniable and inevitable share in this struggle. To this end, so far, I have employed all my material and spiritual resources.

Obviously, what I could do at the beginning, six years ago, is different from what I see today as within my experiences and resources. With the gradual change of conditions and situations, both in Iran and in the arena of political struggle outside Iran, I have also taken steps more consciously and with more preparation, and I will continue to go forward more decisively than ever.

But, my other essential role and duty stems from the commitment which I have undertaken as the guardian of the Constitution and protector of the rights and liberties of the nation. Naturally, the performance of this duty will be possible when the first duty has reached its desired results. When Iran is liberated, the Iranian nation will regain its lost governing power and the necessary organizations will once again be returned and revitalized, and a constitutional government will be established.

I do not see the slightest conflict between the duty that calls me to be present and unconditionally participate in the arena of struggle to liberate Iran and the commitment that I have accepted with all my being to guard the Constitution, and I am certain that the majority of my compatriots are also of the same belief.

[Question] Many of the travelers who come from Iran say that despite the deep interest of the majority of the people in the return of the monarchy, unfortunately, many of them have lost hope and are discouraged because of the lack of action. Outside Iran, too, many of the monarchists criticize this lack of action, and the majority of this group believe that your majesty does not consider the task of leadership a matter of life and death, as it should be considered under the present circumstances. Are you aware of such criticism? What is your opinion in this regard?

[Answer] Yes, I have heard the criticism and am informed about it. But, as I explained earlier, considering the changing conditions and situation in Iran and abroad, I have carried out the role that I have recognized for myself in this struggle. In this regard, the criticism that results from a lack of complete awareness is improper. Here, I wish to reiterate the point that even now that I am more determined than ever to carry out my duty, I shall never be able to take upon myself the share of the responsibilities conferred on the constitutionalist organizations and forces and on all the national combative leaders, in fact, every patriotic Iranian. In such a tremendous struggle, everyone must participate, according to his share and resources. Sitting idly by and allowing criticism of and advice to others suffice will certainly not bring us to victory. The inefficiencies and deficiencies that have existed on the arena of struggle so far, and I never try to cover them up, will be eliminated as soon as we all determine to carry out our specific duties together and by utilizing all our capabilities and resources. Certainly, if everyone carries out his responsibility in the arena of struggle, there will no longer be any discouragement and hopelessness for our compatriots.
[Question] Do you not believe that, under these circumstances, the passage of time with practically no effective plans will be to the detriment of Iranian nationalism and the future of our country?

[Answer] The passage of time in itself is neither to the detriment nor the interest of the struggle that we have begun. If we have an opportunity before us, and I do not think that it will be long, it is to be able to organize our forces and to make the best use of all the human and material resources we have available to us. If the usurping regime continues to decline to helplessness and chaos, as is becoming more certain every day, certainly, the passage of time can be in the interest of all of us. But, if we all do not take our duties and responsibilities seriously, each in some way, and continue our futile and meaningless disputes and differences and consider the enemy to be more miserable and incapable than it is, the passage of time will certainly be to our disadvantage. My warning to all my compatriots, especially the political and national personages and leaders, is not to lose this opportunity for nothing. If the enemy is allowed to regain strength or, due to our negligence, is replaced by another enemy, the liberation of the Iranian nation, which is a certainty, will take much longer than I wish to think about.

But, in any case, I do not deny the certain point that in another dimension, in the human and social dimension, with each day added to the life of the usurping regime, the cultural and material foundations of the society suffer new blows. Our country will fall more deeply into the abyss and the more difficult it will be to repair the damages. Nevertheless, I have no doubt that ultimately, the more these blows increase, the more the old roots of Iranian identity and nationality will remain alive, and the common will of any compatriots to implement their role and liberate and unite Iran will not be harmed in the slightest. This historical determination of several thousand years, which has defeated many times over a variety of strong invaders, will once again be manifest and remove today's enemies as well from the path of the advancement, progress and freedom of Iran.

[Question] The struggle to overthrow a regime always requires coordination and organized activities in political, informational, psychological and military areas, on both the international and national levels. Many critics believe that in the first three areas, no activity has taken place so far and opportunities have not been used to their fullest extent. In the latter case, too, no activity has taken place. Do you yourself evaluate it differently?

[Answer] In my opinion, in evaluating the procedures and the results of the struggle in these years, the factor of time and the governing conditions in the country must not be disregarded. It is true that today, after the passage of eight years from the occurrence of the tragedy, the regime no longer enjoys a popular base; the majority of the nation have rejected and condemned it and demand its unconditional overthrow. But we must not forget that this was not the case in the beginning. In the early years, the true ugly face of the leaders of the regime had not yet been unmasked. Many of our compatriots still blamed the daily criminal and destructive actions of the regime and its anti-national and anti-Iranian policies on the inexperience of its leaders.
Time was required to reveal the true intent and nature of the usurping regime to everyone and to create the necessary conditions to reach final victory, through the issuance of its condemnation by the entire nation. Unfortunately, gradually, as the internal conditions of Iran and the increasing inability and chaos of the regime became favorable to the advancement of the struggle, disunity among the political nationalist organizations and forces continued and futile disputes over secondary and improper issues did not permit the efforts to mobilize and coordinate the forces, which is another main condition for the achievement of victory. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the daily initiatives, efforts and self-sacrifice of our compatriots in Iran have prepared the political and psychological grounds for and paved the road to the final stage. In the final stage, by resorting to every means and method that is effective and necessary, the usurpers of the rights of the nation must submit to the public will. These usurpers will not willingly relinquish power. In this case, I must assure my compatriots that, due to the duty and responsibility that I consider for myself, I have taken measures to study and mobilize the resources to prepare the conditions for victory in the final phase of struggle, and gradually, with the help of our compatriots, I will increase the scope of these actions.

