Near East & South Asia

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

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International Affairs

Clinton Administration Moves in Mideast Criticized
LDJ902221593 Algiers Voice of Palestine in Arabic
1702 GMT 19 Feb 93

[WAFA political editor commentary—"Signs From America Not Encouraging"]

[Text] It is not so much a question of criticizing the new U.S. Administration, which it deserves, as it is a kind of real fear we feel in the face of a number of American signs that have started to concern us, especially as we have made real and sincere efforts to ensure the success of the peace process and the political operations that stemmed from the initiative made by the former U.S. President George Bush, which were restricted to the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace.

With the coming of the current U.S. Administration, we believed that it would continue what the previous one had started. We even thought that it might be more specific and would make a clearer effort to help reach a comprehensive and just solution of the Palestinian issue and the Middle East issue in order to put the region on the threshold of stability, which it lost many decades ago as a result of the conflicts caused and sown by the western colonial forces. However, this belief has begun to wane in the face of the facts, evidence, and signs reaching us from the current U.S. Administration.

The general belief was that the electoral statements differed from the intentions and were not compatible with the political strategies. Therefore, many observers thought that President Bill Clinton made generous promises to Israel during his campaign in order to obtain the Jewish vote and that these promises would soon fade once the administration began following up the file of the Palestinian issue and the Middle East problem. However, the first appointments at the State Department and the working group on the Middle East carried clear signs that the political directions of the U.S. Administration tended to be biased towards Israel since they did not reflect the supposed or required balance.

The problem of the deportees was the first practical test for the new administration—notwithstanding the fact that the issue had started during the Bush administration. The new administration's handling of the problems has yet to show that it has examined the issue upon the bases of international legality or has weighed it using a single standard instead of the double standard of the former administration. Nevertheless, there was an optimism that evaporated as soon as the first dealings with the problem of the deportees began; an optimism based upon the hope that the current administration is more youthful and more committed to human rights and equity. What it did though was make the strangest unilateral package deal with Israel concerning the Palestinian side, without having consulted the latter or given any attention to its reaction.

Warren Christopher's arrival in the region was not preceded by enough, or not quite enough, indicators or signs [passage indistinct] On the contrary, he arrived with an order to bar the Security Council from examining Israel's reluctance to implement the Security Council resolution in one pocket, and a document of deception that gave the impression that the Security Council had already passed a resolution or taken a decision on the Israeli alleged implementation of the package deal in the other. The truth was, however, quite different. The document was no more than a press release by the UN Security Council president rather than the Security Council itself. However, we are not quite sure whether such a matter would foul the Arab parties that have been waiting for a peace solution based upon equitable, just, and comprehensive bases. They have not been waiting for further tricks, perfidy, or pressures that would compel them to surrender, commit suicide, or accept defeat. Therefore, it will be Christopher's task to remove doubts that have been mounting on a scale not foreseen by the American State Department, which still thinks that the Arab parties will always be susceptible to pressure on any matter. President Clinton should not think, however, that his smile can cure large suffering and great injustice. In order to be a true star, one must undertake chivalrous acts and take ethical stances that should not be biased toward Israel when the latter is carrying out a racist act by all standards in Marj al-Zuhur.

PLO Official on U.S. Attitude Toward Middle East
AU2202152393 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 1200 GMT 22 Feb 93

[Telephone interview with 'Abdallah al-Franji, PLO representative in Germany, by Vera Szollosi in Tunis—live]

[Text] [Szollosi] I now welcome 'Abdallah al-Franji, PLO representative in Germany, on the telephone from Tunis. Good afternoon.


[Szollosi] Do you think that the chance for a resumption of the peace talks has increased with the trip of the new U.S. secretary of state?

[Al-Franji] I think that the fact that the first trip of the secretary of state is taking him to the Middle East is a good opportunity. That means that the United States is continuing to intensify its policy in that direction. Many were afraid that Clinton would no longer commit himself so much to the Middle East peace process. However, this trip confirms that the United States is very much interested in the continuation of the peace process in this region.

Nevertheless, the situation is very difficult and complicated because the Palestinian deportees are still in tents outside their country waiting for their return to their homeland. I believe that it is also very difficult and complicated for the PLO to continue to participate in
negotiations with the Israelis, as long as the deportees have to stay under inhuman conditions outside their country.

[Szollosi] When you say that is very difficult for the PLO and the Palestinians to negotiate, does that not mean that the Palestinians’ return to Israel is the decisive prerequisite for talks? Are you banking on this return?

[Al-Franji] I think that the Palestinian delegates cannot participate in negotiations because the mood in the occupied territories does not permit them to negotiate with the Israelis as long as the Palestinians are living in tents outside their country. I do not believe that we will be able to negotiate, even if we wanted to hold talks. Perhaps Syria and Jordan could do it, but the PLO cannot do it. The prerequisite for the success of the peace process is the PLO’s participation. Under these circumstances, the PLO cannot participate in the new rounds of talks, without a clear signal from the Israelis that they are prepared to let the deportees return.

[Szollosi] You said that, with his trip to the Middle East, the new U.S. secretary of state made it clear how important the Middle East is for the United States. Does this trip of the secretary of state show to you what attitude the new Clinton administration will take in the Middle East conflict?

[Al-Franji] I think that the administration represents the Democrats. In former times, before Bush and Reagan, President Carter was also successful in achieving peace between Israel and Egypt. I believe that the Democrats are more qualified for achieving peace between the Arabs and the Israelis. But it is also very complicated and difficult for the United States to bring the Israelis and Palestinians together there, because the Palestinians’ objectives are very far away from Israel’s objectives and contrary to them. Rather, the problem lies between the Israelis and the Palestinians because the Palestinians want a Palestinian state and the Israelis reject this and do everything to prevent it. Nevertheless, I think that the Clinton administration has more experience, also because of the fact that it has called upon experts, for example, President Carter, who is in Cairo now and is there to try to establish contacts between the Arabs and the Israelis to the advantage of the Clinton administration.

[Szollosi] You said that the Palestinians’ objective is a state of their own. Are you still supported in this policy by the other Arab states, or is every state seeking to represent its own interests? Here I am thinking, for example, of Syria.

[Al-Franji] I think that most Arab states try to achieve their objectives, but we in the PLO no longer depend on the political development in the Arab states. We have this stage behind us. That is, the PLO and the Palestinian people are more recognized at an international level, so that we can not be ignored any longer and it is known that peace cannot be achieved without the Palestinians and the PLO’s participation. That is, in this process the PLO is no less important than Jordan and Syria.

World Must Act or Lose Credibility After Israeli Ruling
PM0102134993 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT
in Arabic 29 Jan 93 p 11

[Editorial: “Israeli Position Requires International Community Role”]

[Text] There is no need to get involved in a “Byzantine” argument about the Israeli regime’s concept of right. Nor can any political benefit be gained from entering a purely legal quarrel with the Israeli court’s decision issued yesterday on the Palestinian deportees issue.

The Israeli regime’s concept of right is that it is entitled to everything that others are not entitled to. And that it is permissible for Israel—and its institutions and practices—to violate all conventions and taboos and yet force the world to apologize, submit, and show respect.

As for the court’s decision, which the entire world had been awaiting in the hope that it would spare international legitimacy further embarrassment and and rescue it from a difficult experience increasingly damaging its image, it was exactly as the pessimist wise people had expected, as the Israeli judiciary unanimously agreed that the punishment was “legal” on the basis of the emergency laws inherited from the British mandate. Thus the Israeli judges unanimously agreed to “clear” the Israeli political authorities of violating the law and granted them technical cover for their political crime.

The real meaning of the decision is that the government is in the right politically; as for the legal hearing, it must be conducted on a case-by-case basis.

But the Israeli judges know that the accusation leveled at each deportee is—as far as we know—sympathy with the religious tendency or membership of its organizations, and there is no evidence that any deportee was involved in the incident for which he has been punished, namely the kidnapping and killing of conscript Toledano.

So the situation is clear, namely that the Israeli judiciary has washed its hands and the Yitzhak Rabin government’s hands of the deportation crime and once again thrown the ball into the political court, which today is “international legitimacy’s” court.

Thus—on the basis of the same Israeli logic—the international community now has only two options: Either to adhere to the spirit of international legitimacy and punish Israel, or to respect Israeli “legitimacy” with its blatant contravention of UN resolutions and human rights, thus paralyzing any potential credibility for international legitimacy.

Regional Affairs

Iranian Feature Discusses Islamism, Intifadah
NC0902084493

Today's feature is devoted to the growth of Islamism in Palestine and starts with Palestinian music followed by Muslim, non-Muslim, and media views of the intifadah.

A commentary follows in which the radio recalls that the Palestinians' resistance was initially based on “Arab nationalism and deviant ideologies,” which led to their defeat in three Arab-Israeli wars, and adds: “Disillusioned, the Palestinian people, particularly the young generation from Arab nationalist movements and leftists, lacking trust in Arab regimes' ability to decisively support the Palestinian revolution, turned to Islam for salvation from the clutches of the regime usurping Palestine. The victory of the Islamic revolution of Iran came when the Arabs' compromising policies with the Zionist enemy were just being implemented.” The commentary adds: “You might say that the most important element leading to the emergence and expansion of the Islamic movement's activities in Palestine is based on two factors: the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the incompetence of Palestinian organizations to achieve their declared objectives, the liberation of Palestine.”

The commentary discusses the emergence of various Islamic groups in the occupied territories in the 1980s, saying: “Among these groups, the name of the Islamic Jihad Organization shines out. The Islamic Jihad quickly organized its forces and cadres that would play an active and effective role.” Discussing the organization’s “active presence” in various fields, the commentary refers to the arrest of 25 organization members in August-September 1983, sparking off “the Islamic Jihad's armed struggle,” which continued until 8 December 1987 when the intifadah was born.

The commentary adds: “Since the birth of the intifadah, the Zionist regime has paid dear in confronting the Islamic movement in Palestine. The arrest of intifadah leaders and supporters has not extinguished the Palestinian people's rage. The Zionists try—with another savage act—to crush the intifadah with all their might and fulfill their aggressive objectives. The recent arrest of over 400 intifadah children and their deportation to the south Lebanese border speaks of the Zionist regime's mad rage toward the true owners of Palestine.”

The commentary concludes: “Today the intifadah enters its sixth year and Palestinians are being deported from their homes and land. While the Zionist regime continues to resort to suppressive measures and strongly crushes the Palestinians, Arab countries either argue with each other or fan the flames of opposition and plots against the Islamic Republic of Iran. U.S. assistance to the Zionist regime increases.”

PLO Leader on Deportees, Peace Process
PM0401154693 Paris L'EXPRESS in French 8 Jan 93 p 11

[Interview with PLO Leader Yasir 'Arafat by Safa Haeri in Tunis; date not given]

[Text] [Haeri] Is there now a rapprochement between Hamas and the PLO?

['Arafat] Although Hamas has suspended its participation in the PLO since the start of the process in Madrid in 1991, dialogue has always existed. There is now very broad consultation with all the Palestinian organizations, whether or not they are members of the PLO, to discuss the fate of the deportees and I am satisfied that Hamas gave a positive response to our invitation.

[Haeri] Hamas and Islamic Jihad are insisting on the PLO leaving the negotiating table. What do you think of this demand?

['Arafat] I have told them repeatedly that, because I have been democratically elected as head of the executive council—the political program having been approved by the national council and the executive council—I have no choice but to ensure the implementation of that program, which implies our involvement in the peace process. We will therefore not go back on that. As regards Islamic Jihad, it is well known that that organization is an integral part of the Iranian intelligence service.

[Haeri] Are there disagreements between the PLO and the Palestinian delegation taking part in the peace negotiations?

['Arafat] There are fundamentally none. Contrary to what the Israelis are suggesting, there is no difference in assessment between the PLO and the delegation, because it represents the PLO and it is the PLO alone which issues the directives.

[Haeri] Has the Israeli Government's decision to expel 415 Palestinians, who are members of Hamas, paradoxically made contacts between Israel and the PLO easier?

['Arafat] No, quite the reverse! Unless Yitzhak Rabin reverses this “mass deportation” and this “collective punishment.” How can you expect us to continue to talk to the Israeli delegates, to participate in the negotiations, until the deportees are allowed to return? Israel must go back on its decision if it wishes to avoid scuttling the peace process.

[Haeri] What do you think of the attitude of the European countries?

['Arafat] We would have liked to see Europe play a more constructive, more important, firmer role. Especially since it is well aware of our problems....

[Haeri] What do you expect from the new U.S. administration?

['Arafat] Not much, for the present. We are waiting and watching. Although there has been no official contact between the PLO and the new Democrat team, we have
sent indirect messages to the United States. Our sincere wish is that Bill Clinton will honor his election promises about human rights, including those of the Palestinians, and that he will end the policy of double standards in the Near East.

PLO Organ Provides Biographic Info on Yasin
93AE0315B Nicosia AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
20 Dec 92 p 7

[Article: "Shaykh Yasin Remains Mentally Alert Despite Fading Eyesight and Life-Threatening Condition of His Health"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, the 56-year-old activist shaykh, is the man who founded Hamas, the Islamic resistance movement, in December 1987, a few days after the outbreak of the blessed intifadah. His attorney, 'Abd-al-Malik al-Dahamishah, says that Shaykh Yasin has virtually lost his hearing, that he cannot see with his right eye, and that he can barely see with his left eye.

Some weeks ago International Red Cross envoys were asked by the president of the state of Palestine to visit the shaykh in his place of detention. Palestinian detainees are doing everything they can to make the shaykh comfortable and to provide him with the services he needs. Although the activist shaykh is confined to a wheelchair, he remains alert and in full possession of his mental faculties.

Attorney al-Dahamishah warned of the consequences of the shaykh’s death in prison. He said that if Shaykh Yasin were to die in prison, his death would set off a strong wave of violence because the shaykh’s death in prison would appear more like a slow and deliberate murder that was carried out by the authorities.

The attorney indicated that the activist shaykh rejects the idea of being released and deported and that he often says, "I want to live and die in my home."

Shaykh Yasin has been confined to a wheelchair since he was 12 years old when he sustained a spinal injury while playing soccer in al-Shati’ Camp. The incident left him a quadriplegic.

Shaykh Yasin, who is 56 years old, was born in 1936 in the town of al-Majdal. He got married and fathered 11 sons, but in 1948 he and all the residents of his town were expelled by the occupiers who had destroyed the town completely. Despite his paralysis, Shaykh Yasin completed his secondary school education in Gaza, and he studied for one year at ‘Ayn Shams University in Cairo.

In 1984 Shaykh Yasin was arrested by the occupation authorities and sentenced to 12 years in prison, but he was released the following year in a prisoner exchange operation.

Then on 14 December 1992 he was arrested once again by the occupation authorities. During the trial he said, "The Jewish people were tormented, and they lived in the Diaspora throughout the world. Today, these same people are doing to the Palestinians what was done to them. History will not be merciful to you, and God will hold all of us accountable for our actions."

Islamic Jihad Leader on Territories, Iran
NC140212593Z Tehran ETTELA’AT in Persian
3 Feb 93 p 12

["Exclusive" interview with 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Awdah, spiritual leader of the Islamic Jihad Movement, by unidentified ETTELA’AT correspondent in Damascus; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[ETTELA’AT] Ten years after the creation of the Islamic Jihad Movement of Palestine and five years since the intifadah began, has the Islamic Jihad Movement been able to attain any specific objectives and to evolve its own course?

['Awdah] The people of Palestine view the Islamic Jihad Movement as the movement that will help them realize their aspirations after a long spell of disillusionment with other Islamic movements, especially after certain other Palestinian organizations joined in the so-called peace talks. I think the belief of the Palestinian people in the Islamic Jihad Movement is part of the process known as the Islamic awakening.

