KOREAN UNIFICATION: A UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL FORCES FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYMENT

By

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December, 1997

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# Korean Unification: A United States Army Special Forces Framework for Employment

## Abstract (maximum 200 words)

As Korea approaches unification, the growing stability problems in the north create questions about how these problems can be approached to avoid destabilizing the peninsula upon unification. This thesis predicts and analyzes the significant stability and support operations likely to confront the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army during post-conflict or post-unification proceedings, and presents an employment framework for United States Army Special Forces (USASF) designed to support the ROK Army's efforts. The employment framework is designed to complement a theater-level strategic plan for conducting stability and support operations (SASO) in the north occurring along a suggested spectrum of unification possibilities. The framework consists of three elements: the SASO missions predicted, framework doctrinal elements, and four Korean unification scenarios. Doctrinal elements include the operations, missions, and unique roles USASF conduct during SASO. The utility of this thesis is the analysis of framework doctrinal elements in relation to the SASO missions and unification environment that may confront USASF while supporting the ROK Army in successful completion of these missions. The USASF employment framework is intended to be used as an aid for U.S. military planners at the strategic, operational and tactical levels during the deliberate planning process for post-conflict or post-unification operations in the north.
KOREAN UNIFICATION: A UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL FORCES FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYMENT

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ABSTRACT

As Korea approaches unification, the growing stability problems in the north create questions about how these problems can be approached to avoid destabilizing the peninsula upon unification. This thesis predicts and analyzes the significant stability and support operations likely to confront the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army during post-conflict or post-unification proceedings, and presents an employment framework for United States Army Special Forces designed to support the ROK Army’s efforts. The employment framework is designed to complement a theater-level strategic plan for conducting stability and support operations (SASO) in the north occurring along a suggested spectrum of unification possibilities. The framework consists of three elements: the SASO missions predicted, framework doctrinal elements, and four Korean unification scenarios. Doctrinal elements include the operations, missions, and unique roles USASF conduct during SASO. The utility of this thesis is the analysis of framework doctrinal elements in relation to the SASO missions and unification environment that may confront USASF while supporting the ROK Army in successful completion of these missions. The USASF employment framework is intended to be used as an aid for U.S. military planners at the strategic, operational and tactical levels during the deliberate planning process for post-conflict or post-unification operations in the north.
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I. INTRODUCTION

As Korea approaches possible unification, the South Korean (ROK) Army faces a situation where warfighting capabilities may not be the sole focus. This situation results in several questions. What major problems and issues will the ROK Army likely confront during and after unification? Are problems likely to vary significantly depending on whether Korea unifies through war or unification occurs short of war? What missions and tasks, other than wartime missions, may the ROK Army be called upon to execute in support of stabilizing the peninsula throughout unification and post-unification proceedings? Finally, if Korea unifies in the foreseeable future, what role can United States Army Special Forces (USASF) play in assisting the ROK Army throughout the unification and post-unification process? Sound assumptions are critical in a predictive study of this nature; a short discussion of these assumptions is in order.

A. ASSUMPTIONS

This thesis rests on four assumptions: first, that in the future North and South Korea will unify as one nation-state; and second that, the government in Seoul will provide the vision for a future unified Korea. I do not discount the possibility that military or political persons in the North will participate in the formulation of a unified vision for Korea. Nor do I discount unification fostered by the United Nations. However, I do assert that Seoul’s political leadership and experience in the interdependent international community will provide the impetus for a future unified Korea, whether unification occurs in the short-term, long-term or is fostered by the United Nations. How unification may occur results in the third assumption.

A united Korea will occur either through war or unification short of war. Either category results in several broad unification scenarios. I assume that Korean unification in the future will occur along a spectrum composed of the following four major unification scenarios: (1) the all-out war scenario where one side strikes first followed by complete escalation, (2) the sue-for-peace scenario where the North conducts a limited attack followed by consolidation and a request for negotiated peace, (3) the sudden all-out absorption of the North by the South, and (4) the phased mutual consent transition
between the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) and ROK governments resulting in one nation-state on the peninsula. This broad spectrum of unification possibilities contains mass chaos on one end and nervous expectations of extreme difficulties on the other end of the spectrum. The final assumption addresses the ROK-U.S. security arrangement in view of a unified Korea.

Upon unification, I assume that the current ROK-U.S. security arrangement will remain valid in theory although modifications in the scope and size of U.S. military force commitment may be prudent. Both the ROK and U.S. governments have espoused the continuation of a security agreement while discussing future reductions in U.S. military presence. Counterarguments to the assumptions underpinning this thesis deserve brief consideration at this time.

The argument that peaceful unification will never take place on the peninsula because of political ideologies and deep-rooted mistrust between the two governments is valid. Some analysts base this observation on the fact that the DPRK government is not rational, and its juche ideology, based on self-reliance, will not contemplate adapting to meet new challenges. However this observation is not supported entirely by history.

As Nicholas Eberstadt observes, “If the DPRK has been fanatical, that fanaticism has evidently not inured it to very practical considerations. A capacity for sophisticated calculation and adept management, in fact, would seem to be suggested by what has not occurred in North Korea.” Since the mid-1980’s the DPRK has attempted to modify its economic policies to expand trade and encourage foreign investment in the northern economic zone. The North Korean government’s rapprochement with the United States and agreements on several confidence building measures, including liaison offices and a freeze on continued nuclear material production (1994 Nuclear Agreement) are signals that the DPRK realizes self-preservation in the twentieth century is not compatible with isolation. Similarly, these signals should not be mistaken to mean that the Kim Jong Il regime is dedicated to western style reform designed to benefit the citizens of North Korea. Viewing these “reforms” as manipulation of the international diplomatic system to ensure survival of the DPRK political elite is a more appropriate definition. Marcus
Noland's hypothesis that the North Korean regime will "muddle through" the current famine and economic crisis with external aid by initiating ad-hoc adjustments and reforms addresses this notion. The future of the current security arrangement between the U.S. and ROK is the center of heated debate among Korean and U.S. defense analysts.

The arguments that Korean unification can only occur peacefully upon complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, or that ROK military advancements negate the requirement for a U.S. force presence, are advanced by many analysts. Advocates of U.S. military withdrawal from the peninsula suggest that a U.S. force presence only ensures that the DPRK will continue to posture for war. The current U.S.-ROK security arrangement, including the stationing of 37,000 U.S. military personnel, should be reviewed. I agree that there is room for reducing the U.S. force commitment. However, military-to-military engagement is a crucial aspect of the U.S. national security policy of engagement and enlargement. Additionally, it is unlikely that a unified Korean government will allow for complete security disengagement from the U.S. considering Japan's continued security arrangement with America. A prudent, conservative approach to partial military disengagement in Korea is best, and any planned military departure should be conducted in phases tied to similar arms and troop reductions on the part of the DPRK. The limits bounding this predictive thesis deserve consideration.

B. LIMITATIONS

A detailed discussion of the history between North and South Korea is not included in this study. I have framed this thesis to assist the planners and commanders facing the possible employment of USASF on the peninsula. A lengthy explication of Korean history will only dilute the message. In addition, this thesis does not discuss command relationships or recommendations for task organization in relation to general purpose forces and U.S. Army Special Forces. Similarly, this thesis does not trace the history or seek to establish the utility of USASF involvement in peacekeeping operations. The framework for employment of USASF which I propose is designed to function within existing command and control relationships. Finally, a detailed
examination of other U.S. forces critical to successful unification efforts on the peninsula is not possible within the constraints of this thesis.

A general discussion of the important link between U.S. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Units is elucidated within the employment framework. I recognize how critical this link is to successful civil-military efforts by the ROK Army during unification proceedings. However, proper coverage of this topic would require a separate thesis for appropriate detail.

In researching this thesis I have focused my efforts in four areas: Korean unification literature, literature explicating the unifications occurring in Germany and Yemen, U.S. Army Special Forces doctrine and U.S. Army lessons learned during Stability and Support Operations* in South America, Panama and Haiti. Use of a wide range of unification literature ensures that the identification of general issues and problems from previous national unifications are addressed. Most important though, is focusing on the Korean aspects of those general issues and identifying the scope of the problems that may confront the ROK Army.

Koreans and non-Koreans have written about North and South unification proposals since the early 1960s. Hakjoon Kim’s thorough comparative study of each state’s unification proposals in Unification Proposals of North and South Korea provides an understanding of the diplomatic and domestic difficulties surrounding peaceful unification on the peninsula. Current analysts’ predictions about unification scenarios and issues surrounding unification are expertly covered in several papers written for the 1996, 7th Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) International Defense Conference, and Nicholas Eberstadt’s book, Korea Approaches Unification. Historic predictions of major problems and issues that may arise during Korean unification were drawn from Manfred Cortemaker’s, Unifying Germany: 1989-1990 and Charles Dunbar’s insightful article, The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics and Prospects.

The framework for employing U.S. Army Special Forces is developed from doctrine contained in FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, and FM

* (SASO) replaced the previous U.S. Army doctrinal term Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and is reflected in the current U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, Stability and Support Operations.
31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*. Additionally, the framework is influenced by lessons learned in the three SASO cases highlighted earlier. These lessons learned are documented in *Joint Forces Quarterly, Special Warfare Bulletin*, After Action Reviews and personal interviews with Army Special Forces commanders and soldiers that participated in some of these operations. The U.S. Army doctrinal and lessons learned literature assist in establishing the high degree of utility U.S. Army Special Forces provide in SASO operations. What conclusions do I derive in this predictive study?

C. CONCLUSIONS

The main hypothesis I propose is: The U.S. Army Special Forces have a key role in assisting the ROK Army plan and conduct successful SASO operations during unification and post-unification efforts on the Korean peninsula. The Stability and Support Operations that may occur during unification include: displaced personnel management, humanitarian relief operations, and military restructuring.\(^{11}\) Displaced personnel missions range from controlling substantial displacement of North Koreans into South Korea and northward into China, and maintaining displaced personnel camps in the North. Humanitarian relief missions include food distribution, security of food shipments to the North, and medical issues ranging from malnutrition to possible epidemics. Military restructuring of a combined 1.7 million man military into a reasonable defense force poses significant problems. Foremost restructuring issues that may confront the ROK Army include: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the North, accountability and securing of redundant, incompatible (NATO, Warsaw pact) systems, and implementation of military personnel downsizing. Regardless of how unification occurs, these major problems are likely to be present in one degree or another. Considering the uncertainty of unification occurring in Korea, how relevant is a study of U.S. Army Special Forces employment in support of unification efforts?

In the future, a stable unified Korea is in the best interest of the United States, the Pacific region and the international community. A key aspect of successful unification will be how fast the Korean government can stabilize a potentially chaotic situation internally in order to prevent destabilizing the region. If Nicholas Eberstadt’s observation
is correct, "Nearly all of the great events that have defined Korea since the peninsula’s partition have caught policy-makers unprepared," then we should prepare now to avoid repeating past mistakes, and we should discover similar circumstances before they become new mistakes.\(^{12}\)

United States Army Special Forces have a critical role in assisting the ROK Army to support the government’s stabilization efforts. Besides offering strategic, operational and tactical expertise to the Korean Army, the low-key presence of U.S. Army Special Forces advisors at the tactical level provides a comprehensive monitoring and observer element for the U.S. government. In addition, regional allies will be reassured by having a limited U.S. military presence to assist in the transition of Korea from two states to one nation. Finally, the high utility gained by engaging Korea through such a small force (USASF) allows the U.S. to redeploy the majority of its 37,000 military personnel following unification without losing the critical forward deployed presence required by U.S. national security policy. USASF’s history of providing excellent regional expertise is more than legendary.

USASF’s unique capabilities are tailored to produce efficient, effective results with low signature and high payoff in a host nation stabilization environment. The three SASO cases that best represent this efficiency are Operations Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Safe Border in Peru and Ecuador, and Promote Liberty in Panama.\(^{13}\) The versatility of USASF is evident from Operations Promote Liberty Cause and Uphold Democracy as USASF was prepared to, and in the case of Panama, did conduct offensive military operations in support of the Combatant Commander’s strategic plan. In both cases USASF transitioned from military offensive missions to nation-building, and in the case of Haiti, coalition support as well. At one point in Haiti over 37 USASF A-Detachments (SFODA) were deployed throughout Haiti. These SFODAs conducted missions that ranged from coalition support with the Bangladesh and Malaysian militaries to unilateral nation-building support in remote villages.\(^{14}\) Operation Safe Border is an excellent example of USASF providing U.S. diplomats a low-end alternative to commitment in stopping the violence between Peru and Ecuador without full-blown involvement. As
Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Higgins stated, "Special Forces were critical to the Military Observers Mission in Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP) success. The high utility, low-key involvement of our troops (USASF) was the determining factor in the regional leaders remaining dedicated to the plan of demilitarization and peace through the auspices of MOMEP." These missions alone validate the U.S. Army Special Forces skills and capabilities in these challenging operational environments.

The applicable lessons learned from employing USASF in these operations represent the limited base of historic examples where U.S. Army Special Forces have played a critical role in assisting foreign governments to stabilize in dire situations. These cases are not extolled as comparable in all aspects to the unification problems Korea may face. However the lessons learned, from a framework standpoint, are applicable across a broad spectrum of unification scenarios.

D. METHODOLOGY AND THESIS ROADMAP

A tiered format is used to illustrate my argument and guide the reader from a macro-level analysis of major issues confronting Korea upon unification to a micro-level analysis of problems that may be delegated to the ROK army. A combination of case study and comparative analysis research will be used to test the main and subordinate hypotheses. The major external and internal issues surrounding the previous unifications of Germany and Yemen will be analyzed to establish a table of lessons learned that can be compared to problems confronting Korea. Comparing the lessons learned from Germany and Yemen establishes the critical external and internal issues a unified Korean government must concentrate on, and more important, for the focus of this thesis, the internal issues the government should delegate to the ROK Army. Following this comparison, a macro-level analysis of major external and internal issues confronting Korea is conducted. This macro look transitions to an in-depth analysis of the SASO operations in North Korea that the ROK Army may be delegated to conduct. This micro-level analysis of SASO operations establishes the foundation for the development of an employment framework for USASF designed to assist the ROK Army in conducting these challenging SASO issues. This proposed framework, in conjunction with a combined
theater level plan, can assist in stabilization of the peninsula during unification and post-unification periods.
Endnotes

1 Young C. Kim details three variants of each scenario I discuss in, "Prospects For Korean Unification: An Assessment," in Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 253-259. Kyungssoo Lho, pp. 2-6, elaborates on three unification scenarios referred to as, the "ardent nationalist's scenario", the "nightmare scenario" and the "soft landing scenario". The general scenarios I present are consistent with these explications. It is important to note the ROK-U.S. military command and control relationship for responding or initiating military action. The United Nations Combined Forces Command (UNCFC) has operational control (OPCON) of ROK military forces only during the escalation phase of operations. For day-to-day operations the relationship is Combined Delegated Authority (C.O.D.A.), and in a hypothetical situation the ROK government could initiate a first strike without prior knowledge of UNCFC.


3 The valid concern that peaceful unification may not be possible is forwarded by Nicholas Eberstadt in "Can the Two Koreas Be One." Foreign Affairs: Winter 1992/93 and William J. Taylor Jr.'s, "Is Peaceful Unification Possible?" a paper presented at the 7th KIDA International Defense Conference, Seoul, Korea: November 4-6, 1996.


7 The United States "A National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement", The White House: February 1996. pp. 14-15. The national strategy espouses the increased employment of military-to-military engagement as a form of force projection that highlights U.S. commitment to democracy worldwide. The strategy of engagement is designed to prevent militarization on the part of countries that feel isolated or contained. By creating global interdependence the U.S. hopes to prevent the possibility for armed conflict between dependent countries.


9 For an understanding of U.S. Army Doctrine see, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. For an understanding of U.S. Army Special Operations Doctrine see Fin 31-20.

11 Displaced personnel management is the term the ROK prefer to use when referring to controlling refugee migration into China, Russia and South Korea. As the North Koreans fleeing South are not refugees but Korean citizens in the eyes of the ROK government.

12 Nicholas Eberstadt, “Can the Two Koreas Be One.”, p. 151.


14 Author was detachment commander of SFODA 191 which served as CST for the Bangladesh battalion in Port Au Prince from September 1994 to March 1995. The exact number of SFODAs changed from month to month in Haiti. Author noted this number on a visit to the G3 operations center of the 10th Mountain Division in Port Au Prince during December 1994.

15 LTC(P) Higgins made this comment during a presentation as an Army Fellow at the Naval Postgraduate School in March 1997. LTC(P) Higgins was a battalion commander in the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), and the senior U.S. representative of the 72 man U.S. contingent that successfully led USASF efforts during MOMEF Phase I in Patuca, Ecuador from 17 February through 21 August 1995. The mission of USASF was to coordinate efforts and assist the two host nations, alongside other regional assistance, to monitor a cease-fire and conduct demilitarization of Peru and Ecuador military’s.
II. GERMANY AND YEMEN: UNIFICATION LESSONS FOR KOREA

"The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see."
Sir Winston Churchill

As the international community speculates on the unification of Korea, it is prudent to examine if historically some issues are analogous when two states unify. If some issues are similar in a unification scenario, can Korea learn valuable lessons and contemplate ideas to resolve these issues prior to unification occurring? The unifications of Germany and Yemen in 1990 provide the historical examples of issues a country may confront when contemplating unification.

I propose that analogous issues facing a country during the unification process fall into two main categories: (1) regional issues and (2) domestic issues. Regionally the country must consider the balance of power equation resulting from a unified state which entails future military force structure, any existing treaties or security agreements and international ramifications in the balancing area. Domestically the unified state must develop, and implement a sound economic plan which details the economic restructuring of the state. Additionally the psychological aspects of unifying the peoples of two separate states cannot be ignored by the government of a new unified nation.

Section one of this chapter establishes the relevance between the issues surrounding Korean unification and the historic unifications of Germany and Yemen. Section two outlines the regional issues confronting the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Republic of Yemen during each states' unification process; while section three details the domestic issues surrounding these two unification cases. The conclusion extracts the lessons learned from this analysis that may be applicable to Korea, and reminds the reader that these issues are not intended to be predictions of what “exactly” will occur in a Korean unification scenario. These historical lessons learned reflect trends that can assist the Korean government(s) develop a better plan to offset the historical instability incurred through unification.
A. QUESTION OF RELEVANCE

Korean unification has many macro-level similarities with Germany and Yemen as these two states confronted unification in 1989. All three countries share the distinction of separation due to the Cold War. This separation, orchestrated by the U.S. and U.S.S.R., ensured all three countries divided along ideological lines. Ideological separation included economic and social aspects within the separated states as well as the international diplomatic ramifications of alignment for security purposes. A comparison analysis of these three states assists establishing relevance.

How do North and South Korea compare in 1997 when viewed against Germany and Yemen on the eve of their unifications? Table 2-1 provides interesting statistics which allow us to answer a piece of this question.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>South Korea (mill.)</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>East Germany</th>
<th>North Yemen</th>
<th>South Yemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (billion)</td>
<td>$590.7</td>
<td>$21.5</td>
<td>$1,120</td>
<td>$207.2</td>
<td>$4.5</td>
<td>$1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per person</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
<td>$920</td>
<td>$18,370</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
<td>$690</td>
<td>$480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports (b,m)</td>
<td>$125.4 b</td>
<td>$840 m</td>
<td>$294 b</td>
<td>$30.8 b</td>
<td>$51.1 m</td>
<td>$54 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports (b,m)</td>
<td>$135.1 b</td>
<td>$1.27 b</td>
<td>$228 b</td>
<td>$31 b</td>
<td>$1.4 b</td>
<td>$497 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% GDP – Spent on Defense</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>25-33%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Monetary unit is $US, and (b,m) refers to $US billion or $US million

Table 2-1. Comparisons of Social and Economic Indicators in Korea (1996), Germany (1989), and Yemen (1989).

Every indicator from population to economics has the dominant state, on the eve of unification, far ahead of their rival. With the exception of North Korea’s exorbitant expenditure on the military this dominance is practically all encompassing. Economically it is important to note the wide disparity between GDP per household in the two Koreas. Woo Sik Kee suggests a comparison of per capita consumption between the two Koreas “… North Korea’s private consumption is less than half of
GNP (North Korea’s), while that of South Korea is more than 65% of GNP”, as a better indicator of disparity in North and South Korean living standards. Although West Germany’s GDP per household was greater than the East’s, the disparity was far less than the gap facing Korea. Today, the problems of transitioning the East German economy in order to establish an equitable standard of living is still challenging the government in Bonn. Not to mention that West Germany was in a better position financially to begin the process of economic transition than South Korea’s current position. As Woo Sik Kee remarks, “…the demographic and aggregate economic features indicated that the relative costs of unification are likely to be much heavier for South Korea than for West Germany.” Both East Germany and North Korean State infrastructures suffer from decay. Like East Germany, the North Koreans will require mass financial input to update and transform the industrial capability of their state.