[Question] In order to ensure the active cooperation of the Iranian people and their participation in the struggle, naturally, they must be informed of the general principles of the plans for such a struggle. Certainly, you know that no struggle and uprising can succeed without strong and decisive programs and goals. What is your evaluation in this regard?

[Answer] It is true that no struggle will achieve victory without specific goals, clear plans and courses of action, and, finally, consideration for the need for organization, mobilization, and leadership. What must be decisive is the method of struggle. The program and course of action must be planned and pursued on the basis of the realities, resources and changes in the scene. In any case, in accordance with the changing conditions, both in Iran and on the arena of activities abroad, I have determined my course of action and will create the proper organizations to help me carry out my duties in the best possible manner. In regards to informing them, I must say to my compatriots that from now on, by creating a new organization, when the media and propaganda means are expanded, they will be informed of decisions and activities.

[Question] Frequently, the people go without any news of their king for weeks and months. This absence is also sensed on the international scene while, for example, the forces that were engaged in overthrowing the monarchical regime during the revolution tried not to be absent from the scene even for one day. How can you explain this deficiency?

[Answer] My presence on the political scene and preserving communication and contact as much as possible with my compatriots, particularly outside Iran, requires the availability of both organizational and material resources and is also related to the changes that occur in the issue of the struggle against the usurping regime. Here, it is necessary to point out that the main part of my time and energy and the resources available to me are devoted to struggle
within the country and not abroad and it will be so from now on as well.
Also, it must be noted that the major part of my activities, which in the past
two years have been devoted to activities inside the country, is completely
secret and therefore cannot be talked about. I expected this intentional
silence to be misinterpreted and to appear as if no activity is taking place.
Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that the institution of the monarchy and
its importance, history and necessity are well known to the Iranian nation and
such an institution—particularly with the existence of its manifestation,
that is, myself—requires no daily publicizing, whereas other organizations
that are dependent on ideologies which are incompatible with the tradition and
beliefs of the Iranian people require daily personal and ideological
propaganda in order to exist and have political importance; otherwise, they
will naturally be forgotten. Considering this issue, at the same time, I
intend in entering this new phase of activity to expand my communication and
contact with my beloved compatriots, wherever in the world they are, as much
as possible.

[Question] You have shown a great deal of interest in the constitutional
councils in the past few years. Can you tell us whether the establishment of
these councils was wrong and that, even with increased success, these councils
basically could not help overthrow the present regime? Also, has the council
of advisors, the establishment of which was announced by the office of the
king, been established or not?

[Answer] In my opinion, not only was the idea of forming and organizing the
supporters of constitutional monarchy not a mistake, but as time passes, the
need for it becomes more apparent. Today, no longer should anyone deny the
fact that in order to fight the enemy, which enjoys all material and military
resources, we must be prepared, equipped and organized. It is not enough to
merely want and support a specific goal. And organizing is not merely
appointing or electing officials or announcing programs. The foundation must
be built such that the organization comes alive and is activated so as to
strengthen the potential forces on the scene, to be able to choose a clear
path for struggle, and, finally, to be able to widely spread and publish its
goals and values. The same is true of all political organizations.

In my opinion, the problem with the work of the constitutional councils stems
from the phase of implementation and actualization of ideas. For various
reasons, some of which are very clear to me, a major part of the supporters of
the constitutional monarchy did not participate in the task of the formation
and expansion of the councils. But I am still hopeful that the councils will
be able, by relying on their initiatives and resources, to overcome the
deficiencies and problems and to carry out the duties that they have accepted
on the scene of struggle alongside other struggling national organizations,
better than ever before.

In regards to the council of my advisors, which was announced a few months
ago, I will suffice by saying that the reason behind its not being formed had
nothing to do with my own decision and wishes.
[Question] Without intending to make any exposures, can I ask to what extent you have contact with the resistance organizations in the country or elements that must have an important share in the final struggle?

[Answer] As I pointed out earlier, on the whole, my contact and communication with the resistance centers and my struggling compatriots, both within the organizations of the regime and throughout the country, has expanded significantly, particularly in the past two years.

Many of the members of struggling groups and the constitutionalist resistance are also engaged in fighting against the regime independently, without any particular contact with me or with each other. In recent months, significant evidence of the activities and initiatives of these centers of struggle have been manifested. And I am sure that in the future, as well, we will witness the expansion of their struggle inside the country.

[Question] The revelations in the past few months concerning the sale of arms by the United States to Iran have angered and discouraged all Iranians abroad and those Iranians in the country who have not been deceived by the distorted propaganda of the regime. Many believe that the unpleasant reactions of public opinion in the United States and many other countries have not been utilized by the nationalist organization of Iran and by yourself, as they should have been. Could you state your opinion clearly in this regard?

[Answer] I understand absolutely the anger of my compatriots regarding the measures some governments take to establish relations with the usurping regime. But I do not believe that an old, proud nation such as the Iranian nation will be discouraged in its will and determination to achieve freedom, integrity and security. For this reason, in a detailed message that I sent for the same reason, I pointed out that the destiny of Iran will be determined by Iranian thought, at the hands of Iranians, and on Iranian soil, and that victory against Iranian enemies does not depend on the policies and goals of others, whether friends or enemies, whether far or near. In the same message, I also emphasized that the Iranian nation has never believed in the existence of so-called moderate personalities and factions among the usurpers of its rights. And today, it absolutely does not. Others must not make such mistakes in their policies.

Today, I am happy that I can see the mask of hypocrisy on the faces of the leaders of the regime and there are few governments and nations in the world that hope for good intentions and peace from such groups and factions among the usurpers.