The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine should not dim the hopes of the oppressed Palestinians by becoming one of those political groups merely seeking greater influence. If it embarks on extending its installations and seeking such interests it will digest from its path and will have bartered away its Islamic slogans.

[ETTELA’AT] Is it possible to say that the conditions of jihad have become widespread in Palestine today?

['Awdah] Yes, in simple terms, jihad has become widespread in Palestine.

[ETTELA’AT] Why has the struggle of the Palestinian Muslims not attained any specific objectives, even after a few decades of struggle? What is the reason and what prospects of victory do you foresee?

['Awdah] We see the imminent victory of Islam on the Palestinian horizon and there is no doubt about it. [passage omitted]

Israel is trying to buy time by prolonging the talks so that it can continue its new moves in the occupied areas. This is because the international systems support Israel. If the talks ultimately result in autonomy for Palestinian the problem will not be resolved. Today it is obligatory for the Muslims to acquire real capabilities and upgrade their strength. They will gain nothing through the peace talks. [passage omitted]

[ETTELA’AT] What do you think about the deportees? Is it possible that they will return to the occupied areas? How will the deportation affect the current and future position of the intifadah?
[‘Awadah] The Jews have this program of evacuating the original residents and they carry out these deportations. There are 400 deportees in all. Say they each have families of an average of five members. This means that at least 2000 persons are affected.

Israel has constantly striven to evacuate Palestinian residents and to eliminate the Islamic forces—such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement, which are dissident forces who resist the compromising peace talks—that block its path.

As for the return of the deportees, when there is pressure on Israel, it is possible it will acquiesce and return them. There are those who can exert pressure on Israel, but they are supporting Israel instead. [passage omitted]

As for the intifadah, it is possible there is a short-term effect or lull but in the long term God willing, with divine succor, the outcome will be contrary to what Israel wants. God wants Islam to be established all over the world and today we see its spreading in Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria with God’s will.

If we do not have adequate resources to tackle the enemy at present we should persevere with patience and fortitude. [passage omitted]

[ETTELA’AT] What is your opinion of the coordination in the 10-member coalition among the various religious Sunni and Shiite groups? It appears that there is less harmony between these two groups.

[‘Awadah] Much work has been done regarding the proximity of these sects ever since the forties. An association was established for greater sectarian closeness by Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut, and the Shiites sect that follows the 12 Imams was officially recognized. In Tehran similar associations have been set up and many conferences are held on the subject.

[ETTELA’AT] What has the Islamic revolution of Iran done for Palestinians within the framework of its declared slogans?

[‘Awadah] I believe that despite the massive problems and embargoes against the Islamic revolution that you have faced, as well as the immense hostility, the Islamic revolution of Iran is the first revolution, country, and government where Islam reigns supreme. It is possible that Islam will also prevail in Sudan and both these countries will work for the expansion of the Islamic awakening. The Islamic Jihad Movement is one of the fruits of the auspicious Islamic revolution. Regarding your question about what the Islamic revolution has done for the Palestinians, the Islamic revolution itself is the greatest gift bestowed on the Islamic Jihad Movement. We should not view any particular moment in isolation to judge such issues. If this were so, perhaps we would state that the Islamic Republic of Iran is not active at present. We should view its overall trend. I consider this a great blessing.

The Palestine problem is not confined to the Palestinians or Arabs, it is the problem of all the Muslims and the Islamic Republic of Iran has always stressed this fact in all its statements and stances.

Iran cannot confront Israel directly but it can support the Islamic Jihad forces more. These actions are inherently part of the Islamic revolution. The Palestine issue is incorporated in the Iranian policy and in its slogans. We pray that the Islamic Republic of Iran will continue with its stances and slogans.

[ETTELA’AT] Is there anything special that you think can be done by Iran that has not been done so far?

[‘Awadah] As far as slogans are concerned, one can say that obviously they cannot materialize immediately. Slogans such as “Death to Israel!” and “Israel should be destroyed!” are in fact a statement of objectives and aspirations. These help to strengthen the campaign against Israel. We do not say that Iran merely voices slogans but these slogans need time to materialize. If this is what people say, it means they have not understood Iran correctly. [passage omitted]

**Jihad Denies Connection With Israeli Pilot**

*NCT001104693 Tehran RESALAT in Persian 24 Dec 92 pp 16, 13*

[Interview with ‘Ali Abu-Jihad Muhammad, Islamic Jihad Movement representative in Tehran by unidentified RESALAT representative; date not given]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

[RESALAT] What information does the Islamic Jihad have on the Israeli pilot Ron Arad?

[Muhammad] There is a misconception; some propaganda organizations do not know the difference between the Islamic Jihad Movement of Palestine and the Islamic Jihad Organization. The former is in Palestine and has evolved there, while the Islamic Jihad Organization is a security and military organization in Lebanon that has dealt blows to the Zionist regime's interests. This organization is basically Lebanese and with regard to the pilot, I should state that he is in the hands of the Islamic Jihad Organization. [passage omitted]

**Islamic Jihad Official on Ties To PLO**

*NCT001131593 Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 2 Jan 93 p 16*

[Interview with ‘Ali Abu-Jihad Muhammad, Islamic Jihad Movement representative in Tehran by unidentified KEYHAN correspondent; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[KEYHAN] Following the recent developments that culminated in the deportation of the elite Palestinian figures from the occupied areas, what is the position of the Islamic forces?

[Muhammad] In the wake of these developments, it is being observed that the presence of Islamists and their meritorious operations have been remarkable. In the
past few months, the Islamic forces have launched various operations against the Zionist enemy. [passage omitted]

[KEYHAN] Is the tilt of Hamas toward the PLO a result of the recent events or did the conditions exist earlier and the execution of the Israeli officer merely served as a catalyst?

[Muhammad] This trend was already present in Hamas and in the past few years they had announced their willingness to participate in the Palestinian National Council. The only disagreement they had was on the number of seats allotted to them. In addition, a meeting between 'Arafat and Hamas representatives took place in Sudan. Another meeting was scheduled in Khartoum but it was postponed because of the bloody tension between the supporters of the two groups in the occupied areas.

Now the questions that arise are: What are the reasons for the current meeting? Has the PLO reneged on its former stance and turned its back on the peace talks or are there other considerations that will eventually come to light?

[KEYHAN] Do you foresee the Islamic Jihad Movement going to Tunis in the near future for talks with the PLO leaders, as Hamas did?

[Muhammad] With regard to relations with the PLO, it may be said that our viewpoint is based on a series of principled stances. We think the PLO should adopt a militant stance against the Zionists. Reneging on the firm national objectives of Palestine or ignoring them cannot be allowed. Palestinian land is the natural and indisputable right of the Palestinian nation. Struggle against the enemy should always continue. The intifadah should not be used to attain political solutions. The Islamic Jihad Movement expresses regret that the PLO, which claims to be a proponent of democracy, has initiated an extensive propaganda campaign against the Islamic Jihad Movement. [passage omitted]

As for the possibility of our going to Tunis for talks with PLO leaders, we have already declared our stance. In the course of the 10 years of its struggle, the Islamic Jihad Movement has never resorted to tactics that could drive a wedge in the Palestinian ranks. To date there have been no confrontations or tensions between the Islamic Jihad Movement and other Palestinian groups. We have always endured any pressure exerted on us and we have striven to direct our responses toward the Zionist enemy.

The Islamic Jihad Movement has always eschewed any discord or creating a fissure in Palestinian ranks and supports wholesome negotiations among various Palestinian factions, while at the same time adhering to its policy of armed jihad.

[KEYHAN] What are the effective political measures taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran for the Palestinian deportees?

[Muhammad] In fact the support and assistance of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the Palestinians and Palestine is not a new phenomenon. When the Palestinian brothers were deported, the Iranian Foreign Ministry initiated extensive activity among international political circles. In a meeting I had with Deputy Foreign Minister Sherkholeslam, he said that it has been decided to send assistance to them. The Islamic Jihad Movement hereby conveys its appreciation and gratitude to the Islamic Republic of Iran's officials.

Hamas Views on Autonomy 'Dangers'
92AE0318A London FILASTIN AL-MUSLIMAH in Arabic October 92 pp 18-19

[Article by Khalid al-Harub; The Islamists: What Is After Autonomy"

[Text] Hamas declared its clear position of autonomy and the elections leading to it. It clearly rejects this idea, considering it equivalent to conceding the basic rights of the Palestinian people through the negotiations that started in Madrid. By this declaration, the characteristics of the Palestinian political arena for the coming period became very clear. On the one hand, there would be clearer differences between what is labeled as the official Palestinian policy and that of the opposition, and on the other hand, there would be new climates that might bridge the gap between the two political lines or widen it. Particularly, Hamas's rejection of autonomy and the elections has greatly assured the Palestinian official line, that was afraid during the past few months, of such participation. Its consequences could result in great progress for the opposition regarding the political resolution making and changing its strength. This fear led to instigating the conflict with the Islamists in the Gaza Strip and attempting to liquidate their leaders who could pose a threat in the elections.

With the renewal of the general features of the coming political scene, it is necessary for all to study and analyze its components and dangers. Prior to studying these components and dangers represented in the autonomy stage, it is preferable to mention the basis of the position of the Islamists that refuse autonomy and its elections. Most important of the bases are:

The first basis: Complete harmony with the established position regarding the current peace process based on unilateral concessions. This position rejects it in letter and in spirit considering it an historical concession in the minimum rights of our Palestinian people. Rejecting autonomy and its elections is a natural extension of rejecting the general framework of the process of concessions.

The second basis: Commitment to keeping the political balance in the Palestinian arena by means of maintaining the opposition and not thronging to the perils of the settlement process. Enhancing the opposition led by Hamas is accomplished through opposing the results of
this process whatever the price might be and ascertaining the inadmissibility of resorting to the use of violence in stressing this opposition.

The third basis: Maintaining the clarity of hope and historical vision of the conflict as well as the future possibilities accomplished by the betterment of the Arab and Islamic positions. The conflict in Palestine is not a conflict between Zionists and the Palestinians, it is rather a conflict between the Zionist idea on the one hand and the Arab and Islamic nation on the other. There should be a sustained communication between Palestine and its people on the inside and the nation at large on the outside regardless of the degree of deterioration that the nation suffers from.

The fourth basis: Avoiding calculating profits and losses in taking an historical position. It is clear that such a basic position based on the numerous cultural horizons of the conflict did not favor the consequences that could adversely affect the Islamists as a result of this position. These consequences could be numerous but most important of which could be:

1. Being alienated from the circles of political decision-making. It is clear that abiding by the line of opposition and not participating in autonomy means that the Palestinian official line will unilaterally make decisions on the national level and disregard the opposition. The Arabs mentality, including the Palestinian mentality, regards the other opinion as nonexistent and does not give it its due respect.

2. Vulnerability to liquidation: This is a true threat that could come up when a unilateral autonomous authority is formed, which in this case is the Palestinian official line. Members of this line unjustifiably hate the Islamists. The leaders of this group described the agreements that ended the conflicts between the PLO and Hamas at the Gaza Strip three months ago as a mere armistice saying that the real liquidation will take place after ascending to power.

3. The threat of not halting the secular trend: Being away from the circle of administrative decision-making would clear the way for secular extremist trends held by a group of leaders and members of the Palestinian official institution to support secularizing the society and threatening its religious and historical values through the nature of the relationship with the supreme authority Israel or with the western parties cosponsoring autonomy.

4. Repeating the experiment of the national state in the Arab world in its dealing with the Islamic revival either by political and media marginalization (despite the non-existence of a Palestinian state) or by means of blocking it and falsifying accusations to achieve physical liquidation as previously mentioned.

These losses and many others may affect the Islamic trend and subsequently the Palestinian society at large being either political losses or losses to the trend they would affect the national cause.

National Fears and Responsibilities

The coming stage of autonomy and its developments is laden with a number of dangers that we hope will never come true. Confronting it and preventing it from materializing is a major collective responsibility from which nobody is exempted regardless of their political plateau. This means that the alliance to confront it includes the Islamists and their allies and all the factions refusing the settlement, be they nationalists or leftists or otherwise, the numerous national and independent personalities and the PLO authentic factions that insist on their principles and refuse the settlement. Outside the Palestinian arena, it includes all the Islamic, Arabic, and independent trends and all those concerned with the future of the issue and the nation in the Arab and Islamic world.

The importance of expanding such a front is parallel to the danger and potentials. They are complicated dangers that affect the core and the future of the cause.

Political Dangers

In addition to the future of the political situation represented in the supremacy of the Zionist element in the area, whether on the national level or in the region at large, due to the elements of political and military powers and the Western connections that it enjoys, there is the fear of the establishment of an axis under the name of the confederacy that was called for in numerous statements of leaders of the Palestinian official lines and expressed in the willingness of establishing an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian confederacy. This proposal adds Jordan in an attempt to cover the ugliness of its core. It is fortunate that Jordan has refused this idea on the basis that it has no problem as far as sovereignty or on the level of the political entity. It is expected that this proposal will continue in the form of a call for an Israeli-Palestinian confederacy. This means the establishment of a new and strange political axis attempting to force the victim to meet with the predator in all aspects of life. On the level of the political leadership, the Palestinian side will be a domesticated follower of the strong Israeli side. This axis will follow every direction except the interests of the nation.

This proposal carries a real and eminent danger. It will threaten Arab entities and societies based on the regional idea of the Palestinian entity regardless of its relations with the Arab and Islamic societies and attempting to replace these relations by stressing the historical Canaanite Phoenician dimensions of the Palestinian people of which Arab and Islam is just a stage in its development according to the proponents of this proposal.

This proposal will be enhanced by the feeling of bitterness and disappointment of wide sections of our Palestinian people towards the Arab and Islamic positions from the Palestinian cause so that these feelings would include the essence of the Arab and Islamic affiliation.
Dangers of Naturalization

It is self-evident that the most important Zionist objective of the settlement process is to achieve naturalization in the political economic cultural and social relations with the Arab societies and putting an end to the conflict stage to start the stage of supremacy and containment under the pretext of cooperation and naturalization. The losses of this stage are far greater than the losses of the first stage as the losses of the first stage were limited to military defeats of the current regimes while there was still Arab and Islamic tension against the Zionist entity. The naturalization stage aims at eliminating this national feeling and attempting to liquidate any feelings for revenge and continuing the struggle. This will be realized through the cultural and social behavioral patterns that will be imposed on the societies and through the economic voracity that will plague the region both as institutions and individuals seeking self-interests the horizons of which have expanded after entering the era of the Zionist economy. This is in addition to the potential threat from the concessionary economic relations expected to be formed between the authority of autonomy and the Islamic societies, which will need Asians in the Arab region that are socially acceptable to market its products. This economy will entrust the Palestinians with this assignment while attempting to change the psychology of the Arab and Islamic societies. The dangers of the naturalization process are summarized in changing our region to a Zionist one after is has been secularized. The Western and Zionist planners as well as their Arab and Palestinian allies will lay down the basis of the relations between the individuals, the institutions, and the regimes in such a manner that will neutralize and alienate all religious, cultural, and historical values and visions to be replaced by the slogans of private interests and the relations of cooperation within the framework of the region rather than within the framework of one nation or common history. By so doing the very description of the Middle East region will be realized, which includes Israel, Turkey, Cyprus and all the Arab countries. All efforts will be devoted to develop bilateral relations among the countries of this region so that a number of Arab regimes will compete to develop relations with the new sisterly country (Israel). These relations have been expected by many for a long time.

The dangers expressed by the Islamists regarding the bad intentions of some of the leaders of the mainstream of the PLO are not baseless. Such dangers will be eliminated by means of real and extended agreements under the supervision of independent parties representing the silent majority of our people that has long been paying the price for the conflicts.

