The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY AND UTILIZATION OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD: DOES THE APPLICATION ADHER TO POLICY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD DAILY, JR.
United States Army National Guard

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1998
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY AND UTILIZATION OF THE ARMY NATIONAL
GUARD: DOES THE APPLICATION ADHERE TO POLICY

by

LTC Edward Daily, Jr.

COL Barringer Wingard
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Edward Daily, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, Army National Guard of the United States

TITLE: The Total Force Policy and Utilization of the Army National Guard: Does the Application Adhere to Policy?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project


Since its founding, the United States has relied on a small standing Army, backed up by a large, organized militia of citizen-soldiers for its defense and national security. Over the course of the past two hundred and twenty years, there have been many attempts by the regular Army to challenge the readiness, training and combat capability of the National Guard (the terms militia and National Guard are interchangeable), and to relegate the militia to the status of a state oriented home defense force. Traditionally, Congress and the American people have resisted efforts to create a large standing Army, but in the aftermath of World War II and the advent of the Cold War, there was a paradigm shift. The perceived threat from the forces of communism and the policy of containment brought about more reliance on a large standing Army with less reliance on the citizen-soldier. Following the Vietnam War, General Creighton Abrams, the Chief of Staff, Army and the last ground forces commander in Vietman, established what was to become the Total Force Policy. The intent of his policy was to never again send the regular Army to
war without the Army National Guard being a part of the ground forces; thereby ensuring grass roots support and the political will necessary to fight and win. Vietnam was the only major conflict where the United States did not commit, in a significant manner, its National Guard or reserves; it was an unpopular war, lacking the support and political will of the Congress and the people. The data was collected from three sources, namely a review of the literature, previous research and a survey of regular Army and National Guard officers. The analysis of the data indicates that the operational practices in the day to day activities at the senior levels of the Army do not adhere to the Total Force Policy. The results clearly demonstrate that there is a significant difference between how the Total Force Policy is supported by the regular Army and the National Guard. The unavoidable conclusion is that, if changes are not undertaken to bring these components into balance, the strategic defense of the United States as well as the camaraderie within the brotherhood of arms will continue to erode to an unacceptable level of risk.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................. iii

INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 1

THE PROBLEM ............................................................. 2

PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ......................... 3

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY .............................................. 5

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ................................................ 5

POST WORLD WAR II ....................................................... 7

VIETNAM WAR ERA ......................................................... 8

ABRAMS DOCTRINE ........................................................ 9

TOTAL FORCE POLICY ...................................................... 10

ENHANCED READINESS PROGRAMS ...................................... 11

TOTAL FORCE POLICY AFTER 1990 ..................................... 14

REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH ....................................... 17

ARMY WAR COLLEGE SURVEY ............................................ 17

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE STUDY ....................................... 20

RAND STUDY ............................................................... 22

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY ............................................ 24

RELATED LITERATURE .................................................... 26

METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH SURVEY ................................ 33

SAMPLE ................................................................. 33

INSTRUMENTATION ....................................................... 34

PROCEDURE ............................................................. 35

RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS ............................................. 36

OVERVIEW ............................................................... 36
ANALYSIS OF DATA SUPPORTIVE OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY ...... 36
ANALYSIS OF DATA NON-SUPPORTIVE OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY ... 39
DISCUSSION OF CURRENT POLARIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND THE
REGULAR ARMY ................................................................. 40
OVERVIEW ................................................................. 40
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW ........................................... 41
GOVERNORS RESPONSE TO THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW ...... 43
THE ARMY OFF-SITE AGREEMENT ........................................ 44
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................... 46
SUMMARY ................................................................. 46
CONCLUSION ............................................................. 48
RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................... 50
APPENDIX. TABLES OF DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THE SURVEY .. 59
ENDNOTES ............................................................... 63
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................ 69
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Distribution of Supportive Responses on the Total Force Policy (Active Army Officers and Dept of Army Civilians) ...... 59
Table 2: Distribution of Supportive Responses on the Total Force Policy (National Guard Officers).......................... 60
TABLE 3: Distribution of Non-Supportive Responses on the Total Force Policy (Active Army Officers and Dept of Army Civilians) 61
Table 4: Distribution of Non-Supportive Responses on the Total Force Policy (National Guard Officers) ......................... 62
INTRODUCTION

There is a perception within the senior leadership at the Department of Defense, among military journals and journalists who specialize in military issues, that the current, ongoing rift between the active Army leadership and the Army National Guard has its roots in the Gulf War. This rift has been exacerbated by the Quadrennial Defense Review's findings, published by the Department of Defense in May 1997.¹

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the quick and decisive victory in the Gulf War against Iraq, the Army was again faced with the usual peacetime dilemma. After previous wars, the United States demobilized its armed forces and reduced military spending. It became apparent in 1992 that Congress was going to reduce the military budget. Concern by elected officials and the American public over the size of the federal deficit and projections of continued deficits left the military budget again the object of cost-cutting measures.²

The Total Force Policy was implemented in 1973, following the Vietnam War. According to the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Total Force

...means the integration of planning, programming and budgeting for the manning, equipping, maintaining and training of a mix of active and reserve forces essential for meeting initial (emphasis added) contingency demands for forces. The Total Forces Policy implies an increased interdependence of active and
reserve forces. It absolutely requires that the availability and readiness of reserve forces must be as certain as the availability of active forces.³

At the outset, the Total Force Policy was hailed by the U.S. defense community, especially the Army. The draft had ended and a smaller, All-Volunteer Army was struggling to fill its ranks in an anti-military, post-Vietnam climate. The policy appeared to remedy the probability of the Army again being reduced in size so as to become a hollow army composed of understrength units.⁴ For members of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, the policy appeared to achieve a long sought after goal, full acceptance by the active Army in one Army; as then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger stated, "The basic concept of a total force has in itself provided a new sense of purpose. Guardsmen and Reservists now see a growing evidence that they will (emphasis in original) be called and have a role to play in future emergencies."⁵

THE PROBLEM

There is a perception in the Army National Guard that there is a systemic problem with the implementation of the Total Force Policy in that the Army has a long history in treating the Army National Guard in a prejudicial manner. Many Guard personnel and to a lesser extent, former active Army officers believe the friction between the two components is a continuation of an age-
old battle.

The current rift that is taking place between the Army and the Army National Guard was generated by force structure cuts levied against the Guard during the past eight years, future cuts projected by the active Army leadership and the lack of any operational or strategic mission for the eight Army National Guard Divisions.

PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of the study is to determine if the U.S. Army adheres to the tenets of the Total Force Policy in its strategic long range planning of force structure and missioning of the Army National Guard, and in the operational employment of its combat, combat support and combat service support units. The Army National Guard is a component of the U.S. Army and depends on the Army for all its resourcing. The Army determines its force structure, personnel endstrength, amount of full-time manning as well as providing modern weapons platforms and the requisite logistical support base. In order to better understand the dynamics involved in the rancor between the two components, a study of the perceptions of active Army and Army National Guard officers will be undertaken. Additionally, previous studies and literature will be presented to provide insight on previous periods of rancor between the Army and the Army National Guard.

This study is appropriate, since the continued public and
oftentimes acrimonious dialogue and debate taking place among and between the Army, the Army National Guard and their supporters is not in the best interests of the national security. The rift has caught the attention of the Congress and this can, based on previous events, have an adverse impact on the Army and its reserve components.6

This research is important because it is the officer corps that advises the national command authority on manning and mobilization. The officer corps is also responsible for recommending policy to the civilian/elected leadership, and once policy is established, to enforce the established policy. If the current officer corps at major through colonel rank, who will be the senior Army leadership in the next 5-15 years, does not support the Total Force Policy, it may well decide to do away with it, and the combat power of the National Guard. The abandonment of the Total Force Policy relative to the Army National Guard providing significant combat forces to the active Army during periods of threat to U.S. national security could significantly affect national power projection. Should the combat forces contained in the Army National Guard be converted to combat service or service support forces, in effect, this nation would not have any strategic reserve should this country be faced with major conflict requiring more than the current ten active Army divisions.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The focus of this study is on the relationship between the active Army and the Army National Guard relative to perceptions on the adherence and support for the Total Force Policy when it pertains to retaining or employing combat forces. The Army Reserve, also a reserve component of the U.S. Army, is not discussed as part of this study because it is a federal reserve and not a militia, and is a repository for combat service and combat service support forces. The Army Reserve does not contain combat forces in its force structure.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The National Guard is a centuries-old institution that has been defending this land since 1636 when the first organized militia was formed in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Our Founding Fathers debated the issue of whether to depend on the state militias as a federal defense force or maintain a large standing army. The result of this debate during the Constitutional Convention was a compromise; the right of the states to maintain a militia was guaranteed in the United States Constitution (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 16, and the second Amendment), while granting to Congress the authority to “raise and support armies; to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them, as may be employed in the service of the United States…” (Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 16, U.S. Constitution).