[Question] The most important issue of Iran at the present time is the unending war between Iran and Iraq, which world public opinion strongly opposes. As the leader of Iranian nationalism, what is your opinion in this regard?

[Answer] I have frequently announced my opinions on this destructive war. I have said that defense of the territorial integrity of Iran against the open aggression of Iraq was the sacred duty of all men and women in Iran. History
is witness that the Iranian people and the patriotic military of Iran have carried out this duty to the best of their ability, fought the aggressors fearlessly, and forced the enemy to retreat.

However, for more than three years, the regime has continued the war merely to cover up its crimes and its internal helplessness and to open the way for its interference in the internal affairs of Iranian neighbors.

Today, unlike the early years, this war is not to secure the territorial integrity of the country and repel the enemy from the soil of the country. Rather, its intention is to give a chance to the domestic enemy. In addition, the usurping regime, by insisting on continuing the war, intends to keep the Iranian army and the combatants on the Iranian borders, even on foreign soil, away from the scene of internal struggle.

For these reasons, I strongly oppose the continuation of this sinister war, a war that continues to spill the blood of hundreds and thousands of our young people and wastes the remainder of our national resources.

[Question] What is your ideological understanding of the Iran of tomorrow and the role that this country must play in the society at large?

[Answer] My views concerning the situation and conditions of the future of my country are not ideological. What is at issue for me as the guardian of the Constitution and will always be at issue is the establishment and stabilization of national rule, the protection of the rights and liberation of the nation, the preservation of the territorial integrity of the nation, and securing peace and public security.

In regards to Iran's relations with the outside world, I believe that tomorrow's Iran must once again join the peace-loving societies of the world. All valid international commitments must be honored, especially the UN charter, and the global declaration of human rights must be respected.

I believe that the Iran of tomorrow must establish peaceful relations with all countries of the world, regardless of their political and social regimes. We will never be able to change the geographical conditions of our country. For this reason, we must live in peace and tranquility, particularly with our neighbors, and accept good neighborly relations based on mutual respect and noninterference in each other's affairs. Only under such circumstances and observing such principles can the Iran of tomorrow regain the integrity and prestige in the world that it held before the tragedy occurred and enjoy peace and tranquility rather than war and chaos.

[Question] The regime of the Islamic Republic thinks of itself as the global standard bearer of revolutionary Islam and with this understanding tries to destabilize or overthrow other Islamic regimes, whereas many of them consider this Islamic Republic to be the cause of disunity and chaos in the Islamic world. What is your opinion in this regard, as the legitimate leader of a Shi'ite Muslim country?
The present usurping regime has turned established facts around in all areas. The area of religion and the role of Iran in the Islamic world are no exception. The Iranian nation has never had any inclination towards expansionism and adventurism, particularly in the guise of religion and ideology, and does not have today. Besides, today's standards of international laws and relations do not allow any government or nation to interfere in the internal affairs of others to export revolution and the leadership of the so-called global revolution, whether religious or otherwise. Revolution, in its global Islamic sense, is an excuse fabricated by the usurpers of the rights of the people of Iran merely to export their sinister revolution, to interfere in the internal affairs of others, and especially to cover up the blows that they have inflicted on the religious beliefs of the Iranian nation. In trying to export the Islamic revolution, the regime pursues the same goal it has in continuing the war, that is, to postpone its certain downfall. In my opinion, as no foreign nation and government has the right to interfere in the domestic issues of Iran, particularly in affairs that relate to the national and religious beliefs and precepts of the Iranian people, Iran should never, by resorting to the weapon of terrorism, disturbance and violence, engage in activities in the domestic scenes of other countries.

Efforts to export the sinister revolution and the empty claim to leadership of the Muslims of the world, unfortunately, have severely harmed the credibility and position of Iran in the Islamic world. Our efforts in the future in this area must be devoted to restoring this credibility and reestablishing the lines of understanding and peace with all Muslim societies of the world.

Some time ago, in an interview with a Spanish newspaper EL PAÍS, you said that the wealthy Iranians who reside abroad have not paid their share as they should. Some of these individuals, in letters to KEYHAN, have pointed out that they are waiting for the king of Iran and other members of the royal family to take the first step in order for others who are interested to follow them, and so that a trusted organization is created to which they will be able to give their assistance. What is your opinion in this regard?

In my opinion, it is the duty of every patriotic Iranian, wherever he is and whatever position he has, to take steps to the best of his ability and resources to advance the task of struggle against the usurping regime and towards the liberation of Iran. This struggle is too great and too vital for any Iranian king to exempt himself from participation in it.

So far, I have used every means and resource at my disposal to carry out my responsibility and to help advance the struggle. But the struggle, particularly the closer we get to the final phase, necessitates that the resources and forces, both human and material, be increased beyond what it has been. We should not forget the fact that securing ultimate victory is not within the power of one person, group or organization abroad.
[Question] Last year, the news of your simple, unceremonious marriage was reflected in the Persian and international presses. In your opinion, is it not better for other members of the royal family and wealthy Iranians to follow your example and allocate a part of such expenditures to the liberation of Iran and helping Iranians?

[Answer] I do not allow myself to interfere in the private lives of individuals, whether the members of my own family or others. Every person is responsible for his own actions. But the main issue is that my expectations of individuals who have the ability and resources is that, if they consider themselves to be patriotic Iranians, they should pay their share for the struggle to liberate the homeland.

[Question] Is there any other issue or point that your majesty would like to speak about with your compatriots?

[Answer] What I wish to emphasize at the end of this interview is that there has been no better opportunity than this to liberate Iran, and we must make the best of it.