These suspicions are increasing under the analysis that the policy of Rabin is different from that of Shamir claiming that it eases the Zionists grasp and to pave the way for increased inter-Palestinian conflicts. Rabin's policy is based on the assumption that giving the Palestinians any better results, however marginal, would lead to their fighting over such a result to the extent that the bitterness of the people would lead it to hope for the Zionist occupation once more. Such a conflict would last much longer than the five-year transitional period and would be more than enough to prove the failure of the Palestinians and their being ineligible to more towards the stage of the final settlement.

Dangers of Division

The national, historic, and Islamic responsibility of our nation is doubled when considering the effect of forcing the Hebrew state inside the Arab and Islamic system on the concepts of unity and integration even on the theoretical level. The calls for unity that have been wakened by the narrow nationalistic ideas in the Arab and Islamic world will face an additional fierce opponent that has enough viciousness, cunning, and foresight to continue working around the clock to weaken the trends of unity. This is in addition to the agreements that will be concluded between the Hebrew state and all its neighboring countries, which will include the rejection of any form of unity or solidarity without Zionist approval on the basis that such unity would pose a danger to the Zionist entity that will be the only criteria governing inter-Arab relations.

A quick review of the consequences of the stage of autonomy and its development would lead to analyzing many dangers that could be realized and lead to devastation in the near future unless we confront them.

Hamas Spokesman on Fatah Talks, Deportees

JN0102093193 Paris AL-MUHARRIR in Arabic
1 Feb 93 p 3

[Interview with Ibrahim Ghashshah, the official spokesman of Hamas Movement, by AL-MUHARRIR; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] [AL-MUHARRIR] The picture of what happened at the meetings with the PLO in Tunis and Khartoum is still hazy. Are you serious about joining the PLO establishments?

[Ghashshah] The dialogue between Fatah and Hamas is still in its early stages. It was preceded by other meetings, and it needs intensive efforts by the leaderships of the two movements in order to advance the dialogue on the
right path because dialogue is in the interest of the Palestinian people inside, and everywhere. [passage omitted]

[AL-MUHARRIR] Have you received offers to participate in the PLO establishments, namely the Palestine National Council [PNC]?

[Ghawshah] We have not received specific offers, but the principle of participation in the PLO establishments was discussed with us. We made it clear to the brothers in Fatah that we intend to join the Palestinian establishments within the framework of the facts to which I referred.

[AL-MUHARRIR] But you are asking for 40 percent of the PNC seats while in the past you were offered only 18 seats. Has this position changed?

[Ghawshah] This subject leads us to debate the setup of the PNC. We, in Hamas, believe that it is time to reshape the PNC on civilized and modern principles that reflect the leanings of the Palestinian people in a true and accurate manner. The principles on which the PNC was established are obsolete, and they do not really represent the people at present. [passage omitted]

Some brothers in the PLO say that it is impossible to hold elections. We say that it is difficult, but not impossible. Why doesn’t the PLO start raising this issue with the Arab countries, the United Nations, and the six million Palestinian people?

It is time for the emergence of a Palestinian leadership that really represents what the people want. We do not accept some people’s monopolization of our people’s representation. We respect the Palestinian factions that led the PLO for more than 25 years, but who said that this same faction should lead the Palestinian people for another 25 years? This is a monopoly that we will not accept.

If we succeed in holding elections, they will be the only accurate standard for indicating the superiority of one faction over another, and defining the sizes of the Palestinian forces. But should it be impossible to hold elections, then an agreement should be reached on new specific standards that “weigh” the strength of each faction now, not 15 or 20 years ago. We believe that following the recent developments, Hamas’ weight has practically increased to more than 40 percent. If elections are held, we will realize a landslide victory.

[AL-MUHARRIR] In last year’s elections, you obtained only 18 percent of the votes. How then can you ask for 40 percent of the seats in the PNC?

[Ghawshah] If we view last year’s elections in the trade unions, universities, chambers of commerce, and other places as a yardstick, we find that the Hamas Movement obtained 45 percent of all the votes while we obtained only 20 percent of the total number of seats. There is a difference between the total number of votes and the seats.

We only want what our size gives us as there is no justice if we obtain less than this. We believe this can be discussed at a comprehensive national dialogue conference, particularly that we are ready to discuss all ideas with open hearts and minds. [passage omitted]

[AL-MUHARRIR] The agreement that was announced [between Hamas and Fatah in Khartoum] contains the formation of a command in the occupied territories. Will it replace the Unified National Leadership of the Intifadah [UNLI]?

[Ghawshah] It was agreed to form a joint command in the occupied territories. This is one of the positive results of the Khartoum meeting. This command will be an Islamic and national command that will be open to all the Palestinian factions without any exception. It will be responsible for issuing the statements that address our people in the occupied territories. Thus, the UNLI and Hamas will stop issuing statements separately. However, such a measure needs further meetings and dialogue between the Fatah and Hamas Movements, and the other Palestinian factions to agree on a political militant program that will take into consideration the Palestinian people’s constants and become a guideline for jihad operations in the occupied territories.

[AL-MUHARRIR] Will it replace UNLI?

[Ghawshah] Of course. This joint command will replace everything that exists in the arena.[passage omitted]

[AL-MUHARRIR] The Palestinian deportees are experiencing harsh conditions. Some sources have leaked scenarios for a solution and that there is some kind of a deal under way to end the problem?

[Ghawshah] Let us first agree that Rabin’s step of deporting 415 Palestinians has led to fatal mistakes. As Palestinians, we should exploit these mistakes to expose Rabin on the domestic and international level. We are certain that Rabin finds himself in a dilemma and wants to extricate himself from it with the minimum losses. That’s why he seeks to circumvent the deportees issue by submitting specific solutions. I believe that the stand on the deportation issue is decided in the international arena since it is a just cause. As for what you say about a deal that is being prepared, some Arab parties might be deceived by Rabin’s sweet talk. But, we warn all Arab parties against taking any measures that circumvent the issue or that fragment it. Our stand is clear and is based on the need to have the deportees return to Palestine. [passage omitted]

[AL-MUHARRIR] You are linking the question of the deportees to the negotiations and the intifadah. Do you view the question of the deportees as an indivisible whole, away from partial solutions and compromise?

[Ghawshah] Our position is clear. No to partial solutions and no to turning the question of deportees into a humanitarian issue or fragmenting it. We are convinced that further patience is bound to break Rabin’s hard-line policy. I do not discount the fall of Rabin’s government
as a result of the deportation, which raised many questions within the Zionist entity, which thinks that the deportation has harmed its interests. [passage omitted]

[AL-MUHARRIR] While talking about the question of the deportees, there emerges the U.S. position with its traditional support for Israel. Washington has threatened to use its veto right against any resolution in the interest of the deportees and against the implementation of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. How do you view the U.S. position?

[Ghawshah] Even if the United States uses its veto right, this will be a gain for our people, because the world will discover and ascertain the degree of U.S. bias toward the Zionist enemy with regard to a clear-cut issue, like that of the deportees. [passage omitted]

[AL-MUHARRIR] Suppose that the question of the deportees was resolved once and for all, how do you view the future?

[Ghawshah] Hamas is part of the Islamic movement worldwide. Our stand is clear and decisive. We do not think that 44 years of occupation is a long period. Algeria remained under occupation for 130 years, but it is now independent. Therefore, 44 years is not really a long time. When we demand a Palestine extending from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean, we are being objective and realistic more than those who want to liberate 22 percent of the land of Palestine. In the 1967 deal, Jerusalem seems away from the negotiations while settlement activity continues. [sentence as published] The Palestinian people are offered only self-rule over the inhabitants. Therefore, when we join the PLO, we will do our best to uphold the slogan of regaining all of Palestine from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean and to rally the Arab and Islamic nation around this slogan. That is why we totally reject the theory of setting up a Palestinian state and an Israeli state. Our cause is alive, and we have not given up hope.

[AL-MUHARRIR] Some Palestinian voices are demanding placing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under UN supervision. What do you think?

[Ghawshah] We are for ending the occupation. When the intifadah first erupted, its chief concern was to end Zionist occupation. If this happens in either the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, then we will support it on the condition that this should not result in recognizing Israel or relinquishing Palestine.

We believe that Israel will not withdraw unless it is riddled with wounds. If Israeli forces withdraw, then we do not mind having a phased national Palestinian entity with an Islamic substance in accordance with a democratic approach.

AL-SHIRA' Profiles Hamas Funding, Membership
93AE0238A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic
28 Dec 92 pp 17-21

[Article by Zaynab al-Farran: "Hamas Emerged From Muslim Brotherhood at Outset of Intifadah"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Political Islam in Palestine is not new. In the political notebook and in organizational action, political Islam dates back to the early beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood's experiment in Egypt. Even Yasir 'Arafat himself emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood ranks to join the political action arena. While famous for being head of the PLO, which combines within its folds nationalists, pan-Arabs, and leftists simultaneously, the Palestinian political salon has always circulated reports saying that even though 'Arafat has become a Palestinian symbol, the man maintains his own special political plan in Fatah. What is meant by this plan is the Islamic Liberation Party.

Some Palestinian circles note the above to show that until the arrival of the nationalist and leftist 1960's and 1970's, political Islam continued to find for itself in the Palestinian arena spaces, though narrow or concealed, through which to interact. It is on record how Abu-Jihad devised for Palestinian and Arab Islamists frameworks that he financed with his own money, beginning with the September Martyrs Battalion and ending with the Maoist Islamists, with other, lesser frameworks in between. But they all sought to polarize this "Islamic giant," of whose developing features Khalil al-Wazir was aware even at that time.

Abu-Jihad was not divining at the time because ramifications of the Iranian revolution's success to the region were undoubtedly clear. The fact is that the burning of the Israeli flag flying over the Israeli Embassy in Iran and raising the Palestinian flag in its place and then turning that place into the Embassy of Palestine had the best impact on the Palestinian people, the PLO bases themselves, and even the PLO's Arab supporters. It was normal that that development would be followed by a debate on Islam's role in mobilizing the capacities to liberate Palestine. It is needless to say that on its part, Iran did not allow this opportunity to pass without reinforcing it with various means. This led ultimately to the development of firm relations between Tehran and broad segments in the Palestinian arena. These are the relations that are rejected by 'Arafat and that he characterizes as intervention in Palestinian domestic affairs, whereas Hamas sees in them nothing more than a position of support for the Islamists plan in the Palestinian arena. [passage omitted]

Hamas emerged with the onset of the intifadah [uprising]. However, it did not emerge from void but from the experience of an Islamic movement, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, which has benefited from the intellectual and political legacy of the Islamic movements with their various hues. Thus, it cannot be said that Hamas has no roots and origins in this reality.
distinguishes Hamas is that it reflects a modern plan for the struggling Islamic movement, which combines adopting the Islamist plan with confronting the enemy.

Hamas represents a certain faction no longer. Rather, it has become a vessel that accommodates all sectors that believe in the Islamist plan as a cultural and struggle plan for the liberation of Palestine. Therefore, Hamas is no longer a Muslim Brotherhood movement, as evidenced by the fact that it has opened its membership to whoever believes in the “Islamist line of struggle.” Hamas believes that the Palestinian issue has its special character and is convinced that it is not the issue of the Palestinians solely because there is Arab and Islamic consensus on the important and central place of this issue, contrary to numerous current Islamic issues on which there is no consensus and which are the subject of debate and controversy.

In the 1950’s and 1960’s and during the Arab-Arab tide, there was a debate in the Arab arena on whether the means should be secured for a free] Palestine first or for Arab unity first. Within the same context, a debate went on among the Islamists on whether it should be the Islamic state first or Palestine first.

But Hamas sees that there is no contradiction and no conflict between the two slogans, and this is why the Islamist movements must proceed in both directions simultaneously. Whichever is accomplished first will help accomplish the other objective, meaning that if Palestine is liberated first, then one of the biggest obstacles facing the Islamist plan will be eliminated, and if an Islamic state is created first in any Arab area, then it will contribute positively to the Palestine liberation plan. This is why Hamas’s opinion, which has advocated struggle in the arena and has eliminated a theoretical controversy that could have continued to exist and could have influenced both plans [slogans] negatively.

Hamas also sees the ongoing debate in the Arab arena on whether to Westernize or maintain pure origins as an intellectual debate that must be the subject of discussion and interpretation in the Islamic intellectual circles that should be engaged in constant dialogue to enrich the Islamic thought, not allowing it to be confined to certain corners so that the door cannot be shut in the face of this thought and of its interaction with the activity of daily life. On the other hand, Hamas finds itself unconcerned with details of the intellectual issues because it has established the Islamist plan as a methodical framework that governs its visions, actions, and conduct and because it has established Palestine as its top priority. However, Hamas does not view what comes to it from outside the Islamist plan with a “hesitant and frightened isolationist look.” It believes that wisdom is the believer’s object of desire and that if he finds it, then he is the one most entitled to it. This is why Hamas deals with what presents itself to it realistically, according to Muhammad Nazzal, Hamas’ spokesman in Jordan, who has said that the “movement embraces whatever it believes will serve its plan and its nation, regardless of its source, and renounces whatever it believes will fail to serve its plan and its nation. There are no serious and absolute positions to be discussed insofar as intellectual issues are concerned, keeping in mind that one must define a general framework from which people proceed to view issues. Islam is the framework from which Hamas proceeds.”

Islamic Plan

It is Hamas’s opinion that there are many people and parties who talk about Islam but fail to present it properly to others, thus evoking among them numerous fears regarding the Islamist plan that is being discussed. This is why the others are afraid to accept this plan and reluctant to deal with it. Hamas calls the plan it offers the “revival and progress plan,” which deals with the [Palestinian] people’s national problems and with general problems at the Arab and Islamic level. This is why it is not a sectarian plan that deals just with the Muslims' problems, but rather a plan that deals with the problems of non-Muslims who have merged and interacted with the Muslim society and become an indivisible part of this society. This plan does not deal with non-Muslims as inferiors or as a minority. Moreover, the Islamist plan projected by Hamas means ensuring the freedom of belief—no coercion in faith—and it guarantees that every member of this society will exercise his right to express his opinion within a general framework agreed upon by the various members of the people or of the nation. Hamas also believes that the plan it is projecting is not an isolationist plan that is confined to a special canton but that it is a plan that deals with the others, enriches human life, and serves the progress of mankind. These are the features of the plan. Hamas sees that the plan is not yet complete and that a long time is needed to clarify it.

Way Stations on Hamas’s Course

In the 1960’s and 1970’s, the Muslim Brotherhood had its concerns as a result of what had happened to the Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere. The harassment and the persecution that the movement encountered at the time contributed to evoking violent reactions among broad sectors of the movement. Some retreated to self-isolation. Others saw their contribution as the PLO, which was at the time at most giving, as an inlet to continuing their action. A third part believed that the Islamic movement had to withdraw from the intellectual and political arena because, from a strategic prospective, it had to develop organizational strength, infiltrate societies, and create institutions. They believed, therefore, that there would be a phase of inactivity followed by a phase in which the movement would march into the political arena, would interact with society’s movement, and would confront the enemy. This is why it can be said that the early 1980’s represented a new phase for the modern Islamic movement in Palestine, considering that a number of forces embracing the Islamist plan as a “revival and struggle” plan came into existence. These forces continued to grow with the accelerating rise of the Islamic tendency, culminating in the eruption of the
intifadah, which has represented a new phase, not just for the Islamic movement but also for the Palestinian people.

