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THE "SLINKY EFFECT" IN BOSNIA DURING THE 1st INFANTRY'S TENURE 1996- JUNE 1997

BY 19980504 158

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The "Slinky Effect" in Bosnia During the 1st Infantry's Tenure 1996-June 1997

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
Current doctrine and strategy is built around an endstate. The 1st Infantry Division found itself in a murky situation where the endstate was not defined. Therefore doctrine failed to present the military planner with the tools to put the Task Force Eagle mission into a neat dogmatic world. The 1st Infantry Division found a method to plan called the "slinky effect". While this method is not prescriptive, it shows how one organization used a flexible planning method to apply strategy in a non-traditional environment. The current planner's toolbox is inadequate to this task. This paper provides an alternate method with which one division planned.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURPOSE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERVIEW</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFAP</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILITARY FORCES</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATURE OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCTRINE</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERAGENCY</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMPAIGN PLANNING</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGY</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM STRATEGY</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSION</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANALYSIS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERAGENCY</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDSSTATE</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMPAIGN PLANS</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASK FORCE EAGLE CASE STUDY</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRUCTURE OF THE THEATER</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANALYTICAL PROCESS</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTEGRATING THE LEVELS</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to provide the perspective of a former G-3 (operations officer) of Task Force Eagle, on the application of military doctrine in the Bosnia case study. This will be accomplished by explaining how the strategic, tactical and operational issues in Bosnia during the First Infantry Division’s tenure were linked together from an G-3’s perspective. This is a non-doctrinal approach to a strategic problem that did not follow dogmatic strategic and doctrinal models. Based on a lack of a clearly defined strategic endstate or objective, which exists in traditional models, ideas for the enforcement of international accords often began in the division level and sprang up to the strategic level and then back down to the tactical. Known as the “slinky effect”, there was a continuous flow of strategic concepts that began at the division level and influenced both the strategic Stabilization Force (SFOR) level and the tactical level of brigade and battalion operations. The lack of endstate linkages between the organizational levels indicate a new method of military planning may be needed to cope with a changing world context.
OVERVIEW

With the fall of Yugoslavia, a civil war waged through the Balkans between various former states of the former Yugoslavia. Out of this cauldron the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina rose as an independent nation. Recognized by many nations, the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent entity was in doubt during the internal civil war between the three factions within this warring state the Moslems, the Croats, and the Serbs. In 1995 the Dayton Peace Accords were signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP)\(^1\) which established a baseline of existence between these warring factions\(^2\). This brought relative peace to the country and the UN Security Council Resolution 1031 gave NATO the mandate to take action and lead a military force across the Sava River for the purpose of enforcing the dictates of GFAP\(^3\).

GFAP

When the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina \(^4\) was signed in 1995 there were many aims that needed to be enforced by the international community. Samuel Berger the National Security Advisor best sums this up\(^5\). He states that GFAP tried to accomplish the following goals:

- military balance
- reform of police
- establish economic institutions
• return of refugees
• freedom of movement
• economic recovery
• war criminals\textsuperscript{6}

GFAP was not just a military document. The military provisions of GFAP were found in Annex 1-A and the civilian provisions made up the bulk of the document.\textsuperscript{7} Under NATO, the Implementation Force (IFOR) was given broad powers in Annex 1-A to separate the Former Warring Fractions (FWF) and achieve the provisions of the Annex\textsuperscript{8}. These military provisions dealt primarily with establishing military balance and some freedom of movement. The military provisions of GFAP included:

• ensuring continued compliance with cease fire
• ensuring the withdrawal of forces from the agreed cease fire zone of separation
• collection of heavy weapons into holding sites and demobilization
• allowing for the withdrawal of UN forces other than the NATO led IFOR\textsuperscript{9}

The civilian provisions were to be conducted using the other elements of national power. In a State Department Fact Sheet dated May 28, 1997, \textsuperscript{10} civilian implementation was described:

"This will be brought about by economic revitalization stimulated
by reconstruction and reform, political reconciliation fueled by the establishment of democratic institutions, and the rebuilding of communities. This represents a clear interagency approach to a problem. Let us look at the military first.