Today, instead of emphasizing other people's mistakes, or past mistakes, the common points between the forces must be considered and we must look to the future. Today, the Iranian nation is going through the darkest period of its history and is entangled in unbelievable problems and calamities. No goal but ending this dark, horrible period must preoccupy us. I ask my compatriots, all of my compatriots, to assist me more than ever before and extend their support in this national and patriotic struggle, the final phase of which we are entering, and rest assured that until we reach ultimate victory, my determination will not be affected in the slightest.

10,000
CSO: 4640/122
AMBASSADOR TO DPRK—His majesty the king has appointed Nayan Bahadur Khatri as the Royal Nepalese ambassador to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea also. It is stated in a notice published today by the principal Press Secretariat of his majesty the king. Mr Khatri is the resident Royal Nepalese ambassador to the People's Republic of China. [Text] [Kathmandu External Service in English 1415 GMT 11 May 37 BF] /9274

CSO 4600/225
YAOUB KHAN MEETS WEINBERGER, SHULTZ IN WASHINGTON

BK190412 Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0200 GMT 19 May 87

[Text] Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan met with U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in Washington yesterday. After the meeting, he said the U.S. Defense Department is giving utmost attention to the issue of providing Pakistan with highly effective radar-fitted planes to cope with the air raids of Afghan fighter planes. He said the Defense Department is carefully reviewing congressional moves and technical needs so as to take appropriate decision to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. The foreign minister said he is fully satisfied with his talks with the U.S. defense secretary.

Quoting official sources, APP [Associated Press of Pakistan] has reported that the defense experts of the two countries have begun discussions in light of the talks between Sahabzada Yaqub Khan and Weinberger.

The foreign minister also met with George Shultz and exchanged views on matters of mutual interest, including the Afghanistan issue. Later, he told newsmen that he informed Shultz that Pakistan is extremely anguished and worried about Afghanistan's frequent and serious border violations resulting in the death and injury to a large number of people.

Sahabzada Yaqub Khan is to meet vice president George Bush today. He will leave Washington Saturday for France where he will hold talks with French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond.

/9/16
CSO: 4600/232
PAKISTANI MP URGES PROTEST OF BBC PUBLICATION

PG092101 Paris AFP in English 2051 GMT 9 May 87

[Text] Islamabad, 9 May (AFP)--A Pakistani MP urged his government Saturday to protest over an "outrageous act" by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in publishing an "imaginary and fake" photograph of the Moslem holy prophet Mohammed.

National Assembly member Sheikh Mohammed Mansoor, quoted by the official Associated Press of Pakistan (APP), said the photo was published in the BBC magazine RADIO TIMES and added that the magazine should be banned.

Islamic rules forbid the reproduction of the human body or any "image" of the Prophet Mohammed.

The MP said the BBC had "obviously indulged in a most sacrilegious and profane act to injure the feelings of millions of Moslems" around the world.

He said the Pakistan Embassy in Britain should lodge a "most vehement protest" with the BBC and the British Government over the "heinous crime."

The sheikh also said the Pakistan Government should make sure copies of the RADIO TIMES, a magazine listing the BBC's programmes, are not distributed in the country and added that all Moslem countries should confiscate the magazine.

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CSO: 4600/224
ASGHAR KHAN CRITICIZES DEFENSE, FOREIGN POLICY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 May 87 p 6

[Text]

ABBOTTABAD, May 9: Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan, Chief of Tehrik-e-Istiqlal, has, in a Press statement, bitterly criticised Pakistan's foreign and defence policies. He has said that purchase of three Frigates at tremendous cost and the acquisition of AWACS may give the rulers of Pakistan a false sense of security but will not materially alter the fragile basis on which our defence is based. He says that the almost daily bombing of Pakistan territory, frequent violations of its air space and an increase in explosions and blasts is the natural consequence of a steady drift in our foreign policy over the last eight years.

Asghar Khan said that the purchase of three Frigates at tremendous cost and the acquisition of AWACS may give the rulers of Pakistan a false sense of security but will not materially alter the fragile basis on which our defence is based. If seen in the narrow military sense, divorced from any political implications, it could be argued that the acquisition of Frigates, F-16 and AWACS aircraft strengthen our defence capability. Since defence services are an instrument of policy they should be equipped and maintained to further a political objective. The usefulness of any military equipment must, therefore, be seen in a wider context along with its political implications. Weapons of defence are required to meet a specific military threat and if such policies are pursued that cause the threat to grow, the need for more and more equipment to meet the increased threat will be felt. When this process is allowed to escalate as has been done in Pakistan, no country can provide adequate security for itself.

The AWACS will, he said, do more to push Pakistan into the super power arena of conflict than to safeguard Pakistan's security. He said that the country interests require that our foreign relations should be so managed that the threats which endanger our security should be removed without recourse to military confrontation.

At the rate we are moving into the super power tussle he said, it is only a matter of time before Pakistan becomes an area of potential nuclear conflict.

He said that never in the 40 years history of the country had Pakistan government shown such bankruptcy of statesmanship in the field of foreign relations as the Martial Law government of General Ziauul Haq and later its civilian successor has shown in the last couple of years. Asghar Khan called upon the people to realize the gravity of the situation and the dangers in continuing to allow the present regime to push Pakistan towards greater insecurity and increased dangers.—PR

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SPOKESMAN ON DECREASE IN EXTERNAL DEBT BURDEN

BKO61354 Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0200 GMT 6 May 87

[Text] The rate of per capita external debt burden has decreased to 31.3 percent in 1985-86 as against 59.2 percent in 1972. In 1972-73 the rate of per capita debt was 604.3 while per capita income was 1,021 rupees. The per capita debt increased to 1,835 rupees in 1985-86. Similarly the per capita income also increased to 5,845 rupees. A spokesman of the Economic Affairs Division said in Islamabad yesterday that Pakistan's annual debt servicing liability, as against its total foreign exchange earnings, declined from 18 percent in 1972-73 to about 16 percent in 1985-86. The proportion of Pakistan's outstanding debt against its GNP was 34.4 percent in 1985-86 as compared to 42.3 percent in 1974-75. The outstanding debt against the foreign exchange reserve declined to 165.1 percent in 1985-86. In 1974-75 this was 318.9 percent. The annual debt ratio increased by 7.3 percent during the decade between 1974-75 and 1984-85. The GNP increased to 11.5 percent in dollar terms and the foreign exchange earnings registered an increase of 15.1 percent.