Thus, it can be said that Hamas represents a new phase in terms of both slogan and form. As for content, it entrenches an old reality rooted in the hearts of the Palestinian people. But Hamas believes that the movement in its present form represents a rejuvenation of the Islamic movement. It also believes that the Islamic movement must not develop according to a certain mold and then freeze within this mold. Rather, it must continue to develop and must renew its methods of action, its policies, and its programs. Therefore, it is Hamas's viewpoint that the Islamic movement must not cling to outdated forms or phases. This is why it can be said that Hamas considers itself a new and advanced phase of the modern Islamic movement in Palestine. In its structure and its actions, Hamas tries to surpass partisan or sectarian methods and to present itself as a popular mass movement that includes all citizens in confronting the enemy.

Hamas Movement Organization

Hamas believes that the big mistake made by modern Palestinian organizations is in the fact that they launched themselves abroad, not at home, and that their decision-making and influence-exerting center is abroad. This is why some people want to direct Palestinian action by "remote control, fax," or telephone. Hamas sees that one must take advantage of this experience by focusing on the interior [occupied territories] and by viewing it as a starting point and a field of reaction and confrontation. For Hamas, the exterior exists to support the interior. Hamas stresses, meanwhile, that the interior and the exterior represent the same thing and are a practical proof of the people's unity and of everybody's responsibility for confrontation and development. It is on the basis of these considerations that Hamas launched itself into the arena of struggle and confrontation.

Hamas has an executive leadership that takes care of implementing the movement's policy, and it has higher consultative councils that draft its policies and make their decision with numerical majority after discussion and debate. It also has specialized agencies that deal with various issues according to their jurisdiction. Hamas's eagerness not to let its organizational structure be exposed to attack or harm has made it eager to engulf this structure in privacy and secrecy to keep it safe from strikes. Hamas has been hit repeatedly, and Israel has succeeded in disassembling a central part of the movement's structure. But Hamas has always succeeded in producing new leaders and in restoring its organizational structure. Hamas has organizational extensions that are embodied in individuals and persons who move in the Arab and Islamic region to rally support for Hamas, to fly its banner, and to defend it. These extensions complement Hamas's presence at home and integrate the interior and the exterior.

On the basis of the theory of unity of the interior and the exterior, Hamas has one leadership that represents both interior and exterior, despite the fact that the interior has broad representation in the movement because it constitutes the backbone in the struggle and confrontation arena.

Hamas Financing Sources

Financially, Hamas has learned a lesson from the PLO experiment. This is why it focuses on the interior to secure a large part of the financial requirements for its activity. The PLO's problem is that it has formed armies, established camps, and created military militias. This has caused it to strain under enormous financial burdens and compelled it to spend on these full-time employees who have now become an unemployed army, especially in light of the suspended military activity and the dispersal of these armies in various places outside Palestine. Hamas has learned its lesson from this experience, thus focusing on creating its groups and its institutions at home and has avoided the full-time employment of vast numbers of cadres that could drain large financial resources out of its budget.

While the PLO has established offices and embassies in most parts of the world, thus becoming an institution that finances the salaries of its fulltime cadres, Hamas has, according to Muhammad Nazzal, tried to avoid the PLO mistakes in establishing its institutions. Nazzal has stressed that Hamas finances are confined to collecting donations from popular bodies and organizations in the Arab and Islamic region and that these donations constitute the minimum needed to manage the movement's work and activities, keeping in mind that Hamas has not shut the door in the face of the idea of cultivating other financial sources to ensure continuation of the movement and to enable it to carry on with its plan without obstacles that impede its activity. In light of the reports about Iranian support for the movement, Hamas asserts that it has not received a single penny from any Arab or Islamic government, even though it is not opposed to receiving any unconditional aid, considering that the Palestinian cause is a burden that should be shared by all. But on the other hand, Hamas denies that it benefits from the support given by some official Arab and Islamic circles to Islamic institutions existing in the occupied territories, such as the Islamic University of Gaza.

Membership Requirements

The fact is that Hamas's reliance on ordinary Palestinians has caused it to be flexible in terms of the qualities of the individuals who join it, meaning that the movement's organizational structure is no longer established or formed according to the conventional structure of closed underground organizations, which ordinarily are strict regarding the character and qualities of those who join them. This flexibility does not reach the point of laxity, but it is intended to create a flexibility that enables the movement's various frameworks to absorb whoever wishes to join the movement, provided that he
adheres to the Islamist plan in principle, that he possesses general Islamic ethics and values, and that he is known as an individual who does not offend these values. Performing the basic Islamic fundamental duties is one of the conditions for joining Hamas. As for Christians, the movement can absorb them by trying to lighten the membership requirements connected with these duties as much as possible.

It cannot be said here that the requirements established for joining Hamas ensure a minimal degree of checking on the loyalty and purity of the elements that join the movement. Time is needed to judge this matter. Hamas tries constantly to develop preventive means to confront the infiltration attempts that are made, not just by Israel, but also by some Palestinian rivals. Hamas deals with ethical violations committed by its members through internal rules and regulations that begin with a warning and culminate with expulsion. Hamas applies the Islamic shari‘ah and the death penalty to agents only.

Women in Hamas

The political rhetoric of Hamas’ Islamist plan addresses both men and women, not confining itself to just one of them. This is because Hamas believes that women are equal to men in rights and duties, except for what is in conflict with women’s nature and with their special position insofar as certain issues are concerned. Therefore, women have an influential role in the movement, and they make constant efforts to develop this role so it can represent an advanced condition in the circles of the Islamic movement, some of which continue to deal with women as inferiors. Hamas demands that women who join it meet the same requirements as men, given the religious duties as well as what is permitted and what is proscribed. Thus, a female member has to adhere to any decisive shari‘ah provision that a male member has to observe. Women are also required to wear a veil to be accepted as members of the movement.

Islamic-Nationalist Axis

In this regard, there is ambiguity regarding Hamas’s position. However, Hamas does not project a plan for a merger among the pan-Arabist and Islamist factions. Rather, it proposes a framework for coordination among the factions that agree on a political program that rejects the current settlement proposal for the Palestinian issue. Hamas surpasses the intellectual starting points from which these factions proceed, focusing on the need to develop common factors on which these factions agree. In this phase, Hamas is engaged in dialogue with these factions, excluding no faction other than those that have enjoined the political settlement, because their programs are in total conflict with Hamas’ program.

Hamas and PLO

Hamas views the PLO as a Palestinian national framework. It has no objection in principle to joining this framework as a coalition that encompasses the Palestinian forces that agree on national constants. Hamas believes that in this phase this framework encompasses various Palestinian factions that do not agree on definite constants because these constants have been surpassed by the PLO leadership. The political plan projected currently is in conflict with and cancels these constants. Hamas believes that the PLO has turned into an official Arab regime that harbors all of the maladies of the Arab regime, including bureaucracy, administrative and financial corruption, dictatorship, and individualism. This organization has become a representative of the individual and is no longer a democratic institution. It is not even close to democratic, keeping in mind that there has been improvement in the institutions of some Arab regimes that exceeds the improvements in the various PLO institutions. Hamas has proposed its vision for reforming these institutions. In any case, Hamas is eager to maintain this framework as a minimum in the current phase while it entertains the great hope that this framework will be developed and that the gaps from which it suffers will be eliminated.

Relations Between Hamas and Fatah

Fatah and Hamas represent the two biggest Palestinian factions in the occupied territories. It is well known that Fatah monopolized the Palestinian arena at one time and that this monopoly persisted until Hamas emerged. This emergence contributed to creating competitive sensitivities and to attempts on Fatah’s part to curtail Hamas’ influence. Fatah’s accession to the political settlement has contributed to widening the rift between the two movements and to touching off large-scale disagreements between them.

According to Hamas, the disagreement with Fatah is not a disagreement between two organizations. It is a disagreement with an authoritarian Fatah leadership that controls affairs and takes a severe position toward Hamas.

Hamas believes that large segments of Fatah are inclined to establish good relations with Hamas and prefer an understanding with Hamas to feuding and fighting with it. But Fatah’s authoritarian leadership does not want this understanding and works to widen the rift. It views Hamas as a dangerous foe that poses a threat to its influence, its privileges, and its gains.

In Hamas’ opinion, this problem can be solved only if Fatah deals with Hamas pragmatically, not theoretically, and views Hamas as an existing reality that must not be abolished or excluded. In return, Hamas does not wish to disregard Fatah’s struggle history. The solution, in Hamas’s opinion, is in letting the public interest predominate the private interest, in renouncing the factional and partisan spirit, in laying down the rules for agreement and disagreement, and in dealing with problems promptly and constantly so as not to allow them to assume greater dimensions and to fester in a manner that affects the course of the Palestinian issue negatively.
Intifadah's Future

In wake of the clashes that have taken place between Fatah and Hamas at home, Hamas feels concerned for the future of the intifadah. The intifadah is, in Hamas's opinion, a necessary and important condition, and it constitutes a fundamental strategic mainstay for liberating Palestine. Hamas believes that in its current condition, the intifadah cannot accomplish the goal it wishes to accomplish and that it constitutes a phase toward the strategic goal for which the Palestinian people aspire. It also believes that the intifadah must continue and that efforts must be made to develop it as much as possible. As for the negatives, they must be dealt with and obviated and must not be allowed to form an obstacle to the intifadah’s continuation.

The intifadah has been characterized by the phenomenon of liquidating collaborators—a phenomenon that has created a controversy in the Palestinian arena. Hamas is considered a supporter of the continuation of this phenomenon, provided that it is codified and that the necessary controls are established for it. Hamas does not shut the door of repentance in the face of any collaborator if it feels that he can repent and if his survival is not viewed as dangerous to the cause.

Hamas and Pan-Arabists

In the relationship between Hamas and the pan-Arabists, the former believes that those who put Arabism opposite Islam have erred because it sees that there is no contradiction between Arabism and Islam. But the mistake made by the pan-Arabists is that they have advocated a pan-Arabism that is stripped off religion. Arabism cannot assume its dimension and interact with society without Islam, which has shaded sheltered it for 14 centuries and made the Arabs noteworthy. On the other hand, the Islamists have erred in dealing with the pan-Arabist issue, with some of them trying to ignore or marginalize it. At times, they even tried to fight it. Hamas calls for marriage between Arabism and Islam and for putting them in a position of agreement, not contradiction. This is why Hamas says that it deals with the pan-Arabist forces with a mind that is open to dialogue, coordination, and cooperation.

Hamas and Other Islamic Forces

Hamas does not ignore the existing Arab conditions, and it views with concern any negative influence on the course of the Islamist plan. It urges the Arab governments to deal with the Islamist forces rationally, not with a security approach, because social and political phenomena cannot be suppressed and because suppressing them means breaking up the social fabric of the Arab and Islamic societies. On the basis of the above, Hamas deems it necessary to open the doors of dialogue and of free expression and to give political forces the opportunity to operate openly because those who operate in broad daylight are much better than those who operate in the dark. Hamas holds some Arab regimes responsible for not being able to accommodate the Islamist forces.

Hamas also believes that in Algeria, the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] succeeded in winning over the overwhelming majority of the Algerian people and that, in accordance with the acknowledged democratic rules, it was entitled to be given the opportunity to lead Algeria because democracy cannot be a slogan that is raised only to be disregarded when Islamists gain the people’s confidence. Hamas believes that what has happened is due to seizure of the Islamists’ right. Even though Hamas does not agree with everything that the FIS proposes, it does agree with FIS members on the principles related to the Islamist plan. However, we may disagree with the Algerians on the details of the plan or on how it is expressed.

Hamas also sees that official Egyptian circles, not the Islamists, are responsible for the sectarian crisis in Egypt. It believes that the interests of certain parties are served by inciting sectarian sedition in Egypt, keeping in mind that Copts have lived under a long period of reassurance and security and have dealt with the Egyptian society without any major problems. But it seems that there are some parties that work to fan the fires of sedition. Hamas believes that the main tendency of Egypt’s Islamic movement (the Muslim Brotherhood and the Labor Party) have taken a moderate position toward this issue.

Regarding relations with Iran, Hamas says that it has no special relations with Iran but that it works to meet with the Iranians on common factors that mesh with Iran’s position on the Palestinian issue. As for Lebanon, Hamas wants Lebanon to be a political and information arena for the Palestinian issue. Strategically, Hamas views Lebanon as a frontline state and believes that the Zionist entity poses the same threat to Lebanon that it poses to Palestine. From a pan-Arabist and Islamist perspective, the Palestinian issue concerns the Lebanese as much as it concerns Hamas. According to Hamas, the Palestinian scene in Lebanon is eager for Hamas’s presence in the Lebanese arena, and there are large sectors there that declare their partiality to and support for Hamas by virtue of the revival and struggle plan that Hamas represents. To date, Hamas has not developed a final position on its presence in Lebanon, where this presence is confined now to some notables and figures who have been deported from the occupied territories, who work in the Lebanese arena, and who represent Hamas there politically and at the popular level.

Hamas is now making efforts to develop advanced formulas for its presence in the Lebanese arena, noting that it will not touch Lebanon’s domestic affairs and will respect the country’s laws and regulations. Because Hamas relies on the interior and considers it the primary field of struggle, it focuses its military action on this interior until it is able to overcome problems of its relationship with the frontline states.

Hamas embraces the policy of carrying out operations at home because they are more painful and damaging to the enemy and more beneficial than operations that emanate from abroad.
In light of all of the above, is Hamas’ real condition and activity free of all crises in order for Hamas to keep itself far from any crisis experienced by the Islamist movements in the entire Islamic world?

Of course not. All of the above is intended to explain Hamas’s rhetoric and objectives, without the frustrations of this rhetoric and these objectives, which are still being subjected to the fire of confrontation with the Israeli enemy, and it shows no contradiction and no failure, especially because all of the issues that can be raised within the context of the connection between Hamas’s philosophy and the reality are postponed and exist only theoretically because they have not turned into a daily concern that seeks solutions and answers that the Islamic movements have failed to provide so far.

A total of 414 Hamas leaders and members have been deported to Lebanon (in the buffer zone), and it has become obvious that Israel is trying to uproot Hamas from the occupied territories and plant it in Lebanon in order to move the conflicts between Hamas and Fatah, in particular, out of occupied Palestine and to embarrass Hamas at home in preparation for besieging and containing it. Consequently, a number of questions have arisen regarding the real condition of Hamas, rather, of the Palestinian fundamentalists.

Hamas may or may not answer these questions. But the nature of Hamas’s and the Palestinian fundamentalists’ answers will undoubtedly determine the course that will be followed by numerous tendencies.

**Deportees Describe Arrests, Camp Conditions**

*93AE0250B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 9 Jan 93 p 6*

[Article: “Deportees’ Fault Is To Insist on Returning Home; Israeli Bullets Will Not Persuade Them To Emigrate to Lebanon”]

[Excerpts] Marj al-Zuhur—As new year began, the snows started melting, making it easier for us to travel the road to the deportees’ camp and easing the tragically cruel conditions the deportees are experiencing. Yet at the same time it deprived them of the opportunity to melt snow in special kettles for use as water for washing, drinking, and laundry.

Water reaches them on the backs of animals that the residents of neighboring villages load whenever they can, along with whatever food or medicine is available. But the quantities that reach the camp are insufficient. Most days the deportees are forced to fast.