MILITARY FORCES

The military operation to Bosnia represented a change in many military affairs. It represented a coalition of NATO, non-NATO, and former Warsaw Pact forces all moving to a common aim of stabilizing the region, and fulfilling the military provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords. It was NATO's first deployment.

There were 3 lead troop-contributing nations: France, England, and the United States. The United States portion of this force was named Task Force Eagle. Task Force Eagle, which was centered on an American division, was also the division headquarters for the Northern Division of the Implementation Force (IFOR). This Division was also known as Multi National Division North. So the commander of Task Force Eagle was also the commander of Multi national Division North, as well as the commander of an American division. The words Task Force Eagle and Multi National Division North can be used interchangeably.

The First Armored Division provided the bulk of Task Force Eagle for the first year in Bosnia. They were replaced in a traditional
military maneuver with a covering force provided by the First Infantry Division. The covering force was designed to hold the rear guard of the first Armored division as it re-deployed out of sector. The covering force deployed as part of IFOR.13 Based on a confused endstate, the covering force did not withdraw in turn but rather remained in Bosnia to eventually become the Stabilization Force (SFOR).

**NATURE OF THE STUDY**

In this section a review of the current doctrine will be undertaken. Focus will be placed on how doctrine addresses the endstate or objective. Following will be a lay out of he current strategies that direct the use of that doctrine in Bosnia. The reader will then see how the system actually worked in Bosnia along with an example. In conclusion, the case will be made that the toolbox for application of traditional campaign planning is inadequate. The inevitable conclusion is that we are in the throes of a revolution in military theory and our current toolbox does not meet the challenge14.
DOCTRINE

All doctrinal publications that a US military commander may use state that an endstate or clear objective is a vital part of the formula. This fact will be the lens that allows analysis of doctrine.

GENERAL

United States peace operations, whether U.N or regional, are directed by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 dated May 1994. This document states that "The operation’s anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation." Clearly the Bosnia problem is an interagency mission to accomplish the GFAP tasks listed above and set forth by GFAP. A military commander is expected to turn to doctrine to help him plan the next step.

INTERAGENCY

Interagency guidance is found in Joint Pub 3-08 Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. This publication states that "The integration of political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been the essential to success all levels of operation." This document relies on the thinking of Clausewitz, the arch traditionalist who relates government people and army together. Clausewitz describes this objective or endstate as a
goal. Clausewitz wrote "The political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." 19

Given this heady backdrop, the Joint Publication goes on to follow the prescripts of the PDD. In Chapter 1, Building Interagency Coordination20, the first step is: "...define the problem in clear and unambiguous terms that are agreed to by all."21 The second step is to define the objective. "Within the context of interagency operations, commanders and decision makers should seek clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objectives, endstate, and exit criteria." 22 This document encompasses all operations to include Bosnia which is not a high intensity conflict.

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

From the clear listing of types of operations given in Joint Doctrine, Bosnia is a Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW)23. Joint Doctrine is offered in Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War.24 Chapter 2 of the Joint Publication lists the Principles of Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) begins with the principal of objective.25 "Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and obtainable objective."26 "Although defining mission success may be more difficult in MOOTW, it is important to do so
to keep U.S. forces focused on a clear, attainable military objective. Specifying measures of success helps define mission accomplishment and phase transitions. This comment about phase transitions is important as it lead us to campaign planning, but first it is necessary to link endstate and objective.

The bridge between endstate and objective is also mentioned in Joint Pub 3-07.

"The political objectives which military objectives are based on may not specifically address the desired military endstate. Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) should, therefore, translate their political guidance into the appropriate military objectives through a rigorous and continuous mission and threat analysis. JFCs should carefully explain to political authorities the implications of political decisions on capabilities and risk to military forces."  

This doctrinal manual tells commanders to do constant threat assessment in order to redefine objectives during a campaign.

This all comes together in a campaign plan.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING

The doctrinal source for campaign planning is Joint Pub 5-0. It is useful to note that some of the charts in 5-0 are shared with Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations. This document states that campaign plans contain "...the arrangement of related major operations necessary to attain strategic objectives." The purpose of this plan is to provide the commander an orderly framework to make decisions. It is designed to be a sequential
series of events with decisive points and lines of operation. The doctrine publication further states that the plan should "...clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination objectives."32 Moving to the Army level, FM 100-5 offers us other insights into that Service's campaign planning.