The spokesman rejected as totally incorrect a report published in a national English newspaper that Pakistan owes $14.2 billion in debt to Western banks. He said the total outstanding debt of Pakistan on 30 June last year was $11.10 billion, of this 69 percent was received from foreign governments and the remaining 31 percent from various financial institutions. A loan for 90 percent was obtained on extremely soft and concessional terms. Pakistan has not made any request to the aid to Pakistan consortium for grant of moratorium or for rescheduling its repayment programs. The spokesman described this report as mischievous and against the national interests and expressed regret for the publication of this kind of irresponsible article by a national newspaper.

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CSO 4600/224
PAKISTANIS IN GULF: TRAINING FOR JOBS STRESSED

Islamabad The MUSLIM in English 10 May 87 p 8

[Text]

MAKKAH MUKARRAMA, May 8: Trained manpower from Pakistan can capture more job opportunities in the Gulf countries, Pakistan's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Amir Gulistan Janjua has said in an interview here.

He said that men from the countries like South Korea and Philippines were usually trained in more than one trade. An electrician who also knows the job of plumber, the ambassador said will surely be preferred by companies.

"Our countrymen are thus handicapped," the ambassador said stressing the need for gaining proficiency in as many trades as possible.

Regarding the return of Pakistani expatriate to the Gulf countries, he pointed out that there were three main reasons. The first, he said was the completion of infrastructure and major projects in the Gulf states. Secondly was the fall of oil prices in the world market and supply of trained manpower from India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Philippines and Korea at very low wages. The third reason for increasing number of home coming Pakistanis was the fact that most of the Pakistani had been working on the construction side which had run its course.

Mechanisation of agriculture had further reduced the demand, the ambassador said.

"If we want to stay in the field, we must study the local needs and should plan accordingly," he said.

He said after completion of the major projects, the local need now is for manpower trained to maintain these. But here too there was a tough competition. A man looking for a job here should have been trained in multiple trades, he added.

The ambassador said he personally met with the employer and the owner of the bank. The owner of the National Commercial Bank offered the help with one million rials but the employer (Kafeel) said he was ready to bear the loss of only two lakh rials.

Answering a question, the ambassador said the embassy did not approve of any employment contract offering salary of less than 500 rials. The Saudis had imported manpower from some countries even at the rate of 300 rials.

About the visa business, he said it was unfortunate that some Pakistanis bought visa at the high rate of Rs, 30,000 to Rs 40,000. They get salary of about Rs 200 on nothing here and have to support their family in Pakistan within their meagre means, "one can imagine their plight" he said.

The ambassador appreciated the positive role of Pakistani workforce here but disapproved the attitude of some Pakistanis who performed at their best under supervision of foreigners but behaved differently when working under a Pakistani.

To a question regarding Pakistani exports to the region, Mr. Janjua said "we are not in a happy position, Saudi Arabia is an open market and one can see here goods even from Russia and China besides the Western goods. If we want more trade we will have to produce quality goods at competitive rates."—APP.

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CSO: 4600/233
PUNJAB WHEAT CROP BADLY AFFECTED BY RAINS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 May 87 p 1

[Text]

Lahore, May 9: Heavy rains sweeping the Punjab these days have caused great loss to cash-earning wheat crop which was still in the process of harvesting. Worst hit are the districts falling in the belt from Lahore to Rawalpindi which include fertile areas in Sheikhupura, Gujranwala and Sialkot. The Agriculture Department is assessing the extent of loss in production and value. According to unofficial reports the entire belt was ravaged by the rains. The wheat crop piled in the open after harvesting has been swept away while standing crops have also suffered badly and have been rendered unfit for human consumption. Biggest sufferers are the small landholders.

Mian Mohammad Afzal Hayat, leader of the Opposition in the Punjab Assembly has pressed deep concern over the loss of crops in the province which according to him was irreparable. In a statement he said untimely rains have played havoc to the cultivators who have lost their hard-earned crop which had become ripe and at some places harvested. He called upon the government to extend a helping hand to the cultivators by allowing remission in payment of land revenue and gihana. He further demanded that wheat stocks available with the cultivators should be purchased by the government at a fair price.

Afzal Malik, advocate, who is also a progressive farmer has urged the government to help the cultivators in distress by declaring the affected districts as calamity stricken areas.

PPI ADDS: Still recovering from the last night’s rains the sister cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad were again hit this afternoon by a torrential rainfall.

The weather pundits have forecast more rains along with thunderstorm for the next 24 hours. The sister cities received about 17mm rains today.

The Adviser to the Prime Minister on Agriculture, Sartaj Aziz while talking to PPI here today said that unexpected rains and hailstorm this year have lowered the target of wheat by about eight to 10 percent.

