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STRATEGIC RESTRUCTURING OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE RESERVE

BY

EILEEN GUERIN SWICKER

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Strategic Restructuring of the U.S. Intelligence Community: A Civilian Intelligence Reserve

by

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U.S. Army War College
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The end of the Cold War led to significant reductions in national security spending and corresponding reductions in the Intelligence Community's (IC) workforce. The IC faces an increasing range of issues of interest to policy makers and remains responsible for covering both traditionally hostile states and new, transnational issues. The new challenges require skills not needed during the Cold War, and the current IC workforce lacks the specialized knowledge to fully cover the emerging transnational and global issues. Continuing budget restrictions prevent the IC from recruiting necessary specialists as full-time staff officers. This study argues that by developing a multi-tiered Civilian Intelligence Reserve, the IC can gain access to collection and analytical expertise not found in the IC now.
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NEW CHALLENGES

The United States faces multiple and new challenges in the post-Cold War world. The U.S. needs diplomatic, economic and military instruments of power, supported by intelligence information and analysis when handling regional conflicts with humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions, when opening foreign markets to competition or when controlling the scourges of narcotics and weapons of mass destruction.

Without direct threats to national survival, Congress has substantially cut national security spending. The Intelligence Community (IC), like other national security organizations, lives with a decreasing budget and is shrinking in size. Nevertheless, the IC must provide timely intelligence to support the National Security Strategy. It must be able to report on traditional hostile states and on emerging challenges to U.S. interests.

Several recent studies pointed out structural shortcomings in the IC and highlighted the need to build a workforce that can handle post-Cold War challenges. New, transnational intelligence targets require skills and techniques not needed during the Cold War. The majority of the studies recommended the IC create a Civilian Intelligence Reserve (CIR) to gain access to academic expertise that can augment IC analysis.

This study will argue that, applied in a global restructuring program, the CIR can incorporate into the IC new intelligence
collectors and techniques to deal with transnational and global issues that have recently emerged to challenge U.S. national security interests. The study will argue that adding a new component to the IC is a possible, radical solution that may force substantive change and compel a rethinking of how to manage personnel reductions. The IC should develop a CIR that does more than just tap academic expertise. The IC should incorporate collection expertise concerning transnational and global issues not currently found in the IC.

INTELLIGENCE IN TRANSITION

"Two years ago I set out our top intelligence priorities in the Presidential Decision Directive. First, supporting our troops and operations, whether turning back aggression, helping secure peace or providing humanitarian assistance. Second, providing political, economic, and military intelligence on countries hostile to the United States so we can help to stop crises and conflicts before they start. And, third, protecting American citizens from new transnational threats such as drug traffickers, terrorists, organized criminals, and weapons of mass destruction."

—President Clinton’s remarks at the 50th Anniversary of The Central Intelligence Agency on 16 September 1997

The end of the Cold War was supposed to bring a "peace dividend" -- redirecting government spending from national defense toward domestic priorities. Policymakers are intent on cutting the size and cost of the federal government, despite expensive U.S. global commitments over the last seven years. The Intelligence Community (IC) has taken its share of cuts, but
still must support U.S. efforts to open markets to economic competition, engage in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions and deal with transnational threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, narcotics, organized crime and environmental degradation. Intelligence information and analysis remains critical to effective policy making.

The IC, since the end of the Cold War, has made efforts to restructure itself to meet new budgetary realities. It no longer has unlimited resources to apply to clandestine collection of information by human and technical means. By the end of the century, the IC workforce will decrease by 25 per cent, and the community will be stretched to maintain essential coverage of countries and threats of immediate interest to U.S. national security.

Advocates of intelligence reform contend the IC is still structured for a bipolar world, is vaguely groping for a new mission and is duplicating information collection and analysis capabilities of the private sector. Reform-minded observers' recommendations range from totally dismantling the national intelligence system to major structural cuts with greater reliance on "open source intelligence". Some reform advocates believe the IC should cover only current events; others argue that the principal IC focus should be long-term analysis and assessment.
NEW INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

The Clinton administration stated its reliance on intelligence coverage of key national security issues in the 1995 Presidential Decision Directive 35. Similarly, the 1997 National Security Strategy noted "our intelligence capabilities are critical instruments for implementing our national security strategy." President Clinton's 16 September 1997 remarks at CIA headquarters indicate national security challenges have expanded and become more complicated. The United States no longer faces a single, dominant foreign adversary. The emergence of many small, diverse, less predictable threats, and transnational actors, have made adversaries increasingly difficult to define, making it harder to detect and assess threats.