In Chapter 6 of FM 100-5, the terms and definitions of Army planning are spelled out. A series of definitions here will highlight this section on doctrine. "A military endstate includes the required conditions that, when achieved, attain the strategic objectives or pass the main effort to other instruments of national power to achieve the final strategic endstate".33 Given that the main effort might be another instrument of national power the manual goes further to state:

"Often the combatant commander is required to support the other instruments of national power that the national command authority and coalition leaders designate. He must first understand the desired endstate, then plan means to achieve it. Neglecting to do so could result in a military victory that fails to achieve strategic objective."34

This means that the military element of power can achieve their goal while the common center of gravity is not effected. Center of gravity as described by Clausewitz is: "...the hub of all power and movement, upon which everything depends."35 The implication is that elements of power are placed against vulnerabilities of the opponent's center of gravity along the lines of operation to achieve our strategic and operational aims. The center of gravity
is enunciated in the campaign plans and is described in the strategy for that operation.

**STRATEGY**

Doctrine defines the methods and strategy gives the context to apply the methods. For this case, analysis will look for a Bosnian endstate and objective and how they were applied. Strategy begins with the President. The President’s National Security Strategy states “In Bosnia we seek to help create conditions - through political reconciliation and economic revitalization - ... and permit a timely exit of NATO military forces from Bosnia and the end of SFOR’s mission.”

While the National Strategy quote clearly puts the onus of civilian implementation on the shoulders of the non-military agencies, PDD 56 attempts to clarify the roles and missions of the military vice other agencies. PDD 56 directs the establishment of a Political-Military implementation plan, which will detail agency objectives. This could be considered an interagency campaign plan of sorts. PDD 56 is one small part of the guidance which military leaders use to develop their strategy.

**NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY**

The National Military Strategy is a strategy that takes the national strategy set out by the president and focuses the
military actions that will be necessary to achieve goals of the national strategy. This could lead to a clear goal for the commanders and guidance to complete Annex 1-A of GFAP. Promote Peace and Stability is the first strategic objective. This refers to “creating and sustaining security conditions...that allow the peaceful pursuit of our interests and the just resolution of international problems through political means.” (Emphasis added) Defeat Adversaries, the second objective reminds us to keep the warfighting means available. The elements of the strategy: Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now offer further refined guidance. The National Military Strategy is then taken by EUCOM and applied to that region’s missions.

EUCOM STRATEGY

The EUCOM Strategy offers some policy guidance for the forces involved "...there are several principles we wish to observe: clearly define measurable political and military objectives that will lead to the desired political and military endstate." So again the strategy directed dictates a requirement for an endstate. EUCOM clearly states this policy but fails to follow up with a defined endstate in its discussions of central Europe. EUCOM also saw another issue that they addressed in their strategy.
"Once forces are committed to a mission, identify the conditions that will provoke a re-assessment of objectives but avoid incremental changes as part of the assessment process - prevent mission creep." The new term involved here is mission creep. This important concept represents the desire not to become embroiled in more than what was planned for. In a typical planning session resources are placed against tasks to be accomplished. (This is often called troops to task.) If the resources are held constant and the tasks increase we have mission creep. Given the lack of specificity in EUCOM and SFOR's strategy and orders, Task Force Eagle had to determine its mission.

MISSION

In order to keep this paper unclassified, the SFOR Mission will not be included. However the Task Force Eagle mission can be analyzed. It is instructive for classification purposes to see that even in the Madrid Summit the SFOR mission was omitted. Mission statements do not list endstates. Rather this is often found in intents. However, looking at the Task Force Eagle mission the entire action seems open ended. Even the conditions for transition to DFOR (deterrent force) were not defined. The current Task Force Eagle mission and intent is listed on the Task Force Eagle home page.
Task Force Eagle enforces compliance with GFAP, maintains a credible deterrence capability in sector, ensures force protection, and deters resumption of hostilities to maintain a secure environment in which reconstruction is encouraged and becomes self-sustaining. On order, TFE provides limited support to the municipal elections to set the conditions for transition to the Deterrence Force (DFOR)\textsuperscript{50}.

The mission provides no further insight but the endstate in the intent is interesting "Endstate The result of the synchronized military and civil efforts during the mission will be to enable this region to function on a self-sustaining basis"\textsuperscript{51}.