The road to the camp is difficult, not only because of the rough ground and cold weather, but also because Lebanese Army roadblocks prevent one from crossing into the border strip where the deportees are isolated at Marj al-Zuhur. [passage omitted]

The road to Marj a-Zuhur has become more difficult in recent days, since Lahd’s forces and Israeli occupation forces watch the area night and day. At night the area is illuminated by flares to prevent any materials from reaching the camp. Bullets are fired toward any target moving around or toward the camp, prompting the deportees to ask the villagers not to risk bringing them food or water out of fear for their lives. [passage omitted]

Yet despite the tragic conditions and the living death to which Israel’s crime has condemned them, the deportees have high morale and a remarkable insistence on returning to their homes. This is what their spokesman, Dr. ‘Abd-al-’Aziz al-Rantisi, told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: “Insistence on returning home is a firm demand: we will not abandon it.” [passage omitted]

The Marj al-Zuhur camp includes among its deportees over 100 holders of the doctorate or master’s degree and 108 ulema, university professors, and preachers. Nevertheless, the work spirit in it is the spirit of a harmonious, affectionate community. Each 10 deportees live in a tent. The young people have dedicated themselves to serving and helping the ulema and aged, but the latter are refusing their offer, washing their clothes by themselves and sharing in all the chores that have been divided among everyone. There is someone responsible for the kitchen, someone responsible for cleaning, someone responsible for getting firewood, and so forth.

**Our Existence a Thorn in Their Throats**

Dr. ‘Abd-al-’Aziz al-Rantisi said: “The more days we stay in Marj al-Zuhur, the firmer and more steadfast we become, and the more certain that relief is near. We are sure that our existence in this place is a thorn in the throat of Rabin and the officials of the military establishment in the Israeli entity. When they deported us, they thought that in a day or two we would enter Beirut, scatter among other Arab and European countries, and melt into them, and our case would be closed for good. Our staying in this place has confused the cards for the Israeli Government, which is trying to back out of the deed and it is in.” [passage omitted]

**Deporting the Elite**

The Palestinian intellectual Jihad Jarrar (lecturer in universities and institutes in Jerusalem) said about the reason for his deportation: “I have been talking for years in universities, institutes, mosques, and discussion groups about nationalistic positions. Because I am a religious person, I am generally considered to belong to the Islamic current. Although the occupation authorities have been unable to get hold of any evidence linking me with any organization during the years of the intifadah, they are afraid of what I say and my talks among the people, as shown by the fact that I have been administratively detained four times. The charges brought against me concerned what they termed ‘incitement.’ When someone is administratively detained, he is not subject to trial, and so my terms of incarceration in the cells of the Zionist enemy added up to 22 months. They seem to have sensed the danger of my speaking among people about the occupation and conditions in the Palestinian territories.”
Jarrar added: "The day I was arrested for deportation, I was at home because of the bad weather—it was snowing. I was placed handcuffed under the rain and snow for an hour. Then they loaded us onto buses, our hands and feet bound with iron and our eyes blindfolded.

"We were subjected to various kinds of torture, blows, insults, and obscenities before we arrived here. If any of us wanted to relieve himself, he was allowed only after two or three hours, and they forced us to remain with our hands and feet bound. It happened to me. A soldier was guarding me, and he started laughing because I could not move; so I started laughing in turn so as not to let him enjoy gloating over me.

"I want to explain something. True, Israel wanted to deport the elite of our people, but they also deported people who engaged in no particular activity and had no previous record. It shows that Israel merely wanted to clear the ground. Along with their families and children, the deportees number nearly 3,500 souls. In other words, their number is equivalent to that of any Palestinian village; so they are clearing away Palestinian villages. Bear in mind, also, that these deportees are their families' support. Israeli has turned deportation into a legitimate law. We are at the end of the 20th century, yet Israel continues to work to banish an entire people from its homeland."

Discussion During Torture

Dr. Muhammad al-Zahhar (surgeon, acting dean of the Nursing Faculty at the Islamic University) said: "They have deported a large number of the Palestinian academic elite, foremost among them the head of the Palestine Society of Ulema, Shaykh Ahmad al-Baytawi, also the acting head of the Islamic University in Gaza, 14 engineers, 10 physicians, and 17 university professors and lecturers. The camp also contains businessmen, Chamber of Commerce members, and university students. They represent a cross section of the community's key figures and thinking minds." [passage omitted]

Engineer Muhammad Jawdat Abu-Shalabi said: [passage omitted] "Tragically, one of the university professors—he was next to me—suffered a nervous attack (epilepsy) as a result of being struck on the head. We now face a problem with him because of what he suffered because of the beating he received."

Sick Men Taken From Their Families

The deported Palestinian journalist Jamal 'Abd-al-Rahman Mansur, correspondent for the Jerusalem Press Agency in London, said: [passage omitted] "Facing us and preventing us from approaching the crossing is a roadblock consisting of tanks, armored vehicles, mined roads, and military force. The shooting at us did not stop. We sat and protected ourselves in this exposed place. The soldiers approached within 30 meters and mined the road in front of us. When we stood up to pray, some shells landed around us. A fragment from them hit the lower jaw of the deportee 'Amjad 'Alyan al-Zamil from the city of Nablus and shattered the bones." The other wounded man, Wa'il Hindiyah, recovered after being treated by deported doctors for fractures in the hand and light wounds. The sick deportee 'Abd-al-Qadir (al-Kulak) from Gaza said: "I was in hospital in the Gaza Strip, suffering from a number of ailments, including a hemorrhage, a stomach ulcer, inflammation of the stomach wall, and a rupture in the diaphragm. That is documented at the hospital and in official files. But they came to the hospital, tied my hands, blindfolded my eyes, and carried me to the trucks for deportation; all this without our knowing what was the charge against us and with my family and children not knowing where I was. All they knew was that I was in hospital, not in prison. Sick people are usually taken from the prison to the hospital, not the other way around. Among no nation or religious group was that ever the practice."

Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Shami (preacher and imam of the Martyrs Mosque) said: "We did not choose to stay. We were forced to be in this deserted area. As long as we are forced, we will remain until there is relief and a solution. Naturally, we shall not despair of ways or lack steps. Certainly there will be repeated attempts to return, whatever the cost."

Report Analyzes Settlement Trends, Methods

93AE0250A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 1 Jan 93 pp 28-29

[Article by Nabil al-Baradi'i: "Settlers Enjoy Resources, Privileges; Palestinians Deprived of Rights, Water"]

[Text] The problem of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is still a real obstacle to the progress of Middle East negotiations.

From the end of the Gulf war to last August, a period during which former American Secretary of State James Baker made five visits to the region in an effort to get the peace talks going, Israel seized 100,000 dunams of Palestinian land in the occupied West Bank, constructed four settlements, officially bestowed city status for the first time on a West Bank settlement, announced a plan for "Greater Jerusalem," and began building 17 roads to serve the settlements.

Israel's seizure of Palestinian land and settlements on it are not new government policies, nor are they merely an initiative by a few ministers in the current government: since the military occupation of these lands in 1967, Israel has continued to seize Palestinians' property and fund Jewish settlement in the occupied territories in plain violation of recognized international laws concerning the principles of administering occupied territories.

By the beginning of 1991, Israel had seized nearly 65 percent of the land in the West Bank and 42 percent of the land in the Gaza Strip.

Land seizure operations take place by employing a complicated system of military orders that illegitimately change the laws that apply in time of occupation.
Most of the lands taken from Palestinians have been used to establish civilian settlements and their required infrastructure, thereby providing about 320,000 Israelis permanent residence in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. There they enjoy the same protection and rights as Jews residing in the Zionist entity (the Palestinian part occupied in 1948), while over 2 million Palestinians live under foreign military occupation without any legal identity.

Although a number of private and quasi-governmental Israeli agencies contribute to the settlement process, expanding the process has remained a fundamental component of every government program from the initial occupation of the West Bank to the present. The Israeli Government still has the decisive say in finally approving all settlement activities.

Soon after Israel's initial occupation of the West Bank in 1967, the ruling Labor Party hastily drew up a plan to control the West Bank through settlement. The first settlements were built during that government's administration.

We would also mention by way of reminder that Yossi Ben-Aharon, the general director of the office of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, said in a statement delivered on 8 August, "Any decision related to building a new settlement passes through this office."

The Israeli Government is not satisfied merely to support settlement activities; it effectively sponsors the establishment and expansion of settlements by:

- direct funding of building operations;
- providing financial incentives to building contractors, owners of capital, and settlers, and
- developing an infrastructure exclusively for the settlements.

It should be noted that about 20 percent of the Housing Ministry's budget for the past fiscal year was allocated to West Bank settlements. An Israeli Knesset member, Didi (Tskukr), recently stated that the current settlement activity costs the Israeli government 373 billion new shekels, or more than one-third of the Housing Ministry's budget.

In 1988, the Israeli Government directly funded the building of 273 permanent housing units in the occupied territories, amounting to 11 percent of all housing units built with government funds that year.

In 1990, 564 units were built in the occupied territories, or 20 percent of the total number of buildings that the government funded. Furthermore, 43 percent of all the public buildings that the Housing Ministry constructed during the years 1989 and 1990 were in the occupied territories.

In November 1990, the Israeli Government began offering West Bank land to Jewish contractors to encourage building and gave them support ranging from 10,000 to 15,000 new shekels for each housing unit. It also provided them with guarantees against loss by buying any unsold housing units. Naturally, these measures made building in the occupied territories more attractive to contractors than building in other areas inside the Zionist entity.

Israel's settlement policy is not limited to funding residential building. The government invites industrialists to invest their capital in industrial projects in the settlements. Either it gives them grants amounting to nearly 38 percent of a project's costs, or it gives them tax reductions or exemptions for the first 10 years of work.

These arrangements not only encourage Israeli investment in the occupied territories, they also lure potential settlers with job opportunities close to their new homes.

For example, in the settlement of Mishor Adumim, 84 firms employ approximately 1,700 workers. In the Burkan Industrial Area at the settlement of Ari'el near Nablus, there now are 70 industrial firms whose total economic turnover is estimated at about $360 million a year. They work at producing export-ready products.

The last six years have seen a steady increase in the number of Jewish settlers who work in the settlements. These settlers who work in the settlements of the West Bank alone form approximately 50 percent of all the West Bank's workers.

The Jewish settlements benefit from a highway network throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip designed to avoid passing through Palestinian cities and villages and to link the settlements with each other and with the major cities within the Zionist entity, while isolating Palestinian residential centers.

These roads usually are built on confiscated Palestinian lands, thus shrinking the already limited resources of Palestinian villages for expansion and growth. Furthermore, thousands of productive trees are removed to lay these roads in the knowledge that these trees are one of the major sources of livelihood for Palestinian villages.

The Israeli Government also has built a airfield in the Gaza Strip to comply with the wishes of the owner of an Israeli tourist resort in the Qatif settlement complex in the strip to facilitate arranging domestic trips by Israelis from and to Tel Aviv.

Settlements are connected without charge to the Israeli electricity grid. Water resources in the West Bank and Gaza are diverted for use in the settlements and inside the Zionist entity. The average annual water consumption allowed for settlers is 540 cubic meters; the average consumption allowed for Palestinians is no more than 145 cubic meters.

Add to all this a number of other government services provided to the settlements: post offices, public transportation, immigration offices, schools, and branch offices of various government ministries.

The Israeli Government seizes, closes, or imposes restrictions on Palestinian lands in a number of ways outwardly based on the laws that were in force during the British mandate.
However, since the occupation began in 1967, Israeli military authorities have issued about 2,000 military orders amending the laws that were in force in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Some of these orders are:

1. Military authorities can proclaim any land "closed for military or security reasons." The army sometimes closes land as punishment after particular incidents such as attacks on settlers. The owner is forbidden to enter his land; no compensations are granted to him, nor is he given the right to dispose of the land in any way.

2. Land closed for military or security reasons is usually confiscated subsequently "for military use." It also may be turned over to settlers. The owner is not compensated for the confiscated land unless army forces are actually stationed on it.

3. All land not designated for use by Islamic trusts or not registered in the name of an individual is subject to being considered "state lands." However, because land in many villages was the property of the same families, land ownership was a matter of customary law, without official documents. All land lay under the authority of the state as a matter of trusteeship; most of it, however, has gone under Israeli military rule to settlers, and no compensation has been paid for the land.

4. Appropriation can take place "for public benefit." Israeli authorities have interpreted this to mean the building of settlements, construction of roads linking settlements, etc. The owner may demand compensation at market value, but in practice the compensation is low, and owners usually refuse it to protest the confiscation.

5. West Bank land is considered "abandoned" if its owner left the area before, after, or during the 1967 war. Such land is placed under the control of the superintendent of property of absent persons, whom Israeli military law then empowers to dispose of it. Even if it be established subsequently that the land was not state property, the contract remains valid if the process took place "with good intent."

In addition to the low living costs in the settlements in the occupied territories, coupled with many monetary incentives to anyone who would like to buy or rent a home there, the Israeli Government grants Israelis residing in the settlements a 7-percent income tax reduction.

These Israeli Government incentives have had the result of luring more Jews to settle in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, thereby relieving the pressure that waves of immigration have created on the economic and housing resources of the Zionist entity.

Documents obtained from the Israeli Housing Ministry and published in HA'ARETZ and YEDID'OT AHA-RONOT show that Israel plans to build 106,000 new housing units in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by the year 1994. This figure agrees with the proposal advanced by former Israeli minister Ariel Sharon to raise the number of Jewish settlers living in the cities of Hebron, Nablus, Jannin, and Tulkarm to equal the number of Palestinian Arab citizens in these three [as in source] cities.

There are now over 180 Jewish settlements in the West Bank, including the settlements located in the eastern part of the city of Jerusalem, which Israel has annexed. Four new settlements have been established in the few months since the Gulf war, and a number of previously existing settlements have been expanded.

Israeli authorities have surrounded the city of Jerusalem with a belt of Jewish settlements. At the same time, they are working to strengthen their control over the other parts of the West Bank by increasing the settlement belts that strategically surround the major Palestinian population centers generally.

The growth of Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip has been less than their growth rate in the West Bank.

Although there are no more than 5,000 Jewish settlers in the Gaza Strip, against 800,000 Palestinians, the settlements and the Israeli military authorities enjoy use of 49 percent of the land of the strip.

Since the end of the Gulf war, Israeli military authorities have uprooted over 9,500 fruit trees owned by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in order to expand settlements and roads leading to them.

Palestinians, on the other hand, face many difficulties in obtaining building permits.

Although the Israeli Housing Ministry has been directly involved in constructing hundreds of "illegal" (i.e., unauthorized) homes in the settlements of Qiryat Arba', Imnu'el, and Ma'alé Adumim, homes built by Palestinian citizens on their own land "illegally" end up being destroyed by army bulldozers.

[Box, p 28]

An example of the advertisements that the Israeli Housing Ministry publishes to induce Jewish immigrants to locate in the settlements:

There's a Place for You

If you've come to Israel to do something different, to change your life style, to find your requirements, to contribute—

Your Place Is With Us

In a community settlement far from big city noise, but only 15 minutes by car from Jerusalem or Tel Aviv.

In addition to the convenience of running water, major stores, buses, roads, telephone. Here pioneers live in comfortable houses and work in advanced industries.

Form your own life style! Give your children a chance to grow up in a healthy environment with a superb network
of educational services, youth centers, volunteer projects, and a diversified variety of creative clubs that fit every talent and taste.

Whether you are a scholar, contractor, or professional, there is a series of opportunities from which you can choose.

If you are a family of new immigrants who do not know where you want to live, come try a rural community in the Kfar Adumim absorption center and its Ulpan (Hebrew teaching institute).

If you are a single immigrant or tourist, the 'Ofra Ulpan has a unique program that unites Hebrew language with the basics of citizenship and Jewish history.

Kfar Adumim and (Fura) are flourishing villages. Each of them has a small market, a post office, stores, a clinic, an office, and an Ulpan (a joint program sponsored by the Jewish Agency’s Ulpan department and the Israeli Education and Culture Ministry’s Department of Adult Education).