However much conditions changed with the demise of "monolithic communism", no radically different world order emerged, nor is one likely to emerge. The most probable scenario for the coming decades is a global community, dominated by economic development and commercial enterprise, in which purely political considerations will play a shrinking role next to free trade concerns. Intelligence collection and analysis must contribute to maintaining U.S. superiority in this new global community.

In her February 1997 testimony to the Senate, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research identified specific projected threats to U.S. national security, and
highlighted the key role intelligence plays in the U.S. ability to respond appropriately. Intelligence serves to inform national security decision making whether dealing with the threat of traditional power rivals, rogue states, international terrorism, spread of weapons of mass destruction, civil and regional conflicts, economic espionage, international criminal activity, environmental security or humanitarian crises. Intelligence identifies opportunities for intervention to prevent conflict, informs U.S. approaches in negotiations, monitors compliance with treaties and supports the conduct of military operations.7

Testifying before the House Committee on National Security on 6 June 1996, John D. Steinbruner, director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, identified five generic conditions affecting U.S. security interests in the post-Cold War world:

• Lack of control over nuclear materials;
• potential use of other weapons of mass destruction;
• internal disintegration requiring the international community to intervene to restore civil order;
• threats to the global environment;
• a global inclination to reduce military forces based on perceptions that hostile offensive operations can be detected and disrupted in their initial stages.8

The conditions Steinbruner identified are likely to be
germane well into the 21st century, and U.S. intelligence must be able to contribute information and analysis as national security policy is formed and executed. This is considerably different than monitoring the Soviet Union and judging world events in the prism of the democracy-communism rivalry.

The Director of the National Security Agency echoed a similar theme in a recent interview, noting that the purpose of national intelligence must shift from predicting a great power rival’s next move to preventing strategic surprise. His comments contain an implicit criticism more frequently heard from critics than from intelligence insiders: that the IC is not structured to deal with today’s threats to national security.

THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORM

Charles Cogan, a former senior CIA officer, argues that it is necessary and feasible to restructure American intelligence at this time.10 His is just one call for reform and restructuring in the IC. In 1996, two think tanks, a presidential commission and a congressional intelligence oversight committee published studies on the future of intelligence and the need for reform.11 Press coverage of the CIA’s 50th anniversary in September 1997 reflected the theme that the IC had lost its sense of purpose and ability to respond.12

Informed observers highlighted structural problems at the
heart of the IC:

- emphasis on fleeting current intelligence issues at the expense of covering areas likely to become tomorrow’s crises;
- insufficient technical and specialized knowledge to adequately cover new targets;
- a workforce not educated to deal with the new transnational or non-state targets;
- inexperienced analysts with insufficient language expertise and “in-country” experience;
- expensive means of technical collection funded at the expense of personnel to process the collected intelligence;
- collectors using official cover abroad that does not provide access to personalities associated with new targets;
- insularity, lack of professional contact with experts outside the intelligence community;
- too little hiring of analysts with experience beyond the entry level.
- aging bureaucracy with too many managers, too many employees and a strong resistance to change.\textsuperscript{13}

The IC has made changes since the end of the Cold War, largely in response to administration efforts to reduce the size
of the federal government. The IC has responded to fiscal and political pressure to be part of a more responsive and performance-oriented government. Between 1992 and 2001, the IC will reduce civilian personnel by more than 25 percent.\textsuperscript{14} Most intelligence agencies offered early retirement to eligible employees, which encouraged those with the most intelligence experience to depart. The intelligence agencies have slowed new hiring to a rate of less than one percent of the work force, not enough to ensure orderly turnover and an adequate professional skills mix in the future.\textsuperscript{15} Reduction in personnel has been driven by budget, not by a conscious redesign of function. There has been little restructuring to ensure the IC is positioned to meet future requirements.