\textbf{ANALYSIS}

Looking at the Task Force Eagle endstate there is clearly nothing finite or definitive about the division's mission. So where are the disconnects? First an analysis of strategic and doctrinal disconnects are in order: 1. explore the differences in theater context to traditional models, 2. look at the tool weakness in planning for such a mission. This will then be followed by the case study to determine how Task Force Eagle adapted.

\textbf{INTERAGENCY}

The key breakdown seems to come at the interagency level. The interagency plans mentioned by PDD 25 and 56 fail to adequately denote responsibility when the variables of peace operations change the envisioned environment\textsuperscript{52}. Given this shortfall, the
implication is that the military will respond to a crisis for political necessity not military clarity. Military forces were given a goal based around an end-date not an endstate with an ensuing set of accomplishments, objectives and preconditions. "Clinton said:" I understand your job is to try to get the deadline nailed down, but we tried it during this SFOR period, and it turned out we were wrong." Clearly the president realized that what was needed was an endstate not an enddate. One can imagine a political-military implementation plan that lists tasks to be accomplished enabling the final goal. This plan could set responsibilities for each agency involved in the process. That did not exist for our military commanders.

ENDSTATE

The issue to the military commander on the ground and the doctrinal dogma is that they do not connect. Every doctrinal document I have listed says there must be a clearly defined endstate. Military commanders are responsible to enunciate clear objectives from that endstate. National Security Strategy, Military Strategy, and EUCOM Strategy all say there must be an endstate "Sen. John Ashcroft, R-MO., said there must be a clear "exit strategy" for troops. Without one, "the president sends a disturbing signal that mission creep is setting in for the NATO led peacekeeping effort," the senator said." In Bosnia, further problems arose when mission creep was pushed into the camp of
other agency tasks. Pressure always existed for the military resources to accomplish tasks that were not part of GFAP Annex 1-A EUCOM reiterates strongly that they will "Pursue missions that only military forces can accomplish; once they are accomplished, disengage". Therefore, the EUCOM guidance is clear but lacks specificity and endstate. Task Force Eagle had to be non-dogmatic in its approach to planning because there was no set endstate. The set of assumptions that built doctrine was not valid to this campaign. As the Multi National Division North staff looked for tools to apply to this campaign and to campaign planning there were none that worked adequately.

CAMPAIGN PLANS

Given a strategic goal, the operational center of gravity is addressed by tactical formations operating along lines of operation. This is laid out in advance by the campaign plan. In fact some documents believe that centers of gravity are not changeable. What were the centers of gravity? What were the lines of operation? What were the decisive points that must be met? A doctrinal campaign plan assumes that a line of operation laid out in December will be valid in January on the way to accomplishing the endstate. The flaw in the strictly doctrinal approach is that the situation shifts too quickly. Traditional campaign themes were not agile enough to keep the rapier aimed at the right spots. What was a decisive point yesterday may no
longer certain today. There was no endstate just an amelioration of events. Multi National Division North coined new terms called targets, and pressure points. Targets and pressure points were not decisive points, as victory over the target may not lead to any advantage but simply to the preemption of an incident. In addition, without a clear endstate a method was needed to keep the rapier of operations tuned to changing objectives.

One can argue that divisions do not make campaign plans. However, this argument belies a misunderstanding of the interwoven nature of the operation and how the individual soldier on the ground has clear strategic impact. One shot fired by an individual soldier can have an immediate impact on national policy. Understanding this, Task Force Eagle issued orders that impacted the strategic and tactical operations. If a doctrinal campaign plan was too slow to react to changes in the situation then a method had to be developed to react and focus the power to deal with the situation. What was needed was great agility to involve all levels. Based on the concept of Task Force Eagle's operation, the "slinky effect" became the normal method. The case below will show the "how" of Task Force Eagle's "slinky effect" method.
STRUCTURE OF THE THEATER

Task Force Eagle changed the paradigm for peace operations in Multi National Division North's area of responsibility (AOR) from a resource-intensive, geographically-oriented concept, to an information-intensive, event-oriented one. There was a change in requirements for 1AD and 1ID as they passed responsibility on 10 November 1996. Initially the forces in sector had to focus on the line of separation and locations of opposing Serb, Croat, and Muslim fighting units as they existed at the end of the war, the situation was now changed. FWF military forces were generally in compliance with GFAP. The balance of power had shifted in the Republic Srpska (RS) more to the police forces, away from the military. Military modernization changed the military balance of power more in favor of the Federation. The primary threats became paramilitary extremist groups, not conventional forces. This shows a move away from traditional structures.