[Box, p 29]

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<th>Appropriation of Palestinian Lands in Occupied Territories: 25 February-31 August 1992</th>
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<td>Number of Dunams/Ramallah District</td>
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‘Fatah Hawks’ Caught; 13 Palestinians Wounded

TA2501055293 Jerusalem Qol Yisra’el in English 0500 GMT 25 Jan 93

[Text] Israeli soldiers captured two Palestinian suspects following a high-speed chase. They shot at a patrol in Gaza last night. The Army said the gunmen shot at the soldiers’ vehicle from their own car and sped away. Soldiers in the Army vehicle gave chase and eventually caught up to the car. According to the Army, soldiers found an automatic rifle, a pistol, and ammunition in the car. The suspects, the Army said, belong to a cell known as the Fatah Hawks, which is affiliated with the mainstream of the PLO.

Soldiers opened fire at demonstrators in Jabalyah and al-Burayj in the Gaza Strip yesterday, wounding 13 Palestinians, according to the Army.

In Hebron, a petrol bomb was thrown at an Army outpost near Bet Romano, a home belonging to Jewish settlers. No one was injured, but slight damage was caused. The Army closed the area.

Abu-Musa Officers Said To Flee to Canada

93P50041A Doha AL-SHARQ in Arabic 31 Jan 93 p 7

[Text] Amman. AL-SHARQ Exclusive—Reports coming out of Damascus note that several members of the security command of the Fatah dissident movement, which is under the leadership of Abu-Musa, have fled to Canada, taking with them secret documents that belong to the movement. Sources in the movement told AL-SHARQ that Abu-Ahmad Mustafa, the movement’s Revolutionary Council member responsible for security
in Lebanon, and a number of the security service's cadres—including Abu-Lu'li, who is responsible for Beirut, and Jabir [name as published], one of the security service's highest officials—traveled to Canada after selling their personal weapons and the heavy weapons that they had in their possession. They presented a statement for the account of the sale of these weapons to the Canadian Embassy in Beirut, which provided them with an entry visa. In a related item, the same sources revealed that the movement's Central Committee decided to dismiss Dr. Ilyas Shufani, who had been considered the movement's theoretician. The dismissal decision also included public denouncement.

ANO Said Threatening al-Sus, Fatah Officers  
93PS00394 Doha AL-SHARQ in Arabic 25 Jan 93 p 1

[Text] Amman, AL-SHARQ exclusive—Informed sources in the PLO have revealed to AL-SHARQ that the party who issued the assassination threats against Ibrahim al-Sus, the PLO representative in Paris, is the Fatah-Revolutionary Council [aka Abu-Nidal Organization, ANO], under the leadership of Abu-Nidal. One of those who participated in the recent meetings of the Fatah Movement's Revolutionary Council in Tunis told AL-SHARQ that he had met with al-Sus, who informed him that he had received death threats by telephone from elements belonging to the ANO. The source said that a number of Fatah leaders had received similar threats as part of the escalation of the bloody confrontations in Lebanon, in which the two sides have been engaged for almost a year.

The source revealed that Fatah has distributed a secret circular to its cadres and leadership urging them to take the utmost care and caution, for fear that they might be exposed to assassination operations. This happened after the Palestinian leadership received reports confirming ANO's escalation plan. This plan aims to assassinate the largest possible number of Fatah's leadership and cadres in various areas and not to confine the current confrontation to the Lebanese arena alone. The plan mainly targets those close to Yasin 'Arafat. It should be noted that Ibrahim al-Sus is married to the sister of the Palestinian president's wife.

AL-SHARQ has learned that the Jordanian security service, afraid that the confrontation between the two opposing organizations might extend into Jordanian territory, has summoned ANO officials to let them know that they will not allow Jordan to be turned into a battlefield. The security service warned the ANO officials of the consequences of any assassination attempts on Jordanian soil. A similar message was conveyed to Fatah, under the leadership of Yasin 'Arafat.

Ibrahim al-Sus on Death Threats, Christian Wife  
93WRO1132 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Jan 93 pp 18, 21, 23-24

[Interview with Ibrahim al-Sus by Gidon Levi; place and date not given: "Where Has Ibrahim al-Sus Disappeared To?"]

[Text] A large headline in FIGARO informed its readers last week of the disappearance of the PLO representative in Paris, Ibrahim al-Sus. The item, which was quoted extensively here as well, related that he had become fearful of those threatening his life, and had hastily left town.

Al-Sus is perhaps the last of the survivors among the members of the PLO who were the first to conduct a dialogue with Israelis. He belongs to the generation of Sartawi and Hamami, who were murdered. Apparently, he is now, once again, a target for Palestinian extremists. Abu-Nidal, the Hamas, or the Islamic Jihad may be looking for him. A year and a half ago, when I asked him whether he felt guilty toward his brothers living in Jibliya and Dahaisha while he relaxed in the lobby of the elegant Maurice in Paris, he said that, actually, he lived with the French secret service. An armored BMW that once belonged to Franz Josef Strauss and another security car accompany him everywhere he goes.

Several days before the publication in FIGARO of the item about his disappearance, I was in Paris. We spoke on the telephone at least a dozen times. Each time we said that we would get together, and each time he ended the conversation with "but call again tomorrow." Finally, he said that he could not set a meeting place on the telephone, because of the threats. He did not want to invite me to his home: Diana, his wife, a daughter of Ramonda Tawil and a sister of Soha 'Arafat, always suspected that I was an agent of the Mosad. She giggles about it with great amiability on the telephone but, apparently, the suspicion still remains.

Even during the first phone call, his voice betrayed fear. "Only fools are not afraid," he would tell me several times, later on. He is accustomed to threats already, but perhaps the target is different this time. Since he has become 'Arafat's brother-in-law, he has grounds to believe that the Islamic extremists are seeking the life of Diana more than his own. Soha and Diana are Christians, and the Islamic Jihad and the Hamas were not pleased about the marriage of Muslim 'Arafat to a Christian woman. Soha's independent activity in various areas has only added oil to the fire. An extensive profile about her that was recently broadcast on CNN added further resistance. Incidentally, this week an Arab women's magazine, which contained an interview with Soha, was distributed in the territories. More than a few people there noticed, with pain, that the skirt of the chairman's wife was several millimeters above the knee, God forbid.

Last Christmas Eve, I phoned al-Sus, and who answered the telephone in a very friendly voice, if not Mrs. 'Arafat?

Either way, in the middle of last week, al-Sus considered whether to leave Paris, to take a sort of forced vacation in another Western European country. This week, I found him at home, in a suburb of Paris.

[Levi] Where have you disappeared to?

[al-Sus] I have not left Paris. There was all manner of speculation regarding my personal security, and when I
told the French security forces that there are now threats to me and to my family, they took this very seriously and took all possible measures. The place in which I am best protected in the world is France—do not forget that I am accredited here as a diplomat and this is a place that I can trust.

[Levi] Who is threatening you?

[al-Sus] You know that the people making the threats never identify themselves. There were people who followed me by car, there were dozens of anonymous telephone calls, even though I have an unlisted telephone number. Friends warned me seriously that I am a target.

[Levi] You certainly must have an assessment of who these people are.

[al-Sus] I prefer not to engage in guesses.

[Levi] What do the people making the threats say on the telephone?

[al-Sus] They do not say anything. They wait and hang up. Every five minutes, 20, 30 times a day. This is worrisome. We also have credible information from here and from Tunis that we must be careful.

[Levi] You or Diana?

[al-Sus] I have no idea. I think that both of us are targets.

[Levi] Why Diana?

[al-Sus] I cannot say. I feel that there is something related to the entire family.

[Levi] Are you afraid?

[al-Sus] If I tell you that I am not afraid—that would be a lie. Only fools are not afraid. I am not in a panic, but fear can also be destructive.

[Levi] Destructive enough to change positions?

[al-Sus] No. For the past 20 years, I have been living under threats. I have always been calm. Many of my friends have been murdered only because of the dialogue with the Israelis. In the seventies, my good friend Sa’ad Hamami told me that the meetings with the Israelis are the road to the future. He knew and I know that it is dangerous.

[Levi] Do you also suspect the Israeli authorities?

[al-Sus] I do not feel this way. I do not see why Israel would want to get rid of me. They killed a few of my predecessors, in Rome and in other places, but I do not see any reason why the Israeli authorities would want to murder me, in particular. The fact is that we are in the midst of the peace process, even though Israel is killing our children at the same time, and that is in violation of the peace process. One cannot kill children and be in the process of peace. If I had anything to say to the Israeli authorities, it would be to stop killing, get the army out of population centers and replace them with police, equipped as necessary to maintain order. And honor the Geneva Conventions. It is not possible to conduct negotiations and to kill.

[Levi] But the killing is mutual.

[al-Sus] I am sorry for every victim. You know my position: Every victim is a tragedy. But for every Israeli killed, 100 Palestinians are killed. That is a very macabre account, but a real one. We are not talking about a common ground: you are occupying us, we are resisting the occupation. If we make peace, our responsibility will be equal. Then, if an Israeli is killed—that will be our full responsibility.

[Levi] Did the Rabin government change the situation?

[al-Sus] I am one of the people who had tremendous expectations when the left won in Israel. I identified the victory of the Labor party as the victory of the forces for peace in Israel. Rabin's first steps were also rather promising. We thought that it would continue—and then the killing resumed. I expected that Rabin would make a daring, spectacular move, such as removing the army from the cities. I thought that he would say: We want peace, we will let the Palestinians conduct their lives, even if they are demonstrating. The fact is that they are throwing stones at the troops because the army is there. If the army was not there, there would not be anyone to throw stones at. Why do you not implement the Alon Plan as a unilateral move? Put the army on the top of the mountain, and maintain the security of the State of Israel that way. But for God's sake, get out of our day-to-day life. This daring move did not come. Rabin started out well, then disappointed us. Would you have believed that he would deport 415 Palestinians?

[Levi] He deported exactly those people who are now threatening your life.

[al-Sus] We are completely united in our opposition to the occupation and we are completely united in our opposition to the deportation. The time for making peace is limited and we must not let the extremists on both sides become stronger.

[Levi] Rabin says that the deportees are the murderers of peace.

[al-Sus] Let us assume that he is right. Then you put them on the top of a bare mountain in Lebanon and turn them into martyrs? By deporting them, he turned them into symbols. And the fact is that there are also Israelis who oppose the peace process—will he deport them, too?

[Levi] How many Israelis have you met with since the prohibition on meeting [with members of the PLO] went into effect?

[al-Sus] I did not count them, but there were many. They were many who phoned and many who came. Because of this, I have always believed that what you call "Peace Now" is a homogeneous group with consistent and clear opinions and visions. They are also courageous people, but apparently not courageous enough. I always told them: put yourselves, physically, as a barrier between the army and the population in the territories. Go there and block the army with your bodies. If you know about a house that is about to be destroyed—go there and sit
with the families in the house and we will see how the army would destroy that house, then. So it is true, they are courageous people, but courageous up to a point. There are those among them who are particularly courageous, like my friend Abie Natan, who went to prison.

[Levi] And where are the Palestinians who will block the killing on the other side with their bodies?

[al-Sus] I repeat to you that we are not on an equal footing. You cannot expect that a Palestinian will place himself between settlers and Palestinian youth that want to bring about an end to the occupation. You are the occupiers and we are the occupied, and there is no balance between us.

[Levi] In any event, how many Israelis have you met during the duration of the prohibition?

[al-Sus] I am looking in the eyes of Diana, who is standing here next to me, and am asking her how many she remembers. Forty, fifty, something like that.

[Levi] From the right, as well?

[al-Sus] No, not from the right. There were a few feelers from the right, but they never came to meetings. There was a certain response, but not an absolute one. I am speaking of a very particular faction of the right, and I am choosing my words carefully.

[Levi] Still, whom are you referring to?


[Levi] More specifically?

[al-Sus] The fact is that they never arrived. I am referring to Sephardic Jews from the Levi faction.

[Levi] So would you prefer to see Levi at the head of the Likud after the primaries?

[al-Sus] We treat you as a sovereign country. We do not wish to interfere in your internal affairs, just as we expect that you not interfere in our affairs.

[Levi] Over the past few months you have become a new type of celebrity: ‘Arafat’s brother-in-law.’

[al-Sus] I am proud to be his brother-in-law. The entire family is proud of Soha, that ‘Arafat chose her as his wife. This wedding was also important as a symbol: We do not differentiate between Christians and Muslims. And I am also proud of Soha for being so active in the areas of education and society and human rights. She established the Palestinian Children’s Fund here, and she is a courageous woman who understands her role as the wife of our president.

[Levi] Has your life changed since you became his brother-in-law?

[al-Sus] No, why?

[Levi] Perhaps you are considered more important now?

[al-Sus] My importance in the PLO is measured, I hope, according to my success as an ambassador and not because I am ‘Arafat’s brother. I also do not think that he thinks that I am any more important now.

[Levi] What do you call him now?

[al-Sus] I still call him Abu-Amar. Nothing has changed. He is the president and I am an ambassador.

[Levi] Recently, the Saudi AL-QABAS published that a monetary conflict broke out between the two of you, and ‘Arafat accuses you of stealing 300,000 dollars.

[al-Sus] A certain, dirty press has attacked us ever since ‘Arafat married Soha. I prefer to ignore such maneuvers. There is an Arab proverb that says that if you throw a stone at every dog that barks—the stones will become diamonds. I am only sorry that HA’ARETZ also published that item.

[Levi] Why did Mr. ‘Arafat keep the wedding a secret for so many months?

[al-Sus] They did not keep it a secret. They simply wanted to announce it on an appropriate national occasion.

[Levi] And, ultimately, the item was published in an Israeli newspaper, of all places.

[al-Sus] I have always said that the Israeli journalists are excellent.

[Levi] Perhaps your life is now in greater danger because of your new family relations?

[al-Sus] Yes, this is possible.

[Levi] What can the Israelis learn from the fact that Palestinian extremists are seeking to murder you?

[al-Sus] We are conducting a peace process that does not sit well with everyone. There are those who oppose it on both sides, and so we must hurry. Therefore, I call upon the Rabin government: Come with a great initiative. The power is in your hands. We cannot do any more than we have done. We must not allow the extremists to become stronger.

[Levi] But this is exactly what the Israelis fear: that we will make peace with moderates who will be murdered shortly thereafter.

[al-Sus] I can speak to you in the same tone and tell you that if Rabin does not hurry, the Likud will come into power again, and I do not think that it is possible to make peace with a person like Mr. Netanyahu. If we do not hurry, the antipeace forces in Israel will also become stronger. Fear exists on both sides. I understand your fears, but understand that we are afraid, as well. We are a small people and you are a small people, but you have a strong army. We must not conduct our lives on the basis of fear. I can only tell you that, right now, the forces opposing peace in Israel are much stronger than among the Palestinians. You have 150,000 settlers, and they are all against the peace process. This is a source of great alarm for us regarding the future. The fact is that Shamir’s legacy is catastrophic.
[Levi] But we do not threaten the lives of the moderate.

[al-Sus] True. You are an established society. You have a state, and we are still in exile. We do not have a territorial base. The PLO has moral authority for the Palestinians, but what we are doing in order to unify our people is virtually a miracle in modern history. Imagine that a Palestinian who broke the law was caught in France. Can I request his extradition? We have no territory, we have no prison, and we have no police. Therefore, do not compare the incomparable.

A long time will pass until the residents of the Toftah neighborhood of Gaza, far away from the Paris of Ibrahim al-Sus, forget last Friday. That was their black Friday, black just like the charred apartment of Faraj Dormosh, taxi driver. An antiantank missile destroyed his home, all at once. At least seven more homes were harmed that day during an IDF [Israel Defense Forces] chase after anonymous wanted persons. The wanted persons were not caught and were not killed. There is no other blood in this story, except for the blood of Ahmad el-Ay’s two dead roosters. The property damage, however, is heavy and the bitterness in the heart is heavier still. All in all, we are speaking of innocent residents who had this done to their homes.