Prior to World War II, the size of the state militias (the use of the term militia and National Guard are interchangeable) always exceeded the size of the regular Army; as such, the utilization of the militia forces to augment the regular forces during national emergencies were necessary for national defense and security. The regular Army, prior to World War II, had been a small professional force trained and equipped for limited contingency operations. During the 19th century the Army fluctuated between 25,000 officers and enlisted to a high of 78,000 during the latter part of the century. Prior to World War II, the size of the regular army was 275,000 officers and enlisted personnel. Figure 1 depicts the significant contribution of manpower by the National Guard during major wars and conflicts; the National Guard doubled the size of the Army just prior to World War II, and provided 25% of the combat forces in the Korean War. The contribution of National Guard forces has diminished markedly since the end of World War II, concomitant with the establishment of a large standing Army. At the height of the Vietnam War the Army had over 500,000 troops in the war zone; the Army Guard contributed less than 3% of the force. In the Gulf War, the Army Guard provided slightly more than 10% of the Army forces deployed to the theater of war.
Figure 1: \(^{11}\)

**THE NATIONAL GUARD IN AMERICAN WARS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War or Conflict</th>
<th>Guard/Militia on</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Duty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary War</td>
<td>164,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War of 1812</td>
<td>489,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican War</td>
<td>73,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>1,933,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-American War</td>
<td>164,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Border Service</td>
<td>158,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>379,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>300,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td>138,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>12,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Asia/Gulf War</td>
<td>62,411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**POST WORLD WAR II**

Following World War II and the start of the Cold War, the national command authority believed it necessary to keep a large standing regular Army. This decision was based on the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and the requirement to station sufficiently large forces in Western Europe and Japan.\(^{12}\) When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the U.S. Army, though large in size, found itself unprepared to fight a major war.\(^{13}\) The Army had not modernized its weapon systems and had not
maintained a high level of readiness in its combat units. The Truman Administration found it necessary to mobilize the Army National Guard and call into federal service eight Guard divisions.

Of the eight Army National Guard divisions mobilized for the Korean War, two divisions, the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions, conducted combat operations in Korea; two divisions were deployed to Europe to bolster the U.S. Army forces there against the possibility of a Soviet attack. The remaining four divisions were kept in the continental United States to serve as a strategic reserve.\(^{14}\)

VIETNAM WAR ERA

During the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson decided not to mobilize the National Guard and Army Reserve. Instead, he opted to increase the size of the regular forces by conscription; resulting in men between the ages of 18 and 25 years of age being drafted for two years of military service. Because the available pool of men was larger than the number required, many special classes were given deferments; this resulted in the poorer class being drafted along with a large percentage of blacks. Anyone even remotely familiar with the period 1967 through 1972, knows the polarity that came to be over the United States' involvement in the Vietnam. Many military leaders of that era believe the decision by President Johnson to not mobilize the Guard and

8
Reserve sent the wrong signal to both the North Vietnamese leaders and the American people.\textsuperscript{15}

ABRAMS DOCTRINE

Following the Vietnam War, General Creighton W. Abrams, the Chief of Staff, Army and the last ground forces commander in Vietnam, decided that the United States Army should never again go to war without augmentation by the National Guard and the Army Reserve. General Abrams reasoned that the national command authority should never commit the armed forces of the United States (along with its Reserves) to war without securing the support and commitment of the people. He further reasoned that the national command authority could never gain the support of Congress and the people without demonstrating a strategic need and the will to win. The Army, under General Abrams initiated what became known as the “Abrams Doctrine,” the intent of this doctrine was to fully integrate the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve into active Army operations, training and force structure.\textsuperscript{16}

One must understand the difference between sending the regular Army off to fight a war and mobilizing the National Guard and Reserves to fight alongside the regular Army. When you deploy the Army, at most you have affected the lives of the soldiers family, and the towns and businesses surrounding the forts where the troops were stationed; mobilizing the National
Guard and Reserves becomes a significant and news-worthy event in over 2,700 communities across the United States, the 2,700 communities that have armories or reserve centers where the reservists drill each month. Additionally, businesses across the United States are affected when the reserves are mobilized, and there may be a loss in income when a significant number of reservists are mobilized and moved overseas. In small communities, many of their workers may be reservists; thereby causing a loss of experienced workers and the concurrent lessening of available replacements upon mobilization. One must never lose sight of the clear and forceful message that mobilizing the National Guard sends to a potential enemy.¹⁷

TOTAL FORCE POLICY

In 1973, then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, drawing on the Abrams Doctrine, adopted the Total Force Policy for all services in the Department of Defense; this policy requires that all regular and reserve forces of the Army be treated as a single, integrated national defense force. The policy's basic underlying tenet is that the Army National Guard is the primary combat reserve and augmentation for the active Army during major military contingencies, operations other than war and major theater wars.¹⁸ The Total Force Policy accepted the premise that the nation could not mount or sustain a significant military operation or theater war without utilizing
the Army National Guard. The Army National Guard made many strides during the latter part of the 1970's, and all during the next decade in raising standards, so as to be able to provide a trained, organized, disciplined, ready and professional force to serve as the first line of defense behind the regular Army. In order to increase the readiness and training of its officers and enlisted soldiers, the Army National Guard embarked on an ambitious program which involved many innovative ideas and concepts which resulted in increased training opportunities, producing increased individual and unit readiness.

ENHANCED READINESS PROGRAMS

As an example of innovative ideas to enhance the Army National Guard readiness posture, in 1981, the Army National Guard, with congressional approval, instituted the Captains to Europe Program. This program authorized up to 300 Army National Guard captains to serve 30-month active duty-for-training tours in forward-deployed active Army units in the Federal Republic of Germany. This program, which benefited both the Army National Guard and the regular Army, continued in existence until 1988 when pressure from Headquarters, Department of the Army, caused funding and support for this program to be withdrawn. This program provided excellent training opportunities to over a thousand Army National Guard captains, training that could not be replicated in the United States and it enabled these officers to
gain invaluable experience and greatly expand their skill and knowledge base. Upon returning to their state and unit, these officers possessed skills that surpassed those of their peers who did not participate in the Captains to Europe program. Additionally this program also provided the Army National Guard with a small, but highly effective, corps of officers who could function as expert trainers in their unit. In effect, these officers became the Guard’s “Train-the-trainer” cadre. Additionally, regular Army officers who served with these Army National Guard captains came to realize that these were dedicated, educated, competent and professional officers. A portion of the barrier wall that separates the active component from the reserve component began to break down.

Prior to 1982, the Army National Guard deployed less than 2,000 soldiers to overseas locations in support of the five combatant commander’s war plans. Commencing in 1982, the leadership of the Army National Guard launched a multi-faceted initiative to increase Army National Guard involvement in overseas training and mission support. Army Guard units that were incorporated into a combatant command’s war plans, called CAPSTONE alignment by Headquarters, Department of the Army, were placed on the U.S. Army Forces Command’s five-year overseas deployment training plan and included in the forces troop-listed to support annual Joint Chiefs of Staff theater defense exercises. Secondly, individual and unit exchanges were
initiated with the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway and several island nations in the Caribbean, thereby enabling the Army National Guard to gain experience in combined and joint training exercises.

Finally, the key personnel upgrade program, called KPUP (pronounced keep up) was instituted. This program enabled Army National Guard officers and non-commissioned officers to serve on active duty-for-training for up to ninety days, in positions commensurate with their grade and military occupational specialty; working along side their active Army counterpart.23 The primary goal of the KPUP program was to provide an operational learning and training environment that would increase the military skills of Guardsmen and women, thereby increasing soldier and unit readiness. As with Captains to Europe, KPUP would also provide more soldiers who could train other trainers in their unit. By 1988, the Army National Guard was deploying over 30,000 soldiers to train in the overseas commands. Additionally, another 5,500 officers and non-commissioned officers were training overseas KPUP.

How successful were these programs? After action reports submitted by both active Army and Army Guard commanders after the Gulf War demonstrated the value of these programs.24 Active Army commanders at brigade-level and higher singled out the Army National Guard units for their exceptional ability in being able to rapidly mobilize, marshal personnel and equipment, deploy
overseas to an unfamiliar and austere environment, and quickly assume mission responsibility upon arrival in-theater. The Army National Guard commanders attributed their unit’s success to three programs: overseas deployment training, KPUP and the CAPSTONE alignment program. All three programs enhanced individual and unit tactical and technical expertise, as well as providing invaluable experience in mobilizing a unit, certifying unit personnel for deployment, marshaling personnel and equipment, conducting port operations and deploying overseas to an unfamiliar area of operations.\textsuperscript{25} It should be remembered, the Gulf War was the first time in this nation’s history that units of the Army National Guard were mobilized and deployed into a combat theater without the need for extensive post-mobilization training.\textsuperscript{25} The Army federalized 398 Army National Guard units for the Gulf War; of these, 387 or 97\% met the Army’s mobilization criteria for deployment when they were federalized.\textsuperscript{27}

TOTAL FORCE POLICY AFTER 1990

The Total Force Policy was not adhered to during the Gulf War in 1991 when the Army refused to deploy Army National Guard combat forces into the theater of operations, and restricted the role of the National Guard to combat service and combat service support units. Additionally, the Army relieved, without cause, many battalion-level and higher commanding officers, and replaced
them with active Army officers. Since the end of the Gulf War, the Army leadership has consistently attempted to drastically reduce the combat organization of the Army National Guard and the overall endstrength of the Guard. Since 1991, the endstrength of the Army National Guard has dropped from 445,000 officers and enlisted to the current 362,000. Additionally, as a result of the off-site agreement following the release of the Quadrennial Defense Review report by the Department of Defense, the Army National Guard has agreed to a further reduction of 17,000 spaces; originally, the Army wanted the Army Guard to drop by 38,000 spaces. The Army has also postured strongly for the elimination of the eight Army National Guard Divisions and converting Army Guard combat elements into combat service and combat service support units.