Traditionally Corps level units are considered "operational". In Bosnia this traditional alignment changed especially as we look at events in space and time. Space represents not only geographic mileage but also more importantly, political and military headquarters boundaries. SFOR HQ and EUCOM represented the theater strategic level of guidance. The division in Tuzla represented the operational and the brigades and battalions the tactical. The strategic level covered all of
Bosnia, the Federation and the Republika Srpska. The operational level covered a multinational division area consisting of a large number of cantons.

The tactical level of operations took place at the cantonal level. Often a tactical commander dealt with multiple cantonal governments in a unit's area of responsibility (AOR). The tactical level dealt with Former Warring Faction (FWF) Division and below sized organizations. The Multi National Division North dealt primarily at the FWF corps level and SFOR dealt with factional army level commanders. These political and military entities could not always be moved quickly. At times however, they seemed to move incredibly fast. Focus and agility were key.

Not only was the geographic region different but the focus of effect over time differed. The concept of time drew from the concept of close near and far battles. The tactical level looked at a time for planning from the current to about a day out. The division, with a wider grasp, looked from two hours out to about a week. SFOR headquarters dealt at the army and faction level and looked from 2 hours out as far as several weeks in advance. The common relation in time was that an effect that required immediate action could need the agile response of all levels of headquarters involvement very quickly. This traditionally is done through a campaign plan.
ANALYTICAL PROCESS

The agility needed to anticipate and intervene when incidents occurred came from superior intelligence and combat information that provided the hints to allow the commander to predict and forestall an incident. The Task Force Eagle analytical process strove to: (1) ask the right questions; (2) provide these questions to all potential collectors, from standard intelligence assets to individual soldiers; (3) collect all information through a system of debriefings, reports, and feedback; and integration of national means (4) analyze and assess the information, merging it with more sophisticated intelligence products to yield actionable intelligence and predictive assessments. These assessments attempted to identify the linkages and pressure points that Task Force Eagle could influence to forestall or ameliorate an incident or GFAP violation. There was no endstate so forestalling and amelioration was the overall objective.

INTEGRATING THE LEVELS

Task Force Eagle’s analytical process allowed the commander to see the situation more clearly than commanders at other levels. This allowed Task Force Eagle to begin the strategic and operational thought for the theater. This integration of tactical through strategic concept allowed a better ability to “see” and
predict required actions. Given this concept, it was imperative to focus the elements of national power on the same point at the correct time. This is where the "slinky effect" became useful. By constantly updating his view, the commander of Task Force Eagle could influence SFOR and EUCOM plans as well as tactical plans. Ideas created by the operational level were rapidly sent up to SFOR and down to the tactical level. Improvements and refinements were sent back to Task Force Eagle from these other two levels and the entire realm of military operations were focused. This bouncing up and down of ideas in a spring like manner was coined the "slinky effect". The key was identifying the correct point for focus.

EXECUTIVE BOARD

The commander's tool for identifying this focus was the "Executive Board". Under the direct supervision of the Commanding General, the Executive Board was a "think-tank" like organization of key players. They helped interpret a consistently refreshed picture of the operational environment. As a result the commander used the board to enunciate his assessment and operational guidance. Often the product of the board was a point paper that was sent to COMSFOR to help shape his view and actions. In addition to guidance, COMEAGLE could direct the initiation of the planning process to develop an order based on specific targets or pressure points that he thought were worthy
of this level of staff study. The end product was a written order and a synchronization matrix which would synchronize the actions of all elements of power within Task Force Eagle. COMEAGLE could also decide not to choose a target and give further guidance to the Task Force Eagle analytical process.

The board process was cyclical. The first step allowed the Chief of Staff to convene a board on his level to develop draft guidance and to brainstorm areas of concern as well as objectives for the Executive Board to deliberate. In addition, the Chief of Staff synchronized the inputs of the staff agencies to ensure proper support of the Task Force Eagle commander’s objectives. Step two was an Executive Board meeting with COMEAGLE. The "slinky effect" was best quantified when COMEAGLE directed an order be published as a result of the executive board process.