Last Tuesday, I went to see the destruction with Soha "Araf, a representative of "Betselem. " We walked around the homes for an entire day, like two assessors from the Property Tax Department, estimating the damages. Four days later, and nobody has removed the ruins, as if they were a permanent exhibit of destruction. With a kind of pride mixed with pain, every homeowner is quick to display the bullet holes, the shattered mirrors and the overturned wardrobes, the holiday outfits that were damaged and, mainly, the charred children’s clothing. We went up and down to apartments at random. It was impossible to ignore any invitation. Everyone wanted us to see how terrible the sight was, as if we really were property tax assessors who could compensate them for the damages. On the sidelines, we were constantly surrounded by lawyers and local journalists, who also sought to apprise us of the severity of the situation.

It sometimes turned out that every bullet hole in every worn wall was depicted as a napalm bomb. In spite of this, however, the reality is rather shocking, particularly regarding what was once the home of the miserable taxi driver whose entire family of 14 people now resides almost under the stars. One more affair, particularly severe, remains unsolved and unclear: the driver claims that a great deal of money was looted from his home during the course of the acts of destruction. We shall address this.

There were neighbors who heard the voice of the troops deploying along the roofs at 0200. In any event, at 0415, the troops started to knock on the doors and to move the families out into the street. It was clear to everyone that something big was about to happen. The troops ordered everyone to get out: women, children and the elderly, as well. The retarded daughter of the Dormosh family, Ahmad el-Ay’s 90-year-old father, and Mabrouka’s daughter, who was in the final throes of labor. Do not leave anyone in the homes and do not leave any valuables there. Hence, 16 families went out into the cold Gazan night, one by one, in the block of buildings on ABC street, at the end of Tzalah a-Din Street, the main road of the neighborhood.

In Gazan terms, Toftah is not a poor neighborhood, certainly not a refugee camp. In Tel Aviv terms, it certainly is. Cold homes, bare plaster walls, and perforated roofs with a central space and an infinite number of rooms, a room for each family. An apartment house for each extended family: grandfather and grandmother and sons and daughters-in-law and grandsons and granddaughters. Scores of them.

The army directed the women and the children to Tzalah a-Din Street and dispersed them amongst the homes of the residents there. Most of the men were locked up in a single, distant warehouse. Thirty-seven men in a warehouse, from early morning until late afternoon, almost without food and water. In the afternoon, the soldiers brought bottles of water and one apple for each man. The men could go out to urinate only with permission, one by one, each accompanied by two soldiers. Six men—Mahmud, Ziyad, Halad, Hamdi, Harvi, and Sami—were arrested and taken to the coastal installation. Three more men were put under watch on the main street, ordered to kneel with their hands above their heads. They were allowed to smoke, but forbidden to speak or laugh. Ultimately, they were released. The six men who were placed under arrest have not yet been released.

They soldiers did not specify the names of the wanted men, but called over the loudspeaker to remove all "guests" from the homes. Many residents sought to enter their homes at the head of the procession, to prove to them that there was no one hiding in the house, but no one took them up on the offer. They soldiers said only that they would soon fire missiles at the homes.

This forecast quickly came true. Toward 0900, the residents began to hear sounds of firing and explosions. The men jailed in the warehouse, the women and the children in the neighbors' homes on Tzalah a-Din Street, and the three men kneeling in the street heard and were beside themselves. Each one feared for his home and most of them thought, according to the degree of fire, that the damage they would find would be severe. "We were certain that we would find only the ground," Nafaz told me, leaning on a cane. Fa'iza el-Ay, who saw her husband arrested in the meantime, started to run after the soldiers, shrieking with fear. She is in the third month of her pregnancy and has 10 children at home. She was afraid to remain without her man. Apparently, the soldiers pushed her. She says that one soldier also hit her on the soldier with the butt of his rifle. One way or another, at the end of the day she collapsed, bleeding, in her home, and she says that she miscarried the fetus. Her face now appears quite ill, and she shows us the pills that the neighborhood nurse prescribed to stop the bleeding.
While I am listening to her story, I suddenly hear the sound of the muffled cry of a small child. A block of metal fell on his bare foot, and a thin flow of blood is coming out of his big toe. Out of all of the horror stories in the territories, there is nothing more difficult than these shabby children. Usually, they cry infrequently. Particularly for that reason, their terrible sadness is all the more evident. Here is Muhammed, who is four. Four days, that is. His mother went into labor just as the soldiers circled the house. Somehow, she reached the clinic by foot, with her last remnants of strength, where she gave birth to her Muhammed. The tiny baby is now wrapped in a light blue wool blanket, sleeping peacefully. It is impossible not to think about the reality into which he was born and about the future that awaits him when he grows up. In the meantime, his grandmother is hugging him, just like any grandmother anywhere else. Let him enjoy his days of innocence.

I have seen greater destruction in the past, but the destruction here is great. The soldiers turned apartments upside down and fired at everything that did not move. Perforated refrigerators, beds with holes in them and dozens of shells in every apartment. Here is the new wardrobe that Mo'in purchased last week, 2,000 dinars it cost, and look what is left of it. The soldiers particularly liked the bedrooms: They had the most holes in them. There are destroyed staircases and there are perforated oil cans. We had seen destruction like this before, until we reached the last building in the row. Faraj Dormosh's home.

Dormosh is now sitting on a blue bench from a bus that someone brought over. Around him, everything is burnt. Absolutely everything. Furniture and clothing and beds and UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency] school notebooks and even a burnt Koran. The smell of the burnt plastic still stands in the air in the apartment that, until last Friday, housed Faraj and his children, 14 people in all. Here is the huge hole that the missile made in the curved tin roof, before it charred and burned everything. In the afternoon, the IDF brought a fire truck over, but there was not anything left to put out. Faraj is in the throes of desperation. He asks that someone bring him some clothes or furniture, so he can at some point begin anew. Nothing remains from his top floor apartment, which no longer contains even two stones on top of each other. This is exactly how the apartments in Ramat Gan looked two years ago, the ones that were directly hit by Scud missiles.

A young man with a pleasant look now enters the ruins. Christian, from Geneva, the representative of the Red Cross in the Gaza strip. He lives in the Rimel neighborhood, has an occasional drink at the UN coastal club, and goes to Tel Aviv on the weekends, to relax a bit from the inferno. Each day, he documents the horror here—that caused by our forces and that caused by the Palestinians—writes reports, and sends copies to his headquarters in Jerusalem and Geneva and to our Ministry of Defense. Now, he has come to see the latest ruins.

The soldiers ordered all valuables removed from the homes. In Tofah, like everywhere else in the territories, everything is kept at home. Valuables here are mainly gold, jewelry, and cash—for those who have them. Everyone also turned off the gas switch and opened all of the windows and all of the doors, as the soldiers ordered. Faraj Dormosh hurries now to bring a lone drawer that remains from his wardrobe. Someone tore to shreds dozens of family photographs. Chapters of a happier familial history, destroyed by an evil hand. Afterwards, he takes out a wallet from the drawer, cut with a knife. The wage-earning driver says that all of his assets were here: 17,000 Jordanian dinars and 2,700 Israeli shekels. He says that his money was looted. There were also two gold bracelets shaped like snakes, and they are not here, either. Dormosh did not take his property with him when he left the house, because he left before the incident, at 0400, in order to drive laborers to Tel Aviv. The soldiers stopped him and ordered him to shut his mouth. When the order was issued to remove all of the valuables from the homes, it was already too late, from his perspective. In his desperation, he hypothesizes that perhaps the soldiers fired the missile at his house, the only one to be completely destroyed, in order to cover up the looting. Who knows.

Regardless, only he is still sleeping here in the ruins, in a home that is now completely exposed to the cold and the rain. The other 13 family members found temporary refuge in a room that neighbors allocated to them. There, too, they are almost exposed to the rain and the cold, but they spread a few mats and that is how they are getting through the nights. They can walk up the staircase leading to their temporary residence only if they go one by one. It is completely cracked, and threatens to collapse at any moment.

Guards in fussy uniforms stand at the entrance to the place and direct the cars inside. One by one, the limousines silently glide on the gravel path. More and more Parisian celebrities exit from them. The house at 128 University Street, Hotel de la Cie, is the official residence of the president of the national assembly of France. Tonight, they have come to honor the "man of the year" named by some organization in France. The name of the man of the year for 1992 is Shimon Peres, and the French have always been fond of him.

Something happens to Peres when he is abroad. When he is surrounded with honor and elegance of a type that he is not accustomed to at the party branch in Yokne'am or at the cabinet table headed by Yitzhak Rabin, his facial expression changes entirely. Suddenly, his gloomy face widens, and a slight light of happiness surrounds him. With an award from the red legion of honor affixed to his lapel of his suit, he makes his way around the guests, surrounded with affection. He will get over it tomorrow afternoon in Israel.

Everyone came. Ministers, members of parliament, and the wealthy. Here is Michel Rokar with his Israeli wife, Ilana Shmel, and here is Rika Zara'i, and the president of the national assembly, and violinist Ivri Gitless. And
generations of Peres supporters: Asher Ben Natan and Uri Savir, and even the second contender for the coveted position of director general, Eitan Bentzur. Peres is at his best. He knows the art of small talk, spreads smiles, acts as if he knows the life history of everyone he meets. Today, he has already met with the secretary general of the United Nations and another half dozen foreign ministers, and he likes that. And only once did it appear to me that he grimaced slightly: when the president of the national assembly of France read the reasons for granting the prize, and he mentioned the name Yitzhaq Rabin at least twice.
Ramallah Mayor on 1992 Expenses, Achievements
93AE0315A Jerusalem AL-NAHAR in Arabic 14 Jan 93
p 7

[Interview with Khalil al-Musa, mayor of Ramallah, and 'Isam al-Rafidi, city clerk, by Khalid Nasrah; place and date not given: "Al-Rafidi: 'Large Sums of Money Were Spent To Purchase Machinery and Equipment'; second and final installment of interview; first installment not included]

[Text] The conversation in this, the second interview with Mr. Khalil al-Musa, mayor of Ramallah, and Mr. 'Isam al-Rafidi, city clerk, revolved around a number of the municipality's projects and its future aspirations. What follows is what was gleaned from that interview, which was conducted by our representative, and which also dealt with the services and activities that were completed in 1992 as well as the collection of taxes and fees from taxpayers.

[AL-NAHAR] Before talking about what was accomplished in 1992, would you please give readers an idea about the machinery and other equipment that were purchased by the municipality? Would you also please give readers an idea about the cost of these purchases?

[al-Musa] The municipality has to carry out many projects and perform many repairs in the area within its borders. Instead of contracting with someone to do this work, an approach that costs a lot of money and requires a great deal of time, the council thought that essential machinery and equipment for these projects and repairs should be purchased and made available to the engineering department in the municipality. The department would use this machinery and equipment whenever it needed to do so. That is why the council purchased the following machinery:

- A 936 caterpillar dredger at a cost of 35,000 Jordanian dinars;
- A steamroller for use in surfacing and repairing streets and sidewalks at a cost of 12,500 Jordanian dinars;
- A device used to apply paint to city streets was purchased for 4,500 Jordanian dinars. It will be used to paint pedestrian walkways on the streets, saving time and money that would have been spent if the work were done manually;
- An electronic clock, whose three-sided digital display gives the time of day and temperature simultaneously, was installed in al-Mughtarbin [Expatriates] Square at a cost of 1,500 Jordanian dinars;
- Modern, electronic printers, two in Arabic and two in English, were purchased;
- Two automobiles for the use of inspectors in the municipality's departments were purchased for 7,000 dinars.

Costs
The council set out to purchase the following machines that it thought would be necessary for the implementation of its pressing projects:

Kinds of Machinery
1. A caterpillar dredger for 35,000 Jordanian dinars.
2. A Bumak steamroller for 12,000 Jordanian dinars.
3. A machine that costs 6,000 Jordanian dinars for painting lines on streets.
4. Two automobiles for the inspectors in the municipality's departments for 7,000 Jordanian dinars.

Compensation for Property
The municipality is tearing down a number of old homes located on various sites throughout the city for the purpose of widening streets and squares and building projects at those sites. Consequently, it has to pay compensation to the owners and tenants of these properties. So far, the municipality has paid 8,370 Jordanian dinars.

The council purchased two pieces of land whose combined area amounts to 5 donums and 468 square meters at a cost of 81,000 Jordanian dinars. The land was purchased to build an elementary school. So far, 65,000 Jordanian dinars have been paid, and the balance will be paid when the sale of the property is closed.

The previous municipal administration had built a firefighting center on municipal land located in the industrial zone. The sum of 28,518 Jordanian dinars was spent before the council assumed the responsibility of administering the municipality. During the present council's tenure—that is, since it took office on 1 October 1986—25,996 Jordanian dinars were spent. The firefighting department is overseen by a manager and a crew of ten qualified firefighters who are trained to respond quickly to any fire call or alert. A quick response to a fire alert is one of these firefighters' main and principal missions.

A Court for the Municipalities of the District?
The council established and furnished a court for the municipalities of the district of Ramallah. Establishment of this court had an important, positive effect on court cases in these municipalities. It saved time and effort because court cases and citations for violations issued by these municipalities were settled quickly on a regular basis. Establishment of this court contributed to the stability of the work and curbed many of the violations. This court is overseen by a judge, who is commissioned by the courts, and by two appointed civil servants who are paid by the municipalities. The town of Ramallah has borne the cost and expenses of the court and its employees. By 31 August 1987 it had spent 4,398 Jordanian dinars on the court.

The Flow of Traffic
The council also prepared new maps to regulate traffic in the city. It undertook the implementation of this vital and pressing project in the city after the Traffic Department and the Ramallah and al-Bayrah municipalities approved it. The cost of implementing this project is estimated to be 55,000 Jordanian dinars. The council is hoping that traffic in that part of town will be better than it was in the past.
Priority

A computer has been introduced into the Accounting Department at the municipality, and so far 23,422 Jordanian dinars were paid by the municipality for equipment and furnishings for a computer room.

The municipality trained a number of its employees in the accounting, treasury, and warehouse departments on the use of this computer. This training will save employees and citizens time and effort, and it is also a practical, effective, and scientific approach to carrying out the municipality's business. It is a significant and an economically feasible approach. The municipality of Ramallah is the first municipality in the West Bank to introduce the computer into its various operations.

Tourism

The municipal council has contracted a firm to produce maps of the city for tourists. The contract calls upon the firm to provide 20,000 copies of these maps at a cost of approximately 5,000 Jordanian dinars. The purpose of having this map made is to encourage tourism in the city and provide maps that will serve as a guide to any city visitor.

[AL-NAHAR] What about last year's business and what was completed in 1992?

[al-Musa] The projects that were carried out by the municipality in 1992 may be summarized as follows:

- Completing construction of the industrial warehouse;
- Building and paving some roads;
- Completing the sewage line for the teachers' college;
- Purchasing a furnace and building a refrigerator for the poultry slaughterhouse;
- Proceeding with the construction of rainwater culverts;
- Proceeding with construction of a road to the new cemetery and construction of a wall around it;
- Proceeding with the development of the industrial zone and continuing the construction of industrial units (small workshops).

The municipality and ANERA [American Near East Refugee Aid] Corporation contributed to the implementation of these projects. ANERA contributed to the implementation of the project to build industrial warehouses.

Future Projects for This Year (1993) Are:

- A plan to build a secondary sewage line at an estimated cost of 150,000 dinars.
- A plan to furnish and install pole lights at an estimated cost of 100,000 dinars.

Fees and Taxes

[AL-NAHAR] What about the fees and taxes that are payable to the municipality's treasury? How much of these fees and taxes are being collected?