Accepting the reality of budget cuts, the IC must maximize the value of its human resources by minimizing duplication of effort within the community and avoiding competition with the private sector's ability to provide open source information. The IC must exploit the private sector's myriad capabilities in information technology. This has already begun. The U.S. government has increased its use of commercial off-the-shelf technologies and recognized the greater availability, accessibility, and reliability of open sources of information including commercial imagery.\textsuperscript{16}
THE NEED FOR A CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE RESERVE (CIR)

Each of the four 1996 studies on reforming intelligence advocated improving analytical capability by incorporating experts from outside the IC and expanding IC employees' experiences. Three of the four studies recommended establishing a civilian intelligence reserve to broaden access to outside expertise that is too expensive to maintain in-house. Further, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) provided funding in the FY98 Intelligence Authorization Act for a CIR pilot program to study how to tap expertise from former IC employees, non-IC experts and linguists.

The CIR can be more than a means to tap academic expertise. Applied in a global restructuring program, the CIR can be a means to incorporate new intelligence collectors and techniques not currently in the IC, and to deal with transnational and global issues that have emerged to challenge U.S. national security interests. In this "transitional" time, radical solutions like the CIR become necessary to force real change and to compel rethinking of how to manage personnel reductions. An openly publicized CIR could also attract participants in large numbers lessening a foreign government's ability to identify selected Americans abroad engaged in intelligence collection activities. The U.S. will not be the first nation to utilize its private citizens to accomplish intelligence missions that do not require
the specialized skills of the intelligence professional.¹⁹

THE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE RESERVE

"The function of the Central Intelligence Agency is to protect lives; protect the military so that it is able to dominate the battlefield; protect against terrorism, proliferation and narcotics; advise the efforts of diplomacy; provide awareness of threats and foreign policy opportunities; warn on geopolitical transformation and add value to what is known from other sources."

—Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet's keynote address at the University of Michigan's Ford Library, November 1997²⁰

After considering the analytical shortcomings of the intelligence community, the HPSCI encouraged and funded a pilot program for an intelligence reserve in its June 1997 report to the House on the FY98 Intelligence Authorization Bill. The National Intelligence Council (NIC), on behalf of the DCI, is developing a CIR program, using academic outreach and a knowledge base of experts.²¹ The NIC effort focuses on analysis, but the CIR is also suited to support intelligence collection and can be structured in that direction.

With a shrinking pool of career intelligence officers, the IC cannot maintain global intelligence coverage with representatives in all countries. Based on post-Cold War experience, tomorrow's crises are likely to happen in places not anticipated today, where no intelligence representatives are assigned.
The CIR should augment the intelligence community's ability to deal with generic challenges. Among those are supporting the US military in its diverse missions, working on law enforcement, addressing economic competitiveness issues, covering transnational issues and maintaining coverage on hostile states.

As the issues and techniques are diverse, the CIR should seek reservists whose diverse skills may be needed at varying times. For that reason, it would be sensible to create several "tiers" of reserve service. Each could address a different aspect of intelligence and be administered differently. Reservists could augment existing staff skills, bring in new skills and technical expertise, provide services on an as-needed basis or be part of an academic outreach.

**CIR Tier One**

The CIR Tier One would parallel the military reserve system in that reservists would train and serve individually or in units to augment full-time intelligence staffs. It would differ from the military reserves where the President specifically calls reservists to active duty in major military deployments. Active duty for Tier One reserves would not be linked to military reserve call-ups unless their special skills were needed to support military operations.

Initial candidates for the CIR Tier One could be former career intelligence officers who remain on call. Former intelligence officers have essential language skills, security
clearances and familiarity with the intelligence collection and reporting processes.

Individuals or teams of collectors might be called upon to meet intelligence sources and requirements they handled before. They might carry out liaison activity with foreign intelligence or security services. With increasingly frequent need for crisis coverage, collection-oriented reservists could set up overseas intelligence centers, serve as liaison with the U.S. military or staff task forces in intelligence or military headquarters.

Analytical reservists could staff Washington-based crisis centers or work on specific, rapid response analysis projects. They could also serve temporary foreign assignments to enhance area expertise and for on-scene evaluation.

Reserve teams might be formed specifically to serve in National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST) when the US military deploys overseas.