For Korea the relevance of these cases lies more in the process that resulted in unification and not necessarily the statistics of absorption. Although statistics allow us to “see” problems, it is often too easy to draw inferences from these numbers without inputting the non-intrinsic aspects in a particular example. As Kenneth Waltz warns, “Statistical operations cannot bridge the gap that lies between description and explanation.” Additionally, Woo Sik Kee highlights that, “Differences in the concepts or units of economic data also defy comparisons between South and North Korean economies.”

The inter-country diplomatic dynamics yield some interesting comparisons. The long journey of unification proposals and inter-Korean dialogue is analogous to both Yemen and Germany’s route toward unification. The 1992 North and South Korea “Basic Agreement” and “Joint Declaration on Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula”, are similar to diplomacy efforts in Germany that yielded the Helsinki accords, and Yemen’s numerous unification summits. However as detailed later in this chapter, inter-state dialogue, proposals and exchanges are insufficient if both states are not sincere. As Yemen’s unification will highlight, initial good faith negotiations are of little value if a plan is not designed, agreed upon and rapidly executed through the
final phase. As the German example reveals, the overall plan was implemented with a hurried pace that caught many off guard but succeeded in accomplishing a peaceful absorption. Not a perfect unification, but peaceful nonetheless. The importance of establishing a realistic plan, and being prepared to follow through the execution process is the relevance these cases provide for Korean unification.

B. REGIONAL ISSUES OF GERMANY AND YEMEN'S UNIFICATIONS

Germany and Yemen's unifications involved regional issues that captured the attention of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. diplomatic officials. Apprehension and uncertainty of the superpowers was reflected more during the German unification process than that of Yemen. This was due to the military standoff between the two powers in Germany as well as Germany's economic potential as a united state. Yemen's unification process was addressed in regional forums, and severely affected by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. An analysis of the diplomacy process and security issues surrounding these two unifications highlight the regional issues involved.

1. Diplomacy involved in Germany's Unification Processes

The diplomacy dimensions of German unification were complex. In many aspects East and West Germany were surrogates of the superpowers, allowing the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to confront each other ideologically and militarily through the two German states. The conundrum facing Helmut Kohl (Prime Minister of the FRG), was how to ensure that a unified Germany remained a NATO member and not be reduced to a neutral country state in a rapidly growing interdependent European community. The NATO issue was resolved by arranging an international negotiation forum composed of the two German states and the four powers that were victorious after World War II.

The Ottawa Declaration, signed in February 1990, announced to the world that the four powers and the two German states would jointly work out the external aspects of German unification. The two-plus-four talks allowed France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union to come to terms with the inevitable unification of Germany. Assuaging the Soviet Union's fears of a united Democratic Germany and preparing Europe for the removal of a 45 year old psychological/physical boundary were
the main emphasis of the talks. The Soviets posited three major security concerns surrounding German unification: (1) the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany, (2) a decrease in NATO forces throughout Europe and (3) the corresponding decrease in German forces. None of the Soviet concerns were hotly contested as the U.S. realized the diminishing capability of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War required a reassessment of military force levels in Europe. The Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl agreed in a private conference on February 10, 1990 that a united Germany would remain in the NATO alliance uncontested by the Soviet Union. This agreement stipulated no NATO forces allowed in the former East Germany and the two heads of State agreed on an initial German force of 370,000 personnel. The NATO Summit in July 1990 continued to address security and policy issues of German unification designed to ease Soviet Apprehension of a united Germany in NATO. Unlike Germany, Yemen's diplomatic process on the road to unification was primarily regionally oriented.

2. **Diplomacy Involved in Yemen's Unification**

On May 22, 1990 the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, South Yemen) and Yemen Arab Republic (YAR, North Yemen) unified; the state was renamed the Republic of Yemen (see Figure 2-1). The process for this historic moment in the Arab region began in 1967. Yemen unification occurred after an extended five phase diplomatic process. Efforts included four major regional unification summits involving Arab neighbors held in Cairo, Tripoli, Kuwait and South Yemen. After 22 years of disputes and border wars this apparently sincere diplomatic effort resulted in a unified Yemen nation.

The end of the Cold War saw the significance of North and South Yemen dwindle in the eyes of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Port of Aden was important to the Soviets during the Cold War, but neither state was critical to the superpowers as the Cold War ended. In May 1990 Yemen was confronted with a regional conflict in Kuwait that rekindled tension with long-time adversary Saudi Arabia, and catapulted an infant Yemen government into the international foreign policy arena.
Figure 2-1. A Divided Yemen

held the chair as President of the Security Council and lobbied for an “Arab Solution.” Yemen opposed United States involvement and joined Jordan in lobbying for the Arab League to solve the crisis. This was vigorously opposed by the U.S. and the Saudi government. A united Yemen’s pro-Iraqi stand in the United Nations would prove to be a near-fatal mistake for a struggling country in its first year of unification. Yemen’s diplomatic support for Iraq did not affect the outcome of the Gulf War or help Iraq in any way. The result of Yemen’s pro-Iraqi stance was regional isolation and withdrawal of sorely needed economic aid from the U.S. An analysis of the security issues surrounding Germany and Yemen’s unifications is next.


Both Helmut Kohl and President Reagon realized a united Germany would require a broader security agreement with the United States or face domestic German pressure for complete withdrawal of foreign military presence. The original U.S.-FRG security agreement was narrowly focused on Cold War military aspects whereas a new
agreement required a commitment by the U.S. to a united Germany and the future development of the East European countries surrounding Germany. This development would become the primary responsibility of Germany, however Helmut Kohl was concerned that Germany would be overwhelmed with ethnic problems in the former Soviet satellites and was wisely seeking commitments early on from the U.S. The final agreement saw U.S. force presence reduced to 150,000 troops remaining in the former West Germany. United States involvement in the Bosnia crisis, both diplomatic and militarily, represents a broader U.S. commitment to stability in the East European region. A post-unification foreign policy for Germany was Helmut Kohl's next order of business.

The foreign policy for a united Germany would be characterized by multilateralism. Helmut Kohl did not want to limit Germany's ability to deal with the anticipated regional and international instability resulting from unification. The new Germany would have a broad range of agreements, allowing the nation to take advantage of several foreign policy vehicles while operating with limited resources. Helmut Kohl rested the future Germany's policy on four pillars: (1) NATO, (2) the WEU, (3) the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and (4) the European Community (EC). Each of these pillars offered Germany a specific vehicle for addressing future issues. NATO provided the military security umbrella that was proven and allowed Germany to focus on less stable aspects of their foreign policy foundation. The WEU and CSCE provided Germany the means to discuss European economic issues and general issues affecting all of Europe, while the EC allowed Germany to focus on issues surrounding the struggling former Soviet satellite countries in East Europe. These pillars allowed Germany to participate in institutions already established, thus allowing the new nation to focus on critical domestic issues while participating regionally. Yemen's security issues upon unification were focused on long-time border rival Saudi Arabia.

Regionally, the Republic of Yemen quickly found an economic and security alliance. Allying with Iraq and Jordan in the Iraqi led Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), President Ali Abdullah Salih of Yemen sent a clear signal of balancing to Saudi Arabia. For Yemen, this alliance allowed for a balance of power against Saudi Arabia and the promise of economic stimulus for the new state. For Saudi Arabia this alliance ignited a fear that had burned off and on since conflict with the YAR began in 1967.

Saudi Arabia has harbored two major concerns in reference to a unified Yemen state: (1) a numerically superior antagonistic neighbor, and (2) the Asir province promises a direct oil pipeline to the Indian Ocean (see Figure 2-1). A separated Yemen state ensured the Saudi government did not face a powerful neighbor and allowed the Saudi’s to exploit the Asir province. Prior to unification, the Saudis linked financial aid to South Yemen to access rights in the Asir province. From the Saudi’s viewpoint, a financially strengthened and united Yemen may deny easy exploitation of this province.

A summary of the regional concerns facing theses two states upon unification is helpful prior to analyzing the domestic issues surrounding their unification’s. Table 2-2 represents the two states regional concerns upon unification, and a short summary resulting from their actions. The domestic unification issues confronting Germany and Yemen were as complicated as the regional concerns.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Inter-state and External Dialogue: Ottawa Declaration</td>
<td>1. Security Agreement Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. established the two-plus four talks which resolved external aspects with</td>
<td>Multilateralism: Vehicles were</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>major powers;</td>
<td>NATO/WEU/CSCE/EC;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. CFE Treaty: established military forces maximums</td>
<td>2. Relationship with U.S.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Kohl - Gorbachev Conference: eliminated Soviet interference</td>
<td>reduced U.S. force presence but did not sever the tie;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Yemen                         | 1. Inter-Yemen summits: proposals, no agreements                           | 1. Security Agreement Type                                               |
|                               | 2. Regional powers participation: did not facilitate the process           | primarily bilateral with Iraq                                            |
|                               | 3. Iraq - Kuwaiti conflict: poor decision to side with Iraq               | 2. Relationship with Saudi Arabia: worsened during post-unification      |

Table 2-2. Germany and Yemen Regional Unification Issues and their Outcomes

C. DOMESTIC ISSUES OF GERMANY AND YEMEN’S UNIFICATIONS

Internally the German and Yemen unifications contained destabilizing issues that, in some ways, were dealt with differently by each state. Military integration, economic integration and societal integration were three major areas that required planning and forethought prior to each state undergoing unification. For Germany a well prepared plan that addressed these major domestic issues did prevent these problems from developing into destabilizing factors. For the Yemen government, lack of planning assisted in creating the environment for an inter-Yemen civil war.

1. Germany’s Military Force Integration

With both a well-defined strategic security and regional foreign policy vision a united Germany now focused on the process of merging and downsizing the two States military forces. On October 3, 1990 Germany was officially unified and had a
combined military force numbering 590,000 personnel. In agreement with the two-plus-four talks, a united Germany would field a force of no more that 370,000 personnel. This agreement required a reduction of 222,000 personnel as well as disposal of excess military equipment. Germany’s plan for reduction focused on three areas: (1) a personnel downsizing plan, (2) restructuring the Bundeswehr (FRG military organization) and (3) an excess military equipment disposal plan. In the short-term, the personnel downsizing plan was most important.

The West German government in Bonn allowed the FRG Bundeswehr to outline a personnel downsizing plan for the merging of the GDR National Peoples Army (NVA - National Volksarmee) with the FRG forces. The Bonn government realized that exclusion of NVA personnel from the military would alienate the population, increase unemployment and perhaps cause a sovereignty issue for Bundeswehr forces conducting security missions in the former East Germany. The Bundeswehr was faced with reducing an NVA force of 100,000 in 1990 to a projected force of 50,000 by 1994. A phased personnel downsizing plan was implemented. The transitioning plan included dismissing all general and senior officers over the age of 50, shortening the conscription term from 18 to 12 months for enlisted personnel, and implementing a rigorous two-year selection process for the remaining 23,000 NVA officers. The goal was to build a force to serve in the former East Germany consisting of 5,000 officers, 15,000 NCOs and 25,000 enlisted personnel. The remaining 5,000 of the 50,000 man force would include Bundeswehr officers and NCOs. Timing was critical to the downsizing announcement. The Bonn government announced the NVA military personnel downsizing and reorganization plan on the day of unification, thus reducing anxiety for NVA defense personnel.

The reorganization of the Bundeswehr to accept the former NVA forces while downsizing its own structure was conducted in phases. The first phase established an Armed Forces Eastern Command consisting of an Army, Air Force and Naval Command (see Figure 2-2). A critical Liaison Command for Soviet forces allowed for coordinating redeployment of Soviet military personnel and equipment by the 1994
deadline. The second phase developed a transitional Army corps in the East consisting of two divisions and all required logistics and services units (see Figure 2-3). The final phase resulted in the reduction of the Bundeswehr 3d Corps and the reorganization into the Northern, Southern and Eastern Commands (see Figure 2-4). The Northern and Southern Commands control three divisions each and Bonn projected the total strength by 1995 to be 255,000 personnel.


Figure 2-2. The German Armed Forces Eastern Command and Principal Operations Staffs
Figure 2-3. German East Army Transitional Structure

1. Army Command East
2. Support Brigade
3. Logistics Brigade
4. Medical Brigade
5. Army NCO School
6. Military Districts w/Division Tasks
7. Support Regiment
8. Armored Recon Battalion
9. Field Artillery Regiment
10. Air Defense Regiment
11. Engineer Brigade
13. Logistics Regiment
14. Medical Regiment
15. Security Regiment

Small light triangles = cadre units
Small dark triangles = holding units


Figure 2-4. The German New Army Basic Command Organizational Structure

For the old Bundeswehr this reorganization resulted in a reduction of West German divisions from twelve to six and consequently the number of warfighting brigades from 48 to 28. The disposal of equipment, materiel and ammunition stocks to satisfy this downsized military organization was a daunting task.

The magnitude of the excess equipment disposal problem was significant. In 1990 as the old Bundeswehr and former NVA became one, the new organization had an excess of 41 percent of main battle tanks, 61 percent of armor combat vehicles, 14 percent of fighter aircraft and 42 percent of artillery pieces. These excesses were exclusive of the equipment expected to redeploy with the Soviet forces by 1995 (see Table 2-3). Complicating the disposal situation was an estimated 350,000 tons of ammunition in NVA holdings. With no guarantee that the Soviet Union would pay to ship their forces ammunition back to Russia, the Bundeswehr faced the possibility of an additional one million tons of ammunition. The cost associated with destroying former East German stocks is quoted as low as $937 million to as high as $2.2 billion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Limit</th>
<th>Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Battle Tank</td>
<td>7075</td>
<td>4166</td>
<td>2909 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Vehicles</td>
<td>8950</td>
<td>3446</td>
<td>5504 (61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>4639</td>
<td>2705</td>
<td>1934 (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter Aircraft</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>150 (14%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2-3. Limits and Reductions of Combat Systems Imposed on German Bundeswehr

A logical process for disposal of the materiel was developed by the government in Bonn and the Bundeswehr.

The process for determining materiel retention centered on three main criteria: (1) a requirement for the system; (2) the system must be logistically supportable; and (3) the system must be economically viable. The logistic supportability focused on the
availability and acquisition of spare parts. Economically, parts must be cost effective, and the probable system modifications were a consideration. Based on these criteria the Bundeswehr divided all military equipment into three categories for evaluation: (1) permanent or limited-term use; (2) temporary systems requiring evaluation, and (3) systems to be disposed of upon unification. The result of these categorization saw the Bundeswehr cut a majority of older Soviet systems while taking advantage of some systems with significant ammunition stocks for training purposes. The Soviet ground weapon systems selected for disposal and phased termination included the T-54 and T-55 main battle tanks, the BMP-1 and BTR-70 armor combat vehicles, and 122 mm S-1 howitzers. Air weapon systems selected for disposal included the MIG-21, the MIG-23, and the SU-22 fighter aircraft. No significant NVA naval assets were retained.

The plan for disposal of selected systems consisted of three options: selling, donating, and scrapping. Of these options, selling or donating systems to former members of the Warsaw Pact was preferable to scrapping the systems. In 1991 the German government expected to obtain $US 31.2 million by selling combat support equipment and spare parts on the civilian market. Similarly, the Gulf War in 1990-1991 provided an opportunity to distribute some materiel to member countries of the Arab coalition. However, as Wolfgang Burr highlights, “...80% of all East German equipment cannot be sold or used by other government departments, and must be destroyed.” Scrapping combat systems was a time consuming and expensive option, but required in order to comply with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. Yemen’s lack of military integration set the stage for civil war following unification.

2. Yemen’s Military Force Integration

The continued presence of non-integrated armed forces in the North and South created an opportunity for conflict. The plan for a unified military organization was abstractly discussed prior to unification, but again a formal plan with a timeline for implementation was never established. In addition to the armed forces of the former North and South, Islah had a formidable army of dedicated fighters. This was a recipe for disaster and the catastrophe occurred in 1994.
The civil war in Yemen from April to July 1994 saw Salih consolidate the GPC power base and politically unify Yemen through war. The presence of two separated military forces, aligned with their former party's, was the operational cause of the war. However, Salih's drive to maintain power would not tolerate challenges to his authority and the YSP presented such a challenge, real or imagined. The challenging task of economic integration is analyzed next.

3. Germany's Economic Integration

The economic aspect of German unification was complicated and received appropriate attention from the government in Bonn. The main economic concern centered around the economic reconstruction of the former GDR. Transitioning the GDR economic system into a competitive market oriented system required a detailed plan. The FRG and GDR agreed in March 1990 to implement a four-phase economic unification plan designed to rapidly integrate the former GDR economy into the FRG and allow for a decade long adjustment period. The first phase of the plan focused on the monetary union between the FRG and GDR. This phase stressed implementation of FRG economic laws and regulations, price reform and the establishment of exchange rates. The initial favorable exchange rate for the East German individual savings investor was 1:1 Ostmarks for Deutschmarks, and a 2.4:1 exchange rate was initially used for all commercial transactions. The second phase followed the monetary union in July 1990 and focused on privatization of GDR state enterprises, the establishment of commercial banking and overhauling the social security system. The third phase addressed foreign trade, focusing on more efficient policies to ensure trade prospered and a united Germany was protected. The final phase was implementation of appropriate policies to ensure the integration of monetary, fiscal, social and employment policies designed to lift the former GDR economy to the same level as the FRG. The reality of implementing the four-phase economic plan was far from euphoric.

The economic issues that confronted the Bonn government upon unification included a dilapidated GDR infrastructure that consisted of outdated industrial machinery, an underdeveloped and aged transportation/communications structure and
workforce retraining. Economic optimists on the eve of unification predicted that a united Germany would produce an economic superpower in a few years.\textsuperscript{32} However the East German economy proved to be "a Potemkin economy or worse - a corrupt, inefficient, industrial invalid that was hemorrhaging its human resources West."\textsuperscript{33} Once the process for transition was decided, the FRG contemplated the cost for transitioning the GDR to a market based economy.

The financial costs of unification were woefully underestimated. The initial unified German budget allocated $50 billion for unification efforts and initiated new taxes to raise an additional $31 billion.\textsuperscript{34} However, at the end of 1991 a more realistic projection of the costs to transition the GDR economy was estimated at $500 billion. This estimate accurately reflected the costs associated with rebuilding East German industry and infrastructure, retraining the 9 million man workforce, and providing social services for former East Germans during the initial years of unification.\textsuperscript{35} The direct and indirect costs of unification resulted in higher taxes, increased deficits, higher interest rates and subsequently unemployment. The social ramifications of these costs created resentment among former West Germans. Yemen’s economic integration was less complicated.

4. Yemen’s Economic Integration

Economically, Yemen was one of the poorest Gulf states at the time of unification. The main impetus for unification was the two states need to exploit oil reserves that lay along the North/South Yemen border.\textsuperscript{36} South Yemen had lost all support from the former Soviet Union as the Cold War ended and North Yemen did not have access to the main oil fields or the major oil refinery at Aden. The end of the Cold War and subsequent harsh economic reality, made previous disputes an afterthought among the two Yemen states.

The immediate economic crisis confronting the Yemeni government upon unification was the loss of external aid and the influx of deported migrant workers. Due to Yemen’s anti-coalition position during the Gulf War, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) drastically reduced financial aid from $50 million to
$4 million. Likewise, retribution for Yemen's pro-Iraqi stance was swift from Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government deported approximately one million Yemen migrant workers in 1991. The returning migrant workers created two problems: (1) increased unemployment and (2) loss of remittance income from the workers. For the new united government, assuming the debts for unification was expected. The Republic of Yemen assumed the international obligations of the two states which totaled a debt of approximately $7 billion. In comparison, the gross national product for Yemen in 1990 was $6.6 billion, so this debt was significant.