ORDERS PROCESS—THE SLINKY EFFECT

The "slinky effect" orders process was iterative. Based on integrated intelligence and near fight assessments, orders often began at the near fight and then were synchronized to the close and far battles. Orders developed by Task Force Eagle were sent to HQ SFOR with specific support requests, and down to subordinate HQ’s for action. HQ SFOR assisted in the process and took actions to support the overall plan sending down suggestions, improvements and limitations in the form of orders.
The subordinate HQ integrated their plan into the Task Force Eagle structure and sent changes to the Task Force Eagle order that were needed. Task Force Eagle orders were adjusted based on inputs from HQ SFOR and the subordinate HQs. With the "slinky effect" in operation, this iterative orders process allowed for the synchronization of plans and actions along the spectrum of close, near and far battles. It also created orders that were characterized by many changes. Even with the changes all orders and plans followed one model of application. All orders followed the inner and outer ring method.

INNER AND OUTER RING

The concept of the operation for Task Force Eagle base order 96-296 directed the elements of national power into action applied through use of the inner and outer ring model. All forces were applied with a task and purpose to fill one of these two ring roles. This concept was based on the battle of Alesia where Romans defended in an inner and outer ring against Verticenogix in 52 BC. The Romans isolated and contained the garrison of Alesia while simultaneously preventing reinforcements from getting to the battle scene.

The inner ring forces were in contact with the named target and stopped the target from expanding its influence. In the example of a weapon storage site (WSS) violation, elements of power were
arrayed to control the faction forces around the WSS and stop it from affecting other areas. Inner ring forces were directed inward toward and at the target. Outer ring forces were those elements of combat power that interdict reinforcing elements from getting at and strengthening the target. The WSS example again brings to mind those elements of power that stop reinforcements or external support from getting to the WSS.

The first step in applying the inner and outer ring concept was to isolate the target using inner ring forces. Later, elements of power were arrayed to dominate the entities and influence the target. Task Force Eagle could mass on a single target bringing significant elements of military and national power to bear on the target. Understanding the inner and outer ring model provided unit leaders an easy reference for task and purpose assignment. A checkpoint on the outer ring clearly understood that his task was to operate a checkpoint with a purpose to prevent reinforcements from getting to the isolated target area. This is easily viewed once an incident has begun. But what about stopping it from happening?

**PREEMPTION**

The highest state of "slinky effect" art was preemption. While this was never perfected, this paper will show one case where at least it possibly worked. The objective in preemption was to use
primarily non-lethal operating systems to isolate key targets representing the root causes of a potential GFAP violation. Once isolated, these key targets were dominated through application of forces spanning the elements of power. Near and deep operations conducted at the Division and SFOR HQ level, focused on interdicting those elements that could influence targets. In the event that preemption failed, and events jeopardized the secure environment, the Division shifted the main effort to military assets. The 1ID had to do this 18 hours after taking over in Bosnia.

GAJEVI

This model was applied first during the conflict of Gajevi I, 11-13 November 1996. Moslem settlers supported by soldiers of the Moslem 254th Brigade in an undercover role had a direct fire clash with the Minister of the Interior Police from the Republic Srpska. Forces from 2nd Bde, 1st Infantry Division contained the inner ring around the flash point of conflict in the area of Gajevi. They also conducted OPERATION SATURN, a tactical operation on the outer ring that confiscated the weapons of the 254th Moslem Bde. and prevented them from reinforcing the crisis.

Task Force Eagle, at the operational level, applied resources with both inner and outer ring missions. Simultaneously warnings, military and information operations reinforced the
outer ring. The commander of the Moslem II Corps was deterred from involvement by COMEAGLE and the Chief Joint Military Commission delivered similar messages to commander of the III Corps Republic Srpska. At the strategic level, COMARC from the Allied Reaction Corps (ARC) was involved at the national level with faction leaders to further reinforce the outer ring. The ARC also provided inner ring assets to Task Force Eagle to observe operations around Gajevi. SACEUR was involved in order to ameliorate tensions through discussions with world leaders. Another classic example was operation Rigel I.