[al-Musa] On 1 April 1990 the amount of fees and taxes that was due and payable amounted to 489,000 dinars, and by 31 March 1991, the amount collected amounted to 102,000 dinars. This means that only 20 percent of the amount that was due and payable was collected.

On 1 April 1991 the amount of fees and taxes that was due and payable was 527,000 dinars. By 31 March 1992 the amount that was due and payable amounted to 436,000 dinars. This means that 91,000 dinars or approximately 17 percent had been collected.

On 1 April 1992 the fees that were due and payable amounted to 592,000 dinars. By 30 November 1992 the sum of 100,000 dinars had been collected, and that is almost 17 percent of the amount due.

There are several reasons why the amount of money that is being collected is very small. The most important of these reasons are:

- The poor economic situation;
- The inability of tax collectors to collect the taxes and fees that are due and payable as a result of strikes and the closing of shops.

Construction Permits

[AL-NAHAR] How many permits were issued to citizens in 1991-1992?

[al-Musa] The number of construction permits issued from 1 April 1991 to 31 March 1992 is as follows:

- From 1 April 1991 to 3 March 1992: 54 residential permits; 10 commercial permits; 17 industrial permits; and 38 renewals.
- From 1 April 1992 to 31 December 1992: 52 residential permits; 12 commercial permits; 14 industrial permits; and 25 renewals.

[AL-NAHAR] One last question: Can you tell us briefly how many civil servants and workers are currently employed by the municipality and also the amount of their collective monthly salaries?

[al-Musa] The number of civil servants and workers currently employed by the municipality is 115 civil servants and workers, and their monthly salaries amount to 30,000 Jordanian dinars.

[AL-NAHAR] Thus we come to the end of the second installment in this pictorial investigative report about the work and the accomplishments of the municipality of Ramallah.
UNRWA Faces $30 to $40 Million Deficit
93P50064A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
15 Feb 93 p 3

[Report by Ya'qub al-Zuhi]

[Text] Doha—Ilter Turkmen, the general commissioner of the UN Relief and Works Agency [UNRWA] for Palestinian refugees, warned that the suffocating financial crisis from which UNRWA is suffering might force it to cut its services to approximately 2.7 million Palestinians. He indicated that the current budget deficit is between $30 million and $40 million.

In an exclusive meeting with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT yesterday in Doha, UNRWA's general commissioner said that he had talked with Qatari Foreign Minister Shaykh Hamad Bin-Jasim about UNRWA's circumstances and problems and the urgent need to increase Qatari financial aid.

Turkmen explained that the UNRWA budget may be subjected to this deficit because some large Western donors might decrease their contributions by various proportions, which will determine the 1992-1993 budget deficit.

The general commissioner said that assistance from Arab nations comprises 1 percent of UNRWA's budget, which is basically dependent on assistance from the United States, Sweden, Japan, and the EC [European Community] countries. This assistance covers approximately 95 percent of this year's estimated budget of $525 million.

Before leaving Doha to return to Vienna, where UNRWA is headquartered, Turkmen explained that next week he will visit the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. After that, he may visit Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, then Malaysia, Singapore and the Sultanate of Brunei.

Turkmen indicated that he spoke with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres about Israel's deliberate delay in finalizing UNRWA projects carried out in the occupied territories, explaining that the bilateral agreement signed in 1967 defined UNRWA's work in these territories and what Israel must put forward for this work.

West Bank, Gaza Economic Developments Listed
93P50048A
[Editorial Report]

Olive Oil Council Formed
London AL-HAYAH in Arabic of 12 January 1993 on page 10 reports that the "Palestinian Oil Council" was formed in December for the purpose of marketing Palestinian olive oil. The council intends to expand current markets and find new ones, and "to transfer the production and marketing of olive oil and its derivatives...to private institutions."

Fathi Zaydan, the council's chairman-elect, said that "the Palestinian Oil Council, the Supreme Industrial Council, and the Supreme Health Council are the basic components of the Palestinian infrastructure, and complement one another."

Trade Show in London
London AL-HAYAH in Arabic of 5 February 1993 on page 12 reports that the first Palestinian trade show in England will be 9-15 February. It is sponsored by the British-Arab Chamber of Commerce. Items on exhibit will include fabric, clothing, shoes, packaged foods, agricultural products, engineering and computer accessories, hand carvings of wood and mother-of-pearl, embroidery, and wood furnishings. 'Aff Safiyah, the head of the Palestinian mission, said that "the fair's success in revitalizing the Palestinian economy will be of greater national significance than its mere economic role."

AL-HAYAH of 10 February 1993 on page 13 adds that at the opening of the fair, Palestinian official Mansur al-Shawa spoke of the "necessity of developing light and intermediate industry" in the occupied territories. Hanna al-Sinyurah noted that "the revival of agricultural and industrial production is an intifada in itself" and that "the free economy is an inseparable part of the intifadah." He told the attendees that they "will see that what we are exhibiting is relatively low-priced and able to compete with world prices. You will see that we offer services in tourism, handicrafts, clothing, and even some advanced electronics."

Cement Factory Approved
London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic of 5 February 1993 on page 14 reports that after a year, the Civil Administration in the West Bank has agreed to a application from the Palestinian Cement Manufacturing Company to build a cement factory in Nablus. According to company superintendent Majid Nasif, establishing the company is expected to cost $30 million, which will be financed by "Gulf companies, the Islamic Bank, and Palestinian businessmen." Nasif said that the raw materials for production "will be purchased from Israel or imported from abroad." The article notes that licensing the factory "is considered a definite change in Israeli policy regarding the occupied territories." Work should begin on the factory in "12 to 18 months and will provide 170 jobs."

First Insurance Company Founded
London AL-HAYAH in Arabic of 24 January 1993 on page 10 reports that a group of Palestinian businessmen and insurance experts in the West Bank and Gaza announced the first Palestinian insurance company, known as the National Insurance Company, Ltd., which will be headquartered in Ramallah. 'Aziz 'Abd-al-Jawad, deputy director of the new company, said that "it will open its doors on 1 February."
'Abd-al-Jawad told AL-HAYAH that the company has a registered capital of $45 million, contributed by 4,000 shareholders. He denied that the new company had any political orientation and emphasized that it is a national company that will play an important role in rebuilding Palestinian infrastructure. All of the company's founders, managers, and employees are Palestinian Arabs. 'Abd-al-Jawad estimated the insurance market in the West Bank and Gaza at about $60 million annually.

The company was founded in accordance with the provisions of the Jordanian Insurance Law, which was in effect in the West Bank before 1976, and is therefore able to enter into direct reinsurance agreements with international companies.

'Expert': Economy To Focus on Housing, Training
93AE0316B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 13 Jan 93 p 12

[Report from Amman by Salah Hazine: "Palestinian Economy To Focus on Housing and Manpower Training"]

[Text] A Palestinian economic expert said that Israel continues to obstruct true Palestinian development while it endeavors to increase Palestinian economic subservience to the Israeli economy. He emphasized the need to restructure the Palestinian economy along new lines.

The expert, who identified himself only as a member of the Palestinian delegation to multilateral talks, said that Palestinian leaders face the urgent task of implementing projects that are feasible at this time in order to support the development process during the period of transition. Such projects, he explained, include manpower training because it is the primary component of the productive process, as well as investment projects especially in housing. He pointed out that the occupied West Bank and Gaza need between 180,000 and 200,000 residential units at a minimum.

He emphasized that strategic objectives include developing Palestinian economic infrastructure such as by building a port in Gaza complete with oil pipelines and a refinery; by modernizing and expanding the Qalandyia airport near Jerusalem, which was the sole operating airport in the West Bank until it was occupied by Israel in 1967; and by constructing a Palestinian electric power grid and a sewer network.

The Palestinian delegation member said that those were the crux of Palestinian demands to the Development Committee, which convened in Paris last November. He pointed out that the Committee emphasized the need to solve the water crisis in both the West Bank and Gaza because the progress of negotiations, and consequently of the peace process, depended on resolving the water crisis.

The Palestinian economist said that the delegation advanced during the talks three proposals to propel development—creating a Palestinian development fund with Arab and international support, disseminating technology and technological awareness, and establishing a bureau of accounting as the cornerstone of a Palestinian financial sector.

He emphasized that those proposals were discussed with World Bank representatives during their tour of the West Bank and Gaza last December.

The Palestinian delegation member pointed out that it was not easy to convince World Bank representatives of the Palestinian viewpoint as put forth in the Palestinian [working] paper to the Development Committee because the Bank's position was close to that of Israel in that it ignored the Palestinian people to focus on the conflict as an Arab-Israeli issue and advocated, as an economic solution to that conflict, the implementation of joint projects in the region as a whole without reference to Palestine as one of the countries of the region.

He underscored four positions that emerged during the meetings.

The Israeli position, which initially had World Bank support, called for undertaking joint projects and for economic cooperation regardless of whether there was any progress in the bilateral talks.

The Japanese position had a political focus and emphasized the need for small airports to guarantee free movement of tourists among countries of the region without need for entry visas.

The European position, which the Palestinian delegation member described as closest to the Palestinian position, called for progress in the bilateral talks as a prerequisite for development in the region.

The Palestinian position, on the other hand, clearly linked the bilateral negotiations to the multilateral talks. The Palestinians said they did not mind participation in economic activity as long as the Palestinian people retained control of land and water and of the components of Palestinian economic infrastructure. He added that Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Oman led the list of countries that supported the Palestinian position.

Despite Obstacles, Farmers Target EC Market
93AE0316A Jerusalem AL-NAHAR in Arabic 8 Jan 93 p 13

[Article by Liall Shihadah: "The Worries and Concerns of Al-Aghwar Farmers"]

[Text] It is common knowledge that Al-Aghwar are farm areas most of whose residents make a living in agriculture because of such favorable factors as fertile soil, moderate climate, and plentiful water. Yet, farmer there face difficulties such as the lack of material resources, unsuitable materials such as plastics and fertilizers, fluctuating prices, and sometimes water shortages and dry wells. They also find it difficult to market their products because of closing areas to farmers and the need to obtain special permits as well as seasonal work, difficult roads, and sometimes frost and bad weather,
not to mention customs duties on products and the
dearth of such storage facilities as coolers and ware-
houses and the lack of suitable housing in certain areas
which inhibits farming as is the case in the village of
al-Jafatlik.

Following are estimates of the areas cultivated annually:

• 8,000 donums planted with tomatoes;
• 3,000 donums. eggplants;
• 6,000 donums. squash;
• 4,500 donums. cucumbers;
• 1,000 donums, watermelons;
• 500 donums, melons;
• 2,000 donums. peas;
• 2,000 donums, corn;
• 2,000 donums. peppers;
• 1,500 donums, Jew’s mallow;
• 1,000 donums, flowers;
• 500 donums, cabbage;
• 1,000 donums, potatoes;
• 1,000 donums, garlic and onions;
• 5,000 donums, bananas;
• 3,000 donums, citrus fruit; and
• 1,000 donums planted with assorted produce such as
spinach, peppermint, and parsley.

Land is planted in agreement between farmers and
landlords. Some farmers do not restrict themselves to
specific areas.

Al-Aghwar’s most important crops are tomatoes, egg-
plants, cucumbers, squash, peas, corn, flowers, cabbages,
Jew’s mallow, and citrus fruits as well as bananas in
summer.

The farming season lasts from 20 September until the
beginning of March. Conditions during that period are
favorable for farming and for applying needed soil
fertilization for salinity and acidity.

On the subject of exporting to Europe, Jihad Haddad,
chairman of the Agricultural Society for Marketing in
Ariha says that marketing opportunities are become
available as result of increase production and high
quality, especially after the West Bank and Gaza were
authorized by EC in 1988 as an independent economic
entity.

“In 1989 we exported directly to Europe for the first
time. Exports were previously handled through the
Israeli company ISCO [expansion not given], which put
our production under several constraints such as security
checks conducted after the produce has been sorted and
packaged, causing waste and shorter life because officials
reopen and reinpect the produce before it shipped to
Europe from Ashdud port. By the time the product arrives at its destination it would be spoiled and wilted
causing prices to drop.

Then there are the trucking costs imposed by the author-
ties as well as exorbitant customs levies.

Haddad pointed out that such constraints are meant to
prove to Europeans that Palestinians are inefficient.
Leasing trucks overburdens farmers and causes harm to
produce.

About 3 km to the east of Ariha we had the following
interviews with farmers:

Jawad al-Masri of Nablus owns 2,000 donums of land in
Nablus, Ariha, al-Jafatlik, and Marj Na’jah. He will be
planting all kinds of vegetables as well as watermelons by
the end of this month.

Al-Masri was a major exporter of vegetables to Jordan
before the “disbanding the connection,” which impacted
egatively on farmers and landlords.

Mahmud al-Hamduni, a landlord and farmer in Ariha
emphasized that farmers are like “sheep without a shep-
herd” because of the lack of an organization that would
look after their interests.

The heads of departments and organizations have abso-
lutely no contact with agriculture, according to al-Masri
and al-Hamduni who added: “We demand that true
representatives be farmers themselves and therefore
informed of farming problems. The Palestinian farmer is
a ‘Palestinian kitchen’ whose lands extend from the
Dead Sea to the Baysan border. He is completely ignored
and the farmers are not able in the least to form a
committee to tend to them and look into their problems.
That is why we demand true representation for the
farming sector.”

Al-Hamduni and al-Masri added: “Farmers receive no
services from any organization. The taxes imposed by
the authorities add to their burden contrary to the
practice in all other parts of the world where the farmer
is considered an ‘orphan of the state’ and is totally
exempt from taxes.”

“Farmers also lack cool rooms to store their vegetables
and there is a dearth of facilities to process pickles and
tomato juice.”

They continued: “In spite of limited facilities, the output
of Palestinian farmers parallels that of Israeli farmers
because the former spend more time tending their farms
at the expense of their health and the health of their
wives and children. Farmers are sometimes forced to
bring their infants to the field in order to be able to tend
the children and the land at the same time.”

“Marketing is the most vexing problem facing farmers
because certain areas are closed to them and they can not
export their produce to Jerusalem, Genion, or Nablus,
causwng the produce to spoil.”

“The fields are prepared early in June by plowing and
fertilizing. Planting begins in August and lasts through
November. The crops are harvested in February, March,
and April. Farmers work all yearlong.”

Al-Masri and al-Hamduni appealed to all those con-
cerned to look to farmers and do comprehensive studies
of them.
Al-Hamduni's land is worked by some 50 families that migrated from Tubas after their lands were confiscated. We had the following interview with two of them:

Hajj 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Naji, father to 15 sons, said: "This is our second year in Ariha. We became 'refugees' after our lands were confiscated in 1967 on the pretext of being in military zones. Some members of the family headed for al-Jafatlak, al-Barzalah, and Genion and some others came to Ariha."

Al-Naji added: "We are now tenant farmers after we used to owners and landlords. This hurts even though landlords treat us as owners and don't make us feel like we lack anything. As to our social life, nothing has changed because our land is vast in the al-Aghwar region and our family and friends have departed. We try to get over that gradually. The children work after school, which has endangered their health and affected them psychologically. They travel long distances on foot every day to go to school and when they return they work the land even though they are exhausted, but what can we do?"

Al-Naji called upon the authorities concerned to pay attention to them, conduct studies, offer assistance, and save the children.

'Abd-al-Rahim Dhraghmah has nine children. He said: "I was formerly a chauffeur and a landowner in Tubas, but my land was confiscated in 1969 and my income dropped below my needs especially because two of my daughters are ill and have expenses. I receive no assistance from any source and I therefore beseech those concerned to pay attention to farmers and help them improve their living conditions."