He said, Though we will not be able to achieve the set target due to unfavourable weather yet we will increase over the last year’s wheat output, with enough wheat to meet the country’s requirement."
BRIEFS

OPPOSITION TO SHARI'AH BILL—Lahore, 9 May—The Women's Action Forum, apprehensive of efforts towards a rapprochement between the government and the United Shariat Mahaz over the private members Shariat Bill, has reiterated its strong opposition to the Bill. On behalf of the WAF, Working Committee, Hina Jilani in a statement said that all sane elements in the country have consistently and strongly opposed the said Bill which, as viewed, was an attempt to impose obscurantist views on the nation. The Ninth Amendment Bill, she added, was nothing more than a watered-down version of the demands being pressed by the Shariat Mahaz and hence opposed on the same grounds. Both the bills, she alleged, would not only curtail the sovereignty, of the Parliament but would allow a monopoly over religion by a particular group giving rise to unending sectarian dissections and division among the people. The opposition to the Shariat Bill, she clarified, was in no way a resistance to religious injunctions but was an expression of the nation's lack of confidence in the promoters of the said bill who have never been able to gain a representative position through elections, whenever they are held in Pakistan. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 May 87 p 6] /9274

LOAN FOR POWER GENERATION—Karachi, 9 May—A dollar 70-million World Bank loan will help Pakistan improve its power plant efficiency, it was learnt here today. A shortage of power remains a constraint on Pakistan's development, and alleviation of this shortage was the focus of bank activities in the energy sector in the short and medium term. And the power plant efficiency improvement project was in line with this focus. The project has a number of objectives. Among them: Improving the efficiency with which hydrocarbons are used by the water and power development authority in power generation, providing about 120 MW of additional generation capacity through rehabilitation of existing thermal units and about 80 MW through the conversion of combustion turbines to combined cycle operation, and continuing the institution-building efforts, the government and the World Bank initiated in earlier projects by strengthening WAPDA's capability. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 May 87 p 8] /9274

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION—The rate of increase in agricultural production during the first 3 years of the current 5-year plan was 6.5 percent. A Radio Pakistan representative has understood that there was an increase of 7.1 percent in the production of major crops and 4.5 percent in minor crops. The increase in the sectors of livestock, fisheries, and forestry was more than 6.4 percent annually, whereas the target was 6 percent. There was an annual increase of 9.4 percent in small scale industrial production whereas the target was fixed at 7.3 percent. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0200 GMT 12 May 87 BK] /9274
MEETING WITH ENVOY REPORTED—China has assured Pakistan of taking concrete steps to increase the import of Pakistani goods in order to balance the present volume of trade between the two countries. The assurance was given by the Chinese minister for foreign economic relations and trade, Mr Zheng Tuobin, to Pakistan's ambassador to China, Mr Akram Zaki, during their meeting in Beijing. Mr Zheng, who is to accompany the Chinese prime minister, Mr Zhao Ziyang, during his forthcoming visit to Pakistan, said it was China's keen desire to correct the present trade imbalance. [Text]

[Karachi Domestic Service in English 1100 GMT 19 May 87 BK]

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CSO: 4600/232
GERMAN CORRESPONDENT WITNESSES JAFFNA CONFLICT

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 23 Apr 87 p 3

[Article by Verena Stern: "The Smell of Blood Is Everywhere--Following Their Latest Attacks, the Tamils Can Count on Even Less Indian Military Support in Their Fight to Set Up an Independent Nation"]

[Text] Jaffna, in April--As far as hospital director Nachinarkinian is concerned, there is no doubt about who was responsible for the 6.20 am grenade attack which laid waste to Wards 19 and 20 of Jaffna General Hospital which was filled with cardiac patients at the time. Eight of the patients and one male nurse were killed instantly and 22 persons were injured in the attack. 38 year-old nurse Lena Paranjothy is presently fighting for her life in the intensive care unit. Her shaved head has been bandaged; grenade splinters have lodged in her head and her abdomen. Although the surgeons have already performed two operations on her, they have thus far been unable to remove all the splinters lodged in her brain. Even if Lena survives, the left side of her body may be paralyzed and she may never be able to see or speak again. She returned home to Jaffna in northern Sri Lanka from Dubai only 1 year ago. She has been married just 4 months. Her dry-eyed husband looks at his unconscious wife, saying "those beasts; those murderers."

Lena's husband is referring to the soldiers in the old fort built by the Dutch colonists in Jaffna 307 years ago. A unit of the Sri Lankan army has been holed up in the 22-hectare fort by the sea for several months and is being bombarded day and night by Tamil guerillas who are fighting for "Tamil Eelam," an independent Tamil homeland in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. When the army units return fire, the shells fall in the densely populated residential areas around the fort which the guerillas use as their base of operation. The General Hospital is located a mere 300 meters from the fort. This is why Nachinarkinian is convinced that "the grenade was purposely fired from the fort in the direction of the hospital."

Unwelcome Visitors

Nachinarkinian, himself a Tamil, tells us of the reason for the attack. In late November of last year, he was asked by the defense ministry to shut down his 1,015-bed hospital and to move his patients to another facility in the northern part of Jaffna peninsula. "But the citizens of Jaffna are opposed to
"The hospital offers at least some protection from the continuing army bombardment to the population." The General Hospital, in other words, is of strategic importance both to the army and the Tamil guerillas who are able to use it as cover for their mobile mortar attacks on the fort.

Lt Col Ashoka Jayewardene, the commander of the Sri Lankan garrison at the fort, on the other hand, maintains that his men did not open fire on that particular morning at all. Six guerilla shells did land inside the fort at 1:15 am. In response, the army units fired three shells each at two road intersections which the guerillas were thought to have used to launch their attack. After that, things were quiet for almost 4 hours. After 6 am, they had heard an explosion inside the city.