**OPERATION RIGEL I**

The best example of preemptive action was Operation Rigel I. Based on an intelligence assessment of the Brcko arbitration decision, the Executive Board directed that the Task Force Eagle staff prepare an order to counter a demonstration in Brcko on 14 December 1996. This was the "target."

The objective was preemption of the demonstration. Should preemption fail, a peaceful defusing of the situation was the objective. Each staff element both lethal and non-lethal developed a method of attacking this "target." Each staff agency identified "pressure points" that they could influence to achieve the objective laid down by the Executive Board. This order was initially modeled after SFOR CONPLAN Phoenix. A Synch matrix and
order was prepared to support 1-18 Infantry, the main effort. This synch matrix was sent to both HQ SFOR and 1-18 Inf. Both HQ's adopted and suggested changes. The Synch matrix was adjusted, a new FRAGO issued, and actions commenced.

From the company to the Theater all efforts were synchronized toward a specific target: Moslem demonstration at Brcko on/about 14 December. The 1-18 Infantry operational graphics became the theater standard. SFOR level leaders manned the outer ring at the strategic level and placed their considerable force to bear on isolating the potential incident. All agencies knew where OP9 and Route Pear were. Multi National Division North coordinated actions at the cantonal level to ensure the outer ring was established as well as providing inner and outer ring assets to 1-18 Infantry to isolate the target.

The preemptive side of the spectrum of conflict was weighted as the main effort was made the outer ring forces. This was an in-action model of the slinky effect. The planned demonstration of 14 December never took place. We cannot accurately assess the battle damage or "BDA" from the actions. We do know that the demonstration did not take place but we do not know whether or not preemptive actions in Operation Rigel 1 prevented the demonstration.
CONCLUSION

Traditionally all doctrine and strategy for US forces require an endstate. Doctrinal endstates lend themselves to campaign plans that have waypoints along the lines of operation to the endstate. These are mapped early and changed slowly if needed. Multi National Division North had no endstate in guidance therefore, another means had to be found for campaign planning. Traditional methods designed to support higher strategies failed due to a lack of concrete endstate and waypoints.

Today's world produces conflicts that lack the clarity of foes from the industrial age. Clear endstates are less common than in the past. Traditional missions are not forthcoming from the National Command Authority. This makes planning difficult for a military whose doctrine is designed to address traditional endstates. As a result Multi National Division North developed other methods to provide focus and clarity to subordinate headquarters as well as up the chain of command. This alternate method called the "slinky effect" focused the effort and provided the method and agility for commanders at all levels.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There is an indication here that our toolbox of planning is wanting. The "slinky effect" or similar "focus power" models do
not exist in the framework of campaign planning. The recommendation that flows from this is the entire toolbox of campaign planning be re-looked in light of this and similar missions. Bosnia is a symptom. There are others. What is the endstate in Haiti? We can always dig in and say no involvement of military force without endstate or accept the reality of performing missions in this non-traditional world. If we exist in the non-traditional world then we must hone the tools to plan for it.

**IMPLICATIONS**

The implication is that more work is needed on the campaign planning toolbox. A new way of guiding the application of military force is needed. This study clearly shows that not only is the US in a revolution of military art but also in national strategy development. It appears that the melding of the levels of planning as conducted using the "slinky effect", it becomes clear that it was time, information, and lack of clear endstate that focused the levels. If the integration of accelerated time and information are inculcated into a national consciousness we will move to the preemptive nature of acts in the future? Do we wait for an enemy to strike with a weapon of mass destruction before we act? Do we use the information we gather to identify a potential weapon of mass destruction threat before they strike? Do we help our nation to direct its power in an agile fashion to
forestall such an attack? Does this not indicate the need for a more offensive use of national power based on increased information, limits of time, and no clear endstate?

Another important implication, is that total spectrum of war from tactical to strategic has become more melded over time. No longer can we look at activities to be only in the operational realm or the tactical realm or the strategic. In operations such as Joint Endeavor, strategic action is often spurred by operational direction that reacts quickly to tactical information collection. Slow, dogmatic, mindsets are not agile enough to operate in an environment such as Bosnia.