In addition to the above mentioned economic difficulties, a united Yemen faced the issue of increasing oil exports, attracting foreign investment and implementing monetary reforms designed to transition to a free market economy. The prior unification summits were more for show than for substance, and the lack of a formal economic transition program were apparent by 1992. The former South Yemen populace became disgruntled by the inability of the new republic to deliver on the promise for an oil-driven economic turnaround. Yemen's continued meager oil exports of 130,000 - 140,000 barrels/day in 1992 was justification for the complaint. Foreign investment has been attempted through initiation of a free trade zone centered around the Port of Aden. This zone offers hope for Yemen to diversify its economic base and not be solely dependent on oil exports. However, Yemen was a poor country upon unification and projections for a significant economic surge were a result of political rhetoric designed to gain popular support for the unification initiative, not projections based on economic indicators. Serious economic reform requires a program and government leadership dedicated to rigidly following the details. As of October 1994, the Republic of Yemen had not enacted a program to implement the monetary reforms required by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The critical task of societal integration following unification presented unique problems to Germany and Yemen.
5. Germany’s Societal Integration

Culturally the two German states were not distinct. The wall did not separate the unique aspects of being German, only the capability to physically interact. Ideologically the two state governments were opposites, but culturally the peoples in the East had not developed a separate national conscious. Klaus von Beyme comments, “Churches, trade unions and many other social institutions were kept apart by force, but preserved their organizational similarity.” Additionally, the impact of media and increased visitation rights in the 1980’s allowed East Germans to gage their freedoms, and ensured that neither German population lost its homogenous identity. Integration however brought resentment.

The speed with which unification occurred could not prevent some hard feelings once reality struck. Resentment of the East Germans arose primarily from the anxiety associated with the financial burdens of unification. The financial cost of unification, viewed as being borne by West Germans, created a pronounced inferiority complex in East Germans and further complicated the process of integration. Although not as thoroughly analyzed, the societal integration problems confronting North and South Yemen upon unification provide comparable insights.

6. Yemen’s Social Integration

The lack of a significant economic gap between South and North Yemen resulted in no severe resentment from either state’s populace in regard to the financial strain of unification. The populace was more frustrated with government diplomacy that resulted in the one million migrant workers in Saudi Arabia being deported and the subsequent unemployment that resulted. The major stumbling block to complete integration was internal political turmoil between the former ruling party’s of the separated North and South Yemen.

a. Domestic Political Turmoil

The distribution of power within the new republic was the main issue fermenting the internal political conflict in Yemen. As agreed upon during the unification summits, the former General Peoples Congress (GPC) of North Yemen and
the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) of South Yemen established the new republic’s
government with a 50/50 distribution of power.\textsuperscript{44} Although equal from a percentage
standpoint, it was evident that the persons making decisions and wielding the power
were from the GPC. Salih (GPC) was named president of the new republic and Ali
Salam al-Baid (YSP) was named vice president. Salih and Baid began allying forces
and strengthening their political positions from the start. Salih had an advantage since
the capital was in Saan’a and he was familiar with the Northern tribes in the area.
Additionally, the YSP’s former ideological stance was not popular and party officials
played down their failed past. Salih struck at this weakness in a successful move to
destroy the YSP and establish the GPC as the dominant party.

Ensuring a fierce rival faction confronted and weakened the YSP, under
the auspices of democracy, was Salih’s plan. As the Islamist Yemeni Congress for
Reform or Islah, the Northern Hashid tribe began a relentless political assault against the
former YSP. The 1992 elections saw Islah win a large percentage of seats in parliament
and the YSP power dwindle significantly.\textsuperscript{45} The political attacks continued until Vice
President Baid finally departed the capital and returned to the former South Yemen
capital of Aden. The newly elected coalition government in Saan’a had marginalized
the importance of the YSP and set the stage for a bloody civil war. The elimination of
the YSP leadership and its military backers during the 1994 civil war completed the
unification process in Yemen. A summary of the domestic unification issues faced by
Germany and Yemen is helpful at this time.

Table 2-4 represents domestic unification issues analyzed, and the
resulting outcomes of decisions by the government’s of Germany and Yemen. Next I
will present the lessons learned from the analysis of German and Yemen regional and
domestic unification issues that are applicable to Korean unification.
| Germany | 1. Process: three phased plan developed prior to unification  
2. Equipment: retention criteria established  
3. Ammo/Equipment disposal: cost and disposal amount underestimated | 1. Preparation: personnel exchange helped, but costs were not made public  
2. Speed of the process: resulted in resentment and inferiority complexes  
3. Ideology: primarily a government issue | 1. Process: four phased plan; long-term vision required  
2. Costs: underestimated  
3. Infrastructure: GDR’s overestimated  
4. Short-term: increased deficit, interest rates, unemployment |
|---|---|---|
| Yemen | 1. Process: no decisive plan which resulted in separate military status quo and superficial integration | 1. Deported workers: caused loss of income and unemployment  
2. Political struggle: did not allow populace integration; continued to split the populace along political lines | 1. Process: no plan, exploiting oil reserves the main goal  
2. Costs: mainly debt accrual, no development planned  

**Table 2-4. Germany and Yemen’s Domestic Unification Issues and Decision Outcomes**

**D. CONCLUSION**

The regional and domestic issues presented in these two historic unification cases are representative of major problems facing a unified Korea. However, these cases are not intended to serve as a template for predicting the problems and issues facing Korea. These cases are best adopted to anticipate possible problems and plan for courses of action to increase the probability of successful unification. Table 2-5 represents a consolidation of lessons learned from Germany and Yemen’s unification that may be applicable to Korean unification.

Two states conducting serious unification diplomacy must ensure that all major internal and external power issues are formally resolved prior to a unification commitment. Existing security agreements should be addressed by all powers and the two states to ensure that decisions to modify, dissolve or maintain current agreements
are not a source of future friction for the new unified state. A long-term economic integration focus is required for a new unifying country. Elements, either political or non-political, espousing short-term economic euphoria resulting from unification should be cautious of over estimating a unified state’s immediate economic capability. Resolving the disposition of separate militaries is a crucial step prior to a state unifying. A decision is required as to whether separate militaries will integrate or one system faces demobilization. Resolution of this topic is central during the diplomacy process. Finally, each state must prepare its citizens for unification. Depending on the level of ideological difference between the populations this process may be very difficult. Years of preparation may be required prior to unification, if a state’s population is unyielding in its allegiance to an ideology.

As the German example clearly showed, and the Yemen example confirmed, even a marginal plan implemented with discipline has a better chance of preventing internal conflict than managing problems as they arise during the unification process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>1. Regional or Internationally sponsored talks must achieve substantive signed agreements that bind all parties to a course of action prior to unification.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Cannot delay resolving major issues between parties or sponsors until after unification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Agreement</td>
<td>3. A multilateral or collective security agreement allows a united government more options for regional and international decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Previous bilateral security agreement will require renegotiating, and a phased plan prior to unification should be considered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Integration</td>
<td>5. Long term vision required for any plan adopted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Do not expect direct payoff in monetary terms from integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Short term economic reality of unification = increased deficits, unemployment and interest rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Integration</td>
<td>8. Personnel and equipment restructuring plan developed prior to unification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Be prepared to dispose of more combat systems and ammunition than estimated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Implement restructuring plan immediately, reduces opportunity for separatist elements to gain access to systems and/or personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Aspects</td>
<td>11. Develop a plan to reduce the destabilizing factors that exist as open and closed societies interact for the first time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Populace should understand the short-term economic sacrifices required to unite Korea, and the effects it will likely have on their individual lives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Government should implement a plan to educate the populace about the ideological viewpoints and differences each society is likely to have upon unification.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2-5. German and Yemen Unification Lessons Learned for Korea
The ensuing chapter details major problems and issues confronting Korea as it anticipates unification, and the ROK Army’s role in supporting the government. The lessons learned from analyzing Germany and Yemen's unifications will be applied to the issues confronting the ROK and DPRK governments. A table of possible actions the ROK government should consider implementing will result from this comparison.
Endnotes


2. It is important to note that Yemen's separation was cemented during the post-WW II Cold War period, but the impetus for the division was a result of the early 1900's stalemate between two intrusive, non-Arab empires: the Ottoman, then in occupation of Yemen, and the British, in Aden and the protectorates. Until 1967, when the U.K. withdrew from the region no Yemen authority had any input in the establishment of Yemen's state boundaries. For a detailed accounting of Yemen history see Robert Stookey's, *Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic*, pp. 1-5.


16. Dunbar, p. 470. The former Ambassador identifies that the Saudi government covertly assisted in ensuring the status quo of Yemen separation by aiding Northern Yemen tribes opposed to the YAR.
Additionally, the Saudi's encouraged these fierce tribes to oppose the Marxist government in South Yemen, thus ensuring constant agitation to both the YAR and PDRY government's.


18 Ibid. pp. 21-22.


21 Giovanni de Briganti, "Bonn to Award Arms Disposal Pact." Defense News: August 31, 1992. p. 14. The actual amount inherited was approximately 295,000 metric tons of munitions. Munitions included small-arms, tank and antitank rounds, naval mines, artillery rounds, antitank missiles and artillery rockets. Briganti reports from a telephonic interview with Ernst Niemeimer, German official in charge of munitions-disposal program, that average cost for disposal range from $3.47 to .70 cents per metric ton, depending on type of munitions.


26 Briganti, "Germans Seek Ammo Solution." pp. 1-2. Briganti interviewed Wolfgang Burr, head of international affairs at the German Ministry of Defense, and Burr stated, "Small quantities of other equipment have been given away. The Russian Orthodox Church received 200 trucks, Romania was given tents and clothing, while Egypt was provided with 30 SPW-40 nuclear/chemical warfare reconnaissance vehicles to use in the Persian Gulf War." Thomas Lucey, Defense News Correspondent, reports that Germany sold transportation vehicles and armored personnel carriers to Sweden, donated carriers and clothing to Pakistan for Peacekeeping operations, and donated combat vehicles to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia, in "Germany Disposes East's Assets.", Defense News: March 13, 1995, p. 26.

27 Dunbar, p.462. The former ambassador notes that "... the general staffs were successfully integrated into a unified defense ministry, and a few units were moved from south to north and vice versa. Unification at the rank-and-file level, however, was left to take place over a protracted period of time, in order not to sacrifice military efficiency." In Assem Abdel-Mohsen's report, "Yemen Army Insists it is Politically Neutral." (1993, November 12), Reuters, he comments on the fact that military integration still had not occurred as of 1993.


29 Asmus, pp. 25-27. The German Economic and Monetary Union was established to implement, monitor and adjust as required the details surrounding the transition of East Germany to a competitive market based economy.
30 Gortemaker, pp. 142-146. Leif Roderick Rosenberger identifies this liberal conversion rate as the "conversion mistake" that would be lamented in the years initially following unification in "How German Unification Mistakes Damage West European Economies." Strategic Studies Institute: August 4, 1993, pp. 3-4.


32 Gortemaker, p. 231-232.


35 Gortemaker, pp. 231-232.

36 Schmitz, pp. 33-36.


39 Wright and Pinsker, p. 20.

40 Wright and Pinsker, pp. 20-21.

41 Katherine M. Metres, "Yemen Again on Path to Democracy, Economic Growth." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs: Vol. 15, No. 4, Oct 96, p. 70. Metres reports that by October 1996 the Republic of Yemen had successfully completed the first stage of the World Bank/IMF economic reform program. This positive step is cause for hope that after six years Yemen may be on the path to a free market economy.

42 Klaus von Beyme, "Transition to Democracy - or Anschluss?" Government and Opposition: Vol. 25, No. 2, Spring 1990.

43 Angela Stent, "The One Germany." Foreign Policy: No. 81, Winter 1990-91, pp. 62-64.

44 Schmitz, p.34.

45 Dunn, pp. 17-26. The author highlights an interesting fact that Islah was a coalition of Islamist and tribal traditionalists, with its shrewd and hard-bargaining leader (Sheikh Abdallah Hussein al-Ahmar) grounded more in tribal traditions than Islamic fundamentalism.
III. SIGNIFICANT UNIFICATION ISSUES CONFRONTING KOREA

"Predictions may be useful: The forces that propel two bodies headed for a collision may be inaccessible, but if we can predict the collision, we can at least get out of the way."

Kenneth W. Waltz, 1979

The government of a unified Korea will face many serious issues on the path to a successful unification. With prior integrated planning and coordination perhaps more can be accomplished that simply "... getting out of the way". What are the main unification issues confronting the ROK government, and subsequent unified Korean government in the future? What recommendations for action result if the lessons learned from Germany and Yemen's unification are compared to the unification issues that confront Korea. These are the questions I propose to answer in this chapter.

The magnitude of the problems confronting a newly unified Korean government are daunting. Scholars have dedicated years, countless books and articles have been written, and major conferences scheduled throughout the Asia-Pacific region predicting the apocalyptic nature of the problems resulting from Korean unification. Therefore it is imperative to identify those problems that will naturally demand the full efforts of Korean political leaders and unification planners. Similarly, identification and analysis of these problems can allow the ROK government to preemptive planning. This preemptive planning is essential to reducing the destabilizing internal and external factors surrounding unification.

I contend that regional and domestic unification issues confronting the ROK government include: unification diplomacy, regional disputes, the future of security arrangements, economic and societal integration, and finally the destabilizing internal environment in the north. Preemptive planning that identifies the stumbling blocks inherent in each of these issues can assist the ROK government in addressing these variables with successful countermeasures. Obviously a smooth road to unification is not guaranteed, but the result of not considering countermeasures to identified problems is sure disaster. This is not intended to represent an all-inclusive list of unification issues confronting the ROK government.
The variables affecting long-term infrastructure development are not analyzed here. Although infrastructure development in the former DPRK will be important, stabilizing the decaying situation in the North should occur first before a plan for economic transition is initiate or the positive effects of long-term infrastructure projects can be realized. This chapter consists of three sections.

Sections one and two analyze the regional and domestic unification issues confronting the ROK government. This analysis results in decision-making insights to assist the ROK government conduct preemptive unification planning. The concluding section combines these decision-making insights, and lessons learned from German and Yemen unifications to produce a table of recommendations for the regional and domestic issues confronting Korea.

A. REGIONAL ISSUES

The armistice that halted the Korean War on July 27, 1953 set the stage for an East Asian version of the Cold War in Europe. For over 40 years the DPRK and ROK governments have balanced against each other both militarily and ideologically with the help of the United States, the former Soviet Union and China. With the end of the Cold War the two Koreas have faced a rapidly changing Asia-Pacific community. Globalization and economic development have created a dynamic environment. A unified Korean government faces the problem of implementing a foreign strategy which interacts regionally as well as internationally. This strategy will be influenced by shaping factors to include relations with the four major powers, regional disputes and alliances.

1. Diplomacy and The Four Major Powers

During the Cold War the balancing of superpowers with the two Korean states is understandable since historically the Korean peninsula is one place where the interests of China, Russia, Japan and the United States have intercepted and often collided. However the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent end of the Cold War in Europe has seen the bilateral security alliances between the DPRK and Russia dissolve, and tempered the DPRK-PRC relationship. Likewise the dissolution of support for the DPRK has created an inter-South Korean debate questioning the logic of the ROK’s continued security
umbrella with the United States. A brief analysis of the big four powers position in relation to a unified Korea is helpful at this point.

a. China

China's concerns with a unified Korea are two-fold: (1) a large unified Korean Army sharing a lengthy land border and (2) possibility of a western backed ideological foe. If an antagonistic or lukewarm administration resulted in Korea following unification, then China would be forced to alter its omni-directional strategy for the future and focus on a more intense military modernization and buildup. China's current reform strategy, is designed to promote economic prosperity in a drive to transition from a command economy to a market economy with Chinese characteristics. This drive has Beijing modernizing agriculture, industry, science, technology and defense in what appears to be a successful drive to enter the global market place. How does China currently view the peninsula from a geopolitical perspective?

Today, China's focus on Korea perceives it as a security buffer between China and Japan. China's current policy toward a unified Korea is based on continuation of the status quo; two states one nation on the peninsula is in the interest of China. China is not likely to stand idly by, and watch as the U.S. assists the ROK establish a western-influenced unified Korea along the Yalu River. Predicting a response by China to U.S. involvement is purely a speculative effort. However, some form of unilateral effort by China to prevent North Korean refugees from pouring into China, while securing North Korean provinces along the Yalu river to serve as a geographical buffer is not unimaginable. This fact has the U.S. and ROK government's ensuring China's participation in the current four-way talks between the two Koreas, the U.S. and China. Besides the effort to guide the two Koreas on the road to unification, these talks ensure transparency for all the nations involved. If a coalition effort to support the stabilization of a unified Korea were to result, then perhaps this transparency could result in China's participation in the effort. China's future stance toward a unified Korea is expected to continue to reflect the pursuit of self-interest on China's part.
The future role of China in Korea may best be described as rapprochement to create dependence. China’s economic strategy focuses on engaging the ROK through investment and technology transfer in China and creation of an open market for Chinese goods while using the DPRK primarily as an export market for Chinese goods.\(^6\) As China struggles to enter the free market economy in a Chinese fashion it reveals a unique understanding of targeting an audience by the different approaches used to engage the DPRK and ROK. As China approaches the 21st Century the primary concern is maintaining stability on its territorial periphery. Although not formally acknowledging the desire for the status quo in a divided Korean peninsula this is the ideal situation for China to further its economic and defense modernization goals. As Park Soo-gil highlights, “Beijing is expected to continue its so-called ‘no reunification, no war’ policy of maintaining the status quo (a divided Korea).”\(^7\)

**b. United States**

The U.S. is at the forefront in promoting peaceful unification on the peninsula. In 1997 the U.S. hosted two rounds of four power talks between both Koreas, the U.S. and China. Although the talks were not able to move past the DPRK’s excessive demands for withdrawal of U.S. troops as a condition for further discussion, dialogue was established and this is the critical first step toward the long awaited process of establishing a true end to the Korean War.\(^8\) However supporting peaceful unification does not necessarily mean the U.S. wants off the peninsula nor a lesser role in Korean affairs.

With the end of the cold war the United States slowly enacted a national security strategy for a new era. The United States national security strategy of engagement and enlargement published in February 1996 describes three primary objectives: national security, an integrated economic policy and to strengthen emerging democratic states.\(^9\) The Clinton administration continues envisioning the military as a forward presence diplomacy tool that expresses U.S. commitment and an important deterrent against hostile states. Considering the U.S. national security strategy, how does this strategy shape relations with Korea in the future?
Since the Korean war the United States has forward deployed a significant military deterrent force in South Korea as a result of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954. Currently approximately 37,000 U.S. servicemen and women are serving under three major commands in South Korea: United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea.\textsuperscript{10} The U.S. has acknowledged it would consider reducing U.S. forces on the peninsula for reciprocal reductions by North Korea. However, a complete departure of U.S. forces, from a U.S. perspective, would not be in the best interest of the U.S. and certainly against the ‘forward deployed forces’ aspect of our security policy. The U.S. will likely not disappear from the peninsula overnight but with nationalist sentiment on the rise in Korea, transition to a self-sufficient South Korean military and possibility of unification causes one to ponder how long a permanent U.S. presence will be required or tolerated.

As the United States looks to the future in Korea it is evident that the administration is espousing to seek deep engagement in the economic sector while maintaining the former bilateral security arrangement. However espousing and action are two different things as Taylor and Kim astutely observe, ‘...while the United States is in the region it is not part of the region and no matter how often the U.S. portrays itself as the ‘honest broker’, what Asians know is brokers are not always investors.’\textsuperscript{11} The current security alliance, forged from an unresolved war, will not fade overnight but a strong economic trading partner (in Korea) can outlast a policy based on a anachronistic cold war engagement policy.

\textit{c. Japan}

Japan’s policy toward Korea was consistent with the United States during the Cold War, support for South Korea and rejection for North Korea. As the Cold War ended, Japan reevaluated its policy toward the two Koreas. While still supporting the ROK, Japan began experimenting with an open dialogue between North Korea and Tokyo. Beginning with public acknowledgment of Japan’s ‘wrong war’ in the Pacific, Prime Minister Hosokawa sought to mend fences with South Korea while intensifying efforts to engage Pyongyang. For both Koreas liquidating the past occupation period by
Japan and payment for reparations are continuing thorny issues between all three states. Time may help heal these thorny issues between Korea and Japan but forgiveness will not likely result. For Japan the geostrategic utility of warm relations with Korea is critical from a military security standpoint.