Reservists with specialized language or technical skills could use secure telecommunications to process technical intelligence collection without having to be in an intelligence headquarters.

CIR-Tier Two

The second tier would incorporate private U.S. citizens who are not former intelligence professionals. Creation of this tier could be controversial because it would entail private citizens, rather than professional government intelligence officers,
performing intelligence activities for the U.S. government. U.S. citizens residing abroad would be the most immediately valuable and perhaps the most controversial recruits. Many are employees of US businesses; some are permanent residents abroad. In the case of US business representatives, a strong argument can be made that US business will benefit by having their employees trained to deal with foreign political, trade and counterintelligence issues that have a negative impact on business. According to the National Counterintelligence Center, foreign commercial entities from hostile, semi-hostile and even otherwise friendly countries use foreign business professionals as intelligence collectors for competitive reasons.22

The increasing importance of transnational targets such as weapons proliferation, organized crime, narcotics, terrorism, information warfare and economic competitiveness, highlights the need for the technical specialist collector which a CIR Tier Two can provide. As former CIA officer Charles Cogan noted in a recent article, “official cover” used by professional intelligence officers working from U.S. government establishments abroad offers little significant access to personalities involved in non-state national security threats.23

Tier Two specialists in biochemistry, biology, nuclear science or finance can also serve intelligence needs while attending conferences, by making contact with key, otherwise not accessible, intelligence targets or with targets outside the
technical expertise of the generalist intelligence collector. Biologists and chemists can focus on WMD. Bankers can cover links to money laundering and other financial evidence of narcotics trafficking or organized crime. Communications and information technology specialists are up-to-date on international developments in their fields, and can therefore lend expertise for both collection and information warfare. Selected Tier Two reservists can be trained as collectors, using techniques similar to the market research and sales techniques they already employ. Others can provide technical knowledge to full-time collectors.

Lack of diplomatic immunity means a reservist might be arrested if his intelligence activity is detected by a foreign security service. The risk is real, and while it can be minimized by good security practice, it must be accepted in the way military reserve officers accept the risk of death in combat. CIA's "non-official cover" professional intelligence collectors assigned abroad do not enjoy diplomatic immunity either. Numerous cases of U.S. citizens falsely arrested for espionage mitigate arguments that lack of diplomatic immunity raises unacceptable personal security risks for private citizens abroad. While official protection from arrest and imprisonment by a state is important, it is increasingly irrelevant. When the intelligence target is a transnational organization (e.g. a terrorist, international criminal organization or drug cartel)
operating apart from a national government, diplomatic immunity provides no protection to private citizen or government official.

Although highly controversial, journalists should be allowed to join as Tier Two reservists. Current restraints on intelligence use of journalists would have to be carefully rethought as the CIR is structured. According to a leading advocate for "open source intelligence", journalists publish only a fraction of what they collect. The Council on Foreign Relations 1996 study recommended lifting restrictions on using journalists in intelligence operations and on allowing intelligence professionals to use journalistic cover. In the past some journalists have been willing to share information with the U.S. government, with the consent of their news management.

CIR-Tier Three

A third sector of CIR can be formed of limited-term employees. The 1996 Aspin-Brown Report recommended hiring selected individuals for limited periods or under personal service contracts that do not carry career benefits. Precedents exist in State Department, the Department of Defense (DOD) and CIA. State Department's limited appointment system and DOD's planned three-level civilian personnel system reflect private sector trends toward greater reliance on part-time and non-career employment. The HPSCI study "IC21" cited the "when actually employed" (WAE) program at CIA where inactive staff
employees can be asked to return to temporary duty.\textsuperscript{31}

Tier Three reservists could staff a Strategic Intelligence Studies Center on par with the "think tanks" established by the Army and Navy at their senior war colleges.\textsuperscript{32} A Strategic Intelligence Studies Center could also be responsible for an annual "National Intelligence Strategy" to complement the annual National Security and National Military Strategies. The Center would be an appropriate place to study reform and restructuring proposals originating outside the IC.

Tier Three reservists could also provide program expertise in preparing the annual IC budget, designing training programs, performing surveys or evaluating personnel for promotion. They should be engaged for projects that have specific time limits and need the skills they bring from civilian life. They could be an in-house alternative to expensive commercial contracts the IC lets for some of these functions now.