The Army has built much of its strategic doctrine and philosophy around the writings of General Carl von Clausewitz, an 18th century Prussian officer who compiled a series of writings on the art of war that were published by his wife, following his death. The title of the book is, On War. One of the most profound theories Clausewitz postulated, in light of the fact that it was written in the 1820’s, was on what he termed the Trinity. This theory proposed that for a nation to successfully wage war, the government, the army and the people must support the strategic vision for the conduct of war. What seems to have been lost on the active Army leadership is the
earlier adoption of Clausewitz's theory by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. In that powerful and lasting document, our Founding Fathers embodied the principle of waging war only when the government, the army and the people were all committed to the effort. The President was made the commander-in-chief of the Army; Congress (the voice of the people) was empowered to raise and support armies; and the militia was to be filled by every able-bodied man between the ages of 18-45 under the command of the state Governor. Congress (the people) was empowered to organize, arm and discipline the militia, leaving to the states the authority to appoint the officers and training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

There was much debate, both during the Constitutional Convention and in the Federalist Papers (following the convention), while the Constitution was going through the state ratification process.\footnote{33} The founders created the perfect amalgam for creating a "People's Army," to ensure that no branch of the government, or the regular Army could become too powerful and subjugate the people.\footnote{34} It is surprising how little the active Army officers know about the traditions and history of the militia concept and why the Founding Fathers deemed it necessary to restrict executive authority to commit military power, and to restrict the authority of Congress in funding the Army.\footnote{35} What should not be lost on the Army officer is that the founders did not see a need to place the same restrictions on the Navy.
Congress was limited to a period of two years to appropriate moneys to raise and support armies. Regarding the naval force, the Constitution empowered the Congress "To provide and maintain a Navy" (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 13, U.S. Constitution). The founders did not place any time restriction on the power of Congress to provide for and maintain a Navy as it did on raising and supporting armies.

REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH

ARMY WAR COLLEGE SURVEY

A survey of active and reserve component students attending the U.S. Army War College was conducted in November 1997. The survey was conducted by a resident student for the purpose of collecting data on the perceptions of senior leaders, the lieutenant colonels and colonels, on the Total Force Policy twenty-five years after its establishment. The survey was a Likert-type survey and asked respondents to answer if they strongly disagreed, disagreed, neither agreed nor disagreed, agreed or strongly agreed with each statement.

On the question of whether the active component should be structured and resourced to not rely on reserve units to respond to contingency missions, 71% of the respondents disagreed with the statement, indicating a significant majority of the senior officers support the Total Force Policy. However, although a majority, a lesser percentage (59%) of active Army combat arms
branch students disagreed with the statement.

When asked if the reserve components use resources best applied to sustaining active component readiness, 68% of the respondents disagreed. Twenty six percent of the active Army respondents neither agreed nor disagreed.

The students, all of whom are focusing their studies on national security strategy and national military strategy, were asked if the current military strategy of maintaining and sustaining a military capability to successfully fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars is viable. Two-thirds (67%) of the respondents do not believe the current U.S. military strategy is viable; an even higher percentage (72%) of the active Army respondents disagreed.

Given the current Department of Defense budget constraints, the respondents were asked if greater efficiencies could be gained by placing more reliance on the reserve components. A slight majority of the respondents (54%) agreed that greater efficiencies could be gained by placing more reliance on the reserves; however, 58% of the active Army respondents disagreed with the above statement.

To the statement “reserve components can attain and sustain readiness levels required to respond effectively, when needed, to contingency operational requirements,” there was a significant disparity in the responses. A slight majority of the total respondents (56%) agreed. However, although 66% of the active
Army combat service and combat service support branch respondents agreed with the above statement, 64% of the active Army combat arms respondents do not believe that reserve component units can attain and sustain appropriate readiness levels.

When asked if the current strained relationship between the active Army and the Army National Guard is a serious problem, 58% of the respondents agreed. Interestingly, a slight majority (53%) of the active Army respondents do not believe the strained relationship is a serious problem. Several active Army respondents wrote a comment on the questionnaire that the problems are not in the field but inside the Washington beltway and at the general officer level.

Some additional statistical data bears mentioning. A significant majority (62%) believes the Army National Guard is a state defense force, whereas the Army Reserve is the federal reserve of the Army. Statutorily the Army National Guard is the primary federal reserve of the Army and must be called into active federal service before the Army Reserve. This indicates that a significant number of active component senior officers are not familiar with the roles and missions of their two reserve components. In response to the question “Combat maneuver units should reside only in the active component,” only 38% of the respondents agreed, whereas 54% of the active Army combat arms respondents agreed.
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE STUDY

Seven students (Browning et al.) attending the National War College, Washington, District of Columbia, conducted research on the Total Force Policy in 1982; the title of their research project was, "The U.S. Reserve System: Attitudes, Perceptions and Realities." The Browning et al. research made several recommendations based on the findings from their surveys of active and reserve component leaders. Their study provided several recommendations for improving the readiness of the reserves and improving the relationship between the active and reserve components.

Their research recommended equipping the reserves with the same weapon systems and equipment as the active component. Additionally, active units must increase their role in the quality control of reserve component readiness. It was also recommended the services undertake a massive educational effort (for both active and reserve personnel) to ensure that reserve missions, roles, capabilities, and organization are understood by both components. Browning et al. strongly recommended introduction of the Total Force Policy at the service academies and ROTC detachments, as well as at intermediate schools and senior service colleges.37 Interesting is the fact that fifteen years later, several of the recommendations are still valid, and for the most part, have not been acted on or implemented. Additionally, the author's research supports the recommendations.
put forth in the Browning et al. study.

The research indicated that strategy and policy shifts since the end of the draft in 1973 brought about a greater reliance on the Guard and reserve as an integral part of the total force, yet the appropriate level of funding, equipment and manpower had not been provided commensurate with the missioning of the Reserves. The research also discovered there was a genuine lack of understanding of the history, lineage, purpose and nature of the Reserve Components in general, and the Army Guard in particular by the active Army. Additionally, the National War College research found that the Reserve Components suffer unnecessarily through ignorance and biased treatment on the part of the regulars. They found that regular officers who worked with the Army National Guard had very favorable impressions; while those lacking this experience tended to view the reserves as “part-time” soldiers who do not belong in the military club. They also found that active officers failed to understand the requirement for reservists to identify with both the military and civilian worlds.39

The researchers found the most successful application of the Total Force Policy existed in the Air Force, between the active Air Force and the Air National Guard, and that the Army was the least successful component in integrating its Reserve Components.39 Fifteen years later, the National Defense Panel, commissioned by Congress to review and report on the findings of
the Quadrennial Defense Report, came to the same conclusions. The National War College research also recommended, based on their findings, that gaining wartime commands needed to assume greater, if not full responsibility for the training and readiness of their Reserve Components. Further, the report recommended Reserve organizations within each service should be modified so as to integrate operations, training, and equipping with the active forces; with personnel management, administration and mobilization planning remaining under direct Reserve leadership.

RAND STUDY

Following the Gulf War, the U.S. Congress held a series of hearings to investigate the rationale behind the Army’s failure to mobilize the Round-out brigades until ordered to do so by Congress and then not deploying them to participate in combat operations during the Gulf War. Department of the Army and National Guard leaders appeared before the House and Senate Armed Forces committees to present their positions. Congress was concerned that the Army had not treated its combat reserve forces fairly. The Air Force and Marine Corps both integrated their reserve forces into combat operations; the Navy also used its reserve forces in combat, but to a lesser degree than the Air Force and Marine Corps. Only the Army failed to deploy its combat reserve force, most of which resided in the Army National
Guard at that time, into the theater of operations.

As a result of the congressional testimony, U.S. Forces Command commissioned the Rand Corporation to conduct an analysis of Army Guard combat infantry brigades to determine the number of days required following mobilization for these brigades to be rated combat ready. During the pre-deployment phase of the Gulf War and following the Gulf War, the Army leadership estimated it would take up to 180 days for an Army National Guard infantry brigade to become combat ready; and that it would take up to 360 days for an Army National Guard division to be rated combat ready.

The Army replaced the Army National Guard Round-out brigades (the third brigade in selected active divisions) with “Ad Hoc” brigades and assigned them to replace the Guard brigades. These thrown together brigades were not required to validate their training readiness and were rated combat ready - without any quantifiable measure of testing.43 Because of the disparity of the testimony given before Congress after the war, the Army was required to conduct an independent study of the Army National Guard combat brigades.

The Rand Corporation team visited Army National Guard brigades during their inactive duty training periods (called weekend drills) and at their 15-day annual training period. Under optimistic conditions, the Rand study concluded it would take 79 days for an Army National Guard brigade to become combat
Not called into federal service until November 1990, the 48th Infantry Brigade was sent to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California and achieved combat ready status, according to Army standards, evaluated by active Army officers, in 73 days. Had the Army mobilized the Army Guard brigades in September 1990, these brigades could have been rated combat ready by December 1990, deployed to Saudi Arabia, trained for another thirty-plus days in the combat area of operations and participated in the Gulf War. The Rand study, while not completely supportive of the reliability of the Round-out concept in short-fused contingency operations, at least supported more closely the Army National Guard timeline on combat readiness.