An on-site inspection at the hospital appeared to confirm the colonel's story. The shell landed in the space between the two long rows of hospital beds on the first story of the building and tore a hole into the concrete floor of about one meter in diameter. The metal beds in which the patients met their death are twisted into bizarre shapes. There is a smell of blood and burnt flesh in the air. The thin ceiling is hanging down in strips but the tiled roof above it merely shows a 20-centimeter hole.

The army uses industry-manufactured shells whose tip is equipped with a sensitive impact fuze. Even on striking a roof, these shells will explode into pointed fragments which are not powerful enough to penetrate a concrete floor. The guerillas, on the other hand, make their own 10-kilogram, 120-mm shells and these are equipped with a time delay fuze in the form of an igniter cord which burns at the rate of one centimeter per second. There is no doubt but that the shell which hit the hospital did not explode until the second impact which explains the minor damage to the roof and the large hole in the concrete floor. But Nachinarkinian disputes this by posing the rhetorical question of "what reason Tamil guerillas could have for firing on defenseless hospital patients."

The attack on Jaffna General Hospital has outraged Sri Lanka and, even more so, neighboring India. For the past 2 years, the Indian government has been trying to work out a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the conflict between the Hindu Tamils (who make up 12.6 percent of Sri Lanka's population) and the Buddhist Singhalese who make up 74 percent of the population. The Tamils feel culturally oppressed and economically disadvantaged by the Singhalese majority. Following the latest Singhalese pogrom against their Tamil fellow citizens arising from a Tamil attack on 13 Singhalese soldiers, almost 150,000 Tamils quit Sri Lanka and fled to Tamil Nadu in South India. The Indian government has been looking the other way as Tamil separatist groups trained guerillas on Indian soil for the struggle to liberate Sri Lanka.

But now the Indians are slowly losing patience with their unwelcome visitors. Most of the Sri Lankan Tamils, to be sure, have been taken in by relatives in Tamil Nadu or have brought enough money with them to pay for food and lodging and this, in turn, has appreciably driven up rents in Madras, the state capital. But 32,000 of the Tamils are living in a total of 176 refugee camps—
for the most part in round, two-story shelters which the government has built to protect the population against typhoons.

At the Kelambakkam camp, 40 kilometers south of Madras, 39 families have been living for almost 3 years. Because the two 15-meter diameter stories of the typhoon tower were too small to accommodate 225 people, 20 additional huts with palm frond roofs have since had to be built. Each refugee receives 55 rupees and six kilograms of rice every other week from the Indian government. This comes to about DM 17 per month. Initially, the farmers and fishermen of the area took pity on the Sri Lankan refugees who recounted horror stories about torture and killings. But that is no longer so. "By now, the people are just envious," one of the camp residents says, "because we get more in welfare payments than they earn working 14 hours a day."

The fact that the members of the various separatist groups are trying to finance their struggle for liberation by means of heroin traffic and large ransom payments for kidnap victims has also led to a decline in sympathy on the part of the Tamil Nadu population. In view of this, the oldest and most powerful of the five separatist movements, the "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" (LTTE), tried to clean house among the various guerilla groups last year for "disciplinary reasons," liquidating at least 300 members of the rivaling organizations. In early November, shootings took place in Madras in the course of which one Indian policeman was killed and two others were wounded. In the aftermath, the police took more than one thousand Tamil militants into custody and confiscated their weapons, including antiaircraft missiles, valued at DM 45 million. Following his arrest, Prabakaran, the founder of the LTTE, complained: "Until now we thought that the Indian government looks upon us as freedom fighters but now we are being treated like bandits."

The liberation tigers are feeling the pressure from Delhi to reach a negotiated settlement of the racial conflict. Above all, the Indian government has by now robbed them of the illusion that it would lend them military support in their fight for an independent Tamil state—of the kind it provided to the East Pakistanis at the time of the Foundation of Bangladesh in 1970. For this reason, the LTTE is now expressing a willingness to compromise. Anton Balasingham, who held a professorship in social science in London until 1983 and has since taken over as the LTTE's chief ideologist in Madras and who was still coming out strongly in favor of a socialist republic of "Tamil Eelam" just 2 years ago, is now ready to accept limited autonomy in the areas populated by a Tamil majority. "The cost of our armed struggle has been too high," he says. By his estimate "more than 10,000 Tamil civilians have been killed by the Sri Lankan army." But whenever a political solution seems near, the Tamil tigers raise new demands and provoke incidents which poison the negotiating climate.

Based on the Indian model, the Colombo government has offered to establish autonomous state governments and parliaments in the nine provinces of Sri Lanka. But the Tamil Tigers are demanding "the recognition of our historic Tamil homeland" which calls for linking the northern and eastern provinces together. In the eastern province, however, the Tamils make up only 42 percent of the population. 32 percent of the population are descendants of Arab
Muslims who settled there in the eighth century and now also speak Tamil and the remaining 26 percent are Sinhalese. On 19 December, Indian negotiators got the government to agree to take the Ampara voting district (where the Sinhalese are in the majority) out of the eastern province and to permit the establishment of special ties between the northern and southern provinces, e.g. a common governor and a joint planning commission. At a later date, a decision on linking the two provinces is to be reached following a plebiscite.

A Wave of Terror

But the LTTE is not satisfied with an interim solution. On 1 January, it announced that it was taking over the administration of the Jaffna peninsula—which was tantamount to a unilateral declaration of independence. For the time being, this put an end to Indian government efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. The Colombo government called out the army which occupied a number of guerrilla camps in the north and east of the country and is now preparing to march on Jaffna. There are 825,000 Tamils living on 2,560-square kilometer peninsula in the north which is connected to the rest of Sri Lanka only by way of a one-kilometer road and rail causeway. The strategic successes achieved by the offensive in the north and east of the country have given encouragement to those hawks in the government who are in favor of a military solution of the Tamil problem and have also heated up sentiments among the Sinhalese population. In late March, the Tamil Tigers torpedoed still another Indian government attempt at negotiation when they attacked 25 Sinhalese men, women and children in a northern village, literally hacking them to pieces and then setting the village on fire.