\textbf{CIR-Tier Four}

A fourth tier of reservist might resemble the outreach program the NIC is developing. This tier would foster contact between intelligence community analysts and academic specialists by building routine working relations and by maintaining a knowledge base of experts. Such reservists could provide long-term watch and warning analysis on countries, regions or topics not of priority national security concern. Regular exchanges might keep both staff and other reserve analysts up to date on
areas that could become foreign policy challenges. Echelons of Tier Four experts could be available for consultation concerning specialized expertise not needed on a full-time basis. A key responsibility of the Tier Four reservists would be the labor-intensive task of long-term, low-priority evaluative studies. Delegating the longer think pieces to a reserve would be a substantive step toward focusing IC in-house analysis on only the highest priority concerns.

**Linking CIR to the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program**

On a long-term basis, consideration should be given to linking the U.S. military’s Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP) with the CIR. JRIP has over 80,000 reservists available, some augmenting active duty personnel in intelligence centers in unified commands or in the Pentagon’s National Military Joint Intelligence Center.³³

**Selecting and Training the Reserve**

Identifying the skills mix in the reserve cadres and the means to keep reservists up-to-date on requirements is central to implementing the CIR. Personnel selection must be dictated by need, not by availability of annuitants seeking part-time work. Initial recruitment for Tier One would focus on retired or departing intelligence professionals with critical language, area and functional skills, but finding the right people outside the IC is essential to match intelligence targets with reserve professional skills. To succumb to the bureaucratic inclination
to deal with changing work requirements by simply retraining retired personnel for the CIR would perpetuate the problems identified by the 1996 studies on intelligence reform. The first effort in designing a selection and training program must be to define what missions must be addressed and what categories of reserve skills and knowledge are needed to perform the mission.

The CIR should seek volunteers among current intelligence professionals, but be prepared to refuse candidates who cannot contribute to the future mission. It should seek qualified candidates from among non-intelligence specialists. Latter reservists could contribute unique skills based in their civilian occupations. Future CIR staffing should consider a reserve officer training program (ROTC) in universities for students with academic specialties needed to serve future requirements.

The Size of the CIR

The CIR would be a small reserve force augmenting the relatively limited civilian intelligence community. Although the IC does not publicize personnel strength, information in the public domain leads to an estimate of about 50,000 civilian employees in the four independent intelligence agencies. 34

As an initial goal, the CIR could seek to recruit a reserve cadre equal to 10% of its full-time collection and analysis staff in the four tiers. A proportionally small cadre should be assigned the sole task of leadership, liaison and training, using an average IC subordinates-to-manager ratio of 15:1. The full-
time coordinators would form a leadership cadre for the CIR and be the lifeline between the CIR and the intelligence community. They would maintain contact with reservists, select their assignments and coordinate their training. The leadership cadre should build on professional links already in place between Tier Four reservists and full-time analysts.

**Personnel Administration and Cost**

Personnel administration covers the legal status of reservists, pay, benefits and retirement issues. The IC's exemption from Title V regulations on civil service employment offers flexibility to develop a reserve administrative structure. The IC should consult with HPSCI on legislation to implement the concept. Position classification and pay grades can parallel the full-time staff, especially using existing specialist pay grades.

It is essential that the CIR be less expensive than maintaining the same skills in a full-time career staff. Reservists recruited outside the IC would carry employment and retirement benefits from their private sector employment, a significant cost-saving measure. Reserve service has proven to be a less expensive option for the US armed forces; while constituting 52.9% of military personnel, reserve costs consume 8.6% of the Defense budget.  

CIR "call up" for duty could be based on need for reservists' special skills and scheduled intelligence activities. While they might be summoned to work on "Surge" or crisis
projects, they might also attend annual conferences or meet periodically to discuss ongoing projects.

OVERCOMING OBSTACLES

Specific obstacles must be overcome for CIR to be an effective program. The IC must ensure broad congressional support for the creation of the CIR. The IC must deal with popular misperceptions that intelligence means overthrowing foreign governments. Greater challenges may come from internal IC resistance to change or reluctance of potential reservists to mix intelligence activity with business or academic affairs.