Security, in the form of defense, is one area where the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas is most advantageous to Japan. A South Korea backed by the U.S. serves as a geostrategic buffer to a possible future hegemon in China. Japan enjoys a situation where the U.S. is linked to both Seoul and Tokyo through security alliances as well as American troops stationed in both countries. The security agreement with the U.S. allows Japan to forego expensive military hardware procurement while ensuring U.S. commitment through forward deployed troops. Japan realizes U.S. strategy depends on forward presence and a unified Korea may question the need for U.S. troops deployed in Korea.

Japan’s need to maintain neighborly diplomatic relations with a unified Korea is important. A unified Korea will possess a significant military power posited approximately 150 miles Northwest of Japan. Although a unified Korea does not in itself pose a direct threat to Japan, Tokyo is not likely to be satisfied with a mainland defense force if U.S. domestic pressure forces Washington to withdraw from the region upon dissolution of a North Korean threat. In this sense the U.S. presence in Japan and South Korea is seen as a viable balancing force that benefits Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing and the Pacific region in general.

d. Russia

As the Soviet Union dissolved into Russia and the surrounding Confederation of Independent States, President Gorbachev focused on the internal aspects of transitioning Russia’s state controlled economy to a market based system. Like China, Russia’s bilateral cooperation with South Korea and cooling of relations with North Korea is mainly based on trade and investment. However, unlike the PRC, Russia’s economic interest is one of desperation as it continues to rebuild from an abrupt end as a Communist superpower, paradoxically thrust into the globalized free market system. In
a move that apparently recognized the ROK as the future core of a unified Korea, Russia has sought engagement with the ROK in other areas.

Russia has engaged Seoul in direct military to military exchanges, establishing the fact that Moscow is not taking a backseat in the region. Moscow and Seoul have conducted military officer exchanges and in August 1993 a Russian naval flotilla sailed into Pusan harbor for a goodwill tour. In addition, the two countries conducted a joint naval exercise in 1997. Moscow is spreading the tentacles of engagement to include more than economic facets.

Russia’s current policy toward Korea is not expected to change in the future. The policy is entwined by three aspects: ensure the peninsula remains stable, promote an orderly process for unification and expand economic relations with ROK. Currently Korea is not a primary focus for the Russian state but the future appears to entail deeper involvement. Although Northeast Asia currently ranks third in Russia’s foreign policy priorities, this ranking is not indicative of future overall importance.

Korea’s current involvement in the region and with the four powers is an outgrowth of post-Cold War security concerns and the new dimension of economic engagement with former adversaries. This engagement is positive and in a large part due to the security that alliances formed in the 1950’s. As the two Korean states approach unification relationships with the four powers and the diplomatic capability to mold a strategy for the future will present a serious challenge for the new Korean state. Additionally, regional disputes will certainly impose a serious diplomatic challenge for a unified Korea.

2. Regional Disputes

Disputes in the sub-region are both territorial and a question of divided nations. Territorially disputes include the Spratley Islands, Senkaku Islands, Takeshima/Tokto Islands, and the contested border between China and Russia. The Taiwan-PRC division and possibility of future reconciliation currently takes a backseat to the North and South Korea unification issue regionally. However the signal sent by China’s show of military force is that China intends to reunite Taiwan as part of China in the future. China’s
objective and Taiwan’s determination to remain a separate state in the region is sure to create future regional consternation. Unlike the diplomatic transition of power between Britain and China in Hong Kong, Taiwan may not be as smooth an acquisition for China.

A unified Korean government must take these regional disputes seriously when formulating a strategy for the future. Taehyun Kim notes that these types of issues are “...analogous to Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries”. The two World Wars in Europe had as main issues of contention territorial disputes, containment and expansionist goals of neighboring states. The desire to prevent a repeat of Europe’s World Wars should be the focus of consensus building among Asian states. As Kishore Mahbubani states, “If the Asia-Pacific is to defy the historical odds and make a smooth transition from one order to another, a new consensus must be forged soon.” For a future unified Korean government, their active participation in Asian diplomacy will require a well developed strategy based on consensus building not isolationism. An analysis of multilateralism in Asia upon Korean unification is timely here.

3. Security Agreements

As noted earlier security alliances in the Northeast Asia region have been bilateral and a product of the Cold War. A unified Korea faces security decisions that can be configured as bilateral, trilateral, multilateral or simply comprehensive security. Comprehensive security allows the factors of diplomacy, the economy and military defense an opportunity to provide security through countries interdependence with each other. Currently in the region, economic multilateralism achieved through institutions similar to Europe and track-two diplomacy efforts offer intermediate steps toward achieving a more intertwined security environment.

The Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC) is the primary multilateral economic institution that has achieved success in ushering the Asian community into the global marketplace. The hope that a multilateral security arrangement can produce the same successful results created the preliminary dialogue in the form of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In Northeast Asia, the ROK has initiated the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED), a possible step in the process to establish an institution for
achieving transparency in defense issues. In view of the burgeoning arms race in East Asia, it is apparent that economic multilateralism does not itself insure that all countries feel secure (see Table 3-1). This 23.9% increase in East Asia arms procurement is an alarming indicator of possible future conflict, especially when practically every other region is decreasing arms procurement. To deter the possibility of armed conflict in East Asia, the scope of multilateralism must broaden from a pure economic focus, and begin including diplomatic and security consensus building among states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Military Expenditure, $US billions</th>
<th>Increase or Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (all)</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>339.0</td>
<td>299.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>120.9</td>
<td>144.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (all)</td>
<td>634.9</td>
<td>299.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 1989 expenditure value is a constant 1994 comparative value for accurate comparison


Table 3-1. Regional Military Expenditures by Major Regions 1989-1995.

Although the ROK government is promoting multilateral security dialogue, the results of the 1994 collaborative research by RAND and KIDA produced recommendations that supported a continued Korean-U.S. bilateral security cooperation into the next century.22 It is unlikely that a unified Korean government, under primarily ROK leadership, would abandon the security of the U.S. alliance in the near term timeframe of unification. As Jin-Hyun Paik points out, "... the ROK has firmly maintained that multilateralism is not a substitute for, but rather a supplement to, bilateral arrangements."23 The outcome of multilateral security efforts in Asia is an
unknown entity in the coming years. No doubt that this issue will be a contentious one facing a unified Korean government in the future.

A well planned foreign strategy for entering the region and the international community is critical for a unified Korea. A well planned strategy, decisively implemented is necessary to ensure that a unified Korea is not overwhelmed by diplomatic regional pressures. Upon unification, Korea will not want to appear as a small minnow between two big fish. As if the above mentioned problems were not enough, a Korean government faces domestic economic and cultural issues upon unification that are as boggling as the regional problems.

B. DOMESTIC ISSUES

The critical domestic issues inherent with Korean unification are the economics of unification and the cultural dimension. A sound plan to address these domestic issues is as vital as a sound foreign policy and regional approach during and after unification. If these domestic issues are ignored it is highly probable that internal instability will result on the peninsula. A short analysis establishes the breadth and relevance of these issues for a unified Korea government.

1. Economic Integration

The economics of Korean unification are a complex issue. Complexities can be grouped into two categories: the incompatibility of the two economic systems (capitalist and command driven), and economic prosperity in the South versus complete stagnation in the North. The two economic aspects of unification that require immediate attention focused on long-term viable solutions are the financial cost associated with unification and economic reforms.

a. Cost of Unification

Any attempt to accurately predict the cost of unification is fraught with disaster. Analysts have settled on a figure of about US$ 1 trillion in the near term required to successfully complete unification. Although this figure may appear like an educated guess that leaves the economic analysts room for safe maneuvering, it may be surprisingly accurate. What if North Korea implements some form of economic reform?
A 1994 study conducted by the Korean Development Institute addresses this issue, and
the cost is still staggering in a best-case North Korean economic reform scenario:

... If unification came in (the year 2000), and if the North had implemented some
form of economic liberalization similar to China, the ROK government would
have to invest about US$90 billion in the North during the next decade.25

The reality of DPRK economic liberalization is not optimistic. The North’s “Free Trade
Zone” in Rajin-Sonbong (a region in its far Northeast province), is an isolated venture
that receives little support for expansion from within the government.26 It is important to
note that the monetary cost of unification is not a one-time lump sum investment payment
that sets a unified Korea on the path to economic growth and prosperity. As Germany has
discovered after six years and about a half-trillion dollars invested on rebuilding the
former East Germany, the economy there remains stagnant.27 The problem facing the
current ROK government now, and a unified Korean government in the future is how to
raise the money.

A financial strategy for unification must be developed by the ROK
government that addresses paying for North Korea’s modernization, while establishing a
realistic timeline for reaching unified economic objectives. As a historical highlight West
Germany began pumping US$100 billion into East Germany beginning in 1990.28 This
staggering amount of money indicates the requirement for South Korea to develop a
funding vehicle now. Kyongsoo Lho clearly articulates the political symbolism of a
unification fund and how South Korea, through conservative taxation, could raise
US$2.475 billion in the first year.29 Substantively and as a symbol this fund would
assuage financial anxiety regionally and internationally during the initial period of
unification. Additionally, this unification fund can work across the broad range of
unification scenarios as a staggering monetary price tag is a certain variable regardless of
how Korea arrives at unification. A relevant question to analyze is: how financially
prepared for unification is South Korea?
b. Economic Reforms

Economic analysts have identified that the ROK economic system requires some major economic reforms. Obviously these reforms and time for implementation, are desired prior to undergoing unification. In diagnosing the South Korean economy Chung Un-chan addresses both the short-term macroeconomic indicators and the long-term structural perspective to render this statement of the fundamental problem:

absence of firmly established rules for economic activities, the “survival of the strongest,” rather that the fittest, has become the rule as businesses are obsessed with making easy money through rent-seeking activities rather than in efficient economic activities.30

The bankruptcy of Hanbo Steel in 1997 and the subsequent fallout throughout the ROK economic and political sectors is a prime example of this fundamental problem.31

The task of economic reform is monumental. Jinn Tae-hong further expands on a diagnosis of the ROK economy and comments that, “Any financial reform (in ROK) should establish a substructure that will enable the financial market to monitor business firms and deal with noncompetitive businesses in a self-regulating manner.”32 Additionally Jinn Tae-hong proposes three major tasks required to move the ROK economy toward reform: (1) Deregulation of financial institutions; (2) A system of accountability for financial institutions; and (3) Upgrading the financial system to improve monitoring.33

These economic reforms and aggressive implementation of a unification fund are major issues for the current ROK and future unified Korean government. The issue of long-term cultural assimilation is the final problem I propose that will require the concentrated efforts of the Korean political leaders and government institutions.

2. Societal Integration

This aspect of unification does not receive the extensive coverage that other unification issues do, but it is nonetheless a critical long-term integration factor. Any unifying nation must consider the assimilation of its society if it expects to remain a stable lasting state. In accordance with the societal integration theory of Deutsch and Haas, homogenous reconciliation of two opposing societies - in total - must be achieved
in the long term for successful unification. Nicholas Eberstadt, the respected scholar of Korea adds, "Reunification without assimilation is not worth the name." Although Korea is culturally homogenous, integration may be difficult.

a. Indicators of Trouble

The history of the Korean peninsula is a good indicator that societal problems may arise upon unification. Following over five decades of separation resulting from a fratricidal war, a deep-seated mistrust between the two states is evident. The depth that this mistrust extends beyond government rhetoric is not measurable, however the message is rooted in both government’s propaganda campaigns. A foundation for this mistrust and antagonism is the two states differing political ideologies that only assist in alienating their homogenous populations from each other. A final indicator of problems is simply the inferiority complex that is likely to arise among the people in the North upon unification. Due to the North’s closed society the peoples of the DPRK may feel bitter when discovering their brethren were prospering while they suffered oppression and famine brought on by decades of poor governmental management. The effects of these issues may be considerable.

b. Anticipated Problems

The cultural problems resulting from unification may cause the two societies to clash in a manner analogous to their contending armies. Similar to West German resentment, former ROK residents are likely to resent the long-term taxes required to fund unification and infrastructure development in the North. As mentioned above, North Koreans are likely to resent South Koreans for not forcing their government to negotiate unification earlier or for not providing aid and assistance to the North because of ideological differences. Both societies are likely to feel alienation toward the other. In the North this alienation may take the form of extreme nationalism and this problem can create havoc for a fledgling unified government attempting to unify a society.

The Problem of cultural assimilation will require a comprehensive long-term plan that phases the aspects of integration gradually to ensure complete assimilation.
of all peoples. Intertwined in the issue of Korean societal integration is the problem of a destabilizing environment in the north. The methods and efficiency a unified Korean government displays during resolution of stability and support operations in North Korea is a first step in the societal integration process.

3. Stability and Support Operations

Stabilizing the internal situation in North Korea is a critical step to ensuring successful unification for the people of Korea and their new government. Major stability and support operations in North Korea will consist of military restructuring, humanitarian assistance and displaced personnel management. Compared to Germany and Yemen, these internal problems are monumental, and pose the greatest threat to destabilizing the Korean government during the early stages of the unification process. There is no easy solution to these issues. Each operation is expensive to resolve, requires a long range plan, and is manpower intensive. Military restructuring depends on how unification results, and the political decisions made to determine the size of a unified Korean military force. Displaced personnel management is necessary to prevent a potentially chaotic situation from seriously impeding the unification process. Planning for long-term humanitarian assistance operations in the north will be required to offset the many years of deprivation due to a socialist driven economy. An in-depth analysis of these stability and support operations will be conducted in the following chapter.

C. CONCLUSION

From the analysis of the regional and domestic problems confronting a unified Korean government, what actions should the current ROK government be taking to reduce post-unification chaos on the peninsula? The lessons learned from the German and Yemen unification processes (see Table 2-5), can assist in answering this question. Table 3-2 represents possible recommendations and/or preemptive actions the ROK government should consider implementing in order to reduce the level of destabilization that may result from these issues.

For Korea, the four-way talks must result in concrete agreements that are phased in over time, and commit the governments of North and South Korea to unification by
and through the will of the people. The four-way talks may only set the groundwork for further diplomacy that resolves more immediate inter-Korean problems of unification. This phased process should not be hurried and gradual setbacks are certain. The most important facet is that all major issues are resolved prior to an official unification announcement. The resulting unified Korean government should embrace some form of collective security to allow for more decision-making latitude in the international and regional forums. South Korea and the United States should mutually develop courses of action for modifying their bilateral security agreement depending on how unification results, and the tone of the current four-way talks. It is better to discuss modifying the agreement before either side is forced to do so in the final phases of unification. The economic integration will likely be destabilizing in the short-term, and a long-term vision is required to offset possible economic disillusionment within Korean society. South Korea should plan for a worst-case military demobilization of the north. This plan should address the actual process as well as the financial burden this worst-case scenario imposes. Finally, preparing each state’s societies is an absolutely critical step in the unification process. At a minimum, South Korea should begin preparing its citizens for the realities and long-term commitment associated with unifying Korea.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Regional Issues</strong></th>
<th><strong>Preemptive Planning Recommendations</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy Process</td>
<td>1. Avoid officially unifying until all major issues between ROK and DPRK are resolved;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Diplomacy process must focus on the two Korea's, while resolving potential conflict issues among the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>major powers;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Incorporate confidence building measures in phases, to include: arms reductions, societal exchanges,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and economic reforms;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Disputes</td>
<td>1. Resolve those disputes directly involving a unified Korea during the diplomatic process;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. A unified Korea should practice short-term conflict avoidance;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Agreements</td>
<td>1. Seek foreign policy decision-making flexibility through a multilateral framework;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Avoid bilateral security agreements that commit a unified Korea to participate in another country's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conflict;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Broaden current U.S.-ROK security agreement by assuming more direct control, but do not abandon U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in the short-term period;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Ensure Korea's security agreement choice is thoroughly understood by the major powers during the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>diplomacy process;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Integration</td>
<td>1. ROK government must establish a unification fund: pay a little now or a lot later;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. ROK should seek regional donations for the unification fund: prevent regional economic destabilization;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. ROK government should implement economic reform designed to strengthen the entire financial sector,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>while the DPRK can begin to reform their economic system following China's model;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. The ROK must prepare for a weakened economy following unification;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Integration</td>
<td>1. Prepare the people in each society for harsh realities of unification;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Focus of long-term plan should stress a &quot;go-slow&quot; approach that downplays the early euphoria and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>emphasizes the costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability and Support</td>
<td>1. Develop a plan to reduce these destabilizing DPRK internal factors;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>2. Future insurrections are the cost for ignoring these factors;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Plan should focus on a Korean led interagency effort cooperative long-term effort;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prior to unification, deconflict regional and international assistance in conducting these operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3-2. German and Yemen Lessons Learned Applied to Korean Unification**

The table primarily addresses action on the part of the ROK government prior to unification. However, unification in this situation is a multilateral process that will require patience, understanding and negotiations in good faith by each state, and the
major powers involved. Whether the DPRK government is seeking valid economic reform and adjustment of its state-driven policies is still debatable. What is not debatable is the continued hard-line stance projected by the DPRK political and military elites still in power. The DPRK's non-compromising stance displayed during preliminary four-power talks does not bode well for future confidence building measures enroute to a phased gradual unification. With the DPRK regime's lack of international political and global economic experience, these preemptive planning recommendations are seemingly focused at the ROK government. The next chapter conducts an in-depth analysis of the domestic issue of stability and support operations in North Korea, and the critical role I contend the ROK Army has in conducting these operations.
Endnotes


2 See Manfred Gortemaker, *Unifying Germany, 1989-1990*, New York, NY: St. Martins Press, 1994, pp. 232-238. Gortemaker analyzes the affects that enormous government subsidies had on eastern Germany. The government in Bonn's obsession to quickly bring the East German economy and infrastructure up to the standards of the West was too much too fast. The transition was not grounded in real investment, and after the infrastructure rebuilding focus was complete the government was still subsidizing employment of East Germans. Additionally, the economic gap between West and East extended after two years of completing infrastructure improvements. Edmund Andrew's 1997 viewpoint on German infrastructure confirms Gortemaker's premise. See Edmund Andrew, "Analysis: Will Gamble on Eastern Germany Pay Off?", (April 17, 1997) *Washington Post*. Andrew details that the former East Germany now has renovated or new schools, industrial and power plants, twice the number of malls per resident, 5,000 miles of new highways, 2800 miles of new railroad track, and one of the world's best telephone systems. However, for all the cash thrown at eastern Germany the economy remains fundamentally bankrupt.

3 As the 1990's began, both the former Soviet Union and China normalized relations with Seoul sending a clear signal to Pyongyang that neither country intended to honor former security agreements based on Cold War ideological bonds. These signals were made formal by the rescinding of those articles within the separate security agreements that promised military intervention by both China and Russia in the event war resumed on the peninsula. See Wilhelm, Alfred D. Jr., "China and Security in the Asian Pacific Region Through 2010", Center for Naval Analyses: *CRM-95-227*, March 1996, pp. 15-17; and Ilpyong J. Kim, Young Whan Kihl, ed., "The Soviet Union/Russia and Korea: Dynamics of New Thinking", *Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War*, pp. 84-90.


6 Wilhelm, Alfred D. Jr., Ph. D., p. 68.

7 Park Soo-gil, p. 37.

8 Gedda, George, "Korean Peace Talks Begin Next Week," Associated Press, New York. August 1, 1997. The long diplomatic road to these preliminary talks was rejuvenated in 1994 with signing of the Nuclear Framework Agreement. The ROK has insisted that these talks be viewed as "4-2", with the intent that the U.S. and PRC serve as bystanders and not the main players in the talks. The talks short-lived success ended Monday 22 September 1997, as the U.S. decided not to attend anymore preliminary talks until North Korea negotiated in good faith by dropping the demand for U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea. See "US Won't Attend Another Round of 4-Party Preliminary Talks," (Sep. 24, 1997) Seoul: The Korea Times, No. 14588.

10 See “CFC/UNC/USFK” main page on the World Wide Web: http://www.korea.army.mil/ (revised date, 21 October 1996), for details on organization and mission. The webpage detailed: The United States Forces Korea (USFK) major components include the Eighth United States Army (EUSA), U.S. Air Forces Korea (USAFK), U.S. Naval Forces Korea (USNFK), U.S. Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR) and U.S. Marine Forces Korea (USMARFOR-K). The largest U.S. unit on the peninsula is the United States Army 2nd Infantry Division consisting of approximately 15,000 soldiers and support personnel. A unified Korea creates a mission shift for these U.S. armed forces.