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

The United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, conducted an exhaustive study on the Army National Guard following the Gulf War. Their final report, published in 1993, was titled "The National Guard: Defending the Nation and the States." This report contained congressional testimony given to both the Senate and the House of Representatives Armed Services Committees following the Gulf War, by Department of the Army and National Guard leaders on why the Army National Guard round-out brigades were not deployed to Southwest Asia. The report also referenced Government Accounting Office studies conducted on the use of National Guard units during the Gulf War.
and adherence to the Total Force Policy. The testimony delivered by both sides before Congress shows a polarity exists between the Department of Defense and the National Guard Bureau.\textsuperscript{46}

A Congressional Research Service report on increased reliance on the National Guard and Reserves pointed out that while Congress has been supportive of increased roles and responsibilities for the National Guard, the Defense Department and the Department of Army have tended to be more in favor of a broadly symmetrical reduction in active and National Guard endstrength.\textsuperscript{47} While in the process of realigning its Total Force Policy in 1993, the Defense Department spelled out three strategic theaters - Contingency operations, the Central Command (Mid East) and the Pacific Rim. The only major role for the Guard was in the Atlantic Theater, where there is a slim prospect of a major land war.

The Defense Department went further and stated the reserve forces should be limited to a role that supplements the active forces during protracted contingencies.\textsuperscript{48} The National Guard Bureau raised concerns that the round-out brigades were not utilized during the Gulf War, a fact that seemed to signal a retreat from a large National Guard role in the Total Force Policy. The National Guard Bureau further pointed out that despite all its previous successes, the Total Force Policy has not been able to overcome old prejudices and attitudes within the Department of Army. It was made abundantly clear that the other
services (the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps) fully integrated their reserves into forward deployed combat units during the Gulf War, and these reserve forces performed their mission on par with the active forces.⁴⁹

Major General Ensslin, then the President of the National Guard Association, stated in his testimony, "Congress and the American people are presented with the option of a high cost, active Army of questionable need, or a balanced military consisting of a full-time force to meet our nation's identifiable threats, backed up by a trained, equipped, and ready citizen-soldier force, capable of being quickly "fine-tuned" to meet a variety of threats."⁵⁰

RELATED LITERATURE

The current rift between the active Army and the Army National Guard is not a new phenomenon, it has been going on since the Congress created an Army following the American Revolution.⁵¹ In this century, the Army has tried to reduce the Army National Guard after each war. Additionally, the Army leadership tried to eliminate the Army National Guard during the 1920's and only the intervention of Congress prevented it from being relegated to a state defense force.⁵² Following World War II, the Army leadership again tried to dismantle the Army National Guard by having it absorbed by the Army Reserve.⁵³

At the beginning of each war in this century, the Army has
made the claim that the Army National Guard was not combat ready. Facts do not support this claim. Following World War I, the German General Staff named the eight toughest U.S. Army divisions they faced on the western front. Six of the eight were Army National Guard divisions.\textsuperscript{54}

The first Army division committed to combat operations in the Pacific theater during World War II was the 32d Infantry Division, Michigan National Guard, when they landed at Guadalcanal in support of the Marines. Eighteen Army National Guard divisions were mobilized and fought in World War II; nine fought in the European Theater and nine fought in the Pacific. A nineteenth division, the Americal Division was formed from various non-divisional Guard units and fought with distinction in the Pacific Theater.\textsuperscript{55} The 30th Infantry Division, the "Old Hickory" division, comprised of Guard soldiers from North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia was rated the most outstanding division in the western theater by General Eisenhower's Allied staff.\textsuperscript{56}

Guard divisions in World War II fought in every theater, in 34 separate campaigns, and participated in seven assault landings. The most famous of the assault landings was conducted by the 29th "Blue and Gray" Infantry Division on Omaha Beach on June 6th, 1944. The 29th Division was comprised of Guard soldiers from Maryland and Virginia.\textsuperscript{57}

Another oft stated reason for non-reliance on the Army
National Guard is the poor quality of its senior leaders. Prior to World War II, Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, Commanding General of Army Ground Forces, and a regular Army officer of the Uptonian school, characterized the leadership of the Army National Guard divisions as the "blind leading the blind" and by 1944 he had expanded his viewpoint to total disdain for senior Army Guard commanders. Major General Emory Upton wrote *The Military Policy of the United States* in 1878 (it was not published until 1904); General Upton had little or no use for the militia and distrusted citizen-soldier units commanded by amateur officers. Further, he opined that the organized militia system frustrated the ability of the Army to place capable regular officers at battalion and higher commands in the militia units.

Many regular Army officers, McNair being one of them, subscribed to Upton's opinion of the militia. At the start of World War II build-up, the regular Army consisted of twelve divisions and two warfighting military departments (Hawaii and the Philippines); the Army National Guard consisted of eighteen divisions. While many regular Army officers attributed the poor state of readiness of the Army National Guard divisions to the poor quality of its leaders, they overlooked several mitigating factors.

The Army Guard divisions were organized as World War I-style square divisions, consisting of four brigades, each with
two battalions. Conversely, the active Army had developed the triangular division for its own divisions, with each division, except the 3d Armored Division, having three regiments with three battalions each.\textsuperscript{61} It was not until February 1942 that the complex process of re-organizing the Army Guard's divisions commenced. Additionally, the Guard divisions were lacking modern vehicles, equipment, weapons and uniforms and often trained with mock-up weapons and equipment, such as World War I vintage trucks with the word tank painted on the sides of the truck.\textsuperscript{62}

Much was said about the poor quality of the Guard's "political" division commanders and the fact that most were relieved of their commands. Of the 18 Guard division commanders, only the commanders of the 31st and 37th Infantry Divisions commanded their divisions during combat operations; both divisions fought in the Pacific Theater of Operations. How did the Army Guard compare to the regular Army? Not one of the regular Army division commanders, in command in 1940, took their division into combat, and only two, Major General Stilwell and Major General Devers commanded units in combat.\textsuperscript{63} Of the twenty-one Guard major generals on active duty in 1940, nine or 42 percent were still on active duty in May 1945, this compared more favorably against the regular Army statistics, which had only five, or 23 percent still on active duty in May 1945.\textsuperscript{64}

Promotion of colonels to brigadier general, on the surface, appears slanted in favor of regular Army officers; 84.5 percent
of the general officer promotions went to regular Army colonels, with the Army Guard receiving only 2.4 percent of the promotions.\textsuperscript{65}

The findings released by the National Defense Panel states unequivocally that the Army suffers from a destructive disunity among its reserve components, specifically with regards to the Army’s relationship with the Army National Guard.\textsuperscript{66} The National Defense Panel was commissioned by Congress to study the report issued by the Department of Defense, the Quadrennial Defense Review. The National Defense Panel studied the Quadrennial Defense Review from March to November 1997, and issued its report on December 1st, 1997 and devoted five of its 94 pages to the Army National Guard.

The Army did away with the Round-out program, which aligned an Army National Guard infantry or armor brigade with an active Army combat division, following the Gulf War. The reason proffered by the Army leadership for terminating the Round-out program was that Army National Guard combat units could not be brought up to combat standards quickly enough to deploy overseas with their active Army counterpart. The National Defense Panel recommended integrating some portion of the Army National Guard’s divisional combat units into the Army’s divisions and brigades; the panel did not recommend they round-out the active division or brigade, but rather, they should be assigned as organic units.\textsuperscript{67}

The panel also recommended the Army oversee the training of
the enhanced Separate Brigades to ensure they meet readiness standards. Rather than recommending a reduction in Army National Guard endstrength, the National Defense Panel saw a role for the Army National Guard in shaping the international environment, particularly in the mission areas of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and nation-building. The panel stated that additional Guard and reserve units may be needed to reduce pressure on an already over-committed active Army.\textsuperscript{68} The panel also recommended the modernization of the reserve forces be conducted so as to match the modernization of the active forces. Modernization of the reserves is essential to achieve interoperability between the active and reserve forces in consonance with established doctrine.\textsuperscript{69}

The active Army leadership did not see a role for the Army Guard divisions when the Quadrennial Defense Review was published, it wanted the Army Guard to convert 60,000 combat spaces to service and service support spaces. The National Defense Panel recognized the Army Guard divisions serve a real need in providing a strategic reserve and are required to respond to domestic emergencies, possible terrorist attacks, and to defend critical infrastructure. The panel stated "A total force, fully integrated, requires a common culture to engender unity of thought and action."\textsuperscript{70}

There is a plethora of past literature, surveys, and some research that clearly points to the culture of the regular Army
as being one that condones a discriminating attitude towards the
citizen-soldier and the Army National Guard. To quote Phillip A.
Odean, the National Defense Panel chairman, the current state of
relations between the two components is "dysfunctional."