In the world of Chess, the computer Deep Blue had defeated the human world chess champion. The application of this artificial intelligence has indicated that there are ways to use information to determine plans in this complex arena. Not more than half a decade ago the very thought of a computer using information to plan better than the world’s greatest grandmaster was scoffed at. Doctrine writers of the future must find a way to incorporate non-dogmatic methods into the ways of doing business as the non-traditional world gains prominence.

"You can’t get honey with balloons" said Christopher Robin. "I do" said Pooh.
A. Milne

The House on Pooh Corner

Word Count = 6093
ENDNOTES


2 Dr. Robert Murphy, second revision of this paper, 27 February 1998, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Language is his words exactly.


5 Samuel Berger, policy address by NSA, Georgetown University 23 November 1997.

6 Samuel Berger, policy address by NSA, Georgetown University 23 November 1997.


8 Ibid.


11 Ibid.


13 The chronology of forces in the theater ran from IFOR Dec 95-Nov 96 and had no endstate but rather a date based on soldiers not spending more than a year in theater. IFOR was followed by a "covering force" which provided a militarily sound approach to disengaging 1st Armored Division. This Covering force had no endstate and a sort of loose end date. This covering force became SFOR once the decision to remain in Bosnia till June. This decision was widely anticipated by the operational planners. Within SFOR there were many rotations of troops by the many countries including American forces.

14 Dr. Robert Murphy, second revision of this paper, 27 February 1998, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Dr. Murphy changed the pronoun structure of this section and many of the transitions are his words.

15 Office of the President, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, “Executive
summary", Washington D.C.: Office of the President, May 1994. During my visit to the UN as part of the small group visits the American speakers identified PDD 25 as clear and consistent guidance from the White House. PDD 25 clearly was the guiding document. Questions concerning dichotomies in the application of the policy were sidestepped.

16 Ibid., 169.

17 Samuel Berger, policy address by NSA, Georgetown University 23 November 1997.

18 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-08, Vol. 1, (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 October 1996), I-1.

19 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-08, Vol. 1, (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 October 1996), I-1.

20 Ibid., I-1-I-15.

21 Ibid., I-12

22 Ibid., I-11-I-12.

23 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War, Joint Pub 3-07, (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), ix.

24 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War, Joint Pub 3-07, (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995).

25 Ibid., II-1.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., II-2

28 Ibid., II-2

29 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, Joint Pub 5-0, (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 April 1995).

30 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0, (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1February 1995), pg. III-8 corresponds with Joint Pub 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 April 1995, pg. II-20.

31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, Joint Pub 5-0, (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 April 1995),II-18

32 Ibid., I-20

33 Department of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5, (HQ DA: June 1993), 6-1.

34 Ibid.
35 Major Phillip K. Giles and CPT Thomas P Galvin, Center of Gravity Determination, Analysis, and Application, (Center for Strategic Leadership, Jan 31 1996), 1.


38 Ibid., 294.

39 Chairman of the Joint Chief’s of Staff, National Military Strategy, (Washington D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chief’s of Staff ), 11.

40 Dr. Robert Murphy, first revision of this paper, 25 January 1998, Carlisle Barracks, PA, corrections to draft 1 of this paper.

41 Chairman of the Joint Chief’s of Staff, National Military Strategy, (Washington D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chief’s of Staff ), 11.

42 Ibid., 12-19.

43 Commander USEUCOM, USEUCOM, Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness, (Commander USEUCOM, November 1996), 12.

44 Ibid., 10-11.


48 This is based on my being involved with the writing of over a thousand actual orders.


50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 One noted success here is the inclusion of a State Department officer on the division staff. The POLAD provided a great link with State and offered good objective views to both cultures.


Original concept paper "Covering Force" 20 Oct 1996. This language comes from the initial paper on IID's involvement in Bosnia. Written by the division commander many phrases in this paragraph are his words.

Ibid.

"Covering Force", 20 Oct 1996. This language comes from the initial paper on IID's involvement in Bosnia. It is unpublished and had several authors inputs. Written primarily by the division commander many phrases in this paragraph are his words.

This order cannot be quoted without raising the unclassified nature of this paper.

The ARC was the predecessor of SFOR in Sarajevo.

Dr. Robert Murphy, second revision of this paper, 27 February 1998, Carlisle Barracks, PA, much of this section's words are his.
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