17 1997: CIA World Factbook, CIA Web Page (http://www.odci.gov/cia). Regional territorial disputes include the following: The Spratley Islands in the South China Sea are currently claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam; the Russian administered island groups of Etorotu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai are claimed by Japan; the Japanese administered Senkaku islands are claimed by China and Taiwan; and the Liancourt Rocks which are claimed by Japan and South Korea. The contested border area between Russia and China was recently negotiated in China’s favor for an Arms sales agreement. This agreement may only temporarily resolve the issue as Russia was bargaining from a position of financial weakness.

18 Arthur S. Banks, Alan J. Day, and Thomas C. Muller, ed., Political Handbook of the World: 1997, Binghamton, NY: CSA Publications, December, 1996, p. 173. Chinese direct pressure on Taiwan was in the form of live-fire exercises conducted by naval assets off Taiwan during March 1996. The military pressure was designed to show that China has the capability and willingness to establish a complete blockade on the ports crucial to Taiwan’s economic survival. The United State deployed a powerful naval task force, including an aircraft carrier, to the Taiwan Straits in response to China’s show of force as a signal to the U.S. commitment that force will not be tolerated in China’s pursuit to regain Taiwan.

20 This view is expressed by Singapore's Permanent Secretary (Policy) of Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kishore Mahbubani in "An Asia-Pacific Consensus," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5, p. 158.


22 Jonathan D. Pollack and Young Koo Cha, "A New Alliance For The Next Century: The Future of U.S.- Korean Security Cooperation," National Defense Research Institute: RAND, 1995, pp. 70-75. This collaborative research effort resulted in recommendation for a phased transition alliance based on a threat-driven environment, Integration-driven environment and finally a Profit-generating environment. The final phase is most similar to a multilateral alliance environment, but neither research team renounces the bilateral security arrangements that are the hingepin of the U.S.-ROK relationship.


24 See: "The Economics of Korean Unification", Seoul. Korea: Hyundai Research Institute, September 1996. Kyongsu-Lho cites this economic study as one example of many concerning analysts predictions that unification costs may reach or surpass the staggering amount of one trillion dollars in "Reunified Korea's Challenges and Status", (November 4-6, 1996), a Paper presented at the 7th Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) International Defense Conference. See Marcus Noland, "Why North Korea Will Muddle Through," Foreign Affairs, July-August 1997, p. 114. Mr. Noland claims that $US1 trillion to absorb North Korea is defined as the capital investment required to prevent the incentive for mass migration of civilians from North to South.


26 Some political and economic analysts claim that this is simply a ruse conducted by the DPRK to appear to be implementing reforms in order to continue the flow of aid. The emerging pattern for international investment appears to be a wait-and-see affect with primary investments being small-scale ventures by members of pro-Pyongyang Chosen Soren in Japan. See Asia 1996 Yearbook (37th ed.), Michael Westlake ed., Far East Economic Review, Hong Kong: Review Publishing Co., p.150.


29 Kyongsoo Lho, p. 8.


31 The Hanbo Steel company bankruptcy was a cataclysmic event that again revealed corruption in the loan approval procedures that provide “courtesy money” for those government officials that approve contracts to South Korea’s large business groups or chaebol, using procedures other than those considered fiscally sound. This scandal and economic disaster followed the 1995 televised admission by former President Roh Tae Woo that he embezzled 170 billion won in political slush funds. The main donors to Roh’s campaign were the heads of South Korea’s largest chaebol’s. Soh Byung-Hee summarizes the problem of large business groups and politics in South Korea in, “Chaebol and Politics: Past Ills and Future Tasks”, Korea Focus on Current Topics, May-June 1997, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 57. Soh claims that the problems with chaebols is namely the concentration of economic power, the lack of technological innovation, the closed circle of chaebol ownership, and the widespread collusion between politicians and businessmen.


33 Ibid., pp. 76-84.

34 Boo-Kyon Lee, Thesis: Korean Unification: Problems and Solutions, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1994, pp 59-60. The author summarizes the social integration theorists points of view on unification and effects on society. Predominately, Karl Deutsch suggests that integration must take place among individual units to larger whole units in order to build a cohesive community. The vehicles for transitioning to larger units is low-level phenomena like trade, tourist traffic, and news media.

35 Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Unification, p. 116.

36 The ROK regularly schedules large media events showing the world and the population of South Korea that it will lead Korea to a glorified future. The unification rally held in Seoul in 1995 was a well-rehearsed celebration with a theme of “Fifty Years Since Liberation-Toward Unification, Toward the Future. “Photo Highlights of Rally,” Korea Focus on Current Topics, July-August 1995, Vol.3, No.4, Korea Foundation. Contrasting the South’s high tech media blitz, North Korea focuses its propaganda campaign at the “imprisoned people of the South” and espouses nationalism based on its Juche ideology, and the call for a non-western Korea, by Koreans, for Koreans, and not as a puppet of the U.S. or a surrogate of Japan.

37 A.D. Smith, “States and Homelands: The Social and Geopolitical Implication of National Territory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 194. Smith addresses the power dimension of one state over another, and in the exertion of the state’s power to help “…state-strengthening leads to a paradoxical situation: for state-building, like nation-building, erodes local and kinship ties, and centralizes social life and political structures; but the mobilization required for nation-building can all too easily turn against the state structures, and produce revolutionary or secessionist movements.
IV. STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS: THE ROK ARMY’S ROLE

"As you see I am here. I am alive."

Kim Jong Il, October 1997

The previous chapter outlined the major problems and issues confronting a unified Korean government. The stability and support operations in North Korea upon unification was a serious domestic issue highlighted that may produce a destabilizing situation for the new government. This chapter addresses questions surrounding these operations. What are the scope of the stability and support operations in North Korea? How can the ROK Army assist the government in conducting these SASO missions? What role should the ROK Army play in conducting these operations? Answering these questions can assist a unified Korean government in formulating a plan to successfully implement stabilizing measures in North Korea upon unification. The limitations of analyzing the situation in North Korea are addressed next.

Due to North Korea’s closed society and the tendency to withhold critical statistics and data, the analysis of issues confronting the ROK Army and the new Korean government is a difficult task. Published data and reports are viewed skeptically due to the propensity of the Kim Jong-II government to skew data and statistics for the purpose of proving that Juche ideology is a successful concept in today’s interdependent world. To establish the population and density in North Korea, I focused on the U.S. Census Bureaus’ International database, a 1987 Library of Congress research study on North Korean population, and Nicholas Eberstadt’s thorough research on North Korean population conducted in 1992. I derived 1997 mid-year population estimates by extrapolating Eberstadt’s data using a conservative population growth of 1.8%. This population analysis enhanced and provided the analytic portion required to dissect the scope of the refugee problem. The primary reference for analysis of North and South Korean military capability is the recently published South Korean Defense White Paper: 1996-1997. The scope of the humanitarian assistance effort required in the North was primarily established through the recent daily reports by the International Red Cross and
numerous NGOs and PVOs reporting on conditions within North Korea. Defining the military restructuring issue required assumptions.

In order to properly frame the restructuring problem I have made the following assumptions: (1) in a short-of-war unification scenario, a phased plan to transition the military will be implemented; (2) the final outcome of this transition plan establishes a unified Korean military sized at 570,000 personnel;\(^3\) and (3) similar to the *Bundeswehr’s* decision-making process, only the newest or best maintenance capable combat systems will be retained. These assumptions are based on their being no arms reductions between the two Koreas in association with confidence building measures during the diplomatic process. Arms reductions prior to military restructuring will only assist the overall effort. These realistic assumptions allow us to grasp the scope of the problem. The inter-Korean bureaucratic process of handling issues in North Korea requires discussion.

An understanding of the Korean governmental focus toward North Korea upon unification highlights some issues for discussion. The government in Seoul established the ROK Ministry of National Unification (MNU) to develop policy and plans for unification of the Korean peninsula.\(^4\) Part of the MNU planning is focused on post-unification activities in the former North Korea. However, this focus primarily directed toward reprogramming North Korean society to facilitate transition and interaction with the people in the South. The successful execution of the stability and support operations analyzed in this chapter can be an integral first step on the road to achieving MNU’s objective. Therefore, coordination between the MNU and MND will be essential to ensure that an overall Korean solution to stabilizing the situation in North Korea is developed. The stability and support operations analyzed in this chapter are best viewed as short-term elements of an overall plan. Successful resolution of these elements will require integrated planning and coordination among civilian-military institutions, but an efficiently structured and highly capable organization like the ROK Army is best suited to handle the SASO missions outlined.

I conclude that the Korean government will quickly task the ROK Army to handle perhaps the three most important short and long-term stabilizing issues facing a unified
Korea: (1) military restructuring, (2) humanitarian relief operations in the North, and (3) displaced personnel management. If not handled effectively and with great care, these personnel intense issues could severely prolong or, even worse, subvert successful attempts at Korean unification. The ROK Army is a highly disciplined and effective organization capable of handling many-faceted problems. For the past 40 years it has developed and adopted many of the planning and decision-making procedures used by the United States military. These staff procedures are characterized by the ability to conduct mission analysis, identify and target critical aspects of the operation, plan for and allocate appropriate resources and publish timely orders for subordinates to execute. This chapter consists of four sections.

Sections one, two and three are an in-depth analysis of the SASO missions I contend will be delegated to the ROK Army: military restructuring, humanitarian assistance operations, and displaced personnel management. This analysis presents the scope of the problems as well as recommendations and ideas for successfully implementing a plan of stabilization for each mission. The concluding section summarizes my recommendations for conducting each mission successfully. This summary of recommendations will be used in developing the U.S. Army Special Forces framework for employment in the following chapter.

A. MILITARY RESTRUCTURING

Military restructuring of the combined ROK and DPRK militaries will require exhaustive planning, flexible execution, and entail a team effort between the military leaders of each country. This subsection will define the scope of the problem and consolidation issues, analyze the question of an integrated military, discuss disposal of DPRK conventional ground combat systems and ammunition, and identify the main missions confronting the ROK Army.

1. Scope of the Problem and Consolidation

A combined Korean armed force would be the 3rd largest military in the world and certainly create a destabilizing factor for regional diplomacy. Similar to the situation faced by the West German Bundeswehr, the ROK Army must recommend to their
unified government what type and size of military is required to support the government's domestic and foreign policy. At a minimum a unified Korea will desire a sufficient defense force capable of protecting its sovereign rights as a nation and a peacekeeping contingent to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide. Appendix A shows a combined ROK/DPRK military force of 1.7 million personnel in strength, equipped with an excess of combat systems, albeit not compatible. It is easy to predict that restructuring will be required.

The assumption that a unified Korean military force will primarily be equipped with the latest technology and best maintainable weapon systems helps define the weapon downsizing issue. Unlike the former East Germany, the North Korean forces have comparatively outdated Warsaw Pact weapon systems. Table 4-1 details the major combat systems of the North Korean military, and with the exception of Surface to Air missiles, Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRL), and possibly support aircraft, the majority of the DPRK major military combat systems are outdated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Ground Forces</strong></th>
<th><strong>Air Forces</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks:</td>
<td>Tactical Fighters:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T54/T55/T59</td>
<td>MIG 23/29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T62</td>
<td>MIG 19/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T34</td>
<td>SU-7/25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>MIG 15/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Fighting Vehicles:</td>
<td>Support Aircraft:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR 40-60</td>
<td>An-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>Il-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery:</td>
<td>Helicopters:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer</td>
<td>M1-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,300¹</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRL</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,700²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA Guns</td>
<td>330³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface to Air Missiles:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA series</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Includes 76.2/100/122/130/152/170 mm Howitzers and artillery weapon systems.
² Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRL) include 107/122/132/240 mm weapon systems.
³ Includes the SA-3, SA-2 and long-range SA-5.
⁴ North Korea considers their Advanced Fighters to be MIG 23/29; Mainstay Fighters to be the MIG 19/21 and the SU series.


**Table 4-1. North Korean Major Military Ground and Air Combat Systems**
These outdated systems are hindered by maintenance and spare parts issues similar to those faced by the Bundeswehr. A unified Korean government will need to decide on how best to dispose of over 3800 tanks, 2800 armored fighting vehicles, 20,800 artillery systems (howitzers and AA guns), 840 tactical fighters and 290 helicopters. Once a decision on disposal is made the ROK Army will need to develop and implement a plan for disposal. The first step in disposal may be the most challenging, the consolidation of combat systems.

2. Consolidation of Combat Systems

North Korea’s aggressive military strategy stressing quick strike military tactics


Figure 4-1. North Korean Combat Unit Deployment Posture
may assist in the consolidation of major ground and air combat systems. Approximately 65% of the DPRK’s military forces are postured south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. Figure 4-1 details the ROK Ministry of National Defense military analysts suggestion of four assault corridors leading into the South and the 11 North Korean Corps currently postured south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line.

This posturing formation can be beneficial to ROK Army initial efforts during the consolidation process. The ROK Army can plan tentative courses of action for consolidation based on the offensive and logistics support plans required to execute the North Korean attack plan. By encouraging a withdrawal type maneuver by DPRK forces, the ROK Army can consolidate by attack corridor 65% of the North Korean ground forces, combat systems and accompanying logistics. Similarly, incorporating North Korean unit commanders in a review of the planned consolidation effort can enhance this effort. This maneuver is not designed to push North Korean forces back, but rather to extract them from their offensive stance and assemble them in the rear area. These assembly sites will reduce tension and facilitate accountability and consolidation efforts. Finally, organized assembly sites offer an excellent starting point for disposal of conventional combat systems and accompanying ammunition.

3. Disposal of DPRK Combat Systems and Ammunition

A unified Korean government faces some complicated issues in reference to disposal of excess military combat systems and ammunition. Adding to the increasing arms race in Southeast Asia by transferring the equipment and accompanying ammunition to other nations via either sales or aid will likely create tension within the region. Moreover, transporting the military equipment by sea is a more burdensome proposal than that faced by Germany. Likewise, destroying the combat systems and exorbitant stockpiles of associated ammunition will create a financial burden that is excessive for the Korean government to absorb. However, destroying the systems and ammo is an option, and may be supported by the major powers.

A possible course of action for a unified Korea is to sell the most advanced North Korean military hardware (including support assets), to the PRC or back to the Russians,
and offer a small percentage of the older systems to other countries in the Asian theater. This disposal solution creates some pertinent issues, and has some constraints. Adding bargain priced combat systems to the expanding Asian arms procurement problem will create some tension with the U.S. and the United Nations. The Koreans would likely accept some diplomatic backlash in face of the enormous disposal problem. In this instance the U.S. may step in and offer to take the older North Korean combat systems for use as Opposing Force (OPFOR) equipment at the U.S. National Training Center. Money to pay for systems and China’s military modernization is a constraint to selling excess systems. Russia is currently too financially strapped to consider purchasing systems, and China’s modernization limits the amount of equipment they would consider purchasing. The initial phase of consolidation and the follow-on disposal of combat systems offers the opportunity to begin implementing the integration of ROK/DPRK military personnel as they work together to consolidate North Korea’s military systems and ammunition for disposal. This inter-Korean military cooperation is the first step toward an integrated military force and a reduction in cultural tension.

4. An Integrated Military

As mentioned previously, the consideration for an integrated military force upon unification is likely to occur only if unification is achieved short of war. In light of this scenario it is prudent that consideration be given to the development and implementation of a personnel downsizing plan designed to reduce the 1.7 million military personnel combined force by approximately 1.1 million. Many of these personnel can be used in the initial security and transition phases of the military institutions as they downsize. However at some point the phasing of military personnel back to civilian life must begin. It is this transition phase that may create problems in readjustment and unemployment.

The most important aspect of this issue is to have a plan prepared for implementation. As we saw in the German unification example, the Bundeswehr published and began implementation of a personnel downsizing immediately. This timely action quelled many military personnel’s anxieties and prevented elapsed time that may have created antagonistic feelings. In contrast, the Yemen example provides insight
to the disaster of allowing two separate militaries to remain intact following unification. In North Korea, the possible influence of former political elites on a non-integrated force may ferment future conflict between the two forces as occurred in Yemen.\textsuperscript{12}

5. WMD in the North

In 1994 the Nuclear Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea officially recognized the international community’s concern about the technologically advanced state of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. For decades South Korea and the international community has monitored North Korea’s efforts to transition nuclear power capabilities and technology to a weapons program.\textsuperscript{13} Whether the North has actually produced a deliverable nuclear weapon is questionable, but hardly the point of the matter. The fact remains that the North has research, design and testing facilities for development of a nuclear weapons program, and production and storage facilities for its formidable chemical weapons program.

Since the early 1960’s North Korea has emphasized chemical weapons. According to the Korean Defense White Paper, “It (North Korea) has so far produced and stockpiled, in large quantity, such gas agents as blister gas, nerve gas, blood agent and tear gas.”\textsuperscript{14} Figure 4-2 represents both the chemical and nuclear facilities that are currently operational in North Korea. For the ROK Army these storage sites, facilities and research institutions are likely to present one of the main security operations delegated during the unification process.

The implied task for the ROK Army in a security mission of these chemical and nuclear locations is the accountability and continuous physical control of these weapons to prevent proliferation and pilferage. A phased approach focusing on the six chemical weapon storage sites first, followed by the production facilities and finally the security of the research institutions is a plausible plan for consideration (see Figure 4-2). Again, an integrated ROK/DPRK military effort in accomplishing these security and control missions assist the goal of military integration, while providing a higher degree of cooperation and disclosure.
Once secured, both military organizations have the manpower and capability within organic chemical units to assist the experts from KEDO and IAEA in detailing and disposing of the materials in accordance with a unified government’s plan.

What if a unified Korean government decided to maintain a portion of these chemical stocks or exploit DPRK nuclear research? The chemical and nuclear weapons issue is very sensitive, and requires the major powers to understand the vulnerability a unified Korean government may feel initially. It is likely that the world community will
require an official accounting and explanation of any Korean plan to maintain chemical stocks. Likewise, a unified Korean government planning to exploit any nuclear research or weapons developed by the DPRK will probably result in disapproval from the U.S. and China. The best approach is one that ensures security of these weapons of mass destruction while diplomatically negotiating the final disposition. The major powers may have to accept that in the short term a newly unified Korean government feels more secure having direct influence over these weapons. The next major problem that the ROK Army may find itself involved in is managing displaced persons.

B. DISPLACED PERSONNEL

The macro-level problem lies in the ratio of land mass to population density and encompasses both space and economic issues of unemployment. South Korea has over 45 million people occupying some 98,000 square kilometers of land, while North Korea has almost 24 million people in an expanse over 120,000 square kilometers.\textsuperscript{15} A simple inspection reveals a 1:2 ratio of people to square kilometer (sq.km.) of land in the south compared to a 1:5 ratio in the North. However the fact that both North and South Korea have become predominately urban highlights the real issue. The urban centers in South Korea cannot employ and house a mass flow of North Korean refugees upon unification.\textsuperscript{16} Controlling refugees requires understanding the scope of the problem, and anticipating the egress routes refugees might use in order to aid planning the positioning of refugee centers.

1. Scope of the Problem

An analysis of the North Korean civilian population allows a determination of population densities, a key variable for analysis of the refugee problem. Appendix B details the civilian population estimates and density of persons per square kilometer for the nine provinces, three municipalities and twenty major cities comprising North Korea.\textsuperscript{17} Analysts predict a mass influx of approximately one million refugees in the immediate days following an absorption or collapse unification scenario.\textsuperscript{18} These personnel will primarily flow from the southern provinces and municipalities of Kangwan, Kaesong, and North Hwanghae (see Figure 4-3). In order to further analyze
Note: Arrows indicating egress routes of displaced personnel are the author’s contention.

**Figure 4-3. North Korean Provinces and Predicted Displaced Personnel Flow**

the problem an assumption on the percentage of personnel expected to flee North Korea is mandatory.

Expanding on analysts’ predictions of one million displaced personnel and the current famine and drought in North Korea a conservative value of 5.5% was determined for the percentage of population that will displace upon unification. Applying this percentage to population data from Appendix B results in the expected number of refugees per province or municipality as shown in Table 4-2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province or Municipality</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Displaced Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kangwan</td>
<td>1,448,000</td>
<td>79,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaesong</td>
<td>391,000</td>
<td>21,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Hwanghae</td>
<td>2,259,000</td>
<td>124,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Hwanghae</td>
<td>1,163,000</td>
<td>63,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nampo</td>
<td>844,000</td>
<td>46,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
<td>2,779,000</td>
<td>152,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Pyongan</td>
<td>3,131,000</td>
<td>172,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Pyongan</td>
<td>2,841,000</td>
<td>156,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chagang</td>
<td>1,364,000</td>
<td>75,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanggang</td>
<td>741,000</td>
<td>40,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Hamgyong</td>
<td>3,006,000</td>
<td>165,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Hangyong</td>
<td>2,364,000</td>
<td>130,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,228,205</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4-2. North Korean Displaced Personnel Estimate**

Having defined the refugee problem in an analytical sense, we now turn to a qualitative analysis of egress routes out of North Korea to further frame the problem.