It is interesting to note that the CAPSTONE program did in
fact accomplish the integration of operations and training the
Total Force Policy called for; and as previously noted, the Gulf
War after action reports attributed much success for the
performance of the Reserve Components to the CAPSTONE training
program. The U.S. Army dismantled the CAPSTONE program in 1993,
replacing it with the Wartrace program. Whereas the CAPSTONE
program aligned all Army National Guard units with a combatant
command and assigned them a wartime mission, Wartrace only
aligned Tier I and Tier II units to a wartime mission. The Tier
I and II units are not combat units and surprisingly, they do not
deploy overseas to train; despite all the reports that attributed
the success of the Army National Guard in responding to
mobilization for the Gulf War to its previous experience in
deploying overseas for training.71

Today, twenty-four years after implementing the Total Force
Policy, and fifteen years after the National War College study,
the active Army appears to be regressing rather than moving
forward in integrating its Reserve Components, especially the
Army Guard. The eight Army National Guard combat divisions do
not have a wartime mission, and are not aligned with, nor do they
train with an overseas combatant command. The fifteen enhanced separate infantry brigades are aligned with a U.S. based active Army division but do not routinely train overseas. The oft stated reason by the active Army for wanting to disestablish the eight Guard divisions is because they do not have a wartime mission—a mission that can only be assigned by Headquarters, Department of the Army. It was the Army that deleted the eight Army Guard divisions from their wartime missions and declared them no longer relevant for America's defense.

**METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH SURVEY**

**SAMPLE**

A survey of active Army officers, Department of Army civilians and Army National Guard Officers was conducted by the author in August, 1996. Eighteen regular Army officers (2 Colonels, 4 Lieutenant Colonels, 5 Majors, and 7 Captains), six civilian workers (4 with prior service in the regular Army) and six National Guard officers (1 Lieutenant Colonel, 3 Majors, and 2 Captains) were involved in the research survey. The participants were selected at random. The research project was conducted with personnel assigned to First Region (Reserve Officer Training Corps) which comprises eighteen states (Northeast, Mid-Atlantic and Southeast) and the territory of Puerto Rico. There are a total of 110 universities and colleges participating in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)
program within First Region. The percentages of participants to the total population were as follows: Regular Army: Colonels - 20%, Lieutenant Colonels - 5%, Majors - 10%, Captains - 3%, and civilian workers - 8%; National Guard: Lieutenant Colonels - 50%, Majors - 15%, and Captains - 16%. The respondents were asked to complete the Army National Guard Sensing Survey. The survey presented questions, which dealt directly with the tenets of the Total Force Policy. Five of the six National Guard respondents had prior active duty experience in the regular Army before joining the National Guard.

INSTRUMENTATION

The survey was mailed to each selected participant. The survey (see Appendix) consisted of a cover letter that explained the purpose of the survey and provided instructions for completing the survey and a self-addressed envelope was included. The survey was organized into two parts; Part I consisted of eight biographic and administrative questions; Part II consisted of 16 questions whose purpose was to obtain each respondent's opinion on the role of the National Guard in national defense. The questions were developed to elicit responses on the combat effectiveness of the National Guard, and limiting factors on the use of Army National Guard units in the various contingency, peacekeeping and combat operations. Additionally, questions were asked that would ascertain the respondent's opinions on the
quality of leadership and training in the National Guard. The survey was a Likert-type survey and asked respondents to answer whether they strongly agreed (SA), agreed (A), had no opinion (N), disagreed (D), or strongly disagreed (SD) with the statement. Answers of strongly agree or agree to questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6a, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14a, and 15 indicated the respondent was in agreement with the Total Force Policy as far as the National Guard being a relevant force for national defense. Answers of strongly agree or agree to questions 6b, 7, 11, 13, 14b, 14c, and 16 indicated the respondent did not support the Total Force Policy relative to the participation level of the National Guard.

PROCEDURE

The survey was intended to elicit either a positive or negative response to each question in Part II; no opinion responses were considered irrelevant. The research project was concerned with opinions and beliefs of the sample population concerning the future role of the National Guard in the strategic defense of the United States. The survey population was selected at random, with sub-populations also being selected at random; with this method, the resulting opinions of the respondents on the Total Force Policy relative to the National Guard could be assumed to be representative of the total population of the U.S. Army and the National Guard. The results are judged to be
accurate, with a 95% confidence level.

RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS

OVERVIEW

This section presents the results of the analysis. Descriptive statistics are utilized to present the respondents' opinions relative to the Total Force Policy. Four tables were constructed (see Appendix) to graphically display the data collected.

ANALYSIS OF DATA SUPPORTIVE OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

The research data revealed the following general statistics. Tables 1 and 3 depict data for active Army officers and Army civilians; Tables 2 and 4 depict data for National Guard officers. Answers of strongly agree (SA) or agree (A) to the questions appearing on Tables 1 and 2 postulate an affirmative or supportive position on the Total Force Policy. Answers of strongly agree (SA) or agree (A) to the questions appearing on Tables 3 and 4 postulate an non-supportive position on the Total Force Policy. Twenty-two percent (22.1%) of the regular Army officers and civilians were in strong agreement with the Total Force Policy, relative to the utilization of the National Guard in national defense; seventy-five percent (75.3%) of the Guard officers were in strong agreement with the Total Force Policy. Agreeing with the Total Force Policy were 39% of the regular Army
officers and civilians and 14% of the guard officers. When strongly agree and agree are combined, the number of active Army officers and DA civilians supporting the Total Force Policy climbs to 60.9%; for Army National Guard Officers the percentage indicating support for the Total Force Policy rises to 89%. A difference of 28% between the active Army and Army National Guard respondents is considered significant.

In responding to question number 8, "The history of the Army National Guard goes back 358 years; it has served and fought in every major war or conflict (with the exception of the Vietnam War) the United States has been involved in. Congress should force, by legislation, the Department of Army to deploy Army National Guard combat units in major regional conflicts and contingency operations." 50% of the active Army officers and DA civilians were supportive of the statement, whereas 100% of the Guard officers responded favorably. The responses to question number 11, "All combat elements should be deleted from the Army National Guard Force Structure (as was done to the Army Reserve) and limit the mission of the Army National Guard to combat service and combat service support roles." showed a high level of support from both groups for keeping combat units in the Guard. Eighty seven percent (87%) of the active Army officers and civilians disagreed with the statement, while 100% of the Guard officers disagreed.
It is worth noting that when facts clearly support achievement, the regular army officers rated the Guard more favorably but still did not fully support the Guard as a full partner of the regular Army. When asked if they believed the National Guard non-combat units performed their mission during the Gulf War, as well as the regular Army units, 75% of the regular Army officers and civilians agreed, while 100% of the Guard officers agreed. Reports from front-line commanders and GAO reports after the Gulf War clearly supported the claim that the Guard units did as well, and often out-performed their regular Army counterparts during combat support operations.

Although 67% of the regular Army officers agreed they were confident in the ability of the National Guard to accomplish its wartime mission; the percentage among regular Army officers who served in combat alongside National Guard units rose to 90%. Seventy-five percent (75%) of the regular Army officers agreed that the National Guard units performed as well as regular Army units in the Gulf War; the percentage among officers who served in the Gulf War was 100%. The majority of regular Army officers agreed that National Guard combat units should be retained in the Guard’s force structure (87%), and should provide combat units to the operation (71%).
ANALYSIS OF DATA NON-SUPPORTIVE OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

Strongly disagreeing with the Total Force Policy were 9.6% of the active Army officers and civilians, and 2.6% of the Guard officers; 21.2% of the active army officers and civilians and 5% of the Guard officers disagreed. Combining strongly disagree and disagree shows that 30.8% of the active Army officers and civilians do not support the Total Force Policy, while 7.6% of the Guard officers do not support the policy. Expressing no opinion in several of the key questions were 8.3% of the regular Army officers and civilians, and 2.6% of the Guard officers.

When asked if National Guard units mobilized into federal service and deployed to combat zones should be commanded by regular Army officers, only 42% of the regular Army officers and civilians agreed. Although less than 50%, this is still a significant number of respondents lacking confidence in National Guard commanders at battalion and higher level. One hundred percent of the Army National Guard officers strongly disagreed with this question. When asked if the National Guard should be relegated to a state defense force, 21% of the regular Army officers and civilians agreed, while 100% of the Guard officers disagreed.

What is significant is the fact that 43% of the regular Army officers agreed that battalion-sized National Guard units and higher should be commanded by regular Army officers; of those who
served in combat alongside National Guard units, only 18% agreed. In responding to question 10, "The National Guard Bureau has stated that Army National Guard Infantry and Armor Brigades (Enhanced Brigades) can engage in combat operations if they are provided 30 days of post-mobilization training. What is your opinion?" 50% of the active Army officers and civilians disagreed, with 33% giving no opinion. Only 17% agreed that the brigades could enter combat after 30 days of training, while 66% percent of the Guard officers were supportive. The non-supportive results obtained from this survey are closely supportive of the results obtained in the November 1997 survey conducted at the Army War College.

**DISCUSSION OF CURRENT POLARIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND THE REGULAR ARMY**

**OVERVIEW**

The current polarization and public rancor that exists between the Army and the Army National Guard has its roots in the non-deployment of the Army Guard Round-out brigades during the Gulf War. Lieutenant General Herbert Temple stated the decision by the Army to delay the call-up and mobilization of these brigades and not deploying them with their aligned active component division was the point when the Army broke faith with the Army National Guard. This act called into question the
ethics and integrity of the Army senior leadership. During congressional hearings on the Gulf War, conducted by the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Sonny Montgomery stated that when asked why the Round-out brigades were not mobilized with their active component divisions, General Schwarzkopf, the Gulf War Commander-in-Chief, replied that the Pentagon decided not to call them up. When asked the same question, the Department of Defense stated the reason it had not called up the brigades was, General Schwarzkopf did not ask for them.