Legislative and Legal Issues

The IC should take advantage of HPSCI's advocacy of the CIR to propose public hearings before the oversight committee. Working with the committee, the IC can obtain enabling legislation and approval for the size of the CIR, pay levels and benefits for reservists.

Public congressional hearings could gain national legitimacy for the CIR program. According to former DCI Robert Gates, congressional oversight assures the American public that secrecy surrounding intelligence activities is not in conflict with an open democracy.36 Public awareness and appreciation for government efforts is a potentially positive benefit of the CIR program. Popular suspicions about intelligence activity can be assuaged if the IC can demonstrate how collecting and analyzing
intelligence information helps maintain US superiori ty. The American public may have little interest in specific foreign policy issues, but understands that domestic prosperity is affected by how the US government deals with fair trade, international crime, weapons proliferation and the global environment. Intelligence supports the government’s ability to manage these complex issues.

Taking a lesson from the controversy over “readiness” in the U.S. military reserve components, CIR reservists should be evaluated as “augmentees” rather than “integrees” to the IC. Many military reserve units or individuals are expected to integrate into active duty elements with minimal additional training. CIR units and individuals would augment the intelligence community with specific skills and expertise based in large measure on what they do in their civilian lives, or what they did in their intelligence careers.

**Bureaucratic Resistance**

Former CIA officer Cogan speaks from experience in noting IC reform efforts meet with stiff internal resistance. Intelligence professionals may resist the CIR concept because it opens the closed world of intelligence to part-time, non-professionals. The CIR must have advocates in the IC who can overcome inevitable bureaucratic inertia to change. They must convince their peers that the CIR program brings new expertise the IC needs and that it is imperative to find a long-term
solution to evolving, diffuse intelligence requirements, fast paced technological change, highly restricted budgets and a decreasing work force. They may also emphasize that it is better to reform than be reformed by outside experts.

**Economic Espionage and Unfair Competition**

The relationship between business and the intelligence community must be clearly defined and accepted by the congressional oversight committees to avoid business or public perceptions of economic espionage. The IC, with policymaker support, must build a cogent public campaign to avoid perceptions among American entities that private citizens cooperating in the CIR benefit unfairly from the relationship. Benefits to CIR members would parallel those enjoyed by the defense industry where government funding for research and development can result in developing products with lucrative commercial application.

**Academic Hesitation**

HPSCI's staff study, "IC21" argued the IC must have access to contacts and analytical resources available in the civilian sector, as it cannot maintain the depth of expertise on each area of the world that it once maintained on the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and China. The role of the CIA in covert action, and the sustained attention these efforts receive in the media, complicate the relationships with academic and other civilian scholars. According to HPSCI staff, the well-known hostility to the CIA among many scholars usually derives
from opposition to covert actions rather than to the agency's analytical products. That reluctance may be mitigated by public hearings by the intelligence oversight committees and a serious campaign of positive publicity.

A former IC analyst who teaches Intelligence at Boston University noted that although the IC has sometimes turned to academics for assistance, it has been mostly for the government's benefit. He advocated the IC assist the private sector, including academics and their institutions, by clarifying that capabilities and knowledge acquired in the course of government service can be used in the private sector. Permitting some CIR members to carry much of what they learn for the USG into their private domains will positively benefit all concerned.

**ALTERNATIVES TO THE CIR**

The proposed multi-tiered CIR represents a departure from current U.S. intelligence practice. Is such a restructuring needed? Can some features be adopted to enable the IC to meet its obligation of informing policymakers and preventing strategic surprise?

**Doing Less with Less**

An alternative to the CIR is to "do less with less" by abandoning the pretext of maintaining global coverage and dealing only with issues identified as critical to national security interests. This would be in keeping with current U.S. public
disinterest in foreign affairs based on the absence of an apparent threat to national survival.\textsuperscript{42} This isolationist approach to global intelligence coverage has little credibility if the U.S. is to maintain its preeminent world leadership role. Experience in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia demonstrates the U.S. already has difficulty predicting which crises will rise to the critical level and require a response.