2. Displaced Personnel Egress Routes

The primary methods for refugees fleeing North Korea are by land and by sea. North Korea shares three land borders. The border with China is by far the longest at 1,416 kilometers; the border with South Korea at the DMZ is 238 kilometers, and the border with Russia is only 19 kilometers. Refugees fleeing by land are constrained by North Korea’s rugged geography and this assists in the ability to template the flow of refugees by land access routes. The previously mentioned North Korean military attack corridors into South Korea are designed to take advantage of the only passageways between the mountain ranges laying perpendicular to the DMZ. These four attack corridors can serve as refugee control points and establish a focal point for analyzing placement of refugee centers to reduce mass refugee flow into South Korea through the
DMZ. However care must be taken to avoid appearing non-hospitable, as Nicholas Eberstadt states, “Neither North or South Koreans will favorably view a continued sort of DMZ (as a means) to control migration.” The land egress routes into China are less constrained and in view of the long history of association across their borders it is certain a large percentage of refugees from the bordering provinces will flee into China. Refugee egress by sea offers a viable alternative.

The number of refugees fleeing by sea to South Korea and Japan will be constrained by the quantity of private vessels available but these refugees create an opportunity for media exposure of how the government in Seoul is handling the displaced persons situation. This aspect is critical but not in direct control of the ROK Army’s efforts and will not be addressed further. However, the ROK Army’s initial efforts at controlling displaced personnel flow throughout North Korea may help alleviate some of the expected North Korean “boat people” by reducing the desire to flee in the first place. We now turn to the establishment of displaced personnel centers in North Korea.

3. The ROK Army and Displaced Personnel Centers

The method for controlling a North Korean mass exodus into South Korea is to identify displaced personnel center placement locations to reduce the flow by eliminating the immediate desire to flee. Identifying major urban areas and calculating movement rates of personnel on foot are the main variables used here to identify tentative locations. It is important to note that 40% of the North Korean civilian population live within five walking days of the DMZ. The goal of displaced personnel center placement in the short term is to stabilize the situation by preventing the mass displacement of personnel from consolidating along the borders. Additionally, it must be established that these displaced personnel centers are not designed to provide a permanent living arrangement or replace the homes of displaced North Koreans. These placement and sizing factors will be used to assist in analyzing placement of displaced personnel centers.

A macro level plan for placement of displaced personnel centers might look somewhat like that presented in Figure 4-4. This hypothetical macro plan calls for establishing nine DP centers in three Populace Control sectors. The sectors identified are
based on the provincial DP estimates detailed in Table 4-2, and highlighted in Figure 4-3. Placement of DP centers in sector one focuses on the egress routes leading to the DMZ, and establishes a major DP center along each route. These centers are designed to control those displaced personnel from the high population density areas in sector one from flowing into the DMZ. Placement of centers in sectors two and three are linked to personnel routes of movement and placed near major population centers. These centers are designed to prevent the massing of personnel toward the DMZ. As evident, this DP control plan is personnel intensive.

Figure 4-4. Displaced Personnel Center Placement in North Korea

To show the manpower intensity of this operation, consider that once established, it would require one battalion of soldiers to provide security and insure orderly operation of each refugee center. This would entail over nine battalions in the initial phase. The
missions these military units might conduct focuses on providing security for the non-governmental agencies providing relief, safeguarding materials and components of aid from pilferage, and maintaining order within the DP centers. These nine battalions are inclusive of the refugee centers and do not include the logistical units required to support the battalions or activities of the DP centers. Similarly, humanitarian assistance required within North Korea upon unification encompasses the displaced personnel as well as broader areas of assistance.

C. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

This aspect is best viewed as the ROK Army’s short-term contribution to the government’s long-term nation-building plan in the North. In North Korea’s situation this is especially relevant as over 50 years of socialist style centralized planning has resulted in an outdated national infrastructure. Unfortunately, when dealing with a formerly closed society the infrastructure decay assessment process will require time to determine what can be done and when. The nation-building effort will require in depth planning and execution at the governmental level. Meanwhile immediate assistance will be required for humane purposes and the ROK Army should plan to lead the effort. The ROK Army’s primary focus should be on those short-term humanitarian tasks designed to stabilize and provide comfort to the people of North Korea. These tasks will primarily include control and distribution of food and medical aid throughout North Korea. Unfortunately, unless North Korea opens up to reveal the real extent of infrastructure decay and allows combined inspections to initiate precise planning, analysis is limited to educated appraisals.

1. Scope of the Problem

North Korea’s chronic food shortage has been both a systems and environment problem. A shortage of arable land (18%), poor harvests due to floods and drought, and a cumbersome distribution system have all contributed to a desperate situation for the 17 million persons relaying on government rations for survival. The highly publicized appeal for food aid on North Korea’s behalf in early 1995 was a red flag indicating self-sufficiency inadequacies and deteriorating conditions approaching famine proportions.
The latest reports from the World Food Programme, International Red Cross and several private volunteer organizations (PVOs) indicate that 800,000 tons of food is required to prevent the starvation of an estimated five million North Koreans before the October 1997 harvest. It is important to note that with current drought conditions, and an expected crop shortfall of 2.6 million tons of grain for 1997 the requirement for food aid will likely extend for several years. If unification occurs prior to the food shortage problem receding, then the medical and mental deficiencies resulting from chronic malnourishment will require immediate attention.

Chronic malnourishment yields a variety of medical problems. Chief among them is anemia, including iron, protein and carbohydrate deficiency. Severe anemia results in a conspiracy between malnutrition and infection, creating a vicious cycle where the body requires more nutrients to fight off increasing infections. The infections, aided by starvation, finally override the body's immune system resulting in death. The diagnosis of the malnutrition problem in North Korean children has been the focus of many aid organizations and medical experts ventures into North Korea. Dr. Milton Amayun, a physician specializing in humanitarian emergencies, stated on his return from North Korea in July 1997, "He saw groups of schoolchildren who showed serious signs of stunted growth ... a sure sign of chronic malnutrition." Dr. Amayun further details the gravity of the malnutrition situation by adding that daily food rations are down to several ounces of rice per person. Kathy Zwellegger, of the Caritas Aid Agency, commented on returning from her tenth trip into North Korea, "One school teacher told me five children had died at her small school since the last floods in 1996 ... I saw hungry children too weak to stand and hospital incapable of feeding patients." This malnourishment problem will require immediate aid while long-term food production and distribution adjustments are instituted during the nation-building process.

2. ROK Army's Role

The ROK Army has the support and logistical units to assist in the delivery of critical supplies to suspend the human suffering. However, having the support assets is only part of the issue. Coordination between the ROK Army and the multitude of GO,
NGO and PVO's that will require assistance of vehicles and personnel to move and administer aid is a critical factor. The ROK Army will not only have to provide critical support assets for conducting HA missions, but will have to manage their support assets, while deconflicting numerous competing requirements, and coordinating well-intentioned organizations.

D. CONCLUSION

Regardless of where or when Korean unification occurs along the spectrum of unification, whether through war or the many short-of-war scenarios, the ROK Army can contribute significantly in stabilizing the situation in the North. Through the conduct of Stability and Support operations in the North, the ROK Army will allow the Korean government to direct and provide guidance for stabilizing the North, while retaining the required attention to handle the international and other domestic issues that threaten to overwhelm a newly unified government. Table 4-3 summarizes the ideas and recommendations for consideration by the ROK Army during conduct of these SASO missions.

Developing an integrated planning process for Stability and Support operation efforts between the ROK Army and ROK MNU is an important inter-Korean step toward the effective application of government assets to tackle the problem of stabilizing the North. Lack of integration in planning will result in loss of efficiency during execution. This non-integration will affect every detail of mission execution from deploying specialists and units, to providing sufficient logistical and support assets for successfully conducting the missions. For the ROK Army conducting Stability and Support operations in North Korea is a definite $180^\circ$ degree inverse of their current warfighting focus. How can the United States Army help the Korean Army in the transition from warfighting to stability operations? The next chapter addresses how the U.S. Army Special Forces can be employed to assist the ROK Army in accomplishing the objective of stabilizing the North following unification.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SASO Missions</th>
<th>Analysis Recommendations and Ideas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>1. WMD accountability and control through a sequentially based security plan focusing on storage sites, facilities and research centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Security of conventional combat systems is critical</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. ROK Army leaders develop detailed plan for consolidation and disposal of combat systems/ammo based on civilian leaders guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. ROK Army commanders should be prepared to negotiate one-on-one with DPRK Corps commanders along the DMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced Personnel Management</td>
<td>5. Pre-plan locations of DP centers throughout the depth of North Korea to prevent mass exodus of personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Ensure DP centers do not become permanent homes for North Koreans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Plan for manpower intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. ROK Army commanders should be prepared to work with PVO, GO and NGO’s; while realizing the influence of the media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>9. Focus primarily on use of logistic and support assets to support PVO, GO and NGO plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. ROK Army must be prepared: likely to be the first impression of how a unified government will deal with their “brethren” in the north</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-3. SASO Analysis Recommendations for the ROK Army
Endnotes

1 Kim Jong Il made this statement in Hong Kong at the World Economic Forum in response to probing questions about famine in North Korea by probable international investors. Kim Jong Il was attempting to impress these international investors into investing in North Korea. See, “North Korea Offers Investors Tax Breaks,” (15 October 1997), Wilhelm, Kathy, The Associated Press, America On-Line News Service.

2 Note: Nicholas Eberstadt used a 1.9% growth rate and the U.S. Census Bureau used a 1.7% growth rate. I settled on a 1.8% growth rate due to the recent well publicized famine caused by the floods of 1995 and 1996, and the prediction for poor October/November 1997 harvests.

3 A restructured force of 570,000 is posited by the author when considering various analysts force figures ranging from a low of 300,000 to a high of one million. Kyongsun Lho makes the argument that “a unified Korean army will be look like what unified Korea can afford at the time, and be configured to confront threats it feels it cannot otherwise deflect.” See Kyongsun Lho, “Reunified Korea’s Challenges and Status”.

4 Hakjoon Kim, Unification Policies of South and North Korea: A Comparative Study, Seoul, Korea: Seoul University Press, p. 235. The Park government of the ROK established the National Unification Board on March 1, 1969 as a governmental regular ministry designed to institutionalize its position on unification of Korea, and legalize South Korea’s claim to legitimacy over the unification process within the United Nations.

5 Defense White Paper 1996-1997, Seoul, Korea: The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, 1997, pp. 223-225. The Defense White Paper emphasizes that the ROK defense environment is characterized by military involvement in the political, economic, social movement, culture, and geo-environmental arenas. The paper further stresses that civil-military relations in South Korea have transitioned from the past linear relationship based on security to one of complex interdependent activities extending beyond the military’s primary mission.

6 I define successful unification as a Korean developed, led and managed effort that results in minimal inter-Korean instability. This definition does not preclude assistance from the U.S. or a United Nations coalition effort to assist in the monumental task that confronts Korea, only that these assistance efforts are not a by-product of an international consensus that the internal aspects of Korean unification are rapidly deteriorating.

7 U.S. Army FM 100-5 details the Army Staff Planning procedures that are utilized by the ROK Army. Additionally the ROK military has adopted the U.S. Joint operations concept and conducts annual exercises to practice and improve Joint operations interoperability.

8 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996.), p. 4. The chart in this source shows the ROK and DPRK with separate forces and ranked fifth and ninth perceptively. However, combined the two state’s forces total 1,745,000, second only to China which has approximately 3 million.

9 Defense White Paper: 1996-1997, outlines three task that the military is preparing for as it enters the 21st century: 1) Nurture an advance armed force comparable to leading industrialized nations, 2) Develop military relations with foreign countries and participate in international peacekeeping operations, and 3) Help enhance the nation’s international competitiveness. p. 225.

11 Projecting a probable unified Korean military force level is guesswork that is not founded on any real evidence. Kyongsu Lho details that analysts have projected a unified Korean military to be between 300,000 and one million personnel in "Reunified Korea's Challenges and Status," A paper presented at The 7th KIDA International Conference: Korea Institute of Defense Analyses, November 4-6, 1996, p.18. For purposes of analysis, the author has decided a unified Korean force level of 570,000 to 600,000 is not unrealistic. However, Ben Kremenak highlights a Korean "Nation-at-Arms" following unification and he posits that a healthy military beyond the force levels acceptable to the four powers may be a reality for decades following the euphoria of unification in "Korea's Road to Unification: Potholes, Detours and Dead Ends," CISSM, Paper 5, Center For International Security Studies at Maryland School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland at College Park. May 1977, pp. 59-61.

12 See: Bob Collin, "North Korean Leadership - Their Perspective", (May 1997), a Point Paper for Commander, United States Forces Korea (USFK), USFK: J5 Staff Section, Strategy and Policy directorate. Mr. Collin's analysis of North Korean political and military elite leaders (from the Hamkyong province these personnel are known as the Palchisan Group), indicates that the capability and desire to incite an uprising and challenge a unified Korean government led by Seoul is not beyond reason for some of the military elite in the North Korean regime. This point paper contains an extensive list of the names of the highest ranking military personnel associated with the Korean Worker's Party.


South Korea population = 45,482,291 (July 96 est.); land area = 98,190 sq. km.
North Korea population 23,904,124 (July 96 est., includes military); land area = 120,410 sq. km.

16 Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Unification, p. 126.

17 For the best and most recent population study see Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith Banister, "The Population of North Korea," Center for Korean Studies: University of California • Berkeley, 1992. This study is detailed and documents population statistics published by the DPRK Central Statistics Bureau in 1989 to lay the groundwork for assistance from the U. N. Population Fund. I compared Eberstadt and Banisters' work with a U.S. Census Bureau IDB report and a Library of Congress report, "North Korean Population Estimates," Federal Research Division: Library of Congress, December 1985. The work by Eberstadt and Banister was more thorough and separated the issue of military and civilian populations instead of lumping them together. This is important and focuses on the refugee problem without over inflated population estimates per province or municipalities.

18 Nicholas Eberstadt, Kyongsu Lho, and many other Korean scholars have commented on the possibility of a high number of displaced personnel upon unification depending on the timing, and severity of conditions in the north. Of course the route unification takes will determine how many North Koreans are fleeing south or if China and Japan are better risks for survival.

19 The refugee percent of population expected from North Korea will be confirmed when author attends the Civil Affairs conference in Seoul, Korea in September 1997. The 5.5% estimate was derived from general information and the author's personnel opinion. Estimates from general sources range from 4% to as high as 15%.

20 1996 CIA World Factbook.

22 “North Koreans Starved for Freedom.” (May 13, 1997), J.H. Ahn, The Associated Press, America On-Line News Service. Fourteen North Korean civilian defectors referred to as the “First Boat-People”, made the 27 hour journey from the Port of Shinjiu, a North Korean Western port and were intercepted by South Korean Patrol boats on the Western Sea border, and brought to Inchon.

23 Marcus Noland, p. 114.

24 ROK Combat units can adapt to these security and control missions. The inherent qualities of these missions are similar to perimeter security in a military defense situation. Providing a secure environment and maintaining control are critical factors for the Civil Affairs units and probable NGO/PVO’s that will be assisting throughout North Korea.


28 “North Korea Food Shortage Worsens”, In this article the Seoul’s Ministry of National Unification estimates that North Korea requires 5.8 million tons of grain for a year of subsistence level rationing, and in 1997 is expected to harvest only 3.2 million tons of grain.


31 “North Korea Faring Well in Food Crisis.” (July 07, 1997), Slobodan Lekic, The Associated Press, America On-Line News Service. The title of this article is intended to convey that although chronic food shortages are a fact in North Korea, this fact alone will not lead to complete reform within North Korea. The article does not imply that the average Korean has sufficient food.

32 Ibid.
V. UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL FORCES FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYMENT

*It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it”*

Upton Sinclair

The United States Army Special Forces have a long-standing relationship with the ROK Army. This relationship is primarily with the ROK Special Forces brigades, and focused on the conduct of warfighting missions in support of the defense oriented contingency plan against a North Korean attack. However this relationship is typical for USASF in that it establishes a very personal relationship, through interaction during the conduct of warfighting training, between USASF soldiers and their ROK Army counterparts. In this chapter I build on this base relationship to propose USASF’s unique contribution to assist in stabilizing the tenuous situation in the North. This contribution by USASF is presented as an employment framework. This chapter addresses the following questions: 1) What are the defining elements in the USASF employment framework I propose; 2) How do these defining elements address the broad spectrum of unification; and finally, 3) How will USASF roles, as defined within the framework, assist the ROK Army in successfully conducting the previously analyzed SASO missions in the north. The limitations of the framework are important to address.

This framework is based on U.S. military doctrine as discussed in FM 100-23, FM 100-25, and FM 31-20. This framework is not a unilateral U.S. Army Special Forces solution to stabilizing the north during the post-unification period. The framework is designed to fit into an overall combined strategic plan for stabilizing the tenuous situation in North Korea during the transition from a divided peninsula to a unified nation. U.S. Special Forces commander’s and planners should understand this, and not attempt to replicate previous stability and support operations to Korea. For example, in the author’s opinion, exact application of the operational plan from Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, to SASO operations in North Korea would be a mistake. From the political level to the developed nature of South Korea, these two operations should be viewed as significantly different. However, similarities will be analogous at the tactical level, and
this is where lessons and experiences can be applied. The employment framework I propose has USASF functioning in a support role, as part of a strategic plan, to assist the ROK Army, and not an American designed blueprint for stabilizing the north during unification.

How unification occurs only affects the scale of SASO problems in the north, not whether the framework I propose is applicable. Regardless of where unification occurs along the spectrum of unification, this framework can assist the ROK Army and the new unified government stabilize situations in the north. Obviously the level of participation, resources and commitment from other countries may be less if unification is realized from a long-term gradual process, but only if the long-term process includes confidence-building measures that improve the situation. North Korea simply muddling through for the next ten years, with no substantial reform and improvement may make the problem significantly worse. The Korean view of the best process for conducting SASO missions is one area that may affect the applicability of the framework.

The possibility exists that a regional led effort, obviously excluding the U.S., may be proposed as a means to resolve the SASO missions in the north. This situation does not necessarily reject U.S. support, but may limit that support to providing resources and/or training assistance without entering the north. The author accepts this political dilemma that affects utilization of military assets, and concedes that the possibility exists. However, pre-planning is never wasted if the remote chance of conducting the operation exists. A key assumption underlies this framework.

Long-term commitment by the U.S. for conclusion of successful SASO missions in the north is an important assumption. As the preceding analysis of SASO in North Korea revealed, these problems are complex and monumental in nature. This is where U.S. Army Special Forces make a key contribution to the U.S. strategic goal of regional stability. USASF are an economy of force asset whose units and soldiers are trained to focus on the long-term goal of host nation stabilization. This goal requires a rotating schedule of deployments, and a deep commitment that USASF practices on a daily basis. This commitment is mirrored by the civil affairs and psychological operations units that
compose U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and whose efforts will be as critical as USASF’s to this overall combined campaign plan to assist stabilize the north.

I contend that the USASF framework for employment proposed is applicable across the broad spectrum of Korean unification, with primary utility for the ROK Army in the areas of assisting integrated planning, coordination with external agencies, train-up for SASO missions, and bilateral mission execution. Through the framework, the U.S. Army Special Forces contribute to the overall U.S. strategic objective of regional stability by supporting the ROK Army’s effort to conduct successful SASO missions and stabilize the north. As mentioned in previous analysis, the ROK Army’s success at conducting SASO operations in the north is one of the critical factors to ensuring the government’s overall success at unification. The missions and roles assigned to USASF in the employment framework are directed at assisting the Korean government achieve successful unification by applying USASF’s unique capabilities primarily to assist the ROK Army ensure success in conducting SASO missions in the north. Remembering that success in relation to SASO missions is likely to require long-term effort.

In sections one and two I will define the employment framework’s doctrinal elements, and analyze its application across the spectrum of Korean unification scenarios. Section three analyzes the utility of the employment framework in relation to the ROK Army’s conduct of SASO missions, identifying four aspects of critical support the framework elements provide to the ROK Army. The concluding section summarizes the all-encompassing benefits of the employment framework discussed throughout the chapter.