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

The Quadrennial Defense Review report was released by the Department of Defense in May, 1997. It immediately came under fire. The Brookings Institution, the Center for Defense Information, the National Guard Association, the National Guard Bureau, the Adjutants General Association, forty-three state Governors and several members of Congress came out strongly in attacking the Army’s strategy for structuring its forces from 1997 through 2015. Of major concern to the National Guard Bureau, the state Adjutants General and members of Congress was the fact that the Army senior leadership made force structure decisions affecting the Army Guard without including the Army Guard leadership in the decision-making process or even consulting with them. U.S. Code, Title 32 requires the executive branch of the federal government to communicate and
coordinate anticipated force reductions for the Army Guard with the appropriate state governors.

The Army portion of the Quadrennial Defense Review stated the Army would maintain 10 divisions, its current division strength, to maintain the capability to respond to two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. There was no mention of the eight Army National Guard divisions or the fifteen enhanced separate brigades as being required for the two major theater war scenario. The Quadrennial Defense Review called for the Army to drop its end-strength by 60,000 spaces. The Army leadership decided to apportion the cuts so that the Army would drop by 15,000 spaces (the Army had missed its recruiting goal by 15,000 for fiscal year 1997), the Army Reserve would lose 7,000, and the Guard would lose 38,000 personnel.

The rationale for keeping ten active divisions as laid out in the Quadrennial Defense Review flies in the face of logic. First, at the present time, there is no peer adversary who is a threat to the security of the United States. The Army based its argument for retaining the ten divisions on the possible, but highly unlikely, scenario of having to respond to engage enemy forces in two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Of the ten divisions, two are forward deployed to Europe and one is forward deployed to South Korea; that leaves seven divisions, six in the continental United States, and one in Hawaii.

In the event the Army did have to fight two nearly
simultaneous major theater wars, which the National Defense Panel considers highly unlikely,\textsuperscript{78} ten divisions are not sufficient to respond to such a challenge. One only needs to examine the 1991 Gulf War to come to this conclusion. The Army needed eight combat divisions to conduct combat operations against the Iraqi Army. With three divisions forward deployed in support of other United States national security interests, that only leaves seven divisions remaining to fight two wars. Remember eight were needed for one war in 1991. These facts do not support the Army's logic for deleting the eight Army National Guard divisions from its force structure. Another factor bearing on the need to maintain ten divisions needs to be surfaced. U.S. TRANSCOM, the unified command charged with moving combat forces to a theater of war, only possesses sufficient strategic air and sea transportation assets to move four and one-half divisions and their equipment at one time, leaving two and one-half divisions state-side awaiting transportation.

GOVERNORS RESPONSE TO THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

The state Governors, who in peacetime are the commanders-in-chief of their National Guard forces, mounted an immediate campaign, objecting to these drastic cuts proposed by the Army in the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Governors were concerned that the Quadrennial Defense Review, originally intended to be a review of America's post-Cold War security needs, instead became
a tool for the Army to shift the majority of the proposed personnel cuts over to the Army National Guard. On May 29th, 1997, the Governors sent a letter to President Clinton outlining their objections to the proposed cuts. This prompted Secretary of Defense Cohen to direct the Army leadership to meet with the Army National Guard leadership in an effort to reduce the discord existing between both components. The Army and Guard leadership conducted an "off-site" meeting during the period June 2-4, 1997.

THE ARMY OFF-SITE AGREEMENT

At the Off-site meeting, the Adjutants General Association submitted eleven principles to the Army as the start point for negotiations. Agreement by the Army Guard leadership to accept taking the initial 17,000 end-strength reduction was predicated on the acceptance by the Army of the eleven principles, which the Guard leaders believed the Army did agree to. Among the key elements of the eleven principles were the following: (1) all Army Guard forces would be resourced at a baseline of C-3, which equates to being rated combat ready (C-3 means a unit is combat ready but has shortfalls in one or more of the rated areas: personnel, training, equipment on hand or equipment readiness); (2) the Force Support Package units and the enhanced separate brigades would be resourced at C-1, which equates to being fully combat ready (C-1 means no shortfalls in any of the rated areas); (3) Army Guard forces would be fully missioned and relevant; (4)
Army Guard modernization would mirror the active Army; (5), the Army Secretariat would oversee the entire re-examination process, thereby ensuring civilian oversight.⁸¹

Following the off-site, a Vice Chief of Staff, Army Memorandum for Record, dated 9 September 1997, stated the eleven principles were appropriate goals and that the follow-on re-examination process would be delegated to Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, and not Headquarters, Department of the Army. As a result of the changes made to the off-site agreement, the National Governor’s Association again drafted a letter, this time to the Secretary of Defense.⁸²

The Governors stated their concern that Department of Army senior leaders had characterized the off-site agreement as goals rather than an integral part of the agreement. They were also concerned that the Army was programming Army National Guard force reductions beyond those proposed in the Quadrennial Defense Review. Additionally, the Governors were especially concerned that Army officials were ignoring the historical role of the militia in American society, the recent off-site agreement, and the Total Force Policy. Not overlooked by the Governors was the size of the drawdown of the Army National Guard since 1991. The Army Guard had an end-strength of 457,000 in 1991 and was now programmed to drop below 350,000, the lowest the Army Guard forces have been in the 20th century, and a departure from this
nation's historic reliance on the militia. While recognizing the Army National Guard should share in the force reductions, they objected to prorating the cuts across the three components, since the Army Guard is five times less expensive to train and maintain than the active Army.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY

In summary, previous literature, surveys, and research, to include the author's survey, indicate there is a cultural perception problem in the active Army regarding the Army National Guard. The roots of this negative perception of the Army National Guard go all the way back to the American Revolutionary War, but have become stronger and more deeply seated during this century. Current Army doctrine, and new doctrine preparing leaders for the Army After Next, depicts the Army as a continuously learning and transforming organization. Army warfighting doctrine emphasizes a holistic, overarching and synergistic approach to operational and tactical application of the principles of war. Doctrine also emphasizes the criticality for leaders to be able to seamlessly integrate joint and combined forces, across the broad spectrum of conflict, to fight and win this nation's wars.
The army leadership envisions the future, out to the year 2020, as being a period dominated by complexity, ambiguity, uncertainty and rapid changes in technology and computer-based information systems. Adequate preparation and response to this changing environment, as viewed by the Army leaders, requires the total Army to become a learning organization capable of implementing organizational change. The Army defines a learning organization, and itself, as being one that can adapt quickly to change by shaping the environment, training its leaders and soldiers, and preparing for uncertainty. The tools needed to construct this learning organization encompass personal mastery, collective intelligence, shared vision, investment in people, commitment, team building and systems thinking. The Army also sees itself as a values based organization with time proven values, such as honor, integrity, loyalty and respect. Honor and integrity are perceived as the touchstone of the Army officer. Honor and integrity engender trust and confidence. Trust and confidence are essential ingredients required of an organization, especially a military organization, if it is to operate effectively. Without trust, unity of purpose and cohesion will deteriorate.

According to the literature review, it appears the current state of relations between the active Army and the Army National Guard is not one that depicts a synergistic, integrated, learning organization, possessing a collective intelligence committed to a
shared vision. The Army National Guard leadership has lost confidence in the Army leadership and there is a lack of trust in the perceived integrity and ethics of senior Army leaders as a result of the Quadrennial Defense Review process and the off-site meeting. The off-site meeting in June 1997 did nothing to lessen the schism because the “truth” changed following the agreements reached at the off-site meeting. The Adjutants General and the National Guard Bureau leadership agreed to reduce the end-strength of the Army Guard by 17,000 soldiers over the next three years because they believed the Army leadership had accepted their eleven principles. Following the off-site meeting, the Army attempted to program additional end-strength cuts above the 17,000 spaces and insisted the eleven principles submitted by the Adjutants General were goals and not an integral part of the agreement. The Army National Guard is not without blame in this current rift. Inflammatory statements by certain Guard leaders have fueled the fires of acrimony that exist between the two components. Each side appears to be in a death spiral, zero-sum game in which a gain by one side is perceived as a loss by the other. Zero-sum is not a game played by synergistic, learning organizations.

CONCLUSION

The results of the survey conducted as part of this study,
indicate there is a significant difference between regular Army officers and Army National Guard officers in their respective support for the Total Force Policy. It can be assumed rational thinking is behind regular Army officers agreeing that the National Guard should be mobilized for major regional conflicts and wars. The fact is, the regular Army is too small in manpower and force structure to fight a major conflict without the reserves.

If the current rancor existing between the two components is not brought to closure, the implications of a widening schism could prove onerous. The current spate of pernicious rhetoric emanating from both components and their supporters, undermines public confidence, and contributes nothing towards building a seamless Army. Congress has begun to take notice of the on-going rift, and, based on its traditional interest in the National Guard, may take action to obviate the need for the Army to take corrective action. The Congress represents the people and the Army leadership should never lose sight of this. The Guard and Reserve are more closely aligned with "the people" than the active Army, by virtue of their environment. The Army's interaction with the American people is restricted to the immediate area surrounding its military bases and what is reported in the media but the Army Guard is spread across the entire breadth of the United States. Its 3,700-plus units are located in 3,360 armories, in over 2,700 communities -- it is
America’s community based force. Historically, our nation has relied on the Army National Guard as a mobilization base in preparation for conflict, as well as a community-based force capable of responding quickly to domestic emergencies. Congress has traditionally supported the National Guard when it, Congress, determines the Guard has or is being treated unfairly by the active Army. If past is prologue, it will do so again but there will be no winners. Both the Army and the Army Guard lose when they cannot settle their differences and make Congress take the role of arbiter.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of the findings, several recommendations are presented. More research is needed to determine the underlying causes of this perennial problem and to determine long term programmatic solutions. Previous research efforts and studies conducted by such groups as the Rand Corporation, the Government Accounting Office, and the Congressional Research Institute, to name a few, have been perfunctory at best. Previous research, to include this author’s, has been too narrow in focus, studying the symptoms and not the illness.