The U.S. does not have the latitude to pre-select its crises and therefore it must be aware of what is going on everywhere. U.S. intervention might be required by public opinion or by major national interests. Many of the U.S. defense establishment's numerous deployments since the 1991 Gulf war have been for non-traditional missions of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. Intelligence support in military deployments will be a continuing IC responsibility. The difference between critical and vital national interests becomes irrelevant if strategic alliances or public opinion dictate U.S. participation. While intelligence can not predict the future, it must inform policymakers and prevent strategic surprise. Intelligence must also serve to identify opportunities for diplomatic and strategic intervention to prevent problems from building to the crisis stage.

In this transitional period, the IC may be tempted to deal with decreasing resources by eliminating lower priority programs such as coverage of Africa or Latin America. The IC must resist the facile solution to do less with less and concentrate on a
restructuring that will allow intelligence to meet policymakers' needs in the future.

**Surging and Ad Hoc Help**

Another option is to attempt to maintain global coverage by ad hoc means. The HPSCI study "IC21" and the Twentieth Century Fund report on intelligence reform envisioned the CIR as an academic outreach program, augmenting shrinking in-house analytical capabilities with links to academic experts. Likewise, the HPSCI report suggested that CIA's "when-actually-employed" program could make inactive intelligence professional available for crisis duty or "Surge".

The ad hoc nature of "Surging" implies that crisis coverage is the single most important responsibility of intelligence. However, this is at odds with the role of national-level intelligence to meet policymakers' needs. Relying on the good will of academics and private sector experts to share their knowledge and expertise puts a critical resource outside timely support to the IC. The proposal to use inactive intelligence professionals to staff task forces or watch centers after a crisis breaks out does little to ensure that trained, ready personnel are available prior to or after the crisis phase. Without a formal, institutionalized link to the professional intelligence establishment, inactive professionals have little incentive to maintain their specialized skills. The IC should not deliberately position itself for additional accusations of
"intelligence failures" by failing to dedicate appropriate resources to meet policymakers' needs for intelligence. U.S. policymakers, and increasingly the Congress, expect intelligence to be there, before and after the crisis.

CONCLUSION

Inevitably, the IC’s human resource base will decline as the budget decreases. The IC must find a means to incorporate technical and specialized skills found in the private sector to augment a smaller career intelligence establishment.

Improving the ability to meet crisis intelligence requirements and to cover functional and geographic gaps more effectively is an essential part of refocusing and restructuring the IC. The IC can create a multi-tiered reserve system, capable of working with other elements of the IC to cover the hardest targets.

The CIR offers specific advantages in dealing with shrinking intelligence personnel resources, limited career hiring and rapidly changing policymaker focus in a multi-polar world. It supports global intelligence coverage by augmenting expensive, full-time staff, and integrates expertise based in the private sector with an essential function of national government. There is a clear advantage in being able to tap new resources as the U.S. is called upon to respond to situations not previously identified as critical to the national interest.

Congressional support for the CIR is driven in large part by
a desire to improve the IC’s performance, but Congress also seeks cost savings. Implementing the CIR can help more efficiently use funds allocated for the intelligence process, but cannot substitute for in-house resources and skills; the CIR must be a controllable adjunct. The IC can create a CIR that improves both collection and analysis on the most difficult national security challenges, deals with a decreasing professional work force and creates a new link between the American people and the intelligence world.

The IC must use forecasted intelligence needs to determine the expertise and skills needed to meet its requirements. It cannot be overemphasized that the first step is to decide what is needed for the future, not try to make today’s resources fit tomorrow’s needs. A starting point is a thorough review of its human resource base, the people who staff the IC. By identifying gaps in skills and expertise not currently available, the IC can begin to develop a vigorous and flexible CIR program to fill these gaps. The IC has an opportunity in creating the CIR to undertake an internal reform for the future, not simply react to proposals from reformers outside the community or attempt to make today’s resources fit tomorrow’s needs.
ENDNOTES


2 The Intelligence Community consists of four independent national-level intelligence agencies, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). Latter was formed in October 1996, melding the former Defense Mapping Agency and the Central Imagery Office. Intelligence organizations of the individual armed services and intelligence elements in several executive agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Treasury are funded from those cabinets rather than from the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). For purposes of this paper, "Intelligence Community" refers only to the four independent, national-level agencies.