A. DEFINING THE FRAMEWORK AND ITS ELEMENTS

The USASF employment framework consists of a foundation, USASF employment elements, and the environment surrounding the application of the framework. The foundation is composed of the SASO missions analyzed previously: military restructuring, humanitarian assistance, and refugee management. The framework employment elements include the doctrinal operations, missions, and unique roles USASF will play in assisting the ROK Army in the conduct of SASO missions in the
north. The environment surrounding the application of the framework consists of the four unification scenarios: through war, short-of-war, absorption, and gradual phased unification. The foundation and environment have been discussed in previous chapters, and will not be reiterated in this chapter. In this section an analysis of the USASF framework elements will be conducted beginning with the applicable doctrinal operations.

1. Operations

The operations that comprise the USASF employment framework I propose are peacekeeping and peace building. These operations and the spectrum of unification are the key determinants as to how quickly the SASO missions identified are conducted. The main difference between the two operations is the permissiveness of the operational environment in respect to the area of operations. FM 110-23 defines these operations as follows:

**Peacekeeping operations** - involve military and paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties. Assistance activities may include the requirement to provide humanitarian assistance within the area of operations, and demobilization of forces.

**Peace Building** - consists of postconflict actions that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions in order to avoid a return to conflict. These operations are categorized as support to diplomacy. The permissiveness of the area of operations determines the level of combat unit committed, and thus the speed/efficiency with which the SASO missions identified are conducted. In a peacekeeping operational environment the requirement for continued monitoring, supervision and inspection of compliance to diplomatic agreements by the belligerent parties significantly impacts the speed which missions are accomplished.

The speed that the area of operations enters the peace-building environment greatly enhances the capability of those forces and agencies to provide efficient and effective assistance to the effected parts of the country concerned. The longer a tenuous post-conflict situation inhibits the ability to stabilize a country, the more apt the chance
that a destabilizing environment may develop. The specific missions contained within
the employment framework are discussed next.

2. Missions

The doctrinal missions assigned to USASF within the operational environment of
peacekeeping or peace building include foreign internal defense (FID), humanitarian
assistance (HA), and coalition support. These missions are not unique to USASF alone,
but the focus of USASF in relation to the missions and the framework environment is
unique. It is important to define each mission in relation to USASF capabilities and
limitations. These primary missions and collateral activities are defined as follows:

**FID** - to organize, train, advise, and assist host nation military and
paramilitary forces to help their government’s protect their societies from lawlessness,
subversion, and insurgency.

**HA** - a collateral activity consisting of any military act or operation of a
humanitarian nature; these activities include disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation,
and support to and/or resettlement of displaced civilians.\(^3\)

**Coalition Support** - a collateral activity designed to improve the
interaction of coalition partners and U.S. military forces; this includes training,
coordination of combat support (CS) and combat service support, providing
communications capability, and facilitate integration into command and control systems.\(^4\)

USASF has proven its capabilities in these mission areas as an economy of force
measure that delivers the maximum benefit for the minimum commitment. FID can be an
integral part of a campaign plan to assist in the stabilization of a host nation. FID
missions focus on training in support of the host nation attempts to secure its internal
situation, and develop a credible defense force for preventing external aggression. These
missions are directed at the host nation's military and paramilitary forces, and typically
involve exchange training between the USASF and host nation forces. FID missions also
focus on host nation internal support activities like civil support in the form of
MEDCAPS and ENCAPS in conjunction with the host nation military support units.
These FID missions help build a better relation between the host nation military forces
and the general populous. USASF capabilities in HA missions are normally linked to
U.S. Civil Affairs efforts.
USASF units involvement in HA missions is not intended to serve as a unilateral U.S. assistance tool for helping host nations in these dire situations. USASF is best utilized in a teamwork effort between U.S. Civil Affairs units and host nation efforts. Currently U.S. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USCAPOC) is reviewing doctrine to better integrate planning and mission execution efforts between U.S. forces in the conduct of missions. Coordination and planning between USASF and U.S. Civil Affairs units during Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq is a prime example of this inter-U.S. teamwork during HA missions. Operation Provide Comfort showed how critical USASF is at ground level in HA situations. USASF positioned and began initial relief efforts in the same extreme environment with the displaced Kurds. This initial effort established the key trusting link that allowed the multi-national effort to encourage the Kurd leadership to relocate. However, the small-scale relief capability of an SFODA is not a replacement for a long-term HA success effort. USASF HA relief capability is the gap measure between initial efforts and initiation of the long-term solution. The collateral activity of coalition support will be highlighted next.

Coalition support provided by USASF is designed to ensure smooth integration of coalition member nations efforts in a regional or multinational support situation. The primary focuses for USASF is integration and coordination of each individual nation’s forces and support assets at the tactical or ground level into the operational level plan. In a regional or multinational effort the assurance that each nations efforts are directed toward accomplishing the overall mission is the primary purpose of this collateral activity. The final element in the employment framework is the specific roles USASF will occupy within the context of the employment framework.

3. Roles

In executing the above-mentioned doctrinal missions, USASF serve in the following support roles: FID training teams, Liaison Control Elements (LCE), and Survey Teams. FID training teams can conduct training in practically any environment. This includes training foreign forces in the host nation or training several nations forces at a removed site for conducting specific missions in support of a regional or coalition effort.
An LCE is used with a coalition force partner to provide status reporting, tactical or technical planning assistance, training a coalition force on tactics, techniques, and procedures, and control measure for combined mission execution. Survey teams normally consist of organic SFODAs that conduct surveys of a situation in order to provide critical planning information for follow-on missions. In some situation a survey team may request additional military occupational specialists to accompany the team on a survey. The next section will analyze how the USASF framework for employment may be applied in relation to the spectrum of unification.

B. THE USASF EMPLOYMENT FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO THE SPECTRUM OF UNIFICATION

How the employment framework elements are incorporated within the confines of the spectrum of unification environment, and the foundation of SASO missions is an important variable that determines their effectiveness. Table 5-1 illustrates the USASF Framework for Employment and identifies key points for planners to remember in relation to the elements and the unification spectrum. In this section an analysis of each element in relation to the spectrum of unification completes the contents of Table 5-1.

1. Operations

How USASF approaches post-unification efforts to assist the ROK Army is tied to the environment through which unification occurs. In accordance with the four unification scenarios presented, the ROK government is likely to approach the north from a position of military strength at the start of any operation. This position of strength is tied to the defense oriented wartime operational contingency plan that is exercised throughout each year involving ROK-US forces. This combined operational contingency plan is likely to be the basis for launching stability and support operations in the north.

The two unification scenarios that include warfighting are unification through war and the sue-for-peace scenario. The logical transition from warfighting to peacekeeping is clear in these scenarios. The logistical assets, units and associations will be present to transfer warfighting units to stability and support operations. However, this transition
will not be smooth if post-conflict operational plans are not developed in detail by the ROK political and military leadership.

The transition from peacekeeping to peace building operations is tied to several operational factors. These factors include control of WMD, long range artillery, and confidence in the DPRK military leaders non-aggression commitment. The primary SASO mission to be completed first in these two unification scenarios is military restructuring. The DPRK weapons, units and leaders must not be allowed to rally, and reinitiate some form of disruptive aggression while post-unification efforts are being conducted. Similarly, it is not likely that full-scale assistance and efforts to relieve the populace’s suffering are going to be effective until the Korean government can guarantee a certain level of stability on the peninsula. The warfighting unification scenarios will require patience in the transfer from peacekeeping to peace building. This transfer period prolongs the assistance efforts to the populace and reduces the efficiency of any efforts during the peacekeeping period. The operational environment existing in unification through absorption will be discussed next.

The absorption of North Korea by the South does not necessarily reduce anxiety in relation to stabilizing the situation in the north. In fact absorption may be a case where due caution is a requirement. The ROK government will probably view absorption from a cautious angle until the political and military elite bases of power can be ascertained within the north. This will require the ROK leadership to begin SASO missions in the north from a position of military strength within the peacekeeping operational environment. This allows the ROK government to step-down the military strength aspect in relation to the environment while conducting SASO missions. The mutual consent unification scenario may be approached differently.

The confidence building measures completed by the two Koreas enroute to mutual consent unification may necessitate SASO missions to begin from a peace building operational environment. Additionally, mutual consent unification is not likely to be finalized if either side fears for its security. Beginning operations in a peace building environment will increase efficiency, and speed assistance to the populace in the north.
Again, the permissive environment associated with peace building versus peacekeeping is the main variable for increased efficiency. The USASF missions associated with the framework are analyzed next.

2. Missions

It is important to remember that the missions identified within the framework are linked to the framework foundation of SASO issues confronting the ROK Army. In reference to the warfighting and sue-for-peace unification scenarios this translates into missions conducted prior to, or immediately after hostilities. The mission of foreign internal defense will be discussed first.

a. Foreign Internal Defense

FID training can be effectively incorporated in two broad areas to assist the ROK Army in successfully completing the SASO missions identified. First is training provided to units within the ROK Army, and second is training provided to possible nations volunteering to assist in a regional or multinational coalition effort. USASF FID training to the ROK Army should focus on post-conflict and/or post-unification tasks in support of anticipated SASO missions in the north. Units to be considered for FID training are the ROK Army Special Forces brigades, Civil Affairs units, and ROK Army conventional units. The target training for each unit should be directed at the tasks these units expect to conduct during the SASO missions identified.

In support of the SASO missions identified the ROK Army Special Forces brigades should begin training on township stabilization and area surveys to assist the follow-on units and organizations in the conducting of their specific tasks. Township stabilization is a generic term I use that explains attempts to prevent chaos from developing at the township level by establishing a direct link to the populace on events and actions through soldiers living in the town. From an USASF perspective many of the tasks associated with the mission of unconventional warfare are analogous with stabilizing townships and the next level, provinces. In a mutual consent or all-out absorption unification scenario these teams can link-up with North Korean units to assist in information dissemination to the populace. Conduct of these tasks also provides a
critical on-the-ground information source for the ROK government. ROK Civil Affairs training does not necessarily need to change.

However, the amount and intensity of training should increase, and the focus of operational planning must begin to discuss stability and support operations in the north. USASF FID training in this area should be conducted in conjunction with USCAPOC personnel from B Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. The goal of this training should be to develop detailed plans for conducting stability and support operations during post-conflict operations as detailed in the wartime contingency plan. The lack of a detailed civil affairs plan was identified by both the ROK and U.S. Civil Affairs planners at the recent ROK-US Civil Affairs conference, and this is an excellent place to begin FID training for this ROK Army unit. The FID training for the ROK Army conventional units is as important.

The ROK Army conventional force commanders that will be providing personnel and logistical assets during the conduct of SASO missions require a paradigm shift from their normal warfighting focus. As the U.S. Army has learned that the SASO environment is not an easy transition for warfighters. USASF led FID training can focus training on those tasks associated with conducting SASO missions that have been developed within the confines of U.S. military doctrine. In addition, providing unrehearsed scenarios that focus on difficult situations for leaders and soldiers in the SASO environment is very beneficial from a lessons learned standpoint. These scenarios place units and their leaders in stressful situations like crowd control and food distribution to ensure that training is as realistic as possible. USASF conducted FID training for nations volunteering to assist in a regional or multinational effort is highlighted next.

FID training for other nation military forces volunteering to assist Korea on the road to stabilization should be directed at command and control, planning, and tasks to be conducted. This FID training should occur prior to a contributing nation's military forces enter the area of operations. The overall goal of this FID training is to ensure unity of effort, and develop a similarity in the major operational aspects of mission
execution. It is likely that this training will occur prior to a nation's forces entering the area of operations. As an example, if the Southeast Asian nations volunteered forces as a regional contribution to a larger multinational effort, then perhaps a FID preparation site would be established in Thailand. These nations forces would transition through this training site, and receive specific training and equipment, if required, to assist them successfully complete their mission. This FID training is specifically designed to ensure effective incorporation of contributing nation forces. As a reminder, these USASF FID training missions are a preemptive training measure for fluid execution of SASO missions by the ROK Army across the spectrum of unification. USASF and the humanitarian assistance mission are analyzed next.

b. Humanitarian Assistance

USASF is a key link to assist the ROK Army during the conduct of HA missions across the spectrum of unification. This link is intended to serve as a continuity of effort control measure between the ROK civil-military operations planners and the tactical level units executing the mission. USASF has extensive experience working at the tactical level in HA missions, and this experience can assist ROK Army leaders during the conduct of HA missions in the north. Typical problems that confront a unit at the tactical level are security of logistical and support assets, interaction with disruptive crowds, and categorizing personnel for assistance. Additionally, the tactical unit on the ground encounters NGOs and PVOs that have their own agendas, sometimes diverging from civil-military plans. USASF is a good tool to provide advice in these situations. Finally, USASF's HA experience prepares its detachments for the unpleasant environment that is likely to exist in the north upon unification. By displaying a positive attitude this can infuse the ROK Army with motivation during unsettling moments and events that may lower morale. The Coalition Support mission in relation to the spectrum of unification is analyzed next.

c. Coalition Support

Many variables and factors affect the conduct of this mission in relation to post-unification SASO activities across the unification spectrum. Primarily the desire of
the ROK and DPRK governments to allow nations to assist, not to mention the international and regional opinions about which nations should participate. The author contends that the scope of SASO missions identified establishes the requirement for the ROK and DPRK governments to accept all assistance offered. The spectrum of unification suggests that the approval process, due to diplomatic negotiation, for coalition assistance in the north may be delayed in a sue-for-peace and gradual consent scenario as opposed to unification through war or absorption. Regardless if other nations participate in a regional or multinational effort, this mission is intended to provide for unity of effort among contributing nations forces from the strategic to tactical level. An analysis of USASF roles while conducting these missions is addressed next.

3. Roles

This subsection analyzes the roles of the USASF SFODA team on the ground in relation to the missions, and how these roles assist the ROK Army during conduct of SASO missions. Within the support intent of the framework, these roles serve as the vehicles for USASF to provide assistance to the ROK Army in executing the intent of a Korean civil-military operational plan, and not U.S. attempts to direct Korean decision-makers at any level. The titles of the roles USASF personnel will fill display this support intent: FID Training Team, Liaison Control Element (LCE), and Survey Team. These specific roles are analyzed in relation to the spectrum of unification.

a. FID Training Teams

USASF planners should begin planning FID Programs of Instruction (POI) to address those aspects of training in support of the employment framework. At the USASF FID training team level, Joint Combined Exercises for Training (JCETs) should focus on training in support of the SASO mission with the ROK SF, CA, and conventional units should be the first priority. Simultaneously the regional JCET program should address building regional support through military to military training in the area of SASO missions. This military to military contact is an excellent method for establishing a commitment with regional nations for future assistance in a coalition effort to assist Korea.
b. Liaison Control Elements

LCEs are currently functioning at the ROK SF brigade level in support of OPLAN 5027. This relationship assists operational level integration of ROK SF efforts into the combined strategic warfighting plan. The same relationship is useful for ROK Army and coalition partners efforts during the conduct of SASO missions in the north. If stabilization efforts in the north during Korean unification and post-unification activities are regional or multi-national in flavor, then coalition support in the form of LCEs will be a critical mission area for USASF. USASF LCEs are able to advise and assist tactical level planners in many areas. These areas include: execution tasks involved in SASO missions, integration and coordination of military efforts, and coordination with NGOs and PVOs. Through this advice and assistance USASF LCEs serve as a critical economy of force measure that results in a unity of effort for the ROK Army and coalition partners.

c. Survey Teams

Regardless of how unification occurs, SFOD-A teams are a great asset for conducting surveys of the situation in North Korea area prior to conducting SASO missions. In accordance with the framework intent these survey teams should be combined in nature. The experience that USASF has in SASO missions at the ground level can assist the ROK Army conduct realistic timely surveys to assist in follow-on SASO missions. These survey teams can transition to serve as pilot teams in receiving and guiding the initial efforts of the ROK conventional and civil affairs units as the SASO missions mature.
## Spectrum of Unification

*War* ➔ *Sue-for-Peace* ➔ *Absorption* ➔ *Mutual Consent*

| Framework Elements | 1. **USASF Operations:**  
| Peacekeeping  
| Peacebuilding | 1. OPLAN 5027 a good operational foundation;  
| | 2. ROK likely to begin operations from a position of strength;  
| | 3. Transition to formalized Peacebuilding a slow process;  
| 2. **USASF Missions:**  
| FID  
| Humanitarian Assistance Coalition Support | 4. SASO oriented FID effort should begin immediately in ROK: incorporate FID training into JCS exercises UFL and Foal Eagle in FY 98;  
| | 5. Focus regional JCETs on SASO type missions to build proficiency and capability of surrounding nations;  
| 3. **USASF Roles:**  
| FID Training Teams  
| LCE  
| Survey Teams | 6. Regional USASF Group should begin in-depth tactical level planning focusing on these roles SFOD-A teams will execute.  

SASO

### Table 5-1. USASF Employment Framework as Applied to Spectrum of Unification

## C. HOW THE EMPLOYMENT FRAMEWORK ASSISTS THE ROK ARMY CONDUCT SASO

The employment framework benefits the ROK Army in two primary areas: integration and coordination for both planning and mission execution. Integration refers to those planning processes and measures used to ensure that ROK Army efforts are linked to inter-Korean efforts. Coordination refers to those planning processes and measures used to ensure ROK Army efforts are linked to the overall theater level plan, including operations with NGO’s and PVO’s.
1. Integrated Planning

The government in Seoul established the ROK Ministry of National Unification (MNU) to develop policy and plans for unification of the Korean peninsula. Part of the MNU’s planning is focused on conducting the types of stability and support operations I outlined above during a unification short-of-war scenario. However, currently the ROK MNU considers the task of stability and support operations their business alone if unification is not a by-product of war. According to Major Walter Pjetrach, C5/USFK, “The ROK Army has very little to do with unification efforts if there is not a fight. This task belongs squarely on the ROK Ministry of National Unification. The ROK Army has a role, but very small.” Initiatives are underway to remedy this critical shortfall in integrated planning.

Beginning in 1997 the Combined Forces Command (CFC) Civil Affairs staff section focused a series of initiatives designed to highlight the need for integrated planning of civil affairs actions between civilian and military officials. First was an ROK JCS Staff Officer visit at Ft. Bragg, NC in June 1997. This visit provided an overview of U.S. Civil Affairs organizations, training, and the relationship between senior military and government officials in the United States. The second initiative was a combined ROK-U.S. Civil Affairs conference held in September 1997. This conference provided a forum of exchange for ROK and U.S. military officers to discuss issues of mutual concern in performing combined Stability and Support operations in conjunction with OPLAN 5027. The ability of the ROK Army to successfully complete the stability and support operations outlined in this chapter will be greatly enhanced by detailed integrated planning between the ROK Army, ROK MND, and ROK MNU. The same dedicated staff planning that produced the war time operational contingency plan must be applied to the integrated planning process. Like the unification fund, the time to begin integrated planning for stability and support operations is now as the situation in the North continues to spiral downward.
USASF SFOD-A teams working at the tactical level can assist the ROK Army during the planning phase to ensure that operations and phasing of events are deconflicted. Synchronizing of logistics, support units, and internal crisis management are critical for timely and organized execution. USASF currently provide this type of tactical level integration advice for the ROK SF brigades. Through USASF initiated FID training that targets command and control processes during SASO missions, USASF can begin integrating the operational aspects of the ROK Army. During the conduct of SASO missions in the North, USASF LCEs are an excellent tool to cross-check efficiency of operations, while providing the ROK Army critical operational advice and ensuring integration of valuable assets. USASF can also provide the same form of assistance between the ROK Army and the many external agencies likely to be involved in the effort to stabilize the north.

2. Coordination

Synchronization of stability and support efforts must occur throughout the entire area of operations. Coordination of military and non-military efforts is of utmost importance to ensure that support is provided where it is most required. For U.S. military doctrine, this coordination typically occurs in a civil military operations center or CMOC. Whether ROK civil-military planners adopt U.S. terminology is irrelevant. The coordination that occurs is similar to integrating military planning efforts, only at a higher level. This level of coordination is where U.S. Civil Affairs planners contribute as a key asset. Knowing that this coordination is critical is where the SFOD-A team is indispensable. Working to ensure that ROK Army operations deconflict, while synchronizing and supporting the overall theater level plan is a prime coordination function for an SFOD-A team serving as LCE.