Future research would be better served by taking a systems approach to studying perceived Army National Guard deficiencies and comparing Army National Guard combat units to like active
Army units. Why does it take 70-90 days for an Army National Guard infantry brigade to achieve combat readiness? What is the effect of the current training strategy on readiness? Will training in concert with an active component unit improve training readiness? How does operations and maintenance resourcing affect training readiness? Are the standards used to evaluate training applied equally to the Army Guard and the active Army? Is training at the individual and platoon level more advantageous to producing the desired level of readiness, or should units train at the level organized? Can significant value-added gains to training readiness be achieved by increasing annual training from a 15-day to a 21-day training cycle? Should Army Guard combat units conduct a 30-day active duty annual training period once every three years? Research that exposes a problem without providing potential solutions to the underlying causes of the problems or deficiencies serves no purpose in the long-term.

If one can accept there is some truth or basis in fact that the current culture of the active Army has accepted, and possibly condoned a negative viewpoint about the capability of the Guard, then one solution is to change the organizational culture. By definition, widely accepted in the Human Resource Management profession, organizational culture is a system of shared values, attitudes, beliefs, assumptions, habits, interactions and sentiments that produce behavioral norms. Organizational culture
has both a formal and informal structure. Both cultures
influence each other. The formal structure determines what the
core competencies of the organization are -- its organizational
structure, how it allocates resources, the systems it develops
and uses, the people it hires, how it trains its personnel, the
results it recognizes and rewards, and what it defines as
problems and opportunities, and how it deals with them. The
informal culture can be seen in terms of a sub-culture that
exists below the corporate executive level, influenced to a
degree by the executive level of management. The informal
culture is the realm of perceptions, feelings, informal
interactions and group norms. Most often, the organizational
culture can evolve or be affected by the examples set by the top
management. Senior and mid-level managers are influenced by what
the executive level decision-makers do, not what they say.

Carrying this over to the current situation existing in the
Army, the formal culture supports the Total Force-One Army
Policy, but the informal culture is far less supportive. The
formal culture states unequivocally that the Army National Guard
is a trained and ready force, able to respond in peace and war.
The informal culture seeks to remove the combat capability from
the Army Guard, as it did from the Army Reserve, reduce the size
of the Guard and relegate it to a support organization, retaining
the ability to conduct ground maneuver warfare in the active
Army.
The following illustration should shed some light on how the informal culture adversely affects the relationship between the Army and its Army National Guard. Were a senior Army general officer, or any officer for that matter, to treat a complaint about unfair treatment or possible harassment coming from either a minority group or a feminist organization with anything less than sincere concern, the officer’s career would be in jeopardy. Insensitive or disparaging remarks about minorities or females will bring censure or worse down on any officer foolish enough to think the Army brass will tolerate this type of behavior. This policy is clearly understood by members of the Army and enforced by the leadership. Denigrating remarks by general officers about the Army National Guard, and other “anonymous” officials appearing in the Washington, D.C. newspapers and other periodicals have become commonplace, with nothing but silence from the senior Army leadership. The same level of affirmative action taken in support of minorities, if applied to “Guard bashing” would send a clear signal to all that it will no longer be tolerated.

To change the culture, the Army leadership first has to acknowledge it has a problem. Once admitted and recognized, the senior Army leadership must commit the total Army - active and reserve to a renewal process of its systems through a more effective and collaborative diagnosis of organizational culture. The renewal process is critical to developing a new and
universally accepted culture.

Renewal is a process of initiating, creating and implementing needed changes to make it possible for an organization to become more viable, more adaptable, more able to solve problems and learn from experiences, both positive and negative. In order to change an organization's culture, as much of the organization as possible should be involved in the process. Change, to be effective, can not be driven from the top down. It requires the total support of the senior leaders, their commitment and active participation. The Army would have to develop an interactive process involving Army National Guard leaders, the Adjutants General Association, the Army Reserve and the civilian leadership within the Army Secretariat.

The Army would be well served by hiring a private organization, not connected in any way with the armed forces, recognized and respected for its work in the organizational development discipline. Because it is composed of three components, the active, Guard and Reserve, the action research model of organizational development would probably best meet the needs of the total Army in this effort. The action research model, in organizational development consists of (1) a preliminary diagnosis of the problem(s) affecting the organization, (2) gathering data through the use of a detailed and comprehensive questionnaire or survey, (3) analysis of the
data by the organizational development team members, (4) data feedback to the senior leaders of the three components and the Army Secretariat, and finally, (5) feedback sessions conducted as needed whereby the active Army and its reserve components have an opportunity to interpret and discuss the feedback data, diagnose problem areas and develop coordinated action plans to remedy the identified problems.

Inherent to this process is the establishment of a follow-up and sustainment system to ensure that the desired organizational development change process is a continual and on-going deliberative process. Because this is an open, interactive process, the Army National Guard leaders must be receptive to feedback received from other sources assailing the negative aspects of the Guard’s culture, and the Guard must be willing to initiate action to change its culture.

Educating the active component officers on the history, traditions, organization, administration, accomplishments and the roles and missions of the Army National Guard should reap benefits far exceeding the initial cost of re-engineering the basic, advanced and senior level service schools. The education process must start with the pre-commissioning level of education and continue through to the senior service college. Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets receive one, three hour block of instruction on the two reserve components. At the U.S. Army War
College, the future leaders of the Army and joint service commands are given a one hour orientation on each of the Army's reserve components.

By contrast, because of sensitivities surrounding sexual harassment, the Army leadership decided this year, to add an additional week onto basic training, and annually, conducts mandatory equal employment opportunity training. Actions such as these communicate a signal of command emphasis on achieving a desired endstate relative to these interpersonal relationships. Devoting significant time to social interpersonal issues, while assuming an ephemeral approach to educating officers on the reserve components, provides but one example of the informal culture that sends conflicting messages -- this is what I say I will support or do, but this is all I'm willing to do to support my stated position. The length, depth, and frequency of education on the reserve components will not be addressed in this study, but should be the focus of some future research. One recent encouraging development was a statement by the Chief of Staff, Army that underscores a real need to educate active component on the uniqueness of the reserve components, especially the National Guard. How the education process is developed, hopefully with Army Guard input, and implemented will have an effect on its success.

Previous studies and current perceptions based on
experiences from the Gulf War and the Quadrennial Defense Review process indicate the Air Force and the Marines have been extremely successful in integrating their reserves. The Marine Corps has gone so far as to delete the use of the term “reserves” when referring to their reserves. The Army should consider studying these two services’ approach to total force integration.

Finally, the Army should study the feasibility of implementing a personnel assignment policy that infuses the One-Army concept across all three components. The Army National Guard has taken the lead in initiating a cross fertilization program by virtue of the Louisiana Army National Guard selecting an active component lieutenant colonel to command the 1st Battalion, 141st Field Artillery, “The Washington Artillery,” organized in 1838. The Army and its reserve components should implement a pilot program whereby active component officers would command Guard and Reserve units at company, battalion, brigade and division level. Concurrently, the Army should open up key staff positions at battalion, brigade, division, corps and Headquarters, Department of the Army primary staff positions to Guard and Reserve officers. Such a program, if successful, should improve total force integration, interoperability and more importantly, understanding.

The National Guard Bureau estimates the average Army National Guard officer trains forty-six days a year in a paid status and devotes another thirty-plus days in an unpaid status.
The active component officers may develop a new appreciation for the citizen-soldier once they witness the devotion to duty and dedication these citizen soldiers bring to their second profession, in addition to the personal sacrifices they make in being reservists. If such a program were to be implemented, the Army would have to ensure that service with the reserve components was perceived by active component officers as career enhancing. If the Army leadership fails to establish a service-wide climate that encourages active officers to seek command assignments in the reserve components, the program will fail. In order to achieve the desired end results, such a program would need total support across the three components, from the top down and from the bottom up. Acceptance of the concept of a seamless Army will have to be infused into the very fabric of the Army culture.
APPENDIX. TABLES OF DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THE SURVEY