3 Prominent critics and reformers include Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, author David Wise and several retired senior intelligence officers. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has for many years sponsored a program on intelligence reform and has collected literature critical of the IC's ability to provide timely and specific intelligence suited to current policymaker needs. On the occasion of the CIA's 50th anniversary in September 1997, major U.S. newspapers featured articles both critical and sympathetic to the IC. Numerous specific references follow in this paper.

4 PDD-35 is specifically mentioned in reporting from the Congressional Intelligence oversight committees and the President cited the PDD during his September remarks at CIA headquarters without referring to the number. PDD-35 is a classified document and therefore not available to study for this paper. However, numerous national security officials have spoken publicly about the threats PDD-35 charges the IC to monitor.


8 U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. National Security

13 Wise, Cogan and the various expert studies of 1996 repeat the same list of weaknesses; Cogan also focused on internal structural problems in CIA. The HPSCI report "IC21" and the HPSCI 18 June 1997 report to Congress on the FY98 Intelligence Authorization Act noted that during the Cold War, the IC spent 90 percent of its budget on expensive collection systems. Combined with personnel cuts and fewer language experts, technical collection take has been backlogged. Such intelligence information is useless unless it is processed and made available.
14 Aspin-Brown Report, 95.
15 Ibid. 96-97.
16 Steve Rosenbush, "Street Talk", USA TODAY, 30 December 1997, Sec. B p. 3.
17 Council on Foreign Relations Report, Making Intelligence Smarter, p. 5.
21 The author interviewed on 18 November 1997 the NIC officer
responsible for managing the CIR pilot project. He described the program as an effort to establish academic outreach. The program would be responsible to the DCI in his role as the head of the Intelligence Community, and would be independent of CIA.


23 Cogan, 37. The retired senior intelligence officer noted the declining importance of many of the personalities to whom officially covered officers have access, and the need to acquire new routes of access to the new subjects of weapons proliferation, economic intelligence, terrorism and narcotics. As Cogan noted, “Drug lords are not invited to diplomatic receptions.”


28 Carl Bernstein, “The CIA and the Media”, Rolling Stone, 20 October 1977. Bernstein identified some of the over 400 journalists, including Pulitzer Prize winners, who cooperated with the IC. They carried out assignments ranging from simple intelligence gathering to serving as go-betweens with key foreign targets. A synopsis of Bernstein’s article is available on http://www.mprofaca.cro.net/ciapressi.html, last updated 3 January 1998. Read on 15 February 1998.


30 President, American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), “President’s Notes”, 19 September 1997. Available on www.afsanet.org. According to the AFSA information, DOD would hire more workers on short-term contracts and offer others increased current pay in exchange for reduced retirement and other benefits. It would also create a new group on non-permanent employees hired for a maximum of five years, similar to State Department’s limited non-career appointment system. Interestingly, there is no information on these personnel changes in the DOD Civilian Personnel Management Agency’s Internet site, http://www.cpms.osd.mil.

31 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21, Chapter X.

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *IC21,* Chapter X.

None of the national intelligence agencies publicize either budget or personnel strength. However, numbers can be estimated from public sources. Total civilian strength is probably less than 50,000. David Wise stated in his September 1997 article on the CIA anniversary that CIA has some 17,000 employees. The Federation of American Scientists’ (FAS) Intelligence Reform Program used information in the 1996 Aspin-Brown Commission report to extrapolate personnel strength. According to FAS, NSA has about 20,000 civilian employees, DIA has about 8,500 civilians and CIA has about 17,000. NIMA’s mapping component, the former Defense Mapping Agency, has about 7,000 civilians; the imagery component was transferred from existing national-level intelligence agencies. FAS figures are available on [http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/budget.htm](http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/budget.htm).


Cogan, 39.

Ibid. 35.

This may be less difficult than it seems initially. The National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC) 1997 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage discussed at length the degree of cooperation between the U.S. government and U.S. businesses on intelligence and counterintelligence issues. A copy of the report is available on the NACIC web site [http://www.nacic.gov](http://www.nacic.gov).


Ibid.

Hulnick, 30. Hulnick states “the precedent was long ago established that skills acquired in government service belong to the individual and not the government”, citing the case of pilots and doctors, and that intelligence skills are not different.

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