D. CONCLUSION

As the situation in the north continues on a downward slide, deterrence through military strength is the best assurance for conflict prevention. Planning for possible conflict has been the priority effort for military planners, and with good reason. This focus on deterrence however should not blind military and civilian planners from
conducting concrete planning for the obvious actions that must be confronted upon unification, regardless of the deterrence outcome. The USASF employment framework I suggest is an attempt to address USASF’s focus during post-conflict operations.

The USASF employment framework addresses supporting a unified Korean government by providing military expertise, advice and assistance to the ROK Army during the conduct of stability and support operations. The employment framework espouses the utility of USASF at the tactical level in the roles of LCE, FID training team and survey team, while conducting FID, HA and Coalition Support missions in relation to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations on the peninsula. Stressed throughout the employment framework is the relation of these elements to the SASO foundation problems, and the environment surrounding how unification results. The framework elements are not unique in themselves. However, viewing the elements in conjunction with the problems in the north, and considering the difficult environments the spectrum of unification presents, offers a complete picture for employing USASF during post-conflict operations. The next chapter concludes this thesis with implementing recommendations for the USASF employment framework.
Endnotes


5 Following the recent Command and General Staff College (CGSC) end of class staff exercise, Prairie Edge, one of the main weaknesses identified was the need for more defined doctrine. This doctrine needs to delineate the links and responsibilities of CA units with conventional, unconventional and civilian agencies during the conduct of stability and support operations. See the October 1997 Special Warfare magazine.

6 COL Michael E. Hess served as a civil affairs officer in Northern Iraq assisting to return Kurds from the extreme elevations in Turkey’s mountain passes back to their homes in Iraq. COL Hess presented a vignette on Operation Provide Comfort at the 1997 ROK-US Civil Affairs Conference held in Seoul, Korea. COL Hess stressed that USASF SFODAs were the first U.S. units that became involved following President Bush’s directive to assist the Kurds relocate. U.S. Civil Affairs units, along with many other European nations, began assisting in the relocation effort in the lowlands, while USASF maintained a critical presence in the high elevations with the Kurds reassuring them that this relocation was safe and to trust the multinational effort.

7 During Operation Uphold Democracy, USASF SFODAs from 3rd SFG (A) operated a FID training center in Puerto Rico. This training center established a program that all multinational forces in support of the operation conducted prior to entering the area of operations. The author, serving as detachment commander of SFODA 191, participated in this train-up with the Bangladesh battalion prior to entering Haiti in September 1994.

8 The two major combined exercises held each year in South Korea are Ulchi-Focus Lens and Foal Eagle. These two exercises practice and evaluate unit execution of wartime operational and tactical tasks, as well as command and control aspects of warfighting.

9 The author was present at this conference, and the ROK CA leaders were hesitant to discuss plans South of the DMZ in relation to the wartime contingency plan. This hesitation extended, as the ROK leaders were not able to address specific plans for civil affairs operations in the north. The post-conflict operations from a civil affairs standpoint are practically non-existent in relation to the wartime contingency plan.

10 The U.S. Army has learned that conducting SASO require a paradigm shift from warfighting to a support role with security undertones. Everything from Rules of Engagement to handling of civilian personnel becomes more constraining, while certain fundamental tactical considerations of mission execution remain unchanged.

position on unification of Korea, and legalize South Korea’s claim to legitimacy over the unification process within the United Nations.

12 Cited with permission of Maj. Pjetraj, C5/CINCUNC, Seoul, Korea. Maj. Pjetraj’s statement was made via e-mail on 19 Aug 97 as a result of his gracious critique of my thesis introductory chapter.

13 Official U.S. Army message from Commander, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Subject: ROK JCS Staff Officer Visit, dated: 221353Z May 97.

VI. EMPLOYMENT FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS

A hypothetical recommendation is for the ROK and U.S. National Command Military Authority's (NCMA) to agree on strategic guidance for post-conflict operations in the north, and to submit this guidance to the ROK-US Military Committee for further combined development. Following a plenary and permanent session, the military committee would provide guidance to the CINCCFC for immediate postconflict operational planning by all levels of staffs (both ROK and U.S.). However, this communication channel for strategic guidance is not a channel that is likely to produce guidance in a timely manner. The politics of decision-making at the NCMA level on the peninsula necessitate many years of negotiating before guidance as drastic as this hypothetical recommendation can occur. The recommendations I suggest are less drastic, more negotiable by a combined command, and designed to ensure that the U.S. military planners do not appear to be developing a hegemonistic plan designed to solve all of Korea's post-unification problems. This chapter addresses recommendations tailored to assist with the implementation of the USASF employment framework. However, these recommendations should be viewed as part of an overall theater level strategic plan to begin focusing on the conduct of stability and support operations (SASO) in North Korea. The USASF employment framework is only a small, but integral, part of this theater level plan.

The implementing recommendations are divided into strategic, operational, and tactical level suggestions to assist in the implementation of the USASF employment framework. These implementing recommendations are directed at U.S. military commanders and staff planners throughout the command channels involved in Korea. In some instances, it is required for operational and tactical planners to begin planning for operations that they assume will occur, but due to sensitivity political and senior military leaders, cannot openly provide direct guidance. The combined command environment on the Korean peninsula is one of these instances.
This chapter consists of three levels of implementing recommendations and a conclusion. Section one addresses strategic level recommendations, and Section two addresses operational level recommendations. Finally, the tactical level implementing recommendations are highlighted. The strategic level implementing recommendations include ensuring that: 1) the post-conflict operational phase of OPLAN 5027 is thoroughly planned and integrated into Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) level exercises, and 2) regional Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises are focused on SASO missions. Operational level implementing recommendations include: 1) USFK planners focusing on improving Korean military integrated planning capability, and 2) planners developing the concept for SASO oriented Foreign Internal Defense (FID) training with ROK military units. Tactical level implementing recommendations include: 1) conduct detailed mission analysis for SASO missions outlined in framework; 2) prepare SFOD-B and SFOD-A teams to conduct their unique roles in accordance with framework; 3) develop programs of instruction focused on SASO missions for ROK SF, CA and Conventional military units, and 4) actively seek JCETs that focus on SASO throughout the region.

A. STRATEGIC LEVEL IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategic level policymakers should begin focusing equal efforts on post-conflict operations in accordance with OPLAN 5027, and shoring the regional environment in preparation for stabilizing the north after unification. These recommendations are directed at the U.S. military command structure on the peninsula (CFC and UNC), and USCINCPAC headquarters in Hawaii. The relationship between CINCCFC, CINCUNC and USCINCPAC commanders is critical to efficient operations as CINCPAC provides the forces for operations on the peninsula. This strategic level provides the guidance for staff planning of ROK-US military units. The guidance to emphasize SASO mission planning in accordance with the postconflict operational phase of OPLAN 5027 is critical for implementing the framework elements analyzed prior to chaos ensuing in the north.
1. Emphasize Post-conflict Operations

Strategic level commanders should direct detailed planning of the post-conflict operational phase of OPLAN 5027 by all staff elements. This planning effort should be conducted simultaneously to assure continuity of effort and to focus all staff officers within the various commands. The end result of this guidance should produce completed annexes to OPLAN 5027 for the post-conflict operational phase. These annexes will establish task organization, logistics support and the phasing of operations and missions. The key point in the planning is the combined effort of ROK-US planners to establish the combined piece of post-conflict operations. However, as Major General Raymond P. Ayers, Jr., CINCCFC ACoS CJ5 remarked, “For the combined planning effort to move forward we (ROK-US military leaders) must agree to agree where we can, and bypass areas of disagreements not allowing these differing viewpoints or lack of political guidance to stop the entire planning effort.”2 This may not result in a complete product for execution, but it does provide the means to evaluate what has been developed during the two annual JCS military exercises held on the peninsula.

Ulchi Focus Lens and Foal Eagle, operational names for JCS military exercises held annually on the peninsula must begin focusing an equal amount of effort on the postconflict operations phase of OPLAN 5027. Specific focus on those actions in the north following conflict will provide a method for evaluating the conduct of SASO missions in the north following war. This focus will assist the ROK Army as it evaluates these SASO missions in the post-conflict environment, and allow USASF staff planners to recommend implementation of the framework elements as a method to support the ROK Army’s efforts. Guidance from strategic level leadership directing a focus on post-conflict operations will ensure that SASO missions are proportioned equal planning and evaluation effort at the operational level. Focusing regional JCETs on stability and support FID missions will assist in the implementation of the framework elements.

2. Regional JCET Focus

The Commander in Chief Pacific Command establishes the Pacific Theater strategic guidance for the JCET program. Under the FID umbrella, the JCET program is
a cost-effective tool for CINCPAC to engage countries throughout the Pacific Theater. In order to assist implementation of the framework a larger percentage of JCETs throughout the Pacific Theater should engage countries by providing SASO oriented FID training. This FID training by USASF SFOD-A teams should focus on Medical Capabilities (MEDCAPS), Engineering Capabilities (ENCAPS) and Disaster Assistance Relief Training (DART) type training activities. Increasing the number of countries in the region that are capable of performing these types of missions for their own benefit is an engagement goal. However, relative to the employment framework, these countries may be critical regional partners in a coalition effort; building a base level of proficiency in these missions ensures they are able to contribute in the most efficient manner. For countries like Thailand, continuing SASO-oriented JCETs only improves their capabilities to be an asset in a coalition effort. Strategic level planners may want to engage Thailand, Malaysia or Singapore as possible contingency JCET training centers, similar to Puerto Rico during Operation Uphold Democracy, for the training of countries participating in a regional effort. The JCET program is an excellent method to engage China.

Military-to-military engagement with China prior to the uncertain and chaotic times of possible Korean unification may prevent tension, and also provide an opportunity to begin discussions of China's participation in SASO mission in the north. One recommendation is to focus on conducting MEDCAPS and ENCAPS along the China – North Korean border. USASF SFOD-A teams working and training alongside Chinese military personnel conducting these missions will build an important bond that, in the long-term, will assist the ROK Army if coalition efforts result in stabilizing the north. Additionally, the North Koreans living along the border will see U.S. military personnel living, training, and providing assistance to the Chinese population in conjunction with Chinese military forces. This will help improve the legitimacy of U.S. forces when, and if U.S. forces are involved in stabilizing the north. Operational implementing recommendations are next.
B. OPERATIONAL LEVEL IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS

Operational level planners should begin an effort designed to clear up the ambiguity currently surrounding the post-conflict phase of OPLAN 5027. This effort will create an environment where U.S. planners are constantly trying to speed the decision-making process of ROK military planners. In an attempt to finish the deliberate planning process, U.S. planners are typically frustrated by their Korean counterpart’s ability to provide concrete information and commit to a course of action. Maj. Gen. Ayers commented in respect to this combined planning element of frustration, “Typically the side that has a plan prepared in a moment of chaos, ends up executing that plan regardless of how much frustration has occurred in the past between the combined commands during planning.” Operational level implementing recommendations include improving Korean military integrated planning processes and developing FID SASO objectives for ROK military units.

1. ROK Army Integrated Planning

Continuing the efforts initiated by ROK-US Civil Affairs units to improve civil-military planning processes is a great start in effort to improve the overall integrated planning ability of the ROK Army. In accordance with the employment framework, an association by USASF LCEs at the tactical level of ROK Army CA and Conventional units is the next step. Beginning a habitual association will work best for long-term efficiency, and should focus on those units expected to conduct SASO missions in a post-conflict operational environment. USASF LCEs should begin this habitual association as soon as possible. The building of trust between counterparts is essential to this process and, in some situations can take years to develop. Prioritizing ROK Army units that should receive USASF LCE assistance is critical to ensuring that USASF manning constraints can be met during the annual JCS training exercises on the peninsula. The USFK’s staff should develop FID SASO objectives to guide the efforts of USASF in providing FID training to the ROK Army for SASO missions.
2. Developing FID Objectives

Establishing FID objectives for the ROK Army units that focus on SASO missions is necessary before training can begin. In accordance with the employment framework, the following units would benefit from USASF conducted FID training that focus on the SASO type missions analyzed. This training will be the same as that provided to other countries, and should include those specific activities the employment framework suggests. Particularly, ROK SF units conducting province and township surveys and stabilization missions throughout North Korea in the initial phases of post-conflict or unification through another means. ROK CA units require more command-and-control training, as well as practical experience. Currently, ROK CA units conduct only seven days of training a year, and this includes a three-day mobilization period. I recommend expanding ROK CA training to two 14-day periods a year corresponding with the annual JCS exercises held on the peninsula. FID training for ROK Conventional units should focus on the different operational environment they will confront during post-conflict operations or if unification occurs somewhere else along the spectrum of unification. FID training for these units should discuss the principles of stability and support operations, and conduct unit level exercises that test these units ability to apply principles while conducting a SASO mission scenario. Tactical level implementing recommendations are given last.

C. TACTICAL LEVEL IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS

The U.S. Army 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) (1st SFG (A)) is the tactical level unit that will be providing the majority of the SFOD-A and SFOD-B teams who will provide ‘boots on the ground’ in accordance with the employment framework. I recommend that the Commander, 1st SFG (A) implement a continuous push-pull staff planning effort to gain the required information to begin extensive planning for the tactical portion of USASF’s contribution to post-conflict operations within OPLAN 5027. Implementing recommendations for the tactical level include: 1) detailed mission analysis of SASO missions; 2) SFOD-A and B team preparation; 3) develop FID Programs of Instruction (POI); finally 4) actively promote SASO oriented JCET missions. I will
further discuss the first two recommendations as they are specific to the tactical level, while the latter two recommendations must be implemented at the strategic and tactical level prior to 1st SFG (A) being able to execute.

1. SASO Mission Analysis

The staff of 1st SFG (A) should conduct extensive mission analysis of the SASO missions I contend are the foundation of the employment framework. Classified analysis will further define the problems and provide a critical level of expertise that is sometimes lacking in LCEs as the chaos of a mission has an SFOD-A and SFOD-B team scrambling for mission-essential equipment and rucksacks. The staff elements within USASFC (A), USASOC and USACAPOC can provide information and assistance in this effort. Seizing the initiative now will ensure the tactical level teams are as prepared as possible to conduct this integral portion of stabilizing the north and to provide support to the ROK Army. This analysis will not only help better define the employment framework, but will identify key logistical requirements for the conduct of these missions for the tactical level teams. I recommend that the majority of this analysis remain unclassified in order to ensure dissemination of information in the fastest manner. Continuous flow of information, formatted to address the actions required by the tactical teams, will ensure that a last minute cram session of information for planning is not required. Preparation can assist tactical teams perform better in any environment.

2. SASO Mission Training

SFOD-A and SFOD-B teams at 1st SFG (A) should focus on conducting training in accordance with the operations, missions, and roles identified in the USASF employment framework. The employment framework assists this effort by establishing a foundation of SASO missions to be conducted within the spectrum of unification environment that may exist on the peninsula. SFOD-A and SFOD-B teams typically conduct many tasks that span the employment framework suggested when conducting FID and other missions required for the teams to be considered certified and deployable. However, focusing on the Korean peninsula as viewed by the employment framework shapes the principles and techniques discussed in the field manuals, and inserts a sense of
urgency for gaining proficiency in the tasks required for successful completion of the missions. Developing scenarios that evaluate SFOD-A and SFOD-B teams is as critical for their proficiency as it is for host nation forces at the end of a FID training event. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) provides an excellent opportunity for SFOD-A and SFOD-B teams to evaluate their capability in the challenging SASO environment. The last tactical level recommendation I suggest is a basic one, but probably the most important. USASF pride themselves on language skills and cultural awareness. SFOD-A and SFOD-B teams must ensure that these two critical areas receive adequate attention. As in any environment, when everything fails because the frameworks are too vague, analysis is proven wrong, plans go awry, or paradigms shift, the USASF soldier must always fall back on his best tool, namely, his mind.

D. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The implementing recommendations are presented in descending order of importance to emphasize that strategic and operational level decisions must occur that focus planning on stability and support operations in North Korea now, in order to ensure timely assistance to benefit the ROK Army during SASO missions in the north. The signals of desperation are clearly emanating from the north. Simply having a great defensive plan that defeats the north if they attack, is not preparing to tackle the hardest problems unification will present. I am reminded of General Maxwell R. Thurman’s comment of post-conflict operations following Operation Just Cause, “I did not spend five minutes on Blind Logic during my briefing as the incoming CINC in August (1988)... We put together the campaign plan for Just Cause and probably did not spend enough time on the restoration.” Blind Logic referred to the plan for post-conflict restoration operations in Panama. Too many times we find that planning for combat receives 90% of planners' efforts while post-conflict operations and the destabilizing environments they create, causes insurmountable problems for the government that survives as the victor in war. The USASF employment framework I developed, and the implementing recommendations suggested, are an attempt to focus efforts more equitably between planning for conflict and post-conflict operations.
Endnotes

1 The combined command in Korea is a complicated task organization designed to facilitate the interrelationships of ROK-US political and military leaders during the conduct of the military armistice and a possible war situation. The US four star general on the peninsula (currently General Tilelli), serves as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea. This arrangement allows for continuity in guidance across the entire range of force commitment possibilities on the peninsula. The US four star general has the additional responsibility of senior US military officer assigned to Korea. In this role, the incumbent is the personal representative of the Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and interacts with the ROK JCS to develop high level guidance for the CINCCFC. Details on ROK-US command relationships obtained during unclassified UNO/CFC/USFK Command Relationships briefing by Mr. Glenn Rice, CINCCFC Command Relations Specialist, 22 Sep. 1997 at Yongsan, Seoul, Korea.


3 Permission to cite granted author by Maj. Gen. Ayers during the social event at the ROK-US CA Conference on 23 Sep. 1997. Maj. Gen. Ayers was commenting on his opinion that unilateral planning for conducting postconflict operations must occur now, and once the ROK-US had firm unilateral plans the issues between them could be addressed.

4 ROK CA leaders identified this as a serious shortfall in their ability to effectively conduct CA operations during the ROK-US CA Conference in Seoul, Korea. Like U.S. CA units the majority of ROK CA units are comprised of reserve personnel.

LIST OF REFERENCES


Assem Abdel-Mohsen, “Yemen Army Insists it is Politically Neutral.” (November 12, 1993), Reuters News Service.


Commander, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Official U.S. Army message, Subject: ROK JCS Staff Officer Visit, Fort Bragg, NC, dated: 221353Z May 97.


Stent, Angela, “The One Germany,” Foreign Policy: No. 81, Winter 1990-91.


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(1) Transformed 35,000 enlisted defense call-up to active service in accordance with the abrogation of enlisted defense call-up system; Marine Corps troops are included in the Navy.

(2) The Marine Corps troops who are organized into the Army are included in the Army.

(3) Including Marine Corps divisions

(4) Including nine midget submarines

(5) South Korea: reserve forces, replacement forces

(6) North Korea: Instruction Guidance Units, Worker and Farmer Red Guards, Young Red Guards, People’s Guards

### APPENDIX B: NORTH KOREA PROVINCIAL AND MAJOR CITIES CIVILIAN POPULATION DENSITY, (IN THOUSANDS) YEAR-END 1996, EXTRAPOLATED DATA FROM 1987 DPRK CSB DATA.

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<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Major Cities</th>
<th>Population 1987(^1)</th>
<th>Population 1997(^2)</th>
<th>Area (sq. km)</th>
<th>Density (persons per sq. km)</th>
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<td>753</td>
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<td>Total Major Cities(^6)</td>
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<td>6,435</td>
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1. 1987 data is from Table 3 and Table 6 in Eberstadt’s “The Population of North Korea”.
2. 1997 data is extrapolated using a growth factor of 1.8% annually for 10 years or 18% over 10 years.
3. Includes the Hyonsan Special district.
4. Includes the City of Kaesong which has a population of 120,000 within the municipality.
5. Includes the City of Nampo which has a population of 370,000 within the municipality.
6. Includes the populations of Nampo and Kaesong city’s as detailed in notes 4 and 5.
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### 5. Commander in Chief
United Nations Command Korea
ATTN: C5
PSC 303 Box 30
APO AP 96205-0030

### 6. Commander in Chief
United Nations Command Korea
ATTN: CINC's Initiatives Group
PSC 303 Box 30
APO AP 96205-0030

### 7. Commander
U.S. Forces Korea
ATTN: FKI3
PSC 303 Box 27
APO AP 96204-0027

### 8. Commander
U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific (COMSOPAC)
ATTN: SOJ5
Camp H.M. Smith, HI 96881-4046
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