Table 1: Distribution of Supportive Responses on the Total Force Policy (Active Army Officers and Dept of Army Civilians)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>SA # / %</th>
<th>A # / %</th>
<th>NO # / %</th>
<th>D # / %</th>
<th>SD # / %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1 - Mobilize the Army National Guard for Peacekeeping Missions</td>
<td>5 / 21%</td>
<td>6 / 25%</td>
<td></td>
<td>9 / 37%</td>
<td>4 / 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2 - Mobilize the Army National Guard for Peace-Enforcement Missions</td>
<td>6 / 25%</td>
<td>8 / 33%</td>
<td>1 / 4%</td>
<td>5 / 21%</td>
<td>4 / 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3 - Mobilize the Army National Guard for Contingency Missions</td>
<td>5 / 21%</td>
<td>8 / 33%</td>
<td>1 / 4%</td>
<td>6 / 25%</td>
<td>4 / 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4 - Mobilize the Army National Guard for Major Regional Conflicts</td>
<td>12 / 50%</td>
<td>9 / 37%</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 / 13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5 - Confident in the Ability of the Army National Guard to Accomplish its Wartime Mission</td>
<td>5 / 21%</td>
<td>11 / 46%</td>
<td>2 / 8%</td>
<td>5 / 21%</td>
<td>2 / 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5a - The Army National Guard Should be Deployed to the Theater in Direct Support of the Mission</td>
<td>6 / 24%</td>
<td>10 / 41%</td>
<td>2 / 8%</td>
<td>4 / 17%</td>
<td>2 / 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#8 - Congress should Force the Department of Army to Deploy National Guard Combat units for Contingency operations &amp; Major Conflicts</td>
<td>5 / 21%</td>
<td>7 / 28%</td>
<td>1 / 4%</td>
<td>7 / 29%</td>
<td>4 / 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#9 - Army National Guard Divisions can engage in Combat if they receive 180 days of added training</td>
<td>3 / 13%</td>
<td>12 / 50%</td>
<td>2 / 8%</td>
<td>5 / 21%</td>
<td>2 / 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#10 - Army National Guard Brigades can engage in Combat if they receive 310 days of added training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#12 - Army National Guard Non-combat units Performed as Well as Active units in the Gulf War</td>
<td>3 / 13%</td>
<td>15 / 62%</td>
<td>4 / 17%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 / 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#14a - When Mobilized, the National Guard should Provide Combat, Cbt Service &amp; Support</td>
<td>6 / 25%</td>
<td>11 / 46%</td>
<td>3 / 13%</td>
<td>4 / 17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#15 - Mobilizing the Guard and Reserves garner National Support for Strategic Policy</td>
<td>6 / 25%</td>
<td>3 / 13%</td>
<td>5 / 21%</td>
<td>6 / 25%</td>
<td>4 / 17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-Total 62/21% 104/36% 29/10% 62/21% 32/11%
Table 2: Distribution of Supportive Responses on the Total Force Policy (National Guard Officers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>SA # / %</th>
<th>A # / %</th>
<th>NO # / %</th>
<th>D # / %</th>
<th>SD # / %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1 - Mobilize the Army National Guard for Peacekeeping Missions</td>
<td>4 / 66%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2 - Mobilize the Army National Guard for Peace-Enforcement Missions</td>
<td>4 / 66%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3 - Mobilize the Army National Guard for Contingency Missions</td>
<td>5 / 83%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4 - Mobilize the Army National Guard for Major Regional Conflicts</td>
<td>6 / 100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5 - Confident in the Ability of the Army National Guard to Accomplish its War-time Mission</td>
<td>3 / 50%</td>
<td>2 / 33%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#6a. - The Army National Guard Should be Deployed to the Theater in Direct Support of the Mission</td>
<td>5 / 83%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#8 - Congress should Force the Department of Army to Deploy National Guard Combat units for Contingency operations &amp; Major Conflicts</td>
<td>5 / 83%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#9 - Army National Guard Divisions can engage in Combat if they receive 180 days of added training</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td>3 / 50%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#10 - Army National Guard Brigades can engage in Combat if they receive 30 days of added training</td>
<td>2 / 33%</td>
<td>2 / 33%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#12 - Army National Guard Non-combat units Performed as Well as Active units in the Gulf War</td>
<td>5 / 83%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#14a. - When Mobilized, the National Guard should Provide Combat, Combat Service, and Svc Support</td>
<td>6 / 100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#15 - Mobilizing the Guard and Reserves garners National Support for Strategic Policy</td>
<td>3 / 50%</td>
<td>2 / 33%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-Total 49/68%  15/20%  3/4%  4/6%  1/1%
TABLE 3: Distribution of Non-Supportive Responses on the Total Force Policy (Active Army Officers and Dept of Army Civilians)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>SA  # / %</th>
<th>A  # / %</th>
<th>NO # / %</th>
<th>D  # / %</th>
<th>SD # / %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#5b. - Army National Guard Units Should be Used to Replace Active Units Deployed to Theater</td>
<td>5 / 21%</td>
<td>12 / 50%</td>
<td>1 / 4%</td>
<td>5 / 21%</td>
<td>1 / 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7 - When Mobilized, the Guard Should be Used as a Replacement Pool for the Active Army</td>
<td>2 / 8%</td>
<td>3 / 13%</td>
<td>1 / 4%</td>
<td>10 / 41%</td>
<td>8 / 33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#11 - All Combat Elements Should be Eliminated from the Army National Guard</td>
<td>3 / 13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13 / 54%</td>
<td>8 / 33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#13 - Army National Guard Units deployed into Combat Should be Commanded by Active Officers</td>
<td>3 / 13%</td>
<td>7 / 29%</td>
<td></td>
<td>14 / 58%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#14b. - The Role of the Army National Guard Should be Limited to Combat Service and Support</td>
<td>5 / 21%</td>
<td>2 / 8%</td>
<td>11 / 46%</td>
<td>6 / 25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#14c. - The Role of the Army National Guard Should be Limited to Combat Service Support</td>
<td>5 / 21%</td>
<td>1 / 4%</td>
<td>11 / 46%</td>
<td>7 / 29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#16 - The National Guard Should be Relegated to a State Defense Force</td>
<td>2 / 8%</td>
<td>4 / 17%</td>
<td>9 / 37%</td>
<td>9 / 37%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB -TOTAL</td>
<td>12 / 7%</td>
<td>35 / 21%</td>
<td>9 / 5%</td>
<td>73 / 43%</td>
<td>39 / 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Totals include the sub-total for Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree and Strongly Disagree derived from Tables 1 and 3; there is no consequence for an answer of No Opinion.
### Table 4: Distribution of Non-Supportive Responses on the Total Force Policy (National Guard Officers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#6b. - Army National Guard Units Should be Used to Replace Active Units Deployed to Theater</td>
<td>2 / 33%</td>
<td>2 / 33%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td>1 / 17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7 - When Mobilized, the Guard Should be Used as a Replacement Pool for the Active Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 / 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#11 - All Combat Elements Should be Eliminated from the Army National Guard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 / 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#13 - Army National Guard Units deployed into Combat Should be Commanded by Active Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 / 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#14b. - The Role of the Army National Guard Should be Limited to Combat Service and Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 / 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#14c. - The Role of the Army National Guard Should be Limited to Combat Service Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 / 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#16 - The National Guard Should be Relegated to a State Defense Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 / 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SUB -TOTAL</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 / 5%</td>
<td>2 / 5%</td>
<td>0 / 0%</td>
<td>1 / 22%</td>
<td>37 / 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTALS**

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75.3%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Totals include the sub-total for Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree and Strongly Disagree derived from Tables 1 and 3; there is no consequence for an answer of No Opinion.
ENDNOTES

1 Robert J. Brandt, "The Silent War: The Relevency of Army National Guard Divisions," National Guard, April 1997, p. 64.


10 Ibid., p. 273.


14 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, p. 209.


19 Lieutenant General Herbert Temple, former Chief, National Guard Bureau, interview by author, 26 October 1997, Carlisle, PA.


21 Lieutenant General Herbert R. Temple, former Chief, National Guard Bureau, interview by author, 26 October 1997, Carlisle PA.

22 Ibid.


25 Ibid.

26 Heller, Total Force, p. 15.


34 Ibid., p. 97.

35 Lieutenant General Herbert R. Temple, former Chief, National Guard Bureau, interview by author, 26 October 1997, Carlisle PA.

36 U.S. Code, Title 10, sec. 10101.


38 Ibid., pp. 85-86.

39 Ibid., p. 81.


44 Thomas F. Lippiatt et al., Post Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1997), p. 35.


47 Ibid., p. 29.

48 Ibid., p. 31.

49 Ibid., pp. 31-32.

50 Ibid., p. 32.

51 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, p.262.

52 Ibid., p.170.

53 Ibid., pp. 170-171.

54 Ibid., p. 268 and Brandt, The Silent War, p. 61.

55 Ibid., p. 188.

56 Placard at Fort Jackson, SC; 30th Infantry Division conducted post-mobilization training at Fort Jackson, 1940.


58 Bruce Jacobs, Memo for the Record,” National Guard, July
1982, p. 262.


60 Ibid.

61 Glasson, Mobilization 1940, p. 259.

62 Mahon, History of the Militia, p. 182.

63 Jacobs, Memo for the Record, p. 263.

64 Mahon, History of the Militia, p. 187.

65 Ibid.


67 Ibid., p. 53.

68 Ibid., p. 55.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.


72 Brandt, The Silent War, p. 60.

73 Ibid.

74 Lieutenant General Herbert Temple, former Chief, National Guard Bureau, interview by author, 26 October 1997, Carlisle, PA.


76 Whiteside, Why the Army National Guard?, p. 18.

77 Department of Defense, QDR, p. 29.

78 National Defense Panel, p. 11.


Ibid.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Brandt, Robert J. "The Silent War: The Relevance of Army National Guard Divisions." National Guard, April 1997, 60-64.


Temple, Herbert R., Jr., former Chief, National Guard Bureau. Interview by author, October 26, 1997, Carlisle, PA.