"If the Tamils do not want to negotiate, then the army should just make short shrift of them," says our Singhalese driver Silva who is taking us to a rickety twin-engined military aircraft at 4 am that is to fly 40 soldiers to Jaffna before dawn. Because the pilots are exhausted our actual departure time is delayed by 2 1/2 hours. The soldiers are sent to nine different camps all along the Jaffna coast in which the army has been bottled up for months and is being fired on by the Tamil guerrillas. It is a hard-fought war with the army trying to fight free of the camps inch by inch, to set up new positions and remove the underbrush in preparation for new advances.

We are moving through two villages which were occupied by the army only 4 days ago: well-tended one and two-story bungalows, flowering bougainvillea gardens. The occupants have fled. The Tamil guerrillas had barricaded themselves behind stone walls and sandbags inside the Hindu temple, hoping that the soldiers would not fire on these sacred sites. The temples have remained untouched except for large holes in the back walls which the guerrillas used to escape into the woods in the face of the advancing troops. We take a break on the terrace of a two-story villa. Next to the terrace, there is a defused mine lying on the ground, a pipe 20 centimeters in diameter and one meter long containing a plastic explosive charge and thousands of steel pellets. "Given air support, we could occupy Jaffna in a matter of days," says Capt Majid Prashad. "But that would cause enormous casualties among the civilian population."
In the capital city of Jaffna we can hardly find any sleep. The first shells explode while we are at dinner in the inner courtyard of our hotel. Following the third explosion, we decide to go back inside the house although the two-story building would afford little protection in case of a direct hit. But then things quiet down for a while. It is not until 20 minutes past midnight that we are suddenly awakened again. We then wait until 4 am for the next explosions which occur at something like half-hour intervals. In between times, we can hear machine gun fire.

In the morning, we attend mass at St. Mary's Refuge church. Most of those attending mass sought shelter from the shelling during the night inside the church and in the school building next door. They have no idea how much longer they can take it. "The government should finally recognize our right to a Tamil homeland and pull the army out," they say. They are unable to appreciate the fact that the government will do no such thing because it would be tantamount to accepting the partition of the island. In former times, they say, there also were two different kingdoms on Ceylon—a Tamil kingdom and a Singhalese kingdom. If anything, the attack on the hospital has increased both fear of the army and popular support for the Tamil Tigers. "The boys are at least holding the soldiers in check who used to walk our streets like sick men," they say. "But how much longer can they do it?"

As a good will gesture, the government announced a 10-day cease-fire on 11 April to permit both the Singhalese and the Tamils to celebrate the New Year and the Christians to celebrate Easter in peace. The Tamil Tigers ignored the offer and continued firing on the army camps in the north of the island nation. At the end of 7 days, the government lifted the cease-fire after some 50 guerrillas had stopped three buses and two trucks along a road in eastern Sri Lanka on Good Friday, shooting and killing 127 of the passengers and seriously wounding an additional 60 persons. Outrage about this insidious attack had hardly subsided when a bomb exploded in a crowded business district in the old part of Colombo on the day after Easter which killed at least 150 people and seriously injured more than 200 others. The liberation tigers denied responsibility for the attack. But earlier, in Madras, Balakumar, the leader of the "Eelam Revolutionary Student Organization," which is the only separatist group which closely cooperates with the LTTE, had told us: "We will weaken the government apparatus by planting bombs in the business centers in the south of the country."

After the attack, Jyotindra Nath Dixit, the Indian ambassador to Sri Lanka, said: "If the rebels persist in sabotaging all negotiations, they will be annihilated within 2 months." Is this a first indication of the fact that the Indians no longer have any objections to military action?
REBELS CALLING UP YOUNGER RECRUITS

Bonn DIE WELT in German 7 Apr 87 p 8

[Article by P. D.; datelined New Delhi: "Tamils Force Youths Into Military Service"]

[Text] The methods used by Tamil terrorists in the internal fighting against rival militant groups is becoming ever more brutal. For the second time within a year, the "Tamil Tigers" attacked the camp of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (Telo) and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) in the Jaffna area of Northern Sri Lanka, and massacred more than 100 armed members of both these groups—young persons between 15 and 20 years of age.

Yesterday a spokesman for the "Tigers" called the announcement of the massacre "pure propaganda from Colombo," in a government attempt to divert attention from attacks by its soldiers to the Tamils. Independent observers, however, consider the attack a retaliatory measure for the attack on "Tiger" leader Kittu, who was seriously wounded in a grenade attack.

The "Tamil Tigers" brutalization of the civil war in north and east Sri Lanka affects not only the rival groups, but also the Tamil civilian population in these regions. A colonel in the Army in Jaffna recently stated that "fear of the militants has now grown greater than fear of our security forces."

Raiding parties of militant Tamils ransack the homes of the civilian population on the northern peninsula, looking for young men "of military age." And whoever is over 14 and health is considered capable of bearing arms.

Whereas it has been the "duty" of every Tamil family for years to send at least one son to fight with the guerrillas, now all their sons must serve in the underground army. Those who have no able-bodied children must pay a levy equal to as much as one quarter of the family's monthly income.

The "Tigers" recruiting methods in the Tamil refugee camps in Indian Tamil Nadu are also easily recognizable: the population there is almost entirely composed of the elderly, children and women. Teenagers must go to fight in Sri Lanka.

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